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Realising Potential

Evaluation of Norway's Support to Education in
Conflict and Crisis through Civil Society Organisations

JORDAN: Case Study Report

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and Crisis through Civil Society Organisations:

Jordan: Case Study Report

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Acronyms

| | |
|---------|--|
| 3RP | Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan |
| ARDD-LA | Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development-Legal Aid |
| CoTT | Continuum of Teacher Training |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| EiCC | Education in Conflict and Crisis |
| ErfKE | Education reform for Knowledge Economy |
| ESWG | Education Sector Working Group |
| GoJ | Government of Jordan |
| GORS | Global Output and Outcome Reporting System |
| GPA | Global Partnership Agreement |
| HCSP | Host Communities Support Platform |
| HRP | (Syrian) Humanitarian Response Plan |
| IHP | International Humanitarian Principles |
| INEE | Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies |
| INGO | International Non-Government Organisation |
| IO | International Organisation |
| JFA | Joint Financial Agreement |
| JOD | Jordanian Dinars |
| JRP | Jordan Response Plan |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MFA | Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| MoE | Ministry of Education |
| MoHESR | Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research |
| MOPIC | Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| NAR | Needs Assessment Review |
| NFE | Non-Formal Education |
| NNGO | Norwegian Non-Government Organisation |
| NOK | Norwegian Kroner |
| NORAD | Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation |
| NRC | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| NRP | National Resilience Plan |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
| RAF | Results Assessment Framework |

| | |
|--------|--|
| RRP | Regional Response Plan |
| RRS | Results Reporting System |
| RTP | Right to Play |
| SC | Save the Children |
| SCI | Save the Children International |
| SCN | Save the Children Norway |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| TVET | Technical and Vocational Education and Training |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNOCHA | United Nations Office of Co-ordination for Humanitarian Affairs |
| VTC | Vocational Training Centres |
| YEP | Youth Education Pack |
| YTF | Youth Task Force |

Summary - Jordan Case Study

The Jordan case study forms one of six evidence streams of Norad's Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Education in Crisis and Conflict (EiCC) through Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). As such it is not in itself an evaluation. The case study was conducted through two weeks of field study in Jordan, including visits to camps in Azraq and Zaatari.

Norway's EiCC funding through CSO partners started in 2013 and increased in 2014 and 2015. Since 2013, Norway has channelled 56 million NOK through education-focused agreements, and a further 114 million NOK where education formed part of a Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Global Partnership Agreement. The main CSO recipient of funds over the period has been NRC, who have received over 80% of allocated funds.

The main findings of the case study are as follows:

Relevance: CSO partners have demonstrated adaptive capacity when responding to the changing policy environment, government restrictions and operational challenges. Programmatic changes have arisen largely from adaptation to external circumstances than from early strategic planning. The flexibility of Norwegian funding has helped partners to adapt to changes in context, and interventions aligned with both local needs analyses and national plans, as well as key international instruments such as the Jordan Response Plan.

Effectiveness: CSO partners regularly monitor their activities but there is a strong focus on quantitative indicators and there is no collective attempt, across agencies, to harmonize monitoring and evaluation activities. Each partner uses its own institutional system. Significant results have been achieved in improving both access to and quality of education, though NRC's access to the formal education system in Jordan was limited until 2016. Programmatic commitment to gender inclusion has not always yielded results in gender equity.

Efficiency: Evidence on efficiency is limited. There is evidence that joint assessments were produced during the reporting period. Each partner liaises individually with MFA regarding programmatic choices, with limited strategizing or planning for collective action.

Coherence: CSO partners have been active participants in the Jordan Education Sector Working Group, at both national and camp level. All have engaged with co-ordination mechanisms where opportunities have arisen. Overall, however, MFA-funded interventions are characterized by some fragmentation, partly as a result of their efforts to be responsive to the evolving crisis, and partly due to project-specific intentions and results, which are not linked into any wider strategic framework, although informal communication and collaboration does take place.

Connectedness: Concrete involvement within the formal educational system was limited in the early stages of interventions, both due to government restrictions and CSO partners' own choice of approaches. As a consequence, limited capacity-building occurred within the formal educational structures during the reporting period. This situation has changed since 2016, with increasing efforts to ensure that interventions are linked in to medium term planning within the sector. Transition in Jordan however remains largely government-dependent, with MOPIC and MoE assuming strong leadership and attempting to gear the international emergency response towards longer term sectoral needs.

1. Introduction

The purpose of Norad's Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Education in Crisis and Conflict through Civil Society Organisations is *'to provide decision-makers with information about the results of Norwegian aid to education in crisis and conflict through civil society organisations, and information about factors contributing to attainment or non-attainment of results, that can be used to improve future Norwegian civil society support to education in situations of crisis and conflict.'*¹ It aims to achieve this through three specific objectives, each with a strong learning focus:

- to map Norway's financial support for education in crisis and conflict through civil society in the evaluation period;
- to assess and document the results of Norwegian support to education in situations of crisis and conflict through civil society organisations, including any positive or negative unintended effects of the interventions; and
- to make recommendations to the MFA, Norad and civil society organisations regarding the design and implementation of Norwegian support to education in crisis and conflict through civil society.

Further detail regarding the context and contextual approach for the evaluation is provided within the main evaluation report, as well as details of the broader evaluation methodology.

Six evidence streams form the basis for responding to the evaluation questions. These are (i) systems analysis, (ii) content analysis of a sample of projects, (iii) telephone survey of civil society partners, (iv) desk study of interventions in Somalia and South Sudan, (v) field studies of interventions in Jordan and Lebanon, and finally (vi) mapping of Norway's EiCC portfolio. This report relates to evidence stream (v), field study.

1.1 Purpose/role of the Jordan case study within the Evaluation

This case study explicitly **does not present an evaluation** of Norwegian assistance to Education in Crisis and Conflict, through partner Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Jordan. This text is a case study which gathers together evidence from one context to contribute to the broader evaluation commissioned by Norad, above. As such, it collates evidence, and analyses it against the broader indicators of the evaluation, but it does not seek to make evaluative judgements. It also does not provide recommendations (though the lessons provided at Section 6 may offer some utility for stakeholders).

1.2 Methodology

Standard methods and structured tools were applied. As well as documentary analysis, semi-structured interviews took place with the Norwegian embassy in Amman as well as with civil society partners' key staff (Norwegian Refugee Council, Right to Play, ARDD-Legal Aid, Save the Children)². Two refugee camps were visited in Azraq and Zaatari, and within those, specifically NRC projects (two learning centres providing education supply to primary school-aged children, and two youth centres focusing on an older age group (adolescents and young adults). In the camps, focus groups were held with key NRC staff and direct beneficiaries. Fieldwork took place from May 12th to 28th.

The data collected in Amman and in the camps were recorded against each indicator of the Evaluation Matrix which has been analytically used as the main spine for the evaluation. Additional documentation was also sourced when needed.

1.3 Limitations of the Case Study

The case study has a number of limitations, recorded below:

- Basic education is a subtheme within the larger thematic area of education. This presented a challenge for accessing relevant information, since the Norwegian systems do not lend themselves to generating data on subthemes. Whilst projects were reviewed on the basis of information available, disaggregating information from grant schemes on intended expenditure on basic education - particularly where this is not clearly defined at the time of agreement, such

¹ Terms of Reference.

² The list of the persons interviewed is in Annex 3.

as through framework agreements with civil society organisations – was not always feasible, though interlocutors in Lebanon provided guidance where they could.

- Given the ten-year time span of the evaluation, interviewees were not consistently able to provide institutional memory dating to before their presence in post. Information is much less available for the period prior to 2011; is limited from 2011-2014; and is most strongly available since 2014.
- Only NRC was operational in the camps doing EiCC while field visits were being undertaken. The camp visits were therefore coordinated by this NGO. It was not feasible to approach national or local educational authorities or the formal schools' principals given access challenges in Jordan.
- Field study covered as much ground as feasible within the timescale available in-country, but was necessarily not comprehensive. Fieldwork was directed to camp situations, where the majority of Norwegian funding was directed.
- In NRC learning centres, primary school-aged refugee children and their families were not approached by the evaluation team on request on the NGO, in order not to confuse/harm them or create false expectations.
- Some partners' work (e.g. on youth education programming) straddles codes 112 and 113. The evaluation will continue at this stage to focus on code 112, but will remain open to including in field study such initiatives where the main objective is basic education as defined under code 112) given the practical difficulties of separating the two.

2. Jordan Context and Conflict Analysis

2.1 Political and socio-economic dimensions

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was created in 1946, when Jordan gained independence from the British mandate authorities. During the first Arab-Israeli war (1948), Jordan occupied the West Bank, which eventually voted in 1950 to remain part of the Jordanian Kingdom. During the second Arab-Israeli War (1967), Jordan lost the West Bank to Israel and in the years that followed, severed administrative ties with the territory. In 1994, a peace agreement was eventually signed between Jordan and Israel and exchanges resumed.

Today, most Jordanians are of Palestinian origin. There are no publicly available statistics on the country's exact demographic balance but 'East Bankers' continue to be considered as the historical pillars of the Kingdom.

The political integration of the Palestinian refugees has changed over time adapting to regional political circumstances. After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1948, most Palestinian refugees were granted Jordanian citizenship. But in 1970-71, after a civil war opposed Yasser Arafat Palestine Liberation Organisation to King Hussein Jordanian Armed Forces, Palestinians were no longer granted citizenship.³

Over time, Palestinian refugee camps increasingly fell under the sway of the Muslim Brotherhood, which the authorities supported in the beginning while simultaneously repressing other nationalist Palestinian groups. Palestinian-Jordanians have felt shut out from the public sector while at the same time facing an electoral law based on gerrymandered districts, which tended to privilege rural East Banker areas at the expense of urban Palestinian-dominated hubs.⁴

In reaction to such a lived and perceived exclusion, the Palestinian-Jordanian elite has heavily invested in the private sector, ending up playing a leading role in it, and most Palestinian refugees moved out of the camps into the Amman-Zarqa-Irbid conurbation where infrastructure and industrial development are located.⁵ In contrast, rural East Bankers have been adversely impacted in the past decades from a near collapse of the agricultural sector and curtailed public expenditures. The wave of privatisations that had

³ International Crisis Group report (2012). Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East: Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

started in the 1990s and the important degree of economic corruption did not help their situation. Socio-economic disparities between the two communities have thus grown, fuelled by nationalist discourses, and frustration has increasingly begun to express itself in recent years with protests of modest size - but not modest significance - sometimes seen in Amman.

2.2 Conflict dimensions

Jordan has been a refugee hosting country for over 70 years. Firstly, by welcoming Palestinian refugees from the West Bank, more recently by welcoming Iraqis (1990s and 2000s),⁶ and even more recently by welcoming Syrians. Each refugee influx has added jobs, cash, and diversity to the economy but each refugee influx has also added strains on this small country. Jordan remains a resource-poor country of only 9.5 million people (out of which three million are foreigners according to the 2016 Census).

Notwithstanding such history, the arrival of the last refugee wave has been tougher to absorb.⁷ Approximately one million Syrian refugees arrived in Jordan over the past five years, of which two-thirds registered with UNHCR. The issue is partly demographic: Syrian refugees are mainly from poor, rural areas of southern Syria, in contrast to the well-heeled Iraqi refugees who had come to Jordan two decades earlier. But trade is also hit due to the location of the wars (Jordan borders both Syria and Iraq). Jordan's economy is therefore negatively impacted.

Out of the UNHCR registered refugees, 80 percent of the Syrian refugees live in host communities in the Northern Governorates and in large urban areas like Amman and Irbid. The remaining 20 percent live in refugee camps (Zaatari, 80,000; Azraq, 55,000; in the camp of Emirati-Jordanian Camp, 7,000 and in small camps at the triangular border Syria/Iraq/Jordan). 15,000 live in the fenced off areas of V5 and V2 in Azraq waiting to be processed. Unregistered refugees do not hold the Ministry of Interior card (or hold a card no longer up-to-date), thus have in theory no access to public services (which include free education and health services).

Syrian refugees are largely prevented from working legally. Such a policy was initially designed to protect Jordanian jobs in a stagnating market with an unemployment rate of over fifteen percent (double for youth unemployment). One consequence has been to keep hundreds of thousands of Syrians dependent on aid and low-paid informal work. Such a situation has driven wages down, frustrating many Jordanians.

The policy has evolved recently with the Jordan Compact, which has been an initiative agreed at a major International Conference in London in February 2016. The event marked a radically new approach to the Syrian refugee crisis and instead of viewing refugees as a burden that could only be alleviated by humanitarian aid, the new approach considers them as 'a development opportunity', which, with sufficient levels of investment and structural reforms, could benefit Jordan's entire economy. At the Conference, Jordan Compact committed to secure \$1.7 billion in grants, low-interest loans, and pledges from the international community, in return for Jordan's opening up of its labour market to Syrian refugees (the set goal was to issue at least 200,000 work permits to Syrians in the coming year).⁸ In addition to such arrangements, Jordan was promised access to tariff-free trade with the EU provided it complied with the agreed targets. One year on, Jordan has secured half of the funding and concrete results are planned but are still slow in materialising.

2.3 Education context

Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees or to its 1967 Protocol. It is a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) hence the country is committed to provide education opportunities to anyone entering its territory, and that includes the displaced.

No national legislation is planned for the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees, hence the Law on the Residence of Foreigners applies to them.⁹ Since 1998, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishes the cooperation principles between UNHCR and the Government of Jordan and in 2014; the MoU was amended and limited the length of validity of UNHCR Asylum Seeker Certificate.

⁶ International Crisis Group (2008). Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

⁷ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2017). Critical gaps in Lebanon and Jordan spell looming destitution and despair for Syrian refugee families.

⁸ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016). Work permit boost gives hope to Syrian refugees in Jordan.

⁹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016). In Search of Solutions: Addressing Statelessness in the Middle East and North Africa.

In the beginning of the Syrian Crisis, the Government of Jordan has allowed all refugee children who have missed less than three years of schooling to enrol, unburdened by school fees, in Jordanian schools in order to ensure that refugee children enjoy the right to basic education. In December 2013, 105,000 children enrolled in public schools, of which 85,000 in host communities and 20,000 in camps, and some were on waiting lists.¹⁰ In order to respond to the increased demand for education, second shifts were introduced in 78 schools (in the beginning), 7000 additional teachers were hired on the government payroll (2,300 specifically for double shifted and camp schools), and three formal schools were built in refugee camps to absorb the massive influx of children.

