

11

Annual Report 2011



Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation



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Preface

An evaluation is a comparison. It is a comparison of implementation reality with some predetermined benchmark we want to reach, such as ‘improved coordination’ or ‘integration of women’s rights’ or with a prescribed strategy, such as the Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South. Or it can be a comparison with a counterfactual: what would reality have looked like without the development intervention or policy that Norwegian aid contributed to?

Each comparison is valuable in its own right. It is important to know whether a strategy approved by parliament is being implemented according to plan, or how Norway compares to other donors in its measures to fight corruption. But what really matters is whether the strategy was good (i.e. did it achieve desired impacts in a cost-effective manner) and whether the corruption measures actually led to decreased corruption. It is equally important to know about side effects: did the clamp-down on corruption adversely affect the availability of basic social services?

In the 2009 annual report, Norad’s then director of evaluation noted the need for more attention to the results on the ground. The subsequent evaluation programs have indeed emphasized results to a greater extent, and increasingly demanded that evaluators identify the results and impact on the ground.

Most of these evaluations have been backward-looking. Their usefulness has often been limited by the general lack of data and systems to assess performance among the projects and programs evaluated. None of the evaluations and studies commissioned by the Evaluation Department and finalised in 2011 could report sufficiently on results at the level of outcomes or impact. The report from the *Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway’s Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South* concludes that although most of the

projects have achieved their objectives, they have not expanded the knowledge base for understanding what factors determine performance. It points to both a lack of criteria for assuring quality and assessing performance and the absence of longitudinal or cross-country data for evaluating success or failure. (Report 3/2011, p. 68)

This is characteristic of many reports. *The Evaluation of Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa* reported that ‘most projects lacked the data and information required to be able to measure changes in indicators for key results accurately’ (Report 1/2011, p. xvii). Others were able to measure outputs. *The Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to promote Human Rights* could report on the increased number of university-based human rights centres in Indonesia as a result of Norwegian support. Still the report had to conclude that ‘there is no clear indication of what impact this has had on actual human rights compliance.’ (Report 7/2011, p. xvii)

Evaluations of multilateral aid are facing similar challenges. The synthesis study of Norway’s Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations states that ‘Overall, reviewed project evaluations tend to claim that most projects are relevant and efficiently delivered (albeit without evidence from cost-data or benchmarks). However, whether the projects deliver “value for money” in terms of improving trade is rarely or never proven or even discussed. Furthermore, compared to the large number of projects undertaken, independent project evaluations tend to be few, partly due to financial considerations, but partly also as the Monitoring and Evaluation functions (M&E) for some of the multilateral organizations are surprisingly poorly developed or prioritized.’ (Report 8/2011, p. xiv)

It is hard work to learn ‘what works’ in development and how to become more effective.. We owe it to the

Norwegian tax-payers, and not least to the population in developing countries to continuously strive for improvements in this area. The Department for Quality Assurance in Norad is providing guidelines, assistance and training to employees in the MFA, embassies and Norad to improve the evaluability of projects and programs. Furthermore, the Evaluation Department wants to introduce a certain number of impact evaluations into our 2012-2014 evaluation program. But in-depth, results-focused evaluations are data, time and resource demanding, and we can only do a few. Also, there is still a need to provide insights and lessons at more aggregate levels, such as on human rights, corruption, and agriculture. It is therefore necessary to ensure that more of the interventions funded or supported by Norwegian aid build in rigorous evaluations from the outset. Funds, time and human resources need to be set aside for this, be it in bilateral or multi-lateral programs.

Have the evaluations we commissioned still been useful? Yes. There are many interesting lessons to be learned from the 2011 batch of studies and evaluations, lessons to improve aid: (i) a recently completed study criticises donors for disregarding the fact that changes to reduce corruption are likely to threaten those in power. This insight may explain the finding in a joint evaluation of Norway's and four other donors' support to anti-corruption that there is little evidence to show that donor success in strengthening country institutions and systems has contributed to increased domestic accountability; (ii) evaluations in the area of human rights conclude that Norwegian aid needs to define in more detail what it means by mainstreaming human rights and how to make this part of the aid system's business model; and (iii) large earmarked funds to the multilateral organisations require follow-up from the donor to ascertain efficiency and results.

We are also contributing to and benefiting from global learning on a number of development issues through Norad's collaboration with organisations like the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), and the evaluation office of the UN Development Program. Some of these lessons are very much on the ground. We have learned that when anaemia is rife, giving out multivitamin pills with iron may be a much more cost-effective way to improve learning outcomes than building more classrooms or training more teachers. We know that the provision of pre-school services increases significantly the amount of children that enrol in primary school in some developing countries with relatively low enrolment rates. We also know that while payments for environmental services can reduce the probability of deforestation in targeted areas, deforestation may spill over to other plots of land not covered by the protection program.

The main purpose of evaluation is to learn how aid most effectively can contribute to improved lives in developing countries. Norad's Evaluation Department has invited embassies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments in Norad to participate in a competition for best use of evaluations and reviews. We will announce the winner at the time of the launch of this report. We hope that the prize – the learning prize – will contribute to an increased attention to reviews, evaluations, and learning



Marie Moland Gaarder
Director, Department of Evaluation

Lessons learned in 2011

1 2 3 4 5



Photo: Ken Opprann

1

No shortcuts to fighting corruption

Local conditions are important

In 1996, World Bank Director J. Wolfensohn took the initiative for a fight against corruption - “the cancer of corruption”. He believed that corruption had to be got rid of before development could occur. The economist Mustaq Khan maintains that the order is usually the other way around and points to successful growth in Asia. Corruption often increases at the start of a growth period, as there is more to fight over, before falling afterwards.

Anti-corruption activities have often been unsuccessful because donors have ignored the fact that “universal” standards of neutrality and equal treatment do not apply everywhere, according to the researchers behind a study into development, power and corruption carried out by the Hertie School of Governance, which the Evaluation Department published in September 2011¹: in poor countries, the norm is usually to help those closest to you. Recipes that do not take the local power structure and traditions into account will fail. Aid providers have placed too much emphasis on anti-corruption laws and regulations, for example, in countries that lack law and order and a functioning administration of justice.

Why does corruption arise? Wrong question, say the authors. Ask instead what makes a country “become Denmark”, where equal treatment of all citizens is the norm. There is no simple answer, but we do know one thing: if reforms are to work, they must reflect the changing power structure of a society. The study used cross-section studies to com-

pare countries. They find no positive connection between introducing anti-corruption commissions and similar institutions and a lessening of corruption, and they explain this by saying that the elite can easily render such institutions toothless. They find on the other hand that better information works, such as the internet and laws on openness and freedom of speech. The researchers believe in measures that the country’s power elite go along with, but that this same elite cannot neutralise afterwards.

What works?

Democratic elections should make it possible for people to re-elect those politicians they believe have acted in their best interests. Can increased information about corruption influence voters and election outcomes and thereby future political corruption? J-PAL² has performed several impact evaluations in order to study this. In Brazil, increased information led to a reduced probability of corrupt mayors being re-elected, especially where there were local radio stations that could spread the information. In Mexico, information about previous corruption cases led to established parties losing support in local elections, but also to a lower voting turnout. In India, it appeared that increased information about political activities and results led to more people becoming interested and entering politics. Men gained a better understanding of the efforts of women politicians, and established women politicians became more interested in continuing. Male politicians, on the other hand, became less interested in standing for re-election. The findings of such individual studies do not nec-

1 Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned. Norad Evaluation Department Study Report 6/2011. Hertie School of Governance. Summarised elsewhere in this annual report.

2 www.povertyactionlab.org

essarily apply to other places. But the results indicate that voters pay attention to information about the work of their elected leaders, including whether they can be linked with corruption.

The Hertie researchers maintain that the elite in most developing countries are interested in the status quo, so as to maintain their income and position. A recently completed joint evaluation³ found, however, that donors presuppose that the authorities are alliance partners in anti-corruption work, with the increased use of the country's own financial administration as a natural result. The evaluation concludes that this has led to an increase in the number and extent of corruption cases in the public sector. The evaluation found that donors normally react where there is suspicion of corruption, but that they have no proper overview of the extent or of whether misused funds are paid back. Are donors too quick to give responsibility for aid funds to national administrations where corruption is controlled from the top? The joint evaluation reminds donors that poor aid can lead to corruption.

The Evaluation Department recently commissioned a study of the use of compensation for travel and meeting participation in three African countries⁴. The study shows that this can exceed normal pay and can lead to a temptation to invent seminars or inflate participant lists. Many aid projects are mainly concerned about building capacity, but we do not know enough about whether the meetings, courses and seminars work. The Evaluation Depart-

ment plans an evaluation to find out more about this.

Just because corruption also exists in the north, this does not negate our right to have an opinion about it in countries we give aid to. But as the Hertie study says, the growth of modern governance is not just a question of morale and will, but also part of a historical development. If we forget this, the fight against corruption will have a moral form that is ahistorical and unsympathetic.

Heeks and Mathisen⁵ believe that a lack of interest in implementation is a reason why a great deal of anti-corruption aid has been unsuccessful. They propose a method for measuring the gap between assumptions and reality, so as to discover unreliable assumptions as early as possible. Goals and strategies have had a high status. So must implementation, if we are to learn from the mistakes, they say.

The joint evaluation found no quick solutions. Perhaps donors in the north will be able to sleep better if they take a little more time to understand context, power and incentive structures, and focus on institutions and forces that already exist in these countries. Norge slutter seg til FN's menneskerettigheter. Hvordan viser dette seg i bistanden?

³ Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts. ITAD. Norad Evaluation Report 6/2011. Summarised elsewhere in this annual report.

⁴ Hunting for Per Diem. The Uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries. T. Søreide, A. Tostensen and I. Agedal Skage, Chr. Michelsen Institute. Norad Evaluation Department Study Report ?? Summarised elsewhere in this annual report.

⁵ Understanding success and failure of anti-corruption initiatives. R. Heeks and H. Mathisen. *Crime Law Soc Change*. Online 8 Jan 2012

2

Need for better integration of human rights in Norwegian development assistance

Norway embraces the United Nations human rights. How is this reflected in its development assistance?

Throughout the 60-year history of aid, the endorsement of human rights has been laid down in various policy documents (Box 1) and Norway has contributed substantial resources to the promotion of human rights. During the period 2000 to 2009, about NOK 10 billion, or about five % of Norwegian aid, went to promoting human rights. About NOK 1.4 billion was used to promote the rights of persons with disabilities between 2000 and 2010.

