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OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

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**Redd Barna
Development Activities**

EVALUATION OF REDD BARNA DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

**Royal Norwegian Ministry
of Development Cooperation**

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The evaluation team hereby present their report on REDD BARNA development activities.

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We especially want to request REDD BARNA project personnel to convey to the project populations our sincere gratitude for their patience in listening to us and answering our numerous questions.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation decided to undertake an evaluation of the development activities of REDD BARNA (Norwegian Save the Children). REDD BARNA activities like fund raising and relief work were not to be covered by the evaluation.

The expectations by the Ministry on the evaluation, as indicated in the Terms of Reference, are that they would constitute a valuable guideline for future cooperation between REDD BARNA and the Ministry, (Terms of Reference, see Appendix I).

For the evaluation the Ministry selected the following team:

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2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Criteria for the evaluation

In addition to its value elements, the REDD BARNA development philosophy as stated e.g. in the Handbook for Field Directors reflects accumulated empirical and scientific evidence on what approaches and methods that are likely to bring about lasting changes in the direction prescribed by REDD BARNA's objectives (reprinted in appendix IV). As such, the Team finds the REDD BARNA development philosophy a commendable and relevant framework for the assessment of performance.

For the purpose of the evaluation the Team has elaborated the REDD BARNA development philosophy into a set of somewhat more operational criteria under four headings.

(i) Distributive ambitions

REDD BARNA states that its development work should benefit the poorest and most underprivileged members of the world community and ultimately it should benefit REDD BARNA's particular target group - the poorest children. Even though this statement on the distributive ambitions is somewhat vague, the Team finds it clear enough to provide a basis for judging performance.

However, the Team questions what seems to be an implicit assumption in the REDD BARNA development philosophy, that the distributive objective can best be met, if the needs of the family as a unit are responded to. There is strong empirical evidence on two related counts to disqualify this assumption.

Firstly, women are the prime care-takers and providers of children. Secondly, in most of the context with relevance for REDD BARNA the relationship within the family between men and women is highly unequal, depriving women of equal access to and control of productive assets, income, information, organization and decision-making processes. Therefore, intra-family distributive relationships have to be taken into account when REDD BARNA's performance in reaching its target group - children - is evaluated.

(ii) Economic transformation

In the context of the REDD BARNA development philosophy as understood by the Team economic transformation refers to an improvement in the level of income (including subsistence production). This is an operational criterion against which performance can be measured.

(iii) Social transformation and quality of life factors other than income.

In different formulations social transformation figures as one element in REDD BARNA's development philosophy. Whereas this philosophy is generally commendable, as already noted, the Team has two reservations on social transformation as part of the philosophy. Firstly, evidence suggests that REDD BARNA has placed insufficient emphasis on social transformation. The more general argument in support of this statement is that social transformation is important because of the need to create counter cultures

which contend with forces of social organization and ideology that perpetuate societies which keep the great majority poor, powerless, exploited and disorganized.

Secondly, social transformation has a number of dimensions, some of which are implied but hardly elaborated in the REDD BARNA philosophy statements. For instance the ambition to assist the poorest in a stratified community by expanding their resource base, increasing their self-esteem and capability to solve their problems through cooperative efforts, by necessity implies changes in power relations in favour of the poor in that community. In this way the concept of power is indirectly implied in the REDD BARNA philosophy.

For the purpose of the evaluation the Team has elaborated the following dimensions of social transformation.

- a) A change in power relations within a community in favour of the poor and underprivileged.
- b) Create unity of poor people along class lines and around common interests which affect their access to power.
- c) Break isolation and promote cooperative and collaborative forms of social organization and action.
- d) Change of gender relations within the family with a view to creating equal access for both male and female members to resources, information, legal assistance, decision-making and organization.
- e) Change of cultural norms relating to health behaviour, nutrition practice, education and skill attainment with the view to improving the quality of life of the members of the community.

(iv) Self-reliant and self-sustained process of change.

The REDD BARNA development philosophy recognizes that external interventions should be catalytic in bringing about self-reliant and self-sustained processes of change. The Team identified four aspects which need to be analyzed, when the performance of REDD BARNA is assessed under this heading. These are:

- a) Linkages with government institutions.
- b) Establishment of local institutions and development of the capacity and the capability of such institutions to attain social coercion around common interests, to make needs assessments and to solve problems by their own efforts.
- c) Choice of technology (in development activities).
- d) Administrative and organizational complexity of activities initiated by an external agent.

The above criteria provided the framework within which REDD BARNA performance as reflected in the field programmes was evaluated. As a basis for a more general assessment of the approaches chosen is the two basic development models which are briefly presented in the following section.

2.2 Two basic development models

For analytical purposes it is useful to distinguish between two development models, which in their basic formulations reflect rather differing perceptions of the nature of development processes. These models will be referred to as the delivery model and the process model.

2.2.1 The delivery model is formulated on the assumption that lack of resources and infrastructure are the critical impediments to development. As a consequence, strong emphasis is placed on technology and hardware. Needs assessment, selection and design as well as implementation of development activities tend to be seen as a technical matter most effectively handled in a top/down manner by the (delivering) institutions external to the intended beneficiaries. The beneficiaries may be consulted but their role is

passive. Participation, if any, is limited to the provision of voluntary labour for certain activities. Emphasis is also placed on strengthening the external delivery mechanism, which may include credit institutions, extension services, organization for delivery of agricultural inputs, etc.

There is nothing inherently contradictory with a target group approach in the delivery model, but the perception of the development process as primarily a matter of resources and technology generally limits the attention given to distributive concerns. Development intervention on the basis of the delivery model invariably tends to be of a short duration, i.e. 3-5 years.

In addition to a technocratic perception of development the availability of substantial funds with development agencies is manifested inadequacy. Funding agencies invariably experience an implicit but strong pressure to disperse the funds placed at their disposal although this would generally be denied. Given its emphasis on hardware and the use of existing structures the delivery model lends itself far more readily to absorbing funds than the process model. In this sense excessive funds can become the worst enemy of REDD BARNA's own philosophy.

2.2.2 The process model on the other hand is based on the assumption that it is primarily the lack of power and self-esteem which limit the access to resources, services, information and skills and which keep people in poverty. This is seen as the main barrier to development. Therefore people rather than resources and technology have to be placed at the forefront. A development intervention in favour of the poor on the basis of the process model should contribute to their empowerment and to an expansion of their capacities to solve their own problems and to claim their rights in the society where they live.

This presupposes collaborative and cooperative action within some form of an institutional framework. Institution building as well as leadership and skill development then become important activities. An external agent can play an important role in initiating and supporting such a process, as long as its role is primarily supportive and reactive. The process model does not exclude delivery. Neither does it exclude the provision of certain physical resources and the introduction of improved technology. What is important, however, is that the delivery of services, inputs etc, as well as the introduction of technology are subordinated to the process of empowerment of people and that such provisions are made in response to needs assessment and claims by the people themselves. In the process model of development a much larger time perspective is required than in the delivery model.

This will be particularly so when distributive ambitions and social transformation are superimposed upon the general formulation of the model. Furthermore, lasting results are likely to materialize after a decade rather than after a few years.

It seems clear that the process model is considerably more in congruence with REDD BARNA's development philosophy than the delivery model. Therefore, an assessment of REDD BARNA's development work will also have to cover an analysis of the extent to which REDD BARNA has chosen to apply a process model in their overall approach at country programme level.

However, the implementation of the REDD BARNA philosophy through a process model places certain specific demands in forms of organization and management. These demands will be briefly identified in the following section.

2.2.3 Organizational structure as related to each model

The organizational structure should to some extent be influenced by the implementation of the delivery model or the process model. Some major differences in the direction of the two models are shown below.

Delivery model

directed

Formulating goals and objectives according to top/down model

Objectives defined and measured in quantity

Strategy established by superior bodies

Periodic control of results and justifications

Fixed administrative guidelines, methods and procedures with small possibilities of deviation

Staffing, recruitment and training based on "technical" job requirements

Process model

towards

Formulating goals and objectives according to a bottoms-up model

Objectives defined and measured in quality, quantity and how the objectives were attained

Strategy established in cooperation between levels in the organization

Continuous control of results and justifications

Flexible administrative guidelines, methods and procedures adjustable to actual situations

Staffing, recruitment and training based on a combination of "technical" and process oriented job requirements and flexibility in operation

Development work very often comprises a combination of both delivery and process model. Traditionally, the operations have been focused on delivery of material items and infrastructure, but in development work there is a growing awareness about the value of the process model.

As mentioned before, the implementation of the process model will be more time-consuming and require a combination of technical and process directed qualifications by the staff. As most of the staff are recruited according to their technical qualifications, the ability to work within a process-directed organization has to be trained and accepted by the staff. These changes in behaviour will take time and to some people the change will involve uncertainty and frustration.

The process model should not only be employed by the field staff in contact and cooperation with the beneficiaries, but the whole organization has to adjust their management style to the model. Administrative routines and guidelines have to be changed, especially concerning planning and budgeting.

In the following table we have tried to show the distribution of the functions and activities between different levels in a process-directed organization.

Distribution of some major functions between levels in a process-model organization

Function	Headquarter level	Country level	Project level
Policy and guidelines (Overall and functionwise)	Formulate and decide Interpret to other levels. Monitor and evaluate lower levels.	Interpret, transform and decide on national concepts and understanding. Propose adjustments to HQ level. Communicate and explain to higher and lower levels. Monitor and evaluate results.	Inform, interpret, communicate and decide with community groups and individuals within given framework. Propose adjustments on framework to higher level.
Personell	Recruit, remunerate and train, monitor and evaluate HQ-staff, R.R.s, Ass. R.R.s and expatriate personnel.	Recruit, remunerate, train, monitor and evaluate secretarial and project staff of category 3 and 2.	Recruit, remunerate, train, monitor and evaluate project staff on level 1.
Programmes and projects	Identify, initiate and decide on carrying out country programmes. Monitor and evaluate programmes and projects.	Identify, formulate and implement projects. Propose new projects to HQ. Monitor and evaluate projects.	In close cooperation with local community bodies and individuals work out project surveys and establish a common understanding of the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries. Work out plans and budget on short- and long-term basis for the implementation of different components
Finance	Decide on yearly basis the countrywise framework for expenditures to be allocated. Based on proposals from each country decide the overall budget for REDD BARNA Monitor the use of financial resources based on an adequate accounting procedure.	Based on proposals from project staff and discussions between secretariat staff and people responsible for each project. Propose a budget for expenditures on country level. Explain HQ decision	Based on short- and longterm plans and in cooperation with groups of the beneficiaries, propose short-term budgets which meet the local priorities and needs. Explain the implications of the budget decided and the priorities made

Distribution of some major functions between levels in a process-model organization

Function	Headquarter level	Country level	Project level
		and priorities given in the over-all budget for REDD BARNA to project staff. Monitor the use of resources by statements of accounts.	by REDD BARNA governing bodies.
Provisions of goods and services	Negotiate about delivery of specific goods and services.	Purchase, store, deliver and transport goods and services not obtainable in the local market.	As far as possible buy goods and services in the local market when prices and other conditions are acceptable.

2.3 Duration of assignment, sources of information and limitations

The field work of the Team lasted some 35 days divided fairly equally between Sri Lanka and Ethiopia. It is quite clear that the time constraint placed considerable limitations on the Team. Not only had the number of projects visited to be restricted, but there is an obvious risk that the Team has not reached a full understanding of a complete development effort in two vastly different country contexts. Whereas the debriefing sessions in the two countries suggest that the major issues confronting REDD BARNA have been understood, there may still be errors and misconceptions on some specific points.

The main source of information has been REDD BARNA staff in country secretariats, in projects and in Oslo as well as project beneficiaries. Extensive interviews and discussions have been the means to elicit the information. In addition various policy and project documents including reports and analyses have been studied. Finally, information has been sought from government institutions at national and project levels in the two countries visited.

In Sri Lanka the Team visited and analysed two slum projects, two settlement projects and one community development project. Except for the restrictions imposed by the security situation in the north of the country, no limitations were placed on the Team to choose which projects to visit. Whereas the selected projects represent the three main types of development work in which REDD BARNA Sri Lanka is involved, the sample is still too small as a basis for drawing far-reaching conclusions about the performance at project level of the entire Sri Lanka programme embracing no less than 20 projects.

In Ethiopia the Team visited and analysed the two slum projects and one rural development project. This covers much of present REDD BARNA activities in the country (excluding the relief work) as the other two projects in the current programme are in a planning/replanning phase. Some brief information on the projects visited by the Team is given in appendix III.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The Team is of the opinion that the policy statements as these are articulated in the REDD BARNA Guidelines reflect a commendable value orientation in its ambition to help the poorest and a generally well conceived development philosophy based on empirical and scientific evidence on how to bring about lasting changes.

Whereas the development philosophy is generally well founded, the Team does not agree with the assumption that the family can be treated as a unit in order to reach the children in the most effective way. Overwhelming evidence proves that the distributive effects following from inequalities in the family between men and women make this a false assumption.

The overall REDD BARNA philosophy needs elaboration in order to provide an operational framework for country programme formulation. In addition to the question of how to reach the children, this elaboration would have to cover concepts like people's participation, self-reliance, poverty orientation and social transformation. As part of social transformation it seems particularly important that REDD BARNA elaborates an operational stand on the following issue.

The ambition to assist the poorest in a stratified community by expanding their resource base, increasing their self-esteem and capacity for solving their own problems through cooperative efforts by necessity implies conflicts and changes in power relations in favour of the poor in that community.

REDD BARNA needs to take a stand in operational terms on how to deal with conflicts and power relations within a community.

In the opinion of the Team REDD BARNA is faced with a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand REDD BARNA has a development philosophy which states that the key factor in development is people, the development of their skills, understanding and involvement in a process of change. On the other hand, REDD BARNA feels a pressure to make use of rapidly increasing funds and it feels an obligation to the Norwegian public to show tangible results within short periods of time. This makes it increasingly more difficult to uphold the philosophy.

In the absence of an elaboration of the REDD BARNA policy into an operational framework, and under the pressure to disburse funds and show tangible results management of policy has become unclear. It is the opinion of the Team that REDD BARNA at present largely lacks management of policy giving clear direction and focus to country level programmes in line with the REDD BARNA development philosophy. This lack of management has ramifications in terms of unclear criteria for project selection, training of staff, content of monitoring, approaches to planning and financial management.

As a corollary to the question of management of policy, REDD BARNA Oslo has not ensured that REDD BARNA country organizations have developed country context specific operational interpretations of the overall development philosophy.

However, REDD BARNA Sri Lanka has taken an initiative in this direction. For a couple of years a process is under way to develop a context specific conceptual framework for the operation.

Whereas this framework is well conceived , it still remains to be transformed into operational guidelines

telling field staff e.g. what specifically is meant with people's participation in Sri Lanka, what methods to use, etc. In Ethiopia no similar effort was made.

The conclusions above are the fundamental ones. In addition the Team concluded the following regarding the programmes at country level.

- i. The programmes have been generally successful in orienting the projects and activities to poor and underprivileged sections of the urban and rural communities. However, the Team found a general lack of recognition of the distributive effects following from inequalities in the family. This implies that the needs of women have been generally overlooked.
- ii. Activities to increase incomes have been generally limited in scale and scope in the urban projects.
- iii. Conscious strategies to change power relations within a community in favour of the poor and underprivileged, to build institutions which promote cooperative relations between people in the target group, and to encourage more equal relations between men and women in the family situation have not been sufficiently developed.
- iv. There are commendable efforts to ensure continuity of programme components in health and education by linking these with relevant government institutions. However, the effort to establish self-sustaining processes of change within the framework of peoples' organizations is less noticeable.
- v. In both country programmes staff is a critical asset. The Team is unequivocal in its appreciation of the commitment and competence of staff members in both Ethiopia and Sri Lanka. In this respect the efforts in Sri Lanka to develop the staff through training programmes have been commendable. In Ethiopia, however, adequate recognition has not been given to the need to develop staff through training programmes.

The Team has a number of reservations about REDD BARNA's operations when measured against its own policy and ambitions. Still, when compared to most bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, the Team has concluded that REDD BARNA performance is considerably better in terms of poverty orientation and conscious efforts to work with people.

RECOMMENDATION:

The recommendations are implied in the conclusions given above. However, given its outstanding significance the team wishes to make one specific recommendation more explicitly. For the benefit of the readers it may be useful to summarize the argument which leads to this recommendation, although it is given elsewhere in the report.

