

**François Van Lierde**  
BE: +32 494480986  
DRC: +243 971064885  
[francoisvanlierde@yahoo.fr](mailto:francoisvanlierde@yahoo.fr)

## **« Kinshasa Fight Against Sex Trafficking »**

**On behalf of:** The Salvation Army DRC  
**Period:** 2009 - 2013

## **FINAL EVALUATION REPORT**

December 2014

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# Section 1: Preliminary considerations

## 1.1 Introduction

In 2007, The Salvation Army in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SA DRC) launched its first project to combat sex trafficking in Mpasu, located in the Kimbaseke district of Kinshasa. The two-year project was organised around four principle themes: schooling for young girls involved in sex trafficking, access to vocational training, psychosocial support, and community mobilisation and outreach as a tool for prevention.

Building on the successes achieved, SA DRC, in partnership with The Salvation Army in Norway (SA N), developed a second intervention phase, which, over a five year period (2009-2013), allowed for the consolidation of the results achieved the initial project phase, while extending them to new neighbourhoods in Kinshasa and to new groups of girls aged 12 years and older.

The objective of the project, co-financed by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to an amount of \$227,435 (90%) and SA N (10%), was to “prevent sex trafficking in Kinshasa and promote the social and economic reintegration of victims of sex trafficking into their communities and families.”

The project six main results were defined as follows:

- R1: Prevent child prostitution and contribute to the rehabilitation of victims of sex trafficking through schooling for 240 girls, access to vocational training for an additional 160 girls, and sensitization/mobilisation of 125 community animators in the five SA DRC “postes”.
- R2: Offer alternative economic activities to 500 girls via micro-credit grants and management skills training.
- R3: Improve the psychosocial well-being of 300 girls through close field-based support and coaching by 10 Salvation Army officers and 10 trained faith leaders.
- R4: Offer legal support to victims (100 cases tried over 5 years)
- R5: Strengthen community awareness and mobilisation with regard to the fight against sex trafficking through organised communication campaigns.
- R6: Fight against HIV/AIDS by organising voluntary screening drives and providing support to individuals who test positive.

The project closed on 31 December 2013 and was evaluated for the first time at the end of that year. The evaluation report was rejected by NORAD, resulting in a second project evaluation in 2014. This report presents the main conclusions of the second evaluation.

Notably, a third phase of the project was launched in 2014 with the support of NORAD. Some of these activities were visited by the evaluator and are mentioned in this report, but will undergo a separate final evaluation upon the conclusion of the third phase.

## **1.2 Evaluation methodology and process**

Evaluation objective: to use the intervention's logical framework, results and qualitative and quantitative indicators as reference points to evaluate the relevance, efficiency, efficacy, impact and sustainability of the project, provide for each of these precise and documented analysis, and, *in fine*, formulate all recommendations necessary to strengthen future Salvation Army interventions.

The methodology used for the evaluation relied primarily on triangulating the quantitative and qualitative data gathered from 1) SA DRC (document review, workshop to launch the evaluation, bilateral interviews), 2) key stakeholders and 3) beneficiaries and groups targeted directly and indirectly by the intervention (bilateral interviews, focus groups discussions, collecting testimonials and direct observations *in situ*).

The evaluation began on 24 November and ended on 10 December 2014. The process followed three main stages:

- 1) Reviewing the documents provided by SA DRC: the project proposal, the logical framework and budget, annual reports (2009-2013), and the final narrative and financial reports. The document review was conducted at SA DRC's head office and the training centre in Mpasas, where, however, relatively few documents could be consulted (see point 1.3: Constraints).
- 2) A workshop to launch the evaluation organised in Kinshasa on 2 December with SA DRC teams. Workshop objective: to approve the evaluation methodology and conduct a general discussion about the project, its achievements, effects, lessons learned by the team, and the main difficulties encountered.
- 3) Gathering quantitative and qualitative data in addition to a number of observations *in situ*, and home visits in each of the three project sites: Mpasas, Kinkole and Bibwa. While gathering the data, the evaluator combined group interviews, complimentary bilateral interviews, class visits, home visits and observations *in situ*.

The groups consulted include:

- Salvation Army field workers in Mpasas.
- The five volunteers (community animators) mobilised in the three intervention areas.
- The trainers (vocational training) at the Mpasas centre.
- Local and community leaders in Mpasas and Kinkole.

- 26 girls participating in the sewing programme and 20 girls participating in the beauty and hairdressing programme (2014-2018 project).
- 17 girls who completed the sewing programme and 15 girls who completed the beauty and hairdressing programme (2009-2013).
- 12 girls who received micro-credit.
- 7 girls who received schooling (2009-2011).
- 9 parents of girls who benefited from the project.

Complementary bilateral interviews were conducted with:

- Head of The Salvation Army's Women and Development Department.
- The Salvation Army's Territory Secretary for projects.
- The Salvation Army's National Coordinator for schools.
- The Territory Commander of The Salvation Army in DRC.
- The pedagogical advisor at Collège John Mabwidi
- Salvation Army officers in Mpsa and Kinkole.

Visits and observations *in situ*:

- Classroom visits in the Mpsa training centre.
- Home visits and/or shop visits to 14 girls who participated in the project (micro-credit and vocational training).
- Visit to Collège Mabwidi.

### 1.3 Constraints

A number of constraints were encountered while gathering the data, including:

#### 1) **A serious problem regarding documents, tools, and management and monitoring records for the project and activities.**

One year after the closure of the project, relatively few documents are available or locatable, which significantly complicated the evaluator's ability to conduct the evaluation. Quite often, due to the absence of written materials, the consultant was forced to rely on the testimony of SA DRC staff members who were involved in the project and who are still on staff. With regard to quantitative data, this testimony could only provide general estimations.

Among the missing data, the most problematic included: missing or incomplete beneficiary records (micro-credit and schooling), lack of records on who received start-up kits (sewing and hairdressing), little or no information on the workshops organised (modules, reports, attendance lists), no monitoring tools for voluntary HIV testing nor any reports on supporting individuals who tested positive.

## 2) A problem with the formulation of the project, including the results and indicators.

The indicators set by SA DRC are activity level indicators (outputs: number of people trained, numbers of girls who received micro-credit, average age of girls participating, number of change agents equipped, etc.)

There were no indicators defined at the result (outcome) level, which means that there were also none followed or monitored during project implementation. Because of this, SA DRC lacks information from which to evaluate the impact of the intervention. As a result, the evaluator was not able to work from a large amount of data that could be verified, interpreted and compared. Instead, the evaluation is based on information that, from a quantitative point of view, is incomplete.

