

# EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

# 15/16



Norad

## Learning from the Past: Towards Better Development?

Annual report 2015/16





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# PREFACE



# PREFACE

I am delighted to present the annual report on the work of Norad's Evaluation Department during the past year. We have once again evaluated and analyzed a number of relevant issues linked to the implementation of Norwegian development policy.

The annual report provides a brief description of the evaluations and studies conducted. We also highlight some important lessons learned from the work as a whole, and present a number of the results that have emerged from the department's professional cooperation with international evaluation departments. As in previous years' reports, we also present an overview of how the two ministries in charge of development policy are following up these reports and recommendations.

The annual report covers the period from summer 2015 to the middle of May 2016. For a complete overview of the work carried out in 2015, please refer to the previous annual report in addition. In future years, we plan to cover the entire calendar year in one report.

The Evaluation Department was revitalized to some extent last year when the 2006 evaluation instructions were revised. The new instructions give greater flexibility and increased independence in respect of evaluation activities. Evaluation activities are now reported directly to the secretaries general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment in order to underline the department's independence vis-à-vis all those administering projects and interventions. The new instructions also clarify the Evaluation Department's responsibility to present recommendations on how the evaluations are to be followed up in the context of development policy.

Total resources used for the work of the department – the central evaluation activity for Norwegian development policy – remained at the same level in 2015 as in previous years. Both staffing and the budget have largely remained at the same level over the last ten years. Others must assess whether this is sufficient to elicit the knowledge required to evaluate the implementation of Norwegian development policy.

As a department, our task is to do the best possible job within the available resources.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Climate and Environment, Norad and other Norwegian development aid agencies for excellent cooperation in the implementation of our work. We are well aware that being the object of evaluation is not always regarded as positive in a hectic work situation. Despite this, we experience a large degree of openness and goodwill from those who are the subjects of our evaluations. Naturally, we hope that the evaluation work will lead to even better Norwegian development cooperation.


Oslo, May 2016



**Per Øyvind Bastøe**

Director, Evaluation Department

**AID BUDGET AND ALLOCATION TO EVALUATION 2005-2015  
(NUMBERS IN MNOK)**



■ Aid budget

■ Allocated budget for evaluations and partnership agreements. The numbers in the graph does not include administrative costs. In 2015 total use of resources for the department was 30 MNOK.

Over the last ten years the number of staff has been 11.

**The Evaluation Department's activity**

is regulated by separate instructions issued by the Secretary Generals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. The instructions from 2006 was revised last year and became operative on December 1<sup>st</sup> 2015.

**In May 2016 the department has the following employees:**

- Anette Wilhelmsen
- Anita Haslie
- Balbir Singh
- Caroline Grubstad Hoff
- Ida Hellmark
- Ida Lindkvist
- Jan-Petter Holtedahl
- Kjersti Løken
- Lillian Prestegard
- Per Øyvind Bastøe
- Siv Lillestøl







# IMPORTANT LESSONS LEARNED



# Important lessons learned in 2015/16

In his foreign policy address to the Storting (the Norwegian parliament) earlier this year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized the need for innovation at a time when we are facing a more challenging situation for foreign and security policy than for many years. He underlined the need to introduce stricter requirements for evaluations as a means of reforming and concentrating development policy.

What lessons can we learn from the evaluations and studies conducted during the last year? Have they helped to reform and renew development policy? How have they actually contributed?

It is striking that the findings and conclusions of these evaluations largely are in line with the findings and conclusions of previous evaluations. The implementation of Norwegian development policy appears to share common features regardless of where it is carried out and in what sector it is put into effect. Both the strong and the weak sides of the implementation seem to be repeated again and again.

In the following, we will focus on three of these common features:

## 1

### **UNCLEAR STRATEGIC GUIDELINES**

Reports and propositions to the Storting stipulate the overarching guidelines for the development policy. These are often formulated in general terms, and usually present many praiseworthy objectives and intentions. At the same time, there is broad agreement that not everything can be accomplished at the same time and that there is a need for focus and concentration. This is particularly stressed when it comes to initiatives in complex and fragile situations, which Norway increasingly encounters in its work. The policy goals must therefore be specified and operationalized through various kinds of strategic guidelines.

The evaluations show that this only occurs to a very limited extent. The clearest example in last year's evaluations can be found in the evaluation of the planning, organization and management of the Norwegian initiative in connection with the Syria crisis. Although the initiative is characterized by flexibility and effective decision-making processes, it is difficult to identify the overarching strategic guidelines for the work. Guidelines may have been given verbally or implicitly, but the lack of their explicit expression makes it difficult to assess the initiative.

The evaluation of Norwegian support to basic education channelled through UNICEF and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), and the baseline study of environmental and natural resources in Myanmar lead to much the same conclusion.

## 2

### **LACK OF DOCUMENTATION OF EXPERIENCES**

Another finding, linked to the first, is that it is often difficult to find solid and credible documentation of the experiences gained from the Norwegian interventions. Documenting and reporting requirements are dispersed among various parts of the development aid administration in Norway and abroad. Our evaluation teams repeatedly experience difficulties in finding the documentation, either because it is not easily accessible or because little has been documented and reported.

This was one of the main findings in the evaluation of the work of FK Norway (Fredskorpset - the Norwegian peace corps) to strengthen civil society in developing countries. Even though this was the objective of FK Norway's work throughout the entire period of the evaluation, there is no documentation of how this work is to be carried out or what has in fact been accomplished.

Similarly, the evaluation of Norwegian support to basic education channelled through UNICEF and the GPE

pointed out weaknesses in terms of operationalization and documentation of the intention to strengthen the quality of basic education. While children's access to education was well documented, it was difficult to find any indications that the educational intervention had contributed to learning outcomes.

Reviews and decentralized evaluations conducted by those who manage development funding are intended to be instruments for documenting results. In the mapping study of these reviews and evaluations, we found that there is no complete overview of the reports. Moreover, it was quite difficult to even find the reports, which number an estimated 70 to 80 reviews and evaluations annually.

We note an exception from the general finding of inadequate documentation in the evaluation of the NORHED programme, the Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research. There we found that those who administer the programme clearly show that they learn from experience, and their reflections from the first funding allocation reflect this. The follow-up of the study of crisis-affected populations' participation in humanitarian work also indicates a similar interest in reflection and learning among those responsible in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the humanitarian organizations.