Three evaluations in the area of human rights have recently been completed: one on children's rights⁶, one on human rights generally⁷ and one on the rights of persons with disabilities⁸.

What do these evaluations tell us, and what lessons do they give us for the future? All three of these studies indicate that there is too little connection between Norwegian support for human rights and the system that has been established internationally for monitoring and reporting. The evaluations recommend various measures to correct this, for example by supporting countries to better report on their human rights situation (such as through the UN's Universal Periodic Review system).

Two of these thematic evaluations looked particularly at the issue of integrating rights into general aid measures. The evaluation of children's rights recommends that Norway follows a clearer policy for integration, and points out that Norway is committed to such an integration policy through its endorsement of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 2002 guidelines on the rights of persons with disabilities emphasise integration, but the corresponding evaluation also concludes that there has been too little follow up on this.

The evaluations put the spotlight on certain general conditions in aid administration's work on rights. To begin with, it is unclear where the responsibility for this cross-cutting and inter-disciplinary theme lies. This inhibits the administration's ability to learn from new knowledge and recommendations in this field. Secondly, it appears to be unclear what guidelines apply for the different human rights fields, which makes it particularly difficult to incorporate human rights considerations. Generally speaking, there is a need to find out what a rights-based approach should mean in practice, particularly in the light of the opportunities and obligations that follow from the conventions and from the international human rights system that has been established.

6 "Supporting Child Rights: Synthesis of Lessons Learned in Four Countries", CMI, Norad Evaluation Report 1/2011.

7 "Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights", Scanteam, Norad Evaluation Report 7/2011.

8 "Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm", Nordic Consulting Group, Norad Evaluation Report 1/2012.

Box 1: Governing documents for Norwegian human rights policy

The integration of human rights in Norwegian development assistance has been established in various policy documents throughout the 60-year history of aid.

The Report on Harmonisation of Policy for Development (from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Proposition 1 S; 2011-2012) states in its combined assessment that:

"Norwegian policy is generally based on humanitarian principles and human rights. Norway has always, both bilaterally and multilaterally - and since 2009 as a member of the UN Human Rights Council - made a positive contribution to the global promotion of human rights. The same applies to the Norwegian authorities' dialogue with other countries on human rights issues, the dialogue with industry about social responsibility and Norway's substantial international work to promote the position of women in society" (p. 75)

This report shows that Norway has placed particular emphasis on the rights of vulnerable groups: "Internationally, Norway has always promoted the rights of vulnerable groups such as LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender), persons with disabilities and indigenous people ..." (p. 74)

According to Proposition 1 S, our human rights efforts have an ambitious goal: "to help to close the gap between the norms and the reality." (p. 170) The way in which this is to be done is described as follows:

"In order to increase the opportunities for achieving results, the measures to be covered under this item shall be directed at strengthening

the implementation of the protection of human rights in selected areas.

The priority areas for these efforts will first and foremost be human rights campaigners, freedom of speech, strengthening constitutional government and democracy, the situation of indigenous people, non-discrimination, gender equality, children's rights and efforts against impunity, torture and the death penalty. Certain measures linked with industry's attitude to human rights are also covered in this item."

Proposition 1 S (and the report) do not make much mention of issues and challenges associated with Norway's commitment to securing human rights, something many aid organisations also commented on when it was presented last autumn. However, a review of human rights using the Universal Periodic Review mechanism under the UN Human Rights Council is put forward as an important tool.

The letter of award of funding to Norad for 2012 mentions human rights as a cross-cutting theme:

"Maintaining cross-cutting themes: Norad shall contribute to integrating the human rights perspective in relevant contexts so that the development cooperation helps to strengthen countries' ability to fulfil their obligations and individuals' ability to demand that their rights are fulfilled." (p. 3)

The following "relevant contexts" are mentioned in the general introduction: equality, anti-corruption, environmental and climate considerations. The government's strategy for a decent working life is also mentioned.

3

Earmarking funding for multilateral partners requires follow up

The multilateral system has become a central partner for achieving Norwegian development policy objectives. Increasingly, we are providing earmarked funding through this partnership to achieve specific goals in our priority areas, be it international environment, health, gender and equal opportunity, conflict prevention or peacekeeping.

The Evaluation Department has recently completed a study to get an insight into the use of funds in five UN entities that are important partners for Norway⁹. The study shows that, over the decade 2001-2009, revenues exceeded expenditures for most agencies and there has been a consistent build-up of unspent funds that by the end of 2009 is estimated to have exceeded US\$12 billion. Much of the unspent funds were from earmarked contributions. One of the reasons is multi-year disbursements made in advance. There also often appears to be a significant lead time between contributions and the actual use of the funds. This can be seen from an evaluation of a World Bank Trust Fund for results-based financing in health, commissioned by the Evaluation Department. Good administration practice indicates that the state's payments are in line with the recipient's need to cover expenses. While disbursement of funds per se cannot ensure the achievement of desired results, unused funds mean that the results must wait. A proper design of an intervention and accompanying M&E system takes some time, but can lead times be explained by cautious and meticulous program planning?

A review performed by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank of the evaluations of the Bank's global programmes, which are largely financed by earmarked funding, shows considerable defects in programme planning.

Earmarked funds are donor driven contributions and donors are supposed to have greater influence in decisions related to the use of these contributions. Donor participation in the governance arrangements for these funds is meant to ensure their influence, but it also implies shared responsibility for the use of funds and achievement of results. As distinct from the core funding to the multilateral system, in most cases partnership agreements for earmarked funding also explicitly authorise the donors to follow up on the use of such funding. So far, Norway has to a large extent outsourced the monitoring of the use of these funds to our partner organisations. There is a need to review this practice with the aim of gaining a better overview of what the funding is used for and, not least important, to reinforce results-orientation in the partnerships.

⁹ 'Activity-based financial flows in the UN system', IDC SA, Norad Evaluation Report 9/2011.



Photo: Ken Opprann

4

Not enough knowledge about what works in fragile states

Fragile states represent a great developmental challenge and in recent years the international community has paid increasing attention to conflict areas. According to the World Development Report, 2011, *Conflict, Security, and Development*, 1.5 billion of the world's population live in countries affected by conflict, fragility and organised crime. The response of the international community, including Norway, has been to devote a growing share of its aid resources to these countries. The need for more knowledge about the effects of peacekeeping and state-building efforts has led to an increased focus on evaluation.

Evaluations of support to conflict prevention, peacekeeping and state-building constitute a relatively new field, and have first and foremost concentrated on mapping for example types of activities, how they are implemented and the situations in which they are implemented. Many of these evaluations are so-called process evaluations. They study coordination with other donors, whether analyses of the conflict situations are conducted and used as a basis for activities (which they often are not) and whether the activities are conflict sensitive or could actually contribute to aggravating the conflict. In other words, these evaluations have focused primarily on how things are done, rather than what they result in and what kind of theory of change has been at the base of the measures.

Therefore, few evaluation findings up to now have any particular validity beyond the project, programme or specific context in which the evaluation took place. During recent years, an international effort has taken place in cooperation between the evaluation and the peacekeeping communities,

under the umbrella of OECD/DAC¹⁰, to develop guidelines for evaluation of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. The work has been based on experience of peacekeeping activities and evaluation of these over the past decade. It soon became evident that there was a need for analysing the conflict situation as part of the evaluation, so as to measure efforts against relevant goals. It is also important to ensure that evaluations do no harm.¹¹ The guidelines were completed in 2008.

Several evaluations of peacekeeping efforts have followed the advice of the guidelines. One such evaluation is the evaluation of peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2011.¹² The evaluation uses a conflict analysis to assess the peace efforts, and finds that two important drivers of conflict were neglected by the donors: the land conflicts and the mineral exploitations. Similarly, an evaluation of donors' peacekeeping activities in South Sudan, 2011,¹³ found that the donors put a great deal of work into coordination, but that little information about conflict analyses was exchanged, nor were the activities based on conflict analyses or sufficient information about local conditions.

But these evaluations also have weaknesses. A recent study¹⁴ of evaluations of development sup-

10 Norad's Evaluation Department has had a leading role in this work: OECD/DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: " – Draft Guidance on Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities. Guidance on Evaluations in situations of Conflict and Fragility", forthcoming 2012.

11 Based on the Do No Harm concept of Anderson, M.B. (1999a), Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace or War, Lynne Rienner, London.

12 Brusset, E. et al. (2011), Amani Labda, Peace Maybe, Joint Evaluation of Conflict Prevention and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic of Congo, synthesis report, Channel Research, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development cooperation Brussels.

13 Bennet J. et al. (2010) Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan 2005-2010, Itad., UK

14 Gravingholt, J. og Leininger, J.: "Evaluating Statebuilding Support in Fragile States: Learning from Experience or Judging from Assumptions", forthcoming 2012.

port to state building in fragile states found that few evaluations are concerned with assessing the validity of change theories and assumptions. They could therefore say little about alternative ways of doing things. According to the study, this type of evaluation has an in-built tendency to repeat conventional wisdom about what does not work, without illustrating possible alternatives – i.e. a different type of aid or no aid at all.

There are some positive exceptions. A German study in North East Afghanistan¹⁵ conducted a survey amongst 2,000 individuals in 80 villages with a two year interval (2007 and 2009), to measure the effect of international aid on the attitudes of the Afghan population towards the international society and state legitimacy. The evaluation confirmed that aid reaches the communities and has a small but statistically significant impact on attitudes to the peacekeeping mission, but that the perceived security situation is the decisive factor. If this deteriorates, it has a negative effect on attitudes to the international peacekeeping operation. The study demonstrates that it is also possible to conduct this type of evaluation in difficult conditions.

The evaluation of Norwegian peacekeeping efforts in Sri Lanka in 1997-2009 (2011) used a historical approach to investigate Norway's role as mediator. The evaluation team concluded that Norway should have considered its role more carefully during the course of the process. Changes in circumstances both in Sri Lanka and internationally, partly as a result of the government receiving support from other countries, would then have been realised sooner. The evaluation concluded that Norway should have withdrawn from its role as mediator

several years before the conflict reached its military conclusion in 2009. This was disputed when the evaluation was presented. Some thought that continued Norwegian mediation efforts could have helped to bring about a different outcome, and that it was correct to continue as long as there was a hope of this.

There is increasing awareness about the need for impact evaluations that use quantitative methods and contra factual analysis – a comparison the situation with no measures -, in addition to the qualitative methods. A recent study documents how this can be done in the peacekeeping field.¹⁶ For example, an evaluation of the impact of peace messaging through radio in Rwanda, found that peace messaging did not change individuals' beliefs but yet can still change their norms and behaviour, contrary to social-psychological theory, which presumes that change in beliefs is required in order for norms and behaviour to change.

