Evaluation Department

Norad

Democracy Support through the United Nations

Report 10/2010 – Evaluation

Norad
Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation
P.O.Box 8034 Dep, NO-0030 Oslo
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Phone: +47 22 24 20 30
Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

Photos: Sudanese march trough the streets of the Southern capital Juba to mark the launch of voter registration for April 2010 elections – Peter Martell/IRIN
Design: Agendum See Design
Print: 07 Xpress AS, Oslo
ISBN: 978-82-7548-552-4

Democracy Support through the United Nations

February 2011

Scanteam

Task Team:
Mr. Arne **Disch**, Scanteam, team leader
Mr. Hannes **Berts**, Stockholm Policy Group, Sweden
Mr. Vegard **Bye**, Scanteam
Ms. Marta **Foresti**, Overseas Development Institute, UK
Ms. Liv **Moberg**, Scanteam
Ms. Hanne Lotte **Moen**, Nord/Sør konsulentene
Mr. Manolo **Sanchez**, Scanteam
Mr. Endre **Vigeland**, Scanteam

External Resource Persons:
Mr. Goran **Fejic**, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
Ms. Agneta **Johansson**, International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC)
Prof. Helge **Rønning**, Institute for Media and Communications, University of Oslo

Quality Assurors:
Mr. Erik **Whist**, Scanteam
Mr. Joël **Boutroue**, independent adviser

Contents

Acknowledgements and Disclaimer

The review team had to rely heavily on the time and support from a wide range of persons. The team would in particular like to thank the persons interviewed in the field: staff of the UN agencies, public officials, civil society and beneficiary representatives, and staff from Norwegian and other donor embassies. The team would further like to thank the UNDP Governance Group in New York and UNDP Governance Centre in Oslo, staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norway's Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) in Oslo. The team was met, without exception, by a positive and forthcoming attitude by all met, for which we are grateful.

The task was carried out by Scanteam in partnership with Overseas Development Institute (ODI)/UK, the Stockholm Policy Group (SPG)/Sweden, and Nord/Sør Konsulentene (NSK)/Norway. Arne Disch/Scanteam, was team leader and overall responsible for the report, the mapping study, Mozambique case and Afghanistan desk study, and media and access to information work. Marta Foresti/ODI was responsible for the literature review. Hannes Berts/SPG was responsible for access to justice and judicial development and worked on the Guatemala case while Vegard Bye/Scanteam was responsible for the human rights work and elections and carried out the Sudan case. Liv Moberg/Scanteam addressed civil society role and did the Malawi case while Hanne Lotte Moen/NSK was responsible for the gender dimension and Pakistan case. Manolo Sanchez/Scanteam also addressed civil society and led the Guatemala case while Endre Vigeland/Scanteam looked at public sector oversight and did the Nepal case.

The team was supported by Prof. Helge Rønning/Institute for Media and Communications, University of Oslo in the field of media and communications; Goran Fejic/International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) regarding electoral processes and institutions; and Agneta Johansson/International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) on access to justice and judicial development. The quality assurors were Erik Whist/Scanteam on methodology and overall management of the task, and Joël Boutroue/independent consultant, on the UN system.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCP	Democracy Consolidation Program (DCP)
DEX	Direct Execution (UNDP)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DGTTF	Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (UNDP)
DPA	Department for Political Affairs (UN Secretariat)
DPKO	Department for Peace-keeping Operations (UN Secretariat)
EU	European Commission
GSP	Gender Support Program (Pakistan)
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDPP	Public Penal Defence Office (Instituto de la Defensa Publica Penal, Guatemala)
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMCHRD	Inter-ministerial Committee for Human Rights and Democracy (Malawi)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOF	Ministry of Finance
NEX	National Execution (UNDP)
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission (several countries)
NOK	Norwegian kroner (NOK 6 = USD 1, approx)
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
ODI	Overseas Development Institute, UK
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PMSU	Project Management Support Unit (Pakistan)
Sida	Swedish Agency for Development Cooperation
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	See DPKO above
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund

UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	Unite States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
V&A	Voice and Accountability

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Scanteam, in partnership with the Overseas Development Institute/UK, the Stockholm Policy Group/Sweden, and Nord/Sør Konsulentene, were contracted by Norad's Evaluation Department to carry out the Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Democratic Development through the United Nations, covering the period 1999-2009.

Literature Review

The evaluation carried out a **literature review** that showed that Norway's political and analytical approach to democratic development has historically been closely aligned with UN positions. While there are few rigorous studies in this field, most point to the highly political and context dependent nature of democratic development, the limited influence donors have, and thus the need for support to be locally anchored if it is to be successful.

The study noted the need to keep in mind four principles when undertaking analysis of democratic development support: ***flexibility*** in the analytical framework; the need to understand the underlying ***program theory;*** be ***outcome focused;*** and ***evidence based.***

Mapping Study

The concurrent **Mapping Study** reviewed the structure of Norwegian funding: (i) across countries, (ii) between UN agencies, (iii) across dimensions of democratic development, (iv) share of total funding handled directly by Norway versus through the UN, and (v) the changes over time along these dimensions.

Based on selection criteria in the TOR, the study then proposed programs in Guatemala, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan and Sudan for field study plus a desk review on Afghanistan, which was approved by Norad.

Country Case Results

The programs reviewed were (i) a three-phase CSO program 2000-2009 and support to the Public Penal Defence Office 2001-2008 in **Guatemala**; (ii) **Malawi's** Democracy Consolidation Program (DCP) over the 13 years 1998-2010; (iii) a three-phase media program 1999-2006 in **Mozambique,** (iv) support to the National Human Rights Commission 2002-2005 and then the Conflict-Monitoring Mission in **Nepal,** (v) the Gender Support Program 2003-2008 in **Pakistan,** (vi) support for the elections and a human rights program in **Sudan,** and (vii) a desk study of electoral support 2003-2010 in **Afghanistan**.

In **Guatemala**, the civil society organisations (CSO) program was highly ***relevant*** as it contributed to advances in *elimination of discrimination and racism, access to justice for indigenous peoples, and transparency and social auditing*. A geographic focus on five provinces and the capital, with a balanced selection of CSOs including Maya and women CSOs, contributed to this. The aid to the Public Defence Office was ***relevant*** to the needs of improved access to justice in indigenous communities, and to coordinate formal and traditional systems of justice. The Office's strengthened capacity and influence as well as improved recognition and respect for indigenous law points to high ***effectiveness. Sustainability*** is good as the Office is a public institution and its 15 Indigenous Defence Offices established by the project have been integrated into the regular budget. The precedents for courts accepting the validity of indigenous legal processes and decisions reflect important ***impacts*** of the project.

Malawi's program covered several democratic development dimensions: (i) voice and accountability/civil society participation, (ii) human rights, (iii) gender, (iv) access to justice, and (v) media/access to information. The ***relevance*** was high. It was ensured through government ownership and management of the program and was reflected in the long-term collaboration with national CSOs. ***Sustainability*** is questionable on the financing side, while the capacity of main participating partners has been strengthened considerably and appears robust. Changes to laws and regulations also ensure sustainability. A 2006 baseline will permit good results tracking over time.

The media program in **Mozambique** supported print media, the state-owned public radio, community radios, journalistic standards and the role and capacity of women in media. ***Relevance*** was high as it strengthened quality, geographic coverage, vernacular broadcasting and local involvement in media programming. ***Effectiveness*** varied, with print media showing little progress and community radio the most, but where the latter was also seen as the most important due to it reaching poor, rural, non-Portuguese speaking groups, and where gender improvements were most notable.

In **Nepal**, the two human rights projects were seen as ***relevant,*** but ***effectiveness*** varied. The monitoring mission had the desired dampening effect on conflicts and provided support to national human-rights activists and organisations. The underlying conflicts remain, however, so the longer-term effects are questionable. The capacity-building project for the Commission achieved much less than expected. Due to its constitutional mandate whatever capacities that were improved are, paradoxically enough, likely to be ***sustained.***

The Gender Support Program in **Pakistan** included 11 projects, where Norway was the only donor providing untied funding for the general program. The massive training for female politicians was ***relevant*** while ***effectiveness*** suffered from lack of coherence of the individual projects due to weak program structure. ***Sustainability*** is poor due to weak government ownership, gender implementation structures and little institutional anchoring. The recent economic and political changes further threaten the advances made in terms of gender equality in local and national politics.

In **Sudan**, both projects were ***relevant*** to the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. ***Effectiveness*** of the electoral process, while flawed, was good, and the donor basket fund critical to this. The human rights project suffered from lack of strong UN and donor, including Norwegian, support. The elections, while not to international standards, were important, especially in the South where there was no tradition for democratic vote. ***Sustainability*** of democratic advances is a concern, as the precedence given to peace and stability over human rights and democratic rule is troubling.

Support for elections in **Afghanistan** is the single largest democratic development program Norway has funded through the UN. It has been a highly ***relevant*** program. The ***effectiveness*** in terms of delivering the first presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections 2004-2005 was good, while capacity building during the cycle 2008-2010 was poor. The increasing corruption and violence is clearly threatening the ***sustainability*** of achievements, and also accounts for many of the direct achievements in the second phase.

Capacity Development

Most of the projects have considerable focus on capacity development. While most of the training has been *relevant*, *sustainability* is poor because training has been delivered directly to the individuals rather than building the capacity of training institutions.

There has been considerable support to organisational development but much of this has been shallow and not based on analysis of long-term requirements. At the institutional level, several programs can point to new laws, procedures, power constellations and improved accountability, often due to the size of the program.

Norway has funded multi-phase programs, but in none of them has there been certainty of long-term funding, so capacity development has typically remained short-term project focused. Most capacity results are recorded in an *ad hoc* manner as few projects had results frameworks or monitoring systems in place. Attribution is often problematic: general trends in the social environment may account for much of organisational and institutional change.

Public Discourse

All projects appear to have contributed to improving the public discourse on democratic development, partly by enlarging and defending democratic space, partly by contributing to the contents. Especially in fragile situations, these contributions are important as there are few or no other actors to present and defend democratic development principles.

Perhaps even more so than with capacity development, the net contributions made by each project, and the depth and breadth of impact, is not measured or documented. A particular concern is that sustainability may be low: discourse may cease once the external actors leave the scene. What may be bringing public discourse further and deeper are all the various technology platforms, in particular

social media, but none of the projects here have made any contributions in this field.

Factors that Explain Results

Project-internal factors that contributed to success included good planning ("quality at entry"), good management and dedicated staff who remained in post; long-term presence that engendered trust; the UN as a legitimizing force; predictable medium-term and sizeable funding; local ownership and engagement; and actual delivery of visible results that created momentum for continued work.

Project-negative factors included overambitious programs; lack of internal coherence among program components; and poor quality assurance systems. Lack of local ownership and insufficient time to produce results also weakened program achievements.

The most important external positive factor was political-economic framework conditions, including in particular, government support. In conflict environments the UN presence and assistance was important. Donor support, financial but also political, was considered highly significant. In the cases where Norway provided substance contributions to project content, implementation and monitoring, this was seen as helpful.

External factors hampering progress included changes to public policy and personnel, and missing or poor legal frameworks. In fragile situations the environment could quickly deteriorate, where those in power would resort to repression of dissent and thus loss of democratic governance gains. Trade-off between what was seen as competing agendas – peace and stability versus human rights – meant the latter normally lost. Poor governance – corruption, impunity of violation of laws – clearly undermined democratic development efforts. Finally, the low level of local capacity at the start of the program and a poor performance by the relevant UN agency in some cases also held back progress.

Norwegian Funding

Norwegian support for democratic development and UN agencies' roles in this are key tenets in Norway's development assistance. The UN role is seen as particularly relevant in fragile situations. Norwegian funding is thus in part driven by policy, but also pragmatism: Norwegian engagement and support to democratic development in fragile situations is fairly recent. By giving multilateral bodies responsibilities for handling difficult tasks in contentious environments, Norway can support policy objectives while avoiding what could otherwise have been major administrative burdens.

The UN has always produced formal results frameworks (logical frameworks) that in principle provide explicit assumptions for the results chains. Discussions of underlying assumptions (program theory) tended to address realism of political assumptions, though often as part of more general assessments of country situation.

There is little in terms of planned synergies or linkages between the projects funded through the UN and to other Norwegian-funded activities or those of other donors.

United Nations Agencies as Channel

UN agencies have normally had sufficient skills and capacities in the identification and design phases and in a number of cases for the delivery of good results. But in several cases it was clear that the UN moved to a more administrative focus over time, letting the *contents* dimension weaken, thus undermining longer-term results though donors including Norway were also guilty of the same.

The key factor explaining performance seems to be UN management commitment while the difference between direct and national execution does not seem important. Recent steps by UNDP HQ to strengthen performance monitoring systems are important for improving the organisation's ability to implement such activities. To what extent this will lead to improved performance on the ground remains to be seen.

When it comes to the UN as "the defender of the standards" in the field of democratic development, UN performance has been variable. In Guatemala and Mozambique, UNDP stood up to the authorities on controversial issues. But when the electoral process in Sudan was not in compliance with democratic standards, peace and stability was seen as the key concern, and in Nepal OHCHR more than UNDP stood up for human rights principles.

Norway has been a strong proponent of UN system efforts at reform, and in particular "Delivering as One". One of the consequences of providing considerable funding to specific projects in the field, however, is to fragment the funding to the UN as a system.

Norway, United Nations and Democratic Development

The cases looked at provide somewhat more positive conclusions compared with the "lessons learned" in the Literature Review regarding if the international community can contribute to democratic development. The need for a realistic approach is clear, but the value-added of the UN as legitimizing democratic space has contributed to results, the sheer scale of some of the interventions has been helpful in overcoming local resistance to change, and the linking up with local forces committed to change obviously critical. At the same time, a lack of continued support to defending "democratic space" created may undermine long-term results and in worst-case situations make democratic forces exposed and vulnerable. This puts a particular onus on actors like Norway to provide continuous, coherent and visible support to democratic development initiatives and forces.

Norway has contributed to a universe of activities that have been relevant and can be seen to have made important contributions. Norway's approach of decentralizing decisions for funding thus seems appropriate. But what challenges this is (i) the need for pushing UN reform further, which can be done better through pooling funding to things like the One UN fund in Malawi, (ii) getting in place longer-term and thus larger and more predictable commitments, and (iii) the need to focus

more explicitly on capacity development which also requires more coherence and long-term strategy.

Recommendations

- The UN needs to be pushed vigorously towards "Delivering as One", as especially in the overarching and cross-cutting field of democratic development it is essential that (i) the UN has one consolidated and strategically-based approach, (ii) prepares and implements a consistent and coherent program with one joint performance framework, (iii) provides the authorities, donors and other stakeholders clear, concise yet comprehensive reporting against agreed-upon dimensions and standards.
- UNDP should be commended for the steps taken to improve its performance reporting in the field of democratic governance. It should, however, be strongly encouraged to ensure (i) that these improvements are translated into better programs in key countries, (ii) focus in particular on fragile states and situations, and (iii) pay more attention to longer-term capacity development for democratic development – both on the programming and the results monitoring sides.
- Norway has decided that embassies are also to manage relations with the multilateral system in the field, which is commendable. But Norway needs to become a better partner for the UN in the contentious field of democratic development, among other things as a high-level policy dialogue partner and supporter. This requires (i) more staff and management attention to this area (not necessarily all in the field). (ii) This can probably best be addressed through more concentration in terms of themes, countries and financing. (iii) Norway should then be better at contributing on the substance side, monitoring performance, and ensuring that long-term accountability is moved towards the national authorities. (iv) Particularly in conflict situations with large UN peace missions, Norway should be more active to lobby for a strengthened emphasis on democracy and human rights balanced up against the security concerns that tend to dominate. (v) As part of this, Norway should also consider updating its strategy for democratic development, as the current one from 1992 no longer appears appropriate.

Main Report



1. Background and Introduction

Scanteam, in partnership with the Overseas Development Institute/UK, the Stockholm Policy Group/Sweden, and Nord/Sør Konsulentene/Norway, were contracted by Norad's Evaluation Department to carry out the "Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Democratic Development through the United Nations", covering the period 1999-2009.

1.1 Objectives of the Evaluation

According to the Terms of Reference (TOR), Norway provided about NOK 2 billion through the United Nations to the areas covered by the concept of "Democratic Development". The Norwegian understanding of the concept is strongly linked to UN definition: ***increased possibilities to participate in the society and in decision-making processes that have impacts on citizens' lives*** (see Annex A page 93 (TOR). The main ***Purpose*** of the evaluation was to provide information about the results of Norwegian support to democratic development through the UN.

The main ***Objectives*** of the evaluation are:

1. **Document the results** (i.e. outcomes) of Norwegian multi-bilateral contributions to democracy development;
2. **Undertake an analysis** of how support to different types of activities (elections/ media/parliament etc) has worked in different contexts (i.e. institutional set-up, socio-political context, degree of conflict and level of economic development);
3. **Assess how decisions are made** in relation to allocations and disbursements to this field through the multi-bilateral channel and how this influences development results;
4. **Assess strengths and weaknesses** of different UN organisations and programs in different contexts; and
5. Provide **recommendations** for improving future programming for democracy support and Norwegian positions in relation to relevant multilateral organisations.

1.2 Scope of Work

The focus of the evaluation is bilateral funds disbursed by the embassies to UN organisations in-country and earmarked funds disbursed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to UN organisations, including (global/thematic) trust funds. The TOR provided seven dimensions of democratic development that were to be included:

(i) Access to justice and judicial development;
(ii) Strengthening civil society for enhanced "voice and accountability";

(iii) Human rights;
(iv) Women's organizations and women's empowerment;
(v) Electoral processes and institutions;
(vi) Media and access to information; and
(vii) Public sector oversight: Parliamentary control functions, public watchdogs (ombudsmen, anti-corruption bodies, etc).

The evaluation was to review the experience in a limited number of countries, where the team ended up looking at Guatemala, Pakistan, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal and Sudan, adding a desk-study on Afghanistan.

1.3 Evaluation Approach

The evaluation began with a mapping of Norwegian support through the multi-bilateral channel. This showed the relative importance of the UN as a channel for multilateral support, what kinds of support has been provided through the UN in various countries and regions at different times during the period 1999-2008, and the scale of support by sub-sectors, countries/regions, and years. This was contained in a **mapping study** submitted to Norad for comment (see separate report).

The team subsequently carried out a **literature review** of recent research and evaluations analyzing the effectiveness of development support to promote democracy in different contexts. The study included an overview of reference documents in relevant UN agencies and the Norwegian aid administration. Each team member was responsible for a thematic area (see the Acknowledgement), ending up with a **literature review report** presented to Norad for comment (see separate report).

Based on the two tasks above, the team prepared an **inception report.** This outlined the main findings of the two studies, and was used to prepare the analytical framework and the data collection tools for the field work as well as the selection of countries to visit and the projects to review (see next chapter and Annex D on this).

The basic data collection exercise was the field visit to the six countries. The unit of analysis was the programs identified in each country. While this had not been required, the team ended up looking at all seven democratic development dimensions, as the team member responsible for a thematic area found relevant cases in her/his country of study.

The team leader spent one week in New York, interviewing staff at UNDP, UNFPA, the UN Democracy Fund, the UN Office for Internal Oversight Services, and the Norwegian Mission to the UN. Most of the time was spent with UNDP, since the Mapping Study showed that over 80% of the funds through the UN were channelled through UNDP. Most time was spent with the Democratic Governance Group in UNDP, and with the UNDP Governance Centre in Oslo.

Before the field studies began, team members carried out a document review that included the sectoral/methodological material from the Literature Review, country background studies, but first and foremost project information: project documents

and revisions, reviews, independent evaluations. Particular attention was paid to identify possible results matrixes, to see if specific results were supposed to be produced.

In the field, the international consultant was joined by a local consultant who both knew the country and the sectoral issues, and thus provided contextual analyses for the projects. Interviews were carried out with government officials, UN agency staff, implementing partners, other donors, beneficiary groups, and independent observers such as researchers, journalists, civil society organisations. Visits were carried out to project sites, where feasible, and discussion/feed-back meetings were organised in a number of cases.

The evaluation team was not to generate original results data apart from the interviews, since the time in the field was limited and some programs were quite comprehensive (Guatemala, Malawi, Pakistan), complex (Guatemala, Malawi, Sudan), geographically dispersed (Guatemala, Nepal, Sudan), or ended several years earlier (Mozambique). This evaluation was not validating project results, but looking at the value-added of the Norwegian support, and through the UN, as Norway often was one of several donors engaged in a project. Furthermore, the Norwegian co-funded UN-executed project was necessarily the only and in some cases not even the most important activity in that thematic field in that country.

For each of the six country visits, the team prepared a **Country Case Report** that was circulated to those who had been interviewed for comments and corrections. The finalized versions are provided as separate documents. The relevant documents consulted in each country have been added to Annex C and the lists of persons interviewed in Annex B.

1.4 Evaluation Process

The evaluation's first deliverable was a Mapping Study that identified the universe of cases that could be looked at, so that thematic fields and country cases could be proposed. Work also began on the Literature Review, and these two reports formed the basis for a first team workshop in Oslo early February 2010. The team, with the support of the external resource persons, walked through the thematic fields to identify key issues and reach consensus in each. The draft Mapping Study and the approach for the Literature Review were agreed to, the outline of the Inception Report accepted, and plans for the field work and next steps for each of the deliverables established.

A second workshop was held mid-April, to discuss the draft Literature Review and the upcoming field work.

Malawi was used as a pilot case for the field work, and this was carried out in May, with a visit to the UN in New York running in parallel. A one-day workshop was held early June, walking through the findings from the Malawi work and the New York visit. This led to adjustments to the field work instruments and approach.

The field work in the five other countries took place from mid-June through end August, and the desk study on Afghanistan was carried out in parallel to this. A fourth workshop was then held mid-September to discuss the draft versions of the Country Case Reports, which were peer-reviewed by another team member before sent to the field for comment and validation. The findings from each field visit that were seen as relevant to the general evaluation questions were presented, for a first view of what the key findings and conclusions might be.

Once a draft of the final report was ready, a final workshop of the team was held to walk through the contents and in particular the main conclusions, to verify if these were in line with the findings in each case, before the report then went through Norad's usual hearing and finalization process.

2. Methodology and Analytical Framework

According to the TOR the team was asked to carry out three assessments on each project:

- A ***results evaluation*** of project achievements *(Objectives 1 and 2)*;
- A ***process evaluation*** of the decisions by Norway and UN agencies *(Objective 3);*
- A review of the performance of the ***channel/agency*** used *(Objective 4).*

2.1 The Results Evaluation

The results evaluation was done in two steps.
The first was a ***results chain assessment*** applying standard LFA ***program theory:*** Norwegian funding has been applied to activities that were to produce Outputs that were to lead to Outcomes which were expected over time to contribute to societal Impact. All UN agencies use some form of this planning and results framework for project preparation and management, so in principle this performance tracking should be in line with their own programming methodologies. The team was thus to ***document the results*** and identify the ***program theory*** underlying the results chain (which assumptions were made when deciding on the inputs; what were the arguments for presuming that these activities would successfully produce planned Outputs, etc) *(Objective 1).*

Documenting results depended on the quality of documentation by the UN agencies: the completeness of the project document; the timeliness, quality, coverage and relevance of reporting; existence of reviews and evaluations; and in particular the results framework used. The latter includes issues like indicators selected, targets set for tracking performance, the availability of baseline data, and other classic measurement dimensions.

The second part was the ***analysis of the results.*** Once the *intended* results were identified, what were *actual results* achieved, and what could account for them? The TOR asks for an assessment of the *external and internal factors* that could explain success or non-attainment of expected results (*Objective 2*). The challenges for this analysis are discussed in Annex D.

When looking at Impact, the team looked for possible "spill-over" effects on other democratic development dimensions: if for example support to media strengthened their independence and quality, did this lead to better coverage of Parliamentary and watch-dog reporting, thus enhancing "voice" of oversight institutions?

2.2 The Process Evaluation

The evaluation was to identify the rationale for the decisions and the processes to allocate resources to the particular sector/project supported, and how the choice of using the multilateral channel affected the results. The team thus tried to identify the planning and decision-making processes in the MFA/Norad in Oslo and the Embassies and UN in the field (*Objective 3*).

One question in the TOR was the extent to which the project was linked and contributed to or benefited from other Norwegian-funded activities, or with those of other donors, which thus required the team to understand the project in a possible larger program context.

The challenge for the evaluation team regarding this objective was that most of the information was based on recall by persons who no longer were in the field or had anything to do with the project (the decision making was in some cases more than ten years back in time). The reason for the importance of recall is of course that many of these process dimensions were never put on paper but were based on discussions and on-the-spot understandings. The ability to validate this information was hence variable.

2.3 The Channel Performance

The evaluation was to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the UN organizations in the different contexts in which they have been managing Norwegian funds (*Objective 4*).

The challenge was that the team was not carrying out an organisational review of the UN agency in question, nor looked at a representative sample of its projects. Given that most projects looked at were unique cases, the team tried to isolate the performance effects that could be attributed to the UN agency versus the particular project personnel versus the contextual variables, though the methodological rigour in doing so is problematic.

During the country visits, the teams noted strengths and weaknesses of a UN organization performance as reflected in the *results* and *process* evaluations, and subsequently asked local stakeholders about the *value added* of using that UN agency for the particular project (or Democratic Development dimension) studied.

2.4 The Analytical Framework

2.4.1 Operationalizing Democratic Development

The TOR notes that the UN usage of Democratic Development "*refers to increased possibilities to participate in the society and decision-making processes that have impacts on citizens' lives*". This is looking at the ***rights-based approach*** at the level of the individual. The terms and approach used in this evaluation are closer to the UNDP concept of ***democratic governance,*** where focus is on state-society relations and in particular the ***accountability*** of the state to its citizens. That is, in the "rights holders ⇔ duty bearers" chain of relations, we are not at the first level of the individual defending and claiming her rights, but rather at the level where the

state or a part of the state (sector authority) as the highest-level duty bearer is to be held accountable for delivering on its obligations.

Given the above, the seven democratic development dimensions as used here are compatible with this understanding and specification of Democratic Development.

2.4.2 Identifying Contextual Variables for Democratic Development

The starting point for an analysis of democratic development is thus often understanding ***power relations,*** such as in political economy or drivers of change studies. These provide a ***macro and historical setting*** for the particular project. The ***sector or meso-level*** analysis will typically be found in the project document itself when it discusses background and external factors that had to be taken into consideration when developing the project.

While the team did a general survey of these kinds of contextual factors based on available literature on that country, this analysis was revisited once the consultant had been to the field and triangulated the general analysis with the analysis that came from the program itself: the ***relevance*** of the contextual variables – essential for assessing their importance – could only be understood in light of the program and its objectives.

2.4.3 The Evaluation as One Integrated Exercise

The Results and Process Evaluations were in practice *one integrated exercise*:

- A number of the key informants were questioned both about the decision making process and the results produced;
- A number of documents (project progress reports, final evaluations etc) address both process issues and the results;
- Some of the process decisions presumably were based on a particular program theory thus also linking the Results Evaluation and the Process Evaluation conceptually.

For this reason an integrated Master Data Sheet that covered all dimensions was used as the starting point for collecting information (see Annex D).

2.5 Information Sources

The evaluation was based on four sources of information:

- Quantitative data.
- Documents.
- Informant interviews.
- Project visits – on-site verification.

2.5.1 Statistical Data

The main statistical source used was ***Norad's aid database*** for the analysis of Norway's overall support for Democratic Development (see section 3.2).

At the country/case level, the information from the database was forwarded to the Norwegian embassy and local UN agencies asking them (i) to verify the data on UN-Norwegian collaboration in the democratic development fields; (ii) request data

on any activities funded by Norway that was not included in these tables, (iii) in the case of the UN agencies, provide more complete data regarding possible co-funding by other donors on the same project, or from Norway to other projects not on our list.

2.5.2 Documents

Three kinds of documents were used:

- ***Program Documents:*** The key documents were those produced by the UN partner: the program document; annual results reports; reviews, evaluations and special studies.
- ***Overarching Policy and Evaluation literature:*** The Literature Review discussed policy and guideline documents for both UN and Norwegian support to democratic development, as well as recent evaluations regarding the results from such efforts.
- ***Contextual Factor analyses:*** Some studies and reports on framework conditions were used to understand what were considered the most typical contextual factors to look at. Sources were political economy or drivers of change studies.

2.5.3 Informants

There were essentially seven groups of informants:

- ***MFA and Norad staff***, at policy and administrative levels. This includes decision makers in Oslo – MFA and Norad – but primarily current and former staff at the embassies where most of the decisions have been taken and the follow up carried out.
- ***UN Headquarters Staff.*** This was staff who work on policy or evaluation questions. This has only included the three agencies looked at: UNDP, UNESCO and OHCHR.
- ***UN staff*** at local decision and implementation levels, both those involved in original decisions and those who have been involved in monitoring implementation.
- ***Project implementation staff.*** This would often be nationals hired by the UN agency as project personnel, or staff in the public sector or civil society organisations that are working for the actors receiving the funding ("implementing partner").
- ***Intended beneficiaries.*** This was a very heterogeneous group, and the coverage and depth of understanding of their views varied from one case to another.
- ***Other donors.*** Other donors who funded similar activities were interviewed on their views of the project, the UN agency and its performance, and Norway's funding.
- ***Informed other national informants,*** such as public officials, journalists, academics often contributed valuable insights into the sector, the context, or the project itself.

The team prepared Conversation Guides for the different informant groups (see Annex D).

2.5.4 Project Visits

During the field work, team members visited project sites, where the objective was to talk with those directly involved including beneficiaries. The number and duration of site visits varied, where in some cases this was largely done by the local consultants.

2.6 Field Work Instruments

The key field work information collection instrument was a Master Data Sheet. From this the team developed Conversation Guides and a Results Assessment Work Sheet (see Annex D).

3. Literature Review and Mapping Study

The team carried out two preparatory steps. A Mapping Study was done to identify the scope and form of democratic development interventions that Norway funded by channelling the funds through a UN body. This formed the basis for the selection of the actual programs to be looked at.

At the same time, the team also reviewed the available policy and empirical literature, which was presented in the form of a Literature Review. Its purpose was to provide an overview of current knowledge, and thus to act as a base for the analytical framework and methodology to be applied in the field. This was structured according to the seven dimensions of democratic development that had been identified in the Terms of Reference (see page 95). The Literature Review also represents a key reference document for the evaluation team regarding current knowledge on "what works, what doesn't and why".

3.1 Literature Review

The idea that donor countries might explicitly seek to drive or facilitate democratic transitions began to gain support during the 1970s. By the early 1990s, democracy assistance was a key element of foreign and development policy in a number of countries. Assistance has evolved over time, from initial support to electoral processes to a focus on institutional reform (from the early 1990s), civil society and the media (mid-1990s), engaging with parliaments and political parties and, most recently, work on voice and accountability (V&A) and state–society relations.

Democracy promotion today is only one aspect of a much broader international agenda to support "good governance", one which often assumes that "all good things go together", in particular that today's democratic transitions are being built on the foundations of coherent, functioning states and that state building and democracy are one and the same. This is far from being a reality in many developing countries (Rakner et al., 2007).

As a result, experiences of donor support have often been disappointing, with most countries that began their democratic transition in the 1990s now mired in "grey zones" (Carothers, 2002). Donors have begun to reassess the impact of their interventions and to accept the need to be realistic about what can be achieved. Efforts to impose democracy without strong domestic support are now seen as unlikely to succeed in the long run. Meanwhile, there is a need to place goals and timeframes into context in places that are often defined by weak state and professional capacities.

An important realisation is that democracy assistance is fundamentally a political activity, and that donors themselves thus are political actors. Second, an understanding of democratisation based on the universal application of a single blueprint is unlikely to lead to progress. Third, assistance must be harmonised if it is to avoid needless duplication and the placing of undue burdens on countries. Finally, given that donors are only now starting to build a more systematic understanding of what works, there is a need for additional research and evaluation on democracy support.

3.1.1 UN and Norwegian Approaches to Promoting Democracy

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in 1993 was a watershed in the development of the UN's work on human rights and democracy, leading to the establishment of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and representing the basis for wider democracy assistance through the UN system as an aspect of its overall development aid.

Since then, the overall evolution of assistance to democracy has been reflected in a number of important UN documents and declarations. The Secretary-General's 2009 ***Guidance Note on Democracy*** is now seen as the authoritative source with regard to UN principles in the area of democracy support. This note tries to strike a balance between a call for proactive vigilance with regard to threats to democracy and rejecting any single model, stressing that democracy export has never been a UN policy. Local ownership is seen as crucial, as is engagement with traditionally marginalised and excluded groups.

The Guidance Note also represents the main response of the UN system with regard to the recognised need for improved consistency and coherence, although endemic rivalry among UN agencies and between UN agencies and other international actors in the field has continued to create tensions and competition between approaches.

In Norway in 1992-1999, democracy support was a stated priority, with a strategic document in place. The focus shifted in 2002-2005 towards poverty reduction, although democratisation was still prominent within policy documents. In 2008-2009, democracy strengthening became much less central. Norway currently lacks an up-to-date and coherent policy on democracy promotion, although important dimensions of democratic development do have policies or guidelines in place. The UN since its foundation has been a cornerstone of Norway's foreign policy. Evolving UN principles and priorities are clearly reflected in official policy, although surprisingly little is said about principles for democracy support in general (much more is said about e.g. human rights).

Over the years, Norway has consistently used several UN agencies as channels for development cooperation. Norway has also been a strong proponent of UN reform ("Delivering as One").

3.1.2 Analytical Frameworks to Evaluate and Assess Democracy Support

It is increasingly recognised that democracy support outcomes are highly context dependent, that available measures are often insufficient in determining which

factors lead to different results, and that rigorous evaluations in this field are scarce. Such limitations suggest that a variety of methodologies may be needed when evaluating interventions. Indeed, one of the clearest lessons derived from previous experiences in evaluations is that no single methodology is likely to capture all aspects of a given intervention.

Theory-based evaluations, which place significantly more emphasis on the underlying assumptions and logic of implementation and programmatic theories, are potentially useful for evaluating democracy interventions as they can help identify whether a given donor approach is or is not grounded in "robust theories of how states and societies are transformed" (O'Neil et al., 2007a). The use of theory as an entry point does not preclude discussion of results, but rather offers a potential explanation of performance or lack thereof.

3.1.3 Recent Evidence on Donor Support to Democratic Development

Despite the challenges of evaluating democratic development programs, there is an increasing body of evidence on the effectiveness of donor support to democracy promotion.

In the main, findings suggest that donors have limited impact on democratic development. Above all, they need to be more realistic about what they can achieve in supporting what are essentially domestically driven political processes.

On the seven areas of democratic development included in this literature review, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- ***Human rights*** projects can contribute to the governance agenda, enhance aid design and impact and strengthen aid effectiveness, provided that strategies are grounded in states' domestic responsibilities and thus promote capacity building rather than service provision.
- Although there is a conviction that **justice and rule of law** is good for development and governance, the evidence on this is mixed. The specific impacts of donors' supported interventions are likely to be limited, even though their objectives tend to be far reaching.
- On **gender and democracy,** increased representation of women does not guarantee a substantive impact on politics or a reduction in structural and gender inequalities in the short run. Success is seen to be driven by long-term commitment, agenda ownership, having men on board and adaptation to the local context.
- Several studies find that democracy promotion through **civil society** alone produces positive effects at micro level but no clear recommendation is provided on how they could be scaled up.
- On **media,** donor support is more successful when it focuses on all key aspects: the regulatory framework ensuring media pluralism; the establishment of national agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing the regulatory framework; progressive liberalisation of media including an increasing number of radio, print, TV and multimedia players; and the enforcement of the right to information and freedom of expression.

- As with other dimensions of democracy support, assistance to **parliaments and watchdog organisations** is inherently political – and therefore very difficult for outsiders to engage in. Technical approaches have not produced satisfactory results.
- Until the end of the 1990s, approaches to **electoral assistance** were mostly technical and overly optimistic about the effects of elections with regard to democratisation. In recent years, more holistic approaches have been tested that consider elections as one element of a broader cycle of electoral processes.

3.1.4 Conclusions and recommendations for next steps

This literature review points to a number of key features of donor support to democratic development that are particularly relevant to this evaluation. These include the observation that democracy has had increased importance in development discourse since the end of the Cold War. This is not unproblematic, and results of donor support to democratic development are, in the main, disappointing.

Evidence is weak but a number of evaluations and studies have been commissioned in the past few years, and we now have a better picture of what works, what doesn't and why.

- In most areas, there are examples of good (or improved) practice and innovative initiatives that build on lessons learnt. However, these tend to be isolated examples, and we are still a long way from consistent success in democracy support.
- Measuring results in democratic development is a complex endeavour. It is not easy to quantify meaningfully or attribute the effects of donor action, but also, crucially, donor objectives have tended to be unrealistic and programs insufficiently tailored to the contexts in which they operate.
- Exposing and understanding the often implicit assumptions and consequent program logics that underpin donor support to democratic development should be a key component of democratic development evaluations.
- Finally, democratisation is a deeply political process, contested mostly at the national and local level, where external actors like donors can play only a limited role.

