

EVALUATION OF RAINFOREST FOUNDATION NORWAY'S ADVOCACY EFFORTS TO COUNTER INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS OF DEFORESTATION



(Astra Agro Lestari plantation, West-Kalimantan, Indonesia, April 2015. Copyright: Aidenvironment)

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May 2017

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SUMMARY

This Evaluation Report summarises the main findings of the independent evaluation of Rainforest Foundation Norway's efforts to counter international drivers of deforestation in the period 2008-2017. The Evaluation is based on document review and interviews.

RFN's Advocacy Work

Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN) developed objectives for the advocacy and policy work in 2007 and modified these objectives slightly during the ten-year strategy period (2008-2017). The main objectives and targets can be summarised as follows:

Objective 1: Consumers, private sector and authorities in Norway are well informed about the threats to the tropical rainforests and the importance of conserving these.

- 1.1 Target groups have increased knowledge of raw materials and products that can be linked to deforestation and abuse of forest peoples' rights, such as palm oil, tropical timber, soy, paper and beef.
- 1.2 Target groups have increased awareness of the linkages between deforestation and their consumption, purchases and investments.
- 1.3 Target groups have greater willingness to change their own practices and request changes by other groups (e.g. suppliers).

Objective 2: Consumption patterns, corporate practices and regulations in Norway and internationally have changed such that consumption, trade and investments contribute directly and indirectly to a significant reduction in deforestation in rainforest countries.

- 2.1 Consumers in Norway support calls for deforestation-free products, such as palm oil, tropical timber, soy and paper.
- 2.2 Private sector companies in Norway and selected companies internationally have changed their policies and practices to reduce or avoid sourcing of raw materials or products linked to deforestation.
- 2.3 The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global and other Norwegian investors have reduced their exposure to deforestation by divestment and exercising ownership rights.
- 2.4 Norwegian authorities have implemented measures to reduce or avoid use of products linked to deforestation.

Main Findings

The two main objectives listed above were achieved, and important results were realised under all of the seven targets. The awareness levels of deforestation and forest-dependent peoples among consumers, private sector companies and authorities in Norway were raised considerably and are likely at higher levels than in most other countries. These awareness levels resulted in greater willingness to change consumption patterns, illustrated by the major reductions in imports of tropical timber and the dramatically reduced use of palm oil in the food industry in Norway. Companies have become substantially more willing to change sourcing of raw materials and commodities linked to deforestation, though various companies have different perspectives on how possible or feasible it is to source only in the ways promoted by RFN.

RFN contributed to important improvements in the responsible investment strategies of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, the world's largest sovereign wealth fund. This

was illustrated by conduct-based exclusions of companies from the Fund's investment universe and a total of 54 risk-based divestments due to high risks of deforestation. These changes are noticed internationally and in rainforest countries, though impacts in terms of changes in deforestation rates on the ground remain unclear. RFN also provided input to other institutional investors, primarily in Norway, which excluded companies associated with deforestation risks or engaged more actively in dialogue with companies to improve practices. Only limited work and successes were noted regarding institutional investors outside Norway.

While this Evaluation concludes that RFN's objectives were generally achieved, the exact degree to which the objectives were achieved could not be assessed due to the general nature of the objectives and lack of specific and measurable targets. Also, it should be noted that the at times impressive changes in consumption patterns and sourcing in Norway, may not result in significant reductions in deforestation in rainforest countries given the small size of the Norwegian market. Similarly, the divestments from companies are unlikely to result in shortfall of capital for the companies concerned, but reputational damages have been felt by the companies. The important signals sent by Norwegian consumers, companies and investors were noted internationally and in rainforest countries, and these did result in changes in policies and likely partly in practices in the rainforest countries.

Several factors have contributed to RFN's results, including:

- RFN is recognised as a highly knowledgeable, serious and in most instances constructive partner that adds significant value to partners in Norway and in rainforest countries. The organisation is seen as having competent and professional staff. RFN can go further in exploring solutions to the challenges the organisation raises.
- RFN is the dominant civil society actor in Norway on tropical rainforests and traditional forest-dependent peoples. This gives the organisation a solid foundation upon which to base advocacy work in Norway. Expanding advocacy work beyond Norway will require new skills internally and additional partnerships.
- RFN's comprehensive network of Indigenous Peoples' organisation and environmental organisations in rainforest countries gives a high level of credibility in multiple contexts and access to important knowledge. At the same time, the base of partners in rainforest countries requires considerable broadening along with new and flexible arrangements for cooperation with partners to successfully scale up advocacy work in rainforest countries and internationally.
- RFN has been able to adapt to changing political contexts and to identify, develop and make use of opportunities, particularly in Norway. Careful situation analysis will be required while expanding work abroad.
- Strategically well-founded work contributed to successes. Focus on a limited set of solutions, typically not to buy certain commodities without a complementary focus on how to increase sustainability in a step-wise manner, may limit the scope of impacts resulting from RFN's considerable knowledge and other resources.
- There are some examples of highly successful linkages between RFN's field projects and the advocacy work that amplified results. However, this mode of working appeared insufficiently streamlined and institutionalised in RFN.
- RFN had human and financial resources to undertake consistent advocacy work during the ten-year strategy period. The results were achieved with modest input of resources. A detailed review of efficiency was, however, not possible due to limited available information on resources during the ten-year period.

Recommendations

RFN has achieved several key targets for the advocacy work in Norway over the past ten years. Some continued advocacy work on the existing issues in Norway is required, including monitoring of potential reversal of past successes and new and emerging issues. However, a significant thematic and/or geographical expansion of the work is recommended to take the advocacy work a step further and to produce new results.

Past achievements provide the organisation with a range of opportunities for expansion of the work on tropical rainforests and forest-dependent peoples. The recommendations below are not based on a comprehensive analysis of opportunities and limitations for future work as this was not part of the scope for this Evaluation. RFN should, based on a deeper analysis of the opportunities and limitations, make strategic choices among the options available while avoid spreading too thinly and avoid undermining the added values that have produced results so far. The Consultant does not recommend that RFN expands work to cover all issues listed below, but a significant thematic or geographical expansion of the scope is required, and an increased engagement to find a broader set of solutions to address priority rainforest issues is strongly recommended.

The Consultant recommends that:

- RFN continues advocacy and policy work in Norway to minimise imports and use of raw materials and commodities causing tropical deforestation, forest degradation and violations of human rights (e.g. tropical timber and palm oil). Past successes mean that less resources are required to monitor and maintain low imports and use. Resources should therefore be shifted partly to other raw materials and commodities in Norway where the scope for further impacts is greater (e.g. soy, beef, or biofuels), and partly to new ways of working with stakeholders in Norway and beyond (see below). RFN should also track the impacts caused by changes in Norway to document whether these produce significant improvements on the ground in rainforest countries.
- RFN invests substantially in open-minded engagement with a range of stakeholders concerning Norwegian imports to identify broader sets of solutions to the problems RFN raises. Such multi-stakeholder engagement will better address the diversity of contexts where deforestation, forest degradation and forest-dependent peoples' rights are important issues. The engagement can contribute to a more nuanced, shared understanding between stakeholders of the issues at hand, including of the limitations and opportunities for diverse stakeholders, and help in developing more and better tools to address these issues. RFN needs to find a balance between advocacy on the one side and venturing into what some may see as service provision or consultancies on the other. Advocacy should be the main focus for RFN. Needs for increased capacity should be met through additional internal staff and through partnerships with other organisations.
- RFN expands advocacy work on imports of raw materials and commodities to a limited number of European countries through partnerships with organisations in those countries. Adapting and testing the approaches that produced results in Norway will inform RFN and partners on the feasibility of further expansion to other countries.
- RFN expands the partner base in rainforest countries and develops new and more flexible modalities for partner cooperation to engage more in advocacy work in rainforest countries and regions as well as internationally. While advocacy and policy work at national level in rainforest countries is likely to be undertaken mainly by national NGOs, RFN could take a more active role particularly in regional advocacy work, for instance in relation to financial institutions or companies that are important in the region. RFN should also build policy and advocacy capacity of national NGOs for these to engage with governments and

businesses. This may also reduce perceptions of competition between RFN and national NGOs.

- RFN should better institutionalise linkages between the field projects in rainforest countries and advocacy work in those instances where such linkages add value. Joint planning, clear division of roles and responsibilities, and explicit resource allocations are required.
- RFN invests further in capacity on asset management to advocate more effectively for improved responsible investment strategies among institutional investors and possibly assists in developing tools for effective translation of data into relevant information for investment decision-making. RFN should also consider whether a focus on biodiversity rather than rainforests is a more feasible approach in the longer term, particularly outside Norway where the rainforest cause has a different standing compared with Norway and where biodiversity may be seen as a more relevant concept. A focus on biodiversity requires additional partnerships.
- RFN considers expanding capacity to work on more complex commodities like soy and beef. RFN should strengthen capacity on biodiversity conservation to better target advocacy and policy work towards landscapes and ecosystems with the most important biodiversity areas among those with Indigenous Peoples and traditional forest-dependent peoples.
- RFN strengthens the advocacy programme by rigorous situation analysis, development of a theory of change and a clear results framework including targets, indicators, baselines and assumptions. This will both provide greater clarity on the focal areas and enable more specific reviews of the advocacy work in the future. A clear framework is required but should not be cast in stone. RFN needs to remain flexible to utilise unexpected opportunities or address new challenges that arise.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Consultant is very grateful for all those who accepted the request for an interview and who, despite their busy schedules, generously contributed their time and perspectives during the Evaluation.

In particular, I would like to thank Vemund Olsen, Senior Policy Advisor, Rainforest Foundation Norway who was always very helpful in supporting the Evaluation and also engaged willingly in open and frank discussions.

Persons interviewed may not agree with all the points raised in this Evaluation, but their diverse views have nonetheless been essential in reaching the conclusions in this report. Finally, the views expressed and any mistakes in this report are the sole responsibility of the Consultant.

