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# Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique

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
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in association with Nordic Consulting Group

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# Map of Mozambique





# Contents

Map of Mozambique .....	ii
Contents.....	iii
Acronyms.....	vii
Executive summary .....	ix
<b>1. Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Aims of the report .....	1
1.2 Scope of the report .....	2
1.3 Methodology .....	3
1.3.1. Selection of themes and cases .....	3
1.3.2 Criteria for evaluation .....	4
1.4 Data collection and the study team .....	5
1.5 Organisation of the report .....	5
<b>2. Norway in the peace process: an overview .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>A. The policy process .....</b>	<b>7</b>
2.1 The Rome Process and the GPA .....	8
2.2 Decision-making processes on the Norwegian side .....	10
2.3 The Bretton Woods process .....	12
<b>B. The aid programme: A statistical analysis .....</b>	<b>14</b>
2.4 The fragmentation of aid .....	15
2.5 The complexity of the Norwegian aid portfolio .....	16
2.6 Distribution by DAC sector .....	20
2.7 Forms of assistance .....	21
2.8 The role of NGOs .....	22
2.9 Assistance specifically for peace, reconciliation and reconstruction .....	24
<b>3. Aid and the peace process: the evolution of Norwegian policy strategies .....</b>	<b>27</b>
3.1 The Mozambique Country Study (1990): aid in the context of war .....	27
3.2 The Country Analysis .....	28
3.3 Ministerial level discussions .....	29
3.4 The Country Strategies .....	29
3.4.1 Prinsippnotat 1994-1996 .....	30
3.4.1 The Country Programme 1995-97 .....	32
3.5 Gender issues .....	33
<b>4. The setting .....</b>	<b>35</b>
4.1 Causes of the conflict .....	35
4.1.1 The early years: 1975-83 .....	35
4.1.2 The 1980s: Crisis .....	36
4.1.3 The 1980s: Reforms .....	38
4.2 The peace process .....	39
4.2.1 Reaching the GPA .....	39
4.2.2 ONUMOZ and the donor community .....	40
4.2.3 The military and political component .....	42
4.2.4 The humanitarian component .....	43
4.2.5 Assessment .....	44



4.3 The Bretton Woods process and the Rome process - the economic context of peace ..	45
4.3.1 The pre-GPA CG meeting .....	45
4.3.2 CG meetings during the peace process and the National Reconstruction Plan .....	47
4.3.3 The post-election CG .....	48
4.4 The role of Non-Governmental Organisations .....	50
4.4.1 NGOs and post-war transitions .....	51
5. The grassroots perspective .....	55
5.1 Introduction and methodology .....	55
5.1.1 Interviews .....	55
5.1.2 Direct observation .....	55
5.1.3 Limitations .....	55
5.1.4 Documentary sources .....	56
5.1.5 Areas selected .....	56
5.1.6 District characteristics .....	56
5.1.7 Informant characteristics .....	57
5.2 Summary of findings .....	57
5.2.1 Introduction .....	57
5.2.2 Demobilisation .....	58
5.2.3 Repatriation, returnees and resettlement .....	60
5.2.4 Rapid reconstruction .....	61
5.2.5 Demining .....	62
5.2.6 Aid .....	62
5.2.7 Democratisation, elections and the future .....	63
6. Demobilisation .....	67
6.1 Conceptualisation issues and the objective of demobilisation .....	67
6.2 The GPA and its institutions, mechanisms and players .....	67
6.2.1 The donors .....	67
6.2.2 ONUMOZ and UNOHAC .....	68
6.3 Brief overview of the demobilisation process .....	69
6.4 The Reintegration Support Scheme .....	70
6.4.1 Description .....	70
6.4.2 Assessment .....	71
6.5 Reintegration and transition .....	72
6.5.1 Other reintegration programmes .....	72
6.5.2 Post-ONUMOZ and Government involvement .....	73
6.6 Conclusions and assessment .....	73
6.6.1 The achievement of demobilisation and reintegration .....	73
6.6.2 The contribution of the reintegration programmes .....	74
6.6.3 The contribution to lasting peace .....	74
6.6.4 Norwegian assistance to demobilisation .....	75
7. Demining .....	77
7.1 Introduction .....	77
7.1.1 Criteria for evaluating demining .....	77
7.2 The national mine clearance strategy .....	77
7.3 Implementation .....	78
7.3.1 The UN .....	78
7.3.2 NPA .....	79
7.3.3 Activities of other actors .....	81
7.4 Assessment of the UN performance .....	82



7.5 Assessment of the Norwegian contribution .....	82
7.5.1 Policy process .....	82
7.5.2 Technical mine clearance operations .....	83
7.5.3 Strategic planning .....	83
7.5.4 Training of Mozambican staff .....	84
7.5.5 Cost-effectiveness .....	84
7.5.6 Communication and monitoring .....	84
8. Repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons .....	87
8.1 Introduction .....	87
8.2 Norwegian assistance: an overview .....	87
8.3 UNHCR programmes and strategies .....	88
8.4 Activities of the Norwegian Refugee Council .....	89
8.4.1 Background .....	90
8.4.2 The NAR project .....	90
8.4.3 Civil registration .....	91
8.4.4 LINK .....	92
8.5 Other channels for Norwegian assistance .....	92
8.5.1 NORAD support to women returning from RENAMO captivity .....	92
8.5.2 Redd Barna: The Unaccompanied Children Project .....	93
8.6 Assessment .....	93
8.6.1 General .....	93
8.6.2 The Norwegian contributions .....	94
9. Rapid rebuilding .....	97
9.1 Introduction .....	97
9.2 Rehabilitation of schools in Maputo .....	98
9.3 Seeds and tools .....	100
9.4 The National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) .....	101
9.5 Rural rehabilitation in Cabo Delgado .....	102
9.6 Assessment .....	103
9.6.1 Rehabilitation of schools .....	104
9.6.2 Seeds and tools .....	104
9.6.3 The National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) .....	104
9.6.4 Rural rehabilitation in Cabo Delgado .....	105
10 Political pluralism .....	107
10.1 Introduction .....	107
10.2 Keeping the elections on schedule .....	108
10.3 Keeping RENAMO in the political arena .....	109
10.3.1 The Secretary-General's Trust Fund for RENAMO .....	110
10.4 Preparing and monitoring the elections .....	112
10.4.1 The UNDP Trust Fund for elections .....	113
10.4.2 The UN Secretary-General's Trust Fund for political parties .....	114
10.5 Police and human rights .....	115
10.6 Conclusions .....	116
11. Conclusions .....	119
11.1 The UN operation .....	120
11.2 The NGOs .....	122
11.3 Norway's role .....	122
11.3.1 General aspects .....	122



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11.3.2 Aid characteristics .....	124
Annex 1: Terms of Reference .....	129
Annex 2: List of persons interviewed by the team .....	133
Annex 3: Statistical matters .....	137
A.3.1 The changing composition of State Budget chapters .....	137
A. 3.2: List of peace-process related projects, 1992-95 .....	140
A. 3.3 Aid disbursements to Mozambique 1990-95 .....	141



# Acronyms

Acronym	Definition	Notes
ACNUR	Alto Comissário das Nações Unidas para Refugiados	English acronym: UNHCR
AMODEG	Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados de Guerra	Veterans' NGO
AWEPA	Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa	
BPD	Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento	
CAII	Creative Associates International Incorporated	Consultant
CCF	Cease-Fire Commission	Comissão do Cessar-Fogo
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force	
CENE	Comissão Executiva Nacional para a Emergência	Government body for emergency coordination
CFA	Council for Africa	in Norwegian: Fellesrådet for Afrika
CIVPOL	Civilian Police	United Nations operation
CNA	National Commission on Administration	
CNRS	National Commission for Social Insertion	
COMPOL	National Police Affairs Commission	
CORE	Reintegration Commission	
CSC	Supervision and Monitoring Commission	Comissão de Supervisão e Controlo
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	OECD body
DDSMS	Department of Development Support Management Services	in the United Nations Secretariat
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs	in the United Nations Secretariat
DNE	Direcção Nacional de Estatística	
DPCCN	Direcção de Prevenção e Combate às Calamidades Naturais	
DTU	Demobilisation Technical Unit	
ESAF	Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility	
EU	European Union	
FADM	Mozambican Defence Force	new Army
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation	UN Agency
FRELIMO	Frente da Libertação de Moçambique	
FUMO	Frente Unida de Moçambique	political party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	
GPA	General Peace Agreement	
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
IDPs	Internally displaced persons	
IGOs	Intergovernmental organizations	
ILO	International Labour Organization	
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
INDER	Instituto Nacional do Desenvolvimento Rural	
INEFP	National Institute for Employment and Vocational Training	
INPF	Instituto Nacional de Planeamento Físico	
IRS	Information and Referral Service	Reintegration operation



Acronym	Definition	Notes
ISCOS	Istituto Sindicale ... Cooperazione ... Sviluppo	Italian NGO
LINK		NGO co-ordination body
MCTC	Mine Clearance Training Centre	
MFA	(Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
Mt	Meticais	sing. metical
MULEIDE	Mulher Lei Desenvolvimento	Women's rights org.
NAR	Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados	Govt. refugee agency
NEC	National Election Commission	
NGO	Non-governmental organisation	
NOK	Norwegian kroner	sing. krone
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation	
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid	in Norwegian: Norsk Folkehjelp
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council	in Norwegian: Flyktingerådet
NRP	National Reconstruction Plan	
ODA	Official development assistance	
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	
OIM	International Organisation for Migration	
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique	
PDP	Priority Districts Programme	
PESU	Programa de Emergência Sementes e Utensílios	seeds and tools distribution programme
PFP	Policy Framework Paper	CG meetings' document
PNUD	Programa das Nações Unidas para o Desenvolvimento	English acronym: UNDP
PRE	Programa de Reabilitação Económica	Structural adjustment programme
PRES	Programa de Reabilitação Económica e Social	
PTIP	Plano Trienal de Investimento Público	
QIP	Quick Impact Projects	
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana	
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme	
SDR	Survey, demolition and reconnaissance	demining operations
SGS	Gurkha Security Guards	
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency	
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General (of the United Nations)	Aldo Ajello's title
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	also PNUD
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	also ACNUR
UNOHAC	United Nations Office of Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination	
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development	
UNSCERO	United Nations Special Co-ordinator for Relief Operations in Mozambique	
USAID	United States Agency for International Development	
USD	United States dollars	
WFP	World Food Programme	



## Executive summary

This report has two objectives. The first is to analyse the effects of Norwegian assistance to Mozambique on the processes of peace-making, reconciliation and rehabilitation in the period 1990-95. The second, broader aim is to look at Mozambique as a contemporary success story of internationally supported peace-building in the developing world and draw out general conclusions on the role of donor assistance in processes of this kind.

The Mozambican case bears the imprint of a particular historical era. The war resembled several other Third World conflicts that unfolded in the late 1970s and the 1980s in Southeast Asia, Central America, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa. Some were international in origin, others became heavily internationalised by superpower rivalry and related regional dynamics as they progressed. The end of the Cold War laid the foundation for peace as the local parties realised they were losing critical external support and were unable to win on their own. The logic of internationalisation extended to the peace process as well: the footprints of external actors were visible in all phases.

Whatever conclusions emerge about the Mozambican case by looking through the lens of Norway's contributions will therefore in the first instance be relevant to this type of internationally driven settlement.

The terms "peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation" suggest continuous processes. Formal peace is easier to locate; in the Mozambican case the transition from war to peace lasted from 1990 to 1994. Its central event was the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, which, if it did not bring "peace" in a generic sense, at least ended the war. The first phase (1990-92) covered the Rome negotiations

leading to the GPA; the second phase centred on its implementation and culminated in national elections (1994).

Norway was not involved in the Rome negotiations but participated actively in the implementation of the peace agreement. For the donors and the Mozambican parties, this second period (1992-94) was a clearly defined phase that had an energising set of objectives, an institutional structure, time limits, and even a preliminary price tag attached. Norwegian assistance in this period - here called the short-term peace process - can be evaluated in relation to a set of relatively well-defined, short-term programmes. This constitutes the main focus of the report.

The criteria chosen for evaluation are whether the Norwegian contributions were **timely** and **appropriate** in relation to the internationally defined programme for the transition from war to peace. A third criterion is whether they enhanced **recipient autonomy**.

In addition to aid projects under the programmes called for by the GPA, "assistance" in the form of Norway's participation in the policy process is examined. The donors were not simply faced with requests to finance a ready-made agreement. Implementing the GPA became a dynamic political process as new disagreements emerged alongside old ones that had been papered over in the accords. All major donors had the opportunity to engage.

The peace agreement did not establish formal procedures for reconciliation. At the macro-political level, FRELIMO and RENAMO moved towards peaceful coexistence, if not reconciliation. Reconciliation processes at the local level could not be examined within the



scope of this evaluation, but a study undertaken by researchers from Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (Maputo) attempts to record how villagers in southern Mozambique found their lives affected by the peace agreement (chapter 5).

### ***The policy process - general characteristics***

Norway has traditionally been a major donor and political supporter of FRELIMO. Norway was the sixth largest bilateral donor to Mozambique in the early 1990s, providing over NOK 400 million annually, or one-tenth of Mozambique's bilateral aid. Most Norwegian aid was for long-term development projects. Activities entailed by the peace process (the "peace component") represented about 20 per cent of Norwegian aid during the 1992-95 period. There is no indication that this was insufficient in relation to the peace programme, which generally did not lack international financial support, or to the contributions of a comparable donor such as Sweden.

In the period under consideration (1990-95), Norway appears as a conventional donor, a forceful humanitarian actor, and a reliable but secondary team-player in the peace process broadly understood. The overall Norwegian policy was to firmly support the peace process and the implementation of the GPA. Norway was not, however, involved in the negotiations that set the strategic terms for peace and the aid programmes in the transition period. While opportunities for influencing those terms arose during the course of implementation, the Norwegian government generally did not respond, and then clearly not in a proactive manner. There was no high-level engagement from the Department of Bilateral Development Co-operation or the Political Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a range of political and economic issues relating to the post-war order that other donors and the Mozambican parties themselves took up.

Norway did not become a strategic player partly for reasons beyond its control. Other states and a well-placed NGO had pre-empted the space in the early phases of peace-making. Still, given Norway's role as a major donor, it is striking that there was virtually no engagement by high-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Mozambican peace process. The Minister of Development Assistance and her department naturally did engage, but focused mainly on conventional aid issues. The joint Ministerial Meeting in mid-1991, for instance, barely acknowledged that peace negotiations were well under way, but focused in great detail on traditional aid issues in the Country Programme.

*The result was that, in practical terms, Norwegian policy tended to fold the peace process into the aid programme rather than vice versa.*

Norway also maintained its role as a supporter of FRELIMO who worked with the other Like-Minded states to cushion the Mozambican government against politically painful demands from other donors, or against an international management of the peace process that could be overbearing, overwhelming and intrusive. Norway's continuation of its aid programme through the years of war and into the peace was in itself an expression of political support - an indirect but not insignificant declaration of solidarity that the government appreciated.

*Norwegian policy in this respect was rooted in general principles of aid and was not articulated with particular reference to the exceptional imbalances between the donor community and the Mozambican authorities that prevailed during the peace process. However, the result was to help cushion the government against the intrusive donor presence and to that extent enhance its autonomy.*

There appeared to be little integration of Norwegian policies in multilateral financial institutions (the World Bank and the IMF) with bilateral aid policies. The macro-economic context for peace and reconstruction was



shaped by the Bretton Woods institutions and seems to have been largely accepted as a given in the development of Norwegian aid strategies towards Mozambique. Norway did not appear to be active in the growing discussion within the Bretton Woods institutions about the relationship between the macro-economic framework and the peace process, and co-ordination on these issues within the government was incomplete.

Norwegian authorities gave little systematic attention to the links between supporting the peace process in the short run and sustaining the peace in the long run. The decision to postpone the preparation of a formal "country strategy" paper until after the elections, and subsequent delays (the paper was by early 1997 still not complete), limited the institutional opportunities for articulating a comprehensive strategy and pursuing proactive policies.

The main vehicle in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for developing aid strategies that may incorporate broader issues of the peace process are the various country policy papers. The last such paper on Mozambique (a so-called Country Analysis) was prepared in 1991 and was set aside when the peace agreement was signed the following year. The preparation of the new policy paper was postponed until after the elections. By early 1997, this paper had not yet materialised, and a stop-gap document written in 1993 remained the best available articulation of strategy.

*Four and a half years after the peace agreement was signed, the Ministry and NORAD still had not articulated an aid strategy that explicitly confronted issues of sustaining the peace. If developed at an early stage, a planning document that examines aid policy in the context of the peace process can help develop transition strategies from implementing a formal peace process to sustaining the peace.*

A document of this kind could start by drawing out the longer-run implications of issues that the peace agreement defines as short-term

activities. In the Mozambican case, some of these issues touch on the causes of the war, but mostly they concern its consequences, since a principal reason for the war ended on its own accord (i.e. the South African destabilisation campaign). To consolidate the peace agreement by healing the consequences of war suggests focusing not merely on general issues of development, but more specifically on:

- *social-economic reintegration*: Policies/programmes to support longer-term integration of persons affected by the war, including demobilised soldiers, internally displaced people, refugees and war victims;
- *political pluralism*: Policies/programmes to retain RENAMO and the forces it may represent within the political arena; financing of political parties and related issues of administrative control and revenue raising at the local level; local elections; strengthening emerging sectors of civil society and the legal system; the question of representation of "alternative elites" (i.e. those currently non-represented who may mobilise along ethnic lines, whether "real" or "imagined").

These issues must be examined in light of Mozambique's administrative system and the macro-economic framework shaped in large part by donors.

Overall, Norway's role in the Mozambican peace process was that of a reliable source of finance to programmes whose strategic terms were set by others. The evaluation recognises the need for selective engagement, but the logic of policy coherence suggests greater integration between aid policy and foreign policy. Subsequent reforms have been undertaken in the Ministry to effect greater integration between the Department of Bilateral Co-operation and the Political department, including the development of a "desk system". Such integration may enhance the overall impact of Norway's role in cases where the



government wants to engage politically in a peace process or in countries where Norway is a major traditional donor.

Various administrative mechanisms can help to focus political-bureaucratic attention and meet the specific needs for flexibility yet broad policy co-ordination in a war-to-peace transition. (For instance, Canada recently established a Peace-building Fund, Denmark and the Netherlands have similar special budgetary lines, and the United States has an Office of Transition Initiatives in AID). In Norway's case, flexible budgetary lines are already available, while selective engagement in peace process argues against the establishment of a separate office. A task force approach seems most appropriate in cases where the government wishes to make a substantial commitment.

*In a peace process where Norway wishes to make a substantial engagement, a Task Force approach that provides authoritative co-ordination and streamlines multiple perspectives - including those involving the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions - can improve integration of aid policy with broader foreign policy issues.*

### **Project evaluation: cross-cutting themes**

Once the peace agreement had been signed and an international aid package was put on the table, Norway responded in a positive and proactive manner. Considerable efforts were made in the Ministry and by NORAD/Maputo to stretch the conventional aid perspective to accommodate new initiatives called for by the peace process (e.g. demining and elections). Flexible budget lines and efficient administrative procedures facilitated quick a response.

By means of finance and/or through NGOs, Norway contributed in all the main areas identified by the GPA: demobilisation,

demining, repatriation/reintegration, rapid rebuilding, and promoting political pluralism. Generally, the Norwegian contributions were timely and appropriate in relation to the GPA programme. At the project level, Norwegian NGOs and NORAD/Maputo often seized the initiative. Close donor co-operation in Maputo helped ensure that Norwegian aid activities were integrated with other aid components in the peace process. A diverse and proactive Norwegian NGO community, and timely support in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also worked in this direction.

There was some concern in the Ministry that a heavy and poorly co-ordinated UN mission slowed down some of the GPA-prescribed programmes. Norwegian initiatives did not, or could not, substantially alleviate the situation, although in one case a parallel and useful project developed (demining).

Norway consistently stressed the need to put gender issues on the aid agenda in the post-war period. While gender issues were not specifically raised by the GPA, the post-war situation made it possible to aid women who had been particularly victimised by the violence, and also created new opportunities for empowerment of women. This was recognised in the action plan (Women in Development) prepared by NORAD/Maputo in 1993, and incorporated in various aid activities.

The evaluation assesses selected projects in the five main categories of the "peace component". It also notes several cross-cutting themes.

The aid portfolio was extremely fragmented during the 1990-95 period as a whole, with some 900 aid disbursements, many of them very small (projects under NOK 100,000 represented one-fifth of total payments but amounted to less than 1 per cent of the total expenditure). A large part was related to peace, emergency or other humanitarian projects. The fragmentation of the portfolio, coupled with lack of managerial capacity on the Mozambican side, placed an exceptionally heavy burden on the Norwegian side which evidently pressed against the limits for



systematic project review - and above all co-ordination - at both the Embassy in Maputo and the Ministry in Oslo.

Apart from a fragmented aid portfolio, problems of co-ordination were due to the autonomous nature of NGO operations and to personal/institutional rivalries between the NGO-sector and NORAD that were played out in Maputo. Highly autonomous NGO operations, in turn, were partly a result of the diverse structure of financing which enabled the NGOs to tap several budget lines administered by different offices in the Ministry and NORAD, mostly by negotiating with the various offices in Oslo.

The autonomy and diversity of NGO operations permitted proactive and flexible responses. On the other hand, it made it difficult for the Embassy to assess the cumulative impact of the Norwegian contribution and extract political mileage accordingly. These are classic trade-offs between autonomy and co-ordination in the relationship between the NGO-sector and the parent state. The requirements of the Mozambican peace process did not clearly favour one or the other side in this trade-off.

Norwegian NGOs and NORAD generally worked closely with Mozambican counterparts, although rarely with local NGOs, partly because of the generally weak NGO sector in Mozambique. The problem of using Mozambican channels ("recipient responsibility") during a period when large capital transfers clearly exceeded local capacity was frankly acknowledged. By setting a tight timeframe for "the peace process", and compiling a large agenda with a big budget for implementation, the international community tended to skew aid activities towards local institutions that lacked the necessary capacity - thereby helping to create problems - or to induce foreign actors themselves to take on the job. Norwegian aid actors did not fully escape this trap, although some did better than others.

The apparent need for rapid and flexible response in a transition from war to peace

increases the risk of failure. At the same time, a higher risk would seem justified if the transition indeed requires such response. Some of the projects supported by Norway arguably fall into the high-risk and limited-success category, (e.g. the RENAMO Trust Fund). Other projects (emergency distribution of seeds and tools) involved what seems unnecessarily high risk. While a rapid response was necessary, the semi-permanent nature of the Mozambican emergency had given donors ample time to develop procedures to reduce risk.

There was relatively little reporting and assessment of individual projects in the "peace component" of Norwegian aid to Mozambique. Since many projects have become standard elements in a "peace package" and collectively represent considerable funds, more reporting and assessments are desirable.

### ***The UN peace process: general achievements and shortcomings***

Commenting on the UN-led international effort during the peace process, which Norway supported in general and in principle, the report notes:

The UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was planned with particular reference to the failed peace process in Angola. To avoid another failure, ONUMOZ was designed on a large scale, certainly much larger than the government had expected and wanted. Sovereignty and autonomy issues became sources of tension between the government and the UN, and the large and visible UN presence caused other tensions (distortion of labour market and prices, accentuation of inequalities between the local community and the white-vehicled foreign aid presence, etc.).

Nevertheless, ONUMOZ did become a success story. The cease-fire was maintained, 92,000 troops were demobilised, 4-5 million people were resettled, and post-war elections were



held. The impact of a multifaceted demining programme, distribution of food and seeds, and the construction of hundreds of schools, health posts, water sources and countless community development initiatives was substantial. The principal shortcoming was the failure to collect small arms from the former combatants. As a result, the problems associated with the presence of illegal arms in the southern African region substantially worsened.

The UN presence as an impartial mediator, demobiliser and election supervisor, together with the massive international funding, also enabled donors to keep up political pressure on the two Mozambican parties to implement the peace agreement.

Importantly, the vast majority of the displaced civilians returned home spontaneously, without assistance and without knowing exactly what they would find on arrival - other than the basic essential, peace. The presence or otherwise of mines, infrastructure and social services appears not to have been a major concern. This suggests that the massive international aid devoted to the return process was in some measure superfluous: the same results might have been achieved with more modest financial inputs or, alternatively, some of the resources might have had more lasting effect if applied in a developmental rather than an emergency perspective.

Numerous "quick impact projects" promoted by UNHCR, other donors and many NGOs became unused infrastructural shells that lacked recurrent cost financing or an appropriate service package. While a package to meet basic needs (water, food, seeds and tools) helped the returnees during the first phase, the additional "needs" were diverse and did not necessarily include health and education. This suggests that setting priorities for rehabilitation beyond the most basic survival needs must be done in close consultation with the beneficiaries.

Foreign NGOs made a lower-key but more sustained contribution throughout the war-peace continuum. They provided both humanitarian relief and development assistance during the emergency and the war, were major actors on the ground for reconstruction and reconciliation during the peace process, and post-1994 reoriented their activities to foster peace and development. However, the NGO operations also had downside features that were accentuated by their large number (170 at the height of the peace process), ample resources and often independent mode of operation.

The resource-intensive, high-profile ONUMOZ operation engulfed Mozambique for two years and then left as swiftly as it had come. The result was a marked disjuncture between the peace process - defined as ending in 1994 - and the challenge of sustaining the peace in the longer run.



# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Aims of the report

This report has two objectives. The first is to analyse the effects of Norwegian assistance to Mozambique on the processes of peace-making, reconciliation and rehabilitation in the period 1990-95<sup>1</sup>. The second, broader aim is to look at Mozambique as a contemporary success story of internationally supported peacebuilding in the developing world and to draw out more general conclusions on the role of donor assistance in a peace process of this kind<sup>2</sup>. Each of these objectives has required hard choices about what to include – and exclude – from the study. As noted at the outset of the research, it was clearly impossible to give equal weight to all types of Norwegian assistance<sup>3</sup>. The purpose of this introduction is to make clear how and why the choices were made, and how the terms of reference were operationalised given constraints on resources and information.

Drawing out the implications from Mozambique for broader issues in Norwegian assistance to international peace processes requires some reflection on what is general and what is specific about the Mozambican case. Analysis of the wider comparative context lies outside the terms of reference, yet any evaluation of Norwegian aid approaches in a war-to-peace transition must take it into account. For instance, were Norwegian options constrained by a historical identification with the FRELIMO government, or were there broader strategic concerns at play? Do the limited successes of some short-term

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex 1: Terms of Reference, Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 1996.

<sup>2</sup> “The aim of the evaluation is to draw conclusions and formulate recommendations for future assistance in comparative situations where both humanitarian aid and development assistance are provided.” Terms of Reference.

<sup>3</sup> CMI/NCG (1996).

interventions indicate policy failure or, rather, that more persistent structural issues also needed to be addressed? Four brief points about the general-versus-specifics of the Mozambican peace process must be noted at the outset:

Like several other Third World conflicts of the 1980s, the Mozambican war was heavily internationalised - both its origins and its peace settlement were shaped by the Cold War and its end. Yet the Mozambican conflict was distinctive because its strategic importance was located within a regional conflict and its resolution linked to the negotiations that ended *apartheid* in South Africa.

The peace process was also internationalised. External actors helped negotiate the peace agreement, while its implementation was monitored, orchestrated and largely financed by the UN system and the donor community. Other peace settlements in the early 1990s were internationally managed as well, but the Mozambican case has distinctive features. Prolonged war, deep poverty and the country's long-standing dependence on external assistance accentuated the dominance of foreign states, NGOs and international organisations in the peace and rehabilitation process. Close donor co-operation in Maputo enhanced their weight.

The Mozambican process of rehabilitation and reconstruction, like others of the 1990s, is shaped by the predominance of neo-liberalism in world financial institutions, which was sharply opposed to the kind of Keynesian economic philosophy that governed post-war European reconstruction. In Mozambique, structural adjustment and privatisation are played out against both the ravages of war and the mixed heritage of socialist approaches to ownership and social policy. Domestic capital is weak and grew up in the commercial speculation of war; public institutions other than the state have not been involved in social provisioning.



The peace negotiations in Mozambique took place against a backdrop of increasing concern, both domestically and internationally, with the development of democratic institutions and the strengthening of civil society in African countries. In Mozambique (as in Angola), however, democratisation confronts a recent colonial past as well as the political legacy of Marxism-Leninism. The absence of some of the defining institutions of civil society, such as strong trade unions, and the politically compromised position of others, such as traditional chiefs, are not issues of recent standing that can be easily changed.

## **1.2 Scope of the report**

The terms of reference for this report call for an analysis of the effect of total Norwegian assistance to Mozambique for peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation processes in the period 1990-95. One limitation was given at the outset. Norwegian assistance in this period included a wide range of projects and programmes that were related to peace issues in very different ways - from coastal transport to election support. Since all could not be examined in equal depth within one study, it was decided to focus on aid activities that seemed directly related to the peace agenda. Yet that raised another question: how were "peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation" to be identified?

"Peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation" are terms that connote continuous processes, but formal peace is easier to locate. The formal transition from war to peace in Mozambique, generally referred to as "the peace process", lasted from 1990 to 1994. Its central event was the conclusion and implementation of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in 1992, which, if it did not bring "peace" in a generic sense, at least ended the war. The first phase (1990-92) covered the negotiations in Rome; the second was centred on the implementation of the 1992 peace agreement and culminated in national elections two years later.

Norway was not at all involved in the negotiations leading up to the peace agreement,

but participated actively in the second phase. For the donors and the Mozambican parties, this second period (1992-94) was a clearly defined phase that had an energising set of objectives, an institutional structure, time limits, and even a preliminary price tag attached. The role of Norwegian assistance in this second phase of the peace process can thus be evaluated in relation to a set of relatively well-defined, short-term programmes.

In conventional terms, Norwegian aid falls into three categories - long-term development programmes, humanitarian assistance, and aid to particular activities identified in the GPA or clearly germane to it. We will concentrate on aid that was most directly targeted on the peace process. This assistance is central to the overall purpose of the study, and can be analysed as deliberate policy measures that achieved (or did not achieve) their stated objectives.

Norwegian long-term development assistance to Mozambique was probably related to broader issues of peace and reconstruction in a more general sense via its impact on the country's society and economy. To analyse these complex relationships was clearly beyond the scope of this study. However, some inferences can be made about the political significance implicit in Norway's traditional role as a large donor in Mozambique — particularly when exercised in the wider context of the Like-Minded Group<sup>4</sup>.

"Assistance to peace", then, went beyond conventional instruments of aid. Like the other donors, Norway did not simply face a request to finance a ready-made agreement. New disagreements emerged alongside old ones that had been papered over in the peace accords. Implementing the peace agreement became a dynamic diplomatic and political process in which all the major donors had the opportunity to engage. Norway's role in this policy process must be examined as part of its overall assistance.

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<sup>4</sup> In the context of Mozambique, the Group is comprised of Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.



Clearly, the terms "peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation" have a broader meaning than the short-term activities listed in the 1992 peace agreement, such as demobilisation, return of refugees and elections. Each of these has a long-term equivalent that affects the sustainability of peace. Thus, demobilisation was part of the formal peace process, while reintegration of ex-soldiers seems necessary to sustain the peace. To examine the impact on peace in the latter sense requires a longer time perspective than given for this study. Yet, the analytical distinction is essential if one is to consider linkages between short-term and long-term interventions and has therefore been introduced in the case studies presented here.

The peace agreement did not establish formal procedures for reconciliation. At the macro-political level, a kind of peaceful coexistence, if not reconciliation, was evident as FRELIMO and RENAMO shifted their conflict to the political arena by contesting elections and taking their respective places in the National Assembly. Reconciliation processes at the local level call for careful, sociological or anthropological research. While not pretending to be complete, the work done by a team of researchers from Eduardo Mondlane University for this report captures some of the meaning of peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation in a "grassroots perspective" by recording how villagers in southern Mozambique find their lives affected by the peace agreement (chapter 5).

An estimate of Norwegian assistance directed towards the activities defined by the formal peace process suggests at most NOK 380 million over a central four-year period (1992-95). This "peace component" is equivalent to one-fifth of total Norwegian assistance to Mozambique in the same period (see chapter 2)<sup>5</sup>. The significance of this figure, as we shall

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<sup>5</sup> This report examines only bilateral and so-called multi-bi assistance. Core funding from Norway to various multilateral organizations could well have been used in Mozambique, but these flows are difficult or impossible to trace. "Multi-bi" assistance to multilateral organizations is not part of core funding but earmarked for the execution of particular bilateral projects, in this case Mozambique.

see, is uncertain. Was it exceedingly modest, given Norway's long established political support to FRELIMO and Mozambique's position over the years as a major recipient of Norwegian aid? Does it reflect the limited absorptive capacity of a war-torn and aid-dependent country in a short transition period?<sup>6</sup> Was the formal peace process in Mozambique indeed oversubscribed by foreign donors?

### 1.3 Methodology

The objectives of this study, and particularly its concern with identifying limits, opportunities and instruments for donor assistance in a contemporary peace process of the Mozambican kind, demand qualitative insight into a complex policy process. Conventional project evaluations are inadequate for this purpose, as has been recognised in another recent evaluation with similar ambitions.<sup>7</sup> A more comprehensive approach was therefore developed which involved three analytical components: policy analysis of decision-making processes, assessment of individual projects through a more conventional type of evaluation, and a sociological recording of what "peace" means at the village level.

#### 1.3.1 Selection of themes and cases

The terms of reference call for a review of Norwegian aid activities in several specific areas that largely correspond to the peace component of aid as defined above. Within that component, the project portfolio was quite large (well over 150 projects), necessitating selection of cases for closer review. These were organised thematically according to the five main tasks identified in the peace agreement or presupposed by it:

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<sup>6</sup> In a perceptive comment on the eve of the 1992 donors conference in Rome, the head of NORAD/Maputo, Bjørg Leite, warned that the donors might have designed a capital intensive peace process which would exceed the administrative capacity of Mozambique. Note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 December 1992.

<sup>7</sup> See *Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda*, Copenhagen, 1996, esp. vol. 2.



- demobilisation
- demining
- rapid rebuilding
- repatriation and reintegration (of refugees and internally displaced persons)
- promotion of political pluralism (including human rights)

Within these categories, individual projects were selected because of their magnitude and/or centrality to the peace process (e.g. support for elections), or because they illustrated particular dimensions central to the transition process such as local capacity building or dealing with problems of dual administration.

The five themes were also pursued in the micro-level study carried out in three districts in Maputo province by the team from Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. Their findings are not intended to be representative of what is happening in all the rural areas of Mozambique. Maputo is a special province and indeed, given the complexity of local histories, there is no representative rural district in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the case study points to achievements and tensions in international assistance to the peace process that may recur in several other rural districts.

A statistical analysis of Norwegian aid activity within the five categories in the 1990-95 period is presented in chapter 2, which also gives an overview of the general trends in Norwegian aid to Mozambique in this period.

While reflecting the particulars of the Mozambican case, the five themes can easily be accommodated within a broader framework for comparative analysis. The UNRISD "War-torn Societies Project", for instance, has developed a four-fold categorisation as follows: reforming security structures (e.g. demobilisation); (re)building political structures (e.g. towards political pluralism); removing war-time distortions and rebuilding economic structures (e.g. demining and rapid rebuilding); and reintegrating and empowering

populations on the local level (e.g. through support for returnees).<sup>8</sup>

### 1.3.2 Criteria for evaluation

Problems of using conventional **cost** criteria for assessing activities of the kind identified here are numerous. In demining, for instance, the number of mines found may be an indication of efficiency, but hardly of effectiveness; the importance of the area cleared to social and economic transactions on the local level is a much more central criterion in this regard but harder to operationalise. As for demobilised soldiers, the World Bank's major study of comparative demobilisation does not operate with cost-efficiency assessments across cases, but merely gives an absolute cost estimate per demobilised soldier in the different countries – and in local currency only.<sup>9</sup> One reason is that the various demobilisation programmes occurred in very different circumstances. Moreover, there is hardly an adequate measure for the social value of a quietly demobilised soldier versus one with a gun on the loose. The UNDP report to donors on international assistance to the elections in Mozambique does not operate with measures of cost-efficiency. The main criteria applied were whether the elections were held, were declared free and fair, and were accepted by all. Since all these results materialised, the objectives of the elections were found to have been achieved.<sup>10</sup> This study similarly applies qualitative criteria of stated objectives in relation to **results**.

**Process** criteria concerning administration (including co-ordination and follow-up) and choice of instruments (partners and channels) are used where relevant and where data was available. Where standard procedures were followed (e.g. use of UN Trust Funds), no effort was made to assess the procedures per se, but rather the appropriateness of the instrument to that particular situation. The

<sup>8</sup> See Fagen (1995). A recent compilation of case studies has a simpler categorization but covers essentially the same ground: political, social and cultural, and economic rehabilitation. See Kumar (ed.) (1997).

<sup>9</sup> See Colletta et al. (1996)

<sup>10</sup> See UNDP/DDSMS (1995).



more important question for this study is whether the special characteristics of a war-to-peace transition period suggest that particular process criteria should be adopted that favour speed, flexibility and innovation and acknowledge a higher risk factor than would be acceptable under more stable conditions. Rethinking along these lines with respect to lending policy is currently underway in the World Bank.<sup>11</sup>

More generally, since the overall task is to examine the effect of Norwegian aid on a peace process that was shaped by forces mostly beyond Norway's reach, the criteria for assessment must reflect a sense of historical timing. Was Norwegian aid timely and appropriate in relation to the agenda set by the formal process? Did Norway make any particular contributions to the peace process? Overall, these are the central questions for the evaluation.

#### **1.4 Data collection and the study team**

The study team consisted of Kate Halvorsen, Armindo Miranda (project co-ordinator) and Astri Suhrke (project leader) from the Chr. Michelsen Institute, and Alistair Hallam, Janne Lexow and Pamela Rebelo from the Nordic Consulting Group. Yussuf Adam led the team from Universidade Eduardo Mondlane for the study summarised in chapter 5.

Given the complexity of the subject matter, the study team established two reference groups which helped define the project at the outset, gave valuable advice throughout, and commented on the first draft. Most closely involved was our academic reference group composed of Bridget O'Laughlin, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague; Patricia Weiss Fagen, World Bank/UNHCR, and Alexander Costy, University of Toronto. A broader reference group composed of representatives of NGOs, the Norwegian private sector and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs met

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<sup>11</sup> See World Bank (1996) and Muscat (1995).

twice, at the outset of the project and towards its conclusion. Members were: Marit Sørvald, and Rolf Ree, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Anne Beathe Jensen, NORAD; Åge Skagestad, Norwegian People's Aid; Nina Berg (and later Margaret Vikki), Norwegian Refugee Council; and Sivert Sande, Linjebygg A/S. A seminar at the University of Bergen, organised by Einar Braathen and members of his research team on Mozambique, provided valuable insight at an early stage of the work.

Data collection by the CMI/NCG team was carried out in mainly Oslo and Maputo, including interviews and archival work. (See Annex 2 for a list of persons interviewed). The unorthodox nature of the evaluation, and the wide range of themes and cases considered, made data collection a daunting task. Part of that burden fell in turn upon the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD, whose patience and dedication deserve special acknowledgement here. Initial problems of accessing some NORAD documentation were later solved. Numerous government and aid officials in Mozambique and Norway, representatives of the donor community in Maputo, UN agencies, international organisations, NGOs and independent experts co-operated generously.

#### **1.5 Organisation of the report**

The first draft of the present report ran into some 250 pages. Several readers commented that while the wealth of detail unearthed by the team was worth keeping for further reference, it might discourage the broader audience of non-specialists which the study also aims to reach. In order to accommodate the conflicting interests of brevity and detail, the present version of the report contains the essence of the analytical narrative and findings in the first draft. A working paper presenting more detailed accounts of the issues reviewed will be published separately by CMI<sup>12</sup> to meet the needs of specialists.

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<sup>12</sup> Suhrke and Miranda (forthcoming).



In the present report, an overview of Norway's role in the peace process is given in **chapter 2**. This includes an examination of the policy process in Maputo during the implementation of the GPA and the related decision-making process on the Norwegian side. This chapter also presents a review and a statistical analysis of Norwegian assistance to Mozambique in the 1990-95 period. **Chapter 3** examines the evolution in strategic thinking about Norwegian aid policy to Mozambique and how it reflected, or not, the changing rhythm of war and peace. To avoid distortions when analysing one actor, it is important to recall the broader context of the peace process. This is done in **chapter 4**, which recalls the causes of war as well as the reasons for peace, and outlines the agenda and institutions of the UN-supervised peace process specified in the GPA. The macro-economic framework for peace set by the parallel Bretton Woods process is also sketched for the 1990-95 period. The grassroots perspective as captured by the team of Universidade Eduardo Mondlane is summarised in **chapter 5**. The subsequent **chapters 6-10** examine Norwegian financed activities in the "peace component of aid": demobilisation, demining, repatriation and reintegration, rapid rebuilding, and promotion of political pluralism. The concluding **chapter 11** assesses the timeliness and appropriateness of Norwegian aid to the peace process, and revisits issues of Norway's strategic options in relation to peace-making in Mozambique.

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## 2. Norway in the peace process: An overview

### A. The policy process

As a major donor and political supporter of FRELIMO, Norway had long maintained close relations with independent Mozambique. Aid had started already in the late 1960s with economic support to FRELIMO during the independence struggle. Norway was the first NATO country to assist FRELIMO against fellow NATO member Portugal and remained a staunch supporter. After 1975, an important wellspring of Norway's policy was solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, in which Mozambique was a major front-line state. In both political and aid terms, Mozambique was viewed in the context of a wider regional conflict. But additionally - and more basically - aid policies reflected Mozambique's extreme poverty. As a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official later put it: "Mozambique was the poorest country in Africa. That made it reasonable to consider it above all within a traditional foreign aid perspective."<sup>1</sup> By the late 1980s, Mozambique had become Norway's second largest foreign aid recipient (after Tanzania).<sup>2</sup>

Lines of continuity were evident in the 1990s. During the implementation of the peace agreement, Norway was a reliable donor and forceful humanitarian actor. For instance, NORAD provided quick finance and helped unlock problems in the demobilisation program (see chapter 6). In the humanitarian field, Norwegian NGOs moved quickly and proactively to start demining (chapter 7) and

support refugees (chapter 8). The main development aid program was adjusted somewhat to the changing rhythm of war and peace (chapter 4). But there was little attempt to influence the strategic policy parameters of the peace process, although some such opportunities arose. Rather, Norway appears as "the loyal team member" which gave steady financial support to the implementation program and occasionally moved forward to help it along at strategic times and places. Simultaneously, however, a somewhat different role was being played: that of a faithful friend of FRELIMO which worked with the Like-Minded group to cushion the government against politically painful demands from other donors, or against a foreign management of the peace process that could be overbearing, overwhelming and intrusive.

On the country level, the NORAD representation in Maputo participated actively in the implementation process during these two years, often moving into areas that lay beyond traditional development co-operation. There was close co-operation between NORAD/Maputo and a small group of officials on the development aid side in the Ministry<sup>3</sup>, where key positions were staffed by persons who came from the "political side" of the Ministry<sup>4</sup>, including, after 1992, the most senior civil service position. Yet it is striking that in the Ministry as a whole, the Mozambican file continued to have the imprint of a traditional donor perspective. Granted, there were efforts on the development side to redefine and stretch that perspective to make room for new aid initiatives called for by the peace process, e.g. support for demining and elections. New and flexible budget lines had recently been created for the political department in the Ministry to undertake a wide range of aid activities, and these were duly

<sup>1</sup> Commentary on the draft report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the study team, 7 February 1997. Another Ministry official who worked on Mozambique in the 1990-92 period later recalled the policy context as being dominated by three considerations: poverty orientation, the South African conflict, and Norway's policy of aid concentration - Mozambique was a main partner in development co-operation. Interview, February 1997.

<sup>2</sup> Brochmann, G. and A. Ofstad (1990) - Mozambique. Norwegian Assistance in a Context of Crisis. CMI, 1990.

<sup>3</sup> Department of Bilateral Development Assistance.

<sup>4</sup> Political Department.



tapped for Mozambique as well. Norwegian policy was to support the peace process in general and the implementation of the GPA, but apart from one occasion in early 1995, there was little or no engagement at the highest level of the Ministry on major political issues raised by the peace process. "Mozambique was a foreign aid question" a high level official in the Political Department of the Ministry later noted.<sup>5</sup> This perspective was not challenged in either the Ministry or the Parliament.

An assessment of Norwegian assistance to the peace process must take into account this modest level of ambition and the historical realities which it reflected.

## **2.1 The Rome process and the GPA**

There were two major venues for influencing the strategic parameters of the peace process. One was the Rome negotiations, which led to the conclusion of a General Peace Agreement (GPA) in October 1992, and specified a program as well as an organisational structure for implementation. The other was the Bretton Woods institutions and their consultative forum, which shaped the macro-economic framework for peace (see chapter 4 for further discussion of both).

The Rome process originated in initiatives which lay outside the sphere of Mozambique's traditional donors, including Norway and the other Like-Minded countries<sup>6</sup>. The Catholic Church and the Italian government played key mediating roles after African efforts had helped prepare the way. Later the large Western powers became involved as well. The Mozambican conflict had been closely tied to the strategic rivalries between East and West during the 1980s; supporting the peace process was part of the task of dismantling the Cold War legacy. Thus, the United States, France and the United Kingdom - all permanent members of the UN Security Council - became

<sup>5</sup> Interview, 24 October 1996.

<sup>6</sup> Informal group of donors which in relation to Mozambique is composed of the Nordic countries, Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

observers to the negotiations in Rome alongside Italy and Portugal. These states were also members of the principal commission set up by the GPA to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement - the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), and its subsidiary commissions to oversee the cease-fire and the formation of the new Mozambican Defence Forces.<sup>7</sup>

The CSC was the political heavyweight in the complex commission structure that was set up by the peace agreement and operated at head-of-mission level in Maputo. The CSC was chaired by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), Aldo Ajello. Mozambique's traditional donors, including Norway and others in the Like-Minded group, were members of a commission originally established to oversee the reintegration of demobilised soldiers (CORE). The commission subsequently had a wider humanitarian mandate and included the political "heavies" from the CSC as well. CORE met infrequently, however.

The Like-Minded donors formed their own caucus in Maputo, which met weekly. They also participated in the so-called "Aid for Democracy Group", originally an informal gathering of Western ambassadors who exchanged views on the democratisation process in Mozambique. Later chaired by UNDP and meeting monthly, as the elections approached the meetings concentrated solely on this topic and became fortnightly and eventually weekly, developing into a vital forum for orchestrating and co-ordinating donor inputs.