The examples show that it is possible to carry out impact evaluations. They demonstrate that change theories are often unrealistic and are not examined carefully enough in the evaluations. Future evaluations should devote more investigation to alternative theories of change and, comparisons over time and between groups

A revised edition of the guidance for the evaluation of conflict prevention and peacekeeping activities will be published in 2012.¹⁷ The hope is that the new generation of evaluations in this field can say more about the effect of the measures – what works, what doesn't work and why.

15 Böhnke, J. Koehler, J. Zürcher; C. "Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East Afghanistan 2005 – 2009", http://www.bmz.de/en/publications/type_of_publication/evaluation/evaluation_reports_since_2006/EvalBericht049.pdf

16 Samii, C. Brown, A.N., and Kulma, M.: "Evaluating Stabilization Interventions", forthcoming 2012.

17 OECD/DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: "Guidance on Evaluations in situations of Conflict and Fragility", forthcoming 2012

5

New insights gained in the areas of education and climate and forestry

Through Norad's membership in the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 3ie, we are contributing to, and benefiting from global learning on a number of development issues. 3ie is an initiative dedicated to improving development effectiveness by promoting and supporting impact evaluations and systematic reviews that can answer the questions 'what works, why and under what circumstances?'

Payments for environmental services work but watch out for adverse and spillover effects

Payments for environmental/ecosystem services (PES), and in particular forest conservation, are an important form of incentive-based conservation schemes likely to expand dramatically under proposed international agreements to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and degradation. While there is accumulated evidence on the causes and likely consequences of climate change, there is, however, little rigorous empirical evidence about the environmental effectiveness of existing PES programs. A scoping study commissioned by 3ie pointed out the need for more evaluations of climate change mitigation interventions also assessing the impact on welfare outcomes for the affected population, to avoid widespread implementation of climate change mitigation interventions with negative developmental impacts¹⁸. Norad is in the process of commissioning studies focusing on this subject.

A recent study of the impact of Mexico's payments for hydrological services program finds that the program has on average significantly reduced the probability of deforestation by approximately 35 percent and reduced the area deforested among deforesters by 14 percent. However, the study results indi-

cate possible deforestation spillovers. There is indication of increased deforestation on other property belonging to program recipients (substitution slippage) and increased deforestation within markets where there are high levels of program participation (output price slippage). This therefore emphasizes the importance of ensuring that REDD designers embed PES programs in larger national systems which track overall deforestation at a regional or national scale instead of using a project-based accounting system.

What pills and early childhood education can do for learning outcomes

Studies in Mexico and Mozambique¹⁹, as well as a systematic review²⁰, confirm the cognitive development and social skill gains from attending pre-school. In Mozambique children in communities with pre-school were 26% more likely to go onto primary than children in villages where there was no pre-school, and their siblings, freed from childcare duties, nearly 5% more likely to do so. In Mexico mothers were furthermore able to participate more fully in the labour force as a result of pre-school services.

In the rural provinces of western China, more than one-third of elementary schoolchildren suffer from anemia. Following on from an earlier study showing that multivitamin pills with iron reduce anemia and so improve learning outcomes, it was found that cash payment with information incentivize head teachers to implement effective programs. "Four dollars of multivitamins can turn a 'C' student into a 'B' student. The effects we are seeing are much larger than what's been recorded for many other high-profile education interventions, such as class size reductions. Vitamins are also cheaper than building more classrooms," say the investigators of this study.

18 Prowse, M. and B. Snilstveit (2010), 'Impact Evaluation and Interventions to Address Climate Change: a scoping study', International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, Working Paper 7 (http://www.3ieimpact.org/admin/pdfs_papers/Working_Paper_7.pdf)

19 http://www.3ieimpact.org/3ie_funded_evaluations.html

20 Leroy, J., Gadsden, P and M. Guijarro (2011), 'The impact of daycare programs on child health, nutrition and development in developing countries', International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, Systematic Review 07 (http://www.3ieimpact.org/admin/pdfs_synthetic2/SR%20007_Web.pdf)




Photo: Espen Rost



Photo: Ken Opprann

Evaluation summary

Report 2011/1	Evaluation of voluntary organisations in East Africa
Report 2011/2	Evaluation of research on Norwegian aid
Report 2011/3	Evaluation of strategy for culture and sports cooperation
Report 2011/4	Study of development, power and corruption
Report 2011/5	Evaluation of Norwegian peacekeeping support in Sri Lanka
Report 2011/6	Evaluation of support of work against corruption
Report 2011/7	Evaluation of Norwegian support for human rights
Report 2011/8	Study of aid for trade through multilateral organisations
Report 2011/9	Study of financial flows in the UN System
Report 2011/10	Evaluation of Norwegian support for the health sector in Botswana

World Bank	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Review of multi-donor fund: Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MDTF-EITI)• Technology for development: An evaluation of the work of the World Bank on information and communications technology• Evaluation of the World Bank's strategy for work on governance and anti-corruption• Evaluation of the World Bank's Timor-Leste programme, 2000-2010• Evaluation of the World Bank's work on harmonisation and adaptation in low-income countries• Social security network. Evaluation of the World Bank's support 2000-2011• Review of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
UNDP	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evaluation of the United Nations Development Programme's work in Bangladesh• Evaluation of the United Nations Development Programme's work in Malaw
GAVI	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Evaluation of IFFIm (International Finance Facility for Immunisation)

Evaluations in progress, May 2012

- Evaluation of voluntary organisations' evaluation and monitoring systems
- Evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council
- Study of allowances and per diem in sub-Saharan Africa, published April 2012
- Evaluation of Norwegian support to food safety through agriculture
- Evaluation of Oil for Development
- Evaluation of Norwegian support to Afghanistan
- Evaluation of Norwegian support for education through multilateral organisations
- Evaluation of the World Bank's multi-donor fund for results-based health financing
- Study of learning and the use of evaluations in the Norwegian aid system
- Evaluation of the Government's forest and climate initiative. Voluntary organisations.

BILL OF RIGHTS

ENVIRONMENT

education

HEALTH CARE

children

LANGUAGE CULTURE

CULTURAL

Religious

Linguistic

ACCESS INFORMATION

just

Administrative

ACTION

ACCESS TO COURT

ARRESTED,

DETAINED,

and
ACCUSED PERSON

GNITY

PERSON
ITUDE and
ABOUR

ION,
ION

ION

ONSTRON,
ON

TION

RIGHTS

SHIP

PRO

HOU

M
DR
123
Room
Cod
Cod
Co
F
PASS CL



Evaluation report 7/2011: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to promote Human Rights

Performed by: Scanteam
ISBN: 978-82-7548-603-3

Evaluation of Norwegian development support for the promotion of human rights

Evaluation of:

Norwegian support for the promotion of human rights during the period 2000-2009. The assignment comprised a review and analysis of Norwegian support to human rights efforts, a specific evaluation of support for freedom of speech including field work in Zambia, Serbia and Macedonia and an evaluation of two country programmes (Indonesia and South Africa) of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights.

Purpose:

Obtain information about the results of Norwegian support for human rights. Draw lessons for use in future strategies and measures in this area.

Support for human rights is given through many budget items and channels, with different goals and guidelines, and gaining a better overview of this support was also an objective.

Findings:

- Norway has given almost NOK 10 billion or about 5% of all Norwegian aid to this area during the period 2000-2009.
- Norway has made substantial contributions to strengthening

individuals and organisations who defend human rights in countries where human rights are seriously violated.


- There is no good system for basing general development work on rights, and the link with collaborating countries' treaty obligations is too weak.
- Norway's failure to ratify international conventions in the area of human rights could have a negative effect on Norwegian credibility in this area.
- Collaboration through the programmes of the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights has provided many good results.

Recommendations:

- *General support for human rights:* Given that since 2008 the national budget has stated that human rights conventions shall be methodically used to identify the state's obligations to its population, this must be reflected in the formulation and distribution of aid: Make better use of the UN's Universal Periodic Review processes; Strengthen the human rights and democracy section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and give it clearer responsibilities,

and strengthen and make use of Norad's capacity in this area.

- *Support for freedom of speech:* The guidelines for media support of 2005 are still relevant but should be updated so as to give a more general strategy for freedom of speech and include support for new (social) media.
- *Norwegian Centre for Human Rights:* The centre's programmes have produced good results and should continue. The use of the centre to implement strategic and long-term human rights programmes could be extended to cover other human rights institutions. Greater emphasis should be given to the viewpoints of the civil society (the demand side), to supplement the views promoted by the authorities (the supply side), so as to strengthen human rights efforts.
- *Governance issues:* The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should work to achieve more openness and predictability for partners with respect to allocations, including by introducing more long-term agreements on strategic human rights programmes.



Evaluation report 6/2011: Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts (main report and five country reports)

Performed by: The consultancy company ITAD.
ISBN: 978-82-7548-597-5

Evaluation of work against corruption

Evaluation of:

The work of Denmark, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Asian Development Bank and Norway against corruption, with country studies in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Tanzania, Zambia and Nicaragua.

Purpose:

Find out how support in this area can give better results. Relevance: Was the support well enough adapted to the conditions in each country? Goal fulfilment: What works well, what works less well and what can cause harm?

Findings:

General:

- increased emphasis on anti-corruption work, but insufficient preparation of the work in individual countries
- increased use of the recipient countries' own financial administration
- more large corruption cases linked to aid and the public sector in recent years

Relevance:

- corresponds well with recipient countries' own priorities for governance

- weak analysis of corruption in the countries (the education sector in Bangladesh is an exception)
- little information about the effect of corruption on the poor and women. National studies could have been used better
- corresponds well with the UN anti-corruption convention, but little emphasis on administration of justice, the independence of the prosecuting authority and private sector responsibility.

Effectiveness:

- institutions and systems strengthened, but reduction in corruption not documented
- good results from support to office of the auditor general, in some cases also to special anti-corruption institutions
- examples of successful support to police and other law and order institutions
- limited freedom of speech hindered some anti-corruption campaigns
- "Task Force on Corruption" in Zambia was the only example demonstrated of tracing and recovering money - USD 36 mil-

lion. Expensive measure of uncertain sustainability.