REDD BARNA has a commendable development philosophy. Its key element is the strong emphasis on poverty orientation and the recognition that development is fundamentally a matter of enabling people to develop their skills, understanding and involvement in a process which REDD BARNA would like to support through its Overseas Aid Programmes.

If REDD BARNA is given large funds, the supportive role to such a participatory process becomes very difficult. The pressure to disburse funds simply does not leave time for the slow process of creating awareness, forming local organizations etc. Furthermore, large amounts of money means more complex

decisions and the requirement for technical expertise for planning and implementation of projects. Invariably development becomes an activity above the heads of the intended beneficiaries. The process becomes a secondary concern and the beneficiaries will see little reason to resume responsibility for their own situation when visible things are just delivered to them.

This means that the very essence of REDD BARNA's philosophy, which makes it positively different from most large donors, would tend to be lost.

Therefore, the Team strongly **recommends** that funds from any sources sought by and given to REDD BARNA for its development work are limited to compensate for inflation and changes in foreign exchange rates plus a moderate increase of 10-15% per annum. *

Given the educative value of fund raising from the general public in Norway first priority should always be given to this source of funds.

* The Team Member Mette Jørstad agrees fully with the Team that only a moderate increase in budgets are advisable, without specifying any rate per annum.

4. THE CONTEXT AND APPROACHES

REDD BARNA's possibilities to implement its overall policies partly depend upon the particular context in a programme country. The context provides possibilities as well as constraints, and an assessment of performance of REDD BARNA's development work will have to take such possibilities and constraints into account.

4.1 The context - Sri Lanka

In the following an attempt is made to outline some of the relevant characteristics of the Sri Lankan context. This will serve as a general background for a statement on the approach taken by the REDD BARNA Sri Lanka as well as for the analysis of individual field programmes. The context is presented under six sub-headings.

(i) Resource base and level of economic activities

The fundamental resource base of Sri Lanka is its agricultural land and its people. However, scarcity of productive land has resulted in a growing proletariat, which earns a meagre income as plantation labourers, casual labourers, petty traders, craftsmen etc. In comparison with Ethiopia the level of economic activities as reflected in e.g. GDP per capita is relatively high. (US \$ 309 compared with US \$ 140 for Ethiopia). A large export oriented plantation sector provides Sri Lanka with a considerable import capacity.

Although Sri Lanka does not possess large-scale heavy industries, there is a notable agro-industry. Of particular interest to this analysis is the existence of diversified and dispersed small-scale industrial activities including cottage industries, workshops, crafts, etc.

A striking characteristic of the Sri Lankan context is the high degree of market integration. A great majority of the population depends on cash transactions for production inputs, output, labour, consumer goods including food, etc. With many deficiencies, including exploitative elements, there are functioning transport and marketing systems penetrating the rural areas.

The high level of vocational and other skills in broad layers of the society is a major asset of the country. One of its effects is the opening up of the labour market in the Middle East to a very large number of Sri Lankans. Otherwise resourceless people have reasonable chances to find employment for a couple of years in the Middle East, as long as they have a relevant skill and can raise the commission fees. This has conditioned the aspirations and perspectives of millions of Sri Lankans also in remote areas.

(ii) Physical infrastructure

The physical infrastructure in Sri Lanka is comparatively well developed. An extensive road network, telecommunications and electrification as well as the widespread existence of hospitals, clinics and schools bear witness to this. At present very major investments in irrigation facilities and hydropower generation will add to the stock of productive infrastructural assets.

(iii) Social and economic distribution and gender relations

Sri Lanka is often cited as an example where government policies brought about a relatively egalitarian society within the context of a market economy. The implementation of an ambitious land reform programme, conscious and successful efforts to develop infrastructure, government services and economic activities in the rural areas as well as the introduction of a welfare system (transfers of incomes) in favour of the poor in the past created conditions of considerable equality by South-East Asian standards. However, the structural reform pruned rather than dismantled the prevailing power structure. The mechanisms which create inequality persisted and these have since produced increasing disparities in the society. The trends have become stronger during the present government, which pursues a liberal market-oriented economic policy which is a progressive marginalization of assetless people.

Hierarchical structures of patron-client relationships characterize Sri Lanka. These relationships are centered around control of economic and political power and they are strongly felt also at village and family level.

The stratification of the Sri Lankan society is also reflected in the caste structure. Generally speaking there is a considerable congruence between stratification along class lines and on caste, although there are deviations from this general pattern. It should perhaps be noted that the caste system in the buddhist-dominated society of Sri Lanka is not as rigid and pervasive as in India.

Sri Lanka is a male dominated society at all levels. Laws which have been enacted to ensure equal rights for women have had little influence on the socialization of women and men alike, to regard women as inferior and to limit their access to and control over productive assets, income, information, organization and decisionmaking.

(iv) Administrative structures and government services

Government structures for administration and provision of services are well developed with a high degree of proliferation and penetration. One of the results is that Sri Lanka compares favourably on indicators like life expectations, child mortality and literacy.

(v) Local level institutions

One striking characteristic of Sri Lanka is the prevalence of very large numbers of formal institutions at the village level.

Apart from a very elaborate cooperative structure, there are Government sponsored institutions like the Rural Development Societies, Women's Societies, Community Development Societies in urban areas, and the Local Government Structure (Gramodaya and Pradeshiya Mandaleayas). In addition there are numerous non-government institutions formed on the basis of a multitude of different religious and profane interests. Some of these institutions are local, others are national with multi-tier structures, and yet others are international.

It is important to notice that virtually all these institutions are captured by elites and tend to serve these elites rather than the poor. Many of them work on the false assumption of a conflict-free context where interests are common and shared and where a whole range of activities will benefit all in a community.

(vi) The ethnic conflict

One tragic feature of the Sri Lankan context is the ethnic conflict, which has reached a stage of permanent

violent confrontations between militant organizations among the Tamil minority and Government security forces, particularly in the northern and eastern part of the island. The personal security for hundreds of thousands of people in these areas is threatened, communications are worsening and development work becomes increasingly more difficult.

REDD BARNA operates a number of projects in the affected areas. So far activities have been continued, but with increasing difficulties. Without making any prediction the Team notes that the future of these projects will depend entirely on the development of the conflict.

For REDD BARNA the characteristics of the Sri Lankan context have some notable implications in addition to what is said under (vi) above, and several of these implications constitute constraints to a successful implementation of the REDD BARNA philosophy.

Firstly, the stratification of the society, the prevalence of strong patron-client relationships and a laissez-faire policy, favouring growth at the expense of equity on the part of the government will make it more difficult for REDD BARNA to meet its distributive objectives.

Secondly, REDD BARNA's participatory approach to development can rarely make use of existing institutional framework at the local level as it is generally dominated and used in the self interest of local elites. Repeated experience in Sri Lanka suggests that the establishment of local institutions by the poor, thereby upsetting the existing power relations, stands the risk of sabotage, co-option or take-over by elite groups.

Thirdly, the gender relationships makes it impossible to deal with the family as a unit and calls for concerted and difficult efforts in order to bring about a change.

Fourthly, economic transformation in favour of the target group becomes more difficult, when the possibilities for providing productive agricultural assets are limited.

Fifthly, the existence of well-developed government administrative and service structures will make it easier to link up REDD BARNA initiated activities in fields like health, education, sanitation, agriculture, to mention a few.

When assessing the performance of REDD BARNA Sri Lanka these constraints and possibilities have been taken into account.

4.1.1 General statement of REDD BARNA approach Sri-Lanka

The REDD BARNA Sri Lanka programme has attempted to evolve an overall approach to the work in the field based on the experience of the organization over the years.

Clearly, in the initial stages the method of work was delivery oriented. REDD BARNA's involvement began as a collaboration with the government of Sri Lanka in building a Health Centre on Karainagar Island. REDD BARNA provided resources to build the centre and the manpower to run this programme. Since there was no clear role orientation at this stage, the delivery approach seemed most suited. However, in the process of operating a Health Center important lessons regarding preventive health care were learned by the organization.

Experiences in the field generated the awareness in the organization that in order to reach out to underprivileged children, the REDD BARNA target group, the families of the children should be assisted to have a better standard of living. The policy to assist in long-term integrated development projects with communities resulted from this understanding.

The development assistance took the following programmatic forms:

1. Helping to build settlements for rural assetless people given land by the government (and in consonance with government policy) and assisting in upgrading of poor urban settlements.
2. Helping to initiate a process of self-help for poor communities in traditional Sri Lankan villages (termed in the Sri Lanka REDD BARNA programmes as community development projects).

In starting the Community Development projects, in traditional villages (as opposed to new settlements that REDD BARNA helped set up under the village expansion programmes of the government) the Organization was faced with methodological problems relating to community involvement and identification of target groups and needs and programmes. The traditional village in Sri Lanka, operating as it does within the norms of a stratified society, is generally not one community with a convergence of interests. Needs assessments by the traditional representatives of such a society reflects the aspirations of the elite who occupy important positions in the existing institutional structures for peoples' participation. REDD BARNA Sri Lanka attempted at first and, unsuccessfully, to work with the government sponsored Rural Development Societies which were coopted by the rural elite. As a result of their inability to work on the mechanisms to promote participation by the poorest in identifying needs and planning programmes, REDD BARNA was led primarily into infrastructural development programmes - schools, roads, community halls, latrines, clinics, houses and factories.

With growing awareness among the staff about the social stratification within the traditional society in which they worked, the need to identify with the "target" group as being the poorest and most underprivileged members of the society was recognized. This awareness was also influenced by the debates that took place in the development field within Sri Lanka regarding rural development and the target population therein.

In order to operationalize these perceptions, REDD BARNA as an Organization had to reconsider the roles of the project workers and the strategies for social transformation they had hitherto used.

The present reality is that to varying degrees within the organization there is acceptance of the need to promote the participation of the poorest in assessing their own problems and building up programmes to meet these needs. The Community Development Coordinator (CDC), (generally the project worker at the grass root level) is supposed to act as the catalyst to trigger off this process. However, in most projects in which this transition from concept to reality is taking place the major constraint is of the earlier history of delivering "goodies". This has affected both the perception of the people about REDD BARNA as an organization and that of the grass root level workers of working with people.

At present the more positive point is the realisation and acceptance of the need for change in the Organization's approach to working with poor people. The weakness is in the lack of a clear understanding of the social transformation strategy to be followed in the process model of work.

However, the organization has developed, through discussions at various levels of staff, a reasonably valid conceptual framework for the changes of approach. The two major constraints remain.

- a) Their inability up to the present to develop operational guidelines based on their conceptual framework.
- b) The problem of staff and community groups conditioned by the delivery approach.

4.2 The context - Ethiopia

Resource base and level of economic activities.

Ethiopia is characterized by a weak resource base and low level of economic activities. It has one of the worlds lowest GDP per capita (i.e. US \$ 140). Agriculture, which is the basic occupation of the majority, is primarily subsistence production. The economy is further handicapped by the lack of an industrial base and consequent poor development of small industries and crafts. The drought situation over the past two years has resulted in a heavy drain of scarce resources for relief, diverting personnel and other efforts away from development. Subsistence producers, faced with the onslaught of persistent drought, have lost their productive assets and thus their ability to renew agricultural activities. There has been large scale emigration of people in search of a means of survival. The situation is further aggravated by a crippling civil war in the northern regions of Ethiopia.

Economic and social stratification

The economic and social stratification based on the ownership of land and property have been dramatically reversed in the southern regions of Ethiopia in the last ten years and as a result of two major land reforms enacted after the Revolution in 1974. This reversal is less apparent in major cities and specially in Addis Ababa.

The government policy regarding distribution are unequivocally articulated in the major reforms of land distribution, the confiscation of privately owned productive and non-productive assets and in the attempts to build social ownership of the means of production.

Furthermore, it is evident from the government policies governing development that there is a clear poverty orientation and positive bias in favour of the assetless. As in most societies, women in Ethiopia face clear inequalities culturally and socially, and also in their access to and control over productive assets. Burdened by the arduous tasks of child bearing, child rearing and labourious domestic chores, women bear a disproportionately un-equal work load with little recognition for what they do. These disparities are most evident in those regions where there is a predominantly muslim population. Fuel gathering, carrying water for family consumption over long distances and in difficult terrains, travelling for days to get grain milled to feed the family are solely the women's responsibility. This inequality of status is also evident in the poor urban localities of Addis Ababa where desertion of women with small children by their menfolk has rendered them indigent.

Physical infrastructure

The physical infrastructures, both for communication and other services are poorly developed. There are few all-weather (metalled) roads and most areas remain inaccessible making transportation a major problem. The lack of schools, clinics and hospitals makes the provision of basic educational and health services difficult. Electrification and telephone communications are limited to regional headquarters and district towns.

Administrative structures and government services.

Administrative services upto the regional headquarters level has been developed despite constraints. There is a conscious policy to decentralize administrative services to the district level. However, government services remain poorly developed because of inadequate resources and despite the political will to provide access to the majority.

Local level institutions

What Ethiopia lacks in infrastructure and resources, it has tried in the post-revolution period to compensate for in the organized mobilisation of people. Thus there exists, at both village and urban level, structures for the participation of people in their own development.

The peasants' associations form the cornerstone of rural organization. With every adult peasant of the village comprising the general body of membership, the peasants associations elect every two years an executive committee. The authority to decision-make on behalf of the community is vested in the executive and the various sub-committees appointed by it. The functions of the committees encompass every aspect of the life of the community ranging from development and resource mobilisation to judicial tasks. Executive meetings, sub-committee meetings and general assemblies facilitate a constant flow of information between the people and their representatives. Government agencies have used the associations to channel programmes and national tasks, (as for example, the present literacy programme). Unlike in highly stratified societies, based on class and caste distinctions, the likelihood of cooption of this local level institution by the rural elite is minimal. The peasant associations, however, suffer from the fundamental constraint of not being able to generate adequate resources to undertake major development programmes.

The Kebele administration is the urban counterpart of the peasants' association. The Kebele, which is the smallest unit in the municipal council structure, is governed by an executive committee elected by the residents of the community. The administration appoints sub-committees to undertake similar functions as in the peasants' association. A network of meetings and general assemblies provides communication links and feedback between the community and its representatives.

Besides these structures for peoples' participation in their own development that exist both in rural and urban areas, Ethiopia has now developed mass organizations for women and for youth.

The Womens' association and Youth association have units at village and Kebele level to ensure the participation of these sections of the society in general development and with specific reference to the problems that affect them.

There have also been attempts to organize people on the basis of production and services, albeit less successfully. Peasants have been organized to a lesser extent, into producer cooperatives sharing land cooperatively and labour. The service cooperative structure provides amenities at village and Kebele level and could be considered as the business wing of the community.

The implication of the existence of these structures for peoples' participation for REDD BARNA work is self-evident. The social organization for peoples' involvement in their own development already exists in these institutions and can be further developed by an organization like REDD BARNA. It is a structure that can be used to reach the poorest and most underprivileged member of the society. It is also a structure through which cooperative and collaborative relationships can be developed to identify needs, formulate programmes to meet those needs and thereby develop the capacity of individuals and communities to work together for the greater good of all concerned.

It should be borne in mind that the government's distributive ambitions indicate a clear poverty orientation.

The development policies and programmes are developed within this framework. The selection of project sites, both rural and urban, reflects the government's distributive concerns and these are shared by REDD BARNA.

Government services are poorly developed and consequently this has implications for REDD BARNA's policy of assuring continuity of services by linking these with government institutions.

4.2.1 General statement of REDD BARNA approach - Ethiopia

The genesis and development of the REDD BARNA country programme in Ethiopia is characterized by a general lack of an overall approach. The programme began with the support of a leprosy research project in 1970. It was followed by the provision of financial support to the agency ALERT to undertake leprosy research and field programmes. In the same year (1973) the Board of Directors of REDD BARNA sanctioned money for a drought relief programme in response to the need in the country. In the following years and up to 1981, REDD BARNA assisted organizations operating in Ethiopia and provided funds for relief operations. In 1981 REDD BARNA Ethiopia became operational with the setting up of the Urban Development Programme in Kebele 41. It is assumed that since REDD BARNA had provided assistance for relief assistance in Bale and Gamo Gofa (in southern Ethiopia), the decision to continue development work in these areas formed the basis for their rural programmes.

