

Exchanging Design: The Designs without Borders Model

NORDIC CONSULTING GROUP

Norad Collected Reviews **12/2013**

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Norad and Fredskorpset

Exchanging Design: The Designs without Borders Model

Report, January 31st 2013

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The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the clients, Norad and Fredskorpset.

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Executive Summary

Background

The overall goal of *Design without Borders, a Norsk Form Programme* is to promote reciprocal learning and development in the field of design in organisations and communities through the exchange of designers and funding of prototype development as well as exhibits, publications, and lectures. The programme is jointly funded by Norad's Department for Economic Development, Energy, Gender and Governance and by Fredkorpset (FK). Norad identifies this programme as a private sector development effort and it is a part of a wide variety of Norwegian efforts supporting the improvement of business environments in the South. FK seeks, through this programme like their other exchanges, to promote change **in the mind and on the ground** by enabling exchanges between designers in Norway and countries in the South. In the DwB programme, these exchanges have been primarily to Guatemala and Uganda. Exchange participants to the countries in the South have primarily, but not exclusively, been Norwegian. Between 2002 and 2012 the DwB programme has facilitated a total of 44 exchanges, involving 36 companies, organisations or institutions.

Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology

This **review of the Design without Borders Programme** aims to both assess Norsk Forms' institutional capacity to handle the programme, programme results, as well as the institutional and personal development results achieved through the exchange of the personnel. In addition the review has also examined the degree to which the DwB initiative fits into Norway's priorities in terms of private sector development funding. The focus of the review has been the Guatemala part of the programme. The main audience for this review is Norad, FK in Norway, and Norsk Form but also, partners in Guatemala and Uganda. In pursuit of these aims, the review team conducted a **field visit** to Guatemala; additionally, the relevant counterparts in Norway were interviewed between October 11 and November 26, 2012. An **Online Survey** was fielded to all participants of the DwB exchange over the review period.

Evaluation Team

A team of four Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) consultants conducted the evaluation: the Team Leader was responsible for the overall conduct of the task, review of written material, the field research in Guatemala and the write up of the deliverables; the second Senior Consultant focused on the interviews in Norway, review of documentation in Norwegian and on analysis of financial data; the consultant based in Guatemala was responsible for supporting the conduct of field research in; and the external Quality Assurance Consultant was responsible for the review of all deliverables. The evaluation took place between September and December 2012.

General findings

The review examined the DwB programme in relation to its ability to be, organize, relate and do.

Ability to Be

We found that overall DwB has a strong identity in Norway from having a clear vision of what they believe they should do, and are able to clearly convey their identity through auto-promotion. However there are aspects of DwB ability to be (identity) that can be further strengthened. For example, the approach taken to defining design taken by DwB was not shared by all partners and individual designers in Guatemala context, which was the focus of this review. This is true of the most recent work as well as of earlier interventions. How well DwB identity is understood by the Ugandan partners is not known given that this was not the focus of the review. Partner institutions with a clear identity and role have benefited more from a DwB initiative than organisations that were being developed/established alongside the DwB initiative. Additionally, DwB's could also benefit from utilizing the development paradigm and lessons learned in the development field as a stepping-stone to strengthen the role of design work in the development field. Being able to root "design" within the broader development

paradigm would enrich the design intervention and serve to legitimize their role in the development sector. This would entail a clear examination, by DwB, of the experience of the development sector and how their design work can feed into development work. It also means being able to more carefully stipulate how design ensures that it does not cause harm, for example.

Ability to Organize

In terms of organization, some areas of the DwB effort require more attention than others. The organization in Norway is small and this is an asset to its ability to organize. However, the model used to place designers within institutions both in Guatemala as in Norway requires attention. Chief among the issues noted is DwB ability to identify the right partnerships in order to ensure that the programme benefits from the strongest set of abilities to organise amongst its partners. The last intervention in Guatemala, Transitions, was successful because the partner was able to effectively host and benefit from a designer. This shows the importance of identifying institutions that have solid organizational structures. Earlier interventions appear to have been less successful at doing so. That is to say that the characteristics of the institutions which would have been necessary to ensure that both the design contribution in Guatemala was a sustainable one and that designers going to Norway had an opportunity to contribute to design and learn about Norwegian design were not sufficiently vetted in all cases to ensure success. As pertains to reporting, reports do exist but their use has yet to be systematized and currently relies more broadly on the initiative of individual DwB staff. Lastly as pertains to exit plans, these have most often been limited to informing partners of the intent to exit, rather than a more nuanced effort. This approach is in line with the approach to “exchanges” which is largely limited to the placement of a professional designer within a given institution. However, if efforts are to be sustainable, exit plans may require a thorough re-examination.

Ability to Relate

Adequately conveying the work conducted, being able to relate to other institutions working in the same field and in broader sectors is an important aspect of development work. DwB is clearly talented in presenting its outputs to both specific audiences as well as the public at large. However DwB could benefit from translating current MoU with development organizations into the incorporation of development paradigms into the way DwB envisages its own role (i.e., design as part of development). Doing this would further enable possible partners to be more open to collaboration with DwB. Currently DwB outreach effort appears primarily focused on the design sector or the public at large and its aim appears focused on demonstrating the role of design from a design perspective. However, DwB may benefit from expanding the audience of their outreach to include a more “development” focused perspective. DwB relates well with both of its donors, but these do not relate to each other, hence the possibility of finding synergies between donor goals is not currently capitalized upon.

Ability to Do

The relevance of the outputs of the different DwB interventions varied from case to case and hence, more attention to each intervention appears to be required. While the Guatemala example suggested that more recent efforts have been most successful, some of the most recent programmes in Uganda appear to have not succeeded in full, therefore we do not know if all the lessons from Guatemala have been effectively incorporated into the Ugandan effort. In terms of effectiveness, progress has been made, particularly the incorporation of capacity building as a key component of individual interventions. Efficiency seems to have improved most recently with efforts in Uganda apparently more clearly defining themselves as parts of broader interventions. Sustainability is an area of the DwB efforts that require attention not only to the ability of DwB to be a strong programme or institution but also, the sustainability of the products, which have resulted from DwB interventions. Some of the efforts, such as the Transitions effort in Guatemala appear to be heading towards long-term sustainability, while

other more recent efforts in Uganda such as the helmet and life jackets appear to have succumbed already.

Most problematic in terms of the DwB work is that it is difficult to see how the current DwB fits into the Norwegian Governments Strategy and priorities regarding private sector development. This is an issue that requires close attention on part of Norad, one of the key donors, in order to ensure that in future DwB is funded through an adequate budget line and/or the DwB modifies its work to meet the minimum requirements established by Norway for the funding chapter.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Below a series of lessons learned and conclusions are listed. These we feel are the most prominent issues, which emerge from the review of the Guatemalan experience. While in some cases DwB suggests that these lessons are known and are under implementation in Uganda, since our focus is Guatemala we are unable to confirm their implementation in Uganda. Irrespective of their implementation we feel it is important to highlight these here to keep a record of the key lessons learned from the Guatemalan experience, particularly now that it has come to an end.

In relation to funding under the private sector development chapter, the relevant Guidelines and Strategy, it's important to underscore that:

- a) The DwB programme can give unfair competitive advantages to certain enterprises by subsidizing those who may be the worst enterprises in the market. Providing support to weaker actors can serve to debunk better firms.
- b) DwB provides a service that is too expensive for the local counterpart to buy; hence it can lead to creating a dependency on aid.
- c) The DwB programme risks creating an environment that is supply driven (i.e., by DwB) rather than driven by the local market needs and wants.
- d) The DwB programme is not cost effective when compared with cost of the provision of a similar service from the country or region. A same country/region solution may be less "fancy", but will be less expensive and may be better informed to meet the local needs.

In relation to General lessons learned based on the projects examined:

- a) In some cases the partner lacked a clear idea of what it needed. Similarly, in other cases the partner lacked a clear idea of how design might contribute to fulfilling their needs.
- b) In some cases a clear and solid client base and a proven ability to produce the product once designed was lacking.
- c) In some cases partner organisations were not actively engaged in a specific field. This limited the impact of the DwB intervention, as design efforts should be an asset to an existing effort.
- d) In most cases in Guatemala designers lacked a working linguistic ability and had a limited understanding of any cultural/climatic/geographical factor that may affect their work.
- e) In some cases the role of the designer was on one hand to generate a clearly defined output and on the other, to convey the design process (i.e., building process knowledge). These scenarios, where both development of a product and process capacity development were both present, proved the most successful.

- f) Some of the designers brought to Norway were not involved in programmes that strengthened their capabilities as designers and ensured they were able to utilise their own design knowledge and experience. Actively using the skills of the visiting designers and supporting their learning process is important to ensuring impact.
- g) Numerous placements in Norway served as trial periods for Norwegian would-be employers. The only way to more actively prevent this is by more carefully vetting firms, since DwB has no ability to legally ensure that firms do not hire former interns.
- h) The costs benefit ratio of DwB is comparatively high. Currently economies of scale prevent DwB from reducing their transaction costs substantially. However DwB could focus on creating as many systematic processes as possible in an effort to minimize their transaction costs (i.e., systems for reporting that ensure that the material gathered has a clear utility; systems to manage the data received in reports; etc.). Other efforts could include the development of clear parameters for the identification of projects and the delegation of this process to key local partners.
- i) In relation to transaction costs DwB faces a clear challenge. While they need to expand their field of work in order to proportionally reduce their management costs, the degree to which there is a market for a huge expansion of their type of work is not yet clear. Therefore a market study needs to take place first.
- j) Thus far the different donors have not aligned their different donor objectives. In addition it is important to note that there is a degree of disagreement between the objectives of each donor and the abilities of DwB interventions.
- k) Overall the DwB initiative, despite its merits, by and large fails to meet the minimum requirements applicable to Norad funding under the chapter destined to private sector development.
- l) The expected impact of FK exchanges most easily result from reciprocal exchanges hence DwB faces inherent difficulties.
- m) Norad's private sector development initiatives intend to contribute to the establishment of a business environment that is conducive to growth, including enabling local entrepreneurs to compete in their own markets (i.e., meet the minimum requirements for success), while DwB requires that the pre-requisites of a successful firm (i.e., foundation) be met prior to their intervention. In short a good design is unable to secure the success of entrepreneurial efforts. Clearly having a good end product is a key component for success. However having a good product to produce does not translate into the ability to produce said product. Herein lies the conundrum faced by some DwB interventions.

Recommendations

These recommendations are mainly targeted to Norad, FK and DwB. Some of the recommendations may also be applicable to other actors, however. As with some of the lessons learned, DwB noted during the comments to this report that some recommendations are under implementation in Uganda. However, since this report is primarily based on the experiences in Guatemala the team thought they are relevant still and require mention here.

In relation to Norad and FK as funding partners

- a) Norad and FK should improve their coordination relative to the DwB work to ensure that the individual efforts carried out by DwB are able to meet the goals and objectives of both donors in a seamless manner. Doing should also include cost saving measures such as: joint reporting to reduce administrative costs, common M&E requirements.

- b) Norad and FK must jointly determine which strategies and priorities the DwB programme should meet. This will depend on the budget post applied for the funding as well as on how FK will ultimately define the DwB exchange effort. Ultimately it will be more efficient and effective to ensure that both donors have a common understanding and objective for the overall programme.
- c) Norad should decide if it wants to continue to fund DwB under the private sector development umbrella. If this funding option is chosen, Norad must require that DwB overhaul itself and the way it approaches its work in order to ensure it meets both the Strategy and the Budget Guideline requirements (see Chapter 6). If Norad decides to continue funding under the current budget chapter:
 - 1) Norad should consider funding DwB from a different budget chapter that may be better suited to the approach used by DwB thus far.
 - 2) DwB must ensure it focuses more on institutional strengthening of key institutions in the target country rather than focusing on specific project needs (i.e., individual deliverables).
 - 3) DwB should not engage in partnerships with UN Agencies, but rather focus on partnerships with private sector actors as required by the Strategy and Budget Guidelines.
 - 4) Norad and FK should ensure that a more systematic approach towards institutional strengthening in terms of the Design Program at Makerere University is established.
- d) Norad could decide to shift the funding of DwB to another budget chapter (see above).
- e) FK and DwB should jointly examine whether the FK model of reciprocal exchange can be used for the DwB effort. In case that the exchanges continue in their current format, DwB and FK should work together to define the modality of the exchange, the expectations from it, etc.
- f) FK and DwB should keep in mind that if exchange is solely to be a placement of in-kind contribution, there are existing models such as the NORCAP that better fit the kind of work DwB is doing in relation to the “exchanges”. NORCAP is an institution that focuses solely on placing professionals within development and emergency programmes and programmes; they do not have a component or intention of “reciprocity” tied to their placements. Their structure is designed to support the placement and follow up of said professionals without the notion of reciprocal exchange. Given how the DwB “exchanges” have actually transpired, following the NORCAP model may be more appropriate for DwB. This is something that should be discussed by DwB and FK when they jointly define the parameters/character of the “exchange” component of the programme.

In relation to Norsk Form and Design without Borders internal activities

- a) DwB should define and create a clear system for reporting that fits into a clear and well-defined mechanism for monitoring and evaluating. Having such a system will enable DwB to systematically use lessons learned and will reduce the reliance on individual staff members and their own discretionary approach to implementing lessons learned. In short this will strengthen the institution making it less dependent on the knowledge of individual staff members. By extension this will make DwB less vulnerable to staff changes.
- b) DwB should develop a user-friendly system for institutional memory that enables DwB to benefit from lessons learned without being heavily reliant on their staff/partners. Care should be taken to ensure that the mechanism developed collects information that has a clear use. Otherwise there is a danger that data collected will become a burden rather than an asset.

- c) DwB should engage exclusively in interventions where the role of design can be a key contribution and where other pre-requisites for success are in place. Working in projects where design is one of many aspects that will be required for success and not ensuring that other needs are met will make the DwB intervention very vulnerable and far more likely to fail.
- d) DwB should utilize a clear and concise definition of **design** that serves to guide and structure the work done. The definition should serve to both guide interventions and identify shortcoming early on in the intervention process. The definition should be rooted in design, but benefit from relevant development paradigms such as do no harm, and capacity vulnerability analysis.
- e) DwB should ensure that future projects systematically account for both what DwB aims to achieve through their intervention, but also what is required from other actors. If these requirements are determined on a timeline it will enable DwB to exit from interventions as soon as it is clear that other components are not being met.
- f) DwB should reduce transaction and administrative costs. Reducing transaction costs and overhead costs will make DwB interventions more amenable to donors and more competitive in terms of other interventions in the south.

In relation to the relationship with institutions in the South

- a) DwB should identify a key local counterpart that is able and willing to be part of solidifying a network of partners locally in the long term. The DwB initiative should not be a collection of individual project enterprises, but a way to develop longer lasting networks.
- b) DwB should ensure that key local counterpart provides adequate follow up and institutionalises a mechanism to identify possible projects, monitor and evaluate individual interventions and incorporate lessons learned in a systematic way. In short the key local partner should be deeply vested into the DwB programme and see it as a long term investment into the sector of design in their home country, rather than limiting their involvement to project based one-off partnerships with local organizations.

In relation to the exchange host institutions in the South:

- a) DwB should ensure that the provision of a “designer” to a local counterpart as part of a project is able to contribute to the host organisation’s work in a clear and tangible way. This means that all the other requirements necessary to ensure that the intervention of a designer is successful must be in place prior to DwB involvement.
- b) DwB should ensure that the host organisation is committed to hosting a designer and sees a clear value in doing so (i.e., allocates the necessary resources to ensure success, has a clear idea of what they need and of how a designer might help them achieve their aim).

In relation to the exchange host institutions in Norway:

- a) DwB should ensure that institutions in Norway are selected to host designers from the South only if they are: first, able to benefit from a designer from the South, and second, are willing and able to ensure that the placement supports the designer’s learning process.
- b) DwB should ensure that Norwegian host institutions agree, albeit informally and not legally binding, to not utilise the exchange as an approach to recruitment of new staff.

Acknowledgements

The team would like to thank the staff of Norad, Fredskorpset, Design without Borders Norsk Form and Universidad Landivar in Guatemala for their time, assistance and openness in responding to our questions. In particular we would like to thank Camilla Solvang Hansen at Norad; Mia Østergaard from Fredskorpset and Synne Christiansen from Design without Borders for their efforts in providing us with all the necessary written material, as well as contact details for exchange participants and organizations, and for responding to our long list of questions.

We would also like to extend our gratitude to all staff from institutions involved in exchanges, as well as to participating designers who were placed in Guatemala and Norway. Their will to share their experiences and points of view have proved invaluable to this effort.

Indeed the views, perceptions, and experiences from all those interviewed and from survey respondents, proved invaluable in the conduct of this evaluation. However, the findings presented here are the views of the evaluation team and of its understanding of the data collected. Despite our best efforts to validate and check information, any errors found are our sole responsibility.

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Acronyms

DwB	Design without Borders
FK	Fredskorpset
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
PSD	Private Sector Development
RBM	Result Based Management
URL	Universidad Rafael Landivar

1.0 Introduction

Here we briefly present the context under which funding by the Norwegian government can be provided for private sector development (PSD). This introduction is followed by a brief overview of the programme under review, as well as the financial background and the key lines of inquiry followed throughout this study. In addition the methodology employed and the targeted interventions, as well as the structure of the report have been outlined. To this end this chapter serves as the backdrop for the discussion and findings presented in the chapters to come.

1.1 Funding in the private sector

Here our attention turns to the Norwegian priorities in the PSD field as identified through a review of various relevant documents including:

- “Strategy for Norwegian support of private sector development in developing countries”, originally published in April 1999 and updated in April 2001,
- Guidelines for fund allocation on relevant budget post
- Annual budget objectives

At first glance, the Design without Borders (DwB) programme seems to fall well within the guidelines for support delineated in the Government’s aid budget proposal noted in the annual White Paper No. 1. Job creation is, for instance, noted as one important indicator of success and hence it is given substantial weight. DwB/Norsk Form’s work may have led to job creation as a consequence of increases in sales experienced by companies which have benefited from the knowledge transfer that DwB/Norsk Form has provided them. One example of this could be the Zumos brand created in Guatemala whereby DwB worked directly with local weavers who later created a firm in order to sell the newly created products/brand. Additionally, the institutional partnership between DwB and both Rafael Landivar and Makerere Universities have the potential for strengthening institutional skills in field of design that can be useful to private sector enterprises in terms of successful market development. Thus, DwB, through their initiatives, may have contributed to creating better institutions, stronger enterprises, and to a limited extent, more jobs.

On the other hand, DwB is outside of the typical kind of intervention one might expect when looking at the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) documents. For instance, the DwB partners are not “central to the framework conditions of the private sector” in their respective countries, in short they have little influence over overall PSD. In general - and with some important exceptions like the furniture industry - design is not an area in which Norway has a particular comparative knowledge base. DwB does not count with particular knowledge in the petroleum-energy fields, which are mentioned in various Norwegian documents as key sectors for targeted support. Current DwB plans in Uganda increasingly move further away from the private sector, replacing business oriented enterprise support with technical design services for humanitarian actors.

The “Strategy for Norwegian support of PSD in developing countries,” originally published in April 1999 and updated two years later, in April 2001, explains the logic behind how a number of the MFA Budget chapters related to PSD are used. Although this is a fairly old document, no more recent official document has replaced it and hence it remains relevant. While currently it is probably a somewhat dormant strategy, it is still the most coherent overall framework for Norwegian PSD efforts - and thus of interest to this analysis.

The strategy places emphasis on surmounting the barriers to PSD. To this end Norway is to contribute by working coherently with other donors to improve framework conditions for

business at all levels. This includes targeting global initiatives, country specific efforts, and initiatives that target the various individual business environments. Interventions are meant to work together, and include efforts such as global institutional changes, national legal reform, as well as capacity building and knowledge transfer in sectors where Norway has particular competence. Specialist sectors of interest to Norway include: the petroleum and renewable energy sectors, the maritime and marine sectors (aquaculture), as well as micro financing facilities as a basis for income generating programmes for marginalized groups.

In addition to the aforementioned strategy, Norad has published Guidelines for fund allocation, which aim to guide the process of both identifying potential partners as well as the activities to be prioritized under budget post 161.70 (“Regelverk for Samarbeid om rammevilkår for næringsutvikling i Sør”). The latest version of this guideline was issued on September 1, 2012. Norad funds DwB under this budget post, thus the Guideline’s mention is relevant here. The Guidelines note the objective of this budget as pursuing efforts that focus on “framework conditions for commercial investments and company cooperation, access to energy and framework conditions for trade.” The Guidelines identify “access to qualified personnel and technology” as one way to measure the success of any given allocation. The document furthermore notes that the budget post is intended to target “institutions and private sector actors in the South, central to the framework conditions of the private sector” in their respective environment, but also “Norwegian and international organizations, particularly multilateral organizations – which implement programmes directed towards the target group of the budget post.” Two clear conditions for support under this budget post are: first that the funded activities “improve framework conditions for PSD in the South”, and second that they are in line with “the development plans of the receiving country”

More details on how the resources available through budget post 161.70 are to be allocated each year are found in the relevant annual budget. Although the wording on the priorities for this budget post vary somewhat from one year to another, the gist does not fundamentally change. For the current year the priorities are stated as “activities that support investments in renewable energy, environmental technology, agriculture, forestry, marine and maritime activities and other sectors where Norway has special competence.”¹ Objectives of the funding are “to develop good framework conditions for business in developing countries, growth in longer term, commercially viable investments within prioritized sectors.., increase women’s participation in economic activities, and increase developing countries’ trade capacity and exports.”

Notably, some of Fredskorpsets exchange activities have fully funded under chapter 160.77 since 2009 and hence are part of the PSD strategy. This funding has aimed to support the objectives of the budget post by establishing exchanges between private sector partners and also serve to strengthen of public institutions.

In the context of this evaluation the key question is: Do DwB activities and the results that ensue support the goals and types of activities outlined in the aforementioned governing documents? And to what extent does the DwB work fall within the priorities outlined in the strategy and in the budget documents? These questions are introduced here as a backdrop to the presentation of programme background, findings, conclusions and lessons learned that follow.

1.2 Programme Background

The **DwB** programme originated from a collaborative partnership between Peter Opsvik, a notable Norwegian designer whose goal was to demonstrate that the field of design could both

¹ 2013: Programme area 03.20, post 161.70 Næringsutvikling, Budget proposition 1S

be an important as well as relevant contribution to the development sector, and Norsk Form. Peter Opsvik's commitment included the partial funding for some of the initial efforts, including the staff costs. While the projects in Guatemala are collectively the largest DwB enterprise, the programme gained much of its early notoriety from its involvement in the design of improved mine clearance protective gear. The ministry of foreign affairs funded the design of the demining protective gear. The overarching goal of the DwB programme has changed over the years covered by this review, while originally it could be understood as finding solutions to problems by supporting the development of user-friendly, functional and aesthetically pleasing products, it has come to include a broader range of aspects such as the transfer of knowledge. These goals are sought through working with local partners who can use design to develop solutions that respond to user needs and are economically, socially, institutionally, culturally and environmentally sustainable. To this end, design methodology is used in partnership with business and civil society to develop sustainable solutions that are relevant to the South; in tandem both academia and the general population are targeted in order to both professionalise the design field and gain recognition for the view that design can be a tool to promote social and economic development. Hence in addition to supporting the development of products, the DwB programme also serves to strengthen design expertise. The programme has attempted to achieve this through the placement of designers who could utilise their experience to enable their host institution/organisation to gain "design" knowledge and the ability to develop more design friendly and less expensive products. The placement of designers was coupled with funds to enable the development of relevant prototypes. In Norway the DwB programme has, in addition to supporting the placement of designers within Norwegian firms, been involved in the promotion of design as a mechanism to support development aid generally and PSD in particular, as well as a mechanism to further highlight the role that design can play in the development sector. The model utilised by DwB has included the placement of designers under the Fredskorpset (FK) "exchange" umbrella. Unlike most FK exchanges, the DwB enterprise has not included the direct reciprocity in staff exchange between organisations, rather a system of placements² of professionals. This process is further detailed later on in this report.

This review visited four institutions representing five different programmes in Guatemala. In Norway, representatives from four additional institutions, which hosted designers from Guatemala, were met with and interviewed. The institutions targeted during this review only account for a small proportion of the partnerships and placements of designers that have taken place. Indeed, the DwB programme has led to the placement of 44 designers in total (i.e., Guatemala, Norway and Uganda).

The DwB programme is challenged by having to meet both Norad's objectives as well as those of FK. As such, it is important to underscore that each donor agency has been governed by their own set of assumptions and goals. These are:

- **For Norad** the programme should aim to promote local entrepreneurship through the use of "design" professionals and design input. Although, it is understood that much of the effort can be more broadly recognised as humanitarian development, rather than PSD. In addition Norad's funding should be guided by the relevant strategy and budget post guidelines noted in the first section of this chapter.
- **For FK** there are four elements that underpin the exchange process. These are:
 - a) That **changes on the ground** are created through facilitating the development of skills, knowledge, and technical capacity within institutions, which are in turn enablers to deliver better services or creation of better products and provide benefit to the people

²The term placement, rather than exchange is used as we feel this more accurately describes the activities carried out within the DwB programme.

and communities where they operate.


- b) That **changes in our minds** are created through the promotion of a set of values and equitable/reciprocal relationships between individuals at both, the personal and the institutional levels.
- c) That both types of **changes are interlinked**.
- d) That the very exchange programme process enables exchange participants to become part of a **wider network** which transcends borders.

In line with the above DwB must meet, both the requirements placed by Norad and those placed by FK in order for it to be a fitting match for both funding agencies. Therefore, throughout this review, we have remained cognizant of the wide-ranging objectives that DwB must meet, in addition to their self-established goals (see Chapter 2).

1.3 A Financial Overview of DwB Expenditure


Here we present the financial inputs that have been used during the time period under review. While the input to the DwB programme does not only include the financial allocations, but also, the capacity of participating designers. Here the focus is on the financial contributions. In the time period between 2002-2012, a total of 44.7 million NOK were allocated to the DwB programme. These funds were met by a combination of Norsk Form, Norad and FK³ contributions. The distribution of funding allocation by each institution is depicted in Figure 1, below. During the time period under evaluation, when analysed in the aggregate, 47% of the DwB funding was provided by FK, 39% was provided by Norad, and a further 14% was covered by Norsk Form itself. Additionally there are costs incurred by NorskForm which are difficult to quantify and excluded from the list below. For example: office space, equipment, time involved by staff not directly working on the programme and so forth. By and large these costs would have not incremented for NorskForm due to the programme, but still should be recognized as an institutional investment.