## 3

### **LONG-TERM COOPERATION IMPROVES THE CHANCES OF ACHIEVING GOOD RESULTS**

The evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development shows that long-term institutional cooperation (*twinning*) often provides positive results. The evaluation team found that the key factors for successful capacity development were long-term binding cooperation, flexibility and adaptability. They found that historically, more emphasis has been placed on these factors in Norwegian development cooperation compared with various other donors.

As a rule, long-term cooperation requires good contextual and cultural understanding, which is of prime importance for good results achievement. In the Myanmar study we found weaknesses in how Norwegian institutions took account of the context in which they were to work; notably, conditions were poorly mapped prior to the establishment of the intervention. The report particularly highlighted the need for conflict sensitivity analyses, especially in view of the significance of natural resource management for the conflict situation in the country. In addition, we pointed out the need for greater awareness of organizational culture and the lack of basic information about the capacity of the partner institutions.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

Consequently, last year's evaluations support the findings of previous evaluations, and confirm that Norwegian development cooperation has maintained both its strong and its weak sides. This does not necessarily mean that the development aid administration has not learned anything or resists change. However, it illustrates that the pace of change is slow, and that some of the basic weaknesses have not been satisfactorily addressed. It also means that the political intentions in respect of concentration and renewal have not been sufficiently followed up.

We believe that evaluations can be a vital instrument for renewal, reforms and concentration. Nevertheless, overarching evaluations and studies alone cannot provide a solid enough foundation. The basis of learning and improvement lies in the individual programme and intervention. Objectives must be clarified and documentation of what has been achieved must be better. This then creates a basis for improvement.



# REPORTS FROM THE EVALUATION DEPARTMENT



# Evaluation of Norwegian multilateral support to basic education channelled through UNICEF and the Global Partnership for Education



PHOTO: G.M.B.AKASH

## REPORT 7/2015

### Evaluation of Norwegian multilateral support to basic education

External consultants: University of Southern California's Development Portfolio Management Group (DPMG)

ISBN: 978-82-7548-809-9

## BACKGROUND

Norway has set a goal of being a leading driving force in providing development aid for education. Between 2009 and 2013, almost three-quarters of Norwegian development aid to basic education was distributed through multilateral channels. UNICEF and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) received almost the entire amount in this period.

The evaluation assessed the effectiveness of development aid (results), development aid administration and the funding of education in ten countries: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal and Zambia.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to promote more evidence-based decisions on policy and programme design in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNICEF and GPE.

## FINDINGS

> *Development aid administration:* The report pointed out that both organizations have achieved a fair degree of success, but criticized key aspects of the work of both UNICEF and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). The organizations were highly praised for the relevance of the development aid, which was largely in keeping with both donor and national priorities. UNICEF was criticized for poor documentation and reporting of results, making it difficult to identify and change projects that are not proceeding according to plan. Furthermore, the reporting of results often

focuses on immediate results (for example, the number of teachers in training), with no documentation of long-term development effects (for example, whether teacher training enhanced learning outcomes for the pupils). According to the evaluation, GPE's main challenge is to strengthen quality assurance of both the receivers of GPE funding and the national education plans.

> *Effectiveness of development aid:* The evaluation particularly assessed three objectives: improved learning outcomes, gender equality and equity for marginalized groups. The report found that both UNICEF and GPE achieve good results regarding gender equality programmes. Most countries in the portfolios of the two organizations achieved their goals at primary school levels. The main challenge is to ensure gender equality at the higher levels of basic education (lower secondary school). Furthermore, the evaluation of both organizations showed that they have succeeded in different ways in their work to include marginalized groups.

The poorest results were found regarding learning outcome; either this is not measured or the results fail to materialize. Of the ten countries measuring learning outcomes, only Ethiopia fully met its learning outcome goals, while Mali and Mozambique partly met them.

The most important interventions supported were teacher training, classroom construction, and provision of teaching materials. At the same time, population growth and increased enrolment rates in numerous



PHOTO: STELLENBOSCH

countries were so high that the intervention inputs in many cases did not result in better ratios of teachers, classrooms or books per student although they have ensured that the ratios have remained stable.

> *Funding:* The evaluations showed that while ODA funding to basic education declined by 16 per cent, Norway increased funding to basic education by 41 per cent. The trends for ODA funding to education revealed that the support for the sector increased more slowly than the increase in ODA funding overall.

The same trend is seen in development aid to UNICEF and GPE; Norway is the largest donor to UNICEF's programme for basic education and gender equality, which has been in decline since 2010, and the fifth largest donor to GPE.

At the national level the education budgets often vary widely, which is probably due to weak financial management rather than the result of the authorities replacing their own funding with donor funding. UNICEF was criticized for initiating projects that were not fully funded from their inception.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the evaluation report, the Evaluation Department recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should:

- > Assess which requirements should be in place regarding documentation of UNICEF's and GPE's results, and develop clear rules on the consequences of not meeting these requirements.
- > Consider alternative channels and actors for administering Norwegian support to basic education, including an assessment of regional development banks.

# Study of how crisis-affected populations can be included in humanitarian work?



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

## REPORT 8/2015

**Work in progress: How the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its partners see and do engagement with crisis-affected populations**

External consultants: Nordic Consulting Group (NCG)

ISBN: 978-82-7548-818-1

## BACKGROUND

There is growing international interest among humanitarian aid organizations in involving crisis-affected populations in humanitarian aid operations.

One of the reasons is that the organizations have been criticized for reinforcing the picture of people affected by crises as helpless victims, and not as a resource that can help to improve their own situation.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the mapping study was twofold: Firstly, the study was intended to enhance insight into how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its partners in humanitarian work involve crisis-affected populations in humanitarian aid so that future efforts in this respect can be strengthened. Secondly, the study was intended to make humanitarian aid organizations responsible to the recipients of humanitarian aid.

The findings of the study mainly build on reviews of the available documentation and interviews of staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the organizations that administer the bulk of Norwegian humanitarian aid.<sup>1</sup>

## FINDINGS

- > The humanitarian actors agree that the target group for humanitarian work – crisis-affected populations – should be engaged in aid work. A considerable part of the normative basis for achieving this can be found in policy documents. However, according to the study, much remains to be done in developing approaches to how this will be accomplished in practice.
- > The Norwegian authorities have been involved in setting the participation of crisis-affected populations on the international agenda, but do not pose formal requirements that their humanitarian partners must involve crisis-affected people in operations supported by Norway. Engaging crisis-affected populations is not a topic that has been systematically addressed in dialogue/meetings with implementing agencies.
- > Humanitarian aid organizations perceive the participation of crisis-affected populations in their activities as a way of improving aid interventions, but according to the report there is no evidence that this is actually the case.