The list below provides examples of result indicators that were missing, the absence of which were particularly problematic while evaluating the project:

- Dropout rate among girls registered for vocational training.<sup>1</sup>
- Dropout rate among girls registered for schooling.
- Percentage of girls who received micro-credit who were still active at the end of the project.
- Average capital retained by girls who received micro-credit at the end of the project (as a percentage of capital invested).
- Percentage of girls who participated in vocational training and received start-up kits who were still active at the end of the project.
- Average income from their vocational activities.
- Percentage of girls who attended schooling who 1) are continuing their education or 2) have found employment.
- Percentage of girls who, at the end of the project, have partially or completely abandoned prostitution.
- Number of girls who did not participate in the project who have renounced these types of activities (multiplier effect?)
- Etc.

There are two comment/points of nuance with regard to this issue:

- 1) At the beginning of the project, SA DRC gathered testimonies from the group of beneficiaries (qualitative approach). Although testimonies were also collected from some of these beneficiaries at the end of the project and provide evidence of interesting changes, the absence of a real quantitative monitoring system prevents any real conclusions from being drawn.

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<sup>1</sup> This information was extracted from attendance records by the consultant, but was not previously compiled or addressed by SA DRC.

2) SA DRC had already planned to correct some of these gaps in the implementation of the third phase of the project by introducing new monitoring tools. This is an interesting development, which will need to be further strengthened and systematised (see recommendations).

**3) Not all project beneficiaries were represented in focus groups.**

Focus groups were organised for the evaluation and brought together some of the girls who had participated in the project activities from 2009-2013. However, the girls who attended the discussions were those with whom SA DRC still had contact, most of whom are still conducting their activities and are no longer involved in prostitution.

In contrast, those girls who dropped out of the project during the course of the training or after the project concluded when their activities proved unprofitable (micro-credit or small enterprise), and who went back to their previous activities, were not mobilised to attend the sessions.

The evaluator thus missed 1) quantitative data that would help determine the proportion of girls concerned, and 2) first-hand qualitative data with regard to the reasons for dropping out. However, these reasons could still be gathered and analysed from testimonies from project staff, local leaders and the girls who participated in the focus group discussions.

**4) A small reduction in the number of days spent on data collection.**

Due to serious family issues, the consultant was forced to end his mission three days earlier than planned. I would like to thank the SA DRC team for their understanding and support, and emphasise that the premature termination of the mission had minimal effect on the evaluation as most of the data had already been gathered in the field.

## **Section 2: Evaluation conclusions**

### **2.1. Relevance and quality of the design**

#### **2.1.1 Relevance with regard to the context and needs**

Here relevance is evaluated with regard to the project objectives, location and target groups.

#### General considerations

The project focuses on two objectives. The immediate objective is the social and economic reintegration of young women who were victims of sex trafficking in Kinshasa. A more long-term objective is the prevention of this type of trafficking,

meaning a reduction in magnitude, scope and the number of young women who become victims.

It is first necessary to clarify the semantics of sex trafficking in relation to this project. Generally the notion of sex trafficking, especially when applied to child prostitution (but not only), implies an element of coercion, both physical and moral, as well as the existence of an organised structure, which is the source of the coercion and beneficiary of the trafficking and its revenues, and individuals who are its victims. Prostitution is regularly associated with the concept of human trafficking, being one form of this type of bondage.

In the context of Kinshasa, and of this project in particular, the Salvation Army defines the concept of trafficking in a substantially different way. According to this definition, pressure is rarely physical, but rather economic (sometimes moral) as the root cause of prostitution is generally the extreme poverty and insecurity that affects a large part of the population of Kinshasa.

Although SA DRC did not conduct a baseline study that traces more precisely the parameters of this phenomenon, including its causes and manifestations, a number of typical cases, profiles and courses leading to prostitution were defined during the workshop launching the evaluation. These include:

- 1) Voluntary prostitution: some girls leave the family home on their own initiative and enter prostitution as a way of attaining a level of income they would otherwise not be able to due to the lack of resources in their families and the lack of educational and professional opportunities.
- 2) Survival prostitution: this refers to the phenomenon of "Shege", widespread in the Congolese capital. "Shege" sees girls end up on the street from one day to the next for a variety of reasons (divorced or dead parents, superstition/accusation of sorcery, sexual violence within the family, etc.). For these girls, prostitution becomes one of the only ways to survive and meet their most basic needs.
- 3) Coerced prostitution: in certain cases parents themselves encourage and/or force their children into prostitution. In situations of extreme poverty, it is one way to provide the family with the resources it needs to survive.
- 4) Finally, we can distinguish between organised prostitution, in which girls work and live in a brothel and have part of their income reserved for the manager of the 'establishment', and individual prostitution, in which girls work alone without being attached to a particular place or location.

#### Groups and areas targeted by the project

During the 2009-2013 project, SA DRC targeted mostly girls belonging to the first category, mainly due to the specific context of the target area.



The neighbourhoods of Mpsa, Kinkole and Bibwa are suburban areas where the number of street children is relatively limited, unlike the neighbourhoods of downtown Kinshasa.

This does not call into question the targeting of these neighbourhoods as prostitution in these areas is a real problem, however, future activities could consider targeting the inner city, as well as more specifically targeting young street children/girls ("Shege") given the scope of this problem and the extreme physical insecurity and health risks to which this specific group is exposed.

Among the girls identified in Mpsa, Kinkole and Bibwa, the SA DRC mainly focused on the youngest, the purpose of the project being the fight against child prostitution, fully justified for health as well as social, moral and ethical reasons. That said, the lack of data collected during the identification of beneficiaries makes it impossible to comment more precisely on the actual ages of the target group, or the average age of girls benefiting from the project.

Notably, the third phase of the programme (2014-2018) targets girls and young women involved in prostitution without reference to their age.

Girls currently participating in vocational training were asked about their age during classroom visits and interviews, which is 19.4 years in hairdressing and beauty sector and 19.7 years in the sewing courses. Of the 46 girls consulted, 7 were minors (under 18 years).

### Project objectives

The objective is twofold: reintegration and prevention, which are very relevant, even if the strategy developed for the prevention aspects of the project poses a number of dilemmas as that goal – particularly ambitious and complex – relates to much broader development goals which are beyond, at least in part, the capacity of this single project.

## **2.1.2 Relevance and quality of the intervention strategy**

### **A. Objective 1: Reintegration and rehabilitation of young girls**

Overall, the intervention strategy is coherent as it takes into account the specific needs of the girls targeted – expectations that vary from one girl to the other – and proposes different responses accordingly:

- 1) schooling for those wishing to re-enter the formal education system.
- 2) access to vocational training where reintegration into school is not desired or not possible (mainly because of early school dropout).
- 3) access to credit for girls whose participation in training (formal or vocational) is not possible, mainly because of family and/or specific economic circumstances (domestic responsibilities, motherhood, isolation, lack of resources, etc.).

