


## **EVALUATION OF THE ACT RESPONSE TO**

**ACT APPEAL MEPL 51,61,71 in oPt**

**The Near East Council of Churches/Department of Service to Palestine  
Refugees (NECC/DSPR)**



### ***The Draft Evaluation Report***

**Conducted June- August 2008**

**By: Evaluation Team  
Randa Hilal and Bassam Abu Hamad**

**Jerusalem, August 2008**

**Location:** Occupied Palestinian Territory, West Bank and Gaza Strip,

**Implementation Period:** 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008

**Type of Intervention:** Emergency Response Humanitarian Assistance

**Executive Body:** MECC/DSPR- Central Office,  
In Gaza: DSPR-Gaza, or NECC  
In West Bank: DSPR-WB, or ICC

**Date of Evaluation:** June through August 2008

### Review Team

**Randa Hilal, MSc, Team Leader**      **Consultant for DSPR West Bank and Central Office**  
[ranhilal@yahoo.com](mailto:ranhilal@yahoo.com)

**Bassam Abu Hamad, PhD**              **Consultant for DSPR Gaza**  
[ghsrc@yahoo.com](mailto:ghsrc@yahoo.com)

#### Note

This Evaluation Report was produced with the financial support of the ACT international provided to DSPR. The Opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the ACT or the DSPR.

## *Acknowledgement*

*We the Review Team would like to express our deep gratitude for the DSPR staff in Central Office, West Bank and Gaza who had facilitated our mission amidst all obstacles,*

*We would also like to express our gratitude to all institutes, DSPR partners and communities for receiving us during the mission, and to thank women and men who expressed their attitudes courageously, and shared with us their concerns and needs.*

*We would also like to extend our thanks for the ACT international-Coordinating Office Geneva for their support throughout the evaluation.*

## Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary</b>		viii-xii
<b>Chapter 1.</b>	<b>Lessons Learned</b>	
1.1.	Overall Lesson Learned	1
1.2.	Lesson Learned ACT Appeals DSPR- Gaza	2
1.3.	Lesson Learned ACT Appeals DSPR- West bank	3
1.4.	Lesson Learned ACT Appeals DSPR-Central	4
<b>Section1: Introduction, Background, the Emergency and Responses in oPt</b>		<b>5</b>
<b>Chapter 2.</b>	<b>Introduction &amp; Background</b>	
2.1.	Introduction to the Evaluation	5
2.2.	Methodology of the Evaluation	6
2.3.	The 51,61,71 ACT appeals and the Intervention sectors	
2.3.1.	ACT International	8
2.3.2.	MECC/DSPR	8
2.3.3.	ACT/DSPR Emergency Response in oPt	9
2.3.4.	The ACT Palestine Forum, APF	10
2.4.	Overview of Other Emergency Actors in oPt	
<b>Chapter 3.</b>	<b>The Emergency in the oPt</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1.	Contextual analysis	11
3.2.	Impact on People's situations: Gaza	14
3.3.	Impact on People's situations: West Bank	16
3.4.	Overview of Other Emergency Actors' Approaches	19
3.5.	Evaluation of ACT/DSPR Approaches	
3.5.1.	Overall evaluations of the ACT/DSPR appeals	21
3.5.2.	DSPR & other APF members scope of work	21
<b>Section 2: Process and Impact for different Approaches</b>		<b>Error!</b>
Bookmark not defined.22		
<b>Chapter 4.</b>	<b>Findings: Process and Impact for different Approaches DSPR-Gaza</b>	
4.1.	Relevance and Appropriateness	22
4.2.	Effectiveness and Achieving Targets	22
4.3.	Impact	28
4.4.	Process & Efficiency	29
4.5.	Gender Sensitivity	29
4.6.	Target Groups & Stakeholders Participation	30
4.7.	Transparency and Accountability:	31
4.8.	Minimum Standards: SPHERE, HAP and Code of Conduct	31
<b>Chapter 5.</b>	<b>Findings: Process and Impact for different Approaches DSPR-West Bank</b>	
5.1.	Relevance and Appropriateness	32
5.2.	Effectiveness & Achieving Targets	33
5.3.	Impact	35
5.4.	Process and Targeting Efficiency	36
5.5.	Gender Sensitivity	41
5.6.	Target Groups & Stakeholders Participation	41
5.7.	Transparency and Accountability	42
5.8.	Minimum Standards: SPHERE, HAP and Code of Conduct	42

<b>Chapter 6.</b>	<b>Findings: Organizational Issues- DSPR-Central</b>	
6.1.	Developing the Response	42
6.2.	Control and monitoring mechanism	43
6.3.	Institutional Capacity	44
6.4.	Coordination and Collaboration	45
6.5.	ACT Visibility and Perceptions	45
<b>Chapter 7.</b>	<b>Findings: Organizational Issues- DSPR-Gaza</b>	
7.1.	Institutional Capacity	46
7.2.	Mangement Related Issues	47
7.3.	Control and monitoring mechanism	48
7.4.	Coordination and Collaboration	48
7.5.	Strength and Weaknesses:	49
<b>Chapter 8.</b>	<b>Findings: Organizational Issues- DSPR-West Bank</b>	
8.1.	Institutional Capacity	49
8.2.	Control and monitoring mechanism	50
8.3.	Coordination and Collaboration	51
8.4.	Strength and Weaknesses	52
<b>Chapter 9.</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>	
9.1.	Overall Recommendations to ACT & APF	52
9.2.	Recommendations ACT Appeals DSPR-Central	53
9.3.	Recommendations ACT Appeals DSPR-Gaza	54
9.4.	Recommendations ACT Appeals DSPR-West bank	55

**Annexes**

<b>Annex1: TOR</b>	<b>A1</b>	
<b>Annex 2: Program of the Evaluation and Tools Used</b>	<b>A5</b>	
<b>Annex3: Methods Used and People Involved in Evaluation</b>		<b>A9</b>
<b>Annex 4: Emergency Related Maps and Data</b>	<b>A23</b>	
<b>Annex 5: Emergency and Responses Information</b>		<b>A30</b>
<b>Annex 6: DSPR-Gaza Data</b>		<b>A34</b>
<b>Annex 7: DSPR-WB Data</b>		<b>A37</b>

**List of Figures, Tables & Maps**

**List of Figures**

<b>Figure</b>	<b>Page</b>
Figure 2.1: ACT/DSPR Pledging and Funding Trends	10
Figure 2.2: Movement of goods through Gaza crossings by total number of truckloads	16
Figure 4.1: Distribution of beneficiaries who benefited from the cash assistance by appeals	23
Figure 4.2: Distribution of appeals' budgets planned versus spent by for the cash assistance in \$ US	24
Figure 4.3: Distribution of appeals by budget items spent on the different components	24
Figure 4.4: Distribution of job creation and other hiring (medical staff and other jobs) by numbers by appeals	26
Figure 4.5: Distribution of job creation and other hiring (medical staff and other jobs) by budgets by appeals	27
Figure 5.1: Percentage of Received from Budgeted compared to percentage of beneficiaries reached	34
Fig 5.2: Distribution of funds received over approaches	34
<b>List of Figures in Annexes:</b>	
Figure A6.1 : Children attended the well baby clinic January 2005 through June 2008	A35
Figure A6.2 : No. of antenatal care visits January 2005 through June 2008	A35
Figure A6.3 : No. of persons examined by Doctor January 2005 through June 2007	A36
Figure A7.1: Budgeted/received ACT Support to DSPR-WB/ICC,51, 61 &71	A37
Figure A7.2: ACT/DSPR-WB Planned Goals and Objectives number of beneficiaries in comparison to those achieved	A37
Fig A7.3:Analysis of Kufor Nemeh list 71	A 38

**List of Tables**

<b>Tables in the Report</b>	<b>Page</b>
Table 2.1: List of people interviewed	7
Table 2.2: Summary of the ACT/DSPR MEPL 51,61 and 71 appeals duration and amounts	9
Table 4.1: Distribution of appeals beneficiaries	23
Table 5.1: ACT/DSPR-WB MEPL 51,61 and 71 total received, beneficiaries reached and cost/beneficiary/approach	34
Table 7.5: Strength and Weaknesses of DSPR-Gaza	49
Table 8.5: Strength and Weaknesses of DSPR-West Bank	52

**Tables in Annexes**

Table A 5.1: ACT Appeals and DSPR information	A30
Table A6.1 : Targeting criteria proposed in the appeals and its implementation in the field for DSPR-Gaza	A34
Table A7.1 : Targeting criteria proposed in the appeals and its implementation in the field for DSPR-WB	A38
Table A 7.4: Job Creation, Medical and Education assistance	A40

**List of maps**

Map 4.1: West Bank Fragmentation, Source OCHA	A23
Map 4.2: Gaza Siege, Source OCHA	A24
Map 4.3: Break-up of Economic Space- WEST BANK Fragmentation: Source World Bank 2008	A25
Annex 5.2 Food Security Map per Governorate in oPt- Mid 2006, WFP	A31

## Abbreviations

<b>ACT</b>	<b>Action By Churches Together</b>
<b>ACT-CO</b>	<b>ACT Coordinating Office-Geneva</b>
<b>APF:</b>	<b>ACT Palestine Forum</b>
<b>CA:</b>	<b>Christian Aid</b>
<b>CBO:</b>	<b>Community Based Organization</b>
<b>CC:</b>	<b>DSPR Central Committee</b>
<b>CRO:</b>	<b>Church Related Organizations</b>
<b>CSO</b>	<b>Civil Society Organization</b>
<b>CO:</b>	<b>DSPR Central Office</b>
<b>DCA</b>	<b>Dan Church Aid</b>
<b>DSPR</b>	<b>Department of Service to Palestinian Refugees</b>
<b>DSPR-CO</b>	<b>DSPR Central Office</b>
<b>ECHO</b>	<b>European Commission for Humanitarian Aid</b>
<b>EJ</b>	<b>East Jerusalem</b>
<b>ES</b>	<b>Executive Secretary</b>
<b>EU</b>	<b>The European Union</b>
<b>FAO</b>	<b>The Food and Agricultural Organization</b>
<b>IOCC</b>	<b>International Orthodox Christian Charities</b>
<b>LC</b>	<b>Local Council</b>
<b>LWF</b>	<b>Lutheran World Federation</b>
<b>MECC</b>	<b>Middle East Council of Churches</b>
<b>MEHE</b>	<b>Ministry of Education and Higher Education</b>

<b>MoH</b>	<b>Ministry of Health</b>
<b>MoSA</b>	<b>Ministry of Social Affairs</b>
<b>MoU</b>	<b>Memorandum of Understanding</b>
<b>MS</b>	<b>Medical Staff</b>
<b>NECC</b>	<b>The Near East Council of Churches</b>
<b>NCA</b>	<b>Norwegian Church Aid</b>
<b>NGO</b>	<b>Non-Governmental Organizations</b>
<b>OCHA</b>	<b>Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</b>
<b>oPt:</b>	<b>Occupied Palestinian Territories</b>
<b>PA</b>	<b>Palestinian Authority</b>
<b>PCBS</b>	<b>Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics</b>
<b>PLC</b>	<b>Palestinian Legislative Council</b>
<b>PME</b>	<b>Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation</b>
<b>PNGO</b>	<b>Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations</b>
<b>PRCS-GS</b>	<b>Palestinian Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip</b>
<b>RBA</b>	<b>Rights Based Approach</b>
<b>UN:</b>	<b>United Nations</b>
<b>UNDP</b>	<b>United Nations Development Programme</b>
<b>UNESCO</b>	<b>United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</b>
<b>UNICEF</b>	<b>United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund</b>
<b>UNRWA</b>	<b>United Nations Relief &amp; Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</b>
<b>USAID</b>	<b>US Agency for International Development</b>
<b>VTC</b>	<b>Vocational Training Centres</b>
<b>WB</b>	<b>West Bank</b>
<b>WBGS</b>	<b>West Bank &amp; Gaza Strip</b>
<b>WCC</b>	<b>World Council of Churches</b>
<b>WFP</b>	<b>World Food Program</b>
<b>WHO</b>	<b>World Health Organization</b>
<b>YMCA</b>	<b>Young Men Christian Association</b>

## The Executive Summary

ACT International was able to respond to the emergency status in the occupied Palestinian territories, oPt, following the erupting new emergency status in the year 2000, through launching 10 appeals requesting over 14MUS\$, from ACT Alliance members all over the globe, aiming to alleviate suffering and provide humanitarian assistance to the affected vulnerable populations through its active ACT Palestine members.

However the scope of this evaluation is the last three appeals of MEPL51,61 and 71, implemented through DSPR during the last three years. ACT contracted two consultants to conduct the evaluation for the targeted appeals based on identified Terms of Reference. The main objectives of the evaluation are to measure the impact and assess the performance of the interventions; and to provide a learning opportunity for future operations. The evaluators used a triangulated methodology through Rapid Participatory Approach including reviewing and analyzing the project documents, conducting in-depth interviews and focus groups with the various beneficiaries and stakeholders and carrying out extensive field visits to the implementation sites during the period June to July 2008, resulted in the participation of 183 beneficiaries through focus groups and interviews, as well as 45 Local Partners and local key informants, 16 other stakeholders and major assistance providers, 22 DSPR management, staff and governance body members, all ACT Palestine Forum members through interviews and group discussion, in addition to 4 ACT donor members through interviews and donor surveys. While 14 communities from 4 different governorates out of served 6 governorates were visited in the WB, and 8 communities from 5 governorates were visited in Gaza.

The evaluation started with situation analysis of the emergency that included desk review of secondary data, and Food Security literature, while mapping major actors and implemented responses in the field. Evaluation was carried in parallel in the West Bank and Gaza, included both areas and the central office, while communicating with ACT donors and members of the ACT Palestine Forum. Three feedback workshops were also conducted, to share preliminary findings and gather feed backs. The evaluators used their multi skills experiences in development, humanitarian work and Rights Based approach, to provide thorough deep analysis of a complicated status and appropriate responses.

The emergency in the oPt is currently characterized by the prolonged and unprecedented **siege over Gaza**, imprisoning 1.5 million people into their areas, and **the closure regime implemented over the West Bank** isolating and zoning of areas and restricting the movement of goods and people in between the West Bank different areas, the control over the land and water resources while the growth of settlement in the West Bank, with growing isolation of Palestinian people and the transfer of their resources to benefit the growing settlement existence in the West Bank.

*The following four factors have been identified by the United Nations Country Team as having the greatest impact on the current humanitarian situation: (1) Lack of protection for civilians and increasing violence; (2) Political, geographic, institutional and social fragmentation of the oPt; (3) Closure, lack of access, separation, restrictions and their effects on livelihoods; and (4) the impact of Israeli settlements and settlement expansion on Palestinian livelihoods, the availability of resources and a reduction in space for development.*

By all means, from a humanitarian perspective, the situation in the oPt is serious and worse now than it has ever been since the start of the Israeli military occupation in 1967. . The current prolonged Emergency has lead to contraction of the economy in the West Bank and the collapse of the economy in Gaza, with more than 40% recent reduction in the GDP, it had its deep impact on people, with rise of unemployment, poverty, destruction of livelihoods, leading to humanitarian crisis with sweeping effects, manifested by increase of food insecurity among people to reach 38%, while 2/3 of the population are vulnerable and marginalized, with 80% of population in Gaza relying on humanitarian food aid. This current situation is best described as "**acute on top of chronic**", **man-made, of political origin** that already exhausted all possible coping mechanisms. However, this unique humanitarian situation can only be resolved politically, it is unlikely to be resolved soon, and even if it does it would require a recovery period of at least 3-5 years, with intensive support and humanitarian aid.



This implies that the DSPR and ACT forum needs to be prepared to continue providing its emergency assistance in the coming 3-5 years. It also implies for the DSPR and The APF to address the current crises through comprehensive strategies that tackles the root causes and have long term effects.

Life sustaining approaches could be more appropriate to the current status interrelated with advocacy efforts and contingency plans would be more appropriate. Approaches as 'protecting and supporting livelihood systems' as well as "Job Creation/Cash for Work" is appropriate in parallel with food aid, and cash for work approaches for certain groups and communities. A comprehensive strategy consolidated with all APF members would enrich current responses to address the complex, widespread, prolonged, unpredicted emergency in the oPt.

International actors providing humanitarian aid were able to analyze the emergency and to recommend sets of interventions based on the uniqueness of the status, recommendations that addresses rising food insecurity through mechanisms beyond food aid into supporting livelihood systems and preventing its spread to other categories of the population.

Major actors in the international community are involved in the emergency related humanitarian aid, such as the USAID and the European Union, with major actors in the field such as the WFP, UNRWA and other UN organizations, in addition to various international and local NGOs. Appealing for estimated support of around 500MUS\$ annually. Major actors are unifying their efforts through various networks, headed by lead actors. Finding shows that MECC/DSPR and APF has an opportunity to link up with other actors and draw more support to continue their imperative efforts towards "mitigating the effect of the emergency humanitarian crises over the vulnerable".

The recent activation of ACT Palestine Forum is an added value to ACT in the area and to its members that needs further capitalizing. Further collaborations, joint efforts and consolidated work that is based on common understanding of the emergency and responses; would maximize ACT humanitarian support. Drafting a joint Strategy for APF that is 'Rights Based' would provide the focus and direction for ACT and members to respond adequately and effectively to the complicated emergency.

Findings revealed the responsiveness effect of ACT and DSPR, meanwhile, there were appropriate modalities used by DSPR responding to the needs of the vulnerable in the specific emergency. On the other hand some of the approaches were not continued or favored by ACT; nevertheless they were in line with vulnerability assessment analysis carried out by international organizations. Thus; highlighting the urgency for ACT developing their understanding of the status and its **uniqueness characteristics** compared to other emergency around the world. In addition; ACT needs to develop flexibility in dealing with added variables rising through implementations of the appeals, while DSPR and APF to continuously monitoring the emergency and effects changes' indicators. Advocacy efforts to reflect the status and its effects among members of the ACT alliance is of high priority to mobilize resources needed for ACT Palestine members to provide substantive responses.

The ACT mechanism through DSPR succeeded in mitigating humanitarian effects of emergencies over the vulnerable in oPt through the previous years by providing around 4MUS\$ support, over half of them during the past three years, support enabled DSPR to reach over 35 thousand people in Gaza Strip and the West Bank including East Jerusalem. The ACT/DSPR humanitarian aid responses used various approaches of food aid, cash assistance, medical aid, working program and assistance to education. ACT/DSPR part of the appeals were along these diversified approaches, with higher emphasis along the lines of "Food Security" related responses.

#### **The Findings of Process, Impact of responses implemented in Gaza and organizational issues revealed:**

Evaluators examined the various emergency response modalities which included provision of cash assistance, job creation and supporting basic services programs (health and training), supporting framers who had been negatively affected by the Israeli incursions and providing hot meals to 400 preschool children. The implemented emergency response provided through the appeals included providing cash assistance to 25,723 needy families, more that what was originally anticipated and providing short term job opportunities to 93 persons (originally it was planned to provide 79 persons). Also, as planned, the appeals contributed to supporting the health program through hiring (6 in MPEL 61 and 4 in MEPL 71) health professionals who contributed to increasing the

coverage of health services provided by DSPR-Gaza three health centres. There was a broad consensus that the components of the appeals were relevant and served highly vulnerable populations at critical time. The provided assistance is on line with the overall international principles of emergency assistance. The diverse modalities of the emergency response provided flexibility in responding to the multifaceted needs resulting from the emergency complex situation. Overall, the response achieved its intended goals, despite of the difficult political and contextual factors. The assistance had been delivered to the intended beneficiaries in a relatively timely manner. Due to the continuity of the emergency situation, appeals were extended.

The job creation component-as a separate one (only in MEPL 51) was highly perceived by beneficiaries and it provided a training opportunity for beneficiaries who felt more dignified by being productive not just a negative recipient. On the other hand, the cash assistance provided flexibility for the needy families to partially meet their priority needs such as paying transportation fees for students, medicine fees, buying cooking gas, fruits, clothes, chicken, school requirements and so on. The cash assistance supported a high number of beneficiaries than the other approaches. Beneficiaries and the other major emergency assistance providers recommending that DSPR-Gaza continues providing cash assistance to needy population in Gaza. It is worth mentioning that in Gaza, the majority of the active humanitarian agencies are providing basic food stuff to beneficiaries. Shall the emergency response shift to the provision of food assistance instead of cash, it would be another sort of duplication and the DSPR-Gaza assistance will lose its uniqueness. However, the provided cash assistance is perceived as little and it was recommended to increase it and to provide it more frequently. This would be on behalf of the coverage and fewer beneficiaries will be assisted then. Therefore, revision of the targeting approach and criteria is recommended. Supporting the health program at the DSPR-Gaza three health centres was another important, yet effective contribution to the program. It is worth noting that there is an increasing demand for health services which manifested itself in increasing the number of beneficiaries presenting to the DSPR-Gaza clinics. As a result of hiring the medical staff though the ACT provided fund, DSPR-Gaza expanded its activities and introduced new, but essential services particularly for women and children, the mostly affected categories of the population. Supporting medical program through the emergency response is an example of emergency interventions that have long term implications.

The impact of the emergency response can be regarded as positive in general. Although the impacts of the different components of the appeals were perceived differently, the provided support had at least partially met basic needs of the targeted victims. It was easy to assess the impact of the emergency response on the provision of health services because the baseline readings were available. In contrary, in other areas which were lacking baseline readings, it was difficult to assess the impact quantitatively. Another important impact is the noticeable positive psychological impact of the assistance on the imprisoned population in Gaza. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the emergency situation in Gaza (man-made; political in nature), the provided assistance wasn't able to completely solve the humanitarian situation; simply, it is a humanitarian situation with a non-humanitarian solution.

The support was managed in an appropriate way and the coordination among the involved parties was very good. The community perceived the teams working on the assistance and more noticeably, the management of the DSPR-Gaza as very committed, dedicated, transparent, cooperative and responsive. The cooperation and coordination between DSPR-Gaza and the other official organizations such as MOSA, community based organizations and partners were smooth, friendly, effective and efficient. Despite the efforts made by DSPR-Gaza in relation to increasing the coordination among and within the different players, still clients' shopping among these organizations is common. Developing a database and sharing information among the social assistance providers is essential in order to prevent duplication and to ensure the fair distribution of the scarce resources among the many needy populations. The DSPR-Gaza utilized a diverse approach to access beneficiaries including direct access, post services and most commonly through local organizations. The later, proved to be efficient, effective and politically appropriate. Early involvement of the local organizations in the process and partnering with them ensures maximum efficiency, wider coverage and ownership. It also constituted an opportunity to empower these organizations and to develop their capacity.

The response was implemented in a transparent efficient approach and in compliance with the International NGO Code of Conduct and on line with the SPHERE minimal standards. Gender

equity was generally considered. Fairness and dignity were maintained in all the steps associated with the assistance's processes. MECC/DSPR provided its assistance in a humane environment, in timely manner and through very strict and effective monitoring and control measures.

**The Findings of Process, Impact of responses implemented in West Bank and organizational issues revealed:**

The consultants evaluated the various responses' approaches used by DSPR-WB the Food Aid, Income generation/work programs, Medical and Education assistance, in addition to the one time unplanned responsive approach of providing animal feed to Bedouin community. Findings revealed that most communities reached are those affected by the emergency either trapped in the conflict, or affected by the Separation Wall and closure regime imposed on the WB. Spread of response was extensive and reached wide geographical areas in the North and the center of the WB, the targeted area by DSPR-WB. The responses reached diversified communities, Refugee Camps, Villages, Bedouins and affected zones in cities. Findings indicated that DSPR-WB were able to achieve more than planned compared to received amount versus budgeted in various responses and times. The appeals 51, 61 and 71 enabled the DSPR-WB to reach 16,013 beneficiaries in the different areas within the North and Center of WB with a budget of around 1MUS\$, anticipating effectiveness and high achievement of goals and objectives of the appeals.

The DSPR-WB Approaches used in the response to emergency, were found relevant and appropriate to the beneficiaries, and had different impact on different communities and categories of beneficiaries. The Food Aid approach had the highest impact in contingencies, specific short term emergency on certain location or population, and for special categories of the population, the social cases or destitute, **other wise job creation and livelihood support had the highest relevancy and impact.** Evaluators recommended that DSPR-WB to concentrate their responses along these lines while provide food aid in contingencies and for special groups. The Education and Medical assistance were minimal, although the education support was appropriate, therefore; evaluators recommended that DSPR-WB to network with other NGO or CRO professional institutes for drug provisions and to avoid "personal medical assistance" unless certain measures are taken.

Findings indicated that Food Aid supply chain planning and management was efficient and was enhanced through out the years, yet the Targeting Criteria needs upgrading, in addition monitoring of selection of beneficiaries by local partners needs enhancing, as well as the reach of aid to final destination. On the other hand the "Job Creation/Cash for Work" process was efficient, transparent and effective, and ensured higher participation of target groups and beneficiaries. The process developed through the development of the organization, the available capacity in the DSPR-WB added further strength to the approach.

The DSPR-WB/ICC has an effective network with various CBOs, Churches, Local Councils and NGOs, most have been involved in implementing the humanitarian aid projects and/ or development projects conducted through their program. DSPR-WB/ICC is the address for various other organizations that communicates with ICC on their situations and needs. Partner organizations implementing in the field have high participation in the process, yet their participation needs enhancement in the planning and deciding on the intervention and the evaluation part of the response. In addition; Target groups participation needs enhancement they should be involved at the beginning in a proper Needs Assessment process, and in the planning of the intervention and approach, in evaluating the response. It was recommended that organization carry out a participatory Needs Assessment, that includes gender specifics, at the development stage of the response and that ACT develops its process to include such element without risking its responsiveness.

The MECC/DSPR-WB was able to carry out its efforts with a minimum capacity by extending its ability through linkages to local communities, and specific arrangements made for specific responses. Yet capacities to implement, monitor and develop the responses should be further increased to enable the organization to carry out its processes efficiently, support from governance structure and DSPR-CO would contribute in this regard. On the other hand; Job Creation had best capacity to run the response as the coordinator is a regular staff in the institute. The Area Committee, AC, could further support management of the DSPR-WB through discussing planning issues and carry out the overall monitoring role of process and impact, their links with the community could assist in resolving critical issues. It was found that DSPR-WB adheres to the international Codes and Standards in general, while for further compliance; evaluators

recommends capacity development in this regard and systemizing the processes based on Codes and Standards.

Regarding **ACT visibility in both West Bank and Gaza**, most beneficiaries and local organizations recognized that the assistance is provided by the "churches" but without recognizing the ACT as an identity.

**The MECC/DSPR Central Office** was successful in communicating the emergency, in heading the efforts for developing the responses and mobilizing resources through the ACT alliance network, meanwhile the role of communicating changes and emergency development to ACT and members for increase flexibility required enhancement. The involvement of the Central Committee as an overall governance body in overseeing directions and impact of responses needs activation.

There is a high demand for the DSPR-CO to enhance its PME role for the emergency responses, enhance monitoring of the processes, targeting, gender mainstreaming, ACT visibility, and adherence to Codes and Standards. In addition; to activate it's role in coordination with other actors, advocating as well as fundraising to meet the challenges of the chronic and complex nature of the emergency and its expected prolonged effects.

Finally; the evaluators would like to express their gratitude and admire to all people involved in responding to such emergency amidst all divisions, controversy and conflict, and to recommend that this Evaluation Report to be shared with stakeholders and partners in APF, while to be discussed by Area Committees and Central Committee to further enhance the great and substantial efforts done by the MECC/DSPR to carry out its responses amidst all challenges.

The Evaluation Report contains detailed findings, lessons learned and recommendations; it is divided into three main Sections:

Section 1: Introduction, Background, the Emergency and the Responses

Section 2: Process and Impact for the different Approaches

Section 3: Organizational Issues of the MECC/DSPR, for both areas and central.

While key Lessons Learned are listed in Chapter 1, and key Recommendations in Chapter 9. Lessons learned and Recommendations are provided for ACT, APF, for the MECC/DSPR both areas Gaza and West Bank, and MECC/DSPR Centrally.

## Chapter 1. Lessons Learned

Upon completion of the evaluation the evaluators would like to highlight the following key lessons learned to be considered in the future humanitarian support in oPt or in analogous places:

### 1.1. Overall Lessons Learned

- ACT International was able to respond to the emergency status in the oPt starting in the year 2000, and to support addressing the emerging humanitarian crises, with 10 appeals requesting over 14MUS\$, from ACT Alliance members all over the globe.
- The ACT mechanism through DSPR succeeded in mitigating humanitarian effects of emergencies over the vulnerable in oPt through the last eight years by providing around 4MUS\$ that reached over 35 thousand people in Gaza Strip, the West Bank including East Jerusalem.
- ACT international humanitarian assistance in emergency to oPt have to add value so that the average support of around 1.5MUS\$/appeal is substantive to other organizations as UN agencies appealing for more than 400MUS\$/ appeal annually. 461.9MUS\$ was the emergency appeal through the CAP 2008.
- Although a unified ACT appeal is issued for the oPt, but still further steps is needed for consolidation of efforts. The activation of ACT Palestine Forum is a first step towards consolidation, **developing a strategy for ACT humanitarian assistance should be the next step** for consolidating an integrated well-designed emergency response which most likely will result in more positive long term impacts and can draw more potential recourses; further recommendations are listed in the report.
- The current complex multi-faceted emergency crises, described as "acute on top of chronic", has resulted in severe negative consequences on basic human needs and has affected health, education, economic status, lately manifested in extremely high rates of poverty, unemployment, destruction in livelihood systems, increase in food insecurity levels, deterioration of health status, the disruption of the social fabric, and the heavy reliance on humanitarian aids. The emergency has a sweeping effect over all sectors of the community, increasing the vulnerability and marginalization of Palestinians.
- Observation from the field indicates that People became imprisoned in their own areas, or homes, lost their resources and sources of income, lost their livelihood supportive system, and most became highly dependent on relief support. It is not a Tsunami by its time occurrence, but it's a "slow release" effect that has its humanitarian impact on human lives similar to any other emergency, but can't be solved by humanitarian aid, **it is of political origin and will only be solved by political solution**, the humanitarian aid will only mitigate emergency effects on the vulnerable. It is **the ongoing and forgotten crises**.
- **The definition of Emergency in the oPt needs to be clarified and linked to other actors definitions and understandings.** Flexibility for interpreting the emergency and its effects is needed, ongoing analysis of the status linked to others actors' analysis is essential.
- **Life saving and life preserving actions were more dominant than sustaining and rehabilitating actions** in Crises through DSPR/ACT responses approaches. It is eminent that a diversified approach on various levels is essential to address the effects of the prolonged unpredicted current emergency, with more focus on life sustaining and rehabilitating.
- **International lessons learned** from review of emergency responses and food security literatures, indicates that it is not enough to respond to emergencies without addressing root causes, as UNU-Wider research 08 paper argued based on case studies, specifying '**The bridge between situation analysis, the underlying causes and risk and the analysis of response options, has proven to be more accurate in providing a broader basis for policy framework**'. The current direction of the major actors in oPt is moving in this direction, visible in CAP 08. DSPR and APF would need to develop their comprehensive strategies shifting from mainly temporary relief interventions into multi-approaches that addresses root causes and leaves a longer term effect.
- DSPR and APF found themselves after 8 years of emergency working on two levels, first the development related projects that started from first crises for the Palestinians in 1948 serving refugees and currently serving refugees and vulnerable , second the current emergency related effects with various approaches, The emergency has also impacted the ability to provide the services and sustain the institutes. Although recommended through major actors to sustain their work, ACT was hesitant to link supporting programs serving vulnerable in crises with the emergency. The complicated emergency effects highlighted **the need to distinguish the three**

**levels of directions to address the emergency**, first sustaining on going programs directed to the vulnerable, second addressing the current crises effectively, third through being prepared to contingencies that could rise anytime.

- The emergency has long term effects that are expected to prolong or even deteriorate unless the political conflict is resolved (humanitarian situation with a non-humanitarian solution). Even if the political situation improves, a transitional recovery phase is needed with 3-5 years duration as a minimum. ***This implies that the DSPR and ACT forum needs to be prepared to continue providing its emergency assistance in the coming 3-5 years.*** It also implies for the DSPR and The APF to address the current crises through comprehensive strategies that tackles the root causes and have long term effects.
- ***There is a need to increase support to address the effects of emergency on the vulnerable***, through ACT Forum, AND through other resources and networks, as there is an opportunity to join forces with other actors and request support from other main donors as ECHO.