In his paper dated October 1982 "Adaption of REDD BARNA's general Guidelines for Overseas Aid Programmes in Ethiopia - A self-evaluative Statement on Approaches and Strategies", the then resident representative pointed out the following features of the development of the country programme which are as relevant today as they were when the paper was written. These are:

1. REDD BARNA involvement (in Ethiopia) was not based on a broad assessment of criteria established to determine whether to go into a country or not. Furthermore, no paper is to be found exposing a thorough evaluation of the REDD BARNA strategy in Ethiopia.
2. There is also "no documentation to be found through the REDD BARNA work in Ethiopia exposing a thorough evaluation of the programme as it later developed".
3. The resident representative assumed (and the assumption agrees with our findings of the present situation) that very active individuals have pushed the development forward.
4. The Self-Evaluative Statement was in response to the need felt by the secretariat in Ethiopia to develop approaches and strategies. It was followed by the recommendation by the Resident Representative that "being the first of its kind to be written about REDD BARNA in Ethiopia, it should be followed up in the future with certain intervals, up-to-date, evaluate and reassess the work of the Organization in a broader context".

As a consequence of the lack of a general framework for the Ethiopia country programme developed over a period of time, there is a great variance in the style and content of the two urban and three rural projects that REDD BARNA is at present running. The differences are conditioned to a great extent by the personal approaches of the particular project managers in charge.

In the same paper referred to above, there is an attempt to generalize the major thrusts that should be common to all projects undertaken by REDD BARNA, keeping in mind the varying local situations. These are mentioned as being:

- a. Human resource development and self-help.
- b. Institutional development at the local level with broad based participation and institutional linkages with national, regional and international resources.
- c. Project planning and design appropriate to local resources, needs, traditions and government plans.

This is the closest that any document produced by REDD BARNA Ethiopia comes to a statement of approach. However, with the accumulated experience of the past four years since this was written, there is little evidence of an elaboration of the general statement of approach. The Team is of the opinion that REDD BARNA Ethiopia is in a position to make, as a result of the experiences in projects, clear operational guidelines on the following important issues:

- a. Selection of project sites.

- b. Methodology for the identification of needs.
- c. People's participation in the Ethiopian context.

In the absence of a clear elaboration of policies based on the experiences of the projects, what emerges as statements of approach are pertinent to individual projects and not to the REDD BARNA Ethiopia country programme.

4.3 General statement of approach - Oslo Headquarters.

The document outlining the guidelines for REDD BARNA's Overseas Aid Programmes is sufficiently broad to allow for widely differing interpretations in the field. The role of the headquarters, therefore, is to ensure that key policy issues are explicitly elaborated to avoid misinterpretation and to achieve a measure of uniformity in the approach to work in the different country programmes.

The team is of the opinion that the following key concepts in the policy statement have not been sufficiently elaborated by headquarters, allowing interpretations to be circumstantial.

1. The model of development to be followed.

The REDD BARNA guidelines state that the key factor in development work is people, and enabling people to develop skills, understanding and involvement is a process that REDD BARNA would like to support. REDD BARNA's target is the poorest of the poor and children in poor communities.

This commendable policy has implications for their operational style. It means that REDD BARNA staff at field level must have conscious strategies to identify the poorest in the community and analyse with people the reasons for their poverty. A great deal of time and effort has to be put in to generate awareness in the target communities to help them to reach an understanding of their own situation. Furthermore, programmatic contents have to be developed in connection with these people and based on a perception of their needs. In addition, the people should be enabled to see the reasons for group solidarity with others in the same position and to create institutional structures to retain social organization based on class lines and common interests. People are, therefore, active participants in this process of awareness and decision-making and not passive recipients of programmes delivered to them on the assumption of what is good for them. The operational style for REDD BARNA programmes has, therefore, necessarily to be process oriented if the organization wishes to adhere to the commendable policy statements as enshrined in their guidelines.

The significance of an elaboration of this policy of working with people cannot be overstated since REDD BARNA is also susceptible to pressures which lead them to diverge from their policy statement. This pressure is being exerted by the expectations that REDD BARNA is expected to fulfill at home in Norway. The organization feels it has the obligation to its donors at home to show results. Operationally performance means tangible, identifiable results which are money consuming. In effect, REDD BARNA has to be able to explain to the donors the amount of money spent on programmes - the number of schools, clinics and water and irrigation projects built, houses and roads constructed. Unless greater efforts are made to educate the donors, the organization's performance is unlikely to be judged at home by the number of people's organizations they have helped to form, how these organizations function and are able to retain the power they have acquired through group formation, how these groups have acted in demanding access to services and facilities.

Therefore, REDD BARNA is being pushed, knowingly and unknowingly, into operational styles which

spend money. The implication is that programmes tend to become large and infrastructural, provide inputs and require technical expertise. In such programmes the decision-making is complex and of a technical nature and has to be left to professionals who are trained to handle these, thereby leaving out of this process, the people. The people become recipients of services and infrastructure - passive and powerless.

This operational style generates competition among the recipients for services and "goodies" which they can individually enjoy, and thereby denigrates collective action. People's participation in this operational style is generally reduced to the farcical tokenism of providing labour on infrastructural development programmes.

The team concludes that unless REDD BARNA is in a position to elaborate sufficiently on the operational style it is committed to following, it will be reduced to a position of playing lip-service to its commendable policy statements on people's participation.

2. Policy on social transformation.

The need to elaborate policy on the specific goals of social transformation that REDD BARNA is working to achieve follows from the above.

The ambition to assist the poorest in a stratified society by expanding their resource base, increasing their self-esteem and capacity to solve their own problems through cooperative efforts by necessity implies changes in power relations in favour of the poor in the community. Therefore, REDD BARNA must elaborate its policy statements to embrace the concept of power relations and measures to contend with it.

3. The REDD BARNA policy statement considers that the most effective way of reaching children is through their families. It is assumed that the development of the family will ultimately result in a better situation for the child. This understanding ignores the fact that the situation of most children is dependent on the mother. It is the mother's income and resources that are most directly translated into consumption for the family. This has implications for operations because in the intra-family situation in most societies, and specially the traditional ones, women are inferior and they may not have any control over and access to resources, information and decision-making. Thus, an overall development programme for the family does not necessarily entail distribution within the family unless women are consciously included in the process.

This fundamental lacuna in the conceptual framework has resulted in a general lack of consideration for gender related issues in development in the projects at country level.

Management of policy.

1) At the risk of seeming repetitive it must be re-emphasized that unless REDD BARNA has an explicit policy on the key concepts mentioned above, the organisation is likely to be led away from its policy by the compulsions of having to spend money. It will ultimately mean being in a position of managing only the disbursement of funds. The Team feels that under the circumstances the organisation will be operating in a policy vacuum, signs of which are already apparent.

2) Given explicit policies the REDD BARNA headquarters will be in a better position to insist on the development of context specific operational guidelines at country programme level. These will provide the basis for the selection of projects, design, monitoring and staff training. The context specific operational guidelines will provide a common framework for reference at all levels - the Headquarters, the Resident

Representatives and project staff level. The ambiguity that exists at present at the country programme level and at headquarters with regard to the implementation of policy can best be reduced by this management of policy.

3) The management of policy based on the above is likely to have a firmer basis than the present system which is dependent on the individual capacity of the Resident Representative to interpret the philosophy. It is purely circumstantial and the great variations between country programmes in the interpretations of key concepts of the policy is indicative of a lack of management.

4) At present, monitoring in the absence of context specific operational guidelines, is primarily quantitative and financial. The management of policy necessarily implies that the context of monitoring must be geared to evaluating how policy is implemented in the field.

5) If the organization has firm policies on key concepts such as people's participation, social transformation and gender relations, it has to be able to socialize its key personnel to understand it and put it into practise. Therefore, training of staff, specially the Resident Representatives, is crucial. At present the training efforts have not been sufficiently deliberate, probably because of the existing policy vacuum.

5. APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION

5.1 Distributive ambitions

5.1.1 Criteria and conclusions - Sri Lanka

The distributive ambitions of REDD BARNA Sri Lanka have been observed and evaluated in the following two respects:

- (i) Overall poverty orientation as reflected in the selection and design of activities taking the distributive mechanism in the society into account.
- (ii) Efforts to take intra-family distributive patterns into account, which, due to the inequalities between the genders tend to deprive women and thereby children of equal benefits from development activities.

The conclusions drawn by the Team suggest that REDD BARNA Sri Lanka generally has been successful in orienting its projects and activities to poor and underprivileged sections of urban and rural communities. This orientation has been more pronounced during the last couple of years as a result of modifications in the overall approach.

REDD BARNA Sri Lanka has been less successful in taking intra-family distributive patterns into account. This seems to stem from an underestimation of the significance of prevailing inequalities between men and women and the implications for children which follow thereof.

Project level observations

REDD BARNA Sri Lanka developed specific criteria for the selection in order to ensure that poor and landless people were chosen. As the REDD BARNA settlement projects are part of the Government settlement programmes, the formal selection is a matter for Government authorities. In these processes political interference plays a significant role, and political patronage influences the selection of candidates. As a result of a firm stand on operational criteria, REDD BARNA Sri Lanka was notably successful in influencing the final selection.

In the Pathanegama settlement project only some 10% of the settlers would not have been eligible according to REDD BARNA criteria, but were manipulated into the scheme. In Warakanda where the political influence was stronger, given the proximity of the land to Matale town, the figure is estimated to be somewhat higher. In the urban slum projects geographic areas rather than individuals were selected. The Team could not establish whether the selection of areas, which is made in cooperation with the Urban Development Authority, was made on the basis of an evaluative assessment of alternatives. In the case of Aluth Mawatta and Abdul Hameed street it seems as if the criterion on poverty orientation was satisfied.

In the case of Vestwyke this is more questionable. The settlers in this area have spent an average of Rs 30-35,000 on house construction. REDD BARNA Sri Lanka housing loans amount to Rs 13,000. The balance has been raised by the settlers themselves. Largely, this is explained by the fact that at least someone from each of 40-50% of the families in Vestwyke has worked in the Middle East and brought home savings. Lack of access to titles to land rather than money seems to have kept a majority of this population in slum dwellings.

Perhaps most reassuring for the future is the fact that REDD BARNA Sri Lanka staff at all levels, albeit to a varying degree, are aware of the characteristics of a stratified society and do see the need for distinguishing a target group. In operational terms this has meant, among other, that socio-economic surveys are undertaken of communities and four levels of income are identified. This classification is then used, although not always consistently, to select target groups for intervention. In this way pilot families had been selected in the Laggala Community Development Programme. On the other hand, when pilot farmers were selected for up-land agricultural development in the same programme the classification was only partly used.

The Team found a general lack of recognition of the distributive effects following from inequalities in a family. Project activities are based on the questionable assumption that what is good for the family is equally good for all in the family. As "family" generally comes to mean the male head of the family, programmes and activities generally have a clear male basis. In particular, the activities do not reflect the significant role women play as producers. By implication rather than by intention, activities related to income generation, including credit and agriculture, were mainly directed to men.

Although it is legally possible to give joint title deeds to husband and wife, land and house deeds were given mostly to men.

Finally, in the vocational training programmes in all projects boys are trained in vocations with a strong market demand like carpentry and masonry, whereas the training of girls followed highly traditional lines in vocations and crafts with highly dubious market potentials like lace, macrame weaving and flower making.

5.1.2 Criteria and conclusions

The distributive ambitions of REDD BARNA Ethiopia have been observed and evaluated in the following two respects:

- (i) Overall poverty orientation as reflected in the selection and design of activities.
- (ii) Efforts to take intra-family distributive patterns into account, which, due to the inequalities between the genders tend to deprive women and thereby children of equal benefits from development activities.

The team has concluded that the REDD BARNA Ethiopia programme has a strong poverty orientation.

In the slum development projects conscious and successful efforts were made to counter intra-family inequalities.

In the Bale Gadula rural development project no conscious efforts had been made to establish whether intra-family distribution was an issue.

However, also within a poor community there are social and economic disparities. In cooperation with local level institutions the project managements in the three projects visited by the Team have gone one step further to identify the poorest and most deprived in the communities and priority has been given to their needs.

In Bale Gadula rural development project criteria for identifying the very poorest and most needy in the settlements were developed for the distribution of oxen and seed as well as for tractor ploughing of virgin land.

Similarly, in the slum projects a thorough analysis family by family provided the basis for selecting the very poor and socially deprived community members for different development activities. In addition, conscious efforts have been made to address the problems of poor and exploited women. In Kabelle 13, women dependent upon liquor vending and postition were selected for vocational training. In Kabelle 41, women in similar circumstances were brought into income generating activities like food processing and garment making.

5.2 Economic Transformation

5.2.1 Criteria and conclusions Sri Lanka

The criteria on which the performance in terms of economic transformation have been assessed are:

- a. Provision/development of productive assets
- b. Value added through processing and marketing
- c. Skill acquirement for agricultural development
- d. Skill acquirement and establishment of non-agricultural sources of income.

A general conclusion, particularly for the settlement projects is that there is an imbalance between income generating activities and other activities (like housing), which indebt the participants beyond their repayment capacity. As a result, most credit schemes operated by REDD BARNA Sri Lanka are in great difficulty with mounting arrears.

Economic transformation has been successful in the rural settlement projects where substantial productive assets have been provided. In the urban settlement projects activities related to economic transformation have been insignificant in relation to the needs, particularly for women. Furthermore, the viability of some of the activities is doubtful.

It seems that a clearer policy on economic transformation is needed in community development projects.

Project level observations.

Provision and development of productive assets.

In Pathanegama settlement project 85 farm families have been provided with 2 acres of cardamom land and 1/2 acre for a homestead each. On the basis of a food for work programme the settlers have developed the land by undertaking soil conservation measures and constructing trails. The crop has been established on a credit basis. The scheme is very successful and there are reasons to expect farm income from cardamom to exceed what farmers generally can gain in the area.

However, it should be noted, that the investment per family in this settlement (including housing, but excluding REDD BARNA Sri Lanka overheads) is in the order of 20.000 N.Kr. This is very high.

In the Warakanda settlement project 150 farm families have been provided with 1/2 acre of coconut land and given assistance to develop minor export crops intercropped with the coconut trees. In what is referred to as the new settlement these activities have been successful. The coconut trees, which had been neglected for long, are rehabilitated and are coming into bearing. Around 50% of the farmers have developed minor export crops. Although each production unit will be small, they have good prospects to become viable. However, the proximity to Matale town eventually may prove to be a threat to the idea of providing resourceless families with a lasting source of income. Land value is high and increasing and there may be a strong temptation for still very poor people to sell off their land for what seems to be a staggering amount of money. Land alienation has already reached notable levels in what is called the old settlement (covered by the expanded project).

In the Laggala community development project trials are made to assist farmers to develop new up-land production units concentrating on minor export crops, bananas, papaya, cassava, etc. Whereas this activity has met with initial success, it raises several questions. In the area many farmers cultivate paddy land as tenants (often complemented with shifting cultivation). Although there are laws stipulating tenancy conditions, the tenants in the project area are severely exploited. The crop is shared on a 50-50 basis rather than the stipulated 75-25, and costs for inputs which should be borne by the landlords, are paid by the tenants. One way of improving the incomes of the tenants could have been to address this problem. REDD BARNA Sri Lanka has not done that, but rather looked for an alternative, which eventually became up-land cultivation development. As exploitation of tenants is a nationwide phenomenon and as development of new land seldom is feasible, it seems necessary for REDD BARNA Sri Lanka to have a clear stand on this matter as part of a community development policy or model. This did not seem to be the case.

Furthermore, although the up-land production units were successful from a technical point of view, the question of marketing was hardly well answered. Whereas the limited output from a few pilot farms could be placed on local markets, it is less clear how substantial output from an activity of any significance involving many farmers could be marketed in view of very large scale and rapid developments on the same crops on other and better placed parts of the island. This seems to point to the need for a clearer policy which would include such aspects as crop selection and marketing.

Processing and marketing

In the Pathanegama project the cardamom operation has been fully integrated, covering processing and marketing. Marketing is done directly to the Export Marketing Board eliminating middlemen. These arrangements have contributed to a high quality of production giving the Laggla producers among the best prices for cardamom on the island.

Skill acquirement for agricultural development

In the three rural projects visited REDD BARNA Sri Lanka relied partly on their own technical staff for agricultural development, including extension and training. The success of the cardamom development is to a high degree the result of continued work by one highly competent technician over an extended period of six years. Similarly, the agricultural activities in the two other projects are characterized by high professional standards to the benefit of the farmers.

In the Pathanegama settlement project, office and store facilities have been placed to the disposal of the Ministry of Agriculture, which will establish an extension office to serve the settlement and nearby villages.

A less satisfying observation is that skill aquirement in agriculture has primarily affected men, although women provide nearly half of the labour.

Skill aquirement and establishment of non-agricultural sources of income.