- 4) coaching and psychosocial support for girls in trouble and case-by-case legal support, according to the need and situation.

Some weaknesses and gaps were, however, identified in each of the intervention modes.

### Schooling

The project duration (five years) was expected to enable girls to complete a full study cycle (grades 1–6, humanities) and thus ensure their access to state diplomas, an important step towards employment and access to paid jobs. There were two weaknesses, however:

- 1) Support for schooling was discontinued after the second year of the project at the request of the donor, apparently for financial reasons. The girls for the most part then dropped out of school, which reduces, if not nullifies any impact made by this aspect of the project.
- 2) The project does not provide post-graduation support to girls who nevertheless obtained their state diploma (grade 6), which is why the level of employment among the graduates remained very low (which constitutes a risk for sustainable reintegration and rehabilitation).

The problem is twofold:

- In some fields, the state diploma is not sufficient; additional university-level training is necessary to effectively strengthen the employability of the girls. The project opted for a sponsorship approach, the opportunity to pursue – in some cases (selection) – this sponsorship beyond the primary school cycle could be considered in order to provide a more realistic change of gaining employment, at least some of them.
- Even though for some sectors (for example, education), the national diploma may be sufficient to find a job, the girls were not accompanied, supported, or advised in their search for employment. Again, for this resources could be mobilised in a way to better support the actual attainment of employment (which constitutes the final objective of this part of the project).

### Vocational training

It is first necessary to emphasize the relevance of the choice of training courses both in respect to the requests of the girls as well as the economic opportunities existing in the area of intervention.

This part of the project planned for the installation/construction of a training centre (three classrooms funded by SA N), a nine-month training cycle (skills training) during each year of project implementation, as well as the distribution of start-up kits (sewing machines, fabric, cosmetic products, etc.) at the end of the training cycle.

Even if these activities help enhance the girls' employability, the strategy for supporting them to effectively obtain employment remains incomplete.

Three important elements are missing:

- 1) The project did not include the possibility of internships, an essential step between training and entering employment. Some of the girls consulted during the evaluation were able to arrange for this themselves and are still completing their internships. Others, due to the lack of resources (to pay internship fees), became discouraged and abandoned their activities.

This problem was noted by the SA DRC, which, in the third phase of the project, planned to install community workshops to allow some of the girls who had finished the programme (not all, due to the lack of space and sufficient capacity) to continue their training in these centres—quite an interesting adaption to the strategy.

- 2) The project did not plan for any post-training support. Even though the trainers periodically visited their former students, there was a lack of real entrepreneurial coaching (support to develop small businesses, management support, marketing, etc.). Some girls worked at home using their own means, but their activities were only marginally profitable, and, in most cases, did not allow them to replace the materials in the start-up kits distributed by the project. The depletion of their stock also threatens to interrupt their activities.
- 3) The project did not plan for financial support for the most vulnerable girls during the training cycle, which was found to be one of the causes of the – at times significant – dropout rate (see below). In reality, participating in the training meant putting aside some activities that the girls and their families strongly relied on, which had a negative financial impact on the entire household. However, if the micro-credit activities has benefitted other groups of beneficiaries (such as those in vocational training), part of the credit could have been used to support the most vulnerable households to limit the financial impact linked to the schooling or training of the girl participating, and would have served to further the integration of the different training streams.

### Micro-credit

Over the course of the five years of the project, 374 girls received micro-credit at an average amount of \$93, of which the majority initiated or strengthened small

business activities (buying and selling food products, manufactured products, etc.)

Even though it is difficult to draw conclusions with regard to the development and profitability of these activities due to the lack of quantitative data available, group discussions showed that dropout was related to the significant reduction of initial capital. Overall, seen from a medium-term perspective, the impact of the credit on the financial capacity of the girls remained limited.

There are a number of reasons for this:

- 1) There was no plan to support the development of micro-projects, or any pre-selection of projects. The grants were issued by SA DRC at the closure of a two-day training in which the beneficiaries participated, but with no other conditions. Technical support and dialogue (the viability of the micro-project, etc.) needs to precede the distribution of grants in the future, which will help ensure that the projects are well-managed and develop sustainably. This demands specific technical expertise, which is not, at this stage, available in the SA DRC team.
- 2) There was no coaching or technical and managerial monitoring of the projects. Project staff visited beneficiaries periodically, but these visits were more for encouragement than real visits of support and advice. The beneficiaries managed their activities in their own way, which was often ad hoc. More consistent coaching would undoubtedly help improve success rates and the development of micro-projects.
- 3) The project lacked solidarity funds. The vulnerability of the girls targeted and the use of the generated revenue to cover urgent needs (health care, children's school fees, etc.) were recurring difficulties encountered throughout the project. The use of the initial capital to cover household needs limited saving and reinvestment and explains the almost universal depletion of capital amongst beneficiaries. To reduce this risk, some organisations – with varying degrees of success – have created solidarity funds. Through regular contributions, a reserve fund is created by a small group of beneficiaries and can be used by individual members in case of need or emergency. This approach was discussed in the field with the beneficiaries and is without doubt worth exploring by SA DRC.
- 4) No second grant distribution cycle. The distribution of a first line of credit to a group of beneficiaries generally allows – if there is a good monitoring system in place – for the identification of the more motivated beneficiaries who take the management of their capital seriously. When these beneficiaries have been identified, supplementary support, notably materials, would be justifiable, even indispensable, to support and boost their initiatives. In the selection of these beneficiaries, reimbursing the credit could then be one of the criteria.

Psychosocial support and coaching

In addition to the lack of economic alternatives (the main reason that the girls turn to prostitution), the SA DRC also takes into account the moral and social difficulties the girls face, along with those related to family and identity. Their situation is also often the caused by sensitive, complex and painful personal experiences. The integration of psychosocial support strengthens and completes the project strategy in a useful and relevant way.

Follow-up and coaching of the girls was delegated to SA DRC staff in five locations near Mpsa, in addition to the team of five community animators trained twice (2009 and 2010) in child rights, psychology and community mobilisation. These are essentially the staff members responsible for monitoring and coaching the girls in the training centre and in their homes when particularly sensitive situations, often family-related, are detected.