The greatest effect of the crisis has probably been the rapid expansion of the Jordan education system. This had an impact on quality education since the introduction of double shifts in schools reduced the instructional time available to both shifts. Larger classes and heightened levels of conflict and bullying in schools also affected the quality of the learning environment and many new coming teachers were not sufficiently trained to teach.

The Syrian Crisis had also obvious impacts on the Jordan MoE long-term education reform strategy (Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy – ErfKE).¹¹ This Reform was planning to address structural issues such as overcrowding in formal schools or underserving in certain areas, but eventually resulted in delays in implementation.

Between 2011 and 2013, government spending on education has increased by 17 percent, with the bulk of the budget spent on primary education. The Government has estimated that one third of the Syrian refugee population were school-aged children, out of which two-thirds could be eligible for formal education. How they came up with such number given the fact that many refugees are unregistered is unknown. Additional pressure was thus put on the existing formal system of education at an early stage (80 percent of the Syrian refugees living in host communities). Ensuring access for all therefore became a major issue, in order to try to mitigate intercommunity tensions.

As noted above, ambitious goals were set at the London Conference with regards to education and a commitment was made to provide all out-of-school Syrian children and youth inside and outside Syria (so including those hosted in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt) as well as all children-affected in the host communities.¹² All countries together, the requested funding amounted US\$1.4 billion per year to cover three pillars of education: a) system strengthening; b) access; and c) quality. The principle behind was that education interventions were occurring along an emergency-to-resilience continuum. On the one hand, they represent long-term investments; on the other hand, they cannot avoid addressing the immediate needs caused by the emergency situation. How to link those is thus the current challenge.

One year after the London Conference, education stakeholders from Syria and the five host countries gathered in for a high-level meeting in Amman, Jordan, in March 2017, and analysed education progress and the steps still to go. The five host countries had experienced a 15 percent decrease in the number of out-of-school refugee children and the merging of national public education systems with refugee education response plans, which became mainstreamed in MoE national strategies.

Education barriers yet remain to date for Syrian refugees. Not having an up-to-date Ministry of Interior card or having an ID not issued by the Governorate of residence impedes refugee children to go to formal school in Jordan and there are also other criteria of exclusion.¹³ For instance, when a refugee child has missed school for 3 years, he/she is illegible for registration in the formal system. Fewer teaching hours are done in second shift-schools, with the result that the quality of education decreases. Refugees report experiencing difficulties adapting to the Jordanian curriculum especially in Maths and English since English already starts in kindergarten in Jordan while in Syria, pupils can already read English words in Grade 1 and Jordanians use different terms in Maths. Another barrier includes the lack of accreditation of the few externally-funded short-term TVET courses that are available to Syrian youth for vocational training. NGOs and their respective implementing partners generally issue its own branded certificate to their

¹⁰ Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (2014). National Resilience Plan 2014-16: Proposed Priority Responses to Mitigate the Impact of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan and Jordanian in Host Communities.

¹¹ Ministry of Education (2012). Education Reform for Knowledge Economy – Second Phase – Narrative report.

¹² Jordan Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (2016). The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2017-19.

¹³ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016). In Search of Solutions: Addressing Statelessness in the Middle East and North Africa.

programmes graduates but the added value of it remains questionable and no formal certification of learning is in place.

Structural barriers also exist in the current system, that impact Syrian refugees and Jordanians alike, and attendance/retention in schools is impacted by the distance from the learning centre to the living place; the presence/absence of day-care for young children; having to work; having to go elsewhere; family obligations; marriage; etc.

2.4 The effects of the crisis on Jordan's education system:¹⁴

The MoE invested in school data management system in 2016 in order to get more accurate enrolment data than in the past years and improve the overall accuracy and reliability of its national education statistics. OpenEMIS includes individual student record tracking system for refugees.

In terms of policy development, the MoE has been playing an increasing lead role in refugee education with the aim to retake the hand on the multiplicity of initiatives implemented by international agencies. It developed an inclusive Plan to provide access to Syrian refugee children to certified formal and non-formal education, which included host communities in the process. The Jordan Response Plan (JRP) includes: the creation of additional space in formal schools for 50,000 refugee children by increasing the number of double-shift schools; the construction of 16 additional schools in refugee camps; the hiring and training of 3,870 contract teachers; the political will to allow all refugee children – even those without documentation – the opportunity to register in formal education immediately provided the missing documentation is provided later; the set-up of a certified 'Catch Up' program, which would enabled over-aged children (9-12) to re-enter the formal system; the scaling-up of 'Drop Out' courses in over 116 learning centres, which would target out-of-school youth (female between 13 and 21 years old and male between 13 and 18).

The strengthening of the lead role of the Jordanian MoE with regards to refugee education has been perceived as a constraint by some international agencies operating on the ground. In recent years, there is evidence that the MoE has discouraged uncertified informal education (by not granting approval or by delaying response). This may be due to government willingness to retain a certain degree of control of the Jordanian education system in view of the multiplicity of actors involved and the wide range of quality educational programming provided (with some not necessarily considered by the MoE as matching national standards).

In terms of access, approximately 125,000 Syrian children enrolled in the formal education system in the 2016-17 school year, which represented 20,000 pupils lower than the previous schoolyear but could be explained by more accurate statistics (the EMIS system corrected double counting and other computing errors). In the same schoolyear, 67,000 children received exclusive non-formal education and the MoE has estimated to 17 percent the volume of out-of-school school-aged children, which was a higher estimate than the previous year.

In refugee camps, dropout rates continue to be high for the higher grades, with poverty, child labour, overcrowding and poor quality teaching being frequently cited as explanatory factors.

In host communities, the MoE increased the number of double-shifts schools to 198, with, as consequence, a noted decrease in the quality of learning provided, for both Syrian and Jordanian pupils. Tensions have therefore sometimes exacerbated at the local level, which translated into the schools by increased harassment, bullying and sometimes drop-outs of refugee children. A disparity of skills between the Jordanian teachers who teach the first shift and the contract teachers who teach the second shift was reported, which partly explain why retention is low.

With respect to non-formal education, 47 MoE-certified Catch-Up centres were established in some of the double-shift schools, offering an opportunity for 1,000 refugees to re-enter into formal education. 65,000 children continued to receive INGO/IO-implemented informal education, using the UNICEF-led Makani network.

6,100 refugee children were attending pre-primary education in 2016-17. For higher education, Syrian refugee youth got access to 220 scholarships and, through sustained advocacy, more opportunities for bachelor and master levels were made available. Over 800 youth were provided with opportunities to access

¹⁴ Ibid.

technical or professional diplomas and bachelor degree programmes, although as some MFA-funded interventions point out, they usually follow a special track, generally shorter.

Two nation-wide 'Learning-for-All' campaigns were conducted after the London Conference to boost enrolment in formal schools.

Efforts to improve education quality included the training of 4,000 teachers, with school principals and deputies benefitting from quality leadership trainings. Other efforts were geared to the enhancing of the school learning environment through operational maintenance and rehabilitation of infrastructure and sanitation facilities.

In 2015, a government initiative attempted to assess the education sector vulnerability (Education Sector Vulnerability Assessment). It helped clarify unmet needs and vulnerabilities and was used to feed the Jordan Response Plan. Unsurprisingly, findings showed that vulnerability was most severe in governorates with high concentrations of Syrian refugees, namely Amman, Zarqa, Irbid, and Mafraq, attributing 86 percent of this vulnerability to the additional demand.

The assessment also pointed out that few adolescent Syrians were enrolled in higher grades and their low academic achievements were a worrying trend. Those living in camps, hence the most 'served' by international response, were performing below their Jordanian counterparts, according to the Jordan government standards.

Government call to get supported in increasing access to formal education for Syrian refugees without disturbing too much the existing system was eventually heard by the international community and concretely materialized with the Compact Initiative. MFA-funded EiCC interventions consequently switched strategies in the second half of 2016.

At the same time, the Jordan MoE was aware that many children would not be eligible to re-entry into the formal system. Another aim thus was to harmonize the diversity of Non-Formal Education supply and to scale it up. Certified NFE programs were therefore developed by the MoE (partly inspired from existing uncertified NFE) and non-formal catch-up programmes, which were previously managed by MFA-funded agencies, disappeared at the primary level (getting replaced by 3-month remedial classes). With regards to the MFA-funded youth centres, no restriction was made and they could continue providing uncertified short-term training courses.¹⁵

In terms of education funding, by the end of 2016, Jordan had received US\$618 million from donors for the education sector, which represented 71 percent of what it had requested and an increase of US\$158 million from 2015. 54 percent of the funds were made available to the Education sector in the first half of the year, which made planning and implementation easier.¹⁶ Education humanitarian funding amounted to US\$103 million in 2016 and was fully disbursed. As a comparison, only US\$70 million were disbursed in 2015, out of a requested budget of US\$94 million (these two last figures were obtained from the HRP/3RP Financial Tracking Service and refer to HRP/3RP funding only, which is humanitarian funding. It does not cover funding going to the country development budget.

2.5 International co-operation in the country

International cooperation in country regularly occurred through two main regulation lines during the evaluation period. The first line is the official line, which links international civil society organisations with Jordanian institutions. The second line is the humanitarian coordination mechanism, which expresses itself the most through the Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) and joint advocacy activities. These are detailed in section 4.4 below.

With regards to the first line, the Jordan Government has strengthened its grip on international aid to try to regulate the diversity of external actors that have entered its scene. The large numbers of refugees to

¹⁵ Formal MoE-run TVET does not exist in camps and formal education provision is limited to MoE-run primary and secondary education. Where many MoE secondary schools in host communities include a vocational stream option for students, those in camps do not. The post-basic training provided by NRC is thus one of the only opportunity for youth to continue their education and NRC continues to offer activities not supplied by the public school (computer class, art, library).

¹⁶ No lost generation (2017). Preparing for the Future of Children and Youth in Syria and the Region through Education: London One Year On Brussels Conference Education Report April 2017.

absorb has had an impact on the Jordan educational system and civil society response was not enough addressing it with solely emergency approaches.

The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) has thus attempted to provide leadership in directing and coordinating the overall response by establishing the Host Communities Support Platform (HCSP) in September 2013.¹⁷ The HCSP consisted of a strategic body comprised of government line ministries, donors, UN agencies and INGOs.

Through the HCSP, a Needs Assessment Review (NAR) was undertaken in October 2013, which was directly followed by the preparatory process of the National Resilience Plan.¹⁸ Five Task Forces, led by line Ministries, sat to formulate strategy sectors to respond to the crisis, engaging all major stakeholders, including some MFA-funded EiCC agencies, in a participatory exercise. Attention was placed on the identification of priority responses to address the needs into which additional funds could be channelled quickly and effectively. The resulting portfolio of initiatives took into account existing government programmes and budgets and the main humanitarian support package of the Regional Response Plan (RRP6). The Jordan NRP (2014), and later the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), did not include any of the measures proposed under RRP6 so as to avoid duplication.

The Jordan Response Plan 2017-19 followed the NRP and was the first nationally-led response that proposed to join refugee and development responses in one comprehensive national plan. This meant that instead of dealing with one National Plan and one Emergency Plan like many countries in situations of crisis do, Jordan merged the two, connecting short-term to long-term response.

The JRP provides a three-year vision to ensure that critical humanitarian measures and medium-term interventions are better integrated, sequenced and complemented.¹⁹ The Plan was coordinated by MOPIC, in collaboration with the respective line ministries and the international community, which worked together toward putting in place joint response proposals that spanned comprehensive vulnerability assessments and that linked short-term coping solutions with long-term plans.

Concretely, in order to be authorized to operate in country, international agencies are requested to engage first with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) to ensure government approval and knowledge of programme activities and MOPIC decides based on the national plan. Project controls on approvals became stricter in 2015 for international projects in a governmental attempt to regulate humanitarian resources and to maximize impact on the ground. Once approval is granted by MOPIC (so currently, based on the Jordan Response Plan), international agencies can engage with the respective Ministries to operationalize their projects.

2.6 Education architecture in the country

The structure of the educational system in Jordan consists of a two-year cycle of pre-school education, ten years of compulsory basic education, and two years of secondary academic or vocational education after which the students sit for a General Certificate of Secondary Education Exam—Tawjihi. Basic Education is free of charge, and so is generally secondary education in public schools.²⁰

The Ministry of Education (MoE) is responsible for the pre-primary, primary and secondary levels of education. Post-secondary education falls under the responsibility of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHESR). Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) at the post-primary level (excluding community colleges) falls under the authority of the Ministry of Labour and is administered by the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC).

The central level in Amman is responsible for designing educational policies and plans, implementation and monitoring. At the level of the Districts or Governorates, the Directorates of Education supervise educational policy and make efforts to improve education at the local level. Each District Directorate is

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (2016). The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria Crisis 2017-19.

²⁰ UNESCO (2006). World data on Education. Jordan.

Available at: http://www.ibe.unesco.org/Countries/WDE/2006/ARAB_STATES/Jordan/Jordan.pdf

headed by an education director, assisted by technical and administrative directors.²¹ There are twenty-six Directorates at the district level.

The school is considered the central unit of the educational process it is managed by the school principal, assisted by teachers and key support staff.

The role of CSOs in education in Jordan has mainly revolved around non-formal forms of education. This included accelerated forms of educational supply (catch-up classes, faster vocational tracks), refugee education in camps (both public and NGO schools were present in camps), remedial courses and back to school initiatives. The increasing State engagement in the provision of non-formal education has contributed to raising tensions between some CSOs and the Jordanian Ministry of Education, as the space for intervening in non-formal education has been perceived to be shrinking.

3. Norwegian assistance to the country

3.1 Overall assistance to the country 2008-current

As noted above, Norway's investment through civil society partners has increased in Jordan in recent years, following a Ministerial announcement doubling support to the effects of the regional crisis. Overall, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide the global framework for Norwegian aid and education is considered a top thematic priority.

Overall development aid to Jordan for the period 2008-current is presented in the table below, sourced from Norwegian aid statistics. All figures are in million NOK.

