

# EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

REPORT 9/2017



## Realising Potential Evaluation of Norway's Support to Education in Conflict and Crisis through Civil Society Organisations

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**Commissioned by**  
the Evaluation Department

**Carried out by**  
The Konterra Group

**Written by**  
Dr. Julia Betts (Team Leader), Magali Chelpi-den Hamer,  
Nizar Ghanem, Niamh O'Grady, Kristin Olsen

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—————  
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Norwegian Agency for  
Development Cooperation  
[www.norad.no](http://www.norad.no)  
[post-eval@norad.no](mailto:post-eval@norad.no)

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# Foreword

Education in situations of crisis and conflict has been a priority in Norwegian development aid over some time, for governments across the political spectrum. Norwegian civil society organisations were instrumental in getting the issue up on the political agenda and in driving the agenda forward. They are also important partners for the government in delivering education in these demanding contexts. The current evaluation was therefore initiated in order to generate learning from the experience and the results achieved in this field over time.

Oslo, November 2017

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Per Øyvind Bastøe', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

**Per Øyvind Bastøe**  
Evaluation Director

# Acknowledgements

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# Executive Summary

## BACKGROUND

The independent evaluation of Norway's assistance to education in situations of crisis and conflict (EiCC) through partner Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) was commissioned by Norad's Evaluation Department. It was conducted from March-October 2017.

The evaluation had three aims:

- › To map Norway's financial support for EiCC through CSOs in the evaluation period
- › To assess and document the results of Norwegian support to EiCC through CSOs
- › To make recommendations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and CSOs themselves regarding the design and implementation of Norwegian support to EiCC.

It asked five overarching questions:

- › How appropriate were Norway's EiCC interventions to needs?
- › How coherent were interventions?
- › How effective were interventions?
- › How cost-efficient were interventions?
- › How connected were interventions to longer term concerns?

The evaluation drew on evidence from multiple streams, including interviews with stakeholders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad plus key Oslo-based CSOs; systematic review of a sample of projects; a telephone survey of CSO representatives; desk study of two sample countries (Somalia and South Sudan); and field study in two others (Lebanon and Jordan). Detailed mapping of Norwegian support to EiCC through CSOs was also conducted. A systematic approach was adapted to the methodology, including the use of structured tools to support analysis.

The evaluation experienced a number of limitations, particularly in relation to access to information. Data storage was limited, and variability in partner CSOs' mechanisms for reporting on results meant that generating an aggregate picture of achievements was unfeasible. Insufficient data was available to report on cost-efficiency.

## KEY FINDINGS

**Summary:** Overall, the evaluation finds that Norway's support to EiCC through its CSO

partners is generally appropriate to needs. It has delivered some significant results for vulnerable children experiencing crisis and conflict, and has supported the realisation of Norway's policy goals for the period. It has also successfully influenced global policy dialogue. However, despite a comparative strong strategic architecture, these achievements have been realised largely on CSO's 'own terms'. The Government of Norway's willing, but largely passive, approach, embodied in its trust-based model of support, has meant that in aggregate, the assistance has not comprised '*more than the sum of its parts*'; that is, it has not combined or leveraged collective capabilities to deliver higher-level or broader-ranging results for those in need. In this, Norway's support to EiCC through its CSOs partners is not yet fully *realising its potential* for the greater good.

**Appropriateness:** Norway has contributed at least 2.85 billion NOK to EiCC through CSOs since 2008. The evaluation finds this support to be generally appropriate to humanitarian needs. Despite sometimes unclear programme rationales, CSO partners 'closeness to the

ground’ and their strong emphasis on extensive consultation with affected populations, has enabled provision which is mostly sensitive and nuanced to needs, often in extremely challenging operating contexts.

Support has also aligned closely with Norway’s policy and strategic goals for the period, under a comparatively well-defined strategic architecture for education. However, EiCC assistance has not benefited at country level from any clear Norwegian government statement of how CSOs can or should contribute to education aims.

**Coherence:** The comparatively explicit strategic architecture framing EiCC investment has not yet permeated down to support improved coherence. Limited aggregate-level analysis to inform investment choices, combined with limited oversight at country level, have helped limit the strategic overview of the portfolio. Externally, CSO actors participate in coordination fora where feasible. Horizontal linkages with other partners in the context occur, but are dependent on CSOs’ own willingness and ability to forge these.

**Effectiveness:** Monitoring systems for Norway’s EiCC interventions though CSOs are diverse, reporting on different aims in different ways

at different times. Positively, this supports trust and the freedom of action within the ‘Norwegian model’ of international assistance. However, it also constrains the analysis of aggregate level achievements across the portfolio.

Overall, government-funded EiCC interventions implemented by CSOs have contributed to some significant results. Gains are observed in terms of access and quality of educational provision in conflict and crisis-affected situations. These include opening up access to education for thousands of out of school children; helping strengthen the capacity of national systems and actors; and boosting teacher skills. More strategically, new thinking and concepts have been introduced, for example on inclusive education, gender or psychosocial approaches. Interventions have also made some significant contributions to Norwegian policy goals over the period. The targeting of marginalised groups has mostly focused on gender and disability, and is reported in largely quantitative, ‘inclusion’ terms.

However, such achievements – whilst significant - have largely been built *on CSOs’ own terms*. The trust-based model of support adopted by the Norwegian government has permitted highly-valued freedom of action, and it has preserved the mutual confidence so fundamental to the

‘Norwegian model’. However, the resulting trade-off is that rather than leveraging collective capabilities and expertise, efforts are not combined holistically, to produce higher level or broader-ranging effects for beneficiaries in need. Results created are therefore individualised; they are not *‘more than the sum of the parts’*. In this, Norway’s EiCC support through CSOs might be characterised as not *realising its potential* for the greater good.

Key factors supporting the achievement of results are Norway’s flexible financing model to its CSO partners and its relatively supportive grant management procedures. However, results have also been constrained by limited strategic overview of the portfolio, linked to staffing constraints, and by short-term humanitarian financing streams. Few requirements for lesson-learning and evaluation are in place.

**Connectedness:** Approaches to sustainability are variable, with interventions undertaking clear planning – mainly through efforts to work closely with national systems – for capacity strengthening. However, efforts are not consistently strategic, and are not always supported by clear tracking and recording of results.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The report makes eight recommendations to Norwegian government stakeholders, as follows:

What?	Who?
<p><b>1. Map and define CSO comparative advantages to EiCC at global level</b> To support the leveraging of respective comparative advantages, Government of Norway and CSO partners should collectively map the strengths and expertise that CSOs can jointly bring to Norway's EiCC policy goals. This will provide clarity on respective roles and responsibilities.</p> <p>This mapping should take into account CSO's own individual strengths and also the potential for collective action. It should consider CSO's strengths both in programmatic terms, but also in advocacy/lobbying and building accountability mechanisms, both at country and at global level.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society Strengthening and Education Sections</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. Provide a collective statement of strategic intent</b> Based on the clarification of roles and responsibilities, above, Government of Norway and its key CSO partners should issue a jointly-agreed and clearer statement of intent, on how and where CSOs are best placed to contribute to Norway's policy goals for EiCC over a defined strategic period (such as three years). This statement of intent can be referenced in framework agreements and project applications.</p> <p>This strategic process can also be supported by the creation of a common platform for dialogue, to bring the Norwegian Government and its partner CSOs together at appropriate points (e.g. annually) as part of a process of collective strategic oversight and review. This will facilitate joint progress assessment and support the identification of new needs emerging, and changes in direction required.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society Strengthening Section</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. Enhance country level strategic planning</b> Royal Norwegian Embassies and CSO partners engaged in EiCC interventions at country level should seek to bring their experience together in addressing humanitarian needs through EiCC, framed within a medium-term view of education sector needs. This can lay the foundations for stronger strategic planning and oversight and bring clarity to where and under what conditions CSOs, as distinct from multilateral partners, can add value to the national agenda.</p> <p>MFA Humanitarian Section should provide more explicit guidance to CSOs on expectations in grant agreements regarding planning for transition, as they have done for the International Humanitarian Principles.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; Royal Norwegian Embassies</li> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society Strengthening Section</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Further specify approaches to vulnerability and exclusion as part of the 'no-one left behind' agenda for EiCC in Norway</b> Government of Norway and its CSO partners should more clearly define vulnerability parameters, and the intention to map and record results against these. Expectations on mainstreaming gender and inclusive education should be required to go 'beyond numbers' included in interventions to address more structural/transformational changes, and to report accordingly.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Norad Education Section</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>



What?	Who?
<p><b>5. Expand longer-term funding</b> Further emphasis on longer-term funding modalities, particularly expanding the use of development funds for EiCC, is a pre-requisite to improving access and quality, particularly where crises have become protracted.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> </ul>
<p><b>6. Boost Norway's intellectual leadership in EiCC</b> Strengthen Norway's role as an intellectual leader, by seeking to build and disseminate the body of evidence for EiCC through a lesson-learning strategy, including in areas such as participatory approaches; managing operational independence; and innovation.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Norad Section for Civil Society Strengthening</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>
<p><b>7. Improve monitoring and evaluation</b> The use of standard indicators developed in 2016 as a condition of grant approval will support clarity on achievement. Additional improvements can include: expanding indicators to include policy influencing, capacity strengthening and gender/inclusion, to help make visible some currently uncaptured gains; and integrating qualitative parameters, to add depth to quantitative information.</p> <p>Government stakeholders should consider making independent evaluation or review – the modalities for which could be individually agreed - a requirement of grant approval where appropriate. Feedback loops for data use need to be established and applied.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society Strengthening Section</li> </ul>
<p><b>8. Improve transparency and accountability</b> Norway's legislation and policy commitments on freedom of information, to support public accountability and transparency, are robust, but often little information is available to access. A more robust and explicit directive to Ministry staff on a) storage requirements and b) categorisation by document type, would support delivery on these commitments.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA management and administrative leadership</li> </ul>



# 1. Introduction and context

*‘Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.’*

– NELSON MANDELA

*‘The impact of armed conflict on children is everyone's responsibility. And it must be everyone's concern.’*

– GRAÇA MACHEL

## 1.1 THE CONTEXT: EDUCATION IN CONFLICT AND CRISIS

The number of children and youth living in acute and protracted crisis and conflict-affected contexts is now at unprecedented levels. In 2017, 65.6 million people around the world have been forced from home. Among them are nearly 22.5 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18. 10 million stateless people also lack access to basic rights – including education.<sup>1</sup>

The effects of crisis and conflict on educational opportunities are devastating, both in the short- and long-term. UNHCR estimates that

1 <http://www.unhcr.org/uk/figures-at-a-glance.html> accessed 28/08/17

the average length of displacement from conflict is 17 years<sup>2</sup> – meaning that entire childhoods are spent in situations of displacement, without consistent educational provision.

Globally, aid to education has stagnated since 2010, falling from 10 percent of total aid in 2009 to 6.9 percent in 2015.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, as crises have become increasingly complex and protracted, a conceptual and operational gap has opened up, reflecting the tensions between the need for swift emergency responses to conflict and crisis, often delivered through humanitarian assistance, and the need for longer-term, systemic solutions linked to national education policies and plans, often addressed through development aid. Education as a life-saving response is now recognised in the global policy dialogue,<sup>4</sup> and there is broad agreement that stronger and deeper linkages

2 UNHCR Global Trends 2013 <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/5399a14f9/unhcr-global-trends-2013.htm> accessed 28/08/17

3 UNESCO. (2017). Aid to education is stagnating and not going to countries most in need. Policy Paper 31. UNESCO: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002495/249568e.pdf> accessed 28/08/17.

4 See <http://www.ineesite.org/en/education-in-emergencies> accessed 1/09/17.

are needed to connect humanitarian assistance to wider transitional planning.

### BOX 1 // EDUCATION IN CRISIS AND CONFLICT

At the end of 2015, around 264 million children and youth were out of school, including 61 million children of primary school age.\*

35 percent of all out-of-school children of primary age (22 million), 25 percent of all out-of-school adolescents of lower secondary age (15 million), and 18 percent of all out-of-school youth of upper secondary age live in conflict-affected areas (26 million).\*\*

The world faces a shortfall of 3.3 million primary teachers and 5.1 million lower secondary school teachers by 2030. The countries most in need of education personnel are those affected by emergencies and disasters.\*\*\*

\* <http://uis.unesco.org/en/topic/out-school-children-and-youth> accessed 28/08/17

\*\* Ibid.

\*\*\* Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children Norway (2015) Walk the Talk: Review of Donors' Humanitarian Policies on Education: Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies, accessed 28/08/17.

Education is by definition a politically-sensitive sector, being closely linked with state-building and citizenship issues and priorities.<sup>5</sup>

Particularly in situations of crisis and conflict, these sensitivities can become acute, with issues of universal rights and obligations coming into tension with states' own political and strategic priorities. Such dilemmas have played out in the definitions surrounding education as a humanitarian response. Since the concept of '*education in emergencies*' came to the fore in the 1990s, the recognition of the need for longer-term solutions in light of increasingly protracted humanitarian emergencies<sup>6</sup> led to a re-conceptualisation of 'education in emergencies and protracted crises.'<sup>7</sup> Currently, 'education in conflict and crisis', or 'EiCC', is the recognised term in policy dialogue, and is consequently applied in this evaluation.<sup>8</sup>

Key current issues under debate include the certification of learning attainments for pupils/students crossing borders and already advanced in their education (and also for students starting their education in the host country); the need for formal provision for children spending extended time in emergency education environments, as crises become protracted and the increasing need for non-formal provision; and support for host countries struggling to meet the educational needs of their population and faced with extensive refugee influxes. The role of education in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism is also increasingly prominent in international dialogue.<sup>9</sup>

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5 Secretary General of the United Nations. (2016). Report on the Outcome of the World Humanitarian Summit.

6 In 2015, just five protracted crises– Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Iraq and Sudan– accounted for over half of all humanitarian funding Development Initiatives (2016) Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016.

7 Reflected in the Oslo Summit of 2015 which led to the Oslo Principles for Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises.

8 See Global Partnership for Education (2015) A Platform for Education in Crisis and Conflict: a GPE Issues Paper <http://www.globalpartnership.org/sites/default/files/2015-03-a-platform-for-education-in-crisis-and-conflict.pdf> accessed 30/03/17.

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9 <http://www.ineesite.org/en/> accessed 28/08/17.

## 2. The evaluation

### 2.1 PURPOSE, OBJECTIVES AND INTENT

This report comprises an independent evaluation of Norway's support to Education in situations of Conflict and Crisis (EiCC) 2008-2017, as provided through partner Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). It was conducted from March – October 2017. The evaluation's purpose is:

*'to provide decision-makers with information about the results of Norwegian aid to education in crisis and conflict situations through civil society organisations, and information about factors contributing to attainment or non-attainment of results, that can be used to improve future Norwegian civil society support to education in situations of crisis and conflict.'*

Its specific objectives are:

- › To **map** Norway's financial support for EiCC through CSOs in the evaluation period;
- › To **assess and document** the results of Norwegian support to EiCC through CSOs;

- › To **make recommendations** to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and CSOs themselves regarding the design and implementation of Norwegian support to EiCC.<sup>10</sup>

The evaluation has an **accountability** dimension, in reviewing the results of the assistance, but its main intent is **learning**, to support the Government of Norway in its future investment choices for EiCC. Its main intended users are decision-makers in the Norwegian aid administration; though it is also intended to provide useful information for Norwegian civil society organisations engaged in EiCC.<sup>11</sup>

### 2.2 KEY CONCEPTS

This evaluation was tasked to map and assess Norwegian assistance to EiCC through CSOs with an emphasis on documenting results. However, EiCC is by definition a highly complex object. Four specific features define it:

**The complexity of context:** Norwegian government publications<sup>12</sup> recognise the inherent challenges of implementing EiCC solutions in what are often very complex operating environments, where surrounding governance, policy, systems and mechanisms may not exist, and resources may be scant at best. The diversity of contexts in which EiCC solutions are implemented – from refugee camps to national systems expansion – complicates the design and implementation of programmatic responses.

**Tensions between humanitarian and development approaches:** As signalled in Section 1 above, the structural – and cultural – differences between humanitarian assistance and development interventions influenced EiCC responses. Humanitarian assistance is governed by the International Humanitarian Principles of neutrality, impartiality, independence and humanity. Development assistance is strongly focused on alignment,

<sup>10</sup> Terms of Reference – see Annex 1.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> See e.g. Meld. St. 25 (2013–2014) Report to the Storting (White Paper) Education for Development.

working closely with Ministries of Education, sector policies, programmes and plans, all geared to the medium and longer-term. These two approaches – and the mind-sets of their actors – are frequently brought into tension in the design and implementation of EiCC interventions.

**EiCC is fundamentally political:** As Section 1 has indicated, EiCC's linkages to national policy priorities and sector plans, as well as its high-profile nature, mean that interventions are often more politicised than other areas of humanitarian assistance. It takes place in complex operating environments, under sometimes difficult governance conditions and where national government may or may not be the primary interlocutor (and in some situations, may be a party to the crisis or conflict). At a more macro level, EiCC interventions take place within complex and dynamic webs of political aid relationships at country level.

**A rights issue:** EiCC is globally understood as a child rights issue,<sup>13</sup> a stance strongly reflected in Norway's own policy positions on the issue.<sup>14</sup>

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13 See e.g. [https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/A\\_Human\\_Rights\\_Based\\_Approach\\_to\\_Education\\_for\\_All.pdf](https://www.unicef.org/publications/files/A_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Education_for_All.pdf)

14 See for example Meld. St. 25 (2013–2014) Report to the Storting (White Paper) Education for Development which emphasizes the rights-based nature of Norway's approach to the issue. Key rights instruments include the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the International Covenant on Economic,

This conceptual basis is critical; it also raises complexities in conflict-affected settings, where governments may be party to conflicts and/or may have vested interests in the supply of education to particular groups, communities of geographical areas.

This evaluation is therefore focused on a **complex and fundamentally** political question. Its evaluation questions, approach and methodology, described below, have been designed to address this challenge.

### 2.3 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Within its purpose and objectives, above, the evaluation asked a series of overarching evaluation questions supported by sub-questions and aligned to relevant international evaluation criteria. These are reflected in Table 1 (next page).

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Social and Cultural Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and ILO Convention No. 138 as well as the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and their right to education.

### 2.4 LOGIC MODEL FOR NORWAY'S SUPPORT TO EiCC

No specific theory of change or logic model exists to frame Norway's EiCC interventions through CSOs. However, in line with good evaluation practice, this was reconstructed to inform the evaluation's design and methodology. Key features of the logic model (Figure 1, page 14) include:

- › Its application of the main commitments outlined in Norway's key strategic documents which have framed its EiCC interventions through CSOs since 2008 (see Section 3 below);
- › Its referencing of the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards,<sup>15</sup> which form the global consensus for good practice in meeting the educational rights and needs of people affected by disasters and crises (see also Section 3).

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15 Available at <http://www.ineesite.org/en/>

**TABLE 1 // EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

**1. How appropriate were interventions to needs?**

- 1.1 To what extent were interventions based on a sufficient, precise and updated analysis of the context and relevant conflict dynamics?
- 1.2 How were affected populations engaged in planning of interventions?
- 1.3 Were interventions designed accordingly planned and implemented to meet the needs and interests of the affected population (taking into account the distinct needs of girls and boys, as well as vulnerable groups such as displaced children, children with disabilities, ethnic or religious minorities)? Did they implement protection and well-being concerns?
- 1.4 To what extent have interventions evolved over time, adapting to changing situations?
- 1.5 To what extent were interventions coherent with relevant national education policies and strategies and/or humanitarian/refugee response plans?
- 1.6 To what extent were interventions implemented in line with Norway's policy goals over the period?

**2. How coherent were interventions?**

- 2.1 To what extent are Norway's EICC activities through civil society partners being implemented as part of a coherent portfolio?
- 2.2 To what extent have Norway-funded interventions been implemented in coherence with Education Cluster/Sector Working Groups in the country?
- 2.3 How closely are Norway-funded interventions linked to EICC interventions supported by other relevant humanitarian and development actors?