There are a number of remarks/limitations with regard to this intervention strategy:

- 1) The absence of documentation. The SA DRC indicates in its reporting around 300 cases/situations addressed by its staff. As mentioned above, no written trace of these actions exist. It is therefor difficult, without precise information, to draw conclusions on the nature and the content of these interventions.
- 2) A limited number of staff members. The area of intervention is relatively large (Mpsa, Kinkole and Bibwa). The animators were divided by zone, but by their own admission, their inability to cover their zones, which were also large, on their own, limited their ability to intervene, especially with girls living in furthest areas.
- 3) Limited capacity in psychosocial support. Staff members had no special training in this field and it appears that two trainings of three days each is largely insufficient to considerably strengthen this capacity. In this sense, another option worth exploring, and which could be used as part of the current programme, would be to recruit a professional psychologist who could work permanently from the centre and be accessible to girls facing difficulties at any time.

## Legal support

The project provides for addressing around one hundred cases over five years. Ultimately, the team only intervened on five occasions. This support was reserved for girls who were direct beneficiaries of the project and few cases were presented. Legal support was not included as part of the third phase of the project (2014-2018). It is in any case recommended that SA DRC maintain some capacity to watch for these cases and intervene where necessary. The establishment of a permanent (see the previous point) capacity would be one way of identifying cases that could be referred to SA DRC headquarters, where legal expertise and resources are available.

## **B. Objective 2: Prevention of sex trafficking**

In addition to the reintegration of girls who have been victims of trafficking, the project also aims to prevent sex trafficking, which is to say reduce its magnitude and limit the number of girls involved. This objective is more ambitious than the first as well as more complex as it is linked to larger development goals.

According to the problem analysis presented by SA DRC, prevention activities address the root causes of the problem: insecurity, the struggle against poverty, mentality, behaviour, etc.

The means deployed and strategies used to meet this objective were insufficient to obtain significant results.

In reality, the project focused on:

- 1) Organising awareness raising and sensitization campaigns: distributing flyers in the neighbourhoods, radio broadcasts, and sensitization sessions organised once per year at the Mpsa training centre for a limited number of people (around one hundred) in comparison to the size of the target population.
- 2) The mobilisation of five volunteers and five SA DRC staff in the neighbourhoods. This number, however, only allowed for limited coverage of and contact with the community and the areas targeted by the project.

This, however, does not call the relevance of the outreach activities, which are necessary, into question, but rather puts the effects they were able to achieve in perspective.

More than the outreach activities, the existence in the communities of alternative and accessible opportunities and trajectories (in terms of training and employment) constitute the principle means of prevention.

In this sense, it must be noted that the training centre also welcomed girls who were not engaged in prostitution. Without a doubt, for these girls access to these trainings decreases the probability that some of them, due to lack of alternatives, would become involved in prostitution-related activities. In terms of prevention, this is also an achievement, although limited due to the limited capacity of the training centre, which can host about fifty girls per year.

In conclusion, the SA DRC needs to invest in developing the types of training that it offers and expand the number of students it can host and support. In terms of prevention, this is the most direct contribution that the SA DRC could make. Outreach activities such as awareness raising and sensitisation should not then be stand-alone activities, but part of the effort to support and coach the beneficiaries.

### **C. Complementary objective: The fight against HIV/AIDS**

This is a particularly relevant part of the project when considering the conditions in which prostitution is practiced in Kinshasa’s districts: all of the health risks to which the girls are exposed in addition to the lack of information and access to testing services and support.

Another interesting point: the collaboration between the project team and the SA DRC health department, which offers testing and has the necessary technical capacity and materials (numerous health centres) to support individuals who have tested positive, has allowed for regular and systematic referral and monitoring.

## **2.2. Efficiency**

### **2.2.1 Activity implementation**

This section addresses the degree to which the activities implemented under each project result have respected project planning (for example: the number of people trained, sent to school, etc.), as well as how the activities were organised.

#### **a. Vocational training**

Activity	Planned	Actual
Train girls in sewing, and beauty and hairdressing <b>Indicator:</b> number of girls enrolled over five years	<b>160</b>	<b>257</b>
Budget over 4 years (expenditure 2009-2012)	\$30 389	

Firstly, it should be noted that the training centre in Mpasa (three classrooms and an office), was constructed in 2009-2010, financed by SA N, enlarging the training capacity to about one hundred students per year.

This was an important development that considerably improved the educational environment and learning conditions, which also strengthened the attractiveness of the centre and the community’s interest in the activities.

As a result, the project was able to enrol 257 girls in one of two training trajectories between 2009-2013, which was considerably more than the number planned. However, it must be noted that currently only two classrooms are in use; the third remains unused. The centre’s capacity is then not used to its full potential, a fact that should be corrected as soon as possible in order to expand the catalogue of trainings offered.

The evaluation also looked at the quality of the training offered. First of all the positive elements:

- Good technical capacities of the two instructors, each holding a certificate of professional competence.
- The employment conditions were appropriate (\$ 240/month), there was a good level of motivation, commitment and a very positive relationship with the girls.
- A very good availability of tools (40 sewing machines) and all materials necessary for the practical organization of the courses (fabric, cosmetic products, etc.).
- A good balance between practice and theory (a 70-30% ratio).

In addition to these positive aspects, some shortcomings have been identified, relating in particular to educational management.

- Textbooks: Textbooks were brought by the trainers to the centre. These were often books they used in their own education, sometimes over 10 years old, and in very poor condition.
- Strictly speaking there is no educational management system: no prevision of materials or lesson preparation, no programmes and very little supervision. The management focuses primarily on administration, leaving the trainers to work alone, without coaching/supervision.
- It is therefore possible and necessary to further professionalise the training centre, its management systems and its staff, to contribute to strengthening the quality of teaching and organisation.
- SA DRC has an Education Department, in charge of the coordination of its schools. Some of these schools organise technical and vocational education (including the two sectors targeted by the project). The exchanges of experience and tools, as well as support and collaboration, are certainly worth exploring. To this point, the project team has been relatively isolated, which needs to be quickly corrected.

#### **b. Schooling**

Activity	Planned	Realised
Schooling for girls in secondary education (free of charge). Indicator: Number of girls supported	<b>240</b>	<b>52</b>
2-year budget (expenditure 2009-2011)	\$10 053	

The schooling of 52 girls started in the 2009-2010 school year and was extended during the following school year before being halted at the request of the donor for budgetary reasons. As mentioned above, most of the girls (46 of 52) then dropped out of school without being able to graduate, which greatly limits the effects and impact of this part of the action (see below).



It should be noted that three of the girls were redirected to the training cycle, which each of them completed.

Following the termination of the schooling support, SA DRC developed a new activity: the establishment of girls clubs in five schools. Three of the schools are in the project area (Mpasa) and two are located in downtown Kinshasa. The purpose of the clubs was to bring together between 20 and 40 girls at regular intervals (once a month) and promote discussions and exchange of ideas on various topics: sexual and marital violence, HIV/AIDS, prostitution, etc., lead by an educational animator.