## 1.2. Lessons Learned ACT Appeals DSPR-Gaza

- DSPR-Gaza is a well-established, well recognized and positively perceived organization providing social services to the needy Gazans since more than 50 years. The DSPR-Gaza highly reputable, well-perceived and appropriately-managed contributions to alleviating sufferings resulted from the emergency situation in Gaza needs to continue. The humanitarian assistance and helping the poor is part of the DSPR-Gaza's identity in the Gaza Strip.
- There was a consensus that DSPR-Gaza enjoys a very committed, dedicated effective and transparent management that also enjoys leadership skills. The management culture of the DSPR-Gaza is being transferred to the other participating and collaborating organizations. DSPR-Gaza is becoming a role model and others are already benchmarking its practices. With the availability of such management, MECC/DSPR can explore doing more humanitarian assistance interventions preferably through creative approaches.
- DSPR-Gaza operates in a field flooded with other major humanitarian assistance players who still yet unable to meet all the deprived population needs. This implies that further coordination with those players needs to take place. To avoid duplication, information sharing among organizations providing humanitarian assistance is needed. DSPR-Gaza can contribute in this regard through proactive advocacy and networking.
- The emergency response appeals utilized diversified components to assist victims through a mixture of cash assistance, job creation and supporting basic services such as health and education. This diversified approach is effective, relevant and responsive to the local context of the emergency situations. Emergency assistance needs to consider the local context and what could be suitable in one place is not necessarily suitable in others. However, the components of the different appeals were similar in certain components, but different in others. On one hand, this reflects appropriate responsiveness and field orientation of the designed and implemented appeals. On the other hand, these differences would be more appropriate, if it is part of a larger consolidated strategy as aforementioned.
- Although there is no Palestinian national strategy for emergency assistance, the ACT provided response is on line with the international humanitarian assistance principles. It is important for the MECC/DSRP to proactively advocate for initiating a national unified emergency strategy that regulates the provision of emergency assistance in the oPt.
- The targets of the appeals were met in a timely manner and this could be contributed to the appropriate management, partnership with local organizations and the dedication and commitment of the DSPR-Gaza staff. DSPR-Gaza can build on this success and implement more assistance programs; preferably the ones with longer term impacts.
- Although the targeting criteria were fairly followed and highly respected, it encounters some controversial issues that require revisions. Targeting criteria need to specifically target certain needy segments of the deprived population; those needy populations are currently receiving the assistance as part of the beneficiaries' general pool rather than being specifically targeted (separated women, old age, families with sick and disabled children, families with student member/s).
- The cash assistance component were positively perceived and highly recommended by the other assistance providers; therefore it should be continued as it enabled families to meet their needs according to their priorities. The cash assistance gives an opportunity for the DSPR-Gaza assistance to be different, unique and not a sort of duplication of others interventions. However,

the amount and the frequency of the provided cash assistance require revision. Through a revised targeting approach, fewer beneficiaries can be assisted with larger amounts and for longer periods.

- The DSPR-Gaza was able to perfectly manage the job creation component through an appropriate follow up and monitoring system. Job creation was positively perceived and had benefited both the beneficiaries and the host organizations. It is highly recommended that future appeals contain job creation component.
- The contribution provided by the ACT appeals supporting the health and training programs was very fruitful and contributed to meeting the increasing demands for basic services. The provided assistance is an example of emergency assistance programs that have long term implications.
- DSPR-Gaza used many approaches to access beneficiaries including direct access, using post services and most commonly, through local organizations. Regarding the later, DSPR-Gaza established partnership with local organizations (55 in total) and this effective approach increased ownership of the assistance program by the local community and also empowered these organizations. A lesson learned is that the participatory approach for working with the community is essential and helps programs to deliver its interventions efficiently and effectively.
- To avoid duplication, information sharing among organizations providing humanitarian assistance is needed. Although, this should be led formally by official authorities; the DSPR-Gaza can contribute in this regard through proactive advocacy and networking.
- Meetings with partners were done on an ad hoc basis and usually based on needs. It is important that DSPR-Gaza staff visit the field more often and meet them regularly as this would support the partnership approach.
- Beneficiaries were impressed by the DSPR-Gaza management practices and the way by which they were treated. They preferred that the assistance to be provided to the head of family as what currently happens. One principle of the emergency assistance is respecting cultural values of the assisted population; therefore it is recommended to continue providing the support to head of family; meanwhile, considering some flexibility to ensure gender equity and gender sensitivity.
- The minimal standards of emergency assistance such as the NGO Code of Conduct and the SPHERE minimal standards were "subconsciously" well-respected and implemented. Organizing a session to reinforce these concepts and practices might be helpful.

### **1.3. Lessons Learned ACT Appeals DSPR -West bank**

- DSPR-WB presence in the area for a long time, and the implementation of ACT appeals made them an address for many local communities. The institute is credible among local communities and local partners.
- These linkages increased their ability to sense the changing and emerging needs as result of emergency of the different communities and to be responsive, yet support was needed from DSPR-CO and ACT, as well as flexibility in addressing changing emergency.
- DSPR-WB has developed its measures, procedures and controls throughout time as a learning organization, yet further enhancement is foreseen, systemizing and enhancement of management and Financial controls and monitoring is needed.
- The DSPR-WB Approaches used in the response to emergency, were found relevant and appropriate to the beneficiaries, and had different impact on different communities and categories of beneficiaries. Their effectiveness and efficiency were also different.
- Although food aid supply chain planning and management was efficient and was enhanced through out the years, the Targeting criteria needs upgrading, in addition monitoring of selection of beneficiaries by local partners needs enhancing, as well as the reach of aid to final destination, the targeted.
- Although the "Job Creation" or Cash for work approach was found effective, relevant to the needs of the vulnerable and the process carried was overall efficient and participatory, and within the capacity of the organization, the approach was not favoured by ACT, and was stopped after MEPL51.
- The "Animal feed" provided through one of the appeals reflect responsiveness and flexibility, the response was one way of "supporting livelihood approach" of those affected by the emergency, and in line with recommendations of major actors vulnerability assessment reports, yet it was also not favoured by ACT.

- The uniqueness of the emergency in oPt, its chronicity and complex characteristics and the expectation for its long effects on the population, makes it difficult to plan a response that is relevant, appropriate and could leave an impact.
- The Food Aid approach had the highest impact in contingencies, specific short term emergency on certain location or population, and for special categories of the population, the social cases or destitute, other wise job creation and livelihood support had the highest relevancy and impact.
- The long distribution of food aid as a sole mean of support for certain communities had negative impact of people getting dependent on the food aid rather than being productive. On the other hand at the beginning of the emergency food aid was linked to advocacy hence had a higher impact of reflecting the status and raising more support.
- The Individual Medical support was found relevant for the target groups, yet the DSPR-WB don't have the capacity or the system to deal with the support in a transparent manner.
- The DSPR-WB minimum human resource could restrict its ability to reach various communities and categories of people, yet the DSPR-WB were able to expand their capacity through collaboration with local partners to implement part of the process. This collaboration has proved successful in many cases, although DSPR needs to further monitor partners part of the process specially through targeting and reach to beneficiaries. In a divided vulnerable community prioritization becomes difficult, the accountability of the local partners is part of the accountability of the DSPR and ACT, hence monitoring and careful selection would contribute to accountable process and operation.
- The divisions in the different communities are wide and interrelated on various levels, such as political, religious and tribal. Hence it is very important that careful selection of local partners and monitoring the implementation parts of the response are done to avoid favourism and nepotism, to insure inclusion and better targeting.
- One important lesson learned from the field in this regard is a best practice of a village local council that had enhanced targeting by forming a committee from the local community (representing different CBOs and families) to ensure inclusion of all. Best practice that enhances community selection and could be modeled in the different locations.
- The Job Creation process is highly transparent and ensures higher participation of target groups and stakeholders, although it needed careful selection of labour intensive projects that ensures even higher effectiveness.
- DSPR/WB and CO are committed to the Code of Conduct and SPHERE standards through the appeals, there are various parts of the SPHERE standards that they are implementing, and main parts of the Codes of Conduct. Capacity development for all staff involved in the humanitarian aid would be essential, as well as reflection of the commitment on local partner.
- All emergency response provided moral support for the communities and contributed positively to the internal Muslim-Christian solidarity and relation. Yet there have been some notes on criteria for selection of some Christian communities that has to be tackled carefully to avoid jeopardizing the successes.
- Amidst the conflict, and difficult status with all divisions and lack of security in certain areas, the DSPR-WB was able to mitigate the risks, respond effectively and reach different communities.

#### **1.4. Lessons Learned ACT Appeals DSPR-Central and Overall**

- The DSPR-CO was successful in communicating the emergency, drawing needs from the areas and preparing proposals, as well as raising support for the ACT/DSPR appeals. But there is a need to provide more support for the areas in their implementation and reflecting the changing elements to ACT for increase flexibility.
- There is a high demand for the DSPR-CO to carry out its role of planning, monitoring and evaluation for the emergency responses, role that was affected by squeezed capacities at the CO, it is expected that DSPR- CO would be able to carry out its role after the latest increase in capacities at the project level and increased authority of the finance officer to include internal auditing.
- The DSPR were able to identify the emergency through their linkages in the field and following up development on the national level, on to use the Rapid Response Funding (RRF) mechanism to mobilize immediate resources. On the other hand designing the response, targeting and mapping would need a systemized participatory Needs assessment that is carried for each area and discussed through the Area Committee and the CO. ACT could also develop its format and



procedures to ensure carrying needs assessment for the responses after identifying the emergency.

- The communication between central office and areas during various parts of the response-developing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating- needs enhancing, the evaluators suggested the availability of electronic Video Conferencing at DSPR-CO to enhance the interaction with areas and interactions among areas to exchange lessons learned and experiences developed between humanitarian related management and staff.
- The chronic and complex nature of the emergency and its expected prolonged effects, pinpoint the need to activate the role of the CO coordination, advocating as well as fundraising.
- The Central Committee holds a responsibility in overseeing and monitoring the emergency responses effects carried out by the DSPR areas, overseeing PME of the CO to the responses, and ensuring monitoring and control.
- More active visibility efforts are required from both areas and monitored by DSPR central, as in both areas Beneficiaries and participating organizations are not aware of ACT; instead, they recognized that the assistance comes from the "churches".

## Section1: Introduction, Background, the Emergency and Responses in oPt

### Chapter 2. Introduction & Background

#### 2.1. Introduction to the Evaluation

The ACT International has issued a number of appeals targeted to the oPt starting 2001; following the escalated emergency<sup>1</sup> at the end of year 2000 and the resulting humanitarian crises. DSPR has received ACT appeal funds since then; as part of the ACT members implementing the responses. ACT CO and DSPR have agreed to evaluate the implementation of these appeals and draw conclusions for further assistance.

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

- To measure the impact and assess the performance of the interventions;
- To provide a learning opportunity for future operations.

Based on the Terms of Reference, the evaluation was planned to cover the following aspects<sup>2</sup>:

- ◆ Assessing process and impact, through assessing:
  - General Impact
  - Appeal Goal and Objectives
  - Implementation factors
  - Minimum Standards observance
- ◆ Assessing organizational issues, through assessing:
  - Program tools
  - Coordination
  - Collaboration
  - Visibility and Perceptions

Main outcome expected of the evaluation, is to draw lessons learned from the appeals and make suggestions as to how these might be useful in future disaster responses in the context of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt).

The significance of the evaluation is the opportunity it provides to better understand the emergency in the oPt and to assess the different approaches used through the ACT appeals. Furthermore; it provides a learning experience from the emergency responses, and gives an overview of other actors' responses to emergency in the oPt.

The evaluation poses an opportunity for the recently activated ACT Palestine Forum to have an apparent engagement in the response to emergency in the oPt.

<sup>1</sup> Chapter 3 describes the emergency and its impact on people's situation

<sup>2</sup> Refer to The Evaluation TOR attached in Annex1

## 2.2. Methodology of the Evaluation

The methodology used is a **Rapid Participatory Approach** using multiple tools to achieve the objectives and outcomes of the evaluation. The adopted approach for the evaluation was to evaluate DSPR-West Bank and DSPR-Gaza responses to emergencies in its bigger context of evaluating the emergency itself in both areas, mapping of other actors and scanning their different responses. Evaluation was conducted by two independent consultants in parallel in the two areas to overcome the mobility restrictions without overlooking any of the concerned areas. Evaluation was done in reference to the impact and the performance of the responses, meanwhile considering the other actors and the AFP members.

The evaluation team consisted of two experienced multi-skilled consultants that worked in parallel and closely coordinated their activities. Randa Hilal; the Team Leader for the evaluation; was responsible for the West Bank side of the evaluation and the central part. Dr. Bassam Abu Hamad; the second consultant was responsible for the Gaza side of the evaluation. Both consultants did the emergency analysis and overall linkages for each area. The evaluation team communicated extensively through out the evaluation, exchanged information, reviewed results and discussed directions. Consultants agreed on analysis and findings, and drafted the report jointly. Evaluation Team had ongoing close communication with executive secretaries of DSPR both areas and with DSPR centrally throughout the different stages of the evaluation. DSPR in both areas and centrally provided the team with all required support and assistance, while DSPR seconded Samer Khoury from DSPR-West Bank accompanied the team leader as partner representatives and resource person. In Gaza, Mr Youief Sehuie, social worker, had participated in some activities.

The first phase, was carried out in June 08, is the preparation stage that included initial meetings with DSPR both areas and central office, and extensive communication with ACT-CO, identifying primary and secondary sources of information and desk review documents for carrying the evaluation, and setting plans and schedule for the evaluation annex 2.1 shows the schedule of visits.

The consultants carried out the field work during the second phase, in June-July 08, using a set of combined triangulated tools, to gather secondary and primary data as follows<sup>3</sup>:

- a. **Desk review** of all secondary data, including internal management documents and external reports and documents, other relevant documents of other organizations and responses held within this regard, local and international documents on emergency responses, in addition of relevant data & statistics. Food Security literature, International papers on emergency and responses based on international experiences were also reviewed and referred to in evaluation. annex 3.5 shows a list of documents reviewed.
- b. **Situation analysis** of emergency in the oPt, based on desk and literature review, internal discussion of the evaluation team and the support team, nourished through field visits and observations as well as with the interviews with actors, stakeholders and key informants in various areas, while mapping major actors and implemented responses in the field.
- c. **Various Focus Groups with Beneficiaries of the assistance was conducted for each type of assistance:** food security, job creation, health, education.... etc., 8 focus groups was conducted in each area.
- d. **Structured & Semi structured interviews** was conducted with:
  - i. Main stakeholders, community members, officials and public authorities.
  - ii. Local partners of the DSPR in implementing the responses, community leaders, church leaders, Local councils, governorate offices.
  - iii. Other emergency actors: UNRWA, WFP, Union of Charitable Societies, CHF, PRCS-Gaza Strip, Ard El Enssan, PA MOSA, PA Zakah.
  - iv. Selected Staff & Volunteers
  - v. DSPR AC, CC and CO
  - vi. Financial Auditors
  - vii. Resource persons and key informants from community and other agencies.
  - viii. Beneficiaries and other people that fit Target group criteria but not a beneficiary
  - ix. ACT alliance members in the oPt, APF members.
  - x. National and international NGOs engaged in emergency support and networks representatives.
  - xi. ACT representatives conducted electronically

***Focus Groups , Interviews & group discussion resulted in the participation of 183 beneficiaries through focus groups and interviews, as well as 45 Local Partners and local key informants, 16 other stakeholders and major assistance providers, 22 DSPR management, staff and governance body members and all ACT Palestine Forum members through interviews and group discussion***

<sup>3</sup> Refer to Annex 3 for details of people involved and tools used

- e. **Field/site visits & Direct observation:** various field visits to different communities: villages, cities, refugee camps, Bedouin's sites in different areas for different approaches used and covering the different appeals was conducted, home visits to beneficiaries was also conducted, direct observation of status, effects of emergency, effect of response was noted.

**Evaluators visited 14 communities from 4 different governorates out of served 6 governorates in the WB, and 8 communities from 5 governorates were visited in Gaza.**

- f. **Donor Survey:** An electronic donor survey conducted with donors of ACT to DSPR. As a result 4 ACT donors were contacted through donor survey & interviews.
- g. **Collection and analysis of internal management data, procedures, policies, process, monitoring system and organizational information.**
- h. **Triangulation:** Findings were cross-checked by the different methods.

**Table 2.1: List of people interviewed by method and category**

Category	Method	Number		Note
		GS	WB	
Beneficiaries	Focus groups	72	73	8 focus groups
Beneficiaries	Interview	25	13	
MECC/DSPR areas, CO, AC, CC	Personal interviews	11	11	Some people twice
Official and local participating organizations	Personal interviews	12	33	
Major assistance providers (such as MOSA, UNRWA, WFP, PRCS-GS)	Personal interviews	6	10	
APF members	Personal interviews	1	6	

**Men and women focus groups in Gaza and WB**



The third phase, **Analysis & Report Writing phase**, was conducted during mid July till end of August it included:

- a. Thorough analysis of gathered information, data and findings.
- b. Debriefing meeting and feedback workshops were conducted to present the findings to ACT representative, alliance members and DSPR central and areas. West bank and Gaza areas has jointly participated in first workshop with DSPR Central and representative of ACT through a unified workshop for West Bank & Gaza via a video conference, meeting discussed emergency, approaches & impact, while two internal workshops were conducted afterwards in each area to discuss process & Organizational, feedback was then integrated in the report. List of participants in the three meeting is presented in Annex 3.3
- c. Documenting findings and Report writing, first draft ready mid August
- d. Integrating all feedbacks from partners in the final report by end of August.

The consultant had referred to the results presented in the evaluation of DSPR conducted by Allen Armstrong and Randa Hilal in 2005 in the organizational part. Consultants used SPHERE minimum standards, the NGO Code of Conduct, the ACT Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation and guidelines to promote gender equality in humanitarian actions, for analysing the processes and impact, while used HAP 2007 standard as accountability standard. While used data and information from independent sources to analyse the emergency.

Limitation to the evaluation has been the inability of the evaluators to meet, due to restriction of movement, the team leader was unable to get a permit to go to Gaza, while the second consultant can't leave Gaza.

## **2.3. The 51,61,71 ACT appeals and the Intervention sectors**

### **2.3.1. ACT International:**

"Action by Churches Together (ACT) International is a global alliance of churches and related agencies working to protect and save lives and support communities in emergencies worldwide" ACT Mission Statement.

ACT enjoys wide spread membership of over a 100 members from the different world contents. The churches and their related agencies that make up the membership of ACT are drawn from the members of the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the World Council of Churches (WCC). An ACT office that is coordinating rather than operational in function is located in Geneva, Switzerland, where ACT is registered as a legal entity.

ACT was founded in August 1995 to improve coordination of the ecumenical response to emergencies in the field, improve the raising and channeling of funds for the ecumenical response to emergencies, improve the information and communication of the ecumenical response to emergencies and to develop common policies and provide a more professional response.

ACT offers assistance to people caught in natural and environmental disasters, as well as in emergencies caused by war and civil conflict. Striving to reach communities in crises across frontlines, national borders, and other ethnic, political or religious divides, ACT through its members provides assistance irrespective of race, gender, belief, nationality, ethnic origin or political persuasion. ACT and its members are signatories to the Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief and aim to uphold the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, known as the Sphere Standards. In 2006, ACT raised US\$79.7 million for humanitarian assistance to communities in crisis in 34 countries<sup>4</sup>.

### **2.3.2. The MECC/DSPR:**

The Middle East Council of Churches- Department of Service to Palestinian Refugees, MECC/DSPR, referred to hereafter as the DSPR is a regional ecumenical organization and part of the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC) that was set up in the early 1950s to help Palestinian refugees with their newly acquired status following the catastrophe of the Palestinian people in 1948, were hundreds of thousands became refugees. The DSPR have branches (area committees) in five different regions: Gaza, Jerusalem and West Bank, Galilee, Jordan, and Lebanon, with the clear mandate of working with the refugees, the poor, and the dispossessed.

The DSPR have a long track of serving Palestinian refugees within various sectors of education, health and community development in the region. The DSPR has undergone various internal process of evaluation, strategizing and capacity development throughout years, recently conducted were the DSPR 2005 evaluation, resulting 2007-2010 Strategic Plan and areas' executive secretaries training on monitoring and reporting. Evaluation highlighted various organizational and functional issues, touching on emergency programs in its larger context.

The structure of the DSPR remains complex, governance being shared by the area committees and central committee structures. Each DSPR area committee is a legally constituted entity, acting as boards for the areas, while the Central Committee is the overall policy making body for the organization, while the Central Office is the overall chief executive body responsible for all areas. Area committees and Central office are responsible for strategic management, overseeing and monitoring of programs and projects including ACT provided assistance.

---

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.act-intl.org>

### 2.3.3. ACT/DSPR Emergency Response in oPt

The ACT international has issued various appeals in the light of rising emergency in the West Bank and Gaza following the 2000 emergency in the oPt, developed after the second Intifada and the Israeli occupation collective measures to Palestinian communities and zones, and continued through various added emergencies related to embargo placed upon the PA, the internal fighting and the imposed siege of Gaza.

Appeals were directed to provide humanitarian assistance for Palestinian population severely affected by the resulting devastation of the socio-economic status. ACT also issued Rapid Response Funding support, upon rising emergencies. ACT members participating in the appeals were mainly DSPR, IOCC and LWF, while in other instances local churches participated in the appeals, in one instance Al-Ahli Arab Hospital in Gaza had participated. The table A5.1 in Annex 5 summarises the ACT appeals issued and the DSPR share with targeted and received amounts.

Reviewing the ACT appeals indicates that ACT was active in responding to rising emergencies through out the years, and was able through its partners to reflect the rising emergency, in certain years such as 2002, were emergency culminated, there were two appeals in April and May, accomplished and followed by another two issued Oct 2002 and Dec 2002. The ACT appeals pledged \$ USA **14,842,095 million** through the 10 issued appeals since the year 2000, 35% were pledged for DSPR, amounting to \$ USA **5,256,819 million**, \$ USA **3.89 million amount received<sup>5</sup>**, **over half of them were received through the last three appeals.**

The appeals under evaluation are the ACT/DSPR MEPL 51, 61 and 71, covering support during the years 2005-2008. Table below summarizes duration and amounts of the **appeals**.

Table 2.2: Summary of the ACT/DSPR MEPL 51,61 and 71 appeals duration and amounts

ACT appeal	Duration			Amount Pledged DSPR	Amount Received		Notes
	Planned		Accomplished		US\$	%	
	Start	End	Extended				
MEPL 51	Dec 04	June 05	April 06	500,591	358,600	72%	
MEPL 61	May 06	Dec 06		560,126			<b>DSPR involved in revision1</b>
MEPL 61	May 06	March 07	May 07	<b>1,195,172</b>	923,399	77%	Revision2
MEPL 71	June 07	Dec 07		755.691			
MEPL 71	<b>June 07</b>	April 08	June 08	1,092,885	962,268	88%	Revision1

The ACT appeals MEPL 51 and 61 pledges for DSPR; were around 1/3 of the total appeals' Pledges, while the MEPL 71 was totally pledged for DSPR.-are you sure-IOCC received part from the 71 appeal. The DSPR pledges from the ACT appeals have increased by 4 times during the last 8 years with rising complexity of the emergency, pledges initially started from around 300 thousand US\$ in 2000 to reach \$ USA 1.2 million in 06, as shown in the figure 2.1 below.

In comparison the humanitarian aid to oPt was around 500 MillionUS\$ and 413 Million US\$ during years 05 and 06 respectively

The funding levels varied according to appeals from 39% to 100%, as the figure below indicates, while the pledged amounts were either divided almost equally between West Bank and Gaza, or were 1/3 West Bank to 2/3 Gaza depending on the appeal.

The ACT appeal emergency contributed to 18% and 31% during years 05 and 06 respectively for the DSPR Gaza overall budget of the program, while contributed to 40% and 51% during same years for the overall budget of the DSPR West Bank<sup>6</sup>.

Funding of the appeals were full when the rising emergency hit the news (01 with start of intifada, 02 with incursions into PA controlled areas, while 61 and 71 related to the emergency status in Gaza, although emergency continued throughout the years, but funding level was fluctuated, as figure below indicates.


Approaches adopted through the appeals were mainly food assistance, cash assistance, medical aid, job creation program and assistance to education. ACT/DSPR part of the appeals were along these approaches. The working program was not part of the appeals after MEPL 51 by DSPR as they stated that such approach was not favoured by ACT.

Major part of the ACT/DSPR appeals' requested support was directed towards food aid, presented in the form of food packages distribution in the West Bank and Cash disbursement in Gaza.

<sup>5</sup> Refer to table A5.1 in Annex 5

<sup>6</sup> 2005 and 2006 DSPR consolidated financial statements and audited reports

Figure 2.1: ACT/DSPR Pledging and Funding Trends



In one of the appeals MEPL 61 assistance was made to education, through distribution of education kits in the West Bank and support to VTC in Gaza. The support to VTC was redirected to cash disbursement at a latter stage of implementation due to received support from other donors to the VTC in Gaza.

Medical support to hospitals, clinics in emergency was also part of the appeals, while supporting medical individual cases was also part of the appeals in the West Bank. While medical support was for extending and enriching health services of the DSPR Gaza.

### 2.3.4. The ACT Palestine Forum, APF

The ACT Forum Palestine was initially formed in year 2002, where an effort was exerted by ACT Geneva, to organize and systemize the efforts. A strategic Plan was set during that time and a facilitator was involved<sup>7</sup>. A first evaluation was planned in 2002.

The level of cooperation and joined directions and prioritization of intervention following the strategizing process was clear in the ACT MEPL 22 appeals and some of the innovative appeals with new approaches afterwards.

The ACT forum consists of ACT alliance members involved in oPt through implementing and/or funding, there was an effort of mapping members and partners in the year 2002, where 14 organizations were registered, including the DSPR<sup>8</sup>.

The ACT Palestine forum was reactivated in 2007/2008, members are working on MoU to clarify membership in the APF. Members currently involved in forum and attending its meeting are the DSPR, LWF, IOCC, NCA, DCA and YMCA. CA attended one of its meetings and was interested in joining<sup>9</sup>.

Most of the ACT forum implementing members has been functioning in the country for over 60 years since the first emergency occurred for the Palestinian People and the resulting humanitarian crises of hundreds of thousands became refugees. Since then members continued and developed their programs to address development and poverty alleviation in addition to addressing rising humanitarian crises.

The activated Forum discussed plans, directions, concerns and appeals, the ACT appeal MEPL 81 was discussed through the forum, where DSPR and IOCC participated in the appeal.

## 2.4. Overview of Other Emergency Actors in oPt

Other local and international **actors** have been active in meeting the emergency consequences through various means. They represent PA official bodies, UN bodies, NGOs and INGOs, many have been historically active and developed the emergency program into their program, and others increased in role to meet emergency inflicted effects.

United Nations Relief & Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, UNRWA, represents one of the major actors in emergency in the oPt. UNRWA have been serving and working with Palestinian refugees in the region after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, providing various education and health programs. after the eruption of the

<sup>7</sup> On Behalf of ACT implementing members in oPt, Rudolf Hinz, Strategic Plan for ACT in the oPt, Jerusalem, Sept,2002

<sup>8</sup> Rudolf Hinz, ACT Facilitator, Mapping out ACT members and their partners in the oPt, Jerusalem, Sept,2002

<sup>9</sup> APF April and May Minutes of Meetings, Jerusalem 2008

second Intifada in the year 2000, UNRWA have developed special program for emergency, developed contingency plan extending its scope to non-refugees and continued its work with its original programs with refugees, its emergency budget requested through the CAP 08 appeal is 238.8 Million US\$, representing 51.7% of the appeal, they have received over 1 Billion US\$ through the years 02 to 06.<sup>10</sup>

MOSA provides regular social assistance in the West Bank for 50,000 families and in Gaza to 30,000 families. In addition to the added emergency assistance, the Zakah under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but acting as a separate entity since the year 2007, provides regular services to orphans and vulnerable, in year 2007 they managed to serve over 35, 000 through local & international donations. The union of Charitable organization have over 1000 CBOs & NGOs registered under the entity serving special needs, and destitute, though mobilizing local & international resources.

World Food Program, WFP represents second largest and in specifically related to the food insecurity issue, its emergency budget requested through the CAP 08 appeal is 65.2 Million US\$, representing 14.1% of the appeal.

Other UN agencies are involved in implementing emergency programs, some are partnering with other local NGOs for implementation, while some local NGOs have joined the appeal.

Currently the WFP are heading networking and joining efforts of organizations responding to emergency, including, UN, INGOs and NGOs. *The newly developed network is ready to organize with and include ACT.*

The European Commission for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), has supported Palestinians with humanitarian aid worth €206.6 million since 2006, including a commitment in June 08 of € 24million in livelihood support, food assistance, the provision of basic health care as well as water and sanitation services projects implemented through UN agencies, NGOs and INGOs and red cross/red crescent movement.

The USAID has also responded to emergency through various programs implemented by the INGO registered in USA and have presence in oPt such as CHF, implemented a 1 Million US\$ and currently implementing emergency job program, EJP for 3 years with the value of 20 Million US\$

On the PA official government side Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), is targeting the social hardship cases through food assistance and cash distribution. Zakah under Ministry of Religious Affairs is also targeting social hardship cases through local and international contributions. With current divisions of West Bank and Gaza there are two ministries, one in each location, but indirect coordination exists with regard to distribution of food and cash for hardship cases. The amount of fund is not adequate and many beneficiaries are on the waiting lists (2000 families). The coordination between Gaza and West Bank takes around two months.

Various local and international organizations are involved in supporting humanitarian aid through linking up with major actors and own resources, in Gaza, PRCS-GS is a major player which provided assistance to poor families that values more than 1.5 million US\$ each year since the year 2001.

## **Chapter 3. The Emergency in the oPt<sup>11</sup>**

This section is related to the conducted situation analysis by the evaluators of the emergency in the oPt, based on desk and literature review, verified through field visits and observations as well as with the interviews with actors, stakeholders and key informants in various areas, while mapping major actors and implemented responses in the field, meeting over 250 people from various sources and representing main actors took place. Observation and field visits to 14 communities and meeting their representatives in different localities in the West bank and 8 localities in Gaza contributed to understanding the status. Analysis also depended on data from independent credible sources, while evaluators used their experience and skills in results based analysis to understand root causes and related effects of the emergency.

### **3.1. Contextual analysis**

Any situation is best understood within its frame of reference; therefore, the evaluators present some contextual factors that had affected the design and the implementation of the emergency response and possibly affect any future emergency assistance. Un-like the emergency situation in other places, the situation in the West Bank and Gaza is chronic, political in origin, human-made, completely avoidable and can be resolved. In the coming paragraphs, the evaluators present some contextual facts that are important to illustrate. Supporting Maps & Data are presented in Annex 4.

<sup>10</sup> UN, oPt Consolidated Appeal Process 2008

<sup>11</sup> References for this section are the World Bank, the OCHA, UN Humanitarian monitor, B'Tselem, the Israeli , and the WFP documents and reports, as well as PCBS statistics.

The new emergency in the occupied Palestinian territories, oPt developed after the failure of the peace talks in the year 2000, the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the systematic occupational measures, characterized by increasing violence and imposing collective punishment over the Palestinian population, followed by closure regime imposed on Palestinian population in WB and total isolation of Gaza. The addition of various other destructive elements throughout the years complicated the emergency further such as the internal fighting among the Palestinians, the embargo imposed by the international community against the PA following the election of Hamas into the PLC, and the halt of Israeli transfer of collected Taxes on behalf of the PA, added to the existence of the two governments in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The emergency status is currently characterized by the prolonged and unprecedented siege over Gaza, imprisoning 1.5 million people into their areas, closure regime implemented over the West Bank isolating and zoning of areas and restricting the movement of goods and people in between the West Bank different areas, the control over the land and water resources while the growth of settlement in the West Bank, with growing isolation of Palestinian people and the transfer of their resources to benefit the growing settlement existence in the West Bank.

*'The restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed on the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories over the past five years are unprecedented in the history of the Israeli occupation in their scope, duration, and in the severity of damage that they cause to the three and a half million Palestinians who reside there'. **B'Tselem***

The closure regime in the West Bank goes beyond the presence of physical obstacles into sets of administrative restrictions, as presented by the World Bank<sup>12</sup>. The closure regime consisting of physical barriers is continuously on the rise, and despite the dismantling of some the number reached 602 in June 08<sup>13</sup>, Israel continued building the 720Km2 of the separation barrier on the lands of the West Bank, isolating 9.5% of the WB into the 'Seam Areas', forbidden roads or roads with restrictions on Palestinian use, the movement permit regime, the inability of the Palestinians to use zone C constituting around 60% of the West Bank. These means, as noted by B'Tselem are part of a single, coordinated control mechanism, which Israel adjusts to its needs<sup>14</sup>. It has divided the WB areas into six geographical areas: North, Center, South, the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, with movement between sections becoming hard, slow, and complicated, and almost completely forbids the movement of Palestinians between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and impedes Palestinians from entering Israel. The World Bank has noted that closure is implemented through a complicated agglomeration of policies and practices which has fragmented the territory into ever smaller and more disconnected cantons, map3 in Annex 5, demonstrated World Bank observations<sup>15</sup>.

These measures are correlated with enlargement of Settlements in the WB, increase of their control over land and water resources, and increase of settlers' attacks against Palestinians, while East Jerusalem has witnessed restricted urban planning, isolation and expulsion of residents, with 65 demolished homes and over 1000 orders given to demolish more homes<sup>16</sup>.

*'The main challenge for Palestinian economic recovery remains the comprehensive restrictions on movement and access imposed by Israel, which go beyond concrete and checkpoints to a set of collective policies that combine to stunt economic growth. Beyond movement within and across Palestinian Territories, these policies also restrict access to domestic and international markets, land, water and other natural resources, and donor-financed projects for 60% of the West Bank (Areas C). While there is consensus on the legitimacy of Israel's security concerns, it is difficult to reconcile this with the clear correlation between access restrictions and the protection and expansion of Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank'. **The World Bank***

The new emergency and resulting impediments on movement of people and goods had its implications over the Palestinian economy declining GDP to one third less in 06 than its level in 99. The emerging recovery in 03-05 was again reversed in 2006 as a result of the fiscal crisis following the PLC elections and resulting

<sup>12</sup> The World Bank, Two Years After London: Restarting Palestinian Economic Recovery, Sept07

<sup>13</sup> OCHA, UN agencies & NGOs, The Humanitarian Monitor, #26, June 2008, oPt

<sup>14</sup> B'Tselem, Human Rights in the oPt: Annual Report 2007, Jan 08

<sup>15</sup> World Bank, West Bank And Gaza Investment Climate Assessment: Unlocking The Potential Of The Private Sector, March07

<sup>16</sup> B'Tselem, Ground to a Halt, Denial of Palestinians' Freedom of Movement in the West Bank, Aug 07



embargo<sup>17</sup>, leading to contraction of economy and economic recession. Increasing unemployment to reach 29%<sup>18</sup> and 40% among youth, hitting agriculture sector, increasing poverty levels to 57%<sup>19</sup> among Palestinians and food insecurity affects 34%<sup>20</sup> of the population in 2006. The food insecurity levels have deteriorated even further in 2008 to reach 38% of the Palestinians<sup>21</sup>.