**3. How effective were interventions?**

- 3.1 To what extent have interventions achieved, or are likely to achieve, their intended outputs and outcomes?
- 3.2 To what extent did these achievements contribute towards the realization of Norwegian policy goals for its humanitarian/development assistance over the period?
- 3.3 What factors may explain achievement and non-achievement of results?
- 3.4 Have interventions had any likely unintended consequences, positive or negative?
- 3.5 To what extent were interventions designed and implemented in accordance with the International Humanitarian Principles?


**4. What efforts were made to ensure cost-efficiency?**

- 4.1 To what extent has the portfolio (in sample countries particularly) made efforts to ensure cost-efficiency?

**5. How connected were interventions?**

- 5.1 Are interventions designed and implemented in a manner that supports longer term needs in the education sector?
- 5.2 Were transition strategies explicitly built in?
- 5.3 Where feasible, do partners work in partnership with national authorities and local CSOs or other actors in ways that support the development of their capacity?

FIGURE 1 // LOGIC MODEL



## 2.5 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY


The **scope** of the evaluation is Norwegian Government support to EiCC through CSOs, during the period 2008-2017. The evaluation assessed support to formal and non-formal basic education<sup>16</sup>, and does not address education responses arising from natural disasters.

The evaluation's full methodology is described in Annex 2. However, in summary: A mixed-method approach was applied, combining evidence from six different streams (Figure 2) through a systematic analytical framework (see Evaluation Matrix, Annex 3) and structured tools (see Annex 4) to generate solidly-grounded findings and conclusions. Detailed Mapping of Norwegian support to EiCC through CSOs was also conducted (see Volume II of this report).

This report draws on evidence from four case studies: two field studies (in Lebanon and Jordan) and two desk studies (of South Sudan and Somalia). These are separately annexed to this report. Content analysis of a sample

<sup>16</sup> OECD DAC codes 111 (Education, level unspecified) and 112 (Basic education), including sub-codes 111.20 (Education facilities and training), 111.30 (Teacher training), 112.20 (Primary education) and 112.30 (Basic life skills for youth and adults). Relevant initiatives under 111.10 (Education policy and administrative management) and 111.82 (Education research) were retrospectively included where relevant. Relevant initiatives under humanitarian codes 720 (Emergency response), 730 (Reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation) and 740 (Disaster prevention and preparedness) were also included.

FIGURE 2 // EVIDENCE STREAMS



of projects allowed for finding to be generated beyond the four case studies, and telephone interviews with a sample of CSO partners also helped increase the breadth and depth of the findings.

## 2.6 LIMITATIONS AND INTENT

During its implementation, the evaluation encountered a number of **limitations**, also experienced by other evaluations of the Norwegian aid administration. These are fully detailed in Annex 2, Methodology but mostly concern data availability. As follows:

1. This evaluation has found **access to information** exceptionally challenging. Due to limited information storage within Norad/MFA systems, it was difficult, in many cases, to gain a clear picture of the EiCC investments; their rationale, intended results, and implementation. This is not merely an issue for evaluability, but a substantive point regarding the transparency and accountability of Norwegian assistance. The challenge has been reflected in many previous evaluations<sup>17</sup> and also by Norway's Auditor General's Office<sup>18</sup>. Its implications are discussed in Conclusions, below. To mitigate this, as wide a range of stakeholders as possible was interviewed (see Annex 4, Interviewees), and information was triangulated as far as feasible. Where data gaps remain, these are openly reported.
2. With **basic education a sub-theme within the wider field of education**, accurately mapping support was challenging, since Norwegian administrative systems do not lend themselves to generating data on subthemes. Mitigation strategies were

applied (see Volume II, Mapping), but the data produced represents a probable partial view only of Norway's support to EiCC through CSOs.

3. Partner CSOs **report on results** in diverse ways, through varied indicators and methodologies and at different points in time. Reporting on results has therefore applied the information available, mostly at output level; with triangulation through independent evaluations where available, and fieldwork in Lebanon and Jordan. However, it has not been feasible to generate a comprehensive overview of achievements.
4. Data on **cost-efficiency** was notably absent<sup>19</sup>. Consequently the evaluation has been unable to report in this area.

Finally, while its authors hope that this report provides a useful contribution to discussion around Norway's support for EiCC through its partner CSOs, it is important to be clear on its boundaries.

1. Firstly, as an evaluation of Norway's assistance to EiCC through CSOs, this evaluation has a **limited focus**. It does not comprise an evaluation of Norway's wider support to EiCC, e.g. through the multilateral system, nor aim to comment on its support to education more broadly.<sup>20</sup>
2. Secondly, this evaluation explicitly **does not assess performance against the 2013 'Education for Development' White Paper 25**. The evaluation's timeframe stretches back prior to 2008, before current political commitments; and only reviews one dimension of Norway's broad support to education.
3. Thirdly, and critically, the evaluation is explicitly **not an evaluation of CSOs' individual performance** – but rather of aggregate-level assistance from the government of Norway. This is the lens applied to analysis, therefore.

<sup>17</sup> See for example Norad (2016) Striking the Balance: Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis. Oslo: The Evaluation Department. Report no. 4

<sup>18</sup> Dokument nr. 3:10 (2016-2017). Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av arkivering og åpenhet i statlig forvaltning.

<sup>19</sup> Annual reports to Norad/MFA under framework agreements, for example, report on expenditure against the total budget, rather than providing figures on cost per child educated through differing intervention types. See Annex 2 Methodology for more information

<sup>20</sup> Norway's support to education has been widely reviewed elsewhere. See for example Norad (2017) Rising to the Challenge: Results of Norwegian Support to Education 2013-2016; Norad (2016) Evaluation of Norway's Support for Advocacy in the Development Policy Arena. Oslo: The Evaluation Department. Report no. 2.; Norad (2015) Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education. Oslo: The Evaluation Department. Report no. 7.



4. Fourthly, the evaluation assessed support to **formal and non-formal basic education**<sup>21</sup>, not early childhood/pre-school interventions/secondary or tertiary education. The term ‘EiCC’ used in this report therefore refers to basic education only;
5. Finally, the evaluation adopted a global approach, but for feasibility reasons (and as per requirements), **concentrated its assessment in four countries**, Lebanon, Jordan, South Sudan and Somalia, as a lens through which to generate aggregate-level findings and conclusions.

Overall, therefore, the evaluation presents a **partial** – but, it is hoped, interesting – insight into one specific dimension of Norway’s broader support to education. Despite data limitations, above, it has brought together evidence from multiple streams, through a systematic process, to produce some valid findings and conclusions. In doing so, it hopes to shed light on whether and to what extent, Norway’s EiCC support, delivered through its CSO partners, has addressed a complex, but strategically important, area of rising humanitarian and development need.

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<sup>21</sup> OECD DAC codes 111 (Education, level unspecified) and 112 (Basic education), including sub-codes 111.20 (Education facilities and training), 111.30 (Teacher training), 112.20 (Primary education) and 112.30 (Basic life skills for youth and adults). Relevant initiatives under 111.10 (Education policy and administrative management) and 111.82 (Education research) were retrospectively included where relevant. Relevant initiatives under humanitarian codes 720 (Emergency response), 730 (Reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation) and 740 (Disaster prevention and preparedness) were also included.

# 3. Strategies and structure: Norway's support to EiCC through CSOs

## 3.1 NORWAY'S AID ARCHITECTURE

Although this evaluation reports on the specific area of EiCC through CSO partners, its analysis needs to sit within a clear understanding of Norway's overarching systems for international assistance. This section of the Evaluation Report describes this architecture and the location of EiCC support through CSOs within it, to frame findings and conclusions which follow.

### 3.1.1 Norway's humanitarian commitment

Norway's aid architecture has been characterised as *'fundamentally responsive to situations of conflict and crisis.'*<sup>22</sup> This is linked to the country's long history and its socio-political and cultural identity as an international actor. Its 2008 Humanitarian Policy recognises this explicitly: *'The tradition of solidarity and philanthropy still has deep roots in the Norwegian population, and the humanitarian organisations enjoy strong support.'*<sup>23</sup>

This strategic positioning is reflected in

Norway's financial commitments. In 2016, Norwegian development aid amounted to 36.557 billion NOK, or 1.11 percent of Norway's gross national income (GNI).<sup>24</sup> Recent years have also seen an increase in support to humanitarian assistance to countries in crisis and conflict; in 2016, humanitarian assistance amounted to 3.7 billion NOK, half of which went to the Middle East. Norway also provided considerable humanitarian assistance to countries experiencing acute humanitarian crisis including South Sudan (297 million NOK) and Afghanistan (227 million NOK).<sup>25</sup>

The Government's 2017 foreign assistance budget proposal was 33.9 billion NOK, representing one percent of the GNI projection for 2017. The humanitarian budget for 2017 also reached record amount of 5 billion NOK,

with a large proportion allocated to Syria and neighbouring countries.<sup>26</sup>

### 3.1.2 Aid partnerships

As a relatively small aid administration, Government of Norway does not implement assistance directly, but delivers it through partners such as multilateral agencies, Norwegian and international CSOs, local organisations and on occasion the private sector. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) manages a proportion of CSO partnerships (see Section 3.3 below), with others managed by individual Sections of the MFA.

**CSOs** have a special place in the Norwegian aid architecture. Far from sub-contractual 'delivery' partners, their historical roots lie in helping found the development of democracy and welfare in Norway. *'Norway is by far a society in which civil society organisations have an established and legitimate place in negotiations with the government. In many instances, it is*

22 Norad (2016) Striking the Balance: Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis. Oslo: The Evaluation Department. Report no. 4.

23 Report No. 40 (2008-2009) to the Storting. Norway's Humanitarian Policy.

24 <https://www.norad.no/en/front/about-norad/news/2017/norwegian-development-aid-in-2016/> accessed 28/08/17.

25 Ibid.

26 Press Release, October 2016 Bistandsbudsjettet med historisk satsing på utdanning, humanitær bistand og helse.

also an important partner in policy development and implementation. The organisations have taken this tradition with them in their work in developing countries.<sup>27</sup> They are central partners in the Norwegian aid architecture: ‘Close cooperation, but also a clear division of roles, between the Norwegian authorities and Norwegian NGOs has been a precondition for the development of “the Norwegian model”.<sup>28</sup>

Norway’s aid architecture therefore operates fundamentally as a **trilateral partnership** between the MFA, Norad and Norwegian CSOs. The latter function both as independent advocates and as a delivery arm for government assistance.<sup>29</sup> The synergies in these relationships, but also the potential scope for tension, have been widely discussed.<sup>30</sup>

## 3.2 STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT IN EDUCATION AND EICC

### 3.2.1 Strategic frameworks

The Government of Norway has a long history of investing in education for development.

27 Norad (2016) Results Report on Civil Society 2016 p12.

28 Report No. 40 (2008-2009) to the Storting. Norway’s Humanitarian Policy.

29 See Norad (2016) op.cit.

30 See for example OECD (2013) Development Co-operation Peer Review Norway; Bistandsaktuelt, ‘Bistandsarbeidere er ikke diplomater’, 18.02.2016, <http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/nyheter/2016/kritikk-av-norsk-fredsmegling/> accessed 02.04.2017

Its 2005 strategy for children’s rights: ‘Three billion reasons: Norway’s Development Strategy for Children and Young People in the South’<sup>31</sup> sets ‘Helping to ensure that all girls and boys complete a full course of good quality primary schooling (Millennium Development Goal No. 2)’ as a key goal for Norwegian international assistance.

The subsequent 2008 Humanitarian Policy sets the formal agenda for investing in education in situations of crisis and conflict. ‘The Government will...help to ensure speedy and sufficient funding of education for children and young people in wars and conflicts.’ It prioritises education under the provision of needs-based education and more coherent assistance.<sup>32</sup> Concurrently, the commitment to focus on support for ‘education in fragile states and countries affected by conflict’ was reiterated in White Paper 13 (2008-2009) Climate, Conflict and Capital. It continues the commitment to ‘give priority to measures designed to secure the right to education in fragile states’.<sup>33</sup>

31 <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/Three-billion-reasons/id420398/?selectLanguage=/se/dokumenter/Three-billion-reasons/id420398/>

32 Report No. 40 (2008-2009) to the Storting. Norway’s Humanitarian Policy.

33 Report No. 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting. Climate, Conflict and Capital.

Investment is made through multilateral organisations such as UNICEF, in some cases through bilateral support to governments/ the private sector, and through civil society organisations, including international CSOs, Norwegian CSOs and local organisations.

**Annual Budget Propositions:** Since 2009, *Annual Budget Propositions to Parliament* from Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs consistently reference the need to address situations of conflict and crisis, citing Norway’s role in peacebuilding particularly.<sup>34</sup> Education is also consistently referenced over time as a key area of commitment. However, the most explicit link with states in situations of conflict and fragility comes after 2014, with the advent of the 2013-2014 *White Paper 25, Education for Development*,<sup>35</sup> which provides a clear policy frame for investment in EICC.<sup>36</sup>

34 See for example St. Prp. Nr. 1 (2007-2008) ‘Norway has a long tradition of facilitating peace processes in protracted and difficult conflicts. The government will give priority to this work.’ (p11), Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

35 Report No. 25 (2013–2014) op.cit

36 The White Paper is supported by a separate strategy and results framework. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) ‘Vedlegg 1. Oppfølging av meld.st.25, utdanning for utvikling (Action Plan for White Paper)’. Internal Working Paper. Oslo: Education Team, MFA; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2015). ‘Resultatrammeverk for norsk støtte till utdanning for utvikling’. Informal Note. Oslo: MFA

White Paper 25 makes six explicit commitments (Box 2 below):

#### BOX 2 // COMMITMENTS OF WHITE PAPER 25

##### The Government will:

- › help to ensure that one million more children have access to good-quality education in crisis and conflict situations;
- › encourage and support the development of innovative and flexible solutions that give as many children as possible access to education;
- › increase the percentage of Norway's humanitarian assistance that is allocated to education, and increase the percentage of Norway's development assistance that is allocated to education in the early reconstruction phase;
- › increase the use of development funds to help countries that receive large numbers of refugees as a result of humanitarian crises;
- › play a leading role in the efforts to reach the UN target of 4 percent of humanitarian aid being allocated to education; and
- › help to increase knowledge about education in emergencies in national educational systems, in humanitarian organisations and among development actors.

Meld. St. 25 (2013–2014) Report to the Storting (White Paper) Education for Development.

The strategic commitment continues in 2017. In the 2016-2017 Budget Proposition, EiCC is one of three education-related strategic

priorities.<sup>37</sup> In October 2016, a record 3.4 billion NOK contribution to education from the foreign assistance budget was announced.<sup>38</sup> Education in crisis and conflict also features as priority within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' business planning for 2017 in two key departments: the Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs and the Department for Regional Affairs.<sup>39</sup>

**Gender<sup>40</sup> and inclusion:** Strategic documentation throughout the evaluation period – from the 2005 children's rights strategy onwards and including MFA Annual Budget Propositions; White Paper 25 and its implementation plan; and business planning for 2017 within the MFA's Departments of

37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Prop. 1S: Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak).

38 Doubling of Assistance to Global Education. Press Release 6.10.17. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016-2017.

39 Department of UN and Humanitarian Affairs (2017) Business Plan (Virksomshetplan); Department for Regional Affairs (2017) Business Plan (Virksomshetplan).

40 Norway's Action Plan for Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy 2016-2021 states that 'The fundamental aim of Norway's gender equality efforts is to increase the opportunities available to women and girls, promote their right to self-determination, and further their empowerment. This is crucial if girls, boys, women and men are to have equal rights and equal opportunities. ... Boys and men can be agents of change for gender equality, and will also benefit from gender equality. Our work on women's rights is based on international human rights obligations, in particular the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.' Government of Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016a) Freedom, empowerment and opportunities: Action Plan for Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy 2016-2021. Oslo: Government of Norway.

Regional and UN and Humanitarian Affairs<sup>41</sup> – consistently emphasise Norway's prioritisation of gender in its education assistance. These issues remain prominent; *gender* is one of three education-related strategic priorities for the Norwegian Government in 2016-2017; alongside quality and learning and EiCC.<sup>42</sup> An emphasis on education for marginalised groups also appears repeatedly, including in White Paper 25, with a specific emphasis on disability.<sup>43</sup>

#### 3.2.2 Global strategic positioning

Norway's prominent role in education on the world stage has been captured elsewhere.<sup>44</sup>

Box 3 on next page provides examples.

41 Ibid.

42 Prop. 1S: Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016-2017.

43 'Behind the improved school enrolment rates there are pockets of children who do not have access to education. These children are often discriminated against on several grounds: for example, a poor, disabled girl may also be from a nomadic minority living in a remote province affected by a crisis, with a long way to the nearest village. We will support efforts to identify marginalised groups' Meld. St. 25 (2013-2014) op.cit. p20.

44 See Norad (2017) op.cit; Norad Evaluation Department (2016) op.cit.

### BOX 3 // NORWAY AS A GLOBAL EDUCATION LEADER

- › Norway is a Board member representing a three-donor constituency on the Global Partnership for Education; and one of 36 member states which sit on UNICEF's Executive Board;
- › Norway hosted, in 2015, the Oslo Summit for Education Development (the 'Oslo Conference'), focusing on four thematic areas: financing, education in crisis and conflict, girls' education and quality of learning. Outcomes included the formation of a high-level Commission on Financing of Global Education Opportunities; and the Oslo consolidated principles for education in emergencies and protracted crises;
- › Norway is also a major contributor to the global Education Cannot Wait initiative, which arose from the common platform initiated at the Oslo conference to address the need for education in emergencies;
- › Norway has fostered the Safe School Declaration, which provides States with the opportunity to express their political support for the continuation of education in armed conflict.

Norway was also a founding donor to the Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE), with Norwegian CSOs also involved (Box 4):

### BOX 4 // NORWAY'S ROLE IN THE INTER-AGENCY NETWORK FOR EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES

The Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies (INEE) is a global network of UN agencies, NGOs, donors, governments, universities, schools, and affected populations working together to ensure all persons the right to quality education in emergencies and post-crisis recovery.\*

Currently, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is Co-Chair of the INEE Steering Group, and a member of the INEE Standards and Practice Working Group and the Gender Task Team. A member of Norad's Education Section is also a current member of the INEE steering group, whilst Save the Children Norway is part of the Minimum Standards Working Group.

\* See <http://www.ineesite.org/en/>

## 3.3 ORGANISATIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR EICC THROUGH CSO PARTNERS

### 3.3.1. Organisational architecture:

Administrative responsibility for EICC is spread across the Norwegian aid architecture. Developed from Mapping of the assistance (see Volume II), Table 2 below lists the Departments/Sections engaged in EICC through CSOs (main actors highlighted):<sup>45</sup>

45 Identified through Mapping (Volume II). Sections are identified here as reflected in the current organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at [https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/bilder/adm/orgkart\\_engelsk1708.pdf](https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/bilder/adm/orgkart_engelsk1708.pdf)

TABLE 2 // DEPARTMENTS AND SECTIONS INVOLVED IN EICC THROUGH CSOS

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)	Norad
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› <b>Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs (Section for Humanitarian Affairs)</b>; Section for Security Policy and North America).</li> <li>› Department for Economic Relations and Development (Section for Grant Management; International Development Policy Section)</li> <li>› <b>Department for Regional Affairs</b> (geographical sections including Section for Middle East and North Africa; Section for Horn of Africa and West Africa; Latin America Section; Section for Southern and Central Africa; Section for South Asia and Afghanistan (Asia II))</li> <li>› Department for Security Policy and the High North (Section for Russia, Eurasia and Regional Cooperation)</li> <li>› Department for European Affairs (Section for South East Europe)</li> <li>› <b>Royal Norwegian Embassies</b></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› <b>Civil Society Department</b> (Section for Civil Society Strengthening)</li> <li>› <b>Department for Education and Global Health (Education Section)</b></li> <li>› Department for Economic Development, Gender and Governance (Section for Private Sector Development)</li> <li>› Department for Climate, Energy, Environment and Research (Section for Research, Innovation and Higher Education)</li> </ul>

Two changes in 2017 have directly affected the organisational arrangements for EiCC, including through CSOs. Firstly, the Section for Global Initiatives (formerly housed within the Department for UN and Humanitarian Affairs) at MFA closed with operational effect from 16th January 2017. This previously had responsibility overall responsibility for global education. Secondly, responsibilities for education were transferred from MFA to Norad's Education Section as of January 2017. The exception was EiCC, which is now the formal responsibility of MFA's Section for Humanitarian Affairs.

