

# NPA CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMME EVALUATION

Edward Thomas, November 2018

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation looks at the design, performance, impact, relevance and sustainability of three major projects that form part of NPA's Civil Society Programme from 2016-2018: a four-year Cooperative Agreement with Norad, *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society in South Sudan*, and a four grants lasting for one or two years from Norad Regional Funds, themed around gender, youth, peace. These projects are managed through the Civil Society Programme's four thematic components: Land and Natural Resources, Women's Rights, Youth and Media. *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* covers 17 countries. It was initially designed in Juba, with input from NPA's Oslo office, and then redesigned to fit into the 17-country grant. Project planning documents were drafted in 2015 on the eve of a peace agreement which collapsed in 2016, just after funds began to be disbursed. *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* was revised in the light of the turn towards violence and repression. Projects financed from Norad regional funds were designed in Juba.

The projects under evaluation began in 2016 with 30 partners, only three of which were new to NPA. But there was considerable churn. In 2018, the projects under evaluation have the same number of partners, but more than half had begun their relationship with NPA after 2016.

Along with programme staff, partners play an important role in interpreting the results framework of *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*. This process led to a proliferation of outcomes, outputs and indicators, which along with the partner churn has complicated internal monitoring, and made it difficult for programme managers to maintain a strategic overview. A proposed new monitoring system may address this problem.

This evaluation focuses on two or three major outcomes common to all the all projects under evaluation: influencing, advocating and mobilizing. Internal, formal reporting tends to focus on the first 'influencing' outcome.

The projects under evaluation seek to influence policy and legislation, and advocate on specific issues. These activities require a relatively optimistic engagement with public authorities. NPA's partners have chosen to work mainly with local authorities, because there are many constraints on working with national authorities in the current circumstances. However, some advocacy and policy work targets the national government.

NPA's partners have many results to show, despite working in an environment where social and political relations are being violently reconfigured around ethnicity, and basic freedoms are restricted. NPA's work on Land and Natural Resources is a good example. NPA's partners have done some excellent work on land-grabbing in the past, and nowadays are mediating local land disputes and mobilizing communities to manage and protect their rights in land and natural resources. However, the notion of 'community' is being redefined around hard ethnic borders, and sometimes community rights in land can be used to exclude displaced people, or to polarize host and displaced communities.

NPA's partners also combat gender-based violence through different projects aimed at awareness-raising, economic empowerment, and also by engaging with police and courts to address widespread impunity for perpetrators. They have helped to end impunity in some resonantly symbolic cases, by intervening directly in the administration of justice. This intervention by an NGO in a domain which is usually reserved to the state has raised uncomfortable and complicated procedural and legal questions.

Examples from other thematic components show that NPA's engagement in a complex political terrain has exposed it to other risks and dilemmas. The response to these risks and dilemmas should be study and reflection, rather than disengagement.

The final 'mobilizing' outcome of the projects under evaluation aims at fostering democratic practice within organizations and communicating and organizing diverse constituencies outwith those organizations. NPA supports many membership organizations, and most have struggled to hold general assemblies and board elections, partly because of conflict and economic crisis since *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* began in 2016. NPA's longest-standing partners do not necessarily have the best records on democratic practice. This suggests that progress towards improved internal democratic practice has been modest.

The main aims for financial performance are to support partners to develop adequate financial systems, and to transfer the majority of project resources to partners. Progress towards developing financial systems has been relatively modest: only three partners manage their own accounts, and the remainder provide NPA with receipts. However, all partners have undergone training in the accounting software package QuickBooks, and this training may lead to more sustainable financial systems. Only about one-third of project resources are transferred to partners. Although this is less than the requirements of project planning documents, this level of resource transfer is relatively high in the context of South Sudan. This relatively high resource transfer has been achieved in a volatile political environment, at a time when NPA has begun a significant number of new partnerships, many of them with organizations whose financial systems need strengthening. Finally, another important financial indicator is underspend. All partners spend all the funds transferred to them. This complete absence of underspend may be an indicator of under-utilized capacity among partners.

The projects under evaluation also addressed two cross-cutting themes: conflict-sensitivity and gender-sensitivity, but no consistent approach to those themes was developed. A 2018 evaluation of the Rural Development Programme found that there was little coherence with NPA's two other programmes, Civil Society and Emergency. This evaluation reached the same conclusion.

In order to assess the relevance and sustainability of the projects under evaluation, this evaluation places them in a historical context. South Sudan has long had a wide range of rural, vernacular democratic institutions structured around kinship and ethnicity. As far back as the colonial period, urban associations based on sectoral interests developed. But these have been reshaped or swept away by conflict. A new form of civil society appeared in the 1990s, driven by donor imperatives and focused on humanitarian relief. After a 2005 peace agreement ended South Sudan's second civil war, new universities, media houses, professional and trade organizations appeared, and at the same time, ethnic structures were partly incorporated into administrative, judicial and economic systems of the state, and new basic-services NGOs delivered social services which the government failed to provide. Today, government repression and donor priorities are once again pushing South Sudan's civil society towards service delivery and away from political activism. The current civil war and linked economic crisis has put NGOs, including civil society organizations aiming at social and political change at the centre of the circuits of hard currency in rural South Sudan. Their new economic importance is not conducive to building representative, democratic and accountable civil society organizations.

NPA has in-house classifications for different kinds of civil society organizations, but this classification does not always take account of South Sudan's particularities. A key relationship is that between professional, hierarchical, get-it-done NGOs and volunteer community-based organizations, many of them connected to powerful vernacular democratic traditions. Getting right this relationship between professional capabilities and democratic traditions is really important for South Sudan's future.

The evaluation argues that NPA's three main outcomes (influencing, advocating and mobilizing) correspond to three possible strategic directions for the projects under evaluation and NPA's wider Civil Society Programme: patiently engaging with the authorities; acting as a watchdog or critic of the authorities; and strategically withdrawing in order to study, learn and work out alternative

approaches to democratic practice. All these approaches need a research strategy that builds the capacity of partners.

## ACRONYMS

AMDISS	Association for Media Development in South Sudan
AMWISS	Association of Media Women in South Sudan
CAPAD	Christian Agency for Peace and Development
COMMNETSS	Community Media Network of South Sudan
COREMAP	Community Natural Resource Management & Institutional Capacity Building
CRN	Catholic Radio Network
GBV	Gender-based violence
GELA	Greater Equatoria Land Alliance
IDP	Internally displaced person
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NOK	Norwegian krone
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSANSA	South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms
SSCSF	South Sudan Civil Society Forum
SSLS	South Sudan Law Society
TOR	Terms of Reference
UJOSS	Union of Journalists in South Sudan
UNYDA	Upper Nile Youth Development Association
USD	United States dollars
USN	United and Save the Nation

## TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION

Ten questions are set out in the TOR for this evaluation. This report has organized these questions into three main sections: project design and monitoring, project performance, and project relevance and sustainability. Two shorter sections deal with cross-cutting issues and the coherence between NPA’s Civil Society Programme and the rest of NPA’s South Sudan country programme. The final TOR question (Q10. Assess the NPA South Sudan Oil for Development project) is the subject of a second report, submitted to the evaluation team working on NPA’s global Oil for Development evaluation.

Report section	TOR questions
Design and monitoring	Q1. To what extent have the projects under Civil Society Programme achieved the planned results, i.e. outputs and outcomes (including short term, intended and unintended)? <i>Are the aims of the programme relevant and realistic?</i>
	Q5. Review and comment on current NPA South Sudan Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) practices and systems. Recommend concrete steps for improvements.
Performance and impact	Q1. <i>To what extent have the projects under Civil Society Programme achieved the planned results, i.e. outputs and outcomes (including short term, intended and unintended)? Are the aims of the programme relevant and realistic?</i>
Financial performance	Q8. Are the civil society projects implemented in a cost-efficient way?
Cross-cutting issues	Q4. To what extent does the programme pay attention to conflict sensitivity and gender-sensitivity? What needs to be improved? At what level should/could adjustments be made (design, content, focus, staff training, and community awareness, etc.)
Coherence with NPA’s South Sudan country programme	Q9. Map the complementarity of focus and approach between projects under the Civil Society Programme and the other two programme departments (Rural Development and Emergency Response). Build on a previous evaluation of the Rural Development Programme and give concrete recommendations for improved integration.
Relevance and sustainability	Q2. What is the long-term impact of NPA’s support to civil society in South Sudan over the last 10 years?
	Q3. Are the programmatic approaches, and the chosen partners, relevant to the current political context in South Sudan - how do NPA and partners respond to the volatile context in South Sudan?
	Q6. Is NPA following its global partnership-approach? What are some of the strengths, and challenges that the programme is facing in their work with partners in South Sudan?
	Q7. Is the capacity of NPA partners strengthened through NPA’s support? To what extent? How can this be improved?
Recommendations	



## SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION

NPA's Civil Society Programme in South Sudan is funded by five different grants. This evaluation addresses projects funded under the following three grants.

- Norad Cooperative Agreement, *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society in South Sudan* (2016-19). 19.5 million NOK in the 2018 financial year. Henceforward *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*.
- Norad Regional Funds (2016-17). These funds addressed youth, peace and gender. 7.2 million NOK in the 2017 financial year. They were incorporated into the results framework for *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*.
- Norad Regional Funds, *Unlearning Violence and Promoting Peace* (2017-18). 5.7 million NOK in the 2018 financial year. Henceforward *Unlearning Violence*.
- Norad Regional Funds, *Building Community Resilience to Prevent GBV in South Sudan* (2017-18). 3.8 million NOK in the 2018 financial year. Henceforward *Resilience to Prevent GBV*.

Projects which are managed by NPA's Civil Society Programme, but funded by the following two grants were excluded from this evaluation.

- Norad Cooperative Agreement, *Oil for Development* (2016-18). 3.3million NOK for the period from June 2017 to May 2018. (Oil for Development projects are the subject of a separate evaluation).
- Civil Society Facility of a consortium of embassies in Juba, *Strengthening Capacity to Influence Change through Civil Society in Bor* (2017-20). 200,000 USD in the 2018 financial year. (This project was excluded from this evaluation based on discussion with programme staff).

In addition, this evaluation excludes two projects funded by the Norad Cooperative Agreement, *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society in South Sudan* (2016-2019) which are administered by NPA's Rural Development Programme.

- Community Natural Resource Management & Institutional Capacity Building (COREMAP)
- Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction & Institutional Capacity Building

## METHOD AND LIMITATIONS

The evaluation is based on 48 interviews and group interviews with 88 people, 29 of whom are women. Interviews were conducted with NPA staff, partners and beneficiaries and key informants with knowledge of the Civil Society Programme. All but one of the interviews was conducted in person. Interviews are listed in the appendix.

Most interviews were conducted in Juba, and there was a high representation of staff of NPA and its partner NGOs. Representatives of 16 out of 30 NPA partners were interviewed. Beneficiaries of NPA's Civil Society Programme were interviewed in four group interviews attended by 26 interviewees, eight of whom are women. These interviews took place in Malakal and Nimule, but not in Juba.

NPA's Civil Society Programme is made up of four thematic components: land and natural resources, women, media and youth. Most of the beneficiaries interviewed were participants in the youth programme. However some of the material on the youth component has been reconstructed from NPA's reports, and has not been cross-checked through interviews, because it was not possible to interview relevant staff in the course of the evaluation

The evaluation is also based on an extensive review of programme budgets, proposals, policies, research outputs and reports from partners. In total, 127 texts were reviewed, of which 75 were generated by partners. The evaluation also draws on legal, scholarly and grey literature about South Sudan. This literature is cited in the endnotes.

This evaluation has several limitations. First, it was not possible to interview a wide range of beneficiaries, because of the difficulties of travel to two implementation sites. Second, it was not possible to interview beneficiaries or organizations who had ended their participation with the programme – often, these groups provide useful information about impact. Third, South Sudan's long distances and poor communications imposed their usual limitations on the work. Finally, some NPA staff were not available for interview in the time available.

## DESIGN AND MONITORING (Q1, Q5)

### DESIGN

The *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* project is part of a global programme implemented in 17 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. It was initially designed in Juba, with input from NPA's Oslo office, and then redesigned to fit into the 17-country grant. Subsequently, NPA's Civil Society Programme also won grants from Norad Regional Funds. In 2016-17, grants from these Regional Funds were based on the results framework of the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* project, with the addition of two new outcomes. In 2017-18, Norad Regional Funds financed two stand-alone projects, *Unlearning Violence* and *Resilience to Prevent GBV*, which were designed in consultation with local partners.

The initial results framework for the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* was common to all 17 countries of operation, and was focused on three processes: influencing, mobilizing and advocating.