An important observation is that the activities to develop sources of income outside agriculture are insignificant in view of the needs, particularly for women. The activities are of two major types: vocational training and provision of credit for cottage industry activities, crafts, trade etc.

In the Vystwyke slum project two batches of girls, 6 and 15 in number, had been trained in sewing and 16 had been trained in flower making. Not only is the number small, but the selection of vocations is highly questionable. No effort had been made to establish the demand for such skills. Yet, it is known that hundreds of similar programs giving the same skills are run on the island. In the Laggala community development project, a rather impressive number of 250 girls had been given sewing training. However, it gives reasons for thought that only 10 of them were producing anything for the market.

In the Warakanda settlement project 11 boys had been trained in carpentry in a first batch and 8 were trained in a second batch. In the same programme 3 girls were trained in papadam making, 1 in jopstick making and 35 in sewing. The experience in Warakanda was that the boys trained in carpentry (and masonry) had a ready market, whereas the girls would find difficulties.

REDD BARNA Sri Lanka operates major credit schemes in its programme. However, only a small portion of the credit goes to income generating activities outside agriculture. One problem seems to be that often the credit offer is the only assistance given to a loanee, who wants to establish an income generating venture.

The Credit programmes

For the record, some of the problems with the credit programmes should be mentioned, although REDD BARNA Sri Lanka is fully aware of them and efforts are made to review the entire credit policy, or rather to formulate such a policy.

The credit schemes are operated in a highly unprofessional way in all aspects. A serious weakness seems to be the absence of an assessment of the loanees' repayment capacity. Rather, the project decides upon certain components like housing and it pushes, with good intensions, participants into heavy indebtedness. In addition to social components like housing provided on a loan basis, participants in rural settlement projects have had to shoulder loans for agricultural development. Furthermore, subsistence allowances are repayable. The resulting total debt has gone far beyond the repayment capacity in most cases.

Knowing this, project managements have not drawn up repayment schedules for long- and medium-term loans. Loanees have been requested to pay as and when they can. The result has been a total demoralisation of repayment responsibility. Futhermore, monitoring of repayment performance becomes impossible. Without a fixed repayment schedule amounts due are undefined and arrears lose their meaning. As it stands, it is hard to see how REDD BARNA ever will be able to recover very substantial parts of loans outstanding. Some figures may indicate the problems. The accumulated amount of long-term loans given at the end of 1984 in 12 projects was Rs. 9.6 million, repayable over fifteen years. So far, Rs. 175,000 have been recovered. If the loans were repayed in 15 equal instalments, the amount falling due annually would be Rs. 630,000. The situation on medium-term loans (5 years) is even more alarming. Loans to the tune of Rs. 1.4 million in sixteen projects have been issued, and no more than Rs. 73,000 have been collected.

5.2.2 Criteria and conclusions - Ethiopia

The criteria on which performance in terms of economic transformation has been assessed are:

- (i) Production/development of productive assets.
- (ii) Value added through processing and marketing
- (iii) Skill aquirement for agricultural development
- (iv) Skill aquirement and establishment of non-agricultural sources of income.

In the Bale Gadula rural development project REDD BARNA has been successful in providing productive assets, which have notably contributed to the upliftment of the material standard of the community.

Despite some innovative activities in the slum projects, the scale of different income generating activities is so limited that their impact will be negligible in relation to the needs of the communities.

Project level observations.

In the Bale Gadula rural development project oxen, seed and ploughs have been distributed on a credit basis and virgin land has been ploughed by tractor in response to a desperate need to increase food production. The activities are well conceived and they have had the intended effect according to the beneficiaries. In designing the activities, the project has limited the provision of inputs, giving a minimum production base from which the production cooperatives and individual farmers can expand. The rationale for this was to avoid creating dependence.

Whereas the Team acknowledges the significance of this principle, the question can still be raised, whether further efforts to assist the farmers should have been considered in order to reach a subsistence level of production. It is hard to see that the provision of two oxen rather than one, and ploughs for all as a declared one time effort, would have created dependence. On the same argument, the project could have considered to prepare additional land. Furthermore, a case could have been made to give these inputs in parts or all on a grant basis rather than on a credit basis.

In the Kebelle 41 slum project a grain mill, a food processing unit and a garment making unit have been established. Some fifty persons have found employment in these activities. Whereas the activities are technically successful, they contribute only marginally to solving the pressing problem of low incomes of persons constituting the labour force in the Kebelle. Furthermore, the future of the garment manufacturing unit, in particular, is in doubt.

In the Kebelle 13 slum project no productive assets, except for a bakery, have been established. This is an innovative activity with considerable potential. It is a communal bakery to be used for baking the Ethiopian staple food, injera bread. If replicated in considerable numbers in the Kebelle, this activity can have widespread and lasting benefits by reducing family expences on energy by replacing wood.

Skill aquirement for agricultural development.

In the Bale Gadula rural development project an agricultural research programme has been started. The programme covers trials on varieties, seed, rates, planting time, weeding intervals, etc.

At this stage, no attempts are made to introduce any innovations to the farmers. In a situation where food

production falls below domestic needs, the strategy is to assist farmers to produce as much as they can on the basis of the technology and the husbandry practices they know. In the meantime, the research activities are expected to provide a solid technical basis for the introduction of changes at a stage when farmers are less vulnerable and consequently more willing to consider innovations. The Team strongly supports this approach.

Skill aquirement for non-agricultural income generation.

In order to increase the potential for income generation vocational training programmes are run in both slum projects. This is well and good, but the limited scale of these programmes reduces their value. In Kebelle 13 some 10 girls have been trained in sewing, 30 are beeing trained as maids and 10 youths are trained in carpentry.

In Kebelle 41, 17 youths were trained in carpentry and masonry in 1984 and 10 are being trained in 1985. Except for carpenters and masons the market prospects for the other vocations are unclear.

5.3 Social Transformation

5.3.1 Criteria and conclusions - Sri Lanka

For the purposes of evaluation the Team has elaborated the following dimensions of social transformation.

- a. A change in power relations within a community in favour of the poor and underprivileged.
- b. Creating unity of poor people along class lines and around common interests which affects their access to power.
- c. Breaking the isolation and promoting cooperative and collaborative forms of social organization and action.
- d. Changing gender relations within the family with a view to creating equal access for both male and female members to resources, information, legal assistance, decision-making and organisation.
- e. Changing cultural norms relating to health behaviour, nutrition practices, education, skill attainment with a view to improving the quality of life of the members of the community.

The Team is of the opinion that it is by implication rather than by design that REDD BARNA Sri Lanka has, through their programmes sought to change power relations in favour of the poor and underprivileged.

There have been commendable efforts in projects visited to unite poor people around common interests. However, there is insufficient effort to work with women around their common interests.

The efforts to institutionalize cooperative and collaborative relationships have not been sufficiently deliberate.

REDD BARNA Sri Lanka does not seem to have, as evidenced in the projects visited, a conscious strategy to change gender relations in the family. This has serious implications for women's situation and ultimately for the children, since women are pimarily responsible for offspring.

REDD BARNA Sri Lanka has made contributions to improving health, education and housing in the communities in which they are working.

Project level observations

Change of power relations

The settlement projects, by their very design, help to change power relations in favour of the poor and assetless. This is because the populations served through the settlement programmes in Laggala and Warakanda were assetless people before their involvement in the project. Their participation in the project helped them to acquire homestead and productive land.

REDD BARNA has, however, used deliberate strategies to bring government agencies into the settlement to serve the community. The Laggala project buildings will be handed over to the Agricultural Inputs Corporation and Agricultural Extension Service department, ensuring that these government departments have to take note of the population in the settlement. As such, this has been a way to empower poor people.

It is, however, in the community development programmes in Laggala that REDD BARNA has had to contend with the problem of an unequal distribution of power in a stratified society, resulting in the oppression of the poor. The recently adopted strategy to identify the "poor" and "poorest" families in the villages as the target group is an indication of a conscious attempt to change power relations. It is assumed that it is done with the understanding that unless conscious efforts are made in a stratified society to reach out to this target group, the benefits of development programmes are coopted by the more influential and powerful members of the village community.

The activities with target groups, however, display the fundamental weakness of the social transformation strategy to change power relations. Whereas the poverty of the target groups is inextricably bound up with land relations and an exploitative tenancy system, the REDD BARNA strategy for organisation has evaded this issue. Instead, it has tried to provide an alternative to these groups to increase their incomes by concentrating in upland cultivation. This is feasible up to the point where organizational work is on a small scale and there is land available. It is unlikely to be a viable strategy when these conditions do not exist. REDD BARNA, in the community development projects, is caught in the dilemma arising from not having developed the operational implications of their analysis of the Sri Lankan society.

Unity of poor people along class lines and around common interests

The project experiences indicate that REDD BARNA staff has attempted to build unity of poor people along class lines and around common interests. As for example, in the Laggala settlement, where the settlers are dependent on cardamom plantations as a means of livelihood, the project has helped to bring them together in marketing this product.

Similarly, in the community development project in Laggala, one of the successful endeavours to enhance the unity of poor people and thus increase their access to power has been the attempt to break down the barter system of transactions which were unfavourable for the poor and which resulted in their indebtedness to the merchants and landowners of the area.

Another commendable effort in creating the unity of poor people is seen in the endeavour in the community development project at Laggala to enable poor peasants to come together and jointly market their cash crops. Earlier, as individuals, these poor peasants were exploited by the market system and by the local merchants who bought from individuals at low prices.

Despite these conscious efforts to promote the unity of poor people along class lines and around common interests, there are a number of instances where more effort to undertake this process could have been put

in. More generally, in the projects we visited, there has been very little concerted attempts to identify along with women their common interests and those which would benefit them as an underprivileged group. Although the settlement programme at Laggala has much to commend it, the insufficient efforts shown in trying to make the mothers' committee work was surprising. The objective of the mothers' committee is to organize services for their children. Generally, this implies the running of a nutrition programme for the children. The food materials are supplied by the government. Since the government stocks are irregular, the activity around this programme has degenerated. There has not been much attempt to revive interest in the mothers' group by the staff.

Cooperative and collaborative forms of social organisation

In all the projects we visited we found that this is an aspect of work that has been generally neglected. In order to empower poor people it is necessary to promote cooperative and collaborative relationships and help to build institutions which will enable powerless people to retain forms of organization built on group strength. The only significant effort was the attempt to build a society of the settlers at the Laggala settlement. This Society was created through a process of trial and error in which many forms of organization had earlier failed. The present system of organization of the Society was built on a representative model wherein a group of ten families elect a representative to the Board of Management.

In the Alumawatha urban settlement a Community Development Society was formed of the residents with REDD BARNA help. This Society initially played a useful role in the selection and planning of house plots for the housing scheme. In 1982 the Society was broken up as a result of the feuds ensuing from attempted cooption of the Society by the powerful elite. The residents of the settlement have since reconstituted a new Society whose main function is to attend to the maintenance of civic amenities and to liaise with government departments to obtain facilities for the residents. It was not clear, however, whether the present composition of the Society is such that it can withstand the pressures from elements which earlier did and still do control the economy of the residents. The community development Coordinator for Alumawatha settlement claimed that the Society has played an important role in protecting the life and property of residents at the time of the 1983 communal riots in Colombo. Since the settlement has both Tamil and Sinhalese residents, this effort was a significant one.

Change of gender relations within the family with a view to creating equal access of both male and female members to resources, information, legal assistance, decision-making and organization.

The observation from the project visits indicate that REDD BARNA as an organization has not consciously worked towards the change of power relations within the family. There is no conscious strategy of social transformation to improve women's access to resources, information and organization. As a result of the lack of such a strategy, women, who in the Sri Lankan cultural and social context are considered inferior, have not been included in the development process.

It is the observation of the Team that some of the programmes may in fact work to the detriment of women's position in society. As for example, it was noticed that, in general, title deeds of ownership for houses and land in all the settlements we visited, both rural and urban, were usually in the names of the male heads of households. (In the absence of a male head of household, the female had the title deed). This implies that in the event of a breakdown in the family, which in the circumstances is not unfamiliar, the woman would be deprived of a home. This observation was a very poignant one in the Vystwyke Gardens Urban settlement project where most of the women have been on service contracts in the Middle-East countries. The money they have earned has generally been used to improve the house, and yet they have no right to ownership.

In the Laggala settlement the Team found that most women of the household are not aware of the loans their families have incurred for housing and agriculture. They were also unaware about the incomes that had been received from the sale of cardamom. This is despite the fact that women participate equally in the family labour on the cardamom and rice fields and have also contributed much of the labour for the building of houses. The settlers have to rely on regular, daily income by doing wage labour outside the settlement, and it is generally the women of the family who contribute this income.

Despite this, they are considered by the project staff, as also by their menfolk, to be primarily housewives and, therefore, are not included in the decision-making regarding important matters like income and indebtedness. We also found that although Laggala settlement now has a Society which looks after their affairs, women were generally uninformed about the proceedings of the Board meetings of the Society where important decisions, which affect their lives as settlers, is taken.

In discussions with the men of the settlement and the Board members we realized that the representatives of the groups who are elected to the board of management generally consider the male heads of the household to be the member of the group. As a result, they report to the men about the proceedings in the Board meetings. The men had never considered the need to include the female members of the household in the group meetings (unless, of course, the male member happened to be absent at the time of the meetings).

In the projects visited, the Team did not find any functioning women's committee. The women's committee at Laggala settlement project had discontinued function because there were no activities.

Change of cultural norms relating to health behaviour, nutrition practices, education, skill attainment, housing, education, with a view to improving the quality of life of all members of the community.

In the projects visited it was observed that REDD BARNA staff have consciously attempted to inculcate preventive health practices in the communities in which they are working. A significant effort has been in educating people to take advantage of the government health services. Thus the Team found a high degree of immunisation among the under-five population in all the projects visited. Most pregnant mothers seek ante-natal care in nearby government clinics. In the community development project in Laggala we found that there is a concerted attempt by the REDD BARNA staff to group mothers who have malnourished children and initiate better nutrition practises based on locally available food materials.

In the field of education REDD BARNA staff has attempted not to duplicate the services that already exist, but to creatively supplement those aspects of educational help that are lacking in the formal system. REDD BARNA has built schools in the settlements. However, in the urban settlements where the problem of drop-outism from the formal system is high, REDD BARNA staff have organized after school hours study classes for the children. These study classes also teach children handicraft and other creative activities which are not part of the curriculum in the formal schools. In the community development project in Laggala, the community development coordinator is attempting to use the religious institutions which operate Sunday schools for the children, to teach health and hygiene.

The pre-schools run by REDD BARNA in the city project and also at Warakanda settlement are of a high quality. However, REDD BARNA attempts to run pre schools through the mothers' committees have not met with equal success. This again relates to the problem of not having a strategy for organising women.

Housing has been a very important component in the REDD BARNA settlement programme. As such this may be said to have improved the quality of life of people who otherwise would never have been able to afford proper housing. A significant aspect of new housing is the self-esteem that it has provided to the owners.

In the urban settlements the changes are dramatic. People were earlier condemned to live in slum environments with consequent social and cultural problems. In the Aluthmawatha urban settlement, for example, where the majority of the population is of Tamil origin and were brought to Colombo as labourers and porters on the dock, the peoples' self-esteem is low. They are economically deprived and prey to the powerful elements in the community. The REDD BARNA programme, and especially housing, has enabled these people to look at themselves as a community worthy of human respect. The housing has provided a better physical and thereby a more human environment.

5.3.2 Criteria and conclusions - Ethiopia

For the purposes of evaluation the Team has elaborated the following dimensions of social transformation.

- a. A change in power relations within a community in favour of the poor and underprivileged.
- b. Creating unity of poor people along class lines and around common interests which affects their access to power.
- c. Breaking the isolation and promoting cooperative and collaborative forms of social organization and action.
- d. Changing gender relations within the family with a view to creating equal access for both male and female members to resources, information, legal assistance, decision-making and organisation.
- e. Changing cultural norms relating to health behaviour, nutrition practices, education, skill attainment with a view to improving the quality of life of the members of the community.

The Team is of the opinion that with regard to the change of power relations as a prerequisite of social change, REDD BARNA Ethiopia operates in a very special context where this change has been brought about by the basic structural reforms instituted through the revolution. However, as an NGO, REDD BARNA has in its rural programme helped the community to become aware of the priorities for development aid and has made a significant contribution to build on the opportunity provided by changed power relations within the community.

REDD BARNA Ethiopia is also operating in a context where there has been a large scale mobilisation of people along class lines and around common interests. The projects have tried to work through these social formations.

