







# Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake

Annexes 3-10



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# **Evaluation of Norway's support to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake**

**Annexes 3-10**

December 2014

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### 3 Annex 3: List of persons met

#### 3.1 Interviews

The table below presents a list of people that were interviewed in Norway and Haiti during the desk and field phase of the evaluation.

Table 1 List of people interviewed

Name	First name	Title	Organisation	Location
<b>Haiti</b>				
Achille	Pierre Jonas	Technician (Tree nursery)	MdE	Pépinière Carpentier
Antonine	Francois	Technician (Tree nursery)	MdE	Pépinière Carpentier
Augustin	Mirlande	Resp. Administration	Prosjekt Haiti (Manman Troll...)	PaP
Badio	Robert	Director	Fisheries directorate/MARNDR	PaP
Balutansky	Edwige	Senior Project Officer	IDEA	PaP
Baran	Katarzyna	Responsible pédagogique	Viva Rio	PaP
Beaucéjour	Miguel	Président	Association de pêcheurs de Port Salut	Port Salut
Bellerive	Jean Max	Prime Minister of Haïti (2008-11)	Primature	PaP
Bernsen	Teresa	SGBV Crime Unit	MINUSTAH	Port Salut
Bertrand	Talot	Chief of service	DPC	PaP
Boutroue	Joel	Special Adviser on Haiti	Norway	PaP
Bretoux	Camelia	Administrator	UNOPS	Routes Sud
Brosig	Dana	Team Leader	NRECA/ Haiti Rural Electric Cooperative	Coteaux
Burin	Fidele	Resp. Suivi & Evaluation	DDAS	Les Cayes
Caton	Paul Denis	Directeur/Coordonnateur	UGP Parc Macaya MDE/BID	Camp Perrin
Ceide	Ingvill	General Manager	Prosjekt Haiti (Manman Troll...)	PaP
Charles Voltaire	Jane	Resp. Suivi et Evaluation	Viva Rio	PaP
Cheri	Serge	Delegue	Delegation Département du Sud	Les Cayes
Csielanne	Guillaume	Secrétaire	Association des Pecheurs	Port Salut
Damais	Gilles	Chef des Opérations	BID/IAB	PaP
Dasnaya	Megret	Radiologist	Cuban Medical Brigades	Les Cayes
De Caen	Sophie	Senior country director	UNDP	PaP
Deceus	Wedens Pierre	Chef Agronome	Oxfam Italia	Les Cayes
Deme	Mamadou L.	Chargé d'Opérations Senior	Fonds de Reconstruction d'Haiti (HRF)	PaP
Distilo	Silvio	Chef de projet	Oxfam Italia	Les Cayes
Dolciné	Jean Flanel	Responsable Ingénierie Sociale	UGP Parc Macaya/ BID	Camp Perrin
Donadello	Clara	Representante pays	CESVI	Les Cayes
Dornéval	Marie Claire	Football Selectioner and Trainer	Viva Rio/ Football Academy	PaP
Dube Geto (Dr)	Jean	Directeur Executif	Hopital Universitaire Justinian, Cap Haïtien	PaP
Dulice	Nelson	Hydromet Agent	Desk of the "Ministre délégué à l'énergie"	HydroMet Station, Port a Piment

<i>Name</i>	<i>First name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Location</i>
Edouazin	Bonel	Coordinator of ODESES	ODESES	Les Cayes
Eliodor	Gerardine	Secretary	KOFASUD	Les Cayes
Eval	Maurice	Membre	Association de pêcheurs de Port Salut	Port salut
Fachini	Valmir	Coordinateur Environnement	Viva Rio	PaP
Fenel	Fevrin	Hydromet Agent	Desk of the "Ministre délégué à l'énergie"	HydroMet Station, Port a Piment
Franklin	Jean Rene	Technician (Tree nursery)	MdE	Pépinière Carpentier
Gaussaint	Mari Line	Technician (Tree nursery)	MdE	Pépinière Carpentier
Georges	Jean Ernest	Directeur départemental	Ministry of Environment	Les Cayes
Gonzales	Norberto	Coordinateur général de la Brigade Médicale Cubaine en Haïti	Cuban Medical Brigade	PaP
Henrys	Ingrid	Responsible monitoring and research	UGP Parc Macaya/ BID	Camp Perrin
Hurtig	Jane	Director	NDI	PaP
Ibanez-Lopez	Ovidio	Technical Adviser	UNDP	Les Cayes
Incel	Personnat	Member	Association de pêcheurs de Port-Salut	Port Salut
Jaquin	Jean Charles	Gérant	Eneji Pwop	Les Anglais
Jean	Jean Mirdouin	Chef de service des Ressources naturelles	DDAS	Les Cayes
Jean Jacques	Jean Debalio	Directeur départemental	DDAS	Les Cayes
Jean Robert	Pierre Louis	Directeur CASEC	CASEC Carpentier	Pépinière Carpentier
Joseph	Stephan	Ingenieur Agronomie	PADI	Zanglais
Jude	Pierre	Administrateur of Kaynou, Bel Air	Viva Rio/Kaynou	PaP
Kabalan	Rana	Country Representative	Norwegian Red Cross	PaP
Karoum	Yunes	Assistant Technique	UGP Parc Macaya/ BID	Camp Perrin
Larogue dit Clebert	Pierre	Maire de Port Salut	Mairie de Port Salut	Port Salut
Le Pape	Vincent	Directeur de coopération	CIDA	PaP
Ligondé	Elda	Guide	Centre d'Interpretation de la Nature	Aquin
Lundkvist	Perolof	Representative	Lutheran World Foundation	PaP
Magloire	Eliassaint	Technical Director	ORE	Coteaux
Maguy	Jocelin	Coordinator	KOFASUD	Les Cayes
Milla	Andrea	Q. Planning and Project Officer/ Regional Program	IDEA	PaP
Mirthyl	Anasta	Program officer	IDEA	PaP
Ndikumana	Deo	Country Officer	World Bank	PaP
Neliev	Joseph	Fisherman	Association de Pêcheurs de Zanglais	Zanglais
Noel	Dario	Ingenieur Agronomie	CSI	Zanglais
Noncent	Islande	Guide	Centre d'Interpretation de la Nature	Aquin
Occelas	Marie-Ange	Project Officer	IDEA	PaP
Ommundsen	Else	International Police Adviser	MINUSTAH/SGBV Team	PaP

<i>Name</i>	<i>First name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Location</i>
Oriol	Michele	Executive Director	Comité Interministériel d'Aménagement du Territoire	PaP
Papillon	Rolphe	Communication officer	UGP Parc Macaya/ BID	Camp Perrin
Pardo	Maximilien	South Haiti Programme Manager	UNEP	Port-Salut
Perera	Antonio	Director	UNEP	Port-Salut
Pricien	Josephe André Faine	Responsable Agroforesterie	UGP Parc Macaya/ BID	Camp Perrin
Ramos	Maria	Nurse	Cuban Medical Brigades	Les Cayes
Rivero Perez	Ana Maria	Technical Director	Cuban Medical Brigades	Aquin
Robens	Maxi	Program officer	Lutheran World Foundation	PaP
Saint Lot	Danielle	Ambassador at large – Special representative for Investments in women's empowerment/ Former FED Director	FED	PaP
Smail	Jean	Administrator	Hôpital Aquin	Aquin
Soleman	Thomas	Fisherman	Association de Pêcheurs de Zanglais	Zanglais
Stable	Socrates	Orthopedist Dr	Cuban Medical Brigades	Les Cayes
Subin	Joseph	Rep. Zone	PADY	Port Salut
Thys	Jean Elie	Agent de liaison	UNEP/ CSI	Port Salut
Titi	Colis	Engineer	UNDP	Les Cayes
Tveoy	Anne Caroline	Country Director	Norway Church aid	PaP
Valliere	Jean Renand	Directeur de Projet	UNDP	Les Cayes
Yazdani	Mariam	Programme Coordinator	Viva Rio	PaP
<b>Norway and other</b>				
Bendiksby	Trygve	Deputy Director, Latin America Section	MFA	Oslo
Biason	Lea Angela	Police Policy Officer – Gender	Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN	New York
Eriksen	Tom Edvard	Multilateral Bank and Finance Section, Department for UN, peace and humanitarian affairs	MFA	Oslo
Gisnås	Lauren	Adviser, Department for Climate, Energy and Environment, Section for Sustainable Development and Environment	Norad	Oslo
Hauge	Wenche	Haiti Expert	PRIO	Oslo
Hjellegerde	Nina	Head of Humanitarian Deployments	NORCAP / NRC	Oslo
Hoem	Evelyn	Senior Adviser, Department for Climate, Energy and Environment, Section for Agriculture and Forest	Norad	Oslo
Langsholt	Kristin Hoem	Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Affairs	MFA	Oslo



<i>Name</i>	<i>First name</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Organisation</i>	<i>Location</i>
Lotsberg	Randi	Former Senior Adviser, Department for Peace, Gender and Democracy	Norad	Oslo
Lunde	Henriette	Consultant	Fafo	Oslo
Rikter-Svendsen	Espen	Former Special Envoy to Haiti	MFA	Oslo
Sætre	Halvor	Former Special Envoy to Haiti	MFA	Oslo
Slåttum	Elisabeth	Adviser, Section for Peace and Reconciliation	MFA	Oslo
Thorstensen	Trude Bruun	Analysis and reporting adviser	NORCAP / NRC	Oslo
Thue	Nanna	Former Adviser, Latin America Section (now at the Norwegian Embassy Islamabad)	MFA	Oslo
Tuft	Eva Irene	Senior Adviser and Special Representative for Haiti, Latin America Section	MFA	Oslo

### 3.2 List of focus group discussions

The list below shows the participants of several different group discussions that were conducted in Haiti and Oslo during the field phase:

- Norwegian Decision Makers, Oslo;
- Association of Fishermen, Aquin (Fishery);
- Association of Fishermen, Port Salut (Fishery);
- Staff of Macaya Project, Camp Perrin (Natural resource management);
- Agronomists, technicians and mango tree grafters involved in the activities of ORE in the *Département du Sud* (Agriculture and income generating activities);
- Staff of the tree nursery in Côteaux (Reforestation);
- Association des Femmes Côteaux (Agriculture and income generating activities);
- Household in Zanglais (Energy);
- Local inhabitants on the road segment between Port Salut and Coteaux (All sectors);
- Around 20 community members in Arniquet (Reforestation);
- Eight community members (men, women, youth) in Les Cayes/Quartier Renaud (DRR).

## 4 Annex 4: Complementary evidence

The information presented in this chapter is provided in accordance with the nine Evaluation Questions (EQs) and related Judgement Criteria (JC) used in the evaluation, most of which were set out in the ToR and further developed by the evaluation during the inception phase (see Table 2 below). The information presented underpins the main findings of the evaluation and complements the evidence which is already presented in Volume 1.

Table 2 Evaluation Questions

<b>EQ1. What was the intended overall impact of the Norwegian support to Haiti from 2010-2012?</b>	
<b>EQ2. To what extent has that impact been (or is likely to be) achieved?</b>	
And by evaluation component:	
<b>Part A: Programme</b>	<b>Part B: Process</b>
<b>EQ_A1</b> To what degree has Norwegian assistance supported (or is likely to support) the priorities laid out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?	<b>EQ_B1</b> On which basis were decisions made during different phases and at different levels?
<b>EQ_A2</b> To what degree has Norwegian assistance led to (or is likely to lead to) the objectives stated in project documents / agreements?	<b>EQ_B2</b> To what extent and how did Norway approach the challenge of learning to ensure that aid was optimally allocated, designed and implemented?
<b>EQ_A3</b> To what extent did Norway influence the effectiveness of international aid to Haiti overall?	<b>EQ_B3</b> How did Norway adapt and respond to the numerous factors that could potentially influence the Haiti programme?
<b>EQ_A4</b> What are the likely unintended consequences, positive or negative, of Norwegian assistance?	

### 4.1 Overall EQs

#### 4.1.1 EQ1. What was the intended overall impact of the Norwegian support to Haiti from 2010-2013?

At the time of the Inception Report, all documents then available were explored and analysed to produce the standard product in evaluation – an intervention logic. Although best known for its structure and linearity (linking inputs to outputs to results, and eventually to impacts), the intervention logic for the Norwegian support to Haiti seemed to defy all efforts to give it structure. Even as early as the preliminary briefing sessions that launched the evaluation in Oslo (February 2014), the evaluation team came to a conclusion that the intervention logic might more closely resemble a virtuous circle than a linear output.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, a clear strategy explicitly identifying the intended overall impact (IOI), the ambitions and the limitations of Norway's support to Haiti and the complementarity of this action with the one carried out by other donors in the country turned out not to exist. What was provided, highlighted explicitly in the ToR of the evaluation and proposed during interviews with key informants, was a "Beslutningsnotat", loosely defined in English as "decision memo", the most salient of them being the one dated 6 July 2010 (Sources: portfolio review and KII). Nowhere in that document was there any visible intent to delineate a "strategy", and the word and its cognates, were not employed to present a Norwegian strategic position. Rather, a series of very clear action-related priorities were stipulated (discussed below and referred to as "priority themes") in that guiding document, but with no mention of their combined ultimate desired impact (see also annex 7).

For these reasons, the very first evaluation exercise consisted of organising a focus group of the staff who, since 2010, had comprised Norway's Haiti team, to get these key players to reconstruct the intended overall impact. The three-hour focus group, facilitated in Oslo by evaluation team members, attained a high level of interaction among seven actors. It was clearly explained to them that the objective was neither a single impact nor necessarily a fully consensual IOI; it was also both logical and acceptable that the IOI changed over time (i.e. from humanitarian to reconstruction efforts). The focus group discussion generated many possible articulations of the IOI, but no decisive or convincing consensus. The main

<sup>1</sup> The notion that in fragile settings there can be such a thing as a linear process is proved to be unrealistic and most often counter-productive. Such an approach does, however, require a sound and continuous context analysis (political economy type of analysis), and an intervention logic that allows for flexibility, risk taking and adjustment of programming (based upon monitoring results) against an overall objective. Unfortunately, such an approach is still rarely applied, as most aid systems do not allow for it (e.g. political pressure for results, risk aversion, budget cuts). This leads to the image of Norway as being uniquely positioned to strengthen their support to Fragile States.

impacts were still considered loaded and largely immeasurable, as they were stated. The main IOIs proposed were that Haiti: 1. could stand on its own; 2. would have a basis for development; 3. would handle disasters more effectively. The discussion raised even more questions. Would sitting up (as opposed to “standing”) be enough? What constitutes the “basis for development”? Does “handle” indicate preparedness, prevention and/or efficient relief?

To further clarify and test these proposed IOIs, 15 of them were rephrased into singular and distinct elements<sup>2</sup>, and set up as a ranking exercise as one part of an online survey (Part B e-survey) of main actors. From this survey, the two highest rated IOIs were:

1. Haiti is in the driver’s seat of its own development and reconstruction (Weighted score: 25<sup>3</sup>).
2. Haiti has a sustainable basis for development (i.e. building back better) (Score: 20).

The far distant third choice was “*Haitian communities are more resilient and livelihoods strengthened*” (i.e. Disaster Risk Reduction), with a weighted score of only 8. The evidence thus converges on the above two intended overall impacts for Norwegian support to Haiti from 2010 to 2013. Number 1 is clearly linked to Haitian ownership, which was not explicitly mentioned in the top three IOIs of the earlier focus group exercise. Number 2 is almost identical to the previous second IOI. With this basis as a starting point, the second Evaluation Question (EQ) can then be answered.

Elements that received absolutely no score among the 15 choices included in the Part B e-survey were: Haiti experiences a smooth transition from earthquake response to development; violence in Haiti is prevented and stability maintained; international co-ordination of Haiti’s reconstruction is strengthened or Norway is recognised as a good donor.

The IOIs extracted from the evidence above are distinct from the Norwegian priorities. What clearly surfaced from a review of Norwegian documents, as well as the systematic literature review (SLR), was a set of four main priorities and two cross-cutting issues that Norway highlighted as their focus. It is important not to conflate intended overall impacts with priorities. A discussion on the priorities is featured under EQ\_A1.

Furthermore, strategies that lead, or should logically lead, to the two IOIs are discussed in many portions of this evaluation. First, they are explored under EQ2. Second, programmatic aspects are addressed in findings of Part A, and decisional/managerial ones are discussed in findings of part B.

Still related to IOI, there is ample evidence from multiple sources that the Norwegian “Model” of international aid is known above all for its flexibility. A flexible donor will have flexible IOIs, evolving as challenges are better understood and/or confronted. Evidence demonstrates that the IOI of the humanitarian phase of Norwegian support (saving lives and providing basic needs) very swiftly changed to also address elements of recovery and reconstruction. It is the latter phases, however, that are visible in the IOI above. Because the question was directed to the full post-earthquake period, the humanitarian IOIs did not dominate.

In the Part A survey, respondents were asked to summarise in a single word or phrase their experience or overall feeling about Norway as a donor in Haiti. Only one of the 21 responses (see graphic on cover page) was negative (“lack of co-ordination”), but only one proposed the exact term “flexible”. The others all align to a positive impact – such as effective, sustainable, coherent, conscientious, and realistic.

#### 4.1.2 EQ2. To what extent has the intended overall impact of the Norwegian support to Haiti been (or is likely to be) achieved?

Above, we have identified the following two main impacts:

1. Haiti is in the driver’s seat of its own development and reconstruction
2. Haiti has a sustainable basis for development (i.e. building back better)

To assess the extent to which these two intended overall impacts (IOIs) were achieved, it was important to unpack them to determine which *outcomes*<sup>4</sup> lead to these impacts. This process borders on the development of intervention logic. It is through such a framework, that measurement becomes even remotely feasible. Consider the two lists in Box 1, providing a breakdown of elements that logically contribute to the two identified IOIs for Norwegian support to Haiti 2010-2013.

<sup>2</sup> The list included intentions at various scales, as expressed in literature and interviews. Respondents were encouraged not to focus on their preference of *how aid objectives should be formulated*. Rather, they were asked to recall actual intentions of Norway. The focus on one region (*Département du Sud*) is understood as being a method used, not as an aim in and of itself.

<sup>3</sup> The score is a weighted calculation. Items ranked first are valued higher than the following ranks. The score is the sum of all weighted rank counts.

<sup>4</sup> *Outcome* is used here to indicate the layer of intervention that immediately precedes and contributes to the intended outcome or impact.

Box 1 Results that lead to or determine successful impact of the IOIs

**IOI-1: Haiti is in the driver's seat (a) of its own development and reconstruction**

- Haitian entities (b) participate in or preferably guide needs assessments;
- Haitian entities guide the choice of development efforts;
- Haitian entities demonstrate *ownership* of efforts and their outcomes, defined in part by the unsolicited mention of Norwegian-supported efforts and/or tools as their own;
- Haitian entities can and do refuse certain proposed efforts

(a). *Driver's seat implies the possession of a vehicle (means), a steering wheel (a voice), breaks (public support or checks and balances), etc. to perform the generally accepted role endowed by statehood.*

(b). *Although common sense would limit this to 'State' entities, for the purposes of this evaluation and in line with fragile settings (giving legitimacy issues) has been widened to refer generously to any targeted level: community, association, municipality, or state.*

**IOI-2: Haiti has a sustainable basis for development (i.e. building back better (c))**

- Reconstruction of Haiti achieves a condition that is better than prior to the earthquake/cholera outbreak;
- Three pillars of effort are supported simultaneously: environmental protection, economic growth and social equality (d);
- Add<sup>5</sup> to that foundational attention to security and governance elements required to address widespread issues of corruption and misuse of power common to fragile settings.

(c). *Build back better has been used in DRM for more than a decade but resurged in popularity when Clinton used it in lobbying for Haiti's reconstruction.*

(d). *Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainable development. Source: Our Common Future, 1987.*

Each *outcome* leading to the two IOIs is discussed below, with evidence provided as examples, when available:

- Haitian entities participate in needs assessments: Very limited; if the Action Plan (see below) can be said to reflect the needs that surfaced in the PDNA<sup>6</sup> (financed, in part, by Norway), the involvement of the state in this massive IFI / UN collaboration is unclear.
- Haitian entities guide choice of development efforts: Very limited; the single reported (by Norway) proof of articulation of Haitian choice is the Action Plan<sup>7</sup>. The legitimacy of the action plan as a voice of anyone other than "*donors...and influential members of the domestic and international business communities*" has been repeatedly and loudly questioned<sup>8</sup>. A key resource person involved in the design of the Action Plan however highlighted that it is "*is incorrect to state that the Haitian entities did not have the choice of their direction as far as the Action Plan is concerned*". In particular, the Action Plan was designed with a "*democratically elected and legitimate authorities with the full constitutional power to draft such reconstruction plans*"<sup>9</sup> even if it can be observed that, due to the particular post-earthquake context and the time constraints, "*the Action Plan was not discussed with as many Haitian actors as would have been desirable, including the Haitian civil society*".
- Haitian entities demonstrate ownership of efforts and their outcomes, defined in part by the unsolicited mention of Norwegian-supported efforts and/or tools as "their own": Very limited. Some small positive evolutions can be observed at the level of a few individuals as illustrated by the leadership of the Délégué (official representing the central state at regional level) of the *Département du Sud* in regional co-ordination activities. But, overall, achievements in this area

<sup>5</sup> These issues are required as per evolution since the Brundtland report, specifically key elements for sustainable development in fragile settings, featured most recently in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding's "A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States".

<http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/documentupload/49151944.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> GoH (2010) : Haïti. PDNA du Tremblement de Terre. Evaluation des dommages, des pertes et des besoins généraux et sectoriels. Annexe du Plan d'Action pour le relèvement et le développement national d'Haïti. Referred to as "*notorious*" by Stoianova (2010) in an examination of the "*ways in which information on the scale and severity of needs was generated and used by the humanitarian community in-country to formulate response and quantify funding needs*".

<sup>7</sup> GoH (2010): Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement d'Haïti (PARDH). Les grands chantiers pour l'avenir.

<sup>8</sup> Ferris, Elizabeth (2010): Burning Issues for Haiti's Recovery. Presentation to National Council of Churches' Working Group on Haiti, p. 3; International Crisis Group (2010): Haiti: Stabilisation and Reconstruction after the Quake, pp. 7 and 15; Herard, D. (2012): Disaster Risk Reduction and the Action Plan for National Recovery and the Development of Haiti, p. 21.

<sup>9</sup> The key resource person further explains: "*While the small number of persons involved in putting together the chapters of the PARDH might not have all been from the Haitian administration, the bulk of the work was done by a team put together by the Prime Minister at the time. This team was Haitian in its majority and worked quite independently from any pressure*".

remain very limited. Even in *Département du Sud*, ownership is absent at the lower level of the administration, and, as highlighted by an official of the regional administration, Norway-funded projects like CSI do not appear “owned by the state (...) they still organise everything for the state”.

- Haitian entities can and do refuse certain proposed efforts: Not at all; the evaluation team encountered no incidence of unsolicited articulation of ownership. Furthermore, when solicited, articulated levels of ownership were unconvincing.
- Reconstruction of Haiti achieves a condition that is better than prior to the earthquake / cholera outbreak: No major evolutions observed to date. Overall (at national level), there are some positive evolutions on the access to certain basic services (e.g. education), security and aspects related to human rights. However, the situation is not substantially better on many other aspects. See the details on the limited progress in the main thematic areas under EQ\_A1 and information from sources such as the Fund for Peace’s Fragility Indicators for Haiti (several indicators such as “Uneven Development” and “Public Services” are at the same level or at a worse level than prior to the earthquake).
- Three pillars of effort are supported simultaneously: environmental protection, economic growth and social equality along with governance and statebuilding: No genuine example was found of a simultaneous 3-pillared package at any level. While environmental protection (reforestation, Macaya Park), economic growth (mangoes, women’s associations, fishing associations, energy grids) and social equity (FED women’s centre) were all theoretically occurring in the *Département du Sud* (see also EQA1), they were geographically spread and often not targeting the same or related groups.

Overall, there is no convergence of evidence to suggest that the two IOIs have been achieved so far. This contrasts with the responses given in the Part B e-survey of Norwegian respondents in Oslo. Half of the 12 respondents who voted for IOI #1 (“driver’s seat”) claimed that the impact was achieved “to a great extent” or “fully” (average score was 3.42 out of 5). Four out of the 7 that voted for IOI-2 (“sustainable basis”) considered the impact to have been achieved “to a great extent” or more (average score was higher than for IOI #1, at 3.71).

One main issue reflecting on achievement of these impacts involves timing: the time required to produce such impacts and the timing of this evaluation. Evidence generally points to the need for a substantial amount of time before even modest impacts are visible within an average developing country context. Furthermore, the present evaluation took place when a majority of interventions had only just begun. For two main interventions in the *Département du Sud* (UNDP and UNEP), Phase I had focused on building a knowledge base and planning and Phase II, the actual interventions, was underway when the evaluation team arrived.

A more important question than EQ#2 is perhaps *whether it was reasonable to expect to achieve these specific impacts*. Despite the generous average appreciation provided by e-survey respondents, there were clearly members of the Haiti team (i.e. in Part B e-survey and key informant interviews) who were adamantly more modest in their expectations and less congratulatory about achieved impact at this point. This modesty is shared by the evaluation team; it stems in part from the wide recognition of Haiti as a fragile state.

In the Part B e-survey, Norwegian respondents scored the general application of OECD principles for fragile states by Norway generously among the 10 different policies evaluated (see discussion below in Findings, Part B). Among the ten principles of engagement supported by OECD for support to Fragile States<sup>10</sup>, the third is “*Focus on state-building as a central objective*”. As highlighted in the OECD-DAC policy brief on supporting statebuilding in fragile contexts<sup>11</sup>, statebuilding is a complex concept entailing several dimensions. The policy brief further explains: “*Perhaps the greatest contribution that development partners can make to the cultivation of strong state-society relations comes through support that enables the state to enhance its credibility with the people by its actions. However, this means much more than the classic development partner supported model of capacity-building that is anchored in training and equipping civil services and ministries based in the capital. The four core functions of the state can all be improved in a way that facilitates a richer and more interactive web of linkages between the state and social groups, and which builds capacity through learning by doing as the accountability of the state for meeting demands from its citizens grows.*” When the ten OECD principles were scored for their application in the Haitian context by three<sup>12</sup> evaluators separately, the principle related to statebuilding received the lowest score.

<sup>10</sup> OECD (2007): Principes pour l’engagement international dans les Etats fragiles et les situations précaires.

<sup>11</sup> OECD (2011): Policy brief on supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility.

<sup>12</sup> The three who conducted the field work in Haiti.



## 4.2 Part A / Programme

### 4.2.1 EQ\_A1. To what degree has Norwegian assistance supported, or is likely to support, the priorities laid out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

When the humanitarian response was already under way, Norway identified four main themes (DRR, NRM, protection of vulnerable groups, and dialogue/governance) and two cross-cutting themes (capacity building and human rights)<sup>13</sup>. This question looks at the extent to which the Norwegian assistance during the period 2010-2013 supported the humanitarian response and the main and cross-cutting themes.

Evidence gathered shows that implemented activities largely aligned with priorities set in key strategic documents, and main priority themes have benefited from substantial funds. However, the specific issues that the support has tried to address are complex, and the implementation of the financed interventions has taken place in an extremely demanding environment. Important obstacles still impede the successful contributions of the support to long-term effects in these areas.

**Judgement Criteria: Degree of alignment and contribution (or likeliness of contribution) of Norway-supported emergency response to the priority objective of meeting basic needs for the population affected by the 2010 earthquake.**

It is important that the objective of meeting the basic needs for the population affected by the 2010 earthquake is assessed within the more general context of the country. The situation before the earthquake was already dire, with over half of the population living on less than US\$ 1.25 a day and a high incidence of extreme poverty. The capital, Port-au-Prince, had a housing deficit for 300,000 people before 2010. Basic services such as health and education were particularly poor, and food insecurity was prevalent in many areas of the country. In this context, it cannot be expected that the humanitarian response to the earthquake would solve the structural problems of the country. The challenge was, however, to integrate these realities into the design of the emergency response and, by doing so, enhance the actions aiming to save lives and meet basic needs, while contributing to the definition of a stronger long-term development path for the country.

Humanitarian assistance represents 25% of Norway's portfolio in Haiti over the period, 90% of which was disbursed in 2010, just after the earthquake.<sup>14</sup> Norway followed a clear policy for the use of traditional priority channels (UN and Norwegian NGOs). More than half of the allocations went directly to UN organisations, and the balance was allocated to a chosen number of NGOs (e.g. NCA, Red Cross, MSF, and NRC/NORCAP) and other partners (e.g. Cuba, which provided support via its "medical brigades"). Most partners chosen by Norway had an established presence in Haiti, and some of them are still strongly involved in the country. This includes large sums channelled through framework agreements described below.

Contributions to the UN-implemented operations were made mainly through three mechanisms:

- At the global level, via the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)<sup>15</sup> – a UN-managed fund that provides seed funds to jump-start critical humanitarian operations and fund life-saving interventions. Haiti received 9% (US\$ 36.6 million) of CERF's allocations in 2010.<sup>16</sup> Norway was the second most generous contributor over the period 2006-2014, with an average annual contribution of US\$ 57.9 million.
- At a Haiti-specific level, via the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)<sup>17</sup> – a humanitarian financing mechanism that is used to structure a co-ordinated humanitarian response for the first three to six months of an emergency. It provides an overview of urgent lifesaving needs, and may include recovery projects that can be implemented within the appeal's timeframe. In Haiti, the first Flash Appeal launched in the post-earthquake context request US\$ 575 million for a planning and budgeting horizon of six months. It included contributions from the CERF. Norway's contribution to the Appeal process in 2010 amounted to more than NOK 80 million (more than US\$ 13 million).<sup>18</sup>
- Support to UN-implemented operations and the cluster system, which sets up thematic groups in an attempt to co-ordinate all theme-specific actors during the response, was also provided

<sup>13</sup> See, in particular, the "decision memo" (Beslutningsnotat) dated 6 July 2010.

<sup>14</sup> In total, Norway disbursed more than NOK 215 million in this area between 2010 and 2012.

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.unocha.org/cerf/>

<sup>16</sup> The fund is replenished annually through contributions from governments, the private sector, foundations and individuals.

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/appeals-system>

<sup>18</sup> Norway's contributions went mainly to: UNICEF, UNDP, OHCHR, WFP, FAO, UNFPA and UNOCHA.

through the deployment of secondments in various UN organisations (e.g. WFP, IOM, UNFPA, UNICEF) using the NORCAP roster of experts<sup>19</sup>.

The review of available documentation related to the humanitarian response to the earthquake leads to the following key observations:

- The international community managed to quickly secure large financial sums<sup>20</sup> to provide a vast response to the disaster and a quick response based in part on a number of rapid assessments carried out just after the disaster.<sup>21</sup>
- A complex architecture to organise the response was put in place under the leadership of the Humanitarian Co-ordinator/OCHA, based on the experience gathered in the context of recent similar disasters. The response to the earthquake capitalised on a dynamic that was set in motion years before.<sup>22</sup>
- Some critical interventions and lifesaving operations were successfully delivered, in key areas such as the provision of drinking water and healthcare<sup>23</sup> or the emergency shelter response.

However, many studies point to a number of important weaknesses in the response provided, and some even refer to the overall failure of the response – highlighting in particular the difficulties faced in terms of co-ordinating the humanitarian efforts, the limited sustainability of the structures put in place, the low efficiency of certain actions, and the mismatch between many designed actions and the needs of the affected populations. An important limiting factor highlighted is the overall weak analysis of the disaster context, and, in particular, its urban dimension.<sup>24</sup>

A variety of other factors contributed to the mixed results depicted in the documentation reviewed, among which were:<sup>25</sup>

- The devastating impact of the disaster on the national structures and the international organisations present in the country before the earthquake (in terms of human and physical losses).
- A number of internal inefficiencies in the supported organisations.
- The uncontrollable flow of inexperienced small NGOs.<sup>26</sup>
- The challenges faced in terms of global leadership and aid co-ordination.
- The low involvement of local stakeholders and weak information to the Haitian population.

By deciding to provide an important share of its support via global mechanisms managed largely by the UN (e.g. CERF, Consolidated Appeals), Norway made the choice not to be in a position to directly influence the identification of solutions to the deficiencies, listed above, during the implementation of the response. However, it should be noted that Norway has now been active for many years in discussions taking place at global level on the improvement of the international response to humanitarian crises.