³ Budget figures are used as a source throughout, as we have not been able to get financial reports that show spending allocated to all funding sources. Spot checks on both FK and NORAD resource use show that budgeted amounts have in general been used (and planned activities have been carried out) each year. We therefore think that the shown figures are accurate enough for the analysis in this review. It should be noted that periodisation errors due to FK having a deviating reporting period may influence the totals for a given year.

Figure 1: Distribution of Funding Allocation

The graph above (Figure 1) illustrates that while Norsk Form funding has largely remained stable, Norad funding has consistently increased as has FK funding, except for a small dip in the last year. Despite some of the fluctuation between the different donor allocations, it's also notable that the overall funding allocation has steadily increased over the life cycle of the programme. Also noteworthy is that the visible increase in funding from 2006 onwards is due to the involvement in Uganda, additional to the interventions in Guatemala.

When we turn our attention to how the funding available has been distributed according to programme tasks/activities, a few trends are apparent (see Figure 2). The allocation for projects in the South remains stable throughout the life cycle of the DwB programme. However, the allocation to designers from the South has fluctuated over the years. Most notable is that both the allocation for both promotional activities and programme management has steadily increased over the years. Along the same lines, it is noteworthy that on some years, the overall programme management costs have been equal to programme costs in the South, for example. Overall management costs are comparably high. This is so, even when we remove administrative tasks from programme management. DwBs management costs, understood as programme management and development, are proportionally high today. This can be explained by a lack of economies of scale. DwB needs to be conscious about the ratio between management and actual programme output costs and should consider trying to shift the ratio towards a more favourable fund distribution (i.e., proportionally more allocation towards output and less towards management).

Figure 2: Distribution of funding by task


An examination of the distribution of funding alongside the amount of funds available per year shows that management and administrative costs remain more or less the same despite changes in operational activities. This highlights the challenge that DwB has in terms of economies of scale.

The 2012 budget is typical for the current programme agreement (2011-2013). Although the ToR does not call for a comprehensive analysis of cost ratios, it may be useful for DwB and the donors to bear in mind the current distribution of costs. In the following, we have used DwB's own categorization of programme costs versus programme management and administration. The 2012 budget of DwB totals NOK 5.293.675. Of this, Norad funds account for 2.225.480 (42%), FK funds account for NOK 2.461.200 (46%) and Norsk form funds account for NOK 606.625 (12%). Norsk form's share was higher in 2002 and 2003, but since the funding model was consolidated, the donor shares have stayed more or less the same.

The pie chart below (Figure 3) outlines the distribution of funds according to each programme/activity. The figure illustrates that Programme management costs account for nearly a third of the total programme costs. A third is allocated to the implementation of the Uganda programme (Programme I), including programme-monitoring visits from Norway. One sixth of the total budget is spent on the placements in Norway (Programme II), and a tenth of the total programme allocation is invested on promotional work (Programme III). Compared to other development efforts being funded by Norad, a proportionally low share of overall funds are used on programme implementation. Here we define programme implementation as, the actual conduct of the programme. Since DwB is a relatively small effort, economies of scale


may be a factor, but this is an issue that requires attention as DwB moves forward towards becoming an independent institution.

Figure 3: Distribution of costs




The principal input from the DwB programme is personnel and the capacity they each bring with them, indeed salary accounts for 85% of the 2012 budget. Of these 44% of total costs are salaries in Norway (i.e., Promoter, programme management and administration), 24% are salaries paid to personnel in Uganda, mainly Norwegian designers, and 16% of the total budget is destined to designers from Uganda placed in Norway.

Figure 4: Cost distribution by expense type



When we examine who pays for what component of the budget, we found that NorskForm covers all administrative staff; FK pays nearly 75% of Uganda costs and all costs for designers in Norway, and Norad pays 70-80% of programme management (In Norway) as well as promotional activities.

Figure 5: Distribution by donor by billable component



Having provided a brief financial and programme overview which is designed to frame the type of investments that have been made by different actors over the period under review, we now turn our attention to the development of the DwB programme followed by the methodology that has been utilized and the focus that has been given to this task.

1.4 DwB over time

This review has examined a number of DwB interventions in Guatemala and Norway. In addition a limited review of documents on Ugandan interventions has been conducted. The review has found some indication that more recent projects have improved some of their ways of working and even implemented some of the recommendations made in this report. Currently lack of documentation as well as variation in degrees of success prevents us from determining that things have consistently improved or that lessons learned have been systematically implemented. Discussion with DwB show that there is a desire to make progress and support positive change by the DwB staff. Indeed DwB staff are highly committed to the overall programme and to bettering it.

The recent project with Transitions indicates that lessons had been learned in Guatemala. Moreover the plans for 2012 and 2013 suggest that there will be an effort to implement in future lessons learned and implemented in Guatemala. Some of the past projects in Uganda, such as the helmet and life jacket have not been successful, but the degree to which these tried to implement lessons learned in Guatemala and failed none the less, or did not attempt to learn from the Guatemalan experience, is unclear. In short, because this review has focused on Guatemala, as requested by the donors, we are unable to verify the degree to which the lessons learned in Guatemala and implemented in Transitions have been successfully implemented elsewhere (i.e., Uganda).

Overall it is impossible for the team to evaluate the DwB programme in a longitudinal manner without having data that can confirm the findings and permit triangulation. Therefore, overall we

have tried to show when progress has been made, but we are unable to systematically show progress made as a result of a clear timeline driven progression.

1.5 Purpose of the Review and Questions Asked

This review of the **DwB** programme fulfils two main objectives: First, it is an assessment of Norsk Form's capacity to handle the cooperation, both professionally and administratively. Second, it examines the institutional and personal development results achieved through the exchange process.

Taking into consideration the guiding principles governing Norad's funding of the DwB programme, the principles that guide FK exchanges, as well as the aims of this review, the focus here has been on the following thematic questions:

- The programme's **ability to be**? To what extent have the different institutions involved in the DwB programme been able to master their own strengths in a cooperative way to support the aims of the programme? Has Norsk Form been able, with its existing competence and capacity, to support the programme in a robust way? Similarly, have partner institutions had the adequate and necessary capacity to ensure the success of the programme? This line of questions has included an examination into the Norsk Form institution and the DwB programme capacity specifically, as well as into the programme's performance and operational capacity. The model utilised by the DwB programme for cooperation with its partners has been particularly scrutinised, as has the ability of individual partners to meet the 'institutional' demands of being part of the DwB initiative.
- The programme's **ability to organise**? To what extent has the DwB programme been able to put in place the mechanisms that ensure processes and procedures that: a) can be replicated; b) that lessons are identified and solutions sought after and implemented; c) that the programme, personnel issues and finances are clear and transparent. Has Norsk Form been able to put in place the necessary organisational structures, planning and monitoring systems, documentation procedures, financial management systems, participant selection and personnel management processes at both ends of the exchange? To this end the procedures, systems and tools in place to manage the programme, as well as evaluation and feedback loops have been examined. Equally so, the abilities of partner institutions to meet the aforementioned organisational demands in order to secure the success of the DwB initiative have also been examined.
- The programme's **ability to relate**? To what extent has the DwB programme been able to build relationships between partner entities and with peers at different levels- international, national, private, non-governmental and governmental- which support both the goals of the programme directly, and which enable the programme's work to be disseminated and utilised in a manner that maximises its impact. How have the relationships between Norsk form, the University of Landivar, the local counterparts and the exchange participants developed over time? Have these relationships been used to ensure long-term dissemination and utilisation of products and knowledge gained? If so, how? Here, attention has been placed on a mechanism to relate to partners and simultaneously limit the probability of corruption and nepotism. The degree to which networks have been formed as a result of the programme and the value (short and long

term) of these networks, if existing has also been examined as this falls clearly within one of the key objectives of FK exchanges.

- The programme's **ability to do**? To what extent has the DwB programme delivered as expected/ has exceeded or fallen short from the initial plans and expectations of the outcomes of the work? What have the programme's outputs, outcomes and activities been? And to what extent have they met the overall goal of the programme? In focusing on results, we have aimed to trace these along the Result Based Management (RBM) framework. However, the RBM framework has been utilised for sample interventions only. More broadly, we have examined the pre-requisites for identifying programmes, the degree to which risks were examined, results achieved and sustainability secured. In addition, we have also examined the approach to more recent interventions utilised by the DwB programme, particularly since work in Guatemala has now ended.

A more detailed list of questions asked in connection with this review is available in Annexe 4.


1.6 Methodology

This review utilises a multifaceted methodology in its attempt to respond to all relevant questions. Firstly, we have examined the programme along the abilities framework. Secondly, we employed the RBM framework as a structure to facilitate the analysis of individual interventions (see Figure 6). Thirdly, we utilised the Lewin's Change management model (see Figure 7) in order to systematically examine, and learn from, the exit strategy implemented in Guatemala.

First, the abilities framework was utilised to understand the degree to which different aspects of the programme have been developed and consolidated. This enabled the examination of four different programme areas (i.e., **be, organise, relate** and **do**) independent of one another. Examining the different strengths and weaknesses of the programme individually permitted us to provide clearer recommendations.


Following a nuanced examination of each programme's abilities (i.e., abilities framework) we turned our attention to **efficiency, effectiveness, relevance** and **sustainability** and, to a lesser extent, **impact/results**. This component of the review relied on the RBM chain (see Figure 6) in order to systematically analyse and report data. The utilisation of a somewhat rigid analytical representation of information enabled the organised and systematic examination of data and explains our conclusions based on a pre-determined understanding of the relationship between data sets. In short, we defined efficiency based on the relationship between inputs and outputs, and inputs and outcome; effectiveness was determined based on the relationship between objectives, outcome and impact; relevance was decided by examining the relationship between the needs and objectives; and sustainability by exploring the relationship between needs and impact.

Figure 6: Result Based Management Chain



Third, as a component of the examination into the programme’s “ability to be” we examined exit plans utilising Lewin’s change model management (see Figure 7). This approach enabled us to scrutinise the degree to which the model has been put in place. Analysing exit in this way has enabled us to make clear recommendations that can be implemented in future approaches to exiting a country or ending an individual institutional relationship (i.e., partnership).

⁴Result chain explained. Source: Bruce Britton, INTRAC. Presentation for Bistandstorget, 12 April 2011. Also, see Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A practical Guide, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008, Norad. p.10.

Figure 7: Lewin's Change Management Model

In order to fulfil the data requirements of this review, a number of data gathering tools were utilised. These included:

- 1) **Documentation review:** a thorough review of the programme documents and other material regarded as relevant or useful was carried out. See bibliography for a full list of documents which have been examined during the review process.
- 2) **Interviews:** Staff from DwB/Norsk Form, partner organisations in Norway as well as Guatemala, individual exchange participants, as well as Norad and Fredskorpset staff were interviewed. Interviews were conducted in person, with some interviews including one in-person team member and one via Skype. Most interviews were individual, but in some cases two respondents were interviewed jointly. For a list of respondents interviewed see Annexe 3.
- 3) **Survey:** An online survey to assess the experience and opinion of the exchange participants was fielded. This tool enabled us to include the perspectives of different participants, and in doing so, gain a broader understanding of the programme's implementation.
- 4) **Observation:** We also observed the utilisation of different programme outputs. This enabled us to gain some idea on the utility of different design products. The objective of observation was mainly to determine the degree to which the outputs appear to be having an impact.

The utilisation of all of these tools in conjunction has led to the identification of the findings, conclusions and recommendations made in this report.

1.7 Case Study Programmes

In order to meet the demands of this review, in addition to examining written material and the fielding of online surveys, two case studies were conducted: Guatemala and Norway. In Guatemala, four different counterparts were met with. These included five different individual programmes covering a whole range of partner institutions including government institutions, non-governmental efforts as well as for profit organisations. The programmes were based in three different geographical locations and varied in length from one to multiple years of exchange participants, as well as between a single design output to multiple design outputs.

Given the large number of projects that have been implemented during the DwB programme cycle (see Table 1) we felt that the case studies should focus on a limited number of interventions as examples of the overall programme. This enabled us to achieve more depth in

each case and hence has permitted us to identify more nuanced recommendations that can be translated into other programmes across the Norsk Form-DwB portfolio. At this juncture we introduce the programmes that we targeted for more thorough examination and explain how and why we selected each.

Given the time frame and the depth of inquiry that was pursued, we decided to focus on the following six projects in Guatemala:

Table 1: Programmes Focused upon In Guatemala

Location	Partner	Start year	End year	Programme
	Cruz Roja, Guatemala	2002	2003	Shelter (progressive shelter)
Guatemala - City	INDIS, University of Landivar	2006	2007	Participatory processes in Urban development: (1) A road safety project aiming at increasing the awareness of the population of both community and university in relation to traffic issues, (2) A project aiming to strengthen local identity through improving public space and (3) A project carried out in collaboration with the local communitarian programme Futuro Vivo, where production equipment and a graphic profile was developed for the little chocolate factory Xocolatl.
San Juan La Laguna	Fundación Solar	2006	2007	Design and product development in artisan co-operatives in the village.
San Juan La Laguna	Fundación Solar	2006	2009	Zumos branding programme: During the period 2007–2010.
Guatemala - City	Dirección de movilidad urbana - Transmetro	2007	2009	Transport (Buses) - Transmetro
Guatemala - City	Dirección de movilidad urbana - Transmetro ⁵	2009	2010	Transport (Bicycle paths)
Antigua	Transiciones	2011	2012	Wheel chair design

The projects above were selected because they represented diverse sectors (i.e. housing, transport, product development and support for the disadvantaged/marginalised groups). Simultaneously, the team thought it would be possible to visit all programme outputs as these could be found in either Guatemala City or Antigua which is within reach. It was expected that the project from San Juan La Laguna could not be reached due to the limited stay in Guatemala. However, the team expected that the project included components in Guatemala City such as the stores where the products are sold and hence, this project can also be more easily assessed. Additionally, we hoped that targeting interventions over the years would enable us to more clearly see if and how the DwB has changed over time. We felt that this last point would enable us to further substantiate claims made in interviews and documented in reports. It is important to note that in some cases, multiple interventions targeted a single beneficiary group, for example, efforts in San Juan La Laguna. In such cases, different interventions have been treated as single efforts over time.

⁵ This programme counted with an exchange participant from Ireland rather than one from Norway.

In Norway, four different interventions were targeted. These included:

Table 2: Programmes Focused upon In Norway

Location	Partner	Start year	End year	Programme
Stavanger	Laerdal medical	2009	2010	Product development; birth simulator.
Hammerfest	Spor design	2009	2010	Industrial and web design.
Lillesand	SG Armaturen	2011	2012	Lamp design, electrical fittings design.
Oslo	Kadabra design	2011	2012	Language teaching tool for kindergartens and a mobile medicine services design project which is under development.

These interventions were chosen because after reviewing the literature and considering contextual implications, we felt that the combination of projects could provide a good overview of contributions from the partner country to Norway with varying degrees of subject relevance/need.

While the list of projects of focus here is limited, we have also included information from all other interventions based on a review of literature, interview data as well as data gathered through the online survey.

1.8 Limitations of the Review Process

A few limitations affected this review. Although, we feel that none were detrimental to the extent that it would affect the outcome of the review in any way. Still, we feel it is important to mention them here.

First, not all the cases selected for the review in Guatemala could be included because it was not possible to identify/reach individuals who were sufficiently familiar with all the interventions we had originally selected. This was true of both the Participatory Processes in Urban Development and the Shelter Programme. Although, in the case of the latter, some data could be gathered. Still, we feel that the data collected is insufficient to answer all the questions we have identified as important to respond to the objectives of this review. Hence, these two examples have not been used systematically, as have been others. While this is clearly a shortcoming, in itself, it points out to a finding of this review: Mainly, that both the ability of institutions to document interventions, as well as the solidity of the networks between institutions which have partnered up for interventions require improvement. This will be revisited later on in this review (see Chapter 5).

Second, the plan to observe outputs of the interventions was not possible in all relevant cases. Efforts to visit locations that sold the **Zumos** products, which have resulted from the interventions in San Juan La Laguna, did not succeed. This was due to lack of knowledge regarding the location of the shops which sell the items by the producer of said items, Comercializadora Xuaan Chi Ya S.A., the unavailability of addresses on the web site and the fact that the only shop that carried the products which was both identified and located was in Antigua and happened to be closed on the day the evaluation team visited the city. The very fact that the producer and the distributor of the goods was unable to provide us with key information to identify the retailers, points to a shortcoming in the programme and hence, will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.

Third, only 2/3rds of the individuals targeted with the online survey responded to the survey questions. While the findings are still valid and have been used to substantiate the data gathered through other means, the number of participants from Uganda has been very limited thus far and hence unsurprisingly only 2 survey respondents were from Uganda. This

inherently further limits how much the report can say about the Ugandan case, which was not the focus of this study.

Fourth, there are claims made by different partners that are not documented. This has prevented our ability to triangulate data. Examples include the utilisation of internal reports submitted by designers as a basis for implementing lessons learned and the use of a standard approach/mechanism to select potential partners in Guatemala. Despite the absence of documentation confirming these claims, we noted this information in the report as we felt it was important. Overall, this means that not all the information relied upon for our conclusions and recommendations has been triangulated.

Fifth, this review focuses primarily, based on the demands of the ToR, on the Guatemalan experience. It does so by selecting a limited number of cases as examples of the Guatemalan experience. Therefore the report does not reflect the Ugandan experience in the same level of detail. Moreover, while positive shifts are repetitively noted between earlier interventions in Guatemala (ex: Zumos) and latter ones (ex: Transitions) given the absence of documented trajectories of change (i.e., how and why something was done) it is not possible for the evaluation team to verify if the experience in Transitions is a reflection of a clear institutional learning process or the result of choices made based on a more ad hoc and less systematic trial and error approach taken by individuals. Moreover DwB claims that changes have been implemented in the Uganda case and hence some of the issues pointed to here are no longer valid. While we recognize this may be the case, given the focus on the Guatemala case, as per the ToR, we are unable to adequately substantiate the changes incorporated into the Ugandan experience. Still one positive aspect of this report, we feel, is that it is able to document the lessons that can be learned from the Guatemala experience and substantiate their implementation in the Uganda context.

Sixth, some of the data that was required in order to adequately assess and respond to some of the questions in the ToR was not available and hence these issues have had to be primarily excluded from the report. These include for example progressive use of indicators and baseline studies. However where possible the limited data collected was reported upon and noted as potentially indicative of a trend/change.

As noted above, these shortcomings are not believed to have impacted the review to the extent that would compromise its validity. Nonetheless, making mention of them here will assist the reader in nuancing its understanding of the findings arrived at, through this review.

1.9 Report Structure

This report is divided into 7 chapters. In Chapter 1, we have included financial background information which is particularly relevant in order to understand what governs funding decisions made by the Norwegian government; background information on the DwB programme itself, the purpose of the review, the methodology utilized, the key limitations and the lessons which can be learned from these limitations, as well as an outline of the projects visited/focus on. This chapter also delineates the structure of the report. Following the abilities framework introduced earlier, chapter 2-5 focuses on the key findings of this review. To this end, chapter 2 focuses on DwB's **ability to be**; chapter 3 on its **ability to organise**; chapter 4 on its **ability to relate** and chapter 5 on its **ability to do**. Chapter 5 relies heavily on the RBM framework to present the findings related to DwB's ability to do. Chapter 6 presents the general conclusions of this report and lessons learned and chapter 7 focuses on our recommendations. In addition, a series of annexes are also appended. These include, the terms of reference as well as a list of respondents by category, a complete list of programmes carried out by DwB, a detailed list of questions and a copy of the survey fielded in connection to this review.

2.0 Ability to Be

In this chapter, general findings regarding the DwB programme's **ability to be** are examined. While some of the different programme's abilities that are examined in this review overlap with one another, we have tried to separate them in order to better explore which areas are the strongest and which require more attention in order to ensure that DwB is as robust as possible. Particularly, given their shift from a Norsk Form programme to an independent institution.

Here DwB's, **ability to be**, essentially, their ability to formulate and maintain an identity reflecting aspects such as their programme purpose, values and strategies is examined. In addition, the abilities to lead and manage the programme are also delved into. In the case of DwB it was also deemed relevant to examine the ability of the partner institutions to adequately manage their individual responsibilities to ensure the success of the DwB programme. To this end, the model utilised by the DwB programme for cooperation with its partners has been particularly scrutinised, as has the ability of individual partners to meet the 'institutional' demands of being part of the DwB initiative. It is important to underscore that while DwB is a programme within Norsk Form, the programme is to become independent in the not so distant future. Hence, exploring its ability to "be" is particularly relevant as it moves towards having an independent status.

DwB has been jointly funded by Norad and FK, and to a lesser extent by Norsk Form itself.⁶ However, this joint funding, particularly referring to the funds from Norad and FK, has not been coupled with a joint donor approach or strategy, but rather by parallel funding structures/approaches. As such, the DwB programme has been governed by Norsk Form processes and procedures and has had to respond to the reporting demands of both external donor entities (i.e., Norad and FK) as well. In tandem, this also means that the programme has had to respond to the objectives and goals of each donor agency. This review has found no evidence to suggest that there is a clear benefit from the joint donor approach since it is not coordinated. Both donors appear to work directly with DwB independently of one another, hence the possibility to synergize goals, objectives and support a more streamlined management and reporting effort is lost.

The number of staff engaged in the DwB programmes has fluctuated over the years. In 2008, the DwB programme had budgeted for a total of 2.9 persons. This included 210% programme manager position, 60% administrative position and 20% "resource group" person post. Both the funding structure and staff (person days) requirements have changed over the years. Indeed, the current period (2011-2013) calls for 3,5 persons, this staff allocation includes 2 full time programme managers, a 40% position dedicated to external promotion (i.e., exhibitions etc.), a 30% position dedicated to external competence (i.e., for programme appraisals and other such activities), a 60% administrative position and 15% overall manager post. These staff members are covered by different funding allocations (see Chapter 1).

The number of interventions requires substantial follow up which has meant a heavy reliance on the local principal counterpart. In the case of Guatemala, the Universidad Rafael Landivar (URL) (See Section 2.2) has been the key partner in charge of local oversight of the programmes there. Unlike the staff focused on this programme in Norway, locally in Guatemala the URL only counted with one person in charge of programme oversight. This meant that for

⁶ It is noteworthy that the programme also received private funds, from one of the founders, when the initiative first started (see Chapter 1).

the exchanges between Norway and Guatemala, which are the focus of the review, at any one time there were approximately 2 people in Norway and 1 in Guatemala that could provide oversight for the different placements/projects. While these staff members worked together in identifying projects and overall follow up, as is noted in Chapter 5, very little time was dedicated to systematic oversight of individuals on placement either in Guatemala or Norway. Oversight appears to have improved in the last programme in Guatemala (i.e., Transitions). This particular aspect, DwB claims, has been changed in the current work with Uganda whereby there is more solid and continues engagement between DwB staff and partner institutions and individual designers. How this new approach has changed the programme is difficult to know for this review as the focus has been Guatemala. Having a stronger follow up of designers may have had an impact on the ability of the DwB programme to ensure a cohesive understanding by all parties involved on what the programme was intended to achieve and how (See Section 2.1). Having a stronger engagement, follow up of designers, may also serve to ensure that lessons learned are transferred to individuals working in the field and from there on to end beneficiaries (See Chapter 5). The limited engagement that seems to be characteristic of interventions until the last one may have been weaker because of the lack of swift information transfer between the different levels of the programme. Within the context of this review it is impossible to verify degree to which the efforts in Uganda ensure clear and effective communication lines that enable lessons learned to be transferred swiftly to the field, and that designers have a clear and keen understanding of the programme. In addition to weaker communication structures until the implementation of the Transitions programme; the existence of multiple donors and the need for DwB to meet the objectives of each may have contributed to a lack of cohesion in terms of asserting a clear identity for the programme. The danger in having such demands for information exchange, limited systematized mechanisms to exchange information and multiple donors with individual goals and objectives is that the transaction costs of the programme become unduly high.

2.1 DwB Identify: “To be” or “not to be” Design

DwB has a clear identity in how it understands its own objective and purpose. The degree to which this is shared amongst all concerned partners is a point that merits discussion. The objective or purpose of the DwB programme is to utilise **design** as a way to further development both generally and specifically as pertains to the private sector. The programme aims to, through placement of professional designers, enable institutions and organisations to develop products which are user-friendly, aesthetically pleasing and functional. Given the central nature of the design concept to the programme’s objective, it is relevant to examine what is meant by ‘design’, both in terms of how individual partners have understood it, as well as how it has been implemented through individual initiatives.

The DwB staff understands design to be a broad term which includes both innovation as well as development of processes and products. To this end it includes both the formulation of the product and all aspects related to its practical use, user friendliness and visual appearance. For DwB the focus on the utility of the final product or process is a key driver of their definition of design. Hence, design can be the development of a plan or prototype as well as the transfer of knowledge and/or contribution to changing perceptions or the mind-set regarding a product. An example of this is the Bicycle Path programme in Guatemala city, where the objective was both the development of a “Bicycle Path Master Plan” and a contribution towards understanding bicycle paths as an important, valuable and relevant form of transport within the Guatemalan context.

During interviews with URL staff in Guatemala, the principal partner of the DwB programme, design in the context of this programme was defined as “social-economic and environmental interventions that promote the improvement of the livelihoods of people.” They further noted that while design includes special interventions (architecture), creation of objects (industrial design), and development of communication approaches/strategies (graphic design), their focus

within the DwB programme has been almost exclusively on industrial design. The focus on industrial design, however, has been primarily applied to the part of the programme that involved Guatemalan designers placed in Norway (see Chapter 3).

Individual counterpart institutions in Guatemala had a slightly different view of design attributable to their own individual experiences. All those interviewed, saw design as a combination of both the design **process** as well as the **output** generated by the process. There was variance in the degree of importance placed on the utility of the final product generated. While some organisations felt that “design” requires a final output that is clear, tangible and useful; others felt that the process of design itself could generate shifts and changes that would have otherwise not taken place and that these are chiefly important in their own right and can serve to counter the importance placed on the final product.

Counterpart firms in Norway used design as a creative process governed by a series of formal steps in order to create a product which works well, is practical and well liked by the user or the customer. This approach to design was applied by the Norwegian firms, in the context of the DwB programme, to a diverse number of outputs including a birth simulator, lamp fittings and mobile hospital services.