Active participation by Norway in the diplomatic caucusing in Maputo could not, however, make up for the structural limitations imposed on Mozambique's traditional donors by the Rome process. The division between the political and the economic sphere was clearly visible when, in October 1992, the peace agreement was signed and observed by one group of states, while the donor community as

<sup>7</sup> Germany was later invited to join. The OAU was also represented.



a whole was called in a month and a half later to finance its implementation (the Rome donor conference, December 1992). The commissions established by the Rome Agreement were similarly divided, with the traditional donors assigned essentially a humanitarian, or "low politics", agenda. The subsequent "Aid for Democracy" group in Maputo and the Like-Minded group did discuss political issues in the GPA but principally with an implementation focus. They did not - and could not - address the strategic parameters of the peace process, which were fixed by the General Peace Agreement.

Yet implementation of a peace treaty is rarely automatic, nor was it in this case. Critical junctures and bottlenecks appeared along the way concerning the timing and modalities of implementation. In the final drive to conclude an agreement in Rome, several key issues had been papered over (including the police, the security service, and the administration). These surfaced to complicate the peace process in 1992-94. On the eve of the 1994 elections, moreover, the United States aggressively pushed RENAMO's recently revived demand for power-sharing in a "government of national unity". Donors outside the Rome process but actively involved in Mozambique also had opportunities to influence these strategic issues.

There was considerable fear throughout the two-year period that RENAMO would retreat to the bush and cause the peace process to disintegrate. The debacle in Angola - where precisely that had happened - was a close memory. A main concern in the 1992-94 period, therefore, was to transform RENAMO from a loosely organised military rebel group into a political party that would remain in the political arena. An early bottleneck developed when deployment of UN peacekeeping forces was delayed. Citing security concerns, RENAMO leaders seized on the issue to stall on the demobilisation schedule specified by the GPA: they would not start demobilising until at least 65% of the UN force was deployed.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The UN and the SRSG had emphasised since October-November that rapid deployment was essential, and hoped for an advance Italian battalion. This did not materialise. In his April 1993 report to the Security

Recognising that the momentum of the peace process was slowing down during its critical first phase, the UN Secretary-General called for a quick policy response from UN troop-contributing countries to break the impasse.

Norway, along with Sweden, had been approached informally already in October 1992 to send troops and/or military observers to the UN force in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). In Oslo, the Ministry of Defence turned the request down on the grounds that Norway was already participating in seven UN operations and that its peacekeeping capacity was thinly stretched. Nor did Norway have trained military observers available. Overall, there were severe budget limitations, the Ministry of Defence concluded. The conclusion was not challenged, indeed, seemed barely noted, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The section (later "desk") most closely concerned with Mozambique was institutionally located on the development side of the Ministry and did not conceive of the peace process in military terms.<sup>9</sup> On the political side, no-one raised the issue.

In the end, the peace process moved forward even though an advance battalion was not deployed. Yet Norway did not engage in what was clearly a strategic juncture, evidently because Mozambique was viewed as "a development issue" and compartmentalised with economic and humanitarian assistance.<sup>10</sup>

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Council (doc. S/25518), the Secretary-General confirmed late deployment (an advance party of 5,400 was not in place until 1 May), noted that RENAMO had withdrawn from all commission work in Maputo, and announced that the elections would be delayed as well.

<sup>9</sup> One person working closely on aid to Mozambique in this period later could not even recall that Norway had been asked to contribute troops to ONUMOZ. Interview, October 1996.

<sup>10</sup> Advance plans for sending peacekeeping units could have been made if the government had decided to focus on the peace process in Mozambique. In response to the initial UN request in October-November 1992 for one battalion, the Ministry of Defence estimated that if Norway's current UN engagements were maintained, an additional NOK 285 million would have been needed, as well as authority from Parliament to exceed the permitted ceiling of 1,330 military persons in UN service.



Similarly, official Norway was conspicuously silent on the key political issue in the peace process that arose on the eve of the election – the US-backed RENAMO demand for a guaranteed share of governmental power – and did not respond on a high level until early 1995, when the US persisted (see 2.2 below).

A key instrument for incorporating the military rebels in the political process was the UN trust fund for RENAMO (see chapter 10). The fund was premised on the notion that RENAMO could be bought off. On this issue Norwegian policy was dominated by traditional principles and sympathies for the government side. It was decided that Norway would contribute only minimally.<sup>11</sup> In Maputo, however, the NORAD representation tried in various small but symbolically significant ways to create more symmetry in Norway's relations with the two parties.

The division of labour between the key political actors who shaped and monitored the Rome process, and the traditional donors who were called in to help finance the GPA, was not necessarily dysfunctional. At the Maputo level, there was free flow of communication and much contact between the two. Overall, the donors showed a remarkable degree of concerted attention and focused diplomacy during the two-year implementation period, as participants later recalled. The structural division between the groupings was partly bridged by common participation in the Aid for Democracy group. The group of Like-Minded donors met once a week on their own, and held weekly meetings with the SRSG, Aldo Ajello. The compact size of the diplomatic community of Maputo further encouraged communication, as did the long-standing (but somewhat rare) tradition of inter-donor collaboration in Mozambique. And Ajello was an active link.

In retrospect, Ajello appears as the maestro of multilateral diplomacy in Maputo, orchestrating the donor community to apply pressure on sticking points in the implementation process. The most striking

<sup>11</sup> An added factor was the novelty of supporting political parties over the foreign aid programme, which had not been done before.

example occurred in October 1994, on the eve of the elections. RENAMO leader Dhlakama suddenly announced he would boycott the elections because of irregularities in the preparations. Fearing that a two-year, USD one billion UN peace process might be jeopardised, and with over 2,000 international election observers already in place, Ajello orchestrated a diplomatic offensive. He took the "heavy" political members of the CSC (the American, English, French and German ambassadors) to see Dhlakama, and asked the Like-Minded countries - including Norway - that had close ties with the government side to call on President Chissano. African ambassadors and leading politicians also participated.

Diversity in the donor community thus became a diplomatic resource in the peace process. The United States and the United Kingdom were relatively the most favourable towards RENAMO demands; Norway and other Like-Minded countries were known to be traditional friends of the (FRELIMO) government; and Italy - which had provided the venue for the peace negotiations - appeared as a lead country on numerous issues during the implementation as well, partly reflecting Ajello's Italian ties. In this scheme of things, Norway was perceived to be solidly in the Like-Minded countries' fold.

## ***2.2 Decision-making processes on the Norwegian side***

The hectic diplomatic activity that unfolded during the 1992-94 period in Maputo created only a faint echo in Oslo. In the overall perspective of Norwegian foreign policy, the Mozambican peace process was not a major issue and was in any case primarily seen as a foreign aid question. This perspective was partly determined by the existence of a fairly detailed peace agreement which had removed the most contentious issues and provided a framework for peace. The overall policy of Norway was to support this framework, mainly by providing financial assistance.

The implementation program defined by the GPA shaped the immediate responses in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were



heavily focused on budgetary matters. Funds from the rather rigid main aid program ("landprogrammet") were released for immediate, short-term activities related to the peace process (mainly by reallocating import support items). Flexible budget lines were heavily tapped, both two older ones for emergency assistance, refugee aid and human rights, and two recent additions: one for promoting democracy, and one for "regional activities" in Africa (see table 2.5). Except for the latter, the flexible budget lines were managed by the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as distinct from the Departments for Development Cooperation and NORAD.

The diversity of budget lines involved transaction costs: Whenever ad hoc demands for funding arose during the implementation process, it was necessary to determine which budget line was most readily available. This could be a time-consuming process that encouraged an entrepreneurial approach. Much of the recorded decision-making process in the Ministry on Mozambique during the 1992-94 period concerns budget lines.

Throughout the 1990-1995 period, the Norwegian representation in Maputo was limited to NORAD (which became an embassy as of 1.1.1994). Given the general differences in institutional culture between NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, effective communication and co-ordination between the two required either a case-specific unity of purpose or an advanced bargaining approach. Additionally, potential obstacles resided in the fact that the political department in the Ministry managed most of the flexible budget lines that were tapped by NORAD/Maputo for the peace process. Despite the institutional divisions, the system evidently worked reasonably well, partly for idiosyncratic reasons.<sup>12</sup> A loosely structured decision-making process allowing for free-flowing and frequent consultation developed, with the head of NORAD/Maputo as the hub. Other key

<sup>12</sup> The head of NORAD/Maputo during the implementation period came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus facilitating communication with that culture.

members were officials in the newly constituted Africa desk located in the Department for Bilateral Development Co-operation of the Ministry, and the upper level of the Africa section in NORAD. The Political Department of the Ministry figured mostly as a source of finance and the political advisor for Africa played a peripheral role given the fact that the 1-2 person office covered all of Africa (and earlier also the Middle East). At the lower levels of NORAD, officials were reduced to writing out cheques, as one of them later commented.

The end of the war did generate a process of rethinking the Norwegian aid program as well. The initial concern was to maintain a high level of assistance, given the needs for peace-time reconstruction, and to adopt a flexible approach towards existing programs in recognition of the uncertainties of the transition period. The aid program for the 1994-96 period included support for elections and "democratisation", and plans for a rural rehabilitation project in recognition of the fact that peace permitted the resumption of development projects in the rural areas. Otherwise, the main sectors were traditional (energy, women, environment, import support). As a review of the main aid strategy papers for Norwegian aid in this period demonstrates, there was little effort to relate aid to the particular challenges facing the donors in post-war Mozambique (see chapter 4).

The challenges were numerous. Issues of political and administrative integration were pressing. Given the problems but also the importance of administrative integration in the wake of a civil war where "dual administration" still occurred, what constituted an appropriate balance between support for national structures and local authorities? If RENAMO were excluded from political power by the rules of majority voting, should the leaders and the forces they claimed to represent be accommodated in other ways? Did the structural adjustment program and stabilisation schemes directed by the Bretton Woods institutions form a suitable macro-economic framework for the rehabilitation and reintegration of millions of displaced persons?



What, if any, were the linkages between a massive short-term rehabilitation effort and long-term development? What were the implications of the changing regional political and security situations? Did Norway have anything specific to offer in the development of civil society and the legal system?

The main institutional vehicle for addressing strategic questions of this kind was the array of country policy papers ("country study", "country strategy", "country analysis"), which were prepared at irregular intervals in, or for, the Ministry's Department of Bilateral Development Co-operation. The last such paper had been prepared in 1991, but was quickly overtaken by events when the GPA was signed the following year. It was decided postpone the preparation of the next policy paper until after the elections, but by early 1997, this "country strategy paper" still had not been completed. Instead of taking a proactive approach by exploring issues that clearly were on the agenda and positioning Norway in relation to other donors, the Ministry was waiting for the situation to stabilise, as the 1991 paper noted, before articulating strategy.

On a more continuous basis, the head of sections meeting ("ledermøte") in the Ministry was supposed to provide a strategic and integrative dimension to policy formulation, but - partly because of the way it was constituted - failed to do so. Arguably, a Task Force approach (as used in Norway's policy towards Palestine) might have served to integrate aid policy with overall considerations of foreign policy and Norwegian policy in the Bretton Woods institutions. This was particularly important in the Mozambican case, as we shall see (section 2.3 below). The constitution of a Task Force that could provide authoritative co-ordination of policy would probably have required a political decision to the effect that Mozambique was a high-priority "political issue", where Norway had both opportunity and interest in playing a significant role. As we have seen, this decision was not made.

## **2.3 The Bretton Woods process**

A 1995 episode focusing on a donors' letter from the representations in Mozambique to the IMF illustrates the lack of integration in Norwegian policy. The letter was initiated by the US ambassador to Mozambique, evidently in support of particular US economic interests in Mozambique, but phrased in terms of support for the government's reform policy and growth as against the IMF's stabilisation program (see section 4.3). This unprecedented letter bypassed normal diplomatic channels and the Norwegian (NORAD) head of the embassy in Maputo was instructed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to sign. Nor did the Swedish and Danish embassies, but the other Like-Minded countries did (Finland, Canada and the Netherlands; also Switzerland, and the UNDP). All the Scandinavian representatives strongly favoured the content of the letter, but refrained from signing for reasons of protocol. In Oslo, the Ministry evidently concurred, but the institution which represented Norway in the IMF - the Bank of Norway - did not.<sup>13</sup> Given the formal lines of authority, the Bank's views evidently prevailed.

The Norwegian delegation at the Consultative Group (CG) meetings of the World Bank in 1990-92 focused on issues relating to the social costs of structural adjustment. Of the subsequent CG meetings, two are of particular interest here.

The 1993 CG meeting addressed certain defining characteristics of the relationship between the government of Mozambique and the donors. A paper prepared by the World Bank and widely circulated in Maputo before the meeting took up the issue of donor dominance in the post-war phase, and advocated "putting the Government back in the driver's seat".<sup>14</sup> At the request of the

<sup>13</sup> As recalled by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, February 1997.

<sup>14</sup> The special issues paper was entitled *Improving the Effectiveness of Donor Assistance*. It was partly based on the findings of a special World Bank mission to Mozambique in February-March 1993 to assess the implications of peace for development and lending



Mozambican government, the paper was discussed at a side session. The Norwegian delegation was among those which firmly supported the principle, not surprisingly given the similarity to the Norwegian aid principle of "recipient responsibility".

A more explicitly political agenda was introduced at the 1995 CG meeting. The meeting had been postponed from its customary fall date in view of the elections, and at the insistence of the United States which wanted extra time to prepare its case. A range of political demands relating to "democratisation" was introduced (see section 4.3.3 below). For the United States, two issues were paramount: (a) that RENAMO be given a share of posts in the national cabinet and in provincial governments, and (b) that local elections be held as scheduled and on terms recommended by donors.<sup>15</sup> Both measures were designed to accommodate RENAMO in the political arena. While short of a majority, RENAMO had won a significant vote in the 1994 parliamentary elections and had a strong showing in many provinces. Supported by Great Britain and Germany, the United States insisted that the FRELIMO government depart from the principle of "winner-take-all" and share power with its erstwhile enemy in the name of post-war integration and unity.

The United States and RENAMO had also raised the issue before the elections. In the fall of 1994, power-sharing became one of the most divisive and sensitive political issues in Maputo. Norway took a low profile (see chapter 10). This time, however, the Norwegian government responded to the insistent US lobbying in Washington, Paris, and other donor capitals before the CG meeting by preparing its own case. The Norwegian delegation, led by a high-level official who had just been transferred to the Department of Bilateral Development Co-operation from the Political Department, positioned itself into an early slot in the list of speakers so as to help set

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policies towards Mozambique, also known as the "Vision Mission" (see 4.3.2. below).

<sup>15</sup> Donor demands regarding local elections are described in *Mozambique peace process bulletin, issue 16, December 1995 (AWEPA, Maputo)*.

the tone against the US proposal. The other Like-Minded countries took the same position, with the Danish representative summarising the argument: "This is not the time for rigid conditionalities."<sup>16</sup> Both the nature of the issue and the forum ensured that this time official Norway engaged at a high political level in defence of the FRELIMO government. Mozambicans at the meeting later recalled that "we won this one" with the help of the Like-Minded countries.

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<sup>16</sup> Mozambique Consultative Group Meeting. *Chair's Closing Statement*. Paris, 14-15 March 1995.



## B. The aid programme: A statistical analysis

Given the history of the political and bilateral assistance ties between Norway and Mozambique, it was inevitable that Norwegian aid would play a role in the peace process - but how can this role be more precisely measured and characterized by looking at the aid portfolio? How much money did Norway give, how was it managed in the context of the administrative and budgetary structures of Norwegian aid, for what explicit purposes was it given, in which form and through which channels? These are some of the questions that are addressed in the following analysis of the database on Norwegian assistance to Mozambique compiled by NORAD in accordance with

the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) requirements and guidelines. It should be noted that the data contain significant limitations, in particular because a number of projects benefiting Mozambican refugees in neighbouring countries (Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) are not covered in the NORAD reporting to DAC on account of Mozambique. Such projects are estimated by the MFA to have amounted to NOK 15.7 million in the years 1990-93. Another important exclusion (quantitatively much more important although less relevant to the focus of the present study) concerns the assistance in the form of debt relief grants through the Bretton Woods institutions.

**Table 2.1 Norwegian assistance to Mozambique, 1990-1995 (in thousand NOK)**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Disbursements	327 454	446 313	455 511	419 764	510 085	331 262
Refunds	419	0	1 176	455	794	254
Net	327 035	446 313	454 335	419 309	509 291	331 008

The strength of the bilateral assistance ties between Norway and Mozambique are well evident (Table 2.1). During the period 1990-95, Norway granted a total of approximately NOK 2.5 billion or on average NOK 415 million, which according to OECD's calculations correspond to USD 370 million and USD 63 million respectively (see Annex 3.3, p. 141). This placed Mozambique among the top recipients of Norwegian bilateral assistance - yet since that assistance is spread among many recipients, the share of Mozambique amounted on average to no more than 10 per cent. At the other end of the pipeline, Norway ranked among the most important bilateral donors to Mozambique. During the period 1990-1995, Mozambique received an average of USD 798 million

annually in bilateral ODA<sup>17</sup>, of which some 8% came from Norway. There is therefore a good symmetry in the relationship between donor and recipient, the aid flow being significant to both parties but not overwhelmingly so.

There were considerable variations in the volume of aid from year to year, with a big jump (+ 36 per cent) from 1990 to 1991 and another (+ 21 per cent) from 1993 to 1994, but it is not possible to read from these figures any close link to the peace process calendar. The Donor Conference in Rome took place too late in 1992 in relation to Norwegian state budget process - and there Norway in fact pledged only a relatively modest USD 8 million.

<sup>17</sup> See table A3.3 in Annex 3.3 for details and sources.



Assistance in 1993 turned out to decline by some 8 per cent in relation to the previous year. Obviously, a special effort was made in 1994, the crucial election year, when Norwegian assistance peaked at over half a billion kroner. But a closer look at the data for 1994 reveals that the aid flow in that year was to a large extent dominated by the payment of NOK 92.8 million to Linjebygg for an energy sector project, which thus absorbed almost one-fifth of the Norwegian bilateral assistance to Mozambique in that year. This was followed by a sharp drop (about one third) the following year, so that the level of assistance in 1995 stood at about the same level as in 1990.

While it may not be possible to read the progress of the peace process from the global disbursement figures, that is not to say that Norwegian aid has been insulated from the aggravation of the crisis in the final years of the war and the subsequent

transition from war to peace. The influence of these contextual factors is reflected more clearly the fragmentation of aid, the budgetary and administrative flexibility that was shown, the willingness to continue providing support to certain activities (such as the state owned coastal transport sector or the transport corridors) because of their strategic interest in the context of the war.

## **2.4 The fragmentation of aid**

The Norwegian aid portfolio to Mozambique in the period under review was extremely fragmented. In the six years 1990-95, there were some 900 aid disbursements, some very large (such as the above mentioned NOK 92.8 million disbursement to Linjebygg in 1994) and many very small. While the average disbursement amounted to some NOK 2.8 million, the disparity in project size was very large.

**Table 2.2 Number of disbursements by amount disbursed**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
NOK 5 million and above	19	20	24	24	25	18
NOK 1 million to 4,999,999	28	33	35	33	36	35
NOK 100,000 to 999,999	47	65	62	71	85	48
less than NOK 100,000	25	35	21	39	49	24
All disbursements	119	153	142	167	195	125
Average disbursement (mill. NOK)	2.8	2.9	3.2	2.5	2.6	2.7

During the period under consideration, out of the average of 150 disbursements made every year, only 22 (about 15 per cent) were for NOK 5 million and above. However, these payments represented more than three quarters of the total amount

disbursed. On the other hand, the multitude of very small projects under NOK 100,000 - which stood for about one fifth of the payments - amounted to far less than 1 per cent of the total expenditure.



**Table 2.3 Share of various sizes of disbursements (average 1990-95)**

	Number of disbursements	Amount disbursed (thousand NOK)	Share of total amount disbursed
NOK 5 million and above	22	1908684	76.3%
NOK 1 million to 4,999,999	33	430728	17.7%
NOK 100,000 to 999,999	63	142987	5.7%
less than NOK 100,000	32	7990	0.3%
All disbursements	150	2490389	100.0%

This fragmentation of the portfolio – attributed to the desire to be a “good donor” and respond positively to almost any request – coupled with the lack of managerial capacity of the recipient’s administration placed an exceptionally heavy burden on the Norwegian Embassy in Maputo. The current emphasis on reducing the number of projects, adjusting the flow of aid to match the recipients administrative capacity and freeing the Embassy from the burden of day-to-day project implementation is a reaction to a situation that had become untenable<sup>18</sup>, but had nevertheless been allowed to continue until the peace process had come to its formal conclusion and a new leadership took over at the Norwegian Embassy. The number of disbursements registered a sharp reduction already in 1995 (125 disbursements against 195 the previous year), particularly among the smaller sized disbursements. The fragmentation certainly had consequences also for the capacity of the Norwegian authorities in Oslo to coordinate and evaluate the flow of aid<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> The Norwegian State Auditor in its report from an inspection undertaken in 1994 was especially critical of the fact that NORAD had taken over the responsibility for the primary accounting and administrative execution of several projects.

<sup>19</sup> For instance, the unit (Political Unit II under Section V of the Bilateral Department) which handled (among other things) a multitude of disbursements under the flexible budget lines for promoting democracy, human rights and aiding refugees had only two program officers. Both budget lines were heavily used to finance the Norwegian “peace contribution” to Mozambique.

## ***2.5 The complexity of the Norwegian aid portfolio***

Administratively and budgetarily, aid to Mozambique has involved a complex web of administrative units in several divisions of NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, having primary responsibility for the allocation of resources from similarly large number of posts in the Norwegian state budget. Table 2.4 is an attempt to link the state budget chapters that are relevant in the context of aid to Mozambique with the unit having primary responsibility for it during most of the period 1990-95.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>20</sup> There have been various changes in the administrative set-up of both NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the period 1990-1995. The table purports to present the “most typical” set up for this period for illustrative purposes.



**Table 2.4 Administrative units with primary responsibility for specific budget posts in Norwegian assistance to Mozambique**

Description	NORAD	MFA
Country programme	Regional Department for Africa	
Regional activities	Regional Department for Africa	
Africa, other	Regional Department for Africa	Department for Bilateral Development Cooperation
Special support schemes Environment Women Culture Aids	Regional Department for Africa	Department for Multilateral Development Cooperation (for multi-bi projects)
Support through NGOs	Division for NGOs	
Cooperation with private sector	Division for Industrial Cooperation, Africa Section	
Research and evaluation		Department for Bilateral Development Cooperation (Division III)
Technical assistance	Technical Department	
Volunteers	Division for Volunteers	
Multi-bi		Department for Multilateral Development Cooperation (UN and World Bank Sections)
Humanitarian assistance		Disaster Relief Division in the Department for Bilateral Development Cooperation, subsequently in the Political Department (Section V) (after 1994)
Refugees and human rights		Political Department
Democracy, development and national independence		Political Department

The distribution of the aid portfolio by chapters of the Norwegian State budget<sup>21</sup> is shown in table 2.5 in NOK amounts; for easy reference, the the corresponding percentage structure is shown in table 2.6.

<sup>21</sup> The nomenclature of the relevant chapters of the Norwegian State budget has undergone several changes during the period under consideration. A table showing the budget post codes applicable year by year in each budget chapter is shown in annex 3, table A3.1.



**Table 2.5 Distribution of Norwegian bilateral aid to Mozambique by chapters of the Norwegian state budget**

Budget chapter	Description	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
150.74	Country programme*	224 859	253 016	240 619	232 230	253 437	200 511
note A	Regional activities	46 330	103 597	85 289	54 282	31 403	8 619
150.79	Africa, other			34 140	32 110	25 400	54 282
note B	Special support schemes	3 983	5 501	6 588	7 154	8 849	6 844
note C	Support through NGOs	11 733	14 173	18 349	25 136	26 884	24 014
note D	Cooperation with private sector		99	343	304	93 387	6 218
note E	Research and evaluation	3 236	5 635	3 891	2 096	2 107	1 346
note F	Technical assistance	3 472	3 757	2 509	4 142	3 358	831
note G	Volunteers	5 492	4 830	4 437	6 885	7 832	9 024
note H	Multi-bi	4 761	28 700	10 377	11 500	21 100	7 900
190.70	Humanitarian assistance	5 300	13 700	35 508	25 151	4 218	4 551
note I	Refugees and human rights	17 869	13 305	12 285	14 675	25 213	5 229
note J	Democracy, development and national independence				3 644	6 103	1 893
	Total	327 035	446 313	454 335	419 309	509 291	331 262

\* NOK 1.304.000 under budget post 153.75 (Nordic projects) in 1991 is included here under Country programme. The notes showing the detailed budget line codes are the object of table A3.1 in Annex 3.

The country programme budget chapter is the one that funds most of the Norwegian assistance to Mozambique, as it would be expected in the context of a *hovedsamarbeidsland* - a main recipient of Norwegian aid with whom Norway has established a country programme agreement. This instrument is designed to ensure that aid is negotiated and scheduled by both parties with a medium-term perspective (usually three years), so that it can be better integrated in the national planning process and encourage responsible decision-making on the part of the recipient. Due to the exceptional circumstances in Mozambique, however, a more flexible approach was required - and country programme negotiations had to a large extent to abandon the multi-year perspective to concentrate on the immediate needs for the months ahead<sup>22</sup>. While the country programme budget chapter

continued to fund a large proportion of the aid flow - in some cases the type of activities involved did not have the long term development perspective which would normally be required for this budget chapter. A case in point was the contribution to the fund for demobilized soldiers paid to UNDP in 1995 (NOK 6.3 million); another instance was the payment of NOK 10 million in 1994 to fund the elections. Both cases are eminently short-term operations and the disbursements were classified as import support.

<sup>22</sup> The draft of the Country Analysis (dated 23 April 91) contained a candid acknowledgement of these constraints.



**Table 2.6 The structure of Norwegian aid to Mozambique 1990-95  
by chapters of the Norwegian State budget**

Description	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Country programme	68.8	56.7	53.0	55.4	49.8	60.5
Regional activities	14.2	23.2	18.8	12.9	6.2	2.6
Africa, other			7.5	7.7	5.0	16.4
Special support schemes	1.2	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.7	2.1
Support through NGOs	3.6	3.2	4.0	6.0	5.3	7.2
Cooperation with private sector		<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	18.3	1.9
Research and evaluation	1.0	1.3	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.4
Technical assistance	1.0	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.3
Volunteers	1.7	1.1	1.0	1.6	1.5	2.7
Multi-bi	1.5	6.4	2.3	2.7	4.1	2.4
Humanitarian assistance	1.6	3.1	7.8	6.0	0.8	1.4
Refugees and human rights	5.5	3.0	2.7	3.5	5.0	1.6
Democracy, development and national independence				0.9	1.2	0.6
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Mozambique drew a sizable amount of resources (almost NOK 150 million) from budget post "Africa, other" (region-bevilgning), from the creation of this budget post in 1992 through 1995. This is an eminently flexible budget post, originally intended to support the economic and political reform processes in Africa - long term processes that might need short term support for specific one-time operations. Some NOK 1.5 billion were channelled through this budget post during the period 1992-95 - therefore the share of Mozambique in these funds, although appreciable, was nevertheless relatively modest (about 10%).

Cooperation with the private sector, on the other hand, has traditionally played at best a minor role (in most years, no role at all) in assistance to Mozambique. This was much deplored by the Norwegian side and several policy documents - including the Joint Statement in 1991 - express the

intention to encourage this type of cooperation. The reasons why this did not happen in the circumstances that prevailed until 1992 are too obvious to need elaboration. In 1994, the Linjebygg project departed from tradition in a big way - the company had been following developments in Mozambique closely and discussing business opportunities with Electricidade de Mozambique for several years, planning for the day peace would come. They were therefore ready to bid when the international tender for the project was launched in 1993. Aid money was essential to produce an attractive financial package and win the contract for Linjebygg. Thus, the approval of this project by NORAD was also a strong political signal of confidence in and support for the consolidation of the peace process. Other emerging business opportunities attracted some more private sector interest in 1995, but at a relatively modest level.



## 2.6 Distribution by DAC sector

The sectoral information is summarized in table 2.7 below, by main sector (1 digit code) of the DAC nomenclature<sup>23</sup>.

The most salient feature is the preponderance of main sector 2 - "Development of Public Utilities" - which until 1995 tended to concentrate about half of the Norwegian assistance to Mozambique. In 1995, however, the share of this sector drops abruptly to less than 30 per cent. Health and Population projects, represented until 1992 a marginal area for Norwegian assistance (less than 5 per cent). The official statistics indicate that the sector received growing attention in the post Peace Agreement era, to the point that by 1995, it had become the second largest sector in the Norwegian portfolio, representing about 20 per cent of the total. This increased assistance for the health sector has been given in a very flexible manner- import support for medicines - which can absorb any amount of resources, particularly if it is not tied to specific programme objectives.

Education is also a marginal sector in Norwegian aid to Mozambique and it appears not to have benefitted from the post-1992 restructuring; by 1995, its share remained one of the smallest in the Norwegian aid package to Mozambique - only "Banking and Tourism" receives even less support. This is all the more remarkable that in the analysis of

Mozambique as a development assistance partner, the low level of education in the country is clearly perceived as one of the main obstacles to development.

Assistance "Not Referable to Sector" (main sector 0) was in 1995 the third largest sector in the Norwegian aid package, with a 15 per cent share. In some years in the past it represented an even larger share, particularly in 1992 when it stood for exactly one third of Norwegian assistance. This main sector is of especial interest in the context of this evaluation since it includes disbursements for emergency food aid and humanitarian aid; it also includes a residual category, "Non Referable to Sector: Other", under which various projects at the core of the peace process can be found (for example, the contribution in 1995 to the Demobilization of Soldiers' Fund). However, not all projects classified under main sector 0 are of humanitarian nature or directly related to the broad peace process issues; in 1990, for instance, there was a NOK 20 million payment towards import support of oil from Bahrain; in 1991 and 1992 there were very large payments for miscellaneous import support (NOK 67 million and NOK 70 million respectively). In these latter cases, it would be necessary to look into more detailed project documentation to determine the exact nature of the project.

Also various projects of core relevance to the peace process have been classified in main sector 9 ("Multisector and unspecified"): most of these projects are relatively small, but a notable exception is perhaps the "Rural Rehabilitation" project (Moz-077), for which over NOK 6 million were disbursed in 1995.

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<sup>23</sup> For each transaction, there is information on the sector to which the project belongs, according to the two-digit code recommended by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Our analysis of the raw data suggests that there is some degree of subjectivity in the classification; unlike the financial data, which can be easily tallied and checked, inconsistencies and errors in sector classifications may well go undetected. We have noticed that the contribution to the Research Fund of Eduardo Mondlane University, coded in 1992 under DAC sector 64 (Research), appears for 1991 under code 53 (Trade and Export Promotion); we took this to be a mistake and moved it to sector 64.



**Table 2.7 Norwegian assistance to Mozambique by DAC sector, 1990-95**

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
	<b>in thousand NOK</b>					
0 - Not referable to sector	43 186	114 162	151 934	66 176	69 537	50 304
1 - Planning and public adm.	9 000	5 511	6 017	16 375	16 205	19 415
2 - Develop. of public utilities	150 653	239 598	205 110	177 365	290 897	97 179
3 - Agriculture, Fishery	9 530	15 055	14 130	57 495	18 757	13 624
4 - Industry, Mining, Handicraft	69 902	27 757	21 607	12 197	14 686	18 747
5 - Banking, Finance, Tourism	0	0	0	130	1 955	0
6 - Education, science	13 022	8 904	11 730	10 558	8 715	8 864
7 - Health, Population projects	15 182	19 468	20 912	45 833	48 265	68 147
8 - Soc. infrastr., soc. welfare, culture	3 084	5 027	10 022	13 924	24 376	30 794
9 - Multisector and unspecified	13 895	10 831	14 049	19 711	16 692	24 188
<i>Total (gross)</i>	327 454	446 313	455 511	419 764	510 085	331 262
	<b>percentage</b>					
0 - Not referable to sector	13,2%	25,6%	33,4%	15,8%	13,6%	15,2%
1 - Planning and public adm.	2,7%	1,2%	1,3%	3,9%	3,2%	5,9%
2 - Develop. of public utilities	46,0%	53,7%	45,0%	42,3%	57,0%	29,3%
3 - Agriculture, Fishery	2,9%	3,4%	3,1%	13,7%	3,7%	4,1%
4 - Industry, Mining, Handicraft	21,3%	6,2%	4,7%	2,9%	2,9%	5,7%
5 - Banking, Finance, Tourism	0	0	0	0	0,3%	0
6 - Education, science	4,0%	2,0%	2,6%	2,5%	1,7%	2,7%
7 - Health, Population projects	4,6%	4,4%	4,6%	10,9%	9,5%	20,6%
8 - Soc. infrastr., soc. welfare, culture	0,9%	1,1%	2,2%	3,3%	4,8%	9,3%
9 - Multisector and unspecified	4,2%	2,4%	3,1%	4,7%	3,3%	7,3%
<i>Total (gross)</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

## 2.7 Forms of assistance

In DAC terminology, the “form of assistance” is supposed to reflect roughly whether the assistance flow consists of money, knowledge or goods<sup>24</sup>.

<sup>24</sup> A closer look at the way individual projects were coded with respect to “form of assistance” revealed a number of counter-intuitive outcomes, making the interpretation of this table problematic.



**Table 2.8 Norwegian assistance to Mozambique 1990-95 by form of assistance**

Code and description	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
1- Project assistance	177 731	255 591	312 652	294 333	211 098	155 988
2- Programme assistance	42 586	90 589	20 348	19 861	33 097	51 845
3- Commodity assistance, import support	75 197	69 412	70 038	58 481	37 000	53 801
4- Technical cooperation	31 521	30 721	51 297	46 634	135 296	69 374
7- Mixed credits					92 800	
Total	327 035	446 313	454 335	419 309	509 291	331 008

## **2.8 The role of NGOs**

As shown in table 2.9, assistance to Mozambique provided through NGOs amounted to about NOK 328 million and thus accounted for some 14 per cent of the total Norwegian assistance to Mozambique during the 1990-95 period, with sizable fluctuations from year to year (close to 9 per cent at its lowest in 1991 and about 19 per cent at its highest in 1995). In the context of Norwegian bilateral assistance, these figures are higher than average, but except for 1995, not dramatically so<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>25</sup> In 1995, about 11 per cent of all Norwegian bilateral assistance was channelled through NGOs.



**Table 2.9 Norwegian assistance to Mozambique disbursed through NGOs, 1990-95**  
(thousand NOK)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
Norwegian Refugee Council	-	6 800	9 638	11 934	5 718	9 465
Norwegian Church Aid	2 269	2 660	3 688	4 807	5 014	2 627
Norwegian People's Aid	1 458	4 541	9 163	12 781	19 660	31 565
Norwegian Red Cross	3 760	3 142	11 378	15 107	7 326	6 886
Norwegian Save the Children	23 855	14 094	15 465	10 272	5 809	4 152
Sum: The "big five"	31 342	31 237	49 332	54 901	43 527	54 695
Other Norwegian NGOs	2 715	3 687	12 895	12 863	5 299	4 402
International NGOs	37	-	-	-	-	-
Local NGOs	1 977	3 560	3 249	5 154	5 028	2 318
Total	36 071	38 484	65 476	72 918	53 854	61 415
Share of Norwegian aid	11,0%	8,6%	14,4%	17,4%	10,6%	18,5%

Most of the NGO-channelled assistance is handled by the group of "big 5" Norwegian NGOs: The Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian People's Aid, the Norwegian Red Cross and Save the Children. During the past 6-years under review, their share of the NGO sector has been about 80% on average.

As noted in table 2.7, the sums in State budget chapter earmarked for support to Mozambique through NGOs totalled some

NOK 120 million, while the aid provided through the NGO channel amounted to NOK 328 million. This indicates that NGOs receive funds predominantly from other budget chapters - in fact, some Norwegian NGOs operating in Mozambique mobilize funds from a wide range of State budget chapters, as illustrated in table 2.10. This underscores the great flexibility that Norway has used in the management of assistance to Mozambique.

**Table 2.10 - Funding for projects in Mozambique undertaken by the "Big 5" Norwegian NGOs, by chapter of the State budget, 1990-95** (amounts in thousand NOK)

State budget chapter	Norwegian Church Aid	Norwegian Red Cross	Norwegian People's Aid	Norwegian Refugee Council	Save the Children
Special support schemes (AIDS...)					1221
Africa, other (Regionbevilgning)			47543	9614	
Support through NGOs	10882	27176	14667	5409	13496
Humanitarian assistance (nødhjelpen)	6045	16787	7955	2500	33928
Refugees and human rights	4138	3636	9003	19309	25002
Democracy				6723	
Total	21065	47599	79168	43555	73647

As shown in table 2.11, a clear majority of the NGO-managed assistance goes to projects in Main Sector 0 in the DAC classification - typically projects of humanitarian and emergency nature.

Therefore, the sectoral structure of the NGO project portfolio is quite different from that of the overall Norwegian aid package - which is not that surprising, since NGOs are hardly at home in the



business of developing public utilities. In that sense, the NGO project portfolio, which is heavy on humanitarian assistance, health, education and rural development appears to have complemented and "softened" the Government-to-Government aid effort.

It is in the nature of the humanitarian/emergency project niches that they evolve quickly over time. In 1990, the largest recipient was Save the Children and the smallest Norsk Folkehjelp; by 1995, the situation was nearly the opposite. The current size of Norsk Folkehjelp's activity reflects principally their involvement in mine clearance operations, for which they

received some NOK 15 million in 1994 and NOK 28 million in 1995; it will be interesting to see whether they will manage to keep a dominant position in the context of assistance to Mozambique in the future, as the need for mine clearance hopefully will subside. Similar questions about the future would also apply to the portfolio of the Norwegian Refugee Council, which emerged in 1995 as the second largest NGO. On the other hand, 1995 also saw the emergence of the Norwegian Association for the Blind as an important player, with a Mozambican project portfolio about the size of that of Kirkens Nødhjelp, the smallest of the "big five".

**Table 2.11 Distribution of NGO projects by main DAC sector, average 1990-95**

Main DAC sector	Per cent
0 - Not Referable to Sector	59.0%
1 - Planning and Public Administration	2.3%
2 - Development of Public Utilities	0.3%
3 - Agriculture, Fishery	2.2%
4 - Industry, Mining, Handicraft	1.8%
5 - Banking, Finance, Tourism	0.0%
6 - Education, Science	7.8%
7 - Health, Population projects	10.4%
8 - Social infrastructure, Social welfare, Culture	6.7%
9 - Multisector and unspecified	9.6%
All sectors	100.0%

Direct assistance to local NGOs remains very modest, on average some 6 per cent of the funds given to NGOs and less than 1 per cent of the Norwegian total assistance package. It is likely that some proportion of the assistance given to Norwegian NGOs trickles down to their local affiliates and partners, enabling them to play a more active role in the context of Norwegian assistance than the above figures suggest. On the other hand, it may be noted that a number of the transactions recorded do not concern true NGOs, but rather local consultants<sup>26</sup> working on assignments given

<sup>26</sup>The same observation applies to Norwegian NGOs as well - in the data, the Mozambique Country Study carried out in 1990-91 by the Chr. Michelsen Institute on commission from the

by the Norwegian authorities; such assignments tend to be financially rather insignificant in the context of the Norwegian aid programme.

### ***2.9 Assistance specifically for peace, reconciliation and reconstruction***

When a country is engaged in a peace process, all development and humanitarian aid is in a certain sense, assistance to that peace process and the above data describe through various approaches how that

Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears as a NGO project.



assistance was given. But there is an intuitive feeling that such definition is too broad and that it should be possible to distinguish a core of activities that are more directly related to the peace process, leaving aside all those activities that may have some more or less indirect bearing on that process. For the purpose of this study, we have chosen to define that core as those activities mandated by the Peace Accords and the Rome Conferences (Demobilisation, Demining, Repatriation, Rapid Rebuilding and Elections).

Identifying the specific projects that correspond to these activities is not always easy: there is no automatic way to sort projects between core and non-core and some community development activities may or may not be related to the peace process, depending on the context in which they take place<sup>27</sup>. We have scanned the approximately 900 disbursements that constitute the Norwegian aid portfolio 1990-95 and with the help of some simple rules, tried to eliminate those that did not seem related to the peace process, or which had been undertaken on the basis of other development assistance strategies (for instance, many women projects would fall in that category). Demining, Demobilisation and Election-related projects are easy to identify. The problems arise in the repatriation/rapid rebuilding area and the attendant activities of humanitarian assistance to refugees and community development, which may take place in the context of post-war rehabilitation or resettlement. We have also decided to include only those disbursements

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<sup>27</sup> To illustrate this point, consider a project from the 1994 portfolio called "Combat of Bubonic Plague", DAC sector code 73 (Nursing, Vaccination programmes, Disease and epidemic control). At first sight, nothing suggests that it may be peace process relevant. However, a closer look at archive information reveals that the project was a rat-extermination operation carried out in Tete province, where rats had caused a bubonic plague outbreak among resettled refugees. Given that context, the project appears indeed to be part of the repatriation and resettlement component of the peace process.

that were made from 1992 - excluding, for instance, projects such as humanitarian assistance to refugees or school rehabilitation projects undertaken in 1990 and 1991. The list of projects thus selected is shown in annex A3.2 and summarized in table 2.12.

As shown in table 2.12, the activities in areas that are more clearly peace-process related (demining, demobilization and elections, peace-keeping, conflict prevention, and rehabilitation care for war affected children) appear to have cost some NOK 110 million. Assistance to refugees, their repatriation and rehabilitation absorbed NOK 135 million. A large number of activities, mostly community development projects in contexts that may be peace process relevant received about NOK 140 million. In total, the Norwegian bilateral contribution in assistance to the peace process can be estimated to have amounted to a maximum of NOK 380 million, which represents roughly one fifth of the total disbursements during the period 1992-1995.



**Table 2.12 - Overview of the peace-process related portfolio**

Classification	Number of disbursements	Amount (000's NOK)
Refugees	29	68,694
Repatriation and rehabilitation	26	65,937
Demining	7	56,613
Demobilization	3	19,300
Elections and Democratization	15	22,137
Peace and reconciliation	9	9,958
Community development/grey area	65	137,777
Total	154	380,416
Total bilateral assistance 1992-95	629	1,716,622



### 3. Aid and the peace process: the evolution of Norwegian policy strategies

This chapter describes the development of Norwegian aid strategy towards Mozambique in the transition period from war to peace (1990-95).

Formulation of aid strategy is a continuous process. Each year, the bilateral consultations between Norway and Mozambique and the annual meeting of the Consultative Group in Paris require some articulation of policy - although the focus on strategic issues may vary. Obviously, Norway has more control over the agenda of the bilateral meetings than the Consultative Group meetings, where there are several large donors with strong political agendas. In addition to these regular events, there are ad hoc opportunities to articulate policy and strategy, such as high-level visits and the formulation of policy papers (variously called "country studies", "country analyses" and country strategies").

#### 3.1 The Mozambique Country Study (1990): aid in the context of war

The period under consideration (1990-1995) opens with the preparation of a "country study" on Mozambique<sup>1</sup>, as part of a series of studies of Norway's main partner countries for development assistance, commissioned by the then Ministry of Development Co-operation for the purpose of evaluating the long-term orientation and volume of Norwegian aid. Prepared by independent researchers, the country studies became inputs into an internal assessment process in the Ministry that resulted in "country analyses".

The Mozambique "country study" was carried out in 1989/90 and thus represents a benchmark assessment at the onset of the transition from war to peace. There were yet no concrete prospects of peace - the situation

would indeed further deteriorate for a couple of years - but trends both in Mozambique and internationally indicated that negotiated settlement was on the horizon.

Examining the strategic objectives of past Norwegian aid, the study identified a number of gaps and suggested guidelines for future strategy. The study found that after the first formative years (1977-82), the main structure of the regular programme had not changed much, the main pillars being commodity aid, coastal shipping and the energy sector. Additional programmes had been added, but without becoming "main sectors": fisheries, personnel fund, oil and gas development, and the national tuberculosis programme. On top of the regular programme, Norway had also allocated funds through various arrangements: the Nordic agricultural programme MONAP, regional projects through SADCC, rehabilitation grants co-financed with the World Bank; emergency assistance; volunteers; and special allocations (NGOs, research, women, environment, etc.) As a result, there was considerable diversity and flexibility in the programme, but also increasingly *ad hoc* decision-making and corresponding difficulty for the Mozambican side to participate effectively in the decision-making process.

A principal finding in the study was that the Mozambican reform process (PRE) had not led to major changes in Norwegian aid, even though PRE affected most activities supported by Norway.<sup>2</sup> Norway did not have any explicit policy on PRE, although co-financing with the World Bank of rehabilitation credits had been interpreted as a sign of a Norway's positive attitude towards the reforms process and the

<sup>1</sup>Brochmann and Ofstad (1990).

<sup>2</sup>The Norwegian aid program was affected, for instance, by the devaluation of the metical, the introduction of countervalue payments, the increased economic opportunities for some groups combined with reduced subsidies and social welfare for others, the increased brain drain from the government and the shrinking public sector.



role of the World Bank in this connection. The study recommended that Norway take a more active role, based on an independent analysis of how to strengthen the positive consequences of PRE, while reducing the negative ones. In World Bank discussions and other fora, Norway should advocate that more attention be given to the human aspects of development and to strategies that combined economic growth with poverty reduction. The study nevertheless recognised that Norway's existing capacity to undertake such independent analysis was insufficient and would need to be strengthened.

Another strategic gap, according to the study, concerned policies to strengthen the state and its nation-building efforts. The study found that Norway had hardly developed any strategy on this issue, vacillating between a "recipient oriented" policy of working closely with the Mozambican authorities and a more "donor oriented" policy of defining objectives, target groups and projects according to its own priorities.

Overall, the study recognised that aid must be viewed in the context of war: Mozambique was in a state of semi-permanent emergency where "normal" criteria for aid allocations did not apply. Relief assistance must be given high priority; exceptional caution must be exercised when making new large-scale investments; funding had to be provided on a more flexible basis than under peace-time conditions in order to encourage activities that yielded short-term benefits and avoid commitments that tied up funds for recurrent costs; and added emphasis should be given to institution-building and support to the state. At the same time, Mozambique had to prepare itself for the post-war period by developing human resources and institutions that could act quickly once more "normal" development efforts were possible.