The **Closure regime** has forced fragmentation of economy and destruction of livelihood system, as entrance into the Jordan Valley the identified main agriculture resource and future tourism potential area, the isolation of Nablus City for over 5 years the main economic center for the North of the West Bank, the isolation of people for their agriculture land, confiscation of land and control over water resources, the existence of isolated "Seam Zones" and the impose of permit system over it, have hit agriculture and animal raising in the WB. The total closure of the Gaza Strip and the inability to import raw materials or export production has severely hit the economy in Gaza, forcing the private sector to collapse, 90% of industrial businesses have collapsed causing the loss of over 75 thousand jobs in Gaza. The PA is still suffering from the fiscal crises percussions, as it is \$ US1 Billion in debt, the PA is a main employer of over 160thousand employees, they and their dependences constitute around quarter of the population, such crises could jeopardise the ability for the PA to pay salaries of its employees. ***The fragmentation of the economy, the closure regime and the continuous increase in number of people losing their jobs and resources with time places a high burden over the humanitarian*** status in the oPt. The World Bank noted that " More troubling than the negative growth rates over the past few years is the changing composition of the economy, as GDP is being increasingly driven by government and private consumption from remittances and donor aid, while investment has fallen to exceedingly low levels, leaving little productive base for a self-sustaining economy". Maps 1& 3 in Annex4 illustrates the fragmentation.

The closure regime has severely affected the social cohesion of the Palestinians and fabric of social lives, forced fragmentation of communities, people and families from each other, more internally displaced people (IDP) is growing from, it has limited the participation of women in economy mainly to the informal sector as their participation in the labor market, is limited at 15.2%, amongst the lowest in the world, increase of violence against women have been witnessed. Youth are also suffering the highest rates of unemployment while are literally caught in the conflict with 75% of injured during second intifada where between the ages of 10 to 29%. Geographical fragmentation and poverty status curtails the services and activities of major institutions and systems, specially the health and education ones.

The political fragmentation of the two governments in the WB and GS is also adding to the emergency status and the ongoing internal fight, while depleting any possible resources and adding to the insecurity feeling of the people. The continued Palestinian/Israeli killing, violence and conflict would only worsen the humanitarian status of the people and add to the insecurity of the people.

The ongoing emergency has developed humanitarian crises at all level, which is only worsening with time, causing further socio-economic decline and livelihood crises, erosive coping mechanisms, increased reliance on humanitarian aid and rising food insecurity, as noted through 08 WFP/FAO/UNRWA rapid assessment<sup>22</sup>.

The sweeping effect of the new emergency over all sectors of the community including all areas of the oPt and the resulting level of humanitarian crises, and the ongoing causes requires ongoing intervention and planed unified operation of the donor community including the ACT alliance to mitigate the effect over the marginalized and the vulnerable.

The witnessed emergency status causes are ongoing and would require political efforts to remove the causes, while its effects and implications on the humanitarian crises would take a longer pace and intensified efforts for its remedial.

*The following four factors have been identified by the United Nations Country Team as having the greatest impact on the current humanitarian situation: (1) Lack of protection for civilians and increasing violence; (2) Political, geographic, institutional and social fragmentation of the oPt; (3) Closure, lack of access, separation, restrictions and their effects on livelihoods; and (4) the impact of Israeli settlements and settlement expansion on Palestinian livelihoods, the availability of resources and a reduction in space for development.*

<sup>17</sup> World Bank, Investing in Palestinian Reform and Development, Dec 17th 2007, Paris

<sup>18</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, PCBS, Quarterly Labour Force Survey, Q1, April 08

<sup>19</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Poverty in the oPt in 2006, August 2007.

<sup>20</sup> WFP/ FAO, Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA), released in February 2007.


<sup>21</sup> WFP/ UNRWA/FAO, Joint Rapid Food Security Survey in the oPt, May 2008

<sup>22</sup> *ibid*

### 3.2. Impact on People's situations- Field Reflection and Observation- Gaza

The Gaza Strip is a narrow band of land, located on the south of Palestine, constituting the coastal zone of the Palestinian Territory along the Mediterranean Sea between Egypt and Israel. It is 45 kilometres long and 6-12 kilometres wide with an area of 362 square kilometres and an altitude of 0-40 metres above the Mediterranean Sea level. Currently, the Gaza Strip is composed of five provinces: North Gaza, Gaza City, Mid Zone, KhanYounis and Rafah. There are five towns in the Gaza Strip, eight refugee camps and fourteen villages.

The implementation of the partial autonomy in 1994 and the establishment of the Palestinian authority (PA) have had its impacts on the society after the many devastating wars and the long years of occupation and dispersion over the globe. However, Israel still holds overall sovereignty over the Gaza Strip. It has the upper hand over borders, movement of goods and travellers in and out of Gaza, particularly the Palestinians themselves. It also controls trade, the commercial market, water, the main sources of energy, the means of communications and the overall security. Hence, it still has a hold over the Palestinian economy



With the absence of a tangible progress in the peace process and the eruption of the second "Intifada" in September 2000, the political and economic situation has severely and progressively deteriorated. Since then, the International support dramatically diminished and the Israeli incursions were exacerbated and more restrictions on

movement were imposed.

A historical turning point took place in June 2007 following the " Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip. Since then, tight siege was imposed on Gaza and the Israeli policy sought to ensure 'no development, no prosperity and no humanitarian crisis'<sup>23</sup> (Oxfam, 2007). However, signs of humanitarian crisis are clearly obvious. The already insecure and impoverished, Gazans have continued to live under dire conditions since. The Israeli government has stopped virtually everything (except basic foodstuffs and some medicines), as well as almost all citizens, from entering and leaving the Gaza Strip. Late in 2007, Israeli declared the Gaza Strip a 'hostile entity'. The Israeli government subsequently began reducing the supply of fuel and electricity to the Gaza Strip resulting in further destruction of the already exhausted economy.

Gaza Strip is the second most densely populated area on earth after Hong Kong (PCBS, 2007). Moreover, age structure in the Gaza Strip is similar to that in many developing countries, where nearly half of the total population is under 15 years old. Dependence ratio is estimated at 1:8.5 (one working person sponsors 8.5 persons) (MOH, 2005).

It is worth pointing that the Gaza Strip is going through what is called "epidemiological transition". Palestinian community is suffering from poverty-related diseases and illnesses, such as malnutrition, anaemia, sanitary related diseases which has been aggravated due to conditions associated with the closure resulted in deterioration of sanitary conditions such as lack of diesel to operate the trucks transferring garbage, lack of electricity to pump sewage, lack of water or inability to pump it to the houses. A recent World Health Organization (WHO) study showed that 30 of the examined samples taken from the sea were contaminated with animal and human faeces and an additional 25% of the examined sites are contaminated with animal faeces only<sup>24</sup>. In addition to that, diseases associated with stress are also prevailing and constituting the main causes of death among adults. Non-communicable diseases such as cancer, hypertension and diabetes are also commonly spread among the population. Another important factor that increases the burden and the vulnerability in Gaza is the increased rates of injuries resulting from the Israeli incursions and hostilities and the internal Palestinian fighting started in late in 2006 between Fateh and Hamas.

<sup>23</sup> Oxfam Briefing Notes: Breaking the impasse: ending the humanitarian stranglehold on Palestine November 2007

<sup>24</sup> WHO, Fuel Shortage in Gaza Strip and its implications on the Mediterranean sea water, June 2008



**Internal fighting -one side**



**Internal fighting –the other side**

As a result of diminishing the fuel and the electricity supply, Gaza health facilities including hospitals had experienced power cuts for many hours a day (6-8 hrs per day), creating dependency on generators to run basic health facilities and critical surgical procedures. There is a severe shortage (60-70% shortage) reported in the diesel required for hospital power generators. Another consequence of electricity cuts is water wells stop functioning and drinking water is cut off. Currently, between 25-30% of the population of the Gaza Strip does not receive running water in their homes. Sewage pumping stations also cease to pump sewage to the treatment plants (Amnesty International et al 2008).

In September 2007, a UNRWA survey in the Gaza Strip revealed that there was a nearly 80% failure rate in schools grades four to nine, with up to 90% failure rates in Mathematics. In January 2008, UNICEF reported that schools in Gaza had been cancelling classes that were high on energy consumption, such as IT, science labs and extra curricular activities (Amnesty International et al 2008).

**Amnesty International UK, CARE International UK, Christian Aid, CAFOD, Medecins du Monde UK, Oxfam, Save the Children UK and Trocaire (2008). The Gaza Strip:A Humanitarian Implosion**



**Israeli invasion of Jabalia and Beitlahia –north of Gaza 2006**

This combination of economic and social collapse, and the inability of health services to treat the symptoms of the crisis, has exacerbated the deterioration of health status of the population in Gaza. Many of the primary health care achievements that have been achieved in the last years are now at risk. For instance, infant mortality rate has increased, immunization coverage has decreased, prevalence of anaemia, infections and malnutrition are dramatically increased to unprecedented levels (anaemia among children and pregnant women above 60%). All these are indicative of the deterioration of the situation and imply that adequate interventions should be urgently taken.



Source, Amnesty International-2008




**Children of Gaza....tomorrow's citizens of Palestine..... and Citizens of the world**

At present, 95% of Gaza's industrial operations are suspended because of closure. The construction industry is totally collapsed with tens of thousands of labourers out of work. The agriculture sector has also

been badly hit and nearly 40,000 workers who depend on cash crops now have no income (Amnesty International et al, 2008). For instance, Beit Hanoun, which is regarded as the food basket of Gaza is now totally food aid dependent. The agricultural sector in Beit Lahiya in the northern Gaza Strip has suffered numerous blows due to repeated Israeli incursions, which have destroyed orchards, fields, and polytunnels. Farmers have no alternatives to growing cash crops such as strawberries and potatoes as these comply with Israeli orders that nothing is planted over 40cm high (Amnesty International et al, 2008). But cash crops are costly to produce and heavily reliant on accessible export markets. Many farmers have been crippled by Israel's continued border closures, which do not allow produce such as strawberries to reach EU markets.

In June 2007, there were 748 truckloads of exports leaving Gaza for Israel and other countries. A month later there were none. It can be concluded that any kind of economic recovery in the oPT is impossible while the blockade of Gaza remains in place (OCHA, 1997c). Even if it is lifted, it will take years to repair the damage and to recover the economy. More aid is going to the Palestinians than ever before and yet the humanitarian situation continues to decline. Continued aid is vital to respond to the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza but it cannot provide a solution in itself.

**Figure 2.2: Movement of goods through Gaza crossings by total number of truckloads<sup>25</sup>**



For more details about the emergency context in Gaza, see annex 4.2.3

### 3.3. Impact on People's situations- Field Reflection and Observation- West Bank

The Area of West Bank is 5655km<sup>2</sup>, at population density of 415 capita /km<sup>2</sup>, consisting of 11 governorates and over 600 locality with an average population of 3,500 inheritance per locality, the WB is almost totally isolated from GS and East Jerusalem, except for special permits, the closure regime imposed over the WB and the construction of the Separation Wall has isolated the different localities from each other, impoverished population and hardly hit their livelihood systems, as 3.1 indicated, & maps in Annex 4 shows.

Evaluator and DSPR Seconded person, have visited various locations where ACT has responded through appeals 51,61 and 71, visited locations representing different communities in different areas of the West Bank, targeted people were interviewed or participated in focus group discussion, part of the discussion was related to the emergency, its effect on them, and their community, where findings are presented here, while other parts related to impact, process and organization are presented in relevant parts. Evaluator noted observations during Field visits, and did interviews with community leaders, figures and key informants.

#### Impact of the emergency on people's situation in:

1. Trapped areas by the wall and closure system: Towns and villages adjacent to the wall- Abu-Dies case
  - People lost jobs and work opportunities
  - People lost land they owned and could cultivate/or their cultivated land, it was confiscated for building the Wall.
  - People lost their olive trees, second source of income for lots of people, if not first.
  - People that did not lose their land would need investment that they don't have for reclamation of their land and finding water resources.
  - People can't move –trapped on their own areas, its too expensive and risky which makes it harder for people to find employment in other locations.

<sup>25</sup> OCHA, 2007-The closure of Gaza Strip: the economic and humanitarian consequences-December 07

Mohammad in his mid forties from Abu Deis stated: "I used to earn 5000-6000NIS/month, now I am jobless for the last few years because of the wall, and totally depended on people's support, I hit my hand because of anger as I could not provide living for my family. We need the Wall to go! I need a job opportunity".



## 2. Bedouins near Jerusalem- Abu Dahook Case

- Lost the opportunity of feeding their herds
- Cant use the land around them to feed their herds
- Trapped between East Jerusalem J1 and settlements-
- Lost the seasonal work opportunity to support feeding the herds
- Increased cost for raising their herds and buying animal feed, some are in debt.

Unsecured, some were evicted from areas they lived in for years and some face danger of eviction, evaluator witnessed one

- demolished home.



Demolished Beduin home,



Blocked from moving

*Aisha stated: "It's so expensive to raise our herds, and so dangerous to graze them naturally, some times we can't feed the animal, we watch some of them get puny and die, they are the source of our living, and we get all dairy from them and could survive on them. Our lives are hard enough and now it's getting harder to feed our herds and our families".*

## 3. Villages near settlements and isolated security zones- Aqaba Case

- People can't wonder around and feed their herds- security zones and mine fields around them
- Some has lost opportunity for work
- Its dangerous and expensive to feed their herds
- They are under continual attacks from soldiers, children faces psychological problems.
- People are insecure; they face the dangers of eviction from their village.
- Their lands have been confiscated and they can't use it to feed their herd or cultivate in, the have the deeds for the lands.
- Israeli army demolish their houses, require permits and don't issue the permits. They arrest the herders and the herds if found grazing their herds naturally.
- Water is scarce and presents an issue.
- Most of the people in the village are surviving on humanitarian aid



Aqaba Village Council!

*Sami Sadeq the head of the village council stated that we are peaceful village, have our own system of survival if we were left alone, but they refuse to let us survive on our own village, we have the deeds for the land they want to evacuate us from, they can't terrorise us we will continue to live on our ancestor lands.*

B'Tselem confirmed that most of the people in the village were handed in demolition orders by Israeli Civil Administration

## 4. Villages near the Wall and settlements - Shuqba Case

- People have lost their lands, confiscated for the wall
- Olive trees , source of income uprooted
- Some has lost opportunity for work
- Their remaining fields are under attack from settlers
- Water is scarce and presents an issue.

M. Nakhleh the head of the village council mentioned that 200 families out of around 900 in the village have lost their income due to the status, people can't work in Israel without permits, those who tries are caught and put in prison. Village land is under attack from settlers, fields are burned and pigs are sent to hamper cultivation of our lands, its unsafe to naturally graze the herds as well, we lost some. The level of poverty in the village is high.



5. Western Villages near those affected by the Wall, Kufr Ne'ma near Bili'n, a village that lost most of its land to the Wall

- The Village Had to house natural increase of Bili'n people, IDP
- People lost their work opportunity in Israel,
- There is high competition in near by cities as Ramallah, and narrow work opportunities
- Unable to cultivate their lands, need investment for reclamation and water

*Khaldoon the head of the LC stated people have lost their possessions for food, some people works as employees in the PA, and when PA could not ay salaries in 06 status in the village became harder. People are sharing what they have even with Bili'n IDP, people have sold their possessions to feed their kids, some don't have anything to sell now.*



Picture of settlement on Bilin Land

6. Eastern villages away from the wall- Sarees Case

- People lost their source of income as used to work in Israel before the wall, Most of the people are unemployed
- Min job opportunity, high competition, minimum pay
- Some would sneak into Israel or send their kids there without a permit, most are in prison for getting caught
- Min work available as daily agriculture workers with min pay
- Receive min outside support as they are away from the wall
- The village and another 5 surrounding villages are poor they don't own land.

Serrees: a village were the butcher and the baker had to close down- min people are buying meat and people are baking at their homes-its cheaper.

7. In isolated cities and conflict areas: Nablus, Jenin:

- Investments in the cities hardly hit
  - Many closed down
  - Many moved their businesses out
- Most people have lost their main source of income or support

Resource people at governorates & Public ministries mentioned that people have lost their income, businesses left the area and currently in contraction, people cant work in Israel or in the city, most are requesting support.

8. Old City- Nablus:

- Conflict area and Under siege for many days, with curfews imposed
- Trade in city are hardly hit,
- Very difficult to find any work opportunities in the old city or Nablus city
- Hardly any source of income
- Trapped in their own houses with min spaces
- Children are psychologically affected



Al-Kousa family is living in one of the old small houses with 4 small kids, a mother and a father, their house was shelled 3 times, and was almost burned, every time family had to rebuilt their house with own resources, and change the simple furniture available, each time, one member of the family or two was about to get killed and they were in hospital. Children are lacking the feel of security and they suffer psychological problems. The father is a tailor that barely works due to the economic status. If he works they eat, as wife stated, there are various kinds of food that they are only eating rarely, such as fruits and meat.

## 9. Refugee Camps- Jenin Refugee Camp

- Most were workers in Israel or oPt, has lost their jobs
- High unemployment rates
- Dependent on UNRWA support, suffering from its reduction
- They don't have any other resources

Um Jameel, mentioned that we have suffered a lot and faced a lot, conflicts, the camp was destructed and our sons are jailed. There is no work, so we are dependent on UNRWA for our food, which is not enough, they reduced wheat they used to give, we can't get sick as not all medicine is available at UNRWA or we can afford buying from outside.

## 10. East Jerusalem

- The walling out of parts of East Jerusalem, made lots of people move in with other families, so that not to lose their ID
- Many wives /or husbands don't have the ID, hence unable to work or move.
- Shrinkages on citizenship rights to the Jerusalemites, increased poverty
- Some are going to court to stop the demolishing of their houses.

Zakieh Stated that they are ten in the house, her husband and two of her kids have West Bank ID, so he cant work, and its difficult to commute to other areas, I had to work as a part time cleaner, but my salary would barely pay for transportation and food, she had to give up lots of items in food in order for her family to survive, they are using Burgin instead of rice, she cant afford rice anymore, she has not paid rent for a while, the house is in terrible condition, she cant afford maintaining it, she and her kids are sick most of the time.

Main observation from field visits of the different areas is: **People became imprisoned in their own areas, or homes, lost their resources and sources of income, lost their livelihood supportive system, and most became highly dependent on relief support.**

It is not a Tsunami by its time occurrence, **but it's a "slow release" effect**, that affects the human lives as natural disaster without losing the home for most, while for some it is. It is a man made disaster (UN), and will continue for some time.

Food insecurity rose to affect more than 1/3 of the population, and over 60% are vulnerable and marginal, hence lots of these families could or already had lost their ability to get health and education services and are trapped into the poverty and insecurity cycle. With time the food insecure lists are increasing, with new categories of people joining.

*Within the same context; Ray Dolphin identified Root cause of the status in his book *The West Bank Wall-unmaking Palestine*<sup>26</sup> where is linked to the new policies of annexation, building the wall, and expansion of settlements, leading to creating a new de facto of creeping over the land, enlarging settlements and induce evacuation of people, he added that the separation Wall is the most outrages form of exclusion and control.*

***In summary the new emergency is of political origin, it has its humanitarian impact as any other emergency, but can't be solved by humanitarian aid. It will continue until a political solution is reached. The humanitarian aid will only mitigate emergency effects on the vulnerable.***

### 3.4. Overview of Other Emergency Actors' Approaches

The World Food Program, a major actor in food security in oPt, conducted with FAO a Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) during the year 2006<sup>27</sup>, through which the 2006 CFSVA concluded that

- 34% (1,322,019) of the population of the WBGS is food secure,
- 20% (777,658) is marginally secure,
- 12% (466,595) is vulnerable to becoming food insecure and,
- 34% (1,322,019) is food insecure.**

<sup>26</sup> Ray Dolphine, *The West Bank Wall- Unmaking Palestine*, Pluto Press 2006, UK

<sup>27</sup> WFP-FAO, *Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA)* Jan 07,

The 2003 FAO/WFP Food Security Assessment concluded that four out of ten Palestinians (40%) were food insecure and 30% more were at risk of becoming food insecure, given the conditions at that time.

- CFSVA Analysis on the food insecurity profiles by locality type shows:
  - Populations living in camps are the most food insecure (45%);
  - People most vulnerable to food insecurity are equally distributed between rural and urban areas (32% urban and 34% rural); and,
  - More people than expected in urban areas have been classified as food insecure.
  - Gaza is the worst area with over 41% food insecurity, while Nablus and Tubas are in the west bank with 31-40%, while Jericho is the least, and others are between 21-30%, map 3 in Annex 4.

The CFSVA has recommended that specific strategies can be developed to address key features of food insecurity with a focus on economic access to food with close coordination among local and international

**CFVSA concluded** that “one third of Palestinian households are food insecure and highly dependent on assistance which is unlikely to change until the root causes related to the political sphere of their food insecurity are tackled. It should be noted that it is necessary to embed **food security concerns within a broader framework that creates space for advocacy (e.g. right to food) and long-term action**”.

actors, recommendations included supporting livelihood systems, food aid, supporting schemes run by other actors, job creation and temporary employment, supporting food markets and trade and finally sectoral coordination, details are in Box 5.1 Annex 5.

**Strategies recommended** were adopted by WFP and UN organizations in the following consolidated appeals CAP07 and CAP08 included support of livelihood schemes, contingency plans, food aid support, income generation, and others in 11 sectors including economic recovery, food, agriculture, water, education, health, protection, and others, with actors from UN and local and international NGOs. Economic recovery presented 34.2% of the 08 appeal, followed by food 33.8% of the 462 million US\$ appeal<sup>28</sup>.

The WFP/FAO/UNRWA rapid survey<sup>29</sup> recommended certain actions addressed towards poverty alleviation, safety nets and food assistance, following their assessment of increased food insecurity among population, and the addition of the new poor, all affected by livelihood crises, socioeconomic decline, inflation and increase of food prices and exposed their coping mechanisms. Survey noted that the inability of humanitarian organization to meet the increasing demand and cost of humanitarian assistance have resulted in erosion of livelihood of the Palestinian population and would need immediate support of social safety nets activities along with the relevant public institutes and implementing agencies.

**International lessons learned** from review of emergency, responses and food security literature, indicates that it is not enough to respond to emergencies without addressing root causes, as UNU- Wider research paper argued based on case studies, shows<sup>30</sup>:

“Too often, immediate responses to crises tend to prioritize immediate needs assessments, largely based on a pre-determined set of response options. **The bridge between situation analysis, the underlying causes and risk and the analysis of response options, has proven to be more accurate in providing a broader basis for policy framework**”. UNU-WIDER,08  
Case study argument through the paper “As argued, the chronic vulnerability in East Africa was seen as an indicator of unsustainable livelihoods, without reference to a range of external political and economic factors perpetuating marginalization. Few national governments or external actors recognized this by appropriate policy responses, e.g., addressing access to natural resources such as land and water”

It also highlighted the need for comprehensive strategies with multiple interventions that relate to the identified phase classification of food insecurity at certain time, IPC<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> UN, oPt Consolidated Appeal Process 2008

<sup>29</sup> WFP/ UNRWA/FAO, Joint Rapid Food Security Survey in the oPt, May 2008

<sup>30</sup> **Vulnerability to Hunger-Improving Food Crisis Responses in Fragile States**, Colin Andrews1 and Margarita Flores, UNU- WIDER Research Paper No. 2008/42, April 2008

<sup>31</sup> Refer to Box A5.2 in Annex 5 for IPC classifications and example of strategies for certain classification



### 3.5. Evaluation of The ACT/DSPR Approaches

#### 3.5.1. Overall Evaluation of the ACT-DSPR Appeals-oPt<sup>32</sup>

It was noted that the ACT appeals responded to different emergency status in different time phases, characterized by wide spread of action that reached wide geographical areas using different approaches: Food distribution, Cash assistance, Medical and Educational assistance, work program. (can we link the sentences together with clear paragraphs reflecting clear ideas)

Although DSPR/ACT used different approaches, still response was repetitive, although emergency changed during the emergency period. It is clearly noted that Life saving and life preserving actions were more dominant than sustaining and rehabilitating actions in crises responses.

The pure humanitarian response was dominant through out the appeals, although in 02/03 humanitarian aid was linked to advocacy. Protection, access and equity mechanisms and goals linked to rights based are lacking.

One of the shortfalls noted is that lessons learned from implementing appeals were not integrated in the following appeals, as an example the animal feeding support was used as a means of food production support and support to livelihood system, was not integrated as a response with justification in the following appeal, although supporting herders with feed and water was recommended by OCHA-FAO<sup>33</sup>, in order to sustain their livelihood system and independency with current restrictions.

Some of the approaches as the work program approach implemented by DSPR and other APF as well, was found inappropriate by ACT as an emergency response, although was appropriate and relevant to the communities, refer to chapters 4 and 5.

#### 3.5.2. DSPR and Other APF members Scope of Work

DSPR and APF implementing members are working in development and humanitarian aid:

**The development projects and programs** are related to original crises witnessed by the Palestinian people in 1948 and in 1967 and the resulting effect of hundreds of thousands of refugees, currently estimated at over 4Million, 1/3 of them are in the oPt, (UNRWA) programs running were mainly in education, vocational training and health, It became part of the essential services carried out by NGOs and CROs after 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and the resulting lack of services provided for the people. Development projects and programs are currently related to the ongoing effect of occupation and were contributing to peace building and linked to the goal of building a Palestinian state. Development projects and programs were targeting the poor and the marginalized and some were working towards poverty alleviation and supporting livelihood systems.

**The humanitarian response** to emergencies was always part of their programs since 1948 for many of them but was intensified and systematized through the ACT appeals.

**The linkages between the two parts of development and humanitarian** in the ACT appeals was missing, except for some appeals, the mix between the emergency, the work currently done is noted on the level of members and ACT, as some times the support to schools was questioned, or to programs developing their work and services to mitigate the effect of the emergency, in other words, the development work was viable during the emergency, while it was affected by the weakening support of the communities due to the new emergency and its effect on population, while some were losing the ability to continue supporting the marginalized in order to sustain its role, although ACT once supported sustaining schools it found that this work can't be repeated as it was not inline with emergency responses, although ACT alliance donor members has supported the effect of emergency on APF programs through their back donors. Within same context; WFP/FAO vulnerability assessment report has recommended: "**Support Social welfare/protection schemes operated by various governmental** (e.g., MoSA) and (religious and secular charities and NGOs) actors for the "socially marginal" and "poorest of the poor," preventing those groups from falling into destitution and offering the young generations opportunities for education and jobs"<sup>34</sup>.

---

<sup>32</sup> Sources are ACT Appeals 01 to 71

<sup>33</sup> OCHA/FAO, Drought the Latest Blow to Herding Livelihood, Jan 08

<sup>34</sup> WFP-FAO, Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) Jan 07,

## **Recommendations:**

It is recommended by the evaluator and learning from other actors that projects divided into development, emergency and also contingency (so as to have a contingency plan or an emergency preparedness plan), Hence for APF to work on:

1. Continue the development projects and sustain their existence while mitigating the effect of emergency on their ability for their provision.
2. Develop an APF joint strategy for emergency that is Rights Based and linked to each member's strengths and potentials.
3. Develop consolidated appeal based on the developed strategy.
4. Monitor changes and update priorities annually, through link to other actors monitoring system.
5. Link emergency projects to development elements and strength of various projects and programs.
6. Prepare for contingencies, (Emergency Preparedness Plan).

## **Section 2: Process and Impact for different Approaches**

### **Chapter 4. Findings: Process and Impact for different Approaches**

#### **DSPR - Gaza**

##### **4.1. Relevance and Appropriateness**

The appeals were designed to support highly vulnerable and fragile areas; which are densely populated with victims who have been subjected to chronic very harsh economical and political situations. It served highly deprived needy populations who have had already exhausted almost all their coping and compensatory mechanisms. Although there is no clear national overall strategy for the emergency assistance, the provided response is in line with the international principles of the humanitarian assistance. The implementing bodies actively contributed to the development of the appeals which finally resulted from active discussions and negotiations with and within the ACT members. The appeals comprised of different components which contributed to partially meeting the diversified needs of the assisted clients. The appeals addressed the unemployment problem through job creation component which was very relevant and needed. Additionally, the appeals partially contributed to meeting some basic needs of the population through providing cash assistance which allows flexibility for families to meet some of their needs. Contextually, in principle, the cash assistance component was very relevant and appropriate approach. The support to the health program was also very relevant to meet the increasing demands for health services resulted from the deterioration of health status and the diminished abilities of other health providers to provide health services.

The components of the different appeals were similar in certain assistance approaches and different in others. This reflects appropriate responsiveness and field orientation of the appeals. For example, unlike appeal 51, appeal 61 and 71 included a component to support health services. At that period (2006), and as a result of the Palestinian Parliament Elections, sanctions were more imposed on the PA ministries and the health care system started to further deteriorate. Another sort of appropriateness and relevancy was related to the increased number of beneficiaries benefited from the appeals which corresponds with the progressive and dramatic deterioration of the economic situation.

Because of the chronicity of the situation and the unseen horizon for improvement of the situation, ACT and its members need to develop a strategy for their emergency interventions. It is worth mentioning that MECC/DSPR has already developed a plan for all its interventions including the social assistance program. The proposed ACT overall strategy for emergency response will provide a clearer vision and a direction for future interventions in the oPt. Such strategic approach will enhance the provision of integrated interventions preferably with longer term orientations and also will help to avoid duplications with the many operating major assistance providers in Gaza.

##### **4.2. Effectiveness and Achieving Targets**

As aforementioned, the majority of the Gaza population are living in absolute poverty and lack adequate access to basic services particularly food, fees for medical services, education, transportation and other essential requirements. The combination of all these risk factors coincided with the un-employment and the deliberate destruction of economy by the Israeli, places population especially children at great risks.

As clear from the table below there was a consensus that the project was effective as it reached its stated targets. The project was designed to address basic emergency needs of underserved population. The

project achieved its stated objective in a very difficult context; meeting important needs of the population meanwhile doing that through a participatory and a well perceived approach.

**Table 4.1: Distribution of appeals beneficiaries by number and type of assistance received**

Component	Number of beneficiaries/ families		Total number of household members		Notes
	Planned	Actual	Planned	actual	
<b>MELP 51</b>					
Cash assistance	2000	2014	14000	14031	
Job creation	79	93			Total 6328 days
<b>MELP 61</b>					
Cash assistance	7000	10,544	49,000	77,581	
Jobs for the assistance program	4	4			
Jobs for supporting the medical staff	6	6			
Training	187	187			Covered by the NECC
Medical and medicines fees			76,000		
<b>MELP 71</b>					
Cash assistance	12,500	13,164	75,000	97,515	
Jobs for the assistance program	4	5			
Jobs for supporting the medical staff	5	4			
Fees of medical services			50,500		Covered by the NECC

The approach used by ACT and its implementing partners to provide assistance was diversified both in the type of assistance provided and in the approach to target and reach beneficiaries. Given the chronicity and the complexity of the emergency situation in Gaza and its multifaceted features, a diversified assistance approach in fact is needed as demonstrated later in the coming paragraphs. However, still it will be more effective, if this diversity is deliberately extrapolated from a larger overall strategy.


The beneficiaries were identified and targeted through a diversified participatory approach. Most beneficiaries were targeted through organizations (voluntarily participate in the process) especially those who received cash assistance. DSPR-Gaza developed excellent relationships with official and local organizations; both PA affiliated and the community based organizations (55 in total). These organizations actively collaborated with the DSPR-Gaza in identifying and targeting potential beneficiaries. The mixture of collaborating organizations (governmental versus non governmental, liberal versus religious, political versus benevolent and so on) enabled a more effective and fairer targeting approach. To overcome the limitations of providing assistance through organizations (potential organizational bias), beneficiaries can directly access the assistance without going through these organizations through sending letters directly to DSPR-Gaza or presenting physically to the DSPR-Gaza offices. A reply is sent by the management of DSPR-Gaza in response to each letter received.

The coming paragraphs summarize the analysis of the different appeals and its different components as follows;


### Cash assessment

Through the three appeals, around 25,723 deprived families were benefited from the cash assistance component where almost each family has received around \$ US 50 (equals NIS 200). Flexibility was demonstrated in providing smaller size families lesser amount (NIS 100-150) and families from Um El Nasser Village (disastrous area because of sewage flood which took place in 2006) larger amount as they received NIS 400 for each affected family (280 affected families in total). The already established target to provide cash assistance to 21,500 families has been far exceeded (112%). This has been achieved because the DSPR-Gaza reallocated some of the budgetary items; medical fees, education fees to the cash assistance to respond to the pressing needs of the community. DSPR-Gaza secured budget for these items through its program budget from other sources. On one hand, this reflects pressing needs for providing assistance and on the other hand, it reflects DSPR-Gaza commitments and dedication to maximize the number of beneficiaries (believing in the case).

**Figure 4.1: Distribution of beneficiaries who benefited from the cash assistance by appeals**




**Figure 4.2: Distribution appeals' budgets planned versus spent by for the cash assistance in \$ US**



In appeal MEPL 71, more resources were spent than planned and this resulting from commitment to assist beneficiaries before securing the needed budget. The DSPR-Gaza hoped to recruit more resources through the appeal but unfortunately it did not work. However, DSPR-Gaza is active now to secure the uncovered budget and partially succeeded in that so far. A lesson learned from this experience is that now DSPR-Gaza, doesn't make commitment till budgets are secured.