Individual designers who were involved in placements in Norway, Guatemala or Uganda, and who responded to the survey, by and large defined design as “problem solving.” To this end, it is clear that designers themselves understood their role as driven by the end user, this was true of all respondents irrespective of their country of origin. Some designers added more nuanced definitions and remarked that “design” is both the end result as well as the process, and should be sustainable. This, we have chosen to highlight, as it is particularly in line with the DwB programme perspective.

How this concept of design has translated into actual programmes (e.g., the degree to which all DwB interventions have met this criteria) has varied between institutions and individuals involved in the programme. We were unable to establish if there were any trends suggesting increasing or decreasing levels of clarity or homogeneity regarding this concept over time. Our examination was pursuing how individuals and institutional representatives defined design in the context of the programme, not necessarily the utilization of institutional official responses. One of the aspects that particularly called our attention in our discussions with the URL staff was that they had a very strict view of what constituted a contribution in the field of design within the DwB programme, in terms of programme implementation. For URL, the degree to which the output of the programme had a clear and immediate utility was not a key attribute. In this way, the success of an individual DwB intervention was governed by the ability of the intervention to create an output and not by whether or not this output did in fact fulfil a need, was practical and/or could be implemented. This relative departure from the definition of design noted by DwB (i.e., have a clear utility) was explained by noting that whether or not something was useful could not be equated with its actual use. There are cases, for example, where an output may be very useful but where the context does not yet permit its use. In Guatemala the effort to create a wheelchair prototype with **Transitions**, one of the most recent programmes, is a good example of where all factors defining design came to the fore; while in other examples, such as the work in San Juan La Laguna, particularly as related to the creation of the Zumos products, an older intervention, the degree to which the approach taken has resulted in solving a problem, is user friendly and has a clear utility is less certain (See Chapter 5).

Examining the different understandings of design by different partners and individual actors involved in the DwB programmes (i.e., institutions and individual designers) shows that while for DwB centrally design efforts they become involved with should: Be user friendly; promote skills transfer; respond to a known problem or challenge; and have a clear utility. Not all actors had a similar interpretation of what these attributes mean. The basic understanding amongst all

partners includes design as practical output, design as theoretically useful output, design as idea, design as process, etc. In short the definition is so broad that it can be deduced that contrary to providing the programme with a solid grounding and aim, it dilutes its objectives to encompassing almost anything anywhere. The programme does not, for example, have a clear requirement of what should be the resulting value of any design intervention (i.e., tangible useful and used output). Arguably, however, this degree of flexibility has enabled the programme to venture into a wide variety of interventions that would have not been possible given a more constrained definition of what design is for DwB. Having posed two contrasting views on how the wide reaching definition and understanding of design may have impacted the programme in the past and served to frame the work conducted within the programme boundary, the current degree of programme maturity may require a re-evaluation and narrowing of the definition utilised. The design definitions highlighted by programme partners identified during this review were rooted in “design” rather than “development” paradigms and understandings. Creating a common idea of what “design is” under the DwB banner which is clear, precise, joint to all and which shares in the long history of development interventions and understanding could become a solid contribution to the identity of DwB. Indeed revising the definition of design to a more precise understanding which is rooted in development paradigms, while simultaneously keeping its design roots, could be useful to DwB in its attempt to formulate interventions which are fitting to the local needs and translate into a contribution to development (see Chapter 5).

DwB is to become an independent entity. This is a result of them wanting to become more independent of Norsk Form and of the need to be more flexible in terms of sources of income (i.e., under the umbrella of Norsk Form they are unable to conduct for profit work, which will be a goal as an independent institution). DwB feels that it has sufficiently grown/developed over the last 10 years in order to face the challenges of an independent entity. As an independent entity its ability to assert a strong and clear identity will be crucial. Hence DwB is now in apposition where refining and crystallising the image they want to project is key. While there is, in the work they conduct and on how they conduct it, an inherent message and the staff of DwB appear clear on the way forward this should be more clearly conveyed so as to ensure that all partners have a common understanding of the role of DwB, and therein of what can be expected of the programme once it becomes an institution in the near future.

2.2 The Partners Involved

Here, we introduce each institution briefly to provide the necessary backdrop to the DwB model utilised. The objective here is to bring to the fore, the strengths and weaknesses of the different institutions involved in an effort to highlight what type of agency is most adept to the type of effort DwB is/aims to be.

a) Norsk Form is a private foundation, established in 1992 following an initiative by the Ministry of Culture whose aim is to increase the popular understanding of the importance of both architecture and design. The foundation has as a clear aim to “strengthen professional and interdisciplinary collaboration, disseminate knowledge and give advice to the general public, professionals, authorities, industry and educational institutions.” The approach taken by Norsk Form in the work they undertake is firmly based in participatory approaches and includes cooperation with both private and public sector institutions. As an independent foundation Norsk Form counts with an independent governing board. DwB is currently exploring the possibility of becoming independent of Norsk Form. This new status would include the ability of the DwB effort to seek self-sustainability by ensuring that they secure profit from their initiatives rather than being completely reliant on donor funding. Norsk Form has a mandate that can encompass the aims and objectives of the DwB programme; the challenge it faces lies in being able to both administer and have clear oversight over all individual initiatives in the field.

b) Universidad Rafael Landivar (URL): The University is a private Jesuit University based in

Guatemala city. It is the first and only university in Guatemala that currently offers a degree in Industrial Design but not the only one that offers degrees in either Architecture or Graphic Design. While the University is not the most expensive or elitist in the country, it is well recognised as catering to a select sector of the population that is comparatively well-off and hence, able to cover the cost of the fees. The URL houses the Institute of Research in Design of the Rafael Landivar University (Instituto de Investigacion en Diseno Universidad Rafael Landivar-INDIS). The objective of INDIS is to promote and conduct programmes which enable the development and implementation of new research and knowledge in the field of design. To this end, INDIS aims to incorporate active and participatory learning processes into the work they conduct.⁷ The University does not have a tradition of collaborative work with other universities in Guatemala, indeed interviewees noted that the URL is reticent to engage in partnerships with Guatemalan Universities, but does so with Universities in other countries. Therefore, collaboration with the National University in Guatemala was not a natural progression for the programme because having chosen the URL limited the ability of the programme to engage with other universities locally. The one example of collaboration with the National University was during the shelter programme. This collaboration was stressed, by respondents familiar with the effort, as having been administratively cumbersome and non conducive to future collaboration. The difficulty was noted as having been tied to the URL's general wish to operate independently within the Guatemalan context. While this is countered by INDIS today there are no examples of collaboration with other Guatemalan academic institutions after the Shelter programme that would support the URL's ability or interest in engaging with other local actors. Overall the URL does, as do Jesuit Universities traditionally, wish to place itself as a leader in terms of innovation and social discourse within the Guatemalan society. This is underscored by the current Rector's point of view denoting that 'the URL does not need to be the best university *in* Guatemala but it should be the best university *for* Guatemala.' URL counts with solid administrative structures which enable it to be an administratively secure counterpart. Clearly, the university is a solid institution with a robust administrative capacity. However, its desire to exclusively focus on its own former students limited the DwB ability to have a wider coverage. Additionally, the URL does not have a solid system to maintain networks outside the Jesuit family and hence relationships with individual local counterparts were not maintained.

c) Local counterparts in partner countries: This category is comprised of a diverse group of institutions and organisations including government offices/agencies, UN agencies, private sector enterprises as well as NGOs. Here, the focus is on the institutions in Guatemala which were focused upon during the study, although mention of other organisations is made in order to illustrate the variety of structures and relevant characteristics.

1) Government offices: In Guatemala, the Municipality of Guatemala city was a key counterpart to DwB programmes. The Municipality, as can be expected from a government bureaucracy, counts with clear chains of command and institutional structures. The municipality also counts with a plan of action and a budget to support said plan. The municipality noted that while it was very useful to count with foreign designers to support programmes of the Municipality, administrative difficulties might have been encountered as a result of the existing, rigid and necessary chains of command and rules regarding access to data. The municipality has a long-standing tradition of engaging with other institutions, most often government agencies, to support single areas of concern or initiatives. Therefore, the ability of the municipality to engage with other actors on a needs basis was found. This proved valuable in promoting DwB initiatives and in ensuring a user group (i.e., bicycle clubs).

2) Non-Governmental organisations: The experience in Guatemala showed that NGOs which were well established, administratively flexible and enabled clear and unrestricted

⁷ INDIS Overview pamphlet

access to the work by the designers were most successful. In short, this institutional makeup facilitated the role and influence the designer could have within the institutional structure. In addition, well-established NGOs with a clear clientele/service sector were able to formulate clear goals and objectives and had a clear understanding of the needs on the ground based on extensive and solid experience. This served to ensure that the DwB initiative was a collaborative approach that was firmly rooted in the host institution. However, institutions with unclear goals and objectives proved overall weak partners.

3) For profit firms: In the Guatemala context, the experiences examined that included a for-profit enterprise was not a clear cut for profit company. Rather, one that grew/emerged from the DwB programme itself. Still, the experience in Guatemala, as some of the examples extracted from the literature on Uganda showed that private enterprise firms require a wide range of attributes without which the “design” aspect of the effort will not be successful. For example, they must have available capital, a clear understanding of the client structure, demand for the product, ability to produce the product etc. The examination of the firms that have been involved in DwB initiatives led to a problematic but important question: On the one hand, the firms that could benefit from design support were by and large missing key characteristics to render the production of a prototype, a solid step forward to promote PSD. On the other hand, the firms that were sufficiently well established to actually utilise the design were also firms that may have very well been in a position to secure the assistance of a designer themselves and hence, it was hard to discern the added value provided by DwB.

d) Counterparts in Norway: Institutions in Norway were all private sector enterprises that were well-established and able to host individual designers. Some institutions were better positioned than others to attach designers locally due to a variety of factors, including, for example, their geographical location (i.e., Oslo the capital vs. Hammerfest in Northern Norway); all firm have a solid work-plan which, in some cases, incorporated the visiting designer. However, the incorporation of the visiting designer did not mean that the visiting designer either led or was catalytic in the creation of individual designs. The institutions appeared to have clear goals and objectives. Indeed, a recognised identity but this identity in no way promoted the incorporation of a visiting designer or facilitated the integration of a visiting designer’s skills and expertise. Similarly the Norwegian partners, with the exception of the initial Ugandan placements, were not teaching agencies so the degree to which visiting designers were able to gain new knowledge from their tenure was based on the levels of responsibility they were given and the role they had within the institution.

2.3 Concluding Remarks

DwB is strong in Norway from having a clear vision of what they believe they should do, and are able to clearly convey their identity through auto-promotion (i.e., exhibits, publications, media coverage); the degree to which the DwB identity is emulated and shared by all partners varies greatly and is an area that could benefit from more attention. As pertains to its partners, it was clear that institutions with a clear identity and role (i.e., The Municipality; well established NGOs) had a stronger *ability to be* and hence, benefited more from a DwB initiative than organisations that were being developed/established alongside the DwB initiative (i.e. young for-profit organisations). It is important to stress that while the Guatemala case provides a clear distinction in the ability “to be” between the NGO and the for-profit organisations showcased in the case study, this could also be a result of a well-established vs. a young institution and hence, not attributable to the for-profit status, but rather to its infancy.

Currently DwB shares in a definition of their role which is very far-reaching, this broad definition can negatively affect DwB as it does not serve to clearly anchor their role. Not rooting their definition of design in the development paradigm, or including development concepts in the definition, weakens their ability to have a strong identity in the development field more broadly. DwB notes that they have recently both refined the programmes definition of design and

become more actively engaged with the development sector. This appears to be a positive post Guatemala experience which is reflected in the current MoUs between DwB and UN agencies. These MoU note the role that DwB can play within the development sector. This is a positive step forward that could be further strengthened by rooting future definitions of design in a more solid understanding of the challenges faced by the development sector and including issues such as do no harm, and capacities and vulnerabilities analysis.

The key strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the DwB programme in terms of its ability to be are noted in the box below.

Table 3: SWOT Ability to be

SWOT – Ability to be	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has a recognised brand name. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lacks of a more clear understanding of the development sector. • Ensuring that lessons learned in the development sector are adopted by DwB in their very definition of intervention.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based on the extensive experience over the last decade, the ability to formulate a clear set of goals, objectives and mission which are informed by a decade of field experience. • MoU with UN agencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very wide overarching definition of what is design does not serve to guide interventions because it is too loose/unfocused.


3.0 Ability to Organise

This chapter focuses on DwB's ability to organise itself and coordinate both within the institution, as well as with other institutions. This chapter also examines the institutional ability to have mechanisms in place to assure smooth operations. This particular aspect is very important in relation to the DwB work because the programme involves a high number of actors. Additionally, the chapter examines monitoring and evaluation mechanisms as well as individual programme and overall exit strategies. These questions are framed by the model of intervention used by DwB which is introduced first. In addition to following the abilities framework, the discussion on exit strategies utilises Leiwin's model as a framework for analysis.

3.1 The Structure: the DwB model

DwB has utilised a non-reciprocal model for their interventions where they have been the conduits for placements of Guatemalan or Ugandan designers in Norwegian firms and of Norwegian⁸ designers going to Guatemala⁹ or Uganda. The model referred to as 'exchanges' by programme partners and in the documentation can be illustrated as follows (see Figure 8).

Figure 8: The model for interaction between actors



This relationship between actors (see Figure 8) has involved multiple partners all with distinct histories (how they became part of the programme), as well as distinct roles, responsibilities and rights. The histories of their involvement as well as their individual roles, rights and responsibilities within the programme are described below:

a) Norsk Form - DwB: The DwB programme headquartered at Norsk Form was the centre of all interventions. From here, the decisions over where to intervene in terms of countries and institutions in Norway were made. Early on, it was decided that Guatemala would be a target

⁸ In one instance examined, the designer placed was not Norwegian but European. This shows that the institution does not exclusively place Norwegian citizens but focuses on placing western designers and most often chooses Norwegian nationals.

⁹ Placements in Guatemala have now been stopped. However, Guatemala was the main partner country during the review period and the principal focus of this report.

country for the programme. The factors that led to identifying Guatemala as a target country are not fully known, but the process that led to the identification of the local main partner is described here. The original programme manager, a designer himself who was tasked with identifying an adequate partner in Guatemala had previously been based in Guatemala himself. During his time in Guatemala, he interacted with the “design community” and built a private network in the local design landscape. When he visited Guatemala in an effort to identify a key partner for the DwB programme, a former associate of his was based at the URL as the head and founder of INDIS. This link between the two individuals who respected each other professionally and seemingly shared a common view of what could be accomplished through the DwB programme, led to the establishment of a formal relationship between DwB in Norway and URL in Guatemala. The formalisation of the relationship between DwB and URL included a distinct role allocation. DwB was and remains, the key conduit to donors (i.e., Norad and FK), and hence, is the entity accountable to both Norad, FK and of course to Norsk Form as the parent institution. DwB is also responsible for placing designers coming to Norway and for identifying the designers that were (are) sent to Guatemala and Uganda. In the case of designers going to Norway, the role of DwB was to serve as a conduit between the URL and the firm in Norway. The firm in Norway, however, had the final say in the acceptance or rejection of any candidate. In the case of designers going to Guatemala, DwB was provided with a set of requirements which were developed by the URL with varying degrees of input from the local counterpart institutions. Based on the stipulated requirements, DwB sought to identify designers interested in a placement in Guatemala under the FK exchange modality.

DwB is also responsible for the production of exhibitions and publications for the Norwegian audience. Their role also includes general oversight of the partners locally (i.e., individual organisations hosting a designer), although, much of this responsibility was relinquished to the URL in Guatemala and little direct oversight of designers based in Norway took place. The aforementioned activities which fell within the responsibility of DwB were within its capacity. The experience of the designers interviewed in connection with this review suggested that DwB had a limited ability to follow up and support each placement (i.e., designer working within an organisation or agency). This applied to both designers based in Norway as well as in other countries. Indeed, in some cases, designers in Norway received no follow up support at all. All designers were required to submit update reports and DwB assured the evaluation team that this material was used as a foundation for modifications made to the programme over the years, but the use of these reports has not been systematically documented. DwB notes that this practice has changed recently to include far more engagement from DwB, how this new mechanism of engagement has changed the programme is impossible to determine by this review as this new approach did not apply to the Guatemalan experience.

As pertains to the staff contracted by DwB these appear to be generally identified through the Norsk Form and DwB network. The staff have design background and in some cases have been participants of DwB placements (FK exchanges). Their knowledge base is solidly rooted in the design discourse, but they show solid commitment to their work with DwB in so far as their work has elements that are akin to the development sector. Having some staff or advisors with more solid experience in the development sector could prove positive in alerting DwB of the challenges they can face when implementing programmes in the developing world.

b) University Rafael Landivar (URL): The University and particularly, INDIS was responsible for the identification of programmes where a designer identified by DwB could be placed, as well as for the financial and M&E oversight of partner institutions in Guatemala. INDIS was also responsible for the identification of individual designers proposed to Norwegian firms. The process of identifying both the local projects that could be part of DwB as well as the individual designers going to Norway has changed over the years. In the early days, the selection of individual projects was at the full discretion of the DwB programme manager based at INDIS who was also the INDIS director. He relied on his extensive knowledge of the Guatemalan

context as well as on his network to identify projects that he thought would benefit from hosting a designer. His proposals were then discussed with DwB staff and a selection was made. More recently DwB has paid for researchers based at INDIS to select projects that meet pre-identified criteria. Although, we were informed that the criteria has existed in recent years and that it was actively used by researchers tasked with identifying the most recent projects, for example Transitions, this criteria was not made available to the evaluation team. In the absence of the criteria used, it is difficult to determine what exactly was examined and how each factor was weighted against other factors being considered.¹⁰ As pertains to the identification of individuals who were sent to Norway, the minimum criteria for selection was determined by the host firm in Norway. Based on the criteria, INDIS advertised the position. The adverts were, primarily and often exclusively, disseminated within the university/alumni network targeting industrial design graduates only. According to INDIS, the deliberate targeting of industrial designers was because the programme was exclusively focused on industrial design. Or at least their interpretation of the programme was such that they felt including other types of designers was ill advised. An examination of all the interventions done by DwB shows that industrial design was a limitation tied to placements initiated by INDIS and did not apply to other countries or indeed to designers going to Guatemala. Moreover even though Guatemalan designers were all industrial designers their tasks in Norway were not necessarily limited to industrial design. After discussion with numerous designers and INDIS staff that has been involved in the DwB programme throughout, it seems evident that INDIS decided to emphasise industrial design to provide an exclusive opportunity to their own staff and alumni since no other university in Guatemala offers this degree choice. Arguably the focus on URL staff and alumni only is in line with the FK approach to rely on institutional networks. However the “exchange” here was not between two reciprocating institutions hence the network component of exchanges appeared to the review team as being less crucial. To the contrary it may have been interesting to have Guatemalan designers from different universities that may represent different socio-economic groups and approaches to the field of design.

INDIS was able to report to DwB in an adequate manner and able to identify local counterparts but the latter was not done in a documented linear way that would ensure transparent and comprehensible triggers for identification/selection of partners and could lead to a well-documented set of lessons learned. As noted above a set of indicators to identify possible partners was only developed in the last stages of the programme and was not made available to the review team, hence it is not commented on here. Follow up/oversight of designers placed in Guatemala varied as has the establishment of enduring relationships with partner organisations locally. It seems that the follow up of designers improved as the programme moved forward. In short more recent designers had more follow up than earlier ones. By and large relationships with partner organisations locally have not survived the end of the collaboration. INDIS maintains relationships with local partners during projects only. As was further substantiated during the comments to this reports these relationships are directly tied to a specific initiative and not relationships that endure beyond the end of the project, unless, of course, another initiative that requires the specific partner be engaged arises. In short the FK goal of promoting longer term partnerships resulting from inter-institutional engagement is not fulfilled by INDIS. This, however, is separate from any engagement or network arising from the exchange that pertains to individual designers.

c) Local counterparts in Norway: The Institutions in Norway which hosted designers were identified by DwB and were given a chance to vet the postulants prior to the final selection. Their role was to serve as hosts and to enable the adequate participation of designers within

¹⁰ The Rocio and Mazilla 2011 report provides limited baseline studies of possible programmes. However two issues are worth noting. First that these studies were not used since DwB has decided to withdraw from Guatemala. More importantly however it is difficult to evaluate how criteria were weighted in an effort to determine the ranking that emerged from the study.

their own design programmes. Here, there are a number of factors that require attention. Firstly, the titles of the designers coming from Guatemala or Uganda was changed in 2008-2009 to “intern”. This reduced the notion of “reciprocity” between participating designers (i.e., Norwegians vs. Guatemalans/Ugandans). The title of intern was used although all designers who came from Guatemala had finished their degree and for the most part had professional experience prior to their tenure in Norway. Secondly, while the idea of the participation of Guatemalan (or Ugandan) designers within Norwegian firms was that they would be able to contribute knowledge that could otherwise not be secured locally, and gain knowledge that they could later utilise in their home countries, a set of objectives which are in line with the FK exchange objectives, the reality has been quite different. By and large, the degree to which individual designers were “needed” or their specific Guatemalan skills/knowledge “used” to support initiatives that were otherwise untenable has been limited (see Chapter 5). The degree to which firms in Norway have ensured that the guest designers were able to benefit from the experience, and return to their home country with new gained knowledge has varied. Overall, institutions in Norway did not count with an organisational structure that enabled the easy incorporation of guest designers and their respective “special skill sets”. This limited the degree to which guest designers could contribute their specific “Guatemalan” knowledge to tasks in Norway. Although of course the design abilities of individual designers are influenced by the collection of experiences which informs their background and in this way Guatemalan designers contribute something new to Norwegian firms, evidence based on interviews with Guatemalan designers showed that when specific skills were held by them these were not actively and systematically incorporated. For example, experience with Guatemalan textiles and Guatemalan crafts. The institutions in Norway, which were examined during this review, did not see their participation as an effort to build capacity which they then relinquished when the designer left. Rather, according to the interviews conducted for this review, Norwegian firms often saw the “exchange” as an opportunity to vet future staff (i.e., often hired the designers after their visiting tenure had ended) or simply an opportunity to have additional man power which they could use at whim. It is noteworthy that while 13 of the Norwegian designers have returned to Norway and one remained or returned to the country where they were based during their tenure (n=14); 6 out of 13 designers from Guatemala are no longer based in Guatemala with 4 based in Norway and two in a third country. Indeed of the firms focused upon all except for Kadabra hired the designer at the end of their ‘internship.’

These institutions were all well-established design firms that had well-established mechanisms, both to create products (i.e., design) in their field of competence as well as to manage their staff. Difficulty in being able to identify or secure staff was one characteristic noted among Spor Design and SG Armaturen. This was either because the firm itself was not attractive to Norwegian designers or because the firm’s location¹¹ made recruitment of skilled professionals difficult. The interest in being able to vet a potential employee without an obligation to hire may also have played a role. Given this, the DwB programme provided these firms with a keen opportunity to increase their staff without risk. In the case of Leardal the designers were seen as an asset to the firms international image, and in the case of Kadabra as an opportunity to gain a staff member. These two firms did appear to have an interest in the exchange itself and hence had objectives closer to those of FK at the start of the process. So whilst the goal of the DwB programme would envisage visiting designers have a clear role and ability to contribute something “new” in many cases this was not so. In short, firms had a solid administrative (i.e., ability to organise) capacity to deal with a visiting designer but less of a capacity to ensure that the visiting designer was able to contribute added value that could not be secured locally in Norway. Kadabra was the only firm that stressed the importance they placed on what they perceived their knowledge transfer function responsibility.

d) Local counterparts in Guatemala: The local institutions and organizations were selected

¹¹ Spor is located in Hammerfest and SG armaturen in located in Lillesand.

by URL and thereafter approached/engaged in order to ascertain their interest in/desire to be part of DwB. These institutions were responsible for hosting the designers and ensuring that he/she was administratively/technically able to fulfil their mandate (i.e., had adequate work space, access to information etc.). The institutions had no active role in electing the designer that was sent to them, but had varying degrees of influence over the role/purpose of the designer. There are examples of cases where the activities carried out by the designer were not understood by the local counterpart (at one extreme) and others where all activities undertaken by the guest designer resulted from a consultative process (other extreme). It is noteworthy that the most successful endeavour in Guatemala, Transitions, was the most recent. DwB stresses that lessons learned through earlier interventions were implemented in this last intervention. Overall the ability of individual institutions/organisations to take all necessary organisational measures to ensure that the intervention succeeded varied. It appears that over time DwB and INDIS became more and more proactive in ensuring that local counterparts had a clear organisational ability to host a designer before one was sent. This is seen as a clear step forward. It is clear from the interventions examined that the organisational structure and abilities of partner entities are key, including their organisational mechanisms to engage other actors within their area of work. For example, the ability of any one partner to use the output generated by the design tenure appears to be inextricably tied to their ability to relate to their individual environment (i.e., be able to ensure that the product designed can be part of a production line and has a market). To this end, some local organisations had better organisational mechanism than others to ensure that their products would/could move beyond the prototype stage.

Overall, the model utilised by DwB functioned administratively in so far as different actors were able to meet their individual minimum requirements as delineated by the DwB programme. However, the ability of the model to serve as an ideal organisational structure to meet the objectives of the DwB programme is less certain. To this end, the following issues come to our attention as worth highlighting:

a) The University:

- 1) The URL is first and foremost an academic institution and as such perhaps not the best conduit to either identifying, or following up, partners on the ground. Indeed, there was no evidence to suggest that relationships between former DwB participating organisations and URL have continued after the end of the programme.
- 2) Seemingly, the URL identified the DwB as an opportunity for its industrial design graduates and hence, was in no way compelled to view the DwB programme as a wider initiative that could, for example, include individuals who had not been associated to the URL. According to INDIS the DwB programme was exclusively intended to focus on industrial design. Indeed, INDIS regards any deviation from this as a deviation from the objectives of the programme. This is a further illustration of the different understandings of the programme objective and general goals, as no documentation from DwB notes its objective as limited to industrial design alone. Furthermore an examination of both the programmes in Guatemala, as well as those in Oslo and Uganda suggest that DwB's understanding of design and of the type of design it wished to include is far broader than industrial design alone. Indeed the only systematic focus on industrial design was by INDIS in its recruitment strategy.

b) The exchange/placement of designers:

- 1) FK exchanges are most often reciprocal between partner institutions. However, in the DwB case a designer from Norway was placed in an organisation/institution in Guatemala; while a former student (and often staff member from the URL) was placed in an organisation in Norway. This meant that there was no link between designers and/or

participating institutions. Hence, the opportunity to build networks was limited. This also meant that designers did not have a clear opportunity to share their experiences during the placement with their home institution as they were essentially individuals pursuing a placement of their own accord.