Regarding aid strategy, the study concluded that Norway could contribute most meaningfully by concentrating on relatively few projects and programmes. The present aid programme was considered too expansive and fragmented, involving support in too many areas and activities. Certain principles would be useful in reorganising the programme:

examine past aid experiences in Mozambique and develop areas with "best experiences"; draw on positive experiences in other countries in comparable circumstances;; support strategically important activities that other major donors did not finance for political or other reasons; and consider concentrating more of assistance in one or two provinces.

### **3.2 The Country Analysis (Landanalyse)**

In February 1990, the MFA set up a working group<sup>3</sup> for the purpose of preparing a Country Analysis for Mozambique. The Country Analysis, based *inter alia* on the "country study", was to set the strategy for future assistance to Mozambique. A first draft was circulated by August 1990, with the authors' evident apprehension regarding the solidity of such an exercise. The group noted that the timing of the policy paper had been determined by bureaucratic routines unconnected to developments in Mozambique, and concluded that the uncertain political situation in late 1990 made it advisable to postpone any changes in the aid program. (Coincidentally, the draft was circulated on the same day that FRELIMO's Politburo unanimously endorsed a multi-party political system). Work on the draft continued for several months and a considerably revised version - benefiting from analytical capacity of the local NORAD office, which was uncommonly strong at that time - was circulated at the end of April 1991.

The "country analysis" notes that the main objectives of Norwegian aid to Mozambique had been to contribute to: (a) self-supporting social and economic development; (b) reduction of the social and economic consequences of the crisis; (c) reduction of Mozambique's economic dependency from South Africa and strengthening of regional co-operation; (d) ecologically responsible management of natural resources and the environment. Regarding the

<sup>3</sup> The working group, led by the Department for Bilateral Development Co-operation, comprised representatives from NORAD/Oslo, NORAD/Maputo, and from the Ministry's Department for Multilateral Development Co-operation and Department for Programme.



two first objectives, the analysis found that these harmonised with Mozambican policy objectives. As for the relationship with South Africa, however, it was recognised that Mozambique was tacitly seeking to re-establish economic contact, a decision forced by the structure of the Mozambican economy and the costs incurred by the South African unilateral reduction of economic relations as part of its destabilisation campaign. On the other hand, Mozambique had consistently taken a position against apartheid, and the "country analysis" suggests that Norwegian assistance helped to make this possible. Finally, it was noted that ecological considerations had been subordinated to the need for survival during the prolonged crisis.

### **3.3 Ministerial level discussions**

The country analysis was followed in June 1991 by a visit to Mozambique by the then Minister of Development Co-operation, Grethe Faremo. The objective was to discuss the implications for the aid program of the continuous political and economic reforms, particularly in light of the 1990 Constitution and its framework for political pluralism. The visit took place after the Rome peace negotiations were well underway – and the joint communiqué briefly referred to the changing context, but mostly focused on traditional aid issues.

The joint statement noted of the "crucial transformation" taking place in Mozambique, comprising the democratisation process and the economic reform process and emphasised that these were important goals in themselves, as well as "necessary mutual prerequisites" for economic growth to fight poverty and to promote democratisation. The joint statement also mentioned that the "ongoing peace negotiations" were discussed, but it does not elaborate on what was said nor is there any suggestion that Norwegian support for those negotiations was offered or requested. The prospects of peace seem to have figured in these discussions only by way of Norway's promise to "be open to consider" support to

rural rehabilitation programmes and reconstruction "as soon as there [was] peace". The partners also noted the need to keep investments at a low level to permit adjustments to the programme "when peace [had] been achieved" - more a reflection of the need for flexibility in a state of semi-permanent emergency than a strategy for peace.

By contrast, the joint statement is rich in detail about issues that are traditional hallmarks of Norwegian development assistance, such as the need to target aid to vulnerable groups, particularly women and children; the role of NGOs; sectoral balance; integration of women in development projects and protection of the environment. Characteristically, when referring to the rural rehabilitation efforts that Norway might support in the event of peace, women were identified as an important target group — while demobilised soldiers are mentioned more tentatively as another group that could be included.

### **3.4 The Country Strategies**

The two policy papers that were developed from 1989 to 1991 became largely obsolete with the signing of the Peace Accord in 1992. The Norwegian government recognised that the end of the war created new conditions for aid, but found it difficult to formalise a new strategy during an uncertain transition period. Independently of the changing circumstances in Mozambique, Norwegian aid policy had also been adjusted to incorporate new assistance which placed more emphasis on recipient responsibility but equally made continued support dependent on aid performance and results achieved. While waiting for a new policy paper on aid to Mozambique (now called "country strategy" rather than "country analysis") NORAD drafted in June 1993 an interim policy paper setting out aid objectives for 1994-96 ("Prinsippnotat 1994-1996"). The paper was subsequently endorsed with slight modifications by the Department for Bilateral Development Co-operation of the MFA, which was formally in charge of articulating policy.



### 3.4.1 "Prinsippnotat 1994-1996"

The paper addressed several issues in light of the post-war transition. At this stage, NORAD did not envisage any policy changes in the country aid programme but produced the "Prinsippnotatet" as a basis for the annual negotiations of the aid programme scheduled for November 1993.

(1) **The level of assistance:** NORAD was concerned that overall international assistance to Mozambique would decrease dramatically with the end of the war. The decline in emergency aid, it was feared, would not be compensated for by increasing donor support to long term development. As for Norwegian aid, the end of emergency aid related to the 1992 drought and the completion of the Beira oil terminal would result in a reduction of assistance to Mozambique estimated to NOK 150 million. In NORAD's view, however, Mozambique's need for assistance in this transition period was at least as great as previously, not least in order to secure the peace. To reduce a decline in overall Norwegian aid, NORAD recommended drawing on other flexible budget lines such as the allocations for regional matters, emergency relief, and promotion of democracy. These allocations could be channelled via NGOs and international organisations, which were seen as important partners in the reconstruction and reconciliation process in Mozambique.

(2) **The peace process:** At the time when NORAD prepared its paper, numerous uncertainties surrounded the implementation of the peace accords. It was clear that the elections would not take place until October 1994, perhaps even as late as May or June 1995. As a member of the commission for the reintegration of demobilised soldiers (CORE), Norway, was committed to support demobilisation and reintegration and had already contributed over NOK 40 million for that purpose. It was also felt that Norway should contribute to the electoral process. The volume and composition of such contribution were to be discussed separately, but one specific suggestion was to invite representatives from Mozambican parties to observe the Norwegian parliamentary elections

of 1993, possibly as part of a study tour to the Nordic countries.

(3) **Investments:** Towards the end of the war, the principal changes in aid policy had been a reorientation from long-term investment to humanitarian assistance. The peace agreement made it possible to undertake much needed capital investments and long-term development activities throughout the country. The "prinsippnotat" notes that national authorities and the World Bank natural resource exploitation and development of Mozambique's geographic position as a transit corridor. In this context, the paper suggested expansion of Norwegian engagement in the electricity and oil sectors. Parallel financing and mixed credits at specially favourable terms were recommended as ways to stimulate investment<sup>4</sup>.

(4) **Rural rehabilitation:** Anticipating that peace would make it possible to work in the rural sector, NORAD had in 1992 had started preparatory work and in 1993 produced a preliminary programme for rural rehabilitation. The main strategic decision was to work through, and strengthen, the institutions responsible for reconstruction at the national and provincial level. While recognising the merits of administrative decentralisation in principle, the "prinsippnotat" found that institutional weaknesses and the competition from the private sector made this difficult in practice. However, priority should be given to initiatives that would enable local authorities to actively participate in the planning and the management of local activities. It was recommended to use resource allocations for the specific purpose of promoting interaction between Norwegian and local NGOs, on the one hand, and local and national authorities on the other. To strengthen the family sector in agriculture and improve the women's situation in the rural areas were additional objectives.

<sup>4</sup> The document does not mention the Norwegian private sector interest in the lifting of the investment restrictions, although the planning for the Linjebygg 500MW Songo-Zimbabwe power transmission lines project was well under way; the disbursement for the project (NOK 94 million) took place in 1994, using the credit facilities envisaged in the document.



Children were included as a separate target group.

The question of where to locate the rural rehabilitation program was not yet decided. The Mozambican authorities had proposed the southern part of Cabo Delgado province, requesting assistance primarily in the form of institutional support at the district and province level. NORAD supported the latter point, noting that it did not envisage an integrated district development programme with its own NORAD-financed administration. Cabo Delgado was seen as a promising location in view of other Norwegian supported projects in the area, the comparatively small amount of external assistance received by the province and the expectation that it would receive a large number of demobilised soldiers.

**(5) The co-ordination of emergency and long term assistance:** A smooth transition from emergency relief to assistance to sustainable development was seen as important. Specific paths had not yet been identified, but an MFA-supported study of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and development aid was underway.<sup>5</sup> More concretely, it was suggested that the seeds and tools programme PESU (which appeared to deserve continued support) could be gradually transformed into a credit programme. It was expected that a rural rehabilitation programme could aim at sustainable development yet initially incorporate emergency-type components, such as quick impact employment schemes. At this stage, it was necessary to assist these processes in a flexible way, supporting the relevant efforts of both the NGO sector and the government.

**(6) Import support:** The import support question illuminates the dilemmas of Norwegian aid to Mozambique at a time when a number of institutions, mechanisms and priorities that Norway had consistently supported for years were being questioned or discarded.

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<sup>5</sup> Sørvald, Marit (1995).

A flexible vehicle for aid, import support was both quantitatively and strategically significant in the context of Norwegian assistance to Mozambique. Most of it had been channelled through an institution (GCPI) whose traditional responsibilities in the foreign currency area were being phased out and given to the Bank of Mozambique and the private banks, in line with the new market-oriented macro-economic management policies. Contributing to this was a Swedish audit of GCIP that had uncovered irregularities in the handling of Swedish import support. NORAD considered the documentation behind the accusations "relatively deficient", but conceded that a foreign exchange allocation institution of the GCIP type was "relatively open" to corruption.<sup>6</sup>

NORAD was unhappy with the discarding of GCIP for various reasons. The Bank of Mozambique did not collaborate as well with NORAD as GCIP had done. A World Bank-initiated audit had uncovered grave weaknesses in the accounting and record keeping systems of the Bank of Mozambique, suggesting that it was no better than GCIP. Finally, NORAD was concerned that the new mechanisms for allocation of foreign exchange would not respond adequately to social sector needs, particularly the import of medicines which was a priority area for Norwegian import support.<sup>7</sup> In a market-based foreign exchange system, it was feared, medicines would lose out in the competition for hard currency. Setting aside all considerations of "recipient responsibility", NORAD voiced concern that it would "lose the possibility that it currently has of directing import support to priority types of goods". To retain this control, NORAD proposed to

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<sup>6</sup> The Norwegian import support had not been audited, but NORAD pointed out that the agreements governing such support called for "relatively detailed" reporting on the use of the funds, the type of products involved, the suppliers, amounts, etc.; NORAD also felt that the practical collaboration between the Maputo office, GCIP and the Bank of Norway had been "generally good".

<sup>7</sup> Norway had for many years given financial and technical assistance to the State agency for import and distribution of drugs MEDIMOC and had a strong sense of commitment to this sector and its institutional arrangements.



operate its import support, at least for a time, through an ad-hoc administrative system based on the country programme negotiations.

**(7) Administration and the problem of corruption:** In the NORAD's analysis, a number of factors in Mozambican society could lead to corruption and abuse of power: the one-party state and state-controlled media; low technical competence within the judicial system; low education level in the administration and the essentially public-owned business sector; little transparency of the state budget; and poorly developed procedures for economic management. Some of the political and administrative changes underway (such as freedom of the press, a multi-party system, and decentralisation, ) could reduce corruption, but the transition to a market-based economy could also increase the risk of corruption. As a result, institutions that ensured transparency, control and responsibility should be strengthened, including the independent media and the legal system. Initiatives promoting power-sharing in the society should be supported, and requirements for accounting, auditing and tender bidding tightened.

### 3.4.2 The Country Programme 1995-97

The preparation and negotiation of the 1995-1997 country programme took place during the period of uncertainty that preceded the 1994 elections. The Norwegian position was essentially unchanged in relation to "Prinsippnotatet". It was recognised that the aid strategy was due for a review, but not on the eve of the elections.

Maintaining the volume of assistance recurred as an important theme. It was also emphasised that aid be given in a form that did not undermine the Mozambican authorities' responsibility and leading role. To a large extent, these two perspectives turned out to be mutually incompatible. The amount of aid was to drop rather dramatically in subsequent years, as the focus shifted from quantity of assistance to recipient responsibility, economic viability and other considerations of aid quality.

In an apparent order of priority, the objectives of Norwegian aid were identified as (1) secure

the peace agreement and the democratisation process; (2) promote sustainable economic and social development, with emphasis on improving the living conditions in rural areas; (3) work towards "responsible management" of natural resources and the environment; and (4) reduce aid dependence, *inter alia* through regional co-operation. For each, the country programme identified a number of intervention areas – ending up with 27 areas, under which again a varying number of projects and initiatives would be supported. The main intervention areas were:

- *Securing the Peace Accord and the democratisation process:* 6 intervention areas relating to the Peace Accord institutions - including the elections and the national demining programme; cultural activities related to the peace process; import support.
- *Sustainable development* covered no less than 10 intervention areas of varying scope and specificity: rural rehabilitation and local administration; health; volunteers ("Peace Corps"); local NGOs; training in gender roles issues for planners; national strategy for vulnerable groups; emergency assistance; support to the agricultural sector; training; and support to cultural institutions.
- *Natural resources and the environment* included 6 intervention areas: national environmental management; management skills for fisheries resources; coastal management, maritime security; meteorology; and the personnel fund.
- *Reducing aid dependence* had 5 five intervention areas relating to regional co-operation in the electrical power sector; co-operation in the oil sector; ports and coastal transport; SATCC co-operation and private sector development.

The list demonstrates that the principal vehicle for Norwegian aid to Mozambique - the "country programme" - did incorporate the peace process, although in an apparent secondary and segmented way. The list also points to the continued dispersion of Norwegian aid, and the evident difficulty of acting upon the recommendation of the 1990



“country study” to streamline the assistance programme. Possibly, the desire to be a supportive partner of Mozambique - and the difficulty of making strategic choices during a transition period - stood in the way.

### **3.5 Gender issues**

Norway's consistent commitment to gender concerns was evidently a salient aspect of its profile in Mozambique during the years 1990-95<sup>8</sup>. The need to integrate gender concerns in humanitarian as well as in development programmes is a matter of general aid policy for Norway which appears to have been persistently argued in Maputo on numerous occasions - during ministerial discussions, field-trips and in contacts with others in the donor community. The joint statement following the 1991 Ministerial discussions repeatedly emphasised that women were an important target group and proclaimed that high priority would be given to the integration of women in aid supported activities. In 1993, NORAD/Maputo produced an Action Plan on Women in Development, based on the explicit perspective that national reconstruction offered a good occasion to introduce a more systematic effort to assist women. In particular, it was noted, the democratisation process provided women with new channels through which they could take an active part in the shaping of civil society.

In the period 1990-95, a large number of gender specific activities were supported, some of which had a direct bearing on the peace and reconstruction process: support to various local NGOs and government institutions focusing on gender issues (in some cases with a view to ensure women's participation in the election process), emergency assistance to the reintegration of returnee women, health care targeting women in previously inaccessible RENAMO areas, etc. Most of this projects received relatively small grants (which makes individual evaluation disproportionately costly)

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<sup>8</sup> Interviews with representatives of the international aid community in Maputo, who had been present during that period.

and added considerably to the striking fragmentation of the Norwegian aid portfolio.

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## 4. The setting

In Mozambique, as elsewhere, an assessment of the process towards peace requires and understanding of the war. Until recently, this seemed relatively simple: the generally accepted interpretation was that the violence which engulfed most of Mozambique for over a decade was the product of an external destabilisation campaign spearheaded by (white) Rhodesia and later South Africa. This conventional wisdom has increasingly been challenged. A revisionist school of thought emphasises the importance of the internal causes of the war, particularly the government's Marxist-inspired reforms which alienated peasants, local chiefs and some ethnic groups. In the following, both dimensions will be noted. Possibly, as a recent account concludes, independent Mozambique had no more of its share of misrule, local discontent and ethnic divisions than many other African states, but had the misfortune of being located next to white-ruled neighbours who exploited its problems with a vengeance.<sup>1</sup>

### 4.1 Causes of the conflict

#### 4.1.1 The early years: 1975-83

Recognising the heavy legacy of colonialism, an assessment of the more recent roots of the conflict would usefully start in 1975, when Mozambique obtained its independence after 11 years of fighting. The new government was faced with a mass exodus of Portuguese nationals and only a handful of trained Mozambicans to take their place. Productive enterprises were abandoned and public institutions were fragile. The economy was dependent on service revenue from hostile Rhodesia and South Africa.

In 1977 the FRELIMO party - the constitution had established a one-party system - outlined a socialist strategy which emphasised the state's

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<sup>1</sup> Finnegan (1992).

responsibility for education and health care, a strong state-owned productive sector in key areas, an agricultural programme based on state farms, co-operatives and communal villages, and centralised planning of the economy<sup>2</sup>.

Foreign policy emphasised relations with allies of the independence struggle (e.g. Eastern Europe and the Nordic countries) and support for the liberation movements in South Africa and Rhodesia. In March 1976, applying UN sanctions, Mozambique's borders with Rhodesia were closed - a situation which lasted four years and cost an estimated USD 500 million in lost transit revenue. In response, the Rhodesian security services created the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) - later to be known by its Portuguese acronym: RENAMO. Its main purpose was to thwart support for the Zimbabwe liberation movement, ZANU. South Africa retaliated by diverting its traffic from Mozambican ports, reducing the number of Mozambican miners and launching air attacks and commando raids against Maputo.

In 1978-79 Rhodesia established an MNR base in Gorongosa, Sofala province, in order to step up hostilities from within the country but before it could really become effective the independence of Zimbabwe was agreed in December 1979. The MNR contingents in Rhodesia were immediately transferred to Mozambique and to South Africa.

In keeping with its socialist development policy the government stressed what today would be called human resource development. Between 1975 and 1981 the number of school pupils and teachers doubled. Primary level health facilities

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<sup>2</sup> Already in 1975 the government had nationalised land, education, health, legal practice and rented property. Although no further nationalisation was on the agenda, in practice the widespread abandonment of companies and farms resulted in their being taken over.



rose from 450 in 1975 to 1,200 in 1982, and a pioneering essential drugs programme was introduced. Some 90 per cent of the population was vaccinated against major diseases. Development co-operation agreements produced support for the social sectors and large investments in factories, fishing, agriculture and irrigation, mineral development, dams, power lines and railway rehabilitation.

#### 4.1.2 The 1980s: Crisis

The trend turned in the early eighties. The economic decline manifested itself with sharp reductions in the GDP and exports, a marked balance of payments deficits, and a worthless national currency. Barter replaced monetary transactions in the rural areas. Real expenditure on the social services fell drastically. The decline had multiple causes.

**Economic policies** counted mistakenly on the Party's ability to build on the post-independence euphoria and substitute mobilisation and enthusiasm for economic and financial incentives. Rigid central planning, intended as a short-cut to modernisation, reflected needs and aspirations rather than available resources, and preventing a flexible response as the situation deteriorated. Capital investment projects were based on political considerations rather than economic rates of return. In industry, rehabilitation and maintenance were ignored, while in agriculture mechanised large farms took precedence over the small peasant farmer. The productive sector was dominated by state enterprises run by untrained and inexperienced managers hamstrung by price controls and administrative interference.

The effects of misjudged economic policies were compounded by repercussions from the international economic context, particularly the oil crisis and soaring interest rates. Oil imports as a percentage of exports rose from 31 per cent in 1975 to 60 per cent in 1982. While many social and educational services were popular, FRELIMO's **political agenda** and "predatory state", as the revisionist school

emphasises, also created severe problems.<sup>3</sup> Traditional leaders in rural areas were ostracised for collaborating with colonialism or because they did not fit the concept of a modern society. Collectivisation of abandoned Portuguese farms and forced relocation of peasants created resentment in the countryside. The state marketing company could never fill the vacuum left by the departure of many small Portuguese shop keepers. Condemnation of traditional practices (polygamy, bride-price, child marriage) caused dissatisfaction. Much of the rural population was touched by one or other of these circumstances. The rural population, moreover, suffered most when the economic crisis cut into the social sector gains and turned the terms of trade against them.

Other influential groups were antagonised as well. The Roman Catholic church hierarchy, for example, resented the loss of its special status when Mozambique was declared a secular state, and when its health and education facilities were nationalised. Other religious groups were uneasy with the emphasis on a secular society and the prohibition of religious schools.

Thus the spread of the war was facilitated by local discontent and disillusionment, aggravated in some instances by ethnic and regional resentments. External destabilisation, however, was a principal driving force in the destruction of the country, the economy and the extent of the emergency.

In one sense, the Mozambican government clearly provoked the hostility of its neighbours by taking a nationalist and aggressive stance towards apartheid South Africa. Yet, in the logic of its own liberation background and the international context of that period, FRELIMO had little choice.

The second period of destabilisation - early eighties to early nineties - was completely different from the first, reflecting the new

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<sup>3</sup> For a brief summary of the revisionist school, which is centred on French anthropological research, see Braathen (1994). A leading exponent of that school is Christian Geffray, see Geffray (1990).



South African backing and its objectives. In addition to stopping ANC infiltration through Mozambique, it also sought to undermine the newly created Southern African Development Coordination Conference - SADCC (the economic association of Southern African states created to foment co-operation and reduce their dependence on apartheid South Africa), by halting traffic along the transport corridors. More fundamentally, the South African-backed campaign sought to destroy the independent, non-racist African model of development by destabilising the Mozambican economy, intimidating the population and alienating them from the government, while at the same time achieving a much higher international profile for RENAMO. Given the greater resources at their disposal, the South African backers enabled RENAMO to increase the extent and scale of its destruction throughout the country.

In assessing the subsequent peace process it is important to take into account the extreme and vicious nature of the violence. In an often decentralised and chaotic war, it was often unclear which side was responsible for violence against civilians and suspected collaborators. But the targeted nature of much of RENAMO's violence is clear: key economic infrastructures and the social sectors - both the infrastructures and the people using them - were sabotaged in order to undermine the government's legitimacy and its key social policies. By the early nineties, 58 per cent of primary schools had been destroyed or forced to close down.<sup>4</sup> Almost all the 1,200 primary health posts and centres constructed during the decade had been destroyed or forced to close. The already fragile rural trading network came to a halt. Exports of coal, cement, tea and cotton virtually ceased. Following the destruction of over 300 miles of Cahora Bassa power lines, instead of exporting electricity to South Africa Mozambique had to import it. In 1989 the UN Economic Commission for Africa<sup>5</sup> estimated the destruction and related losses cost GDP worth USD 15 billion.

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<sup>4</sup> GoM (1994).

<sup>5</sup> UNECA (1989).

There were other costs as well. The same report estimates that during 1980-88 some 900,000 deaths (including 500,000 children) were directly or indirectly attributable to the war - through murder, destruction of health services and war-induced famine.

**Nature** contributed to and aggravated the situation, drought in particular. While drought afflicted the whole of Southern Africa it had a disproportionate effect in Mozambique because the conflict prevented an adequate response. Traditional safety nets, relief operations and recovery mechanisms were all impaired by war. The drought-war combination in 1981-84, and again in 1991-92, reduced 70 per cent of the rural population to absolute poverty<sup>6</sup> and gave rise to what became known as the "emergency" - a major relief effort which lasted for about 10 years, from 1982-83 to 1992. Mozambique made its first appeal for emergency assistance in 1983, during the early eighties drought.<sup>7</sup>

As the structural nature of the emergency became evident, the targeting of relief was refined by distinguishing different categories of beneficiaries e.g. "displaced"<sup>8</sup>, "affected"<sup>9</sup>, to

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<sup>6</sup> GoM/World Bank (1990).

<sup>7</sup> At that time, the national relief agency (DPCCN) operated only in the three southern provinces; by the end of 1987 it was working in all ten, had the largest fleet of trucks in the country and a logistics unit run by technical assistance. In 1987 the first international appeal backed by the UN was launched at an Emergency Conference in Geneva and a special UNSCERO (United Nations Special Co-ordinator for Relief Operations in Mozambique) office was established. On the government side the emergency was supervised by the deputy Minister for Cooperation working through an permanent executive committee (CENE), an emergency official in each relevant ministry, and weekly coordination meetings with donors. An international Emergency Conference was held every year between 1987 and 1991.

<sup>8</sup> People living in an area affected by war or a disaster who have temporarily lost their capacity to buy, exchange and produce. They need food aid for a limited period, and sometimes seeds and tools.

<sup>9</sup> People who have been forced to abandon their homes, lost their possessions and are in accommodation centres, needing food aid for a longer period as well as other forms of assistance, including seeds and tools.



try and avoid dependence or undermining local food production through unnecessary food relief (which nevertheless happened). By 1988 there were 1.7 million displaced and 2.9 million affected people in Mozambique, and one million refugees in neighbouring countries - over a third of the total population. In that year alone the country received emergency relief totalling about USD 300 million<sup>10</sup>.

UN figures<sup>11</sup> on the population upheaval at the time of the peace agreement indicate 3.7 million internally displaced and 1.6 million refugees, totalling 5.3 million people or one third of the population. However, this does not take into account the ebb and flow of hostilities which generated constant population movements.

#### 4.1.3 The 1980s: Reforms

Confronted with a calamitous situation, FRELIMO chartered a new economic, political and diplomatic course. The heavy cost of supporting the ANC was recognised, leading to a (temporary) peace agreement with South Africa. The government sought to improve relations with the West and obtain support from the World Bank and the IMF. The new orientation in foreign and economic policy in turn entailed demands that the domestic economic and political liberalisation which had started be accelerated.

Delegates to the FRELIMO 4<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 1983 severely criticised the administrative controls and central planning, the heavy investment emphasis and in particular the marginalisation of smallholder agriculture and determined important policy shifts towards rehabilitation, small-scale activities and the private sector. As a result, the 1984-86 Economic Action Programme was launched. Measures included some price liberalisation, freer movement of goods and the privatisation of the smaller companies. However, it was a case of too little and too late since growing

destabilisation prevented the planned reallocation of resources to the rural areas.

Parallel initiatives were taken on the international front. In 1984 Mozambique joined the IMF and World Bank and concluded its first debt rescheduling with the Paris Club. Efforts to improve relations with the United States resulted in Mozambique being taken off the black list and the signing of a private investment guarantee agreement. The following year Mozambique adhered to the Lomé Convention.

The Economic Action Programme, combined with the fresh inflow of foreign exchange which followed debt rescheduling and the IMF/WB agreement produced a small about-turn in the economy in 1986, with 2 per cent growth. It was followed in 1987 (coinciding with the first international emergency appeal conference) by the introduction of a much more rigorous IMF-backed structural adjustment programme - PRE<sup>12</sup>. This heralded a period of rapid devaluation, budget restriction, the reduction of enterprises and consumer subsidies, price liberalisation and in general a move towards a market economy. User charges and private services were introduced in education and health. Private legal practice also returned.

As the political swing gathered momentum, at its the 5<sup>th</sup> Party Congress (1989) FRELIMO abandoned all claim to be a Marxist party. The importance of promoting democracy was stressed, as was the participation of all people and interest groups and open and frank debate on national questions. In 1990 a new constitution introduced a multiparty democracy, aspects of which were detailed in subsequent 1991 legislation on freedom of association, freedom of the press, and the independence of the judiciary. The same year also saw new legislation on privatisation, the restructuring of state enterprises, and on the structuring of the banking system.

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<sup>10</sup> Ratilal (1989).

<sup>11</sup> UNOHAC (1994).

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<sup>12</sup> Programa de Reabilitação Económica.



## 4.2 The peace process<sup>13</sup>

By the turn of the decade it was evident that both the government and RENAMO had reached a mutually hurting stalemate that neither side could overturn. RENAMO could never hope for more than the immediate fruits of its raids, while the government was faced with an increasingly demoralised and disorganised army which it could not afford, and the impossible task of implementing a structural adjustment programme and promoting economic growth under war conditions. Never heavily committed to either side, the vast majority of the population which bore the brunt of the war wanted peace - at any price. However, the crucial contributing factor arose from the radical changes in the international scene in the late 1980s and early 90s, when both sides lost their external backers. The Soviet bloc edged towards economic and political collapse, depriving the Mozambican government of its principal foreign economic and military support. As the Cold War came to an end, so did international tolerance for the apartheid regime in South Africa, and RENAMO's foreign support lines dried up as well. The situation clearly was conducive to negotiations, and peace talks commenced in 1990 in Rome.

The war in Mozambique had been internationalised, and so was the peace. The United Nations and the donors financed and supervised the implementation of the GPA, the Bretton Woods institutions shaped the macro-economic framework for rehabilitation and reconstruction, and some 170 foreign NGOs worked on the ground throughout the country. These forces will be considered in turn.

### 4.2.1 Reaching the GPA

Some four years elapsed between the first informal contacts between the Catholic church and RENAMO in May 1988, the first official meeting between the two sides in July 1990 and the signature of the General Peace Agreement

<sup>13</sup> The main sources for this section are United Nations (1995), Berman (1996), UNDP (1995) and Hume (1994).

(GPA) on 4 October 1992, during which time the war continued.

The period until October 1991 comprised essentially bridge building and setting the general framework and agenda for peace talks, arranging mediators etc. Although the partial cease-fire agreed to in December 1990 was ineffectual, the resulting establishment of a Joint Verification Commission saw the first formal involvement of other countries<sup>14</sup> and the first RENAMO presence in the capital city.

Despite the snail's pace, from mid-1990 there was rising hope and anticipation among the Mozambican people and the donor community, albeit tinged with much caution, that peace was on the horizon.

Negotiations gathered speed in 1992, and against the backdrop of another devastating drought. Various component parts of the peace agreement were finalised, taking the form of signed Protocols, four of which, covering the tougher transition and military matters were only signed together with the GPA itself. The first three were spread over five months:

- Protocol I (October 1991) on "basic principles" obtained RENAMO recognition of Government authority and institutions and the latter's undertaking not to legislate on any important issue until after elections. It also established the principle of a Commission to supervise the peace process, with UN participation.
- Protocol II (November 1991) on the recognition of political parties
- Protocol III (March 1992) on elections and press freedom

With these positive signs of progress, international observers started to cover the Rome negotiations. In June 1992 UN military observers arrived in Mozambique to provide

<sup>14</sup> France, Portugal, UK, USA, Congo, Kenya, Zambia, USSR. The first four were to continue to play a prominent role in other key commissions.



technical advise on cease-fire monitoring. The following month, pressure by humanitarian organisations - NGOs, the Red Cross and UN agencies - brought concrete progress on the ground. The government and RENAMO signed the joint *Declaration of Guiding Principles for Humanitarian Assistance*, which enabled international relief convoys to travel more freely and gain limited access to RENAMO areas. In anticipation of an agreement, in early September 1992 the UN sent two technical teams to Mozambique: one on cease-fire arrangement and one on elections.

Despite two meetings between the Presidents of Mozambique and RENAMO after Protocol III, negotiations still dragged on for several months. Some contentious issues were papered over on the eve of the GPA, including the security services, the police force and civil administration in RENAMO areas, and one was left outstanding - the location of the Assembly Areas for troops. All, but especially the Assembly Area issue, were to cause complications later. Consequently, a smooth implementation of the GPA was by no means assured.

The General Peace Agreement was signed on 4 October 1992, accompanied by the remaining four Protocols:

- Protocol IV on military and related issues: the formation of the Mozambique Defence Force (FADM), the withdrawal of foreign troops, the functioning of the security and police services, and demobilisation and the reintegration of demobilised soldiers.
- Protocol V on the election timetable and guarantees and the creation of the CSC
- Protocol VI on cessation of the armed conflict and the creation of the Cease Fire Commission
- Protocol VII requesting a donors conference to mobilise funds for the

humanitarian and electoral aspects of the GPA.

The timetable envisaged by the GPA and its Protocols entailed a cease fire on 15 October 1992 with the concentration of forces starting six days later, demobilisation running from mid-November to mid-May 1993, with elections in October 1993.

#### 4.2.2 ONUMOZ and the donor community

As the gap between the two warring parties narrowed, it became increasingly clear that once the final terms of a peace settlement had been agreed on paper, the modalities and timing of implementation would depend not only on the political will of the Mozambican parties but also on mediation of two kinds: the human and technical resources of the United Nations, and the resources of the donor community.

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique, and indeed the GPA itself, was shaped by the historical context. The early 1990s saw a series of peace agreements (in El Salvador, Cambodia, Namibia, Angola, Ethiopia) around Cold War-related conflicts, with the UN in a prominent role. The UN "peace-keeping" agenda in these conflicts typically had multiple dimensions - political, military, electoral, and humanitarian. ONUMOZ was planned accordingly. Moreover, the failed peace process in Angola<sup>15</sup> became a particular point of reference for the UN operation in Mozambique. The UN, it was felt, could not afford another failure. ONUMOZ was consequently planned on a large scale, and certainly much larger than the government had expected and wanted. Although ONUMOZ did not assume direct

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<sup>15</sup> Elections were held in Angola at the end of September 1992. Following the announcement of the elections on 17 October - some two weeks after the signing of the GPA - UNITA launched an operation to take municipalities by force and by the end of the month there was heavy fighting in Luanda. This outcome was subsequently attributed to the failure to disarm and demobilise both sides before the elections, hence the insistence on linking demobilisation to elections in Mozambique.



administrative powers (as did UNTAC in Cambodia), the "sovereignty issue" was a frequent source of tension between the government and the United Nations throughout the peace process. The large and visible UN presence also caused other forms tensions (distortion of labour market and prices, accentuation of inequalities between local communities and the white-vehicled foreign aid presence, etc.).

Headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Aldo Ajello, ONUMOZ had four inter-linked components, whose functions were to be carried out by a complex structure of international and national commissions based in Maputo.

- **Political:** This involved political mediation, and chairing and backstopping key commissions - the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC) and its subsidiaries: the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF), the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Forces (CCFADM), and the Reintegration Commission (CORE). The UN had oversight functions on the establishment of the National Commission on Administration (CNA), intended to facilitate and promote mutual understanding in the civil administration of areas controlled by RENAMO.
- **Military:** This entailed cease-fire monitoring by UN military observers, the concentration, disarming and demobilisation of troops, the disbanding of private armed groups and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Logistical support for the demobilisation Assembly Areas, the establishment of a database and the provision and civilian clothing and home transport were provided by a Technical Unit under the SRSG. A large UN peace-keeping force<sup>16</sup> was deployed

<sup>16</sup> A headquarters company and military police platoon, 354 military observers, 5 logistically self-sufficient infantry battalions of 850 men each, 1 engineering

to ensure security for key infrastructures and international activities, particularly in the transport corridors following the withdrawal of foreign troops.

In the paramilitary field, the UN provided 1,095 civilian police officers (CIVPOL) from 29 countries to monitor police activities and human rights the country, and had a facilitating and monitoring role in relation to the National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) and the National Information Commission (COMINFO), which monitored the security police -although in effect these barely functioned.

- **Electoral:** Technical and material assistance was provided for the elections as well as impartial monitoring of the election process, including the establishment of a National Elections Commission (CNE) and the appointment of the three international members of the Electoral Tribunal. Not provided for in the GPA but meeting frequently was the UNDP-chaired the "Aid for Democracy Group" of donors that also focused on the elections.
- **Humanitarian:** Co-ordination of humanitarian assistance operations, and the assessment of needs for the resettlement of refugees, the internally displaced and demobilised soldiers was assigned to UNOHAC<sup>17</sup>. The head of UNOHAC chaired CORE, the Commission established to prepare specific programmes for the reintegration of demobilised soldiers.

Recognising the importance of donor political and financial support for the peace process, GPA Protocol VII specifically requested that a donor conference be convened to mobilise funds for the elections, for emergency and reintegration programmes, and for the political parties. Donors responded vigorously providing

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battalion, 3 logistic companies, and air, communications, medical and movement control support units.

<sup>17</sup> United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination



considerable funds (the December 1992 Rome Donors Conference resulted in pledges totalling USD 400 million), over and above their regular development assistance.

The physical and organisational scale of the ONUMOZ operation was matched by the complexity of the multi-layered funding mechanisms and channels used. Bilateral donors, UN agencies, ONUMOZ and the government contributed development and emergency funds and in-kind assistance through bilateral programmes working directly or through NGOs, Trust Funds making direct payments or working through NGOs and UN agencies, co-financing and parallel financing arrangements, UNDP projects and the government budget.

The six UN Trust Funds and the UN bodies responsible for them were as follows:

- Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement (for RENAMO) - Secretary General (ONUMOZ)
- Trust Fund for Assistance to Registered Political Parties - Secretary-General (ONUMOZ)
- Elections Trust Fund - UNDP
- UNOHAC Humanitarian Assistance Trust Fund - DHA
- UNHCR Trust Fund - UNHCR
- Reintegration Support Scheme Trust Fund - UNDP

#### **4.2.3 The military and political component**

It was clear from the outset that the timetable for implementation in the GPA was unrealistically tight. The process did not really "take off" until about mid-1993. Moreover, given the prevailing atmosphere of distrust for some considerable time neither the government nor RENAMO were willing to entirely forsake the military option. In addition, RENAMO clearly tried to obtain leverage by stalling and

walk-outs, so as to obtain more benefits from the implementation process.

Despite initial contacts with the UN several months before the GPA was signed, and the arrival in Mozambique of technical teams one month before, it took time for the UN operation to get moving. Although the Special Representative of the Secretary General and 21 military advisers arrived promptly on cease-fire day (15 October), ONUMOZ was only approved by the Security Council two months later (December 1992), and the interim budget not until March 1993. The first military contingent from Italy arrived in March-May 1993.

These delays were matched by political setbacks. Following initial delays in transferring key staff from its Maringue headquarters to Maputo, RENAMO pulled out of all activities on 9 March and its leaders left Maputo, on the grounds of insufficient logistical support from the government and the absence of the promised international funding for RENAMO. All commission work came to a halt (some were not even created). Activities were only resumed when RENAMO returned at the end of May, following the establishment of a trust fund for its benefit (see chapter 10).

At the same time, demobilisation was held up by RENAMO insistence on prior deployment of 65 per cent of the UN forces, disagreement over the suitability of proposed assembly areas, and the failure of both sides to provide list of troops and weapons or appoint members to the CCFADM. Deployment of the full 6,000 UN soldiers was only completed at the end of August 1993, partly because the government delayed signing the necessary status-of-forces agreement permitting the movement of UN personnel. Since demobilisation and the formation of a new army were to precede elections, it was soon clear that the October 1993 deadline for elections could not be met.

Commission work finally resumed in June, with the establishment of the CCFADM, the commission for the formation of the new army. However, profound disagreement between the



government and RENAMO, and disturbances in some RENAMO-controlled areas, prevented the establishment of the civil administration commission (CNA). August saw the beginning of the training programme for the new Mozambican Army (FADM) in Zimbabwe and the establishment of a Maputo residence by the RENAMO President, thus facilitating communication on contested issues.

On the down side however, the multiparty conference on the election law which had resumed its work on 2 August after a standstill in April 1993 made little progress. By 25 August only 16 of the 284 articles had been considered and there was deadlock over Article 16, on the composition of the National Election Commission. Work was interrupted again and the Government decided to pursue bilateral contacts with the various parties.

This and other contentious issues which continued to stymie the peace process prompted a visit by the UN Secretary General in October. His main message was that the UN was not willing to prolong its effort indefinitely. As a result, solutions were found to the demobilisation timetable (to start in January 1994), the composition of the election commission (NEC) and consultations on the electoral law, and the chair of the three commissions not yet functioning - CNA, COMPOL and COMINFO.

In December 1993 the Assembly of the Republic finally approved the Electoral Law, which opened the way for election preparations to start in earnest, beginning with the appointment of the National Election Commission and its Chairman, Brazão Mazula, in January 1994. Substantially aided by foreign donors, elections were held as rescheduled in October 1994, and were certified by thousands of international observers as free and fair (see chapter 10). FRELIMO won the elections with a comfortable margin in the presidential race - incumbent President Joaquim Chissano was re-elected with 53% of the vote as against the 34% for RENAMO candidate, Afonso Dhlakama. The National Assembly vote was much closer: FRELIMO won 44% of the total

parliamentary vote, or 129 seats, compared to 38% and 112 seats for RENAMO. (A smaller party got the remaining 9 seats). RENAMO won a majority of the parliamentary seats in five of Mozambique's ten provinces, all in the central and northern region.

The demobilisation, as noted, got off to a slow start and remained problematic during much of 1994. Most of the soldiers were effectively demobilised in July-August 1994 with the aid of a several donor initiatives to facilitate their reintegration into civilian life (see chapter 6). The disarmament and post-demobilisation verification process was less complete. It was generally recognised that the UN collected only a small proportion of the small arms, leaving illegal weapons as a major, problematic legacy of the war.<sup>18</sup>

#### 4.2.4 The humanitarian component

As a result of the December 1992 Rome Conference 20 countries, the EU and the Commonwealth Secretariat pledged USD 450 million for elections, emergency and reintegration programmes and organised refugee repatriation. A follow-up meeting in Maputo in July 1993 produced a further USD 70 million.

With some 3-4 million internally displaced and 1.8 million refugees, whose difficulties had been intensified by the 91/92 drought, the Secretary General declared that "Without sufficient humanitarian aid, and especially food supplies, the security situation in the country may deteriorate and the demobilisation process might stall"<sup>19</sup>. Fortunately, in late 1992 good rains returned, establishing propitious conditions for the return home.

<sup>18</sup> By the end of its mandate in December 1994, UN military teams had verified 754 military positions and depots - on the government side 432 out of 435 declared plus 67 undeclared, and on the RENAMO side 171 out of 287 declared and 79 undeclared locations - leaving at least 116 sites uninspected.

<sup>19</sup> Report of the Secretary General on ONUMOZ, 3 December and 9 December 1992.



Between October 1992 and December 1994 about 4.3 million Mozambicans moved back to their home areas, the vast majority spontaneously by their own means. Organised movements covered only some 200,000 demobilised soldiers and their dependants and 300,000 refugees.

Supported by UNHCR and bilateral donors, and under the overall co-ordination of UNOHAC, the resettlement programmes aimed to provide food aid, seeds, restore basic social services (health care, education) and repair basic infrastructure (water supply, roads and bridges). In 1994 almost 500 quick impact projects were implemented and more than 30 NGOs launched area-based reintegration programmes. More than 700 primary schools, 250 health facilities and 2,000 wells were built (see chapters 8 and 9).

One of the most important peace contributions of the humanitarian assistance programme was its extension to formerly inaccessible RENAMO areas, and mediation between the Government and RENAMO on the expansion of government services and the integration of RENAMO personnel into these. In addition, counselling services were established for former child soldiers, mainly RENAMO, and some 8,000 were reunited with their families.

Demining was considered a humanitarian not a military activity. Placed under UNOHAC, but covered by a separate funding system and without a UN lead agency in a traditional sense, the demining operation was fraught with political and administrative problems. It began very slowly and only started to take off in mid-1994, six months before the end of the ONUMOZ mandate (see chapter 7).

#### 4.2.5 Assessment

The UN Mission in Mozambique, which closed down immediately after the elections October 1994 elections, became the success which the organisation so badly needed. In the words of the official history of the UN, the operation was

“a major success story in United Nations peacemaking, peace-keeping, and humanitarian and electoral assistance. Through a complex, multifaceted and highly innovative strategy which broke new ground in how the United Nations dealt with parties in a conflict situation, a formerly socialist Government, committed to a one-party State, negotiated with an armed rebellious group to create peace for their country”.<sup>20</sup>

Independent observers agree that the immediate post-war was largely a success. The cease-fire was maintained, 92,000 troops demobilised, perhaps as many as 4 million people were resettled, and post-war elections were held. The impact of a multifaceted demining program, distributions of food and seeds, and the construction of over schools, health posts, water sources and countless community development initiatives was clearly substantial. The principal shortcoming was the inability to collect small arms from the former combatants. As a result, the problems associated with the presence of illegal arms in the southern African region has substantially worsened.

The UN presence as an impartial mediator, demobiliser, and election supervisor, and the massive international funding - which also enabled donors to keep up political pressure on the two Mozambican parties to implement the peace agreement - were undoubtedly key factors. The contribution of NGOs was also substantial, particularly in penetrating previously inaccessible areas and thereby serving a national integrative function. The importance of one nation with will and resources to keep the process moving on several fronts was also evident. Italy served as a key actor in the original mediation process and played an instrumental, and concerted role in all the aspects of the implementation phase as well.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The United Nations and Mozambique, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>21</sup> Italy was head mediator during the peace talks, later provided most of funding that helped keep RENAMO in the political arena, sent the first military contingent to UNOMOZ and was a key donor to the UNDP trust Fund for the elections. This singular national diplomacy was linked to the UN multilateral role in the office of the SRSG, Aldo Ajello, an Italian diplomat.



The importance of the international contribution in implementing the peace agreement must also be seen in the perspective of national efforts.

The vast majority of the civilian population returned home spontaneously, without assistance and without knowing exactly what they would find on arrival - other than the basic essential, peace. In most instances the presence or otherwise of mines, infrastructure, social services, does not appear to have been a major concern. This suggests that massive international finance to the return process was superfluous: the same results might have been achieved with more modest financial inputs or, alternatively, the same resources might have had more lasting effect if applied in a development rather than an emergency perspective.

More fundamentally, the short-term peace process succeeded - and seemed by 1996 to be holding - because the Mozambican parties had reached a mutually hurting stalemate, and the foreign supporters of the war had disintegrated. With the old FRELIMO long gone, and RENAMO leaders launched on a new career in politics, the political scene in Mozambique two years after the elections seemed curiously remote from the conflict of the 1980s. The legacy of the war for the future course of events, and hence the sustainability of the peace process, seemed to lie less in the original causes of the conflict, than in its consequences in terms of destruction and distortions of development (see chap. 11).

### ***4.3 The Bretton Woods process and the Rome process - the economic context of peace.***

#### **4.3.1 The pre-GPA CG meeting**

Mozambique has been implementing an IMF supported structural adjustment programme since 1987. By late 1991 it was possible for the Chairman of the December Consultative Group (CG) of the World Bank for the Mozambique

meeting to note that considerable progress in reforming key areas of economic management (including exchange and trade policy, pricing policy and fiscal policy) had resulted in five years of economic growth.