Table 1: Overall Norwegian Aid to Jordan, Middle East and All Countries, 2008-16

| Norwegian Aid | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | Total |
|---------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| Jordan | 13.8 | 5.0 | 2.3 | 17.8 | 17.3 | 63.5 | 70.2 | 118.8 | 252.8 | 561.4 |
| Middle East | 905.5 | 845.2 | 892.3 | 904.4 | 1,082 | 1,680 | 1,695 | 2,395 | 3,330 | 13,730 |
| All countries | 22,862 | 25,624 | 26,424 | 26,653 | 27,638 | 32,805 | 32,051 | 34,496 | 36,557 | 265,111 |

Source: Norad/extracted from: <https://www.norad.no/en/front/toolspublications/norwegian-aid-statistics/?tab=geo>

Overall, for the reporting period, Norway-funded education support to Jordan (not limited to EiCC) reached 136.3 million NOK through all partners (CSOs, multilateral partners, sectoral support).²² The bulk of the funding started in 2014 with 24.5 million NOK and then doubled in 2015 and 2016, reaching more than 50 million NOK each year.

EiCC funding through CSO partners started in 2013 in Jordan in reaction to the Syrian Crisis, with a first grant of 31 million NOK through an NRC Global Partnership Agreement. Funding. It increased in 2014 and 2015, with 38.5 and 39.2 million NOK allocated respectively, to over 62 million NOK in 2016. For the whole reporting period, Norway contributed 56 million NOK through education-focused agreements, and a further 114 million NOK where education formed part of an NRC Global Partnership Agreement.

Table 2: Norwegian support for EiCC (main policy objective) in Jordan through civil society (NOK 1,000)²³

| EiCC Policy Objective (NOK 1000) | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | Grand Total |
|----------------------------------|------|--------|--------|-------|-------------|
| Main objective | | 24,531 | 27,208 | 5,259 | 56,998 |

Finally, a Joint Financial Agreement (JFA) involving UK, US and Norway, was put in place in 2016. As part of this mechanism, Norway plans to channel most of its aid through Jordan's MoE, reversing its

²¹ Ibid.

²² Source: Norwegian aid statistics database.

²³ Source: Norwegian aid statistics database.


prior decision not to provide budget support but to work through civil society agencies and international organisations instead.

3.2 Recipient Organisations

Figures show that, in Jordan, a large part of Norway-education funding was channelled through Norwegian NGOs, at least in the beginning of the response.

The way Norwegian funding was allocated during the reporting period was relatively uneven, as illustrated by Figures 1 and 2. Only a small number of NGOs were financed for implementing EiCC activities (only 4 over a 9-year period).

Figure 1: Percentage of Norwegian funding to Jordan allocated to the various partners, 2013-16²⁴



Three partners out of four were Norwegian (the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Save the Children (SC) and Right to Play (RTP)). ARDD-Legal Aid (ARDD-LA), a Jordanian NGO, received recent funding for advocacy and research purposes.

NRC has by far received the largest share over the period (145 million NOK, if main and significant objectives are added which represented 84 percent of EiCC Norwegian funding through CSOs from all streams). The proportion of NRC GPA spent on education activities was reported to be 40 percent in 2014 (5.5 million NOK out of the 14 million NOK distributed) and 58 percent in 2015 (7 million NOK out of 12 million). It is worth noting that out of the 145 million NOK received, 31 million NOK had education as a main objective (which corresponds to 21 percent of the funds received) while 114 million NOK were channelled through global partnership agreements with education as significant objective.

Save the Children International, through Save the Children Norway, received a 16.4 million NOK Embassy grant, which corresponded to 9 percent of Norwegian funding to EiCC. Right to Play received 6.2 million NOK, while ARDD-LA received 3.4 million.

Seven main agreements were signed, with some amendments additionally over the grant period: three agreements for NRC, two for Right to Play, one for SCI and one for ARDD-LA. In addenda number 5-2016 to the 2016-2018 NRC global partnership agreement, there is a further commitment of 17.5 million NOK in Jordan for EiCC to be spent in 2016-2017. The detail is provided in a draft addendum, but the principle was acknowledged (November 2016).

²⁴ Source: Norwegian aid statistics database.

Table 3: Recipient organisations for Norwegian-supported EiCC, as main and significant policy objectives (NOK 1,000) ²⁵


| Agreement Partner (NOK 1000) | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | Grand Total |
|--|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Main objective | | | | | |
| ARDD-LA | | | 2,250 | 1,126 | 3,376 |
| Flyktninghjelpen (Norwegian Refugee Council) | | 6,000 | 25,000 | | 31,000 |
| Right to Play | | 1,707 | | 4,486 | 6,193 |
| Save the Children | | 16,429 | | | 16,429 |
| Main objective Total | | 24,531 | 27,208 | 5,259 | 56,998 |
| NRC-GPA Significant objective | | | | | |
| Flyktninghjelpen (Norwegian Refugee Council) | 31,000 | 14,000 | 12,000 | 57,000 | 114,000 |
| NRC-GPA Significant objective Total | 31,000 | 14,000 | 12,000 | 57,000 | 114,000 |
| Grand Total | 31,000 | 38,531 | 39,208 | 62,259 | 170,998 |

3.3 Source within the Norwegian Aid Administration

Nearly 171 million NOK were thus disbursed by Norway in Jordan on EiCC between 2013 and 2016.

The majority of support was channelled through the Section for Humanitarian Affairs (120 million NOK,²⁶ which corresponds to 70 percent of Norwegian aid to EiCC). The Norwegian Embassy in Jordan provided 45 million NOK to local and international NGOs (corresponding to 26 percent) and 6 million NOK were disbursed by Norad's Section for Civil Society Strengthening (corresponding to 4 percent). This is illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 2: Percentage of Norwegian funding to Jordan channelled through the various streams, 2013-16²⁷



3.4 Funding according to OECD-DAC codes

Between 2013 and 2016, the majority of EiCC support with education as a main objective used OECD DAC code 111 (Education, level unspecified) and DAC code 112 (Basic education), for respectively 44.8 million and 12.2 million). A large part of the support though, channelled through NRC Global Partnership Agreements, was coded using DAC code 720 (Emergency Response) for 114 million NOK.

For 2017, 4.7 million NOK are committed to Norwegian NGOs to implement activities under DAC code 'Basic Education' (at the time of writing, 2.3 million NOK had been disbursed through one grant). Under

²⁵ Source: Norwegian aid statistics database.

²⁶ Comprising 6 million earmarked for education in 2014; 114 million where education is a significant policy objective, through the NRC-GPA.

²⁷ Source: Norwegian aid statistics database.

DAC code 'Emergency Response', 47 million NOK were provided to the Norwegian Refugee Council (QZA-16/0141-13), which is likely to include some contribution for education. In comparison, 98 million NOK were committed to three multilateral organisations (UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP).

4. Findings

4.1 Relevance

Summary: CSO partners have demonstrated adaptive capacity when responding to the changing policy environment, government restrictions and operational challenges. Programmatic changes have arisen largely from adaptation to external circumstances than from early strategic planning. The flexibility of Norwegian funding has helped partners to adapt to changes in context, and interventions aligned with both local needs analyses and national plans, as well as key international instruments such as the Jordan Response Plan.

4.1.1 Use of context and conflict analysis

Presence and use of conflict analysis: NRC Country Strategy Plans demonstrate explicit use of conflict analysis. This analysis evolved from the initial Response Plan (2014-16),²⁸ which included a relatively cursory analysis of the Syrian conflict and its refugee spillover effects, to the revised Plan of 2015-17.²⁹ Particularly important in the updated plan is the distinction made between the conflict in Syria and actual or potential fault lines caused by the influx of refugees into Jordan (e.g., resentments felt by Jordanians, competition for resources, government restrictions). The latter seem to have the most immediate implications for the Norwegian government's Jordan programming, as later plan acknowledges. A 2016 revision of the 2015-17 Strategy³⁰ elaborated in even greater detail on the actual and potential sources of conflict in Jordan. Also important is that the updated strategy notes the situation of Iraqi and Palestinians refugees as well. Conflict analysis was also sometimes presented in advocacy publications disseminated locally and internationally, such as NRC's 2016 regional study³¹ of the Syrian conflict's impact on young people across the Middle East.

At the same time, NRC documents sometimes present limited explanation of the barriers to programming, as shown in the most recent Country Strategic Plan. NRC cites the Government of Jordan's (GoJ) use of restrictive registration practices and encampment policy to constrain international aid and limit refugee freedom of movement (re-registration procedures, stricter documentation requirements to access basic social services). But they do not go deeper to understand why the Government chose to pursue this path or what structural impact external interventions were having on the national educational system.

Conflict analyses were not present in the documents provided by other CSO partners, but their projects too suggest an evolving response to the demands of conflict.

Use of Do No Harm principles in design: Do No Harm principles were not specifically mentioned in project documents, though it was clear that MFA-funded activities attended to conflict-sensitive needs. One illustration of this is seen in the NRC Country Strategy Plans, where humanitarian needs are broadly identified.

CSO partners understood generally well the context of conflict, the sources of tensions, what divides and what links groups together (dividers/connectors), and the local capacities for peace. The effects of interventions on such dividers and connectors were however not explicitly reported in documentation. Programme adjustments were driven by external circumstances.

²⁸ See NRC Country Strategy Jordan, 2014-16.

²⁹ NRC Country Strategies for 2015-17 (2015).

³⁰ NRC Country Strategies for 2015-17 (2016).

³¹ See NRC 2016.

There is evidence that local staff were sensitive to Do No Harm approaches in designs intent. There is room of improvement though in both implementing and reporting phases. How partners react when confronted with a contextual issue that is potentially harmful would be worth further exploration. In the same vein, the tracing of such incidents and responses would be worth systemizing using M&E tools.

Presence of education assessments of the emergency situation to inform planning and design:

Perhaps the most noteworthy characteristic of Norway's education programming in Jordan is its flexibility and adaptability in the face of a fluid crisis. The key analytic enabler of this flexibility is the commitment of NGO partners (especially NRC) to continuous education assessment as part of its programming. All four agencies reviewed for this case study included education assessments in their reporting, whether in their initial program design or in their annual strategy. NRC in Jordan has a stated strategy of modifying programme content continuously according to the evolving context. Its Country Education Strategy is updated annually, with the aim of informing planning and design, and its four years of operation have demonstrated a readiness to introduce, remove, and adapt activities as the education situation changes.³² Some of its education assessment information has been used at the cluster level in order to promote efficiency and non-duplication.³³

Other partners also prioritise regular assessment of education needs. In its report 'Fostering a Culture of Responsibility and Accountability – Improving the learning environment in Jordan', ARDD-Legal Aid outlined the legal and political framework governing the Jordanian Education system and used its analysis to inform its own research and work.³⁴ Right to Play has chosen to build long-term relationships with schools in order to create learning environments that foster its approach and teaching methodology (the value of play in the learning environment). It regularly adapts programming midstream.³⁵ Working through existing Vocational Training Centres (VTCs), Save the Children conducted visits to 12 VTCs in central and southern Jordan using a selection tool to choose the training courses that would be offered. SCI staff also conducted a Rapid Needs Market Assessment to better understand the market demands and the skill sets required for it.

There is no evidence of agencies using INEE standards systematically in their education assessments, despite the fact that contextualized INEE indicators had been produced for Jordan by representatives of the Ministry of Education and members of the Education Sector Working Group. Gaps in cross-cutting issues such as public health, WASH, protection, and nutrition are therefore less well addressed in programming. They were usually known by the field team but little reported to senior management. For instance, in Zaatari and Azraq camps, the public health sessions did not include information on puberty, lice,³⁶ or Hepatitis A prevention,³⁷ even though these are considered important issues for the camps' residents.

Presence of context analysis: All CSO partners have documents that discuss contextual barriers to education. These analyses tend to align with general regional, national, and international understandings of the crisis, reflecting partners' engagement with education networks and national policy frameworks. Among the prominent barriers cited were overcrowded classroom facilities for a growing refugee population, girls' safety going to and from school, inadequate day-care facilities for young women, Jordanian government restrictions, dropouts due to a family issues or deportation, misalignment between vocational courses and economic opportunity, and lack of vocational course accreditation. These barriers lowered attendance and retention rates, problems cited by all partners.

CSO partners have also proposed creative strategies for overcoming these barriers. NRC organised the Walk to School program in order to confront the barriers posed by distance from school and safety *en route*

³² In one year, for example, it opened two satellite classrooms in Zaatari Camp districts 7 and 9 based on an identified gap confirmed by the Education Working Group. Interview in Zaatari Camp with NRC Education programme coordinator, May 2017.

³³ See for instance the Jordan Intersector Working Group update, April 2017, on the Makani and outreach campaign.

³⁴ ARDD-Legal AID (2014) 'Fostering a Culture of Responsibility and Accountability – Improving the learning environment in Jordan'.

³⁵ Right to Play interviews, Amman, May 2017.

³⁶ Petrol is the traditional way of getting rid of lice and no repellent/cure was provided at the learning center.

³⁷ Jordanian staff and refugee staff were found to use separate bathrooms for fear of contamination.

– especially helpful for keeping girls in school.³⁸ Save the Children set-up day-care facilities in its Vocational Training Centres (VTCs)³⁹ to encourage female participation.

Partners regularly cited barriers imposed by the Government of Jordan as it attempts to maintain control over national education policy. After the London Conference, the Government decided to take over uncertified programs for out of school youth and accelerated learning that had been run by NGOs. In order to assist Syrian children to get access to formal education, ARDD has worked to secure documentation and registration to make sure refugees can benefit from this public service. In collaboration with the FAFO Norwegian Research Institute, ARDD also produced an insightful report on Jordanian schools that highlighted the lack of communication between parents and teachers and between parents and children, a phenomenon hitherto overlooked by international organisations.⁴⁰ This effort to bridge the needs of Syrian and Jordanian children is a valuable initiative. Nonetheless, the substantial difficulty entailed in balancing the needs of Syrian children with those of the national education system is perhaps the greatest challenge faced by CSO partners in Jordan.

4.1.2 Engagement of affected populations in planning interventions

Meeting the needs of affected populations: Norway-funded EiCC interventions were partially designed, planned and implemented to meet the needs and interests of the affected population (protection/well-being): Beneficiaries were more involved in the implementation of projects than in their planning, analysis, or evaluation. This is perhaps to be expected for projects aimed at delivering needed education services rapidly to an uprooted population. Nonetheless, all eight projects showed some kind of participation. Although parents in both Azraq and Zaatari camps said they were not consulted in the design of education activities, Syrian refugee teachers reported intervening early in the program and helped to design curriculum content, exam organisation, and daily management of the learning centres.⁴¹ A majority of focus group respondents involved in the NRC education project in Azraq and Zaatari camps also reported that they had channels for communicating with NRC staff. How complaints and feedback were fed to senior managers, however, was unclear.

