External Evaluation of ACT Alliance Response
Typhoon Haiyan - PHL 131

Final Report

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Ternstrom Consulting AB

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Acknowledgements

In the course of fulfilling this assignment it has been a pleasure for the evaluation team members to interact with a number of key informants, including beneficiaries, local authorities, staff members of ACT, its member organisations and their partners.

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This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors.

Team Leader and main author: Bjorn Ternstrom, Ternstrom Consulting AB

Team members and contributors: Uma Narayanan, Senior Consultant
                                    Rior Santos, Junior Consultant

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACT	Action by Churches Together
CA	Christian Aid
CBDRR	Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction
CBPS	Community Based Psychosocial Support
CFW	Cash for Work
CoS	Church of Sweden
CRM	Complaints Response Mechanism
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CWS	Church World Service
DCA	Dan Church Aid
DKH	Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe
DM	Disaster Management
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
FCA	Finn Church Aid
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HEKS	Hilfswerck der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz
HfHP	Habitat for Humanity Philippine
ICCO	ICCO Cooperation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
LGU	Local Government Unit
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LWR	Lutheran World Relief
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NCCP	National Council of Churches in the Philippines
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PWD	People with Disabilities
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRK	Shelter Repair Kit
TFM	Task Force Mapalad
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
VSO	Voluntary Services Overseas
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

Executive summary

On 8th November 2013, typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines, affecting 600 municipalities and 44 provinces in nine regions of the country. Approximately 14.1 million people were affected: There were 6,300 casualties, four million people were displaced and about one million houses were destroyed.

Christian Aid (CA), ICCO Cooperation (ICCO), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) made a joint appeal for MUSD 19 to assist the most vulnerable and resource poor people with food and non-food items, WASH, shelter, psycho-social support, education, livelihood restoration/development, cash for work, disaster risk reduction (DRR), capacity building and climate change advocacy. The implementation period was November 2013 to April 2015. Activities were implemented in Cebu, Samar, Leyte, Panay Island and Palawan. This is the evaluation of the activities undertaken with the help of funding from this appeal, named PHL131.

The objectives of the evaluation were to:

a) To assess to what extent the results planned were achieved.

b) Review ACT members' appeal funded response against OECD-DAC criteria (excluding impact).

c) To identify lessons learnt and best practices, including innovations/new systems developed for continuous programme improvement of the ACT Philippines Forum and the ACT Alliance.

d) Determine how resilience to disasters has been increased in programme communities.

PHL131 includes activities within a large number of areas, with five requesting members and a large number of other organisations involved as implementing partners. The evaluation team has not been able to study all activities, nor visit all organisations or locations, hence this report is based on information from a selection of projects and organisations.

The evaluation was carried out by a team of three external evaluators from Ternstrom Consulting AB. The team has visited 21 project sites, sampled by the evaluation team in co-ordination with the requesting members. Data has been collected mainly through review of internal and external documents and interviews with key stakeholders. The majority of interviewees have been beneficiaries.

Results

The team has found that to a large extent, the planned results as outline in the ACT appeal PHL131 were achieved or exceeded.

The *Relevance* of the planned and implemented activities were found to be high and in line with beneficiaries' priorities. Food and non-food items were regarded as of good quality and were distributed in quantities according to humanitarian standards.

Timeliness was good in the initial relief phase, while later activities, especially where activities involved construction such as semi-permanent shelter, experienced significant delays. These were sometimes caused by government procedures or land issues, sometimes by logistics or market shortages and were in other cases due to inflexible internal systems or staff inexperience with large scale responses.

Effectiveness was generally high for activities that were implemented according to plan. WASH activities contributed to better hygiene, NFIs were highly appreciated and disaster risk reduction activities and Shelter support provided a sense of safety for future disasters. However, there were examples of materials being of poor quality, either as a result of insufficient knowledge of project staff regarding quality control, or due to improper storage.

The evaluation team lacks the data to make an overall assessment of *efficiency* in terms of utilisation and deployment of resources. It is clear that it varied due to e.g. lack of technical expertise, difficulties in identifying or accessing appropriate staff, delays due to shortage of materials and insufficient communication between member organisations and implementing partners. The evaluation suspects a possible overinvestment in external coordination resources early in the response and notes a later underinvestment in support structures such as management follow-up, staff training, monitoring, inter-organisational learning and quality control.

The ACT response brought *value added* in terms of in-depth contextual knowledge and heavy investment in community relations. Pre-existing networks added value by allowing a rapid scaling-up of activities, drawing value from relationships with external stakeholders and all levels of government. The members' multi-year experience of development programming in the affected areas increased connectedness and the likelihood of outcome sustainability. Value-added was further enhanced by the ACT members' willingness to focus on peripheral, logistically difficult yet underserved affected people.

Impact is beyond the mandate of this evaluation to assess. Positive *outcomes* beyond immediate output included improved shelter, a building of awareness around risk, capacity and relationship building in various forms and limited examples of increased tendency to claim rights. *Negative outcomes* included limited examples of increased intracommunity tension post-distributions and related political fall-out. The evaluation also discusses whether livelihoods programming may have returned people to persistent poverty instead of supporting steps to get out of it.

The team found multiple examples of *increased resilience to disasters* in programme communities, such as increased awareness of and willingness to use evacuation centres as well as structural improvements in shelter. In interviews with communities it was found that disaster alerts are now taken more seriously, using typhoon Ruby as comparison with Haiyan. There were some examples of projects directly addressing disaster risks. The report notes the need for organisational disaster preparedness and recognises that the ACT Forum have taken the initiative to begin addressing such challenges.

Cross-cutting issues

Quality and Accountability

Overall quality was good and awareness of accountability high albeit with varying interpretations.

All ACT members demonstrated adherence to international humanitarian standards (Sphere Standards, Red Cross Code of Conduct and Humanitarian Accountability Partnership) albeit to a varying degree. Difficulties in cascading skills to partners and field level are noted however.

The evaluation notes lapses in quality, both in terms of materials and management, affecting beneficiary welfare in some shelter projects and some other programming. Awareness of rights of beneficiaries was not evident, neither among staff or the affected population. We only encountered one partner organization that consistently applied a rights based approach.

Complaints response mechanisms were absent in some projects and overly formalistic in others. The evaluations notes well-functioning verbal, trust based, complaints response mechanisms in some cases but a general lack of documentation and aggregation of data make learning and management follow-up difficult or impossible.

The evaluation team encountered some examples of inappropriate transfer of risk and accountability. In some cases ACT members expected their partner organizations to assume the full responsibility for gaps in project interventions, in other cases unrealistic plans and timeframes were accepted.

Cross-organisational learning and sharing on quality and accountability was a missed opportunity. For example, LWR's capacity in accountability and ICCO's understanding of rights-based approaches could have been constructively shared among Forum members.

Gender, protection and psychosocial support

Overall the response dealt with protection issues satisfactorily, addressing the specific needs of vulnerable groups and giving priority to the most vulnerable throughout the response. Three ACT members (NCCP, LWR and ICCO) implemented the psychosocial component, however there was no collaboration or sharing of experience and expertise between these three agencies and although an extensive baseline survey for psychosocial support was carried out, this was not used to update the appeal.

Capacity building and coordination

The report addresses capacity building in terms of own staff, in terms of communities and partner organisations, in terms of state actors and cross organisationally in ACT. Significant investments were made for all these target groups. Multiple examples of capacity built were noted by the evaluation but the programming vision for capacity building remains unclear. Managers and staff members all speak well of capacity building in principle but have difficulty in summarising the practical results. There are no useable indicators of intended results and there is no aggregation of achievements nor documented organisational learning.

A series of actions were undertaken to support coordination, communication and collaboration within the ACT alliance. Respondents emphasised the value of the coordination and consolidation role vis-a-vis funding agencies but questioned the value of the technical input given and the quality, especially the ability to contextualise, of some of the surge staff supplied.

During the initial stages of the response, demands for frequent updates from Geneva and ACT members were overwhelming. Only some of the ACT members chose to coordinate through the joint appeal. The evaluation team notes that there is a perceived tension between the ambitions of the ACT Code of Conduct and the timeliness required by the Humanitarian Imperative.

The ACT Forum was in the process of being formalised when Haiyan struck. In the first few weeks regular coordination meetings evolved allowing members to share information from cluster meetings and organise themselves to avoid geographical duplication. There was a clear ambition to complement others in underserved areas but little ambition to integrate programming or exploit potential organisational synergies in support of for example advocacy or inter-organisational learning.

The members of the joint appeal seem to have interpreted the role of the ACT Coordination Centre as a supportive function focused on information sharing, consolidation of reporting, administration and logistics and there was limited coordination with the aim to exploit potential synergies between ACT member organisations within the joint appeal and other ACT member organisations.

The ACT members displayed an impressive ability to draw on their existing networks despite a lack of organisational emergency preparedness but the rapid scale up resulted in a systemic lack of role and mandate clarity which affected work relationships and overall efficiency at all system levels.

The evaluation team is impressed by the flexibility and adaptation evident in the rapid development of the relationships with field level partners. This was crucial to implementation. Having developed under great time pressure, many of these relationships now need to be reviewed.

The ACT response coordinated well with local government, regularly attended national and local cluster meetings and showed an awareness of and coordination with existing technical support structures.

Conclusions

Overall, the response was relevant and effective, despite timeliness and technical issues. Support given was appropriate, generally of high quality, adapted to the needs of affected populations and undertaken in close cooperation with local partners, be they local government, community associations or implementing local NGOs.

The evaluation team lacks the data to make an overall assessment of efficiency. Nevertheless, the report concludes that the multi-organisational approach, built on agencies with long-term experience and extensive networks, brought significant value added to the response, especially in terms of contextualisation, connectedness and potential sustainability of outcomes.

The international ACT response was rapid, with some question marks around quality. The ACT Forum and its members were not well prepared but showed an impressive ability to learn by doing and rapidly scale-up and adjust programming from development to emergency response.

External coordination was good to excellent throughout the response. Relationships with local partners were rapidly adjusted and significantly expanded. However, support systems for such rapid change were inadequate and ACT member organisations need to closely review what they can demand from partners and to what extent they need to take responsibility for monitoring and follow-up of funded partner activities. ACT members did not do enough to ensure the quality of programming as implemented by their local partners. This was in part due to a lack of management resources within members own organisational structures. It was accentuated by ambition levels that at times were unrealistic.

Although outcomes vary considerably, the evaluation assesses that most interventions were successful and beneficial. Many beneficiaries indicate that they are better off today than they were before the typhoon. We do not have the data to attribute this to ACT members' interventions across the board but there is significant anecdotal evidence that for many people this was the case.

Lessons learned and recommendations

Lessons learned are presented in Annex 4, addressing community interaction, rights-based approach issues, relations with local partner organisations and staff relations.

Recommendations address the ACT Secretariat, the ACT Forum in the Philippines and the ACT member organisations operational in the response in separate sections. As the evaluation subject is the joint appeal, recommendations are focused on systemic issues relevant to all stakeholders in each category. The recommendations address roles and responsibilities, systems, inter-organisational relationships, operational ambition levels and preparedness, learning and staff welfare.

As instructed in the Terms of Reference, the recommendations are presented in an Annex to the report.

1   Background

Typhoon Haiyan, considered the world's strongest typhoon ever, made landfall in Eastern Samar on the 8th November 2013.[1] Haiyan made six subsequent landfalls in the provinces of Central Visayas. Reports estimate that 14.1 million people were affected, including 6,300 casualties and hundreds missing, four million displaced and about one million houses destroyed or damaged across 600 municipalities and 44 provinces in nine regions of the country.

With the support of the ACT[2] Secretariat, five ACT Alliance members launched a preliminary appeal for their Relief and Rehabilitation response within five days. This was followed by a full appeal on 16 December 2013. Some ACT members registered their projects with the government and the UN independently while other ACT members responded through direct partnership. A revised ACT appeal was issued on 18 August 2014.

An ACT Coordination Centre was established in Manila, functioning under the supervision of the ACT Philippines Forum. The purpose of the Centre was to coordinate the responses of ACT members within and outside the appeal, and to interface with the external stakeholders, particularly the government and UN agencies.

An ACT Rapid Support Team (RST) was also deployed during the first weeks to assist the Forum in areas of coordination, communications, community-based psychosocial support, quality, accountability and finance.

Christian Aid (CA), ICCO Cooperation (ICCO), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) made a joint appeal for USD 19 Million. The activities undertaken with the help of funding from this appeal, named PHL131, are the focus of this evaluation. The appeal goal was to assist the most vulnerable with food and non-food items, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), shelter, psycho-social support, education, livelihood restoration and development, cash for work, disaster risk reduction (DRR), capacity building and climate change advocacy. Activities were implemented in Typhoon Haiyan affected areas in Central Philippines particularly in Cebu, Samar, Leyte, Panay Island and Palawan. The formal implementation period was November 2013 through April 2015.

Responding ACT members, both within and outside the PHL131 appeal, responded independently. Programming coordination primarily involved geographical separation of target areas and included a conscious effort to reach underserved areas beyond media attention.

ACT members responding outside of the PHL131 appeal included: Christian Aid (inside and outside), Church World Service (CWS), Dan Church Aid (DCA), Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH), Finn Church Aid (FCA), Hilfswerck der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKS), United Methodist Committee On Relief (UMCOR). Please see Annex 7 for a map of organisations and interventions within PHL 131.

Broadly, the intervention chronology was as follows:

Pre-Haiyan: NCA was not operational in the Philippines. ICCO had a long history of operations together with local partners but not engaged in humanitarian/disaster response over its 40-odd years of presence in the country. CA and LWR were present and active in a mix of programmes. NCCP is a Filipino organisation with a membership of 10 local churches. The latter three organisations had varying but growing experience of disaster response, mainly related to typhoons, floods/landslides and volcano eruptions. Most of the programming was development oriented with a focus on poverty alleviation, rights issues and organisational or community capacity building.

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[1] The background summary is based on the Terms of Reference.
[2] Action by Churches Together.

There was a growing organisational will to join forces and seek areas of cooperation and coordination with others aiming for similar goals. In response to this the ACT Forum was formally constituted in mid-2013. The first Forum meeting to plan strategy and set ambition levels was set to take place in late November 2014.

Immediate response: In the weeks following Haiyan the response was focused on basic needs and scaling up capacities, including establishing coordination mechanisms. An ACT Rapid Support Team, including the regional coordinator and technical specialists, was mobilised. An ACT Coordination Centre, hosted by the NCCP, was established. Individual members also supplied support staff and conducted assessment missions. Throughout November and December operational ACT members met repeatedly, physically or via Skype, in order to coordinate, share data and avoid duplication of efforts.

Interventions were divided among members based on capacities and geographical areas. Areas with little or no service from other organisations were explicitly prioritised. This addressed real needs but led to significant logistical challenges as many underserved areas were quite remote. It also led to a highly disbursed geographical pattern of interventions, limiting the potential for cross organisational synergies in the field.

The focus of interventions in this phase was on immediate needs such as food, water and temporary shelter.

Early rehabilitation/reconstruction: In the first months of 2014, the members were busy scaling up and refocusing towards medium term needs. This involved expanding staff, renegotiating old partnerships and establishing new ones with local implementing organisations. During this phase interventions included cash distributions, cash for work, WASH and livelihoods programming focused on minor capital goods replacement (such as agricultural tools, seeds or seedlings, draught animals, boats, nets etc.) as well as quite widespread distribution of construction materials to households with partially damaged houses. This was also the phase when much surveying and community organisation work was done.

Late recovery: Since mid-2014, programming has focussed on core housing and livelihoods programming, often complemented with capacity building of local partner organisations and community members or their associations, for example disaster risk reduction awareness, psycho-social activities, hygiene awareness training or livelihoods focused activities such as oyster farming, organic agriculture, business skills or legal support, often related to replacing lost documents and/or land issues.

2 Approach and methodology

The Terms of Reference define the evaluation objectives as follows:

    a) To assess to what extent the planned results were achieved as outline in the ACT appeal PHL131.

    b) Review ACT members' response (work funded by the ACT PHL131 Appeal) to typhoon Haiyan against OECD-DAC criteria (excluding impact as it is too soon to assess this but focusing on outcomes and outputs).

    c) To identify lessons learnt and best practices, including innovations and new systems developed which may benefit communities in their recovery and further build local capacity as well as generate knowledge for continuous programme improvement of the ACT Philippines Forum and the ACT Alliance as a whole.

    d) Determine how resilience to disasters has been increased in programme communities.

The terms of reference specify a number of evaluation questions, please see Annex 1 for more details.

A mixed methods approach has been used, including document review, key informant interviews, site visits to 21 project areas, and feedback sessions with the staff of each member organisation and a concluding data sharing and joint analysis session.

The selection of project areas to visit was made by the evaluation team in co-ordination with the requesting members. Sampling was not random, but based on a combination of logistic feasibility and representation of different stakeholders to include a broad range of implementing organisations and types of projects. For practical reasons, the ACT members handled field visit logistics, including selection of project sites to be visited, coordinated by the ACT coordination centre. This implies that the sample of sites, programmes and organisations visited cannot be treated as representative of the whole intervention, and that there has been room for ACT members to bias the sample. However, the evaluation team has not seen any signs that sites were visited with the purpose of giving the team a skewed picture of the intervention.

Interviewees included beneficiaries, ACT coordination staff, ACT members' staff, local partner organisations' staff, CSO[3] representatives, Barangay officials and staff, Municipal Mayors and technical staff and UN representatives. In total over 600 people have been interviewed individually or in groups. Group interviews were sometimes gender specific, sometimes split by programme sector. For a list of interviewees, please refer to Annex 2. Key informant interviews were semi structured, supported by checklists of relevant evaluation questions that were derived from the Terms of Reference and adapted following document reviews and initial scoping interviews. Interview logistics, including selection of people to be interviewed, were provided by the operational ACT member or their local partner based on broad selection criteria provided by the team.

Documents provided to the evaluation team and evaluation tools (e.g. document list with comments, standard interview protocols, evaluation question formats and documentation matrix, emerging hypotheses and documentation of internal discussions) have been shared in daily debriefs within the team. For a full list of documents reviewed, please refer to Annex 3.

2.1 Limitations

Initial plans to conduct an internet survey were not implemented due to the extensive nature of interviewing and the expectation of relatively low response rate. In consequence, while the perspectives of field staff and volunteers are well represented, ACT member HQ staff and their global management perspectives are only captured through their representatives in the field.

We note that our pool of interviewees has been skewed in favour of beneficiaries. The reader should be aware that this report captures the views of non-assisted people mainly through formal representatives within community associations and/or local government.

The host organisations provided the team with translators, one male and one female per project area. These were externally recruited and not previously connected with the projects. While many were highly qualified, some were clearly new to the role of interpreter and some data is likely to have been lost in translation.

Other limitations include time and logistical restrictions. Some site visits were cancelled due to coast guard restrictions on sea travel (typhoon passing). The team visited a total of 21 project areas over the course of three weeks implying very limited time for interviews and on-site visits in each. Meanwhile, it should also be noted that current project activities had target populations in the hundreds not the tens of thousands.

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[3] Civil Society Organisation.

At the time of the evaluation NCA was no longer operational in-country. Therefore no active projects sites were visited and only a single member of their former local staff was possible to interview.

2.2 Evaluation team and distribution of work

The evaluation team consisted of a Team Leader specialised in humanitarian evaluations and organisational development, Mr Björn Ternström (main author of the report), a Senior Consultant specialised in human resource management and international standards in relief and development, Ms Uma Narayanan, and a Junior Consultant with several years' operational experience of relief and Philippine NGOs[4], Mr Rior Santos. The team travelled together for most part of the field work, with areas of responsibility matching the team members' areas of specialisation. Please see the list of interviewees for information on which team member carried out which interviews.

