



# Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)



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Norad



Photo: Ken Opprann

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASEC	Assamblé de la Section Communale (Assembly of the Communal Section). An elected committee that serves as a rural parliament that provides checks and balances to the CASEC.
<i>azek</i>	Creole equivalent of ASEC, q.v.
CASEC	Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communale (Council for the Administration of the Communal Section). A three member council elected as the unarmed civilian authorities of a rural section.
CCC	Communal Coordinating Committee
CIC	Citizen Information Centers, opened in the immediate post-earthquake period to serve as a clearinghouse for information on survivors, displaced persons, and humanitarian resources.
CSO	Civil society organization
DC	Departmental Coordinator
DCC	Departmental Coordinating Committee
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
GOH	Government of Haiti
HC	Haitian Creole
IC	Initiative Committee
ILPI	International Law and Policy Institute
IOM	International Office of Migration
IRI	International Republican Institute
<i>kazek</i>	Creole equivalent of CASEC, q.v.
LAF	Local action fund
<i>majistra</i>	Creole term for mayor.
MFA	Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP	Membre de Parliament -- Member of Parliament. Most frequently used of lower chamber deputies.
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
PADF	Pan-American Development Foundation
TOR	terms of reference
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report on “Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens’ Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)” is delivered to Norad under the contract of the International Law and Policy Institute to review a civil society democracy building program in Haiti implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The program has been funded by Norway since August of 2010.

The review is based on a study of available literature and program documentation and field work which included eight sites covered by the program, as well as interviews with NDI staff and a wide range of stakeholders.

The core element in NDI’s civil society programming in Haiti is the Initiative Committee (IC), a democratically elected 11 member group. NDI has encouraged the formation of hierarchically nested ICs. Village level “section” ICs coalesce into municipal level “communal” ICs, which in turn coalesce into Department level ICs. The principal objective of the program has been to encourage citizen participation and advocacy around reconstruction and development issues via these ICs. But an additional objective has been to create broader municipal or departmental units called platforms and advocacy coalitions that organize around specific issues.

NDI’s contribution to ICs is twofold: (1) organize them through intensive training in a village or urban neighbourhood and (2) support them logistically through event financing at the communal and departmental levels. This entails use of Norwegian funds to rent a meeting space, to pay for food and drink at meetings

Another major element was the preparation of *cahiers de charge*, referred to in English by NDI as *developmental roadmaps*. NDI mobilized the ICs in every department to organize forums on the major local developmental priorities were discussed. These forums resulted in 11 documents, one for each Department plus a national document, synthesizing local priorities. They have taken on a quasi-official status, have been given some discussion in the media, and are designed to give legislators information on what funding they should lobby for in their region. Much enthusiasm was expressed in different parts of the country for these *cahiers*.

The program extends to the entire country. Its managerial structure is dendritic. In addition to the expatriate field director, there is a national coordinator of the civil society program in the head office along with two subordinates, each in charge of the program in half of Haiti. Each of them in turn supervises the “departmental coordinators” (DC) in his region, the staff employed in each of Haiti’s ten departments. These DC are the program’s most direct contact with the ICs.

NDI has formed other organizational units called “platforms” at the municipal and department levels. These are coalitions, broader than ICs, of prominent individuals who meet regularly to plan interactions with representatives of the local and central governments to spur the government into productive action on locally important issues. The most recent development has been the formation of special-issue advocacy coalitions. The most promising one is a recently formed borderland coalition that unites people from municipalities along the north / south Haitian/Dominican. The major issue there spurring organization is the mistreatment of Haitian market women by Dominican soldiers in the border markets. The Haitian State is absent and offers no protection to its citizens.

The program has successfully met the quantitative goals of forming more ICs in this year and of activating platforms and coalitions. The review team was impressed with the enthusiasm that IC members feel at being organized to dialogue with elected leaders as a group, instead of being forced to go to them with issues as lone individuals.

The program has several problems as well that are managerial, budgetary, and conceptual. Managerially there is staff turnover. The recent arrival of a new director with a specialization in gender issues is a positive development, as the gender component of the program has been weak. But there have been salary related tensions among high level Haitian staff. The most serious staffing problem came when 6 of the 13 departmental coordinators were let go because of budget reasons. The remaining departmental coordinators are not adequately supported at the same level as employees in other programs at the same level. They also face serious logistical challenges as they receive very limited support in terms of meeting spaces, transport and basic operations. Despite the logistical obstacles they are performing their jobs.

An analysis of the budget shows that nearly 4 out of every 10 dollars in the \$1.6 million grant are absorbed by a combination of the money retained in Washington headquarters plus the costs of the salary, fringe benefits, and special allowances that are required to hire an expatriate field director in Haiti. This is far above MFA's 8% guideline for office support. Because NDI has no other donors in Haiti at the moment, the entire \$256,000 required for the one expatriate is being charged to the Norwegian program. These director costs are somewhat routine for larger American NGOs. But they render costly the pursuit of development in this mode. The report gives evidence that the amount of money retained for NDI HQ and for 100% support of the in-country field director has had deleterious budgetary impact on field level activities, including the need to dismiss nearly half of the Haitian field staff.

Monitoring / evaluation procedures are weak. The ICs have existed for 12+ years. There is no discussing their failure to achieve their central goal: motivating the government to release funds for locally identified priorities. (It has not.) The program avoids this dilemma by using program activities themselves (committee formation, public forums) as measures of program "results". The review team considers these to be a spurious measure of genuine program effectiveness.

In terms of gender issues, the program faces the dilemma that in many of the 11 member ICs, only a small minority are female. The reasons for this are discussed in the report. NDI has encouraged female participation. The current gender ratio appears to be one third female. However the report points out that the most pressing gender issues are not IC gender quotas but other problems that surfaced in the field visits. Domestic violence was raised as a problematic issue as was the question of the economic and verbal abuse of Haitian women in the border markets by Dominican soldiers. The report suggests how both problems might be amenable to mitigation.

Despite problems, the report concludes that NDI has effectively fulfilled its part of the agreement at least in terms of activities if not of results. We recommend that MFA and NDI deal with the conceptual, budgetary and managerial issues raised in the report and continue in partnership. The recommendation is also made for the creation, in the next phase, of local action funds (LAF) that will permit at least some local level of concrete action for mature ICs that have yet to receive resources from the State. The IC will not be sustainable unless years of dialog are transformed into some form of visible action.



## 1. INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND

This report on “Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens’ Political Influence in Haiti through National Democratic Institute (NDI)” is delivered to Norad under the contract of the International Law and Policy Institute to evaluate a civil society democracy building program in Haiti implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). The program has been funded by Norway since August of 2010.

The proposal was titled “Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation in the reconstruction and electoral period”. It was submitted in August of 2010. It will henceforth be referred to as the “2010 program”. Its activities extended from August of 2010 to May of 2011. (A no-cost extension was eventually granted.) The (rounded) budget figure was for \$1.6 million. The grant financed activities that fall under both elections and civil society, that is, support to improve citizen’s political influence through elections and civil society organizations.

The second proposal, which has the same title and covers current activities, is an add-on and continuation of the first proposal. It was submitted in November of 2011 and covers activities from January 1 to December 31 of the current year, 2012, It will henceforth be referred to as the “2012 program.” The activities of the current proposal fall exclusively under the rubric of civil society. The original (rounded) budget figure for this program was also \$1.6 million. It was later raised to \$1.8 million to compensate for exchange rate fluctuations.

The review examined activities funded under both proposals, focusing, however, on the civil society activities of both programs. In both the 2010 and 2012 programs activities focused on the Initiative Committees at section, municipal, and departmental levels and on other civil society organizational entities such as “platforms” and special topic advocacy coalitions. The civil society activities in both programs were examined and treated as organically linked, as part of the same program.

The report will first discuss our methodology and itinerary. It will then describe program structures and achievements. Program challenges and difficulties will then be aired, distinguishing between design issues, managerial dilemma, and budgetary issues, to be followed by separate discussions of monitoring /evaluation and gender issues, the latter of particular importance to the Norwegian MFA in its development support around the world. The body of the report will then discuss issues of general program relevance and of sustainability, and will end with conclusions and recommendations. Several annexes will present standard items such as terms of reference, itinerary, and persons interviewed, and will discuss other issues of importance that fall outside the body of the report. The body of the original draft of the report adhered strictly to the 20 page limit stated in the TOR. At Norad’s suggestion (and with their permission) we have lengthened the body by shifting several annexes into the body of the report and by addressing other issues that surfaced in Norad’s comments on the first draft.

### METHODOLOGY AND ITINERARY

The review was carried out by a two-person team. The team leader was Gerald Murray, an Anthropologist from the University of Florida who has been working in Haiti, both on research and on program and development issues, since 1971. The second team

member was Herard Jadotte, a Haitian political scientist who currently directs the publication bureau of the Université de l'Etat d'Haiti.

The methodology consisted of a combination of literature review and field study. The literature review covered program documentation provided by MFA and NDI. This included documentation covering planning, budgeting and negotiation of contracts between NDI and MFA, as well as reports produced by the project and its staff. A complete list of documents consulted is provided in Annex 4.

The field work in Haiti took place from Sept. 19th to Oct. 1st. Original plans were to visit three or four field sites. But the NDI in country team, led by the newly arrived director Jane Hurtig, assisted by her professional staff Jude Jeudy, Sandrel Cherenfant, and Gabin Jean Pierre, arranged for field visits to seven sites where NDI's civil society program is currently active. The table below provides an itinerary of the sites visited.