Parents and community members have been increasingly integrated in programming during the reporting period. NRC learning centres organise monthly parent meetings to discuss the children's situations. Parental and community members' engagement was a substantial NRC focus in 2015, and small grants (700 JOD, equivalent to 900 USD) were provided to support parental community-service activities, such as the production of toys, shelter painting, cooking groups, and gardening.⁴² Parent committees and volunteer groups were also set up in the refugee camps to promote community outreach. Parents and caregivers also engaged in awareness rising and event participation (graduation ceremonies, special events at the learning centre).⁴³

In some instances, community members were used to identify individuals in need of services. Save the Children turned to influential community leaders and organisations when it experienced early difficulties recruiting students to its vocational training courses. While there is little evidence of community participation in program design, youth were sometimes empowered to give feedback to teachers or to suggest course topics. In NRC youth centres, for example, activities were adjusted depending on youth interests. Sweet making, for instance, was recently added for females, and may be extended to males. Youth also report that they are engaging in their communities more as a result of the programme, a positive sign of NRC's overall effect on behaviour and attitudes.⁴⁴

³⁸ The program was not restricted to students at NRC learning centers but assisted others as well. Assembly points were set up along the Walk to School where children could meet and commute as a group alongside teachers and volunteers.

³⁹ Agreement number: JOR-14/0003. Embassy-funded initiative.

⁴⁰ ARDD-LA, 'Improving learning environments in Jordanian Public Schools'.

⁴¹ In recent years, refugee teachers have lost part of the room to manoeuvre they had, with the decisions on student passage now taken in Amman. The marks are crosschecked with attendance and if attendance is too low, pupils are not allowed to pass. The teachers regret this decision and witnessed good students failing after scoring low on attendance because they had to miss class to respond to familial obligations. Interview with the male teachers in Azraq Camp, NRC learning center, May 2017.

⁴² NRC interviews, Azraq, May 2017.

⁴³ 2016, NRC Annual Report to MFA, JOFE1601.

⁴⁴ 2016 – Evaluation, NRC Jordan Youth Program, Women Refugee Commission report.

4.1.3 Interventions designed and implemented to meet the needs and interests of the affected population

Alignment with national or local education needs analyses: The relation between the Government and the Syria relief effort has been fraught. On the one hand, Jordan has actively sought international assistance to deal with the Syrian crisis. In January 2014, as part of the National Resilience Plan (2014-16), which proposed ways to mitigate the impact of the Syrian crisis on Jordanian Host Communities, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) requested \$394 million from international donors to cover the impact of the Syrian Crisis on the Jordan educational system. At the same time, it has imposed restrictions on registration of Syrian children and teachers and on NGO activities. After the 2016 London Conference, the government embraced some of the non-formal education provided by aid agencies (accelerated learning for children still eligible to re-enter primary school and an out-of-school programming, authorizing UNICEF-led Makani to go to scale), while encouraging greater CSO involvement in host communities, thus linking Syrian and Jordanian children. Nonetheless, the fundamental tension remains: the Syrian Crisis is a large burden for Jordanian government and society, and aid rushed to Syrian refugees threatens to cause resentment among Jordanians and escape the control of the Jordanian government.

MFA partner alignment with national education needs and interest must be understood within this fraught context. The programs run by the four CSO partners were in many cases designed to fill education gaps that were not met by the Jordanian system or were unique to the Syrian refugee population, such as ARDD's legal aid program or NRC's learning centres in the refugee camps. Nonetheless, CSO partners were responsive to national opportunities as they came available. After the promulgation of the Jordan Response Plan (2017-2019), MFA-funded EiCC interventions engaged in host communities, responding to an official call to improve Syrian access to formal education services and to use aid to benefit both Jordanians and Syrians.

Of the four partners, three partially aligned their programs with government plans. This was partly due to government restrictions but also partly due to the partners' choice of initial approach.

In its first years of programming (2012-15), NRC interventions remained confined to uncertified non-formal education in camps, despite the fact that 80 percent of the Syrian refugees were living outside camps. By avoiding structural issues, NRC largely sidestepped MoE long-term priorities.⁴⁵ In 2015, however, NRC's program shifted to align with government plans by engaging in host communities and supporting MoE effort to expand the education infrastructure and absorb higher numbers of refugee children, preferably into single-shift schools.⁴⁶

Save the Children improved the infrastructure of ten Vocational Training Centres located outside the camps, providing chairs, tables, projectors, and air conditioning. Right to Play has been formally accredited by the government, and the MoE Training Department has approved its plan to start a play-based training unit.⁴⁷ These two organisations are some of the very few organisations to have been authorized by the Government to work in the public sector.

One of the main future challenges for CSO partners will be to continue aligning their work with Jordanian education priorities, meeting the needs of both Syrian and Jordanian children in order to foster greater integration. This will require continued diplomacy and patient communication on the both sides.

Alignment with national or independent analyses/policies for priority groups: Jordan's education priorities for the country as a whole are reflected in the Education Reform for a Knowledge Economy policy, and for the Syrian crisis in particular, in the Jordan Response Plan (2017-2019). Though all refugees can be described as vulnerable, the JRP does note gradations, indicating the particular vulnerability of girls and women, children, the elderly, and the disabled. It also highlights economically vulnerable Syrians and Jordanians who have adopted "severe coping strategies".⁴⁸

Most of the MFA project documentation includes sector-based priority targets that match up with national and independent analyses. NRC project documents contain disaggregated targets for men, boys, women,

⁴⁵ The shift was probably more incurred than planned, due to the change in funding channels that happened after the London Conference, when most international aid became channelled through the Government of Jordan.

⁴⁶ NRC Jordan Strategic Plan, 2015-17.

⁴⁷ Right to Play interviews, Amman, May 2017.

⁴⁸ Jordan Response Plan, 7, 9.

and girls, and clear vulnerability criteria that build on the UNHCR vulnerability framework.⁴⁹ Several partners chose broad targeting, status-based and did not disaggregate by specific vulnerability features, since they took the stand that everybody within the refugee population was vulnerable. This may mean though that the most vulnerable were not reached.

The vulnerable group most commonly identified in partner documentation is women and girls. ARDD-LA research echoed the Education Vulnerability Assessment finding that girls receive poorer education than boys, partly because the majority of the double-shift schools with reduced teaching hours are either mixed or girls' schools.⁵⁰ Both NRC and SCI address gender and protection concerns through the provision of separate classrooms and shifts for boys/male youth and girls/female youth, as well as fenced sport sites to encourage the use of the pitch by female youth. Worth noting, in SC's VTC centres, 65 percent of project beneficiaries were female, exceeding the target of 50 percent.⁵¹ NRC's Walk to School program also benefits girls, since they face disproportionate safety concerns.

Regarding other vulnerable groups, perhaps the most sector-specific is out of school youth. While NRC's early youth program was designed to address out-of-school youth in learning centres, the recent disengagement from uncertified non-formal education since the Government took over the programme increases the risk that out-of-school youth will be left behind even as their numbers continue to rise. NRC reported itself as 'weak' in addressing issues of disability.⁵²

Evidence that access to quality and relevant education opportunities was available to all sections of the targeted population (INEE Access and Learning Environment standard 1): While CSO partners in Jordan tried to reach all sections of the targeted child and youth population and despite documented efforts to address gender-related learning and protection issues, respondents reported that more refugee boys than girls enrolled in services.⁵³

Interviews suggested mixed views about educational quality. Parents praised the quality of learning supplies and learning centres while at the same time, life skills teachers reported very low attendance to their course, suggesting limited relevance from the youth's point of view.

Use of community resources to implement learning opportunities: MFA-funded EiCC interventions have tapped community human resources (refugee teachers, parents, volunteers) in program implementation. Of the seven projects reviewed, six used them on a daily basis. NRC in particular has developed robust outreach and community mobilization initiatives to support children's education.⁵⁴ Refugees have contributed in diverse ways, including teaching, providing camp knowledge, conducting outreach, walking children to school, and coming to school on Saturdays to engage in activities. Some volunteering, such as parental participation in school activities, received no compensation, whereas other types were incentivized, such as refugee outreach staff or participants to the Walk to School initiative.⁵⁵ In interviews, youth also report volunteering on some activities, though some respondents in Azraq and Zaatar camps said that girls and women volunteer less than boys and men.⁵⁶

4.1.4 Extent to which interventions have evolved over time, adapting to changing situations

Responsive decision-making during implementation: MFA-funded EiCC programming has substantially evolved over the years, with strategy and programme changes deriving from both increased need and contextual changes. This adaptability is best demonstrated by NRC, which receives over 80 percent of MFA funding. NRC's Country Strategies and Annual Plans show that the organisation has regularly developed new activities and strategies in response to evolving needs and government directives:

⁴⁹ 2016 – Evaluation, NRC Jordan Youth Program, Women Refugee Commission report.

⁵⁰ ARDD-Legal Aid (2017). Education for the Future Project. Communities of Learning among Syrians and Jordanians in Host Communities. Final Report to MFA. Grant JOR-15/3000., p.9.

⁵¹ See Save the Children project final report. Attracting male youth was actually reported as a challenge in this programme.

⁵² Interviews with key informants.

⁵³ Azraq camp interview.

⁵⁴ 2014 – Amendment, NRC Annual Report to MF.

⁵⁵ Incentive-based-work was for long the only authorized way of working for camp-hosted refugees. With the coordination of UNHCR, agencies developed SOPs on IBV, which constitutes an important income-generating opportunity in the camps, especially in Azraq where the running of small private businesses continue to be strictly limited. For more information, see: <http://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/jordan-incentive-based-volunteering-azraq-camp-october-2016>

⁵⁶ Azraq camp Youth females, Azraq camp life skills teacher, Zaatar camp mothers.

the creation of day-cares in NRC learning centres to serve young mothers; the expansion of walking routes between the living place and the school in order to meet increased demand; the expansion of the physical infrastructure in Zaatari and Azraq camps, with additional classrooms and sanitation facilities built to accommodate need; the partial shift of MFA funding from education to winterization activities.⁵⁷ The Right to Play programmes, initially designed to cover the needs of Palestinian refugees before the Syrian Civil War, also adapted its response in the face of the dramatic new refugee crisis.⁵⁸

Partners also had to adapt to a changing policy environment in Jordan. It is important to highlight that the evolving conflict analysis found in these documents – and the risk analyses contained in Annual Reports – reflect NRC’s attention to the changing nature of the conflict. This adaptability is most obvious in the ways that program activities have evolved since their 2013 inception, responding to new dynamics. For example, when after the 2016 London Conference, it became clear that the government will directly implement the part of non-formal education that liaised with the formal system (accelerated education), NRC responded in refugee camps by switching from catch-up to remedial classes, and by expanding its educational programme in host communities to work in some formal schools with refugees and Jordanians alike.⁵⁹

All MFA-funded EiCC interventions had to align with national educational plans in order to receive MOPIC approval.⁶⁰ Nonetheless, partners faced government restrictions on their activities, and were forced to accommodate centralizing tendencies on the part of the Jordanian MoE, as illustrated in successive sector resilience plans (NRP then JRP). For NRC, strategies for working in host communities and urban areas are now being rolled out, with government’s approval, by providing remedial classes, support to public infrastructure and teacher training on soft skills.⁶¹

Norwegian economic trends also affected programming. Three of the four civil society partners mentioned that planned activities were affected by the 2015 depreciation of the Norwegian krone. ARDD-Legal Aid, for example, received a late compensation from the Norwegian Embassy for an outreach programme event.

Use of lesson learning in programme/strategy design/decision-making: MFA’s Annual Report Template requires all partners to engage in reflection on lessons learned as part of their annual reporting, and evidence suggests that this is carried out faithfully. NRC’s four available reports contain thoughtful reflections on lessons learned that address both contextual challenges and program difficulties. The lessons reported demonstrate an ongoing engagement with changing needs and a readiness to make alternations as necessary. One example is the partial shift of MFA funding in 2014 from an education initial purpose to winterization activities.⁶²

Since the response is relatively recent and intensive, there have not been many evaluations, and those that exist tend either to deal with the crisis in the aggregate or provide a particular situation assessment, rather than evaluating single projects or portfolios.⁶³ Nonetheless, CSO partners have produced some evaluation reports. NRC’s Evaluation of its Youth Programme by the Women Commission and the ILPI report on Save the Children project are the most notable examples of independent evaluations – and MFA itself compiles brief Progress Reports that enumerate risk factors.⁶⁴ Thus, within the context of a recent and rapidly moving crisis with many players, MFA-funded partners do seem attentive to gathering lessons learned.

Evidence that the activity was aligned with relevant international and national education policies, laws, standards, and plans and the learning needs of affected populations: In their first years of operation,

⁵⁷ See Annual Reports for the years 2013-2016. 15,000 camp-hosted refugees were provided with gas cylinders for heating and cooking using educational funds. The rationale behind was twofold: 1/delay in education programming (due to delay in camp construction); 2/genuine protection concerns over the security of the women who were cooking in the communal kitchens.

⁵⁸ Right to Play interviews, Amman, May 2017.

⁵⁹ NRC interviews, Zaatari Camp.

⁶⁰ Field and phone interviews with NRC key educational staff.

⁶¹ NRC did not wait for 2017 for suggesting to intervene in host communities and we find trace of this willingness in 2014. The situation then however was that the government did not allow them to implement non-accredited NFE in host communities, probably as a way to control the formal educational supply.

⁶² 15,000 camp-hosted refugees were provided with gas cylinders for heating and cooking. The rationale behind was delay in education programming (due to delay in camp construction) and genuine protection concerns over the security of women cooking in communal kitchens.

⁶³ See, for example, NRC’s 2016 Youth Assessment “A Future in the Balance.”

⁶⁴ NRC Youth Programme – Jordan: Evaluation Final Report”, 2016; 2016 Program Report for Grants from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Norwegian-funded programs for the most part operated outside of the national education system, filling gaps in the refugee response and coordinating with other organisations to avoid duplication. It largely avoided the larger structural concerns of Jordanian education policies. Since 2016, collaboration with the Jordanian government, following new approaches by the Ministry, has brought on closer alignment through the NRP and the JRP, both of which NRC helped to craft. Despite this trajectory, NRC and other Norwegian actors appear to have tried from the start to align with international standards and norms for serving vulnerable populations, even if they did not always reference those standards directly in reports. This is evident not only from the emphasis on conflict-sensitive development noted above, but more directly through the wide engagement with other humanitarian actors through the Education Sector Working Group and other coordination mechanisms. Through these mechanisms, CSO partners are embedded in the wider Syrian response community in Jordan and take a leadership role in it.