The team was accompanied by Ms Sylwyn Sheen Alba, administrative assistant of the ACT Coordination Centre, who provided logistic support and took the photos.

3 Findings

In this chapter we summarise the findings that have emerged from the data collected, starting with a comparison of planned and achieved overall results, moving on to sector-specific findings, findings related to cross-cutting issues and a section on coordination, communication and collaboration. Our conclusions, based on these findings, are presented in the following chapter. Recommendations and lessons learned are presented in Annex 5.

3.1 Overall results

The evaluation team notes that targets were achieved in difficult circumstances. We recognise that we lack triangulation of the data as the presentation of results is based on the reporting of the ACT Alliance itself. The table below shows the summary of targets and reported results of ACT Appeal PHL-131. The targeting varies from household to individuals depending on the identified sector responses. Overall, identified targets were reached, or exceeded, while some sector responses such as the livelihood and shelter components are still on-going.

As illustrated by the number of rows in the table, the different organisations have grouped and ordered their logframes and reports differently. The lack of proper reporting format that ensures uniformity in terms of the appeal logical framework and actual reporting mechanisms created some challenges in interpreting the data that was provided. Please note that not all targets and results are included, and that some of the numbers in the table are aggregates.

Organisation/Sector Response	Target	Reported	Achieved (%)
Christian Aid			
Food and Non-food Items	1500 HH	2554	170
Livelihoods	7700 HH	4073	53
Shelter and Water System	1200 Ind	12120	1010
DRR	Collective Target	2000	100
Advocacy	Collective Target	716	100
ICCO			
Food	4250 HH	53300 Ind	228
Shelter	5956 HH	2493	42

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[4] Non-Governmental Organisations.

WASH	435 HH		*0*
NFI kits	3530 HH	4699	*133*
Food Security and Agriculture	20000 HH	4762	*22*
Early recovery /Livelihoods	10536 HH	8172	*78*
DRR, climate change, capacity building	1515 Ind 36 Collective	1406 36	*93* *100*
LWR			
Shelter	5000 HH	5347	*107*
Core Housing	347 HH	358	*103*
Cash for Work	6800 HH	4790	*70*
NFI and Material Resources	10000 HH	16420	*164*
Quality and Accountability	500 sets	626	*125*
NCA			
WASH	50000	81172	*162*
NCCP			
Food Security	20000 HH	27001	*135*
Non-Food Items	5000 HH	8345	*167*
Shelter- Transitional	700 HH	74	*11*
Shelter - Progressive	1500 HH	588	*39*
Shelter Repair Kits	500 HH	1815	*363*

Figure 1: Table comparing targeted and reported results. HH indicates number of households, Ind number of individuals. Targets are based on: Appeal Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Response - PHL131 Revision 2 (Document name: PHL131 Revision2 corrected and reissued 03092014). ICCO results based on: Narrative Reporting: PHL 131 Haiyan - ICCO & Kerk in Actie Reporting (Document name: PHL131 ICCO FinalNarrative Rec30June2015), other results mainly from: End Report Figures April 30 2015. Note that in NCCP's targets and reporting, "Shelter – Transitional" and "Shelter – Progressive" should be understood together.

3.2 Sector specific findings

3.2.1 Initial relief phase

Relief provided by the members varied in content. Focus was on food, water, non-food items (NFIs) and temporary shelter. Materials distributed were appropriate and consistent feedback indicates that quality was better than that delivered by other agencies.

The programming of distributions was according to international standards and area targeting was coordinated among members and geographically ambitious, focusing on underserved areas, commonly in places beyond the general media interest. In consequence, the operations faced logistical challenges related to the marginality of operational areas.

During the initial relief phase there were few selection issues as most distributions were general distributions covering the entire population of a particular targeted area.

Given the context the relief phase deliveries were done in a timely manner in the projects visited.

3.2.2 Non-food items

The non-food items that were distributed included solar lamps, quilts, school kits and household needs. In some cases shelter and livelihood interventions overlap and can be considered non-food items due to the nature and approach used in the support. For example, the conditional cash vouchers provided by LWR were divided in two parts: 1.) 3,000 pesos for livelihood assets, and 2.) 2,000 pesos for household items. The recipient family can exchange the vouchers in two pre-

arranged shops, one that supplies exclusively with fishing livelihood assets and the other one supplies household items.

Non-food item distributions were made both in the initial relief phase and later. Over time distributions became more targeted towards those most heavily affected and/or those most vulnerable. With increasing sophistication in targeting, selection issues became more and more important to programming quality.

The NFI assistance provided to affected communities was deeply appreciated by the beneficiaries. They clearly expressed that it helped them to recover since most of their items were destroyed during the typhoon. NFI distributions at times overlap with livelihood interventions. For further detail please refer to the livelihoods section below.

The geographic targeting considered levels of support given by other organisations and focused on underserved areas. In general, distributions were based on assessments which were properly conducted. However, common standards for assessment processes were not applied; some interventions were entirely based on local government data without validation; in contrast, some were done with minimal contact with local government. When queried about such choices it was found that the assessment methodology was clearly governed by an intervention strategy.

In some areas there was confusion and gaps in the community orientation and transparency of the selection process. There were beneficiaries who expressed that they were not consulted and informed on the final decision although representatives from the assessment team had

Figure 2: Solar lamps were among the non food items distributed. Beneficiaries cited savings of five pesos per day compared to traditional keresene lighting. Hilantagaan Island, Project by LWR partner RAFI.

visited, interviewed them and even taken photos of their situation and conditions. This resulted in some level of confusion and dissatisfaction from those who did not receive the assistance. The criteria for selection were, in most of the cases, decided without community consultation but were generally understood and accepted. Communities which were consulted and given a say in developing selection criteria were understanding or uninterested in who got support. Meanwhile, communities with little project investment in communication to ensure that the criteria were understood commonly cited tensions, jealousy and even conflict between recipients and non-recipients.

Field visits and interviews conducted suggest that NFIs distributed were perceived as of good quality and addressing real needs. However, in many cases, by the time they were provided the urgent needs had passed although goods distributed remained useful. The delays can, in part, be attributed on shortages of supply and logistical challenges. In some cases the need was not directly related to the Haiyan emergency. Recipients of solar lamps for example stated that there was power shortage and lack of electricity long before Haiyan.

3.2.3 Shelter

The shelter components that were implemented included provision of shelter repair kits for partially destroyed houses using different modalities. In terms of provision of shelter repair kits there was no uniform approach among ACT Alliance members. Some projects provided standard kits while NCCP for instance provided materials for repairs based on individual household needs. Some organizations used cash vouchers which beneficiaries could exchange for materials at accredited and recognized suppliers, while another organization provided shelter repair kits based on beneficiaries' responses to a written survey regarding their preferences among a set supply of materials.

The diversified (based on household specific surveys of damage and vulnerability) approach in the provision of shelter repair kits created mixed reactions from the beneficiaries we interviewed. Some felt that materials distributed were not enough while others felt this was not a problem and they recognized that the implementing organisation could not provide everything they needed. In general, the approach was labour intensive but also well accepted and appreciated by the beneficiaries since it was tailored to actual needs.

LWR and NCCP also supplied core housing to households whose houses were completely destroyed. A "core house" is a housing unit fulfilling minimum standards, without interior walls and designed to be semi-permanent (10-15 years). The NCCP did direct implementation of the core housing component with construction through community participation and utilizing local workers. These were supported by trained masons and carpenters that NCCP contracted. Meanwhile LWR implemented their programme through a local partner with which they had an established long term relationship; Habitat for Humanity Philippines.

In some cases there was a lack of proper storage facilities for shelter materials which contributed to a rapid degradation of material quality. Some of the construction materials were exposed to extreme and changing weather conditions while there were cases where material was directly distributed to the beneficiaries and the beneficiaries lacked a protected place to stock it. In these cases, the quality of the end result was compromised (degraded cement, twisted lumber, insect infestations).

There were delays in the implementation of shelter assistance both for the provision of shelter repair kits and the construction of core housing. Apart from some of the shelter repair kits, none of the shelter support was timely. Reasons cited included staffing issues, logistics challenges and procurement problems. There were competing demands of supplies from other INGOs[5] and agencies operating in the area. Delays were also noted due to the absence of final guidelines from the government on site selection (including the issue of the so called exclusion zone), territorial disputes as well as land titles issuance and lease agreements. Land issues were particularly tricky for core housing projects. In many cases this was linked to an ambition to relocate affected people, either for DRR (disaster risk reduction) reasons or due to latent land issues.

Projects that chose an on-site strategy, constructing the new core housing on the sites where people had previously been living, appear to have solved land issues more rapidly, commonly due to established relationships with the concerned landowner (family and/or other ties).

The evaluation team lacks sufficient data to assess whether ACT timeliness was worse than other agencies'. Anecdotally, we note that a number of other agencies had encountered similar problems and that uncompleted construction work for core housing was evident in a number of locations along the route travelled by the team (as were completed core houses).

The criteria for selection for core housing support included access to land. The most vulnerable were thereby excluded from this form of support except in the cases where land could be provided from another source (i.e. government allocation in almost all cases).

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[5] International NGOs.

House design and community involvement in design varied significantly between project areas. Training and orientation for the beneficiaries on proper construction methods was provided but at times found to be insufficient. This can be attributed to insufficient follow-up and monitoring of the construction process, both when done by contractors and when done by the affected people themselves. The evaluation team found several houses not following the Sphere Standards[6] and affected people did not always apply techniques taught in the training given. Some houses that the evaluation team visited lacked proper finishing and there were also cases where latrines were not available (please refer to comments in the WASH section below).

The quality of handover processes also varied significantly. Habitat for Humanity Philippines, working in partnership with LWR, is an example of good practice in this area. Their process for handover included external quality control, recipient involvement in pre-handover inspection, proper documentation of ownership or right to access to land and checks and balances to avoid commercial speculation in core houses (agreements not to sell for a specified number of years).

Monitoring of the shelter activities seems to have focused on delivery of the construction materials, completion of the construction and whether the shelter repair kits that were provided were used.

Figure 3: Onsite construction addressed some of the land access issues with these core houses built by LWR partner Habitat for Humanity. District 9, Burauen Barangay, Ormoc, Samay.

Little analysis appears to have been done in terms of assessing and evaluating the appropriateness of the materials used or provided as well as whether it is safe for habitation.[7] Nevertheless, recipients of both shelter materials and core housing attested to new constructions being more sturdy and, in all likelihood, more typhoon resistant than pre-Haiyan housing.

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[6] In comments to the draft LWR gives reasonable explanations to some of the deviations from standard.
[7] In comments to the draft LWR notes that in projects implemented by Habitat for Humanity, designs were pre-approved by the government.

Please also note comments on shelter programming in the section on Quality and Accountability and discussion regarding interaction between information, selection and community empowerment in the section on Lessons Learned in Annex 5.

3.2.4 WASH

The evaluation team's main field visits on WASH interventions were with programmes implemented by NCA, NCCP and CA in Iloilo, Samar islands and Palawan. WASH interventions included both soft (hygiene promotion, hygiene kit) and hard components (latrine construction, water systems). Both drinking water and some water purification materials were distributed during the first phase. Some core housing supplied included water catchment systems (household supply from roof). Respondents appreciated the easy and safe access to water and indicated improved quality of life. Female beneficiaries, especially those with young children, stated greater convenience in cooking and cleaning.

The quality and selection of hygiene kit items were relevant, useful and timely. In one project the improvement in water accessibility combined with the provision of communal latrines was cited as having almost eliminated open defecation and significantly improved daily handwashing frequency. Hygiene promotion in and of itself was not cited as having changed behaviour. It is in our understanding that systematic hygiene promotion did not take place, however the absence of epidemics indicates that this was not a serious problem.

Consistent feedback from the communities maintained that the water related health situation was no more serious than the average year. No outbreak of epidemics and no significant rise in diarrhoea cases as compared to before Haiyan was reported.

Figure 4: Core Housing with water harvesting system, Molocaboc Island, Sagay Negros Occidental, implemented By ICCO partner Task Force Mapalad (TFM).

Constructions of comfort rooms[8] were seriously delayed in the areas visited, in some cases these are yet to be constructed. Some of the respondents, including senior citizens, had to use their neighbour's comfort room or go to the bushes to relieve themselves. Although this practice existed prior to Haiyan, timely interventions on construction of toilets would have improved the conditions. Communal comfort rooms constructed, while appreciated, led to minor issues wherein the rules of using the comfort rooms (immediate cleaning after use) were not always adhered by the communities. This is also indicative of a lack of sensitisation on proper use of communal toilets by the respective partner organization.

The delayed construction of comfort rooms were in part due to delays in the government's decisions on relocation sites, but also due to inadequate understanding of local conditions specifically regarding high water table sites located near sea level. As the latter is well known and highlighted in Sphere Standards, it should not have been a problem. There was a lack of planning and coordination between ACT members that were implementing WASH components. A lack of technical expertise within ACT members implementing WASH component was also one of the causes of the delay. This was the case especially regarding the hard component while sensitisation and hygiene dissemination skills were more available.

Field visits and inspections suggest that hand pumps were installed properly and were of good quality. However there was anecdotal evidence that placement may have been influenced by stakeholders' involvement in the implementation.

3.2.5 Livelihoods and food security
Livelihoods and food security are considered in the same heading in this report. Apart from initial general food distributions all other food security interventions consisted of livelihoods interventions such as support for re-establishing or diversifying agriculture and fisheries.

Cash programming
The cash programming implemented was not coherent across ACT members. The evaluation team saw examples of direct cash transfers, cash for work and conditional cash transfers linked to specific purchases. In this, as in other programming implemented, there were selection issues. These are further discussed below.

Several organisations had sought to address protection issues related to the management of cash resources in creative and flexible ways. We saw examples of sub-contracting to cooperatives, plastic cash cards and voucher systems.

Cash for work
Cash for work programming followed cluster recommendations in terms of amounts paid, number of days offered, coordination with local authorities in identification of works to be done etc. The evaluation team encountered examples of creative work design in order to address the needs of single parents, persons with disabilities and the aged (examples included childcare being arranged by elderly and timekeeping assigned to a female worker). Tasks carried out were generally related to the clearing of debris and core public works such as the rehabilitation of canals and roads. Protection issues were considered with those participating receiving tetanus vaccinations and materials such as boots, protective gloves etc.

Programming of this nature required prior survey work in coordination with local government. In consequence, the bulk of such programming was undertaken two to four months after the typhoon. Asked about their opinions as to the timeliness of these interventions most beneficiaries responded that this form of support came at the right time. Had they been implemented earlier people would

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[8] Toilets, by their Filipino name.

have been too busy arranging their immediate emergency needs to be able to engage in income strengthening efforts such as cash for work. From a beneficiary perspective these interventions therefore came at the right time. From a public-works perspective there were instances where much of suitable tasks to be undertaken had already been sorted by local government or other agencies (debris already cleared etc.).

Other livelihood interventions

Livelihood interventions varied widely between ACT members and their implementing partners. This reflects the broad spectrum of experience represented by the various local partners. Most such organisations were found to be either development or rights based oriented. In general their programming reflected their past experience.

The NCCP implemented its programming through its network of local churches. These commonly have limited experience of livelihood programming but had invested heavily in developing good community relationships. Livelihood programming was developed interactively with the communities and available expertise such as local government technical experts. Support given focused on replacing lost capital goods, such as boats, agricultural tools and improved seeds. Projects also focused on strengthening community associations, commonly by supporting the development of their organisational structure and linking to the relevant technical departments available through government structures. This was in line with community preferences and existing institutional structures.

In the project supported by LWR and CA that the evaluation team visited, a similar strategy was implemented but, as they were working through local partners, community interaction was less apparent.[9] It is the impression of the evaluation team that these organisations emphasised livelihoods programming less and that follow up with implementing organisations was insufficient to ensure the kind of capacity building and connectedness with local institutional frameworks achieved by NCCP. Both organisations tried innovative solutions for the distribution of materials including various voucher-based systems.[10]

The implementing partner portfolio of ICCO included a broad range of development oriented NGOs. The evaluation team visited several apparently successful livelihoods interventions with innovative approaches. These included organic farming, work on value chains, oyster farming and investment in rights-based approaches related to land and documentation issues.

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[9] In comments to the draft CA gives examples of community interaction in their projects. The quality of such interaction *in the projects visited* was low however.

[10] In comments to the draft LWR notes that NFI distribution (asset recovery, distribution of nets and the like) falls within the relief stage. LWR livelihood recovery, on the other hand, is intended to strengthen the primary livelihood and diversification of livelihood.

Figure 5: Livelihoods support was mostly capital goods distribution to re-establish past livelihoods. There were examples of diversification and greater market orientation however, such as this support for oyster farming, Carigara Leyte. Implemented by ICCO partner CARET.

A number of interventions encountered significant issues related to selection of recipients. Some organisations invested heavily in community participation in identifying capacities and vulnerabilities, some depended heavily on local government data available. There were large variations in community perceptions regarding how well selection was targeted. Issues raised included lack of information regarding selection criteria, lack of openness around who got what and perceived overdependence on inaccurate or politically flavoured local government data. In many cases support was dependent on membership in community associations such as farmers' groups or fishermen or women's groups. Some of the affected people did not want to be members of these associations and were therefore disqualified from support. In other cases people's livelihoods were mixed, drawing on agriculture, fishery or work as daily labourers. As support received through one association excluded beneficiaries from support through another organisation, those whose livelihood depended on mixed income sources were not able to re-establish their livelihood presence in multiple sectors. There was also anecdotal evidence of associations where channelled support reached a select group based on unclear criteria (in one case eight out of a total 10 people supported were members of the board).

Many interventions included an ambition to strengthen the capacity of the recipient community or organisation. However, capacity building was ill-defined and therefore both difficult to implement and monitor. This does not imply that capacity was not built. There is significant anecdotal evidence that beneficiaries, community organisations and local government have learned new techniques, improved coordination and today better understand how to access appropriate support for livelihood needs. Nevertheless, both staff and communities found it difficult to identify concrete examples of capacity having been built.

In a series of cases, people interviewed have referred to an enhanced sense of community or unity and exemplify this with more tightknit communities where households have a greater tendency to assist each other in times of need. In a number of cases a greater awareness of the needs of people

with disabilities, single parents and the elderly was described as a consequence of joint implementation of project activities.

Relief and recovery efforts are commonly governed by an ambition to Build Back Better. In the opinion of the evaluation team, some of the livelihood assistance can be described as too focused on replacing tools and materials to re-establish the livelihood situation prior to the typhoon. Given that that situation included the conditions that had left people vulnerable and in poverty it can be argued that the interventions risk having Built Back Poverty instead of addressing the core issues leading to such vulnerability and poverty.[11]

3.2.6 Disaster risk reduction

Overall DRR awareness raising took place on all project areas. Beneficiaries can site location of evacuation centres (when existing) and significant change of behaviour was evident in terms of various measures in preparation for up-coming disasters. Trainings for community members on practical ways of strengthening structural integrity of homes were provided and practiced. In a number of project areas interviewees made comparisons between the levels of preparedness before the typhoons Haiyan and Ruby (Dec 2014). Examples given showcase significant improvements both at Barangay, Municipality and Community level. Some of these improvements can be directly attributed to project awareness raising while some are more likely the results of the aggregate of multiple agencies and government efforts and interventions.

