



Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 – 2005)

Case Studies:

Wildlife Management and Natural Resources

Transparency in Financial Management

Agriculture in Northern Province



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Case Study 1: Wildlife Management and Natural Resources

Executive summary

Introduction and Purpose

This case study report concerns the support given by the Norwegian government to Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) for its **wildlife and natural resources sector** during the study period of 1991-2005. This support was delivered primarily through the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP) and its successor, the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU). Related support was provided during 2000-2001 and 2004 to assist the transition from the government department responsible for wildlife management, the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), to the parastatal statutory body, Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA).

The purpose of the review was to evaluate Norwegian support according to standard (DAC) evaluation criteria – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact – and also to consider the effect of national and international power structures on this support, with the theoretical framework for the study of power structures in Zambia, the importance of **neopatrimonial systems** in determining power relations and their impact on the delivery of aid.

The case study took place in Zambia during the month of July 2007, with follow-up reporting in the UK and Zambia during the month of August. The analysis is based on examination of project documents and key stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions.

Background of LIRDP/ SLAMU and the Zambia wildlife sector

LIRDP/ SLAMU has been concerned primarily with the conservation of the Luangwa Valley in south-central Zambia, with a focus on the continued existence of the South Luangwa National Park (SLNP) and its wildlife in the Lupande Game Management Area (LGMA) immediately adjacent to the southwestern boundary of the SLNP. At the same time, it has aimed to utilize wildlife as a natural resource to improve livelihoods of the people in the LGMA, addressing rights, access to and ownership of natural resources, governance and political economics. Lessons learned in South Luangwa could be applied to other areas of Zambian wildlife sector as a whole.

The origin of LIRDP was the Lupande Development Workshop of 1983, with a following study proposing a multi-sectoral project that received crucial initial support from the extant President, Kenneth Kaunda. The project has gone through several phases, with changing objectives, as well as changes in the external conditions in the Zambian government.

The first implementation phase, **Phase II**, during 1987-1992, was an ambitious, multi-sectoral approach to improving the standard of living of the people in the project area by means of sustainable use of its natural resources, and a large component of infrastructure development. Although now viewed in retrospect as a top-down, unsustainable “mini-government” that substituted for the work of the GRZ, this type of project was typical of ICDP-type donor interventions of the mid-1980s period, and Phase II did provide the initial basis for subsequent, more focussed developments.

Phase III saw improved administrative management and a focus on creating a viable CBNRM programme, phasing out the non-wildlife sector components and making wildlife utilization the primary means of income-generation for park management and rural livelihoods. The CBNRM work also introduced a strong element of decentralized grass-roots democracy, with elected Village Action Groups given the key decision-making role for managing the funds from hunting concessions.

Phase IV coincided with the transition of NPWS to ZAWA, a process that ironically resulted in re-centralization of key activities, such as CBNRM. LIRDPA became a ZAWA “area management unit”, SLAMU, arguably a positive step in the direction of institutional sustainability. However, it also, decentralized “ownership” of the wildlife resource in the GMAs and reduced the flexibility and level of funds received.

Phase V extended the objectives of Phase IV, with even greater focus on financial and technical self-sufficiency of SLAMU for managing the SLNP and the LGMA. The expansion of the tourism sector, including creating ever-greater opportunities for private sector operators within the SLNP, and the development and maintenance of partnerships with NGOs in the GMA, have been key aspects of the move towards self-sufficiency.

The project objectives have clearly evolved over the two decades of support, with an accompanying trend towards greater financial, managerial and technical accountability and independence. In all phases, there has been a commitment to infrastructure development in the region, with a significant proportion of the budgets devoted to road building and maintenance.

Project management

The projects have been managed by the implementers, with oversight and guidance provided by the Norwegian authorities. Phase II had good support and commitment by the Norwegian embassy but little effective reporting of results or financial accounting and Phase III introduced a more rigorous system of performance management and reporting, which has been maintained to date. The Norwegian project management system appears to have the advantage of flexibility but the drawback of being not particularly rigorous, dependent on the quality of individual officials and consultants. In practice, the Norwegian officials have generally shown good commitment to the aims of the project, and in later stages have chosen competent evaluators. The monitoring and evaluation system, however, lacked clear project documentation in a readily accessible form.

Relevance

The project is in line with Norway’s Country Strategy 1992, 1994-1997, and Strategy for Development Cooperation 2001-2005. Norwegian support to LIRDPA/SLAMU and the Zambian wildlife sector has been remarkably consistent over the past 20 years. Other donors and NGOs have supported the sector for more limited periods, and Norway has been actively involved in coordination and has played a leading role. Norway’s continuing commitment, while other donors are turning away from the sector, is admirable, supporting the investment in wildlife-based development as it shows real promise of becoming an engine of economic progress.

On the Zambian side, although the National Conservation Strategy supports wildlife management, National Development Plans have not identified wildlife conservation as an economic and social development mechanism, nor does government provide ZAWA with sufficient funding for capital development; rather it must generate funds for central government. It appears that the commitment by Norway to support the LIRDPA / SLAMU has not been effectively complemented by the Zambian government. Both the earlier Country Strategy and most recent Strategy for Development Cooperation expects commitment by the recipient government and the Norwegian development authorities may have been slow in the past in insisting on greater policy and budgetary support from Zambia to match the donor contribution. There is recent evidence that a dialogue on this strategic issue has been taking place with the Zambian authorities.

Effectiveness

Wildlife conservation and management in South Luangwa has improved significantly. Wildlife populations have been protected and stabilised, through greatly improved patrolling effort and success, together with cooperation with communities in LGMA. Since the early project phases, the management of SLNP has improved progressively and in the most recent year, it achieved financial self-sufficiency, which is a considerable achievement compared to other protected areas in Zambia and indeed the Southern Africa region. There has been steady development of tourist facilities within the park.

There has been **improvement in local livelihoods** in the Lupande GMA. This was clearly the case in Phase II, although the results were delivered in a top-down fashion and did not build local capacity. Phase III produced genuine benefit and considerably greater decentralized, democratic control of funds through the hunting concessions in the GMA, although there is little systematic evidence of the financial contribution to household incomes provided by CBNRM. In project Phases IV and V, funds retained at the local level were reduced by the re-centralisation of ZAWA. There is an ongoing problem of central government support for CBNRM, with reports of political interference in ZAWA by powerful individuals.

Land use planning has not been successful and there is currently a serious risk of encroachment by commercial extractive farming in nearby areas, which could develop in future in Luanda, requiring urgent action to counter the loss of natural resources in Luangwa Valley. There has been a similar lack of success in achieving an agreed park management plan for SLNP and there is need for a strategic and operational blueprint for budgeting and work planning.

Efficiency

In the earliest period of the project implementation – Phase II – expenditure against the multitude of activities proved difficult. With successive Phases, efficiency increased markedly and financial management improved greatly. The system for accounting, reporting and issuing of payments is now more streamlined. The relatively large expenditure on roads across all phases, and their ongoing low quality despite these efforts, could be judged inefficient as well as ineffective. There were gaps between project phases, during periods of appraisal and negotiation. The most recent was 2005, when there was no Norwegian funding at all, and SLAMU had to exist purely on its own resources, by minimizing expenditure and cutting back on developments.

Impact

Wildlife conservation has improved, a success that can be attributed to improved enforcement by government authorities, an encouraging environment for private sector investment bringing development to the area, and improved cooperation with local communities.

There has been successful creation of decentralized community structures to receive funds from hunting concessions and to make decisions on development projects. Much of this progress was diluted after ZAWA re-centralization of hunting revenue collection and disbursement and decision-making. The Chiefs' direct role has also been reduced, as the Local Leaders' Sub-Committees and subsequent local Area Development Committees, which they controlled as chairmen, no longer exist; this may have benefited the local people in reducing the ability of the Chiefs to sequester funds without accountability.

The local economy has benefited from spin-off handicraft industries and multiplier effects on the local and national Zambian economy. There have also been unintended negative impacts. From the start of the project there was resentment among NPWS professionals, with some residual tendency effect in ZAWA, for example in the area of hunting quotas. The success of the projects has attracted people to the area, which has increased pressure on resources and threatened the viability of project gains, diluting the per capita share of income.

The increased mobility of people, including incomers, the rise in employment and relative wealth creation may have served to increase the incidence of HIV/AIDS in Mambwe District. The projects in the later stages have specific outputs directed at prevention, which may have offset the increased risk somewhat.

Sustainability

SLAMU is moving towards **financial** sustainability, and while its success towards this objective compares well with other wildlife areas in Zambia and the Southern Africa region, it nevertheless remains dependent on external support for capital expenditure, while GRZ does not provide investment funds from the national Treasury to ZAWA. This

lack of support for essential investment threatens to undermine the ability of SLAMU to consolidate gains made thus far and to extend its ability to generate income for its own operations and for the social development needed to build local support for conservation.

The park management **institutions** function well, while institutions at the community level remain weak and there are unresolved tensions between the Chiefs and the elected CRBs and VAGs. Local government at the District level is undeveloped and is in no position to replace the Chiefs as the authority for conflict resolution and land use decisions. The process of change from NPWS to ZAWA has not been smooth. There remains a high degree of interference from central government, both by the Ministry and other political players. The effect on SLAMU has been to re-centralize financial and decision-making authority, and this has undermined the process of local democratisation and empowerment.

Phase II improved services in a number of sectoral areas promoting **social** development in Lupande GMA, but they did not build local capacity to maintain them, and were in no way sustainable. Line ministries in South Luangwa, apart from MTENR through ZAWA, are poorly resourced, the agricultural sector in particular needing support. In this vacuum, the COMACO project is making a contribution, but it faces the same challenge of ensuring sustainability as did of LIRDP Phase II. The social gains of Phase III, in terms both of financial benefit and community development projects, as well as increasing democratisation, lost ground during Phases IV and V. A modicum of good will remains – for example, the village scout system still operates – but with such reduced direct benefit and decision-making, the social sustainability of the CBNRM-based livelihoods and wildlife conservation has been reduced.

The prospects for **environmental** sustainability of the wildlife resource are good, if SLAMU maintains the local institutions.

Ownership and commitment

ZAWA appears to have taken on ownership of the LIRDP through its creation of SLAMU, but central government still does not appear to be taking seriously the role of the wildlife sector in the national economy, in tourism and its multiplier effects, in general or in the Luangwa Valley in particular.

Implications for hypotheses

Because politics may be defined as a ‘contestation for control over resources’ it is clear why SLNP and the Lupande GMA have been immersed in political battles for decades. SLNP is one of the finest in southern Africa, and control of natural resources has been fought over by various actors, including Chiefs, government officials at local and national levels, LIRPD/SLAMU staff, local populations and community leaders, international and local agencies, conservationists, NGOs, and entrepreneurs. Those nearest to the centres of power (Chiefs, entrepreneurs, and presidents) have been the most successful in advancing their interests (ministers, conservationists, companies, etc). Those closest to the resources, the villagers, are the weakest politically and have had to depend on others to protect their interests, such as Norad.

Villagers remember with pleasure LIRDP benefits, but today the poorest depend on the land, with seemingly little support from government ministries or the district administration, and on funds ‘trickling down’ from the employment of family members in the lodges and park. The villagers in the GMA are not unlike those living in other backward areas of Zambia, though a few community projects are built with hunting revenues, some provisions arrive as a result of the Chiefs’ largesse, and a few NGO/charity programmes benefit the people.

We were asked whether ‘Zambian power structures and politics allowed enough space for Norwegian aid to be used effectively in the Luangwa valley?’ The answer, in terms of protecting animals and subsequently attracting foreign tourists and hunters, is a qualified “yes”, since sustainability is still an open question. There was also some success in alleviating poverty in the years up to 2000, although the benefits to local communities

have been reduced in recent years. Whether the effectiveness of conservation management has been maintained from 2005 onwards (outside the remit of this study) is dependent on the amount of government effort (policy, programming, and funds) going to maintain and develop the park and GMA, and the country's wildlife sector in general. At the moment, this effort is still not sufficient for long term sustainability, without donor support. In the last decade the goals of poverty alleviation and strengthening participatory governance appear less of a priority to the donor and Zambian governments, apparently a result of a shift in policy rather than a reduction in need locally. Our brief research trip to the area indicated that little recent progress seems to have been made in these areas of local empowerment.

The re-centralization of authority over wildlife resources in Lupande GMA in the transition from Phase III to Phase IV of the project, brought about by the concurrent transformation of NPWS to ZAWA, represents a step backwards for the building of local ownership and democratisation, and with it the prospects for delivery of improved rural livelihoods through CBNRM. As noted, this occurred when ZAWA abandoned the participatory approach developed by LIRD/ SLAMU under Phase III, forcing it to conform to the nation-wide ADMAD programme, operated through ZAWA's central headquarters, and retaining significant funds for itself and for the national treasury. Perhaps the most important lesson of the project is that the process should be applied in the **reverse direction**: in order for sustainable wildlife use to become part of the solution to reducing rural poverty in Zambia, the Phase III LIRD/ SLAMU model should be applied by ZAWA in all its GMAs, in Luangwa Valley and across the country. Whether this is possible in the context of Zambian power structures is the challenge for government and for donor programme design and should be prioritised as the subject of dialogue between the Norwegian and Zambian governments, with the former considering making future support conditional on a satisfactory outcome of such discussion.

Conclusions and recommendations

The main lesson from South Luangwa is that maximum impact on rural livelihoods, local democratic structures and active involvement in sustainable natural resource use and protection occurred under the conditions of Phase III, when all hunting funds were received directly by communities and decisions on their disbursement and spending were taken by village-level groups. This arrangement empowered the people most directly involved in wildlife utilisation and prevented much of the interference in their control over these resources by individuals and groups at higher levels, including powerful interests in government and the chiefdoms. The current system has interposed ZAWA between the source of revenue in hunting concessions and the rural people. The government now retains a significant proportion of financial return at a higher level, but more importantly it has re-taken much of the decision-making power over resource use out of the hands of the rural populace. This approach is consistent with the view that, unless attention is focussed, powerful groups at higher levels in social hierarchies act to maintain their control over resources.

We suggest that Norway and the development programme through its Embassy

1. should continue its support for investment in the capacity of ZAWA to develop its protected areas as income-generating enterprises, using the SLNP model and applying it to other parts of the country, .
2. should continue dialogue with GRZ to reverse the policy of Treasury drawing funds from ZAWA, and instead for Treasury to recognize the importance of well-functioning wildlife PAs in the national tourism economy by providing ZAWA with funds sufficient for capitalization and investment to build PA capacity for income generation.
3. focus attention on devolving financial resource capture and decision-making power to the lowest levels in community areas of Lupande GMA, and with that model, to other GMSs around the country. This may require changes to the Wildlife Act.

Abbreviations

ADMADE	Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
COMACO	Community Markets for Conservation
CRB	Community Resource Board
DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
GMA	Game Management Area
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
ICDP	Integrated Conservation and Development
LIRDp	Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
LGMA	Lupande Game Management Area
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MTENR	Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
NCDP	National Commission for Development Planning, Ministry of Finance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPWS	National Parks and Wildlife Service
SLAMU	South Luangwa Area Management Unit
SLNP	South Luangwa National Park
UNIP	United National Independence Party
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAG	Village Action Group
WCRF	Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
ZAWA	Zambia Wildlife Authority

1.1 Introduction and Purpose

This case study report concerns the support given by the Norwegian government to Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) for its **wildlife and natural resources sector** during the study period of 1991-2005. This support was delivered primarily through the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP) and its successor, the South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU). The LIRDP was a project within Zambian government departments, while SLAMU is an autonomous unit within the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). A smaller measure of related support was provided during 2000-2001 and 2004 to assist the transition from the government department responsible for wildlife management, the National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), to the parastatal statutory body, ZAWA.

The Norwegian government has been involved in other initiatives in the wildlife sector, in other parts of Zambia including Kafue National Park, but these latter efforts have taken place in the period after 2005 and are thus outside the scope of this evaluation.

The history of the LIRDP/SLAMU projects is complex and the limited scope of this review does not do full justice to it. A more complete description of the projects can be found in Dalal-Clayton & Child (2003).

The purpose of the review was to evaluate Norwegian support according to standard (DAC) evaluation criteria and also to consider the effect of national and international power structures on this support.

Team composition:

The case study evaluation team comprised three experts:

- Keith Lindsay (team leader), international wildlife management specialist
- Henry Mwima, national wildlife management specialist
- Diana Cammack, international political-relations specialist

The principal investigations under the case study took place in Zambia during the month of July 2007, with follow-up reporting in the UK and Zambia during the month of August.

1.2 Methodology of the Case Study

The analysis is based on examination of project documents (the suggested projects for the case study are attached to the end of this document), and key stakeholder interviews, with the Norwegian Embassy in Zambia, with project managers and implementers, donors, NGOs, both local and national, and other influential actors in the sector. Focus group discussions were conducted, as appropriate and possible, with some of the project beneficiaries. Lists of persons and documents consulted can be found in Annexes 1.2 and 1.3 respectively.

As noted above, the case studies will address standard DAC assessment criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. In addition and in line with the overall study, there was specific attention to the influence of power structures on the wildlife sector and on the delivery of support by the Norwegian government.

Hypotheses

The evaluation's Interim Report proposed a theoretical framework for the study of power structures in Zambia, namely the importance of **neopatrimonial systems** in determining power relations and their impact on the delivery of aid. The logic of such systems states that there is little incentive for those in power to devolve authority, which will limit their discretionary control of funds, opportunities for financial benefit to themselves or their patrons and technical control of activities at lower levels. Programmes may be designed, in the context of wildlife management, with objectives that may promote good governance, but there may be little effort taken to ensure that these are implemented well, especially when funds are needed to garner the support of clients and voters. Unless donors take the political context into account when discussing project design with

recipient governments, they are unlikely to provide effective support. The case study will use this hypothetical framework to examine the performance of the project against its intended objectives.

1.3 Background of LIRD/ SLAMU

As noted above, the primary programme of support to the Zambian wildlife sector during the whole period under study was the assistance through the Zambian government to the South Luangwa National Park and the Lupande Game Management Area. Indeed, Norwegian aid has played a role in the region for over two decades from the early 1980s to the present day.

In parallel, there was a brief period of direct support for institutional change, amounting to NOK 4,000,000 during 2000-01 for the “Transformation of NPWS to ZAWA”, which was bridging support following investment in a project funded by the European Union and targeted specifically at institutional change during 1996-1999. There was an additional commitment of NOK 700,000 during 2004 to Institutional Capacity Development. We have decided that assessment of these two brief interventions for institution-building can be considered as an aspect of underpinning sustainability of the wildlife sector, rather than the subject of a separate Case Study,

LIRD/ SLAMU has been concerned primarily with the conservation of the Luangwa Valley in south-central Zambia, with a focus on the continued existence of the South Luangwa National Park (SLNP), which includes an area of 9,050km², and its wildlife in the Lupande Game Management Area (LGMA), some 4,500 km² stretching across six Chiefdoms immediately adjacent to the south-western boundary of the SLNP. At the same time, it has aimed to utilize and promote the wildlife as a natural resource to improve the livelihoods of the people who live in and shape the landscape of the LGMA. Although LIRD/ SLAMU was designed to conserve wildlife and reduce poverty, it also attempted to address more fundamental issues of rights, access to and ownership of natural resources, governance and political economy. By 2001/02 it was considered that the lessons learned in South Luangwa might be applied to other areas of the Zambian wildlife sector as a whole.

LIRD/ SLAMU was a programme, or series, of projects implemented in five phases to date. It had its origin in the Lupande Development Workshop of 1983, which was initiated by concerned, expatriate or European-Zambian wildlife experts and development professionals working for government and/or NGOs, along with Zambian wildlife and land use officers. The Workshop resolved that a feasibility study be carried out for a project involving multiple land uses including agriculture, forestry, fisheries and water development in addition to wildlife management. The study – funded by Norad and WWF – was undertaken in 1985 and assessed, among other factors, the lessons that had accrued from an earlier implementation of ADMADE -a Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) project in Lupande GMA with funding from USAID. It proposed a multi-sectoral project which became known as the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project. The project received crucial support from President Kenneth Kaunda, who acted as Chairman of the Steering Committee from the project’s inception in May 1986 until his election defeat in 1991.

During the subsequent two decades, the project has gone through several phases, with changing objectives as well as external conditions in the Zambian government. The following table summarizes the main phases, their changing objectives and activities and the conditions in the GRZ and these will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

Table 1.1 Project Phases, Objectives and Activities

Dates	Project Phase	Project Objectives	Actions/ Outputs	GRZ context and developments
1983	Lupande workshop	Apply quantitative data on resource potential, land use capabilities, socio-economics of village societies and cost-effective designs of resource protection for helping solve land use problems in Lupande GMA Extend the lessons learned in Lupande to embrace the future requirements of land use management for the entire Luangwa River catchment	Presentation and analysis of conservation and social issues in Luangwa area Resolutions for a Lupande development project to develop the Lupande catchment as a model for efficient management and utilisation of wildlife and natural resources through integrated long-term regional planning and land use rationalisation.	Participation by NPWS (and other GRZ bodies). Lupande Development Project was developed -a USAID-supported pilot project from which the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMAGE) and LIRDPA subsequently developed
1983-1985	Planning		Initiation of planning for LIRDPA	Establishment of the Revolving Fund under the approval of the Ministry of Finance. National Conservation Strategy endorsed by Cabinet in 1985
1986-1987	Phase I	Improve the standard of living of the people in the project area by means of sustainable use of its full range of natural resources including agricultural, forestry, fisheries, water and wildlife	Establishment of LIRDPA and definition of activities, inputs and work programmes	May 1986: Formal appointment of Co-Director – Management (Fidelis Lungu) and Co-Director – Technical (Richard Bell). Secondment of staff to the project and allocation of office space in Chipata
1987-92	Phase II	Improve the standard of living of the people in the project area by means of sustainable use of its full range of natural resources including agricultural, forestry, fisheries, water and wildlife	LIRDPA investment and development phase. 5-year agreement between Norad and GRZ for implementation of a multi-	LIRDPA implemented and managed under NCDPA in Ministry of Finance; strong support by President Kaunda
1991		Ensure the programme becomes self-sustainable sustaining environmentally, socio-economically, financially and institutionally Without prejudice to the above, provide revenues and other benefits at the national level Provide infrastructural development for the project area to enable the development of land related resources including agriculture, forestry, wildlife and water supply	sectoral development programme, with the intention to attain sustainability.	Change of government from K Kaunda's UNIP to MMD with F Chiluba as president; change of priorities and reduced support for LIRDPA. Government initiated change of the LIRDPA administrative structure in 1992
1993-1994	Bridging phase	Provide basis to achieve sustainability as articulated in the original project objective Accomplish activities on the Annual Work Plan of the final year of Phase I (1992)	Continuation of the status quo but at reduced levels after the loss of the founding co-directors. Planning for Phase III	Transfer of LIRDPA from NCDPA to NPWS in Ministry of Tourism

Dates	Project Phase	Project Objectives	Actions/ Outputs	GRZ context and developments
1995-1998	Phase III	Development Objective Improve the status of the wildlife resource in the project area, thereby increasing the densities of key animal species while maintaining the biological diversity and creating a favourable environment for further development of the tourism and hunting-safari industries, which will allow continued generation of benefits for communities and revenues for effective management of the resource. Immediate Objectives Establish a sound CBNRM system, operative under Integrated Resource Development Authority, which will gradually take over all responsibilities of LIRDPA Manage SLNP so that it becomes ecologically and financially sustainable.	Restructuring and focus on wildlife management as a core function and transfer of other functions back to line ministries. Effective CBNRM programme a priority.	Revision of the NPW Act Cap. 10 started to – among other amendments – make provisions for more community involvement in wildlife management. Passage of The Zambia Wildlife Act, 1998, to establish ZAWA
1998-2002	Phase IV	Development Objective Luangwa Valley natural habitats and wildlife conserved and sustainably utilized. Immediate Objective SLAMU is technically and financially capable of managing SLNP and LGMA	LIRDPA became SLAMU in preparation for transition of NPWS to ZAWA. Improvements in Project Performance. Introduction of clear objectives, leaner structure, performance management and devolved financial and managerial authority.	1999-2002: Transition of NPWS to ZAWA; completed in 2002 2000-2002: Ban on trophy hunting initiated by Chiluba government 2002: Chiluba succeeded as president by L Mwanawasa
2003-2004	Phase IV extension		Norwegian financing of 14% anticipated deficit of SLAMU budget while waiting for Phase V financing.	
2005-2008	Phase V	Development Objective Natural habitats and wildlife conserved and sustainably utilized as evidenced by stabilization of large mammal populations and general increase in population of other species Immediate objective SLAMU capable of covering “core operational costs”, managing SLNP and GMAs in partnership with private operators and CBOs.	Greater focus on financial self-sufficiency of SLAMU.	

1.4 Project phases and objectives

As noted in the table above, the first implementation phase was actually “Phase II”, which began after the Phase I planning process. Phase II started in 1987, four years before the beginning of the period under study, and ended in 1992. Subsequent phases, Phase III and IV and their “bridging” and “extension” periods, brought the project up to 2004. A Phase V began in 2005, the last year of the evaluation period, and it is intended to continue until 2008. This evaluation will necessarily include assessment of the “bookend” phases II and V overlapping the start and end of the study period as well as those entirely contained by it.

Phase II was a highly ambitious, multi-sectoral approach to improving the standard of living of the people in the project area by means of sustainable use of its full range of natural resources including agricultural, forestry, fisheries, water and wildlife. It had a large component of infrastructure development for the project area, with the intention of enabling the development of related resources. This phase is now viewed in retrospect as a top-down, unsustainable “mini-government” that substituted for the work of the GRZ – and even supplied functions that might have been provided by the private sector, such as a milling operation and a bus company – but did not build the capacity for their eventual handover (Dalal-Clayton & Child 2003). However, this type of project was typical of ICDP-type donor interventions of the mid-1980s period, and such criticism is at least partly “wisdom in hindsight”. It could be argued that Phase II provided the initial basis for subsequent, more focussed developments and it is certainly still remembered rather fondly, and wistfully, by many rural residents in Lupande GMA (Key informant interviews, July 2007).

Phase III emerged from a project review (Scanteam 1993) that called for improved administrative management and a more tightly targeted effort to create a viable CBNRM programme. All the non-wildlife sector components were terminated or phased out, and there was a concerted approach to take wildlife utilization seriously as a means of income-generation, both for the management of the park and the improvement of rural livelihoods. The CBNRM work also introduced a strong element of decentralized grass-roots democracy, as it was driven from the bottom up by elected Village Action Groups, which were given the key decision-making role for managing the funds directly derived from the hunting concessions in the Lupande GMA.

The LIRD P approach shared similarities with the ADMADE programme, a separate programme which piloted a revolving fund for retaining and returning revenues generated from hunting concessions (the Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund, WCRF) in other GMAs in Zambia and which had developed following the Lupande Development Workshop. It was supported by USAID during 1989-1999 and received technical support from the Wildlife Conservation Society through a range of interventions. There were, however, important differences between ADMADE and LIRD P:

- in an attempt to mainstream the WCRF, it was located in NPWS, which administered funds earned from ADMADE areas through its headquarters office, while under LIRD P payments from hunting outfitters went directly to a community account, with decisions on expenditure controlled by the Village Action Groups,
- ADMADE funds were shared as follows: 100% of hunting concession fees and 50% of licence fees went to the WCRF (the other 50% going to central Treasury), and from the WCRF, 40% was for management costs (village scouts); 35% was returned to local communities and 25% went to NPWS, while LIRD P funds were shared as follows: in Phase II, 60% went to management costs and 40% to the communities, but under Phase III, 100% of **all** hunting revenues were retained in a community account, with 80% going to Village Action Groups and the remainder to the Chiefs, Area Development Committee and management costs.
- its main point of contact in rural areas were the Chiefs, rather than village organizations, as in LIRD P.

ADMADE was thus more fully integrated within the government wildlife authority than was LIRD P, arguably a good thing for building sustainability and capacity, and for the

morale of NPWS officers – see below --but it was also more centralised in financial and managerial arrangements and less able to develop grass-roots community structures.

Phase III involved an important shift in the programme's institutional framework. Under Kaunda, LIRDPA's oversight committee, chaired by KK himself, was located in the NCDP in the Ministry of Finance, in view of the importance he accorded it. After Kaunda lost electoral office to the MMD under F. Chiluba, LIRDPA was moved to NPWS in the Ministry of Tourism. The earlier arrangement had caused deep resentment within NPWS, who were the agency mandated to manage wildlife in Zambia, yet who felt estranged from the LIRDPA programme, which operated outside its control. With the incorporation of LIRDPA into NPWS, the project nevertheless maintained a degree of autonomy in its direction and practices, quite possibly because of the involvement of Norad as its financial patron.

Phase IV coincided with the transition of NPWS, a government department, to ZAWA, a statutory body/ parastatal, a process that was intended to give greater autonomy to the wildlife agency but which, ironically, resulted in greater centralization of key CBNRM activities in South Luangwa. The project objectives remained the conservation of the natural habitats and wildlife of the Luangwa Valley and sustainable natural resource use leading to poverty alleviation. An important difference, however, from previous project phases was that funds were given to a project account administered by ZAWA, rather than to a separate LIRDPA entity. Project managers were also now ZAWA staff officers, rather than being employed by the project. The LIRDPA was transformed from a project with distinct, nongovernmental staff into an "area management unit" within ZAWA – i.e. SLAMU. This was arguably a positive step in the direction of institutional sustainability of the process. However, the Zambia Wildlife Act, 1998, creating ZAWA, included provisions that extended the ADMAD arrangements to **all** GMAs, reducing the flexibility and decentralized "ownership" that had developed in Lupande GMA under LIRDPA. Community Resource Boards became an administrative layer above (and more remote from) the grassroots Village Action Groups, and CRBs are now the recipients of the funds which are passed via ZAWA from the hunting concessions. The proportion of funds received by CRBs from hunting was also reduced by more than 50% --see Section 1.5.5 below. Phase IV also aimed more specifically at making SLAMU technically and financially capable of managing both SLNP and LGMA.

Phase V extended the objectives of Phase IV, with even greater focus on financial and technical self-sufficiency of SLAMU for managing the park and the LGMA. The expansion of the tourism sector, including creating ever-greater opportunities for private sector operators within the SLNP, and in developing/ maintaining partnerships with NGOs in the GMA, have been key aspects of the move towards self-sufficiency.

The project objectives have clearly evolved over the two decades of support, from a broad-scale, multi-disciplinary rural development programme towards greater focus on wildlife conservation and community-based natural resource management. At the same time, there has been a trend towards greater financial, managerial and technical accountability and independence. LIRDPA/ SLAMU has developed an increasing ability to generate and retain income from SLNP, largely from tourist lodge concession fees and park entry fees, and the funds required from Norad and other donors have correspondingly decreased. In all phases, there has been a commitment to infrastructure development in the region, with a significant proportion of the budgets devoted to road building and maintenance.

Figures for financial commitments by Norad to LIRDPA/ SLAMU and ZAWA over the period 1990 to 2004 were extracted from databases at Norad headquarters in Oslo, reported fully in Annex 1 and summarised in Table 1.2 below. (It was not possible to find records at the Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka on actual disbursement of funds.) This period covers the last two years of project Phase II, the whole of Phases III and Phase IV and respective bridging and extension phases. The commitment over this evaluation period has been considerable, a total of **NOK 160,432,250**. If the expenditure for the first four years of Phase II (1987-90) are included at an estimated NOK 14,000,000 *per annum*, the total expenditure on LIRDPA/ SLAMU implementation from 1987 up to 2005 comes to

NOK 216,432,250. An additional NOK 65,000,000 has been committed for Phase IV, which began in 2005 and is due for completion in 2008.

Table 1.2 Financial commitment by Norad to project phases

Project phase	Commitment NOK	Period
LIRDP Phase II	30,172,000	1990-91
Bridging phase	43,869,000	1992-93
LIRDP Phase III	55,630,000	1994-97
SLAMU Phase IV	18,361,250	1998-2002
SLAMU Phase IV extension	3,000,000	2003-2004
SLAMU Phase V	65,000,000	2005-2008
ZAWA institutional transformation and capacity development	4,700,000	2000-2001, 2004

1.5 Evaluation of project objectives

1.5.1 Project management

Project management in terms of direction, implementation, financial planning and expenditure against workplans and reporting has been provided by team leaders (Phases I-III) or SLAMU managers (Phases IV-V), while oversight, monitoring and project design have been provided by the Norwegian authorities. This process underwent changes during the different phases and had varying degrees of success.

In Phase II, there was good support and commitment by the Norwegian embassy but little effective reporting of results or financial accounting. It was only towards the end of Phase II that the first systematic reports of finances and results were produced. The review of Phase II took note of this and in Phase III, a more rigorous system of performance management and reporting was introduced. This was a great improvement and all subsequent Annual Reports have been more thorough and well-documented.

The Norwegian development cooperation manual (Norad 2005), describes project monitoring and evaluation, which is achieved through annual reporting by the project implementers and meetings with Norwegian officials. Pre-project appraisals and midterm/end-term reviews are done by outside experts. The annual reporting is related to outputs defined in the original project agreement, and the annual or more frequent meetings offer the chance to discuss obstacles to progress.