Region	Sites	Dates visited
Southwest	Jacmel, Caye Jacmel.	Sept. 21, Sept. 22
South	Les Cayes, Port Salut.	Sept. 23
Center	Saint Marc	Sept. 25
North	Cap Haitien	Sept. 28
Northeast	Ouanaminthe	Sept. 27

In addition, to have some protection against the "dog and pony show" phenomenon, the team leader made an unannounced visit to a village where he had lived for years and where NDI had been active in the past. A full itinerary of the fieldwork is provided in Annex 2, and a list of people interviewed in Annex 3.

Some of the visits entailed observations of meetings in progress, after which we were able to interview participants. On other occasions we interviewed individuals who had specifically been asked to speak with us. Among the interviewees were NDI departmental coordinators, members of IC groups, platforms, and advocacy coalitions, ordinary villagers, employees of other organizations (USAID, IOM, PADF, and others). In most interviews the team leader and the Haitian colleague were together, asking questions. In some interviews only one of the team did the questioning. Almost all interviews with Haitians were held exclusively in Haitian Creole. People would occasionally slip into formal French. And with expatriates the normal language of interaction was English.

## 2. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND ACHIEVEMENTS

NDI is an American non-profit NGO, linked to the Democratic Party, specially founded by the U.S. Congress in 1983 along with a parallel organization, the International Republican Institute (IRI). It has been in Haiti since 1986. It engages in multiple activities worldwide that can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) governance, (2) elections, and (3) civil society. In governance programs NDI funnels resource to, and attempts to strengthen the procedures of governmental agencies, particularly parliamentary entities. None of NDI's Norway-financed activities in Haiti have entailed support to government agencies. Since the onset of Norwegian support in Aug. of 2010, NDI's Haiti activities have entailed support to elections and political parties on the one hand and support to civil society, on the other, principally through the vehicle of the Initiative Committee. The present report focuses on the latter.

## THE PROGRAM

**Concept of the Initiative Committee.** The core element in NDI's civil society programming in Haiti is the Initiative Committee (IC). Its fundamental role is, first, to identify problems of local concern and, secondly, to dialog with elected officials concerning the resolution of these problems. The IC would presumably also coordinate activities funded by the Government of Haiti (GoH) as a result of the advocacy. With rare exceptions, this GOH financial support has yet to materialize, though the ICs have been in existence for more than a decade. Over the years the ICs have evolved into a hierarchically nested structure with three levels: the rural section or urban neighborhood; the commune (which is a municipality containing several neighborhoods and outlying rural sections); and the department, which embraces several communes.

In Haiti the rural "section" is an administrative unit comprising several villages and hamlets. It is the lowest legally recognized territorial unit, as the individual villages (lokalite or bitasyon) have no juridical recognition. The section-level IC is composed of 11 members elected from the multiple organizations that have existed for decades in most Haitian villages. Village level ICs send a member to participate in communal ICs, which in turn elect a representative to participate in broader departmental ICs. The ICs interact with elected local government authorities at three levels. In the rural areas the contiguous villages and hamlets are grouped into a larger administrative unit called the "communal section". Each section, which is governed by a three person elected committee referred to as the *kazek*, has one IC. The town center and each of the surrounding neighborhoods also have an IC where the section is governed by a three person elected *kazek*; the commune by an elected mayor and two associate mayors; and the department by a "delegate" appointed by the President.

ICs have periodic elections. One member of the IC is the coordinator. ICs in principle meet once a month on a specified day (e.g. first Monday or second Sunday). Others meet more frequently. Though the IC has political functions in terms of linking citizens to elected leaders, it is non-partisan in character. It cannot represent a particular political party. Any IC member with electoral aspirations must exit the IC. The function of the IC at all three levels is to enter into friendly but goal-oriented dialogue with elected officials.

NDI developed the concept of the IC under earlier funding from USAID. The review team was told, however, that NDI field staff, not USAID, came up with the concept of the IC itself. Its evolution into hierarchically nested committees has occurred over the past decade, in part with Norwegian funding.

**Objectives of 2010 program and the 2012 program.** The civil society objectives of the 2010 program were to support Initiative Committees, to facilitate increased dialogue among communities, elected officials and candidates for office about the reconstruction process, to identify needs, and to resolve post-earthquake issues (the 2010 program also had electoral objectives not covered in this review). The objectives of the 2012 program are exclusively in the domain of civil society. The first objective is also to encourage citizen participation and advocacy around reconstruction and development issues. An additional objective is to create municipal or departmental units called platforms and advocacy coalitions that organize around specific issues. The platforms are groups of prominent citizens (lawyers, businessmen, journalists, etc.) who were not necessarily members of ICs.

**NDI's support of ICs.** NDI's contribution to ICs is twofold: (1) they organize them through intensive training in a section or neighbourhood and (2) they subsequently

support them logistically, at the communal and departmental levels, through event financing. This entails use of Norwegian funds to rent a meeting space, to pay for food and drink at meetings which entail long distance travel or which last more than four hours, and in the case of broader advocacy coalitions, to pay for the transportation and lodging of people who travel from other parts of the country to an NDI sponsored event.

This simple logistical support is absolutely essential and its importance should not be downplayed because it entails simple food and transportation support. Without the Norwegian-financed subsidies for food, transportation, and occasional lodging, these events could not and would not occur. We observed such an event in the northern border town of Ouanaminthe, where a new advocacy coalition drew in people from border towns from the north to the south of Haiti. In this case we observed NDI staff playing a major intellectual role, uniting people in a preliminary meeting to develop a border “manifest”, preparing and presenting the next day a power point presentation of the manifest, and hosting the entire group of some 90 people to a meal after a meeting that lasted several hours.

It was the first time that the team leader for the review, who has been working in Haiti for decades, had seen a gathering of individuals from all along the border. The participants were impassioned about the problems that were identified in the manifest. The review team was impressed with the excitement and electricity generated at this and other NDI-organized meetings that we attended. As we will see, the lack of visible results over time has caused attrition in some ICs. But as a preliminary organizational strategy, the ICs appear to have generated excitement among individuals who were happy to be interacting in an organized manner, perhaps for the first time in their lives, with government officials

The above-mentioned border coalition is one of four advocacy coalitions that NDI uses to expand the program beyond the confines of the IC structures. NDI's other activities with domain-specific advocacy coalitions have a more mixed review. The tourism coalition to promote an upgraded airport in Cayes is dealing with a locally important matter, but it is a special-interest coalition that will hardly have the local population jumping with excitement in the streets. The coalition in Cap-Haitien, in the north, coalesced around the goal of blocking a USAID post-earthquake house building program near Caracol, as presumably inimical to tourism. The effort failed and the coalition has at least momentarily ceased to function. There is an additional agriculturally-related coalition in the Central Plateau which we were not able to visit.

**Cahiers de charge.** Another major element in the Norwegian-financed repertoire was the preparation of *cahiers de charge*, referred to in English by NDI as *developmental roadmaps* (this took place in the 2010 program). The post-earthquake population of Haiti had been excluded from participation in the National Reconstruction Plan, which was presented by the government to international donors. Most people in Haiti had no clue as to what was in the plan. NDI mobilized the ICs in every department to organize forums where the major local developmental priorities were discussed. These departmental level dialogues were synthesized in 10 different French language *cahier de charge*, one for each department, that were printed and distributed by NDI.

Throughout our review, in all parts of the country, we heard favorable accounts of the importance of the *cahiers de charge*. A former mayor in the southern seaside town of Cayes Jacmel called them a major potential weapon in the battle to get the attention of the Port-au-Prince government. The fact that they were printed documents that emerged from municipal and departmental committees and were widely distributed endowed them with a quasi-official status, which carries more weight than a simple

verbal presentation. The cahiers de charge have been alluded to frequently in the Haitian media.

## MANAGERIAL STRUCTURES

NDI's Haiti operations are divided into two major groups of activities, each with different Haitian staff that serve as national coordinators. One branch deals with support to political parties and to electoral procedures. When elections are about to occur, the coordinator of the political branch assists with the organization of debates between candidates, support to political parties, election monitoring, and other related matters. Since there is currently neither a political campaign in progress nor elections in the immediate future, the coordinator of the political branch is managing NDI's newly funded program for women and youth.

The other branch of NDI's activities, the focus of the current review, is the civil society program. This is the component entrusted with ICs. It is national in its scope and, as mentioned, has extended to the entire territory of the Republic

NDI has an office in the upper reaches of Port-au-Prince. The key personnel are the country field director, the financial manager, and the managers of the two "branches" of NDI / Haiti's activity – the "political branch" and the "civil service" branch (our focus was on the latter). In addition to the civil service national director, there are two regional coordinators, one for the departments in the south and southwest, the other for the departments in the center and north of the country. Each has shared access to four-wheel drive vehicles.

The key actors are the "departmental coordinators" (DC), in principle one for each department in Haiti (as we shall see, their number has been problematically reduced for budgetary reasons). They are the ones who organize and give workshops to the ICs in their department. They must work out of their homes and must ride public trucks or motorcycle-taxis to transport themselves to different towns in their department (this is a problematic anomalous situation that will be discussed).