In a number of cases duplications of DRR trainings provided by various INGOs and government agencies were identified. Despite this, community members still saw the value of undergoing such trainings to further deepen and enhance their capacity in responding to disasters. The team notes that some components and topics of DRR trainings provided by different agencies complemented each other. In our opinion this synergy could have been significantly improved if proper coordination with other training providers had been initiated prior to training implementation. Even within ACT Alliance Philippines, it is evident that there was no consultation or effort in creating a common or harmonised standard curriculum on DRR. The DRR training methodologies and approaches were dependent on each ACT members' objectives, goals and agenda.

To date, DRR efforts have been limited to awareness raising, except for structural shelter design and some risk reduction interventions such as mangrove planting, planting of native trees in upland areas and agroforestry approaches. The building of evacuation centres in distant areas and the stock-piling of relief goods and first aid materials has in many cases not yet been implemented. We note that some of these needs are government rather than agency responsibilities. For NCCP and CA hazard mapping is systematic in the DRR trainings provided to various partner communities.

At the organisational level there have been numerous efforts to orient existing and new staff on international standards to be applied in relief interventions. This has undoubtedly increased the organisations' preparedness for future interventions. As in any organisational change process a number of issues remain, particularly in terms of cascading skills to field level and in terms of understanding of the practical implications in day-to-day programme activities. Please also refer to sections on Quality and Accountability as well as Lessons Learned.

We note that, at the time of the evaluation, the ACT members' awareness of the need for better organisational preparedness was being discussed in the ACT Forum. A few days after the conclusion of the data collection field work the Forum held a meeting where one of the themes was the development of an emergency preparedness and response plan for the future.

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[11] Comments to the draft indicate understanding of the complexities involved, some recognition of this risk and organisational plans to address some of these issues in later phases.

3.3 Cross-cutting issues

3.3.1 Quality and accountability

Humanitarian standards

All ACT members demonstrated adherence to international humanitarian standards specifically Sphere Standards, Red Cross Code of Conduct and Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) albeit to a varying degree. PHL131 provided opportunities for ACT members to introduce and meet these standards. The evaluation team noted several challenges in meeting the standards:

Materials and skills

In the shelter component insufficient quantities and inferior quality of materials was seen. According to interviews held with some of the shelter beneficiaries, the quality of the shelter material did not always meet the standards due to reasons such as exposure to weather or a lack of monitoring and inspection of material resulting in coco-lumber that was hollow or termite infested, and rusty steel structure components. Recipients of shelter repair kits (distributed to households with partially damaged houses) also cited the lack of material where there was no household specific targeted distribution.

In some cases inadequate availability of technical expertise also compromised the quality of the shelter interventions (for example, only a few engineers and masons were available during the project implementation period). The respondents at some sites emphasized the need for a qualified engineer to ensure high quality of core housing.

Overall, implementing partners had inadequate knowledge, understanding and skills regarding standards. Attempts were seen from the ACT members to sensitize or build capacity of partner organizations with Sphere Standards, Code of Conduct, and HAP to build capacity; however in some cases there was insufficient time to absorb standards. Gaps ranged from lack of understanding regarding equal access, to documentation needs in complaints mechanisms, to practical understanding of quality of interventions.

Rights awareness

Awareness of rights of beneficiaries was not evident, neither among staff or the affected population. The right to assistance was not fully understood by communities, who were at times demonstrating excessive gratefulness and thankfulness rather than recognising that it is their right to receive assistance.[12] We only encountered one partner organization that consistently applied a rights based approach. The interventions we observed showcased the four levels of ambition summarised below:

- Assistance was given without participation
- Assistance was given with participation by the community in implementation
- Assistance was given with a component of capacity building
- Assistance was given with, or developing, awareness about their rights, empowering the community to confront duty bearers with rights based demands in the future.

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[12] This statement generated several comments to the draft report. For a more nuanced treatment of the issue, the interested reader is referred to Ong, J. C., Flores, J. M. and Combinido, P. *"Obliged to be Grateful: How local communities experienced humanitarian actors in the Haiyan response"*, May 2015. http://www.alnap.org/resource/20633

Complaints Response Mechanisms

The effectiveness of Complaints Response Mechanisms (CRM) varies among the ACT members. Some members have fully understood and implemented the CRM process in a comprehensive manner, including for example banners and orientation of communities and partner organizations on CRM. In some cases, partner organizations have not been oriented on CRM therefore the implementation is limited and inadequate.

The cultural context of Filipinos being reluctant to complain is given as the main reason for the ineffectiveness of formal CRM. Communities perceive that the assistance is "charity and a favour from agencies", therefore it is inappropriate to raise concerns through a formal mechanism and people remain reluctant and hesitant to do so. In cases where CRM is placed in the barangay office, there is reluctance to complain. At least two ACT members have invested a lot in implementing CRM, however the return does not seem to be in proportion to the investment. The number of formal complaints is very limited.[13]

Organisational accountability

The evaluation team notes an implied and inappropriate transfer of risk and accountability when an ACT member expects the partner organization to assume the full responsibility if there are gaps in the project interventions. Partner organizations are put under tremendous

Figure 6: Example of Complaints Response Mechanism information used by NCCP, Barangay San Roque, Estancia.

strain and pressure to complete projects within the agreed timeframe even when not realistic. The team observed several cases where ACT members accepted programming proposals from implementing partners that were clearly unrealistic despite which the funding partner then proceeded to pressure the implementing partner to live up to its commitments.

Code of conduct application and understanding, while evident amongst staff interviewed, was not evident amongst communities. Communities were unaware of the type of behaviour that is expected of aid workers. Nevertheless all interviews suggest that ACT members and partner organizations' staff are highly appreciated and respectful when working with the communities.

Cross-organisational learning and sharing on quality and accountability was a missed opportunity. For example, LWR's capacity being the lead in accountability used by all ACT members. Similarly, ICCO understanding of rights-based approaches could have been constructively shared among Forum members.

PHL131 provided an opportunity for members to improve systems for quality assurance. ACT members implemented measures to improve quality assurance through various approaches including

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[13] In comments to the draft LWR notes that they received numerous both verbal and written complaints.

hiring experts (technical experts or consultants) to ensure that quality was adhered to. Examples include contracting a shelter expert, typhoon resistant principles training and Sphere trainings.

An increased level of knowledge and skills in humanitarian standards was noted in both staff and communities. In communities for example, the trainings on principles of DRR for shelter repair has resulted in better technique for a typhoon resistant shelter and equipped the carpenters with techniques to build/repair shelter of better quality.

3.3.2 Gender, protection and psychosocial support

Overall the response dealt with protection issues satisfactorily, addressing the specific needs of vulnerable groups. Priority was given to the most vulnerable including senior citizens, pregnant women, children and people with disabilities (PWDs) throughout the response, early recovery and rehabilitation stages. This was well noted and appreciated by the communities interviewed. For example, gender differentiation was evident in livelihood programming. Some Barangay council members interviewed stated that this kind of prioritization for the vulnerable groups was new and was something they would pay attention to in the future.

Three ACT members (NCCP, LWR and ICCO) implemented the psychosocial component, however there was no collaboration or sharing of experience and expertise between these three agencies. An extensive baseline survey for psychosocial support was carried out by Church of Sweden for NCCP, however the result of the survey did not inform the appeal process and there is no evidence of revising the appeal to incorporate its findings. NCCP and ICCO took different approaches to psychosocial support. NCCP for example focused on community based psychosocial support whereas ICCO provided psychosocial first aid support, specifically counselling to a targeted group such as the PWDs.

Figure 7: Persons living with disabilities were supported in claiming their rights, altering their relationship with local government. Barangay Daan Bantayan, Cebu. Project implemented by VSO-Bahaginan, a partner of ICCO.

Knowledge and skills on psychological first aid components was effectively utilized especially in assistance to persons with disabilities through a local partner, VSO-Bahaginan[14], and ICCO at various levels (community, local government unit, barangay etc.). There was also some evidence of policy changes specifically for PWD through the creation of a PWD federation and their representatives' integration in the local government disaster management committee. Segregation of data for PWD is now being done in Daan Bantayan, Cebu.

3.3.3 Capacity building

Capacity building among staff

The composition of staff across ACT Alliance members in terms of technical capacity on humanitarian response varies. For example with NCA and Church of Sweden (CoS) there was a clear intent to build staff and organizational capacity in their respective technical fields i.e. WASH and community based psycho-social support (CBPS). Although the evaluation team found that there is an increase in capacity in these areas, there is inadequate baseline or data to gauge the increase in capacity in a systematic way.

In another example, most of staff such as in NCCP come from private practices, churches and industries while others are from development sectors. The design of capacity building activities has been dominated by an approach emphasizing mentoring and accompaniment on the job combined with formal training activities. This approach showed significant improvements of staff skills and proved to be effective in staff response to needs. It is also consistent with our interviews with various NCCP staff where they expressed deep appreciation of the mentoring and coaching support provided to them which enables them to perform their tasks in accordance with the program needs.

Capacity building for community and implementing partners

There were clear gaps in terms of providing necessary capacity building support for ACT's partners and communities. Some ACT Alliance members provided trainings on HAP and Sphere Standards but there was minimal support in translating those standards to the local context. There were cases where implementing partners could not identify how to implement the standards but were familiar with the different criteria and indicators in the standards. Most members of the community interviewed appreciated the professionalism of ACT Alliance members' field staff but were not familiar with what to expect from them. Nevertheless, they also emphasized the readiness of the field staff to respond to their concerns and appreciated being able to approach staff when needed. However, the evaluators felt that a stronger focus on providing additional training and orientation on humanitarian standards as well as codes of conducts to communities would have enabled them to have a sense of ownership and understanding of their rights.

Capacity building within ACT Alliance Members

There is an expressed willingness among ACT Alliance members to share their skills and technical support as needed, however the immediate and fast pace of humanitarian intervention did not give them appropriate time and opportunity to do so. There were instances where LWR for example provided trainings on HAP and Sphere Standards and invited ACT Alliance members to participate. Those who participated expressed their appreciation and saw the value of such trainings. At the same time, they felt that follow-through could have been provided to them in terms of contextualizing it to the local setting and guidance in translating the standards to actual implementation. The ACT Philippine Forum clearly expressed a wish to continue the capacity building interventions in the next phase of PHL 131 and put emphasis on mentorship and coaching as well as field visits to areas where the ACT members operate and learn from it.

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[14] Voluntary Services Overseas–Bahaginan.

Prioritising training in the face of organisational operational pressure is always a challenge. The fact that trainings were often centralised was identified as a factor limiting their use. A decentralised system with a series of shorter trainings based in the different regions would most likely have increased managers' willingness to release staff for such exercises.

Capacity building for state actors and local government units

The capacity building for state actors specifically for government officials in the local government unit such as the Barangays were proven to be effective. All of them expressed that there were changes in attitude and behaviour in responding to future disasters, hence being able to apply the learning they gained from the training. In a number of cases, they also mentioned that they noticed the change of attitude of the community in terms of their active participation in consultations and developing community response for future disaster. Before, the government officials had a difficult time convincing them to attend consultations if there was no monetary support or assistance, but now once they requested the community for consultation they came without asking for anything in exchange. At the same time, the officials we interviewed also expressed that the trainings provided were also open for the community members and where they underwent the training together this eased the burden for the officials to repeat the training. This resulted in having a cooperative and participative planning for future disasters and increased their level of ownership in the process since they were part of crafting and developing the said plan.

However, this increase of knowledge and skills cannot be traced directly to the ACT Alliance member intervention since there were number of capacity building activities provided to affected communities from various agencies including INGOs, government and private institutions.

In the course of interviews with beneficiaries the evaluation team has asked questions regarding what the community does differently in preparation for future typhoons. The team was given multiple examples of practical and attitudinal change ranging from a greater propensity to evacuate based on public warnings to pre-stocking materials, food etc. Elements of shelter programming, such as the inclusion of structural strengthening in core housing provided, and of the quality of coordination with local government and other agencies, indicate a higher level of awareness concerning storm risks. In some cases respondents attributed these changes directly to training given by ACT member organisations or their local partners.

The team also noted that in discussions with management the different ACT member organisations indicated awareness of the need for organisational disaster risk reduction, primarily in the form of preparedness activities focused on establishing protocols for coordination and mutual aid prior to the next disaster.

Programming vision for capacity building remains unclear. Managers and staff members all speak well of capacity building in principle but have difficulty in summarising the practical results – what have the interventions actually contributed to? Future capacity building programming needs to be guided by a clearer understanding of what such efforts seek to achieve; who needs to develop what skills? What behavioural change are interventions designed to achieve? What indicators could possibly be used to clarify whether capacity has actually increased?

3.4 ACT Coordination, communication and collaboration

3.4.1 Interaction within the ACT alliance

A series of actions were undertaken to support coordination communication and collaboration within the ACT Alliance. This included the mobilisation of the Rapid Support Team, individual members involved in back donor relations and examples of international advocacy.

Opinions regarding the effectiveness of the Rapid Support Team were varied and respondents differentiated their answers by function (essentially identifying individuals who contributed greatly

and expressing scepticism about others). Asked regarding the value added, responses emphasised this coordination/consolidation role vis-a-vis funding agencies but question the value of technical input given and the quality, especially the ability to contextualise, of some of the surge staff supplied.

Practical support was also given by surge capacity supplied by the Lutheran World Relief. The capacity building regarding financial and reporting issues provided by Lutheran World Federation was cited by several respondents as having been particularly effective.

During the initial stages of the response, demands for frequent updates from Geneva and ACT members were overwhelming despite the presence of a communications surge support, a support which was not seen to constructively contribute in addressing the day-to-day needs for updates. As the response is stabilised, with the development of the joint PHL131 appeal, narrative and financial reporting were standardised and seen by the implementing organisations as reasonable and easy to comply with.

Only some of the ACT members chose to coordinate through the joint appeal. The evaluation notes that the ACT Code of Good Practice does not specify that local members should take the lead in implementing disaster response. Some local stakeholders were under the impression that it does and it is our impression that this generated friction. ACT members are described as arriving with predetermined interventions allowing coordination only regarding the siting of the interventions. If challenged, reference was made to the humanitarian imperative and the perceived slowness of the development of the joint appeal. It is unclear to the evaluation team whether a more rapid process, while maintaining the need for relevant information, would have been possible to achieve, nor if this would have increased the interest in coordinating. It may not have been feasible to sufficiently rapidly establish the capacity to supply all the relevant information needed. In the context, even with the ACT Forum, the surge capacity possible to supply and the ACT Coordination Centre that was established in this case, information demands exceeded capacity.

The evaluation team notes that there is a perceived tension between the ambitions of the ACT Code of Conduct and the timeliness required by the Humanitarian Imperative. Beyond information sharing based coordination during the first few weeks, coordination with the aim to exploit potential synergies between member organisations within the joint appeal and other member organisations was very limited.

The ACT Coordination Centre was under great pressure; providing information, hosting visitors, dealing with logistical issues and catering to the various members of surge capacity. ACT members were fully occupied with the response and developing their own programming. Beyond the development of the joint appeal there are few indications of proactive efforts to learn from each other in programming design or draw upon organisation specific technical skills.

There is little evidence that the members interpreted the role of the Coordination Centre as anything beyond a supportive function focused on information sharing, consolidation of reporting, administration and logistics. When asked about its role and added value responses consistently emphasised such a role and we did not encounter an ambition to have it develop into programming, quality assurance or other duties.

3.4.2 Interaction within the ACT Forum

As mentioned above the ACT Forum was in the process of being formalised and established its interaction methodologies as the response developed. In the first few weeks regular coordination meetings, physical or via Skype, evolved allowing members to share information from cluster meetings that not all could attend, and organise themselves to avoid geographical duplication. Opinions about the quality of these meetings varied, with some meetings being seen as lacking in structure and not operational enough in the sense that this was not a decision-making forum.

There was a clear ambition to complement others in underserved areas. There is little evidence that there was an ambition to integrate programming or exploit potential organisational synergies. The programming that developed was parallel rather than integrated. A key cause of this development was the fact that members are seldom overlapped in the same geographical areas. Furthermore the various ACT members did not have the same implementing partners, creating an additional level of complexity in the response. Nevertheless, potential for cross organisational learning and the sharing of technical expertise appears to have been underutilised.

The potential for strength in numbers of coordinated action among ACT members in for example advocacy appears to have been exploited to a very limited extent or not at all. Only NCCP seems to have systematically utilised the ACT brand (while all partners did display the logo in external communication). Meanwhile, anecdotal evidence indicates that individual members were able to strengthen advocacy efforts by linking with their international partners.

3.4.3   ACT Forum members internal issues and local partner relations

The ACT members displayed an impressive ability to draw on their existing networks. This was evident for example in a rapid human resource expansion made possible by recruiting new staff from local partners or from networks of known former employees. It should be noted however that few of these new staff members had a background in emergency response as ACT member organisations, prior to the typhoon, were predominantly development focused. This resulted in a need for rapid on the job skills development which in most cases was quite successful.

Organisationally there was a lack of process preparedness, implying that templates, reporting and administrative systems, staff contracts et cetera were adapted to the requirements of development programming rather than rapid emergency response.

By necessity, many staff orientation and preparation processes were exceedingly short. This had a series of consequences including gaps between the organisational rhetoric around standards, processes and attitudes and the actual implementation in the field including staff behaviour.

The rapid scale up also resulted in a systemic lack of role and mandate clarity affecting work relationships and overall efficiency at all systems levels. This was true for overall coordination (role and mandate of the Forum), for inter-organisational relations (between member organisations) and in the working modalities between member organisations and their implementing local partners.

The evaluation team is impressed by the flexibility and adaptation evident in the rapid development of the relationships with field level partners. This has been crucial to the implementation of activities on the ground. Having developed under great time pressure, many of these relationships are in need of reviewing to address for example the following:

- Several of the implementing partners are overstretched, partly caused by too a great tolerance on the part of the ACT members when faced with overambitious programming. Project proposals have been accepted despite being unrealistic in terms of reach and/or complexity;

- there is commonly a mismatch between implementing partner ambitions and ACT member accompaniment resources;

- there is a lack of communication, monitoring and follow-up, especially in terms of quality;

- there is a lack of clarity on how to balance autonomy (self-governance, mission, values) of local partners with the funding members' responsibility to deal with capacity gaps (identified or unidentified);

- ACT members' follow-up of partners' performance varies significantly – there is no common approach on how to deal with a partner that is not able to quality assure agreements?

3.4.4 External coordination

The ACT response invested significantly at all levels in coordinating with government and cluster system structures. This includes significant investment in coordinating with local government, regular attendance in national and local cluster meetings and an awareness of and coordination with existing technical support structures.

In several cases ACT coordination with local government structures was favourably compared to other agencies' implementation process.

4 Conclusions

In this chapter we draw conclusions based on the findings in documents, interviews and by observation in the field. The chapter is structured in line with the evaluation questions from the TOR.

4.1 Relevance

Overall, the response was relevant. Support given was appropriate, generally of high quality, adapted to the needs of affected populations and undertaken in close cooperation with local partners, be they local government, community associations or implementing local NGOs.

First phase relief interventions were, given the context, timely and distributions were undertaken in line with international standards. Interventions in later phases, especially shelter activities, were not timely and the delays caused significant inconvenience for the affected people. Some of these delays were due to contextual issues related to logistics, market conditions and land issues. Some could have been avoided with better organisational preparation including for example establishing protocols with preferred suppliers, better staff preparations, closer managerial follow-up and mentoring and greater investment in relationships with implementing partners.

Some of the delays were also caused by technical issues that with a greater contextual understanding on the part of ACT members could have been avoided.