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<sup>19</sup> <http://norcapweb.no/>

<sup>20</sup> Fifty-five donors pledged a total of US\$ 4.59 billion in grants for 2010 and 2011, a situation that contrasts with the one in 2008. At the beginning of September 2008 (after several hurricanes had hit the island), an initial Flash Appeal was launched, calling on donors to contribute an estimated US\$ 108 million in humanitarian assistance. But by the end of the month only 2% of the funds pledged had actually been given. Three months after the hurricanes, only 40% of a revised post-disaster reconstruction plan was actually financed by the international community (source: UN (2008): Haiti. Flash Appeal Revision).

<sup>21</sup> “*The speed of disbursement and volume of funds were critical factors in the response. The CERF and the Flash Appeal based primarily on estimates and assumptions provided by field staff was rapidly prepared and launched by headquarters three days after the earthquake.*” (Bhattacharjee, Abhijit/ Lossio, Roberta (2011): Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, p. 22)

<sup>22</sup> See EQ\_B1 for the co-ordination mechanisms put in place in response to the earthquake.

<sup>23</sup> The 2010 Inter-agency Real Time Evaluation highlights the following achievements: “*The need for drinking water was covered reasonably well and quickly (...) By early March, on average, over 6,500 cubic metres of potable water reached more than 341 destinations in Port-au-Prince, Léogâne, Petit Goave, Grand Goave and Jacmel. The Red Cross system alone had distributed 120,000 cubic metres of drinking water to nearly 310,000 people (...) (...) The MSF network made a major contribution to the response, with hundreds of medical staff being dispatched (...). Despite major constraints, specialised medical actors, such as MSF, ICRC, MdM, Merlin, etc., were able to become operational quickly.*”

<sup>24</sup> See EQ\_B1 for further details on the needs assessment process.

<sup>25</sup> Annex 8 provides further details of the lessons learned that are highlighted in the major evaluations covering the international response to the earthquake.

<sup>26</sup> More than 1,000 organisations were registered in Haiti in the weeks that followed the earthquake, creating a burden for the most important organisations already active in the country and making overall co-ordination efforts extremely difficult.

Moreover, one of the main elements hampering the response has been the multiplicity of actors involved. In this context, Norway's efforts to concentrate aid on key actors have been particularly adequate.

Most of the aid actors, including Norway, readily recognised the importance of quickly initiating transition efforts and providing Haiti longer-term collaboration beyond humanitarian response. However, it turned out to be particularly difficult to find the balance between maintaining a focus on the acute humanitarian needs that still remained – in a context of limited domestic resources and the scaling down of humanitarian operations initiated in the aftermath of the earthquake – while addressing the expectations of Haitians to give a greater role to Government of Haiti (GoH) and other national stakeholders, to provide more durable solutions and to respond to the more structural problems.

It was also particularly challenging to ensure that the aid co-ordination and delivery system put in place during the initial response was able to evolve, to make the transition from relief to reconstruction. The "Inter Agency Real Time Evaluation (RTE) – Phase II" explains that, one-and-a-half years after the earthquake, *"transition is on the agenda but needs a vision, a strategy, a plan and leadership. (...) the co-ordination and planning mechanisms are not fully adapted to the current context. (...)"*<sup>27</sup> The 2013 ODI working paper, "Disaster as opportunity? Building back better in Aceh, Myanmar and Haiti", confirms the important failures in this area<sup>28</sup> and concludes that *"the very architecture that had been designed to improve humanitarian response also undermined the ability of that response to engage in actual reconstruction at all, to say nothing of approaches that could be seen to be building back better"*.<sup>29</sup>

At another level, Norway made efforts to continue certain actions to meet some of the most pressing needs of the affected population after the immediate response phase. In particular, renewed support was provided to actions managed by NCA (e.g. in WASH), the Cuban Medical Brigades, and MSF (especially the provision of healthcare, including in the context of the cholera outbreak in late 2010). In addition, the deployment of secondments in various UN organisations via the NORCAP roster of experts was continued.

The majority of Norway's transition and development efforts actually went to new thematic areas (e.g. Natural Resource Management) that were not directly related to the actions or to the target beneficiaries covered by the emergency response. The efforts also focused on geographical areas that, even if presenting a high level of vulnerability, were not directly affected by the earthquake (the reasons for this choice are discussed below under EQA1.3 and EQ\_B1). This focus was however consistent with the priorities set in the Haiti Action Plan.

Almost half of Norway's transition and development efforts went to the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), which took time to be set in motion. The interventions funded via the HRF helped to carry out some specific actions in the first year after the earthquake (including a budget support operation to help GoH meet immediate financial needs) and contributed to addressing some pressing issues, such as debris removal. However, KIIs and the desk review suggest that, overall, the HRF did not fulfil the expected critical role it could have played in the recovery phase. More details on the HRF are provided under EQ\_A3 and in Annex 6 – Portfolio Analysis.

### **Degree of alignment and contribution (or likelihood of contribution) of Norway-supported development interventions to a reduction in disaster risk<sup>30</sup>.**

The Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) concept is based on the idea that disasters are preventable and that risk is a function of "hazards" (natural and other, including conflict) and "vulnerability". DRR is a main tool to promote resilience in which sustainable programming needs to reduce exposure to potential threats caused by external factors (e.g. by erecting flood walls) while at the same time enhancing the human

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<sup>27</sup> IASC (2012): Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Earthquake in Haiti. 20 months after, pp.8-9, 23, 40-42.

<sup>28</sup> The ODI paper (Lilianne Fan (2013): Disaster as opportunity? Building back better in Aceh, Myanmar and Haiti) discusses in particular the case of the 'shelter' sector: *"when it came to addressing more than urgent basic needs, there were heated debates and divergent views on a broader shelter strategy, on what a sustainable approach to shelter would look like in an urban environment and the extent to which the international community should be involved in reconstruction at all. The IASC cluster system in Haiti struggled to develop a common strategy and maintain a consistent approach, with responsibility for co-ordinating 'shelter' interventions divided between at least four different clusters and numerous sub- and inter-cluster working groups. (...) The shelter response thus got stuck in a humanitarian co-ordination system which could not see beyond itself precisely when a comprehensive and long-term perspective on reconstruction was required from the beginning."* (p.27)

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p.27.

<sup>30</sup> It is important to note that "risk" here is disaster risk – an entirely separate concept from the "risk analysis", discussed elsewhere in the report, that provides the requisite context for programming in fragile states and for more general programming.



condition (e.g. reduces vulnerability and poverty). Main components of DRR include prevention, preparedness, and risk reduction.

Most Norway-funded interventions in this area were implemented in the *Département du Sud*, which is consistent with the Norwegian key strategic documents elaborated in 2010 – setting the priorities of the engagement in Haiti<sup>31</sup>. Several interventions specifically focused on mitigating exposure in relation to risks associated to flooding in the hurricane season<sup>32</sup>. Concepts related to watershed management were used in the overall design of the interventions in the region, with some activities focusing on the upstream and others on the downstream.

Important attention was given to riverbank protection through the construction of gabions and reforestation. Several interventions, aimed at reducing exposure to hurricanes and the vulnerability of the local population, covered livelihoods in relation to economic activities in the agriculture and fishery sectors, and, to a lesser extent, to tourism. Norway also supported a UNDP-led intervention aimed at developing national capacities in DRR. The support focused on the national civil protection agency and the country disaster risk management system.<sup>33</sup>

Interviews in Haiti highlighted the fact that infrastructure activities, such as the construction of gabions, were highly appreciated by local people and officials. They clearly lead to tangible results, with a non-negligible immediate effect on risk reduction for those living within the vicinity. However, they represent expensive investments that are difficult to replicate in all vulnerable areas. As with many infrastructure projects, and as highlighted in the meta-analysis, these actions are also associated with rather low sustainability. Such physical investments need to be accompanied by complementary actions to address other risk factors endangering the population under threat. Unfortunately, most resources were consumed by the actual construction and too little remained for other actions, such as activities targeting risk behaviour of the local population, and informal settlements in the flooding areas.

Upstream activities such as reforestation also proved to be particularly challenging. Most activities have taken several years to be launched. One of the reasons for this is that project leaders felt that numerous studies and data collection activities were needed to carefully design the interventions. These consumed most of the resources (time and funding) of Phase I of the interventions.

Gleaned from the SLR, meta-analysis and Part B e-survey, DRR – at least in its purest articulation – is not the main theme in the Norwegian portfolio in Haiti. Rather, actors referred more to themes related to “eco-DRR” (this term has come to represent DRR activities that focus predominantly on the environment side, and especially hazard reduction). The most important contribution of the portfolio actually appears to have been in the field of Natural Resource Management (NRM), scored by the meta-analysis with an average of 1.9 out of a possible 5 marks. (Fifty per cent of all grants studied in the meta-analysis had at least a minor focus on NRM; although more grants, 57%, contributed to DRR, this contribution was assessed as being less influential in the overall portfolio, at 1.2)<sup>34</sup>. NRM, as for many other sectors, can be recognised as contributing to reduced risk, but may not necessarily be packaged as a DRR effort. Rather, in the case of Haiti, “environment” was used as the main and logical entry point into DRR-type efforts (see more detail below on NRM).

#### **Degree of alignment and contribution (or likeliness of contribution) of Norway-supported development interventions to improvements in Natural Resource Management.**

Respondents to the Part A survey identified “Natural Resource Management/environment” as a top thematic priority of Norway in Haiti. Indeed, Norway’s support in this area included some large

<sup>31</sup> The Norwegian portfolio also includes smaller interventions implemented outside the region like ‘The joint programme for climate change/DRR’ financed via NCA and which aims to empower vulnerable communities to adapt better to the effects of climate change and specific implement Disaster Risk Reduction activities.

<sup>32</sup> The geography of many regions of the country is characterised by steep and rugged terrain. Also, the region is on the hurricane route and is defined as a high risk zone. In 2001, a study conducted by Oxfam showed that the *Département du Sud* is the region of Haiti hit by the highest number of cyclones, being hit by 16 of the 27 cyclones that the country has had to endure between 1954 and 2001. It is followed by *Département de Grande Anse*, which was hit by 10 in the same period (see <http://www.mde-h.gouv.ht/etude/etudepdf.pdf>, p. 30). Since 2001, 12 cyclones have hit Haiti, out of which at least six directly affected the region (<http://www.haiti-reference.com/geographie/milieu/cyclones.php>).

<sup>33</sup> UNDP is one of the main partners for the DPC (*Direction de la Protection Civile*), which is part of the Ministry of Interior. According to one of the relevant people interviewed, the contribution of UNDP is about 95% (with UNDP-managed funds coming from various sources, including the EU). The rest is shared by USAID (3%) and the GoH (2%). The DPC does not have control over funds allowed to UNDP, even though they work together to plan activities. With this setting, the DPC can function, but it remains highly dependent on UNDP and other international partners. The contribution and ownership of the GoH in this effort remains very marginal.

<sup>34</sup> The same trend is repeated across many sources. Part A survey respondents were more generous, giving NRM a score of 4.3 compared to 4.0 for DRR.

interventions managed by UN organisations or the IADB (e.g. “CSI – Sustainable development programme in the South West”, led by UNEP, or “Sustainable management of upper watersheds of South Western Haiti – Macaya National Park”, led by IADB). As previously highlighted, NRM was also closely associated with some DRR interventions (e.g. the programme “Reducing Vulnerability in the South – Phase I & II”, led by UNDP). Almost all of the interventions of significant size have had a clear geographical focus on the *Département du Sud*. Norway’s support in this area also included some smaller interventions (mostly focusing on reforestation and soil conservation activities) managed by NGOs (e.g. NCA/LWF) in other regions of the country, and an intervention (“Frontera Verde”, led by UNDP) implemented on both sides of the border with the Dominican Republic<sup>35</sup>.

The evidence compiled from the meta-analysis<sup>36</sup> and other sources (mainly the Part A survey and KII) confirm substantial efforts provided in this area, and highlights some positive achievements, including:

- The official recognition by the GoH of a number of protected areas in the *Département du Sud*. In August 2013, the GoH decreed the country’s first nine coastal and marine protected areas.
- Several reforestation activities have been implemented with Norway’s financing in various parts of the region (some of them of important scale, such as in the St. Louis d’Aquin watershed area).
- Interventions contributed to the development of a number of Natural Resource Management tools for the GoH and its partners, such as watershed and natural park management plans, hydrography, and land management datasets. Supported interventions also generated a substantial amount of studies covering a wide range of topics, mostly in relation to environmental vulnerability in the *Département du Sud*.
- Various environmental education activities have been implemented in the *Département du Sud*. Most of them focused on reforestation initiatives, such as the one carried out directly by the Ministry of Environment in the framework of a Norway-financed/UNDP-managed programme. Others (as in the context of a UNEP-managed programme) aimed at raising awareness among fishermen on marine resources.

However, while most of these achievements correspond to direct outputs of Norway-financed activities, wider and longer-term effects in terms of better management of natural resources and reduced environmental vulnerability remain to be seen. According to the KII and the literature reviewed, huge challenges remain, including:

- Complexity of the issues to be addressed: Interviews conducted with project staff involved in the supported interventions (e.g. support to fishermen groups) illustrate little progress made so far. Raising awareness of the importance of protecting natural resources remains a huge challenge. The studies carried out in the design and first phase of the interventions already clearly underlined the complexity associated with environmental programmes in Haiti, and more specifically in the *Département du Sud*.<sup>37</sup> In particular, the deforestation observed in Haiti<sup>38</sup> is closely related to wider, extremely complex issues, such as land tenure and the economic situation of the local population. Some of the interventions reviewed recognise these challenges and try to integrate some of the specificities in their design. But they only partially recognise the huge long-term investments that are required to overcome the identified obstacles and obtain significant outcomes. In parallel, the situation at local level in Haiti depends on decisions made in Port-au-Prince (e.g. on the allocation of resources to priority areas). Important factors upon which the success of projects depends remain out of the realm of influence of the specific interventions<sup>39</sup>.
- Scale of the interventions: So far, most of the implemented activities have focused on rather small and specific geographical zones, isolated from each other despite being in the same *département*. The scaling up of these activities to achieve a critical mass at the level of the *Département du Sud* (which is under way for some of them) will naturally be accompanied with an increased number of obstacles.
- Pace of progress: After a long period of planning (in which studies consumed a substantial amount of resources), the largest interventions are only just starting. Some of them (e.g. Parc

<sup>35</sup> The intervention aimed at restoring transboundary ecosystems, while strengthening the relationships between the population and institutions of the two countries.

<sup>36</sup> As already indicated above, “Natural Resource Management/environment” is the thematic area that received the highest score in the meta-analysis (in terms of the effects, or potential effects, of Norway’s support in Haiti).

<sup>37</sup> See UNEP (2009): Haiti Regeneration Initiative. Study of lessons learned in managing environmental projects in Haiti.

<sup>38</sup> According to FAO (2010), some 95% of Haiti’s original forests has been destroyed and nearly 10% of the country’s forest cover (11,000 ha) was lost between 1990 and 2005.

<sup>39</sup> For instance, a vast project to transform the island of *Île-à-Vache* into a luxury resort and connect it to other countries via an international airport is likely to have a huge impact on the local dynamics in the *Département du Sud*. Some people interviewed fear a devastating impact on the already fragile ecosystem of the area.

Macaya) have already suffered significant delays – in part, due to procedural difficulties. For most of them, the availability of resources to implement the follow-up actions in the medium/long term is a problem still to be solved.

- Leadership by, and capacities of, national stakeholders: Important investments were made to develop the capacities of local institutions such as the Ministry of Environment. However, some interviewees questioned the effects of the provision of equipment (e.g. cars, computers) on capacity building, and highlighted the distortion created with capacity building efforts of other partners. Concerns also exist with regard to the payment of salaries of project staff presented as staff from the ministry, but who are unlikely to be taken over by national institutions after the completion of the interventions.
- Synergies and overall coherence of the supported efforts: The establishment of a donor working group at *Département* level focusing on environmental issues (“*table verte*”) has been pointed out as a major success in the Part A survey and some KII. However, synergies between the various efforts initiated so far are weak. Local institutions still do not have the capacity to ensure more coherence in these efforts. Some approaches adopted by the local officials of the Ministry of Environment and their key international partner (UNDP) are contested by the main institution in charge of land management at the central level. In general, co-ordination among partners remains poor, as illustrated by the lack of a clear strategy at *Département* level to adopt a common approach for reforestation activities (two UN organisations, both supported by Norway, follow different approaches). The numerous studies and important amount of data collected under Norwegian funding by the different partners in the first phase of the interventions are also not consolidated in a common framework to support a joint approach with national institutions, nor are they likely to be taken up by the latter.

**Degree of alignment and contribution (or likeliness of contribution) of Norway-supported development interventions, at national and other levels of governance, to enhanced citizen participation and, in particular, a greater role given to women and the youth in reconstruction and development.**

As highlighted in the KII and the Part A survey (this area received one of the highest scores), “governance and dialogue” represent major co-operation areas for Norway in Haiti. These themes were first addressed by the Norwegian co-operation with Haiti in 1998 in a general context of “peace-building/conflict resolution”. However, Norway’s support in this area took a new direction in the context of reconstruction after the earthquake. During the period 2010-2013, the support covered a wide range of sub-themes and channels.

The largest supported interventions have focused on topics related to citizens’ participation, better dialogue between key actors in Haitian politics, and political stability:

- The *National Democratic Institute* (NDI), an American thinktank that has been active in the country since the 1990s, has carried out several interventions (totalling around NOK 25 million in disbursements). These interventions consisted of support to Initiative Committees (ICs) and other civic groups to facilitate increased dialogue at the local level among communities, elected officials and candidates for office – in particular, with a view to achieving increased government responsiveness to citizen priorities around reconstruction and development. An important focus was put on the reconstruction process, to identify needs and to resolve post-earthquake issues through participatory processes. The interventions included the coaching of some female candidates and support to their communication strategy. Some activities also aimed at promoting inter-party dialogue and tolerance around the presidential/legislative election process that took place during the period evaluated. Support to NDI was discontinued after an external review commissioned by Norad (published in 2012).
- Based on recommendations of Norway, followed by financial support to specific activities, the *Institut International pour la Démocratie et l’Assistance Électorale* (IDEA), a Stockholm-based organisation not active in Haiti previously, started a number of activities in the country in 2011. While the approach of NDI focused more on fostering community dialogue and direct support to specific political actors, IDEA’s focus has been on the political structures in place at national level and the institutionalisation of key issues of national politics. IDEA’s action has also covered advocacy activities and the production of knowledge on topics related to democracy in Haiti.

Norway also provided significant core contributions to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission In Haiti (MINUSTAH) – estimated at US\$ 20 million over the period 2010-2012 (see Annex 6). The UN mission intervened in Haiti in a variety of areas, including on topics related to conflict prevention and governance. Its presence in the country is seen by many as having been instrumental in the organisation of free elections in 2010.

Finally, Norway also supported a few smaller interventions, covering areas such as:

- Women: At the national level, Norway financed the foundation *Femmes en Démocratie* (FED) to help them translate the “Haitian Women’s Policy Platform for the Reconstruction of Haiti” (an initiative initially supported by MINUSTAH) into action. It also provided complementary support to strengthen the wider advocacy role of FED, and helped to implement a project in the *Département du Sud* – the establishment of a “one stop centre” in the city of Les Cayes, aimed at contributing to enhanced women’s access to services in areas such as health or ICT/business development. At the local level, Norway supported a small initiative (named “Mama Troll”) carried out by a Norwegian NGO (Prosjekt Haiti). This aimed particularly at strengthening a network of women in a neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince in their work to educate and train local women to be able to support themselves and gain influence in their community. Support to women’s inclusion in the national development process has also been provided, in the context of wider interventions such as the ones managed by NDI and IDEA (see above).
- Youth: Norway provided a small grant to support the action of the *Association des Volontaires pour la Démocratie*, a civil society organisation that created a national youth parliament and focused on the representation of youth in national debates. Norway also financed small projects such as “Petit Troll”, under the same Prosjekt Haiti effort described above.<sup>40</sup>
- Media: Norway provided support to the mass media sector after the earthquake through various activities (e.g. setting up press centres, training journalists, support to audio programming, university exchanges) implemented by the International Media Support (IMS) organisation, a Denmark-based NGO.
- Peace building: Norway pursued its work, initiated with NCA and local partners more than a decade ago, to promote tolerance and peace-building at community level.

The continuity of the partnerships established by Norway with national and international organisations on several of these topics was praised by many people interviewed as being a key factor of success. The position of Norway in Haiti – with no visible link to a “political agenda” –, and its participation in international platforms such as “Friends of Haiti”, were also perceived as positive elements. The meta-analysis and KII show that the Norwegian-financed interventions all appeared very relevant in view of the needs of the country and the specific context of reconstruction of Haiti after the earthquake. In particular, gender and empowerment of women is not an area that has received a lot of attention from other donors in Haiti, despite important needs<sup>41</sup>. Moreover, by trying to contribute to strengthening the links between actors on the political scene in Haiti and the removing of distrust existing between the government and its citizens, Norway’s support addressed what is seen by many as a major factor of fragility. However, Norway’s support in Haiti faces important challenges, and limited results have been observed so far:

- Complex dynamics in national political structures: As recognised by Norway’s implementing partners themselves, obstacles are immense in this area, and evolutions are very slow. One observer highlighted the fact that “*money has become the driving force among politicians*”, making efforts in this area increasingly complex. In this context, Norway and its partner IDEA decided to adopt a flexible approach, based on progressively building confidence with key national actors and regularly adjusting the activities to new challenges identified. As in all countries, evolution in terms of dialogue and participation in political activities requires behavioural change for key actors involved, and this can be very slow. For the Norwegian strategy to function as hoped, at least implicitly, this change had to occur. Key Norwegian informants voiced their continuing hope that “*the political leaders of Haiti would step up and exert their leadership*”.
- Local governance: Observers have noted some positive evolution in recent years in terms of local partnerships between civil society and local governments. However, many also highlight the important deficiencies of public institutions and the persistent failure of the State to deliver services. There is general consensus on the need for the public administration to undergo a complete overhaul, and for the decentralisation process to be reactivated. This process has been stalemated in recent years, and has evolved in an irregular fashion over the past decades. Despite the transfer of some powers to the local level, local governments suffer from a huge lack of resources and capacity which make it difficult to implement the many (inclusive) local development plans formulated over the years. Some communities do manage to organise themselves to raise funds for specific investments, but these examples still remain localised,

<sup>40</sup> The activities of Prosjekt Haiti were later expanded to the *Département du Sud* (in St Louis du Sud), where Prosjekt Haiti created a community centre focusing mostly on youth activities.

<sup>41</sup> According to the 2013 study on the progress towards the MDG (UNDP (2013): *Haïti un nouveau regard*), the situation in terms of gender equality in the education sector and the private sector is not bad. However, the presence of women in decision-making position in the public sector remains an important challenge. With only 4% of women in the Parliament, Haiti is ranked 135 out of 142 in a list established by IPU (Inter-Parliamentary Union) in 2014.



limited, and local “public” investments are still highly dependent on external funding. In this context, Norway’s supported interventions only partially covered the issues at stake. Norway has participated only marginally in the support to policy reform processes at national level. In general, its support to state-building has remained limited over the period 2010-2012. As highlighted in the 2012 “Review of the Norwegian support to Strengthening Citizens’ Political Influence in Haiti through NDI”, Norway’s support focused on “*organising the citizenry for advocacy purposes rather than directly trying to improve government performance*” (an area which represented a gap in the international support provided to Haiti).

- **Mainstreaming governance-related issues in other areas of support:** Since it first addressed these issues in the 1990s, in relation to efforts to contribute to peace-building and conflict resolution, Norway has accumulated an important knowledge base to understand the various dimensions of fragility related to governance in Haiti. These dimensions include the lack of “social contract” between the government and Haitian citizens, and the organisation of power structures in the society. However, as highlighted in the meta-analysis, these themes are barely mentioned in the project documentation related to the new areas of support covered after the earthquake (e.g. DRR, NRM, etc.). This is not surprising, as Norwegian support lacks a clear framework (i.e. Country Strategy) that would establish which intended overall impact or strategic objective related to governance and fragility the interventions were supposed to contribute to, what the thinking was behind it, and how it all ties together (if at all).

**Degree of alignment and contribution (or likeliness of contribution) of Norway-supported development interventions in the area of human rights to reduce violations and, in particular, to decrease sexual and gender-based violence.**

Despite strong statements in Norwegian strategic documents<sup>42</sup>, the Part A survey indicates that “human rights” does not feature prominently as a priority area in Norway’s support to Haiti. This is confirmed by the meta-analysis, which also highlights that, although the theme indirectly features in some interventions focusing on governance (see above section on governance and democracy), human rights is not integrated as an important cross-cutting issues in most supported interventions.

That said, the portfolio review showed that, in addition to specific interventions provided in the aftermath of the earthquake (e.g. support to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights), Norway’s direct support to human rights still included several interventions. Except for some activities, such as the ones of NCA and its partner OBMICA that addressed issues related to statelessness and migration, the main focus of Norway-supported interventions directly addressing human rights issues has been on gender-based violence (GBV). Norway’s support in this area included:

- The secondment of GBV experts to UN organisations via NORCAP (e.g. to UNFPA in 2012).
- A multi-annual project implemented by a Norwegian police contingent within MINUSTAH since 2010. The project aims at strengthening the capacity of the national police (PNH) to deal with sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). More specifically, it intended, via the provision of training to a large number of national police officers (around 1000 between 2011 and 2013), to develop knowledge and skills, as well as a change in behaviour, within the PNH. Also, through the development of Standard Operational Procedures and the construction and equipment of SGBV offices throughout the country, it aimed to reinforce operational capacity.
- Several projects implemented by NCA partners (GARR<sup>43</sup>, MISSEH<sup>44</sup>)<sup>45</sup>: While GARR worked on protection of victims of GBV and on the implementation of a multi-stakeholder approach locally in Plateau Central, MISSEH focused on raising awareness among women and local leaders within churches in the Port-au-Prince area (*Portail Leogane, Carrefour Feuille*) and *Cité Soleil*. In addition, via NCA, Norway financed the organisation Viva Rio, which has worked with the PNH, UNPOL and MINUSTAH to provide training to PNH staff and local leaders on GBV in the Port-au-Prince area (*Bel Air*).
- Some specific activities implemented by other partners: for instance, FED established a “one stop centre” in the city of Les Cayes (*Département du Sud*), which, as well as providing business-related services to women, was also aimed at enhancing the prevention of GBV and ensuring support to victims.

<sup>42</sup> The decision memo of July 2010 notes: “Norway will follow up the Human Rights Council Special Session on Haiti’s recommendations for stronger inclusion of protection and rights perspectives into the reconstruction efforts.”

<sup>43</sup> Groupe d’Appui aux Réfugiés et Rapatriés.

<sup>44</sup> The Social Mission of Haitian Churches.

<sup>45</sup> Given the evolution of the context (the country moving away from an emergency situation) and the increasing importance of GBV activities in the supported interventions, NCA Haiti shifted its thematic focus from “Women, Peace and Security” to “Gender-Based Violence” in 2012.

Most supported activities have been successfully implemented. For example, numerous awareness activities have been carried out at the local level, an important number of police staff and local leaders have been trained and sensitised on SGBV issues, and specific infrastructure dedicated to SGBV has been built in several regions. However, despite the variety of initiatives supported, the results of Norway's investment in this area have been limited, and are likely to remain so. The item "likely effects on issues related to reducing human rights violations (including decreased GBV)" received the lowest score in the meta-analysis (1.5 out of maximum 5). The literature review and KII point to the following observations that help in understanding the challenges ahead:

- The context of Haiti is characterised by a weak judicial system and a patchy national policy and legislative framework related to GBV<sup>46</sup>. These issues are not addressed by Norway's support to Haiti, and only very partially by other donors' support. In addition to specific social-cultural factors (such as the structure of families and communities), the economic situation of many households in both urban and rural settings creates important constraints that are contrary to the reduction of GBV (e.g. perpetrators are often protected to preserve the workforce available in the community).
- Supported interventions addressing GBV were often based either on a vague approach (general awareness raising activities) or a rather narrow perspective (e.g. covering only the handling of cases by the police), without addressing issues of prosecution or long-term assistance to victims, and root causes of such violence. Bearing in mind the difficulty of implementing such an approach, it is still worrisome to see that, except for some interesting attempts at a small scale (NCA-partner GARR), no intervention targeted an integrated holistic treatment of GBV cases (at psychosocial, medical, legal and economic levels, and covering assistance both to the survivors and their families). Almost no intervention has covered the psychosocial assistance/counselling /re-education of the perpetrators, and only very few have tried to address responsible masculinity.
- The sustainability of infrastructure projects can be questioned. There are no credible plans so far on how to finance the sustained maintenance of infrastructure (SGBV offices/cells) built for the PNH by the Norwegian contingent/MINUSTAH. Alternative use of such infrastructure by the PNH has already started to be observed in certain regions.
- Norway's support was characterised by an important geographical dispersion and spread over a variety of small projects, without any link between them. There was no attempt to achieve synergies or sharing of experience between support interventions until the end of 2013, when NCA and the SGBV team within MINUSTAH took the initiative to meet and share information on their respective actions. During the period, very few contacts were established between the Norwegian-supported actors and national co-ordination bodies focusing on this issue (e.g. the Protection Cluster/GBV sub-cluster headed by UNFPA).

#### **Degree of alignment and contribution (or likeliness of contribution) of Norway-supported development interventions to increased access to clean energy for the population.**

In addition to a number of environmental and agriculture-related activities in *Département du Sud*, Norway provided specific support to improve access to clean electricity in that region. The support focused on the "supply side" and the development of new electrification and power-generating systems. It mainly covered three levels: 1. the development of retail energy products and rental sales of solar-powered lamps, lanterns and home systems; 2. the development of a rural electrical co-operative to upgrade, operate and manage multiple, town-scale, conventional-renewable energy hybrid mini-grids; 3. the implementation of two hydropower projects connecting to the Les Cayes regional grid, managed by EDH, the state electricity company.

The support has already led to some important outputs, such as the selling of hundreds of solar-powered lamps and home systems to rural households in the region, and the inauguration of the first electric co-operative in Haiti in February 2014, which followed the registration to the co-operative of no less than 600 local members. A very small initiative supported by the not-for-profit EarthSpark International (whose activities in Haiti are partially financed by Norway) has also illustrated the existence of potentially promising local solutions to enhance access to electricity in rural areas of Haiti.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> The first law against rape (allowing perpetrators to be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison) was passed in 2004.

<sup>47</sup> Using excess diesel-powered electricity from a local cellular phone tower, a micro-grid has been developed to deliver 24-hour electricity to a remote town in *Département du Sud*. Customers prepay for power on a model similar to the one currently used for cellphones. The grid, which started with just a dozen houses, was progressively expanded and now covers more than 40 households. The electricity is mainly used for a couple of light bulbs in each home, and small items such as cellphone chargers.

However, larger-scale interventions still face important challenges:

- The economic sustainability and future growth of the network of retail energy stores still need to be confirmed, as the purchasing capacity of the local population remains extremely low.<sup>48</sup>
- The intervention focusing on establishing an electricity co-operative has encountered some delays. While the co-operative was officially inaugurated earlier this year, the electric grid/powering system is not yet fully operational, and there are still discussions on the rates to apply. The model of co-operative, initially designed in US rural areas and re-shaped in Asian countries (e.g. the Philippines), has been adjusted to the Haitian context, but it still needs to be further adapted. The main challenges lie in the involvement of the community, which faces difficulties to fully own some of the complex components of the project, as well as in local power struggles that came to light during the first years of implementation.<sup>49</sup>
- The development of two hydropower plants completely stalled in 2014, facing obstructions by key decision-makers at the central level. A respondent to the Part B e-survey explained that *“hydroelectricity is dead-ended with vested interest”*.