All of these points have important consequences for the evaluation of Norway's support to democratic development through the UN. In particular, in line with international good practice and recent experience of evaluation in related fields, the following principles should be taken into account in the analytical framework for the evaluation (Foresti et al., 2007):

- *Flexibility:* The framework needs to be applied to different types of programs in different country contexts.
- *Theory based:* In line with a theory-driven approach to evaluation, the framework should aim at eliciting and analysing the implicit program logic of democratic development programs, with a view to better defining the assumptions, choices and theories held by those responsible for design and implementation. This will allow a more realistic assessment of results, including the reasons why objectives are being met or not.

- *Outcome focused:* The framework needs to clearly define and assess outputs, direct and intermediate outcomes and, when possible, pathways to impact and long-term change.
- *Evidence based:* The key findings of this literature review and the mapping of Norwegian support to democratic development through the UN will provide an important evidence base as well as analytical pointers to guide the evaluation framework.

3.2 Mapping Study

The Mapping Study was based on Norad's aid database. It covers all Norwegian ODA, including funding that is channelled through the UN. The variables in the database used for this analysis included (i) year, (ii) agreement partner (i.e. UN agency), (iii) sector and sub-sector according to the DAC classifiers, (iv) country, (v) disbursements made.

The Mapping Study focused on the nine countries identified in the TOR.

3.2.1 Structure of Norwegian Funding through UN

The database shows that total support to Democratic Development as identified in the database includes about 12,600 disbursements for a total value of just over NOK 12 billion. This covers both funding through the UN, through other multilateral channels (such as the World Bank, the OAS and others), and through direct bilateral agreements.

Of these, UN agencies received 780 disbursements for nearly NOK 2.2 billion, but in the nine study countries they managed only 235 for a total value of NOK 782.7 million – that is, 30% of the number of payments and nearly 36% of the funding[1].

3.2.2 Distribution of Democratic Development Funding across Countries

Graph 3.1 shows that funding has varied across the nine countries, both in terms of size and consistency over time. While Norway funded NOK 172 million in Guatemala, NOK 10 million went to the Palestinian territories and NOK 47 million to East Timor.

1 In the Mapping Study, tables show funding broken down by year and dimension of democratic development for the nine study countries, one table shows funding by country by year and thus the funding pattern over time with regards to the various countries, while another table shows funding for each dimension by country.

Graph 3.1: Norwegian Funding by Country over Time (NOK '000)



As can be seen in the graph, Guatemala, Pakistan and Malawi are the countries that have seen the most consistent funding, and Afghanistan to a large extent as well. While Mozambique received considerable funding at the beginning of the period, that has tapered off to nearly zero the last half of the period.

3.2.3 Distribution of Funding across Dimensions

The nine study countries represent 36% of total democratic development funding through the UN, but along three dimensions these nine countries represent over 50% of the funding (legal and judicial aid, support to civil society, and support to elections), and in one case in fact 75% (access to media). The support to the different dimensions in these nine countries over time is shown in graph 3.2 below: funding to legal and judicial development, human rights and to civil society is fairly constant, gender support increases towards the end of the period, election support is periodic.

Graph 3.2: Support in Nine Countries, by Dimension (NOK '000)



Graph 3.3 below shows how the funding to the various democratic development dimensions is distributed across countries, showing that the patterns are very different. When it comes to electoral support, it is not difficult to understand why

almost half of the nearly NOK 178 million went for various elections in Afghanistan. Of total funding for elections, only NOK 309 million has been handled bilaterally while NOK 390 million went through multilateral channels. Of this again, over NOK 350 million went through the UN. One reason may be that when support for elections comes up, the UN may be the "vehicle of choice", depending on what the countries in question themselves have stated as their preferred partner.

When it comes to supporting parliaments and public watchdog institutions, the picture varies from one country to another in terms of the relative importance of the UN channel. In Afghanistan and East Timor, all Norwegian support in this category was through the UN while in Guatemala 65% was handled bilaterally and the rest through the UN. In the two neighbouring countries of Malawi and Mozambique, all support was handled bilaterally in Malawi and all was handled through the UN in Mozambique. Again the explanations are probably very particular to the situation on the ground at the time the support was requested. But another point that needs to be borne in mind, and may be particularly pertinent in this case, is that Norway is but one small funding agency in the larger picture. While Norway may have some policy or priority concerns regarding public watchdog institutions, other funding agencies may have been the preferred partners in these countries which hence explains the rather limited funding for this objective – though this remains a hypothesis to explore.

Graph 3.3: Funding by Dimension by Country, 1999-2008 (NOK '000)



3.3 Use of alternative UN Channels

The Norwegian funding has been provided through a number of UN bodies and agencies, though UNDP is by far the dominant one (table 3.1). The NOK 630 million through the UNDP represents over 80% of all the funding and nearly three quarters of the disbursements. UNICEF is the second most important, but far behind with only 13 disbursements totalling NOK 36 million.

Table 3.1: Norwegian funding by UN Agency (NOK '000)

Agency	Funding	Share	Disbursements	Share
UNDP	631,171.6	80.6%	171	72.8%
UNICEF	36,215.3	4.6%	13	5.5%
UNHCHR	32,400.0	4.1%	11	4.7%
UNIFEM	25,700.6	3.3%	10	4.3%
ILO	10,739.6	1.4%	8	3.4%
UNFPA	12,950.0	1.7%	7	3.0%
UNESCO	19,050.0	2.4%	6	2.6%
Other *	14,428.0	1.8%	9	3.8%
Total	782,655.2	100%	235	100%

*: Includes UN Secretariat, UNOCHA, UN Volunteers, UNOPS and various UN offices.

There is a grouping of agencies around certain themes: legal and judicial reform support is largely through the UNDP, as is 100% of the support for elections. Support to human rights, gender equity and access to media are more evenly distributed across UN agencies. The UNHCHR only has activities in the field of human rights and UNFPA in gender, while UNIFEM, ILO and UNESCO are engaged in two, as reflected in graph 3.4 below.

Graph 3.4: Support by Dimension through UN Agencies, 1999-2008 *(NOK '000)*



3.4 The Project Cases for Study

While there are 235 agreements, the number of projects is much smaller: several agreements support one project. A number of projects are in turn linked to what can be considered a thematic program in a number of countries. As pointed to above, Norway in fact funds only a few democratic development dimensions in each country, and often with one particular theme or program dominant across time. The most important ones were shown in a separate table in the Mapping Study.

The portfolio of projects funded in the nine countries is thus considerably smaller than the number of disbursements indicate. In several countries, a program has been continued in a series of phases, such as the media support in Mozambique (three phases, eight years), civil society support in Guatemala (three phases, nine years). This meant on the one hand that individual cases may permit more in-depth results analyses, but also that the limited number of cases means that there will be limited variation for cross-country analyses.

The TOR for the task suggested that the study be limited to cases in five countries. Since it is not the *countries* that are interesting, but the *cases* and the *dimensions,* the team used the data from the database and more detailed analyses of the actual country programs funded to identify the cases to look at, taking into consideration four criteria: (i) size and complexity of country program funded, (ii) coverage of democratic development dimensions in the overall portfolio being looked at, (ii) coverage of different contextual factors, in particular fragile states, and (iv) ensuring that the cases are "information rich" in terms of identifiable results.

The team ended up proposing case projects in Guatemala, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan and Sudan, and a small desk study on elections in Afghanistan. In Guatemala, Nepal and Sudan the team looked essentially at two programs, while in the other three countries only one program was reviewed. The programs in Malawi and Pakistan were both quite complex ones, the first addressing larger democratic participation, the second one looking at a large gender program, so sub-themes or projects were selected for more careful study in each case.

3.5 Findings and Conclusions

The Literature Review noted that Norway's political and analytical approach for its support to democratic development has historically been closely aligned with UN positions. The Secretary-General's 2009 Guidance Note on Democracy is seen as the authoritative source with regard to UN principles in this field, where it strikes a balance between a call for proactive vigilance with regard to threats to democracy and rejecting any single model, stressing that democracy export has never been a UN policy and that local ownership is crucial. Norway has at the same time been a strong proponent of UN reform in the field, supporting the move towards "Delivering as One".

There are few rigorous empirical studies on the effects of donor support to democratic development. One common finding is that such development is highly context dependent, but also that the (implicit) expectation that there are synergy effects across different dimensions – "good things go together" – has little basis in fact. Donor support has little impact on democratic development: these processes are domestically driven, and the (attributable) results from donor support have therefore largely been seen as disappointing.

The Literature Review identifies important findings for each of the seven democratic development dimensions used in this study. But the more general conclusions point to the limited transferability of results due to the context dependence; the complexities in measuring democratic development changes which makes empirical

verification difficult; the need to systematically challenge the underlying program theory of the various interventions; and to be aware of these interventions' deeply political nature. It thus ended up with four key *principle*s for undertaking such analyses: ***flexibility*** in the analytical framework; need to understand the underlying ***program theory;*** focus on identifying outcomes; and base this on clear ***evidence.***

The ***Mapping Study*** identified Norwegian disbursements for democratic development totalling NOK 12 billion over the 10-year period of the study. Of this, NOK 2.2 billion were channelled through the UN. When looking at the nine countries identified in the TOR for this evaluation, they had received about 30% of this – NOK 783 million. The *size distribution* and *consistency* over time of funding varied considerably across the nine countries, as did funding across the *seven democratic development dimensions*, and the *composition* of the funding in each country (which democratic development dimensions were funded).

80% of the funding was channelled through UNDP, with UNICEF, UNHCHR and UNIFEM receiving 3-4% each, with funding of some dimensions focused in a few agencies.

The study ended up identifying ten programs in seven countries for review. Field work was to be carried out in Guatemala, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Pakistan and Sudan, while a desk study was to be done on the electoral support in Afghanistan.

4. Country Case Results

The empirical foundations for this evaluation are primarily the country case studies. This chapter presents the country cases, the key results as well as the assessments of these. The chapter also looks at the contributions to capacity development and how sustainable these are, whether the activities contributed to an open discourse on democratization and human rights, and what were the most significant factors to drive or inhibit progress.

4.1 Guatemala Case Results

Guatemala's 36-year long civil war ended with the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996, in particular the *Global Accord on Human Rights (1994), Accord on Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Peoples (1995), Accord on Socioeconomic aspects and Agrarian situation (1996),* and the *Accord on Strengthening of Civil Power and the function of the Armed Forces in a democratic society (1996).* These call for respect of human rights, citizen participation, respect for the specific rights of indigenous peoples, and the strengthening of civilian power and institutions.

Norway had been involved in the peace process, and as a follow up to the accords funded several projects, including two major programs through UNDP: strengthening civil society organisations (CSOs), and judicial sector reform. Concerning the latter, focusing was on four central entities: (i) the Supreme Court, (ii) the Interior Ministry, in particular civil intelligence and the National Police, (iii) the Prosecutor General; and (iv) the Public Penal Defence Office (*Instituto de la Defensa Publica Penal*, *IDPP*). Norway has provided support to all four, but the largest and longest-running project was with IDPP (see separate report on Guatemala).

4.1.1 Support to Civil Society Organisations: PROFED-PASOC Program

During the nine years 2000-2009, Norway funded a three-phase CSO program known as PROFED (2000-2003), PASOC I (2004-06) and PASOC II (2007-09). Norway provided just over USD 10.9 million or two-thirds of the funding for this USD 16.1 million program, with Denmark and Sweden providing the remainder.

The program supported a range of CSOs, with some changes over time. PROFED focused on national and local reconciliation, protection and promotion of human rights and justice sector reform while PASOC I supported national reconciliation but also equal access to justice and transparency in public administration. PASOC II moved towards elimination of racism and discrimination, access to justice for indigenous people, and social audit and transparency. PROFED funded 27 projects, PASOC I funded 38, and PASOC II a total of 44. While the program was always

national, the capital got a lot of attention during the first two phases while in the last one five provinces were prioritized.

The program was managed directly by UNDP throughout the nine years, but with strong participation by the CSOs themselves, national and local authorities, and the donors. A total of 80 CSOs have been involved in one or more phases, ranging from large professional organisations based in the capital to small rural NGOs.

4.1.2 Results Produced

A total of 109 projects were supported through PROFED-PASOC, each phase with different goals and varied thematic areas. The key results for each phase are presented in the Guatemala case report, while table 4.1 provides the overarching Goal for the last program period and the key results documented according to the main areas/objectives. This is at a fairly aggregate level, but shows a reasonably structured and focused program.

Table 4.1: Key Results from PASOC II (2007-2009)

Goal: To contribute to the elimination of all forms of discrimination against indigenous peoples, women and other vulnerable and disadvantaged groups, through the promotion of inclusive public policies, human rights, their fulfilment and a culture based on tolerance and the respect for diversity.

Access to Justice for Indigenous Peoples	Transparency and Social Audit	Combating Racism and Discrimination
• Promotion of Judicial pluralism and application of Maya law and conflict resolution in some Maya communities; • Access to justice in cases deriving from the internal armed conflict: paradigmatic case of El Jute village, Chiquimula where the CSO GAM in collaboration/ alliance with PDH followed the case of the forced disappearance of 8 persons from this Maya Chorti village in 1981. The case resulted in the first sentence of a high ranking military officer for crimes committed during the civil war.	• Promotion of awareness, knowledge and practice of social audit and transparency methods by CSO counterparts in the five provinces; participation in social auditing of local governments; • Monitoring of the Prosecutor General's Office (MP): Myrna Mack Foundation implemented "The management of cases of violent death of men and women in the Department of Guatemala", published a report where they show the high level of inefficiency and inefficacy of the MP, which contributes to high level of impunity in the country, with specific recommendations for improvement. This project was considered of effect and impact in a key institution of the justice sector. • Access to Information: Accion Ciudadana, one of the most recognized CSO in the area of transparency and anti-corruption, assisted members of congress to draft the law initiative of the Access to Public Information Law, approved by Congress in Sep 2008.	• Promotion of 11 Municipal Women's Offices in the province of Chiquimula through local municipalities and also working with local development councils • Network against racism and discrimination in the province of Huehuetenango and in alliance with CODISRA (Presidential Commission against Discrimination and Racism); prevention of racism and discrimination through training and information dissemination; • Strengthening of Maya Women's Social Communicators organization in Sololá • Strengthening of intercultural bilingual education (EBI) • Denouncements against racism and awareness training of justice operators

Cross-cutting: Gender and Indigenous Peoples

All projects were to integrate the cross-cutting dimensions in plans and implementation. The ones in rural areas and provinces, particularly indigenous and women's CSOs, were more successful at this than ones in the cities. During field visits the team saw that local women organizations were trained in social auditing and monitored the work of municipal councils and promoted the inclusion and participation of women in development councils, had got municipal councils to create Women's Offices and programs on the problem of violence against women. They had also strengthened their capacity and recognition as CSO advocates of individuals or groups of citizens.

4.1.3 Assessment of Results

The PROFED-PASOC program shows many results throughout the three phases. It is clear that some of the projects implemented were not only successful in achieving outputs but also outcomes related to important themes such as access to justice or transparency and social audit. Other projects may not have been so successful. The lack of a clear results framework, particularly beyond outputs, and the lack of strategic focus in the first two phases of the program, affected the achievement of results in general. The deficiencies of the monitoring system used, made it difficult to assess results, particularly at outcome level.

Relevance. The program started at a time when the country was still in transition from the end of the civil war (1996) to the consolidation of a democratic society, where both the strengthening of civilian power and the participation of civil society were needed, and "mandated" by the Peace Accords. In this sense, the goal of strengthening the capacity, competence and incidence of civil society organizations was highly relevant for the country, and stayed relevant throughout the nine years of the program. The thematic areas chosen for projects implemented were also appropriate in each phase.

Efficiency. Managing a multi-donor program to strengthen civil society organizations' capacity and incidence, with the participation of many CSOs and projects, requires a large and proven administrative and technical capacity. Norway and Sweden, and later Denmark, decided to channel this support to civil society organizations through UNDP since 2000 as a direct execution program, probably because UNDP was the best channel at that point, and also because of UNDP's neutral political standing and access to state institutions. Overall, donors were satisfied with the performance of UNDP as manager of this program, but they noted deficiencies in the planning framework, poor monitoring and follow up system of the projects, and particular dissatisfaction with the delays in the presentation of narrative and financial reports, and the lack of quality/ analysis of narrative reports.

Effectiveness. The first phase, PROFED, according to the review of 2002, was not effective in achieving the goal of "Strengthening the technical and institutional capacities of CSO". The program focused on administration and project implementation capacities of CSO instead. There were results in this phase, but they were from individual projects. The program lacked strategic focus and a clear vision of civil society and its role (Review 2002). The second phase, PASOC I, was not so effective in the areas of reconciliation and access to justice, and highly effective in the area of transparency in public administration (Fundación SARES 2005). PASOC I had many results at the output level, and with some outcomes in the area of Transparency, but it continued to lack strategic focus, both geographically and in its relation to local and national authorities/ institutions. Regarding PASOC II, the final evaluation of the program (ARS Progetti 2010) was generally positive regarding results achieved. Concerning strengthened national and local CSOs to establish alliances with State, CSOs – particularly those that participated in PASOC I – had greater capacities. Because of lack of political will in some state institutions, there were difficulties in establishing alliances at national level while easier at local level: municipal councils, development councils, local courts, judges, local prosecutors.

Positive factors to the effectiveness of PASOC II were: (i) The strategic geographic focus: five provinces selected; (ii) The balance in the selection of CSOs: from the 5 provinces (including Maya and women CSOs), and the capital (professional/experienced CSOs, both Maya and non Maya); (iii) the inclusion of an Immediate Response Fund (FRI) to support short-term projects in response to current events. Constraining factors of PASOC II were: (i) The large number of projects (44), which put a strain on the coordinating team to properly follow up all counterparts and projects; (ii) The monitoring and evaluation system used was relatively unclear, and with no clear baseline and outcome indicators (CEDIM 2009).

Sustainability. Given the fact that so many projects and organizations were part of the three phases of PROFED-PASOC, it is difficult to assess the sustainability of the results or effects of the program. However, CSOs who were beneficiaries of this program pointed out the strategic importance that this program had for the country, as it contributed to both critical institutional support and capacity development of CSO. The fact that now civil society organizations are a strong contributor to political discourse, and respected proponents of solutions to current challenges such as lack of access to justice, corruption, impunity, violence and insecurity, is proof that CSOs have been strengthened. Also, some CSO who participated in the program were instrumental in the advocacy work that contributed to the creation of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) in 2007. The strength and capacity of civil society organizations in Guatemala today cannot be attributed solely to this program, but it certainly contributed to it.

4.1.4 Support to Penal Public Defence: IDPP Project

The IDPP is mandated to provide public criminal defence services and facilitate access to state justice, and as of 1998 became an autonomous institution of the state. Indigenous populations have been and are still subject to discrimination and exclusion from public life. In the judicial system, cultural and language differences pose additional barriers. The UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) stated that: "*the obstacles that hinder or prevent access by the indigenous peoples to State Justice are basically cultural, beginning with the language barrier. Legal processes are carried out in Spanish, few operators (judges, magistrates, defenders, policemen …) know any other language and the number and linguistic diversity of the interpreters is still very limited… In the second place, the operators are generally not capable of comprehending the cultural thought processes and behaviour of the persons that do not belong to their own ethnic group or culture.… In the third place, the cultural obstacle of the indigenous population's access to the administration of justice is shown by their lack of knowledge of their rights, the proceedings and regulations, of which they are only informed in rare instances and then only in Spanish*" (MINUGUA, September 2001). The statement explains the focus on strengthening the access to justice for the indigenous populations. Norway funded two project phases, 2001-2004 and 2005-2008, for a total of NOK 17.5 million.

While PROFED-PASOC was managed by UNDP under so-called Direct Execution (DEX), this project was implemented by IDPP under National Execution (NEX) modality.

4.1.5 Results Produced

The key objectives and the results from Phase II only are given in table 4.2 below:

Table 4.2: Key Results from IDPP Project, Phases I and II (2001-2008)

Goal: Promote the peace process and strengthen the rule of law in Guatemala through improved access to justice services provided within a framework that respects the multilingual and multicultural nature of the country.
Phase II: 2005-2008: Documented results
• ***Expected Result 1: Strengthened IDPP through an institutional policy and a legal assistance strategy.*** An institutional policy was developed and adopted, a significant step in the institutionalization of a culturally relevant defence within IDPP. It developed a manual for indigenous advocacy, defining functions, mandate and responsibilities of indigenous defenders. Guidelines provide public defenders with a tool to analyze cases with cultural relevance both in the official system of justice and the indigenous system, and pedagogical modules on "the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" and "Cultural Strategic Litigation" are now used nationwide. IDPP administrative and operational staff trained in intercultural skills, covering 90% of legal staff, significantly strengthened the intercultural character of IDPP. A diagnostic study of indigenous women in social, cultural and political life of their communities was conducted, and a mechanism for coordination between Defensorías Indígenas and the units specialized in gender issues and victims of domestic violence established. • ***Expected Result 2: Mechanisms for recognition and respect of indigenous law and strengthening of indigenous authorities in place.*** To systematize, validate practices of indigenous law, IDPP has worked to raising awareness on indigenous people's rights. Training and information activities for indigenous authorities and leaders reached more than 5 700 individuals. 35 teams were organized in the North East region and reached 125 communities. The process promoted the strengthening of traditional practices as well as increased awareness regarding rights set out in national legislation and international conventions. – However, the evaluation team is not aware of any study into the actual effects of these activities.

4.1.6 Assessment of Results

Looking at the two phases of the IDPP project in conjunction, significant progress has been made, particularly relating to the objective to enhance access to state justice in indigenous communities. It is therefore the assessment of the evaluation team that the ***effectiveness*** of the IDPP-project has been fairly high. A majority of the planned Outputs have been produced. Monitoring and reporting has often been quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. The qualitative aspects of results have therefore often been difficult to determine, particularly relating to outreach activities and trainings at community level. However, a number of important Outcome-level results can also be identified, such as the enhanced access to justice for members of communities where Indigenous Defence Offices have been established and the increased awareness of and respect for indigenous culture in the formal justice system. The NEX modality appears to have been effective as the project was implemented by a national agency (the IDPP) committed to the project objectives.

The 15 Indigenous Defence Offices that are now in operation have been integrated into the regular budget of the IDPP, which is an important indication of ***sustainability*** of project results. In the areas where these offices have been established,

there is no doubt that steps have been taken to enhance access to justice for indigenous populations.

There is increased awareness about multiculturalism in Guatemalan courts and precedents for courts accepting the validity of indigenous legal processes and decisions. IDPP played an important part in arguing these cases. While opinions on the matter of indigenous law varied, interviews with Supreme Court Justices demonstrate a high degree of awareness of the issues, which if confirmed represents important ***impact***.

The project was highly ***relevant*** in relation to the needs of enhanced access to justice in indigenous communities, and to coordinate formal and traditional systems of justice. Since Norway has been the only donor, these results can be *attributed* to Norwegian funding.

4.2 Malawi

The first multi-party elections in Malawi were held in 1994 after 30 years of authoritarian rule under President Hastings Banda. Since then, democratic development has progressed slowly but without dramatic set-backs. There are challenges related to accountability and transparency; the independent functioning of constitutional bodies, election processes, the relationship between the Executive and Parliament and regulatory frameworks such as the NGO law and the absence of a freedom of information act.

The Democracy Consolidation Program (DCP) addresses the lack of transparency and accountability between duty bearers and rights holders at local level, but the absence of councillors in the local assemblies due to non-functioning decentralised structures represents a fundamental challenge. Still, the bottom-up rights-based approach applied in the program has proven to be very successful in the villages, and can be seen as preparing the citizens for local democracy once the formal structures are in place (see the separate report on Malawi).

4.2.1 The Program

The DCP is under the Inter-ministerial Committee for Human Rights and Democracy (IMCHRD) in the Office of the President and Cabinet and is implemented through projects developed by Civil Society Organisations and Public Institutions. It is aimed at promoting good governance and respect for human rights, especially the right to development, at grassroots level. This is achieved through the creation of local structures that will facilitate dissemination of knowledge, access to redress in cases of human rights violations, consensus building on community priorities and dialogue between rights holders and duty bearers to ensure transparency and accountability. In the absence of a functional bottom-up development planning process (village and area development committees), participation is encouraged through a number of mechanisms, such as village rights committees, radio listening clubs, reading clubs, women's groups, youth groups, etc. Volunteers such as paralegal officers, church mediators and community based educators are trained and ensure wide outreach of the program.

The DCP received Norwegian funding for 13 years (1998-2010), implemented in three phases. The government designed a comprehensive program for democracy consolidation with UNDP in 1996-97, intending it to be the overarching framework/ sector approach for donors to participate in. The IMCHRD was to be the coordinating body for efforts within democratic governance. Four bilateral donors, including Norway, contributed to the first basket fund, but large donors such as the UK, EU, USAID and others preferred to operate outside this framework and set up separate programs. The program has over the years been scaled down and steered towards a more narrow focus on civil society empowerment.

The DCP represents a shift to a rights-based approach to development. The current program is a combination of the following democratic development dimensions: (i) voice and accountability/civil society participation, (ii) human rights, (iii) gender, (iv) access to justice and (v) media/access to information. The two dimensions of Oversight/Parliament and Election/Civic Education were important components of the first DCP phases.

4.2.2 Results Produced

In the first phases of the program, DCP contributed substantially to election processes and to strengthening of the Parliament through comprehensive training programs. Access to Justice was also a component in the program. There is no systematic overview of overall DCP achievements, but examples of important Outcomes of the program have been:

- CSOs that have been DCP partners for many years have been strengthened and been able to solicit funding from other sources for their programs.
- Better Parliament deliberations on important bills: the Human Rights Commission Act, the Ombudsman Act, the Local Government Act, etc. There were effective discussions on finances and budget expenditure, electoral process and gender due to DCP training.
- The Constitutional Bodies Forum has facilitated identification of common needs and development of Strategic Plans for a number of Constitutional and legal Institutions such as the Human Rights Commission and the Law Commission.
- The Draft National Plan of Action for Human Rights was developed by the Human Rights Commission with DCP support.
- Media Monitoring of Article 19 included periodic reports that were detailed and evaluative. The impact of these reports towards freedom of expression was enormous according to the 2000 Mid Term Evaluation.
- The battle against the Presidential third term bill was won by church, CSO and donor pressure. Some of the organisations that received DCP support over a long period of time were the most vocal in the third term debate.
- Alternative dispute resolution systems have been established and are functional in many of the DCP target Districts.

Annual Reports and Evaluations have documented increased civil society participation and vigilance on issues of governance, human rights and social service delivery. There are numerous examples of how village rights committees have been able to hold public functionaries to account, but also of how they have initiated cooperation with various partners to bring about change. The following are examples of out-

comes of village group initiatives to address a problem or a conflict in their local communities, as they have been reported in the DCP 2007 and 2009 Annual Reports:

- The Community Based Educators and drama groups conducted awareness campaigns as well as held community debates on issues affecting the well-being of the citizenry. The debates offered an opportunity for consensus building as well as lobbying and advocacy on critical governance and human rights issues.
- Under the leadership of Village Right Committee and Community Based Educator, the community discussed the lack of health workers in the only health facility in the area. When this did not yield positive results, they brought the issue to the attention of the District Health Officer (DHO) and asked for his intervention. This was done and the community is happy as they are now enjoying their right to health.
- A check in the District Assembly records indicated that a borehole had earlier been sunk in the area. The community advised the officials that this was not so and challenged them to come to the area and identify the borehole. Consequently, a borehole was sunk.
- The community dialogued with traditional leaders, District Trade Officer and private buyers on the price of pigeon peas which resulted in the stakeholders agreeing to a fixed price of MWK 100 per kilogram as opposed to the previous price range of MWK 60 to MWK 70. The stakeholders also resolved that the District Trade Office should confiscate scales that were not functioning properly.
- A widow was dispossessed of a garden by her village headman following the death of her husband. The Village Right Committee discussed the matter with the village headman and other leaders, but only when they took it to the Police was the village headman ordered to return the land to its rightful owner, which was done.
- The District Social Welfare Office launched a project to support ten orphans with cash disbursements of MWK 10,000 each. The money was meant to be used by the guardian to run a small business and use the profits to provide for the needs of the orphans. However, the money was not disbursed. Aware of principles of good governance, the community sought the assistance of the Community Based Educator, which confronted the District Assembly where it transpired that the money had been used on other activities. The Assembly agreed to and actually disbursed the money within two weeks from the date of the meeting.

4.2.3 Assessment of Results

Program effectiveness is in general given a high score in all evaluation reports, but this is mainly for the two components of 'civic education on governance' and 'program management'. These were the two components brought forth into phase III. There is no systematic and comprehensive overview of the main outcomes, but many examples as shown above. Those interviewed for this report confirm the positive impression of a strong program that makes a change, especially at grassroots level.

In terms of ***efficiency***, the main weaknesses claimed by local stakeholders were slow disbursements and procurement by UNDP (which UNDP in turn attributes to unsatisfactory management by the program office). The DCP mechanism for

channelling funds to a large number of very diverse CSOs with wide outreach seems to be both efficient and effective. The program office has been quite strict and not renewed contracts for partners that did not deliver on time. When 'activist organisations' (CSOs) were found to be more efficient and effective than public institutions, DCP gave priority to these more results-oriented organisations. The program office with low turnover and dedicated, professional staff is given praise in all reviews and evaluations. It is clear from the annual reports that they know their partners well and that all implementing partners are contributing to overall objectives of the program, while being complementary to each other.

The ***relevance*** of DCP to Government policies and priorities is ensured by the Government ownership of the program through IMCHRD. The program has been designed to contribute to an improvement in the quality of life of vulnerable citizens as envisaged in the country's Vision 2020 and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (2006-2011). The relevance of the program to challenges on the democratic agenda has been further ensured by broad stakeholder consultation and the involvement of national experts in the field of democratic development, from Government, academia and civil society. Civil Society and UNDP are also represented with observers in the Program Steering Committee. DCP (phase III) represents a niche program which is complementary to other interventions in Democratic Governance. The long term partnerships that have existed between DCP and some of the Implementing Partners are also a testimony to the relevance of the program. Some of these CSOs have been very active in the national debate on human rights and democratic development. *Relevance to peoples' interests and needs* can be seen through the good results documented at village level, where people volunteer and build on what they learn to find new ways of demanding public accountability on issues that are close to their hearts.

The DCP Program Office and the support to Implementing Partners' projects depend on donor funding and is thus not a ***sustainable mechanism,*** despite a Government contribution to cost-sharing. But Implementing Partners have had their capacity built and may solicit funds from other sources. Civil society organisations have been strengthened through the Norwegian/UNDP/DCP strict focus on financial- and results accountability and the strong element of networking and knowledge sharing. The outcomes of DCP are, to a large extent, sustainable. Examples were quoted above of contributions to the democratisation process related to policies and regulatory frameworks. At village level, abolishment of harmful traditional practices, for example, were also sustainable changes.

It is deemed likely that the many examples of concrete behaviour change at village level will in the long run have ***impact*** on local governance and popular participation, but a follow-up of the 2006 baseline survey is necessary to assess broader impact along the key indicators in those geographic areas where DCP has been implemented. The 2007 evaluation concludes that *"direct wider sector benefits have included greater participation by civil societies and communities in governance. In addition, there has been changing gender roles due to women's rights awareness. Power has been redistributed at the community level with traditional leaders accepting new forms of authority as represented by radio listening clubs and the*

increasing acceptance of the role of the community-based educator" (Kamchedzera, G and Kanyongolo, F.E. 2007). The key challenge, as mentioned in the introduction, is the knowledge, capacity and will of duty bearers (politicians and public functionaries) to respond to the increased demand by citizens for accountability and transparency. The evaluation report from 2007 even pointed out that some of the 'success stories' could be explained more by duty bearers not wanting to be exposed on radio, than a real change in their perception of their roles.

The positive view of DCP held by national opinion leaders (human rights activists, academics and NGO leaders) interviewed for this report is another indication that DCP has had an impact on public discourse. The radio programs and radio listening clubs are well known, and DCP is seen as an important "actor" within democratic development. Another interesting indication of impact will be the participation in the next local elections, now postponed till spring 2011.

4.3 Mozambique

The UNDP/UNESCO Media Development Project (MDP) was designed by UNESCO in 1995 to strengthen the role of independent print and radio media. The project was signed in September 1997 and was implemented in three phases over eight years, from July 1998 through September 2006. Total budget was just under USD 14 million of which Norway contributed USD 4.9 million, over 35% of the total (see the separate report on Mozambique).

4.3.1 The Program

For each phase, the project developed a new results framework. The shift from Phase I to Phase II meant a considerable improvement in terms of realism and clarity on what expected results were, while Phase III was an exit phase with narrowed-down objectives.

The Objective provided for the second phase was "*to strengthen the human, technical and organisational capacity of the independent media and public service radio to enable them to become sustainable and to contribute effectively to the process of governance and democracy in the country ... [and] strengthening national reconstruction and development by increasing access to the media through decentralization, the creation of media facilities at the provincial and community levels and empowering especially isolated communities, youth and women to actively participate in the media"* (UNDP 2001). There is thus focus on organisational development and on specific marginalized and disadvantaged social groups. The five Immediate Objectives were (i) Increase impact and sustainability of print media in Mozambique; (ii) Increase the capacity of the provincial delegations of *Radio Mocambique*; (iii) Increase impact and sustainability of community radio stations in Mozambique; (iv) Improve journalistic skills and quality of media content; and (v) Strengthen the capacity of women in journalism and the media.

UNESCO was the executing agency and thus responsible for administration, hiring of project staff and procurement of equipment. UNDP had fiduciary responsibility as the UN agency that signed the funding agreements with the donors. A number of Technical Advisory Groups were established to function as discussion and advisory

bodies to project management. They included a range of national stakeholders, to ensure that all relevant voices were heard, and in particular civil society organisations were heavily represented. Groups were established for community radio, independent print media, and training.

Six donors – Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden – contributed financing, where Norway was seen as the lead donor as it contributed the largest share.

The administrative systems of UNESCO were experienced as unresponsive when it came to procurement. UNESCO/Paris responded slowly to requests for clearance, leading to delays of several months in some instances. At one point UNDP stepped in and pushed for administrative autonomy for the project so that the project could handle purchases directly.

4.3.2 Results Produced

The evaluation of Phase I noted that "*There is no doubt that the project has contributed positively to the development of the media situation in the country*" (Roenning and Munoz 2001, p. 2). Support to community radios was the most important aspect of the project, with a total of 480 persons trained, mostly through two-week courses, in substantive journalistic fields but also management courses.

The evaluation for phase II was also positive: "*the Project has attained the objectives...: (i) improvements in the access to the media through the creation of media facilities at the provincial and community levels, a better distribution of print media and the decentralisation of Radio Mozambique; (ii) a diversification of the media by increasing their number, strengthening independent media and improving the quality of media content; and (iii) a greater participation of communities in the media and an increased involvement of critical target groups (e.g., women and rural population)*" (Ammassari and Munoz 2004, p. 3).

More attention had been put on the ***sustainability*** of the media through improvement of business plans and management of media organizations, and where the financial future was of key concern both for the smaller newspapers and radio stations. Continued donor funding through more open and pooled mechanisms was suggested so that longer-term funding could secure the plurality in the media landscape. But there was also a push for media to become better at mobilizing advertising income within the local community, including as an expression of local ownership and support to that particular media outlet.

The question of the media coming together in interest organizations was also given increasing attention as a means of ensuring that the voice of the media as social actors was strengthened. The project thus encouraged and was important to the establishment of several media organizations. While the project did not itself take on advocacy positions in national policy discussions, it supported arenas for this and encouraged the creation and strengthening of those national bodies that could be expected to play this role.

The final project evaluation summarized the achievements of the project, the range and complexity of issues addressed, but also the difficulties and challenges that media in a poor and diverse society like Mozambique face:

- Media capacity to promote democracy, good governance, peace and human rights was strengthened through training 550 journalists and editors, including training in "ethics, democracy and good governance".
- Community Radios covered the 2003 local elections based on a common Code of Conduct that contributed to improved balance and better reporting on issues and parties.
- The capacity of independent newspapers to cover news from the provinces and distribute their copies throughout the country was strengthened with better equipment.
- The quality and editorial independence at Radio Mocambique was improved through training media staff and providing new equipment. This was further strengthened with participatory strategic management planning undertaken in all Provincial Delegations.
- A policy and strategy for restructuring, upgrading and enhancing the capacity of training institutions to provide both professional and academic training in journalism and communication in Mozambique was formulated.
- The Project helped establish eight new community radios and supported five others that are part of the 53 community/local radio stations fully functioning in the country. Their technical sustainability is addressed through a central laboratory funded in Chimoio, while they receive institutional, lobbying and advocacy support through an institute at the University of Eduardo Mondlane, which is receiving Swiss funding.