In some cases, ACT members did not sufficiently consider the realism of programming proposed. Insufficient investment in capacity development and acceptance of unrealistic programming proposals at times led to substandard quality.

There were also examples where rigid application of protocols intended to ensure quality, for example in terms of levels of sophistication in assessments and application of procurement protocols, led to unnecessary delays in implementation.

4.2 Effectiveness

In the section on overall results above we emphasise that our assessment of quantitative results is based on the reporting of the ACT Alliance itself. We have not encountered reason to believe that reported achievements differ materially from actual achievements. Here we give our overall assessment based on what we have seen in the field.

The revised appeal, dated September 3, 2014, summarises the objectives of the intervention. These are presented in italics below with our comments.

> *[…In the first phase] focus remained on distribution of relief goods while also providing early recovery support through livelihoods restoration, WASH, unconditional cash transfer and provision of semi-permanent shelters alongside providing psychosocial care with optimal integration of quality & accountability measures.*

It is clear that the relief phase of the intervention overall delivered the results it intended to achieve in terms of distribution of foodstuffs and non-food items. Deviations from intended quantitative

targets generally involved greater deliveries than intended or reallocations to more needed responses. Cash-based programming took some time to operationalise but feedback indicates that the beneficiaries perceived the interventions to be timely, arriving at a point in time when initial coping mechanisms were exhausted. Shelter interventions were not timely, in part due to land tenure related issues that required a redesign of programming.

As of April/May 2014 the ACT response has made transition to early recovery and rehabilitation.

While it may be true that programming conceptually made this transition in late spring it is also clear that in a number of projects actual operational impact was not felt until significantly later.

The construction of permanent housing has been downsized [……] the focus of ACT response would be on repair and providing semi-permanent shelters which would last for several years. Relocation sites may require common facilities like a drainage system and access pathways between houses.

The reorientation of the shelter programming towards semi-permanent housing was well advised given the context. Nevertheless, even in its new shape this support was significantly delayed, negatively impacting the welfare of the affected people. Parts of the programme remained to be completed at the time of this evaluation. Some of these delays were due to land tenure issues over which the implementing agencies had limited control. Some of the delays were instead caused by a range of issues related to planning, purchasing, technical difficulties, coordination difficulties and the inexperience of the implementing organisations with large scale construction work.

There will be focus on Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) Approach [.....] Some multi-purpose community centres will also be constructed which could be used as cyclone shelters in the event of future cyclones.

Some of the implementing organisations, notably the NCCP and some of the local partners of the other organisations, invested heavily in community interaction. The ambition level for disaster risk reduction varied among the projects implemented but our assessment is that disaster risk awareness, and in many cases practical preparedness, has significantly improved. The evaluation notes that this is done in a context where a number of other stakeholders were also investing in disaster risk reduction activities and that we lack the data to attribute the improvement seen to the ACT members' interventions. Nevertheless, there is significant anecdotal evidence that specific ACT supported interventions had a positive influence on disaster risk reduction awareness and activities.

Now there will be more thrust on rehabilitation of livelihood activities through cash for work, cash transfer, provision of fishing gears, agriculture inputs and so on. Coconut plantation and increasing mangroves cover will be other areas of emphasis.

It is clear that livelihoods activities have been one of the major focal areas for interventions during the past year. A broad spectrum of activities has been undertaken, some of which were innovative and contributed to diversification and/or increased resilience to future emergencies. Most of the livelihoods activities were well appreciated by the communities concerned. The report also expresses concern that many of the activities were focused on rehabilitation of pre-typhoon livelihood activities. This concern is born out of a hypothesis that the pre-typhoon livelihoods in many cases contributed to the affected people being in poverty in the first place.

There will also be an emphasis on cross-cutting issues including quality and accountability, psychosocial care and LRRD.[15]

While the report notes that ACT member management had high ambitions in these areas, as evidenced by investment in orientation regarding international standards, CRM systems et cetera, the report also notes that these ambitions encountered serious implementation difficulties and some contextual hurdles when applied at field level. Quality gaps were noted primarily in shelter and

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[15] Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

livelihoods. Formal CRM systems put in place were not sufficiently contextualised and followed up on. In cases where communities were referred to verbal systems based on mutual trust, a general lack of documentation made systemic learning based on complaints impossible.

Baseline documentation ambitions significantly delayed psychosocial programming. Meanwhile, a number of the projects visited supported community interaction and programming design was sufficiently sensitive to community needs to have psychosocial elements mainstreamed. The reader should note that the evaluation team has not had access to the evaluation of psychosocial activities undertaken in March of this year, however we had an opportunity to speak to CoS on the support rendered to the ACT members during the appeal.

As to linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD), programming indicates an awareness of such issues and multiple examples of successful outcomes have been noted. This is especially true in terms of selected aspects of community capacity building and efforts to link communities closer with formal support structures available through local government.

4.3 Co-ordination

4.3.1 ACT overall coordination

The ACT system responded rapidly. Both the ACT Secretariat and individual ACT members rapidly had support staff in country within hours or days (some already had relevant staff in-country for other purposes). Members already operational in the Philippines rapidly adapted programming and scaled up, simultaneously hosting incoming human resources and trying to provide the system with relevant information as assessments were conducted and affected areas reached.

An ACT coordination centre was quickly established hosted by NCCP. A rapid support team was mobilised and individual ACT members also provided bilateral support to their member organisations in-country. A number of ACT members chose to become operational in the Philippines in parallel to the joint appeal organised by the ACT Secretariat. Their interventions were seen as predefined, based on funding ACT member priorities and open to coordination in terms of geographical siting only.

Human resources provided were of varying quality, some were described as experienced and contributing significantly to response effectiveness while others were questioned as either prescriptive, inexperienced or having difficulty in contextualisation. The value added of overall ACT coordination was understood to be primarily in specific technical advice and capacity building, in coordinating the joint appeal process and in strengthening the ability to receive and support incoming ACT members' assessment and operational staff. The elements of capacity building often cited as of importance included finance and administration as well as international humanitarian standards.

4.3.2 ACT Forum Philippines coordination

When assessing ACT Forum coordination it should be kept in mind that the forum was established a mere three months before the typhoon. The first strategy meeting was planned for late November 2013 and in consequence the coordination efforts were characterised by learning by doing with processes and routines developed and implemented as the need for them was discovered.

During the first weeks after the typhoon there were a series of meetings focused on coordinating operations geographically according to emerging needs and available capacity. An informal system of sharing responsibility for attending cluster meetings developed. Members kept each other aware of implementation progress and assessments undertaken. Programming was done by each member individually, based on that organisation's past experience, existing capacity and established or emerging local partnerships.

What developed was a cluster of independent programs under the umbrella of the joint appeal. Coordination efforts avoided geographical overlaps but, in part as a consequence of this, there were few examples of synergies or inter-organisational learning. An important detail contributing to this was the absence of common standards for results indicators to be used. The absence of such standards makes aggregation and joint learning difficult to achieve.

The role of the ACT coordination centre over time became focused on hosting and logistics related to member monitoring visits and to the administration of reporting and follow-up of the joint appeal. The appeal itself was cited as contributing to a lack of competition for "humanitarian space" among ACT members. Meanwhile, it is the impression of the evaluation team that commitment to ACT membership operational coordination appears greater at HQ level than in practical implementation in the field.

With the exception of the visit of the ACT Secretary General, the potential for joint visibility and advocacy based on that was not exploited. With the exception of the NCCP, none of the members appear to have used the ACT brand beyond including the logo on communication materials.

The evaluation team notes that the ACT Forum intention to have a rotating leadership, based on one-year coordination responsibilities, was not adhered to. The NCCP remained responsible for ACT Forum coordination activities throughout. We are not aware of any practical or financial support given to the organisation in recognition of the additional management burden this will have entailed.

4.3.3   ACT external coordination

Overall the evaluation team is impressed by the level of investment in external coordination. Participation in relevant clusters at both national and local level has been consistent and active. Coordination with local government was systematic and contextualised to adapt to the quality of existing institutions both in terms of availability of technical skills and the local political situation. With few exceptions local government was involved in identification of affected people through iterative processes drawing on existing secondary data combined with survey-based validation.

Relevant implementation guidelines, whether produced by the cluster system or independently by the national government, were appropriately followed although at times contextualised. Reporting required for overall coordination was submitted with reasonable timeliness and quality. The ACT brand was negatively impacted by aggregation difficulties related to the dual identity of ACT members and the structure of the UN reporting system.

4.3.4   ACT members' coordination with local partners

Due to the very varied character of the ACT members' local partnerships, this section focuses on systemic issues. Among the members, the NCCP was the only organisation that did not, at least in part, work through implementing partners.

Implementing partnerships varied from hurriedly established in the aftermath of the typhoon to multi-year relationships that included past emergency responses. In most (all?) cases, existing partnerships were significantly adjusted and expanded in scale.

Most existing partnerships and ongoing programs were development focused with organisations whose capacity was primarily rights based and development oriented rather than focused on rapid delivery to meet relief needs. Established administrative and logistical arrangements were not adapted to the speed and scale of activities. Although some members had access to emergency procedures such as derogation or increasing decentralisation by increasing thresholds of middle management spending mandates, timeliness of operations was negatively impacted by inadequate adaptation of management and administration processes. All organisations confronted challenges in

recruiting skilled staff and establishing appropriate orientation, field management, monitoring, on-the-job training and reporting procedures.

New skills, such as those brought in by the rapid support team or individual members' surge capacity, had difficulty in cascading down to field level implementation. This was true within member staff structures and accentuated when the need to disseminate skills involved Local partner staff.

ACT members did not do enough to ensure the quality of programming as implemented by their local partners. This was in part due to a lack of management resources within members' own organisational structures. It was accentuated by ambition levels that at times led members to accept programming proposals that were clearly unrealistic and in some cases pressure on local partners to expand beyond their capacity. The evaluation team recognises that some managers responsible for programming felt under significant pressure from funding agencies to be ambitious in the quantitative goals set for programmes.

In some cases the evaluation team noted a tendency to transfer risk and responsibility for programme implementation to local partners to an extent that we regard as inappropriate. Implementation through local partnerships contributes to connectedness, local capacity building and contextualisation. The funding agency retains responsibility for quality control and monitoring however and must ensure that it provides appropriate organisational resources to ensure that.

4.4   Efficiency and value added of ACT interventions

The evaluation team lacks the data to make an overall assessment of efficiency in terms of utilisation and deployment of resources. Some stakeholders are of the opinion that there was an overinvestment in external coordination resources early in the response. We can neither refute nor confirm that. Based on what we have observed in the ongoing projects we suspect that there has been an underinvestment in support structures such as management follow-up, staff training, monitoring, inter-organisational learning and quality control.

In terms of value added we have noted that ACT interventions overall were based on in-depth contextual knowledge, in many cases combined with heavy investment in community relations. This has been possible thanks to multi-year experience of development programming in the affected areas. The evaluation team notes that this has increased connectedness and believes this increases the likelihood of outcome sustainability.

The ACT members' pre-existing networks added value by allowing a rapid scaling-up of activities for example through the organisations' access to a broad pool of skilled human resources with whom they were already familiar. It also allowed the interventions to draw upon existing organisational relationships with external stakeholders such as informal and formal institutions and the various levels of government.

Value-added was further enhanced by the ACT members' willingness to focus on peripheral, logistically difficult yet underserved affected people.

4.5   Impact and outcome

The evaluation does not have sufficient data to consider impact.

Although outcomes vary considerably, most interventions are perceived by the target populations are successful and beneficial. People reached by the interventions are generally of the opinion that support received was useful and of good quality. Many beneficiaries indicate that they are better off today than they were before the typhoon. We do not have the data to attribute this to ACT member's interventions across the board but there is significant anecdotal evidence that for many people this was the case.

There is also evidence that communities and individuals are more aware, and better prepared, for future disaster events. Various project activities have contributed to this. Meanwhile, it is clear that these efforts have been undertaken in a context where multiple stakeholders, ranging from the government to mass media to community organisations, having implemented activities to strengthen disaster preparedness.

Some of the project activities undertaken have strengthened community coping mechanisms and the sense of unity. Please refer to the lessons learned section for further details. However, there are also examples where interventions, and implementing staff attitudes, have emphasised charity and that recipients should be grateful, rather than being rights based and contributing to empowerment.

4.6 Cross cutting issues

4.6.1 Quality and accountability
The ACT members all sought to follow relevant international standards. Programming was designed and staff oriented in order to make this possible. Broadly speaking, Sphere standards were adhered to in programming design, as was the Red Cross code of conduct. HAP standards were formally in place in most cases. Problems identified mostly relate to the practical implementation of standards which suffered from insufficient documentation and follow-up.

A common element in most of the gaps identified was an underinvestment in contextualising systems and procedures put in place as well as on the job follow-up for field staff.

4.6.2 Gender and protection
Overall programming was adapted to the specific needs of different vulnerable groups and included a consideration of gender specific needs. The evaluation team notes that this attention to the difference in needs, specific to gender, people living with disabilities, the elderly et cetera, was an aspect of disaster response that local government technical and administrative officers cited as learning for them to be applied in the next disaster response.

4.6.3 Power dynamics
We have noted in the report that we have concerns that livelihoods programming seldom addressed root causes of poverty. As to other power dynamics we note programming elements related to land tenure specific to shelter siting. We also note that there are individual implementing local partners that have in-depth knowledge of power dynamics in Philippine society but that ACT members show limited awareness and correspondingly limited ambitions in this field.

4.6.4 Organisational preparedness
In our assessment, we note that a number of stakeholders have cited improvements in preparedness adaptations of systems and capacity built. However, these improvements were not a consequence of a systematic strategy. The capacity building that has taken place among such stakeholders appears to primarily be the result of learning by doing - a situation that parallels that which has taken place within the ACT members' own organisations. We also note that the members at the time of the evaluation were in the process of reflecting over their own preparedness levels and how these could be practically improved.

4.6.5 Capacity building
Capacity building efforts implemented were directed towards ACT members, member organisation staff, local partner organisation staff, communities and community associations as well as at times towards local government.

Capacity building in financial and administrative matters was one of the key contributions of the rapid support team. This long after their departure it is difficult to attribute other capacity building that has taken place to their presence in country.

Staff capacity building investments were significant and included orientations about international standards and significant on-the-job training on issues of implementation. As NCCP was the only member organisation implementing all their projects, training needs and training investments were the greatest in that organisation. Other members primarily worked through local partners and the evaluation team lacks data concerning those organisations' ambition levels for staff development.

Capacity building investments appear to have been either quality assurance focused, such as orientations on international standards, trainings on reporting templates, budgeting, programming et cetera or based on the perceived needs of target populations such as DRR training, guidance on construction issues in the shelter programme or organisational development oriented training for community associations within livelihoods.

Capacity development of other stakeholders such as local government was ad hoc and based on a combination of needs and preferences in the concerned institutions.

The capacity building investments suffered from a lack of an overall strategy. Organisations were not clear on ambition levels and intended effects or how to follow up whether intended effects were achieved. Partly in consequence of this, investments made are difficult as to assess although multiple examples of built capacity are evident.

A systemic challenge faced by all ACT members' capacity building efforts was a limited cascading of skills from national or management level to the field. These difficulties were accentuated in the organisations working through local partners where capacity building efforts were not necessarily synchronised between organisations.

The evaluation concludes that the effects of the investments made in capacity building are difficult to assess. Nevertheless, it is evident that they would have been more effective if they had been preceded by systematic capacity building assessments and an overall strategy drawing on the different ACT members' complementary skills. Greater efforts to translate theory into practical implementation and better follow-up in applying newfound skills on the job would have further enhanced their effect.

The evaluation notes that the ACT members do not have a common understanding regarding what their organisational responsibility is, or should be, for the capacity development of their local partners.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

External Evaluation for ACT Alliance Response Typhoon Haiyan - PHL 131

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1.   BACKGROUND

Barely recovering from the devastation of a 7.1 magnitude earthquake on 15 October 2013, the people of the Philippines were further hit by super Typhoon Haiyan (local name Typhoon Yolanda). Typhoon Haiyan, considered the world's strongest typhoon ever to make landfall, slammed into Guiuan, Eastern Samar early in the morning of 8 November 2013 packing sustained winds of 235 kph and gusts of 275 kph. Haiyan made 6 subsequent land falls in the provinces of Central Visayas.

UN agencies and government reports estimate that 14.1 million people were affected, including 6,300 casualties and hundreds more missing, 4 million displaced and about 1 million houses destroyed or damaged across 600 municipalities and 44 provinces in 9 regions of the country.

With the support of the ACT Secretariat, 5 ACT Alliance members launched their Relief and Rehabilitation response through issuing of the preliminary appeal within five days (8 November 2013), followed by a full appeal on 16 December 2013. Some ACT members registered their projects in the UN independently while other ACT members responded through direct partnership. A revised ACT appeal was issued on 18 August 2014.

Given the large scale of the emergency and in anticipation of a long-term rehabilitation programme an ACT Coordination Centre was established in Manila within the first week of the disaster. It functions under the supervision of the ACT Philippines Forum, with the purpose of coordinating the responses of ACT members within and outside the appeal, and to interface with the external stakeholders, particularly the government and UN agencies.

An ACT Rapid Support Team (RST) was also deployed during the first weeks to assist the Forum in areas of coordination, communications, community-based psychosocial support, quality, accountability and finance.

2.   ACT EMERGENCY RESPONSE

a) **Size of the appeal:** US $19 million

b) **Implementation Period:** 10 November 2013 to 30 April 2015

c) **Appeal goal:** The appeal aimed to assist the most vulnerable and resource poor people in the following sectors: food and non-food items, WASH, shelter, psycho-social support, education, livelihood restoration/development, cash for work, disaster risk reduction (DRR), capacity building and climate change advocacy.

d) **ACT Requesting Members**

   a. <u>Within the ACT Appeal PHL 131:</u> Christian Aid (CA), ICCO Cooperation (ICCO), Lutheran World Relief (LWR), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP)

    b. <u>Outside the ACT Appeal PHL 131:</u> Christian Aid (inside & outside), Church World Service (CWS), DanChurchAid (DCA), Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe (DKH), Finn Church Aid (FCA), Hilfswerck der Evangelischen Kirchen Schweiz (HEKS), United Methodist Committee On Relief (UMCOR)

e) **Objectives, main activities and locations:**
    a. <u>Sector of work:</u> Food security and agriculture, non-food items (NFI), early recovery (cash for work), livelihoods restoration, shelter, WASH, psychosocial support, education, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and capacity building
    b. <u>Areas of operations:</u> Typhoon Haiyan affected areas in Central Philippines particularly in Cebu, Samar, Leyte, Panay Island & Palawan

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT

3.1 Purpose of the evaluation

a) Since the coverage of the appeal has exceeded the threshold of US$5-million and due to requirements from back donors, the ACT Secretariat is commissioning an external evaluation. The ACT Evaluation Policy and Guidelines[16] provides broad directions, definitions and implementation arrangements for evaluations and should be used as reference throughout the evaluation process. The evaluation is to be considered as a learning opportunity to improve performance, quality and accountability along with community empowerment, sustainability and disaster preparedness.

b) This evaluation takes place approximately 2 months after the closure of ACT appeal PHL131, and 2 months into the implementation of the follow-on appeal PHL151 which has the same ACT implementing members and partners as PHL131.

c) In order to promote learning, the conclusions and recommendations will be shared among ACT Alliance members and discussed with interested members in two debriefings, one in the region and one in Geneva.