The cash assistance constituted the major component of the appeals' budgets and enabled the provision of support to a relatively high number of beneficiaries.

**Figure 4.3: Distribution of appeals by budget items spent on the different components**



Cash assistance was positively perceived by beneficiaries and enabled them to at least partially meet some of their basic needs according to their priorities. It is a matter of fact that many organizations providing large scale assistance in Gaza are providing food rations including UNRWA, MOSA, benevolent organizations, CARE International, Islamic organizations and many others. Those organizations are providing assistance to hundreds of thousands of people. For example, in the last emergency assistance UNRWA distributed food assistance to 118,098 families in one shot (June 2008). Through external donations, MOSA distributes food to around 30,000 families. Interestingly, in the Palestinian context, the provision of food provides security feeling to families; a feeling that is chronically lacking. Therefore, the MECC/DSPR provided support provides a different, yet needed kind of assistance as families have other requirements other than food. It is noticed that some people who receive food assistance from assistance providers sell it to have some cash for other needs; although, they need this kind of food in certain cases.



**Jabalia Camp Market- Food Aid distributed by WFP and UNRWA-June 2008**

Providing cash assistance allows a flexible and responsive approach for families to buy their needs. Among the family requirements procured by the MECC/DSPR provided cash assistance was cooking gas, cleansing materials such as soap, clothes, school bags, medicine, paying electricity bills and so on. One beneficiary said *"I bought chicken as we didn't eat it since months"*. Another one stated *"I went to the market and bought trousers for my son who studies at the university and also bought a cooking gas cylinder"*. Another advantage of providing cash assistance is that it requires less administrative and logistic costs. As they reported, organizations providing food assistance spend around 5 to 10% of the total assistance budget on logistics and administration. In MECC/DSPR in Gaza case, around 2% of the total budget is allocated to administrative costs, basically covering the salaries and some incentives for social workers, secretary, clerks and so on.

Unlike the emergency situation in other places where the focus is on the immediate provision of food, water and shelter to victims, the chronic emergency situation in Gaza created other needs and requirements that are usually not of a great concern in other emergency contexts (transportation fees, education fees, cooking gas, clothes, electricity and water bills, school bags, fruits). However, the provision of cash assistance is liable for misuse and misallocation. It is possible that this assistance is directed to other non-essential requirements. One interviewed lady reported that her husband bought cigarettes with the provided cash support. However, with the strict control and the monitoring system the MECC/DSPR teams are using, the misuse has been controlled and strictly managed when it happens.

Interestingly, the stakeholders and the major emergency assistance providers such as UNRWA and MOSA recommended that MECC/DSPR continues providing cash assistance at the current time. In fact, most organizations nominating potential beneficiaries to the MECC/DSPR have lists of names to receive the cash assistance.

To conclude, both providing food and cash assistance are needed and both contributing to covering the complex emergency needs of the underprivileged population in Gaza. Food has the advantage of meeting essential basic human needs and provides security feeling to families also, the direct provision of food overcomes the problem of lacking food in the local market and protects beneficiaries from the increase in prices. It is worth mentioning that most assistance providers particularly the international ones, bring food into Gaza rather than buying it from the local market in Gaza. Their status as international organizations gives them the privilege of importing high quality food stuff into Gaza. In contrary, there are encountered limitations related to the type of food provided. Most organizations provide basic food stuff that is usually insufficient for meeting all human requirements. One beneficiary stated *"I have seven 50-Kg bags of wheat flour but I am unable to give my son one NIS for transportations to his school"*. Because of the chronicity of the situation and the complexity of human needs, both cash and food are needed. Given that many organizations are providing food assistance basically the same type of food staff and because families have other unfulfilled needs, MECC/DSPR contributes uniquely through providing cash assistance in Gaza. The provided cash assistance is complementary to the already existing food distribution programs. Therefore, it should continue as a modality of assistance at least in the near future.

#### **Limitations of the implemented cash assistance**

- Most beneficiaries and collaborating organizations regarded the amount of assistance as limited in amount and requested doubling it. In fact, with the current prices in Gaza it is symbolic in nature and is only enough to buy one bag of sugar or wheat flour (50 KG) or a trousers. However, this will be on the price of the number of beneficiaries who could be assisted. As any social assistance program, each intervention has its positive as well as negative sides. It is worth remembering that, any taken social policy approach has adverse effects.
- The criteria of providing the cash assistance only for one time were felt as constraining. It is worth mentioning that, the letter sent by MECC/DSPR to organizations nominating potential beneficiaries clearly states that the nominated family should not be assisted before from the MECC/DSPR. However, with the best intentions, this condition is used in order to filter cases and to assist as much as possible a larger number of needy people (wider coverage). However, still, despite this condition, some organizations do nominate beneficiaries who received assistance before, and with the presence of strong justifications those beneficiaries could receive assistance more than once. This creates some differences among those who strictly and literally complied with this condition and don't nominate any person who had been assisted before and those who don't comply with this condition and nominate people who have been assisted before.
- A commonly stated request is that the assistance should be provided more frequently as far as the emergency situation continues in Gaza. Repeating the assistance every three to six months is a possible alternative. However, again, this would be on the price of coverage and may contradict with the emergency nature of the provided assistance. MECC/DSPR can't perform and shouldn't

duplicate the role of UNRWA and MOSA as this is beyond the capacity of the organization or the interests of the nation.


- Among the possible alternative is that instead of helping too many beneficiaries, at least some of them also receive assistance from other sources, DSPR/NECC utilizes a more conservative targeting approach and identify fewer number of families who are not benefited from other sources; the poorest among the poor and the most needy among the needy, and supporting them financially more frequently for specified period of time.
- Although the targeting criteria were fairly followed and highly respected, it encounters some issues. The targeting criteria were perceived as rigid and sometimes not specifically targeting needy segments of the deprived population. The following issues may require revisiting:
  - Families with less than 5 members are not entitled to the assistance. Those could be elderly people, families without children, or a needy family but didn't reach the threshold of having 5 members. Therefore, adopting a progressive approach which adjusts the assistance to the needs and correlates it to the number of family members could be more effective approach than having 5 members as a cut off point. Through providing its emergency assistance, UNRWA uses a progressive approach and allocates certain amount of food stuff per each family member.
  - Dealing with the head of the household, who is a man in most of cases, sometimes perceived as problematic. Some women are separated although not officially divorced. Women married to men with more than one wife could not receive the assistance although they need it as providing the support to the head of the family (usually a man) makes the distribution of the assistance subjects to the husband personal preference. Similarly, women whose husbands are not living with them or traveled, face difficulty in proving that as far as that is not officially documented.
  - The following segments of the community need to be more specifically assisted
    - Needy old age regardless of the household number (growing number)
    - Needy families with students
    - Families with disabled and sick members
    - Separated women although still they are officially married
    - Families suffer from additional problems crises/disasters

Annex 6.1 shows the targeting criteria and its implementation in the field. The annex shows that some of the targeting criteria that are illustrated in the appeals need to be more considered in the field upon targeting beneficiaries. The filtering criteria added by the MECC/DSPR need to be revised in a way that ensures specifically targeting needy beneficiaries. However, this doesn't mean that those beneficiaries such as families with sick, disabled or students members are not assisted rather; they should be more specifically targeted.


### Job creation

In appeal 51, job creation (JC) program were implemented to reduce unemployment and alleviate poverty. The program included a provision of job opportunities to 79 persons for 135 working days each. This target has been achieved and 93 persons were employed through this component at the MECC/DSPR premises such as clinics, training centres, headquarter office as well as in other organizations such as churches. As proposed in the appeals, some of the beneficiaries were graduates of the MECC/DSPR secretarial, vocational and community workers training courses. Also, health professionals were recruited to support the MECC/DSPR health program. Additionally, skilled workers such as painters and guards were also employed.

**Figure 4.4: Distribution of job creation and other hiring (medical staff and other jobs) by appeals**



**Figure 4.5: Distribution of job creation and other hiring by budget planned versus spent by appaels**



The payment of cash for work enables beneficiaries to earn and allocate scarce financial resources to household priorities and at the same time assists delivery of essential services and supported organizations in which they worked. Job creation beneficiaries assisted the health and the training programs implemented in the DSPR-Gaza as well as provided administrative and logistic assistance to the concerned organizations such as working as secretary, guards, services provision in churches, painting and so on.

Beneficiaries benefited from the offered job creation program were satisfied the most among the other beneficiaries and perceived the assistance as very positive. It supported them at critical moment of time and the provided financial compensation was reasonable and enabled them to assist themselves and their families. In fact, job creation was the most positively perceived component by beneficiaries, stakeholders and policy makers. It provided a chance for training for many of them as their skills were empowered. Later on, after receiving this job creation opportunity, some of them were hired in the DSPR-Gaza and other organizations as well. Local people enthusiasm for job creation is in line with the nature of the Palestinian people who are not poor by nature, but deliberately made poor as a result of the Israeli de-development policies. Job creation component constituted a chance for people to be assisted but still in a dignified way as they felt productive not only just negative recipients. One of them said, "*We felt as a productive human being not just a drifter (Shahath)*".

However, still some people don't regard providing job creation as a part of the classical emergency assistance where the attention is focused more in meeting basic needs such as health, food, water, safety and shelter. Again, emergency assistance must be contextualized and with the chronicity of the situation in Gaza, short term employment becomes an essential need. Interestingly, other United Nations and international donors developed job creation programs as a part of their emergency assistance to the Gaza population. For instance, currently, UNRWA offers 7,000-11,000 short term employment opportunities per month and the plan is to increase that up to 22,500 opportunities per month. However, the number of beneficiaries who could be assisted through the job creation component still limited as it requires relatively larger funds. The fact that some beneficiaries are sick, old can't make them liable for work. An additional constraint is related to the current collapse of the Gaza's economy. For example, materials needed for constructions work were not allowed to enter Gaza since June 2007 and most domestic industries were shutdown as mentioned earlier.

The DSPR/NECC was able to perfectly manage two commonly reported problems with job creation programs; namely monitoring and making participants productive. It was evident that participants in the job creation component were received appropriate follow up exactly in the same approach as regular employees. Each beneficiary of the job creation signed a contract and time sheets were accurately filled and monitored. The participants in this component were productive and had benefited the organizations they worked in particularly those worked in health facilities. With the contribution of the hired health professionals in this component, the numbers of beneficiaries of health services were significantly increased as explained later in this report.

The criteria for selecting beneficiaries for the job creation component mentioned in the Appeal MEPL 51 were respected by the DSPR-Gaza. However, the approach for selecting the beneficiaries wasn't systematized. People selected were known to the DSPR-Gaza as needy population. The DSPR-Gaza didn't publicly advertise this component to avoid the confusion and the problems associated with receiving hundreds of thousands of applicants. Unfortunately, Appeal 61, 71 doesn't include job creation as a separate component rather it included few opportunities that were designated to support the health and the social assistance programs. ACT was not in favour of including job creation component in these appeals.

## Hiring medical Staff

As proposed in the appeals, medical staff including doctors, nurses, community workers and a dentist were hired through the ACT's provided fund in order to support the health program implemented in the three MECC/DSPR health centres. The goal of hiring them was fully achieved and they contributed in increasing the coverage of health services and reaching more beneficiaries. The target of providing health services to around 76,000 beneficiaries was achieved even in fact exceeded as detailed below.

The total number of beneficiaries receiving health services from DSPR-Gaza is now more than 100,000. The total number of families registered at the MECC/DSPR has significantly increased and reached in June 2008 up to 24207 families (average per family in Gaza is 6.5 persons in average). Moreover, as shown in annex A6.2 the number of registered children who received well baby care and also treated when they were ill reached 67395 annually. The number of pregnant women and the number of women visited after delivery at their homes were almost duplicated (currently, DSPR-Gaza performs a total of 4000 home visits each year).

Through the contribution provided by the ACT appeals, new services were introduced such as dental screening programs for women and children. The number of clients who received dental care double in 2007 and reached 7237 beneficiaries (the figure for the year 2005). The effect of hiring the staff was more valued as the need for health services is increasing with the deterioration of health status and the declining ability of the other health providers particularly MOH to provide health services.



Ibtesam, community worker benefited from the JC



Dr Mohammad, Dentist employed through the ACT support, serving highly needy population in Rafah

## Other components of the appeals

The provision of assistance to cover the Vocational Training Centre (VTC) trainees and also to cover medical fees was also an important component. Interestingly, among the frequently mentioned needs of beneficiaries are covering costs of medicine and education expenses. However, DSPR-Gaza covered the targets in these two components using resources from its own program budget and therefore has not utilized the ACT appealed resources. In other words, DSPR-Gaza was able to attract additional funds for covering health and training fees. The originally allocated resources for training and health fees were designated to support beneficiaries receiving services from the DSPR-Gaza facilities. However, other beneficiaries from areas not directly served by the NECC health services were not entitled to this kind of assistance due to the fact that the DSPR-Gaza health centres render services to communities living in the same localities. In case they were in need for health related assistance, they have to find other sources. In fact, some clients who received the cash assistance used the resources for covering health or education needs such as procuring school bags, stationary, medicine or paying transportation fees.

### 4.3. Impact

The impact of the appeals can be seen as positive in general. The evaluators judgement clarify that the different components of appeals had different impacts as clarified in the coming paragraphs.

Regarding the cash assistance, the impact of the assistance is perceived as positive. The appeals provided assistance to 25,723 deprived families and partially met some of their basic needs. It is not expected that providing limited amount of cash assistance for one time would produce long lasting impact. However, the assistance was a sign of sympathy and support and provided hope to beneficiaries plus it covered some needs and families' priorities. The impact would be greater if the amount of assistance is increased and provided more frequently possibly to a less number of clients. This could be achieved through revising the



targeting strategy and selecting the poorest among the poor or neglected segments of the needy population.

Job creation had more positively perceived impact than providing cash assistance as it provided a temporary chance for beneficiaries to work and to receive training as well. Although the period of job creation is relatively limited, it contributed to alleviate the suffering of beneficiaries, at least at that period. 93 jobless were benefited from this component in MEPL 51 and they were productive at the provided job opportunities. The services they provided to the host organizations were perceived as useful. An additional important issue is the psychological impact on the beneficiaries, who reported that the provided job opportunities improved their self-esteem.

Hiring medical staff was also another important component of the project which helped the MECC/DSPR to meet its targeted beneficiaries given the many prevailing contextual constraints. The hiring of medical staff through the appeals increased the coverage of services in the MECC/DSPR clinics by at least 20%. In certain services such as dental services and screening, the coverage rates were almost duplicated. The contribution of the appeals helped the MECC/DSPR to meet the increasing demands for health services resulting from the deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions and the disruption of health services in MOH as a result of the contraction of donors support and the current division within the PA. The impact of the provided health services can be regarded as a long term investment in the nation's future; the children.

To conclude, the comments made by the beneficiaries and the field observations illustrate that the emergency response had positive impacts on the life of population served and partially met their needs. Additionally, the informants from the official authority and the collaborating organizations also reported a positively perceived impact of the emergency response provided by the ACT. However, given the nature of the provided assistance, and its short term, it was impossible to validate its impacts relying on solid figures. As aforementioned, developing indicators and tracking the change in these indicators is suggested. However, ACT emergency responses should continue in the coming years till the underlying reasons of the emergency situation are resolved and its consequences disappear.

#### **4.4. Process and efficiency**

Despite that the process of providing the assistance as a whole is not documented as a recognizable flow chart, it is well known process by MECC/DSPR and its collaborating organizations and was efficiently done. Although, the process of selection and verification of candidates for the cash assistance was rigorous, very organized, and possibly strict; it has been implemented in a timely manner. Taking approaching the beneficiaries through organizations as an example; the process took around 4 weeks to be completed. This process involved sending letters to organizations, organizations provisional selection of candidates, communicating that to MECC/DSPR, verification of names, informing organizations of the potential names after filtering, giving appointments, clients' presentation to the MECC/DSPR main office, doing social assessment of the cases and issuing the amount of assistance and then receiving and signing the voucher.

Upon receiving the assistance, beneficiaries go through three service delivery points. Firstly, upon the arrival to NECC for registration, taking information and opening a file; secondly, upon conducting the social case assessment and finally when receiving the assistance in hand. Some beneficiaries preferred having all the steps done at one service delivery point. However, the currently in use system ensures efficiency from organizational perspectives and ensures transparency as well. It is not advisable that all the steps be done by one person. Each client visits DSPR/NECC office once, and all the steps are done in one single visit. In rare cases, in appeal 51, some clients were sent home back and return in the second day and this was avoided in subsequent appeals with the development of an appointment system. There was obvious improvement in the waiting time in MPEL 71 (20-30 minutes) in comparison to MPEL 51 (4 hrs) due to the development of an effective appointment system. Client flow is monitored and documented and management pays attention to the time spent at each stage of the process.

#### **4.5. Gender Sensitivity**

Overall the response has been implemented meanwhile maintaining respect for the gender factor within a culturally sensitive frame. Families consisting from males and females both were benefited from the ACT provided assistance. This was not only applicable to the provided cash assistance but also to the job creation and hiring medical staff as well. Many females were also hired in the job creation program and more than men; the hired medical staff were mostly females. In fact, cash assistance was provided to the head of the family irrespective of gender, but culturally men are the head of household in the Palestinian context. Female widows and families headed by ladies were also entitled to assistance.

Interviewed ladies were notified by their husbands about the assistance and shared in the decision making regarding the utilization of the provided assistance. Interestingly, interviewed women reported that they are active nowadays in securing support to their families. Most interviewed women preferred that their husbands received the assistance except one lady who reported that "*men miss use the money-buy cigarettes*". Some others don't care about who receives the assistance as far it's for the family. However, the majority of men and women preferred that men receive the assistance. One female said "*these days men do nothing.....let them get out of the house and do something*". MECC/DSPR team working on the assistance is a mixture of females and males. In this evaluation, both males and females beneficiaries had participated.



Social workers team- Female dominant team



A female beneficiary during social assessment

A perceived remaining gap in this regard, is related to ladies who are still officially married but not living with their husbands. An example of that is the separated ladies as there are not entitled for assistance until they prove that officially. Similarly, ladies who are married to men with more than one wife could be disadvantaged as the assistance usually goes to the new wife. Another category is the ladies whose husbands are abroad and they can't easily prove that. However, for those categories the door is not completely closed as if they prove that through a document from "Mukhtar-community leader" then, they are entitled for assistance. Still gender relevant measures should be taken to ensure access to women.

Although DSPR adheres to ACT gender policies and codes, further work is needed to develop gender mainstreaming in emergency responses, reflect gender relevant analysis and indicators that promotes access to resources and protection to women, as suggested in part 5.5 for the DSPR WB and for DSPR to lead and monitor.

#### 4.6. Target Groups and Stakeholders Participation

DSPR-Gaza didn't perform needs assessment as an independent exercise. In fact, many UN agencies, national and international organizations carefully monitor the situation and regularly produce reports about the humanitarian situation. Subsequently, DSPR-Gaza uses these reports as basis for their interventions. Therefore, beneficiaries are not officially involved in designing the appeals. It could be also claimed that the DSPR-Gaza as a grass-root organization working in Gaza since 1952, has developed extensive knowledge and experience of the local context. DSPR-Gaza on going programs in the field of health, training and social assistance, made them fully aware of the field situation.

However, involvement of beneficiaries and partner organizations in needs assessment is done on a continuous basis. DSPR-Gaza is keen to listen to the beneficiaries' comments and responses and to respond accordingly. Unfortunately, a suggestion box is not available in DSPR-Gaza. Collaborating organizations reported engaging in active communications with the DSPR-Gaza and with the beneficiaries. Meetings with partners were done on an ad hoc basis and usually based on needs.

DSPR-Gaza showed responsiveness and flexibility in the implementation based on the needs. For example, Um El Nasser, a village suffered from sewage flood in summer 2006, were assisted by providing each affected family with double cash support than the usual also, because of the frequent Israeli incursions and the destruction, almost all the population of El-Shoka were assisted. Another example of DSPR-Gaza responsiveness was the development of an appointment system to decrease the long waiting time. The developed system with the collaboration of the participating organizations succeeded to shorten the waiting time from 5 hrs to less than 1 hr. As a part of its monitoring system the DSPR-Gaza is keen to get feedback from beneficiaries and carefully listens to beneficiaries' comments and perspectives and responds accordingly. This has left positive impressions on beneficiaries.

The communication between DSPR-Gaza and partners and beneficiaries is regarded as very good. Collaborating organizations complied with and respected the targeting criteria for the assistance as specified by the DSPR-Gaza and utilized it. Because many of them deal with other assistance providers,

they use the DSPR-Gaza criteria in their work. Interestingly, for social services, most partner organizations developed a computerized data base for filtering cases and they adopted the approach used by the MECC/DSPR in this regard.

Overall, the ACT response can be judged as meeting the needs of vulnerable and deprived population through a participatory approach in which local organizations play a central role and makes the implementation of the assistance efficient, effective and most importantly, positively perceived by clients and beneficiaries.

#### **4.7. Transparency and Accountability**

The level of transparency and accountability of the ACT provided response can be described as very good. DSPR-Gaza respects and complies with the targeting criteria and honestly implements them. Collaborating organizations also respected and followed the required criteria and used them with other assistance providers. For filtering and verifying the cases a computerized data base has been developed by the DSPR-Gaza and partners organizations. Beneficiaries felt that DSPR-Gaza is a transparent organization utilizing a fair approach. Sometimes, the concerns for transparency had annoyed some organizations. The later refers to one statement mentioned in the letter sent by the DSPR-Gaza to organizations which clearly states that *"The organization which nominates candidates for assistance should not receive any financial compensation for their work from beneficiaries"*. In fact, in Gaza, with other emergency assistance programs, some organizations involved in providing emergency assistance take part of the assistance from beneficiaries. Beneficiaries know that they have been assisted because they met the targeting criteria and that they should not give any part of the assistance to others. DSPR-Gaza carefully monitors this issue and regards it as a serious issue if it happens.

Interestingly, the culture of transparency and equity noticeable in the DSPR-Gaza has been transferred to some other participating organizations. One interviewed Mayor said *"We learned a lot from the MECC management particularly the executive secretary and I am very concerned that the cases we send are needy and accepted according to the criteria. Even, I told the members of local community committees any person nominates people who are not in need, will lose his right to nominate in future. We need to be fair and transparent as MECC expects from us"*. Most participating organizations have representatives from the different neighborhoods representing their areas. Those representatives are being asked to nominate potential cases to receive the assistance based on need of that area (like a Quota system) and to bring the needed documents from them (usually a copy of the identity card). Subsequently, a meeting is held and all the names are discussed and agreed upon before sending them to the DSPR-Gaza office. This approach ensures that the selected cases cover the entire area and names are double checked and verified before being sent to DSPR-Gaza.

To ensure transparency, cash is provided to the person in hand and s/he should present her/him self physically to the DSPR-Gaza (beneficiary can't be substituted) except if there is a strong reason such as in case of illness. Wives of those who can't present should present holding documents proving that their husbands might be incapacitated, after that, they can receive the assistance.

#### **4.8. Minimum Codes and Standards: SPHERE, and Code of Conduct**

The minimal standards of emergency assistance were very well respected. The design and the implementation of the assistance do comply with the NGO Code of Conduct and with the SPHERE minimal standards. Although the Act Code of Conduct and the SPHERE minimal standards were not available as documents in the DSPR-Gaza in Gaza Office, the practices on the ground showed that they are well respected and implemented. Organizing a session to reinforce these concepts and practices might be helpful. Some thing that kept emerging in every focus group discussion is that the DSPR-Gaza provides its assistance regardless of any kind of discrimination; and assistance is only provided based on needs. Although currently, the Gazans community is clearly disaggregated into various strata in reference to political affiliation, religion, citizenship status (being a refugee or a non-refugee), geographical place, there was a consensus across the different strata regardless of the geography, the political affiliation, religious beliefs and citizenship status that the MECC/DSPR doesn't discriminate so whatever. In other words, organizations and beneficiaries positive perceptions about the provided support were constant throughout all the interviews with partners and beneficiaries who were heterogeneous in their political and religious orientations.

Unlike aid provided by other organizations especially non-governmental organizations and some charity organizations, the provided aid by the ACT wasn't manipulated to serve any governmental, political or religious agendas. One governor said *"because of politics, since the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, we now don't receive any assistance to the poor in our areas from any organization except the MECC/DSPR"*.

More importantly, aid was provided in a way that maintained dignity of beneficiaries meanwhile considering cultural sensitivities (politically appropriate). Giving an appointment time, monitoring waiting time, monitoring beneficiary flow, responding to every letter sent by people requesting the assistance, are all signs of respecting human dignity. In response to a question to beneficiaries and partners organizations, what comes to your mind first when the world MECC/DSPR is mentioned, the most frequently cited words were "*Fairness, equity, organization, respect and dignity*".

However, one remaining un-met principle of the NGO code of conduct is related to meeting basic need and preventing future vulnerability. The ACT's provided aid didn't completely meet basic needs of victims and is unable to prevent future vulnerability. This is related to the context of the emergency situation in the oPT which is man-made and political in nature (a humanitarian situation with a non-humanitarian solution). One approach to respond to this principle is designing a strategy for humanitarian assistance and advocating for greater integrations and coordination with other agencies particularly PA and UN agencies.

## **Chapter 5. Findings: Process and Impact for different Approaches**

### **DSPR- West Bank**

#### **5.1. Relevance and Appropriateness**

The different appeals were responding to the emergencies raised in the oPt during the various periods, and based on various emergency changes during the years 05 till April 08 for the appeals MEPL51, 61 and 71.

The appeals were inline with various emergency and vulnerability reports indicating the increase in food insecure people, the depletion of coping mechanisms and the inability of humanitarian aid providers to meet all the demands (section1).

The responses' approaches used by DSPR-WB were mainly: Food Aid, Income generation/work programs, Medical and Education assistance. It is noted that all approaches were immediate relief actions related to life saving and preserving.

Most communities reached are those affected by the emergency either trapped in the conflict, or affected by the Wall and closure regime imposed on the WB, part 3.3 from the report illustrates some cases.

Spread of response was wide and reached wide geographical areas in the North and the center of the WB. The responses reached diversified communities, Refugee Camps, Villages, Bedouins and affected zones in cities. The wide coverage was mostly attributed through the food aid approach.

**The Food Aid Approach was found appropriate for people affected by contingencies or immediate emergency in their community**, for instance that community was under curfew for certain periods, under attack, isolation...etc, as the case of curfews imposed over the Old City Nablus, or Jineen Refugee camp after its destruction in the year 2002, as well as the incursions to various locations in 2002.

**Such intervention was also appropriate for dependent families that have no other source of income**, they live on charities, and don't have any family member in the work force, they are social cases that fit in the criteria of ongoing assistance by MoSA and UNRWA with support of WFP. It was noted that some groups whom qualify are not served by either, such groups requested receiving the portions in periodic intervals as discussion in various focus groups and interviews with members of these categories stressed that portion received once, or once/year is not enough for life sustaining or to provide food security.

Beneficiaries interviewed suggested a voucher system from local merchants through controlled measures that ensures accountability to be able to purchase other basic commodities.

**The Income generation/work program Approach was the most relevant approach to the vulnerable house holds with one member in the work force but is unemployed.** It was most appropriate to provide support with dignity, it was prioritized by most focus groups conducted even those receiving support through other approaches. It was more appropriate to them: provided them with cash to pay for bills, education fees, buy other stuff as well as food.

The approach provided certain work days opportunities through labour intensive projects to the unemployed. For the beneficiaries, it was their main work opportunity during that period,

This approach was implemented in 51, then not favored by ACT, although argued through Oxfam policy paper<sup>35</sup>, that cash in humanitarian food aid responses, through various mechanisms as work for cash, could be more appropriate to population than receiving in-kind food aid support, to improve people's purchasing powers.

---

<sup>35</sup> Oxfam Briefing Note, " Making the Case for Cash, April 2005

The Medical assistance for the vulnerable community and people was a need for most of them, the medical assistance delivered by ICC used two methods, the support through Medicine delivered to UNRWA clinics in Jineen Refugee camp-61, and the Medical individual assistance. It was found that the support to UNRWA clinics was appropriate for the people, which supplemented what was missing at certain emergency. Although Individual assistance was relevant to their needs, it was limited.

The Education assistance is relevant to the vulnerable groups in the form of one time assistance before scholastic year entry, or in the form of fees and support (transportation or accommodation) payments as groups interviewed suggested, one man stated that his wife had to sell her gold for her son to go to university, for another although his daughter could get very high marks and acceptance from university he was unable to enrol her. For some of them the enrolment of their sons and daughter in the higher education system or in Vocational training adds to their vulnerability.

The support was provided by the DSPR-WB in 61 through School bags distribution in limited villages, it was needed at that time as beneficiaries stated, it is relevant to the emergency analysis were the economic cycle was severely hit during year of 06 where most of PA employees were not getting their salaries and the resulting cash liquidity crises, within same period UNESCO had a similar project and distributed 1 million bags to all basic schools' students.

DSPR-WB has responded through other unplanned approaches such as Distribution of Animal feed, distributed to Bedouin communities affected by Wall, settlements and closure systems. It was noted through the evaluation that **Animal feed support was more appropriate to the survival of the herding communities**, as animal production is their main source of income, for them feeding their herds is more appropriate for their food security. The two herding communities visited stressed the importance for such support, one of them received the support earlier while the other received food aid but prioritized such support.

The response is in line with recommendation of various food security and vulnerability reports stressing the importance of protecting and supporting their livelihoods (section1) in response to the emergency, environment change and the increase of animal feed prices.

## 5.2. Effectiveness and Achieving Targets

The Appeals Objectives for the DSPR-WB MEPL51 61 and 71 were to provide the planned assistance through the various approaches of food aid, job opportunities, medical and education assistance for planned number of beneficiaries.

All approaches were implemented as planned in the stated appeals, yet the percentage of reached number of beneficiaries of those planned were affected in some way by the amount received of that pledged, as figure 5.1 below shows and figures A7.1 and A7.2 in Annex 7 shows.

**The figure below shows that DSPR-WB were able to achieve more than planned compared to received amount versus budgeted in all items of MEPL 61 and the food aid items in 51.** The over achievement in 61 was due to the dollar –NIS exchange rate difference between planning and implementation, as noted in the auditor report, the over achievement in number of people receiving education aid, is due to distribution of school bags only rather than school bags and uniform as planned, uniform was found of a hustle due to different students in different schools<sup>36</sup>.


The under achievement of job creation was due to the fact that it was planned to use unskilled workers at rate of 15US\$/unit, the type of projects implemented required skilled and unskilled workers for reliable technical work and to hold responsibility for achievements. ICC was able to implement 4 class rooms and facilities in Girls school-Serees, 4 class rooms and facilities in Yamoun village school and side walks in Serees village. The side walks were the only part implemented based on labour intensive indicators of 40% material, 60% labour<sup>37</sup>. According to project coordinator DSPR-WB was able to develop its labour intensive approaches and are currently implementing through part of the water cistern provision to communities.

---

<sup>36</sup> El Yousef and Company- Deloitte, MECC-DSPR Emergency Appeal MEPL61, Auditors' Report and Financial Statement, from May 06-May07

<sup>37</sup> El Yousef and Company- Deloitte, MECC-DSPR Emergency Appeal MEPL51, Auditors' Report and Financial Statement, from Oct 04-April06

**Figure 5.1: Percentage of Received from Budgeted compared to percentage of beneficiaries reached**



Source: ACT Appeals, Narrative and Audited Reports

The under achievement of Medical assistance in MEPL 71, was related to the amounts received and the management decision taken to prioritize the food aid, where only 2 served compared to 500 planned beneficiaries.

In MEPL61 the aid to animal feed was accounted for under food aid as it was not planned in the original appeal.


The appeals 51, 61 and 71 enabled the DSPR-WB to reach 16,013 beneficiaries in the different areas within the North and Center of WB with a budget of around 1MUS\$, at a cost of 60US\$ per beneficiary.

**Table 5.1: ACT/DSPR-WB MEPL 51,61 and 71 total received, beneficiaries reached and cost/beneficiary/approach**

	Received US\$	Person-HH Benefited	Cost / person-HH US\$
<b>Food aid</b>	565,808.25	10827	52.26
<b>Job Creation</b>	90,687.00	2784	32.57
<b>Medical</b>	22,283.64	502	44.39
<b>Education</b>	25,825.53	1900	13.59
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>704,604.42</b>	<b>16,013</b>	<b>44.00</b>
<b>Total including admin fees and audit</b>	<b>953,539.12</b>	<b>16,013</b>	<b>Actual: 59.55</b>

Each beneficiary represents a household, the administration cost is not added here but it represents an add Analysis of cost effectiveness of approaches shows that **Education had the best cost effectiveness, followed by job creation, then medical and last is the food aid.**

**Fig 5.2: Distribution of funds received over approaches**



Most of aid fund was spent on food aid, followed by Job creation, education and medical.

Effectiveness in targeting and reaching the target groups is detailed in part 5.4 Process and Targeting of the report.

### 5.3. Impact

MEPL61 and 71 Appeals goals were to provide emergency assistance that will enable families and their members to withstand the negative effects of the increased emergency situation and the negative effects of war and ongoing conflict through provision of essential services such as food, health, education, home and business rehabilitation and special needs.

It would be expected that according to type of emergency, the prolonged duration the sweeping effect it has over various communities, and its resulting damaging effects including erosive coping mechanism, that any response would result in ONLY mitigating the effects on the vulnerable and the destitute.

The response was able to reach over 15thousand households, the response was able to impact various communities as well as households, impact varied according to approach used.