The report noted that Mozambique was one of the first beneficiaries of UNESCO's drive to support media in Africa. The positive results were also a function of the highly qualified leadership and staff of the project that ensured continuity and quality; the focus on capacity development with large-scale yet tailored training; and that donors provided large-scale, continued and predictable funding throughout the period.

The evaluation pointed to the challenge of working in a country where most people do not speak the official language (Portuguese) and are illiterate, and that this is an even greater problem for women. The focus on community radio was therefore important to address gender disparities and involve women more in media development. The project ought therefore already from the start to have focused more on these priorities.

Informants agree that the main concern is sustainability of financial, technical, managerial results. The replacement of expensive and technically complex equipment is seen as a major headache, especially for community radios, while managerial and journalism upgrading needs to be addressed through the improvement to the country's training institutions.

The project found itself in a rapidly changing environment – globalization of information flows, digitization and increased internet access reducing capital and informa-

tion costs but also increasing competition, increasingly from abroad, and increased concentration in the key information generation centres as a possible threat to genuine local and diverse media.

What was not mentioned in the report but is noted by all informants as the most important factor for success is that Mozambique emerged from a bloody conflict that ended with a successfully negotiated peace agreement that was actually inclusive and led to a strong and stable democratisation process in the country – a fairly unique occurrence in Africa.

4.3.3 Assessment of Results

Relevance: The project came at a time when media in general and free and independent media in particular were weak along virtually all dimensions: financial, journalistic and technical quality, outreach, thematic coverage, etc. All informants agree that the program provided much needed financial, technical and organisational support across the board: public and private media; broadcast and print; local, provincial and national media.

The project re-directed its resources more and more towards community radio, which stakeholders agree was useful in addressing a number of inequities in the media picture: lack of non-public radio, strengthening decentralization and getting more media outside the large urban areas, strengthening the use of vernacular languages and getting more community involvement in defining the contents and producing it.

More formally, the project objectives of contributing to ***national development*** and ***good governance*** were in line with the Government's objectives, those of the UN system, and the donors providing the funding, so the project was highly relevant.

Efficiency: The overall costs of project delivery – overhead to the agencies as well as the unit costs of staff – dropped across the three phases of the project, though the geographic spread of the project led to very high travel costs. In terms of Outputs, training received high scores by the participants. Much of the written materials were adaptations of "good practice" manuals developed in the region, but were further refined and then posted on the publicly available web-site for comments and further improvements. Project staff were throughout given high marks for attentiveness to local needs, solid technical skills, commitment and thus quality of support and training provided. These indirect ways of assessing Output production thus points to high value-added capacity building. Given that only the CTA was a foreigner, informants saw the delivery as cost-efficient as it could be.

There were serious delays both in equipment procurement and in some disbursements. These held back activities so the *pace* of production of results was lowered. These delay costs were probably the most important ones in the project, as it meant that the use of the existing technical capacity was not as high as should have been, though high staff commitment by all accounts meant that time was re-directed to useful activities, so net losses were small. All in all, Efficiency was probably above average for such a complex undertaking.

Effectiveness: Regarding expected Outcomes, the evaluations note that results for print media have been variable: some of the newspapers supported folded, new ones came onto the market but overall print media remain weak. There have been improvements to business management and journalistic qualities, but the most important change has come about due to the improvement in the economy. This has increased household incomes, especially in urban areas where newspapers are bought, and the amount of advertising available.

Improvements in *Radio Mocambique*'s provincial delegations have been documented: increased local programming, better coverage due to additional equipment, but in particular better strategic planning due to training and participatory methods that have also improved the relevance of programming – results that have been praised by management.

It is with regards to the last three objectives – community radio, journalistic skills, and capacity of women in media – that reports and observers agree that the project achieved the most. Evidence-based conclusions do not exist, however. A considerable list of achievements have been produced, but because of the lack of rigorous assessments, it cannot be documented the degree to which for example sustainability of community radios has been achieved, and what share of the improvements to the media landscape can be attributed to the project. However, all reports claim and informants agree, that effectiveness has been quite good.

Impact: The desired Impact was "*to strengthen capacity of the independent media and public service radio to enable them to become sustainable and to contribute effectively to the process of governance and democracy in the country ... [and] strengthening national reconstruction and development...*". The project reports and evaluations provide some evidence: people listen and are interested in what local radio transmits, women and youth have opportunities for engagement and empowerment which they otherwise would not have. Radio has been important during elections, providing information on procedures (registering as voter, polling stations etc), transmitting political debates and commentary, but also for developmentally relevant public service (health, education) and economic (prices, availabilities and opportunities) messages. This contributes to unify markets and reduces all kinds of transaction costs across the country, especially information and uncertainty costs on important topics, thus contributing to national reconstruction and development as well as governance, in concrete though not easily measurable terms. The increased use of local languages further contributes to this.

Sustainability of project results – technical (skills and equipment), financial and managerial – is poor, especially for print media and smaller community radios. One issue, however, is that media are providing an important ***public good*** – access to information and freedom of expression. The responsibility for funding these for continued democratic development thus ought to remain an important donor obligation, yet does not seem to be treated as such.

4.4 Nepal

Two programs were looked at in Nepal. The first was *"Capacity Development for the National Human Rights Commission (CDNHRC)",* a capacity development project delivered by UNDP. The program cost about USD 10 million since start-up in April 2002. Norway contributed NOK 3 million (less than USD 500,000) during the first three years.

As of 2005, Norway shifted its funding to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which runs a civilian conflict-monitoring mission, the first large mission of its kind channelled through this UN organisation. Norway has provided a total of NOK 13.5 million (over USD 2 million) from the start-up in 2005 and until today, towards an effort that has cost almost USD 54 million (see the separate report on Nepal).

4.4.1 Results Produced

The *CDNHRC project* had a significant effect on the development of Nepal's National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). The provision of infrastructure, equipment and advisory services enabled the institution to come into existence by helping to put in place managerial and administrative rules, regulations, systems and processes. It provided training that built capacities of staff in administration, human-rights monitoring and public outreach. It facilitated good working relationships between the NHRC and parts of Nepal's human-rights NGOs. These achievements are less significant than envisaged in 2001, but considering the extremely volatile situation in the country in the period between then and today, they are by virtually all accounts satisfactory.

The biggest failure of the project, in the eyes of stakeholders, is a lack of demonstrable impact by the NHRC on Nepalese society. The general impression is that the institution is politicised, divided, and impotent, suffering from backlogs, a fig leaf for the government to pretend it is serious about upholding human rights. But plausible as all this criticism may be, it cannot be blamed on UNDP or the project. The reasons are rooted in the fragile political and security situation in the country.

However, the NHRC has collected a lot of data and documented over 8,000 cases of human-rights violations, involving a much higher number of victims. Experts believe this could serve as a basis for accountability at a later stage when the security situation allows it. The project is also praised for having helped the NHRC produce some good analyses of the human-rights situation. The institution is linked up with international peers. At a local level, regional NHRC offices have forged valuable ties to local human-rights NGOs that may become useful in years to come. Finally, two options are supposedly being considered by the NHRC that may change the assessment of its impact. One is that the NHRC may begin publishing cases it has investigated, the even lower number of cases where it has recommended an action (prosecution, compensation, etc) and – perhaps more importantly – the disgracefully low number of cases where the government and the prosecution service have actually followed up on the NHRC's recommendations. The other is that the NHRC may begin "naming and shaming" culprits, which is in its mandate to do.

The OHCHR's conflict-monitoring mission has by all accounts contributed significantly to a stabilisation of Nepal after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. OHCHR began by establishing a presence not only in Kathmandu, but also in key districts and hot-spots in the country. The arrival of foreign observers installed hope and a sense of protection among local human-rights activists and organisations, and inspired them to labour on in times of danger. The effort has worked alongside and supported the capacity of human-rights NGOs and institutions (including NHRC) in matters of human-rights protection (monitoring, collecting data, investigating cases, submitting cases to NHRC for further recommendation to prosecute). Several accounts were given of how the mere presence of internationals has prevented highly tense situations from escalating into violence thus avoiding situations that could have caused further destabilization. The mission headquarters in Kathmandu was endowed with donor support and resources sufficient to retain clout in the capital.

There are also shortcomings. The OHCHR has not managed to remain politically neutral. It has been accused of pro-Maoist leanings by monarchist and republican political groupings. It was difficult to establish a good co-operation with the Nepalese army, which possibly wants OHCHR out of certain places. The mission's capacity-building activities have failed to deliver according to expectations. Some capacity has been built at local NGO level, but much less in public human-rights institutions. However, the primary mission was fact-finding and a stabilizing presence – capacity development was clearly a secondary objective.

Regarding the cases of human-rights abuses that the mission has looked into and forwarded to the NHRC, few have gone to the cabinet secretariat and fewer still to the prosecution service, which has not prosecuted a single human-rights abuse case investigated by OHCHR or anybody else. The main worry about the OHCHR Office in Nepal is that it is being asked to leave too soon, and that therefore it may not leave any sustainable impact.

4.4.2 Assessment of Results

Relevance: Both efforts were clearly highly relevant under existing policies of all involved.

Efficiency: Resource-effectiveness of the efforts is difficult to assess. Observers have argued that efforts have been about as efficient as circumstances in Nepal allowed. A counter-factual is difficult to assess, but the most logical alternative to OHCHR's civilian monitoring mission would have been a military peace-keeping mission, which would have been several times more expensive. An alternative to UNDP's capacity-building project is difficult to see outside the UN: sources agree that such a sensitive task as building an NHRC needed "the blue flag" of the United Nations (as opposed to a bilateral intervention), and within the "UN family" the most logical agency for such interventions is UNDP.

Effectiveness: The OHCHR operation in Nepal is clearly till now the more successful. The monitoring mission has by all accounts had the desired dampening effect on simmering conflicts. It has provided support to national human-rights activists

and organisations, not least of all by being present and showing that the international community cares about human rights and is able to do something about in concrete terms that is of value to the population. The OHCHR monitoring mission is thus considered to have been very effective.

UNDP's NHRC project Outputs have not led to the originally hoped-for Outcomes. While the NHRC has collected data, completed some investigations and made a number of recommendations to prosecute conflict-related human-rights violation, these have not been followed up by the legal system. While internal capacity has been built and applied to human rights violations situations, neither the Commission as an agency for human rights nor the particular cases it wanted to pursue have led to changes in the human rights situation in the country, perceived or real. effectiveness of the project has thus been poor.

Sustainability: The projects show mixed sustainability where the *least* successful is the more sustainable: The NHRC is seen to be a sustainable institution due to its constitutional mandate. To the extent it continues to exist and work on the basis of systems and skills introduced through the CDNHRC, the project will leave a legacy beyond its lifetime. Paradoxically, then, though it shows no clear impact to date, the project achievements – largely the internal capacity building – are likely to be sustainable.

The most common view was that the lasting effects of OHCHR impacts are fragile. The authorities of Nepal are still weak and unstable. Presently, the OHCHR is required by the government of Nepal to cut back on its monitoring in the field, in a situation where there is no mechanism in place that can fill the role so far played by the OHCHR. The longer-term effect of the effort will depend on developments in Nepal in the years to come, so its sustainability is highly uncertain.

Impact: By almost every account the NHRC has had no noticeable effect on Nepalese society, largely because the human-rights situation is driven by other actors, so the consensus is that there is low if any impact**.** OHCHR Nepal, on the other hand, has helped to diffuse tensions at critical points, has strengthened some capacity of local NGOs, and assisted the NHRC in case-processing and capacity-building. Many informants praise the mission for contributing significantly to achieving and maintaining Nepal's fragile stability. By and large, all sources of information suggest that the mission has had a very positive impact. But as long as the underlying tensions remain unresolved, the quick impacts are fragile too.

4.5 Pakistan

In 2001 the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf introduced extensive local government reforms in Pakistan, decentralizing powers to ensure real community participation. This represented a watershed in women's political participation with a 33% quota for female seats in the district, sub-district and union council levels and 17% at federal and provincial levels, a change that NGOs and women's activists had fought for during the previous decade. After the 2001 elections over 36,000 women councillors entered local politics representing a great presence of women in elected public positions at local levels.

With the support of the government in power at the time many donors found a conducive environment for achieving results in terms of democracy development and women's rights and gender equality, and a number of large scale and highly profiled initiatives were introduced to support the institutions and structures put in place.

4.5.1 The Program

UNDP signed a five-year Gender Support Program (GSP) with the Government of Pakistan in August 2003 as a step towards eradicating poverty in Pakistan through gender-responsive governance and a rights-based approach to sustainable human development. GSP was envisaged to provide coherent programmatic assistance in the areas of gender related policy analysis and coordination, capacity development, cutting edge research, and awareness rising in order to address gender inequality. Relevant projects were to be identified along the way, and a total of 11 projects were implemented (see the separate report on Pakistan). With the new GSP phase 2008-2011, the total GSP budget was USD 45 million, of which Norway contributed about NOK 40 million (USD 5.9 million), where other partners were DFID (UK), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and Canadian International Development Agency. Whereas the other donors mainly supported specific projects, Norway has been the only donor contributing solely with basket funding.

4.5.2 Results Produced

The many individual projects under the GSP ranging from alternative dispute resolution to economic opportunity development and political empowerment, have been described as *"imaginative, innovative and courageous in the Pakistan context"* (UNDP 2008 MDR, p. 6). Although with some variations, many of the projects are generally seen to have produced the desired results in terms of carrying out the planned activities and achieving the expected outputs. The Multi Donor Review acknowledges that the GSP can be proud of its achievement in terms of the individual projects delivering their expected outputs.

Evidence of consolidated results contributing towards the goal or outputs at an aggregate program level has not been documented, but being "perhaps the largest assortment of gender related projects being managed under one roof" (UNDP 2008, GOE p. 21), the sheer size of the program has contributed to its importance. Various sources note that GSP as a program has contributed to a more open discourse on democratization and women's rights by keeping gender equality visible on the national agenda, elevating the women activists' agenda to the cabinet level and helped create opportunities for women to become a stronger force in politics. In the context of political participation, the biggest achievement is capacity building of over 50,000 women councillors enabling them to contribute to gender sensitive public policy and implementation.

GSP is known to have been instrumental in landscaping women's empowerment agenda in Pakistan and helped the National Commission of the Status of Women (NCSW) become quite proactive for some time. GSP supported the production of publications on key areas relating to women, law and policies, feeding into the government's policy development.

GSP has contributed to the training contents and practices on gender integration for selected training institutes., building capacities for integrating gender and adapting gender sensitivity in the development and delivery of training to a wide range of public officials. This has in turn led to greater awareness about gender issues among the civil servants and policy makers who have benefited from the variety of training programs. Trainings on gender sensitive and gender responsive budgeting for the Ministry of Finance have developed the capacity for budgeting according to gender needs. Moreover, GSP has contributed to start the process of gender integration in the PRSP processes.

GSP has contributed to the mobilization of 1050 *Musalihat Anjumans* offering alternative dispute resolution services at the community level for settlement of issues relating to violence, custody and inheritance. And lastly, GSP has created new models of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) and contributed to enhancing women's role, income and employment in the livestock and textile sector. The partnerships are said to have resulted in increased incomes and employment generation for women in the livestock and garment sector.

4.5.3 Assessment of Results

Several GSP projects have been a success in terms of achieving their outputs and to some extent Outcomes, and many have been effective, efficient, relevant and sustainable. However, evidence of Outcomes is scarce and anecdotal, particularly at program level. The evaluation reports note a focus on project outputs, and unclear goal hierarchy with varying LFAs makes it challenging to assess the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of the GSP as a program (UNDP 2008, MDR). The team has, however, identified and assessed some factors that are found to have influenced the achievements of GSP program results.

Relevance: The GSP was designed at the time of massive local government reforms. It was in line with Norwegian and Pakistani priorities, contributed to strengthening the government's ability to carry out their national gender agenda. The government had to build its gender machinery and was lacking technical expertise. The introduction of the quota for female councillors created a huge need for training and capacity building, which GSP did cater for. The women interviewed hold that the training given through the GSP has been invaluable to them. Overall, GSP has proven to be an adequate solution to the challenges at the time, and was clearly a highly relevant initiative.

Efficiency: There is agreement that there were no realistic alternatives channels or actors that could deliver such a large scale gender program at that time. Although UNDP proved to have strong management capacity, many informants note that several GSP projects suffered from implementation delays and low disbursement rates. The Mid Term Review states that high staff turnover, slow appointments and replacement of staff, lack of alternate signatories in the absence of the Project Director, and inadequate staffing were obstacles to efficient management. As GSP grew rapidly, the Program Management Support Unit (PMSU) was actually shrinking. Although the PMSU is said to have been responsive, constructive and helpful, resources have undoubtedly been stretched. Better coordination functions could also have enhanced efficiency in terms of synergies across the GSP.

Effectiveness: There are no baseline data, and the scarce evidence of achievements at the program level make the assessment of GSP's ability to achieve the planned results difficult. There are, however, some issues emerging as central to the effectiveness of the GSP.

Exploiting the program approach: The program document speaks of the holistic program approach and the linkages between projects. In practice, GSP has been a collection of projects rather than a coherent program. This has diluted the programmatic approach and reduced the effective achievement of results. Rather than concentrating on the short term deliveries, a stronger emphasis on monitoring the achievements of GSP as a program could have contributed to a more long term strategic focus and increased the effectiveness of the GSP.

Donor coordination within the GSP: There are cases of good donor coordination related to GSP but even better donor coordination could have enhanced the results. The linkages between the program LFA and project LFAs are ambiguous at best, creating barriers to measuring results at an aggregate level. The fact that donors had separate LFAs and reporting formats also undermined harmonization and encouraged "project silos".

Coordination with other stakeholders: Linkages and effective coordination with the many other stakeholders implementing similar programs and projects was poor, with most interventions in this field carried out in isolation. Duplication of training materials has been cited as common within the GSP and between various initiatives, and some trainees met at Lalamusa had undergone similar trainings 8-10 times organized by various organizations.

The GSP program document emphasizes the linkages with other government initiatives, but this is missing in implementation. The Gender Outcome Evaluation remarks that "*the virtual disconnect of virtually all donors with the on-going GRAP (Government Plan) is particularly alarming*" (p. 33). More systematic integration between GSP and GRAP could have reduced the risk of marginalisation and enhanced efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability.

The program document highlights civil society as a *"major strategic partner for the effective implementation of GSP"* (p. 10). There are examples of NGO involvement with the GSP, such as the Aurat foundation providing training for the WPS project. However, NGOs were mainly used for service delivery and in general the linkages with NGOs remained weak throughout the program, and civil society partnerships remained under-developed.

Sustainability: Many of the interventions providing capacity building, especially the training, are seen as sustainable interventions at the individual level but unclear at the more institutional level. Furthermore, GSP's lack of gender expertise, management issues, and the absence of real government ownership have been mentioned as sustainability concerns. At the time of GSP design, UNDP had adequate technical gender capacity and was the UN lead on gender in Pakistan. However, after some time the emphasis on gender capacity eroded leading to a lack of program-

matic and strategic focus. The potential for developing leadership capacity on gender equality and women's empowerment at the governmental level for the long term was subsequently not adequately exploited by the GSP.

As the years passed the program grew substantially with no equivalent growth in terms of human resource availability. The donors became concerned with the deteriorating quality of proposals and reporting and the minimal gender expertise remaining with the program management. In December 2007 an external Multi Donor Review of GSP was undertaken. It highlighted GSP's successes and strengths but held that it required changes including "a significant change of approach in the GSP's leadership and management to its partnerships at all levels…". The subsequent change management process, however, soon terminated as the consultants felt that the program management within UNDP was not willing to bring about necessary changes to generate positive results from the coaching opportunity. A difficult relationship between UNDP and UNIFEM also led to the lack of a coordinated UN approach to the gender portfolio, leading to the potential ***One UN*** cooperation to remain largely unexploited. At this stage Norway and some of the other donors decided not to continue their support to the program, and GSP was officially closed in December 2009.

Government ownership: While there are conflicting views on government consultation and ownership of the GSP, several informants hold that real consultation with the government at the time of design was lacking – the comments were sought only after development of GSP proposals and similarly after the development of specific projects. Evaluation reports similarly state that the lack of real government participation, involvement and ownership has led to multiple misunderstandings and conflicts between the government and UNDP.

Lacking political will and weak gender capacity: Despite the introduction of national and international commitments, government commitment and ownership of the gender agenda remains weak. Public sector gender capacity is seen to be weak and ineffective, understaffed and without long term gender expertise. The lack of will among donors and the government itself to support, strengthen and capacitate the MoWD and other government offices responsible for gender policies at federal, provincial and local levels, since they are too weak, turns into a vicious cycle. Dependent on external assistance for core functions and without long term gender expertise the MoWD and other institutions are left unable to play a significant role in the gender work of the Pakistani government.

Political and Emergency Factors impeding gender and democratic development goals: During the last years a number of factors have negatively affected Pakistan's ability to achieve its gender goals. Growing economic and political problems and a worsening security situation are turning the attention towards other issues. The worsened security environment related to extremist elements and the ongoing war against terror has led to the feeling of insecurity among the population and women in particular, and is clearly affecting the ability to carry out gender related activities, particularly in the affected areas. Moreover, the escalating number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has led to the influx of massive humanitarian aid in Pakistan, which has changed the donor community's priorities and decisions.

Gender is not seen to have benefited from this shift as the urge to tend to the basic needs of the IDPs has overshadowed gender concerns (Khan 2008).

The devolution system – Uncertain basis and uncertain future: The devolution system introduced in 2001 with 33% quota for female seats in local parliaments undoubtedly lay some of the foundation for the GSP by creating a need for training of the thousands of women elected in local parliaments. However, many critics have been questioning the real influence of the women elected. There are anecdotal evidence that the female presence in the local councils are merely a token or on paper only, or they are elite women serving the will of male relatives. The quotas for women in politics are also perceived as lowering the status and legitimacy of the female councillors and often men are said to have greater leverage and authority as they have been elected directly on the basis of their merits. Moreover the devolution system introduced in 2001 is today at a crossroads. The government is at present discussing the future of the devolution system, which is now virtually put on hold leaving an uncertain future for the trained local councillors.

4.6 Sudan

Sudan had experienced 39 years of widespread and brutal war when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005. The CPA set the stage for national conciliation by offering a provisional semi-autonomous status to South Sudan during an interim period where promotion of democracy and human rights would be the highest priority. The CPA contained concrete time tables for the holding of national elections and a referendum to decide the possible secession of South Sudan.

Norway was among the key international brokers of the CPA. Along with the US and the UK, Norway constitutes a "*troika*" with a special responsibility to supervise the transition process. The UN has played a crucial role in the implementation of the CPA. Based on several Security Council Resolutions, a massive UN Peace Mission (UNMIS) is present both in the North and the South (see the separate report on Sudan).

4.6.1 The Program

The evaluation has looked at two programs supported by Norway in Sudan. The first one was the support to the 2010 elections through a UNDP managed basket fund, where Norway contributed a total of NOK 34 million, about 6% of the Fund. The other is a human rights program through the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, OHCHR. This supported the human rights unit of UNMIS with a Norwegian contribution of NOK 5 million each year 2007 and 2008. This was an earmarked contribution to OHCHR. Norway was by far the largest donor for two critical years, providing 38% of budget in 2007 and 48% in 2008[2, 3].

2 A similar amount was earmarked for UNMIS/HR for 2009, but OHCHR later decided there was no implementing capacity to absorb it. The Head of UNMIS/HR was unaware of this dominant Norwegian funding for the programme, and OHCHR HQs has recognized there was a communication gap in this regard. A similar gap seems to have existed between MFA/Oslo and the Khartoum Embassy. All in all, this funding, meant as a strategic contribution from Norway to UN's HR work in Sudan, never led to active policy coordination between Norway and the UN on the ground.

3 Comment from OHCHR, dated 3rd March 2011: "This point deserves more of a nuance: OHCHR discussed the 2009 earmarking for Sudan with the Permanent Mission of Norway in Geneva and was informed that the allocation had already been made. In view of the sizable carry-over that existed from 2008, OHCHR then consulted the Norwegian MFA and it was agreed to reallocate the funds to another operation. In 2010, Norway did not provide earmarked funds for specific country operations, rather it provided a lumpsum for "field operations", a development which greatly facilitates fund management in OHCHR."

The Election Basket Fund financed the holding of elections, including decisive support to the election management body, financing of civic and voter education, training and monitoring of media, support to domestic observation and to various stakeholders.

The Human Rights program supported the establishment of human rights commissions, provided technical support and advocacy to law reform in line with human rights requirements, trained law enforcement officials and civil society, and supported treaty ratification and treaty reporting.

4.6.2 Election Program Results

The Goal set for the UNDP's Basket was "*Support the democratic process in Sudan; support the holding of elections in 2010 which are recognized as transparent and credible by national and international observers; promote the participation of voters and civil society stakeholders in all democracy strengthening events"* (UNDP 2010). The ***outputs*** were:

- *Civic and voter education:* 10 medium-size and 90 community-based organizations trained to implement civic and voter education program. For many organizations and many communities this was the first ever experience with direct and open democracy work.
- *Training of media professionals:* Over 350 journalists trained in 13 workshops throughout Sudan in effective election reporting; international mentorship program providing on-the-job training by 12 African/Arab journalists to 12 media houses.
- *Monitoring of media performance during elections:* Two monitoring stations (Khartoum and Juba) established and 40 Sudanese monitors trained to measure access to media by all political parties, occurrence of hate speech, gender balance, evidence of voter education.
- *Support to domestic observation:* 3,900 observers trained in the North and 860 in the South affiliated with three CSO networks, monitoring 25% of the 16,500 polling stations.
- *Support to National Elections Commission* (NEC): Decisive UN role for an extremely complex election process (logistically); enabled NEC to select, train and deploy 100,000 polling staff to administer 16,500 polling stations; with UNMIS had main responsibility for procurement and transportation of 135 million election material pieces.
- *Support to the Political Parties Affairs Council* (PPAC), responsible for party registration and legal performance: supported development of operational plan, trained 200 representatives of 76 political parties and training manual for massive distribution; supported development of Code of Conduct signed by the political parties.
- *Support to women and youth participation,* in partnership with UNIFEM, IRI and Friedrich Ebert: civic and voter education; capacity development for women/youth candidates.
- *Security enhancement,* implemented with UN Police: "Handbook for elections security" produced and distributed, 34,000 police officers trained all over the country.

- *Support to Judiciary:* supported UNMIS to train judges on electoral legal aspects, preparing them for appeals processes.

Concerning the expected **outcomes** as a result of these Outputs, the findings were:

- *Support the holding of elections:* UN role was decisive for these complex elections, where the UNDP Basket Fund was one of two UN legs (the other being UNMIS). UNDP played a more independent role than UNMIS, widening the democratic space in an attempt to internalize a democratic mindset among leading social actors at all levels
- *Elections recognized as transparent and credible:* All observers (national and international) concur that elections fell short of international standards and domestic expectations. But they were an important step forward. The question is whether better synergizing and advocacy partnering could have enhanced democracy and human rights space further.
- *Democracy strengthened through participation of voters and other civil society stakeholders:* This took place to the extent possible under the circumstances. On some occasions, UNDP took action to modify government decisions in a positive direction.

4.6.3 Human Rights Program Results

The Goal of the Human Rights program was to support the implementation of the human rights-related components of the CPA by monitoring its implementation, investigating violations, observing movements of armed groups and ensuring an adequate human rights presence. It was also to support the rule of law and national institution building, advocate for judicial and legal reforms, promote international human rights standards and implement technical cooperation programs. The key Outputs that were produced were:

- *National and Southern Sudan Human Rights Commissions:* The South Sudan Commission is established and functions relatively well, the National Commission has not materialized.
- *Legal reform advocacy with Parliamentary Committees (National and South):* Technical advice has been provided to several important law reforms, i.a. child bill, national security and intelligence bill, criminal acts and criminal procedure amendments, press and printed material's act, national land commission act.
- *Awareness raising with law enforcement officials:* Human rights as a topic was taught in all modules of UN training of police and correction officers by human rights officials.
- *Strengthening capacity of civil society:* over 500 CSO actors from more than 250 NGOs were trained; active use of local radio transmissions.
- *Support with treaty ratification and treaty-reporting obligations:* UNMIS/human rights supported work of Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur for Sudan and used her Report as an advocacy tool. One additional treaty ratified: Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities.
- *Human rights monitoring:* Systematic monitoring of human rights violations, reporting after 2009 mostly for internal use of UN and discretely shared with GOS.[4]

4 Comment from OHCHR, dated 3rd March 2011: "This point needs to be more nuanced. In 2010, UNMIS issued one public report (instead of two as in previous years) because it was decided to link public reporting to technical cooperation in line with the UN Policy Directive on Public Reporting. In 2011, UNMIS is planning to issue two public reports. A monthly human rights bulletin continued to be issued throughout the reporting period".

Concerning the expected **outcomes** as a result of these Outputs, the findings were:

- *Legal reforms:* human rights concerns were rarely given significant consideration by GOS. Laws frequently ended up violating the Interim Constitution and international treaties.
- *Strengthened capacity of civil society:* There is little in terms of documented knowledge among CSOs about UNMIS/human rights, and the interaction was less than desirable.
- *Monitoring and reporting:* Reports on human rights situation and violations have been important for international human rights advocacy on Sudan, not least regarding Darfur. Reports may also had a preventive impact on human rights violations by authorities. But a new OHCHR policy (post-October 2009) has restricted public release of reports in an effort to improve discrete human rights dialogue with GOS[5].

4.6.4 Assessment of Results

The 2010 elections in Sudan were possible to organize only because the UN played such a heavy and decisive role. They fell clearly short of democratic criteria, but the UNDP Basket Fund did make a difference in involving civil society and enhancing transparency. However, several informants felt that both the UN and Norway as an important player in Sudan seem to have been more concerned with the holding of elections as such – as another element in CPA implementation – than with their democratic character.

Regarding the Human Rights program, it had limited visible impact on the human rights situation. Training of law enforcement officers plus the fact that there has been a systematic monitoring of human rights violations and that the Government has been aware of them, may, however, have contributed to limiting human rights abuses. Technical support and advocacy to bring legal frameworks in line with standards has rarely succeeded.

The political context has been the main limiting factor for a positive democratic impact of the programs. The war history and the character of the Khartoum regime, the CPA, the Darfur conflict, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Bashir and socio-economic developments, made it extremely difficult to push democratic development during the post-CPA period. The Basket Fund project must be characterized as a relative success, while the Human Rights program has been seriously hampered by its limited political space. The donors (including Norway) have been hesitant to line up with and support the vulnerable UNMIS unit in charge of this component. According to local informants, no visible attempt was made, either by the UN, Norway or other donors, to take advantage of possible synergy between these two and other pro-democracy programs/projects.

Relevance: Elections and human rights protection/promotion were the two most important elements in CPA implementation, along with the maintenance of peace. The two UN programs were arguably the two major efforts – although very different

5 Comment from OHCHR, dated 3rd March 2011: "Reference is made to the above footnote. The Head of UNMIS reports to OHCHR HQs who was consulted about the fact that only one public report would be issued in 2010. There seems to have been a slight misunderstanding here".

in size and priority – by the international community in support of these two goals, and thus highly relevant.

Effectiveness: Effectiveness was quite high when it comes to the *organization* of the elections: elections of a certain standard could simply not have been held in Sudan in 2010 without massive UN support. The human rights program has operated against very heavy odds, and may not be said to have been a very effective instrument for enhanced human rights protection/promotion in Sudan, although a little more so in the South. But a better partnership between UNMIS/human rights unit and the diplomatic community including Norway with stronger support from UN senior management could have made a difference.

Impact: The holding of elections even if they were not up to international standards, as a follow-up to the peace agreement, did at least temporarily lead to the expansion of democratic space in Sudan, particularly in the South where there was no previous experience with democracy. The fact that this war-ridden country was enabled to experience the probably most comprehensive election process ever should not be underestimated. The impact of the human rights program has of course been much more limited. Impact could probably have been strengthened if there had been more strategizing for synergy effects between various actors and programs, within the UN system and between the UN and other donors, and even among the many elements supported by Norway in Sudan.

Sustainability: The priority given to security and military concerns at the cost of optimizing democracy and human rights may have limited the sustainability of the democratization gains. The continuation of the UNDP Basket Fund with post-election activities is one effort to sustain results. No parallel effort by UNMIS/human rights unit to protect the human rights defenders who became visible during the election process has been seen[6]. If there is a return to war, these gains will rapidly be lost, though this is beyond either program to address.

4.7 Afghanistan Desk Study

The single largest program funded by Norway in the field of democratic development through the UN, is the NOK 120.3 million provided through the UNDP for elections and electoral processes in Afghanistan during the period 2003-2009. This has been a comprehensive program that has contributed to information and mobilization across the country in several electoral phases; has funded actual elections and electoral campaigns; has provided training to elected officials in parliamentary and legal procedures and obligations; has had a gender dimension; media support; capacity building for the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); funded technical assistance in fields of legislation and regulatory development; funded the convening and operations of elected bodies during early periods. While Norway's funding is substantial, it is only a small share of total funding, where the US in particular but also the EU and the UK have been major contributors.

6 Comment from OHCHR, dated 3rd March 2011: "The protection of human rights defenders is part of the protection work done by the UNMIS human rights section on an ongoing basis. In cases of arrests, detention or attacks against human rights defenders, UNMIS HRS has regularly mobilized the Special Procedures system including the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. The Independent Expert on Sudan also releases public statements and has consultations with Governments on specific cases during his in-situ visits in Sudan".

The main program, Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT), ensured that the first round of presidential and subsequent parliamentary and provincial elections could take place in 2004 and 2005. UNDP and UNOPS had direct administrative responsibilities for running the electoral processes, beginning with a massive voter registration program in 2003 and followed by bringing in 130 international trainers who trained several thousand Afghanis in electoral procedures, who in turn trained about 160,000 polling staff for the 26,500 polling stations that had to be established and made functional. The elections, while containing weaknesses, were considered a major success, though the strong role of the UN (and some problems arising from unclear and competing mandates of some UN agencies) provided little capacity building of the national bodies that were to take over these responsibilities over time.

In the subsequent phase 2006-2010, however, much more attention was to be given to building the skills, organization and management of the IEC. The complementary Support to the Establishment of the Afghan Legislature (SEAL) was to help strengthen the knowledge, procedures and workings of the Afghan Parliament. The Presidential electoral process in 2009 became controversial, however, as the donors felt UNDP was running the show much as it had the last time: a highly centralized and tightly controlled *technical* project did not invite in either Afghan skills and views nor allow for much local procurement in an exercise where huge sums were spent on logistics and materials, nor did it build much local capacity. While the international community had expected the UN Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, to manage the *politics* of the process and oversee UNDP's management of it, this only came into place after considerable donor pressure and resistance by UNDP, and thus with limited involvement by local actors such as civil society organisations that knew the situations in the localities outside Kabul. At the same time, UNDP was willing to take risks, and maximized the number of polling stations so as to allow as many as possible voting access for the 2009 vote despite the security problems and thus the lower levels of control with voter fraud and corruption. For the Parliamentary elections in 2010, in part due to the criticisms of the fraud that in fact did take place in 2009, the number of polling stations was reduced to ensure greater control and security – but with the result that in particular some Pashtun-speaking areas ended up underrepresented, creating a different form of credibility gap.

The overall support to elections and the legislature are seen as highly ***relevant*** to the challenges that Afghanistan faced right after the ouster of the *taliban*. The ***effectiveness*** of the first phase support is seen as good with respect to the elections themselves but weak concerning capacity development. Given the time constraints, however, it was the first objective that was primary. With ELECT and SEAL, a more classic long-term capacity development approach was to be taken, building on the more comprehensive approach to elections as part of democratic processes, and where the entire electoral cycle is addressed, and not just the electoral events. Both the electoral outcomes but in particular the capacity building results from the last cycle are seen as disappointing. This is partly due to politics becoming more contentious and corruption rapidly increasing, undermining trust in Afghan institutions and making transfer of resources and responsibilities – critical to

capacity building – more difficult. The ***sustainability*** of results in terms of laws and regulations for electoral processes is good while capacities built in the IEC and Parliament are weak and further subject to the effects of increased corruption and contested elections.

The choice of UN as channel for the funding was never really questioned, and the job done during the first cycle 2003-2005 under extremely challenging conditions is praised by all, and the reviews and evaluations are positive but note weaknesses and suggest improvements. For the second cycle, however, the expectation was that the Afghani role would have been much more prominent, that civil society would have been more involved but that UNDP allocated to itself too dominant a role, with much attention on financial control to avoid charges of financial mismanagement. While this was an understandable concern, it made the process too "UN-centric" and did not succeed in supporting a more Afghan-led process.