### **Degree of alignment and contribution (or likeliness of contribution) of Norway-financed debt relief and budget support operations to the objective of helping the GoH to cover the budget deficit.**

The National Action Plan for the Reconstruction of Haiti (PARDH), elaborated just after the earthquake, called for massive budget support<sup>50</sup> in order to support macro-economic stabilisation (especially the important loss of national revenues)<sup>51</sup> and the substantial investments necessary to rebuild the country.<sup>52</sup>

At the donor conference in Punta Cana (June 2010), Norway announced that it would provide NOK 100 million (around US\$ 15 million) in the form of budget support via the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF).<sup>53</sup> The aim was to help Haiti deal with its large recurrent budget deficit.

It is estimated that, out of the greater US\$ 45 million of Norway's contributions to the HRF (see Annex 6), US\$ 10 million<sup>54</sup> was eventually used to finance the budget support operation<sup>55</sup> managed by the World Bank in 2010. It should however be noted that a bit less than one third of Norway's contributions to the HRF (around US\$ 14 million) was not associated with any specific intervention. Part of these funds that were not earmarked may also have been used for the general budget support operation co-financed via the HRF and negotiated by the WB in 2013.

According to data from the IMF report related to 2012 Article IV Consultation, budget support operations represented 9% of domestic revenues and 4% of the total of revenues and grants received by Haiti in the 2009/10 fiscal year (Norway's contributions to budget support represents less than 12% of the total

<sup>48</sup> This situation has already been identified in the project documents, which explain: *“The very poorest are effectively excluded at this stage as unfortunately they do not have the purchasing power to sustainably achieve even basic levels of energy access, and the project resources do not extend to cover 100% subsidisation/gifting of goods and services.”* That said, the targeted medium-level income population actually represents only a small fringe of the population in areas covered by the intervention. The store visited in Les Anglais during the field visit presented empty shelves, and stocks had not been replenished for weeks (the person in charge explained that stocks would be renewed after the harvest season, when most households regain their purchasing capacity).

<sup>49</sup> Some persons interviewed expect that this project will ultimately be successful and will pave the way for similar projects throughout the country. Because of the challenges highlighted above, it is too early to confirm this.

<sup>50</sup> *“[The state] must create hope and affirm its legitimacy as a leader in the reconstruction of the country. The response must be massive and immediate. The preferred mechanism to meet these requirements is the use of the state budget which, in the current context, depends on external budget support to balance it”*. (2010, PARDH)

<sup>51</sup> *“The earthquake has seriously deteriorated the fiscal and budgetary positions of the Haiti. (...) approximately 85% of state revenues are collected in Port-au-Prince and its surroundings, the epicentre of the earthquake. Facilities for the collection of taxes and customs duties were virtually destroyed.”* (2010, PARDH)

<sup>52</sup> *“The State must meet the enormous needs of the population directly affected by the earthquake. (...) Clearly, the State cannot meet its obligations without financial assistance valued at 350 million U.S. dollars.”* (2010, PARDH)

<sup>53</sup> Together with France (estimated contributions to budget support via the HRF: US\$ 30 million), Spain (US\$ 20 million) and Brazil (US\$ 15 million), Norway has been the donor most open to providing budget support via the HRF.

<sup>54</sup> Norway eventually decided to re-allocate US\$5 million out of the US\$ 15 million initially planned for budget support to the recently-launched interventions to support the development of the Macaya National Park in *Département du Sud*.

<sup>55</sup> Funds were provided in the form of “general budget support”. The operation didn't target a specific sector, but some conditionalities were still used for the release of funds. They covered areas such as public finance management (including budget control) and public sector governance (including public procurement and anti-corruption measures), as well as specific measures to enhance governance in the energy sector (e.g. monitoring mechanisms for the payments to the electricity sector), an important sector for macro-economic stability in Haiti.

budget support provided to Haiti during the 2009/10 fiscal year).<sup>56</sup> Despite the relatively small share that budget support represents in the national budget, some observers<sup>57</sup> highlighted the fact that such support did contribute to rapidly addressing immediate financing needs of GoH and help to maintain basic state functions in the aftermath of the earthquake.

In parallel with the contributions to the HRF-financed budget support operations, Norway contributed to multilateral initiatives to reduce the debts Haiti had contracted with certain international organisations (mainly IFAD and IADB). However, these contributions did not exceed more than US\$ 2.65 million in total<sup>58</sup>, and most of it has been used to reduce debt services after 2012. Beyond this financial contribution to debt relief and budget support operations managed by other donors, Norway did not support any specific intervention supporting GoH's capacity in public finance management and macroeconomic policies.

KII highlight the fact that, once the emergency period was over, the key people involved in the implementation of the Norwegian support to Haiti engaged in intense discussions on whether or not to engage more strongly in budget support. These discussions reflected the wider disagreements between international donors on the assessment of the fiduciary risk in Haiti<sup>59</sup> and what position to adopt on the integration of this risk in their strategy. Certain donors (e.g. the EU or the IADB) decided to strengthen the partnership built with the central government by further providing budget support, while increasing the political and policy dialogue associated to it. Other donors (e.g. Canada) made the choice to continue supporting the central government through projects specifically targeting certain important policy and institutional reform processes.<sup>60</sup>

The final position of Norway has been to provide some unearmarked funds through the HRF (see above), but without explicitly adopting any separate form of budget support or any other modality directly aimed at supporting the government at central level to implement its policies and the institutional transformations it engaged in during the transition period that followed the earthquake. In sum, budget support was eventually used only via the HRF as a macro-economic stabilisation tool in the aftermath of the earthquake.

While some support was still provided at central level (see section above on the support provided to national political structure), the outcome of the discussions around budget support and the use of the HRF reflects a clear move of the Norwegian strategy towards greater attention to the "local level" (see also the following sub-section and EQs related to the Part B/Process of the evaluation).

### **Focus on the poor in the interventions.**

Overall, given the situation of poverty in Haiti (see box below), it can be assumed that most of Norway's assistance to Haiti did target "poor people". Moreover, a large part of the emergency response in the post-earthquake context and a number of development interventions (e.g. SGBV-related actions) explicitly targeted the most "vulnerable groups" of the population. However, only very few long term interventions have had an explicit focus on the poorest groups of the population<sup>61</sup> and while, some aspects of income poverty were addressed in the interventions carried out in the *Département du Sud*, there is no evidence of long lasting effects on the economic situation of the target population so far.

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<sup>56</sup> The biggest contributor of budget support in the fiscal year covering the period just after the earthquake was the European Union, which provided more than 40% of the funds (outside of the HRF).

<sup>57</sup> This includes key people (staff from the IMF and the WB, a former Minister of Economy & Finance, and current high-level staff of the Ministry) interviewed on the topic of budget support in a previous mission to Haiti. More detail can be found in Particip GmbH (2014): *Evaluation of the EU's co-operation with Haiti (2008-2012)*.

<sup>58</sup> Norway's contributions to the debt relief operations for Haiti were based on the relative shares of Norway's equity in both IADB and IFAD.

<sup>59</sup> There have been strong suspicions by several observers that a substantial share of public funds was being misused at various institutional levels.

<sup>60</sup> As highlighted in the 2012 OECD Guidance document on 'International Support to Post-Conflict Transition', there is no clear consensus among donors on where/when to use budget support and there are mixed experience in the use of this modality in transition contexts: *"It is generally (although not always explicitly) agreed that general budget support is the preferred way to ensure that partner governments are in charge of their own development process. Budget support has had some success (...): Budget support can rapidly address immediate financing needs to prevent government collapse and help maintain basic state functions. (...) Budget support can help governments to implement policy and institutional transformations that can break cycles of fragility and violence (...) However, recent work has also highlighted the challenges associated with this type of support during transition (OECD, 2011a; IDPS, 2011c), and it is clear that budget support may not always be an appropriate instrument to address transition challenges."*

<sup>61</sup> While most of the population is actually highly vulnerable, certain groups (e.g. rural workers who depend exclusively on wage employment, landless farmers/sharecroppers, fishers who do not have their own boats, charcoal producers with no other activity) can still be identified as the poorest and most vulnerable groups of rural people in Haiti



Box 2 *Level and characteristics of poverty in Haiti*

In 2012, the incidence of poverty was almost 60% at national level<sup>62</sup>, and around 25% of the population was living in extreme poverty. The situation is particularly dire in rural areas (38% incidence of extreme poverty) where around 44% of the population lives.<sup>63</sup> Only 10% of rural populations have access to electricity, and less than 8% have access to safe drinking water.<sup>64</sup> In both (urban/rural) settings, the population is highly vulnerable to heightened impoverishment due to disasters or economic shocks (84% in urban areas and 95% in rural areas<sup>65</sup>). Only 20% of farmers depend solely on farming their own land, and 80% of farms fail to produce enough to feed their households. Other income-generating activities include wage labour on larger farms, extraction of sand, chalk or charcoal, and small-scale trade.<sup>66</sup> Food insecurity, which affects around 3 million Haitians, or 30% of the population<sup>67</sup>, is closely associated to the above mentioned dimensions of poverty, especially in rural areas. 50% of the country's food requirements are imported. Food prices have been consistently rising since the end of 2010, which has led to an overall loss of purchasing power for the majority of Haitians.

A vast assessment of poverty in Haiti was conducted by the World Bank at the end of the 1990s to try answering the question "what account as for the dire extent of poverty in Haiti?". The assessment pointed to a combination of key factors: i) Political instability, woefully poor governance, and corruption; ii) Inadequate growth, as a result of distortions at the macroeconomic level and inadequate levels of private investment; iii) Underinvestment in human capital and the poor quality of the expenditures that are made. The report further explained that "*the interaction of these various factors, including high population growth, produces a downward spiral, a "poverty trap" from which there frequently appears no exit nor hope. Some aspects of that trap (...) include: highlands; rampant environmental degradation, especially in rural areas; an increase in crime and violence, systematic abuse of human rights and outward migration from the country.*" While the model of "poverty trap" and the importance of the various factors explaining persistent levels of poverty have been lengthily debated<sup>68</sup>, subsequent reports on poverty in Haiti all emphasised the multidimensionality and complex nature of the phenomenon.

The 2013 Review of three Programmes for NRM and DRR in *Département du Sud* notes: "*The most vulnerable and poor individuals are not at the core of the CSI or partner programmes. (...) For instance, as the ORE programmes focuses on landowners, the poorest individuals will not benefit from farm-level interventions.*" Since they do not have "*the purchasing power to sustainably achieve even basic levels of energy access*"<sup>69</sup>, the extreme poor are also not part of the target beneficiaries in the Norway-financed Sustainable Energy programme in *Département du Sud*.

More generally, the item "increasing purchasing power of the population" received one of the lowest score in the meta-analysis (1.9 out of 5).<sup>70</sup> The meta-analysis highlights nonetheless that, in addition to some high labour-intensive (Haute Intensité de Main-d'œuvre – HIMO) infrastructure investments, several relevant activities with regard to increasing the purchasing power of the population have been carried out, especially in relation to interventions focusing on environmental vulnerability in the *Département du Sud*. Rural poverty was seen there as a major obstacle to natural resource protection and, more generally, as an important dimension in the development process of the region. The interventions co-ordinated by UNEP in the region (CSI-I and CSI-II) financed some small agriculture-related income-generating activities targeting specific groups of population, such as fishermen communities (via the provision of, for example, boats and fishing nets), women (via the provision of seed storage silos to support local trading

<sup>62</sup> The figures come from the 2012 survey '*Enquête sur les conditions de vie des ménages après le séisme*' (ECVMAS) and are calculated on data related to household consumption. Previous calculations based on household income (see WB 2001) present an even more worrying picture of poverty levels in the country. See also UNDP (2013): *Rapport 2013 sur les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement - Haïti un nouveau regard.*

<sup>63</sup> It is important to note that the country is experiencing a massive urban growth leading to new issues related to poverty in urban settings; 70% of the population was living in rural areas in the 1990s, but this level had fallen to 48% in 2010 and was at 44% in 2013 – source: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

<sup>64</sup> IFAD 2012.

<sup>65</sup> In rural areas, small farmers represent the poorest section of the population because of low productivity, limited access to credit and inputs, and the small size of their land (average land holdings are less than 1 hectare). Urban households may have higher resources than rural ones, but they have also a higher monetary dependence for essential goods/staple products.

<sup>66</sup> Remittances, accounting for roughly 15% of rural incomes, are also crucial for the survival of the poorest.

<sup>67</sup> The country ranked 67 out of 78 in the 2013 Global Hunger Index (<http://www.ifpri.org/ghi/2013>). An estimated 3 million Haitians, or 30% of the population, is food insecure - WFP 2014, <http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti/overview>.

<sup>68</sup> See Kraay & McKenzie (2014): *Do poverty traps exist? Assessing the evidence.*

<sup>69</sup> 2012 concept paper of the intervention Sustainable Energy programme in *Département du Sud*.

<sup>70</sup> There was also no evidence gathered to show that the support provided in this area was "conflict sensitive" – that is, took explicitly into account power relations and balances at community level.

activities), mango producers (via the grafting of more profitable mango species onto the trees growing on their lands).

Figure 1 Illustration: Catches of local fishermen supported by Norway in Port Salut (Département du Sud)



Source: Particip GmbH

An intervention managed by UNDP (*Projet de Réduction de désastres dans le Département du Sud*) has also supported the development of a model of farms based on better planning and greater integration of the ecological dimensions of agricultural activities in the context of a specific watershed (programme “plan de ferme” – farm plan). From the start, the intervention has integrated a strong participatory component with the involvement of the farmers in the planned activities.

Norway also supported small interventions aimed at promoting women’s emancipation through training and entrepreneurship (e.g. NCA-partner MOFECS activities in *Cité Soleil* or the Mama Troll project implemented by Prosjekt Haiti in the Delmas neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince).

As highlighted during KII and field visits, for most of the interventions, limited small direct effects could already be observed during the implementation of the activities (e.g. slight increase in catches in a local fishing association, or income generated by the planting of fruit trees on farmers’ lands). However, it is still too early to affirm that the interventions will actually make a substantial and long-lasting contribution to the economic situation of the targeted population. The field visits carried out in *Département du Sud* illustrate the extent of the challenges:

- Studies carried in the framework of the CSI interventions underline the high economic vulnerability of small fishing communities in *Département du Sud*. Incomes, even when generated with external support to promote more profitable fishing activities, barely cover the required investment necessary to support their activities. Field visits showed that fishermen had been unable to maintain and repair most of the motors and some of the boats donated in the first phase of the intervention. Similarly, due to the cost of such investments, they were unable to replace the fishing nets donated or invest in new nets of a specific mesh size that would allow them to diversify their activity. Moreover, despite the training provided in the context of the intervention, they still lacked sufficient managerial and investment capacities to organise themselves in a way that would substantially enhance the commercial aspect of their activities.
- Field visits also showed the fragility of the women’s groups’ supported activities. A group of women that received seed storage silos in 2013 had decided to place all their investment in one specific type of seed – namely, maize – that had been highly profitable in recent years. When the sowing season (and the time to sell the stored seeds) arrived in early 2014, the prices of the other types of seeds (e.g. coffee, beans) had increased, while the maize had barely done so. The consequence was the absence of any profit for the group of women. It is also noteworthy that, given their costs (thousands of dollars for sophisticated equipment), the acquisition of seed silos can only be envisaged with external support. This example does not illustrate necessarily the

lack of relevance of such type of support. It however highlights some risks which can limit the expected effects of the support and which need to be carefully taken into account in the design of the support.

- The “model of agro-ecological farms” (promoted in the *Département du Sud* by UNDP) is based on the acquisition of new agricultural and managerial/planning techniques by farmers, as well as the precise geo-referencing, monitoring and technical support of the farms by the Ministry of Agriculture (MARNDR). This approach is interesting, innovative, addresses important weaknesses of the existing system, and places the issues that are being addressed in a broader context. However, KII highlighted the difficulties of implementing such an intervention on a large scale. In particular, the extent of the lack of planning/managerial techniques of farmers, the complexity of the monitoring system put in place (which relies on the use of an elaborate database and geo-referencing system) and the (financial and human) resources necessary to regularly visit and provide technical support to farmers, sometimes in very remote areas, contrast with the current weak capacities of the decentralised services of the Ministry.

These observations show that, for all interventions, a long-term accompaniment is still required to develop a favourable environment (e.g. adequate capacities and resources, established mechanisms) and to contribute to a real change in the economic situation of the population in target areas.

#### **Focus on the *Département du Sud* in the interventions.**

The “decision memo” (Beslutningsnotat) of July 2010 clearly identified the *Département du Sud* as a priority area for Norway: “*The South-western region, more specifically Département du Sud and the region around the city of Les Cayes, is one of the priority development areas in the authorities’ Action Plan. The region receives little aid but has great potential for agriculture and partly for tourism. At the same time, the region is highly vulnerable to hurricanes and flooding, and has serious environmental problems. (...) Norway wants to invest [there] in the prevention of natural disasters, sustainable natural resource management and economic development with a focus on: food production and income generation (from agriculture and fishing), the management of watershed and catchment areas, the conservation of natural forests and the biodiversity, reforestation, ecotourism, the construction of small hydro power plants (clean energy) and the disaster prevention and management.*”


A detailed justification (beyond the small extract above taken from the decision memo) of why Norwegian support should focus on this *Département* could however not be found in the documentation consulted. Other documents identified mentioning the focus on *Département du Sud* only observe that the choice was welcome by Haitian authorities and was in line with the Action Plan.

KII highlight (ex-post) the high relevance of the choice. The focus on the *Département du Sud* in Norway’s support to Haiti is also reflected very strongly in the responses given by respondents to the Part A survey. The focus on the region receives the highest score among all Norwegian priorities in Haiti. The portfolio analysis shows that the engagement in the region started in late 2010<sup>71</sup> with the support, via the HRF, of three interventions managed by UNEP, UNDP and IADB (three partners already present in the region). As illustrated in the figure below, the region received increased attention in the Norwegian portfolio in 2012<sup>72</sup>. As underlined in the KII, this important attention continued in the following years.

<sup>71</sup> There was no major intervention financed by Norway directly targeting the *Département du Sud* before that date.

<sup>72</sup> Out of NOK 127 million disbursed by Norway in development interventions that year, at least NOK 71 million was disbursed for activities in the *Département du Sud*.

Figure 2 Distribution of Norway's development portfolio by geographical focus



Source: Particip GmbH analysis based on data on disbursements available in Norad Aid Statistics. See Annex 6 for further details.

The support to UNEP and UNDP was extended outside the HRF in 2012. In the meantime, Norway invited a number of its other existing partners (e.g. the Cuban Ministry of Health, Femmes en Démocratie, NORCAP, Prosjekt Haiti) to also implement specific activities in the region.<sup>73</sup> Although not specifically targeting the region, some interventions at national level (e.g. the SGBV project within MINUSTAH) have also included activities in the *Département du Sud*.

As highlighted in previous sections, interventions implemented in the region cover a diversity of thematic areas largely aligning with the priorities set in the 2010 strategic documents.<sup>74</sup>

#### 4.2.2 EQ\_A2. To what degree has Norwegian assistance led to, or is likely to lead to, the stated objectives in project documents/agreements?

While the previous EQ looks at the Norwegian support from the perspective of the priority areas stated in key reference documents, this EQ examines the specific interventions financed by Norway in Haiti. In particular, the EQ looks at the stated objectives in project documents/agreements, and explores whether or not the design of the supported interventions was conducive to achievement of those objectives.

Overall, the evidence gathered shows that objectives were clearly formulated, but were not always precisely measurable. The associated monitoring & evaluation (M&E) frameworks were usually inadequate and characterised by confusion between outputs and wider/longer-term effects. This focus on outputs had led several stakeholders to highlight very positive “results”, but the analysis in this evaluation points to major difficulties in achieving the stated higher-level objectives or impacts.

While some of these difficulties are directly related to the complexity of the issues addressed and to factors outside the realm of influence of supported interventions, the analysis highlights several internal weaknesses in the design of these interventions. In particular, the failure to adopt a longer-term strategic vision in the project design and to link up with wider efforts in the relevant areas/sectors covered makes it very unlikely that the interventions will achieve the initial stated objectives.

#### Judgement Criteria: Intervention objectives were clearly stated and are measurable.

The meta-analysis shows that, in most interventions, objectives were clearly formulated. There are some exceptions that correspond either to programmes reflecting the limited experience of “standard” design on the part of the chosen partner (e.g. Cuba Medical Brigade, managed by the Cuban Ministry of Health) or to multi-faceted programmes with specific objectives not easy to define (e.g. the IDEA-implemented programme, “Supporting democratic transition and consolidation in Haiti”).

While the objectives of most interventions are clearly formulated, the meta-analysis shows that they are often not precisely quantified or measurable. It is noteworthy that, for many of the examined interventions,

<sup>73</sup> Multi-lateral organizations, which represented 100% of the interventions implemented in the *Département du Sud* in the period 2010-11, still represented more than 85% of the portfolio in the region in 2012.

<sup>74</sup> The topics range from fishery and agro-forestry to women empowerment, renewable energy and Disaster Risk Reduction.



there is a lack of consolidated monitoring data, and external reviews or evaluations are limited<sup>75</sup> (only 6 external reviews/evaluations for 45 interventions screened). More generally, the M&E frameworks reviewed reveal some major weaknesses. Respondents to both surveys echoed this observation. (One respondent to the Part A survey stated: *“Norway should not confuse the desire to be flexible with the absence of clear results frameworks and robust monitoring.”*)

A major characteristic of many of the M&E frameworks analysed is the focus on outputs, and the confusion between outputs and wider effects or “outcomes”. The 2012 review of the “Support to Strengthening Citizens’ Political Influence in Haiti through NDI” notes: *“It appears that activities are being conflated or confused with results. (...) This leaves unaddressed the outcome and impact levels of the result chain. (...) There is nothing in the evaluation plan that alludes to anything that ordinary Haitians would consider results.”*

The above observations may be nuanced by specific aspects of the Haitian context. In a country such as Haiti, evolutions are rarely linear. They remain exposed to a variety of factors and, in most sectors, outcomes take a long time to materialise. It is thus not always realistic to expect to measure outcomes in the framework of the short implementation period of Norway’s financed interventions (two to three years). Moreover, for some of the sectors covered by Norway’s support, specific outcomes are particularly difficult to measure – a situation that is aggravated by the lack of robust data in Haiti to accurately monitor changes over time. In several instances, project documents of Norway-supported interventions clearly acknowledge this situation and highlight the need to carry out a first phase focusing on better understanding the context and creating a reference base for future implementation. For instance, the project document of the “CSI I – Haiti South West Sustainable Development” programme states: *“Due to a lack of data there is no attempt in 2011 – Year 0 of the CSI – to quantitatively collate or measure the high-level benefit of the project to the population”*. That said, such an approach also poses a risk that most of the available resources allocated to the interventions are eventually absorbed by studies and other preliminary research activities, followed by planning processes. In addition, a detailed monitoring framework can quickly become too elaborate to be used effectively. Key informant interviews (KII) carried out during the field phase indicate that this risk was manifest in the case of several projects supported by Norway, in particular in *Département du Sud*.

Overall, the evidence gathered shows that, while objectives have been clearly stated, the associated M&E framework has usually been inadequate.

### **Extent to which objectives have been, or are likely to be, met**

Responses to the Part A survey highlight a very positive perception of results achieved by the Norway-supported interventions. The question *“To what extent have the objectives been met (or are likely to be met)?”* received an average score of 4.2 out of 5.

As highlighted in EQ\_A1, several initiatives were successfully implemented, and a variety of outputs have been achieved in all sectors. Yet, as also pointed out in EQ\_A1, successes are so far mainly observed at “output level”, and in most sectors – although it is probably still too early to measure the outcomes of supported interventions – longer-term effects are likely to be hindered by a number of important obstacles. The difference between obtaining outputs and achieving higher-level objectives greatly explains the contrast between the very mixed observations of the meta-analysis (which gave a score of 2.1 out of 5 to the item “Success in meeting planned objectives”) and the positive perceptions highlighted in the Part A survey.

EQ\_A1 showed that several factors have limited (or are likely to limit) the effects of the supported interventions. Limiting factors relate both to the supported interventions themselves and to contextual elements beyond the realm of influence of the interventions. The analysis of the quality of design of supported interventions, and the question of whether the main challenges have been identified from the outset and integrated in the initial design, are dealt with in the following sub-section

### **Interventions were appropriately designed to meet their objectives**

The meta-analysis highlights a high diversity of designs across interventions, with varying levels of quality (scores related to the item “quality of design” range from 2 to 4, out of 5). This diversity reflects the important flexibility of Norway in relation to its partners’ own frameworks and capacities.

Certain interventions have strongly benefited from the prior experience of Norway’s partners in the country. Most interventions reviewed do recognise some prevailing challenges in Haiti (e.g. lack of

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<sup>75</sup> Out of 45 interventions (representing more than 95% of the Norwegian portfolio) screened during the desk study, only six external evaluations/reviews covering specifically these interventions in Haiti could be identified. In addition to these evaluations/reviews, one case study was produced in 2010 on the Norwegian humanitarian response to natural disasters (the study was not focusing on the effects of the support) and one evaluation covered indirectly some of Norwegian support (the Inter-agency Real-Time Evaluation in Haiti after the earthquake).

capacities, continuous emergency situation, exposure to external shocks, and, to a lesser extent, the importance of political interests at local and national levels). The design of some interventions does integrate some of the specificities of the Haitian context. These important obstacles are also illustrated by the Part B e-survey, in which every respondent highlighted the problem that factors outside Norway's control are likely to impede achievements in the areas supported.

Nevertheless, this cannot compensate for the absence of a documented risk analysis for the overall Norway portfolio. Furthermore, almost 40% of the respondents to the Part B e-survey also indicated the weakness of the design as one of the main barriers to success with regard to intended objectives. A respondent to the Part A survey noted: *"The intentions were right, but the execution proved more challenging, which is often the case in a country like Haiti"* [Evaluators' comment: *"in a fragile state"*].

The meta-analysis shows that intervention designs only partially recognised the huge investments that are actually required to address the complex issues covered by the support and to overcome the identified potential obstacles. The analysis further highlights the following major weaknesses:

- **Over-ambitious design:** Several interventions have had a high ambition disproportionate to the availability of resources and the complexity of the problems they aimed to address. To explain the failures in achieving certain objectives, some respondents to the Part B survey highlighted the imbalance between the *"scale of problem to be addressed [and the] available resources"*. One respondent also highlighted *"a lack of realism in the programme preparation"*. The 2012 review<sup>76</sup> of the "Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through NDI" programme highlights the same problem, and stresses that: *"there should be a healthy, modest recognition of what outsiders can and cannot do"*.

It is noteworthy that the "CSI I – Haiti South West Sustainable Development" programme was initially meant to focus on the whole South-west of Haiti (covering three 'Départements'). It was quickly downsized to a single region ('Département'). Most activities eventually focused on very specific areas in this region, resulting in a patchwork effect that may have further diluted the impact.

- **Lack of a comprehensive approach:** As highlighted above (see EQ\_A1), many themes covered by Norway's support to Haiti present a high degree of complexity that cannot be addressed by a single intervention. While many partners recognise this limitation, it should be noted that very few of them have tried to link up their actions with broader strategic efforts. Insufficient attention has been given to create complementarities with other interventions in the same sector (e.g. actions in the areas of SGBV or governance/citizens' participation). In the *Département du Sud*, the meta-analysis and the field visits also show that the supported approach has been sketchy, with various activities implemented in different geographical areas or involving different actors without connections between them (see also EQ\_A3 on the mixed achievements in terms of aid effectiveness).

KII also highlight that, while there is a limit to the influence that can be exerted at political level by external actors (especially by an external actor alone), it is crucial to integrate the political dimension of the supported actions in the design and implementation of the interventions. Documents reviewed (see, for instance, the 2013 Review of three Programmes for NRM and DRR in *Département du Sud*) show that several Norwegian-financed interventions lacked sufficient efforts to mobilise actors at the local level. Some KII also stressed the fact that interventions were not systematically associated with higher-level dialogue. The repeated efforts of the Special Senior Adviser to Norway to "unblock situations" – for example, by mobilising senior representatives of the GoH – illustrate the necessity to go beyond the mere technical aspects during project implementation. A more comprehensive approach needs to be embraced to ensure continuous dialogue and the involvement of all key stakeholders in the actions supported. The need for such efforts was not anticipated or considered during the design, but could have been if a solid risk analysis had been conducted.

- **Lack of a long-term perspective and adequate financing:** In most of the KII, interviewees highlighted the slow pace of development processes in Haiti, and hence the importance of adopting a long-term perspective in supported interventions. One respondent to the Part A survey highlighted the fact that *"the strengthening of democratic institutions and structural inequities requires a long-term, sustained commitment on the part of the donor"*. Apart from some exceptions (for example, the "CSI I – Haiti South West Sustainable Development" programme,

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<sup>76</sup> The 2012 review goes even further and highlights the need to *"re-examine the project's core assumption about the causal chain: (a) citizens contact parliamentarians, (b) parliamentarians then structure the budget on the basis of citizen concerns, (c) the money then flows outward from the government and downward to towns and villages to implement activities. In the Haitian context, this posited causal sequence bears little relationship to reality. It is an inappropriate fiction on which to base a programme."*

which planned overall efforts over a 20-year timeframe), most interventions did not recognise this aspect in their design. Very few elaborated a clear framework with a tentative timeframe and an estimation of resources to mobilise for changes to occur in the long run.

It should be noted that the predictability of funding for planned interventions was not properly addressed in most interventions. In several instances, Norway used very short funding cycles (less than three years), which contrast starkly with the pace of changes observed in Haiti. It also used different approaches to finance the actions of its partners, without always clearly justifying these differences. A respondent to the Part A survey noted: *“Norway should, to the greatest extent possible, attempt to streamline the length of project cycles. Given the general difficulties in implementing successful projects in Haiti, Norway should as a general rule commit funding for a minimum of three years.”*

While these observations can be nuanced by the fact that, in most cases, Norway eventually provided continuous support to its partners over more than three years (by extending existing financing agreements or renewing them), KII showed that this situation still represents a problem for Norway’s partners in Haiti. This also echoes the observations made in recent works carried out in the context of the New Deal.<sup>77</sup> The provision of “seed money” should be carefully considered in the case of Haiti, where results and capacities to fully own a project take time to materialise, and where it is not always easy to highlight the success of a project after only two or three years.

Some partners supported by Norway have initiated huge interventions without being sure of the level of resources available in the following years. In parallel, international support to Haiti is fading out, with domestic resources remaining at a low level. For most interventions, exit strategies remain vague or unrealistic. For instance, the project document of the Norway-financed energy programme in *Département du Sud* explains: *“During the 3 year project the goal is to have installed capacity in government and the private sector. Norway is in dialogue with the UNDP and the IDB on capacity building follow-up where needed.”*

In addition to the issue of better securing and organising external financing, several interventions simply did not plan the sustainability of the actions supported. As highlighted above in EQ\_A1, various resource-intensive infrastructures projects – such as installing gabions, and building offices for projects addressing sexual and other forms of gender-based violence (SGBV) – have been carried out without sufficient consideration of maintenance and, more generally, sustainability issues. The SLR<sup>78</sup> shows that, given the scarcity of economic resources and the low efficiency in the use of public resources in Haiti, the long-term financing of important sector investments remain an enormous challenge, in all sectors. If the investments supported by Norway are part of a strategy to respond quickly to pressing needs (e.g. to reduce the exposure of the population to natural hazards), while, at the same time, trying to develop national capacities to ensure the sustainability of some of these investments, the temporary nature of the actions financed should be clearly acknowledged in the project documentation and communicated to the stakeholders. This has not been the case so far.

#### 4.2.3 EQ\_A3. To what extent did Norway influence the effectiveness of international aid to Haiti overall?

**Judgement Criteria: Norway’s interventions and overall approach have contributed to strengthened aid coordination, harmonisation and alignment by international development partners.**

As supported by a review of internal documents, influencing the effectiveness of international aid to Haiti was a key ambition for the first year. The Norwegian ambition to positively impact the international donors and actors was influenced by an intuitive reading of the situation at that time. In the first months of 2010, the environment was seemingly conducive for a *“new beginning for Haiti”*, as Norway perceived the main donors, and parts of the Haitian political actors trying to *“do the right thing”*, and there was some indication of the Haitian diaspora and elite taking on more responsibility. Norway was cited as one of the first donors to think longer term and one of the only donors to *“put their money where their mouth was”* – to disburse the full volume of funds committed. At the very least, this attests to Norway as a leader by example.