Vassenden, 31 May 2017

Svein Erik Hårklau

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CoE	Council on Ethics
DNB	Norway's largest financial services group
EUTR	EU timber regulation
GPFG	Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global
KLP	Kommunal Landspensjonskasse, a financial and insurance service provider to the public sector
NBIM	Norges Bank Investment Management
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NOK	Norwegian kroner
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
PFAD	Palm Fatty Acid Distillate
RFN	Rainforest Foundation Norway
SWF	Sovereign Wealth Fund
ToR	Terms of Reference

1 INTRODUCTION

Context: The introductory section seeks to contextualise this document. The introduction provides a brief description of the Rainforest Foundation Norway, the organisation's work and the advocacy and policy work to counter international drivers of deforestation in particular. A summary of the Evaluation's purpose and scope is included along with a brief description of materials and methods used during the Evaluation.

1.1 Rainforest Foundation Norway

RFN: Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN) is a Norwegian non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Oslo and working to protect the world's tropical rainforests and the human rights of traditional, forest-dependent communities. RFN was established in 1989. With more than 25 years' experience in the field, RFN considers itself as one of the world's leading organisations working on rights-based rainforest protection.

Drivers: The most important drivers of tropical deforestation and forest degradation are the demands for natural resources found in forest areas and agricultural expansion into forest lands. The specific drivers of deforestation and forest degradation vary between countries and regions, but most are related to international trade and finance through at times complex supply chains and financial flows.

Main objectives: In order to reduce and halt deforestation in tropical rainforests, RFN has worked to achieve two main objectives:

- 1) Supply side: A reduction in the supply of commodities linked to rainforest destruction, for instance by advocating for stronger regulation of business operations in rainforest areas and by changing the practices of companies engaged in direct deforestation.
- 2) Demand side: A reduction in the international demand for commodities linked to rainforest destruction, for instance by advocating for consumers, businesses, public procurement authorities, banks and investors to demand that the products they buy and the companies they buy from or invest in are deforestation-free, and by advocating for stronger regulation of trade in products associated with deforestation risks.

Supply side: The majority of RFN's work is related to objective 1 and the supply side. This work is mainly support to local indigenous and environmental organisations in Southeast Asia, Central Africa and the Amazon through a range of field projects that seek to reduce supply of commodities associated with destruction of tropical rainforests. The Evaluation is not concerned with this objective.

Demand side: Activities to achieve the second objective, on the demand side, are mainly carried out by RFN's Policy and Campaigns Department, based in Norway. This work seeks to influence political and economic frameworks for protection of tropical rainforests and forest peoples' rights, including climate change negotiations, human rights mechanisms and international drivers of deforestation in rainforests. The Evaluation considers the advocacy work related to this second objective.

Programmes: The advocacy work was one of six programmes in RFN's strategy for the period 2008-2017 and was titled 'Policy, campaign, and information efforts'. The other programmes consisted of four geographically oriented programmes (Amazon, Southeast Asia, Papua New Guinea, and Central Africa) that all targeted rights-based, sustainable rainforest management,

and finally a programme concerning financial resources and fundraising. A mid-term revision of RFN's strategy in 2012 did not result in many changes, and the fundamentals remained the same. However, the increased importance of the climate change agenda for forest protection during the first half of the strategy period did result in some adjustments.

Inputs: The Evaluation should provide accountability through internal reporting as well as reporting to supporters, donors, partners and stakeholders by describing key results that were achieved as well as improve the understanding of how these results were achieved. The Evaluation should also provide for learning as RFN is preparing a new long-term strategy (2018-2030). RFN will submit a four-year results' report to Norad in May this year, and a proposal for a new four-year framework agreement with Norad will be submitted in October. This Evaluation is intended to inform these processes. In addition, the Evaluation may provide input to fundraising, proposals for other donors, various reporting and public outreach.

1.2 Description of the Advocacy Work

Main components: Over the past ten years, RFN stepped up the international advocacy work in order to reduce the underlying drivers of deforestation. The advocacy work complements the localised work that RFN undertakes in close cooperation with local partner organisations in rainforest countries. The site-specific work tends to focus more on reduction of the supply side of commodities that cause deforestation and violations of forest communities' rights, while the international advocacy work focuses on the commodities' demand side. The Rainforest Foundation Norway's advocacy work mainly consisted of policy work, campaigns, and information work aimed at improving a range of the economic and political frameworks for protection of rainforests and traditional forest peoples' rights. Politicians, technocrats, private sector, media and the general public were targeted in multiple kinds of advocacy work. Policy work included advocacy to change public regulations and procurement policies. Campaigns included consumer-oriented campaigns to shift people's consumption choices away from commodities that were associated with deforestation. Information work aimed to increase awareness and willingness for change among consumers in particular. RFN also had cooperative engagement with the private sector to reduce the demand for commodities linked to rainforest destruction, for instance by changing companies' sourcing policies.

Norwegian focus: The advocacy work contained work streams both in Norway and internationally, but with a clear focus on Norwegian target groups. RFN considered its capacity to create change to be greater in Norway than internationally in most instances. Even though the scale of Norwegian consumption of commodities linked to deforestation is insignificant on a global scale, Norway has significant international influence as one of the world's richest countries, its role as a significant donor in several areas (including the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative) and as the owner of the world's largest Sovereign Wealth Fund (Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global) that invested in thousands of companies worldwide. While changes in Norway in themselves will only have limited direct global impacts, the models developed or signal sent to stakeholders internationally may have much more wide-ranging implications. Working effectively in Norway as a Norwegian NGO and having mostly indirect, but significant, impacts internationally was an important and deliberate element of RFN's advocacy strategy.

Advocacy objectives: The main objectives of RFN's advocacy work were described in the 2008-2017 strategy,¹ the framework agreements with Norad (2008-2012, 2013-2017)² as well as the

¹ Programme title: 'Policy, campaign, and information efforts' (2008-2017)

more recent proposals to the Ford Foundation,³ and Good Energies Foundation.⁴ These different documents provide slightly varying descriptions of the objectives, partly targeted at the funding source. For the purpose of this evaluation, the objectives of the advocacy work were summarized as follows:

Objective 1: Consumers, private sector and authorities in Norway are well informed about the threats to the tropical rainforests and the importance of conserving these.

- 1.1 Target groups have increased knowledge of raw materials and products that can be linked to deforestation and abuse of forest peoples' rights, such as palm oil, tropical timber, soy, paper and beef.
- 1.2 Target groups have increased awareness of the linkages between deforestation and their consumption, purchases and investments.
- 1.3 Target groups have greater willingness to change their own practices and request changes by other groups (e.g. suppliers).

Objective 2: Consumption patterns, corporate practices and regulations in Norway and internationally have changed such that consumption, trade and investments contribute directly and indirectly to a significant reduction in deforestation in rainforest countries.

- 2.1 Consumers in Norway support calls for deforestation-free products, such as palm oil, tropical timber, soy and paper.
- 2.2 Private sector companies in Norway and selected companies internationally have changed their policies and practices to reduce or avoid sourcing of raw materials or products linked to deforestation.
- 2.3 The Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global and other Norwegian investors have reduced their exposure to deforestation by divestment and exercising ownership rights.
- 2.4 Norwegian authorities have implemented measures to reduce or avoid use of products linked to deforestation.

Changes: The forest sector has been very dynamic over the past decade at international level, in rainforest countries, and in Norway. Considerable changes have taken place in economic, political and legal frameworks. RFN's work was inevitably influenced by the dynamics, and RFN also utilised opportunities that came up in this period. Advocacy to counter international drivers of deforestation became an increasingly important part of RFN's advocacy work in Norway and internationally during the strategy period.

Growth: RFN experienced a major growth with budget and staffing more than tripled during the ten-year strategy period. The advocacy work remained a relatively small programme compared to the other programmes, which were dominated by field projects in rainforest countries. Resources for the policy and advocacy work on drivers were also more than tripled during the period, but starting from a low level equivalent of about one full-time staff.

Funding: The overwhelmingly most important source of funding during the period were Norwegian sources, particularly the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. An overwhelming reliance on government funding is a common feature for Norwegian NGOs. In the second half of the strategy period, the funding

² Programme titles: 'Conditions for rights-based management of rainforest biodiversity' (2008-2012), and 'Global policy for rights-based rainforest protection' (2013-2017)

³ Project title: 'Climate change responses that strengthens rural communities' (2013-2017)

⁴ Project title: 'Investments and supply chains: breaking the link to rainforest destruction' (2015-2017)

base expanded to the Ford Foundation (annually since 2013) and the Good Energies Foundation (annually since 2015). However, the funding base remained diversified only to a small degree at the end of the strategy period.

1.3 Purpose and Scope of the Evaluation

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Evaluation outlined two main objectives:

- 1) To demonstrate results from RFN's advocacy work and how these results have been achieved (accountability)
- 2) To foster internal capacity building and contribute to strategic development and planning (learning)

As per ToR, the Evaluation should answer the following questions:

- What outcomes/impacts have been caused by RFN's advocacy to counter international drivers of deforestation, and how effective has the organisation been in achieving its goals?
- How efficient has RFN's advocacy been, *i.e.* what is the quality of results in relation to the resources used?
- What are, if any, the specific strengths and added values of RFN's advocacy, within the overall context of efforts to counter drivers of deforestation?
- To what extent has RFN shown capacity to adapt strategy and tactics to changes in the political context?
- To what extent has RFN used the right strategic target groups, messages, policy frameworks and tactics to reduce international drivers of deforestation?
- How well has RFN coordinated advocacy efforts with local partner organisations, and how could such coordination be improved for larger effect?
- How may RFN increase the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of its advocacy to counter drivers of deforestation?

In addition, RFN wants to use the Evaluation for learning purposes. This includes improving the understanding of barriers to achieve more advocacy results and how the organisation can be more effective in its advocacy work, how the results can be monitored more effectively, and how RFN can better demonstrate and make use of the advocacy results.

The ToR is included as Annex 1.

1.4 Materials and Methods

To answer these questions the Consultant relied on two main methods:

- Literature: Review of RFN funding proposals, reports and strategies as well as other documents related to rainforests, climate change or RFN's work.
- Interviews: RFN staff and representatives of various partners and target groups for RFN's policy and advocacy work were interviewed.

RFN provided a range of documents, particularly funding proposals, reports to donors, other reports, strategy documents and other material. More than 50 documents were provided by RFN. Except for some confidential documents, these are listed in section 4 (Literature). The Consultant collated various other relevant documents available online.