The decisions by Norway to contribute these large amounts were logical, given the political commitment to the stabilization and development of the country. It is clear, however, that these decisions are not driven simply by the objective needs of Afghanistan, but by the political imperative that the coalition of Western nations have coalesced around concerning how to address a post-*taliban* Afghanistan. Norway was therefore an active member in the donor group supporting the electoral processes during the second phase, providing considerable pressure to involve local actors and for the UN to hand over tasks to national bodies.

4.8 Capacity Development

This evaluation defines capacity as "*the ability of individuals, organisations and institutions/societies to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner*". This is in line with UNDP's widely-used definition (UNDP 2010 "Measuring Capacity Development", July). The definition can be operationalized using the matrix in table 4.5 below. The evaluation hence assesses the contributions of UN managed projects using this matrix, looking at the extent to which projects succeeded at building capacity at institutional level and the more challenging dimensions of solving problems and setting and achieving new objectives, rather than just providing training in non-controversial technical fields.

Table 4.5: Capacity Development Matrix

Societal Level	Task Complexity		
	Perform Tasks	Solve Problems	Set/Achieve New Objectives
Individual			
Organisational			
Institutional/Societal			

4.8.1 Individual Skills

Most projects have training as a major component: in the gender program in Pakistan the training of female councillors was a key Output, and similar for media

staff in Mozambique, while the Sudan and Afghanistan programs were basically massive training exercises for the elections. Most of the training that is mentioned in the results reports has been seen as ***relevant*** and in the two cases mentioned above training has also been ***effective:*** the training of female councillors was critical to them being able to play their role in the various elected bodies. The same was true for the media staff in Mozambique, where the second phase training was tailored to the particular media and thus targeted to their specific needs.

But the training was provided *directly* to the beneficiary groups. No project established a permanent training capacity. The first phase training of parliamentarians in Malawi led to more thorough review of draft laws and budgets, but when the new Parliament was elected it went back to the more superficial treatment of laws and budgets. In Pakistan the lack of continuous training for newly elected female councillors means that the gains from the first round of training is not sustainable.

The media training in Mozambique points to variability in sustainability. The very technical training was provided to a limited number of persons who had particular tasks, but leaves the organisations vulnerable to the technical dependence that is established. Once repair staff leave, the radio station does not function once it breaks down! General journalism training in fields like Human Rights or Elections is more sustainable, since it is provided to a large number of persons who provide a "critical mass" who continue transmitting this new knowledge through informal on-the-job training to colleagues.

There are no easy answers to these capacity development challenges, which are well known. But they point to issues that the donor community and the UN should have been able to find a better answer to by now. The critical one is the realisation that training is always a short-term answer to a capacity problem. Without local training institutions being given the ability to reproduce these training outputs, project training will have time-limited effect on the performance of the organisation. A capacity building project that does not look seriously at how to embed this kind of training in local institutions is not really addressing the problem.

The challenge for project managers (UN agencies) is how donors structure their support. In the cases of Guatemala, Malawi and Mozambique, Norwegian funding continued for eight to nine years over two to three phases. If this time commitment had been reasonably clear early on, a more long-term and sustainable capacity development strategy could have been designed. However, very seldom is a donor able to make these kinds of commitments, leaving the UN without the possibilities for planning long-term.

The other problem is a reluctance to engage with more sustainable capacity building institutions outside of the project. The result is funds spent on project-specific training that from a societal perspective may make less sense than a more strategic focus on broad-based education and capacity development. One exception is Malawi, where the training of Parliamentarians was done by staff of a national university, which should have been able to continue providing this kind of training if and when the need arose.

Most of the training has assumed that it was to address "doing assigned tasks better": women councillors in Pakistan and Parliamentarians in Malawi have been trained in what are considered their core tasks. IDPP staff in Guatemala were trained in indigenous laws and their cultural context, polling staff in Afghanistan and Sudan in elections.

But some training has also been more on *how to do things better.* Newspaper journalists and community radio reporters were involved in discussing how to cover elections, how to understand human rights issues. Much of the training in Guatemala has had this same awareness-raising dimension where simple transmission of knowledge is not useful.

Project reports do not discuss the difference between these two kinds of capacity building, but there seems to be more focus on technical rather problem-solving skills.

4.8.2 Organisational Development

While considerable funds were spent on training, most activities had an organisational focus. In Nepal two human rights bodies have been supported, while in Malawi focus was to begin with on Parliament and other bodies, including civil society actors that were important at national level. In the last phase focus was on community-level organisational development.

In Guatemala, focus has been on a public body and the CSO community, with nearly 80 CSOs involved in one or more phases. Similarly in Mozambique, where support has gone to semi-public TV and radio, community radios, and private newspapers, to aid them develop as media actors. In Sudan, the support was in part to help establish and build the capacities of Human Rights Commissions at the national and southern levels, but in particular to enable the Election Monitoring Body to organize the country-wide elections.

The training that has taken place has therefore been based on needs as seen from the organisations' point of view. In Sudan and Afghanistan part of the challenge was to prepare autocratic societies and traditions in handling an open and democratic process, with over 100,000 polling staff trained in each country in how to ensure free and fair elections.

But there has also been considerable focus on *organisational development* as such. The CSOs in Guatemala were to be strengthened as legitimate actors in the field of improved justice. The results were mixed, in part because the project did not have a good analysis of civil society and the challenges CSOs faced in becoming more qualified actors in a field that is contentious. The findings were similar in Mozambique, where management training and other forms of capacity development were provided, but where the results in terms of improved sustainability varied. For public radio and TV, since the organisation was already good, the decentralisation and greater use of local languages led to (probably) sustainable improvements. For the private newspapers, the improvements were cosmetic. Part of this is structural: the organisational development required is more long-term and fundamental. But the

understanding of what was required was also fairly shallow and the resources available limited. That is, the more "transformational" organisational development – enabling media to figure out better answers to their challenges – has been poorer.

4.8.3 Institutional Development

Most projects do not have ambitions at the highest societal level, of changing institutions and societal framework conditions, though the electoral processes in Afghanistan and Sudan to some extent did. But some projects can point to real achievements at this *Impact* level as well.

In Guatemala, the progress that has been recorded in terms of better understanding of the role of indigenous justice systems and the precedents that have been established, leading to a culturally more equitable overall legal system, is noteworthy. Another potentially important precedent is the successful prosecution of a high-ranking officer, which changes the implicit framework condition that the armed forces were working under.

In several cases, new laws have been passed or other framework conditions changed due to actions by project participants. Again in Guatemala, a number of rules, regulations, national handbooks have been put in place that change "the rules of the game".

In some cases more ambitious targets may not have been met, but still institutionalisation of gains can be seen. In Mozambique, media actors themselves agreed to a Code of Conduct when covering elections that has led to what observers see as qualitatively better and more balanced reporting. The support to female reporters has also begun "changing the rules of the game" in an important field for the media. The strengthening of community level accountability both in Malawi and Guatemala is contributing to empowering civil society actors in their role as rights holders vis-à-vis the public sector as duty bearers.

In Nepal such framework changes are *not* taking place: while human rights offices ought to be important for empowering more marginalized groups, this is far from taking place due to the maintenance of power by the dominant castes. In Sudan, the direct political contestation is still so confrontational that there is no real "space" for more long-term structural-political power transformations.

The first phase of the gender program in Pakistan was important in providing content to the gender laws passed by the government. But the subsequent economic and political instability, including growth in conservative religious forces, has partly undone the early gains, making the institutionalization of gender progress more questionable. At the same time, an entire generation of female councillors has been trained, they have seen progress in a number of fields important to women – budget allocations, rules and laws – so some of the "rules of the game" may have changed even there – though more subtly than was hoped for.

As noted in several country studies, there is little in the way of rigorous performance tracking along this important dimension, at individual, organisational or

institutional levels. Some changes, while "anecdotal", clearly are real, such as those brought about through the elections in Afghanistan, the new laws in Guatemala, the expanded media landscape in Mozambique, increased local political participation in Malawi or by female politicians in Pakistan. What is missing is more careful recording of what these changes actually are, which factors were critical in triggering them, but also of course to understand the sustainability of the improvements that have taken place as many of them came about with strong funding and watchful eye by the international community which over time wanes.

4.9 Public Discourse on Democratization

All projects have contributed to the public discourse on democratization, human rights, gender, and dimensions of democratic development, by legitimizing and defending the space for such discourse, and by contributing substantive inputs to the actual discussions.

In Sudan, the support to the electoral processes has opened up democratic space, confirmed the legitimacy of the aspirations of the South, and principles of accountability that had largely been absent from the public arena. One should not exaggerate the importance of this: the election process suffered from a "democracy deficit" as a series of issues that ought to have been addressed to ensure the democratic nature of the elections were never tackled. But once the electoral processes gathered momentum, they provoked discussions around process and content, among other things through the civic and electoral education and the training of media professionals, the 4,800 domestic electoral observers and 100,000 polling staff. This process and mobilization thus provided an opening for debate on issues that otherwise would have had no platform.

Observations by the UNMIS Human Rights unit to a number of new laws have mostly been ignored and therefore not helped expand the actual space for human rights. But the fact that crucial law proposals have been systematically assessed from a human rights perspective has identified and raised the awareness about the shortcomings of the legal framework.

The Nepal program has some of the same results. The visible intervention by the monitoring mission allowed a debate on the rights citizens have to protection, a better understanding of the obligations of the state to protect and defend, and of the possibilities citizens have for demanding these rights. In a turbulent phase of the country's history, this highly visible presence has thus also provided space for democratic discourse and sensitization.

The media program in Mozambique brought community radios to new parts of the country, increased the use of local languages and thus the participation of the local population in the debates on their rights, provided more comprehensive coverage of elections, and allowed citizens from poor and marginalized groups to be heard and participate directly in the public discourse. The decentralization of public radio brought programming closer to local groups with more debates on issues of concern to them, and public officials were for the first time challenged to defend their actions and their record.

This was also a major accomplishment in Guatemala, where CSOs worked both at national and local levels to improve the accountability of public officials according to basic human rights principles. The debate around the sentencing of military accused of human rights abuses during the civil war improved the conditions for raising such issues (though this is now again deteriorating). The national debate on indigenous rights has received a major push by the project and opened the space but also improved the contents of these debates.

Similar has happened as a result of the training of parliamentarians in Malawi and female councillors in Pakistan: substantive issues have been brought to the table and debated more thoroughly, and raising issues such as needs and rights of women have been followed by legislation and budget re-allocations in Pakistan.

In all the countries and on all the projects it can be seen how these interventions have enlarged the space and improved the contents of democratic development discussions. What is not clear is how deeply embedded these improvements really are, how far out into society – away from the direct project beneficiaries – these improvements have taken place and have been noticed by society at large, and how sustainable these gains are. It is already clear that some of the gains in Pakistan are being challenged, in Malawi are being lost, in Guatemala are being rolled back by increasing violence, and in Sudan and Nepal seem to stand on shaky feet with an uncertain future if external assistance disappears tomorrow. The only country where the gains seem to be fairly sustainable, is Mozambique, in large part due to the stable environment and positive economic improvements that are taking place, which thus is also benefiting the openness and range of public discourse.

4.10 Factors Explaining Results

A key question in the TOR concerns the identification of the factors – positive or negative, project internal or external – that can explain success or short-comings of the programs.

In each country, the team asked informants to list those factors they felt were the most important, and based on this a "factor matrix" giving the five key factors in each of the four quadrants of such a matrix was created (see all the separate country case reports). The discussion below is thus based on these country case matrices. An aggregated version of these matrices is included as a separate annex (see Annex E).

Project Internal Factors for Success

A key factor mentioned in most cases is the ***quality of the planning***. This includes both the *process* – the extent to which consultations took place, the range of stakeholders that were invited in – but also the *contents skills*, such as gender knowledge in Pakistan, media knowledge in Mozambique.

A second point noted by most is the ***management*** of the projects, which in some cases was provided by the UNDP under the so-called Direct Execution (DEX) modality, in other cases by a national actor through national execution (NEX), such as in Malawi and Guatemala. An important contributing factor here was *dedicated,*

qualified, hard-working project staff who remained in place during the period, while another was *flexibility and innovation* by management to adapt the program and its focus as circumstances changed.

One of the advantages of the staff remaining in place was the question of ***trust*** that was established. This may be particularly important in the sensitive fields of democratic development, as it is known that the authorities in several of the countries were sceptical to the donor-funded initiatives. This includes the issue of the ***UN being a trusted partner*** on several projects, acting as a guarantor for the contents and parameters for the activities – in some cases defending the space required for the project to achieve real results and willing to take on constraining national authorities (particularly visible in the case of Sudan, where the heavy presence of the UN system was important), but also as a "friend of the country" that ensured that there was no hidden agenda involved (such as in Mozambique).

Other factors raised included the knowledge of the actual issues to be addressed, and how the project went about this. While this to some extent is captured in the "quality at entry" of the planning and the dedication and knowledge of the staff, there is still the problem of identifying the right partners, finding the appropriate scope of the intervention, and the best mode of working with stakeholders. A common factor seems to be that these interventions were quite comprehensive and thus were able to both cover a large share of the actors and the key issues within the field. This may have given the projects/programs "critical mass" in terms of actors involved, visibility, and enough broad-based legitimacy that a momentum for change actually was able to begin overcoming some of the inertia and resistance to change that most democratic development activities face. This last point is quite speculative, but it is interesting to note that interviews with stakeholders outside the direct project groups often recognized the projects as pushing and mobilizing quite successfully around their objectives. The issue of scale and persistence over time does come up as important characteristics of success in a number of different ways, including in how gains painfully acquired can easily be lost if and when resources disappear and momentum slows down.

The issue of momentum also seems to be linked to the extent to which the projects truly are based on local concerns and ownership. The ability to adjust, the accommodation to changing circumstances that projects are praised for, appears to be projects finally adapting to local agendas. The fact remains that while the successful aspects of projects are tied to good planning, a lot of the inputs and thinking is provided by external actors and the projects initially may have fairly shallow local embeddedness and ownership. The longer time perspective, the predictability thus provides local actors with greater confidence in the value of investing own resources – time, political commitments – in engaging. This probably goes beyond the normal understanding of the trust issue, which is more centred on intellectual agreement on objectives and means. Here there is a greater commonality of ***values*** – critical to democratic development – that brings parties closer together.

The ***ability to deliver*** was seen as important. The fact that the projects were not only delivering Outputs as foreseen but contributing to Outcomes as perceived by

key stakeholders (Mozambique, Malawi, Guatemala, Pakistan) provided both credibility to the concept and project, and with the flexibility/innovation by management, led to follow-on but modified/improved phases being approved and supported (and conversely – when the program no longer delivered as expected, such as with UNDP in Pakistan, donor support was withdrawn and the program largely disintegrated).

Finally, the project/program's role as a donor coordinating vehicle has been seen as positive, partly because it has increased the resources available, partly because it has given the program greater political legitimacy by having support from several donors. This latter aspect may, however, be a more complicated issue exactly because democratic development often goes to the heart of policy contestation. Support from donors may become a liability if this allows opponents to label national actors as agents for external interests. This does not seem to have been an issue in the cases looked at here, which may possibly in part be attributed to the projects being under the UN "umbrella".

Project Internal Factors inhibiting Results

The main weakness seems to have been ***over-ambitious objectives, unrealistic expectations:*** the program was trying to address too many issues at the same time. The second weakness seems to have been ***lack of internal coherence*** – that a program was made up of a number of projects or components that were not well linked – there was little or no synergy from the various activities undertaken. A third point mentioned was ***poor quality assurance***, monitoring and evaluation, which meant that oversight and learning was weak.

These factors are somewhat difficult to reconcile with what was seen as the strengths of some of these same programs: good planning both on the process and contents side, a program that was large enough to cover a wider range of issues and stakeholders and thus able to actually forge ahead and produce results, and thus ability to produce results also at Outcome and to some extent Impact level, which gave the programs enough credibility to be continued in several phases.

These negative factors may, however, be "second order" concerns. That is, the overall design and contents of the program was good, but resources got spread too thinly and the contents of particular interventions were not well enough planned ("the devil is in the details"). The lack of coherence and synergies seems partly to be a management problem on the side of the UN: while the overall objective for the gender program in Pakistan was good, the various interventions were planned as stand-alone projects that never built in lateral linkages, learning and joint action. But part of the problem was also with the donors, who sometimes wanted own-specified reporting that meant it was difficult to get coherence in the various results frameworks (Pakistan in particular).

When some of the positive dimensions mentioned in section 5.3.1 are missing, these quickly appear as important weaknesses. Lack of embeddedness/local ownership led to too much donor dependence (Nepal). While the ***program*** in Guatemala ran for nine years, individual projects for CSOs were often too short.

Some of the advisers did not understand the Nepali context which led to slow results. The UN agency managing the project was too dominant (Pakistan), and was not efficient in administrating the program (Mozambique). Finally, the programs may not have taken full advantage of the possibilities that the UN presence, prestige and resources opened for in pushing the frontiers for more comprehensive and systematic human rights achievements (Sudan).

External Factors for Success

The general political and economic frameworks – fairly stable and predictable environment, a government providing space and support for the democratic development activities – were important in Malawi, Mozambique and Pakistan, and also largely true in Guatemala.

In the more conflictual environments of Nepal and Sudan, the UN as the "mother" for the program was important, and to some extent compensated for the lack of a benign environment: in contentious situations, the UN provided a stabilizing and conflict-reducing role. As part of this, programs were designed to address some of the "democracy deficit" in the environment, and the UN's ability to protect the space of the projects was thus critical.

In the first group of countries, local ownership was both possible and existed. This was important for explaining positive achievements: results were a function of national authority support – tacit or active – but in particular due to strong engagement by the primary stakeholders (Guatemala, Malawi, Mozambique, Pakistan).

In the group of conflict-affected countries, the issue of ownership is more complex. The Literature Review (which refers to the Secretary-General's Guidance Note on this issue) and general development cooperation experience point to local ownership as fundamental to any long-term sustainability and impact. However, if the conflict environment is such that the stakeholder groups that would normally benefit from and wish to be part of the democratic development program are among those being suppressed, then there has to be an approach towards ***building*** ownership that in itself may be contentious. That is, if the government is part of or the major cause of the "democracy deficit", any attempt at building democratic structures, policies and results will tend to be seen as an antagonistic challenge by the authorities. Manoeuvring this kind of situation requires considerable political skills and determination, but also raises questions about "whose ownership" is being sought if the regime is seen to lack legitimacy and a situation of confrontation exists (Nepal, the Khartoum government in South Sudan, general deterioration of governance in Pakistan, Guatemala).

The support by donors was noted in several cases. One thing is that joint donor funding provided more stability and size of funds and thus political visibility. Another is that in the political discussions with national authorities, the fact that there were several important donors politically committed to a program was important (Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan). In some cases, the partnership between the UN and Norway went further, where Norway was important in providing contents inputs to the preparation and implementation of activities (Malawi, Mozambique, Pakistan) and/

or in their monitoring/quality assurance (Guatemala, Nepal). While the Literature Review drew the conclusion that donor support has generally produced disappointing results, in the cases looked at here the international support has clearly been important for the positive achievements.

External Factors inhibiting Results

A major problem in fragile environments is constant changes to policies and decision makers in the public sector, or simply a lack of clear legislation on which to base the activities. This lack of stability has been a major barrier to progress (Nepal, Guatemala, Pakistan).

Another dimension that often comes from the societal fragility is deterioration in general socio-economic and political conditions: dysfunctional governance or weak capacity to respond to new challenges means that the economy or political system is not able to function and deliver expected results, especially if there are sudden "shocks" to the system, either internal (drought, political unrest) or external (confrontation with neighbours). A defensive response from the leadership often includes clamping down on critical voices and processes, cutting short progress (Pakistan, Nepal).

In the case of Sudan, a classic "trade-off" calculus has affected results. The key concern has been stability and peace and thus the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The pursuit of human rights and democratic development objectives has clearly been accorded secondary status to the CPA. This has in part been a function of which voice on the UN side was dominant, and in this case it was the security concerns rather than the human rights principles. A similar dynamic was seen in Afghanistan, where the second electoral cycle 2009-2010 was expected to focus a lot more on handing over responsibilities to local actors and building their capacities, but instead UNDP's attention was on running the electoral processes given the lack of trust in local systems and actors.

An overall lack of rules-based governance is noted as a major stumbling block. Corruption, penetration of criminal actors into the public sector, the impunity of violent action means that a program that is promoting the respect for rule of law, transparency and accountability directly challenges these groups (Guatemala, Nepal). In such environments, the degree of achievement is in part a function of how important the democratic development intervention is perceived to be, and how much protection the project is able to mobilize around its activities and personnel. In Guatemala, the notable progress can in part be attributed to the fact that these programs are not seen as strategically challenging to non-democratic power groups, while in Nepal an operationally functional human rights commission could become a serious challenge to powerful groups, thus leading to its emasculation.

A different problem has been the low level of capacity that the project had to build from (Afghanistan, Mozambique, Nepal, Sudan). This has of course made progress slow, but this factor seems to have been underestimated during project planning (Mozambique, Nepal).

Poor performance by the UN agency in charge or disagreements between UN agencies has led to poorer results over time (Pakistan) or in general implementation (Mozambique), though in the latter case has not been critical as the key agency assumed responsibility and addressed the problems at the critical points in time.

4.11 Findings and Conclusions

Capacity Development Results

Most of the projects have considerable focus on capacity development, and while there has been a lot of training (***individual level***), the projects by and large have had an ***organisational*** point of departure for their capacity programs. Most of the training has been *relevant*, but *sustainability* is often poor because training has been delivered directly to beneficiary groups rather than building the capacity of training institutions. However, a distinction can be made between highly technical training where exact knowledge is mission critical, and more process or incremental skills. The former is much more vulnerable to poor sustainability.

There has been considerable support to ***organisational*** development – strengthening of organisational functions, improvement in strategies – but much of this has been shallow and not based on careful analysis of long-term requirements. At the ***institutional*** level, a number of projects can point to important achievements – new laws, procedures, new power constellations, improved accountability systems and realities – where much of this seems to be a function of the *size* of the program.

Most of the support at individual and organisational level has been to address known tasks while the more "transformational" capacity of identifying new ways of addressing problems has been paid less attention.

It is realized that capacity development should be a long-term effort. But while Norway has funded a number of multi-phase programs, in none of them has there been certainty of long-term funding, nor a long-term capacity strategy, so efforts have remained short-term project based. Furthermore, most results are recorded in an *ad hoc* manner as few projects had results frameworks or monitoring systems in place for tracking capacity changes. Attribution is often problematic: general trends in the social environment may account for much of organisational and institutional change, and improvements in individual capacities have been reversed, revealing the fragility of achievements in this field.

Public Discourse

All projects appear to have contributed to improving the public discourse on democratic development, partly by enlarging and the defending democratic space, partly by contributing to the contents, partly showing through activities the contents of these democracy concepts. Especially in fragile situations, these contributions are important because there are often few or no other credible actors to present and defend democratic development principles. The presence of these kinds of projects thus legitimizes and acts as a defence for local discourse.

Perhaps even more so than with capacity development, the net contributions made by each project, and the depth and breadth of impact, is not measured or documented. A particular concern is that sustainability may be low: discourse may cease once the external actors leave the scene. What may be bringing public discourse further and deeper are all the various technology platforms, in particular various social media, but none of the projects here have made any contributions in this field. The value-added of the projects may therefore be more in legitimizing the debate, offering content inputs, and providing arenas for it to take place – but which also says something about the limitations of the contributions made.

Factors that Explain Results

Project-internal positive factors were good planning ("quality at entry"), good management and dedicated staff who remained in post; long-term presence that engendered trust; the UN as a legitimizing force; predictable, medium-term and sizeable funding that provided "critical mass of effort" that enabled the project overcome obstacles and resistance to democratic change; local ownership and engagement; and actual delivery of visible results that created momentum for continued work/phases.

Project-internal hampering factors included overambitious programs; lack of internal coherence among program components; and poor quality assurance systems. Lack of local ownership as well as insufficient time to produce results also weakened program achievements.

The most important **external positive factor** was political-economic framework conditions, including in particular government support. In conflict environments the UN presence and assistance was important. Donor support, financial but also political, was considered highly significant. In the cases where Norway provided substance contributions to project content, implementation and monitoring, this was seen as helpful.

External factors hampering progress included constant changes to public policy and personnel, and missing or poor legal frameworks for action. In fragile situations the environment could quickly deteriorate, where those in power would resort to repression of dissent and thus loss of democratic governance gains. Trade-off between what was seen as competing agendas – peace and stability versus human rights – meant the latter normally lost. Poor governance – corruption, impunity of violation of laws – clearly undermined for democratic development efforts. If these efforts were addressing strategic areas, they could easily become emasculated. Finally, the low level of local capacity at the start of the program and a poor performance by the relevant UN agency in some cases also held back progress.

The project internal factors are largely those already familiar from other project evaluations. The fact that the same ones are important for democratic development activities, and in particular in fragile situations, is at one level banal. At the same time this should not be surprising: sensitive activities and in particular in sensitive environments are even more dependent on good project design and implementation in order to succeed.

But in line with the conclusion in the Literature Review, democratic development activities are very context sensitive. A supportive environment is particularly important for longer-term effects. And an important part of this environment is the degree to which the international community is supportive and actively so. This has in several instances been important at critical stages of a particular program.

A central concern in the TOR was to what extent it would be possible to identify what kinds of interventions are likely to succeed under what circumstances. This issue, however, it was not possible to address, among other things because the evaluation did not include failed projects, which might have helped identify why some interventions had to give up.

5. Norwegian Funding

When it comes to the issue of Norwegian funding, the task is to "*assess how decisions are being made in relation to allocations and disbursements to this sector through the multi-bilateral channel and how this influences development results*". (see TOR Annex A, page 97). The more specific questions in this regard concern (i) the criteria for Norwegian allocations; (ii) which role program theories played for resource allocations; (iii) potential synergy effects between the various types of support; (iv) links to other Norwegian-funded activities in that country in that field; and (v) links to other donors' activities and possible contributions to the UN's programmatic work (UN Development Assistance Framework – UNDAF – processes and "Delivering as One").

5.1 Reasons for Norwegian Funding

Democratic development and support to the UN system are two key pillars of Norway's development cooperation policy, as reflected in numerous policy statements and documents (see the Literature Review). Norway supports the UN's mandated role in the various fields of democratic development, and has been a major funder of a range of UN bodies when it comes to activities in these fields, from peacekeeping operations to agency interventions on a democratic development issue. Funding UN projects in these areas at embassy level is thus part of this larger policy stance.

The reasons for funding the ***particular*** programs looked at here was either because Norway had been involved in this field previously, often on a smaller scale (gender in Pakistan, media in Mozambique), or because there was a new opportunity, often then in the form of a program developed by a UN body (Malawi, Nepal, Sudan).

In fragile situations the UN often plays a prominent role, and in some fields like national elections the UN is usually called in to administer the process. Norway thus joins a large-scale effort as only one of several donors, and in high-priority countries like Afghanistan and Sudan the decision to join has been made at the political level in Norway, as noted in political statements and the budget documents.

In other fields, the UN is the dominant or only actor on the scene, so if Norway wants to provide support, it would necessarily be as part of the UN effort (media in Mozambique, human rights in Nepal and Sudan). In other situations Norway felt the UN had the most sensible approach or most coherent program (the gender program in Pakistan, though Norway continued some support through CSOs, or providing more coherent support to CSOs through the UN administered program in Guatemala).

In all of the cases looked at here, donor coordination, pooling funds from several sources to allow for a more comprehensive program, and economies of scale in administering the program, were arguments that were used to justify Norway's participation.

Linked to this were the cost savings to Norway from handing over project management responsibilities to a UN agency as this reduced the demands on Norway's own technical, administrative and policy/management skills. The UN could often begin implementing soon after the project was approved. The real advantage was on the operating costs side: the UN had a field presence that ensured continued engagement (in the case of direct implementation, which was quite common in a number of the fragile countries) or monitoring (in the case of national execution). This meant that Norway could hand over all the direct transaction costs of managing what were often complex and contentious activities to the UN, freeing the embassy largely to deal with the UN and not the project and the authorities directly. In all cases, a structured program of reporting, annual meetings and mid-term and final evaluations was agreed to. This pushed the responsibility for these quality assurance tasks onto the UN. Follow up measures, additional data and further steps could be agreed to at the policy level and the UN would be responsible for following up. At the same time, Norway always had the possibility and the right to demand direct insight or additional supervision, or could provide own inputs to projects in agreement with the other parties (review of media program in Mozambique, mid-term reviews of the support in Guatemala).

The UN was generally open to technical inputs, which provided Norway with possibilities for influencing the design and components of programs. In several cases, Norway's engagement and contributions were noted by other parties as important: the overall democracy support program in Malawi, gender in Pakistan, media in Mozambique. In other cases, it is clear that Norway has largely provided funding but not been active on the direct *contents* side (Nepal, Sudan) though engaged regarding the larger political framework for support (Guatemala, Nepal, Sudan).

Generally speaking, staff at the Norwegian embassies had a good understanding of the context in which the programs have been supported. The support has therefore been a deliberate choice as Norway always had other options: it could decide not to fund that field, it could fund local CSOs/NGOs, it could link up with other bilaterals, or establish an own program. As noted in the Mapping Study, 80% of Norway's funding for Democratic Development is handled bilaterally – the choice to go with the UN has therefore always been considered as against alternatives.

Furthermore, these programs have all had a certain size and in most cases also a duration that made them significant programs. There has therefore been considerable discussions and thinking going into the decision making process: in Mozambique, it took nearly two years to sign the program due to negotiations between the UN agencies, the government, and the donors around significant political issues, and the planning and negotiation processes for the Malawi and Guatemala programs also ran for some considerable time.

5.2 The Role of Program Theory

Where Norway was involved in the design or early discussions of the program (Malawi, Mozambique, Pakistan), the assumptions underlying the programs and the logic of the program structure were topics of concern. In Mozambique, technical advice provided through the embassy contributed to both focus the program but also to ensure that private media were main beneficiaries. In Malawi, a mission from Norway contributed to the design and logical coherence of the program, and embassy staff were instrumental in the development of program design in Pakistan. Since democratic development programs contain important change ambitions – strengthening democratic discourse through independent media in Mozambique, enhancing the role and voice of women in Pakistan, strengthening popular participation and thus public accountability in Malawi – close attention was paid to the realism of the *political* assumptions underpinning the projects, since this was typically the most sensitive dimension of the proposed programs.

Most of the changes to program design happened due to mid-term reviews or end-of-period evaluations. In Guatemala, shifting the focus and a geographic concentration in the third period was a function of the findings from the first periods but also a desire to make the program closer to key constituencies so that it was more likely to have a real impact. The same change happened in Malawi, driven by a wish to improve effectiveness.

In Sudan, UNDP began developing its support to the upcoming elections even before a formal request had been received. While the UN Mission to Sudan (UNMIS) was also engaged in the elections, UNDP was much more insistent on the role of civil society actors and on seeing the preparations for the elections in light of the larger electoral cycle, in line with more recent thinking regarding how elections can contribute to more long-term democratic development.

The UN system in general and UNDP in particular use the logical framework approach to programming, and have produced various kinds of results frameworks ("LFA matrices"). The quality of these has generally been poor but typically improved over time for a given program in terms of *completeness, comprehensiveness, and concreteness*. Regarding the *completeness*, UNDP till recently focused only on activity and Output production, and said very little if anything about higher-level results. This has changed over the last several years, where Outcome level has become more important, as noted for example in Malawi. With regards to comprehensiveness, neither Malawi nor Pakistan provided a good *program* framework so it was almost impossible to aggregate results from the individual projects up to the larger program level. As for being *concrete* and measurable, most of the LFA matrices were poor with respect to indicators or target values, and there were few measurable baselines that performance could be tracked against. Mozambique was the one exception, with a good baseline at the start of the program and a follow-up study towards the end. Malawi did a good one but only in 2006. There were no cases of program frameworks being linked to formal national results frameworks (monitorable action plans) as far as the teams were informed. Towards the end of the program period in Mozambique there were general measures being published regarding the media situation but without the UN media program adjusting its own

performance matrix to become aligned with this since these measures were available only as the project was about to close down.

Overall, program theory has formally existed, though the quality both in terms of providing a realistic and coherent results chain from activities to desired results, and from a more theoretical perspective – what are the empirical foundations for believing that a particular intervention would lead to the defined results – have been poor. The risk analysis and risk mitigation proposed has also tended to be weak and without contributing much to performance. As programs have progressed over time, the results frameworks appear to have improved along both dimensions – operational coherence and completeness, and clearer grounding in "good practice" knowledge.

Questions have been raised regarding the realism of program theory in such a complex and process-intensive field as democratic development. One thing is that particularly in fragile situations, where weak authorities may resort to authoritarian measures, spelling out strong change needs for the sitting regime is hardly going to ensure government approval of the program. Political realism makes strongly worded democratic objectives difficult. Another is that the high uncertainty and risks of such situations makes it unrealistic to believe one can foresee future Outcomes, much less long-term societal change, which is what the Goal/ Impact statement should provide. The gradual definition of what is achievable as a process evolves is more likely to be realistic. The question is if this is acceptable as the basis for requesting donor funding.

In the cases looked at here, however, none of the programs were that controversial or the environment so unstable that it was not possible to formulate meaningful higher-level objectives. The progress achieved over time in doing so (Guatemala, Mozambique) shows that this is a realistic demand – though perhaps not fully formulated before a year or two into the process, when the environment and the various forces at play are better understood.

It should also be noted that Norway over time in most cases reduced its engagement with the programs it supported. This is in some sense natural – priorities change and as embassies are given new priorities while staffing levels remain static or even reduced, it necessarily means that some fields begin receiving less attention. While the ideal would be that Norway maintained its interest and time commitment, the fall-off in direct engagement is to be expected and will probably continue in the future. Handing over responsibilities to the UN is thus another way of ensuring that a body that is more permanently on the ground with a specific thematic mandate and with larger capacities pursues the activities in the democratic development field, which is necessarily staff- and management intensive. But it is probably also an argument for Norway and others to insist on greater clarity and realism in the program theory and management information systems built around them for these kinds of complex problems and tasks. But there is also the problem that if Norway and other donors reduce their engagement, experience shows that overall accountability of program performance tends to drop as well – a concern for longer-term results.

5.3 Synergies across Democratic Development Dimensions

The team has looked at this issue from two angles. The first is the extent to which possible synergies were presented as part of the project design. The other is if *ex post facto* programs were found to have contributed to other dimensions of democratic development – that positive "spill-over" effects were created even when focusing on a different dimension.

Regarding the first question, the Malawi program was designed as a multi-dimensional democracy program. In Guatemala, the strengthening of civil society and indigenous justice had gender as an explicit dimension, as did elections in Afghanistan and the media program in Mozambique where women's issues and role of women in media was to be strengthened.

Gender is the dimension that most often is included when other dimensions have been the focus of attention. But while gender is mentioned, operationalization of a gender objective – target values, final expected results – is generally missing. The Malawi and Mozambique programs are exceptions, with some targets spelled out but with little in terms of resources actually allocated. This is a general weakness, with no earmarked resources set aside to ensure that gender objectives can be reached, and with no explicit gender expertise included in the planning of the intervention.

Other cross-over linkages seem to be few when it comes to the planning stage. For the elections in Sudan, the strengthening of free and independent media is an exception, where this was a particular intervention with own funds. This, however, was not really a question of a "synergy", but of a separate project that was seen as necessary for free and fair elections to be possible.

Norway does therefore not seem to have had a larger democratic development program in mind or supported a larger scheme when deciding to fund a UN intervention. Rather that activity has in itself been found to be important and thus worth financing – not because there were important or interesting synergy potential through link-ups with other initiatives.

On the ***results*** side, there do seem to be important synergies. The Sudan and Mozambique case reports walk through how the interventions have contributed to results also along other dimensions. Most of these were perhaps hoped for or expected, based on general knowledge about how for example an access to justice program would lead to more awareness of human rights and gender issues, but without clear notions of how exactly these results would be achieved. There has therefore not been any systematic measuring or tracking of these other dimensions – they are reported on an *ad hoc* basis as positive additional achievements. There are thus serious questions about the *scope* of these results, even more about the *attribution* – how much of the change in the knowledge about human rights can really be attributed to the media program in Mozambique? – and even more about the *sustainability* of the achievements. Since these other dimensions have not been tracked very well there is thus also no information available to address these questions.

What is seen in a number of these programs is that there are spill-over or synergy effects that take place, in part because of the general mobilization, "space" and legitimacy that the projects confer on one dimension which thus creates possibilities and perhaps aspirations also in other democratic development fields. Many of the key actors in the programs are aware of and concerned about these synergy possibilities, and the team has seen internal notes pointing to these possibilities in several countries. What tends to happen is that they are not pursued, often for funding reasons: there are no additional resources available to address the possible add-on/synergistic dimensions. So while spill-over effects are probable and perhaps likely as a result of intervention in one field, there is nothing from the cases looked at that tells us anything about possible "scale effects" or gains from "interactivity" or any other kinds of synergistic outcomes, the logic of sequencing or similar issues.