In the view of the evaluation team, this system has the advantage of flexibility but the drawback of being not particularly rigorous. The definition of targets and indicators is not sufficiently specific and there does not seem to be much opportunity for revision of the logical framework on the basis of monitoring data and reports.

The levels of accountability and scrutiny seemed to vary depending on the personalities of the individual officers in the Norwegian embassy. Equally, the value of the appraisals and reviews has been dependent on the individual consultants employed. To their credit the Norwegian officials with responsibility for this sector have generally shown good commitment to the aims of the project. They have also apparently recognised that reviews of early project Phases were not helpfully constructive and in subsequent years have employed evaluators with good objectivity and knowledge of the sector.

One aspect of the weakness of the Norwegian monitoring and evaluation system, however, was the lack of clear project monitoring documentation in a readily accessible form. The project documents – agreements, reports, evaluations – are simply stored amongst other documents and correspondence, with no straightforward framework for assessing project achievements against targets. The Norwegian official has reports and other project information at his fingertips, and may have a good knowledge of the project progress, but the documentary evidence of a consistent monitoring system across the years of the project phases is lacking.

1.5.2 Relevance

Fit of objectives with Norway strategy and goals

The project is in line with Norway's rolling three-year country strategies over the period 1992-1997. The overall goal for Norwegian support was "to contribute to economic and social development and ensure sound management of resources and environment." Specific priorities included "support to strengthening of civil society, including material and democratic rights." One Priority was given as:

"Environment and resource management: Luangwa Valley project should be evaluated in order to determine whether the model is economically sustainable, and whether new funds should be made available." Clearly it was decided that new support would be provided, under a more streamlined and targeted approach, with improved financial and technical management and reporting systems.

It is also consistent with the Strategy for Norwegian Development Cooperation with Zambia 2001-2005. While the overall Goal of the programme is to support Zambia's efforts to reduce poverty, Norad (2003, pp13-14) notes under Programme Objectives

– Main Areas of Support, its Objective 4: "Contribution towards enhancing environmental management, with the main focus on wildlife management". Recognizing that it has supported since the 1980s wildlife management reforms with respect to one of the national parks (i.e. SLNP), it now intends to broaden its approach to reorganization of wildlife management at the national level, with support for private investment and community development in relation to tourism as a means both to generate foreign exchange and protecting natural resources. Continuation of the established programme aims to extend results so far achieved, including mainstreaming of lessons learned at the local level.

Norwegian support to LIRD/SLAMU and the Zambian wildlife sector has been remarkably consistent over the period of study, and indeed the past 20 years. They have continued to support the process of developing sustainable use and conservation of wildlife as a legitimate natural resource through an evolving programme that has learned and changed in line with international best practice. Other donors have supported the sector for more limited periods: among others, USAID supporting ADMAD and NGO activities for much of the 1990s, the Danish government supporting NGOs and a variety of small projects in South Luangwa and elsewhere, UNDP and the World Bank with projects in other areas of the country, JICA in various protected areas, WWF and IUCN. The Norwegian government has coordinated well with these programmes and has played a leading role, such that lessons learned in South Luangwa are being applied recently in other areas, such as Kafue National Park (Key informant interviews, July 2007). In the last year or so, there has been a harmonisation and donor coordination process in Zambia around the Joint Assistance Strategy (JASZ), in which Norway has been an active partner. Most other donors, however, appear to be withdrawing from the wildlife sector, if not the "green" environment sector entirely, while Norway – to date – retains its commitment. This is admirable, since it is only now that the investment over the years in wildlife-based national and rural development is starting to turn the corner, with the tourism sector showing real promise of becoming an engine of economic progress.

Fit of objectives with Zambia strategy and goals

The programme addresses four areas:

- conservation and wildlife management
- tourism development
- poverty reduction
- decentralization and strengthening local communities (in wildlife management)

These are in line with the National Conservation Strategy which was adopted in 1985 and was intended to satisfy the basic needs of the Zambian people through wise use of natural resources. This Strategy was accompanied by policy statements on the importance of tourism in the Zambian economy, and the need for diversification of rural incomes, for the benefit of the Zambian people, especially those communities that live closest to wildlife and bear the costs of conservation initiatives. Such statements in support of the wildlife sector include the Policy for Wildlife in Zambia (approved by Cabinet 1993), the Policy for National Parks and Wildlife (1995) and the National Environmental Policy (2005).

The commitment by the Zambian government at higher levels – to wildlife conservation as a means for contributing tourism and to delivering poverty reduction and local community empowerment – can be questioned, however. There is little direct recognition in any of the National Development Plans of wildlife conservation as an economic and social development mechanism, nor any indication of commitment to the strengthening of this sector. In the FNDP, there is mention of the importance of strengthening the tourism sector but not of investment in the basis of the sector, which is nature and wildlife, nor is there any recognition that the expansion of the wildlife sector can deliver significant benefits to the national economy and rural livelihoods (Hamilton et al 2007). The agency responsible for wildlife management, ZAWA, has received insufficient funding for capital development of its key parks, which are the main targets of tourists, and at the moment is actually expected to be a net generator of funds for central government (Key informant interviews, July 2007). This is short-sighted and likely to stifle development in the sector,

For this reason, it can be argued that the commitment by Norway to support the LIRD / SLAMU has not been effectively complemented by the Zambian government. The Strategy for Development Cooperation expects commitment by the recipient government and the Norwegian development authorities may have been slow in the past in insisting on greater policy and budgetary support to match the donor contribution. In our discussions in July 2007 with the First Secretary, Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture at the Norwegian Embassy, we were told that Norway is now requesting greater dedication of resources by the GRZ to the development of its wildlife sector.

1.5.3 Effectiveness


Inside SLNP, LIRD/SLAMU has focused on maintaining the maximum number and diversity of animals without their posing a threat to the available habitats. In LGMA, the aim has been to enhance local people's benefits from sustainable management of wildlife. Many outputs have been achieved. Others are making good progress, but some are not likely to be achieved.

Wildlife conservation and management in South Luangwa has improved significantly which is a considerable achievement compared to other protected areas in Zambia and indeed the southern African region. From early project phases, it was clear that illegal killing of wildlife was significantly reduced. Poaching of elephants dropped during Phase II and although this coincided with the international ivory trade ban in 1989, which reduced poaching levels across the continent, it was felt that SLNP saw improved control earlier than other areas of Zambia. Poaching of rhinos, which peaked along with that of elephants during the middle 1980s (Leader-Williams et al 1985) resulted in the complete elimination of this wildlife species, and reintroduction has not been considered a safe option until earlier this year (2007)¹. This would indicate that there have been perceived limits on wildlife protection capacity in the Luangwa Valley for the past two decades, although the situation may

The management of SLNP has improved under progressive phases of the project and in the most recent year, 2006, it achieved financial self-sufficiency. This was achieved by holding maintenance costs low and does not include capital expenditure, so true financial self-sufficiency has yet to be achieved. There has been steady development of tourist facilities within the park; by the end of 2005, the LIRD / SLAMU area had a total bed capacity of 566. A recent analysis (Mwima 2007)¹ of overall management effectiveness for the nineteen national parks managed by ZAWA has revealed that SLNP is comparatively better managed than any other national park in Zambia. The analysis was based on six management components of the World Commission on Protected Areas Framework (See Figure 1.1). Similar analyses for Game Management Areas revealed that LGMA is comparatively better managed than any of the thirty six Game Management Areas in Zambia (see Figure


1.2). Norad support through LIRD and SLAMU has undoubtedly contributed to making SLNP and LGMA the best managed protected areas in the country.

Figure 1.1 Management effectiveness of National Parks



Abbreviations: (BLNP: Blue Lagoon, KsNP: Kasanka, LvNP: Lavushi Manda, LuNP: Luambe, LPNP: Lusenga Plain, LkNP: Lukusuzi, SNP: Sioma Ngwezi, SbnP: Sumbu, KNP: Kafue, LcNP: Lochinvar, MNP: Mosi-Oa-Tunya, LIPNP: Liuwa Plain, LZNP: Lower Zambezi, SLNP: South Luangwa, NLNP: North Luangwa, NNP: Nyika, INP: Isangano, MWNP: Mweru Wa Nitpa, WLNp: West Lunga

Figure 1.2 Management effectiveness of Game Management Areas



Abbreviations: (B: Bangweulu, Bbl: Bbilili Springs, Czr: Chizera, CN: Chibwika Ntambu, Csm: Chisomo, Nkl: Nkala, Chw: Chiawa, Cbs: Chambeshi, KM: Kalasa Mukoso, KFNB: Kafue Flats – North Bank, MF: Machiya Fungulwe, KFSB: Kafue Flats – South Bank, WM: West Musalangu, MM: Musele Matebo, Mkg: Mukungule; Myd: Munyamadzi, Lkk: Lukwakwa, Lwg: Luwingu, Mft: Mufunta, KB: Kasonso Busanga, LL: Lunga

1 <http://www.afrol.com/articles/12944>

Luswishi, Lpd: Lupande, Lun: Luano, EM: East Musalangu, Kfd: Kafinda, Kpt: Kaputa, UWZ: Upper West Zambezi, Mlz: Mulobezi, Rfs: Rufunsa, Mmb: Mumbwa, Mns: Mansa, Nml: Namwala, Scf: Sichifulo, Tnd: Tondwa, Lmb: Lumimba, Snd: Sandwe, WP: West Petauke and LWZ: Lower West Zambezi

There has been **improvement in local livelihoods** in the Lupande GMA. The multitude of services provided under Phase II and the glowing reports from local residents (Key informant interviews July 2007) suggest that benefits did flow to households at that time, although the results were delivered in a top-down and did not build local capacity. Phase III produced genuine benefit and considerably greater decentralized, democratic control of funds through the hunting concessions in the GMA. Between 1996 and 2005, the following community projects were undertaken: 25 teachers' houses built, 61 school renovation / constructions projects, 24 rural health clinics built, 102 wells / boreholes, 72 Village Scouts hired from six Chiefdoms, 5 electric fences erected and not the least, 5 CRB office blocks built. There has been, however, no systematic attempt in any of the project phases to **quantify** the level of financial contribution to household incomes, relative to other income sources (as for example by Hamilton et al 2007), and thus to measure the level of success of CBNRM in relation to other land uses.

The hunting concession holders do provide additional benefits to communities through contributions to local development projects, some employment and a limited provision of bushmeat. The game-viewing lodges also make significant contributions to social services in the GMA. The recent study by Hamilton et al (2007) has shown that household incomes in GMAs adjacent to SLNP are significantly higher than in control areas, but the distribution of benefits is skewed away from the poorest individuals.

In project Phases IV and V, the levels of funds retained at the local level have been reduced and control of funds has been re-centralised with the creation of ZAWA. The commitment of central government to supporting CBNRM has not been consistent, and there are always reports of political interference in ZAWA by powerful individuals, often in the context of the awarding of hunting concessions, who apparently see the sector as a means of getting rich individually, but at the same time not worthy of governmental support (Key informant interviews, July 2007).

The efforts at land-use planning for the area have not been successful. A land use planning process, funded with assistance by WWF, was initiated in Phase IV but it has been stalled by lack of cooperation by the Chiefs and by the weakness of local government; it is also likely that insufficient consultation took place to include the views of all relevant stakeholders. There is currently a serious risk of encroachment by commercial extractive farming in nearby areas in the Luangwa Valley, in the interests of large external groups which could develop in future in Lupande. Initiatives such as "conservation farming" (such as COMACO²) are now being developed to counter these alienating land-use forms. The viability and sustainability of such endeavours in the longer term must be questioned, but it is clear that in the absence of land zoning and decentralized local control over resources, urgent actions must be taken to counter the loss of natural resources in Luangwa Valley.

In parallel to the land use planning, there has been a similar lack of success in achieving an agreed park management plan for SLNP. This remains a priority area, since although SLAMU managers have done well in maintaining the integrity of the park, there is need for a strategic and operational blueprint for budgeting and work planning.

A large proportion of project funding in all phases was devoted to road-building and maintenance, but success in this area has been very difficult to achieve. In part, this paucity of results has been attributed to the lack of competent contractors in the region who can, or intend to, deliver successful works.

1.5.4 Efficiency

In the earliest period of the project implementation – Phase II – managing expenditure against the multitude of activities proved difficult. With successive Phases, efficiency increased markedly and financial management improved greatly. The system for

² Community Markets for Conservation. See <http://www.itswild.org/>

accounting, reporting and issuing of payments is now more streamlined, although ZAWA internal systems for tendering, based on possibly unrealistically low ceilings for competitive tendering, is still considered cumbersome (Key informant interview, July 2007).

There has been large expenditure on major link roads between SLNP and the Zambian road network across all phases, and their ongoing low quality despite these efforts, could be judged inefficient. In part, this paucity of results has been attributed to the lack of competent contractors in the region who can, or intend to, deliver successful works, but it is also likely due to the sharing of responsibility for maintenance with other government departments, which lack capacity for ongoing repairs. It should be noted that roads within SLNP, which are under the direct control of the ZAWA officers, are now in sufficiently good condition they can be used more or less year round.

There were gaps between project phases, during periods of appraisal and negotiation. The most recent was 2005, when there was no Norwegian funding at all, and SLAMU had to exist purely on its own resources, by minimizing expenditure and cutting back on developments.

1.5.5 Impact

Intended Conservation of wildlife

Wildlife conservation was improved greatly during the initial phase, when the threat of poaching, particularly of elephants was very high. The drop in elephant poaching in the late 1980s coincided with the international ban on trade in ivory, which resulted in a drop in elephant poaching across the whole continent of Africa. However, it is argued that the reduction in poaching in South Luangwa occurred earlier than in other areas of the country (Dalal-Clayton & Child 2003).

This success can be attributed to two approaches: improved enforcement by government authorities and improved cooperation with local communities. Enforcement capacity by SLNP staff has certainly improved and a village scout system operates with apparent effectiveness in LGMA. It is not possible to attribute the impact, or proportion of impact on wildlife conservation to either of these factors. However, it is safe to say that without cooperation with the communities, the efforts of the enforcement authorities would be much harder. Indeed, some of the community effort is directed at enforcement, with the deployment of village scouts.

An additional factor that has contributed to the appreciation of wildlife as a resource worth protecting, and to bringing financial resources to bear on this goal is the encouraging environment that has been provided for private sector investment in tourism operations and related services. This investment has generated direct income to the SLNP and has brought social development to the area, through job creation and trickle-down effects on the local economy. As noted above, one wildlife species that has not benefited from this improved conservation is the black rhinoceros. It was exterminated in South Luangwa in the 1980s before commencement of LIRD and it has not been possible to protect it from poachers sufficiently well to allow reintroduction of the species, although this has been considered recently. One could argue that the protection of this species is the ultimate measure of conservation impact, which has yet to be fully realized.

Community empowerment and democratic structures

There has been successful creation of structures to receive financial returns from hunting concessions, and to make decisions on the expenditure of such funds on projects that would be of benefit to the communities in question.

During Phase III, there was greatly increased success in the distribution of revenues to local communities in the LGMA. All (100% of) revenues from both hunting licences and concessions were retained locally. Of this, there was the following distribution:

- 80% to villagers
- 4% to ADCs for administrative costs and allowances
- 6% to the Chiefs (1% to each of the six Chiefs)

- 10% to the VAG's accounts for wildlife management.

The funds were distributed directly to villagers in open meetings. They were then invited to decide whether to retain the funds for their own households or to devote some or all of their funds to community projects. After an initial period of personal retention, involvement in local projects increased. This was generally felt to be a highly positive approach to local ownership of the wildlife resource and devolution of decision-making directly to people at the grass-roots level. Decisions on hunting quotas were still taken by NPWS, but there was the intention to move towards greater community involvement in this process as well.

Much of this progress was diluted and lost after the transition of NPWS to ZAWA, and the re-centralization of hunting revenues and decision-making in South Luangwa, bringing LIRD/SLAMU into line with the ADMADE system in operation in GMAs elsewhere in the country. At a workshop held in Lusaka in 2002 by ZAWA with Chiefs and community representatives, the decision was adopted that a much-reduced portion of hunting revenue would be retained locally according to the following formulae:

- animal licence fees
 - 50% to ZAWA and GRZ
 - 10% to central government
 - 40% to ZAWA headquarters
 - 50% to communities
 - 45% to CRBs, of which varying proportions are retained and spent on community projects
 - 5% to the Chiefs
- concession fees
 - 80% to ZAWA
 - 20% to CRBs

The effect of this change is twofold: the local people now receive considerably less financial incentive from the wildlife resource than they had previously realised, and the decisions on how to spend the proceeds have been removed to a higher level, from that of individual households to that of the CRBs. There is a process of election of CRB members, via Village Action Groups, but focus group meetings with VAG members indicated that this process is understood by only a few, more well-informed and possibly well-connected, individuals and that ordinary people had little idea of how much there was and how the funds would be spent.

The Chiefs are also unhappy with the change in the system, since under the Phase III system, they had both higher direct revenues and a greater role in influencing how the community funds would be spent. It could be argued that this reduction in the formal influence of the Chiefs has benefited the local people in reducing the ability of the Chiefs to sequester funds.

Unintended positive

There has undoubtedly been stimulation of the local economy, including spin-off handicraft industries and multiplier effects on the local and national Zambian economy. A local example is Tribal Textiles, which currently employs just over 60 local people, making and selling luxury souvenirs to tourists. There is one other formal handicraft operator nearby, with a similar though smaller contribution.

The volume of tourists to SLNP has justified the creation of the local airport, with two daily flights to Lusaka and elsewhere, and this has increased the prospects for the transport of goods in both directions.

Unintended negative

In the early stages of the project, the NPWS professionals resented the project because it was based in a different Ministry, yet had a mandate over the sector managed elsewhere by NPWS. Although it has been some years since the project has been absorbed within ZAWA, there may still be some feeling at ZAWA headquarters that the agency should

assert its authority over SLAMU. This is exemplified by its over-riding of hunting quotas that are proposed during stakeholder meetings in Mfuwe and the subsequent lack of clear justification to the communities.

The very success of the projects in creating employment and the appearance of wealth creation has attracted people to the area. In the early 1990s, the project area had a population of approximately 40,000 people. By 2004, the population had increased to approximately 50,000 people. This has increased pressure on resources and threatened the viability of project gains, diluting the per capita share of income.

The increased mobility of people, including incomers, the rise in employment and relative wealth creation may have served to increase the incidence of HIV/AIDS in Mambwe District. The later project phases have specific outputs directed at prevention, which may have offset the increased risk somewhat.

1.5.6 Sustainability

Financial

SLAMU is moving steadily towards financial sustainability by building its capacity to host tourist lodges and entries in SLNP. In the year 2006, it recorded its first apparent budget surplus on recurrent costs. However, this was achieved by minimizing expenditure on road maintenance and other non-priority activities, which must nevertheless be paid for at some point. The income **on paper** also includes the taking of funds from the LGMA, in the form of the retention of 50% of hunting licence fees and 80% of concession fees by ZAWA headquarters. However, since SLAMU does not actually receive these hunting revenues into its own account, they should not really count as actual income, and therefore the 2006 budget fell short of actual surplus. While its success towards this objective compares well with other wildlife areas in Zambia and the Southern Africa region, SLAMU nevertheless remains dependent on Norwegian support for capital expenditure, particularly on plant and vehicles

The central GRZ does not appear to recognize the importance of the wildlife resource as the basis of the growing tourism industry and as an engine for rural development. Its unwillingness to invest in capital expenditure to build protected area infrastructure and its insistence that ZAWA should be a net **contributor** (through its payment of 10% of hunting concession fees) to, rather than recipient of, the national treasury's funds at this stage in its development threatens to undermine the ability of SLNP and the wider SLAMU area to consolidate the gains made thus far to continue and extend its ability to generate income for its own operations and for the social development needed to build local support for conservation.

Institutional

The park management institutions now appear to have been rationalised and function well.

The institutions at community level remain somewhat weak and there are unresolved tensions between the Chiefs and the elected CRBs and VAGs. The Chiefs are resentful that their authority has been undermined by their limited role in the CRBs, and that they are formally sidelined in decision-making on community projects. The 1998 Review of Phase III suggested that constructive approaches to resolve the "Chiefs Issue" be undertaken, but this does not appear to have been acted upon. Communication between CRBs and VAGs, and between VAGs and villagers, is not effective.

Local government at the District level is undeveloped and is in no position to replace the Chiefs as the authority for conflict resolution and land-use decisions. Land-use planning remains stalled, while relations with the Chiefs have not been resolved.

Line ministries, apart from Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR) through ZAWA, are very poorly represented and resourced in the South Luangwa area. This is a major weakness, since the agricultural sector in particular needs

support and attention. In this vacuum, the COMACO project is making a contribution, but it does face the same challenge of ensuring sustainability as did LIRD Phase II.

The Zambian government's wildlife conservation agency has undergone transformations over the years of the evaluation period. In the early 1990s, the relevant authority was the National Parks and Wildlife Service, under the Ministry of Tourism. Following the programmes of various donors during the 1980s and 1990s, including USAID, the concept of revenue retention from the proceeds of wildlife utilization, including both hunting and viewing tourism became well-established. The ADMADE programme and LIRD involving "revolving funds" developed the concept that income from wildlife could and should be reinvested in the sector itself, rather than going to higher government levels and trickling back down. For this reason, and following the lead of initiatives in other African countries, it was felt that the wildlife agency should become an autonomous body, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), with a degree of financial and managerial independence.

This process of change should not be the subject of the current evaluation, but suffice it to say that progress has not been smooth. There remains a high degree of interference from central government, both by the Ministry and quite likely other political players. The effect on SLAMU has been to re-centralize financial and decision-making authority, and this has undermined the process of local democratisation and empowerment.

Social

The Phase II efforts provided improved services in a number of sectoral areas promoting social development in Lupande GMA and these are remembered, wistfully, by local residents. However, as these services were totally dependent on Norwegian aid funds, did not build local capacity to maintain them, and were lost when the project changed its funding level and focus, they were in no way sustainable.

The social gains of Phase III, in terms both of financial benefit and community development projects, as well as increasing democratisation, lost ground during Phases IV and V. A modicum of good will remains – for example, the village scout system still operates – but with such reduced direct benefit and decision-making, the social sustainability of the CBNRM-based livelihoods and wildlife conservation has been reduced.

Environmental

The alarmist suggestions, contained in Dalal-Clayton and Child (2003), of imminent ecological destruction have not materialized. They advocated vigorous culling of several species to avoid habitat damage and competition between wildlife populations in SLNP. Some limited, regular culling of hippos continues but other species are not controlled and elephants have not yet destroyed the woodlands, hippos have not eliminated other species, buffalo, zebra and impala populations have not spiralled out of control. The promotion of culling was to serve the purpose of revenue generation for LIRD/ SLAMU, through sales of products, rather than management for environmental sustainability.

The development of park roads has increased the prospects of soil erosion through run-off and this problem must be taken more seriously, monitored and ameliorated.

The broader question of sustainability of the wildlife resource is affected by the other three sustainability aspects – financial, institutional and social --discussed above. If SLAMU supports and maintains the local institutions, there is every reason to believe that the wildlife resource can be conserved. However, particular attention must be given to the social aspects of CBNRM and land use in the GMA in order to maintain the cooperation of local communities in the conservation of wildlife.

1.5.7 Ownership and commitment

By recipient agency

ZAWA appears to have taken on ownership of the LIRD through the creation of Area Management Units, including SLAMU, under the Wildlife Act. The personnel appointed

to SLAMU appear very competent and motivated, an indication that it is considered a priority posting by the ZAWA administration. However, there still remains a feeling that the ZAWA officers, both at Headquarters and even in SLAMU, do not fully appreciate the importance of building capacity at, and transferring control to, grassroots levels in the communities for empowering their own ability to derive benefit from the wildlife resource. The ZAWA Director has recently requested greater provision of capital funds from central government, so it appears that he does recognize the importance of maintaining the momentum on the developments initiated by LIRD/ SLAMU.

By Central and Local Government

Central government still does not appear to be taking seriously the role of the wildlife sector in the national economy, in tourism and its multiplier effect, in general or in the Luangwa Valley in particular. There remain serious suspicions that powerful politicians at the national level use the wildlife sector for personal short term gain, rather than national and local development.

Local government remains weak and although the current District Commissioner is supportive of SLAMU, the District Council has a limited mandate and limited resources to play a significant role. The traditional Chiefs remain important players in the region, and although un-elected and lacking accountability for their often self-interested actions, they retain the customary respect of their “subjects” in the village communities. In the absence of strong, truly local government, the Chiefs fill an authority and social cohesion vacuum. Their role in supporting the wildlife sector and the efforts by SLAMU, NGOs and the private sector to derive and channel benefits to the rural people are highly dependent on individual personalities – some Chiefs are helpful and others obstructive.

1.6 Implications for hypotheses

Introduction

With regard to the South Luangwa Wildlife programme (LIRD/SLAMU) four issues have been identified as key drivers of political decision-making and action:

- the contestation between various actors for power over access to resources;
- the tension created by the need to control the human and animal populations in South Luangwa valley when it is becoming an economic growth point, drawing in many new settlers (though this may be only one factor contributing to human demographic and migration patterns);
- the Luangwa programme and the government department sometimes managing it (NPWS /ZAWA) have been subject to the same political pressures as other systems and structures, and so their history is influenced by the development policies of the three political regimes (1964-1991, 1991-2001, 2001-present); and
- safaris and tourism are money-earners, and that fact creates incentives that have spurred a number of people to act illegally, which has had political implications since the programme’s inception.

The focus of aid to South Luangwa has changed over the years, from poverty-alleviation to wildlife conservation within a community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) framework. This too, has had an impact on human development (and therefore, power relations) within the valley.

Politics and South Luangwa

Though Luangwa valley is in one of the most isolated and underdeveloped parts of Zambia³ a highly charged political environment surrounds the South Luangwa (SL) wildlife management project. This is because a National Park has been created by marking off some areas exclusively for wildlife and photo-tourists⁴ while allowing local people to

3 In 2000, literacy and access to clean water in the Province stood at less than 40%, where only 3% of the population had proper latrines. Also, the Mfuwe area is a ‘hot spot’ for HIV/AIDS/tuberculosis and malaria. www.liv.ac.uk/sace/research/projects/mfuwe/references/index.html

4 Nearly six hundred thousand visitors entered the park in 2003. www.liv.ac.uk/sace/research/projects/mfuwe/impact/index.html

live in the adjacent Lupande Game Management Area -GMA⁵ where 'poaching'⁶ is restricted though lucrative, licensed game hunting is encouraged. As one Chief put it, 'We are deep in the bush.... We are here because of these animals, [and] if we had none we'd be ignored'. (Key informant interview, July 2007)

Two groups of people in particular are affected by this arrangement – those who live on the land nearby the park and those seeking profit from animals (viewing, hunting, selling animal and forest products, etc). Contesting control of access to land and animals (and sometimes to state and donor resources) are various actors – concessionaire hunting companies, lodge owners and photo-safari operators, Chiefs, 'democratically elected' village committees, and local populations. The government (in the form of ZAWA⁷) is required to balance these competing interests and ensure the resource base is sustainable (e.g., there are not too many trees cut or animals killed), which gives it a powerful role in the politics of the area. The fact that big money is involved in some aspects of the area's operations, especially the awarding of hunting concessions and the building of tourist lodges, makes GMA management subject to clientelist and corrupt practices.⁸

Another dimension of the South Luangwa story also has political ramifications, and that is the fact that South Luangwa National Park is a victim of its own success: in the normal course of events, an economic 'growth point' emerges as it attracts investment, infrastructural development, entrepreneurs and workers, etc. Thus a village with a vibrant economy becomes a town and then a city. This, though, is anathema to those interested in preserving wildlife and tourism, who naturally oppose the indiscriminate in-migration of workers and businesses, the unregulated use of land and resources, and unrestricted and unsightly building in the GMA⁹. Unemployed workers from elsewhere in Zambia and the region are drawn to the Luangwa valley, competing with locals for employment and resources, building small businesses and huts along the road, and when unable to find work, poaching animals. As one CRB member put it, people from the 'plateau' are coming here and they 'spoil [the] bedroom for our [wild] animals' by cutting trees, building dams, and bringing in dogs.¹⁰

Governance at Mfuwe, South Luangwa

The Lupande GMA is in Mambwe District, Eastern province, with a District Commissioner (answerable to the President), who administers the area with the assistance of technical specialists from the various central government ministries (health, education etc), who in turn form the District Development Coordination Committee (DDCC). There is besides a district council, composed of elected councillors, but it has relatively little power or funds.¹¹ The reach of the council into South Luangwa valley appears tentative at best, reflecting the fact that decentralisation has not advanced far in Zambia.¹² On the other hand, central government, through the DC and a Mfuwe-based intelligence officer (also answerable to the President) ensure order in the district, though ministries (such as agriculture) appear idle. Six Chiefs --Mnkhanya, Kakumbi, Malama, Jumbe, Nsefu and Msoro --in the SL area fill the power vacuum at the local level. They play management, fund-raising, voter-mobilization, information-sharing, ceremonial, judicial, and spiritual roles within the community.

5 Villagers used to live inside the park but were encouraged to move to the GMA; the last village was shifted in the 1950s. The memory of the move has dimmed, and even local leaders are unaware of specific dates: one Chief was unable to tell us when his Chiefdom was moved, while another said it was 'in the 1800s'.

6 Poaching ranges from villagers snaring animals close to home to groups moving through the park and GMA, motivated by commercial interests such as the sale of ivory or game meat. Ninety-nine animals were thought to have been poached in 2003 (including 15 elephant) compared to 3600 elephants killed each year between 1975 and 1985 but only 20 in 1991 (LIRD, Annual Report 1991.) That said, in 2004 a team of specialists concluded (though could not substantiate) that 'illegal hunting is extensive, especially during the rainy season' when the park is less visited by tourists (Booth et al, 24 June 2004, p. 29).

7 The Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) is regulated by the Wildlife Act of 1998, which includes as one of its functions (besides protection of biodiversity, the environment, etc) 'the enhancement of economic and social well-being of local communities'. It calls for local communities to be 'intimately and practically involved in protecting and deriving benefits from what is rightfully their natural heritage'. Communities are empowered to elect CRBs (Community Resource Boards) comprised of representatives from Village Action Groups (VAGs), which receive and spend funds among other duties.

8 The Species Protection Department of the Anti-Corruption Commission was established in the early 1990s to combat illegal wildlife activities. This function has been merged into ZAWA's Investigations section more recently. (Booth and Whist, 1 Sept 2005, p. 26).

9 One informant said there are 55,000 people in Mfuwe now. Another key informant said that in 1998 there were 3500 households in Lupane but there are 11,500 now.

10 Key informant interview, July 2007.

11 The district authorities receive no funds from SLAMU or from tourist revenues (Key informant interview, July 2007).

12 A National Decentralisation Policy was adopted in Nov 2002, which was meant to improve the existing decentralised governance system that lacked accountability, was ineffective and was 'ironically... used to strengthen central control'. In 2003, the Decentralisation Secretariat established a ten year time frame for full implementation but 'no tangible progress' has been made to date. (Imber, June 2004; *Times of Zambia*, 21 June 2007. Also Key informant interviews, July 2007).

LIRDP/SLAMU and the Chiefs

The Chiefs (at least the two we interviewed, Kakumbi and Mnkhanya) have had key roles in the LIRDP/SLAMU project. Most importantly, they formed LIRDP's initial 'Local Leaders' Sub-Committee' (which *inter alia*, appointed village scouts, controlled culling operations, and gave themselves 'hardship allowances'), influenced hiring (often nepotistically), and ensured that projects were located near their residences. (Gibson, 1999, pp. 134-36). They were chairmen of the ADCs (Area Development Committees) in Phase III (1995-98) and later they became 'patrons' of the CRBs in Phase IV (to the present). Today, their views are taken seriously by the villagers and members of the CRBs/VAGs because of their customary standing and their power to impose their will through headmen and supporters. For instance, some Chiefs in the GMA reportedly expropriate the bulk of the game meat meant for communities, provided by hunting operators (under the SLAMU/ZAWA agreement), and demand favours (vehicles etc) from companies (Key informant interview, July 2007). Their role in land management remains crucial in an area where control of natural resources is key.¹³ Chiefs are also in a position to determine CRB and VAG membership¹⁴ (which undermines the long-term SL-project goal of building local 'democratic governance'¹⁵). That they remain active in local affairs means that community development can be influenced by Chiefly power-politics. (Box 1)

Box 1 Chief Kakumbi and ZAWA

In early 2007 the Chief was found to have an illegal charcoal-making kiln in the forest near his 'palace'. It was destroyed by an 'honorary ranger' (a foreign development worker), who reported it to ZAWA staff in Mfuwe. The Chief seized the foreigner's donor-provided vehicle and ordered him and two ZAWA staff to leave 'his area', though the donor-funded project he ran was seen to be valuable to the community. That some members of the Chief's advisory group supported his expulsion order was seen by locals first, to be a result of their not directly benefiting from the foreigner's development project and secondly, because of an earlier succession dispute (between the current Chief and a relative) that could now be mended by the rival faction standing with the Chief. Soon the matter was raised in the national press, and the Vice President's office became involved, along with the Ministry of Tourism Environment and Natural Resources, the provincial government, ZAWA at national level, etc. In the end the Chief had no choice but to comply with the central government dictate that the aim worker and the two ZAWA staff should be allowed to remain and carry on their work. Though chastised, Chief Kakumbi retains a keen sense of his role in his community of 6000 people, and in the governance and development of his area.