### 3.3.2 CSO partners


The importance of CSOs' role in education is signalled in Annual Budget Propositions and White Paper 25. It is based on their comparative advantages of **outreach** (ability to reach the most vulnerable groups of children and young people) and **capacity**, with many such civil society partners having a dual humanitarian and development mandate.<sup>46</sup> In 2016, 35 percent of the total disbursement to education was disbursed through Norwegian CSOs,<sup>47</sup> increased from 25 percent in 2013.<sup>48</sup>

46 Meld. St. 25 (2013–2014) op.cit and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2014) Plan for Follow Up on White Paper 25 (internal document).

47 Ibid.

48 Figure provided within White Paper 25: Meld St. (2013) op.cit.

**FIGURE 3 // CSO AGREEMENT PARTNERS FOR EICC 2008-2016**



The remaining 65 percent was channelled through multilateral institutions.<sup>49</sup>

Thirty-three Norwegian CSOs have received support from the Norwegian government for EiCC 2008-2016. The two largest of these are the **Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)**, which

49 However, a Norad report in 2017 noted that the percentage of funds channelled through multilateral institutions increased by 36 percentage points between 2013 and 2016, whilst support to Norwegian NGOs dropped significantly in 2016 compared to the previous two years Norad (2017) Rising to the Challenge: Norway's Education Financing 2013-2016.

has received 38 percent of the total support, and **Save the Children Norway (SCN)**,<sup>50</sup> which has received 33 percent. Other recipient CSOs are also listed in Figure 3 above.

50 From 2012 onwards, all SC Country Offices, which had previously implemented operations, merged into one structure: Save the Children International (SCI). SCI serves effectively as the implementing arm of all SC members. SC members, such as SCN, undertake fundraising, provide technical support and assistance and ensure donor compliance. Since grant applications and agreements refer to both SCN and SCI, and since fully tracking assistance from MFA/Norad delivered through SCN to SCI has not consistently proven feasible in any of the case studies for this evaluation, SCI implementation identified as taking place through Norwegian funding is included in the evaluation.

**BOX 5 // THE NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL AND SAVE THE CHILDREN NORWAY: ENGAGEMENT IN EiCC**

In their agreements for EiCC with the Norwegian Government:

- › NRC focusses on promoting access to education for children and youth through non-formal programmes amongst a wider scope of humanitarian assistance to displaced persons worldwide;
- › SCN focusses on ‘strengthening systems’, including through safe schools, Quality Learning Environments and support to the Education Cluster, and building capacity.

\* As reflected in framework agreements with Norad/MFA

NRC and SCN both benefit from multi-year framework agreements (Box 5), as well as funding for specific initiatives.

**3.3.3 Financing streams**

Norway’s support to EiCC through CSOs is organised through two main financing streams:

- › *Humanitarian assistance*, which supports education as an emergency response and which is mostly implemented through MFA’s Humanitarian Section. Some assistance takes the form of annual grants for specific initiatives, and some includes 2-3 year framework agreements.
- › *Development assistance*, which supports civil society partners, often through framework agreements, and under which EiCC initiatives

**TABLE 3 // CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT**

**Global Partnership Agreements** – non-thematic Global Framework Agreements plus Addenda between Norad and key CSOs. Of these, the two main partners with an education focus are NRC and SCN. Education activities are not earmarked within GPAs.

**Specific framework agreements for EiCC** – notably a tripartite agreement between NRC, Norad and MFA funded through humanitarian assistance, but including other 2-3 year framework agreements.

**Humanitarian assistance** on an annual basis, provided to CSOs to implement initiatives which may include EiCC.

**Small grants**, issued through two main routes: from MFA/Norad, e.g. from the Norad Section for Civil Society Strengthening); and Embassy grant schemes.

- › may be undertaken. Such agreements are mostly formed with Norad.

Contractual modalities for the delivery of EiCC assistance through CSOs are set out in Table 3 above.

**3.3.4 Scale of assistance**

**Education:** The profile of Norway’s expenditure on education as a share of the foreign assistance budget has fluctuated over the evaluation period, and increased significantly in recent years. Specifically:

- › Between 2005 and 2013, support declined from 13.3 percent of the of the aid budget in 2005, to 7.2 percent in 2013. White Paper 25 set an ambitious agenda, aiming to reverse the trend and reach the 2005 level again by 2017;

- › According to Norad figures, between 2013 and 2016, Norway increased the proportion of its aid to education from 5 to 12 percent. Funding under the humanitarian budget coded as education increased from two to nine percent, compared with the global average of 2 percent;<sup>51</sup>
- › For the years 2016-2017, a record high of 3.4 billion NOK of the development aid budget was allocated to global education.<sup>52</sup>

The most recently available international aid statistics (2015) identify Norway as the third largest bilateral donor to basic education,

51 Norad (2017) Rising to the Challenge: Norway’s results on support to education 2013-2016.

52 Prop. S1: Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til stortingsvedtak), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016-2017.

after the US and the UK. Among all OECD DAC donors, Norway gave the highest proportion of its earmarked development aid to basic education.<sup>53</sup>

More specifically, Norad-conducted analysis in 2017 stated that:

- › Between 2013 and 2015 around 74 percent (2.5 billion NOK) of country specific assistance to education was given to countries defined as fragile or conflict affected;
- › Of this, 900 million NOK was provided to basic education.<sup>54</sup>

**EiCC:** The more specific profile of expenditure on **EiCC through CSOs** follows the trend above. Volume II contains a detailed mapping, but overall: Norwegian assistance for basic education<sup>55</sup> in countries or situations affected by crisis and conflict<sup>56</sup> through CSOs between 2008 and 2016 is known to be *at least 2.85 billion NOK*.<sup>57</sup> Table 4 provides a summary:

53 OECD DAC (2016). International Development Statistics: Creditor Reporting System.

54 Norad (2017) Statistics Note: Norwegian ODA expenditure on Education 2013-2015 Prepared by Education Section and Statistics section.

55 As a main Policy Objective – see the Mapping Annex for further details and definitions.

56 As defined through application of the World Bank's Fragile States list and as per UNESCO's Global Education Monitoring Report (GEM), with latest data available for the period 2008/2014, as per UNESCO's 2016 GEM.

57 Includes investment channelled through NRC Global Partnership Agreements (GPAs) between 2013-2016, of which at least 87 million NOK is known to be allocated to EiCC

**TABLE 4 // INVESTMENT IN EiCC THROUGH CSOS**

Million NOK	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Total Investment	235	296	257	231	255	320	313	410	535	2,852

In addition, a further **2.1 billion NOK** comprises support to investments where basic EiCC support is considered a 'significant' (or secondary) policy objective' in amongst other humanitarian or education policy priorities, including through additional support via NRC Global Partnership Agreements.

Critically, **these figures are likely to under-represent actual support to EiCC** given they reflect only assistance which can be explicitly identified as 'EiCC-dedicated'.<sup>58</sup> Overall, however, the level of support provided has increased – in line with wider expenditure on education, and in line with broader policy commitments – **from more than 235 million NOK in 2008 to more than 535 million NOK in 2016**.

58 As recorded in project summaries on aid databases, within global framework agreements, etc. For example, according to interviews conducted for one evaluation, SCN received 140 million NOK in 2015 earmarked for education. Norad (2016) Case study on Norway's Engagement in Education for Development, Annex 4 under Synthesis Report: Evaluation of Norway's Support for Advocacy in the Development Policy Arena. Oslo: The Evaluation Department. Report no. 2.

### 3.3.5 Number and duration of agreements

The **number of agreements** managed by the Norwegian Government, where basic EiCC is the main policy objective, has remained similar over time, with 48 agreements in both 2008 and 2016. The number of sub-units (comprising both administrative sub-units and a number of addenda) has increased from 69 to 148 within the period.<sup>59</sup> A policy directive in 2016 requested reductions in the number of future partnerships, to reduce transaction costs and staff burdens.

The **duration of agreements** is limited: the vast majority of humanitarian budget agreements span less than twelve months. However, 2016 saw changes in this, with an increase in funding to longer-term agreements. Development funding for education to countries affected by fragility and conflict tends to be longer-term, with most agreements covering two years or more.<sup>60</sup>

59 Source: Mapping data

60 Mapping plus Norad (2017) 'Rising to the Challenge: Results of Norwegian education aid 2013-2016 p38.



### 3.3.6 Framework agreements for EiCC

Beyond its wider global partnership agreements with CSOs, the Norwegian government contracts the two largest CSO partners, NRC and SCN, to deliver EiCC through specific, education-focused framework agreements. These incorporate several commitments, which are often also extended through multiple *Addenda* to support specific new/evolving needs. A detailed breakdown of these agreements is available in Volume II, Mapping. In summary, however:

- › Dedicated support to EiCC through NRC specific GPAs exceeded 43.6 million NOK<sup>61</sup> between 2013-2015 and 66.8 million NOK in 2016.<sup>62</sup>
- › Dedicated support to EiCC through specific SCN framework agreements between 2008 and 2016 was at least 218 million NOK, excluding subsequent *Addenda*.

61 As above, this reflects support explicitly identified as EiCC-related.

62 Investment in 2016 includes an additional 14m NOK commitment, and *addenda*. Commitment to Syria not included, as proportion intended for education is not known.

### 3.3.7 Countries

Key countries receiving EiCC support through CSOs were as listed in table 5.<sup>63</sup>

**Overall**, therefore, Norwegian support to EiCC through CSOs 2008-2018 may be characterised as:

- › Having increased significantly over the period of evaluation, in line with Government of Norway's policy commitments since 2013 particularly;
- › Experiencing an increase in sub-units (comprising both administrative sub-units and a number of *addenda*) over the period;
- › Being particularly focused on the two large CSOs identified for this study: NRC and SCN.

63 Figures identified through field and desk study included for Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan. Figures do not account for NRC GPA framework agreement contributions, which do not routinely record country-specific contributions.

**TABLE 5 // COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THROUGH EiCC**

Country	Volume of support (NOK million 2008-2016)
Somalia	432
South Sudan	218
Ethiopia	171
Uganda	158
Afghanistan	157
Lebanon	156
Syria	134
Sudan	104

## 4. Findings

*‘Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family.’*

– KOFI ANNAN

This section of the report presents the main findings of the evaluation. It reports on the appropriateness, coherence, effectiveness and connectedness of Norway’s support to EiCC as delivered through CSO partners.

### 4.1 HOW APPROPRIATE ARE INTERVENTIONS TO NEEDS?

#### 4.1.1 Ensuring appropriateness through analysis

**Extensive (but sometimes shallow) context but limited conflict analysis:** Norway’s EiCC interventions through its CSO partners have made greater use of context than conflict analysis, reflecting the requirements of grant application formats. Specifically:

- › As required in Norad/MFA funding requirements, project designs and framework agreements reviewed for this evaluation

**Summary on appropriateness:** Government of Norway-funded interventions through CSOs to EiCC have been generally relevant to the needs of affected populations. The analytical basis of interventions is variable, with stronger use of context than conflict analysis, and few explicit links to implementation. Extensive local engagement with affected populations has however allowed for nuanced alignment with specific needs and priorities. Interventions are responsive to the needs of priority groups, particularly girls and more recently disabled children in terms at least of their inclusion.

All implemented interventions are aligned with national education policies/strategies and/or relevant humanitarian or refugee response plans. However, alignment is often determined by national governments’ management of crisis responses – making it sometimes tactical, rather than strategic. Frequent lesson-learning takes place, but this is largely CSO-specific, rather than being supported by wider structures or requirements put in place by the Norwegian government.

applied *context analysis*. These are variable in quality, however, ranging from a limited analysis in which much information was assumed or could be inferred, to detailed descriptions of the operating context at the time, and associated risks of interventions, alongside the effects of the crisis or conflict on the target population.

- › Standard grant application formats – either Norad or MFA - do not formally require a conflict analysis. Nonetheless, this occurred in around half of project and framework agreements analysed.<sup>64</sup> *Conflict analysis* was particularly prominent in NRC documentation and strategies (Box 6).

<sup>64</sup> Of 16 projects and frameworks analysed, eight showed use of conflict analysis; findings were more variable in field and desk study.

## BOX 6 // NRC'S CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Country strategies developed by NRC for Jordan, Somalia, Lebanon and South Sudan all contain detailed conflict analyses. For example, Country Plans for Lebanon 2011-2014 and 2015-2017 contain detailed analysis of conflict dynamics stretching back to 2008, as well as stakeholder and power analyses, and assessments of specific future scenarios.

Analysis varied greatly in its *depth and quality*. Some was detailed and specific – for example, in South Sudan, Norwegian funding had been used by BRAC to conduct door-to-door analysis to understand needs and the effects of the conflict on individuals. Other designs tended to reference, rather than detail, grantees' understanding of the context, leaving this to be assumed.

Some protracted crises analysed for this evaluation showed *increased maturity* of context and conflict analysis over time. For example, NRC project designs for Lebanon 2008-2012 were limited, focusing mainly on issues facing target populations in the period – Iraqi and Palestinian refugees. By 2017, both SCN and NRC analyses were extensive and in-depth, drawing on wider literature to reflect on the unfolding crisis.

Few designs or framework agreements made *explicit links from analysis into programming* in documentation – often leaving an uncertain rationale for programme intervention. However, field staff from CSOs interviewed reflected strong knowledge of localised conflict dynamics, and could reflect on how these had influenced design and implementation.

### **Comprehensive education assessments:**

Interventions were universally based on detailed and comprehensive education assessments in the context. These described the existing education system, and mapped gaps between supply and demand, identifying probably future needs. *Barriers to access* aligned with regional, national and international priorities, such as the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans for Jordan and Lebanon.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Barriers identified included poor capacity and 'infrastructure' within the national education system; interruption caused by protracted conflict and recurrent natural disasters; protection issues; and quality concerns linked to availability of and support for qualified teachers, curriculum, availability of learning materials and quality assurance.

## BOX 7 // ASSESSING EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

In Somalia, education assessments included Save the Children International's Quality Learning Environment (QLE) Assessment, conducted in 2014. The QLE assessment conducted in sample SC-supported schools indicated the need for a more child friendly learning environment, identifying gaps in geographical and thematic areas, such as the protection of children's physical wellbeing and parent and community engagement.

**Supporting the international response through analysis:** Many government-funded CSOs have also worked within education clusters to help produce system-wide education assessments (see Section 4.2 on coherence). For example, in South Sudan, three Norway-funded CSOs, ADRA, BRAC and NRC, helped conduct a 2016 cluster assessment which identified the extent to which schools were functioning and had faced attacks by armed groups, as well as enrolment and drop-out rates and teacher attendance. In Jordan, NRC produced in 2016 a Norway- and Sweden funded context and conflict analysis of the situation: '*A Future in the Balance*'.

**Variable gender analysis:** Despite Norway's consistent policy focus on gender, described in Section 3, the use of gender analysis in design was variable. All designs or framework agreements reviewed at least referenced sex disaggregation, and some analysis could be detailed and insightful, assessing the structural barriers to gender equality and the political, economic, and cultural factors which mediate it.<sup>66</sup> Some organisations had also contributed to wider gender analyses in the country, as for example in Jordan, where NRC had helped prepare the Inter Agency Task Force (IATF) Education Sector Gender Analysis in 2016.

However, the majority of designs confined gender analysis to disaggregation, and a vague statement of 'attention to address the needs of girls.' The finding of a 2016 gender review of SCN's education programme<sup>67</sup> – that gender analyses are neither consistently used in the project design phase nor in the needs assessment phase – reflects the status of many interventions analysed for this evaluation.

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66 For example, in Digni's 2013-2015 Norad-funded education programme, or Right To Play's 2016-2020 (as yet unfunded) application for its Transforming Attitudes, Approaches, and Learning Outcomes across the Middle East (TAAALOM) programme.

67 Osman, S (2016) Gender Analysis of Save the Children Norway's Education Programme.

### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- › Stronger requirements for conflict analysis would help its funded interventions demonstrate their conflict-sensitivity.
- › Firmer requirements on gender analysis would help ensure closer alignment with Government policy priorities for gender in education.

#### 4.1.2 Ensuring appropriateness through consultation

##### **Extensive engagement of affected populations:**

Norway's prioritisation of beneficiary participation in crisis response is reflected in multiple government policy and strategic documents, including the 2008 Humanitarian Policy.<sup>68</sup> Despite the limited availability of standard operating procedures and strategies on engaging with crisis-affected populations found by other studies,<sup>69</sup> this evaluation found consistently high levels of community and local stakeholder engagement in design. Examples include:

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68 See for example Auditor General Investigation into the Effectiveness of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance Dokument nr. 3:2 (2008–2009) Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av effektiviteten i norsk humanitær bistand. Also see Norad Evaluation Department (2015) Evaluation Report 8/2015 Engaging with Crisis Affected Populations.

69 See Norad (2015) Evaluation Report 8/2015 op.cit.

- › CSO strategies contained explicit commitment to participation and consultation as part of good humanitarian practice, for example the consultation of children as part of SC's requirements;<sup>70</sup>
- › All project designs analysed showed evidence of participatory approaches applied, and all CSO staff in different countries could explain participation exercises conducted;
  - In Somalia, all Norwegian-funded CSOs providing EiCC interventions had undertaken extensive consultation with Community Education Committees (CECs) to inform design;
  - In Jordan, Syrian refugee teachers were key design participants for NRC's EiCC interventions in refugee camps, helping shape curriculum content and exam organization;
  - In South Sudan, one evaluation found NRC to be one of the most accountable organizations working in the country, due to its community participatory approach.<sup>71</sup>

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70 See for example NRC (2012) Programme Policy 2012-2016 and Draft Programme Policy 2017; Save the Children (2014) Investing in Children: Save the Children Strategy 2014-2018.

71 Mansilla, C and Turnbull, M (2016) NRC Final Evaluation Report: South Sudan Emergency Response, December 2013-December 2015.

Channels for consultation included:

- › Community outreach, as in the (partly Norway-funded) Save the Children Rewrite the Future campaign implemented in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Guatemala, Nepal and Uganda;
- › Local community structures, as through Community Education Committees in Somalia;
- › Parent education committees, as in SCN's work in Pakistan, Lebanon and Jordan;
- › Engagement with local authorities, as in the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee's work in Afghanistan.

Strategies for local ownership in implementation were also established consistently; these included formal agreements, as for example in Norway-funded SCI interventions in Somalia; and representation on management structures, as used by ADRA for example in its multi-country programme to improve access and quality of education. Some Norwegian-funded initiatives also involved community structures in project monitoring as part of local accountability, for example, in Somalia.<sup>72</sup>

72 ADRA Norge (2015) SEAQE Annual Progress Report; NRC (2017) Somalia Annual Report 2016, Global Partnership Agreement (GPA); Save the Children Norway (2017) Interim Narrative Report.

### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- › Capturing and sharing experience and learning from community engagement throughout the EiCC project cycle will ensure more consistent good practice in its funded interventions.

