

REPORT 7, 2023

Evaluation of the interaction between Norwegian humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace efforts

Country report: Democratic Republic of the Congo



Disclaimer This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Evaluation Department of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.



The report is commissioned by the Department for Evaluation in Norad.

The Department for Evaluation is responsible for conducting independent evaluations of activities funded over the ODA budget. The department is governed under a separate mandate and associated strategy issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. The department reports directly to the Secretary Generals of these two ministries.

This report has been prepared by ADE.


Team

Vincent Coppens (Team Leader)
Dr Edward Rackley (Country Lead DRC)
Martine Van de Velde (Country Lead Lebanon)
Erik Toft (Country Lead Ethiopia)
Grace Rubambura (National Expert DRC)
Dr Chaza Akik National (Expert Lebanon)
Ambachew Amare (National Expert Ethiopia)
Dr Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, PhD (Senior Advisor)
Bassam Bechara, Théo Mercadal (Evaluation Experts)
Edoardo Pittola, Lea Matthaei, Paul May (Research Assistants)
Dr Edwin Clerckx (Quality Assurance Expert))

December 2023

ISBN: 978-82-8369-185-6

Coverphoto: **Catianne Tijerina** | UN Women | Flickr
Photo: **Marina Mestres Segarra** | UN Women | Flickr →





Preface

As the Director of the Department for Evaluation at Norad, it is with great anticipation that I introduce the culmination of our extensive evaluation of the coherence of Norwegian humanitarian, development and peace efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Lebanon.

Our journey in this evaluation began with a foundational geospatial country analysis, conducted by Devstat. This quantitative analysis set the stage for the subsequent analysis presented here, led by ADE, with a focus on implementation and policy coherence.

At the heart of our evaluation lies the exploration of the nexus between humanitarian efforts, development aid, and peace initiatives. This concept, which has gained prominence since the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016, challenges us to bridge the operational, organizational, and financial divides that have historically separated these crucial sectors. Addressing this issue is crucial as the fulfillment of humanitarian needs, development, and peace cannot be achieved without one another.

The ongoing multidimensional crises have led to a reversal in progress on human development, an increase in the number of people living in crisis-affected contexts and escalated humanitarian needs. A coherent response between humanitarian, development, and peace efforts is crucial. It ensures that the crisis-affected individuals, the rights holders, receive the necessary support to overcome the challenges they face.

In each country, the evaluation aimed to observe and analyze the real-world manifestations of this nexus, examining how these interactions unfold in practice and their implications for Norwegian development policy and the broader Norwegian development aid system.

ADE's evaluation team has addressed these questions and provides insightful analysis in this report. The insights gleaned here have the potential to inform and improve Norway's engagement not only in the DRC, Ethiopia, and Lebanon but also in other regions grappling with similar challenges.

Helge Østveiten
Director, Department for Evaluation

December 2023





Table of contents

Executive summary	7
1. Introduction	10
Objectives and scope of this Country Report	11
Approach and limitations	12
2. Context	14
3. Findings	17
Implementation Coherence	18
Policy Coherence	29
Implementation and policy coherence at sector level: Health and Peace	33
4. Conclusions	34
5. Recommendations	37
List of annexes	40
Annex 1: Terms of Reference	41
Annex 2: Stakeholders consulted	50
Annex 3: Bibliography	51





List of figures and boxes

Figure 1. Overview of the evaluation approach	12
Figure 2. Number of Norway-funded HDP projects and total disbursement by type of project in DRC (2015-2021)	23
Figure 3. Balance in funding between HDP dimensions in Norwegian and other bilateral donors' portfolio (2015-2021)	23
Box 1. Emergency water for IDPs becomes urban distribution system under State control	28





Abbreviations and acronyms

CAFI	Central African Forest Initiative	REGIDESO	Régie de Distribution d'Eau de la République Démocratique du Congo
CFM	Complaint and Feedback Mechanism	SCI	Save the Children International
DG ECHO	Directorate-General European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations	TOC	Theory of Change
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	UK	United Kingdom
EQ	Evaluation Question	UN	United Nations
ET	Evaluation Team	UN CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
EU	European Union	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
FONAREDD	Fonds National REDD+	UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
GBV	Gender-Based Violence	USD	United States Dollar
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
HDP	Humanitarian Development Peace	WBG	World Bank Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	WFP	World Food Programme
IDP	Internally Displaced Person		
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation		
KII	Key Informants Interview		
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organizations		
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC		
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid		
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization		
NMFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs		
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council		
OECD-DAC	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee		
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation		





Executive summary

Introduction and methodology

The Department for Evaluation of Norad commissioned ADE to conduct an independent assessment of the interaction between Norwegian humanitarian aid, development cooperation, and peace efforts (HDP) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The assessment, spanning from 2016 to 2021, focuses on implementation and policy coherence, with a specific exploration of the connection between health and peace initiatives.

The evaluation comprises two phases: a geospatial country analysis (Phase 1) and the current implementation and policy coherence analysis (Phase 2). This report, emphasizing Phase 2, builds on insights from Phase 1. It applied a theory-based approach in line with OECD-DAC standards, primarily including a Theory of Change and a set of structured evaluation questions. The evaluation process drew its findings mainly from a review of Norwegian policy documents, and HDP-related research literature, from remote interviews with stakeholders based in Oslo, from an in-country mission in the DRC from 27 August to 7 September 2023, and from a survey to relevant stakeholders, both at country and global levels.

Limitations to this country reports include: (i) challenges related to partner availability, which were partially addressed using the survey, (ii) institutional memory, as there was significant staff turnover in DRC during the evaluated period, that could only be partially mitigated by conducting reviews of project documents, and (iii) the volatile security context in which the field mission took place, that hampered the ET (Evaluation Team)'s ability to meet with stakeholders based outside of main cities.

Conclusions

C1. Norwegian embassy had little capacity to engage directly on the HDP Nexus; it relied primarily on the United Nations system and the Nexus Working Group.

The embassy was recent and had limited staff and resources to cover three countries. Funding and planning remained separate between NMFA and Norad, determined with Oslo. Capacity to engage in HDP Nexus discussions and planning with actors receiving Norwegian funding was limited; it was easier to outsource by giving flexible funding and core funding to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in New York for humanitarian response and to UN agencies in country that used Nexus approaches,

such as the resilience programmes described in this report. Main downsides to this were loss of influence/leverage, high overhead fees, and very little localization or State ownership. The embassy had also not undertaken any formal assessment of how the HDP Nexus works in DRC.

C2. Implementation coherence was limited. NMFA and Norad remained distinct institutions with separate mandates and funding streams, which were not always mutually transparent. Coexistence was collegial and supportive but there was no pressure to integrate or coordinate around HDP or simpler goals, such as collaborating for greater return on investment on humanitarian spending to reduce humanitarian needs, for instance, or to increase localization and State ownership to reduce Norway's development budget.

C3. Flexibility of Norwegian funds was a key value added of Norwegian aid. It was widely appreciated by HDP actors and donors. It enabled targeting of specific needs, where few other donors invested (specifically, transitions between humanitarian and development projects).





C4. Umbrella or 'cascading' financing structures posed a dilemma for HDP thinking and delivery (OCHA Country-Based Pool Funds and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, CERF and Humanitarian Financing Unit, UN agencies). With their high transaction costs, limited transparency, and resistance to localization, the cost benefits of these financing structures to channel and direct outside funding toward DRC's most pressing needs were questioned by non-UN actors working in HDP. Other HDP donors and actors saw the need for reform while accepting that State capacity was too weak, making substitution inevitable for now. In the case of Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI), the chain of payments included the State, but the number of oversight institutions made for high overhead losses. Norwegian funds went first to UNOPS, then to FONAREDD (DRC institution), then to Tulane University and other delivery partners that deliver projects using local agencies.

C5. The absence of a Nexus Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework meant positive outcomes and impacts were not documented. Did the HDP community of actors and programmes need its own theory of change and M&E framework for measuring results? HDP donors and actors were proud of progress made without creating additional layers of bureaucracy and coordination. While positive, no changes were measured, or successes documented. Should Norway invest in measuring and capturing the progress of its investments in HDP projects given that the wider HDP approach had no dedicated M&E framework or theory of

change? HDP actors maintained that the DRC national development plan contained sufficient indicators and that it was reflective of Nexus goals and ways of working. The UN Humanitarian Response Plan also had indicators against which results would be measured. Without dedicated case studies focusing on Nexus in DRC, however, and no Nexus M&E framework, positive changes risked getting lost. Also, Norway's future investment in Nexus projects might be contingent on prior measured progress. For this reason, asking Norway's partners to show measured changes in their HDP projects could be constructive.

C6. As a pilot country for the UN New Way of Working, DRC had benefited from an intense HDP focus among donors and agencies since 2016. Yet the country context and State capacity remained a major challenge. While state building was not the purpose of the HDP Nexus as such, it was impossible to reduce humanitarian need in DRC, which was a Nexus goal, without basic service delivery managed and run by the State, including security. Despite successful HDP approaches, current donor resources were inadequate to meet DRC's needs in administrative capacity, eliminating extreme poverty, and increasing human development. Many donors identified State capacities as a major obstacle in addressing those issues. Many Norwegian-supported partners perceived provincial authorities to be much better HDP partners than central government, as they were chronically under-funded and closer to needs.

Recommendations

The following set of key recommendations emerge from this country study.

R1. For Norad: Consider a dedicated study to help analyze HDP opportunities for Norway in DRC, to assess previous HDP programmes (bilateral and multilateral), and to inform policy and programming now and in the immediate future.

Could Norway have gotten better, more lasting results through other types of programmes, such as the CAFI, a highly innovative response to a long-term, multi-faceted crisis? And what are the specific opportunities and priorities for Norway as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) prepares to depart in 2024? Given that the two preeminent HDP programmes receiving Norwegian funding were UN-led and depended heavily on MONUSCO ('resilience' in Kasai and Tanganyika), such questions on priorities for the future are worth examining further in detail.

R2. For NMFA in DRC: Consider a stand-by ('rainy day') fund to identify and support handovers between humanitarian services and State and/or development partners to ensure continuity and durable solutions. This implies the difficult challenge of moving from humanitarian no-cost service models to cost-recovery (or fee based) systems used by development actors and the State.





R3. For NMFA and Norad in DRC: Better define Norway's specific contribution to HDP Nexus programming and reflection in DRC. HDP donors stated that the best way for Norway to contribute to advancing HDP in DRC was to invest where Norway can make a difference, e.g. increasing climate security thinking and practice at the national level, improving HDP outcomes and localization among Norwegian NGOs, or supporting specific forms of research and analysis on realistic conditions for peace, security, and development in transitional contexts where HDP programming is being considered. European donors specifically asked that Norway join the 'Nexus core team' as technical advisers. Some Norwegian NGOs requested that Norway push for coherence at the sub-national level by directing its implementing partners to share their HDP lessons and challenges with local Nexus coordination groups to enrich local learning and to encourage wider adoption of effective solutions.

R4. For NMFA and Norad in DRC: Improve coherence among UN agencies who receive the largest share of Norwegian funding in DRC (and who are its leading HDP actors) by pushing for increased inter-agency analysis, planning and integrated delivery. Greater coherence can be achieved by pressuring the country's biggest HDP actors to harmonize and integrate their HDP planning, analysis, and M&E systems. Some UN agencies wore both hats (humanitarian and development) but had no plans to integrate these sections internally. This strict compartmentalization could impede opportunities for HDP synergy within and between UN agencies. Inter-agency synergy and collaboration appeared to be the preference (versus collapsing humanitarian and development departments within agencies).

R5. For NMFA and Norad in DRC: Consider providing flexible multi-year funding for UN-led HDP Nexus programmes with solid track record (e.g. resilience programmes in Kasai and Tanganyika). Continue leveraging Norway's ability to be crisis-responsive with its flexible funding, seen as a strong value-added to be replicated and expanded in DRC. Funding flexibility would allow Nexus partner agencies (UN, or Norwegian NGOs) to target arising needs quickly, often where few other donors invest. Their multi-year scope (vs. annual funding cycles common to humanitarian programmes) would help anticipate and capture results over several years. Coordinate this approach with key resilience and HDP donors in the country such as Sweden, Italy, Canada, GIZ and the European Union.

R6. For NMFA and Norad in DRC: A frank exchange over root causes is needed between Norwegian actors in country, and within the wider HDP community. Resulting programme designs will better anticipate and respond to immediate crises, and to those that escalate more slowly. Norway, its HDP delivery partners, and other HDP donors and their partners have not openly discussed or agreed upon why HDP is critical in DRC in the first place. HDP as a reform of the overseas aid sector should continue, as new crises are likely, and a more integrated response will remain essential. But greater coherence will result if HDP actors can agree on root causes and then design tailored, integrated approaches that accommodate these drivers. There was consensus that insurgencies and inter-group hostilities will continue to be driven by competition over resources and unequal access, lack of basic services (specifically health), ongoing insecurity and violence against citizens, forced displacement and refugee influx

from neighboring countries, and other new dynamics. But what or who is best placed to prevent these from happening? Is it the State, MONUSCO, or HDP actors? Such reflexion needs to happen to increase coherence within Norway's HDP community of actors, and across DRC's HDP actors generally. If Norwegian institutions and partners agree that the primary 'root cause' driving future need for HDP approaches is State fragility and weak public services, for example, then tailored programmes can be designed to address this. Specific consideration should also be given to connecting HDP Nexus thinking in DRC with environmental protection and the conservation agenda (cf. the CAFI funded by Norway) as a logical next step. Poor natural resource management is a major cause of increasing competition, violence, and insecurity between communities, particularly where State authorities and security forces are absent.