Source: Key informant interviews, July 2007.

Memories are long and people recall the time (Phase II) when Norad/LIRDP provided bus services, tractors on loan to plough fields, road construction, and other infrastructural and agricultural assistance. Further, there was a time (Phase III) when projects were directly determined by the communities and funds from hunting were handed out to individual villagers (Key informant interviews, July 2007). Coming from those days it is now difficult for VAG and CRB members to convince the population that the CRB should exist or that they are not 'eating' funds. That shares of hunting revenues are disbursed by ZAWA to CRBs quarterly (or withheld indefinitely)¹⁶ makes it now more difficult for them to make plans for large (multi-quarter-cost) initiatives. Some projects that have been started have remained incomplete, which only adds to the villagers' certainty that funds are being diverted. Many VAG/CRB members feel therefore, they will not be re-elected, which is unfortunate because they gain expertise as time goes on. (Focus group discussions, July 2007). Meanwhile, poor women in the villages are hardly aware of projects being undertaken by the CRBs in their areas, or the other benefits that might derive from the GMA/ZAWA. They complain of the lack of women's groups and 'capital

13 Key informant interview, July 2007. He explained that one company seeking land to build a lodge in a prime hunting area advanced its cause when it put the Chief on the board of directors.

14 In both areas the Chiefs were given the applications of CRB nominees, which they 'screened' and approved before elections were held.

15 This was a goal stated in the transitional phase. See LIRDP, 22-23 Nov 1993.

16 This measure was taken by ZAWA after they found CRBs were spending annual grants without providing adequate accounts. Now funds to recalcitrant CRBs are given quarterly and only after previously disbursed funds are properly accounted for. (Key informant interview, July 2007, and CRB/VAG interviews, July 2007).

to start businesses', and of their inability to find work in the lodges, where only those with an education/literacy or 'a relative [already] working there' are employed. (Focus group discussion, July 2007).

Indeed, for the average villager the benefits of living next to a park and in a GMA are hard to realise.¹⁷ While there are jobs for some in the lodges, in NGO projects and as scouts, these go to the most educated or well-connected. Locals complain that jobs go to 'foreigners' – i.e., people from Chipata or the 'plateau', people from other Chiefdoms, etc. (Key informant interviews, July 2007). People are meant to receive bush meat from hunting companies, but as one otherwise enthusiastic VAG member put it, 'to be very, very honest, I can taste [game] meat [only] once a year'. (Focus group interview, 2007). Where once they snared and hunted, now villagers are not allowed to kill animals (though it is likely they do). Instead, their crops are eaten and huts destroyed by elephants (who raid them for stored food), while periodically a lion will kill cattle or a person. In some areas incomers are settling on land (sometimes without permission) and bringing in cattle that draw more predators from the park. Along the road they are building small, tightly packed houses, which are thought to be unsightly. Newcomers are also blamed for crime and poaching, and the area has become an HIV/AIDS 'hot spot'. Finally, whatever funding, employment, meat, etc comes to the people from tourism, aid agencies and hunting, it must be shared by more and more people as immigrants arrive (Key informant interviews, July 2007)

This, then, raises the issue of land-use planning, which has become a politically charged issue, particularly with the Chiefs who oppose any 'interference' – especially by upstart outsiders like ZAWA staff – in how they allocate or utilize land.¹⁸ Reportedly, they oppose any plan that makes them designate borders between Chiefdoms, for this could easily cause 'confusion' between the Chiefs and/or their subjects (Key informant interview, July 2007). Also, they individually feel 'targeted': for instance, Chief Kakumbi prefers the whole district be subject to land-use planning, not just the GMA, while Chief Mnkanya objects to the 4 km-wide swath of land (2 km on each side of the road) that runs through his area to be specially re-zoned. (Key informant interviews, July 2007).

National politics and SLAMU

Wildlife conservation has been a national political issue since the colonial period. Rural Zambians (like other southern Africans) were anxious to see the end of British rule, in part because nationalist politicians promised that upon independence they would eliminate the restrictions on natural resources imposed by the colonialists.¹⁹ But President Kaunda had an ardent personal interest in preserving wildlife (Key informant interviews, July 2007) and he ignored public calls 'for greater access to wild animals'. Colonial conservation efforts were thus maintained. In 1968 a National Parks and Wildlife Act was passed, which established a park service and a 'centralised, exclusionary system' of wildlife management that fit well within the wider patronage system.²⁰ In the same period the deterioration of the Department of Game and Fisheries meant that poaching expanded, though this had few 'political costs' for the ruling party because conservation was not widely valued by the general population. A key form of patronage became the 'special license' (to hunt animals above the yearly quota), which the minister of tourism used to reward followers (party functionaries, Chiefs, etc). Generally, then, from the Kaunda period onward 'wildlife resources became another source of goods that an incumbent party could distribute'. (Gibson, 1999, pp. 22&47).

17 This assertion supports Gibson's finding (for the period to 1991) that 'most individuals in the [ADMADE and LIRD] programs' areas... experienced little direct economic or political benefit...' Basically, he argues that people prefer hunting and they do not secure equal levels of utility from development projects. Besides, the project design allows people to do the former without excluding the latter. Gibson, 1999, p. 136-42.

18 This is not a new issue. The 1991 LIRD Annual Report notes that meetings between LIRD and the Chiefs and people of South Luangwa had been held, and then the locals were afraid of the 'removal of land rights and reallocation of land to other land uses like wildlife and forest reserves...'

19 Gibson, 1999, p. 38, notes that UNIP told people in the colonial period that 'wildlife conservation [is] an oppressive colonial scheme that only benefited Europeans'.

20 Gibson, 1999, p. 35. He notes (p. 22) that 'UNIP used wildlife to reward its followers, distributing jobs, game meat, concession areas, and trophies to supporters and only selectively enforcing the act's provisions. These benefits mitigate some of UNIP's political costs for establishing the colonially inspired wildlife policy'. Child, 2004, p. 151 states that 'the Department was used to create employment ... [and] employment favoured relatives. Systems of central control and authority were also used to extort payments for various permissions...'

Poverty increased as the national economy collapsed in the 1970s-80s, and internationally, wildlife products such as meat,²¹ ivory²² and skins were increasingly sought. Thus, poaching for subsistence and sale²³ increased, while government funds available for securing animals declined, to the point that Kaunda and conservationists encouraged local and international organisations (including Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines!) to intervene and help preserve Zambia's wildlife. In 1983 conservationists held a meeting to promote community-based natural resource management and out of that grew two (contesting) programmes, ADMADE supported by NPWS and North American donors, and LIRDP, which stood outside NPWS, was supported by Europeans and funded by Norad. LIRDP, covering SLNP and the GMA around it, was originally located in the Office of the President, while Kaunda became the chair of LIRDP's steering committee.²⁴

NPWS was understandably 'angry' at having the park withdrawn from its management.²⁵ Other resentments arose from the fact that LIRDP (Phase II) became a 'mini-government' fostering development in many sectors, meaning it undermined the authority of several line ministries.²⁶ Its innovative management methodology was thought to be 'too radical' by some (Dalal-Clayton & Child, p. 242) and its scope too wide, for it intended to take 'complete control of all natural resources' in the programme area, 'mitigate some of the political meddling caused by politicians' and bureaucrats' search for patronage resources' and to reduce the 'influence of NPWS [which lacked] ... integrity and capacity'. (Gibson, 1999, p.90).

In spite of the creation of LIRDP and ADMADE, at the national level during the Kaunda years the incentives to preserve wildlife at SL were weak, while opposition to various government wildlife policies remained strong. Nonetheless, Kaunda's personal backing for LIRDP won it donor support – a pledge of \$12.3m for five years from Norad in Oct.1988. Its top-down style of management meant that in its first phase governance of the programme reflected that of Kaunda's own style: its management was highly centralised, hierarchical, 'confrontational', non-accountable and personalised (Gibson, 1999, p. 101-08).

After 1991 management of the park and GMA changed. Two political processes competed: 'elite predation' of wildlife – as part of the logic of patronage and corruption that characterised Chiluba's rule – and a shift of 'allocatory decisions from the political to the economic market place' (Child, 2004, p. 128) For instance, the single project-run operator, Malambo Safaris,²⁷ lost control of the hunting concession, which was allocated to two private operators, a change that caused considerable anxiety among people in the project area.²⁸ LIRDP was also integrated into the NPWS, even though the latter was highly centralized, mismanaged and subject to political interference (e.g., NPWS failed to produce reliable audited accounts, work-plans, budgets, or policies and its allocation of safari-hunting concessions and other hunting licenses was steeped in patronage and intrigue'.) LIRDP's development projects (infrastructure, agriculture, water etc) were also integrated into the central ministries and the district and sub-district administration. Later (1998-2002) the transition of the NPWS from a government department to an executive agency, ZAWA, was 'filled with intrigue' – again because wildlife remained an 'important patronage resource' (Child, 2004, p. 141). After that it took some time for ZAWA to get staff, systems and game management processes established.²⁹

21 Game meat is cheaper than domesticated animal meat, and so attractive to consumers. Also, a lot of game meat reportedly went to South Africa, where it was used to produce commercially sold biltong. (Key informant interview, July 2007).

22 Spurred on by the petrodollar boom and Asian prosperity.

23 Those involved included politicians, businessmen, Chiefs, villagers, soldiers, urban residents, etc. See Gibson, 1999, pp 57-8.

24 As Gibson states, p. 99, this also suited Kaunda's own personal and political agenda (the province was a UNIP stronghold, significant foreign funds would go into that area, and his wife's family was from Mambwe).

25 Because wildlife agencies 'provide a source of employment and security [and are thus an instrument of political patronage] ... and they are used for political or personal gain, most notably in the allocation of tourism or hunting concessions, permits, permissions and other use rights.' (Child, 2004, p. 127) Besides this, 'personality clashes, distribution of benefits from SLNP, and competition with ADMADE' generated conflict between LIRDP and NPWS. See Gibson, 1999, chpt 3.

26 Resentment was countered by LIRDP's policy of supporting 38 different activities and through those 'constituencies of beneficiaries among public agencies, ... often in the form of meeting allowances' which 'purchased political support and allowed the project to survive with some positive impacts...' (Child, 2004, p. 256)

27 The project had other enterprises, e.g., Malambo milling and Malambo transport (which together made a loss of K54m in 1992). LIRDP, 22-23 Nov 1993.

28 In 1992 the hunting concessions went to Luangwa Safaris and Executive Safaris. LIRDP 1992 Annual Report.

29 Child notes that 2004 was the 'first year in at least a decade' that 'the allocation of hunting concessions has not been associated with intrigue, disputes have mostly been settled in court, and contracts are clear and transparent'. (Child, 2004, p. 141).

The political economy of wildlife tourism and hunting

As noted above, the politics of LIRD/SLAMU and NWPS/ZAWA have been influenced by local and national political events and trends – by Kaunda’s personal interest in the Luangwa valley (see above) and later by Chiluba’s liberalisation and corruption (see below). Since 2001 Mwanawasa’s desire to promote transparency and to encourage the formation of a Zambian middle class has dominated politics (Key informant interview, July 2007, and see the Case Study Report on Transparency in Financial Management) and so these are important to SLAMU and the GMA. It is known for example, that Zambians have consistently disapproved of the licensing of non-Zambians to start tourist and hunting enterprises; non-indigenous Zambians have entered the hunting business especially, because it has had weak restrictions on foreign exchange transactions in, at times, an otherwise highly regulated for-ex market (Gibson, 1999, p. 60). Thus, of the current 20 or so game hunting companies, three are owned by indigenous Zambians, 8-10 by foreigners and the rest by non-indigenous Zambians. Now Mwanawasa is reportedly keen to increase indigenous ownership of wildlife operations, which in due course may affect the way licenses are given.³⁰

Not surprisingly, politics in this sector is also been driven by the significant amount of money to be earned from wildlife, especially from hunting in the GMA and by tourist lodges and photo-safari businesses.³¹ Efforts to gain access to building sites have been of particular interest to lodge developers and Chiefs and hunting is big business. (Tables 1.3 & 1.4)

Table 1.3 Approximate payments (US\$) made by Safari Hunting outfitters in Lupande GMA

Name of Hunting Block**	Type of Hunting Block**	Amount paid in annual hunting block concession fee to ZAWA**	Amount paid by hunting company for annual business trading license to ZAWA**	Compulsory hunting parties per block, annually*	Amount paid by company to professional hunter/day*
Upper Lupande	Prime	20,700	3,500	7 Classical safaris 5 Mini-safaris	300
Lower Lupande	Prime	34,500	3,500	5 Classical safaris 3 Mini-safaris	
Msoro Lupande	Secondary	23,300	2,500	None	

Source: * Key informant interviews, July 2007 **ZAWA

Considerable amounts of money are paid by international hunters to come to the Lupande GMA to shoot animals (as ‘one of the few well-run GMAs in Zambia’) and it is the hunting companies’ desire to win concessions (lasting from 1-10 years) for lucrative hunting blocks that has generated competition³² and at times, ‘James-Bond style’ allocations of hunting blocks.³³ As can be seen in Tables 1.2 & 1.3, seven ‘classical’ safaris and five ‘mini-safaris’ – the number of safaris allocated to a ‘prime’ block annually – will earn the operator nearly a quarter-million dollars, with the operator’s expenses being considerably less.

30 Key informant interview, July 2007.

31 The 12 companies belonging to the Luangwa Safari Operators Association pay out \$1.9m in wages and spend between \$1/2-1 million locally per year on goods and services, and much more in Lusaka. Lodge rates range upward of \$200/night in season and photo-game drives cost upward of \$35 per person for an afternoon. Turnover of the LSA members has increased from around \$1m in 1997 to an estimated \$14m in 2006. (Key informant interview, July 2007 and email to Cammack, 27 July 2007).

32 The number of years for which concessions are granted has fluctuated from 1 to 10 (and to 15 in depleted areas), and the number of operators nationally has risen from 1 in the mid-80s, to 3 in 1989, and to about 20 in 2007. (Key informant interview, July 2007).

33 Referring to the award ‘overnight’ of hunting blocks to companies that might not even have bid, outside the knowledge of other companies that did. (Key informant interview, July 2007).

Poaching for commercial gain and ‘bending the law’ around licensing and the allocation of quotas and hunting blocks have plagued the wildlife business all along. Poaching, by members of the army, for instance, resulted in a noticeable decline in the elephant population nationally by the late 1980s. Also prevalent has been the award of ‘special licenses’ – by the minister to individuals to kill animals above the annual quota. Special licensing has been motivated by politics – a benefit allocated to a supporter or friendly foreigner³⁴ by the ruling party or state – but it might also be a lucrative business transaction that materially benefited all involved.

Table 1.4 Approximate revenues generated by safari hunting outfitters annually (US\$)

One hunter’s cost for a safari: paid to hunting operator/company*	Fees paid to ZAWA (with % passed to communities) for each animal, by animal type**	Hunting Rights*	Annual number of animals to be killed per block (quota different in each block & year) *
Classical 30,000 (14-21 days)	Lion 3,500 Elephant 13,000	750 ?	Lion 3-5 Elephant 3-4
Mini 6,000 (7 days)	Buffalo 1,000 Zebra 600	250 200	Buffalo 25 Zebra 12 Impala 30
	Leopard 1,750	750	Leopard 5
	Hippo 1,000	350	Hippo 15
	Crocodile 1,000	150	Crocodile 15
	Puku 350	80	Puku 10
			* Currently 60% or more of the quota must be killed.

Source: *Key informant interviews, July 2007 ** ZAWA

For instance, a minister, an MP or someone close to the president might tell the minister of tourism and/or the director of NPWS/ZAWA that he wanted to hunt a sable or leopard, and a special license would be given (above the annual, national quota/animal species already allocated), a hunter would be found, and the skin (and meat) sold in due course. During the 1990s and early into the new millennium ‘a lot’ of these requests were made and approved by directors and ministers, and rumours persist that special licenses are still being abused.

In the past when staff complained about the practice, they were either ignored or threatened with firing. Ministers who went too far were rarely dismissed by the president, but were transferred to a different ministry. The hunters who were caught were ‘rarely’ prosecuted. People on the board of ZAWA who complained about the practice were replaced. Until appointments to ZAWA and the board are made differently the abuse of power in allocating blocks, quotas and licenses is likely to continue (Key informant interviews, July 2007).

Conclusion

Because politics may be defined as a ‘contestation for control over resources’ it is clear why SLNP and the LGMA have been immersed in political battles for decades. South Luangwa National Park is one of the finest in southern Africa, and control of its natural resources (to exploit or protect them) has been fought over by various actors, including Chiefs, government officials at local and national levels, LIRPD/SLAMU staff, local populations and community leaders, international and local agencies, conservationists, NGOs, and entrepreneurs. Those nearest to the centres of power (Chiefs, entrepreneurs, and presidents) have been the most successful in advancing their interests (ministers, conservationists, companies, etc). Those closest to the resources, the villagers, are the

34 Reportedly a Cuban plane carrying a tonne of ivory was allowed to depart in 2000, with the full knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Inspector General of Police. Key informant interview, July 2007.

weakest politically and have had to depend on others to protect their interests, such as Norad.³⁵

Villagers remember with pleasure the Phase II LIRDP benefits – tractors, wells, transport, grain mills, etc. There was a time when more than 250 community-identified projects were completed in a six-year period, when people were handed their share of hunting revenues and they pledged to use part of them for community projects, and almost no programme funds went missing. (Key informant interview, July 2007) Today the poorest depend on the land, with seemingly little support from government ministries or the district administration, and on funds ‘trickling down’ from the employment of family members in the lodges and park. The villagers in the GMA are not unlike those living in other backward areas of Zambia, though a few community projects are built with hunting revenues, some provisions arrive as a result of the Chiefs’ largesse, and a few NGO/charity programmes benefit the people.

Finally, we were asked whether ‘Zambian power structures and politics allowed enough space for Norwegian aid to be used effectively in the Luangwa valley?’ The answer, in terms of protecting animals and subsequently attracting foreign tourists and hunters, is a qualified “yes”, since sustainability is still an open question. There was also some success in alleviating poverty in the years up to 2000, although the benefits to local communities have been reduced in recent years. Whether the effectiveness of conservation management has been maintained from 2005 onwards (outside the remit of this study) is dependent on the amount of government effort (policy, programming, and funds) going to maintain and develop the park and GMA, and the country’s wildlife sector in general. At the moment, this effort is still not sufficient for long term sustainability, without donor support. In the last decade the goals of poverty alleviation and strengthening participatory governance appear less of a priority to the donor and Zambian governments, apparently a result of a shift in policy rather than a reduction in need locally. Our brief research trip to the area indicated that little recent progress seems to have been made in these areas of local empowerment.

The re-centralization of authority over wildlife resources in Lupande GMA in the transition from Phase III to Phase IV of the project, brought about by the concurrent transformation of NPWS to ZAWA, represents a step backwards for the building of local ownership and democratisation, and with it the prospects for delivery of improved rural livelihoods through CBNRM. As noted, this occurred when ZAWA abandoned the participatory approach developed by LIRDP/ SLAMU under Phase III, forcing it to conform to the nation-wide ADMADE programme, operated through ZAWA’s central headquarters, and retaining significant funds for itself and for the national treasury. Perhaps the most important lesson of the project is that the process should be applied in the **reverse direction**: in order for sustainable wildlife use to become part of the solution to reducing rural poverty in Zambia, the Phase III LIRDP/ SLAMU model should be applied by ZAWA in all its GMAs, in Luangwa Valley and across the country. Whether this is possible in the context of Zambian power structures is the challenge for government and for donor programme design and should be prioritised as the subject of dialogue between the Norwegian and Zambian governments, with the former considering making future support conditional on a satisfactory outcome of such discussions.

1.7 Recommendations

The main lesson from South Luangwa is that maximum impact on rural livelihoods, local democratic structures and active involvement in sustainable natural resource use and protection occurred under the conditions of Phase III, when all hunting funds were received directly by communities and decisions on their disbursement and spending were taken by village-level groups. This arrangement empowered the people most directly involved in wildlife utilisation and prevented much of the interference in their control over these resources by individuals and groups at higher levels, including powerful interests in government and the chiefdoms. The current system has interposed ZAWA between the source of revenue in hunting concessions and the rural people. The

³⁵ ‘Before’, as one informant put it, ‘Norway forgot they were meant to help people’.

government now retains a significant proportion of financial return at a higher level, but more importantly it has re-taken much of the decision-making power over resource use out of the hands of the rural populace. This approach is consistent with the view that, unless attention is focussed, powerful groups at higher levels in social hierarchies act to maintain their control over resources.

We suggest that Norway and the development programme through its Embassy

1. should continue its support for investment in the capacity of ZAWA to develop its protected areas as income-generating enterprises, using the SLNP model and applying it to other parts of the country, .
2. should continue dialogue with GRZ to reverse the policy of Treasury drawing funds from ZAWA, and instead for Treasury to recognize the importance of well-functioning wildlife PAs in the national tourism economy by providing ZAWA with funds sufficient for capitalization and investment to build PA capacity for income generation.
3. focus attention on devolving financial resource capture and decision-making power to the lowest levels in community areas of Lupande GMA, and with that model, to other GMSs around the country. This may require changes to the Wildlife Act.

Annexes

Annex 1.1: Norway-Zambia Projects reviewed

Annex 1.2: Persons consulted

Annex 1.3: Documents consulted

Annex 1.1 Norway-Zambia Projects reviewed Projects for Case Study: Wildlife Management and Natural Resources

Project No.	Project Title	Agreement No	Support to	Support Type	Commitment NOK	Period
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	2562	LIRDP	Project	14,679,000	1990
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	277	LIRDP	Project, TC?	1,409,000	1991
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	277	LIRDP	Project:	14,084,000	1991
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	55	LIRDP	Project	24,709,000	1992
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	89	LIRDP	Project	19,160,000	1993
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	38	LIRDP	Project	10,696,000	1994
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	45	LIRDP	Project	6,217,000	1995
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	26	LIRDP	Project	7,421,000	1996
ZAM-044	LUANGWA VALLEY	153	LIRDP	Project	6,296,000	1997
ZAM-44	Environment bio diversity	ZAM-98/007	LIRDP	Project	25,000,000	1995-1997
ZAM-44	Community based natural resource management	ZAM-99/355	Ministry of Tourism	Project	10,500,000	2000-2002
ZAM-44	Environment bio diversity II	ZAM-98/007	ZAWA	Project	5,500,000	1998-2000
ZAM-44	Add. to SLAMU Phase IV Land Use Plan	ZAM 00/387	ZAWA	Project	361,250	2000-2001
ZAM-2373	Transformation from NPWS to ZAWA	ZAM-99/429	ZAWA	Project	4,000,000	2000-2001
ZAM-2369	Planning SLAMU Phase IV and New HQ	ZAM-99/336	ZAWA	Project	2,000,000	1999-2000
ZAM-44	SLAMU Phase IV extension	ZAM-03/310	ZAWA	Project	3,000,000	2003-2004
ZAM-2373	ZAWA Institutional capacity development formulation phase	ZAM-03.304	ZAWA	Project	700,000	2004
ZAM-3007	SLAMU Phase V	ZAM-01/327	ZAWA	Project	65,000,000	2005-2008

1.2.1 Itinerary and consultations

Annex 1.2 Persons consulted

Date	Persons	Organisation	Position	Team members
10 July 2007	Moosho L. Imakando	Royal Norwegian Embassy	Programme Officer, Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture	KL, HM
12 July 2007	Gunnar Bøe	RNE	Deputy Head of Mission, Head of Development Cooperation	KL, HM
	Dr Lewis Saiwana	ZAWA	Director-General	KL, HM
	Dr Victor Siamudaala	ZAWA	Director of Research	KL, HM
13 July 2007	Dr. Dale Lewis	Wildlife Conservation Society	Country Director	KL, HM
	Monica Wrobel	WCS	Program Manager, Africa Program	KL, HM
	David Mulolani	Independent consultant	Zambia CBNRM Specialist	KL
16 July 2007	Olav Lunstøl	RNE	First Secretary, Country Economist	KL, HM
	Amos Muchanga	UNDP	Programme Analyst / Environment	KL, HM
17 July 2007		SLAMU Headquarters Office, Mfuwe	Senior staff – see A.3.2 below	KL, HM, DC
18 July 2007		Shadi village, in Lupande GMA near SLAMU headquarters	Local people (5 women, 1 man)	KL, HM, DC
	Adrian Coley	Luangwa Safari Operators Association / Flatdogs Camp	Chairman, LSA / General Manager, Flatdogs Camp	KL, HM, DC
	Malama Njovu	SLAMU	Community Affairs Assistant	KL, HM, DC
	Shonga Jashua	COMACO	CTC Manager	KL, HM, DC
	Joel Ng'umayo	COMACO	Data/ Research Analyst	KL, HM, DC
	Chisenga Mukosha	SLAMU	Procurement Officer	KL, HM
19 July 2007	John Kunda	Kakumbi Chiefdom	Chief Kakumbi	KL, HM, DC
		Kakumbi Community Resource Board	Kakumbi CRB members (4 women, 8 men) – see A.3.3 below	KL, HM, DC
		Village Action Groups in Kakumbi CRB	Kakumbi VAG members (7 women, 11 men) – see A.3.4 below	KL, HM, DC
	John Chilowa	Mambwe District Administration	District Commissioner	KL, HM, DC
20 July 2007	Shadrak Zulu	Mnkhanya Chiefdom	Chief	KL, HM, DC
		Mnkhanya CRB	Mnkhanya CRB members (2 women, 3 men) – see A.3.5 below	KL, HM, DC
		VAGs in Mnkhanya CRB	Mnkhanya VAG members (1 woman, 6 men) – see A.3.6 below	KL, HM, DC
	Mathews Mushimbalume	SLAMU	Acting Regional Manager	KL, HM, DC
	James Milanzi	SLAMU	Acting Area Warden/ Ecologist	KL, HM, DC
23 July 2007	Rashid Randera	Baobab Safaris Ltd (Hunting safari outfitter)	Director	KL, HM, DC
	Jan-Erik Studsrød	RNE	First Secretary, Environment, Natural Resources & Agriculture	KL, HM
	Jacob K Jepsen	Royal Danish Embassy	Senior Programme Officer	KL, HM
24 July 2007	Jan-Erik Studsrød	RNE		KL, HM
25 July 2007	Dr Brian A Child	University of Florida	Associate Professor / ex-CBNRM Advisor SLAMU 1996-2002	KL, DC, HM
	Lena Hasle	RNE	Governance Advisor	KL, HM, DC
	Jan-Erik Studsrød			KL, HM, DC
	Beate Bull	Norad	Advisor, Evaluation Department	KL, HM, DC
	David Mulolani	Independent consultant		DC
	Francesca Chisangano	ZAWA	Head of CITES Management Authority	KL, HM
	Dr Lewis Saiwana	ZAWA	Director General	KL, HM
	Anna Moola		Head of Licensing	KL, HM
	Adam Pope	Independent consultant	Consultant to ZAWA, EU Delegation, World Bank in relation to wildlife and natural resources	KL
26 July 2007	Richard Jeffrey	Independent consultant	ex-Head of WWF Zambia Country Office, WWF Wetlands Programme	KL, HM

1.2.2 SLAMU senior staff consulted, SLAMU Headquarters, 17 July 2007

Name	Position	Time with SLAMU
Mathews Mushimbalume	Acting Regional Manager	5 years
James Milanzi	Acting Area Officer/ Ecologist	5 years
Betty Msimuko-Njovu	Extension Officer	6 years
Nyambe Namushanawa	Regional Accountant	1 year
Erastus Kancheya	Park Ranger, Operations	4 years
Fred Siakabeya	Acting Resident Engineer	3 weeks
Moses Mukumbi	Park Ranger, Tourism & Infrastructure	11 years
Jarton Shawa	Research Technician	16 years

1.2.3 Kakumbi CRB members consulted, 19 July 2007

Name	Position
Phiri Peter Simon	Kakumbi CRB Chairperson
Darlington Daka	CDC Chairperson
Sakala Lewis	Bookkeeper
Timothy Chilimbamtima	KNR Chairperson
Bonnik Mwanza	Community Liaison Officer (Kwalata)
Monica M Phiri	Kakumbi Ward Councillor
Damaless Chisumo	Finance Chairperson
Mary Makondo	Committee member
James Chimilongo	Secretary for CDC
Lyson Mwanza	Board Secretary Kakumbi CRB
Jonathan Chisenga	Committee member
Nelly Zulu	KCRB Board member

1.2.4 VAG members within Kakumbi CRB consulted, 19 July 2007

Name	Village Action Group	Position
Nelia Tembo	Luangwa	Member
Fanny Mwanza	Luangwa	Member
Mwaona Nkhowani	Luangwa	Member
Adam Mushotu	Luangwa	Treasurer
Harry Nkhuwa	Luangwa	Secretary
Maiko Mushuta	Luangwa	Indona
Isaac Mbuzi	Mfuwe	Secretary
Peter Kazyakao	Mfuwe	Member
Neya Banaki	Mfuwe	Member
Doreen Banda	Mfuwe	Member
Boniface G Kazembe	Mfuwe	Vice Chairperson
Ziyenela Mushota	Luangwa	Member
Muonde Nyirenda	Luangwa	Vice Chairperson
Mary Banda	Luangwa	Member
Phiri Peter S	Luangwa	Chairperson
Lyson Mwanza	Mfuwe	Chariperson
Jonathan Chisenga	Mfuwe	Treasurer
Janet Banda	Mfuwe	Member

1.2.5 Mnkhanya CRB members consulted, 20 July 2007

Name	Position
Michael M Chulu	CRB Chairperson
Agripa Mbewe	CRB Finance Chairperson
Edward M Zulu	Bookkeeper
Charity Mbao	Finance Secretary
Mary Msangu	Committee member

1.2.6 VAG members within Mnkhanya CRB consulted, 20 July 2007

Name	Village Action Group	Position
Mary Tembo	Matula	Treasurer
Andrew Banda	Ncheka	Secretary
Banda Isaac	Katemo	Headman
Moses Phiri	Kawalia	Headman
Davison Chulu	Kabalika	Village Scout / Headman
Dickson Mbewe	Chiminku	Village Scout
Weston Zulu	Chitempha	Village Scout

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Case study 2: Transparency in Financial Management

Executive summary

This case study is carried out in support of an evaluation of Norwegian Development Assistance to Zambia for the period 1991-2005. It examines three general areas of activity, which are: first, support for public financial management improvements under the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) programme from 2005; second support for the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) from 1997; and third, support for a variety of Anti-Corruption activities including financing of the Task Force on Corruption (TFC) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) since 2000. All three project areas demonstrate a focus on increased transparency and the fight against corruption which is recorded in the Zambia-Norway Memorandum of Understanding (2000) as a priority area for the achievement of Zambia's development objectives.

The methodology of the study is indicated at Paragraph 1.3 of the main report. The evaluation uses DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. In addition, a political assessment of the projects has been undertaken using the logic of the neopatrimonial state as an analytical framework. This framework has motivated the following hypothesis (which is more fully stated in the Main Report):

the logic of the neopatrimonial system suggests that there is little incentive for those in power to implement accountability systems which limit their discretionary control of funds.

PEMFA

The overall objective of PEMFA is to contribute to the efforts of GRZ in *improving capacity to improve public expenditure management, and to strengthen overall financial accountability*. It includes 13 PFM components under Task Managers and is entirely donor funded. Its Programme Document was finalised in 2005. The total budget for 5 years is currently set at \$72.2 million, against which Norway has committed NOK 70 million or approximately \$12.2 million. More than one-third of this money is to support an IFMIS programme which appears to have a short timetable.

The programme got off to a slow start in 2005, but action has recently been taken to support timely implementation. An "evaluation" of PEMFA was undertaken in 2005. However, this was effectively a PEFA-PR assessment, which assessed the status of the PEFA indicators and therefore provided a baseline by which to judge future PFM progress. Some of its findings were contradicted by informants.

Ownership by any of the arms of government is difficult to gauge. Senior officials of the MoF reiterated their strong support for the programme as laid out now; some government informants were concerned that protracted and detailed negotiation with government on work plans was a symptom of too close an involvement by donors, which undermined ownership by Task Managers. The evidence is not conclusive.

A mid term evaluation is due in September when the picture will be better known.

Auditor General

In recent years, the OAG has faced several constraints in performing its duties including inadequate financial resources, and inadequate human resources capacity. This resulted in inconclusive and untimely reporting. Recognizing these constraints in 1997, the NORAD provided support to the OAG under the Restructuring and Institutional Development Project (RIDP) in phases as follows:

Table 2.1 Norwegian Support to the Auditor General

Phase	Period	NOK million	USD Million
I	1997-2001	13	1.7
II	2003-2005	15	1.7
II (first extension)	2006		1.2
II (second extension)	2007-2008		1.6

The Netherlands, a silent partner in the project, provided 50% of the total project cost.