Other findings:


- abuse of aid funding is still a considerable problem
- many donor reactions to abuse in the public sector, but little overview of extent or repayment
- poor donor coordination has inhibited the work. Coordination led by multilateral organisations is often ineffective
- donors' influence on national policy is limited, but dialogue can work where national circumstances allow for reforms (e.g. Vietnam)
- corruption cases have led to demands for more reporting and auditing. Poor donor coordination can weaken the effectiveness of aid
- donors' political decisions about commitment to an area can lessen reactions when corruption is discovered
- a great deal of aid financing of social sectors exposes the population to risk if corruption leads to aid being cut. The use of more channels for support minimises the risk

- increased awareness and monitoring has strengthened local control and changed attitudes, something future anti-corruption support can benefit from.
- 7. Do no harm: remember that poor aid measures can lead to corruption.

Some examples of what can give results:

Recommendations:

1. Place more emphasis on knowledge and information about corruption in the countries. Support the building up of the countries' own monitoring and evaluation.
 2. Explain the basis of and goals for anti-corruption policy better.
 3. The poor and women: Place more emphasis on how corruption affects vulnerable groups.
 4. Support collaboration between institutions in the countries rather than individual institutions.
 5. Coordination: Review areas that are not being covered - including with the aid of the UN anti-corruption convention - and consider supporting these.
 6. Support the countries' own long-term, preventive efforts and adapt the aid to national systems.
- Combination of knowledge-building (surveys, audits) and information to the public (through the media or debate in national assemblies).
 - Collaboration between established institutions, for example between anti-corruption commissions and voluntary organisations or between auditor general and national assembly. Examples of successful collaboration between anti-corruption commissions and the judicial system were not demonstrated.
 - Training and educating public employees as part of reform of public institutions .
 - Support to voluntary organisations that monitor local services.



Report 4/2011: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned

Performed by: Hertie School of Governance
ISBN: 978-82-7548-593-7

Study of development, power and corruption

Purpose:

To learn from the weak results there have been in the work against corruption, with the emphasis on finding forms of support that are suitable for countries that find themselves at different stages of development - with different forms of governance and power structures.

Findings:

1. National conditions decide whether anti-corruption work succeeds or not. If reforms are to succeed, they must reflect real changes in the power structure.
2. The transition to modern forms of governance does not consist of technical or formal processes, but political ones. The international anti-corruption movement cannot demonstrate any international successes.
3. Successful countries have followed their own way. Change requires broad national political alliances, and these only grow slowly. The international community can only have a supporting role. This must be based on knowledge of which national players are interested in new rules to play by and where to begin. Both

direct corruption prevention and more general programmes for democracy, freedom of speech and the civil community can be relevant.

4. The international community has often undermined its own efforts. Donors' conditions regarding corruption have often failed because donors have not understood that particularism - favouring selected groups - is a form of governance. The belief that leaders in such countries will be driving forces for change is futile. Moreover considerations of good governance have often been the victims of other strategic considerations: aid to the area of governance should be paid when results have been achieved, not before.
5. There is no magic formula for fighting corruption. Anti-corruption agencies have no effect, partly because there is no independent administration of justice or ombudsman and favouritism for one's own group is the rule, not the exception. With established systems of favouritism and aggressive elites, it is impossible to protect new institu-

tions against those around them. Laws on freedom of speech do have some effect, however. The same applies to reforms for openness on budgets, legal processes and the wealth of leaders, probably because voluntary organisations can monitor the implementation.

6. Statistical surveys do not indicate that the UN convention on anti-corruption has had any effect, five years after it came into existence. The convention does, however, set norms that will eventually make it easier to be a fighter against corruption. Its instruments are only effective if the local players use them in long-term work. The convention only helps if the whole community contributes. If a country ratifies the convention, donors should encourage widespread national monitoring. This will be more effective than an international review. Ownership must be with the whole community, not just the government.
7. Quantitative and qualitative studies show that the civil society can contribute against corruption, although not

necessarily the type of organisation that has grown with donor support. What is needed are monitoring and warnings from “losers”. Developing countries have many people who are outmanoeuvred by the network of the privileged. Without their participation, there can be no lasting change in the rules. Strengthening such forces should therefore be a goal. Successful examples can be found in South Korea and some Eastern European countries.

8. New indicators are needed for monitoring the effect of strategies and measures. World Governance Indicators for Control of Corruption, which is based on perceptions of corruption, has played an important role in healthy governance competition between countries. What is needed for change processes are indicators that make it possible to understand the reality better - including the governing norms of a society - and changes over time. Specific reports on Brazil and Romania provide examples of this.

9. In societies where many of the elite are above the law, the process of law easily degenerates into a hunt for opponents and others who cannot defend themselves. Corruption in poor countries, where perhaps the government is in arrears in paying employees and is starving many institutions, must be handled in a different way. Punitive measures have never solved a lack of resources. Governments should hand over tasks they cannot pay for to others. Prohibition by law as a measure against corruption will only succeed in countries with well-developed institutions.

10. Long-term economic liberalisation, such as the World Bank and others have gone in for, has gained a bad reputation because privatisation and other measures have often favoured selected parts of the elite. But, as previous studies also indicate, such measures used to dry up resources that could be exploited corruptly work. Gradual liberalisation leads to economic growth and the sim-

plification of laws and regulations.

11. Formalisation and corruption: Societies become open and modern as a result of negotiation in which individuals agree to pay taxes in exchange for certain public benefits. Such agreements are not found in societies of favouritism. In these, everyone knows that resources are not distributed according to written rules, and this hinders development. Citizens defend themselves by hiding from greedy overlords, and it is therefore important for government and society to work together for more openness. Successful formalisation is based on negotiation, not suppression, except where clearly criminal activities (smuggling, drug dealing, money laundering, human trafficking) are involved. Formalisation, as a process of persuasion and encouragement to register property and business activities, is an important step on the road to equal treatment of all citizens.



Report 2/2011: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance

Performed by: SIPU International
ISBN: 978-82-7548-584-5

Evaluation of research on Norwegian aid

Evaluation of:

Research on Norwegian aid 1999-2010.

Purpose:

To gain an overview of the extent, composition and independence of Norwegian aid, and to gain advice about how to strengthen independent research on aid.

Findings:

Measured in accordance with defined criteria for independence:

- research initiated by researchers at universities, usually financed by the Ministry of Education, is the most independent. The amount has fallen
- research under the Research Council of Norway and financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Norad is relatively independent. Behind many of the 82 established publications on independent research
- research ordered by aid administration is by definition not independent.

About the recommendations of the Research Council's development research evaluation of 2007:

- more to research into the effect of aid. Not followed up
- more to internal research about aid. Not followed up. The proportion of the most independent research has fallen.

Other:

- both commissioned and independent research is useful
- researchers want to have more independent research, while employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs see commissioned research as most useful
- the aid administration makes little use of available research. This applies to both independent and commissioned research, and is a greater problem than lack of research
- cultural differences, which are not unique to Norway: the administration is concerned with budget cycles, changing political priorities and administration. The researchers have more time to consider what can be learned from experience
- the administration's interest in and use of research must increase before there is any hope of increased demand - and increased funding - for

independent and other research.

Recommendations:

In order for different types of research to be able to provide more knowledge about aid, the evaluation recommends:

1. focus more on researcher-initiated, long-term research
2. initiate impact evaluation of the effects of selected programmes, and consider evaluation and research more in context
3. make research more accessible by popularising findings and facilitating dialogs between researchers and decision-makers
4. establish special programmes for research into aid, in order to achieve a sufficient volume.

For greater openness and effectiveness, the evaluation further recommends:

5. separating funding from the exchange of information (users of research should not at the same time administer financial support for research)
6. the Research Council to better monitor the research pro-

grammes through improved registration of applications, and requirements that all publications state the source of funding

7. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to maintain a better overview of its own use of funding for commissioned research
8. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to establish and use an overview of researchers who are qualified for research assign-

ments, instead of ad hoc commissioning

9. the aid administration to switch from consultant to research contracts. Greater rights for researchers could make commissioned research better and more independent.


**The evaluation department:
greatest possible independence
for all evaluation and research?**

Hardly. Independence can help

lead to other important questions being asked. Sometimes, however, prior knowledge and a closeness to what is to be evaluated are needed. The evaluation points to the significance of diversity, because commissioned and independent research have different roles. The summary of the evaluation at www.norad.no/evaluating gives more information about the views of the affected parties on these issues.



Photo: Ken Opprann



Report 3/2011: Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South (main report and five country reports)

Performed by: Nordic Consulting Group. ISBN 978-82-7548-587-6

Evaluation of Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South

Evaluation of:

The Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South.

The strategy covers the period 2006 to 2015 and was to be evaluated and if necessary changed in 2010. Culture and sports is a relatively small sector of Norwegian development cooperation, with less than 1% of the total funding, and received approximately NOK 1.4 billion during the period. Just under a quarter of this amount, about NOK 300 million, went to sports.

Purpose:

Gain insight into Norwegian development cooperation in the field of culture and sports under the strategy, improve cooperation, look at the value of the strategy as an instrument for guidance and assess the need for changing it.

Findings:

- Few stakeholders outside the official administration of development work were consulted when the strategy was prepared and the process was not as open and inclusive as it should have been in order to

create commitment to the strategy.

- The strategy does not make clear strategic choices. It is a general policy that explains the significance of culture and sports rather than a strategic instrument for planning and implementation.
- The strategy has never been followed up with guidelines and instructions that gave the aid administration a mandate to implement programmes in order to realise the objectives.
- The strategy had few incentives that could motivate potential stakeholders.
- The strategy was more or less unknown among the partners in the south, so these could hardly be expected to identify themselves with it.
- Even so, the results of the projects in India, Mozambique, Nicaragua, the Palestinian area and Zimbabwe were quite good. The planned activities were implemented, most of them in a cost-effective manner.
- The strategy did not play a central role in formulating the projects in the five countries. The positive results were mainly the result of other factors,

such as good partners in the south and good relations between artists and sportspeople in the countries in the south and Norway. It was also important that employees and managers in the aid administration were motivated to work on culture and sports.

Recommendations:

- The strategy must be changed. It is important to define it clearly, and the evaluation points out both advantages and disadvantages of combining culture and sports in one strategy. A system should be developed containing directives and instructions (sticks) and incentives (carrots) for implementing a new strategy. More should be done to communicate and explain it.
- The change process itself must be carefully planned and it should be rapid, inclusive and open.
- The roles for O2 budget funding (to promote Norwegian culture abroad) and O3 funding (to promote cultural development in the south) should be defined more clearly.