<sup>1</sup> Doctors without Borders, Norwegian Church Aid, Save the Children, the Red Cross (NORCROSS, ICRC, IFRC), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.





PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

- > Humanitarian aid organizations believe that engaging crisis-affected populations is both a way of ensuring the safety of their own aid workers and of ensuring that crisis-affected people receive help.
- > The organizations that do have practical experience of involving crisis-affected populations in their aid work do not document their experiences systematically, which makes learning, both internally in the organization and in the humanitarian aid environment generally, more difficult.
- > In answer to the question of when organizations engage crisis-affected people in their work, the most neglected area appears to be post-activity engagement, mainly because of a lack of resources.
- > The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should formalize requirements for engaging crisis-affected populations in humanitarian operations when entering into cooperation agreements and contracts with humanitarian aid organizations.
- > Humanitarian organizations should adopt the Inter Agency Standing Committee's (IASC) guidelines in their own work on developing models to engage crisis-affected populations in humanitarian aid work.
- > Humanitarian organizations should document, systematize and share their own experiences with engaging crisis-affected populations so that this can promote learning in and between organizations.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The report provides recommendations for both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the organizations:

- > The Norwegian authorities should continue to take part in international forums to highlight the theme and to promote the development of overarching guidelines and methods for involving crisis-affected populations in humanitarian work.
- > The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should consider including the engagement of crisis-affected populations in the annual report on Norwegian humanitarian interventions.

# Evaluation of NORHEDs award mechanism and evaluability study



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

## REPORT 6 AND 9/2015

### Evaluation series of NORHED: Higher Education and Research for Development. Evaluation of the award mechanism & evaluability study

External consultants: University of Southern California's Development Portfolio Management Group (DPMG)

ISBN: 978-82-7548-769-6 / ISBN: 978-82-7548-819-8

## BACKGROUND

The Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research for Development (NORHED) supports cooperation between universities in Norway and low and middle-income countries. The objective is to improve the capacity of partner institutions through more and better research, and more and better-educated graduates. The programme has an annual budget of approximately NOK 130 million. The Evaluation Department has followed the project over the last two years with a series of evaluations. The purpose of the evaluations has been to promote learning, so that future investments can be more effective. The first report was published in 2014 and the last two in 2015. (All reports are available on the website of the Evaluation Department at [norad.no](http://norad.no).)

## PURPOSE

In 2015, two studies were conducted. The purpose of evaluating the award mechanism was to provide input on how it could be improved in order to ensure that the partners chosen are those best suited to achieving the programme's goals.

The purpose of the evaluability study was to improve the results frameworks of the various NORHED projects to ensure that future results can be measured.

## FINDINGS

- > The award process was well conducted and in accordance with international standards, with only a few exceptions. Nevertheless, the study found that the external committees that had assessed the applications had not received adequate training and had an excessive workload. In addition, the overall assessments of the committees were not documented in writing.
- > The evaluability study identified weaknesses in the results frameworks of the selected partners, making it difficult to assess whether the objectives of greater capacity and better research were met.



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- > Most of the recommendations regarding the award mechanism were of a technical nature, and Norad was recommended to consider following these up for inclusion in the next announcement.
  
- > Provided that the committee members receive training, their workload is reasonable and documentation of the assessments improves, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is recommended to employ similar award mechanisms for other grant schemes of this nature, including the use of external panels.
  
- > The evaluability study recommended that NORHED should require partners to develop results frameworks that will make it possible to assess whether the goal of achieving greater capacity and more and better research has been met.

# Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

## REPORT 10/2015

### Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development

External consultants: Itad Ltd.

ISBN: 978-82-7548-820-4

## BACKGROUND

Capacity development has been an important goal for Norwegian development aid for several decades, and many of the aid interventions have highlighted capacity development as a main goal or key component. Such support is often provided through institutional cooperation with Norwegian organizations with comparable responsibilities and relevant expertise (twinning). The evaluation was initiated because there has been little assessment of the effectiveness of this kind of support.

The evaluation examined Norwegian bilateral support to institutional development in the public sector, based on in-depth studies of 11 programmes supported by Norway in Malawi, Mozambique and Vietnam. In addition, desk studies and interviews were carried out in connection with eight programmes in six other countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Nepal, Nicaragua, Moldova and China).

While this evaluation examined Norwegian support to capacity development, corresponding evaluations of Danish and Swedish development aid were conducted by the evaluation departments of the Danish and Swedish development aid agencies. A joint report on the three evaluations is being prepared and will be presented in the course of the year.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the Norwegian evaluation was to identify the results of Norwegian-financed support to capacity development. A further aim was to identify knowledge that may be useful in this work in the future. Even though the evaluation was limited to bilateral aid, the results may also provide relevant lessons for similar aid channelled through multilateral or civil society organizations.

## FINDINGS

The report provided a generally positive picture of Norwegian support to capacity development. In most cases, considerable improvements were observed in partner institutions, particularly as regards professional expertise, which has meant that the organizations are better equipped to deliver results in relation to their missions.

According to the report, Norwegian support is characterized by long-term commitment as well as a high degree of flexibility and ability to adapt during the process. Long-term support allows relationships of trust to form between partners. This promotes a better dialogue and stronger national ownership of the implementation and development of interventions.

Even though the flexible approach showed benefits as regards adaptability, the evaluation team also found that it may create a greater mismatch between strategy and capacity needs. Informal dialogue may undermine clear formulation and documentation of the programme goals, making it difficult to learn




PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

lessons applicable to future programmes. Questions are also raised in the evaluation as to whether the Norwegian contributions are sufficiently well aligned with the recipient's needs, particularly in view of the lack of good contextual analyses.

Moreover, the evaluation detected weaknesses in the quality assurance of the planning, design and implementation of the interventions. Even though the specialist expertise of Norwegian institutions contributes positively, the evaluation questions the use of twinning and the selection of partners. In many cases, the national institutions have no real say in choosing the institutions they are going to work with because this has been decided beforehand. The evaluation showed that in some cases partner institutions felt that more appropriate support could have been provided by others – also nationally – but they were unable to draw on these institutions.