#### *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society 2016-19*

Outcome 1: Civil Society Organisations influence political decision making

- Intermediate outcome 1: Partners mobilise around common issues
- Intermediate outcome 2: Popular organisations are more effective in organising people who have a common cause
  - Output 1: Partners have capacity to challenge authorities
  - Output 2: Representative member base in partner organisations increased
  - Output 3: Partners have democratic structures in their organisations
  - Output 4: Partners have systems in place for financial administration

In 2016-17, Norad Regional Funds financed a project which was based on the results framework for *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society in South Sudan (2016-19)* but which added additional outcomes, as follows:

#### *Regional funds 2016*

Outcome 2: South Sudan Civil Society influences the successful implementation of ARCISS.

- Output 2.1: Youth and women have knowledge about the implementation of the peace agreement in South Sudan
- Output: 2.2 Civil society raise the voice of victims of the conflict.
- Output 2.3 Media coverage promotes peaceful co-existence in South Sudan.
- Output 2.4: South Sudanese Artists use their art to promote peace & justice.

Outcome 3: The resilience of youth, women and journalists is strengthened

- Output 3.1. Youth have increased understanding on mental health issues in their communities.
- Output 3.2 SGBV survivors are provided with support and services.
- Output 3.3 South Sudanese Journalists are provided with support to address their mental health and psychosocial needs.

In 2017-2018, instead of being incorporated into the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* project, Norad Regional Funds were used to set up additional projects, *Unlearning Violence* and *Resilience to Prevent GBV*. Their outcomes were as follows:

### *Resilience to Prevent GBV 2017-18*

Outcome: Conflict affected women and girls have strengthened resilience to prevent GBV within their communities

- Output 1: Girls have increased opportunities to build social assets to protect against and respond to violence.
- Output 2: Women have increased social assets and safety nets to protect themselves from violence and respond to threats and incidents of violence.
- Output 3: Influential people in women's and girls' lives have improved attitudes, knowledge and skills to protect girls and women from violence and support them to be safe from violence.

### *Unlearning Violence and Promoting Peace in South Sudan 2017-18*

Outcome 1: Multi-ethnic youth mobilize to promote peace.

- Output 1.1: Youth gain knowledge and awareness and skills on how to resolve conflict non-violently.
- Output 1.2: Cooperation and partnerships between youth from different communities are established.
- Output 1.3: NPA youth partners advocate for peace, reconciliation, healing and justice in South Sudan.

Outcome 2: Community Radio stations in South Sudan engage people at the grassroots on issues of peace and reconciliation through their platforms.

- Output 2.1. Radio programing is created for youth on issues of peace and conflict.
- Output 2.2. Citizen Journalists report on youth led peace activities at both the grassroots and community level.
- Output 2.3 Community Radio Journalists have skills and knowledge to effectively report on peace and conflict.

The ARCISS peace agreement all but collapsed in July 2016, and most NPA staff left the country – just one month after the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* funds were disbursed. This big change to the external environment led to several changes. First, there was a reconsideration of the objectives and approaches of the NPA's whole Civil Society Programme. Working with national government on natural resource governance became more complex and NPA's own role, as opposed to that of its partners, was pushed to the background. Second, partnerships with groups deemed to be lacking adequate accountability mechanisms were ended. In 2018, NPA's Civil Society Programme was renamed as '*Limu Idan*' (*Joining Hands*) *Partnerships for Strong Communities in South Sudan*. Existing outcomes remained in place, but the work was now organized around three pillars. The three pillars sought to articulate some of the ways in which the results framework could be adapted for NPA's partnerships in the South Sudan context, and focused strongly on those partnerships, as follows:

#### *Limu Idan*

Pillar 1: To strengthen NPA's Partners internal structures, systems and good governance practices.

- Output 1.1: NPA civil society Partners have strong project management skills and systems in place.
- Output 1.2: NPA's civil society partners have the basic organizational governance systems in place.
- Output 1.3: NPA civil society partners have internal systems and controls to ensure compliance and accountability.

Pillar 2: To strengthen NPA's civil society partners capacity to mobilize and organize people in their communities.

- Output 2.1: NPA's civil society partners are equipped with tactics & tools that make them effective organizers
- Output 2.2: NPA's civil society partners increase their use of civic space.
- Output 2.3: NPA's civil society partners conduct joint actions on common issues.

Pillar 3: To strengthen NPA's civil society partners capacity to influence change at both local and national levels.

- Output 3.1: NPA's civil society partners influence authorities and those in power.
- Output 3.2: NPA's civil society partners provide information that increase awareness on rights and responsibilities.
- Output 3.3: NPA's civil society partners provide services to communities that increase their access to rights and improve their lives.

NPA's Civil Society Programme has four teams, each managing one of four thematic components: Land and Natural Resources, Media, Youth Rights and Women's Rights. These four thematic teams manage the grants. Partners each fall under one of these thematic components for management purposes, although partners may participate in more than one project. Work on civil society representation in the peace process includes partners from all four teams, and it is managed separately. In addition, the Women's Rights Coordinator functions as the Gender Adviser for the whole programme.

This evaluation looks at a group of projects are part of NPA's Civil Society Programmes. They have different project cycles and reporting requirements. But they are all managed by the same staff teams, with the same approach, and together, the projects under evaluation make up most of the Civil Society Programme's activities and funding.

## PROGRAMME MONITORING

The NPA Civil Society Programme has about thirty partners, and is funded by five grants, three of which are evaluated in this report. Over the past three years, these three grants have been required to deliver six different outcomes with 28 different outputs and 65 different indicators. This does not include the outcomes, outputs and indicators that are generated by partners in concept notes and action plans: each partner can commit to several specific outcomes with a dozen indicators. Monitoring all this is a challenge.

### MONITORING METHODS

NPA uses a variety of methods to monitor outcomes and outputs:

- Narrative reports. These are written by partners and structured around a template that includes sections on context, achievements/results, plans, capacity building, mobilization and engagement of external groups, risks, deviations from plans, lessons learned, feedback from beneficiaries, and a report against the outcomes, outputs and indicators in the results framework.
- Progress reports: These are written by NPA staff, based on the same template used in partner narrative reports. Coordinators of the Civil Society Programme's four thematic components synthesize partner reports, and the programme manager then reports against the different grants which make up the Civil Society Programme, including those under evaluation in this report.
- Partner profiles. These are electronic forms maintained by NPA staff. They have a list of checkboxes describing the legal status of organizations, their membership of alliances, information about staff, board and membership. Organizations are classified in checkboxes based on NPA's Partnership Policy: NGOs with/without membership, People's Organizations, and Umbrella Organizations.
- Global Results Indicator Forms: These are electronic forms maintained by NPA staff. They have a list of checkboxes based on the indicators in the Global Results Framework.
- Informal dialogues: NPA staff make frequent visits to partners to discuss progress but also just to engage in dialogue.

### MONITORING IN PRACTICE: OUTCOMES, OUTPUTS AND INDICATORS

*Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society's* outcomes are process-oriented: influencing, mobilizing, advocating. These outcomes and outputs are common to NPA's civil society work in 17 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Because the planning documents set out broad and generalized directions for civil society, each country needs to interpret these directions locally. In practice, the process of interpretation of *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society's* outcomes was devolved to partners, using its results framework as a guide to annual reporting. Partners develop concept notes in dialogue with NPA staff, and they have considerable autonomy in interpreting the outcomes locally. They also sign a contract which typically requires them to produce an interim and final report over the lifetime of the grant, which may last less than 12 months. *Unlearning Violence* and *Resilience to Prevent GBV* projects follow a broadly similar process. They develop annual action plans with log frames structured around the results frameworks agreed with donors.

This practice is important because it devolves significant decisions to partners. But it is complicated. First, understanding of terms like 'outcome' or 'indicator' can change as they pass from one organization to another. Second, important process-oriented outcomes, such as mobilization and representation, can be downgraded, perhaps it is difficult for local organizations to make

meaningful, measurable commitments to such outcomes. Third, the proliferation of outcomes, outputs and indicators makes it difficult for programme managers to maintain an overview of the programme's achievements and limitations.

The following example sets out one way in which the process of turning global results into local outcomes can work. First, here are seven key outcomes and outputs from the Global Results Framework of *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*:

RESULTS	INDICATORS
<b>Outcome: Civil Society Organisations influence political decision making</b>	# of partners who have presented proposals to authorities
	# of partners whose proposals have been included in policies
	# of law proposals presented by partners to authorities
	# of law initiatives that partners have worked to stop
<b>Intermediate outcome 1: Partners mobilise around common issues</b>	# of partners who participate in alliances
	# of partners who have organised campaigns
	# of partners who have initiated public debates in media
	# of cases where communities were able to negotiate large scale land investments with investors
<b>Intermediate outcome 2: Popular organisations are more effective in organising people who have a common cause</b>	# of partners with more than 10% increase in membership
	# of partners with political training programmes
<b>Output 1: Partners have capacity to challenge authorities</b>	# of partners who have on-going advocacy cases to influence local/regional authorities
	# of partners who have on-going advocacy cases to influence national authorities
	# of partners who have on-going advocacy cases internationally
<b>Output 2: Representative member base in partner organisations increased</b>	# of local groups in partner organisations
	% of female members in partner organisations
	% of young members (below 30 years) in partner organisation
<b>Output 3: Partners have democratic structures in their organisations</b>	# of partners with internal elections in 2011 or later
	# of partners with policy documents approved by elected assemblies
	% of female board members
<b>Output 4: Partners have systems in place for financial administration</b>	# of partners do their own financial audit 3 partners currently doing their own audits

And here is an example of the way that these outcomes and indicators were interpreted by one NPA partner, the Greater Equatoria Land Alliance (GELA), in a concept note that formed the basis of a 2017 contract (the table presented here has been lightly edited for space):

Outcomes	Output(s)	Indicator(s)
<i>Please include 2-3 that connect to the change you will influence, mobilization and strengthening your organization</i>	<i>Measurable deliverables that contribute towards achieving the outcomes</i>	<i>Suggest a few and NPA will also provide once direction of project is clear</i>
Level of cooperation among the stakeholders improved.	Consultation meeting with stakeholders	# Consultative Meetings conducted. # stakeholders (male, female) who participated in the consultative meeting.
Increased capacity of GELA members on land and resources rights	ToT for GELA members	# TOTs conducted. # TOT Participants (male, female) trained. # topics covered.

Increased capacity of GELA staff on GELA operations and activities implementation	Training for GELA staff.	# training conducted. # GELA staff trained. # topics/contents covered.
Increased community awareness of their land and resources rights and able to claim their land and resources rights.	Radio talk-shows on land and resources rights.	# radio talk shows conducted. # talk-shows talking points developed and covered #people who call in during the talk-show
Land related conflicts in Equatoria mapped and strategies to address them collectively developed.		# interviews administered. # respondents interviewed in Equatoria region
Increased capacity of land officers and administrators on their role in land administration management.	Workshop on the role of land officers on land administration and management	# workshops conducted. # land officers trained. # topics covered.

The two tables give the impression that the terms ‘outcome,’ ‘output’ and ‘indicator’ are being used in different senses. The GELA logframe presents outputs as activities that can be measured by indicators, while the Global Results Framework presents outputs as lower-order outcomes.

The Global Results Framework makes mobilizing, organizing and representing into key outcomes/outputs. Prioritizing democratic practice in this way is a very significant (and in the context of South Sudan, very welcome) element of the whole programme. However, these are not results that are easy to operationalize. In the GELA logframe, most of these processes are summed up under a consultation meeting with stakeholders. In its narrative report of September 2017, GELA reported as follows on this output:

The people whom GELA mobilized in order to achieve the planned results were: Civil Society Organizations' members, traditional leaders and the government representatives mainly from the County Land Authority and the State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure.

This evaluation reviewed 40 narrative reports from partners, 9 progress reports from NPA staff, 1 Global Results Indicator Form and 1 Partner Profile. All these reports focused their attention more on tangible outputs, such as training events, rather than processes such as democracy. This is understandable: it is very difficult to give an account of these processes in formal, documented reporting.

Instead of formally reporting on these results, NPA staff reported that they gathered information about progress on democratic practice through informal dialogues. NPA staff conduct regular visits to partners which aim more at dialogue than at monitoring. Some NPA Civil Society Programme staff said that they were more likely to reach judgements about partner accountability or programme quality and results from informal monitoring than from formal reporting.

These informal judgements can be decisive. Some NPA staff described long-standing partnerships with organizations which they felt were no longer accountable to their members, or which held rigged elections. These partnerships were ended – but NPA staff said that the problems were not discussed in detail with partners. It was not possible to interview former partners in the course of this evaluation, in order to understand their judgement of how partnerships ended.

The programme’s formal reporting is extensive, as would be expected with a programme that has generated such a complex set of outcomes/outputs/indicators. This has made formal reporting somewhat unwieldy. Nonetheless, coordinators from each of the Civil Society Programme’s four thematic components summarize formal reporting in annual progress reports, which are then consolidated by the programme manager and presented to the donor. But the unwieldiness of formal reporting, combined with the challenges of reporting on progress in democratic processes, may have pushed NPA staff to a reliance on informal assessments of democratic practice, which are



not always documented. The recommendations at the end of this report give some suggestions for making monitoring more user-friendly.