The evaluation is carried out within the framework of the ACT Alliance's commitment towards quality, accountability and continuous improvement (learning). In order to promote learning, the conclusions and recommendations will be shared among ACT Alliance members and discussed with interested members in two debriefing meetings, one in the region and one in Geneva. Each ACT member involved will be requested to prepare an action plan based on the findings and recommendations, indicating how the lessons learned will be put into practice.

3.2 Objectives

a) To assess to what extent the planned results were achieved as outline in the ACT appeal PHL131.

b) Review ACT members' response (work funded by the ACT PHL131 Appeal) to typhoon Haiyan against OECD-DAC criteria (excluding impact as it is too soon to assess this) but focusing on outcomes and outputs.

c) To identify lessons learnt and best practices, including innovations/new systems developed which may benefit communities in their recovery and further build local capacity as well as generate knowledge for continuous programme improvement of the ACT Philippines Forum and the ACT Alliance as a whole.

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[16] http://www.actalliance.org/resources/policies-and-guidelines/evaluations/ACT_Evaluation_Policy-Guidelines_FINAL_apprGB_May2012.pdf/view

d) Determine how resilience to disasters has been increased in programme communities.

A short assessment for each implementing partner should be included in the report.

Although it is unlikely there will be the time to evaluate the projects of ACT members outside the ACT appeal, it is hoped that a mapping (literally a map) can be created showing the members' outside the appeal, the areas, sectors and numbers of beneficiaries assisted.

Key Questions

Achievements
a) *Relevance*: How relevant, in terms of appropriateness and timeliness, are the ACT members' interventions to the needs, expectations and priorities of the affected population and local partners?
b) *Effectiveness:* Were the interventions and outputs of the program consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives? What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
c) *Co-ordination:* Assess the effectiveness of the collaboration/co-ordination and co-ordination mechanisms among ACT members (both inside and outside the appeal), partners of ACT Alliance as well as with other stake holders, to ensure interventions are harmonised, promote synergy, and avoid gaps/duplication and resource conflicts.
d) *Efficiency*: Was the response implemented in an effective and efficient manner in terms of utilisation /deployment of resources? How was value for money demonstrated and evidenced? What was the added value of the ACT members' interventions?
e) *Impact/outcome:* What was the outcome (both intended and unintended, positive and negative) in saving and protecting lives, assisting people towards longer-term recovery and reducing future vulnerability?

3.3 Quality & Accountability
a) To what extent were international humanitarian standards (SPHERE, Code of Conduct, HAP) met and what were the opportunities and challenges in meeting these?

3.4 Gender, protection & cross-cutting issues
a. How did the response recognise power and gender dynamics and address the specific concerns and needs of women, girls, men and boys along with other vulnerable groups?
b. Comment on level of preparedness pre-disaster and quality of response. How has ACT response supported the local structures (state, local NGOs, churches) in such a way that they would be better prepared to respond should a disaster strike again?

3.5 ACT policies, coordination and capacity
a. How effective was the ACT Secretariat in facilitating and co-ordinating the response efforts? How did exchange/co-ordination between in-appeal and outside of appeal members take place and how could quality in this sense be improved?
b. What was the added value being a member of ACT?
c. How effective and efficient was the role of Rapid Support Team (RST) in ensuring a well-developed and quick response to the Haiyan emergency?
d. How did ACT Philippines programme optimize the value of ACT Alliance's joint appeal system to create greater impact? Were appropriate synergies, institutional platforms and existing national strategy used to leverage ACT response?

e. How are organizations addressing the issue of coordination and what leadership are they demonstrating with regards to the challenges?

f. Were the needs and priorities of the affected population, ACT donors and policy standards of ACT Alliance met?

g. What were the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities of ACT visibility in a multi-actor ACT response?

h. How was the coordination of ACT with UN clusters and other external mechanisms? Was it possible to utilize the ACT forum structure to better participate and influence those platforms?

4. Evaluation Methodology

- The selected Evaluation Team Leader is to develop a plan (inception report) in discussion with the ACT Secretariat and with the designated person in the ACT Philippines Forum Evaluation Committee.
- The evaluation uses the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (Relevance, Appropriateness, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Sustainability) to establish the overall performance and results of ACT response to the ACT Haiyan response.
- The evaluation will be conducted in a participatory manner through a combination of methods including a document review of key project documentation (appeal, sitreps, reports), interviews with different stakeholders/counterparts, beneficiary consultation and site visits to ACT members' project sites as sampled by the evaluation team in co-ordination with the requesting members.
- Semi-structured interviews with key informants in selected villages/urban localities. Note that evidence from beneficiaries/communities should constitute the backbone of the evaluation.
- Focus group discussions (done separately for males and females) with selected beneficiaries and/or members of the community-based/people's organizations
- Review of the procurement and distribution process
- Physical verification of warehouses
- Interview with secondary stakeholders (e.g. relevant government officials, local government unit)
- Assess collaboration/interfacing with external stakeholders, in particular the government and the UN agencies.
- Meetings with management of implementing members, project and administrative staff etc.
- Online survey with ACT members and staff
- Sharing and review of existing information 2 weeks prior to the field work: (a) Review of ACT members' documents/publications/reports; (b) visual evidence – existing collection of photos and videos, pre- and post-interventions of different ACT members, e.g. repaired shelters, WASH facilities, restored livelihood materials, cleared and replanted farms and areas; workshops, interviews with beneficiary groups/other stakeholders, etc. – will complement actual field visits. (c) Review of case studies of good practices and lessons learned by the different members.

5. Expected outputs

Based on the understanding of this ToR, the evaluation team shall propose in the inception report the approach, design, methods and data collection strategies to be adopted for conducting the evaluation. The team should triangulate and validate information, assess and describe data quality in a transparent manner. Data gaps and shortfall in evaluation design should also be highlighted in the evaluation report. ACT guidelines for evaluation report shall be used for reporting.   The final

document should not be more than 30 pages excluding lessons learnt, good practices and recommendations which should be annexed. The document should also include an executive summary to facilitate use of the report.

While the evaluation is intended to promote learning and establish our commitment to accountability, in order to benefit from the many lessons learned and positive experience of the ACT Philippines typhoon emergency response, the evaluator will have the task to specifically identify lessons and good practice for documentation and facilitate a **lessons learnt workshop**.

6. Key evaluation dates/schedules

The ACT Philippines Forum will generate the initial draft ToR in consultation with the ACT Secretariat, this will be shared with the funding members for the appeal within the month of February 2015 and hence revised to the final ToR by the last week of March 2015. The profile for the evaluation team will be advertised through ReliefWeb and Alnap giving a period of 2 weeks for applications. Selection of the external evaluation team will take place by 24 April.

Meetings (via skype) between ACT Secretariat staff, ACT Forum representatives and the evaluation consultants prior to the field work will enable the team to articulate the ToR and discuss the inception report and lead to a full consensus on how the evaluation will be best executed. The national forum and ACC will be responsible for facilitating the administrative, logistics support and related details.

The field work will take place within the period 21 June to 4 July 2015 a maximum of 14 days in-country which will include including 2 days travel, the briefing meeting on 22 June, 2 non-consecutive days for writing the report and a debriefing on the final day, 3 July.

It is expected that the lead evaluator will need 2 days preparation prior to going to the Philippines with a one day briefing at the ACT Secretariat.

Following completion of the visit, the lead evaluator will need 4 days (associates 2 days) to put together the first draft of the report which should be available within 15 – 20 days upon completion of the visit. ACT stakeholders will have two weeks to comment on the report after which the evaluation report shall be finalized and shared with all relevant stakeholders. A final "lessons learned and good practice along with recommendations" document shall also be produced together with the final evaluation report.

The team leader will be supported by the ACT Philippines Forum representative, ACT Coordination Centre staff and a member of the ACT Secretariat staff.

Main steps for the assignment & timeframe

Finalising Terms of Reference	end-March 2015
Evaluation team leader identified along with two team members (M/F) in consultation with team leader.	End April 2015
Review of appeal documents – appeal PHL131, sitreps, reports etc. (2 days)	May 2015
Briefing with evaluation team in ACT Secretariat or skype (1 day)	End May - early June
Field work 22 days. Arrival 21 June 2015; 22 June – briefing with Forum; 23 – 26 field visits; 27 June – writing day; 28 June – 2 July field visits; 3 July – 7 July field visit; 8 July - writing day; 9 July – 12 July field visit; 13 July debriefing; 14 July – departure.	21 June to 14 July 2015
Analysis + writing of report (4 non-consecutive days for leader, 2 for associates). First draft of the report along with lessons learned and good practice document.	by 30 July 2015
ACT stakeholders feedback	Mid- August

Final Draft Evaluation report along with lessons learned, good practices and recommendations.	End August 2015
Debriefing in Geneva I day	Beginning September 2015
Finalising evaluation report & document on "lessons learned" and recommendations	Mid-September 2015

Annex 2: List of interviewees

List of interviewees PHL131 External Evaluation June 24 - July 15, 2015

DATE	ACTIVITY/AREA	PARTICIPANTS/RESPONDENTS	INTERVIEWED BY
June 24	Briefing in Manila (Fersal Makati Avenue)	CA: Ted Bonpin, Alex Nayve	Bjorn Ternstrom, Uma Narayanan, Rior Santos
		ICCO: Rico Cajife, Rajis	
		LWR: Tim Miller	
		NCCP: Minnie Anne Calub, Edward Santos, Sylvia Ulanday, Donna Galingan	
		ACT CC: Sylwyn Sheen Alba	
LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF			
June 24	LWR Staff Interview	Tim Miller (Director - Haiyan Emergency Response Program)	ALL
June 25	NFI Solar Lamp – RAFI Brgy. Proper, Hilantagaan Island Cebu	Men beneficiaries (MB): **10** Women beneficiaries (WB): **13** Barangay Captain Roger Segovia Babylyn Marabi, Rowena Veliganio, Davilla Ofqueira (individual interviews)	Rior Uma Bjorn Uma
	LWR Staff Interview	Nenita "Neneth" Clenuar (Livelihoods Program Officer)	
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Neneth	
June 26	Shelter Repair Kits (SRK) – Habitat for Humanity (HfH) Brgy. Maya, Daanbantayan Cebu	Shelter Repair Kit: **15** Barangay Captain Elver Ali Abucay Mayor Augusto Corro	Rior and Uma Bjorn Bjorn and Uma
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Rico	
June 27	Cash-for-Work (CFW) and SRK Brgy. Lao, Ormoc City	Men beneficiaries (MB): **7** Women beneficiaries (WB): **12** Barangay Captain Wilfredo Rios	Bjorn Uma Rior
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Mi-an	
June 28	Core Housing – Habitat for Humanity District 9, Burauen Ormoc	Men beneficiaries (MB): **14** Women beneficiaries (WB): **13** Barangay Captain Jesus Mangallon Marcial Esperas (Project Coordinator - HfH)	Rior Uma Bjorn Bjorn
	LWR Staff Interview	Mi-an Taglucop (Shelter Program Officer)	Bjorn
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Mi-an	
July 6	Skype Interview with LWR Local Partner	Leonilo "Tots" Escalada (National Coordinator - Habitat for Humanity)	Uma
July 13	Local Partner Interview	Carmen "Babes" Baugbog (PHILDHRRA)	Rior
July 15	LWR staff interview	Femia T. Baldeo	Bjorn
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES			

June 29	Food & NFI, Shelter, Agriculture and Livelihoods Brgy. Salvacion, Jinamoc Island, Basey Samar	Men beneficiaries (MB): **9** Women beneficiaries (WB): **5** Barangay officials: **7** Barangay Captain Antonio Dizon	Bjorn Uma Rior
	Food & NFI, Shelter, Agriculture and Livelihoods Brgy. Sawa, Basey Samar	Men beneficiaries (MB): **7** Women beneficiaries (WB): **13** Norwin Solayao and Rejane Hierro (Community Organizers) Aerra Belena (Community-Based Psychosocial Support Assistant Officer) Donna Lou Galingan (CBPS officer)	Rior Uma Bjorn Uma Uma
	Cabero's Pension House at Marabut, Samar	Pablito Jonale (WASH Technician) NCCP Field Staff: **5** female **4** male	Uma All
June 30	Food & NFI, Progressive Houses, SRK, Boats and Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) Brgy. Ferreras, Marabut Samar	House beneficiaries: **8** Livelihoods and CBDRR: **6**	Uma and Rior Bjorn
	Food & NFI, Progressive Houses, SRK, Boats and Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) Brgy. Odoc, Marabut Samar	Livelihoods beneficiaries: **5** (from each livelihood association) CBDRR, CRM: **6** Barangay Officials: **5**	Bjorn Uma Rior
	Food & NFI, Progressive Houses, SRK and CBDRR Brgy. Serum, Basey Samar	Shelter beneficiaries: **6** Livelihood beneficiaries: More or less **30** Barangay Officials: **4**	Rior Bjorn Uma
	Debriefing	Evaluators + 16 NCCP staff	
July 3	Shelter, Livelihoods, CBPS, CBDRR, WASH, CRM Brgy. San Roque, Estancia Iloilo	Shelter, WASH, DRR group: **10** (3M, 7F) Livelihoods, CBPS, CRM group: **9**	Bjorn Rior
	Shelter, Livelihoods, CBDRR, WASH, CRM Brgy. Tanza, Estancia Iloilo	Men beneficiaries (MB): **7** Women beneficiaries (WB): **6** NCCP Field Staff: **7** Aira (Finance Asst.), Arlyn (CO), Marc (Field Coordinator), Phoebe (CO), Aaron (CO), Rodema (CA), June (Warehouse person)	Bjorn Rior Rior
July 4	Shelter, Agriculture, Livelihoods, WASH, CRM Brgy. Bulak Norte, Batad Iloilo	Beneficiaries group: **10** Barangay Officials: **6** led by Barangay Captain Roy Alleno Marilyn Javier (Women's Association)	Uma Rior Uma
	Shelter, Agriculture, Livelihoods, WASH, CRM Brgy. Tanao, Batad Iloilo	Group 1 beneficiaries: **13**	Rior and Uma
	NCCP Staff Interview	Minnie Anne Calub (Emergency Program Manager - Haiyan) Edward Santos (CBDRR Officer)	Bjorn Uma and Rior
	Debriefing	Evaluators + 10 NCCP staff	
July 8	NCCP Management Staff Interview in Manila 879 EDSA, West Triangle, Quezon City	Rev. Rex RB Reyes (General Secretary) Sylvia Ulanday (Project Finance Officer) Teddy Delicana (Procurement Assistant/Volunteer)	Bjorn

INTERCHURCH COOPERATIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION				
June 26	Climate Smart Agriculture Project – R1 Brgy. Poblacion, Daanbantayan Cebu	Agriculture Project (Livelihoods beneficiaries): **32** (**8** male, **24** female)	Bjorn and Rior	
	PWD Psychosocial Project – VSO-Bahaginan Brgy. Poblacion, Daanbantayan Cebu	Psychosocial Group: PWD beneficiaries (**10**), volunteers (**3**), LGU (**2**)	Uma	
	Local Partner Interview	Hazel "Lala" Tanghuling (Coordinator - Rice Watch)	Bjorn	
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Rico		
July 1	Wing Oyster, Boats & Pedicab – CARET Brgy. San Mateo, Carigara Leyte	Men beneficiaries (MB): **4** Women beneficiaries (WB): **6** Ferdinand Buenviaje (CARET)	Rior Uma Bjorn	
	Organic Farm & CLOA recipients - RIGHTS Brgy. Tutug-an, Barugo Leyte	Men beneficiaries (MB): **6** Women beneficiaries (WB): **8** Barangay Officials: **4** RIGHTS staff led by Baby Reyes: **6**	Rior Uma Bjorn Uma and Rior	
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Ylah (at the airport)		
July 2	Abaca Production Center – NTFP Brgy. Rosal, Libacao	Group 1 beneficiaries: **9** Group 2 beneficiaries: **10** Mayor Vincent Navarosa Fanny Orbista (MSWD officer) Violeta Villanueva (MDRRMO)	Rior Uma Bjorn Bjorn Bjorn	
	Abaca Production Center – NTFP Brgy. San Jose, Madalag	Group 1 beneficiaries: **24** Mayor Alfonso Gubatina NTFP staff: **5**	Rior Bjorn Bjorn and Uma	
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Rico and Martin (Kirk in Actie)		
July 7	Shelter, Rain Water Conservation System, Evacuation Center (Multi-purpose Hall) – Task Force Mapalad (TFM) Molocaboc Island, Sagay Negros Occidental	Men beneficiaries (MB): **10** Women beneficiaries (WB): **9** Barangay Leaders/LGU: **8** Local partner staff: Carlos Tulali (Productivity Improvement Program Coordinator), Engr. Freddie Dofeliz, other 5 more staff Armando Jarilla (National Coordinator - TFM)	Bjorn Uma Rior Uma and Rior Bjorn	
	Debriefing	Evaluators + Rico and 8 TFM staff		
July 11	ICCO Management Staff Interview in Manila 213 Eagle Court Condominium, Matalino St., Quezon City	Billy de la Rosa (Senior Program Officer) Pedro Rico Cajife (Junior Program Officer - Haiyan)	Bjorn	
CHRISTIAN AID				
July 9	Entry Meeting with PHILSSA and SAMDHANA	PHILSSA & SAMDHANA Staff: **10**	Uma & Rior	
	Coron Municipal LGU partners	LGU representatives: **3** Mayor Clara Espiritu-Reyes	Rior Uma and Rior	
	UN FAO office	Jomel Baobao (Post Harvest National Consultant – UN FAO) Nadine Alberto (Kalahi staff - DSWD)	Uma and Rior	
	Debriefing	Uma and Rior + Alex		

July 10	Cash Transfer, Livelihoods and WASH Brgy. San Nicolas, Coron Palawan	Group 1 beneficiaries: **12** Group 2 beneficiaries: **10**	Uma Rior
	Local Partner Interview	PHILSSA Staff: 7 (Gender & Protection Technical Staff, Community Organizer, Finance Person, Admin Staff) Erwin Quinones (Community Facilitator/Project Coordinator - SAMDHANA) Teodorico "Ka Tisoy" de Guia (Local Project Coordinator - PAGE/PHILSSA)	Uma and Rior Uma Rior
	CA Management Staff Interview in Manila Christian Aid Office, Manila Observatory, Ateneo de Manila University	Ted Bonpin (Senior Emergency Program Manager - Philippines) Coree Steadman (Regional Officer) Allan Vera (Acting Country Manager) Flordeliza Dimabuyu (Finance Manager)	Bjorn
	Debriefing	Uma & Rior + Alex and Lea	
July 11	Cash for Livelihoods – PHILSSA Brgy. Bintuan, Coron Palawan	Group 1 beneficiaries: **12** Group 2 beneficiaries: **11**	Uma Rior
	Disaster Risk Reduction Trainings (Indigenous People) – SAMDHANA Brgy. San Jose, Coron Palawan	Barangay Chairman Edgar Villareal DRR Facilitators/Volunteers: **6** with **2** elders	Rior Uma
	CA staff	Alex Nayve (Senior Emergency Program Officer) Lea Cea (Emergency Program Officer - Palawan)	ALL
July 13	Food, DRR, Cash for Livelihood and Capacity Building, and School of Living Tradition (Balik Calauit Movement Community) – SAMDHANA Brgy. Calauit, Busuanga Palawan	Group 1 beneficiaries: **19** Group 2 beneficiaries: **17** Local Government Unit: **6**	Uma Rior Uma & Rior
	Cash for Livelihoods Brgy. New Quezon, Busuanga Palawan	Men beneficiaries: **6** Women Beneficiaries: **11** Barangay Officers: **4**	Bjorn Uma Rior
	Local Partner Interview	Benedict "Dick" Balderrama (National Coordinator/Project Director - PHILSSA) Joan Jamisolamin (Grants Manager - SAMDHANA)	Bjorn
July 14	*Debriefing*	Evaluators + Lea and 2 SAMDHANA staff; Lea and 3 PHILSSA staff	ALL
NORWEGIAN CHURCH AID			
July 6	Skype Interview with NCA	Anja Riiser (Project Officer - NCA Haiyan Response on Haiyan)	Uma
DEBRIEFING			
July 15	Debriefing in Manila	**CHRISTIAN AID** Ted Bonpin - SEPM Lea Fenix Cea - Emergency Program Officer (EPO) <u>CA Local Partners</u> Dick Balderrama – National	ALL

		Coordinator/PHILSSA Rhea Aguilar – Partnership Coordinator/PHILSSA Joan Jamisolamin – Grants Manager/SAMDHANA Institute Erwin Quinones – Project Coordinator/SAMDHANA	
		INTERCHURCH COOPERATIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION Rico Cajife – Junior Program Officer Erwin Roxas – Junior Finance Officer <u>ICCO Local Partners</u> Maia Urata – EPO/NTFP-EP Phil Sara Grachelle Ang – EPO/NTFP-EP Phil Florina Repo – Project Coordinator/RIGHTS Tez Naz – Staff/RIGHTS, Inc. Hazel Tanghuling – Coordinator/Rice Watch Maria Pilar Pablo – Project Staff/RWAN Carlos Tulali – Project Coordinator/TFM Elvira Escoto – Project Coordinator/CARET	
		LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF Femia Baldeo – Country Director Jill Marie Duero – Monitoring & Evaluation Officer/LWR <u>LWR Local Partners</u> Love Dorero – DR Manager/Habitat for Humanity Mabel Cuizon – Habitat for Humanity Marge Gravador – Exec. Director For Integrated Development Unit/RAFI	
		NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES Minnie Anne Calub – Program Manager – Haiyan Response Edward Santos – Education/Advocacy Officer Donna Galingan – CBPS Officer Joselito Sosmena – Field Coordinator/Tacloban Office Sylvia Ulanday – Program Finance Officer Padi Rex Reyes – General Secretary	
		HEKS - SWISS INTERCHURCH AID Joseph Zapanta – Country Director Markus San Gabriel – Program Officer	
		ACT COORDINATION CENTER Sylwyn Sheen Alba – Admin and Finance Assistant	
July 22	Skype interview with ACT Gva	Gabrielle Bartholomew Ghaderi, Regional Programme Officer, Asia	

Annex 3: List of documents

Documents are arranged according to organisation and type of document.