1

Introduction





Objectives and scope of this Country Report

The Department for Evaluation in Norad commissioned ADE to conduct an independent assessment of the interaction between Norwegian efforts in humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace (HDP, or 'triple Nexus' or 'Nexus' in this report¹), centered on implementation and policy coherence. It is based on three country cases: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Lebanon.

This report focuses on the DRC. It seeks to understand the coherence of Norway's HDP efforts in practice, within its specific national context, and over the period 2016-2021. This report does not examine the wider debates or interpretations of the Nexus, but focuses

on inherent dilemmas within HDP efforts in this country. In addition, the evaluation tries to highlight the dynamics between the health and peace interventions², also considering the place of Norway's climate and environment investments in DRC, CAFI specifically, relative to the wider arena of Nexus programming in DRC and Norway's role therein.

While the DRC was a significant recipient of Norwegian funding, with around NOK 1,4 billion received in 2016-2021, it was also a pilot country for the New Way of Working – as outlined in the UN Secretary General's report for the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit.



Photo: **Marina Mestres Segarra** | UN Women | Flickr

¹ The 'Triple Nexus' or 'HDP Nexus' refers to the 'New Way of Working' declaration on increasing coherence between development, humanitarian and peacebuilding (or human security) programming, a formulation first articulated in Antonio Guterres's, the current UN Secretary General, acceptance speech in 2016. See also Annex 7 to this report. 'Nexus' in this paper refers to this 'triple' or HDP version, unless otherwise indicated.

² Intervention' in this context is used interchangeably with 'project'






Approach and limitations

General evaluation approach

The evaluation follows a two-phased approach: a geospatial country analysis (Phase 1), already completed by Devstat, and the current phase of implementation and policy coherence analysis led by ADE (Phase 2). The geospatial country analysis, completed at the end of February 2023, provided a quantitative review of Norwegian aid in the three countries, focusing on interventions between 2015 and 2021, and evaluating their coherence relative to each other, relative to evolving contexts, and relative to interventions through multilateral aid or by other OECD-DAC countries. The present report's primary goal is to draw on the findings from Phase 1 and complements them with a qualitative assessment, with the aim of elaborating conclusions and activable recommendations for relevant Norwegian stakeholders.

FIGURE 1
Overview of the evaluation approach





The present evaluation for Phase 2 follows a theory-based approach, based on OECD-DAC guidelines, notably consisting of (i) reconstructing a Theory of Change (ToC) with regard to coherence between Norwegian humanitarian, development and peace efforts (annex 4), and (ii) structuring data collection and analysis around an evaluation matrix with evaluation questions (EQs) and sub-questions, and a series of possible indicators and data collection methods. The several steps of the evaluation process were conducted as per figure 1:

Limitations of this country report include: (i) availability of certain partners, partially compensated by the survey, (ii) institutional memory due to staff turnover in DRC also considering that the evaluation covered a period that ended 2 years ago 2016-2021, partially compensated by project document reviews, (iii) a very volatile security context that hampered ET's ability to conduct field visits and meetings with stakeholders and beneficiaries, and (iv) a set-up allowing analysis at national level and at programme level in only one province, North Kivu.

Country approach

The country approach included:

- A desk review of Norwegian policy documents, agreement and implementing partners documentation and HDP research literature.
- Remote interviews with stakeholders based in Oslo from NMFA, Norad and Norwegian civil society organizations.
- An in-country data collection mission occurred in Kinshasa and Goma between Aug 27 – Sept 7, 2023.

The DRC case study was conducted by an international senior evaluation expert and a national senior evaluation expert. Field research for this study was conducted simultaneously in Kinshasa and Goma, to enable meetings with the donor community and to visit project sites. Some Norwegian civil society

organizations (i.e., Digni) have no representation in Kinshasa. Those met in Goma include Save the Children International (SCI), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Besides remote interviews, in-person meetings, and project visits, the Evaluation Team conducted an extensive desk review of DRC project literature and reports on the triple Nexus approach since 2016. An online survey was developed and shared with key informants to capture quantitative findings around triple Nexus coherence, planning, and programming.

Please refer to Annex 2 for the exhaustive list of stakeholders consulted as part of this study.





2

Context





The DRC is the largest country in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a population exceeding 95 million. Its population was among the five poorest nations in the world and its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita stood at 577.2 United States Dollar (USD) in 2023³. Ongoing challenges such as insufficient infrastructure, a complex legal environment, corrupt practices across society, and a lack of transparency in government policies and financial activities, continued to impede investment and hamper economic development. The country ranked 164 out of 174 countries on the 2020 Human Capital Index, the culmination of decades of conflict and fragility.

Sixty-two years after its independence, DRC experienced its first peaceful transition of power in January 2019. Despite continued conflict prevention and stabilization efforts, areas of insecurity have persisted in the country, particularly in the eastern region. Indeed, MONUSCO deployments in the Tanganyika Province were short-lived but effective in achieving stability⁴, while their presence in the Kivus region has persisted for decades with no significant improvement in citizen security.⁵ The DRC had the largest population of

3 WBG, Country Overview, DRC, 2023 (<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>).

4 MONUSCO, MONUSCO's withdrawal from Tanganyika: mission accomplished, according to Bintou Keita, 2022 (<https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/monuscos-withdrawal-tanganyika-mission-accomplished-according-bintou-keita>).

5 Security Council Report, September 2023 Monthly Forecast, 2023 (<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-09/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-22.php>).

internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa and the highest number of food-insecure people worldwide. Additionally, it had one of the highest rates of gender-based violence (GBV) worldwide⁶.

The DRC has been a long-term recipient of significant international and UN-led aid effort, with an emphasis on stabilization, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, alongside considerable funding allocated to humanitarian interventions, to which Norway has been a contributor. Climate change has further intensified the complexity of challenges in the DRC, as it complicated access to natural resources for the population⁷. In parallel, DRC also faced acute crises regarding its healthcare system, as it has been significantly strained by its prolonged conflict and enduring complex humanitarian crises. Recurring outbreaks of cholera, measles and Ebola during the reporting period, capped by COVID-19 from 2020, required new resources for emergency response from donors and agencies, as the Ministry of Health capacity and budget remained sub-standard.⁸ COVID-19 created another layer of complexity, as many expatriate staff from donor institutions returned to their home countries, and projects were managed remotely. Finally, the number and geographic scope

6 USAID, Democratic Republic of the Congo – Complex Emergency, 2023.

7 UNEP, UNEP Study Confirms DR Congo's Potential as Environmental Powerhouse but Warns of Critical Threats, 2017 (www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/unep-study-confirms-dr-congos-potential-environmental-powerhouse-warns).

8 WBG, Country Overview, DRC, 2023 (<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/drc/overview>).

of conflict theatres have increased since 2016, beginning with the Kamuina Nsapu insurgency in Central Kasai province. Alongside this crisis, in 2017, waves of inter-ethnic violence surged in northern Tanganyika province, again requiring donors and agencies to shift budget and programming to accommodate this new area of critical humanitarian need.




Photo: Marina Mestres Segarra | UN Women | Flickr





As UN peacekeepers were deployed in Kasai and Tanganyika, their efforts to control violence were largely successful, allowing Nexus planning (context and needs analysis, operational synergies, priority sectors, lead agencies, etc.) and collaboration (division of operational labor, resource sharing, relations with State actors, programme outcomes, etc.) to commence in both contexts.⁹ The Nexus Task Force, led by Sweden, had been very active in DRC following the 2016 New Way of Working declaration and the 2019 DAC amendment, and its contribution to the development of Nexus programming (integration of H, D, and P with resilience as the end goal) in these two highly visible pilot contexts was widely reported to the ET. Donors also reported that this momentum later stalled during the COVID-19 epidemic (2020-2022), as quarantine restrictions limited physical interaction and many donor staff returned home.¹⁰¹¹ Still, the period between 2016 and 2020 saw great progress in coordination and operational collaboration towards implementation of the Nexus, with some Norwegian

involvement. It saw the development of collective outcomes, fostering greater Nexus awareness, and learning to read the Congolese context through Nexus eyes.

In 2021, DRC received over 3.5 billion USD in aid, which accounted for approximately 7% of its GDP.¹² This ratio was significant and suggests that international aid has continued to provide the bulk of basic service-delivery for local populations where national institutions were absent.

9 Unless otherwise specified, 'Nexus planning', 'Nexus delivery', 'Nexus collaboration' and similar terms refer to HDP activities by the aid community of actors. Where Norway is directly involved, 'Norwegian Nexus' or 'Norwegian HDP' activities are the terms used. The distinction is important, as it underscores the scale of Nexus activity in country compared to Norway's relatively small level of engagement in Nexus matters, as Norway considers whether (and how) to increase that engagement.

10 Key Informant Interviews.

11 Sweden continues to lead the Nexus donor group but stated that for last 1-2 years the group was on hiatus. See also the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Results Group 4 Country Brief on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus in the DRC.

12 WBG, Data Bank, 2023 (<https://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep>).





3

Findings





Implementation Coherence

EQ1

To what extent are Norwegian humanitarian, development, and peace interventions coherent at the implementation level (i.e., the relationship between interventions)?

Summary of findings: The coordination among Norwegian-supported partners was limited in DRC, as no official mechanism of internal coordination, little information sharing, and no ongoing collaboration between Norway partners were identified by the evaluation team (ET). This resulted in few common outcomes and synergies among Norwegian actors.

One reason for this fragmentation was that the NMFA/Norad approach to HDP Nexus implementation in DRC has been 'project-based', meaning that the three components of HDP Nexus were adopted by specific projects, independently from one another, and without a clearly stated strategic framework for HDP Nexus implementation at country level.

As highlighted in multiple Key Informant Interviews (KIs), collaboration opportunities in implementing Nexus programming were generally examined in response to evolving dynamics on the ground by both Norwegian and non-Norwegian actors. Intervention dynamics varied considerably according to context across the country.

While Nexus-related fora were well-established for the international community working in DRC, with a national coordination group for donors and regional, sector-specific groups for implementing partners (some receiving Norwegian funding), these mechanisms seem to have produced uneven results. Survey respondents were quite cautious in claiming significant progress in joint HDP programming and work planning, collective outcomes, and synergies between Norwegian and non-Norwegian actors. Strong differences continued to distinguish humanitarian and development approaches. Approaches to sustainability are different, exit strategies differ, relations to the State and public services differ. Crucially, their project financing structures were opposed: humanitarian aid was free (donated) and often independent of government services; development assistance builds in user fees to recover costs and partners with the State.

In the Congolese context during the period under review, Norway was viewed by like-minded partners as a minor actor in DRC HDP implementation but was strongly encouraged to develop a more active role in HDP Nexus coordination mechanisms and programming debates. Norway's ability to be crisis-responsive thanks to its flexible funding was seen as a strong value-add to be replicated and expanded in DRC.





I.a. To what extent have there been spatial (geographic) and longitudinal (sequential) coherence in Norwegian HDP programming?

Finding 1: There was no forum or official mechanism in place to ensure coordination among Norwegian HDP partners, and limited information sharing among them. This resulted in a 'project-based', fragmented approach to the three components of the HDP Nexus, meaning that these were independently adopted by individual projects, but without reference to a wider strategic framework or orientation, either locally or at country level. Regional level, sector-specific coordination mechanisms were the primary interface between Norwegian HDP partners. Beyond these mechanisms (cluster meetings, the international NGO forum, and thematic working groups), stakeholders reported that there was no internal forum for consultation between Norwegian-supported partners to identify HDP-specific opportunities for operational synergies, to increase operational impact, or to extend geographic reach.

Some information exchange between Norwegian-supported partners was identified during interviews with key informants at cluster level, for instance where a Norwegian partner was the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster co-lead. There was limited evidence for this practice among other Norwegian-supported partners.

Data from the survey confirmed this lack of internal coordination among Norwegian actors, as only 3 respondents on DRC out of 18 that expressed an opinion agreed or strongly agreed that HDP programmes funded by Norway demonstrate complementary work planning. Views on information sharing were more positive: 14 respondents out of 22 agreed or strongly agreed that Norway is a donor actively engaged in regular and structured information sharing when planning and implementing HDP programmes.¹³

What appeared from interviews with Norwegian-supported partners and staff from the Embassy in Kinshasa was that the NMFA has not been proactive in the design of programmes integrating HDP Nexus with Norwegian-supported partners or UN entities in DRC, despite promoting the adoption of such an approach internally and at Oslo level. Its role was essentially to identify programme proposals that best corresponded to operational objectives, including the joint integration of Humanitarian, Development or Peace components, as translated through competitive bidding, and that were then funded by Norwegian resources. It did not prescribe or dictate the design of these programmes according to a country strategy with pre-determined objectives, operational parameters or approach, but did offer strategic guidance and feedback where relevant.¹⁴

¹³ No significant trend was observable when disaggregating survey data per sub-groups on these dimensions.