The objective of RIDP in both phases was to improve the OAG's ability to conduct independent, timely and cost effective audits. Funds continue to be project-based. This is inconsistent with the JASZ, and there is discussion of attaching the funding to PEMFA in future, which the OAG is resisting.

Evaluations, including independent evaluations, tend to be very positive and it is clear that the OAG is much strengthened in capacity. Key informants advise that there has been substantial improvement in terms of timeliness, coverage and quality and the present Auditor-General is held in high regard by many informants. Although concrete actions resulting from OAG data are not easy to evidence, the active media have consistently brought the work and findings of the OAG to the attention of the Zambian people. It is likely that this has made civil servants cautious in handling public resources, although reports of misappropriation continue to abound. Meetings of the PAC are open to the press and public in Zambia, and this is likely to encourage continuing good use of OAG reports.

The OAG is not always well resourced by government. From 2004-2006 the submitted budget was regularly cut to approximately 63% of the original amount -a consistent 37% cut. Actual releases improved from 38% in 2004 to 47% in 2006.

Anti Corruption Activity

This case study examines Norwegian support to the following anti-corruption activities: the ACC; the TFC; Transparency International Zambia (TIZ); and the Governance Development Unit (GDU). Only the first two are referred to in this Summary, whilst limited comment on the other two is confined to the main report.

ACC

It is difficult to assess the broader impact of Norwegian support to the ACC for two reasons: first, because it was intended to catalyse the support being received from other donors; and second because the effectiveness of the ACC in general is difficult to gauge. None of our key informants maintained that the ACC was effective: many thought it weak.

TFC

NORAD has provided extensive support to the TFC since its establishment in 2002. Amounts have totalled NOK21.45 million (USD 3.7 million at August 2007 exchange rates) up to end 2006. Norway therefore provided almost one-quarter of all TFC support. All support has been provided through a multi-donor TFC pool fund.

There are several criticisms of the TFC including its lack of a legal framework and its focus limited to the period 1991-2001. It is the submission of this paper that, especially given Mwanawasa's weak position immediately post-election that it could not have succeeded at all if had a current focus. A recent evaluation is comprehensive and draws key lessons for Zambia to render the process more effective.

Conclusions

All projects have merit and are broadly consistent with the stated goals of Zambia and Norway. Not all are fully compliant with Paris principles, but all with the possible exception of the GDU Support have been implemented in awareness of them, and with that direction of travel in mind.

In the case of PEMFA faster progress is expected with the completion of procurement guidelines, the appointment of the Secretariat, and the faster approval of the 2007 Work Plan. The TFC is expected to have stronger results as those cases which were adjourned prior to the election in the hope of a change of government are finally brought to court. According to all reports, support to the Auditor-General is delivering what was promised.

An issue of concern is that Norway's array of interventions may not make for an effective approach despite the effectiveness of individual project activities.

Current interventions are taking place against a backdrop of political change in the GRZ-donor relationship. This has come about from three factors including an improved economic position and the steady implementation of Paris principles.

The projects do not prove anything conclusively about the neopatrimonial hypothesis, although outcomes are not inconsistent with it. However, we believe that motives are more complex than indicated in the hypothesis; there are reformers in government who seek change; there are people of vision who see a Zambia free from aid and managing its own affairs; and that President Mwanawasa (and probably others) has a genuine interest in reducing corruption, even if zero tolerance is not politically possible. Consequently the neopatrimonial nature of the Zambian state should be acknowledged, but the complexities of motives and incentives of public sector actors must be understood in equal measure.

Abbreviations

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission
BOZ	Bank of Zambia
CCSD	Centralised Computer Services Department
CFAA	Country Financial Accountability Assessment
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
DEC	Drug Enforcement Commission
DPP	Directorate of Public Prosecutions
FMS	Financial Management System
FNDP	Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010
GDU	Governance Development Unit
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System
JASZ	Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia 2007-2010
MoFNP	Ministry of Finance and National Planning
MOLA	Ministry of Legal Affairs (Justice)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPSA	Ministries Provinces and Spending Agencies
NCPGGZ	National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia
NACPS	National Anti-Corruption Policy and Strategy
NGBS	National Governance Baseline Survey
NORAD	Norwegian Development Agency
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
OCIA	Office of Controller of Internal Audit
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
PEMFA	Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability
PEFA-PR	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Performance Report PFA Public Finance Act
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSCAP	The Public Service Capacity Building Project 2000-2012;
PSRP	Public Service Reform Programme RIDP Restructuring and Institutional Development Project (for the Office of the Auditor General)
SITET	Special Investigations Team on Economics and Trade
ST	Secretary to the Treasury
TFC	Task Force on Corruption
TI	Transparency International
TIZ	Transparency International Zambia
TM	Task Manager
ZICA	Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants
ZNTB	Zambia National Tender Board
ZRA	Zambia Revenue Authority

2.1 Introduction and Purpose

This case study is carried out in support of an evaluation of Norwegian Development Assistance to Zambia for the period 1991-2005. It examines three general areas of activity, which are: first, support for the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) from 1997; second, support for a variety of Anti-Corruption activities including financing of the Task Force on Corruption (TFC) and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) since 2000; and third, support for public financial management improvements under the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability (PEMFA) programme from 2005. All three demonstrate a focus on increased transparency and the fight against corruption which is recorded in the Zambia-Norway Memorandum of Understanding (2000) as a priority area for achievement of Zambia's development objectives.

The case study team comprised Tim Cammack (team leader; financial management and aid effectiveness) Inyambo Mwanawina (economic analysis) and Neo Simutanyi (political analysis).

2.2 Financial Transparency Institutions in Zambia 1991-2005

In recent years financial transparency has come under the spotlight in Zambia. In large part this has come about for three reasons: first, because during the Chiluba era from 1991-2001 Zambia was recognized as one of the most corrupt countries in the world based upon the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI); and second, related to the first, incoming President Mwanawasa in 2001 declared anti-corruption as a major focus of his administration. He took major steps against corruption including the prosecution of his predecessor and renewed support for a number of oversight agencies including the TFC, the OAG and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC); and third because the issue has been taken up anew by three important nongovernment constituencies within Zambia: civil society organisations, the media and the donor community.

Amongst government agencies, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP) plays a major role in ensuring financial transparency in public matters. Other critical government entities include the Accountant General's Office, the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) and the OAG.

In addition to these major players, the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) has developed a number of oversight institutions over the years to ensure financial transparency. Some like the Special Investigations Team on Economics and Trade (SITET) were abolished during the 1990s, while others have sprung up. Amongst those that have a constitutional base is the OAG, which was neglected during the early 1990s, but which has flourished as a result of increasing government funding, donor support and lately, an energised leader. Other constitutional bodies include the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament, which receives the reports of the Auditor General and follows up on them, and the Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB) which supervises public sector procurement. The ACC was founded in 1980 with a triple mandate to investigate corrupt practices, promote preventive measures and raise public awareness. It has been struggling to assert itself as lead agency to guide the fight against corruption, handicapped by a lack of true autonomy. Unlike the ACC, the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) has the advantage of being able to initiate prosecutions³⁶ without consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). It is the home of the Anti-money Laundering Investigations Unit and enforces the Money Laundering Act No. 14 of 2001. More recently, two additional organizations have been added to this array. They are the Governance Development Unit (GDU) established in 2000 in the Ministry of Justice to coordinate the National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia (NCBPGGZ). In 2002 the TFC was founded by President Mwanawasa. It is not a formally constituted body and has no legal framework to guide its work. Its task is limited to

³⁶ The DEC was publicly hailed by the President for its successes in investigating and prosecuting corruption allegations while at the same time he condemned the TFC for supposed ineffectiveness (TI-Z, 2006 (3)).

investigating corrupt activity during the Chiluba era from 1991 to 2001 and preparing case files for prosecution.

2.3 Methodology of Case Studies

The analysis has been based on examination of project documents indicated in the bibliography at Annex 2.3, and other documents and publications listed in the bibliography including contemporary evaluations and assessments of the individual projects. This document review has been supplemented with semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, with past and present project managers and implementers, government counterparts, donors active in the sector, staff of NGOs, both local and national, and influential actors in the sector. Since this evaluation covers a large number of projects it has relied extensively on existing evaluations and other secondary material.

The primary approach of this evaluation uses the DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact, which have been interpreted according to the demands of the case study. In determining the relevance and appropriateness of objectives a first consideration has been whether they are consistent with the stated goals of both Zambia and Norway, and consistent with the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia 2007-2010 (JASZ) (GRZ/Various Cooperating Partners, 2007). The relevant Norwegian governing document for most interventions considered here is the 2000 MoU between Zambia and Norway (GRZ/GKN, 2000). This document includes several priority development objectives including macroeconomic stability, increased transparency and the fight against corruption. For the most part the appropriate Zambian documents are the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or the Fifth National Development Plan 2006-2010 (FNDP).

In addition, a political assessment of the projects has been undertaken using the logic of the neopatrimonial state as an analytical framework. This framework has motivated the following hypothesis which is considered in the concluding discussion at Section 2.5:

The logic of the neopatrimonial system suggests that there is little incentive for those in power to implement accountability systems which limit their discretionary control of funds. Elites may design PFM and corruption/ethics/police programmes with objectives that promote good governance, but these are less likely to be implemented well when funds are needed to garner the support of clients and voters, especially at certain critical times (e.g. during election periods).

Neopatrimonialism is considered here to represent the dominant logic of the political system; however, it is acknowledged that those who interact with the projects have multiple and complex motivations, and that while some have narrow rent-seeking interests, others do not. Moreover, the case study will consider how rent-seeking activity has been constrained by the interventions under review, and what political factors and incentives support or undermine such constraints.

Neopatrimonial influence generates patronage activities wider than rent-seeking, particularly the generation of employment for network members, usually in the public sector. The extent of such patronage activities is less evident from this study, and would be better addressed by a study of wider civil service reform and the right-sizing process.

Case Studies

Case Study 1: PEMFA

Background & Project Description

In 2001, at the beginning of the Mwanawasa administration, GRZ with the support of the World Bank carried out a Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) and a PEMFA Review which highlighted a number of required improvements. Much later in April 2004, GRZ produced the *Government Strategy for the Priority Areas of the Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) for the period 2004-2008* which adopted much of the 2001 PEMFA diagnosis and incorporated many of its recommendations. The PEMFA has since been named as one of three pillars of the PRSP³⁷ aimed at improving the quality of service delivery in the public sector.

The PEMFA element of the April 2004 Government Strategy was reported by informants to have significant high level GRZ ownership. However, it was considered by donors to be “unbankable” without significant revision (Key Informant Interview) and a team of consultants nominated by members of the sponsoring group carried out an appraisal (Zambia Donor Harmonization Group, 2004) which reported in August of 2004. The bulky document that resulted totalled 299 pages, and was probably not easily digested by busy senior civil servants. In the following December an MOU was signed with a group of donors, and after many iterations a Programme Document was finalised in 2005. The development of a monitoring arrangement proved difficult and an output-based Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) was not finalised until May 2007. The first year of operation was 2005 and therefore only its first year falls into this evaluation. Nonetheless, the period immediately following is taken into account since it informs the paper’s view on sustainability and likely impact.

The programme is entirely donor funded. The total budget for 5 years is currently set at \$72.2 million, against which Norway has committed NOK 70 million or approximately \$12.2 million. At this level of commitment, PEMFA accounts for more than half of the value of Norwegian commitments in the area of financial transparency amongst the projects selected for review. Donor funds for PEMFA are pooled. The lead donors are DFID, EC, Norway and World Bank, although many other donors either contribute to the pool or provide technical support.

³⁷ The other two are (1) Right-sizing and Pay reforms and (2) Decentralisation

Project Objectives

Objectives

PEMFA is a wide ranging programme which includes fourteen components (including the PEMFA Secretariat itself) indicated in the table below:

Table 2.2 PEMFA Components

Component		Task Manager	Allocated Funds Amount	
No.	Name		\$ millions	% of total
1	Commitment Control and Financial Management System (FMS)	Accountant General, MoFNP	1.3	1.8
2	Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS)	IFMIS Secretariat	26.5	36.8
3	Fiscal Policy and Planning	Planning & Econ Mgmt -MoFNP	2.0	2.8
4	Budget Preparation and Execution	Budget Office/Accountant General MoFNP	0.8	1.1
5	Debt Management	Investment & Debt Management dept. MoFNP	0.5	0.7
6	Internal Audit and Control	O CIA	3.5	4.8
7	External Financing	External Finance, MoFNP	0.5	0.7
8	Legal and Regulatory Framework	MoLA	1.0	1.4
9	External Audit	OAG	7.6	10.5
10	Parliamentary Oversight	Clerk of Parliament	1.9	2.6
11	Accounting Training and Regulation	ZICA	1.9	2.6
12	Public Procurement Reforms and	ZNTB	8.8	12.2
13	PEMFA Secretariat	<i>Not Applicable</i>	11.0	15.2
14	Computer and Communication.	CCSD	-	
	Contingency	<i>Not Applicable</i>	4.9	6.8
	TOTAL		72.2	100.0

The overall objective of PEMFA is to contribute to the efforts of GRZ in *improving capacity to improve public expenditure management*, and to *strengthen overall financial accountability*. Each component is managed by a Task Manager and a Deputy Task Manager, and has its own set of objectives specified in the Programme Document. The vast majority of the funds are handled by government entities. Components 1-5 and 7 are directly under the control of Departments of MoFNP; almost 37% of the total is allocated to the IFMIS; a further 12% is allocated to procurement and 15% of the total is allocated to the PEMFA Secretariat for management of the programme. These three elements therefore account for two-thirds of the total funding. Although all PEMFA components have the capacity to strengthen financial transparency, the wide coverage of the programme embraces the whole of Zambian public financial management.

The programme is at an early stage, but objectives have evolved nonetheless and in two respects: first, the major evolution arose prior to programme commencement as the original PEMFA strategy was modified by the conclusions of the 2004 Appraisal; and second the objectives were extended in 2005 to include the Computer and Communication component. In both cases the aim was to rectify perceived omissions, rather than to react to changing circumstances.

Assessment of objectives

The broad objectives of the PEMFA are relevant to the stated goals of both Zambia and Norway, and consistent with the JASZ. In the context of stated Zambian goals, the MOU notes that the goals of PEMFA derive directly from the PEMFA Component of GRZ's Strategy Document for Public Sector Reforms that was approved by the Cabinet of GRZ in June 2004 (PEMFA Memorandum, 2004:1). PEMFA is specifically mentioned within the current FNDP (GRZ 2006:4).

The relevant Norwegian governing document is the 2000 MoU between Zambia and Norway (GRZ/GKN, 2000). This document includes several priority development objectives including macroeconomic stability, increased transparency and the fight against corruption. An effective PEMFA will contribute in all these areas. The MOU goes on to indicate four areas which would be a particular focus of the Norwegian programme, in which the connection to strengthening public expenditure management is less clear, except insofar as it is subsumed under the heading of “reinforcing human rights and democratisation (good governance)”³⁸. This does raise the question of why Norway chose to step outside its mandated area for PEMFA, and why it undertook such a financial commitment.

Achievement of objectives to date (and likelihood of future achievement)

The PEMFA Programme got off to a slow start in 2005, to the disappointment of the supporting donor group. A contemporary document prepared by donors identified several reasons including the lack of coordination of the programme in the absence of a full time Secretariat (which was rectified by the establishment of a Secretariat in early 2006); and lack of capacity to undertake effective procurement in the main implementing agencies³⁹.

Progress in 2006 was also quite limited. Obstacles in this period were procurement delays as procedures were agreed and a long period of negotiation between donors and government/Task Managers over the 2006 work plan which in the event was not agreed until July 2006 -more than half way through the year. Better progress is expected in 2007 since the 2007 work plan was approved in a timely manner in December 2006.

It took a long time to develop measurable indicators for the programme. Even in late drafts of the Programme Document (e.g. 3rd draft, March 2004) indicators were not specified in a measurable way, leaving many items with no time frame for achievement and other items appearing as, for instance “x% of internal audit’s recommendations acted within 30 days” (p47). Overall programme indicators have still not been determined, and this is consistent with a flexible approach. However, objectives and indicators for the year 2007 have since been more closely detailed in a 2007 PAF agreed between donors and government in May 2007 (PAF, 2007). This process was envisaged in the MOU.⁴⁰

The “PEMFA Programme Evaluation” of 2005

The PEFA-based Public Financial Management Performance Report of 2005 (GRZ, 2005) was misleadingly subtitled the “PEMFA Programme Evaluation”. This report was not an evaluation of PEMFA as such. It was rather a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Performance Report (PEFA-PR) whose purpose as described in the document is:

to assess the current status of the Zambia PFM system based on the PEFA indicators in order to set a baseline for the continued use and assessment of these indicators.....the purpose of this evaluation has not been to evaluate and score different institutions or responsible individuals in the Government. The focus is on the PFM system as such, and the results of the evaluation should serve, not only as a baseline for coming evaluations, but also as an important input in the process of steering the PEMFA Programme and prioritising within it.

The PEFA-PR therefore aims to set a baseline for future PEMFA activity. However, during the brief visit, the review team came to doubt its credibility in two areas; the finding that bank reconciliations were being prepared in a timely manner was contradicted by two key informants, both knowledgeable government officers⁴¹ – perhaps as a result of

38 The other areas of focus in the 2000 Memorandum are: improving basic education; strengthening the roads sector; and enhancing environmental management with the main focus on wildlife management

39 Although GRZ officers pointed to the protracted nature of the World Bank’s “No Objection” procedures.

40 The responsibility of the 12 Task Managers will be formally identified in specific workplans and performance indicators relevant to each component guiding the execution of their tasks. This documentation will be discussed and approved by the JTWG (PEMFA MOU, 2004:5).

41 One informant advised that bank reconciliations are usually three months behind schedule due to late submissions of bank statements. It is also interesting to consider this finding alongside the OAG’s report of 2005 which revealed unexplained balances of more than K1.9 trillion between BoZ and MoFNP. (“K1.9 Trillion Transactions Unexplained at BoZ, Finance” The Times of Zambia (Ndola), 6 July 2007, <http://allafrica.com/stories/200707060354.html>)

this finding this critical area is not addressed in the 2007 PAF⁴²; and the sequencing of reforms suggested by the PEFA-PR is mechanical rather than methodical.

In a second area, the report suggests that reforms should be dealt with starting with those areas with poor grades and moving towards those items with satisfactory grades. This overly simplistic approach ignores the point made in the appraisal document (Zambia Donor Harmonization Group, 2004: 26) concerning the paramount importance of “defining sequencing and synchronization strategies” for PEMFA.

The PEFA-PR is not necessarily a good guide to reform since it does not assess causes of the weaknesses it detects, nor does it prioritise them. It specifically does not address the dynamics of the reform effort. Rather it gives an indication of where to look. The mechanical approach to sequencing adopted by the evaluation suggests that technical status alone should determine sequencing issues, whereas sequencing is better informed by the connectedness of reforms, and a sense of technical priority. In addition, a more politically aware approach to PFM reform would be more opportunistic, echoing the flexibility of the overall programme and looking for an individual, coalition or group prepared to back a particular process. It is often important to emphasise those areas which provide impetus for future reform. For instance it may be imperative to strengthen the publication and dissemination of budgetary information even though it is already quite good, until it reaches a saturation point and the pressure which comes from public awareness is at maximum.

Assessment of Impact

A mid term evaluation is due in September. However the achievements of the PEMFA programme will be difficult to determine at this stage for two different sets of reasons. First, there are many factors at play outside PEMFA which will affect PFM variables. They include HIPC completion in 2005 with resulting greater availability of government funds and possibly staffing; new legislation

(e.g. the Public Finance Act (PFA)) giving the ST power to remove and appoint COs (PFA para 7(1)); and other PFM activities outside PEMFA.

Second, progress of broad public sector reforms is particularly difficult to monitor since many of the variables are inevitably process variables such as passage of legislation or training of staff. These may and may not result in substantive and measurable change. Since such activities meet donor/programme requirements and do not of themselves affect the status quo, they may be undertaken for precisely that reason. Some variables that can be measured, such as release of funds against budget (included in the 2007 PAF), fail to measure the effectiveness of spending; other measurable variables such as timeliness of bank reconciliations require an extensive database and even then omit a quality criterion which is essential to assessment of effectiveness.

Finally, the evaluation will be able to assess process indicators, but it is too early to assess the impact of PEMFA, since it only began in 2005 (the last year of this study) and suffered from a slow start as discussed above.

Ownership and commitment

By recipient agency

All are agreed that ownership is critical to project success, and this is particularly true of PFM reforms which are inherently political. Unfortunately, the very term “ownership” is ambiguous; there are at least four possible interpretations in the context of PFM support. First, the programme may be owned through the democratic process, in a Parliamentary democracy like Zambia, through Parliament; second, the process may be owned by the political cadre: ministers and senior civil servants responsible for central government agencies, especially senior staff in the key implementing ministry – MoF; third, the

⁴² The 2007 PAF refers to matters of budgetary execution under Component 1 *Commitment Control and FMS* where it requires: reduced variances of cash releases against actual expenditures by MPSA; reduced audit queries; timely submission of expenditure returns; and training activities. Other than this budgetary execution issues come under Component 2, *IFMS*. Budget execution is therefore perceived as primarily an IT issue; the section of the 2007 PAF on Component 4: Budget Preparation and Execution has two objectives on budget classification, one on tax policy reform and one on training in policy analysis.

process may be owned by government more widely to include line ministries and sub-national authorities; fourth, the programme may be owned by those who implement it – in this case the Task Managers and their subordinates; in this list we have deliberately not mentioned ownership by civil society or society more widely. Their support for a strong PFM process, their interest in it and their activism related to it can all be beneficial, although ownership would be inappropriate.

Ownership by any of the arms of government is difficult to gauge. The programme arose from a government initiative – the Government Strategy paper of 2004 (GRZ, 2004). At this point it is widely understood there was strong ownership from the MoF and especially from Planning where the document was coordinated. However, it was much amended as a result of donor instigated consultancy to render it “bankable” and one donor informant observed that at some point government lost interest⁴³. By contrast, senior officials of the MoF reiterated their strong support for the programme as laid out now; some government informants were concerned that protracted and detailed negotiation with government on work plans was a symptom of too close an involvement by donors, which undermined ownership by Task Managers. The Norwegian Embassy indicated that it had seen close management by four lead donors as too intensive, and had pulled back from engagement with programme details, preferring to monitor broad developments and await the outcome of the mid-term evaluation.

A major discussion underway at the time of our visit was whether allowances should be paid to Task Managers (TMs). The insistence on this suggests that the project is still seen by TMs as an add-on to their normal activities and possibly as a separate “un-owned” task being carried out primarily for the donor community, but the evidence is not conclusive; such allowances may also be construed as compensation to Task Managers either for loss of rents that might accompany a more stringent PFM regime, or compensation for having to make decisions that are unpopular with their subordinates.

Task Managers under PEMFA are spread through many organs of government from MoFNP to the Zambian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ZICA). Those Task Managers visited by the team were anxious to stress their support for the components under their care, but were sometimes sceptical of the likely success of others.

Case Study 2: Auditor General

Background

The OAG is responsible for ensuring accountability and transparency in generating and expending public revenue. The main function of the Auditor General (AG) is to ensure proper compliance with the provisions of the constitution regarding collection and application of public funds and stores, in order to promote public accountability and proper financial management (Article 121 of the Constitution of Zambia).

The OAG has its headquarters in Lusaka. Four regional offices are located in Ndola, Kabwe, Lusaka and Livingstone. It has an establishment of 250 of which 194 are audit staff.

The constitution requires the AG to produce a report to the President within 12 months after the end of the financial year to which the accounts relate. The President is required to submit the report to Parliament within 7 days of the first sitting of the Assembly, failing which the AG will cause the report to be submitted to Parliament.

Mission Statement

The adopted mission statement of the OAG is:

To provide auditing services to the government and other institutions in order to promote accountability, economic, efficient and effective utilisation of funds and other resources for the benefit of society.

⁴³ Amongst the donor community views of PEMFA ownership vary; one key informant in the donor community considered that there was a high level of ownership of PEMFA but that it was not necessarily uniform, citing Parliamentary ownership as being strong

Historically, the OAG faced several constraints in performing its duties:

- Independence compromised because supported by civil servants and public officers
- Inadequate financial resources;
- Inadequate human resources capacity and skills;
- Poor management information systems;
- Undeveloped internal systems;

These constraints resulted in some key failings including lack of professionalism and fiduciary duty; limited scope of audits; and inconclusive and untimely reporting.

Recognizing these constraints in 1997, the Norwegian Development Agency (NORAD) provided support to the OAG under Restructuring and Institutional Development Project (RIDP) aimed at enhancing the achievement of the set objectives. The support was provided in phases as follows:

Table 2.3 Norwegian Support to the Auditor General

Phase	Period	NOK million	USD Million
I	1997	1	1.7
	2001	3	
II	2003	1	1.7
	2005	5	
II (first extension)	2006		1.2
II (second extension)	2007-2008		1.6

The Netherlands, a silent partner in the project, provided 50% of the project costs.

Project Objectives

The objective of RIDP's first phase was to improve the OAG's ability to conduct independent, timely and cost effective audits in order to ensure optimal utilisation of public resources. The critical assumption for the project was that GRZ would ensure that the OAG was able to offer competitive salaries. RIDP II objectives were similar. It continued to enhance the capacity of the OAG in order to improve its service delivery to the public sector.

Relevance of objectives

A perusal of the project documents, minutes of various meetings and interviews with key informants clearly demonstrate that project objectives derive from the OAG's 1996 Strategic Plan, conferring a strong degree of ownership and relevance to Zambian objectives. The project objectives not only originated with the OAG, but were discussed and agreed upon in mutual consultation with NORAD and other interested stakeholders.

Additionally, the Netherlands delegated authority to the Norwegians, which is in conformity with the DAC guidelines. Such donor cooperation reduces transaction costs for both donor and GRZ, and enhances aid effectiveness by maximising the comparative advantage of individual donors.

Fit of objectives with Norway strategy and goals

One of the four main areas of support identified by the 2000 Norway-Zambia MoU is reinforcing human rights and democratisation (good governance) under which the support to OAG falls. There is also agreement that further progress in increasing transparency and fighting corruption is important in achieving Zambia's development objects. Therefore, RIDP is consistent both with the priorities in co-operation between Zambia and Norway and with Norway's development policy objectives for Zambia.

Fit of objectives with Zambia strategy and goals

The project is embodied in the second objective of the governance chapter of Zambia's PRSP, which focuses on ensuring an efficient, equitable, and transparent management of public resources. Moreover, the project also supports the FNDP 2006-2010 which stresses the need to strengthen the position of the OAG (p. 281); for GRZ to facilitate the review

and enactment of legislation to provide for the autonomy of the OAG (p. 281); and to decentralise operations of the OAG and develop new services to clients (p. 284).

Achievement of objectives to date (and likelihood of future achievement)

The project has been subjected to a number of reviews and evaluations including: the 2000 RIDP Phase I Mid Term Review; the RIDP Phase II Mid-Term Review; and has produced several annual progress reports. Under RIDP Phase I accomplishments were reported in the area of training, information technology, organisational restructuring, audit quality methodology, and procurement of transport and equipment. The OAG also made significant progress in restructuring. Despite some initial delays in undertaking some project activities like training, project activities were implemented efficiently. Annex A8 shows the status of achieving the project objectives. Disbursement of project funds and procurement were both reported to be timely. However, quality control mechanisms of performance, IT, Environmental and Forensic Audits are yet to be established even though the IT, Performance and Environment and Forensic Audit unit have been set up.

Project activities implemented are necessary and useful for the achievement of project objectives. The project can be said to be effective for being generally on track and achieving planned outputs in a timely manner and to the desired quality.

Assessment of Impact

Key informants advise that there has been substantial improvement in the work of the OAG in terms of timeliness, coverage and quality of reports. There is also improved engagement with parliament through the PAC on parliamentary oversight and other public stakeholder engagement. OAG reports that it has consistently delivered material to the ACC, TFC, Attorney General and other law enforcement agencies.

Importantly, in the jointly developed PEFA-PR⁴⁴ assessment of 2005 (GRZ, 2005) indicator 26 on the scope, nature and follow-up of external audit was rated B+. The report also observed that prior to 2002, financial statements had not been delivered in time, causing delays of audit reports, but that in recent times audit reporting has improved markedly, and official audit reports were by then being submitted in a timely manner⁴⁵.

Meetings of the PAC are open to the press and public in Zambia, and the active press has consistently brought the work and findings of the OAG to the attention of the Zambian people. Together with the improved performance and scrutiny of the OAG, this has enhanced debate in Parliament and public on the Auditor General's Report. It is likely that this has made civil servants cautious in handling public resources, although reports of misappropriation continue to abound. This has positive implications for efficient management and utilisation of financial resources in GRZ and other public funded institutions thereby ensure their contribution, in the most effectiveness manner, to sustainable economic development, poverty reduction and the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

However, the ultimate effectiveness of the OAG is still challenged in a number of areas:

- Quality, comprehensiveness and consistency in reporting need to be further improved. In particular, reports tend to highlight cases of “unconstitutional⁴⁶ expenditure” even when monies have been legitimately vired from one budget head to another to cover these. The immediate public impression that there is gross abuse and misapplication of public resources when that only becomes the case where such unconstitutional expenditure fails to stand before the PAC.
- OAG tends to be silent in commending line ministries and other agencies expending public resources that are doing a good job.
- Reporting on follow up action is a big challenge. The AG's Report generally covers different agencies in each issue, limiting possibilities for follow up. The OAG has promised a follow up report on audit observations in 2007.
- Staffing and funding issues continue to affect performance of the OAG

⁴⁴ Titled the PEMFA Evaluation and referred to at pp. 54-55 above

⁴⁵ This was facilitated by the Accountant general's successes in bringing accounts production up to date

⁴⁶ Unauthorised by Parliament

These views were echoed in a recent evaluation of multiple Supreme Audit Institutions in developing countries which concluded in the case of Zambia (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006:39):

“The institutional arrangements of the OAG do not hinder an effective external audit, but severe limitations exist with regard to staffing and other resources. Additionally, the National Assembly has not been very active in using the AGs recommendations.”

However, the report continues:

“Over the past five years, a continuously improving trend is visible bringing clear results in terms of timely reporting and audit quality.”

Ownership and commitment

By recipient agency

The project has proved vital to the OAG. Its purpose embodies both the vision and mission statement of the OAG thereby ensuring the ownership and commitment from the recipient.


There is now some pressure from the donor community for it to be subsumed under PEMFA. Although the idea behind the PEMFA is that it should result in a harmonisation of all PFM reforms, the OAG is hesitant about incorporating the project into PEMFA. It argues that MoFNP is responsible for reviewing and agreeing to expenditure estimates of the OAG, and the OAG budget is subjected to cuts in the level of approved funds (recurrent and capital) just like any other line ministry (see below). Since PEMFA is also controlled by the MoFNP they expect that OAG might receive a lesser amount overall. Further, the OAG considers that increased MoFNP influence over the OAG budget would further undermine independence of OAG in the absence of enactment of appropriate legislation.

By Central Government

The OAG has been under pressure to enhance the accountability process through comprehensive audits. Various GRZ documents argue for the strengthening of the OAG and to give the office the independence it requires. Some of these documents are the PSRP, PSCAP, the National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia (NCBPGGZ) document, Transitional National Development Plan and FNDP. In the private sector, the same calls have been made in published 491books like Transparency and Participation in the Budget Process: Zambia, Budget Transparency and Participation II: Zambia Case and Show me the Money.

One way of measuring the commitment of central government to a project activity is examine the resources allocated to it. Figure 2 contrasts budget submissions of the OAG, inclusive of donor support, to authorised and actual releases. This shows that from 2004-2006 the submitted budget was regularly cut to approximately 63% of the original amount -a consistent 37% cut. Actual releases improved from 38% in 2004 to 47% in 2006. What does this mean? It’s not so good for the OAG because the increase in releases is provided to accommodate an upward adjustment to salaries due to an increase in the number of staff. The wage bill increased by an average of 67% over the three year period while actual releases increased by 49% on average in nominal terms over the same period. Given the increase in the establishment of OAG, recurrent departmental charges suffered as a consequence in both nominal and real terms.

Figure 2.1 Budget Releases to OAG (shown as a percentage of original submitted budget)



Source: Constructed from Data supplied by OAG

In this case, what explains the observed improvement in the performance of the OAG or is there a contradiction? The OAG suggests that there is no contradiction at all, but that the improvement arises from NORAD/RIDP support. To the extent that this is so, any threat that might be posed to the OAG's financing by a switch of donor funding to PEMFA needs to be taken seriously.