General

ACT Alliance Code of Conduct- approved 05 February 2011
ACT Alliance Code of Good Practice approved 05 Feb 2011
FINAL ACT Alliance Joint Monitoring Visit Report Philippines May 2014
PHL131 Revision2 corrected and reissued 03 09 2014

ACT CC Philippines

ACC Interim Financial Report PHL 131
ACC Interim Report PHL 131
ACT Alliance Typhoon Haiyan Response
ACT Alliance Typhoon Haiyan Response with Logos
ACT Brochure
ACT CC Activities
ACT Narrative Report final draft
ACT PHL131 LWR Final Narrative Report
ACT PH Haiyan
End Report Figures April 302015
PHL 131 NCCP End of Project Report
PHL131 ICCO Final Narrative Rec 30June2015
RS10739 philippines 2014 jeffrey typhoon 7A11
ToR ACC Coordinator

Bulletins
Bulletin #10 Dec3
Bulletin #1 Nov12
Bulletin #2 Nov15
Bulletin #3 Nov16
Bulletin #4 Nov17
Bulletin #5 Nov19
Bulletin #6 20 Nov
Bulletin #7a Nov21
Bulletin #7b Nov22-23
Bulletin #8 Nov24-25
Bulletin #9 Nov27-28

Situation Reports
ACT Sitrep template
PHL 131 SitRep1 Jan2014
PHL 131 SitRep2 Feb2014
PHL 131 SitRep3 Mar2014
PHL 131 SitRep4 May2014
PHL 131 SitRep5 Jun2014
PHL 131 SitRep6 Aug2014
PHL 131 SitRep7 Oct2014
PHL 131 SitRep8 Nov2014
PHL 131 SitRep9 Feb2015

Christian Aid (CA)

PHL131 CA 2nd Interim Narrative Reviewed Rec 19Feb
PHL131 CA 2nd Interim Financial Reviewed Rec 19Feb2015
ACT Narrative Report Final
Devt of Yolanda Rehabilitation & Resilience Framework with CA partners
August Yolanda Rehabilitation and Resilience Strategy Paper
Partner Humanitarian Capacity Assessment
Annexes - DFID Yolanda Proj Review May 23
CA Cash Transfer Programming FAQ Jan 2012
Change in Adoption of Food Coping Strategies
Change in Adoption of Livelihood Coping Strategies

Change in Food Consumption
DFID Yolanda Proj Review May 23
Evidence of local partnership in indigenous populations
Haiyan 3-Month Review Philippines Feedback
Haiyan Appeal Management Roles Responsibilities 15June 2015
Haiyan Appeal Staffing Matrix shared with ACT june 2015
Haiyan Review Relief Phase
ICCO Evaluation Report
Missed Again Haiyan Advocacy
Report on Yolanda Frontliners Reflection and Learning Workshop May 2014
Security Guidelines for Cash Distribution

CODE NGO in Philippines
Year End Report CODE-NGO ACED Year 2   YRR - April 1 to March 30 2015 final
Annex A1 ACED Training Day 1 Documentation
Annex A2 ACED Training Day 2 Documentation
Annex A3 ACED Training Day 3 Documentation
Annex A4 ACED Training Day 4 Documentation
Annex A5 ACED Training Day 5 Documentation
Annex B The BIG ONE Activity Aug 2014
Annex C Documentation of ACED Year 1 Assessment and DRR Hub Workshop v3
Annex D Draft CODE-NGO DRRM Coordination Hub Protocols ao April2015
Annex E. Summary Results of PCVA Application and Engagements in ACED 1 Pilot Areas
Annex F Davao Declaration on Peace and Resilience
Annex G Yolanda a Year After Public Forum documentation 4Nov2014
Annex H CSOs Recommendations on YRR V7
Annex I Yolanda Year One Forum CODE-NGO Members Meeting 3Nov2014

Haiyann Evaluation outside CA
DEC Contribution to Change Philippines Evaluation Report
IAHE Haiyan Philippines

PHILSSA in Palawan
Link to video Cash for Shelter support by ACT PHL 131
Narrative Terminal Report Angat Calamianes Emeregency Shelter Assistance PHILSSA&PAGE
Selection and Prioritization of Beneficiaries for Livelihood Cash Grant Assistance PHILSSA&PAGE
Angat Calamianes Emergency Shelter Assistance Beneficiaries
Angat Calamianes Emergency Shelter Assistance Photo Stories PHILSSA&PAGE
Angat Calamianes Livelihood Recovery Cash Grant Assistance Timeline & Updates
Busuanga After Yolanda Presentation
Busuanga Briefing on Typhoon Yolanda
Cash Transfers Plan - PHILSSA
Coron Fisheries and Aquaculture Damage
Coron MDRRMC Report
CULION Damaged Bancas
CULION Totally-Damaged Houses
TY Haiyan Livelihood Cash Grant Assistance Dashboard PHILSSA 25 Nov 2014

CVs
CV- CO Coron Aborot P1
CV- CO Coron Aborot P2
CV- CO Coron Quijano P1
CV- CO Coron Quijano P2
CV- CO Coron Quijano P3
Cv- CO Coron Quijano P4
CV- CO Coron Quijano P5
CV- CO Coron Quijano P6
CV- CO Culion Cabalquinto P1
CV- CO Culion Cabalquinto P2
CV- Local Fin Admin Rubino P1
CV- Local Fin Admin Rubino P2
CV- Local Fin Admin Rubino P3
CV- Local Fin Admin Rubino P4

CV- Local Fin Admin Rubino P5
CV- Tech Staff DRRM Zamoranos P1
CV- Tech Staff DRRM Zamoranos P2
CV- Tech Staff Gender and Protection Galalan P1
CV- Tech Staff Gender and Protection Galalan P2
CV- Tech Staff Livelihood Olmido P1
CV- Tech Staff Livelihood Olmido P2
CV- Tech Staff Livelihood Olmido P3

Samdhana in Palawan
05 24 14 Final Report CAid-ACT Emergency Relief Samdhana
Biong RDANA raw data (13.12.05)
Biong Family Baseline Info
Biong list of beneficiaries livelihood (14.03.10)
Samdhana-annual-report-2013
Resilience
One-Pager for ACT Alliance (14.04.21)
Photo Story - Livelihood Biong (14.04.23)
Photo Story - Turda (14.04.23)
CV ebq june2015
ERRB CTB Final
ERRB map1
Jamisolamin CV 082013

UPA in Leyte
Balanak Household Profile Final
Brgy 86, Tacloban City Profile
Brgy 52 54 58 Students
Brgy 54-A, Tacloban City
Brgy 54A Students
Brgy 56-A Spot map
Brgy 86 Disneyland Lists of Students
Brgy. 89 Contigency Plan
Brgy. 89 Green Card Holder
Brgy. 89 Masterlist
Data Summary
Geohazard Assessment of the Proposed Relocation Sites
NO BUILD ZONE SURVEY brgy. 56-A 2 Final
PROVISION OF SHOES AND SCHOOL UNIFORMS
School uniform beneficiaries
Tacloban CLUP Vol 1 final
Tent improvement masterlist
Tent Improvement Project Grievances

ICCO Cooperation
ICCO PHL131 Interim Financial end October2014 Rec 30April2015
PHL131 ICCO InterimNarrative Rec 31March2015

Lutheran World Relief (LWR)
LWR Haiyan One-Year Update
LWR ACT Interim Report Nov2014
PHL131-LWR 2nd InterimFinancial Rec 28Nov2014
PHL131 LWR 2nd InterimNarrative Rec 28Nov2014
TANGO LWR phase 1 evaluation

Project Briefers
LWR NFI and Cash For Work Briefer
LWR Shelter Briefer

Terminal report
NFI Final Report
SRk Final Report

CFW Terminal Report

Core Housing
Beneficiary Scorecard Core Housing prefinal rev 120314
certificate of acceptance
HFHP Bidding Process
HP 120314 Update Eng
implementing partner file-iligan habitat.zip
LWR House Cost Est Welded

Sample Implmenting Partner files
Amended Articles of Incorporation, Iligan habitat for Humanity Foundation, Inc.
Iligan Habitat Foundation
Vendor Info & Accre Sheet
Vendor Info p.2

Job Descriptions
JD Director for Haiyan Emergency Response - JD FINAL AUGUST 2014
JD FAO.ER draft
JD M&E Officer
JD PO.WASH-JD
JD POER

National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP)
MOU between NCCP and NCA
Organizational Flow
PHL131 NCCP 1st 12-monthAudit Rec 2February2015
PHL131 NCCP 2nd InterimFinance Rec 10Dec2014
PHL131 NCCP 2nd InterimNarrative Rec 10Dec2014
Report on PHL 131 to NCCP Annual Assessment and Planning.ppt
CRM-Manual-rev-2 (1)

CBDRR
CBDRR MODULE 1 - Disaster Management Orientation
CBDRR MODULE 2 - Community Risk Assessment
CBDRR MODULE 3 - Disaster Preparedness Training
NCCP CBDRR PROGRAM

Iloilo Field Office
Barangay Profiles with Need Assessment:
Brgy Profile Bulak Norte raw material
Brgy Profile Daan Banwa raw material
Brgy Profile Embarcadero raw material
Brgy Profile Pasayan raw material
Brgy Profile San Roque raw material
Brgy Profile Tanao raw material
Brgy Profile Tanza raw material
ILOILO Batad Bulak Norte
ILOILO Batad Embarcadero
ILOILO Batad Pasayan
ILOILO Batad Tanao
ILOILO Estancia Daan Banwa
ILOILO Estancia San Roque
ILOILO Estancia Tanza

Community Description Briefer
Batad Bgy Bulak Norte
Batad Embarkadero
Batad Pasayan
Batad-Bgy Tanao
Estancia Bgy San Roque
Estancia Bgy Tanza
Estancia Daan Banwa

NCCP Job Descriptions
Administrative Assistant
Agriculture and Livelihood Assistant
Assistant Field Coordinator
CBDRR Assistant
CBPS Assistant
CBPS Officer
Community Worker
Emergency Program Manager
Field Coordinator
Field Engineer
Procurement Assistant
Program Assistant
Project Finance Assistant
Project Finance Officer
Warehouse Assistant
WASH Technician

Tacloban Field Office
Barangay Profiles with Need Assessment:
BARANGAY 83-C
BARANGAY FERRERAS
BARANGAY MAHAYAG
BARANGAY ODOC
BARANGAY SALVACION
BARANGAY SAWA
BARANGAY SERUM
Raw data profile and need assessment (Brgy. Sawa)

Community Description Briefer
Basey Brgy. Salvacion
Basey Brgy. Sawa
Basey Brgy. Serum
Marabut Brgy Ferreras
Marabut Brgy Odoc

Livelihood
Summary of Livelihood Projects

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Annex 1 NCA Final Log-frame results PHL131
PHL131 NCA IndependentAuditReport Rec 11Feb2015
PHL131 NCA AuditLetter Revised Rec 27Feb2015
PHL131 NCA FinalFinancial Rec 11Feb2015
PHL131 NCA FinalNarrative Rec 11Feb2015

Annex 4: Lessons learned

Lesson learned on community interaction

All ACT member organisations and their local partners invested in keeping local government informed about community needs and project implementation. Assessments of needs commonly took local government lists of affected people as point of departure. The level of validation of such lists varied significantly from project to project.

Assessment methodologies and selection processes were at times results focused (get the data fast to allow rapid implementation). In other cases the assessment and selection processes were used as tools for community empowerment and trust building, both within communities and between the implementing organisation and the affected people.

Organisations that chose the latter methodology invested heavily in information and community interaction. Criteria for selection, information regarding project implementation and objectives were shared with affected populations through multiple media. Transparency was supported through posters, discussions with community representatives, community information meetings et cetera. The criteria for selection and the composition of and motivation for the support given was repeatedly and consistently communicated and discussed.

In some communities intra-community tensions, such as jealousy, criticism of selection processes and even social ostracism of selected beneficiaries, were noted as side-effects of the support given. However, in projects where the implementing organisations had invested systematically and heavily in transparency and communication, such side-effects were rare and weak.

The Lesson Learned: Support given without community understanding regarding selection criteria and purpose risks doing harm by building intra-community tensions. On the other hand, investing in transparent information regarding organisational objectives and selection criteria can contribute to increased community awareness around vulnerabilities and rights, supporting long-term empowerment.

Lesson learned on accountability, protection and rights

All ACT members in principle support accountability, relevant Codes of Conduct and international humanitarian standards such as SPHERE. ACT members' orientations of staff and efforts to build capacity of their implementing partners and communities in this area were not practical enough. Commonly the What was communicated but not the How. CRM implementation, for example, should be carried out in consultation with the communities and at reasonable cost. A formal structure, based on written communication is not always appropriate. Verbal and trust based mechanisms are a good complement but need to be documented for follow-up and learning. Documentation and analysis should be done with anonymity. Community participation in designing the CRM will help in overcoming cultural reluctance to complaining (based on perceived risks that aid will cease or fear that complainant will be seen as ungrateful). Involving communities in some of the monitoring roles may lessen resistance to complaining. This may work well especially in situations where ACT members or partner agencies are unable to access remote locations.

Protection principles when consciously applied addressed protection needs of specific target groups in the communities including People with Disabilities (PWDs). ICCO's psychosocial support activity specifically targeted PWDs, combining emotional support with rights awareness. As a result of the intervention the PWDs established a Federation with greater access to assistance from the government authorities.

Assistance provided with a clear rights based approach where communities were made aware of the relevant rights empowered them to confront duty bearers to demand their rights. For example, the

RIGHTS Network (ICCO partner) effectively engaged communities on farmers' rights while providing livelihood support. Although the process is tedious and time consuming, the result is long lasting as empowered communities who now know how, when, where and to whom to demand their rights. Similar changes in relations with local government were noted in some other projects that emphasised rights in practice.

The Lesson Learned: in accountability, protection and rights programming it is easy to quote existing rhetoric but difficult to apply in a complex and politicised reality. Field staff need more that general orientations. Practical on-the-job with developing contextualised approaches in each locality are needed for successful implementation. On the other hand, when an organisation invests in applying such approaches the results may be spectacular.

Lessons learned on staff relations

Employees of ACT members and their local partners that were involved in the emergency response have confronted difficult, stressful situations with limited orientation and back-up. Most of those interviewed attested to periods of high stress and exhaustion. That staff work long hours during emergencies is understandable. However, beyond the emergency phase the working hours should be reasonable especially for field based staff who are travelling extensively.

Many of these employees have left, or will soon leave, the organisations they have been working for. If staff daily working conditions, training and exit strategies are systematic and in line with the employees' hopes for the future, the "organisational alumni" can develop into a crucial resource pool for future interventions. If they leave burned out and disappointed their skills will be difficult to access next time.

The Lesson Learned: ACT members should take measures for its own staff as well as encourage partner organisations to pay attention to staff well-being and exercise 'duty of care'.

Lesson Learned on partnerships

Inter-organisational relationships vary depending on context. The evaluation notes three types of organisational partnerships that have supported the response:

- Horizontal partnerships such as those between the members of the ACT Forum Philippines.
- Vertical partnerships within federations or networks as exemplified by the relationship between Christian Aid UK and Christian Aid Philippines.
- Vertical partnerships between funding and implementing organisations as exemplified by the relationships between LWR and HABITAT Philippines, ICCO and CARET.

The horizontal relationships are a result of a common agreement that action together implies mutual benefits in the pursuit of more or less well-defined common goals. It is a voluntary arrangement that will last for as long as the parties remain convinced that organisational time and money invested contributes to the goals of their own organisation. If the ACT Forum Philippines is to survive it needs to develop greater clarity regarding how it contributes to member organisations' objectives.

The vertical relationships are necessarily influenced by the power distance between funding and implementing organisations. Such partnerships benefit both parties as they provide implementing organisations with resources and funding organisations with better contextual understanding and greater reach.

There are some lessons learned around these vertical relationships.

- The programming connectedness (links with society at large, the external context) is improved only if the implementing partner is present in the area beforehand (some implementing partners were as new to project areas as the funding partner).
- The funding organisation must follow-up brand/image risk and cannot delegate its responsibility to "do no harm". The funding organisation must therefore invest in monitoring capacity adapted to the implementing organisation that it partners with. This also means that the funding organisation may have to invest in cascading capacity through formal or on-the-job training on issues such as humanitarian standards in practice.
- Good practice examples noted include the work done by NCCP to help member churches understand that support must be given based on need, not on church membership. Another good example is LWR's follow-up of shelter programming where implementation processes were renegotiated with the local partner when gaps in implementation were identified. There were also bad examples such as the funding of unrealistic partner plans, of funding without monitoring as well as of support systems that were clearly understaffed.

Finally the vertical partnerships between funders and implementers need to be transformed into a long term relationship or concluded in a respectful way that benefits both parties. This requires the partners to decide how they want the partnership to develop and to engage in systematic negotiations in time for adjustment.