## PARTNERSHIP

This programme seeks to bring about complex positive changes in the way that South Sudanese organizations mobilize for change. Establishing partnerships with civil society organizations is a key element in this process. This evaluation addresses these partnerships primarily through the section below on relevance and sustainability. But partnership is also addressed here, because it plays a key role in programme design and monitoring.

NPA's partnership selection criteria are set out in a global Partnership Policy. Partnership selection requires a careful assessment of the organization's policies and values; its internal unity, its capacity to influence outside actors and capacity to make alliances; and its technical and administrative competence. NPA assesses its partners and their progress through visits and dialogue, and records its assessments on electronic Partner Profile forms, which include some of the criteria set out in the global Partnership Policy. In addition, electronic Global Results Indicator forms record the progress of each partner towards the results set out in *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* planning documents.

Informal dialogue is as important as formal reporting or attendance at policy and strategy meetings. One partner explained how informal dialogue takes place:

NPA is a small donor, but it has a capacity-building aspect. Most donors want you ready to spend money. But NPA does an assessment and it builds your capacity. They visit, not monitoring per se, but just to build a relationship. They allow you. [Other donors] are more directive.

Ending partnerships is part of the process of 'partner selection.' NPA had a pre-existing Civil Society Programme, and the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* project drew mainly on existing partners: in 2016, the project began with 30 partners, only three of which were new to NPA. But by 2018, more than half of the projects 30 partners had begun their relationship with NPA after 2016. Some partnerships were ended because of political change. Before the civil war broke out in 2013, NPA had engaged with the government and the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) directly, but subsequently it focused more on supporting non-governmental partners to engage with these actors. Others ended because of accountability issues (for example, in 2016, partnerships with 10 state women's associations ended). Others were not so much ended as rebranded: 10 state land alliances were restructured into three regional land alliances, to comply with government prohibitions on the use of the names of former states. Others ended because violence had made partnership impossible: partnerships in NPA's historic headquarters of Yei in Central Equatoria ended because of severe fighting and displacement.

Partners have the opportunity to evaluate their partnership with NPA. One way that this '180 degree' evaluation takes place is through a partnership feedback survey, which was conducted in June 2018 through an anonymous interview poll. Partners were asked to evaluate statements such about NPA's practice as a partner: for example 'NPA is flexible and willing to adopt the terms of its support to meet our needs' (81 percent strongly agree or agree, 12.5 percent strongly disagree), or 'The contact and level of communication we had with NPA was satisfactory' (75 percent agree or strongly agree, 12.5 percent strongly disagree). They were also asked to evaluate statements about NPA's approach to building capacity. For example, '[NPA supported us] to strengthen our capacity, effectively mobilize, engage and represent our communities' (69 percent believed support was excellent or adequate). Ninety-four percent of partners said that they were in contact with NPA more than once a month – more than half contacted NPA once a week or more. Partners almost unanimously believed that the reporting burden imposed by NPA was less onerous than that of

other NGOs and donors. But the value of monitoring and reporting was questioned by some partners – 38 percent stated that they would like monitoring and reporting to be useful for their organizations and the people with whom they work.

Partnership surveys are a useful way for NPA to understand how its partnerships are perceived by the NGOs with which it has a contractual relationship. However, NPA's partnerships extend more widely than that: NPA partners have their own network of partnerships. For example, in 2016, the 10 state land alliances had partnerships with about 80 community-based groups. All told, NPA partners have about 200 partners with these smaller and less formal groups. This means that a lot of implementation happens through groups benefiting from minimal resources and support. The challenges of working through community groups are discussed in the next section, on results, and the section on relevance and sustainability.

Monitoring is focused on the thirty-or-so NGO partners which have contracts with NPA, rather than the wider community partnerships which those NGOs set up in order to implement projects. This evaluation engaged with some of these partners-of-partners during visits to Nimule in Eastern Equatoria (a special protection unit run by the local police) and Malakal in Upper Nile (a youth centre and a youth union in a Protection of Civilians site). The youth union, which had partnerships with a number of international and national NGOs, had a good idea of the aims of the *Unlearning Violence* project of which they had been a part. The police unit was linked to a local NGO that participates in the Women's Rights thematic component of the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* and also the *Resilience to Prevent GBV* project. Police personnel had been influenced by some of the project's aims – this experience is discussed in greater detail below.

## PERFORMANCE (Q1)

This section focuses on the way that the projects under evaluation have responded to a challenging external environment. Partners report to the Civil Society Programme’s four thematic coordinators, who prepare reports based on the results framework for each thematic area (land and natural resources, women’s rights, youth, and media). Coordinators’ reports are then consolidated in annual progress reports to donors. Rather than trying to sum up the results frameworks set out in progress reports, this section sets out some examples of what has been achieved, and other examples which reveal the limitations of the projects under evaluation.

This section is structured around the four thematic components of NPA’s Civil Society Programme: Land and Natural Resources, Women’s Rights, Media and Youth with an additional note on NPA’s support for a civil society forum linked to the current peace process. It looks at how different components have addressed two key outputs of *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*: influencing/advocating, and mobilizing

### PART 1: INFLUENCING AND ADVOCACY

The main outcome of *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* is influence on political decision making through a variety of approaches: policy and legal change, media debates, campaigns, and advocacy.

Outcome/output	Indicator
<b>Outcome: Civil Society Organisations influence political decision making</b>	# of partners who have presented proposals to authorities
	# of partners whose proposals have been included in policies
	# of law proposals presented by partners to authorities
	# of law initiatives that partners have worked to stop
<b>Intermediate outcome 1: Partners mobilise around common issues</b>	# of partners who participate in alliances
	# of partners who have organised campaigns
	# of partners who have initiated public debates in media
<b>Output 1: Partners have capacity to challenge authorities</b>	# of partners who have on-going advocacy cases to influence local/regional authorities
	# of partners who have on-going advocacy cases to influence national authorities
	# of partners who have on-going advocacy cases internationally

### LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES: STRATEGY TO INFLUENCE LAND POLICY AT A LOCAL LEVEL

NPA has worked on natural resources for some time. In 2010, NPA worked with the South Sudan Law Society (SSLS) to look at the issue of land-grabbing, during a global commodity boom which created an appetite for large and risky investments in African land. SSLS found that many investors had made large acquisitions in South Sudan. These acquisitions were often made on the basis of inadequate community consultation. Many people believe that the SPLM slogan, ‘Land belongs to the community,’ which helped it mobilize support across Sudan, has legal force. This is not correct, but the 2011 constitution recognizes that communities have many rights in land, and most land is held under customary systems that vest land rights in ethnic communities. A decade ago, investors were challenging those rights with ready cash, and between 2008 and 2013, SSLS handled over 100 land cases. In the end, South Sudan’s violent politics and poor infrastructure effectively prevented foreign investors from exercising rights in land. However, if South Sudan’s cash-strapped political class finds a way to sell land access to investors, they are likely to do so. NPA’s previous work still offers an important framework protecting community rights in land from the global market.

Since 2013, the Land and Natural Resources team has taken a different approach. The ARCISS peace agreement, the 2009 Land Act and the 2011 draft National Land Policy all provide a basis for land governance. Progress on implementation was slow before the current armed conflict and has all but ground to a halt. Since 2013, NPA has partially disengaged from working directly with the national government on land rights. Instead, it has focused its work on research and work with local authorities on survey and registration of urban and peri-urban land, because this can help to reduce conflict in a period of rapid urbanization and displacement. This strategy has allowed NPA to engage creatively with issues like gender, which are deeply embedded in local societies. One NPA partner argued that this approach needed to be complemented with an approach that better prepares local communities for future pressure on land rights.

NPA's strategy focuses on local disputes that often reflect wider patterns of violence. This strategy was questioned by some interviewees. The chair of the land commission argued that NPA needs to be more engaged with national government, although he acknowledged the many dilemmas of working with the government at the moment. One NPA partner argued that intervention in many different disputes runs the risk of spreading out too thinly. Several partners working in land rights and women's rights discussed the challenges of working on community land rights in ethnically polarized communities – their views are discussed in a case study below.

## RESULTS AND IMPACTS

The Land and Natural Resources thematic component plays a key role in *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*. It addresses all of the overarching development goals of the project: promoting policies that foster just distribution of resources; organizing communities to defend their land; promoting the participation of communities and women.

The Land and Natural Resources thematic component has worked towards many of the results set out in the results framework, including:

- Setting up alliances for land rights
- Addressing women's rights to land across different campaigns
- Conducting campaigns for land rights
- Initiating debates on land rights in the media
- Supporting authorities to register land
- Advocacy for civilians engaged in a land dispute with a military barracks in Juba
- Mediation of land disputes in Lakes state

Research is an important component of NPA's work on land. NPA's previous research on land set a high standard: *a 2011 report by NPA and its partner SSLS entitled 'The New Frontier: A baseline survey of large-scale land-based investment in Southern Sudan,' has 35 citations on Google Scholar, a widely-used index of scholarly literature. Subsequent research products have not made this kind of impact, although this may reflect the decline in interest in South Sudanese scholarship. NPA is still working with its SSLS to produce research on land and natural resources rights. With SSLS, it conducted research on land disputes in urban and peri-urban South Sudan, which used innovative approaches to sampling to show the increase in land disputes, and the way that these connections relate to gender relations, inter-communal relations and displacement. This approach to research – working through local partners to produce and disseminate high-quality research about complex and fast-changing social and economic relations – offers a model for good practice, which is discussed further in the recommendations.*

NPA's research has also contributed to project work addressing local land disputes. NPA's partner, Greater Bahr al-Ghazal Land Alliance (GBLA) carried out a women's right to land campaign which established women's right to register land in their own name in several towns across Bahr al-Ghazal, and SSLS has done similar work in Torit, Eastern Equatoria. SSLS staff reported that their legal aid

programme in Torit had directly contributed to the resolution of land disputes in Torit. SSSL continues to address the effects of land grabbing in Eastern Equatoria, where teak deals in afforested areas have been concluded without community consultation.

NPA Land and Natural Resources partners have also intervened in communities polarized by displacement in the former Eastern Equatoria State. In the former Lakes State, one partner mediated 15 land disputes outside the courts. In Juba, the project has intervened in a land dispute around a barracks. It has provided awareness training and supported local authorities to register land. These activities have been undertaken despite considerable turnover of partnerships, and in places where conflict significantly undermines dialogue.

## CASE STUDY: SOCIAL IMPACTS OF INTERVENING IN LAND RIGHTS IN AN ETHNICALLY POLARIZED SOCIETY

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees make up as much as one third of South Sudan's population, and many have been born in displacement. A key question is: do IDPs have rights in land in areas of displacement? The Land Act (2009) is ambiguous on this point. It protects 'lands traditionally and historically held or used by local communities' and says that communities may be 'identified on the basis of ethnicity, residence or interest.'<sup>1</sup> This suggests that IDPs might have rights to land as part of a community of residence or interest, even if they do not qualify as part of a community on the basis of ethnicity. However, where the Land Act addresses the question of displacement directly, it envisages that IDPs will return to 'their original communities'.<sup>2</sup> It stresses reintegration, resettlement and restitution as the main remedies for IDPs who have lost rights to land.<sup>3</sup> These remedies are apparently restricted to people who have lost rights to land 'as a result of the civil war starting from May 16, 1983'.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast, the National Land Policy drafted by the South Sudan Land Commission recognizes IDP's right to choose their place of residence.<sup>5</sup> It says that IDPs should be able:

to make a free and informed choice in shaping solutions to their displacement. These choices may include local integration, return to their community of origin or relocation elsewhere in Southern Sudan.<sup>6</sup>

NPA's partners acknowledge these rights of IDPs, but it can be challenging to put them into practice. In Nimule, Eastern Equatoria, NPA's partner GELA works on land disputes. Since 1991, many people have been forcibly displaced to Nimule from predominantly Dinka areas of Bor. Many brought cattle with them, upsetting established land use systems at a time when most of the indigenous Madi community fled to Uganda. Nimule was a key SPLA base, and during the civil war, many Dinka arrivals had personal connections to the security forces, which helped them establish their presence there. Today, the decision of many Madi people to move to Uganda is misrepresented by some wartime arrivals to Nimule as a failure to participate in the liberation struggle, which disentitles former refugees to their original lands.<sup>7</sup>

One GELA representative explained the problem. He said that many people identifying as Dinka have been born in Nimule, some to Dinka-identifying parents born in Nimule:

Their parents were born there. How can you take them from such a place called home? ... The population of Madi in Madi land is smaller than Dinka. There are no Dinka people in the membership organizations. GELA won't have any Dinka ... Community can be lineage or territory. County land committee, they say, should be by territory, but NGOs are more on the lineage side. ... If the county land authority is formed, it will refuse county land authority to include Dinka. Nimule don't want a land committee because it will influence land demarcation, and then many Madi people will lose land. So resettle Dinka before you set up land committee. Some people say that the Madi are part of all this [because they are selling land to Dinka people]

The shift away from communities of residence to communities of lineage is part of a wider trend towards ethnicization and tribalization fostered by the government and its adversaries. NGOs with memberships and community links have to navigate these trends towards social polarization. The requirement to 'mobilize around common issues' and organize 'people who have a common cause,' (Intermediate Outcomes 1 and 2 in the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* results framework) may even intensify social polarization in a place like Nimule.