Forms of social organisation manifesting cooperative and collaborative relationships have been developed in the light of the conscious strategies used to promote the effectiveness of these people's organisations. It is the finding of the Team that in the urban projects this strategy has been consciously used and it has helped enhance the organisational capabilities of the people's organisations. In the rural programme, however, the social transformation strategies have not consciously incorporated methods to promote the effectiveness of people's institutions.

The choice of programmes in the urban community development projects displays a positive bias to promote women's access to resources and information. In the rural project, however, the opportunity provided by the organized strength of women in associations has not been recognised or exploited.

The health and nutrition programme in Kebelle 41 is comprehensive in nature and has served as a model for the Municipal Council of Addis Ababa. However, the experiences acquired in this programme have not been utilized or replicated in the second urban development programme in Addis Ababa, or in the rural development project in Bale Gadula.

REDD BARNA Ethiopia does not have a comprehensive policy regarding urban housing. Their inability

to develop such a policy in collaboration with the people has resulted in a deterioration of the relationship between the Organization and the community groups.

The social transformation strategies in the urban programmes have taken cognizance of a major urban problem, namely delinquency, and has tried to build creative programmes to prevent it.

Project level observations.

Change of power relations within the community in favour of the poor and underprivileged.

In Ethiopia, REDD BARNA works in a very special context. The far reaching structural reforms as a result of the revolution has brought about a decisive and permanent change of power relations within the community. This has determined the choice of target populations for development programmes, and also the content. Consequently, REDD BARNA as a non-governmental organisation, does not face similar difficulties as in a stratified society in helping to change power relations.

Given this background REDD BARNA Ethiopia has had the opportunity to build on the foundations of a changed power relation in the community. The project experiences in Bale Gadula REDD BARNA programme clearly illustrates this. Here, special efforts have been made to identify and reach out to assetless people when distributing oxen and ploughs. In undertaking this exercise jointly with the peasants' association, REDD BARNA has made a significant contribution in helping the peoples' decision-making organisation to set priorities for aid.

Create unity of poor people along class lines and around common interests which affect their access to power.

Here again, REDD BARNA Ethiopia is operating in a special context. After the revolution there has been a large-scale mobilisation of people, and unity of poor people built along class lines and around common interests. The peasants' associations are examples of this formation.

Cooperative and collaborative forms of social organisation

Forms of social organisation manifesting cooperative and collaborative relationships exist in the Ethiopian situation. The REDD BARNA programmes have used these structures and also in some instances sought to develop them. Therefore, an assessment of the REDD BARNA efforts has to be seen in the light of the conscious strategies used to promote the effectiveness of the existing peoples' organisation.

In the two urban community development programmes, namely Kebelle 41 and 13, interesting experiments have been undertaken to enhance the organizational capability of the Kebelle administrations.

Annexure I represents an organisation chart of the Kebelle administration structure. Some Kebelle administrations in the major cities have developed their organisation to the level of zone coordinators. In Kebelle 41, at first, and later in Kebelle 13, it was found that the zone, representing 100 households, was too large a unit to provide sufficiently close communication channels between the people and their representatives.

Therefore, the concept of developing neighbourhood groups, bringing together 10 to 15 houses into one unit, was developed by the REDD BARNA project staff in collaboration with the Kebelle administrations. Each neighbourhood group selects a neighbourhood representative. In Kebelle 41 every five neighbour-

hood groups select a zonal representative. This has facilitated filtration of decision-making and communication between every household and the Kebele administration. The development programmes of REDD BARNA have involved the neighbourhood groups and representatives to enlist the participation of every household in assessing problems, identifying target families and in programme implementation.

Furthermore, in Kebele 41 an educational process has been consciously undertaken, along with the Kebele administration, to train every level of peoples' representatives in the REDD BARNA philosophy. The REDD BARNA project staff in Kebele 41 have developed, in collaboration with the Kebele administration, guidelines outlining the responsibilities of the peoples' representatives and those of the REDD BARNA staff.

In addition, REDD BARNA project staff have developed peoples' committees around community services provided by the programme. In Kebele 41 and 13, the community showers built by REDD BARNA are administered by the shower committees. In Kebele 13 the injera baking unit is also controlled by a committee of Kebele residents set up for this purpose.

In the Rural Development Programme in Bale Gadula the social transformation strategy has not been able to incorporate conscious methods to promote the effectiveness of existing peoples' organisations. The potential of women's associations of Gadula and Doreni villages and the Service Cooperative of Bale valley has not been fully exploited as a result. The Womens' associations have brought about dramatic changes in the self-image of the women in this remote valley. Whereas before, women were beasts of burden and passive slaves of their men, today, as a result of the organizational efforts of the women's association, they are an organized group able to articulate their problems, and striving to find their place in the new society which promises them equal rights.

Literacy classes organized by the government have enabled them to acquire skills which they now use effectively. Book-keeping, correspondance, files on each member are meticulously maintained by ordinary women in the village who combine their responsibilities with their heavy burden of domestic and economic chores. The human potential that has been unearthed has hardly been explored or guided by the REDD BARNA rural development programme in Bale Gadula. In Gadula village the project has invested in horticultural crops on land collectively owned by the Women's association. However, there has been little or no concerted effort to develop through this programme or any other, the women's organizational or managerial capability. Similarly, in Doreni village, where the water supply project has primarily benefited women (and which the Women's Association termed as a dream come true), there has been little effort to link up the running and maintenance of the water points voluntarily. They were firm in the opinion that the association could raise some money for the future running and maintenance of the water supply, because it was so important for them. Unfortunately, this proposition has never been discussed by the project managers with the women's association for reasons which can only be interpreted as a male inability to give recognition and importance to the power of women organized in associations.

The Service Cooperative of Bale Gadula valley, which services three of the four villages of the project area was constituted in 1981. In the initial stages of its existence the Cooperative serviced one village only. It has recently expanded to cater to the needs of three villages. The Cooperative had a very small working capital because of its limited membership. REDD BARNA has helped the Cooperative financially by providing the membership fee of the other two villages as a loan. In addition, the Cooperative will now be responsible for collecting and recycling the loans given by REDD BARNA to farmers in the rural development programme. This includes seeds, oxen and heifers. Inevitably, this sudden expansion of capital will entail managerial problems.

The role of REDD BARNA in the development of this institution, other than providing material assets in terms of buildings and finances, is unclear.

Change of gender relations within the family with a view to creating equal access of both men and women to resources, information, legal assistance, decision-making and organization.

The choice of programmes in the urban community development programmes displays a positive, female bias. The health and nutrition programmes in Kebele 41 are aimed at mothers and children. This has been followed up with a concerted attempt to enable women with chronically malnourished children to attain skills and an occupation which makes them economically self-reliant to provide for their children. In doing so, the Kebele 41 project managers have recognized an important truism, that income of mothers, as opposed to that of the men, is translated directly into providing food for the children.

In Kebele 13 the vocational training programmes have primarily been directed at women. This has resulted from a pragmatic analysis of the major problem of the Kebele population which is that it is populated by a disproportionately high number of women-headed households with children. These women, most often deserted by their menfolk, with no occupational skills have had to survive by vending liqueur or by prostitution. Although the employment potential of occupational skills now being taught to these women through the REDD BARNA programme can be questioned in the long run, the social transformation strategy based on an analysis of the existing reality is commendable.

In the rural development programme at Bale Gadula this emphasis on providing equal access for women is lacking. It has been assumed that by helping subsistence farmers to produce enough for home consumption, there will be a more equitable distribution in the intra-family situation. Experiences all over the world discount this assumption. (The team faced an interesting problem which is indicative of what can happen if women are not consciously, through programmes, provided equal access to resources. We met a woman, the only potter in the village. Her husband had remarried and she and her child were thrown out. While the peasants' association and women's association were arbitrating on her behalf, this woman, who now has no right over her husband's land, cattle or the agricultural produce, was dependent on charitable collections by the members of the Women's association to feed her child).

Change of cultural norms relating to health behaviour, nutrition practises, education, housing.

The well-designed and comprehensive health care programme in Kebele 41 urban community development project is a conscious attempt by the REDD BARNA Ethiopia programme to create an impact on the health behaviour and nutrition of this poor urban community. The health care programme, as designed in this Kebele, has all the components one would expect from a community health care model. Firstly, it stresses prevention and concentrates on immunisation of under-five children, ante-natal, intra-natal and post-natal care and nutrition advice and training. Secondly, in its delivery it uses para-professionals and people from the community. Thirdly, environmental sanitation which includes building of latrines, showers and garbage disposal units and health education has been an integral part of the strategy for health care. In fact, the health strategy has been so well planned and implemented that it has served as a model for the Municipal Council. The first Health Post and Community Health agents programme in urban areas was sanctioned by the government in Kebele 41. The vaccination coverage of under-five children has reached the 100 percent mark and the health programme is in a position to outreach this service to the neighbouring Kebeles.

Given this experience in one urban development project run by REDD BARNA Ethiopia, the Team was at a loss to understand why it was not replicated in the new urban development project undertaken by the Organization in Kebele 13.

At the rural project at Bale Gadula the health programme has a much less comprehensive coverage. Although the project has built a Health Post and clinic (the latter is yet to be inaugurated) and uses para-professionals such as a Community Health Agent, a Health Assistant and Traditional Birth Attendant (all

trained by the government), at present there is little health work done except to dispense medicines for primary ailments. The team approach to health delivery has not been consciously developed and the project managers seem to be satisfied that they have built the infrastructure (in terms of buildings) which can now be handed over to the government.

Little attention has been paid to making the community health care programme work. Since there is precedence and professional competence within the Organization in Kebele 41 of a comprehensive community health care programme, it is incomprehensible why this professional competence could not be utilized for the health work in Bale Gadula valley.

The objective of the housing programme in the urban community development programmes was difficult to comprehend. One of the major problems of the people in these two urban communities, where REDD BARNA is operational, is the poor housing. And yet the Organization has no real plan as to the number of houses it is going to build or how they are going to go about it. The lack of policy on housing has had a detrimental effect on the relationship of the people with REDD BARNA as an organization. In Kebele 41 the Kebele administration and the zonal Representatives felt that although REDD BARNA has helped the community in many other ways, their attitude regarding the housing programme, which is a priority need, reflects an unequal relationship. People feel that since REDD BARNA is the donor it has used this position of power and not consulted them as to their needs.

In both urban development projects the major urban problem, delinquency, has been contended with. An experimental programme is underway to keep children and adolescents creatively occupied.

5.4 Self-sustained development activities

5.4.1 Criteria and conclusions - Sri Lanka

In order that project and programme activities may continue after REDD BARNA phase-out it is the Team's assumption that the components should be:

- a. Linked up with government institutions
- b. and/or that capacity (resources) and capability (skills and knowledge) of local institutions have been established and developed.
- c. that the choice of technology is within the capacity and capability of the institutions/social groups that are taking over
- d. that the managerial skills required for this technology have been established and/or developed.

- Activities in sectors like health, education and agriculture are to a large extent geared to a take-over by government. This strategy will make a continuation of these activities more sustained.

- Some project groups of target populations, with REDD BARNA as a catalyst, have been able to organize around common interests (Pathanegama Settlement scheme and Laggala Community Development Scheme). This may provide the basis for an extension and escalation of development activities in the future.

- The material assets obtained by the settlers in Pathanegama may have given them an improved bargaining position versus the government and other social groups.

- However, generally the social organization in the projects visited is too weak or unstable to ensure self-sustained development for the poor target populations in this stratified society.

- The choice of technology and the managerial skills required in the projects do not seem to pose major constraints on future functioning since the Sri Lanka society is characterized by a high level of vocational and other skills and since the physical infrastructure is fairly well developed.

Project level observations

a. Linkages with government institutions

Agriculture

Laggala. Demonstration plots to promote the use of agro-chemicals were introduced through the Ministry of Agriculture and has led to some success in increasing production. Through REDD BARNA and in cooperation with the Ministry there is also some initial success in giving poor farmers permits and subsidies to permanent cultivation of highland fields, formerly used for chena purposes (slash and burn), which is officially forbidden. Such land regularization had begun before initiation of the REDD BARNA project.

However, the team does not feel assured that an adequate credit system for individuals and groups has been established in order to provide agricultural inputs in rural development schemes after REDD BARNA phase-out.

The market and transport potential for some of the cash crops may not have been adequately looked into. Some increase in production, and services like health, roads and wells are likely to be maintained after REDD BARNA phase-out.

Pathanegama. Each individual farmer has been given a 2-acre cardemom plot, 1/2-acre home garden, agricultural subsidies, subsistence allowance for the first years before first harvest and a communal processing plant for the cardemom. An extension officer has been stationed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Minor Export Crops, in the project area, and the Team feels confident that the chances of a continued functioning of this scheme are good. Extension services to increase and vary the crops grown on the home gardens will continue. A permanent fertilizer depot in the project area will be of lasting benefit to the farmers.

A cardemom nursery has been well established in the project, and it is assumed that the agricultural extension services are or will be capable of supporting this commendable effort.

It is reasonable to assume that the settlers have been given assets (in the form of valuable cardamom fields) that will improve their bargaining position, not only towards the government, but also towards other social groups.

Health

The day-care centres in the gardens (slum projects, Colombo) will be taken over by the Urban Development Authority after REDD BARNA phase-out.

Nutrition programmes are still to a large extent dependent on external food resources.

The sanitation programmes, i.e. latrine building has been successful in most projects with REDD BARNA as a catalyst for a government subsidy programme. The Team had, of course, no possibility of assessing the actual use of the latrines, but hygiene education was ongoing.

Laggala. The health programme was planned as a pilot scheme for 5 families in each village in the hope of spill-over effects. It is the Team's opinion that this strategy is less likely to succeed where health improvement is concerned than in most other sectors. Firstly, health and hygiene education belongs mostly to the private sphere and the activities encouraged will therefore not be very visible by neighbours. Secondly, improvement in health depends perhaps as much on the surrounding community as on the individual family.

The "well-baby" chart and methods of measuring is partly overlapping with, and partly in conflict with the methods used by the Ministry of Health.

Pathanegama. Since the village has been officially registered it is now entitled to, and is receiving social services like monthly clinic programmes, referrals for Hospital services, nutrition components and training.

Warakanda. The 1/2-acre home gardens have been well established in cooperation with agricultural extension services. The Team assumes that these services are well established, as well as the subsidy and credit services provided by the Ministry of Agriculture.

The credit scheme for housing has not been well planned. Partly, no system or rate of repayment has been established, and partly, no assessment of the ability to repay has been made. Some of the households interviewed had half finished building the new houses, but had no means of finishing them, and a very doubtful economic basis, from their 1/2-acre gardens and occasional day-labouring, to repay the credit spent.

Housing.

Colombo. Government has provided free land to squatters in Colombo. On repayment of credit it is the assumption that title deeds will be issued. REDD BARNA has played the role of catalyst in organizing and subsidising (credit scheme) the Gardens in the slums.

The project personnel did not think, however, that this could serve as a model for neighbouring slum areas who might want to do the same, since the bureaucratic procedures involved would be too complex to be undertaken by voluntary community groups. The government may not continue this work.

Other services.

A postal service has been established in Pathanegama. REDD BARNA is assisting the farmers in obtaining a licence for carrying arms in order to protect the crops.

b. Development of capacity and capability of local organizations.

Community groups

Colombo. Community Development Committees are established in order to carry on activities such as drainage, provision of water, labour in the construction of houses etc. Social development groups were established before the REDD BARNA project for upgrading slums was initiated, but they now seem to have gained self-confidence through organizing round the tasks of obtaining a much improved standard of housing.

Pathanegama. The settlers in Pathanegama were initially organized in work groups for the soil conservation and infrastructural set-up of the project. These groups have more or less disintegrated and been replaced by informal neighbour groups for voluntary sharing of work. The establishment of an elected formal committee to represent and make decisions on behalf of all the settlers has been encouraged by REDD BARNA, and has gone through many difficulties. It seems that project management has kept a low profile in this connection in order that settlers develop a real capacity for social organization through the painful process of trial and error. It is to be hoped therefore, that the newly established Committee (Jan. -85) and the new rules and regulations passed will serve the interests of the community after REDD BARNA phase-out. One of the main tasks will be to re-establish the co-operative shop and get it registered with the authorities. Another task, which may be lower on the priority list, since all committee members are men, will be to re-establish the day-care center. This will not only benefit the men through increasing their wives' capacity for subsistence labour, but would especially benefit the children and their mothers.