#### 4.1.3 Responding to the needs of priority groups

**Inclusion of some priority groups but limited depth:** Key priority groups targeted broadly reflected those of Norwegian policy priorities and included girls, children with disabilities and in some cases context-specific marginalised groups. However, data disaggregation below numbers of boys/girls/disabled children enrolled was limited (see section 4.3, Monitoring). In their designs and implementation plans, EiCC interventions provided significant *attention* to the issue or marginalisation, but did not always follow through with commensurate *depth*, as follows:

**1. Gender in education:** The policy priority of gender is reflected in grant funding

requirements for both Norad and MFA.<sup>73</sup> All funded EiCC interventions paid attention to gender accordingly – even back to 2008. However, as for gender *analysis*, above, approaches varied in their depth and scope.

Some organisations/interventions adopted transformative approaches, proposing to use education as a means to address fundamental structural gender imbalances. For example, ADRA Norway's application for a 2014-2018 education-focused framework agreement with Norad made a clear statement on how education would be used to challenge gender and other inequalities in society, and contribute towards wider transformation of accepted norms around violence, gender, and power.

The majority of intervention designs and framework agreements analysed however adopted a more limited approach, with a focus on parity only (ensuring 'equal inclusion' in education). SCN's 2016 gender review of its education programming, referenced above, found that most of its education proposals are

73 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Grant Scheme Rules; Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance; Norad (2015) Grant Scheme Rules for Support to Civil Society and Democratisation; Norad (2016) General Conditions Applicable to Grants from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation; see also the grant assessment tool of RAM-Light (Norad (2016) RAM Light Modellen v2, internal document).

not yet gender sensitive.<sup>74</sup> This evaluation finds that this conclusion would also hold true for the wider body of EiCC designs reviewed here.

**2. Inclusive education** Norway's policy emphasis on inclusive education, reflected in White Paper 25 and given added emphasis by Sustainable Development Goal 4,<sup>75</sup> has also filtered down to its EiCC programming through CSOs. It is reflected in recent framework agreements with SCN and NRC.<sup>76</sup> CSOs themselves indicate a marked increase in their strategic commitments to the issue in recent year; it forms one of six strategic priorities for SCN under its 2014-2018 Strategy, for example,<sup>77</sup> though a 2016 review found no disability policy yet in place.<sup>78</sup>

National policy frameworks have also provided entry points for inclusive education, to which CSOs have been responsive. For example, in

74 Osman, S (2016) Gender Analysis of Save the Children Norway's Education Programme.

75 Particularly SDG4.5 that quality education should be extended to 'the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations'.

76 E.g. SCN: QZA-16/0219 Education in Emergencies and Child Protection II; NRC QZA-16/0141 GPAII.

77 'SCN Norway will strive to meet the particular rights of girls, boys, children with disabilities and other marginalised children in relation to context'. Save the Children Norway (2014) Investing in Children, Strategy 2014-2018.

78 SCN (2016) Just Include Me: A review of Save the Children's work to promote the rights of children with disabilities.

Lebanon, SCN responded to an opportunity in the national response plan to the Syria regional crisis<sup>79</sup> with a 2017 Concept Note for MFA proposing a subsequent prioritisation of the most marginalized children, including children with disabilities.

Other **key priority groups** identified for targeting within initiatives were mostly location-specific, and identified through detailed needs assessments. They included (Box 8):

**BOX 8 // PRIORITY GROUPS FOR EiCC INTERVENTIONS**

- > Children within internally-displaced populations (IDPs)
- > The rural/urban poor
- > Pastoralists
- > Vulnerable returnee children
- > Vulnerable members of host communities
- > Female- and child-headed households

Various **programme strategies** were applied to ensure inclusion, including:

- > Participation in national advocacy campaigns, such as NRC and SCN's engagement in Lebanon's Back to School campaigns,

79 Government of Lebanon, Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2016) Reaching All Children with Education (RACE II).

or NCA/NRC's engagement in Somalia's 'Go to School' campaign;

- > Direct outreach to local communities, e.g. through Community Education Committees in Somalia;
- > Discussion with national education authorities to support the policy environment on inclusive education, such as conducted by Right to Play in Lebanon;
- > Training staff and teachers on inclusive education approaches, for example by NCA, Right to Play, SCN and NRC in a wide range of countries;
- > The provision of psychosocial/psycho-educational support within EiCC interventions, such as that provided by SCN and NRC in Lebanon, Jordan and South Sudan.

However, with the exception of gender, the extent to which these approaches were effective – i.e. resulted in the subsequent inclusion in education and improved educational outcomes - is little recorded in documentation (see Section 3.3 Effectiveness, below). Moreover, the evaluation has not found evidence, however, of such strategies – or experience of their implementation - being collated and shared across government-funded partners working on EiCC.

### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- > The collation of wider knowledge and experience on gender, inclusive education and targeting marginalised groups would boost the technical resources available to Norwegian government-funded partners working on EiCC.

#### 4.1.4 Aligning with national priorities

##### **Strong alignment with national/regional/international needs analyses:**

Reflecting their context sensitivity, above, EiCC initiatives reflected strong alignment with available needs analyses for the context. For example, in South Sudan, Norway-funded interventions were all geared to the Cluster Response Plan 2015 and the General Education Strategic Plan (GESP) 2012-2017.

##### **Generally strong alignment with national and international sector plans:**

EiCC interventions were mostly aligned with national education policies/strategies and/or relevant humanitarian or refugee response plans over time. Table 6 summarises for the four focus countries of this study:

**TABLE 6 // ALIGNMENT WITH SECTOR PLANS AND RESPONSES**

Country	Relevant national policy frameworks/strategies	Cluster plans	Examples of alignment
Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; New Deal Compact for Somalia (2013)</li> <li>&gt; Strategy Document for the Go-2-School Initiative 2013-2016</li> <li>&gt; National Development Plan 2017-2019</li> </ul>	Key cluster plans include the Keeping Children Safe initiative (2017)	<p>Initiatives align with both the National Development Plan and cluster plans including the Keeping Children Safe initiative:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; SCI 2016-2018 Country Strategy details alignment with national strategies and rights agendas</li> <li>&gt; NCA and NRC support the government's 'Go to School' Initiative.</li> </ul>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; General Education Strategic Plan, 2012-2017 (GESP)</li> </ul>	Cluster Response Plan 2015-2017 focusses on ensuring uninterrupted access to critical, multi-sector, and quality learning in protective spaces for conflict-affected children; Education Cluster response strategy for 2017-18 under development.*	EiCC projects respond to both the Cluster Response Plan 2015 and Goals of the General Education Strategic Plan, 2012-2017 (GESP), specifically related to increased access to education, improving the quality of education provided, building institutional and human capacity and working in partnership.
Jordan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Education Reform for a Knowledge Economy policy (2012) Second Phase</li> <li>&gt; Jordan Response Plan (JRP) (2017-2019)</li> </ul>	Education chapter of the JRP	All MFA-funded EiCC interventions must align with the national education plan and the Jordan Response Plan to be granted approval for implementation by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)
Lebanon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) I (2014-2016)</li> <li>&gt; RACE II (2017-2021)</li> <li>&gt; Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) (2015-2016, 2017-2020)</li> </ul>	Education chapter of the LCRPs RACE I and RACE II Implementation Plan	<p>Alignment with RACE I and RACE II is a requirement for CSO permission to operate in Lebanon, as determined by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education.</p> <p>CSOs can implement accredited Non-Formal Education programmes only.</p>

\* Education Cluster Meeting minutes, 27 July 2017. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/document/ssec-2017-07-18-meeting-minutes> accessed 21/08/2017.

Where *gaps in alignment* occurred over the evaluation period, these reflected weaknesses in the policy architecture at the time, and/or its permeation down to local level. For example, an ‘alignment vacuum’ in Lebanon 2012-2014 arose from the absence of a coherent sectoral strategy around the Syria crisis response from national stakeholders, where external actors found themselves in the period with few firm strategic or operational directives to align *with*.

#### **Tactical rather than strategic alignment:**

However, CSOs’ alignment was sometimes required to be *tactical* (aiming to preserve operational delivery by aligning tactically with national preferences) rather than *strategic* (having the operating space to lobby and advocate for the medium-term needs of the education sector). This was linked to (i) complexities surrounding education as a sector in crisis response given its closeness to issues of citizenship and state-building (Section 1 above), and (ii) the often-complex political geometries of crisis response management, and particularly government sensitivities around international CSO engagement.

Of the four case study countries for this evaluation, this aspect was particularly visible in Lebanon and Jordan. In both countries – and following period of concern regarding the

activities of international actors, including CSOs – national authorities took strong ownership of the education response to the Syria regional crisis post-2014, determining specific limited entry routes for CSOs. When this occurred, CSOs found themselves trying to continue to serve humanitarian needs in accordance with their mandate, but amid newly-restricted operating space.

#### **Areas for consideration by Government of Norway**

> Frequent discussion of where and how its funded CSOs are aligning with national education strategies and plans, and where challenges require intensified political advocacy, can make valuable use of the close partnerships between the Norwegian government and its CSO partners.

#### **4.1.5 Applying external standards and approaches in design**

**Do No Harm:** Most – though not all - interventions analysed applied Do No Harm and protection concerns either explicitly or implicitly, with notably more explicit referencing since 2015. Interventions implemented by SCN, NRC and ADRA made particularly consistent

reference to its concepts. Approaches applied included commitments to conflict-sensitive and rights-based approaches; extensive community consultation; and attention to conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches in design and implementation.<sup>80</sup> All interlocutors interviewed voiced familiarity with Do No Harm approaches, though not all could articulate how exactly approaches had been integrated into planning and design.

**Humanitarian Principles (IHPs):**<sup>81</sup> Norway’s 2008 Humanitarian Policy reinforces the role of the Humanitarian Principles in all humanitarian action.<sup>82</sup> Adherence to them has been an explicit requirement of both MFA programme grants or framework agreements since 2016<sup>83</sup> and a specific guidance note was prepared in June 2016 on ‘*Ensuring respect for the principles*’.<sup>84</sup> Norad grant schemes to CSOs do not explicitly cite adherence to them as a

80 For example, a 2010 NRC proposal for work with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in UNRWRA-led camps commits to building peace building/conflict resolution skills.

81 See for example [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples\\_eng\\_June12.pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf)

82 Humanitarian Policy (2008) p15.

83 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Grant Scheme Rules; Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance.

84 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Ensuring respect for the Humanitarian Principles: Guidance note for support provided from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (19.12.16).



condition of funding,<sup>85</sup> but its Principles for Support to Civil Society in the South reference them indirectly, through discussion on neutrality and independence.<sup>86</sup>

Adherence to the Principles in implementation is analysed in Section 4.3 below. However, MFA-funded CSOs most consistently reference the Principles since 2016, likely in response to the policy directive above.<sup>87</sup> There is also evidence of ongoing dialogue between CSOs and MFA on adherence to the Principles around framework agreements.<sup>88</sup>

**Protection:** Adherence to protection concerns, as in international commitment,<sup>89</sup> is not a formal requirement of Norwegian grant funding for CSOs, either within MFA or Norad grant

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85 Norad (2015) Grant Scheme Rules for Support to Civil Society and Democratisation; Norad (2016) General Conditions Applicable to Grants from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation; see also the grant assessment tool of RAM-Light (Norad (2016) RAM Light Modellen v2, internal document).

86 Norad (2009) Principles for Norad's Support to Civil Society in the South.

87 NRC's documentation reflects continual and consistent referencing of the Principles over time, however.

88 For example, SCN's 2016 Annual Report on its Global Agreement for Education in Emergencies and Child Protection references recurrent dialogue with MFA on adherence to the Principles: 'One recurring topic in the discussion on diversion of aid in the Syria crisis between NMFA and SCN is whether schools supported by the NMFA could be used to teach or spread jihadist ideology or materials from one or the other of the armed groups involved in the Syria conflict.' SCN (2016) Progress and Financial Report 2016 and Updated Implementation and Plan and Budget 2017 QZA 16/0219.

89 See [https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/oom\\_protection\\_english.pdf](https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/documents/oom_protection_english.pdf)

schemes. Some designs and framework agreements – notably those of NRC – did explicitly reference protection concerns, though others did not, and staff interviewed had variable awareness and experience of protection concerns. At an advocacy level, SCN's Schools of Zones as Peace initiative, part-funded by MFA, provides a pilot approach for schools in vulnerable and conflict-prone areas.<sup>90</sup> The Safe Schools Declaration, in which Norwegian CSOs participated alongside their government counterparts, has also been a major contributor to embedding protection concerns into EiCC.<sup>91</sup>

**INEE Standards:** Norway's aid actors – including government and CSOs – have taken a prominent strategic role in the INEE network and the production of the Standards (see section 4.3.5 below). Demonstrating adherence to the Standards however is not a requirement for Norad/MFA grant approval; and they are inconsistently addressed in project designs over time (although contextualised standards exist for all case study countries, and these were consistently referenced in both NRC and SCN project designs). Respondents interviewed-in-country were familiar with

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90 SCN (2017) Schools as zones of peace: Presentation to INEE May 2017.

91 <http://protectingeducation.org/guidelines/support> accessed 11-10-17.

the Standards, particularly those contextualised for the country, and generally referred to them as valuable reference points, but they also frequently described them as 'aspirational' in relation to operational practice.

### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- > As for the International Humanitarian Principles, providing a guidance statement on how INEE standards, Do No Harm and Protection concerns should be addressed within EiCC interventions will support greater consistency across Norway's EiCC portfolio.

## 4.2 HOW COHERENT ARE INTERVENTIONS?

**Summary on coherence:** Norwegian-government funded EiCC interventions have a comparatively explicit strategic architecture, with the broad guidance of Budget Propositions and White Paper 25 supported by a recent implementation plan and results framework.\* However, **no aggregate level analysis to help implement the strategic architecture has been identified**, and oversight at country level is light and mostly on a bilateral basis, leading to a relatively limited strategic overview and little formalised learning.

Externally, CSO actors supported by the Norwegian government participate in coordination fora where feasible. Horizontal linkages with other partners in the context occur, but are dependent on CSOs' own willingness and ability to forge these.

\* MFA (2015) 'Resultatrammeverk for norsk støtte till utdanning for utvikling'. Informal Note. Oslo: MFA; MFA (2014) 'Vedlegg 1. Oppfølging av meld.st.25, utdanning for utvikling (Action Plan for White Paper)'. Internal Working Paper. Oslo: Education Team, MFA.

### 4.2.1 Internal coherence

#### **Comparatively explicit strategic architecture:**

The main strategic statement in the recent period to guide Norway's investments in EiCC has been the 2013 White Paper and its associated implementation plan and results framework.<sup>92</sup> Prior to this, strategic statements in Annual Budget Propositions and other policy documents provided broad guidance for decisions. The White Paper provides broad roles for CSOs in realising policy aims, and the strategy provides an implementation plan, though does not make a clear link to the comparative advantages identified in the White Paper.

Additionally, in 2016, and following a request from MFA to Norad, an education results framework was developed for use by the Norwegian government. The Results Reporting System (RRS), which comprises a Goal Hierarchy, a corresponding 'Menu of (standard) Indicators' and a reporting template, applied from 2016 to bilateral and multilateral agreements where education is the main component, in both emergency settings and development interventions.

<sup>92</sup> MFA (2015) 'Resultatrammeverk for norsk støtte till utdanning for utvikling'. Informal Note. Oslo: MFA; MFA (2014) 'Vedlegg 1. Oppfølging av meld.st.25, utdanning for utvikling (Action Plan for White Paper)'. Internal Working Paper. Oslo: Education Team, MFA.

The tangible effects of this firming architecture can be seen in two SCN framework agreements, both with MFA, from 2013-2016 and 2016-2018 respectively (Box 9):

#### **BOX 9 // EVOLVING RESULTS ARCHITECTURES**

##### **SCN Global Agreement on Education in Emergencies 2013-2016**

Contains overall objectives and outputs, but not a detailed results framework

##### **SCN Global Agreement on Education in Emergencies and Child Protection 2016-2018**

Contains a detailed Results Framework, including indicators, data sources/means of verification, baselines and intended targets

However, the evaluation has not identified tangible aggregate-level analysis to inform investment choices to implement the strategic architecture, for example reviewing CSOs' respective comparative advantages in relation to strategic priorities.

**Light country level oversight:** At the same time, the country level overview of Norwegian investments of EiCC through its CSO partners is relatively light. Norwegian Embassy plans<sup>93</sup> reference education as a priority sector for

<sup>93</sup> Royal Norwegian Embassy Plans for 2017: Amman (Jordan), Beirut (Lebanon) Nairobi (for Somalia), Juba (South Sudan).

the country, along with explicit rationales for Norwegian government investment. However, they do not set out *how* the Norwegian government's strategic intentions will be realised in the country, nor define the intended roles of funded education actors in the country, including CSOs. The limited human resourcing available to Royal Norwegian Embassies also constrains the scope for strong oversight at country level with most engagement between Embassies/representatives from Norad/MFA and partner CSOs taking place bilaterally.<sup>94</sup> Some Norwegian Embassies had worked hard to support coherence, as for example the Norwegian Embassy in Nairobi, which facilitates six-monthly lesson learning events together with all Norwegian partner agencies.<sup>95</sup> However, these examples were also few rather than systematic, mainly due to time pressures on Embassy staff. The appointment of Beirut-based Regional Education Adviser is hoped to increase linkages in the Middle East and North Africa region.

### **Firming CSO strategic and results architectures:**

Analysis finds a recent firming of CSOs' own strategic architectures for EiCC, as follows:

› At the global level, larger CSOs funded

94 Interviews with stakeholders conducted for desk and field study. See attached case studies for more information.

95 Key informant interviews.

through Norwegian government assistance have developed their own, highly rigorous, education strategies and plans. For example, SCN's Education Strategy for 2016-2018 clearly defines its intended strategic goals for the sector and sets out clear programmatic approaches, intended reach and priority countries.<sup>96</sup> NRC's 2015-2017 'One Million Learning' strategy defines its aims to reach one million children and youth in emergencies annually with educational provision by 2017<sup>97</sup> and defines explicit programmatic approaches to achieve this.

› At country level, the strategic architecture for EiCC is also firming.<sup>98</sup> For example, SCI and NRC in Lebanon, and NRC in Jordan, have developed sector strategies or narratives for education.<sup>99</sup>

CSOs' own results architectures for EiCC have also firmed in the most recent period. At corporate level, results frameworks have

96 Save the Children Norway (2016) Education Strategy, 2016-2018. Aims: 1. Children learn in safe, inclusive and protective environments 2. Effective governance systems exist to ensure that deprived children have equitable access to good quality basic education and demonstrate relevant learning outcomes.

97 Norwegian Refugee Council (2015) One Million Learning in Emergencies: Increasing access to quality education for displaced children and youth.

98 Previously, education aims were captured within Country Strategies or plans, and although containing clear statements of intent, these were not always matched by specific aims or feasibility statements, or accompanied by clear resourcing plans.

99 Save the Children (Lebanon) Education Sector Strategy 2017-2018; NRC (Jordan) Education Strategy 2017, (Lebanon) Education Sector Narrative Lebanon 2016.

### **BOX 10 // NRC EDUCATION STRATEGY LEBANON**

NRC's Education Narrative for Lebanon, developed in September 2016, identifies key target groups as Palestinian refugees and those affected by the Syria regional crisis, including host communities and cites planned areas of intervention, namely: 1) provision of non-formal education in community settings for out-of-school children and youth; and 2) support to formal education through the reintegration of out-of-school children and youth into public schools and the provision of school retention programmes such as remedial classes, homework support, recreational and psycho-social activities, transportation support, and school construction/rehabilitation.

been developed to accompany sector strategies and plans, as for those developed by NRC and SCN, above. At country level, specific sector plans are increasingly accompanied by detailed logframes which include objectives, outcomes and outputs.<sup>100</sup> The main gearing framework for those reviewed lies (appropriately) not in corporate intentions or Norwegian government aims, but in national education goals for the sector.<sup>101</sup>

100 For example, in Lebanon, NRC's September 2016 Education Strategy Narrative Analysis is supported by a Theory of Change in the education sector narrative, and accompanied by a logframe.