During the evaluation mission, these clubs were no longer active. Although a good dynamic – during the project period – was reported in two of these schools (the SA DRC schools), the results were more mixed in the other three (schools in the project area) where the level of mobilization of the clubs remained relatively limited.

Nevertheless, the initiative remains interesting, the targeting of the schools being quite relevant. That said, this activity was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without being structurally integrated into the overall strategy of the project. Available resources remained too limited, particularly in monitoring. And again, the lack of collaboration with SA DRC's Education Department – whose involvement would certainly strengthen the impact and durability of the activity – is regrettable.

### c. Micro-credit

Activity	Planned	Realised
Provide micro-credit to girls, train them and support them in managing their business. Indicator: number of beneficiaries over five years	<b>500</b>	<b>374</b>
4 year budget (expenditure 2009-2012)	\$25 740	

The disbursement of grants was organised yearly, each time to new groups of beneficiaries. The average grants amount was \$93, with at times significant variations from \$30 to \$120 depending on the beneficiary.

Disbursements were preceded by an information session for the beneficiaries (the reimbursement system, the objectives of the action, the basic principles of good management, etc.).

As mentioned above, the results of this component remained mixed (see the efficacy analysis) because a number of key activities were not always included in the planning: support to project development, the process of project selection, advisory support and coaching (development and management of micro-projects), establishment of a solidarity fund, granting of a second loan for the most promising projects, etc.

Reimbursement rates have not been compiled by SA DRC. A report was presented to the consultant (4m report 2010), which showed a relatively low rate of reimbursement (about 20%).

**d. Psychosocial support**

Activity	Planned	Realised
1. Train 10 SA DRC officers and 10 other faith leaders.	<b>20</b>	<b>50</b>
2. Provide psychosocial support to 300 girls	300	?
5 year budget	\$4373	

The budget refers to the two trainings in psychosocial coaching techniques and methods organised in 2009 and 2010, in which 50 people participated including SA DRC staff members, other faith leaders, the project team and the volunteers/community facilitators.

Due to the impossibility of consulting the modules and training reports, it is not possible to comment on their content.

The support itself was mainly provided by community facilitators with support from some SA DRC staff members. There is no report documenting the support provided, rendering it impossible to determine the exact number of girls who benefited from these activities.

**e. Information and community mobilisation**

Activity	Planned	Realised
Train community facilitators (child rights) Indicator: 125 people trained	<b>125</b>	<b>122</b>
4-year budget (expenditure 2009 – 2012)	\$12 835	

The budget presented above covers the period 2009-2012 (the 2013 figures have not been consulted) and refers to the organisation of one training workshop per year on child rights for the project teams and community animators.

Again, the training modules and reports were not available for consultation making it is difficult to draw any conclusions on their content or methodology.

Community mobilisation also included the regular broadcast of radio messages and distributing information leaflets in target communities (2009-2012 budget: \$ 8 280).

Although these are interesting activities, on their own it is unlikely that they managed to produce significant changes, particularly in the prevention of sex trafficking (see the efficacy analysis).

These activities do appear to have contributed to a relative level of awareness in some neighbourhoods, although on a limited scale in comparison to the extent and magnitude of the phenomenon.

#### f. Legal support

Activity	Planned	Realised
Provide legal support to girls in difficulty Indicator: 100 cases addressed	<b>100</b>	<b>5</b>
5-year budget	\$8 631	

The budget here refers to advocacy trainings organised for project staff and community leaders (between 2009 and 2011).

The low number of cases addressed results from the fact that the support was limited to the girls directly targeted by the project (the beneficiaries) and few cases in need of legal support developed during the implementation period.

Five cases were presented to the consultant concerning: a land dispute (the purchase of a plot by a beneficiary was challenged), two arbitrary arrests and the closure of two of the beneficiaries' shops by the social services (bribery). In each of these cases, project field staff intervened to resolve the situations amicably, and pay, in some cases, fines and other fees charged by local authorities.

Notably, this aspect of the project was not renewed within the framework of the third phase (2014-2018), most likely due to the limited number of cases and relatively high costs.

#### e. The fight against HIV / AIDS

Activity	Planned	Realised
Organise voluntary testing and referral of positive cases in the project area. Indicators: number of voluntary tests	<b>1000</b>	<b>937</b>

These campaigns were organised by the SA DRC medical team on a yearly basis in the Mpassa training centre. The project team was made aware of detected cases and referred these individuals to SA DRC health centres where they appear to have been supported. However, there is no quantitative data reported that confirms this.

## 2.3 Efficacy

The evaluation of the efficacy, or effectiveness of the project, focuses on measuring the degree to which each of the six intervention results was achieved. As mentioned above, there was a significant problem in the formulation of project indicators as they were defined by SA DRC at the activity level, but not

(or poorly) at the result (impact) level. Very little data on the changes resulting from the project was presented to the consultant.

### 2.3.1 Result 1: prevention and reintegration

Due to a lack of indicators, monitoring and quantitative measurement of reintegration (i.e. the proportion of girls no longer active in prostitution and reintegrated in their communities and their families), we cannot accurately specify the results achieved.

The data collected during field visits, especially in the focus group discussions, however, provide some indication.

#### 2.3.1.1. Professional training

##### 1) The dropout rate of girls enrolled in training

	Sewing			Beauty/Hairdressing		
	Enrolled	Graduated	Drop out	Enrolled	Graduated	Drop out
2009-2010	39	29	26%	NA	NA	NA
2010-2011	30	19	36%	30	21	30%
2011-2012	21	16	24%	21	14	33%
2012-2013	23	20	13%	22	16	27%
2013-2014	44	36	18%	27	18	33%
<b>Average</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>31%</b>

#### Comments:

Based on annual records consulted in the field, out of a total of 267 girls registered for the current training cycle, 68 have dropped, a dropout rate of 26.5%. We also note that the dropout rate for the sewing component progressively and significantly decreased over the years. This is potentially a positive trend but will need to be confirmed over a longer term.

Two main causes of dropout were identified and discussed with the girls, with their parents and with project staff:

- 1) The lack of means and resources and the obligation for girls in training to forgo other activities that provide them and their families with some income (prostitution and/or other small business or agricultural activities).
- 2) The low initial capacity of some girls who, lacking basic training, had difficulty following the classes and dropped out, discouraged.

Regardless of the reason, a significant portion of the 68 girls who dropped out (26.5%) is estimated to have returned to their previous prostitution activities due the lack of alternatives. No follow-up has been done with regard to these girls so this number remains an estimate, but provides an initial indication nonetheless.

## 2) Starting-up post vocational training activities

The evaluation now turns to the 73.5% of girls who completed the training cycle, looking into the degree to which they effectively implemented their activities. This is one way to evaluate whether the project managed – thanks to these training – to offer the girls viable economic alternatives.