There is, however, some concern about the fairly imminent REDD BARNA phase-out. Partly, the expressed concern was fear that neighbours might encroach on or try to destroy the valuable cardemom fields, out of envy. This problem will, however, have to be faced by the settlers whether REDD BARNA phases out fairly soon or in a distant future, and the REDD BARNA policy of offering at least some services to the surrounding areas in order to reduce jealousy is commendable.

Laggala. REDD BARNA has succeeded, as a catalyst, in organizing the poor farmers to circumvent the exploitative middlemen in agricultural sales and purchases. It is the Team's opinion that this organization may provide a sound basis for future development processes.

Warakanda. A settlers' committee does not yet seem well established and ready to take over activities initiated by REDD BARNA.

Income generation.

The activities are very small in scale and consist of training in welding, typewriting, sewing, baking, repair of simple instruments, brush- and papadam-making, cigarette production (by hand) and preparation of medicinal herbs. The marketability of the products does not seem well established.

The degree to which women's associations were established and functioning varied, but the Team found no evidence that REDD BARNA had a comprehensive policy of support. On some projects they had formed groups for production of paperbags and jam, for raising of milch cows and poultry and for plant nurseries, but their requests for land and credit in order to get started had not been granted.

c. Choice of technology.

Pathanegama. The processing plant for cardemom is already taken over by the settlers who have been trained in operation, maintenance and management.

d. Managerial capacity and capabilities, as related to choice of technology.

The Team has some doubts that the Community Development coordinators will have the necessary capacity and capability to support the income generating activities, i.e. the provision of material and marketing efforts, in order that the production may not only remain at a status quo, but actually increase to some significant proportion for the project populations.

5.4.2 Criteria and conclusions - Ethiopia

In order that project and programme activities may continue after REDD BARNA phase-out, it is the Team's assumption that the components should be:

- a. Linked up with government institutions
- b. and/or that capacity (resources) and capability (skills) of local institutions have been established and developed
- c. that the choice of technology is within the capacity and capability of the institutions/social groups that are taking over
- d. that the managerial skills required for this technology have been established and/or developed.

Activities in sectors like health, education and agriculture are to a large extent geared to a take-over by government. This strategy will make a continuation of these activities more sustained.

The local institutions who have, or will take over some of the activities lack various resources, such as vocational and managerial skills, available time and funds. Although several of the activities now generate enough income to cover running costs, it is questionable whether they would cover future replacement of inputs, an escalation of development activities, or even a continuation of activities at the present level.

Project level observations

- a. **Linkages with government institutions.**

Health.

Ministry of Health has provided the blueprint for the construction of the clinics in Bale Valley and Kebelle 41, and it is taking over the health programmes.

The Community Health Agent Worker component, initiated by REDD BARNA on a voluntary basis, has been adopted by the government and has been included amongst the salaried positions for urban areas.

The immunisation programmes have been taken over by the Ministry.

The sanitation and environmental sanitation programmes in the Kebelles have been taken over by the Municipality and the Kebelle Administrations.

Education.

The planned kindergarden in Kebelle 41 will be taken over by the government.

It is assumed that the above activities will be assured a continued functioning after REDD BARNA phase-out of the project. There are, however, some programme components that still lack a national linkage to safeguard future functioning:

The road to Bale Valley has not received the planned support, as stated in the Agreement with RRC, and is impassable during heavy rains. This may jeopardize some of the other activities introduced in the valley.

The water for consumption in Gadula (Bale Valley) does not have adequate technical support for repair, nor an established base for meeting running costs after REDD BARNA phase-out.

The day-care center for marasmic children in Kebelle 41 and the nutrition programme components are dependent on CRS, an external NGO.

Agriculture.

Ministry of Agriculture is taking on responsibility for the follow-up of demonstration plots and research into new crops. Although there has been some difficulties in getting personnel willing to be stationed in Bale Valley, the Team was assured that this problem would be solved in near future.

b. Development of capacity and capability of local institutions.

Public services

The bakery, shower, clothes washing facilities, communal kitchens and butchery in the Kebeles are supported and run by community elected and selected groups. The fees charged for the services/commodities are generally adequate to meet operational costs, and may even generate some income. The continued function seems to be well planned and established.

The grain mill is taken over and administered by the Kebelle Administration.

Awareness creation.

REDD BARNA has stimulated and developed the ability within target populations and staff to assess priority needs and the neediest. The Farmers' Associations and the Zonal offices (the latter were established through REDD BARNA in the Kebeles) have through this process improved their capacity to analyse and present community problems, and to set priorities.

Health.

The First Aid Post in Kebelle 13 is supported jointly by REDD BARNA and the Kebelle Administration.

There are, however, programme components that do not have an adequate basis for a self-sustained future functioning: Income generating activities in Kebelle 41, that have quite some potential, lack an organizational structure and support. The managerial and technical skills needed for a cooperative take-over of the fairly complex activities have not been adequately established. It is the Team's opinion that the necessary capacity and capability for this does not exist in the Kebelle Administration.

The vocational training programme in Kebelle 13 is as yet totally dependent on REDD BARNA.

Many of the REDD BARNA activities in Addis Ababa, especially in Kebelle 41, are directed towards women. However, the potential for sustained development purposes of the Women's Associations seems to have been insufficiently explored and supported.

The potential of the Service Cooperatives seems to have been insufficiently explored and supported.

Organizations and community groups have been mobilised around the tasks of setting priorities and participating in implementation of the schemes made possible from using external resources. The Team finds it difficult to assess the likelihood of a continuation of this process if financial resources dwindle while a more firm basis for the generation of resources has not been established, and while resources of skill and administration are still somewhat lacking in connection with a take-over.

c. Choice of technology.

The water supply for irrigation by gravity in Gadula (Bale Valley) has been constructed by the local population and there is every reason to assume that adequate capacity and capability for future function has been established. The same is the case with the modern production of honey, and possibly also with the 3 new crops introduced (sweet potatoes, bananas, maize).

The bridge and roads constructed/improved in the Kebelles are fairly easy to maintain.

The solar heater for the public shower is fairly easy to maintain.

The environmental sanitation system in the Kebelles is simple and presently adequate.

However, as mentioned above, Gadula (Bale Valley) water supply for consumption, which is pumped by diesel engine, stands less of a chance of continuous operation after REDD BARNA phase-out. There was no alternative choice of technology due to the ecologic conditions. There are, however, no available local repair facilities in the case of major break-downs. Even if the Water Works Commission should have the necessary capacity for a take-over of responsibilities (which may seem unlikely since the area is not on the priority list for a water supply), the fact that the road is impassable during the rains imposes serious constraints on repair and even on operation, as related to the provision of diesel.

d. Managerial capacity and capabilities, as related to choice of technology.

Concerning the Gadula (Bale Valley) water for consumption supply, maintenance skills may have been adequately trained, but the establishment of whether the community is able and willing to pay for the running costs has not been undertaken. If or when the community becomes responsible for covering such costs the managerial skills in connection with the collection and accounting for revenue will be lacking.

5.5 Organisation and management

5.5.1 Criteria and Conclusions

The Team has used the following criteria to evaluate the ability of the REDD BARNA organisation to fulfill the objectives.

a. Regarding policy and guidelines:

How the organization has been able to transform the overall policy and guidelines to operational guidelines adapted to the context of each specific programme.

b. Regarding functions:

How the organisational set-up copes with the short- and long-term tasks, especially concerning operation of programme and projects, - and how the functions are adapted to and reflect policy, guidelines, local and country specific context requirements.

a. Policy and guidelines.

The total organisation suffers from a lack of operational framework and guidelines regarding the development work. This weakness is a major constraint affecting the development work within all levels of the organization, and are dealt with in Chapter 3. : Conclusions and Recommendation, and 4. : The Context and Approach.

In the absence of such guidelines project identification and formulation becomes circumstantial. In this situation some project personnel, given their background and experience, have attempted to interpret the REDD BARNA policy and philosophy in their project contexts when they have to cope with the problems in the field.

The Team is of the opinion that one of the most important tasks of the Oslo headquarters is to monitor the development and continuous adjustment of operational guidelines, taking into account the specific country contexts.

b. Functions.

REDD BARNA has worked out a series of instructions and guidelines in The Handbook for Field Directors which deals with administrative matters such as:

REDD BARNA, Aims, Principles, Organization
Cooperating Agencies
Personnel Administration

Administrative Routines
 Finance and Accounting Routines
 Programme Administration
 Public Relations and Information
 Fund Raising
 Resources, Materials

These guidelines give a standardized base for procedures to be applied in each of the countries in which REDD BARNA is working. The instructions and guidelines cover the administrative sector very well, but are weak on the programme and project sector.

Resident Representative

The Resident Representative has a major role in the management of programme and activities on the country level. This position demands extensive qualifications and experience, and the results are to a large extent dependent on how the Resident Representative performs his/her job. Every change in this position leads to some sort of uncertainty for the staff members, which can harm the daily work for a period until the new Resident Representative is established in the position and the subordinates have become familiar with his/her management style.

To reduce the difficulties ensuing from such changes in leadership the Team recommends that the period of employment is extended to e.g. five years. To give a new Resident Representative the opportunity to prepare himself/herself for the job, he/she needs a period of 6 to 12 months at the country secretariate before he/she takes over the position.

To give the Resident Representative better access to country information and how local people think and behave, it could be useful to have a council of local people who can give advice and opinions on local matters.

Planning of programmes and projects.

In the absence of country specific policies and operational guidelines, project identification and formulation becomes circumstantial. Guidelines worked out with proper consideration of the context within the actual country will secure comprehensible and complete information necessary for an analysis of the situation. Decision of priorities and activities could be made on a sound basis.

The long-term planning of projects is weak since plans and budgets are made up on a yearly basis. Although there are many elements of uncertainty attached to the implementing period it should be an objective to work out long-term plans for projects.

In addition to the activities which should be accomplished, thorough consideration should be given to:

- participation of the beneficiaries
- the project period should cover the total length of project
- how phasing out should be prepared
- counterparts, who, and how should they be trained
- the sustainability and viability without support from REDD BARNA
- monitoring and evaluation

The report format should contain more quantitative comparison between planned and accomplished activities which will make the report more useful for monitoring work. The financial control of expenditures is important, but the monitoring of programme results should be strengthened.

Personnel.

More emphasis should be laid on personnel management. Major aspects are recruitment and training of people who are participating in promoting social changes within the community.

Recruitment should be based on a thorough analysis of job requirements and specific determination of qualifications needed to meet job requirements. If no proper candidate is available for a vacant job, employment should be postponed.

Training of staff, especially of field staff, should be strengthened. No systematic monitoring of individual training needs is maintained. More emphasis should be laid on training on participation in the process of surveying, planning, decision-making and implementation of activities

Finance

Accounting, cash management and statements of accounts are well kept and maintained, given the system.

Provision of goods and services, storage and transportation are functioning well and according to need.

SPECIAL COMMENTS ON SRI LANKA OPERATIONS

Uncertainty among staff

Different circumstances have caused a lot of uncertainty among the staff about the future of the organization and the terms of employment in REDD BARNA Sri Lanka.

The reasons for this uncertainty are to a large degree based on the following issues:

- A possible REDD BARNA phase-out of Sri Lanka
- A possibility that REDD BARNA will be transformed to a Sri Lankan organization with domestic managers
- Staff recruitment on a regular basis changed to recruitment on contract basis
- Establishment and later dissolution of "staff council" led to unclear understanding of the role of the council and caused considerable misunderstandings about the functions of the council
- Reduction in the number of staff

The Team will recommend a period of consolidation before new activities are commenced.

Training of staff

The ethnic problems influence to a large degree the operations, especially in the northern and eastern provinces. The training of staff is reduced to a minimum in 1985 due to the problem of gathering people from different parts of the country. Some key people are leaving REDD BARNA and without a replacement of these people and proper training programmes the organization will suffer considerably.

Sri Lanka staff as per 31.3.85

Function	Regular app.		Contract app.*		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Management	17	3	-	-	20
Programme incl. cons.	47	24	4	7	82
Adm.	22	9	2	2	35
Technician	23	1	3	-	27
Support	44	-	8	-	52
Total	153	37	17	9	216

* From 1.1.1985

SPECIAL COMMENTS ON ETHIOPIAN OPERATIONS

Organizational set-up of the secretariate

The administrative functions by the secretariate are now analysed and some changes in work distribution have already been implemented and others are under preparation. The changes were explained to the Team and seem reasonable. The salary system is under consideration and will be changed from individually stipulated salaries to a salary scale system with fixed salary levels based on job requirements. This change will probably eliminate some of the striking discrepancies in the present method.

With regards to the proposed placements of the personnel officer the Team feels that this position, which is considered very important, should not be subordinated to the administrator. It is assumed that it will be more adequate to link this position directly to the Resident Representative.

Ethiopia staff as per 30.4.1985

Project No.	Administration staff		Project staff		Total	Remark
	Male	Female	Male	Female		
4000	4	2	25	3	34	Secretariate
4002	3	3	7	9	22	Kebelle 41
4003	1	3	9	3	16	Kebelle 13
4004			2		2	Nolayita
4005	1	2	5	2	10	Bale
4006	2		6	1	9	Gamo Gofa
4043			1		1	Queen Home
4070	3	1	23	7	34	Rehab.Unit
Total	14	11	78	25	128	

Staff recruitment related to gender.

	Regular app.	
	Male	Female
Sri Lanka	170	46
Ethiopia	92	36
	262	84

Total male, number: 262 percentage: 76
 Total female, number: 84 percentage: 24

APPENDIX I

Terms of reference for the evaluation of selected REDD BARNA development activities.

1. BACKGROUND

The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation, hereafter called the Ministry, will evaluate selected REDD BARNA development activities. The evaluation will constitute a valuable guideline for future cooperation between the Ministry and REDD BARNA.

The evaluation will take place in selected projects in Sri Lanka and Ethiopia.

2. MODE OF WORK

For the evaluation the Ministry has selected the following team:

Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay, leader, Master of Social Work, Calcutta
Lars E. Birgegård, Ph.D. in Economics, Stockholm
Eilif W. Knudsen, School of Economics and Business Administration, Oslo
Mette Jørstad, Cand. Polit. Social Anthropology, Bergen

The evaluation will be carried out in close cooperation with the Ministry, REDD BARNA Headquarters and field staff.

The assignment will include interviewing people concerned with REDD BARNA development activities at headquarters and at regional and local levels; studying relevant documents and reports and visiting development projects selected by the team based on proposals by REDD BARNA and/or the Ministry.

3. TASK OF THE EVALUATION TEAM

The team shall evaluate selected REDD BARNA development activities covering the following main aspects in addition to other issues found relevant by the team:

1. Review the organisation's project related activities and achievements in relation to goals, production targets and inputs (costs), as these are stated in project plans and other relevant documents.
2. Assess the criteria according to which REDD BARNA projects are selected and whether projects are implemented in accordance with national policies and coordinated with government activities in general.
3. Consider the adequacy of the organisation's institutional cooperation, administrative procedures, communication between project personnel, between project personnel and target groups, and between project personnel and national/local authorities.

4. Determine how project plans and budgets are developed and analyze reasons for possible change over time.
5. Assess the present or planned REDD BARNA reporting and monitoring systems, especially as related to the questions above.
6. Assess observable and probably short- and long-term social, political, economic, cultural and ecological consequences of the project for the intended target group and different segments of the target group, with special attention to gender, age and ethnicity.
7. Assess whether there are unexpected consequences of the projects for the target group or segments of target groups. Suggest ways and means to minimize possible negative consequences and to support and promote possible positive ones. Assess consequences of project related activities for other affected groups.
8. Assess the recruitment and training procedures and career structures of expatriate and local REDD BARNA personnel.
9. Assess the local/national capacity, ability and willingness to take over REDD BARNA commitment. Assess REDD BARNA involvement in strengthening local and national institutions for this purpose. Review existing procedures towards full takeover by local institutions and persons.
10. Assess ongoing readjustments and existing plans for REDD BARNA future project related work in the light of the evaluation team's findings, and if necessary, suggest possible re-design.
11. Comment on the capacity of REDD BARNA at different administrative and implementing levels to extend and expand development activities.
12. Comment on the possible need for further studies of specific issues.

4. **REPORTING**

The main conclusions and recommendations drawn from the above mentioned points shall be drafted by the whole team. The joint report in the English language comprising all findings and recommendations, is to be submitted to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation before 1. July 1985.

Oslo, 1985

Helge Kjekshus
Head of Division
2 Planning Division
The Norwegian Ministry of
Development Cooperation.