101 In a further example from Lebanon, the main results frameworks to which both SCN and NRC education activities are geared are those of RACE I and the stronger articulation, framed around outputs and outcomes, in RACE II. Both NRC and SCN link the intended results of their respective strategic plans.

#### 4.2.2. External coherence

##### **Varied engagement with coordination mechanisms, shaped by government preferences:**

At field level, larger CSO actors supported by the Norwegian government are actively involved in respective Education Clusters/Sector Working groups in the countries reviewed. Although these structures function to varying degrees, they have supported coordination and partnership among partners, and enabled shared learning. However, Norway-funded CSOs have experienced varying roles within these mechanisms. In some countries, government preferences regarding CSO engagement in EiCC responses have restricted their engagement in coordination mechanisms. This highlights the sensitivities surrounding education as a humanitarian response (Section 1, above), and the need for ongoing political dialogue with host governments on the issue. For example, in Lebanon, the Government suspended the main sector coordination mechanism for a period, and CSOs are now represented on a 'sub-committee' rather than on the main coordination structure. Table 7 illustrates for the case studies of this evaluation.

Where national coordination systems had experienced periods of weakness – as for example in Lebanon 2012-2014 - actors

**TABLE 7 // PARTICIPATION IN COORDINATION STRUCTURES**

Country	Cluster/Working Group participation
Somalia	All larger Norway-funded CSOs actively engaged in the Education Cluster, participating in the monthly meetings held in Nairobi and in Somalia, and chaired by the Ministry of Education. The Cluster is co-led by Save the Children and UNICEF, and is partly funded by the Norwegian Government.
Jordan	NRC participates in the 24-agency Jordan Education Sector Working Group (ESWG), co-led by the Ministry of Education and UNICEF, though Ministry participation is limited. The ESWG initiated the contextualization of the INEE Minimum Standards for Jordan, in which NRC was involved.
South Sudan	All larger CSOs are engaged in the Education Cluster and participate in the monthly meetings and chaired by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. Multiple informants raised issues relating to effectiveness of the cluster and its limited role in coordinating the response.
Lebanon	The Education Sector Working Group was disbanded in 2014 due to Ministry concerns about the fragmentation of education assistance to the Syrian regional crisis. It was replaced in 2015 with the RACE Executive Committee, considered the official sector coordinating mechanism for the Syria crisis response. CSOs are not part of the formal RACE Steering Committee; however, NRC was eventually one of two CSOs appointed to an NGO Sub-committee, in April 2016.

reported general coordination problems, with unsystematised targeting and some evidence of overlap.

**Horizontal linkages in place but undirected:** At programmatic level, horizontal linkages between Norwegian-funded and other EiCC interventions in the country were mostly operationally-focused rather than strategic in nature. Where such linkages were formed, these were not directed or stimulated by the Norwegian government, but rather by CSOs' own initiative (Box 11).

#### **BOX 11 // EXAMPLES OF HORIZONTAL LINKAGES**

- CSO-initiated horizontal linkages included
- > NRC co-chairs the Education Sector Working Group at camp level in Zaatari camp, and co-chairs the Youth Task Force;
  - > Education actors have formed a Norwegian-based education group, in which ADRA Norway, Digni, the Strømme Foundation, NRC and Caritas Norway participate

### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- › Within its next policy iteration relating to EiCC, a clearer statement of intent on where and how respective actors will contribute to intended policy goals, will provide stronger guidance for CSO actors as well as MFA and Norad.
- › Reflecting these intentions within the global Results Reporting System will add further internal coherence to investments.
- › Dedicating Embassy staff time to supporting horizontal linkages across actors and interventions in-country will support external coherence; as will close liaison on political dialogue where sectoral coordination is weak.

**Summary on effectiveness:** Monitoring systems for Norway's EiCC interventions through CSOs are diverse, reporting on different aims in different ways at different times. However, overall, government-funded EiCC interventions implemented by CSOs have contributed to some significant results which have improved access to, and quality of, educational provision in conflict and crisis-affected situations. They have also made some significant contributions to Norwegian policy goals over the period.

However, these results are *'on their own terms'*, in line with the strongly trust-based approach of the Norwegian aid model. The capabilities and expertise of CSOs have not been combined to generate results which are *'more than the sum of the parts.'*

Interventions have largely been implemented in alignment with the International Humanitarian Principles, though operational independence has come under strain in some countries. The special features of the Norwegian aid model of support to EiCC through CSO partners have strongly supported relevance and adaptive capacity, but have resulted in a limited strategic overview of the portfolio.

## 4.3 HOW EFFECTIVE ARE INTERVENTIONS?

### 4.3.1 Monitoring and reporting

#### **Few monitoring requirements and diverse approaches:**

As section 4.2 notes above, Norwegian government oversight of its framework agreements and interventions with CSOs has intensified in its results focus in recent years. However, this intensification has not yet resulted in a consistent set of regular monitoring reports

being collected from CSOs, in line with the trust- and partnership-based ethos described. Reporting mostly takes place through Annual Reports, which consolidate gains made in the past year (though these are variously reported, as below), Annual Review Meetings and regular dialogue. The major grant-holders, NRC and SCN, also provide interim progress reports against framework agreements.

Monitoring systems, as for strategic planning, above, are therefore set by individual CSOs and reporting takes place according to their own internal requirements (example in Box 12 next page):

## BOX 12 // CSO MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Both NRC and SCN have well-developed monitoring and evaluation systems, as follows:

- > SCN's 'Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning' (MEAL) system ensures that data is collected and reported upon under key indicators. A dedicated MEAL team also work to ensure that data is applied, through concrete feedback loops, to inform programming. The MEAL function includes the evaluation process and system.
- > NRC's Monitoring and evaluation system is based on five principles: Contribution, Appropriateness, Flexibility, Participation and Triangulation. It includes project result measurement, quality assessments, and after-action reviews; program and country-office emergency response reviews, studies and evaluations; organizational evaluations; global Program Strategy Assessments and global Annual learning reviews. Minimum standards include preparing, implementing and updating annually set of governing Monitoring and Evaluation Standard Operating Procedures at Country Office level; tracking and reporting on core performance indicators annually; and quarterly and annual analysis of reported core performance indicator data centrally. Evaluation is included in each country office strategy; and Annual Learning Reviews are conducted and shared for discussion.

Overall, analysis for this evaluation found monitoring systems being successfully implemented for EiCC activities; though these applied widely varied indicators and methodologies. These challenges – also reflected in a 2017 Norad report on Norway's

TABLE 8 // MONITORING CHALLENGES

Enrolment	For enrolment, children enrolling in an institution are counted every school year. This means that students will be counted several times if the intervention is supporting school across several school years.
Safe learning environments	Varying indicators are applied. Where school construction or rehabilitation is recorded, CSOs do not always disaggregate between the two, and between permanent or temporary structures. Moreover, 'rehabilitation' can range from minor improvements through to full reconstruction; the former is not always recorded. Construction standards applied are highly varied.
Provision of learning materials	A student is counted every year they receive learning materials. This means that a student may be counted several times if they receive learning materials in more than one year under the intervention.
Training of education staff	Some teachers had received several trainings throughout the intervention period. Trainings were not differentiated according to whether they were e.g. one day's instruction, or a much longer course of capacity strengthening. Very few CSOs monitored the effects of training in professional practice.

support to education<sup>102</sup> - are highlighted through four specific output areas, in which evidence was sought for this evaluation (Table 8).

**Achievements masked by indicator gaps** were also noted in monitoring reports, which focused mainly on 'hard' outputs and outcomes, such as enrolment and teacher training. Other 'softer' results, reflected in documentation (including independent evaluations) and triangulated by the evaluation team in fieldwork, were not consistently captured

by all CSO results frameworks.<sup>103</sup> These included some significant gains, such as in capacity strengthening of local partners and policy influencing at central level, reported below under Section 4.3.2. Their omission from systematic results reporting meant that such achievements – which were often considerable - were not consistently made 'visible' in reporting.

**Data disaggregation but little attention to structural changes:** Data was mostly disaggregated in terms of gender across all

<sup>102</sup> Norad (2017) Rising to the Challenge op.cit.

<sup>103</sup> Though results frameworks of SCN, particularly, were well-developed in this respect.

CSOs, and throughout the evaluation period. However, this often went little further than ‘numbers of girls enrolled/retained/dropping out’, again reflecting findings from SCN’s 2016 gender in education assessment.<sup>104</sup>

Systematic results reporting on other vulnerable groups noted above, including disabled children, was not reported comprehensively. SCN began to report on disability in 2015, but reporting was only available from 2016. NRC results reporting also includes disability figures from 2016.

No results reporting reviewed reported systematically on the **INEE standards**. Some evaluations and reviews commissioned did reflect these, but their treatment was variable in the documentation assessed.<sup>105</sup>

**Recent changes/innovations** identified in monitoring systems were:

- › An increasing use of theories of change or logical frameworks, such as by NRC, which prepares and updates annually theories of change for all its Core Competencies, including education;
- › Effort to improve monitoring and evaluation in ‘difficult to access’ areas, e.g. through remote

104 SCN (2016) op.cit.

105 For example, NRC (2013) Assessment of NRC’s Emergency Education Response to the Syria Crisis in Lebanon, April 2013.

monitoring via mobile phone technology, use of third party monitors, etc., as in Somalia;

- › Increased use of community resources to support monitoring, also as in Somalia, through Community Education Committees;
- › Use of monitoring processes for capacity development e.g. through accompaniment by government officials at local level, as in South Sudan.

**Challenges** included weak national education management information systems in some countries, such as South Sudan and Somalia; limited access to education management information systems within the public education system, as in Lebanon and Jordan; and limited partner capacity/experience in monitoring and evaluation (in case of SCN, who implement mostly through partners).

#### 4.3.2 Achieving results - methodology

The challenges above have **prevented robust consolidation of results** of Norwegian-government funded EiCC interventions implemented by CSOs over the evaluation period. Additional constraints included:

1. Significant data gaps (also noted by the Norwegian Auditor General)<sup>106</sup> within archive

106 For example, a 2017 report on archives and transparency in public administration: Dokument nr. 3:10 (2016-2017). Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av arkivering og åpenhet i statlig forvaltning.’

#### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- › More consistent requirements on monitoring and reporting, at least on a few standard indicators, will facilitate greater oversight and results being achieved, as well as aggregation for government reporting. It will be important to establish feedback loops for use of this data.
- › Including indicators on policy development and capacity strengthening would help such achievements become visible in reporting.

1. systems, with some information on results unavailable, particularly back to 2008;
2. The large number of funded projects globally, with 148 sub-units (comprising both administrative sub-units and a number of addenda) in 2016 alone;
3. Separate reporting systems for different grants schemes, for example to Norad and MFA;
4. Varied reporting formats, ranging from comprehensive, non-donor specific reports (for example, NRC’s 2016 annual report through its Global Output and Outcome Reporting System) to more limited, project-specific reports;

5. Difficulties in robustly linking results to Norwegian funding, which is often used to gap-fill other funding streams, particularly when reporting is generic or multi-donor;<sup>107</sup>
6. Difficulties in extracting results within the sub-theme of basic education only, with much reporting addressing education as a thematic area only or merging primary and lower secondary education results in reporting.

The virtual absence of reporting against the INEE standards, noted above, has also meant that they are not applied systematically as an analytical framework here, though they are integrated where feasible. Outcome data was also available to a very limited extent.

Analysis of available results was therefore complex, and the methodological challenges described prevented aggregation. Results presented below are therefore **indicative only**; and are presented simply as reflected in CSOs' own available reporting, for the period 2014-2016. They are discussed in more detail under Access and Quality, below.

<sup>107</sup> Although in line with principles of good donorship – where individual donors do not require reporting on individual grant streams – this enables the evaluation to signal 'contributions' to results only.

Results apply the following sources:

1. SCN/NRC results for the period 2014-2016, as per available reporting on Norad/MFA framework agreements. For NRC, results apply NRC's Global Outcome and Output Reporting System. For SCN, results are extracted from a) data supplied by SCN for 2015-2106 and b) framework agreement reporting to Norad (since available reporting on EiE framework agreements with MFA focus mainly on process).
2. Results identified for the individual countries analysed for this report, mainly for the period 2012-2016, with further detail available in the annexed Case Study reports.

Results are at output level, and are reported quantitatively, and then discussed in more depth in Section 4.3.2. ii, according to the two main parameters of Access and Quality.

Finally, in light of the challenges above, the results presented here cannot be claimed as directly arising from Norwegian funding. Instead, they are results **to whose realisation Norwegian funding has contributed** over the period.

#### 4.3.2.i Quantitative results

##### NRC and SCN

As Section 4.3.1 notes, Government of Norway's two main strategic CSO partners for EiCC delivery have varied results reporting systems, and report separately on the various agreements and frameworks they hold with Norad and MFA.

**Indicative** results at global level are therefore presented in Table 9 (next page) to give a sense of the scale of results achieved through Norwegian funding. More depth is provided below from the four countries studied through field and desk study.

Additional results to which Norway has contributed include:

- › NRC has made an organisation-wide commitment to significantly upscale its education programmes. Globally, by 2017, it aimed to reach one million displaced children and youth annually with education, requiring a four-fold increase in recipients 2014-2017. By the end of 2016, NRC reported that it had reached over 730,000 beneficiaries globally with education responses, in countries such as Afghanistan, Central African Republic,



**TABLE 9 // NRC AND SCN RESULTS**

Agreement Partner	# conflict-affected children with increased access to inclusive quality education enrolled	Safe and secure learning environments	Students provided with learning materials	Education staff trained
<b>NRC (2014-2016)</b> <sup>1</sup>	501,804 children enrolled in Accelerated Education or Education in Emergency programmes 2014-2017 (gender breakdown not available)	280 classrooms constructed/ rehabilitated 2015 <sup>2</sup>	2014-2016) 679,521 children received Education in Emergencies packs	(2014-2016) 36,206 teachers trained <sup>3</sup>
<b>SCN (2015-2016)</b>	2015-2016: 930,000 learners reported as enrolled in EiCC programmes (49.3% of which were girls) <sup>4</sup>	(2016) At least 281 schools in 11 countries undertook risk reduction initiatives. 272 schools developed a disaster risk reduction plan for their school <sup>5</sup>	(2016) At least 850 educational institutions provided with teaching materials <sup>5</sup>	(2016) At least 13,770 education personnel trained during 2016 <sup>5</sup>

1 Source: Figures collated from NRC Annual Reports 2014-2016. 2016 figures not attributable to Norwegian funding only.  
 2 Figures not available for 2014 or 2016.  
 3 In EIE/ 'standalone'  
 4 Source: Data supplied by SCN. Caveats include: Niger was not defined by Norad/MFA as a fragile/conflicted affected state so is therefore missing from

the data. Haiti data for 2016 was not available, and is not therefore included. Not all MFA awards were finished at the time of data collection and therefore the enrolment numbers may be slightly underreported.  
 5 Under Norad framework agreement GLO-0605 QZA-014/0477. Not systematically reported under EIE framework agreements with MFA which focus mainly on process.

Democratic Republic of Congo and Syria.<sup>108</sup> In six countries, a new internal innovation fund launched education-related projects, such as e-learning, to reach more children and youth education programmes.<sup>109</sup>

108 NRC (2017) Global Output and Outcome Reporting for 2016.

109 NRC (2017) Annual Report for 2016.

› SCN's flagship Quality Learning Environment (QLE) assessment model has been piloted during the period 2015-2016, with a view to being replicated and taken to scale within Save the Children International and externally by national governments and other partners. Its contributions to improved child development and learning outcomes are

being studied by researchers in Norway and in country programmes, with results to be reported in 2018.<sup>110</sup>

### Sample countries

Selected results identified in the four case study countries (see associated Case Study Reports) for this evaluation were as follows. These combine reported results from CSOs active in the country (Table 10, next page).<sup>111</sup> More details are available in the Case Study reports attached to this evaluation.

Specific features of Norwegian assistance to EiCC in the sample countries included:

### Jordan

› The majority (80%) of Norwegian funding through CSOs is directed in Jordan through NRC. Efforts in education until recently have been focused on two main refugee camps in the country, Azraq and Zaatari, where the Jordanian government allows Syrian refugees to remain.<sup>112</sup> Until 2016, NRC could engage in camps only in non-formal education provision.

110 SCN (2014) Strategy 2014-2018.

111 Results generated from review of documents and annual reporting to Norad/MFA by partner CSOs in-country and triangulated with Norad (2016) op.cit reporting. Results are not exhaustive, with e.g. over 33 agreements in South Sudan over the evaluation period.

112 As of 2017, NRC report that they are 'evenly spread' between camps and host communities. Pers. Comm. 12/10/17

**TABLE 10 // CASE STUDY COUNTRY RESULTS**

Country	Access to education	Safe and secure learning environments	Provision of learning materials	Education staff trained
<b>Somalia</b>	From 2013 to 2015, over 45,000 children per year supported <sup>1</sup> . In 2015, 75,055 children were enrolled in supported learning institutions <sup>2</sup> through the work of 6 civil society institutions.	622 classrooms 2013 onwards constructed/ refurbished.	Around 117,000 students reached with learning materials 2013-2016.	Over 3,800 teachers and other education staff trained 2013-2016.
<b>South Sudan</b>	Approx. 23,000 children supported in education per year.	280 classrooms constructed/ refurbished 2013-2016.	Over 40,000 students reached with learning materials.	Over 3,300 teachers and other education personnel trained.
<b>Syria and neighbouring countries, including Lebanon and Jordan</b>	On average, more than 36,000 students supported each year.	More than 650 classrooms  Constructed/ refurbished.	115,000 students reached with learning materials.	5,000 education staff trained.
<b>Lebanon</b>	At least 20,255 children enrolled in accredited non-formal education programmes 2014-2016. <sup>3</sup>	At least 41 schools rehabilitated 2012-2016.	35762 <sup>4</sup> provided with learning materials.	957 teachers trained 2015-2016. <sup>5</sup>
<b>Jordan</b>	At least 17,995 children enrolled in non-formal education programmes in 2015 and 2016. <sup>6</sup>		11,891 students provided with NFI kits 2015-2016. <sup>7</sup>	867 teachers trained 2015-2016. <sup>8</sup>

1 Includes secondary education.

2 Figures mostly reflect children enrolled in primary education but include children at lower and upper secondary.

3 Source: NRC and SCN reporting.

4 Source: NRC GORS reporting 2015-2016.

5 NRC GORS reporting 2015-2016.

6 Source: NRC GORS reporting 2015-2016.

7 NRC GORS reporting 2015-2016.

8 NRC GORS reporting 2015-2016.

It surpassed its target for learners enrolled in accelerated education in 2015-2016; and in 2016, it opened two Satellite Centres in order to cover educational gaps and support out of school girls particularly.<sup>113</sup>

- › Following a government policy shift in 2016, which opened access to the Jordanian public education system for Syrian refugees, NRC adapted its programme to support UNICEF and the Ministry of Education to enrol and transition Syrian refugee children into formal education. It provided catch-up and additional learning outside of formal school times. Jordan's Ministry of Education (MoE) also developed formal and non-formal Education programmes (Catch-up Programme Programme), based on NRC's Accelerated Learning Programme.<sup>114</sup>

### Lebanon

- › CSOs' role in Lebanon since 2015 has been mostly restricted to the delivery of non-formal education programmes determined by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE). NRC and SCI, the main CSOs funded by Norway in Lebanon, have therefore provided accredited non-formal education provision in areas of the country determined

113 NRC Jordan (2016) Annual Report to MFA for 2016.

114 Ibid.

by MEHE, and have also participated in the Ministry's Back to School campaigns of 2016. Programmes have continued Norway's longstanding commitment to Palestinian refugees, as well as supporting Syrian out of school children.