In terms of time management and coordination, the DCs must write a biweekly activity report. In addition there is a monthly meeting of all DCs in Port-au-Prince. The principal information gathering mechanism is the biweekly report submitted by each regional coordinator (in French). These reports are compiled in the Port-au-Prince office and a summary is sent to NDI / Washington. NDI Washington then prepares an English language bimonthly information bulletin on the program. A perusal of these bimonthly reports showed them to be informative not only on the program but also on the evolving political situation in Haiti as a whole.

## 3. PROGRAM DILEMMAS AND SHORTCOMINGS

In discussing general dilemmas we will distinguish between managerial issues and budgetary issues.

### MANAGERIAL ISSUES

A number of managerial issues were identified that have an impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the project. These relate to staff classifications, staff turnover and insufficient operational support of coordinators.

**Staff classification.** For reasons that continue to be somewhat opaque, all in-country staff, most of whom are full time, are hired as “contractors” rather than as NDI employees. We were told, however, that they had full insurance and retirement benefits, as well as the “13th month” bonus routinely paid in December in Haiti to most employees. This classification, we were also told, is used by NDI in other countries as well. One budgetary difference is that expatriate salaries have an additional 48.3% added in fringe benefits or overseas allowance.<sup>1</sup> Haitian “contractors” do not.

**Staff turnover.** The major staff turnover issue came with the arrival of a new Haiti field director, a Canadian citizen who has worked with NDI on two previous assignments (in Iraq and Mauritania). She had been in country less than a month when this program review began. The departure of the previous field director (a citizen of Costa Rica) was planned months ago. Comments elicited about the former director from Haitian staff in the Port-au-Prince office as well as in the field were uniformly positive. This was, in other words, a smooth, planned transition, not a symptom of program tensions. The new director has experiences and credentials from previous work in Iraq and Mauritania that are particularly germane to Norway’s frequently stated emphasis on issues of gender.

In terms of Haitian staff, however, the program has been undergoing potentially debilitating staffing challenges. The national coordinator of civil society activities, a charismatic individual whose departure would hamper activities, has for financial reasons left his slot as national coordinator and has come back on board as a consultant. (Consultant compensation is much higher.) The team interviewed an agronomist working for another NGO who was being paid U.S. \$2,500 per month for activities equivalent to NDI departmental coordinators, whose salaries are closer to \$1,200 per month. The former salary is comparatively high. But an \$1,800 per month minimum was presented as a “decent” salary for 2012. At any rate the national coordinator, whose departure would create a serious gap in the program, is in a tenuous consultant position because of salary issues.<sup>2</sup>

One of the major survival strategies in post-earthquake Haiti is emigration. That has affected the program. The coordinator for the south departed rather suddenly when his Canadian visa application was approved. During the review the entire country was being “covered” by the national coordinator and the remaining regional coordinator.

The most surprising (and programmatically debilitating) staff exodus came, however, on June 30, exactly half way through this one-year grant period. 13 “departmental coordinators” (DC) were reduced to 7. This sudden reduction was planned from the outset and was due strictly to budgetary constraints. (The original budget called for keeping only 5 of 13; measures were taken to keep 7.) It is not that the organizational task of those dismissed was finished, or that their performance was substandard. The budget simply did not permit the hiring of 13 field coordinators for a full year. Therefore some were hired for only six months with no subsequent renewal of contract. This raises the question of the managerial logic of trying to cover the entire country on an annual budget of \$1.6 million. It would be sufficient to permit adequately funded coverage of two or three departments, but obviously not of the entire country.

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<sup>1</sup> This is standard in USAID contracts for international contractors working overseas.

<sup>2</sup> NDI informed us that they recognize that the pay of DCs is low but that they constantly monitor data on current salaries in Haiti to ensure that NDI salaries are basically in line with the norm.



**No local office for departmental coordinators.** The structure of NDI's Haiti operation in one sense parallels that of similar NGOs that operate in several regions of the country: a head office in Port-au-Prince with field staff deployed in other regions. This program, however, is unusual – perhaps unique – in that it obliges regional personnel to operate from their homes. Meetings of committees and hierarchically nested super-committees are a central element of NDI's objectives in the current proposal. But even small group meetings have to be held in borrowed or rented spaces (many of the spaces in which the review team met with groups were borrowed). And each single rental entails advance written permission from the Port-au-Prince office, which we were told by several independently interviewed field staff is often denied with the response "*pa gen kob*". "There's no money."

**Departmental coordinators lack their own transportation.** DCS do not have their own transportation. Instead they are given taxi money. That is, to reach distant communities they must either wait hours for the passenger trucks or ride as a passenger on the back of the motorcycle-taxis that are now standard fare in most of Haiti. We were told that this decision was made by Washington headquarters out of fear of possible lawsuits from bereaved family members were an employee to lose his/her life after being ordered by NDI to use "dangerous transportation".<sup>3</sup> Motorcycles are now the normal mode of transport in much of rural Haiti, and the dangers of accident are much higher when the employee is forced to ride on the back as a passenger. This is a very atypical arrangement that encumbers the mobility of NDI field staff. The cost of a simple Honda motorcycle in Haiti starts at \$3,000. Chinese motorcycles start at \$1,000.

**Departmental coordinators are not given laptops.** Regional staff must email biweekly reports in French to Port-au-Prince. They must supply their own computers. Staff in Port-au-Prince (and of course in D.C.) have access to NDI-supplied computers. But the field staff who do most of the program work must purchase their own computers. This is a highly questionable disparity. Internet-capable netbooks (at least in the U.S.) are now available for as low as \$200.

As is true of the office-space question, the motorcycle and laptop issues are moot. The reality is that, due to budgetary decisions, there is no money left over for field staff to have their own laptops or their own transport even if motorcycles were not classified as "dangerous". It will be useful at this point to turn to the budget.

## BUDGETARY ISSUES

For budget and cost effectiveness analysis we will focus only on the currently active budget. The budget to which the review team had access, was the original \$1.6 million budget, and our analysis will be based on that (it was later modified slightly to compensate for exchange rate fluctuations).

The analysis provided in this sub-section looks at budgetary issues with a view to addressing the question of cost-efficiency. The discussion is informed by the managerial issues identified in the preceding subsection.

**Importance of Norwegian funding for NDI / Haiti.** At the time of this program review, Norwegian funding constitutes 82% of NDI / Haiti's funding. Former USAID funding has terminated. Proposals are now being prepared by NDI / Haiti for other sources of funding linked to the forthcoming (delayed) elections for local officials which will

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<sup>3</sup> NDI later clarified that HQ liability is only one factor, and that staff may purchase and use their own motorcycles. It also "would welcome additional support" for transportation

hopefully take place in 2013. The review team was told in Haiti that the follow-on proposal currently being prepared by NDI for MFA focuses exclusively on civil society activities. (NDI HQ subsequently informed us differently.)

**The direct costs of an expatriate field director.** The typical international NGO in Haiti has an expatriate field director, whose total package affects the cost-effectiveness of a program. There are three categories of cost to take into account: (1) salary, (2) automatically added fringe benefits of 48.3% of the salary, and (3) miscellaneous allowances that have become standard among American NGOs. These allowances include housing and utilities, a “difficult to fill allowance” (i.e. a type of “hardship bonus” for working in a country like Haiti), shipping of belongings to and from Haiti, and storage of the director’s belongings back home

The budgeted costs for the expatriate director are as follows:

12 month salary:	\$112,691 <sup>4</sup>
Fringe benefits:	\$54,430
<u>Additional allowances:</u>	<u>\$89,035</u>
<b><u>Total field director costs</u></b>	<b><u>\$256,156</u></b>

That is, it costs a donor more than a quarter of a million dollars just to hire an expatriate field director through a U.S. NGO. Individuals in other organizations were questioned during the review about currently prevailing expatriate salary levels for directing an NGO field office in Haiti. The “floor” was reported to be \$100,000, the ceiling \$140,000. NDI’s in-country salary expatriate rate fell between the minimum and the maximum. This quarter of a million dollars for the director is charged entirely to Norwegian funds instead of being spread among three or four donor projects as is often the case with other large NGO’s.

**The money that stays in Washington headquarters.** The question of how much development grant money stays in Washington has become a matter of angry public comment in post-earthquake Haiti. Public complaints focus on the “profiteering Non-Profit” that finds ways to legally divert into its own institutional coffers money earmarked for Haitians. The matter bears examination, as it is a matter of concern in MFA which has an 8% guideline.

The money that stays in NDI Washington headquarters from current Norwegian funding is dispersed into three separate budget line items, one of them a sub-item within another item. The three sources of revenue that stay in Washington are:

- **Direct payment to Washington staff.** Salaries and fringe benefits of six Washington-based staff are paid, as a percentage of their salaries, from the grant. The total amount charged to the grant for this expenditure is \$55,623 – or 3.5% of the total grant.
- **Overhead costs.** This is a standard percentage negotiated by U.S. law separately for each institution. The institution is allowed to retain this percentage of the budget for itself without further justification or receipts. Its purpose is to cover the “indirect costs” that an institution incurs when managing a federal grant. The

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<sup>4</sup> This is the average of what was budgeted for the outgoing director and the incoming director with Norwegian money. The actual salary paid does not always correspond to the budgeted salary that was presented to and approved by Norway. Norway has given NDI permission to make reasonable discretionary budget changes.



amount charged as overhead to this program at a flat rate of 9.5% was \$119,811. That is 7.5% of the total grant.