- National needs and ownership should receive significant attention when preparing new projects, especially where the use of Norwegian partners is concerned.
- The culture industry (e.g. music, TV, film and publishing) is growing quickly in many countries and support for the culture industry should be included.
- Institution building should be an important element.
- An organisational review should be carried out to clarify the roles of partner organisations and to identify overlapping interests and the risk of biased decision making.
- Systems for monitoring and evaluation should be developed.


Follow-up:

Less than two weeks after the evaluation was completed, the Section of Cultural Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a seminar on the cultural part for Norwegian aid embassies with a cultur portfolio, as part of its follow-up of the evaluation.

The evaluation as part of the evaluation debate and literature

The evaluated strategy itself is characterised by a rights perspective and one of its important fundamental points is that cultural rights are part of universal human rights. The evaluation has looked at the rights aspects to a certain extent and points out that there has been only limited success in establishing an equal cooperation that gets parties in the south to identify with the strategy.

In assessing the strategy, the evaluation team has to a great extent taken as its basis a theory that incentives (carrots), penalty options (sticks) and explanations (sermons) are all needed in order to implement a policy. In this context, the team refers to “Carrots, Sticks, Sermons: Policy instruments and their evaluation” by Marie Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C. Rist, Evert Vedung (1998). In this way the evaluation team has pointed out what it believes to be weaknesses in the current strategy.



Report 8/2011: Norway's trade related assistance through multilateral organizations: a synthesis study

Performed by: Devfin Advisers AB
ISBN 978-82-7548-608-8

Aid for trade through multilateral organisations

Study of:

Norwegian aid for trade, given through multilateral organisations since 2007. Extent approximately NOK 125 million. Nine organisations investigated.

Purpose:

To document and systematise the experience and results of Norwegian aid for trade given through multilateral organisations, focusing on the six largest recipients. The study addresses the extent to which the organisations have succeeded in implementing and achieving results in the priority areas for Norwegian aid for trade, as presented in the Action Plan for Aid for Trade (2007): democratic governance, regional trade and gender and trade.

Findings:

- Norway is an important donor, with a high and stable level of grants to a large number of projects.
- Of the priority areas for Norway, good governance, regional trade and equality of opportunity are followed up by most of the organisations, while cross-cutting themes such as climate

and working conditions receive little follow up.

- Norway is the largest donor to EIF (Enhanced Integrated Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance, a multi-donor fund for support to the least developed countries), and the second largest donor to the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in this area.
- A lack of good studies makes it difficult to assess how the organisations function. Some independent studies indicate, however, that the results vary between organisations.
- Support for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been reduced due to a lack of reform within the organisation.
- Several of the organisations have weak systems for monitoring and reporting the results of their activities. This applies particularly to EIF, UNCTAD, International Trade Centre (ITC) and WTO.
- EIF, which has the highest priority in the Norwegian action plan, has a poor record on implementation thus far.

Recommendations:

- Norway should continue to focus on a broad engagement through multilateral organisations
- Norway should update its action plan for trade-related aid
- Norway should set the multilateral organisations clearer requirements for improvement and perhaps consider postponing further grants
- Norway should place more emphasis on reforms within UNCTAD
- Consideration should be given to transferring the responsibility for project support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Norad, because Norad has better capacity for this task
- Norway should place more emphasis on covering the needs of the poor countries
- In countries that receive Norwegian aid for energy and transport, support for trade should also be considered



Report 9/2011: Activity-Based Financial Flows in UN System. A study of Select UN Organizations

Utført av: Stefano Migliorisi, Iradj Alikhani, Michel Cramer, Nils Borje Tallroth, Manouchehr Ashouripour, Giorgio di Dio
ISBN: 978-827548-648-4

Study of Financial Flows in the UN System

Study of:

The financial flows to and from five UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNHCR and WFP).

Purpose:

The main objective of the study is to describe how funds were utilised during the last decade. It is largely based on a compilation of existing public documents published between 2000 and 2010, complemented by interviews at headquarters of agencies concerned and two country visits.

Findings:

- Over the decade 2001-2009, the five agencies mobilised resources for almost US\$100 billion, nearly three quarters of which were earmarked contributions.
- Revenues exceeded expenditures for most agencies over the period. By end-2009 unspent funds, including mandatory reserves at these agencies, are estimated to have exceeded US\$12 billion. Much of this is earmarked funding and the reasons include:
 - Multiyear disbursement of resources received in advance;

- Disbursements by donors during the last quarter of the year;
- Tight earmarking and thus non-fungibility of funds;
- Dealing with contingent liabilities (pensions, medical insurance and unused leave); and
- The study did not address the question of whether the unspent balances is indicative of absorptive capacity constraints of the agencies.
- Tightly earmarked, non-core funds are perceived as having a negative impact on the effectiveness of the organizations receiving them. They also diminish the role of these agencies' boards in deciding priorities.
- Earmarking can also generate a free-rider problem if the cost recovery fee charged is set too low.
- Increased expenditures by UN agencies have been accompanied by an increase in staffing; over 80% work in country offices or in regional offices.
- The agencies included in this study have high dependency on a small group of donors as

their top 10 donors accounted for 70 to 85% of total revenues.

Recommendations:


- Address the issue of unspent funds:
 - Boards of agencies should continue to monitor the build-up of unspent funds;
 - The relevant donors of earmarked funds need to monitor their commitments and disbursements from such resources. The study recommends a review of donor monitoring practices, based partly on analysis of samples of projects; and
 - UN agencies and donors should also engage in a dialogue aimed at agreeing on more flexible use of earmarked resources.
- To address some of the issues related to cost recovery, donors may wish to consider setting both minimum size and a certain amount of flexibility before initiating non-core programmes. Small donors of non-core resources could still be accommodated as long as they are prepared to pool their funds with others in the form

of multi-donor thematic trust fund.

- The increases in staffing ensures good UN staff presence on the ground. However, the aid delivery model whereby UN staff is a major provider of advice to governments deserves further scrutiny.
- The problem of reliance on a limited number of bilateral donors should be addressed through improved mobilization of core resources from new sources.
- The study's main recommendations related to public information, financial management and procurement are as follows:
 - Continue improving public information systems, for instance by posting more project level information and supervision reports;
 - Ensure better comparability of information (over time and between theme areas and organisations); and
 - Ensure that all agencies have adopted in 2012 the international financial accounting standards.



Photo: Ken Opprann



Report 5/2011: Pawns of Peace – Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009

Performed by: Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, and School of Oriental and African Studies, London
ISBN: 978-82-7548-596-8

Evaluation of Norwegian peacekeeping support in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009

Evaluation of:

Norway's role as mediator in Sri Lanka during the period 1997 - 2009. Norway was invited by the parties in the conflict: the government in Colombo and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). This led to the signing of a cease fire agreement in February 2002 and to a reduction in violence. Gradually, however, the LTTE withdrew from the peace process and in spite of several attempts to get the parties back to the negotiating table, full-scale war broke out in 2006. The evaluation team was asked to relate the history of the Norwegian peace efforts, including looking at how Norway understood and handled its various roles as mediator, aid provider, supervisor of the cease fire and diplomat during various phases of the peace process.

Purpose:

Drawing lessons from experiences of what Norway did in Sri Lanka, with a view to inform future peace efforts. Contributing to the academic debate on international efforts to resolve conflicts.

Findings:

Conditions that supported the peace process up until 2002, namely a western-oriented government and widespread international support for the peace process, were of a short-term nature. The evaluation concludes that there is little Norway could have done to stop the war and the humanitarian disaster that developed in 2009.

The evaluation recognises the Norwegian contribution, especially to the cease fire agreement (February 2002), the Oslo Communiqué (December 2002) - in which the parties agreed to attempt a federal solution - and the efforts to bring the parties together again after the tsunami of 2004. But the evaluation team believes that Norway should have withdrawn earlier from its role as mediator when the peace process became deadlocked. The team believes that the peace process gradually strengthened the forces working against the peace negotiations, that Norway was increasingly used as a pawn in a political game and that greater attention should have been given to this by Norway.

The evaluation found that there were conditions that hindered a peaceful solution, which Norway could do little to influence, including:

- insufficient will on the part of those involved to modify their opening positions
- new opportunities for a military solution after 2005, because of support for the government from China and other Asian countries
- LTTE lost international support, became listed as a terrorist organisation and was subject to internal divisions
- the two largest political parties in Sri Lanka never managed to cooperate or to break with nationalistic tendencies.

As regards the Norwegian role as mediator and its understanding of the conflict, the evaluation puts forward the following findings:

- The role of facilitator with the emphasis on the parties "owning" the peace process gradually became a greater challenge as new "owners" appeared (including after elections and internal divisions).
- Norway should have withdrawn from its role as mediator ear-

lier as it gradually became clear that neither party seriously considered peace negotiations to be a possible solution and the conflict escalated in 2006.

- As facilitator, Norway should have considered whether a role as mediator was necessary after 2006, in order to limit the scale of the damage from the war and maintain channels of communication, or whether for example channels to the LTTE could have been kept open without the mediator role.
- Not enough resources were allocated on the Norwegian side to analyse the consequences of the peace engagement for Sinhalese politics. The nationalistic trends in Sri Lanka became stronger during the course of the 2000s and eventually embraced parts of the political environment that had previously been in favour of the peace process.
- Norway's lack of a proper media strategy meant not only that Norway's reputation was damaged, but also that the peace process lost legitimacy in Sri Lanka.

- The evaluation asks whether enough was done to avoid the isolation of the Norwegian facilitator when the Sri Lankan government gradually found new alliance partners and the LTTE became regarded in the west as a terrorist organisation.

Recommendations:

- Clearer conditions should be linked to a mediator mandate (for example the possibility of dialogue with all relevant parties, the freedom to go out in the media, the assurance that cease fire observers can move freely and independently and that the parties display a willingness to negotiate).
- Before assuming a mediator role, possible negative consequences should be assessed against possible gains.
- Norway's "soft" mediator role could be sufficient to bring the parties to the negotiating table, but consideration should be given as to whether it is sufficient to contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement.
- Sufficient resources should be set aside for analysis and monitoring of the political context

in which a peace process is taking place. In particular, positive and negative effects should be monitored, with the emphasis on forces that could counteract a peace process.

- There should be analysis and monitoring of the regional and geopolitical picture that affects the peace process.
- When several roles are combined (development collaboration, humanitarian input, observer, mediator), there is a need to formulate a more robust strategic framework that helps to clarify the relationship between the different roles.
- It is recommended that the consequences of aid in conflict situations are investigated, so as to ensure that aid does not help to make conflicts worse.

Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana

Evaluation of:

Norway's contribution to the development of the Botswana health services since 1975: Phase 1 of the assistance, from 1975 to 1996, valued at nearly 400 million Norwegian Kroner was programme based. The smaller Phase 2, from 1996 to 2012, valued at around 135 million Norwegian Kroner, has primarily involved institutional cooperation to contribute to capacity development.

Purpose:

Assess the role of Norwegian assistance in the health situation in Botswana up until around 1990. Assess what role its assistance may have had in helping Botswana respond to the severe HIV/AIDS epidemic that emerged in the late 90's.

Findings:

Phase 1 focused on primary health care development and systems development and enabled greatly improved access to health care throughout Botswana:

- The number of health posts grew by 57%, and the number of clinics more than quadrupled.
- There was an increase in the utilisation of health services, with primary level services contributing significantly:

- The number of general outpatient attendances more than doubled.
- The total number of child welfare attendances provided by the various facilities grew almost four times.
- Immunisation coverage rates of 90% or higher for all vaccines amongst children under one year of age were achieved by 1988 and subsequently maintained.
- Antenatal care attendances grew by around 75% between 1976 and 1994.
- There was a massive increase in the uptake of family planning services from 1976.

A number of features of the assistance, unusual at that time, contributed to its success. Some of the factors in this context were:

- It followed Botswana's own planning priorities established through a transparent planning process.
- It was sector wide in that its focus was on addressing key constraints to improve the effectiveness of the health system as a whole.
- It was flexible in that as one bottleneck was loosened, it moved on to address the next.

- It was implemented using the Government of Botswana's own procedures and systems with no separate project management structures.

Phase 2, 1996 – 2012, was implemented in the context of a major crisis resulting from the AIDS epidemic. Phase 2 supported activities included support to develop systems to improve the quality of care and to roll out anti-retroviral therapy, to increase health systems research capacity and improve HIV prevention efforts as well as support medical doctor training. The Evaluation team considers that:

- The primary health care infrastructure, the district health systems, the presence of an effective pharmaceutical supply network, all developed with Norwegian assistance, along with the support of a number of Norwegian technical assistants, contributed to the capacity of Botswana's health system to respond to the AIDS epidemic.
- Norway's Phase 2 activities consisted of a series of disparate inputs, some seen as short term gap-filling and others with a more developmental focus. Sustainability of these inputs has been mixed.



Report 1/2011 Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa

Performed by: Ternstrom Consulting AB
ISBN: 987-82-7548-564-7

Evaluation of Norwegian NGOs in East Africa

Evaluation of:

Results of development collaboration through Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in East Africa. The evaluation covers the period from 2005 to 2009 and includes 15 randomly selected projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The projects represent a wide selection of NGOs and activities²¹.

Purpose:

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the results brought about by projects supported by Norwegian NGOs and their partners in East Africa. The evaluation questions focused on how and to what extent the intended results have been achieved and to what extent the organisations use results-based

management in planning, implementation and reporting. This also includes how results are documented and how organisations and activities contribute to strengthening the local civil society and to what extent the projects are relevant for the target groups. This evaluation is the third evaluation commissioned by Norad's evaluation department as a follow-up to the Rattsø Commission's recommendation that the government should take more responsibility for evaluating the work of Norwegian NGOs.

Findings:

The evaluation found that the interventions were in line with the Norwegian government's policy for development aid and with national priorities and were assessed to be relevant for the target groups. The focus of the interventions was poverty alleviation and women and children. The target groups were marginalised or vulnerable or both. The evaluation found several examples of projects that contributed to the strengthening of civil society.

Results-based management was not systematically used in most

of the projects. A basic understanding of the method was, however, found and some projects had defined overall and subsidiary goals. Documentation of baseline data was lacking in most of the projects. There was a wide variation between the different organisations with regard to the quantity and quality of planning and documentation. In most cases, there was insufficient investment in project preparations and the evaluation found serious shortcomings with regard to documentation in all phases of the project cycle.

Achievement of results was found to be high: 73-85% of the expected results, depending on evaluation method²². The evaluation team believes a clear causal relationship can be found between the project activities and the results achieved. Identified side effects were mainly positive.

The evaluation also found that the financing system lacked transparency. The funding passes

21 In Kenya: Digni/Norwegian Mission in Development with Chesta Girls Secondary School, CARE Norway with Lok Pachi – Change your attitude, Norwegian Church Aid with FGM Awareness Creation and Mobilisation and ARC-aid with Change Agent Training Programme. In Tanzania: Forum for Women in Development with Elimination of FGM, Dodoma and Women and Health Project, Chole Island, Norwegian Church Aid with Capacity Development for Interfaith Cooperation, The Norwegian Conference of Trade Unions with Education and Organisational Development, Norwegian People's Aid with Youth Rights and The Stromme Foundation with Microfinance in Tanzania. In Uganda: The Atlas-Alliance with Community Based Rehabilitation in Uganda, The Norwegian Bar Association with Legal Aid Project, Forum for Women and Development with Vocational Training to Disadvantaged Girls and Save the Children Norway with Early Childhood Development and Education and Quality Education Project.

22 Since most of the projects lacked the data and relevant information needed to measure changes in key indicators, the evaluation team developed a method (which is explained in the report) in order to be able to make qualified assessments of the results achieved.

through between six and nine administrative levels on its way from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Norad through the organisations to the end user. The various administrative levels budget and report differently: some have a programmatic focus while others focus on theme or project. The overall cost-effectiveness at field level is assessed as high on average, although there were great differences between the various projects. Measures aimed at small target groups had higher, and sometimes much higher, costs per recipient. Some of the larger projects gained economies of scale. Successful projects have generally not been replicated or scaled up.

Weaknesses were also found in Norad's criteria for financial support to the organisations.

Recommendations:

Recommendations to Norad:

- Norad should require the organisations that receive support to show that results-based management principles are followed at all administrative levels, including project implementation in the field.

Applications with vague targets and indicators that cannot be measured should be rejected.

- Norad should only finance small projects if special reasons exist and can be identified (such as for pilot projects). Norad should also instruct umbrella organisations to do the same.
- Norad should develop new criteria for awarding support. The NGOs' own contributions and the historic budget level should be phased out as a basis for distribution of limited resources. Criteria for awarding support should cover a qualitative assessment of documented results achievements and the organisation's capacity and ambition in relation to innovation and risk.²³
- Norad should develop indicators that facilitate prioritising on the basis of the criteria specified in the governing documents, as well as developing an incentive structure that supports these priorities. The qual-

ity of the organisation's documentation should be given a higher weighting in the distribution of scarce resources.

Recommendations to the NGOs:

- The NGOs should use results-based management to a greater extent. Incentive structures and follow-up with employees should focus on results achieved, not activities completed. The organisations should develop clear goals and SMART indicators²⁴ for all projects within a given deadline.
- The NGOs should develop their capacity for expansion and focus on programme components where the results are clear and positive. They should actively seek to expand and replicate successful programmes. Replicating good results on a larger scale should be an expressed goal.

²⁴ Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Timebound.

²³ In the report, the evaluation team directs this recommendation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation department considers that the correct body for this recommendation is Norad, since Norad itself formulates the regulations for the award of funding to civil community organisations.

Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) Evaluation of the International Finance Facility for Immunization (IFFIm)

Performed by: Mark Pearson, Jeremy Clarke, Laird Ward, Cheri Grace, Daniel Harris, Matthew Cooper

Evaluation of international finance facility for immunisation (IFFIm)

Introduction:

IFFIm is a special purpose organisation that has allowed donor countries to make binding long-term commitments for funding and convert these future cash flows into immediately available funds through the financial markets. Had the donors met their international aid commitments and provided the resources required to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) up front, IFFIm funding would not have been needed.

Findings:

The role of IFFIm is to raise money efficiently from investors in the international capital markets. Its performance against this goal so far indicates that:

- Its borrowing costs have been considerably lower than was originally anticipated.
- It has raised substantial resources, and has the capacity to raise more - though slightly less than originally anticipated at the outset due to the lack of donor pledges.

IFFIm funds have been spent by GAVI Alliance on activities which have delivered, or seem likely to deliver:

- Extremely good development returns, although assessments of health impact are subject to uncertainty and the results may well be somewhat less than initially envisaged.
- It is estimated that the benefit cost ratio is likely to be at least 3.5:1 and that the 800,000 deaths averted which GAVI needs to achieve to break even will be exceeded by some margin.
- These results seem likely to be achieved mainly because GAVI has been able to implement cost effective interventions.
- IFFIm is well regarded by donors and has formed effective partnerships with GAVI, the GAVI Fund Affiliate (GFA) and the World Bank .
- The governance framework of IFFIm has generally been effective albeit more costly to establish and operate than anticipated.
- The IFFIm Board has been well led and has been important to the successful establishment and operation of IFFIm as has the treasury management of the World Bank.
- Accountability and reporting requirements are being met but there is room for improve-

ment. In the early years there was some disagreement between the IFFIm Board and the World Bank due to different expectations and interpretation of the Treasury Management Agreement. A shared understanding on these issues would help IFFIm going forward.

IFFIm, in isolation, is not a sustainable funding model. Looking forward, GAVI aims to increase spending rapidly, at the same time as IFFIm disbursements - based on current donor pledges - are declining. These challenges were not created by IFFIm but the IFFIm model - spending 20 years of donor contributions in 5-7 years - makes them more acute. GAVI is now gearing up to face them through intensified resource mobilisation efforts.



World Bank Independent Evaluation Group: Global Program Review of the World Bank's Engagement with the Global Fund

http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/content/dam/ieg/grpp/GF/GF_evaluation.pdf

Review of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

Introduction:

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was founded in January 2002 and since its inception has become the largest global and regional partnership programme in which the World Bank is involved. This review is based on the evaluation of the Global Fund that was completed in May 2009. The purpose of the review is to learn lessons from the experience of the Global Fund about (a) the design and operation of large global partnership programs that are financing country-level investments, (b) the engagement of the World Bank with such programs, and (c) the evaluation of these programs.

Findings:

- The Five-Year Evaluation — consisting of three Study Areas and a Synthesis Report — was an independent quality evaluation.
- The 2009 evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of the Global Fund and its partner environment at the global and country levels had major impacts on the Global Fund's organisation.

- The evaluation could not assess the contribution of the Global Fund to country-level results.
- Country level mechanisms for coordinating official donor commitments have successfully brought country-level stakeholders together to submit grant proposals to the Global Fund, but monitoring of implementation has been weak.
- Collective donor efforts have contributed to increased availability and use of disease-control services, particularly for HIV/AIDS, which should ultimately reduce the disease burden.
- Reliance on external funds and inadequate investments in long-term capacity raise concerns about the sustainability of recipient countries' disease-control programs.