4.2 Effectiveness

Summary: CSO partners regularly monitor their activities but there is a strong focus on quantitative indicators and there is no collective attempt, across agencies, to harmonize monitoring and evaluation activities. Each partner uses its own institutional system. Significant results have been achieved in improving both access to and quality of education, though NRC's access to the formal education system in Jordan was limited until 2016. Programmatic commitment to gender inclusion has not always yielded results in gender equity.

4.2.1 Extent to which interventions achieved, or are likely to achieve, intended outputs and activities

Monitoring of education response activities: Annual reports demonstrate MFA-funded partners regularly monitor planned activities. This monitoring focuses on quantitative output and outcome indicators, and (for NRC at least) the over- and under-achievement of targets are clearly explained. MFA requires annual project-level monitoring data for its periodic project and partner reports.⁶⁵ NRC uses GORS (Global Output and Outcome Reporting System) plus donor-dependent mandatory indicators to report on project data. RAF (Result Assessment Framework) and project review meetings are done internally as well as annual reviews. Project indicators are disaggregated for males and females, and they have clear vulnerability criteria drawn from the UNHCR vulnerability framework. Indicators sometimes shift year by year even within organisations, primarily as a result of institutional adjustments.⁶⁶ This makes it difficult to track outcomes and impact longitudinally since there is no baseline for comparison. M&E is largely focused on quantitative indicators, at the expense of qualitative – and perhaps more relevant – ones.

According to M&E personnel, NRC program officers manage output data whereas M&E staff led outcome monitoring.⁶⁷ Some expressed concern that there was too much focus on “irrelevant” quantitative data at the expense of qualitative assessments that could better inform program adjustments.⁶⁸ For example, donor indicators request the number of student learning kits distributed rather than inquiring about their quality, relevance, or use. Respondents also warned of imprecise data gathering, due to staff size and turnover; lack of rigorous data analysis due to human and time constraints; insufficient access to beneficiary reporting from Amman; and difficulties in customizing reports to the demands and formats of multiple donors. The problem of multiple demands and unclear communication was manifested even within Norwegian agencies alone. In one case, communication breakdowns between the MFA-funded country office, MFA headquarters, and the Norwegian Embassy led to the failure to update project M&E logframes.

In these issues, CSO partners face challenges common to many humanitarian and development programmers. Projects must balance between the home office demand for precise quantitative monitoring data and the need for less precise, but often more programmatically useful qualitative feedback. And in

⁶⁵ See for example the “Final Report JOR 14/0003 MFA Embassy Education; vocational, ECCD, Youth, Community Dev – one year” on Save the Children activities from 2014-15.

⁶⁶ NRC interviews. Amman. May 2017.

⁶⁷ Key informant interview.

⁶⁸ Key informant interview.

turn, donors should be mindful of the demands placed on project staff by the profusion of monitoring indicators, especially in a fluid humanitarian crisis.⁶⁹

The biggest challenge for monitoring is the gathering of longitudinal data and the follow-up of educational cohorts through years (tracer study type). This, to date, is not done in Jordan by any of CSO partners. Evaluation too is hampered by the lack of data over time. Though the youth program was evaluated, the current evaluation marks the first time that the full portfolio is being assessed. Because of the non-comparability of data across years (since indicators might change over years and vary per donor, making comparison difficult), it is highly recommended that partners, and projects, current evaluators lean more on qualitative data. This is not in and of itself a problem – as one staff member noted, qualitative data often provides the most immediate and useful information for program adjustments – but the lack of data over time does limit assessment capability.

As CSO partners transition to closer work with the Jordanian education system, they will need to stabilize their M&E systems, in part by aligning them with national indicators.

4.2.1a Access

Access to education: NRC's 2016 GORS report shows an overachievement of the target for learners enrolled in accelerated education, but an underachievement for the YEP (Youth Education Pack) program (63%).⁷⁰ Data on access to formal education remains thin for NRC programs, mostly because of the limited access to public schools before 2016. After 2016, the number of children enrolled in formal school exceeded the planned target (1,226 vs. 1,060 initially planned), which is consistent with the change of strategy since, from 2016 onwards, NRC chose to target refugee children already enrolled in the camps' public schools. Yet not every child transitioned to formal schools after this change of strategy and the figures show that 79 percent of NRC-supported children who were enrolled in informal accelerated education before the strategy shift were enrolled in the public system in the Azraq refugee camp vs. 90 percent in Zaatari.⁷¹

NRC has also intervened in several national outreach campaigns to promote registration into formal education ('Learning for All' Campaign, 'Back to School') and to eliminate obstacles to inclusion (particularly on documentation issues).

Attendance and dropout rates also provide a measure of educational access. The 2015 NRC Annual Report shows that 56 percent of children attended more than 60 percent of the course. The indicator no longer existed in the 2016 report. The dropout rate was up to 70 percent in the Azraq YEP, although it is unknown how this compares to dropout rates in other NGO programmes.

The short duration of vocational courses run by NRC and SCI (3-4 months) and the lack of formal MoE certification for the catch-up courses also contributed to retention problems. Nonetheless, during the MFA grant, SCI supported 279 beneficiaries in short-term courses (260 graduated, 214 completed the on-the-job training) and selected 100 VTC graduates of the formal VTC system for grants to set up small businesses.

Gender equity and inclusion: Field interviews, program reports, and monitoring indicators show that gender balance and girls' inclusion was a priority for all CSO partners. Programmatic commitment to gender inclusion, however, did not always yield results in gender equity. In particular, both qualitative and quantitative data show an under-enrolment of female youth in education programs. Managers seem to be aware of this problem, and they have taken several innovative steps to address it.

- the Walk to School program provides safety for girls who travel long distances to school
- a day-care centre was introduced so that young mothers could attend vocational training
- separate, fenced-in sports pitches were built to protect girls and enable them to do sport unveiled

In line with the known gender barriers to participation, NRC's 2016 Annual Report shows female under-enrolment in the YEP programme (female enrolment rate corresponds to 35 percent of NRC-supported

⁶⁹ See Terrence Jantzi, "Balancing the Contradictions: The Business and the Practice of International Development," in *The Practice of International Development*, ed. Jerrold Keilson and Michael Gubser (Routledge, 2017), 35-50.

⁷⁰ 2015 & 2016 Annual Reports.

⁷¹ 2015 & 2016 Annual Reports.

youth in both Zaatari and Azraq Camp). The Save the Children project reported difficulties in enrolling male youth, which they tried to mitigate by using community outreach with the help of local leaders (the bulk of the SC beneficiaries were actually female). For younger children, in some cases female enrolment outnumbered male enrolment, as for example in the Right to Play project.

| | |
|--|---|
| Youth enrolment in NRC activities (2015 figures) | Azraq: 536, of which 189 female (corresponding to 35% of the Azraq NRC-supported youth) Za'atari: 1,503, of which 531 female (also corresponding to 35%) 2,039 in total (>target) |
| Children and Youth participating in Right to Play regular play-based activities (2016 figures) | Male: 5,040 ((corresponding to 38% of children beneficiaries) Female: 8,085 (corresponding to 62%) Total: 13,125 |

Youth and adult respondents in Azraq and Zaatari camps confirmed the issue of attendance for girls, noting female under-involvement in both education courses and among maternal volunteers. While this gender disparity may have cultural origins, the success of Save the Children's community outreach in raising the number of girls who participated in its 2014-15 Vocational Training Courses (183 females vs. 96 males) suggests that concerted recruitment can lead to greater female participation. Innovative solutions like NRC's Walk to School campaign and creation of day-cares can also disproportionately benefit women and girls, who face greater security concerns when walking long distances to school and/or are primarily responsible for childcare.

On **disability**, NRC surpassed its 2016 target, enrolling 129 children or adolescents with disabilities, against a target of 106. This achievement, however, came exclusively in the cohort of boys; the girls' target was not met. Qualitative data paints a more mixed picture of disability access. While NRC has a partnership with Handicap International, which consists in staff training and physical check of NRC infrastructure to see if they comply with disability norms, a systematic referral system has been difficult to implement. According to one respondent, some disabled children attended courses for a few weeks and then stopped.⁷² This may be a result of both distance to school and inadequate accommodations in school. One learning centre teacher, on his own initiative, developed a Braille-type method of reading in order to teach a blind student, but the tool has not been scaled up institutionally.⁷³

Access: Humanitarian access and protection ensured in conflict and crisis situations with a view to maintaining continuity of learning and safeguarding schools: Norwegian support has resulted in increased access to safe child- and youth-friendly learning environments due to the construction and rehabilitation of schools, the organisation of learning centres, and the establishment of youth programs, as well as through targeted formal and non-formal education support to vulnerable populations and support to the education cluster and national initiatives. While these are significant accomplishments, it will be important in the future to establish some educational continuity for students as the program transitions from an emphasis on non-formal (and often uncertified) educational activities to working with the formal school system and host communities.

Use of innovative and flexible solutions: CSO partners have introduced a number of innovations into their education programs in order to improve access to education, and there is some evidence that these innovations have had a positive impact on access. Examples of innovations include the introduction of a Walk to School program in order to overcome distance and safety concerns, the set-up of day-care in learning centres to foster female attendance, the use of community outreach to recruit for the vocational training courses, the work in shifts (morning/afternoon) to separate boys and girls and to allow them to attend formal education when they're not in the informal setting. Further administrative innovations will be needed as CSO partners integrate programs originally designed to work outside the formal school system for operation within it.

4.2.1b Quality

⁷² NRC interview, April 2017.

⁷³ Fieldwork interview, May 2017.

Supporting the development of national systems: Integrating with the national education system is the dominant challenge confronting CSO partners at this point in the program. This integration must be twofold: It requires assimilating Syrian refugee children with their Jordanian counterparts in formal schools and host communities, despite the widespread hope that they will be only temporary visitors. And it requires integrating MFA-funded programs into the Jordanian formal education system in ways that serve both Syrian refugees and local nationals, despite their different needs and educational backgrounds. Both of these integration processes have begun, but it is too early to tell if they will contribute to robust system or the improvement of education quality.

In its first years of operation, MFA-funded Syria Response programming worked mostly outside the official system due to both government restrictions and the programmatic decision to concentrate on Syrian refugees. The current strategy shift, launched since the London conference, holds some promising notes of greater integration. As CSO partners seek to expand their programming beyond emergency response and into more long-term systematic educational development, they may want to devote more resources to areas in the overlap between their goals and those of the Government in order to cultivating greater institutional buy-in.

Enhancing teaching skills: NRC trains its learning centre teachers in student-centered methodologies. According to Annual Reports, 152 Syrian teachers and youth facilitators were trained in 2015 in child protection, psychosocial support, right-based approaches, and course content. Some teachers in Zaatar camp report that trainings were relatively thin – one-off sessions with little follow-up. As partial evidence of this,⁷⁴ in 2015, only one-fourth of the teachers observed after training were using the techniques learned in training, which led to a reported willingness from the part of the agency to focus more on pedagogy.⁷⁵ The next year (2016), 70 percent of NRC teachers were reported to correctly replicate something learned in training. This increase, compared to 2015, was institutionally attributed to the continuous presence of NRC teachers' support officers, whose function was to coach and to mentor teachers in the classrooms on a daily basis.

Right to Play and its Jordanian partners transitioned their education training in 2015 to align with Right to Play organisational shift to a new training approach: the continuum of teacher training (COTT). It is institutionally believed that COTT strengthens RTP overall approach by continuously building and supporting teachers' skills in the delivery of quality play-based pedagogical activities. Internal post-monitoring in Jordan showed that 85 percent of the teachers trained in the 14 foundation workshops that occurred in Irbid, Zarqa and Amman began implementing play-based learning techniques in their classrooms. Furthermore, many previously trained teachers began requesting that they be allowed to participate and be given such training.⁷⁶

As the discussion above suggests, the greatest challenge for MFA-funded teacher training activities is their evolving relation to the Jordanian national system. Jordan's MoE does not allow CSOs to do teacher training in formal schools, and there is no interaction with MoE training department. As CSO partners seek to increase their involvement within the Jordan formal system, they may investigate possibilities for supporting Jordanian inspectors and/or teacher trainers to fill this role. Thus, as programming shifts to formal schools, NRC is currently restricted to working with Syrian refugee teachers in camp learning centres by providing them with remedial classes while they are enrolled in the camps' public schools and with Jordanian teachers in host communities who teaches in the shorter and lower-quality afternoon shifts to which Syrian students tend to be assigned. NRC has pushed to have Syrian assistants accepted in public schools but so far without success. As collaboration with the government progresses, MFA-funded partners will need to negotiate a new agreement that enables its activities to support not only the Syrian crisis response but also the broader Jordanian ERfKE education reform. At this point, it is too early to know how MFA-funded teacher training activities will accomplish this task. To date, the training supplied to formal teachers is small-scale (NRC is only starting in host communities) and formal teachers are only trained in soft skills and basic management.

⁷⁴ It is also possible that teachers were simply not using the technique when observed.

⁷⁵ As reported in NRC 2015 annual report to MFA (ref.# JOFE 1501-6XFM1603).

⁷⁶ Right to Play final report. Agreement #: GLO-3395 QZA-12/0831. Reporting period: 2013-15.

4.2.2 Factors explaining achievement and non-achievement of results

The dominant factors explaining project results were the extent and fluidity of the refugee crisis and the complex relationship with the Jordanian host government. The constraints on MFA partner action due to host government restrictions may, paradoxically, have had a certain benefit for programming innovation and results. Within the restricted domain of the camps, outside of the formal education system, NRC and other CSO partners were relatively free to experiment and innovate with their programming, introducing new activities in response to evolving needs and using novel strategies to address emerging problems. At the same time, this freedom has posed a genuine challenge to Jordanian authorities, in terms of coordination of efforts and long-term linkages to sectoral plans.

While partner achievements were small in the overall scope of the crisis, realistic targeting and close collaboration with partner NGOs in the greater Education Cluster Working Group helped CSO partners focus their interventions and amplify their achievements. The relatively unrestricted nature of Norwegian funding also encouraged results-based innovation: the MFA has broad sectoral requirement but does not dictate specific activities, allowing partners the latitude for experimentation and responsiveness.