¹⁴ Key Informant Interviews with agencies supported by Norway.

This support role resulted in a 'project-based approach' (term used by the wider Nexus community in DRC), where practices in line with the implementation of the HDP Nexus were adopted by ongoing or existing programmes independently from one another and without wider strategic or operational coherence across a given donor's portfolio.¹⁵ Interviews with other donors confirmed that this lack of internal coherence – the absence of a detailed 'HDP Nexus approach' within their country strategy, with its own operational guidelines and outcomes, applied by a given donor – was widespread in DRC.¹⁶ We also note that the concept of Nexus was mentioned for the first time in Embassy planning only in 2019.¹⁷

Reasons for this included the experimental attitude of donors and agencies towards HDP Nexus implementation in the DRC, the wide range of implementing partners with different mandates, scope, understanding and relationships to HDP Nexus implementation (and the 2019 OECD-DAC declaration¹⁸), and the probability of different outcomes given the diversity of local contexts. Also, given the inter-agency partnerships required to create complementary multisector H, D and

¹⁵ Interviews with MFA Kinshasa and Oslo Norad representatives.

¹⁶ A stakeholder consulted mentions for instance in this respect that: "The initiative of Nexus types of projects could come also from Norad, not only from MFA / embassies. With the new reorganization of the Norwegian institutions, it will be easier to coordinate Nexus projects."

¹⁷ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norwegian Embassy in Kinshasa, Annual activity plan, 2019.

¹⁸ <https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/public/doc/643/643.en.pdf>.





P projects, agreement on respective roles and responsibilities, integrated M&E systems, and delivery modalities was required, which took time and involved institutional compromises. The onus to attain optimal coherence within a given programme therefore fell to agencies themselves. Donors could support, guide, and offer feedback but were not ultimately responsible for the operational design of specific delivery modalities given the plethora of different actors and wide variety of operational contexts facing actors in the DRC¹⁹.

The upshot of HDP Nexus programme design being actor driven created a nuanced trade-off: (a) less coherence across Norwegian programming among its H, D and P components ('project-based approaches') in turn (b) allowed programmes to tailor themselves precisely to the specific needs and conflict dynamics of their chosen operational context ('bottom-up design'). This trade-off helped explain why less portfolio coherence could be considered a 'positive sacrifice' that allowed for better adapted programmes, despite their resulting content and aims being dissimilar, and yet still 'HDP Nexus' in their own way. An HDP Nexus project that prioritized food security would not resemble one that highlights human security, for example.

¹⁹ Key Informant Interviews with UN agencies, other Nexus donors and Working Group members.

Finally, a related finding is the proportionality of H-D-P funding from Norway during the review period, and how these amounts cohered with dynamics and opportunities for implementation of HDP Nexus programmes on the ground. Our analysis, supported by the Mid-Term Review of the Norwegian Humanitarian Strategy and Strategic Partnership Model, revealed that DRC was the 7th largest recipient of Norwegian humanitarian funding from 2019-2021. Yet the ET found no documented correlation between this funding stream and any specific humanitarian crisis or opportunity (as in Kasai or Tanganyika) in support of an integrated HDP Nexus programme. It was probable, but not confirmed, that concerns over the potential consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in a populous country with weak national health system informed this high humanitarian budget for DRC during the three-year period. As is widely documented now, the coordination of emergency donor funding for COVID-19 was poor, resulting in significant excess that could have been constructively absorbed by other pressing priorities in DRC.²⁰

²⁰ Investigating the effectiveness of COVID-19 aid in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2023: <https://doi.org/10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2023/338-3>.

Finding 2: There was no ongoing collaboration between Norwegian-supported partners as part of joint programming and implementation, resulting in few outcomes and synergies between the programs implemented by these actors. According to interviews with partners receiving Norwegian funding, there was no recent or ongoing collaboration or consortium to regularly convene in DRC. One recent exception, however, an example of spontaneous collaboration, was reported: SCI was implementing an NMFA-funded education project in 2020 with a school in Uvira that did not have access to water. SCI raised this problem in a cluster meeting. This resulted in another Norwegian partner going to the school and installing WASH services, thereby extending the range and impact of Norwegian partner.²¹

²¹ Key Informant Interviews.





This tendency among Norwegian-supported partners to work in isolation was reflected in the survey results. Only 4 respondents out of 21 agreed or strongly agreed that HDP programmes funded by Norway were “often jointly implemented”. 6 out of 19 agreed or strongly agreed that Norwegian actors involved in HDP programmes “continuously collaborate over time on the ground”.²² Yet significant differences in responses were noted across respondent categories. Notably, in Norway, 7 out of 8 individuals disagree that HDP programmes funded by Norway are jointly implemented, as opposed to 3 out of 12 at the national level and 1 out of 3 at the subnational level. Additionally, among thematic fields, 11 out of 15 respondents in the Development field disagree, while the Humanitarian field has 3 out of 12 respondents who disagree, and the Peace field has 2 out of 4 respondents who disagree. The contrast of these response patterns suggests an absence of common perspective resulting from regular communications with the aim of consensus. After all, the existence of coordination mechanisms clearly did not guarantee coordinated programming or even shared perspectives among agencies and donors.

²² A stakeholder consulted mentions for instance in this respect that: “Even though there are coordination meetings at local level, projects do not share their results or good practices enough or do not cooperate enough with each other. This should be improved locally, but MFA/ Norad could also encourage it by introducing this (the need for local cooperation or sharing the results locally) as a mandatory element in their call for proposals.”

As a result, no clear collective outcomes or synergies attributable to joint programming and implementation could be identified involving only Norwegian-supported partners. This finding was not unique to Norway; it was supported by other evaluations of portfolios of donors having the ambition of implementing HDP Nexus programmes in DRC.²³ Surprisingly, many survey respondents shared a satisfactory opinion on the question that ‘HDP programmes funded by Norway worked towards common outcomes’ (regardless of whether these were implemented by Norwegian agencies), with 16 out of 20 agreeing or strongly agreeing with this. This divergence of opinion could be explained by the fact that respondents considered these collective outcomes to be achievable through collaboration with non-Norwegian partners or the UN system. Indeed, numerous examples of successful joint programming by Norwegian-supported partners with a large set of international and local actors were identified.

²³ International Assistance Evaluation Division (PRA), Global Affairs Canada, Evaluation of International Assistance Programming in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2012–13 to 2018–19, 2020. (<https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/evaluation/2020/drc-ia-ai-rdc.aspx?lang=eng>).

Overall, Norway and other donors explained that collaboration possibilities often arise spontaneously, based on context dynamics and events that make joint programming logical and compelling. The collaboration related above between SCI and the Norwegian partner was a good example of ad hoc conditions driving local partnerships with other relevant actors, be they Norwegian-supported partners or not. As confirmed in interviews, Norwegian-supported partners have collaborated with a large set of international and local actors as part of planning and programming of projects integrating HDP Nexus components. In some cases, the selection of collaborating partners was based less on context and more on principle. For instance, one Norwegian partner emphasized it sought to partner with local organizations because of its corporate priority on localization²⁴.

²⁴ In the Kivus, where many national NGOs are active, Norwegian INGOs conduct competitive bidding processes and select the best technical proposals based on local knowledge and demonstrated analysis. This makes localization more realistic in the Kivus. Localization is more difficult, with significant risk and compromise on technical capacity, in other Nexus operational contexts such as Ituri and the Kasais which had little to no prior presence of HDP actors. Local CSOs and NGOs that arose are arguably fewer and less experienced than those in the Kivus and Ituri, where violent conflict has persisted for more than twenty years.





I.b. To what extent (and eventually how) do humanitarian, development and peace interventions combine to respond to contextual changes?

Finding 3: Norwegian funding covered all three H-D-P dimensions, although in particular humanitarian aid and development. Several positive examples were reported of linking all three dimensions into their designs. As compared to Peace activities, Humanitarian and Development interventions received the bulk of Norwegian funding over the review period²⁵. Interestingly, this balance between Humanitarian and Development funding was not shared by the main bilateral donors in DRC (see figure 3 below), although a similar equivalency can be found in United Kingdom (UK) and Sweden's portfolios. The Peace component remained significantly lower in Norwegian funding, although it was also proportionally higher than in other donors' portfolios, especially in 2017 and 2018.²⁶ A Norwegian stakeholder mentioned that one reason for a lower share of development aid (D vs. H and P) compared to other donors, was that Norway saw itself already as a major contributor to the UN system, including MONUSCO, UN CERF, and

²⁵ Over the period evaluated, Humanitarian interventions represented 44% of the funding channeled by Norway to DRC, while Development interventions represented 45%, and Peace interventions 7%.

²⁶ Devstat, Geospatial country analysis Phase I, 2023.

the annual humanitarian appeals²⁷, and saw no added value in competing with or duplicating UN actions by funding additional development programmes in the same sectors, given Norway's very limited DRC budget. This incentive to further reinforce coherence with UN actors, including MONUSCO and UN stabilization fund, was also highlighted in the Embassy work plans²⁸. A stakeholder also raised the point that after MONUSCO withdrawal in 2024, Norway might wish to re-evaluate its development priorities and programming budget with regard to UN entities, Country based Pooled Funds, and its coherence with humanitarian and peace interventions generally.

²⁷ Moreover, much of UNICEF, WFP, UNFPA, UNDP and FAO's work in the DRC, besides being crisis-related, also pursues institutional strengthening and sustainable development at the community level (noting that Norway has no direct oversight or donor responsibility in these UN programmes). Norway's exact contribution amounts to core support for UN entities at HQ level, which in turn is allocated to programmes at country level, was not known by stakeholders interviewed during the Kinshasa visit. How this sum compares to Norway's annual budget in country for H, D and P, would have been useful for them to know as it could inform future analysis, advocacy and positioning vis à vis the UN in country.

²⁸ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norwegian Embassy in Kinshasa, Annual activity plan, 2015-2021.



Photo: **Wayne Conradie** | picturingafrica.com





FIGURE 2

Number of Norway-funded HDP projects and total disbursement by type of project in DRC (2015-2021)





FIGURE 3

Balance in funding between HDP dimensions in Norwegian and other bilateral donors' portfolio (2015-2021)



Source: Devstat, Geospatial Analysis, 2023





Among the projects implemented by Norwegian-supported partners and/or funded with Norwegian financial resources mentioned during interviews and reviewed by the ET, some could be highlighted as linking all three HDP Nexus components into their designs, based on specific context dynamics or challenges facing local populations. These included:

- Support to the CAFI, a multi-donor initiative originally launched with Norwegian funding in six partner countries, which pushed for more mechanized farming to replace slash and burn practices. Conserving forests through improved agriculture and family planning could reduce resource-related conflict and instability and improve quality of life – also Nexus aims but via different vectors of change. CAFI consisted of three main projects: (i) creating a national forestry surveillance system to measure the rate and range of deforestation; (ii) driving national policy reforms for sustainable agriculture (adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture as a condition for receiving World Bank Group (WBG) loans); (iii) promoting the ‘demographic dividend’ through family

planning and female contraception.²⁹ The main challenge was to bring public institutions into these dynamics and processes, and to make them deliver for local people. The idea was to create and apply publicly owned solutions today that prevent resource scarcity and conflict in the future.³⁰

- The joint support to education programmes in conflict zones involving Norwegian-supported partners, DG ECHO, and the EU more widely. The European Commission’s Directorate-General European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) developed emergency education accommodations for IDPs in existing school buildings and included children from vulnerable local families. The EU also signed a bilateral agreement with the provincial Ministry of Education, although their role was initially minimal given little presence and resources. The Norwegian

²⁹ CAFI’s seven key outcomes are: (i) Sustainable agricultural practices lead to less land conversion and increased food security; (ii) Sustainable alternatives to current wood energy practices are adopted; (iii) Forestry sector and protected areas institutions and stakeholders have the capacity and the legal framework to promote, monitor and enforce sustainable management of forests; (iv) Future infrastructure and mining projects minimize their overall footprint on forests; (v) Land use planning decisions ensure a balanced representation of sectoral interests and keep forests standing, and better tenure security does not incentivize forest loss by individuals, communities or companies; (vi) Population growth and migration to forests and forest fronts are slowed down; (vii) Better inter-ministerial coordination and governance resulting in a permitting, enforcement and fiscal regime of economic activities that do not push economic actors to forest conversion and illegal activities; and a business climate favorable to forest-friendly investments. Source: CAFI Trust Fund, 2021 Consolidated Report, October 2022.

³⁰ Key Informant Interviews with CAFI participants.