- › Progression to enrolment in formal education has been a major focus of CSOs' provision in Lebanon, in keeping with MEHE strategic directives.<sup>115</sup> However, CSOs in Lebanon are unable to assess the effectiveness of these referrals, since drop-out data from the public schooling system, which wider data sources find to be high, is not made available to them.<sup>116</sup>

### South Sudan

- › In South Sudan, crises and conflict have repeatedly interrupted educational provision, particularly in the conflict-affected states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile. A 2016 Education Cluster assessment found that 25 percent of schools which were open at any point since 2013 were non-functional.<sup>117</sup>

115 Government of Lebanon, Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2014) Reaching All Children with Education 2014-2016 (RACE I); and Government of Lebanon, Ministry of Education and Higher Education (2017) Reaching All Children with Education 2017-2021 (RACE II).

116 at 30% in 2012 and subsequently not estimated to have reduced. UNICEF Lebanon and Save the Children (2012) Education Rapid Needs Assessments for Displaced Syrian Children in schools communities and safe spaces.

117 Education Cluster South Sudan (2016) Education Sector Assessment.

- › Norwegian-funded CSOs work across the country. SCI and NRC are present in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile, while ADRA, the Strømme Foundation, BRAC and KFUK-KFUM-Global work in these and other regions of the country.<sup>118</sup> Many NGOs targeted areas with statistically low enrolment rates (e.g. ADRA and NRC in Eastern Equatoria State, NRC, Strømme Foundation and SCN in Jonglei state) or children in the most disadvantaged areas (BRAC and NRC in Juba).
- › CSOs have applied innovations such as child friendly approaches, child-to-child clubs, peace initiatives (such as peace clubs, training on peacebuilding; girls' study clubs) and recreation spaces. Wider community engagement was also enabled through regular consultation and engagement with communities and supporting parent meetings.

### Somalia

- › Norwegian support delivers education through a wide range of CSOs across all zones of Somalia, with NRC and SCI having an operational presence across all major regions. Given Somalia's history of conflict, and the related interruption to educational provision, much effort focuses on access to education. The progression from non-formal to formal

118 See the South Sudan Case Study report for a full breakdown of figures.

education is also a major thrust of Norwegian effort;

- › CSOs have used approaches such as child-to-child clubs and peace initiatives and recreation spaces to engage children in education. Innovations aimed at enabling transition from non-formal to formal learning were also introduced, such as agreements between formal and non-formal education to enable integration into primary school. Community Education Committees were also supported to engage with education authorities and communities towards advocating for improved education.<sup>119</sup>

### 4.3.2.ii Results in Access

The following section presents a discussion of results in terms of Access. More information on specific country-level results is available from the four case studies which accompany this evaluation report.

### Enrolment

Review of results reports and evaluations find that Norwegian-supported EiCC initiatives through CSOs have contributed to **significantly increased levels of enrolment of vulnerable children in basic education**. Aside from the global results above, example results include:

119 See Somalia Case Study Report for further details.

- › In Jordan, in 2016, in Azraq camp, 78 percent of students enrolled in accelerated learning programmes transitioned into formal education, with 90 percent in Zaatari camp. NRC’s interventions have contributed to an increase in the number of refugee children accessing formal schooling, from 55 percent to 65 percent of the eligible population during 2015;<sup>120</sup>
- › In Somalia, a minimum of 125,771 children benefited from formal and non-formal education provision by Norwegian-funded CSOs 2009-2016;<sup>121</sup>
- › In South Sudan, the majority of Norwegian-funded projects reviewed reached their targets relating to access to education, with at least 33,700 children enrolled in basic education 2014-2016;
- › In Lebanon, in 2016, programmes mostly met their intended targets: over 12,000 Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi refugee children were reached by SCI and NRC with non-formal education programmes.

### **Transition from ‘non-formal’ to formal education:**

Many CSOs have placed significant emphasis on *referral/transition* into formal public

<sup>120</sup> NRC (2015) Global Outcome and Output Report. Because of national delays and restrictions, this indicator was not measured in 2016.

<sup>121</sup> Data from Somalia case study.

education systems – where this is permitted by government. The *avoidance of parallel systems* was a strong operating principle of CSO provision, in line with international good practice, though success of referral into the formal system was mixed.

In Somalia, where data is relatively available, ADRA has taken a lead role on the standardising of certification and curriculum in Technical and Vocational Education and Training, and Non-Formal Education. It has helped formalise agreements between the government’s non-formal education and formal education departments, to help ensure that children trained in accelerated basic education will be successfully reintegrated into primary schools.<sup>122</sup> Between 2013-2015, over 10,000 learners were enrolled in NRC’s Alternative Basic Education (ABE) programmes annually; the majority completed and transitioned for formal primary school (84% in 2015). In 2016 between 90 and 98 percent of learners across Somaliland and Puntland passed their final ABE exam at target grade level, whilst between 75 percent and 92 percent of learners enrolled into the formal school system across all three states.

<sup>122</sup> NRC, ABE Tracer Report.

In Lebanon, where data available is more limited, CSOs’ own reports found comparatively high success rates of enrolment within the formal sector following completion of government-accredited Non-Formal Education courses.<sup>123</sup> In 2016, at least 2,800 children were referred from Norwegian CSO-funded interventions into the public education system. Once into the formal system, however, as stated, the lack of access to national data systems prevented CSOs measuring accurately retention and dropout rates.

### **Reaching vulnerable populations**

Internal Norad results reporting cites Norway’s strengths in reaching the most marginalized and vulnerable children, including girls.<sup>124</sup> This evaluation has not been able to verify this internal data, but findings here offer some nuances, as follows:

a) In terms of *gender*:

- › Reflecting the wider findings above, *enrolment is broadly gender-equitable* within results reporting reviewed. Overall, ratios are generally in the range of 40 percent girls:

<sup>123</sup> For example, in 2015, 90% of learners (boys/girls) enrolled in the formal school system within 6 months of completing NFE programmes against a target of 80%; in 2016, over 1,700 children were referred into the formal system under SCN and NRC initiatives.

<sup>124</sup> See Norad (2016) Results Report on Civil Society and Norad (2017) Rising to the Challenge op.cit.

- 60 percent boys across interventions reviewed, but individual interventions commonly report close to 50-50 ratios;
- › However, all four case studies for this evaluation found *drop-out rates* for girls both within funded interventions, and subsequently following referral from non-formal to formal education, higher for girls than for boys. This makes retention from a gender perspective particularly important;
  - › There is little evidence across the interventions reviewed of efforts to *mainstream gender issues* into education more broadly – for example into curriculum development and/or teacher training interventions;
  - › There is scant evidence of more *transformative* strategies for gender equity in EiCC – for example, on addressing changes within institutions and social norms which reinforce gender inequalities; or changes to legislation and policies that promote gender equality; or attitudinal changes at country level. Thus, Norwegian-funded EiCC interventions can report on the *inclusion* of girls within EiCC initiatives, but they are not able to report systematically on more *structural* changes and reforms for which EiCC interventions hold the potential.

**TABLE 11** // EXAMPLE RESULTS FOR MARGINALISED GROUPS

<b>IDPs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› In Somalia, emergency education was provided for IDP children through targeted programmes delivered by SCN, NRC and NCA. In 2016, this enabled 12,394 learners (mostly IDPs) in Puntland, Somaliland and South Central (NRC) and 3,929 children (including 125 IDPs) to access basic quality education (SCN).</li> <li>› In South Sudan, specific interventions targeted IDPs and other vulnerable children within communities (involved organisations included BRAC; ADRA; NRC; SCN).</li> </ul>
<b>Vulnerable children in host communities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>› In Jordan, from 2015, and reflecting wider global policy shifts,* NRC interventions sought to align with government plans, by engaging in host communities and supporting government efforts to expand the education infrastructure and absorb higher numbers of refugee children into single-shift schools.</li> <li>› In Lebanon, NRC was engaging with host communities was evident as early as 2013.** However, this began to gain momentum following the development of the sector coordination plan in 2014,*** when programmes and projects devised by international actors were required, as part of accreditation, to demonstrate their accessibility by Lebanese children in need.</li> </ul>

\*London Conference on Supporting Syria and the Region <https://www.supportingsyria2016.com/>

\*\* For example, a 2013 assessment of NRC's education response to the Syria crisis in Lebanon found that 'All children had access to the Community Centers, no discrimination observed. In two of the centers Lebanese children were participating in the activities, though representing a minority. In the Learning Support Programme in the schools, Lebanese children were also participating.' Almaas, T (2013) Assessment of NRC's Emergency Education Response to the Syria Crisis in Lebanon.

\*\*\* Reaching All Children with Education (RACE I) 2014-2016.

b) Regarding *inclusive education*:

- › Similarly to gender, available reporting is oriented to the number of disabled children *included* in initiatives.<sup>125</sup> More structural changes – seeking to address for example the legal and policy barriers to inclusive education; to support national implementation plans; or to build capacity among key national authorities and stakeholders – were little featured in results frameworks and reporting reviewed.

<sup>125</sup> See for example SCN's 2015 report from Lebanon on the Norad Global Framework agreement GLO 0605 QZA – 014/0477.

c) The two main other *categories of marginalised groups* targeted by EiCC interventions for which data is available were the children of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and vulnerable children in host communities. Results here were not systematically recorded, though some examples were available (Table 11).

**Supporting safe learning environments**

Norwegian support has resulted in increased access to safe, child-friendly learning environments, partly through major advocacy campaigns, such as the Safer Schools

Campaign, below, but also through support for the construction and rehabilitation of schools, classrooms and facilities. Specific examples of results are in Box 13 below:

### BOX 13 // PROVIDING SAFE LEARNING ENVIRONMENTS

#### In South Sudan:

- › In 2014-2015, SCI constructed 20 Temporary Learning Structures, whilst NRC supported the construction of Temporary Learning Structures in three communities.

#### In Somalia:

- › During 2015-2016, NRC supported construction of 14 new child-friendly classrooms in seven schools in Somaliland and 16 new child-friendly classrooms in five schools in South Central Somalia;\*
- › Between 2011-2014, NCA supported improvements of facilities in 71 primary schools and 5 secondary schools. Improvements included creating new classrooms and sanitation facilities, provision of teaching and learning materials; constructing libraries and laboratories as well as recreational facilities.\*\*

\* NRC (2017) Somalia Annual Report 2016

\*\* Norwegian Church Aid/Act Alliance (2015) NCA Somalia 4-year report 2011-2014.

Whilst these achievements are considerable, the INEE minimum standards for physical facilities were not systematically applied across interventions, being considered ‘ambitious’ by many interviewees (in line with the ‘aspirational’ sentiment expressed above). Interviewees also

raised the tensions incurred between access imperatives in situations of humanitarian need, and planning/resourcing for INEE requirements.

#### 4.3.2.iii Results in Quality

Beyond expanding access to basic education for out-of-school children, evidence finds that EiCC initiatives have helped improve the *quality* of educational provision. Contributions have occurred in three main areas: a) capacity strengthening of national and local education systems and authorities; b) improving the availability of teachers and c) improving the quality of teaching. Results in this area are strongly mediated by the political considerations surrounding education as a humanitarian response, as the following analysis reflects.

#### Strengthening the capacity of education systems

Norwegian-funded EiCC interventions have helped strengthen the ability and resilience of education systems at both national and local level, as follows:

- › **National level:** Where direct engagement with public education systems is feasible, results are identified in a range of areas:
  - **Policy and strategy development** has occurred in many countries where government actors are open to receiving

external support. For example, in Somalia, NRC has deployed technical advisors to the Ministry of Education, who have helped build policy and strategy guidelines for three targeted States. Also in Somalia, ADRA support has contributed to drafting of a joint review of the education sector and an Education Sector Strategic plan for South Central Somalia.

- **Improving monitoring systems:** In some countries, Norwegian assistance has supported Ministries of Education to strengthen and develop national monitoring systems for basic education. Such support often takes place alongside UNICEF, and has occurred in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Myanmar, for example through ADRA’s support to education systems-building.
- **Strengthening education management and administration systems:** Norwegian support has also helped build national management systems for education. For example, in South Sudan, ADRA has trained government officials on improving education management and administration systems.<sup>126</sup>

126 ADRA (2016) Annual Progress Report to MFA, project ‘Strengthening Equity, Access and Quality in Education’ 2016.

- **Improving capacity in education supervision and quality assurance:** For example, in Somalia, Norwegian-funded CSOs including ADRA, NCA, PYM, SCN and NRC trained over 200 education officials in education supervision, monitoring and quality assurance between 2011-2016.<sup>127</sup>
- **Improving coordination between education stakeholders:** This often takes the form of building or formalising links across different management layers of the education management system. For example, in Somalia, NRC enabled the engagement of regional education officers in local education networks, expanding the resources and expertise available to them.<sup>128</sup>

Such interventions, however, are fully dependent on available openings in the operating space for CSOs. Where access to the public education system is constrained – as in Lebanon and Jordan, for example – CSOs’ main strategy and approach rests on advocacy, below.

- › **Local level:** Many Norwegian-funded EiCC initiatives sought to enhance the quality of education systems by strengthening community level capacities – both of

education systems themselves, and of the stakeholders involved in them. Three main areas of results were identified: improvements in school planning; enhanced management systems; and improved parent-school links.

- **Improvements in local-level school management:** In Somalia, where Community Education Committees (CECs) play a major role in education delivery in the country, Norwegian-funded CSOs have worked intensively to strengthen local capacities in school management. Between 2011-2016 more than 1,300 CECs were trained in school management, including on issues such as conflict resolution, leadership, monitoring and resource mobilisation.<sup>129</sup>
- **Improved school planning:** Training in school improvement planning took place in several countries, including Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Myanmar, e.g. through ADRA’s support to education systems-building. For instance, in Somalia, NRC supported 44 schools in South Central between 2012 and 2015 to develop school improvement plans.<sup>130</sup>
- **Improvements in parent-school linkages:** Improvements in school-parent linkages were reported in several countries, usually

through the creation of formal committees or liaison groups. Examples included the establishment of Parent Committees in SCN’s non-formal education provision in Lebanon, which met monthly and provided valuable fora for not only airing concerns, but for making collective decisions on course-correction in programme implementation; and BRAC’s work in South Sudan, where 25 Parent Teacher Associations were established, with 32 percent of parents attending being women.<sup>131</sup>

#### **Improving teacher availability**

Norwegian-funded CSOs has supported the availability of teaching in two ways: firstly, by recruiting teachers directly where appropriate, for example within non-formal educational provision and secondly by applying incentive schemes for teacher recruitment. However, since results are not reported systematically by CSOs, it has not been feasible to generate an aggregate number of teachers recruited. Example results come from Lebanon and Jordan:

- › In Lebanon, where teacher recruitment has proven challenging under the Syrian regional crisis particularly, in 2016, SCN reports that

127 See Somalia desk study for breakdown of activities by CSO.

128 NRC (2014) SOFM1301 Final Report (Somaliland).

129 Ibid.

130 NRC Somalia (2012-15) Final Reports to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

131 BRAC (2016) Annual Progress Report for Project ‘Accelerated Learning Process targeting 750 girls aged 10-19 in South Sudan’.

115 non-formal education teachers were recruited over one grant lifetime;<sup>132</sup>

- › In South Sudan, BRAC successfully recruited 25 teachers from Government primary schools to run additional Accelerated Learning Programme centres in two regions, while the Strømme Foundation was able to recruit and train 50 female teachers;<sup>133</sup>
- › A 2015 meta-evaluation of NRC's Accelerated Learning Programme globally did not record numbers of teachers recruited, but found that NRC has carefully considered the best approach to recruiting teachers in a conflict-sensitive and sustainable way.<sup>134</sup> In a comment on sustainability, however, it also found that NRC's programmes have been challenged by the lack of Ministry of Education follow through on commitments to absorb NRC trained teachers into the formal education system, e.g. in Burundi, Angola and Somaliland. It also found limited flexibility in regulations to allow Accelerated Learning-trained teachers to transition into the formal system (e.g. in Colombia);
- › Finally, teacher incentives, notably in the form of salaries, are mainly provided through UN actors such as UNICEF. However, these were

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132 SCN (2016) Report to MFA on grant QZ-13-0289.

133 BRAC (2016) op.cit; Strømme Foundation (2009) Final Report, project SDN 08/011 Community Based Education and Peacebuilding Programme'.

134 NRC (2015) NRC's Accelerated Education Responses: A Meta-Evaluation.

applied by CSOs such as Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and NRC in South Sudan and Somalia.

### **Boosting teaching skills**

CSOs implementing Norwegian-funded EiCC initiatives have contributed to the improvement of teaching skills across countries, with a particular focus on child-friendly learning approaches. This study finds at least 49,000 teachers trained<sup>135</sup> 2014-2016 in the four case study countries for this evaluation alone.

- › The main foci of teacher training within Government of Norway-supported CSOs have been *child-friendly methodologies* and *inclusive education*. Examples of activities conducted include:
  - Across three countries in the Middle East Region, Right to Play has strengthened teacher capacities by introducing child-friendly approaches through the medium of play-based learning methodologies, for example working with UNRWA;
  - In multiple countries, analysis conducted under SCN's Quality Learning Environment approach introduced greater use of inclusive approaches; child-friendly methodologies; and, particularly psycho-social approaches for dealing with

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135 Though the extent and nature of the training was highly varied across organisations reviewed.

traumatised children. In Lebanon in 2016, for example, SCN trained 108 teachers on active learning methods in classrooms<sup>136</sup>

whilst in 2017, NRC reported that it had trained a total of 143 teachers in inclusive approaches and child-centred methodologies;<sup>137</sup>

- In South Sudan, from 2015-2016, SCN through SCI trained 381 teachers in child centred approaches, teachers' code of conduct, child safe guarding, disaster risk reduction and conflict sensitive education.<sup>138</sup>

However, as for other areas of this evaluation, engagement with teacher training is strongly mediated by the national context. In Lebanon and Jordan, for example, CSOs' constrained ability to engage with the public education system means that teachers within the formal system cannot benefit from the new approaches provided within their training. In Jordan, NRC has pushed to have Syrian assistants accepted in public schools, but so far without success.

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136 QZA-13/0289.

137 Annual Report to MFA.

138 SCN (2016) Final Report: Integrated education and child protection support for children affected by conflict in South Sudan 2015-2016.



Beyond the inability to access to the public system teaching cadre, concerns exist about uptake of new methodologies, however:

- › In Jordan, some teachers in Zaatari camp reported that NRC-provided trainings were relatively thin – one-off sessions with little follow-up. In 2015, only a quarter of the teachers observed after training were using the techniques learned in training.<sup>139</sup>
- › In Somalia, three CSOs reported that uptake of child-friendly methodologies and other professional tools provided through training was lower amongst teachers than anticipated. To improve uptake, ADRA developed a teacher mentoring approach.<sup>140</sup> Save the Children found that end of term examination results recorded an improvement by an average of 15 percent over the previous year score – linked to teacher training.<sup>141</sup>

#### 4.3.2.iv Additional Results

Three main areas of additional results achieved by Norway's EiCC support through CSOs have been identified through the evaluation. These are not systematically captured in MFA/Norad

139 NRC Jordan (2015) Annual report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (internal document).

140 ADRA Norge (2015) SEAQE Annual Progress Report.

141 Save the Children Norway (2016) Final report, Education for Children Affected by Conflict and Displacement Project (ECACD).

or CSO reporting, but remain important areas of achievement. They are: global policy influencing; supporting global accountability; sector coordination; and innovation.