5.4 Links to other Norwegian-funded Activities

Another way of looking at the "synergy in planning" question is if Norway was funding other democratic development interventions and tried to ensure linkages between these.

This has varied across countries. In Malawi, there were numerous parallel small-scale projects, several through UNDP, for the Human Rights Commission, Ombudsman's office, Law Commission, Elections, NGO Umbrella – but not linked through a unified program. In Pakistan, Norway funded gender activities also through civil society but without ensuring links to the UNDP GSP. In other countries, Norway seems to have focused largely on one program at a time, undoubtedly partly for administrative reasons: democratic development is typically only a small part of the overall country program but management intensive.

One apparent exception to this is the case of the Sudan, where a number of complementary projects were put in place by the UN. Norway provided funding for several: the basket fund for elections, human rights work and support to media. But this was all part of a concerted effort to ensure the democratic nature of the elections, since this was the first time since independence that Sudan was going to have free nation-wide elections.

In Sudan there were furthermore several Norwegian-funded activities implemented by academic institutions, NGOs and others. While it may have been a conscious policy to respect the autonomy of the actors rather than push in favour of perceived common objectives, it would seem that for example Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) project in support of the democratic development of SPLM would be a crucial pro-democracy instrument, yet NPA did not see much interest by Norway's representation in Juba in using this project for synergy-building during the election process.

In other cases, these kinds of linkages do not seem to have been important. Norway provided funds for elections in Mozambique in addition to the media program, but the election fund was a one-off contribution that was handled fully by the UN, and since there were few hitches in the election process itself there was not so much involvement of the donors. The media program *did* contribute to

improved election coverage, but more as an internal initiative during the second phase of the program and evidently not because the Norway or the UN as such provided any particular inputs or thoughts to this.

There is a more fundamental reason why one should perhaps not expect many synergistic aspects of Norwegian funded programs. Norway believes strongly in the principle of "recipient responsibility" – that it is the local partner who should define the overall priorities and programs. Norway therefore does not see any particular need for the program it funds to be coherent, consistent and comprehensive – as long as the partner country has such a program and the Norwegian funding provides financing that is in line with this. If Norway therefore funds a somewhat inconsistent patch-work of interventions this is fine as long as that patch-work is part of a larger picture that has been designed locally and is funded.

5.5 Links to other Donors' Activities

Donor ***alignment, coordination and harmonization*** in the field of democratic development seems to be a function of the overall coordination in the country, though may perhaps be more complicated in this field due to the highly political nature of some of the activities[7].

UN managed *basket funds* for elections in Afghanistan and Sudan, since they fully funded these activities, ensured that all three dimensions of donor coherence was in place. The joint donor funding for the Guatemala and Mozambique programs got the coordination and to some extent harmonization in place for those donors that funded the program. But as with the gender program in Pakistan and democracy support in Malawi, many donors funded similar or even overlapping activities (Pakistan) on the outside of the UN managed program, undermining UN and participating donor attempts at ensuring better aid effectiveness.

One of the problems for donors to live up to the Paris Aid Effectiveness agenda is that especially in fragile states/situations, the government may *not* be in the driver's seat and is not the proponent of the program. A number of the democratic development programs are exactly there because the authorities themselves do not guarantee women's rights, equal access to justice, the holding of free and fair elections, etc.

Norway has generally been a supporter of donor coordination mechanisms, preferably led by the national authorities where viable, and if not then through UN or World Bank administered pooled funding mechanisms. Whether democratic development activities channelled through the UN have been part of these larger coordination mechanisms is not clear. The UN does in fact *not* have a good reputation for submitting their activities to such joint donor deliberations. They instead point to the UN system's Development Assistance Framework, UNDAF, as the joint program-

7 ***Alignment*** occurs when donors fund their activities according to national priorities. This would be ***coordinated*** if the donors ensured that all their activities then not only were aligned according to national priorities, but also complemented each other and avoided duplication and competition. Finally, if the implementation were then carried out using similar instruments and procedures, preferably by relying on national systems and processes, this would make donor funded activities ***harmonized.*** This happy set of circumstances can be created through formalized mechanisms like Budget Support (full alignment, coordination and harmonization since all funding goes through treasury and thus is fully under government control and disbursed using government mechanisms) or Sector Wide Approaches and Basket Funds (where alignment is in place and to a large extent coordination though depending on how funding is handled harmonization may still be lagging).

ming instrument for the UN and government, as they see some of the other coordinating mechanisms as too donor driven. – There is little the team was able to collect from these cases that provide much insight regarding this issue. The general impression, however, is that UN-developed projects were funded on their own merits, not on expectations of how they might complement or contribute to other donor funded activities in similar or related fields.

5.6 Findings and Conclusions

Norway is a strong supporter of democratic development, of the UN, and in particular of the UN's role and responsibilities for democratic development. Despite this, Norway in fact manages 80% of its democratic development funding directly, so the decision to channel funding for these activities through the UN is a deliberate choice.

This is more likely in fragile situations, for a number of reasons. Norway's own presence was often weaker and more recent than in countries with longer-term development cooperation so the ability to run programs directly was poorer[8]. The legitimacy and role of the UN tended to be stronger and with stronger international support for its activities, in particular in programs like electoral processes. The weakness of national authorities also often meant the UN was often asked to take on tasks it would not do in other circumstances.

In addition to the principled reasons, there were often practical arguments for using the UN. UN agencies had a history of continuous technical, administrative and management presence on the ground. They could therefore prepare, implement and report on activities using known standards including regarding fiduciary management. By pooling funds from several donors it was also possible to develop larger programs that could have longer-term results on national policies while generating economies of scale in the administration.

For Norway, relying on the UN to manage democratic development programs, especially in fragile environments, reduces management and monitoring costs. Such projects are typically management intensive activities, particularly in these often contentious environments. Norway can largely intervene and address only those issues it feels are important yet the door is always open for Norway to contribute when it wants to and carry out more in-depth checks when it demands to.

The UN has always produced formal results frameworks that build on logical framework thinking and thus should in principle provide explicit assumptions underlying the results chains. Regarding the expected results, in the early phases this seldom went beyond the Output level. Higher-level results have been vaguely formulated, monitoring systems/ indicators and target values poorly defined, and especially in the first stage of a program the higher-level objectives unrealistic and over-ambitious. A question can be raised as to the validity and realism of higher-level objec-

8 This situation has changed over time, with increasing presence in Sudan and Afghanistan, fairly constant in Nepal and the Palestinian territory while staffing in Central America has been falling.

tives in unstable and fragile environments, but in the cases looked at here, realistic objectives could have been formulated (though not all necessarily achieved).

Discussions on underlying assumptions (program theory) tended to address realism of political assumptions, though often as part of more general assessments of country situation – projects were typically reviewed in light of this larger context.

While Norway has contributed to formulation of programs and generally demanded improvements in monitorability of program proposals, over time Norway has tended to reduce its involvement in the program as other priorities have taken over.

Regarding ***synergies*** across democratic development dimensions, while some have been thought of during the ***planning stage***, there is little explicitly programmed (some gender concerns raised), and no additional resources or expertise provided to ensure that these other democratic development dimensions could produce tangible results. On the ***results side*** one can see a number of positive spill-over effects, though most recordings are *ad hoc* and not linked to specific project inputs or activities. Rather there seem to be some *commonalities* that can account for these, such as legitimizing democratic development, providing space and visible actors (projects, UN) around which other voices can be heard. But while such synergies are probable, the cases looked at provide no further information as to possible "scale effects", logic of sequencing or similar. What also seems clear is that each intervention was chosen based on the logic of its own case, which was country/case specific, so learning and spill-over effects are most likely quite context-specific.

There seems to be little in the form of linkages to other Norwegian-funded activities, or strategic links to other donor activities. The programs looked at here have been of a size that has justified expectations of results on their own and not depended so much on other projects, though Norway has often been aware of complementary or competing activities in the same fields. This is largely in line with Norway's adherence to Paris principles for aid effectiveness, which allocates the alignment and coordination responsibilities to the national authorities.

6. United Nations Agencies as Channel

Norway is a strong supporter of the UN system, and a major funder of UN agencies like UNDP, UNICEF, UNIFEM and UNHCHR. Providing funding for these agencies' projects in the field is therefore looked upon positively by the MFA, providing the embassies a fairly wide mandate to fund projects developed and implemented by UN agencies.

6.1 The United Nations as a System

Norway's prime minister was one of three co-chairs of Kofi Annan's high level panel to look at reforms of the operational part of the UN. The panel presented its report in 2006. The key task had been to propose ways in which UN agencies in the field could improve the UN system's effectiveness and impact through closer collaboration. The intention was to accelerate reforms begun through joint instruments like the UN Development Assistance Framework, UNDAF, and shared programming in technical fields. The intention was for the UN to begin "Delivering as One".

The evaluation is to see to what extent the programs looked at have contributed to this. The short answer seems to be "Nothing discernible". There are several reasons for this. The first is the time dimension. Most of the interventions looked into began long before the 2006 panel report was handed to the UN's Secretary-General, so it would have had no impact on original project/program designs and decisions.

Another is that many of these projects clearly belonged to the core business of an agency, such as UNDP: no other UN body has a mandate or experience to handle elections, for example, so there has been little scope to use these projects to further inter-UN cooperation.

But there are areas where there are overlaps of mandates such as in human rights, where UNDP, OHCHR, UNICEF (children's rights), UNIFEM (women's rights) all are relevant. Here one sees continued organizational "chauvinism": once an organization has taken on a task, it is not interested in handing over responsibilities to another. In Pakistan UNDP resisted handing over gender project funding to UNIFEM. There are several reasons for this. One is the formal one: UNDP has signed agreements with donors and thus is responsible. Handing over funds will often require a lengthy formal procedure, so the solution there was for UNDP to continue till the funding ran out. Another is financial incentives: an agency generates an overhead through the management of a project, and for an agency like UNDP where 80% of its projects are funded locally and only 20% come from untied donor funding, mobilizing local funding is critical. Agency disputes may thus not be because of

personalities but is structural: competition for project funds has direct impact on funding for running the local offices, so the donor model of channelling more and more of the financing through specific projects creates job insecurity and generates frictions between agencies.

Another result of this is that UN agencies have to put considerable resources into developing and "selling" projects in order to raise funds for key programs. UNDP is the agency that most clearly is engaged in this, in part exactly because it is so heavily focused on democratic governance. Since this is a field that is particularly important in vulnerable and otherwise problematic states, circumstances change quite quickly meaning that both circumstances/ possibilities on the ground may change, but donor interest may also suddenly surge or ebb, leaving UNDP vulnerable to the caprice of donor priorities.

This may become quite different in the future, especially if "Delivering as One" really moves ahead. Getting agencies to agree on a new program that has been designed as a joint undertaking from the beginning has been seen to be much easier than trying to merge existing projects. But it requires management to give a strong steer, so this is to a large extent a management responsibility. And this points to the strength and the weakness of the UN: UN agencies delegate a lot of responsibility to their field offices, and field office performance is thus vulnerable to the skills, commitment and priorities of the UN agency heads. The trend of having a UN Resident Coordinator on the ground is seen as positive. One thing is that it is then clear who is overall responsible for UN activities and performance. The other is that the UN as a system is taking this position quite seriously by carefully vetting and subsequently training the Coordinators to play this role well. This is intended to improve overall performance by the UN, not least in the field of enhanced coordination and alignment.

In the case of media in Mozambique, UNDP and UNESCO at points had an uneasy relationship, where UNDP was solving problems while UNESCO was at times a brake on performance. In connection with the new programming cycle coming up, UNESCO has prepared a draft media strategy. But instead of coming up with a joint vision based on a good analysis of what media in Mozambique require and how authorities with UN support could develop this, it was trying to delineate roles for the various UN agencies and in particular UNESCO – that is, it provided a UN-centric and agency-focused approach that had little "Delivering as One" to it.

In the case of Sudan, the vast scale of the operations involved many agencies. But this was also not driven by a "Delivering as One" approach, especially since DPKO came in with a Security Council mandate and focused principally on security. The larger UNMIS was given a coordinating function but did not take much of a proactive lead in preparing elections while the reluctant national government was dragging its feet in the preparation of this crucial element of the peace agreement. UNDP thus took a risk and went ahead with its own election preparatory work, which turned out to be a good move since UNMIS waited for the formal government clearance. The country study (see the separate report on Sudan) criticizes Norway, as one of the politically most active donors that also provided considerable re-

sources to the various UN bodies, for not being more pro-active in getting the diplomatic community and UN agencies rallying more consistently behind basic UN principles on for example human rights. So in Sudan the problem was not just that the UN did not "Deliver as One" – and this program began so late that this approach should have been implemented – but that the agencies did not give the expected priority to basic UN values in their individual programs.

One of the weaknesses that the Sudan case points to is that the various parts of the Norwegian system itself has not "Delivered as One". The MFA in Oslo, the Norwegian missions in New York, Geneva, Khartoum and Juba were not always fully informed about each other's actions and there was thus lack of consistency in Norway's political messages and priorities. This was exemplified by the lack of knowledge about Norway's earmarked support to the UNMIS human rights program through OHCHR at a time when this was politically important for this vulnerable program.

In some cases, however, Norway has actively promoted UN reform with its funding. In Malawi, Norway – evidently as the only donor so far – is providing funding for a One UN basket fund, based on a more coherent UNDAF. In other countries Norway does not seem to have been this strategic in its actions or this pro-active in its funding decisions.[9]

6.2 The United Nations as Policy Actor/Standard Promoter

One of the key roles of the UN system in the field of democratic development is to promote the standards agreed to by the international community in these various fields. Here different agencies seem to perform somewhat differently – though not totally consistently across countries and time, as will be seen.

The clearest example of a standards-based agency is the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Both in Nepal and Sudan, the OHCHR has clearly been driven by its human rights mandate and set an example in terms of adhering to these. The problem emerges when it becomes a small and invisible advocate without much political backing from its funders. In Nepal this was not a problem since the program was big, visible and with active donor support. In Sudan, the situation became much more difficult, in part because a number of donors – like some UN bodies – did not want to "rock the boat".

UNDP has in many respects also performed well. It took a clear lead in developing important democratic development programs in Guatemala, Malawi, Nepal and Pakistan. While the Nepal program can be criticized for lack of realism, there was a "window of opportunity" that should not have been foregone.

The performance on the implementation side has been somewhat different. While it continued to perform well in Guatemala, in Malawi real responsibilities were quickly

9 Additional information from the UN section in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as per e-mails dated 3rd March and 22nd March: "The report refers only to Malawi as a country where Norway has contributed with funding to One UN Fund. However, Norway has supported One UN-funds in all the UN pilot countries (Vietnam, Pakistan, Rwanda, Mozambique, Tanzania, Cape Verde, Albania og Uruguay). This support started in 2007, while the Norwegian support to the multi-donor trust fund Expanded Window for Delivery as One Funding started in 2009".

handed over to the Malawian partner, while in Pakistan and Nepal UNDP did not keep on top of the issues and drive the intellectual debate/contents of the program according to circumstances. In Afghanistan, UNDP is criticized for being too technical/administration focused, not involving local stakeholders and maintaining too much control itself rather than building local capacities. On the other hand, while the program in Mozambique had been developed by UNESCO, it was UNDP that ensured that the program stayed on track and with the appropriate democratic development focus when problems arose with the authorities: UNDP is credited with saving the program from collapse in some sensitive early moments. Similarly can be said about Sudan, where UNDP went ahead and prepared its electoral work based on "good practice" principles rather than waiting for the (reluctant) authorities to give the go-ahead for the planning.

Of the smaller agencies, little has been seen of their actual performance. UNIFEM seems to have a good approach to the gender program in Pakistan, but has little to show for actual implementation since it only was re-established there in 2007. UNESCO did a good job in designing the program in Mozambique, largely with support from the head office in Paris, but then the local office at times became an implementation bottleneck.

More importantly in Sudan, however, the country case points to UN agencies being in some sense opportunistic with regards to own standards, in large part based on agency-specific mandates and priorities. For DPKO, with both an overarching leadership role but also a concern for stability and security, some trade-offs against human rights and democratic principles regarding the electoral process were necessary evils in an unstable situation: it is hard to question that continued peace while carrying out a contentious electoral process was a major victory. However, these kinds of trade-offs in "the real world" pose dilemmas for the legitimacy and credibility of the values-based UN system: If that multilateral body is not able to defend basic rights, where else is one to turn?

The question is if there are any realistic alternatives in such complicated and conflict-laden situations. Despite all the criticisms of the UN, the legitimacy of the UN in the field of democratic development is greater than for other actors. UN agencies are still regarded as "the holders of the standards": this is what they are supposed to do and to defend, and at times they have been seen to have done this, providing real support and coverage for local actors in virtually all the cases looked at here. This has been noted in the country studies, sometimes in the negative: a UN partner has not lived up to expectations. But this underlines the high degree of legitimacy that UN agencies start out with.

While a number of factors may be important, the relevance of each often depends on the larger political circumstance. In Mozambique, the UN system could "float" on the credibility it had gained by playing an important and successful role in the 1992 peace negotiations and the transition period leading up to and including the elections in 1994. A somewhat similar situation can be seen in Guatemala, where the UN played a visible and important role in stabilizing and improving the framework conditions for societal development, as did the OHCHR

mission in Nepal. In Sudan, the massive presence of the UN enabled it to challenge and overcome resistance to change on some issues (while not as far and as many as some would have liked – but still did more than others), while in Pakistan the UN was seen as the major external player when it came to promoting the gender agenda.

6.3 Performance by UN Agencies

Since 80% of the funding went through the UNDP, this is the agency that was looked at most carefully. In practical terms, UNDP has taken lead in six (seven) of the nine programs the team has looked at: both the programs in Guatemala; the programs in Malawi and Pakistan; and one of the two programs in Sudan and one of the two programs in Nepal. The case of Mozambique is a little "messy" in that UNDP has formally been the signatory agency to the agreements while the substance issues have been developed and handled by UNESCO. The two programs in Sudan and Nepal not managed by UNDP went through the OHCHR.

UNIFEM established itself as the gender focal agency in Pakistan though UNDP continued managing the gender projects for which it had received funding so UNIFEM had as yet no donor funded program in place. UNFPA had a complementary program to UNDP's in Guatemala. While the team has looked at these and carried out a first series of interviews, they have not been made the subject of study here. This points to the few cases and agencies considered here, and thus a caution regarding findings and conclusions is in order.

6.3.1 UNDP

As noted above, UNDP has been the lead agency in most of the activities, from identifying, designing and negotiating the activities, to either managing or directly implementing the programs. In Guatemala, UNDP executed the CSO program (direct execution, DEX) while IDPP was responsible for its own activities (national execution, NEX). In Nepal and Sudan, UNDP executed directly (DEX), while the Malawi and Pakistan programs were handled by the authorities (NEX). Out of the six programs for which UNDP can be held directly responsible, half were thus DEX and the other half NEX. In the case of Mozambique, while implementation was with UNESCO, UNDP played the lead agency role, and thus was not so much involved in the identification and design, but in the negotiations and monitoring of program implementation, so this should be considered a "quasi DEX"-program.

One of UNDP's advantages as an implementing agency compared with the more political bodies in the UN system – DPKO, DPA, UN missions under the Secretary-General's mandate like UNMIS in Sudan – is that it can interact directly with civil society actors and the private sector and is not bound only to public sector bodies. In Guatemala, Pakistan and Sudan, the ability to work directly with national NGOs has been critical for the programs, though one of the main criticisms of UNDP in Pakistan was that it did not involve the NGOs sufficiently in the GSP. This has allowed UNDP to play a constructive role even when it has had a more indirect role, like with IDPP in Guatemala and the media program in Mozambique (which involved both community-based organisations and privately-owned newspapers).

The support to the national human rights commission in Nepal has been more classic capacity development in the form of provision of technical assistance, while the role in Malawi fairly quickly became one of primarily being a funding agency and carrying out quality assurance activities.

In Guatemala, Mozambique and Sudan, UNDP is credited with providing high quality inputs and good management and oversight, with the overall conclusion being positive. In Afghanistan, Pakistan and Nepal, UNDP is criticized for letting the relevance of its work decline – in Afghanistan by maintaining too much control during the second electoral cycle, in Pakistan by not maintaining high quality gender expertise, not adjusting to critical feed-back and then subsequently not handing over in a proper way the program to UNIFEM, in Nepal by continuing a program that was not going to produce sustainable results. In Malawi, UNDP's role was fairly limited almost from the beginning, so program results are more attributable to the national program office rather than to UNDP.

There does not seem to be any particular difference with regards to whether a UNDP program was direct or national execution. What seems to have been the determining factor is the commitment by management to the program. In the case of Mozambique, the UNDP ResRep was seen as central to getting the program accepted by government while defending the idea of most of the resources going to private and community rather than state media. In Guatemala, UNDP has maintained a strong and credible presence. A similar pro-active approach in Sudan ensured that UNDP was well prepared for the elections

UNDP has a reputation for being too close to the government and thus not willing to defend controversial issues like democratic development activities. In the cases looked at here, however, UNDP appears to have been fairly consistent when such issues have been brought up. Another aspect, however, is that UNDP, like Norway, has lost some of the commitment to the *content*s of the program and focused more on the *administration* over time (Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan). There may be a "synergy" at work here: as donor focus on the contents side weakens, more attention is paid to formal requirements such as proper audits, finalization reports etc. UNDP thus can also lower its costs of managing the activity by concentrating on the key formal requirements, giving desk officers the responsibility to run the project, leading to complaints of micro-management and less policy oversight of the program.

While a number of issues emerge when looking at performance in the field, it may also be important to realize the more recent changes that are taking place and which are driven from head office level. This is therefore addressed separately in section 6.4 below.

6.3.2 Other UN Agencies

UNESCO was responsible for identifying, developing and implementing the media program. The project itself is considered in positive terms, and the role and contributions by UNESCO head office was important. The local UNESCO office had its focus on education activities, so it provided little substance contributions. It fo-

cused instead on the administration of the project, where the general view is that it did a fairly poor job, where equipment procurement delays held back implementation by many months at a critical early stage of the project.

As regards the OHCHR, it is a fairly small though growing field organization. Nepal is an exception, where it had a strong mandate and actually was the major UN agency for several years. In this context, it is often considered a "good performer" yet with a challenging mandate. The relatively new field presence role of this branch of the UN has put it in a new and often uncomfortable role of moving away from global standard setting and verification to directly advocating for implementing the standards in some of the most complicated countries from a human rights perspective. While monitoring human rights violations and attempting to protect victims directly, its field presence often has to weigh discrete engagement with authorities up against public reporting – and the emphasis of the Sudan operation seems to have changed from the latter to the former in 2009. The mandate of this organization may create tensions with host country governments in situations where its country representative ends up standing quite alone among the UN agencies. It is in such situations crucial to have support from the highest level of the UN and from the human rights engaged diplomatic community in the country. In the case of Sudan such support was not really forthcoming. Being part of the peace mission, the existence of the human rights unit became invisible and its role as the major human rights field instrument of the Security Council was rather illusory. In such a situation, Norway as a dominant donor for two years seems to have missed an opportunity – and indeed a duty – to rally the more likeminded countries and beef up the political relevance of the unit.

A key point to note is thus that at the end of the day, the UN is no stronger than the active support it gets from its partners: the international community, the government, its collaborators in civil society and the private sector. When it comes to the international community, one comment often heard from UN officials is that the donors basically give money, they don't provide the *political* support the UN needs for pushing a democratic development agenda. If UNDP is seen as close to government, one response is that the agency has often little choice: donors have provided only tepid support while the government is always there, and in that force-field, where rapid changes in donor funding is an important aspect, the UN agencies need to ensure that the basic conditions for continued operations in the country are in place.

6.3.3 Support from Head Offices, Quality Assurance

The UN system is quite decentralized, so the engagement from head offices is variable but generally with little direct oversight of individual projects. The quality assurance that takes place is generally through the various field-based activities: annual progress reports usually in connection with the standard tri-partite reviews; financial audits; programmed mid-term reviews and final evaluations; and possible special reports or studies in connection with a component or issue in the program. The role of the head offices in these processes and products tends to be marginal. If there is a known problem, head office might participate in a review meeting, or the head office may provide a participant or candidate for the review or evaluation

team, or the program officer at head office may walk through the project during field visits. There were examples of support requested, either from the local office or directly from the project (the media project to UNESCO/Paris, for example). Communication lines are therefore available – it is just not clear how often they were used, how structured this was and thus how much benefit the field believes it gets from this. The views of most desk officers spoken with is that they can get help on general matters, but that particular project issues have to be handled locally – largely because they are a function of the specific situation on the ground.

All UN agencies publish an increasing number of documents such as programming guidelines on their web-site, so the universe of information available is constantly expanding (see section 6.4 on UNDP). The degree to which local program staff use the resources available is unclear. One thing is that there is an awful lot of material, and it is constantly being updated and thus changing. It becomes quite a challenge for local desk officers to absorb and apply this, especially if they are handling several sectors or themes. Another problem on some projects is that some desk officers who have been in post for some time seemed as concerned with own career as with project results and thus were not as diligent about updating their knowledge as could be wished for. At the same time, one comment heard was that "ResReps come and go – desk officers remain". If local management is not ensuring that local staff are focusing on the right issues, performance is likely to suffer.

There may also be particular engagement from the head office. In the case of UNESCO, the officer in charge of media programs in Paris was heavily involved in the Mozambique program, among other reasons because this was for a long time the single largest media program UNESCO was managing. The project found this helpful and was able to draw on this person's experiences elsewhere, and the project in turn was used as an important case when discussing media development in the Southern Africa region.

The UNHCHR as a fairly small agency with a clear and strong mandate also appears to have a tight and efficient learning milieu. There is systematic methodology development taking place at head quarters in Geneva for operationalizing the agency's reporting responsibilities, and this appears based on close contact with the field staff.

6.4 UNDP and Democratic Governance

Within UNDP, the organisation talks about Democratic Governance rather than Democratic Development. This is one of the five "practice areas" that the agency focuses on. This area includes access to information and E-governance; access to justice and rule of law; anti-corruption; civic engagement; electoral systems and processes; human rights; local governance; parliamentary development; public administration; and women's empowerment. It thus covers all the seven democratic development dimensions covered here, but also the public sector dimensions: it includes both the rights holders ("demand side") as represented by civil society, households and the private sector, and duty bearers ("supply side") as represented by the state.

UNDP has over 160 country programs managed from nearly 140 field offices. The Governance Group in the Bureau for Development Policy is the unit directly responsi-

ble for quality assuring its Democratic Governance work. There are about half a dozen senior advisers covering the various technical fields plus staff managing the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF), which provides small-scale funding for pilot activities. The UNDP Governance Centre in Oslo is part of this group, conducting systematic analysis and reviews of UNDP's work around the globe.

The Group relies heavily on the web for its services to the field. It publishes an increasing number of reports, handbooks, studies and other learning materials, and also uses the web to facilitate discussion and learning groups. One of the oldest, on human rights ("HuRiTalk"), involves government officials, CSOs, researchers, donor officials and other interested stakeholders across the globe. The Democratic Governance forum has over 3,000 active members. The Global Programme on Democratic Governance Assessments, GAP, is one of six global programs that provide support to country offices in a substantive thematic field through a comprehensive web-portal. The "iKNOW Politics" is a joint undertaking of UNDP, UNIFEM, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) which supposedly is the world's leading website on women and politics, with a free library of 1,400 resources and an established community of more than 5,000 members worldwide, publishing in Arabic, English, French and Spanish.

A second area is through tighter, more structured yet more comprehensive and standardized performance reporting. The main step has been UNDP's "corporate contract" with its Board, where it now is to present aggregated performance reporting in the five performance areas. These performance reports are based on country-level tracking of achievements as entered in UNDP's global database. Each country structures its report according to the main practice areas and their subcomponents, based on UNDAF objectives and sector goals. In principle all field offices are now to record their results at the program Outcome and higher level in these matrixes. While results recording is continuous and real-time, field offices are expected to provide a coherent picture of the status of the country programs at least once a year, in connection with the processing of Country Program Documents and the resource allocations from headquarters. This results monitoring is now global and with increasingly standardized indicators that permit direct commenting from New York to the field offices.

Both New York and Oslo-based Governance Group advisers travel extensively and thus also get direct field experiences regarding the challenges being faced by country programs. There is considerable and systematic learning at central levels, and these lessons are in principle fed back to the field in the form of updated and improved guidelines, policies and direct advisory services. But results of these comprehensive and seemingly important changes at head office level were not easy to discern in the field. One reason is undoubtedly that many of the programs looked at were designed much earlier or were coming to an end and thus the advisory services were not directed so much towards the programs under review here.

What is also not known to this evaluation team is how good and relevant the lessons provided from head office are seen to be by field staff. In particular how

operational and mission-critical are they considered to be: do they really address the problems as experienced by field staff?

Democratic Governance staff in New York felt progress was being made. A major achievement was the UNDP's Executive Board in 2003 agreeing on a Human Rights approach to democratic governance. This was an important issue and one reason this was won was that Sweden in particular but also Norway said they would withhold funding unless this was adopted. This thus points to the importance of donors standing up for key principles in the democratic development debates. A second big step was the UN Secretary General mainstreaming this into the overall UN system. This was passed as a resolution, which therefore has provided a political foundation for UNDP's work in these fields.

In this connection, the (improving) inter-connection between different parts of the UN system for promoting democratic governance should be noted. The Human Rights Council sits in Geneva and reports to the General Assembly based on Treaty ratification. The Universal Periodic Review on Human Rights (UPR) is a peer- and state-based system that is a key Treaty-process managed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). UPR reports are used by UNDP for designing responses to UPR recommendations. The division of labour in clear as the OHCHR has a mandate to monitor and point to human rights violations, while UNDP does not have such a mandate but instead focuses on capacity development to address human rights problems.

It is also important to note that the UN does not recognize a hierarchy of rights – they are to be considered indivisible, universal and equal in importance. This means that an Auditor General, a national human rights commission and other oversight bodies are all seen as part of the larger governance area. UNDP considers there to be about 90 national human rights institutions worldwide though largely independent in terms of funding, governing bodies, publication etc. These are now being rated on a scale from "A" to "C", where OHCHR and UNDP are to help those rated as "B" or "C" to become "A". The funding for many of the UNDP capacity development projects is through the global program, which is trying to ensure coherence and consistency in the support, but where much of the funding is small-scale catalytic and where in some countries this is now being move to the country programs and into the UNDAF as a key performance area.

There is also a shift underway in terms of which tasks UNDP takes on. There is a growing number of INGOs engaged in particular fields, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International on human protection. These are actors that can increasingly take on monitoring and capacity building tasks in a more efficient and effective manner than the UN, which is still fairly bureaucratic and costly. So UNDP is being challenged to define which issues and under what circumstances it should be the agency to address democratic governance issues. One clear trend is that UNDP is asked to handle more difficult and contentious activities.

With regards to democratic governance performance reporting, the central group sees progress in this area. There are an increasing number of perception surveys,

covering broader issues and groups with more sophisticated measuring instruments and more careful methodological foundations for ensuring validity and reliability. There are also more "hard" data such as records of court cases on different issues, outcomes of court cases, share of complaints that successfully end up in courts, average time per court case, rate of wrongfully imprisoned or length of time spent in detention before case comes before the court, etc. The ability to get a more comprehensive and verifiable picture of these issues is improving, as is therefore the ability to track changes over time, which is perhaps even more important.

There were also examples given of the more structured movement from Output to Outcome reporting, in more complex fields. On gender violence, issues of impunity, police training in investigating and prosecuting and courts in adjudicating and sentencing are being looked into, and whether such skills are being generalized and reproduced. There are more standards and linkages of issues coming into place, so issues like violence against women in conflict situations based on Security Council resolution 1325 passed ten years ago is now part of UN's Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, IDDRS (see UN IDDRS section 5.10 and others).

Actual work in these fields is variable, where the Asia-Pacific region is seen to be in the lead because they have had advisers for some time, Africa lags badly while Latin America and Central Asia are now getting regional advisers in place. In most cases there are still no baselines in place, there is still not agreement on what the "minimum package" of indicators that should be measured are, nor what the right balance of data are: perceptions, administrative data, in-depth studies and so on.

The UNDP is also grappling with the linking of technical skills and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) expertise. While there is an management specialist who advises on M&E issues within the Bureau for Development Policy, in the field this combination is still weak. UNDP's Evaluation Office is, however, paying more attention to governance dimensions, and is thus also working on development of indicators and standards for evaluating this field. During the February 2010 global Democratic Governance practice meeting in Dakar with about 120 staff from around the world, one of the feed-back messages was exactly that field staff often are not well informed about new tools and how to use them, so the application of all this new knowledge at field level remains a challenge.

6.5 Findings and Conclusions

Norway has been a strong proponent of UN system efforts at reform, and in particular "Delivering as One". One of the consequences of providing considerable funding to specific projects in the field, however, is to fragment the funding to the UN as a system, which sets up competition between agencies and creates job insecurities for desk officers.

In terms of concrete steps to promote "Delivering as One" through the structuring of Norwegian support, as of 2008 Norway will be contributing to the ***One UN*** fund in Malawi. For the programs looked at here, however, no similar examples exist, primarily because most of these interventions were designed before the 2006 report was in place.

When it comes to the UN as "the defender of the standards" in the field of democratic development, UN performance has been variable. In Guatemala and Mozambique, UNDP has stood up to national authorities on controversial issues based to a large extent on the "political capital" it accumulated through contributions to national peace processes. In other situations UN bodies have gone for trade-offs. When the electoral process in Sudan was not in full compliance with democratic standards, UNDPKO felt that peace and stability was the overriding concern, and in Nepal OHCHR more than UNDP stood up for human rights principles. In Afghanistan the focus during the second electoral cycle was on technical-administrative matters as much as the politics and capacity development.

UNDP has been the most important democratic development partner for Norway, managing six (seven) of the nine programs looked at. The key factor explaining performance seems to be management commitment while the difference between direct and national execution does not seem important. The performance of other UN bodies is difficult to state given the very limited number of cases. One general observation, however, is that donors seem more willing to provide funds than political support for democratic development initiatives. This leaves the UN often feeling exposed and without the political backing they believe the international agreement around democratic development ought to provide them.

Recent steps by UNDP at head office level to strengthen its *technical* skills and knowledge as well as designing and putting in place more rigorous performance monitoring systems are important for improving the organisation's ability to implement such activities. To what extent this will lead to improved performance on the ground remains to be seen since these changes are quite recent and thus had not led to any discernible impact at field office level for the programs looked at.

UN agencies have normally had sufficient skills and capacities in the identification and design phases and in a number of cases have delivered or been important to the delivery of good results: Guatemala, Mozambique, to some extent Malawi in terms of longer-term results; Afghanistan, Sudan, Nepal in terms of immediate results where the short-term was the major concern. In Pakistan short-term results were good but longer-term results disappointing. In several cases it was clear that the UN agency, and UNDP in particular, moved to a more administrative focus over time, letting the *contents* dimension weaken, thus undermining longer-term results (Pakistan, the UNDP project in Nepal, second election cycle in Afghanistan). In some cases, weaker long-term results were in part a function of lack of donor support, financial and political (Pakistan, Malawi having to lower its ambitions, Sudan and Nepal not being able to overcome resistance to reforms).

This points to the need for actors like Norway to acknowledge the need for long-term engagement also from the donor side. It is not enough that UN agencies build their monitoring and quality assurance systems – Norway also has to have this in place to both monitor progress and demand performance on substance, but also to be able to contribute over time. Norway seems to have followed the *political* situations well, and the UN-administered programs have been useful for its political engagement in important processes (the human rights situation in Guatemala and

Nepal, the elections in Afghanistan and Sudan, democratisation in Malawi). The challenge remains on the delivery of substance of the programs. This requires capacity and consistent attention to the democratic development agenda over time, and where weakening UN and donor focus leads to poorer long-term results (Pakistan, unclear longer-term effects in Afghanistan, Nepal and Sudan, possibilities for loss of results over time in Malawi and Mozambique). This in turn reflects the situation that in a number of cases particular individuals/project managers were important for a number of the results achieved, and when they leave those gains may wane – a function of the fact that where structures are weaker (fragile states and situations), the importance of individuals is greater.

7. Norway, UN and Democratic Development

Before discussing more generally the findings from the various cases, it is important to note that these cases do not represent "typical" or "average" samples either of what Norway funds in the field of democratic development, what it funds through the UN, or UN portfolios in this area (see the Mapping study for a more complete discussion). Nor does it capture what Norway funds in any particular dimension of democratic development, or democratic development in fragile states – though the latter has been an important aspect. At the project level, there is a bias in favour of more successful projects since the cases selected were the ones that have received sustained funding over time, which typically would be the ones seen as producing positive results.