Seven RFN employees were interviewed, all of them individually. In addition, a meeting with a group of three RFN employees were held. Fourteen representatives of private sector, civil society and government were interviewed. These had various exposures and interactions with RFN. Most of them were targets for RFN's policy and advocacy work while a limited number were partners in such work. All were interviewed individually on phone or Skype. For a list of people interviewed, see Annex 2.

2 MAIN FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The Evaluation's main findings and analysis are organised around the questions listed in the ToR (see section 1.3 above). These questions are supplemented by a brief introductory section that considers the programme design and available resources to contextualise the considerations in the subsequent sections.

2.1 Programme Design and Available Resources

Context: At the start of the strategy period (2008), RFN had reportedly undertaken some analyses of the contexts within which the planned advocacy work would be carried out. No detailed documentation on situational analyses were seen by the Consultant, but the strategies and plans indicated that RFN had a clear understanding of the issues at hand.

Frameworks: The original RFN strategy 2008-2017 was adopted at the RFN Annual Assembly in June 2007. This overall strategy focused on the field oriented forest protection work that was the main area of operation for RFN. The strategy was relatively general in terms of advocacy work and contained a programme called 'Policy, campaign, and information efforts'. Priorities were not well defined, and much of the advocacy work appeared geared towards activities rather than the specific results these activities were ultimately intended to produce. A theory of change and a rigorous or logical framework for how results would be achieved and measured, were not developed at the start of the strategy period. Even without these elements, the Consultant finds the direction of the work clear even if not detailed.

Work streams: In the absence of a comprehensive and clear programme framework, the planned advocacy work consisted more of work streams or work packages. Each package had its logic, at least implicitly, but where the totality of these packages was not described as a coherent programme. It was nevertheless clear that all of the work would contribute to reduced destruction of tropical rainforests and support to traditional forest-peoples' rights. The lack of a clear framework with targets, indicators and baselines means that a detailed review of results achieved compared with objectives at output, outcome and impact levels is not possible, at least not at programmatic level. This Consultant's analysis of results achieved therefore focuses more on the achievements under the various work streams.

2.2 Main Achievements

ToR: The ToR requested review of the following questions: What outcomes/impacts have been caused by RFN's advocacy to counter international drivers of deforestation, and how effective has the organisation been in achieving its goals?

Material: The evaluation of this question has been split in two sections, namely a) institutional investors and handling of deforestation and human rights, and b) Norwegian consumers and the demand for deforestation-free products. Available material was partly a number of documents and partly the interviews.

2.2.1 *Institutional Investors, Deforestation and Human Rights*

The issue and RFN's work

The issue: Deforestation is caused by multiple factors, and the drivers vary between forest areas, countries and regions. RFN stresses that deforestation is often associated with violations of forest-peoples' human rights. The financial sector, which is one of the sectors that indirectly

contributes to deforestation, provides capital to projects and activities and consequently enable these to impact negatively on forests and people depending on these forests.

RFN's work: RFN's advocacy work covered institutional investors and their handling of deforestation and the human rights of forest-dependent peoples. Drivers and companies associated with Western financial institutions, in particular Norwegian institutional investors, were targeted. RFN worked to ensure that investors have policies in place to minimise or avoid risks of being invested in companies that caused deforestation or violations of human rights for forest-peoples. Reducing exposure to these risks normally involved a combination of active engagement with companies and the measure of last resort, namely divestment (selling all shares and fixed-income instruments in a company). RFN provided information to investors about potential violations of guidelines or regulations, often with assistance from local partners that had a presence in the field and hence could provide field-based documentation. In some instances, RFN also assisted investors in developing information collection systems that could provide information on deforestation risks. RFN anticipated that based on the information provided, investors would either divest to ensure investment portfolios free of deforestation and human rights violations, or actively engage in dialogue with companies in order to improve conditions.

Norwegian investors: The Rainforest Foundation Norway approached institutional investors with particular priority on Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the manager for the world's largest Sovereign Wealth Fund (Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global). Beyond a range of meetings with NBIM, the work included meeting with politicians, participation in hearings of the Parliament's Standing Committee on Finance regarding the management of the GPFG, and media outreach. Other Norwegian fund managers were also targeted, such as Storebrand, KLP (financial and insurance service provider to the public sector), and DNB (financial services institution). The Council on Ethics, which can recommend divestment from or observation of companies in the investment universe for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global (GPFG) also received considerable input from RFN, particularly in the first half of the strategy period. In parallel, RFN participated in international campaigns targeting a limited number of companies and requesting them to stop deforestation and adopt no-deforestation policies. The various activities were designed to complement each other for greater results.

Nordic investors: RFN also identified other Nordic institutional investors with capital in high deforestation risk industries such as oil and gas, palm oil, soy, mining, cattle farming, logging, paper and pulp, and dam construction. Limited work was carried out in relation to the Nordic investors this far, and hence the Nordic investors are not discussed below.

Achievements and Attribution

Council on Ethics

Potential exclusions: In the first half of the strategy period, RFN prioritised providing the Council on Ethics (CoE) with information about companies' potential violations of the GPFG's guidelines for responsible investment, the so-called ethical guidelines⁵. RFN's desired result would be that the CoE recommended exclusion of companies from the GPFG investment universe, and that the Ministry of Finance subsequently made a decision in line with the CoE's recommendation. Following such a decision, the Ministry would request NBIM to sell all shares and fixed income instruments in the company. The CoE recommendation, often detailed in nature, and the Ministry of Finance decision would thereafter be made public and send clear signals to the companies in question and other investors. Alternatively, a company could be placed on an observation list where performance was monitored but without divestment. During the strategy period, RFN

⁵ These guidelines can be found online: <https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/fin/statens-pensjonsfond/formelt-grunnlag/guidelines-for-observation-and-exclusion-from-the-gpfg---17.2.2017.pdf>

provided information to the CoE on several companies with allegations of deforestation or human rights violations.

Detailed reviews: Before the Council on Ethics makes a recommendation, detailed reviews of a company's operations are undertaken by the Council. Field-based information from RFN and other sources were important inputs to the CoE's company assessments. Once the issue is raised, the Council will typically carry out its own and often detailed reviews and consult multiple sources. This involves dialogue with the company in question. Any recommendation is based on the aggregate findings.

Inputs: Input from RFN, and any other source, will therefore never be the only source resulting in a recommendation for exclusion or observation from the CoE. The relative importance of RFN's contributions in cases that result in a recommendation for exclusion from the GPFG is therefore not possible to assess, but in most instances the contributions were probably of moderate importance for the final outcome but were nevertheless important because it was field-based information from a competent and credible organisation and not just opinions. Often, the most important input to the Council from stakeholders like RFN was to raise a specific issue with the Council, particularly in those instances where the Council's monitoring systems had not identified the alleged violations of the ethical guidelines.

An example: One interesting case where RFN engaged was the oil company Repsol that CoE recommended to be excluded from the investment universe following risks of serious violations of human rights of Indigenous Peoples living in voluntary isolation in Peru. Importantly, RFN raised this issue with the CoE in 2007 and brought it on to the Council's radar screen. While the Council did its independent studies, the continued pressure from RFN probably contributed to the company ultimately pulling out of Block 39 in 2014. COE's engagement with a company on such an issue will inevitably be perceived as a 'threat' of exclusion, which likely contributed to Repsol's retreat.

Deforestation: Among other things, RFN also provided valuable information and local contacts to the CoE concerning a range of palm oil and forestry companies, some of which ended up being excluded from the GPFG following CoE assessments and recommendations to the Ministry of Finance and later to the Central Bank (Norges Bank). Six companies were excluded from the GPFG due risks of severe environmental damage related to deforestation: Samling Global Ltd. (CoE recommendation on 22 February 2010), Lingui Developments Berhad Ltd. (CoE recommendation on 15 September 2010), WTK Holdings Berhad (CoE recommendation on 25 June 2012), Ta Ann Holdings Berhad (CoE recommendation on 3 December 2012), and POSCO and Daewoo International Corporation (CoE recommendation on 27 March 2015). One company, PT Astra International Tbk, was first recommended for exclusion (CoE recommendation 15 January 2014), and this was later revised to a recommendation for observation rather than exclusion (CoE recommendation on 23 June 2015).

NBIM

Slow exclusions: The detailed CoE assessments were time-consuming company-by-company assessments, and the period until a final decision was made by the Ministry of Finance also tended to be long and unpredictable. Both of these processes could take years. During this potentially long period, no information about the Council's or the Ministry's considerations reached the public. It would therefore normally not be possible for an organisation like RFN to understand whether a case was shelved as not relevant to the CoE or pursued.

Risk-based divestments: A second way in which divestment from the GPFG can occur is that NBIM considers an investment in a company as being of high risk, so-called risk-based

divestments. In addition, NBIM may engage in dialogue with a company as a shareholder and exercise ownership rights by voting in annual general meetings. RFN gradually shifted some of the attention away from the CoE and towards NBIM. Rather than providing the CoE with company specific information as input to time-consuming assessments at the Council, RFN shifted focus towards sectors with high risks of deforestation and violations of human rights and raising awareness of these sectors. This was for instance done in the 2012 report 'Beauty and the beast – Norway's investments in rainforest protection and rainforest destruction', a report produced jointly with Friends of the Earth Norway (Naturvernforbundet). This report generated media attention nationally and internationally and was used by RFN in discussions with NBIM, public authorities, government and Parliament to argue for changes in responsible management strategies for the GPFG. Among the key messages from RFN was that NBIM's investments were undermining the Norwegian Government's widely appreciated and costly International Climate and Forest Initiative.

Investor expectations: The RFN was gradually able to establish a dialogue with NBIM, an achievement in itself at a point when NBIM had minimal contact with civil society. NBIM gradually started incorporating deforestation risks in the considerations of and dialogue with companies. For instance, NBIM's expectation paper on climate change, revised in 2012 (NBIM, 2012) and later in 2015 (NBIM, 2015), placed considerable emphasis on clearing of tropical forests and activities that could have direct or indirect impacts on such forests, including as a result of the supply chains of companies.