In particular, a lot of resources were invested in the work of the Haitian Reconstruction Fund (HRF) and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (referred hereafter as the Interim Commission), with donors and to a lesser extent with the Government of Haiti. The aim was to promote coordination and alignment under theoretical Haitian Governments’ leadership. After the dismantling of the Interim Commission, a

<sup>77</sup> OECD (2012) Rethinking policy, changing practice: DAC Guidelines on Post-Conflict Transition. Report available at: [http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/intsupporttopostconflicttransition.htm#How\\_to\\_obtain](http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/intsupporttopostconflicttransition.htm#How_to_obtain)

<sup>78</sup> Other studies, such as the 2014 Evaluation of the EU co-operation with Haiti, illustrate this challenge.

certain loss of momentum was observed (KII). The box below provides further details on the experience of the HRF.

*Box 3 Focus on the HRF*

Building on the lessons of the response provided in similar post-crisis contexts (e.g. Aceh), a multi-donor trust fund – the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) – was launched in Haiti in spring 2010 with the objective “to support the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources” provided by donors for the reconstruction efforts, in coherence with the priorities set in the Haiti Action Plan<sup>79</sup> (see also details on the HRF in Annex 6 - Portfolio Review). As highlighted in the minutes of the steering committee meetings and in MFA internal correspondence as well as in the interviews with key informants, Norway firmly believed in this concept since its inception during the spring 2010 and actively supported its launching phase. Following an early contribution of around US\$ 30 million, Norway was among the first donors to be granted a voting power within the system. Despite the presence of other major donors in the system (e.g. the United States, Canada and Brazil), Norway continued to play an active role in the steering committee meetings in the following years (source: desk review and KII). Almost half of its transition and development efforts during the period 2010-2012 were eventually channelled through the mechanism (source: portfolio review).

The HRF faced important challenges, including important delays during its launch phase and in the first years of operation. Despite the high level of donors’ commitment and the good performance of the secretariat which was supporting the functioning of the funds (KII), only five interventions<sup>80</sup> had been approved 10 months after the earthquake<sup>81</sup> and only \$US 56 million of all HRF contributions had been disbursed by the partner entities by early 2012 (source 1).<sup>82</sup> This situation contrasts with the timeframe for reconstruction outlined in the Haiti Action Plan which foresaw an 18 month period (from spring 2010 to fall 2011) for the main recovery phase. It also contrasts the concept described in the Action Plan, which foresaw a set up associated with a “fast payment mechanism”, an increase in “the fluidity of financial flows” and “expedite procedures for supplying and mobilizing operators to carry out the programmes”.

Several reasons explain these delays. The GoH was overall committed to the HRF but the actual support it provided to the mechanism and the interventions funded under it turned out to fluctuate substantially over the period. This was partly explained by the political instability which reached a peak in 2011 when difficulties were faced in forming a new government (see the UNDG-HRF 2011 annual report). As highlighted by a key informant, “enormous amount of time and efforts were invested to get the new Government to support the HRF” (source 2). The implementation of the funded interventions were also themselves exposed to a variety of constraints – ranging from natural hazards to the slow approval process of certain activities by the Haitian institutions and a certain administrative burden by the donors/partner entities themselves – which resulted in the low disbursement rates observed. Like for other similar mechanisms, HRF’s multiple layers (GoH/HRF/Partner entity/Implementing organisation) also created some rigidity. This is illustrated by the very lengthy re-allocation process of the \$US 14 million initially planned for an IADB project focusing on DRR. The initial project proposal was approved in October 2010. But, in 2011, the resources allocated turned out not to be relevant anymore for the intervention which was facing some delays and had already received substantial funds from other sources of financing. It was finally decided to re-allocate the funds within the HRF. The restructuring of the funds (which required the submission of new concept notes/full proposals to the GoH, the IADB board of directors, the HRF...) was finalised in mid-2013<sup>83</sup> and activities really started only in 2014.

The decisions on allocations were strongly influenced by international donors, who often, in consultation with a small group of national decision-makers, favoured their own areas of interest. Like in other multi-donor trust funds, a system of “preferences” was integrated in the mechanism since the beginning: in a formal letter addressed to the steering committee, donors could express their “preferences” regarding the way their contributions would be allocated to the various interventions

<sup>79</sup> GoH (2010): Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement d'Haïti (PARDH).

<sup>80</sup> One project was eventually never launched.

<sup>81</sup> The launch of the HRF took more time than initially planned. The GoH requested the postponement of the start of formal operation until the IHRC was fully functional and the donors only gradually joined the funds because of their own administrative requirements.

<sup>82</sup> According to the February 2012 financial report presented at the 8<sup>th</sup> steering committee meeting, \$US 377 million had been received from 19 donors, \$US 265 million had been allocated to 17 identified interventions and \$US 259 million had been already transferred to the partner entity.

<sup>83</sup> The project was approved at HRF level in late 2012.



(sources: desk review and KII).<sup>84</sup> There was an expectation from the donors' side that the HRF - and the Government - needed to show tangible results fast to ensure their legitimacy. Key informants report that MFA debated among the Haiti team for a greater proportion of un-earmarked funding, but had to negotiate a balance. When the second payment to the HRF (74 million NOK) was due in 2011, it was finally decided not to earmark. However, un-earmarked funds eventually represent a small share of the HRF overall (less than 20%). The HRF 2012-13 annual report recognises that the system of "donor preferences" had resulted in a "*reduced level of flexibility and availability of funding*" and a position which is "*at odds with the aim of strengthening government ownership and alignment with government priorities*".

Finally, the HRF did help to channel external funds supporting reconstruction efforts via a limited number of partner entities and through a process which involved the GoH (even if at a lower level than initially planned). It also certainly contributed to some extent to enhanced coordination. However, the results in terms of harmonization remain limited. In particular, if regular and detailed reporting was ensured by the HRF secretariat and the partner entities, there is no evidence of efforts to develop a common result framework (building on the one outlined in the Haiti Action Plan) and establish harmonised procedures to monitor and evaluate (externally) the actions supported. (source: KII and desk review)

In the HRF meetings, Norway advocated for what Norway's best practices and agreed standards prescribe: aligning behind government priorities (or, more accurately, those expressed in the Haiti Action Plan), a prominent role for the UN, strategic coordination, protection of the vulnerable, a human rights focus, and a gender perspective. A tangible direct result of Norway's contribution was the increased attention given to gender and protection in the Interim Commission and the HRF.<sup>85</sup> One example is that Norway co-facilitated a thematic discussion in the Interim Commission with Michael Forst, on Human Rights perspective for the reconstruction to promote the 'Protect, Respect, Remedy' framework elaborated by Professor Ruggie.<sup>86</sup>

At a more general level, due to the fact that Haiti has several long-term international partners (Canada, United States, France, the EU), it is hard to specify what or where Norway has contributed. Even though Norway has been involved in Haiti for nearly two decades, its presence has only become visible to Haitians (and still, not systematically) since after the earthquake and when it won a seat on the table of 'big donors' (as mentioned above, Norway entered the HRF group with an initial contribution of over USD 30 million signed on 17 June 2010). Norway remained an active humanitarian actor in 2010, and was present in the major donor meetings in New York or Punta Cana in June 2010 used to elaborate the Haitian reconstruction plan. Norway was also present in different co-ordination fora via the active involvement of its Special Adviser and, on various occasions, the participation of MFA officials coming from Oslo or regional embassies.

Part A survey respondents gave Norway an average score of 3.8 out of maximum 5 for its influence on a the international aid portfolio. Respondents from the Government of Haiti and multilateral organisations gave the highest scores (respectively 4.2 and 4.1) while other respondents (NGOs) were less generous (2.5).

The fact that a large portion of Norwegian aid was directed to the *Département du Sud* resulted in a more concerted effort to coordinate among donors at that level. Evidence does lead to Norway as a catalyst for strong coordinated international support to that department. The coordination is manifest by Norwegian support to the UN coalition in the South (CSI) and the very first Green Table of Donors (*Table verte des bailleurs*) at departmental level in which government authorities and multiple donors (UNEP, UNDP, IADB, Canada, etc.) debated on the priorities of the region.

However, the results are more mixed and nuanced at certain levels. The 2012 review of the CSI programme noted: "*The significant effort that has been spent on branding and profiling the CSI has backfired. Rather than succeeding in raising awareness of what the programme is doing and in mobilising support for it, it has raised unrealistic expectations, failed to convey the current priorities of the programme and eroded public confidence and support. CSI appears, not incorrectly, as an externally conceived concept.*" The KII and field visit confirm the fact that while some improvements can be observed in terms of coordination (e.g. Green Table of Donors), huge challenges linger. UN organizations remain in

<sup>84</sup> Norway was the first donor to express its specific interests (June 2010, first steering committee meeting). Funds provided by Norway were expected to mainly go to interventions in the areas of environmental management, agricultural development and disaster risk management, and with a geographic focus on the *Département du Sud*. It is however important to highlight that Norway's "preference" resulted from active consultations with the GoH and the relevant line ministries which started several months before the official launch of the HRF.

<sup>85</sup> Interviews key MFA stakeholders and several internal documents.

<sup>86</sup> Interviews high level representative person at MFA , internal MFA e-mail correspondence (28 June 2010).

competition in the region and joint frameworks to guide the action of the various partners in priority areas (e.g. reforestation) is still lacking.

Beyond the efforts in the *Département du Sud*, its active participation in national co-ordination mechanisms, plus the widely-held perception of Norway as “a good donor”, there is no clear evidence that Norway has had substantial success in influencing the co-ordination, harmonisation and alignment of international aid to Haiti. Such an objective was probably unrealistic given the context. Overall, consensus holds that international aid to Haiti remained extraordinarily uncoordinated, biased by national interests of the big donors, and with overall limited impact despite a huge amount of funds (main sources: SLR and KII). There are two main explanations for this lack of success. The first is due to shifting of the positive collective environment in which the big donors were guided by their home public, their ‘real’ interests, and their need to control use of the funds. The second is that perhaps, as for Norway, donors’ goals were overly ambitious.

### **Norway’s interventions and overall approach have contributed to strengthened leadership by the GoH and ownership by national partners**

As discussed above under EQ 1 and 2, ownership by the Government of Haiti of supported efforts was strongly perceived by Norwegian actors as an Intended Overall Impact. As supported by the Part A survey, the overall average score for Norwegian support to state was scored at 3.65 out of a maximum of 5 (NGO respondents gave it a much lower score, 2.6). Among factors cited for project success and/or failure: government capacity and commitment to the results were the most prominent answers – thus a make-it-or-break-it factor. The only examples of partial government ownership originate in the *Département du Sud* efforts. In the *Mer Sud* Programme, the Government of Haiti designated its first ever nine coastal and marine protected areas in the country (August 2013). In the *Gouvernance Sud* Programme, the Government called the first sub-national level Green Donor Table (February 2013) at which environment-related Government priorities were presented by authorities to different donors. In the Part B e-survey, 53% of Norwegian respondents cited “*Haitian governmental plans and requests*” to be the factor that weighed most heavily in Norwegian decisions.

Despite perceptions of success by many stakeholders and sources, evidence collected provides very few concrete examples of such ownership or leadership of the government. In general, only few such “official” plans and requests came to the attention of Norway. Literature strongly debates the extent to which the ‘National Action Plan’ reflected national priorities (as opposed to donor priorities). Furthermore, findings point to such ownership as being both an overly ambitious intended overall impact and one not supported by a portfolio designed without a clear emphasis on strengthening central institutions and without clear active links to central government policy, etc.

In the *Département du Sud*, Norway has worked with the Ministry of Agriculture (fishery), Ministry of Public Works (Road rehabilitation) and Ministry of Environment (watershed management, DRR) guided by UN agencies (UNDP, UNEP and UNOPS), local partners (ORE, Foundation Macaya) and IADB (Macaya). These government entities, both public and local, have seized tools to implement their actions, giving them more visibility in the Department. In terms of conflict resolution, democracy improvement and gender initiative, they have worked with NGO (local and international working in Haiti) and UN peacekeepers. With NCA-partner Viva Rio Haiti, they have reportedly helped the pacification of the Belair / La Saline zone, which was one of the many hotspots in Port-au-Prince. With IDEA they have supported the democracy learning process by providing training and materials to political actors and the civil society. With FED, they have accompanied women’s emancipation in their projects. With the UN peacekeepers, they have trained and equipped Haitian Police Officers to better understand and manage SGBV.

Norwegian interventions are noble and are well appreciated among entities (public, private or international) and local communities. However, it is too soon to have a realistic appreciation of the leadership by the Government entities and a full ownership by local institutions. Moreover, the fact that funds are passed via UN agencies before reaching Ministries seems to create or encourage more dependency from local to UN agencies. There is no evidence that Government entities will carry on when international support ends.

### **Norway’s strategic choices have contributed to ensuring an inclusive dialogue on the reconstruction of Haiti with a focus on development results**

Inclusive dialogue here is reflected at two levels: inclusive of the population and inclusive of the greater international aid body, in this order.

Fostering inclusive dialogue within the Haitian population from within the Norwegian Portfolio in Haiti has received compliments. It is one of the highest scored priorities (receiving a 4.05 out of maximum 5 from the Part A survey). Capturing voices and making known the rights and desires of groups marginalised in Haiti, such as women, youth and opposition party members was a feature of multiple projects (IDEA, NDI, FED to name only a few).

Because Norway has no official presence in Haiti, they were forced to find flexible innovative solutions to achieve impact as an international donor. They hired a Special Advisor on Haiti based in Port-au-Prince. This individual works closely with an MFA official based in Oslo who comes to Haiti several times each year. He also represents Norway in important meetings in the country. The use of a Special Adviser in Haiti presented clear advantages (e.g. in terms of helping to understand the political economy of the country) and was flexible<sup>87</sup>. But it was also limited. Without a diplomatic status, the agent has limited clout / diplomatic advantages that would enable him to exert a stronger influence. The political backing he could benefit from Norway was necessarily limited by the non-permanent presence in the country. The relevant Norwegian embassy in the region (Caracas/ La Havana) and Norway's Special Envoy to Haiti could only partially fill these gaps despite the very crucial role they played<sup>88</sup>. Another limitation is the fact that the Special Adviser has occupied high international un-neutral positions in Port-au-Prince shortly before 2010 and is inevitably viewed by certain groups in regards to his previous assignments. While this could be considered a distinct advantage for some (his knowledge of the country and having a large network is a definite strength) it is a non-negligible detriment for others. Nonetheless, despite the previous considerations, the Special Adviser's presence resulted in Norway being seen as active in the reconstruction dialogue. This inclusive dialogue is launched at donor levels, capitalizing on the skills of the Special Adviser on Haiti.

**Norway supported development interventions focusing on involving new partners and regional cooperation have contributed (or are likely to contribute) to establishing or renewing relationships in cooperation between Haiti and its regional partners**

Regional and South-South or horizontal cooperation supported by the Norwegian Portfolio in Haiti has also been recognised as valuable. It received an average score of 4.75 out of 5 from the Part A survey. As symbolic of horizontal cooperation, the Norwegian portfolio included 'Frontera Verde' (an effort to reforest and promote collaboration on the shared border with Dominican Republic), Cuban Medical Brigades (a regional effort providing medical services in Haiti for the past twenty years) and another long-timer 'Viva Rio' (a Brazilian NGO with an urban and sports-based focus, partner of NCA).

- The 'Frontera Verde' project was approved by the IHRC process. It was a binational initiative proposed by the two Governments of Haiti and the DR, through their Ministries of Environment; UNDP and UNEP were agencies in charge of the execution. In this case, the binational project has brought both countries together to promote environmental preservation. This should be considered a positive step, even though it may take time to see concrete results.
- Cuba and Haiti signed a cooperation agreement since the 1990s. Under this agreement, Haitians have gone to Cuba for their studies and Cubans has come to Haiti to help in providing medical services to Haitians. Norway support has helped "fuelling" a mechanism of South-South co-operation which involves several regional partners (the Cuban medical brigade also receives funding from Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela). With the Norwegians, the Cubans had an opportunity to be more efficient in their assistance in the *Département du Sud*. They assisted the Hospital in Aquin with energy supply and other facilities improvement, which has ameliorated their efficiency. However, in Aquin, they have worked in parallel with the Hospital administration, led by Haitians. While Norwegian support included mechanisms for Haitian doctors educated in Cuba to practice with their Cuban counterparts in Haiti, there is no evidence for Haitian hospital staff benefitting from on-the-job training by the Cuban teams. Overall, interviews carried out in *Département du Sud* have shown a low level of knowledge/skills transfer.
- Finally, the NCA-partner Viva Rio initiative has benefited from Norway for many years to diversify their action in Haiti over the Port-au-Prince area (Belair, La Saline, Bon Repos) and out of Port-au-Prince (Montrouis). With Norwegians funds, they improved the peace programme and diversified their action over sports and eco-tourism. Although their management style, hasty diversification into new fields and tardy handover to national management have been voiced as main detriments to sustainable success by other respondents, their efforts in formerly violent urban settings have been recognised across the region. It is not evident that this effort has contributed to strengthening regional partnerships.

Not without challenges and gaps, Norway has been very motivating in their strategy to bring Haiti closer to their neighbours, the DR; Brazil, with peace effort; and Cuba; with public health endeavours.

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<sup>87</sup> With this flexible strategy, Norway was present in most major donor or coordination meetings in Haiti (incl. Haiti Reconstruction Fund).

<sup>88</sup> The Special Envoy was regularly received by the most senior leaders in Haiti, including the Prime Minister, and thus made possible a regular, formal dialogue between the Norwegian and the Haitian Governments.

#### 4.2.4 EQ\_A4. What are the likely unintended consequences, positive or negative, of Norwegian assistance, for instance on institutional capacity or local and regional political dynamics?

As highlighted in the recent Norad desk study on unintended effects in evaluations of Norwegian aid, “without a clear idea of what is expected it is difficult to deal with the issue of unexpected effects”<sup>89</sup>. Given the absence of a country strategy document for Haiti or of a clear list of intended overall impacts, no conclusive intervention logic could be established. Even though ideas were resurrected post-facto from focus group exercises, they were insufficiently developed to be able to trace the logic, isolating the expected from the unexpected.

##### Unintended consequences on institutional capacity

Largely unintended but visible everywhere in Haiti, including in Norway’s portfolio, is the provision of services by entities other than the state. The literature is suffocating with reports of the “NGO-republic of Haiti”. It is nearly equally matched by critiques of multi-lateral entities also working in a void in parallel to the government, with even less impact on the ground. This lack of direct statebuilding as a centrepiece of development goes contrary to best practice in OECD guidance on support to Fragile States. Although Norway and many donors aimed to avoid this trend, partially by channelling through the HRF, their efforts were unsuccessful. While use of the HRF may be seen as a failed attempt, the creation of parallel systems and structures (through the concentrated use of multi-laterals and NGOs) in the Haitian context is considered to be an unintended consequence of the Norwegian portfolio.

Although Norway was risk-aware and made a conscious decision not to channel funds through government channels, the creation of parallel structures (such as the Cuban Medical Brigades) should have been clearly recognised in a specific risk analysis, documented in a country strategy and managed in a mitigation strategy with explicit plans for a hand-over to the GoH.<sup>90</sup> This consequence is neither positive nor minor.

##### Unintended consequences on local dynamics

Inevitably, the bypassing of the state can have a less-than ideal influence on local dynamics. Populations increasingly see state actors as at best futile or worse, going against their best interests. One alarming example repeatedly sounded in the SLR was the growing distrust: as affected populations heard about massive donations coming to Haiti from external sources, and as they continued to see their main needs going unmet (i.e. shelter, etc.), they became increasingly distrustful of their government. From their perspective, the funds had not only come, they had been given to the Government of Haiti to manage and were being once again used for personal interests, not those of the population. As stated eloquently from the literature review, “the irony was that by keeping the money under their own control, donors reinforced the perception of systemic Haitian corruption” (Katz 2013). Even if this perception could be proven to be unfounded and naïve, it is easy to understand the public pressure donor support may exert on a fragile government, especially with a spotted political history such as in Haiti. Internal MFA reports and interviews provide evidence that Norway was aware of this dynamic and tried to mitigate against by promoting transparency and information sharing.

The evaluation was unable to identify evidence for other unintended consequences of Norwegian support, such as on regional dynamics or on international aid. Parallel evaluations of the humanitarian response in Haiti reveal major unintended consequences. The effects that may have also been caused by Norwegian funding come from, for example, cash for work programs<sup>91</sup>: “While these programs help inject desperately needed cash into the economy, the colourful ‘UN’ t-shirts that beneficiaries wear, with UN rather than government logos, tend to stigmatise beneficiaries and undermine the credibility of the government, which appears to have limited results for the population”.

Further time invested may reveal other potential unintended consequences that are inevitably numerous in complex programs situated in fragile states, especially given the absence of a solid risk analysis. These include potential for having neglected a department (due to the undocumented choice of the *Département du Sud*) in which impact may have been more forthcoming or the potential to have encouraged other donors to engage in earmarking via the HRF.

<sup>89</sup> Norad (2014): Unintended Effects in Evaluations of Norwegian Aid - A desk study.

<sup>90</sup> Cuban brigades have been present much before Norway’s support and Norway did make some efforts to ensure that the Haitian government takes increased ownership over the role of the Cuban medical brigades. This has resulted in the cooperation being signed as a trilateral agreement between Haiti, Cuba and Norway. However, the evaluation team assesses that these efforts did not prevent this action to continue supporting a “parallel structure”.

<sup>91</sup> Groupe URD/ GPPi (2010): Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake.



## 4.3 Part B / Process

### 4.3.1 EQ\_B1. On which basis were decisions made during different phases and at different levels?

According to Part B e-survey respondents, the organizational culture in Norway is characterised above all by "*flexible, informal decision-making*" (60% of respondents). Stakeholders in interviews have also stressed the ability of Norway to seek bold and innovative solutions and to apply fast and non-bureaucratic approaches when needed. While most respondents see this as a positive feature, it is recognised that this approach is dependent on having the right people with the right knowledge, skills and experience. The OECD Peer Review commends the MFA for the "*flexible approach when it comes to allocating bilateral aid, choosing channels, instruments, sectors, and partners*" but it also notes that the evidence base is "*not easily seen*" and that without proper analyses to ensure feasibility, sustainability and the ability to achieve intended results. In interviews, several respondents pointed to the few human resources as a main factor for the lack of documented analysis (but note a difference of opinion portrayed autonomously in the e-survey suggested that the "*number of staff is adequate*"). "*If we were to spend our time writing long documents, we would not be able to do our job*" one key stakeholder put it. This view was echoed by several colleagues, implying strongly that MFA's ability to "*punch above its weight*" hinged upon the non-formal way of working.

Two of the e-survey respondents also characterised the culture as "*hierarchical*", which reflects the formal decision making structure. Proposals developed at the working level go through several levels of management before being submitted to political leadership (the Minister and his team).

The Haiti programme was defined through a process that lasted more than six months. The pattern was as follows. The direction, or a broad framework with the main programme elements, was decided on 28 January 2010 in a memo endorsed by the Minister of Development and Environment. This was done before specific and comprehensive information on needs was available. This programme sketch was then tested and discussed with the Haitian Government, in particular the Prime Minister Bellerive and most of the relevant ministers<sup>92</sup> as well as with international partners. The special envoy (who was appointed in February 2010), developed the programme with the support of a 'Haiti team'<sup>93</sup>. The group travelled together to Haiti on several occasions, and developed a strong team spirit. The inclusion of the then Special Advisor to the Prime Minister (financed by DFID) in the mission provided the team with direct access to Governmental entities.

#### **B1.1: What elements were used to come to the main decisions?**

Over the years, Norway has been very active at the global level to strengthen multilateral capacity to coordinate assessments and provide comprehensive prioritization of needs. The two preferred processes are the OCHA led Appeals processes (CHAP and CAP) for humanitarian response, and the PDNA for longer term needs. In the aftermath of a major disaster, the international community has developed and repeatedly tested, instruments that aim to relate the actual needs of affected people, not of those wanting to help them or donors ready to fund interventions. In addition to the use of the UNDAC, the United Nations typically guides and produces with the national government and key partners a coordinated assessment. The Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), an effort managed in which NRC is involved since 2009<sup>94</sup> in Geneva (in collaboration with OCHA) often serves as a partner to produce this assessment. Norway (MFA) has contributed substantially to the ACAPS concept since its inception<sup>95</sup> and in many specific country contexts but not in Haiti in 2010<sup>96</sup>. Ideally, a coordinated rapid assessment fuels the UN Appeals process, the Flash Appeal and eventually the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP). In reality, however, the UN Appeals process is launched before any assessment is finalised, reflecting more the needs of the actors to do whatever they can (and are mandated to do) than the needs of the affected.

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<sup>92</sup> Ministers of Interior, Agriculture and Tourism, Secrétaire Technique for Comité Interministériel pour l'aménagement du territoire (CIAT) and local and regional authorities (Norad (2010): Rapport fra besøket til Den dominikanke republikk 31.05.-08.06.2010).

<sup>93</sup> The Haiti team consisted of members from MFA (the Section for Humanitarian Affairs, the Bank section, Peace and Reconciliation and the Latin America section) and Norad. MFA uses the cross branch team model on an ad hoc basis, when certain crises need an integrated approach. The Haiti team was most actively used for the first year following the quake.

<sup>94</sup> ACAPS was initially a consortium of NRC, HelpAge and Merlin. HelpAge was the lead agency until NRC took over in July 2012.

<sup>95</sup> Norway has also provided specific funding from 2013 onwards.

<sup>96</sup> Although ACAPS was present in Haiti in 2010, a specific ACAPS report was not published, but ACAPS contributed to the joint UN report produced that year.

Norway had close to no capacity to do its own analysis and assessment of the situation on the ground when the earthquake struck. Norway did have a programme in Haiti at the time, but this was limited in scope and volume, and there was no embassy or other permanent presence in Haiti. The UN appeal, launched after the earthquake was the largest ever Flash Appeal in history (larger even than that for the Indian Ocean earthquake/tsunami), seeking to raise just under US\$1.5 billion for a 12-month-long humanitarian operation. Total funding for the Haiti earthquake emergency was more than double the requirements of the revised appeal, but more than 70% of the funding was given to projects 'not listed' in the appeal and thus not guided by the global assessments of needs conducted in the country or subject to the overall coordination of UN OCHA<sup>97</sup>. It was prepared in Geneva and issued on 15 January 2010 with a revision on 18 February 2010 (the latter building, above all, upon information gathered from the different clusters, active in Haiti since 2008). The UNDAC assessments were not used as the main source of information for the revision of the appeal, which was produced in an unusually short period of time after the original appeal was issued. The ACAPS<sup>98</sup>-guided Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) was conducted from 23 January to 5 February 2010 and, rarely mentioned in documents reviewed, did not have results ready for the Flash Appeal revision.

The use of cross-sector rapid assessments, such as RINAH, are often supported and incentivised by donors such as Norway, especially to link them more strongly to the different elements of the response, i.e. resource mobilisation, strategic decision-making and response planning. Norway had already committed nearly USD 30 million (before the Flash Appeal revision and before the ACAPS humanitarian Needs Assessment, RINAH), representing 2.5% of grand total of funding requested. At that time, 72% of Norwegian humanitarian funding was channelled through the recognised UN appeals process (CAP, compared to 69% for Sweden, 19% for USA, nearly 100% for Brazil and Saudi Arabia).

UNDP received WB/GFDRR funding to conduct a reconstruction assessment entitled the PDNA, or Post Disaster Needs Assessment, encouraged by Clinton initiatives and aiming to influence the NY donor meeting (31 March 2010). Norway is listed therein as one of many financial partners<sup>99</sup>. The PDNA was made public in March 2010. Despite reported non-Haitian influences on Haiti's National Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti which relied on the PDNA<sup>100</sup>, this plan (along with undocumented discussions with ministers and civil society representatives) was one of the only commonly cited sources in Norwegian documents to constitute government ownership of the principles that drove the portfolio. The legitimacy of the action plan as a voice of anyone other than "*donors...and influential members of the domestic and international business communities*" has been repeatedly and loudly questioned<sup>101</sup> and its contents presented as reflecting concepts and priorities, such as market liberalization and privatisation, thought to be generally un-attributable to the Haitian administration of the time<sup>102</sup>.

Meanwhile for the humanitarian phase, the decision-making in Norway was generally based on established and agreed upon procedures, guidelines and policies, combined with flexibility and informal communication lines. The strategies and policies in turn are consistent with international best practices, and based on experience from recent comparable disasters (in scope), like the Pakistan earthquake and the Indian Ocean Tsunami. The scope of the contribution and the channels were decided fast, the main bulk of humanitarian aid was allocated within very short time. Decisions were clearly made at MFA Oslo level. Senior officials in the Humanitarian Section had a great deal of autonomy to propose main principles, channels and allocations, there were daily briefings with State Secretary Fiskaa and numerous others with the Minister of Development and Environment.

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<sup>97</sup> Stoianova, Velina (2010): Donor funding in Haiti. Assessing humanitarian needs after the 2010 Haiti earthquake.

<sup>98</sup> RINAH was conducted by ACAPS members, conjointly with IMMAP, UNOCHA, CDC, UNs agencies and IASC partners, Source: <http://www.acaps.org/deployments/ha-ti>.

<sup>99</sup> It is interesting that UNDP organised the Reconstruction Assessments, a task led most commonly by international financial institutions. Also interesting is the Norwegian investment in this assessment when Norway has invested more commonly in the promotion of humanitarian assessments.

<sup>100</sup> In fact, the Haiti PDNA was launched in March 2010 as an "Annex" to the National Action Plan for reconstruction and Development" with a preface by Jean Max Bellerive, Prime Minister.

<sup>101</sup> Ferris, Elizabeth (2010): Burning Issues for Haiti's Recovery. Presentation to National Council of Churches' Working Group on Haiti, p. 3; International Crisis Group (2010): Haiti: Stabilisation and Reconstruction after the Quake, pp. 7 and 15; Herard, D. (2012): Disaster Risk Reduction and the Action Plan for National Recovery and the Development of Haiti, p. 21.

<sup>102</sup> See for example Katz, Jonathan M. (2010): The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster, pp124, 155 and Ramachandran, Vijaya/ Walz, Julie (2012): Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?

The decision to engage in a longer-term support was taken by the Minister of Development and Environment within weeks of the earthquake.<sup>103</sup> The rationale given for this decision included: 'moral / political' imperatives given the scope of the disaster and the vulnerability (fragility) of the country; lessons from comparable disasters (e.g. the Tsunami and Pakistan earth quake); and that Norway could add value as a 'neutral' donor (not historically entwined as for United States and Canada).

A first thematic profile of the support was formulated early (28 January 2010, 16 days after the earthquake), as a result of internal discussions within MFA sections and external consultations with Norwegian research institutions/NGOs.

### **B1.2: Was the evidence base adequate (reliable and timely) to inform decisions?**

E-survey respondents scored the knowledge base, as a foundation for overall decision-making on average at 3.86 (out of 5 maximum). This conveys that the information perceived as needed to make decisions was not felt to be particularly weak or missing.

The Norwegian decisions for the humanitarian allocations rested to a great deal on the UN flash appeals. The assessments underpinning these priorities are known to have weaknesses, as they often are a compilation of what the different sectors (or '*clusters*') plan to do, rather than a solid analysis of needs (see discussion above).

For the 28 January 2010 decisions, which also defined the Norway portfolio, the existing Haiti knowledge within MFA and the Norwegian partners, and experience from other disasters/fragile states are the only cited sources. While there is consensus that these priorities "*made sense*", there is little evidence of a knowledge base to underpin them. Alternative priorities were apparently only discussed very briefly.

The evidence base was not explicit for each of the decisions. The programme was defined based on a complex web of political decisions, informal input and discussions, pre-existing knowledge, experience from other crises and assessments and analysis at Haiti level.

### **B1.3: Was the time used to make the decision appropriate to the urgency / importance of the decision?**

Decision-making has consistently been swift and flexible. The MFA respondents have underlined that fast decision making in itself was a priority for both the political leadership and the Haiti team. The humanitarian allocations were in place within the first weeks, and the overall strategic decisions within 1-2 months. Norway was also of the first ones to disburse its pledges to both the humanitarian response and the HRF. This is in line with best practices for post disaster reconstruction, as recovery and development programmes usually are too slow in materialising.