**The job creation element had the highest effect on beneficiaries** as approach provided the unemployed with opportunity to earn their income and be productive in the community, for some of the beneficiaries it was the first opportunity for years. Most people interviewed perceived that this approach provide them support with dignity: **“We are earning our income, then support becomes our right not a charity”** as beneficiary focus group of the job creation stated. Some of the other beneficiaries stated that if work program is presented it would reduce violence in the family, and would reflect better on the psychological well being of the bread winner and the family.

**The job creation approach had a clear impact on communities**, it added class rooms that continued to serve the local communities for years to come and other works for the community that is apparent and realized by the local community. The community was also able to participate in the project through local contribution, where local councils were active in fund raising from other resources based on the DSPR-WB response.



Class rooms



Side Walks

**The Food Aid approach had a higher effect on the social cases, the destitute, or families without bread winners and with no other income**, whom are receiving aid from others such as UNRWA and MoSA, and it is insufficient, “popular committees in camps and people interviewed has stated that UNRWA has reduced its portion from around 4 times a year to twice”.

**Food aid had more of an immediate relief effect, it is not enough on its own to leave an impact, with amount given once a year or in a life time. It would have a better impact if it targeted the new poor of the destitute that are not receiving support from other sources with more frequent distribution, until they are registered with MoSA, UNRWA or other major actors.** This is a clear issue indicating the importance of collaborations with other main actors.

**The food aid had a high effect on PA employees families in 06**, through MEPL 61, as PA lost its ability to provide salaries for its employees, so the one portion assisted those families specially that it arrived in the critical time just before Christmas and Ramadan. **It had the higher impact in contingencies, and following certain ‘fresh’ emergency.**

It also **had an impact on low income people as a supplementary source** that contributed to reduce the effect of increase of food prices and lower ability to find extra income opportunity.

Food was produced from local markets and through regional wholesalers, while local products were also prioritized for purchasing, such measures have a positive impact on the economy by pumping cash into the local economy.

**The long distribution of food aid as a sole mean of support for certain communities had negative impact of people getting dependent** on the food aid rather than being productive, due to the time element and the ongoing support in this direction. It is recommended that this intervention to be supplemented with other livelihood support.

**The medical assistance had a high impact on those assisted but was limited**, as price of medicine is high, hence **with chronic diseases certain categories of households could be pushed into poverty and vulnerability**, as stated by various beneficiaries. The impact was limited as approach was not accessible or announced. The one time intervention to supplement medicine availability at the Jenin refugee camp had an impact on the people in the camp as the head of the popular committee mentioned and beneficiaries interviewed.

The one time intervention of educational assistance during fiscal crises in 2006, affected the assisted families positively as mentioned by beneficiaries, as part of educational support beneficiaries **requested loans for education and loans for small businesses that institute provides, but is not announced enough**. Loans for education could be added as part of the education emergency support.

While the one time intervention of **supporting animal feed, had an impact on their communities to sustain the herds that season**, specially those received the support were trapped with the Wall and the settlements and lost the opportunity for seasonal work to support their herding, if not supported they would have sold some before time or watch some of the herds get sick and died.

***The overall thin support for so many people, has impacted certain communities and certain categories of the vulnerable, but needed further enhancement, through focusing, targeting, and linking each approach with the relevant categories based on findings of the evaluation.***

The response provided people with **moral support** as well, as one stated: **“We are not left alone, there are people thinking about us in other places round the world”**. The support perceived by the communities as Christian organization supporting mostly Muslim communities was very much appreciated and contributed positively to the increase internal Muslim-Christian solidarity and relation.

To maximize the positive impact of the ACT emergency support, within the limited available resources, taking into consideration the extensive humanitarian demand to serve various vulnerable communities that is increasing with time, and taking into consideration the prolonged effect of the emergency and the expected continuation of such emergency. **It is highly recommended that the DSPR-WB concentrate on protecting and supporting livelihood systems based on their strength and lessons learned from the evaluation. In addition to joining forces with other ACT members to maximize the impact, it is also recommended to focus rather than spread thinly over areas so that to move from a repetition of one time response for over 8 years into an impact that could enhance food production and reduce the effects of the emergency, over certain communities.**

One example of such has been in the joint effort of ICC/Caritas supported by DCA, where certain land was reclaimed and water wells were dug, so that the land is productive and can support the owners. In focus group discussion for some vulnerable groups in villages that still have land found this intervention as appropriate and would leave a better impact, this was also confirmed by resource persons through interview. The experience of well digging within job creation could be used.

**The food packages could continue to be an option in contingency**, and for the destitute groups if coordinated well with the other actors. **Animal feed for the Bedouin communities was found feasible** as a mean of supporting livelihood systems, other measures could be added in cooperation with other actors.

## **5.4. Process and Targeting Efficiency**

### **5.4.1. Food Aid<sup>38</sup>:**

#### **Food Supply Chain Management- Food aid planning**

**The ration planning:** the portion within the food basket is planned to be 2,100kcal/day/person used for a family of 6 for 3 weeks. The content was designed by nutritionist at the beginning of the program. Upon verifications with two nutritionists<sup>39</sup> showed that contents would give less than that, and is only enough to give 40% of the required calories for 3 weeks<sup>40</sup>. Package needs rechecking again.

It was also found from files that the family number served are variant and ranges between 1 to 10, each family gets the same basket if they had less or more than 6, refer to 5.4.2 Targeting and figures A7.3 and A7.4 in Annex 7.2.

In analyzing **appropriateness and acceptability** of the basket contents, it was found that basket contents are same for MEPL51,61 and 71 no reference of satisfaction assessment or consultation of it's contents, it was altered in the revision of 71 due to price increase and dollar devalue against local currency, where certain elements were removed.

**Beneficiaries were mostly satisfied with the basket** contents except for some in certain locations that did not use one item (the canned meat). Certain women in other locations requested flour to be added, especially after increase of its prices, it became a non-affordable basic commodity, that vulnerable used to depend on.

**Food Quality and Safety: Food quality of the ICC package was rated as best among all other food aid programs**, this was stated during different Focus Groups and interviews. In addition; not a single

<sup>38</sup> This part has been evaluated based on SPHERE indicators

<sup>39</sup> Name of Nutritionists: Dr Adnan El Wahadi and Dr Ahmad El Liely

<sup>40</sup> Refer to Annex A7.5 for contents of the package



complaint was heard from the different locations visited, regarding safety and quality. The following measures were taken by the ICC, especially in MEPL71 that contributed to this satisfaction:

- The timing between purchasing and delivery was min that allowed for min storage timing.
- The packaging of food was monitored by coordinator and checked through spot visits.
- The storage of the packages was checked by coordinator and insured safe and hygiene location.
- The expiry dates of the products were checked, and certain packages randomly checked by coordinator.

**During last appeal ICC distributed a list of package contents, which the beneficiaries and CBOs praised.** The only concern is the **distribution of powdered milk** although essential to families with children but has been recommended not to distribute in any form for fear of contamination, food safety, SPHERE food aid technical standards.

### **Food Supply Chain Management- Food aid management**

**Food handling was monitored** in various locations during last appeal, while communicated with other locations on methods used. In addition no complaints were registered during discussion and interviews with Beneficiaries.

**Distribution methods** were divided into 2 parts carried in series, first part is the distribution to certain location, where the ICC is responsible for. Followed by distribution to recipients where it is the responsibility of local partners. Method has been effective, **but further monitoring of targeting and reaching the targeted needs to be enhanced. Targeting criteria also needed upgrading**, while registration of House holds served should be better monitored, as well as distribution of local partners and verification of final destination through various means including random check is needed.

**Supply Chain Management, has been enhanced throughout the appeals**, it was noted that:

- There is a set of food aid guidelines paper that represents the food pipeline used.
- The Coordinator in 71 monitored food pipeline operations.
- DSPR-WB uses local suppliers which add to the efficient use of resources.
- DSPR-WB developed their procedures on quality control and selection of suppliers.

**Nevertheless; involvement of stakeholders and local partners in supply chain management and sharing of info and reporting** would be more beneficial than division of labour.

#### **5.4.2. Targeting-**

Targeting was divided into two main parts targeting of area and communities, and targeting of beneficiaries, the targeting of beneficiaries is affected by the choice of local partners.

##### **5.4.2.1. Targeting- Communities**

Targeting communities is the first stage in targeting, were mapping exercises is carried, and info gathered from application of different communities for help, contacts with major actors as UNRWA and WFP is carried, after which specific areas of intervention is highlighted as specified in the guidelines.

It is noted from evaluation that the decision making process for the different appeals is not totally documented, although some minutes of meetings with actors is, but “why was each area selected” needs documentation. It was noted that ICC was responsive to the emergency in certain locations where it was affected badly with emergency, most of the communities selected were vulnerable, yet there were other communities in other areas selected that were not in such need.

The WFP food insecurity maps<sup>41</sup> identify “Tubas and Nablus” with the highest food insecurity population while Jericho with the lowest. Jericho was selected, while selection was not justified. It is recommended that further interpretation of vulnerability monitoring data reflects on targeting, while decision making process to be documented.

##### **5.4.2.2. Selecting local partners**

In each targeted community DSPR-WB selects local partner to cooperate with. Local groups and partner organizations were selected based on prior knowledge, their past experience, or if they have approached the ICC. It is usually the:

- Local councils in Villages
- CBOs
- Governorate offices in cities
- Local churches

---

<sup>41</sup> One of the maps is illustrated in map A5.2 in Annex 5

Local partners will choose the beneficiaries based on Target Groups criteria set by the ICC, they will distribute the food packages after arrival to their location by supplier, or monitor distribution of educational support, or some times medical support. Local partners implement major part of the cycle, **hence as they are implementers their accountability reflects on the DSPR and ACT accountability.**

It was noted from the field that the thin spread of the food packages and the high demand in each location limits the benefit in certain areas, restricts targeting and increase the number of people unsatisfied, as

***The divisions in the different communities are wide and interrelated on various levels, such as political, religious and tribal. Hence it is very important that careful selection of local partners and monitoring the implementation parts of the response are done to avoid favourism and nepotism, to insure inclusion and better targeting.***

stressed by various local partners met, one local partner stressed that “the number of allocated packages represents half of the number needed in my community, so the selected half was satisfied while the others were not”. Evaluation of impartiality, transparency and technicality of the different local partners visited differed according to areas, and type.

Based on the observation of the evaluator in most locations visited there were some positive effects and Target group satisfaction in communities where accountable partners were selected and worked with. It was noted that elected LC in villages enjoyed trust in their communities as the newly elected bodies by these communities. They are also perceived as the representative body that represents different sectors of the community by other actors, they are always contacted by other donors for their communities, and hence their selection is not as questionable as other CBOs.

The choice of governorate offices was not favored, as they don't have the system for good targeting, one governorate chose the CBOs that deals with disabled families from different vulnerable localities, which proved to be good choice, while the other chose two popular committees, one proved accountable, the other did not. ***One of the lessons learned of humanitarian aid handling from another stakeholder was setting up of a representative committee on the governorate level lead by the governorate office.***

Another observation was that the choice of churches as bodies that distribute for Christians adds to the division in the community, **they can be chosen to distribute for all in certain locations, and to be part of the stakeholders committee**, while the LC takes the charge with allocated percentages for Christians that fits the criteria. Local churches met, were not favoring their involvement.

***One LC had enhanced targeting by forming a committee from the local community (representing different CBOs and families) to ensure inclusion of all. Best practice that enhances community selection and could be modeled in the different locations.***

The ICC has developed their experience in dealing with local partners, and have changed some of them when proved non-credible, yet there is no documentation of past experiences, and reasons for changes, or documentation of mechanism of selection.

In summary; local partners were the extended support for ICC to implement their responses in different communities, various local partners were performing efficiently and impartially, but still careful choice of local partner is needed, the involvement of other stakeholders in the community with local partner is also favored.

The ICC developed better involvement mechanisms of local partners for the community development elements following their evaluation that **reflected in good targeting in the work program, and increase involvement of different stakeholders.** As LC was involved, MEHE and engineering dept in MEHE were also involved in monitoring of the process.

#### **5.4.2.3. Targeting- beneficiaries**

The Selection Criteria are set and communicated to local partners, forms designed based on the criteria and sent to the communities to fill and send back to ICC. The Selection Criteria used by DSPR-WB, is the one detailed in the appeals, with extra measures included. Table A7.1 in Annex 7 indicates quick assessment of the level of implementation of the criteria.

Findings regarding targeting<sup>42</sup>:

- The set criteria target the food insecure, although certain elements ***have to be revised, and specific indicators set.*** To ensure addressing the destitute and most vulnerable.

<sup>42</sup> Refer to Annex A7.2 for details of targeting analysis

- Forms used reflects partially the criteria set, more columns should be added for total reflection: forms have the following columns: name, ID #, age, type of housing, profession, # of HH, signature. Other variance such as those related to illness, special needs, with children of elementary provision is not apparent. Hence Form and required info from the local partners should reflect the criteria.
- Verification is left to the local partner systems and their credibility; it has been effective in certain areas but not necessary in others, depending on the partner, as detailed in the previous part of report.
- **Monitoring of targeting and reach of targeted is lacking and needs enhancement.** Lists received from local partner are not same as send; some only have name, ID number, number of HH members and signature.
- Although unemployment was stated clearly in the criteria, there were various full time employees, one focus group session conducted with employees. It could be justified that PA employees in 06 would be eligible for the support after the seize of payment of salaries to PA employees then, but not after, with the high number of vulnerable people this has to be justified.
- Monitoring of distribution of local partners and verification of final destination through various means including random check is needed; some lists were received with no signature of recipients. Although coordinator could be present in distribution and check some of the places received assistance, ICC did not verify the rest.

### **Raised Critical issues-Impartiality versus inclusion of minorities**

The ACT support is according to Code of Conduct and international Standards, and should be provided regardless of creed, race, sex, political views, ..<sup>43</sup>

Evaluation noted unclear distinction of the needy among the Christian communities, which could further the division in communities and would affect transparency of ICC (in food distribution- the Jericho case)

The Jericho Case: All Christian families from the Jericho area received food aid support through the 3 appeals, one of them is a retired employee of ICC, others are high level employees and people that are not in need.

Father Firas representing the local church cooperated with ICC stated: " ICC told me that there are 100 packages for the Jericho area, so its less hectic and I could distribute to all Christian families living in Jericho, they did not specify a limited number, I cooperated with another CRO that requested the selection of 22 families only based on need, it was more hectic but I did it as requested"

It was noted that there is wrong perception among some of the humanitarian staff members and volunteers towards "church related support that should reach churches regardless of their economic status, money that comes from churches should go to churches !"

Minorities as Christians may not be targeted from other organizations such as Zaka (the Islamic Charity), although in their interview they mentioned otherwise, so for the dilemma of inclusion of minorities and in specifically the Christians versus impartiality it would be highly recommended that additional element of selection should be given to poor Christians to ensure inclusion, but other Christians that are not vulnerable should be excluded from ACT support.

This issue should be immediately tackled by DSPR and DSPR-WB, targeting should be enhanced, so that support would not further the division in the community, by targeting non vulnerable in certain communities.

*The ongoing food aid for Christians corrupt the Christians, Father Ra'ed from Jifna mentioned, "I don't like the food aid support and I don't prefer distributing it unless I have to, although we have a committee from the 3 churches and it goes to the needy, but it makes our people dependent, some people feels that it is a must to receive the aid, even those who could find other ways". In Nablus churches it raised division between churches.*

It was argued by ICC that in their past experience for mixed areas Christians were not selected, and when requested by the ICC the local partner, MoSA at that time refused, hence inclusion of minorities based on needy criteria, and inclusion of Christian community representatives in the selection committees could enhance the process.

Hence the following suggestions are recommended to enhance process inclusion and impartiality, to reduce any unplanned negative side effects and to be inline with international codes:

<sup>43</sup> Refer to Annex A7.3 International Code of Conducts in Disaster Relief

- For mixed areas the selection committee to consist of all representatives of the communities lead by LC including the Christian community representatives.
- The Selection Committee to decide upon the beneficiaries with clear measures to ensure inclusion of minorities with vulnerable based criteria.
- Capacity development and training of humanitarian aid related staff and volunteers on Human Rights and international codes and standards, before being involved in the work.
- Involvement of humanitarian aid related staff in assessing needs, planning, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of responses.
- Monitoring, as stated earlier, by the DSPR- WB and DSPR Central of the targeting.

For clarity it should be noted that Christian families constitute around 15% only of the appeals, although they are served in every appeal, the families served represent less than 10% of the Christian households in oPt, but recommended measures would enhance credibility and would not further partition in the community, and would be inline with commitment to codes of conduct.

#### **5.4.3. Job Creation**

**The process of the Job Creation approach was participatory with the local partners and local authorities MEHE representatives.** They participated in all parts of the chain, starting from selecting, planning, implementing, and monitoring of progress. Sourcing of materials was done collectively as well, and process documented.

The process was based on the development process enhanced throughout the years, and gained experience of the staff in this regard; the enhancement after the 2005 evaluation on the programs was also reflected in the approach.

**The process includes quality measures** that are verified by ICC, local council and MEHE. On going joint meeting between the parties during implementation was also conducted.

Beneficiaries were divided into two parts the skilled and the unskilled labour, the skilled was decided upon quality criteria as well as vulnerability to ensure delivery of quality component, while Targeting of beneficiaries was left to the local council and the skilled based on the set criteria by the ICC. Weekly monitoring of the activities and involvement and payment to beneficiaries was taking place by all three representatives.

Selection of areas and local partners were done similar to the food aid process. The areas for intervention selected were part of the most vulnerable, Serees was visited were two out of five of the works implemented in MEPL51 (case#6 in emergency section), while the local partner was the local councils, with the additional involvement of the local MEHE. The beneficiaries met were satisfied of the process and the approach.

***The Job Creation process is highly efficient, transparent and ensures higher participation of target groups and stakeholders.***

#### **5.4.4. Medical and Education Assistance**

The Medical and Education assistance was included in MEPL61, while MEPL71 also included health but has only served 2, Annex 7.4. It was noted that the less Support received through ACT, was reflected mainly in cutting support from Medical and Education assistance, table A7.4 in Annex 7.

The educational assistance was planned for uniforms and kits, was reduced to kits due to complexity of uniforms, while beneficiaries of kits only increased. The process used was same as the food aid process, hence same lessons learned and recommendations are valid for the approach. It should also be noted that same year UNESCO distributed bags for all elementary stage in schools, future prior collaborations could avoid duplications.

The provided Medical assistance in 61 was divided into 2 parts; first providing unavailable medicine to Jenin refugee camp, and second individual medical assistance. The process for the first part was similar to that of the food aid, in purchasing and delivering, hence same lessons learned and recommendations are valid for the approach.

**The individual medical assistance does not have a clear system, the cases applied individually and without announcement. Most of the beneficiaries and local partners did not know about such response. This affects the access to the response and could affect the credibility of institute.** Unlike DSPR-Gaza, health is not part of the institute's strength. There are neither fit capacities nor appropriate transparent systems to deal with the response.

**Unless the individual medical assistance is systematized and announced and/or conducted through another medical institute or partnership with another NGO, or CRO that is working in the field, it is strongly advised that this kind of response not to be delivered by ICC.**

### **5.5. Gender Sensitivity**

The current emergency status has its highest effects on women and children, where more women and children are forced to work in the informal sector on daily bases some times with lack of protection. Mechanism of coping has affected the family nutrias intakes, families are reducing their food intakes in quality and quantity as interviews with beneficiaries and international reports revealed. It affected priority of women education unless supported, as noted through LWF Vocational training programs that unless women were supported in fees and transportation they would drop-out. It would also affect children and women health well being on the long run.

The DSPR-WB-ICC response is targeting the households; registered beneficiaries are usually men, unless the household is headed by women being a widow or divorced. In some lists the household headed by women constituted 8% (Shuqba71) in others it raised to 20% (Taibeh 51).

In food aid the household headed by women was considered among the most vulnerable, as various CBOs stated. For such households it was realized from interviews that food aid is the most appropriate for them.

Women in focus groups, interviews and discussion whom were part of the households headed by men realized that job creation and livelihood support are the most appropriate for them. Job creation and income generation through livelihood support enhances the male psychological status and that reflects on the well being of the family and reduces tension and violence.

It is recommended that DSPR take into consideration that different approaches suited different categories of women, in future design of the response, it is also recommended to increase participation of targeted women in the process and to consider women needs in future needs assessment processes.

Women constitute 16-20% of the newly elected Local Councils, part of the local partners that is involved in relating to the beneficiaries, their presence in LC enabled more women to address the council. It is highly advised that DSPR indicate gender representation in selecting the local partners. Mean while the project coordinator and job creation coordinator at the DSPR-WB is a women engineer.

The management and staff at the DSPR-WB are gender sensitive and adhere to gender equality, yet gender sensitivity and equality measures are not integrated enough in planning, programming, and implementation. **Although DSPR adheres to ACT gender policies and codes, further work is needed to develop gender mainstreaming in emergency responses, reflect gender relevant analysis and indicators that promotes access to resources and protection to women. Mean while communicate gender sensitive measures and codes to local partners. It is also recommended to develop capacities of staff in dealing with the gender related codes that could reflect on the local partners.**

### **5.6. Stakeholders and Target Groups Participation**

The DSPR-WB/ICC has an effective network with various CBOs, Churches, LCs and NGOs, most have been involved in implementing the humanitarian aid projects and/ or development projects conducted through their program. DSPR-WB/ICC is the address for various other organizations that communicates with ICC on their situations and needs.

Partner organizations implementing in the field have high participation in the process, they asses their needs and implement part of the assistance (refer to section 5.4), while their involvement needs enhancement in the planning and deciding on the intervention, evaluation part of the response as well as integrated participation as partners rather than dividing roles without involvement.

**Target groups participation needs enhancement they should be involved at the beginning in a proper needs assessment process**, and in the planning of the intervention and approach, in evaluating the response. Their voices need to be heard and integrated in the process, not only through CBOs but through direct involvement with the CBOs. Some CBOs are exposed through other actors to the needs assessment and evaluation processes and willing to participate and prepare for it.

It was noted that interaction with target group and local partners in the Job creation approach was the highest than others, due to the type and duration of intervention; local partners are part of the whole cycle as well.

In implementing MEPL 71, ICC was present in some location at the distribution of food packages, which allowed interaction with target groups and feed back, ICC also did some random check to some locations for feedback, but unfortunately feedback was not documented. In addition; the distribution of the sheet in the packet with telephone number of the DSPR-WB/ICC encouraged lots of people to make the contact and provide feedback.

**It is recommended that ICC could put up a system to document the target groups feed back and complaints, and to reflect that on the CBOs as well.**

The DSPR-WB/ICC has good relations with other stakeholders and actors in the field, from the PA, UN organizations and other NGOs. Such interaction supported their work in the field.

#### **5.7. Transparency and Accountability:**

DSPR/WB-ICC is highly accountable as beneficiaries and local partners stated, Yet still there are various measures recommended by the evaluators regarding targeting that could increase accountability. (part 5.4.2)

It is also recommended that documentation and share of information could enhance transparency and accountability measures.

The financial procedures adds to transparency measures accounted for in the institute, the newly financial auditor status also would enhance transparency, there are also various management and financial related recommendations to enhance transparency further for DSPR and DSPR-WB that are detailed in Section 3.

#### **5.8. Minimum Codes and Standards: SPHERE, and Code of Conduct**

DSPR/WB and CO are committed to the Code of Conduct and SPHERE standards through the appeals, and as part 5.4 indicates there are various parts of the SPHERE standards that ICC is implementing, while they are implementing main parts of the Codes of Conduct, except for the concern raised in targeting.

But it was noted that they don't have a copy of codes and standards, and have not been trained on main elements of the codes and its applications in the different approaches and field, nor have the local partner heard about it, although they are exposed to different parts of codes as international values.

**It is highly recommended that DSPR carry out capacity development and training for all staff involved in the humanitarian aid**, and that ongoing coaching is carried on this regard by the management to the staff, and newly employed staff. It is also recommended that such capacity development training is also conducted to all local partners, while copies of the codes and standards are made available to all and to the DSPR CO and areas.

This evaluation is based on SPHERE and HAP standards, hence relevant Lessons Learned, and recommendations is inline with the international indicators, benchmarks and codes. It is worth mentioning that the evaluation has raised awareness of DSPR and stakeholders in such standards, and that a copy was provided to DSPR and to UNRWA emergency program.

### **Section 3: Evaluation of Organizational Issues of the DSPR**

#### **Chapter 6. Findings: Organizational Issues- DSPR- Central**

##### **6.1. Developing the Response- Central and Areas**

In response to emergency status the DSPR central office together with executive secretaries of the two areas develop the request for support, in various cases they were able in consultation with ACT to immediately request **Rapid Response Funding (RRF), such mechanism enabled DSPR to act urgently in specifically in Gaza, RRF was issued on June 20<sup>th</sup> 2007 following Civil Strife in Gaza and enabled the DSPR to receive immediate funding for cash assistance to 950 families, until the appeal MEPL 71 was developed and sent to ACT.**

Existing on the ground as a grass-root organization, and based on in-depth knowledge of the situation on the ground and being active participants in the society, DSPR areas decide on the emergency response and would initially draft the emergency appeals. The DSPR uses the information available from secondary sources as well as from the field observation to draft the appeal. Health facilities, training centers and social assistance department which belong to the DSPR-Gaza enabled them to have direct contact with people and to know their needs and sufferings. DSPR-West Bank existence in the community development and rural development program enables them to reflect the emergency in various communities of the WB. The ongoing work of the DSPR in emergency and its functional network with other stakeholders and partner organizations enables them to sense the urgency and figure out urgent needs and demands. Both areas try to set realistic targets that could be timely fulfilled and achieved.

The Central Office through its executive secretary and Chief Finance finalizes the appeal, then its publicly advertised, through the ACT alliance network and mechanisms. The ongoing monitoring of funding versus requirement is done by the CO, while implementation is carried through areas based on DSPR CO estimation build through relation to donor members of the alliance. As the implementation goes on the

ground and based on funds availability, revisions are done. Revision was done to appeal MEPL 71 to allow DSPR continue its response especially in Gaza.

**Identifying the emergency based on secondary data and presence on the ground is sufficient, while designing the response, targeting and mapping would need a systemized Needs assessment that is carried for each area, and discussed through the Area Committee and the CO.**

The rich experience of the field through the long track record of emergency work is not reflected back in the appeals, for instance the gathered feedback from communities and beneficiaries on certain response or in certain community is not reflected back in the next appeal. The level of cooperation between the two areas is carried on the management level, while it is recommended to exchange experiences, best practices and lessons learned in implementing the appeals among areas' management and staff and with CO. Final documents of the ACT appeals are sometimes missing from Areas, specifically Gaza. **Perhaps the availability of Video conference facility in both areas as many NGOs have, could overcome such obstacle** that is existing due to the emergency status and mobility restriction, the discussion of evaluation results through video conference for the two areas had a positive impact on both, especially Gaza.

The recent activation of the APF allows the joint development of the appeal as experienced through MEPL81. The existence of a joint strategy as was developed in 2002 by the ACT members assists members in prioritizing different responses relevant to the identified emergency and possible scenarios.

Evaluators recommend the APF development of a joint strategy that could shape various responses, and joint action, while the design stage in mapping and targeting to be better monitored and documented by the DSPR.

The ACT appeals format may require some development. The appeal could be done in two stages, RRF or similar mechanism to sense the emergency, and start the process, while the detailed appeal to integrate planning elements, requiring systemized needs assessment and reflects the actual planning stage and would help in monitoring and tracking interventions. It is recommended to develop a unified strategy for the ACT emergency response. From this strategy, different appeals can be derived and formulated, and vision for intervention would be available. It is also desirable to develop emergency preparedness plan, where it would activate quick responses to deterioration of status and any rising emergency.

In addition to the above and for more responsive and effective intervention in emergency, it is **recommended that DSPR would carry out continual monitoring of the emergency development, its effects**, as well as monitoring of other international interventions and actors monitoring reports. Continual monitoring to involve information from the field through areas probing ability, while monitoring to include other effects that adds to the emergency effects, The overwhelming political emergency sometimes covered the environmental effects on the livelihood of the vulnerable, as the draught, the frost and cold effects on the agriculture and animal raising livelihoods.

With the continual deterioration of the humanitarian situation, particularly in Gaza, it is advisable to activate the recruitment of resources probably through an effective communication and marketing strategy among ACT donor members and through other networks active locally such as the UN network and through ECHO funding, where there are big opportunities for both. The joint APF efforts could raise opportunities for such support.

## **6.2. Control and monitoring mechanism**

There are various levels of monitoring for the response:

- Pipeline monitoring or process monitoring-the coordinator, designated staff in each area
- Achievement versus planned monitoring and project monitoring- the area management, executive secretaries and management structures in areas.
- Overall Project monitoring- DSPR CO
- Impact and intervention- DSPR AC, CO and CC.
- Financial and Management monitoring, DSPR CO and AC

The role of DSPR CO and CC is evaluated in this part, while the related role of areas and management is detailed in following parts of 7.2 and 8.2, for Gaza and WB respectively.

The DSPR was able to lead and organize the efforts in applying for the appeal as well as contacting ACT and Donor members of the alliance, while monitoring progress of funding. Yet the CO needs to enhance its role further in advanced monitoring and expectations of funding so that to avoid any over or under expenditure as experienced in MEPL71, where funding for Gaza was under expectation although funding covered 88% of that appealed.

The overall project monitoring by the CO also needs enhancing to ensure achieved objectives and goals versus targeted within available funding **and to provide support** for areas during their implementation, as

an example the ICC used part of the Food aid in 61 for animal feed based on probed urgent need, change was only figured out by the central office at the end of the appeal, if such change was reported in time, it would reflect flexibility and responsiveness.

**The role of DSPR-CO needs to extend to provide support in planning of the response and monitoring the impact and lessons learned of the response.** It is expected that CO to be involved at the systemized participatory and gender sensitive needs assessment and planning efforts before implementing the appeal, to conduct Joint evaluation meetings and communications with executive secretaries of areas at the end of the appeal, as well as receiving internal monitoring and self-evaluation reports from the areas, in addition to open communication to areas to enhance such role. The preceding measures would activate CO role in Planning, Monitoring and evaluation (PME). **The CO is expected to monitor participation, targeting, adherence to codes and standards and other lessons learned and recommendations of this evaluation.**

The DSPR financial system is unified across areas through the unified accounting package and system the GIT, and consolidated external audit process with a single auditor. Such measure provides the ongoing and end of appeal financial monitoring.

Capacities are only newly added at the CO, see 6.3 below, which could enable its PME role. The more serious issue that adds to the weakness of the CO, stressed in 2005 evaluation report is the inability of the CO to exercise influence and authority over the areas.

Further monitoring of controls is required from the CO to ensure that implementation is inline with ACT policies and procedures, the procurement policies of ACT to be implemented in sourcing, and audited against when auditing. It was noted that the admin percentage is in line with ACT policies and does not exceed 15% for the appeal; it was 12.7%, 11.6% and 7.1% of the MEPL51, 61 and 71 appeals respectively.

The involvement of DSPR in consolidated planning process such as the consolidated strategic planning of 07-10 and the following capacity development in monitoring and reporting in 07 has enhanced the areas and CO capacities in monitoring progress of the strategy and in providing results based consolidated reports. One of the donors evaluation remarks mentioned that reporting of the appeals has enhanced through out the years.

The Central Committee role in financial and impact monitoring still needs enhancing, 2 days meeting every six months with overloaded agenda does not allow the CC to carry such role. The CC still consists of volunteers with same structure as presented in evaluation 2005, and although various processes with regard to programs has been carried, the organizational part of the evaluation needs to be addressed.

The ACT Appeals has been ongoing for the last 8 years through 3.89 MUS\$ of funding. Funding represented part of the annual funding for the DSPR. Emergency Appeal represented 17% and 27% of the 05 and 06 DSPR financial income respectively<sup>44</sup>. Hence monitoring the directions and effects of the responses is of necessary to the DSPR central structures. The appeals also contributed 28, 57 and 25 thousand US\$ to CO through 51, 61 and 71 appeals respectively, as part of the administrative support of the CO to areas.

**It is recommended for the CC that:**

- Lessons learned and evaluation recommendations to be monitored through the CO and CC.
- 2005 evaluation recommendations in the organizational part to be carried.
- A committee to be formed to follow up emergency related actions and support, it is recommended that members could be from the WBGS CC members, to work with CO closely in this regard.

### **6.3. Institutional Capacity**

The complex nature of the emergency and its prolonged effects could possibly result in donor's fatigue that would limit the available resources for emergency response, a challenge that requires activation of the CO role in advocacy, in addition to leading extensive efforts in communications and fund raising.

The PME role of the CO was affected by the minimum capacities at the CO. The 2005 evaluation regarding extending the CO professional capacity was fully implemented recently, and during the current evaluation period. In June/July 08 the following took place:

- **The role of the Finance Officer was extended to include the internal audit role** for all areas, he enrolled immediately in a course for internal auditing to develop his capacities, and started to systemize the auditing through preparing manual procedures, meeting with auditor and based on SPHERE standards, where the evaluator provided him with a copy, he would consider evaluation related outcomes and recommendations.

---

<sup>44</sup> Deloitte, MECC-DSPR Consolidated Financial Statement and Auditor's Report, Dec 31, 06 and 05



- Two new staff members were employed to carry out the project manager/fundraiser and advocacy roles. It is worth mentioning that CO had previous unsuccessful experiences since 2005 in this regard.

The internal auditor role of the finance officer **would** enable the DSPR to better monitor financially, and enhance transparency measures and to be in line with ACT procedures and SPHERE standards.