- 2) In numerous cases designers placed in Guatemala, Uganda as elsewhere (i.e., other than Norway) are involved in both design as well as administrative and other tasks.
 - 3) The Norwegian designers were given extensive responsibility and varied degrees of clarity regarding what was expected of them or what the clear output of their intervention was to be. In contrast, the Guatemalan designers in Norway were identified as “interns” and were given varied degrees of responsibility, but this did not include overall programme oversight and in some cases did not even include design tasks. This approach did not foment a system of equal partnership between partners to the programme.
 - 4) In some cases, there was a clear informal link/tie between the Norwegian design firm and DwB (i.e., individuals knew each other from other unrelated venues/circumstance) which ultimately led to the participation of the firm in the exchange process. This reliance on institutional networks can be beneficial, but may have also been a factor that truncated the DwB ability to identify partners locally in an unbiased and systematic manner based on what the relationship could result in rather than based on who knew whom.
 - 5) Designers coming to Norway were required to speak English. However, designers going to Guatemala often did not speak Spanish prior to their placement. Indeed, none of the designers interviewed who were placed in Guatemala had language skills beyond the most basic/rudimentary ones prior to their arrival. Hence, their ability to perform their duties was limited. Since, it cannot be expected that their language skills would drastically improve despite the 1 month intensive training they were given once in Guatemala. This was further compounded by the limited knowledge of Spanish of some of the people with whom they were expected to interact.¹² Given the often-extensive responsibilities weighted on to designers and that Spanish is an essential language for daily communication in Guatemala, placing individuals without fluent linguistic abilities was a noted constraint in numerous cases.
 - 6) The URL poses that it was equally concerned with designers in Guatemala as well as in Norway, but was better able to support and follow up those in Guatemala. The degree of follow up of designers was improved in the last programme (i.e., Transitions).
- c) The design:**
- 1) The model does not guarantee a clear follow up of design outputs that would ensure the outputs meet the objectives of the DwB programme.
 - 2) What exactly determines what constitutes a DwB output is not fully clear. While in Guatemala the outputs have most often been the direct result of the designer’s intervention, in Norway the lines are far blurrier. Many of the internships in Norway have not resulted in any “DwB” products. However, one intervention did lead to a very visible output, the Mama Natalie birth simulator. Still, in this case the output generated was the initiative of the Norwegian counterpart and would have most probably been carried out irrespective of the DwB contribution. Still it is important to note that the intern from

¹² It is important to note that in some areas of Guatemala people do not speak Spanish fluently. Rather, they rely fully on indigenous languages. However, relying on Spanish as a way to communicate is far more adept than English, of course.

Guatemala did, in this instance, contribute significantly as a designer generally. It is notable, however, that at this time DwB highlights that they are far more dedicated to ensuring that placement of Ugandan designer in Norway lead to the transfer of skills from the Norwegian company to the intern going back to Uganda.

d) The funding:

- 1) The funding has come from Norad and FK, but it has been parallel, rather than joint funding (i.e., governed by commonly defined objectives). This complicates DwB's ability to ensure that all the varied objectives by the different donors are met by each single intervention.

The presentation of the model provided here is particularly focused on the relationships and experience from Guatemala, we understand that the model as such is quite similar to that utilised in Uganda. Although, it has undergone some modifications based on, we are told, the lessons learned in Guatemala. These changes include some direct relationships between DwB and the local counterpart, for example UNICEF, as well as how the counterparts have been identified and the placement of two designers jointly in each programme. While the experience of Uganda may show some progress that is omitted here, the focus on the Guatemalan experience may very well serve to further refine the relationships built as DwB moves forward in the Ugandan context.

3.2 Monitoring, Evaluating interventions and managing risks: Conducting and Doing

As section 3.1 noted that there has been limited institutional (partners to the DwB programme) systematic and critical monitoring and evaluation of projects. Indeed, there are no clear evaluation parameters that have been utilised throughout the Guatemalan experience. DwB notes that these processes are becoming better in Uganda, hence the implementation of these should be examined at a later date. Heavy reliance on single individuals has enabled individuals to both decide upon and implement lessons learned at their own discretion. The initiative of individuals in ensuring lessons learned were incorporated into the way the DwB programme was implemented must be commended. From an organisational perspective, however, the DwB programme has a weakness in terms of documented institutional learning. Which lessons have been adopted and why is unclear, and there is no mechanism to ensure that approaches which have not resulted in good outcomes are not re-introduced in the future by new staff who are unaware of the progress made and lessons learned along the way. There have been numerous reports written by, for example, designers themselves who have delineated the strengths and shortcomings of individual initiatives (end of tenure report), however, and these have been used on an ad hoc basis by individual DwB staff members. This accounts for the changes that have been implemented in more recent programmes.

There are end of programme report as well as regular reports provided by the exchange participants throughout their exchange tenure (i.e., monthly, for example). These reports vary greatly both in format and content from one project to another. The most recent project, from Transitions for example, appeared far more standardised than earlier ones. Some delineate the activities undertaken, as well as any challenges envisaged or experienced and the counter measure proposed to respond to the challenge or threat identified. However, what type of follow up was undertaken to mitigate the risks is unclear. For example, the monthly reports submitted in connection with the Transitions programme included a clear table outlining risks, impact, their probability and the proposed countermeasure. A closer examination of two reports has been used for illustrative purposes. Both tables below correspond to reporting for the Transitions project, the most recent programme in Guatemala. Table 4 is almost identical to Table 5, despite the fact that Table 4 was reported in July 2011 and Table 5 was reported in June 2012.

All other monthly reports between July 2011 and June 2012 had these two rows unchanged (i.e., identical to Table 4 throughout). Almost one year after the first report there was a minor modification to row 2. Examining these reports prompts us to ask a few questions:

- a) What is the purpose of identifying on a regular basis a risk for which there appears to be no adequate form of mitigation other than not conducting the programme at all? It's a clear question prompted by the first row of both tables below.
- b) Overall, what is the purpose of requiring that designers submit regular reports? Who is utilising it and for what purpose? What information is required and what is the rationale behind the data reported on? These questions come to the fore particularly, since, there is such little change found between the two tables.

Table 4: Excerpt July 2011

Risk	Impact (rating)	Probability	Counter Measures
External Risk			
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions may force us to abort the project.	Guatemala has been prone to Natural disasters related to tropical storms and hurricanes, and suffers great human and material loss due to its poor infrastructure and lack of formal household construction. There are also poor disaster response and relief efforts from the Government. This poses a threat to the designer's safety and effectiveness of the project execution. (High)	High	It should be mentioned that the area of Antigua Guatemala, home to the Asociación Transiciones (project partner) is very close to the capital city, and thus, has better roads, infrastructure and safety procedures than most small towns in the country.
Project partner is pressuring designers to spend a lot of time carrying out tasks that are not relevant to the project.	Design without Borders management must clarify designer's role and work description in MOU and clarify those during project if necessary. Upon arrival, the project partner (Asociación Transiciones) did not have a clear idea of the project's objective and evolution of the design process. The designers were asked to immediately start working on designing products without considering the design research phase. (High)	Medium	An extensive project start-up presentation was prepared for all the staff at the project partner to get to know Design without Borders, its previous work and its design process. It is believed that stronger communication should exist between Design without Borders and the project partner during the previous preparation stage to avoid misunderstandings and to make the start-up meeting more productive.

Table 5: Excerpt June 2012

Risk	Impact (rating)	Probability	Counter Measures
External Risk			
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions may force us to abort the project.	Guatemala has been prone to Natural disasters related to tropical storms and hurricanes, and suffers great human and material loss due to its poor infrastructure and lack of formal household construction. There are also poor disaster response and relief efforts from the Government. This poses a threat to the designer's safety and effectiveness of the project execution. (High)	High	It should be mentioned that the area of Antigua Guatemala, home to Asociación Transiciones (project partner) is very close to the capital city, and thus, has better roads, infrastructure and safety procedures than most small towns in the country.
Project partner is pressuring designers to spend a lot of time carrying out tasks that are not relevant to the project.	Design without Borders management must clarify designer's role and work description in MOU and clarify those during project if necessary. Upon arrival, the project partner (Asociación Transiciones) did not have a clear idea of the project's objective and evolution of the design process. The designers were asked to immediately start working on designing products without considering the design research phase. (High)	Low	An extensive project start-up presentation was prepared for all the staff at the project partner to get to know Design without Borders, its previous work and its design process. It is believed that stronger communication should exist between Design without Borders and the project partner during the previous preparation stage to avoid misunderstandings and to make the start-up meeting more productive.

Reports for other intervention were even far less systematic than the example excerpt provided here (i.e., Table 4 and 5) and simply related the activities undertaken during the previous reporting period in a journal type format. The role these reports have had in terms of Monitoring or Evaluating the activities conducted is unclear. Interviews with DwB suggest that their utility at the central level (i.e., within DwB in Oslo) has been at the discretion of the individual manager responsible. At the country level (i.e., in Guatemala at URL), there was no documented use for the reports beyond ensuring that the designer had carried out some activity during the month. In this way, the report served to ensure a degree of accountability of designers as it served to keep tabs on what activities they had, as individuals, been involved in.

DwB notes that since 2011 they have introduced the RBM framework into their way of working and that this is reflected in the work they do currently in Uganda. Doing this, they claim, has also meant that reporting is more actively used. Indeed current annual plans have far clearer goals and indicators. Indicators were also used in the latter cases in Guatemala, for example the Transitions programme, however these were deemed inadequate soon once the programme started on the ground and hence had to be modified. This would suggest that the background information attained prior to the start of the programme was not sufficiently nuanced and/or thorough in order to generate reliable indicators, although there was a descriptive report of the intervention detailing the background of the project (i.e., for Transitions). DwB suggests that their ability to generate indicators has improved in Uganda, a case which was not reviewed in the context of this task. It is expected that the relevance of the material collected in the preliminary reports has also improved from the Transitions experience forwards as to more adequately support the identification of indicators.

When we examine risks, and the way that DwB has handled risks. The data reviewed does not permit a clear examination into how risks have been handled. This is primarily because the reports that were gathered from the field in Guatemala did not have a clear and systematic utility. However, it is important to highlight that the most recent reports from Guatemala had clearly defined risks, which is seen as a positive step forward. Here it is important to distinguish between risks that can be influenced and those which cannot. Focusing attention on risks which are unmovable, may lead the actors to limit their commitment to the effort from the start. An example of risks which cannot be changed is visible in row 1 of both table 4 and 5 above. Overall, interviews with DwB suggest that they have become increasingly aware of risks in their interventions in Uganda. We would encourage DwB to ensure that they clearly distinguish between the different types of risks and note unchangeable risks in the general report rather than the monthly updates.

In addition, DwB's exit from Guatemala was tied to the perception of security, and risk, associated with remaining in the country. The security situation in Guatemala has been consistently challenging throughout the life cycle of the programme. However it appears that it was the individual experiences of the designers, rather than an assessment of changing levels of risk that prompted the exit. In future it may be more adequate for DwB to have a clear approach to determining risks and responding to them rather than relying on individual misfortunes as triggers for action.

3.3 Exit Plans

In order to examine the DwB exit plans, in the context of DwB's ability to organise, we turn to the Lewin's change management model which is based on exploring exit as a three stage process: unfreeze, change and refreeze. This model recognises that in order for sustainability to be achieved there must be a process that clearly communicates the exit and makes provisions to ensure that the role played by the institution exiting is either transferred or replaced prior to the actual exit.

Here we will examine exit plans in relation to three scenarios:

1. Exit from an individual partnership with a local organisation after the end of a single designer placement;
2. Exit from an individual partnership with a local organisation after multiple consecutive designer placements; and
3. Exits from working in a country.

These categories have been identified because we felt that each required different levels of attention and had distinct characteristics that were worth highlighting.

Firstly, **exit plans/experiences involving DwB and organisations that hosted a single designer placement.** This type of case also includes large institutions, like the Municipality, where more than one designer were hosted but there were no linkages between the different designers and their respective tasks. The “*Unfreeze*”, “*Change*” and “*Refreeze*” process of this type of placements is very basic: DwB makes a commitment for a single placement of a designer without any indication that any further designers will be placed at the institution in future. In short, there is a basic understanding from the start that at the end of the designer’s tenure the programme would be discontinued. To this end, the agreed upon output of the placement is understood as the end of the project. This approach places the burden on the host organisation, not DwB, to ensure that the outputs of the designer’s tenure have longer term implications. The need to exit or reasons for why only a single designer will be placed within the institution varies from case to case with some organisations clearly recognising the merit of the approach and others feeling that a more long term DwB commitment would be warranted. This approach works best when the output of the designer placement is very clear and tangible and is something that fits well into the rest of the organisation’s body of work: For example, consider the handicapped access plans for the Transmetro¹³ in Guatemala. This programme was a task that had a very clear output/result which fit seamlessly into the general work-plan of the municipality in terms of their overall “Transmetro” plan of action and work schedule.

In these cases the “exit plan” is communicated to the partner from the onset of the project. The degree to which the project is designed to build on existing capacities and empower partner organizations varies somewhat. In some cases, the result of the project is a clear “product”, the bicycle paths master plan, for example, and hence, the output could have utility without the need to build further capacity beyond explain how to use the master plan. In other cases, the building of capacity has been a core component of the placement itself. For example, the creation of the wheelchair prototype for Transitions was executed in a way that ensured that clear capacity and a sense of empowerment were left behind amongst the workshop staff at Transitions. The latter case is a good example of a “*refreezing*” process that was successful. Follow up with the institution revealed that the prototype is still being fine-tuned but that the workshop team is fully able to do this; the wheelchair is a product that can both be produced by the Transitions workshop and has a solid client base; moreover, working with the designers enabled the workshop staff to feel more confident about their ability to contribute to future design efforts. Hence, here the process of exit can be understood as successful. This success seems to be tied directly to the ability of the institution to work independently rather than to the efforts made by DwB to ensure a successful exit.

Secondly, **exit plans/experiences involving DwB and organisations that hosted multiple consecutive designer placements.** This category of exit plan is described separately because although it is similar to the first case (see above) in that each designer placed has a task or tasks to fulfil in a limited time period, these programmes count with a series of designers placed consecutively. In these cases each single intervention (i.e., designer) is expected to build upon the work conducted by the previous designer. These efforts have less clear timelines because although it is clear that designers will be placed for a limited time period, how many designers will be placed overtime is not known from the start. Of the cases examined, the work in textiles and the creation of the **Zumos** brand at San Juan La Laguna is a good illustration. Unlike single placements of designers, programmes involving multiple designers placed consecutively seem to be less clear in terms of overall goals (i.e., what will be accomplished by all the designers in conjunction). On one hand, the work by individual designers appears to be more dynamic and responsive to local needs. On the other hand, this approach is less clear regarding what exactly

¹³ Public transport system instituted in Guatemala

is to be accomplished by each designer.¹⁴ The experience from the example reviewed in Guatemala showed that there was a very limited understanding of how the designer placements would build on the work of the previous designers (i.e., would progress over time). Tied to this, the exit of DwB was not understood by the local partners as having arisen because goals have been achieved or because sustainability was secured. On the contrary, the exit was perceived as arbitrary. DwB did inform the counterpart that they would discontinue placements of designers but this notification was not part of a joint plan built to ensure that the organisation was able to systematically take on the responsibilities/tasks carried out by the designer. It was noted that over time much of the lessons learned by the host organisations have been internalised and utilised even if this was not part of a clear exit strategy. The issue of sustainability '*refreezing*' is a question that is both tied to the exit plan but also to the relevance of the task conducted (see Chapter 5). In this particular case, the local counterpart has noted that the most relevant issue has been their ability to secure sustainability, while much of what was intended by the programmes has not been achieved (i.e., has not been sustainable). It's important to underscore that the challenges faced here illustrate that even in cases where the DwB intervention was longer and expanded multiple designer placements, some projects were either not ready to be able to host and benefit from a designer and/or were ill-conceived. These two factors have, as is illustrated here, consequences that include the degree of sustainability/exist success. Additionally, this category illustrated that DwB did not have a clear and methodological approach to exit, but rather limited their approach to "informing" the counterpart that they would discontinue their involvement. This type of effort could benefit from an approach to exit that is better tied to achieved goals. Although in this particular case there were so many challenges that the exit strategy may not have affected sustainability at all.

Thirdly, we turn our attention to the **exit from a country on the whole**. It's important to distinguish this as a separate group because existing from a country translates into the severing of the partnerships with the key players which have been part of the programme throughout. In the case of Guatemala, the key partner was the URL. It is apparent that the exit strategy by DwB was largely limited to informing the URL that they would be discontinuing the placement of designers in Guatemala and with hosting Guatemalan designers in Norway. At a glance this approach may seem sufficient as it ensured all the parties were given due notice, the approach serves to underscore the expectations of the relationship. The URL was not seen as an organisation that should have had a more in-depth and long standing relationship with either its local partners or with companies that hosted Guatemalan designers. If the URL had, in fact, had more solid relationships with its counterparts then the exit plan would have had to also consider how these relationships were to be maintained. Also, notable is that while the exit as such was sudden, the ULR and DwB are currently exploring possible future collaboration. Similarly, the ULR is also exploring the possibility of becoming engaged in exchanges through FK directly. Overall the process of exit, from a change model perspective, lacked all the basic components. However, the programme appears to have also lacked a clear view of what the URL would contribute in the long term? What about the URL's role in the DwB programme could generate an outcome that would merit sustainability? And how such sustainability could/should be secured? In the absence a clear description of long term expectations of the main partner (i.e., in Guatemala the URL), the question of adequate exit plans is arguably beyond scope.

3.4 Concluding Remarks

As pertains to the DwB model for placing designers within institutions both in Guatemala as in Norway, there are some clear questions that require attention. Chief among them is DwB

¹⁴ It is important to note that this description is based on the San Juan La Laguna experience which, according to Xuaan Chi Ya, the firm that emerged from the programme and is responsible for distributing the Zumos goods, was very unclear at the outset of what it was to accomplish, what the role of the initial designers was, etc. (see Chapter 5).

identifying the right partnerships in order to ensure that the programme benefits from the strongest set of abilities to organise amongst its partners. That is to say that the characteristics of the institutions which would have been necessary to ensure that both the design contribution in Guatemala was a sustainable one and that designers going to Norway had an opportunity to contribute to design and learn about Norwegian design were not sufficiently vetted in all cases to ensure success. As pertains to reporting, on the one hand reports do exist, on the other hand how these have been used and what overall purpose they fulfilled in Guatemala is less clear. Lastly as pertains to exit plans, these have generally not been clearly envisaged beyond informing partners that exit is soon approaching. DwB notes that they are far more stringent in their selection of partners in Uganda and are moving towards a more systematic approach to using the data they collect.

The key strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the DwB programme in terms of its ability to organise looking at the Guatemala experience are noted in the box below. It is important to stress that while the most recent programme in Guatemala, Transitions, is amongst the most successful the systematic utilization of reports and development of more nuanced exit plans was not fully implemented in Guatemala. DwB notes that these areas of progress are more visible in the recent Ugandan interventions, which were not the focus cases of this review and hence are omitted here.

Table 6: SWOT Ability to organise

SWOT – Ability to organise	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutions in Norway were well established. • The URL counts with a solid organisational structure • Some partner organisations (where designers were placed) counted with solid organisational structures. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The use of reports in a systematic manner is unclear / undocumented. • Some partner organisations had very weak organisational structures. • Exit plans were very basic and did not systematically ensure that DwB efforts were sustainable.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DwB as the centre of all relationships is in a position to ensure that it learns from all the different relationships it pursues as part of the programme. • The reports can be used in a systematic way to ensure that interventions are adequately monitored, and evaluated and that lessons learned are incorporated in a clear, systematic and documented manner. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The lack of documentation regarding the incorporation of lessons learned and what led to said lessons could lead to regression in progress made in the future when new staff, unaware of the experience gained, joins the DwB programme.

4.0 Ability to Relate

In this chapter DwB's ability to relate to partners is explored. This section focuses on DwB ability to relate to partners beyond those with which it cooperates directly (see Figure 8 in Chapter 3) as DwB's mechanism to relate to immediate partners was discussed earlier in (Chapter 3). Here, we make a distinction between the DwB work in Norway and its work in host countries (Guatemala and Uganda). In addition we also discuss how DwB relates to the development sector and to its donors.

4.1 Relating in and to the Norwegian Environment

DwB ability to relate to institutions, organisations and the general public in Norway is one area that has commanded considerable attention. Particularly, in relation to the exhibitions and the media coverage that DwB has secured in Norway. DwB has been remarkably successful at marketing their accomplishments within the Norwegian environment. Examples of this include the exhibition in Oslo this year (Oct-Dec 2012), as well as media coverage, brochures and other publications. DwB's aptitude and commitment to ensuring it has a recognised place within the design and to a lesser extent, development environment in the Norwegian context is clear. The portrayal of the work conducted through the DwB programme merits discussion. While clearly, DwB's ability to convey in an accessible form, the type of programmes and initiatives they have been involved in over the years is positive, a review of the most recent catalogue which was designed as complementary to the exhibition on display in the fall of 2012 (see Box "The 2012 DwB exhibition") reveals that narratives of the projects lack a nuanced understanding of the development process and the factors that are required in order to enable design to have an impact. The narrative makes leaping conclusions in terms of impact that merits question. We do not intend here to categorically state that the arguments put forth are wrong. Instead, that a far more nuanced presentation would be more accurate in representing how DwB operated and also noting the challenges that are faced when working in the development sector. This in turn would serve to further inform the Norwegian audience regarding design, its contribution and the real challenges that are met in the field when designers venture into the development territory. Some examples of the current shortcoming of the explanation given in the aforementioned catalogue include the following statements:

- a) "In a unique fashion the creative processes that Design without Borders is involved in produce equality between the designers and all other participants. In such a creative process, the distinction between the one who "assists" and the one "being assisted" is obliterated"(pg. 21). While this statement can be understood as a goal of the programme, the evidence collected from the field suggest that achieving equity is a tall order that requires trust building and respect that can only be developed overtime. While some project may have achieved this, the limited interaction between designers and end users has also truncated the ability of the programme to achieve the goal embedded in the above statement. The Guatemalan experience shows that the interaction between designers and the staff of the organisations and institutions where they were placed varied immensely from full integration to almost no communication. This difference between one case and another seems to have been tied to a number of factors including: individual personality of the designers; the designers' linguistic competence; and the type of task the designer was trying to undertake. While efforts to improve communication are reported and understood as positive, DwB should remain aware of the difficulties embedded in securing equity between partners.
- b) "In a society haunted by fatal accidents it is difficult for people to see life in a long term perspective. The consequence of this engrained fatalism is an absence of family

planning and economic planning, and a high HIV infection rate" (p. 85). This statement, which is made in connection with the development of lifejacket for fishermen in Uganda is a gross simplification of what can be achieved by the creation of this device and overlooks the complexities faced by intervention in the HIV-Aids field. Overall, this type of statements troubling as they both show a lack of understanding of the complexities of development aid, in this case the health sector, but also unduly credits the DwB achievements. Moreover, this approach is unlikely to be conducive to cooperation with other development initiatives.

- c) In relation to the role of design in sanitation and the link between sanitation and urban economic growth the catalogue notes, "we interviewed all kinds of stakeholders to get an understanding of the breakdowns and why the traditional development community had not been able to deliver lasting results in sanitation. The conclusion was clear but the solutions complex: The sanitation sector needed innovation both in terms of service delivery and product development, and to find a way to create turnover in order to make sanitation systems sustainable"(p. 98). While it is undeniable that DwB can have a useful contribution in this, as well as other sectors, all-encompassing statements that put the DwB intervention front and centre as the "solution" to the ills of development both gives DwB undue credit and shows a lacking understanding of the limitations of design in the development field. This kind of statement are in contrast with interviews conducted with DwB staff who noted that their efforts have become tapered over the years and that DwB is much better able today to determine the exact role they may play within a broader intervention.

DwB responds to the critique to the Catalogue by stressing that it is to reflect the experiences, views and ideas of external actors or that of the curator, and not necessarily of DwB, this however highlights an additional concern: the catalogue is clearly a DwB publication. Indeed it is branded as such. Therefore it can serve both as an asset to the programme or a detriment to it. DwB cannot expect readers to associate its content to the author and fundamentally extricate DwB from said assessment. Therefore it is in the interest of DwB to ensure that the message conveyed is one that is representative of their views, understanding, objectives, etc. Otherwise the publication should be far more clearly branded as in no way representative of DwB and its view of itself and the world. Moreover the publication would benefit from clearly outlining which products have been successful and which ones less so and why. As it stands it is not evident that a number of products in the catalogue are not being produced (i.e., have essentially not succeeded).

4.2 Relating in and to the Foreign Environments

As pertains to DwB's ability to relate to other actors in the design field outside Norway, and/or the population at large, it is important to distinguish between activities within the European/Western context and activities or efforts undertaken in the countries where the programme has been implemented (i.e., designs have been created). In the case of other European countries DwB is an active participant at relevant conferences and meetings. In countries where it has operated, such as Guatemala, it has been involved in supporting exhibitions. Indeed, there is current discussion with partners regarding the possibility to take the exhibit displayed in Norway in the fall and winter of 2012 to Guatemala.

This type of involvement promoting the programme outside Norway can have two particular forms of impact: first, that it allows former designers involved to highlight their work in environments that may be professionally beneficial/fruitful to them; second, having design displays in countries such as Guatemala can serve to provide a new perspective on what type of activities can contribute to the development sector and what is needed in order to spring board the country forward. However, it is important to note that the degree of coverage given to the exchange in Guatemalan media has been limited. Importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that efforts within Guatemala, to disseminate the work done under the DwB programme umbrella have resulted in a broadening of the programme's network. In short, efforts such as exhibitions have not lead to the coming forward of new partners, greater reception/coverage for the products produced by DwB etc. This may very well be tied to the fact that while exhibitions can be useful, they inherently cater to a particular segment of society which tends to be the

The 2012 DwB Exhibition

In 2012, Norsk Form staged an exhibition commemorating the 10th anniversary of the DwB programme. The exhibition was housed at Norsk Form's house DoGA and it displayed an array of the products that have, over the years, resulted from the Design without Borders (DwB) programme. Visitors were shown an emergency shelter made from empty plastic bottles, the MamaNatalie birth simulator, the wheelchair from Transiciones placed in an "Antigua market square" setting, as well as the UNICEF information portal placed in a village like setting. All products were shown alongside an extensive presentation of the history of, and processes that led to, the end product. Each exhibit focused considerable attention on the value added of design competence in creating products or principles for product creation that addresses user needs in a development setting.