### **B1.4: Were the appropriate stakeholders involved in the decision-making?**

Cooperation and coordination between/with pertinent Government of Norway units (scored at 4.29), and the number of dedicated personnel (scored at 3.36) were perceived as relatively adequate to achieve desired impact. The presence in Haiti (i.e., Special Advisor on Haiti, scored at 2.86) was perceived as much less adequate for effective decision-making. The respondents scored the extent to which the working relation between the MFA and Norad was "*adequate, predictable and clear in regards to roles and responsibilities*" at 3.8 out of maximum 5.

At national level, most relevant stakeholders were involved in the design of the program, in particular for the first year. Norad was involved in programmatic decisions, and formed part of the Haiti team. At strategic level decisions, MFA sections took active part. With time, the importance of the cross branch team was reduced, and e.g. Norad is only asked to provide specific advisory services at project level.

In Haiti, decisions have, at least formally, been aligned with and endorsed by the authorities, through the HRF, and discussions with Ministries. The Interim Commission and the HRF Steering Committee was the main forum initially, but with the discontinuation of the IC, discussions have been more ad hoc<sup>104</sup>. Again, with the lack of real capacity to prioritise and plan makes the real involvement in decision making questionable.

It is more uncertain whether civil society has been involved in a systematic way. Visits to Haiti have consistently included meetings with some civil society partners, but there is little evidence of systematic discussions around Norwegian priorities and decisions.

<sup>103</sup> In a press release 16 January (4 days after the earthquake) Mr Solheim commented that he would "*consider how we can help to support Haiti after the acute emergency relief phase is over*", as "*Haiti will need support for its reconstruction efforts for a long time to come*."

<sup>104</sup> The Haiti desk reports that all field visits include meetings at local and central level, and that programming decisions are always run by the relevant ministries. There is more evidence of endorsement though than of actively influencing strategic decisions.

### 4.3.2 EQ\_B2. To what extent and how did Norway approach the challenge of learning to ensure that aid was optimally allocated, designed and implemented?

Norway has a rich tradition of high-level policy documents and White Papers to the Storting that hold clear and specific directives for what should be done in many different situations in humanitarian and development contexts. They all have sections that state "*Norway will...*". Although it is not expected that each and every group of statements or even each and every policy could be applied to its fullest in Haiti, given the profile of these documents, it is assumed that they are founded on a sturdy basis of lessons learned, even if only as a starting point towards the development of a Country Strategy. The statements were extracted for each of 10 policy documents (including one OECD policy) and two evaluators scored each group of statements on what was visible in Haiti (using the 5 to 1 scale of extent).

The results of this exercise were paralleled with a question to the Part B e-survey respondents on the extent to which they perceived their understanding of the Haiti programme (2010-13) as being generally aligned to principles within each Policy<sup>105</sup>. This parallel analysis produced two comparable rankings: one by the evaluators based on what they saw and learned on the ground and a second by the Norwegian decision makers, based on their perceptions (see Table 3 for the results). Humanitarian Policy scores highest, thereby suggesting that the humanitarian portion of the portfolio was the Norwegian support that was most firmly grounded in existing policy. Interviews also confirmed a high degree of that policy. Prevention and OECD policies also scored highly. The humanitarian and Prevention policies were both fairly recent when the programme was initiated, and several of the key MFA stakeholders had been heavily involved in the drafting of the two documents, and thus had a strong ownership of the policies.

Norwegian decision makers systematically had more generous scores than the evaluators. Both groups scored Norway's Humanitarian Policy highest, thereby suggesting that the humanitarian portion of the portfolio was the Norwegian support that was most firmly grounded in existing policy. Interviews also confirmed a high degree of awareness of that policy. Prevention and OECD policies also scored highly. The humanitarian and Prevention policies were both fairly recent when the programme was initiated, and several of the key MFA stakeholders had been heavily involved in the drafting of the two documents, and thus had a strong ownership of the policies.

Table 3 Policies and White Papers

<i>To what extent do you regard the Haiti programme 2010-2013 as being generally in line with the following established priorities, policies and strategies? As evaluated by...</i>	<i>Norwegian Decisions Makers</i>	<i>Evaluators</i>
2008: Norway Humanitarian Policy	<b>4.40 (1)</b>	<b>3.63 (1)</b>
2008: Norwegian Policy on the Prevention of Humanitarian Crises	4.10	<b>3.30 (2)</b>
2007: OECD – the 10 Fragile States Principles and advice for donors	<b>4.22 (3)</b>	<b>3.06 (3)</b>
2011: Towards greener development: A coherent environmental and development policy	<b>4.33 (2)</b>	2.89
2009: Climate, Conflict and Capital, Norwegian development policy adapting to change	<b>4.22 (3)</b>	2.60
2010: MFA Women, Peace, Security: Action Plan for Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation	3.90	2.49
2006: Norwegian Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation	4.14	2.34
2012: Norway and the United Nations: Common Future, Common Solutions	3.75 (lowest)	2.14
2010: Guidance Note: Reconstruction and Long-term Capacity Development in Haiti	4.18	1.71
2013: Sharing for prosperity-- Promoting democracy, fair distribution and growth in development policy	4.00	1.52 (lowest)

While key Norwegian respondents cited them in discussions, none of the 10 policies were ever mentioned specifically in any studied document relating to the Haiti portfolio. This does not mean that the lessons held up therein were disregarded. In fact, it is evident that many of the lessons were deeply ingrained into the overall thinking, practice and even daily routines of many of the Norwegian actors. It is evident, however, that there was no conscious decision to ever take stock of the wealth of lessons to see how and which could be applied systematically for a stronger programme in Haiti.

While there is a learning environment and a culture to improve and "do the right things", there are practically no systematic approaches or mechanisms to document or share lessons learned. There are

<sup>105</sup> All respondents were familiar with the 2010 Capacity Building guidance but one third were unfamiliar with the 2006 Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation (among the latter, all but one was familiar with a one of the more recent policies related to the environment, see list in table).



indications that individuals quite consistently have adapted programming based on what they learn, but this is done informally and between individuals, not at the system level. There are several examples of lost opportunities, as the Haiti engagement has been innovative in its approach. Project and programme evaluations have been undertaken for only a few interventions, but do not appear to follow a set strategy or monitoring and evaluation system.

**B2.1: What mechanisms exist inside the Norwegian system to generally enable reflection and learning at the stages of design, allocation and implementation?**

As highlighted under EQ\_A2, the M&E frameworks of several supported intervention presented a number of weaknesses that have made it difficult to ensure a continuous and comprehensive monitoring of financed activities. Reviews/evaluations were not systematically implemented (only 6 external reviews/evaluations for 45 interventions screened). However, where they existed, useful feedback loops within MFA were established leading to some adaptations in the design of future interventions. Overall, at the country programme level, there are several examples of how Norway adapted programme elements and approaches based on both formalised evaluations and from observing ineffective practices. As an example of the former, the portfolio in the South changed in response to recommendations related to the planned IDB and UN interventions. As Norway learned from an ineffective experience with the HRF (partly due to a stalling of the Interim Commission), it moved away from that mechanism to a second phase of support for the *Département du Sud* directly with the multilateral entities (UNDP and UNEP).

The stakeholder interviews reported MFA attention to improvements in the design and contents or targeting of various interventions. No documentation of these was found, however, as these improvements have happened gradually, and usually based on mutual agreements between the Oslo desk and the special advisor when travelling. While annual/semi-annual reporting (M&E) could lead to more systematic learning, few of these agreements have been recorded.

The only evident mechanism, which was also highly and verbally cited by implementing entities and authorities alike in Haiti, is the frequent field visits by MFA and Special Advisor. The visits appear to be the main source of information on the allocations. These undocumented visits made it difficult to share the lessons learnt observed in the field with the other stakeholders involved in the implementation of the Norwegian support to Haiti.

**B2.2: How well were these mechanisms employed to guide the support to Haiti? Did they function optimally? Why or why not?**

While in the *Département du Sud*, it was unanimous that these visits were hand-on, provided ample room for debate and flexible exploration of solutions to highlighted challenges, multiple Norwegian partners outside the *Département du Sud* expressed strong disappointment in the lack of a mechanism that would create synergy, build better partnerships and harmonise efforts. They reported that despite explicit requests for regular coordination across the greater full-Norway portfolio, the coordination meetings were never organised.

Very little evidence was found (i.e. Trip Reports) to learn what the discussions covered during the field visits and what changes were required and encouraged. There is also little evidence of learning being shared with other sections and departments outside of the Haiti team. The Haiti programme is internally seen as an innovative intervention where creative solutions have consistently been sought. A few new models were tested, e.g., NRC using civil defense equipment for soup kitchens at the request from WFP. Some critical issues were addressed in the real time evaluation, but no further follow up from the MFA occurred that could support decision making in similar situations.

The lack of systematic documentation and sharing of methods and approaches is an opportunity lost for the Norwegian system. That includes Norad, who was used systematically in the design phase to provide quality assurance and advice. As there were no feedback loops returned to Norad on whether the advice was used, or the results of the programmes, valuable learning was and may continue to be lost.

**B2.3: What good practices of learning are visible in the Haiti programme?**

Evidence of learning (or more explicitly, proof of lessons learned and applied) is unequally visible throughout the programme.

One of the examples of good learning practice is the real time review the humanitarian section commissioned of its response, only about a month after the earthquake struck. This practice is prescribed in the humanitarian strategy, and is an example to follow. While it is difficult to measure the impact of the evaluation, it is evident that the actors involved are very conscious of the strategic choices made for the humanitarian support and why. This is less evident for the other parts of the portfolio. A structured follow up of this evaluation at a later stage could have further institutionalised the learning.

Another example is how Noref (Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre) was used to promote discussion and dialogue on Haiti. Noref arranged several seminars in Norway (and also one in Brazil) where a few researchers and NGOs met to share analysis and experience.

The move away from the Haiti Reconstruction Fund after Phase I of the efforts in the *Département du Sud* is another potential proof of learning. Given the limited mandate over time of the HRF and frustrated with the heavy procedural way with which the HRF had been functioning, Phase 2 of the UNEP and UNDP efforts were channelled directly to the multi-lateral entities.

#### 4.3.3 EQ\_B3. How did Norway respond to the numerous factors that could potentially influence / have influenced the Haiti programme?

A vast majority of Part B e-survey respondents consider Norway as a donor to be 'risk-willing'. According to 47% of respondents, Norway is 'risk willing' *with documented risk analysis and risk mitigation procedures*. Another 33% perceive that Norway "is 'risk willing' with informal and / or ad hoc risk analysis and risk mitigation". In the context of Haiti, to be risk-willing means initiating the aid programme with a realistic consciousness of rather limited chances for success. In other words, Norwegian decision makers recognised, and accepted, a longer-term programme in Haiti as a calculated risk.

It is interesting that, despite this 'risk-willingness' and recognition, the same decision makers are quite generous when scoring the results of the Norwegian portfolio in Haiti.

There is evidence for a high degree of *awareness* of risks within the Norwegian aid system, and that the decision to *accept those risks* was a deliberate one, and taken at the highest political level. There is also proof of written analyses of the situation in Haiti that specifically include potential obstacles (i.e. risks)<sup>106</sup>: e.g. the potential for political instability, weak governance, corruption and lack of inclusion and/or information on the recovery work. These risks and obstacles are not directly linked to the Norwegian assistance though, and there is no analysis of whether and how they could be expected to impact viability or results. There is also awareness of the internal weaknesses/vulnerabilities: whether there was sufficient 'applicable' knowledge, and how to manage such a complex programme without sufficient presence. There were critical voices and their concerns were heard, but the proposed structure was decidedly sufficient to move forward. Despite these anecdotes, no evidence was found for an explicit Risk Analysis and Mitigation Strategy. The level of recognition of the risks remains opaque and the manner chosen to mitigate the recognised risks is only implied in the portfolio.

##### **B3.1: What influential factors are confirmed by available evidence?**

According to Part B e-survey respondents, factors influential in Norway's overall support of Haiti after the earthquake were 1. Inputs from the Haitian government (score of 4.0/5), 2. changes in Haitian institutions that occurred in the same period (3.92), 3. political interests of Norway (3.91) followed by many lesser influences.

The intention to support the Haitian Government's leadership in defining the overall and Norwegian programme was stressed in analyses and decision memos, in particular the first year. Interviews and internal reports confirm that Norway consistently sought to engage all relevant ministries before taking the most important decisions. The extremely low capacity of the Government, however, meant that this translated more to the Haitian Government *endorsing* Norwegian initiatives, rather than Norway taking on Haitian suggestions and direction. The articulation of the Haitian Government's priorities in the aftermath of the earthquake (the Haiti Action Plan) was also strongly influenced by international actors, including the special advisor of the Prime Minister (who shortly after became the special advisor to Norway). Such processes of alignment are typical of the relationship between international aid actors and the affected Government in fragile states, and make it difficult to establish who is actually driving the priorities. The Interim Commission was nominally led by the Haitian Government, but there is little evidence of them exerting real power and leadership. This was also acknowledged in internal documents and interviews with stakeholders.

*Political changes and agenda.* Haiti has changed government several times. Each time, getting accustomed to the new group in power takes time. Also, their agendas can change. The first election after the earthquake was by many seen as the test case for the fragile state. The incoming President had in the election campaign capitalised on the general discontent with how the Government and the international community failed to provide tangible improvements despite the massive inflow of funds. He was especially discontent with the Interim Commission, and promised to dismantle it. Although he later appeared to have changed his mind, the Interim Commission was discontinued after having been held in a limbo for many months. Without the Interim Commission, the HRF lost the momentum it formerly possessed. Norway continued the interventions in the South, now channelling the funds directly to partners. The new architecture for aid coordination in Haiti (Cadre de Coordination de l'Aide Externe au Développement en Haïti - CAED) not being fully operational yet, the formalised exchanges with the

<sup>106</sup> MFA (Section for Peace and Reconciliation) produced several notes and strategic papers such as "Status for Norges fred - og forsoningsengasjement på Haiti" (February 2010), "Haiti. Dialogsporet – Strategisk veikart for høsten 2010" (19 August 2010), and similar ones for 2011 and 2012.

Government through the Interim Commission ended, letting even more space to informal discussions with key decision makers.

*Personal motivation of people in the Ministry of Environment.* As only one example, in the *Département du Sud* individuals in the directorate, starting with the Departmental Director, work very closely with the UN agencies (UNDP and UNEP). Because of the lack of means to operate with Government subsidies only, they have developed ‘collaboration’ with UN agencies. One very visible benefit is receiving equipment from UNDP and UNEP (e.g., vehicles, offices, supplies, computers, small army of ‘consultants’ to manage). With access to and encouraged by these material elements, Ministry staff are involved in action and engaged in producing results with the UN. Given this has not been hidden, colleagues from the Ministry at central level have warned the Departmental Director not to act/be viewed more like a UN employee or consultant rather than a government employee. Interviews and observation confirm this perception and attitude.

*UN agencies and international partners’ agenda and policies.* Due to the fact that Norway chooses to rely on large multilateral actors (i.e., UN, WB or IDB) it is difficult to isolate actions funded by Norway from other donors. On the policy side, while the strategy put in place by Norway is ‘flexible’, producing results with these large partners is often complex and delayed. An illustration could be found in the Macaya project where IDB procedures have lengthened the process of procurement tremendously.

*Political and institutional interests in Norway:* Climate and deforestation were issues high on the agenda of the Minister of Development and Environment and the MFA. He also took a very personal and quite direct interest in Haiti. He gave the overall direction of the programme, and was also involved in all major decisions. Given this personal interest of the Minister, the replacement of the Minister of Development and Environment in March 2012 (he was replaced by two party colleagues as they simultaneously re-established the usual division of the portfolio between a Minister of Development and a Minister of Environment) could potentially have affected the programme. However, the new Minister followed the same path, and also visited Haiti shortly after.

There is no indication or evidence that there were any hidden agendas, or political self-interests at play for Haiti. The general impression from interviews with MFA officials is that the lack of interest in Haiti on the part of Norway in general is a bigger problem than too much targeted attention.

Institutionally, the decisions promoted by the Haiti team and taken by the political leadership were followed loyally by all parts of the MFA and Norad, even when there had been disagreements and scepticism. However, what transpires in interviews has been a lack of institutional “enthusiasm” within MFA sections and also Norad, at least after the initial period. Human resources were prioritised elsewhere.

There was an enormous interest by the Norwegian public – and media – on the earthquake, and how the public could help. This created a pressure on the MFA to support Norwegian NGOs, but also to support ad hoc initiatives from Norwegian groups wanting to feel they were contributing.

MFA, however, decided to concentrate support through the UN agencies, Norwegian NGOs with presence and/or proven added value. This meant that several big Norwegian NGOs (Caritas, SoS Children’s villages, etc.) did not receive support, despite efforts to influence the political leadership to support their programmes. There is evidence of several initiatives with potential high visibility turned down, because of ‘do no harm’ principle. One example was the Ministry of Health who mobilised Norwegian health workers to stand by for dispatching to Haiti on 24 hours notice. As there was no system or framework the health workers could be plugged into, the risk was that this personnel could strain resources and capacities, rather than strengthening them. Thus, MFA turned this initiative down.

### **B3.2: Which factors weigh most heavily in the decisions made?**

The Norwegian intervention in Haiti has developed through an ‘organic’ decision making where Norwegian priorities, former experience, input and analysis from Haitian and international actors have converged and shaped the program. The restrictions – limited amount of staff, no presence, and funding limits - also inevitably contributed to the portfolio design. It was early on decided that Norway would not have the capacity to engage in a strong bilateral programme with Haiti, which effectively excluded longer term programmes to build and strengthen state institutions. The choice of using multi-lateral organisations and multi-donor funds to channel and implement programmes also partly stems from lack of own resources. The result is a programme with high values, good intentions, and some excellent ideas, but less thoroughly / strategically thought-out and ill-supported with documentation.

### **B3.3: How did Norway manage the weight of those influences?**

It was clear that Norway recognised risks and obstacles, but never systematically documented those. There is also reason to believe that they were acted upon, as there are a few examples of what may constitute attempts to *mitigate* risks, in particular the changing political landscape. An example is the dialogue the Minister of Development and Environment initiated with opposition candidate(s) before the

Presidential election in 2011, to try to avoid setbacks/ensure continued leadership of the recovery efforts (i.e., Interim Haiti Recovery Commission).

There is however no *documented systematic* analysis of political risks, and there is little evidence of analysis of *how* the changes in the political system could affect programmes and projects, and how to mitigate this.


Norway does not have a substantial presence locally. They rely strongly on their Special Advisor on Haiti who is based in Haiti, and periodic visits from MFA staff coming from Oslo, or the Latin America area and Cuba, to follow up. In addition to this, they have irregular external evaluations used to make decisions. Actions in the *Département du Sud* were implemented in collaboration with the Ministries of Environment and Agriculture, above all. Ministry specialists in discussion with the UN, and IADB identified the intervention sites.

## 5 Annex 5: Complementary elements on the context

### 5.1 Time line of main events

The following timeline gives an overview of the most important events and actions following the Haiti earthquake from 12 January 2010. It considers Norway's contributions and actions towards Haiti and embeds it into the aid context of the international donor community.

Figure 3 Overview of key events and Norwegian decisions after the Haiti earthquake



Source: Documentation received from MFA / Norad

### 5.2 Evolution of key indicators of fragility

Haiti was recognised as a 'fragile state' long before the 2010 earthquake. In 2010, Haiti ranked 11<sup>th</sup> worst out of 177 countries on the Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index<sup>107</sup> (see Table 4). Following the earthquake, in 2011, Haiti's rank aggravated to 5<sup>th</sup>. Haiti scored worse than the year before in nine out of the 12 fragility indicators that are measured by the index. The impact of the earthquake was evident especially in the indicator *Refugees and IDPs*, where the score went from 5.6 to 9.2 (out of 10). Other indicators showing a clear increase in fragility were *Democratic Pressures* (9.3 to 10), *Uneven development* (8.3 to 8.8) and *Deterioration of Public Services* (9.5 to 10). The indicator *Human Rights* is the only indicator that improved after the earthquake (8.2 to 8.0), and it has improved every year since then (7.5 in 2014). In 2012, 10 out of the 12 indicators saw an improvement with regards to the previous year. Currently, Haiti still ranks 9<sup>th</sup> out of 178 countries, situated between Yemen and Pakistan.

The following table shows the fragility indicators for Haiti for the past 10 years.

<sup>107</sup> See the Fragile States Index Ranking at <http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings>



Table 4 Fund for Peace's Fragility Indicators for Haiti 2005-2014

Year	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Economic	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Total	Rank
2005	8.8	8.0	7.7	3.4	9.0	8.1	9.4	9.8	8.7	7.8	8.5	10.0	99.2	10
2006	8.8	5.0	8.8	8.0	8.3	8.4	9.4	9.3	9.6	9.4	9.6	10.0	104.6	8
2007	8.6	4.2	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.4	9.2	9.0	9.1	9.3	9.3	9.6	100.9	11
2008	8.5	4.2	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.3	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.9	8.9	9.6	99.3	14
2009	9.3	5.8	7.3	8.6	8.2	8.9	9.2	9.5	8.5	8.4	8.3	9.8	101.8	12
2010	9.3	5.6	7.3	8.6	8.3	9.2	9.3	9.5	8.3	8.2	8.4	9.6	101.6	11
2011	10.0	9.2	7.3	8.9	8.8	9.2	9.4	10.0	8.0	8.4	8.8	10.0	108.0	5
2012	9.5	8.1	7.0	8.8	8.6	9.5	9.3	9.3	7.7	8.2	9.0	9.7	104.9	7
2013	9.6	8.6	7.0	9.1	9.1	9.7	8.8	9.6	7.6	7.9	9.0	9.9	105.8	8
2014	8.7	8.5	7.0	9.1	9.3	9.4	8.9	9.5	7.5	7.5	9.1	9.8	104.3	9

Source: Fund for Peace – Fragile States Index

### 5.3 Two examples illustrating political instability in Haiti

As an illustration of the political instability in Haiti, it can be observed that:

- At the central level: There were no less than four prime ministers during the period 2009-2012 (see table below). The country underwent regular political crises at the central level as illustrated by the five months of “political vacuum” in 2011. On 14 May 2011, M. Bellerive resigned as Prime Minister to allow the new President (Michel Martelly) to choose his own Prime Minister. President Martelly selected Daniel Gérard Rouzier, a business man who runs several companies in different sectors and is member of the executive board of a Haitian bank. However, the parliament rejected M. Rouzier. Garry Conille (a Haitian academic and development worker) was eventually officially designated as the new Prime Minister in September 2011 and his mandate started in mid-October 2011.

Table 5 List of prime ministers and finance ministers appointed during the period 2009-2012

Prime ministers	Mandate - Start	Mandate - End	Finance minister	Mandate - Start	Mandate - End
Michèle Pierre-Louis	5 Sept. 2008	11 Nov. 2009	Ronald Baudin	12 Nov. 2009	19 Oct. 2011
Jean-Max Bellerive	11 Nov. 2009	18 Oct. 2011	André L. Georges	19 Oct. 2011	8 May 2012
Garry Conille	18 Oct. 2011	14 May 2012	M.C. Jean-Marie	8 May 2012	9 April 2013
Laurent Lamothe	14 May 2012	-	Wilson Laleau	11 Apr. 2013	-

- At the local level: the situation is characterised by the very little progress made in terms of decentralisation<sup>108</sup> over the last decades and, since 2011, a political crisis associated with the regular postponement of the municipal and senatorial elections which were originally scheduled to take place in 2011. Local elections have not taken place yet and municipal councils have not been renewed. In the meantime, elected mayors were replaced by “Interim Executive Agents” directly appointed by the central state. The bi-annual report on human rights in Haiti of December 2012 explains: “The practice of appointing Interim Executive Agents (Agents exécutifs intérimaires) to replace local elected officials whose mandates have expired continues. The indefinite extension of these appointments - initially justified by the need to ensure the proper functioning of local institutions - compromises the elective character of the functions concerned and presents a risk for the principle of democracy.”

<sup>108</sup> Since the new constitution of 1987, decentralisation was regularly emphasised as a priority area of policy reform by the Government of Haiti. A law was passed in July 1996 to strengthen intergovernmental fiscal transfers and increase resources available at the local level (“fonds de gestion et de développement des collectivités territoriales” - FGDCT). In 2006, the central government issued three decrees on the organization and functioning of local government. However, the actual level of decentralisation remained very limited with local government largely lacking resources to assume their function.

## 6 Annex 6: Portfolio review

### 6.1 Introduction

The portfolio review is based on data extracted from the internal information systems of MFA and Norad<sup>109</sup>. The analysis covers all ‘grants’ and other forms of financial agreements related to Haiti for which disbursements were made during the period 2010-2012.

The review of the three-year programme portfolio of Norway in Haiti identified **81 interventions** corresponding to 95 unique grants or agreements, totalling 834.3 NOK million. The sub-sections below present further details on the results of the portfolio analysis that was carried out in the framework of the evaluation.

### 6.2 Channels

#### *Main implementing organisations*

Overall, the implementation of Norway support to Haiti between 2010 and 2012 has involved no less than 42 agreement partners and 52 implementing entities.

The table below presents the main implementing organisations.

Table 6 Portfolio overview – Top 10 implementing organisations by domain

<i>Development</i>	<i>Humanitarian</i>
WB / HRF	CERF
MINUSTAH <sup>110</sup>	UNICEF
UNDP	NCA
UNEP	Norway Red+
NDI	Cuba
Viva Rio (partner of NCA)	OHCHR
NCA	WFP
IDEA	FAO
IFAD	UNFPA
IMS	MSF Norge

It should be noted that the HRF (a trust fund managed by the WB) was actually used to finance interventions implemented by various multi-lateral organisations, including: UNDP, UNEP, IADB and the WB itself (see also next sub-section 6.4.1).

Similarly, NCA signed partnership contracts with other entities, including: GARR, MOFECS, MISSEH, OBMICA, LWF and SCH.

The box below provides details on the inclusion of Norway’s contributions to global aid mechanisms (e.g. CERF) or provided through specific framework agreements (e.g. NRC). Further details on these organisations/global aid mechanisms are provided in section 6.4.4 below.

#### *Box 4 Remarks on the inclusion of global contributions into the portfolio analysis*

‘Global contributions’ do not correspond to single specific interventions implemented in Haiti but rather to global support provided by Norway to organisations which operate in the country. Three types of global contributions were included in Norway’s portfolio in Haiti and added manually to the database used in the evaluation:

**Contributions to CERF:** CERF<sup>111</sup> is a UN managed fund that provides seed funds to jump-start critical humanitarian operations and fund life-saving interventions. According to MFA, Norway’s contributions to CERF action in Haiti can be estimated at NOK 32.5 million over the period 2010-2012.<sup>112</sup> This support was coded with the DAC sector code ‘720 - Emergency Response’ in the database elaborated for this evaluation.

**Contributions to MINUSTAH:** The ‘United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti’, also known as MINUSTAH (*Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti*) is a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti that has been in operation since 2004. According to MFA, Norway’s contributions to MINUSTAH can be estimated at

<sup>109</sup> The Norwegian Aid Statistics database (<http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/norwegian-aid-statistics>) and other internal database (PTA and P360) were accessed on February 2014.

<sup>110</sup> Financed via UNDPKO.

<sup>111</sup> <http://www.unocha.org/cerf/>

<sup>112</sup> Norway contributions over the period amounted to 15.78% of total member states’ contributions (15.72% of total contributions).

NOK 117.9 million over the period 2010-2012. This support was coded with the DAC sector code '151 - Government and civil society, general' in the MFA database as well as the database elaborated for this evaluation.

**Contributions to NRC:** NRC is the largest Norwegian humanitarian organization (measured by the number of employees). Its main funding partner is the Norwegian Government. NORCAP, a division of NRC, provide a standby roster of several hundreds of persons who can be deployed on short notice to support the UN and other international organizations. NORCAP is essentially funded by the Norwegian Government and its operation is guided by a framework agreement between NRC and MFA which was first signed in 2009 and renewed in 2012. The only activities implemented by NRC in Haiti during the period 2010-2012 are related to the NORCAP roster of experts. According to MFA, Norway's contributions to NRC/NORCAP's action in Haiti can be estimated at NOK 16.3 million over the period 2010-2012. This support was coded with the DAC sector code '720 - Emergency Response' in the database elaborated for this evaluation.

### *Forms of assistance / Types of assistance*

The table below underlines the importance of the use of multilateral channels (mainly UN) in the emergency response given after the 2010 earthquake. Response to the other emergency situations which occurred after 2010 (e.g. cholera outbreak) were made through "bilateral assistance" (via the Norwegian Red Cross or NCA).

The table below seems to show an increasing attention given to "bilateral assistance" in the "development" part of the Norwegian portfolio. This should however be interpreted with care as large disbursements were made to the HRF in 2010 and in late 2011. All of the interventions supported via the HRF (i.e., interventions managed by IADB, UNEP and UNDP) were still running in 2013 (and some had barely started).

Table 7 Portfolio overview – Evolutions by type of assistance and domain

Types of assistance	Year			Total
	2010	2011	2012	
<b>Domain: Development</b>				
Bilateral	10%	19%	28%	17%
Multi-lateral	90%	81%	72%	83%
<b>Domain: Humanitarian</b>				
Bilateral	40%	100%	100%	47%
Multi-lateral	60%	0%	0%	53%

The table below shows the evolutions of disbursements by form of assistance.

Table 8 Portfolio overview – Evolutions of disbursements by form of assistance ('000 NOK)

Forms of assistance	Year			Total
	2010	2011	2012	
Contributions to specific-purpose	292,102	136,281	13,287	441,670
Project-type interventions	188,715	53,520	117,419	359,654
Debt relief	10,040	5,386		15,426
Donor country personnel	2,249	766	6,682	9,697
Core support to NGOs and other		731	4,383	5,114
Other technical assistance	550	926	879	2,355
Various administrative costs	346			346
<b>Total</b>	<b>494,002</b>	<b>197,609</b>	<b>142,649</b>	<b>834,261</b>

## 6.3 Domain and sectors

### *Distribution by domains*

The figure below shows the overall share between humanitarian and development aid in the Norwegian portfolio. Details disbursements made between 2010 and 2012 are presented in the table below.

It is important to highlight that around 90% of the humanitarian aid was provided in 2010.

Figure 4 Portfolio overview – Distribution of Norway portfolio by domain (humanitarian vs. development)





Table 9 Portfolio overview – Evolution of disbursements by domain ('000 NOK)

Domain	Year			Total
	2010	2011	2012	
Development	301,815	190,234	126,827	618,876
Humanitarian	192,187	7,375	15,822	215,385
Grand Total	494,002	197,609	142,649	834,261

The figure below shows an apparent decrease in funding going to development aid. Here also, the figures should be interpreted with care because of the large disbursements that were made to the HRF in mid-2010 and in late 2011.

Figure 5 Distribution of the development aid part of Norway's portfolio by year




#### Distribution by target area and DAC sector

The figure below illustrate the importance of the sector "reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation" (DAC sector code: 730) as well as the humanitarian sector. This illustrates the specific nature of the support provided by Norway in Haiti during 2010-2012 (in response to the 2010 earthquake). It is however important to highlight the fact that several large interventions (such as the support provided via the HRF)

were categorised in the MFA database in the sector “reconstruction, relief and rehabilitation” but actually corresponded to interventions related to specific sectors such as environmental protection, agriculture, energy, etc.

Figure 6 Distribution of Norway portfolio by DAC sector



The table below provides details on disbursements by Target area and DAC sector.