Where results were not achieved, much of this shortfall seems to concern government delays and restrictions, camp opening delays, refusal of official project authorizations, and other factors beyond NGO control. The Senior NRC Education Specialist met in Amman, for example, reported that after the London Conference, the Jordanian government froze all activities and held up MoUs while waiting for donor money; the result was a six-month period of marking time.⁷⁷ The lack of MoE-certification for the non-formal education programs also seems to have delayed provision of education programming in host communities. In recent years, most agencies have called for a shift to urban settings/host communities, where 80 percent of the Syrian refugees live. NRC had already made an attempt in 2014, by starting an education pilot project in three host communities, targeting both Syrians and Jordanians, but the project was quickly frozen by the government. Conversely, Save the Children, who was only intervening with Jordanians, could implement its vocational programme using the existing system (notwithstanding reported difficulties in the starting phase).

4.2.3 Unanticipated results

As a positive result of NRC and Youth programme, several respondents stated that parents and youth engage more in their communities, build relations with others, get out of their shelters, and implement small-scale projects to improve the living conditions. NRC has recently started to fund some of these projects to further strengthen the school-community link.

On the negative side, MFA-funded interventions may help to fuel a government strategy of capturing international aid in order to address structural challenges independent of the Syrian Crisis. The government freeze on activities after the London Conference, for example, was imposed until concrete donor aid was received. Donors continue to support the cost of education for Syrian refugees by paying 50 JOD per refugee child in primary school⁷⁸ (there is no education fee involved for Jordanians) and 500 JOD per youth enrolled in VTCs (Jordanians are asked to contribute 50 JOD).⁷⁹

4.2.4 Evidence of effort to design/implement against the IHPs of neutrality, humanity, impartiality and independence.

The International Humanitarian Principles were not explicitly referenced in partner reports, though many of them appear to have been applied. CSO partners' managers in Jordan maintain direct contact with the Norwegian embassy's humanitarian affairs secretaries, and partners collaborate closely with the wider community of humanitarian organisations. In addition, reports and staff interviews reveal a concern for conflict-sensitive assistance, including do no harm principles. The attempt to alleviate suffering for a range of vulnerable refugee populations clearly imbues MFA-funded activities.

At the same time, relations with the Jordanian government sometimes impinge upon the strict fulfilment of these principles. While NRC's independence prior to 2016 granted it programming latitude at the price of limited engagement with the national system, closer collaboration with the GoJ opens up the possibility of working with both Jordanian and Syrian children, but at the price of having to abide by the policies of a

⁷⁷ NRC interview, Amman, May 2017.

⁷⁸ UNICEF interview, Amman, May 2017.

⁷⁹ See ILPI report 2015, A review of Norwegian support to Save the Children in Jordan, p.26.

government whose priority is not refugees. Conversely, Save the Children's project only focused on Jordanian youth living in communities stressed by the refugee crisis. Thus, the principles of humanitarian impartiality and independence must be understood in the context of these extenuating circumstances.

4.3 Efficiency

Summary: Evidence on efficiency is limited. There is evidence that joint assessments were produced during the reporting period. Each partner liaises individually with MFA regarding programmatic choices, with limited strategizing or planning for collective action.

4.3.1 To what extent has the portfolio been implemented with a view to cost efficiency?

Achieving efficiency in business processes: There is some evidence of efficiency in monitoring and evaluation and report-writing, as tasks are clearly delegated to different staff members. There is little evidence though of attempted harmonisation of M&E systems: NRC uses GORS (Global Output and Outcome Reporting System) plus donor-dependent mandatory indicators to report on project data; Right to Play has recently introduced a new M&E system (IMPACT), which incorporates its new approach to educational training (CoTT); and SCN uses the corporate MEAL system that enable systematic aggregation of results. The reports provide little evidence, however, of efficiencies in other areas (to the exception of cost control, which is detailed below).

Strategic use of resources: There is evidence of strategic use of resources both within and external to the project in order to maximize the impact of program activities. The relatively unrestricted nature of MFA funding means that partners can shift monies around within and among its projects in order to address needs strategically. Quarterly and annual NRC project reviews examine budgets and procurement in order to reallocate funds if needed. In 2014 for instance, funds underspent on educational lines were used to provide heating and cooking gear to the refugee population as this was identified as more relevant then.⁸⁰

At the same time, MFA's yearly reappraisal and reallocation of funding sometimes forced partners to think only in terms of small-scale, year-long interventions, for fear that funding would end mid-project. Save the Children, for example, explained its use of an expensive short-term vocational training model by noting that the training and support to VTC graduates was accelerated to fit in one year so that all could be completed in a single funding cycle.⁸¹

In addition to internal strategies for maximizing resources, NRC involvement in the Education Sector Working Group and other coordination mechanisms enables partners to target their resources to the most urgent needs and gaps without duplicating efforts of other players.

Programme management: Relations with MFA and Norad appear to be strong, as do relations among the funded partners. There were occasional concerns expressed about the challenges of communicating and coordinating with so many different agencies (MFA, Norad, Norwegian Embassy), especially when partners also have multiple layers. In the Save the Children case, for example, communication breakdowns between Save the Children Norway, Save the Children International (which was then SCN implementing arm in Jordan), and the Norwegian Embassy led to a failure to update project M&E logframes and to the Embassy frustration with regards to this project management.⁸²

⁸⁰ See Annual Reports for the years 2013-2016. 15,000 camp-hosted refugees were provided with gas cylinders for heating and cooking using educational funds. The rationale behind was twofold: 1/delay in education programming (due to delay in camp construction); 2/genuine protection concerns over the security of the women who were cooking in the communal kitchens.

⁸¹ See Save the Children final report to MFA (2015).

⁸² Due to SCI international structure, SCN is the main entity responsible for grant management when there are Norwegian donors involved. This point is especially interesting to bring to the fore since this 16-million Save the Children International project was the first SCI project supported by the Norwegian Embassy in Amman (the Embassy had more supporting experience with Save the Children Jordan) and since it is the Norwegian Embassy that commissioned an independent evaluation report (ILPI report, 2015).

There were some concerns expressed regarding staff management. In view of their longstanding history in Jordan, ARDD-Legal Aid and Save the Children Jordan⁸³ seem to present a more stable staff base with strong local links.⁸⁴ In spite of its ongoing presence in country since 2008, working in UNRWA schools with the Palestinian refugees, Right to Play reported greater staff salary expectations after the start of the Syrian crisis, as a response to the increasing demand for skilled staff within the newcomers. NRC's Jordanian staff reported high turnover, largely due to difficult working conditions (e.g., daily trips to the camps from Amman) and a perceived imbalance in the treatment of Amman vs. camp staff. Turnover was also reported within the management team.

Efforts to achieve efficiency gains in programme implementation: There is some evidence of efficiency gains due to partnerships with local NGOs or formal educational structures (VTCs, UNRWA schools) and regular consultation to incorporate local lesson-learning in programming.

There is also partial evidence of cost- efficiencies in Norwegian-funded EiCC programs in Jordan. For NRC in particular, regular expense reviews provide the basis for relatively frequent programming adjustments, with money shifted from one project or activity to another in the interest of achieving greater impact. When NRC could not do what it planned in the Emirati Jordanian Camp for lack of a government permit, it reallocated funds to the Azraq Camp, where two new educational infrastructures were built. Similarly, MFA funding shifted one year from educational to winterization purpose. In 2014-15, using MFA-funding, NRC detached its Youth Programme from the Education Programme since it had outgrown the combined project and followed a different logic; but this too enabled clearer financial flows.⁸⁵

Right to Play reports an interesting innovation for cost control. Through the use of electronic system, the finance team reports to be able to audit all activities in real-time prior to booking expenditures. Project activities are submitted using a mobile app, which provides supporting evidence (photos, videos, time and GPS stamping). It is reported that the use of such technology has led to the elimination of any possibility of corruption happening at field level; Right to Play uses besides the services of professional independent accountants who come to check bookkeeping every month. An independent assessment of such initiative would be welcome in order to confirm the reported benefit.

There were also examples of financial inefficiencies, some due to excessive institutional layers within a same NGO, others to budgetary arrangements, especially when co-funding was involved. Of particular concern was the cost-efficiency of fast-track vocational courses. An independent evaluation commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy in Amman found that while the CSO partner was paying 500 JOD per student enrolled in a fast-track path (for 3-month training), the cost of a student who would complete a normal vocational training path (which represents a 18-24-month cycle) would in fact be ten times less (50 JOD).⁸⁶

International trends also affected program costs. The depreciation of the NOK had a negative impact on MFA-funded programs, translating into fewer activities (e.g., fewer classrooms built, fewer PR events) and requiring creative re-budgeting. Sometimes, other funds covered a planned activity (e.g., a new football pitch, originally planned with MFA funds, was built with other sources). At other times, activities were delayed (e.g., ARDD-LA postponed a key local advocacy activity until it received money from the Norwegian Embassy).

A Joint Financial Agreement (JFA) involving UK, US and Norway, put in place after the London Conference, is also likely to affect programming budgets. As part of this mechanism, Norway plans to channel most of its aid through Jordan's MoE, reversing its prior decision not to provide budget support but to work through civil society agencies and international organisations instead. This funding change will have major implications for Norwegian NGO partners, requiring them to partner closely with Jordanian agencies.

⁸³ Save the Children International and Save the Children Jordan merged operations at the beginning of 2017. Save the Children Jordan is now the sole entity implementing interventions in Jordan.

⁸⁴ Fieldwork interviews, Amman, May 2017.

⁸⁵ NRC interview, April 2017.

⁸⁶ See ILPI report 2015, A review of Norwegian support to Save the Children in Jordan.

4.4 Coherence

Summary: CSO partners have been active participants in the Jordan Education Sector Working Group, at both national and camp level. All have engaged with co-ordination mechanisms where opportunities have arisen. Overall, however, MFA-funded interventions are characterized by some fragmentation, partly as a result of their efforts to be responsive to the evolving crisis, and partly due to project-specific intentions and results, which are not linked into any wider strategic framework, although informal communication and collaboration does take place.

4.4.1 To what extent are Norway's EiCC activities through civil society partners being implemented as a coherent portfolio, rather than as piecemeal activities?

Links into a country-level strategic framework: At the beginning of the Syrian crisis in 2011, UN humanitarian appeals were launched by the GOJ to ensure that Syrian refugees would receive international assistance and would be supported with essential protection services. In its first years of operation, most MFA-funded partners operated therefore outside the formal system of education, filling gaps that the Jordanian government could not or would not meet, under the umbrella of UNHCR-led humanitarian assistance.

As of 2015, Jordan has assumed leadership of the set-up of the response plan by integrating humanitarian and development responses and resources to address the needs of both Syrian refugees and host communities.⁸⁷ The JRP2015 and JRP 2016-18 represented a paradigm shift in this respect by bridging the divide between short-term refugee and longer-term developmental response within a resilience-based comprehensive framework. NGOs and IOs are specifically referenced in the JRP:

'We are at a moment of critical opportunity and must collectively deliver on the promise of the Jordan Compact and the Jordan Response Plan 2017-19. I [MOPIC Minister] call upon our partners, UN agencies, the donor community and NGOs to support Jordan as it continues to forge a new model of response capable of meeting immediate needs while also safeguarding human development and fostering resilience to future shocks.' (JRP, p.vii)

'The JRPSC Secretariat will work with MOPIC Humanitarian Relief Coordination Unit (HRCU) to facilitate the swift implementation and accurate monitoring of JRP projects. JORISS will be the information management system to ensure that all money for the JRP is tracked and accounted for, through any of the different channels approved by the government for the financing of the plan: budget support, pooled funds or project aid for public entities, UN agencies, NGOs or other implementing partners.' (JRP, p. 3)

In practice, MFA-funded programs have to link with the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) in order to be able to operate. As noted above, CSO partners, like other NGOs and IOs, have to submit their program proposal and get approval from the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), as well as their sectoral Ministries, and MOPIC only approves a project if it is in line with the JRP.

Norwegian partners have been active participants in the Jordan Education Sector Working Group (ESWG) of donors and NGOs engaged in the Syria response. NRC has served as a co-chair.⁸⁸ The Group produces Education Sector Quarterly reports and monthly minutes.⁸⁹ The ESWG also contextualized the INEE Minimum Standards for Jordan with the aim of guiding the planning, implementation, and monitoring of activities. This coordination reveals CSO partners' close linkages with wider strategic frameworks for the Syrian response.

Gearing to a single overarching set of intended results: MFA-funded programs in Jordan fit under an overall Country Strategy, but results are project-specific and explicit links to overarching strategy- or programme-level results were not evident. Because the program is characterized by its responsiveness to evolving needs, it covers several sectors (education, youth training), and these sectors have shifted over the years. NRC has for instance split education and youth activities into two separate programs in 2015.

⁸⁷ See Jordan Response Plan, p.11.

⁸⁸ Interview Zaatari camp. The Inter-Sector Working Group.

⁸⁹ Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/working_group.php?Page=Country&LocationId=107&Id=14

Links to other interventions in the same country: MFA-funded interventions are characterized by some fragmentation across sectors as a result of their efforts to be responsive to the evolving crisis. This fragmentation is mitigated by two factors. One mitigating factor is NRC's deep entrenchment in the Education Sector Working Group and other coordinating mechanisms, enabling it to coordinate activities and amplify findings in the area of its core program focus (education). Another is the complementarity of CSO partners, who make localized efforts to be aware of each other's activities and to connect informally as well as formally (ARDD, Right to Play).

The picture then is an unusual one: MFA's education intervention is linked to those of other agencies and NGOs working in the sector, but it is fragmented within itself, with some aspects of the program de-linked from others. This is not in and of itself a failing as long as partners are aware of the trade-offs entailed in running a group of smaller, disparate activities, rather than one larger, more focused program. However, as collaboration with the government proceeds, there is perhaps the need to focus resources in fewer areas in the hope to achieve a lasting impact.

4.4.2 How closely are Norway-funded interventions linked to EiCC interventions supported by other relevant humanitarian and development actors?