INGO became the primary implementing partner, helping displaced children get placed in local schools. When entire communities were displaced, the Norwegian INGO helped their community teachers to move with them. This helped ensure that IDPs were being schooled, that their rattrapage (remedial learning) was monitored and effective. This also helped local communities absorb the shock created by the mass IDP influx.³¹

Finding 4: Despite the proactiveness of Norway to identify and support HDP Nexus programmes in DRC, the national political and security context was highly volatile, hampering the sustainable impact of such interventions. Lessons learnt provided by other donors helped to highlight basic best practices for optimal results of HDP Nexus implementation in the evolving DRC context. Interviews with donor representatives underlined that even though certain HDP Nexus projects were relevant and achieved results, the extremely volatile security and political context in DRC has seriously hampered their ability to scale their localized impact to the regional level. As reported during interviews with different donors,³² Without national institutions absorbing some of the cost and responsibility for Humanitarian Development and Peace programmes, donors emphasized that

³¹ Key Informant Interviews in Goma and Kinshasa.

³² On this purpose, the DRC was rated in 2021 by the Government Effectiveness Index with a score of -1.8 and was ranked among the top 10 lowest scores worldwide.





opportunities for exit strategy were limited. For instance, in the Kivus where humanitarian action and chronic displacement predominate, public services were absent.³³ Norwegian aid actors tried to marry relief operations to durable solutions (promoting local autonomy), knowing that conflict, forced displacement, and aid dependency will continue.

Stakeholders consulted also informed the ET of various strategies to adapt to contextual changes when implementing HDP Nexus programmes, including:

- The need to prioritize HDP Nexus programmes where previous conflict had subsided and displacement-affected people were ready for returns or resettlement. Cessation of conflict opens a window of opportunity for analysis and possible implementation of H, D, and P programmes, and worked well in Kasai and Tanganyika, producing the 'resilience' programmes led by FAO and WFP. Their focus on contexts where peacekeepers were withdrawing but public services were still too weak to meet basic needs of the population proved a conducive environment for the effective implementation of H, D, and P programmes and, ultimately, success. With Norwegian support, these H, D and P projects occurred after peacekeepers had controlled armed conflict making IDP returns possible, and were providing a minimum of security

³³ CFR, Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2023 (<https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo>).

for implementing partners to engage. As reported during interviews, such was the case in the Kasais and Tanganyika after the departure of MONUSCO in 2018-2019.³⁴

- The peacebuilding component accompanying programmes was able to succeed by integrating returning displaced populations and communities of origin using joint farming activities to restore relations around a common purpose. This social cohesion approach in turn generated more stable food security, increased agricultural production and revenue, fostering resilience to shocks from climate change (rainfall and drought periods are increasingly unpredictable) or to future social tensions that would otherwise result in violence or mass displacement.³⁵

³⁴ The UN-led resilience programmes to which Norway has donated in recent years are the sole HDP efforts that directly involve Norway and that directly interface with MONUSCO peacekeeping and stabilization efforts. Norway is not involved in these discussions; they are between UN actors and MONUSCO. Other Norwegian NGOs and programming partners in the East working with Nexus approaches avoid any direct association with MONUSCO in the field, given the potential for negative consequences due to public hostility and mistrust towards MONUSCO for its perceived impotence and support for Rwandan interests. This avoidance also helps to preserve agency neutrality, as MONUSCO is not seen as neutral or impartial by most Congolese in conflict-affected areas.

³⁵ Key Informants Interviews with UN agencies leading resilience programmes, which are understood as HDP in essence. The same resilience dynamics ('virtuous circle') are described in the Kasai and Tanganyika resilience programme documentation provided to the ET by FAO and WFP during the Kinshasa visit.

- Geographic convergence over several years was critical to develop relations with provincial authorities, gradually integrating them into HDP activities, and seeking opportunities for handover. With basic service delivery in health and education, these could be targeted for transition from humanitarianism's costfree services to more sustainable models of user fees for basic public services provided by the State. As stated by implementing partners receiving Norwegian funding, this outcome offered the most realistic exit strategy and terms of successes.





I.c. To what extent (and eventually how) have these efforts been coordinated with those of other actors (e.g. other OECD DAC countries, national government, multilateral actors)?

Finding 5: Coordination among like-minded donors towards HDP Nexus implementation was already in place with Norwegian actors involved. Coordination among like-minded, complementary donors³⁶ including Norway was well established, and included joint programming and fundraising (see also chapter 2). Implementation and conceptual understanding of HDP Nexus programmes was overall advanced in DRC, to the point where UN agencies³⁷, implementing partners, and national NGO implementers designed HDP Nexus programme proposals (based on emerging opportunities), piloted them with core funding³⁸, and then sought larger follow-on funding for a multi-year

³⁶ These partners included Nexus donor group countries, whose membership was fluid, but generally included EU Member States, FCDO as well as JICA. One should note that USAID was absent from this donor group. UN agencies were not included as they compete for donor contracts, so their presence could pose a conflict of interest.

³⁷ Norway's funding to multilateral organizations for projects / support specific to DRC represented NOK 691 million during the 2016-2021 evaluation period. All of it was provided to the UN family, in particular to the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (NOK 149 million or 34%), WFP (NOK 136 million or 31%), WHO (NOK 41.5 million or 9%), UNICEF (NOK 30 million or 7%) and OCHA (NOK 21 million or 5%). Other UN entities directly funded by Norway in DRC are FAO, UNHCR, UN-REDD, UNDP, IOM, UN Women, and OHCHR. Department for Evaluation, Norad, Norwegian development assistance to DRC 2015-2021 database.

³⁸ With regard to Norway, its core support to multilateral organizations, globally, represented NOK 54.5 billion during the 2016-2021 evaluation period (source: Norwegian Development Aid, Norad). Some of this support is likely to have been spent also in DRC.

duration. Key informants consulted also highlighted that depending on the type of crisis or outbreak, consultations could arise and occur daily, involving all humanitarian actors, seeking the best approach including Norwegian ones. Through the same coordination structures, funding opportunities were announced, and gaps in interventions/activities were shared to find solutions. Information on the Country-Based Pooled Fund was communicated through the same channel, and proposals were developed jointly with local actors while aligned with national response plans by sector.

Even though these coordination mechanisms were in place, survey respondents have uneven opinions on whether these led to significantly improved coordination between Norwegian and non-Norwegian actors. Only 9 respondents out of 16 agreed or strongly agreed that Norway as a donor actively engages in regular and structured information sharing with non-Norwegian donors. 9 out of 16 agreed or strongly agreed that Norway and non-Norwegian actors have joint programming strategies and/or workplans. 9 out of 18 agreed that they operate under complementary strategies³⁹, and only 4 out of 15 stated that they have complementary work plans.

³⁹ Among the 9 respondents who indicated 'agree' or 'strongly agree,' 7 of them work at the national level. Out of this result, no specific trend among sub-groups of respondents could be observed.

Finding 6: Norwegian-supported partners also collaborated with local NGOs as part of a localization-driven approach Some Norwegian INGOs described successful joint actions with non-Norwegian implementing partners receiving Norwegian funds, and that these opportunities arose through local coordination mechanisms. One such example was a joint intervention with the Mukwege Panzi Foundation in South Kivu, where a Norwegian-funded INGO provided WASH infrastructure and a building to host GBV survivors in transit to the Foundation. Other collaborations involving Norwegian INGOs integrating H, D and P components were driven specifically by localization and the aim of empowering local actors. One Norway-supported INGO had a corporate objective that by 2030, 80% of its funding should be allocated to local organizations in its intervention areas.





Finding 7: Norway remained a minor actor in the DRC but with strong value added given its flexible funding to certain implementing partners. Actors and other donors interviewed by the ET claimed not to have specific knowledge of Norwegian programmes or positions regarding the implementation of HDP Nexus programmes in DRC, but encouraged more active participation from Norway, particularly in technical discussions on HDP Nexus implementation. This was also true for Norway's direct partners. One Norwegian partner stated that there was no clear and structured knowledge on Norway's position on the HDP Nexus implementation and related Norwegian policies in the DRC. This partner received both NMFA and Norad funding but for distinct programmes.⁴⁰

However, all implementing partners and donors consulted in Kinshasa and Goma were aware and highly appreciative of Norway's practice of offering flexible funding ('unearmarked') to certain UN agencies and their partners implementing projects integrating H, D and P components. This was true not only for the UN-led 'resilience' programmes described in this report, but for other opportunities in the Kivus as well.⁴¹

40 Key Informants Interviews.

41 Key Informants Interviews.

Finding 8: The disconnect between humanitarian and development actors over funding and strategy remained significant and threatens further integrated humanitarian and development programmes. Examples of progress towards implementation of programmes integrating H, D and P component involving Norway in DRC described in this report were largely opportunistic and adaptive. They were not planned or programmed in advance by donors and agencies working together with the State to create common H, D and P solutions for a specific crisis area.⁴² Donors familiar with Nexus dynamics and challenges said the main obstacle to smooth transitions between humanitarian and development programmes concerned the financing of basic service provision— if government allocations were inadequate, would beneficiaries pay for services or not? Humanitarians delivered cost-free services to people in crisis in a way that could not be financially sustained without external funding or through direct financial involvement of governmental actors and the beneficiaries themselves. Development actors used cost-recovery models (service fees on a graduated scale to accommodate for poor clients to generate self-financing delivery models that could later be absorbed by the state-run system of health, education,

42 A stakeholder consulted mentions for instance in this respect that: "From an implementing agency perspective it was difficult to plan Nexus type of engagement when it was still in its infancy and not even a clear definition was made when most of these projects were launched. It takes time for implementing agencies to absorb the knowledge and find synergies before launching concrete projects."

or other basic services). The difference in approach between humanitarian response and developmental systems-building concerned financial sustainability. Donors like Norway accepted that development programmes should build financially sustainable service models, while humanitarian response was an externally funded, life-saving intervention with no long-term ambitions. For donors interviewed for this study, this basic difference between development and humanitarian approaches was irreconcilable and stood in the way of greater HDP integration⁴³.

One consequence of this distinction was that the implementation of HDP Nexus programmes in DRC had become project-based⁴⁴, and not systematically planned or coordinated by donors and implementing partners. How to respond to this disconnect was a problem recognized by Norway and all donors interviewed for this study.

However, during the field mission, the ET was able to identify a successful example (see box 1 below) of a transition from Humanitarian to Development and, finally, state-run delivery, that could constitute a lesson learned to be shared with other donors in DRC, and partners receiving Norwegian funding.

43 Key Informants Interviews.

44 See chapter 3 for additional information on the 'project-based' approach of HDP Norwegian actors.





BOX 1

Emergency water for IDPs becomes urban distribution system under State control

Norwegian partner International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided emergency urban water for IDPs in the outskirts of Goma, building a distribution network of neighborhood taps over 15 years of conflict. Development actors were more risk averse at the time, ICRC reported, so ICRC engaged the “Régie de Distribution d’Eau de la République Démocratique du Congo” (REGIDESO), the state water utility, to develop, produce, and distribute drinking water over the northern periphery of town where IDPs were concentrated. The collaboration matured to the point where the World Bank was providing \$30m over 3-4 years to ensure effective state ownership of this long-term solution, also proving that sustainable development and state ownership were possible even in conflict areas. WBG will oversee REGIDESO as it transitions this new water system for profit with prices adjusted for poorer consumers.

The crux of this transition was a successful management of the difficult transition between a cost-free humanitarian service and a fee-based cost recovery model that conformed to state-run public service delivery. It was rare that humanitarian services could be continued in a cost-recovery format by development actors, and then be taken over by a public utility.

ICRC staff consulted believed this example of Nexus success illustrated the problem of humanitarians replicating the same short-term solutions, with no long-term plan to achieve financial sustainability. Donor fatigue was described as a problem in DRC and viable Nexus approaches such as this could serve to revive donor interest in approaches with proven value for money and realistic exit strategies.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Key Informants Interviews, Focus Group Discussions.





Policy Coherence

EQ2

To what extent are Norway's humanitarian, development, and peace interventions coherent at the policy level (i.e., the relationship between interventions and Norway's normative commitments)?

Summary of findings: Norwegian-supported partners were consistent with their normative commitments related to conflict sensitivity, localization and HRB approaches, as lots of examples were identified by the ET of Norwegian-supported partners effectively putting into practice these tools to the benefits of the local population. However, responses from the survey were prudent on these aspects, suggesting that Norwegian actors may still have to produce additional efforts for concrete results to be materialized.

In the DRC context, both Norwegian and non-Norwegian actors highlighted that localization would have a central role to play in creating sustainable solutions and exit strategies for HDP donors. It would strengthen ownership by local populations and organizations, and could potentially facilitate hand over of service delivery to State providers.

II.a. To what extent (and eventually how) are Norway's humanitarian, development, and peace interventions consistent with its commitment to conflict sensitivity?