Recommendations:

- The situation has improved since the 2009 evaluation in terms of the World Bank and other partners' providing technical assistance in support of Global Fund activities. However, there is a need to define these technical support functions

with greater clarity and different donors should be better coordinated.

- The Fund should consider evaluating a random selection of the present individual programmes and establish a system of regular national evaluations, so as to find out more about what works.
- Both the Global Fund and the World Bank should improve monitoring and evaluation at project and national levels.



**World Bank Independent Evaluation Group.
Global Program Review.**

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLOREGPARPROG/Resources/GPR_EITI.pdf

Review of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Introduction:

The World Bank, as administrator of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MDTF)-EITI, commissioned an external evaluation that was completed in May 2009. This review assesses the quality and independence of the external evaluation. As did the evaluation, the review assesses the effectiveness of the MDTF-EITI's work and the performance of the World Bank in its management and support of the programme, and draws some lessons and implications for its future engagement. It covers the period from FY05–10, which corresponds to the First Phase of the MDTF-EITI program.

Findings:

- The programme is in the process of achieving its objective of increasing transparency of revenues in resource-dependent countries. It has succeeded in attracting a growing number of countries, donors, enterprises and civil society organisations and it appears that the benefits will be forthcoming within a reasonable time.
- The focus on revenue transparency agreed for the first phase of the MDTF-EITI made the programme non-threatening and acceptable to a critical cluster

of the poorer countries. This has enabled the initiative to establish itself as a global standard.


- EITI has been effective in managing the differences between the multi-stakeholder driven agenda and the fiduciary duties and priorities of the donors.
- The MDTF-EITI's contribution to the broader goal of improving governance and fighting corruption remains unclear. The programme is creating structures and processes that can be expected to contribute in the longer term.
- The programme has focused on growing the number of EITI candidates and producing reports.

Recommendations:

- To ensure that tangible benefits in terms of improved revenue management and accountability can be achieved, the programme needs to:
 - address the emerging doubts about the adequacy of the programme and whether changes and complementary measures are needed,
 - improve the scope and quality of the EITI reports,
 - recognise the trade-off between expanding the number of EITI candidates and improving results in countries

that are already implementing EITI.

- The World Bank's engagement needs to concentrate on achieving the expected benefits from EITI, such as improved revenue management and reduced corruption, with the following focus:
 - The MDTF-EITI will need to develop a logical framework for results that identifies milestones, necessary conditions, and risk factors. The programme must integrate EITI into relevant, complementary activities in the countries, including those concerned with governance and tax revenues, in order to achieve the long-term goals; and
- The program needs to rigorously apply the principle that it will only support countries where there is a high likelihood that the EITI goals can be achieved. At the same time, the World Bank should work towards increasing support for the EITI principles
- The EITI's stakeholders are aware of these issues, which have already been discussed at board meetings and in working groups. The next phase of the work needs to address EITI's main principles and agreement on priorities.



An Evaluation of World Bank Group Activities in Information and Communication Technologies: Capturing Technology for Development

<http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/content/ieg/en/home/reports/ict.html>

Evaluation of World Bank Activities in Information and Communication Technologies

Introduction:

This evaluation focuses on the activities of the World Bank in information and communication technologies (ICT) in developing countries. During the years 2003–2010, the World Bank provided \$4.2 billion in support of the ICT sector, of which \$2.9 billion was to the poorest countries, where it remained the largest multilateral financier in telecommunications. The World Bank's strategy focused on sector reform, increasing access to information infrastructure and developing ICT skills and applications (that is, ICT components in projects in other sectors).


Findings:

- Countries that received World Bank support for policy reform and investments have increased competition and greater access as compared to countries without such support.
- In other priority areas, the World Bank's contribution has been limited.
- Efforts to increase access beyond what was commercially viable have been largely unsuccessful.

- Access for the poor has been more effectively supported through general, non-targeted interventions focused on the enabling environment and direct support to private investments.
- Targeted approaches, including those involving public-private partnerships, appear positive.
- ICT skills development has received little attention in World Bank operations and the bank has few results to show in this area.
- ICT applications should become the main focus for World Bank support, including through ICT skills development.
- There is a need to ensure that the World Bank Group's organisational structure for ICT enables effective strategy formulation and the effective division of labour between IFC, MIGA and other parts of the World Bank.

Recommendations:

- There could be a vital role for the Bank in updating regulatory frameworks and promoting competition in the ICT sector.
- There are great differences in broadband and internet access in the countries, indicating that the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) must carefully consider support for private investments in each case.
- Expanding access beyond what the commercial market would provide should remain an important priority for the World Bank.



An Evaluation of the 2007 Strategy and Implementation Plan: World Bank Country-Level Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption

<http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/content/ieg/en/home/reports/gac.html>

Evaluation of the World Bank's strategy for work on governance and anti-corruption

Introduction:

In 2007, the World Bank prepared a strategy for its work on governance and anti-corruption. The evaluation considers its relevance and effectiveness, including its implementation in the countries during the period 2008 to 2010. The evaluation will provide inputs for the updating of the strategy.


Findings:

- The Bank is active in the area of governance and anti-corruption in virtually every country where it has operations, and borrowers, development partners and civil society organisations value its analytical capacity and experience in this area.
- The Bank made plans for institutional support in three times as many countries during 2008-2010 as it did in 2004-2007.
- Its use of governance and political analysis in project design has increased, as has its use of some country systems in projects in Africa and in countries with weaker institutions.
- However, important opportunities have yet to be seized:
 - Project-level solutions to institution-building need to keep pace with commitments in country strategies;
 - Political and economic analyses should show more of the systematic improvement evident in projects;
 - Measurement of governance results and measures against for example fraud and corruption could be improved; and
 - The Bank's operational response in countries with weak governance needs to be more consistent.
- Many stakeholders inside and outside the Bank hold the view that lending goals conflict with pursuing governance and anti-corruption objectives.
- The Bank's record in achieving governance improvements has been limited.
- Bank support focused primarily on community-driven and local governance initiatives and established audit institutions and anticorruption bodies. Direct financing of non-state bodies was rare.
- More could be done by the Bank and countries to ensure that efforts to strengthen transverse systems (for example, public financial management and personnel systems) are better coordinated with sector initiatives to improve service delivery.
- To date, efforts have been more focused on the Bank's own capacities, resources and position than on the long-term needs of partner countries.

Recommendations:

Key elements of the 2007 strategy and implementation plan need to be addressed if the Bank is to more consistently and effectively help countries overcome deep-seated governance challenges. There is a need to:

- Focus on helping countries achieve tangible governance improvements, while acknowledging and seeking to resolve trade-offs between different interests.
- Update the Bank's approach to institutional reinforcement through a greater focus on financial instruments, more consistent risk management and improved monitoring in priority areas. These include civil service reform, public management support for service delivery and the investment climate and improved management of revenues from natural resources.
- Clarify the Bank's zero tolerance stance on corruption.
- Use country partner strategies to determine the countries' needs and the Bank's obligations.
- Consolidate different financing schemes so as to bring governance activities more into line with the Bank's administrative and operational principles.



World Bank Independent Evaluation Group

[http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/7AEE150F898C9781852578D1004EA9B6/\\$file/TimorLesteCPE.pdf](http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/7AEE150F898C9781852578D1004EA9B6/$file/TimorLesteCPE.pdf)

Evaluation of the World Bank's Timor-Leste Programme, 2000-2012

Introduction:

This evaluation considers the results of the World Bank programme in Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) during the period 2000 to 2012. The Bank was actively involved in the reconstruction and development of the economy, through 39 operations, financed through regular IDA (US\$24.6 million) and IBRD grants (US\$5 million), in addition to numerous grants from the Trust Fund for East Timor and other donor trust funds managed by the Bank (US\$316.3 million in total). Over the same period, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) had four advisory service projects.

The Bank's strategy focused on: (a) poverty alleviation and the provision of basic social services, (b) development of state institutions and (c) promoting sustainable non-petroleum growth, especially through the development of agriculture and the private sector.

Findings:

- The World Bank strategy was broadly aligned with the country's own aspirations. It became more dispersed, however, at

the cost of areas such as agriculture and capacity-building of state institutions.

- The outcome of the World Bank's support was mixed:
 - Assistance in securing the country's petroleum revenues and managing them transparently was highly satisfactory;
 - Assistance in health and war veteran issues was moderately satisfactory; and
 - Assistance in other areas, particularly in promoting sustainable non-petroleum growth through the development of agriculture and the private sector, fell short of its objectives.
- Measured against its own goals, support is rated as 'somewhat unsatisfactory'.


Recommendations:

IEG recommends that the World Bank:

- Set its key objective as one of supporting vigorous and sustainable non-oil growth, creating jobs and improving infrastructure.
- In consultation with development partners, define clear pri-

orities for the programme with realistic time frames.

- Increase its focus on effective human resource development for institution-building and improved governance.
- Follow more closely its own guidance on dealing with fragile states.
- Ensure more active management of its assistance program, strengthening its capacity to deliver timely high-quality policy and technical advice.
- Be realistic with regard to the situation on the ground and what is needed to attain development objectives.
- Make IFC's interventions of sufficient scale to achieve the objectives of the programme.
- Concentrate monitoring and evaluation on a few key results, with the emphasis on improving national statistical capacity.



World Bank Evaluation: World Bank Progress in Harmonization and Alignment in Low-Income Countries

http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/content/dam/ieg/pubs/donor_harmonization.pdf

Evaluation of the World Bank's work on harmonisation and alignment in low-income countries

Introduction:

This evaluation focuses on the effectiveness of the Bank efforts in advancing two of the Paris Declaration principles—harmonisation (between donors) and alignment (with the countries' own systems). These are considered central to strengthening aid effectiveness.

Findings:

- The Bank has made good progress in harmonising with other donors.
- The cost of joint strategies with other donors can outweigh the benefits. Coordinated strategies have been a good alternative.
- Bank strategies have been aligned with partner country development priorities, and the use of country structures to implement projects has increased.
- Generally, the Bank's donor coordination activities have been effective in reducing costs to governments, building government capacity, and improving the quality of the policy dialogue.
- Progress in the use of country financial management and pro-

urement systems has been constrained by inadequate capacity in the countries and the Bank's fiduciary obligations.

- The Bank's internal rules for harmonisation and alignment play a modest role in promoting coordination.
- The field presence of Bank staff is important for coordination, although entails significant costs.
- Government ownership and leadership are not always present, but important where they exist.