APPENDIX II

Profile: SRI LANKA**Redd Barna Development Activities in 1985**

Agricultural Settlement Projects
 Rural Community Development Projects
 Urban Community Development Projects
 Medical Offices of Health Units
 Intensive Water Supply Areas
 Reafforestation Campaign Areas

Facts about Sri Lanka

Area	: 65,610 sq. Km (about 2 times the size of Norway)
Population (mid 1983)	: 15.4 million
Population density (1983)	: 238 persons per sq, Km.
Population growth rate (1982)	: 1.5% p.a.
Exports	: Rs.25,096 million
Imports	: Rs.45,553 million
Gross National Product (1982)	: Rs.89,674 million
Per capita Income (DGDNDP per capita 1982)	: Rs. 5,904 \$ 224

(However, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit (3) the **GDP** per capita was \$ 309, - 1983)

The value of calculating per capita income on the basis of Gross National or Gross Domestic Products is very questionable in highly stratified societies like Sri Lanka.

Structures

The government's preoccupation with security and its reluctance to take unpopular measures that could add to social and political unrest divert attention from dealing with the major structural weakness of the economy. These include the budget and current accounts deficits (temporarily masked by high tea prices), the appalling state of government owned tea and rubber plantations, the poor performance of other public sector corporations and continued over reliance on foreign aid to keep the economy afloat.

Notwithstanding pressure from the USA, India and the World Bank (on behalf of aid donors, creditors and foreign investors) for an acceptable political solution, the chances of an initiative succeeding in the short term are remote and the stage is set for continued armed confrontation. The government is determined to demonstrate that the terrorists cannot gain a military victory but Tamil Separatists continue to push for the establishment of a Tamil Eelam state by violent means.

REDD BARNA in Sri Lanka

History in Brief

The 13 of October 1974, the first Redd Barna establishment in Sri Lanka was opened. The HEALTH CENTRE on Karainagar Island was built according to an agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and Redd Barna of 18 December 1972, whereafter, "Redd Barna agrees to build, equip, organize and operate a Health Centre at Karainagar, Sri Lanka".

Originally, the centre was only for curative services. After an evaluation and under an agreement with the Ministry of Health, the activities were turned to Preventive Health in 1976. During the years that followed Redd Barna personnel carried out health surveys, sanitation programmes, latrine building, immunization and nutrition programmes among the fairly troubled population in the Island of Karainagar. This evaluation and the work in the years to follow showed the need for preventive health work in general and Redd Barna agreed to design and construct two more model Health Units for the Medical Officer of Health. (MOU Units).

But an even more significant result of the pioneer project in the Island of Karainagar was however, that the Organization through the preventive health work got closer contact with the people's everyday life. This contact made it clear that a child's health situation is only a result and an indication of the child's general living conditions. No real success could be expected if the primary reasons for the situation were not removed through an integrated and comprehensive approach to child welfare

In turn, this led to financial assistance to local organizations on the Island of Kayts. Assistance to the unfortunate victims of the communal disturbances in 1977 and relief and rehabilitation among the cyclone affected population on the East Coast in 1978.

Encouraged by the results achieved and the need for more long term integrated development work to give long term solutions to needy people in Sri Lanka, a policy decision was made by the Board of Directors of Redd Barna in 1978. This decision expanded the Sri Lanka programme into both COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT and AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS. Hence, a new agreement between the government of Sri Lanka and Redd Barna was signed in May 1979, where the Ministry of Plan Implementation was made liason between the government and Redd Barna - a liason Redd Barna has been happy to have ever since.

Five years ago, in October 1979, a new and larger Redd Barna-Sri Lanka was formed. Ready to build on the experiences from the first five years, and eager to implement development work according to the "Fundamental Principles" for Redd Barna's own aid programmes.

Profile ETHIOPIA

REDD BARNA Development Activities in 1985:

Urban Development Programmes
 Rural Development Programmes
 Water Development Programme
 Integrated Leprosy Control Programme

Facts about Ethiopia:

Area	: 1.223.600 sq. km. (about 4 times the size of Norway)
Population, about	: 35 mill.
Population density, about	: 286 per sq. km
Population growth rate	: 2,5% p.a.
Exports	: Birr 900 mill.
Imports	: Birr 1.600 mill.
(GNP 1980)	: US \$ 140,-

The low per capita income (only about 1/3 of that in neighbouring Kenya) indicated that Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries. However, the calculation is based on estimated statistics of population and inadequate information on income in this country of mainly subsistence production.

Structures.

Since the revolution in 1974 Ethiopia has made a transition from feudalism to communism, with a land reform that gives private farmers the usufruct rights to a maximum of 10 ha of land. Agricultural production dominates the economy (over 80%) in Ethiopia, and about 90% of the production is private, with state farms and farmers' cooperatives consisting of less than 10%.

Mass organisations like Farmers', Women's and Youths' Associations are established and are used by the government to control, inform and educate the population.

Since the revolution, political conflicts have reached a major scale in the hostilities with Eritrea, Tigray and Ogaden. Amharas, who make up about a quarter of the total population, tend to dominate the rest of the population politically and culturally.

REDD BARNA - ETHIOPIA - History in Brief

The REDD BARNA presence in Ethiopia came into reality in 1969. Together with Swedish Save the Children (Rädda Barnen) REDD BARNA established the Armauer Hansen Research Institute (AHRI).

As is the case for most REDD BARNA programme Countries, also here the REDD BARNA involvement was not based on a broad assessment of criterias established to determine whether to go into a

country or not. A sectoral interest and very active argumentation from individuals created a REDD BARNA presence in Ethiopia.

The first expansion of the Country Programme came in 1973 when REDD BARNA took up providing financial support to ALERT (All African Leprosy and Rehabilitation Training Center), which increased the REDD BARNA involvement in the field of leprosy. Later on that same year REDD BARNA received the news that a drought had badly hit Ethiopia and the Board of Directors considered it natural to give help to this country where it has a presence established.

The expansion in grant-aided projects which also continued into 1978, marked the adoption of what can be said as to have been the Organization's established policy and way of operation in Ethiopia up to 1981 when REDD BARNA - ETHIOPIA signed the Agreement with Municipality of Addis Ababa for implementation of an Urban Development Programme in Kebelle 41, Addis Ababa. In addition, during 1979, 1980 and 1981 the Organization made a considerable assistance available for relief purposes in Southern Ethiopia (Bale and Gamo Gofa).

REDD BARNA - ETHIOPIA became operational in April 1981. This effort has given an opportunity for REDD BARNA to understand the social, cultural, historical and economic situation in Ethiopia and to explain the Organization's development approach to the Community people.

APPENDIX III

PROJECT PROFILES:

The following project information are excerpts from REDD BARNA reports.

SRI LANKA**1) Colombo District.****Community Development Project, Abdul Hamid Street****FACTS ABOUT THE PROJECT**

Date of Inception	: 1979
Expected date of phasing out	: December 1984
Target population	: Existing population in the garden
Population in the project area	: 1,424
No. of families	: 276 living in 124 houses
Size of project area	: 46,161 sq.ft.
Main source of income	: Casual Labour/A few family industries
Average income	: Difficult to estimate

Community Development Project, Aluthmawatha**FACTS ABOUT THE PROJECT:**

Date of Inception	: 1979
Expected date of phasing out	: December 1984
Target group	: The existing population of the area
Population of the project	: 563
No. of families	: 129 in 67 houses
Size of project	: 59,024 sq.ft.
Main income	: Casual Labour
Average income	: No estimate

Community Development Project, Vystwyke Road**FACTS ABOUT THE PROJECT:**

Date of Inception	: 1981, delayed because of uncertain ownership
Expected date of phasing out	: December 1984

Target Group	: The existing population in the area
Population of the project	: 390
No. of families	: 78 in 53 houses
Size of project	: 53,040 sq.ft.
Main income source	: Casual Labour
Average income	: difficult to estimate

The slum clearance programme of the government which is generally carried out through the provision of alternative accommodation in high rise buildings, has been supplemented by special projects of infrastructure development with the assistance of external agencies.

In 1978, the Urban Development Authority presented to the government a policy paper to upgrade the slums and shanty dwellings as a major component of its housing policy.

A survey carried out by the Urban Development Authority, in 1978, revealed that 41.8% of the city's population (256,470 out of estimated mid-year population of 613,000) were living in slums and shanties. The policy paper had recommended the provision of upgrading the dwellings of slum and shanty dwellers, specially of the low-income groups.

At present, there are several governmental and non-governmental agencies engaged in slum and shanty upgrading programmes, sponsored either by government or international donor agencies. Redd Barna-Sri Lanka has been prominent among these non governmental organizations, in slum and shanty upgrading programmes, sponsored either by government or international donor agencies. Redd Barna-Sri Lanka has been concentrating its attention on three major areas in central and northern parts of Colombo - the Aluthmawatha shanties, Abdul Hamid Street slums and the Vystwyke Road shanties.

Having engaged in slum and shanty upgrading projects in Colombo since 1979, the Redd Barna-Sri Lanka, today has gained valuable and varied experience in this field. The three projects undertaken by the Organization in Colombo - Abdul Hamid Street (1979-1984), Aluthmawatha (1980-1984) and Vystwyke Road (1981-1985) are almost complete and are in phasing out stages.

2) New and old settlement schemes, Matale District.

New Settlement

After a delay for about one and a half years, due to circumstances beyond our control, activities began finally in December 1983. We are happy to mention here that rapid progress has been made since then. A socio-economic survey was completed in this settlement recently. Some of the facts revealed are as follows:

Out of 145 families selected for settling only 138 are either permanently resident or developing their plots while being resident in their old places which are closeby.
Total population is 686.

Percentage of those who have never gone to school	- 4.00%
Percentage of those who completed primary education	- 8.75%
Percentage of those who had above primary level education	- 56.30%
Percentage of those who completed secondary education	- 3.00%
Percentage of settler-families with less than Rs.100/- income per month.	- 1.40%

Percentage of settler-families with income 100/- to 300/-	- 28.20%
Percentage of settler-families with income 301/- to 600/-	- 31.30%
Percentage of settler-families with income over 600/-	- 39.10%

Old Settlements

There are about 300 families in these settlements who have been settled during the period 1956 to 1976. Average family size here is 6 members while educational and income levels are slightly below that of the new settlement. This is mainly due to the fact that the families in the new settlement are younger. Percentage under 15 years in this area is 40%.

General Goals of the Project

Establishment of a new settlement in the remaining area of eighty acres of the Warakanda estate where 145-150 families would be settled and be well integrated with the adjoining old settlements is the objective of this project, ultimately giving reasonable living conditions to another group of under-privileged children from among families of low income range.

3) Agricultural Settlement, Pathanegama, Laggala

Pathanegama Settlement has completed its 5th year.

Population Statistics

No. of families	Married		Unmarried		Children 1 mth to 15 yrs.		Total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Stage I	53	44	09	02	22	35	160
Stage II	38	31	07	00	14	18	98
Total	91	75	16	02	36	53	258

Adults - 169 65.5%
Children - 89 34.5%

In order to improve the standard of nutrition, new cultivation of crops has been introduced.

Growth charts maintenance was carried out during the year.

Undernourished children were identified and given a special programme for the parents to uplift their economy in various activities in order to feed children. At the same time, **powdered milk and extra nutrition** were distributed to those by the Dept. of Social Services (Sri Lanka). More and more income generating activities have to be planned out in the future.

In Stage I, most of the participants have felt that their cardamom plantation could give them a sufficient

income. The year 1984 was a good year for cardamom growers in general. Mainly the growers who have got good harvests seem to be well established. The people who didn't get a good income feel that their lands are not suitable.

Most of the participants in Stage II have received the Govt. Subsidy for their cardamom plantations.

After discontinuation of payment of subsistence, 31 participants have left.

In the later part of the year -84, few settlers have started to harvest and 60% expect to harvest cardamom in -85.

In cardamom, we expected an average income of about 8000/- per annum. This is on the basis of a good plantation. But due to unexpected drought in 1982, severe draw-back was shown.

Special problems.

Only the fact that the project shall have to last longer than planned because of a slower income development than expected.

4) Community Development Project Laggala

The project was started in 1982 as the extension arm of the Youth Agricultural settlement, Laggala.

The community development project at Laggala provides services to 14 villages in Matale district situated under the Assistant Government Agent's division of Laggala-Pallaygama. All the villages are agriculturally predominant, and the major cultivation are Chena type of crops and Paddy. In most of the home gardens oranges are grown and this existed as an unorganized cultivation giving very low income to the villager. After Redd Barna's initiation this crop has become a good income earner.

The 14 villages with whom we work at present are situated surrounding the Agricultural Settlement. The Settlement and the villages has a good relationship from the inception and it was found necessary to develop the villages, instead of concentrating the development programmes only to the settlement.

The project area comprises of about 475 houses and about 2550 adults and children.

The ultimate goal of the project is to help the poorest of the poor in each village to have a better awareness of their standard of living and help them to plan and implement programmes of action, to create a better and a permanent standard of living.

During the past period of operation many programmes were carried out. The programmes had to be carried out commonly to both classes, poor and richer, without making any distinction. This was mainly because the people in both classes were ignorant of better ways of living by taking use of the available resources.

ETHIOPIA:

Slum Projects, Addis Ababa

1) Kebelle 41

Study was undertaken to establish a participatory, collaborative baseline relationship between REDD BARNA - ETHIOPIA team that would be assigned to work in the Kebelle and the people, and to establish a data base for planning, monitoring and evaluating the programme which would include a set of objective indicators to be established of socio-economic conditions, and the problems and needs subjectively perceived through local people's perspectives.

Major findings: Out of the total of 788 dwelling units, 778 were covered by the physical survey. The social survey covered 728 households consisting of some 3,845 persons of its total of slightly more than 4,100.

The analysis indicated that approximately 94% of the total families were below the poverty line and that 67% have no regular income. Literacy and educational achievements showed a very low rate. The environmental and sanitary conditions were extremely poor as identified through housing, roads, drainages, latrines, water pipes, garbage disposal facilities and a polluted river adjacent to the Kebelle. The Kebelle also showed some very typical characteristics of a poor, urban community. Although some basic services, facilities and amenities seem to be available in Addis Ababa to some extent, there was a clear lack of access to them for Kebelle 41 which seemed to lead to a high level of frustration.

Programme Strategy

The programme strategy to achieve the objectives involved 4 programming sectors:

- 1) Physical infrastructure,
- 2) Income generating activities/economic development,
- 3) Preventive health/mother and child care, and
- 4) Human development/social awareness building.

2) Kebelle 13

From the area survey the following facts were accumulated.

538	total houses in Kebelle 13
94	total privately owned houses
124	number of houses that are condemned
195	number of houses that need major repair
177	number of houses that need minor repair

42 number of houses that need no repair
 57 condemned latrines
 20 latrines that need major repairs
 20 latrines that need minor repairs
 21 latrines that need no repair
 128 condemned kitchens
 79 kitchens that need major repair
 28 kitchens that need minor repair
 97 houses have no windows
 12 houses have no electricity
 Hectarage in Kebele 13 is 6.15
 2868 - total population

In 44 houses there are a total of 103 family heads and 268 people.

The present work in slum upgrading urban development programme in Kebele 13 is concerned in physical upgrading that includes housing, latrines, kitchens, income generating self-help projects. The other sector of concentration includes community development in the fields of preventive health care, environmental sanitation, education service giving and job oriented training and last but not least, local community administration to unit level.

The aim of the programme is to assist and work with the community for a fixed period of time in the attainment of total takeover. Whatever introduced and expanded services to be productive long after the assistance discontinues is the general aim. It is to facilitate and start the process whereby the community members in the community take over and administer, supervise, expand and implement new programmes and projects.

3) Bale Gadula Settlement Project.

The project concept was:

To offer a rehabilitation assistance to settlers displaced by the Somali war and now returning to undertake a development of themselves and their land to make them self-contained. The direct aim of the new plan is to provide support for development to a population of approx. 2,500. It is also stated that equally important, but secondary, is to allow the whole valley of Bale Gadula to take off on a development process through assistance and input of new ideas, encouragement and general support. The time-frame of the new plan is three years of involvement for REDD BARNA - ETHIOPIA.

The Bale Gadula settlers comprise of 243 households, the members of which are up to 1016 persons. Practically all the settlers have emigrated from the surrounding area of Weib Valley for noneconomic reasons. The settlement resulted from a planned resettling of peasants affected by the War. All the immigrants manifest cultural homogeneity as all are of Oromo Origin and of Muslim religion.