Finding 9: Partners receiving Norwegian funding were consistent in their prioritization of conflict sensitivity and Do No Harm. This prioritization was more pronounced among INGOs receiving Norwegian funding than with UN agencies. Some INGO partners reported conducting periodic conflict-sensitivity analyses to update and adapt their programming as context dynamics evolved. Rapid protection analyses, multisectoral assessments, and rapid needs assessments were all required by donors, which created a certain standardization in practices and approaches.⁴⁶

Norway's INGO partners maintained the strictest confidentiality regarding beneficiary identity, also required by humanitarian standards. Overall, conflict analysis informed conflict sensitive actions but how these were implemented differed between actors. As highlighted by stakeholders consulted, during

⁴⁶ Key Informants Interviews. Such analyses are not specifically requested by Norwegian donors but are expected as a matter of course, in pace with the evolving standards of the industry.

implementation, conflict dynamics were regularly conducted and updated, with analyses aiming to be inclusive, participatory, and action-oriented at the community level.

When conducting baseline studies for a given project, M&E teams from Norwegian-supported partners made sure that "Do No Harm" questions were reflected throughout the survey process to capture conflict sensitivity, safeguarding, and child abuse rights.⁴⁷

Survey respondents gave mixed feedback on Norway's practices in terms of conflict sensitivity. Only 6 of 18 respondents that expressed an opinion agreed or strongly agreed that Norway's conflict analyses inform conflict-sensitive action in HDP sectors, while 11 of 19 agreed or strongly to the fact that programmes supported by Norway change in response to conflict sensitivity.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Key Informants Interviews.

⁴⁸ When disaggregating data by sub-groups of respondents on these questions, no significant trend was observable.





II.b. To what extent (and eventually how) are Norway's humanitarian, development, and peace efforts consistent with Norway's commitments to the localization agenda?

Finding 10: Actors receiving Norwegian funds have consistently implemented localization-related practices into their approaches. In the DRC context, localization was understood by Norwegian and non-Norwegian partners not only as local empowerment but also, crucially, as a key element to ensure a sustainable exit strategy. The ET found that localization was interpreted and applied very differently by different agencies, given that its logical conclusion means the redundancy or obsolescence of international actors. Of course, no international agency aims to disappear completely, to not be needed at all. This question is ultimately for donors to decide – hence the need for the NMFA and Norad to consider developing a common policy or shared guidelines for localization in the humanitarian and development context.

As expected, the concept of localization carried different meanings from one actor to another. Understandings ranged from 'decolonizing foreign assistance' to community ownership and locally led development. In DRC, localization was generally understood by Norwegian-supported partners to mean that aid programming was more effective, more resilient, and more equitable when local partners played a lead role in identifying sectors,

planning programmes, implementing projects, and evaluating progress (i.e., local empowerment).

As highlighted in interviews with implementing partners that received Norwegian funds in Kinshasa and Goma, participatory planning and shared programme delivery were seen as two separate tools to ensure quality enhancement for better outcomes, greater local ownership, and more sustainable results. These approaches predate the emergence of localization as an industry value and goal. However, the two concepts and practices were tightly interwoven. Evidence suggested that localization could be an outcome of effective participatory planning and delivery using local partners, beneficiaries and authorities, but this ('localization' as a logframe outcome) must be made explicit and defined from the outset. It was distinguished from participation (the equal sharing of key roles) as the transmission of contractual responsibility from an international actor to a national one: NGO, local authority, etc. This included financial responsibility and all forms of compliance with donor regulations and requirements, an expertise that most local actors lacked.



Photo: [Marina Mestres Segarra](#) | UN Women | Flickr





The goal of local ownership as a means of maximizing sustainability of impact was identified by Norwegian-supported agencies in all three thematic areas of the HDP Nexus, although with important distinctions. Specifically, humanitarian actors tended to prioritize local communities for ownership, while development actors target the State. This difference stemmed in part from the humanitarian concern for impartiality and political neutrality.

In addition to the above, Norwegian-supported partners tended to see localization as both an end and a means of bottom-up ownership and as exit strategy, as it implied the eventual absorption of aid activities by public service providers. For one Norwegian implementing partner, "Localization is a relevant topic and for most Norwegian organizations it means local ownership. In the Nexus context the localization agenda should be followed by a good and common definition of the Nexus between the local and Norwegian partners." For other Norwegian-supported partners, localization had become synonymous with exit strategy, as it implied a hand over of responsibility for services or activities that were initially donor-funded, thus allowing donors and actors to progressively step away. A key advantage of such a handover would be, in theory, to decrease donor budgets in that sector or geography and to reallocate them to a different priority. In this light, it was clear why localization was germane to the understanding of HDP Nexus, as it could help foster

the needed transition or sequencing from humanitarian response to development investments in institutions.⁴⁹

Concretely, Norwegian-supported partners that were committed to some form of localization began by collaborating with local organizations. Often this partnership began in the design phase between well-established Norwegian-supported partners, or during implementation phase when an opportunity arose for collaboration. Norwegian-supported partners also designed joint projects with local/national organizations, with each defining their roles and responsibilities in implementation. As shared by interviewees, localization was notably of major importance for one Norwegian partner and another implementing partner receiving Norwegian funds (SCI and NCA):

- Save the Children International had a strong commitment to localization that envisioned by 2030 to give up to SCI overall project budget 80% to the local partners. Localization was also central to SCI strategies for planning and implementation

49 The ET found that localization is interpreted and applied very differently by different agencies, given that its logical conclusion means the redundancy or obsolescence of international HDP actors. Yet no international agency aims to disappear completely, to not be needed at all. This question is ultimately for donors to decide—hence the need for Norwegian donors to consider developing a common policy or shared guidelines for localization in the humanitarian and development context (as noted in a footnote above). For reference, the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance localization policy can be found here: USAID, Policy for Localization of Humanitarian Assistance, 2022 (<https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2022/10/DRAFT-USAID-Policy-Localization-of-HA-10242022.pdf>).

where it always co-created with local structures at different levels, develop proposals together and implement projects together, to jointly achieving the results.⁵⁰

- Localization was central to NCA practices where they did not directly implement activities but used local partners based on their expertise in different practice areas.⁵¹ This was more feasible in implementation rather than planning especially in emergency settings. Efforts were put on expanding local partners' contextual experience while helping them grow technically and operationally.⁵²

Survey respondents seemed to have rather cautious views on localization implementation in DRC. Indeed, 13 respondents of 20 confirmed that Norway very much or completely engages local communities and leaders in programme delivery. 8 respondents out of 14 considered that HDP programmes funded by Norway often or always support oversight of local partners so that they adhere to inclusion and equity in accessing services.

50 Key Informants Interviews.

51 QZA-20/0052 – Application Release NRC.

52 Key Informants Interviews.





II.c. To what extent (and eventually how) are Norway's humanitarian, development, and peace efforts attuned to rights-based approaches, especially in connection to accountability, transparency, voice and participation, and non-discrimination?

Finding 11: Three partners implementing HDP Nexus programmes showed solid mechanisms and practices to ensure a rights-based approach.⁵³

Three Norwegian-supported partners visited in the field were using human rights based (HRB) approaches, described below. These cases are not sufficient to be representative of all Norwegian-supported partners, but still represent interesting practices worth highlighting:

- NRC was recognized as having a robust re-accreditation system following sufficient investment in this area. Even though this tool was implemented after the end of the period under review, the CFM (Complaint and Feedback Mechanism) was a telephone number available to the beneficiary community to denounce abuses, complain about the intervention, and/or give positive feedback on a given intervention.⁵⁴ NRC piloted this approach by first introducing a CFM line for child protection. Another NRC approach was the "Safe and Inclusive" programming: for groups living

⁵³ This finding is limited to the agencies met and does not cover all agencies receiving Norwegian funding.

⁵⁴ QZA_16/0141 NRC Global Partnership Agreement 2016-2018.

with disabilities and minority groups such as the Twa who were involved in construction activities, and for awareness raising.⁵⁵

- SCI was active in social protection relating to individual rights. This concerned overall activities implemented at SCI in every project, as SCI has a department of "Advocacy, rights, and communication". SCI had a strong accountability system with a phone number to their Kinshasa office where each beneficiary could call to learn how activities were designed based on identified needs, and how a programme was structured over time. Accountability mechanisms were also in place to guarantee that SCI remain accountable to donors and to the people they serve.⁵⁶
- NCA systematically performed a community needs assessment and analysis before a project was designed, which was then shared back to communities. This was the first level at which communities were offered a voice on activities that NCA was planning. Once a project had been funded, NCA presented the activities to the community to show how these followed the needs assessment phase. An accountability mechanism was then set up with the community, and complaints management committees were established. NCA code of conduct, including fraud, child abuse and protection as well as feedback

⁵⁵ Key Informants Interviews.

⁵⁶ Key Informants Interviews.

mechanisms were clearly communicated to all communities and a phone number was shared to report complaints during implementation, such as misconduct by project staff.⁵⁷

The survey further confirmed these findings, as respondents shared very positive views of Norwegian partner practices related to rights-based approaches. For instance, 16 respondents out of 18 considered that Norway was very much or completely committed to HRB approaches in its humanitarian work, while 18 out of 19 expressed a similar opinion regarding its development work. Moreover, 13 respondents out of 17 considered that Norway often or always provided complaint mechanisms for affected populations.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Key Informants Interviews.

⁵⁸ When disaggregating by sub-group of respondents to these questions, no significant trend was observable.





Implementation and policy coherence at sector level: Health and Peace

EQ3

To what extent has Norway's funding promoted equitable access to resilient health services (physical and mental health) for vulnerable and/or conflict affected communities?

Summary of findings: Links between health and peace were happening on several occasions where Norwegians provided core funding and/or in which Norwegian-supported partners were involved as implementing actors.

Finding 12: Links between health and peace were happening in several areas where Norway was providing core funding, and/or in which Norwegian-supported partners were involved as implementing actors. The ET was able to identify a significant number of programmes linking health and peace in DRC that were funded by Norway and/or implemented by Norwegian-supported partners. These covered several strands of health/peace synergies as shown below with an indicative list of the type of projects that were taking place over the period evaluated:

- Resilience programming implemented by WFP and FAO with financial contribution of Norway (flexible funding). These interventions targeted food security, equitable land access, and increased farmer productivity with social cohesion as a cross-cutting dimension. Improved nutrition in integrated communities and schools also fostered social cohesion. These programmes were targeting areas of former conflict where displaced groups were returning, or refugees had chosen to resettle. Social cohesion, revenue generation through livelihoods, female empowerment, initiating savings and loan groups all supported synergies for long-term stability and greater autonomy.
- Humanitarian health programmes for conflict-affected populations such as IDPs and refugees. These interventions provided free basic healthcare to local communities, thus building social cohesion

and preventing escalation of inter-group tensions. Peacebuilding activities overlapped with humanitarian action in the health sector more indirectly. For instance, the MONUSCO Stabilization Unit conducted behavior change activities with police and security forces (e.g. positive masculinity and public accountability) to reduce violence against women. Similarly, humanitarian mine action prevented future mine-related injuries and incidents of war-related trauma, particularly for children.

- Health-related projects with psycho-social activities implemented by SCI. Overall, SCI emphasized psycho-social activities in all its projects. It was a cross-cutting approach in post-conflict, transitional contexts, where psychosocial staff were on hand to provide support when necessary. All projects were informed by a needs assessment where specific psychosocial needs were identified and addressed immediately.
- Implementation of 'safe spaces' for GBV survivors as part of support to health facilities by NCA. This consisted in providing housing near a health facility where GBV survivors were receiving medical, psycho-social or reintegration support, as in Bukavu with the Mukwege Foundation at Panzi Hospital. This helped improve access to health services for vulnerable and conflict affected women and their dependents. Women stayed at these safe spaces until they were ready to return to their communities.





4

Conclusions





The following set of conclusions emerged from this country case.

Conclusion 1: Norwegian embassy had little capacity to engage directly on the HDP Nexus; it relied primarily on the United Nations system and the Nexus Working Group. The embassy was recent and had limited staff and resources to cover three countries. Funding and planning remained separate between NMFA and Norad, determined with Oslo. Capacity to engage in HDP Nexus discussions and planning with actors receiving Norwegian funding was limited; it was easier to outsource by giving flexible funding and core funding to the UN CERF in New York for humanitarian response and to UN agencies in country that used Nexus approaches, such as the resilience programmes described in this report. Main downsides to this were loss of influence/leverage, high overhead fees, and very little localization or State ownership. The embassy had also not undertaken any formal assessment of how the HDP Nexus works in DRC.

Conclusion 2: Implementation coherence was limited. NMFA and Norad remained distinct institutions with separate mandates and funding streams, which were not always mutually transparent. Coexistence was collegial and supportive but there was no pressure to integrate or coordinate around HDP or simpler goals, such as collaborating for greater return on investment on humanitarian spending to reduce humanitarian needs, for instance, or to increase localization and State ownership to reduce Norway's development budget.⁵⁹

Conclusion 3: Flexibility of Norwegian funds was a key value added of Norwegian aid. It was widely appreciated by HDP actors and donors. It enabled targeting of specific needs, where few other donors invested (specifically, transitions between humanitarian and development projects).