As the 1991 meeting was the first to be held following tangible evidence of progress in peace talks<sup>22</sup>, this context influenced the assessment of economic policy, although only in a very generic way. Noting the importance of a durable peace framework for economic growth, in his opening statement the chairman recognised the demands this made on the government

“...management of the economy during the transition to peace will present an enormous challenge to the government to re-establish law and order, demobilise the military and resettle more than 4 million displaced people, while maintaining fiscal balance in the face of mounting budgetary pressures. It is inevitable that planning during this transitional period will be subject to a considerable degree of uncertainty and we must therefore be prepared to be flexible in programming our assistance”.<sup>23</sup>

Critical donor interventions addressed issues of the extent and spread of corruption, the size of the military budget, and the importance of improved donor-government co-ordination in order to achieve more integrated administration of financial resources. More generally, various papers centred on the on-going development and structural adjustment discussions as well as a government paper on demobilisation were the subject of side-sessions.<sup>24</sup> The addresses by both government speakers (the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance) and also the World Bank background document

<sup>22</sup> The first three Protocols had been signed.

<sup>23</sup> 5th Consultative Group for Mozambique, Paris, December 9-11, 1991. Chairman's Opening Statement.

<sup>24</sup> In the demobilisation paper ("A Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme for Mozambican Military Personnel - first phase 1991-92", October 1991) the government presented a programme to implement its unilateral decision to demobilise 16,000 government troops in order to reduce the untenable military expenditure. It should be noted that the GPA was still almost one year away.



referred to the implications of the imminent peace. Given the war context, the government had started to build its rural development programme around the concept of "priority districts", to help focus public resources at areas where they could be used most effectively and produce the fastest response.<sup>25</sup> The Priority Districts Programme (PDP) targeted districts with fewer security problems so as to ensure rehabilitation without disruption and avoid the threat of further destruction, although within a perspective of expansion to new districts as and when the security situation improved.

Subsequently, as peace talks progressed, in February 1991 an inter-ministerial commission for planning and co-ordinating national reconstruction, reintegration and rehabilitation was established. Its task was to prepare a National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) of rehabilitation and development activities, with strong beneficiary involvement. The World Bank/government CG document outlined the four main vectors of the plan:

- re-establishment of security (disarmament, demobilisation and the restoration of the national and rural road network)
- reactivation and expansion of production (focusing on rural families not affected by the war, the displaced, refugees and demobilised soldiers with the NRP and the PDP as the main instruments, and gradual expansion as the security situation permits).
- resettlement of the displaced population and refugees (requiring integration between the PDP and the emergency programme) and the gradual re-allocation of resources from survival emergency to livelihood rehabilitation (particularly land restoration and access, seeds and tools) and a concern for income-generating

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<sup>25</sup> Criteria for the selection of priority districts included resource endowments and economic base, population density, security status and to the extent possible, concern for regional equilibrium.

opportunities. The process could take several years in sensitive areas.

- reintegration of demobilised soldiers from both sides, through specific programmes.

The document stated that under the current circumstances the NRP would have two components: (a) recurrent and capital expenditure required for development activities which could be started immediately in stable districts through the PDP and (b) a contingency part which would depend on a peace agreement and cease-fire. It would be financed in part from government savings arising from a cessation in hostilities, but would also require substantial assistance from the donor community.

Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance stressed the medium-term perspective for effective resettlement as well as the crucial importance of the social and economic reintegration of demobilised soldiers.

The closing statement of the chairman of the 1991 CG meeting<sup>26</sup> showed that although the mainstream discussions had concentrated on traditional structural adjustment and development issues - economic management and accountability/transparency, consolidation of the reform process - the meeting had also reflected "a sense of expectation, anticipation and urgency with respect to the peace process", which required the "integration of government and donor programmes into a unified national development strategy, incorporating post-war reconstruction, emergency and demobilisation requirements".

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<sup>26</sup> Chairman's Closing Statement, Mozambique Consultative Group Meeting - 1991



“The challenge will be to formulate a unified national development strategy that maintains the framework of the [PRES] while meeting the genuine emergency needs of refugees and deslocados and promoting the demobilisation and resettlement of thousands of ex-combatants and their dependents. A unified approach would address concerns such as the decline in emergency assistance to an increased focus on poverty reduction, the relationship between resettlement, rural development and the priority districts programme....Reintegrating Mozambique’s economy carries over to donor activities as well....Increased untying, greater flexibility in financing current expenditure, and increased coordination with development priorities will be essential”. (op. cit)

In short, the first peace CG was characterised by government initiative in presenting its peace transition strategy and ideas and manifestations of donor willingness to respond as soon as peace was assured and more concrete programmes presented. There was, however, no indication that there would be any modification in the pace of reform measures or the macro-economic stabilisation targets. Indeed, improved the initiatives linked to improved economic management and the consolidation of economic reforms were considered two key elements in minimising the risks inherent in the “rough passage in the transition period” (op. cit).

#### **4.3.2 CG meetings during the peace process years and the National Reconstruction Plan**

There were two CG meetings during the peace process years: the 1992 meeting took place one month after the signing of the GPA, the 1993 CG was held shortly after critical bottlenecks in the peace process had been removed with demobilisation due to start in January 1994 and elections put off until October 1994. During these two years the economic policy reform measures and the related PFP benchmarks continued to provide the backdrop, with continued emphasis on restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. However, the financing requirements and the related “financing gap”

presented to the CG included provision for “special programmes” as did structural adjustment benchmarks pertaining to the budget. Although the agenda and issues papers for the two meetings combined “business as usual” topics with some directly related to the peace process - the latter was also treated separately in the December 1992 Rome donors conference and the July 1993 follow-up meeting in Maputo.

The CGs also followed the government’s work on the preparation of the NRP, which was finally presented in the end-1993 meeting. Although begun in early 1991, the NRP process was time-consuming since it involved field work at district level to ensure the involvement of local authorities and beneficiaries in the identification of development needs and priorities. Much of the field work was done at a time when it was difficult for the government to access many districts, in which cases estimates of needs were made. The work was concluded in 1993, and comprised a data base on resettlement and public service coverage, and some 5,000 actions or projects - on-going and proposed, financed and non-financed.

The NRP was criticised by some donors for being little more than a “shopping list” of physical reconstruction needs with little reference to recurrent cost implications and management capacity. However, given the absence of well-defined sectoral strategies, the lack of experienced staff at local level, and the nature of immediate reconstruction needs as seen from a local perspective, such an outcome was only to be expected. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the NRP marked an important turning point in moving from an essentially top-down identification of investment priorities to “bottom-up planning”. Its priority projects were incorporated into the subsequent 1994-96 rolling three-year investment plan (PTIP), thus ensuring that an increasing share of public investment would be directed towards the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure<sup>27</sup>. Moreover, some NGOs referred to the initial

<sup>27</sup> Cf. the comments by the Swedish delegate to the 1992 CG meeting.



provincial plans when identifying their reconstruction component during the transition period.

In the meantime, the World Bank undertook a complementary initiative aimed at identifying key issues for the peace transition and as a contribution to longer term strategic thinking. In February/March 1993 (with demobilisation underway, massive population movements, intensive donor humanitarian and rapid reconstruction activity) it fielded what subsequently became known as the "Vision Mission", which produced a draft 64-page report<sup>28</sup> on the post-war challenge in July. While the main conclusions centred on the challenge for Mozambique - focusing on the restoration of the rural economy (including access to land and the development of agricultural services), the enhancement of human capital, and the establishment of a better business climate - it also identified the implications for donors. These were subsequently incorporated into both the 1993 CG document and formed the basis for a special issues paper "Improving the Effectiveness of Aid".

### 4.3.3 The post-election CG

A new government was formed after the October 1994 elections, and the traditional December CG meeting was delayed until March 1995. For the first time there were considerable preparatory discussions in Maputo, with two donor working groups on the budget and governance. The latter concern was also reflected in the World Bank document<sup>29</sup>, where policy reform priorities included "strengthening governance" as an important element in the consolidation of peace and reconciliation - the consolidation of democracy, strengthening legal processes and fighting corruption.

It was clear that donors considered that consolidation of the peace process required

increased attention to political issues within the development co-operation and economic reform process. Consequently, although the main discussion topics focused on poverty reduction and impediments to industrial sector recovery donor, the chairman's closing statement noted the importance of "working democratic institutions" for growth and poverty alleviation. In this regard, donors had particularly noted the importance of the correct functioning of the Assembly, dialogue with the opposition and its status, a free press, decentralisation, stronger civil society and local authorities, good governance, and an independent judiciary. The Chair continued:

*"While virtually all of the interventions by the aid partners stressed some of the above components in nurturing democracy, there were some differences in approach. We heard that the American delegation would wish to see agreed specific benchmarks in order to monitor progress. On the other hand, the Danish representative said, 'This is not the time (in this area of political processes) for rigid conditionalities'. Nonetheless, what emerged loud and clear from the interventions and debate is that the aid partners as a whole hope and do expect to see measurable progress on several fronts by the time of the next Consultative Group meeting."<sup>30</sup>*

As in the "pre-peace" 1991 CG, donors noted that the effectiveness of government policies depended on a stable political and economic climate. However, the UNDP representative inverted this interpretation, stating that rapid, sustained and equitable economic growth was essential for establishing a strong foundation for reconstruction and the consolidation of democracy, and thus by implication peace and stability. He also raised an underlying problem in the reform process that was subsequently to come increasingly to the fore in discussions between donors and the Bretton Woods institutions - the relationship between stabilisation programmes and growth.

<sup>28</sup> World Bank (1993).

<sup>29</sup> "Establishing the Basis for Economic and Social Development: Key Policies", March 1995.

<sup>30</sup> Mozambique Consultative Group Meeting. Chair's Closing Statement. Paris, March 14-15 1995.



*"...if the Government is to achieve its goals, there seems to be a clear need for a sharply focused and implementable strategy for speeding up economic growth in the short run that is coherent with a longer-term development perspective. This is a tall order for the government since ensuring consistency between higher economic growth and tight fiscal monetary and inflation targets may turn out to be very problematic to obtain"*

This statement was particularly relevant given that performance under the stabilisation programme had slipped during 1995. The chair's closing statement<sup>31</sup> noted that "...the various parties were concerned about the danger of the economic programme drifting away from the path agreed with the IMF and the World Bank. The danger of *dérive budgétaire* was noted.... In particular the aid partners applauded the emphasis on macroeconomic stability as an absolute prerequisite..." The resulting tightening of benchmarks and budget targets for 1995 were illustrated by the Minister of Planning and Finance, who noted that current expenditure was programmed to fall by 3.3 percentage points of GDP, resulting in an annual per capita expenditure of USD 16.8 compared to USD 20 in 1993 and 1994.

The Chair's conclusion that donors gave wholehearted support to the emphasis on macroeconomic stability was soon challenged. At the initiative of the US ambassador in Mozambique, a group of donor representatives in Maputo<sup>32</sup> took the unprecedented step of sending a letter to the IMF, expressing their appreciation of the government's commitment to its reform agenda and their concern over the prospect of IMF discontinuation of the ESAF arrangement owing to non-compliance with some of the established benchmarks. They

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<sup>31</sup> *Op. cit.*

<sup>32</sup> The "Donor Statement", dated October 6, 1995, was signed by the Acting Delegate for the EU, the Ambassadors of the United States, Netherlands and Canada, the Chargés d'affaires for Finland and Switzerland, and the Resident Representative of UNDP.

expressed the opinion that the reform priorities should be reduced to manageable proportions. The growth versus stabilisation debate subsequently intensified within the donor community. It reflected not just growing concern that an excessive emphasis on stabilisation was strangling growth. In contrast to the earlier concern that peace was an essential pre-requisite for development, critics now argued that rapid growth was essential to consolidate peace and stability. The position of many was reflected in the Maputo Head of Mission contribution to the EU intervention in the March 1996 CG meeting, which provides an apt summary of the current post-war situation, prospects and issues:

*"The peace negotiation in Rome, the implementation of the GPA and the preparation and celebration of the first democratic elections in the country were an unqualified success and an example for the Southern Africa region and for the whole Continent. Three years after the end of the war the political stability is largely maintained.... This historical achievement would be in jeopardy if Mozambique were unable to make the transition from emergency aid and dependency to sustainable development and economic growth".<sup>33</sup>*

The statement notes that this economic transition requires certain basic reforms in the politico-administrative field - administration reform (less bureaucracy, more efficiency and transparency to curtail corruption and enhance good governance) and reform of the state (decentralisation, local elections, and the development of local authorities which respond to local needs). There are also indispensable structural reforms. However,

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<sup>33</sup> Final version of Head of Mission contribution to the Presidency's Intervention to the Consultative Group Meeting on behalf of EU member states. 28 March 1996.



*“after 16 years of devastating war, Mozambique faces the historical challenge of national reconciliation and country-wide reconstruction.... Rapid economic growth...is very much needed for alleviating poverty and, in the context of Mozambique’s recent encouraging transition towards an infant democracy, for promoting political stability. Given existing pervasive poverty and prevailing political tensions between the two former warring parties especially at the local level, it becomes absolutely essential to avoid an economic recession and a further decline in living conditions. In this unique situation it becomes imperative that financial stabilisation be managed in the context of economic growth. The challenge for Mozambique is that financial stabilisation needs to be accommodated in the context of a growth strategy and not vice versa”.* (emphasis added).

#### **4.4 The role of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)<sup>34</sup>**

While the resource-intensive, high profile ONUMOZ operation engulfed Mozambique for two years and then left as swiftly as it had come, foreign NGOs made a lower-key but more continuous contribution throughout the war-peace continuum in Mozambique. They provided both humanitarian relief and development assistance during the emergency and war, were major actors on the ground for both reconstruction and reconciliation during the peace process, and post-1994 reoriented their activities to sustain peace and development.

The result has been a continued and massive presence of foreign NGOs. Starting from a handful of solidarity NGOs in the early independence years, Mozambique had by the early 1990s some 170 with a wide range of backgrounds, mandates and approaches. The heavy presence of NGOs have intensified Mozambique’s already severe aid-dependency,

<sup>34</sup> This section draws heavily on Costy (1996) in Suhrke and Miranda (eds.) (forthcoming).

and led some critics to question whether on balance the recipient benefits.<sup>35</sup>

The consequences of NGO intervention depend in part on their mode of operation. In the case of Mozambique three kinds of intervention have been noted:

- NGOs which favour **integrated interventions** work with national structures (ministries and local government) on the grounds that this is more likely to conform with national strategies and priorities, produce nationally sustainable results, avoid untenable recurrent costs, and contribute to the rationalised response needed for immediate recovery. They also believe that this produces a healthy levelling of donor-government relations, thus restoring a measure of dignity to national authorities.
- **Semi-autonomous interventions** involve coordination with government planning strategies and some measure of participation by local (district) authorities. However, the NGO retains a high degree of decisional autonomy on project timing, implementation methods and spending.
- NGOs which favour **autonomous interventions** consider their main partners to be communities, civic associations, target groups and international donors and their initiatives may or may not fit official relief and development priorities. Religious organisations or those working with a local sister organisation (eg. the Red Cross) tend to fall into this category.

Even conventional development work has a political context, but in a conflict situation both development and humanitarian work has political implications. Moreover, the substantial economic power of NGOs in relation to local authorities in a post-war political context enhances the political

<sup>35</sup> Hanlon (1991).



dimension of their work even further. Some agencies recognise this more readily than others, by being “**politically sensitive**” and developing a “coping strategy” which is responsive to the course of events so as to minimise undesirable political consequences. Others take a more overt political position. **Politically active** NGOs have a dual agenda, combining reconstruction-development work with political activism of the local empowerment and rights or civic education type. **Politically mandated** NGOs, on the other hand, exist precisely to foster civil and human rights and the growth of civil society. They support political and institutional reforms - decentralisation, local elections, judiciary reform, transparency and accountability - and also tend to foster market economic reforms and privatisation (e.g. business training).

The number and diversity of NGOs in Mozambique, and weak Mozambican control over foreign NGOs at the central level, ensured that all modes were represented.

#### 4.4.1 NGOs and post-war transitions

The nature of the Mozambican conflict entailed particular challenges for the work of foreign NGOs, with possibilities for singularly constructive but also and highly problematic operations. Humanitarian organisations were at the forefront of getting the peace process moving on the ground. It was their pressure which produced the July 1993 agreement on Humanitarian Assistance provided the framework for opening up RENAMO areas. They subsequently responded vigorously to the challenge of accessing these areas, launching relief and rehabilitation programmes in isolated areas and frequently providing a much-needed bridge between RENAMO and government authorities.

The post-war transition period, when state and local government authorities were weak, yet sought to develop their capacities and formulate priorities in line with a National Reconstruction Plan, the downside features of NGO operations became clearer:

- autonomous interventions with little relation to national priorities and that fragmented rehabilitation efforts;
- non-conformity to national training, employment, and construction standards (either substandard in quality and durability or higher standard) which jeopardised sustainability and absorption;
- non-conformity with regional equity criteria in the geographic distribution of national social service networks (e.g. health, education, rural water supply);
- inadequate and/or unstandardised disclosure of information on activities;
- strained relations with government, particularly at local level; where resource-rich foreign NGOs became alternate structures of political and administrative power,
- low levels of capacity transfer and community participation (despite the perception of NGOs as being much more community oriented).

With the elections over and a new government in power, the purely relief agencies started to withdraw while the others reassessed their role. The politically mandated and active NGOs became active in promoting pluralism and the growth of civil society, sponsoring national partner organisations and NGOs, democracy-related initiatives and promoting local civil groups as part of the decentralisation process. Others focused on social reconciliation and security, with special programmes aimed at resolving disputes within targeted sections of society and developing indigenous conflict management capacity (e.g. work with demobilised soldiers, unions and youth, voluntary weapons consignment, funding for local initiatives which promote non-violent solutions to social issues).

Given the economic status and influence of a foreign NGO in a resource-poor environment, their effect can be pronounced. It is frequently the main employer and controls the distribution of key resources and materials (food, seeds, equipment, transport) which symbolise not only welfare but also power and prestige. There have been various instances where differential



payment schemes and employment criteria, distribution schemes and rehabilitation projects have generated unrest which has become politicised.<sup>36</sup>

Areas of "dual administration" pose special challenges. Some NGOs have consciously applied conflict management techniques, sometimes calling on outside expert advice.<sup>37</sup> In other instances, NGOs have aggravated the situation by aligning with either the government administration or RENAMO authorities.<sup>38</sup> The co-existence of pro-administration and autonomous interventions, negotiated access and the engagement of community participation in RENAMO areas thus poses the risk of institutionalising the dual administration problem and laying the ground for recurrent conflict.

The proliferation of "autonomous" NGO interventions arose in the post-war transition period when government authority was substantially reduced. The post-election government has not only greater legitimacy, but also a clear programme that highlights national development priorities and emphasises national integration. Recognising that these objectives could be countered by the operational modalities of NGOs and donors, the government is intensifying sector programming and decentralising or deconcentrating certain responsibilities to local authorities.

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<sup>36</sup> Project-related incidents, in some cases violent, involving one or both of the political factions have been reported in Zambezia, Sofala, Gaza and Inhambane by Oxfam, Action Aid, RRR, FHI, TDH, LWF, AISPO, CEAR, World Vision and MCC.

<sup>37</sup> Information, mediation between parties, facilitation of communication and joint decision making, cooling off periods.

<sup>38</sup> Chibabava, Inhaminga, and Gorongosa in Sofala have all experienced this.

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## 5. The grassroots perspective<sup>1</sup>

*"Everyone remains alone, everyone just has to push on his own side"*

Profidelino Carlos Viana and Inácio Armando  
interview, Manhiça town, 22.10.1996

### 5.1 Introduction and methodology

This chapter summarizes an analysis of the peace process in Mozambique from the point of view of the recipients, i.e. a "grassroots perspective". The analysis is based primarily on semi-structured interviews and observation in three districts of Maputo province: Manhiça, Magude and Moamba.

#### 5.1.1 Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted because of the diversity of themes to be covered. We tried to obtain views on democratisation, the peace process, general expectations of peace and whether these were fulfilled or not, current problems and their causes and solutions, as well as aid and its impact on livelihood strategies.

The interviews also brought to the surface fears and silences of the villagers. Questions linked to the security situation, democratisation, refuge and return strategies were often answered with reservations by the respondents, either because they already had been asked these questions by other people or simply were afraid of talking about such issues.

#### 5.1.2 Direct observation

Although brief, the field work allowed the research team to observe the behaviour of informants as well as the general situations in

the districts visited. At times, this permitted immediate correction. For instance, the district administrator in Manhiça district spoke about the non-existence of problems of double administration between FRELIMO and RENAMO. "It existed but now the questions is resolved". Visiting a village and outlying areas in the district, however, we were told that anyone wanting to cut wood or conduct any other activity in certain areas had to get permission from the RENAMO representative. The physical limits of this geographical area is known to the residents.

The field work also made it easier to understand the low priority given by the state administration and by the government to areas situated far from the administrative centres and main roads. A trip to some of this areas visited (Macaene in Moamba, Mapulanguene in Magude and Chichongui in Manhiça) takes about six to seven hours even though they are located in Maputo province. This is the same time it takes needs to go from Maputo to Inhambane, 600 kilometres to the north.

#### 5.1.3 Limitations

The findings from Maputo province must not be taken as representative of what is happening in rural areas in all of Mozambique. Given the complexity of local histories, there is no representative rural district in Mozambique.

Maputo province has several special characteristics. It is one of the richest provinces

<sup>1</sup> The study on which this summary is based was prepared by a team directed by Yussuf Adam, Centro de Estudos de População, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane. The full text of the study is presented in the CMI Working Paper companion to the present report (Suhrke and Miranda, eds., forthcoming).



in the country, it is Southern, has long been a FRELIMO stronghold, and borders on South Africa. The province is heavily influenced by its proximity and traditionally close relations to both the most developed economy in the region (South Africa) and the capital city. This created special circumstances for the displaced and refugee populations, e.g. continuous movements across the border, and the possibility, through family networks and cash income to maintain a foot on either side of the border or in Maputo city, as well as a desire to do so.

Given the conditions of work, it was not possible to rigidly structure the sample of informants. Insecurity limited the work of the team (e.g. it was impossible to drive after night time, and there was an assault on a bus near the village 3 de Fevereiro the night before we got there). These factors, and the diversity in findings within and among districts, make it difficult to draw firm generalisations even with respect to rural areas in Maputo province.

#### **5.1.4 Documentary sources**

There is a large literature (published and unpublished) on Maputo province and the three districts selected for field research that broadly speaking is relevant to the peace process and its aftermath (e.g. studies on rural development). Due to time constraints we concentrated on recent studies which summarised relevant information and helped to avoid duplication in the collection of data. Four important sources were used: (1) the reports produced by the Mozambique Participative Poverty Study Project run by the Population Studies Centre at Universidade Eduardo Mondlane; (2) the UNCHR/ UNDP "District Development Profiles"; (3) Moamba's official monograph and (4) The ICS baseline study for the Community Radio Project.

#### **5.1.5 Areas selected**

Maputo province was selected for the following reasons:

- time and logistics restraints: it was relatively easy to start work near Maputo, and conducting and supervising field

research in Maputo seemed to be easier to organise than in more remote provinces.

- Norwegian NGOs were or had been working in the province. Some of their activities had already been evaluated.
- all themes to be covered - elections, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement, rapid rebuilding also occurred in Maputo province.


#### **5.1.6 District characteristics**

The three districts represent different levels of development. Moamba was and is a rich district; Magude was a rich district which became poor due to the war. Manhiça is a relatively poor district. All were affected by repatriation, resettlement, reconstruction; in Moamba, there had been extensive demining. Within each district, three to four areas were selected. Besides the administrative centre itself, research was conducted in 1) areas of easy access from the district capital, usually some 10-20 kilometres from the capital; 2) marginal areas which were either poor or difficult to access; 3) areas which had been under RENAMO administration. Marginalities (physical, economic and political) often overlapped. RENAMO for example had often installed itself in remote areas - see figure 1.

All districts voted overwhelmingly in favour of FRELIMO in the election.



Figure 1. Areas visited



### 5.1.7 Informant characteristics

Three types of informants were interviewed in each district:

- prominent people - administrator and some of the district directors (health, education, agriculture, etc.) These contacts were useful to gather general information and get permission to work within the district. These people also had a general view of the situation in the district. In the communities or villages, we interviewed people who had a prominent role in the communities (priest, régulo, etc.).
- citizens: the team tried to interview a balanced sample of population but also talked with people randomly. Individuals who had been specifically affected by an aid program were interviewed.

All interviews were organised and conducted independently. The research teams were not accompanied by a guide from the administration.

## 5.2 Summary of findings

### 5.2.1 Introduction

Maputo is a rich province as compared to other parts of the country. It has many rivers (Incomati, Sabié, etc.), good infrastructures (railway and roads to South Africa and the Limpopo railway corridor to Zimbabwe). The province also hosts the capital city, something which is of crucial importance in terms of services.

The province borders South Africa and Swaziland and consequently has strong historical, social-ethnic and economic links with both countries. Whereas Swaziland and South Africa use Maputo's port, Mozambique (and Maputo province in particular) export labour to South African mines, industries and farms. Commerce between the three states also flourishes. Since the ANC came to power, new political links between South Africa and Mozambique have been forged, including joint police operations in Maputo province to locate and destroy arms caches and recover stolen cars.



and destroy arms caches and recover stolen cars.

Maputo province occupies the second position in the development ranking of the country's ten provinces. Nampula is the most developed province, and Cabo Delgado the least developed one<sup>2</sup>. War has affected the development of the province: infra-structure has been destroyed; cattle was stolen or killed; one of the sugar cane companies closed down. War also led to large forced migrations. People left for South Africa, Swaziland or to the relatively secure areas around district capitals, administrative posts and the city of Maputo. When the war ended in 1992, a reverse

movement of people occurred as refugees and displaced persons returned to their home areas.

Some economic activities, especially agriculture, have resumed. Large companies have indicated their willingness to restart or expand their activities. Manhiça's Maragra sugarcane company will reopen in 1997.

### **5.2.2 Demobilisation**

Maputo province had 6 assembly areas where soldiers were concentrated and demobilised. They all opened between the month of October 1993 and February 1994. Two centres were for RENAMO soldiers and 4 for government soldiers.

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<sup>2</sup> Adam, Y. and H. Coimbra (1996B).



<i>Government assembly areas</i>		<i>RENAMO assembly areas</i>	
Center' location	dates of opening	Center' location	Date of opening
Moamba	30.10.1993	Chinhanganine (Moamba district)	31.10.1993
Magude	30.10.1993	Tinonganine (Matutuine district)	01.02.1994
Catembe	20.12.1993		
Boane	01.02.1994		

Source: Borge Coelho and Vines (1996), p. 23

No particular problems were recorded in the assembly points in Maputo province.<sup>3</sup> The demobilised soldiers received their first aid in the assembly areas. ONUMOZ supplied clothes, soap, medical treatment and food. When leaving the ONUMOZ camps after completion of the demobilisation process soldiers were given "kits" of tools, clothes as well as money. This aid helped them to return home. Once at home, they also received a one-year salary subsidy from the government, designed to ease the transition to civilian life and to self-sufficiency. RENAMO and government soldiers were treated equally in the demobilisation process.

To secure the return of soldiers to civilian life and to encourage a permanent disengagement from war, the international community (NGOs, multilateral and bilateral organisations) established development projects specifically for demobilised soldiers. There were also some in Maputo province. The objective was to foster the initiative of demobilised soldiers and help them start their own activities. Former soldiers received training and credit. Training activities (mechanics, carpenter, bakers, etc.) were organised. Basic kits of equipment to start activities was distributed and financial credit supplied specifically for demobilised soldiers.

Respondents criticised the aid projects in Maputo province on several grounds. The courses were said to be very short and lack follow-up. No diplomas or certificates were distributed and no job opportunities were

<sup>3</sup> According to Borge Coelho and Vines (1996) relatively few problems occurred in the whole of the country.

offered at the end of the course. Materials (sewing kits, equipment, etc.) and credits were often inaccessible as they had been stolen or were sold. Most demobilised soldiers we spoke to said they got little out of these projects and were highly disappointed. Grand promises were made but little delivery followed.

One aspect of the demobilisation process that was not dealt with on a systematic basis by the state, NGOs and the international organisations is the social and psychological problems faced by former soldiers.

Most demobilised soldiers interviewed complained that society, the state and the international community lacked and still lacks respect for them. As evidence of lack of respect, they cited the failure of projects and the inability of the donors to deliver the goods and the activities they promised.

The demobilised also sense hostility of the population towards themselves. There is a feeling that the population considers the demobilised to be behind the prevalent criminality. Ordinary people, for their part, often say that former soldiers have been favoured with aid programs and have been given priority in projects and credit. Their perception thus differs markedly from that of the ex-soldiers themselves. Ordinary people also tend to consider the ex-soldiers responsible for the killing and destruction during the war.

Demobilised soldiers feel marginalised and insecure. They claim that this situation explains the prevalence of a high rate of divorce among them.



### 5.2.3 Repatriation, returnees and resettlement

The number of returnees in Maputo province and its districts is difficult to ascertain. First, people are still moving and numbers are fluctuating. Second, some people have only returned partially. They have started farming but continue to sleep or live in the house they moved to during the war. Third, there is a certain confusion as to who is a returnee and who isn't. In general, anyone who had left his or her normal place of residence during the war and returned after the Peace accord is considered a returnee. Common designations are: returnees from abroad, returnees from another province; returnee from another district and returnee from the neighbouring town.

In a context of massive population movement after the war most people are "returnees" in one sense or another. Each administration and organisation seem to have its own understanding of who is a returnee. Manhiça district has registered 60,000 returnees, equivalent to one-third of the total population. The district administration in Moamba has registered only 6,000 returnees out of a population of around 84 000. One reason could be that fewer persons left Moamba in the first place, since even with few returnees the district is almost back to its 1980 population. The remaining absence of some may reflect several factors. Moamba borders on South Africa, thus making it possible to cross back and forth without formally returning. The war was particularly violent in Moamba and a settlement of demobilised RENAMO soldiers in the district worries the local people.

The Southern Mozambique transit centre for returnees (ex-refugees) was established in Moamba and closed at the end of 1995. All refugees were treated similarly. International organisations (in co-ordination with the Mozambican state) bussed people home from South Africa or Swaziland. Internally displaced persons were also transported to their places of origin.

On their way home, both the former refugees and internally displaced persons received resettlement kits containing tools, cooking

instruments, etc. In the area of origin, people received food donation from international organisations and state institutions to survive until the first crop. Respondents in Manhiça said that aid was distributed in a discriminating manner and eventually fell short. "The small people and the last one [in line] did not receive [any]".<sup>4</sup>

There were categories of former refugees in Maputo province: camp refugees and "illegal" or "independent" refugees. Once returned, they were both treated equally by international aid organisations. "Camp refugees" were forced to go back home by the authorities in South Africa or Swaziland. They had to return at once with their whole family. In contrast, "independent" or "illegal" refugees returned home voluntarily. They developed strategies to minimise the risks and costs of re-starting life in their home area. Also this group received humanitarian aid. They often kept their house where they had taken refuge and left some relatives behind to take care of it. Sometime they returned only temporarily to receive humanitarian aid and re-open their farms, but they continued to live as migrants in the country where they had taken refuge.

Some "camp returnees" did not go all the way home because they feared war might restart. They returned to stay close to the border area so that they could easily flee in case war resumed. These returnees lived in unfamiliar areas where they had neither a social network nor relatives. They were usually poor. By the second half 1996, when this field work was undertaken, former camp refugees who played it safe considered that the situation was safe enough to go home. But they could not cover the cost of travel, and the aid organisations which had helped in repatriation had stopped their activities. This was particularly a problem in the frontier district of Moamba.

Peace and security was not the only factor considered by those who returned home to choose the moment of return and the place where to return to. Some respondents also cited the state of social infrastructures (hospital,

<sup>4</sup> "Os Pequenos e os últimos não apanham", C. Viano e I. Aramando, Interview, Manhiça Town, 22.10.1996



school) as an important factor, while others said this was not significant.

#### 5.2.4 Rapid reconstruction

Many humanitarian programs had a Rapid Reconstruction component to build or rebuild schools and hospitals, etc. The assumption was that the return and resettlement of refugees and displaced people depended at least in part on the functioning of social institutions.

The reaction of the respondents was divided and contradictory. Those who have benefited from such programs are satisfied because something has been built, although typically services are not properly delivered and the infra-structure itself is not maintained (noted especially in Manhiça, Moamba). The local people emphasise that services, not buildings, are the important thing. Many schools have not reopened because there is no teacher. Many health posts do not function because there is no nurse (e.g. Calanga). There is a serious lack of doctors. Moamba and Magude are served by only one doctor each. Manhiça has two. The three districts, representing together around 400,000 inhabitants, are served by only three doctors.

Access to social services is also a problem because of lack of transport, high costs and informal charges levied by often untrained personnel.

The respondents often identified problems related to commercialisation and transport as priority areas to be solved. For instance, peasants in Vundiça (Moamba district) work in an area with insufficient rainfall. The meagre results from agriculture are complemented with incomes generated from fuelwood cutting and sale and charcoal production. But there is no outlet for this production. Access to market is a limitation. "Here the bag of charcoal costs 12,000 meticais (Mt). In Maputo, it is worth Mt. 45-50,000. The problem is that transport to Maputo costs Mt. 10,000 (for the person) and one has to pay another Mt. 10-12,000 for each bag, as transportation fee. Then in Maputo one has to pay for a market place too. Well, that does not leave much at the end of the

day"<sup>5</sup> Yet, respondents noted that aid programs ignored infrastructure for trading (shops) and transport.

The rapid rebuilding of infrastructures in the Maputo province was balanced politically. Construction took place in RENAMO as well as government areas. Some organisations such as (the Swiss) Helvetas had projects specifically targeted for RENAMO areas.

However, if politics were well taken into account in the rehabilitation of the infrastructure, the needs and priorities of the local population were not. As is often the case, rehabilitation or building of new schools or health posts was done in areas of easy access, situated near the administrative posts where infra-structure already existed. In Manhiça district, most rehabilitated or newly build schools are located along the road. No organisation has crossed the Incomati river to build a school in the administrative post of Calanga. Yet Calanga had 15 schools before the war, representing 30% of the total school network in the district.

Unresolved problems between the church and the state impede the reconstruction as well as the reopening/functioning of schools and hospitals. The state is in a process of denationalising property it took over from the church in 1975. However, the negotiation process is slow. Neither the church nor the state are showing signs of wanting to make concessions. The result of this deadlock is the following: 1. Church property has not been handed back; 2. The infra-structure is deteriorating because no one is investing as long as the conflict over property rights is unresolved.

Two mission stations in respectively Magude (Antioka) and Manhiça (Chichongui) illustrate the absurd situation. The infra-structure is there but there is no functioning school or hospital since there is no personnel to teach or treat the population.

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<sup>5</sup> Nelson X. Beve, Interview, Vundiça, 02.11.1996



### 5.2.5 Demining

In each district, known mined places are marked. Nevertheless, they create problems. Mines prevent people from returning to their homes, from working in their fields or from hunting and collecting wood. The problems are most acutely felt in periods of hunger and/or drought, when people depend for their survival on hunting, wood- and food-collecting and forage over large areas which have not been inhabited for some time. The problem increases with the return of the population and the resumption of economic and social activities. For instance, in Vundiça in Moamba district, the mined area is fairly close to the school and village and includes the region where the régulo had his house. In 1994 a mine killed a hunter. This year the population is worried. As one mother said: "We are preoccupied with this mine situation because now that the school will start, the children are going to see mangoes and other fruits, and they are going to enter the mined area to pick the fruits".<sup>6</sup>

Mines were extensively used by the government in Maputo province. The objectives were to (1) create a barrier to RENAMO and establish a security "cordon" around towns and villages; (2) protect infrastructures such as military quarters or shops, and (3) block the use of roads.

Priority areas for demining were identified by the government, by ONUMOZ or by the two in collaboration. In Maputo province, demining of roads was not made a priority. In the three districts we visited - Moamba, Magude and Manhiça - towns and their immediate surroundings had been selected for clearance first. ONUMOZ worked until their mission ended in 1995. Other UN bodies such as UNDP kept up a presence in demining operations. Since 1994, private companies also started to work in demining. By late 1996, the most important areas in Maputo province had been cleared. Marginal areas are either being prospected, marked or are in the process of demining.

The pattern of demining priorities - urban or urbanised areas cleared, but marginal areas

and areas near the borders are still mined - appeared in all three districts and may partly reflect military or strategic considerations. The population did not participate in defining the areas where demining should be given priority, nor did they expect to do so, citing lack of knowledge of mine locations.

Demining operations were accompanied by preventive activities. Education and awareness campaigns were conducted among the population to prevent accidents and included public lectures, meetings, dissemination of posters, a press and radio campaign, distribution of pamphlets and projection of films. The publicity, awareness and education campaign covered extensive territory - from refugee camps abroad to the most remote areas in the districts.

In the three districts visited, the information program was very successful. The mine education campaign reached its target groups. People had usually understood well the information about mines. Most people were able to explain what a mine looked like and what they should do after they discovered a mine. Relatively few mine accidents have taken place in the three districts after 1992 and at present very few cases are reported.

### 5.2.6 Aid

Norwegian aid to the peace process in Mozambique was noticed in the three districts where the research was conducted. Three Norwegian NGOs - the Norwegian Refugee Council, the Norwegian People's Aid, and the Norwegian Africa Committee - had built schools, hospitals and installed water pumps. Their participation in demining and mine danger awareness campaigns was reported. Seed and tools distribution was undertaken. Support was also given to transport and resettlement of former refugees and IDPs.

While much of this aid was spoken of in positive terms, it was also clear that the NGO aid in the districts often showed the same weaknesses and errors as the government's. Most importantly, aid programmes were organised without any proper consultation with the population. The Norwegian NGOs were not

<sup>6</sup> Helena M. Machie, Interview, Vundiça. 02.11.1996



totally exempt from this criticism, including one case cited where food was distributed without proper information and caused some tension.

Much NGO aid was directed to constructing and rehabilitating building when the population needed and asked for teachers and doctors. The building which was done focused on areas of easy access, reinforcing the imbalances within the districts as poor areas are usually the one with difficult access.

Aid programmes for returnees were drawn and organised on the basis of rapid return and rebuilding, while the population actually planned and returned with a longer-term perspective. The lack of consideration for the population included the ignorance of the population's right to information about distribution of aid. Aid was sometimes handed out and the donor disappeared without saying a word. The people never knew if more aid was to come or not. In some cases, such attitude created misrepresentation and bad feelings.

### 5.2.7 Democratization, elections and the future

Compared with the rest of the country, the elections in Maputo province had only one particular feature: the results gave an overwhelming victory to FRELIMO. FRELIMO won over 75 per cent of the votes at the province level, and RENAMO less than 10%. This is in line with the election pattern in Southern Mozambique generally but contrasts sharply with the results obtained in provinces in the Centre and North, where RENAMO won with a (sometimes very) strong majority.

The election process itself in Maputo was not different from the one which occurred elsewhere in Mozambique, and cannot therefore explain discrepancies in results between the Northern and Southern provinces. Most probably, FRELIMO's overwhelming victory had to do with socio-historical factors.

FRELIMO actually won even more votes in the rural district of Maputo than in the capital city itself. This is surprising since a core of FRELIMO's electoral support is urban. The results could reflect an urbanisation of the districts in the immediate vicinity of Maputo city. Other factors, like the strong organisation of FRELIMO party, the linkages between FRELIMO party and the state administration, and fear may also have played a role.

NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL (MAPUTO) RESULTS \_ LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

	VOTES	VALID	ABST.	FRELIMO	%	RENAMO	%	UD	OTHERS
Maputo	335,149	254,430	42,528	198,429	78	17,749	7	15,055	23,197
National	6,177,881	4,773,225	773,583	2,115,793	44	1,803,506	38	245,793	600,133
Manhiça	52,281	39,835	4,688	31,745	80	1,274	3	3,068	3,748
Magude	17,945	14,436	1,541	11,738	81	631	4	930	1137
Moamba	19,052	14,600	2,559	11,096	76	866	6	1,066	1,572

Source: Brito (1996), p.497

The 1994 election was meant to be a democratic exercise. However, many persons in

Maputo province were reportedly forced or pressured to vote. That was the case, for



example, in the village of 3 de Fevereiro in Manhiça district. The FRELIMO secretary reportedly went around the village to order the population to go to the voting post. One woman told us: "If you didn't go, they would come and fetch you. It's the head of the neighbourhood who obliged us. If you didn't vote, you had to tell which was your party".<sup>7</sup>

People were not upset about having been obliged to vote. They are used to such practices. They also viewed the elections as a positive event, clearly equating it with peace. Many respondents said that with their vote they contributed to Peace. Some declared their intention of taking part in the next election because that was the way to keep the peace.<sup>8</sup>

While the respondents considered peace and the 1994 elections as positive factors, the results and consequences of the elections more specifically were viewed in a negative light. After the elections, people felt deceived for several reasons: 1. FRELIMO did not deliver on its electoral promises; 2. There was little impact on their own life. 3. The State and FRELIMO's administrative structures remained the same and 4. The opposition was almost non-existent (outside the capital). In Moamba for example, RENAMO was the only opposition party which manifested some presence during the electoral campaign. Yet its representation in the district capital closed down after the elections.

As for future, two positions can be distinguished.

1. Some people did not feel secure and feared war could start again. This was most acute in Moamba district where poverty, land conflicts and the continuous presence of people at a RENAMO base enhance the feeling of insecurity. As a man in Dindiza said: "Here we don't know if the war has stopped because we have no contact with anybody. Every time a car passes by, we

are ready to flee".<sup>9</sup> Another man explained: "War has stopped. But one can see that it has not ended in the habits of the heart".<sup>10</sup>

2. Others simply refused to comment on the future. They would just declare: "Only God knows about the future. He decides".<sup>11</sup> In some cases, they reckoned that it depended on the politicians: "We do not know if Peace is for ever or not. It all depends on the politicians".<sup>12</sup>

Taken together, these feelings of insecurity and powerlessness show a lack of confidence about the future. This attitude probably can be explained by vivid memories of the past - of war, atrocities, and flight - and a sense that the present is confused, uncertain and insecure.

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<sup>7</sup> Albertina Wati, Interview, 3 De Fevereiro, 30.10.1996

<sup>8</sup> For Example, Terezina Bonzela. Interview, 3 De Fevereiro, 30.10.1996

<sup>9</sup> Enós Mathevula, Interview, Dindiza, 02.11.1996

<sup>10</sup> Lucas Chongo, interview, Moamba Town, 31.10.1996

<sup>11</sup> Terefina Bonzela, Interview, 3 De Fevereiro, 30.10.1996

<sup>12</sup> Silvestre Chauque, Interview, Manhiça Town, 24.11.1996



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## 6. Demobilisation

### ***6.1 Conceptualisation issues and the objective of demobilisation***

Given the history of the armed conflict and the prolonged peace negotiations, demobilisation in Mozambique was a sensitive and complex process. It was made even more so by the large number of actors involved and by diverging perspectives as to its purpose and nature. The short term view, which concentrated on the finite GPA-governed peace process, saw demobilisation as pacification, entailing troop disarmament, documentation, initial dispersion through home transport, and a cash and goods take-home package. This perspective was heightened by the fact that some 4-5 million displaced people also required assistance. A longer-term concern for lasting peace saw demobilisation as demilitarisation and complete reintegration into civilian life, involving counselling, training and employment generation. It stressed the special features and concerns of demobilised soldiers, their limited experience of civilian life, strong sense of entitlements and potential for instability. It also incorporated the view that to the extent possible, external assistance should have a development rather than an emergency perspective.

The tension between these two opposing views was never resolved and prevented the development of a common strategy, and thus a coherent demobilisation programme. The initiatives which eventually emerged were fragmented and piecemeal, reducing their effectiveness and wasting resources. But perhaps it could not have been otherwise given the GPA framework, the time pressures and in particular the myriad of players and interests whose decisions impacted on the future of the demobilising soldiers.

### ***6.2 The GPA and its institutions, mechanisms and players***

Demobilisation involved several distinct "interest groups". The signatories to the GPA were duty bound to obtain a good deal for their combatants. The UN, haunted by the spectre of Angola, had to successfully conclude its GPA tasks by the given deadline. The government officials involved in many aspects of the programme had more of a post peace perspective and a culture of development. The donor community was a disparate group with varying agendas and degrees of commitment to development co-operation with Mozambique, and with different quantitative and procedural financial possibilities for peace. Finally, there were the former combatants themselves, ill-informed and without a voice. Demobilisation was a top-down exercise which gave little heed to the opinions and feelings of the target group.

#### **6.2.1 The donors**

Demobilisation was complicated by the fact that the implementation of the GPA was heavily dependent on donors - collectively crucial players, but ones who were operationally autonomous and not always in complete agreement with its terms. The GPA considered demobilisation and reintegration to be two separate but equally important activities, and even established a specific commission (CORE) to plan, organise and direct this activity. However, the nature of both CORE activities and the reintegration programmes themselves were not specified, since this would depend on the resources to be made available at the subsequent Rome Donors Conference. Here the collective donor position was clear - the reintegration programme would be directed indiscriminately at the community as a whole.



Nevertheless, as time passed, certain donors influenced how demobilisation-reintegration was handled - collectively through participation in ONUMOZ Commissions and informal groupings and individually through their chosen funding priorities and mechanisms. One influential group comprised those represented in the high-level politico-military commissions<sup>1</sup>. Of these, the USA and UK in particular stressed the short-term nature of GPA activities, although the USA and Germany eventually ended up playing a prominent role in bilateral reintegration initiatives (information services and employment funds).

The Like-Minded group<sup>2</sup>, of which Norway was an active member, comprised donors with long experience, a heavy development assistance commitment to Mozambique and a tradition of mutual collaboration and exchange of views. Both as a group and individually, they showed more interest in assisting demobilisation, and were among the first to commit funds. This was due in part to their involvement in pre-GPA initiatives on unilateral demobilisation, spearheaded by Switzerland and the Ministry of Finance. Swiss technical assistance for the ONUMOZ Demobilisation Technical Unit (DTU) was the logical continuation of this, as was the Netherlands contribution of USD 2.2 million a UNDP project and Trust Fund for Demobilisation, and a subsequent Norwegian contribution (USD 1.3 million) in August and December 1993 respectively. The Netherlands and Sweden earmarked part of their UNOHAC Trust Fund contribution for training activities, and Swiss/Danish contributions were used for some Assembly Area activities and preliminary reintegration studies. Finally, the Netherlands, Norway and UNDP launched the Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS), which was almost totally funded by the Like-Minded donors.