Although the OAG is hopeful that the introduction of IFMIS is going to further improve the quality and timeliness of the AG's Report by reducing the time lag to six months or shorter, sustainability of the OAG's operations beyond RIDP outside concrete GRZ direct funding remain of grave concern

Case Study 3: Anti Corruption activity

Background & Project Description

Corruption is a major area of concern in Zambia and has probably been so throughout the period 1991 – 2005, although it has not always been closely monitored. 87% of the people interviewed for the National Government Baseline Survey (NGBS) of 2004 perceived corruption as a problem. In TI's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Zambia was ranked amongst the worst evaluated countries for the last six years scoring consistently at around 2,6 on a scale of 10⁴⁷. More broadly, a summary of World Bank Governance Indicators for the years 2000, 2002 and 2006 showed the following:

Table 2.4 Summary of World Bank Governance Indicators

Governance Indicator	Year	Percentile Rank (0-100)
Voice and Accountability	2006	37
	2002	37.5
	2000	36.1
Political Stability	2006	56.7
	2002	35.1
	2006	32.2
Government Effectiveness	2006	25.6
	2002	20.9
	2006	16.1
Regulatory Quality	2006	29.8
	2002	29.3
	2006	43.4
Rule of law	2006	31.9
	2002	36.7
	2006	33.8
Control of Corruption	2006	22.8
	2002	17
	2006	19.4

Source: <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/> accessed 27 August 2007

The figures indicate the percentile into which Zambia falls by comparison with its peers. Thus, in Voice and Accountability Zambia slid slightly from the 36th to the 37th percentile, in government Effectiveness it slipped from 16th to 25th percentile and in an area that concerns us directly, Control of Corruption, it slipped from the 19th to the 22nd percentile.

In recent years, Zambia has enacted a number of pieces of legislation which have the potential to strengthen financial transparency, although this may not be their primary objective. These include the Prohibitions and Prevention of Money Laundering Act (2001), the Terms and Conditions of Public Service, Chapter IV on Conduct and Discipline (2003) the Public Finance Act (2004), and the Bank of Zambia Anti-money Laundering Directives (2004). That said, important pieces of legislation for effective corruption prevention are still missing, including a legislation to protect whistle blowers and a reformed procurement law. However, it is widely recognized that the full application of existing laws remains a challenge in practice, both as a result of capacity issues in the legal system and corruption amongst officers of the law.

For the purposes of this case study we have included Norwegian support to the following project activities: the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC); the Task Force on Corruption

47 2003 with a score of 2.5 showed a minimal difference, see www.transparency.org.

(TFC); Transparency International Zambia (TIZ); and the Governance Development Unit (GDU).

Support to the Anti-Corruption Commission

The ACC was founded in 1980. Its mission is to investigate and prevent corrupt practices and to raise public awareness and debate on issues pertaining to corruption. Formally it is an autonomous body created by statute⁴⁸, but in practice it is dependent on the approval of the executive especially in the prosecution of corruption for which it requires the consent of the DPP.

In 2000, whilst President Chiluba was still in power, NORAD made a project grant of NOK 4.8 million available to the ACC for the purchase of motor vehicles and office equipment and the extension of an office block. This was expected to enhance the effectiveness of other donor support being provided at the time. The grant was intended to be spent over 3 years but was eventually extended until January 2007 to allow completion of activities.

The objectives of the support are highly relevant in view of the ACC mandate. It is Zambia's key anti-corruption agency and its objectives are wholly consistent with the Norway-Zambia MOU of 2000 and the governance chapter of the PRSP, although both came after project commencement.

During the same period the ACC was supported sporadically by Japan, Finland, Sweden and Denmark and DFID had a long term cooperation arrangement. DFID had confirmed at the outset that Norwegian funds would complement DFID support (Royal Norwegian Embassy, 2000: Norway, 2000:1). However, it is notable that although Norway consulted with DFID, it is not clear why funds were not pooled with DFID long term support. At the time this was already acknowledged as best practice (although not at that point formalised in the Paris Declaration).

The final project report (ACC 2007) of the ACC reports that activities began in 2001 and that it partially met the indicators laid out in the project document which were: the carrying out of community education activities in 60 districts (Achievement: 51 districts); 30% increase in complaints made to the commission (Achievement: 83%); and 50% efficiency increase in investigations and disposals of cases (Achievement: unclear, although an improvement was claimed).

It is difficult to assess the broader impact of Norwegian support to the ACC for two reasons: first, because it was intended to catalyse the support being received from other donors; and second because the effectiveness of the ACC in general is difficult to gauge. None of our key informants maintained that the ACC was effective: many thought it weak. Mention was made of a number of factors that inhibit its effectiveness including: the lack of independence from the executive and DPP; the carry over of unhelpful aspects of public sector culture in spite of its autonomous status; poor leadership; and delays in the approval of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy. More than one informant compared the ACC unfavourably to the DEC (which has greater powers and significantly more staff⁴⁹).

Support to the Task Force on Corruption

The TFC was established by President Mwanawasa on July 15, 2002 for the purpose of investigating official corruption in Zambia from 1991 through 2001. The mission of TFC is to:

- Investigate suspected cases of corruption arising during the relevant time period regardless of who might be implicated.
- Prepare prosecutions on the basis of the strongest available evidence when the Director of Public Prosecutions determines that prosecution is warranted.
- Recover stolen GRZ assets for the benefit of Zambia.

48 Anti-Corruption Commission Act No. 42 of 1996

49 A private communication from the Embassy indicates that the DEC had 442 staff in 2006 compared with only 270 for the ACC.

- Build capacity for the investigation and prosecution of complex financial crimes in Zambia and make recommendations on appropriate anti-corruption measures to minimise future abuse.

The TFC is staffed by seconded officers from several GRZ agencies, including the DPP, Zambia Police Service, the DEC, the ACC, the Office of the President (Special Division), the BOZ, and the OAG. Outside experts have also been engaged as required, especially attorneys and accountants.

NORAD has provided extensive support to the TFC since its establishment in 2002. Amounts under a series of grants have totalled NOK21.45 million (USD 3.7 million at August 2007 exchange rates) in tranches of NOK 2.7 million, 1.35 million, 3.4 million, and 14 million. Total donor support is reported as \$16 million up to end 2006 (TFC Evaluation, 2007:5). Norway therefore provided almost one-quarter of all TFC support. All support has been provided through a TFC pool fund which has also been supported by GRZ and a group of donors comprising: Royal Danish Embassy, Development Cooperation Ireland⁵⁰, Royal Netherlands Embassy, SIDA and DFID.

As with the support to the ACC, support to the TFC is highly relevant in terms of the 2000 Norway-Zambia MOU which specifies a focus area of “increased transparency and the fight against corruption”. The pooled modality is appropriate for such a large fund. Moreover, high level ownership was clear since the TFC initiative was led by the President himself and he was heavily involved with its proceedings in the early years.

The TFC was evaluated in June 2007 (TFC Evaluation, 2007). The evaluation acknowledges that the ultimate measure of success for the Task Force is the degree to which its work restores a culture of accountability to Zambia’s public service, which it argues is impossible to assess with accuracy. It uses amongst other indicators, convictions and funds recovered.

Points made in the evaluation include that overall it has secured 3 convictions and 3 questionable acquittals.

The evaluation team examined a sample of 24 high priority cases, and identified the following outcomes:

Cases	In court in October 2005	Planned to go to court by March 2006	% of total
Under investigation	0	8	33
DPP consent denied	0	2	8
On trial	8	4	50
Convictions	2	0	8
Total	10	14	100

The evaluators report that progress on investigations is slower than anticipated with some cases in court for 43 months without conclusion. This is because of very large numbers of adjournments, which were often sought in the hope of a new government after the 2006 elections, which did not materialise (key informant interview). However, despite the limited number of convictions, the evaluation argues that between assets recovered and monies saved in defensive litigation, the TFC has more than covered its costs.

There have been three major criticisms of the TFC. First that it is an ad-hoc institution “with no legal framework to guide its powers”. This is more than a nicety, but has implications for its sustainability, for the security (and retention) of its staff, and for the comprehensiveness of the anticorruption institutional structure. The second criticism is that it has a backward-looking focus – it does not apply to present misdeeds which are left to the oversight of the (less powerful and less well-endowed) ACC. It is sometimes argued that the TFC is therefore a tool of political vengeance as much as an anti-corruption

⁵⁰ Now Irish Aid

institution. The third complaint is that it has simply not achieved very much – simply the 3 convictions above and recovery of funds which almost cover costs.

Addressing the first of these criticisms, the review team understands that the absence of a legal framework enabled the President to establish the TFC quickly. Its practice of drawing staff from several organisations facilitated this rapid establishment and gave it extensive powers. However, the nature of its establishment and its mandate bear the hallmarks of political pragmatism. Given that the establishment of anti-corruption institutions is a highly political process we must ask two questions: even with presidential backing, how would the political elite have reacted to the establishment of a *permanent* anti-corruption organisation which combined the powers of the police, the Auditor General, the DEC, the DPP and the ACC? And second, how would that same political elite have reacted (or indeed how would they react today?) if the mandate of that powerful organisation were to pursue current corrupt activity as well as historical? It is the submission of this paper that, especially given Mwanawasa's weak position immediately post-election, that it could not have succeeded at all. Indeed, one key informant advised the team that "at the establishment of the Task Force not all in government were in favour, *because they did not know how far it would go*". Against the criticism that the Task Force has failed to cover its costs, the evaluation presents information that shows that in addition to the 3 convictions obtained and the recovery or forfeiture of \$25 million of assets, a further \$40 million has been saved in the Donegal case through a successful defence, and a further \$300 million may yet be secured in the Zamtrop case.

The evaluation draws key lessons for Zambia: first that the swift operationalisation and later success of the TFC was based on a mixture of *principle*, *innovation* and *pragmatism* (here it notes the willingness to ease the shortage of lawyers by recruiting them from the private sector, but we have also noted political pragmatism above). It also stresses the importance of the multi-skilled model for tackling crime that is designed and facilitated by criminal members of the accounting, banking, commodity and legal professions.

Lastly, the evaluation makes the important point that the TFC was unable to step out of the dysfunctional environment completely and with the exception of some cases tried in the UK, the TFC was forced to use local courts whose personnel are not well trained in financial crime and which are also corrupt themselves.

Support to Transparency International Zambia

TIZ is the Zambian Chapter of Transparency International whose mission is exclusively fighting corruption. NORAD provided general project support of NOK 3 million to TIZ to cover the period 2004 to 2006. However this support was not renewed because it was perceived that TIZ had many other sources of financial support.

Like other anti-corruption projects in this section, the objectives of TIZ are in harmony with the stated objectives of both Norway and Zambia.

Time limitations meant that the Review Team met only briefly with TIZ and its performance was not addressed in discussions with key informants. Nonetheless it is understood that TIZ is active in producing key corruption awareness literature. This is not limited to its country contribution to the CPI, but also many leaflets, its short book *Show Me the Money* which sold out within days of reaching the bookshops in 2006, and regular pieces in magazines such as "Why our Corruption Fight is a Mirage" (Lifuka, 2007) .

Support to the Governance Development Unit

In March 2000 GRZ launched the National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia (NCBPGGZ). Its objectives are:

- The promotion and protection of constitutionalism and human rights
- Enhancement of accountability and transparency
- Efficient and effective economic management
- Democratisation, decentralisation, and strengthening of local government

The Governance Development Unit (GDU) was established in the Ministry of Legal Affairs in 2000 in order to coordinate, monitor and evaluate the NCBPGGZ.

In 2000 NORAD provided a project grant of NOK 3.3 million over 5 years. The grant was for vehicles, IT equipment, salaries of a programme coordinator and M&E people, and consumables. In many ways the support to the GDU is a traditional project, and has resulted in the establishment of a donor-supported, somewhat unintegrated unit which does not appear to have a very high profile within GRZ. The original decision document pointed out its project nature and rightly questioned its sustainability.

Time limitations meant that the Review Team was unable to meet with the GDU and its performance was not addressed in discussions with key informants. It looks to be an inappropriate project in the respects indicated above, but its impact has not been evaluated here.

2.4 Have these interventions been effective?

In much of the discussion above it has been possible to evaluate the relevance and appropriateness of the objectives of the various interventions. Subject to different views of the relative efficacy of varying approaches, all have merit and are broadly consistent with the stated goals of Zambia and Norway. Not all are fully compliant with Paris principles, but all with the possible exception of the GDU Support have been implemented in awareness of them, and with that direction of travel in mind.

Single-donor project modalities have only been used for support to the Auditor General and for relatively minor initiatives to support ACC or GDU and for support to non-governmental agencies such as TIZ. The major initiatives in support of PEMFA (NOK70 million) and the TFC (NOK21.45 million) use pooled funding mechanisms, but fall short of budget support.

As the Norwegian Embassy in Zambia has moved away from project funding direct attribution of outcomes is no longer possible, and evaluations are dependent upon a more general assessment of results for the institutions or programmes supported. In the key areas of PEMFA and TFC support it is too soon to claim that either has been effective. Results at present are less than had been hoped for, but in both cases the outlook is more hopeful.

In the case of PEMFA faster progress is expected with the completion of procurement guidelines, the appointment of the Secretariat, and the faster approval of the 2007 Work Plan. The TFC is expected to have stronger results as those cases which were adjourned prior to the election in the hope of a change of government are finally brought to court.

According to all reports, support to the Auditor-General is delivering what was promised. The media and organs of civil society have full access and actively disseminate and publicise the material amongst their audiences (which are admittedly mostly urban middle class). In that sense, the support provided has been effective within the objective of strengthening the OAG. The major outstanding question is whether other institutions (Cabinet, ACC, PAC) and processes within government are sufficiently robust to ensure that the findings of the Auditor-General are used effectively to strengthen accounting and management procedures, to limit the misuse of funds and to better enforce regulations.

Decision documents exist and evaluations occur regularly in all the projects reviewed here. A midterm PEMFA evaluation is due in September, and lead donors have in any event kept a close eye on proceedings – some would say too close. The TFC was evaluated in June 2007 and found to have proceeded in a satisfactory manner in spite of disappointments and a view amongst many Zambians that it could have done much better (Lifuka, 2007:6). The RIDP project in support of the Auditor General has been the subject of frequent reviews.

Nonetheless, there is a tendency to acknowledge things in the decision documents but to leave them unresolved, The GDU decision document is a case in point. At one point it

acknowledges that the whole GDU is project-based and the salaried staff financed by the project do not provide a sustainable solution, but the project goes ahead without changes. The same document observes that the NCBPGGZ focuses “mostly at the lack of capacity and not lack of will as the main reason for non-adherence to internationally acceptable good governance” (Royal Norwegian Embassy, 2000:5). Based upon this, the GDU project addresses capacity without questioning the premise upon which it was based.

Another issue that causes concern is the effectiveness of the array of interventions as opposed to the effectiveness of individual project activities. The GRZ approach to anti-corruption, through the multiplicity of organisations mentioned here, is very fragmented and some rationalisation is called for. However, it seems likely that donors are encouraging that fragmented approach by funding the numerous separate organisations. Undoubtedly the National Anti-corruption Policy will provide some guidance on how anti-corruption might be rationalised. However this policy was formulated in 2005/06 and is still awaiting cabinet approval (key informant).

2.5 Political drivers and neopatrimonial influence

Current interventions are taking place against a backdrop of political change in the GRZ-donor relationship. This has come about from three factors. The first is the declaration of commitment to the Paris Declaration which has reaffirmed country ownership of programmes and alignment of donor activities with country systems. Whilst movement towards the Paris ideal may be fitful it has definitely strengthened the hand of all aid-dependent countries. The accompanying movement to programme-based approaches and budget support modalities has reinforced this. The second is the one-off granting of HIPC relief which Zambia achieved in 2005. It is true that donors and IFIs exerted pressure on Zambia to extract the maximum concessions prior to HIPC Completion, but now that it is done aid dependency is reduced from more than 100% of government budget to around 25% (key informant interview). Another benefit for GRZ arising from HIPC Completion and the fiscal discipline that contributed to it, is that government has a new found confidence. The third factor is that the commodity boom has driven up the price of copper which has risen five times since 1999. This has had a number of positive consequences for the economy including more buoyant tax collection and a strong inward flow of investment for mining from China, Australia and elsewhere.

The implications of this shift in power are significant. GRZ has already exercised its new strength in refusing a new PRSP and insisting on the broader FNDP; in insisting on programme based funding to the point where MoFNP advised the team that 80% of aid is now received in this way. In the PEMFA programme there is a discussion over whether Task Managers should receive allowances – a less aid-dependent Zambia is more likely to stand its ground on such issues. It will be increasingly difficult to pressure GRZ in a particular direction: incentives will assume a new importance.

Political issues affect all governance programmes, but financial transparency is inherently political. Financial transparency initiatives (1) impact upon the legitimate area of where government spends its money and (2) strike at the heart of the less legitimate area of patronage systems. Where donors are involved this is a critical arena for the determination of ownership and appropriate directions of accountability. This perspective underlies the primary hypothesis and we return to it here:

the logic of the neopatrimonial system suggests that there is little incentive for those in power to implement accountability systems which limit their discretionary control of funds. These elite will design PFM and corruption/ethics/police programmes with objectives that promote good governance, but these are less likely to be implemented well when funds are needed to garner the support of clients and voters, especially at certain critical times (e.g. during election periods).

The PEMFA programme does not shed that much light on the hypothesis which suggests that in so far as PEMFA strengthens accountability it will be resisted. It is possible that there is at least passive resistance in certain quarters, and it is also possible that the slow pace of implementation is associated with such resistance. However like many issues in

public sector reform in low capacity environments it is difficult to say whether non-performance derives from politically based resistance, or from capacity limitations.

The support for the Auditor General is somewhat different. The hypothesis suggests that support for the OAG will be poor because of its role in ensuring proper use of funds. However, it is clear that the OAG was successfully strengthened even in the Chiluba era, and that strengthening has continued up to the present in large part as a result of assistance from Norway. This appears to contradict the hypothesis. On the other hand, it is clear that although the OAG has increased numbers of staff and offices, and increased skills, informants continually expressed concern that its reports are not followed up effectively by the PAC and the ST. Even where matters are followed up there have historically been few prosecutions. There is likely to be a lot more tolerance of an accountability process within a neopatrimonial regime if in the end it has a limited effect.

Norway is involved with several anti-corruption initiatives. First, it may be said that if the ACC is ineffective (as many of our informants maintained) it can be tolerated, using the same logic as in the previous paragraph. However, the same cannot be said of the TFC which has confiscated assets and secured convictions. It is in some measure, effective. However, its effectiveness is still compatible with the hypothesis as presented, since President Mwanawasa has secured support for it by limiting its mandate to the 1991-2001 period, and thus limiting its targets and enlarging its constituency of support to include senior members of his own regime. It has been suggested above that this might have been the only way for Mwanawasa to develop an anti-corruption strategy.

It is reasonable to ask why the TFC was established at all when the ACC was already in existence. Interviews with key informants indicate that it was because the President recognized the ineffectiveness of the ACC and wanted the TFC to achieve results. This results focus is consistent with the use of the British courts and foreign lawyers. Why then not strengthen the ACC to do the TFC's job? The only answer that makes sense to the study team is that a permanent institution with the powers of the TFC was never a political possibility for reasons given above.

The Task Force evaluation identifies two categories of limitation on its work. The first are the limitations which derive from capacity, such as inadequate courts etc. However, the second group of limitations suggests that informal forces are at work to prevent the operation of the Task Force. These include the thwarting actions of the Attorney General (reported by a key informant) and the lukewarm response of the Zambia Revenue Authority toward the TFC (TFC, 2005). This latter category of limitations on the effectiveness of the TFC is consistent with the hypothesis.

In spite of the foregoing, there remain points from this case study that are not immediately explained by the hypothesis. If the hypothesis were correct, surely there would not even be a PEMFA, the OAG would never have been strengthened in the first place, and there would not be a Task Force on Corruption.

There are two possible explanations. First it can be argued that these things are established at donor insistence (but not necessarily rendered effective) as the price of receiving aid. They are part of the quid pro quo. This is likely to be part of the answer. However, discussions with key informants lead us to a second explanation. We believe that motives are more complex than indicated in the hypothesis; there are reformers in government who seek change; there are people of vision who see a Zambia free from aid and managing its own affairs; and that President Mwanawasa (and probably others) has a genuine interest in reducing corruption, even if zero tolerance is not politically possible. Consequently the neopatrimonial nature of the Zambian state should be acknowledged, but the complexities of motives and incentives of public sector actors must be understood in equal measure.

2.6 Recommendations

Although the main function of the case studies was to further explore the hypothesis *that there is little incentive for those in power to implement accountability systems which limit their discretionary control of funds*, the case study, as indicated above, does not accept this hypothesis in full. In order to build on the successes that Norwegian and other donor interventions in the area of Public Finance Management, the case study team suggest the following recommendations:

4. Norway should seek to “go with the political grain” in developing initiatives in sensitive areas such as public financial management, since activity in such areas requires strong political buy-in. In particular, Norway should continue to support anti-corruption activities which although not technically ideal or complete, are politically possible. The Task Force falls into this category – it does not address (and in political terms, probably cannot address) corruption in the present, but by addressing past offences it raises the profile of the corruption issue in public debate.
5. Norway should make a specific effort to identify the immediate winners and losers from its interventions or proposed courses of action; and to consider how winners may be used to motivate the intervention and how losers may be either (1) compensated (2) otherwise incentivised to support the activity, or (3) their opposition neutralised.
6. Based upon the good intermediate outputs of the Auditor General activity, Norway should consider developing support to the post-audit processes. This might include support to the PAC and to the process of Treasury follow up of PAC reports.

Annexes

Annex 2.1: Norway-Zambia Projects reviewed

Annex 2.2: Persons Met

Annex 2.3: Bibliography

Annex 2.4: Auditor General: Summary of Project Implementation Status

Annex 2.1 Norway-Zambia Projects reviewed

Projects for Case Studies: Transparency in Financial Management

Project No.	Project Title	Agreement No	Support to	Support Type	Commitment NOK	Period
ZAM-0088	Restructuring and Institutional Development	ZAM 97/085	Auditor General	Project	13,000,000	Disbursed 1999-2001
ZAM-0300	in respect to reformulating of the Project Document for phase II on support to OAG,	ZAM 02/147	Auditor General	Project	137,527	disbursed 2002
ZAM-0088	Restructuring and Institutional Development, Second phase of cooperation.	ZAM 99/303	Auditor General	Project: co-financing with the Netherlands	15,000,000	2003-2006
ZAM-0089	Anti-Corruption Fund	00/408	Anti-Corruption Commission	Project	4,800,000	2000-2002
ZAM-3011	Anti-Corruption Fund	ZAM-02/337	Task Force on Corruption	Project	2,700,000	2002-2004
ZAM-3011	Anti-Corruption Fund	ZAM 04/154	Task Force on Corruption	Project	1,350,000	Bridging
ZAM-3011	Anti-Corruption Fund	ZAM-05/015	Task Force on Corruption	Project	3,400,000	Bridging II
ZAM-3011	Anti-Corruption Fund	ZAM 04/157	Task Force on Corruption	Project	14,000,000	2004-
ZAM-0300	National Integrity System (NIS) Study	ZAM-02/315	Transparency International	Project	62,000	2002
ZAM-0300	PEMFAR Financial Management programme to improve PFM based on the PEMFAR report	ZAM 02/315	MOFNP	contribution to the multi-donor basket	70,000,000	2005-
ZAM-3011	General Support	ZAM-03/323	Transparency International	Project	3,000,000	2004-2006

Annex 2.2 List of persons met

- Regina M.K. Mulenga, Director, PEMFA Secretariat, MoFNP
- Maxwell Nkole, Executive Chairman, Task Force on Corruption
- Louis Mwansa, Acting Director (Planning & Information), Office of the Auditor General
- H. D. Zulu, Director (Ministerial Audits), Office of the Auditor General
- Mulima Kufekisa-Akapelwa, Executive Director, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction
- Patricia Palale, Public Sector Management Specialist, World Bank
- Jacob M. Mwanza, Chairman, Board of Directors, Citibank
- Goodwell Lungu, Director, Transparency International Zambia
- Likolo Ndalamei, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Finance & Economic Development), Office of the President
- Hon. Charles Milupi, MP, Chair, Public Accounts Committee
- Hon. Given Lubinda, MP, Chair, Government Assurances Committee
- Hon. Batuke Imenda, MP, Member Estimates Committee
- James S. Mulungushi, Permanent Secretary, Planning and Economic Management, MoFNP
- Christopher Siakokole, Secretary and Chief Executive, Zambia Institute of Chartered Accountants [PEMFA Task Manager]
- Situmbeko Musokotwane, Economic Advisor to the President, State House
- Emmanuel Ngulube, Permanent Secretary, Budget and Economic Affairs, MoFNP
- Bruce Lawson-McDowall, Governance Advisor, DFID
- Mark Chona, Former Executive Chairman, Task Force on Corruption
- M Goma, Accountant General, MoFNP
- M. W. Lewanika, Permanent Secretary, Financial Management and Administration, MoFNP
- Chembe Mukunsha, Accountant – Banking, Office of Accountant General

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Annex 2.4 Auditor General: Summary of Project Implementation Status

Objective	Inputs	Outputs	Status
Organisational Restructuring	Develop & implement organisation restructuring plan for OAG	Organisation restructuring plan of OAG developed & implemented	Planned activities undertaken. New structure took effect in 1998 but implementation to be gradual.
Enhancing independence of OAG	Review & revise laws governing the role & functions of OAG	Laws governing the role & functions of OAG revised, approved & enacted	Public Finance Act reviewed to incorporate new types of audit, public audit Act yet to be reviewed, Review of the constitution of Zambia & draft report and constitution to make OAG more independent done.
Improving capacity of OAG			
Training	Develop & implement training programme (management, auditing & IT)	Completion of management training, audit training, IT training carried out, improve number of trained staff	Component on schedule with adequate quality
Information Technology	Purchase & install IT equipment & facilities	IT training facilities purchased & installed, increased use of IT	Implemented in an efficient & effective manner
Audit Quality Methodology/ Financial Audit	Develop a plan for AQM	Timely completion of audits, manual for AQM developed	Time lag in producing AG' Report reduced to within 12 months in line with legal provision, Audit coverage increased from 25% to 75% with respect to overall auditing of budget heads & total funding levels, audit standards are established, documented & operational. Standards based on International Federation of Accounts & International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions. Audit manual & guidelines are available & in use.
Performance Audit	Plan & implement programme for PA	PA introduced & increase in the number of audits undertaken	Department of PA established but members of staff (six) work part time on PA. 14 staff members trained on PA of which 12 have remained at OAG but only 4 work part time on PA.
Human resource management	Establish department of Human Resources and Administration	Establishment of the department of Human Resources and Administration	Department of Human Resources and Administration established.
Decentralisation	Establish four provincial offices.	Establishment of four provincial offices	Construction of four provincial offices in progress (under PEMFA)
Transport & equipment	Develop a plan for transport & maintenance, procure parts, equipment & vehicles	Plan for transport, equipment & maintenance developed, new vehicles acquired & distributed	Plan not yet formulated. Request to procure eleven motor vehicles made in 2005, but none have been bought so far.

Case study 3: Agriculture in Northern Province

Executive summary

The case study of Norway's support to agriculture in Northern Province is part of the evaluation of Norwegian development cooperation with Zambia in the period 1991 to 2005. Its main objective was to explore in more depth the interaction between development assistance and power structures, at local and central levels. Employing a neo-patrimonial model to characterise Zambia, development cooperation was said to be shaped by power dynamics which are in turn determined by the various competing interests at both national and local level. The avowed motive was to bring about development and eradicate poverty but elites in reality sought to maximise opportunities for access to resources. The Interim Report set a range of general and specific hypotheses to be explored in the case study.

The agriculture case study employed a range of methods which included:

1. A review of over a wide range of literature that consisted of project documents, studies, appraisals, evaluations, correspondence, agreed minutes and bilateral agreements and memorandum of understandings between Zambia and Norway;
2. Interviews in Lusaka and Northern Province of people who had played a key role in the project; and,
3. Field work in Northern Province in four districts – Kasama, Mungwi, Mbala and Isoka. While in the districts, visits were made to the former programme sites were made and Focus Group Discussions with participating farmers conducted.

The Programme and its Objectives

The case study covers the period 1991 to 2005 in line with the terms of reference for the overall country programme evaluation. However, to locate the power relations in project context, it is important to trace the changes to the programme from its previous phases. Norwegian support to agriculture was initiated in 1977 with the Village Agriculture Programme (VAP). It had its own management structure outside GRZ. In 1981, the Soil Productivity Research Programme (SPRP) was introduced under the management of NORAGRIC. Extension Training Support (ETS) was placed directly under the Ministry of Agriculture.

VAP in 1992 was reconstituted into the District Support Programme (DSP) and its extension activities merged with ETS to form the Extension and Training Support Programme (ETSP) under the Ministry of Agriculture. The NORAGRIC contract to manage SPRP ended in 1991. Management was now placed under the Ministry of Agriculture. Besides DSP, ETSP and SPRP, four other projects were reconfigured and were together placed under one programme called Provincial and District Support Programme (PDSP) or ZAM020. This is after a further trimming down from 12 projects. The PPU provided coordination of ZAM020. In 1995, the DSP was separated from the purely agriculture related projects which were now constituted under the Agriculture Support to Northern Province (ASNP) (ZAM070). These were the Fish Culture in Northern Province, FSRP, SPRP and ETSP. Coordination of the programme was placed under the Provincial Agriculture Coordinator (PACO).

The goal of the Programme was to facilitate “*the continued transition of agriculture practices in the Northern Province toward more environmentally sustainable and economic farming systems which will enhance local food security and create cash incomes for small-scale farmers with particular*

emphasis on women and female-headed households”.⁵¹ In simple terms, the Programme sought to facilitate a movement of farmers away from *chitemene*, a slash and burn shifting cultivation farming system.

51 As stated in V.R.N Chinene, et al, 1997: Impact Assessment of Agricultural Support to the Northern Province of Zambia, 1981 – 1996, p.35. The ASNP Project Proposal Document had no logframe.

Power Interests in Programme Context

The Problem of Chitemene

By choosing the change of farming practices in Northern Province away from chitemene to more permanent farming systems as its main objective, Norwegian support unwittingly entered into a contested area. Both the colonial and post-independence governments had sought to stop the practice of chitemene with the stated reasons that it was environmentally destructive and was unsustainable on both ecological and social grounds. However, the main reason was political control. Chitemene was unacceptable to the colonial government because the mobility of the cultivators made the collection of tax difficult. Attempts to ban chitemene in the process elevated the practice to an expression of identity and the right to cut down trees was fiercely asserted by its cultivators.

But chitemene had been encouraged by the colonial government at first to undermine chiefly authority and “*many ordinary people seized this first opportunity to escape from the direct control of the Benang’andu chiefs, leaving their stockade settlements and setting up small villages*” (Moore and Vaughan, 1995, p.11). When the colonial government changed course over the matter, the chiefs aligned themselves with the cultivators so as not to lose the little authority left. However, the issue of chitemene and the chiefs remained contested between the cultivators and the chiefs even during the Programme period as Senior Chief Nsokolo of the Mambwe people pointed out to the team.

There is no indication that the Programme designers understood and took into account this political dimension of chitemene. Both the Norwegians and their Zambian counterparts readily accepted the arguments put forward by the authorities who emphasised the negative aspects of chitemene. The advantages that chitemene conferred on the cultivators with respect to its flexibility in responding to a household’s consumption decisions, availability of labour, climatic exigency, as a good insurance against total crop failure and food security/nutrition merits were not given due attention.

So the belief was reinforced that chitemene was a system in crisis ecologically and socially because the chitemene carrying capacity of the land diminished as population density rose. This ignored the fact that the cultivators did not depend on chitemene gardens alone, and that the system was more complex than the authorities portrayed. Socially it was thought that chitemene was too dependent on male labour and that male labour migrations tended to leave *chitemene* very vulnerable. Again evidence was ignored which showed that chitemene had survived labour migrations before and that male labour although important was not crucially needed to the household every season.

Therefore, not understanding the power struggle of that had taken place in the past meant that farmers felt that the programme was aligned against them. It was the elites who saw chitemene as a problem and not they. It was not simply a matter of the Misamfu researchers and extension workers developing and promoting varieties and technologies suitable for the soils of Northern Province. A viable alternative to *chitemene* needed to confer on the cultivators’ all the advantages seen above at the same time. *Chitemene* is a system and it needed to be replaced by another system that would give all the advantages that *chitemene* conferred. The farmers visited during field work in the communities where trials had taken place appreciated some of the varieties and technologies developed and promoted with Norwegian support. Where they could, therefore, the *chitemene* cultivators incorporated into their farming systems the new technologies without abandoning *chitemene* itself.

The Reformulations of the Programme

Vested interests on the Zambian side welcomed Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province without much regard to farm level impact. The VAP when it was first constituted in 1977 focused its activities in selected villages of Northern Province and funded complementary agriculture activities including infrastructure support for marketing and social services, input subsidies, extension and training, oxenisation and agriculture credit through cooperatives. It was therefore a grassroots’ focused intervention. However, over time as the support was reformulated, there was an increasing

concentration of activities towards, first the district level, and finally the provincial level. Capacity building of institutions was becoming more important. In fact by the time ZAM 070 was put in place in 1995, even the provincial administration had become less involved and MAFF headquarters had taken a much more direct role.

This change in management was much more about access to and control of resources than the need to make the interventions more effective. Resources were now spent more at higher levels. Technocrats appeared had manoeuvred to gain more access to short and long term training, develop their local and international professional networks, gain better access to assets such as vehicles, increase their gains in terms of subsistence allowances, etc. There was less focus on farm level impact. Therefore, camp extension workers who interacted with farmers had the least access to these resources with one informing the team that they had little motivation to work at the time as a result.