Implementation in connection with co-ordination mechanisms: CSO partners are very active participants in education coordination mechanisms in Jordan. All four partners are members of Jordan Education Sector Working Group, the sector's main coordinating body. Initially established in 2008 following the Iraqi refugee crisis, the ESWG is co-led by the Jordanian Ministry of Education (MoE) and UNICEF and works at both the national and subnational level. It is composed of 24 aid agencies. Although MoE participation is minimal, the ESWG is the only official coordination mechanism that brings together all education actors in Jordan.

Since the onset of the Syrian crisis, ESWG's mandate has been to ensure a link between the humanitarian response and national education programming, at first through the Host Community Support Platform (HCSP) planned in the National Resilience Plan (2014-2016), and more recently through the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC) planned in the Jordan Response Plan (2017-19). The ESWG's objectives are to provide a coordination forum in which all organisations and institutions collaborate with the aim of aiding the Jordanian education system in current and future emergencies; to plan and implement a response strategy while developing local capacity; to ensure continued access to quality education in a safe and protective environment for all vulnerable children; to avoid duplication of efforts; and to help search for additional funding through advocacy.

As part of the ESWG, CSO partners meet with their counterpart organisations regularly, producing Education Sector Quarterly reports and monthly minutes.⁹⁰ The ESWG initiated the contextualization of the INEE Minimum Standards for Jordan in order to guide planning, implementation, and monitoring. The Group feeds into the Inter-Sector Working Group, which tracks the funds received for the refugee response in Jordan, including the 3RP interagency appeal in support of the JRP. Education-related, NRC also participates in the UNESCO and UNHCR-led Tertiary Education Coordination Group, an advocacy and policy dialogue forum.

In 2015, NRC assisted in developing the Jordan Response Plan (2016-18), engaging with international partners and government departments through the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis (JRPSC). It had also participated in developing the previous plan (NRP, 2014-16), as the main international NGOs were part of the Host Community Support Platform (HCSP).

Several respondents noted that NRC pushed for having youth recognized as a separate category in light of its unique needs.⁹¹ SCI too participated in the Jordan Response Plan's Food, Security, and Livelihood Task Force.

⁹⁰ Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/working_group.php?Page=Country&LocationId=107&Id=14

⁹¹ Field interview... Soft advocacy is in fact perhaps the most interesting contribution MFA-funded agencies did in Jordan. NRC was represented at, and participated in, meetings which resulted in the term 'Youth' being included in the Jordan Response Plan, and today, both Social Protection and Education sector national strategies outline the specific needs and priorities for youth programming.

MFA-funded agencies also participate in sectoral coordinating mechanisms at the camps level. Since the start of the crisis, NRC has co-chaired the Zaatari Youth Task Force (YTF), a field-level coordination mechanism that brings together actors working with youth to develop common goals and strategies. Twenty-two agencies regularly attend the sessions. The YTF led several assessments in 2014. With UNICEF, NRC also co-chairs the Education Working Group in Zaatari, and through this mechanism has been leading the education response in the camp. NRC has also worked with UNICEF on integrating the INEE minimum standards into sectoral programming although there is little evidence of using INEE standards systematically in CSO partners' donor reporting.

Save the Children is involved in UN-chaired working groups on education, child protection, food security, and basic needs and joined an informal livelihood consortium with Oxfam, CARE, ACTED, and the Danish Refugee Council. Both NRC and SCI were part of a Joint Education Need Assessment team that issued a 2015 report assessing access to education for Syrian and Jordanian youth.

NRC and SCI also participate in the UNICEF-led Makani initiative, which has GOJ support and which aims at harmonizing non-formal education initiatives throughout the country.⁹²

Evidence that the interventions have been implemented with horizontal linkages at country level and that the partner has links/relationships with others in the context: Evidence shows CSO partners have strong horizontal linkages with other organisations working in the youth and education sectors in the camps, but their linkages with Jordanian government agencies, especially the Jordan MoE, and with the decentralized educational structures, are more tenuous and agency dependent. The Zaatari Camp Education Working Group, to which NRC belongs, is one example of these linkages. The Group coordinates capacity development, child protection, WASH, health and nutrition, and community participation activities in the camp. The Group agreed to implement standard operating procedures for GBV and child protection, with outreach teams responding to reported cases and coordinating through referral systems.

As co-chair of the Zaatari Youth Task Force (YTF) and the Zaatari Education Working Group, NRC works in consortia with other NGOs to coordinate and deliver needed interventions. As part of the Jordan INGO forum, for example, NRC chaired meetings of youth actors who developed key joint advocacy messages prior to the Global Forum on Youth, Peace, and Security (held in Jordan in August 2015). NRC also helped to facilitate the Global Refugee Youth Consultations, an initiative by UNHCR and the Women's Commission to establish workshops that bring together refugee and host community youth.

Partnerships: There are several examples of partnerships between NRC and UNICEF, including co-funding. NRC has also partnered with a number of smaller organisations since the start of its program. The international NGO, Capoeira4Refugees, ran recreational activities in camps and helped NRC doing outreach at the start of the NRC programme. Two local NGOs acted as the agency's implementing partners for specific project activities: Since 2016, Luminus has provided trainings in licensing and staff coaching, while We Love Readings has helped to promote literacy. NRC also partnered with the Queen Rania Foundation initiative (EDRAAK) to provide distance learning through a MOOC platform.

During the reporting period, Right to Play initiated the TAALOM project, which is a process of sub-granting funds to local partners. This process included the implementation of a very strict partnership assessment process, which was chosen to be done in collaboration with local authorities. Right to Play took the stand to have its prospective local partners audited by the responsible line ministries before entering into partnership, in order to ensure that they were financially and programmatically vetted by local authorities. During the reporting period, the initiative reported that they worked to build the capacity of two local organisations.

Networks and Forums: CSO partners are active members of numerous forums designed to coordinate, collaborate, and amplify program implementation. In addition to the membership of all four partners in the ESWG, NRC co-chairs the Zaatari Camp Youth Task Force and Education Working Group. It is not clear why these Zaatari camp models have not been replicated in Azraq. As already noted above, NRC is also part of Jordan's INGO forum, and SCI is a member of an informal livelihood consortium.

⁹² Interviews with agencies staff, Amman, May 2017. See UNICEF document available at: <https://www.unicef.org/jordan/1. Jordan - NLG - MAKANI - All Children Accessing Learning.pdf>

4.5 Connectedness

Summary: Concrete involvement within the formal educational system was limited in the early stages of interventions, both due to government restrictions and CSO partners' own choice of approaches. As a consequence, limited capacity-building occurred within the formal educational structures during the reporting period. This situation has changed since 2016, with increasing efforts to ensure that interventions are linked in to medium term planning within the sector. Transition in Jordan however remains largely government-dependent, with MOPIC and MoE assuming strong leadership and attempting to gear the international emergency response towards longer term sectoral needs.

4.5.1 Interventions designed and implemented in a manner that supports longer term needs in the education sector

Integration into national programming/ strategies/budgets as far as feasible: In its initial years, most MFA-funded activities were not integrated into national programming or strategies. With the exception of SCP's work with formal VTCs, the bulk of MFA-funded EiCC activities were designed to fill gaps in national programming within refugee camps.

Since the 2014-16 rollouts of the National Resilience Plan, the Jordan Response Plan and the London Conference, program partners have set out to work more closely with host communities and Jordanian education authorities. The Jordanian government drafted the JRC in collaboration with NGO partners that included MFA-funded EiCC organisations. It aimed to link the short-term emergency response to longer-term development needs, inviting education partners to support its actions by reducing classroom overcrowding; using MoE-certified interventions for out-of-school children in order to help them re-enter formal schooling; strengthening efforts to eliminate barriers to inclusion; increasing access to post-primary education (including vocational training); and supporting initiatives designed to foster social cohesion between Jordanians and Syrians. The implementing process is still ongoing and will require the negotiation of new agreements designed to support Jordanian goals not only for the refugee response.

Efforts to prioritise continuity and recovery of quality education: As part of the integration process described above, NRC is currently working with authorities to expand education programs from refugee camps to host communities and schools that enrol Jordanian as well as Syrian children. But even while expanding programming to new populations, Norwegian partners must work to limit the disruption to long-term and still vulnerable camp beneficiaries even as they develop their partnership with government agencies. By deciding to shift from non-formal education aimed at providing catch-up classes to out-of-school children eligible to re-enter the formal system to a system that only provide support to children already enrolled in formal schools, the danger of abandoning vulnerable refugee children while trying to embrace greater national inclusivity is considerable.

4.5.2 Were transition strategies explicitly built in?

Design and implementation with transition strategies in mind, where feasible: In its first years of operation, Norway-funded partners primarily ran a series of smaller projects designed to respond to the immediate needs of a vulnerable camp population. Interventions prioritised responsiveness rather than long-term transition and sustainability; transition strategies were not explicitly built in to programme design. In view of the refugee influx, NRC, for example, focused on non-formal education in camps; its programming was uncertified and had few links to the formal system. These strategies appear to have emerged more out of implementation than program design.

2014 marked a shift in strategy, as humanitarian agencies started discussing host community interventions. NRC started working on small-scale projects in three host communities. At first, this programming was discontinued because the MoE started restricting authorizations.⁹³ It is in 2016 that NRC concretely shifted from uncertified non-formal education toward assisting the MoE in strengthening its national educational system, by supplying remedial classes in the camps to children already enrolled in formal schools and by starting to explore what could be done in host communities.⁹⁴

⁹³ See Middle East Research and Information Project (2016). Losing Syria's Youngest Generation. The Education Crisis Facing Syrian Refugees in Jordan, and phone interview with former NRC Education Manager, April 2017.

⁹⁴ NRC is still trying to address the needs of those who are not eligible to formal education but this component tends to decrease in importance.

Over time, several MFA-funded agencies were recognized by the Jordan Government and invited to participate in government planning exercises. NRC and SCI were both involved in the drafting of national education plans (NRP and JRP). On several occasions, the MoE recognized the positive contributions of MFA-funded partners. ARDD-LA was selected to become a member of 'the Syrian Education Committee', and had the opportunity to contribute to the National Strategy for Human Resources Development in 2016. NRC participated in the 2015 Urban Verification Exercise, through which the Jordanian government issued new biometric cards for registering Syrian refugees and opening access to public educational and health services.⁹⁵ Both NRC and SCI participated to official Back to School Campaigns to promote Syrian enrolment in formal schools.

Nonetheless, the sustainability of Norwegian-funded programs – even with their burgeoning government contacts – is hampered by the broader unsustainability of the camp situation: it is designed to be temporary even though no one knows when it will end. NRC's 2015-17 Country Strategy recognizes this paradox in its refusal to project an end date:

“With no end to the Syria crisis in sight, shrinking protection space and gradual depletion of refugees’ own resources, the need will continue to remain high for services offered by NRC. Although it is expected that the Government of Jordan will seek ways to alleviate the impact of the refugee crisis on the Jordanian society and economy, it is expected that significant numbers of Syrian refugees will still be residing in Jordan within the scope of the present strategy and beyond. The humanitarian and protection needs of refugees both in and out of camp settings will likely continue to be high, and could worsen with time, as savings are expended and relations with the Jordanian host communities worsening, while the new initiatives strengthening the refugees’ resilience and coping mechanisms rooted in the Jordan Compact will not have large impact on many. NRC has no immediate plans to exit Jordan, given the scale of the crisis to which it is responding at present, however, as the operational space is likely to shrink, programmatic contingency plans will be put in place to respond to any restrictions NRC may face in accessing those most in need. One of the key priorities will include continued expansion of partnerships with local civil society actors.”⁹⁶

Because of the permanent impermanence of refugee needs, the new strategy of working through the formal system is probably the best assurance of a transition to sustainability. Norwegian partners should continue to integrate their activities into the broader national system.

As noted above, however, the strategy is not without danger. As partners shift from the emergency response and into a more development-oriented design, there is a danger of abandoning those who are the most in need. While it is widely recognized that the process of expanding and improving the formal education system must be supported, it is also acknowledged that alternative education opportunities for those ineligible to re-enter the formal system need to be scaled up using a network of national and international NGO and CSO partners. Thus, a dual humanitarian-development mandate may require partners to work on two tracks: maintain a fluid response capability that can react nimbly to unforeseen needs while at the same time shifting toward more long-term, sustainable programming for more stable populations.

There is little evidence of transition plans in the documentation reviewed and programming changes seem so far to be more incurred than planned. It is worth noting though that CSO partners are currently all negotiating with Jordanian authorities about collaborative strategies.

4.5.3 Do partners work in partnership with national authorities and local CSOs or other actors in ways that support the development of capacity?

Building local capacity: Scope to build local capacity in educational provision in Jordan was limited by restrictions on engagement in the public education system. For example, although NRC has contacts with some departments from the Ministry of Education (Teacher Training, Curriculum Development, Certification, Non-Formal education), there was, at the time of writing, relatively little evidence of concrete capacity-building at the Ministry level and decentralized infrastructure.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ This process is compulsory for Syrians to receive back their documentation that in many cases had been retained by the Jordanian authorities when they crossed the border.

⁹⁶ NRC Country Strategy, 2015-17.

⁹⁷ NRC interview, April 2017.

While Norwegian partners do work with some local NGOs and CSOs, apart from Right to Play's reports of capacity-building for two local organisations, there is no indication in documents or interviews of systematic capacity-building for local partner organisations. In its Youth and Education projects, NRC builds the capacity of individuals such as Syrian teachers. Otherwise, local capacity-building appears to have been very limited. The fluid nature of the crisis may account for its limited emphasis, but this will no doubt have to become a much more integral part of future programming in collaboration with public and private Jordanian counterpart agencies.

NRC's recent programming shifts towards working through the formal education system will necessitate greater capacity-building of both government agencies and local NGOs and CSOs. At the time of fieldwork, there was still little evidence of capacity building, beyond some limited training for formal school teachers, in the MoE collaborations that have occurred thus far.

Capacity-building of individuals and some local organisations was reported in Annual Reports, but because the capacity-building program was limited and because M&E data does not facilitate longitudinal comparison or comparison between partners, there is no evidence of capacity development gains.

5. Conclusions

Over the reporting period, one-fourth of Norway funds to civil society partners intervening in EiCC were directly overseen by the Norwegian Embassy in Jordan. This placed a strain on Embassy capacities, which were not necessarily geared to meet such needs.

The Norwegian Refugee Council received 84 percent of EiCC Norwegian funding in Jordan over the reporting period (CSOs earmarked). But channelling up to 47 percent of Norwegian Education Aid through civil society partners (2015 figures) in a stable middle income raises questions about the choice of available funding channels. The recent shift (8 percent in 2016), largely due to the London Conference and the Compact Initiative, appears more appropriate for the setting.