Palm oil divestments: NBIM's annual report for 2012 (NBIM, 2013: 35), stated that the GPFG had divested from 23 palm oil companies as they produced palm oil unsustainably as seen from NBIM's perspective. This reflected a focus on palm oil's contributions to deforestation in Indonesia and Malaysia in particular. The GPFG's holdings in the palm oil sector were reduced by about 40 per cent through this move, an important signal from the world's largest SWF. It is also worth noting that less than one year after NBIM divested from the large palm oil producer Wilmar International, the company adopted a no-deforestation policy that not only applied to the company's own plantations but also third-party suppliers.

Further divestments: NBIM excluded four and two companies in 2013 and 2015, respectively, due to palm oil driven deforestation risks. A review of the deforestation related to palm oil was carried out in 2016, and the divestments were maintained but with another review planned in a year later (NBIM, 2017). In 2015, NBIM also divested from four companies in the pulp and paper industry due to deforestation risks and four additional companies in 2016.

And more divestments: At the end of 2016, NBIM had made a total 210 risk-based divestments across a range of issues, most related to greenhouse gas emissions (68 divestments). A total of 54 risk-based divestments were made in relation to various forms of deforestation (NBIM, 2017), presumably mainly in tropical rainforest areas. It should be noted that while GPFG is currently invested in a very limited number of plantation companies as a consequence of risk-based divestment, the Fund is still invested in banks that provide funding for palm oil companies, including companies that expand into forest areas.

Information systems: It is also worth noting that following a series of meetings, RFN was among the organisations invited by NBIM in 2013 to provide suggestions for systems to enable NBIM to collect information that inform investors of deforestation risks. This underlined the respected position RFN had established with NBIM.

Signals abroad: RFN's efforts contributed to clearer expectations from NBIM concerning deforestation, more responsible management by NBIM through dialogue with companies and in

several instances also risk-based divestments. Given that the GPFG is the world's largest SWF, this sent important signals internationally.

Controversial proposal: The new conservative government in 2013 proposed a series of changes to the Fund's management. A controversial proposal was to disband the independent Council on Ethics and move its functions to NBIM. Civil society, including RFN, opposed this change, and Parliament maintained the independent Council though with Council recommendations submitted to NBIM rather than the Ministry of Finance for decision. RFN and other civil society organisations also called for increased transparency about NBIM's ownership activities, which has later materialised.

RFN's role: The above discussion illustrates that RFN was an important civil society organisation generating both public and political awareness, RFN delivered field-based information to NBIM and made propositions regarding NBIM's future risk management. The final decisions concerning investments and divestments of the GPFG were determined by a multitude of concerns, and the detailed considerations were not made public so it is hard to assess the degree to which the considerable shift in NBIM's responsible management strategies over the past five years or so were influenced by RFN. NBIM became more open and transparent, engaged more actively with civil society, and introduced a system for risk-based divestment that so far has resulted in divestment from at least 210 companies. Deforestation has become a priority area under NBIM's climate change work. Clearly, RFN contributed to these changes and NBIM's more active engagement on environmental and social issues. RFN's longstanding work to raise awareness of tropical deforestation in Norway in general, and RFN's advocacy work for support by the Norwegian Government to reduce deforestation through the International Climate and Forest Initiative, also probably contributed to deforestation being more likely to receive attention by NBIM. The fact that for deforestation it was relatively straight-forward to create a link between a company and specific damages, and there were minimal conflicts with Norwegian interests, may also have made it easier for NBIM to take up this issue. Over time, there has also been a growing public and political pressure on NBIM to take a more proactive role on responsible investment strategies, and debates in Parliament over the management of the GPFG seem to gradually have moved from a narrow focus on returns to more attention given to other aspects of the Fund's management, for instance responsible investment strategies.

Human rights: Advocacy in relation to the GPFG also covered human rights in recent years, though with much less effort. RFN and three other Norwegian NGOs undertook a short campaign that contributed to Parliament and NBIM supporting the development of a human rights policy for the GPFG. In June 2015, Parliament asked the Government to request NBIM to develop an expectations document on human rights. NBIM initiated this work later in 2015. RFN and other NGOs provided substantial input to the expectations paper, and NBIM published the document on human rights in February 2016 (NBIM, 2016). In this document, NBIM expects companies in which the GPFG invests to respect human rights and integrate a human rights strategy into their operations and risk management. Companies are also expected to report on their performance in a comprehensive and accessible manner. Again, RFN contributed to more responsible management of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global through a progressive human rights expectations document.

Other investors

Palm oil: RFN's work in relation to other investors such as Storebrand, KLP, and DNB, should also be noted. Storebrand, for instance, is an institutional investor and pension provider that in 2013 excluded all palm oil plantation companies except one from its portfolio. RFN had contact with Storebrand for a number of years to share information on palm oil and companies, and RFN was one of the important sources of information for Storebrand. Recently, Storebrand also asked

for input from RFN to (re-)assess the palm oil sector and consequently reinvested in a major company due to the company's improvements, while maintaining the exclusion of the overwhelming majority of palm oil companies. Storebrand consults multiple sources prior to divestment and it is not possible to isolate the contribution to RFN, but there seems to be a correlation between RFN's work and divestments in palm oil.

Other results

Astra: One of the most tangible results from RFN's advocacy work was the contribution to stopping deforestation by Astra Agro Lestari, Indonesia's second largest palm oil company. While several palm oil companies since 2013 committed to avoid deforestation, Astra continued its destructive practices. RFN and partners in Indonesia and internationally organised a campaign in 2015 targeted at international consumers, companies purchasing palm oil from Astra, investors in the company, and Indonesian authorities. In a relatively short time, the campaign contributed to Astra stopping deforestation in the company's concession areas of several hundred square kilometres, and Astra committed to avoid forest and peat conversion for palm oil plantations as well as to respect the human rights of forest-dependent communities and its workers.

2.2.2 Norwegian Consumers and Deforestation-Free Products

The issue and RFN's work

The issue: Deforestation is often driven by commercial activities that are part of international supply chains with the involvement of Western companies, in particular customers of commodities where raw materials or the commodity itself originate in forest areas. Non-commercial drivers (e.g. subsistence agriculture) and companies that supply a local, national or regional markets but with no or only weak links to Norway, were generally not considered in this context.

RFN's work: RFN prioritised drivers related to a selection of commodities and customers in Norway. Tropical timber was targeted throughout the strategy period, palm oil in the second half of the period, and soy, paper and beef more recently. Companies approached included large Norwegian companies in the food industry utilising palm oil (e.g. NorgesGruppen, Rema1000), buyers of wood and wood products (e.g. Byggmakker, public authorities), buyers of soy (e.g. Denofa), and publishers buying paper (e.g. Cappelen Damm). The advocacy work focused on ensuring deforestation-free supply chains through consumer campaigns and advocacy directed at both the private sector and public authorities in Norway. RFN also had regular contact with private Norwegian companies investing in tropical rainforest countries.

Achievements and Attribution

Timber

Long-term efforts: Advocacy on tropical timber in Norway is the most long-standing issue of advocacy engagement for RFN, work that persisted throughout the strategy period 2008-2017. The so-called 'timber campaign' aimed to reduce demand for tropical timber in Norwegian products and buildings. This involved surveys to identify tropical timber with Norwegian suppliers and retailers of building materials, furniture and interior, flooring, kitchens and garden furniture, and tropical timber used in construction of new buildings, contact with importers and assistance to companies in improving procurement and quality assurance for sourcing policies, work in relation to public authorities, and public campaigns to raise awareness on tropical timber, including illegally logged timber. Import of tropical timber consequently reduced markedly with tropical timber from natural forests virtually eliminated while some tropical forest products from plantations are still in use.

EU timber regulation: RFN also monitored, and contributed to, the implementation and enforcement of the EU timber regulation (EUTR), which entered into force in Norway on 1 May 2015. This work mainly involved dialogue and information activities in relation to the Ministry of Climate and Environment (Klima- og miljødepartementet), the Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet), and the Norwegian National Authority for the Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim). RFN has reportedly also built a substantial (and still confidential) case against a Norwegian importer for violations of the EUTR. This case involves liaison between Norwegian, Peruvian, and U.S. authorities as well as Interpol. The case could hold significant implications for the enforcement of the EUTR in Norway and beyond, for forest sector governance reform in Peru, and for improved cooperation between the USA and Norway in their respective efforts to fight illegal logging and associated trade.

Palm oil

Norway: An area of major RFN effort in the second half of the strategy period was advocacy on deforestation caused by palm oil plantations. Campaign efforts were launched together with Green Living (Grønn Hverdag) in 2012 and advocated for stop in the use of palm oil or changes in sourcing policies to demand traceable and certified sustainable palm oil from suppliers. In addition to a remarkable increase in the public awareness related to deforestation associated with palm oil, some of the largest Norwegian companies in the food industry (e.g. NorgesGruppen, Orkla, and Rema1000) established or improved policies related to deforestation, for instance zero-deforestation policies across commodities, removed palm oil from their products, reduced the use of palm oil, or sourced more sustainably. Already following the first year of the campaign, RFN reported a reduction of palm oil use in Norwegian food by 2/3 from 2011 to 2012. A remarkable achievement by any standard.

Other countries: Reportedly, such reduction had not been seen in other country. Among other things, this triggered interest internationally, including from organisations interested in undertaking similar campaigns in other countries. The palm oil industry in key producer countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia was also struck by the success of this campaign in reducing palm oil consumption in Norway. The palm oil campaign combined with NBIM's divestments contributed to the increase in zero deforestation policies among palm oil producers. These policies are gradually being implemented and contribute to reducing deforestation by these companies.

Ultimate impacts: Several interviewees raised questions related to the impressive reduction in Norwegian palm oil consumption, namely the extent to which this changed conditions on the ground. Norwegian demand for palm oil was only a small proportion of the international demand, and reducing Norwegian consumption may not translate into changed practices on the ground. Some noted that the Norwegian reduction was seen as a form of boycott of palm oil rather than as part of a more multifaceted approach to find more sustainable forms of palm oil production that did not result in deforestation. Even if some companies improve practices, other companies may continue deforestation in areas left by more responsible companies.