Although, the 2012 exhibition was by far the largest initiative of its kind in the history of the programme, it was not exceptional in terms of DwB promotional outputs. The first book on the programme was published in 2004. Products such as the mine clearing equipment and the Bepro helmet have been parts of exhibitions in Norway as well as abroad. DwB staff and programme participants have regularly presented the results and experiences at conferences around Europe and elsewhere and to students at the design institutions in Norway. The programme has produced brochures and leaflets, as well as its own website and visual profile. Moreover, DwB has had consistent, albeit sometimes limited, media attention every year. Undeniably, a considerable effort is placed on promoting knowledge about the programme's ideas and principles within the design industry in Norway.

The 2012 exhibition, conducted alongside a conference which included participants from institutions that have partners with DwB from both Guatemala and Uganda, and exhibition catalogue, were the main Norsk Form promotional event/outputs of the year. In the exhibition, DwB proposes that all ideas leading to the design outputs displayed were both new and that DwB has been the driving force behind the results. However, an examination into the factors/histories of the individual outputs, those displayed as well as others, reveals that the role played by DwB was not always instrumental or catalytic. Hence, a more nuanced display may have better enabled visitors to reflect on the various processes that have led to the displayed results and in so doing gain a more nuanced understanding of the role played by designers generally and DwB in particular. Moreover, the publication that accompanied the exhibition dedicated considerable space to discussing different design outputs, however, a number of the story lines reviewed lacked a clear and intricate/detailed understanding of the development environment and the actual degree to which a single intervention can contribute. By giving the impression that the design output may be instrumental in generating a social or practical change is somewhat misleading and can create undue expectations from the DwB programme and its outputs.

more privileged and hence, the one requiring least development efforts within the overall country context/reality.

4.2 Relating to the development sector

There are two key aspects in relating to the development sector: First, how well DwB sees its work as grounded in development and actively utilizes the lessons learned from the development field as ways to more effectively carry out its own tasks; second, how well DwB is regarded by development actors and how DwB is able to become an actor that contributes to broader efforts in the development field.

DwB has number of agreements with UN agencies, including the World Food Programme and UNICEF. These are positive steps towards working as part of larger ventures. DwB also highlights its relationships with numerous other institutions. The Guatemala experience does not attest to high levels of collaboration between DwB and the development sector, the above suggests this is changing in Uganda.

The degree to which DwB has rooted its work in the development paradigms and actively benefitted from the lessons that have been learned over the years by the development sector is less clear. With the move towards identifying their own work as a limited part of broader efforts there is a greater opportunity for DwB to actively ensure they become familiarized with and benefit from the experiences from the development sector. This should not, in any way, affect DwB ability to remain rooted in the field of design. Becoming active members of the development sector, by relating more actively to development actors, and becoming well versed with the development paradigms should serve to strengthen the DwB ability to engage in interventions which are more likely to be successful.

4.3 Donors: relating to donor goals and donors relating to each other

DwB has as a challenge meeting the objectives of both Norad and FK. Norad and FK for their part do not act in unison in relation to the DwB programme. Therefore little is gained from the “joint” character of the effort. Each donor operates individually towards DwB.

In relation to how DwB is able to meet the demands of each donor, there are a number of issues worth noting. First, the DwB model is included in the FK framework as an exchange, although it does not meet the standard characteristics of an FK exchange and hence it cannot meet the overall goals of FK exchanges. FK is aware that DwB does not operate in the same manner as do their other “exchange” efforts. In short all interested parties operate in the knowledge that DwB does not, and will not be able to meet FK overall expectations, but have not actually formalized their understanding and agreement of the DwB experience as an exception.

Norad for its part funds primarily the “Norwegian” component part of the programme as FK covers most of the placements in developing countries. This presents an interesting dichotomy, since normally the expectation of Norad as a development organization would be that its contribution is more closely tied to the activities on the ground.

The distinction in the funding distribution is most apparent because the donors have not developed a joint objective to which they both contribute in an equitable manner. Rather each is operating as a separate donor which in essence only allows it to understand its contribution as limited to what it has covered financially. As it stands today there is no added value gained from the joint funding because the donors work independently of one another.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

Adequately conveying the work conducted, being able to relate to other institutions working in the same field and in broader sectors is an important aspect of development work. DwB is

clearly talented in presenting its outputs to both specific audiences as well as the public at large. Its outreach appears primarily focused on the design sector or the public and its aim appears focused on demonstrating the role of design from a design perspective. This inherently means that actors who do not conceive “design” as a field of work that can add value to them may disregard the DwB efforts before even exploring them.

A review of the efforts to engage with other actors/the public also revealed that in cases where there is a well-established environment where the design output would fit, little effort to place the design firmly within the broader context is required. However, in cases where the design effort did not have a firm role then there is a need to explore and ensure that the output is adequately conceptualised (i.e., that the design has a clear and adequate home). To this end, DwB needs to be able to both understand itself as a design institution but also be able to root itself within the development paradigms. Thus far, it does not appear that DwB has been able to do this. There is no evidence to suggest that development practitioners understand DwB as a development initiative. Rather, it appears to be regarded as a design institution which works on the fringes of development efforts. This is one of the challenges that DwB appears to be trying to confront in its current work with UNICEF in Uganda. Being both a design institution and having roots in development is, of course, a tall order that requires bridging two sectors that are traditionally distinct and which do not naturally regard each other as belonging to the same category. This in turn requires that DwB make an effort to understand the challenges faced by the development sector and learn from the knowledge gained in that field thus far. Moreover, the DwB programme should consider more clearly framing its work within existing donor strategies that also place development at their centre. While this may seem cumbersome overall it would help DwB in determining a more clear identity in the broader field and also enable it to benefit from all the efforts that have come before it.

The key strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the DwB programme in terms of its ability to relate are noted in the box below.

Table 7: SWOT Ability to relate

SWOT – Ability to relate	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solid ability to market itself within the Norwegian environment and ensure the brand is recognised. • Recent recognition (documented in interviews only) that the DwB role is limited to precise interventions within larger programmes/programmes. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of systematic and nuanced understanding/depiction of its role and activities within development initiatives.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage with the development sector more actively and ensure that DwB publications clearly and intelligently depict their role as a contribution to broader efforts. • MoU with UN agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of a more nuanced understanding of the development paradigms and relevant lessons learned.

5.0 Ability to Do

This chapter focuses exclusively on the DwB programme's "*ability to do*", (i.e., deliver on its goals and objectives). In order to systematically examine the DwB ability to do, we have chosen to utilise the RBM framework. Hence, below we examine each component of the RBM utilising examples of the case studies to illustrate the DwB experience. However, before turning our attention to Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability, we present a general overview of the programme in an effort to provide a backdrop for some of the discussions found later on in this chapter

5.1 DwB: An Overview

The DwB programmes included an extensive number of initiatives, partners, and outcomes. Here, we focus on providing an overview of the key projects that were examined as case studies in order to avail the reader of important background information that we felt was crucial in order to understand the analysis provided later on and the conclusions we have arrived at.

As noted in Chapter 1, a select number of interventions in Guatemala and in Norway were identified as examples of the DwB programme trajectory. Here, a brief overview of those projects is provided in order to have a backdrop against which these examples can be utilised to illustrate particular strengths or weaknesses of the programme later in this chapter. In Guatemala, the interventions focused on in chronological order were:

- a) **Shelter Project (2003-2011)** This intervention has included a series of efforts over the years which have not been continued. The first phase of the project counted with a single designer for 11 months. To begin with the project included the design of a shelter prototype, the construction of shelters. Most recently, in the last phase, the drafting of a catalogue of all the different types of shelters that have been used by different actors in Guatemala has been developed. The final document produced makes mention of Sphere standards¹⁵ and confirms that all the shelters described in the catalogue comply with the standards. However, it is unclear what the shelters designed for Guatemala have which sets them apart from others created elsewhere around the globe and which also comply with recognised international standards. The added value of this project in view of other efforts elsewhere is not clear. Our ability to draw from the experiences of this intervention were limited since we were unable to contact individuals in Guatemala that were familiar with the initial intervention and who could clearly outline what was gained from the creation of a shelter prototype.¹⁶
- b) **San Juan La Laguna Weaving Project (2005-2009):** This intervention was a comparatively long intervention spanning a number of years and counting with 61 person months of designer professionals. The objective of the project was to provide weavers from San Juan La Laguna with alternative mechanisms to generate income.

¹⁵ See <http://www.sphereprogramme.org/about/>

¹⁶ Originally, we also aimed to use the shelter project as an example but we were able to collect only scant data on this project because the network between the URL and other actors was so weak that it was not possible for us to identify individuals who would be able to provide us with a more detailed understanding of the project. Most recently the project has included an effort by INDIS to catalogue all the shelter initiatives/approaches taken in Guatemala. This effort, however, is a compilation of designs rather than the creation of a design.

This included, at the onset, an effort to explore ecotourism opportunities and later came to focus upon the development of a product line that would enable the community of San Juan La Laguna to improve their income generation potential from weavings. The intervention's tangible outputs were generated by four individual designers each of whom were involved in either the improved presentation of the village (i.e., garbage collection mechanism) and general beautification (i.e., first designer); or in the creation of a number of products that were to be sold under a brand created by the intervention (**Zumos**) and which was intended to cater to a not yet targeted customer (i.e., a luxury goods buyer). The designers involved in the latter interventions which focused on the creation of **Zumos** were based in San Juan La Laguna and worked directly with a number of local weavers. As the project progressed, an institution was born to be able to make sales of the products created. This firm, Xuaan Chi Ya, as noted, emerged from the intervention but was not originally the DwB partner in San Juan La Laguna. The former staff from original partner, Fundacion Solar, which has since collapsed, were unable to provide any information to the review team regarding the efforts made within the context of the project.

- c) Universal Access to the Bus (Transmetro) (2008-2009):** A single designer was based at the Guatemala city municipality and tasked with developing an approach to meet the needs of the handicapped/disabled to improve their access to this particular form of public transport. The designer's work was firmly tied to the development of the Transmetro and hence, the effort was implemented very quickly. It is also important to note that the initiative to include access for the handicapped to the Transmetro system was something that was scheduled within the Municipalities work-plan and hence, would have taken place irrespective of the DwB designer's tenure. The Municipality does count with both an awareness of the need for designers as well as a budget to secure the service of designers on a need-basis.¹⁷
- d) Bicycle Lane Master Plan (2009-2010):** This project counted with a single designer who was based at the Municipality of Guatemala in the Urban Development Department. The designer, one of the few Non-Norwegian designers who were involved in the DwB programme and represented the Norwegian side of the placements, had a background in landscape architecture as well as industrial design and was an avid cyclist himself. While he was based at the municipality, the designer invested considerable energy engaging local cycling associations and promoting cooperation and communication between the Municipality and the potential users (i.e., the associations). The Municipality proposes that cycling lanes had been an item on the agenda for quite some time but that the presence of the designer was able to precipitate progress made in this field.
- e) Transitions-Wheelchair Development (2011):** This intervention counted with two designers. One stayed a longer than the one year originally envisaged (i.e., the total time of placement: 1.5 years), while the other left before he had completed the first year.

¹⁷ DwB claims that the quality of output was drastically improved by their involvement in the project. However, it is impossible for the review team to determine if the Municipality would have hired more, less or equally competent staff if they had had to pursue the task alone. Moreover, it is outside of the scope of this review to assess the quality of designers hired by the Municipality for other city projects.

The reasons for the early departure of one of the designers was tied to personal experiences and his perception of safety and not to factors directly relevant to the programme itself. The majority of the placement counted with both designers working together. The designers were based at Transitions, a local NGO that has 17 years of experience producing wheelchairs for local end users around Guatemala. The organisation has a clear objective and line of work and extensive end user experience as most of the people who work at Transitions are handicapped wheelchair users themselves. This project aimed to produce a wheelchair for children which met specific technical/medical and operational demands particular to the Guatemalan context including, for example, robustness, light weight, solid support for the patient, etc. The project also set to support Transition's in-house ability to design their own products in future. This was the last project in Guatemala and counted with a baseline study and the identification of clear indicators at the onset of the project, which was not the case in all Guatemala projects. The indicators first identified were changed when the project was fielded as they were found to be inadequate. The Transitions project is amongst the most successful in Guatemala and one that, according to interviews with DwB, included a number of lessons learned from other experiences in the country. This project showed that having a better understanding of the project, clear and narrow objectives and a solid partner were key components to ensure overall success. The project also served to illustrate the challenges in identifying the most relevant information as part of the baseline study and identifying relevant indicators based on these studies.

In Norway the Interventions focused on were:

- f) Laerdal Medical (Placement 2008-2009)** is a well-established company with 400 employees in different countries around the globe which is specialised in designing and producing various medical assistance tools. It is mostly known worldwide for its Heart-Lung-Resuscitation training doll "Anne". Laerdal has also successfully developed a low tech infant resuscitation training doll. Following this experience, they were exploring the possibility of pursuing the development of a birth simulator that could be used to help midwives. Particularly, in low-income settings, to train on how to respond to the most common birth complications. When the DwB programme became engaged with Leardal and a decision to identify a designer from Guatemala was made, the initial thinking about the birth simulator had already commenced. Indeed, upon selection, the Guatemalan intern was informed that this may be a programme she would be engaged in. The intern's Guatemalan background, according to the interviews conducted, does not seem to have been of any consequence to her contribution to the final output (i.e. Mama Natalie), although it is undeniable that she was an active member of the design team and as such an important contributor to the final product. The designer was not familiar with either the conditions or realities of birthing in Guatemala or elsewhere in the developing world/context therefore her nationality did not contribute to her role as a designer in the project, rather it was her skill as a designer generally that made her a solid asset to the team. Flaws in the design which made it ill-conceived for the developing world/context were identified through a testing process in Ethiopia. The design that emerged from this effort has been widely successful so far and the Guatemalan intern herself has secured a permanent placement within Leardal as part of their design staff. Indeed this could be seen as supporting the DwB self perception that

they are generally good at identifying good designers. This aptitude while beneficial to the firms involved does not ensure, however, that the overall objectives of the programme are met.

- g) Spor Design (Placement 2009-2010)** is located in Hammerfest, the northernmost city of Norway. Spor is one of the few design companies in this sparsely populated region of Norway that serves clients locally (i.e., within the northern region of Norway). The company is small and counted with two staff members. Indeed, the Guatemalan intern came to account for 1/3 of the staff capacity of the firm. The firm has traditionally focused primarily on graphic design but most recently, also, in industrial design. The Guatemalan intern worked mainly on graphic design. Although, his background was in industrial design. The company's manager states that although, they were loosely interested in the type of input that could be generated by hosting a designer from another country (i.e., Guatemala), the primary motive for engaging with the DwB programme and indeed, agreeing to host a Guatemalan designer was to vet a likely future employee without having to hire them first. Moreover, an intern from Guatemala was far more likely to agree to a placement in Northern Norway than would a Norwegian designer (i.e., Hammerfest, a very small town in a desolate region of Norway). Indeed, Spor also takes part in the Norwegian-Russian matchmaking programme in an effort to recruit staff from Russia. The intern from Guatemala was first extended for six months, then hired on a permanent basis by Spor, but has since moved to Oslo in pursuit of employment in the capital.
- h) SG Armaturen (Placement 2011-2012)** was established in 1990 and is known to be the preferred choice for lamp and light fitting design of a large number of leading electrical wholesalers, electrical installers, architects and lighting engineers. The product range is designed and manufactured by SG AS in close cooperation with renowned industrial designers and architects. The Company's Head Office and General Stock is located in Lillesand in the southern part of Norway, while the production of their products is carried out in Dong Guan, China. The company explains that their need was for an industrial designer with some experience, this was tied to their need for more staff. Lillesand is not an attractive work location for Norwegian designers, hence, their involvement with the DwB programme was a clear mechanism to recruit new personnel. Once the Guatemalan intern proved herself as competent, she was hired on a permanent basis.
- i) Kadabra Design (Placement 2011-2012)** now, Kadabra, is a Norwegian design bureau with offices in Trondheim and Oslo. At the time of the exchange, the firm counted with seven staff members. The intern was given a variety of programmes to work on because Kadabra was aware that knowledge transfer was to be an element of the internship. Simultaneously, the firm did see the DwB programme as an opportunity to potentially engage a new staff member. However, in this case the intern was not hired on a permanent basis and is instead currently pursuing a master's degree/diploma/programme in service design in Norway.

In each of these cases, the designer placed in Guatemala worked largely autonomously and was able to have considerable authority over how they wanted to arrive at their end objective. In most cases, they were not part of a team of designers. The only exception is Transitions where two designers came and worked jointly, a model that is now used consistently by DwB. Transitions is also different in that the wheel chair workshop workers became more and more directly involved in the design process as the visiting designers made progress on the design. In the case of the Norwegian firms, we found no evidence, amongst the example cases, where the specific knowledge of the Guatemalan designer was relevant. Indeed, in most cases the designer was regarded by the local firm as an addition to the firm's general man power and

often, as is noted above, hired on a permanent basis after the placement ended. DwB highlighted that they were not always aware of the motivations driving the participation of Norwegian firms. Overall the more in-depth vetting of Norwegian partners could be beneficial to the programme in ensuring that the Norwegian side of the placements meet the goals of the programme.

The Exchange Experience

Based on the survey data collected from participating designers, the following has been gleaned to create a profile of design participants as well as of their experiences/perceptions of the placement.

Half of the survey respondents (x=14) were between 26 and 30 years of age at the time of their placement, seven were 25 years old or younger, while 9 were between 31 and 40 years old. No designer surveyed was older than 40 at the time of their tenure. The survey was completed by an equal number of both female and male designers, of these half came from Norway; 12 from Guatemala and a further 2 from Uganda. The majority of designers were single at the time of their tenure (x=19; n=29). Of those who were married or cohabitating, 5 were accompanied by their spouses or partners, 2 were visited during their tenure and a further 2 were alone throughout their placement. With one exception, all the designers that were either accompanied or visited during their exchange were Norwegian.

At the time of the exchange, the majority of designers (x=23; n=27) identified themselves as professional designers rather than managers or students. The same trend is true currently (x=21 designers; n=26). 9 of these were Norwegian while the remaining 14 were from either Guatemala or Uganda. This data was exactly the same both before the DwB programme as is currently. 18 of 28 respondents noted that they had been selected through a competitive process but an analysis of how they found out about the DwB initiative reveals that most often an existing network (i.e., university, friends, direct contact with someone involved in the programme) precipitated their application. In the case of Norwegian designers, however, the data suggests that in the majority of cases (10 out of 14) the designer became aware of the programme through an advert.

Regarding the placement itself, the majority of respondents (n=20; x=29) were hosted for 13-18 months, and three designers stayed longer than 18 months. Indeed all designers from Norway were placed for 13-18 months, with one exception who stated that he/she was posted for a period longer than 18 months. It is also noteworthy that 10 of 19 respondents noted that they were not the first designer placed through DwB in the same organisation/institution. In the case of Norwegian designers, 9 out of 14 stated that they were the first designer in the institution. However, only 3 respondents, of which 1 was a Norwegian designer, were placed with another designer (i.e., two designers working alongside each other).

13 designers felt they were part of identifying the programme they were part of and/or determining what the programme would accomplish, of which 9 were Norwegian. Their roles varied between leading the intervention to playing a role in the brainstorming process that led to the end product. Amongst the designers that were not part of the identification of the programme they worked on, they most often noted that their employer determined what programmes would move forward and the role they would play. Also, notable was that the majority of designers were unaware of what factors contributed to determine which programmes were identified as worth pursuing by DwB. Still, 24 respondents (n=29), of which 14 were Norwegian, felt that the programme they were involved in had the potential for impact. The responses to substantiate this view varied extensively and generally did not, however, include a clear regard for the challenges faced in ensuring that outcomes lead to discernible impact. Along this view, most respondents (x=21; n=27), 10 of which were Norwegian designers, felt that DwB did have the capacity to facilitate change in the field of design.

Turning our attention to the expectations placed on designers, it was notable that 14 respondents felt that the expectations placed upon them were clear while 15 respondents felt this was not the case. Of these 14 designers were Norwegian and were evenly split 7/7 between those who felt that the expectations of them were clear or not so. Interestingly, the explanation regarding the expectations varied from very clear outputs to vague notions of representation. Also notable was the view shared by 18 respondents (n=28) that the host organisations were unclear on what they hoped to achieve from hosting a designer. Amongst the 14 Norwegian designers who answered this question, 7 felt that the host organization had clear goals while 7 felt the contrary was true.

All respondents without exception noted that the placement had been beneficial to them. They added, however, that a number of issues could serve to improve the experience. Chief among them, a clearer understanding of the goals and objectives of their tenure, more solid/firmer/stronger background information on the programme (baseline data) as well as a clearer understanding of the context they would encounter. Designers placed in Guatemala also noted that the URL was decidedly hands-off and that the individual interventions would have benefited from amore active set of partners in the field.

5.2 Relevance – of programme

Relevance is determined by examining both needs on the one hand and programme objectives on the other. The evaluation of needs, and the degree to which DwB interventions responded to specific needs, and were able to fulfil specific needs varies from one programme to another and from one country to another. Here, we explore both the roles of the exchange participants and also the role of the design output. To this end, it's important to underscore that the objective of the placement of designers in the South has been both to generate design outputs (i.e., specific tangible product) and more recently, to couple the design output with transferring knowledge on the design process. Placements in Norway aimed to support firms in Norway with knowledge from the South that would better enable them to create certain outputs (i.e., designs). Alongside this objective, having designers in Norway was also intended to expose the participant to the Norwegian design environment and enable them to use these experiences upon their return to their home countries.

The objective of an FK exchange is, amongst other things, that the exchange participants return to their home country and utilise his/her experience to contribute to their home society/environment. Simultaneously, designers must, based on their background/context be able to contribute to their host institution/environment in a way that could not be possible to do by a local designer (i.e., their specific knowledge tied to being from the South must be of value to the host in Norway and vice versa). The experience of DwB does not appear to meet these minimum requirements in all cases. This is understood and accepted by FK. However in the absence of a clear modification of the goals of FK 'exchanges,' it is difficult to determine whether the approach taken by DwB is relevant to the donor. **In Norway**, the general consensus amongst institutions that have hosted designers from Guatemala and which were included as examples in this review has been that these professional designers fulfilled a 'professional role' within the institution but were not catalytic in either initiating a design process or determining the design output. There is no evidence that their Guatemalan specific knowledge was actively used in any of the projects examined. Of course as individuals, whatever their collective of experiences entails will influence their view of design, but this is different from being able to contribute a "development or developing country" perspective to their work. Often designers coming to Norway fulfilled a "staff" role which in some cases translated into a "trial period" which culminated in their long term employment. Therefore, while they contributed to the end result of design products, the question must be raised, was there a "need" for a designer to be provided through the DwB programme? It is noteworthy that designers placed in Norway, although, professional with both a university degree and job experience were regarded as interns by their host institution and indeed by DwB. The title of "intern" does not credit the experience held by the designer and places him/her in a subordinate role to all of their colleagues, as well as serves to highlight the distinction made by DwB between Norwegian designers (not interns) and developing country designers (interns) and by extension could be perceived by different actors as descriptive of the DwB sees their role, knowledge and standing vs. that of the developing world. It seems that the main outcome of the placements in Norway has been supporting the development of the individual designer by providing them the opportunity to gain new knowledge, employment opportunities and simultaneously providing Norwegian private firms with low cost professional staff. **In Guatemala**, the designers tended to have a much more prominent and catalytic role in determining the creation of a design output. This was due to a number of factors. First, designers had a more prominent role starting with the inter-institutional agreement which enabled them to make decisions that ensured the completion of a final product/output. Second, they often worked alone or with another designer that was also part of the DwB programme and hence, they were jointly able to make design

decisions themselves. Third, they were regarded as professionals, unlike Guatemalan designers who were regarded as interns.¹⁸

As pertains to objectives of the DwB initiatives, a number of factors need to be examined. In pursuing our identification of objectives we were able to identify four distinct categories of DwB experiences:

- a) Cases where a design was needed to fulfil a known gap and there was an established parent institution which would be able to use the design in pursuit of a tangible output.
- b) Cases where a design was to be utilised as a catalyst to create awareness on the utility and importance of a particular product/output.
- c) Cases where a design could be useful, but key components of the design process, or use of the designed output were not available or in place and hence the design was rendered obsolete.
- d) Cases where a design would have been made irrespective of the DwB contribution.

The distinction made between the different categories above, requires that needs be examined not only in terms of what could be useful but also in terms of what types of interventions can meet the demands of the different donors (i.e., Norad and FK).

The process of identifying needs by DwB has varied somewhat from project to project. As noted in Chapter 3 for many years decisions on which project to pursue in Guatemala was largely made by the local project manager at URL based upon his own knowledge, experience and network. To this end, it was an “informed decision” but not a systematic one.

The experience gained from the different interventions examined during this review has shown that while some products were clearly fulfilling a need and did so by pursuing a clear and informed objective, other projects were less so. For example, the wheel chair designed at Transitions responded to a clear need (i.e., severely handicapped children) and pursued a clear objective (i.e., to build a wheelchair that met the medical requirements of patients, was easy to manoeuvre and light weight, and could be easily built/engineered). Arguably, this kind of product existed already, however, Transitions posed that the wheelchairs in the current market which are designed for the client group, did not meet the demands of the Guatemalan environment (i.e., semi-rural, rural, uneven streets and pathways, no systems for wheelchair transport, etc.) and were costly to make. The “Zumos” line of products designed in San Juan La Laguna, illustrates a very different reality. The need to improve the income generating capabilities of the weavers in San Juan La Laguna was clear. Particularly, since people in San Juan La Laguna needed to identify alternative income generating after hurricane Mitch destroyed their main income source: crop lands (1998). Hence, the need was for an income generation alternative, the choice to support weaving appeared to be a good option particularly given the extensive and renowned Guatemalan market in the field of textiles. However, the objective of creating a product line that catered to a wealthy clientele and utilised exclusive raw materials appears to have not been the most sound set of choices. Indeed, the Zumos effort lacked key elements to secure its relevance. Chief among them a clear study of demand was absent, as was a clear understanding/communication between the first designers and the community they were working with. This lack of communication meant that the project could not benefit from the experiences, impressions and ideas of the whole team. The experience of Zumos shows that income generating activities require knowledge and expertise that goes well beyond the production/design of a good. DwB poses that the gap between the Transitions experience and the Zumos experience is a clear example of the implementation of lessons learned. Transition was the most recent programme in Guatemala and hence benefitted from

¹⁸ All Guatemalan designers were university graduates with post-university professional work experience.

all the lessons that were learned earlier. A brief desk examination of projects in Uganda suggest that some progress has been made, as illustrated between Zumos and the Transitions projects, but this is not a result of systematic progress over time. Indeed some of the challenges faced in Guatemala have been experienced in Uganda also. That is to say that not all products in Uganda were resulting from a clear identification of a need with a response that could be sustainable. In Uganda, for example, a number of designs are not in production today. This suggests that DwB still needs to develop better approaches to ensuring that the partners they team up with will be willing and able to pursue the design produced.