<sup>1</sup> Italy (the mediator), Portugal (the former colonial power), Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States. With the exception of the USA, their development cooperation programmes were not that substantial and Mozambique was not a particularly "high priority" aid beneficiary.

<sup>2</sup> Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Switzerland and Canada (in the context of assistance to Mozambique).

## 6.2.2 ONUMOZ and UNOHAC

To the five interested groupings mentioned above, the UN added six cross-cutting institutions and mechanisms involved in demobilisation-related decisions and initiatives.

- a) The **ONUMOZ Politico-Military bodies** (chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General) included the **Supervision and Monitoring Commission (CSC)**, with generic responsibility for supervising compliance with the GPA – and thus key decisions affecting demobilisation and its timing – and the **Cease Fire Commission (CCF)**, which was directly responsible for implementing the demobilisation process through weapons-collection and demobilisation. Finally all activities were ultimately dependent on the **Commission for the Formation of the Mozambique Defence Force (CCFADM)**. Its decisions and activities determined both the timing and dimension of the demobilisation process, which would cover only those who did not join the new army. No member of the "like-minded group", the most significant and active donor group in Mozambique, participated in these commissions.
- b) **Reintegration Commission (CORE)** chaired by the Head of UNOHAC, was responsible for the economic and social integration of demobilised soldiers. However, it turned out to be the most ineffective of the commissions, since (i) with no executive functions, its mandate covered essentially policy formulation, programme co-ordination and fiscal monitoring, and (ii) it got bogged down in protracted debate on what that policy and strategy should be. UNOHAC favoured medium-term development-related activities while donors preferred short-term programmes which required neither heavy government involvement (to maintain impartiality) nor substantial donor funds, nor the perpetuation of a special status for demobilised soldiers.



- c) UNOHAC co-ordinated donor reconstruction-reintegration activities, and administered a multi-donor USD 34 million Trust Fund with the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which financed not only 60 NGO and community projects but also demining activities and some components of the demobilisation programme.
- d) The Demobilisation Technical Unit (DTU) ran 44 Assembly Areas (AA) and was responsible for all the technical and logistical aspects of demobilisation and the “first line” response to reintegration<sup>3</sup>. This covered Assembly Area logistics (food, lodging, water and sanitation, health); all the paperwork, from the registration of entrants, to issuing Demobilisation Cards and RSS vouchers; the provision of civilian clothing, a take-home package and the first severance pay instalment; and co-ordination of transport arrangements. It also organised an **Information and Social Reintegration Programme** comprising literacy, cultural and sports programmes and information on health and sanitation, the RSS and “how to start a new life”.

### **6.3 Brief overview of the demobilisation process**

The GPA time-frame for the demobilisation process was unrealistic – starting on 15 December 1992, two months after the GPA and finishing on 15 April 1993 – and the situation was aggravated by the tardy start-up of the UN operation. The Security Council resolution establishing ONUMOZ, and the Donors Conference to mobilise the required additional funding only took place in mid-December (the

<sup>3</sup> Its activities cost about USD 58.7 million provided by ONUMOZ (USD 11 million), Government of Mozambique (USD 22.4 million) and 14 donors (USD 24.3 million) either directly or through UN agencies and the UNOHAC fund.

GPA deadline for the demobilisation of the first 20 per cent of the troops).

Despite delays elsewhere, the DTU was one of the first ONUMOZ structures to be mounted since it benefited from conceptual and preparatory work begun in 1991, long before the GPA. Following a government request for assistance with a unilateral demobilisation programme, Swiss technical assistance and Ministry of Finance staff jointly identified procedures and needs, mounted a special unit in the Ministry of Finance, did a socio-economic survey of the 16,000 soldiers concerned and lobbied the donor community – the “like-minded” group in particular. Switzerland agreed to finance the programme if another donor would also come on board. Although the Norwegian embassy wanted to, but Oslo refused. Events were subsequently overtaken by the GPA. However, thanks to the preparatory work not only was it relatively easy to transfer the DTU to ONUMOZ, but also an influential donor group was well informed and prepared to respond promptly.

However, owing to a series of setbacks and delays<sup>4</sup>, soldiers only started arriving in the Assembly Areas seven months later, in November 1993 under a new timetable whereby demobilisation would start in January and end by 15 July 1994. Disturbances by soldiers on both sides were an important factor in getting the programme moving, and alerted donors to the programme’s vulnerability to troop discontent. They also brought home the fact that no reintegration programme was as yet in place, the take home package was minimal and the six months severance pay (less than USD 100, the lowest on record) would end just before the elections. Consequently, a rapid initiative by the Netherlands, Norway and UNDP resulted in the conception of a financial **Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS)**, which

<sup>4</sup> RENAMO's temporary withdrawal from the peace process, late deployment of the peace-keeping force, late submission of troop and weapons lists, the unsuitability of many assembly area sites



received the tacit donor approval at the Consultative Group Meeting in December 1993.<sup>5</sup>

The new deadline pressures meant that the planned orderly, phased troop concentration was abandoned. Many Assembly Areas became overcrowded, and their facilities over-taxed by the concentration of soldiers' families around the camps. Tensions and logistical problems intensified when the creation of the new army stalled, and inmates remained in the camps much longer than the planned six weeks. Fanned by unrealistic promises by military leaders, riots and disturbances quickly forced the issue and the bulk of the demobilisation took place in July-August. The process was declared closed in August 1994, although cases continued until the end of the year.

## **6.4 The Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS)**

### **6.4.1 Description**

The aim of the RSS was to ease the transition to civilian life at a time of employment constraints and to encourage beneficiaries to return to their home districts. It comprised 18 months salary, with privates receiving the minimum wage (Mt. 79,000), double the allowance they had received while in the army (Mt. 35,000). Payments were made bimonthly rather than lump-sum, so as to extend benefits over time and help/encourage beneficiaries to settle in their home areas, where the payments were made. Payment levels were maintained throughout the life of the programme in the anticipation that inflation would gradually wean beneficiaries off heavy dependence on the income (final payments were roughly one third of the minimum wage). They were made through the BPD bank, the only one bank with a network, albeit incomplete, of branches in the districts.

The procedures involved preparation by DTU of a voucher book for nine bi-monthly

<sup>5</sup> After almost one year with few palpable results, the RSS took only two weeks to conceive and less than three months to set up.

payments, issued in the Assembly Area together with the demobilisation card. The soldier had to select in advance the bank branch where he/she wished to receive the , each bank only paying out to those on its list of payees. Procedures and forms were prepared for exceptional situations – loss of vouchers, change in residence and preferred bank, power of attorney for collection by a third party, and notification of death for surviving entitlement holders.

The initial study identified two demobilisation scenarios covering 80,000 and 54,000 soldiers and costing USD 28.1 million and USD 21.7 million respectively. As more information became available, the project Plan of Operations anticipated 69,000 troops costing USD 19 million. The final figure was however USD 31 million for 95,500 troops. This increase was due in part to the unplanned inclusion of some 2,000 members of the presidential guard, but primarily to the fact that many more soldiers than anticipated opted for demobilisation when they learned of the RSS. The UNDP Trust Fund, however, eventually received USD 35 million from 8 donors. Eighty-seven per cent was provided by the like-minded group, 7 per cent by Norway.

The scheme was managed by a UNDP project. Given the haste with which the scheme was mounted, the country's communication difficulties, the fragility of banking institutions, there were various problems at the beginning. However, these were eventually ironed out, particularly after the DTU was phased out and its data base as well as some of its staff were integrated into the UNDP project.

BPD staff were inadequately briefed and trained and thus initially ill-prepared to deal with problems or explain procedures. These difficulties were accentuated by the veterans' limited formal education (most were illiterate) and their difficulty in dealing with the bureaucracy. Moreover, some branches had a particularly heavy concentration of beneficiaries, and during the first days of each payment period they were overwhelmed.<sup>6</sup> This

<sup>6</sup> The national average was 600 per district branch, but Mocuaba had 4,500, Gurue 2,500 and Tete 2,400.



produced tense situations in which BPD staff were threatened or harassed by irate beneficiaries impatient at delays. Fortunately, the USAID-funded provincial Information and Referral Service (IRS) offices came on line and spent their first few months providing important backstopping services, helping the veterans with their paperwork (although this intervention also produced conflicting lines of command and orientations. The situation also improved with the appointment of 3 United Nations Volunteers as RSS officers to assist the BPD. Relations between UNDP and the BPD head-office were uneven, one of the main problems being incompatible financial reporting systems.

The main complaints of the beneficiaries were the limited BPD coverage, requiring some of them to travel long distances (up to 250 or 300 km) at considerable expense, and the inability to convert their entitlement into a single lump sum payment. In addition, the volume and workload involved in processing claims had been underestimated. By the end of April 1996 the RSS office had processed 11,600 claims related to the so-called "exceptional situations" (changes of residence, lost voucher books, lost demobilisation cards, etc.) and it was estimated that the Claims and Logistics section would need to continue processing applications until the end of January 1997.

On the funding side, financial programming was complicated by the uncertainty of two key variables – the number of beneficiaries and the exchange rate. The latter in particular resulted in the project having a surplus of USD 5 million. After much discussion the Government accepted the donor proposal that a final lump sum of USD 50 be paid to each beneficiary.

#### 6.4.2 Assessment

From its launching in March-April 1994 to the project closure and final accounts in June 1997, the RSS will have taken a little over three years, employing seven UN Volunteers for management and regional support, one

international adviser and fourteen local . Contributions totalled USD 35.2 million. With administrative overheads of about 5 per cent, by the end of the project some USD 34.4 million will have been paid out to 92,600 beneficiaries spread throughout the country. As of January 1996<sup>7</sup> the RSS data base contained the following information:

Registered	102,900	demobilised and new army, FADM
RSS	92,566	demobilised*
FADM	10,334	

\* including the 14,000 or so demobilised before the GPA

By the end of the project, payments averaging USD 358 per person<sup>8</sup> will have been paid through 128 BPD branches. Excluding the final bonus, disbursements exceeded USD 1 million per month over the original 26-month payment period.

The general opinion among both donors and beneficiaries is that the RSS has been successful in a variety of ways. On the whole it was *organisationally* successful in that most payments reached the intended beneficiaries as scheduled. It was also *administratively* effective in that the UNDP Trust Fund/project mechanisms enable donors to contribute to a vital peace process initiative with little administrative effort on their part, while ensuring international administrative expertise to run the programme and provide accountability. Moreover, since the RSS was administratively simpler, partially implemented through existing institutions and covered many more beneficiaries, both aggregate and per capita overheads were much lower than for the other programmes.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> RSS Activity and Progress Report for the period September-December 1995. 16 January 1996.

<sup>8</sup> USD 308 + USD 50 final bonus

<sup>9</sup> For instance, only USD 7 million of the USD 16 million allocated for the Provincial Fund for employment generation programmes had actually been spent on job-creating projects.



*Socially* it was an effective interim measure which provided immediate benefits, helped soldiers adjust to civilian life, and bought time for the other reintegration programmes to take off. Moreover, it was the only programme which benefited **all** demobilised soldiers, without exception. *Economically*, although small, the payments provided an important safety net when few jobs were available, were often used to buy more permanent goods (e.g. building materials) and a few beneficiaries opened savings accounts. Most payments were made in rural districts, where the regular cash injections provided a useful stimulus for the local economy.

The RSS made a *political* contribution by (unintentionally) fomenting troop pressure to break the deadlock on FADM recruitment and start Assembly Area evacuation, and by providing the incentive of financial security which encouraged many more soldiers to opt for demobilisation. The new army was eventually about one third of the GPA target. Moreover, phased payments in their home district helped consolidate dispersion by providing an incentive for the demobilised soldiers to remain there.

A UNDP sample survey of 1,000 RSS beneficiaries<sup>10</sup> found that 91 per cent were satisfied with the RSS. They had spent the money on subsistence, investments in the machamba, small scale businesses and housing, and 50% had been able to save some money. Only 5 per cent said they had experienced problems in obtaining the subsidy<sup>11</sup>, although almost 60 per cent had to spend more than Mt. 20,000 (about one third of a private's monthly payment) on transport to cash their voucher. Almost 60 per cent would have preferred a lump sum payment. The remaining 40 per cent preferred the phased system since it allowed

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<sup>10</sup> Preliminary results of the quantitative analysis of the data obtained during interviews with some 1,000 demobilised soldiers. Maputo: UNDP/RSS. 28 May 1996.

<sup>11</sup> Although the 11,600 claims handled by the RSS office were equivalent to 12 per cent of all beneficiaries.

them to save money and have a fixed income over a period of time.

## **6.5 Reintegration and transition**

### **6.5.1 Other reintegration programmes**

The other reintegration programmes were launched more or less unilaterally by individual donors between January 1994 and August 1995, providing training, occupational kits and/or credit, job creation/promotion and information services. The overall reintegration effort, including the RSS, comprised nine major initiatives involving 13 bilateral, multilateral and government entities, with an equally varied assortment of funding and implementation modalities.

Despite the initial donor apprehension about medium-term commitments and observance of the end 1994 peace process deadline, almost all the programmes ran for a further two years. Other much-debated issues, however, found expression in field implementation, most notably: on emergency response versus development strategy (OIM versus GTZ employment generation), and on government agency involvement (these two agencies operated autonomously, whereas the ILO, ISCOS and World Bank employment projects worked with the Ministry of Labour. On the whole, despite outreach activities, most programmes tended to have an urban bias.

Also despite the initial donor reluctance to fund special programmes, they eventually contributed USD 64 million (about half as a cash transfer and half for information/employment promotion) equivalent to USD 690 per demobilised soldier. As of September 1996 average programme cost per beneficiary<sup>12</sup> was as follows: information service USD 189; cash transfer USD 378, employment USD 508 and training USD 587.

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<sup>12</sup> Since most programmes had not reached their final number of beneficiaries, the final cost would eventually be lower.



It has not been possible to assess the lasting impact on beneficiaries, if any, although a UNDP evaluation is currently underway. Anecdotal evidence apart (people attending courses only to receive the attendance subsidy, or selling their tool kits), many did participate successfully in training courses and/or were provided with some measure of employment, although most jobs were generated by short-lived labour-intensive projects.

The UNDP survey of 1,000 RSS beneficiaries found that only 23% had used the information service. Of the remaining 67%, half said they did not know about it and 13% did not use it because it did not have district offices. Of those who did use it, only 14% thought that it worked well (half had no opinion). Seventy-one per cent had never contacted any of the Provincial Fund employment schemes. Training courses had been attended by 11%, but only 15% of these subsequently found employment.

### **6.5.2 Post-ONUMOZ and Government involvement**

When the ONUMOZ operation terminated in December 1994, many peace process activities were still ongoing - including reintegration activities. These responsibilities were abruptly transferred to a UNDP "Unit for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction" in January which would continue with the monitoring, donor co-ordination and backstopping until early 1997.

In June 1995 the government established a National Commission for Social Insertion (CNRS) headed by the Ministry for Social Action, with a complex web of subsidiary structures, to co-ordinate all reintegration interventions, but it has been ineffectual. In July, the Ministry of Labour established a Programme Co-ordination Unit (PCU) in its National Institute for Employment and Vocational Training (INEFP), to oversee and co-ordinate the veteran training and employment programmes - although once they end there will be no special initiatives for this group. The Ministry will try to extend the

experience gained to employment promotion in general.

However, this will be no mean task, given that the two major employment programmes (IOM and GTZ) operated entirely outside the government system. Although the World Bank project required IOM and GTZ to provide on-the-job training for local Ministry of Labour staff, there are misgivings about its financial capacity to absorb the staff and infrastructures mounted by these organisations.

## **6.6 Conclusions and assessment**

### **6.6.1 The achievement of demobilisation and reintegration**

The overwhelming consensus is that **social reintegration** has been achieved: family links have been (re)established, homes built; demobilised soldiers participate in community life and have no special identification with military structures.

The UNDP survey found that 27 per cent of the demobilised soldiers interviewed had married since demobilisation and 93 per cent liked their civilian status. Another recent study<sup>13</sup> concluded that nothing distinguished DS from the remaining members of the community. They perceived themselves as reintegrated and saw the difficulties they faced as being the same as those of their neighbours.

**Economic integration**, however, has been more difficult, given the state of the economy and the customary shortage of employment opportunities in rural areas. In the UNDP survey the RSS was the sole income for 73 per cent of those interviewed; 71 per cent

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<sup>13</sup> Creative Associates International Incorporated (CAII). *Study of Demobilised Soldiers Facing Difficulties in the Reintegration Process. Final Report.* September 1996.



considered themselves unemployed, although most had the first line safety net of a machamba (usually worked by their wives).

### 6.6.2 The contribution of the reintegration programmes

It is widely recognised that successful reintegration was to a large extent “self reintegration” - greatly facilitated by the improved weather and bumper harvests. Prolongation of drought and hunger would certainly have made the reintegration of former soldiers more problematic.

Although it is impossible to compare the contribution of the special programmes, it does seem that the RSS assisted social integration by facilitating marriage and the observance of the tradition that an absent relative should not return home empty-handed. Moreover, marriage brought not only the stability of affective relations but also the added security of extended family and economy roots.

Despite the laudable degree of co-operation between agencies, the overall reintegration exercise was a costly, piece-meal operation involving essentially ad hoc measures. The transfer of experience and facilities to government is proving problematic. More modest inputs would probably have achieved the same result. Alternatively, given the vital importance of the informal sector in the Mozambican economy, the same resources might have been better applied in a slower, developmental approach involving micro-projects, employment generation and capacity building<sup>14</sup>.

It has been argued, with some justification, that while demobilisation and reintegration went more smoothly than anticipated, this conclusion has the benefit of hindsight. The key decisions were taken in a context of uncertainty when the main concern was to buy time and ensure that the peace process remained on track.

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<sup>14</sup> The CAII study mentioned noted that programmes were terminating just when the process was starting to gather momentum (and also involving more and more persons who were not demobilised soldiers).

Nevertheless, one major error was the perception that a demobilising soldier should receive similar treatment to the other war-affected members of population. This failed to take into account the soldiers' own perception of their situation, and entitlements<sup>15</sup>. In two instances it was spontaneous action by the soldiers which ended the deadlock in the peace process.

On the emergency versus development debate, it might have been expected that donors with considerable experience in Mozambique (such as the “like-minded group”), might have had a different perspective, since they were aware of the constraints on agricultural employment, the importance of the informal sector and the need to build government capacity. The inability to produce a more sustained interface between the peace operation and development thinking is probably due in part to the fact that these were completely separate processes — organisationally, financially and conceptually. Such an approach also required an unrealistic degree of donor co-operation. Nevertheless, the bottom line appears to be that demobilisation was not a priority in a situation requiring the resettlement of some 4-5 million people (where 100,000 soldiers were a drop in the ocean) and the elections which would implant a multi-party democracy in the country.

### 6.6.3 The contribution to lasting peace

Although a return to widespread instability is considered unlikely, the national picture is nevertheless uneven. Renewed drought, economic stagnation, or growth with geographical and social polarisation could spark off violence to resolve personal needs. The two most significant demobilisation-related variables affecting lasting peace are: (a) resource poor areas with a high concentration of demobilised soldiers and few prospects; (b)

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<sup>15</sup> The veterans association, AMODEG, stresses that soldiers were conscripted against their will and sacrificed the best years of their lives and their future prospects. Moreover, as soldiers they had no freedom of choice about their status and options, whereas war-affected people did.



volatile vulnerable groups, in particular the 5-7,000 disabled soldiers and those with pension problems. While the solution to many of these problems is either a government responsibility or falls within the political domain, targeted regional development assistance could also help defuse potential discontent.

#### **6.6.4 Norwegian assistance to demobilisation**

Norway provided NOK 16.3 million for the RSS. For reasons already mentioned, it had a positive impact and within available evaluation parameters was probably the most successful and appropriate of the reintegration initiatives - in particular given its numerical and geographical coverage, its incentive to demobilise, go home and stay there, and its role in facilitating social integration.

Norway was one of the front runners in stressing the importance of demobilisation and in promoting the RSS. Its prompt contribution provided an important signal of commitment. However, although a logical consequence of its prior involvement in the pre-GPA demobilisation initiative, the decision did not stem from a strategic plan or established priorities. It arose when soldiers started to agitate and it became evident that there was no programme in place to ease their transition to civilian life.

Apart from supporting the major UN-organised demobilisation programmes, there is no indication that Norway took other initiatives on its own to facilitate reintegration, for example by directing development assistance to this end. Although a Norwegian power line company employed a large number of demobilised soldiers on the construction of NORAD funded power lines (including a former officer with demining experience to clear one of the areas), this arose from their own initiative in responding to the job advertisements – i.e., self-integration – not from any social policy by the company nor from embassy guidelines.







## 7. Demining

### 7.1 Introduction

The demining project of the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) was one of the largest Norwegian aid activities in Mozambique, totalling NOK 50.4 million over three years (1993-95). The NPA project received additional funding from the UN, which was the contractor.

Demining was central to the short-term peace process, initially by permitting refugees and displaced persons to return home in greater safety, and later by facilitating the normal economic and social transactions of peacetime. The UN contacted NPA to discuss demining soon after the peace agreement was signed, and with financial and contractual arrangements finalised during the first half of 1993, NPA was on the ground in Mozambique in March and had the first team of sappers ready in July 1993.

Given the nature of the task, time was of the essence. The speed in the launching of the NPA project compares favourably with UN procedures in realising a broader demining program. NPA's demining activities had a different focus than the other UN-supported project, and can be regarded as a complement not a substitute to it. As such, the NPA project was therefore both timely and appropriate to the peace process.

#### 7.1.1 Criteria for evaluating demining

The number of mines in a country is not a useful indicator of the extent of a mine problem. Thousands of mines may present no danger if located in clearly marked minefields that the local population is aware of. However, important roads, hundreds of kilometres in length, may be closed due to the *fear* of mines on just one particular stretch of the road. Similarly, the number of mines found by

deminers does not indicate the impact of a demining programme. Months may be spent demining a road and no mines found, but if the road can be used again, the local impact may be very significant.

The area cleared is a better indicator of the impact of a demining operation. However, in some cases this may more accurately measure the *efficiency* of an operation than its *effectiveness*. The demining of a small stretch of road may open access to a previously unreachable area. On the other hand, the clearing of a long stretch may merely shorten a journey that could already be made.

Demining is only one way to minimise the impact of mines. Fencing or building trenches around a minefield may be faster, cheaper and just as effective in preventing accidents. Building a by-pass around a mined stretch of road may be significantly more cost-effective than demining. The use of a range of techniques to neutralise minefields can free up deminers to work in other areas.<sup>1</sup> Mine awareness activities are also important, particularly when people are returning to villages where surrounding fields and paths are mined.

### 7.2 The national mine clearance strategy

Landmines were used extensively by both sides to the conflict in Mozambique, but there are no maps detailing their location. According to one estimate, around 6,000 people were killed or maimed by landmines between 1980 and October 1993, with over 500 incidents in the year following the signing of the peace accords. About half of all mine casualties are believed to die before reaching hospital, partly because

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<sup>1</sup> See Portillo (1995).



health posts in Mozambique are far and few between.<sup>2</sup>

It was initially feared that the presence of mines would be an obstacle to the implementation of the peace process, limiting access to soldiers wishing to be demobilised and preventing the return of 5-6 million displaced persons and refugees. Mines would also have economic consequences by preventing the use of farmland, limiting access to markets, delaying the repair of bridges and power lines, and discouraging tourism.

The main components of the UN's National Plan for Mine Clearance were:

- I. the Mozambican Mine Clearance Programme, which was to involve the contracting of a commercial demining company to clear 2,000 kilometres of priority roads;
- II. a project to establish the Mine Clearance Training Centre (MCTC), to train demobilised soldiers from both RENAMO and the Government) to become deminers;
- III. the development of a national mine clearance capacity, which would use sappers trained at the MCTC to carry out demining tasks over the longer-term;
- IV. the undertaking of a national mine survey, to assess the extent of the mine problem in the country and to provide the basis for setting priorities.

Responsibility for the management of the UN demining programme was assigned to the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC), which reported both to Aldo Ajello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and to the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in New York. Civilian contractors or NGOs, using Mozambican staffing, were expected to

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<sup>2</sup> See Sheehan and Croll (1993).

clear priority areas and carry out mine awareness activities.

## **7.3 Implementation**

### **7.3.1 The UN**

The Control and Supervision Commission<sup>3</sup> agreed on 31 December 1992 that "the clearing of mines on 28 roads ... essential for the distribution of humanitarian aid to affected populations, shall be undertaken immediately". Implementation of the UN plan ran into difficulties almost immediately, however. UNOHAC sought approval of the plan from the mines subcommittee of the commission-structure in Maputo. This led to complete paralysis at the political level because RENAMO withdrew from all commission work in March 1993, and did not return for three months (see section 4.2.3). After a long series of meetings, the plan was finally approved by the relevant Commission on 27 November 1993.

While the impasse in the Commissions clearly delayed the start-up of UN-funded demining, the UN's own internal procedures were also a factor. UN attempts to contract a commercial company to clear the 28 so-called priority roads took over one year; the initial 34 million dollar contract was submitted by UNOHAC to UNDP (New York) in February 1993, and not until May 1994 was a contract signed with the successful bidder.

Donors had initially supported the UN plan and paid into a UN Trust Fund for demining, which received USD 4.3 million from Sweden, USD 2.7 million from the Netherlands and USD 0.2 million from Italy. The Dutch also provided instructors for the National Demining School. However, by the time the contract was signed,

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<sup>3</sup> Under the terms of the GPA, the implementation of the peace accords was to be monitored by a number of UN-supported commissions in Maputo, the most senior of them being the Control and Supervision Commission (CSC).



the interminable contract procedures in the UN had made both the Dutch and the Swedes request that their contributions be returned.

As a result of the earlier problems with the Maputo-based commissions, the UN decided to adhere rigidly to clearance of the 28 priority roads sanctioned by the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC). Any change, it was feared, would cause further delays. The company that had won the road contract - a consortium of Royal Ordnance, Lonrho and Mechem - finished their work ahead of schedule, clearing 2,051 kilometres in 6 months. The speed was partly a result of finding very few mines on the priority roads. These roads had been given top priority in mid-1992, when humanitarian agencies had been seeking access to drought-affected populations, but - when work actually started in mid-1994 - needs and priorities had changed.

Lack of progress was also registered on other fronts. The national mine survey, which was to have been completed by June 1993, was held up by UNDP delays in approving expenditure of little more than USD 200,000. The practical phase began only in February 1994.

The survey provided the first detailed information on the mine situation in Mozambique, but helped little in setting priorities for mine clearance. There were no detailed estimates of the size of mined areas and the length of mined stretches of road. More importantly, no attempt was made to measure the impact that a suspected mined area was having on the lives of the local population.

Considerable delays also occurred in establishing the training centre (MCTC). Dutch trainers were ready to begin work from mid-1993 onwards, but new delays occurred when UN procurement rules made it difficult to rehabilitate the building selected for training.

### **7.3.2 NPA**

#### **Background**

Contacts were made between UNOHAC and NPA in December 1992, shortly after the

signing of the Peace Accords. On 4 February 1993, an NPA representative met with Bernt Bernander, the Director of UNOHAC (who had previously worked in Cambodia and knew NPA from there) to discuss a contract. NPA had previously contacted UNHCR, who proposed that NPA work in Tete and Zambézia - two provinces to which hundreds of thousands of refugees were expected to return from Malawi.

NPA proposed a 12-month demining program for a total of USD 1.79 million, of which USD 0.75 million was to be funded from the UN Trust Fund and 1.04 million by the Norwegian government. On the Norwegian side, response was quick. The Embassy in Maputo proposed in a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on 18 February 1993 that Norway contribute to the UN Trust Fund and also support NPA directly. The next day, the NPA presented its formal proposal to the MFA and the latter immediately telephoned Bernander in Maputo to say that Norway would support the NPA request with approximately USD 1 million. This was later reduced somewhat by adjusting administrative costs.<sup>4</sup>

And advance NPA team arrived in Mozambique in March 1993 and established its base in Tete province. The first team of 64 local sappers were trained and ready for deployment in July 93. Demining only began, however, following a meeting in Tete on 24 August 1993, involving representatives from the government of Mozambique, RENAMO, ONUMOZ, UNHCR and the Norwegian government. In this meeting, it was agreed that demining would start in government areas, while permission from RENAMO was awaited.

#### **The first year of operations**

On 1 September 1993, demining began in two sites. Both tasks were completed by the end of September, with 125 mines found and destroyed. While these minefields were not a

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<sup>4</sup> The Second Division, Political Department of the MFA issued the formal approval for NOK 6.7 million on 26 March 1993.



significant threat to the local population, who knew of their existence and boundaries, they were suitable to test procedures, being easily reached by a good tarmac road from Tete.

Under an agreement whereby UNHCR co-financed NPA, UNHCR was responsible for defining priority areas for demining. These were chosen on the basis of the areas expected to receive the most returnees. UNHCR did not appear to appreciate the limitations to NPA's capacity, and initial priority lists consisted of thousands of kilometres of road - enough to keep NPA occupied for a decade.

Following completion of the first tasks, NPA moved to a minefield near the planned entry point for thousands of refugees returning to Mozambique. Although believed to be heavily mined, only 1 anti-personnel mine was discovered in almost 3 months. In Doca, a town further north, an additional 18 mines were found before heavy rains led to this work being suspended.

In February 1994, NPA flew its platoons to Doca, to demine a road along which UNHCR expected many refugees to return. As soon as work began, it became apparent that the road had been regularly used by pedestrians and cyclists, which gave the deminers a safe line from which to begin demining. During the 3½ months that it took to demine the 41.5 km stretch of road, no mines were found. Once the road was cleared, a local organisation graded the first 15.5 km. No comprehensive rehabilitation of the rest of the road, which included two damaged bridges, was carried out until 1995, however, and trucks supplying the town with food-aid continued to travel the long way round for almost two more years<sup>5</sup>. Scarce demining assets were thus tied up for over three months with almost no impact on the humanitarian situation in the province.

In April 1994, work began in other areas, including roads expected to be used by

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<sup>5</sup> Personal communication with WFP representative

returning refugees and displaced persons. By this time, NPA had trained additional deminers and was able to operate three new demining groups.

In March 1994, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees visited Tete Province, and was unhappy to find that her organisation was financing demining. As a result, UNHCR informed NPA that it could not honour the agreement reached between the two, leaving NPA with a sudden shortfall of funds. After some delays, UNOHAC covered USD 362,000 of the deficit.

**Mine detection dogs:** Towards the end of 1994, NPA started to experiment with mine detection dogs. Dogs were bought in Scandinavia and transported to Tete for training, requiring a major investment by NPA: kennels had to be built, special food and medicines purchased, and skilled personnel hired to train both the dogs and their handlers.

NPA's Mozambique-trained dog teams have been used in Angola and in were in 1996 twice seconded to UN peace-keeping forces in Bosnia. This pay-off from the local training program had a double benefit: after decades of receiving foreign expertise in their country, Mozambicans were proud to be exporting skilled Mozambican personnel to Europe.

The demining contractor working for USAID transferred its dogs, dog-handlers and deminers to NPA in Tete when its own operation in Mozambique ended. These formed a fourth demining group for NPA.

**Training of Mozambican staff:** NPA withdrew its expatriates from the field units in January 1996. Mozambican supervisors took over the day-to-day operations but were regularly visited by monitoring teams which included expatriates. The transfer was a considerable success. Mozambicans were also trained for administrative roles and the Deputy Manager of demining operations was a Mozambican. Training of NPA's Mozambican medics did not begin until May 1995. NPA's



medical supervisor reports that the program went well, and by late 1996 there were two Mozambican medics per group.

#### **From the end of the UN mandate to the present day**

When the mandate of ONUMOZ and the peace commissions ended in December 1994, there was no central body responsible for identifying mine clearance priorities. The gap was not filled until May 1995, when the government established its National Mine Commission (NMC). Asked to define policy and set mine clearance priorities, the NMC developed slowly and by 1996 was still unable to fulfil its intended role. In the absence of strong national co-ordination, the setting of priorities has varied from province to province. In Tete, for instance, the provincial governor declared that mines no longer posed a problem, and largely left NPA to determine priorities on its own. In Manica province, by contrast, the governor established a department to determine clearance priorities.

Some NPA priorities are questionable. Since September 1995, NPA has had a group of 100 deminers in a large minefield around the Cahora Bassa dam in Tete province. The minefield was laid in the 1960s to protect the dam, and the area was fenced to prevent accidents. The fence has since collapsed and accidents have occurred.

Replacing and patrolling the fence would give the local population protection at a fraction of the cost of the demining that was undertaken. Alternatively, a large trench and dike could have been built around the perimeter to prevent people or animals from accidentally straying into the minefield. Precious demining capacity would then have been freed for humanitarian priorities.

NPA recognises that demining the dam area does not have the highest priority for humanitarian reasons, but maintains it serves a training purpose. Deminers need to find mines regularly, to keep up their concentration and avoid accidents. However, the same 100

sappers in Group 1 have been working in this field without rotation for over a year.<sup>6</sup>

The NPA operation has produced high quality results. Only one accident has been reported in an area cleared by NPA (a cow stumbled onto an anti-tank mine in September 1995).

Three Mozambican NPA deminers have been killed and one injured while demining. In each case, investigation by NPA indicated that the accidents were due to human error rather than inadequate operating procedures.

#### **7.3.3 Activities of other actors**

A UN-supported Accelerated Demining Programme (UNADP) was started in June 1994, with three foreign companies helping to develop an indigenous Mozambican demining capacity. In late 1996, UNADP had 430 Mozambican deminers organised into 10 platoons, each supervised by an expatriate. UNADP started working on perimeter minefields around towns close to Maputo. The sites were chosen primarily because they were easily accessible by an organisation in the process of establishing itself. By concentrating on large minefields, moreover, UNADP succeeded in finding more mines than other organisations even though it started last. As explained above, however, this is no indication of effectiveness. UNADP has developed considerably since it was set up, and was in 1996 functioning in a manner similar to NPA, although with more expatriates and higher costs.

Just after the signing of the Peace Accords, some priority roads were cleared by Gurkha Security Guards (SGS), under an EU contract. Halo Trust, an NGO similar to NPA in its approach to demining, has been operating principally in Zambézia, the most highly populated province in the country. Halo Trust

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<sup>6</sup> As a result, Group 1 has indeed found numerous mines - 4,210 mines in 1995 alone. By comparison, Group 3 found only 79 in eighteen months.



has a staff of 150 with only 3 expatriates. All supervisors and medics are Mozambican.

RONCO, financed by USAID to the sum of USD 7.8 million, began training staff in January 1994. Using a manual approach and dogs, RONCO cleared roads in Zambezi Valley until the project ended in mid-1995.

A German entrepreneur has been testing a new demining process in Mozambique, using a tractor-like machine designed to destroy all mines in its path. Tests have shown that the machine leaves too many mines undetected to be used for humanitarian demining. The machines are also too heavy for many bridges in Mozambique and hence unsuitable for large parts of the country. A number of accidents have occurred during the tests.

Mechem – the company which together with Royal Ordnance and Lonrho won the UN contract for demining priority roads – used a mechanical approach in combination with dogs. The method was extremely fast, permitting the company to clear over 2,000 kilometres of roads in six months. As with other demining methods, no independent analysis of effectiveness appears to have been carried out. In addition to the above, both the government and RENAMO have been involved in uncoordinated mine clearance across the country.

#### **7.4 Assessment of the UN performance**

Weaknesses in the UN plan were the result of problems in implementation rather than strategy. Delays in undertaking the National Mine Survey, limitations of the data it contained, and lack of work to update the survey have constrained the development of a coherent and cost-effective mine clearance programme on the national level. Importantly, the national survey scheduled for 1993 – but delayed until 1994 – found that initial estimates

of the mine problem in Mozambique had been considerably overstated.

Considerable delays were also encountered in the establishment of the Mine Clearance Training Centre and the contracting of a firm to demine priority roads. Although the impasse in the Peace Accords Commissions held up progress, the UN's own internal procedures were a major factor in the delays.

The lessons seem clear: The UN urgently needs to evaluate and revise its procedures for demining, and consider giving far more operational autonomy to the field. Until there is evidence that the UN can be effective, donors should finance activities bilaterally rather than tying up resources in a UN Trust Fund. However, a UN co-ordinating role is absolutely essential if resources are to be used efficiently.

Both mechanical and manual methods appear to have important roles in mine clearance operations. The UN-funded consortium was able to clear 2,000 kilometres in six months; this would have taken years if done by manual methods. However, a greater degree of independent analysis of the efficacy of new and existing mine clearance techniques is needed, particularly since large amounts of money are spent in this sector.

### **7.5 Assessment of the Norwegian contribution**

#### **7.5.1 Policy process**

When the Peace Accords were signed, demining was seen as a critical precondition for the other activities envisaged by the Accords. In this light, the Norwegian government's decision to provide financial support for demining activities in areas to where large numbers of refugees were expected to return was appropriate.

A speedy and flexible policy process on the Norwegian side facilitated a prompt reaction in the field. The policy process, in turn,



demonstrated the possibilities for rapid response inherent in a small bureaucracy that has close relations with a proactive NGO community, and can draw on flexible budget lines (in this case the regional budget line for Africa, 150.83). More generally, there was a political commitment to the peace process in the Ministry and the office in Maputo, and that constituted a favourable framework for quick response in new areas of assistance.

When Norway agreed to finance NPA's demining programme it was unimaginable that the UN would take so long to sub-contract a commercial demining firm. The Norwegian decision to support the NPA should not, therefore, be seen as an attempt to salvage the situation by substituting for the UN initiative. Indeed, NPA's comparative advantage lay in demining areas rather than roads, while the initial UN project focused almost exclusively on roads. NPA's manual approach and limited capacity meant that it would have taken them years to demine the 2,000 kilometres of road cleared by Mechem in just six months. Due to capacity constraints, NPA's work - while valuable - was initially concentrated only in one province, while mines were present throughout Mozambique.

### **7.5.2 Technical mine clearance operations**

NPA did an excellent job in quickly building up an operation from scratch and running a highly proficient technical operation<sup>7</sup>. Roads have been reopened, access to water sources cleared, and areas close to population centres made safe.<sup>8</sup> In a country emerging from decades of war, with a weak transport and communications infrastructure, this is a testimony to the strength of NPA's internal organisation.

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<sup>7</sup> This is also the assessment in Martens (1996).

<sup>8</sup> Since March 1993, over 3 million square metres have been demined and 19 demolition tasks carried out, during which 6,000 anti-personnel mines, 12 anti-tank mines, 2,700 UXOs and over 70,000 rounds of ammunition have been destroyed.

The background of the first team - ex-military personnel with experience of demining in Cambodia - helped them gain a high degree of credibility and respect from all concerned, included the demobilised soldiers who made up the demining teams.

To some extent, NPA has given precedence to technical over strategic thinking by allowing the size of the platoons to determine which tasks to undertake, instead of adjusting their operational mode to reflect the fact that tasks meeting humanitarian and development criteria generally require smaller, more flexible demining groups. Switching to smaller platoons is not straightforward, however.

### **7.5.3 Strategic planning**

Too much attention was given to the operational side of the programme at the cost of strategic planning. Around USD 2 million may have been spent on tasks where demining had almost no humanitarian or economic impact (e.g. demining the Doca road that remained unused by heavy traffic because the bridges were out), or where alternative solutions to the problem would have been much more cost-effective (e.g. fencing the minefield around Cahora Bassa dam). Tying up scarce demining capacity on low priority tasks also meant delaying more important work.

In retrospect, NPA has recognised the need for better strategic planning. Part of the responsibility does indeed lie with those initially setting priorities for NPA (including UNHCR and other parts of the UN system), and with the delays in carrying out the National Mines Survey. Given the weakness of the UN framework, however, it might have been wise for NPA not to defer to it completely when working locally.

Another question concerns input from the provincial level. It is unclear to what extent these were forthcoming or encouraged by NPA. In the later phase of its operation in Tete, NPA continued working, apparently according to its own priorities, even though the provincial



governor maintained that mines no longer constituted a problem in the area. In this case, NPA violated the spirit, if not the letter of the principle of "recipient responsibility".

In the aftermath of a long war, provincial as well as national authorities may have limited capacity to assess the mine problem and to determine priorities accordingly. This clearly was the case in Mozambique, although both the concern and the capacity to make such assessment were present at the provincial as well as the national level. NPA recently signed an agreement with the Mozambican National Mine Commission (NMC). Although the NMC is not yet fully operational, this is a positive step that demonstrates NPA's commitment to work according to the national priorities.

Setting priorities for mine clearance is admittedly a complex task. Since the *impact* of mines and not the sheer *number* is a decisive factor, determination of priorities for clearance requires a good data base. All demining organisations could contribute to this by helping to update the National Mine Survey and regularly publish reports of their operational plans<sup>9</sup>. This will also help co-ordination and monitoring. In the meantime, NPA might undertake verification exercises to assess the extent of mines in various defined areas before formulating future priorities<sup>10</sup>.

To tackle the problem effectively, particularly where government institutions are weak, demining teams need people with an understanding of the local environment and people who can speak the local language. The first expatriate NPA team included no Portuguese speakers. NPA's decision to set up the demining operation independently from the development programme was unwise, as it set

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<sup>9</sup> This idea was proposed by USAID Consultant Enrique Portillo. See Portillo (1995).

<sup>10</sup> NPA currently have an SDR team in the field undertaking detailed survey work. Whilst this work is vital once priority areas have been identified, initially, NPA need to cover a large area quickly.

demining apart from normal development activities, and encouraged a way of thinking about demining as a technical issue, rather than as the development issue that it is<sup>11</sup>.

#### 7.5.4 Training of Mozambican staff

NPA applied the principle established by the UN that demobilised soldiers would be used for mine clearance. However, the organisation was slow to train and promote Mozambicans for supervisory and medical work. Greater use of Mozambicans in these posts at an earlier stage would have made the operation considerably more cost-effective.

#### 7.5.5 Cost-effectiveness

A crude comparative cost analysis of the demining organisations working in Mozambique reveals NPA to be cheaper, at USD 3.9 per square metre, than the two other agencies that use similar techniques - Halo Trust (USD 4.8 per square metre) and UNADP (USD 7.2 per square meter). However, NPA is considerably more expensive than organisations that use dogs more extensively, namely RONCO (USD 0.45 per square metre) and Mechem (USD 0.28 per square metre). These figures are indicative only, and do not take into account the quality of demining.

The introduction of mine detection dogs into NPA's operations appears to have been very successful. Dogs are expensive and their upkeep places special demands on logistics; their performance varies according to environmental and other factors. More analysis is needed to identify the circumstances in which their use is cost-effective.

#### 7.5.6 Communication and monitoring

Some mine clearance techniques are of uncertain reliability. Given that donors are spending millions of dollars on such techniques, more independent analysis to assess their efficacy are needed.

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<sup>11</sup> The two components of NPA in Mozambique have now merged.



Much valuable experience in demining has been gained in Mozambique. The lessons learnt should be documented and shared internationally. Given its wide experience, NPA needs to produce more documentation on its demining activities in English. At present very little documentation exists, or is in Norwegian.

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## 8. Repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons

### 8.1 Introduction

The war had displaced around a third of the country's population, of which 3-4 million were internally displaced and 1.7 million had sought asylum in neighbouring countries. Among the refugees, most were peasants who had lived for years in camps assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Anxious to return home, refugees in some areas went back and forth across the border when peace seemed close in order to prepare their return.

As soon as the peace agreement was signed, the vast majority of refugees started returning home spontaneously and on their own. Only some 370,000 were assisted by UNHCR with transportation. Between October 1992 and the 1994 elections, the large majority of the estimated 1.7 million refugees had returned.

The returnees came back to a country heavily destroyed by war and dependent on international assistance for rehabilitation and reintegration. Although the number of international organisations increased drastically, several areas had no aid agency presence. The local government and NGO partners lacked human and material resources, which contributed to a situation where foreign aid organisations became increasingly concerned with corruption issues on the Mozambican side.

With some 80 per cent of refugees returning spontaneously, most assistance activities were focused on the areas to which they returned. The focus on locality rather than beneficiary group ensured that also the large number of internally displaced and those who had remained in the area benefited. Assistance consisted of hand-outs of basic needs items (food, seeds, tools, household kits, material for shelter, sometimes blankets), as well rehabilitation and construction of infrastructure

such as wells and pumps, access roads, school buildings and health posts and the provision of school and health materials.

The rate of return was rapid and was completed by the end of 1995, leaving only around 100,000 in South Africa who stayed behind as migrants. By mid 1996 only 200,000 people were still receiving UNHCR-supported food aid. There was no significant backflow to asylum countries and no serious problems of protection or security. Starvation of returnees was not reported, nor, apparently, did the health status of returnees deteriorate. With very few exceptions, returnees were given farming land from local communities and authorities. There were fewer landmines than expected, and fewer accidents than feared. While some tense situations developed, the agency strategy of aiding return areas rather than returnees per se helped to create a situation where the returnees faced little or no animosity from the local population, a UNHCR evaluation in 1996 concluded.<sup>1</sup>

### 8.2 Norwegian assistance: an overview

Norway has long been a leading contributor to UNHCR and finances large assistance programs for refugee through Norwegian NGOs as well. Not surprisingly, Norway identified refugee assistance as a priority area early on in the Mozambican peace process.

The main Norwegian NGO dealing with refugees, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) initiated a joint co-ordination mission with UNHCR and UNDP to Mozambique already in March 1992, i.e. half a year before the GPA was signed. The Norwegian general

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<sup>1</sup> UNHCR (1996), p. 9



aid program for Mozambique (country program) for 1992-95, which was drafted in late 1991, as well as the program for 1994-97, noted the importance of aid to repatriation and reintegration. In line with evolving international practice and UNHCR's operations in Mozambique, Norwegian policy papers and NRC make no distinction between returning refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The two main channels for Norwegian assistance to returnees were UNHCR and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The Embassy in Mozambique also supported a few, smaller activities locally. Despite the small number of channels, Norwegian activities in the area of repatriation and reintegration were fragmented in a way that raises questions of overall control and co-ordination. As the reader will recall (table 2.10), NRC's activities in Mozambique were funded from 5 different Norwegian budget lines managed by various offices in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cf. table 2.4).

Norwegian contributions to UNHCR came in part from yet a different budget line, managed by a different office. NRC also received funding from SIDA and UNHCR. NRC's project portfolio in Mozambique, moreover, was large in term of disbursements. No office in the MFA had overall responsibility for co-ordinating and streamlining the various pieces of Norwegian refugee assistance. Individual program officers had a heavy work load. Only one program officer in the Ministry, for instance, handled the entire budget line for humanitarian affairs.