Developments: More recently, the issue of biofuel has received increased attention in Norway. After tax changes regarding the use of biodiesel in Norway in 2015, incentives were created to increase the use of palm oil-based biofuels. RFN along with an environmental NGO (ZERO) raised concerns over the issue through both official communications with the government and the media. Subsequently, the Norwegian Government changed the classification of biodiesel produced from palm fatty acid distillate (PFAD) by classifying PFAD as a by-product feedstock rather than a waste product. This meant that PFAD became subject to the European Union's sustainability criteria. The accompanying public debate led to a significant degree of consensus around the need to avoid the use of palm oil-related biofuels.

Paper

New standards: Production of paper may involve the use to tropical rainforest trees. Based on a test of fibre used in book publishing in Norway, RFN found rainforest timber in the nearly half of 64 books from 30 Norwegian publishers. Based on these findings, a consumer petition, media work to create attention and dialogue with the publishers were undertaken to put pressure on publishers to avoid paper from tropical rainforests. One publisher (Cappelen Damm) announced they will perform paper tests of their own books from 2016. Other publishers asked RFN for advice on how to develop a policy to ensure using paper from sustainable sources. The Norwegian Publishers' Association (Forleggerforeningen) is working to develop a common standard for the publishers to avoid that the publishers contribute to rainforest destruction. The Association plans to launch the standard in 2017.

Soy and beef

Norway: RFN's work on drivers increased in scope towards the end of the period to include also soy and beef, though with considerably less effort, particularly for beef. An important milestone was reached in November 2015, when Orkla adopted a zero-deforestation policy that covered all commodities in Orkla's supply chain, including soy, palm oil, beef, paper and packaging etc. Orkla was reportedly the first Norwegian company to adopt such a cross-commodity policy. RFN also engaged with Denofa, Norway's main soy importer, the Norwegian Chamber of Commerce (NHO), and the Ministry of Climate and Environment on creating a no-deforestation policy for soy used in Norway. Soy is an important ingredient in animal fodder in Norway.

International companies: RFN also recently carried out a campaign targeting Burger King and the parent company (RBI) in Norway and abroad together with partner organisations. The campaign covered soy, beef and palm oil as drivers of deforestation. International soy traders (e.g. Cargill and Bunge) were also targeted to increase their efforts on against deforestation in Latin America.

Other results

More results: RFN also recorded results beyond RFN's concrete actions. In 2016, RFN reported that all major fish feed producers had eliminated palm oil from their fish feed products, due to demands from their customers. The use of palm oil was also greatly reduced in animal feed. Further, RFN reported that at least one Norwegian private company has avoided investing in vulnerable tropical rainforest areas as a result of contact with RFN. In 2016, the Norwegian Parliament decided that public procurement should avoid products that contribute to rainforest deforestation. During work on guidelines for Norwegian hydropower interests internationally, including a series of roundtables during 2011-2013, RFN was one of several NGOs that engaged and contributed to stressing the importance of Indigenous Peoples' rights and environmental concerns in the report 'International standards and principles for environmental and social management of renewable energy projects in developing countries' (Vista Analyse & Norplan, 2011).

2.3 Efficiency

2.3.1 ToR and Available Information

The ToR requested the following questions to be considered: How efficient has RFN's advocacy been, *i.e.* what is the quality of results in relation to the resources used?

Limited information was available on financial and human resources allocated for advocacy work in the ten-year period. The frequent sharing of staff between programmes also meant that it was challenging to isolate the resources allocated to policy and advocacy work on drivers. Therefore, the review of efficiency below is brief.

2.3.2 Main Findings

Resource inputs: It was estimated that the available staffing to work on policy and advocacy more than tripled in the strategy period (2008-2017), starting from a low level. In the years 2008-2010, there was a total equivalent to about one full-time position available but spread across different staff. This increased to about 1 ½ full-time positions in 2011 and about 2 ¼ positions in 2012-2015, still spread across several people. Staffing increased further with the equivalent of about 3 ¼ and 3 ½ full-time positions in 2016 and 2017, respectively. With greater overall resources, RFN tried to concentrate resources in a limited number of full-time positions. It is also worth noting that during the peak period of the palm oil campaign, ¼ of the resources were directly attached to the Asia department doing field project coordination as a consequence of the close links with palm oil companies operating in Asia, particularly in Indonesia but also in Malaysia. Annual budgets for the policy and advocacy work were not available to the Consultant.

Results produced: A detailed review of efficiency was not possible as the planned outputs were only defined in general terms and information about the resource inputs was not clearly linked to outputs. Available information indicated that RFN had between one and 3 ½ full-time positions available for advocacy on deforestation drivers during the ten-year period. Considering the multiple and at times impressive results achieved, the efficiency appears overall satisfactory and in some instances efficiency was probably high. The quality of the results appears appropriate. However, as is often the case with policy and advocacy work, positions of target groups (e.g. politicians or companies) may change. There are stakeholders pushing target groups in other directions than RFN, and this could reverse at least some of the results achieved. Continued monitoring is therefore required by RFN and a minimum of preparedness and capacity to respond if undesirable trends occur, for instance significant increases in import of tropical timber from natural forests or unsustainable palm oil.

2.4 Strengths and Added Values

2.4.1 ToR and Available Information

The ToR included the following question: What are, if any, the specific strengths and added values of RFN's advocacy, within the overall context of efforts to counter drivers of deforestation?

The interviews carried out showed that perceptions of added values and strengths may be seen from slightly different perspectives and may therefore vary with the type of stakeholder. The main strengths and added values identified during the Evaluation are briefly discussed in the following.

2.4.2 Main Findings

Knowledge: The most consistently reported and most heavily emphasised added value by interviewees was RFN's strength in terms of technical capacity and knowledge on tropical rainforest issues, including forest-dependent peoples. The stakeholders interviewed did not have the insights and knowledge possessed by RFN, which was a main reason for engaging with RFN. This capacity, and the credibility that comes with it, is most likely not matched by any other organisation in Norway and hence a unique added value in the Norwegian context. RFN also distinguishes itself from other Norwegian environmental NGOs by focusing on one main issue, the tropical rainforests. The whole organisation from senior management to the various

departments is geared towards this one issue, while other environmental NGOs divide their attention on multiple issues and is unable to maintain the same consistent focus of senior management, technical staff, communications staff etc. RFN therefore has an in-depth and more complete understanding of tropical rainforest issues that was widely appreciated across stakeholder groups.

Partnerships: RFN has a wide-reaching network of Indigenous Peoples' organisations and partly environmental organisations in rainforest countries. Partnerships with such organisations are usually long-term, and the partner organisations are well placed to gather and disseminate data on rainforest destruction, human rights violations and related issues. Through these organisations, RFN has access to experiences and insights that enables RFN to bring field-based information to the table. Such information can be used to inform and influence national and international policies, to improve analysis of complex issues, and the networks give credibility to RFN's work. The partnerships also enable RFN and partners to achieve results that none of them were likely to achieve on their own.

Networking: RFN can link parties in Norway or internationally with civil society organisations in rainforest countries such that these parties can access first-hand information or engage directly with field-based organisations. This was appreciated by some of the interviewees. For RFN's partners in rainforest countries, an added value is RFN's ability to influence Norwegian policies that concern them, including development cooperation programmes, initiatives like the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative, and private sector investments. RFN has access to stakeholders that can be very useful for partners in the rainforest countries and that these partners would not be able to reach without the facilitation of RFN.

Outreach: RFN was able to reach out to various audiences (e.g. consumers, company executives, and politicians) through traditional media, social media and other channels and thereby influence the agenda. The organisation's communication capacity enabled RFN to attract attention to issues, often an essential ingredient in successful advocacy work. Companies targeted by RFN in campaigns were well aware of RFN's capacity and felt pressure to act in order to minimise or avoid negative publicity, also when companies felt the messaging from RFN was too simplistic and not reflecting the real-world complexities and diversity of approaches required to reduce deforestation.

2.5 Ability to Adapt

2.5.1 ToR and Available Information

The ToR raised the following question: To what extent has RFN shown capacity to adapt strategy and tactics to changes in the political context?

Not all interviewees had interacted with RFN in a manner that enabled them to respond clearly to this question, but the responses of those who did are summarised in the following.

2.5.2 Main Findings

Political contexts: Interviewees generally reported that RFN had been able to identify, develop and make use of opportunities in shifting political contexts. RFN understands well most of the contexts within which RFN works, particularly the Norwegian contexts. The ability to propose and help drive through the establishment of an initiative like Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative, contribute to ensure political support for NICFI year after year since 2008 despite political changes, and most recently also a government commitment to support NICFI until 2030, is a good illustration of RFN's ability to adapt to shifting political contexts successfully.

New issues: During the strategy period, RFN moved increasingly into a relatively new area such as investments and asset management. Focus was initially mostly on feeding information to the Council on Ethics (CoE) and later there was a shift towards the NBIM. The understanding of this context, including the procedures and criteria applied by CoE and by NBIM, and the political space to manoeuvre in, appeared to improve significantly over the strategy period. This learning increased the ability to adapt RFN's strategies, including shifting the focus increasingly to NBIM. RFN and other NGOs also used Parliament to push the Government to request more transparency and improvements in responsible investment strategies from NBIM as well as to block the proposed removal of the independent CoE after a new government came into power. These are examples of how RFN and partners successfully were able to adapt their strategies.

Rainforest countries: Feedback from interviewees outside Norway was also generally positive and confirmed that RFN understood the contexts and generally were able to adapt strategies to the applicable political contexts in rainforest countries. However, unlike in Norway, there were also some comments that RFN's partner organisations were often field-oriented NGOs representing predominantly Indigenous Peoples or environmental groups that did not necessarily reflect the complexities of the country-specific political context well. Ability to adapt appeared lower in rainforest countries. A better understanding of complex rainforest issues in these countries, particularly as basis for sound advocacy work, is likely to require an expanded partnership basis. This will most likely result in adjustments in RFN's strategies and tactics in these countries.

2.6 Strategic Direction

2.6.1 ToR and Available Information

The following question was raised in the ToR: To what extent has RFN used the right strategic target groups, messages, policy frameworks and tactics to reduce international drivers of deforestation?