The role of project manager/fundraiser and advocacy officer, if carried efficiently, would increase effectiveness of the CO to carry out its role in fundraising and PME over the areas.

**It is recommended that internal auditor carry out his monitoring role of financial and procurement procedures, while use the financial system for decision making, early warning and monitoring of financial status.**

**It is also recommended that the Executive Secretary to monitor, coach and assist the two new employees, while empowering their role in relation to areas.** ES continual involvement is essential until they are able to carry it out with the support of the ES only, while for Advocacy it is recommended that the ES to be directly involved in Advocacy, due to its complicated nature and the mature understanding of advocacy by the ES and its linkages to the DSPR work. **The empowered role of the CO and the stronger leadership role of the Executive Secretary would reflect positively on CO monitoring, communicating, advocating and fundraising roles.**

**In addition, consultants recommend that CO to lead efforts in developing capacities of related humanitarian aid staff in ACT Codes and standards,** and to integrate indicators of standards and codes back into the process, while monitoring areas related implementation, as part of DSPR commitment to these standards and codes. Within same context; **CO to develop gender mainstreaming** in emergency responses, reflect gender relevant analysis and indicators that promotes access to resources and protection to women. Mean while communicate gender sensitive measures and codes to local partners, while developing capacities of staff in dealing with the gender related codes that could reflect on the local partners<sup>45</sup>.

#### **6.4. Coordination and Collaboration- Central office**

The Central Office coordination efforts with ACT and donors are active, and many ACT alliance donor members were contacted by the ES to support the appeal, which reflects in high coverage of the appeal requests, and increased number of donor participation, of 9, 16 and 22 in MEPL51, 61 and 71 respectively. It is noted that some donors for the appeal are also donors of the development programs.

Central office has been involved through the CO Executive Secretary in activating the ACT Palestine Forum efforts, and in discussing the emergency related responses on the oPt level. As well as in previous ACT forum joint efforts and strategizing. Yet the coordination on the field level between APF members is not reflected, it is recommended that the coordination info in meeting to be shared and discussed with ES on the area level.

Although UNRWA and WFP are coordinated with on the field level in both areas, it is recommended that the DSPR CO to carry out coordination on policy level with main actors and officials. While it is recommended that representation of all ACT members on joint networks is done through ACT Forum.

#### **6.5. ACT Visibility and Perceptions- Central Office and areas**

The ACT visibility and perception are dependent on the area and the approach, the DSPR central had the role of monitoring the visibility as part of agreement with ACT, the MEPL71 appeal contained elements to enhance ACT visibility through various produced materials.

Regarding visibility in DSPR-Gaza responses, logos and written statements of ACT were clearly posted on the waiting halls, MECC/DSPR –Gaza offices. Some documents sent to partners contain the ACT logo others don't.

Unfortunately, beneficiaries and participating organizations are not aware of the ACT. Instead, they know that the assistance comes from the churches. The visibility was more for MECC/DSPR –Gaza rather than for ACT.



<sup>45</sup> Parts 4.5 and 5.5, 4.8 and 5.8 illustrates the areas related info

In DSPR-WB the ACT visibility was not apparent, in food aid the food packages contained stickers that had the name of the WCC and the logo of the ICC, while contained the list inside the package with ICC logo and name, in food distribution the vehicles used the ACT logo.



The visibility was more to the DSPR-WB/ICC in most communities and approaches. The DSPR visibility was apparent in the Refugee Camps were DSPR functions for a long time, and local partners referred to DSPR as well as ICC.

For beneficiaries the support was from “the Christians”, for some locations beneficiaries and even local partners mixed the organization with the YMCA.

On the other hand the DSPR-WB /ICC visibility was apparent in the work program, as implementation time was longer and outcomes remained visible, while big signs were standing next to the constructed part. In Serees, unfortunately due to poverty some people stole the sign in the main road and sold it as steel. While the other sign provided by the community inside the school was still there but held the name of the director and engineer and the ICC only. Certain responses were covered by the newspapers articles using ICC rather than DSPR or ACT.



ICC Sign in Serees

Hence visibility of DSPR-WB increased in relation with duration of implementation of support and level of interaction, and previous work experience, the existence of a coordinator in MEPL71 and the interaction with communities raised the visibility of ICC over other appeals.

The ACT-CO visit to certain areas during appeal 71 raised its visibility in that area. It is recommended that the DSPR-CO monitors ACT and DSPR visibility while implementing the budgetary item allocated for the visibility in the appeals.

**The perception of people in both areas that Christians and churches are providing such support has been positive, they reflected that some people in different parts of the world are human enough to think about their suffering and provide it with impartiality.**

## Chapter 7. Findings: Organizational Issues- DSPR- Gaza

### 7.1. Institutional Capacity

There was a consensus that DSPR-Gaza enjoys a very committed, dedicated and effective management that also enjoys leadership skills. A well experienced and highly motivated team was working to achieve the emergency response targets. Three social workers performed the technical aspect of the social assistance, in addition, to the administrative and financial support provided by DSPR-Gaza staff. The executive secretary of the MECC/DSPR office in Gaza performed the key management roles and provides oversight supervision on the entire assistance management. The communications with ACT are performed by the main DSPR in Jerusalem. All letters and communications pertaining to the emergency response implementation in Gaza are signed by the Executive Secretary. DSPR-Gaza is a responsive organization that listens to beneficiaries and stakeholders comments. Dialogue and communications are active among DSPR-Gaza and its partners and beneficiaries but may require some formalities. An example of that is monitoring of waiting time and clients flow by the DSPR-Gaza management. DSPR-Gaza uses open door policy and clients can access management and report their concerns. However, a suggestion/complaints box is not available for the beneficiaries receiving the emergency assistance.

The DSPR-Gaza governance body, the area committee, AC is active in the overall supervisory roles that involve endorsing appeals before advertisement, overall monitoring of performance, making strategic decisions, financial monitoring and financial control. Periodic review meetings are carried out to discuss performance, improvement strategies and taking decisions.

The close follow-up of the committed AC and their readiness to increase their involvement, and even step in if needed, contributes to ease the concerns raised in Gaza evaluation report and 05 DSPR evaluation report, of the lack of a second liner for a DSPR substantial program, and key player in the emergency responses. The presence of systems, procedures and team work is also another added factor. Even though; the presence of an overall project coordinator to act as a second liner is essential to gain experience from committed strong leadership.

The overall financial management of the ACT provided assistance is done centrally through the DSPR-Gaza office in Jerusalem. The review of the financial documents reveals that an auditable financial system is in place. Records of the financial transactions in Gaza feed into Jerusalem through a harmonized system which is amenable to producing monthly statements and periodic reports detailing all transactions. In fact,

tight internal financial review is done locally in Gaza and auditing is done centrally. The Executive Secretary, as principal cosignatory, needs another signature from the treasurer of the Board or an authorized member of the Board, to effect payments and financial transactions.

Monthly financial reports are produced and submitted to the MECC/DSPR Central Office in Jerusalem. Midterm reports are timely produced and final reports are submitted as required. Appeals related documents are well documented. However, because the response and the communications are managed centrally, MECC/DSPR in Gaza should keep copies of all relevant documents. In other words, it is advised that copies of all the communications pertaining to the appeals are sent to the MECC/DSPR office in Gaza.

For each beneficiary, a file is kept. Samples of the examined documents revealed accuracy and completeness. Using their own resources, a data base has been developed by the DSPR-Gaza staff and mainly used for checking whether the case had received assistance before or not and when. NECC data based is used by other organizations (PRCS-Gaza Strip). Examining the data base reveals that it is not sufficient and it requires developments. Not all data collected from clients pertaining to their social status and characteristic information are entered into the data base. There is a potential to increase the use of the data base to perform some statistics and analysis.



**Records keeping**



**Computerized system**



**Cheerful place**



**Paying attention to beneficiaries with special needs**

Regarding the space, DSPR-Gaza maintains a comfortable and clean humane environment for beneficiaries. The waiting area is cheerful, provided with enough seats, nice pictures, drawings, posters. Toilets are clean and suitable for people with special needs. Cold water and tea are provided to clients. Clients are very impressed by the environment at the DSPR-Gaza. However, staff place is narrow and crowded (one room for three social workers plus another room used as standby and for the storage of files). Because of the closure, it was difficult to make an extension for the place as a result of lack of constructions materials.



## **7.2. Management related issues**

The provided emergency response was managed in an appropriate way and the coordination among the involved parties was generally good. The assisted community perceived the team working on the assistance as very cooperative and responsive. One member of the community mentioned "*we are pleased with the MECC/DSPR team more than we are pleased by the assistance it self*". Stakeholders including the heads of community committees, women and the community leaders all perceived the project positively and regarded the method of implementing it as very smooth and responsive. The collaborating organizations were informed about the emergency response in advance and the steps are effectively coordinated with them, which subsequently facilitated the implementation. The DSPR-Gaza established working relationships with around 55 organizations including women empowerment organizations. These organizations became an essential part of the process and contributed to facilitating the implementation.

**The roles and benefits of using these organizations in reference to the assistance can be summarized in the following bullet points**

- Partner organizations played an important role in selection, filtering and identification of cases. This creates ownership of the response by the local community and increased efficiency.
- Partner organizations helped to ensure the wider geographical coverage of the assistance. The computerized data base available within these organizations helped in the filtering the cases and targeting the neediest ones.
- Partner organizations used representatives of the local community committees to identify cases (10 representatives in average in each organization) and this increased transparency and decreased the influence of personal bias on the selection.
- In most cases, partner organizations approached the beneficiaries in order to assist them through the ACT provided assistance.
- Partner organizations collected the needed documents and coordinated the implementation including the timely receiving the assistance through an organized system with prior appointments.
- Partner organizations participated in conducting follow up for cases after receiving the assistance.
- Partner organizations reported their perspectives about the assistance and contributed to the entire process modifications and development.
- Gaining from their experience with DSPR-Gaza, partner organization developed effective systems for selecting candidates. An example of that is the decreasing trend in the percentage of cases rejected by the DSPR-Gaza. When they started with DSPR-Gaza around 20% of the beneficiaries nominated by them were rejected, later on, this percentage is less than 5% in many organizations. Interestingly, as aforementioned, partner organizations adopted the process of selection of beneficiaries and used it while working with others.

We recommend that DSPR-Gaza builds in these relationships and empowers it as it represents an efficient participatory approach for providing assistance.

### **7.3. Control and monitoring mechanism**

Management continuously and proactively monitors the implementation of the emergency assistance. A computerized database is used to ensure compliance with the established criteria. Systematically, multiple checking takes place at various levels; at the organization nominating the beneficiary level, at the MECC/DSPR office level and upon conducting the social study. Social study for cases is done routinely and documented in a separate file for each beneficiary is maintained. Reports are regularly produced by the different involved departments.

Follow up visits is supposed to be done to 3% of cases after receiving the assistance but it is difficult to achieve due to shortage of staff and lack of fuel in the current circumstances. Appropriate Financial policies and procedures are in place. At least, three different persons check the financial documents before providing the assistance to clients. Additional internal auditing and checking is done. Each recipient signs the payment voucher receipt and should present in person to the MECC/DSPR as aforementioned. Cases of misuse were strictly followed. In general, financial control mechanisms are very strict. Samples of the examined financial documents revealed accuracy and completeness. Control measures and follow up minimized the misallocation of funds. Organizations that don't comply with the criteria and/or miss-behave, are excluded. Some partner organizations adopted the same control measures within their organizations.

### **7.4. Coordination and Collaboration**

Benefiting from the experience of working together for many years in this field, the cooperation and coordination between DSPR-Gaza and other stakeholders was effective, efficient and most importantly transparent. DSPR-Gaza is the main player for ACT appeals and the good relationships between the two parties enhanced the smooth implementation of the response. At the implementation level, the cooperation between the DSPR-Gaza and other organizations was functional in general. The coordination with other stakeholders such as the Palestinian Red Crescent Society-Gaza Strip (PRCS), MOSA was perceived to be good. For instance, PRCS-GS uses the DSPR-Gaza database program. With others, it is less effective or not existing at all such as the UNRWA. Information sharing among organizations is almost absent resulting in duplication and redundancy. As mentioned earlier, still beneficiaries do shopping among providers and one challenge is to ensure better coordination. However, this coordination is not formalised and mainly relied on initiatives coming from the DSPR-Gaza. This area requires further attention by the official bodies with the contribution of other players such as DSPR-Gaza.

MECC/DSPR was proactive in coordination with official bodies and other organizations. MECC/DSPR led the efforts started few years ago to establish a coordination forum for providing humanitarian assistance in order to prevent duplication and to synergise activities. Unfortunately, this step didn't achieve its goals and the forum is not anymore functioning.

To sum up, most partner organizations described MECC/DSPR as an excellent organization which proactively coordinates with others. Most organizations explicitly reported learning from MECC/DSPR approach (organization, transparency, respect...etc). Coordination with organizations contributed to making the provided emergency response widely accessible, smooth and efficient also it contributed to strengthening the community role of these organizations. At the macro level (assistance providing organizations), more efforts are needed to set national strategies for the emergency assistance and to agree on the different roles and responsibilities assigned to these organizations. This involves developing data base and sharing information in order to synergize rather than duplicate efforts.

## 7.5. Strength and Weaknesses

The following table summarizes the strength and weakness associated with the ACT emergency response implemented by the DSPR-Gaza

Perceived Strength Points	Perceived Weakness Points	Notes
<b>Design</b>		
Different managerial levels at the MECC/DSPR are involved and ensured appropriateness (Area committee, Executive Secretary, Field staff)	Cash assistance was neither sufficient nor frequent and it is not long term oriented	
Appeals emerged from the field and initiated by people on the ground	Targeting needs to be more specific	
Appeals quickly launched in response to emergency situation		
Appeals contained diversified components		
Cash assistance represented the largest program component and benefited large number of population	Job creation as a component was only available in MPEL 51	
Cash assistance complemented what other provided	Interventions start before budgets are secured	
Job creation component was effective particularly hiring medical staff and increased coverage	Components need to be part of a larger strategy	
<b>Implementation</b>		
Efficient implementation	Modifications introduced without proper formal communication	
Targets met even exceeded	More follow up is needed	
Participatory implementation (Partnership with organizations)	More concern to ensure the provision of assistance to certain female beneficiaries (separated, husband not available)	
	Data based is not sufficient	
Multiple approaches for reaching beneficiaries		
High degree of transparency and accountability		
Capable, effectively managed organization		
Timely reporting and documentations		
Financial and management systems in place		
Adherence to the ethical principles of emergency assistance		
<b>Clients perspectives</b>		
Very well perceived intervention program	Requested more frequent assistance	
Comfortable place and environment		

## Chapter 8. Findings: Organizational Issues- DSPR- West Bank

### 8.1. Institutional Capacity

The DSPR-WB runs with min staff capacity, consisting of the Executive Secretary, project coordinator, finance officer and a secretary, running community development and rural development programs as well as emergency humanitarian aid programs. The minimum current human resources capacity affects their ability to run and manage certain responses effectively and efficiently.

The implementation modality of the approaches varied according to the available capacity, **the best modality within the limited capacity was found in the “cash for work/temporary job creation” approach in MEPL 51**, as:

- The project coordinator is in the field of rural development, constructing water cistern and overseeing the process of implementation, the partnership with local partner and monitoring progress of work.
- The implemented Job Creation program had a site engineer paid by local authority while the MEHE engineer participated in monitoring.
- The DSPR-WB, the Local Council and the MEHE had close cooperation ties and monitored the progress through extensive meetings and communication

**The Modality has extended DSPR-WB capacity and resources through partnership and community contribution**, while the overall technical and development managing capacity is done through the ICC coordinator with the support of the ES and finance officer. Within same context; the project director had undergone the process of evaluation, strategizing, and capacity development during the past few years.

The presence of a coordinator in MEPL71 Food Aid approach has contributed towards better systemizing of the process and better monitoring of its activities, in comparison to MEPL 51 and 61, where only the ES and the finance officer were responsible for its implementation, without any available designated staff. The MEPL71 coordinator was employed on temporary basis, using the 6% support for the personnel support part of the appeal, duration of employment was affected by the funding available, and extension made, duration was limited of his employment and he was immediately involved in delivery of service, which limited his involvement in the whole cycle of Needs Assessment, planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating of the response. The short intensive duration also affected the ability of the ICC to develop the new employee's capacities in humanitarian aid, although his participation in staff meeting has contributed to his capacity development. **If the approach is to continue same way as it is then a full time employee to be hired not only for the emergency program, but also for implementing other elements of the strategy.** There were two development employees during the 2005 evaluation that has shrunk into one, with same level of budget and support; it would certainly affect the quality of the program. This decision had to be studied carefully by area committee to ensure effective and efficient running of future emergency responses.

It was noted that DSPR-WB do not have the capacities to manage the medical support part of the response and it is highly advised to drop this approach unless coordinated with other professional NGO or CRO.

It was noted that Management systems have improved through the appeals, where 71 was better monitored and documented than others, while ICC have developed guidelines and sets of procedures. The implementation process was enhanced as chapter 5 illustrates, but process requires further enhancement to address gaps identified through the evaluation.

Management of the program is carried by the ES, assisted with the staff through regular staff meeting that discusses implementation related issues. **Management was able to deal with rising risks efficiently**, they had to monitor the changing emergency status and acts in a flexible responsive way, management had also to monitor the local partners and deals with any rising issues that could affect credibility, they changed local partner in old city Nablus due to rising concerns after implementing one of the appeals. Management had to monitor other elements affecting the program such as the change in the dollar value during MEPL71 and reflect that on implementation, ICC had to reduce portion of food packages in the extension to ensure reaching of targets.

The minimum available human resources at DSPR – WB affected their ability to plan and evaluate the response, while revise and enhance methods and mechanisms, it also limited its ability to enhance its financial and procurement controls as next part shows.

## **8.2. Control and monitoring mechanism**

There are various levels of monitoring at the DSPR-WB, the coordinator is performing pipeline or implementation process monitoring for both food aid in 71 and job creation in 51, the management of ICC perform the overall project monitoring, ensuring accomplishment of planned objectives and goals, the Area Committee, AC is the governance body of the DSPR-WB is responsible for overseeing the planning, achievements and impact, as well as the financial management and controls. On the other hand the Central Office and the Central Committee has a monitoring and control role discussed in part 6.2.

The internal program monitoring of the operation and process is carried with the management supervision as discussed earlier with some shortfalls that needs addressing. It is recommended that ICC management should monitor flow of assistance through CBOs, targeting and enhance their documentation of self evaluation of the response, Lessons Learned, and beneficiaries complaints.

On the other hand the AC has been discussing the overall status of the ICC in their meetings including the financial status of the area program, while Ac is aware of the ACT appeals but not enough time was given to discuss the planning and impact of the responses. The evaluation result is an opportunity to start such discussion. **It is recommended for AC to** discuss and decide upon the intervention and targeting criteria in the planning process, as well as to discuss evaluation and impact after accomplishing the intervention.

The AC is structured from people nominated by the churches, this could assist the DSPR-WB in addressing the issue of "Impartiality versus inclusion" raised through the evaluation by discussing the wrong attitudes towards the role of the ICC and the humanitarian assistance, and raising awareness towards international codes of conduct, in specifically impartiality in their own churches.

AC and DSPR-WB can also activate their efforts in mobilizing local resources for addressing emergency in specific, an effort proven success through other actors, as Union of Charitable Societies and Zakah, a recommendation that is also in line with 05 evaluation report.

AC is also expected to assist in control measures for the DSPR-WB taking into consideration it's minimum capacity, and in specifically in procurement procedures, by selecting members to participate in the committee, for sourcing and selecting supplier. As well as overseeing selection decisions made for selecting areas, local partners and suppliers. The recommended support would enhance the monitoring and control capacity of the DSPR-WB.

In this regard, the procurement procedures for Food Aid, medical and education selection of suppliers is done through a process of bidding, selecting and contracting suppliers. Binding contracts are added during MEPL71 with suppliers, hence enhanced transparency. The process is carried by ES and Finance officer, documentation of the process needs enhancing. It is recommended that ES is not involved rather an independent committee is selected constituting finance office and two AC finance committee members. The DSPR finance officer/internal auditor would carry out internal auditing of the process and procedures. The development of the financial and procurement internal guidelines by the internal auditor and the CO, as planned, would enhance the procedures further.

The procurement procedures in the work program is done differently, as bidding was open, and selecting was carried on the local level with involvement of MEHE, local engineer, local council and DSPR-WB representative, decision made was documented and contracts were signed afterwards.

Enhancing documentation and electronic data base of the target groups and the local partners would also support the process development and addressing rising gaps. Data base can be used as a resource for verification with other local actors, and could contribute to the national effort in unifying data base.

### **8.3. Coordination and Collaboration**

All ACT responses (except the individual medical assistance) is carried in collaboration with local partners, It is worth mentioning that such cooperation has extended the DSPR-WB limited capacity, further more and as a result of the collaboration in the job creation approach local partners has developed their systems and capacities, through DSPR systematized approach.

Coordination with PA Bodies, such as MoSA and Zakah could be enhanced, in order to utilize their capacities in the verifications part to ensure targeting through their wide spread social workers, in addition to the possible use of their local warehouses. Both showed willingness to organize and collaborate.

The DSPR-WB have a good historical working relation with UNRWA, specially the social services dept. while ICC coordinated with their emergency program on the field level for the implementation of the ACT appeals. Its highly recommended to continue coordinating with the three UNRWA programs of social services, emergency and contingency.

ICC coordinated on the field level with WFP the largest actor in food aid in oPt, for areas and coverage. It is highly recommended to continue coordination with other actors such as WFP, UN organizations and NGOs, and to take the collaboration to a highest policy and strategizing level, through DSPR Central office and APF involvement.

It is also recommended for DSPR and ICC to investigate possible means for cooperation with other APF members based on evaluated strength, joint strategy of the APF can invest on such collaboration.

## 8.4. Strength and Weaknesses:

Detailed Strength and Weaknesses is listed almost in every section, the following table summarizes main points:

Perceived Strength Points	Perceived Weakness Points
<b>Approaches- Design</b>	
The Job Creation approach is relevant and appropriate to the needs of beneficiaries and the emergency	The Job Creation was not favored after 51
The Food Aid is relevant in Contingencies and to destitute	Long term food aid provision to same communities produces dependencies and could affect production
Medical –drug provision part and educational are appropriate	Individual medical support lacked transparency measures and was not accessible
The spread over different communities sensed the emergency and responded to different communities	The spread allowed thin distribution of responses that affects impact
<b>Process</b>	
Job Creation process is efficient	
Food Aid Chain process is efficient except for targeting	Monitoring Targeting and Reach of support needs enhancing Data Base of targeted, reached and local partners needs unifying
Local partners are part of the implementation process	Involvement of other stakeholders in the community needs enhancing
Timely responses and mostly reached affected communities	Certain communities needs to be re- evaluated
Job Creation coordinator is a regular staff at the ICC, while the food aid coordinator was added in 71 on temporary basis	Minimum management and Human resources Capacities
ICC visibility and Churches support is high	ACT visibility is low
<b>Beneficiaries Perspective</b>	
Support Very Well perceived	Needs more Support and to meet their needs

## Chapter 9. Recommendations

Key Recommendations presented in this section relates to the findings of the evaluation, detailed recommendations are presented in each relevant parts of the report. The recommendation is directed to ACT international, ACT Palestine Forum, MECC/DSPR central, West Bank and Gaza areas, for further fortification of responses to the emergency in the oPt and analogous places **The key Recommendations are listed below as follows:**

### 9.1. Overall Recommendations for ACT International and APF

- **A new position paper on the definition of emergency** to be drafted based on the emergency analysis in the report and relevant other secondary data, Lessons Learned from the emergency, other actors monitoring reports, involving ACT-CO and ACT Forum, it could entail an ACT mission to be involved.
- **Advocate among members on the emergency status in oPt**, and APF roles and responses to raise understanding towards the different characteristics of the emergency in oPt, and its prolonged effects. Such advocating is necessary against any fatigue effect of the long term annual emergency support.
- **A unified strategy** should be drafted for the ACT Palestine forum, APF, that builds on members' strengths, experiences, and lessons learned from previous responses. Drafted Strategy to be Rights Based, and respond to the emergency complexity, chronic and wide spread effects. Such strategy would be the bases for future consolidated appeals and proposals to other international donors and networks.
- **DSPR and APF supported by ACT should distinguish the three levels of directions to address the emergency**, first sustaining the on going programs directed to the vulnerable, second addressing the current crises through strategies that addresses root causes and leaves a longer term effect, third through being prepared to contingencies that could rise anytime.
- **A “Contingency plan” or “ Emergency Preparedness Plan”** to be prepared for immediate intervention for any raising effects and immediate emergency, which is different than the above, and in line with the humanitarian aid network actions and plans.



- It's of utmost urgency to **network with other actors and harmonizes responses**, while APF should be represented with the humanitarian aid network lead by WFP, and to monitor the emergency and vulnerability monitoring reports. It is also as important to approach other actors as ECHO, joint efforts would enhance such opportunities.
- It is recommended that ACT develop capacities of their partners in monitoring and control systems, as well as on Humanitarian international codes and standards. It is also recommended that ACT develop its processes to encourage partners to develop needs assessment and enhance their monitoring systems and controls.
- ACT Co to be engaged on regular basis in monitoring the emergency, visiting the area, ACT responses and participating in APF strategizing and monitoring exercises.
- Its worth investigating if the linkage of current Emergency in oPt to development programs could fit the basis for developing international support through ACT Emergency together with ACT development under establishment.

## 9.2. Recommendations for DSPR-Central and Overall

- Enhance the role of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, PME, of the emergency responses in both areas, while increase intercommunications between areas and between areas and CO. Highly advised to have a media system that enables Video conferencing technology: to Increase communications and feedback on ACT projects among WB and Gaza areas and the CO, through joint staff and management periodic meetings.
- DSPR CO together with areas to introduce the mechanism of carrying out detailed needs assessment as part of the planning process with full participation of the beneficiaries, including women and minorities. Link outcomes with monitoring data of emergency in the oPt and recommended approaches, as well as other responses to design the interventions.
- Activate the DSPR-CO role in mobilizing resources to mitigate the effects of emergencies over the vulnerable, through activation of fund raising, advocating the status and the emergency need for support to ACT and other donors, extend collaborations with major actors to policy level, while continue monitoring emergency update, obtain Food Security and vulnerability Monitoring data provided regularly by WFP, UN, analyze and use in targeting.
- DSPR could enhance its role in monitoring of ACT Visibility, and monitoring carrying out related actions and activities, there is also a need to conduct field visits during implementation of the different part of the process in the emergency responses, as part of monitoring and to enhance visibility of DSPR and ACT.
- The DSPR to hold their responsibility towards implementation of the responses based on international Codes and standards, through:
  - Systemizing monitoring and control systems based on them,
  - Monitoring based on International codes and standards, and the current evaluation results and recommendations conducted according to those basis.
  - Capacity development of related staff in areas and CO on Human Rights, Codes of Ethics and SPHERE standards and its applications in the field. (training for all staff members involved in aid is needed). Enable and monitor each area providing quick training or orientation of new staff employed temporarily as well.
  - Ensure integration of all elements of codes and standards with areas in responses.
- Within same context; it is recommended that DSPR extends its commitment to ACT Gender policies and Codes through:
  - Developing gender mainstreaming in emergency responses,
  - Reflecting gender relevant analysis and indicators that promotes access to resources and protection to women.
  - Communicating gender sensitive measures and codes to local partners.
  - Developing capacities of staff in applying the gender related codes in humanitarian aid
  - Reflecting indicators and involving local partners on gender related measures and policies.
- Along the lines of the MECC/DSPR Central Committee policy related monitoring, It is recommended for the CC that:

- Lessons learned and evaluation recommendations to be monitored through the CO and CC.
- 2005 evaluation recommendations in the organizational part to be carried.
- A committee to be formed to follow up emergency related actions and support, it is recommended that members could be from the WBGS CC members, to work with CO closely in this regard.

### 9.3. Recommendations for MECC/DSPR-Gaza area

- Building on its experience and solid existence on the ground, MECC/DSPR has the capacity to effectively implement humanitarian assistance interventions. With the availability of effective and dedicated management at MECC/DSPR, it is advisable to explore doing more humanitarian assistance interventions preferably through creative approaches.
- The situation in Gaza is an emergency situation that will most likely continue or even deteriorates, until the political situation improves. Assuming that the political situation improves, a transitional recovery phase is needed; therefore, MECC/DSPR should plan to continue providing its emergency assistance in the coming years.
- ACT and its partners need to agree on the concept of emergency and develop a strategic integrated direction for their interventions in the oPt.
- MECC/DSPR needs to maintain its uniqueness and distinction as an organization providing social assistance through the delivery of appropriate and effectively managed assistance that is positively perceived and that is also congruent with long term developmental goals.
- Continuing doing appeals that are diversified in its components containing a mixture of different approaches. This diversified approach is effective in meeting the complex emergency related needs. Still, the components of these appeals need to be parts of a larger consolidated strategy.
- MECC/DSPR can contribute to advocating the development of a national unified emergency strategy which could contribute to regulating the provision of emergency assistance in oPt.
- The approach followed by the MECC/DSPR to partnership with local organizations is efficient and effective approach and should continue in future interventions. However, to overcome the limitations associated with this approach, MECC/DSPR should continue allowing access to direct beneficiaries without going through these organizations. The followed diverse program is preferably to continued.
- Targeting criteria need to be revised in order to specifically target certain needy segments of the deprived population (separated women, infertile couples, old age, families with sick and disabled children, families with student member/s).
- At the current circumstances, the provision of cash assistance is recommended. The amount and the frequency of the provided cash assistance require revision. Through a revised targeting approach, fewer beneficiaries can be assisted with larger amounts and for longer periods. Following a progressive assistance approach is advisable (amount of assistance correlates with the size of the family).
- In future appeals, certain amount of the budget should be allocated to job creation particularly (job which requires training) due to its double benefits; to the families and the host organizations.
- Due to its significant long term impacts, support to basic services program is essential. It is important that future appeals include component to support health and training costs.
- Coordination with other organizations at the implementation level as well as at the strategic level needs to be always considered and preferably formalized.
- Information sharing among organizations providing humanitarian assistance is needed and because of its capacity, transparency and excellent reputation, MECC/DSPR can play a proactive role in advocacy, networking and organization.
- It is important that MECC/DSPR staff visit the field more often and meet beneficiaries and partners organizations regularly.
- To monitor and keep beneficiaries satisfaction, it is suggested to install a suggestion box with a system to track, document and respond to beneficiaries perspectives.
- As a respect to cultural norms and values, it is preferable to continue providing the assistance to the head of the family; meanwhile, paying attention to the gender equity and ensuring access to deprived females who are not entitled to assistance through and/or because of their husbands.

- Organizing a session to reinforce the concepts and practices related the ethics of the emergency assistance such as the NGO Code of Conduct and the SPHERE minimal standards.
- More active steps are needed to show greater visibility to beneficiaries, participating organizations, assistance providing organizations and the public as well. The used logo in oPt should contain an Arabic translation. Organizing a workshop or a meeting designed to discuss the humanitarian assistance in the oPt could serve many purposes; one of them is visibility.
- To better monitor the emergency situation and the impacts of the interventions, it is preferable that a set of indicators are developed and tracked. These indicators could be integrated into a wider data base for the ACT.
- To achieve timely implementations and to synergize the efforts in the humanitarian assistance field partnership with local organizations is essential. Involving local organizing ensures ownership, facilitates the efficient implementation and ensures access to needy beneficiaries.
- Last but not least, the MECC/DSPR high capacity to implement assistance programs could be utilized more through designing more creative programs, allocating more resources, playing a more creative role in advocacy and setting policies and also, performing a coaching role for others.

#### **9.4. Recommendations for MECC/DSPR -West bank area**

- To systemize the process through systemizing all project cycle parts based on findings of the evaluation, Lessons Learned, previous experiences, international codes and standards and responses best practices.
- Develop mechanisms to ensure participations of Target Groups in decision making and implementation of the response, and develop complaints recording system. Targeting and monitoring of targeting mechanisms needs improvement and continual monitoring.
- Documentation and share of info with stakeholders is essential step towards increase humanitarian accountability. Within same context; the Evaluation results and report to be shared with AFP and local partners for better transparency
- Enhancing of mechanisms to work with local partners is needed through involvement of other stakeholders in the community, and through comprehensive partnership process rather than division of labour within the process. In addition, DSPR-WB could include capacity development of local partners, and in specifically on international codes and standards.
- The long term effect of the emergency, and its variant effects over different communities, entails that Planning of the response needs more attention to meet the actual needs of the affected communities and mitigate the emergency effects, while leaving an impact.
- The Area Committee to improve their role in monitoring of targeting and impact of the responses, revise the targeting criteria, participate in selecting of suppliers and participate in monitoring and control measures.

#### **Recommendations- Approaches**

- The complexity of the emergency situation in the WB requires multiple approaches responses that would reflect the needs of different groupings of the communities and would leave an impact.
- It is highly recommended that the DSPR-WB concentrate on “protecting and supporting livelihood systems” in parallel with “Job Creation/Cash for Work” approaches based on their capacities, strength, developed experiences and lessons learned from the evaluation. So that to enhance food production and reduce the effects of the emergency and increased vulnerability over certain communities. (An example could be based on ICC experience in land reclamation and water support, within cash for work approach, or animal feed support,...).
- Amalgamate the above response with Food Aid to:
  - Target certain destitute groups with increase of rate of distribution, specially the new poor until supported by the authorities and other actors.
  - In cases of Contingencies
  - To diversified communities affected differently if linked to advocacy to reflect their status.
- Avoid “personal medical assistance” unless announced and made accessible using enhanced transparency measures. For the other medical assistance; network with other NGO or CRO professional institutes for drug provisions.