The Lessons Learned:

- *Differentiate between different types of partnerships.*
- *Implementation can be delegated, responsibility can not.*

Annex 5: Recommendations

ACT Secretariat

The ACT Secretariat is recommended to focus on:

- Advocacy, both international and in support of the national brand in the Philippines

- Ensuring ACT agreement on and adherence to international standards, including the modalities for interaction between the ACT Forum members and non-Forum members operating in the Philippines

- Fundraising coordination including

  - Future rapid support team focusing on coordinating appeal processes
  - Future rapid support team focusing on putting systems in place to ensure the quality of donor/member – implementing organisation relations. This would include ensuring the capacity to appeal, to address donor and member needs in terms of communications as well as to report on time with sufficient quality
  - Future rapid support team focusing on supporting learning by mapping member organisation capacities and skill gaps as well as supporting inter-organisational learning and skills transfers as needed

- Developing greater clarity regarding the role of rapid support teams. Seconded staff needs to be able to rapidly assess existing capacities and orient their work towards supporting these. Standard approaches need to be balanced by contextual awareness and assisting pre disaster non-operational members to engage national members and to contextualise should be explicit part of their job description. To the extent that members contributing human resources to rapid support teams wish to include less experienced staff in order to develop their skills or ensure organisational presence, this should be explicit in the job descriptions of these individuals.

The ACT Forum

The ACT Forum is recommended to focus on:

- Building national level advocacy and the national ACT brand

- Continuing its role in the administration of coordinated appeals and reporting

- Expanding its role in inter-organisational learning, including consideration of establishing a peer review process for programming

- Seeking Secretariat support in clarifying relations with non-forum members, as needed

- Continuing the process of building organisational preparedness, with the first step already initiated in the form of the work to develop a national emergency preparedness response plan (EPRP). The process should include defining joint standards to be applied by ACT members in the Philippines. It should be a gradual, demand driven process addressing questions such as: What is needed for programme quality? What is needed for clarity of the national ACT brand? What is a constructive balance between ACT visibility and individual member organisation identity?

The ACT Forum member organisations

The ACT Forum member organisations are recommended to:

- Contextualise and then implement standards consistently. Such standards should be built on member and partner organisations' comparative advantages in development (such as pre-disaster presence, contextual understanding etc.) and how this can be applied to disaster response.

- Shift focus of complaints response mechanisms from formal structures to insuring field application. This may imply accepting trust-based verbal systems. If that is the case they need to be systematically documented in order to allow local follow-up, aggregation of trends and systemic learning.

- Develop a strategy to adjust programming to available capacity. For example, if technical skills are lacking in a particular field, such as construction, programming should avoid this field and focus on areas where there is a comparative advantage such as community-based approaches (for example avoiding latrine construction and instead focusing on hygiene promotion). Such a strategy should consider how best to link affected populations to other actors with needed capacities, while allowing a focus on core competencies.

- Members should accept full responsibility for the quality of programming implemented with funds supplied by them, whether this is done by the member itself or a local partner. This implies a duty to limit programming funded to realistic levels. It also implies an organisational responsibility to appropriately resource monitoring and follow-up structures involved in local partnerships and to strategically plan for exits.

- Differentiate more clearly between relief operations and programming focused on reconstruction and development. It should be clear from the start where organisations intend to exit after the relief phase and where a transformation to development is planned. Programming should be adapted accordingly.

- Invest more in staff capacity, including staff welfare. Emergency recruited staff are commonly inexperienced yet passionate and ambitious. Overwork during the relief phase may be unavoidable but pressure on staff should adapt to moving from emergency conditions to longer term programming.

- Continue systematic investments in coordination with external stakeholders, including government, the cluster system, the private sector and informal community institutions.

- Develop "state of emergency" routines to speed up adaptation of administration and procurement processes (derogation procedures, preferred suppliers, increased budget mandate from middle/field management). Members with the resources to do so should consider investing in a human resource pool mechanism including the identification of candidates, training, pre-contacting et cetera.

- Predefine and communicate to ACT Secretariat and members the anticipated support needs in large emergencies in the Philippines.

- Develop a clear monitoring and evaluation system that complements that of their implementing partners. Clear roles and responsibilities in Monitoring and Evaluation between ACT members and implementing partners should be defined.

- Ensure that assistance is designed to empower communities in the true sense (reduce feeling of gratefulness and increase feeling of empowerment) so communities know their rights.

Annex 6: Organisational assessments

6.1 Christian Aid (CA)

6.1.1 CA brief profile and response context

Christian Aid has been operational in the Philippines for many years. In responding to typhoon Haiyan, ACT support has been utilised to meet food, shelter, livelihoods and education needs at the relief phase, and as leverage funding for the broader early recovery work, including disaster risk reduction-climate change adaptation (DRR-CCA) capacity building and advocacy work being implemented by CA and its partners Urban Poor Associates (UPA), Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (PHILSSA), Samdhana, and Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE NGO). According to CA's final report on the PHL 131 appeal funds, this enabled the CA response, recovery and rehabilitation programme to collectively reach at least 12,064 families (58,934 people) delivering food aid, cash assistance, livelihood assistance, and advocacy and empowerment activities.

This organisation specific assessment complements the overall findings, conclusions and recommendations of the main evaluation report. Please note that this assessment is based on the projects in Coron, North Palawan visited and does NOT reflect the totality of CA activities in response to the typhoon.

6.1.2 Relevance

In principle Christian Aid interventions were relevant. Food and NFI distributions and water system support were needed, as were shelter and livelihoods support. However, there were serious issues with timeliness, selection of beneficiaries and quality of programming in the projects visited. The team visited projects in the Calamianes group of islands, Coron, North Palawan, where CA worked through two local partners, Samdhana and PHILSSA, the latter of which in turn subcontracted some of the implementation to its member organisation PAGE.

6.1.3 Effectiveness

Overall, CA reports delivering above targets in distributions and water programming while attaining approximately half of livelihoods targets as compared to objectives set out in its programme proposals.

6.1.4 Efficiency

Geographic and logistical challenges in Palawan were underestimated and CA did not sufficiently monitor and support their implementing partners. Existing reports indicate that planned outputs have been achieved (livelihoods still on-going) but field observation of implementation raises a series of questions about management, monitoring and follow-up. The programme was understaffed for its size. Given the understaffing, administration costs are likely to have been low – but with serious effects on quality.

6.1.5 Quality and Accountability

The evaluation team has serious concerns regarding the quality of CA supported programming in Coron, especially through local partner PHILSSA. This partner did not have past experience from the area, they hugely underestimated support and monitoring staff needs and the team found a series of implementation weaknesses. CA has a well-developed set of guidelines, methodologies, templates etc. but these were not systematically used by PHILSSA and CA did not sufficiently monitor and support the partners' project implementation in the Calamianes.

Examples of observed weaknesses include

- Validation of beneficiary lists provided by local government took place through public voting on whether people on list deserved to be there, at mass community meetings without clear communication regarding the criteria for selection. The purpose of these meetings was not widely communicated and people not present, for whatever reason, did not have a voice.

- CRM systems were dependent on local government structures or based on telephone hotlines (including in areas without mobile phone coverage).

- The Programme Coordinator (a full time job) was also the System Superintendent and Manager of Coron Rural Water Works (also a full time job, with an institution which received much of the WASH funding supplied through the programme).

- Livelihoods programming consisted of distribution of pesos 5000 to anyone filling out a form describing what they wanted to invest in. Support consisted of the advice to double the money. Beneficiaries were informed that they would have to repay the money if they did not use it. No monitoring took place.

CA also partnered with Samdhana, a Community of Fellows focused on indigenous peoples, their culture, rights and environment. Samdhana's approach heavily emphasised community interaction and respect for existing local institutions. Their programming was high in quality of interaction but also slow and, by respecting traditions of the affected people, not necessarily in line with donor preferences regarding for example gender issues.

6.1.6 Gender, Protection and Cross Cutting Issues

Vulnerable groups (women, PWD's, senior citizens, pregnant women) were considered during needs assessment and distribution processes. All such categories were well represented in the groups of beneficiaries interviewed. However, given the weaknesses of selection processes described above, coverage is not likely to have been systematic.

6.1.7 Capacity Building and Disaster Risk Reduction

The informal coordination in the Coron Livelihoods Technical Working Group, hosted by FAO and CORDAID, was a clear example of good practice.

The evaluation team noted little enhanced capacity in partner staff or local government that could be attributed to programme activities.

6.1.8 Impact or outcomes

It is too early to assess impact, but below are some reflections regarding outcomes:

Activities were implemented in logistically very challenging areas. The fact that these areas were reached at all was in some cases an achievement.

The quality gaps in PHILSSA implementation are likely to have significantly limited positive outcomes. In some cases lack of communication and inappropriate selection methodologies are likely to have caused harm to individual households be increasing community tensions.

Samdhana interventions targeted the most challenging affected groups, due to both geographical and cultural distance. Outcomes are limited and assessing whether they are positive or negative is closely linked to subjective views around the balance between respect for indigenous culture and the appropriateness of development and the integration of indigenous peoples in broader Philippino society.

6.1.9 Recommendations

1) CA is recommended to immediately review their partnership agreements and implementation practices.

2) CA is recommended to clarify their policy regarding the balance between volume and quality. A funding organisation has the responsibility to support partners in becoming realistic in their programming or to assist them in building the capacity to implement projects agreed with reasonable quality.

3) CA is recommended to invest more in support systems, on the job training for implementing partners and follow-up.

4) CA is recommended to build a long term relationship with Samdhana. Such a relationship should not focus on Samdhana as an implementing partner, but as a partner on contextual understanding of indigenous people when developing future programming for implementation by more operational partners.

6.2 ICCO

6.2.1 ICCO brief profile and response context

ICCO has a long history in the Philippines and maintains a small office in Quezon City, Philippines. Its programming in the Philippines, however, did not include DRR until typhoon Haiyan happened.

In responding to typhoon Haiyan, ICCO made a series of interventions in Central Visayas, in multiple sectors including; Food and NFI distributions, shelter support, livelihoods, legal and psycho-social support, health and disaster management. All interventions were implemented through local partners, most of which ICCO had previous experience with through development programming.

This organisation specific assessment complements the overall findings, conclusions and recommendations of the main evaluation report.

6.2.2 Relevance

ICCO supported interventions were varied, depending on which implementing partner was involved. Overall they were relevant although there were questions about timeliness. The clear development orientation of local partners was both a weakness and a strength. Relief activities were a real challenge in many cases, though ultimately delivered. In recovery programming, ICCO partners represented a clearer rights focus and at times better community interaction than other ACT Forum member partner, thus increasing relevance. There was more innovation and some livelihood activities went beyond the replacement of capital goods common in most other livelihoods programming.

6.2.3 Effectiveness

Overall, ICCO reports that they have achieved their targets (refer table in section 3.1 above). Reported achievements were not always consistent with planned activities in the documentation provided to the team. The evaluation team assesses this to be more an administrative/ reporting issue than a lack of implementation (for example; the underacheivement in "Food security and Agriculture" may be related to the overacheivement in "Food").

6.2.4 Efficiency

Implementation strategies and support systems varied with each partner – most likely influencing efficiency. We lack data to comment further on this.

6.2.5 Quality and Accountability

ICCO systems for monitoring and supporting partner organisations were under-dimensioned resulting in gaps in quality, both in implementation and in planning, follow-up and reporting.

Accountability standards were not paid sufficient attention and CRM systems were often missing and the ICCO-supported projects that the team visited included some with questionable implementation. For example, in an integrated island support project staff attitudes had actively supported the development of gratitude by responding to complaints with urgings to be gratefull. Another example was a livelihood project where eight of ten distributed tricycles were allocated to board members of the implementing organisation.

Such obvious mistakes, although serious, were in contrast to good quality programming with a high level of innovation in other projects. The psycho-social support to PWDs implemented by the VSO-Bahaginan network has been noted in the lessons learned annex but deserves being mentioned again. Another good example of innovative approaches is a cluster of livelihoods interventions based on organic farming and adaptation of traditional livelihoods of affected indigenous people.

Gender, Protection and Cross Cutting Issues

Vulnerable groups' (female, PWDs, senior citizens, pregnant women) protection and immediate needs were generally well taken care of and systematically considered during needs assessment and distribution processes. In several projects activities were adapted to the different needs and capacities of vulnerable groups.

6.2.6 Capacity Building and Disaster Risk Reduction

ICCO programming had a strong focus on capacity building and DRR. Again, because of the different strategies chosen by diverse implementing partners, large variations in approach were noted.

6.2.7 Impact or outcomes

It is too early to assess impact but some reflections regarding outcomes are presented below:

Outcomes are likely to be as varied as the implementing strategies chosen. Overall, the development background of the partners has led to a project portfolio with a higher potential for impact than more relief oriented programming.

The potential of the innovation activity noted depends on how ICCO chooses to support dissemination of lessons learned and skills developed, both inter-organisationally between their local partners and to their ACT Forum colleagues.

6.2.8 Recommendations

1) ICCO should review the cluster of projects they are supporting as there is a need to address gaps and a great potential to build on emerging good programming.

2) ICCO should strengthen its support to local partners by intensifying monitoring and facilitating peer to peer learning (and later dissemination throughout the ACT membership).

3) ICCO should upgrade administrative training and support in order to ensure that ICCO activities are realistically showcased in aggregated ACT reporting systems.

6.3 Lutheran World Relief (LWR)

6.3.1 LWR brief profile and response context

Lutheran World Relief' began its operations in the Philippines in 1960 through hosting arrangements. During the late 1980s, LWR focused its operations in Mindanao which is characterized by high levels of poverty in rural areas due to chronic armed conflict, natural disasters and limited opportunities for economic improvement[17]. LWR is formally registered with the Security and Exchange Commission in the Philippines as a non-stock, non-profit organization focusing on agriculture and food security, climate change adaptation, disaster risk reductionand emergency operations.

In responding to typhoon Haiyan, LWR partnered with Habitat for Humanity Philippine (HfHP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in providing shelter repair kits for 5,345families located in the province of Cebu (Daan Bantayan, Bantayan, Medellin, Madridejos, and Santa Fe) as well as in the province of Leyte (Ormoc City). Its on-site core housing construction benefitted a total of 410 families in Burauen, Leyte

LWR partnered with RAFI in providing NFI for selected sites in the province of Cebu (Daan Bantayan, Bantayan and Madellin) and Leyte (Ormoc city, Karanga and Polompon). Cash for work support was provided in partnership with Phildhrra Visayas office following the government of the Philippines guidelines and regulations.

This organisation specific assessment complements the overall findings, conclusions and recommendations of the main evaluation report.[18]

6.3.2 Relevance

A series of interviews with field staff, beneficiaries, community members and government officials and representatives in selected sites in the provinces of Cebu and Leyte indicates that LWR interventions were relevant. Overall, LWR response was consistent with current government policies and recommendations as well as community identified needs.

The shelter repair kits provided in some areas were not responsive to household needs. There are also some inconsistencies in terms of adhering to Sphere standards in terms of providing technical assistance and guidance on appropriate rebuilding techniques. For example, some respondents expressed that they were provided training and orientation on proper building construction but no one assisted them in the actual construction and no one monitored if such practices were adhered to. In some cases, the recipients just tied their houses to the trees and some also expressed that they could not follow the design since the materials provided were not enough. [19]

However, some of the interventions were not timely. NFI distributions were significantly delayed and the cash for work programme originally intended for debris removal was no longer needed for that purpose when such interventions started.

The core housing interventions were significantly delayed. This can be attributed to land issue requirements and delays in contracting and delivery of materials. Since LWR operated through a partnership, significant delays in finalization of the plans and negotiations with partners contributed to the delayed implementation of the project. HfHP, in turn, also operated through implementing

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[17] http://programs.lwr.org/asia/philippines

[18] In comments to the draft LWR notes that "as a result of the external evaluation where LWR commissioned the services of TANGO, LWR held a Learning Workshop in June 25-26, 2015 during which the lessons learned from the evaluation results had informed LWR top leadership management to revisit the LWR Emergency Operations Objective Strategy. The lessons learned from this ACT report were similar to the TANGO evaluation which we resolved to address as we revisited the organization's emergency operations objective strategy".

[19] In comments to the draft LWR states that the kits were in line with cluster minimum requirements and that the organisation sought to address the gaps in construction assistance.

partners and the transfer of responsibilities in terms quality of construction was not clear. This affected the quality of construction and led to confusion and disappointments among some beneficiaries. In core housing projects, some of the community members expressed doubt that the core housing would be completed because of the delays.[20]

The conditions for cash transfers through conditional voucher were unclear. There was some confusion from the beneficiaries how to use it. Some say 50% for household needs and 50% for livelihood needs. However, many expressed that they used everything either for household needs or livelihood needs, because according to them there is no mechanism to check and verify it. Furthermore, on Daan Bantayan the place where they could exchange the voucher required the beneficiaries to cross the sea and in terms of distance was very far from their island.

Some of the beneficiaries were also confused about the purpose of the quilts that were provided and did not see the value of using them. Solar lamps that were provided were cited as very useful but, as the absence of electricity pre-dated the typhoon, should be seen in the context of poverty alleviation or DRR, more than emergency response.

6.3.3 Effectiveness

Overall, LWR delivered according to the objectives and targets set out in its programme proposals.

6.3.4 Efficiency

Geographic and logistical challenges combined with the partner based implementation strategy of LWR to create significant delays in implementing some programme components. Identifying the right implementing partners proved to be a challenge, partly addressed by encouraging known partners from non-affected regions to train local colleagues, partly by establishing new partnerships. This affected the coordination, management, evaluation and monitoring processes.

A lack of staff with needed technical experience created gaps in guidance, monitoring and follow-up of implementing partners' interventions. A consequence was monitoring and evaluation activities focused on reporting requirements, while quality and standards at times were not met. For example, majority of core housing viewed by the team in Ormoc city had clear indications of improper finishing. Interviewees stated that such issues had not been addressed despite several visits from LWR staff.

6.3.5 Quality and Accountability

LWR clearly demonstrates adherence to Sphere and humanitarian quality standards in theory as indicated in project proposals and reports. However, translating this into practice is challenging, especially in terms of ensuring standards in implementation by local partners. There was a clear transfer of accountability from LWR to implementing partners to sub-implementing partners. The evaluation team is of the opinion that delegation was not sufficiently followed-up to ensure that standards were upheld.

For example, some of the LWR staff mentioned that they underwent Sphere standard trainings but could not identify how to contextualize it in the local setting. Furthermore, there were inconsistencies in terms of some implementing partners stating that they received proper training and orientation on Sphere and HAP standards, and some saying they did not. It was clear that sub-implementing partners of HfHP were not provided proper trainings on Sphere and HAP standards.

Complaints response mechanisms were in place. However there were clear gaps in terms of confidentiality, proper implementation and follow through. This caused community members to avoid lodging their complaints since they were afraid that their house constructions would be

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[20] In comments to the draft LWR states that core housing was complete by June 30, 2015.

affected. For example, the complaints box in Barangay San Jose, was managed by the Barangay Secretary who is related to the owner of the sub-implementing partner of HfHP, indicating a clear conflict of interest. This created some level of conflict in the community and discouraged honest feedback. The lack of proper management of sensitive information may expose whistle-blowers to danger and conflict.

6.3.6   Gender, Protection and Cross Cutting Issues

Vulnerable groups' (female, PWDs, senior citizens, pregnant women) protection and immediate needs were well taken care of and systematically considered during needs assessment and distribution processes.