Again, as a result of the lack of systematically collected data on this point, the consultant was forced to rely on data collected during the focus group discussions, which are not necessarily representative (see above).

In any case, the data collected is as follows:

### a. Sewing

No. of girls interviewed	No. of girls in internships	No. of girls starting up on their own	No. of girls employed	Total no. of girls active
17	9	2	0	11

- 65% of the girls who completed the training are still active in the field of sewing; six of them abandoned the activities because they couldn't afford the internship fees required by the workshops.
- Two of the girls started-up on their own using their own resources, one of whom set-up a small workshop.
- The other nine girls are engaged in internships. The internships require the girls to pay fees; they receive no payment for their work. Some of these girls also take on work at home, usually small periodic orders from which they earn a very limited profit (between 2000 and 5000 Congolese Francs, or \$2-5/week).

### b. Beauty and hairdressing

No. of girls interviewed	No. of girls in internships	No. of girls starting up on their own	No. of girls employed	Total no. of girls active
15	2	13	-	15

- 100% of the girls who completed the beauty and hairdressing training who were consulted during the evaluation are still active in the field: two of the girls are in internships, two others set up their own salon (in large part thanks to financial support from their families), the others work on their own from home. For the girls in this last category, their activities

remain irregular and generally not very profitable (their average income is comparable to that of the girls involved in sewing).

A number of conclusions can be drawn from this information, which are formulated below:

- 1) A significant portion of the girls trained is still active in their field (26 out of 32). That is an interesting result in itself.
- 2) However, their professional situation remains extremely precarious.
- 3) Of the 32 girls consulted during the evaluation, only four were able to set up their own workshop or salon from which they could draw a fair and relatively stable income.
- 4) Eleven girls are still in internships and six girls dropped out because they were not able to access internships. Currently, they don't make any supplementary income.
- 5) A significant portion of the girls work at home, although their activities are not very profitable. The revenue they generate is generally not enough to replace the material distributed by the SA DRC upon conclusion of the training. This diminishing stock is a serious threat to the sustainability and viability of their activities.

In terms of real employment and alternative income generation, the results remain mixed. We will come back on a number of measures in the recommendations, which, if put in place, would partially mitigate these weaknesses.

There is an additional conclusion, which is both important and obvious. Although the girls earn very little, or no, money through their new activities, all of the girls consulted in the evaluation have returned to their families and affirmed, with a certain pride, that they have definitively abandoned prostitution.

This underlines another element of the training, which was not strictly linked to learning a trade, but rather to the social and moral (and in some ways spiritual) environment of the nine-month training. Thanks to coaching, as well as to encouragement from their peers, there is a conscious willingness to turn the page on their previous activities.

That said, it is clear that because of the limited development of their economic activities and the revenue generated, the risk that some of the girls become discouraged and return to their previous activities remains real. For this reason, additional investment in post-training support (support to develop their activities and products/services) is still necessary (see recommendations).

### **2.3.1.2 Schooling (secondary education)**

As mentioned above, SA DRC paid the school fees for 52 girls for two years before the funding for this component was interrupted. Most have not been able to complete secondary school and obtain their state diploma.

Although there was no data collected and/or compiled on this component, the following information was presented by the SA DRC team:

- 1) Drop-out rate: according to these accounts, none of the girls dropped out during the period that SA DRC paid their school fees.
- 2) Girls graduated: Six (of 52 girls supported). Of these six girls, two continued on to university (supported by families), one girl worked as a teacher before following SA DRC's officers training (she is now in the an officer in Bas-Congo), the other three are engaged in small business.
- 3) Of the 46 girls who left school: two joined the project's vocational training cycle (they are currently in training) and three have been included in the new programme (2014-2018) and are back in school.
- 4) Lacking information on the other 41 girls (those who did not follow vocational training or go back to school), it is not possible to comment on their current status.

Note: In addition to the problem of data collection and monitoring, it is regrettable that SA DRC did not further align the last two phases of the project to systematically reintegrate the girls who dropped out school during the second phase (2009-2013) into the third phase, returning them to their respective schools and of allowing them to complete the cycle of secondary education.

### **2.3.2 Result 2: alternative economic activities (micro-credit)**

Again there is little or no quantitative data on the results achieved on this aspect of the project, such as the number of girls still in business, revenue generated, income saved, current level of capital compared to the initial support, reimbursement rates/recovery, etc.

SA DRC did, however, collect some testimonials that report interesting changes (girls who bought a parcel of land, who educated their children, etc.). However, these relate to a limited number of beneficiaries only and are therefore not sufficient to evaluate the impact of the project on the entire target group (374 loan beneficiaries).

The data presented below are derived from focus groups discussions and observations made during visits to the homes of some beneficiaries (ten in total). Although the sample is not representative, it does allow us to draw some conclusions.

- 1) Total amount received by the group of ten beneficiaries: \$630
- 2) Amount/capital available now: \$335
- 3) Decrease in accumulated capital: - 47%

Several remarks:

- 1) The focus group formed by SA DRC during the evaluation mission is made up of girls who used the credit to launch a business (mostly small trade) only. It seems very likely that some girls used the credit for other purposes (immediate basic needs), but it is impossible to estimate the proportion.
- 2) Regarding girls who started a business, often the credit they received allowed them to cover a number of needs that they were not able to cover before: purchase of a plot for a small group of girls, schooling for children and health care for most of them.
- 3) That said, we observed a strong decline in capital amongst all of the girls involved. This brings the viability of the action and its effects into question and raises concerns with regard to the consequences for the long-term reintegration of girls whose resources are increasingly limited and where disruption of their activities in the coming months is not excluded.

### **2.3.3 Result 3: psychosocial support and counselling**

In its proposal, the SA DRC set the following result: "300 victims are psychologically stable." Without questioning the relevance of this part of the action nor the fieldwork carried out by the five community leaders who were mobilized and trained under the project, it is not possible to determine exactly the degree to which this result was achieved due to, once again, the difficulties encountered in the collection and compilation of data and evidence. The gaps are, however, being corrected (Phase III: 2014-2018). We will return to this point in the recommendations.

### **2.3.4 Result 4: legal support**

As mentioned above, the volume of this activity was very limited: five cases were treated over five years in comparison to the one hundred planned for in the proposal. That said, the effects of SA DRC support were significant for the five girls who directly benefited: securing a parcel, release of two girls who were illegally arrested, and reopening the last two girls' workshops.

The SA DRC, however, stopped this activity and did not include it in the new project currently being implemented.

### **2.3.5 Result 5: community mobilisation and awareness raising**

This is a result particularly difficult to assess and measure.