In Norway the “need” for Guatemalan designers has been far more difficult to determine in terms of the “design output”. Clearly, the designers have in many cases filled the need for staff at the host institution but this is not the same as fulfilling the “need” for a specific Guatemalan born skill that results in the creation of a product. Indeed, none of the institutions interviewed could show that the output to which the Guatemalan designer had contributed had been possible because of the DwB involvement and would have otherwise not occurred. The products which are attributed to DwB did in some cases fulfil a need, had a clear objective and were relevant efforts but may have been created even if the DwB intervention had not taken place. Mama Natalie, for example, seems to fulfil a clear need and has a well-defined objective. Hence, its relevance is high. However, the degree to which this is a DwB intervention dependent design is debated. Particularly, since the design of Mama Natalie was one that had been in the conceptualisation stages prior to the DwB intervention. Moreover as noted earlier the Guatemalan designers contribution seems to have been tied to her profession rather than her home country experience and expertise.

These findings show that the relevance of the DwB projects vary. In some cases, the projects were not conceptualised in a way that would guarantee their relevance (i.e., San Juan La Laguna); while in others, the relevance of the project is clear, but the relevance of the DwB contribution is less so (i.e., Mama Natalie). In yet other cases, both the needs and objectives were carefully explored as was the DwB contribution and hence, unsurprisingly, the relevance of these cases is clear (i.e., The Transitions wheelchair). DwB would stress that the distinction between the effort in San Juan La Laguna and the Transitions wheel chair is a direct result of having learned key lessons along the way and having implemented them.

In short three elements need to be in place for DwB to secure the relevance of each project:

- a) There needs to be a clear need for the product being designed, including a well-defined user group/client.
- b) The objective of the design outcome must be carefully matched to the documented needs.
- c) A designer with the appropriate and relevant skills must not be available locally. Hence, making the DwB placement relevant.

5.3 Relevance to Norway and funding structures

Here we turn our focus to whether or not the DwB programme is relevant to the Norwegian funding priorities under the relevant chapters (see section 1.1). Although the DwB exchange model is not wholly in line with the reciprocal exchange model implemented by FK, the type of competence of the participants and institutions/organisations selected can be regarded as falling within FK’s target group which is defined as “a varied multitude of organizations and institutions” and is in with the Norwegian Governments 2013 budget proposal¹⁹.

¹⁹ 2013: Programme area 03.20, post 160.77 Utvekslingsordninger gjennom Fredskorpset, Budget proposition 1s

In terms of funding from Norad relevance less clear. Although an actor neither DwB, or Norsk form can be excluded from the extended target group of “Norwegian organizations” mentioned in the guidelines for support allocation.²⁰ The guideline implies, through the examples given, as well as by the precedent set through the list of other efforts financed under this chapter, that institutions funded should be central to influencing the framework conditions of the private sector in their respective countries. None of the DwB partners in Guatemala would clearly fall within this category.

Indeed the Guatemala projects, as is shown in this report, have generally not contributed much to the institutional strengthening the University of Landivar, the key partner. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that DwB even consider institutional strengthening a key component of their support in relation to any of their partners in Guatemala. The programme portfolio in Guatemala does not show a strategic direction, but rather is was composed of a series of individual projects selected on an ad hoc basis. According to the University, their motive for joining the initiative was the possibility of sending their alumni to Norway. For its part, DwB looked at INDIS/Landivar as a vehicle for project selection in Guatemala.

The bicycle path project contributed to highlighting the issue of bicycle lanes among planning authorities in Guatemala city. The same is true for the public transport (Transmetro) universal access manuals. However the designers were not from an institution that could continue the cooperation after the individual project ended, and the guidelines and manuals made by them are not necessarily followed. The programme that is closest to the PSD objectives is the San Juan La Laguna intervention. However, this was not a result of a clear strategy, but rather was the outcome of a series of efforts that were defined through trial and error over a period of four years, few of which have had a sustainable impact on the ground. Indeed the viability of the product and marketing channel that has been set up is yet to be proven. It can be argued that the knowledge about how to establish a new business has been increased among the women of San Juan La Laguna, but this was not the original objective of the project, and is not an area of DwB competence. In addition, this kind of direct intervention with individual enterprises is not recommended in the strategy.

DwB did not support the building of linkages between companies in Norway and their Guatemalan partners. The bulk of the projects in Guatemala were oriented towards getting a specific job done, such as creating a manual for universal access, designing a master plan for bicycle routes, or establishing income generating activities for a group of women in San Juan La Laguna. Only the last project, the Transitions programme, was more focused on the capacity building element. However, this most recent project had no commercial component.

In short, the DwB partners in Guatemala were at best at the margin of the target group for PSD funds as defined by the Norwegian Government (see Section 1.1). While Guatemala city planning authorities may arguably be defined as the adequate target group, as can the public transport development, neither the women in San Juan La Laguna nor the Transitions organization can be defined as “institutions and private sector actors in the South, *central* to the framework conditions of the private sector”²¹, which are the key target group for the Norad funding mechanism.

Linking this to the development of design competence, in the case of Guatemala, no local design competence was utilized in any project prior to the effort at Transitions. In the Transitions case the local designer was personally very keen in the project and his participation

²⁰ Regelverk for Samarbeid om rammevilkår for næringsutvikling i Sør – latest version September 1, 2012.

²¹ Regelverk for Samarbeid om rammevilkår for næringsutvikling i Sør – latest version September 1, 2012.

was seen as a possible asset. However the local designer was a professional designer himself and the project did not intend to build his capacity or transfer knowledge to him. On the other hand, the fact that several of the exchange participants coming to Norway are actually hired in Norway after their placement tenure because of their skills, may be said to both have a detrimental effect on the Guatemalan design environment, and indicates that there was no need for design sector development in the first place as clearly the field counts with highly competent staff.

Since the DwB programme currently only has activities in Uganda, it is important to look at how current and planned DwB activities there relate to Norad's priorities. As we have not had the opportunity to study the Uganda programme in depth, our analysis here is based on document review only. The key question here is whether there has been a change in DwB's strategic direction to accommodate Norad's priorities for the PSD funds.

The Bepro helmet, the life vest programme, the Mogas oil can project and the Reco industries food packaging projects are all private sector oriented. The latter two demonstrated a clear intention on behalf of DwB to support the partners' process thinking about product development, rather than just focusing on the product. The Reco project linked a Norwegian design company, a local Ugandan designer, the Reco company and Makerere University which shows there was an attempt to develop institutional linkages.

Even if these latter projects are successful as individual efforts, the degree to which support to individual enterprises through Norwegian in-kind personnel has the ability to strengthen framework conditions of businesses in general is questionable. Solving specific skills needs for private companies such as Mogas oil and the juice manufacturer Reco may even give these companies an unfair competitive advantage over other local manufacturers present in the market.

It would probably have been more in line with Norad's priorities and stated intentions if the efforts focused on developing design education programmes with Makerere University to ensure that the design processes and work methods which DwB promotes become part of the Ugandan design field and in the long term available to all businesses. From the documentation we have had reviewed, cooperation to support the field of design at the educational level, although planned for, is not a focus, but rather a secondary element of the DwB intervention in Uganda. Even in the Reco programme, institutional strengthening of Makerere comes as output 6 out of 6 in the 2012 plan.²² It is unclear to us how concrete the plans for building a design programme, or including the teaching of industrial design in other programmes at Makerere are.

Improvements that DwB have implemented in their programming, such as teaming up two designers in each project, working more systematically with pre-project appraisals and connect with more robust partners, have strengthened their ability to select projects and implement them with a higher chance of success. However, projects still seem to be defined not as part of a strategy for where linkages and institutional build-up can be strongest, but more as links with partners that want to work with DwB.

Moreover, current project plans seem to be strengthening ties to international aid agencies rather than the private sector. In the UNICEF project, institutional strengthening of Makerere is not part of the output, nor is any local designer competence. The project can be understood as DwB being commissioned by UNICEF to solve a particular design challenge: How to construct an affordable casing for UNICEF's digital information portal. DwB's task is to find the right Norwegian designer to meet the UNICEF requirement.

²² 2011: Revisjon 2-Årsplan-Design-uten-grenser, pg 17.

In the WFP project, DwB is asked to improve the model for food aid deliveries to North Uganda. In this project, DwB moves away from development and the private sector and into the field of humanitarian aid. Although there is a potential income generating component in the project, it is far removed from the objectives of the PSD strategies, guidelines and budget posts defined by the Norwegian Government. This type of project appears to be a far better fit for the overall funding post for Uganda, where reconstruction of North Uganda is a priority.²³

The UN agencies are not part of the target group for PSD interventions as described in Guidelines and government budget posts. Furthermore UN agencies, do not implement projects directed at improving private sector framework conditions. Therefore they make ill suited partners for DwB is the funding source (budget post) is to remain unchanged.

Promotional material issued by DwB is focused on concrete project and how the design component has influenced their tangible output. DwB does not tend to focus on how skills transfer effects the general field or whether or not these projects improve framework conditions for businesses as such. This seems to indicate that DwB itself is not fully aware of the strategic priorities of the Norad budget chapter under which they are funded.

As regards Norway's priorities for aid to Uganda in the future, for 2013 the focus is on "petroleum sector management, women's rights, governance, reconciliation peace and reconstruction of North Uganda, in addition to clean energy"²⁴. The technical support currently envisaged by DwB does not stand out as clearly within any of priorities.

Lastly, it should be noted that current plans for "exchanges" appear to stress skills and capacity building more than before. It is, however, not possible for us to say whether this component of the DwB programme leans towards longer term partnerships and institution building as is envisaged under the PSD and FK budget posts and strategies.

5.4 Effectiveness of Programme

Effectiveness is determined by exploring the relationship between the objective and the outcome and impact. Here, we turn our attention to the degree of effectiveness of the DwB programme by examining the examples we focused upon.

As noted in the section above, the objectives of individual interventions, and particularly the role of DwB within said objectives varied from very clear objectives to more nebulous ones. Amongst the most clearly defined outputs are, for example: The production of a Bicycle Path Master Plan for Guatemala City, the creation of a wheelchair for severely incapacitated children who live in rural or marginal areas of Guatemala, the design of a motorcycle helmet in Uganda, etc. On the other side of the spectrum, amongst the less clearly defined outcomes are the work done with San Juan La Laguna, where the objective was the creation of a product line but the details of it were not clearly predefined. As with other cases, DwB highlighted that they have made progress over time, in the absence of documentation it is difficult to clearly identify what lessons have been learned and how these have influenced activities/decisions made. Moreover some programmes in Uganda have also had the trademarks of shortcomings also identified in Guatemala. Our review, resulting from the focus on a limited number of cases, was not able to clearly substantiate progress on a longitudinal basis.

Aside from the degree to which the output was clearly defined, the degree to which the objective could be attained without the DwB intervention is also important to note. Here too there was variance between different interventions. In Guatemala, the work at Transitions and San Juan La Laguna would have clearly not taken place had DwB programme not been part of

²³ 2013: Programme area 3.20 post 150.78 Uganda, proposition 1s

²⁴ 2013: Programme area 3.20 post 150.78 Uganda, proposition 1s

the equation. In the case of Transitions, the issue of a wheelchair that could be used by children with severe handicaps was recognised as a priority but the institution is small and did not have an in-house design capacity. Therefore, they admit that without external design competence they would have continued to modify the existing wheelchairs they had available, utilising a “patch” system in order to meet the demands of individual clients. In the case of San Juan La Laguna, unlike Transitions, the idea that they would benefit from a new luxury brand was not conceptualised locally. Hence, clearly the work would not have taken place without the DwB intervention. Moreover, in San Juan La Laguna, the objective of the intervention, according to the interviewees, was not clearly understood by the weavers and community members until the second part of the second designer’s tenure²⁵. This further illustrates that without DwB the initiative would not have happened.

The projects based at the Municipality of Guatemala City however, are not so clear-cut. The Municipality does have funds available for the type of project that was funded by DwB and the issues the DwB interventions attempted to solve (i.e., bicycle lanes and universal access) were on the Municipalities’ radar as issues requiring attention. While the ability to create a mechanism to ensure universal access to the Transmetro was at the forefront of the agenda and would have likely taken place, irrespective of the DwB designers, the creation of a bicycle paths plan is less clear. The municipality maintains that the bicycle issue, while on the agenda, was not at the top of the priority list. Therefore, had it not been for the DwB designer who was deeply committed and dedicated to underlining the importance of the issue, it is likely that the work would not have taken place when it did. In the interventions in Norway the output would most probably have been generated irrespective of the DwB intervention, there are no examples in the pool of cases we examined where the output was dependent on the Guatemalan designer. This shows that DwB has been involved in pursuing objectives that span the range from initiatives that would have never occurred without DwB to initiatives that were completely independent of the DwB intervention.

Efforts in Uganda are noted by DwB, as probably tied to the inability of local firms to identify local expertise rather than to the clear need for a Norwegian designer. In short DwB functions, in Uganda, as an enabler to find design staff when the local agencies are not able to identify someone locally. In short what is needed is a “designer” whether or not he or she is Norwegian appears to be less important.

An additional issue that comes to our attention when exploring objectives and particularly in relation to outcomes and impact is that while some objectives were clearly formulated, others were far less so. The degree to which the objectives were clearly defined and enabled a situation whereby they could be actively and linearly (progressively) pursued has led to better outcomes and better chances for impact. In short having a clearly formulated goal and work plan has led to a more effective DwB intervention.

At one extreme, the wheelchair example, the most recent project in Guatemala, shows that a clear objective (i.e., having a prototype wheelchair by the end of the stay of the designers) enabled the formulation of a work plan that in turn was able to generate a clear output and subsequently has a very good chance to have both the outcome and impact desired. While the output was marginally delayed and still some minor modifications are required, by all intents and purposes it can be said that the effort was an efficient one. The delays were minimal and the advance/progress made in the development of the design and construction of a viable prototype is commendable. Not only did this project attain the output expected, the wheelchair will soon go into user testing and soon thereafter will go into production. Moreover, the

²⁵ The first designer placed in San Juan La Laguna did not focus on the creation of the Zumos brand, but rather, focused on what can be broadly understood as eco-tourism (i.e., efforts to beautify the town through garbage collection mechanism, for example).

prototype could have clear implications for other developing countries with similar end user needs (i.e., severely handicapped children) and environments (i.e., rural and low income urban areas with few wheelchair enabling friendly facilities).

On the other extreme, one of the earlier projects (i.e., San Juan La Laguna) goals were defined as the project got under way. This approach generated a number of challenges: First, that since there was an unclear understanding of what was to be achieved over all, different actors had varied understandings and interpretations of their own individual roles and responsibilities as well as those of others (i.e., roles of the designer and the weavers). This also had consequences for the local communities' sense of ownership of the project. At the onset of the development of the Zumos product line, for example, lack of communication between the designer and weavers led to low participation and little incentive on behalf of the weavers and contributed to an insensitive approach by the designer. For example, that harvest season is not a time conducive to capacity building events as people are fully occupied with harvesting the crops which account for their principal income generating activity. Yet, the designer attempted to schedule activities during the harvest season. In short, the overall process/approach generated a dynamic that severely constrained the effectiveness of the project. Once these challenges were remedied by the hiring of an interpreter and by the more active engagement of the designer with the local population (i.e., explaining her goals and objectives to the weavers upon the demand of the latter), the project was able to move forward to designing clear outputs. The Zumos products were expensive to produce and relied heavily on raw material which was not locally available. This further truncated the ability of the local population to have ownership over the final output and to ensure that the product line was one that met local requirements.

It is important to highlight here, that these two projects did not take place at the same time. The transitions project is one of the last interventions in Guatemala, while the San Juan La Laguna effort (2005-2009) was amongst the first. It is also important to note that the San Juan La Laguna case changed extensively over the years and it appears that the later designer placements were more successful in attaining their goals and objectives. Still, the case is important as it illustrates how important having clearly defined objectives and outputs is in order to secure the desired outcome, impact and ensure an effective project.

It is also important to highlight that DwB has made some clear modifications to the way they work. The impact of these is hard to determine at this time, since, the majority of the changes in approach have been implemented in Uganda which is not the focus of this review (see Box: The Ugandan Experience). Still, it is worth noting that DwB has placed special attention into trying to define more clearly, the objectives and the desired outcomes. This process was initiated in Guatemala with a baseline study and identification of indicators for the Transitions project. This first effort to identify indicators was not fully successful as it required they be extensively modified when the project started. Identifying clear objectives and desired outcomes has been precipitated by a realisation within DwB that having more clearly defined objectives that delineate in detail, the role that will be played by DwB as well as the role/requirements of other actors is a central component to securing greater probability of overall success. This process has also led to the narrowing of the objectives of the DwB intervention to more realistic objectives. This is seen as a positive step forward on behalf of DwB.

5.5 Efficiency of Programme

We now turn our attention to efficiency which we explore by examining the relationship between the different parts of the RBM process from input to outcome (i.e., input, activities, outputs and outcome).

In relation to input, the DwB programme counted with two distinct and complementary types of input. On one hand, the funds itself which enabled the production of prototypes, the placement of designers, publications, exhibitions etc.; on the other, the knowledge and experience of the

designer who was placed either in Guatemala, Uganda or Norway. These two types of input combined, constitute a robust form of global input with solid potential to support efficient and robust interventions. Benefiting in the greatest possible way of these inputs requires realistic, clear and concisely defined objectives.

In Guatemala, linguistic challenges proved a major constraint to ensuring adequate collaboration between the designers and the host institution. In addition to the difficulty of communication, some designers chose to work very independently from their target institution and thereby effectively truncated the impact that their work could have had in the long term. In Norway, the utilisation of the input (i.e., the use of skills of the visiting designers) tended to vary from case to case. In some instances, the skills of the visiting designer were completely overlooked; while in other cases, the skills of visiting designers were actively engaged. Furthermore, the degree to which the skills of visiting designers were used to challenge the way of doing things in Norway was minimal. Along these lines, it must also be asked if locally trained designers could not replace the designers from Norway going to Guatemala or Uganda? There is little evidence to suggest that the designers coming to Norway were invited to participate in changing/modifying/adapting the Norwegian approach to design. This leads to question the utility of placing designers from Guatemala or Uganda in institutions in Norway, as well as Norwegian designers in institutions in Guatemala or Uganda. Although, clearly from a participant perspective being placed in a foreign country opened innumerable employment opportunities, particularly for the designers from the South which would have otherwise, not been available. However, this benefit for the individual designer cannot be understood as the main objective of the DwB intervention. In general the experience from Guatemala and Norway can lead to a series of lessons learned some of which were implemented in the Transitions project. This project proved far more successful than others in ensuring efficiency despite early delays caused by the need to reformulate indicators, for example.

The activities that have been undertaken have also varied depending on the objective of the task. One trend towards improvement is visible in more recent interventions: a clear aim to be more engaging of the local partner and to include a solid capacity building effort within the tasks of the designer being placed. This is a new approach that is exemplified in the Transitions experience where the designers not only worked on the creation of the wheelchair prototype but also in building capacity within Transitions on issues pertaining specifically to how the design process emerges triumphant. This approach has clear implications for sustainability and also to ensure that the project is efficient. In short, building a solid capacity building component into projects has served to ensure far more solid local engagement and sense of ownership by local partners, which in turn leads to a more efficient project.

Prior to the more engaged approach that is currently used, the activities undertaken tended to vary. While some did include capacity building, this was not necessarily done in an engaging way, but rather, followed a prescriptive top down approach. The data reviewed and interviews conducted suggests that the top down approach failed to ensure that the recipients of knowledge clearly understood why they should be engaged in training or how this training may benefit them directly.

Overall, we can divide the activities into activities that were aiming to *build capacity* in the design sector and activities which aimed to result in a *tangible product* (a prototype). The degree of efficiency of any one intervention is closely tied to a number of factors. The different factors that influence efficiency are outlined in the two models below:

- a) Projects that included a clear output (tangible result), where all stakeholders were aware of their own role, as well as that of other key players, and where actors actively interacted with each other led to the more efficient and clear outputs.

- b) Projects where capacity building (i.e., where the design process was also imparted to the key stakeholders) was a clear component of the project further increased the efficiency of the overall project because the output was not only limited to the direct product (i.e., a prototype) but also tied to the process of developing a prototype.

The cost of option (b) is not greater than the cost of option (a) alone. Efficiency has improved with the introduction of capacity building as a central component of projects. Without this component, there was a danger that the product created existed in a vacuum.

Additionally, a clear and active engagement with the local partner as well as thorough assessments that result in the clear identification of the specific role which can be played by DwB are a key component to ensuring an efficient intervention. This of course means that in order to ensure efficiency, DwB must clearly limit its role as part of a broader intervention where other key aspects to ensure overall success are met by relevant/qualified actors. In other words the DwB intervention must be part of a collection of activities by different actors and cannot rely solely on DwB for success. Moreover it is important to note that interviews, and some documents suggested that in Uganda an effort to more clearly delineate the role of DwB was made. However, some projects in Uganda showed that DwB has not been systematic in ensuring that requirements that are not design dependent are met. A limited examination of the distribution of funds relative to the general type of output of the projects calls attention to the programme's cost-efficiency (see chapter 1). Particularly, if compared to other development type interventions in the South. However this was not a key goal of this study and hence not focused upon further.

5.6 Sustainability and Transformation

Here, we turn our attention to both sustainability and the concept of transformation of the DwB programme, tied to it. As was discussed earlier (see Chapter 3), the approach to exit by DwB was not an approach that generally invested in securing long-term sustainability. While this may be understandable given the way DwB sees its role as a catalytic intervener (i.e., enabling the creation of a single product which has long term implications), it is still important to examine how DwB utilises its experiences to secure its own sustainability. That is the focus here. Thus far, DwB has utilised two approaches aimed at securing its sustainability in the long term:

First, **Visibility**: To this end, DwB has made great strides to ensure that it is a noted and visible programme. The approach taken has been one that aims to ensure DwB becomes a recognised actor through the use of the media, exhibitions and publications. Secondly, **implementation of lessons learned**: DwB has also attempted to secure its own existence by actively endeavouring to learn from its experiences and better both its approach and its products. While the efforts to learn from the experiences generated is commended, it is important to recognise that the efforts to implement lessons learned is an effort that is not yet institutionalised in a replicable fashion. In short, until now, the programme has been highly dependent on the sensitivities of its staff and the ability of individuals to identify lessons learned and the ways to implement those. The approaches have not yet been made part of a clear procedure, although some M&E mechanisms do now exist in paper. Both of the approaches to ensure sustainability merit recognition. The latter approach taken by DwB to secure its sustainability can be understood as a "sustainability through transformation" approach. This approach starts with the premise that the programme can be improved and that any improvement will serve to ensure the long-term success of the effort.

Aside from pursuing the sustainability of DwB per se a related and relevant sustainability question is the degree to which any output from DwB interventions are sustainable. Here, progress has been made in the way designers work with host organisations, including a stronger focus on capacity building, there are numerous examples, old and recent of DwB

efforts that have not survived beyond the creation of the prototype or which simply have failed soon, thereafter. The helmet (2009-2010), and lifejacket (2008) efforts in Uganda have not succeeded, for example. The former has failed to go into production and the production of the latter has been halted following the bankruptcy of the firm which produced it. These two efforts followed other more successful efforts in Uganda, for example Mogas Oil (2007-2008). Earlier examples such as the Zumos effort in Guatemala, while it continues to exist, sells very little and certainly does not meet the initial goal/intention (i.e., becoming a key income generator, locally). This trend shows that while the design component is one part of any one project, there are many other issues that influence sustainability. These include: access to capital, the ability to produce the product, make it available to the market, and have a client base which is willing and able to buy the product. These factors, are elements recognized by Norad as the most basic in order to ensure any chance for success, but are outside the scope of the DwB capabilities. Interestingly, the effort that has been most positive is not a for-profit enterprise (i.e., Transitions). The success of Transitions may be because the organization is a very well established entity which was not dependent on the design by DwB but rather, had a clear objective, line of work and client base to begin with. The design was an added value for the institution but one that does not appear to have affected the survival or workings of the institution thus far.

We now turn our attention to the sustainability aspects of the placements in Norway. There is little indication that the placements led to any substantial structural changes at the host institution level. Therefore, it is unlikely that the placement had any sustainable impact. Moreover, since numerous participants placed in Norway have not returned to Guatemala after the exchange, choosing to stay in Norway or having migrated to a third country²⁶, the impact of that individual designers had in their home country following the exchange tenure is limited.

Overall, it is clear that DwB has made efforts to secure its own longevity. However, the degree to which these efforts are based on ensuring that the outcomes of the DwB programme are relevant and applicable to their respective environments has varied. Therefore, attention must be paid to ensuring that DwB pursues its own longevity while simultaneously ensuring that it invests its efforts in initiatives that result in sustainable and valuable outputs. As elsewhere in this report, DwB maintains that they have mechanisms of working today, which are starkly different from those examined. However given that some interventions in Uganda were not sustainable and chronologically followed more sustainable ones suggests that while DwB has made efforts to improve over time these efforts are not systematic across the board yet.

5.7 Cross cutting issues of the programme

There are a number of crosscutting issues, mainly corruption, gender and environment, that require special attention. In terms of corruption having a solid partner such as the URL in Guatemala has served to ensure that the programme does not fall victim of corruption in any way. Choosing solid local counterparts ensures that mechanisms to prevent corruption are robust and hence the probability for corruption is small.