Relatively few interviewees were able to give direct comments on the strategic choice made by RFN as the interviewees had only been exposed to parts of the work and were generally unaware of the options considered by RFN. Nevertheless, the interviews and document review gave useful insights that are discussed below.

2.6.2 Main Findings

Sound strategies: The various successes listed above indicated that RFN was able to identify relevant target groups, design messages that worked, target relevant frameworks and adjust tactics to the various settings and how these settings evolved over time. Section 2.2 above illustrates the sound strategies of RFN where relevant problems were identified, awareness and willingness for change were created and, in some instances, changes were produced. This was for instance illustrated by the major reduction in the use of palm oil in the food industry in Norway. The successful development, establishment and further support for the NICFI mentioned in section 2.5 above, also highlighted RFN's ability to identify strategic direction successfully.

Narrow scope: Several interviewees did, however, feel that RFN had concentrated on a set of solutions to rainforest problems that was too narrow and did not always sufficiently match the multitude of relevant contexts internationally or in rainforest countries. For instance, while the palm oil campaign in Norway in many ways had been very successful, the messages conveyed in Norway were at times perceived abroad more as a 'no' to palm oil than as a 'no' to deforestation, while the latter is the ultimate objective of RFN. In some countries, stopping palm oil production is

not an option. The question is how to stop deforestation while allowing benefits from palm oil production to flow in a sustainable manner. Further engagement by RFN in finding solutions to improve palm oil production was therefore requested by stakeholders both in Norway and in rainforest countries.

Larger toolbox: Some stakeholders felt RFN could achieve greater impacts by not just identifying important problems and proposing 'simple' solutions like not buying tropical timber or palm oil. More engagement in terms of solutions and discussing specific solutions targeted at varying contexts were requested. The considerable technical capacity of RFN, and in Norway a dominant position on tropical rainforest issues, were also referred to by stakeholders as reasons for further engagement by RFN in defining larger and more holistic sets of tools to address deforestation drivers. Few were seen as better equipped than RFN to take on such a role, and some stakeholders posed this as a challenge to RFN.

Specific support: Directly related to this, some stakeholders (mostly private sector) also asked RFN to show greater willingness to engage and be a discussion partner to explore potential solutions or improvements within the sphere of influence or available options. In practice, and of varying reasons, not all options are available to all stakeholders and hence some flexibility in approaches is required. RFN's participation in multi-stakeholder dialogues to shed light on opportunities and limitations was desirable. Some private sector stakeholders also challenged RFN to be more specific in terms of solutions, for instance how to specify requirements for supply chains. Some of these were also ready to pay for such specific support as it would be equivalent to consultancy support in some instances.

2.7 Coordination with Local Partners

2.7.1 ToR and Available Information

The ToR raised the following question: How well has RFN coordinated advocacy efforts with local partner organisations, and how could such coordination be improved for larger effect?

Most of the interviewed people were among those targeted in Norway, given that the advocacy work focused on Norwegian stakeholders. The main findings from interviews with RFN staff and external persons are summarised below.

2.7.2 Main Findings

Asset: RFN's networks of partners were by most interviewees seen as an important asset that brought added value through field-based information, in-depth understanding of issues, and credibility. Most interviewees had not been directly exposed to RFN's coordination with local partners and consequently had few observations beyond the fact that the partners are a key asset for RFN.

Limited partner base: A limited number of interviewees commented that in terms of advocacy work, RFN's existing local partner base was useful but unlikely to be sufficiently broad. Partners are mainly field-oriented partners with limited capacity to do advocacy work, particularly at national and international levels. A considerable amount of capacity building would be required to enable these organisations to carry out higher level advocacy work. Interviewees also stressed that partners were required beyond the Indigenous Peoples organisations and environmental organisations given that in some countries these organisations may not have the best access to target groups for policy and advocacy work on drivers.

Internal coordination: Most of the comments on partnerships, including how to improve coordination for increased results, came from RFN's own staff. This probably reflects the staff's more intimate insights into partnerships, the potential for improvements and how well partnerships can work when advocacy work and field projects join forces. Successful examples of coordination with local partners were found in some of the campaigns where RFN's policy and field-oriented programmes worked together. In the palm oil campaign, site-specific and credible data from local partners on company-specific palm oil plantations could be combined with advocacy work targeted at investors and customers of palm oil, ultimately resulting in significant changes to company practices. Some staff requested clearer and more systematic coordination between programmes to ensure linkages are utilised when feasible, and informed decisions are made on the cases where linkages are not feasible to pursue.

Flexibility and capacity: The coordination between RFN and local partners in terms of field projects appeared highly institutionalised and streamlined, while coordination for the purpose of advocacy work appeared more limited and ad-hoc. RFN has, however, started building a foundation for strengthened coordination on advocacy work, for instance by building partners' capacity to collect and use field data systematically using modern technologies, for instance to monitor business-driven forest destruction. Such data are of great interest to several other stakeholders, including investors and companies in the downstream end of supply chains. RFN's traditional local partners require strengthening in advocacy work, but a key to expanded and successful advocacy work in rainforest countries is likely to be a larger and more flexible partner base that allows RFN and partners to make use of policy and advocacy opportunities, often at short notice.

2.8 Scope for Improvements

2.8.1 ToR and Available Information

The ToR requested that the following question was considered: How may RFN increase the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of its advocacy to counter drivers of deforestation?

A range of suggestions for improvements came up during the interviews, but the perspectives of interviewees varied considerably as one would expect given that respondents ranged from NGO representatives to companies trading in commodities that these NGO representatives were campaigning against. It is also important to note that most of the people interviewed did not, first and foremost, see a need for major changes and improvements. The past work of RFN was generally appreciated as important and sound, and improvements were more about increasing relevance of approaches to a diverse and complex world, and about how RFN could play a greater role in finding solutions at the scale required to stop the negative rainforest trends.

2.8.2 Main Findings

Partners in Advocacy Work

Additional partners: The existing partner base can continue to play valuable roles, including through providing field-based data that has the potential to convincingly silence any doubts raised about forest destruction or human rights violations taking place on the ground. However, more systematic and effective advocacy work in rainforest countries will require a more flexible approach to identifying partners by RFN. An expanded partner base need to bring in additional perspectives, new skills and new networks compared with the existing partner base dominated by Indigenous Peoples' organisations and environmental organisations that typically have considerably weaker capacity to do policy work than the capacity for field project implementation. The strengths of existing partners vary from country to country, and some of them may well carry out advocacy work based on further capacity building and joining forces with additional partners.

Mindsets: Good advocacy work requires consistent building of relations with stakeholders, including government and private sector and seeing these as part of the solution and not just part of the problem. For some field oriented NGOs, such a change in mindset may be challenging and they may not have staff that can dedicate sufficient time for consistent advocacy work. It is also important to recognise that campaigning against a project or an operation, which regularly is part of a field oriented NGO's activities, may be very different from longer-term advocacy work to change important management framework and gradually ensure these are actually put into operation. The latter requires dedicated time for engagement with government and private sector and understanding the limitations and opportunities of these stakeholders.

Ad-hoc and short-term: RFN's traditional partnerships with local partners are long-term field-oriented implementation arrangements. By nature, advocacy work can be more short-term and founded on opportunities that arise quickly, for instance a policy review process or a proposed project development. Consequently, partnerships for such work may be less formalised and more short-term. RFN may need to map potential partnerships for such purposes, while at the same time avoid perceptions of potential conflicts with existing partners.

Linkages field - advocacy

Internal improvements: As mentioned in section 2.7 above, there were important examples of successful linkages between RFN's field projects/partners and advocacy work yet an unutilised potential for more institutionalised linkages. There is clearly recognition in RFN that these linkages need to be strengthened further, as was also stressed in the mid-term revision of RFN's strategy in 2012. Several discussions have already been held internally on coordination between staff from the field implementation programmes and those responsible for policy, campaign, and communication work. Proposed improvements include regular joint planning and more explicit allocations of resources and responsibilities to ensure coordination is prioritised.

From problems to a broader set of solutions

Finding solutions: Interviewees consistently praised RFN's ability to identify problems, create awareness and facilitate willingness for change by generating political and public pressure to reduce deforestation. Thereafter, some of the interviewees felt that RFN's solutions did not represent a sufficiently broad set of tools to address the diverse contexts, abilities, political spaces, or willingness of stakeholders to change. Some of these interviewees felt that the best or safest solution, for instance not to buy a commodity at all or refrain from certain activities, was communicated as the only solution in some contexts, while this is not a feasible solution in some contexts. They felt RFN did not engage in, and consequently influence, the solutions tailored to specific contexts where the ideal solution (e.g. 'no palm oil') of some reason was not an option. Some of the interviewees, in different stakeholder groups, also perceived RFN as overly sceptical to market solutions in driving improvements and mobilising resources for sustainable management of forests. It was said that there was a potential for RFN to achieve greater impacts by engaging further as a discussion partner and provide input on specific issues as part of what interviewees characterised as more holistic solutions, or solutions within the sphere of influence or available options for involved parties.

Multi-stakeholder fora: In some instance, finding broader sets of solutions will involve participation in multi-stakeholder dialogues to shed light on limitations and opportunities for the benefit of mutual understanding and to find potential solutions. RFN's networks, from local via national to international levels, enable the organisation to facilitate contact between different parties, including private sector, consumers, government and forest peoples. RFN's deeper engagement in multi-stakeholder discussions was encouraged.

Side-effects: As part of such broader discussions, some interviewees also wanted discussion of the potential side-effects of various solutions, which could help shed light on alternative tools to achieve a certain goal. During interviews, concerns were also raised from rainforest countries that perceived boycott of a commodity could scare away responsible companies that were willing to improve, while less responsible companies would instead take over and progressive forces in the country would not have the same opportunities to push performance in the right direction. Interviewees stressed the importance of acknowledging such side-effects, also by RFN, and work jointly to find solutions to these challenges.

Trust-based dialogue: One private sector representative also mentioned that willingness to engage in open discussions around alternative solutions, acknowledging strengths and weaknesses of various solutions, would also make it easier to have an open, trust-based dialogue with RFN on challenging issues. The interviewee had such dialogue with other organisations that were willing to engage in such manner and felt RFN could achieve more by doing so.