Table 10 Portfolio overview - Distribution of Norway portfolio by Target area and DAC sector

Target areas and DAC sectors	2010	2011	2012	Total
<b>Emergency assistance</b>	<b>392,187</b>	<b>88,375</b>	<b>15,822</b>	<b>496,385</b>
730 - Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation	200,000	76,000		276,000
720 - Emergency Response	192,187	7,375	15,822	215,385
740 - Disaster prevention and preparedness		5,000		5,000
<b>Good governance</b>	<b>70,687</b>	<b>91,419</b>	<b>40,135</b>	<b>202,241</b>
151 - Government and civil society, general	62,565	67,116	28,035	157,716
152 - Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security	8,122	24,303	12,100	44,525
<b>Economic development and trade</b>	<b>20,040</b>	<b>15,796</b>	<b>43,456</b>	<b>79,292</b>
430 - Other multisector	10,000	9,997	42,997	62,994
600 - Action relating to debt	10,040	5,386		15,426
311 - Agriculture		414	395	809
321 - Industry			64	64
<b>Environment and energy</b>	<b>11,000</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>33,092</b>	<b>44,382</b>
230 - Energy generation and supply	-	290	15,592	15,882
312 - Forestry	11,000		4,000	15,000
410 - General environmental protection			13,500	13,500
<b>Health and social services</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>1,229</b>	<b>9,645</b>	<b>10,961</b>
122 - Basic health			5,000	5,000
160 - Other social infrastructure and services	88	1,229	2,658	3,974
140 - Water and sanitation			1,498	1,498
130 - Population policies/programmes and reproductive health			488	488
<b>Education</b>		<b>500</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>1,000</b>
111 - Education, level unspecified		500	500	1,000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>494,002</b>	<b>197,609</b>	<b>142,649</b>	<b>834,261</b>



## 6.4 Details on some major groups of interventions

### 6.4.1 The Haiti Reconstruction Fund

The contributions of Norway to the HRF was made through two grants (HTI-10/0024 – 200 million NOK; HTI-11/0030 – 74 million NOK) corresponding to two transfers/disbursements, one made in August 2010 and one in December 2011.

In total, 274 NOK million (around 45 USD million) were disbursed to the HRF during the period. It is estimated that at least 45% of it was used to finance interventions in the *Département du Sud*.<sup>113</sup>

#### Box 5 Details on the Haiti Reconstruction Fund

##### General overview

After consultation with the GoH, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, along with contributing donors, established a multi-donor fund called the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF).

The objective of the HRF is to support the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources in the form of contributions to improve basic living conditions in Haiti and assist in building the capacity of the Government of Haiti in the longer term consistent with the Haiti Action Plan<sup>114</sup>.

The HRF coordinates its activities with the Government of Haiti (GoH)<sup>115</sup> and his supervised by a Steering Committee (SC)<sup>116</sup>. The HRF is administered by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group which also serves as Trustee, and constitutes pooled contributions to provide grant financing for priority activities (projects, programs and budget support) identified and/or endorsed by the IHRC/GoH within the GoH Recovery Plan.

The expected advantages of this multi-donor approach are that it:

- Increases harmonization by pooling resources from many donors in support of the Government's Recovery Plan;
- Draws on the comparative advantages of proven international (IADB, UN and World Bank) and locally-active partners that are eligible to implement according to a Partner Entity's rules and procedures;
- Reduces transaction costs for the Government and donors by working through one funding facility;
- Avoids overlapping initiatives and duplication of efforts; and
- Helps to meet strategic financing needs in the reconstruction process as identified by the Government of Haiti.

##### Financing arrangements with partner entities


The Trustee, at the instruction of the HRF's SC, enters into a Transfer Agreement with a Partner Entity to finance HRF activities. The Trustee has no responsibility for the use of funds once transferred to the Partner Entity. Partner Entities include the IADB, UNDG organizations, and the World Bank. Partner Entities should meet the fiduciary and management standards as required by the SC and Trustee. Partner Entities can work through one or more Implementing Agencies that are permitted by a Partner Entity's rules and procedures to undertake reconstruction and development activities. The figure below illustrates the flow of funds through the HRF.

<sup>113</sup> The estimations of 'shares of total portfolio' were made based on the overall budget of each intervention financed via the HRF.

<sup>114</sup> GoH (2010): Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement d'Haïti (PARDH). Les grands chantiers pour l'avenir.

<sup>115</sup> During the period 2010-2012, the HRF was coordinating its activities with the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC).

<sup>116</sup> The Steering Committee is chaired by a representative named by the GoH. It consists of the following members: a representative of the GoH; a representative from each Donor making the minimum contribution of US\$ 30 million; a representative from each Partner Entity (IADB, UN and the World Bank); and a representative of the Trustee.



The HRF presents the specificity that allocations approved by the SC can actually follow specific “requests” from contributing donors. Donors can express their “preferences” in a formal letter and submit it to the SC which then examines whether the preferences of the donors align with the priorities outlined in the Government’s recovery plan. The HRF 2012-13 annual report recognises that the system of “donor preferences” has resulted in, on the positive side, “*increased amount of funding*”, on the negative side, a “*reduced level of flexibility and availability of funding*” and a position which is “*at odds with the aim of strengthening government ownership and alignment with government priorities*”. The table below gives an overview of the contributions of each donor and the scale of the “preference” system.

Donor	Contributions with preferences (US\$ millions)	Contributions without preferences (US\$ millions)	Total	%
Brazil	55.00	-	55.00	14%
Canada	15.00	30.50	45.50	12%
Finland	1.84	-	1.84	0%
France	32.28	-	32.28	8%
Japan	30.00	-	30.00	8%
Norway	30.00	14.27	44.27	12%
Spain	20.00	10.00	30.00	8%
The United States	125.00	-	125.00	33%
Other donors	-	17.16	17.16	5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>309.12</b>	<b>71.93</b>	<b>381,05</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>81%</b>	<b>19%</b>		

Note: Based on July 2013 data.

Source: <http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/> and interviews carried out with HRF staff.

Like most trust funds managed by the World Bank (and most pooled funds mechanisms), it is not possible to track precisely where the contributions of each donor are going: **funds are not earmarked**. However, as mentioned in the box above, in the case of the HRF, a large share of the contributions does correspond to “preferences” expressed by the donors. If this information is combined with the overall contribution of the donor and the size of the different interventions financed via the Fund, one can calculate an estimation of the final contribution of this donor to each of the intervention.

The evaluation team applied such an approach to better understand the support provided by Norway via the HRF. Based on the information available to date, Norway’s support via the HRF can be summarised as in the table below.

Table 11 Overview of Norway's support provided through the HRF

Component / Intervention title	Implementing organisation	Budget / Total planned (US\$ millions)	Norway initial preference (US\$ millions)	Norway estimated final contributions (US\$ millions)
<b>Interventions in the South</b>			<b>15.0</b>	<b>20.0</b>
Projet de Réduction de désastres dans le Département du Sud	UNDP	8.0	4.0	4.0
Programme de Développement Durable dans le Sud-Ouest d'Haïti	UNEP	8.0	4.0	4.0
Atténuation des Désastres Naturels dans le Département du Sud	IADB	14.0	7.0	0.0 <sup>117</sup>
Macaya project ("Sustainable Management of Upper Watersheds of South Western Haiti – Macaya Park")	IADB	9.0	0.0	7.0
Institutional Transformation and Modernization Program of the Energy Sector	IADB	25.0	0.0	3.0
Sustainable Energy for Haiti	IADB	2.0	0.0	2.0
<b>(Budget Support) Opération d'Appui à la Politique de Développement d'Urgence</b>	<b>WB</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>10.0</b>
<b>Norway Funds without preferences</b>			<b>14.3</b>	<b>14.3</b>
<b>Total allocated to HRF</b>			<b>44.3</b>	<b>44.3</b>

Source: Particip calculations based on information on project documentation, HRF data on disbursements and KII.

#### 6.4.2 Interventions in the Département du Sud

The table below list the development interventions that were financed by Norway in the Département du Sud and the related disbursements over the period 2010-2012.

Table 12 Overview of Norway's support provided in the Département du Sud

Implementing organisation	Intervention	MFA Grant / Agreement nr.	Disbursements (million NOK)			
			2010	2011	2012	Total
HRF (UNDP, UNEP & IADB)	See previous sections		90.4 <sup>118</sup>	33.4 <sup>119</sup>		123.8
UNDP	Disaster Risk Reduction in South Dep.	HTI-12/0012			33.0	33.0
UNEP	Sustainable Energy programme in South Dep.	HTI-12/0011			14.0	14.0
UNEP	Agriculture and Marine programme in South Dep.	HTI-12/0013			13.5	13.5
Cuba	Cuban Medical Brigade in Haiti in the South Department	HTI-12/0010			5.0	5.0
FED	Women Resource Center South Department Haiti	HTI-12/0016			3.0	3.0
NRC	Special secondments renewable energy, South region	HTI-12/0014			0.9	0.9
Sweco Norge	Technical assistance to review hydrology data	HTI-12/0006			0.7	0.7
NRC	Special secondment renewable energy	HTI-12/0008			0.6	0.6
Prosjekt Haiti	Construction of school campus and community centre in St Louis	HTI-11/0032			0.5	0.5

<sup>117</sup> The preference expressed for an intervention implemented by IADB was eventually modified. Norway entered in discussions with the involved partners in the period 2012-2013 to invite the HRF to re-allocate the funds to a project focusing on the Macaya Park.

<sup>118</sup> 45% of NOK 200 million (see previous section on the interventions financed via the HRF).

<sup>119</sup> 45% of NOK 74 million (see previous section on the interventions financed via the HRF).

Implementing organisation	Intervention	MFA Grant / Agreement nr.	Disbursements (million NOK)			
			2010	2011	2012	Total
LWF	Environmental sustainability in vulnerable areas, Macaya	QZA-10/0953-388		0.4		0.4
Sweco Norge	Data hydropower in South Department Haiti (Sweco)	HTI-11/0022		0.2		0.2
<b>Total</b>						<b>195.6</b>

### 6.4.3 Humanitarian response

The table below present the main interventions and implementing partners financed in the framework of the humanitarian response provided in Haiti during the period.

Table 13 Details on the humanitarian response

Implementing organisation	Intervention	MFA Grant / Agreement nr.	Disbursements (million NOK)
<b>Multilateral institutions</b>			<b>113.88</b>
CERF	Global contributions via CERF	n/a	32.50
UNICEF- United Nations Children's Fund	UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to UNICEF	HTI-10/0006	28.50
UNDP - UN Development Programme	UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to UNDP.I	HTI-10/0013	15.00
OHCHR – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights	UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to the OHCHR	HTI-10/0008	10.00
WFP - World Food Programme	UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to WFP	HTI-10/0009	10.00
FAO - Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations	UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to FAO	HTI-10/0018	9.00
UNFPA - UN Population Fund	UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to UNFPA	HTI-10/0007	6.84
UNOCHA - UN Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to OCHA & Emergency relief (OCHA)	HTI-10/0010 & HTI-10/0017	2.04
<b>NGO</b>			<b>75.50</b>
Kirkens Nødhjelp	Humanitarian assistance: water, sanitation and shelter (NCA)	HTI-10/0002 & HTI-11/0012	25.00
Norges Røde Kors	Rapid Deployment of Emergency Hospital & Cholera outbreak response (NRX)	HTI-10/0001	23.00
Flyktninghjelpen	Global contributions via NRC	09/02194	16.30
Leger uten grenser Norge	Emergency funding for medical intervention in Port au Prince & Humanitarian action 2011 (MSF)	HTI-10/0012 & QZA-11/0708-2	6.70
Redd Barna Norge	Humanitarian response (Save the children)	HTI-10/0011	4.50
<b>Other</b>			<b>26.00</b>
DSB - Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap	General support to UNDAC and other prevention activities	QZA-12/0254	15.79
Cuba	Cuban Medical Brigade in Haiti	HTI-10/0004	10.07
Scanteam AS	Study of Norwegian humanitarian response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti	HTI-10/0005	0.15
<b>Total</b>			<b>215.39</b>

## 6.4.4 Details on three global contributions: CERF, MINUSTAH and NRC

### 6.4.4.1 CERF

CERF is a UN managed fund<sup>120</sup> that provides seed funds to jump-start critical humanitarian operations and fund life-saving interventions. Haiti received 9% (USD 36.6 million) of CERF's allocations in 2010.<sup>121</sup>

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is a humanitarian fund established by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. The fund is replenished annually through contributions from governments, the private sector, foundations and individuals and constitutes a pool of reserve funding to support humanitarian action.

The CERF was established to upgrade the Central Emergency Revolving Fund by including a grant element. The CERF has a grant facility of US\$450 million and a loan facility of \$30 million. The CERF grant component has two windows; one for rapid response and one for underfunded emergencies.

The CERF's objectives are to:

- promote early action and response to reduce loss of life;
- enhance response to time-critical requirements;
- strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises.

Following a humanitarian crisis, humanitarian actors in the field can immediately provide life-saving assistance using pooled funds managed by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). There are three types of pooled funds: CERF, Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF) and Emergency Response Funds (ERFs). While CERF can cover all countries affected by an emergency, CHFs and ERFs are country-based pooled funds that respond to specific humanitarian situations in currently 18 countries.

The pooled funds enable humanitarian organizations to provide the most urgently needed assistance following a natural disaster; fill critical gaps in the response in countries with large, on-going humanitarian operations; and provide basic life necessities for people struggling to survive in many of the world's forgotten emergencies.

Since these funds were created, billions of dollars have been disbursed to help millions of people in dire need of assistance in 88 countries. Funds come from the voluntary contributions of over 125 countries and private-sector donors.

Immediately following a disaster, the Resident or Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) can submit a CERF application for funds to cover life-saving projects identified by UN agencies, and prioritised by the Humanitarian Country Team. CERF provides the funds directly to UN agencies and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), who provide a portion of the funding to NGOs, civil society organizations and host governments for joint implementation. In countries where there is an ERF or a CHF, the HC can immediately release available funds upon agreed priorities at country level. CHFs and ERFs can allocate funds directly to NGOs.

Decisions on prioritizing life-saving activities are managed by humanitarian actors on the ground. These priorities are organised into an appeal document and presented to Member States and other partners for funding. Generally there are two types of appeals: Consolidated Appeals developed on an annual basis in countries where there are on-going humanitarian needs; and Flash Appeals developed following a sudden-onset emergency such as a flood or an earthquake. CERF, CHF and ERF funding is recorded against these appeals. All funding information is recorded in the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) database. OCHA coordinates the appeals and manages FTS. OCHA's management of pooled funds allows for faster response to humanitarian needs. The appeals ensure coordination of humanitarian action, while the tracking of funding facilitates transparency in how humanitarian funding is provided. OCHA works with Member States and the private sector to mobilise funds for the pooled funds and humanitarian appeals.

#### *CERF pledges by donor and year*











An overview of CERF pledges by donor and year is given in the table below.

<sup>120</sup> <http://www.unocha.org/cerf/>

<sup>121</sup> The fund is replenished annually through contributions from governments, the private sector, foundations and individuals.



Table 14 CERF pledges by donor and year (top 10 donors)

	Donors	2010 Contribution	2011 Contribution	2012 Contribution	2013 Contribution	2014 Contribution	Total Contributions
1	 United Kingdom	60,005,700	94,280,000	95,148,000	111,230,500	50,643,000	<b>411,307,200</b>
2	 Norway	65,483,535 (1 <sup>st</sup> )	67,966,752 (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	73,945,027 (2 <sup>nd</sup> )	68,265,453 (3 <sup>rd</sup> )	62,238,002 (1 <sup>st</sup> )	<b>337,898,769</b>
3	 Sweden	64,369,548	74,483,671	72,132,873	71,687,729	15,170,000	<b>297,843,821</b>
4	 Netherlands	54,984,000	54,460,000	52,484,000	52,124,000	54,956,000	<b>269,008,000</b>
5	 Canada	37,328,450	41,188,191		28,809,407	26,719,985	<b>134,046,033</b>
6	 Spain	39,585,000	20,091,000	2,608,200	6,617,500		<b>68,901,700</b>
7	 Ireland	5,099,972	5,466,772	5,160,772	13,009,444	12,183,300	<b>40,920,260</b>
8	 Germany	21,735,000	16,370,000	19,402,500	20,313,000	10,212,750	<b>88,033,250</b>
9	 Denmark	11,135,478	9,182,231	23,008,541	24,065,368	18,204,325	<b>85,595,943</b>
10	 Australia	10,986,000	13,906,200	16,272,000	18,566,600	9,868,384	<b>69,599,184</b>
	(...)						
	<b>Total contributions</b>	<b>424,339,211</b>	<b>464,537,072</b>	<b>425,144,941</b>	<b>478,731,249</b>	<b>286,954,722</b>	<b>2,079,707,195</b>

Note: Contributions are expressed in US\$.

Source: <http://www.unocha.org/cerf/our-donors/funding/cerf-pledges-and-contributions-2006-2014>

CERF receives broad support from 124 United Nations Member States and two observers, regional governments and the private sector, including corporations, non-governmental organizations and individuals. Norway contributions over the period 2010-2012 amounted to 15.78% of total member states' contributions (15.72% of total contributions).

#### CERF allocations by country

(Source: <http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/allocations-country/2006-2014-country> )

Table 15 CERF allocations by country<sup>122</sup>

	Country	Funds Allocated US\$	% of Total	Country	Funds Allocated US\$	% of Total	Country	Funds Allocated US\$	% of Total
		2010	2010		2011	2011		2012	2012
1	<a href="#">Pakistan</a>	51,832,831	12.48 %	<a href="#">Somalia</a>	52,953,336	12.40%	<a href="#">South Sudan</a>	40,044,091	8.18%
2	<a href="#">Haiti</a>	<b>36,564,849</b>	<b>8.81%</b>	<a href="#">Ethiopia</a>	46,475,653	10.89%	<a href="#">Pakistan</a>	36,736,840	7.51%
3	<a href="#">Niger</a>	35,015,440	8.43%	<a href="#">Pakistan</a>	32,370,901	7.58%	<a href="#">Syrian Arab Republic</a>	36,476,732	7.45%
4	<a href="#">Congo, The Democratic Republic of the</a>	29,126,626	7.01%	<a href="#">South Sudan</a>	22,766,954	5.33%	<a href="#">Congo, The Democratic Republic of the</a>	31,486,288	6.43%

<sup>122</sup> Full lists from 2009 to 2013 available at:

<http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/allocations-country/2009-country>

<http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/2010>

<http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/2011>

<http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/2012>

<http://www.unocha.org/cerf/cerf-worldwide/2013>

	Country	Funds Allocated US\$	% of Total	Country	Funds Allocated US\$	% of Total	Country	Funds Allocated US\$	% of Total
5	<a href="#">Republic of the Sudan</a>	23,856,917	5.75%	<a href="#">Kenya</a>	22,683,472	5.31%	<a href="#">Niger</a>	24,609,716	5.03%
6	<a href="#">Chad</a>	22,839,556	5.50%	<a href="#">Chad</a>	22,553,084	5.28%	<a href="#">Yemen</a>	23,460,436	4.79%
7	<a href="#">Kenya</a>	20,029,976	4.82%	<a href="#">Republic of the Sudan</a>	18,321,205	4.29%	<a href="#">Republic of the Sudan</a>	20,158,449	4.12%
8	<a href="#">Ethiopia</a>	16,690,193	4.02%	<a href="#">Cote d'Ivoire</a>	16,324,871	3.82%	<a href="#">Myanmar</a>	16,651,567	3.40%
9	<a href="#">Sri Lanka</a>	15,690,704	3.78%	<a href="#">Sri Lanka</a>	16,082,778	3.77%	<a href="#">Burkina Faso</a>	14,869,587	3.04%
10	<a href="#">Yemen</a>	14,539,112	3.50%	<a href="#">Niger</a>	15,736,845	3.69%	<a href="#">Chad</a>	14,781,195	3.02%
11	<a href="#">Korea, Democratic People's Republic of</a>	13,440,519	3.24%	<a href="#">Korea, Democratic People's Republic of</a>	15,410,406	3.61%	<a href="#">Ethiopia</a>	13,984,781	2.86%
12	<a href="#">Myanmar</a>	12,455,835	3.00%	<a href="#">Zimbabwe</a>	15,016,297	3.52%	<a href="#">Mali</a>	13,954,347	2.85%
13	<a href="#">Afghanistan</a>	11,019,952	2.65%	<a href="#">Yemen</a>	14,834,581	3.47%	<a href="#">Philippines</a>	13,914,163	2.84%
14	<a href="#">Zimbabwe</a>	10,439,418	2.51%	<a href="#">Philippines</a>	11,348,971	2.66%	<a href="#">Korea, Democratic People's Republic of</a>	12,920,667	2.64%
15	<a href="#">Chile</a>	10,283,575	2.48%	<a href="#">Haiti</a>	<b>10,371,212</b>	<b>2.43%</b>	<a href="#">Haiti</a>	<b>11,897,489</b>	<b>2.43%</b>

Table 16 Main CERF interventions in Haiti (2010-2012)<sup>123</sup>

Agency	Agency Project	Sector	Window*	Approved	Approved Date	Disbursement Date
<b>2010 main CERF interventions in Haiti (2010 total: 36,564,849 USD)</b>						
FAO	Support d'urgence aux petits agriculteurs affectés par le tremblement de terre et les inondations de 2010 (10-FAO-020)	Agriculture	RR	3,000,000	17/03/2010	07/04/2010
WHO	Availability of essential drugs in health institutions providing services free of charge, (10-WHO-023)	Health	RR	1,500,000	17/03/2010	31/03/2010
IOM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management for Vulnerable Earthquake Victims in Haiti HTI 1 0/CSS/31812/R (10-IOM-013)	Camp Management	RR	3,000,000	15/03/2010	22/03/2010
UN Habitat	Vulnerable Neighbourhood and Housing Security Assessment, Urgent Demolitions and Transitional Camps at Neighbourhood Level (10-HAB-001)	Shelter and non-food items	RR	2,529,963	15/03/2010	31/03/2010
WHO	Health response and availability of adequate drugs and medical supplies to Haiti - earthquake 12 January 2010 HTI-10/H/31423/122	Health	RR	1,500,140	05/02/2010	19/02/2010

<sup>123</sup> The table only presents the interventions above 1,000,000 USD. Full lists are available on CERF's website: <http://www.unocha.org/cerf/>

Agency	Agency Project	Sector	Window*	Approved	Approved Date	Disbursement Date
	(10-WHO-003)					
IOM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management for Vulnerable Earthquake Victims in Haiti HTI-10/CSS/31455 (10-IOM-003)	Camp Management	RR	2,487,750	28/01/2010	04/02/2010
IOM	NFI Assistance for Vulnerable Earthquake Victims in Haiti (10-IOM-002)	Shelter and non-food items	RR	1,243,875	28/01/2010	04/02/2010
UNDP	Time-critical rubble removal for streets, houses and public utilities through cash for work in Port-au-Prince metropolitan area affected communities HTI-10/ER/31387/776 (10-UDP-001)	Economic Recovery and Infrastructure	RR	1,000,000	28/01/2010	05/02/2010
WFP	Logistics Augmentation and Coordination for Relief Operations in Response to the Earthquake in Haiti & Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in response to the Earthquake in Haiti (10-WFP-010)	Coordination and Support Services - Logistics	RR	3,000,000	26/01/2010	05/02/2010
WFP	Food Assistance to Earthquake Affected Populations in Haiti HTI-10/F/31422 (10-WFP-009)	Food	RR	2,001,882	26/01/2010	05/02/2010
UNICEF	Provide access to safe water and sanitation and hygiene facilities to families affected by the earthquake HT1-10/WF/31373/124 (10-CEF-006-A)	Water and sanitation	RR	1,354,620	26/01/2010	28/01/2010
WFP	Food Assistance to Earthquake Affected Populations in Haiti HTI-10/F/31422 (10-WFP-005)	Food	RR	2,893,426	15/01/2010	20/01/2010
WHO	Saving Lives and Reducing Suffering for the Affected Population in the Haiti Earthquake (10-WHO-002)	Health	RR	2,054,356	15/01/2010	20/01/2010
WFP	Logistics Augmentation and Coordination for Relief Operations in Response to the Earthquake in Haiti” & “Provision of Humanitarian Air Services in response to the Earthquake in Haiti (10-WFP-006)	Coordination and Support Services - Logistics	RR	2,000,000	15/01/2010	20/01/2010
UNICEF	Provide access to safe water and sanitation facilities to families affected by the earthquake HT1-10/WF/31373/124 (10-CEF-004-B)	Water and sanitation	RR	1,201,075	15/01/2010	20/01/2010

Agency	Agency Project	Sector	Window*	Approved	Approved Date	Disbursement Date
IOM	Immediate Shelter and NFIs Assistance to Vulnerable Earthquake Victims in Haiti HTI-10/S-NF/31409/298 (10-IOM-001)	Shelter and non-food items	RR	1,154,081	15/01/2010	20/01/2010
<b>2011 main CERF interventions in Haiti (2011 total: 10,371,212 USD)</b>						
WHO	Response to Cholera Outbreak in Haiti HTI-11/H/40194 (11-WHO-002)	Health	RR	2,771,951	19/01/2011	02/02/2011
IOM	Life-saving response to the Cholera outbreak in IDP camps and high-risk spontaneous sites HTI-11/CSS/40184 (11-IOM-001)	Camp Management	RR	1,997,860	14/01/2011	25/01/2011
WFP	Provision of Air Services to Humanitarian Community in Haiti (11-WFP-001)	Coordination and Support Services - UNHAS	RR	2,497,860	10/01/2011	25/01/2011
<b>2012 main CERF interventions in Haiti (2012 total: 11,897,489 USD)</b>						
IOM	Humanitarian and shelter response to Hurricane Sandy HTI-12/S-NF/56880/R (12-IOM-031)	Camp Management	RR	1,018,566	29/11/2012	06/12/2012
IOM	Support and Assistance for Sustainable Return and Relocation of IDPs within the Framework of CCCM in IDP sites in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (12-IOM-004)	Camp Management	UFE	1,900,000	19/03/2012	23/03/2012
UNICEF	De-sludging/disposal of human waste in 321 camps in the earthquake-affected areas (12-CEF-011-B)	Water and sanitation	UFE	2,475,316	13/03/2012	20/03/2012

#### 6.4.4.2 MINUSTAH

##### Overall presentation of MINUSTAH

(source: <http://www.minustah.org/> & <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/>)

The 'United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti', also known as MINUSTAH (an acronym of the French title: *Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti*) is a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti that has been in operation since 2004. According to its mandate from the UN Security Council, MINUSTAH is required to concentrate the use of its resources, including civilian police, on increasing security and protection during the electoral period and to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti.

MINUSTAH was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1542 on 30 April 2004 because the Security Council deemed the situation in Haiti to be a threat to international peace and security in the region. MINUSTAH was originally set up to: support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment; to assist in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes; assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti; protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; support the constitutional and political processes; to assist in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights; and to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the country.

In the following years, the mandate of MINUSTAH, its concept of operations and the authorised strength were adjusted by the Security Council on several occasions to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground and to the evolving requirements as dictated by the political, security and socio-economic situation prevailing in the country.

Following the devastating earthquake which hit Haiti on 12 January 2010, the Council, by its [resolutions 1908](#) of 19 January and [1927](#) of 4 June, increased the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts. It requested MINUSTAH to continue, within its current mandate, its collaboration with OCHA and the United Nations Country Team in supporting the humanitarian and recovery efforts. It requested the Mission to continue its support to the Haitian Government and to the Provisional Electoral Council in the preparation and conduct of Haiti's elections, and to coordinate international electoral assistance to Haiti in cooperation with other international stakeholders including the OAS. Subsequently, as the security situation in Haiti had improved, the overall force levels of MINUSTAH were reduced, including most recently by Security Council [resolution 2070](#) of 12 October 2012.

#### *How is UN peacekeeping financed?*

(source: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/fifth/pkofinancing.shtml> )

According to Article 17 of the United Nations Charter the General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization and the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

In its resolution 55/235 of 23 December 2000, the General Assembly reaffirmed the general principles underlying the financing of peacekeeping operations:

- The financing of such operations is the collective responsibility of all States Members of the United Nations and, accordingly, the costs of peacekeeping operations are expenses of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations;
- In order to meet the expenditures caused by such operations, a different procedure is required from that applied to meet expenditures under the regular budget of the United Nations;
- Whereas the economically more developed countries are in a position to make relatively larger contributions to peacekeeping operations, the economically less developed countries have a relatively limited capacity to contribute towards peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures;
- The special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security should be borne in mind in connection with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations;
- Where circumstances warrant, the General Assembly should give special consideration to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, and those which are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peacekeeping operation;

Most recently in 2012, by its resolution 67/239, the General Assembly endorsed updated levels of contribution for peacekeeping operations contained in annex II to the Secretary-General's report on the Implementation of General Assembly resolutions 55/235 and 55/236 (A/67/224 and Add.1) and decided to review the structure of levels of contribution for peacekeeping at its seventieth session.

#### *Norway's contributions to MINUSTAH*

1. The contributions are part of Norway's obligatory contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget (according to Art. 17 of the UN Charter). These contributions currently amount to 0.851% of the UN peacekeeping budget and amounted to 0.871% of it before 2013. It is noteworthy that UN peacekeeping budget is different from the UN regular budget.

2. The UN peacekeeping budget is distributed among different peacekeeping missions which have each their own budget. MINUSTAH was representing between 8% and 11% of the UN peacekeeping budget over the period 2010-2012.

3. The calculation (estimation) of Norway's contributions to MINUSTAH is based on the Norway's total contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget and the share that MINUSTAH represents in this budget (e.g. in 2011/12, Norway contributions to MINUSTAH = 0.871% x 10.1% of the UN peacekeeping budget since Minustah was representing 10.1% of the budget in 2011/12).

4. Norway has no direct influence on how much of its contributions is spent specifically on the Haiti peacekeeping operation every year (this depends on the resource allocation between the various peacekeeping missions decided by DPKO/the UN) or on the type of activities financed by this money.

5. The obligatory contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget do not show up on Norwegian aid statistics tool (<http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/norwegian-aid-statistics>) because most of it is not



counted as ODA. According to the OECD regulations, only 7% of Norway's contribution to UN PKO is counted as ODA.

#### 6.4.4.3 NRC

(Main source: 'Norad, 2013: Evaluation of five NRC programmes')

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is the largest Norwegian humanitarian organization, measured by the number of employees. It employs more than 3000 persons and has programme activities in more than 20 countries spread across Africa, Asia, America and Europe. NORCAP, a division of NRC, has some 850 persons on a standby roster who can be deployed on short notice to support the UN and other international organizations. NRC has grown significantly in later years. In 2011, the revenue (and operating costs) exceeded 1,200 million Norwegian Kroner, more than twice the amount in 2006. Such a rapid expansion is in itself a valid reason for an evaluation.

In 2010, 52% of the total funding to NRC was provided by the Norwegian Government. Among other major donors is the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), and there has been a useful cooperation with Sida regarding this evaluation.

NORCAP is funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) and operated by NRC. In 2009, NMFA and NRC entered for the first time into a three year agreement concerning NRC's operation of NORCAP with a financial frame of 240 NOK million (see details provided in the box below on the main scope and objectives of the NRC - MFA agreement).<sup>124</sup>

#### Box 6 Extracts of 2009 framework agreement between NRC and MFA

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), have agreed to establish a platform for cooperation based on the project document concerning financial support to secondment of personnel to the UN and other international organisations, called Norwegian Standby Capacity Programme (hereinafter referred to as NORCAP) for the period of 2009-2011. NORCAP replaces the previous system based on project support to NORSTAFF, NORAFRIC, NORMIDEAST, NORDEM and TIPH and special secondment.

MFA and NRC agree as follows:

##### 1. Scope and Objectives

1.1 This contract (...), establishes NORCAP, consisting of the following separate, but interlinked elements; further described in the project document:

- The Norwegian Emergency standby roster (NORSTAFF)
- The Norwegian Standby roster for civilian observers (NOROBS) The Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM).

This contract sets forth the objectives, scopes, terms and conditions of the cooperation as outlined in the attached Agreed Project Summary in Annex 1 and further described in the Project Document, dated 30 March 2009.

##### 1.2 Goal:

Enhancing the capacity of the UN and international organisations to provide and coordinate international protection and assistance.

Strengthening relations between the UN and the Norwegian society, humanitarian community and Government.

##### 1.3 Purpose

To provide the UN and other requesting agencies with timely deployments of highly qualified personnel, and offer competent advice and assistance to a variety of humanitarian situations, observation of peace keeping, elections and violations of human rights.

5% of NORCAP's budget is allocated to NRC's overall budget and any requests related to the core cost of NORCAP, including request for staff, will need to be negotiated and approved by NRC senior management.

NRC aligns itself closely with Norway's humanitarian policy as expressed in parliamentary report no 40. Support for the UN humanitarian reform process, launched in 2005, lies at the core of this policy. As the majority of NORCAP's contributions are channelled through UN agencies, NORCAP sees the reform process as an important term of reference for its activities.