Conclusion 4: Umbrella or 'cascading' financing structures posed a dilemma for HDP thinking and delivery (OCHA Country-Based Pool Funds and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, CERF and Humanitarian Financing Unit, UN agencies). With their high transaction costs, limited transparency, and resistance to localization, the cost benefits of these financing structures to channel and direct outside funding toward DRC's most pressing needs were questioned by non-UN actors working in HDP. Other HDP donors and actors saw the need for reform while accepting that State capacity was too weak, making substitution inevitable for now. In the case of CAFI, the chain of payments included the State, but the number of oversight institutions made for high overhead losses. Norwegian funds went first to UNOPS, then to FONAREDD (DRC institution), then to Tulane University and other delivery partners that deliver projects using local agencies.

⁵⁹ A stakeholder consulted mentions for instance in this respect that: "Implementation coherence is definitely needed for a better response to the problems in DRC. This is also challenging as Nexus types of projects can vary but is very much needed in this period of learning."





Conclusion 5: The absence of a Nexus Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework meant positive outcomes and impacts were not documented. Did the HDP community of actors and programmes need its own theory of change and M&E framework for measuring results? HDP donors and actors were proud of progress made without creating additional layers of bureaucracy and coordination. While positive, no changes were measured, or successes documented. Should Norway invest in measuring and capturing the progress of its investments in HDP projects given that the wider HDP approach had no dedicated M&E framework or theory of change? HDP actors maintained that the DRC national development plan contained sufficient indicators and that it was reflective of Nexus goals and ways of working. The UN Humanitarian Response Plan also had indicators against which results would be measured. Without dedicated case studies focusing on Nexus in DRC, however, and no Nexus M&E framework, positive changes risked getting lost. Also, Norway's future investment in Nexus projects might be contingent on prior measured progress. For this reason, asking Norway's partners to show measured changes in their HDP projects could be constructive.

Conclusion 6: As a pilot country for the UN New Way of Working, DRC had benefited from an intense HDP focus among donors and agencies since 2016. Yet the country context and State capacity remained a major challenge. While state building is not a purpose of the HDP Nexus as such, it was impossible to reduce humanitarian need in DRC, which was a Nexus goal,⁶⁰ without basic service delivery managed and run by the State, including security.⁶¹ Despite successful HDP approaches, current donor resources were inadequate to meet DRC's needs in administrative capacity, eliminating extreme poverty, and increasing human development.⁶² Many donors identified State capacities as a major obstacle in addressing those issues. Many Norwegian-supported partners perceived provincial authorities to be much better HDP partners than central government, as they are chronically underfunded and closer to needs.

60 https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/FINAL-Triple-Nexus-Guidance-Note-for-web_compressed.pdf.

61 DR Congo spends less than 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on health and education (respectively), half the regional average (4%); WBG, DRC Human Capital Index, 2020 (https://datbankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/hci/HCI_2pager_COD.pdf).

62 Donor opinions, Key Informants interviews.





5

Recommendations





The following set of key recommendations emerge from this country study.

Recommendation 1: For Norad: Consider a dedicated study to help analyze HDP opportunities for Norway in DRC, to assess previous HDP programmes (bilateral and multilateral), and to inform policy and programming now and in the immediate future. Could Norway have gotten better, more lasting results through other types of programmes, such as the CAFI, a highly innovative response to a long-term, multi-faceted crisis? And what are the specific opportunities and priorities for Norway as the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) prepares to depart in 2024? Given that the two preeminent HDP programmes receiving Norwegian funding were UN led and depended heavily on MONUSCO ('resilience' in Kasai and Tanganyika), such questions on priorities for the future are worth examining further in detail.

Recommendation 2: For NMFA in DRC: Consider a stand-by ('rainy day') fund to identify and support handovers between humanitarian services and State and/or development partners to ensure continuity and durable solutions. This implies the difficult challenge of moving from humanitarian no-cost service models to cost-recovery (or fee based) systems used by development actors and the State.

Recommendation 3: For NMFA and Norad in DRC: Better define Norway's specific contribution to HDP Nexus programming and reflection in DRC. HDP donors stated that the best way for Norway to contribute to advancing HDP in DRC was to invest where Norway can make a difference, e.g. increasing climate security thinking and practice at the national level, improving HDP outcomes and localization among Norwegian NGOs, or supporting specific forms of research and analysis on realistic conditions for peace, security, and development in transitional contexts where HDP programming is being considered. European donors specifically asked that Norway join the 'Nexus core team' as technical advisers. Some Norwegian NGOs requested that Norway push for coherence at the sub-national level by directing its implementing partners to share their HDP lessons and challenges with local Nexus coordination groups to enrich local learning and to encourage wider adoption of effective solutions.



Photo: [Marina Mestres Segarra](#) | UN Women | Flickr





Recommendation 4: For NMFA and Norad in DRC: Improve coherence among UN agencies who receive the largest share of Norwegian funding in DRC (and who are its leading HDP actors) by pushing for increased inter-agency analysis, planning and integrated delivery. Greater coherence can be achieved by pressuring the country's biggest HDP actors to harmonize and integrate their HDP planning, analysis, and M&E systems. Some UN agencies wore both hats (humanitarian and development) but had no plans to integrate these sections internally. This strict compartmentalization could impede opportunities for HDP synergy within and between UN agencies. Interagency synergy and collaboration appeared to be the preference (versus collapsing humanitarian and development departments within agencies).

Recommendation 5: For NMFA and Norad in DRC: Consider providing flexible multi-year funding for UN-led HDP Nexus programmes with solid track record (e.g. resilience programmes in Kasai and Tanganyika). Continue leveraging Norway's ability to be crisis-responsive with its flexible funding, seen as a strong value-added to be replicated and expanded in DRC. Funding flexibility would allow Nexus partner agencies (UN, or Norwegian NGOs) to target arising needs quickly, often where few other donors invest. Their multi-year scope (vs. annual funding cycles common to humanitarian programmes) would help anticipate and capture results over several

years. Coordinate this approach with key resilience and HDP donors in the country such as Sweden, Italy, Canada, GIZ and the European Union.⁶³

Recommendation 6: For NMFA and Norad in DRC: A frank exchange over root causes is needed between Norwegian actors in country, and within the wider HDP community. Resulting programme designs will better anticipate and respond to immediate crises, and to those that escalate more slowly. Norway, its HDP delivery partners, and other HDP donors and their partners have not openly discussed or agreed upon why HDP is critical in DRC in the first place. HDP as a reform of the overseas aid sector should continue, as new crises are likely, and a more integrated response will remain essential. But greater coherence will result if HDP actors can agree on root causes and then design tailored, integrated approaches that accommodate these drivers. There was consensus that insurgencies and inter-group hostilities will continue to be driven by competition over resources and unequal access, lack of basic services (specifically health), ongoing insecurity and violence against citizens, forced displacement and refugee influx from neighboring countries, and other new dynamics. But what or who is best placed to prevent these from happening? Is it the State, MONUSCO, or HDP actors?

⁶³ This recommendation to Norway donors is also found in an unpublished policy paper: "Holistic efforts in crisis and conflict: What more can Norway do?", Nikolai Hegertun, Ottar Mæstad & Hans Inge Corneliussen, as part of NORAD's Knowledge Department's project on "Development Aid towards 2030".

Such reflexion needs to happen to increase coherence within Norway's HDP community of actors, and across DRC's HDP actors generally. If Norwegian institutions and partners agree that the primary 'root cause' driving future need for HDP approaches is State fragility and weak public services, for example, then tailored programmes can be designed to address this. Specific consideration should also be given to connecting HDP Nexus thinking in DRC with environmental protection and the conservation agenda (cf. the Central African Forest Initiative funded by Norway) as a logical next step. Poor natural resource management is a major cause of increasing competition, violence, and insecurity between communities, particularly where State authorities and security forces are absent.





List of annexes

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Annex 2: Stakeholders Consulted

Annex 3: Bibliography

Annex 4: Theory of Change

Annex 5: Key concepts

Annex 6: Evaluation Matrix

Annex 7: General context

Annex 8: Survey

Annex 9: Country map

Annexes 4 – 9 can be found as a separate document together with the report at norad.no/evaluation.





Annex 1:

Terms of Reference

Implementation and policy coherence analysis: Evaluation of the interaction between Norwegian humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace efforts

Background

The Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) nexus

After the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 and the UN Secretary-General's push for a 'New Way of Working', the Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) nexus has been a term high on the agenda in international development cooperation. The term is linked to debates concerning the persistent divide between humanitarian, development and peace programmes. This divide is characterised by operationally, organisationally and financially differences between such programmes. Earlier debates and recent research and policy documents suggest that better collaboration, coherence and complementarity between these sectors may enhance the quality of the aid to crisis-

affected populations and increase their resilience, and pave the way to durable solutions.¹

Twenty-five countries serve as pilots for the 'New way of working' and a related undertaking established by the European Union calling for better collaboration, most of which in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa. Joint planning and programming are being used to address several thematic areas, the most common being peace and human security.

¹ See e.g. UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement (2021), "Shining a Light on Internal Displacement: A Vision for the Future"; Center on International Cooperation (CIC), "The Triple Nexus in Practice: Toward a New Way of Working in Protracted and Repeated Crises" (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2019); OECD (2019) DAC Recommendations on the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus; OECD (2017). Humanitarian Development Coherence. World Humanitarian Summit. Putting Policy into Practice; Redvers, L. and B. Parker (2020). 'Searching for the nexus: Give peace a chance'. The New Humanitarian. 13 May 2020; United Nations and World Bank (2018). Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank.





Other joint efforts focus on food security and economic resilience, access to basic social services, forced displacement, and strengthening the coping capacity of local systems and the resilience of communities in the face of climate change or other risk factors.²

Humanitarian assistance, development aid and peace efforts are all needed at the same time to reduce needs, risk and vulnerability³. Organisations have committed to aligning short-, medium-, and long-term objectives with their respective contexts, striving for collective outcomes such as addressing humanitarian needs, addressing the drivers of violent conflict, and developing institutions, resilience, and capacities in a complementary and synergistic manner⁴. OECD DAC countries including Norway have explicitly outlined specific positions and ways of working to enhance the coherence of their humanitarian, development and peace efforts.⁵ Coherence between these interventions supports the prevention of crises and their resolution. It helps to better meet immediate humanitarian needs of the most vulnerable (the realm of humanitarian

² OECD (2022). The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Interim Progress Review, OECD Publishing, Paris,

³ IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) (2020). Exploring the Peace within the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDPN). Issue paper. IASC Results Group 4 on Humanitarian-Development Collaboration.

⁴ The peace promise (Agenda for Humanity). Commitments to more effective synergies among peace, humanitarian and development actions in complex humanitarian situations. 23 May 2016.

⁵ OECD (2022), pp.22-23.

aid) while also addressing the longer-term drivers of vulnerability and root causes of crises coming under the development aid and peace umbrellas.

In some contexts, tensions may arise between the different humanitarian, development, and peace objectives. For example, efforts to uphold humanitarian principles may strain collaboration with national and local actors in achieving peace and long-term development goals in conflict settings, while the opposite could be the case in other contexts.

Evaluation of the interaction between Norwegian humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace efforts

The Department for Evaluation in Norad is governed under a separate mandate⁶ from the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Climate and Environment, whereby the Department is tasked with planning, initiating, and carrying out of independent evaluations of activities financed by the Norwegian aid budget, which totalled about 40 billion NOK in 2021.

⁶ Available here (in Norwegian): <https://www.norad.no/globalassets/filer-2015/evaluering/evalueringsinstruks-januar-2022.pdf>

The Department for Evaluation has a mandate to initiate and perform independent evaluations of development cooperation. Other policy areas will be included in evaluations carried out by the Department for Evaluation to the extent they are relevant to development cooperation and from a Norwegian development aid policy perspective.

The Department for Evaluation has started an evaluation of the interaction between Norwegian humanitarian aid, development cooperation and peace efforts. The main purpose of the evaluation is to contribute to learning through the provision of knowledge on the interlinkages between Norwegian humanitarian, development and peace efforts. The evaluation findings might also provide useful insights for other donors.

Coherence

In the evaluation coherence is understood as the compatibility of humanitarian, development and peace interventions with other humanitarian, development and peace interventions in a given country. Coherence can be broken further down into two sub-types of coherence: implementation coherence, which pivots around the relation between interventions; and policy coherence, understood as coherence between interventions and the overall policy level or normative commitment.





From an implementation perspective, a HDP response would be coherent when:

1. There is coherent subnational aid targeting. The same target population can be reached by very different humanitarian and development programmes.⁷ Geographic separation of humanitarian and development aid within countries impedes complementary of action.⁸ Studies have pointed out the existent geographic dispersion between development and humanitarian aid⁹, with development aid not always reaching the most conflict-affected areas.¹⁰ It is thus vital to improve the mapping of HDP assistance at subnational levels in crisis contexts.¹¹
2. Development actors engage in the crisis early on and/or continue to be engaged throughout¹².
3. The linkages between humanitarian efforts, development aid and peace interventions are reinforced, to the benefit of affected populations, without undermining the humanitarian principles.