Institutional Investors and Deforestation

Understanding investments: RFN's achievements illustrate that the organisation has gained considerable understanding of the institutional investor world. Institutional investors' decisions on investments, company dialogues, and divestment as a means of last resort, are informed by a number of factors beyond the focal issues of RFN. Investors make their own independent assessments as per their internal criteria and while using information from a range of sources, including from RFN. RFN has played an important role by bringing field-based information and intimate knowledge of tropical rainforest issues to investors. There seems, however, to be a potential for further analysis and dialogue with investors on how information can be collected, analysed, interpreted and contextualised such that information can more easily be made relevant and applicable by investors. Gaining further understanding of investment strategies and guidelines, limitations and opportunities for various types of investors can make RFN's work more targeted at meeting investors' information needs, though it will also require additional resources on the side of RFN.

Consulting investors: There is an opportunity for RFN to ask at least some investors how they think advocacy in relation to certain companies may be best targeted. RFN should see investors also as a source of information about strategies, not only a target group for advocacy. Such consultations may also result in more harmonised efforts from investors and NGOs.

Strengthened Knowledge

Expanded knowledge: An important factor behind RFN's successes is the relatively narrow scope of the organisation's work and the ability of a whole organisation to focus on a limited number of issues and address those well. Nevertheless, tropical rainforest destruction and violations of human rights are interwoven with many other issues, and there is scope for taking on further issues to protect the rainforests in a more holistic manner. An expanded knowledge base could be built internally in RFN and through new partnerships.

Asset management: As indicated above, further knowledge of asset management and its complexities could open up new opportunities for providing information that can more effectively be translated into responsible management strategies for GPF, other Norwegian institutional investors and investors abroad.

Soy and beef: RFN intends to engage more on soy and beef. These are more complex issues than palm oil or timber in the sense that a range of forest areas and other areas are involved, not only tropical rainforests, land use systems and supply chains vary, multiple environmental issues

are concerned (e.g. other groups of biodiversity, GMOs, pesticide use, and pollution) and questions regarding agricultural technologies are important. Finding sustainable and workable solutions in questions related to soy and beef production will require additional capacity.

Biodiversity: Biodiversity conservation is a main justification for RFN's work in tropical rainforests. The Consultant came across limited analysis and other information on biodiversity, and specific biodiversity considerations did not seem to inform priorities and approaches of the policy and advocacy work. There seems to be a potential for increased capacity on biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services as input to strategic priorities of policy and advocacy work such that resources can be allocated towards the most important biodiversity areas among those with Indigenous Peoples and traditional forest-dependent peoples.

Trade: Frameworks for international trade did not receive much attention during the past strategy period, except for work in relation to the EU Timber Regulations. While being a complex issue in multiple respects, further engagement in relation to trade is still relevant to consider given the importance of trade regulations for sustainable harvesting and trade. Most likely, such engagement would also necessitate contact with new stakeholders in Norway, such as the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries and the Parliament's Standing Committee on Business and Industry.

3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Next steps: RFN achieved several key targets for the advocacy work in Norway over the past ten years, and in some of these areas there are limited problems remaining in the Norwegian context (e.g. import of tropical timber from natural forests) and hence limited value of continuing with substantial investments. However, some continued advocacy work on the existing issues in Norway is required, including monitoring of potential reversal of past successes and new and emerging issues. Given the resources available to RFN, the Consultant recommends a significant thematic and/or geographical expansion of the work rather than simply continuing doing more of the same. RFN can take the advocacy work a step further, and the organisation is well positioned to produce new results.

Multiple options: RFN's past achievements provide the organisation with a range of opportunities to build on when considering expansion of the work related to tropical rainforests and forest-dependent peoples. Conclusions on which areas to focus on should be based on a comprehensive analysis of opportunities and limitations for future work. Such an analysis was not part of the scope for this Evaluation. RFN should therefore carry out a deeper analysis of the opportunities and limitations before making strategic choices among the options available. It is important that RFN avoids spreading too thinly and avoids undermining the added values that have produced results so far. The Consultant does not recommend that RFN expands work to cover all issues listed below. But the Consultant believes that a significant thematic or geographical expansion of the scope of the policy and advocacy work on deforestation drivers is required. Further, an increased engagement to find a broader set of solutions to address priority rainforest issues is strongly recommended.

The Consultant recommends:

- RFN should continue advocacy and policy work in Norway to minimise imports and use of raw materials and commodities causing tropical deforestation, forest degradation and violations of human rights (e.g. tropical timber and palm oil). Past successes mean that less resources are required to monitor and maintain low imports and use of the raw materials and commodities. Resources should therefore be shifted partly to other raw materials and commodities in Norway where the scope for further impacts is greater (e.g. soy, beef, or biofuels), and partly to new ways of working with stakeholders in Norway and beyond (see below). RFN should also track the impacts caused by changes in Norway to document whether these produce significant improvements on the ground in rainforest countries, and to document lessons.
- RFN should invest substantially in open-minded engagement with a range of stakeholders concerning Norwegian imports to identify broader sets of solutions to the problems RFN raises with respect to tropical deforestation, forest degradation and violations of human rights. Such multi-stakeholder engagement will better address the diversity of contexts where deforestation, forest degradation and forest-dependent peoples' rights are important issues. The engagement can contribute to a more nuanced, shared understanding between stakeholders of the issues at hand, including of the limitations and opportunities for diverse stakeholders and how they have arrived at their respective positions. An improved mutual understanding can help in developing more and better tools to address the issues, even though there is likely to be differences in opinion on which are the most feasible tools in any given context. RFN needs to find a balance between the traditional advocacy role on the one side and venturing into what some may see as service provision or consultancies on the other. Advocacy should be the main focus for RFN. This engagement will require additional capacity on RFN's side. These needs should be met through additional internal

staff and through partnerships with other organisations that bring in complementary resources.

- RFN should expand advocacy work on imports of raw materials and commodities to a limited number of European countries through partnerships with organisations in those countries. Selection of countries should be informed by analysis of potential partners, scope for change in potential countries and the importance of those countries as drivers of deforestation, forest degradation and violations of human rights. Adapting and testing the approaches that produced results in Norway will inform RFN and partners on the feasibility of further expansion to other countries. Should the approaches applied successfully in Norway not work well in other countries, new approaches should be tested.
- RFN should expand the partner base in rainforest countries and develop new and more flexible modalities for partner cooperation to engage more in advocacy work in rainforest countries and regions as well as internationally. While advocacy and policy work at national level in rainforest countries is likely to be undertaken mainly by national NGOs, RFN could take a more active role particularly in regional advocacy work, for instance in relation to financial institutions or companies that are important in the region. RFN should also build policy and advocacy capacity of national NGOs for these to engage with governments and businesses. This may also reduce perceptions of competition between RFN and national NGOs.
- RFN should better institutionalise linkages between the field projects in rainforest countries and advocacy work in those instances where such linkages add value. Joint planning, clear division of roles and responsibilities, and explicit resource allocations to ensure agreed actions are followed up should be put in place.
- RFN should invest further in capacity on asset management to advocate more effectively for improved responsible investment strategies among institutional investors. RFN could also assist in developing tools for effective translation of data on deforestation, forest degradation and human rights violations into relevant information for investment decision-making. RFN should also consider whether a focus on biodiversity rather than rainforests is a more feasible approach in the longer term, particularly outside Norway where the rainforest cause has a different standing compared with Norway and where biodiversity may be seen as a more relevant concept as it captures important ecological values across different ecosystems. A focus on biodiversity requires additional partnerships to cover different aspects of biodiversity. A broader partnership might represent a stronger coalition when approaching institutional investors to promote integration of biodiversity concerns into responsible investment strategies. Such a coalition may also have the appetite for establishing a form of 'sovereign wealth fund watch', or an investor monitoring function, with specific emphasis on biodiversity, which is an area receiving limited attention by most institutional investors.
- RFN should consider expanding capacity to work on more complex commodities like soy and beef. These commodities are not only originating from rainforest areas, there are multiple land uses and supply chains involved and a whole set of issues that are relatively new to RFN. RFN should also strengthen capacity on biodiversity conservation to better target advocacy and policy work towards landscapes and ecosystems with the most important biodiversity areas among those with Indigenous Peoples and traditional forest-dependent peoples. Expanding to more complex commodities and stepping up analysis of biodiversity are likely to require new partnerships rather than relying fully on adding new staff to address these issues.
- RFN should strengthen the advocacy programme by rigorous situation analysis, development of a theory of change and a clear results framework including targets,

indicators, baselines and assumptions. This will both provide greater clarity on the focal areas and enable more specific reviews of the advocacy work in the future, which will also assist in learning lessons. While a clear framework is required, this should not be cast in stone. RFN needs to remain flexible to utilise unexpected opportunities or address new challenges that arise.

4 LITERATURE

In addition to the documents listed below, the Consultant had access to confidential documents produced by the Rainforest Foundation Norway produced for internal RFN use or for sharing with selected target groups.