Findings on the occupational characteristics indicated that the two main occupations in the valley are farming and cattle raising in which 80% of the total settlers are engaged.

The project components can be grouped as follows:

- a) Improve the food production capacity
- b) Preventive health, Mother and Child Care
- c) Income generating

- d) Infrastructure building
- e) Human development, increase level of general awareness
- f) Savings and credits

APPENDIX IV

General Guidelines for REDD BARNA's Overseas Aid Programme

Approved by REDD BARNA's Board of Directors 16th June 1980

1. The Goals for REDD BARNA's Overseas Aid Programmes

- a. Children in need of help are the primary target group for REDD BARNA's Aid programmes.

Children quite often are the least protected and most dependent members of the world community. Children represent the future of the world. REDD BARNA has the United Nation's Declaration of Children's Rights as both the guideline and goal for its aid programmes.

- b. REDD BARNA recognises that the best and most correct way to help most children is to assist those who are responsible for them, e.g. their parents or guardians.

Most children live together with their parents, often in extended families. Nearly all families are inclined to do their best to help their children. The problem lies in the fact that these families often lack the resources and knowledge necessary for the children to thrive and develop. Children denied the protection of their families orphans and handicapped - can best be helped through support to local organizations and institutions.

- c. REDD BARNA recognises that the family cannot be considered independently of the community of which it is a part.

The individual family is dependent upon the local community for health services, schools, markets, supplies, etc. Many important initiatives such as schools, clinics, small industries, etc., can only be carried through if the people of the local community work together.

- d. REDD BARNA's primary goal is to help the poorest and most underprivileged members of the world community - women and children, the unemployed and the landless.

Women in many countries are often overburdened: they often have sole responsibility for heavy and time-demanding work such as agriculture, carrying of water and finding firewood. At the same time they must take care of their children. Many development projects do not take consideration of the situation of women, and often make the situation more difficult. By improving the living conditions for women, we can improve those of the children.

Land or permanent employment are conditions necessary for a family to be able to bring up and take care of their children in an acceptable manner. REDD BARNA will strive to make it possible for the landless and the unemployed to be able to take care of themselves.

2. REDD BARNA is Engaged in Several Types of Aid Programmes

- e. REDD BARNA uses the largest part of its funds to its own aid programmes. Often it will be advantageous to co-operate with other international organizations, especially our sister organizations in the 'Save the Children Alliance' who work in accordance with the same principles as REDD BARNA. Financial aid is also given to local initiatives in the developing countries.

The need for thorough planning, the involvement of the local community, adherence to correct principles, continuing evaluation, and not least the proper management of donated funds, place upon us a responsibility which we cannot easily leave to others. Joint projects give us the possibility to utilize funds, experiences, and personnel in such a way that the effect of our aid programmes is greater. This is especially true of disaster aid.

Many good aid programmes are initiated and carried out by local organizations in the developing countries. REDD BARNA recognises the value of supporting organizations without at the same time making them dependent on our support over longer periods of time. Quite often our support to a particular project (school, clinic, children's institutions, etc.) can encourage the local organizations to continue and expand a useful programme.

- f. Many children in developing countries do not have the advantage of the normal protection provided by the family or the local community. This is particularly true of orphans and handicapped children. REDD BARNA therefore supports local organizations and institutions helping these children.

Our support is aimed at assisting local initiatives, strengthening existing programmes, and establishing new programmes which will guarantee these children's future within a safe environment. REDD BARNA anticipates that the local partner will eventually obtain sufficient local support - both private and governmental - so that the future of the programme is ensured. REDD BARNA's assistance will be given only for a limited period of time so as to avoid an unfortunate condition of dependency. However, the circumstances relating to particular projects can be such as to require assistance over a longer period of time.

- g. The existence of many serious health problems in the developing countries has led REDD BARNA to place particular importance on activities relating to preventive health.

REDD BARNA participates in special programmes aimed at combating and preventing particular infectious diseases, i.e. leprosy, polio.

REDD BARNA has for many years been engaged in the fight against leprosy, and we actively participate in research, training of health personnel, registration and treatment of patients, and preventive health activities.

- h. Many of the poorest countries in the third world are not only burdened by extensive poverty, but are also susceptible to acute natural and/or man made disasters. Children are the most seriously affected by these. REDD BARNA participates in disaster assistance in those instances where we are able to provide effective aid.

In countries where REDD BARNA has its own projects, our own personnel and equipment will be mobilized for disaster assistance. In other areas our help will be channeled through co-operating organizations. REDD BARNA, however, recognizes that we cannot provide effective assistance everywhere.

REDD BARNA maintains that it is irresponsible only to participate in disaster relief immediately after a disaster. It is equally important to rehabilitate a disaster-struck community as it is to save lives during and immediately after a disaster. REDD BARNA will, in addition, always evaluate the desirability of continuing assistance after the rehabilitation phase so that the local community also begins to raise itself out of its original condition of poverty.

3. Fundamental Principles for REDD BARNA's own Aid Programmes.

- i. REDD BARNA recognizes that one component of an aid programme i.e. preventive health, cannot be totally effective if carried out independently of and isolated from other components such as agriculture, small industry, education and training, infrastructure, water supplies etc.

No permanent improvement in the health and general living standards of the poor, can be achieved unless their income and degree of self-sufficiency are increased at the same time. Assistance programmes must therefore be directed towards all aspects of existence in the local community; and REDD BARNA, therefore, emphasizes integrated community development projects. Such projects will include all or most of the following components: preventive health, nutrition, hygiene and sanitation, water supplies, energy supplies, housing, education and training, agriculture, craft work, small industries, etc.

- j. REDD BARNA is convinced that aid programmes which include the local population in the decision-making processes will contribute to achieving permanent solutions to the problem of poverty. Emphasis is, therefore, placed upon the establishment and strengthening of local committees and councils elected by the population and representative of the different groups within the local community. These committees can establish sub-committees responsible for particular areas of activity such as health, hygiene, the situation of women, etc. Our job is to serve as advisor and catalyst so that the people themselves are better able to direct their own social and economic development.
- k. 'Help-to-self-help' is a guiding element for REDD BARNA's aid programme and implies a mobilization of the people's own labour and resources which will be supplemented by REDD BARNA's assistance in the form of personnel, funds and material.

In such a way, the human need for self-respect and pride is being properly recognized. At the same time, we know that most people will most actively involve themselves in activities which require their own effort and are directed towards meeting their own felt needs. In addition to their labour, the local community can contribute materials, equipment and skills. In as much as possible, REDD BARNA prefers that the local people either individually or collectively, also contribute to financing the aid activities. In as much as the people being assisted seldom have savings, REDD BARNA will normally provide long-term low-interest loans which can be repaid from future income generated by the assistance activities. Such loans are to be paid back to the community's own committee or council to be used again in the future towards new community investments.

- l. Aid programmes which aim to contribute towards long-term solutions of poverty problems should be long-term programmes.

Development is a process in which the most important element is people. This process must aim at increasing people's skills, understanding and involvement. Likewise they should be helped to improving their own living situation through, among other things, income-generating activities.

This is a necessary condition so as to achieve permanent improvements. Because the starting conditions are different in each community that REDD BARNA involves itself in, it is difficult to say how much time is needed in order to achieve a self-perpetuating process. Before withdrawing from a community, REDD BARNA will first want to convince itself that the process will be continued after they have terminated our support.

- m. When the development process in a project area has come so far that the local population and/or the local authorities are themselves able to continue the work, then, REDD BARNA will withdraw in a gradual, responsible manner.

REDD BARNA will assist in the establishment and strengthening of the village committees which are our development partners in the project area. By participating in the aid programme the committees develop their own abilities to identify their needs, formulate solutions, mobilize local resources, and carry out development activities. When REDD BARNA perceives that the local agents are themselves able to carry the work on, we will then transfer ownership of our investments such as health clinics, schools, workshops, etc., to the local population and the local authorities.

- n. REDD BARNA will to the greatest possible extent utilize local personnel in carrying out its aid programmes.

The development process is primarily dependent upon human factors. It is, therefore, advantageous that those who will be working directly with the local population are familiar with the culture, language, superstitions, manner of thinking etc. Locally employed personnel will also have a better understanding of local conditions such as community institutions, geographical and economical factors, etc. Through employing and training local personnel we increase and strengthen that group of experienced and competent people who can lead the development efforts within their own communities. It is often more rational and effective to carry out our aid programmes with local personnel than to use expensive foreign 'experts'.

- o. REDD BARNA will normally use Norwegian or third-country administrators and consultants during the establishment phase of a new aid programme. REDD BARNA will normally attempt to recruit and train local personnel ('counterparts') to take these positions.

The need for responsible control of REDD BARNA's funds necessitates that those who are charged with the establishment of a new aid programme are familiar with our guidelines and control routines.

4. Guidelines for the Individual Components of an Aid Programme

- p. The achievement of the ultimate aims of our aid programmes is dependent upon the acquisition of new skills and knowledge by the local population. REDD BARNA, therefore, places particular importance in the training component in each project.

The training part of each element of an aid programme should be directed towards imparting practical and vocational skills. The knowledge imparted should be, of immediate use to the local community. Training activities should be directed equally towards women and men, boys and girls.

With regard to formal education, REDD BARNA feels it is important that all children have the opportunity to attend primary schools and that adult education programmes especially for

women are an important supplement to formal schooling. REDD BARNA perceives the fight against illiteracy as an important link in the development process.

- q. Preventive health is an important part of nearly all aid programmes started by REDD BARNA.

REDD BARNA perceives poor health as one of the causes of continuing poverty. At the same time we recognize that poverty is one of the important causes of poor health. Most diseases in poor communities result from ignorance, poor hygienic and sanitary conditions, lack of water and nutritional food, etc. Preventive health work attacks these conditions directly and lessens the need for expensive curative health programmes.

- r. In addition to health and training activities, every aid programme must contribute towards increasing the population's economic independence.

In those areas where most people are still employed in agriculture, REDD BARNA will emphasize increased food production at the same time as we attempt to assist families to increase their income through production for sale and/or further processing. In co-operation with the local population REDD BARNA will also attempt to promote small industries, handicrafts and other incom-generating activities.

- s. Aid programmes within the agricultural sector will first and foremost aim at increasing the local population's own production of food. After this has been ensured, we will encourage increased production for sale. The goal is that as much as possible of the further processing of this production should occur in the local community.

Availability of land and water are essential requirements for increased agricultural production. Wherever possible REDD BARNA will attempt to secure these important factors for the poorest in the community. The high degree of rural under-employment in most poor communities leads REDD BARNA to emphasize labourintensive activities which aim to increase productivity per acre instead of mechanization which increases production per labour. We will attempt to introduce improved agricultural techniques which give larger harvest. At the same time we will attempt to avoid making those whom we help dependent upon imported fertilizers, pesticides, machinery, etc. REDD BARNA is aware of the fact that cultivation of land involves a certain risk of disturbing the ecological balance in an area. We will, therefore, always consider this danger and aim for good conservation practices.

In non-agricultural communities, i.e. fishing villages and urban areas, our income-generating activities will also give priority to the need of labour-intensive methods, independence of imported factors of production and avoidance of environmental damage.

- t. REDD BARNA will attempt to ensure that the establishment of small industries, workshops and other income-generating activities are carried out in agreement with the local community's capabilities and needs. Such activities will be based primarily on local raw materials and on a simple labour-intensive technology which in as much as possible is not dependent upon imported sources of energy, esp. petroleum. In order to ensure that the poorest benefit from future incomes, REDD BARNA will promote the establishment of co-operatives and other joint enterprises. Furthermore, we expect that those who are involved in the activity also, in as much as possible, invest their own labour and capital in the activity.

REDD BARNA is aware of the fact that it can be difficult to market locally produced products. Therefore, marketing is an important part of the planning and execution of such activities.

- u. Every aid programme will bring skills and new technology into the local community. REDD BARNA will attempt to ensure that these are adapted to the local conditions.

'Appropriate technology' like any other correctly applied technology takes consideration of local needs, skill levels and resources. 'Appropriate technology' is not an inferior technology. In communities characterized by large-scale unemployment, labour-intensive technology should be emphasized. In capital-poor communities the use of local raw materials and simple machines and process should be emphasized. In a community with limited access to petroleum products and electricity, alternative energy sources should be emphasized.

- v. Many of REDD BARNA's aid programmes include construction work such as schools, children's institutions, clinics, workshops, housing, etc. These buildings will to the largest possible degree be adapted to the local conditions.

REDD BARNA will attempt to select a simple building style as much as possible adapted to the local culture and climate. Local materials will be chosen as much as possible. In so far as possible we will use construction techniques which the local population can easily learn to master. Buildings should be so simple and straight forward that it is possible for the local population both to maintain the buildings and set up similar buildings themselves.

- w. REDD BARNA recognizes that the world today is threatened by a wide ranging energy crisis. Through its aid activities REDD BARNA will attempt to reduce the negative consequences that this has for the local population.

The energy crisis exists at two levels. The petroleum crisis is characterized by high demand, high prices and limited supplies and it affects everyone, but the developing countries are particularly hard hit. The other crisis, the scarcity of ordinary fuel for cooking and heating affects millions of the world's poor.

REDD BARNA attempts to avoid making the poor dependent upon imported petroleum at the same time as we attempt to ensure the supply of ordinary fuels. Through the application of simple techniques for utilizing alternative energy sources such as wind, sun and water energy, we attempt to reduce this problem in the local community.

In those communities which for the foreseeable future will continue to be dependent upon firewood for fuel, we must prevent further deforestation at the same time as we ensure new supplies through reforestation. Reforestation is also necessary to repair the damage caused by deforestation, i.e. soil erosion, falling water tables and climatic changes.

5. Limitations to REDD BARNA'S Aid Programmes

- x. REDD BARNA's aid programmes presuppose that we involve the local population and co-operate with them until the development process is self-perpetuating. This requires concentrated efforts over a longer period of time. This will necessitate limiting the number of countries in which we operate our own aid programmes. In addition the need for responsible control of funds forces us to concentrate our aid activities.

The administration of aid programmes is expensive. It is less expensive to administrate large programmes in a few countries than many small projects in many countries. Involvement in a particular country over time is more effective as one becomes more familiar with the conditions

in the country. REDD BARNA, therefore, limits the number of countries in which we establish programmes in order to carry out the work we do in a better manner.

- y. REDD BARNA's aid programmes must always be carried out with the understanding of the host country's government. The government for this part must accept the fact that REDD BARNA is politically and religiously neutral and has its own guidelines for carrying out programmes.

Most important for REDD BARNA is that our assistance benefits the poorest and least privileged members of a community and that those whom we assist are involved in decisions affecting their own development. REDD BARNA can only engage in aid programmes in those countries whose governments permit us to work in accordance with the guidelines.

- z. Many of the most serious problems confronting the developing countries can only be solved through political decisions made at the national and international levels. REDD BARNA can directly affect these decisions through its public opinion activities in Norway.

REDD BARNA's efforts in various communities - together with many other organizations, public institutions and private persons - contribute to building the necessary foundation for the solution of the most serious problems in the developing countries, and thereby contribute towards ensuring the rights of all children in all countries.

APPENDIX V

SUMMARY OF REDD BARNA'S EXPENCES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 1982 - 1984

All figures in NOK 1.000,

	1982	1983	1984
Programme expences			
Ethiopia	5.406	7.335	12.783
Zimbabwe	45	3.798	4.418
Kenya	5.597	6.624	7.835
Yemen	3.430	4.683	4.905
Sri Lanka	8.855	8.573	7.527
Thailand	2.578	3.731	4.267
Maldivene	134	885	1.193
India	1.591	1.329	-
Nepal	-	-	1.323
Guatemala	3.025	5.361	-
Total Programme Countries	30.661	42.319	44.269
Total outside Programme Countries	5.711	4.485	11.367
Programme Support & Control	1.131	2.014	2.040
TOTAL PROGRAMME EXPENCES	37.503	48.818	57.676

	1982	1983	1984
Relief Activities:			
Ethiopia	1.137	794	18.206
Zimbabwe	-	55	2.951
Kenya	1.130	783	200
Yemen A.R.	-	712	825
Sri Lanka	55	1.344	703
Thailand	1.256	2.077	2.466
Maldivene	201	-	-
Guatemala	-	1.811	-
Total Programme Countries	3.779	7.579	25.351
Total outside Programme Countries	6.277	2.069	6.401
TOTAL RELIEF ACTIVITIES	10.056	9.638	31.752
TOTAL FOREIGN EXPENCES	47.559	58.466	89.428

29.05.85

REDD BARNA, Oslo

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