7 OECD, 2017.

8 CIC, 2019.

9 Mowjee, Garrasi and Poole, 2015.

10 Briggs (2021). Why does aid not target the poorest? *International Studies Quarterly*, 65(3), 739–752; Briggs, R.C. (2018). Poor targeting: A gridded spatial analysis of the degree to which aid reaches the poor in Africa. *World Development*, 103, 133–148; Briggs, R.C. (2017). Does foreign aid target the poorest? *International Organization*, 71(1), 187–206; CIC, 2019; Desai and Greenhill, 2017.

11 DI (Development Initiatives) (2020). *Development actors at the nexus: Lessons from crises in Bangladesh, Cameroon, and Somalia*.

12 DI, 2020; OECD, 2017.

4. International actors operating in a given country seek to work towards collective outcomes by coordinate their efforts and make use of respective complementarities and comparative advantages in a multiyear perspective.¹³
5. Humanitarian actors seek to move beyond implementing short term efforts, to enable longer term perspectives in their operations¹⁴.

In addition, from **a policy perspective**, a HDP response should respect humanitarian principles and deliver on commitments related to¹⁵:

1. Conflict sensitivity to avoid unintended negative consequences and maximise positive effects across HDP actions.
2. Engagement of national and local actors and institutions and strengthening their existing capacities, with a view toward a (gradual) transition between internationally- and nationally/locally-led approaches.¹⁶
3. Accountability, transparency, non-discrimination, and participation.

13 OECD, 2019; CIC 2019.

14 CIC 2019; United Nations (2016)

15 OECD 2017, 2019; United Nations (2016). *One humanity: shared responsibility*. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit. A/70/709. 2 February 2016.

16 The localisation agenda empowering local actors in decision-making and their control over resources became part of the humanitarian reform agenda after the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit.

These issues are key to create a coherent HDP response and are considered important for aid to be able to reach the goal of alleviating people's needs and risks and to contribute to resilience and more peaceful societies.

Context

This evaluation is focused on how Norwegian development, humanitarian and peace efforts are coherent within a context. Other studies have looked at how the nexus is being understood within aid systems or amongst donors broadly, but this analysis aims to analyse how this is done in practice by Norway within a given country context. The various degrees of humanitarian, development, and peace efforts supported by Norway, as well as their combinations, should be assessed against the specific context conditions and changes over the evaluation period, taking into consideration the inherent dilemmas. The human rights situation in the countries, and its potential contribution to risks for conflicts, should also be considered.





For this evaluation we have chosen to look at three countries, all of them pilots for the New Way of Working;

- *The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):* The DRC suffers from one of the most complex and prolonged humanitarian crises in the world¹⁷. At the end of 2021, there were more than 5.5 million internally displaced people in the DRC, the third highest figure in the world. The north-east of the country has been continuously experiencing intercommunal tensions and conflicts, with a sharp increase in targeted attacks on displacement camps since November 2021¹⁸. DRC ranks among the countries that are considered extremely fragile contexts on several dimensions¹⁹ and has a UN peacekeeping mission task to protect civilians and support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts. The 'New Way of Working' approach in the DRC focuses on five provinces in Greater Kasai and Tanganyika and is guided by four collective outcomes in the areas of food insecurity, access to basic social services, forced displacement and gender-based violence²⁰. Between 2015 and 2021, NOK 1.6 billion in Norwegian earmarked development aid funds were disbursed to DRC, 64.7% channeled through

17 OCHA (2021). République démocratique du Congo: Aperçu des besoins humanitaires 2022. December 2021.

18 NRC (2022). The world's most neglected displacement crises in 2021.

19 OECD (2022), States of Fragility 2022, OECD Publishing, Paris.

20 IASC Results Group 4, undated. Country Brief on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Norwegian non-governmental organisations and 28.9% through multilateral organisations²¹.

- *Ethiopia:* Ethnic tensions and conflicts flared in Ethiopia at various points in time in the 2015 – 2021 period. Reforms that altered Ethiopia's vulnerable ethnic-based federalism in 2018 led to an armed conflict in Tigray and neighboring regions by November 2020.²² In 2021, the conflict in the north was compounded by instability and violence in several other regions and a drought – leaving almost 4.2 million people internally displaced²³. Between 2015 and 2021, NOK 4.0 billion in Norwegian earmarked development aid funds were disbursed to Ethiopia. 34.8 % channelled through Norwegian non-governmental organisations, 29.5% through multilateral organisations and 22.4% through public sector in the recipient country²⁴.
- *Lebanon:* The situation in the country in the past years has been portrayed as a multi-layered crisis offsetting development gains and with acute humanitarian consequences. It is estimated that 2.5 million people are in need²⁵. According to OECD Lebanon's fragility increased in five of the six dimensions between 2019 and 2021, most markedly in the economic and political dimensions. Lebanon is not categorised as fragile in the 2022 edition

21 Norad, Norwegian development aid. Statistics and results.

22 Protection Cluster Ethiopia. Protection Analysis Update June 2022.

23 NRC (2022). The world's most neglected displacement crises in 2021.

24 Norad, Norwegian development aid. Statistics and results.

25 OCHA (2022). Increasing Humanitarian Needs in Lebanon. April 2022.

due to its still-relatively strong performance in the environmental, human and societal dimensions.²⁶ Between 2015 and 2021, NOK 3.3 billion in Norwegian earmarked development aid funds were disbursed to Lebanon, 52.2% channelled through multilateral organisations and 39.6% through Norwegian non-governmental organisations²⁷.

The evaluation questions will be responded to in an evaluation report that builds on the following two phases:

- A geospatial country analysis (Phase 1 of the evaluation), focusing on implementation coherence. The analysis is expected to be completed in February 2023, and its findings should be a key input to Phase 2. Its purpose is to provide the necessary overview of humanitarian, development and peace interventions funded by Norwegian aid in the three chosen countries. Its scope is restricted to implementation coherence. It assesses the spatial and longitudinal distribution of humanitarian, development and peace interventions receiving Norwegian earmarked development aid (1) relative to each other; (2) relative to crisis dynamics and needs; and (3) relative to other interventions.²⁸ It also considers Norwegian partners implementing humanitarian, development and peace interventions

26 OECD (2022), States of Fragility 2022, p.28.

27 Norad, Norwegian development aid. Statistics and results.

28 Interventions funded either by other OECD DAC countries or by Norway through multilateral aid.





– i.e coherence between types of interventions they implement, their locations and changes over time. This analysis is exclusively quantitative, based on both internal data sources on Norwegian aid and external data sources.

- Implementation and policy coherence analysis (Phase 2 of the evaluation). This deliverable will use mainly qualitative research methods and a participatory process to capture the expertise and experiences within Norwegian aid administration and Norway's partners. It will contextualize and explain findings on implementation coherence from the geospatial country analysis, while addressing evaluative interests (e.g., how different parts of the Norwegian aid administration work together) that were not or only partially covered by the geospatial country analysis. Additionally, it will cover all policy coherence analysis questions that were out of scope for the geospatial country analysis.

This Terms of Reference refers exclusively to phase 2, the implementation and policy coherence, which is further described below.

Purpose and objective of the implementation and policy analysis

This analysis shared the overall purpose of the evaluation as described above: to contribute to learning through the provision of knowledge on the interlinkages between Norwegian humanitarian, development and peace efforts. The objectives of both this analysis and the evaluation as whole are as follows:

1. To assess to what extent Norway's efforts have been coherent at country level to prevent, respond to, and recover from humanitarian crises.
2. To formulate lessons on how Norway can coherently link HDP interventions to reduce people's needs, risks and vulnerabilities.

Scope of the analysis

The **scope** of the implementation and policy analysis of Norwegian efforts is limited to one OECD DAC evaluation criterion - coherence. As described above, coherence is understood in this analysis as the compatibility of humanitarian, development and peace interventions with other humanitarian, development and peace interventions in a given country. It covers internal coherence (centred on Norway's efforts) as well as external coherence (synergies and interlinkages between Norway and other actors). On the former,

the analysis will consider both policy coherence and implementation coherence but give more weight to the latter. The focus on implementation is justified on two grounds: 1) while there are Norwegian policy references of different sorts to HDP, there is no unified HDP policy nor practical guidance specifically on HDP. 2) there is broad consensus on the need to see interventions in a relational manner, to avoid duplication of effort and maximise opportunities to achieve an overall goal.

The analysis will cover the period 2016 – 2021. Geographically, as noted above, it will focus on three countries:

- The Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Ethiopia
- Lebanon

Thematically, the analysis will approach the analysis questions in section 4, identified below, from a broader HDP perspective, considering the broader portfolio of HDP activities supported by Norway. However, due to limitations in how detailed and deep the analysis can be when considering the total Norwegian aid for each of the three countries, the evaluation will at a minimum focus on two sectors: health (including sexual and gender-based violence as a health issue) and peace, for greater analytical granularity and useful insights (for practical reasons, these interlinkages can hardly be studied in sufficient depth and the study generate findings of relevance unless they are concretised at a





sector level). Findings from this sectoral analysis are likely to reflect more than this sector, though²⁹. The analysis team may expand the analytical reach to other sectors deemed relevant for the analysis due to their interlinkages with the above-referred themes (such as GBV interventions beyond health-related ones) or due to its contextual significance.

The focus on health was chosen for several reasons; the sector is important for both humanitarian and development aid intervention; health interventions are funded by Norwegian development aid in all three countries; including SRHR and GBV in the health sector gives additional avenues for studying coherence.

The human rights situation in the country can fuel conflict, for example if there is unequal access to services, and conflict has severe effects on development and service provision. In this evaluation, the peace dimension of the HDP nexus refers to local peacebuilding, understood as context-specific efforts at the national or sub-national level or as actions that engage local civil society³⁰. These efforts might aim to create infrastructures for peace at all levels (peace committees,

²⁹ It was important to choose the health sector to allow for deeper and more detailed analysis. Other sectors that were considered for the evaluation were education and food security.

³⁰ At its core, this definition is aligned with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)'s definition. PBSO, PeaceNexus Foundation and UN Volunteers (2022). Thematic Review on Local Peacebuilding. May 2022. Local civil society as herein understood includes a broad range of actors, both formal organisations (e.g. NGOs) and informal groups, traditional structures and religious institutions.

national peace platforms and similar) or to improve inter-community relationships and social cohesion. Moreover, peace is also related to understanding and navigating the dynamics of conflict - that is, being conflict sensitive in health programming. Conflict sensitivity calls for the use of regular conflict analysis.

The evaluation focuses exclusively on official development assistance funded through the budget of the Norwegian Foreign Affairs (budget area 03 International aid³¹)

Analysis questions

Against the backdrop of the definition of implementation and policy coherence provided in Section 1, this analysis will aim to answer the following **core questions**:

1. To what extent are humanitarian, development and peace interventions funded by Norway coherent at the implementation level (i.e. the relationship between interventions)?
 - a. To what extent have there been spatial and longitudinal coherence?
 - b. To what extent (and eventually how) do humanitarian, development and peace interventions combine to respond to contextual changes?

³¹ From Norwegian: budsjettområdet 03 Internasjonal bistand.

- c. To what extent (and eventually how) have these efforts been coordinated with those of other actors (e.g. other OECD DAC countries, multilateral actors)?
2. To what extent are Norway's humanitarian, development and peace interventions coherent at the policy level (i.e. the relationship between interventions and Norway's normative commitments)?
 - a. To what extent (and eventually how) are Norway's humanitarian, development and peace interventions consistent with its commitment to conflict sensitivity?
 - b. To what extent (and eventually how) are Norway's humanitarian, development and peace efforts consistent with Norway's commitments related to the localisation agenda?
 - c. To what extent (and eventually how) are Norway's humanitarian, development and peace efforts attuned to rights-based approaches, especially in connection to accountability, transparency, voice and participation and non-discrimination?
3. What are the lessons concerning the coherence of Norway's HDP efforts that might be relevant for other ongoing or future work in this realm? What factors hinder or enable coherence?





The geospatial country analysis conducted in the first phase of the evaluation focused on and shed light on questions 1a-c, and its findings provide a solid starting point for this analysis. However, as described above, the geospatial analysis approached those questions from a quantitative method perspective and did not attempt to investigate the reasons behind a particular finding. Thus, this implementation and policy analysis will go beyond those findings, adding new perspectives (on, for example, the quality and use of coordination mechanisms, or overall perceptions of stakeholders) and explaining them.

Approach and methodology

The team will propose an outline of a methodological approach that maximizes the chance of producing evidence-based assessments. The team will follow rigorous research practices, documenting technical and methodological choices and steps to answer the analysis questions via a cross-section of data sources and mixed methods.

Analytical approach to coherence

The analysis will outline an analytical approach to understanding coherence, based on the definitions described in these terms of reference. The analytical approach shall be sensitive to the multidimensional definition of coherence, further developing it where necessary.

Coherence between interventions, or between interventions and policies, are described with notions such as capability, coordination, outcomes and synergies. The analytical approach should spell out what these notions entails. For example, coordination might refer to formal and informal structures and venues, both internal to the Norwegian aid administration and external to it, but also included the ability to produce and use joined analyses. Furthermore, coordination can refer to international, national and sub-national levels – for example, participation in local coordination mechanisms and following up overall efforts in central multilateral boards.