However, the interests of civil servants were not homogenous. Instead, opposing interests could, in broad terms, be seen between: (i) researchers and extension workers (even at camp level); (ii) within research between SPRP and ARPT researchers; (iii) National and provincial officials; (iv) Provincial and district level officials; and, (v) Camp level staff versus the rest. This comes out when certain critical decisions in the Programme are looked at, especially the decision to carry out the Impact Assessment and the way the civil servants handled the aftermath.

Power Relations and the 1997 Impact Assessment

The Impact Assessment whose report was issued out in November 1997 concluded that *“Despite all the R&D investment over the years, farmers are still without an economically viable alternative to chitemene. It is, therefore, concluded that SPRP, FSRP and EIS have not had a positive impact on addressing environmental degradation”* (V.R.N. Chinene, 1997, p.79). This was the first Impact Assessment, coming twenty years after Norway had began to support agriculture in Northern Province. Although long overdue, we still ask: why was it done at this time in the life of the Programme?

The drivers of the assessment were not the Norwegians but Zambian civil servants in the province and it appears to have been instigated by the extension wing of the Programme and not research. Extension staff, having been in more direct contact with farmers, were more keenly aware that the Programme was not having ground level impact. They were dissatisfied with what was coming out of Misamfu. For a number of them, the SPRP was too academic and did not address farmer needs. They genuinely wanted research to be more needs focused. Second, the advantage that research had over extension in terms of access to and control of resources had produced some resentment. It was hoped that the finding of lack of impact would help to have the extension-research funding balance re-examined.

Nevertheless, the antipathy was not just against research at Misamfu but was actually broader. Provincial and district agriculture staff were also hugely dissatisfied with the extension service delivery system and the relevance of research to smallholder needs in general. Therefore, when Norway indicated that, based on the findings of the Impact Assessment it was not going to fund the Programme in its current state, the provincial team went into overdrive and came up with proposals that would have in essence overhauled the extension-research system in the province. They advocated an overhaul of the T&V system to be replaced by a system that respected, listened and learnt from poor farmers. Some of the proponents of this were district staff who had become convinced that things were not working long before the results of the Impact Assessment. Coupled with this is the fact that the T&V system as applied tended to concentrate resources at provincial level. Their antipathy was thus also about inadequate access to resources vis-à-vis research on one hand and the whole extension delivery system on the other. The Impact Assessment and the demand by Norway for a new approach gave them the chance to demand a system that would work in their favour and hopefully that of the farmers they interacted with.

It is more complicated to assess the interests of national staff. On one hand they had long been uncomfortable with the regional approach and expected that the aftermath of the

Impact Assessment would lead to a discussion that would help bring the Programme much more in line with the principles of the Agriculture Sector Investment Programme (ASIP). They had struggled to have some access to the ASNP resources. But the Impact Assessment was carried out at a time when some serious doubts about ASIP had been growing. Donors had not believed in ASIP and collectively held back their funds or disbursed them through other channels. Therefore, some MAFF headquarters staff that genuinely wanted to retain the Programme in its current state given that prospects of ASIP continuing were not good.

Assessment of Project Impact

Assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of Norway's support to agriculture in Northern Province has been touched upon in the discussion above. This section can briefly restate these issues more systematically, particularly with a view to assess whether eight years after ASNP was terminated some unforeseen impacts are now discernible.

Relevance Enhancing local food security and creating cash incomes for small-scale farmers particularly for women and female-headed households was a relevant goal for small farmers in Zambia in general and Northern Province in particular. However, this was the stated objective. Other interests led to decisions being taken that made the objective difficult to attain. Various and competing interests among civil servants led to the design of activities that were less focused on small farmers and more on their own benefits including training, career development, professional networks and allowances. Norwegian and other expatriate scientists and their counterparts seemed to be much more motivated to extend their research interests rather than the needs of farmers on the ground.

Effectiveness From what has been seen above, we question whether aiming at moving farmers from using *chitemene* to “*more environmentally sustainable and economic farming systems*” was premised on a correct understanding of the problem. The researchers and extension workers hoped to achieve this by developing and promoting varieties and technologies suited to conditions of the province. It was not appreciated that *chitemene* was a system that had a wide range of advantages and could only be replaced by another system conferring similar or better advantages. Varieties and technologies developed in isolation were not enough. *Chitemene* was not a system in decline or in crisis whether socially or ecologically as was supposed. It is doubtful whether the programme could achieve its objective with the approach it took.

Impact The main conclusion of the 1997 Impact Assessment cited above stands ten years after. Interviews and a trip through the eastern part of Northern Province (Kasama-Mbala-Nakonde-Mpika) showed that the people of north eastern plateau continued to cut down trees. It is nevertheless acknowledged that research produced a number of varieties for beans, finger millet, sorghum, soya beans, cassava etc. In the trial site areas visited some of the varieties were appreciated and were still being used by farmers. There are also signs that with a changed environment farmers are more ready to adopt these varieties. However, in the main they incorporate the varieties adopted within the *chitemene* system, as part of the semi-permanent or permanent system.

Discernible impact was recorded in fish farming. It led to a significant increase in the number of farmers engaged in fish farming and consequently fish ponds and was said to have performed according to the set objectives. After the termination of the programme, fingerling production at Misamfu stopped and many farmers lacked an alternative for restocking the ponds. The resuscitation of the hatchery at Misamfu by the Livestock Development Trust in 2006 has also revived fingerling production. A number of farmers visited were starting restocking their ponds but supply of fingerlings was still a problem.

The programme built skills through both long and short-term training. By 1997, seventy-one Programme staff had attended long-terms courses. This was ninety-four for short-term courses. Therefore, after 1994, Zambians managed the Programme without any discernible problems. Nevertheless, the full impact of this capacity building exercise could not be realised after the Programme ended because of the shortage of operational funds.

Sustainability This can only be judged in areas where there has been some impact – the development and adoption of improved varieties and promotion of fish culture. As noted above, a number of varieties are still in use by farmers and to that end their adoption has been sustainable thus far. However, they risk being lost to contamination because production of seed has not been taken up by commercial seed producers and farmers are dependent on recycled seed. In the case of fish farming, it seems that it will be a small step to make fish farming sustainable if fingerling production is operated on commercial lines.

Implications for Hypotheses

The implications of the above discussions for the general and specific hypotheses set in Phase I of the evaluation are summarised below.

1. In the case of the Norad support to Northern Province's agriculture, there is no evidence to support that this assistance legitimised clientelism and corruption. But that there was pressure to spend was evident from the huge outlay that exceeded the absorptive capacity of the institutions supported – more vehicles than was the number of officers in some organisations. This pressure to spend made searching questions not to be asked concerning the research agenda and whether the so called problem of *chitemene* could be addressed within a programme context. The pressure to spend was fuelled by vested interests of organisations in Norway, including Norad. It had ready recipients on the part of the Zambian government because it met the interests of the civil servants. Unfortunately, in all this, the needs of the farmers, for whom the programme was designed in the first place, did not take centre stage.
2. Ownership was an issue particularly in the early stages of the Programme when it was implemented outside GRZ structures. During the period of ASIP, the agriculture sector had a well elaborated vision. However, competing interests among civil servants undermined the extent to which this vision could be implemented in the way that benefited the target group through which by aggregation broad based growth was to be obtained. Furthermore, throughout the programme's life, change agents were in short supply among Zambians. Junior officers at district level who were agitated about lack of impact had no influence in the system to bring about change. Civil servants mostly served their own interests rather than focus on obtaining impact at farmer level. This was worsened by the fact that the Zambian public service system does not readily acknowledge failure nor reward good performance.
3. Civil servants in general were the greatest beneficiaries of the project through training, professional advancement and allowances. MAFF HQ representing national level elites had worked to repeal the previous system where funds were disbursed directly to the project by Norad. At the time of ASIP, funds were now disbursed through the Financial Management Unit. This gave more space to MAFF HQ to manage its finances. Overall, there was little convergence between the interests of elites and that of the rural poor in Northern Province. Most of the project resources were spent on the elites in Zambia.

Recommendations

Given the analysis above, the following should inform future Norwegian development cooperation to Zambia and other developing countries.

- Producing impact on the ground should be the controlling thread that informs the entire programme. The selection of objectives, strategies and implementation arrangements should strictly conform to this.
- The needs of the beneficiaries should be understood from their own perspectives and not merely interpreted from experts' view point.
- Recipient responsibility to bear fruit must be accompanied by a richer and deeper dialogue around policies and strategies
- A continuation with project funding modality is necessitated by the absence of decentralisation and mechanisms to capture priorities of grassroots in national development frameworks
- Sufficient attention should be paid to the understanding of power relations and competing interests of the key players

Abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARPT	Adaptive Research and Planning Team
ASIP	Agriculture Sector Investment Programme
ASNP	Agriculture Support to Northern Province
ASP	Agriculture Support Programme
BSAC	British South African Company
CEO	Camp Extension Officer
DACO	District Agriculture Coordinator
DDCC	District Development Coordinating Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DSP	District Support Programme
EIS	Extension Information System
ETS	Extension Training Support
ETSP	Extension and Training Support Programme
FINNIDA	Finnish International Development Agency
FOPERA	Farmer Owned Extension and Research
FSRP	Farming Systems Research Team
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
HIV	Human Immune Virus
HPI	Human Poverty Index
HQ	Headquarters
IFAD	International Fund for Agriculture Development
IR	Interim Report
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature
MAFF	Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development
NORAGRIC	Norway Institute of Agriculture
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
PACO	Provincial Agricultural Coordinator
PDSP	Provincial and District Support Programme
PIRI	Programme of Investment in Rural Infrastructure
R&D	Research and Development
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SPRP	Soil Productivity Research Programme
T&V	Training and Visit
TA	Technical Assistance
VAP	Village Agriculture Project

3.1 Introduction and Purpose

Phase 1 of the evaluation of Norwegian development cooperation with Zambia for the period 1991-2005 studied the interaction of power structures and development cooperation in Zambia. Using a neo-patrimonial model to characterise Zambia, development cooperation was said to be shaped by power dynamics which are in turn determined by various competing interests at both national and local level. The elites who are the main dispensers of resources state through various policy and project documents that the intention of development initiatives pursued is to raise the nation's standards of living, particularly to eradicate poverty. However, in reality they seek to maximise opportunities for access to resources "to win political support or for personal wealth accumulation or even both".

The main objective of the case study is to therefore explore in more depth the interaction between development assistance and power structures, at local and central levels. Phase 1 set a number of general and specific hypotheses to be tested in Phase 2 through the three case studies of Norwegian support to Zambia. All the three case studies were meant to test four general hypotheses (See Section 3.8.1). There was one specific hypothesis for the agriculture case study (see Section 3.8.2)

3.1.1 Methodology of Agriculture Case Study

The agriculture case study was conducted between early August and early September. It employed a variety of methods and was conducted in three stages. In Stage 1, which largely took place in Lusaka, we reviewed various literature including project documents, studies, appraisals, evaluations, correspondence, agreed minutes and memorandum of understandings between Zambia and Norway. These documents provide a wealth of information of the dynamics that went on between Norwegians and their Zambian counterparts, within these two sides and between them and other interested players. Stage 1 also involved interviews in Lusaka with people who had played a role in the project at national, district and local levels. They were now dispersed over many institutions because Norwegian support to Northern Province agriculture had been terminated for eight years. Fortunately the team was assisted by a small group of former project staff to identify and track these actors.

Stage 2 of the case study was field work in Northern Province. This consisted of four elements. The first were interviews with provincial and district officials in Northern Province. The main criteria for selecting who to interview was familiarity with the Norwegian support to agriculture in the province. A detailed knowledge of the provincial and local scene which helped to create the context in which the project operated was the other criteria. The second element consisted of "field visits" in four districts of Northern Province— Kasama, Mungwi, Mbala and Isoka. In each district, discussions were held with Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) staff and other government officials. Visits were undertaken to selected sites in the four districts where Focus Group Discussions were held with local people who participated in the Norwegian funded programme. In addition, interviews with key informants were also carried out. Field sites were selected where trials for varieties and agro-forestry had taken place or where aquaculture had been promoted. While in Kasama, a special visit was made to the Misamfu Agricultural Research Institute given its central nature in the Norwegian support. Here discussions were held with scientists who had been active in the research programme in the 1990s and an inspection of physical infrastructure constructed with Norwegian funds was made.

Stage 3 was the analysis of evidence gathered in the first stages and the writing of this report. Our assessment of this evidence is that both farmers and officials spoke very candidly about the project and gave very good insight into issues we could not decipher from the review of literature. A major shortcoming is that much of the personal perspectives gathered came from Zambian project participants. Only a very limited number of Norwegians with detailed familiarity with the programme were interviewed and this took place in the early stages of the Country Evaluation when the agriculture case study was not the primary focus.

3.2 Evolution of Norwegian Support to Northern Province

Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province started in 1977 with the Village Agricultural Programme (VAP), ZAM009. This was one of a number of stand-alone projects which were gradually integrated until in 1984 ZAM020 was established, bringing together 13 projects in total under one umbrella, though the projects were still managed separately on the ground. This included soil productivity research, marketing and storage, extensions and training, support to the provincial planning unit, fish culture, road improvement, and other related areas.

Over time, these projects were gradually phased out, or replaced by other projects, until, by 1993, only seven projects remained. In 1995, five of these projects were integrated into ZAM070, and the remaining two, which were not directly connected with agricultural development (support to the provincial planning unit and the district support programme) were to be subsumed in an institution building project.

The purpose of ZAM070 was to develop new technology and improved methodology in agriculture and aquaculture through research and on farm trials and make these services available to peasant farmers in Northern Province through a well functioning extension service. There were three main elements of the project:

- Agricultural Research Support (this was a continuation of the Soil Productivity Research Project, and the Farming Systems research under ZAM020)
- Extension and Information Support (previously the Extension and Training Support Programme)
- Fish Culture Support (previously Fish Culture Support in Northern Province)

A fourth component on marketing and trade was suggested as a possibility in the programme document, but does not appear to have been implemented⁵².

Table 3.1 shows the financial support given to these projects and programmes since 1991. It also shows the size of the financial support to Agriculture in Northern Province, relative to the overall ODA from Norway to Zambia. Even though by 1991 support to Agriculture was past its peak (well over 56 million NOK in 1990), it was still a substantial proportion of total ODA to Zambia, reaching over 10% in two years.

Table 3.1 Norwegian Support to Agriculture in Northern Province, 1991-1998 ('000 NOK)

2	Subproject	3	1991	4	1992	5	1993	6	1994	7	1995	8	1996	9	1997 ⁵³	10	1998
11	Soil Productivity Research Programme	12	3,714	13	2,970	14	3,310	15	2,620	16	1,832	17	2,512		5,900		4,900
18	Adaptive Research and Planning Programme	19	2,913	20	1,602	21	2,766	22	2,690	23	1,973	24	1,458				
25	Extension and Training Programme	26	6,053	27	4,988	28	5,323	29	4,157	30	7,663	31	7,087		8,400		7,000
32	Fish Culture Northern Province	33	2,933	34	1,363	35	1,532	36	1,136	37	2,256	38	1,549		1,300		1,100
39	District Support Programme	40	5,557	41	3,435	42	4,192	43	5,112	44	4,147	45	144				
46	Provincial Planning Unit and Departments		5,188		3,417		3,841		1,815		1,109						

⁵² There are references to a programme document being developed but this does not seem to have passed the appraisal by NORAD/NORAD. There is no indication of funding being provided for this area.

⁵³ For 1997 and 1998, the figures included are from the budget, rather than actual disbursement. In 1998, the total figure represents planned disbursement after a reduction of 3 mill NOK agreed at the annual meeting following the impact assessment of 1997.

⁵⁴ For 1991 and 1992, the total includes additional elements which are not specifically identified in the table.

2	Subproject	3	1991	4	1992	5	1993	6	1994	7	1995	8 1996	9	1997 ⁵³	10 1998
47	Labour Based Road Improvement and Maintenance		8,483		5,163		6,340		1,201						
48															
49	Total⁵⁴		34,841		22,938		27,304		18,731		18,980	12,750		15,600	13,000
50															
51	Total Norwegian ODA to Zambia		334,269		312,941		235,470		361,218		222,652	197,386		263,216	240,240

3.2.1 Norwegian Development Policy

In the 1970s and 1980s, when support to agriculture in Northern Province began, Norwegian development policy was focused on development assistance as a way of giving resources to poorer countries, almost as a form of charity. Much of its development assistance was implemented by Norwegian organisations, and was largely bilateral, government to government in nature.

In 1992, in the Strategies for Bilateral Development Cooperation, Norway proposed its approach of recipient responsibility. This coincides with the end of the contract Norad had with NORAGRIC, to manage its support to agriculture in Northern Province. From this point onwards, there is much more Zambian management of the programme, both at provincial and later at national level. In the 1992 document, the key areas for Norwegian development cooperation are laid out as follows: sustainable development, democracy and human rights, productive activities and employment, environment, population, gender issues and institutional development.

The 1992 country strategy for Zambia reflects this approach. Priority areas included: import and debt support; economic growth and private sector development; democracy and civil society; environment and natural resource management; water and sanitation; and women and children. Agriculture is not explicitly mentioned. These priorities are repeated in the 1993 MoU between Norway and Zambia which guides overall ODA during this period, until replaced by a new MoU in 2000.

A new country strategy was developed for the period 1994-1997, but this has few changes in focus. It does however note that agricultural support to Northern Province had been too ambitious and focused on too many areas. This is reflected in the narrowing of areas included when ZAM020 is replaced by ZAM 070 in 1995.

The 2000 MoU does not include agriculture as one of Norway's four priority areas for cooperation with Zambia, and the 2001-2005 country strategy limits Norway's involvement in agriculture to continued support to ongoing work with the private sector.

3.2.2 Project Objectives

Original Objectives

It is difficult to bring together the objectives of the various projects which eventually made up ZAM020, as they address quite different aspects of agriculture and rural development. The SPRP, which started in 1981, was aimed at providing more permanent farming systems at different levels of technology for farmers in Region III, the high rainfall areas which suffer from soil acidity and low natural fertility. In particular the programme was aimed at farmers practicing shifting cultivation.

This was supported by the Farming Systems Research Programme (originally known as the Adaptive Research Planning Team) which started in 1985. Its stated objective was to improve the crop and livestock recommendations produced by the Research Branch of the ministry specifically for traditional and small scale farmers, and form a link between extension and research.

Support to the Extension and Training Support programme was started in 1989, and focussed on training extension staff and upgrading farmer training centres, specifically to improve food self-sufficiency, rural employment and income, particularly for women, and improving the operations of the Department of Agriculture's extension services.

Support to Misamfu fish culture project started in 1987 with the objective of increasing pond fish production and per capita consumption of fish in the Northern Province.

Evolution of Objectives

As the projects evolved over time, so did the objectives. This is perhaps most true in the support to the extension services, where the adoption of the T&V system had an important effect on the way the project was run, which changed emphasis on farmer training from residential courses to mobile training near farmers' fields. The overall objective of the support to what was now referred to as the Extension and Information System (EIS) was widespread dissemination of agricultural messages which are appropriate to areas of Northern Province, relevant from an environmentally sustainable, nutritional and income generating standpoint, and are specially related to the needs of women and female headed households.

Once the projects came together in ZAM 070, the objectives of the different programmes were linked in the Agreement between Norway and Zambia of 1995. Here the goal of the project is set out as to have peasant farmers in NP provided with essential agricultural services that may facilitate the introduction of sustainable and improved farming practices in support of social and economic development. Specifically, as described in the project purpose, this would be based on the development of new technology and improved methodology to permit increased food production for home consumption and income generation.

The Impact Assessment of 1997 formalises this in a logical framework. The evaluation team were unable to identify the source of this logframe, which does not appear in the project document of 1994. The logframe appears to be a more formal statement of the goals and objectives as laid out in the project document, including measurable outputs and indicators.

It is important to note, therefore, that the goal and purpose of ZAM 070 were carried over from previous projects. Initially the projects had had different objectives, but chitemene had always been important for the soil science programme, and this was carried over as a major objective of the combined programme. Any attempt to understand what led to their choice would of necessity have to refer to how things were perceived by the various actors who participated in conceiving the Norwegian support to agriculture in the first place.

Appropriateness/ relevance of Objectives

The overall objectives of the programme, although expressed in different ways, responded to a shared understanding of the problems of agriculture in Northern Province, i.e. poor soils and an environmentally unsustainable way of addressing them, *chitemene*, or slash and burn farming.⁵⁵ This appears to have been addressed as a technical issue, within the SPRP and APRT without trying to understand the factors underlying this practice. Other programmes were added on over time to address the problems of poor farmers in Northern Province, with laudable overall objectives, but without the overall objectives being well integrated.

By 1995, with ZAM070, there appears to be a much greater integration of the programme objectives, within an overall goal. However, the underlying analysis seems to remain the same: that there are technical problems which can be solved by research. The emphasis in funding shifts to the extension system to disseminate these solutions, and success is measured by the changes in output and the numbers of farmers following extension advice.

⁵⁵ How this problem was understood is dealt with in detail in Section 3.4.2

3.2.3 Approach and Strategy

In the early stages of ZAM020 and earlier, the SPRP was managed by NORAGRIC, the Agriculture University of Norway and the other projects were managed by Norad. There was considerable technical assistance, and Norwegian presence⁵⁶. As indicated above, the programme was very much research led, and the strategy was to build a cohort of qualified Zambians ultimately to run a research programme based at Misamfu.

Over time, this emphasis on human capacity building was extended to other aspects of agricultural services in Northern Province: the Farming Systems Research Programme, the Provincial Planning Unit and the Extension Services. After 1991, there was more effort to integrate support with existing services, e.g. researchers presented their budget and work plans to the government research system based at Mount Makulu; and support to extension had always been within the framework of the government system.

The project document for ZAM070 built on the perceived successes of ZAM020. These were identified by GRZ in terms of staff development and Zambianisation of the research institutes. At the review meeting at the end of ZAM020, the Norwegian delegation was concerned about the degree of alignment of the project with government policies, and in particular the ASIP which was being introduced. The name of the project was changed to ASNP (Agricultural Support to Northern Province) a change which echoed the national approach to agriculture. Funds were channelled through MAFF, as opposed to disbursing directly to the province, as had been done previously.

Norad itself appears to have had little direct influence on the approach taken in research, except insofar as it approved the initial project design and the management structure. This meant that the approach very much mirrored the concerns of initially NORAGRIC researchers and then of provincial and national technicians. An examination of the minutes of the review meetings indicates that Norwegian representatives occasionally raised issues of the emphasis on gender issues, the need to take account of market conditions or the role of the private sector, but these concerns do not appear to have been expressed sufficiently forcefully to influence the overall approach.

3.3 Northern Province, Some Key Trends

In deciding to support development in Northern Province, Norway chose to help bring prosperity to one of the more deprived regions of Zambia. The choice of Northern Province was in line with Norwegian development cooperation policy to use aid as an instrument for poverty reduction in deprived areas. Northern Province has a higher proportion of people living in poverty than the national average. This is partly due to the province being largely a rural province. In 2000, 85.9 percent of the population of Northern Province lived in rural areas. Although poverty is widespread in Zambia, rural areas are the worst affected.

Most of the social indicators provided in Table 3.2 show that the province has higher levels of deprivation when compared to the country as a whole. This fact is summarised in the higher than national average Human Poverty Index (35.2 compared to Zambia's 27).⁵⁷ The only aspect in which Northern Province does better is in her lower HIV prevalence. Again this is partly due to the rural nature of the province as HIV/AIDS prevalence is generally lower in rural areas.

⁵⁶ The evaluation team was told that at one point there were 66 Norwegians in Northern Province, though a considerable number of these were volunteers with the Village Agriculture Programme.

⁵⁷ The Human Poverty Index (HPI) summarises the extent of deprivation faced by the population in the three provinces. It is an index based on under-five mortality rate as a proxy for vulnerability to die at an early age, adult illiteracy rate and lack of access to economic provisioning as seen in child malnutrition and the proportion of people who lack access to safe water and health services.

Table 3.2 Population and Social Characteristics, 2000

Indicator	National	Northern Province
Overall population	9,885,591	1,258,696
Population % growth rate, 1990-2000	2.5	3.1
Share of rural in total population	65.33	85.93
Share of females in total population (%)	49.96	49.95
Total Area in km ²	752,612	147,826
Population Density, persons/km ²	13	9
Literacy rate	70.1	62.3
Primary school attendance rate	79	75
Secondary school attendance rate	71	69
Under-Five Mortality Rate	183	220
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate (15 -49 Years)	15.6	8.3
Proportion of People Without Access to Safe Water	43	65
Proportion of People Below Poverty Line	68	74
Proportion of people living in extreme poverty	53	60
Proportion of people without access to health	9	18
Proportion of children who are underweight	20.1	25.7
Human Poverty Index	27.0	35.2
Human Development Index		
Percentage in Informal Agriculture	66.42	83.71
Percentage in Informal Non-Agriculture	14.58	6.30
Formal Sector	19.00	9.99

Source: CSO, August 2004, *Zambia 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Volume Six Northern Province, Analytical Report*; Living Conditions Monitoring Survey, 2005; UNDP, 2007: *National Human Development Report*.

Because Northern Province is a vast area, it defies easy generalisations. It is Zambia's largest province and is 147,829 square kilometres in size, nearly one fifth of Zambia's total area. In 2000 when Zambia conducted her last population census, there were 1.3 million people living in Northern Province, 12.7 percent of the nation's population. A combination of these two factors means that Northern Province is one of the least densely populated areas in Zambia. This factor was said by some as favouring in past decades the practice of shifting cultivation under the *chitemene* systems. However, the province had one of the highest population growth rates at 3.1 percent between 1990 and 2000. The population growth rate has been on the increase, rising from 2.2 percent from 1969 to 1980 and 2.4 percent between 1980 and 1990. This is in contrast with the trends for Zambia as a whole whose population growth rate has dropped from 3.1 percent between 1969 and 1980 to 2.5 percent between 1990 and 2000.

As in everything else, there are wide variations. Population settlements in the last few decades have tended to cluster around major roads, the railway line built in the 1970s running from Kapiri Mposhi to the Tanzanian coast through Nakonde, and some fertile patches of land and fishing areas. These variables are concentrated in the eastern side of the province whose districts accounted for 76 percent of the province's population in 2000. Nakonde and Mungwi had a population density of 30.8 and 26 people per square kilometres which exceeded the national average of 13.1 by far. It is, however, noted that within the districts of the east, there are very wide variations in population densities.

Northern Province is a well watered area with some of the largest water bodies in the country. It has three lakes– Tanganyika in the northeast, Mweru-wa-ntipa in the northwest and Bangweulu in the southwest– and many rivers. The fisheries of these lakes and rivers provide a significant source of livelihood for artisanal fishers and fish traders. Commercial fishing is vibrant on Lake Tanganyika. Concern has been raised about the other two lakes regarding the depletion of fish stock.

Besides the lakes, there are a number of water falls but there are few visitors due to poor roads and other infrastructure. Since the mid-1990s, there has been a significant improvement in trunk roads. However, this is not the same regarding feeder and district roads. For example, an inventory on feeder roads conditions conducted in 1998 found only 9.4 percent of feeder roads in either good or fair condition. The rest were classified as poor (46.4 percent) or very poor (44.2 percent).

The majority of the people in Northern Province derive their livelihood from agriculture. Because of the subject of the case study, this needs to be put in historical perspective. The main tribe of the province, the Bemba, had established hegemony over other tribes before the 1900s raiding neighbouring tribes (Mambwe, Namwanga, Iwa, Lungu, Bisa, etc) for food and other goods (NORAGRIC and IUCN, December 1989, p.31). It has been suggested that raiding other tribes was institutionalised among the Bembas, a warrior tribe, because they occupied marginal land in terms of agricultural productivity. With the coming of the colonialists, raiding came to an end and the Bemba had to rely entirely on agriculture. *Chitemene*, a slash and burn shifting cultivation system, which had been practiced from earlier times was now intensified.

Table 3.3 Trends in Agriculture Production in Northern Province

		1990/ 91	1993/ 94	1995/ 96	1996/ 97	1997/ 98	1999/ 99	1999/ 00	2002/ 03
Total area under cultivation	Ha	159,182	119,775	156,400	241,031	224,283	294,602	247,235	242,841
Area cultivated per HH	Ha	1.17	1.22	1.05	1.5	1.39	1.72	2	
Share of area under maize	%	34.43	35.46	25.6	17.08	11.94	16.90	15.14	8.0
...cash crops	%	0.99	0.21	0.66	0.16	0.29	6.10	0.55	12.76
...drought tolerant	%	45.02	49.46	47.8	65.81	69.11	65.82	71.75	49.6
...other	%	19.56	14.87	25.94	16.95	18.65	16.63	12.55	29.15
Maize yields	Kg/ ha	2,409.79	2,340.74	1,904.40	1,691.71	1,274.83	1,438.69	1,038.00	1,470.00

After independence, maize production made a phenomenal growth. Between 1971 and 1988 maize production increased by 283.2 times with marketed production to the Northern Province Cooperatives Union reaching 158,000 metric tonnes in 1988 (NORAGRIC and IUCN, p.36). This big rise was due to the post-independence agricultural policy that favoured maize production above that of other crops. In particular, subsidies, the maize uniform price system and agricultural marketing through cooperatives favoured remote areas like Northern Province. There were also heavy investments in research and extension services targeted at maize production.

The change in agricultural policy with liberalisation halted this. Table 3.3 above shows that whereas area cultivated under maize accounted for 35.4 percent of total cultivated area in 1993/94 marketing season, it had dropped to 8 percent in 2003/04. In its place has been the rise in drought tolerant crops (millet, sorghum and cassava), cash crops (dominated by soya beans) and other crops in which mixed beans is the major crop.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ See discussion on impact for further details on these developments.

3.4 National Developments and Implications for Northern Province

Zambia started her post independence years as one of the richest sub-Saharan countries. By the mid-1980s, however, she was ranked one of the poorest nations in the world. From the early colonial days, the economy was driven by copper mining on the Copperbelt. High copper prices in the first ten years of independence led to high economic growth but seeds of an economic meltdown were sown at the same time.

Within the dynamics of the wider economy, Northern Province was established as a labour migrant reserve for the copper mines. During the colonial times, total migration to urban areas was somehow controlled as authorities discouraged migrant workers from moving with their families. The need to lift these restrictions was an issue of great agitation in demanding for African rule. At independence, with the easing of restrictions on migration, an explosion in rural-urban migration occurred. The rise in copper prices led to an increase in copper production and the demand for labour. At the same time families of previous migrants were now free to move and join their bread winners. This partly explains the lower than average population growth rates of the province in the early years of independence seen above.

The Zambian economy was dealt a severe blow when the copper boom ended in 1975 with a sharp fall in prices. As the economy entered a free fall, employment opportunities on the mines and other urban areas along the line of rail also went down. This took away the pull of urban centres and some reverse migration started to emerge. The consequence was a rise in the population growth rate at the time when this was dropping for the country as a whole.

Table 3.4 Selected Economic Indicators, 1997 – 2005

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
GDP Growth (%)	3.34	1.97	2.20	3.60	4.90	3.30	5.10	5.00	5.44
GDP Per Capita Growth (%)	0.03	-5.28	-1.06	0.25	1.8	0.1	1.8	1.7	2.20
Inflation Rate (%)	18.6	30.6	20.6	30.1	18.7	26.7	17.2	17.5	15.9
External Debt Service (US\$m)	176.00	143.23	129.35	102.61	196.76	276.32	342.82	250.72	246.23
Interest rates (%)				37.5	45.8	45.3	40.4	30.7	28.0
Exchange Rate (K/US\$)				3,170.8	3,581.1	4360.9	4732.2	4778.5	4475.2

Source: *Macroeconomic Indicators, various issues*

Piecemeal reforms were instituted between 1981 and 1990 at the behest of the World Bank and the IMF but these failed to correct the situation. With a new government in 1991, reforms aimed at restoring macroeconomic stability and remove distortions in various sectors were aggressively pursued. But rather than improve performance, Zambia’s economic stagnation persisted while macroeconomic stability worsened as seen in the high rates of inflation and interest rates and a free fall of the exchange rate. These developments meant that poverty continued to deepen even after the wide-ranging economic reforms instituted in the 1990s.

Of relevance to the this case study are the reforms in the agricultural sector. Policies for agricultural market liberalisation were amplified in the documented entitled, “*Framework for Agricultural Policies to the Year 2000 and Beyond*”. The state was to cease its direct

role in the marketing of food crops and agricultural inputs, remove subsidies, privatise state owned companies in the agricultural sector, and completely free producer prices. The state was to instead restrict itself to managing strategic reserves of grains through the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) and to foster an environment that empowered the private sector to take on functions previously performed by the state.

The key steps taken included: discontinuing maize and fertiliser subsidies, amending the Agricultural Marketing Act to repeal restrictive marketing arrangements, liberalisation of prices of commodity and input markets, lifting import and export restrictions, and privatisation of agro-processing firms. Therefore, the milling plant built with the help of Norwegian support was sold but did not work for very long before it was dismantled and the machinery exported out of the province. Support to cooperatives was immediately halted due to their perceived inefficiency and partly because of their close links with the former ruling party, UNIP. They faced serious competition from private buyers and started to collapse including the Northern Province Cooperative Union which had dominated maize buying in the province. However, private traders could not fill the void entirely due to the remoteness of the province, poor infrastructure and little market information, all which made the transaction costs very high.