#### Global policy influencing through advocacy

Norway's funding of CSOs has made important contributions to global policy dialogue, alongside the Government of Norway's own efforts, often through advocacy skills. Over the evaluation period, example results include:

- › *Oslo conference*: Norwegian CSOs were closely involved in the dialogue and preparation for the 2015 Oslo Summit for Education Development, which has led to several tangible effects, including the Oslo consolidated principles for education in emergencies and protracted crises; and the Safe Schools Declaration, now endorsed by 69 states.<sup>142</sup> Government of Norway provided 6.2 million NOK 2013-2016 to support the Safe Schools Declaration through the Geneva Call, Plan Norway and SCN. It also formed part of SCN's 2016-2018 grant application for its 6 million NOK Cooperation agreement with MFA.<sup>143</sup>
- › *INEE*: As recorded in Chapter 2, SCN and NRC particularly – alongside the Norwegian

142 SCN (2017) Schools as zones of peace: Presentation to INEE May 2017 and information supplied by MFA.

143 Source: STASYS database and SCN 2016-2018 Application for Cooperation Agreement.

government itself – plays a major role in INEE, with NRC Co-Chair of the INEE Steering Group, and a member of the INEE Standards and Practice Working Group and the Gender Task Team and SCN also part of the Minimum Standards group. Government of Norway has provided both SCN and NRC with dedicated resources to support INEE-related work and particularly the development of the Minimum Standards. Resource allocations include 0.3 million NOK to SCN in 2010, and 1.76 million to NRC 2011-2014).<sup>144</sup>

- › *Education Cannot Wait*: Both SCN and NRC were major actors in the dialogue and consultations leading up to the launch of the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) initiative at the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016. SCN was nominated to sit on the ECW's High-Level Steering Group as a representative of Northern CSOs.
- › *The '4%' commitment*: Both SCN and NRC have advocated strongly, alongside government partners, for realisation of the UN target of 4 percent of humanitarian aid being allocated to education.<sup>145</sup> Tangible results included the European Union (EU's)

144 Source: STASYS database.

145 See for example NRC's (2015) Global Advocacy Strategy 2015-2017 which includes as a key message: 'Donors should include education as part of their humanitarian strategies and allocate at least 4% of funding for education in emergencies.'

pledge at the Oslo Summit of the European Union to increase to 4 percent the share of the humanitarian aid budget allocated to education for children experiencing conflict and crisis, and 8% in 2018.

### **Global accountability**

Norwegian CSOs play a major role in the global accountability function, reflected in their own strategic plans and advocacy strategies.<sup>146</sup>

Major efforts include contributions to the evidence base which led up to the Oslo Conference and World Humanitarian Summit which launched the Education Cannot Wait initiative; as well as standalone pieces, such as the production of “Walk the Talk: A Review of Donors’ Humanitarian Policies on Education” which was jointly developed by NRC and SCN and co-funded by these two organisations and MFA. This prominently signalled education’s under-funding within humanitarian appeals, at less than 2 percent.<sup>147</sup>

### **Cluster coordination**

SCN particularly has been funded by MFA to support education cluster coordination at a global level within the humanitarian

architecture. The 2013-2015 SCN framework agreement with MFA includes NOK 21 million for support to the Education Cluster, among other items;<sup>148</sup> and the agreement allows for SCN to assume a co-leadership role along with UNICEF in the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Education Cluster, coordinating education efforts in humanitarian action. In 2017, SCN reported that funding had helped result in the launch of the *Guide to Education in Emergency Needs Assessment* technical tool, as well as deployment of the Rapid Response Team to 10 different country clusters.<sup>149</sup>

### **Use of innovation**

Evidence from across the evaluation’s data sources finds strategic commitment to innovation – as for example in SCN’s Education Strategy for 2016-2018 – and several innovative solutions applied at operational level to improve access to education. However, these were examples only, and there was no evidence to effort capture and systematise the learning generated from them. Examples include:

- › The introduction of methods to enhance child-friendly approaches across countries, including child-to-child clubs and peace initiatives in Somalia, and the use of

recreation spaces and play-based approaches by organisations such as Right to Play;

- › Ensuring safe transport through e.g. the Walk to School campaign in Zaatari and Azraq camps in Jordan;
- › The use of innovative approaches to build an ethos of education among families, such as NRC’s Family Read and Write together initiative, praised by one evaluation.<sup>150</sup>

### **Use of integrated approaches**

Several organisations report efforts to apply integrated approaches, with education and activity areas being interconnected in delivery. Examples include:

Examples include:

- › Integrating peacebuilding approaches into curricula in South Sudan (KFUK-KFUM);
- › Building disaster risk reduction approaches into education planning and curricula, as in Nepal and Uganda (SCN);
- › Building child protection approaches into education delivery as in Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo (SCN and NCA);

Integrating Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights themes into delivery in Malawi (SCN).

146 See for example SCN (2014) Investing in Children: Strategy 2014-2018; and NRC (2015) Strategy for Global Advocacy 2015-2017.

147 Norwegian Refugee Council and Save the Children Norway (2015) Walk the Talk’: A Review of Donors’ Humanitarian Policies on Education.

148 Source: EiE Agreed Project Summary 2013-2015.

149 SCN (2016) Progress and Financial Report for 2016 and Updated Implementation Plan and Budget 2017: Report to MFA 30.6.17.

150 Shah, R (2015) NRC’s Accelerated Education Responses: A Meta-Evaluation.

**BOX 14 // LINKING EDUCATION WITH DISASTER RISK REDUCTION**

In 2016, Save the Children Norway reported that it reached over 281 schools in 11 countries (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe) with risk reduction initiatives through Norad funds. 272 of targeted schools developed a disaster risk reduction plan.\*

\* SCN (2017) Annual Progress Report to Norad GLO-0605 QZA 014/0477

However, one evaluation of NRC’s Accelerated Learning programmes found that peacebuilding and reconciliation had been insufficiently integrated into programming.<sup>151</sup>

**4.3.2.v Summary of contribution to Norway’s policy goals over the period**

Based on the evidence above, the contribution of EiCC through its partner CSOs to Norway’s policy goals over the period is assessed as shown in table 12.

Critically, however, the results described above – whilst important contributions to the realisation of Norway’s policy goals for EiCC – are occurring ‘on their own terms’. That is, they are highly individualised to CSOs, without the collective capabilities and expertise of CSOs

151 Shah, R (2016) op.cit.

**TABLE 12 // CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY GOALS**

Time period	Policy commitment and source	Contribution to policy goals
2008	Support educational programmes adapted to the needs of children and young people in refugee situations, including the internally displaced, and support reintegration programmes for children who have been associated with military forces.*	<b>Significant contribution</b> in terms of supporting education programmes for those in refugee situations, though less evidence of reintegration programmes of children associated with military forces.
2008	‘Give priority to measures designed to secure the right to education in fragile states’ **	<b>Significant contribution</b> , as evidenced through the increase in budgetary contributions to EiCC and to the high proportion of resources directed to basic education through CSOs which is allocated to fragile states.
2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; help to ensure that one million more children have access to good-quality education in crisis and conflict situations</li> <li>&gt; encourage and support the development of innovative and flexible solutions that give as many children as possible access to education</li> <li>&gt; increase the percentage of Norway’s humanitarian assistance that is allocated to education, and increase the percentage of Norway’s development assistance that is allocated to education in the early reconstruction phase;</li> <li>&gt; increase the use of development funds to help countries that receive large numbers of refugees as a result of humanitarian crises;</li> <li>&gt; play a leading role in the efforts to reach the UN target of 4% of humanitarian aid being allocated to education; and</li> <li>&gt; help to increase knowledge about education in emergencies in national educational systems, in humanitarian organisations and among development actors.</li> </ul>	<p><b>Significant contribution</b> in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Increased percentage of Norway’s humanitarian and overall development assistance budgets to education, and to the share of education assistance to fragile and conflict-affected situations</li> <li>&gt; Increased allocation of resources to countries affected by the Syria regional crisis</li> </ul> <p><b>Partial contribution</b> in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Numbers of out-of-school children supported through EiCC CSO interventions</li> <li>&gt; Innovative approaches applied, particularly to enhance access</li> </ul> <p><b>Limited contribution</b> in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Increasing knowledge about education in emergencies (learning is generated but as yet unsystematised).</li> </ul>

\* Report No. 40 (2008-2009) to the Storting. Norway’s Humanitarian Policy.

\*\* Report No 13 to the Storting: Climate, Conflict and Capital.

\*\*\* Meld. St. 25 (2013-2014) Education for Development, white paper from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

being combined and leveraged to create higher-level or broader-ranging effects for beneficiaries. Results are therefore individualised, rather than being ‘*more than the sum of the parts.*’<sup>152</sup> The ability to create wider effects for affected populations is not currently being maximised.

#### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- › A clearer statement of overarching intended results for EiCC, linked to current/future policy goals, would provide clearer guidance for partner CSOs, and enable the identification of areas for collaboration;
- › More explicit definition of Government of Norway’s intended priority groups, and associated requirements to address structural barriers, would support equity-focused policy aims;
- › A more explicit approach to gathering and disseminating learning on innovation would enhance the toolkit and knowledge available to CSOs.

152 The concept of ‘more than the sum of the parts’ is from holism, being related to the idea that the total effectiveness of a group of things each interacting with one another is different or greater than their effectiveness when acting in isolation from one another. See [https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sum\\_of\\_its\\_parts](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/sum_of_its_parts)

#### 4.3.3 To what extent were funded EiCC interventions designed and implemented in accordance with the International Humanitarian Principles?

Section 4.1 above has confirmed the prominence of the International Humanitarian Principles (IHPs) for Government of Norway in education within humanitarian response. Assessing adherence to the IHPs in Norway’s EiCC provision through CSOs could support a full evaluation on its own: a summary analysis, based on findings from the four case studies of this evaluation, is therefore presented in Annex 9.

The key finding is that **whilst Norway’s EiCC support as implemented through CSOs has mostly adhered to the Principles, the area in which it has been most challenged is operational independence.** This is linked, as reflected in other findings from this evaluation, to national crisis response management within the education sector, and specifically sensitivities around the role of CSOs within this. CSOs have found themselves – as in Lebanon and Jordan for example – needing to walk a difficult line between maintaining alignment and sustaining relationships with national actors, and preserving sufficient independence to be able to lobby and advocate for reform.

#### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- › Collective learning around the management of operational independence, based on extensive experience available from countries, will contribute not only to Government of Norway’s ensuring of adherence to the IHPs in implementation, but also contribute to the global body of evidence in this complex area.

#### 4.3.4 What factors explain achievement and non-achievement of results?

A wide range of factors have affected the achievement and non-achievement of the results above. Critical ones ***within the control of the Norwegian aid administration*** are as follows.

Positively, the relative ***flexibility of the Norwegian funding model*** under Norway’s aid management model,<sup>153</sup> combined with the degree of trust between MFA/Norad and CSO partners, has greatly supported *relevance*, in CSOs’ ability to respond adaptively to needs

153 See for example Norad (2016) Striking the Balance: Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis. Oslo: The Evaluation Department. Report no. 4.

under fluid and volatile conditions. It has also enabled *effectiveness*, by facilitating CSO partners' ability to respond to humanitarian needs as they arise, particularly under the humanitarian funding streams managed by MFA. CSO partners repeatedly stressed this comparative advantage of Norwegian funding, and the absence of 'bureaucratic hoops' when swift responsiveness is required. They also appreciated the ability to request additional humanitarian funding particularly at various times of the year rather than to strict funding cycles, and expressed confidence in MFA's willingness and ability to respond quickly where feasible. Organisations also appreciated Government of Norway's comparatively **supportive grant management procedures**, perceiving these as relatively 'light', though more stringent requirements were referenced under Norad. Interlocutors also appreciated the **fungibility** of Norwegian financing, which allowed agencies to 'gap-fill' around more prescriptive donor contributions, without the burdens of needing to rigorously attribute results to individual funding streams.

**Staffing constraints** were voiced as a repeated constraint; Norway has a comparatively small aid administration, with Embassy staff often limited to two or three diplomats, and leaving little time for portfolio oversight. The

appointment of three education advisers – posted in Beirut, Kathmandu and Addis Ababa – reflects the strategic and political importance of the education portfolio to Norway, though the advisers do not have a decision-making voice on funding decisions at country or regional level.

The **limited strategic overview** of the portfolio, linked to the staffing constraints above, has however also constrained potential effectiveness. Despite the comparatively strong strategic architecture, the translation of this structure into policy and programmatic choices at global and at country level remains inexplicit, with for example no explicit analysis of patterns of disbursement to individual CSOs over the evaluation period to inform Government of Norway's strategic choices. The rationale voiced for the support provided was generally oriented to familiarity and the ethos of partnership: '*We are partners: we know their strengths, and we trust them.*' The choices made for Norwegian investment at both country and global levels are therefore not informed by a full strategic overview.

Additionally, the central tension of funding a development-oriented sector, which relies on predictability for continuity of implementation, through **short-term humanitarian financing streams**, was recognised by all actors engaged in this evaluation. This challenge is far from

unique to Norway, and is under debate within global policy dialogue. Structurally, Norway has attempted to 'bridge the gap' by undertaking multi-year humanitarian framework agreements for education. This has been widely welcomed by CSO partners, with three-year Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa (HAPPDA) framework agreement for example, cited as 'a perfect model' for countries such as Somalia. Nonetheless, for EiCC going forward, 'bridging the gap' financially by considering the suitability for current financial instruments for EiCC responses, particularly in middle income countries experiencing protracted crises, such as Lebanon and Jordan, is a critical concern.

As other evaluations and desk reviews of Norway's work in conflict- and crisis situations have found, Norway's **approaches to systematic learning**<sup>154</sup> have been limited. Whilst grant application templates require documentation of lessons learned, these are intervention- or agreement-specific. They also vary greatly in their level of depth and detail, and their wider relevance for the EiCC field. No overarching MFA- or Norad-led process has been identified of efforts to seek out broader lessons from EiCC

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154 See for example Norad (2017) How to Engage in Long Term Humanitarian Crises: A desk review. Oslo: The Evaluation Department. Report no. 2.

interventions, to help build the wider body of evidence and inform future strategic planning. Some Norwegian Embassies have conducted learning initiatives, as for example in Nairobi. But these are not comprehensive; and other learning processes remain largely bilateral.

Finally, beyond Annual Review meetings with Norad/MFA, MFA funding does not impose formal requirements for **independent evaluation** to be conducted of Norwegian-funded EiCC activities.<sup>155</sup> Although many CSOs do have robust evaluation functions – including NRC and SCN - many evaluations reviewed for this study tend to be of individual projects, programmes of themes, rather than at a more strategic, thematic or country level. Moreover, the quality of evaluations reviewed is variable, with few systematic quality standards in place; and not all independently conducted.

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<sup>155</sup> Norad framework agreements take a stronger position here, with for example SCN's evaluation commitments for 2017 written into its current Norad framework agreement. SCN (2017) Evaluation plan for 2017, internal document.

### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- > A clearer definition of how policy goals are expected to be achieved, and of CSOs' respective contributions to these, would support strategic oversight;
- > Clearer articulation of strategic expectations over the time-period of framework agreements, without sacrificing highly-valued flexibility, would provide stronger guidance and reduce the need for reactivity;
- > Continued emphasis on multi-year funding streams (and expansion where feasible) would facilitate the addressing of EiCC as a critical aspect of humanitarian response;
- > A more systematic and rigorous approach to lesson learning and evaluation will help build the global body of evidence, as well as building internal capacity and supporting accountability.

## 4.4 HOW CONNECTED ARE INTERVENTIONS?

**Summary on connectedness:** Norad/MFA grant procedures have not required explicit attention to addressing longer term needs in the education sector, or to sustainability, and accordingly these areas have been variably addressed by CSOs. Their efforts have however brought new thinking and models to education systems in countries, including on child-friendly approaches, inclusive and psychosocial approaches. Limited grant requirements are in place regarding sustainability, but CSO strategies and plans reflect a realistic recognition of the limited scope for exit in the countries reviewed. Efforts to build national capacities are diverse and often piecemeal rather than systems-oriented. They are not always supported by clear tracking and recording of results.

**Addressing the longer-term needs of the education sector:** Many of Norwegian CSOs' contributions to addressing the longer-term needs of the education sector have taken place through policy influencing and capacity strengthening efforts. Results in this area have not been an explicit requirement of grants, but have been significant, as Section 4.3.2 above explains.

At country level, influencing sector reform as part of humanitarian response is strongly determined by the political economy factors surrounding government relationships with international CSOs. In countries such as Lebanon and Jordan, strong sector ownership by respective governments determines where and when CSOs can engage in, and advocate for, EiCC provision. Field study for this evaluation found intensive advocacy efforts around access and quality in both countries,<sup>156</sup> with for example NRC's election to the NGO Sub-Committee of the coordinating mechanism in Lebanon, the only entry point for policy dialogue available, to have been appropriately maximised.<sup>157</sup>

One area where CSOs have notably contributed to sector reform – again, undirected by Norad or MFA but part of their technical capacities – is in bringing new thinking and models to the education sector. This is perhaps most evident in the application of child-sensitive teaching methodologies, inclusive and psychosocial approaches. However, concerns remain about the transfer of these approaches to contribute to longer-term sector reform. In Lebanon and Jordan, they are confined to non-formal (albeit accredited) provision. In Somalia, whilst inclusion

<sup>156</sup> By SCN and NRC in Lebanon, and NRC in Jordan.

<sup>157</sup> See the Lebanon case study for a description of advocacy strategies applied.

is central to government education policy, there is limited understanding of how this will be implemented in practice.<sup>158</sup> Not all government systems are therefore sufficiently mature to absorb the new approaches being conveyed.

**Strengthening national capacities:** As for addressing longer term sector needs above, CSOs receiving grants have not been explicitly required by Norad or MFA in their funding requirements<sup>159</sup> to demonstrate how they will build the capacity of local education stakeholders, to help build future sustainability. Like other areas explored by this evaluation, therefore, efforts at capacity strengthening have been variable, both in terms of attention paid to them, and in terms of their quality and depth.

In some countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon, limited access to public education sector prevented comprehensive efforts at capacity strengthening. In these countries, CSOs cannot engage on school governance, professional development for teachers in the public system, the education management

<sup>158</sup> See the Somalia desk study for more details.

<sup>159</sup> See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Grant Scheme Rules; Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance; Norad (2015) Grant Scheme Rules for Support to Civil Society and Democratisation; Norad (2016) General Conditions Applicable to Grants from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation; see also the grant assessment tool of RAM-Light (Norad (2016) RAM Light Modellen v2, internal document).

information system, strengthening local education authorities, or other kinds of support.

Where access is feasible, almost all CSO interventions reviewed sought to build capacity on one or more levels. Yet approaches were diverse. Whilst some took a systems view, as for example in ADRA's multi-country programme of education systems-building or Right to Play's regional model of teacher training in the Middle East, others focused on 'training' as an end in itself, and/or designed and implemented piecemeal, rather than comprehensive, approaches.

Beyond building teacher capability (Section 4.3 above), capacity strengthening gains are not consistently monitored or tracked across results frameworks. Where present, indicators were often limited to 'numbers trained'. There was also a tendency to reference the number of participants *being* trained, but to provide limited detail on the quality of the training or the extent of any capacity gains, rendering the subsequent *effects* of capacity strengthening unclear.

**Sustainability and transition:** Norad and MFA grant applications both require a statement on sustainability as part of approval procedures, though without providing guidance on what appropriate sustainability strategies might

### BOX 15 // TRANSITION STRATEGIES

- › Advocacy for governments to take on payments for schooling (Somalia)
- › Sustaining broad-based community support and cultivating champions within communities (all country-level interventions analysed)
- › Working in collaboration with key stakeholders/ existing structures at local, regional and federal level (all country-level interventions analysed)

be.<sup>160</sup> Perhaps consequently, sustainability statements reflected in CSO designs and implementation reports were often not consistently addressed,<sup>161</sup> and where present, were relatively light, with little reference to how interventions would support the longer-term needs of education sector planning and provision in countries.

Rather than ‘transitioning out’ *per se*, much of the evidence reflects a realistic recognition of continued future need. In Jordan, for example, NRC’s Country Strategy for 2015-2017 articulates a clear rationale for continuance, rather than exit. *‘With no end to the Syria crisis*

<sup>160</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016) Grant Scheme Rules; Emergency Response and Humanitarian Assistance; Norad (2015) Grant Scheme Rules for Support to Civil Society and Democratisation; Norad (2016) General Conditions Applicable to Grants from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation; see also the grant assessment tool of RAM-Light (Norad (2016) RAM Light Modellen v2, internal document).