Recommendations:

The World Bank should:

- Promote sector wide approaches.
- Make transparent to authorities the reasons for not using country financial management systems when they are not used, and deficiencies that clients need to address.
- Mobilise financial and technical support to strengthen country leadership of aid management and coordination.
- Recognise World Bank staff efforts in coordination.

Social Safety Nets - An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2000–2010

Introduction:

During the period 2000-2010, the World Bank supported social safety nets (SSNs) with \$11.5 billion in lending and a programme of analytical and advisory activities and knowledge sharing. Support during the last two years was largely a response to the financial crisis and higher food prices.

Findings:


The evaluation finds that World Bank support to SSNs has largely accomplished its short-term objectives and has helped many countries:

- The Bank increased lending and analytical support in a way that helped cushion the consequences for poor and vulnerable households and be better prepared for future crises.
- Expansion of support included both low and middle-income countries, increasing SSN activity greatly in many low-income countries.
- The Bank began to move from a project-focused approach towards helping countries build systems and institutions to improve social response.

Recommendations:

The World Bank and others should:

- Improve social safety nets during stable times to help in poverty-enhancing crises-situations.
- Place more emphasis on developing institutional capacity in low-income countries.
- Reinforce the results framework for work on social safety nets, including objectives and project formulation and monitoring.
- Improve the harmonisation of support to social safety nets with other donors.



Assessment of Development Results. Evaluation of UNDP Contribution in Bangladesh

Performed by: The UN Development Programme's evaluation office
<http://web.undp.org/evaluation/adr/bangladesh.html>

Evaluation of UNDP Contribution in Bangladesh

Evaluation of:

The United Nations Development Programme's contribution to development in Bangladesh since 2006.

Purpose:

Generate information about the results of UNDP's contribution in Bangladesh during the programme period 2006-2011, for use in the next programme period.

Findings:

UNDP has played an important role in connection with electoral reform in Bangladesh and during the election of 2008. UNDP helped to ensure that 81 million voters were registered over the course of 11 months.

UNDP has contributed to putting human rights on the agenda in the country and integrating and institutionalising these rights in the National Human Rights Commission. Because UNDP's role is perceived as neutral, the organisation has managed to contribute to the development and piece-building work in Chittagong Hill Tracts. UNDP has also contributed to the reform of the police and supported the work of decentralisation. This has led to the for-

mulation of a new policy and new regulations. Otherwise, the report maintains that almost all of UNDP's activities are closely linked to Bangladesh's national priorities and development plans

The findings are more varied when it comes to UNDP's various roles in the country: implementing projects, giving advice to the authorities, mobilising resources for development activities and championing certain causes. The report points out that it has been difficult in some cases to find the right balance between these roles. UNDP has had difficulties in bringing voluntary organisations, local authorities and private industry together, and this should be improved. The report believes that UNDP should place more emphasis on advocacy than on being an organisation that implements actual projects.


The assessment report praises UNDP for being successful in integrating the gender equality perspective into its projects. It is difficult, however, to find out what practical significance this has had because of the lack of evaluation of the extent to which women's advancement has been moni-

tored during the implementation of the projects.

UNDP's work now places more emphasis on climatic adaptation, while other environmental efforts have been reduced during the course of the programme period.

Recommendations:

- UNDP must link its work with Bangladesh's own priorities, especially as these appear in the 6th five-year plan.
- UNDP should build exit strategies into its projects.
- UNDP should scale up its use of influence, especially in human rights and gender equality.
- UNDP should make more strategic use of the lessons it has learned from equality and women's projects, including by educating various groups in these questions and integrating equality issues into the academic curriculum.
- UNDP should continue its work on environmental issues and connect these with the reduction of poverty.



Assessment of Development Results. Evaluation of UNDP Contribution: Malawi

Performed by: The UN Development Programme's evaluation office
<http://web.undp.org/evaluation/adr/malawi.html>

Evaluation of UNDP Contribution in Malawi

Evaluation of:

The United Nations Development Programme's contribution to development in Malawi since 2002. The evaluation considers cost-effectiveness and sustainability and also considers whether UNDP has adapted its activities to changes in the situation of the country and the government's objectives.

Purpose:

Generate information about the results of UNDP's contribution in Malawi during the programme period 2002-2011, for use in the next programme period.

Findings:

On a scale of 1 to 5 (5 highest), the evaluation gives a score of 4.6 for relevance, 3.7 for goal fulfilment, 2.6 for cost-effectiveness and 2.8 for sustainability. The evaluation concludes that UNDP's contribution in Malawi is satisfactory. Support for the development of policy – not programmes at ground level - is normally considered to be UNDP's most important task. The assessment found, however, that the programmes worked quite well, although the organisation has not assessed its

own or the authorities' capacity to see things through well enough. The organisation has, on the other hand, had little influence on the authorities and on the policies that have been formulated.

Collaboration has mainly been with the central state apparatus, rather than with local authorities or civil bodies.

A general lack of exit strategies and the absence of co-financing by the authorities have led to low sustainability.

The UNDP's processes and procedures are often rigid, which has weakened goal fulfilment in the programmes.

Recommendations:

- UNDP should place greater emphasis on economic governance and compliance with regulations in the private sector. In areas where many are involved, such as elections, the organisation should concentrate on building capacity and coordination.
- UNDP must extend its use of influence, especially in poverty reduction and human rights.

- UNDP must strengthen the partnerships with the civil society and the private sector.

Evaluation Follow-up

The Instructions for evaluation of Norwegian aid administration (approved by the Secretary General on 29 May 2006) state procedures for following up on evaluations. On the basis of the final report and comments from interested parties on the findings and recommendations, the Evaluation Department shall prepare a memorandum with recommendations for follow-up in Norwegian development policy. This memorandum is sent via Norad's Director Gen-

eral to the Secretary General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry then decides which items will be followed up and how, within what time frame and by whom. This follow-up plan shall be devised within six weeks and advised to the parties involved, the Evaluation Department and the Director of Norad. The unit responsible shall then report within a year to the Secretary General, with a copy to the Director General of Norad, and the

Evaluation Department, advising what measures have been taken to follow up on the decisions taken on the evaluation. The table below shows the status of the memorandums, follow-up plans and reports for evaluations performed during the period 2009-2011. As can be seen from the table, as at the end of April 2012, there are 2 follow-up memoranda, 9 follow-up plans and 4 follow-up reports outstanding.

Evaluation project	Report number	Memorandum to Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Adopted action plans	Follow-up report
Nepal's Education for All	2009/1	Policy Brief 02.2010	Follow-up by Nepal Government	
Joint Donor Team in Juba	2009/2	09.09.2009	No plan recommended beyond the follow up already done	
NGO's in Northern Uganda	2009/3	31.08.2009	25.06.2010	25.06.2010
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development II	Joint	07.08.2009	Norwegian action plan not required	
Support to Cultural Heritage	2009/4	30.09.2009	09.06.2010	08.11.2011
Multilateral Environmental Development Assistance	Synthesis	08.10.2009	Action plan not required	
Norwegian Peace Building in Haiti	2009/5	15.02.2010	15.07.2010	02.02.2012
Norwegian people's Aid Mine Action Activities	2009/6	19.02.2010	08.04.2010	31.03.2011
National programme for development related research and education (NUFU) and Norad's programme for master studies (NOMA)	2009/7	14.04.2010	03.11.2010	

Evaluation project	Report number	Memorandum to Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Adopted action plans	Follow-up report
Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002-2009	2010/01	26.03.2010	07.05.2010	
Synthesis Study - Support to Legislatures	2010/2	Memo note not required		
Norwegian Business-Related Assistance	2010/3 (Case studies 2010/4,5,6)	23.09.2010	15.03.2011	
Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans	2010/7	04.11.2010	21.01.2011	
Transparency International	2010/8	22.09.2011	21.11.2011	
Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives	2010/9	24.02.2011		
Conflict Prevention and Peace building Activities in Southern Sudan	Joint	03.03.2011	22.06.2011	
Democracy Support through the United Nations	2010/10	08.07.2011		
International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking	2010/11	18.05.2011	05.10.2011	
Real-time evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative	2010/12 (Country reports 2010/ 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18)	08.06.2011	12.09.2011	
Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO's in East Africa	2011/1	25.04.2012		
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness	Joint	Report did not include Norwegian aid specifically. Memo note not developed.		
Support for Child Rights	Joint	21.11.2011		
Research on Norwegian Development Assistance	2011/2	04.01.2012		
Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with countries in the South	2011/3	27.01.2012		
Support to Anti-corruption Efforts	2011/6	15.02.2012		
Study. Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption	2011/4 Study	Memo note not required		
Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka	2011/5	08.02.2012		
Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights	2011/7	17.01.2012		
Synthesis Study: Norway's Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations	2011/8	08.03.2012		
Financial flows in the UN system	2011/9 Study			
Norwegian support for the health sector in Botswana	2011/10			

Learning Prize

On the initiative of the Evaluation Department, a competition is being organised for the first time this year on the best use of and learning from evaluations and reviews.


The Learning Prize 2012 will be awarded for the best use of evaluations and reviews in the last five years. Evaluations commissioned by the Evaluation Department and reviews and evaluations performed by or on behalf of others are all eligible for the competition. The intention is to stimulate better use of this type of information and to obtain a better overview of which evaluations and reviews are actually being used. The prize is primarily aimed at Norad, the embassies and the sections, units and departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Those nominated must be able to demonstrate that the use of evaluations has led to actual changes to or strengthening of the work being done. It is also possible to nominate use in the form of insights, attitude changes and learning during the processes, or that the knowledge obtained has been used in an organisation as a whole to a much greater extent. The nominations must also describe what assessments have been made of the evaluation or review's usefulness and credibility, main conclusions and recommendations.

It is possible to nominate evaluations or reviews of a specific programme, policy, project, sector approach or instrument or an organisation, partner or project portfolio.

Eight nominations were received for the use of learning, three of them regarding reviews and four evaluations. Three were commissioned by the Evaluation Department of Norad and one (of a Norwegian-Swedish programme) was commissioned by SIDA's evaluation department. Five of the nominations came from departments and sections of Norad and two from embassies. We will announce the winner at the annual report presentation seminar.

The learning team, which consists of representatives of Norad's Evaluation Department and the Department for Method and Results, hope that the learning prize will stimulate departments of Norad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies to conscious use of good evaluations and reviews.



Norad

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Cover photo: Ken Opprann

Design: Siste Skrik Kommunikasjon

No. of Copies: 500

ISBN: 978-82-7548-659-0

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