Added to this is the re-emergence of spatial price variations which meant that farm gate prices were much lower in a remote province as Northern Provinces. It increasingly became less profitable to grow maize destined for sale along the line of rail. As seen above, small farmers in Northern Province responded by reducing the production of hybrid maize and its heavy reliance on fertilizer and improved seed.

There have been signs of an economic turn round in recent years. For nine years since 1997 the economy has grown uninterrupted, the longest uninterrupted period of growth in the forty-three years of Zambia's post-independence. It has averaged 4.6 percent since 2000. However, the Fifth National Development Plan (FNDP) suggests that this is not enough. The economy needs to grow consistently at more than 7 per cent if a significant reversal in the high poverty trends is to be seen.

3.5 Power Relations in Project Context

3.5.1 Actor Mapping and Interests

In the agriculture case study, we use the power analysis approach developed by SIDA which provides a framework for the analysis of actors, interest groups and structures and tries to uncover where the real power in a society lies and how that power is distributed institutionally.⁵⁹ This approach is useful in understanding the delivery of development assistance in terms of competing interests and incentives for or against reform by various actors.

As already informed by the neo-patrimonial model adopted in Phase 1 of the evaluation, development assistance is delivered and takes place in the context of power structures. Power structures are in turn shaped by competing interests for influence, control, resources and facilities. We can expect that Norwegian support to Northern Province agriculture was shaped by conflicting interests of various actors. At the international level there were the interests of politicians and bureaucrats in Oslo, interests of various groups in Norway, such as NORAGRIC in the early stages of the project, those of embassy staff in Lusaka and technical staff deployed in the projects.

At the national level were the interests of politicians in Lusaka, in Cabinet, at MAFF and Ministry of Finance and National Planning; civil servants at Ministry of Agriculture headquarters and technical staff at Mount Makulu Research Station. At provincial level were the interests of provincial officials, such as the Provincial Minister, Permanent Secretary and Provincial Agricultural Officer (PACO). At District level were interests of district officials, including district Agricultural officers, such as the District Agricultural Coordinator (DACO). At sub-district level were interests of projects and programmes, such as Misamfu Research Station, Camp Extension Officers and small-scale farmers.

⁵⁹ Sida 2005, 'Methods of Analyzing Power: A Workshop Report', Division for Democratic Governance, Sida, Stockholm. http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=486&=1521&dlanguage=en_US.

Development assistance makes an assumption that a recipient country needs funds, technical assistance and particular technologies. From the outset the donor-recipient relationship does not only produce dependence on the part of the recipient but also a kind of subservience. It diminishes the recipient's bargaining power and leverage over financial and technical decisions. But development assistance also produces winners and losers who position themselves to either defend their vested interests or oppose status quo by seeking more access and control to resources or demanding reform.

3.5.2 Mapping Power Structures

Table 3.5 Map of Actors in Northern Province Agriculture

Structures	Actors	Interests
1. External Context		
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Politicians	Providing ODA as a policy objective
Norad	Civil Servants	Poverty alleviation
NORAGRIC	Technical Staff	Research soil productivity & attitudinal change
Norwegian NGOs	NGO officials	Food security and poverty alleviation
	Norwegian Public	Poverty alleviation
2. National Context		
State House (Presidency)	President	Power and control over agricultural policy
Cabinet Office	Cabinet Ministers	Power, control and political influence
Ministry of Finance	Minister	Power, control, coordination and influence over Disbursement donor funds and resources
	Civil servants	Influence over policy, funds and resources.
Ministry of Agriculture	Minister	Power, control, coordination and influence over agricultural funds and resources
	HQ civil servants	Control and influence over funds and resources. Access to benefits such as training and allowances
	Mount Makulu Research Station	Access to training, resources for research and facilities. Also top-up and lunch allowances
3. Provincial context		
Provincial office	Minister	Control over funds, resources and transport
	Senior civil servants	Access to funds and transport and coordination of donor-funded agriculture activities
	Other civil servants	Access to training and other resources from donor-funded programme
Provincial Agricultural Officers	PACO	Access to funds and resources and control over donor-funded programmes
	Agricultural officers	Access to training and other resources from donor projects
Misamfu Agricultural Research Station	Researchers	Access to training, funds and research facilities and networks. Top-up and lunch allowances
4. District Context		
District Administration	District Commissioner	Pursuing national aim of political influence and access to resources for personal use
Ministry of Agriculture	District Agriculture Coordinator	Access to funds and transport and coordination of agriculture activities
Local Government	Town Clerk/District Secretary	No observable link but coordination of the programme through the DDCC could have been an interest
	Councillors	Access to funds and transport for their areas to enhance political influence
	Members of parliament	Access to resources for their respective constituencies to enhance their political influence
Traditional authority	Chiefs	Permanent and semi-permanent cultivation enhanced their chiefly authority
Camp level	Camp Extension officers	Access to resources and facilities (reliable transport), training and allowances
Citizens	Small farmers	Increase in household food security and income

Norwegian support to agricultural development in Northern Province was shaped by the assumption that as a recipient, Zambia needed assistance to modernize its agriculture in an area in which traditional farming methods (*chitemene*) have had a negative impact on the environment.⁶⁰ As seen above, Norwegian development assistance was viewed almost as charity given to poorer nations. It was further assumed that the problem could be tackled through technical assistance to conduct research and develop new seed varieties. Support to extension was meant to help farmers change their practices – abandoning *chitemene* and adopting new technologies developed under the programme.

Table 3.6 Average Share in Total Disbursement

Subproject	1991-98	1991-94	1995-98
SPRP and ARPT	27.03	22.39	31.67
Extension and Training Programme	35.56	20.20	50.91
Fish Culture Northern Province	8.36	6.51	10.21
District Support Programme	12.07	18.39	5.74
Provincial Planning Unit and Departments	7.42	13.39	1.46
Labour Based Road Improvement and Maintenance	9.56	19.12	0.00
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: Table 3.1

This was readily embraced by the Zambian scientists and extension workers who stood to gain in terms of access to resources. However, differences in access to resources created tension between them. This was particularly the case between research and extension. Before 1995, there was a bias towards research in resource allocation. SPRP and ARPT received a combined average of 22.4 percent of the total allocation compared to extension which received 20.2 percent (see Table 3.6). Although the difference is not big in absolute terms, extension covered every district and camp in the province whereas research was mostly at Misamfu and some selected sites scattered around the province. After 1994, the bias was reversed somewhat although when seen in terms of the difference in the number of staff between the two, research still had more favourable access to resources.

This elevated research in status within the programme. Zambian researchers had better access to transport, housing, allowances and opportunities for further training than the other staff. Tensions between research and extension staff was in evidence.⁶¹ A repeated phrase by the former non-research staff to the evaluation team was that researchers considered themselves superior. This is a perception that can not be proved but expressed the tension that had existed between the staff of the two sub-programmes.

Interests of provincial staff also were different from those of Ministry of Agriculture headquarters. Being close to the programme both the Provincial Administration in Kasama and the Provincial Agricultural Office had access to project resources, including motor vehicles. Much of the funds were used at provincial level and little reached the districts. Camp Extension Officers received little funding and often relied on a bicycle to cover vast areas.

But within the province the interests of the Provincial Administrators also diverged from those of Ministry of Agricultural staff. They sought more access and control over the programme resources and facilities than Norwegian staff were comfortable with. A provincial minister in the early 1990s was said to have been ‘*always quarrelling with the project over money and transport.*’ Jealousies that agricultural staff stationed at Misamfu enjoyed better access to resources have been noted above.

During meetings, Zambians appeared the weaker side. While Norway was represented at the highest level in review meetings, lower level officials represented the ministry of

⁶⁰ See ‘Report to the Norway-Zambia annual Meeting, 8-10 January, 1994, Kasama, Provincial Planning Unit, pp.22-23.

⁶¹ Interviews with key informants in Lusaka and Kasama who had previously worked on the project in the 1990s.

Agriculture. This was compounded by the observation of a former Norad official that: 'Zambians were often unprepared when attending annual country programme negotiations with Norway and did not appear to have any clear aims or objectives from what they wanted from Norwegian assistance.'⁶² Nevertheless, an analysis of minutes of review meetings shows that Norway did not significantly try to change the direction of the Programme.

The change of attitudes to farming practices was the main thrust of the Norwegian programme to Northern Province. Research and extension was expected to lead to a change of cultural practices and adoption of permanent farming methods, new seed varieties and technologies. But it would appear that the interests of farmers and that of the Programme were at variance. As seen below, farmers did not see chitemene as a problem and solutions were being imposed on them. Further, the new technologies seemed inappropriate as they were premised on the availability of seed and chemical fertilizers.

Why did the embassy or the Norad office not alert Oslo in good time that not all was well with the project? The embassy staff and Norad were convinced that the Programme was in the best interest of the people of Northern Province. There were results in the form of varieties developed and the Zambians that received training and were in the 1990s holding positions in the programme. In addition, as many informants told the team, embassy officials were under pressure to disburse funds. Because 'they were afraid of criticism if all the money was not disbursed', they ignored deficiencies in the programme.

Over time there was a re-orientation of priorities for Norwegian development cooperation. Zambia was no longer such an important focus area after 1995. Norway made a policy decision to reduce the number of sectors in each country to 2 or 3 plus general budget support. The new thrust of Norwegian policy was in mining, energy, peace building and human rights. While interviews in Oslo do not shed much light on the motivation for this shift in policy it seems probable that there were tensions between civil servants and politicians over the direction of development policy in Africa in general and Zambia in particular. One informant informed the team that civil servants were pushing for the suspension of development to Zambia on account of poor realization of objectives, while politicians were opposed to such an action.⁶³

3.5.3 Explaining Some Critical Turns in the Project

The interests of civil servants were not homogenous. Instead, opposing interests could, in broad terms, be seen between: (i) researchers and extension workers (even at camp level); (ii) within research between SPRP and ARPT researchers; (iii) National and provincial officials; (iv) Provincial and district level officials; and, (v) Camp level staff versus the rest. This comes out when some critical turns in the Programme are examined.

Power Interests in Programme Reformulations

The case study covers the period 1991 to 2005 in line with the terms of reference for the overall country programme evaluation. However, to locate the power relations in project context, it is important to trace the changes to the programme from its previous phases. As seen above, Norwegian support to agriculture was initiated in 1977 with the Village Agriculture Programme (VAP). It had its own management structure outside GRZ. In 1981, the Soil Productivity Research Programme (SPRP) was introduced with its own management structure provided by NORAGRIC. Along the way, several changes were made until in 1995 Norway's support to agriculture in the province was reconstituted to form the Agriculture Support to Northern Province (ASNP).

Two main features of these changes are: (i) transfer of programme management to the Ministry of Agriculture from Norad; and, (ii) increasing centralisation of activities from lower levels to provincial level. The VAP when it was first constituted focused its activities in selected villages of Northern Province (Bjorn Lunoe, et al, 1994, p.3). Once a catchment area under which a number of villages fell had been selected, VAP supported activities complementary to agriculture including infrastructure support for marketing and

⁶² Interviews in Oslo, May 2007.

⁶³ Interview with a senior official at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, May 2007.

social services, input subsidies, extension and training, oxenisation and agriculture credit through cooperatives.

The increasing concentration of the programme in higher level institutions follows the recommendation of the programme review in 1990 which stated: “*There is need to focus future Norwegian support to Northern Province under one strategy and to concentrate activities under a few related projects, in order to strengthen guidance, co-ordination and continuity, and to make more effective use of scarce resources. The programme should have a single overall development objective which is attainable within a reasonable time perspective, and should focus on a few clearly defined programme areas*” (Scanteam International a s, 1990, p.2). This was a reasonable recommendation and from our observations above was long overdue.

But this recommendation did not necessarily mean a scaling down of ground level activities where greater impact could be expected to instead focus on strengthening institutions. The move concentrated resources in the technocrats at provincial level. In fact by the time ZAM 070 was put in place in 1995, even the provincial administration had become less involved and MAFF headquarters had taken a much more direct role.

This development was much more about access to and control of resources than the need to make the interventions more effective. Resources were now spent more at higher levels. Technocrats manoeuvred to gain more access to short and long term training, develop their local and international professional networks, gain better access to assets such as vehicles, increase their gains in terms of subsistence allowances, etc. Farmer level impact was less focused on. Therefore, camp extension workers who interacted with farmers had the least access to these resources with one informing the team that they had little motivation to work at the time as a result.

The Politics of Chitemene

As stated above, the overall objective of Norway’s support to agriculture in Northern Province was to help farmers move from reliance on *chitemene* to permanent or semi-permanent system of cultivation. This objective started with the SPRP in 1981 and continued with ZAM 070. The identification of the problem was obviously influenced by the long prevailing view held by both the colonial and Kaunda governments and many experts that *chitemene* was a wasteful farming practice which was vulnerable to limitations of the ecological carrying capacity and social factors especially the absence of male labour.

The definition of the problem for Norway’s support to agriculture overlooked two important factors. First, the quest to stop *chitemene* in the past by colonial and, to a certain extent, the post independence governments was motivated by political control. *Chitemene* cultivators had strongly resisted this and asserted their right to cut down trees. Second, it failed to appreciate that the system had many advantages such that the “problem” of *chitemene* could not be resolved by merely developing and promoting new varieties. When seen from both fronts, it is not difficult to see why ASNP and the previous interventions failed to reverse *chitemene*.

The British South African Company (BSAC) which until 1911 had territorial authority over Northeast Rhodesia and later the British Colonial Government through various measures tried to stop the practice of *chitemene*. Although the justification for this was environmental and food security concerns, political control and particularly the ability of the government to collect taxes was at the centre of it.

“Chitemene was also unacceptable to colonial administrators because it involved seasonal mobility, where people went to live in huts (mitanda) in their field, and the periodic residential shifts, when villages were forced to relocate owing to insufficient forest for cultivation. These movements of people made taxes hard to collect and affected the administrative control of the population (Moore, 1995, p.xi)..

At first, the BSAC had encouraged the dispersal of villages as an attempt to undermine chiefly control and “*many ordinary people seized this first opportunity to escape from the*

direct control of the Benang'undu chiefs, leaving their stockade settlements and setting up small villages" (Moore and Vaughan, 1995, p. 11). The Bemba had operated from large well protected villages (NORAGRIC and IUCN, p.30). But the demise of these villages was quickly regretted by the BSAC and attempts to reverse the situation were now instituted. The colonial administration were forced later to allow some form of *chitemene* under certain conditions central to which was whether cultivators should erect *imitanda*, little huts by the fields where cultivators stayed when cutting trees, protecting the fields from animals and birds and harvesting.

The ban against staying in *imitanda* meant that cultivators could not garden *chitemene* fields at long distance which was the principal reason for *imitanda* in the first place. This was resisted by the cultivators. Although *chitemene* had been practiced from pre-colonial times, the right to cut trees had now assumed a new meaning; it had become an expression of Bemba identity and male masculinity.

Where did the chiefs stand in all this? The dispersal of villages undermined their control. But they too resisted attempts to reverse *chitemene* by the colonial government. They made a political choice of aligning themselves with the people they ruled as doing otherwise would have eroded further their authority.

"The Bemba chiefs who were equally concerned to control their people and exact tribute through their manipulation – brilliantly described by Richards – were anxious to retain the right to practice chitemene" (Moore, 1995, p.xi).

This point was illustrated by Senior Chief Nsokolo of the Mambwe people who told the evaluation team that his father whom he had succeeded three years earlier almost caused a revolt among the people when he tried to stop *chitemene*.

Therefore, the cadre of the Norwegian supported agriculture, by putting the reversal of *chitemene* at the centre of the Programme, unwittingly picked on an issue which was being contested – the people against both chiefs and government while, as long as the government took an active role in stopping *chitemene*, the chiefs sided with the people to protect their own authority. It does not appear that the Programme designers took note of this political side of *chitemene*.

Power Relations and the 1997 Impact Assessment

A report on the impact assessment of Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province that covered the period 1981 to 1996 was produced in November 1997. Its main finding was that: *"Despite all the R&D investment over the years, farmers are still without an economically viable alternative to chitemene. It is, therefore, concluded that SPRP, FSRP and EIS have not had a positive impact on addressing environmental degradation"* (V.R.N. Chinene, 1997, p.79). In the minds of many people interviewed, this conclusion was the death blow to the Programme that led to its termination in 1999. However, we argue below that there were many other factors at play within the complex power dynamics of the Programme. In fact the decision to carry out the Impact Assessment and the way the different actors handled the aftermath provides important insights into the nature of the power relations at the time.

It is important to note that this was the first Impact Assessment carried out by an independent team of experts. There had been a number of reviews before but they mostly looked at the institutional and organisational aspects of the Programme. None focused on impacts of the interventions on the ground. An Impact Assessment was therefore only carried out twenty years after Norway had been supporting agriculture in Northern Province. The question, therefore, is why was it done at this time in the life of the Programme?

The drivers of the assessment were not the Norwegians but Zambian civil servants in the province. A former senior Programme team member said that *"the 1997 Impact Assessment was requested by us as we felt that activities were going on and on without*

*any serious review*⁶⁴. But what is important to note is that among the civil servants, the need for the impact assessment was instigated by the extension wing of the Programme and not research. This could be interpreted in two ways. First, extension staff who were in more direct contact with farmers all over the province and not just in camps with trial sites were more keenly aware that the Programme was not having ground level impact. Somehow they had become dissatisfied with what was coming out of Misamfu. For a number of them, the SPRP was overly academic. They therefore thought that a clear finding of non-impact would help to rectify the situation and have research become better focused. Second, the overwhelming advantage that research had in terms of access to and control of resources had produced some resentment in the extension staff. It was expected that the finding of lack of impact would lead to the funding balance between extension and research to be re-examined and perhaps have the distribution of resources tilted in favour of extension on the premise that it needed to take out the messages more effectively.

Nevertheless, the antipathy was not just against research at Misamfu but was actually broader. Provincial and district agriculture staff were also hugely dissatisfied with the extensions service delivery system and the relevance of research to smallholder needs in general. Therefore, when Norway indicated that, based on the findings of the Impact Assessment, it was not going to fund the Programme in its current state, the provincial team went into high drive and came up with proposals that would have in essence overhauled the extension-research system in the province. They proposed a “Farmer Owned Extension and Research Project” (FOPERA).⁶⁵ The ideas were not entirely new and were being applied in Luapula under the FINNIDA-supported programme which had a Participatory Extensions and Research (PEAR) component. FOPERA advocated for an overhaul of the T&V system because it was top-down, prescriptive and was based on a “we-know-best” philosophy. T&V needed to be replaced by a system that respected, listened and learnt from poor farmers. Given what we have seen of *chitemene* above, more respect for these cultivators would have served the Programme well!

What is interesting to note is that some of the proponents and designers of FOPERA were district staff who had clearly become convinced that things were not working long before the results of the Impact Assessment. Coupled with this is the fact that the T&V system as applied tended to concentrate resources at provincial level. Their antipathy was thus also about inadequate access to resources vis-à-vis research on one hand and the whole delivery system on the other. Given the civil service system, their voice did not count for much but the Impact Assessment and later the demand by Norway that there be a new approach gave them chance to demand for a system that would work in their favour and hopefully that of the farmers they interacted with.

The Termination of the Programme

Norway agreed to have the Impact Assessment carried out because there had been increasing concerns and voices about the lack of impact. Despite what we have said above that Norad overestimated what could be achieved regarding *chitemene*, we have to admit that twenty years of intervention without an impact assessment is indeed a very long time in the development assistance context. Results needed to be justified and acceptance of the need for an impact assessment could be understood. However, what was surprising was the fact that after the impact assessment Norway decided to actually pull out and did so without any exit strategy and little communication to the Programme team in Kasama. Various people talked to suggested that this shocked the system and took agriculture in the province back by many years because even the little impact that had been made was eventually lost.

For some time after the Impact Assessment, Norway had indicated that it would continue funding agriculture in the province but that a totally new approach was required. The Programme team started to prepare a new programme. Proposals on FOPERA were made in this context. Other aspects included in the proposals were:⁶⁶ (i) promotion of a cottage

64 Personal communication, Lusaka, August 2007.

65 We were unable to access the project proposal document for FOPERA. Our observations are based on the comments provided by V.A. Ashworth on the document who was a GRZ/World Bank consultant.

66 Interviews, Kasama and Lusaka, August 2007.

seed industry to help farmers access improved seed which was being developed at Misamfu; (ii) promotion of entrepreneurship development among small farmers; (iii) promotion of food processing technologies to enhance food consumption and nutrition; and, (iv) the use of the group as a vehicle for extension delivery – turning farmer groups into economic units, minimising transaction costs and helping establish farmer driven extension system. *“The first draft of the Proposed Project Document had been reviewed and received comments from Norway asking for the inclusion of forestry and the dropping of capture fisheries”*.⁶⁷

There are various explanations of why the Norwegians decided to pull out in the end. Some suggested that this was irreversible after the Impact Assessment and that the Norwegians had become unenthusiastic about a second phase of the Programme even if they played along for a while. Others date the decision to pull out to even earlier than the Impact Assessment; that there was a strong disquiet about the programme within the Norwegian community for sometime and a feeling that Norway did not have a comparative advantage in promoting agriculture development in developing countries. It is difficult to know whether the shift in Norwegian development cooperation policy that de-emphasised agriculture preceded this disquiet or was because of it.

Whatever it was, agriculture development in developing countries and that in Northern Province had lost its champions in Norway. This was aptly put by a scientist who had worked at Misamfu during that period, that the ending of TA mostly in 1991 had lost the champions for their research programme. He said that by the Programme team insisting that ASNP did not need TA, the benefits of the Programme to the Norwegians were being closed off. Hence there was no incentive on their side to defend the Programme when its continuation was being debated in Norway. *“By having TA, it gave the project leverage. It was the TAs that justified the project. They knew whom to talk to within the Norwegian community. The ending of TA meant the loss of champions for the Programme”*. Certainly this was not the whole story but was a part of it.

Another explanation given is that Norway realised that self interests among civil servants were too entrenched to seriously change things. Actually, Norway decided to appraise proposals for ASNP Phase II alongside other proposals that had been submitted (see Oliver Saasa, et al, November 1998). Phase II proposals had four components one of which was the Promotion of Increased Agriculture Production and Productivity by smallholder farmers. This envisaged the generation of appropriate technologies and their dissemination to farmers through the extension service. This component in essence embraced SPRP, FSRP and EIS. The appraisal team dismissed this component as being *“the same approach that has been pursued since the inception of Norad support and, as found by the impact assessment study, has not yielded desired impact”*.⁶⁸ A second component, Promotion of Grassroots Involvement in Agricultural Development, which adopted FOPERA proposals but also included beneficiary infrastructure development support, was seen as innovative but much of the activities were anticipated to be covered under a DFID proposed initiative called Programme of Investment in Rural Infrastructure (PIRI) which was to cover Luapula and Northern Province.⁶⁹ Another component, Improving Institutional and Management Capacity of Stakeholders and Monitoring and Evaluation, was dismissed as too management related and did not merit to stand on its own. Only the Increasing the Incomes of Smallholder Farmers component was found to be “progressive and innovative” with its emphasis on market linkages through outgrower schemes.

This detailed summary of the findings of the appraisal team has been made to validate the fact that Norad could have been disappointed with the attempt to reformulate the programme and lost hope. However, it also goes on to show that interests of elites and not the needs of farmers again held sway in the decisions that were being taken by civil servants.

67 Interviews, Lusaka, August 2007.

68 Oliver Saasa, et al, p.36

69 In the end, DFID did not go ahead with the project citing a poor supportive environment particularly the absence of decentralisation.

Key Observations on Power Relations in Programme Context

The analysis on power relations made in this section has revealed a number of things:

- Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province chose to deal with an issue that was politically contentious, complicating the extent to which the Programme objectives could be achieved. *Chitemene* was shrouded in a battle for political control. Central government favoured permanent and semi-permanent cultivation because this made it easier to exercise its control. Resistance to this control had made *chitemene* a symbol of masculinity for the cultivators. Chiefs and central government had similar interests for political control. However, their relation was complex as chiefs distrusted central government which had earlier encouraged *chitemene* to undermine chiefly control. At the same time, chiefs recognised their delicate position in the eyes of the cultivators if they made any overt support to central government.
- Civil servants manoeuvred to have the Programme serve their interests by advocating for increasing centralisation. The interests of farmers became less in focus. The principle of recipient responsibility which sought to align Norwegian support to national policies and strategies and work within national institutions unwittingly played into the hands of the civil servants.
- Opposing interests among civil servants that led to competition over access to and control of resources meant that there were forces that wanted the Programme to be reformulated and redistribute resources more fairly. The tension was more visible between research and extension but also between district and camp level staff on one hand and provincial and national level staff on the other.
- When the chance to reformulate the Programme came so that it could reflect farmer interests much more, this aspiration did not coincide with the interests of national and provincial level civil servants and was thus resisted. Recommendations to take operations much more to the ground were shot down and Norad may have lost hope that the Programme could be successfully reformulated to respond to the 1997 impact evaluation.

3.6 Assessment of Project Impact

Assessment of the relevance, effectiveness, sustainability and impact of Norway's support to agriculture in Northern Province has been touched upon in the discussion above. This section only briefly restates these issues more systematically, particularly with a view to assess whether eight years after ASNP was terminated some unforeseen impacts are now discernible.

3.6.1 Relevance

As already seen from above, part of the Programme goal was to facilitate “*the continued transition of agriculture practices in the Northern Province toward more environmentally sustainable and economic farming systems which will enhance local food security and creating cash incomes for small-scale farmers particularly for women and female-headed households*”. We comment below on the merit of focusing on *chitemene* as implied in the first part of the goal. However, the need to enhance food security and create cash incomes was a relevant goal for small farmers in Zambia in general and Northern Province in particular and cannot be questioned. But from what we have seen above, this was only the stated goal. Although small farmers were the focus of the Programme, other interests prevailed such that decisions were taken that made the goal difficult to attain.

Various and competing interests among civil servants led to the design of activities that were less focused on small farmers and more on their benefits including training, career development, professional networks and allowances. This is seen particularly in the increasing centralisation of the Programme such that by 1995 the talk was more about harmonising ASNP with ASIP. In the end resources were being directed more at the provincial level and very little at the camp level. Camp Extension Officers who should have been the main agents to bring about farmer impact rarely received allowances and had little motivation to do the work.

3.6.2 Effectiveness

It is questionable whether aiming at moving farmers from using *chitemene* to “*more environmentally sustainable and economic farming systems*” was premised on a correct understanding of the problem. The researchers and extension workers hoped to achieve this by developing and promoting varieties and technologies suited to conditions of the province. It was not appreciated that *chitemene* was a system that had a wide range of advantages and could only be replaced by another system conferring similar or better advantages. Varieties and technologies developed in isolation were not enough. The way the problem of *chitemene* was defined appeared to fix on the slash and burn side of *chitemene*. It failed to appreciate the complexity of the system described as “... *well-adapted to local environmental conditions, as well as being flexible and responsive to change*” (Moore and Vaughan, 1994, p. 26). *Chitemene* gave better and more reliable yields to finger millet and other crops intercropped with it on the *chitemene* garden. This happened at lower cost. Better results by research often involved higher costs in terms of modern farm inputs and labour.

The “problem of *chitemene*” was accentuated in the minds of the scientists of the Programme because it was seen as synonymous to finger millet. “*Yet the detailed research of colonial scientists had demonstrated that the chitemene garden was best conceived as a complex horticultural system involving mixed cropping*”.⁷⁰ It was not strange to find a range of crops – different varieties of finger millet, gourds, pumpkins, small cumpers, cassava (in more recent times), sorghum, cow peas and a few plants of maize – all on one garden, planted at different times of the growing season and harvested in different months. Furthermore, it was common for a household to have a number of *chitemene* fields as part of a system used for crop rotation. What is more is that these “*crop mixtures always appear to have been responsive to labour availability, household composition, consumption preferences, and climatic exigency*”.⁷¹

Chitemene was therefore a remarkable insurance against total crop failure, had important merits for household nutrition given the types of crops harvested and the evening out of food availability. It also levelled out labour peaks. Mixed cropping also helped in disease control and the efficient use of soil nutrients by plants with different requirements. Therefore, it was not a question of the Misamfu researchers and extension workers developing and promoting varieties of crops that were adaptable to the soil conditions of Northern Province. A viable alternative to *chitemene* needed to confer on the cultivators’ all these advantages at the same time if they were to abandon it.

It was also assumed that *chitemene* had inherent weaknesses and could not serve its cultivators for long, i.e. it was a system in crisis both ecologically and socially. But here too the experts that informed the choice of the overall objective were wrong even though by the time of Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province much evidence to dispel this point of view had accumulated.

Socially *chitemene* was said to be in crisis because it needed male labour for cutting down trees. But *chitemene* had survived labour migrations for a long time. In any case, at the time the Norwegians took the decisions to support agriculture in Northern Province, Zambia was already undergoing a serious economic decline which had begun to reverse the high rural-urban migrations that were seen in first years of independence and the absence of male labour was no longer an issue.

Second, that *chitemene* was socially weak failed to appreciate the interplay between *chitemene* gardens and permanent and semi-permanent gardens where female labour was much more crucially important. “*While men’s labour was crucial to the cutting of trees for chitemene-based millet production, it was much less important for the cultivation of village gardens where most of the work was done by women, and indeed for the subsequent rotations which took place on the chitemene gardens*” (Moore, 1995, p.xvi). When this is taken into account, the absence of male labour in a household in any single growing season did not entail a food crisis as a household had access to the other gardens.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p.37

⁷¹ Moore and Vaughan, 1994, p.37

Perhaps a more relevant concern was that it was a system in crisis ecologically because as the population density increased, the *chitemene* carrying capacity is exceeded such that it can only be carried out at the expense of very serious environmental degradation. But projections of the imminence of a crisis on these grounds overlooked other factors that made *chitemene* more sustainable than if its cultivators had relied on it alone. Factors such as the role of semi-permanent and permanent gardens in supplementing *chitemene* gardens, the proportion of land suitable for *chitemene*, population distribution, the role of non-farm activities (employment, fishing, hunting and even gathering), etc were crucial to the survival of *chitemene*.

If *chitemene* had such internal weaknesses and had reached crisis point at the time of Norwegian support, the messages that the programme was promoting would have found ready ears. However, the view *chitemene* was a system in crisis was over emphasised by governments whose main motive was the exercise of political control. The view overlooked the many advantages that the system had to its cultivators. Talking to farmers in Northern Province in the communities where FSR trials took place, they appreciated many of the varieties and technologies developed and promoted with Norwegian support.⁷² But the *chitemene* cultivators were not looking for a technology. They needed a system that would give all the advantages that *chitemene* conferred at the same time. Where they could, therefore, the post-ASNP *chitemene* cultivators incorporated into their farming systems these new technologies without abandoning *chitemene* itself.

3.6.3 Impact

The main conclusion of the 1997 Impact Assessment already cited above was that “*despite all the R&D investment over the years, farmers are still without an economically viable alternative to chitemene*”. From the observations made during field work in Northern Province, this conclusion stands ten years after. Interviews and a trip through the eastern part of Northern Province (Kasama-Mbala-Nakonde-Mpika) showed that the people of the north eastern plateau continue to cut down trees. Two main reasons for this have been given above. First is the lack of relevance of the problem definition to *chitemene* cultivators, i.e. they did not see it as a problem the same way the scientists and extension workers did. Second is that by choosing to reverse this practice, programme designers and implementers had entered into a contested area between authorities (both government and traditional leaders) and the people. The programme unwittingly aligned itself with the former.

Nevertheless, there were some positive outcomes of which three can be mentioned.

1. Research under the Norwegian supported Programme produced a number of varieties for beans, finger millet, sorghum, soya beans, cassava etc. In the trial site areas visited by the evaluation team, some of the varieties were appreciated and are still being planted by farmers. The Impact Assessment of Root and Tuber Research in Northern Zambia conducted in 2000 found that research and extension had contributed significantly to the adoption of new cassava and sweet potato varieties with 47% claiming that research and extension was the original source of planting materials for each of the two crops (Soils and Crops Research Branch, Farming Systems and Social Sciences Division, July 200). Although this research was done under SIDA funding, Norad support to Misamfu in terms of infrastructure and the FSRP which conducted field trials helped to augment these results.
There are also signs that with a changed environment – e.g. crops that were once produced only as food crops becoming increasingly marketable especially through cross border trade – farmers are more ready to adopt these varieties. However, in the main they incorporate the varieties adopted within the *chitemene* system, as part of the semi-permanent or permanent system without completely abandoning the system.
2. An area of discernible impact was that of fish farming. During the project life, there was a significant increase in the number of farmers engaged in fish farming and consequently fish ponds. These farmers were using fish culture to generate cash

⁷² This point must be made with great caution. Decades of preaching against *chitemene* by successive governments and experts including the cadre that worked under the Norwegian supported Programme had brought about a guilty feeling in the minds of these farmers. This is seen in the fact that not a single farmer talked to admitted to practicing *chitemene* although they always suggested that this was still rampant and was practiced by other farmers in the area. These farmers were therefore much more ready to over amplify the advantages of these technologies against *chitemene*.

income, improve household consumption and for exchange of fish with other commodities such as maize, beans, cassava, finger millet and groundnuts (Denams Environmental Consultants, June 1997).