- **Program Support.** This is an additional flat percentage of 14.4% of program costs that NDI retains for the home office. This “Program Support” money, which could perhaps be less ambiguously relabeled as “Additional Support for Headquarters”, totals \$181,609, or an additional 11.4% from the Norwegian budget. Unlike Washington staff salaries, this sum is not calibrated by specific time investments of specific people. It is a lump sum that is taken from the budget. It functions as a de facto form of relabeled additional overhead.<sup>5</sup>

The breakdown, then, of the money retained by Washington headquarters is:

Washington staff salaries and fringe benefits:	\$ 55,623
Federally permitted overhead	119,811
<u>Additional Program Support to Washington</u>	<u>181,609</u>
<b><u>Total amount of money retained by Washington</u></b>	<b><u>\$ 357,043</u></b>

This amounts to 22.3% of the budget.

If we add to this the above calculated costs for an expatriate in-country director, \$256,156, we come to the sum of \$613,199. That is 38.3% of the Norwegian budget. Roughly 4 out of every 10 dollars was budgeted to cover the cost of the Washington office and its in-country field director.

The in-country director’s contributions to the program, of course, are much greater than those of D.C. consultants. But in many NGOs the expatriate field director divides time and costs with multiple projects. In this case, however, the entire burden of the quarter of a million dollars falls on one grant, that of Norway. This is a substantial cut on a \$1.5 million dollar budget and must enter into any serious discussion of cost effectiveness.

Three points must be quickly made. First: the figures were explicitly agreed on by both parties, MFA and NDI. Secondly in a clarification given to ILPI by email, NDI explained that it does not include this additional program support line-item, separate from overhead, in budgets proposed to the U.S. government. The latter budgets, however, are currently governed by a federally approved indirect cost rate of approximately 24%, which is equal to the sum of the overhead rate and the program support rate found in the MFA budget. In other words, the money retained by the head office of NDI from the MFA grant is the same amount that would have been retained had the grant been given

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<sup>5</sup> The judgment of “relabelled overhead” does not appear excessively harsh. NDI informed us that on U.S. federal grants this “Program Support” chunk of money is in fact merged with the overhead line item. In the Norwegian grant proposal 14.4% was removed from the overhead line and placed in a line item with a different, somewhat ambiguous label. The explanation of the nature of “Program Support” (additional money to be retained by HQ rather than sent to Haiti) was found at the bottom of page 13 in a 14 page memo that NDI appended to the proposed budget. It is explained as follows. “Program Support Costs allow NDI to strengthen the individual programs by providing the expertise of our executive officers—a small group of in-house experts on political party strengthening, governance, enhancing the political participation of women, election processes, legislative political and civic organization building, information technology, as well as specialists on program coordination, implementation and grant management, among others.” The specializations on the list are of marginal relevance to the civil society program in Haiti. The Haiti program could much more easily have dispensed with the long-distance expertise of Washington based expatriates than with the services of half of the Haitian field coordinators who had to be fired for budgetary reasons six months into the program.

by the U.S. government. Thirdly, even the 24% retained by headquarters is not unusual in the context of U.S. NGO's and U.S. federal contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements.

That having been said, although \$182,000 seems modest in the world of development programming, the allocation of the Program Support to Washington instead of to Haiti raises some difficult questions in relation to cost-effectiveness. It is perhaps useful for MFA to be aware that had a substantial chunk of the \$182,000 in "Program Support" gone to the Haiti office rather than the Washington office:

- There would have been salary money for all coordinators for 12 months. There would have been no need to fire half of them six months into the program.
- There would also have been money for Departmental Coordinators to have their own motorcycles, office space, and laptops.
- There would have been sufficient money for hosting large meetings, with no cancelling of meetings or reductions in the number of those invited.

It would seem difficult to argue that the program support provided by the home office, over and above the itemized costs charged by Washington based staff provides a comparable value.

If these budgetary arrangements continue to be acceptable to both parties, however, the major logical alternatives for any future program are either (1) to augment the amount of the Norwegian grant substantially to compensate for the money that Washington retains or (2) to drastically reduce the geographical scope of the operation in the future. The attempt at national coverage was instituted during the earlier phase of USAID support. It appears to have been simply continued under Norwegian support. The Norwegian grants each totaled about \$1.5 million dollars. No program can expect to cover all ten departments adequately on such a budget.

#### 4. MONITORING AND EVALUATION ISSUES

To our knowledge there has been only one statistically reliable evaluation done of a democracy-enhancement program in Haiti, a major USAID program that preceded NDI's current efforts: the Democracy Enhancement Program of the 1990's. The results of the DEP program were independently evaluated, using rigorous survey techniques and multiple regression analysis.<sup>6</sup> The major finding was discouraging: degree of exposure to the civil service program had no statistically measurable influence on the advocacy capacities of those groups that participated in the survey.

No such thorough evaluation has yet been done of the ICs founded by NDI. The proposal for the 2012 program (as was true of its 2010 predecessor) ended with a list of evaluation criteria including two major objectives, several "intermediate results" which would show that the objectives were being pursued, and under each result, several specific "indicators" for the results. The biweekly departmental field reports were to be the major source of data on most of these indicators.

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<sup>6</sup> Zeric Kay Smith, *"Fe Womble ou Fe Kombit?: Political Advocacy and CSOs in Haiti -- Baseline Data and Preliminary Progress."* Washington, D.C.: Management Systems International.

[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACH154.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACH154.pdf)

There are questions, however, to be raised with respect to the validity of the criteria selected. One question has to do with the definition of “results”. In the document *Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation*, it is stated

It is generally accepted that outcomes represent the most important result-level in results management. Outcomes are the intended, intermediate effects on the target groups, such as a lower incidence of malaria in a given geographical area.

The “results” that NDI proposed as evaluation criteria, however, were items such as:

The IC network is enlarged  
Civic advocacy coalitions are established  
Coalition members implement visible advocacy campaigns

It appears that activities are being conflated or confused with results. Haitians engage in the *activities* of ICs and coalitions and advocacy in hopes of achieving pragmatic *results* – an improved feeder road, a water system, a hospital, an airport, a borderland marketplace. But here the program *activities* are being defined as the program results. This leaves unaddressed the outcome and impact levels of the result chain. Using the above cited Norwegian document’s health example, NDI’s use of the term would define the “results” of a vaccination campaign in terms of the quantity of vaccine distributed, rather than its impact on health outcomes. This terminological maneuver in effect frees program managers from the task of proving any impact of the delivered activities.<sup>7</sup>

There is nothing in the evaluation plan that alludes to anything that ordinary Haitians would consider results. We heard repeatedly during interviews: We have formed committees and spoke with a deputy, *men nou poko jwenn rezilta*. But we still have not had any results. The concept of results in the NDI proposal is at odds with the common sense definition that ordinary Haitians (and probably most humans) have.

We did receive a document summarizing the number of committees and coalitions that had been formed. Two sheets with statistical data were presented to the review team: a breakdown of ICs by gender composition and a sheet showing the number of meetings. The documents do indicate that NDI has carried out the activities that it promised in terms of committee formation and meetings. That is not, however, a measure of bona-fide results.

There is a quick reference, in a single sentence, in the final report turned into MFA after the 2010 program to village level activities concerning health, infrastructure, and other activities. But (a) these are mentioned and dismissed in one sentence as though of secondary importance to the committees and meetings, (b) they are not documented, and (c) they do not address whether these activities were financed through government disbursements produced by IC advocacy. This is the core purpose of the program.

During the field visits we heard anecdotal comments on bona-fide results – a road that had been repaired, electric poles installed. But in the views of most Haitians interviewed (excluding project staff), the results have been meager. One example: it was proudly stated that some police in the south had approached the communal coordinating committee to advocate with their police superiors in Port-au-Prince for a vehicle for the local police. No mention was made of whether the vehicle was ever sent. The fact that

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<sup>7</sup> Such analysis is similar to that of the “logframe” approach, with goals, purpose, outputs and activities, used worldwide in USAID programs. Designed to bring scientific logic to management activities, it can easily substitute abstract labels for commonsense understandings of true results.

the police approached NDI was viewed as proof of project results - whether or not the police car ever arrived (we suspect that it did not).

Stated differently, NDI's system of monitoring and reporting is built around output indicators. This is not uncommon in the world of international development, where there is often very strong pressure to "demonstrate results" over a short time frame under what are often very difficult circumstances. The danger of this is the adoption of an output orientation where activities are counted as results. This also incentivizes working to achieve a higher number of, say, committees formed and meetings held, over considering what type of processes are more likely to produce sustainable outcomes in terms of citizens' political influence over the longer term.

In addition to weak definition of results, NDI has not yet directed to Haiti the high powered comparative analytic expertise that, in its justification for \$182,000 in Program Support for headquarters, it claims to have, and very well may have, among its executive staff in Washington. There is no document to our knowledge analytically comparing the challenges of Haiti to the challenges of other countries in which NDI works. Even within Haiti, the team found no evidence of any analysis being carried out, for example, of the evolution of ICs over time, and of the conditions that make some ICs succeed and others fail.

Two visits were made during the year by a Washington specialist in organizational matters. They were spoken of highly by NDI Haitian staff. But these are not monitoring and evaluation visits.<sup>8</sup>

Most of the mid-course corrections that have been made – the reduction of the IC from 15 to 11, the jettisoning of unrealistic hopes of forming one national level IC from a selection of departmental IC representatives – have been made as a result of common sense empirical discoveries by Haitian staff. The superbly articulate prose emanating from HQ was directed to the composition of the grant proposals, which understandably speak glowingly of the achievements of NDI. We saw no empirical, rigorous documentation or analysis of successes and failures in program activities.