At the country level, the Embassy had limited capacity to exercise effective co-ordination given the large NGO project portfolio, the fact that in most cases financing was arranged directly by the various offices in the Ministry in Oslo and the NGO concerned, and that some NGO-funding came from foreign donors. Of the Norwegian-funded returnee-specific projects in Mozambique, most were financed by budget lines other than those managed by NORAD, and thus separated from the "country aid program" in Mozambique which constituted

the main responsibility and work of the Embassy.

The diversity of budget lines, and problems of identifying projects as returnee specific, also make it difficult to calculate total Norwegian funding for refugees and IDPs in this period. A liberal estimate suggests NOK 171 million in 1992-95, equivalent to some 10 per cent of Norway's total aid to Mozambique in these years.

This seems a modest amount, especially since addressing the needs of returnees was identified as one of two principal challenges facing the government of Mozambique during the peace process. On the other hand, the Norwegian contribution – equivalent to USD 26 million – is quite respectable compared to the total UNHCR program in Mozambique of USD 145 million. Moreover, since the preferred strategy for assistance activities was area rather than target group oriented, a range of general relief and/or development activities could be included in the count as well.

Most importantly, the limitations on a capital-intensive strategy to aid returnees in the short run were becoming increasingly evident, not least in UNHCR's own experience.

### **8.3 UNHCR programmes and strategies**

The overall framework for assisting returning populations was outlined in the GPA (Protocol Chapter IV). As the lead agency for refugees, UNHCR shaped the framework for other donors and NGOs in this field. Moreover, some of the experiences encountered by UNHCR were shared by others, suggesting general principles at work.

The repatriation of Mozambican refugees was one of UNHCR's largest operations; it cost around USD 145 million and was planned to last three and a half years from 1993 to phase-out in early 1996. In this period, UNHCR assisted returnees and affected communities in 34 districts in seven of Mozambique's ten provinces.



Immediate assistance to meet basic needs clearly was important and a major reason for the largely successful repatriation. With distribution of food, water (about half of UNHCR's so-called Quick Impact Projects, QIP, in Mozambique were installation of water pumps), and seeds-and-tools, the returnees were able to secure their own food supplies. Plentiful rain was another main reason for these positive results.

Assistance in other areas was more problematic.<sup>2</sup> In quantitative terms, UNHCR-supported infrastructure projects contributed importantly to the government's national rehabilitation plan. However, rapid rebuilding in the health and education sector, in particular, required financing of necessary, related services (e.g. teachers for schools) and recurrent cost coverage for maintenance. UNHCR's internal evaluation noted the danger that the Quick Impact Projects would deepen Mozambique's dependence on foreign aid for service and maintenance. Participatory strategies were not used, hence the local communities did not become "stake-holders" in the projects.

The tension between the needs of assistance to repatriation in the short run, and reintegration in the longer run, was thus a continuing feature of the program.

In co-operation with UNDP, UNHCR also tried to forge a link between relief and development by establishing an inventory of local needs and services in the 34 districts where it worked. Criticised on various grounds, the "district development mapping" was not integrated with other planning projects and not widely used.

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<sup>2</sup> UNHCR (1996).

## **8.4 Activities of the Norwegian Refugee Council**

NRC was the leading Norwegian NGO assisting refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP) in Mozambique. Working from government figures and NORAD sources, which constitute major but not exclusive funding for NRC, it appears that NRC received a total of 43.5 million NOK in Norwegian government funding during the period 1990-1995, with projects only starting in 1992. Due to limitations of time and data classification, NRC could not provide the requisite breakdown of its portfolio in Mozambique for this evaluation.

If it is difficult in retrospect to obtain an overview of NRC's total activity in Mozambique, it presumably was even more so at the time. At the country level, there was not a close working relationship and hence little co-ordination between the Embassy and the NRC during most of the period under consideration. As a result, NRC operations in Mozambique acquired a highly autonomous character. In view of this, systematic evaluations of the organisation's activities in Mozambique would seem appropriate. To date, however, only one semi-internal evaluation has been carried out.<sup>3</sup>

For this report, a few projects were selected that would highlight two central aid issues during the transition phase from war to peace, viz:

- institution building
- aid located in the so-called continuum of relief-to-development.

The projects selected were: (a) support to Núcleo de Apoio aos Refugiados (NAR), the

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<sup>3</sup> The NRC recently requested but failed to obtain funding, from donors for a major evaluation of its activities in Mozambique. The NRC completed in 1996 an internally-based study of its field operations in repatriations in Guatemala, Afghanistan and Mozambique. The study was largely based on response from NRC's field officers and completed with the help of external consultants. See (in Norwegian) NRC (1996).



government refugee agency; (b) support to LINK, the NGO co-ordinating body; and, (c) civil registration, which was part of NRC's conflict prevention and reconciliation activities, and was designed to link the repatriation phase with social reintegration in the longer-run.

These projects may or may not be representative of total NRC's activities in Mozambique, but they are good illustrations of a number of important general issues.

NRC in Mozambique was both an implementing and funding agency. Local partners included NAR, the National Communications Service, the National Land Commission, MULEIDE (Mozambican women's rights NGO), the Provincial Civil Registration unit, the Provincial Civil Identification unit.

#### 8.4.1 Background

NRC was quicker than UNHCR in preparing for repatriation. UNHCR did not have a reintegration strategy ready until late 1994; NRC, by contrast, took a proactive role already in early 1992 by engaging UNHCR and UNDP through joint missions and a major international conference held in Oslo. In June 1992 - i.e. well before the peace agreement was signed - NRC was in Mozambique with a field office in Tete province (expected to be an area of returnee concentration), and established a head-office in Maputo in February 1993.

NRC's country strategy, developed in mid-1992, sought to include a wide range of protection and human rights issues, as well as establish forward links from the short-term repatriation phase to reintegration in the longer run. The latter included capacity building with Mozambican state institutions and local NGOs.

As noted, the working relationship between the Embassy in Maputo and NRC was not close, and at times strained. The reasons were partly structural: the NGOs' concern to maintain maximum autonomy - partly secured through separate and multiple sources of funding in the Ministry in Oslo and foreign donors - was juxtaposed against the Embassy's interest in

authoritative co-ordination. The organisational contradictions were in this case exacerbated by personality clashes. The tension was reflected in, and fed upon, disagreement over particular projects.

#### 8.4.2 The NAR project

UNHCR defined its relationship with the Mozambican government agency for refugees (NAR) in minimalist terms. Partly as a result, the government of Mozambique invited NRC to enter into partnership with NAR. In an agreement signed shortly after the peace settlement was concluded, NRC agreed to channel funds to NAR and provide institutional support to help the agency undertake a wide range of co-ordinating and supervising functions during repatriation and reintegration. The total budget for three years was NOK 17 million, or USD 2.88 million.

NRC had been aware when it started co-operation with NAR that problems might arise regarding transfer of funds.<sup>4</sup> Towards the end of 1993, the audit showed that ca. USD 12,000 were unaccounted for, and over USD 400,000 had been transferred using improper exchange rates. Few activities in direct support of refugees had been undertaken except for transportation of refugees in the south.

There is no question that NAR mismanaged NRC funds and failed to fulfil its obligations. Retrospectively, NRC agrees that its staff should have supervised NAR more closely. From NAR's point of view, NRC transferred money without providing sufficient guidance, supervision and training of staff in accounting, financial reporting and project implementation. The new NAR staff also lacked knowledge about refugee assistance. The agency had been established in 1976 to assist refugees from national liberation struggles who had fled to Mozambique, and in recent years had been dormant. In 1992/3, its mandate was suddenly changed and the work load dramatically expanded.

<sup>4</sup> Comment from NRC on the first draft of the present report, 7 February 1997.



The NAR project also touched on NRC's working relationship with UNHCR. The two organisations disagreed on the role of NAR - UNHCR wanted to limit and NRC to expand the functions of the agency. While NRC did not see NAR as an operational agency (e.g. doing rehabilitation projects that were the responsibility of the line ministries), the Norwegian NGO had urged NAR to take on a wide range of organisational and co-ordination functions that NAR had neither the capacity nor experience to handle properly. Critics in UNHCR felt that NRC was creating a parallel government structure for short-term refugee assistance which represented duplication and waste, and held that State capacity building at any rate was beyond the scope of an NGO.

The NAR project had another, unfortunate consequence. When it was terminated, NRC took on the co-ordinating activities foreseen in the NAR project, and ended up with too many Mozambican recipient agencies, according to NRC's own assessment<sup>5</sup>. To reduce the number of partners, NRC subsequently terminated the distribution project (of non-food items to returnees) and scaled down its rehabilitation programs, concentrating instead on projects related to reconciliation and conflict prevention, including the civil registration project.

### 8.4.3 Civil registration

Civil registration had been an important activity undertaken by UNHCR and NGOs in Central America, and in the refugee assistance community the large registration project in El Salvador was considered a major success story<sup>6</sup>. NRC had also been involved in the project and wanted to apply the positive lessons from that experience to Mozambique<sup>7</sup>.

NRC initially asked UNHCR for support, but civil registration was not one of UNHCR's priorities in Mozambique.<sup>8</sup> NRC then pursued

<sup>5</sup> Comment from NRC on the first draft of the present report, 7 February 1997.

<sup>6</sup> UNHCR (1996b).

<sup>7</sup> Interviews with NRC staff (Oslo).

<sup>8</sup> Interviews with NRC staff (Oslo).

other and obtained SIDA financing for the bulk of the project (the Norwegian MFA only provided NOK 278,000 in 1994).

The project was designed to strengthen the ability of returnees to enjoy their rights and duties as citizens. Registration and documentation was considered essential for access to various services, i.e. health and education. A secondary objective was to strengthen the registration and documentation authorities on the provincial level and to re-establish files and registers that had been destroyed during the war. The goal was to register at least 284,000 persons and hand out 200,000 identification cards.

Using registrars organised by the Ministries of Justice and Interior, by October 1996 the project had registered around 800,000 individuals and more than 400,000 persons had received ID cards in the two provinces of Maputo and Tete.

The project was defined during provincial-level meetings between NRC and local authorities, and was carried out in close co-operation with the provincial government. In the end, only two of Mozambique's ten provinces were covered (Tete and Maputo). Due to lack of funding, NRC had to turn down requests for similar projects from other provinces. The central government, on the other hand, had not made civil registration a priority. NRC tried in vain to persuade the National Directories of the registry and identification authorities to implement the national plan for registration which by then had been developed.

A problematic dimension surfaced at the time relating to the elections. The civil registration coincided with registration for the elections. This was highly undesirable. Election registration was done by a non-partisan, specially trained staff working under the independent National Election Commission. Civil registration was done under the supervision of the provincial authorities, which represented FRELIMO. Given the political climate in Mozambique at the time, a parallel registration could be exploited by RENAMO to



cry fraud and create political tension. The Chairman of the National Election Commission immediately contacted the Minister of Justice when he heard about the Tete registration, and NRC stopped the project until after the elections.

#### **8.4.4 LINK**

NRC was proactive in the establishment of LINK, an umbrella organisation of NGOs operating in Mozambique. Established in April 1993 with NRC providing the Secretariat for one initial year, the main objectives of LINK were to :

- promote co-operation and co-ordination among international and Mozambican NGOs and the UN, Mozambican authorities, donors and others involved in humanitarian assistance and development work
- strengthen Mozambican NGOs
- provide a common forum for raising professional and practical issues
- present and advocate NGO views to decision-making and policy formulating bodies

Taking the position that NGOs should be working in all areas of the country, LINK promoted and co-ordinated an initiative to establish a continuous dialogue with the RENAMO leadership on NGO access, activities and implementation modalities in RENAMO areas.

The total budget for 1993 was USD 173,000 with contributions from NRC also for 1994 and 1995.

Given the large numbers of NGOs in Mozambique, LINK was generally viewed as a useful co-ordinating body by the international donor community and the Mozambican authorities. Yet, it was a controversial structure.

Critics felt that LINK did not respond to a need from below but reflected the particularistic

agenda of NRC. Others maintained that LINK met a long-standing need for NGO co-ordination. During its first year LINK was criticised for becoming too involved in the politics of the peace process; others felt that was one of its strengths. Although the Ministry of Co-operation supported the establishment of LINK, tension developed when the Ministry wanted to be a member of the Steering Committee.

Co-operation among foreign and local NGOs was initially hampered by different organisational interests, resources and often agendas. Some local NGOs claimed that LINK was mainly designed to aggregate the power of foreign NGOs, and held that a common organisation was neither necessary nor desirable. One controversial issue was fundraising: local NGOs felt that international NGOs should identify and secure funding for Mozambican NGOs, which LINK refused.

Nevertheless, LINK continued to grow. By October 1996 membership had risen to 103, of which 66 were international and 37 national. The main objectives remained threefold: information service, dialogue and meeting, and development of national NGOs. LINK established a sizeable office with 13 staff members, of whom the Co-ordinator continued to be an expatriate, a large library, and three major information data bases. Eighty percent of its budget was funded by donors and the rest by international NGOs. NRC and NORAD continued to fund LINK in 1996.

### ***8.5 Other channels for Norwegian assistance***

#### **8.5.1 NORAD support to women returning from RENAMO captivity**

NORAD supported returnees in a project to benefit women returning from RENAMO captivity. The project benefited not only the target group in Cabo Delgado province, where NORAD had established a rural development project, but also returnee women from Malawi in Manica province.



The women were given emergency relief food and non-food items. The implementing agencies were national (DPCNN) and local authorities in Cabo Delgado, and in Manica a national NGO (SOTEMAZA) in co-operation with village leaders. Some 600-800 female-headed households probably benefited from this assistance.<sup>9</sup>

The project is an example of Norwegian assistance targeting a vulnerable group that had been systematically left out during distributions at the village level. It was one of the very few repatriation and reintegration activities that was in line with Norwegian policy of giving high priority to the reintegration of women in aid supported activities.<sup>10</sup>

### 8.5.2 Redd Barna: The Unaccompanied Children Project

Redd Barna established itself in Mozambique during the war (1987) and in the 1990-95 period took on a variety of relief and rebuilding projects. Redd Barna also had a program for tracing missing or unaccompanied children and reunifying them with their families – an initiative that was particularly relevant to war-time and post-war Mozambique.

In monetary terms, the Unaccompanied Children Program was small. Redd Barna's expenditure for 1990-95 was NOK 187.9 million NOK (of which NOK 73.7 million was Norwegian government funding). The Unaccompanied Children Program cost only around NOK 11 million.

A Mozambican National Family Tracing Program had been established in 1985. Working closely with the government ministry of Social Welfare, Redd Barna started its program in 1989, establishing tracing networks in refugee camps as well as in Mozambique.

An external evaluation of the Unaccompanied Children Program done in 1993 generally considered the program a success in terms of

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<sup>9</sup> K. Halvorsen (1995).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. 1993 *Prinsippnotat* (NORAD), see also chapter 3.

its stated objectives.<sup>11</sup> Between 1989 and 1993, over 14,000 children were registered, of which 6,363 were reunified with their families.

Redd Barna was also in the forefront of foreign NGOs that gained access to RENAMO areas. In 1993, a meeting with RENAMO leaders to deal with "child soldiers" provided a basis for further contact, and Redd Barna helped facilitate communication between government officials and RENAMO at the local level. Officials from the Ministry of Social Welfare eventually accompanied Redd Barna into RENAMO areas in order to establish a social services structure that avoided double administration.

## 8.6 Assessment

### 8.6.1 General

The repatriation of Mozambican refugees is generally considered a success in that the repatriation took place quickly and peacefully, produced few return flows, and most of the returnees were dependent on food aid for only a short period. The success is partly attributable to the returnees themselves, who mostly returned on their own and developed strategies for coping and surviving. Critically important, the weather co-operated with plentiful rains. The international aid community played a significant role, with UNHCR being particularly significant as the lead agency for international assistance.

The limitations of a capital-intensive strategy of repatriation and reintegration were evident, particularly in relation to so-called quick impact projects (QIP) in the social service sector (schools, health posts). While these helped the government achieve the quantitative goals of its national rehabilitation plan, qualitative problems arose relating to sustainability, maintenance and lack of "software" (teachers and nurses).

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<sup>11</sup> Gilbert and Tadesse (1993).



The emphasis on quick rebuilding in the repatriation phase was particularly questionable in the Mozambican case since the majority of people returned spontaneously, regardless of schools and health posts. Specific evidence to this effect was also found by this report (see chapter 5 "The grassroots perspective" and chapter 9 "Rapid rebuilding").

Problems in applying participatory strategies during the early phase of return –0 and thus establishing forward links to development priorities – might reflect social and administrative conditions in Mozambique at the time, as well as organisational imperatives of aid institutions under pressure to produce quick results. In that case, it would have been wiser to adopt a less ambitious strategy – one that would initially have emphasised food and the obvious facilitating infrastructures, leaving the social aspects for a second line of activity.

### 8.6.2 The Norwegian contributions

In monetary terms, the estimated Norwegian contribution to repatriation and reintegration through both NGOs and UNHCR was sizeable compared to UNHCR's overall program (ca. USD 26 million compared to USD 145 million). But also Norwegian aid was subject to the limitations of a capital intensive strategy: in addition to those noted above, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) experienced serious problems of local absorptive capacity in a project to strengthen the Mozambican refugee agency (NAR). Low-cost projects, on the other hand, could yield large returns, e.g. Redd Barna's program for unaccompanied children.

As the principal Norwegian aid organisation in the refugee sector, NRC played a proactive role in relation to the UN agencies and the Mozambican national authorities. Its Mozambican program contained innovative and important projects, some of which established forward linkages between the short-run repatriation phase and reintegration in the longer run. With a high profile, early presence on the ground, and numerous projects, NRC made Norwegian assistance quite visible.

For most of the period under consideration, structural factors as well as personality clashes created a distant, and at times strained, working relationship between NRC and the Embassy in Maputo. NRC operations in Mozambique had a highly autonomous character, partly secured through the structure of funding (multiple and separately managed sources of budget lines in Norway, and multiple donors). This raised issues of co-ordination of projects funded or implemented by Norway. Possibly there was an opportunity cost in terms of maximising the political impact of overall Norwegian aid. On the other hand, autonomy permitted NRC to move rapidly, flexibly and proactively in the field.

NRC's proactive role vis-à-vis the UN agencies (notably in the 1992 initiative to develop an early, regional response) made this NGO sometimes appear as a State actor. This may be necessary and desirable role in relation to a generally slow-moving international bureaucracy. A similarly proactive role in relation to the national authorities, however, is more questionable, especially in a post-war situation when national authorities are weak and fear that the foreign aid presence can be overwhelming. This was certainly the case in Mozambique, but the working relationship between NRC and national authorities nevertheless seemed satisfactory.

Apart from a limited and semi-internal evaluation, NRC's projects in Mozambique had not been previously evaluated. A more systematic assessment seems important given its large and often innovative program, and substantial official funding but autonomous operations.

The projects reviewed seemed timely and appropriate in relation to the peace process. Yet, some raise broader issues and suggest lessons to be learned:

**The NAR project** did not achieve its objectives and was discontinued. The project demonstrates problems of working with a weak organisational partner that does not meet requisite standards of management and



expertise, yet is expected to handle large amounts of money and produce quick results in a short period of time. This is necessarily a risky undertaking, and the risk should have been taken into account in the decision of whether or not to engage in the partnership. NRC evidently did not do so. The risk is accentuated when working in a post-war situation characterised by a vacuum of moral authority, corruption and crime - which is typically the case after a long or devastating war.

Another issue specific to a post-war situation is the existence of temporary institutions for relief and rehabilitation. It was clear from the beginning that NAR would be a temporary institution, hence there would be limited returns on investments in capacity or institution-building. If effective methods for channelling assistance could not be developed through NAR, other institutions with a longer-term mandate might have been selected as partners, such as the DPCCN (Disaster Preparedness Unit). Unlike NAR, this institution would necessarily persist, albeit with more modest and new functions.

In contrast to the Norwegian Refugee Council, UNHCR took a minimalist view of NAR. Critics in UNHCR felt that NRC's institutional support for NAR created a parallel government structure for short-term refugee assistance which represented duplication and waste, and that State capacity-building at any rate was beyond the scope of an NGO.

**The civil registration project:** Citing positive responses in Mozambique and favourable attention in the donor community, NRC considers the registration project one of its most successful ventures in Mozambique. By facilitating the social reintegration of returnees, the project was designed to serve as a link between the short-term peace process and sustainable peace in the longer run.

In many respects, the project was indeed a success. The stated objectives were achieved and, in quantitative terms, surpassed. The project demonstrated that an NGO can step in effectively when the UN or the bilateral

agencies do not engage. Registration in itself was undoubtedly a social good and facilitated social reintegration. NRC worked closely with local authorities, trained and used local staff, and the provincial governor later commented on the project and the role of NRC in very positive terms.<sup>12</sup> The project generated interest in other provinces as well. NRC received requests from local authorities to start similar projects in other provinces, but did not obtain donor funding.

On the other hand, the central government had not made civil registration a priority, and it may be questioned how far a foreign NGO should assume a proactive role in relation to national authorities. NRC tried in vain to persuade the National Directors of the registry and identification authorities to implement the national plan for registration which by then had been developed. By effectively bypassing the central authorities and working on the provincial level, NRC succeeded in getting registration done in some areas, but - by the same token - raised issues of national uniformity of standards and sustainability of a project beyond the short-term commitment of a foreign NGO. It may be noted that NRC did not obtain funding to continue registration beyond the Tete and Maputo provinces, despite requests to both NORAD and SIDA, among others.

The timing of the civil registration clashed with the preparation for elections. Quick responses ensured that no damage resulted, but the lesson is still important: isolated initiatives on the ground need to be harmonised with, or at least take into account, national priorities and activities.

**LINK:** The umbrella organisation of NGOs, created with considerable help of NRC, achieved some but not all of its objectives. Co-ordination during the rehabilitation and short-term peace process improved. But the goal of strengthening Mozambican NGOs was more elusive. National NGOs who joined remained a minority, and those on the outside criticised LINK for serving the interests of foreign NGOs.

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<sup>12</sup> Interview, Maputo, November 1996.



Given the wide differences in resources and experience of foreign and local NGOs – and often differences in agendas as well – it was probably unrealistic to expect an umbrella organisation to serve both equally well. The preponderance of resource-rich, foreign NGOs necessarily shaped LINK's activities. Thus, LINK refused to act as a fund-raiser for Mozambican NGOs, as the latter demanded. Regional co-ordination also proved beyond reach, and was later dropped as a formal objective. Nevertheless, LINK continued to grow. By October 1996 membership had risen to 103, of which 66 were international and 37 national.

Despite its problems, LINK did provide the local NGOs with a framework for co-operation and contact that may strengthen their role in Mozambican civil society and help sustain the peace in the longer run.

**Women's Project:** NORAD support for women who had been kept in RENAMO captivity was in line with Norwegian policy of giving high priority to the reintegration of women in aid activities.<sup>13</sup> However, the project was very small, and one of the few projects in the Norwegian aid portfolio that focused on women returnees.

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. *Prinsippnotat 1994-96* (NORAD, 1993), see also chapter 3 in the present report.

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## 9. Rapid rebuilding

### 9.1 Introduction

Projects discussed in this section include relatively short-term activities to consolidate the peace process by rapidly providing basic economic and social services ("seeds-and-tools", health, education and water), and rebuilding infrastructure such as roads and bridges. Infrastructure and all types of services had been severely disrupted in the rural areas during the war, and services still available in the urban became heavily overstretched due to disruption of normal economic activities as well as the influx of large number of displaced persons.

"Rapid rebuilding" projects will here be understood as those that lie somewhere in the middle of the continuum between short-term assistance and aid for sustainable development.<sup>1</sup> Ideally, and in keeping with the continuum concept, rapid rebuilding should link short-term and long-term objectives by taking into consideration the priorities of recipients and other dimensions of regular development projects. Yet, the emergency context did create some obstacles in this respect.

Norwegian policy documents on aid to Mozambique do not discuss any particular strategies of rapid rebuilding. The categorisation "rapid rebuilding" is made by the study team. Apart from the Rural Development Programme in Cabo Delgado, which includes components specifically defined in NORAD project documents as "rapid impact projects"<sup>2</sup> the projects reviewed here are officially registered under other labels.

<sup>1</sup> See Marit Sørvald (1995) (in Norwegian) for a discussion of institutional, financial and managerial problems related to projects located in this "grey zone" between emergency relief and development aid.

<sup>2</sup> For example Annex 1 to the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Mozambique 1994

Norwegian support in this area was channelled through several aid systems - UN-organisations, (especially UNHCR), NGOs (Mozambican and Norwegian), the NORAD "country aid programme", and the special emergency fund (budget line 190.70). The various allocations were administered by different parts of the Norwegian aid system and subject to different criteria for funding.

The cases selected for the review here are:

- Council For Africa (CFA) - rehabilitation of schools in Maputo
- PESU - seeds and tools distribution
- National Reconstruction Plan (NRP)
- Rural development in Cabo Delgado

Sharp differences among the projects chosen to illustrate "rapid rebuilding" activities make it difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding their contribution to the peace process. First of all, there are two types of projects:

- 1) Projects where NORAD operated as a bilateral donor and worked directly with a Mozambican partner: These were relatively few (rebuilding/repairing schools and rural rehabilitation).
- 2) Co-financed projects where NORAD pooled its resources with other donors (PESU and the NRP). Given the time and resource restraints of this study, it has not been possible to evaluate these broader programmes per se. We have relied on other assessments, when available, about the overall impact of the programmes, and sought to ascertain whether the Norwegian contributions were timely, appropriate and effective.

While the rationale for all projects



generally was phrased in terms of problems related to the post-war situation and support for the peace process, the NORAD documentation says little about how precisely the projects were intended to address such issues. There may be good reasons for this since there were no direct, instrumental links between say, repair of a school and implementation of the peace agreement. On the other hand, the projects and activities reviewed here were generally designed to "restart the wheels" after a prolonged war, some addressed immediate critical transitions (e.g. PESU), and others presumably had some indirect and long-term impact on the sustainability of peace insofar as they strengthened local developmental capacity.

Clearly, the most significant change in the rapid rebuilding sector brought on by peace was the possibility to work in the rural areas, as NORAD recognised and acted upon. As a bilateral donor, NORAD took relatively few initiatives on its own in the "rapid rebuilding" area, but pooled its resources with other donors. In a situation where NORAD had limited capacity to monitor the support provided, this approach seems appropriate.

## ***9.2 Rehabilitation of Schools in Maputo***

In the period 1990-95, the Council for Africa (CFA), a Norwegian NGO worked with the Directorate for Education and Culture of Maputo City to rehabilitated and restore eight school buildings. NORAD funded the project with NOK 12.1 million.

Generally speaking, the experience from the repair phase was rather good. All repair objectives were achieved, and the work contributed positively to the physical conditions of the school buildings as well as the security of the children and teachers.

Without rehabilitation, some of the schools probably would have collapsed. As a side-benefit, the Mozambican authorities gained experience in managing contracts with firms, using bidding procedures etc. Local building capacity was strengthened through in-service training of technical staff.

The maintenance part of the project was more problematic than the "technical repair" part. In 1994-1995, the focus shifted to maintenance capacity with workshops and awareness-training, yet it proved more difficult than anticipated to mobilise teachers and students for preventive maintenance projects. The capacity for mobilising for self-help seemed to have been exhausted. Possibly, the political and economic changes during the 1980s had generated less positive attitudes towards community activity, particularly in urban areas, in contrast to the early years of independence when community engagement on a self-help basis was emphasised as a critical tool of development.

The project also indicated that maintenance is not only an attitudinal problem but also a structural one. It is difficult to sustain a "culture of maintenance" when there is little or no public funding for major repairs, even though the education system sometimes operated on a three-shift basis.<sup>3</sup>

The end of the war made it possible to start education projects in rural areas. CFA began working with Progresso, one of the first Mozambican NGOs to be registered (1991), and generally recognised as very capable and solid.

With NORAD funding, CFA and

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<sup>3</sup> In the case of Mozambique where donor-dependency is extremely high (70-80 per cent of the GNP) lack of "public" funds for recurrent and maintenance is also a function of lack of donor funding in such areas.



Progresso were in late 1996 rebuilding 3 schools in Manhiça district in Maputo province. The schools had been completely destroyed during the war. CFA/Progresso worked in close collaboration with Mozambican authorities. To ensure that “software” was matched with “hardware” and avoid common problems of creating unused infrastructure, it was decided not to start construction until the teachers were on the payroll of the Ministry of Education.

Lessons learned from maintenance problems during the war led to a new approach. The schools were designed as “maintenance free” from the very beginning, which seemed wise given the likelihood of continuous problems of covering recurrent costs for maintenance. The rehabilitation project also appeared to be cost-effective.

The reopening of schools was a major component of national reconstruction. The government wanted to boost enrolments, but faced a shortage of teachers, schools and educational materials. The CFA/Progresso projects helped address these shortages in a coherent manner, notably by systematically including the “software” component (teacher/materials). The school projects contributed to an improved learning environment, which presumably enhanced the quality of education. In the larger context of reconstruction and its role in sustaining the peace, this may appear a minor contribution; nevertheless it seems appropriate and timely.

The Manhiça project had an additional advantage. Community mobilisation is particularly important in a situation where people’s sense of belonging has been weakened by years of absence. Recognising this, the project sought to include in a strong community involvement in the rebuilding process. Local factions had to agree upon issues such as localisation of

the schools, size, number of teachers etc. Schools were built in RENAMO-controlled as well as government areas, although the political aspects of reintegration seem not to have guided the location of the project.

It is widely recognised that NGOs which were sensitive to political issues and worked closely with local structures played an important part in translating rehabilitation priorities into reality. Several NGOs bypassed official plans and priorities or did not assess the “software” requirements thoroughly. The CFA did not make these mistakes, but linked its projects closely to district/provincial authorities and/or a Mozambican NGO partner (Progresso). As the CFA experience with its rehabilitation project in Maputo during the war demonstrated, working with local authorities may have short-term disadvantages by reducing efficiency, but there are longer-term gains in that local organisational capacity and human resources are strengthened. Thus the potential for a sustained impact is also greater.

It is unclear whether, or to what extent, the rebuilding of schools encouraged return and resettlement. It is commonly assumed that provision of basic educational facilities is decisive for resettlement.<sup>4</sup> The general impression in the Mozambican case, however, is that most refugees and displaced persons went home irrespective of what was waiting for them. The experience from the Manhiça-project supports this conclusion: Plans for construction of two schools (Maragra and Machambutana) were shelved because people did not move back to these areas despite the prospect of newly built infrastructure.

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<sup>4</sup> Danida (1995), p. 26.



### 9.3 Seeds and tools

When the war ended, agricultural production had come to a standstill in most areas of Mozambique. The country had become dependent on food aid for more than three-quarters of its cereal needs. Some 6-7 million people that had been displaced, internally and externally, were returning home. In this situation, provision of seeds and tools became critical to rehabilitation and a prerequisite for reconstruction.

The Mozambican government's seed and tools programme – PESU – was established in 1987 when the Ministry of Agriculture, through the Commission for the Emergency (CENE), started to distribute seeds and hand tools to small-scale farmers affected by the war and adverse climate conditions. The severe drought in 1991-92 accentuated the emergency relief aspect of the programme, which a little later was expanded to include refugees and persons displaced by the war. The main objective remained the provision of essential inputs to help the beneficiaries maintain a production level that would meet their minimum food requirements. Sweden, Norway and UNOHAC were the three main donors of the programme.

Norway's contribution was substantial: a total of NOK 70.3 million in the 1991-93 period, all of which came from the bilateral import-support programme.

The impact of the PESU programme in terms of rehabilitation of agriculture and relief is difficult to isolate and has not been systematically assessed. It should be noted that the distributions in the critical 1993-94 period coincided with good rains, hence enhancing the impact. WFP estimated that the number of people requiring direct food aid in 1993-94 would fall from 3.5 million in 1992-93 to under 1 million. This figure did not include refugees. FAO estimated in June 1995 that agricultural production had increased by 45 per cent from 1994 to 1995.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Vildby (1995), p.19 (in Danish).

While the impact on relief and production thus appears to have been substantial, audits of the SIDA-PESU project in 1994 and 1995 documented several administrative weaknesses:

- lack of a proper accounting system
- inadequacy or poor state of records
- unclear contracts with companies delivering tools
- ineffective internal control over project funds
- inadequate bank statements

Legitimate questions have been raised with respect to the implementation of PESU programme as a whole (did the seeds arrive on time for the rain? should the provisions have been moved through the rural trading networks sooner, rather than given away?), but these cannot be addressed within the terms of this evaluation. The principle of providing the rural population with basic agricultural inputs during a transition period from war to peace was clearly essential for the return of people and restoration of some normalcy. As such PESU had an important role in the peace process. Norway demonstrated its support for this principle by making a large financial contribution to the programme.

Of the Norwegian contribution, all but NOK 3 million were administered according to an agreement between SIDA and NORAD of July 1992, whereby SIDA advised NORAD on the dispositions of the transfers. This was probably a wise arrangement, considering NORAD's limited experience in the agricultural sector in Mozambique and SIDA's long-standing role in this area. Nevertheless, the larger issues of mismanagement remained.

When the audits undertaken in 1994 and 1995 showed major mismanagement of funds at



PESU,<sup>6</sup> the case became a *cause célèbre* in the government's relations with donors, and Sweden responded by holding back assistance in the agricultural sector. According to a Swedish report at the time, the PESU programme lacked a proper accounting system, had unclear contracts with companies delivering tools, and substantial funds were unaccounted for, including some USD 2 million of NORAD funds.<sup>7</sup>

The experience with the PESU programme points to problems that can arise from projects located in the borderline between emergency relief and development aid.

In SIDA, the PESU-experience was taken as evidence of inherent weaknesses in the Mozambican administrative apparatus. However, by adopting "emergency procedures" in project management and not making the terms of funding clear, donors may unintentionally have contributed to the misuse of funds. When donors make weak institutions responsible for large-scale operations, they need to take the attendant risks into account.

A lesson to be learned here is that in order to minimise risks, donor should adopt procedures that make misuse more difficult. In particular, it seems that since the PESU programme in 1992-94 was not a response to an immediate crisis, but the adjustment of a mechanism established in 1987 to deal with an emergency that had long-term dimensions, donors need not have rushed in, but had ample opportunity to develop policies based on thorough project appraisal.

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<sup>6</sup> The 1994 audit was carried out by the Government of Mozambique and the one in 1995 by KPMG, Peat & Marwick.

<sup>7</sup> SIDA (1995), p. 4.

## 9.4 The National Reconstruction Plan (NRP)

Until recently Mozambique had a highly centralised planning system where the investment plan and budget were dominated by centrally managed, donor-funded projects. NORAD was one of five donors (Accord, DANIDA, GTZ, NORAD, UNDP) that supported various donor efforts to decentralise the national planning system. Each donor input was defined in bilateral agreements with the government of Mozambique. The Norwegian contribution to the National Reconstruction Plan was USD 300,000 as per Agreement of November 1992. It was an early contribution, and not ear-marked, but given as core funding to the National Directorate of Planning (DNP) in CNP (National Planning Commission), which was the executing agency.

The NRP represented an attempt to establish a decentralised planning structure in preparing for post-war reconstruction. In principle, the NRP would be a means whereby inputs from the local level - including traditional leaders and RENAMO structures - could be channelled into a national mapping of future infrastructure needs. In practice, the NRP never materialised as the "bottom-up" planning document it was intended to be, partly due to extreme shortages of administrative capacity at the local level. In this connection it might be noted that Norwegian policy documents have suggested that one cause of the war was dissatisfaction among local leaders and traditional power structures that had been bypassed under FRELIMO's centralised state and planning system.<sup>8</sup> However, there is no evidence that this was a consideration behind Norway's financial support for the NRP.

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<sup>8</sup> *Mosambik Norge. Landprogram 1995-97*, p. 2



Despite its shortcomings, the NRP has been useful. NGOs, for instance, used it to formulate their own priorities.<sup>9</sup> At the central level, the line ministries had to consider NRP goals in plans for new investments concerning the three-year public investment programme (PTIP) for 1993-95, as well as the current one.

Additional long-term effects are felt in the decision of the National Planning Commission (CNP) to build on the NRP experience by consolidating current work to strengthen provincial planning directorates. UNDP is providing direct assistance to some provincial planning directorates and CNP/UNDP are encouraging bilateral donors to support provinces which are not covered. The programme includes the development of uniform methodologies for gathering district level data and developing district level planning capacity. Thus the NRP appears to be a good example of how aid that started in a relief phase can evolve into development assistance.

### **9.5 Rural Rehabilitation in Cabo Delgado**

Since 1993, Norway has financed a rural rehabilitation programme to stimulate rural production and strengthen local government structures.<sup>10</sup> The role of women is especially emphasised. The main activities have concentrated on three southern districts of Cabo Delgado: Balama, Namuno and Montepuez.

<sup>9</sup> Action Aid used the NRP extensively in Zambézia province. Their staff found the NRP useful for at least three purposes: 1. As a document to demonstrate recipient priorities vis-à-vis own members 2. To present plans for own donors and 3. As a basis for discussion at the monthly provincial meetings which were held to coordinate donor activities.

<sup>10</sup> The Agreement was signed in 1994.

The Cabo Delgado project is a mixture of rapid rebuilding and long-term development. The former – defined by NORAD as “rapid impact” projects – consists of activities to assist women and rebuild infrastructure (feeder roads). The other component is long term assistance to institution-building at the national, provincial and district level.

The rapid impact projects for rehabilitation of feeder roads seem to have progressed relatively well. By opening up access to rural areas, especially marketing access for peasants, feeder roads are considered important to post-war reconstruction and development. Norwegian support was also premised on these arguments. Feeder roads were identified by NORAD and the district/provincial authorities as critical to boost agricultural marketing, and were to be built with labour-intensive methods over a period of 12-18 months. The roads project was based on a “cash-for work” scheme involving “deslocados” of both gender, as well as demobilised soldiers, thus specifically targeting war-affected populations.

The longer term aspects of the programme were identified after a Logical Framework exercise in March 1992. The meeting included representatives from Agriculture, Public Administration, Planning Commission and Secretariat for Social Action (SEAS). A four-project programme was proposed that included agricultural rehabilitation, social action, public administration and support to planning at all levels. It was decided that INDER (Instituto Nacional de Desenvolvimento Rural) - identified as the central governmental institution for promotion and co-ordination of rural development - would manage the programme. For this purpose, a small management unit would be established in INDER and capacity-building initiatives undertaken.



After two years of operation NORAD concluded that the programme as a whole had been too biased towards institution-building and other activities at the national level.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the disbursement of funds had not kept up with the original plans. Rather few activities had been carried out locally.

This particular NORAD project emerged from a wish to support the rural areas after the war, but otherwise contained few components that appeared directly or strategically linked the peace process. Indicative in this respect was the selection of Cabo Delgado as the geographic area of support. According to UNOHAC, Cabo Delgado was one of the provinces least affected by the war, and the penetration of RENAMO came much later than in other provinces.<sup>12</sup> UNDHA described the main problems in Cabo Delgado as "health and education"; these areas were not covered by the NORAD programme. However, the southern district of Cabo Delgado did have refugees from Nampula, and the programme did seek to integrate war affected groups (e.g. demobilised soldiers and IDPs) through employment schemes. Moreover, NORAD/Maputo estimated that the province would receive a large number of demobilised soldiers relative to the population.<sup>13</sup>

NORAD later recognised that the project had been too biased towards institution-building and activities at the national level.<sup>14</sup> The result was a proposal in 1995 to transfer implementation authority to the provincial level. The change is in line with

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<sup>11</sup> Minutes 25.11.95

<sup>12</sup> UNDHA (1994), p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> Comments from Bjørg Leite to the first draft of the present report, dated 25 January 1997.

<sup>14</sup> Interview, Maputo, October 1996. In the current agreement, support for SEAS has been eliminated altogether.

ongoing national efforts to strengthen provincial planning structures, and may significantly contribute to processes that will bring people at the district level closer to control and decision-making power.

Another lesson to be learned from the Cabo Delgado project - and as revealed by the NRP process as well - is that in the immediate wake of war, donors should realistically assess the implementation and absorption capacity of recipient institutions. Logical Framework exercises, no matter how carefully carried out, may not be adequate to diagnose problems of planning and administration. In a period after a prolonged turbulence and conflict, normal administrative mechanisms are typically weak. Hence, "normal" procedures that are usually associated with the Norwegian policy of "recipient responsibility" may not ensure a well-functioning programme locally. More intensive project supervision locally may be necessary until the situation stabilises further. Closer contact with local organisations will also enable donors to better identify appropriate development partners.

## **9.6 Assessment**

The projects and activities reviewed were generally designed to "restart the wheels" after a long war. They ranged from support for existing relief programmes adjusted to deal with problems in the transition to peace (e.g. PESU), to more conventional rural development projects that incorporated some post-war dimensions. All projects reviewed were indirectly related to the peace process, but there is little articulation and analysis in the NORAD documentation about the nature of this relationship.

As a bilateral donor, NORAD took relatively few initiatives on its own in the "rapid rebuilding" area, but pooled resources with other donors. In a situation where NORAD had limited capacity to monitor the support provided, this



approach seems appropriate.

### 9.6.1 Rehabilitation of schools

The reopening of schools was a priority in national reconstruction. The CFA response to rapid rebuilding in the school sector seems both appropriate and timely.

Many NGOs involved in rapid rebuilding of infrastructure bypassed official plans and priorities or did not assess the "software" requirements thoroughly. The CFA did not make these mistakes, but worked closely with district/provincial authorities and/or a Mozambican NGO partner (Progresso). This had short-term disadvantages by reducing efficiency, but probably longer-term gains in the form of capacity building. The potential for a sustained impact is also greater.

The CFA/Progresso projects systematically included the "software" component (teachers and materials). Efforts to mobilise community participation were less successful, possibly for socio-historical factors embedded in contemporary Mozambique.

CFA/Progresso built schools in RENAMO-controlled as well as government areas, although project documents reveal little strategic thinking about the political aspects of reintegration after a civil war.

Some donors supported social infrastructure on the assumption that it would facilitate return of refugees and displaced persons.<sup>15</sup> The general impression in the Mozambican case, however, is that most refugees and displaced persons went home irrespective of what was waiting for them. The experience from the Manhiça-project supports this conclusion: Plans for construction of two schools (Maragra and Machambutana) were shelved because people did not move back to these areas despite the prospect of newly built infrastructure.

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<sup>15</sup> Danida (1995), p. 26.

### 9.6.2 Seeds and tools

The PESU programme was designed to fill a critical need in the transition from war to peace, and Norway was a major financial contributor.

Considering NORAD's limited experience in the agricultural sector in Mozambique, it was probably a wise strategy to work through another donor agency (SIDA).

PESU experienced major problems of managing funds and became a source of significant tension between the government and donors in 1994-5. In SIDA, the PESU-experience was taken as evidence of inherent weaknesses in the Mozambican administration. However, by adopting "emergency procedures" in project management and not making the terms of funding clear, donors may unintentionally have contributed to the misuse of funds. When donors make weak institutions responsible for large-scale operations, they need to take the attendant risks into account before entering into co-operation.

Risks can be minimised. In particular, since the PESU programme in 1992-94 was not a response to immediate problems of return and reintegration, but adjustment of a relief mechanism established already in 1987 to deal with an emergency that had long-term dimensions, donors had ample opportunity to develop procedural safeguards and policies based on thorough project appraisals.

### 9.6.3 The National Reconstruction Plan (NRP)

Norway was an early financial supporter of the NRP, which was an attempt to establish a decentralised planning structure in preparing for post-war reconstruction. The NRP never materialised as the "bottom-up" planning document it was intended to be, partly due to extreme shortages of administrative capacity on the local level. The rationale for supporting NRP seems not to have been related to the war, even though other Norwegian policy documents suggested that one cause of the war was grievances of



local leaders against FRELIMO's centralised state and planning system.<sup>16</sup>

#### 9.6.4 Rural Rehabilitation in Cabo Delgado

This NORAD project emerged from a wish to support rural development after the war, but contained few components that were directly or strategically linked to the short-term peace process. In particular, Cabo Delgado was selected as the geographic area for support even though the province was among the least affected by the war, and the penetration of RENAMO came much later than in other provinces.<sup>17</sup>

UNDHA describes the main problems in Cabo Delgado as "health and education"; these areas were not covered by the NORAD programme. However, the southern district of Cabo Delgado did have refugees from Nampula, and the programme did seek to integrate war affected groups (e.g. demobilised soldiers and IDPs) through employment schemes. Building of feeder roads was seen as a priority in order to increase agricultural production and marketing, a development which peace had made possible, and in turn required to be sustained.

Mozambican authorities and NORAD later found that the project had been too biased towards institution-building and activities at the national level and transferred implementation towards the provincial level. Given that tension between local and national structures had been both a cause and a consequence of the war, the need to strike an appropriate balance between the two levels would seem important in the context of sustaining the peace.

Another lesson to be learned from the Cabo Delgado project - and as also revealed by the NRP process - is that in the immediate wake of war, donors should realistically assess the implementation and absorption capacity of

recipient institutions. In an immediate post-war situation, the Norwegian aid policy of "recipient responsibility" may not ensure a well-functioning programme. More intensive project supervision locally may be necessary until the situation stabilises further. Closer contact with local organisations will also enable donors to better identify appropriate development partners.

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<sup>16</sup> *Mosambik Norge. Landprogram 1995-97*, p. 2

<sup>17</sup> UNDHA (1994), p. 48







## 10. Political Pluralism

### 10.1 Introduction

In the political sphere, the short-term peace process envisaged in the General Peace Agreement (GPA) centred on national elections and establishing a multiparty system. More fundamentally, this meant ensuring that the main protagonists - FRELIMO and RENAMO - renounced the military option and stayed in the political arena.

For the donors that were not part of the Rome negotiations, the elections initially seemed a "given" - an agreed-upon event which they were simply asked to help finance. The date and the parameters were set, and the significance was undoubted. Only a price tag remained, and that was attached at the donor conference in Rome in December 1992. As it turned out, disagreement between the parties deprived the implementation of any automaticity. Preparing for the election became in itself a policy process where appropriate intervention of donors could - and did - make some difference.

This chapter will consider Norway's role with respect to the principal election issues that arose, and the major instruments used by the international donor community to implement the GPA's provisions in this regard. These were:

- The UNDP Trust Fund for elections;
- The UN Secretary-General's Trust Fund for Political parties;
- The UN Secretary General's Trust Fund for RENAMO;
- Other bilateral and multilateral support to prepare and monitor the elections, including the international

civilian police component of ONUMOZ (CIVPOL);<sup>1</sup>

- Diplomatic suasion.