This augmented household food security and nutrition and was in line with the original objectives of the project. Fish farmers in many cases were utilising integrated fish farming methods, rearing fish in conjunction with fruit trees, horticultural products, cereal crops and small livestock. These activities were therefore helping to stimulate a more diversified income base for farmers. However, after the termination of the programme, fingerling production at Misamfu stopped and many farmers lacked an alternative for restocking the ponds. The resuscitation of the hatchery at Misamfu by the Livestock Development Trust in 2006 has also revived fingerling production. A number of farmers visited reported that they had started restocking their ponds although supply of fingerlings was still seriously low.

3. All the officials interviewed gave high marks to the Programme for carrying out a comprehensive training programme. This was initiated in the 1980s with the SPRP and continued in the 1990s. A number of people were trained at different levels. Seventy one Programme staff⁷³ had undergone training by 1997 (see Table 5). The SPRP had the largest share of staff trained accounting for 42.3 percent. The FSRP, EIS and Fish Culture accounting for 23.9, 28.2 and 5.6 percent respectively. Therefore, put together, research accounted for 66.2 percent of the long term training. The training programme has been criticised for favouring men. Only 18.3 percent of trainees were women.

Table 3.7 Number of Staff Undergone Long Term Training by 1997

Level	Male	Female	Total
Soil Productivity Research Programme			
Certificate	8	3	11
Diploma	2	0	2
B. Sc	4	0	4
M. Sc	11	0	11
Ph. D	2	0	2
Farming Systems Research Programme			
Certificate	7		7
Diploma	1	1	2
B. Sc			
M. Sc	5	2	7
Ph. D	1		1
Extension and Information Support Programme			
Certificate		1	1
Diploma	6	1	7
B. Sc	2	1	3
M. Sc	5	4	9
Ph. D			
Fish Culture Development Programme			
Certificate			
Diploma	1		1
B. Sc			
M. Sc	3		3
Ph. D			
Total	58	13	71

Source: Chinene, V.R.N. et al, 1997, Table 5.7

Long term training was supplemented by short-term courses. If each time a Programme staff attended a short course is counted, there were ninety-four such attendances of which

73 Each attendance at the course is counted separately. Some staff attended more than one long term training course with one training from diploma all the way through Ph. D.

fifty-nine took place between 1991 and 1997, 62.8 percent of the total.⁷⁴ There was therefore an intensification of short-term training under ZAM 020 and ZAM 070.

The success of the training programme could be seen in the fact that ASNP was largely managed by Zambians after 1994 and there were no indications that it performed any worse than in earlier years when there was a larger presence of expatriates.⁷⁵ Problems of retention regarding training are discussed below. Nevertheless, eight years after ASNP was terminated, there are still a number of people trained by the Programme working in Northern Province.

There is no objective basis for assessing whether this training continues to make positive impact on the agriculture sector in Northern Province. However, there is a general acceptance that this training helped to build a strong cadre of research and extension staff. Unfortunately poor funding to the province ever since Norway pulled out has undermined the extent to which this training could be put to good use. But some attributed to the earlier support by Norway the better performance of the Swedish funded Agriculture Support Programme (ASP) in Northern Province than in the other three provinces where it is being implemented. The positive impact of ASP was cited by both officials in the province both in and outside the agriculture sector as well as by farmers including those interviewed in non-ASP camps.

3.6.4 Sustainability

Some sustainability can be observed in areas cited above where there has been some impact, especially the development and adoption of improved varieties and promotion of fish culture. As noted above, a number of varieties are still in use by farmers and to that end their adoption has been sustainable thus far. However, they risky being lost to contamination because production of seed has not been taken up by commercial seed producers and farmers are dependent on recycled seed. In the case of fish farming, it seems that it will be a small step to make fish farming sustainable if fingerling production is operated on commercial lines.

In general, however, from a sustainability view point, the main problem with Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province was the high operational costs. Therefore, a milling plant built with Norwegian support was closed down after privatisation – with machinery demobilised and shipped out of the province. It seems it was more economical to do this than to maintain the operations of the plant. Another example is the motor vehicle workshop established to service all project vehicles is hardly operational because it depended on projects contributing resources to meet its operational costs.

In the short term, the Programme was unlikely to be cost effective. A lot of resources went into capacity building particularly training of staff. It has been remarked that many people trained under the Programme have since left the province, a concern that was alluded to by the Norwegian delegation in meetings with the Zambian Government. At issue then was whether such highly trained personnel could be retained under GZR conditions of service. However, added to this later on was the ASIP restructuring exercise that saw Northern Province producing five Provincial Agricultural Coordinators (PACOs) out of nine. Other personnel left the province when upon return from their studies they found that their positions had been given to other people. It has been often remarked that most of these people are still in Zambia working in the agricultural sector and are therefore contributing to achievement of sector goals. But Zambia as a whole was not the primary focus of Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province.

Furthermore, given the high investments in transport, buildings and equipment and the high service level adopted under the T&V extension delivery system, the operational costs were too high compared to what the Government could reasonably maintain after the Programme. This problem was accentuated by the “sudden” termination of support without any exit strategy. But sustainability was always going to be difficult given the problems of government funding. A visit to Misamfu showed that the infrastructure built

⁷⁴ Chinene, V.R.N. et al, 1997: Annex 8

⁷⁵ The Ministry of Agriculture as for the rest of the civil service does no objective system to assess performance to know the success of training with any degree of certainty.

under the Programme are still functioning but operating at very low level because of the problem of funding. What is worse is that although the research station has the capacity of generating its own funds to meet some of the operational costs, Government regulations do not allow for this. For example, Misamfu can charge an economic rate on seed certification which is becoming a viable industry in the province. However, given that funds generated through this way have to be surrendered to the treasury, there is no incentive for doing so. This also applies to fingerling production. For this reason, there have been suggestions that the Livestock Development Trust take over fingerling production in the same way it has taken over the running of the hatchery.

3.7 Non-Attributable Perceptions

As part of the agriculture case study, a perception survey was undertaken which solicited views of stakeholders on the Norwegian support to agriculture in the Northern Province in general and on Norway as a donor specifically. These views have been used in the discussion provided above relating to participation in programme design and implementation, ownership, Norway's approach compared with that of other donors and perceptions on impact. In this section we provide a brief summary of these views on each of the main issues.

As indicated in Section 3.2.3 on methodology, the people interviewed played varying roles in the Programme.⁷⁶ The team was fortunate to have had access to such a broad range of players given the passage of time. As already stated, the team had the impression that different people discussed their experiences and observations candidly. It is also remarkable to note just how consistent perceptions on a number of issues regarding the Programme were.

3.7.1 Perceptions on the Origins of the Programme

Few people recollected clearly the origins of the programme. However, a number of people interviewed thought that Norway selected Northern Province in the first place because of its remoteness and it being one of the most deprived areas of Zambia. One official interviewed suggested that *“when the Norwegians arrived, they made it clear that they wanted to work in a remote area”*.

It was noted that the regional approach was not peculiar to Norway as Zambia was divided up by different donors in the 1980s and 1990s – the Finnish in Luapula, the Danish in Western Province, IFAD in North-Western and Southern Provinces, the African Development Bank in Eastern Province, etc. The regional approach was important to Norway and other donors as the regional projects gave them visibility and made it easier to demonstrate results. One official told the team that Norwegians at times appeared uncomfortable to indications that other donors could start projects in agriculture in Northern Province. Given the amounts that Norway pumped into Northern Province, this probably made sense because there were some absorptive capacity problems. However, some officials felt that Norwegian support did not cover all critical areas and there was thus room for other donors.

The dividing up of the country by donors was at first encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture which wanted to see all parts of Zambia covered by a large project in one form or another. With the passage of time, the Ministry of Agriculture found the regional/project approach difficult to manage and started in early 1990s to develop ASIP which among other things advocated the integration of all agriculture projects into one sector programme. The need to have all funds channelled through the basket managed by the Financial Management Unit at the MAFF headquarters was also emphasised. In the words of a former director of agriculture, *“donor programmes made the harmonisation of approaches in extension difficult. This is why we sought to introduce basket funding but this was not popular among donors”*. For some players, therefore, Norway and other donors resisted integration into ASIP because they would have lost control and visibility in the process.

⁷⁶ See Appendix 3.2 for people interviewed

3.7.2 Perceptions on Zambian Ownership

A senior member of the provincial Programme team remarked that “*the activities were designed by the Norwegians themselves. Zambians only participated*”. He was quick to add that this had, however, progressively gotten less. He and other people interviewed linked this to the level of TAs over time and the fact that initiatives increasingly became incorporated within GRZ systems. By the time the ASNP was inaugurated, there were only 5 TAs across the whole programme.

People interviewed give high marks to Norway for its “counterpart system” whereby people to take over from expatriates were identified early and mentored on the job. Mentorship was combined with short and long term training. In the view of many, this is probably the greatest contribution of Norwegian support. However, it was said that mentorship did not always work out well. Sometimes the gap between the apprentice and the expert was just too big that the former had little say and participation in the running of things. This gave the expatriates a considerable degree of influence which unfortunately meant that they failed to learn and appreciate quickly enough the local context of the problem situation they had come to help resolve.

3.7.3 Perceptions on Effectiveness of Design and Implementation

Those that commented still believed that what the Programme pursued was the right approach, i.e. development of varieties and technologies to bring about a shift in farming practices from *chitemene* to more permanent cultivation. It was said that Misamfu had done a good job in coming up with new varieties and technologies. However, by working through the T&V system which was the official extension delivery system at the time, adoption was compromised.

There was great consensus on the lack of effective monitoring. It was said that the Programme had no targets, indicators and clearly defined objectives to measure impact. Some suggested that these were only developed during the Impact Assessment. Officials were therefore at a loss when they were asked to comment on the impacts of the Programme as they had not objective reference point for doing that. Furthermore, there had been no baseline survey to establish the benchmarks against which performance was being measured. This, in the minds of many, was the greatest weakness of the Norwegian Programme.

3.7.4 Perceptions on Sustainability

Although capacity building was rated as the best achievement of the Programme, it was pointed out that organisations that had been supported drastically reduced their activities after termination of the Programme. Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute even though has the infrastructure Norad left behind including a research laboratory cannot sustain the same level of operations as before due to inadequate operational funds. In the words of one scientist, “*Misamfu work has considerably reduced since the withdraw of Norad support*”.

Many people interviewed suggest that sustainability was partly due to a lack of exit strategy. Norad did not give a clear indication that it was going to end the Programme even after the 1997 Impact Assessment. “*There was no clear phase-out plan. The sudden withdraw shocked the system that had been well funded*”. What led to the sudden withdrawal is a subject of speculations. Some attribute it to the change of staff at the embassy. Others suggest that it was GRZ insistence on channelling funds through MACO which affected Norad’s commitment to the Programme. The reduction in the number of TAs is still another reason. It was said that with the departure of TAs the Programme lost its champions in Norway.

3.7.5 Perceptions on Poverty Impact

There was consensus that the Programme did not have significant impact on farmers in Northern Province despite the huge investments. In that sense there was general agreement with the conclusion of the 1997 Impact Assessment. However, in terms of continuing impacts, the improved varieties and technologies developed are cited as beneficial. In areas where trials were conducted, farmers have continued to use the

varieties. For example, in Nsokolo, Kaka and Nsenga Hill in Mbala which were trial sites during the Programme, farmers said they were still using varieties of finger millet, groundnuts and sorghum introduced with Norwegian support. Short maturing cassava varieties were also introduced. They cited a number of advantages and disadvantages but were generally happy with the varieties. However, they have not abandoned traditional varieties because these were better in some aspects including beer brewing, drought tolerance and marketability⁷⁷.

3.7.6 Comparison of Norway's Approach to Other Donors

Despite the weaknesses in the Programme that were noted, people interviewed still regarded Norway highly as a donor. The achievements in capacity building, particularly training and the mentorship programme, were given high marks. Norway was considered a more flexible donor that allowed adjustments to be made during the course of the Programme. It was said to be more prepared to work through recipient organisations. As an example given were the audits by the Office of the Auditor General.

It was nevertheless noted that Norway was less focused on results compared to the other donors. The absence of targets and indicators, baseline, a robust monitoring system and impact evaluations were cited as examples for this view. It was said that Norway had no system of gathering best practices. A contrast was made of how SIDA managed its support to seed multiplication. This was contracted out to a private company whose performance was followed up through regular supervision missions. *“Did Norad ever review the performance of NORAGRIC?”* was one question raised. It was thought that part of the problem was that there were no people at the embassy with the technical competency to raise questions about the Programme and focused mostly on the processes rather than the substance and the impacts.

3.7.7 Overall Perceptions on the Success of the Programme

Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province was generally perceived to have failed. In this the people interviewed were in agreement with the findings of the 1997 Impact Assessment.⁷⁸ A number of reasons were provided for the lack of impact.

- ASNP had little focus on the farmer and spent much of the resources at the province. Camp extension officers were the last in the chain to receive allowances (and consequently rarely did) which undermined their commitment to engaging the farmers.
- Objectives, targets and indicators were not clearly spelt out and communicated to everyone. Some officials claim to have heard of these only when being interviewed during the Impact Assessment. No baseline survey was undertaken to provide ground for objectively measuring change. Therefore, monitoring of the Programme was weak and strategic decisions to correct the situation could not be taken.
- Norway trusted Zambian officials too much and did not ask searching questions on the Programme. Some attributed this to the absence of people with a good grasp of issues in the agriculture sector. Norwegians were said to be more concerned about administrative rather than technical issues.

It was implemented using a flawed extension methodology of T&V which was an expensive and top-down approach. The voice of beneficiaries counted for very little in the development of messages which was done at the province before being shipped to the camps by provincial subject matter specialists.

Adoption rates for varieties developed by the Programme were low because they required the use of fertilizers whose subsidies were removed in the 1990s while organisations that provided seasonal credit had began to collapse. Other than beans, the crops for whose varieties were developed had little markets. Therefore, farmers had no means to generate cash income to buy fertilizer.

Deregulation of the agriculture sector punished remote areas like Northern Province as there was no emergence of the private sector to take over from where the public

⁷⁷ The team was told by farmers in Nsasamwenze in Isoka that some local varieties were much more in demand in Tanzania than improved varieties.

⁷⁸ It is interesting that many officials interviewed both in Lusaka and Northern Province criticised the 1997 Impact Assessment as having been too categorical in concluding that there ASNP had failed but expressed a similar view when asked to rate the impact of the Programme.

organisations had left. It was a big omission that the Programme did not include the markets side of things.

3.8 Implications for Hypotheses

In this section we pull the evidence provided in the discussion above to state clearly whether the hypotheses established in Phase 1 stand or not. Two general hypotheses are discussed first before turning to the specific hypothesis.

3.8.1 General Hypotheses

- The ‘pressure to spend’ by donors not only masks policy failures but legitimises incompetence, inefficiency, clientelism and corruption. *Donors and government/other elites pursue conflicting but complimentary interests that do not seem to promote pro-poor development*

In the case of the Norad support to Northern Province’s agriculture, there is no evidence to support that this assistance legitimised clientelism and corruption. But that there was pressure to spend was evident from the huge outlay that exceeded the absorptive capacity of the institutions supported – for example, more vehicles than was the number of officers in some organisations at times. This pressure to spend legitimised a flawed extension delivery system (T&V) that had few results and allowed it to go on for sometime before its efficacy could be debated. Questions were not asked concerning the research agenda and whether the so called problem of *chitemene* could be reasonably addressed.

The pressure to spend had ready recipients on the part of the Zambian government because it met the interests of the civil servants. Norwegian support to agriculture provided them a chance for training, developing local and international professional networks, having a ready access to resources to carry out functions and ultimately to advance their careers. Unfortunately, in all this, the needs of the farmers, for whom the programme was designed in the first place, did not take centre stage. Most of the resources were spent on Zambian civil servants and Norwegian TAs and little reached the ground. The result was the lack of impact alluded to above.

- The assumption that aid could be delivered effectively through formal structures has been misplaced as it has failed to take account of the logic of power and decision-making in the Zambian social system. Informal power relations, rooted in personalised authority and a system of clientelism informs the behaviour of formal institutions and tends to be subordinated to it.

The hypothesis fails to explain what happened in the case of the ASNP. Personalised authority and clientelism does not explain the behaviour of civil servants who were the greatest beneficiaries of the Programme. Instead, different categories of civil servants competed against each other to have access to Project resources.

- *Political and economic reforms undermine formal interest groups’ capacity to mobilise a membership or build coalitions of support for group interests.* The absence of clear policy orientation or strong interest group identification creates opportunities to resort to clientelism in pursuit of power and privileges within organisation and in relations with central power holders

No evidence has been found regarding clientelism in the case study. However, it is true that the 1990s political and economic reforms destroyed the cooperative societies to which most farmers belonged. They had been strongly associated with Kaunda’s UNIP and were organised in a hierarchical manner with the Zambia Cooperatives Federation as the apex body. Withdraw of agriculture market subsidies destroyed cooperatives which had been among the biggest beneficiaries and with that the ability of farmers to mobilise in interest groups. There were even suggestions that agriculture market reforms were implemented faster because the new MMD government meant to destroy the organisational structures that UNIP had built.

After some time, farmers are mobilising themselves in interest groups facilitated by projects such the Economic Expansion in Outlying Areas that ended in 2002 and the

Agriculture Support Programme which started in 2003 and is to end in 2008. These interest groups have not yet gotten the political stature they had under UNIP because there is no similar hierarchical organisation.

- Particular factors responsible for poor development performance and low accountability include:
 - I. *Lack of ownership and a shared vision for the national interest* – This was particularly the case in the early years of the Programme when design and implementation arrangements occurred largely outside the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1990 when support to agriculture in Northern Province by Norway entered a new phase, a programme review was undertaken by Scanteam International. A re-planning workshop was held to discuss the findings and recommendations for the follow up programme (see Agriculture and Rural Development, Northern Province, May 1991). The workshop outcomes show divergent views between the Scanteam recommendations and Zambians. But the final outcome of the Programme indicates that Scanteam’s recommendations carried more weight in the final analysis. This confirms the view expressed by a number of people interviewed that the interventions were largely designed by the Norwegians in the earlier years although the holding of such a workshop was an important milestone. But even with the 1995 programme, although there were improvements in terms of local participation in the design, the Norwegians had signalled what they were going to continue supporting. Therefore, a senior member of the Programme team remarked, “*most of the interventions were designed by themselves. They designed these to fit departments rather than needs*”. In the 1990s, agriculture operated under a well stated vision elaborated in the ASIP document. The main objectives of increased food security and incomes were relevant to what the Programme had always stood for. However, the stated vision was undermined by underlying and different interests of the people that played a role in designing and implementing the Programme. Access to and control of resources appear to have been the common denominator of these interests. In the end, the farmer was less in focus and hence the lack of impact.
 - II. *Lack of agents for change* – Throughout the programme’s life, change agents were in short supply among Zambians. As already seen, civil servants mostly served their own interests rather than focus on obtaining impact at farmer level. From the interviews, it is evident that district and subdistrict level officials were more willing to focus on farmers because they were in more direct contact, they knew better their needs and farmers are able to lobby them much more directly. However, these officials had little influence on the system which was designed from the top. At the national level, a lack of agents for change is apparent from an inadequate response to the 1997 Impact Assessment. It called for a fundamental change in the approach. However, the proposals given, although they made some changes, had the same essential characteristics of the Programme that had failed. Some have blamed this on the system’s willingness to have departments that had been beneficiaries not to lose out in the new phase. At national level, there is no one interested enough to arbitrate between departments. Ministry of Agriculture Permanent Secretaries who could play this role tend to be too removed. It is thus difficult to change an ongoing programme fundamentally if it entails leaving out some existing activities under given departments.
 - III. *Weak system of rewards and sanctions* Therefore, the Programme went on and was being rolled out under different formulations despite the lack of results that were apparent to nearly all even in the absence of an impact assessment. Officers are not sanctioned for failing to deliver. Neither can those that deliver expect some reward. There were therefore no incentives for good performance.
 - IV. *Style of public administration which look to central power holders, especially the executive, to decide on almost all key decisions, lack of policy initiative in subordinate and lower-level individuals and groups* District and camp level agricultural staff had come to realise that the Programme was not delivering. They knew that the T&V system was faulty and that research was not prioritising the needs of the farmers. However, the public administration system meant that they could not influence the policy direction required to bring about a change in the approach. Unfortunately, this worsened in the 1990s under ASIP when even the provincial administration felt more alienated from the Programme.

3.8.2 Specific Hypothesis

- Where programmes are important to elite interests – such as mining – political interventions will tend to favour those interests. In the case of the N Zambia agricultural project, the question is then:
 - I. *In whose interest did the project function?* Civil servants in general were the greatest beneficiaries of the project. This is seen in: (i) The large numbers trained by the project; (ii) The professional networks they developed, local and internationally; and, (iii) Access to resources in carrying out functions. However, as already pointed out above, the interests of civil servants were not homogenous. On the other hand, NORAGRIC used the project to extend its scientific interests.
 - II. *Did the national elite have an interest, what was it, and how was it advanced or undermined by donor funding?* Within the principles of ASIP, the funds to the project needed to go through the ministry's Finance Management Unit. It gave the FMU forex because money came in NOK while disbursements were made to Northern Province in local currency. This gave more space to MAFF HQ to manage its finances.
 - III. *Did they intervene to promote their interest?* The funding mechanism alluded to above came as a gradual shift. At first funds were disbursed directly to projects by Norad and were managed outside the GRZ established systems. Overtime, the disbursing channels were brought in line with the prevailing systems. At first these were given to the province directly from Norad until after 1994 when the funds were disbursed through the MAFF HQ. Agreed Minutes show that this was a subject of some discussion between MAFF and Norad, indicating that national elites intervened to have the authority they needed over resources.

There had also been some conflict by national elites attempting to have a share of resources, especially for scholarships at times more than what Norad was comfortable with. Furthermore, when lack of farm level impact was identified as an issue in 1997 by the Impact Assessment, the provincial and district level staff in extension were willing to change and refocus their strategies.

This was not taken on board by national level officials for whom the status quo appeared to serve their interests best.

- IV. *Was there a convergence of interests between local and national elite, and the rural poor whom the project was to help?* It has been shown above that there was little convergence of interests. Therefore, most of project resources were spent on the elites through allowances and training. Little went to directly benefit the poor on the ground.

3.9 Will Chitemene Survive?

That Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province did not achieve its main objective of bringing about sustainable farming practices is clear from the discussion above. The main reason is that the goal was merely premised on the fact that the people of Northern Province needed this shift rather than on a clear review of the evidence that had accumulated overtime. To an environmentally conscious society which prided itself of a great sense of solidarity with poor nations, helping farmers to abandon *chitemene* seen as environmentally wasteful and unlikely to survive and continue meeting the needs of its cultivators was a compelling reason to render support.

Eight years after ASNP was terminated what to do about *chitemene* is still a live issue. From what has been discussed above, it is clear that *chitemene* will not be abandoned by farmers through development and promotion of improved varieties and technologies. *Chitemene* is a system that answers farmers needs in terms of soil fertility, labour requirements, household nutrition, consumption preferences, etc. These needs should be satisfied first before a farmer can abandon *chitemene*. The problem is therefore much more complex than the Norwegians saw it when they arrived in Northern Province. Neither did the farmers share with the experts that their system had such serious problems.

Targeting *chitemene* as Norway did does not seem with hindsight realistic. If *chitemene* will be abandoned, a number of things outside the *chitemene* system should take place. We postulate that there are indeed factors that will make farmers to slowly abandon *chitemene* although its existence will not be eliminated completely for many decades to come. Already there are trends in this direction of which four are important to mention.

1. Population in Northern Province is getting more concentrated around particular infrastructure – roads, schools, health facilities, railway line, electricity, etc. People are increasingly unwilling to shift around as access to these facilities becomes a more dominant variable in choosing where they live. This brings about an increasing need to move from shifting cultivation to more permanent systems. Unfortunately what this means is that for sometime, *chitemene* will be intensified in these areas until the forests are unable to regenerate completely. There were signs of this during field visits as many people remarked that *chitemene* cultivators were having to get back to secondary forests that had not fully regenerated. In earlier times people would have simply shifted to more distant areas following suitable forests. Although we should not be quick to suggest that around these areas the carrying capacity of *chitemene* has been exceeded, farmers seemed to have been searching for an alternative.
2. Growing population and its concentration in more accessible areas has led to the carrying capacity of the environment to decrease for a whole range of activities that were done in combination with and support of *chitemene*. The fisheries of Northern Province have been overexploited and are becoming increasingly less viable. Hunting is no longer an option as animals have nearly finished in most areas while conservation enforcement is more stringent. Gathering from the forests such as caterpillars is now only taking place in localised areas. For this reason, *chitemene* is looking much more perilous as to whether it can survive given that the activities that once supported it are less viable.
3. Many crops that were grown mostly for household consumption have become increasingly marketable. The varieties that were developed with Norwegian support were promoted at the time mostly for their food value. However, farmers are re-evaluating them in terms of their commercial value. This was the case in Mbala and Isoka of the four districts visited which have a more vibrant cross border trade. Therefore, finger millet, sorghum and beans varieties developed at the time are more important now than at the time they were introduced. Early maturing and high yielding cassava varieties have been widely adopted all over Northern Province because of cassava's rising marketable value. Although farmers have long incorporated these crops in their *chitemene* systems, the need to expand the area cultivated to raise volumes produced will compel *chitemene* cultivators to increasingly move towards more permanent farming practices.
4. The rural economy of 2007 is much more cash based than was the case at the height of Norwegian support to agriculture in Northern Province. Economic reforms of the 1990s are the main cause especially the removal of subsidies on a whole range of social services. This means that everything that people do is now increasingly viewed in monetary terms. For this reason, market participation is on the rise as subsistence farming of *chitemene* systems is no longer adequate to meet household cash needs. This need coupled with the rising market value of traditional crops seen above will work together to bring about a reduction in the reliance on *chitemene*.

Therefore, *chitemene* will increasingly meet less the needs of farmers in Northern Province. Farmers will not completely abandon it but will rely less on it in the next decades. Rather than target its abandonment directly, it seems that it will be more feasible to work on the forces that are working to undermine reliance on *chitemene*. Essentially this requires speeding up the integration of small farmers into markets. Interventions that help farmers to view farming as a business and help to acquire skills to manage them as such will in the end be more effective strategies to fight *chitemene* than the approaches used before 2000 by MAFF and Norad.

3.10 Conclusions and Recommendations

The agriculture case study of the country programme evaluation of Norway with Zambia yields a number of specific messages that should inform the design of future country programmes in Zambia and elsewhere. The key ones are outlined below:

Producing impact on the ground should be the controlling thread that informs the entire programme. The selection of objectives, strategies and implementation arrangements should strictly conform to this. This was not the case for Norway's support

to agriculture to Northern Province. The increasing centralisation of the programme and the little attention paid to assessments to check whether impact was being generated point to this fact. Furthermore, the case study shows that ***needs of the beneficiaries should be understood from their own perspectives and not merely interpreted from experts' view point***. The “problem” of *chitemene* was seen as a technical issue with solutions to be found in research and dissemination of improved technologies. A simple but often ignored lesson is that beneficiaries have the primary knowledge of their own problem situation and unless they see things as a problem, interventions to help them are unlikely to work. This calls for investing in understanding the problem situation before devising interventions.

Recipient responsibility to bear fruit must be accompanied by a richer and deeper dialogue. The requirement under the Paris Declaration adopted by OECD countries that donors should “*base their overall support on partner countries' national development strategies, institutions and procedures*” reflect well Norway’s recipient responsibility principle it inaugurated at the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, Norway aligned her support to Zambian policies including the need to contain *chitemene* and chose to work through national institutions rather than have stand alone projects. However, there is nothing to suggest that Norway critically looked at the country’s policies and institutions and whether these defined the problem correctly and were the right vehicles for delivering the kind of impact anticipated. Norad raised concerns over the approach of the programme, especially the need to take into account markets and allow the private sector to play a role. Trying to uphold the principle of recipient responsibility, this was not brought out forcefully enough. A deeper and collaborative discussion over these issues may have led to some important alterations to the programme and perhaps make it more effective in addressing agriculture development needs.

A continuation with project funding modality is necessitated by the absence of decentralisation and mechanisms to capture priorities of grassroots in national development frameworks The experience of ZAM070 of the tension between aligning support to national frameworks and producing impact on the ground is further heightened by lack of decentralisation in Zambia’s governance and development delivery systems. Therefore, within districts, projects working directly with farmers such as the Agriculture Support Programme are more appreciated than the development premised on the Fifth National Development Plan and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper before it. It was claimed that these national frameworks do not reflect the needs on the ground as prioritised with the participation of the people themselves.

It brings into focus what should be the funding modalities of development cooperation. Increasing general and sector budget support is welcome because it allows Zambia to set the agenda of the development process while simplifying development cooperation with all her cooperating partners. However, as long as mechanisms for recognising grassroots priorities in national development frameworks are not sufficiently mature, there should always be a role for project funding. However this should be rooted in a good understanding of the problem situation on the ground.

There should be sufficient attention paid to the understanding of the political economy of the problem By making the movement of farmers away from *chitemene* as the main objective, the designers of ZAM070 failed to appreciate they were entering a contested area – the cultivators against government and chiefly authority but chiefs and cultivators allied in opposing interventions of the government. It was a complex issue that if it had been understood this way would not have been made central to the programme. As it is, the Programme unwittingly aligned itself against the cultivators whose cooperation it needed to succeed. The case study also shows the importance of a serious analysis of competing interests that might work against the success of the programme. This is something that takes place all the time. Unfortunately in the case of ZAM070 it distorted the programme to benefit civil servants against farmers.

Annexes

- Annex 3.1 References
- Annex 3.2 People Interviewed
- Annex 3.3 List of Focus Group Discussions

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Annex 3.2

People Interviewed

Felix Chizyuka	Secretary, Agribusiness Forum
Collins Nkatiko	Independent consultant (Former Provincial Agriculture Coordinator, Northern Province)
Neiburt Phiri	Budget Analyst, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Dr John Siame	Facilitator, EU Agriculture Project
Dr. Munyinda	Lecturer, Agriculture Sciences, University of Zambia
Dr. Anthony Mwanaumo	Executive Director, Food Reserve Agency
Davies Chitundu	Food Security Advisor, Sida/Norad HIV/AIDS Team
L.J. Mwale	Retired Director of Agriculture Sesele Sokotela Head, Soil Survey Unit/Soil Correlator, Mount Makulu Research Institute
Dr Mwilola Imakando	Director, Livestock Development Trust
Julius Shawa	Director, Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Chomba	Human Resources Officer, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Lewis Bangwe	Assistant Resident Representative, Food and Agriculture Organisation
Dr Bunyoro	Head, Region III, Mount Makulu Research Institute
Ndiyoyi Mukelebai	Independent Consultant (Former Head of Farming Systems Research, Mount Makulu Research Institute)
Mponde Mecha	Agribusiness Facilitator, Agriculture Support Programme, Former District Agriculture Coordinator, Isoka
John Phiri	Senior Economics and Marketing Coordinator, Northern Province
Boniface Mwalongo	District Agriculture Coordinator, Mungwi
Limbani Liembani	Provincial Agriculture Coordinator, Northern Province
Thomas Mwape	Provincial Agriculture Officer, Northern Province
Gabriel Kaunda	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Northern Province
Fackson Nyanga	Advisor, Irish Aid, Northern Province
Dr Sam Phiri	Programme Officer, Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute
Shaderick Bwembya	Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute
Chikambi Msilika	Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute
Helen Kasalu	Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute
Rachel Msilika	Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute
Nelson Siwale	Fisheries Research Officer, Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute
Nalupute Mubiana	Hatchery Manager, Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute Ruth Nawakwi Senior Seed Analyst, Misamfu Agriculture Research Institute
Humphrey Ngoma	District Agriculture Officer, Kasama
Mchael Chishimba	Field Coordinator, Agriculture Support Programme, Kasama/Mungwi/Mbala
George Chileshe	Former Animal Husbandry Officer, Northern Province
Aonyola Anumunda	Fisheries Officer, Mbala
Peter Kangwa	Acting District Agriculture Coordinator, Mbala
Kennedy Sinkamba	Senior Agriculture Officer, Mbala
Rose Silyato	Nutritionist, Mbala
Odnea Chisela	Former District Agriculture Coordinator, Mbala Agriculture in Northern Province
Snr Chief Nsokolo	Mbala
Kayula	District Commissioner, Isoka
Chiwele	District Administrative Officer, Isoka
Wilson Katumbi	District Agriculture Coordinator, Isoka
A.P. Changala	Crop Husbandry Officer

Annex 3.3 List of Focus Group Discussions

Mwamba Village, Kasama
Kalafya Village, Mungwi
Nsenga Hill, Mbala
Nsokolo Village, Mbala
Nkaka Village, Mbala
Nsansamwenze Area, Isoka



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