## 5. THE ISSUE OF GENDER

Norway imposes a strong condition of attention to gender issues in the allocation of development funding. NDI's follow-on proposal for the 2012 program was returned because of that issue. The final proposal, returned within four days, had a strengthened gender component.

It is the conclusion of the review team, however, that the gender component of the current program did not meet its goals. At the suggestion of MFA the following lengthy discussion of gender issues, originally consigned to an annex, has been placed here in the body of the report.

### **Background: Norwegian emphasis on gender equality.**

The proposal for the currently ongoing activities was submitted by NDI to MFA on Nov. 21, 2011. MFA responded on Nov. 28, expressing disappointment at the absence of a

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<sup>8</sup> We were informed that the transportation and lodging costs incurred in such visits from Washington were not charged to "Program Support" but were taken directly from the budget of the Haiti field office.

convincing gender perspective in the proposal submitted. Among other things, MFA's response to NDI pointed out that

- Norway is interested in promoting equal representation of men and women in politics and society.
- Haiti had recently passed a constitutional amendment for achieving a 30% quota of women in national life.
- Norway would hope that its partner NDI would give explicit attention to promoting gender equality.

### NDI's programmatic response

Within four days (on Dec. 1, 2011) NDI returned the revised proposal. The gender-related text, at least in the version of the proposal to which the review team had access, was in the eyes of the review team problematically generic in nature. An example is the following paragraph from pages 4 and 5 of the proposal. The reader can substitute Zimbabwe or Mexico for Haiti, "community groups" for IC, and "provincial" for "departmental" in the following paragraph and the text would be equally applicable around much of the world.

NDI also recognizes that men and women citizens face different challenges to participation and bring different perspectives to bear, based on entrenched gender norms in Haiti. In the Institute's approach to engaging citizens, special attention would be paid to ensuring outreach to and participation of women, striving for equal participation. Arrangements would be made to conduct outreach in areas that women frequent, such as public markets, and to hold program activities at times and locations where women would feel safe to attend. The Institute's gender approach also takes into consideration issues of importance to women and how government policies regarding the reconstruction and development process can affect men and women differently.

Most of the preceding is generic boiler-plate text which, *mutatis mutandis*, could easily be copied and pasted to gender-related proposals in developing countries around much of the world. Nothing which it says is incorrect. But it hardly reflects decades of experience with Haitian women since NDI's arrival in Haiti 26 years ago, in 1986, as election monitors and its subsequent decades of involvement in civil society programs.

We can turn to the specific gender-related activities to which the proposal committed NDI. Among them are the following.

- **The program will conduct special outreach to women in public markets.** No such special market-place "outreach visits" were reported, nor would they have made any sense. Haitian women in the market are busily buying, selling, haggling, and transporting. It is hardly the place to lecture them, or even engage them in conversation, about democracy and gender equality.
- **The program will hold activities at times and locations where women would feel safe to attend.** No special adjustments in meeting times were reported for female safety concerns. Nor are any required in the areas where NDI is operating, none of which are in the Port-au-Prince refugee camps where female safety is indeed an issue. Certainly nobody can quibble with the goal of making women "feel safe". It is not clear, however, to what safety issues in Haiti the drafters of the proposal text

were referring. It reads more like generic boiler-plate text that could be safely copied and pasted into proposals around the world.

- **The program will work with the ICs to facilitate the participation of women in program activities.** The major IC program activities have up till now been training sessions, meetings, forums, and other dialogue venues. Women are in a small minority at these sessions, and even those present rarely talk. It must be stated, however, (1) that these are cultural patterns over which NDI staff have little control, and (2) NDI staff are aware of the dilemma and have tried to take mitigating measures.
- **The program will disaggregate participant data by gender.** In this program there are three separate variables on which data can be disaggregated by gender.
  - NDI staff. The current director and financial manager of the Haiti office are both female. At least two of the seven currently active regional coordinators are female. (Both were interviewed.)
  - Membership on IC committees. Data have been tabulated by NDI staff on the gender ratio prevailing in the ICs. Of the existing IC, all told about a third of IC members are women.
  - Participation in larger forums, assemblies, platforms, advocacy coalitions, etc. Several larger groups, including communal and departmental committees, were interviewed in the course of the review. In all of these females constituted a small minority of those present. Attendance sheets are signed at every meeting, but no tabulations are routinely done. The statistically marginal position of women, however, is clearly visible and indisputable.
- **The program will collect specific feedback from women regarding each activity they attended.** The review team found no evidence of any programmatic procedure for systematic interviewing of women to elicit feedback after each program activity. Nor does any program documentation (except the grant proposal itself) allude to such systematic female feedback collection.
- **The program will design a gender assessment questionnaire to be conducted three times during the program: the first one at the beginning, the second one after six months, and the last one at the end of the program.** No such gender assessment questionnaire was ever processed, administered, or even designed. The inclusion of a “gender assessment questionnaire” in the proposal was apparently provoked by MFA’s concern at the absence of gender programming in the first draft of the proposal. But once the grant was approved, the promised questionnaire appears to have disappeared from the program’s radar screen.

The review team must conclude that the gender component of the NDI program under review did not comply with the gender components of the proposal. The NDI field staff have been making efforts in the area of gender. And an important option has recently opened for assisting market women in the border area. But the monitoring and evaluation measures mentioned were on the whole not carried out.

### **Cultural Background to the program gender imbalance**

In defense of NDI, it must be pointed out that the egalitarian gender norms prevailing in Europe and the U.S. are simply not present in Haiti. Haitian market women play prominent – and even dominant – roles in the rural economy. They are not submissive as in certain other parts of the world. But there are strong gender norms in terms of public behavior.

A meeting, which we attended in the southern town of Cayes, is illustrative of gender dynamics in the program. Several well dressed members of the NDI-supported departmental advocacy platform sat up front at a table to meet with a representative of the Ministry of Tourism, in the presence of an audience of several dozen people. On the one hand, the meeting was a good example of interaction of civil society with a high level minister of the national government. The tourism representative did not even go through the motions of taking notes on what was being told to him by representatives of different municipalities. It was an empty ritual of “citizens dialoguing with authorities” from which no results will be forthcoming (unless one accepts NDI labeling of the meeting itself as a “result”).

On the other hand, in terms of gender dynamics, only one of the platform members was a woman; and she remained totally silent during the proceedings. In a subsequent interview with a subset of four members of that group, including the coordinator of the group and the one woman present, the interview was totally dominated by the male coordinator. Only at the end, when I explicitly questioned the woman (and implicitly asked the eloquent coordinator to please be quiet) did she finally open up and make several eloquent and impassioned points, including a plea for inclusion of domestic violence against women in the NDI agenda, which she described as a major problem in her part of the country.

The male dominated character of this meeting (and of a similar meeting observed at the opposite corner of the country in northeastern Ouanaminthe) derives from deeply rooted cultural patterns over which NDI staff simply have no control. There are two separate questions: (1) Why do so few women become members of Initiative Committees? (2) Why are women so silent at mixed-gender meetings?

As for the first, girls (particularly in rural areas) are still explicitly taught that “politics is not for women.” This should not be dismissed by outsiders as simply “false consciousness.” In terms of Haitian history, this cultural rule is less an issue of ideology than an issue of physical safety. Political meetings in Haiti have historically been associated either with dangerous anti-government movements in the dictatorial past, or with the eruption of lethal partisan violence in the post-Duvalier politics of the present. There is still nervousness even among men about attending anything that smacks of partisan politics. It has taken years for the population to realize that the NDI supported ICs are truly non-partisan. The initial and continuing reluctance of women is in no way surprising.

Furthermore one woman interviewed reminded us, quite correctly, that women in rural Haiti are deeply involved, not only in domestic chores and childcare, but also in itinerant market activities. Given this “double shift” that is imposed on women – domestic chores and economic pursuits – they objectively have much less time than men to attend distant meetings.

### **The silence of women in meetings.**

The second question posed above concerns the chronic silence of many articulate Haitian women in mixed-gender meetings. We had the experience of interviewing two women, one of whom was articulately speaking about program matters. A third person, a male, entered late and was courteously silent. For a few minutes. But eventually he ended up dominating the conversation and the women lapsed into silence.

Haitian women are articulate and eloquent when they are in all female groups. Most Haitian villages have several organizations – a male farmer’s group, a woman’s group, and a youth group. These village based groups were originally an artificial response to the arrival, half a century ago, of externally financed development projects, which demanded local organizations as a pre-condition of resource disbursal. But they are now a part of the Haitian social landscape.

Haitian women function freely, autonomously, and energetically in all-female groups. In mixed gender groups the prevailing social strategy of many females (not all) is silence. This silence is in no way an indicator of female submissiveness. The market oriented Haitian female is not submissive to males. Female silence in mixed groups is best seen as culturally strategic silence.

### **Bypassing of women’s groups, merging of women into mixed-gender groups.**

NDI staff are fully aware of the marginal position of women in their field operations and seemed, on different occasions, apologetic to the review team about that disparity. Their dilemma stems in part from the failure of the program to capitalize on the potential organizational energy of all-female groups. Had there been from the outset a formal recognition of the cultural legitimacy of all-female groups, and a formal incorporation of these women’s groups into program activities, the gender dimension of NDI’s Haiti’s activities would be quite different.