NRC has most of its project activities in Africa, followed by Asia, MENA and Eastern Europe. The Horn of Africa region received the largest share. During the same period, NRC had secondments in 78 countries. The geographical distribution was different from the project financing, and included Haiti.

<sup>124</sup> A new framework agreement was signed on March 9, 2012.

## 6.5 List of all Norway's supported interventions (2010-2012)

The table below provides the full list of 84 interventions which fall in the scope of the evaluation. It also highlights the interventions covered by the desk study.

Table 17 List of all interventions and desk study sample

Intervention Title	Main implementing organisation	Disbursements ('000 NOK)	(%)	MFA Grant / Agreement nr.	Domain	Covered by desk study
Support via HRF (eight interventions see details above)	World Bank, IADB, UNEP and UNDP	274,000	32.8%	HTI-10/0024 HTI-11/0030	Development	
Global contributions to MINUSTAH	MINUSTAH/ UN-DPKO	117,870	14.1%	HTI-09/0012	Humanitarian	
Disaster Risk Reduction in South Dep. (UNDP)	UNDP	33,000	4.0%	HTI-12/0012	Development	
Global contributions via CERF	CERF	32,500	3.9%	n/a	Humanitarian	
Integrated security and development programme (Viva Rio)	Kirkens Nødhjelp	29,994	3.6%	HTI-10/0029 HTI-11/0021	Development	
UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to UNICEF	UNICEF	28,500	3.4%	HTI-10/0006	Humanitarian	
Humanitarian assistance: water, sanitation and shelter (NCA)	Kirkens Nødhjelp	22,000	2.6%	HTI-10/0002	Humanitarian	
Rapid Deployment of Emergency Hospital (NRX)	Norges Røde Kors	20,000	2.4%	HTI-10/0001	Humanitarian	
Global contributions via NRC	Flyktninghjelpen	16,300	2.0%	09/02194	Humanitarian	
General support to UNDAC and other prevention activities (DSB)	DSB	15,787	1.9%	QZA-12/0254	Humanitarian	
UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to UNDP	UNDP	15,000	1.8%	HTI-10/0013	Humanitarian	
Frontera Verde. Haiti - Dominican Republic (UNDP)	UNDP	15,000	1.8%	HTI-10/0035	Development	
Sustainable Energy programme in South Dep. (UNEP)	UNEP	14,000	1.7%	HTI-12/0011	Development	
Agriculture and Marine programme in South Dep. (UNEP)	UNEP	13,500	1.6%	HTI-12/0013	Development	
Supporting democratic transition and consolidation in Haiti (IDEA)	IDEA	12,000	1.4%	HTI-11/0024 HTI-12/0002	Development	
Establishment of gender crime unit at national police (MINUSTAH)	MINUSTAH/ Norwegian police	11,948	1.4%	HTI-10/0039 HTI-10/0040	Development	
Cuban Medical Brigade in Haiti	Cuban Ministry of Public Health	10,070	1.2%	HTI-10/0004	Humanitarian	
Debt relief Haiti (IFAD)	IFAD	10,040	1.2%	HTI-10/0020	Development	
UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to the OHCHR.	OHCHR	10,000	1.2%	HTI-10/0008	Humanitarian	
UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to WFP	WFP	10,000	1.2%	HTI-10/0009	Humanitarian	
Support to Civil Society Dialogue in Haiti (NDI)	NDI	9,500	1.1%	HTI-11/0027	Development	
UN Flash-appeal (revised) - Contribution to FAO.	FAO	9,000	1.1%	HTI-10/0018	Humanitarian	
Promoting dialogue and citizen participation (NDI)	NDI	9,000	1.1%	HTI-10/0030	Development	
Support to the Mass Media Sector (IMS)	IMS	8,500	1.0%	HTI-11/0018 HTI-10/0019	Development	
UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to UNFPA	UNFPA - UN Population Fund	6,841	0.8%	HTI-10/0007	Humanitarian	

<i>Intervention Title</i>	<i>Main implementing organisation</i>	<i>Disbursements ('000 NOK)</i>	<i>(%)</i>	<i>MFA Grant / Agreement nr.</i>	<i>Domain</i>	<i>Covered by desk study</i>
Debt relief for Haiti (IADB)	IADB	5,386	0.6%	HTI-10/0022	Development	
Cuban Medical Brigade in Haiti in the South Department (Cuba)	Cuban Ministry of Public Health	5,000	0.6%	HTI-12/0010	Development	
Disaster Risk Reduction programme (UNDP)	UNDP	5,000	0.6%	HTI-11/0029	Development	
Support to Youth and Women deputies (NDI)	NDI	4,554	0.5%	HTI-11/0019	Development	
Humanitarian response (Save the children)	Redd Barna Norge	4,500	0.5%	HTI-10/0011	Humanitarian	
Emergency funding for medical intervention in Port au Prince (MSF)	Leger uten grenser Norge	4,200	0.5%	HTI-10/0012	Humanitarian	
Projects in Haiti of Kirkens Nødhjelp (NCA)	Kirkens Nødhjelp	3,800	0.5%	HTI-12/0001	Development	
Women Resource Center South Department Haiti (FED)	FED	3,000	0.4%	HTI-12/0016	Development	
Water and sanitation project (NCA)	Kirkens Nødhjelp	3,000	0.4%	HTI-11/0012	Humanitarian	
Special Adviser to the MFA (NRC)	Flyktninghjelpen	3,000	0.4%	HTI-12/0009	Development	
Cholera outbreak response (NRX)	Norges Røde Kors	3,000	0.4%	HTI-11/0001	Humanitarian	
JPO UNDP - Erlend Wilhelmsen	UNDP	2,924	0.4%	HTI-11/0009	Development	
Support to MISSEH through Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	MISSEH	2,721	0.4%	HTI-11/0006 HTI-10/0028	Development	
Humanitarian action 2011 (MSF)	Leger uten grenser Norge	2,500	0.3%	QZA-11/0708-2	Humanitarian	
Support to Femmes en Démocratie (FED)	FED - Femmes en Democratie	2,500	0.3%	HTI-11/0028 HTI-12/0015	Development	
UN Flash-appeal. Contribution to OCHA.	UNOCHA - UN Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	2,000	0.2%	HTI-10/0010	Humanitarian	
Humanitarian response to cholera in South East Dpt (Save the children)	Redd Barna Norge	2,000	0.2%	HTI-11/0002	Development	
Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Haiti (PRIO)	PRIO - International Peace Research Institute, Oslo	1,997	0.2%	HTI-11/0016	Development	
Representation Haiti expats (NCA)	Norwegian Church Aid - local office	1,818	0.2%	QZA-10/0953-330	Development	
Women's Project Mama Troll (Prosjekt Haiti)	Stiftelsen Prosjekt Haiti	1,500	0.2%	HTI-10/0015 HTI-11/0010 HTI-11/0031	Development	
Support to GARR through Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	GARR - Group for Refugees and Repatriated Persons	1,364	0.2%	HTI-10/0031 HTI-11/0005	Development	
Election observation Haiti	OAS - Organization of American States	1,253	0.2%	HTI-10/0037 HTI-10/0036	Development	
Support to the Observatory of Migrants - OBMICA- via Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	Obmica - Observatory of Migrants in the Caribbean	1,225	0.1%	HTI-10/0026 HTI-11/0003	Development	

<i>Intervention Title</i>	<i>Main implementing organisation</i>	<i>Disbursements ('000 NOK)</i>	<i>(%)</i>	<i>MFA Grant / Agreement nr.</i>	<i>Domain</i>	<i>Covered by desk study</i>
Election observation Haiti - 2nd round 2011	OAS - Organization of American States	1,000	0.1%	HTI-10/0043	Development	
Construction of new school, community centre and health clinic (Prosjekt Haiti)	Stiftelsen Prosjekt Haiti	1,000	0.1%	HTI-11/0011& HTI-11/0032	Humanitarian	
Capacity building of partners (NCA)	Kirkens Nødhjelp	964	0.1%	HTI-10/0034 HTI-11/0007	Development	
FK Norway - personnel exchange - Peace Corps (Tvibit)	Tvibit	957	0.1%	FK10/115601Y-1 FK11/115601Y-1 FK11/115602Y-1 FK12/115602Y-1 FK12/115603Y-1	Development	
Special secondments renewable energy, South region (NRC)	Flyktninghjelpen	900	0.1%	HTI-12/0014	Development	
Haiti Office Wash Norad (NCA)	Norwegian Church Aid - local office	812	0.1%	QZA-10/0953-439	Development	
Green Schools Haiti 2012 Norad (NCA)	Norwegian Church Aid - local office	686	0.1%	QZA-10/0953-440	Development	
Special secondment renewable energy (NRC)	Flyktninghjelpen	600	0.1%	HTI-12/0008	Development	
Support to FONJAFE through Kirkens Nødhjelp (NCA)	Fonjafe	579	0.1%	HTI-10/0025	Development	
Support to MOFECS actions in Cite Soleil (NCA)	MOFECS	518	0.1%	HTI-11/0004 HTI-10/0033	Development	
Support to LWF through Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	LWF - The Lutheran World Federation	500	0.1%	HTI-10/0027	Development	
FA-Stand up against AIDS	Salvation Army - local office	488	0.1%	GLO-07/107-414	Development	
Seminar for journalister på Haiti	TV-stiftelsen Innsikt	471	0.1%	HTI-10/0023	Development	
Environmental sustainability in vulnerable areas, Macaya (NCA)	LWF - The Lutheran World Federation	414	0.0%	QZA-10/0953-388	Development	
Reforestation project (NCA)	LWF - The Lutheran World Federation	395	0.0%	QZA-10/0953-438	Development	
Review democracy support through NDI in Haiti	ILPI - International Law and Policy Institute	295	0.0%	HTI-12/0007	Development	
Haiti Capacity Development Guidance Note	Scanteam AS	199	0.0%	HTI-10/0038	Development	
Data hydropower in South Department Haiti (Sweco)	Sweco Norge AS	186	0.0%	HTI-11/0022	Development	
Youth Parliament - Association des Volontaires pour la Democratie	Association des Volontaires pour la Democratie	120	0.0%	HTI-11/0033	Development	
Assessment clean energy	Optimo Finance AS	103	0.0%	HTI-10/0042	Development	

<i>Intervention Title</i>	<i>Main implementing organisation</i>	<i>Disbursements ('000 NOK)</i>	<i>(%)</i>	<i>MFA Grant / Agreement nr.</i>	<i>Domain</i>	<i>Covered by desk study</i>
FK Norway - personnel exchange - Peace Corps (Norges Fotballforbund)	Norges Fotballforbund	94	0.0%	n/a	Development	
Technical assistance to review hydrology data	Sweco Norge AS	72	0.0%	HTI-12/0006	Development	
FK Norway - personnel exchange - Peace Corps (Prosjekt Haiti)	Prosjekt Haiti	64	0.0%	FK12/119201N	Development	
Michel Forst - Travel expenses to Haiti	Michel Forst	45	0.0%	HTI-11/0015	Development	
Emergency relief (OCHA)	UNOCHA - UN Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs	40	0.0%	HTI-10/0017	Humanitarian	
Legal Review of Power Purchase Agreement	Kjell Haagenen	20	0.0%	HTI-12/0005	Development	



## 7 Annex 7: Decision Review

### 7.1 Decision Overview

The desk-study and subsequent evaluation tried to identify the explicit and/or implicit strategy for Norway's support to Haiti, and examine the key decisions that led to that strategy.<sup>125</sup> For this study, we used a simple definition of 'decision':

*"A choice made between alternative courses of action in a situation of uncertainty."*<sup>126</sup>

The evaluation focused on a few key 'strategic decisions', those which affected the long term composition and performance of the intervention and relate directly to its (explicit or implicit) aims and objectives.<sup>127</sup>

The working hypothesis was that the main overarching strategic decisions in the Norwegian support of Haiti after the earthquake (see below) were made at an early stage, within a few weeks after the earthquake.

The sub-sections below list the key decisions that were identified during the inception phase.

#### 7.1.1 Overarching Policy / Strategic Decisions (N=2)

- Make a swift and substantial contribution to the humanitarian response;
- Make a long(er) term<sup>128</sup> commitment for/in Haiti.

**Decision portfolio:** The following list is a compilation of decisions that support the two main decisions above. They were identified from a systematic review of the 6 July 2010 'Beslutningsnotat' (Decision memo), including decisions from previous official notes thereby reinforced and those newly-made, as well as initial conversations with MFA and Norad stakeholders. During the desk phase, a full-scale in-depth review using the MODEM framework was conducted for most decisions (a detailed description of the MODEM database structure can be found in section 8.4).

#### 7.1.2 Set 'A' Decisions: Thematic Priorities, Volume<sup>129</sup> and Geographical Focus (N=4)

1. Focus on humanitarian action (app. one-quarter of the overall aid portfolio);
2. Focus on 4 thematic areas (1. DRR, 2. Environment, 3. Protection and 4. Governance/Conflict prevention);
3. Focus on 2 cross-cutting issues: capacity building and human rights/equality. Insistence on stronger protection, inclusion and rights;
4. Geographical focus of one region outside Port-au-Prince: *Département du Sud*.

#### 7.1.3 Set 'B' Decisions: Institutional Collaboration: Channels and Partners (N=5)

1. Give priority to multi-lateral channels (e.g., international financial institutions, United Nations, etc.), and in particular strengthen the United Nations (UN);
2. Use the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) as one channel;<sup>130</sup>

<sup>125</sup> MFA describes the medium to longer-term engagement as evolving over time, and currently consisting of the following elements: a.) Geographical concentration in the *Département du Sud*, b.) Support to organizations promoting governance, safety and human rights – National level and c.) South-South Cooperation.

<sup>126</sup> <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/decision.html#ixzz2sXD731RB>

<sup>127</sup> See for example: <http://businesscasestudies.co.uk/npower/developing-people-through-decision-making/strategic-decisions.html#ixzz2uFUNjKVI>. Strategic decisions are usually taken at the highest levels of management and carry higher levels of risk. However, effective strategic decisions bring high levels of reward.

<sup>128</sup> The first references are to an unspecific "long-term" ("*langsiktig*") support. Later 'medium-to-long' term was used, and a 4-year scope was established.

<sup>129</sup> The volume was set at NOK 800 million for 4 years (of which: 200 is for humanitarian and 600 for "medium term support"). Other sub-decisions regarding volume were 1) to grant 200 NOK million to the HRF, which could be increased up to 360 NOK million (as of the Memo of 24/05/2010 "up to 60% of Norwegian support can be channeled through the HRF – including budget support") and 2) To grant 100 NOK million as "budget support" through the HRF.

<sup>130</sup> See Annex 6 for more information on the HRF.

3. Support the following actors in protection (all named in the *Beslutningsnotat*): MINUSTAH<sup>131</sup>, UN country team, Michel Forst<sup>132</sup> (UN expert on human rights), National Democratic Institute<sup>133</sup> (NDI), Frontera Verde<sup>134</sup> and the local media;
4. Collaborate with regional stakeholders (Cuba, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and other regional actors);
5. Participate in 4 international fora: IHRC<sup>135</sup> (Clinton/Bellerive), HRF, UN in Haiti and “Haiti Group of Friends”<sup>136</sup>.

#### 7.1.4 Set ‘C’ Decisions: Approach, Principles & Donorship (N=4)

1. Insist on national (i.e. Haitian) ownership and demand-driven interventions;
2. Good donorship: results-based, transparency, accountability;
3. Aim for coordination (among UN, GoH and donors, also through the UN and in Dept/ du Sud);
4. Support the Ruggie framework using the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights.

#### 7.1.5 Set ‘D’ Decisions: Organisational Setup (N=3)<sup>137</sup>

1. Appoint Special Envoy(s) to Haiti;
2. Appoint a Special Advisor in Haiti;
3. Establish a Haiti team in MFA/Norad.

## 7.2 Overall humanitarian decision making

The decision making for the humanitarian allocations was based on established and agreed upon procedures, guidelines and policies, combined with flexibility and informal communication lines.

The strategies and policies in turn are consistent with international best practices, and are based on experiences from recent comparable disasters (in scope), like the Pakistan earthquake of 2005 and the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004.

The scope of the contribution and the channels was decided on fast and the main bulk of humanitarian aid was allocated within a very short time. The main source for allocations was the UN Flash Appeal under the coordination of OCHA.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, decisions were made between the Humanitarian section and the political leadership. The officials had a high degree of autonomy to propose main principles, channels and allocations, while daily briefings with State Secretary (and numerous others with the Minister) ensured rapid decisions, and also allowed for a consistent strategy.

*Finding: A predefined strategy, guidelines and procedures supported a fast and effective humanitarian decision making.*

<sup>131</sup> Established in 2004 by Sec Council Resolution and present in Haiti for earthquake and cholera response efforts. See: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/>

<sup>132</sup> See UNGA Feb 2013 Report from human Rights Council: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Report%20of%20the%20independent%20expert%20on%20the%20situation%20of%20human%20rights%20in%20Haiti%20Michel%20Forst%20A-HRC-22-65.pdf>. Forst resigned from this position Feb 2013

<sup>133</sup> With support from USAID and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, NDI worked with the Initiative Committees (ICs) to establish 12 citizen-run information centers around the country to serve areas directly damaged by the earthquake and those with large numbers of displaced persons. See: <https://www.ndi.org/haiti>.

<sup>134</sup> The Frontera Verde Project (launched April 2011) is a joint Haiti-Dominican Republic (DR) transboundary project, funded by the Government of Norway and implemented by the GoH, the Government of the DR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNEP. See for more information: <http://www.onu-haiti.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/UNFactsheet-FronteraVerde-FINAL.pdf>

<sup>135</sup> The Interim-Haiti Reconstruction Fund, see for more information: <http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/relief-and-recovery/interim-haiti-recovery-commission/> and google IHRC to review the copious critique of this channel.

<sup>136</sup> OAS established the “Group of Friends on Haiti” in October 2001, with Norway as one member; see: <http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press2002/en/press2001/october01/203.htm>. On January 25, 2010, Canada hosted in Montreal a Ministerial Preparatory Conference with foreign ministers from the Group of Friends of Haiti, major donors and key regional and multilateral partners engaged in Haiti. Norway appears not to have attended. This preparatory conference contributed to establishing a coordinated, clear and common vision within the international community for the early recovery and longer-term reconstruction of Haiti. This meeting was the first step in reaching that goal, and preparing for a larger reconstruction conference on Haiti that was to take place a few months later.

<sup>137</sup> These three features of the institutional setup were referred to in the initial conversations with MFA (5 February).

### 7.3 Deciding on a longer term engagement – January 2010

The intention to engage in a longer term support was announced by the Minister of Development and Environment within days of the earthquake (16 January), and formalised on 28 January. The initiative was the Minister's, who asked the administration to discuss the feasibility and propose elements of a program.

The rationale given for the decision was:

- 'moral/political' due to the scope of the disaster and the vulnerability (fragility) of the country.
- lessons from comparable disasters (e.g., the 2004 Tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake)
- Norway's added value as a 'neutral' donor.

Several of the informants also mentioned the enormous interest and solidarity shown by the Norwegian public to the earthquake victims as an important backdrop to this decision.

*Finding: The decision to engage in a longer term support matched the needs on the ground, and is a sound one according to international standards and recommendations related to support to fragile states. It was certainly timely, as donors usually are criticised for being far too slow in committing and releasing funds for longer-term recovery.*

### 7.4 Defining the longer term commitment – January to July 2010

A first thematic profile of the support was formulated very early (28 of January – only 16 days after the earthquake), and came as a result of internal discussions within MFA sections and external consultations with Norwegian research institutions and NGOs.

It was decided that the Norwegian engagement should focus on 4 thematic areas:

1. Increased resilience to new crises.
2. Environment and reforestation
3. Protection, in particular of women and children
4. Political dialogue, governance and conflict prevention

The preference for channelling support through multi-lateral organisations and multi-donor trust funds was also defined in January 2010.

While there is consensus among stakeholders that these priorities "*made sense*", there is no reference to any specific knowledge base underpinning the analysis and reasoning in this early phase. Some alternative programme areas were briefly discussed, but not assessed in depth. Education was mentioned in one meeting, but immediately taken off the list as some donors (incl. Canada) apparently "*were going big*" in this sector. At this stage, the existing Haiti knowledge within the MFA and its partners was a main source, and even more importantly, the experience from other disasters and fragile states influenced decisions.

In July 2010, the programme was further specified and decided in the decision memo. This memo became the principal document steering the interventions. The memo and decisions were the result of several missions to Haiti, where discussions were held with the Haitian Government at all levels, UN agencies, other donors, international NGOs and civil society representatives. The Post Disaster Needs Assessment and the Haiti Action Plan had been finalised, and were also used.

The scope of the programme – 800 NOK million over four years - was defined by several factors:

- It matched the threshold for donors to become members of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.
- Four years was set as a time frame for donor commitments at the donor conferences, and also fitted the Norwegian Government's period in position (elections in September 2013).
- There would be no permanent Norwegian embassy in Haiti, and Haiti would not become a priority recipient of aid.

The development of this programme was led by a special envoy, who coordinated with the 'Haiti team' that was comprised of representatives from the main MFA sections and Norad. The processes leading up to the decisions were complex and fluid. Rather than setting up goals and defining the best ways to reach them, it was about identifying and strengthening what presented itself as opportunities and interesting partners.

#### *Risk to programming*

There is evidence of a high degree of *awareness* of risks, and that the decision to *accept those risks* was a deliberate one, and taken at the highest political level.

There is evidence of written analyses of the situation in Haiti that include potential obstacles (i.e. risks), e.g. the potential for political instability, weak governance, corruption and lack of inclusion and/or information on the recovery work.

There is also evidence of awareness of Norway's internal weaknesses/vulnerabilities, namely the question whether there was sufficient 'applicable' knowledge, and how to manage such a complex programme without sufficient presence. There were critical voices and their concerns were heard, but the proposed structure was decided to be sufficient.

There are a few examples of what can constitute attempts to *mitigate* risks. For example, the Minister was in dialogue with opposition candidate(s) before the elections to try to avoid setbacks and to ensure continued leadership of the recovery efforts (i.e. Interim Commission.)

There is, however, no evidence of a *documented systematic* risk analysis, and there is little evidence of analyses of *how* risks could affect programs and projects, and how to mitigate specific risks.<sup>138</sup>

## 7.5 Implementing the framework July 2010 – 2012

The priority for the period between July 2010 – 2012 was to make sure that the programme was implemented within the framework set up in the decision memo. Some adaptations and amendments to the overall priorities were seen as necessary, primarily as a consequence of changing conditions on the ground. The change of government in Haiti resulted in the dismantling of the Interim Commission, which also meant that the HRF came to a temporary halt. The strong focus on influencing the international community gradually lost importance, and a shift towards the programme in the South took place.

The composition of the Haiti team changed in August 2010 when a new envoy was appointed and a full time Haiti desk in the MFA's Latin America Section was set up. A model of rotating field presence was established with the MFA's Special Advisor spending 50% of his time in Haiti, while a staff member of the MFA's Peace and Reconciliation Section covered the rest of the time.

The Special Advisor became the main driver behind programme in the South. Decisions and recommendations were taken "organically" between the Special Advisor and the representative of the Haiti desk, often while travelling together in the field. Top level is kept informed through yearly updates, with proposed further plans. In 2010 and 2011, there were three Minister level visits.

By end 2011, the team was further reduced to two persons, the Haiti desk and the Special Advisor in Haiti; with the embassy in Havana supporting with regular visits. Most of the programmatic decisions and recommendations were taken "organically" within the team, often while travelling to the field together. The Norwegian government was kept informed through yearly updates on activities, programmes and disbursements, with proposed further plans, but little to no reference to objectives and results.

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<sup>138</sup> The e-survey shows that the informants have somewhat divergent opinions on this issue, as 50% perceive the Norwegian aid structure to be risk willing with systematic and documented risk analysis, while the rest either think it is informal or non-existent.

## 8 Annex 8: Instruments for compilation and collection

Throughout the evaluation process, different instruments were used in order to cover all possible sources of information in an exhaustive manner and to allow triangulation of the collected data. Furthermore, answering to the two different purposes of the evaluation, separate tools were developed for the two components.

### 8.1 Sampling frame for intervention / decisions to review, interviews and site visits

With such a complex and large programme, it was not possible to analyse in-depth every grant or decision made, nor to exchange with every implementing actor (i.e. of programmatic grants) or every key decision maker (i.e. influencing the process analysis). For this reason, it was crucial to choose the cases carefully. Cases were sampled for both programme and process analyses as follows (see also Table 18):

- **Part A/Programme**
  - Sample 1: Out of the 84 identified interventions, **27 were proposed as our sample for the desk study (Meta-Analysis)**. These interventions were chosen because they each represent over 1% of the total volume of Norwegian funding to Haiti. In the desk phase, the in-depth systematic review of the 27 interventions reflected 90% of the portfolio's total value while examining documents reflecting on the efforts of 19 different entities. See section 6.5. for the details of this sample.
  - Sample 2: Near the end of the desk study, **a second sample of interventions** was developed to produce and organise logistics for a list of interviews in the field-work portion in Haiti (Port au Prince and *Département du Sud*). The field interviews were sampled from both grant managers/implementers and expected 'beneficiaries' of the efforts; the latter including central and local government authorities as well as communities. This sample was chosen to validate the desk study findings, to carefully triangulate among varied sources, and also for their ability to fill gaps identified during the desk study. The interviews in Haiti reflected more than the set of 27 interventions when appropriate and deemed useful.
  - Sample 3: A list of **questions with survey-type answers** was sent to all interviewees / informants prior to meeting them (along with the meeting request/confirmation, and either provided already completed to the team or completed during the interview). The detailed questions of the survey can be found in section 8.3.
  - Sample 4: Finally, a smaller number of representative grants formed the basis for the **site visits**. The final set of criteria was decided during the desk phase based on the review of available documentation. Criteria included: potential to help fill data gaps, geographical focus, type of implementing organisation, priority focus, etc.
  - Sample 5: Recruitment of respondents from **'beneficiary' government entities and communities** for each planned field visits is equally important. At the community level, it was crucial to make sure that respondents included diversity: women, youth, marginalised groups and the most vulnerable (but specifically, if they were targeted as project 'beneficiaries'). To obtain these recruits transparently, the Haitian member of the team followed acceptable social norms to identify and organise meetings with the right profiles of people.
- **Part B/Process**
  - An inventory of decisions has been developed (see section 7.1) and includes 18 decisions.
  - From this set, certain decisions were featured and explored in-depth through available documentation (exchanges, reports, communications, etc.).
  - From a subset of the above, interviews and surveys were targeted at decision makers and entities who may or should have made and/or benefited from the decisions. Most of them were invited to complete a short opinion survey. The detailed questions of the online survey can be found in section 8.5



Table 18 Sampling overview

	<b>Part A/Programme</b>	<b>Part B/Process</b>
Sample 1: Database Cases for In-depth Review during Desk Phase (Meta-Analysis)	27 of the 84 interventions	All of the 18 decisions
Sample 2: Cases for "Field" Interviews	Subset of approximately 12 entities in Haiti, excluding humanitarian response: a.) Management / Implementation and b.) 'Beneficiaries'.	Subset of (in Oslo): a.) Decision makers and b.) Actors likely affected by the decisions
Sample 3: Survey	Same as above	E-survey, with 20 people invited to complete out of which 15 completed the survey
Sample 4: Site Visits	Choice of 3-5 sites to visit outside PaP	N/A
Sample 5: Recruitment	List of respondents (Titles / Profiles) at government and community level at each of above sites	N/A

## 8.2 Part A: Meta-Analysis / Database Structure for Desk Study

The information collected during the desk study (focusing on a sample of interventions) were organised in a systematic manner in a structured database. The data was summarised around the dimensions listed in the table below. For triangulation purposes, the data of sampled interventions was coded by two or three evaluators separately and later compared. A scoring system allowed synthesising the evidence collected for certain dimensions in order to facilitate analyses/comparisons across interventions and dimensions.

Table 19 Database structure for meta-analysis conducted during the desk study

<b>Item</b>	<b>Coding/description</b>
a. What is the geographical focus?	<i>Coding for categories (categories: South, other)</i>
b. What are the main objectives?	<i>Short description, coding (as is possible)</i>
c. Quality of project design; to what extent is this design likely to achieve the stated objectives?	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
d. Success in meeting objectives?	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 3)</i>
e. Who are the main target beneficiaries?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: government, communities, associations/NGOs, households, individuals, other)</i>
f. Targeting of the poor/most vulnerable and targeting of women and youth	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
g. Who are the main secondary stakeholders?	<i>Coding for categories (categories: directions départementales, communes/ municipalities, associations de professionnels, NGOs, other)</i>
h. (Likely) effects on the reduction in disaster risk	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
i. (Likely) effects on better management of natural resources / environment	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
j. (Likely) effects on access to clean energy	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
k. (Likely) effects on increased purchasing power	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
l. (Likely) effects on issues related to protection	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
m. (Likely) effects on issues related to reduced human rights violations (including decreased sexual and gender based violence)	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
n. (Likely) effects on governance, democracy/participation and dialogue	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
o. (Likely) effects on capacity development and application of capacity development principles	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
p. (Likely) effects on meeting basic needs	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
q. Explicit mention of integration of lessons learnt from previous experience (Norway interventions or other)	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>

<i>Item</i>	<i>Coding/description</i>
r. Visibility of unintended contributions	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5) and short description</i>
s. Likelihood of sustainability of results	<i>Scoring on a scale (1 to 5)</i>
t. Relation to international aid effectiveness	<i>Short description</i>
u. Link to Norway strategic (or other) decisions	<i>Short description</i>
Note: debt relief and budget support operations are special cases not included in meta-analysis	

### 8.3 Part A: Survey Tool

The following survey was made available both in hard copies to respondents in Haiti and/or electronically to managers in partner organisations implementing or having implemented activities in Haiti. The questions were formulated based on the desk phase research. The survey contained two parts; one for all respondents and one referring specifically to actions financed by Norway.

#### NORVEGE EN HAÏTI, 2010-13; Partie A: TOUS LES REpondANTS

1. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous familier avec la Norvège en tant que donateur en Haïti, de 2010 à 2013?

	Pas de Tout .....Très
[Cercle un]	0 1 2 3 4 5

2. Quelle est votre expérience avec la Norvège en tant que donateur à Haïti ?

[Cercle un] a. Aucune b. Bénéficiaire c. Partenaire d. Autre .....

3. Si vous deviez décrire vos impressions de la Norvège en tant que donateur en Haïti en un seul mot, que serait-il?

.....

4. Dans quelle mesure la Norvège a-t-elle appuyé le Gouvernement Haïtien entre 2010-13?

	Pas de Tout.....Substantielle ment
[Cercle r un]	0 1 2 3 4 5

Expliquer votre réponse:.....

.....

5. Dans quelle mesure la Norvège a-t-elle influencé l'efficacité de l'aide internationale à Haïti entre 2010-2013 en général?

	Pas de Tout.....Substantielle ment
[Cercle r un]	0 1 2 3 4 5

Expliquer votre réponse:.....

.....

6. Quelles sont les avantages comparatifs de l'appui de la Norvège (par rapport à d'autres bailleurs)?

.....

7. Selon vous, dans quelle mesure les éléments suivants sont-ils vus comme une priorité pour Haïti par la Norvège:

	[Cercle] Ne sais pas (NSP), Pas du tout (0), Forte priorité (5)
a. Réduction des risques de catastrophes / prévention / préparation	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
b. Gestion des ressources naturelles / environnement	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
c. Protection des femmes et des enfants	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
d. Gouvernance / dialogue	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
e. Droits de l'homme	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
f. Renforcement des capacités : l'Etat (national/local)	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
g. Renforcement capacités : acteurs locaux/organisations de base	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
h. Développement du département du Sud	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
i. Coopération horizontale / sud-sud	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
j. Etre un "bon" donneur et efficace	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5
k. Autre: .....	NSP 0 1 2 3 4 5

7. Y a-t-il des mesures ou des projets financés et/ou encouragés par la Norvège en Haïti qui ont été particulièrement bien réussis et durables? [Cercle un] Non / Oui, expliquer.....

.....

8. Y a-t-il des mesures ou des projets financés et/ou encouragés par la Norvège en Haïti qui ont été particulièrement critiqués? [Cercle un] Non / Oui, expliquer.....