Using lineage-communities as a starting point for social mobilization is unavoidable in South Sudan. But it may have negative effects. What are the land rights of a Dinka widow in Nimule? Of a Dinka orphan boy? Community mobilization in a polarized society has the potential to undermine gender equity in the name of ethnic equity, as another NPA partner working on gender relations in Nimule pointed out. Focusing on a local conflict with intractable national dimensions raises difficult questions for Dinka and Madi widows.

## WOMEN'S RIGHTS: STRATEGIES FOR ADVOCACY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

The Women's Rights thematic component of NPA's Civil Society Programme is responsible for managing Women's Rights partnerships. The Women's Rights thematic team is led by a gender adviser, with a brief to look at how the wider Civil Society Programme (and indeed all other NPA programmes) engage with or neglect gender relations and gender inequality. This thematic component is also responsible for managing *Resilience to Prevent GBV* which aims at promoting livelihoods for women and girls, and promoting awareness among women, girls and influential people, in a way that helps them protect themselves against violence.

This thematic component has had many changes to staff and partners since 2017. The strategy of the *Resilience to Prevent GBV* project is based on awareness raising in schools and local communities in order to prevent gender-based violence and strengthen protection for women and girls at risk. This component also provides basic education and vocational training aimed at promoting women's economic empowerment, advocates for legal reform, and provides legal assistance. Some of NPA's partners also provide health and case-management services that complement the awareness, legal aid and training services provided through their partnership with NPA.

NPA's partners from this thematic component also participate in the peace process and in the promotion of UN Security Council Resolution 1325

### RESULTS AND IMPACTS

Many of the results agreed in the *Resilience to Prevent GBV 2017-18* focus on economic empowerment and awareness raising. The project also works on mobilizing women's groups and advocacy for legislative and policy change, in line with the results set out in the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* results framework. Results include:

- Awareness raising for young women and girls
- Dialogues between men/boys and women/girls in schools and community settings
- Support for men's Watchdog Groups
- Literacy and numeracy training for women
- Training for women on urban livelihoods such as professional catering
- Advocacy for legal change
- Legal aid for women

Support for the administration of justice awareness raising activities include radio and school campaigns; public demonstrations against gender-based violence; mentorship; and work with influential actors in local communities to strengthen protection and prevention activities, by addressing social and cultural norms that promote male domination and condone violence against women and girls. In some cases, graduates of vocational training programmes have progressed to set up small catering and tailoring enterprises. But the most wide-ranging and influential work of this thematic component has been in the area of legal aid and administration of justice.

In Nimule, NPA's partner Steward Women has attempted to go beyond awareness-raising and training to bring about change in the criminal justice system, with the aim of addressing impunity for gender-based violence. Steward Women is also advocating for changes to the Penal Code, so that it prohibits marital rape.

Two main activities are support for the construction of a Special Protection Unit and Gender-Based Violence desk in Nimule police station, which includes a shower and latrine which is available for women using the unit and also for women in the prison across the road from the police station. The unit is separate from the main police station, and it allows women to report gender-based violence in privacy – which is not possible in the main police station. The unit was opened in July 2018, and political, religious and traditional leaders all took part in the ceremony.

In addition to providing dedicated facilities for women and girls to report gender-based violence, Steward Women provides women with legal support and has worked with the county court to organize trials for people accused of rape. According to the magistrate in Nimule county court, there are seven people facing charges of rape in custody, and some of them have been held for over a year. But rape trials can only be conducted by high court judges, and the nearest high court is in Torit.

In 2017, a police inspector accused of rape of an under-age girl was tried by a High Court judge in Nimule. Steward Women paid for the judge to come to Nimule with a police entourage in order to hear the case and other cases too grave for the county court. His visit led to the conviction of the police inspector – a powerful message about accountability for gender-based violence. In another case in 2015, Steward Women transported a 19-year-old boy accused of raping a 13-year-old girl from Magwi to Torit for trial. Her parents wanted a prosecution and his parents wanted a forced marriage, and in the end, he received an eight-year sentence. A Steward Women representative said:

It was the first time someone was receiving justice for rape from Magwi. The chief [who first dealt with the case in Magwi] said that this was a landmark decision by the judge and that he would punish all rapists.

Many indications suggest that the sexual and gender-based violence is becoming a wider and deeper problem in South Sudan, perhaps as a result of armed conflict and economic crisis. This crisis figures very visibly in media reporting on South Sudan, but it is a relatively under-funded area of work: OCHA's Financial Tracking Service reports that in 2018, the protection cluster (which includes child protection, displacement and other sub-clusters) received USD 24 million from all the donors it tracks.<sup>8</sup> Underfunding aside, many organizations working to counter gender-based violence find it a challenge to address this fast-changing and deep-rooted crisis. Steward Women's work is determined, focused and has brought significant results. But as the following case study suggests, their work involves many risks. Understanding and addressing these risks needs thoughtful research, and this need is discussed in the recommendations at the end of this report.

#### **CASE STUDY: THE RISKS OF NGO INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE**

In most societies, the costs of transporting judges and convicted persons is borne by the state. The involvement of civil society organization in the administration of justice raises many questions about the relationship between the state and civil society in South Sudan. One staff member who worked on a case involving a military perpetrator said he was threatened arrested and tortured. Another said:

We are exposing ourselves to a great risk to the community. We can chance a close-down if some of the offenders are government people, like the inspector.

A separate problem is the lack of procedural mechanisms to deal with victims and perpetrators. For example, the girl who was the victim of the police inspector-rapist was relocated after his trial. Partner and NPA reporting on the event mentioned the place to which she had been relocated, which was a significant breach of privacy.



Another serious procedural problem arises from the practice of transporting convicted persons. When Steward Women transported the police inspector-rapist to prison in Torit, it transported with him other convicted persons, including a man sentenced to death for murder. The high court judge whom Steward Women had brought from Torit decided, or perhaps was required, to hear all grave cases in Nimule, including the murder case. The death penalty is a likely outcome in a murder case: judges must explain any decision not to apply it.<sup>1</sup> NPA's work on the administration of justice has led it unexpectedly into unintentional facilitation of the death penalty.<sup>1</sup>

Another problem relates to the interpretation of laws relating to sexual relations. In some versions of South Sudanese customary law, adultery, rape and elopement leading to pregnancy and are all grouped as wrongs requiring remedies. Most versions of customary law have no penal sanctions, so fines act as the remedy for these wrongs<sup>1</sup> South Sudan's Penal Code criminalizes some but not all of these wrongs:

- Non-offences: Elopement is not an offence. Marital rape is not an offence.
- Statutory offences with potential customary remedies: Both adultery and kidnapping a woman to force or seduce her into marriage or illicit intercourse are statutory offences. Both can lead to imprisonment, but they should be 'addressed in accordance with the customs and traditions of the aggrieved party.'<sup>1</sup>
- Statutory offences with statutory remedies: Rape (which includes any sex with a boy or girl under 18) and kidnapping juveniles are both statutory offences. Both are punished by imprisonment.<sup>1</sup>
- South Sudan statute requires police and prosecutors to navigate custom and statute when dealing with rape, kidnap and adultery. The process of working customary law into statutory law has exposed women and girls to injustice. Staff at Nimule police station said that almost all defendants in adultery cases were women. Police mix customary law and statutory punishments to deal with non-offences such as extramarital sex. While statutory law deems under-18 incapable of consent to sex, police in Nimule (and in many other parts of South Sudan) appear to see them as lacking rights to have sex. Nimule police also see imprisonment as a means of maintaining social peace, rather than punishment for specified offences. Special Protection Unit staff explained their views in a group conversation:

Lady under age is not mandated to have sex. If they are mature enough they have the right. If you do [have sex under 18] people look at you as spoiled. Parents can insist that the girl is put in jail. They are detained in prison to cool the problem.

Steward Women's understandable impatience with the near-impunity for rape in South Sudan has led it to intervene in the administration of justice. But this intervention may need more reflection.

## MEDIA: STRATEGIES FOR INFLUENCING AUTHORITIES

The media thematic component of NPA's Civil Society Programme includes some of NPA's longest-standing partners: one partnership began in 2005. Over the years, NPA has worked with partners to advocate for the adoption of the main legal frameworks for media: the Broadcasting Corporation Act, the Media Authority Act and the Right of Access to Information Act, which were all adopted in 2013. Progress on implementation of these acts has been limited by the civil war. The Media Authority did not effectively begin its work until February 2017, and its independence has come into question, because of its procedures for director appointments and because it has sought to force media houses to register.

Since the outbreak of armed conflict in 2013, freedom of expression has been severely restricted. Journalists have been killed, abducted, detained and tortured and security services have censored content. At the same time, the security services have introduced restrictions on free assembly. NPA's media strategy has had to take into account major changes to media regulation which have taken place at the same time as rapid reversals in basic freedoms.

Two other considerations are radio dominance and language. A 2015 media survey found that the national weekly reach of radio was 38 percent. This compared to 13 percent for television, 10 percent for newspapers, and 7 percent for the internet.<sup>9</sup> Local radio stations are best placed to disseminate information in South Sudanese languages other than English and Arabic to the country's multilingual population.

Since 2016, NPA has responded to these strategic challenges by developing new partnerships with community radio stations and expanding the use of social media. They have maintained support with some long-standing partners but ended relationships with others.

### RESULTS AND IMPACTS

Results in this thematic area include:

- Training for journalists on peace and conflict journalism and on safety and security issues
- Disseminating peace messages through the media
- Broadcasting peace dramas on the radio
- Supporting community radio networks
- Training journalists on mental health issues
- Advocacy for imprisoned journalists
- Support for civil society participation in peace processes

Results in this thematic area serves the overall developmental goals of *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*: democratization and accountability of public authorities. NPA's partners include highly capable Juba-based NGOs and alliances with the capacity to engage in complex advocacy and dialogue with the government. For example, the Association for Media Development in South Sudan (AMDISS) maintained regular dialogues with parliamentarians and with the security services, sometimes intervening on urgent cases. The former chair of AMDISS, Alfred Taban, was arrested for an article he wrote in July 2016 calling for the president and vice-president to resign. AMDISS participated in an international campaign for his release. Likewise, the Union of Journalists in South Sudan (UJOSS) engages in dialogue with the National Security Service and the Ministry of Information to protest against government clampdowns.

NPA's media thematic component also participated in *Unlearning Violence*, which aimed to promote the use of community radio for peace. Older NPA partners such as AMDISS and UJOSS have

supported new partners such as the Catholic Radio Network (CRN) and the linked Community Media Network of South Sudan (COMNETSS) to train journalists working in local radio stations and broadcasting in local languages. For example, CRN's station in Tonj, Warrap, has recently started broadcasting in Bongo, a neglected South Sudanese language.

CRN has also worked with NPA to support IDPs and refugees to participate in peace building through radio. CRN journalists visited refugee settlements in Uganda during South Sudan peace talks hosted in Khartoum in July 2018. CRN broadcast many messages from refugees calling for an agreement that would allow them to return home, and sending messages to their families at home. CRN arranged for these messages to be broadcast through Ugandan radio stations that are members of a cross-border radio network.

NPA ended its relationship with a long-standing partner, the Association of Media Women in South Sudan because of questions around accountability and project implementation. With the support of NPA, a new Female Journalists Network was established this year. The new network aims to train women in reporting skills and in safety and protection.

One woman journalist interviewed for this evaluation said that the Female Journalists Network was needed because existing media bodies do not protect and support women journalists. She gave example of two female journalists who were arrested in December 2017 while trying to interview a government minister. Although they had an appointment, they were detained for two hours at the gate of the ministry. They contacted UJOSS, which contacted the Media Authority, reportedly accepting assurances from the authority that the two women were junior staff with no IDs or credentials. UJOSS failed to intervene even though the two journalists were in detention.

NPA's partners have shown the courage to challenge authorities about attacks on journalists. In the current climate, such advocacy for free expression can expose civil society to the threats to safety. But there are more subtle risks too – maintaining a dialogue with security services in order to protect journalists also exposes journalist and media unions to the risk of co-optation or of stepping back from vigilant resistance to repression.