The interviews conducted in the field, especially with local leaders, parents of girls and project facilitators, however, show a real awareness about the extent of prostitution, its social and health consequences, and the need for concerted prevention efforts, awareness and action, supported by all community actors.

This improvement in awareness is, in itself, already an interesting result.

Although the permanent involvement of SA DRC in the neighbourhoods is an interesting catalyst, a wider and more systematic involvement/collaboration of faith leaders was undoubtedly necessary, and still is for the current project, to



create a strong basis in the community on which to build, strengthen and extend this mobilisation.

This point refers back to the main weakness of this part of the action: the geographical coverage is very limited compared to the extent of the phenomenon and the size of areas/neighbourhoods targeted by the project, areas that the SA DRC resources could only partially cover.

### **2.3.6 Result 6: the fight against HIV / AIDS**

In terms of voluntary testing, the results are significant and in line with expectations: 937 girls and other community members were tested. Note that this service simply does otherwise not exist in Kinshasa neighbourhoods, reinforcing the high added value the services made available by SA DRC.

Added value was also linked to the health facilities managed by the SA DRC and to the referral of positive cases to these facilities. Lacking a compilation of data, it is however not possible to say precisely how many cases were actually referred, as well as the nature and duration of the treatment they received. This element deserves more systematic monitoring in the future.

## **2.4 Impact**

The impact goes beyond the reintegration of the girls directly benefitting from the action to the broader effects (ripple effect) of their reintegration on the communities in which they live, especially on young girls who are still victims of trafficking or exposed to such practices.

Although it impossible to formulate a quantitative report, a number of testimonies have been collected that report interesting changes.

- 1) First, it is notable that despite all of the difficulties encountered by the girls participating in the project (difficulty gaining employment, marginally profitable activities, little income generation, reduction of capital available to participants in the micro-credit component), a significant portion of the girls seems to have definitively renounced their previous prostitution activities. The fact that they renounced these activities despite an economic situation that remains precarious shows a real change in mentality, even an important and significant moral and social 'reconversion'.
- 2) Among the girls, a certain level of accountability is also notable. A number of girls confirmed playing a role in their communities, raising awareness amongst their friends and others close to them involved in prostitution about the risks they face. Aware of the risks, the girls feel responsible and spread the message. They feel valued again and empowered to participate in the project's community mobilisation effort.
- 3) A certain sense of accountability is also notable amongst the local leaders, primarily amongst those linked and associated more or less with SA DRC.

The fight against prostitution (prevention) is an addition to their social actions. Even though taboo has typically surrounded these types of activities, it has clearly lifted, and some leaders now demonstrate strong community engagement, even a real willingness, to work on these issues. This is an achievement and an interesting change.

- 4) Although these changes are important, there remains some nuance: the impact of the project with regard to prevention remains limited. Although the project succeeded in bringing a significant number of girls out of prostitution, it remains widespread in the Mpasa, Kinkole, and Bibwa districts. This is linked to the much bigger problem of the general insecurity faced by a significant portion of the population, on which the project could only have a limited impact because of the complexity and extent of the issue.

## 2.5 Sustainability

- 1) With regard to the Mpasa training centre.

At this stage, the training centre is functioning almost exclusively thanks to external financial support. Its degree of autonomy and financial viability are very limited and are without doubt among the major challenges to which SA DRC needs to respond in the next few years.

The centre's operating costs are synthesized in the table below:

Operating costs in \$US (monthly)	
<b>1. Personnel</b>	
Director	336
Trainers (2X)	490
Trainer (literacy)	245
Security guards (2X)	240
<b>2. Vocational training</b>	
Sewing related materials	1500
Hairdressing related materials	1000
<b>3. Operations</b>	
Electricity	35
Water	35
Other expenses	50
<b>Total operations</b>	<b>3931</b>

These numbers must then be seen from the perspective of the income that the centre generates:

- \$ 25/month (sales from the community workshop).
- \$ 320 tuition fees paid by their students.
- Notably, four other community workshops are under construction (total revenue expected: \$125).

- It is also notable that none of the students have paid the tuition fees (\$7/month) and that the centre's third classroom is not yet in use. If it was available, the number of students could increase from 60 to 90, an increase in revenue of \$630).

In sum, at maximum capacity, the centre in its current state could generate \$755, barely 19% of its operating costs.<sup>2</sup>

We will return to this point in the recommendations and propose a few courses of action, which could strengthen the financial capacity of the centre and thus its financial viability.

## 2) Regarding schooling:

The viability of this activity is very weak, considering that SA DRC supports all of the school fees and that, if interrupted, the girls and their families are not able to assume, as shown in the 2009-2013 phase of the project (all of the girls dropped out after the financial support was interrupted).

Another problem: the families did not have and will not have the means to support the girls who graduated to continue with higher studies, which are often indispensable in significantly improving the girls' employability. Strengthening the families' financial capacity rather than directly paying the girls' school fees could be an option to respond to this twofold challenge (see recommendations).

## 3) Viability of the micro-credit activities

As mentioned above, the viability of the activities initiated using the micro-credit grants is also relatively limited: the capital currently available is well below the initial capital, and the general trend is a progressive decrease. The probability that these activities will be progressively abandoned due to the lack of resources and the lack of capacity to replace them is significant. A number of reasons for this have been identified: a problem related to identifying and selecting the projects, very limited management support (and little technical expertise amongst the SA DRC team) and the absence of a solidarity fund (the income generated was spent on urgent household expenses and not saved or used for reinvestment). A number of courses of action to address these issues have been proposed in the recommendations section.

## 4) Viability of production and service activities (hairdressing, beauty, and sewing).

With one or two exceptions, the profitability of the activities initiated by the girls who participated in the vocational training is equally limited (average of 2000 Congolese Francs/week for most of the girls working from home). As mentioned above, due to the lack of a significant and stable income, these girls used the products and the materials distributed by SA DRC at the end of the training, but

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<sup>2</sup> This percentage is actually lower as the opening of a third classroom would involve additional operating costs.

were not able to renew their stocks, which quickly diminished. Again, progressive dropout from these activities, due to the lack of means and resources (and profitability), cannot be excluded.

## **Section 3: Recommendations**

### **1) Increase the capacity of the training centre**

Awareness raising and community mobilisation had only mixed results in relation to prevention. The enrolment of girls in the vocational training cycle appeared to be the best strategy for both reintegration and prevention (the training was also open to other girls). It is also the area in which a certain level of specialisation and expertise exists on the part of SA DRC. For these reasons it is recommended to invest even more in vocational training in the future by increasing the carrying capacity of the centre. This requires 1) using the third classroom that is not yet in use, 2) constructing new classrooms (and mobilising the necessary funds for this), and 3) opening new training sectors (based on baseline studies that are necessary to identify promising sectors adapted to the needs and capacity of the environment).