The evaluation found that ownership and long-term commitment are important for successful support. The more national partners had been involved in the design and implementation of interventions, the more successful the interventions were. In cases where Norway has committed to funding national partners for more than ten years, the evaluation found that the outcome was substantial.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Evaluation Department recommends that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should:

- > Establish a capacity development focal point in Norad or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributing guidance, sharing of experience and quality assurance of interventions, with capacity development as a significant component, so that quality and effectiveness are safeguarded in Norwegian support to capacity development.
- > Develop guidelines for support to capacity development.
- > Conduct thorough analyses of options prior to making the decision on support to capacity development.
- > Enhance understanding that capacity development must include long-term plans and commitments.
- > Help to boost the quality of the work with the largest Norwegian twinning institutions by systematically assessing the institutions' capacity and expertise, and designing guidelines for the activities of the institutions.

# Mapping study of reviews and evaluations in Norwegian development cooperation



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

## REPORT 2015

### Study of reviews and evaluations in Norwegian development cooperation – Mapping report 2015

External consultants: Nordic Consulting Group

## BACKGROUND

This work was initiated on the basis of indications that the quality of reviews and decentralized evaluations of Norwegian development aid is not good enough. This was pointed out, for example in the OECD-DAC Peer Review 2013 and in the Evaluation Department's report no. 1/2014 (Can we demonstrate the difference that the Norwegian aid makes?). Moreover, other donors have carried out systematic assessments of the quality of their decentralized evaluations and found that the quality varied. Consequently, there is also reason for scrutiny in a Norwegian context.

Every year the Norwegian aid administration undertakes a large number of reviews and evaluations. These are a key part of the evidence-base for decisions regarding financial support to individual projects and programmes, and are used to justify what in total becomes large development aid investments. We must be certain, therefore, that these reviews are of sufficiently high quality.

This study has mapped all types of reviews and decentralized evaluations commissioned by the Norwegian development aid administration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian embassies, Norad) in the period 2012–2015. The evaluations conducted by Norad's own Evaluation Department, which is the agency's central evaluation function – are not included in the study.

## PURPOSE

The mapping study was primarily done in preparation for the evaluation that has now been initiated to assess the quality and use of such reviews and decentralized evaluations in the aid administration. The purpose of the mapping was to acquire a better overview of the scope to enable a relevant selection for the evaluation.

## FINDINGS

- > There is no comprehensive overview of reviews and decentralized evaluations in the Norwegian aid administration.
- > The mapping identified close to 300 reports from the period 2012–2015, amounting to 70–80 reviews per year. Altogether 40 countries and 20 sectors were represented.
- > The reviews were mainly commissioned by embassies and Norad (just over 100 reports each during the period). A relatively small proportion (20 reports) were commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- > Team composition: 86 per cent external consultants; 9 per cent a mixture of external and internal members; 4 per cent internal team. 60 per cent used national consultants. It was primarily Norad that used internal and mixed teams.



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

- > 40 per cent of the reports did not include the evaluation mandate as an appendix, which may indicate insufficient awareness of formal requirements.
- > Almost all reports (96 per cent) address results at the outcome level.
- > A large proportion of the reports address cross-cutting issues, in particular gender and gender equality (84 per cent), environment and climate (45 per cent) and anti-corruption (62 per cent).

#### **WAY FORWARD**

The Evaluation Department will commission an evaluation to assess quality and use of the reviews and evaluations. This evaluation will be carried out in the course of 2016.

# Evaluation of Fredskorpset



PHOTO: STELLENBOSCH

## REPORT 1/2016

### Chasing Civil Society? – Evaluation of Fredskorpset

External consultants: Chr. Michelsen Institute  
in collaboration with Nordic Consulting Group

ISBN: 978-92-7548-821-1

## BACKGROUND

One of the main objectives of Fredskorpset (FK Norway) is to contribute to developing and strengthening civil society in developing countries. FK Norway aims to facilitate the exchange of young people (in the age group 18 to 35 years) between institutions, organizations and businesses in Norway and developing countries or between two developing countries. Each year, more than 600 people are involved in FK Norway's exchange programmes. FK Norway is an administrative body under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to review FK Norway's approach to the objective of contributing to the development and strengthening of civil society in developing countries, in light of international research on how development cooperation may contribute positively to this.

The evaluation covers the period 2006–2015, and is based on data collected in Norway and in two main case countries, Tanzania and Thailand, together with data from supplementary visits to Cambodia, South Africa and Uganda.

## FINDINGS

The evaluation found that the primary focus of FK Norway has been on facilitating good exchanges for the participants, and not on strengthening civil society. FK Norway has not defined either in its strategy or its operational documents what it means to strengthen civil society.

The evaluation showed that the goal of strengthening civil society is primarily being pursued through the Youth (Ung) programme, which arranges for exchange of young volunteers aged between 18 and 25. According to the evaluation, these exchanges are primarily an enriching experience for the young people who participate. It is unlikely that the exchanges yield results other than this, in the form of stronger civil society organizations or a stronger civil society.

According to the report, exchanges through north-south and south-south programmes yield more results at organizational and civil society level, although there are great variations from one project to the next.

The comparative advantage of FK Norway, in relation to other Norwegian instruments for strengthening civil society, lies in the reciprocal exchange model.





PHOTO: STELLENBOSCH

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Evaluation Department recommended that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

- > Clarify what sort of development cooperation channel FK Norway is intended to be, particularly with respect to strengthening civil society.
- > Revise FK Norway's instructions, with a view to formulating objectives that are realistic in terms of the instruments available to FK Norway.
- > Exercise caution when issuing guidelines about areas to be prioritized in the annual letters of allocation to FK Norway.
- > Follow up existing guidelines on coordination with relevant Norwegian development aid actors, with a view to better combined use of resources.
- > Consider whether FK Norway's administrative practice is adequate for documenting assessments and decisions, and ensure appropriate follow-up of the individual project.

# Literature study and theory of change for Norway's Climate and Forest Initiative



PHOTO: KNUT NYFLØT

## REPORT 2/2016

### Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Literature review and programme theory

External consultants: AECOM International

ISBN: 978-82-7548-824-2

## BACKGROUND

The Norwegian government launched its International Climate and Forest Initiative in December 2007 and pledged up to NOK 3 billion annually to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+). The Evaluation Department has been following the initiative since the start, and carried out a number of studies and evaluations in the period 2010-2014. These can be downloaded from the Evaluation Department's site at [norad.no](http://norad.no).