Because the team has looked at programs of a certain duration, recent changes in overarching frameworks such as more unified UNDAFs (eight countries are now moving ahead on "Delivering as One") or with better designs of implementation or monitoring, will not have been captured. Since democratic development is a dynamic and rapidly-changing field, more recent projects and programs can be expected to reflect better designs – though it is not obvious that the political will to push ahead with democratic change processes has necessarily increased either within the UN or the international community.

Given these issues, there are limitations on the validity and obviously on the universality of the conclusions that can be drawn (see more on this in Annex D, "Methodology", section 6, "The Universe Sample and Evaluation Validity"). However, the cases do raise some questions that are worth pursuing and will be presented below.

7.1 Literature Review versus Field Case Findings

The Literature Review structured some of the key findings according to the seven democratic development dimensions pursued in this study. These seven sets of findings are given below (in italics), and the findings from the cases looked at in this study are then compared with them, as they sometimes confirm, sometimes differ or modify in their conclusions:

- ***Human rights*** *projects can contribute to the governance agenda, enhance aid design and impact and strengthen aid effectiveness, provided that strategies are grounded in states' domestic responsibilities and thus promote capacity building rather than service provision.*

In Nepal, the human rights activities contributed to the governance agenda by making the protection of human rights visible, concrete, and real: the monitoring mission was able to address conflictual situations and stand up to potential human rights abuses. But the gains may be temporary as the OHCHR mission is time-limited and sustainability is thus uncertain. The legal responsibilities, however, are already largely vested in the national human rights commission, so the potential defender of rights holders is in place. In Afghanistan and Sudan, the lack of political "push" by the UN system and the donor community probably missed an opportunity to introduce a stronger human rights policy and practice in connection with the large-scale national election processes. In these cases, the large-scale resources and the UN presence provided added legitimacy to the human rights issue as well as critical support for the national forces defending greater human rights. This is thus a more optimistic view than the one in the current literature – though the sustainability of such progress may be fragile and reversible.

- *Although there is a conviction that **justice and rule of law** is good for development and governance, the evidence on this is mixed. The specific impacts of donors' supported interventions are likely to be limited, even though their objectives tend to be far reaching.*

The **justice and rule of law** programs in Guatemala have generated new laws, institutions, awareness and practices in a sensitive field of particular importance to indigenous populations. This has had spill-over effects to dimensions like gender and awareness of human rights, but also showed the importance of facilitating linkages between civil society actors and the public sector, and how well-focused programs can generate considerable impact. The main reason for the considerable impact, however, was the strong local anchoring both within existing systems, and social groups and forces that were pushing for change.

- *On **gender and democracy,** increased representation of women does not guarantee a substantive impact on politics or a reduction in structural and gender inequalities in the short run. Success is seen to be driven by long-term commitment, agenda ownership, having men on board and adaptation to the local context.*

The Pakistani case is largely in line with this, but it is also clear that the kind of massive investment that took place in Pakistan created a "critical mass" of female legislators that were able to push through budget changes, legislation etc that represent real gains to women's interests. But it also revealed several fragilities: the need to ensure continued and large-scale capacity building so as not to lose the early gains, and as broad-based an alliance as possible for mobilizing the necessary support for this.

- *Several studies find that democracy promotion through **civil society** alone produces positive effects at micro level but no clear recommendation is provided on how they could be scaled up.*

Both the programs in Guatemala and Malawi provide examples of how the scaling up can take place through national programs, local mobilization, facilitating linkages

between CSOs and appropriate public institutions, and using media to further create linkages of information, transparency and accountability.

- *On **media,** donor support is more successful when it focuses on all key aspects: the regulatory framework ensuring media pluralism; the establishment of national agencies responsible for implementing and enforcing the regulatory framework; progressive liberalisation of media including an increasing number of radio, print, TV and multimedia players; and the enforcement of the right to information and freedom of expression.*

The Mozambique case did not address most of these dimensions, but instead concentrated on reaching out to groups not previously covered by media, using the vernacular languages more, focusing on gender issues, and through this making itself relevant and thus enlarging the space for public discourse without having in the first instance to address many of the formal frameworks. This, however, was probably due to the fact that the media environment was already quite benign and considerable freedom was in place.

- *As with other dimensions of democracy support, assistance to **parliaments and watchdog organisations** is inherently political – and therefore very difficult for outsiders to engage in. Technical approaches have not produced satisfactory results.*

The broad-based program in Malawi that included considerable technical training of parliamentarians, was seen as highly useful to the quality of the work and in particular to strengthening the democratic oversight role of Parliament. When this technical training ceased, this aspect of parliamentary work was seen to fall. A similar case can be made for Afghanistan. The real issue is thus clearly the extent to which the offer of training or support answers a felt need by the local political bodies.

- *Up until the end of the 1990s, approaches to **electoral assistance** were mostly technical and overly optimistic about the effects of elections alone with regard to democratisation. In recent years, more holistic approaches have been tested which consider elections as one element of a broader cycle of electoral processes.*

This has been confirmed by the large-scale programs in Afghanistan and Sudan, but these cases also show how the democratic space that a large-scale electoral process creates can open up for further democratic development activities.

7.2 Conclusions

The cases looked at in the six countries visited plus the rapid desk study appear to modify and perhaps open up a little bit more the “lessons learned” from the Literature Review regarding how the international community can contribute to democratic development. The need for a realistic approach is clear, but the value-added of the UN as legitimizing democratic space seems to have contributed to results. The scale of some interventions may have been helpful in overcoming local resistance to change, and the linking up with local forces committed to change obviously critical.

Box 7.1: Fragile Situations and Democratic Development Dilemmas

One question that has been raised is whether more or less imposed democratic processes contribute to genuine democratization of the country. This may be an issue if elections are part of a (donor imposed/supported) peace agreement (Afghanistan, Sudan) where the international community – UN and donors – appear more concerned with the holding of elections as a necessary step in the implementation of the accords rather than giving them genuine democratic contents. Similar can be asked about the gender program in Pakistan, the media program in Mozambique, the indigenous rights program in Guatemala, the human rights programs in Nepal.

A particularly troubling question is whether programs that facilitate a political opening to CSOs and opposition groups may create unrealistic or even "entrapment" expectations. There is democratic space created by such programs or during internationally supervised election processes that local actors are able to take advantage of. But if the international community does not somehow protect this space over time, can emergent democratic forces find themselves the victims of repression later on?

The above issue is accentuated by the divergent concerns of large-scale international operations in conflict-affected and fragile situations, such as big peace missions led by the UN-DPKO with a Security Council mandate that has peace and stability as the first concern. The UN agencies that have "softer" mandates like governance and human rights and thus longer-term time horizons for their interventions tend to be heard less. The ability to develop and defend democratic space may turn out to be weaker than could have been expected. Strong collaboration between the diplomatic community and these parts of the UN is important to ensure that these concerns are given proper attention. This requires good coordination among the various parts of Norway's (and other countries') missions in-country and at UN head offices (New York and Geneva), along with a clearer and more coherent long-term focus on supporting these democratic development dimensions.

For female politicians in Pakistan, local community organizers in Malawi, human rights activists in Guatemala and others, the experience of new space and possibilities seem to have given them aspirations to defend and try to enlarge that space by own efforts. If true, that would be an important long-term effect of the projects, and hence something that ought to be monitored.

The democratic development activities that Norway contributed towards do not provide an easily identifiable or unified universe of programs but rather reflect the specific nature of the situations in each country. They were thus ***relevant*** to the local conditions, and hence appropriate for Norwegian funding. The decentralized decision making model behind Norway's approach for deciding which activities to fund is thus at one level highly operational and suitable.

From a more systemic point of view, three issues have come up that challenge this approach, however. The first is the idea of accelerating the UN system's progress towards "Delivering as One" by providing funding to a ***One UN*** national basket as is being done in Malawi, rather than providing earmarked financing by project.

The second is to look at more long-term commitments, either at country level through the funding basket, or by moving more funds from the field to untied central funds, in order to allow a higher share of financing to be predictable. A situation where field offices are essentially competing against each other, and often based on short-term interventions, is not helpful in the field of democratic development.

The third aspect is to pay more attention to capacity development and sustainability of this key dimension of virtually all democratic development interventions. This also requires more long-term horizons and better specified thinking of what is to be achieved.

UNDP has been taking steps towards more solid knowledge management and a results-based focus on performance reporting. The extent to which this is having an impact on the ground is variable, and Africa as a region seems to be lagging for a number of reasons. But a number of the weaknesses seen on the methodology and contents aspects of democratic development are being addressed. What is not captured by these changes is the tendency for UNDP and other UN agencies to get bogged down in administrative and delivery matters, where the overall impression remains of fairly bureaucratic and inefficient delivery. The one thing that can be said about this is that in fragile environments, the meticulous risk avoidance is often considered an asset, though as noted in other studies (Scanteam 2007), donors are often inconsistent about what they ask for: tough economic controls and low fiduciary risk exposure in highly corrupt and volatile environments while at the same time expecting quick delivery and highly operational activities on the ground. It remains to be seen if the manner and costs of this risk management really are efficient, and if they undermine effectiveness. This evaluation is not in a position to address this question.

At the end of the day, democratic development projects are as much about politics as about technical knowledge. They are in part about UN agencies' abilities to identify and design useful activities, their capabilities to implement well but also their political will and capacity to develop and defend the UN principles, particularly in fragile and conflictual situations. This, however, is not only a function of the UN system, but also of the larger international community's willingness to prioritize democratic principles.

Norway needs to take democratic development seriously by providing not only funding but also political backing for such projects vis-à-vis the host government. It provided this kind of support in the development of the programs in Guatemala, Mozambique, Malawi and Pakistan, and was an active party to discussions surrounding the Afghanistan and Sudan elections and human rights in Nepal. Where Norway at times has been weak is on contents follow-up regarding democratic development principles in the programs funded.

7.3 Recommendations

1. The UN needs to be pushed vigorously towards "Delivering as One", as especially in the overarching and cross-cutting field of democratic development it is essential that
   - The UN must have one consolidated and strategically-based approach,
   - The UN must prepare and implement a consistent and coherent program with one joint performance framework,
   - The UN provides the authorities, donors and other stakeholders clear, concise yet comprehensive reporting against agreed-upon dimensions and standards.
2. UNDP should be commended for the steps taken to improve its performance reporting in the field of democratic governance. It should, however, be strongly encouraged to ensure
   - That these improvements are translated into better programs in key countries,
   - That there is a particular focus on fragile states and situations,
   - It should pay more attention to longer-term capacity development for democratic development – both on the programming and the results monitoring sides.
3. Norway has decided that embassies are also to manage relations with the multilateral system in the field, which is commendable. But Norway needs to become a better partner for the UN in the contentious field of democratic development, among other things as a high-level policy dialogue partner and supporter. This requires
   - More staff and management attention to this area (not necessarily all in the field),
   - This can probably best be addressed through more concentration in terms of themes, countries and financing,
   - Norway should be better at contributing on the substance side, monitoring performance, and ensuring that long-term accountability is moved towards the national authorities,
   - Particularly in conflict situations with large UN peace missions, Norway should be more active to lobby for a strengthened emphasis on democracy and human rights balanced up against the security concerns that tend to dominate,
   - As part of this, Norway should update its strategy for democratic development, as the current one from 1992 no longer is appropriate.

Annexes

Annex A:
Terms of Reference

1 Introduction

Norad's Evaluation Department will conduct a comprehensive evaluation of Norwegian earmarked funds for democratic development support through the United Nations (UN). This will in the following be referred to as multi-bilateral support.

The rationale for this evaluation is based on the scale of Norwegian multi-bilateral support to democracy development through the UN, amounting to approximately NOK 2 billion over a ten year period. Over the same period a total of NOK 3.5 billion was given as multi-bilateral support to democratic development and public governance support, which again is 14% of total multi-bilateral support (all sectors)[10]. Support to this sector is expected to continue to grow.

2 Background

The democratic governance agenda sailed up in the beginning of the 1990s, and is today seen as a key element in the international efforts to help fight poverty and corruption in development countries.

The Norwegian understanding of democratic development is strongly linked to the UN's definition, which refers to increased possibilities to participate in the society and in decision-making processes that have impacts on citizens" lives. This shall be done through elections and other participatory processes that are necessary to strengthen the social contract and the legitimacy of the state. Access to justice, freedom, gender equality and democratic governance is seen as cornerstones for development and underpins the UN Millennium Declaration and the Norwegian development policy. A dynamic civil society is seen as a precondition for democratic development, and a "living" democracy requires free and independent media[11].

Norway sees the UN as an important channel for development aid in areas where its various organisations may have special competencies[12]. The UN's focus on rights-based development, throughout its work, is important in this regard. The UN has a broad presence in many countries, often has close contact with the authorities and is willing to discuss controversial questions. Without a too large burden on the Norwegian aid administration and capacity as well as the recipient government's administration, Norway can channel its resources through the UN. This is in particular the case in conflict countries where the bilateral cooperation is minimal.

10 This evaluation will focus on democratic development and not include public sector support due to reasons of scope
11 For more detail, see the Report no 13 (2008-2009) to the Storting *Climate, Conflict and Capital,* pp 13, and 19, 20.
12 "Relevant areas include health, education, and infrastructure, aspects of the fight against HIV/AIDS, agriculture and good governance". Op.cit. p. 90.

Norway is one of the most important donors to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which spends half its budget on supporting democratic governance[13]. However also other organisations work in the area of democratic development and receive earmarked support from Norway: United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) to mention some.

There are numerous challenges in terms of democratic development in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Flawed representation is one of them, emanating from elitist institution building and fragmented citizen participation[14].

There is relatively little systematic use of knowledge of what works and what does not work with regard to support in the field of democratic development[15]. Especially is this the case in many fragile states where democratic development is pursued alongside state building – two processes that are not necessarily always mutually reinforcing[16]. There is therefore a need for more information about which contexts, strategies and approaches that are conducive in terms of bringing about positive results. Strengths and weaknesses of the UN organisations in terms of democracy support in different countries and contexts, is another area where there is need for more evaluation and learning.

The Evaluation Department is currently conducting several evaluative activities in the field of democratic governance support. Included herein is a synthesis study of experiences with support to legislative assemblies and an evaluation of the Norwegian support to political parties. In addition the Evaluation Department has the previous years participated in an evaluation of support to voice and accountability together with six other donors[17]. Where relevant the team should draw on this work.

3 Purpose and Objectives

Purpose

The main purpose of this evaluation is to provide information about the results of Norwegian support to democratic development through the UN.

The knowledge generated from this evaluation will be used as a basis for further development of Norwegian positions in the dialogue with the UN Development System.

Objectives

The main objectives of this evaluation are to:

- **Document the results** (i.e. outcomes) of Norwegian multi-bilateral contributions to democracy development,
- **undertake an analysis of how** support to different types of activities (elections/ media/parliament/ jurisdiction/ civil society, etc) **has worked in different**

13 Op.cit. p. 20.
14 Törnquist, Olle et al. (2009, *Rethinking Representation.* Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills and New York.
15 Rakner, Lise, Alina Rocha Menocal and Verena Fritz (2007) Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democratic Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned, ABIA Project Working paper.
16 See Carothers , Thomas (2004) Critical Mission. Essays on Democracy Promotion. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, referenced in Booth, David and Verena Fritz (2008): Final Synthesis Report: Good governance, aid modalities and poverty reduction - From better theory to better practice.
17 For more see http://www.norad.no/en/Evaluation/Ongoing+evaluations.

contexts (i.e. institutional set-up, socio-political context, degree of conflict and level of economic development),

- **assess how decisions are being made** in relation to allocations and disbursements to this sector through the multi-bilateral channel and how this influence development results,
- **assess strengths and weaknesses** of different UN organisations and programs in different contexts, and
- provide **recommendations** for improving future programming for democracy support and for Norwegian positions in relation to the relevant multilateral organisations.

To achieve the above objectives the issues to be addressed include, but are not limited to, those listed in sections 4 and 5 of this document.

4 Scope and delimitations

The focus of the evaluation is bilateral funds disbursed by the embassies to UN organisations in-country and earmarked funds disbursed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to UN organisations, including (global/thematic) trust funds. It excludes evaluating results of Norwegian contributions to core funding of UN organisations.

The elements that are of importance for development of democracy to be included in this evaluation includes support to parliaments, watchdog institutions (such as a national Human Rights Commission, Law commission, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ombudsman's Office), election processes and institutions, the media and access to information, access to justice and judicial development, human rights, support to the strengthening of civil society that are linked to "voice and accountability" issues, including support to women's organisations and women's empowerment.[18] Not covered by this evaluation are: support to public sector reform, financial management, civil service reform and decentralisation[19].

The evaluation shall focus largely on the country level, by looking at efforts to promote democracy and good governance in partner countries, but the evaluation shall also assess decision making processes at HQ in Oslo and in relevant Norwegian embassies and delegations. The evaluation shall cover the time period from 1999 to date[20].

The UN's normative and standard-setting role in this field and its perceived legitimacy and impartiality makes it an indispensable global actor for democratic development. The evaluation aims to contribute to our understanding of what works and not, and why, in terms of democratic assistance to different developing countries and contexts, and it is the intention that the Norwegian aid administration learn from this work for the benefit of future support.

The evaluation will include the following components:

18 This is roughly represented by the DAC sub-sectors: 151 30, 151 40, 151 50, 151 61, 151 62, 151 63, 151 64
19 DAC sub-sector 151 10, 151 20, and most of sub-sector 151 40.
20 This implies that allocations made in 1999 are subject to the evaluation, not *results* starting in 1999.

4.1 Intermediate outputs:

- **A literature review** of recent research and evaluations analyzing the effectiveness of development support to promote democracy in different contexts. The study shall also include an overview of reference documents for this area in the relevant UN organisations and in the Norwegian aid-administration, including strategies, results frameworks and plans. The purpose of the literature review is to provide an overview of the knowledge base that is relevant for this evaluation exercise.
- **A mapping of Norwegian support through the multi-bilateral** channel to democracy to provide a comprehensive **overview of the portfolio**. This includes information regarding what kind of support has been provided through the UN in the various countries and regions at different times during the period (1999-date), and the scale of the support broken down according to sub-sectors, countries/regions, and years (time-periods). Coding of the data shall be assessed. The mapping should furthermore include information about how much of the funds are disbursed through the various channels (MFA/ Embassies/ Norad) to the various recipient UN organisations (and whether it is NEX or DEX). The mapping should also say something about how the overall availability of funds in the area of democratisation in the respective countries, and which impact this may have on delivery. The mapping exercise should provide the basis for detecting trends and shifts in support over time and hence identifying the factors that have influenced these developments. It should also provide the basis for the selection of 5 country case studies based on 1) where there has been significant support, 2) consistently over the years, 3) to one or more of the specified DAC sub-sectors.

4.2 Main evaluation study

The main evaluation study shall document whether Norwegian support to democracy through the UN has achieved or is likely to achieve results and why/why not. It will comprise:

a. **Assessment of planning and decision-making** processes in the UN and in the MFA and at relevant Norwegian embassies and delegations, including advice from Norad.
b. **Case studies at country level:** Contribution of the Norwegian supported interventions to outcomes and possible impacts shall be assessed at country level, as shall other contextual factors, such as institutional set-up, socio-politics, power-relations and informal structures that might play a role in influencing the outcomes. The following nine countries have been identified as relevant for case studies based on the scale and concentration of democratic governance support over a consistent time period: Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Palestinian areas, East Timor, Nepal and Pakistan. The selection of the final five countries should be informed by the previous mapping exercise. Consideration of the overall mandate/strategy of the UN organisations within the area of democratisation, as well as strategies and wider governance support programs and coordination and synergies at the country level shall be taken into account.

5 Main evaluation questions:

Results:

- What have been the *most significant* factors that "drive" or inhibit change in key outcomes at country level, and how have these factors limited or facilitated progress towards key outcomes? (Variables including institutional set-up, politics, income, gender, age, power relations, human capital, culture and religion should be discussed.)
- What results in terms of output and outcome, and (if possibly impact), have the Norwegian grants/allocations contributed to achieving at local and national levels?
- Have the grants/interventions been *efficient* compared to *alternative* ways of delivering assistance to the identified activities? Were there any lower-cost options or more sustainable options that could have achieved similar results? Where possible, additionality of the Norwegian support shall be examined.
- To what extent have the grants/allocations contributed to the development of institutions in the partner countries (capacity development)? To what extent are the achievements *sustainable*?
- To what extent have the projects within the area of democratic development contributed to an open discourse on democratization and sensitive issues such as human rights?
- What have been the strengths of the various programs and organisations keeping in view their performance in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability?

Process: Planning, decisions and implementation:

- What has been the criteria for Norwegian allocations through the UN channel (sustainability, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, roles, delegation of responsibility, legitimacy/impartiality, other)[21]?
- Have implicit or explicit program theories behind the programs played a role in the actual allocation of resources?
- Have potential synergy effects been taken into account in the planning process of the various types of support (parliament/access to justice, freedom of information, human rights)?
- Has the Norwegian contribution through the UN channel to democratic development been coherent and connected to other Norwegian engagement in this field?
- Has the Norwegian contributions been coherent/complementary to other actors' (bilateral/multilateral) activities in the area of democratic development (avoiding overlap and fragmentation)? How does the Norwegian contribution fit into the overall One UN-program (if applicable) / UNDAF process at country level?

Monitoring and evaluation:

- To what extent have the Norwegian financial contributions been followed up and /or complemented by MFA, embassies and the delegations with policy and technical inputs and quality assurance?

21 The UN is often seen as an honest broker. However, it is also sometimes seen as working too close to the government.

- To what extent are lessons regarding results or lack thereof transferred between UN country offices, including through the involvement of regional and central offices of UN organisations, and the extent to which there is quality assurance from regional and central levels?

The evaluation team is expected to adhere to the DAC Evaluation Quality Standards as well as Norad's Evaluation Guidelines[22]. Any modification to these TOR is subject to approval by Norad.

6 Evaluation Approach and Methods

The evaluation team shall propose the approach, design, methods and data collection strategies to be adopted for conducting the evaluation, according to the three components: 1) the literature review, 2) the portfolio review and 3) the main evaluation study. For the main evaluation study, the consultant shall propose case study countries and a strategic sample of interventions (elections/judicial development, parliament, civil society), design an appropriate analytical framework and specify suitable qualitative and quantitative indicators, to be used to assess performance of the different organisations and types of activities across different countries and contexts. The evaluation team shall make use of empirical methods such as questionnaire surveys, interviews, focus groups, case studies, and data/literature surveys to collect data. The team shall interview different stakeholders including MFA, the Norwegian Embassies, Norwegian delegations, Norad, the relevant UN organisations at HQ, regional and country level, partners at country level, including third party international, multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental organisations and beneficiaries (e.g. individuals, communities that benefit directly or indirectly from the interventions). *Guiding principles*: Triangulate and validate information, assess and describe data quality in a transparent manner (assess strengths, weaknesses, and sources of information). Data gaps should be highlighted.

7 Organisation and Requirements

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation Department, Norad (EVAL). An independent team of researchers or consultants will be assigned the evaluation according to prevailing regulations on public procurement in Norway. The team leader shall report to EVAL on the team's progress, including any problems that may jeopardize the assignment.

The team should consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment. All decisions concerning changes to the TOR, the inception report, draft report and final report are subject to approval by EVAL.

The evaluation team shall take note of comments received from stakeholders. Where there are significantly diverging views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, this should be reflected in the report.

22 See. http://www.norad.no/items/4620/38/6553540983/Evalueringspolitikk_fram_til_2010.pdf

7.1 Composition of the team

The evaluation team shall cover the following competencies:

Competence	Team Leader	At least one member
Academic	Higher relevant degree	
Discipline		Political science, social anthro-pology, sociology and similar
Evaluation	Leading multi-disciplinary evaluations	
Sector: Democracy support	Yes	Yes
International Development Cooperation	Yes	Yes
Norwegian Development Cooperation and –policies		Yes
Multilateral, especially the UN development organisations		Yes
Gender expertise		Yes
Country/region: Developing countries	Yes	Yes
Country/region: Fragile states		Yes
Case studies		Five countries selected out of tentative list ...
Language: English	Written, reading, spoken	
Norwegian		Written, Reading, Spoken
Spanish or Portuguese		Reading, Spoken
Others (local languages)		Reading, Spoken

National team members shall be identified once the case countries have been selected and approved. Gender balance is an asset. * Minimum two team members must be able to fully read and understand Norwegian.

7.2 Budget and Deliverables

The project is **budgeted** with a maximum input of **77 person weeks.** The **Deliverables** in the consultancy consist of following outputs:

Intermediate deliverables:

- ***Literature review*** not exceeding 30 pages
- ***Portfolio-mapping*** not exceeding 20 pages

Main evaluation study:

- **Inception Report** not exceeding 30 pages shall be prepared in accordance with EVAL's guidelines given in Part 3, *Annex 3, Guidelines for Reports* of this document. It will be discussed with the team and the stakeholders before approval by EVAL.
- **Draft Final Report** for feedback from the stakeholders and EVAL.
- **Final Evaluation Report** maximum 70 pages - prepared in accordance with EVAL's guidelines given in Part 3, *Annex 3, Guidelines for Report* of this document.
- **Seminar for dissemination** of the final report in Oslo or in the case countries, to be arranged by EVAL. Direct travel-cost related to dissemination in the case countries will be covered separately by EVAL on need basis, and are not to be included in the budget.

All presentations and reports are to be submitted in electronic form, in English, in accordance with the deadlines set in the time-schedule specified under *Section 2 Administrative Conditions* in Part 1 *Tender specification* of this document. EVAL retains the sole rights with respect to all distribution, **dissemination and publication** of the deliverables.

The Consultant is responsible for editing and quality control of language. The final report should be presented in a way that directly enables publication.
All reports shall be submitted to Norad for approval.

Annex B:
List of Informants

Guatemala Informants

Government Officials

Mr. Pedro Ixchiu, Director of Indigenous Peoples Program, IDPP
Ms. Blanca Aida Stalling, Interim Director, IDPP
Mr. Mario Rivera, Finance director, IDPP
Mr. Miguel Sulugui de León, IDPP office, Sololá
Mr. Alvaro Oswaldo Buenafé, IDPP office, Quiché
Mr. Hernán Filemón Villatoro, IDPP office, Quiché
Ms. Teresa Zapeta, Former leader of DEMI (Indigenous Women Defender), UNIFEM
3 Judges of Sentence Court, City of Chiquimula, El Jute Case
Ms. Giovanna Lemus, National Coordination for the prevention of domestic violence and violence against women
Mr. Luis Archila, President, Civil Chamber, Supreme Court Magistrate
Mr. Gabriel Medrano, Member, Civil Chamber, Supreme Court Magistrate
Mr. Gabriel Gomez, Member Civil Chamber, Supreme Court Magistrate
Mr. Rogelio Zarceño, Member Civil Chamber, Supreme Court Magistrate
Mr. César Barrientos, President Penal Chamber, Supreme Court Magistrate
Mr. Francisco Jiménez, Security Advisor and former Minister of the Interior (Gobernación)
Mr. Carlos Quintana, SICOMP, Prosecutor General's Office (MP)

Norwegian Government Officials

Ms. Hilde Salvesen, Former Norwegian Embassy Secretary Guatemala, Dept. Of Humanitarian Affairs, MFA, Oslo
Ms. Guri Rusten, Former Norwegian Embassy Secretary Guatemala, Minister Counsellor, MFA, Norwegian Embassy in Poland

Donor Representatives

Mr. Oscar Chavarría Quan, USAID, Manager, Justice programs
Ms. Sofía Villatoro, Coordination Assistant, Transparency and Justice Regional Program, Danish Cooperation, Embassy of Denmark
Mr. Antonio del Borgo, European Union
Mr. Lars Vaagen, ambassador, Norwegian Embassy
Ms. Kristin Svendsen, Advisor, Norwegian Embassy in Guatemala, (on leave in Norway)
Mr. Teunis Kamper, Ambassador of the Netherlands to Guatemala

UN and UNDP staff

Mr. René Mauricio Valdés, Resident Representative
Mr. Xavier Michon, Country Director, UNDP
Ms. Chisa Mikami, Deputy Director, UNDP
Ms. Claudia Saravia, Program officer, UNDP
Ms. Nely Herrera, Monitoring and Evaluation officer, UNDP
Mr. Edelberto Torres Rivas, Adviser/Consultant, UNDP
Ms. Claudia Maselli, Former UNDP national program officer, Justice and Security
Ms. Ana María Mendez, Former UNDP national program officer, Justice and Security
Ms. Wendy Cuellar, Former UNDP national program officer, Justice Program
Mr. Sergio Pivaral, Director, PASOC II program
Ms. Feliciana Mendoza, Deputy Director PASOC program
Mr. Fernando Masaya, Program Officer, Civil Society
Ms. Christina Elich, Program officer, Justice program
Mr. Miguel Angel Balcarcel, Program director, Democratic Strengthening of the Police System
Mr. Daniel Saquec, Director, Maya program
Ms. Ana Luisa Rivas, Deputy Representative, UNFPA
Mr. Alejandro Silva, Program officer, Sexual and Reproductive Health, UNFPA

Other Informants

Ms. Ana Garita, Chief of Staff, International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala)

CSO Counterparts/ Beneficiaries

Ms. Walda Barrios, UNAMG, Counterpart in PASOC I and II
Mr. Ricardo Cajas, COMG, Maya Organizations Council
Ms. Helen Mack & Ms. Mayra Alarcón, Fundación Myrna Mack, PASOC counterpart
Ms. Aracely Ramírez, Presidenta, plus five members of Board, REDMUCH, Red de Mujeres, Chiquimula
Mr. Saúl Suquino (manager), ASEDECHI - Asociación de Servicios y Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Chiquimula
Ms. Delfina Pu, Coordinadora MARS, ASEDECHI - Asociación de Servicios y Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Chiquimula
Ms. Carol Duque, técnica de apoyo MARS, ASEDECHI - Asociación de Servicios y Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Chiquimula
Ms. Marta Elena García, Técnica de apoyo psicosocial MARS, ASEDECHI - Asociación de Servicios y Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Chiquimula
Ms. Flor de María Flores (beneficiary), ASEDECHI - Asociación de Servicios y Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Chiquimula
Ms. María Consuelo Madrid (beneficiary), ASEDECHI - Asociación de Servicios y Desarrollo Socioeconómico de Chiquimula
Mr. Alvaro Pop, NALEB (PASOC II)
Mr. Eduardo Sacayón, Director, Interethnic Studies Institute, IDEI, University of San Carlos
Mr. Alejandro Urízar, Acción Ciudadana (Guatemala Chapter Transparency International)

Mr. Mynor Alvarado, Coordinator Law Unit, GAM; PASOC counterpart, El Jute Case Group of 6-8 people (approx.), Peasants from El Jute Village, Chiquimula; El Jute judicial case – forced disappearances dating back to 1981; PASOC II

Malawi Informants

UNDP Officials

Mr. Richard Dictus, Resident Representative
Mr. Fred Mwanthengere, Governance Programme
Mr. Marius Walker, Junior Professional Officer since
Mr. Clemence Alfazema, Programme Officer, Governance
Mr. Jockley Mbeye, former Deputy Resident Representative and Governance

DCP Programme Staff

Mr. Ammani Mussa, Programme Manager
Ms. Grace Valera, Deputy Programme Manager

Donor Officials

Ms. Bianca Vandeputte, Programme Officer, Economic and Public Affairs Section, European Union
Mr. Adrian Fitzgerard, Irish Embassy,
Mr. Asbjørn Eidhammer, former Ambassador, Royal Norwegian Embassy, (2000-2005)
Mr. Bjorn Johannessen, Ambassador, Royal Norwegian Embassy,
Mr. Unni Poulsson, Chargé d'Affaires, Royal Norwegian Embassy,
Ms. Solrun Maria Olafsdottir, Royal Norwegian Embassy

Other Informants

Dr. Gerard Chigona, Norwegian Church Aid (former GTZ)
Mr. MacBain Mkandawire, Youth Net Counseling
Dr. Edge Kanyongolo Researcher, Faculty of Law, University of Malawi (Chancellor College)
Mr. Ted Nandolo, Council for Non Governmental Organizations in Malawi
Ms. Lusungu Dzinkambani, Development Communication Trust
Ms. Fiona Mwale, Law Commission
Mr. Ollen Mwalubunju, Centre for Human Rights & Rehabilitation
Dr Aubrey Mvula, Malawi Human Rights Commission
Mr. Mwafulirwa, Malawi Human Rights Commission
Mr. Konzakapansi, Malawi Human Rights Commission
Dr Fletcher Tembo, ODI/MEJN
Mr. Jeffrey Mwenyeheri, National Assembly
Mr. Desmond Kaunda, MHRRC
Mr. Gerald Grant, Former Development Centre Technical and Financial advisor to the Church / NGO Consortium
Ndindi Community (10 people) CHRR Village Rights Committee

Mozambique Informants

Government Officials

Mr. Ricardo Dimande, Director, Gabinfo

Project Staff

Ms. Birgitte Jallov, Chief Technical Advisor/UNESCO, 1998-2004
Mr. Tomás Vieira Mário, National Project Coordinator, 1998-2006

UN and Donor Officials

Mr. Ndolamb Ngokwey, UN Resident Coordinator/Maputo
Mr. José Macamo, Governance Programme Manager, UNDP/Maputo
Ms. Habiba Rodolfo, Justice Programme Specialist, UNDP/Maputo
Mr. Wijayananda Jayaweera, Director, Division for Communication Development, UNESCO/Paris
Mr. Noel Chicuecue, National Programme Officer, UNESCO/Maputo
Ms. Cristiana Pereira, Project Coordinator, Communication & Information, UNESCO/Maputo
Ms. Nina Bull-Jørgensen, UNESCO-UNV 2004-2006/Maputo
Ms. Berit Tvete, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Oslo (in Mozambique 2004-2007)
Ms. Clarisse Barbosa, Programme officer, Norwegian Embassy/Maputo
Mr. Mark Smith, Senior Governance Advisor, DFID/Maputo
Mr. Salvador Forquilha, Programme Officer, Governance, Swiss Cooperation/Maputo

Other Informants

Mr. Helge Rønning, Professor, Institute for Media and Communications, Univ of Oslo
Mr. João Pereira, Management Unit Director, Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC)
Ms. Polly Gaster, Head of ICT4D/CAIC, Eduardo Mondlane Univ Informatics Centre
Ms. Paulina Velasco, Managing Director, Radio Muthiyana
Mr. Fernando Lima, Editor, Savana Newspaper
Ms. Acia Sales, Executive Director, FORCOM, 2004-2007
Mr. Alfredo Libombo, Executive Director, MISA-Mozambique
Mr. Ericino de Salema, Project Officer, Information and Research, MISA-Mozambique

Nepal Informants

Government Officials

Mr. Madhu Ghimiri, Office of the Prime Minister
Dr. Jagadish C. Pokharel, Vice-Chairman; National Planning Commission

National Human Rights Commissioners and Staff

Ms. Indira Rana, fmr. Commissioner, National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)
Mr. Sushil Pyakurel, fmr. Commissioner, NHRC
Mr. Gauri Pradhan, Commissioner, NHRC
Mr. Hari Fuyan, Attorney.at-Law; NHRC
Mr. Bishal Khanal, Secretary of the NHRC
Mr. Bhim Prakash Oli, Human Rights Officer, Investigations; Focal Point, Torture
Mr. Bhanu Bhakta Acharya, Communication Officer, NHRC
Mr. Mohan Dev Toshi, Human Rights Officer, NHRC Regional Office Nepalgunj
Mr. Hari Prasad Gnawali, Human Rights Officer, NHRC Regional Office Nepalgunj
Mr. Bhanu Bhakta Acharya, Communication Officer, NHRC

Women's Commission

Ms. Mohna Ansari, Commissioner; Women's Commission, Nepal
Ms. Dhana Kumari Sunar, Commissioner; Women's Commission, Nepal
Ms. Manju Kumari Yadav, Commissioner; Women's Commission, Nepal
Ms. Amuda Shrestha, Commissioner; Women's Commission, Nepal
Mr. Rituraj Bhandari, Secretary of the Commission; Women's Commission, Nepal