<sup>161</sup> For example, of 16 projects and framework agreements analysed, eight referenced the need to aim for transition in their designs.

*in sight, shrinking protection space and gradual depletion of refugees’ own resources, the need will continue to remain high for services offered by NRC...NRC has no immediate plans to exit Jordan.’<sup>162</sup>*

Where transition strategies were applied, these tended to be localised and/or initiative-specific, as for example in Box 15:

There is some evidence that, on a localised level, transition strategies have resulted in an increased likelihood of sustainability of EiCC interventions, where conditions permit. These are examples only, but include:

- › Successful implementation of referral pathways into formal education through SCN and NRC’s work in Lebanon
- › Improved capacity in community and government education authorities through ADRA’s work in Somalia
- › Government cooption of NRC’s Accelerated Learning Programme in Jordan

<sup>162</sup> NRC Country Strategy, 2015-17.

### Areas for consideration by Government of Norway

- › Providing more explicit guidance on expectations regarding sustainability strategies and capacity strengthening to CSO partners, as has been done for the IHPs, will enhance attention to this area.
- › Embedding intended results on capacity strengthening improvements (e.g. at outcome level) in the RRS will facilitate more consistent approaches.



## 5. Conclusions

*‘Norway has a long tradition of solidarity and compassion with repressed and impoverished people, and with refugees and internally displaced persons...This commitment has been a prerequisite for the development of the “Norwegian model”’*

– HUMANITARIAN POLICY (2008)

### CONCLUSIONS

**Appropriateness:** This evaluation has found Norway’s support to EiCC through CSOs to be generally appropriate to humanitarian needs. Despite sometimes unclear programme rationales, CSO partners ‘closeness to the ground’ and their strong emphasis on extensive consultation with affected populations, has enabled provision which is mostly sensitive and nuanced to needs, often in extremely challenging operating contexts.

Support has aligned closely with Norway’s policy and strategic goals for the period; and, at country level, and shaped by organisations’ own country strategic plans, national sectoral strategies and, where appropriate, humanitarian response plans. The strategic architecture for

### Summary statement

This evaluation finds that overall, Norway’s support to EiCC through its CSO partners is generally appropriate to needs. It has delivered some significant results for vulnerable children experiencing crisis and conflict, and has supported the realisation of Norway’s policy goals for the period. It has also successfully influenced global policy dialogue. However, despite a comparative strong strategic architecture, these achievements have been realised largely on CSO’s own terms. The Government of Norway’s willing, but largely passive, approach, embodied in its trust-based model of support, has meant that in aggregate, assistance has not sought to combine and leverage the expertise and capabilities of Norwegian CSOs, to generate higher-level and broader-ranging results for populations in need. Thus, the resulting support has not comprised ‘more than the sum of its parts’. In this, Norway’s support to EiCC through its CSOs partners is not yet fully realising its potential for the greater good.

education is therefore well-defined. However, EiCC assistance has not benefited at country or global level from any clear *Norwegian government* statement of how CSOs can or should contribute to education aims. In this, Norway’s EiCC support to its CSO partners might be characterised as *willing, but passive*, under the trust-based approach of Norway’s international assistance.

**Coherence:** The comparatively strong strategic architecture for education has not yet permeated down to support improved internal coherence of interventions. There is no evidence of aggregate level analysis to inform investment choices. Relatively light oversight at country and global level has led to a limited strategic overview. Externally, CSO actors participate in coordination fora where feasible, and horizontal linkages with other partners in

the context occur, but are dependent on CSOs' own willingness and ability to forge these.

Globally, the recent firming of the Government's results architecture for EiCC promises a more directive approach. Concurrently, CSO-specific strategic and results architectures for education have also recently firmed, both at corporate and country level. More explicit definition of where and how CSOs can contribute to intended aims, particularly at country level, will support coherence in the future.

**Effectiveness:** Reflecting the centrality of trust in the geometry of its aid relationships, the Government of Norway does not impose monitoring requirements on its partner CSOs. Consequently, Norwegian-funded CSOs collect diverse information, to different extents, in multiple ways. Positively, this supports the freedom of action and individuality which is almost culturally embedded in the 'Norwegian model'. However, it also constrains accountability; restricts learning; and prevents full visibility of what has been achieved – which, on the evidence collated here, is likely to be considerable.

The advent of standard indicators, to be applied from 2016, will support such consistency. The inclusion of additional parameters – such as

policy influencing, capacity strengthening and gender/inclusion - would further support the demonstration of effectiveness.

The CSO-implemented EiCC interventions examined for this evaluation have largely achieved their intended results. The comparative advantages of CSOs' support to EiCC has been clearly mapped out by the evaluation, in terms of their ability to outreach to vulnerable groups, advocate and lobby at country and global level, and to bridge the humanitarian-development divide. CSOs have opened up access to education for thousands of out of school children; helped strengthen the capacity of national systems and actors; and boosted teacher skills. More strategically, new thinking and concepts – on inclusive education, gender or psychosocial approaches – have been introduced, expanding the toolkit available to national actors in their efforts to serve humanitarian needs.

However, such achievements – whilst significant - have largely been built on CSOs' *own terms*. The trust-based model of support adopted by the Norwegian government has permitted highly-valued freedom of action, and it has preserved the mutual confidence so fundamental to the 'Norwegian model'. However, the resulting trade-off is that rather than leveraging collective

capabilities and expertise, efforts are not combined holistically, to produce higher level or broader-ranging effects for beneficiaries in need. Results created are therefore individualised; they do not comprise '*more than the sum of the parts*.' In this, Norway's EiCC support through CSOs might be characterised as *not realising its potential* for the greater good.

Similarity, targeting of **marginalised groups** – beyond gender and more recently disability - has been largely left to CSOs own definitions of priorities. This flexibility has demonstrable value in terms of improving responsiveness to specific humanitarian needs. However, it has also created a disparate approach across organisations. Whilst the specific nuances of humanitarian need in different settings cannot be determined ex-ante, a stronger statement of expectations, for example of applying transformative, not merely quantitative, approaches to gender, will improve effectiveness. Additionally, defining expectations in EiCC provision – as has been done in relation to the IHPs, for example - will provide CSOs with clearer guidance on expected standards.

One prominent example of where support to EiCC through CSOs has delivered powerful aggregate-level collective results – often in

partnership with the Norwegian government - is in **advocacy**. This work – both at global and at country level – provides a strong example of relatively small actors in the global aid partnership combining to leverage their assets and capacities to help build significant momentum for reform. The combined deployment of Norwegian CSOs' financial resources, technical capabilities, and partnership abilities has brought new dimensions to the EiCC debate; from the quality standards of INEE through to international agreements on safer schools. These gains are infrequently captured by results frameworks, but are powerful contributors to change.

**Connectedness** Ensuring strategies to 'transition out' of EiCC provision remains challenging where volatility remains and vulnerability to conflict is high. With refugee flows increasing around the world, and crises increasingly protracted, the emphasis is less on 'exiting' crises than on preparing for the medium-term. Norway's CSOs closeness to their operating environments allow for a realistic recognition of this, and interventions analysed show clear planning – mainly through efforts to work closely with national systems – for capacity strengthening. However, efforts are not consistently strategic, and are not always supported by clear tracking and recording of results.

Key **factors** supporting the achievement of results are Norway's flexible financing model to CSOs and its relatively supportive grant management procedures. These are highly valued assets; they not only support relevant and agile delivery, but they preserve the essential trust between the Norwegian government and its partner CSOs. However, the limited global strategic overview of the portfolio, combined with relatively light oversight at country level, has resulted in reduced internal coherence and constrained potential effectiveness. Short-term humanitarian financing streams have been problematic for all involved, though MFA has worked hard to provide alternatives.

Currently, the trust-based model of Norwegian aid model does not actively promote **good humanitarian and development practice** among all its CSO partners. Norway's policy statement on its contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals signals its responsibility for contributing to global knowledge development.<sup>163</sup> Yet learning modalities across the composite set of CSO interventions are largely ad-hoc and dependent on CSOs' own internal

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163 Meld. St. 24 (2016-2017) Joint responsibility for the common future: The Sustainable Development Goals and Norwegian development policy (Felles ansvar for felles fremtid Bærekraftsmålene og norsk utviklingspolitikk).

systems. Little collation of evidence has been undertaken across a body of interventions in which Norway has invested more than 2 billion NOK since 2008. Given Norway's central position on the global stage for EiCC, more can be done to support its position as an intellectual leader on the theme. This is particularly important as the humanitarian-development nexus, so sharply highlighted in EiCC interventions, continues to evolve. It also builds internal capacity, in a system where staffing resources are highly constrained.

More broadly, the Norwegian government's aid management system itself suffers from **weak transparency**. Well noted within many former evaluations, this attempt to analyse a sub-theme within a sector has encountered major and significant challenges. Norway has legal commitments on access to information, but these can only be honoured where information is recorded in the first place. The experience of this evaluation has been that of largely obscure systems, which impede rather than support insight. This works to the advantage of many actors involved in the system; keeping bureaucratic burdens to a minimum enhances agility. But it constrains the scope for external review and scrutiny and – far more importantly – accountability to the Norwegian taxpayer.

**Comparative advantages:** Finally, but critically, the envisaged pathways from CSO EiCC activity, and Norway's policy aims – at country and at global level - are insufficiently explicit and defined. This strategic gap supports freedom of action, but constrains CSOs, and their government partners, in combining their respective comparative advantages for potential greater impact. A more cohesive statement from Norway on its expectations from its CSO partners in relation to its policy goals, geared to their comparative advantages, would support improved coherence and effectiveness. At country level, as well as globally, where and how does Government of Norway expect to see its CSO partners contributing to its intended results? Where and how can their comparative advantages best be combined, for maximum effectiveness at global and at country level? Where and how can they most effectively advocate, reach those in greatest need, and hold actors to account?

Such definition raises a **central question** for aid administrators in the Norwegian government. Fundamentally: **what matters most?** Is the preservation of the 'Norwegian model', so deeply rooted in the country's democratic tradition and with its strong emphasis on solidarity, trust and partnership, the key priority? Or should the emphasis be on

harnessing individual strengths for enhanced collective results - albeit with (perhaps uncomfortable) increased directiveness? These questions are far from mutually exclusive; they are also fundamentally political. But finding the balance of emphasis between them lies at the heart of defining CSOs' contribution to EiCC policy goals in future.

Overall, however, clarifying the 'rules of the game' brings clarity on expectations for all its players. It makes for more conscious and explicit aid investments without undermining the good faith and trust so valuable to the Norwegian aid model. It enhances the transparency of a currently highly opaque system, and helps better leverage its many assets to achieve results. In short, it can help *realise the potential* of Norway's investments in a strategically important, and increasingly complex, area of acute humanitarian and development need.

## 6. Recommendations

The Recommendations presented below arise from the findings, conclusions and implications above. They are targeted to various actors in the Norwegian aid architecture, but primarily

to Government of Norway, as the main audience for this evaluation. They build on the Areas for Consideration listed throughout this report. They are offered in the spirit of building on

significant accomplishments to date, and supporting future improvement, mindful of the central question raised above.

What?	Who?
<p><b>1. Map and define CSO comparative advantages to EiCC at global level</b>            CSOs comparative advantages for improving access to and quality of EiCC have been clearly identified by this evaluation, particularly in terms of their ability to reach vulnerable groups, to advocate and lobby at country and global level, and to bridge the humanitarian-development divide. But respective comparative advantages are currently insufficiently leveraged for the collective realisation of results.</p> <p>More explicitly defining the added value Government of Norway perceives CSOs collectively, with all their different strengths, bringing to its EiCC policy goals will support the leveraging of individual strengths in the pursuit of collective and higher-level goals. It will also provide clarity on respective roles and responsibilities.</p> <p>This mapping should take place collectively, with Norway's policy goals for EiCC as the focal point behind which individual CSOs' strengths and capabilities are aligned. It should take into account CSO's own individual strengths and also the potential for collective action. It should consider CSO's strengths both in programmatic terms, but also in advocacy/lobbying and building accountability mechanisms, both at country and at global level.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society and Education Section</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>
<p><b>2. Provide a collective statement of strategic intent</b>            Based on the clarification of roles and responsibilities, above, Government of Norway and its key CSO partners should issue a jointly-agreed and clearer statement of intent, on how and where CSOs are best placed to contribute to Norway's policy goals for EiCC over a defined strategic period (such as three years). This statement of intent can be referenced in framework agreements and project applications.</p> <p>This strategic process can also be supported by the creation of a common platform for dialogue, to bring the Norwegian Government and its partner CSOs together at appropriate points (e.g. annually) as part of a process of collective strategic oversight and review. This will facilitate joint progress assessment and support the identification of new needs emerging, and changes in direction required. It will also build on the existing ethos of shared responsibility and collective action.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society Strengthening Section</li> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>



What?	Who?
<p><b>3. Enhance country level strategic planning</b>            Extending the process of joint planning and review at global level to the country will also help fill a current gap. Not all interventions analysed here have adequately integrated their approaches to EiCC within a holistic overview of Norwegian-funded activities in the country, nor within a longer-term view of education sector needs.</p> <p>Royal Norwegian Embassies and CSO partners engaged in EiCC interventions at country level should seek to bring their experience together in addressing humanitarian needs through EiCC, framed within a medium term view of education sector needs. This can lay the foundations for stronger strategic planning and oversight and bring clarity to where and under what conditions CSOs, as distinct from multilateral partners, can add value to the national agenda. MFA Humanitarian Section should provide more explicit guidance to CSOs on expectations in grant agreements regarding planning for transition, as they have done for the IHPs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; Royal Norwegian Embassies</li> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society Strengthening Section</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>
<p><b>4. Further specify approaches to vulnerability and exclusion as part of the ‘no-one left behind’ agenda for EiCC in Norway</b>            Currently, intended priority groups for Norway’s EiCC ambitions are not defined. This supports responsiveness, but does not provide guidance to CSOs on expectations in addressing needs.</p> <p>Collectively with its CSO partners, Government of Norway should confirm its prioritised vulnerability parameters, and state the intention to map and record results against these. This will provide a clear picture of whom resources are targeting, where and why. It will also clarify how Government of Norway anticipates CSO capabilities to be deployed in meeting these needs – for example; that advocacy capacity will be deployed in support to tackling structural barriers to inclusion; that gender and inclusion-sensitive approaches will be mainstreamed beyond enrolment and into classroom provision, etc.</p> <p>Expectations on mainstreaming gender and inclusive education should be required to go ‘beyond numbers’ included in interventions, to address more structural/transformational changes, and to report accordingly.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>
<p><b>5. Expand longer-term funding/agreements</b>            A major challenge for Norwegian CSOs has been the short-term funding provided through humanitarian streams. The development of multi-year EiCC-specific framework agreements has been widely welcomed. However, these remain relatively small-scale and limited to a few major actors. For a sector which requires predictability to function, expanding the use of development funds for EiCC is a pre-requisite to improving access and quality, particularly where crises have become protracted.</p> <p>Additionally, the use of multi-year agreements – rather than many individual agreements/addenda - should be prioritised where crises are protracted, or are likely to become protracted. This will require close collaboration (and joint agreements) between MFA, Norad and partner CSOs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; Norad Education Department</li> </ul>

What?	Who?
<p><b>6. Boost Norway's intellectual leadership in EiCC</b>  Many valuable lessons, and much important strategic and technical insight, is available from CSO-implemented EiCC initiatives. These assets are currently insufficiently leveraged to improve results. Yet generating and applying learning and experience is increasingly important as the nexus between emergency and development continues to evolve, and as Norway continues to hold a central position on the global stage for EiCC.</p> <p>Government of Norway, collectively with its partner CSOs, should strengthen its role as an intellectual leader, by seeking to build and disseminate the body of evidence for EiCC through a lesson-learning strategy. Key areas might include experience from participatory approaches; managing operational independence; and innovation. Grant proposals should be required to demonstrate how learning from experience is being applied.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; Norad Education Department</li> <li>&gt; CSO partners</li> </ul>
<p><b>7. Enhance reporting</b>  Currently, the visibility of CSOs' individual and collective results on EiCC is hindered by the diverse monitoring and reporting systems used. Government of Norway should intensify its requirements here, as part of the broader aggregation of results. The use of standard indicators developed in 2016 as a condition of grant approval will support progress but additional improvements can include: expanding indicators to include policy influencing, capacity strengthening and gender/inclusion, to help make visible some currently uncaptured gains; and integrating qualitative parameters, to add depth to quantitative information.</p> <p>Government stakeholders should consider making independent evaluation or review – the modalities for which could be individually agreed - a requirement of grant approval where appropriate. Importantly, feedback loops for data use need to be established and applied.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA Section for Humanitarian Affairs</li> <li>&gt; Norad Civil Society Strengthening Section</li> </ul>
<p><b>8. Improve transparency and accountability</b>  Norway benefits from robust legislation and policy commitments on freedom of information, to support public accountability and transparency. However, legislation is only beneficial when information is actually available to access. A more robust and explicit directive to Ministry staff on a) storage requirements and b) categorisation by document type, would support delivery on these commitments.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>&gt; MFA management and administrative leadership</li> </ul>

# Annexes and case study reports

## **ANNEXES**

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**ANNEX 2** – Methodology

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**ANNEX 4** – Semi-Structured Interview Guides

**ANNEX 5** – Analytical templates, field and desk study

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## **CASE COUNTRY STUDIES**

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Lebanon

Somalia

South-Sudan

## **MAPPING STUDY**

Volume II: Mapping Study

Annex 1-9 can be found as a separate report at our website. So can the case country studies for Jordan, Lebanon, Somalia and South-Sudan, as well as the mapping study. [www.norad.no/evaluation](http://www.norad.no/evaluation)



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# Acronyms

<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisation	<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>EICC</b>	Education in Conflict and Crisis	<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>GNI</b>	Gross National Income	<b>UNOCHA</b>	United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs
<b>HAPPDA</b>	Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa		
<b>INEE</b>	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies		
<b>INGO</b>	International Non-Government Organisation		
<b>MFA</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
<b>NNGO</b>	Norwegian Non-Government Organisation		
<b>NOK</b>	Norwegian Kroner		
<b>NORAD</b>	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation		
<b>NRC</b>	Norwegian Refugee Council		
<b>DRE</b>	Department of Renewable Energy		
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance		
<b>OECD DAC</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Europe Development Assistance Committee		
<b>RRS</b>	Results Reporting System		
<b>SCN</b>	Save the Children Norway		
<b>UN</b>	United Nations		
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Programme		

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## 2017

- 8.17 Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Lessons learned and recommendations
- 7.17 Real-time evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. An evaluation of empowerment of indigenous peoples and forest dependent local communities through support to civil society organisations
- 6.17 Monolog eller dialog? Evaluering av informasjons- og kommunikasjonsvirksomhet i norsk bistands- og utviklingspolitikk
- 5.17 Country Evaluation Brief: Palestine
- 4.17 Country Evaluation Brief: Malawi
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## 2000

- 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway’s Special Grant for the Environment
- 9.00 “Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?” Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East
- 8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme
- 7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation

- 6.00 Making Government Smaller and More Efficient.  
The Botswana Case
- 5.00 Evaluation of the NUFU programme
- 4.00 En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand  
gjennomfrivillige organisasjoner 1987–1999
- 3.00 The Project “Training for Peace in Southern Africa”
- 2.00 Norwegian Support to the Education Sector.  
Overview of Policies and Trends 1988–1998
- 1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development  
Cooperation 1988–1997

#### **1999**

- 10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of  
European Parliamentarians for Africa,  
and AEI, The African European Institute
- 9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital  
Development Fund (UNCDF)
- 8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness
- 7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction  
in Norwegian Development Aid