Norway-funded interventions through civil society partners were only partially linked to national plans over the reporting period, despite a noted participation to the making of these plans, and it is only in 2016 that NGOs and the JRP substantially connect, partly due to the London Conference and the opening up of opportunities for direct funding to the Jordanian government. Support was fragmented, with no particular longitudinal approach between programmes, even when partners had a long history in country.

While without common reporting frameworks and comparative baselines, the measurement of interventions' impacts remains challenging. As well as providing education services to vulnerable children in refugee camps, Norwegian actors have provided some significant gains in soft advocacy, in particular concerning the importance of integrating youth in national programming.

Reporting is mostly quantitative in nature, and would benefit from additional qualitative indicators, which may well provide more valid information than the compilation of figures that are difficult to compare overtime and across partners.

6. Lessons learned/implications for the evaluation

Analysis of the policy and institutional context: The educational policy context within Jordan requires closer examination, particularly through a historical lens, since Jordan has been welcoming refugees for decades. Understanding the dynamics within the Jordan Ministry of Education as it continues to tightly manage the operational space available to external actors is particularly essential, not the least to understand differences in response (if any), between the different refugee waves (Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians). This could be expanded to understanding the dynamics between other key ministries, such as The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC).

Recording results: Operationally, and especially for agencies providing services, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of civil society organisations from multilateral organisations, the educational terrain being characterized by overlaps (e.g. UNICEF-run Makani programme for NFE) and co-funding (e.g. with UN financial contributions financing part of civil society programming). So far, it remains difficult to accurately measure the effectiveness of the interventions funded. Results data from the early period of implementation is limited, it is thus important for learning and accountability reasons that results are well

monitored and tracked., to help enable the Norwegian government to understand CSOs' individual and collective contributions to intended results.

Mapping marginalisation: During programming, some important gains have been made in enabling girls to access education in Jordan, in particular through fostering day-care within learning facilities or by using salary support. Assessing the sustainability of these initiatives after intervention remains to be done in order to gauge the added value of such initiatives. On other types of vulnerability (disability, indigent), there are few consistent interpretations across CSOs and other actors in Jordan of who the 'most vulnerable' are, in terms of education provision. Results frameworks and monitoring do not disaggregate beyond gender. Collective agreement on vulnerability parameters, and the intention to map and record results against these, would benefit the collective understanding, and provide the Norwegian government with a clear picture of who its resources are targeting, where and why.

Advocate for adapted funding modalities: In the early period of the Syria crisis, humanitarian funding streams responded to a largely humanitarian response. In 2017, however, the modality has shifted to a development one, with the focus on sector reform, formalisation of learning and accredited pathways into the public system. Annual funding streams in this context are not fit for purpose. Norway's aid administration has done its best to be flexible, providing multi-year streams where feasible, but grants remain multiple, comparatively short-term, with no systematic follow-up of the programming consequences on the existing educational structures. Continued advocacy for adapted funding models - framed within wider dialogue on the contribution of EiCC to development and resilience – will help the issue stay on the agenda, as well as more involvement with local research institutes, in order to connect emergency practice with development. In addition, to avoid competition among the diverse sources of Norwegian funding, linking funding streams with specific strategies (for instance 1 for NFE, 1 for support to formal education) could be a path to follow. It would avoid duplication of efforts and competition between CS partners and multilateral organisations (since UN agencies are both funds recipients from Norway perspective, and donors, in the view of civil society organisations).

Seek coherence: Despite weak co-ordination in the sector generally, Norwegian actors have collaborated informally and at times operationally. But there is more scope for greater co-ordination and, particularly, lesson-learning, working with CSO partners to think beyond individual institutional aims, and towards collective intentions and strategies to achieve them. The regional Education Advisor may have the potential to play an important role here.

Annex 1 - List of interviewees

| Name and title | Agreement Organisation | Date |
|--|---|---------------|
| Zainab Al Khalil, Project Manager | Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development - ARDD | 14 May 2017 |
| Alli Phillips, Program Development Officer | Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development - ARDD | 14 May 2017 |
| Mario Stumm, Development Counsellor | Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany | 15 May 2017 |
| Jorunn T. Staubhaug, First Secretary (Iraq Affairs) | Embassy (Norway) | 15 May 2017 |
| Hanan Hani Shasha'a, Program Officer | Embassy (Norway) | 15 May 2017 |
| Katrina Stringer, Education Adviser | DFID | 15 May 2017 |
| Negar Ghobadi, M&E Manager | Norwegian Refugee Council | 14 May 2017 |
| Sue Nicholson, Education specialist | Norwegian Refugee Council | 14 May 2017 |
| Carlo Gherardi, Country Director | Norwegian Refugee Council | 14 May 2017 |
| Ana Povrzenic, Head of Programmes | Norwegian Refugee Council | 14 May 2017 |
| Nayef Alkhalwaldeh, focal point for evaluation | Norwegian Refugee Council | 14 May 2017 |
| Hassan Hijazi, Technical Comm. Officer | Norwegian Refugee Council | 14 May 2017 |
| Andrea Naletto, Regional Education Specialist | Norwegian Refugee Council | 14 May 2017 |
| Emma Bonnar, Former Education Coordinator and Youth Manager, Amman | Norwegian Refugee Council | |
| Khaled Elkouz, Country Manager | Right to Play | 15 May 2017 |
| Ahmad Abdel Hadi, Formerly responsible for SCI Embassy-funded project | Save the Children Jordan | 18 May 2017 |
| Sara Al Duraidi, Responsible for the implementation of the Makani programme | Save the Children Jordan | 15 May 2017 |
| Espen Gran, Associate Area Director for the MENA region | Save the Children Norway | 6 April 2017 |
| Sebastian Blomli, Current Education advisor for SC projects in Lebanon | Save the Children Norway | 6 April 2017 |
| Liv-Heidi Pedersen, former Education advisor for SC projects in Lebanon | Save the Children Norway | 6 April 2017 |
| Bergdis Joelsdottir, senior advisor Global EiCC Advocacy | Save the Children Norway | 23 March 2017 |
| Silene Martino Almeras, Partnerships specialist | UNICEF | 15 May 2017 |

Fieldwork and focus groups

| | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|
| Focus groups parents 11 fathers | Norwegian Refugee Council | Azraq Camp NRC learning center | 17 May 2017 |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|

| | | | | |
|---|-------------------|---------|--|-------------|
| Focus groups teachers 6 female teachers | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Azraq Camp NRC learning center | 17 May 2017 |
| Focus groups youth 10 female + 16 male youth | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Azraq Camp Youth center/Village 3 | 17 May 2017 |
| 3 key informant interviews with math, life skills, and tailoring teachers | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Azraq Camp Youth center/Village 3 | 17 May 2017 |
| Focus groups parents 7 mothers | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Zaatari Camp NRC learning center | 18 May 2017 |
| Focus groups parents 4 fathers | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Zaatari Camp NRC learning center | 18 May 2017 |
| Focus groups teachers 8 teachers | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Zaatari Camp NRC learning center | 18 May 2017 |
| Focus groups youth 10 youth | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Zaatari Camp Youth center, District 10 | 18 May 2017 |
| Focus groups youth 9 teachers | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Zaatari Camp Youth center, District 10 | 18 May 2017 |
| 2 key informant interviews with youth project officer and youth center team leader | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Zaatari Camp Youth center, District 10 | 18 May 2017 |
| 4 key informant interviews with teachers and education assistants, NRC learning centre | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Azraq Camp | 16 May 2017 |
| 2 key informant interviews with youth project coordinators | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Azraq Camp | 17 May 2017 |
| 2 key informant interviews with education team | Norwegian Council | Refugee | Zaatari Camp | 18 May 2017 |
| Focus group with 12 teachers | Right to Play | | Talbiah Camp (Palestinian refugees) | 23 May 2017 |

Annex 2 - Semi-structured interview guide/Fieldwork tools

Interview Questions to key respondents in Amman

(senior staff/donors and implementing partners)

- How has the EiCC portfolio evolved since 2008-now? What are the main changes that you have seen? (plot timeline)
- Is there an overarching strategy for the EiCC portfolio? What is its nature? (time period, priorities, delivery etc.)
- Does your organisation have any thematic concentrations generally within its EiCC portfolio? What are these?
- Does your organisation seek to target particular groups through its EiCC assistance? Which ones/why?
- Are there any particular geographical concentrations within the portfolio? What/where?
- How does your organisation consider coherence of the portfolio? (linking with partners' EiCC interventions)
- Please could you describe how you engage with MFA/Norad on EiCC investment? (Core funding? Annual applications? Ad-hoc applications?) Is the applications process cumbersome/light/other?
- Could you describe the relationship with MFA/Norad? What are the positive/negative aspects? What would you like to change?
- How does Norad/MFA monitor/review/evaluate work with your organisation on EiCC? What are its requirements for reporting?
- Have any evaluations or reviews been done of your organisation EiCC initiatives? (ask for copies)
- What risk management strategies are you required to have in place (e.g. for working with local partners)? Are you asked to report on these?
- Do you link with other major Norwegian civil society partners to learn from experiences in implementing EiCC?
- What has worked well so far, and what has not? What would you do differently going forward?

Focus group/KIIs – Parents

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

- How many people present? (m/f)
- Where from? (Syria/Lebanon/Jordan/other)
- How many children in the school? What ages?
- How long they have participated in the education?
- What stage of education are they participating in? (grade/year)

2. WELL-BEING

- Is the school or facility used for any other purpose apart from children's education – e.g. training, information sessions, meetings etc? Have you participated in any such events?

3. ENGAGEMENT

- How are you involved in the school? Do you have regular meetings with school teachers, managers?

4. CONTRIBUTION

- Do you/does the community provide any contributions to the school? (money, time, other resources?)
How is this used?

5. ADAPTATION

- Has the education in which your child participates changed over time? How? For better or worse?

6. CONSULTATION

- Have you been asked (by project implementers) for your views on the education provided for your children – timing, subjects, curriculum etc?

7. QUALITY

- Under the conditions, do you feel that the school facilities are adequate? What would be the priority for change?
- Do you feel that the education/school is a safe environment for your child? Why (not)?
- Do you feel confident in the skills of the teachers at the school? Why? (not)
- Do you feel that the school is well managed? Why? (not?)
- Are you happy with the curriculum provided? Is there anything you would change?
- Generally, do you feel that the school provides a good quality education for your child? Why? (not?)

8. ACCOUNTABILITY

- If you have complained about any aspect of the education, have your complaint been listened to and acted upon?

9. STRENGTHS

- From your perspective, what are the main strengths of the education provided?

10. WEAKNESSES

- From your perspective, what would you change about the education provided?

Focus group/KIIs – Teachers

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

- How many teachers present? (m/f)/Where from? (Lebanon/Jordan/Syria/other)
- Teaching what level? / Numbers in class/gender balance
- Years of experience as a teacher/Duration teaching in this school/facility
- Where qualified as a teacher?

2. BACKGROUND

- Please describe the classes you teach, and some of their characteristics. What is the teacher: pupil ratio?

3. WELL-BEING

- Is the school or facility used for any other purpose apart from children's education – e.g. training, information sessions, meetings etc? Have you participated in or led any such events?

4. QUALITY

- Are the community/parents involved in the school? Do they provide contributions to help its operation?
- How often do you have contact with parents at the school? Does the interaction work well, or is it challenging?
- Are you provided with adequate materials and equipment for teaching – and in sufficient time? If you ask for items, can they be provided in a timely way?

5. CURRICULUM

- What is the curriculum applied in the school? Is it sufficiently adapted to the needs of the students (language etc)?
- Do you face any particular challenges in trying to implement the curriculum? Please could you describe these?

6. TRAINING

- What professional development and support have you been offered since adopting your role as a teacher? How frequently have you been offered training? Was the training good quality?
- How often is your teaching reviewed? Do you receive feedback, from whom, and is this useful?

7. MANAGEMENT

- What are your views on school leadership and management? What works well and what could be improved?
- If you have any concerns, do you feel that these are listened to and heard? Have any of your concerns been acted on? (examples)

8. CONDITIONS

- Do you have a formal contract for employment? Is this properly implemented?

9. QUALITY

- Do you feel that the education/school is a safe environment for teaching and learning? Why (not)?
- Under the conditions, do you feel that the school facilities provide an environment which helps you teach, and students learn? If you could change one thing, what would it be?

Focus group/KIIs – Project staff implementing partners

1. FACTUAL INFORMATION

- Project name and locations
- Number of schools/education facilities operated
- Total numbers of students served (gender)
- Age ranges served
- Numbers of teachers employed by the project
- Other education-related serves offered by the project

2. DESIGN

- If you were part of the design process for the project – What context analysis was done to make it relevant for the situation?
- (How) Were beneficiaries involved in design?

3. ACCESS

- How does the project ensure equal access for all groups, including girls and the disabled?
- Are any groups harder to reach than others?

4. DEMAND

- Does the supply of education from the project meet the demand in this location?
- Are there any areas where the supply cannot meet demand?

5. MONITORING AND REVIEW

- How is the project monitored?
- How does monitoring inform changes in implementation?

6. IMPLEMENTATION

- Has the education project been implemented as planned? What has changed along the way, and why?

7. CURRICULUM

- What curriculum has been employed, and how has it been adapted to learning needs? Does it meet these needs?

8. LEARNING NEEDS

- Have learning needs evolved as the project has been implemented? (How) have they changed, and how has the project responded?

9. TEACHING NEEDS

- How has the project responded to the needs of teachers?
- What support/training/performance review do they receive?

10. COHERENCE

- Is the project linked to any others in the country? How?

11. EFFICIENCY

- How has the project sought cost-efficiency? (examples)

12. EFFECTIVENESS

What results has the project achieved? (ask for documentation). How many:

- Schools constructed
- Children enrolled (gender disaggregated)
- Drop-out rates
- Teacher:pupil rates
- Cost per pupil
- Learners achieving educational standards (gender disaggregated)
- Teachers appointed (gender disaggregated)
- Trainings conducted for teachers
- Other results

13. LEARNING

- How is the performance of the project assessed? Have any evaluations been conducted? (ask for copies)

14. LEARNING

- What have been the main challenges that the project has encountered?
- What are the main challenges for the future?

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