Some examples of furthering of the conceptual framework around coherence at implementation level might include an examination of the goal interaction (i.e. what the intervention aims to achieve and its change pathways) spectrum between interventions (and in some cases within interventions), from cancelling and counteracting goals to reinforcing and indivisible goals - and eventually the degree to which positive goal interaction is due to planning and coordination or serendipity. Another area that could be further unpacked in the analytical framework is communication (venues, forms, thresholds) and shared or joined analytical efforts (context, risk or conflict analyses).

Context

This evaluation emphasises how coherence is achieved, or not, within a specific country context. The design calls for a comparison between the Norwegian effort within a country, and its compatibility with events within the context. This refers to both various locations within the country, and to the timeline included in the scope of the analysis. Hence, it is important that the team spells out which elements in the context are to be analysed and how.

Analysing the health and peace sectors

There are numerous possibilities for analysing the interaction and coherence within health interventions and between health and peace interventions. The analysis of key interactions within the health sector is likely to require the identification of sub-sectors bridging the humanitarian and development divide – e.g. Reproductive, Maternal, Newborn, Child and Adolescent Health, Primary Health Care. As for synergies between health and peace, the analytical framework might theorise and explore areas such as social cohesion, mental health and psychosocial support or transformation of conflicts related to the provision of health services, to mention just a few.

Data collection methods

Data will be collected in Oslo, the DRC, Ethiopia and Lebanon, disaggregating it at the appropriate level. As mentioned above, the team will outline a rigorous methodological approach to answer the analytical





questions. Considering the scope of the evaluation, it is desirable to make use of both surveys and key informant interviews to gather data from a wide variety of stakeholders and to uncover deeper insights, respectively. The analysis is also expected to review documentation and may include other data collection methods such as focus groups. The analysis must be clear and explicit on how the proposed data collection methods will answer the evaluation questions, and how triangulations are being made.

Deep knowledge of the context is important in this analysis, and we encourage a team composition that prioritizes in-country presence for DRC, Ethiopia and Lebanon.

The evaluation process should take into consideration and be adapted to constraints and restrictions due to security and other concerns.

The composition of the field data collection teams will be critical to ensure the gender and diversity sensitivity of the evaluation.

Participation/engagement

In addition to Norwegian stakeholders, the analysis will actively seek input and promote participation from a wide range of local organisations, groups and individuals from the three analysis countries. The selection process, methodological choices and sampling strategy should consider the full list of both

Norwegian agreement partners and implementing partners in the given country and time period, expanding it to include other organisations, groups and individuals as relevant. It should make sure to include populations affected by interventions. It shall apply intersectional lenses, considering their areas of operation or place of residence (urban-rural divide), thematic focus of work and/or social categories such as ethnicity, religion, disability, sexual orientation and age. Strategies to promote meaningful participation of local organisations, groups and individuals in the process should be clearly defined by the team. Similarly, the analysis will account for and include relevant national and international actors, including formal coordination mechanisms and platforms (e.g. humanitarian clusters, development forums, Multi-Partner Trust Funds, etc.).

Ethical assessments and human rights-based approach to evaluation

The analysis shall adhere to recognised evaluation principles and the OECD DAC's quality standards for development evaluation in addition to their guidelines for evaluations in settings of conflict and fragility, as well as relevant guidelines from the Department for Evaluation. The analysis shall be utilization-focused, laying out a process that secures engagement of the primary intended users and increases the likelihood of the findings being used.

The process must follow and document a human rights-based approach (non-discrimination /equality; participation; accountability and transparency; interdependence of human rights)³², showing sensitivity and respect to all stakeholders. The assignment shall be undertaken with integrity and honesty and ensure inclusiveness of views. The rights, dignity, safety and security of participants in the analysis should be protected. An introductory statement to the analysis report should explain what measures were taken to ensure no harm from the analysis itself, as well as the security of the interviewees and their right to remain anonymous.

The evaluators should reflect upon and document their ethical judgements throughout the analysis process. Doing so, preferably with reference to recognized norms for evaluation and social science research³³.

³² See more on this in the literature study by Deval: I.Worm, M. Hanitzsch, L. Taube and M. Bruder (2022) Human Rights-Based Evaluation in German and International Development Cooperation: Literature Review, DEval Discussion Paper 1/2022, German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval), Bonn.

³³ For instance the ethics embodied in the NESH guidelines: Guidelines for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities | Forskningsetikk (2022)





6. Organisation of the assignment

The analysis will be managed by the Department for Evaluation in Norad³⁴. The contractor will report to the Department for Evaluation through the team leader. The contractor will keep in regular contact with the Department for Evaluation throughout the process, to discuss progress - including any problems that may jeopardize the assignment - make adjustments to the research design when required and shed light on actions to be taken to guarantee the high quality of the deliverables. Such regular communication will be especially important in the early stages of the assignment, to iron out the details of the approach.

The team should consult widely with stakeholders (reference is made to section 5) and facilitate the dissemination of findings from the evaluation. In some evaluations, the Department for Evaluation participates in parts of the field work to gain a better understanding of the context of the evaluation - this will be the case for this evaluation.

The contractor should maintain the highest degree of integrity and honesty, and consider the potential direct and indirect negative effects tied to the research process and deliverables, formulating strategies to mitigate these.

³⁴ For more information, see <https://www.norad.no/en/evaluation>

Quality assurance shall be provided by the institution delivering the services prior to submission of all deliverables.

All decisions concerning the interpretation of these Terms of Reference, and all deliverables, are subject to approval by the Department for Evaluation.

Deliverables

1. An **inception report** with detailed description of the methodological approach (including the operationalisation of key concepts) of maximum 7,500 words (approx. 15 pages) excluding figures, graphs and annexes. The inception report will also lay out challenges, risks and limitations and possible strategies to mitigate those, and provide an outline of the structure for the country reports and the synthesis report. Similarly, the inception report will propose how the findings from the evaluation will be disseminated in the three countries. The inception report should also provide a preliminary desk review of relevant existing published materials and situate its methodological approach in reference to this literature (including any gaps it aims to fill). The inception report needs to be approved by the Department for Evaluation before proceeding further.

2. Draft analysis reports (one per country i.e. the DRC, Ethiopia and Lebanon, and a synthesis report). Each of the country analysis reports must stand alone and will not exceed 12,000 words (approximately 24 pages) excluding figures, graphs and annexes. The synthesis report will have a maximum length of 7,500 words (approx. 15 pages), and will primarily bring together key findings from the three country analyses and recommendations. Methodology will be annexed. Supplementary summary statistics, dynamic or static visuals, data files / datasets are to be submitted together with the draft analysis reports.
3. **Final analysis reports** of the same maximum length as the draft reports. Data files / Datasets are to be submitted, along with supplementary visuals (if any) and other visuals included in the report, as separate, high-resolution files.
4. Presentation of the final report in a seminar in Oslo with physical and digital participation from stakeholders.

All reports shall be written in English in an informative, clear and concise manner in accordance with the Department for Evaluation's guidelines³⁵ and shall be submitted in electronic form (searchable format).

³⁵ <https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/about-evaluation-department/evaluation-guidelines/>





Annex 2

Stakeholders consulted

Organisation	Department/Unit/Function
CAFI	Norwegian representative
CARE Norway	DRC Country Director
DAI	Team Leader
DIGNI	Senior Advisor
Enabel	Programme Manager
Enabel	Senior Programme Officer
EU	Director, Development Commission
FAO	Head, Resilience programming
FAO	Head, Partnerships
FONAREDD	Director
ICRC	Head of Delegation
MAGNA	Head of Mission
MONUSCO	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
MONUSCO	Stabilization Support Unit Coordinator
NMFA	Chief of Staff (old and new)
Norad	Senior Advisor
NCA	Programme Manager WASH Coordinator

Organisation	Department/Unit/Function
NRC	Global Roving Country Director
OCHA	Head of Office
SCI	Country Representative
SIDA - Nexus Donor Group	Head of Nexus Donor Group
Tulane	Country Director for Family Planning Programmes
Tulane	Research Assistant Professor
Tulane	Project Director
UNDP	Programme Specialist
UNFPA	Senior Advisor on Human Rights and Gender
UN Humanitarian Fund	Programme officer
UNICEF	Programme Manager, Resilience and Nexus Advisor
USAID	Chief of Party, Good Governance Activity
USAID	Head of Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance
WFP	Head of Programme
WFP	National Programme Officer
WFP	Project Coordinator
WFP	Office Manager





Annex 3:

Bibliography

General level and country level

Author	Title	Year
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Results Group 4	Country Brief on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus. Democratic Republic of the Congo	2021
Central African Forest Initiative	Annual Report	2016-2021
Centre for Humanitarian Action, Berlin (Marc DuBois)	The triple Nexus- Threat or opportunity for the humanitarian principles? Discussion paper	2020
Development Initiatives (Sarah Dalrymple, Angus Urquhart)	Peace in the triple Nexus: what challenges do donors face?	2019
Department for Evaluation, Norad	Report from Phase 1 of the evaluation	2023
Eric Abitbol, Erin McCandless	Transforming our common crisis: Complexity, Climate change, and Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus	2022
European Commission	HDP Nexus: challenges and opportunities for its implementation	2022
Feinstain International Center Publication	Co investigators but with different power	2023
Food and Agriculture Organization, Norwegian Refugee Council, United Nations Development Programme	Financing the Nexus	2020
Global Conflict Tracker	Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo	2023

Author	Title	Year
International Assistance Evaluation Division	Global Affairs Canada, Evaluation of International Assistance Programming in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2012-13 to 2018-19	2020
International Organization for Migration	A mapping and analysis of tools and guidance on the HP linkages in the HDP Nexus	2022
Mariam Hamad	Midterm Review of the Norwegian Humanitarian Strategy and strategic partnership model	2022
Momentum	The Humanitarian-Development Nexus	2022
MONUSCO	MONUSCO's withdrawal from Tanganyika: mission accomplished, according to Bintou Keita	2022
New York University Center on International Cooperation	A triple Nexus in Practice Toward a new way of working in protracted and repeated crisis	2019
Norwegian Embassy in Kinshasa	Plan of activities	2018-2021
Norwegian Embassy in Luanda	Plan of activities	2016-2017
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Norway's Humanitarian Strategy	2020
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Norwegian Embassy in Kinshasa	Annual activity plan	2015-2021





Author	Title	Year
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development	DAC recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development peace Nexus	2023
OXFAM	The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus	2019
Security Council Report	September 2023 Monthly Forecast	2023
Sida and Development Initiatives	Leaving no crisis behind with assistance for the triple Nexus	2023
United Nations Environment Programme	UNEP Study Confirms DR Congo's Potential as Environmental Powerhouse but Warns of Critical Threats	2017
United Nations	Outcome of the world humanitarian Summit	2016
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction	Evidence of positive progress on disaster risk reduction in the Humanitarian Development Peace Actions	2023
United States Agency for International Development	Democratic Republic of the Congo – Complex Emergency	2023
United States Agency for International Development	Policy for Localization of Humanitarian Assistance	2022
World Bank Group	Maximizing the impact of the World Bank Group in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations	2018
World Health Organization	Data Bank	2023
World Bank Group	Country overview, DRC	2023
World Health Organization	A guide to implementing the Humanitarian Development Peace Nexus for Health	2021





Project level – Selected documents most useful for this study:

Project Code	Author	Title	Year
COD-12/0017	Join Good Forces	Improve Quality and Access to Infant and Maternal Health Care	2015
COD-13/0006	Norwegian Church Aid	Reducing gender-based violence and building sustainable peace in Democratic Republic of Congo	2014
COD-15/0006	The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Combating SBGV and Impunity in the DRC	2016
COD-18/0003	Care Norway	Ebola Emergency Response in North Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo (Grant Agreement, Application.	2018
QZA-12/0763	Digni	Special Report on Projects ended	2017
QZA-13/0122	Norwegian Refugee Council	Global partnership Agreement between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Refugee Council regarding assistance di displacement persons worldwide (Grant agreement, Application part 1 and 2)	2019
QZA-15/0178	Norwegian Red Cross	Global Cooperation Agreement between Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and The Norwegian Red Cross	2014
QZA-15/0216	Norwegian Red Cross	ICRC emergency appeals for 2015: support form MFA	2015

Project Code	Author	Title	Year
QZA-15/0477	Norwegian Church Aid	Faith Leaders address fear and resistance towards Ebola prevention in communities and risks in south and north Kivu, eastern DRC (Final Report)	2020
QZA-16/0141	Norwegian Refugee Council	Global partnership Agreement 2016-2018 (Annual Plan 2016, Initial submission)	2016
QZA-16/0141	Norwegian Refugee Council	Global Partnership Agreement	2016-2018
QZA-16/0219	The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Schools as zones of Peace: operationalizations of guidelines for a protective learning environment	2018
QZA-17/0350	Caritas Norge	Final Report for Covid-19 response In DR Congo	2022
QZA-18/0159	Digni	Special Report on Projects ended	2019
QZA-20/0052	Norwegian Refugee Council	Application release	2019



Department for Evaluation