However, the core organizational strategy adopted by the program is the IC. Women’s groups are simply one out of many groups invited to propose a member to be elected to the IC. This IC, which is in theory gender egalitarian, in practice, in Haitian cultural context, ends up being dominated by males. *Dynamic, autonomous women’s groups are lost to the MFA / NDI program as it is currently structured, with its core dependence on the gender-integrated but male-dominated IC.*

One symptom of this loss was the inability of the in-country team to comply with an explicit request for the review team to be given interviews with women’s groups. The staff did arrange for some interviews with individual women. But the program focuses on the ICs at section, commune, and department level, and on platforms, advocacy coalitions, and other male-dominated forums. The impression emerged that the program is not in dynamic programmatic touch, or at most in weak and occasional programmatic touch, with women’s groups as such.

### **Current program measures to deal with the gender disparity**

The program continues in its herculean efforts to make the IC more gender egalitarian. At the final debriefing meeting, it was pointed out to us that in the currently funded year long program, some 50 new Initiative Committees were formed. In these new committees a rule was instituted by NDI that at least 5 of the 11 members of these groups had to be women.



That program measure, however, continues to bypass women's groups as legitimate partners in their own right. It also violates standard democratic procedures. The 5-to-7 gender rule for new ICs most certainly did not arise from the spontaneous electoral habits of the Haitian population, which has only one female senator out of 30, and 2 female deputies out of 99. It had to have been programmatically imposed or strongly "suggested" by NDI staff. The intent is positive: representation of women in program activities.

The programmatic imposition of a gender quota on electoral outcomes, however, is puzzlingly incompatible with standard democratic electoral procedures. As stated elsewhere, gender quotas in Europe and the U.S. are used for hiring or discretionary appointments. They are not used as criteria for the validity of elections.

The 30% female quota that was recently written into an amendment to the Haitian Constitution cannot be invoked here. It refers to the desired gender balance of governmental appointments or other discretionary positions. It does not refer to some new requirement regarding the number of senators and deputies, who are elected by popular vote, and who are almost all male.

At any rate the imposition of IC gender quotas is an anemic window-dressing gesture that skirts the real-life issues that are confronting Haitian women.

### **The issue of domestic violence.**

One such real-life issue raised was the phenomenon of domestic violence against women. Post-earthquake media accounts emphasize rape in the refugee camps. But it was pointed out in Cayes that domestic violence against women is very common. Victims of such violence rarely report it to the authorities, almost all male, expecting little support. The police force in Haiti is recently formed, small in number, and busy with other issues. Women who are victims of domestic violence currently have nowhere to turn. It was suggested that NDI could promote workshops specifically geared to this problem.

At first glance this matter appears to be more geared to the issue of relations between husbands and wives, or between males and females, than to links between civil society and authorities. In actuality, however, the major goal would be to give abused women information on their civil and legal rights in this matter and to give them a voice with local authorities. In this sense the program would link an abused subsector of civil society to public authorities.

The NDI supported section or neighborhood ICs are ideally suited to play a role in this as intermediaries between the victim and the local elected kasek. One of the most positive functions of the section level ICs has been their role as ombudsman in dispute mediation. Individuals with complaints can find redress more easily by bringing their complaints first to the IC. A delegation from the local IC leadership is in a better position than a lone individual to get a serious hearing from a kasek.

The defense of battered women has not, to our knowledge, yet been a common function of the ICs. It could easily become that in the next phase of any IC program.

### **Abuse of market women in the borderland markets.**

A second major pressing gender issue concerns the treatment of Haitian women in the border area. The most important economic activity which takes place in most of the

border communes is the twice-weekly “binational markets” during which Haitians are permitted to cross over into the neighboring towns of the Dominican Republic. The major Haitian actors in this event are market women, who are simultaneously the major beneficiaries of these markets, as well as its major victims.

The victimization takes the form principally of abusive and arbitrary economic and social practices on the part of Dominican authorities, both civilian and military. Women are not only subjected to arbitrary taxes both when they enter and exit the border. Though they used to be permitted to bring over Haitian produce, such as rice, vegetables, fruit, coffee or Haitian rum, to sell in the Dominican Republic, that is now forbidden to them. They can go in only as buyers of Dominican produce. They are also subjected to humiliating verbal and behavioral treatment of many types.

Two major market buildings (one in the north, one in the south) were built with European funding on Dominican soil under the mistaken premise that the markets would be genuine binational markets, with equal treatment being accorded to citizens of both countries. They have evolved instead into Dominican markets where Dominican authorities set the rules and arbitrarily change them, and Dominican soldiers abuse the Haitian market women economically, verbally, and often physically.

The victims are not simply a small number of market women in the border towns. There are also thousands of women who travel long distance on trucks from other parts of Haiti to participate in the market. It is a major source of personal concern to much of the female population in those regions that feed the markets. They are much more deeply concerned with these inequities than, for example, with their underrepresentation on Communal Initiative Committees.

It is hoped that the new NDI-supported borderland advocacy coalition will be able to intervene in these matters. It would appear at first blush that no Haitian coalition will be able to deal with abusive behavior by Dominican authorities on their own territory. But defeat should not be conceded too easily. A major problem is the absence (or low number) of uniformed and armed Haitian authorities in the border towns, which provides a humiliating contrast with the well organized and well armed Dominican authorities. Another problem is the inactivity of Haitian elected authorities in defending Haitian women.

We will propose specific actions in this regard in the recommendation section.

## 6. RELEVANCE OF THE PROGRAM TO MFA ADVOCACY GOALS

### **The NDI program in the context of other programs in Haiti.**

In one sense NDI’s civil society program is filling a logical niche in the area of democracy promotion. Unlike standard NGO programs, it does not bypass governmental actors. But unlike standard governance programs, it does not allocate funds for “institution building” of government ministries, an activity that has squandered millions of dollars since it began in Haiti in the 1950’s. The NDI program focuses on organizing the citizenry for advocacy purposes rather than directly trying to improve government performance.

Though there are thousands of NGOs in Haiti, there are few that pursue this logically important route. This comes out clearly in an online *Directory of Civil Service*

*Organizations*, a database, prepared by the U.N., of over 1,000 NGOs operating in Haiti.<sup>9</sup> A perusal of these CSOs shows very few that are involved in governance, electoral issues, or civil society programs. The list of activities are: Advocacy and Policy, Agriculture, Arts & Culture, Children & Youth, Disaster Risk Preparedness, Economic Development, Education, Environment, Food Security, Health, HIV / AIDS, Housing, Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance, Media, Microfinance, Water and Sanitation, Women's Programs, Other. Most CSOs engage in more than one of the activities. Each organization listed its own specializations.

In terms of activities germane to the interests of Norway, the (approximate) number of CSOs involved in each activity in Haiti is as follows:

Advocacy and Policy:	40
Children and Youth:	90
Human Rights:	175

NDI is on the list but it classified its sole activity as "Other". (Other organizations such as Oxfam / Canada, PAHO, and IICA of the OAS also listed their sole activity as "other".) More than half of the organizations on the data base appear to be Haitian, some of them even with Creole names. The database not only gives a map of the development scene in Haiti. It also provides donors with a broad menu of potential collaborators currently working in Haiti who could be invited to bid on a competitive basis for grants targeting specific activities.

The most thorough analysis of democracy building efforts in Haiti, anterior to, or parallel to, those funded by MFA, is an evaluation of a large USAID programs, which funded several sub-programs around the country. The program was called DEP – Democracy Enhancement Program. It was authorized in 1991 with the accession of Aristide, suspended after his removal, and reinstated after his return in 1995. In the words of the lengthy and informative evaluation document<sup>10</sup>

"Its goal was to assist the Haitian people build a participatory, accountable, responsive democracy and to establish the basic conditions for sustainable and equitable growth. Its purpose was to increase the capacity of public and private institutions and individuals to facilitate broad-based participation in democratic decision-making and respect for the constitution."

The goal and purpose (two distinct entities in the log-frame language of USAID) were not unlike those formulated later in the NDI proposals. There were several components: local governance, civil society, and civic education. These USAID funded activities preceded the Norwegian-funded activities of NDI.

In short the NDI program is not unique in its focus. But it does belong to a very small subset of programs that deal with electoral and civil society issues. It is filling an otherwise poorly covered developmental niche.

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<sup>9</sup> The link is <http://csohaiti.org/>. The database is called Haiti Civil Society Organizatons (CSO) and is published by the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti/ Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.

<sup>10</sup> "Local government and civil society in Haiti: An assessment of two components of USAID / Haiti's Democracy Enhancement Project. (Authors: Craig Olson, Sara Guthrie, Marc-Antoine Noel, Phares Pierre, Glenn Smucker). Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI)

### **Examining theoretical assumptions.**

A question posed by Norad, however, is whether, in retrospect, the activities proposed, funded, and undertaken make sense in terms of democracy-building goals. To reformulate the issue as a question: Can MFA feel reasonably assured that the financing of pressure groups and advocacy coalitions within civil society will lead to positive, change, to enhanced responsiveness, on the part of the Haitian government?

In examining both sides of the coin – citizen advocacy and government response – we can say from our brief field visits that the IC program has contributed to the former. But it must be said with equal or stronger certitude that the program has proved unable to bring about the latter. The dilemma is partially created by the unstated assumption that the Haitian government functions in a manner analogous to that of European or North American regimes, where citizen advocacy does trigger off government response. To understand how and why the Haitian state differs, a brief examination of its origins and evolution are in order.