There was little indication that gender was a key issue in any of the programmes. Of course the intervention in San Juan La Laguna can be seen as a gender sensitive project as it is established in order to work with women and provide them with stronger income generating options. There was no evidence to suggest that the project was based on a clear understanding of gendered roles in the community and on how to work with these. More broadly the initial interventions can also be seen as lacking a clear do no harm or capacities vulnerabilities analysis. The latter interventions (i.e., Transitions) were far more nuanced, but it

²⁶ The survey results show that 4 of 10 survey respondents from Guatemala who responded to this question are currently in Guatemala. The rest are either in Norway or elsewhere.

is unclear if this was a product of individual designers who were better able to respond to the local needs in a sensitive way or a DwB initiated effort.

Environment is a crosscutting issue which was not systematically considered in all programmes. The San Juan La Laguna example shows that early on the efforts to create products for the Zumos line were not environmentally sound in terms of utilizing products which were readily available locally. However, the majority of the other examples (i.e., bicycle lanes, access for the handicapped and the wheelchair) suggested that an effort was made to be environmentally sound and rely on approaches and materials that were contextually appropriate (i.e., locally available).

The Uganda Experience

The scope of this review did not include Uganda but since the future of DwB lies in Uganda, Guatemala being closed down as of 2012, interventions from both countries have been explored and compared based on available documents and the field research in Guatemala. Based on this loose assessment (e.g., All information on Uganda is based on document review), it appears that a number of lessons learned in Guatemala have led to modifications in the way the programme has been implemented in Uganda.

DwB initiated work in Uganda with Makerere University as a key partner in 2005-2006. Since then, the DwB activities have remained more or less stable in size, including the placement of two Norwegian designers in Uganda as well as two in Norway on an annual basis. Currently, given the end of the programmes in Guatemala, Uganda is the only country where DwB is active.

In Uganda, DwB has come to identify its role as a component of the overall development efforts, rather than identifying itself as a game changing catalyst. Moreover, DwB is now conscious of not owning the development objectives of individual interventions, but rather, contributing to an overall goal based on their specific area of competence (e.g., design). In the most successful cases this means both producing a tangible product with the assistance of an external designer and transferring the skills necessary to replicate the design process in the production of other products without the intervention of an external designer. From the literature reviewed, it appears that this has been the model utilised in both the MOGAS oil can programme and in the Reco industries juice packaging programme. Both examples noted here are of commercial enterprises. In Uganda, DwB has sought after robust partners who had clearly defined needs that DwB could adeptly respond to. In both cases, ensuring overall impact and sustainability has been defined as the responsibility of the partner and not that of DwB. To this end the intervention of the designer was limited to technical support.

Makerere University, the key partner in Uganda, is not actively involved in selecting programmes in Uganda as was URL in Guatemala, but rather, its input is limited to the selection of designers placed in Norway. The University's efforts identifying designers to go to Norway is a task which is funded through the DwB programme. In relation to the placement of designers in Norway, the DwB programme envisages the effort as directly supporting the development of the field of design in Uganda. In line with this overall goal, DwB is now actively trying to utilise designers who have been to Norway on programmes in the field in Uganda. Tied to this is an initiative, currently under development, to match designers who have been to Norway with agencies in need of design expertise in Uganda.

Some of the early programmes in Uganda appear to have fallen victim to some of the shortcomings seen in Guatemala. The life vest programme, although, resulting in vastly improved vests, has not fulfilled its expected objective of producing better life vests for fishermen, since the company charged with the production has closed. Also notable to this example is the focus that was placed on the production of the vest and not on the transfer of design knowledge. The BePro helmet resulted in a good product but it is not under production. Moreover, according to participants, the placements of the first Ugandan designers in Norway have not met the expectations of the Ugandan designers.

Overall the experience from Uganda shows that some lessons from Guatemala have led to improvements in Uganda, but a systematic approach to ensure that no lesson learned is lost along the way is still lacking.

5.8 Concluding remarks

Overall DwB's ability to be requires close examination. In terms of relevance there are two issues of concern: Relevance as per the beneficiary population and relevance as per the funding allocation and Norway's priorities. Regarding the former, the relevance of the outputs of the different DwB interventions varied from case to case and hence, attention to each intervention must be paid in order to establish relevance. It is not possible, therefore, to establish relevance or lack thereof of the DwB programme as a whole. In terms of relevance in terms of Norwegian funding under the PSD budget allocation, it is difficult to see how the DwB meet the minimum requirements established by Norway in the relevant Strategy and Budget guidelines, although there are some areas where the definitions could be interpreted to fit. Overall, it is likely that the DwB program is more relevant to other funding chapters. In terms of effectiveness, progress has been made, particularly the incorporation of capacity building as a key component of individual interventions. However some of the key issues noted in relation to relevance and the Norwegian strategy and guidelines is also relevant in terms of effectiveness. Efficiency is one area that requires attention, particularly, in view of the more nuanced approach taken in relation to the intervention model used in Uganda where DwB is categorised as a component of larger initiatives. This is a clear step forward but there is a need for examining the distribution of funds to ensure that the allocation of resources is one with is amenable to future donors/clients of DwB (i.e., management vs. implementation costs). Sustainability is also an area of the DwB efforts that requires attention. The ability of DwB to be a strong programme or institution as well as the sustainability of individual products which have resulted from DwB interventions are areas that require continual attention. It is clear that DwB has thus far been successful in ensuring its own sustainability. The sustainability of the outputs of individual interventions has varied greatly from one intervention to another. As such, more attention is required to ensure that DwB contributions have a long-term impact.

Additionally, the Guatemalan experience suggests that generally speaking DwB was very ambitious of what could be achieved through their interventions. Experience, however, seems to have helped them modify their approach and become more constrained in their goals. The limited examination into Ugandan examples, as well as the experience in Transitions suggests this.

The key strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to the DwB programme in terms of its ability to do are noted in the box below.

Table 8: SWOT Ability to do

SWOT – Ability to do	
Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An extensive community of designers. • Ability to modify the DwB approach to the needs of programmes on the ground. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of systematic M&E. • Non-systematic use of reporting documents. • Lack of systematic baseline assessments that are able to generate accurate indicators and ensure the relevance and sustainability of individual interventions.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create a strong network with partners to better benefit from experiences and lessons learned. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existing professional designers in the country rendering the need for DwB less relevant.

- Define more clearly, the goals and objectives of single interventions.
- The programme might fit well into development or emergency aid funding posts.
- The budget line currently used to fund the DwB initiative is not appropriate (i.e., the DwB programme does not meet the requirements established by the Norwegian government for funding under PSD).

6.0 General Conclusions and Lessons Learned

The overall goal of the DwB programme is to: solve problems by supporting the development of user-friendly, functional and aesthetically pleasing products. DwB seeks to achieve this goal by working with local partners in their countries of focus who can use design to develop solutions that respond to user needs and are economically, socially, institutionally, culturally and environmentally sustainable. Partners include the civil society, private enterprise and academia in an effort to both ensure good individual design outputs as well as the general improvement of the knowledge base in the field of design (e.g., academic progress). There are multiple opportunities for impact to result from the DwB programme. Indeed, the DwB programme has the potential to generate or jump start, development chains both within institutions in the South as well as in Norway. To this end, this review has identified a number of key lessons learned and conclusions whose implementation can serve to ensure that the efforts undertaken under the DwB umbrella benefits as much as possible and leads to the greatest degree of sustainable impact. In tandem with examining the merit of the DwB programme itself, the review has also been tasked with examining the degree to which funding of the programme fits well under the PSD umbrella priorities and requirements as defined by the Norwegian government. Therefore, before delving into specific lessons learned and conclusions pertinent to DwB independent of the funding source, here we summarize findings relevant to the funding chapter and Norwegian priorities.

As pertains to relevance of DwB efforts in Guatemala in relation to the funding allocation budget post a few things require attention: First, funded partners in Guatemala were either on the margin or outside of the target group indicated by Norad in their governing documents. Second, objectives of the projects were more generally oriented towards development, and not towards improvement of business framework conditions. Third, there was no connections between Norwegian and Guatemalan partners. Fourth, although some of the projects in Guatemala have had a limited success as interventions in and of themselves, we have found no evidence of a strategic effort to systematically strengthen key actors relevant for PSD in Guatemala. Fifth, the transfer of knowledge to individuals was, at best, limited. Lastly, the competence area which DwB sought to develop were weakened rather than strengthened by facilitating the migration of various skilled designers to Norway.

Efforts in Uganda have been more directed towards the private sector in the past, but not at the institutional level, rather as transfer of technical skills to individual companies. Current plans in Uganda move away from the private sector towards services to international aid and humanitarian agencies, and hence cannot be defined as part of Norad's PSD efforts.

Overall, the DwB programme has clearly lacked an overall strategy for its interventions - the portfolio of projects are made up of a sets of very diverse activities with many types of stakeholders. Programmatic strategic priorities and focus in line with the Norwegian Strategy and Budget Guidelines are both lacking. As we have commented above, in relation to current Norad policies, one particularly important priority is missing: A focused targeting on framework conditions per se. The one-on-one type of support at the enterprise level that apparently constitutes most of DwB's work has actually been out of favour within donor PSD for a long time because of a number of weaknesses which are visible in the DwB intervention. These include:

- a) The DwB programme can give unfair competitive advantages to certain enterprises by subsidizing those who may be the worst enterprises in the market. Providing support to weaker actors can serve to debunk better firms.

- b) DwB provides a service that is too expensive for the local counterpart to buy, hence it can lead to creating a dependency on aid.
- c) The DwB programme risks creating an environment that is supply driven (i.e., by DwB) rather than driven by the local market needs and wants.
- d) The DwB programme is not cost effective when compared with cost of the provision of a similar service from the country or region. A same country/region solution may be less “fancy”, but will be less expensive and may be better informed to meet the local needs.

Overall it is important to underscore (see Section 1.1) that the Strategy (2001) established a clear shift away from supporting individual initiatives/firms to supporting the private sector framework in a given country for many of the reasons noted above in relation to the DwB.

In terms of lessons learned we list here those, which we consider most relevant and which have emerged from the review of the Guatemalan experience as well as some general points regarding budget allocations. While in some cases DwB suggests that these lessons are known and are under implementation in Uganda, since our focus, determined by the ToR, was on Guatemala we are unable to confirm the implementation of new practices in Uganda. Irrespective of the implementation of lessons learned listed here we feel it is important to highlight these none the less as it serves to keep a record of the key lessons learned from the Guatemalan experience. Recording lessons learned from Guatemala we feel is particularly important since the efforts in Guatemala have come to an end.

- a) In some cases the partner lacked a clear idea of what it needed. Similarly, in other cases the partner lacked a clear idea of how design might contribute to fulfilling their needs.
- b) In some cases a clear and solid client base and a proven ability to produce the product once designed was lacking.
- c) In some cases partner organisations were not actively engaged in a specific field. This limited the impact of the DwB intervention as design efforts should be an asset to an existing effort.
- d) In most cases in Guatemala designers lacked a working linguistic ability and had a limited understanding of any cultural/climatic/geographical factor that may affect their work.
- e) In some cases the role of the designer was on one hand to generate a clearly defined output and on the other, to convey the design process (i.e., building process knowledge). These scenarios, where both development of a product and process capacity development were both present, proved the most successful.
- f) Some of the designers brought to Norway were not involved in programmes that strengthened their capabilities as designers and ensured they were able to utilise their own design knowledge and experience. Actively using the skills of the visiting designers and supporting their learning process is important to ensuring impact.
- g) Numerous placements in Norway served as trial periods for Norwegian would-be employers. The only way to more actively prevent this is by more carefully vetting firms, since DwB has no ability to legally ensure that firms do not hire former interns.
- h) The costs benefit ratio of DwB is comparatively high. Currently economies of scale prevents DwB from reducing their transaction costs substantially. However DwB could focus on creating as many systematic processes as possible in an effort to minimize their transaction costs (i.e., systems for reporting that ensure that the material gathered

has a clear utility; systems to manage the data received in reports; etc.). Other efforts could include the development of clear parameters for the identification of projects and the delegation of this process to key local partners.

- i) In relation to transaction costs DwB faces a clear challenge. While they need to expand their field of work in order to proportionally reduce their management costs, the degree to which there is a market for a huge expansion of their type of work is not yet clear. Therefore a market study needs to take place first.
- j) Thus far the different donors have not aligned their different donor objectives. In addition it is important to note that there is a degree of disagreement between the objectives of each donor and the abilities of DwB interventions.
- k) Overall the DwB initiative, despite its merits, by and large fails to meet the minimum requirements applicable to Norad funding under the chapter destined to PSD.
- l) The expected impact of FK exchanges most easily result from reciprocal exchanges hence DwB faces inherent difficulties.
- m) Norad's PSD initiatives intend to contribute to the establishment of a business environment that is conducive to growth, including enabling local entrepreneurs to compete in their own markets (i.e., meet the minimum requirements for success), while DwB requires that the pre-requisites of a successful firm (i.e., foundation) be met prior to their intervention. In short a good design is unable to secure the success of entrepreneurial efforts. Clearly having a good end product is a key component for success. However having a good product to produce does not translate into the ability to produce said product. Herein lies the conundrum faced by some DwB interventions.

Taking note of the above general lessons learned and conclusions can serve to enable the creation of products/outputs which have a direct impact in the development environment and which can either be modified to fit to the needs of PSD funding structures or seek funding from better suited funding chapters.

Funding chapters aside, there is a huge gap between full success and total failure. With that in mind we turn now our attention to the aspects which were successful in programmes that were not an overall success in order to illustrate areas that can have impact and have not been adequately credited, we feel. In short, the unintended and positive impact of DwB programmes. In Guatemala, for

example, the *Zumos* enterprise has thus far not been successful in that it has yet to secure a clear and sustained corner of the market, however, some positive impact did emerge from the programme. Indeed the establishment of the firm *Xuaan Chi Ya* despite the break down of *Fundacion Solar*, a local NGO, is a positive development that can be understood as tied to the

Signs of progress the post Guatemala experience: DwB in 2011-2013

This report focuses on Guatemala (until 2012), but a number of lessons seem to have been taken into consideration in the 2011-2013 programme document. Among them are noted a stronger focus on programme appraisals, a clearer indication of what the design component of the programmes will really be, a more concrete description of the role of the designers versus the partner, the introduction of two designers from Norway being teamed up with one from the local country, as well as a more carefully formulated set of pre-requisites of partner institutions in order to secure sustainability. Only one programme implemented within this new programme framework, the wheelchairs with Transitions, took place in Guatemala. This experience was a positive one, but the team is unable to verify if the model has been implemented on the ground and or is equally successful in Uganda.

Zumos effort at some level. Moreover, women in San Juan La Laguna are now able to utilise new techniques in their weaving. They have new knowledge on colour combinations and aesthetics which enables them to create goods for a wider market and have learned new approaches to have a stronger sense of the importance of quality products and of quality assurance. These outputs have resulted from the effort to create the *Zumos* brand. Similarly, the Bicycle Paths master plan designed for the Municipality of Guatemala City was not successful in that the plan is far more far reaching than the current implementation (i.e., 1 km between a Transmetro stop and the National University Campus). Moreover, the part that has been implemented has not followed the directives outlined in the plan. However, there are two key issues that require attention. One that the design of the master plan brought the cycling issue to the front of the Municipalities' agenda in Guatemala City, in addition the establishment of the 1 km of cycling lane has been coupled with a system to enable students and staff of the National University main campus to use bicycles for free. The cycling lane requires more police to control traffic and this in turn has increased the security of the area. Given the ever increasing security threat in Guatemala City, any initiative that has the potential to reduce crime is a positive one. In addition, the design process was able to bring together key actors in the cycling community. The areas where the cycling programme had an impact were not directly related to design but the municipality maintains that without the design master plan, no other progress would have been possible. In short, the Bicycle Master Plan may not have achieved its goals overall (i.e., the full implementation of the master plan) but it has had positive implications (i.e., increasing awareness of the use of bicycles, more security in the area etc.).

7.0 Recommendations

In this chapter, recommendations emerging from this review are listed. These are primarily targeted to Norad, FK and DwB but may also be relevant to partner institutions in the countries in the South as well as in Norway. Recommendations are divided into efforts that could contribute to improvement in the way different actors approach or are involved in the programme. Overall, the recommendations are made with the view of increasing the impact that can be generated by the programme overall. As with some of the lessons learned, DwB noted during the comments to this report that some recommendations are under implementation in Uganda. However, since this report is primarily based on the experiences in Guatemala the team thought they are relevant still and require mention here.

In relation to Norad and FK as funding partners

- a) Norad and FK should improve their coordination relative to the DwB work to ensure that the individual efforts carried out by DwB are able to meet the goals and objectives of both donors in a seamless manner. Doing so should also include cost saving measures such as: joint reporting to reduce administrative costs, common M&E requirements.
- b) Norad and FK must jointly determine which strategies and priorities the DwB programme should meet. This will depend on the budget post applied for the funding as well as on how FK will ultimately define the DwB exchange effort. Ultimately it will be more efficient and effective to ensure that both donors have a common understanding and objective for the overall programme.
- c) Norad should decide if it wants to continue to fund DwB under the PSD umbrella. If this funding option is chosen, Norad must require that DwB overhaul itself and the way it approaches its work in order to ensure it meets both the Strategy and the Budget Guideline requirements (see Chapter 6). If Norad decides to continue funding under the current budget chapter:
 - 1) Norad should consider funding DwB from a different budget chapter that may be better suited to the approach used by DwB thus far.
 - 2) DwB must ensure it focuses more on institutional strengthening of key institutions in the target country rather than focusing on specific project needs (i.e., individual deliverables).
 - 3) DwB should not engage in partnerships with UN Agencies, but rather focus on partnerships with private sector actors as required by the Strategy and Budget Guidelines.
 - 4) Norad and FK should ensure that a more systematic approach towards institutional strengthening in terms of the Design Program at Makerere University is established.
- d) Norad could decide to shift the funding of DwB to another budget chapter (see above).
- e) FK and DwB should jointly examine whether the FK model of reciprocal exchange can be used for the DwB effort. In case that the exchanges continue in their current format, DwB and FK should work together to define the modality of the exchange, the expectations from it, etc.
- f) FK and DwB should keep in mind that if exchange is solely to be a placement of in-kind contribution, there are existing models such as the NORCAP that better fit the kind of work DwB is doing in relation to the “exchanges”. NORCAP is an institution that focuses solely on placing professionals within development and emergency programmes and programmes; they do not have a component or intention of “reciprocity” tied to their placements. Their structure is designed to support the placement and follow up of said professionals without the notion of reciprocal exchange. Given how the DwB “exchanges” have actually transpired, following the NORCAP model may be more appropriate for DwB. This is something that should be discussed by DwB and FK when they jointly define the parameters/character of the “exchange” component of the programme.

In relation to Norsk Form and Design without Borders internal activities

- a) DwB should define and create a clear system for reporting that fits into a clear and well-defined mechanism for monitoring and evaluating. Having such a system will enable DwB to systematically use lessons learned and will reduce the reliance on individual staff members and their own discretionary approach to implementing lessons learned. In short this will strengthen the institution making it less dependent on the knowledge of individual staff members. By extension this will make DwB less vulnerable to staff changes.
- b) DwB should develop a user-friendly system for institutional memory that enables DwB to benefit from lessons learned without being heavily reliant on their staff/partners. Care should be taken to ensure that the mechanism developed collects information that has a clear use. Otherwise there is a danger that data collected will become a burden rather than an asset.
- c) DwB should engage exclusively in interventions where the role of design can be a key contribution and where other pre-requisites for success are in place. Working in projects where design is one of many aspects that will be required for success and not ensuring that other needs are met will make the DwB intervention very vulnerable and far more likely to fail.
- d) DwB should utilize a clear and concise definition of **design** that serves to guide and structure the work done. The definition should serve to both guide interventions and identify shortcoming early on in the intervention process. The definition should be rooted in design, but benefit from relevant development paradigms such as do no harm, and capacity vulnerability analysis.
- e) DwB should ensure that future projects systematically account for both what DwB aims to achieve through their intervention, but also what is required from other actors. If these requirements are determined on a timeline it will enable DwB to exit from interventions as soon as it is clear that other components are not being met.
- f) DwB should reduce transaction and administrative costs. Reducing transaction costs and overhead costs will make DwB interventions more amenable to donors and more competitive in terms of other interventions in the south.

In relation to the relationship with institutions in the South

- a) DwB should identify a key local counterpart that is able and willing to be part of solidifying a network of partners locally in the long term. The DwB initiative should not be a collection of individual project enterprises, but a way to develop longer lasting networks.
- b) DwB should ensure that key local counterpart provides adequate follow up and institutionalises a mechanism to identify possible projects, monitor and evaluate individual interventions and incorporate lessons learned in a systematic way. In short the key local partner should be deeply vested into the DwB programme and see it as a long term investment into the sector of design in their home country, rather than limiting their involvement to project based one-off partnerships with local organizations.

In relation to the exchange host institutions in the South:

- a) DwB should ensure that the provision of a “designer” to a local counterpart as part of a project is able to contribute to the host organisation’s work in a clear and tangible way. This means that all the other requirements necessary to ensure that the intervention of a designer is successful must be in place prior to DwB involvement.

- b) DwB should ensure that the host organisation is committed to hosting a designer and sees a clear value in doing so (i.e., allocates the necessary resources to ensure success, has a clear idea of what they need and of how a designer might help them achieve their aim).

In relation to the exchange host institutions in Norway:

- a) DwB should ensure that institutions in Norway are selected to host designers from the South only if they are: first, able to benefit from a designer from the South, and second, are willing and able to ensure that the placement supports the designer's learning process.
- b) DwB should ensure that Norwegian host institutions agree, albeit informally and not legally binding, to not utilise the exchange as an approach to recruitment of new staff.

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Sketches and planning of programme documents and trip reports, as well as pamphlets and brochures from INDIS, and web pages from both DwB as well as its partners. In addition MoUs with different institutions were also examined.

1. Annex: ToR

TERMS OF REFERENCE Review of Design without Borders

2.1 Background

Norads vision is results in the fight against poverty. Norad shall contribute to effective management of development funds and ensure that Norwegian development cooperation is quality assured and evaluated. Furthermore, Norad shall be Norway's innovative academic community in the fight against poverty, in close collaboration with the national and international academic community.

As a part of this work Norad aims to strengthen private sector development and trade as key drivers for economic development through chapter post 161.70 Private sector development. Economic development and increased trade is necessary for developing countries to achieve sustainable economic growth. The purpose of this work is poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth in developing countries. The goal is economic development and wealth creation in poor countries as a result of private sector development, trade and productive employment. A prerequisite is better utilization of human, institutional and natural national resources in poor countries.

One of Norad's responsibilities is to encourage Norwegian companies to engage in commercial activities in developing countries. Assistance to promote the transfer of technology, goods and services in order to support the development of infrastructure and commercial activities in developing countries is also important. Furthermore, assistance is provided for measures that strengthen developing countries' export opportunities. The projects that receive support must meet the environmental requirements of recipient countries and the international community. They must also help to promote fundamental trade union rights in accordance with international conventions and labour standards.

FK Norway (Fredskorpset or only FK) contributes to change through global exchange of young people and professionals. FK Norway facilitates exchange between partnering institutions in Norway, Africa, Asia and Latin-America. Individuals and institutions share competence and experience across cultures. Development and change is not only expected to happen in developing counties, but also in Norway.

FK Norway is a tool for Norwegian development cooperation, and is fully financed from the National Budget. For the year 2011, the budget allocation was NOK 186,7 million, and 577 FK participants were exchanged between 380 organizations in 50 countries. These organizations work in a wide variety of sectors, ranging from business development, environment and governance to health, education and culture. FK Norway represents a unique program globally, facilitating mutual, reciprocal exchange between organizations and institutions in Norway and developing countries. Over the past 11 years, more than 5000 FK participants have been exchanged.

Norsk Form, The Foundation for Design and Architecture in Norway, was established on the initiative of the Ministry of Culture in 1992. Norsk Form aims to work actively to improve people's quality of life and everyday situation through the use of design and

architecture. This goal is attempted reached by initiating and participating in projects and through teaching, events, competitions and exhibitions.

Design without borders (DWB) is one of Norsk Forms projects, initiated in 2001. DWB was established to address the need for developing products and solutions in developing countries in a more targeted way through exchange of competent designers and user centered design processes. Linking design skills and development Design without Borders uses design as a tool to improve long-term aid and emergency relief mainly in Guatemala and Uganda. The project is managed by Norsk Form and supported by Norad and Fredskorpset.

Universidad Rafael Landívar is the largest, private, higher education institution in Central America, hosting 21 000 students and 1 800 academic employees. Landívar is a Jesuit university, with service to the Guatemalan society being a fundamental goal. The Instituto de Investigación en Diseño (INDIS) of the Design and Architecture Faculty is a project unit that complements the academy when it comes to research and social outreach.

2.2 About the partnerships


In 2011 **Norad** and Norsk Form signed a three year agreement with a budget limit of NOK 6,9 million for the period 2011-2013. The main objective of the agreement is to use design in partnership with private sector and civil society to develop sustainable solutions for social and economic development in developing countries. Norsk Form has received support from Norad to this project since 2002. An external review of Norsk Forms work in Guatemala for Norad was undertaken in 2007 by consultant Hans Petter Buvollen. It concluded on a positive note, however found that continued efforts should be based on improved methods for considering capacities, limitations and viability of the projects as well as a concentration of the projects based on lessons learned. The review also recommended that criteria for selection of projects should be improved by working with development oriented local organisations rather than international organisations to ensure local sustainability.

Fredskorpset have had agreements for exchange of designers between Norsk Form, Universidad Rafael Landívar (Guatemala) and Makerere University (Uganda) since 2002. A total of 32 FK participants (14 from Guatemala and 18 from Norway) have been exchanged between Norsk Form, Universidad Rafael Landívar and their local co-partners. The objective of the project has been to exchange designers between Norway and Guatemala, using design as a tool to develop products and solutions that contribute to sustainable economic and social development. Through the exchange, Norsk Form and Universidad Rafael Landívar aimed to build capacity on developing and promoting user focused design, and to strengthen the cooperation between the university and organizations in social development projects. An external review was undertaken in 2004, by Scanteam.

The cooperation between Norsk Form and Universidad Rafael Landívar started in 2001 with the first FK exchanges taking place in 2002. In 2012, Norsk Form and Design without Borders decided to phase out their exchange project in Guatemala. The project Design without Borders continues in Norway and Uganda.