In 2015 the department commenced a new phase of real-time evaluation of the initiative for the period 2015–2017. This is the first study made during this period.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the literature study was to gain an overview of recent knowledge of relevance to the REDD+ initiative (the UN climate and forest programme) in order to identify areas where there is a need for further research and knowledge development. The overview will form the basis for evaluations that may provide information of use for developing the initiative further.

## FINDINGS

The report confirms a substantial increase in the number of project level studies from the past 2–3 years providing documentation that:

- > The climate and forest initiative is "well under way" in making its overarching theory of change more concrete, but it still has some way to go with regard to concretizing its programme theories at the country level.
- > Planning and coordination under the REDD+ initiative are progressing, but an investigation is needed into whether the coordination between donors and actors can be improved.
- > Use of local community surveillance of deforestation and forest degradation is increasing, and this is a cost-effective means of exercising surveillance of forest resources.
- > The factors required to ensure that result-based disbursements function according to intention are seldom present.
- > There is limited evidence that REDD+ has resulted in major behavioural changes.
- > There is little documentation of the use of impact analyses in REDD+ projects.
- > Reform of land ownership rights is important if REDD+ is to succeed.
- > There is a need to further develop the framework for measuring, reporting and verifying results achieved.

# Literature review on promotion of human rights through political dialogue



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

## REPORT 3/2016

### More than just talk? A literature review on promoting human rights through political dialogue

External consultants: Chr. Michelsen Institute

ISBN: 978-82-7548-825-9

## BACKGROUND

In December 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the first report to the Storting in fifteen years that discussed Norwegian support for promotion of human rights: "Opportunities for all: Human Rights in Norway's Foreign Policy and Development Cooperation".

Norway uses a variety of instruments, arenas and partners in its broad commitment to promoting and protecting human rights in many countries. Norwegian contributions target multilateral organizations, bilateral cooperation and support for civil society.

The Storting Report outlines an ambitious plan for promoting human rights in Norwegian foreign and development policy. Bilateral political dialogue is presented in the report as a key instrument. At the same time, this is an area where we do not know much about the effects.

The study is based on publicly available documents and relevant academic literature. Access to internal documents was limited. Bilateral political dialogue often takes place "behind closed doors", and memos from these meetings are not accessible.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the study was to compile and summarize relevant and available knowledge on the use of bilateral political dialogue as a means of promoting human rights. Emphasis was placed on knowledge of methods and on effectiveness.

The literature review is a preliminary study to the evaluation of Norwegian support to promote human rights which is on the evaluation programme for 2016/2017 and which according to plan will be completed by late 2016 or early 2017. According to plan this will be completed by late 2016 or early 2017.

## FINDINGS

The study concluded that the following criteria applied if the dialogues were to have the greatest possible effect:

- > Broad participation during the dialogue itself.
- > Better briefing and debriefing procedures in advance of and following the dialogue.
- > A clear, focused agenda for the dialogue.
- > Technical cooperation tied to the dialogue.
- > A clear time schedule for milestones for measuring success.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

As this is a mapping study to prepare for the planned evaluation of Norwegian support for promoting human rights, it does not include recommendations.

# Organization of Norwegian support related to the Syria crisis



PHOTO: OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER

## REPORT 4/2016

**Striking the balance: Evaluation of the planning, organization and management of Norway's assistance related to the Syria regional crisis**

External consultants: IOD Parc

ISBN: 978-82-7548-827-3

## BACKGROUND

By the end of 2015, Norway had contributed over NOK 3.5 billion to initiatives related to the Syria crisis. The volume has increased each year since 2011, and the support in 2016 is expected to be the highest ever. What was originally an acute humanitarian crisis in Syria in 2011 has developed into a long-term humanitarian challenge requiring engagement for many years. Against this background, the Evaluation Department wanted to examine how Norwegian support is planned, organized and managed, and whether the support has adapted to developments in the crisis.

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to improve Norwegian support to Syria and neighbouring countries in the future. The objectives of the evaluation were to:

- > Map the organizational set-up underpinning Norwegian assistance related to the Syria crisis, and key aspects of its strategic planning and management.
- > Assess whether this set-up enabled good support, given the resources available in Norway's aid management system.
- > Issue recommendations on changes for how to improve future support.

Although the evaluation was limited to Norwegian aid related to Syria, the evaluation team was asked to identify general aspects of Norwegian aid administration

that may be relevant for comparable situations and contexts in other places.

## FINDINGS

There are several strong aspects to Norwegian support to Syria. Norway has played an important role in mobilizing international economic support. Norway is regarded as a principled donor that places emphasis on doing the right things, and has in several cases supported high-risk activities because this has been regarded as the right course of action. Norway is a stable partner over time, and makes allowance for the fact that not all its partners' activities are equally successful in the difficult situation in which they operate.

Nonetheless, the report points to several critical aspects of the support:

- > Norwegian support for Syria has no overarching strategic framework. The Norwegian support is characterised as very flexible. Planning has been increasingly structured since 2015, but there is nonetheless a need to define goals and priorities more clearly.
- > Coordination of Norwegian initiatives is weak. Norwegian support consists of support to many different initiatives and partners. On a number of occasions, Norway has been central in strategic and political coordination of the international response, without this visibly influencing the distribution of Norwegian funding. Norway has prioritized emergency aid and humanitarian interventions,



PHOTO: ESPEN RØST

while the international response has increasingly focused on resilience and conflict prevention.

- > More attention needs to be paid to risk assessments. Norway has a tradition of basing its choice of partners on trust. Few formal requirements are made of partners. Although the quality of risk assessments has increased since 2015, there is still a need for improvement.
- > Human resources and technical capacity are inadequate. The Syria crisis has been very work-intensive because of the increasing scope and complexity of the crisis. Norway's staffing has not caught up with the increasing volume of the disbursements and number of projects. There has also been limited use of both internal and external technical resources. These factors contribute to a high risk profile for Norwegian interventions.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Evaluation Department recommends that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

- > Develop clear strategic priorities for Norwegian support.
- > Clarify how international humanitarian principles are maintained in decisions and allocation of funding, and their separation from political concerns related to the crisis.
- > Develop clear criteria for the choice of partners and a minimum standard for reporting. This should also include a stronger focus on risk assessment.
- > Increase the number of personnel and the technical capacity engaged in the Syria response.
- > Systematize experience and learning to form a basis for improved future support.