More hands-on protection issues were also considered. For example, the cash for work beneficiaries were provided with accident insurance, availability of medical personnel on site and rapid payment as compared to other organizations who provides similar assistance.

6.3.7   Capacity Building and Disaster Risk Reduction

The evaluation team noted enhanced capacity at all levels including staff capacity building, local government officials and community members. Interviewees referred to an increased knowledge of DRR in the communities. For example, communities have evacuated immediately upon receiving disaster alerts during recent disasters.

The close coordination and partnership of LWR with implementing partners and vice-versa clearly shows mutual benefits from learning from each other and building their respective capacities and capability. The complexity of the approaches and interventions implemented by all partners during the typhoon Haiyan response enhanced and strengthened their technical capacity to respond to future disasters. However the challenge to sustain this remains considering the high turn-over rate of humanitarian aid workers.

6.3.8   Impact or outcomes

It is too early to assess impact. Some reflections regarding outcomes;

In cash for work projects, the amount of money received was appropriate for daily and weekly household needs. The Cash for Work (CFW) programmes took place two to three month after the typhoon. This lessened positive indirect effects (much of the needed debris clearing was already done). Meanwhile, beneficiaries were of the opinion that this support came at the right time as this was when their money was running out and earlier on they would not have been able to participate as they were so busy addressing immediate needs of the household.

A majority of the beneficiaries expressed that the assistance and interventions provided to them by LWR in terms of core housing had a positive impact on their lives. They felt that their houses were more secure and disaster resistant compared to the houses they had prior to typhoon Haiyan. It provided them peace of mind and some sense of security for their families.

6.3.9   Recommendations

1) There is a need to invest in strategy development and practical planning in line with LWR ambitions towards humanitarian response.
2) There is a need to review the HR policy in terms of recruitment specifically during humanitarian response stage. Hence, develop clear and appropriate capacity building support for staff prior to their exposure in the field.
3) Continue to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation systems especially in technical areas.
4) Explore cross organizational mentorship and coaching among ACT alliance members with clear expertise on specific interventions such as on NFI from NCCP. LWR core housing

interventions are advanced compared to other ACT alliance members especially regarding documentation and handover mechanisms in core housing.

5) Review the system on CRM specifically on managing sensitive information. Ensure that such systems are integrated at all levels and stages of implementation including LWR partners and their sub-implementing partners.

6) Further enhance the "right to receive humanitarian assistance paradigm" in target communities; move further towards empowerment and ownership instead of "feeling of gratefulness".

7) Review the relevance of providing "quilts", whether it is relevant given the Philippine and local context.

6.4 National Council of Churches of the Philippines

6.4.1 NCCP brief profile and response context

Founded in 1963, the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) is an ecumenical fellowship of non-Roman Catholic denominations in the Philippines working for unity in faith and order. With the purpose of coordinating the response of ACT Alliance members and to interface with the external stakeholders, particularly the government and the UN agencies, the ACT Coordination Center was set-up and hosted by the NCCP under the supervision of the ACT Philippine Forum.

In response to Typhoon Haiyan, NCCP in coordination with its member churches and other ecumenical partners implemented its humanitarian assistance in the provinces of Eastern and Western Samar and Iloilo right at the onset of Typhoon Haiyan on November 2013 through the ACT Alliance appeal PHP131.

NCCPs response to Haiyan was to contribute to the overall efforts of the affected communities in recovering from the devastating effects of the typhoon through the provision of relevant assistance that will cover their immediate needs, provide opportunities for early recovery and rehabilitation, and build up their capacities to better prepare and cope with disasters. To be able to facilitate relief distribution and rehabilitation projects in the most affected areas in Samar, Leyte and Panay Island, NCCP established field offices in UCCP Church, Tacloban and Balasan, Iloilo.

This organisation specific assessment complements the overall findings, conclusions and recommendations of the main evaluation report.

6.4.2 Relevance

Interviews with staff, government officials and community members from Iloilo and Samar islands field sites visited suggest that all the interventions in the different sectors provided by NCCP were relevant. Community members interviewed affirmed the usefulness of the interventions and that they had positively changed their lives.

While the interventions were relevant, not all the interventions were timely, especially shelter, psychosocial support and comfort rooms (latrines). At the time of the evaluation, more than 1 ½ years after Typhoon Haiyan, the shelter component of NCCP's proposal was not yet completed.

6.4.3 Effectiveness

Immediate outputs of the projects were fully achieved, except in the areas of shelter, WASH and psychosocial support where they were partially achieved.[21]

Food distribution

Food distribution met its objective which was provision of essential food to meet immediate family life-saving and nutrition needs. The amount and quality of food was superior as compared to government authorities and other agencies that distributed food. All respondents appreciated the speed and quality of NCCP's food distribution.

Shelter and NFIs

Shelter and NFIs programming partially met planned objectives. Vulnerable households received non-food assistance (including tools) to complement emergency and transitional shelter assistance.

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[21] In comments to the draft the NCCP notes that "for the Psychosocial Support, if the basis of the measure of output is the logframe, it is important to note that CBPS is an approach and focused mainly in the mainstreaming and not in specific stand-alone activities – thus evaluating the output on the basis of the logframe is limiting since the effects of the mainstreaming must be factored in more than the specific activities".

NFIs (kitchen utensils, hygiene kits, school kits, etc) were distributed on time and adhered to Sphere standards.

Household surveys conducted for shelter repair kit (SRK) provision were highly effective especially in Tacloban where beneficiaries' houses were completely repaired. Completed houses adhered to the principles of building back better and are structurally sound, however, there was a delay in distribution of SRKs. Furthermore there are still incomplete shelters, especially core housing. No systematic handover procedures addressing legal issues took place for the core housing. Shelter planning in Iloilo was better than in Tacloban. Barangay council members interviewed in Serum were critical of NCCP's interventions, and this may be attributed to internal politics in the barangay. Overall, there is an absence of strategy and response plan for shelter in NCCP (refer to Sphere Standards on settlement planning; Sphere Handbook pages 249 – 257). [22]

WASH

WASH objectives were partially met. Water supply, sanitation and hygiene services were provided to disaster affected children, women and men, including people living with disabilities inside or outside of evacuation centres, transitory shelters and to households during the recovery process at Iloilo and Samar islands. Hygiene kits, while relevant and effectively distributed, were not accompanied with hygiene promotion. Under WASH, construction of latrines was the main activity and was yet to be completed at the time of the evaluation. NCCP did not have adequate expertise in the 'hard component' of WASH, which contributed to the delay of the latrine construction.[23] Coordination with NCA on WASH was not as effective as could have been the case due to competing priorities and varying work pace and approaches between the two agencies. There was also an absence of systematic transfer of WASH skills and knowledge from NCA to NCCP.

Food security

Objectives for food security and agriculture were met in that vulnerable communities were provided with seeds, agricultural inputs and training. Although it is too soon to measure the impact of this intervention, the evaluation team is of the view that this intervention supported communities in re-establishing livelihood activities.

Early recovery outcome was met in that livelihoods provision of emergency and early recovery livelihoods to affected communities including through cash-for-work and conditional cash transfers for debris clearance was successfully achieved. The cash received was highly appreciated by the communities and was used to meet their immediate unmet needs such as buying medicines, buying school materials for the kids, buying food, etc. Beneficiaries confirmed that the livelihoods interventions have supported a return to the 'normal life' they had before Haiyan.

DRR and climate change

DRR and climate change objectives were fully met in terms of increased knowledge and skills of partners and local leaders on DRR and climate change through training, knowledge management and learning. All respondents acknowledged the increase in knowledge and skills in DRR. When disasters

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[22] In comments to the draft NCCP notes "There is a strategy and response plan for shelter that includes the improved design of the core housing units as well as the "bayanihan" process that employs the beneficiaries themselves as skilled workers and helpers. This promoted the spirit of unity and project ownership among the beneficiaries. However, due to the scarcity of quality construction materials as well as the delay due to access to land or land ownership, project implementation was greatly affected specifically timeliness. The bulk of beneficiaries of core housing in Samar need to be relocated in safe, secure relocation site approved by the government. Siting and acquisition of the relocation site took some time that delayed the project's timeline considerably."

[23] In comments to the draft NCCP disagrees and states" The delay in the construction of latrine was not due to the absence of a technical expert rather the delay in the shelter construction [which] also pushed back the timeline of the latrine project."

hit again (for example Typhoon Ruby) communities were quick to evacuate upon hearing the alerts. Houses rebuilt are safer and more typhoon resistant in most cases.

Psychosocial support

The objective of psychosocial support, i.e. strengthening target communities´ resilience, coping mechanisms and psychosocial wellbeing was achieved. However, the evaluation team lacks suficient data to directly attribute such outcomes to the psychosocial activities in the NCCP response. There were psychosocial activities that were yet to be completed at the time of reporting. A comprehensive and detailed psychosocial baseline survey was conducted with the support of the Church of Sweden. The result of the baseline was not used to revise the Haiyan response appeal plan and the psychosocial component in the appeal, which was the contribution of Church of Sweden, may not have been fully understood by NCCP.[24]

One of the purposes of the psychosocial wellbeing baseline tool was to guide project planning so that activities to improve wellbeing were in line with the community priorities. In other words, if at the end of the project signs of psychosocial wellbeing were seen more frequent and actions likely to improve wellbeing happened more often, it may be concluded that the project had contributed to people's psychosocial wellbeing. NCCP interventions were highly sensitive to the communities' needs and its programmatic interventions were designed to take into consideration the psychosocial wellbeing. Essentially the organisation mainstreams psycho-social components and attitudes in all programming. Given that context, it was not evident that the specific psychosocial activities implemented made a real difference to the wellbeing of the communities.

6.4.4 Efficiency

NCCP appears to have a collegial, close-knitted and highly motivated staff that respects the leadership of the Emergency Programme Manager. Part of the hiring of new staff during the Haiyan response was from respected institutions that had been destroyed by the typhoon. There is low staff turnover in NCCP. Overall the response has been efficient in that material and human resources was used efficiently. All respondents spoke highly of NCCP staff behaviour which indicates adherence to Code of Conduct.

NCCP's staffing approach was to have positions that required generalists rather than specialists. This approach, while it worked in some cases, negatively influenced the quality of service delivery that requires specialization. For example, the capacity in NCCP was yet to be fully built for psychosocial support. It is also unclear to what extent psychosocial support will be considered as a niche of NCCP, given all the training for the two officers in charge of the psychosocial programme. The NCCP noted that while the organisation was still building its capacity on CBPS, the principles of it were already part of the NCCP's ministries not just for the Relief and Rehabilitation for Typhoon Haiyan. Thus the trainings were useful not just for the Project but for the work of the whole NCCP as an institution, with or without disaster.The WASH component of the appeal was slow to be implemented but was at the time of the evaluation being implemented more rapidly having hired a WASH specialist.

Some instances of increased capacity at the barangay level were noted; however this capacity building effort was not a structured effort.

Procurement processes were described as the same as before the Haiyan Response – approximately one month for procurement. The possibility of derogation was included in the financial manual and

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[24] In comments to the draft the NCCP notes "It is not about NCCP not understanding but about the limitations of the Baseline Tool that was used. It is important to factor in that the baseline Survey that was conducted was a Pilot test of a new tool developed by Church of Sweden. The activity conducted was "Pilot of a new CBPS baseline tool on NCCP psychosocial programme' that aims to get feedbacks and ideas for improvement of the Tool. The first version that was piloted by NCCP did not generate the data needed to be interpreted and translated into activities for revision – which is not also the purpose of the Pilot Test."

was used particularly for purchase of food items, due to urgency. Training of warehouse management was provided however there was no training on standards, where warehouse staff rely on external experts to verify the quality of the items such as coco lumber. Meanwhile, a detailed procurement policy was developed during the Haiyan response.

6.4.5 Impact or outcome

Interventions in the different sectors were showing positive results and were likely to contribute to positive impact such as in the food and NFI distribution. All communities affirm that NCCP's support was 'different' from other agencies in that the quality and size of the service provided was very high. The provision of these items, especially the food items, was lifesaving. Shelter provision restored the dignity of communities and allowed for a safer and protected environment for their families.

6.4.6 Quality and Accountability

NCCP demonstrated accountability to communities and adherence to standards in theory and practice. The project proposal adhered to Sphere standards, there were displays of banners on information sharing and complaint response mechanisms. Orientations were provided on complaint response mechanisms in most cases. The number of complaints received was limited. It was apparent that most complaints were communicated verbally to field staff. Such complaints were not documented and therefore not possible to follow-up or aggregate for organisational learning.[25] A lot of investment was done on formal complaint response mechanisms, however the return on this investment was unclear.

Information sharing was not consistent in that some communities were unclear when the shelter or CR would be completed or when NCCP will leave the target area or what they will receive during food and NFIs distribution.

6.4.7 Gender, Protection and Cross Cutting Issues

Vulnerable groups' (female, PWDs, senior citizens, pregnant women) protection and immediate needs are well taken care of. Consideration of such differences was apparent during needs assessment and distribution processes.

6.4.8 Capacity Building and Disaster Risk Reduction

Enhanced capacity is observed at all levels including staff capacity building, local government officials and community members. There is an increased knowledge of DRR in the communities. Communities have evacuated immediately upon receiving disaster alerts during recent disasters.

6.4.9 Recommendations

1) Information sharing on project intervention should be continuous and regular so to avoid misinterpretation or misunderstanding or rumour mongering. Information sharing on distribution of food and NFIs should be timely and clear in order for recipients to be prepared in advance. Linked to that, NCCP should be more explicit in developing and communicating its exit strategy.

2) The use of technical staff may contribute to efficiency. NCCP should decide which technical sectors require specialization and which require generalists in line with the niche that NCCP would like to be known for.

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[25] In comments to the draft NCCP notes that there were complaints documented and properly relayed to the concerned field offices. Complaints raised to field staff, albeit unwritten, were discussed and resolved during the weekly staff meetings.

3) NCCP should develop a clear strategy and response plan for the shelter component, taking into consideration the assumptions and risks. The assumptions and risks should be periodically reviewed.

4) NCCP should design a more structured approach to building capacity at local government levels.

5) Programme interventions should make further efforts to inform communities of their rights in order to reduce the 'feeling of gratefulness' and promote a feeling of empowerment.

6) NCCP should provide standards training for warehouse staff as well as checklist to assist in checking quality of items throughout the supply chain.

7) Revisit and revise effectiveness of the complaints response mechanisms. If existing mechanisms such as frequent visits and consultations with communities work well, NCCP may consider reducing the investments in CRM. Concerns raised verbally to community mobilizers should be recorded in order to analyse the trends of complains and concerns and ways to improve quality of the intervention.

8) Share experience with ICCO (who is also implementing on psychosocial stand-alone component) on psychosocial component. Both organisations can draw on each other's good practices and challenges in implementation.

6.5 Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)

6.5.1 NCA brief profile and response context
Norwegian Church Aid's component of the ACT Appeal PHL131 was implemented both operationally by NCA, and in partnership with the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP). NCA also collaborated with other ACT members in the Philippines. The overall goal of the response was to reduce public health risks through improving access to water supply, providing adequate access to sanitation and hygiene promotion and supporting local government in the recovery process for disaster affected communities.

NCA left Philippines in November 2014 upon closure of the project. The duration of stay was extended compared to the original plan which was only 6 months (November 2013 – April 2014). The second phase ended in November 2014. The evaluation team visited WASH projects in the areas that NCCP was operating. The evaluation team was only able to speak to the former NCA Team Leader and a former NCA WASH technician, now working with NCCP.

This assessment complements the overall findings, conclusions and recommendations of the main evaluation report.

6.5.2 Relevance
The response was relevant in that in sites visited respondents confirmed that both access to water and hygiene practices have improved. The water catchment system was deemed as very helpful especially in areas where clean water is scarce. Respondents, especially mothers with children, are able to use water with convenience.

Timeliness was questionable and there were numerous complaints from the beneficiaries visited on the lack of latrines. The delay in this component was caused by several factors including government decisions on resettlement sites, decision on target areas and the lack of proper latrine design for high water table areas. Although this is now the responsibility of NCCP, a greater collaboration between the government and NCCP could have mitigated some of the challenges in the WASH implementation.

6.5.3 Effectiveness
According to ACT reporting, NCA surpassed the number of planned beneficiaries by 60%.

6.5.4 Efficiency
NCA has stocks of latrine materials in Malaysia and Dubai. However, these materials were not designed for use in the Philippines where communities preferred sitting toilets rather than squatting toilets. Implementation also encountered physical difficulties due to high water tables, a condition that was known. It contributed to a lack of efficiency.[26]

6.5.5 Quality and Accountability
NCA's proposal has a very clear integration of Sphere standards and complaints response mechanisms. While WASH interventions paid attention to Sphere technical standards, interviews suggest that there was a lack of organizational accountability, especially towards the host agency, NCCP. There was a challenge related to the transfer of operational funds, leading to a solution

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[26] In comments to the draft NCA notes that the latrines were only meant for the first phase of an emergency and were in line with the Global WASH Cluster specifications, although not appropriate for all contexts.In the next stage of the project local designs were used. Meanwhile,the issue of high water table was an ongoing discussion throughout, challenging all WASH responders. Several of the NGOs chose to not build in the areas with high water table or build shelters without sanitation solutions.

involving a jont savings account of the field coordinator and the finance assistant as designated by the NCCP. The process of developing and utilising this system generated significant tension between NCA and NCCP. The organisations have yet to resolve the issue and have different opinions on how the situation evolved. To clarify exactly what happened goes beyond the scope of this evaluation. All parties seem in agreement that channeling relief funds through a jont savings account was not a good idea and has generated problems.

6.5.6 Gender, Protection and Cross Cutting Issues
Gender and protection issues were well integrated into the WASH programme.

6.5.7 Capacity Building and Disaster Risk Reduction
Capacity building of NCCP on WASH, especially on the hard component, is limited except in the case where a former NCA WASH staff was hired by NCCP. It is also unclear to what extent ACT members used the results of the NCA led WASH survey to reprioritize their WASH interventions. ACT members typically focused on the hygiene kits without the hygiene promotion component the need for which was one of the main conclusions of the survey.

6.5.8 Impact or outcomes
Immediate outcome of the WASH interventions suggest positive results especially in areas where WASH interventions were completed. However further verification and validation is required upon completion of all pending WASH components that are now the responsibility of NCCP.

6.5.9 Recommendations
1) Considering NCA was not permanently present in the Philippines, it is advisable that NCA effectively coordinates with the host agency, especially to avoid any legal exposure to NCA and its host agency. An exit strategy should be clearly communicated to the host agency and other ACT members given the 'non-presence' status of NCA.

2) Given the nature of NCA's operation (short term intervention during Haiyan), it is proposed that greater efforts are made to capture and communicate learning for continuity and sustainability. This would also be a demonstration of accountability toward fellow ACT members who are present in the Philippines.

3) NCA should apply its contextual learning to its ready-made stocks. Future needs assessments could further emphasize contextual understanding and should be carried out in collaboration with host agency or partner organizations.

4) It is proposed that NCA focuses on transferring capacity in a more systematic and conscious manner to partner organizations such as NCCP.[27] In the absence of technical capacity within NCCP, the focus of capacity building could be on the 'soft component' of WASH such as hygiene promotion. A more strategic assessment of the needs of communities as well as partner organizations should be carried out in order to ensure a more effective implementation.

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[27] In comments to the draft NCA notes that NCA invested and was very concerned with capacity building throughout the response. However, the circumstances and the overload of NCCP made this very challenging. Certain assessments were done: WASH technical assessments, hygiene survey, partner assessment of NCCP

Annex 7: Map of PHL 131