In a broader perspective it is evident that these measures were only part of the overall effort to move the political process forward. The elections were timed to occur as the last, culminating event in the formal peace process outlined in the GPA. Demobilisation of soldiers and repatriation of refugees had to take place first. Directly or indirectly, the 1994 elections therefore became linked to virtually all aspects of the peace process. Because the elections also signified that the peace agreement had been implemented and the UN Mission (ONUMOZ) could terminate, the polling event acquired great political symbolism. Indeed, the numerous activities of ONUMOZ and the donor community in the 1992-94 period appear retrospectively as virtually a coherent process oriented towards one single end - the elections.

Unlike some other contemporary peace agreements, the 1992 GPA did not address the causes of the war except in one respect: regulating access to political power and dividing the spoils. The narrow focus of the peace agreement reflected in considerable measure what the war had been all about, and the fact that the external destabilisation campaign which had ignited and sustained the conflict had ended for reasons of its own. The destabilisation campaign had tapped into diffuse domestic discontent, but many of the issues had been pre-empted by the internal economic and political reforms instituted since the early 1980s.

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<sup>1</sup> CIVPOL had a dual function in relation to the elections by monitoring the national police - which had become a contentious issue that in the implementation process - as well the elections. The UN CIVPOL contingent also had a human rights monitoring function.



Sharing of political power had been the key issue during the first, informal talks to end the war in 1984-85. RENAMO wanted cabinet posts in a government of national unity, which the government refused. Although the GPA did not include provisions for power-sharing in a government of national unity, the demand for a pre-election deal among the parties re-emerged as a major issue. Other critical challenges on the political side concerned (i) keeping to the elections on schedule, and (ii) transforming RENAMO from a rebel military movement into a political party. The donors were deeply involved on all fronts.

## ***10.2 Keeping the elections on schedule***

The principal purpose of the elections was to move RENAMO from the bush to the political arena. With the experience of Angola fresh in mind, the donor community was firmly convinced that this required demobilising the two parties and establishing a new national army (FADM) prior to elections. Otherwise, it was feared, RENAMO might challenge an unfavourable electoral verdict by resuming the war. The sequencing was kept, but slow demobilisation became the single most important factor to delay the electoral schedule agreed upon in Rome. As noted in chapter 4, decisive intervention from the donors, especially the Like-Minded countries, helped put the demobilisation process back on track so that the revised election deadline (moved from October 1993 to October 1994) could be observed.

It was recognised at the time that the original election schedule set by the GPA was unrealistic. The delay might in fact have strengthened the political process. Given the profound mistrust between two parties who had been at war for more than a decade, it was essential to have a correct electoral process even if it took more time, as the National Election Commissioner observed.

The National Election Commission was prepared to further postpone the election deadline if necessary. The practical and administrative problems of organising elections in a large and poor country, ravaged by years of warfare, were formidable. On the political level, numerous issues complicated the promulgation of an Electoral Law, and even small differences were magnified by the distrust between RENAMO and the government. A Multiparty Conference was called in the second half of 1993 to amend the government's draft electoral law. Recognising the importance of the conference, the Nordic countries, including Norway, helped to finance it (the Norwegian contribution was NOK 118,000). The Conference was an important first step towards a legislative consensus, although insufficient in itself to unlock the impasse that had developed.

Composed of representatives appointed by the political parties, the National Election Commission (NEC) worked slowly to untie the remaining knots. Only the Chairman, Brazão Mazula, was generally recognised as being independent. His approach to deal with the RENAMO-FRELIMO divide on the Commission was to require agreement on all issues - a painstakingly slow approach. As the deadline of October 1994 neared, the UN Special Representative, Aldo Ajello, and the US Ambassador were becoming demonstratively impatient. Another postponement of elections would mean prolonging a costly ONUMOZ operation - with the US scheduled to pay 31% of the costs - and some feared it would unravel the entire peace process. Mazula was implored in more or less diplomatic terms to stick to the schedule. Bristling at the pressure, Mazula found consistent support from the Nordics. "We will support you," the Swedish ambassador told him, even if the Commission had to adjust the timetable so that all conditions for free and fair elections could be met. By law, the NEC was an independent and sovereign body and an important symbol of both in the face of heavy donor presence as well as the



assertive head of UN Special Representative. Nordic support for the formalities of sovereignty was appreciated on high levels in the Mozambican government.

The Nordics appear again as balancing actors in the pre-election diplomacy during October. On the eve of the polling day, Dhlakama made a dramatic *volte face* by announcing that he would boycott the elections on the grounds of irregularities in the preparation. Sensing a diplomatic disaster, Ajello, orchestrated the counterattack. He went to see Dhlakama, accompanied by the American, English, French and German ambassadors who all had relatively good relations with RENAMO and collectively represented considerable political weight. For almost three hours the foreign diplomats urged Dhlakama to rescind the boycott. The next day, and at Ajello's request, representatives of the Like-Minded countries that had close ties with the government - including Norway - called at Chissano's office to ask that the government stay the course. Top politicians and the ambassadors of South Africa and Zimbabwe joined it. While it is doubtful that Dhlakama could have carried out a boycott at this late stage, RENAMO's failure to recognise the elections would have jeopardised the result. As it was, Dhlakama reconsidered, and the elections went ahead as planned.

### **10.3 Keeping RENAMO in the political arena**

The possibility that RENAMO would renounce the peace agreement and retreat to the bush seemed real, and RENAMO used it to press for financial and political concessions, including money, recognition, and demand for power-sharing in the government. The international donor community and the UN operation in Mozambique were inclined to accommodate RENAMO leaders in several respects, hoping thereby to keep in the peace process. For Norway, the strategy raised special questions about how far to adjust its

traditional pro-FRELIMO course in line with this process.

Norwegian support for FRELIMO reflected both sympathy for "African socialism" and solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle in which Mozambique was the front-line state which had suffered most for its open support for the liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa. RENAMO's reputation for extraordinary brutality during the war had strengthened Norwegian sympathy for the government both on official levels and in the solidarity movement. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RENAMO leaders were viewed as alternately *bandidos* or mass murderers on the level of the Khmer Rouge, as a high ranking official wrote in an internal memo to protest Dhlakama's proposed visit to Norway in May 1993. To accept RENAMO as a legitimate political party and partner in the peace process was difficult enough, to actively support the erstwhile *bandidos* through diplomatic contacts, financial contribution and occasional pressure on the Mozambican government to meet RENAMO demands was even harder to accept, even though this was on the agenda of the donor community.

While equidistance was not the issue, the head of NORAD/Maputo took the initiative to create slightly more symmetry in Norway's relationship. As a measure to integrate RENAMO in the peace process, the Chargé d'affaires, Bjørg Leite, started in January 1993 to promote the idea that Dhlakama should visit Norway, and met him as well as RENAMO's Secretary General, Raúl Domingos, in Mozambique during the first half of the year. The idea was hard for some to swallow in Oslo as well as Maputo. To maintain a careful balance, Leite recommended that Prime Minister Mário Machungo be invited to Oslo after Dhlakama's visit.

On two major implementation issues that divided RENAMO and the Mozambican government, Norway took a low profile. In February 1994 the foreign observer states to



the Rome negotiations - which had retained their prominence in the commission structure set up to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement - enlisted the rest of the donor community to demand that the government pay RENAMO "logistical support" as obligated by the peace agreement. At the time, RENAMO was citing the lack of payments to slow down demobilisation, and while the donor community would itself also entertain request for funding, "this should not be interpreted that (sic) the international community will underwrite every expense of the peace process in Mozambique, thereby alleviating the government of any financial responsibility for its success."<sup>2</sup> Conferring with the Ministry in Oslo, NORAD/Maputo decided to lie low on the issue.

In the pre-election period official Norway was likewise conspicuously silent on the question of a government of national unity. Power-sharing was a familiar mechanism designed to manage deeply divided countries. The idea did not seem far-fetched to some donors, and was strongly advocated by the US ambassador in Mozambique in late 1994. Proponents invoked the South African model, where a government of National Reconciliation and Unity came to power after the April 1994 elections. The government of Mozambique protested vociferously against giving RENAMO any guaranteed share of the political posts prior to elections, and after a short but tense dispute, the idea died. On the Norwegian side, the question hardly appears in the official document trail of NORAD and the Ministry from this period. Possibly, the case seemed self-evidently in favour of the government. Yet, the question remains why Norway at this time chose not to publicly demonstrate support when its old FRELIMO-friends were hard pushed by the United States and RENAMO on a critical political issue in the peace process.

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<sup>2</sup> *Statement regarding logistical support for RENAMO (draft)*. Maputo, 16.2.1994.

This kind of support was not forthcoming until after the elections when a persistent United States asked the donors to pressure the government to depart from the "winner-take-all" principle and give some posts in the national and provincial governments with RENAMO even though the latter had not obtained a majority vote in the elections. Along with several other donors, Norway actively protested, arguing that the government had followed the rules in undertaking a major political restructuring, and must now be left in peace. As discussed above (chapter 2), the discussion was played out in the context of the 1995 CG-meeting, which helps to explain the change in the Norwegian position. The CG-forum - and active US lobbying in Washington and Paris before the meeting - ensured that high-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to engage. The issue had also changed. One thing was to pressure the Mozambican government to change the rules before the elections, quite another was to demand adjustments retroactively.

### **10.3.1 The Secretary General's Trust Fund for RENAMO**

An innovative and unusual mechanism, the fund was thought to be the key to the metamorphosis of RENAMO. The fund rested on the premise that RENAMO was a species of political bandits that could be bought into the peace process. Having developed from - and by - the war, rather than originating in a political movement, RENAMO lacked any experience in the field they were now entering. They needed training, subsistence funds, and campaign money for election expenses. Moreover, Dhlakama was understood to have promised his men, especially the officers, material rewards. Whether as a pay-off or as a contribution to political retooling, a trust fund for RENAMO would address issues critical to the demilitarisation of the conflict.

Italy was the driving force. Already in early 1992, the Italian mediator in the Rome negotiations had suggested establishing a



foreign-supported conversion fund. The idea was incorporated in the peace agreement (Protocol III(V)/7 b,c), which also named Italy as a likely funding source.

In the short run, the fund was significant, perhaps essential, to keep RENAMO in the political process. Unlike other guerrilla movements that controlled valuable resources (e.g. the Khmer Rouge which sold timber and diamonds), RENAMO had no independent financial base and by this time uncertain foreign supporters (in South Africa, Portugal and the United States). The GPA obligated RENAMO to participate in the administrative-political structures established to implement the peace agreement, including, most importantly, the commissions that monitored demobilisation (CSC), the cease-fire (CCF) and oversaw the establishment of the new Mozambican army (CCFADM). In March 1993 RENAMO withdrew from the commissions and left Maputo, citing lack of money to operate in the capital. The result was that negotiations on the commissions - the lifeline of the implementation process - came to a halt.

Lack of funds was hardly the only reason why RENAMO suspended its participation in the commissions, but turning the tap on again had the desired effect. The UN Secretariat made moves to realise the conversion fund called for in the peace agreement, and on 10 May 1993 the UN Trust Fund was established under the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative in Mozambique, Ajello.<sup>3</sup> The initial goal was USD 10 million.<sup>4</sup> Almost immediately, RENAMO delegates returned to Maputo and resumed their work in the commissions.

The cover of a UN Trust Fund permitted donors who would not assist RENAMO directly to nevertheless assist in the

<sup>3</sup> When ONUMOZ folded in January 1995, UNDP/Maputo took over the management of the fund

<sup>4</sup> United Nations, S/26034, 30 June 1993.

conversion process. The fund was initially understood to support RENAMO up until the elections, with the USD 0 million estimate covering the period June 1993-November 1994. Later pledges raised the amount to USD 18 million, which RENAMO spent, but its additional, sizeable debt remained outstanding as of late 1996. The major contributor was Italy with USD 11 million pledged in 1993-94 (or 63 per cent of the total), the next was the EU (USD 1.4 million), and the US (USD 1 million). Among the Nordics, Denmark contributed most (USD 500,000), and also carried the issue in Maputo on behalf of the European Union. Sweden contributed somewhat less (367 454), and Norway least of the three with USD 107,150.<sup>5</sup>

The fund appeared to have a strategic effect also on the eve of the elections. RENAMO representatives pointedly raised the issue of funds with a visiting Security Council mission in early August 1994. Realising the importance of timing and being the consummate tactician, Ajello called together the donor representatives in Maputo in August 1994 to tell them that the RENAMO trust fund was overdrawn with about USD 2 million and needed replenishing.<sup>6</sup>

At this time also Norway paid up. A symbolic contribution of some USD 100,000 (NOK 0.7 million) had been pledged in 1993, but kept in abeyance to assess need, as NORAD noted when asked by the political section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to pay from a NORAD-administered budget-line.<sup>7</sup> As it was, Ajello determined the need in relation to his election diplomacy, and told the Norwegians to hold on to their pledge until this time.

<sup>5</sup> UNDP (1996a).

<sup>6</sup> By that time RENAMO had already spent USD 13.6 million. Ajello appealed specifically for the US and the EU to pay in the amount pledged. United Nations, S/1994/1009, 29 August 1994.

<sup>7</sup> The Norwegian contribution was drawn from a flexible budget line for the African region (*regionalbevilgningen*).



While small, the contribution was controversial in the Ministry in Oslo. Critics argued that a contribution from the budget line for promoting democracy might be justified if the fund was really used to support democratisation of RENAMO or related party-building tasks. But pure hand-outs was another matter, and there was growing evidence that the fund was merely "slush-money" for Dhlakama's men to keep the peace, or for the leaders to enrich themselves. A later audit noted an "excessive nature of procurement" (including USD 1.3 million worth of clothing for 85 RENAMO "executives" and their 280 employees).

#### **10.4 Preparing and monitoring the elections**

The political and physical setting of Mozambique in 1993-1994 made the elections an extraordinary challenge. The country had just emerged from a devastating conflict that had disrupted or destroyed physical infrastructure as well as the social fabric. The legacy of war was everywhere - in the deep distrust between the parties, the return movements of millions of refugees, displaced persons or demobilised soldiers, mined roads and fields, fear of disgruntled ex-soldiers, problems of access to some RENAMO-areas, and the sheer difficulty of reaching and registering voters in a large country with a minimally functioning transport and administrative system in place.<sup>8</sup>

The Rome donor conference (December 1992) had drafted an aid budget of USD 60 million for the elections, and UNDP became the lead agency. Various funding sources and methods were used (cost sharing, contributions to a UNDP Trust Fund, and parallel financing donors). The flexibility in financing scheme made it possible to mobilise numerous sources with optimal

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<sup>8</sup> See e.g. ONUMOZ, Electoral Division. *Report on Voter Registration Covering the Period 8 July-14 August*.

timing, according to UNDP.<sup>9</sup> It also made it virtually impossible to separate out activities financed according to source.

Given the funding structure, UNDP made an overall assessment of the elections and the role of international support, rather than analysing individual contributions. The main conclusions of its 1995 final report are non-controversial:

- The electoral process occurred in an extremely complex context and some difficulties arose, but the elections did take place according to the (revised) schedule, the polling proceeded without major incidents or violence and were declared free and fair by the National Election Commissions, the United Nations, and additional international observers. All Mozambican parties accepted the outcome.
- About 81% of the estimated 7.8 million voters were registered, and about 85% of those registered actually voted.
- The long-term objectives of the UNDP technical assistance were largely met. The capacity of the Mozambican electoral bodies was enhanced (in preparation of budgets and operational plans, training of electoral officials), and civic education strengthened. Thus assets were generated for the future democratic development of Mozambique, most immediately the local elections (scheduled for 1996). The objective of creating a permanent electoral register for future elections was not achieved.

Concerted and consistent donor support for the elections was partly a result of effective co-ordination in Maputo. Organised under UNDP auspices, the donor representatives met monthly in the "Aid for Democracy Group", subsequently twice monthly and finally weekly in the "Electoral Monitoring Group".

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<sup>9</sup> See UNDP/DDSMS (1995) and UNDP (1996b).



More fundamentally, the focused attention reflected the failure of the 1992 elections in Angola. Mozambique came to be regarded as the test case of the ability of the international community to manage a war-to-peace transition in the 1990s. The UN Special Representative clearly saw it as a UN event, even asking that the elections be held on October 24, that is, on United Nations day. (The Mozambicans chose 27-28 October).

Apart from providing legitimacy, the international community gave critical technical assistance for preparation and monitoring, helped to integrate the polling with other elements of the peace process, and underwrote some 95 per cent of the total election costs. Without this support, elections clearly could not have been held. Questions of costs, modalities and the degree of international involvement were raised however. Referring to an original cost estimate of USD 20 million made by the UN Secretariat, the American and British representatives in Maputo indicated that a USD 60 million election was extravagant and recommended cost reductions measures. Yet, the logic of a capital-intensive election prevailed, not least because the country's physical infrastructure had been heavily destroyed or mined, requiring extensive use of aircraft.<sup>10</sup>

In monetary terms, the major Norwegian contribution to the election consisted of transfers to the UNDP Trust Fund totalling USD 3.1 million. Much smaller projects undertaken by NORAD/Maputo were significant in different ways. As part of a joint Nordic initiative, representatives of all Mozambican political parties were invited to study the functions of Nordic democracies; in Norway the visit was timed to permit observation of the 1993 parliamentary elections. NORAD also helped finance an international seminar on elections in Maputo, and aid to a new newspaper distributed by telefax helped

<sup>10</sup> The US contribution included USD 4.5 million for lease of aircraft.

launch what became the most significant independent media in the transition period.

#### **10.4.1 The UNDP Trust Fund for elections**

Norway's contribution to the UNDP Trust Fund highlights some characteristics of effective national participation in a trust fund mechanism.

The UNDP Trust Fund eventually reached USD 24.4 million. Italy was again a leading contributor with USD 9.2 million in non-earmarked funds; next was the United States with USD 9.1 million, mainly in earmarked funds for air transportation and civic education. Norway's contribution of USD 3.1 million was the third largest and mostly non-earmarked.

The initial Norwegian contribution was less than USD 1 million (NOK 5 million), mainly earmarked for Norwegian technical assistance or Norwegian-produced goods. As other pledges were slow in coming in, UNDP experienced a critical cash-flow in April 1994. Some USD 10 million were needed immediately for voter registration, which had to be completed between June and August if the elections were to stay on schedule. Representatives of local elections committees had recently met with UNDP and produced a list of shortages. They lacked offices, office equipment and money to train 6,000 election officials. But mostly they lacked transportation and means to rebuild roads and bridges to establish the administrative prerequisites for elections and start registration.

Against this background, the NORAD representation in Maputo made an urgent request for Oslo to transfer over USD 2 million (NOK 15 million). The Norwegian reaction is a case study of a near-flexible budgetary response. NORAD/Maputo sent a request to Oslo on 3 May. The file circulated quickly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was approved by all the three relevant offices within a week. Then the process started to slow down because, for



all its speed, the Ministry would only authorise NOK 2.5 million from its own budget lines. NORAD was requested to take the rest from its "country aid program". NORAD complied, but it took a month to prepare the authorisation.

Given the normal rigidities of the country aid program, this was still a quick response. It was facilitated by previous affirmation in principle that Norwegian aid to Mozambique during the transition period should be flexible so as to promote peace and democratisation.<sup>11</sup> NORAD intended to take most of the money from the import support item. That, however, made things slow down further. Under the terms of the Mozambican-Norwegian aid program, reallocation of the import support funds required approval from the Mozambican Ministry of Co-operation. As the Ministry would release only NOK 5 million from existing allocations, NORAD had to find the remaining amount elsewhere. While the amount involved was small by any measure, final NORAD approval did not come until July 18.<sup>12</sup> By that time, UNDP's immediate cash-flow problems had been solved as Italy honoured its pledges and Austria came in with quick finance.

#### 10.4.2 The UN Secretary-General's Trust Fund for political parties

Norway also contributed to the UN Trust Fund set up to help the political parties during the campaign. While the Norwegian contribution was small (NOK 2 million), the Trust Fund touched on broader issues relevant to sustaining peace.

<sup>11</sup> Legitimising language had been inserted in relevant documents, both the internal "*prinsipnotat*" of 1993 of NORAD/MFA, and the 1993 country program.

<sup>12</sup> In the end, the 15 million allocation was financed with NOK 2.5 million from the Ministry's budget line for promoting democracy, NOK 2.5 million from the NORAD administered budget line for "Africa regional, other", and NOK 10 million from reallocated import support and unspent funds from the previous year.

For all practical purposes, Mozambique had emerged from the civil war with two parties - FRELIMO and RENAMO. Yet, several smaller political parties quickly appeared to contest the elections and take advantage of the financial support for "logistics" specified in the peace agreement (Protocol III, Art. 7). The UN established a small trust fund for this purpose. Since a separate fund was set up for RENAMO, and FRELIMO had the advantage of the incumbent, the additional support would mainly benefit the smaller political parties. The fund was administered by ONUMOZ, and a modest amount was envisaged.<sup>13</sup>

In the end, with only USD 2.3 million paid in, each political party received USD 150,000 (in instalments). That was dwarfed by the USD 18 million handed out to RENAMO, but it was certainly more than a token amount and enabled numerous smaller parties to establish themselves prior to the election. Their broader significance is uncertain. Some resembled "fly-by-night" companies: loose coalitions formed around individuals to register as a party, the collected the hefty UN subsidy, and contested the elections. Most of them lost and subsequently disappeared. Of the 16 smaller parties originally registered in 1994, only half a dozen remained two years later.

On the other hand, the smaller political parties represented the "unarmed opposition" which had symbolic significance and long-term political implications. Their presence parties helped demonstrate that Mozambique was indeed moving political pluralism, which was a concern to the donors in particular. In the longer run, more developed third parties might cushion the confrontation between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and give political articulation to ethnic, regional or socio-economic groups that were not adequately represented through the established parties. The UN Trust fund can

<sup>13</sup> In September 1994, on the eve of the elections, Ajello announced that the fund aimed for USD 3.7 million and did not call for an enlargement.



be seen as “seed money” in this type of process.

### 10.4.3 Monitoring the elections

The Mozambican elections was one of the most closely observed polling events in contemporary history. The UN had more than 100 observers in place for six weeks before, and over 2,000 during the elections. The European Union sent 200 observers. This was in addition to 35,000 Mozambican observers. The heavy international observer presence was again related to events in Angola: in order avoid another failure, the UN mobilised twice as many international observers as in Angola even though there were much fewer polling stations.<sup>14</sup>

Norway contributed 9 observers. In itself, this was hardly significant in terms of presence or cost (NOK 131,000 direct cost to Norway, with the remainder covered by the UN). However, it was a contribution in line with the broad international support for the elections, and an appropriate expression of continued Norwegian interest in Mozambican affairs.

The heavy international monitoring presence has been questioned. An evaluation done for the Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Southern Africa (AWEPA) claims that the UN-organised contingent emphasised quantity over quality of observers, the number was excessive, and lack of proper training caused instances of improper interference.<sup>15</sup>

Given the size of the country, the poor state of the communications, and the brief presence of international observers (many of whom were unfamiliar with Mozambique), the international monitoring would seem largely symbolic. Yet, as such it served to demonstrate, and accentuated, foreign interest in the peace process, both in

Mozambique and in the home countries of the observers.

The principal oversight was done by the 35,000 Mozambican observers, who, according to foreign participants, were excellent, committed, and slept by the urns at night.

## 10.5 Police and human rights

The role of the national police was one of the issues papered over in the peace agreement which surfaced to complicate the implementation. The GPA envisaged the “depoliticisation and restructuring of the police forces” (protocol V), and handed the task over to a 21 person monitoring commission to be composed of government, RENAMO and other Mozambican political forces. Predictably, the government and RENAMO did not agree on appointments. The National Police Affairs Commission (COMPOL) had by late 1993 not functioned, while the old police force remained in place. The issue affected the momentum in the peace process since RENAMO claimed that the government was cheating on the demobilisation agreement by putting ex-soldiers into the police force, in effect creating a reserve para-military force of its own. The lessons from Angola were salient to both sides: when Savimbi withdrew from the electoral pact and resumed the war, it was a reconstituted national police that helped save the government in Luanda.

One way to deal with the stalemate was to introduce neutral, third-party observers. That was the origin of the UN Civilian Police contingent (CIVPOL), established in early 1994 to monitor all police activities as well as the rights and liberties of all Mozambican.. The CIVPOL contingent of 1,144 observers was incorporated in ONUMOZ (including the near-token unit of 128 that had been there from the start). Given its origins, the main functions of CIVPOL appeared to be political, i.e. to be “an early confidence-building measure”, as

<sup>14</sup> Berman, E. (1996).

<sup>15</sup> AWEPA (1995), pp. 73-77 (in Portuguese). see also E. Braathen (1994) for a report of the Norwegian observation team.



the UN Secretariat argued, by countering RENAMO's claims that the government was reshaping the national police into an instrument of the party rather than the state.<sup>16</sup>

To some extent, the immediate political objectives were met. The police issue was defused, and attention shifted to other matters that could stall the count-down to elections. But on a working level, immediate problems remained. CIVPOL observers had problems of access and co-operation on both sides. Their mandate was unrealistically broad, they had to function throughout the country, but with very few requirements as to training, knowledge and language proficiency necessary for operating in Mozambique, and with only a 5-day course in human rights prior to taking up their assignment. Not surprisingly, a UN review of ONUMOZ emphasised the uneven and inadequate training of CIVPOL.<sup>17</sup> The US ambassador in Mozambique concluded that the unit was "worse than useless".<sup>18</sup>

Also Norway contributed to CIVPOL. The Norwegian contingent has not been evaluated separately, but it appears to have been no exception. Nobody in the 10-man contingent spoke Portuguese. Two of the ten had to be sent home soon after arrival - one due to illness, the other for beating up a Norwegian Peace Corps volunteer in Maputo. The cost of the Norwegian contingent was initially estimated to be slightly over NOK 6 million for the one-year mission, although less was disbursed due to late deployment.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Doc. S/1994/89/Add.1, 28 January 1994, para. 3.

<sup>17</sup> International Workshop... (1995).

<sup>18</sup> Jett, D.C. (1995).

<sup>19</sup> ONUMOZ closed its operations in January 1995. The Norwegian contingent was deployed for slightly over half a year. The budgeted costs covered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994 were NOK 2.09 million, and NOK 0.12 in 1995. Additional costs may have been covered by the Ministry of Justice.

The function of the CIVPOL raises broader questions about the appropriate mandate, size and training of an international police force. The shortcomings of the CIVPOL unit were not unique to ONUMOZ but part of an emerging discussion of UN reforms in the early 1990s.

These broader, strategic dimensions did not surface in the Norwegian decision to contribute a CIVPOL contingent. Rather, Norway, like the other Nordics, responded within the framework of its policy towards UN peacekeeping. Citing lack of resources, the government decided in the fall of 1992 not to contribute troops to ONUMOZ, and offered instead a small Civpol unit. The offer was activated when the UN in early 1994 decided to expand CIVPOL. The related discussion on the Norwegian side was essentially about budgets: whose budget line was the money to come from? The Ministry of Justice (which declined), or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which reluctantly agreed). There is no discussion of mandate, function and proficiency. Only one solitary voice was raised in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 1993, asking pointedly whether CIVPOL was really necessary. The Norwegian delegation to the UN in New York confirmed that it was, by referring to an official statement of the Secretary-General..

## 10.6 Conclusions

Norway's contributions to implement the explicitly political provisions of the peace agreement fall in three categories:

- smaller bilateral initiatives by NORAD/Maputo that shaped the informational context appropriate to multiparty elections (seminars, visits, press support)
- contributions to multilateral schemes, mainly by financial transfers to UN trust funds, and a small contingent of UN Civpol and election observers
- diplomatic moves of a generally "balancing" kind undertaken by NORAD/Maputo : low-keyed but



continuous diplomatic support to the government when an intrusive donor community and assertive head of the UN Mission clashed with the government on sovereignty issues; cautious contacts with RENAMO which previously had been held at arm's length.

The Norwegian contributions were timely and appropriate in relation to the peace process as a whole, and were closely integrated at the Maputo-level in the network of donor activities. Norway appear in the role of a "team player" that could be relied upon to provide funds or diplomatic support when deemed necessary by more senior players to help move the process forward.

The framework for the elections was defined by the GPA, and the commission structure that monitored the agreement was biased in favour of the larger Western powers. But issues of implementation arose which opened the field for other states as well. The Norwegian government did not leap into the arena. On the controversial question of RENAMO participation in a "governmental of national unity", for instance, Norway did not take an active stance before the elections even though its traditional FRELIMO-friends were hard pressed by the United States to accept RENAMO demands. Possibly, a more active role would have required a political engagement in the peace process at higher levels in the Ministry in Oslo than was the case. That did not happened until early 1995 when the United States continued to pressure the government to share power with RENAMO despite having itself won the elections. This time, moreover, the issue was played out in a World Bank forum which ensured that high-level officials in the Ministry would engage. Overall, Norway's rapprochement with RENAMO was quite cautious. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made only a minimal contribution to the UN Trust fund for RENAMO, and gave Dhlakama a frosty welcome in Oslo. Nor, it seemed, was Norway active in the discussion among

donor representatives in Maputo to explore alternative ways of financing RENAMO, including investments in development projects in RENAMO areas.<sup>20</sup> Yet, precisely because Norway along with the other Nordics had been a traditional supporter of FRELIMO, a half stretched-out hand to RENAMO arguably increased the value of whatever was conferred.

Norway had the advantage of a small administration with newly established, flexible budget lines that permitted prompt budgetary decisions in a transition period. Relatively small amounts can be significant by "oiling the machinery of peace" at strategic times and places. The Norwegian bureaucracy had the decision-making capacity to provide such strategic financing but, as the case of the UNDP trust fund for the elections shows, was restrained by other limitations. The Ministry was willing to release only a small amount (NOK 2.5 million) from its main flexible budget line for promoting democracy (totalling some NOK 60 million) That shifted the burden to the long-term aid program, which was subject to administrative rigidities in Oslo and the need for consultations with the counterpart Mozambican ministry. However, significant trade-offs must be recognised: Consultation was a guiding principle of Norwegian aid co-operation, and stable allocations within the main country aid program had a value of its own.

The international effort to promote political pluralism in a poor, war-torn and previously one-party state raises several questions independent of Norway's specific contributions. Only some can be noted here:

**The elections** were a complex undertaking and certified success in terms of its

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<sup>20</sup> *Africa Confidential*, vol. 35, no. 1 (7 January 1994), p.6. Proponents argued that this would enable RENAMO to claim credit for specific development projects and collect "tax", while contributing to national reconstruction. Ajello strongly opposed this, however, fearing it would strengthen the tendency towards dual administration.



immediate objectives. The relative lack of civic education among the voters - manifested in a high proportion of invalid ballots - raises questions about priorities, however. Given the novelty of multiparty elections in Mozambique, greater emphasis might have been given to civic education rather than monitoring the act itself.

**Fund for political parties:** The UN management of a trust fund for political parties was an innovation to meet the objections of donors who would not aid political parties directly. Most controversial was the trust fund for RENAMO, which rested on the proposition that peace in some measure could be bought. The verdict in retrospect is that it succeeded.

For most donors, the trade-off involved in supporting the RENAMO Trust was readily solved. If a slush-fund would help keep RENAMO in the peace process in the short run, it seemed a small price to pay. For Norway, it was an equally easy decision to contribute a marginal amount, since the Fund would operate regardless and thus give Norway a "free ride".

If there were no easy alternatives, the RENAMO Trust Fund still leaves serious questions about management and magnitude. USD 18 million was a sizeable hand-out to one party, equivalent to almost one third of the cost of the entire election process. The fund solved a short-term problem, but was not applied towards the more difficult task of building a political party. In this respect, both RENAMO and the donors took a short-term perspective delimited by the 1994 elections. When the elections were over the underlying question returned in force: How can a multiparty system, including newly established opposition parties with uncertain social base, be sustained in a war-torn and poverty-stricken country?

The UN CIVPOL unit was generally considered ineffective or worse, and the Norwegian contingent appeared to be no exception. The case highlights the

difficulties of finding an administrative home for old structures with new functions. Is an international police unit a useful instrument for protecting human rights? For moving the peace process forward? The decision on the Norwegian side did not touch on these broader issues, nor the appropriate mandate for this particular Civpol, but was essentially about which budget line to tap.

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## 11. Conclusions

As noted at the outset, this study was asked not only to evaluate Norwegian contributions to peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation in Mozambique, but also to draw out the implications for international assistance to similar processes elsewhere.

The Mozambican case bears the imprint of a particular historical era. The war resembled several other Third World conflicts that unfolded in the late 1970s and the 1980s in Southeast Asia, Central America, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa. Some were international in origin, others became heavily internationalised by superpower rivalry and related regional dynamics as they progressed. The end of the Cold War laid the foundation for peace as the local parties realised they were losing critical external support and were unable to win on their own. The logic of internationalisation extended to the peace process as well: the footprints of external actors were visible in all phases.

Whatever conclusions emerge about the Mozambican case by looking through the lens of Norway's contributions will therefore in the first instance be relevant to this type of internationally driven settlement. Foreign mediators shaped the negotiations that led to the peace agreement. The UN played a major role in implementing it. The international donor community financed a peacekeeping force and programmes for demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration, and underwrote and monitored national elections. The peace-related projects formed a highly organised and integrated set of activities that were placed within a short timeframe (1992-94).

The main tests of Norwegian contributions to the short-term peace process, therefore, are whether these contributions were **timely** and **appropriate** in relation to the internationally defined programme for the transition from war to peace. A third criterion is whether they enhanced **recipient autonomy**.

For Mozambique, the transition period meant dealing with a powerful and ubiquitous donor community - including some 170 international NGOs - that in this case was also well organised by means of close co-ordination at the head-of-mission level in Maputo. For the government of Africa's poorest country, which had long been extremely dependent on foreign aid, it was a singularly uneven relationship.<sup>1</sup> Emerging from a devastating war that it had failed to win, the government was left with a massively sabotaged social and economic infrastructure and an exhausted and uprooted population. A foreign-encouraged economic reform process had been undertaken to dismantle the earlier socialist framework for development. The reform process had laid the basis for a new, externally-supported economic growth policy, but had sapped the vitality of the old FRELIMO and left it with uncertain legitimacy. As peace approached, a vacuum of moral authority was evident in the political sphere. In public administration, institutions barely functioned on the local level, and national institutions were weak or overloaded. These conditions accentuated the dominant foreign role in the peace process.

An increasingly central concern for the government and some donors was to "put the Government back in the driver's seat", as the World Bank's first major mission to Mozambique after the war (1993) emphasised. Given Norway's principled emphasis on "recipient responsibility" in aid, it seems reasonable to assess Norwegian contributions

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<sup>1</sup> The combined UN military and humanitarian operation during the two-year transition from war to peace (1992-94) was estimated to have cost USD 2 billion. The UN-organised, foreign-financed elections cost USD 60 million. The World Bank estimated that total foreign financing requirements for reconstruction and development in 1993 - the first year after the peace treaty was signed - would be USD 1.5 billion and constitute 80 per cent of the government's fiscal revenues (World Bank, 1993).



in the transition period with particular reference to the criterion of enhancing recipient autonomy.

A fourth criterion concerns the links between activities called for by the short-term *peace process*, on the one hand, and the longer-term requirements of *sustaining the peace*, on the other. The UN role in the Mozambican peace process was short, intense, massively funded, and operated on a tight timetable laid out from the start. When the UN mission hurriedly packed up at the end of 1994, it was left to individual donors to maintain an aid presence and to chart a meaningful path from short-term activities to longer-run programmes. Ideally, this would require some planning at an early stage, including an assessment of whether the causes of war - as well as its consequences - were addressed in a manner designed to sustain peace.

### 11.1 The UN operation

The UN peace-keeping agenda in the Cold War-related conflicts that ended in the early 1990s typically had multiple dimensions - political, military, electoral, and humanitarian. The UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was planned accordingly. Moreover, the failed peace process in Angola became a particular point of reference.<sup>2</sup> The UN, it was felt, could not afford another failure. ONUMOZ was consequently designed on a large scale, certainly much larger than the government had expected and wanted. Although ONUMOZ did not assume direct administrative powers (as did UNTAC in

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<sup>2</sup> Elections were held in Angola at the end of September 1992. Following the announcement of the results on 17 October - some two weeks after the signing of the peace agreement - UNITA launched an operation to take municipalities by force and by the end of the month there was heavy fighting in Luanda. This outcome was subsequently attributed to the failure to disarm and demobilise both sides before the elections, hence the insistence on linking demobilisation to elections in Mozambique.

Cambodia), sovereignty and autonomy issues were a frequent source of tension between the government and the UN throughout the period. The large and visible UN presence also caused other tensions (distortion of labour market and prices, accentuation of inequalities between the local community and the white-vehicled foreign aid presence, etc.).

Nevertheless, ONUMOZ became the success which the UN so badly needed. According to the official history, the operation was

*a major success story in United Nations peacemaking, peace-keeping, and humanitarian and electoral assistance. Through a complex, multifaceted and highly innovative strategy which broke new ground in how the United Nations dealt with parties in a conflict situation, a formerly socialist Government, committed to a one-party State, negotiated with an armed rebellious group to create peace for their country.*<sup>3</sup>

Independent observers agree that the immediate post-war transition went very well. The cease-fire was maintained, 92,000 troops were demobilised, perhaps as many as 4 million people were resettled, and post-war elections were held. The impact of a multifaceted demining programme, distributions of food and seeds, and the construction of hundreds of schools, health posts, water sources and countless community development initiatives was clearly substantial. The principal shortcoming was the inability to collect small arms from the former combatants. As a result, the problems associated with the presence of illegal arms in the southern African region substantially worsened.

The UN presence as an impartial mediator, demobiliser and election supervisor, and the massive international funding - which also enabled donors to keep up political pressure on the two Mozambican parties to implement the peace agreement - were undoubtedly key factors. The contribution of NGOs was

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<sup>3</sup> United Nations (1995), p. 3.



substantial, particularly in penetrating previously inaccessible RENAMO areas and thereby promoting national integration. The importance of one state with the will and resources to keep the process moving on several fronts was evident. Italy served as a key actor in the original mediation process and played an instrumental role in all the aspects of the implementation phase.<sup>4</sup>

The importance of the international contribution must also be seen in a perspective that acknowledges Mozambican national efforts.

While uncertainties and problems arose during the implementation of the peace agreement, the Mozambican parties were basically committed to ending the war. With the old FRELIMO long gone, RENAMO leaders launched on a career in the National Assembly, and the South African destabilisation campaign a thing of the past – the Mozambican political scene at the time of the 1994 elections seemed curiously remote from the vicious war of the 1980s.

The vast majority of the displaced civilians returned home spontaneously, without assistance and without knowing exactly what they would find on arrival - other than the basic essential, peace. In most instances the presence or otherwise of mines, infrastructure and social services does not appear to have been a major concern. *This suggests that the massive international aid devoted to the return process was in some measure superfluous: the same results might have been achieved with more modest financial inputs or, alternatively, some of the resources might have had more lasting effect if applied in a development rather than an emergency perspective.*

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<sup>4</sup> Italy was head mediator during the peace talks, later provided most of funding that helped keep RENAMO in the political arena, sent the first military contingent to ONUMOZ and was a key donor to the UNDP Trust Fund for the elections. This singular national diplomacy was linked to the UN multilateral role in the office of the SRSG, Aldo Ajello, an Italian diplomat.

There was a related recognition that numerous “quick impact projects” promoted by UNHCR, other donors and many NGOs became unused infrastructural shells that lacked recurrent cost financing or an appropriate service package. Alternately, there was concern that rapid rebuilding would increase the government’s foreign aid dependence for recurrent costs coverage. While a package to meet basic needs (water, food, seeds and tools) helped the returnees during the first phase, the additional “needs” were diverse and did not necessarily include health and education. For instance, interviews with villagers in southern Mozambique done for this report indicate that development of infrastructure to facilitate trade was a high, but neglected, priority. *This suggests that setting priorities for rehabilitation beyond the most basic survival needs must be done in close consultation with the beneficiaries.*

The sudden infusion of foreign capital, goods and services of this magnitude pushed the limits of Mozambique’s absorptive capacity. The government had limited institutional and administrative assets and the local NGO sector was weak. The self-imposed need to implement the multifaceted peace settlement within a strict timetable during the 1992-94 transition exacerbated the pressure on Mozambican institutions and highlighted the trade-off between efficiency and immediacy of results, on the one hand, and development of local capacity on the other. In this trade-off - familiar from situations straddling “pure” types of emergency aid and development assistance - donors tended towards the efficiency pole. In the process, donors also highlighted problems of corruption on the Mozambican side (e.g. in the seeds-and-tools scheme). *These situational constraints reinforce the suggestion that a less capital-intensive approach to the transition period would have been appropriate.*

As it was, some observers maintained that the sudden influx of hundreds of millions of dollars in a short time at least had the welcome side-effect of cushioning the impact of structural adjustment policies.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The initial price tag for the implementation of GPA was USD 400 million, not including the cost of the peace-



## 11.2 The NGOs

While the resource-intensive, high profile ONUMOZ operation engulfed Mozambique for two years and then left as swiftly as it had come, foreign NGOs made a lower-key but more sustained contribution throughout the war-peace continuum in Mozambique. They provided both humanitarian relief and development assistance during the emergency and the war, were major actors on the ground for reconstruction and reconciliation during the peace process, and after 1994 reoriented their activities to sustain peace and development.

Humanitarian organisations were at the forefront of the peace process on the ground, negotiating *inter alia* the July 1993 agreement on Humanitarian Assistance which provided the framework for opening up RENAMO areas. They subsequently responded vigorously to the challenge of accessing these areas, launching relief and rehabilitation programmes in isolated areas and frequently providing a much-needed bridge between RENAMO and government authorities.

The NGO operations also had downside features. State and local government authorities were weak in the post-war transition period and struggled to develop their capacities to formulate priorities in line with a National Reconstruction Plan. Foreign NGOs were not only numerous, they sometimes made autonomous interventions that had little relation to national priorities. Resource-rich foreign NGOs strained relations with local authorities when they became alternate structures of political and administrative power. Some did not adequately disclose information on activities and did little to transfer capacity and encourage community participation. Some critics questioned whether on balance the recipients benefited.

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keeping force. As noted, the two-year UN operation has been estimated to have cost USD 2 billion.

## 11.3 Norway's role

### 11.3.1 General aspects

In the period under consideration (1990-95), Norway appears as a rather conventional donor, a forceful humanitarian actor, and as a reliable but secondary team-player in the peace process broadly understood. A major bilateral donor to Mozambique since independence, Norway was not involved in the Rome negotiations that set the strategic terms for peace and the programmes to be implemented in the transition period. The overall policy of Norway during this period was to firmly support the peace process and the implementation of the GPA. Beyond this, the Norwegian government generally did not respond, and clearly not in a proactive manner, when opportunities arose for influencing the terms of implementation..

The macro-economic context for peace and reconstruction was shaped by the Bretton Woods institutions. Apart from the CG-1995 meeting, it is difficult to discern an active Norwegian role. As for the IMF, it is unclear to what extent the government assessed the Fund's policy prescriptions for Mozambique in light of the peace process. Authoritative coordination was lacking on at least one occasion (see section 2.3).

Norway also played another, distinctive role in relation to the Mozambican government - that of a faithful friend of FRELIMO who worked with the other Like-Minded states to cushion the government against politically painful demands from other donors, or against an international management of the peace process that could be overbearing, overwhelming and intrusive.

Norway's continuation of its aid programme through the years of war and into the peace was in itself an expression of political support - a declaration of solidarity that the government appreciated as it was urged by powerful donors



to press ahead with radical economic and political reforms, and finally, in 1994-95, even to share power with RENAMO irrespective of the election results. Occasionally, Norway also sided with the government on specific political issues (notably the election date and post-election power sharing). More generally and as a matter of principle, NORAD/Maputo and Norwegian NGOs tried to work closely with government institutions in the formulation of programmes and distribution of relief supplies.<sup>6</sup>

*Norwegian policy in this respect was rooted in general principles of aid and was not articulated with particular reference to the exceptional imbalances between the donor community and the Mozambican authorities that prevailed during the peace processes. However, the result was to help cushion the government against the intrusive donor presence and to that extent enhance its autonomy.*

Norway did not become a strategic player partly for reasons beyond its control. Other states and a well-placed NGO had pre-empted the space in the early phases of peace-making. Still, given Norway's role as a major donor, it is striking that there was virtually no engagement by high-level officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Mozambican peace process. The Minister of Development Assistance and her department naturally did engage, but focused mainly on conventional aid issues (see chapter 3). The joint Ministerial Meeting in mid-1991, for instance, barely acknowledged that peace negotiations were well under way, but focused in great detail on traditional aid issues in the Country Programme.

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<sup>6</sup> For instance, NORAD supported the government structure, CENE, as a vehicle for relief distribution in the early 1990s when foreign NGOs and IGOs increasingly demanded that supplies move through their own channels, claiming that this would reduce corruption and ensure that RENAMO areas benefited as well as government territory.

Once the peace agreement had been signed and an international aid package was put on the table, Norway did respond positively. Considerable efforts were made in the Ministry and by NORAD/Maputo to redefine and stretch the conventional aid perspective to accommodate new initiatives called for by the peace process (e.g. support for demining and elections). Flexible budget lines for democratisation, refugees and human rights had recently been created for the Political Department in the Ministry to support a wide range of aid activities; these were duly tapped for Mozambique as well. NORAD/Maputo participated actively in the multilateral diplomacy that unfolded to implement the GPA. But that could not compensate for the absence of high-level engagement on political issues such as the modalities of integrating RENAMO in a post-war order, national versus local-level authority, the police, human rights and the legal system, the suitability of the macro-economic framework formulated by the Bretton Woods institutions for rehabilitation and reintegration, or the capital-intensive peace process designed by the donor community.<sup>7</sup> Active engagement on these issues would have required a political commitment at a high level in the Ministry, which evidently was lacking. Instead, Mozambique was considered a conventional "development" or "foreign aid" matter, which suggested sector engagement on energy development, rural rehabilitation, etc., although the other issues were central to development in a fundamental sense and to sustaining peace.

*Norway's role in the Mozambican peace process was reactive rather than proactive, and that of a reliable source of finance to programmes whose strategic terms were set by others. While recognising the need for selective engagement, the logic of policy coherence suggests greater integration between aid policy and foreign policy.<sup>8</sup>*

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<sup>7</sup> The issue was raised by NORAD/Maputo in late 1992 but not picked up at higher levels in the Ministry or by the delegation to the Rome donor conference in December 1992.