**OTHER EVALUATION  
REPORTS**

# PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS

Most organizations that receive Norwegian aid, whether they are multinational (multilateral) organizations, or institutions or voluntary organizations of the recipient country, conduct evaluations of their own activities. Since some of these activities are supported by Norway, this work is also important for generating more knowledge about Norwegian development assistance.

In order to gain insight into this evaluation work, the Evaluation Department joins forces with similar units in UN organizations, development banks and other evaluation communities. Our contractual partners this past year are described in the next column:

## **EVALUATION DEPARTMENT OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK**

In 2015, the department signed a partnership agreement with the independent evaluation office of the African Development Bank (African Bank), whereby we subsidize evaluations of the Bank's support to the private sector, the energy sector and country programmes. Three evaluations were completed in 2015, and are described below. Work currently in progress is looking in particular at evaluations of the Bank's support to the private sector in the region.

## **THE EVALUATION DEPARTMENT OF THE UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)**

A new agreement was made with UNDP in 2015 after the previous agreement came to an end in 2014. The work currently in progress in the cooperation is restricted to supporting evaluation measures that improve partner countries' opportunities to evaluate their attainment of sustainability goals in the years ahead. The thematic delimitation is regarded as relevant with respect to Norway's development policy priorities. No evaluation was completed with direct funding from the Evaluation Department in 2015.

## **INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR IMPACT EVALUATION (3IE)**

The Evaluation Department supports 3ie in its capacity as member. This is an international organization that works for evidence-based policy in low- and middle-income countries. 3ie funds impact evaluations and systematic reviews and promote knowledge about these evaluations.



# Independent evaluation of the African Development Bank group's equity investments

## INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF BANK GROUP EQUITY INVESTMENTS

PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

### BACKGROUND

The evaluation focused on the African Development Bank's equity investment, which represents total capital commitments equivalent to UA 740 million, of which UA 475 million has been disbursed (64 per cent of total capital commitments).<sup>2</sup>

### PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to strengthen the basis for the Bank's decisions regarding future equity investments. The evaluation has assessed the relevance and performance of the Bank's equity investments. It has also identified lessons learned, recommendations and areas for improvement.

### FINDINGS

- > The bulk of the African Development Bank's equity investments are in accordance with the Bank's goals and priorities including: regional diversification, regional integration, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and, to a lesser extent, fragile states.
- > All direct investment is in financial institutions that support the Bank's strategy of developing soft infrastructure.
- > Only ten per cent (UA 27 million) of total funding is invested in companies that operate in fragile states.

> A substantial share of the Bank's funds were behind in their plans, or did not meet their targets for job creation and tax revenue.

> Outcome data were lacking, particularly for direct investment.

> The Bank's equity funds performed well with respect to environmental plans.

> The Bank has played a catalytic role with regard to mobilizing private equity, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The additionality of the Bank's contribution is restricted to middle-income countries, which are capable of mobilizing sufficient funding without the Bank's support.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- > Continue investing in private equity funds and strengthen portfolio management.
- > Review the Bank's risk management methodology.
- > Strengthen the system for monitoring equity investments and further develop the outcome tracking system.

<sup>2</sup> The African Development Bank uses as its reporting value a "Unit of Account" (UA) which corresponds to the IMF's Special Drawing Right (SDR). The value of SDR, which fluctuates continuously, is calculated daily in relation to USD by the IMF. For example, in February 2016, UA 1 = USD 1.39.

# The African Development Bank's country strategy and program in Tanzania 2004-2013

## EVALUATION OF THE BANK'S COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAM IN TANZANIA 2004-2013

<http://idev.afdb.org/en/document/evaluation-bank%E2%80%99s-country-strategy-and-program-tanzania-2004-2013>

### BACKGROUND

During the period 2004–2013, the Bank supported interventions totalling around UA 1.52 billion in Tanzania. The evaluation covers the Bank's three country strategies.

- > The first (2002–2004/5) prioritized rural development, including infrastructure, development of human capital and national reforms.
- > The second (2006–2010) focused on growth and poverty reduction, along with improvement in quality of life and social well-being.
- > The last (2011–2015) focused on two main areas:
  - i) infrastructure development and
  - ii) enabling the institutional and business environment.

### PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to provide input for the preparation of the next country strategy for Tanzania, and for the report *The Comprehensive Evaluation of the Bank's Development Results*.

The evaluation considered the development results of the Bank's support to Tanzania, including the degree to which the Bank's investment had made a positive difference to the country. In addition, it identifies what has been learned, and key areas for improvement.

### FINDINGS

- > The Bank's country strategy and operative portfolio were largely in line with Tanzania's national and sectoral strategic framework and needs. Country strategies and operations were also well in line with the Bank's own strategies.
- > Tangible results can be documented for the transport sector. At 34 per cent, transport is the largest sector in the portfolio. Results achieved include improved road conditions, increased access to affordable transportation and improved connectivity between the country's economic centres.
- > Governance (multi-sector) accounted for 26 per cent of the portfolio. General budget support (GBS) put the government in a position to maintain and at times increase the amount of development funding in key areas.
- > The energy sector accounts for about 7 per cent of the portfolio. The Bank reports concrete added value in the sector, attributable to the part it plays in policy dialogue in this sector.
- > The share of the Bank's investments that go to agriculture and the social sector declined during the period. The level of investment in agriculture, energy, and water and sanitation nonetheless remained high in absolute terms. Due to delays and inefficiency, outcomes were weaker than expected, however. Most initiatives in the private sector were first launched in the last country strategy, and account for less than one per cent of total assistance.



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

- > The sustainability of projects and results is not always ensured. Challenges in this connection include the financing gap in road maintenance, the low level of local technical capacity for maintaining rural infrastructure (particularly for irrigation projects) and low return on investments in rural markets (some of which are also underutilized).

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- > The Bank should concentrate its investment on fewer key areas with proven expertise and place greater emphasis on inclusiveness and integration.
- > Future strategies should have a strong focus on poverty, possibly focussing on a few key job creation and revenue generation objectives.
- > The Bank should explore opportunities to strengthen its operations in the private sector by increasing its engagement in the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises, and considering main stream lending in order to reduce inequalities.
- > The Bank should strengthen supervision through closer cooperation with its institutional partners at the project design stage.