UN and Donor Officials

Mr. Robert Piper, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative, Nepal
Ms. Anne-Isabelle Degryse-Blateau, Country Director, UNDP Nepal
Ms. Anne Helene Marsøe, Consultant; fmr. Programme Officer, UNDP Nepal
Mr. Tek Tamata, Programme Analyst (Justice and Human Rights), UNDP Nepal
Mr. Sharad Neupane, Assistant Country Director, UNDP Nepal
Ms. Morgan Murray, Consultant, UNDP Nepal (observer)
Mr. Hemang Sharma, National Project Manager, SCNHRC Project; UNDP Nepal
Mr. Richard Bennett, OHCHR Representative, Nepal
Ms. Patricia Okello, Human Rights Officer, OHCHR Nepalgunj
Mr. Ram Prasad Gautam, Human Rights Officer, OHCHR Nepalgunj
Mr. Vibhu Mishra, Mational Interpreter/Translator, OHCHR
Mr. Richard F Ragan, WFP Resident Representative
Mr. Shiv Vishnakarma, Deputy Head, WFP Sub-Office Nepalgunj
Ms. Gillian Mellsop, UNICEF Representative
Mr. Surendra S. Rana, Chief , Mid & Far Eastern Zone Office, UNICEF
Ms. Anita Dahal, Programme Officer, Decentralisation and Governance, Mid & Far Eastern Zone Office, UNICEF
Mr. Einar Rystad, Minister Counsellor – Deputy Head of Mission, Norwegian Embassy
Ms. Camilla Røssaak, Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy
Mr. Jarle Fjelde, Norwegian Embassy
Mr. Lill Vaksdal, Norwegian Embassy

Other Informants

Mr. Basanta Aautom, Senior Legal Officer, Advocacy Forum
Mr. Chandrashivar P. Singh, President, Forum for Community Empowerment (FORCE)
Mr. Bhajan Ram Cherdhari, Senior Officer, INSEC
Ms. Maimoona Siddiqui, Fatima Foundation
Mr. Chhavilai Tamang, President, Sayatra
Mr. A. Varma, member, Sayatra
Mr. Kishnawar Bahadur, Dalits Welfare Organisation
Mr. H…, Dalits' Welfare Organisation (several representatives whose names not recorded
Ms. Elizabeth Ordonio, Management Adviser (VSO), Dalits' Welfare Organisation
Mr. Alex Arter, Managing Director, Entec Consulting & Engineering, Switzerland

Pakistan Informants

Government Partners

Mr. Muhammad Ayub, Chief Gender Unit, Planning Division, Government of Pakistan (GBG – WPS was merged into GBG)
Mr. Sajjad Shaeikh, National Project Mananger, Strengthening Poverty Reduction Strategy Monitoring Project, Poverty Reduction Strategy Unit, Ministry of Finance (GRB)
Dr. Naveeda, Poverty Economist, Strengthening Poverty Reduction Strategy Monitoring Project, Poverty Reduction Strategy Unit, Ministry of Finance (GRB)
Mr. Muhammad Taimur Khan, Director General (Development) Ministry of Women Development
Mr. Riaz Hussain, Deputy Secretary (Empowerment), Ministry of Women Development
Ms. Anis Haroon, Chairperson, National Commission on the Status of Women
Ms. Sofia Noreen, National Project Manager, National Commission on the Status of Women

Donors

Mr. Blaine Marchand, First Secretary Development, CIDA
Ms. Farrah Chandani, First Secretary Development, CIDA
Ms. Umbreen Baig, Programme Officer, CIDA
Mr. Syed Saadat Ali, Senior programme officer, Netherlands Embassy
Mr. Tor Haug, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy
Mr. Naufil Naseer, Programme Officer, Norwegian Embassy
Mr. Alf Arne Ramslien, former Head of Development, Norwegian Embassy
Ms. Thora Holter, Adviser, Norad
Ms. Kanwal Bokharey, National Programe Officer, SDC

UN Officials

Mr. Toshihiro Tanaka, Country Director, UNDP
Ms. Faiza Effendi, Assistant Resident Representative, Chief Poverty Reduction Unit, UNDP
Mr. Farhan Sabih, Assistant Resident Representative, Chief Governance Unit, UNDP
Ms. Mehreen Saeed, Communication Analyst, Strategic Management Unit, UNDP
Mr. Hayat Muhammad, Programme Associate, M&E, UNDP
Mr. Shoeb Iqbal Syed, Provincial Project Manager, GJTMAP, UNDP
Mr. Rizwan Mehmood Sheikh, Planning Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, UNDP
Mr. Syed Ayaz Hussain, Provincial Monitoring and Reporting Coordinator Advocate, UNDP
Mr. Muhammad Ayub, Chief, Gender Development, Social Welfare, Special Education and Nutrition, UNDP
Mr. Sajid Baloch, Director Chief Commissioner's Office, Ministry of Interior (ex-programme officer, UNDP)
Ms. Bushra Hassan, ex-M&E Officer, UNDP
Mr. Barak ullah Khan, Provincial Programme Manager, GBG
Ms. Alice Shackelford, Country Programme Director, UNIFEM
Mr. Saghir Bukhari, Senior Programme Coordinator, UNIFEM
Mr. Salman Asif, Gender Advisor to RC, UNFPA

Field Visit to Lalamusa - Women's Political School (WPS)

Nighat Iqbal Qureshi, Trainer
Syeda Shahida Shah, Trainey
Muhammad Afzal, Assistant Director (Training)
Tariq Sheikh, Deputy Director
M. Ashraf Rana, Assistant Director, (Training)
Ismat Fatima, Qadarabad Union Council (UC)
Kousar Fatima, District Member
Talat Yasmin, Trainer
Rehana Kosar, Councillor
Shazia Kouser, Councillor
Mumtaz, Counsellor
Zakia Rabbani, Councillor
NasreenAkhtar, Councillor
Nasim Akhtar, Councillor
Rehana Kausar, Councillor

Field Visit to Attock – Gender Justice Through Musalihati Anjuman (GJTMA)

Zakir Hussain, Member
Hafiz Naseer Ahmad, Secretary,
Ghazala Siddique, Member
Salma Bibi, Beneficiary
Sabia Bibi, Beneficiary
Mussarat Bibi, Beneficiary
Khalid Nawaz, Secretary, UC
Amjad Khan, Secretary, UC
Khalid Mahmood, Member
Malik Munir, Convener
Surraya Begum, Member
Khalida Rana, Member
Attiya Begum, Member
Muhammed Jamil Khan, Convener
Muhammed Sabir, Beneficiary
Mian Kokab, Councillor
M. Sohail, Secretary
Muhammed Aftab, Member
Masood Ilahi, Secretary
Aftab Ahmed, Secretary
Zubair H. Aafaq, Secretary
Atta-ur-Rehman, Advocate
M. Naseer, Secretary
Razaq, Secretary

Other Stakeholders

Prof. Dr. Khalida Ghaus, Managing Director SPDC
Ms. Fauzia Yazdani, ex-Programme Officer, Norwegian Embassy
Ms. Rukhsana Rashid, ex-Manager Gender Equality, CIDA
Ms. Mossarrat Qadeem, PAIMAN

Ms. Rehana Hashmi, Director, Gender Reform Action Plan (GRAP) ex-Prpgramme Officer, WPS
Mr. Rashid Chaudhry, Parliament Watch, Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN)
Ms. Saadia Mumtaz, Consultant (worked with CEDAW Unit, MOWD)

Sudan Informants

Norwegian Government Officials

Mr. Geir O. Pedersen, Director General, Dept. for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Mr. Endre Stiansen, Senior Advisor, MFA, Oslo
Ms. Trine Mathiesen, Advisor, MFA
Mr. Svein Sevje, Ambassador to Sudan (until end of August, 2010)
Mr. Arve Ofstad, Deputy Head of Mission, Khartoum Embassy
Mr. Henrik Lunden, Secretary and liaison with Basket Fund Project, Khartoum Embassy
Ms. Helene Skaardal, Secretary and liaison with UNMIS/HR, Khartoum Embassy
Mr. Stein Erik Horjen, Deputy Consul General, Juba

UN Officials

Mr. Auke Lootsma, Deputy Country Director, UNDP/Khartoum
Mr. Joe Feeney, UNDP HO, Juba
Mr. Ray Kennedy, Chief Electoral Affairs Officer, UNMIS/EAD, Khartoum
Mr. Jorge Guzman, Election Project Manager, UNDP/Khartoum
Mr. Azhar Malik, Election project manager, UNDP/Juba
Ms. Thusita Pilapitiya, Governance Section, UNDP/Juba
Mr. Matthew Dominic, Head of UNMIS/EAD, Juba Sub-Office
Mr. Guillaume Chartres, Election Project Officer, UNDP/Khartoum
Ms. Ann Li, Election Project Officer, UNDP/Khartoum
Mr. Mohamed Abdel-Aziz Ibrahim, Chief, RoL, Judicial and Prisons Advisory Section, UNMIS, Khartoum
Ms. Benedict Sannoh, Head of UNMIS/HR, Khartoum
Ms. Roxana Garmendia, Head of UNMIS/HR Juba Office
Cardinal Uwisheka, UNIFEM, Juba
Ms. Nemata Majeks-Walker, UNIFEM, Juba
Mr. Steffano Pes, IOM, Khartoum

Sudanese Officials

Mr. Abdalla Balla el Hovdalle, Commissioner, NEC, Khartoum
Mr. Galal Mohamed Ahmed Altayef, Secretary General, NEC, Khartoum
Amb. Abdeen, Advisor, NEC, Khartoum
Mr. Antipas Nyok, SPLM Secretariat, Juba
Mr. Henry Wani Rondyang, SPLM Secretariat, Juba
Mr. Thomas Dut, Acting Head of South Sudan Human Rights Commission
Mr. Jersa Kide Barsaba, South Sudan High Elections Committee

NGO and academic personalities

Mr. Halle Jørn Hanssen, ex-SG, NPA
Mr. Jan Ledang, Country Director NPA, Juba
Mr. Tore Torstad, Country Director NCA, Juba (until June, 2010)

Ms. Trude Falch, Sudan responsible, NPA/Oslo (interviewed both in Oslo and Juba)
Ms. Marit Hernæs
Ms. Liv Tørres, consultant and political advisor
Mr. Audun Herning, Project Responsible, NPA/SPLM project, Juba
Mr. Øistein Rolandsen, Senior Research Fellow, PRIO (interviewed in Juba)
Ms. Robina Namusisi, IRI, Juba
Mr. Franklin Bonner, IRI, Juba
Mr. Said Sanadiki, Programme Director for Domestic Observation, Carter Center, Khartoum
Mr. Ajay, Carter Center, Khartoum
Mr. Yusef, IFES Representative, Khartoum
Dr. Hassan A. Abdel Ati
Dr. Muawia Hamid Shaddad
Representatives of the following NGOs met in Khartoum: Women Initiative Group, Youth Center for Development, Darfur Medical Society, Friends of Peace Society, Sudanese National Union of Disabled

United Nations Officials – New York and Oslo

UNDP New York

Mr. Bisrat Aklilu, Executive Director, UNDP Trust Fund Office
Ms. Winnie Byanyima, Director, UNDP/Gender Team, Bureau for Development Policy
Mr. Djordje Djordjevic, Justice and Security Sector Reform Specialist, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
Mr. Urs Nagel, Evaluation Adviser, Evaluation Office
Mr. Michael Reynolds, Evaluation Adviser, Evaluation Office
Mr. Tore Skatun, Accountaiblity project manager, Bureau of Management

UNDP New York – Democratic Governance Group

Ms. Geraldine J. Fraser-Moleketi, Practice Director
Ms. Myriam Mendez-Montalvo, Practice Manager
Ms. Shireen Said, Policy Adviser, Human Rights
Mr. Phil Matsheza, Policy Adviser, Anti-corruption
Ms. Nina Berg, Policy Adviser, Justice sector
Ms. Sujala Pant, Policy Adviser, Governance
Mr. Kevin Deveaux, Policy Adviser, Parliamentary Development
Mr. Jason Pronyk, Management Specialist
Ms. Gemma Archer, Justice Specialist
Ms. Sarah Rattray, Knowledge Management Specialist
Ms. Mragaret Chi, Coordinator, Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund

United Nations Democracy Fund

Ms. Annika Savill, Senior Adviser, Secretary to the Board

UNFPA

Ms. Sonia Heckadon, Regional Adviser
Mr. Charles Katende, Evaluation Adviser
Ms. Margherita Tinti, Programme Analyst

Office of Internal Oversight Services
Ms. Muriette Lawrence-Humes, Section Chief, Special Assignments Section, Internal Audit Division
Mr. Helge Rieper, Section Chief, Evaluation Division

UNDP Governance Centre - Oslo
Mr. Bjørn Førde, Director
Ms. Claudia de Andrade Melim-McLeod, Democratic Governance adviser
Mr. Joachim Nahem, Democratic Governance adviser
Mr. Darko Pavlovic, Democratic Governance adviser
Mr. John Samuel, Democratic Governance adviser

Other Informants
Mr. Andreas Løvold, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN
Ms. Hanne Melfald, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo

Annex C: Documents Consulted

Literature Review

Most of the documents used in the Literature Review are not provided here but in the Literature Review itself, published separately. Only documents referenced in the text here are included.

Carothers, T. (2002) 'The End of the Transition Paradigm'. Journal of Democracy 13 (1): 45-69.

Foresti, M., B. Sharma, T. O'Neil and A. Evans (2007) 'Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability – Evaluation Framework'. London: ODI.

O'Neil, T., M. Foresti and A. Hudson (2007a) 'Evaluation of Citizens' Voice & Accountability – Review of the Literature & Donor Approaches Report'. London: DFID.

Rakner, L., A. Rocha Menocal and V. Fritz (2007) *Democratisation's Third Wave and the Challenges of Democracy Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned*. Working Paper 1. Dublin: ABIA.

Scanteam (2007), "Review of Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds", Two volumes, Oslo, February.

United Nations Secretary General (2009b) 'Democracy'. Guidance Note of the Secretary General, September.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (2005), "Election Observation Report: Wolesi Jirga and Provincial Council Elections". Kabuil, September.

Bennett, Christina; Shawna Wakefiled and Andrew Wilder (2003), "Afghan Elections: The Great Gamble". Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, November.

Boneo, Horeacio; Katherine Collin; Trevor George-Coker and Catinca Slavu (2009), "Mid-term Evaluation of the Project 'Enhancing Legan ald Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow' (ELECT)". Kabul, November.

Coburn, Noah and Anna Larson (2009a), "Patronage, Posturing, Duty, Demographics: Why Afghans Voted in 2009". Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, August.

Coburn, Noah and Anna Larson (2009b), "Voting Together: Why Afghanistan's 2009 Elections were (or were not) a Disaster". Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, November.

Cook, Margie and Dan Finn (2006), "Afghan Voter Registration 2003 and Elections Projects 2004/2005". Electoin Evaluation Mission – Final Report, Kabul, May.

Inter-Parliamentary Union (2008), "Evaluating Parliament: A Self-assessment Toolkit for Parliaments". Geneva

Inter-Parliamentary Union (2006), “Parliament and Democracy ni the Twnty-First Century: A Guide to Good Practice”. Geneva
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and UNDP Afghanistan (2006), “Enhancing Legal anad Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)”. Project Document, October 2006-2008. Kabul, November.
Kippen, Grant (2008), “Elections in 2009 and 2010: Technical and Cohntextual Challenges to Building Democracy in Afghanisan”. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, November.
Reynold, Andrew and Andrew Wilder (2004), “Free, Fair or Flawed: Challenges for Legitimate Elections in Afghanisan”. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, September.
UNDP (2009), “Assessment of Development Results: Evaluation of UNDP Contribution – Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”. Evaluation Office, New York, May.
UNDP Afghanistan (various), “Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT)”: quarterly and annual progress reports, 2006-2009, Kabul.
UN Development Group (2009), “2008 Resident Coordinator’s Annual Report”, Kabul
UN Development Group (2008), “2007 Resident Coordinator’s Annual Report”, Kabul
UN Development Group (2007), “2006 Resident Coordinator’s Annual Report”, Kabul
Wilder, Andrew (2005), “A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Afghan Elections”. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, December.

Guatemala

PROFED-PASOC programme documents

A.R.S. Progetti S.P.A. (2010), “Evaluación Externa Final, Informe Final, PASOC II”, August.
Buvollen, Hans Petter (2007), “Sistematización de experiencias y lecciones aprendidas, Programa Participación de la Sociedad Civil-PASOC”. UNDP Guatemala, 2004-2006.
CEDIM (2009), “Evaluación Externa Intermedia, PASOC II”, August.
Fundación SARES (2005), “Informe de Evaluación Externa, Programa, Participación de la Sociedad Civil (PASOC)”.
Norwegian Embassy Guatemala (2007), “Appropriation Document, plus Agreement NMFA-UNDP, PASOC II Alliances with Civil Society”, 23 March.
Norwegian Embassy Guatemala (2003), “Agreement Norad-UNDP, Civil Society Participation” program, 2004-2006 (PASOC)”, December.
Norwegian Embassy Guatemala (2000), “Agreement Norad-UNDP”, PROFED 2000-2003 GTM 2648.
UNDP Guatemala (2010), “PASOC II, Informe Final”, August.
UNDP Guatemala (2010), “PASOC II, Financial reports”, March and August.
UNDP Guatemala (2008), “Narrative Report, PASOC II, January-December”.
UNDP Guatemala (2007), “PASOC I, Informe sustantivo final, auditoría 2006, financiero 2006 (período cubierto: enero 2004 – marzo 2007)”.
UNDP Guatemala (2007), “Informe FINAL del proyecto (ampliado a junio de 2007). Participación de la Sociedad Civil (PASOC), Período del informe: enero de 2004 – junio de 2007”.

UNDP Guatemala (2006), "PRODOC PASOC II, Programa Alianzas Con La Sociedad Civil".
UNDP Guatemala (2004?), "Informe final del Proyecto PROFED OSC, Oct. 2000 – Sept 2004".
UNDP Guatemala (2003), "PRODOC. Participacion de la Sociedad Civil – PASOC -. Noviembre 2003".
UNDP (2005), "Informe ANUAL de proyecto, PASOC, Enero-diciembre 2005".
UNDP (2001), "Informe Narrativo 2001", PROFED.
Thue, Nana and Thoresen, Beate (2002), "Final report project review of PROFED", October 2002.
Yujnovski, Oscar and Binder, Alberto (2003), "Evaluación de Efecto—Consolidación del Estado de Derecho en Guatemala", Informe final 2003.

IDPP programme Documents

Bain, Jannicke, and Svendsen, Kristin (2004), "Project Review – Fortalecimiento del Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal", Norad, 18 May.
Completion Document, IDPP-project Phase I, 20 July 06.
Ekern, Stener, and Leifsen, Esben (2008), "Project Review – Fortalecimiento del Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal, Defensorías Indígenas, Fase II", Norad, 7 April.
Final Narrative Report of IDPP-project (Phase I), recieved 02.11.05, approved by Embassy in letter of 09.01.06.
"Final Narrative Report of IDPP-project (Phase II)- Fortalecimiento Institucional Del Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal, Defensoría Indígenas, Fase II".
UNDP Guatemala (2007), "Revised Project Document (Phase II) – Fortalecimiento Institucional Del Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal, Defensoría Indígenas, Fase II", 8 January.
UNDP Guatemala (2002), "Project Document (Phase I) - Strengthening of the Public Penal Defense Institute", February.

General Bibliography

Aguilera Peralta, Gabriel (1996), "El Proceso de Paz en Guatemala 1987-1996", Estudios Internacionales, Vol. 7(14): 1-19.
Booth, John A. (2000), "Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala in the Central American Context", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42(4):59-87.
CEH (1999), "Guatemala Memory of Silence, Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification. Conclusions and Recommendations", February.
Dickinson, Elizabeth (2010), "Failed States Watch List. Four Countries in Big Trouble: Guatemala and Honduras", Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/21/watch_list
Flores Alvarado, Humberto (2003), "Los Compromisos de Paz: Sinopsis de su Cumplimiento", SEPAZ Guatemala.
Hessbruegge, Jan Arno, and García, Carlos Fredy Ochoa (?), "Mayan Law in Post-Conflict Guatemala", ILO, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/event/wcms_084059.pdf

IDEA (2008), "Del Dicho al Hecho: Manual de Buenas Prácticas para la Participación de Mujeres en los Partidos Políticos Latinoamericanos", IDEA, Stockholm, Sweden.
MINUGUA (1996), "La Construcción de la Paz en Guatemala", MINUGUA-UNDP, Guatemala.
Pape, Edgar (1996), "Modernización del Estado Guatemalteco: una Propuesta para la Posguerra", Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Guatemala.
UNDP (2010), "Informe Regional sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Latina y el Caribe", New York.
UNDP Guatemala (2007), "Informe Estadístico de la violencia en Guatemala", December.
Robles Montoya, Jaime (2002), "El Poder Oculto: Serie de Ensayos Sobre los Poderes Ocultos", Fundación Myrna Mack.
Scanteam (2006), "Assessment of UNDP as channel for Norwegian aid in Guatemala, Final Report".
Tamup, Carlos; Asier Martínez de Bringas Gorka Urrutia Asua and Mikel Berraondo López (2006), "Guatemala: 10 años de la Firma de los Acuerdos de Paz. Un Análisis de la la(s) Práctica(s) de la Cooperación Internacional desde la Perspectiva de los Derechos Humanos", Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.
The International Council on Human Rights Policy (2000), "Local Perspectives: Foreign Aid to the Justice Sector", The International Council on Human Rights Policy, Versoix, Switzerland.
Vicepresidencia de la República de Guatemala (2007), "Visión de Paz, Misión del Futuro: Seminario", Editorial Piedra Santa, Guatemala, Guatemala.
Washington Office on Latin America (2008), "Advocates Against Impunity: A case study on human rights organizing in Guatemala", WOLA.
Zaunbrecher, Katie (2010), "The International Violence Against Women Act: Could IVAWA Save Guatemala from Femicide? Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA)".

Malawi

Chidammodzi F, Nandini Patel, Rugumayo R. (2000), "Mid- term evaluation of the Democracy Consolidation Programme"
Government of Malawi & UNDP (2002), "Project Document, *Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase II*"
Government of Malawi & UNDP (2010), "Report. Workshop on Democratic Governance Sector. Working Group foundation, design and coordination mechanisms".
IMCHRD / DCP (2004), "Draft Report on the first Democracy Consolidation Programme Stakeholder Consultative Forum held on 18th August 2004 at Lilongwe Hotel"
IMCHRD / DCP (2005a), Letter to the Norwegian Embassy, "Allocations of DCP financial support towards student demonstrations against parliamentarians."
IMCHRD / DCP (2005b), "Draft Minutes of the 2nd Stakeholder Consultative Forum held on 19th September, 2005 at Capital Hotel".
IMCHRD / DCP (2008), "How DCP III Will Address Gender Issues", Note to the Norwegian Embassy
IMCHRD / DCP (2007), "Democracy Consolidation Programme 2007 Annual Report"
IMCHRD / DCP (2008), "Democracy Consolidation Programme 2008 Annual Report"
IMCHRD / DCP (2009), "Democracy Consolidation Programme 2009 Annual Report"

IMCHRD / DCP (2009), "Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase III, Background information to the TPR meeting March 30, 2009"
IMCHRD / DCP (2008), "Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase III, Guidelines for Proposal and Project Implementation
IMCHRD / DCP (2008), Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase III, Monitoring and Evaluation System.
IMCHRD / UNDP (2008), Draft Terminal Tripartite Review Meeting, Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase II
IMCHRD / UNDP (2009), Terminal Tripartite Review Meeting, Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase III
Kamchedzera, G and Kanyongolo, F.E. (2007) "Evaluation of Malawi's Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase II
Magolowondo, Augustine Titani. (2005) *Democratisation Aid as a Challenge for Development Co-operation. A Comparative Study of Overall Policies of Two Bilateral and Two Multilateral Development Agencies and How they are Implemented in Malawi .* Doctoral Thesis.
Mugore, J.L.M and Kadzamira, Z.D. (199?), Report on Workshop on Governance Capacity and its Development (IMCHRD & UNDP)
Newell, J. (1995), *"A moment of Truth? The Church and Political Change in Malawi 1992;* in Journal of Modern African Studies Volume 33, 2 (1995), Cambridge University Press
Norwegian Embassy (1998), "Memo fra samtale med UNDP's Repr., Terence Jones 04.05.98"
Norwegian Embassy (1998), "Memo fra samtaler I UNDP 5.5.1998"
Norwegian Embassy (1998), "Appraisal of Democratic Consolidation Programme"
Norwegian Embassy (1998), "Mandat for Dialog. Støtte til Democracy Consolidation Programme in Malawi.
Norwegian Embassy (2007), "Mandate for the Annual Monitoring Meeting on MWI-2635-05/021 – UNDP Civil Society Framework Agreement"
Norwegian Embassy (2007), "Note for the file: 2007/01754. Democracy Consolidation Programme III
Norwegian Embassy (2007), Memo. UNDP managed projects/political governance
Norwegian Embassy (2008), "Memo: Discussion paper on possible short-term follow-up of the political governance portfolio due to reduction of staff".
Norwegian Embassy (2008), Mandate for Annual Monitoring Meeting, Malawi Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase II
Norwegian Embassy (2010), Memo to file. "Meeting at DCP III Programme Office with Auditor General of Norway".
Norwegian Embassy (2009), Speech at UN mtg in Malawi by the Chargé d'Affaires: "What Norway expects from UNDP and how UNDP can effectively manage our resources"
Norwegian Embassy (2010), Completion Document, Democracy Consolidation Programme II.
Norwegian Embassy / Norad (2001), "Strategy for Norwegian Development Cooperation between Malawi and Norway
Norwegian Embassy (2010), Memo to file. "Meeting at DCP III Programme Office with Auditor General of Norway".

Sub-Committee on Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights (2000), Note to Heads of Mission Group: *Concerns regarding the submission to Parliament of Local Government (Ammendment) Bill*.
UNDP (1996), "Programme of the Government of Malawi, Programme Support Document, *Democracy Consolidation Programme*"
UNDP (2000), Outline of a Proposal for the continuation of the Democracy Consolidation Programme for the period 2000-2001.
UNDP (2005), "Mid Term Review of the 2nd Country Cooperation Framework for Malawi"
UNDP (2006a), "Report to the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase II. Progress Report"
UNDP (2006b), Minutes from the tripartite meeting of the Democracy Consolidation Programme October 17th, 2006.
UNDP (2008a), "Annual Work Plan for Democratic Governance"
UNDP (2008b), "Final Progress Report, Democracy Consolidation Programme II"
UNDP (2008c), Programme Document: "Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase III (DCP III)
UNDP (2010), "Democracy Consolidation Programme Phase III Annual Work Plan – 2010"
UNOPS / Cowi (2006), *Baseline Survey for Civic Education in Malawi.*
Williams, A. and Dulani, B. (2005), "Democracy Consolidation Programme (DCP II): Mid Term Evaluation."

Mozambique

African Peer Review Mechanism (2009), "Country Review Report: Republic of Mozambique", APRM Country Review Report no. 11, June.
Ammassari, Savina and Botelho Moniz (2004), "Final Evaluation of the Second Phase of the Project 'Strengthening Democracy and Governance through Development of the Media in Mozambique' ", Maputo, September
BBC World Service Trust (2006),"African Media Development Initiative", Research Summary Report. London: BBC World Service Trust.
Bolap, Henri-Paul and Patricio José (2006), "Final Report, Strengthening Democracy and Governance through Development of the Media in Mozambique", Maputo, November.
Bonin, Marie-Hélène (1999), "Media Pluralism Landscape: An Overview of the Media Sector in Mozambique", Prepared for UNDP/UNESCO Media Development Project. Nordic-SADC Journalism Centre, July.
Cachamba, Simeão J. (2002), "Avaliação dos Centros de Comunicação: Eficácia, Funcionamento e Sustentabilidade", Maputo, March.
Center for International Media Assistance (2008), "Empowering Independent Media. US Efforts to Foster Free and Independent News Media around the World", Washington, DC: NED.
Erichs, Peter and Botelho Moniz (2003), "Mid-term Review, Phase II of Strengthening Democracy and Governance through Development of the Media in Mozambique", Maputo, April.
Ferreira, Antonio (2000), Assessment of equipment needs for RM (exact title and date unknown – front page missing), report to project, Maputo.

International Media Support (2007), “Media in Sudan at a Crossroads: Assessment and Outline of a Strategy for Media Support”, Copenhagen: IMS.
Lange, Y. and T. Hughes (2007), “Building Sustainability for Media Centres: A Handbook on Best Practices”, Copenhagen: IMS.
Lines, K. (2009), “Governance and the Media: A Survey of Policy Opinion”, Report submitted to the BBC World Service Trust.
MISA Mozambique (2009), “Panorama do Desenvolvimento da Comunicação Social em Moçambique” (Overview of the development of social communication in Mozambique), Prepared for UNESCO, Maputo, October.
MISA Mozambique (2008), “Pesquisa sobre Direito à Informação em Moçambique: Um Olhar a Partir do Distrito” (Research on the right to information in Mozambique: a view from the districts)”, Maputo, August.
MISA (2009), “African Media Barometer: Mozambique 2009”, Windhoek/Namibia.
MISA (2007), “African Media Barometer: Mozambique 2007”, Windhoek/Namibia.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004), “Guidelines for Support to Free Media in Developing Countries”, Oslo.
Mogekwu, Mathias and Eduardo Namburete (2000), “Study of Journalism Education and Training in Mozambique”, Maputo, draft, undated.
Mpengula-Tomas, Donna (2009?), “Development of a Joint Communication Program in the Context of Delivering as One”, Maputo, undated.
Munck, Gerardo L. (2009), “Promoting Democratic Governance: The Role and Contributions of UNDP”, Report prepared the Democratic Governance Group Partner Event, “One Vision, Many Approaches”, New York, 7 December.
Myers, M. (2009), “Funding for Media Development by Major Donors Outside the United States”, Report submitted to CIMA.
Norad (2001), “Contract for Strengthening Democracy and Governance through Development of the Media in Mozambique, Phase II”, Maputo, November.
Orgeret, K.S. and H. Rønning (2002), “Media in Development: An Evaluation of UNESCO’s International Programme for the Development of Communication (IPDC)”, report submitted to MFA.
Price, M. (2002), “Mapping Media Assistance”. Oxford: Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, University of Oxford.
Rønning, Helge (2008), “The Media Development Situation”. Study undertaken for UNESCO, Oslo, April
Rønning, Helge and Botelho Moniz (2001), “Evaluation Report, Media Development in Mozambique”, Maputo, June.
Sitoe, (200x), “The Cost of the Freedom of the Press”, Maputo.
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2006), “Culture and Media in Development Cooperation”, Sida, Stockholm.
Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (2004), “Media and Governance: A Guide”, SDC, Berne.
United Nations (2010), “UN Resident Coordinator Annual Report 2009”, Maputo, March.
UNDP (1997), “Project Document, Strengthening Democracy and Governance through Development of the Media in Mozambique”, Maputo, September.
UNDP (2001), “Project Document, Strengthening Democracy and Governance through Development of the Media in Mozambique, Phase II”, Maputo, July.

UNDP (2003), "Access to Information. Practice Note". Bureau for Policy Development, Democratic Governance Group/New York and Oslo Governance Centre/Oslo, October.
UNDP (2006), "A Guide to Measuring the Impact of Right to Information Programmes. Practical Guidance Note". Bureau for Policy Development, Democratic Governance Group/New York and Oslo Governance Centre/Oslo, April.
UNDP/OGC (2008), "Annual Report 2008". Oslo Governance Centre, /Oslo.
UNDP/UNESCO (2006), "Media Pluralism Landscape Study", Maputo, November.
UNESCO (2008), "Media Development Indicators: A Framework for Assessing Media Development". Paris, IPDC.
Select Project Team Documents
Project Progress Reports: (i), covering Oct 2005-Oct 2006, (ii) covering Oct 2004-Oct 2005, (iii), End of Phase II (2004), (iv), covering July 2001-June 2002, (v), covering January-November 2000, (vi), covering January-December 1999, (vii), covering Sep 1997-Dec 1998.

Nepal

"Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission NEP/00/010, Quarterly Progress Report for July – September 2006", issuer and date unknown.
"Government of Nepal. ANNUAL WORK PLAN 2003", CDNHRC annual work plan for 2003, signed by NHRC, MoF and UNDP, Mars-June 2003.
"Government of Nepal. ANNUAL WORK PLAN 2002", CDNHRC annual work plan for 2002, signed by NHRC, MoF and UNDP, Oct 2002.
"National Women's Commission Act, 2063 (2007)".
"Third-Party Cost-Sharing Agreement between the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation ("The Donor") and The United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP"), November 2001.
CDNHRC and UNDP (2009), "Capacity Deveopment of the National Human Rights Commission (NEP/01/010, April 2002 – December 2008. Project Completion Report", April.
CDNHRC and UNDP (2008), "Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission (CDNHRC) NEP/00/010. Comprehensive Report 2002–2008 September".
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (2008), "Government of Nepal. Annual Progress Report – 2008".
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (2008), "Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission (CDNHRC) NEP/00/010". Annual Report January – December 2007.
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (2007), "Annual Progress Report January – December 2006".
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (2005), "Annual Progress Report", December.
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (2004), "Annual Project Report (APR)", December.
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (not dated), "Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission NEP/00/010. Annual Progress Report 2003.
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (not dated), "Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission. The Annual Progress Report" (progress report April-December 2002).

CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (2008), "Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission (CDNHRC) NEP/00/010. Half Yearly Report January-June 2008), July.
CDNHRC and UNDP Nepal (not dated), "Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission. NEP/00/010. For the period of January – June 2007".
Dwyer, J., Moran, G., and Karel, S. (2006),"Review of the Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission NEP/00/010. Final Report", February.
Government of Nepal. UNDP. "Capacity Development of the National Human Rights Commission (NEP/00/010),", not dated.
Government of Nepal. UNDP. Capacity Development of the National Human Rights Commission (NEP/00/010), (CDNHRC revised project document for 2006-2007).
Government of Nepal. UNDP. Capacity Development of the National Human Rights Commission (NEP/00/010), (CDNHRC revised project document for 2004-2007).
National Human Rights Commission (2008), "Strategic Plan – 2008-2010", June.
O'Neill, W., and Sharma, H. (2007), "Capacity Development of the National Human Rights Commission: Shifting Challenges, New Opportunities. Evaluation Report October 2007".
Rimal, P., Pokhrel, J., Sharma, I., and Aryal, A. (2000), "Nirbachan 2056, Media-line's Election E-Bulletin – A Day-to-Day Account of Nepal's 1999 General Election", edited by Stephen J. Keeling.
UNDP (2008), "United Nations Development Programme. ANNUAL WORK PLAN – 2008".
UNDP (2007), "CDNHRC Donor Meeting, 5th September 2007", minutes from meeting.
UNDP (2001/2002), "Capacity Development of the National Human Rights Commission, Project Document". CDNHRC original project document 2001-2004).
UNDP (2001), "Project Appraisal Committee Meeting, Capacity Development of the National Human Rights Commission (NEP/00/010) 9 May 2001", minutes.
UNDP (not dated), "Quarterly Progress Report 2006, CDNHRC, Second Quarter (April – June). Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission".
UNDP (not dated), "Quarterly Progress Report 2006, CDNHRC, Second Quarter (January-March). Capacity Development of National Human Rights Commission".
Women's Commission (2008), "Five Years Strategic Plan (2009-2014)", Nepal.

Pakistan

Abbasi, Nadia M. (2009), "The EU and Democracy Building in Pakistan", International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
Condor, Jeremy and Yazdani, Fauzia (2009), "Change Management Coaching Consultancy Report", Islamabad, Pakistan.
Dohad, Rashida and Zaidi, S Akbar (2010), "Governance Outcome Evaluation (2004-2010)", UNDP, Pakistan.
Khan, Atif Humayun and Zia, Shehla (2004), "Evaluation Report Women's Political Participation Project (W3P)", UNDP, May.
Khan, TheMr.ise (2008), "Gender Equality and Aid Effectiveness in Pakistan, A mapping and situational analysis", Interagency group on gender and development (INGAD), Pakistan.
Lopez-Vargas, Mariela (2007) SDEPP II Evaluation Mission Report, Pakistan, November.

Meyer-Resende, Michael and Roberts, Hannah (2010), "Pakistan's maturing democracy", The Guardian.
Ministry of Foreigh Affairs (MFA) (1997), "Norwegian Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997-2005)".
Norwegian Embassy (2001), Appropriation Document Gender Equality Umbrella Project (GEUP) PAK 2729 01/236 "Women's Political Participation and Gender-Sensitive Poverty Alleviation Strategy".
Norwegian Embassy, Appropriation Document, Gender Support Programme.
Norwegian Embassy, Appropriation Document, Gender Support Programme II.
Norwegian Embassy, Platform for Dialogue, Gender Support Programme.
UNDP (2001), "Human Development Report, Manking new technology work for human development", NY.
UNDP (2003), "UNDP Country Programme for Pakistan 2004-2008", Pakistan.
UNDP (2003), "GSP Project Document".
UNDP (2003), "United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Pakistan 2004-8", Pakistan.
UNDP (2006), "GSP Mid Term Evaluation Report".
UNDP (2007), "Women's Political School Project Progress Report 2004-2007", April.
UNDP (2008), "Gender Outcome Evaluation".
UNDP, "GJTMA Project document".
UNDP, "GJTMA Benchmarking Study Report".
UNDP (2008), "GSP Multi Donor Review Report", May.
UNDP, "WPS Progress Report 2004-07".
UNDP (2004), "W3P Evaluation Report".
UNDP (2009), "GSP Closure Report".
UNDP (2009), "Human Development Report, Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development", NY.
UNDP (2009), "Annual review report 2008", UNDP Pakistan.
UNDP.org
UNIFEM (2008), "Progress of the world's women 2008/2009".