## YOUTH: STRATEGIES FOR INFLUENCING AUTHORITIES

The Youth component of NPA's Civil Society Programme has seen wide-ranging changes during the current grant cycle. When *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* began in 2016, the Youth component provided mainly in-kind support to three sports associations, which were its only partners. Now the Youth component covers a much wider range of activities, and works with a diverse group of organizations, including some capable and well-established NGOs. Some of its partners also engaged in *Unlearning Violence* (alongside partners from the Media component).

Even before the current armed conflict began in 2013, youth organizations were widely used by political and military actors to build ethnic constituencies and to intervene in local contests over power. Youth sports associations can provide a low-key but important alternative to the militarization and criminalization of young men. From 2016-17, Norad regional funds were used to educate youth about the peace process, promote young people's mental health. From 2017-18, regional funds were used to mobilize young people across ethnic communities.

### RESULTS AND IMPACTS

Results in this thematic component include:

- Production and distribution of simplified accounts of the peace process
- Research on peace process reparations
- Cultural activities and events in support of peace
- Public and social media campaigns to promote youth ownership of the peace process
- Income generating activities for youth
- Community youth dialogues in person and on radio
- Training on conflict resolution
- Youth peace festivals

Anataban Art Initiative, an artist-led social movement is one of the most high-profile of NPA's partners. Its innovative use of art and social media has won it a wide following among young people, and its name (which means, 'I'm tired/fed up') has been cited by senior participants in the regional peace process. By focusing primarily on performance, Ana Taban has been able to circumvent some of the restrictions on free assembly and free expression. It has about 600 members – but it requires members to show interest and commitment to the organization's values. Members who participate in hate speech or violence are asked to leave.

Other participants in this thematic component have organized dialogues between youth of different ethnic communities to address crises in relations. Action for Conflict Resolution and Christian Agency for Peace and Development (CAPAD) organized inter-clan dialogues in Unity State and Jonglei State, aimed at resolving local crises. Upper Nile Youth Development Association provided training for young people on peace and conflict in communities and Protection of Civilians sites in Upper Nile. They also supported small groups of young people to take part in income-generation activities.

Work in this thematic area includes campaigns through a wide range of media outlets on peace and social transformation. The work of this component is dealt with in the next section, on mobilizing.

## CASE STUDY: SUPPORT FOR THE REGIONAL PEACE PROCESS THROUGH THE SOUTH SUDAN CIVIL SOCIETY FORUM

In July 2016, just as the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* was beginning its activities, the ARCISS peace agreement effectively collapsed. Alongside a handful of other international NGOs, NPA supported the formation of civil society networks which aimed to provide a cohesive civil society contribution to the peace process. Civil society participants in previous peace processes of 2014 and 2015 had aligned with different armed actors and opposed each other.

NPA supported two civil society bodies to participate in the ARCISS High Level Revitalization Forum, the most recent iteration of the peace process, conducted in Addis Ababa and Khartoum. The Women's Coalition was formed in September 2017, during a meeting of about 40 women's organizations and networks. It aims to promote the role of women in building peace and security and to participate in the peace process. The Women's Coalition participated in negotiations and organized public demonstrations. The South Sudan Civil Society Forum was established in December 2017. Civil society organizations had participated in previous iterations of the peace process, but they had been instrumentalized and divided by warring parties, and the aim of the new forum was to develop a cohesive civil society engagement with the peace process, which could provide an alternative track for negotiations.

NPA supported these two NGO networks directly. But many of the participants in these two networks were existing NPA partners. Ana Taban and the The South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) – both NPA partners – developed campaigns such as *Hagana* ('it is ours') 'The South Sudan we Want' and 'South Sudan is Watching.' Mediators sometimes invoked these campaigns to remind South Sudanese warring partners of the huge weight of expectation among South Sudanese people. SSANSA's campaign was based on workshops with a range of different people who discussed their hopes and aspirations for the future. SSANSA also developed videos that were carefully structured to avoid censorship restrictions, but which allowed people to participate in debates around peace and exercise effective pressure on the warring parties. .

Partners from different thematic components played a role in the SSCSF. For example, Okay Africa argued for a greater role for youth in the peace process and the transition, invoking Security Council Resolution 2419 (2018) on youth and peace. The text of the Agreement on Outstanding Issues of Governance (25 July 2018) which emerged from the July negotiations included a number of provisions for youth: one of South Sudan's five vice-presidents will be in charge of a cluster of ministries for youth and gender, and the minister of youth must be under 40 years of age.

NPA has invested a lot in mobilizing different South Sudanese organization to influence authorities. It was able to draw upon the mobilizing skills of different partner organizations to support SSCSF and the Women's Coalition, and along with other international NGOs, it provided financial resources which allowed the two groups to organize themselves and engage in the process.

The validity of the peace process has been questioned because it is taking place in a society where basic freedoms have been eroded by the state and other armed actors. The peace process has also been criticized for prioritizing the distribution of official posts among its fractious elite over wider and deeper questions about peace and equity. However, this process marks out the current limitations on political possibility. Nonetheless, NPA's partners were able to make progress. Okay Africa argued to South Sudan's leaders that young people no longer want to be a means for violence or a bodyguard for the big men. SSANSA promoted a sense of accountability to the aspirations of the long-suffering South Sudanese population.

These limitations present a dilemma for NPA. NPA's partnership approach seeks to give partners the space to work out their own objectives, and NPA is supportive of partners seeking to address political objectives. In the current situation, partners can only focus on gradual improvements to a flawed process rather than outspoken demands for change, because they believed there was no

realistic chance of changing the South Sudanese political system, which distributes many national resources through a post allocation system structured around ethnicity and military patronage. So for example NPA partners have called for changes to the government's post allocation system that reflect the youthfulness of the population – but they are not able to call for an abandonment of the post allocation system itself.

## PART 2: MOBILIZING

Influencing policy is the main outcome in the results framework of *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*. For NPA, the sustainable route to influence is to build internally democratic organizations that are accountable to memberships and communities. Rather than being a cross-cutting issue, internal democracy and accountability are intended outcomes of the project.

Outcome/output	Indicator
Intermediate outcome 2: Popular organisations are more effective in organising people who have a common cause	# of partners with more than 10% increase in membership
	# of partners with political training programmes
Output 2: Representative member base in partner organisations increased	# of local groups in partner organisations
	% of female members in partner organisations
	% of young members (below 30 years) in partner organisation
Output 3: Partners have democratic structures in their organisations	# of partners with internal elections in 2011 or later
	# of partners with policy documents approved by elected assemblies
	% of female board members

*Unlearning Violence and Resilience to Prevent GBV* also have specific outcomes and indicators for building effective organizations and networks which give people voice. This section looks at how NPA's Civil Society Programme has supported partners to build democratic, accountable structures.

These outcomes are central concerns of NPA's policies on organization, participation and partnership. They are also key to the sustainability of the whole Civil Society Programme – an internally democratic organization with a message backed by its membership or constituency is more likely to last than a donor-driven organization. Supporting organizations to become more democratic and more accountable is also relevant to the way NPA hopes to phase partnerships. NPA's global Partnership Policy envisages partnerships that do not just begin and end with funding: they should begin before any financial relationship starts, and if successful, should continue after funding finishes.

These ideals of partnership face many challenges in South Sudan. Some of the challenges are described in the next section, on the relevance of the projects under evaluation. They can be summed up briefly here. Historically, South Sudan has many rural, vernacular democratic institutions structured around kinship and ethnicity. As far back as the colonial period, urban associations based on sectoral interests developed. But these have been reshaped or swept away by conflict. A new form of civil society appeared in the 1990s, driven by donor imperatives and focused on humanitarian relief. The current civil war and linked economic crisis has put these organizations at the centre of the circuits of hard currency in rural South Sudan, given them enormous economic importance. This situation is not conducive to building representative, democratic and accountable civil society organizations.

Nevertheless, NPA's capacity to make long-term investments in civil society, and its commitment to democratic process give it an important role. This section reviews the way that partners across the projects under evaluation have used this capacity to promote democratic practice. Most of the evidence comes from interviews: it was noted above that NPA's Civil Society Programme's internal monitoring and reporting systems pay relatively little attention to outcomes concerning mobilization and internal democracy than they do to the main, influencing/advocating outcomes. Most narrative

reporting does not address the internal democracy elements of the results framework. The Global Results Indicator Form has two checkbox questions based on two indicators from the global results framework:

- Have there been internal elections in the organisation in 2011 or later? Yes/No/NA
- Has the organisation policy documents been approved by elected assemblies at regional/local or national level in 2011 or later? Yes/No/NA

The Partner Profile has checkbox classifications of organizations: government, civil society, non-government with/without members, people's organizations, umbrella organizations. This evaluation sought to understand more about how internal democracy works in practice. Partner narrative reports contain a section on public mobilization and engagement, which is discussed below.

## BOARDS AND MEMBERS

The results framework of the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* project includes a requirement for political training programmes. NPA conducted a training for partners in 2017 on organizational governance, which some participants viewed as a form of 'political training.' Participants developed action plans on organizational development.

Some of NPA's partners are accountable to a self-appointed board. But many of them are membership organizations, which means that the board is elected by a wider group. Members can be individuals or institutions – AMDISS has 23 members which are all media houses, but most other groups have individual members. Some membership-based organizations seek to represent the interests of their members – UJOSS is one such group. Others seek to advance interests of communities or other groups. The Upper Nile Youth Development Association (UNYDA) had 970 members before the current civil war, but now most of them are displaced and some are on different sides of the frontlines of Upper Nile state. UNYDA used to charge a membership fee of about 3 US dollars a month, which gave the group some independent resources, but now it is almost entirely dependent on donors.

Membership means different things. Anataban, a high-profile arts group full of young people in the public eye was founded in 2016. Not everyone who wants to join Anataban can become a member though, as one Anataban leader explained: ..

To become a member, you show interest. When we have a workshop, we have tried to study you and seeing if you actually can be a member. Because there are those who want to join for money or fame. No paperwork, except for signing the code of conduct. People can be removed from membership. If a member goes against the values of AT and start speaking hate speech on social media

Donors can play a decisive role in expanding and contracting membership. For example, the Rumbek Youth and Sports Association (RYSA) supports football teams with sports equipment and organizes competitions in an area that has been badly affected by intra-communal fighting. Until 2012, it was funded by a Kenyan organization, and then it was funded by NPA on a smaller budget. The budget reduction meant that it cut the number of teams it supported fell from 270 to 48. Such decisions clearly affect membership.

United and Save the Nation (USN) is an NPA partner focused on service delivery and advocacy. It was founded in 2016 and has about 75 members in Juba and Malakal, only five of whom are women. It has 33 staff, some of whom are members. When there is no money, members continue working but the staff leave. So membership is a means of pooling labour for institutional survival. This can be an important strategy for civil society organizations which are structured around families or kinship networks.



## **ELECTIONS, ASSEMBLIES AND MEMBERSHIP FEES**

Six of the sixteen NPA partner organizations interviewed for this report said that they had held elections in 2016 or after.

Anataban members have yet to elect their board, which is currently made up of the movement's founders. But the movement held elections for its secretariat and team leaders. UNYDA had elections in 2011 and 2013, but it has not had one since. RYSA elected a new board in 2016. USN was able to hold elections in 2017. But convening a general assembly is expensive, and conflict may make it impossible to bring people together across battle-lines.

NPA has financed some general assemblies, particularly for new organizations. But most donors do not fund running costs of an organization, much less the costs of democratic accountability. There are some valid reasons for donors not to do so – some people would argue that issues of membership and accountability are so important to the integrity of an organization that they should be managed and financed internally. Likewise, the notion that donors could set an indicator for membership increases, as NPA does, could potentially undermine a commitment-based model of membership, with implications for an organization's integrity. However, a very difficult economic situation also affects the value of membership fees. For example, SSLA used to be a bar association and it was partially funded from fees. It is now overwhelmingly dependent on donor income. It still has a membership fee of 500 SSP, less than 20 US dollars, but this fee is not routinely collected. UNYDA had almost a thousand members before 2013, each paying 10 SSP, then worth almost 3 US dollars. Now its membership is dispersed, and it is entirely dependent on donor income.

Another factor affecting elections is infiltration by members of the security forces. Members of the SSCSF, which has played an influential role in the peace process, believed that the government attempted to infiltrate their forum. One civil society activist said:

Infiltration concerns us a lot. There's no clear, hard evidence of how these infiltrators are planted and how they function. Government [-linked] NGOs operate around donor policies. They organize youth for peace. But they're collecting intelligence from other groups. They could come and be in a sub-group of a network, get your info and pass it to national security. They can organize an arrest or a close down of your event.

A related fear is that of direct intimidation. One interviewee from Steward Women reported that they had been threatened while addressing an incident of gender-based violence allegedly perpetrated by a member of the military. Other interviewees reported cases of intimidation directed at colleagues whom they knew.