# The African Development Bank's country strategy and program in Ethiopia 2004-2013

## ETHIOPIA COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAM EVALUATION 2004-2013

<http://idev.afdb.org/en/document/ethiopia-country-strategy-and-program-evaluation-2004-2013>

### BACKGROUND

In the period 2004–2013, the Bank supported 37 interventions with a total value of about UA 1.6 billion. This evaluation covers the Bank's three country strategies.

- > The first (2002–2004) focused on:
  - (i) agriculture and rural development;
  - (ii) road transport;
  - (iii) water and sanitation, and improvement of institutional and policy framework conditions.
- > The second country strategy (2006–2009) had three strategic pillars:
  - (i) infrastructure development (roads, power supply, and water and sanitation);
  - (ii) agricultural transformation;
  - (iii) promotion of good governance.
- > The third, and the latest country strategy (2011–2015) rested on two strategic pillars:
  - (i) improved access to infrastructure (particularly roads and energy); and
  - (ii) promotion of good governance.

### PURPOSE

The evaluation had two main purposes: (i) to assess the development outcomes of the Bank's assistance, and in particular the extent to which the Bank's investment has made a difference in the country; and (ii) to identify lessons and potential for improvement in connection with the design and implementation of the upcoming country strategy (2016–2020).

### FINDINGS

- > The Bank's strategy was aligned with the Ethiopian government's priorities at both country and sector level, and the operative portfolio was largely consistent with the country strategy.
- > The portfolio targeted three main sectors: transport, energy and governance, each of which represented between 27 and 31 per cent of total investment, making a total of 86 per cent together.
- > The Bank has become more selective over time. One result of this is that investment in sectors of strategic importance to inclusion, such as agriculture and water and sanitation, has declined. Nor did the Bank contribute to the social sector in the two last country strategies (2006–09 and 2011–15). The private sector accounted for an insignificant proportion (0.1 per cent) of the Bank's total investment.
- > Concrete results were achieved in the transport, energy, and water and sanitation sectors. The country's (primary) road network underwent some upgrading, as did the power and water supply sector.
- > The gender dimension and geographical inequalities are not satisfactorily taken into account in the design of the different operations.
- > The instruments used by the Bank in Ethiopia have remained stable over time, although initiatives for innovative alternatives have been taken at the corporate level.



PHOTO: KEN OPPRANN

> Limited national implementation capacity is a major challenge to the Bank's efforts to achieve development effects. This is due to financial constraints and low technological and managerial capacity of the national utilities that are responsible for infrastructure maintenance, particularly rural power supply.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- > Improve analysis in country strategies and project appraisals, with a view to determining how the Bank's investment in prioritized sectors contributes to inclusive growth in the country.
  
- > In line with the prioritization of the private sector by the Ethiopian government and other development actors, the Bank should improve investment in the private sector, also through cooperation with other development partners.
  
- > Use a wide range of instruments, including programme-based approaches and institutional development programmes. The use of less common instruments, such as credit guarantees, is recommended in the private sector.
  
- > Strengthen the analysis of sustainability risk with a view to achieving long-term, sustainable economic and social development.

> Support the governance capacity of the Ethiopian government and its implementing agencies for effective delivery of assistance offered. Mainstreaming of technical assistance and capacity building should help to improve capacity at the different governance levels. Participation in multi-donor funds, and implementation of institutional development programmes could offer adequate solutions in collaboration with other development partners.





# **FOLLOW-UP OF EVALUATIONS**



# Follow-up of evaluations

Follow-up of the Evaluation Department's reports is institutionalized through the Instructions for Evaluation Activities in Norwegian Aid Administration.

Against the background of a final report and acquired information, the Evaluation Department prepares a cover memo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' leadership or, when it comes to following up the evaluation of the Norwegian Climate and Forest Initiative, to the Ministry of Climate and Environment. In the memo, the Evaluation Department presents its assessment of the evaluation and proposals for points that should be followed up in Norwegian development policy. Further follow-up is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Climate and Environment. The department or foreign service mission that is responsible for the aid that has been evaluated is required to draw up a follow-up plan within six weeks and report back to the ministry leadership within a year on the measures that have actually been initiated as follow-up to the evaluation. Both these documents must be sent to the Evaluation Department for information purposes.

The table that follows shows the follow-up status of the Evaluation Department's reports in the period 2009 and up to April 2016. Both the Evaluation Department's follow-up memos and the ministries' follow-up plans and reports are published on the Evaluation Department's website: (<http://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/evaluationreports/>).