The objective of this increase is twofold: 1) respond to a significant demand that is not yet, at this stage, completely met, and 2) increase the financial capacity of the centre by increasing the staff (and fees collected).

### **2) Put a strategy in place to ensure the training centre's financial independence.**

The centre's operating costs are in large part covered by donors until 2018. As mentioned, the financial capacity of the centre itself is very limited, which in the current state, does not ensure the sustainability of the centre beyond the period of donor support. It is essential to address this issue now in anticipation of the end of donor support and develop a realistic and progressive strategy to manage donor exit as strengthening financial capacity is a long process. There are a number of possible courses of action: 1) increased enrolment (see point 1 above), 2) the development of community workshops to increase profitably and turnover (which remains very limited), 3) a reduction in operating costs (based on an organisational and financial audit) and 4) develop new sources of income generation and identify the necessary investments (which should then be integrated in the independent financing strategy and be an integral part of budget planning in the coming years, 2015-2018).<sup>3</sup>

Notably, if the payment of fees by the students constitutes a key source of income, putting a differentiated payment scheme in place that takes the financial situation of each girl and their family into account could be considered to ensure that the centre remains accessible to the most vulnerable girls. This type of

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<sup>3</sup> The question of "mécanisation" was discussed with the management of the SA DRC education department. Considering the nature of the instruction organised at the Mpasa training centre (skills training) and the absence of a formal mentoring system for this type of training, mechanization did not appear to be an option at this point.

system already exists in some educational establishments in DRC. SA DRC could contact these establishments to study how these systems work in more detail.

### **3) Strengthen the quality of education and training.**

It is still possible to further professionalise the training programme, including its management and organisation. This should include the following steps:

- Establish a network amongst the five training centres managed by SA DRC in Kinshasa and organise exchanges between the centres' trainers and managers to share experiences. The Mpsa centre is the newest and could certainly learn from the experiences of the older centres.
- Improve the collaboration between the project team and the SA DRC national education department. This department manages and supervises numerous primary and secondary schools, and notably, the secondary schools organise vocational training (including hairdressing, sewing and beauty). The department has specific expertise, trainers, training and management tools, and manuals that the Mpsa training centre lacks. This collaboration is essential and should be systematised as soon as possible.
- Put an educational management system in place in the Mpsa centre, which is still lacking. This should include strengthening the (training) capacities of the centre staff (management and teachers) in educational management, a subject that is not well understood, particularly by putting in place basic tools and educational management practices (development of annual programmes, annual forecasts, preparation of materials, monitoring tools, supervision and evaluation of teachers, etc.).

### **4) Further integrate the different intervention components**

A strategy to support the most vulnerable families should be developed. It is regrettable that the micro-credit component does not further this goal. On the contrary, it was designed as a completely separate and distinct project component where it should have been considered a complementary support activity, reinforcing the project's principle activity, which is the vocational training of girls.

### **5) Considerably improve post-training support**

Overall, girls who have completed the training programme have not been successful in attaining employment, and the income that they have earned through activities they have organised themselves, mostly at home, has been very low. The project offers training and a start-up kit, but support to develop income-generating activities remains largely insufficient. Until now, trainers have visited the girls at home, but these have been more forms of encouragement than real technical and managerial support (due to the fact that the trainers do not have the necessary qualifications to do so). Post-training support needs to be an integrated part of the strategy, which requires additional resources and expertise (notably via the recruitment of a staff member

specialised in micro-enterprises and who has the capacity to provide more consistent support/coaching).

## **6) Literacy and the organisation of internships**

The question of literacy was also discussed and forms a major issue for both the training and the development of activities once the training has come to a close. SA DRC has integrated a literacy course in the new project. This is a very useful and relevant adaptation, which deserves to be further supported and even expanded in the coming years.

Internships are another major issue as many girls (2009-2013 project) abandoned their activities when they were not able to find an internship opportunity (or not able to cover the costs). The new project has corrected this issue thanks to the creation of 25 community centres in which girls who have completed the training will have a chance to improve their skills.

SA DRC could also develop partnerships with certain workshops and salons, which would be one way to facilitate the girls' transition from the training centre toward workshops and internships. This should be part of the educational support organised by the training centre, support that should extend beyond the initial training.

## **7) Professionalise the micro-credit system considerably**

The comments here are the same: The profitability of the activities initiated through the micro-credit grants remained relatively weak. With the exception of a few, these activities have been poorly developed, largely due to the limited support strategy, which currently includes only a monetary grant and some home visits (again, more encouragement than technical support). To professionalise SA DRC practices in relation to micro-credit, the following courses of action should be explored:

- Establishment of a real selection and development process for the projects proposed by the girls in order to maximise their prospects for profitability and development. Again, this requires SA DRC to recruit staff with technical expertise in this area.
- Establishment of a systematic monitoring system focused more specifically on management, entrepreneurship and marketing.
- The establishment of groups capable of setting up solidarity funds through membership fees. These funds could allow – as long as they are contributed to and correctly managed – members to pay for certain urgent needs and prevent the gradual decline in capital that has been observed in the field and that is often caused by the use of the capital to pay for their needs, whether basic, urgent, or unforeseen.
- The organisation of a second grant cycle based on the identification and selection of the most promising projects. This would primarily be an incentive. It would also be a way for the girls to demonstrate their seriousness, capacities, motivation, and commitment.

## **8) Link phases II and III with regard to the education component**

More than 40 girls enrolled in the education component of the project (2009-2011) dropped out of school due to the interruption of financial support. It is recommended to reintegrate the girls into the new project so that they can continue their studies and complete their secondary education. This has already been done for some of the girls, but should be extended to all.

The possibility of complementary support to pursue university studies could also be explored, at least for a limited number of girls selected based on performance. University education is often essential to realistically improve the employability of girls. In addition, this investment would also create a number of role models from amongst the girls who would be capable of influencing their surroundings and community and would serve as examples and inspiration for other girls.

## **9) Considerably strengthen and develop the monitoring and evaluation system**

This has been observed to be a significant and recurring weakness, which posed major problems during this evaluation process. This should be corrected promptly. Some potential courses of action:

- Organise training for project staff on monitoring and evaluation. Their technical and methodological knowledge in this field are still far too limited.
- Reformulate the indicators in the logical framework to define, in addition to activity indicators, result and impact indicators (see remarks under point 1.3).
- Develop a package of monitoring tools to gather quantitative and qualitative data necessary to monitor these indicators.
- Put a system in place to compile and archive the data, which is much more effective and systematic.