Improve efficiency of responses and enhance targeting and monitoring of reach for the different related approaches, while ensuring widened stakeholder participation.

**EVALUATION OF THE ACT RESPONSE TO  
ACT APPEAL MEPL 51,61,71 in oPt**



**List of Annexes**

<b>Annex 1.</b>	<b>TOR</b>	<b>A1</b>
<b>Annex 2.</b>	<b>Program of the Evaluation and Tools Used</b>	
	Annex 2.1 Program of the Evaluation	A5
	Annex 2.2 Tools Used	A6
<b>Annex 3.</b>	<b>Methods Used and People Involved in Evaluation</b>	
	Annex 3.1 : Area: West Bank and Central Office	A9
	Annex 3.2 : Area: Gaza Strip	A15
	Annex 3.3:List of Participants in the DE-Briefing Meeting and Feedback Workshop	A21
	Annex 3.4: Donor Survey and ACT international contact people	A21
	Annex 3.5: Desk Review	A22
<b>Annex 4: Emergency Related Maps and Data</b>		<b>A23</b>
	Annex 4.1: Maps	A23
	Annex 4.2: Important Indicators for the Emergency	A26
	A4.2.1 Protection and Access Related Indicators	A26
	A4.2.2: Socio-Economic Data	A27
	A 4.2.3 Crises in Gaza	A28
<b>Annex 5: Emergency and Responses Information</b>		<b>A30</b>
	Annex 5.1: ACT Appeals and DSPR information	A30
	Annex 5.2 Food Security Map per Governorate in oPt- Mid 2006, WFP	A31
	Annex 5.3: Food Security and Vulnerability	A32
<b>Annex 6: DSPR-Gaza Data</b>		<b>A34</b>
	Annex 6.1: Targeting criteria	A34
	Annex 6.2: Health Services Statistics	A35
<b>Annex 7: DSPR-WB Data</b>		<b>A37</b>
	Annex 7.1: Goals and Objectives:	A37
	Annex 7.2: Targeting	A38
	Annex 7.3 International Codes of Conducts in disaster Relief	A39
	Annex 7.4: Job Creation, Medical and Education assistance	A40
	Annex 7.5: Contents of the Food Packages	A40

**ANNEX1:  
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN EVALUATION  
OF THE ACT RESPONSE TO**

150 route de Ferney, P.O. Box 2100  
1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland

Tel: 41 22 791 6033 Fax: 41 22 791 6506

E-mail: act@act-intl.org

**ACT APPEAL MEPL 51,61,71**

Coordinating Office

**BACKGROUND**

Since the beginning of the second Palestinian Intifada on 29 September 2000, the conflict between the Israeli occupying forces and the Palestinian people has ever more escalated. The occupation practice since the late 1960s consisted in setting up settlements on Palestinian land and protecting the settlements with military measures, expropriating and rendering land inaccessible to the Palestinian population. A part of retaliation measure by the Israeli army was collective punishing of civil population. Hundreds of houses have been demolished and huge areas of agricultural land bulldozed

Until end of June 2008, 4749 thousands of Palestinian people have been killed by Israeli forces since the year 2000 and 45 killed by Israeli civilians, in addition to 69 Palestinians killed inside Israel. While the toll of people on the Israeli side is reported to be 723 civilian and 334 security forces, according to B'Tselem.

In 2003, Israel began building a separation wall which fenced the Palestinian population inside the West Bank off from Israel. The wall and hundreds of checkpoints made it difficult for Palestinians to move. About three million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are since living under siege, which isolates Palestinian communities from each other and prevents people from receiving food, medical care and other basic needs. Closing borders and the Palestinian airport in Gaza, has cut Palestinians off from the outside world. As a result, unemployment and poverty rates have increased dramatically in the Palestinian areas. Israel controls sources of water, electricity and fuel. After Hamas has taken over the de facto rule in Gaza, Israel reacted with prohibiting fuel supplies from getting into the Gaza Strip.

The political stalemate has created a continued humanitarian crisis. To respond to this crisis, ACT international has issued a number of appeals since 2001, which included different ACT members the Near East Council of Churches/Department of Service to Palestine Refugees (NECC/DSPR), LWF, and the IOCC.

Since 2001, DSPR has received appeal funds to the tune of over five Million US\$ and benefited from funds of 3.89 MUS\$. Given this relatively large amount of funds, ACT CO and DSPR have agreed to evaluate the implementation of these appeals and draw conclusions for further assistance.

## **EVALUATION OBJECTIVES**

The two main objectives of the evaluation are:

- ⇒ to measure the impact and assess the performance of the interventions;
- ⇒ to provide a learning opportunity for future operations.

The following ToR for the ACT Evaluation will be applied for this evaluation:

### **Section 1 – Process and Impact**

- 1) **General Impact:** to evaluate the emergency response in order to determine how adequately the affected population was assisted. This will also consider gender, cultural and conflict sensitivities.
- 2) **Appeal Goal and Objectives:** to assess the degree of attainment of the goals and objectives as stated in the Appeal MEPL 51,61,71 and relevant for the activities implemented by DSPR.
- 3) **Implementation factors:** to assess for NECC/ DSPR
  - a. timeliness, appropriateness, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, gender-sensitivity, and flexibility of the response implementation
  - b. the level of participation of the affected communities in the needs assessment, planning and implementation, in particular whether the ACT appeal reached the set target groups, whether the methodology of targeting was appropriate and effective.
  - c. the level of transparency and accountability towards the beneficiaries
- 4) **Minimum Standards observance:** to examine the extent to which SPHERE minimum standards, the NGO Code of Conduct, the ACT Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation and guidelines to promote gender equality in humanitarian actions have been applied during implementation.

### **Section 2 – Organizational Issues**

#### **1) Program tools :**

**The evaluation will** assess the management capacity of implementing members in responding to this emergency, drawing on results presented in the evaluation of DSPR conducted by Allen Armstrong and Randa Hilal in 2005. It will assess the effectiveness and adequacy of the management tools used by DSPR.

*It will focus on specific issues:*

- Has the DSPR carried out adequate needs assessments as a basis of the appeal proposals?
- Has the DSPR procurement policies in place which match the requirements of the ACT policies? Have these policies been used to render the operations efficient and cost-effective?
- Does the DSPR follow the ACT policy on the amount and use of overhead costs?
- Has the use of cash grants to beneficiaries been an effective tool for transfer of funds?
- Have the risks of misallocation been well managed by DSPR?
- What are the lessons of the cash for work approach used in earlier appeals?
- To what extent have the internal financial and administrative control mechanisms including reporting, monitoring been effective?

- To what extent have the recommendations made by the by the evaluation in 2005 been helpful to set up efficient internal control mechanisms?
- 2) **Coordination: The evaluation will** assess the effectiveness of the co-ordination of ACT Appeal activities implemented, and *will focus on the following specific issues:*
    - Have the appeal activities been coordinated at the stage of design, implementation and evaluation with other ACT members?
    - To what extent was the coordination effective in view of services to the beneficiaries?
  - 3) **Collaboration:** the evaluation will review the effectiveness of the response in relation to agencies of the Palestinian Authority (where relevant), co-ordinating bodies, bi- and multilateral agencies, national and international NGOs, and affected communities.
  - 4) **Visibility and Perceptions :** to review –
    - a. the degree of (corporate) identity of ACT at the various levels (target population, humanitarian relief organizations, national and international media, and implementing member agency staff)
    - b. the extent to which the relevant stakeholders (general public, religious institutions, government, other NGOs) are aware of ACT-International and the programs and priorities of the ACT members involved in emergency response.

### **Section 3 – Outcome of the evaluation**

- 1) The Evaluation will draw special lessons learned from the appeals - successes and failures - and make suggestions as to how these might be useful in future disaster responses in the context of the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
- 2) The Evaluation will also reflect on the evaluation methodology in order to allow further refinement of the ACT evaluation mechanism.

### **EVALUATION TEAM**

The evaluation team will comprise of two evaluators and resource persons from the ACT members:

The evaluation Team Leader should have the following skills: Capability of representing the ACT Alliance, an international Church-based humanitarian association; proven professionalism in humanitarian aid and track-record in humanitarian evaluations, strong ability to stimulate and guide participatory processes; competence in report writing; Political, religious and cultural sensitivity and diplomatic skills; proficiency in English and working knowledge of Arabic would be an asset.

The team leader will have specific responsibility related to the finalisation of the ToR and the preparation of the Mission Plan. S/he will also divide the task between the members of the team in consultation with them.

A Team Member will assist the Team Leader in the assignments as stated in the ToR. S/He should have the following skills and capabilities: Capability of representing the ACT Alliance, proven professionalism in humanitarian aid and evaluations, religious and cultural sensitive and diplomatic skills; strong background knowledge of the institutional set up of the partners; proficiency in English and Arabic.

DSPR will be invited to second one (senior) staff member to participate fully during the whole evaluation mission as partner representatives and resource persons. They should have a

strong knowledge of members' humanitarian assistance or development activities and of concepts of humanitarian assistance and development.  
In general, the inclusion of women as evaluators and partner representatives is encouraged.

## **EVALUATION METHODOLOGY**

In line with the *ACT Evaluation Guidelines*, April 2001, common principles and approaches will be followed, which are concerned with

- a focus on impact at beneficiary-level
- beneficiaries' perception of what the assistance provided did for them using participatory fieldwork practices
- information will be gathered through appraisal of reports, interviews with staff of implementing agencies, resource persons from other agencies, sample of beneficiaries, public authorities.

The list is not inclusive. A detailed methodology will be developed by the evaluation team during its initial team briefing/orientation and in close co-operation with the ACT CO. The approach will be confirmed with the ACT members in Lebanon.

## **DURATION AND REPORTING**

The consultancy will commence on 18 June and should be completed by end-July 2007. In total the number of workdays should not exceed 24 days.

A *Mission Plan* will be developed by the Team Leader in close consultation with the implementing ACT members concerned and the ACT Co-ordinating Office.

The Consultant reports to the ACT Director and will work closely with an ACT Programme Officer designated by the ACT Director.

The Team Leader will hold briefing meetings with the ACT CO before the field mission and after sub-mission of the draft report.

The Team will hold a briefing meeting with the ACT alliance members before the end of the mission and prepare a note on findings, conclusions and recommendations.

The Team will submit the draft final evaluation report to the ACT-CO two weeks after the end of the mission. All ACT members involved are requested to give comments for factual corrections within 12 days after the submission of the draft report. The Team Leader will finalise the report within 4 ½ weeks after the field mission.

The Final Report will be distributed to the concerned implementing and funding members. The implementing members will then prepare a follow-up Action Plan.



**Annex 2: Program of the Evaluation and Tools Used**  
**Annex 2.1: Program of the Evaluation**

Evaluation done in Parallel, details of people interviewed and details of field visits are in Annex3

<b>Timing</b>	<b>Visits/interviews DSPR-WB and Central Consultant: Randa Hilal</b>	<b>Visits/interviews DSPR-Gaza, Consultant: Dr Bassam Abu Hamad</b>	<b>Timing</b>	<b>Visits/interviews DSPR-WB and Central Consultant: Randa Hilal</b>	<b>Visits/interviews DSPR-Gaza, Consultant: Dr Bassam Abu Hamad</b>
Wed 4 <sup>th</sup> June 08	Meeting with Finance Officer DSPR-CO		Wednesday 25 <sup>th</sup> June		El Wafa, Health NGO Beit-Lahia, NGO Bedwian
Mon 9 <sup>th</sup> June 08	DSPR- Start up meeting		Thursday 26 <sup>th</sup> June	Zakah meeting, and Visit Bedouin location, and AC meeting	Zawida
Thursday 12 <sup>th</sup> June 08	LWF- Representative meeting		Fri 27 <sup>th</sup> June	UNRWA, auditor, CC meeting, DSPR	DSPR
Tue 17 <sup>th</sup> June 08	DSPR- Staff interview and document review	DSPR- Start up meeting	Sat 28 <sup>th</sup> June	Qalandia Camp, Abu-Dies and meeting with Jericho community representative	DSPR centre
Wed 18 <sup>th</sup> June	DSPR- Staff interview and document review		Sunday 29 <sup>th</sup> June		WFP ,Deir el Balah Middle area governorate
Fri 20 <sup>th</sup> June	IOCC, WFP, DSPR	DSPR- Staff interview and document review	Monday 30 <sup>th</sup> June	PWWD, MoSA, DCA	
Sat 21 <sup>st</sup> June	Field Visits to Ramallah Villages, interviews and FG	DSPR- Staff interview and document review	Tue 1 <sup>st</sup> July	NCA, IOCC and DSPR meeting	DSPR centre and Ahli Arab Hospital
Sunday 22 <sup>nd</sup> June	Field Visits to Jenin city, Villages, Refugee camp, interviews and FG	Ard El Enssan PRCS-Gaza Strip DSPR	Wed 2 <sup>nd</sup> July		Meeting with CHF/USAID
Mon 23 <sup>rd</sup> June	Field Visits to Nablus communities, interviews and FG	Shoka municipality Um el Nasser, women association Quarara Municipality, Ma'en	Thursday 17 <sup>th</sup> July	<b>DE- Briefing Meeting Through VIDEO Conference</b>	
			18 <sup>th</sup> and 28 <sup>th</sup> July		UAWC and preschools/ worked with IOCC
			Friday 25 <sup>th</sup> July		Feed back workshop for DSPR-Gaza area
Tuesday 24 <sup>th</sup> June		Gaza Governorate office (MOSA) Social services department-UNRWA	Friday 1 <sup>st</sup> August	Feed back workshop for DSPR-WB area and Central	

**Annex 2.2 Framework of Questions used during interviewing beneficiaries, stakeholders and Key informants**  
**Organizations collaborating with MECC/DSPR, stakeholders and key informants - plus MECC/DSPR**

Area	Questions
Warming up	Warm up and introductions, orientation, purpose of the meeting, business of the organization, its goals, history, reasons for engagement in this domain Introduction from interviewee about the area, the community, the effect of emergency on the community and people.
Appropriateness Relevancy and Effectiveness	What do you think of the support provided by DSPR -reference ACT appeals
	Was the support needed and why-is it needed in future, for people and communities
	Did you request the appeal for your community or did DSPR offered it
	How and Why did you decide upon type of response, if you request it (Local partners)
	Has the provided support met beneficiaries needs-how-have you participated in the design of the project
	Was it enough-can you tell stories to support your assumption
	Has the support program achieved its intended objectives
	Does this kind of support meet emergency related need-support your assumption
	How you describe the beneficiaries satisfaction about it
	Is there another way that could help in better utilizing the program resources-probe other possibilities (food rations, small projects, job creation, others)
	Number of beneficiaries benefited from the program through your organization-different kinds of beneficiaries by category
	How many people are on your lists who need assistance-is the number increasing or decreasing and why
Are there any negative effects of the response	
How does the program meet emergency related needs	
Design Management and cooperation	In which areas you collaborate with DSPR and when this collaboration started
	Can you describe your part in the process of the response
	How can you part and collaboration be improved
Efficiency and Targeting	How you select the candidates before you send the lists to DSPR -which criteria you use to select beneficiaries
	How you make sure that the lists you send are the most needy among others
	What methods of verifications you use to make sure that you serve the most needy one
	How you make sure that the beneficiaries use the resources properly and as declared
	Do you have a data base of beneficiaries who benefited from the program
	How you describe the relationships with DSPR
	Has DSPR refused any of the names you proposed-can you provide percentages
	Do you communicate with DSPR and get feedback about the list you send
	Do you charge clients or ask for contribution from beneficiaries who benefited from the project through your organization
	How much time in average it takes from the moment of registration till the client receives the support
	How do you regard the verification processes at the DSPR
	What do you suggest to improve the management of this support
	Do you know who provided the support? Probe for ACT
	Did the needs and the way people benefited from the response differed on Gender basis
	How do you handle complaints from beneficiaries
How you maintain confidentiality and ethical rights of beneficiaries	
Opportunities and emergency	Has any of your staff or any beneficiaries of the job creation nominated by your organization
	Can you give an example that shows the contribution of the job creation approach
	How the organizations were benefited from the job creation
	If you were in a position to decide, which modalities of support you prefer and why
	What does the emergency situation mean to you
How were your community and the people you represent affected? Why do you think your community were selected not other communities	

	Is the current situation still an emergency one? Why? Support your assumption
	How the project contributed in meeting emergency needs
	Based on your experience, how emergency support can be more effective
	What are the lessons learned from experienced dealing with the DSPR in this regard
	Are you responding to emergency with other means, how and with whom?
	What other areas of strength that DSPR could use in future collaboration
	What could be future collaborations with DSPR
Closing	Any other comments, info, suggestions Thanking the stakeholders on behalf of ACT and DSPR

### Beneficiaries' questions

Warm up and introductions, orientation, purpose of the meeting.
Previous employment history, current and previous income
Living conditions, family size, housing conditions, place of living
Kind of support received (financial support, food aid, job creation, covering health fees, other medical, education)
What makes you entitled for assistance through this scheme (lost work, lost bread winner, sick, suffered from disaster, incursion, demolished house, farm destruction, closure)
How you knew about the DSPR provided support
How your name reached the DSPR –through organizations or directly
How many visits you paid to DSPR/local partner to actually get the provided support
How much time it took from moment of registration till receiving the support
How much you received from DSPR (in total) distributed by years-Gaza only
How you spent the money you received? Elaborate - work program and Gaza
Has the money alleviated your suffering? Elaborate
Did you hear of any one misused the support
Did any of the people involved in distribution of service asked you to do any thing in return,
Did you hear about the other services the DSPR is providing
Would you prefer the support you got or the other provided services
Are you in need for support now? What response are you in most need of?
Has any of the DSPR staff visited you?
Has any one asked for something you regard as sensitive-invasion to your privacy
How do you feel about the way the DSPR treated you
Was the approach used by the DSPR suitable from your perspective WHY
Is there a way in the which the support can be more effective in meeting your/your family needs
Do you know who provided the support- probe for ACT
Others

### DSPR ( areas and CO) questions (plus some of the questions for stakeholders as mentioned above)

- Orientation and introduction
- When we mention the ACT appeals what comes to your mind first
- Your role in the project
- Are you engaged in social support other than ACT provided funds
- How the idea of the appeal emerged? Have the community/NGOs/formal organizations been involved in identifying the needs and the design of the project? Have you carried out needs assessments as a basis of the appeal proposals
- Is the support on line with the other projects working on the same field? Does it fit within a larger social support approach?
- How many beneficiaries were benefited from the project distributed by appeals, families' numbers, households' members, area in the different components (financial support, cash, medical fees, job creation, special assistance, medical aids) and kind of assistance provided?
- Which component of appeals worked better? And why? Has the use of cash grants to beneficiaries been an effective tool for transfer of funds in your perspective? Elaborate on this? Why you selected this approach other than the others?
- How you regard the effectiveness of the project? Elaborate
- To what extent the project met its intended objectives-impact can you give real examples/stories which support your assumption?

- Does the project meet emergency needs and how?
- How long it takes from the moment of notification of the case till providing the support?
- How you select, verify participants? What selection criteria you used?
- With whom you collaborate in this project (planning, design and implementation, how you regard this collaboration? Does this project fit the larger support strategy? Does this coordination have synergistic effect in alleviating poverty?
- How you make sure that participants use the support properly and as proposed
- To what extent you adhere to SPHERE minimum standards, the NGO Code of Conduct, the ACT Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation and guidelines to promote gender equality in humanitarian actions in implementing the project ( Local partners were also asked this question)
- Can you illustrate the process of support from notification till providing support-do you have it documented as a flow chart
- What steps you follow in order to make sure that participants benefited from the support
- Illustrate the financial cycle of the project related activities.
- Describe the procurement procedures at your project
- Are all steps documented, how could it be improved
- Had the financial and procurement policies in place match the requirements of the ACT policies? Have these policies been used to render the operations efficient and cost-effective?
- What are the lessons learned from the current work approach, design?
- Are you going to continue working in the same approach in future?
- Have you seen/benefited from the evaluation carried out in 2005 in setting up efficient internal control mechanisms?
- What measures you deliberately carry out to show visibility for ACT at various levels (beneficiaries, public, formal organizations, others). Are stakeholders aware about the ACT?

CO, AC and CC members were asked more questions about

- How do you perceive your role in Monitoring and evaluation
- How do you perceive your role in planning, designing, deciding on the response and selected targeting Criteria
- Level of Satisfaction with response, management procedures, how can it be improved

APF members

- How do you perceive the emergency and its effects
- How do you perceive ACT forum role in emergency
- Previous experience with ACT as implementing or donor
- How do you perceive DSPR role and responses carried
- The coordination and collaboration
- How can APF play a more effective role

Donors Survey, included evaluation of:

- The identified emergency in the appeal
- The proposed strategies to address emergencies
- The coordination and cooperation with other partners and actors
- The reporting received
- Relevance of the response to the emergency
- How do you perceive strength and weaknesses related to response

In addition to above other related specific questions and open discussion were carried.

**Annex 3: Evaluation of ACT APPEAL MEPL 51,61,71- DSPR  
Methods Used and People Involved in Evaluation**

**Annex 3.1 : Area: West Bank and Central Office**

**Consultant: Randa Hilal**

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Dates & Timing	Notes
<b>Nablus District : MEPL 51, 61 and 71</b>						
Nablus	Effectiveness, cooperation, and impact	In-depth interview	Wjdan	Governorate Representative	23 <sup>rd</sup> June 10:00-11:30	
Ministry of Interior	Status, needs, effectiveness, cooperation	In-depth interview	Ibrahim Salameh	Director General		Security status and needs for support
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	5 PA employees Beneficiaries	from old city		Income below poverty line
West old city	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	Group discussion	5 members of the local committee	Local committee	23 <sup>rd</sup> June 11:30-1:30	Local committee that dealt with the 71 appeal different than previous
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	11 Beneficiaries	MEPL71 beneficiaries		
	Home visits, observation	Interviews with beneficiaries	4 beneficiaries and families			
East old city	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	Interview	Amjad Eiran	Head of Popular Committee- East Old City	23 <sup>rd</sup> June 1:30-3:30	Local committee that dealt with the appeals,
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	16 Beneficiaries			
	Popular Committee Building	Walk through		Future plans of the women center		
Rafidia	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Jack Sa'adeh Fr. Yousef Sa'adeh	local churches coordinator	23 <sup>rd</sup> June 3:30-5:00	in contact for the 51,61 and 71 appeals

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Dates & Timings	Notes
<b>Jenin Governorate:</b> MEPL 51, 61 and 71						
Jenin Governorate	Effectiveness, cooperation, and impact	In-depth interview	Sana' Badawi	Governorate Representative Head of Public Relation	22 <sup>nd</sup> June 10:00-11:30	
	Status, needs, effectiveness, cooperation	In-depth interview	Abdallah Barakat	Deputy Governor		
Jenin Refugee Camp,  MEPL 51, 61 Food, Medical and Education	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Adnan Hindi	Head of Popular Committee	22 <sup>nd</sup> June 11:30-1:00	Local committee that dealt with the 61 and 51 appeals
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	5 women Beneficiaries	MEPL 61 beneficiaries		
Aqaba Village	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Silmi Sadeq	Head of Village Council	22 <sup>nd</sup> June 1:30-3:00	Local committee that dealt with the appeals,
			4 other council members	Village Council		
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	5 Beneficiaries			
Serees Village  MEPL 51, Work program and 61 Education	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Ahmad Shawar	Administrator at Village Council	22 <sup>nd</sup> June 3:30-5:30	Local committee that dealt with the MEPL 51 and 61 appeals,
			Waheed Barham	Ex-Head of Village Council		
	Effectiveness, Relevance, status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	8 Beneficiaries and Supplier			
	Visibility and relevance	Walk through	School, pavements	Future plans of the women center		
Drove through Jordan Valley-Jenin Road, through Tubas and Zababdeh						

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title /Capacity	Dates	Notes
<b>Ramallah Governorate:</b> MEPL 51, 61 and 71						
Taibeh Village MEPL 51, 61,71 Food and Education	Effectiveness, cooperation, and impact	In-depth interview	Fr. Ra'ed Abu Sahlia	Latin Parish	21 <sup>st</sup> June 10:00- 11:30	Part of Church committee dealt with all appeals, Food distribution
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	12 Beneficiaries and head of women CBO			
	Status, needs, effectiveness, cooperation	In-depth interview	Daoud Kana'an	Head of Village Local Council		
Kufr Na'emeh MEPL 71 Food	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Khaldoon Deik	Head of Village Council	21 <sup>st</sup> June 11:30- 1:00	Local committee that dealt with the 71 appeal
			3 other council members + 1 executive	Village Council		
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Interviews with beneficiaries	3 women from the community	2 beneficiaries and 1 complaining		
Shuqba Village MEPL 71 Food	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Mahmoud Nakhleh	Head of Village Council	21 <sup>st</sup> June 1:30-3:00	Local committee that dealt with implementing the appeal
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Interviews with beneficiaries	2 Beneficiaries			
All Villages were toured through were the Wall effect, the settlements were seen as well as the socio economic status observed						

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Dates & Timings	Notes
<b>Jerusalem Governorate:</b> MEPL 51, 61 and 71						
Beduin Community trapped between Jerusalem and Settlements MEPL 61, Animal Feeding	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Moh'd Abu Dahouk	Head of the Bedouin Community	26 <sup>st</sup> June 11:30-1:00	Local partner that dealt with the appeal
	Effectiveness, Relevance status and needs	Interviews with beneficiaries	5 Beneficiaries	3 men , then with the 2 women		
Jerusalem inside the Wall MEPL 71	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Khaled Sulaiman	Head of Jerusalem Municipality Social Services for the southern neighborhoods	26 <sup>th</sup> June 1:30-3:00	Local committee that dealt with the MEPL 51 and 61 appeals,
	Effectiveness, Relevance, status and needs	Interviews with beneficiaries	2 Beneficiaries			
Qalandia Refugee Camp MEPL 51, 61	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Moh'd Al Araj	Head Workers Union and popular committees	28 <sup>th</sup> June 9:00-11:00	Local committee that dealt with the MEPL 51 and 61 appeals, For Qalandia and North West Villages of Jerusalem
	Effectiveness, Relevance, status and needs	Interviews with beneficiary	1 Beneficiary	From Qalandia		
Abu Deis MEPL 51, 61	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Mahmoud Iraiqt	Head of Al Amal Charitable Society in Abu Deis	28 <sup>th</sup> June 1:30-3:30	Local committee that dealt with the MEPL 51, 61 and 71 appeals,
	Effectiveness, Relevance, status and needs	Focus groups with beneficiaries	11 Beneficiaries	8 women and 3 men		
<b>Jericho Governorate:</b> MEPL 51, 61 and 71						
Jerusalem	Relevancy, contribution, implementation cooperation and impact	In-depth interview	Fr. Firas Hejazin	Local Church in Jericho	28 <sup>th</sup> June 12:00-1:00	Local committee that dealt with the MEPL 51, 61 & 71 appeals,



Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Dates	Notes
<b>Stakeholders: Authorities, NGOs and CROs, ACT Forum members</b>						
PA- Ministry of Religious Affairs- Al-Zakah	The emergency needs. Their responses, approaches, capacities, cooperation, DSPR and ACT visibility	In-depth interview	Sh. Jamal Bawatneh	Minister of Religious Affairs and Board Chairman of Zakah Fund	26 <sup>th</sup> June	
PA-Ministry of Social Affairs			Ismail Abu El Halaweh			
			Fadia El Masri	Public Administration for Aid and Family Rehabilitation	30 <sup>th</sup> June	
<b>Other NGOs and international organization involved in emergency work</b>						
World Food Program, WFP	The emergency needs. Their responses, approaches, capacities, cooperation, DSPR and ACT visibility	In-depth interview	Cecilia Garzon	WFP Program Officer West Bank and Gaza	20 <sup>th</sup> June	
UNRWA-Emergency Program			Husain Faraj M. Manasreh	Program Coordinator Social Services	27 <sup>th</sup> June	
Union of Charitable Organization			Abdul Rahim Barbar K. Aloush	Jerusalem Director General Board Member	28 <sup>th</sup> June	
<b>ACT Forum implementing and Donor members</b>						
Lutheran World Federation, LWF	ACT responses in oPt the emergency, ACT Forum, Collaboration, approaches, effectiveness and impact of responses, future directions, lessons learned	In-depth interview	Rev. Mark Brown	LWF Regional Representative	12 <sup>th</sup> June	Met all ACT Palestine Forum members
International Orthodox Christian Charities, IOCC			Dr. George Malki Dirk van Gorp	Program Manager IOCC Representative	20 <sup>th</sup> June 1 <sup>st</sup> July	
The East Jerusalem, YMCA			Ilham Salameh	Forum Member	26 <sup>th</sup> June	
Dan Church Aid, DCA			Fadia Daibes	DCA Country Representative	30 <sup>th</sup> June	
Norwegian Church Aid, NCA			Liv Steimoeggen	NCA Regional Representative	1 <sup>st</sup> July	

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Dates & Timings	Notes
<b>DSP- West Bank and Central Office</b>						
DSPR West Bank and Central office	Overall management, relevancy, appropriateness, coordination, processes, effectiveness, lessons learned, future vision	Interview Internal Review of materials- Data, financial and procurement procedures Lists of beneficiaries, internal system and documents	Hanna Khoury	Finance officer- and involved in 51 and 61	17 <sup>th</sup> June 18 <sup>th</sup> June 20 <sup>th</sup> June	DSPR -WB Staff Could see them several times to verify info
			Samer Khoury-	coordinator of 71		
			Luna Saniora-	The coordinator Engineer, for work program 51		
	Approaches, Developing the response, Needs assessment, Planning, Monitoring, Lessons Learned, ACT forum, ACT visibility, processes, management, policies, Codes and Standards Financial monitoring	In-depth interviews	George Sahar	AC members	26 <sup>th</sup> June 30 <sup>th</sup> June 27 <sup>th</sup> June	Working with international NGO
			Fadwa Khader	AC members		Working with women org
			Claudit Habash	CC member		Head of Caritas
		Start up meetings At least 2 In-depth interviews one at the beginning and another one by the end, other meetings in between	Ramzi Zananiri	DSPR-WB Executive Secretary	4 <sup>th</sup> June 9 <sup>th</sup> June 27 <sup>th</sup> June 1 <sup>st</sup> July	Review of documents and monitoring methods
			Dr. Bernard Sabela	DSPR-CO Executive Secretary		
			George Istiphan	DSPR-CO: Finance officer		
	Delloitte auditing	External auditor for the ACT support and the DSPR	In depth interview, and review of audited reports and procedures	Yaqoob El-Yousef Azza	Certified Public Accountant	27 <sup>th</sup> June  17 <sup>th</sup> June
De- Briefing Meeting list of participants attached	Meeting for Presentation of findings by consultants and Receiving Feed back, Presented emergency responses and approaches		ACT Forum members and main staff of DSPR CO, WB and Gaza,		17 <sup>th</sup> July	Video conference used for interaction
	Meeting for Presentation of findings by consultants and Receiving Feed back, Presented emergency responses and approaches		DSPR CO and WB staff , AC and CC		1 <sup>st</sup> Aug	Internal workshop

**Annex 3.2 : Area: Gaza Strip**
**Consultant: Dr Bassam Abu Hamad**

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Organization	Timing	Notes
<b>NECC Central office-Project staff and management</b>							
NECC	Overall management, relevancy, appropriateness, coordination, lessons learned, future vision	In-depth interviews	Mr Qustantine Dabagh	Executive secretary	NECC	Tuesday June 17 <sup>th</sup> 08	2 hrs each
NECC	Overall management, relevancy, appropriateness, coordination, lessons learned, future vision	In-depth interviews	Mr Qustantine Dabagh	Executive secretary	NECC	Friday June 27 <sup>th</sup> 08	2 hrs each
NECC	Management, approach, procedures, documentation, follow up, impact	In-depth interviews	Yousief Sehawel	In-charge of social services program	NECC	Friday June 20 <sup>th</sup> 08 9-11	Also performs coordination 2 hrs
NECC	Approach, procedures, documentation, follow up, impact	In-depth interviews	Heba Bekhait	Social worker	NECC	Friday June 20 <sup>th</sup> 08 11-12,30	2 hrs
NECC	Approach, procedures, documentation, follow up, impact	In-depth interviews	Heba Dabagh	Social worker	NECC	Friday June 27 <sup>th</sup> 08 11-12,30	2 hrs
NECC	Financial procedures	In-depth interviews and records check	Wedad Shayegh	Bookkeeper	NECC	Friday June 20 <sup>th</sup> 08 12,30-13,30	1 hr
NECC	Administrative procedures	Interview and records check	Sa'ada Querbawi	Secretary	NECC	Saturday June 21 <sup>st</sup> 11-30-12	1 hr

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Organization	Timing	Notes
DSPR	Administrative and financial procedures	Interviews and documentary check	Essam Farrah	Administrative assistance	DSPR	Sunday June 22 <sup>nd</sup> 17-19	1 hr
DSPR	Overall management, relevancy, appropriateness, coordination, lessons learned, future vision	In-depth interviews	Mr Elias Mana	Chairman	DSPR	Friday June 27 <sup>th</sup> 08	1hrs each
DSPR	Support to Health program	Interviews and documentary check	Saleem Abadallah	Coordinator of health program	DSPR	Saturday June 21 <sup>st</sup> 13-14	1 hr
<b>Gaza area</b>							
Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA)	Relevance, appropriateness, impact, Coordination, visibility	In-depth Interview	Subhy Abu Radwan	Deputy Minister	MOSA	Tuesday 24 <sup>th</sup> June 08 9,30-10-30	1 hrs
Social services department-UNRWA	Relevance, appropriateness, impact, Coordination, visibility	In-depth interviews	Mustafa Halaby	Director of program	UNRWA	Tuesday 24 <sup>th</sup> June 08 11-12	1 hr Sunday is possible
UNRWA emergency program	Emergency program at UNRWA	In-depth interviews	Nasser Khalidy	Program director	UNRWA	Tuesday 24 <sup>th</sup> June 08 12-13	1 hr Sunday is possible
Gaza Governorate office	Relevance, impact, visibility, coordination	In-depth interviews	Ali Mekky	Governor and Deputy Governor	Gaza Governorates	Tuesday 24 <sup>th</sup> June 08 8-9	1 hr