**FOLLOW-UP OF EVALUATIONS // STATUS AS OF 21 APRIL 2016<sup>3</sup>**

TOPIC OF THE EVALUATION/PROJECT	REPORT NO.	EVALUATION DEPARTMENT FOLLOW-UP MEMO TO THE MFA	FOLLOW-UP MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE MFA	REPORT ON FOLLOW-UP
Nepal's Education for All programme	1/2009	February 2010	Follow-up Government of Nepal	
Joint donor team in Juba	2/2009	09.09.2009	No plan recommended beyond the follow-ups already conducted in the MFA	
NGOs in Uganda	3/2009	31.08.2009	25.06.2010	25.06.2010
Integration of emergency aid, reconstruction and development	Joint	07.08.2009	No Norwegian follow-up required	
Support for the protection of cultural heritage	4/2009	30.09.2009	09.06.2010	08.11.2011
Multilateral aid for environmental protection	Synthesis	08/10/2009	No Norwegian follow-up required	
Norwegian peace effort in Haiti	5/2009	15.02.2010	15.07.2010	02.02.2012
Norwegian People's Aid – humanitarian mine clearance activities	6/2009	19.02.2010	08.04.2010	31.03.2011
Norwegian programme for development, research and education (NUFU) and Norad's programme for master's studies (NOMA)	7/2009	14.04.2010	03.11.2010	08.01.2013
Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support	1/2010	26.03.2010	07.05.2010	14.11.2012
Study of support to parliaments	2/2010	Follow-up memo not relevant		
Norwegian business-related assistance	3/2010 (Case studies 4, 5, 6)	23.09.2010	15.03.2011	09.01.2013
Norwegian support to the Western Balkans	7/2010	04.11.2010	21.01.2011	04.06.2013
Transparency International	8/2010	22.09.2011	21.11.2011	01.02.2013
Evaluability study - Norwegian support to achieve Millennium Development Goals 4 & 5 (maternal and child health)	9/2010	24/02/2011	Included in the MFA's follow-up plan for report 3/2013	
Peace-building activities in South Sudan	Joint	03.03.2011	22.06.2011	31.03.2015
Norwegian democracy support through the UN	10.2010	08.07.2011	20.05.2014	20.05.2014
IOM – International Organization for Migration's efforts to combat human trafficking	11/2010	18.05.2011	05.01.2011	20.12.2012
Real-time evaluation of Norway's international climate and forest initiative	12/2010 (Country reports 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18/2010)	08.06.2011	12.09.2011	16.07.2012
Children's rights	Joint	21.11.2011	18.12.2012	03.02.2014
Development cooperation among Norwegian NGOs in East Africa	1/2011	25.04.2012	19.09.2012	16.09.2014
Research on Norwegian development assistance	2/2011	04.01.2012	19.02.2013	19.02.2013
Norway's culture and sports cooperation with countries in the South	3/2011	27.01.2012	06.06.2012	11.09.2013
Study on contextual choices in fighting corruption: lessons learned	4/2011 Study	Follow-up memo not relevant		
Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka	5/2011	08.02.2012	29.03.2012	30.05.2014
Support for anti-corruption efforts	6/2011	15.02.2012	27.05.2013	02.06.2014
Norwegian development cooperation to promote human rights	7/2011	17.01.2012	17.12.2012	05.05.2014
Norway's trade-related assistance through multilateral organizations	8/2011	08.03.2012	11.01.2013	15.10.2013
Activity-based financial flows in UN system	9/2011 Study	Follow-up memo not relevant		
Norwegian support to the health sector in Botswana	10/2011	Follow-up memo not prepared		
Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities	1/2012	20.04.2012	14.01.2013	14.02.2014
Study of travel compensation (per diem)	2/2012	03.07.2012	06.05.2015	06.05.2015
Norwegian development cooperation with Afghanistan	3/2012	13.12.2012	16.05.2013	06.03.2015
The World Bank Health Results Innovation Trust Fund	4/2012	18.09.2012	21.01.2013	13.05.2014
Real-time evaluation of Norway's international climate and forest initiative: lessons learnt from support to civil society organizations	5/2012	03.12.2012	14.01.2013	31.01.2014 <sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This overview has been prepared by Norad's Evaluation Department and is based on copies received of follow-up resolutions and reports in accordance with the Instructions for the Evaluation Activity in Norwegian Aid Management.

<sup>4</sup> Since 1 January 2014, responsibility for follow-up and real-time evaluation of Norway's international climate and forest initiative rests with the Ministry of Climate and Environment





TOPIC OF THE EVALUATION/PROJECT	REPORT NO.	EVALUATION DEPARTMENT FOLLOW-UP MEMO TO THE MFA	FOLLOW-UP MEASURES ADOPTED BY THE MFA	REPORT ON FOLLOW-UP
Norway's Oil for Development Programme	6/2012	21.03.2013	23.05.2013	17.10.2014
Study of monitoring and evaluation of six Norwegian civil society organizations	7/2012	16.05.2013	27.05.2014	25.08.2015
Study of the use of evaluations in the Norwegian development cooperation system	8/2012	30.04.2013	16.06.2013	30.07.2015
Norway's bilateral agricultural support to food security	9/2012	03.06.2013	22.01.2014	17.03.2015
A framework for analysing participation in development	1/2013 (Case studies 2/2013)	09.07.2013	25.09.2013	22.10.2014
Norway-India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health (NIPI I)	3/2013	07.11.2013	09.03.2015	12.04.2016
Norwegian Refugee Council / NORCAP	4/2013	16.10.2013	18.11.2014	15.01.2016
The Norwegian climate and forest initiative – real-time evaluation: Support for measuring, reporting and verifying	5/2013	28.11.2013	11.02.2014 <sup>5</sup>	22.05.2015
Evaluation of results measurement in aid management	1/2014	11.06.2014	15.09.2014	21.10.2015
Unintended effects in evaluations of development aid	2/2014	Follow-up of study included in follow-up memo for report 1/2014		
Norwegian climate and forest initiative – real-time evaluation: Synthesis report	3/2014	06.10.2014	08.06.2015	
Evaluation Series of NORHED: (higher education and research for development) Theory of change and evaluation methods	4/2014	Follow-up memo not relevant		
Evaluation of Norwegian support through and to umbrella and network organisations in civil society	5/2014	15.12.2014	13.03.2015	07.04.2016
Training for peace in Africa	6/2014	16.02.2015	10.03.2015	12.04.2016
Impact Evaluation of the Norway India Partnership Initiative Phase II for Maternal and Child Health – Baseline	7/2014	Follow-up memo not relevant		
Evaluation of Norway's support to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake	8/2014	23.02.2015	17.06.2015	
Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing countries (Norfund)	1/2015	24.02.2015	03.06.2015	
Norwegian support for strengthening women's rights and gender equality in development cooperation	2/2015	26.06.2015	13.10.2015	
Study of baseline data for Norwegian support to Myanmar	3/2015	10.09.2015	23.12.2015	
Experiences with Results-Based Payments in Norwegian Development Aid	4/2015 5/2015	02.12.2015	27.01.2016	
Evaluation Series of NORHED Higher Education and Research for Development Evaluation of the award mechanism	6/2015	20.11.2015	19.04.2016	
Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education (Unicef and the Global partnership for Education)	7/2015	02.11.2015	04.12.2015	
Work in Progress: How the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Partners See and Do Engagement with Crisis-Affected Populations	8/2015	14.12.2015	02.02.2016	
NORHED Evaluability study	9/2015	Follow-up memo not relevant		
Evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development	10/2015	10.12.2015	22.04.2016	
Chasing civil society? Evaluation of Fredskorpset	1/2016	26.01.2016	16.03.2015	
Real-time evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Literature review and programme theory	2/2016	Follow-up memo not relevant		
More than just talk? A Literature Review on Promoting Human Rights through Political Dialogue	3/2016	Follow-up memo not relevant		

<sup>5</sup> Since 1 January 2014, responsibility for follow-up and real-time evaluation of Norway's international climate and forest initiative rests with the Ministry of Climate and Environment.



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**Norad**

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

Postal address: P.O. Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 OSLO

Office address: Bygdøy allé 2, 0257 Oslo

Tel: +47 23 98 00 00 / Fax: +47 23 98 00 99

[postmottak@norad.no](mailto:postmottak@norad.no) / [www.norad.no](http://www.norad.no)