- NBIM (Norges Bank Investment Management), 2009. *NBIM Investor Expectations: Climate Change Management*. 6 pp.
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- NBIM (Norges Bank Investment Management), 2017. *Responsible Investments 2016. Government Pension Fund Global. 2015*. 96 pp.
- Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation), 2012. *Real-time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations*. Report 5/2012 Evaluation. 190 pp.
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2007. *Programme Document. Multi-year proposal for cooperation agreement 2008-2012*. 99 pp. (in Norwegian)
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2007. *Proposal for core support from the Ministry of Environment in 2008*. 14 pp. (in Norwegian)
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- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2008. *Proposal for core support from the Ministry of Environment in 2009*. 13 pp. (in Norwegian)
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- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2010. *Annual Report 2009*. Report submitted to Norad. 15 pp.
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- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2011. *Report on RFNs work in Norway 2010*. Report to the Ministry of Environment. 4 pp. (in Norwegian)
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2011. *Proposal for core support from the Ministry of Environment in 2012*. 1 p. (in Norwegian)
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2011. *Annual Report 2010*. Report submitted to Norad. 17 pp. (in Norwegian)

- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2012. *Report on RFNs work in Norway 2011*. Report to the Ministry of Environment. 3 pp. (in Norwegian)
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2012. *Proposal for core support from the Ministry of Environment in 2013*. 1 p. (in Norwegian)
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2012. *Strategy 2008-2017. Revised 2012*. 50 pp.
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2012. *Application*. Proposal submitted to Ford Foundation/ Climate and Land Use Alliance. 17 pp.
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2012. *Advancing Rights-based Rainforest Protection and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Application for 2013-2017*. Proposal submitted to Norad. 16 + 57 pp (two documents).
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2013. *Report 2008-2012*. Report submitted to Norad. 20 pp. (in Norwegian)
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2013. *Proposal narrative 2014*. Proposal submitted to Ford Foundation. 8 pp.
- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2013. *Proposal for core support from the Ministry of Environment in 2014*. 1 p. (in Norwegian)
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- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2014. *Proposal narrative 2015*. Proposal submitted to Ford Foundation. 9 pp.
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- RFN (Rainforest Foundation Norway), 2017. *Narrative report 2016*. Report submitted to Ford Foundation. 9 pp.
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Vista Analyse & Norplan, 2011. *International Standards and Principles for Environmental and Social Management of Renewable Energy Projects in Developing Countries*. 176 pp.

ANNEXES

Annex 1 Terms of Reference for the Evaluation

Annex 2 People Interviewed During Evaluation

ANNEX 1 TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

Evaluation of Rainforest Foundation Norway's advocacy efforts to counter international drivers of deforestation

1. Introduction

Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN) is seeking a consultant to undertake an evaluation of the impact of RFN's advocacy to counter international drivers of deforestation.

2. The organisation

Rainforest Foundation Norway (RFN) is a Norwegian NGO working to protect the world's tropical rainforests and the human rights of traditional, forest-dependent communities. In addition to supporting local indigenous and environmental organisations in Southeast Asia, Central Africa and the Amazon, RFN has an international advocacy program aimed at influencing political and economic framework conditions for protection of rainforests and forest peoples' rights, including climate change negotiations, human rights mechanisms and international drivers of deforestation.

3. Background

The most important cause of deforestation is the global demand for natural resources found in forest areas and agricultural expansion into forest land. The specific drivers of deforestation and forest degradation vary between countries and regions, but most are tied to international trade and finance through complex supply chains and finance flows. In order to reduce and halt deforestation, RFN holds that it is necessary to do two things:

- 1) Reduce the *supply* of commodities linked to rainforest destruction, e.g. by advocating stronger regulation of business operations in rainforest areas and by changing the practices of companies engaged in direct deforestation.
- 2) Reduce the international *demand* for commodities linked to rainforest destruction, e.g. by getting consumers, businesses, public procurement authorities, banks and investors to demand that the products they buy and the companies they buy from or invest in are deforestation-free, and by advocating stronger regulation of trade in products with deforestation risk.

Efforts to achieve the first of these objectives are mainly carried out by local partner organisations in RFN's project countries, with funding and other support from RFN. Activities to achieve the second objective are mainly carried out by RFN's Policy and Campaigns Department, based in Norway. Internal evaluations indicate that results are best when these two action areas are well coordinated, and that there is a significant potential to improve coordination.

Advocacy to counter international drivers of deforestation has become an increasingly important part of RFN's advocacy work in Norway and internationally. While Norwegian consumption of deforestation-linked commodities is insignificant on a global scale, the country has significant international influence on account of its consistent rating as one of the world's most developed countries, its role as a major aid donor and because it has the largest Sovereign Wealth Fund in the world. Based on the premise that progress in Norway may contribute to similar progress in bigger markets like the EU, and that RFN's capacity to effect change is larger in Norway than

abroad, the organisation RFN has mostly focused on Norway in its efforts to reduce international demand for deforestation.

The main elements of RFN's activities in this field have been the following:

- Advocacy efforts to reduce Norwegian consumption and use of deforestation-linked commodities like palm oil, paper, tropical timber, soy, and beef. The tools used include consumer campaigns and advocacy directed at both the private sector and public authorities in Norway.
- Advocacy efforts to make Norway's Government Pension Fund Global (GPF) and other Norwegian investors reduce their exposure to deforestation through a combination of divestment and active engagement with companies.
- Participation in joint campaigns against international companies, to make them adopt No Deforestation Policies.

RFN's funding for this area of work comes from NORAD, the Ford Foundation and the Good Energies Foundation.

4. Purpose

1. To demonstrate what outcomes/impact RFN's advocacy generates and how (accountability)
2. To foster internal capacity building and strategic development and planning (learning)

5. Rationale

RFN is currently in the process of making a new long term strategy (2018-2030) to replace the current strategy (2008-2017) next year. In addition, the organisation will submit a 4-year results report to Norad in May this year, and a new 4-year framework agreement proposal to Norad in October. The proposed evaluation should inform all these processes.

In relation to the accountability objective, the evaluation will provide material for fundraising, reporting and public outreach.

In relation to the learning objective, it will help RFN to:

- Enhance understanding of barriers that limit RFN's advocacy impact as well as entry points to maximize impact.
- Document best and promising practices.
- Develop the organisation's capacity to effectively monitor advocacy impact in the future.
- Develop the organisation's capacity to more effectively demonstrate and use its advocacy impact.

6. Scope

The time-frame for the evaluation is RFN's current 10-year strategy, which began in 2008 and runs to the present day. The main focus of the evaluation should be on the efforts of RFN's Policy and Campaigns program to reduce international drivers of deforestation, as described in the 2008-2017 strategy, framework agreements with Norad and program proposals to the Ford Foundation and Good Energies Foundation. While most of RFN's support to local partners falls

outside of the scope of this evaluation, at least two examples of partner involvement linked to RFN's international advocacy against drivers of deforestation should be included.

7. Evaluation questions

The evaluation should answer the following questions:

- What outcomes/impact have been caused by RFN's advocacy to counter international drivers of deforestation, and how effective has the organisation been in achieving its goals?
- How efficient has RFN's advocacy been, *i.e.* what is the quality of results in relation to the resources used?
- What are, if any, the specific strengths and added values of RFN's advocacy, within the overall context of efforts to counter drivers of deforestation?
- To what extent has RFN shown capacity to adapt strategy and tactics to changes in the political context?
- To what extent has RFN used the right strategic target groups, messages, policy frameworks and tactics to reduce international drivers of deforestation?
- How well has RFN coordinated advocacy efforts with local partner organisations, and how could such coordination be improved for larger effect?
- How may RFN increase the impact, effectiveness and efficiency of its advocacy to counter drivers of deforestation?

To answer these questions the evaluator will be expected to:

- Review all relevant RFN funding proposals, reports, strategies and other materials, as well as any relevant external reports, media reports or evaluations.
- Survey and interview RFN staff, target groups for RFN's advocacy, local partners, allies and other relevant stakeholders.

8. Outputs

The consultant will produce a report in English. The report should include an executive summary, an evaluation which answers all questions outlined above, a list of recommendations and the bibliography used. The consultant will also be required to meet with RFN staff to present the findings of the evaluation.

9. Duration and timeline

The evaluation will be conducted in February and March 2017. A more detailed timeline will be developed by the evaluators in cooperation with RFN.

Suggested deadlines for report production:

- 1st draft submitted to RFN: 13th March
- RFN's feedback to first draft: 17th March
- Final draft submitted to RFN: 31st March

10. Division of responsibilities

RFN is responsible for the overall coordination of the evaluation and for the contractual relationship with the evaluators, which includes payment of consultant services. Nils Hermann Ranum, Head of RFN's Policy and Campaigns Division, will be RFN's focal point for the evaluation. RFN will dedicate staff time for interviews as well as provide the necessary reference documents.

The evaluator is responsible for i) providing an evaluation framework with time schedule and division of tasks, ii) collecting data and iii) writing the evaluation report.

11. Qualifications

The evaluator(s) should possess the following qualifications:

- Experience with evaluation of development projects
- Experience with evaluation of advocacy
- Ability to communicate complex issues in an easily readable format.
- Proficiency in spoken and written English and Norwegian.

12. Terms and conditions

Applicants for this assignment should present a proposal including budget to RFN by January 29th 2017. When considering proposals, RFN will make a decision based on a combined assessment of cost, quality of proposal and experience/competence of evaluator.

ANNEX 2 PEOPLE INTERVIEWED DURING EVALUATION

Name	Position, organisation
Anders Krogh	Senior Advisor Peru, Rainforest Foundation Norway
Anja Lillegraven	Head of Southeast Asia and Oceania Department, Rainforest Foundation Norway
Anja Lyngsmark	Senior Advisor, Rainforest Foundation Norway
Johan Haffner Knagenhjelm	Policy Advisor, Rainforest Foundation Norway
Kamilla Berggrav	Policy Advisor, Rainforest Foundation Norway
Nils Hermann Ranum	Head of Policy and Campaign Department, Rainforest Foundation Norway
Vemund Olsen	Senior Advisor Policy and Campaigns, Rainforest Foundation Norway
Bjarne Rask Thomsen	Chief Executive Officer, Denofa
Bjart Thorkil Pedersen	Manager Sustainable Sourcing, NorgesGruppen ASA
Bustar Maitar	Consultant based in Indonesia, previous Greenpeace employee working on tropical forest issues
Ellen Behrens	VP Corporate Responsibility, Corporate Communications & Corporate Affairs, Orkla ASA
Hanne Iversen Rye	Senior Analyst, Sustainable Investments, Storebrand Asset Management
Hilde Jervan	Senior Advisor, Council on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global
Hilde Singaas	Deputy Minister of Finance 2009-2013
Håkon Lindahl	Head of Climate and Environment Department, Future in Our Hands
Jeanett Bergan	Head of Responsible Investments, KLP
Knut Hjelset	Managing Director, RORG
Knut Lutnæs	Environmental Manager, Coop Norge Handel AS
Leif John Fosse	Senior Advisor, Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative, Ministry of Climate and Environment

Name	Position, organisation
Ola Mestad	Chair, Council on Ethics 2010-2014
Per Fredrik Ilsaas Pharo	Director, Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative, Ministry of Climate and Environment