This is a difficult period for NPA's partners to enhance democratic practice. But a number of people interviewed for this evaluation discussed the possibility of enhancing democratic practice. One leading member of SSANSA said:

Funding is affecting democratic practice. There could be some way of working around this. If members were really committed to the network, we could ask them all to buy a flight ticket. If members are putting in something, we could ask for matching funds from friendly donors ... If donors emphasize the importance of democratic practice within civil society, if it's a requirement of capacity assessment, it's likely that civil society will take that as an important thing. Otherwise we will see briefcase organizations, family organizations, created for the purpose of livelihoods.

But other partners expressed some confusion about some of the indicators for mobilization – what are 'political training programmes'? What kind of policies are approved by elected assemblies? Confusion about NPA terminology may be one reason for the relative scarcity of reporting on these objectives in NPA's formal reporting system.

Confusion about outputs and indicators seems to affect even the most capable partners. NPA has worked with a handful of partners, most of them professional media groups, for over a decade. However, one Civil Society Programme staff member said; ‘They aren’t really democratically organized.’ That is to say, long-standing partnerships may not necessarily enhance democratic practice. And even though record-keeping in the area of mobilization and democratic practice has many gaps, it appears that NPA Civil Society Programme staff reach judgements about the democratic practice of partners. When partnerships, such as the partnership with AMWISS, come to an end, the lack of democratic accountability is often invoked as an explanation. At the same time, NPA Civil Society Programme staff do not seem to communicate these concerns clearly to erstwhile partners. ‘When partnerships end, it’s usually on the basis of non-communication.’

## **MOBILIZING THE PUBLIC AND DEMOCRATIC SPACE**

Partners of NPA’s Civil Society Programme are required to mobilize sections of the public. NPA’s project planning documents see this kind of mobilization as a key aim of the whole programme. NPA’s vision is to build strong, accountable organizations which can effectively mobilize the public for positive change.

Reporting on this aspect of mobilization is much more considered than reporting on internal democracy. Partner narrative reports, which are completed once or twice a year, include a section entitled ‘How have you mobilized and engaged people in achieving your goals?’ Partners report all sorts of engagements under this section: training for a few dozen people, public events for a few thousand, and campaigns which address even bigger audiences. For example, CAPAD, a participant in the *Unlearning Violence* project, works in Duk County, Jonglei, an area which has seen a number of inter-sectional disputes over sectional boundaries, and which witnessed a devastating attack from armed elements of the neighbouring Murle ethnic community in 2017. It mobilized people in the following ways

- Two workshops, on advocacy and business skills, for 80 participants
- Six youth-led dialogues, each with forty participants
- Two peace festivals, one with 8,000 and another with 5,000 participants
- Two cinema shows, with about 3,000 participants at each

Many organizations reported that they had mobilized thousands of people through radio information campaigns. These are important achievements. However, the strength of NPA’s approach is that it encourages popular mobilization *by democratic organizations* – groups that people can take part in, vote for, use to peacefully advance their interests and the interests of others. Most donor organizations working in South Sudan do not pay as much attention to the internal democracy of their partners, and some donors use partners as mechanisms for passing messages to the wider population, rather than engaging them in positive change. The section on relevance and sustainability, below, discusses ways of promoting internal democratic practice in partners during this difficult period.

## FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (Q8)

The main aims for financial performance are to support partners to develop adequate financial systems, and to transfer the majority of project resources to partners. NPA's Civil Society Programme has made limited progress on these aims.

Only three of almost forty partners have audited accounts: the rest submit receipts directly to NPA. This is costly and time-consuming for NPA, but it reduces the financial risks of working with smaller and weaker partners, and allows NPA to maintain a diverse range of partners. In the past few months, most partners have undergone training in QuickBooks, an accounting software package, and this training may lead to progress on the indicator requiring that partners conduct their own audits within a year or two.

A more ambitious aim is to transfer most of the financial value of its grants to partners. This aim should push NPA to invest heavily in capacity building of partners. In its initial application for *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*, NPA said that it would transfer to partners only 15 percent of the total budget (which includes funds for some projects managed directly by NPA outside the Civil Society Programme). Programme planning documents cite 'relatively weak internal core structures' of most partners. Instead, NPA stated that 59 percent of the total budget would directly benefit partners, and 6 percent would directly benefit community-based groups.

In 2017, NPA estimates that it transferred 31 percent of the total project budget to partners. The smallest grants were 24,193 NOK, and the largest 489,437 NOK, with a median grant of 82,104 NOK (that is the median of the 22 actual grants: 11 organizations, most of them state land alliances, were scheduled to receive grants but were abolished before they could receive them). It was a year when NPA gained 16 new partners – requiring quick changes to financial plans.

The *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* budget for 2018 plans for a higher proportion of resources to be transferred to partners, up from 31 percent in 2017 to 36 percent in 2018. In 2018, budgeted grants for *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* ranged from 41,000 NOK to 574,000 NOK. The median grant was 205,000 NOK.

These funds are supposed to trickle down. For example, state and regional land alliances are expected to have about 80 community-based organizations as their partners. In 2017, the actual budget for these land alliances was 74,219 NOK. In 2018, the proposed budget for three land alliances is just under 500,000 NOK. But the butter is still spread very thin.

The increased rate of transfer of resources in the 2018 budget is prospective, not actual. It may reflect changing partner selection criteria – partners selected after the 2016 crisis tend to have more capacity.

The rate of transfer of resources for the two regional funds, *Unlearning Violence* and *Resilience to Prevent GBV* is much higher. For example, in 2017, the project allocated 2,091,500 NOK to five partners, and actually spent 2,006,741 NOK of a total budget of 3,800,000 NOK – that represents a net transfer of resources to partners of 56 percent.

The projects under evaluation have had some underspends. In 2016, the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* budget was underspent by 15 percent of budget; in 2017, it was underspent by 9 percent. There were smaller underspends on the *Unlearning Violence* and *Resilience to Prevent GBV* projects, in contrast. The underspends on the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* budgets may be partly attributed to the suspension of NPA's operations during the crisis of 2016 and to the government-required reorganization of organizations named after former states.

The lack of underspend suggests that partner capacity is underutilized. Some partners get grants which only cover six months of activities. Partners which depend heavily on NPA have no funds to continue their work for the rest of the year. These fallow periods do not necessarily help

organizations. They are an indication of the limited financial resources available for partners. As one finance manager said, 'The reason we do six months grants is the money that we have – not the rainy season.'

## CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES (Q4 )

The Civil Society Programme's two cross-cutting issues are gender-sensitivity and conflict-sensitivity. The results framework for *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* addresses gender primarily by proposing quotas for female members and board members in partner organization. The importance of female participation is well understood across the team, even though progress towards equal participation is difficult. For example, Anataban's membership is 70 percent male. One representative of the group said:

It is hard to convince women to come to a workshop, and a lot of them have a lot of work at home. The culture rarely allows. People have a feeling that a musician is a kind of spoiled person. No one wants their daughter to be a spoiled person. Lack of encouragement from relatives. If you go deep in the village they view you as different. You might not be a clean person, you might be involved in drugs. Also in our culture a lady is supposed to be a reserved individual. Performance is exposure

In addition, the Civil Society Programme has a stand-alone Women's Rights thematic component. The programme supports women's participation in the current peace process. The Women's Rights thematic component is also responsible for the *Resilience to Prevent GBV* project. The coordinator of the Women's Rights thematic component is also the gender adviser for the whole Civil Society Programme (and also the only gender adviser in NPA's Country Programme). However, the post has been difficult to fill, and this has undermined progress towards understanding how the projects under evaluation, and the Civil Society Programme as a whole, affect women and men differently, and whether the Civil Society Programme aggravates or mitigates gender inequality – there are no procedures in place to analyse these questions systematically. It has proven a challenge to move beyond quotas and stand-alone work with women.

Programme staff feel more confident about the conflict-sensitivity of the projects under evaluation. As with gender, there is no procedural mechanism for analysing whether a project is likely to aggravate or mitigate conflict. But the issue is addressed through dialogue within the team and with partners. Interviews with partners generally indicated that they had a good understanding of the way that their work interacted with the conflict. Many of them may have chosen to work in civil society because they believe it gives them an opportunity to work in a domain which is marginally more distanced from the conflict, relative to other domains.

## COHERENCE WITH NPA'S SOUTH SUDAN COUNTRY PROGRAMME (Q9)

NPA's South Sudan country programme is made up of the Civil Society Programme, the Rural Development Programme and the Emergency Programme. The Rural Development Programme manages two projects funded under Norad's *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*: Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Community Natural Resource Management & Institutional Capacity Building (COREMAP). The Disaster Risk Reduction project works with local communities developing their capacity to manage natural disasters, and COREMAP surveys and maps socio-economic conditions natural resources in different areas in order to promote the transfer of natural resource rights to local people.

A 2018 evaluation of the Rural Development Programme found that there was little collaboration between the different programmes, and that conclusion is borne out by this evaluation. For most of the past year, the Rural Development and Emergency Programmes had no managers. Programme managers have recently been appointed, they sit near each other, but only meet once a month. NPA's country leadership has seen some rapid turnover recently, and that has delayed the development of a country strategy that can take into account the enormous and violent changes since 2013.

COREMAP predates *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society*, and it provides NPA with an extremely significant in-house capacity for generating and managing geographical and statistical information. Its surveys and maps provide significant levels of detail on complicated and misunderstood parts of South Sudan, but they do not appear to be widely used. COREMAP reports have direct relevance to the work of the Land and Natural Resources thematic component, but there appears to be little cross-over between the two.

## RELEVANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY (Q2, Q3, Q6, Q7)

“From which political force will a better future arise? That’s a difficult question. Civil society’s divided between government and opposition. We need to have connections to grassroots. But we only deal with urban associations. [I asked a civil society network in opposition areas] how frequently they engage with members, they say, we don’t have the money.”

This quote comes from NPA’s longest-standing partner, SSLS. They were asked what kind of theory of change might work in the current violent, volatile state of South Sudan. One of the *Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* project planning documents sets out the project’s theory of change as follows: strong civilian power bases, organized around rights or common interests will increase grassroots civilian voice and influence and autonomy and decrease inequality and lead to more stable and resilient communities. This theory of change has shaped the objectives and results framework of all the projects under evaluation, and the whole Civil Society Programme. It means that the programme need to work on three processes at once: influencing, challenging and mobilizing. But the relevance of these processes in South Sudan’s fast-changing, violent and complicated environment is open to question. A historical overview can help to address this question.

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH SUDAN

**Civil society and kinship society:** South Sudan’s ethnic communities are linked to kinship systems. They play an important role in social organization in South Sudan. Many have powerful democratic traditions. But these communities and their democratic traditions are being reshaped by powerful forces. For over a century, successive states have incorporated ethnic community leaderships into the administrative and legal order. Political and military leaders use ethnic communities as constituencies, often stoking ethnic rivalries in the process. The 2011 constitution and 2009 Land Act gives communities a key role in the governance of land and natural resources. But South Sudanese law gives an ambiguous definition of the term community, which can be ‘identified on the basis of ethnicity, residence or interest’<sup>10</sup>. Since 2013, many displaced people have used ethnic communities as the basis for self-organization in UN-administered Protection of Civilians sites – an altogether new kind of ethnic community.

**‘Modern’ civil society began in the 1930s:** Alongside communities based on ethnicity and kinship, South Sudan has civil society organizations that have been shaped by modern experiences of urbanization. In the 1930s, South Sudan’s towns (which were home to less than 2 percent of the population) witnessed the emergence of urban ethnic community associations: democratically-organized groups for people from one area to share language, traditions, and social support while they navigated the difficult transition to the town.<sup>11</sup> South Sudan experienced an economic boom during the second world war as Allied forces routed supplies for battlefields in Europe down the White Nile.<sup>12</sup> After that war, development schemes and educational expansion created new spaces for people to organize.<sup>13</sup> Student and workers unions appeared: workers unions resisted race discrimination in wages at a time when East Africa was the scene of widespread workers’ unrest.<sup>14</sup>

**Civil society eclipsed by militarization:** But these forms of civil society, based organically in the interests of emerging urban social groups, were eclipsed by the mutinies and wars which began just before Sudan’s 1956 independence, which began a process of militarizing social organization in rural areas. Towns grew, but the war brought severe repression to urban populations. As a result, urban ethnic community associations grew in importance. Their basis in kinship and their ability to communicate in indigenous languages had always meant that they could evade government scrutiny. During South Sudan’s first civil war (which began around 1956 and lasted to 1972), state

repression and the ethnic-community response gave South Sudan's systems of social organization a parochial and potentially tribalist character.