The two partners are coordinating partners and are collaborating with co-partners, where the actual work place of the FK participants has been. Norsk Form and Universidad Rafael Landívar have to a varying extent been active in the concrete design development projects at co-partner level. Below is a figure of the partnership in the current round of exchange, ending in July 2012. See Annex 1 for an overview of FK participants, period of exchange and the co-partner/project they have been working for.

Fig. 1 Partner model for Design without Borders



Objectives for the Norad project 2011-2013:

The project's local partners continue to use design to develop solutions for satisfying users' needs that are economically, socially, institutionally, culturally and environmentally sustainable.

Design methodology is used in partnership with business and civil society to develop sustainable solutions in the south.

The academic community and the general population recognize design as a tool for social and economic development.

Design expertise in the south has been strengthened.

From Annex I to the Agreement, 2011

Objectives for the FK project 2002:

Develop and use the creative and analytic skills of designers to contribute to develop solutions for less favoured in a sustainable way

Facilitate for professional co-operation and mutual understanding between different cultures.

Increase the focus on the possibilities using design (product development) as a tool for development in poor countries. This is both in general and within the professional environments.

From Appendix 1 to the Partnership Agreement, 2002

Objectives for the FK project 2011:

Assist organisations and businesses in using design as a tool to develop products and solutions that contribute to sustainable economic and social development.

Facilitate intercultural co-operation and mutual learning between Ugandan, Guatemalan and Norwegian designers and product developers

Raise awareness of the benefits of socially motivated design among design professionals, humanitarian organisations, businesses and government in either country.

From Collaboration Agreement 2011

2.3 Reference material

Norad

- *Program document 2011-2013, dated 11.11.10.*
- *Contract and agreement between Norad and Norsk Form dated 30.3.11 including budget.*
- *Norsk Forms and DWBs plans, budgets and reports to Norad.*
- *Review: "Assessment of Partnership and Project Results through Design without Borders Guatemala. An external review by Hans Petter Buvollen, Guatemala, May 2007".*
- *Other relevant reviews and documents (including Norsk Forms own)*

Fredskorpset

- Project descriptions (Annex 1 of the application) from 2002-2011
- Collaboration Agreements between Fredskorpset and Norsk Form with budgets
- Norsk Forms plans and reports to Fredskorpset
- FK Norway's Theory of Change
- Result study of selected projects of Fredskorpsets primary programme, Scanteam 2005
- *Other relevant reviews and documents (including Norsk Forms own)*

2.4 Purpose/scope of the review

The purpose of the review is to evaluate Norsk Forms ability to provide effective aid cooperation through the project DwB. The review will in particular explore the ability to achieve goals and results, cost-effectiveness and sustainability of the project.

It is important to see Design without Borders as one integrated project, having two main donors.

For **Norad** the main focus of the review shall be the existing agreement 2011-2013, however also taking the cooperation from 2002 into consideration. The review shall assess Norsk Forms/DwBs professional and administrative capacity to carry out the project and

ensure results. The review will have a particular focus on DwB and where relevant to the project, the foundation Norsk Form.

For **FK Norway** the review shall cover the period 2001-2012 and focus mainly on the results of exchange of personnel in the project. The review shall focus on institutional level, and if possible also on community level. The review shall assess results both “on the ground” and “in the minds”, seeing the two as integrated aspects, in line with FK’s Theory of Change. Also, the review shall specifically look evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the use of the co-partner model in Design without Borders.

The review shall also look at the synergy effect of the Norad and FK funding.

The review shall provide conclusions about the quality of the Norsk Forms work/DwB. It shall provide Norad and FK with recommendations about the future direction of the cooperation with Norsk Form/DwB and if necessary, recommend changes or steps to be taken for improvement.

A special assessment including a field visit shall be made to Guatemala.

The review shall describe and assess Design without Borders on the basis of the following criteria:

2.4.1 Key points to be evaluated for Norad

Description and analysis of Norsk form/DwB

- Organisational structure of DwB and relations to Norsk Form. Resources from Norsk Form to the project; economic contributions over time and future plans.
- Strategy to clarify priorities in DwB.
- Procedures/tools for organisation management and financial management.
- The relevance of DwBs strategy and work to Norads strategy and particularly private sector development (chapter post 161.70 Næringsutvikling).

2.4.2 Key points to be evaluated for Norad and FK Norway

Risk- and result based management

- Systems for result management, hereunder documentation of results
- Systems for monitoring and evaluation.
- The quality of baseline studies.
- The level of documented results and progress (input, output, outcome).
- Achievements of results compared to plans (and baselines) in partner countries. How realistic are the goals and planned results?
- The use of indicators; do the indicators measure what the project aims to achieve?
- Sustainability of achievements within partner institutions. Are sustainability plans realistic?
- Exit strategies at country level. Are exit plans realistic?

- Systems for risk management, hereunder procedures for handling risks.

Performance analysis; resources and operational capacity of DwB

- Scope of total activities.
- Relevant qualification of personnel.
- Cost-effectiveness and work methods versus results (operation expenses versus contributions).
- Methods for learning; use of lessons learned.
- Assess cross-cutting issues such as gender, corruption and environment in the programs.
- Added value and synergy of co-funding from Norad and FK Norway.

2.4.3 Key questions to be evaluated for FK Norway

These questions are not exhaustive, but are expected to contribute to starting off the study. Relevant questions may be added by the consultant, and some of these questions may be less relevant than others.

Universidad Rafael Landívar:

- How have the long-term, repeated exchanges over 10 years affected Universidad Rafael Landívar and its surroundings? What kind of competence, values and mindset is left behind? What are the benefits of the exchange for the University?
- To what extent has social design for development been developed at the university?
- The Guatemalan FK participants that have returned from Norway, how have they contributed after coming home? What specific technical knowledge/skill did the participant introduce to the home partner? What methods were used to introduce the specific new knowledge/skill to the home partner? How have they been followed up by the university?
- Networks, web of relationships: Have new relationships developed? What are these relations used for? Spin-offs, unintended results.
- Has the programme been given attention in Guatemala, by the authorities and by the media?
- What have been the major success factors/good practices/lessons learnt?

Selected co-partners and their local community:

- How have the long-term, repeated exchanges affected the co-partners and their surroundings? What kind of competence, values and mindset is left behind?
- To what extent has social design for development been developed at the co-partner?
- What kind of traces have Norwegian FK participants left in Guatemala? At the co-partner where they have worked, and in the communities.

- Are solutions, products and projects developed at co-partners sustainable? Have solutions, products and projects contributed to economic development in the local community or for the co-partners?
- Networks, web of relationships: Have new relationships developed? What are these relations used for? Spin-offs, unintended results.
- Evaluate specifically the model of using co-partners as hosts for participants and as project work places. Is this an appropriate way of working with competence building? In which ways has the cooperation between Universidad Rafael Landívar and the co-partners been a strength or a weakness for the project? Suggestions for improvements to strengthen the model.

The sector of professional designers in Guatemala:

- How have the long-term, repeated exchanges affected the sector of professional designers? What kind of competence, values and mindset is left behind?
- To what extent has social design for development been developed in the sector of professional designers?
- Networks, web of relationships: Have new relationships developed? What are these relations used for? Spin-offs, unintended results.

2. Annex: Programmes supported through the Norsk Form “Design without Borders” initiative

Designer's home country	Implementation country	Location	Designer	Partner	Start year	End year	Field	Programme
Norway	Unknown		Leif Steven Verdu-Isachsen	NPA, Rofi industries	2001	2006	Humanitarian Aid	De-mining protective wear
Norway	Guatemala	Almolonga-Quetzaltenango	Fredrik Hansen	Municipality of Almolonga	2002	2003	Development	Waste management
Norway	Guatemala		Eivind Solberg	Cruz Roja, Guatemala	2002	2003	Emergency – Development Aid	Shelter (progressive shelter)
Guatemala	Norway	Trondheim	Maria Regina Alfaro Maselli	Inventas	2002	2003	Development aid	Furniture design
Guatemala	Norway	Moss	Mauricio Armas Zebadua	Hareide design mill	2002	2003		Multiple programmes
Norway	Guatemala		Jan Andre Pederse n	CONRED - national coordinator for disaster preparedness	2004	2004		Shelter (progressive shelter)
Norway	Guatemala		Guro Nereng	CONRED - national coordinator for disaster preparedness	2004	2006	Planning material	WATSAN manual for emergency situations
Norway	Guatemala	Coban - Alta Verapaz	Julian Mejia	Anacafé	2004	2005	Development	Coffee production
Norway	Guatemala	San Juan La Laguna	Harald Sævareid	Fundación Solar	2004	2005	Development	Ecotourism, waste management in village etc

Designer's home country	Implementation country	Location	Designer	Partner	Start year	End year	Field	Programme
Guatemala	Norway	Trondheim	Alejandro Fong	Inventas	2004	2005		
Guatemala	Norway	Trondheim	Andres del Valle	Inventas	2004	2005		
Guatemala	Norway	Moss	Nancy Yon	Hareide design mill	2004	2005		
Guatemala	Norway	Trondheim	Hector Ponce	Inventas	2005	2007		
Guatemala	Norway	Oslo	Luis Mata	Stay	2005	2007		
Norway	Guatemala	Guatemala - City	Ida Nilstad Pettersen	INDIS, University of Landivar	2006	2007	Development	Participatory processes in Urban development: (1) A road safety programme aiming at increasing the awareness of the population of both community and university in relation to traffic issues, (2) a programme aiming to strengthen local identity through improving public space and (3) a programme carried out in collaboration with the local communitarian programme Futuro Vivo, where production equipment and a graphic profile was developed for the little chocolate factory Xocolatl.
Norway	Guatemala	San Juan La Laguna	Heidi Winge Strøm	Fundación Solar	2006	2007	Development	Design and product development in artisan co-operatives in the village.
Norway	Guatemala	San Juan La Laguna	Johan Rye-Holmboe	Fundación Solar	2006	2009	Development	Zumos branding programme: During the period 2007–2010.
Norway	Uganda	Kampala	Even Helly-Hansen Sørbye	Gatsby foundation	2006	2007	Development	Design of agricultural machine - grass cutter
Norway	Uganda		Brita F Nielsen	Uganda Cleaner production centre	2006	2007	Development	Eco food storage
Uganda	Norway	Oslo	Dorah Kasozi	Høgskolen i Akershus	2006	2007		
Uganda	Norway	Oslo	Raymon Nsereko	Isandi Konsept	2006	2007		
Norway	Guatemala	Guatemala - City	Stian Sørli	Dirección de movilidad urbana - Transmetro	2007	2009	Development	Transport (Buses)

Designer's home country	Implementation country	Location	Designer	Partner	Start year	End year	Field	Programme
Norway	Uganda		Anne Britt Torkildsb y	National association of women's associations in Uganda	2007	2008	Development	Sustainable development in artisan communities
Norway	Uganda		Kristoffer Leivestad-Olsen	MogasOil	2007	2008		Engine oil packaging
Uganda	Norway	Oslo	Jesse Musamba	Pride arkitekter	2007	2008		
Uganda	Norway	Oslo	Paul Lubowa	Høgskolen i Akershus	2007	2008		
Ireland	Uganda		Sam Russel (Ireland)	National Lake Rescue institute	2008	2008	Development (??-depending on end user)	Life vest
Guatemala	Norway	Oslo	Oscar Quan Lafiesta	Norsk form	2008	2010	NA	Exhibition
Guatemala	Norway	Oslo	Melissa Pelaez	Supertanker	2008	2010		Worked as designer at Supertanker.
Norway	Guatemala	San Juan La Laguna	Synne Christensen	Xuaan Chi Ya	2009	2010	Development	Fair trade and export
Ireland	Guatemala	Guatemala - City	Cathal O'Meara (Ireland)	Direccion de movilidad urbana - Transmetro	2009	2010	Development	Transport (Bicycle paths)
Norway	Uganda		Sarah Keller	Crestank industries urban harvest	2009	2010	Development (??)	Low-cost urinal for domestic.

Designer's home country	Implementation country	Location	Designer	Partner	Start year	End year	Field	Programme
Norway	Uganda		Vanja Steinbru	U-ICC	2009	2010	Development (??)	Bepro motorcycle helmet
Guatemala	Norway	Stavanger	Paulina Quiñonez	Laerdal medical	2009	2010		Product development; birth simulator.
Guatemala	Norway	Hammerfest	Luis Pedro Quiñonez	Spor design	2009	2010		Industrial and web design
Uganda	Norway	Oslo	Geoffrey Ogwang	Høgskolen i Akershus	2009	2010		Unfinished programme
Uganda	Norway	Oslo	Olivia Suubi Njuku	HÅKKI	2009	2011	Research/publications	Research for a book on Norwegian logo design 1930-1980.
Norway	Uganda	North-Uganda	Mariann e Boye	Reco industries	2010	2012	Development	Food packaging
Ireland	Uganda		Neil Ryan (Ireland)	UNICEF Uganda	2010	2012	Development	Rugged solar powered PC design.
Norway	Guatemala	Antigua	Jannicke Rogne, Magnus Printzell Halvorsen, Juan Carlos Noguera	Transiciones	2011	2012	Emergency Aid/Development	Wheel chair design.
Guatemala	Norway	Lillesand	Lucia Lobos	SG Armaturen	2011	2012	Development	Lamp design, electrical fittings design.
Guatemala	Norway	Oslo	Valeria Gaitan	Kadabra design	2011	2012		Language teaching tool for kindergartens and a mobile medicine services design programme which is under development
Uganda	Norway	Oslo og Bergen	Brenda Asiimwe	Fretex	2011	2012		

Designer's home country	Implementation country	Location	Designer	Partner	Start year	End year	Field	Programme
Uganda	Norway	Porsgrun n	Ivan Barigye	Onezero	2011	2012		

3. Annex: List of Respondents

Below the lists of individuals interviewed, either as part of an individual or group interview, are listed according to their country of current residency.

3.1 In Norway

Name	Position	Institution
Thore Anton Bredeveien	Desk officer 2010-2012	Fredskorpset
Synne Christensen	Intern San Juan La Laguna 2009-2010, Current programme manager DwB Guatemala	Norsk form/DwB
Valeria Gaitan	Intern Kadabra Design 2011-2012	Student
Tor Inge Garvik	Manager design	Laerdal Global Health
Lucia Lobos	Intern SG armatures 2010-2011	SG Armaturer
Cathal O'Meara	Intern Transmovilidad Urbana 2009-2010	
Jan Walter Parr	Designer	Egg/Kadabra design
Paulina Quiñonez	Intern at Laerdal Design 2009-2010	Laerdal Global Health
Luis Pedro Quiñonez	Intern at Spor design 2009-2010	Free lancer
Johan Ry-Holmboe	Intern in San Juan La Laguna 2007-2009	Norrøna Sport
Camilla Solvang Hansen	Desk officer 2012-	NORAD PSD
Stian Sørli	Intern in Transmetro 2007-2009	
Oddveig Sætereng	Manager	Spor design
Harald Sævareid	Intern San Juan La Laguna 2004-2005	Laerdal medical
Vibeke Trålim	Head of PSD Section	NORAD PSD
Leif Verdu-Isachsen	Fagsjef design	Norsk form/DwB
Mia Østergaard	Desk officer 2012	Fredskorpset
Asle Åsmul	Head of design	SG Armaturer
Anita Fausa	Former Desk officer responsible for DwB	Norad

3.2 In Guatemala

Name	Position	Institution
Oscar Quan Lainfiesta	Researcher	INDIS
Cristian Vela Aquino	Director	INDIS
Savina Almonte	Representative	Asociacion Al Monte
Elmy Hernandez Cholotio	Comercialozadora Xuaan Chi Ya	CEO
Alessandra Lossau	Director of Urban Mobilization	Municipality of Guatemala City
Diego Giron	Officer Urban Mobilization	Municipality of Guatemala City
Eddy Morataya	Officer Urban Mobilization	Municipality of Guatemala City
Juan Rogelio Andrade	Technician	Transitions
Hugo Leon Andino	Technician	Transitions
Fredy Ejcalon	Technician	Transitions

Name	Position	Institution
Juan Carlos Noguera	Technician	Transitions
Hugo Rene Samayoa	Instructor	INTERCAP
Luis Enrique Chutan	Technician	Transitions
Gonzalo Gonzales Gabez	Technician	Transitions
Alexander Galvez	Executive Director	Transitions
Estuardo Divani	Technician	Transitions
Joel Chiti	Clinic Coordinator	Transitions
Vinicio Cabrera	Technician	Transitions
Juan Buch	Technician	Transitions
Oscar Tez	Technician	Transitions
Carlos V Quina	Technician	Transitions
Wilder Anibal Castellanos	Technician	Transitions
John Bell	Support	Transitions
Hector Ponce	Lecturer	URL
Andres Del Valle	Lecturer	URL
Oscar Arce	Independent consultant	Former director of INDIS

3.3 To the Online Survey

Below is the list of persons who were sent the survey questionnaire. Since the survey questionnaire was issued confidentially, it is not possible for us to know who amongst the individuals listed below are amongst the 30 individuals who chose to respond to the questions issues.

Name	Address
Fredrik Hansen	frederik@ludo.no
Eivind Solberg	eivind.solberg@inventas.no
Guro Nereng	nereng@gmail.com
Julian Mejia	juliandesign@gmail.com
Harald Sævareid	haraldsa@gmail.com
Ida Nilstad Pettersen	idanilst@gmail.com
Heidi Winge Strøm	heidiwstrom@gmail.com
Stian Sørli	studio@stiansorlie.com
Johan Rye-Holmboe	jrh@boetco.no
Synne Christiansen	Synne@norskform.no
Cathal O'Meara	cathalomeara@gmail.com
Jannicke Rogne, Norge	rognejannicke@gmail.com
Magnus Printzell Halvorsen, Norge	magnuhal@gmail.com
Juan Carlos Noguera, Guatemala	noguera@gmail.com
Maria Regina Alfaro Maselli	Marialfaro79@yahoo.com

Mauricio Armas Zebadu	primocaster@gmail.com
Alejandra Fong	alebara@gmail.com
Andres del Valle	andres_delvalle@hotmail.com
Nancy Yon	chinayon@gmail.com
Hector Ponce	disenoinactivo.gt@gmail.com , feoponce@hotmail.com , elsolmaya@gmail.com
Luis Mata	lfmatac@gmail.com
Oscar Quan Lafiesta	oquanl@gmail.com
Melissa Pelaez	mss2mil@gmail.com
Paulina Quinonez	qg.paulina@gmail.com , paulina.quinonez@laerdal
Luis Pedro Quinonez	quinope@gmail.com
Lucia Lobos	lucialobos@gmail.com
Valeria Gaitan	vpgaitan@gmail.com
Dorah Kasozi	kasozidorah@yahoo.com
Raymon Nsereko	nserekoray@yahoo.co.uk
Paul Lubowa	lubowapaul@designitlimited.com
Geoffrey Ogwang	ogwangobia@yahoo.com
Suubi Njuki	suubinjuki@gmail.com
Brenda Asimwe	brenda_asimwe@yahoo.com
Ivan Barigye	ibarigye@gmail.com
Even Sørbye	evenhhs@gmail.com
Brita F. Nielsen	britanielsen@gmail.com
Anne britt Torkildsby	annebrittt@gmail.com
Kristoffer Leivestad Olsen	Kristoffer@norskform.no
Sam Russel	mrsamrussell@gmail.com
Sarah Keller	naturalbornkeller@gmail.com
Vanja Steinbru	design@vanjasteinbru.no
Marianne Boye	marianbo@gmail.com
Neil Ryan	neildanielryan@gmail.com

4. Annex: List of Interview Questions

The following lists provides an overview of the general questions that were asked during the interviews. It is worth noting, however that questions were not necessarily asked in a linear fashion, but rather used as a guide for the type of information that was perceived by the review team as useful.

Baseline Questions for Norsk Form and DwB Staff

Aside from a general description of how they worked, and of following the line of questioning listed in annex 2, the following list provides some of the more specific questions, which we believe would be relevant.

- Could you describe the organizational structure of DwB and how DWB fits within Norks Form?
- Are the organizational and financial management procedures existent adequate to meet the needs of the DwB programme? What measures are taken to ensure that the exchange process does not support systems of patronage, nepotism and or corruption?
- Is there a DwB strategy and how does said strategy determine priorities?
- How are individual programmes identified/chosen?
- How did individual programme introduce crosscutting issues?
- What type of baseline studies was conducted for individual programmes? How useful were these baseline studies?
- Were the planned goals of the programmes realistic?
- What kind of systems and structures are in place in order to implement a result based management system?
- What M&E systems and procedures are in place?
- What systems do you have to document progress (input, output and outcome)? Are these systems adequate? Does DwB staff clearly understand and distinguish between output, outcome and impact; and do they use each adequately as a stepping stone to ensure progress?
- How much and how well are indicators used?
- Are lessons learned documented and utilized to modify the programme? What examples can be used to depict this dynamic?
- Were there individual goals for each exchange process/ exchange with individual partners?
- If yes, what were the specific goals of each individual exchange processes/exchange with individual partners?
- What criteria were used to select partners and programmes in Guatemala and in Norway?
- What criterion has been used to identify individual design outputs? Who has made the final decision to support any one endeavour.
- What requirements have been made of individual partners in terms of their incorporation of lessons learned gained through the exchange/programme process?
- What is your view of the co-partner system? Do you think it is beneficial, useful? Why?
- What criteria were identified to select DwB staff? How was the criterion determined and the ToR developed?
- Have the change in objectives as of 2010 been followed by a change of approach in the field and in Norway?
- How do you see the programme management model (planning and monitoring) changing for the last three to four years? Are the monitoring tools described by Marianne Boye in February 2011 (file in folder 8 – monitoring and evaluation) being used? If the model has changed, what have been the reasons for the changes? Have these changes had the expected impact on programme quality?
- Can you describe the resource allocation and how resource allocation is envisaged for the future?
- Which factors drive resource allocation?

- How interlinked was the funding between Norad and FK?
- Do you think that FK-Norad co-funding was important/valuable? Why?
- How were exchange participants identified? What criteria was used and how (or what) was the criteria determined?
- How do the internships in Norway fit into the development objectives of the programme?
- Have there been any networks that were established as a result of the DwB programme? If yes what are they and what has been their impact/utility?
- Has the design sector changed in any way as a result of the DwB programme? If so how?
- What steps are taken to secure sustainability? How realistic, in ensuring sustainability, are the efforts made?
- What systems for risk management exist/are in place? How adequate are these systems? (these will be examined in relation to the 5 step risk management framework: identification of hazard; decision of the possible victim of hazard; evaluation of risk and implementation of precautions; record and implementation of findings; review and modify approach).
- How has the exit plan of each individual programme been designed and implemented?
- How well have different partners understood relevant exit plans?
- How well has the exit plan been supported by DwB
- How well has DwB communicated the exit plan?
- Has the exit plan been designed in a manner that built on existing capacities and empowered?
- How was design defined and what factors determined what was considered to be a DwB product.

Questions for Guatemalan Partners

Aside from a general description of how they worked, and of following the line of questioning listed in annex 2, the following list provides some of the more specific questions, which we believe would be relevant.

- What were the individual goals of the institution when it became engaged in the DwB programme?
- What organizations measures/structures did it have in place to ensure that it could benefit as much as possible from being involved in the DwB programme?
- What was the goal of pursuing (individual) programme?
- Whose idea was (individual) programme?
- How are individual programmes identified/chosen?
- How did individual programme introduce crosscutting issues?
- What type of baseline studies was conducted? How useful were they
- How do you think this design programme can have an impact?
- What void is the design trying to fill? How would have this void been filled in the absence of the DwB programme? If the void had not been filled, what would be the consequences of an existing void? What is the realistic beneficiary population?
- Were the planned goals realistic?
- Has your organization changed in any way as a result of the exchange (or during the exchange period)? If yes, what triggered these changes?
- What is your (institution's) view of co partnering with other institutions? Was it beneficial/why/why not?
- Have there been any networks that were established as a result of the DwB programme? If yes what are they and what has been their impact/utility?
- Has the design sector changed in any way as a result of the DwB programme? If so how?
- How has the exit plan of each individual programme been designed and implemented?
- How well have different partners understood relevant exit plans?
- How well has the exit plan been supported by DwB
- How well has DwB communicated the exit plan?

- Has the exit plan been designed in a manner that built on existing capacities and empowered?
- How sustainable is the effort likely to be
- What factors will (have) affect sustainability?
- What will be sustainable/is left behind at the end of each programme?
- What are the benefits of being part of an exchange process?
- Has social design, in particular, changed as a result of the DwB programme?
- Have new techniques been introduced? Have these become routine over time?
- Do you have any other institutional partners, aside from Norsk Form, and if yes who are they?

Questions for Fredskorpset

Aside from a general description of how they worked, and of following the line of questioning listed in annex 2, the following list provides some of the more specific questions, which we believe would be relevant.

- In keeping with Fredskorpset's overall goals of making a change in the mind and on the ground. What have been the main objectives of pursuing exchanges in the DWB context?
- Has the DwB delivered in terms of impact on exchange participants and institutions and how has that impact been different from what can be experienced in other exchange fields such as culture, education and health?
- What is the long term plans for contributing to the DwB Programme (financial allocation and distribution)?
- What have been FK's requirements in terms of partner and participant identification
- What is your view of the co-funding arrangement between you and Norad? What have been the benefits and drawbacks of such an arrangement?
- How are individual programmes identified/ chosen?
- What type of baseline studies was conducted? How useful were they?

Questions for Norad

Aside from a general description of how they worked, and of following the line of questioning listed in annex 2, the following list provides some of the more specific questions, which we believe would be relevant.

- What is the long term plans for contributing to the DwB Programme (financial allocation and distribution)?
- How relevant to (in sync with) Norad is the DwB programme? Particularly as it relates to Norad's strategy in the private sector development field?
- What is your view of the co-funding arrangement between you and FK? What have been the benefits and drawbacks of such an arrangement?
- How are individual programmes identified/chosen?

Questions for Guatemala Government representatives

Depending on which programmes are identified, government officials from relevant ministries/institutes etc. will be interviewed.

- Are you aware of the DwB programme?
- How are individual programmes identified/chosen?
-
- Do you think the programme has been beneficial to Guatemala (sector specific)? If yes how so, why?
- What existing capacity does the DwB programme (and list individual programmes) support in the (determine) context?
- Is the programme/programme sustainable long term? How?

5. Annex: Online Survey Questionnaire