### **Origin and evolution of the Haitian State**

International discourse about the Haitian government tends to refer in a highly critical way to its negative dysfunctional characteristics. For program purposes, however, it is better to view it as a system whose organization and behavior flow logically and consistently from its historical origins and its subsequent evolution.

To state matters succinctly: whereas the structure of the GOH conforms to that of many Western democracies (an executive branch headed by a President, a bicameral legislative Parliament, sector specific ministries such as health, education, agriculture, etc.) its functions and behavior have from the outset (1804) lacked the service component that most Westerners assume to be one of the essential features of a modern government. The following points can be highlighted.

- **Absence of democratic precedents and models.** Haiti was historically unique in that the slaves were not emancipated by the abolition movements that in other island colonies emerged from Europe. Haitians emancipated themselves and set up a nation-state run by former slaves. Earliest Haitian military leaders were, however, slaves born in the colony. They had no exposure to African traditions of governance, nor to the emergent democratic models appearing in Europe. They did observe and imitate the surface structures of European governance. (One ruler had himself crowned Emperor, in imitation of Napoleon. Another, with more modest regal rather than imperial aspirations, had himself crowned King and established a nobility with dukes, barons, and the like.) But in terms of governance, the only local model was the harsh control system imposed by France in its slave colonies. The function of colonial government was extraction and control, not the provision of services. This was the political context that, quite logically and predictably, shaped the governance traditions that were to emerge in Haiti.
- **Historical antagonism between rulers and ruled.** While faithful to the elimination of slavery, early rulers attempted to impose a societal vision and an economic model by which the liberated slaves would return to the status of laborers on plantations managed by the Haitian army or by managers assigned by the Haitian government. The whip wielded by the white was to be replaced by the bayonet of the Haitian soldier. The population passively resisted and remained as smallholding peasants on their own privately controlled plots. The two rulers most closely

associated with efforts for State control – Dessalines and Henri Christophe – were both killed. That is, despite a universally shared abhorrence of the institution of slavery, there was an antagonism from the outset between rulers and ruled. When one 19<sup>th</sup> century president finally began distributing land, he was looking for a way to pay his army in the absence of money. Private citizens had to buy land. The emergence of the energetic and bustling Haitian freeholder market economy occurred in spite of, not because of, the policies of earliest Haitian rulers.

- **Political violence and electoral procedures.** The first century of Haiti's existence was spent under violently shifting military rule. Many rulers left office in coffins, not in horse and carriage. However just as the Haitian State had adapted to 16th and 17th century European norms of governance by titled nobility, there was in the 20th century an eventual capitulation to the surface features of democratic, republican modes of governance, based on electoral procedures, bicameral legislatures and the like. But capitulation to the norm of electoral procedures cannot be interpreted as a turn to underlying democratic values.

Underlying assumptions concerning the “normality” of violence survive. Duvalier (who came to power through electoral procedures) feared the army and created his own civilian militia, the Tonton Macoute. The followers of popularly elected Aristide (who has the unusual distinction of having been thrown out of office twice) also formed their own paramilitary groups. Aristide himself made public speeches that in effect encouraged mob action against political enemies. Electoral procedures in Haiti are a thin frosting on a cake whose ingredients derive more from assumptions of violence than from respect for democratic principles. The peaceful transition in 2012 from President Preval to the new President Martelly was done under the shelter of a foreign military occupation. It is best interpreted, not as a turn to deep societal respect for democracy, but as a temporary political truce imposed by foreign arms.

- **The dependent State.** GOH dependence on a foreign military presence for its stability is simply one side of a dependency coin that has existed for decades in the economic realm. Whereas most governments depend on taxes for the bulk of their revenues, the GOH has for decades depended most heavily on foreign aid.

This emphatically does not mean – as is often incorrectly stated – that “Haitians are now dependent on the outside world.” Haitians are among the most energetic, self-sufficient people the team leader has ever seen. They receive nothing from their government. And the “foreign aid” that has flooded the country hardly ever reaches them, much of it being siphoned off either by Haitian elites or (at present) by the overseas headquarters and/or local branch offices of foreign NGOs. What is left over is often shunted off into outsider-designed projects with no material benefits to locals. Ordinary Haitians have survived and continue to survive on their own. Parasitical dependency on handouts (including donor grants) is a feature of the Haitian State and some flourishing NGOs, emphatically not of the Haitian population.

### **Systemic formulation**

A frequently invoked explanation for GOH malfunction is “corruption.” This in effect diverts analysis into issues of personal morality. A much more powerful conceptualization would construe the Haitian State in terms of the behavior of systems rather than the morality of individuals.

At the risk of oversimplification, one can summarize the matter abstractly in terms of systemic mechanisms. Whereas all states have mechanisms of coercion and extraction (police, military, and tax collectors) modern states also have mechanisms of service delivery as well. The Haitian State throughout most of its history has had mechanisms of coercion and extraction. But it has never developed service delivery mechanisms.

With the dissolution of the Haitian army under Aristide and the ongoing military occupation, the coercive power of the Haitian State is close to zero. It can no longer be called an “oppressive regime”. But its extractive mechanisms continue to be in full play. A major source of extraction was at one time foreign aid. In response to that, beginning in the 1980’s, donors started channeling aid through NGOs. The extractive mechanisms of the NGO’S – the profiteering non-profit – are well known and a matter of angry comment in Haiti. Nonetheless they do deliver services, though usually at a great cost.

There are cries in some quarters that the relief funds earmarked for Haiti should be channeled through the hands of the Haitian government. Most Haitians interviewed on the matter emphatically disagree. They do not, of course, discuss the matter in abstract systemic terms. But the systemic reality is that

1. the Haitian State no longer has strong coercive mechanisms and with the UN occupation has little legitimacy in the eyes of the population. I.e. in addition to the chronic mistrust of its economic behavior, there is now scorn at its status as a State financed and run by foreigners.
2. It still lacks the service delivery mechanisms that it never developed. It has all the proper ministries in place, but they are like Hollywood sets in term of what goes on inside them; but
3. Traditions of extraction are still strong. That is an abstract way of saying that an unspecified percentage of donor money would disappear. And though the idealistic, sovereignty-respecting foreigner may not know it, Haitians most certainly do.

### **Comparing the Haitian government to other Caribbean governments.**

What about other former Caribbean slave colonies? The difference with Haiti is that they have inherited modern political systems. Martinique and Guadeloupe are part of France. Barbados is independent but inherited strong governance traditions from Britain. The leaders of the Haitian slave revolt, in contrast, having been born in the colony, had access to neither African nor European traditions of governance, but only the vicious model of a slave society, founded on coercion and extraction. They applied this model when they began ruling their own people.

Governance traditions are part of culture, not genetically inherited. Societies can and do evolve. A contrast with Haiti’s closest neighbor is instructive. When the team leader, who had done research in the Dominican Republic, began research in Haiti under Jean Claude Duvalier’s regime in the early 1970’s, he found a surprising contrast between Dominican and Haitian popular views of governments. Dominicans expected their government to provide roads, water systems, and electricity. Trujillo had provided these. There was anger if the government broke its promises. The Haitians in contrast *expected nothing of their government*. There were no services, no expectations, no promises – and therefore no broken promises. There was nothing in Haitian history that would have created expectations of State service. Villagers’ major hope was to be left alone.

The few services provided have been provided through foreign aid, usually administered through foreign NGOs. In the chaotic hours following the earthquake, the question people cried out in the rubble filled streets was not: *Kote leta?* (Where is our government?) But rather: When will we get help from the outside world? This is not shameful lack of patriotism. It is an objective response to the realities of Haitian political and economic history.

We must therefore urge MFA and NDI to critically challenge unstated program assumptions that if Haitian civil society behaves in an organized manner, the Haitian State will begin behaving like the governments in Oslo and Washington. Thanks to the program being reviewed here and to other similar advocacy programs that have been tried, Haitian civil society has begun to have expectations of their rulers.

But at the very same time even active IC members laughed at the notion that if a program perhaps made “matching grants” for water systems or roads repair, the Haitian government would contribute the other 50%. The people have organized; they know what services the government should provide. But the team found no evidence in this field review that the people really expect the government to come through.

And given the chronic, continuing chaotic state of the government, they are right.

- Delays in parliamentary approval of appointments such as the prime minister paralyze the government for months.
- Constant frivolous replacements of ministers and delegates by the President create paralysis and a nullification of earlier plans. These occurred right in the middle of our field visit and threw the Cayes platform into chaos.
- With delayed elections, current mayors are appointed, not elected, and have low legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
- There were street manifestations and road blockades during the review.

The government of Haiti, to put it mildly, continues to be radically dysfunctional and there is nothing that NDI or MFA can do to change that. These observations have theoretical implications that force critical examination and refinement of the theories of change on which a democracy-enhancing program is implicitly based.

### **Adapting political advocacy strategies to the Haitian context.**

To bring abstract theoretical discussions to the ground, we can examine quite specifically how advocacy procedures in Haiti must differ from those in mature stable democracies.

**General statement about political advocacy.** Civil society advocacy strategies have some elements that are universal to all democracies but other elements that must be tailored to the political and social realities of a specific society (in this case, Haiti). A universal feature of political advocacy at its most general level is the voluntary joining of citizens into groups that will dialog with, negotiate with, and/or pressure local and national governments to implement certain policies and programs. There are two analytically critical universal elements: (1) mechanisms of citizen pressure and (2) patterns of governmental response. The specific citizen pressure mechanisms, however, must mesh first with the pre-existing social organization found in the local society and, secondly, with the structure and behavior of the governmental system in which the

advocacy system is lodged. Specific procedures cannot necessarily be effectively transplanted into different political systems whose structure and behavior are quite different.