***Civil society under the Southern Regional Government of the 1970s:*** The 1972 peace deal between South Sudan's rebel movements and the Khartoum government created a Southern Regional Government as part of Sudan's one-party political system. Hundreds of thousands of refugees returned to South Sudan, and with them came international NGOs and UN bodies, in what was Africa's first big internationally-organized refugee return operation. The new government and the NGOs created new possibilities for social organization: production cooperatives and farmers' and pastoralists' unions. These new women's groups and co-ops were based on local sectoral interests, but they were often financed from foreign organizations and fitted in with government policies – they did not constitute a challenge or counterbalance to the state.<sup>15</sup>

***Civil society and the war of 1983-2005:*** The Addis Ababa peace agreement collapsed in 1983, and the ensuing civil war lasted until 2005. The war reversed progress on the development of civil institutions and civil society: from the outset, the military objectives of the rebel SPLA and the government eclipsed their political objectives. But in 1994, SPLA leader John Garang called for a civilian authority to administer SPLA-held territory.<sup>16</sup> The US and the European Union began to require partnerships with indigenous civil society organizations. Some of these partnerships were aimed at relief distribution or service delivery.<sup>17</sup> But others like the South Sudan Law Society (SSLS) or the New Sudan Council of Churches aimed at wider processes of social change and democratization – albeit a top-down version of democratization. The SPLM's 2003 NGO Act defined NGOs as religious or other organizations with written constitutions (excluding ethnic communities) with charitable aims funded by private resources (professional associations such as SSLS were regulated by other legislation). Although the SPLM was reluctant to legally recognize NGOs as agents of social or political change or accountability, civil society organizations participated in the peace process of the early 2000s, which led to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

***Civil society after 2005:*** The long war created a civil society that was mostly made up of organizations contracted to deliver relief or services. These organizations were allowed to participate in some political processes, and sometimes found a space to promote peace and civic values in a militarized political culture.

The peace that came in 2005 started many wide-ranging changes in South Sudan. In rural areas, traditional leaders were given a place in the new constitutional order. New institutions also appeared – newspapers, universities, human rights organizations, professional and trade associations. They had scarcely existed in South Sudan before, but now they had new laws governing their existence:

- The Land Act (2009) and Local Government Act (2009) defined terms like 'community' and 'traditional authorities,' drawing them into state administrative, judicial and economic systems.
- The Human Rights Commission Act (2009), which gives powers to a parastatal commission to undertake private investigations of human rights violations.
- The Workers Trade Union Act (2013), which requires unions to register
- The Broadcasting Corporation Act (2013), the Media Authority Act (2013) and the Right of Access to Information Act (2013) which regulate media affairs. The Media Authority now requires registration of media houses.
- The NGO Act (2016) and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Act (2016) which defined terms like 'civil society' and 'community-based organization' and added new conditions for the registration of NGOs.

The legislative focus on registration is an indication of the government's anxieties about the power of civil society. But all this legislation is also a recognition of the civil space which emerged after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For example, trade unions have the right to comment 'on



any law, action or policy of any authority or body affecting the interests of its members or the working class in general.’ However, not all legislation governing civil society has been updated – for example, the Juba University Act (1990) gives student unions a say in the running of the university, and protects the right of free inquiry, but it has not been extended to other universities. The Cooperative Societies Act dates back to 2003.

These new laws give a tangible framework of legal procedures to civil society. But in the period after 2005, the dramatic expansion of government resources and posts saw a migration of capable civil society actors to government ministries, along with complaints that civil society was losing its teeth. The swelling government did not, however, invest much in social services, which meant that service-delivery NGOs probably increased in number, to handle donor investment in areas such as health and refugee reintegration. After 2009, donors began to invest significantly in civil society, as the limitations of the state sector became more apparent.<sup>18</sup>

At the same time, ethnic community associations, not always visible to outside observers, spread with the dramatic pace of urbanization – still providing community services, but also providing a link for urban professionals and politician to manage rural ethnic constituencies, in the new ethnopolitical order. That order generated new self-selecting ethnic community organizations, such as the Jieng Council of Elders, with dense links to the state, but no democratic framework.

***Civil society and the current civil war:*** In 2012, the year after independence, South Sudan’s economic outlook worsened as a result of conflict and falling oil prices. The economic crisis significantly changed the position of foreign-funded NGOs, including the civil society organizations supported by NPA. These organizations are allowed to work with hard currency, and they control most of the circulation of hard currency outside Juba. This has an enormous effect on local economic life, which has itself been reshaped by displacement, a process which makes local populations more dependent on markets and money. This complicated process has changed the social position of NGOs and NGO staff significantly, and these changes in turn affect interactions with local community organizations, which operate at the margins of the money economy. The economic power of NGOs has also renewed and deepened arguments over the ethnic allocation of salaried posts.

At the same time, several forces pushed NGOs towards service delivery and away from social or political activism. First, the government adopted a new NGO Act in 2016, which brought new regulatory pressures on NGOs. Second, the security services rapidly intensified repression, cracking down on free speech and free assembly. Third, donors lost confidence in the government, and as a consequence reduced their support for governance and civil society programmes, which had been increasing in importance prior to 2013. Any major change to US funding for South Sudan may lead to further reductions in funding for civil society.

## HOW DOES CONTEXT EXPLAIN THE RELEVANCE OF NPA’S CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMME?

NPA’s Civil Society Programme needs to reflect carefully on the civil society that has emerged from South Sudan’s historical experience. NPA’s global policy on organization and participation recognizes that civil society comes in many forms: professional NGOs, people’s organizations, representative social movements, liberation movements, labour movements, women’s movements, farmers and indigenous people’s movements, flexible networks, traditional structures. Organizations based on common ideals or agendas and with an active membership base can influence political decisions and public opinion. There is much of relevance to South Sudan in NPA’s classification of civil society, but South Sudan’s particularities need also to be recognized. Kinship and ethnicity form the basis of a lot of social organization, but both have been subjected to violent manipulation and polarization.

One of the main strategies for social change is fund professional NGOs, based in urban areas, to work with community organizations on community interests. The differences between salaried NGO staff and community volunteers are made even starker by the fact that NGO staff earn in dollars, and

now play a decisive role in rural economies. The interests of the two groups are diverging. NPA's commitment to internal democracy can help its civil society partners to maintain relevance at a time when many civil society organizations risk detachment from their own constituencies, and become more dependent on donors. Donor-dependence is a risk for NPA's Civil Society Programme too: NPA's 2018 partnership feedback survey found that the majority of partners surveyed saw their relationship with NPA as 'primarily a donor/recipient relationship.'

This evaluation found that NPA staff have a reflective approach to the challenges of maintaining a commitment to internal democracy during a time of crisis and authoritarianism. Norad's relatively long-term approach to funding has enabled this reflection. NPA should keep up this sort of reflection, and constantly explore ways in which it can identify commonalities between South Sudan's vernacular and self-sufficient democratic traditions and the new systems represented by professional NGOs. Promoting democratic practice within NGOs can help them to build stronger alliances with community groups.

A major challenge, discussed in the case study on land rights in Nimule, is that community-based associations are often linked to ethnic communities, which have been polarized by armed conflict, displacement and authoritarian politics. NPA may need to look for ways of mobilizing communities that help them to resist ethnic polarization. The *Unlearning Violence* project specifically aims at bringing together youth from different communities to work for peace. Careful research and analysis, conducted with partners, can help move projects towards more specific activities that can help communities identify and work for common interests. NPA has a lot of relationships and experiences on which to build, and it can use those relationships to help NGOs work with communities to work together in this way. The relationship between largely professional NGOs and largely voluntary community-based is key to maintaining relevance and sustainability.

The relationship between professional NGOs and community organizations is key to a lot of civil society activity in South Sudan. NPA also actively seeks out other civil society forms, such as trades unions, media houses and NGO-ized professional associations like SSLS, some of which came into being during the rapid era of transformations in Juba after 2005. NPA's willingness to engage with diverse forms of civil society, rather than just investing in professional, get-the-job-done NGOs, makes the programme more relevant to its context. However, like most international organizations in South Sudan, NPA does not partner with urban ethnic community associations. Nor does NPA have partnerships or dense connections with church organizations, universities or schools, or student unions. These groups occupy the same civic space where NGOs can be found, and they also are grounded in sectoral interests – in contrast to the professional detachment and donor-dependence of many NGOs. There are significant risks with working with these sectors of civil society. Some urban ethnic community associations have contributed to ethnic polarization. Universities are under close surveillance from the security forces. But at the same time, some urban ethnic community associations can play key roles in local peace processes. Working closely with South Sudanese academic researchers, and supporting South Sudanese research capacity, can help NPA to produce research which is more responsive to South Sudan's complexity, and help NPA to disseminate its research products more widely among South Sudanese readers. Including such partners could help NPA to maintain its relevance.

Ten years ago, South Sudanese civil society organizations sometimes complained that civil society lost its teeth when the new Government of Southern Sudan came to power on a flood of cash. In retrospect, though, that period brought diverse new forms of civil society and a new urban sub-culture to South Sudan. Civil society organizations can be effective conduits of information and policy proposals for the government. The new education and academic institutions, unions, interest groups, church groups, and social service delivery organizations have created a space for negotiation with the government. In this space, NPA's partners have been able to work on policy proposals, legislative change and advocacy casework. Many South Sudanese people, and many donors, believe that this strategy of patient engagement with the government is no longer relevant, because the

government has withered into the size and shape of its most capable security forces and its interests have almost completely diverged from those of the general population.

However, NPA's programme is built on the assumption that this strategy of patient engagement is relevant for its work, and the assumption that laws and policy can be changed by organizations with a strong representative base despite the erosion of democratic practice. The programme has delivered a wide range of results through a large number of fast-changing partnerships during a period of exceptional political volatility over a contested and inaccessible landscape. This somewhat hectic achievement has sometimes neglected the requirements of caution.

NPA needs to invest in reflection if it is to make this strategy of patient engagement relevant and sustainable. Commissioning research is part of this process of reflection. In the past three years, NPA's Civil Society has produced research papers on artisanal mining, urban and peri-urban land disputes, and attitudes towards transitional justice. Two of these reports were conducted in collaboration with SSLS. In addition, NPA's COREMAP project produces regular, in-depth reports on natural resources and socio-economic conditions in counties of Lakes and Western Equatoria states. Research is conducted by technical experts, and there appears to be no strategy to use research as a means for a wider group of programme participants to learn about and reflect on problems they are facing, and to think through ways of engaging with those problems. Using research as a tool to build capacity is discussed in the recommendations below.

#### OTHER STRATEGIC APPROACHES – WATCHDOG AND WITHDRAWAL

*Partnership for a Dynamic Civil Society* sets out a 'patient engagement' strategy – working with public authorities to bring about policy change, often at a local level, that serves the development goals of the project and the wider Civil Society Programme. This strategy has brought results, but sometimes those results reveal a wider set of problems that cannot be addressed in South Sudan's current political order, because it has been deliberately polarized around ethnicity. Two other possible strategies for civil society in South Sudan are a 'watchdog' strategy and 'strategic withdrawal.' The 'watchdog' strategy requires civil society to gather evidence about government failings or misdeeds and publicize the evidence nationally or more likely internationally, in order to create pressure for change. A 'strategic withdrawal,' in contrast, starts from the assumption that the government is immune to pressure and progress, and that unwinnable confrontations with authoritarianism should be avoided. Instead, the focus should be on studying and learning, and creating alternative democratic spaces.

NPA's Civil Society Programme's commitment to advocacy and to democratic practice is an acknowledgement of the relevance of both these strategies. However, the programme could pay more attention to each of these strategies.

- **Watchdog strategy:** NPA partners carry out ad hoc advocacy activities, sometimes defying significant risk to do so. Media partners and SSSCF partners both have experience of confrontations or threats from the security services. NPA is well-positioned to expand this area of work. In addition, NPA has a wide range of links with external advocacy organizations. The costs and benefits of working through international advocacy organizations have not been explored, and relationships with those partners have not been optimized. Prioritizing a watchdog strategy increases risks to NPA and its partners. Although NPA frequently reflects on the risks faced by its partners, it has not conducted formal risk assessments for partners carrying out advocacy, nor any in-depth study of risks to media and SSSCF partners.
- **Strategic withdrawal:** NPA's commitment to democratic practice is highly relevant and a key element of sustainability. But it could be made more of a priority. The evaluation of the record on mobilizing in the three projects under evaluation, above, stated that NPA's formal reporting on democratic practice is minimal. Although commitment to democratic practice is central to the results frameworks of the projects under evaluation, this evaluation has argued that it has

proved challenging for NPA to monitor democratic practice. The evaluation also argues that the combination of armed conflict and economic crisis has also undermined the democratic practice of NGOs. More attention to scoping out civic space and working out alternative approaches to democratic practice could work in this authoritarian period. Sometimes democratic practice works better in unexpected places – like small sports organizations. These have the potential to provide alternative spaces for boys and girls or young men and women whose lives are surrounded by violence.