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Organization	Timing	Notes
EI Wafa, Health NGO	Focus on supporting seriously injured people-walking aids, diapers, medical aids	In-depth interviews Services statistics	Teaser EI-Beltaji	Director of EI Wafa rehabilitation centre	EI-Wafa	Wednesday June 25 <sup>th</sup> 08 8-9	1 hr
EI Wafa, Health NGO	Beneficiaries perspectives	Interviews with 3 beneficiaries who received medically related aid			EI-Wafa	Wednesday June 25 <sup>th</sup> 9-11	Coordinate with the Hospital 1 hr
DSPR centre	Beneficiaries perspectives-job creation beneficiaries	Focus group	8-10 Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries-male and female mix	Beneficiaries	Saturday June 28 <sup>th</sup> 08 10,30-12	1,30 hrs
DSPR	Beneficiaries perspectives	Interviews with randomly selected beneficiaries from different components	20 Beneficiaries and their families	Beneficiaries-female	Beneficiaries	Tuesday July 1 <sup>st</sup> and Wednesday June 2 <sup>nd</sup> 08	5 from each appeal, 3 from job creation 2 from medical staff
WFP	Exploring other new approaches, cooperation, emergency status	In-depth interviews	Nehaia Abu Nahla	Chairman	WFP	Sunday June 29 <sup>th</sup> 8,30-9,30	1 hr
Ard El Enssan NGO specialized in nutrition	Exploring Ard El Enssan experience, cooperation	In-depth interviews	Etidal Khatieb	Executive director	Ard El Enssan	Sunday June 22 <sup>nd</sup> 8-9	1 hr
PRCS-Gaza Strip	Exploring other approaches, cooperation	In-depth interviews	Abed El Ziz Abu Quaria	Director General	Palestinian Red crescent Society	Sunday June 22 <sup>nd</sup> 10-11	1 hr
Ahli Arab Hospital	Other ACT projects	In-depth interview	Suhila Tarazy	Director of hospital	Ahli Arab hospital	Tuesday July 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-11	1 hr

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Organization	Timing	Notes
<b>North of Gaza</b>							
Beit-Lahia, NGO	Relevancy, contribution, cooperation and impact	In-depth interviews	Nedal El Maselami	Chirman of Beitlahia-NGOs	Development of Beitlahia	Wednesday June 25 <sup>th</sup> 08 12-13	1 hr
Beit Lahia	Beneficiaries perspectives-regular beneficiaries	Focus group	8-10 Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries-female	Beneficiaries	Wednesday June 25 <sup>th</sup> 08 13-14	Coordinate the attendance 1,30 hr
Bedwian Village	Beneficiaries perspectives-disastrous area (sewage flood)	Focus group	8-10 Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries-men	Beneficiaries	Wednesday June 25 <sup>th</sup> 08 14-15	
<b>Middle area</b>							
Governorate office	Relevancy, emergency situation, visibility	In-depth interviews	Abdallah Abu Samhadana	Governor	Middle governorate	Sunday June 26 <sup>th</sup> 10-11	1 hr
Governorate office	Beneficiaries perspectives	Focus groups				Sunday June 26 <sup>th</sup> 12-13	1 hr
Zawida	Relevancy of intervention, meeting needs, visibility and impact	In-depth interviews	Shoqry El Taweel	Manager	Zawida Zakkat committee	Thursday June 26 <sup>th</sup> 11,30-12,30	1 hr
Zawida	Providers perspectives	Focus groups				Thursday June 26 <sup>th</sup> 12,30-13,30	1 hr

Location of visit	Detail of the visit	Methods used	Targeted people	Title	Organization	Timing	Notes
<b>Khanyounis</b>							
Ma'en	Appropriateness, visibility	Interview	El Galban	Head of Tribe	Mukhatar-tribe	Monday June 23 <sup>rd</sup> 15,30-16,30	1 hr
Quarara Municipality	Coordination, appropriateness,	In-depth interviews	Eeed Abadallah	Mayor of Qarara	Qarara municipality	Monday 23 <sup>rd</sup> June 08 13-14	1 hr
Quarara municipality	Beneficiaries perspectives (recipients of aid, job creation beneficiaries)	Focus group	Beneficiaries			Monday 23 <sup>rd</sup> June 08 4-15	1 hr
<b>Rafah</b>							
Shoka municipality	Focus on supporting demolished and vulnerable areas	In-depth interviews Services statistics	Moansor Abu Braek	Mayor of Skoka Municipality	Shoka municipality	Monday 23 <sup>rd</sup> June 08 8-9	1 hr
Shoka	Beneficiaries perspectives (incursion area)	Focus group	8-10 Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Beneficiaries	Monday 23 <sup>rd</sup> June 08 -9-10	1hr
Um el Nasser, women association	Relevancy, contribution, coordination	In-depth interviews	Lila Moammer	President	Women health and empowerment	Monday 23 <sup>rd</sup> June 08 10-11	1 hr
Um el Nasser, women association	Providers perspectives	Focus groups	8-10 women beneficiaries			Monday 23 <sup>rd</sup> June 08 11-12	1,30 hr
CHF/USAID	Providers perspective	In-depth interview	Atef Owda	Director of Gaza office	CHF/USAID	Tuesday July 2 <sup>nd</sup> 2008 4-6 pm	2 hrs
UAWC	IOCC implementing body	In-depth interview	Mohammad Bagari and the project team	Director	UAWC	July 18 8-10	2 hrs
Preschools	IOCC implementing body	In-depth interview	Sabah Sarraj	Project Coordinator	Preschools	July 28 <sup>th</sup> 2008	2 hrs

**Annex 3.3**  
**List of Participants in the DE-Briefing Meeting and Feedback Workshop**

Name	Title
Debriefing meeting with DSPR CO, Gaza and West Bank and ACT members on 17/07/2008	
West Bank and Central	
Liv Steimoeggen,	ACT Palestine Forum Coordinator, NCA representative
Dr. George Malki,	ACT Palestine Forum, IOCC
Dr. Bernard Sabila	ACT Palestine Forum, DSPR DSPR-CO Executive Secretary
George Istiphan	DSPR-CO Finance Officer
Ramzi Zananiri	DSPR-WB Executive Secretary
Gaza	
Araxi Waheed,	Area Committee Vice-Chairperson, DSPR-Gaza
Dr. Issa Saleem Tarazi,	AC Treasurer, DSPR-Gaza
Sohaila Tarazi,	AC Member, DSPR-Gaza
Constantine Dabbagh,	Executive Secretary, DSPR-Gaza
Yousef Sehwal,	Social Worker, DSPR-Gaza
Debriefing meeting with MECC/DSPR Gaza staff, senior management and AC members in Gaza on 25/07/2008	
Elias Abed Manneh,	Chairperson, MECC
Araxi Waheed,	Vice-Chairperson, MECC
Dr. Issa Saleem Tarazi,	Treasurer, MECC
Dr. Sohail El Madbak,	Delegate, MECC
Dr. Imad Hanna Borbara,	Alternate, MECC
Constantine Dabbagh,	Executive Secretary, MECC
Yousef Sehwal,	Social Worker, MECC
Heba Dabbagh,	Social Worker, MECC
Heba Bukheet,	Social Worker, MECC
Debriefing meeting with MECC/DSPR West Bank staff, management and AC members and DSPR CO and CC in Jerusalem on 1/08/2008	
Dr. Bernard Sabila	DSPR-CO Executive Secretary
Claudit Habash	DSPR-Central Committee Member
George Sahar	Area Committee member
Ramzi Zananiri	DSPR-WB Executive Secretary
Luna Saniora-	Project Coordinator
Hanna Khoury	Finance officer
Samer Khoury	Coordinator of MEPL71

**Annex 3.4: Donor Survey and ACT international contact people**

Donor Survey Filled By:	
ACT funding member	Contact Person
Church World Service	Donna Derr
Church of Sweden	Carolina Grelsson
In depth Interviews with ACT funding Members	
Norwegian Church Aid	Liv Steimoeggen
Dan Church Aid	Fadia Daibes

ACT International –CO provided information:

Michael Zschiegner	Program Officer Latin America, Middle East, West Africa
Genviave	Finance Officer



### Annex 3.5: Desk Review

<b>The desk review for DSPR Gaza:</b>	
Appeals MEPL 51,61,71	
NGO code of conduct and SPHERE	2003, 2004, 2005
Annual audited Reports	
Financial Reports	
Monthly reports	
Final reports	
Cash assistance beneficiaries files	
Job creation contracts	
Vocational training centre reports	
Health program reports	
Communications between MECC and collaborating organizations	
Budget revised	
Annual reports of other assistance providers	
Local organizations data bases	
MECC/DSPR data base	
Emergency related documents (MOH, OCHA, CHF, MOSA, UNRWA)	
<b>The desk review for DSPR-WB:</b>	
ACT Appeals and revisions	MEPL 10,11,12,21,22,23,31, 51,61,71
NGO code of conduct and SPHERE minimum standards, the ACT Code of Conduct on sexual exploitation and guidelines to promote gender equality in humanitarian actions	2003, 2004, 2005
Appeal Audited reports	MEPL 10,11,12,21,22,23,31, 51,61,71
Annual audited Reports	2005 and 2006
Financial Reports	Of MEPL 51,61 and 71
Semi-annual and Final reports	Of MEPL 51,61 and 71
Communications between DSPR-WB and collaborating organizations	
Food Aid beneficiaries files	
Job creation files	
Procurement and Selection documents	
Area Committee minutes of meetings	
Main Actors reports and documents, WFP, Zakah and Union of charitable organizations	
Web Sites of B'Tselem, OCHA, UNRWA, PCBS, World Bank, ..	
Food Security Literature	
Documents on emergency, detailed in the related section	
Contracts and Bids	
Field visits reports	

Internal and external communications	
2005 Evaluation of the DSPR	
DSPR-WB Annual reports	
HAP Standards	
Processes guidelines	
<b>The desk review for DSPR-Central:</b>	
Semi Final and Final Appeal reports	MEPL 51, 61 and 71 only semi-final
APF Minutes of Meetings	2008
ACT Forum strategic plan and communication	Since 2002
DSPR Strategic Plan	2007-2010

## Annex 4: Emergency Related Maps and Data

### Annex 4.1: Maps


#### Map 4.1: West Bank Fragmentation, Source OCHA



UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

### West Bank territorial fragmentation and Palestinian access

October 2007



#### TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION

More than 38% of the West Bank consists of Israeli settlements, outposts, military bases and closed military areas and Israeli-designated nature reserves. These areas are tightly controlled or off-limits to Palestinians. As a result, the West Bank has been dissected into dozens of enclaves that geographically separate Palestinian communities.

Key to this fragmentation is a network of roads that are primarily for Israeli use and which connect Israeli settlements and other infrastructure to each other and to Israel. This road network is the main delineator in marking the boundaries of the Palestinian enclaves. Via a permit system, a series of physical obstacles placed principally along these roads and the existence of tunnels or underpasses, Palestinian vehicular access onto them is either restricted or prevented and ultimately diverted. Palestinians are forced to take longer, more circuitous routes to go distances that once took a few minutes. Consequently, these roads have become barriers.


- Palestinian holders of West Bank ID cards who wish to travel on this network generally need a permit depending on whether the vehicle is commercial, public transport or private car. Few drivers of private cars receive these permits. For those drivers who do, access onto this road network is controlled by fixed and partially manned checkpoints, or flying checkpoints that are regularly set up by the IDF. These measures have enforced the status of these roads as almost exclusively for Israeli use. They have also severely limited Palestinian access to and use of areas under Israeli control, namely, East Jerusalem, the land located west of the Barrier, the Jordan Valley, etc.

- Secondary roads that lead onto these primarily Israeli-use roads have been blocked by physical obstacles like roadblocks, road barriers, or earth mounds, preventing Palestinian vehicles from moving onto or across these roads.

- Checkpoints are in many places situated at the entrance/exit points to Palestinian enclaves. The same checkpoints that regulate Palestinian traffic on the Israeli road network also check Palestinian vehicular movement from one enclave to another.

- A growing trend is to funnel this traffic under the roads primarily for Israeli use via tunnels and underpasses, forcing Palestinian vehicles to remain on their inferior secondary road network.


- In addition, the IDF is constructing what they term 'fabric of life' roads. These purpose-built roads are located around Jerusalem where traditional links between communities have been severed by closures and the Barrier. They are designed to provide alternative connections via specially created roads that avoid the Israeli infrastructure in this area. Elsewhere in the West Bank, some secondary roads used by Palestinians are also being upgraded to allow for the increased traffic flow. In effect, Israelis and Palestinians use a parallel road system and these recent trends maintain this separation further.



The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
Cartography: OCHA-cP1 - October 2007. Base data: Palestinian Authority Ministry of Planning, July 2000 - OCHA update 2007  
For comments, contact <ochaocp1@un.org> or Tel. +972 (02) 582-962  
<http://www.ochaocp1.org>

**WEST Bank Area is 5,655km<sup>2</sup> with over 60% of the Land Zone C under Israeli Control, and 38% of land not allowed for Palestinians to use,**  
**Map 4.2: Gaza Strip Access: Source OCHA**



**Map 4.3: Break-up of Economic Space- WEST BANK Fragmentation:  
Source World Bank 2008**



## Annex 4.2: Important Indicators for the Emergency

### A4.2.1 Protection and Access Related Indicators<sup>1</sup>:

#### Fatalities

29.9.2000-30.6.2008	Occupied Territories			Israel
	Gaza Strip	West Bank	Total	
Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces	2970	1779	4749	67
Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians	4	41	45	2
Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians	39	197	236	487
Israeli security force personnel killed by Palestinians	97	147	244	90
Foreign citizens killed by Palestinians	10	7	17	37
Foreign citizens killed by Israeli security forces	4	6	10	
Palestinians killed by Palestinians	442	135	577	

Sources: B'Tselem Aug 08

#### Settlements in West Bank and Settlers:

At the end of 2007, the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) contained 120 settlements that the Interior Ministry recognized as "communities," even though some of them contain stretches of land on which the built-up area is not contiguous. 12 other settlements are located on land annexed by Israel in 1967 and made part of Jerusalem. There are an additional 100 or so unrecognized settlements, referred to in the media as "outposts," which are usually smaller than the recognized settlements.

By the end of 2007, the number of settlers in the West Bank stood at 462,000. According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, in September 2007, 271,400 settlers were living in the West Bank, excluding Jerusalem. In addition, based on growth statistics for the entire population of Jerusalem throughout 2007, the settler population in East Jerusalem is estimated at 191,000.

Israel has used a complex legal and bureaucratic mechanism to take control of more than fifty percent of the land in the West Bank. This land was used mainly to establish settlements and to create reserves of land for the future expansion of the settlements.

B'Tselem has noted the increase incidents of settlers' violence against Palestinian in the territories with increased number of complaints.

#### Restriction on Movement

The restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed on the Palestinian population in the Occupied Territories over the past five years are unprecedented in the history of the Israeli occupation in their scope, duration, and in the severity of damage that they cause to the three and a half million Palestinians who reside there. In the past, Israel has imposed either a comprehensive closure on the Occupied Territories or a curfew on a specific town or village to restrict Palestinian freedom of movement, but never has Israel imposed restrictions as sweeping and as prolonged as those currently in place.

<sup>1</sup> Source: B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, extracts from website <http://www.btselem.org/english>

<b>A4.2.2: Socio-Economic Data<sup>2</sup>:</b>															
	Q1 1999														
	Q1 2000														
	Q1 2001														
	Q1 2002														
<b>Unemployment rate - relaxed definition - % - PCBS24</b>															
West Bank	22.9%	16.9%	32.5%	35.0%	40.3%	31.0%	28.8%	27.2%	25.3%	23.4%	24.3%	22.6%	25.20%	25.90%	25.70%
Gaza Strip	27.9%	21.8%	48.8%	46.4%	37.3%	35.1%	38.0%	39.6%	41.8%	39.6%	35.4%	32.3%	37.60%	35.30%	35.50%
oPt	24.7%	20.2%	37.7%	38.7%	39.3%	32.3%	31.7%	31.1%	30.3%	28.4%	27.9%	25.7%	29.10%	28.80%	28.90%
<b>Households in poverty - based on consumption - % - PCBS25</b>															
Poor	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	27.7%	38.8%	29.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Deep poor	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	16.8%	23.8%	18.1%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<b>Number of Palestinians employed in Israel and in the settlements - PCBS26</b>															
West Bank	107067	105501	105501	57000	43281	49750	65255	59846	69478	68100	68100	63700	66800	n/a	n/a
Gaza Strip	25758	25380	2580	2000	6295	5849	0	852	0	0	0	0	0	n/a	n/a
oPt	132825	130881	107630	59000	49576	55999	65255	60698	69478	68100	68100	63700	66800	n/a	n/a
<b>Economic dependency ratio - PCBS27</b>															
West Bank	n/a	n/a	5.7	6	6.6	5.7	5.6	5	5	5	5.0	4.7	4.9	n/a	n/a
Gaza Strip	n/a	n/a	9.1	8.8	7.5	7.5	8.2	8	9	8	7.3	6.9	7.4	n/a	n/a
oPt	n/a	n/a	6.6	6.8	6.9	6.3	6.3	6	6	6	5.7	5.3	5.6	n/a	n/a
<b>Evolution of consumer price index (CPI) - PCBS28</b>															
West Bank	19.9%	24.8%	26.0%	32.0%	39.7%	44.2%	49.2%	54.3%	55.3%	57.0%	57.0%	55.7%	59.3%	64.1%	70.7%
Gaza Strip	21.9%	24.7%	22.8%	23.2%	26.4%	32.0%	33.8%	38.1%	41.5%	40.7%	42.0%	41.9%	46.1%	53.0%	60.0%
oPt	20.7%	20.7%	24.2%	28.4%	36.2%	41.4%	46.1%	51.0%	53.1%	52.9%	53.5	53.1%	56.9%	62.2%	68.3%
<b>Evolution of daily wages in NIS - PCBS29</b>															
West Bank	57.7	61.5	60	57.7	60	62.8	60	70	69.2	67.3	70.0	69.2	70.0	70.0	76.9
Gaza Strip	45.0	48.2	60	50	50	50	55.8	65.4	65.4	61.5	66.9	57.7	57.7	60.7	57.7
oPt	51.35	54.8	55	53.85	55.6	57.7	57.7	69.2	69.2	65.4	69.2	65.4	67.3	69.2	70.0

### PCBS Labour Force Survey Q1 2008

- Current number of PA employees in the oPt is 159,000
- Represents: 22.9% of the employed people in the oPt •
  - 16.3% of the employed people in the West Bank •
  - 38.7% of the employed people in the Gaza Strip •

Poverty can be defined by using either of two indices: Consumption-based poverty, and Income-based poverty. For clarifications on definitions, please see footnote # 25.

### Deep Poverty in the oPt Consumption-based (PCBS)

West Bank	Gaza Strip	oPt
1998	8.4%	12.5%

<sup>2</sup> Extracted from: OCHA, UN agencies & NGOs, The Humanitarian Monitor, #26, June 2008, oPt, source OCHA and PCBS

2001	12.0%	35.4%	19.5%				
2004	11.6%	26.0%	16.4%	2006	13.0%	34.8%	18.5%
2005	13.1%	27.9%	18.0%	2007	9.7%	35.0%	18.3%

### A 4.2.3 Crises in Gaza


#### Demographic and health indicators in the Gaza Strip

Demographic reports indicated that the Gaza Strip is the second most densely populated area on earth after Hong Kong (PCBS, 2007). Moreover, age structure in the Gaza Strip is similar to that in many developing countries, where nearly half of the total population is under 15 years old (20% in UK). Dependence ratio is estimated at 1:8.5 (one working person sponsors 8.5 persons) (MOH, 2005). Should the present rate of population increase continue, the Gaza population would almost double every 15 years. This creates a desperate situation in terms of education, employment, health, slowing production growth and increasing the prevalence of poverty.

It is worth pointing that the Gaza Strip is going through what is called "epidemiological transition". Palestinian community is suffering from poverty-related diseases and illnesses, such as malnutrition, anaemia, sanitary related diseases which has been aggravated due to conditions associated with the closure resulted in deterioration of sanitary conditions such as lack of diesel to operate the trucks transferring garbage, lack of electricity to pump sewage, lack of water or inability to pump it to the houses. A recent World Health Organization (WHO) study showed that 30 of the examined samples taken from the sea were contaminated with animal and human faeces and an additional 25% of the examined sites are contaminated with animal faeces only (WHO, June 2008).-Fuel Shortage in Gaza Strip and its implications on the Mediterranean sea water. June 2008. In addition to that, diseases associated with stress are also prevailing and constituting the main causes of death among adults. Non-communicable diseases such as cancer, hypertension and diabetes are also commonly spread among the population. Another important factor that increases the burden and the vulnerability in Gaza is the increased rates of injuries resulting from the Israeli incursions and hostilities and the internal Palestinian fighting started in late in 2006 between Fateh and Hamas.


While the health burden and the conflict-related injuries have increased, provision of basic health services has dramatically deteriorated on two levels: the provision of health services inside Gaza and access to treatment outside Gaza (OCHA, 2007b). OCHA (2007b), 'A Year of Decline, the Financial and Institutional Status of the Palestinian Authority', Special Focus 1 and 2, East Jerusalem. Health facilities are experiencing severe shortage of medications and lack of maintenance services and spare parts. For example, 11 out of 17 incubators available for neonatal services are not functioning. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHAa) reports in late 2007, indicate that around 35% of the essential drugs are available at zero stock. With the increasing rates of poverty, clients' ability to contribute to covering the medical fees has decreased OCHA (2007a), *The Humanitarian Monitor* No. 17, September, p. 1,. According to the WHO, the proportion of patients given permits to exit Gaza for medical care decreased from 89.3% in January 2007 to 64.3% in December 2007. WHO confirmed the deaths of many patients including children as a result of the blockade OCHA (2007a), *The Humanitarian Monitor* No. 17, September, p. 1,.

**Figure1: Distribution of Deaths in Gaza caused by the Israeli hostilities during the appeals years (MOH, 2008)**





**Figure 2: Distribution of injuries caused by the Israeli hostilities by the appeals years (MOH, 2008)**



### **Economic situation**

Since 2000, there has been a chronic down turn in wage income from Israel due to the security closure of the borders between Gaza and Israel till it reached the zero level now. This has been complicated by the massive contraction of employment opportunities inside Gaza due to the current collapse of economy due to production factors such as lack of raw materials, fuel, electricity as well as to market failure resulting from closure, lack of transportations and poverty. The collapse of the economy has left little money to buy food, and little food to buy. The reductions in the supply of food have significantly increased the price of food items. Around 75% of the Palestinians in Gaza are estimated to live in absolute poverty (Amnesty International, 2008).

Further, unemployment is estimated at 40% in the Palestinian community. Food prices are rising and wheat flour, baby milk, and rice, among other essential goods, are increasingly scarce and very expensive (wheat flour prices increased by 70%). It is worth mentioning that daily life expenses in Gaza are similar to Israel, if not higher, as both share one commercial market despite the high purchasing power of the Israeli community compared to the Palestinian community. In 2007, 80% of families in Gaza rely on humanitarian aid compared to 50% in 2005, 63% in 2006. This situation represents a serious threat to the earning population and their families (Oxfam, 2007).

**Annex 5: Emergency and Responses Information**  
**Annex 5.1: ACT Appeals and DSPR information**

ACT appeal	Issuing Date	Title	Implementing ACT members	Appeal Target US\$	DSPR Pledges US\$	DSPR Received Overall	Notes
MEPL 10	27 <sup>th</sup> Oct, 00	Emergency Relief for the Victims of Conflict	MECC/DSPR, LWF/AVH & IOCC	525,313	321,791	300,660.36	Rapid Response fund, transferred immediately of 25,750 to LWF and 25,000 to DSPR
MEPL 11 Revision2	3 <sup>rd</sup> July,01		MECC/DSPR, LWF/AVH & IOCC	855,550	380,373	147,400.10	Issued , Revision1: 2 <sup>nd</sup> April Only DSPR project revised for Revision2
MEPL 12 Revision1	30 <sup>th</sup> April,02		LWF/AVH & VHC	1,896,790	0	0	Issued
MEPL 21 Revision1	30 <sup>th</sup> May,02		MECC/DSPR & IOCC	770,163	551,378	552,536.17	Issued 19th March 02 for 551,378 for DSPR parallel to MEPL12 for LWF Revision to include IOCC
MEPL 22	3 <sup>rd</sup> Oct, 02		MECC/DSPR, LWF/AVH & IOCC	2,311,942	684,717	304,867.00	
MEPL 23 Revision1	12 <sup>th</sup> Dec 02	Assistance to Schools	LWF-VTC, Orthodox Church, Anglican Church and Evangelical Lutheran Church	868,625	0	0	Issued 11th Nov 02 revised to include the Arab Episcopal school in Ramallah run by Anglican Church
MEPL 31 Revision2	14 <sup>th</sup> Sept04	Emergency Relief for the Victims of Conflict	LWF-VTC, MECC/DSPR, LWF/AVH & IOCC	1,975,134	529,912	342,603	Revision2 for LWF-VTC Satellite program,
MEPL 51	23 <sup>rd</sup> Dec04	Emergency Assistance to Civilians	MECC/DSPR, LWF/AVH & IOCC	1,558,523	500,591	331,464	
MEPL 61 Revision2	Sep06		MECC/DSPR, LWF/AVH & IOCC	2,987,170	1,195,172	923,399	Issued at March06 for 1,396,013 Revision1 DSPR joined Revision2 IOCC Joined
MEPL 71 Revision1	June07		DSPR	1,092,885	1,092,885	962,268	Issued at for 755.691, extended on Only DSPR implementing
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>14,842,095</b>	<b>5,256,819</b>	<b>3,892,333.62</b>	


Sources: ACT Appeals MEPL 10,11,12,21,22,23,31,51,61,71 and revisions  
 DSPR- Emergency Appeals Audited Reports

## Annex 5.2 Food Security Map per Governorate in oPt- Mid 2006, WFP



United Nations  
World Food Programme

### United Nations World Food Programme Food Insecurity Level in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 2006



## Annex 5.3: Food Security and Vulnerability

Box A 5.1 The WFP/FAO Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) summarized recommendations:

- **Protection of livelihoods and mitigation of poverty**, through
  - strengthening of Palestinian produce, poultry, vegetables and olive oil;
  - investing in the diversification of food production patterns
  - improving technology to increase agricultural productivity within the natural limits of land and water resources
- **Food aid** to be geared towards including:
  - Productive assets creation (Food for Work) and protection of livelihoods assets base (targeted to socially-impaired and poor households);
  - Support for education (school feeding) and vocational/literacy training (Food for Training);
  - Protection of food consumption/nutrition levels of very poor households; and, Response to acute food shortages (e.g., in situations of blockades and armed conflict) through **contingency planning**.
- **Support Social welfare/protection schemes operated by various governmental** (e.g., MoSA) and (religious and secular charities and NGOs) actors for the “socially marginal” and “poorest of the poor,” preventing those groups from falling into destitution and offering the young generations opportunities for education and jobs. These schemes may include:
  - • Direct income transfers (cash assistance, food aid);
  - • Vocational training; and,
  - • Promotion of income generating activities
- Job creation to provide temporary employment (income support) to the unemployed and cash assistance, could be:
  - Maintenance of urban infrastructure including roads, water schemes and other infrastructure thus preventing degradation and maintaining towns/camps’ appearance and standards of hygiene; and,
  - • Investment in the productive asset base, particularly land and water conservation and management to prevent degradation of the physical environment,
- Food markets and trade should be supported
- Inter-sectoral coordination: building on existing Strong complementarities among UN CAP members

Box A5.2: The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

- **Classification based on national indicators:**
  - Phase classification 1: Generally food secure**
  - Phase classification 2: Chronically food insecure**
  - Phase classification 3: Acute food and livelihood crisis**
  - Phase classification 4: Humanitarian crisis**
  - Phase classification 5: Famine/humanitarian catastrophe**
  
- **Example of recommended Responses for phase classification 2:**
  - Design and implement strategies to increase stability, resistance and resilience of livelihood systems, thus reducing risk
  - Provision of 'safety nets' to high risk groups
  - Interventions for optimal and sustainable use of livelihood assets
  - Create contingency plan
  - Redress structural hindrances to food security
  - Close monitoring of relevant outcome and process indicators
  - Advocacy

## Annex 6: DSPR-Gaza Data


### A6.1: Targeting criteria:

Targeting criteria proposed in the appeals and its implementation in the field


Criteria	Source	Consideration in implementation	Suggestions
No income or income is severely restricted	Appeal	Very High	
Low income families with children who need education	Appeal	Not specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Low income with health related needs	Appeal	Not specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Unemployed with no income	Appeal	Very High	
Families unable to meet costs of medical services	Appeal	Not specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Families with members who require special needs	Appeal	Not specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Families on organizations lists of the very needy	Appeal	High	Lists need to consider other criteria
Families affected by the demolitions and destruction	Appeal	Sometimes specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Families with 5 members and more	MECC/DSPR	High but not absolute	Requires revision
Families who didn't receive assistance from DSPR	MECC/DSPR	High but not absolute	Requires revision

**Annex6.2: Health Services Statistics**


**Figure A6.1: Children attended the well baby clinic January 2005 through June 2008**



**Figure A6.2: No. of antenatal care visits January 2005 through June 2008**



**Figure A6.3:**  
**No. of persons examined by Doctor January 2005 through June 2007**





## Annex 7: DSPR-WB Data

### A7.1: Goals and Objectives:

Figure A7.1: Budgeted/received ACT Support to DSPR-WB/ICC, 51, 61 & 71





Figure A7.2: ACT/DSPR-WB Planned Goals and Objectives number of beneficiaries in comparison to those achieved




Source: ACT Appeals, Narrative and Audited Reports

## A7.2: Targeting


**Table A7.1: Targeting criteria proposed in the appeals and its implementation in the field**

Criteria	Source	Consideration in implementation	Suggestions
No income or income is severely restricted	Appeal	Very High	To set a clear indicator of no work or receiving less than indicated poverty line
Low income families with children who need education	Appeal	Not specifically targeted , some partners sent the list with criterion identified	To be given more attention
Low income with health related needs	Appeal	Not specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Unemployed with no income	Appeal	High in specifically in certain highly affected areas	To be given more attention
Families unable to meet costs of medical services	Appeal	Not specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Families with members who require special needs	Appeal	Not specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Families on organizations lists of the very needy	Appeal	High	Need to consider other criteria
Families affected by the demolitions and destruction	Appeal	Sometimes specifically targeted	To be given more attention
Families with 5 members and more	DSPR-WB	High but depends on area	Requires revision, as some with no income while have small families, such as the elderly
Families who didn't receive assistance from DSPR	DSPR-WB	High but not absolute	Requires revision

**Fig A7.3: Analysis of Kufor Nemeh list 71**



**Fig A7.4: Analysis of Taybeh list 61**



## A 7.3 International Codes of Conducts in disaster Relief

# PRINCIPLES OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT AND NGOs IN DISASTER RELIEF

1. **The humanitarian imperative comes first.**
2. **Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone.**
3. **Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.**
4. **We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.**
5. **We shall respect culture and custom.**
6. **We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.**
7. **Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.**
8. **Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.**
9. **We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.**
10. **In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.**

The full text of the Code of Conduct is available both as a stand alone document (in English, French, Spanish and Arabic) or as a section of the World Disasters Report 1994 (in English, French, Spanish and Arabic, with a commentary) from the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, PO Box 372, 1211 Geneva 19, Fax: +41 22 7330395

WCC and LWF are signatories to this Code of Conduct.

September 1995

G:\ACT\ACTPOLCY\FINAL\ENGLISH\NEWLOGO\CODE OF CONDUCT.doc

---

ACT is a global alliance of churches and related agencies working to save lives and support communities in emergencies worldwide.

The ACT Coordinating Office is based with the World Council of Churches (WCC) and The Lutheran World Federation (LWF) in Switzerland.

#### **A 7.4: Job Creation, Medical and Education assistance**

	<b>Budgeted61</b>	<b>Received61</b>	<b>Planned61</b>	<b>Achieved61</b>
<b>Food</b>	<b>292,314.00</b>	<b>240,021.56</b>	<b>5,158.00</b>	<b>5110</b>
<b>Medical</b>	<b>25,000.00</b>	<b>22,141.14</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>500</b>
<b>Education</b>	<b>50,050.00</b>	<b>25,825.53</b>	<b>1430</b>	<b>1900</b>

#### **A 7.5: Contents of the Food Packages: MEPL71**

Based on the Appeals and verified by the evaluator the contents are:

- 10 Kg Rice
- 1 Box Fat
- 1 Kg Halaweh
- 3 Liter Cooking Oil
- 2 Boxes Corn Beef
- 2 Boxes Luncheon Meat
- 2 Kg Sugar
- 2 Packs Noodles
- 4 Packs Spaghetti
- 1 Kg Salt
- 2 Boxes Nido Milk
- 1 Kg White Peas
- 2 Boxes Tomato Paste
- 2 Kg Green Peas
- 1 Box Carton