<sup>8</sup> By contrast, the Dutch Minister of Co-operation, Jan



*Political engagement in a peace process in countries where Norway is a major traditional donor may enhance the overall impact of its contributions.*

period when the GPA was being implemented, the relevant decision-making process on the Norwegian side was based on an informal, loosely structured - and partly therefore effective - system of close consultation between NORAD/Maputo and a small number of officials in the Department of Development Aid in the Ministry and NORAD/Oslo. There was relatively little systematic policy input from the higher levels in the Ministry's Political Department, and the small office of the Regional Advisor for Africa was heavily overstretched. In view of this, the peace process was folded into the aid programme, rather than vice versa.

*To improve integration of aid policy with broader political issues arising during a peace process, including those involving multilateral institutions, a Task Force approach that can provide authoritative co-ordination and multiple perspectives seems appropriate.*

During the 1992-94 transition, Norway appeared as a reliable contributor to the overall peace programme defined by the Rome process and further shaped by the Mozambican and foreign parties in the course of implementation. By means of finance and/or through NGOs, Norway contributed in all the main areas identified by the GPA: demobilisation, demining, repatriation/reintegration, rapid rebuilding, and promoting political pluralism.

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Pronk engaged himself in a high-profile effort to integrate Dutch aid with a broader strategy of reconstructing "war-torn societies" and sustaining peace.

*Generally, the Norwegian contributions were timely and appropriate in relation to the GPA programme as a whole. On the project level, Norwegian NGOs and NORAD/Maputo often were proactive. Close donor co-operation in Maputo helped ensure that Norwegian aid activities were integrated with other aid components in the peace process. A diverse and proactive Norwegian NGO community, and timely support and budgetary flexibility in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also worked in this direction.*

The Norwegian "peace component" as defined by this study was small relative to overall Norwegian aid (averaging NOK 95 million annually or about 20 per cent of total Norwegian assistance during the 1992-95 period). However, there were no obvious shortfalls of finance for the GPA programme and hence no *prima facie* case for larger commitments,<sup>9</sup> particularly in view of the limitations of a capital-intensive implementation noted above. Overall, the Norwegian aid in the "peace component" category appears to be the same magnitude as the Swedish one, although the different categorisation of the data makes precise comparisons difficult.<sup>10</sup>

### 11.3.2 Aid characteristics

In the early 1990s, Norway remained the largest single bilateral donor to Mozambique, providing almost one-tenth of Mozambique's total assistance. During the full 1990-95 period under review, changes in the Norwegian aid portfolio reflected in part the additional demands for disbursement related to the peace process. The period opened with an aid level of NOK 327 million (1990) and ended nearly the same at NOK 331 million (1995). In between, aid rose steadily to peak at NOK 509 million in 1994. That peak itself was mainly caused by a large payment of NOK 92 million to a private

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<sup>9</sup> Some items were in fact oversubscribed. For instance, the World Food Programme told donors in 1993 not to give more food aid for demobilised soldiers; there was already a surplus that could not be distributed.

<sup>10</sup> See Suhrke and Miranda (forthcoming).



Norwegian company (*Linjebygg*) for energy sector activity.

The *Linjebygg* project illustrates the indirect but complex relationship between regular development aid and the peace process. The peace treaty made it possible to start systematic reconstruction of the electricity sector (which had been heavily sabotaged during the war). NORAD approval of the contract in 1993 was a political signal of confidence in the peace process. Moreover, restoring electricity by rebuilding transmission lines in outlying provinces, as in this case, probably contributed to the integrative development of the country as well as enhancing export earnings - both measures indirectly relevant to sustaining peace.

Throughout most of the 1990-95 period there was a stable disbursement pattern to most sectors defined in the regular Country Programme. The variations that occurred (notably a sharp reduction in the public utilities sector and a rise in health and population projects) reflect factors other than the evolving peace process. Continuity in regular aid programmes projects helped maintain Norway's position as a reliable partner of the Mozambican government and to that extent facilitated a resumption of development after the war. As noted, Norway's donor role also underpinned its standing in the Like-Minded Group during the peace process.

Within the "peace component", projects in the five main categories have been assessed separately in the case studies on, respectively, demobilisation, demining, repatriation/reintegration, rapid rebuilding and promoting political pluralism (see concluding sections of chaps. 6-10). Only cross-cutting themes will be discussed here.

**Fragmentation of aid:** The aid portfolio was extremely fragmented during the 1990-95 period, with some 900 aid disbursements. The multitude of very small projects under NOK 100,000 represented one-fifth of total payments but amounted to less than 1 per cent of the total

expenditure. Many were related to peace, emergency or other humanitarian projects (see section 2.9). The fragmentation of the portfolio, coupled with lack of managerial capacity on the Mozambican side, placed an exceptionally heavy burden on the Norwegian side which evidently pressed against the limits for systematic project review - and above all co-ordination - at both the Embassy in Maputo and the Ministry in Oslo.

**Budgetary and administrative flexibility:** Some flexibility was introduced into the normally rigid budget authorisation for the long-term Country Programme so as to provide quick, short-term financing in the transition period. For instance, money from the import support item was transferred to the fund for demobilised soldiers and the election. The versatile line for "regional other" was frequently used for "peace activities", as were the newly established general budget lines for aid administered by the Political Department of the Ministry. The existence of several budget lines enhanced flexibility but also carried transaction costs in terms of bureaucratic bargaining and overall control. Quick and flexible bureaucratic procedures to handle finance requests permitted a rapid response. This was centred on an informal and loosely structured decision-making system involving mainly NORAD/Maputo and a few officials in the Department of Bilateral Development Co-operation in the Ministry and NORAD/Oslo.

The multi-year project on demining carried out by the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) shows that a professionally sound response can be rapidly launched when a quick and flexible bureaucratic decision process works in tandem with a proactive and professionally capable NGO. In terms of effectiveness and efficiency, the assessment of the NPA project is more complicated (see chapter 6).

**Lack of co-ordination:** There was little overall project co-ordination by either the Embassy (or earlier, NORAD/Maputo) or the Ministry in Oslo. Reasons were the fragmentation of the aid portfolio noted above, autonomous NGO



operations, and personal/institutional rivalries between the NGO sector and NORAD that were played out in Maputo. Highly autonomous NGO operations, in turn, were partly a result of the diverse structure of financing which enabled the NGOs to tap several budget lines administered by different offices in the Ministry and NORAD, mostly by negotiating with the various offices in Oslo.

*The autonomy and diversity of NGO operation had the advantage of encouraging proactive and flexible responses. On the other hand, it made it difficult for the Embassy to assess the cumulative impact of the Norwegian contribution and extract political mileage accordingly. These are classic trade-offs between autonomy and co-ordination in the relationship between the NGO sector and the parent state. The requirements of the Mozambican peace process did not clearly favour one or the other side in this trade-off.*

**Choice of channels:** UN trust funds were often used for "peace activities". In particular, UN trust funds to support political parties were an innovation that helped bring the formal peace process forward and permitted donors that would not directly fund political parties to participate.

Norwegian NGOs appeared to work closely with Mozambican counterparts, although rarely with local NGOs, partly because of the generally weak NGO sector in Mozambique. One project involving Norwegian-Mozambican NGO co-operation was examined; this was also a project which met criteria of sustainability (school building/repairing by the Council for Africa and *Progresso*). The efforts of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to establish LINK were a major Norwegian initiative to improve co-ordination among NGOs and strengthen local NGOs; it mostly achieved the first objective, but much less so the second.

In a civil war and post-civil war situation, humanitarian access to both sides has both a value in itself and a possible side-effect of

facilitating political interactions. Given the important role played by foreign NGOs in accessing RENAMO areas, it is noticeable that only one of the five main Norwegian NGOs in Mozambique made a deliberate effort to do so. "Save the Children" (Norway) established early contact with RENAMO to deal with problems of child soldiers and later entered RENAMO areas in co-operation with government officials.

The dilemmas of working with provincial authorities, but in the absence of a national policy framework, were encountered by both NPA (on demining) and NRC (civil registration). In the first case, the lack of a national mine survey also meant there was inadequate information at the provincial level and made it difficult to undertake strategic planning. NPA did not adequately compensate for this situational constraint. In the case of civil registration, NRC worked with authorities in two provinces to issue civil ID cards, but lack of support at the national level and from donors made it impossible to include other provinces, thus diminishing the value of the undertaking. The project also threatened to conflict with the national electoral registration programme that was taking place at that time.

The problem of using Mozambican channels ("recipient responsibility") during a period when large capital transfers clearly exceeded local capacity was frankly acknowledged by Norwegian aid officials<sup>11</sup>. This was evident in the corruption problems in the "seeds and tools" programme (PESU), and in the institutional collaboration between the Mozambican refugee agency (NAR) and the Norwegian Refugee Council. The case studies suggest that these problems could and should have been anticipated, making it possible to develop other approaches, e.g. by taking a longer-term approach towards institution-building. This was not done partly because of the urgency of finishing a large aid agenda before the donor's concentrated attention elapsed, i.e. before the 1994 election.

<sup>11</sup> The point was also affirmed for the post-election period. See *Landprogram* 1995-97.



*The combination of a tight timeframe with a large budget/agenda for the formal peace process tended to skew aid activities towards local institutions that lacked the necessary capacity – thereby helping to create problems – or to induce foreign actors themselves to take on the job.*

**Risk-taking:** The apparent need for rapid and flexible response in a transition period increases the risk of failure. At the same time, a higher risk would seem justified if the transition from war to peace indeed requires rapid reaction and flexible response. Some of the projects undertaken and supported by Norway arguably fall in the “high-risk but limited-success” category, e.g. the RENAMO Trust Fund, which in effect was a “slush fund” of USD 18 million to buy off the former rebels. The fund was a success in that it helped move RENAMO into the political arena, but a failure in the sense that the funds went into short-term consumption rather than long-term party-building. Other projects involved what seemed unnecessarily high risk. In relation to PESU, for instance, there had been ample time to develop procedures to reduce risk inasmuch as the programme had existed since 1987 and its functions were merely adjusted to the 1992-94 transition period.

*Given the semi-permanent dimension of Mozambique's emergency, risk-taking could be reduced through improved planning and capacity building of the relief-oriented institutions that served in the transition period as well. In other areas, innovation and risk-taking accomplished short-term objectives.*

**Reporting and evaluating** There was relatively little reporting and assessment of individual projects in the “peace component” of Norwegian aid to Mozambique. Since many projects have become standard elements in a “peace package” and collectively represent considerable funds, more reporting and assessments are desirable. Contributions to UN trust funds also appeared to have poor follow-up in terms of reporting and evaluation, raising

questions of overall control and co-ordination on the Norwegian side.

**Planning for aid to the peace process and sustaining the peace:** The main vehicle in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for developing aid strategies that may incorporate broader issues of the peace process are the various country policy papers. The last such paper on Mozambique (a so-called Country Analysis) was prepared in 1991 and was set aside when the peace agreement was signed the following year. The preparation of the new policy paper was postponed until after the elections. By early 1997, this paper had not yet materialised, and a stop-gap document written in 1993 remained the best available articulation of strategy.<sup>12</sup> Rather than taking a proactive approach and position itself to link the short-term issues in the peace process with the longer-term issues of sustaining the peace, the Ministry deliberately took a reactive stance.

*Four and a half years after the peace agreement was signed, the Ministry and NORAD still had not articulated an aid strategy that explicitly confronted issues of sustaining the peace. If developed at an early stage, a planning document that examines aid policy in the context of the peace process can help develop transition strategies from implementing a formal peace process to sustaining the peace.*

A document of this kind could start by drawing out the longer-run implications of issues that the peace agreement defines as short-term activities (e.g. demobilisation and repatriation). In the Mozambican case, some of these issues touch on the causes of the war, but mostly they deal with its consequences since a principal cause of the war – the external destabilisation in the 1980s – has ended for reasons of its own. Both causes and consequences, however, are relevant to the overall task of sustaining the peace. The 1992 peace agreement indicates two main categories in this respect:

<sup>12</sup> Prinsippnotat, 1993. NORAD/Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo (August 1993).



- (i) *social-economic reintegration*: Policies/programmes to support longer-term integration of persons affected by the war, including demobilised soldiers, internally displaced people, refugees and war victims;
- (ii) *political pluralism*: Policies/programmes to retain RENAMO and the forces it may represent within the political arena; financing of political parties and related issues of administrative control and revenue raising at the local level; local elections; strengthening emerging sectors of civil society and the legal system; the question of representation by what some observers call "alternative elites" - i.e. those currently non-represented who may mobilise along ethnic lines (whether "real" or "imagined").<sup>13</sup>

These issues must be examined in light of Mozambique's administrative system and the macro-economic framework shaped in large part by donors. The nature of these issues can only be indicated here; their elaboration as the context for development of aid strategies should properly be the task of a Country Strategy Paper.

- (a) *national administrative capacity*, in particular, the balance between local and national authorities and its consequences in terms of national integration. A central issue in any post-civil war situation, it is particularly important in Mozambique's case given its history and geography. In particular, decentralisation and a decentralised aid focus may give regional forces a disintegrative effect unless counterbalanced by national institutions;

and

- b) *the macro-economic framework of structural adjustment and stabilisation*, including the evolving debate on stability-versus-growth in the Bretton Woods institutions on policy towards Mozambique,

and the underlying relations between this economic framework and emerging civil and political institutions. As the social science literature demonstrates, these are critical relationships. In the Mozambican case, the macro-economic framework sharply limits the basis for the political opposition parties to develop programmatic alternatives. Simultaneously, economic policies that enhance regional and income inequalities have political implications that tend to impede progress towards democratisation in any meaningful sense, for instance by encouraging political mobilisation around token issues of corruption or personality, divisive lines of ethnicity, or what has been called "distributive populism" where political entrepreneurs compete in demanding immediate distribution of goods.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Abrahamsson and Nilsson (1995).

<sup>14</sup> Kohli (1993).



# **Annex 1: Terms of Reference**

## **TERMS OF REFERENCE- EVALUATION OF NORWEGIAN ASSISTANCE TO PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND REHABILITATION IN MOZAMBIQUE**

### **1. Goal of the evaluation**

The purpose is to examine results achieved through the Norwegian assistance to peace, reconciliation and rehabilitation in Mozambique during 1990-1995.

Norwegian assistance has been channelled through multilateral organisations, NORAD, Norwegian local and international NGOs, and cover a wide range of activities from short term humanitarian aid to long term development assistance. The purpose will therefore be to evaluate the total effect of the assistance and examine how Norway's contribution has been coordinated.

The aim of the evaluation is to draw conclusions and formulate recommendations for future assistance in comparative situations where both humanitarian aid and development assistance are provided.

### **2. Scope of the evaluation**

#### **2.1. International conditions**

Basic preconditions for Norwegian assistance to Mozambique shall be reviewed. This includes major plans and strategies outlined as preparation and as response to the Peace Agreement from 1992. The following plans should be included:

The General Peace Agreement (1992), the plan of Mozambican authorities (1993), UN's different plans for rehabilitation (ONUMOZ, UNOHAC, UNDP, UNHCR) and other bilateral co-operating partners.

#### **2.2 Review of Norwegian support**

A review of Norwegian supported activities during 1990 -1995 shall be prepared. These are activities such as:

- support to repatriation, rehabilitation and replacement of refugees and internally displaced persons, including humanitarian aid (food supply, shelters etc.)
- demobilization of soldiers
- human rights activities, including legal assistance and information activities
- support to institutional development, including NGOs
- rehabilitation of social and financial institutions
- demining activities

It should also be considered whether other relevant categories of activities should be included in the review.

The review shall include the role and functions of:

- cooperating partners in Norway and Mozambique



- Norwegian administrative units responsible for funding
- total allocated funds during the period

A brief categorization of the Norwegian assistance shall be worked out.

### **2.3 Analysis**

On the basis of this review, a representative sample of activities will be selected and subject to in depth analysis.

#### **-Results**

The selected activities shall be analysed in relation to their respective objectives, and to which degree results correspond with the goals of international and national plans, as preconditions for Norwegian assistance.

An assessment of how the total Norwegian assistance has contributed to the overall objectives shall be made.

#### **- Instruments**

An assessment of the performance and relevance of Norwegian activities shall be carried out. This includes an assessment of the channels selected, as well as choice of cooperating partners.

Likewise, it shall be analysed how activities have been adapted to national and international plans and strategies, and how Norwegian activities have been coordinated.

The report shall provide recommendations and conclusions for future Norwegian assistance in similar contexts.

#### **- Cost efficiency**

Use of resources shall be examined in relation to the results achieved.

### **3. Methods**

Based on a representative sample of activities covering the different categories of assistance, an analysis of how Norwegian aid has contributed to peace and reconciliation shall be undertaken.

Data availability has to be taken into consideration. The process of activity selection shall be described. Data collection will imply interviews with persons involved in the implementation of Norwegian supported activities. A field visit to Mozambique for collection of documentation, archive documents/studies and interviews shall also be made.

The evaluation report shall be written in English.

### **4. Implementation**

#### **-Qualifications**

The evaluation shall be implemented by a team with:

- experience in evaluating humanitarian aid and development assistance
- skills in social science, political science and economics/social science
- country specific knowledge of UN humanitarian operations



**-Invitation**

Both Norwegian and Nordic institutions will be invited to present a design for the implementation of the evaluation, including costs and timetable. The institutions should consider possible partner arrangements to implement the consultancy.

**-Time schedule and financial frame**

The evaluation should be undertaken during 1996 within a time frame of six months. The financial limit for the evaluation is estimated to NOK 1,2 mill.







## Annex 2: List of persons interviewed by the team

Note: Functions and titles provide an indication of the context of the interview; they do not necessarily reflect current responsibilities. Except when otherwise indicated, the location of the institution is in Maputo.

Name	Function/Title	Affiliation
Villem Ahlmans	First Secretary	Dutch Embassy
C. Lima Albino	Operational Studies	National Demining Commission
Domingos Arouca	President	FUMO/PCD
Ann-Helen Perez Azedo	Prog. Officer (Health)	Norwegian Embassy
Rasmus Bakke	Second Secretary	Norwegian Embassy
Clarisse Barbosa		Norwegian Embassy
Sam Barnes	former staff member	UNOHAC
Nick Bateman	Technical Coordinator	Halo Trust
Anne Bauer	Head of Division	MFA, Oslo (on leave)
Simon Bell	Country Economist	World Bank
Nina Berg	Representative	NRC
Gregor Binkert		Swiss Embassy
Kari Bjørnsgaard	Senior Officer	MFA, Oslo
Sidney Bliss		USAID
Richard Boulter	Team Manager	Halo Trust
Juliet Bourne		USAID
Tim Bourne		USAID
Antonio Branco	Director	Madal
Miguel de Brito	Principal Researcher	War-torn Societies Project
Gunnar Bøe	Chargé d'affaires	Norwegian Embassy
José Norberto Carrilho	Vice-President	Supreme Court
Joaquim Carvalho	Executive Director	World Bank, Washington
Daphne Casey	Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP
J.A. Castillo	Food Aid Coordinator	WFP-Tete
Roberto Chávez	Resident Representative	World Bank
João Paulo Borges Coelho	Researcher	Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford Univ.
Mike Croll	consultant	UNADP
Kjell Harald Dalen	Regional Adviser for Africa	MFA, Oslo
Phillipe Dicquemare	Director	Handicap International
Arne Disch	former First Secretary	NORAD
Tomé Eduardo	Director	SEAS
Asbjørn Eidhammer	Deputy-Director	MFA, Oslo
Jan Egeland	Deputy Minister	MFA, Oslo
Patrik Ekløf		Norwegian Council for Africa
Lars Ekman	former Project Coordinator,	Ministry of Agriculture (for SIDA)
Einar Ellefsen	First Secretary	Norwegian Embassy
Lars Emanuelsson	Programme Officer	Norwegian Embassy
Sigurd Endresen	Ambassador	MFA, Oslo
Bjarte Erdal	Head of Division	MFA, Oslo
Thormod Eriksen	Consul	MFA, Oslo




<b>Name</b>	<b>Function/Title</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Rui Falcão	Economist	IDPPE
Sr. Fazenda	Director	NAR
Ernesto Fernandes		Mozambique Electricity Company
Fernando Ganhão	Historian	Eduardo Mondlane University
Roeland van de Geer	Ambassador	Dutch Embassy
Kjell Egil Gjerde	former Progr. Officer (NGOs)	NORAD
Sr. Godinho	former Coordinator	Emergency Committee-Tete
Sr. Gonçalves	former Director	IDPPE
Anna Gram	Programme Officer	SIDA
Kari Haldorsen	former Prog. Officer (NGOs)	NORAD
John Hammock	Director	International Famine Center
Uffe Hansen	Resident Representative	NPA
Ole Bernt Harvold		Norwegian Embassy
Carlos Horta	Economist	UNDP
Sr. Ibraimo		GITEC-Tete
Elizabeth Jacobsen	Head of Division	MFA, Oslo
Anne Beathe Jensen	Senior Officer	NORAD, Oslo
Birgitta Johansson	former Ambassador to Mozambique	Swedish Embassy
Celia Jordao	Programme Officer	IRS/PF
Jacinta Jorge	Head of Women's Department	Mozambique Veterans Association, AMODEG
Magnus Josephson	Dog Team	NPA
Ernst Kalseth	Admin. Coordinator	NPA
Tore Kjøsterud	First Secretary	Norwegian Embassy
Daniel Lampião	General Manager	Navique
Guernicindo Langa	Deputy Director	DNPCCN
Gerardo Lastres	Coordinator	GITEC-Tete
Bjørge Leite	former Chargé d'affaires	Norwegian Embassy
Karen Lindquist	Medical Coordinator	NPA
Jon Lomøy	Director General, Reg. Dpt. for Africa	NORAD, Oslo
Paulino Lourenço	Provincial Coordinator	Handicap International-Tete
Augusto Lourenço	Head of the Planning Department	DNPCCN
Merethe Luis	Adviser	Multilat. Dpt., MFA, Oslo
Lt. Col. G. Lynstrom	Chief Technical Adviser	UNADP
Johan L. Løvald	former Director General	Bilat. Dpt., MFA, Oslo
Elias Machissa	Personnel Manager	NPA
Mette Masst	First Secretary	Norwegian Embassy
Moises Massinga	former Secretary of State for Fisheries	
Eusebia Mata	Prog. Officer	Norwegian Embassy
Henny Matos	Programme Officer	UNDP
Osorio Mateus	Director	National Demining Commission
Pablo Mateus		UNHCR
Richard Matope		GITEC-Tete
Brazao Mazula	former National Election Commissioner	
Ole Morten Meland	SDR Expert	NPA
Boudewyn Mohr		UNICEF
Firmino Mucavele	Head of Faculty of Agriculture	UEM
Guy Mullin		LINK
Eduardo Mussanhane		Ministry of Interior
Cadmiel Muthemba	former Governor of Tete province	
Filipe Muzima	Deputy Manager-Demining	NPA



<b>Name</b>	<b>Function/Title</b>	<b>Affiliation</b>
Dr. A. Namitete	National Director	Directorate of Maritime Affairs
Carlos Nascimento	Personnel Manager	NPA
Anthony Nedley	Country Director	Actionaid
Julio Joaquim Nimuire	President	AMODEG
Mihael Olsson	Dog Team	NPA
Ton Pardoel	Head	Demobilization Technical Unit
Christer Persson	Dog Coordinator	NPA
Enrique Portillo	Private Consultant	National Demining Commission
Mario Rodrigues	Coordinator	World Vision -Tete
Tiziana Salmistraro		ISCOS (Italian NGO)
Elisa dos Santos	Economist	War-torn Societies Project
Graham Saul	Adviser	OXFAM
Dr. David Aloni Selemani	MP	RENAMO
Elizabeth Sequera		Council for Southern Africa (Norwegian NGO)
Svein Sevje	former Head of Division	Dept. of Bilateral Dvpt. Cooperation, MFA
Elizabeth Sheehan	Co-author report on landmine casualties in Mozambique	
Terezinha Silva	former Ministry of Social Welfare	Centre for African Studies
Joao Siteo	Deputy Director	Directorate Maritime Affairs
Isabel Soares	focal donor for Health	Swiss Embassy
Kaja Stene	former Volunteer (FK)	IDIL
Lise Stensrud	Senior Officer	NORAD, Oslo
Ann Stodberg	Counsellor	Swedish Embassy
Anny Svendsson	First Secretary	Norwegian Embassy
Daniel Taillon	Representative	Council for Africa (Norwegian NGO)
Mario Tavolae	IRS/PF Manager	International Organization for Migration
Sr. Titus	Coordinator	LWF-Tete
Jon Unruh		Land Tenure Program, Land Commission
Leite Vasconcelos	Journalist	
Moisés Venâncio	Programme Officer	UNDP
Virginia Videira	former National Director	Comissão Nacional do Plano
Francisco Viqueira	Ambassador	Spanish Embassy
Nils Vogt	Former Res. Rep. Maputo	NORAD
Knut Vollebæk	Special Advisor	MFA, Oslo
Tom Vraalsen	Ambassador	MFA, Oslo
James Wilson	Economist	IDPPE
Einica Zunguze	former staff member	NCR
Arne Øygard	Manager-Demining	NPA
Erik Åberg	former Res. Rep. Maputo	SIDA







## Annex 3: Statistical matters

### Annex 3.1 The changing composition of State Budget chapters

The following table shows the composition of the 14 State relevant budget chapters by budget post on a year by year basis, in the period 1990-95. The budget post codes are those used by the NORAD Accounts Office in its DAC reporting and at least in the case of the regional allocation "Africa, other" (regionbevilgning) is different from the codes used in the State budget itself.

Table A3.1 - Composition of relevant State budget chapters by budget post (NORAD coding)

Budget Chapter	Description	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
	Country programme	150.74	150.74	150.74	150.74	150.74	150.74
note A	Regional activities	152.72, 74	152.72, 74	150.82	150.82	150.82	150.82
150.79	Africa, other (regionbevilgning en)	n.a.	n.a.	150.83	150.83	150.83	150.83
note B	Special support schemes: environment, women, culture, AIDS	154.70- 72	154.70- 72, 74	154.70- 72, 74	154.70- 72, 74	173.70- 72, 74	173.70- 72, 74
note C	Support through NGOs	155.70	155.70	155.70	155.70	174.70	174.70
note D	Cooperation with private sector		160.70	160.70	160.70	180.70, 81	180.70, 73
note E	Research and evaluation	165.11, 167.70	165.11, 166.71, 167.70	166.71, 167.70	166.74	176.74	176.74
note F	Technical assistance	167.11, 45, 99	167.01, 11, 45, 99	167.01, 11, 45, 99	167.01, 11, 45, 99	177.01, 11, 45, 99	177.11, 45, 99
note G	Volunteers	168.99	168.99	168.99	168.99	153.99	153.99
note H	Multi-bi	180.72	180.70, 72	180.70, 72, 78	180.72	160.70, 72	160.71
	Humanitarian assistance (nødhjelp)	190.70	190.70	190.70	190.70	190.70	190.70
note I	Refugees and human rights	191.75	191.75	191.76	191.76	191.75- 76	191.75- 76
note J	Democracy, development and national independence	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	192.70	192.70	192.70
	Total	0	0	0	0	0	0



## Annex 3.2: List of peace-process related projects, 1992-95

Table A3.2 Norwegian assistance specifically for the peace process, Mozambique 1992-95

### Peace-process related projects, Mozambique 1992-1995

Cat.	Year	Sector	Form	Type	NGO	Code	Description	Amount	Chapter post
	1992	2	1	1	1		Care N; distr. of seed grain & tools	1,000	190.70
	1994	99	4	1	0	MOZ 300	RR Robin Jensen Consultancy	119	177.11
	1995	1	1	2	0		FAO; seed distribution	1869	190.70
	1993	63	1	1	1		K Nødhjelp; com. development/school rehab.	1020	155.70
	1995	62	4	1	1		N Røde Kors; Children 1	1785	174.70
	1992	2	1	1	1		N Flyktråd; prep. for repatr. plan Moz. refugees	138	191.76
	1994	99	4	1	0	MOZ 300	RR Marni Pigott Consultancy	141	177.11
	1993	90	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp; Chitima district dev.	203	155.70
	1992	1	1	1	1		N Røde Kors; Human. aid food	3,000	190.70
	1995	91	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp; Chargara women mob. centre	246	174.70
	1992	99	4	2	0		JPO/Ass. experts	274	167.01
	1994	99	4	1	0	MOZ 043	RR: SEAS, Task Force	319	173.71
	1993	2	2	1	1		N Røde Kors; IRKKS Hum. aid Moz. delegates	333	191.76
	1995	69	4	1	2		Rr; diocese of Lichinga school proj	223	174.70
	1994	2	1	1	1		Seeds agric tools clothing	388	190.70
	1993	82	1	1	1		N Røde Kors; Children affected by war	4,494	155.70
	1993	2	1	1	1		N Røde Kors; IRKKS hum. aid proj.	3,838	190.70
	1995	91	4	1	2		Rr; Sotemaza; women	4	174.70
	1993	30	1	2	0		UNICEF; provision of seeds & tools	2,000	180.72
	1992	2	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp, human. aid	2,500	190.70
	1994	9	2	2	0	MOZ 090	UNDP Trust Fund	2500	150.83
	1992	2	1	1	1		N Røde Kors, human. aid (IRKK)	2,000	190.70
	1995	63	1	1	1		Fellesrådet for Afrika; rehab schools	-50	174.70
	1993	2	1	1	1		K Nødhjelp; humanitarian aid & rehab.	2,936	190.70
	1993	2	1	1	1		Redd Barna; rehab. & relief aid	7,785	190.70
	1992	2	1	1	0	Moz-090	Humanitarian aid misc.	9,142	150.83
	1992	2	1	1	1		N Røde Kors, human. aid (IRKK)	2,000	190.70
	1994	89	4	1	0	MOZ 077	Institutional building	7,694	150.74
	1995	90	2	1	0	Moz-077	Rural rehabilitation	6,155	150.74
	1994	63	1	1	1		Fellesrådet S.A., Rehab. schools	2,796	174.70
	1992	1	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp; corn delivery (Mozamb)	5,000	190.70
	1992	1	1	1	1		Redd Barna, human. aid (Mozambique) food	5,000	190.70
	1993	63	1	1	1		Fellesrådet S A: Rehabilitation of schools	4343	155.70
	1993	99	4	1	0	Moz-300	Rr: Robin Jensen, consult. services	104	167.11
	1993	99	4	1	0	Moz-300	Rr; consultant l.m.	7	167.11
	1995	9	2	1	0	Moz-090	Support to Micoa via UNDP	1,200	150.83
	1995	63	1	1	1		Fellesraadet for Afrika; rehab schools	500	174.70
	1992	63	1	1	1		Fellesrådet SA; rehab. schools, Maputo	1,500	155.70
	1992	1	1	1	1		N K Nødhjelp; Human. aid (Inhambane, Moz)	1,500	190.70
	1994	90	1	1	1		N. Folkehjelp, Chiuta district	1,726	174.70
	1995	63	1	1	1		N Røde Kors; Chimoio, rehabilitation	1,059	174.70
	1993	90	4	1	0	Moz-300	Rr; rural rehab., Dupont	11	167.11
	1992	1	1	1	1		Care N; food aid hungry in Nampula/Niassa	515	191.76
	1993	90	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp; Chluta district dev.	656	155.70
	1992	91	4	1	0	Moz-043	Muleide/inaj, legal assistance	676	154.71
	1994	1	1	1	1		K. Nødhjelp Supplement food (child)	1,000	190.70
	1995	2	1	2	0		Dep humanit. aff; emergency aid storage	1,000	191.76
	1993	39	1	1	1		CARE N: agricultural project, Nampula prov.	1,262	190.70
	1995	89	1	1	2		Rr; Adpp: Nacala emergency relief	86	174.70
	1993	39	3	1	0	Moz-100	Imp. supp; seed & hacks	37,281	150.74
	1994	91	1	1	2		RR SOTEMAZA Women	13	174.70
	1995	9	4	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; compet dev local NGOs	113	192.70
	1994	92	1	1	0	MOZ 046	RR: Nacala FINNIDA	1,025	173.70
	1993	83	1	1	0	Moz-045	Rr; media	70	154.71
	1994	99	4	1	2		RR Activa Inst. Dev. Managm. Training etc.	80	174.70
	1995	63	1	1	1		Fellesraadet for Afrika; rehab schools	90	174.70
	1995	90	2	1	1		N Folkehjelp; Chiuta district development	1,249	174.70
	1993	99	4	1	0	Moz-300	Rr: Samsa	68	167.11
	1992	2	1	1	1		N Røde kors; human. aid to internal refug	1,800	191.76
	1993	1	1	2	0		WFP: relief aid project, Mozambique	477	190.70
	1995	63	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp; Chargara secondary school	514	174.70
	1992	2	1	1	1		Caritas N, airlifts, logistics	1,000	190.70
Demin	1995	9	1	1	1	Moz-092	N Folkehjelp; mine clearance	28,471	150.83
Demin	1994	9	4	1	2		RR Fencing minefield	107	174.70
Demin	1995	9	4	1	0	Moz-086	Mine clearance Mozambique	2,000	150.74

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Peace-process related projects, Mozambique 1992-1995

Cat.	Year	Sector	Form	Type	NGO	Code	Description	Amount	Chapter post	
Demin	1993	9	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp, mine clearance (MR)	3,872	150.83	
Demin	1995	2	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; mine awareness-measure	229	191.76	
Demin	1994	9	1	1	1	MOZ 092	N. Folkehjelp Mine clearance	15,200	150.83	
Demin	1993	2	1	1	1		N Folkehjelp: mine clearing programme	6,734	191.76	56613
Demob	1992	2	1	2	0		WHO; WHO - Mozambique	3,000	150.83	
Demob	1993	9	1	2	0		UNDP; Insurance scheme demob sold (MR)	10,000	150.83	
Demob	1995	9	3	2	0	Moz-100	Imp. supp: UNDP; demob soldiers FND	6,300	150.74	19300
Democ	1994	83	1	1	2		RR Casa Velha Culture Project/Democrat	63	174.70	
Democ	1994	89	1	1	2		RR Coop Editorial Publish Newspaper	114	174.70	
Democ	1992	83	1	1	0	Moz-045	Rr; mediafax., mediacoop	26	154.72	203
Elec	1994	9	2	2	0	MOZ 090	UNOMOZ Fund Political parties	2,000	150.83	
Elec	1993	99	4	1	0	Moz-300	Rr; conf. support, multi-party	118	167.11	
Elec	1994	9	4	1	2		RR ONJ Study tour elections S.A.	131	174.70	
Elec	1994	9	2	2	0	MOZ 090	UN Secr Moz; UN Trust Fund RENAMO	700	150.83	
Elec	1994	9	4	1	5		Inst. for MR Election observers	131	192.70	
Elec	1994	9	3	1	0	MOZ 100	Imp. Supp: Election support	10,000	150.74	
Elec	1993	9	1	1	5		Inst. for menn.rett; obs. at nor elec (MR)	650	150.83	
Elec	1993	9	1	2	0		UNDP; supp to the election process (MR)	5,000	150.83	
Elec	1994	9	1	2	0		UNDP Election support	2,500	192.70	
Elec	1994	9	4	1	0	MOZ 300	RR Election seminar SARDC	83	177.11	
Elec	1994	9	1	1	0		Euro Parliament SA Election observers	66	192.70	
Elec	1994	9	1	1	0	MOZ 045	RR: Regional democracy conference	555	173.72	21934
Peace	1995	9	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; conflict prev theatre	393	192.70	
Peace	1992	89	1	1	1		Redd Barna, UNACC children, Sofala distr.	1,000	155.70	
Peace	1994	79	1	1	1		N. Røde Kors Child affec violence war	2,401	174.70	
Peace	1992	89	1	1	1		Redd Barna; UNACC children, Manica distr.	1,000	155.70	
Peace	1995	9	1	1	0		Justisdep; Onumoz - UN operation	123	192.70	
Peace	1993	82	1	1	1		N Røde Kors; children affected by war	42	155.70	
Peace	1992	79	1	1	1		N Røde Kors; rehab. of war affected children	2,578	155.70	
Peace	1994	9	1	1	0		Justisdep. Peace keeping oper ONUMOZ	2,097	192.70	
Peace	1994	9	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, Theatre proj.	324	192.70	9958
Ref	1995	9	2	1	5	Moz-090	Int menneskerett; misc. refugees	52	150.83	
Ref/Demob	1992	1	1	2	0		WFP; WFP - Mozambique	21,998	150.83	
Ref	1994	2	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, operational costs	1,250	191.76	
Ref	1992	2	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; human. aid	2,500	190.70	
Ref	1994	2	4	2	0		UNHCR Asst. Protect. Officer (Refug.child.)	500	177.01	
Ref	1993	2	1	1	1		N Røde Kors: Hum. aid refugees	303	191.76	
Ref	1995	63	4	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; distrib schoolbooks	1,067	174.70	
Ref	1993	1	1	1	1		CARITAS N: food programme Moz. refugees	370	191.76	
Ref	1995	19	1	1	1	Moz-091	D N Flyktningeråd; Moz. refugees	3,768	150.83	
Ref	1994	63	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, Distr. school books	993	174.70	
Ref	1994	9	4	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, Information centres	603	192.70	
Ref	1992	2	1	1	1		Redd Barna; human. aid, internal refugees	2,500	191.76	
Ref	1995	49	4	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; vocational training	1,020	174.70	
Ref	1992	2	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd: aid Moz. refug & repatr. prep.	7,000	191.76	
Ref	1993	9	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd: legal ass. (MR)	3,644	192.70	
Ref	1994	2	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, comp. buiding refugees	100	191.76	
Ref	1994	9	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, Legal aid women refugees	104	192.70	
Ref	1995	9	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; radio transm loc info	630	192.70	
Ref	1993	31	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd: forestry rehab.	783	191.76	
Ref	1994	30	1	2	0		UNICEF Seeds and tools (child refuge)	1,500	160.72	
Ref	1992	2	1	1	1		K Nødhjelp; refugees Mozambique, Tete	721	190.70	
Ref	1994	49	4	1	1		N. Folkehjelp Vocational training, refugees	932	191.76	
Ref	1994	2	1	1	0	MOZ 043	RR Mic Equip to Refugee Women	2	173.71	
Ref	1993	19	1	1	1	Moz-091	D N Flyktningeråd; refugee unit	5,055	150.83	
Ref	1995	9	2	1	1	Moz-090	D N Flyktningeråd; misc. refugees	791	150.83	
Ref	1993	2	1	2	0		UNHCR; support to refugees	7,000	150.83	
Ref	1994	49	4	1	1		D.N. Flyktningeråd, Vocat. training refugees	1,509	174.70	
Ref	1993	39	1	1	1		CARITAS N: agricult. rehab., refugees	1,030	190.70	
Ref	1994	2	1	1	1		K. Nødhjelp Aid and rehab refugees	969	191.76	68694
Rehab	1993	71	4	1	0	Moz-043	Rr; health services, Renamo areas	439	154.71	
Rehab	1995	9	1	1	1		K Nødhjelp; repatriat, resettlem & rehab	424	174.70	
Rehab	1995	90	2	1	1		K Nødhjelp; reconst schools & health ctr	1,611	174.70	
Rehab	1994	2	1	2	0		UNHCR Quick impact rehab (refugees)	5,000	191.75	
Repat	1994	2	2	2	0	MOZ 090	UNHCR Repatriation Refugees	5,000	150.83	
Repat	1995	89	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; claims of land	560	174.70	
Repatr	1993	2	1	1	1		N Røde Kors: repatr. & rehab. war victims	4,949	190.70	
Repatr	1994	2	1	2	0		UNHCR Repatriation Refugees	5,000	191.75	
Repatr	1994	9	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, Home and ID registration	278	192.70	



Peace-process related projects, Mozambique 1992-1995

Cat.	Year	Sector	Form	Type	NGO	Code	Description	Amount	Chapter post	
Repatr	1994	2	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd, Repatr. refugees	279	191.76	
Repatr	1994	2	1	2	0		UNHCR, Secondment repatriation (refugees)	287	191.76	
Repatr	1994	2	1	2	0		UNHCR Repatriation refugees	5,000	191.76	
Repatr	1993	91	1	1	0	Moz-043	Rr; Regressadas	240	154.71	
Repatr	1993	2	1	1	1		DN Flyktningeråd: reintegration refugees	1,300	191.76	
Repatr	1994	2	1	1	1		Redd Barna Repatriation prep. refugees	3,502	191.76	
Repatr	1994	2	1	2	0		UNHCR Repatriation programme refugees	2,300	191.76	
Repatr	1993	2	4	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd: repatriation conf, Oslo	7	191.76	
Repatr	1993	2	1	2	0		UNHCR: repatriation & reintegration	1,000	191.76	
Repatr	1994	81	1	1	1		K. Nødhjelp, Repatr. Resettlement Rehab.	1,015	174.70	
Repatr	1993	2	1	2	0		UNHCR: repatriation progr., Moz.	2,700	191.76	
Repatr	1995	9	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; public registration	446	192.70	
Repatr	1995	9	1	1	1		D N Flyktningeråd; info & legal aid	188	192.70	
Repatr	1994	2	1	2	0		UNHCR Repat and reintegration refugees	316	191.76	
Repatr	1994	73	1	1	0		Amb. Maputo Combat bubonic plague	96	190.70	
Repatr	1995	89	2	2	0	Moz-090	UNCHR reintegration	20,000	150.83	
Repatr	1995	2	2	2	0		UNHCR; repatriation & reintegration programme	4,000	191.75	65937
								380,416	380416	
All Norw. assist 1992-95 (disbursements)								1,716,622		
								0.22		



### Annex 3.3: Aid disbursements to Mozambique 1990-95

Table A3.3 Total ODA net (in millions of US dollars)

Donor	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	Total 1990-95
Australia	8.2	7.6	12.7	8.9	12.6	11.6	61.6
Austria	4.1	1.5	2.3	3.5	4.8	4.5	20.7
Belgium	0.7	2.1	0.7	2.9	3.4	1.1	10.9
Canada	34.3	29.8	28.6	29.2	17.4	5.8	145.1
Denmark	24.0	21.9	26.6	31.9	36.4	45.5	186.3
Finland	26.5	24.2	22.8	9.5	12.6	11.9	107.5
France	71.8	80.7	80.1	52.5	33.2	42.9	361.2
Germany	37.4	64.6	36.3	136.2	101.3	110.9	486.7
Ireland	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	1.2	2.3	4.0
Italy	106.2	58.9	249.9	97.0	93.9	26.9	632.8
Japan	17.0	15.8	38.7	18.9	43.3	39.8	173.5
Luxemburg	-	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	-	0.6
Netherlands	40.8	23.7	54.2	42.5	41.7	54.5	257.4
New Zealand	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2
Norway	52.3	68.9	73.1	59.1	72.2	52.2	377.8
Portugal	44.6	101.8	164.3	109.4	39.6	62.4	522.1
Spain	16.3	10.0	10.6	16.6	4.4	16.5	74.4
Sweden	136.1	135.0	97.2	71.8	73.5	54.2	567.8
Switzerland	26.1	27.6	19.0	19.1	30.1	27.0	148.9
UK	43.2	37.6	40.7	47.0	38.7	35.6	242.8
United States	62.0	60.0	52.0	61.0	73.0	96.0	404.0
Total DAC Countries	751.5	771.6	1010.1	817.3	733.4	701.5	4785.4
Total multilateral and Arab agencies	256.4	300.8	458.3	366.9	495.8	400.9	2279.1
Arab countries	0.1	0.3	2.2	3.4	2.4	2.1	10.5
<b>Total ODA net</b>	<b>1008.1</b>	<b>1072.6</b>	<b>1470.6</b>	<b>1187.6</b>	<b>1231.6</b>	<b>1104.5</b>	<b>7075.0</b>

Sources: *Geographical distribution of financial flows to aid recipients, 1990-94*. Paris: OECD, 1996, p. 145 (for 1990 data) and *Geographical distribution of financial flows to aid recipients, 1991-95*. Paris: OECD, 1997, p. 147 (for subsequent data).

Table A3.4 The 10 largest bilateral DAC donors, ranked by amount of ODA to Mozambique 1990-95

Donor	Total 1990-95
1- Italy	632.8
2- Sweden	567.8
3- Portugal	522.1
4- Germany	486.7
5- United States	404.0
6- Norway	377.8
7- France	361.2
8- Netherlands	257.4
9- UK	242.8
10- Denmark	186.3



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## EVALUATION REPORTS

- 1.87 The Water Supply Programme in Western Province, Zambia  
2.87 Sosio-kulturelle forhold i bistanden  
3.87 Summary Findings of 23 Evaluation Reports  
4.87 NORAD's Provisions for Investment Support  
5.87 Multilateral bistand gjennom FN-systemet  
6.87 Promoting Imports from Developing Countries
- 1.88 UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women  
2.88 The Norwegian Multi-Bilateral Programme under UNFPA  
3.88 Rural Roads Maintenance, Mbeya and Tanga Regions, Tanzania  
4.88 Import Support, Tanzania  
5.88 Nordic Technical Assistance Personnel to Eastern Africa  
6.88 Good Aid for Women?  
7.88 Soil Science Fellowship Course in Norway
- 1.89 Parallel Financing and Mixed Credits  
2.89 The Women's Grant. Desk Study Review  
3.89 The Norwegian Volunteer Service  
4.89 Fisheries Research Vessel - "Dr. Fridtjof Nansen"  
5.89 Institute of Development Management, Tanzania  
6.89 DUHs forskningsprogrammer  
7.89 Rural Water Supply, Zimbabwe  
8.89 Commodity Import Programme, Zimbabwe  
9.89 Dairy Sector Support, Zimbabwe
- 1.90 Mini-Hydropower Plants, Lesotho  
2.90 Operation and Maintenance in Development Assistance  
3.90 Telecommunications in SADCC Countries  
4.90 Energy support in SADCC Countries  
5.90 International Research and Training Institute for Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)  
6.90 Socio-cultural Conditions in Development Assistance  
7.90 Non-Project Financial Assistance to Mozambique
- 1.91 Hjelp til selvhjelp og levedyktig utvikling  
2.91 Diploma Courses at the Norwegian Institute of Technology  
3.91 The Women's Grant in Bilateral Assistance  
4.91 Hambantota Integrated Rural Development Programme, Sri Lanka  
5.91 The Special Grant for Environment and Development
- 1.92 NGOs as partners in health care, Zambia  
2.92 The Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia Programme  
3.92 De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand, Fase I
- 1.93 Internal learning from evaluation and reviews  
2.93 Macroeconomic impacts of import support to Tanzania  
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3A.95 Rapport fra presentasjonsmøte av "Evalueringen av de frivillige organisasjoner"  
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