## RESEARCH

Enhanced commitment to research is needed to make NPA's 'patient engagement' strategy work better. In fact, whatever strategic approach NPA follows will benefit from better and more coordinated research. NPA's research meets good standards for methodological rigour and relevance, it does not appear to be grounded in the experience and capacity of partners. Developing partner research capacity, and supporting partners to learn about the complexity of social change in South Sudan through research, is just as important as putting together a good report for desk officers to read. Organizations with a capacity to study and learn are more likely to be relevant and sustainable.

## CONCLUDING REMARK

One young woman interviewed for this evaluation set out NPA's strategy as follows

- Build optimism. Tomorrow I could be running back to Uganda. The focus is not on *this is home, this is a country*. We should build strategies on optimism, on what to do if things get better.
- Both a strategy of acting now and waiting. Acting now is the programmes. But all the thinking is in the now setting. You can't think what will happen in five years. At the end of six months of work the vision gets diluted.
- Continue to invest in smaller initiatives. A lot of donors make it hard to get funding and that makes it hard to make change. Having faith in young people.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

## STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Developing an appropriate strategy for civil society in South Sudan is a challenge. This evaluation has set out three possible approaches: 'patient engagement,' 'watchdog,' and 'strategic withdrawal.' These strategies correspond to the main aims of influencing/advocacy/mobilizing, which have shaped the whole Civil Society Programme. Each has costs as well as benefits. NPA should convene a discussion with partners about different strategic approaches, and discuss which to prioritize.

- The influencing/patient engagement strategy needs more reflection on the relationship between professional NGOs and community-based associations. Where complications or contradictions occur they should be studied carefully with a view to learning and improving.
- The advocating/watchdog strategy requires a thorough risk assessment, which looks at how existing partners manage relationships and confrontations with authorities. If NPA is to develop its advocacy work, it may need to develop partnerships with other actors in order to deliver advocacy. These partners could include UN bodies, the Norwegian foreign ministry, and international advocacy NGOs.
- Mobilizing and/or strategic withdrawal requires reflection on how to make develop alternative approaches to democratic practice that would suit the current situation. This could include straightforward innovations, like online voting or surveying for members of organizations. It could also look creatively at how alternative spaces and alternative movements could emerge in South Sudan.

## MONITORING AND REPORTING SYSTEMS

The projects under evaluation have too many objectives and indicators. This makes it difficult to follow the strategic direction of the programme. Monitoring systems are unwieldy. NPA needs to develop a simple, usable monitoring system, that allows the teams coordinating different thematic components to reflect on achievements and communicate more openly with partners. Promoting democratic practice in civil society is a key aim of this programme, and monitoring systems need to go beyond a checkbox approach to this important area.

## PARTNERSHIP QUANTITY AND QUALITY

The projects under evaluation have a lot of partners, many of them relatively new to NPA. Long-standing partnerships have not always led to significant progress in capacity or quality. NPA should review its current partners on the basis of the strategic direction it seeks to follow (influencing/advocacy/mobilizing). However, the eclecticism of the partnerships is probably a strength. Bringing together trades unions, media houses, and football clubs in one Civil Society Programme is an achievement. And there are good arguments for making the whole programme more diverse, for example, by including academic institutions or churches as partners. Although there is an argument for reducing the number of partners, such a decision should only be taken in the context of wider strategic reflection.

## RESEARCH STRATEGY

NPA's Civil Society Programme should develop a considered research strategy that supports its main goals. Research should be grounded in partners' experiences, and build on their knowledge and capacity to learn – the aim of the research strategy should not just be reporting or advocacy. NPA

could consider working with a South Sudanese university on improving the capacity of its partners, and if it contracts foreign researchers, should require them to work in a way that builds the capacity of partners to study and learn. This evaluation has drawn attention to some uncomfortable questions about activities in the area of land rights and the administration of justice. The response to such uncomfortable questions is not to stop those activities, but to study them better, and study collaboratively with implementing partners.

## **DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE**

Commitment to democratic practice gives NPA's Civil Society Programme distinctive strengths, which should be maintained and developed. NPA should consider ways of supporting democratic practice within organizations. There are several challenges here: funding regular general assemblies could be costly and counter-productive, because people might join membership organizations simply for the travel benefits. NPA could work with partners to develop new approaches to democratic practice. This could include the use of new technologies such as online or Whats App discussion forums. It could also include new commitment to high-quality participatory research, which might allow a wider range of views to be included in the way problems are described and the way solutions are proposed – that is to say, democratic policy making.

## **DECENTRALIZED DEMOCRATIC ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE AS A ROUTE TO BETTER DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE**

Another, very different approach to enhancing democratic practice which might fit well with NPA's strengths is to use the field offices of local partners as a starting point for investment in local, decentralized, democratic energy infrastructures. NGOs need energy supplies, and providing them with access to renewable solar energy is a potentially cost effective way of doing so. Renewable energy tends to have a decentralized infrastructure, freeing local people and organizations from dependence on trucked fuel supplies and hard currency payments. Decentralized infrastructures can be managed by local officials, but it is also possible to develop democratic oversight for them, allowing communities or groups of beneficiaries to make decisions about access to energy. Fostering democratic community oversight of resources fits well with NPA's aim of ensuring that resources are transferred to local partners. This recommendation would require careful reflection on the part of NPA. Some of that reflection has been started by Energy Peace Partners, in a report at <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/sr418-south-sudans-renewable-energy-potential-a-building-block-for-peace.pdf>

## APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

<b>Date and place</b>	<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Interviewee relation to the programme</b>
12 Jul 2018, Juba	Michelle D'Arcy	NPA Civil Society Programme Manager
12 Jul 2018, Juba	Michael Gorjin Kuol	NPA Youth component coordinator
12 Jul 2018, Juba	Jacob Atem Anyieth	NPA Media component coordinator
13 Jul 2018, Juba	Geoffrey Duke	SSANSA
13 Jul 2018, Juba	Michael Duku, Irene Ayaa	AMDISS, Executive Director and Media Development Officer
13 Jul 2018, Juba	Mary Ajith	Catholic Radio Network director, AMDISS chair
13 Jul 2018, Juba	Oliver Modi Philip Taligi, Sam Kidi, Mary Talata	Union Journalists of South Sudan
14 Jul 2018, Juba	Brigid O Conor	Catholic Relief Services country director a.i., key informant
14 Jul 2018, Juba	Charles Onak Todo, Thomas Thiel	UNYDA leadership
14 Jul 2018, Juba	Manasseh Mathiang, Thomas Peter	Ana Taban leadership
14 Jul 2018, Juba	Michael Wani	Okay Africa Foundation, executive director
14 Jul 2018, Juba	Taban Kiston	South Sudan Law Society, programme coordinator
16 Jul 2018, Juba	Riek James Doar	NPA Land and Natural Resources Coordinator
16 Jul 2018, Juba	Acuil Malith Banggol	Former SPLM secretary of syndicated and popular organizations, key informant
16 Jul 2018, Juba	Alfred Angok Uliny	Greater Bahr al-Ghazal Land Alliance leadership
17 Jul 2018, Juba	Taban Kiston, Gaspard Muleh	SSLS programme coordinator and programme officer
17 Jul 2018, Juba	Benjamin Loki	South Sudan Land Commission chair
17 Jul 2018, Juba	Garang Mauein Ngong, Philip Mamoun	South Sudan Workers Trade Union for Petroleum and Mining leadership
17 Jul 2018, Juba	Angelina Nyajima Simon, Kuony Riak	Hope Restoration South Sudan leadership
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Audrey Bottjen, Ranga Gworo	Conflict Sensitive Research Facility, director and programme officer, key informants
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Muatile	UNESCO communications officer
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Lual Deng	National Dialogue coordinator
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Agherkuei Aleer Kon, James Kachuon, Ayar Deng,	USN leadership
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Riak James Doar	NPA Land and Natural Resources Coordinator
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Jacob Atem	NPA Media coordinator
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Ebul Simon, Reuben Ochomoi	GELA leadership
18 Jul 2018, Juba	Josephine Chandirio Drama	Steward Women director
19 Jul 2018, Juba	Akello Susan	NPA Senior Partnership Officer
19 Jul 2018, Nimule		Magistrate of Nimule county court
19 Jul 2018, Nimule	David Ben Anyanga, Shandy Agnes, Kiden Mary	Police officers, Special Protection Unit
19 Jul 2018, Nimule	James Izarieu, Grace Mark, Chandia Joyce	Steward Woman field manager, finance assistant, women's economic empowerment assistant
19 Jul 2018, Nimule	Juliet, Esther, Dorinne	Steward Women economic empowerment project participants

19 Jul 2018, Nimule	Rachel Mallinson, Pascalina Idreangwa	HUMAES leadership, key informants
20 Jul 2018, Juba	Lorna James Elia, Dorothy Drabuga	Voice for Change leadership
21 Jul 2018, Juba	Aluel Naomi	Crown the Woman leadership
21 Jul 2018, Juba	Abbas Mayek Mayen	RYSA leadership
23 Jul 2018, phone	Michelle D'Arcy	NPA Civil Society Programme Manager
23 Jul 2018, Malakal	Hazel de Wet	UNMISS, Head of Field Office Malakal
23 Jul 2018, Malakal	Charles Boum	UNMISS, Civil Affairs, Malakal
24 Jul 2018, Malakal POC	Hakim Yoanes	UNYDA project coordinator, Malakal
24 Jul 2018, Malakal POC	Ronyo Simon, Mary Chol, Andrew Ajak, Acuil William, Butros Taban, Cong Luak, John Acuil, Aliza Yuet, Bakhit James, Zakaria Kak	UNYDA Unlearning violence project participants
24 Jul 2018, Malakal POC	Samuel Kur, Duk Thomas	Youth Union, Malakal POC
24 Jul 2018, Malakal town	Bol Malik, Johnson Majok, Juma Paul, Abraham Jam, Atyay Mayen, Emmanuel, Gabriel, Christina, Nyaw Kuang	UNYDA project participants
26 Jul 2018	Zwelo Ndebele, Emmanuel Yengi	NPA Rural Development programme manager and deputy manager
26 Jul 2018	James Dhal, Amoko Edward	NPA COREMAP project
26 Jul 2018	Grant Pritchard	NPA country director
26 Jul 2018	Fadzai Manyere	NPA Emergency programme manager
6 Aug 2018	Aly Verjee	IGAD mediation/US Institute of Peace, key informant



## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Land Act, 2009: Section 6 (4)

<sup>2</sup> Land Act 2009: Section 4, 'Reintegration'

<sup>3</sup> Land Act 2009: Sections 5 (f), 72, 78

<sup>4</sup> Land Act 2009: Section 78.1

<sup>5</sup> 'Every internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his or her residence.,' Principle 14, OCHA Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

<sup>6</sup> South Sudan Land Commission, 'Draft National Land Policy' 2011: Section 4.3

<sup>7</sup> Such forced disentanglement contravenes the Pinheiro Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (2005), an instrument of international human rights law which South Sudan has accepted in its Draft Land Policy.

<sup>8</sup> Available at <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/646/summary>, accessed on 13 Sep 2018

<sup>9</sup> Internews 'We're Still Listening: A Survey of the Media Landscape in the Accessible Areas of South Sudan in 2015 (Juba) 2015: 16

<sup>10</sup> Land Act 2009: Section 11 (1)

<sup>11</sup> Severino Fuli Boki Tombe Ga'le *Shaping a Free Southern Sudan: Memoirs of our Struggle 1934-1985* (Loa: Diocese of Torit) 2002: 96

<sup>12</sup> A C Beaton (ed) *Equatoria Province Handbook, 1936-1948* (London: Sudan Government) 1949

<sup>13</sup> Southern Development Investigation Team *Natural Resources and Development Potential in the Southern Provinces of the Sudan* (London: Sudan Government) 1955

<sup>14</sup> Mike Harman, 'The post-war strike wave in East, West, and Southern Africa,' available at [libcom.org/blog/post-war-strike-wave-sub-saharan-africa-02032018](http://libcom.org/blog/post-war-strike-wave-sub-saharan-africa-02032018), accessed on 15 Aug 2018

<sup>15</sup> Terje Tvedt, 'The Collapse of the State in Southern Sudan after the Addis Ababa Agreement: A Study of Internal Causes and the Role of the NGOs,' in Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt (eds) *Short Cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet), 1994: 95

<sup>16</sup> John Garang de Mabior *This Convention is Sovereign: Opening and Closing Speeches by Dr John Garang de Mabior to the First SPLM/SPLA National Convention* (SPLM Secretariat of Information and Culture) 1994

<sup>17</sup> Soforonio Oniama Efuk *Operation Lifeline Sudan (1986 - 1996)* (University of Leeds) unpublished PhD dissertation, 2001

<sup>18</sup> J. Bennett et al, 'Aiding the Peace: A Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities in Southern Sudan, 2005-2010,' ITAD/Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, page xv