Sudan

Carter, Jimmy (2010), Op-ed after conclusion of Sudan elections, the Los Angeles Times (April 28, 2010)
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (2004), "Protocol Between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on Power Sharing" (The most important protocol forming part of the CPA in determining the political framework of the interim period up to the holding of a referendum for South Sudan self government)
Deng, Francis Mading, War of Visions. Conflicts of Identities in Sudan. The Brookings Institution (Washington D.C.)
Flint, Julie and Alex de Waal (2005), Darfur. A short History of a long War (Zed Books)
IDEA (2006), Electoral Management Design.
Johnson, Douglas H. (2003), "The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars". African Issues (Indiana University Press.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007 – 2009), Documents regarding support to OHCHR, Sudan.
NORLAT (2010), Review of the Project "Capacity Building and Strengthening of the SPLM Party".
Nyama, P.A. (1997),The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan. An Insider's View. (Fountain Publishers, Kampala)
OHCHR (2007; 2008; 2009), Annual Reports.
OHCHR (2008), Human Rights Component – Sudan (UNMIS), Annual Report
OHCHR (2009), 2010 – 2011 Strategic Management Plan.
Rolandsen, Øystein (2005), Guerilla Government. Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990ies. (Nordiska Afrika Institutet)
Schomerus, Maireke, Tim Allen et. al. (2010), Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself. Dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. (LSE/Development Studies Institute, London)
Scroggins, Deborah (2004), Emma's War. Love, Betrayal and Death in the Sudan. Harper Perennial, (London)
UN Security Council Resolutions (1590/2005; 1870/2009).
UNDP (2009; 2010), Project Document / Support to Elections and Democratic Processes [in Sudan] [various versions].
UNDP (2009; 2010), Progress Reports (Quarterly) on Support to Elections and Democratic Processes, Sudan.
UNDP (2009, 2010), Minutes of Basket Fund Steering Committee Meetings.
UNDP (2009,2010), Election Basket Fund Steering Committee – Informational Update and Supporting Documents
UNDP (2010), Lessons learnt from elections programming (draft, based on consultations with Donor Working Group)
UNDP/UNMIS, (2009-2010), Minutes of meetings in Electoral Assistance Group (EAD)
UNMIS (2010), After-Action Review; on Support to Sudan General Elections, Khartoum, 6-10May 2010.
UNMIS (2010), Minutes from Joint Technical Meetings; NEC, International Electoral Assistance, Donors.
UNMIS (2010), Human Rights (monthly) Bulletins.
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2010), "Two Views on the Crisis in Sudan", with articles i.a. by Alan Goulty and Nureldin Satti (WDC, August 2010).
SMEC (2010), Monitoring of the Coverage of Sudan 2010 Elections (various Interim reports).
The Carter Center (2010), Public Statements on 2010 Sudan Elections.

Annex D: Methodology

The TOR essentially asked the team to carry out three assessments on each project:

- A ***results evaluation*** of project achievements *(Objectives 1 and 2 – see page 2);*
- A ***process evaluation*** of the decisions by Norway and UN agencies regarding the projects funded *(Objective 3);*
- A review of the performance of the ***channel/agency*** used for implementation *(Objective 4).*

Due to the way cases were selected, a last section looks at results validity.

1 The Results Evaluation

The results evaluation was done in two steps.

The first was a ***results chain assessment*** applying standard LFA ***programme theory:*** Norwegian funding has been applied to activities that were to produce Outputs that were to lead to Outcomes which were expected over time to contribute to societal Impact. All UN agencies use some form of this planning and results framework for project preparation and management, so in principle this performance tracking should be in line with their own programming methodologies. The team was thus to ***document the results*** and ensure that the ***programme theory*** underlying the results chain was made explicit (which assumptions were made when deciding on the inputs; what were the arguments for presuming that these activities would successfully produce planned Outputs, etc) (*Objective 1*).

Documenting results depended to a large extent on the quality of documentation by the UN agencies: the comprehensiveness of the project document; the timeliness, quality, coverage and relevance of reporting; existence of reviews and evaluations; and in particular the results framework used. The latter included issues like indicators selected, targets set for tracking performance, the availability of baseline data, and other classic measurement dimensions. What was found was that the quality and comprehensiveness of the log-frames tended to be quite poor, and in the early phases only went up to Output level, seldom higher.

The second part was the ***analysis of the results*** (that is, once we knew what the *intended* results were and the *actual results* achieved, what can account for successes/non-achievements). The TOR wanted a careful assessment of the *external factors* ***(context variables)*** in addition to the *internal factors* (project management, quality of inputs etc) *(Objective 2).*

This looked at how context variables affected the choices available when the project was designed, but also how changes to them during implementation might have led to changes in project design and results – explicitly through formal project revisions or more informally where project management for example obtained agreement to shift resources to emphasize some Outputs over others.

This challenged the team in terms of being able to ***identify*** and ***document*** these factors and their shifts, but perhaps even more to assess their ***relative importance*** (*was it difficult circumstances or poor project management that explains poor results*?). That is, the team was asked to identify which contextual factors were important for producing the results (whether results were more positive or negative than expected).

One issue was identifying which ***level*** of contextual factors was relevant. That is, for a media project understanding the overarching nature of the regime over time (*was it highly authoritarian or fairly permissive when it came to voiced opposition?*) may have set the overall conditions for the project, but the specific laws and how they were implemented and understood by media actors may have been more important for the actual *design* and *results* of the project.

The contextual factors that affected two projects in the same country may therefore have to be differentiated: at ***macro level*** the conditions were the same but the ***meso level*** (sector) factors are likely to have been different, and these may turn out to have been important/determinant in explaining achievements.

These challenges were greater than normal because many of the projects work in a fragile state context, so project performance is more dependent on contextual factors than in stable and predictable circumstances.

In the end, the team agreed to identify a maximum of ***five*** factors for each of the four categories to be found in a two-by-two matrix looking at (i) project internal versus project external factors, and (ii) were positive or negative for achieving results.

When looking at possible Impact results, the team looked for any positive "knock on" effects on other democratic development dimensions, as sometimes claims are made of mutually reinforcing linkages between different DemDev dimensions (*if support to media strengthened their independence and quality, has this also led to improvements in issues like coverage of Parliamentary and watch-dog reporting and thus enhanced the "voice" of oversight functions? Have media improved the quality, coverage, outreach and impact of its coverage of gender issues?*). Such linkages may or may have been important, but they provided some useful insights.

2 The Process Evaluation

The TOR asked that the team identify how decisions were made in terms of allocations and disbursements to the particular sector/project supported, and how this choice of using the multilateral channel affected the results. In order to do this, the

team tried to identify and assess the planning and decision-making processes in the UN and the MFA/Embassies and Norad (*Objective 3*).

One task was to assess the criteria used on the Norwegian side for selecting the UN as the channel for the support. The TOR there note both issues like performance criteria, and programme theories.

One question raised in the TOR concerns possible synergies from the project selected: (i) has support to one particular DemDev dimension had positive "spill-over" effects along other dimensions (will be addressed in the Results Evaluation, as noted above), (ii) to what extent has the particular project been linked in with and contributed to or benefited from other Norwegian-funded activities in the field.

In order to address these questions, the team tried to speak with several levels of decision makers in the MFA: those who have taken overarching decisions regarding fields to support, and those in the embassies who have approved the particular projects. On the UN side, in most cases project decision making decisions have been delegated to the field.

The evaluation team faced some difficult issues when carrying out the process evaluation. One thing was that most of the information was historical recall by persons who often no longer had any connections to the project. The ability to remember (or interest in recalling) discussions that may have taken place eight to ten years ago varied! Another dimension was that many of these decisions had been informal exchanges and views with little written material to back it up. The ability to triangulate the information was thus poor.

3 The Channel Performance

The team was asked to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the UN organizations in the different contexts in which they have been managing Norwegian funds (*Objective 4*).

The challenge here was that the team was not to carry out an organisational review, as this would have required a very different level of resources and would have meant that the team looked at the entire portfolio of similar projects, or at least a reasonable sample of that universe of projects. There is no reason to believe that the UN-managed projects this team will look at represent any kind of *typical* or *representative* project from the overall portfolio. Instead the projects happened to be the ones that received Norwegian funding – that is the essential identifying dimension.

Given that most projects looked at were unique cases, the team tried to isolate the performance effects that can be attributed to the UN agency versus the particular project personnel versus the contextual variables – but clearly the methodological rigour in doing so can be challenged.

In light of this, the team attempted to do the following during the country visits:

- Systematically noted strengths and weaknesses of a UN organization performance as a product of the results and process evaluations;
- Consistently asked stakeholders (donors, implementing organizations, government agencies or ministries, CSO, independent observers) about the value added of using a given UN organization for the particular DemDev dimension studied;
- At the end of the evaluation, prepared a synthesis of key findings regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the UN organizations, given the varying implementation circumstances.

4 The Analytical Framework

Analytical Categories

The seven DemDev dimensions that the team used for the Mapping Study are *funding categories* developed by the OECD/DAC to classify ODA expenditures reported to them by the donors. They are, however, largely classes of ***actors*** that receive funding. While these actors are grouped according to the objectives they have been established to achieve – educational institutions receive funding for education etc – this scheme is not uniquely well defined: a given CSO can be set up to defend human rights, promote gender equity or distribute agricultural seeds and tools yet all would fit into the same DAC category.

In the remainder of this evaluation, the team tried to be analytically more consistent and distinguish the ***actor*** – the entity that received the funding – from the ***DemDev dimension*** that was actually intended to be addressed. That is, while the funding may be to media, the objective may be to strengthen women's rights through improved coverage and quality of reporting, or funds may go to a CSO where the objective is to strengthen judicial development through better oversight. The projects were therefore be classified according to their ***objectives*** as distinguished by the DemDev dimensions. The starting point for the analysis was the seven dimensions as listed in section 2.2 above.

Operationalizing Democratic Development

The seven DemDev dimensions are not fully congruent with the UN usage referred to in the TOR, which notes that the UN "refers to increased possibilities to participate in the society and decision-making processes that have impacts on citizens' lives". This is looking at the ***rights-based approach*** at the level of the individual, whereas the terms and approach used here are closer to the UNDP concept of ***democratic governance,*** where main concerns are ***state-society*** relations, and in particular the ***accountability*** of the state to its citizens. That is, as we move up the "rights holders-duty bearers" chain of relations, we are not at the first level of the individual being able to defend and claim her rights, but rather at the highest level of where the public sector as the highest-level duty bearer is to be held accountable for delivering on its obligations. The issue is thus simply the societal level at which the principles are applied, but this has implications for how DemDev is operationalized.

Given the above, the seven DemDev dimensions as used here are compatible with this understanding and specification of Democratic Development.

Identifying Contextual Variables for Democratic Development

The starting point for an analysis of Democratic Development as specified above is thus often understanding ***power relations,*** such as in political economy or drivers of change analyses. This provides a ***macro and historical setting*** for the particular project that Norway has provided funding for.

The ***sector or meso-level*** analysis will typically be found in the project document itself when it discusses background and external factors that had to be taken into consideration when developing the project.

While the team did a general survey of these kinds of contextual factors based on available documentation, this analysis was clearly limited (the general political economy and historical literature on any country is vast), it was revised once the consultant had been to the field and triangulated the general analysis with the analysis from the project/programme itself.

The Evaluation as One Integrated Exercise

The Results and Process Evaluations will in practice be *one integrated exercise*:

- A number of the key informants will be questioned both about the decision making process and the results produced;
- A number of documents (project progress reports, final evaluations etc) address both process issues and the results;
- Some of the process decisions presumably were based on a particular programme theory thus linking the two dimensions also conceptually.

For this reason an integrated Master Data Sheet that covers all dimensions will be used as the starting point for collecting information, to ensure that all sources are exploited optimally.

The approach to the Results Evaluation, the Process Evaluation and the Assessment of Channel are provided below.

5 Information Sources

The evaluation will be based on four main sources of information:

- Statistical data and indicators.
- Documents.
- Informant interviews.
- Project visits – on-site verification.

Statistical Data

The main statistical data used were ***Norad's database on Norwegian funding of DemDev through the UN.*** This had been analysed in connection with the Mapping Study. However, the team contacted the Norwegian embassies as well as the UN agencies in the field to (i) ask them to verify the data the team had on the Norwegian-UN collaboration, (ii) request any further data they might have on activities

funded that were not in our tables, (iii) provide more complete data (in the case of the UN agencies) regarding funding for these activities (for example if Norway was only one of several funding sources for a project, or if Norway provided other funding in a relevant DemDev field that we did not have).

Documents

Two kinds of documents were the most important ones used:

- ***Overarching Policy and Evaluation literature:*** The Literature Review discussed the more relevant policy and guideline documents for both UN and Norwegian DemDev support, as well as recent evaluations regarding the results from such efforts.
- ***Programme/Project Documents:*** Project/programme documents for the specific activities that the team looked at were requested from the various UN agencies and embassies. Depending on how far back the activity went, the UN normally had a complete archive.

The MFA did a document search in their archives and was not able to identify anything relevant. Most reports are normally kept by the respective embassy in the field – these documents are typically not sent to Oslo.

Informants

Informants could be grouped into seven groups:

- ***MFA and Norad staff***, at policy and administrative levels. This is partly decision makers in Oslo – MFA and Norad – but primarily at the embassies where most of the decisions have been taken and the follow up carried out. The challenge was to find former embassy staff who are now working elsewhere than the country where the project is implemented.
- ***UN HQ Staff.*** This was staff who worked on policy or evaluation questions at agency head offices, informants at offices like the UNDP Governance Centre, and others at UN overarching policy levels who can advise on policy guidelines, their application, and experiences with them.
- ***UN staff*** at local decision and implementation levels. This was agency staff who were involved in the decision to forward a proposal to Norway and was involved in negotiating the agreement, and project level staff who had been involved in monitoring the activities from the agency office.
- ***Project implementation staff.*** This was often nationals hired by the UN agency as project personnel, or staff in the public sector or civil society organisations that are working for the actors receiving the funding ("implementing partner"). The permanence of staff both in UN offices and in projects varied considerably so the ability to identify the "right" informants was sometimes impossible.
- ***Intended beneficiaries.*** This was a fairly heterogeneous group, and posed the greatest challenge in identifying the most relevant ones since the intended or potential beneficiary groups may be quite wide-ranging, depending on the project.
- ***Other donor representatives.*** Other donors were visited to hear their opinions both about the UN agencies but also about the projects. This was particularly

important in cases where Norway was just one of several donors contributing financially to the project.

- ***Informed other national informants.*** Apart from project staff and beneficiaries, there were other national informants the team spoke with, such as public officials who were aware of the project and its activities but not part of it. Others were academics, journalists, NGO activists who are familiar with democratic development/governance in their societies.

The team prepared Conversation Guides for the different informant groups (see below).

Project Visits

During the field work, team members will be visiting project sites, which will be the best occasion to talk with those directly involved including beneficiaries.

The number and duration of site visits will depend on the work programme developed in each country, and how much information can reasonably be expected from site visits. It may also be that the local consultant will take on most of the site visits, generally before the international consultant arrives, depending on project and situation. In that case, reports from the site visits will have to be drawn up by the national consultant if it is s/he who in fact carries them out, so that there is documented reporting from each visit.

Field Work Instruments

The key field work information collection instrument was the ***master data sheet***. From this the team developed Conversation Guides and a Results Assessment Work Sheet for each of the projects, as explained below.

Master Data Sheet

The Master Data sheet contained questions on all key dimensions that had to be covered for each country and program in order to respond to the questions in the TOR. The main themes covered by the Master Data Sheet are presented below while more specific questions guiding the field work will be elaborated for each of the programmes/projects following a review of programme documents received. The Master Data sheet will also be updated after the pilot case study in Malawi.

A. Country Context Description

Key contextual factors: those expected to be important at the outset of the programme, those that were found to be important for explaining actual results and key changes that have taken place since.

- Which factors were seen as important to understand the level of Democratic Development in that country at the beginning of the programme period (***macro level***) – issues such as socio-political context, degree of conflict, institutional arrangements, level of economic development;
- Which factors were seen as important at the level of the programme/project itself, if different than the above (***meso-level***);

- Were there important changes to any of these factors over the programme period that are seen to have influenced programme results (positively or negatively);
- Short description of key challenges within the seven DemDev Dimensions
- Main International Actors in DemDev at country level – who does what.

B. Norwegian and UN Policies and Decisions

- ***Norwegian decisions***: who took the decision (Oslo or embassy), what were the (three) most important criteria/concerns for agreeing to fund the project: (i) the importance of that particular DemDev issue in that country at that time, (ii) general policies or guidance from Oslo, (iii) the quality, content of the project proposal, (iv) the link this project would make to other Norwegian-funded activities, (v) where Norwegian support could make a difference (comparative advantage?), (vi) the reputation of the UN agency in question to deliver good results, (vii) other factors?
- ***UN decisions***: what were the most important reasons for asking Norwegian funding for this project: (i) the issue/DemDev dimension was an agency or government priority, (ii) Norway itself had suggested or been involved in developing the project, or UN knew the field was a priority for Norway, (iii) the project fit in well within a larger portfolio – getting this complementarity was important, (iv) other donors were already involved, or having Norway in as a donor might get others involved – a funding issue, (v) Norway had signalled it had funds available and wanted a project proposal.

C. Programme Description

- Programme Theory (to be recreated with stakeholders if not in programme documents)
- Roles and Responsibilities of key actors (UN, Government, Stakeholders)
- Programme Design: Norwegian involvement, stakeholder participation
- Monitoring & Evaluation Frameworks and Products
- How programme fits with other DemDev dimensions (if synergies)
- To what extent have gender, human capital, culture and religion (other relevant factors) been framing the programme

D. Documenting Programme Outcomes.

- Document what were the ***planned results*** at Output, Outcome [and Impact] levels (where relevant), including respective indicators and target values
- Document what are ***recorded achievements*** at these levels, and the source of the data
  - If programme Outcomes are at national level, check if relevant indicators exist and have been produced over time
  - If programme Outcomes have not been defined through explicit (measurable) indicators, check relevant sector guidelines and see if stakeholders accept using those for verifying results.
  - If there is little available information and few/poor/no pre-defined indicators/results values, use *ex post verification* methods (Most Significant Change, other more open-ended approaches) to identify key achievements. Triangulate.

- Investigate and Document any unexpected (positive / negative) effects and side-effects (spin-offs) resulting from the delivered outputs, in particular along other DemDev dimensions.
- Investigate and Document if there are any likely Impacts that can be attributed to the Outputs / Outcomes.

E. Explaining Programme Outcomes.

- Can outcome (non-) achievements be explained by relevance factors? (were outputs relevant to needs and capacities of stakeholders?)
- Can outcome (non-) achievements be explained by sustainability factors? (were outputs sustainable enough to lead to outcomes)
- Can outcome (non-) achievements be explained by (lack of) compatibility with other interventions / policies (e.g. in other DemDev dimensions or other types of capacity building necessary for building on outputs)
- Can outcome (non-) achievements be explained by programme consistency/ evolution?
- Is it likely that another programme approach / programme agency would have given better outcomes? Are there other examples of good practice?
- Are there external (risk) factors that can explain (lack of) programme outcomes? These may be related to power-relations, politics, culture, religion, conflict etc.

Conversation Guides

The Conversation Guide was a short (1-2 pages) outline of the key issues that the team wanted to hear the informant's views on. These were based on the Master Data Sheet, but tailored to the particular informant group.

Conversation Guides were normally sent beforehand to the informants so that they knew what the team would be asking about, and so they could prepare themselves (for example by bringing along supporting documentation). The Conversation Guides were to ensure consistency and coherence in terms of what the individual team member asked about, though the content of the Guides tended to change as the process evolved: some questions turned out to be less interesting than expected; others became more important; as the process evolved we got sufficient information on one variable and focused more on others; etc. But since the team visited six quite different countries, it was important to ensure as much consistency across DemDev dimensions and countries as possible, and the Conversation Guides helped achieve this.

While many interviews were one-on-one, for site visits the conversations often were in larger groups. For group discussions in particular more open-ended questions and Most Significant Change questions were often more helpful.

Results Assessment Work Sheets

This is essentially a Results Framework for the project/programme that the team used to systematically record planned results, actual achievements, contextual factors, and information sources. The two results levels that were given most attention were Outputs and Outcomes. Information on Impact was be included

whenever this was methodologically feasible to assess given the time dimension and possibilities for programme attribution.

Objectives (Planned Results)	Actual Results/ Achievements	Contextual factors – identified at start up or later as important – changes to them	Other projects, links important for understanding performance
[Inputs – Activities]	[Inputs – Activities]		
Outputs	Outputs		
Outcome (	Outcomes		
[Impact (Goal)]	[Impact]		

The actual contents/structure of these work sheets varied considerably, not least of all because the concreteness of both expected results and actually documented results was often poor.

6 The Universe Sample and Evaluation Validity

The programs that the team has looked at here make up a problematic foundation for drawing clear conclusions at a more general or systemic level, for a number of reasons:

- It is not clear what the overall universe that this sample is drawn from actually is meant to be:
  - It is not what Norway funds in the field of Democratic Development, because 80% of those funds are managed directly by Norway;
  - It is not what the UN funds in the field of Democratic Development, because what Norway contributes is only a small share of the total;
  - It is not what the UN does in the field of Democratic Development in those countries looked at, because even in these countries the Norwegian-funded activities are not necessarily representative from a DemDev point of view;
  - It is not what Norway funds of Democratic Development through the UN, because much of this funding is through direct multilateral programs and channels rather than the smaller multi-bilateral country-specific funding mechanism;
  - It is not a particular dimension of democratic development, like gender equality or improved elections;
  - It is not even about democratic development in fragile states, because while many of the programs took place in fragile states there is nothing that ensures that the programs looked at are “typical” or representative of this group of activities.
- There are some important biases in the selection of the programs included. They were supposed to be of a certain size in order to increase the likelihood of identifiable results upon which the analyses could be based. This means that all the small and perhaps more *ad hoc* activities in the study countries are not included. Smaller-scale programs in other countries are also excluded. But this selection criterion may have kicked out less successful programs in general: projects that do not turn out well, for whatever reason, will not be renewed, and

thus fail the scale or longevity criterion for inclusion. In Guatemala, the larger justice sector reform program contained four programs, all of which got Norwegian support, but only one is looked – the others were not as successful.

- Because the team has looked at programs of a certain duration, the more recent changes that have taken place, either in overarching frameworks such as more unified UNDAFs (eight pilot countries are now moving ahead on "Delivering as One"), or with regards to insights and technical designs of implementation or monitoring, will not have been included. Since democratic development is perhaps the most dynamic, discussed and rapidly-changing field in development cooperation, there may be an important bias in that the team has been looking at the less representative and interesting cases as seen from a "lessons learned" and "where is the UN in its thinking today"-perspective.

A further consideration to bear in mind is that the team has focused on the operational UN agencies, and in particular the UNDP. In the field of democratic development, however, there are other UN interventions and actors that need to be considered when doing a more holistic assessment of how Norway can contribute to democratic development through the UN. This means looking at the larger Secretariat structure that includes the Department for Peacekeeping Operations, the Department for Political Affairs, the OHCHR, the Human Rights council, to mention the most important. That means that there are important components missing from this study when looking at the larger picture of options.

Given these issues, there are hence limitations on the validity and obviously on the universality of the conclusions that can be drawn.

Annex E:
Tables of Factors Affecting Results

Table E.1: Project Internal Factors that Contributed Positively to Results, by Country

	Factors
Guatemala: PASOC	• UNDP as good administrator, facilitator, adviser and bridge CSO ⇔ State institutions • The good selection of thematic areas and CSO counterparts in each phase • Strategic decision to support both urban & rural, indigenous & non indigenous CSOs • The continued support to CSO who performed well • The Selection and Follow up Committee's role in choosing pertinent projects
Guatemala: IDPP	• Relevant and well defined project plan to enhance access to justice • Provision of legal assistance in indigenous languages with cultural sensitivity • Innovative approach of promoting access to justice for indigenous peoples and advocacy for indigenous rights within a government institution
Malawi	• Project design thoroughly discussed and adapted/ improved over time with broad participation of all relevant stakeholders; • Project team highly qualified, hard-working, committed, remained in post, and thus able to establish trust and close working relationship with all partners • Sustained funding, providing predictability, stability for partners, able to apply RBM • Project management with independence to manage program for results, develop outcome focus, provide capacity building for serious implementation partners • Working methods catalytic and facilitative, close supervision by PO, broad participation, focus on outcomes, networking/ exchanging experiences, active follow-up of evaluations • Rights Based Approach become main mode of program and is seen to work well.
Mozambique	• Project design thoroughly discussed and adapted/ improved over time • Project team highly qualified, hard-working, committed, remained in post • High level and sustained funding, providing predictability, stability for partners and for wide scope of activities • Flexibility of project management, adapting to changing needs, priorities

	Factors
Nepal: NHRC	• Maintained competent staff • Flexible management; realigned to shifting circumstances over the years • Focused focus on the long term • Managed to deliver outputs well in eyes of stakeholders • Sequenced wisely; built core capacities first, extensions later
Nepal: OHCHR	• Well-staffed, at HQ and field levels • Competent management, close personnel bridges UNMIN-OHCHR; maintained donors' trust • Quick deployment in 2006 to cover main hot-spots in Nepal
Pakistan	• Adequate gender expertise at design stage • Donor coordination good at times • Several successes on the level of the individual projects that provided legitimacy and impetus to program • UNDP strong management capacity
Sudan	• Basket Fund along with UNMIS decisive for holding elections – positive in itself • Good dialogue donors/UN/NEC on the election process • UNDP post-election activities may be important to maintain democratic conquests • HR monitoring may have put certain pressure on GoS to limit HR violations • Presence of UNMIS/HR has provided political actors with significant HR knowledge

Table E.2: Project Internal Factors that Inhibited Results, by Country

	Factors
Guatemala: PASOC	• Large amount of projects supported in each phase limited effective project monitoring and strengthening of CSO • Geographic dispersion of projects, except in PASOC II • Monitoring and evaluation weak in first two phases, improved in PASOC II • Poor risk assessments in PROFED and PASOC I (risk analysis PASOC II was good) • Short timeframe of projects with unclear follow up • The Selection and Follow up Committee too large, slowing significantly decision making process to select CSO counterparts/ projects
Guatemala: IDPP	• Insufficient consideration of the complex nature of the more political components of the project sometimes caused confusion • Under-utilized potential synergies with other ongoing justice sector projects (primarily with the OJ and MP), and weak donor coordination
Malawi	• Project design unrealistic, too ambitious with too many dimensions, though there was donor buy-in with basket funding at the time of design. • Low visibility of program due to its nature – which may have been pre-requisite for results – but resulting in low donor buy-in, few synergies with other programs • RBM and strict financial accountability preclude CSOs that do not have necessary capacity in place to seek funding through DCP, but which may be grassroots-based.
Mozambique	• Project design unrealistic (too ambitious) with regards to objectives • Local UNESCO office weakly committed, bureaucratic • Weak documentation of results
Nepal: NHRC	• Project cannot control Outcome level; Nepalese politicking decisive • Started out with far too high expectations; unrealistic objectives in 2001 • High UNDP turnover, except project managers • Donor dependency created • Slow results as some advisers failed due poor understanding of Nepalese culture
Nepal: OHCHR	• Weakness of NHRC has made the OHCHR mission more relevant • Got image of partiality; said to have legitimised some NGOs not working with them • Failed to establish good relations with the Nepalese army • Capacity-development (ToT) of local NGOs had limited effect (unpaid) • Some in NHRC saw OHCHR as a rival • Accused of collecting information from NGOs, but not sharing information in return

	Factors
Pakistan	• Collection of individual projects , not coherent program w synergies between projects • Poor coordination within GSP and with other actors delivering similar projects • Erosion of gender expertise, strategic thinking ⇨ poor programmatic focus, synergies • UNDP too much in the drivers' seat and too little real government ownership • Weak documentation Outcome/Impact results leading to few lessons learned
Sudan	• Donors, UN concerned not to complicate peace process more than optimize democratic outcome (→acceptance of sub-standard elections) • Part. UNMIS more concerned with security than democracy/HR (DPKO vs. DPA & OHCHR) • Weakness in coord of Norwegian policies vis-a-vis conflicting UN interests (to strengthen democratic/HR concerns) • UNMIS/HR had limited dialogue with potential supporters (diplomatic community, CSO, political opposition) →more vulnerable to GoS pressure • Norway & rest of diplomatic community not very proactive to offer such support • Potential synergy among UN projects and other UN-supported projects not activated

Table E.3: External Factors that Contributed Positively to Results, by Country

	Factors
Guatemala: PASOC	• Experience and capacity of some CSO was key in achieving good results and impact • The creativity and dedication of smaller CSO who worked in rural/ Maya areas • The consistency and coordination of three like-minded donors to support three phases of a program during more than 10 years
Guatemala: IDPP	• Close coordination with indigenous authorities in communities where Defensorías were established • The management of IDPP integrated the Defensorías Indígenas into the regular budget of the institution, securing sustainability of results
Malawi	• Stable, though slow democratisation process, no dramatic set-backs. • Government ownership – without political intervention in activities – unique. • Norway and UNDP stable and "hands-off" partners – supporting national / local ownership, but demanding financial and results accountability. • Project partners – local communities, engaged, and with a strong voluntary aspect to participation (not based on allowances) • Donors remained committed to the project for a long enough period to adapt it to framework conditions and ensure efficiency and effectiveness • Villagers are willing to participate and volunteer to work together to improve the situation in the communities. They take responsibility for their own development and find innovative solutions
Mozambique	• Political and legal frameworks positive • Media professionals strongly engaged, largely very positive to project • Project partners – local communities, RM – engaged, supportive • Donors remained committed to the project and its objectives • ***Critical:*** General economy, political stability improved, ***the 1992 peace*** agreement has held
Nepal: NHRC	• UN blue flag needed • Within UN, UNDP was the clear choice of agency for this sort of capacity-development • UNDP modus operandi is to work with the governments • When project was launched in 2001, there was solid donor backing
Nepal: OHCHR	• UN blue flag needed • Independence from the Nepalese government • Solid donor backing from outset

	Factors
Pakistan	• Highly relevant initiative aligned with government initiatives at the time • Conducive political environment at design stage, including government introduced devolution system with 30% quota for women local councillors • On going constitutional reforms (18th amendment) moving powers from Pres to prime minister and Parliament, and from federal level to provinces
Sudan	• Elections held without significant violent incidents • CPA/double power (GoSS+GoS) created democratic opportunities • No alternative to the UN channel (elections plus HR) • Norway's strong role in Sudan peace process → comparative advantages

Table E.4: External Factors that Inhibited Results, by Country

	Factors
Guatemala: PASOC	• Frequent changes in Govt and key national, local authorities (four different gov'ts during program period) limited the sustainability of alliances CSO-State institutions • High level corruption in branches of government • Marked increase in violence and impunity in the country affected implementation of CSO's projects, especially regarding sensitive issues • Penetration of organized crime, parallel criminal structures in all State institutions • Weak national and local leadership
Guatemala: IDPP	• The absence of legal and constitutional reforms clarifying the jurisdiction and authority indigenous leaders and the status of indigenous legal practices • Breakdown of state security, justice services in indigenous communities ⇨ serious mistrust and vigilante justice • Insufficient efforts (in society at large) to promote reconciliation and to rebuild trust and to rebuild a social contract
Malawi	• Donors more interested in stand-alone flagship projects with high visibility • Political, legal frameworks not on par with govt support of the program. Exs: slow decentralisation, NGO law, lack of independence of Human Rights Commission. • Traditional leaders positive and take active part in DCP • UNDP mainly regarded as a channel for funding, many complaints about slow procurement, disbursement. • Accountability of civil servants low due to poverty and capacity – too little integration between demand side – supply side interventions (donor coordination) • Lower level duty bearers unable perform duties due to higher level duty bearers.
Mozambique	• Level/quality of media management, journalism at start very low, putting limits on what could be achieved • Media training institutions weak and did not improve much during the period • General levels of poverty, education meant limited demand for increased media penetration, especially print • Poor infrastructure, high costs of printing, distribution for print media • While general framework conditions positive, also seen as fragile and vulnerable to political whim, with limited further progress in latter years.

	Factors
Nepal: NHRC	• Caste and ethnic divisions • Institutionalised corruption • Dysfunctional governance system – including elections and parliament, government, judiciary, prosecution, police and army • NHRC mandate very ambitious • NHRC commissioners associated with political factions • Commissioners seen as politicised, divided, lack experience in human-rights law • NHRC as fig leaf: all govt factions tacitly agree to impunity to not "rock the boat" • 11 commissions being set up; unclear jurisdictions; dilutes impact of NHRC
Nepal: OHCHR	• Caste and ethnic divisions • Institutionalised corruption • Dysfunctional governance system – including elections and parliament, government, judiciary, prosecution, police and army • India and China believed to want internationals out of the way • UNMIN weak; suffers from many of the same problems that OHCHR and UNDP do • Being squeezed out too soon by the Government of Nepal
Pakistan	Loss of government commitment to the gender agenda as time went by Weak and ineffective women's machinery Uncertain future for the devolution system Growing economic and political problems, increased religious fundamentalism, escalating numbers of IDPs and a worsening security situation
Sudan	Adverse socio-economic indicators; very weak infrastructure Limited democratic space, particularly Khartoum (both leading parties rejecting real power contest) Security apparatus; general fear in population Realistic fear of return to war ICC indictment: positive for HR in global terms; short-term backlash for HR/democracy space Advantages plus UN leverage not taken full advantage of in order to optimize HR/democracy

EVALUATION REPORTS

1.98 "Twinning for Development". Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South
2.98 Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities
3.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Private Companies and Consulting Firms
4.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development Promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations
5.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Developmentin Norwegian Bilateral Assistance. Synthesis Report
6.98 Managing Good Fortune – Macroeconomic Management and the Role of Aid in Botswana
7.98 The World Bank and Poverty in Africa
8.98 Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples
9.98 Evaluering av Informasjons støtten til RORGene
10.98 Strategy for Assistance to Children in Norwegian Development Cooperation
11.98 Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict
12.98 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation between Norway and Nicaragua
13.98 UNICEF-komiteen i Norge
14.98 Relief Work in Complex Emergencies

1.99 WID/Gender Units and the Experience of Gender Mainstreaming in Multilateral Organisations
2.99 International Planned Parenthood Federation – Policy and Effectiveness at Country and Regional Levels
3.99 Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psycho-Social Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus
4.99 Evaluation of the Tanzania-Norway Development Cooperation1994–1997
5.99 Building African Consulting Capacity
6.99 Aid and Conditionality
7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction in Norwegian Development Aid
8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness
9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI, The African European Institute
1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development Cooperation1988–1997
2.00 Norwegian Support to the Education Sector. Overview of Policies and Trends 1988–1998
3.00 The Project "Training for Peace in Southern Africa"
4.00 En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand gjennomfrivillige organisasjoner 1987–1999
5.00 Evaluation of the NUFU programme
6.00 Making Government Smaller and More Efficient.The Botswana Case
7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation
8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme
9.00 "Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?" Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway's Political Past in the Middle East
10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway's Special Grant for the Environment

1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund
2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network

1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracyand Human Rights (NORDEM)
2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of theNorwegian Red Cross
3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMAn ILO program for "Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives" in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMUn programme du BIT sur l'« Appui associatif et coopératif auxInitiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique del'Ouest de 1978 à 1999
4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia

1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for Africain the World Bank
3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk

1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Togheter.Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peace-building.
2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead
3.04 Evaluation of CESAR´s activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganiasajoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building CivilSociety
6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society

1.05 –Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
1.05 –Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme
2.05 –Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
5.05 Evaluation of the "Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)"

1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation

1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer:En syntese av evalueringsfunn
1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 - 2005)
5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegion NGOs in Guatemala

1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise
1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capasity Development in Low Income African Countries
2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Enviromentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation the EEA Grants
4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Reasearch and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector

1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal´s Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme
1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millenium Development Goals
2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
3.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Coopertation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)
3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage
4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008
6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid
7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)

1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009
2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures
3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
4.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Africa Case Study
5.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Bangladesh Case Study
6.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Uganda Case Study
7.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans
8.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International
9.10 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives

Norad
Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation

Postal address
P.O. Box 8034 Dep. NO-0030 OSLO
Visiting address
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway

Tel: +47 22 24 20 30
Fax: +47 22 24 20 31

No. of Copies: 350
postmottak@norad.no
www.norad.no