.....

9. Quelles leçons peut-on dégager pour de futur appui de la Norvège?

.....

## PARTIE B: QUESTIONS SPECIFIQUES AUX EFFORTS FINANCES PAR LA NORVEGE

Nom du/des projets : .....

QUESTIONS	REPONSE [Entourer et écrire]
1. Dans quelle mesure les interventions appuyées par la Norvège ont-elles atteintes (ou ont des chances d'atteindre) les <u>objectifs</u> initiaux prévus lors de la conception de vos projets ?	(Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)
2. Quelles ont été, à ce jour, les principaux <u>effets</u> des interventions appuyées par la Norvège ?	
3. Dans quelle mesure la conception des interventions appuyées intègre-t-elle une attention spécifique aux questions de <u>renforcement des capacités</u> ? →Connaissez-vous les lignes directrices sur le <u>renforcement des capacités</u> préparées par Norad en 2010? Si oui, dans quelles mesures la conception des interventions reprend-elle les principes qui y sont énoncés?	(Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)  Non / Oui (Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)
4. Dans quelle mesure les interventions appuyées par la Norvège ont-elles donné une attention spéciale aux <u>populations les plus vulnérables</u> et aux questions de <u>droit de l'homme</u> ? Avec quel effet ?	(Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)  (Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)
5. Dans quelle mesure la conception des interventions intègre-t-elle une dimension spécifique portant sur la problématique du <u>genre</u> ? Avec quel effet ?	(Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)  (Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)
6. Dans quelle mesure la conception des interventions appuyées intègre-t-elle des <u>leçons</u> d'expériences similaires passées?	(Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte)
7. Quels types de <u>mécanismes de suivi</u> ont été mis en place pendant la mise en œuvre ?	
8. Est-ce que des <u>synergies</u> sont observables entre l'intervention appuyée et d'autres interventions dans le secteur (ou dans d'autre secteur)? Des liens existent-ils avec d'autres interventions ou d'autres acteurs financés par la Norvège ?	Non / Oui, expliquer...
9. Dans quelle mesure les interventions appuyées par la Norvège ont-elles contribué à renforcer le <u>leadership</u> du GdH dans le secteur et l' <u>appropriation</u> des actions par les parties prenantes nationales ?	
10. Peut-on observer des <u>conséquences potentielles imprévues</u> (positives ou négatives) liées aux interventions appuyées par la Norvège (p. ex. sur la capacité institutionnelle de certaines parties	Non / Oui, expliquer...

prenantes ou les dynamiques politiques locales et régionales) ?	
11. Quelles ont été les principaux <u>facteurs de réussite</u> et les principaux <u>facteurs de blocage</u> des interventions soutenues?	
12a. Quelle est la <u>durabilité</u> des effets des interventions soutenues? 12b. Quelles en sont les principaux éléments déterminants ?	(Pas de tout) 0 1 2 3 4 5 (Forte) expliquer...
13. Pendant leur mise en œuvre, les interventions soutenues ont-elles bénéficié d' <u>autres appuis de la Norvège</u> (appui technique, facilitation au niveau politique, etc.) au-delà du financement des activités ?	Non / Oui, expliquer...



## 8.4 Part B: MODEM / Database Structure for Desk Study

The information collected during the study regarding decisions were organised in a systematic manner in a structured database. The data was summarised around the dimensions listed in the table below.

Table 20 Database structure for MODEM-analysis conducted during the desk study

<i>Item</i>	<i>Coding/Description</i>
Identify the decision topic/name	<i>Open answer</i>
Cite main sources in a specific way so that another evaluator can find them and reconstruct the logic	<i>Open answer</i>
What type of decision was this?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: policy, strategic, programmatic, other)</i>
What/who is the decision expected to affect most?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: systems, people, tasks)</i>
Decision date	<i>Date</i>
Who were the lead decision makers?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: persons (who?), office/unit)</i>
Which institutions made the decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories : MFA, Norad, other)</i>
Were the appropriate stakeholders involved in the decision making?	<i>Yes, no, explain weaknesses</i>
What info/event(s) led to the need for this decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: request/proposal, info on problem, other)</i>
Estimate the length of time between problem appearance and decision	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: intermediate, short, medium, long)</i>
Which decision making process seems to have been employed in this decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: management science approach, Carnegie model (uncertainty, conflict, coalition, satisficing), incremental decision model (identification, development, selection, other)</i>
What values did the exchanges leading to this decision reflect most?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: culture, norms, identity, visibility, other)</i>
How strong was the organisational consensus on the problem/trigger for the decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: strong, medium, weak)</i>
How strong was the organisational consensus on the decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: strong, medium, weak)</i>
How strong is the commitment to follow through?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: strong, medium, weak)</i>
What methods/resources are made available to implement this decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: human, financial, other)</i>
What elements were used to come to the main decisions?	<i>Coding for categories. Coded categories: no evidence base found, requests by Haitian entities, directives by Norwegian entities, informal information from actors (any), internal (Norwegian) exchanges (emails, mission summaries, etc.), formal/published report (evaluations, etc.)</i>
How reliable and meaningful is the information that led to the decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: high, medium, low)</i>
Were there any issues regarding timeliness of the evidence (i.e. a decision had to be made regardless)?	<i>Yes, no, explain</i>
How well is the decision aligned with Norwegian policies and strategies?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: high, medium, low)</i>
How clearly was the problem statement that led to this decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: high, moderate, low)</i>
Is there evidence for the articulation of arguments and reasoning?	<i>Yes, no, explain which</i>

<i>Item</i>	<i>Coding/Description</i>
Were alternative courses of action identified that are significantly different from one another, creative and realistic?	Yes, no, explain
Were there alternatives evaluated appropriately: risk/return?	Yes, no, explain
Is there sufficient evidence for this decision being a result of learning?	Yes, no, explain
Which factors (if any) appear to have weighed most heavily in this decision?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: political interests of Norway, institutional interests in Norway, changes in institutions that occurred in the same period (specify Norwegian or Haitian), changes in politics that occurred in the same period, advice from Norad)</i>
What factors made this decision most influential?	<i>Coding for categories (coded categories: timing, scope, visibility)</i>
Where there any unanticipated effects/impacts?	Yes, no, explain
Note: categories might have been widened during the analysis	

## 8.5 Part B: Survey Tool

The following survey was made available electronically to 20 stakeholders from the MFA and Norad that were or are actively involved in Norway's support to Haiti. The questions were formulated based on the desk phase research, information collected via interviews as well as through a stakeholder workshop that took place during the desk phase. The response rate was 75% (15 respondents).

### Evaluation of Norway's support to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake - Survey

#### General

1) Please indicate your engagement with Norway's Haiti assistance:  
(Multiple answers possible)

MFA

Norad

Part of the Haiti core team

Management responsibilities

Advisory role

Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

#### Intended achievements

2) What did Norway intend to achieve through its support to Haiti 2010-2013 in the medium/long-term? (Please read all before choosing and ranking the three (3) answers that most closely reflect your perception.)

#### Additional

explanation:

- The list below includes intentions at various scales, as expressed in literature and interviews.
- Please do not focus on your preference of how aid objectives should be formulated. Rather, we are asking here about the genuine intentions of Norway, as you remember them.
- The focus on one region (*Département du Sud*) is understood as a method used, not as an aim in and of itself.

- Haiti is in the driver's seat of its own development and reconstruction
- Haiti's state institutions are reinforced (state building)
- Haiti has a sustainable basis for development (i.e. building back better)
- Haitian communities are more resilient and livelihoods strengthened (i.e. Disaster Risk Reduction)
- Haiti is better prepared to manage future disasters

- Haiti's natural resources are protected and/or reinforced
- Destructive influence of natural hazards is reduced in Haiti (i.e. disaster mitigation through gabions, reforestation, etc.)
- Vulnerable individuals/groups in Haiti are better protected
- Violence in Haiti is prevented and stability maintained
- Human rights in Haiti are promoted/protected
- Political climate in Haiti is enhanced, with dialogue strengthened and/or reconciliation across political parties
- International coordination of Haiti's reconstruction is strengthened
- Haiti experiences a smooth transition from earthquake response to development
- Norway is recognized as a good donor
- Regional (Caribbean/Latin American) cooperation is enhanced
- Other (please specify below)

If you chose "Other" above:

Please provide an intention that is succinct, concrete and measurable, rather than a list of vague concepts:

---

3) Norway's contribution to the intended achievements chosen above

In your opinion, to what extent has Norway contributed to achieving your first choice from above?

Fully, to a great extent, somewhat, not at all, I don't know

In your opinion, to what extent has Norway contributed to achieving your second choice from above?

*Fully, to a great extent, somewhat, not at all, I don't know* In your opinion, to what extent has Norway contributed to achieving your third choice from above?

Fully, to a great extent, somewhat, not at all, I don't know

Please explain your answer from above:

---

4) In your opinion, what were or could potentially be the main detriments to the lack of success with regards to the intended achievements?

*(Multiple answers possible)*

Design: \_\_\_\_\_

Implementation: \_\_\_\_\_

Factors outside of Norway's control: \_\_\_\_\_

Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

Coherence

5) To what extent do you regard the Haiti programme 2010-2013 as being generally in line with established priorities, policies and strategies for Norwegian (or general donor) development aid?

Answer option for each document: Fully, to a great extent, somewhat, not at all, I don't know, I am not familiar with this policy/priority; please explain.

- Norwegian Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation (2006)
- Norway Humanitarian Policy (2008-2013)
- Norwegian Policy on the Prevention of Humanitarian Crises (2008, White Paper)
- Climate, Conflict and Capital. Norwegian development policy adapting to change (2009, White Paper)
- Women, Peace and Security: Norway's strategic plan (2011-2013)
- Norway: Action Plan for Women's Rights and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (2007-2013)

- Norway: Towards greener development: A coherent environmental and development policy (2011, White Paper)
- Norway and the United Nations: Common Future, Common Solutions (2012, White Paper)
- Norway: Sharing for prosperity: Promoting democracy, fair distribution and growth in development policy (2013, White Paper)
- Norway: 10 Principles of Capacity Building in Haiti (Guidance Note: Reconstruction and Long-term Capacity Development in Haiti 2010)
- OECD – Principles for good international engagement in fragile states & situations (2007)

#### Decision making

6) In your opinion, what factor weighed most heavily in Norwegian decisions regarding the overall objectives and components of the programme?

*(Please choose only the most important one)*

- Needs of the most vulnerable / poorest in Haiti
- Haitian governmental plans and requests
- International visibility
- Political interests of Norway
- Institutional interests in Norway
- Experience gained from Norway's support of other crises
- Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_
- I don't know

Please explain your answer from above:

---

7) Influential factors: To what extent do you feel that Norway's overall support of Haiti after the earthquake...

Answer option for each item: Fully, to a great extent, somewhat, not at all, I don't know; please explain.

- ...reflected political interests of Norway?
- ...reflected institutional interests in Norway?
- ...responded to changes in Haitian institutions that occurred in the same period?
- ...responded to changes in Norwegian institutions that occurred in the same period?
- ...adapted to relevant changes in Haitian politics that occurred in the same period?
- ...adapted to relevant changes in Norwegian politics that occurred in the same period?
- ...was influenced by inputs from the Haitian government?
- ...was influenced by inputs from other stakeholders in the programme?
- ...took account of reviews / evaluations during the same period?
- ...applied a learning by doing approach in programming / planning?
- ...applied a learning by doing approach in implementation?
- ...considered advice from Norad?

8) In your opinion, how did Norway handle risks to its programmes in Haiti?

- Norway is 'risk adverse'
- Norway is 'risk willing' with documented risk analysis and risk mitigation procedures
- Norway is 'risk willing' with informal and / or ad hoc risk analysis and risk mitigation
- Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

Please explain your answer from above:

---

#### Institutional setup

9) How would you describe the learning systems and learning culture in the Norwegian aid system?  
(Multiple answers possible)

- A coherent system of learning processes and practices
- Based on personalised experiences
- Informal and ad hoc exchange of experience and lessons learned
- Systematic use of evaluations and lessons learned documents
- Ad hoc use of evaluations and lessons learned documents
- Systematic sharing of experiences
- Ad hoc sharing of experiences
- Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

Please explain your answer from above:

---



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10) How would you best describe the organisational culture in the MFA?  
(Please limit your choice to two answers)

- Un-bureaucratic
- Strict adherence to policies and strategies
- Flexible, informal decision-making
- Hierarchical
- Risk adverse
- Innovative
- Based on personalised experience
- Other, please specify: \_\_\_\_\_

Please explain your answer from above:

---



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11) To what extent do you regard the working relation between the MFA and Norad as adequate, predictable and clear when it comes to roles and responsibilities?

Fully, to a great extent, somewhat, not at all, I don't know

Please explain your answer from above:

---



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12) In your perception, to what extent were the different elements of the institutional setup for Haiti between 2010 and 2013 adequate to achieve the desired impact?

Answer option for each item: Fully, to a great extent, somewhat, not at all, I don't know; please explain.

- Number of dedicated personnel
- Cooperation and coordination between involved units (MFA sections, Norad, Embassy)
- Presence in Haiti
- Knowledge base: information available regarding the evolving situation

13) In hindsight, what are the lessons that Norway could learn from its choices regarding the support provided to Haiti?

In terms of geographic priority:

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In terms of sector priorities:

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Related to choice of institutions to collaborate with:

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Other, please specify:

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14) Do you think it was a good decision for Norway to engage in Haiti with a longer-term programme?

Yes  No

Please explain your answer from above:

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Other

15) Please indicate any other remarks or comments that you may have:

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## 8.6 Part B: Stakeholder workshop in Oslo, Norway

In order to gain information to feed into the answer to the first overall question “***EQ. What was the intended overall impact of the Norwegian support to Haiti from 2010-2012?***”, a workshop with available key stakeholders from the Norwegian MFA and Norad was held in Norad premises in April 2014 in order to explore the main stakeholders’ perceptions of Norway’s intended achievements of its support to Haiti right after the earthquake as well as in the longer term. The findings were later used as a basis for a part of the E-survey sent to a larger group of Norwegian stakeholders (a detailed description of the E-survey can be found in Annex 8).

The following stakeholders were present:

- Tom Edvard Eriksen (MFA)
- Evelyn Hoen (Norad)
- Kristin Hoem Langsholt (MFA)
- Halvor Sætre (MFA)
- Eva Irene Tuft (MFA).

## 8.7 Part A and B: Systematic Literature Review

For both parts of the evaluation, a systematic literature review (SLR) was conducted in order to dissect information on the Norwegian support to Haiti and the Haitian national context from Norwegian and Haitian strategy documents, programme documents, evaluations and reviews related to Norwegian assistance, reviews and studies carried out by other donors, academic research as well as relevant press releases and articles. An SLR is a systematic and very structured review of available literature, whereby available documents are compared against specified criteria.

For Part B, the SLR took place with the help of the MODEM database described in detail in section 8.4.

For Part A, almost 40 non-project documents were analysed. They were compared against the evaluation questions and their specific indicators and summarised in an Excel grid in order to make them accessible to the whole team, so the gathered knowledge could be used by all team members during the writing process. The documents that were screened for Part A were the following:

- Barjon, Régine (2011): Effectiveness of Aid in Haiti and How Private Investment Can Facilitate the Reconstruction. Written Statement of Régine Barjon to the U.S Senate Subcommittees hearing entitled "Rebuilding Haiti in the Martelly Era".
- Bell, Beverly (2013): Fault Lines - Views across Haiti's Divide.
- Bhattacharjee, Abhijit/ Lossio, Roberta (2011): Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake.
- Carment, David/ Samy, Yiagadeesen (2010): Haiti without Tears: Getting Aid Right.
- Chen, Michelle (2010): The Total Failure of Global Aid in Haiti.
- Collier, Paul (2009): Haiti: From Natural Catastrophe to Economic Security. A Report for the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
- Eggen, Øyvind/ Roland, Kjell (2013): Western Aid at a Crossroads: The End of Paternalism.
- Farmer, Paul (2012): Haiti after the earthquake.

- Government of Haiti (2010): Plan d'action pour le relèvement et le développement d'Haïti (PARDH). Les grands chantiers pour l'avenir.
- Government of Haiti (2012): Fonds de Reconstruction d'Haïti. De la Mobilisation de Ressources aux Résultats. Rapport Annuel 2011/2012.
- Heine, Jorge/ Thompson, Andrew S. (2011): Fixing Haiti. MINUSTAH & Beyond.
- Herard, Dimmy (2012): Disaster Risk Reduction and the Action Plan for National Recovery and the Development of Haiti.
- ILPI (2012): Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Norad Report 8/2012 Discussion.
- ILPI (2013): Review of three Programmes for Natural Resource Management and Disaster Risk Reduction in Departement du Sud, Haiti. Final report. Norad Report 12/2013.
- Katz, Jonathan M. (2010): The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save haiti and Left Behind a Disaster.
- Kaufmann, Daniel (2010): Beyond Emergency Relief for Haiti: The Challenge of Effective Development Assistance.
- Langmore, John/ Egeland, Jan (2011): Learning from Norway: Independent middle-power foreign policy. Griffith Review 32 (2011), p. 164-179.
- Le Groupe-conseil baastel s.p.r.l. (2009): Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998-2008. Evaluation Report 05/2009.
- Norad (2010): Guidance Note: Reconstruction and Long-term Capacity Development in Haiti. Norad Report 23/2010 Discussion.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012): Report to teh Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) on Policy Coherence for Development 2011.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008): Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009): Norway's Humanitarian Policy.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010): Konkretisering av norsk engasjement for gjenoppbygging av Haiti. Beslutningsnotat. 06.07.2010.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010): Rapport fra besøket til Den dominikanke republikk 31.05.-08.06.2010.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010): Rapport fra FN's givskonferanse til Haiti 31. Mars i New York.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011): Women, Peace and Security: Norway' Strategic Plan 2011-13. 2011 Progress Report.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011): Women, Peace and Security: Norway' Strategic Plan 2011-13. 2011 Progress Report.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012): Terms of Reference for the Secondment to Haiti Special Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Joel Boutroue. Phase II August 2012 - December 2013.
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013): Haiti – status tre år etter jordskjelvet og videre innretting av Norges engasjement. 19.03.2013.
- OECD (2013): OECD Development Co-operation Peer Review Norway 2013.
- Ramachandran, Vijaya/ Walz, Julie (2012): Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?. CGD Policy Paper 004.
- Riddell, Rober C. (2007): Aid architecture and aid effectiveness - challenges to Norway.
- Scanteam (2010): Norwegian humanitarian response to natural disasters. Case of Haiti Earthquake January 2010. Norad Report 9/2010 Discussion.
- Schuller, Mark (2012): Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs.
- Stoianova, Velina (2010): Donor funding in Haiti. Assessing humanitarian needs after the 2010 Haiti earthquake.
- Yamashiro Fordelone, Talita (2009): Triangular Co-operation and Aid Effectiveness.

## 9 Annex 9: Key lessons of evaluations of the humanitarian response to the earthquake

This Annex summarises some of the main lessons of four major evaluations covering the international humanitarian response given to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti.

### *Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti - 3 months after. (March 2010)*

The Government of Haiti (GoH) and many international actors, particularly the United Nations, were both victims of the disaster and actors in the response. This affected all control and command mechanisms at the central level.

Despite the quick mobilization of aid, the quality of the achievements was drastically affected by serious constraints linked to the magnitude of the disaster, the uncontrollable flow of frequently inexperienced small NGOs, the inappropriateness of many practices in urban contexts, and weak global leadership. The RTE found that the response to the earthquake between January and April 2010 was a missed opportunity to translate the quick setting up of cluster coordination and the availability of substantial resources in the form of money, military assets and staff into timely results.

Several critical points should be underlined in particular:

- The weakness of the humanitarian leadership;
- The limited collaboration between international actors and national institutions at both national and decentralised levels;
- The difficulties encountered in establishing an appropriate system for collecting and analysing data in order to provide decision-makers with information in a timely manner;
- The difficulties encountered by the humanitarian system due to the urban setting.
- The departure of many experienced Haitians for the US or Canada within a few days of the disaster left the country with depleted levels of competent human resources and the arrival of members of the Diaspora was not enough to make up for this loss.

Key humanitarian actors recognised these shortcomings and worked hard to improve the response by strengthening humanitarian leadership and local ownership, increasing coverage and preparing for the upcoming hurricane season.

Taking into account experiences from earlier disasters, six key lessons can be drawn from the Haiti experience for future large-scale disasters:

- Get the analysis right. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs, in cooperation with donors, should strive to carry out a comprehensive “diagnosis” of a humanitarian situation
- Get the paradigms right. The humanitarian community, including the United Nations, NGOs, the Red Cross movement, donors, policy makers and academics need to challenge a series of paradigms that distort the way aid functions
- Get the resources right. Humanitarian organizations and donors need to ensure that the right resources are available at the right time.
- Get the coordination right. There is a need to better manage the influx of a large number of agencies. The Emergency Relief Coordinator and global clusters need to support the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team to build up a cluster system that is compatible with local coordination structures. At a strategic level, proper articulation of country, regional and global decision-making levels is essential in order to avoid confusion and weakened accountability.
- Get the communication right. Two specific communication actions are essential: communication with the affected population; communication with donors.
- Get the leadership right. The Haiti response shows that leadership remains an important issue for humanitarian reform. There are key examples in the Haiti response that demonstrate the importance of strong leadership, for example the Health and Food Clusters (UN leadership), WASH (national leadership), and the political and military branches of the UN mission. Best practice exercises between cluster lead agencies and between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and OCHA could help to identify success factors and good practice.

### *Evaluation of OCHA Response to the earthquake (September 2010)*

Despite the fact that the UN system including OCHA was very badly affected by the emergency, they were operational and contributed to the humanitarian response quickly. UNDAC arrived within 24 hours of the emergency, and OCHA mobilised key staff from all departments in New York, Geneva and the regional office in Panama to support the badly affected OCHA country office. Coordination and leadership were

challenges from the beginning in the chaotic circumstances where much of local capacity had been destroyed or disrupted, and thousands of humanitarian and faith-based organisations arrived on the scene to provide relief to the affected communities.

The response to the earthquake in the first three months was successful in quickly mobilising aid, setting up cluster coordination and mobilising important resources in the form of funds, military assets and staff. However, weak humanitarian leadership and lack of local ownership, the humanitarian sector's difficulty in preparing for and responding to an urban disaster, as well as a weak assessment of the humanitarian situation and needs delayed the response and led to important gaps in geographical and sector-based coverage. In specific terms, some of the key achievements of OCHA were as follows:

(a) The speed of disbursement and volume of funds were critical factors in the response. The Central Emergency Fund (CERF) and the Flash Appeal based primarily on estimates and assumptions provided by field staff was rapidly prepared and launched by headquarters three days after the earthquake. The appeal was quickly funded by donors.

(b) In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, international Search and Rescue (SAR) teams began to arrive. A total of 26 SAR teams were in the country by 15 January who rescued a total of 134 people, the highest number of live rescues by international SAR teams ever recorded.

(c) From the time of the earthquake up until the end of the declared 'OCHA Corporate Response' (12 Jan – 12 Mar) a total of 87 emergency deployments of humanitarian coordination personnel were made through OCHA-managed mechanisms to deal with the response – the deployments were made in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Miami and Washington (latter two for liaison with US authorities).

(d) All of the above enabled OCHA to facilitate and support a massive mobilisation of humanitarian response by the international community for delivery of assistance in very difficult circumstances: in the first six months of the response, 4 million people were provided with food aid; 1.2 million people provided access to safe water daily; 1.5 million people received emergency shelter materials; 2.1 million household received Non-Food Items (NFIs); 11,000 latrines installed; and over half a million children and pregnant/lactating mothers received supplementary feeding, as a result of the collective humanitarian effort. (IASC, 6 Months Report).

*Detailed findings on coordination:*

Despite the chaos that followed the earthquake and with the arrival of hundreds of organisations on the scene, OCHA was able to rapidly put in place mechanism for coordination of all humanitarian players. Deployment of senior staff from the region and UNDAC team within the first 24 hours enabled OCHA to undertake this. Although clusters were activated within the first three days, it took about 2-3 weeks for all clusters to become functional. OCHA coordinated well at the operational level. However, inter-cluster coordination remained weak. Linking coordination at national level to those happening at local level remains an issue.

Furthermore, since Port-au-Prince (PaP) had a large concentration of humanitarian organisations spread over several departments in the city, more localised coordination structures closer to the point of action would have helped overcome the problems of access to log base and overcrowding in meetings. The interface between clusters and government-led coordination mechanisms remain weak and there is no clear guidance on how the two will relate to each other and ensure coherence between humanitarian response and recovery/development work.

On the issue of coordinating with military, especially in non-conflict countries like Haiti, the humanitarian community appears to have varied interpretation of the 'principle of last resort' for use of military and civil defence assets under the Oslo guidelines. One additional factor complicating OCHA's role has been the relationship between OCHA's humanitarian mandate and the mission's (MINUSTAH) long term role in the country. Clear guidance does not exist which clarify how in times of major crises which warrants

***Independent review of Unicef's operational response to the earthquake  
(February 2011)***

UNICEF's early response to be marked by rapid reaction in the earthquake's immediate aftermath, followed by inconsistent performance soon thereafter. UNICEF-led clusters were activated immediately but, with the exception of the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cluster, their leadership remained weak and unclear. Programmatically, some sectors delivered critical interventions quickly – if not entirely to scale – even in areas where UNICEF's work had been negligible beforehand. Notable examples include its timely mobilization in water delivery and its key role in the reopening of schools and ensuring that these were well stocked with supplies. In contrast, sanitation solutions were expensive and ineffective in what was a largely urban disaster – something most humanitarian agencies had little previous experience of.

In addition, UNICEF's stance on child protection in Haiti, nuanced and outspoken before the quake, became muddled in the immediate aftermath and the organization was unable to break through early on and seize the debate. Effective action on gender-based violence was stymied by the fact that this issue is not yet

sufficiently integrated or mainstreamed into UNICEF's work in all programme sectors. Nutritional interventions were undertaken, but without a clear sense of what the highest-priority needs were, and its achievements in health have been difficult to systematically document.

In seeking explanations for UNICEF's mixed performance in delivering results in Haiti, the review highlights a number of factors related to both its systems and culture. Key drivers underpinning the organization's positive accomplishments include systematic action by its Supply Division, supported by clear procedures, to pre-position and rapidly deliver supplies. In addition, the establishment of Life-Line Haiti (LLH) in neighbouring Dominican Republic provided a vital means of ensuring UNICEF's response in light of unprecedented physical destruction in the country itself. The review also takes note of an organizational culture in which appropriate risk-taking, though by no means the rule, is sometimes undertaken in order to achieve results. Finally, UNICEF is credited for actively engaging the Government of Haiti in select clusters, an overture that proved vital for a coordinated response in the sectors in which it was undertaken.

Explanations for why and where UNICEF failed to consistently act nimbly or effectively in Haiti point to a range of larger impediments in its internal systems and culture. Curiously, many of these weaknesses appear to be some of UNICEF's key strengths in smaller-scale emergencies and non-emergency settings.

***Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the earthquake in Haiti - 20 months after. (October 2011)***

By the end of 2011, the key achievements of the response have been: mainstreaming disaster preparedness; an effective response in camps, with populations largely free of cholera; recent progress on the rate of rubble removal, which had been a key obstacle for recovery; developments on transitional shelter solutions; implementation of integrated neighbourhood-based approaches; and progress on improving water and sanitation in the longer term.

There was considerable consensus amongst respondents on the deficiencies of the response and current existing gaps, with Haitian actors far more critical of the international response at this stage. The main shortcomings as perceived in August-October 2011 include: durable solutions; livelihoods; accommodation; communication; and provision of continued support to address remaining needs. International actors underlined that, despite the huge efforts deployed, many critical constraints have affected the overall response and the speed of recovery in this period.

In addition to existing contextual constraints, the humanitarian community in Haiti has been facing three main challenges:

- Acute humanitarian needs persist with only limited resources to address them. Operations are scaling down without sustainable solutions being in place.
- Assistance that does not favour durable solutions no longer meets Haitian expectations. Humanitarian goals are not always understood and the humanitarian community's methods and instruments (i.e. forms of assistance, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) as a decision-making body, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), methods of needs assessment and monitoring) are repeatedly questioned.
- The aid coordination and delivery system has not been sufficiently rationalised or adapted to the fast-changing reality on the ground and the need for more interaction with other actors (e.g. Government of Haiti and development donors).

(...)

While there was no formal follow-up or management response to the first phase of the IA RTE, progress has been made with respect to three of its main recommendations. First, the humanitarian community has incorporated in its response the challenges of mainstreaming disaster preparedness. Second, there is greater awareness of the need for humanitarian actors to adapt their response to the particular needs of an urban environment. Humanitarian efforts have continued to focus on neighbourhoods, and community-based integrated approaches are increasingly favoured and implemented. Third, specific recommended actions were taken to make the response more inclusive. These have not yet proven sufficient to effectively address the extent of the problem. Finally, the response did not manage to extend its coverage fully to the earthquake-affected populations in rural areas. (...).

The humanitarian community needs to improve utilization-focused approaches to evaluation. At this time in Haiti there are not enough examples of systematic follow-up to evaluations (e.g. by developing an operational plan based on recommendations and assessing progress 4 to 5 months later).



# 10 Annex 10: Map of Haiti

Figure 7 Map of Haiti



## EVALUATION REPORTS

- 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
- 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
- 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
- 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)
- 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
- 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMA An ILO program for “Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives” in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMA Un programme du BIT sur l’« Appui associatif et coopératif aux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l’Ouest de 1978 à 1999
- 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
- 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for African the World Bank
- 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk
- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peacebuilding.
- 2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead
- 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR’s activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
- 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksempifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
- 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
- 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme
- 2.05 –Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 5.05 Evaluation of the “Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)”
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
- 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
- 1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
- 1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn
- 1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
- 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
- 2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
- 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
- 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 - 2005)
- 5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
- 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise
- 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries
- 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
- 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
- 2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
- 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation the EEA Grants
- 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
- 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal’s Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme
- 1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millennium Development Goals
- 2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
- 2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
- 3.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)
- 3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
- 4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage
- 4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
- 5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008
- 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People’s Aid
- 7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad’s Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- 1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009
- 2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures
- 3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
- 4.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Africa Case Study
- 5.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Bangladesh Case Study
- 6.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Uganda Case Study
- 7.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans
- 8.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International
- 9.10 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives
- 10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations
- 11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
- 12.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)
- 13.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Brasil
- 14.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo
- 15.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Guyana
- 16.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Indonesia
- 17.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Tanzania
- 18.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 1.11 Evaluation: Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO’s in East Africa
- 2.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance
- 3.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South
- 4.11 Study: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned
- 5.11 Pawns of Peace. Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
- 6.11 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, 2002-2009
- 7.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights
- 8.11 Norway’s Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations: A Synthesis Study
- 9.11 Activity-Based Financial Flows in UN System: A study of Select UN Organisations Volume 1 Synthesis Volume 2 Case Studies
- 10.11 Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana
- 1.12 Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm. Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.
- 2.12 Hunting for Per Diem. The uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries
- 3.12 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001-2011
- 4.12 Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
- 5.12 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations. Facing the Resource Curse: Norway’s Oil for Development Program
- 6.12 A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society Organisations
- 7.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
- 8.12 Evaluation of Norway’s Bilateral Agricultural Support to Food Security
- 9.12 A Framework for Analysing Participation in Development
- 1.13 Local Perceptions, Participation and Accountability in Malawi’s Health Sector
- 2.13 Evaluation of the Norwegian India Partnership Initiative
- 3.13 Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and of the Standby Roster NORCAP
- 4.13 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative Contribution to Measurement, Reporting and Verification
- 5.13 Can We Demonstrate the Difference that Norwegian Aid Makes? Evaluation of results measurement and how this can be improved
- 1.14 Unintended Effects in Evaluations of Norwegian Aid
- 2.14 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 3.14 Evaluation Series of NORHED Higher Education and Research for Development. Theory of Change and Evaluation Methods
- 4.14 Evaluation of Norwegian support through and to umbrella and network organisations in civil society
- 5.14 Building Blocks for Peace. An Evaluation of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme
- 6.14 Baseline. Impact Evaluation of the Norway India Partnership Initiative Phase II for Maternal and Child Health
- 7.14

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