**Advocacy in mature stable democracies.** Norad has familiarized us with the model of the “advocacy pluralist system” that is an analytically useful framework for the conceptualization of advocacy in mature, stable democracies. In such political systems both policy-making authority and financial resources are decentralized and diffused among different governmental agencies. In terms of mechanisms of citizen pressure, special self-selected interest groups approach such agencies through hearings, lobbies, and / or informal one on one contacts. In terms of governmental response, decades or centuries of service-delivery traditions, of respect for citizens’ rights, and of attentiveness to citizen voices, permit the expectation of the other side of the coin: governmental response.

**Haitian governance traditions.** Our preceding analysis of the evolution of the Haitian political system makes it clear that the Haitian system lacks all three of the above features. However an optical illusion, to which outsiders can easily succumb, is created by the superficial presence of all the formal structures required in a modern democracy: elected president, appointed prime minister, elected parliament, service ministries (health, education, etc). In the first place they have no stable source of internally generated resources, but are dependent of foreign aid. Secondly there are chronic, historically deep mechanisms of extraction (rather than service delivery), which will divert a hefty percentage of the resources; and thirdly, there are absolutely no traditions of attentiveness to or even interest in citizen demands.

**Pseudo results.** For these reasons one must be skeptical about the mechanical importation of exogenous advocacy procedures into the Haitian context. As could have been predicted from the above considerations, after more than 12 years of nationwide IC efforts, NDI can show virtually no successful mobilization of GOH funds. The institutional response on the grantee’s part appears to have been that of redefining “success” and “results” in terms of the advocacy activities themselves. The rare presence of a deputy or senator at a town forum is misconstrued as a sign of program success, especially if he waves and makes favorable comments about the local *Cahier de Charge*. Is this not a sign that the program is working?

No it is not. If a lobbying group in Tampa, Florida or in Bergen in western Norway had failed to elicit a dollar or a kroner from the local government during 12 years of efforts, the undertaking would be declared a failure. Why should it be considered a success in Haiti?

**Required adaptations in promoting democracy in Haiti.** The response to the objective characteristics of the Haitian State should not be to abandon democracy building efforts but to redesign them, to engage intellectually with the origins, evolution, and current behavior of the Haitian state, and to adapt democracy promoting strategies militantly and creatively to this current reality. It is our contention that the reality of Haiti – both in its institutional and socioeconomic dimensions – calls for a strategy of “grounded democracy”. This is democracy that is pursued at grassroots level in the context of ongoing material activities that involve both the population and its local leaders, the *kazek* and the *majistra*.

There are at least two additional features of the current Haitian landscape that render questionable the further implementation of organizational activities divorced from material projects.



**The extreme poverty of Haiti.** The economic well-being of citizen groups in Tampa or Bergen permit the pursuit of advocacy activities without the need for rapid material outputs. The desperate poverty that affects most Haitians, in contrast, calls for programs that deal with political issues in a manner that simultaneously address economic, educational, health, infrastructural or other material problems. The current “pie in the sky” approach – “let’s spend development money on more dialog, someday the GOH may respond” – is problematic and unjustified in the context of a country such as Haiti.

**Current Haitian anger at the post-earthquake behavior of foreign NGOs.** Allusion has already been made to collective anger in post-earthquake Haiti at rumors about the “profiteering non-profit.” This is now an objective element in the Haitian landscape that must be taken into account in program conceptualization. The predatory behavior of NGO’s is a major point of contention, particularly (but not exclusively) among educated sectors of Haitians. At village level, the team leader has heard all over Haiti complaints about organizations that spend all the money on the salaries of itinerant organizers or workshop-presenters without providing funds to do anything afterwards with the training. Much more so than in most countries, Haiti is flooded with NGOs carrying out various activities. The most valued NGOs are those who help in the solution of some material problem. The most despised are those whose sole beneficiaries appear to be the salaried program employees. NDI is not (yet) the target of such scorn. But when the funding ceases, and NDI departs, and GOH response continues to be close to zero, the ICs may well disappear and the program will be remembered as one of those that did nothing concrete.

MFA and NDI have democracy building objectives, not road construction or water systems. But democracy building, the forging of functional, harmonious links between citizens and their elected leaders, can be done in a grounded fashion, linked to ongoing material activities. In post-earthquake Haiti this dual mode of “grounded advocacy” should be seen as a requirement. Specific recommendations will be made in that regard.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The final section presents the conclusions and recommendations of the review. First, the conclusions of the review’s findings are presented, giving a summary of the review’s analysis. This is followed by a set of recommendations for the donor and the implementer. The recommendations aim as far as possible to be realistic, concrete and implementable, with a view to further improve the effectiveness of the program and aid its chances of contributing to a sustainable strengthening of democratic processes in Haiti.

### CONCLUSIONS

The concluding observations are captured below, loosely organized according the issues they relate to.

#### **Performance of NDI**

- The review team considers that NDI has satisfactorily carried out IC-related activities that were promised in the proposal. The absence of bona-fide results has

more to do with the intractable nature of the Haitian State. NDI has achieved the creation of a network of hierarchically nested and democratically constituted organizations that reach all the way from village level to departmental level. The network of IC committees has been supported, communal and departmental platforms have been supported, and four advocacy coalitions have been organized, the most promising of which is the recently launched borderland coalition. The terms of the agreement have been met.

- There have been shortcomings in other program domains. Several promised gender-related activities were not carried out. The report also discussed managerial shortcomings with respect to the support of the key field staff, the departmental coordinators.
- These operational shortcomings were shown to be an inevitable result of budget-allocation decisions made from the outset. The review team analyzed the figures and documented programmatic consequences. It is up to MFA and NDI to mutually work out the implications, if any, of this analysis.

#### **The issue of civil society advocacy strategy.**

- MFA / NDI strategy neither bypasses the government as do most NGO programs, nor channels resources directly to the government. It attempts instead to influence the government by organizing and supporting civil society advocacy. The program has thus filled an important but largely vacant niche in Haitian development activities.
- The logic of the basic IC advocacy strategy must, however, be critically examined. In Europe and North America successful advocacy is done by self-selected groups who form lobbies and special-interest coalitions (in the U.S., Chamber of Commerce, League of Women Voters, Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, etc.). The IC in contrast invokes territorial contiguity, rather than specific issues, as the principal grouping principal – an IC is supposed to represent “all the citizens” in a particular village, town, or even department who will presumably put aside special interests for the common good. This has never worked in Haiti, nor is it the common advocacy approach in most mature democracies, which utilize special interest groups. It is not clear why the IC model was chosen for Haiti or, particularly, why it was imposed nationwide without any indication that it would work.
- The principal victims of a universalist approach to advocacy have been women, whose voice is largely silenced, and whose interests are rarely addressed, in IC meetings at any territorial level. The IC is in theory “gender egalitarian” but, for reasons discussed in the body of the report, in practice remains male dominated. If women’s needs are to be addressed, the basic IC advocacy model must be critically reexamined.

#### **Committees, platforms, advocacy groups**

- Comments about the ICs were uniformly positive throughout Haiti though people interviewed had few expectations that the Haitian government would actually come through with funding.
- Village level ICs however can fulfill conflict-resolution, emergency preparation, and general ombudsman functions even if the central government fails to allocate resources for major projects. Municipal and departmental ICs may in the long run paradoxically be less powerful because, unlike village ICs, which can play

ombudsman roles, they would depend on centralized disbursements for most of their needs.

### **Adaptive program modifications**

- NDI staff have made creative adaptive modifications to their programming strategy when called for. The original 15-member committees were reduced to 11. And NDI has correctly abandoned as unrealistic the quest for the national level network of ICs that was called for in the current proposal.
- NDI has adaptively gone beyond the 11-person initiative committee and has created broader “platforms”, both at the municipal and departmental levels, that include economically and socially prominent members of local civil society who may not be members of a committee. These units have become particularly active during the second phase of Norwegian funding.

### **Gender issues**

- The gender component of NDI’s activity has been relatively weak.
- The most exciting development found during the field review, and the most promising one from the point of view of gender issues, was NDI’s recent forming of a borderland coalition that crosscut department lines and joined populations all along the north-south Haitian / Dominican border. It opened the door to dynamic involvement of women in advocacy activities around an issue of fundamental importance to them: markets.

### **Budgetary issues**

- NDI’s salary rates for expatriate field directors have been within the prevalent Haiti norm. Its salaries for Haitian field staff have created some staffing issues.
- The support for regional field staff (the Departmental Coordinators DC) has been below the standards of most NGOs that have a similar structure of a Port-au-Prince office and regional staff in other parts of the country.
- Budgetary analysis shows that nearly four out of every ten dollars is absorbed by money retained in Washington and by the costs of an expatriate field director, including salary, fringe benefits, and other special allowances. NDI’s services come at a very high cost, much higher than the 8% office-support guideline of MFA.
- Budgetary and logistical dilemmas are created by the excessively ambitious geographical scope of the program.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

- Monitoring and evaluation criteria are weak. Activities are being defined as indicators of results. Though NDI has been in Haiti since 1986, there is little evidence of rigorous analysis of lessons learned during 26 years in Haiti.

### **Sustainability and continuity issues.**

- Sustainability implies the temporary financing of activities that will carry on after external funding ceases. For a donor who insists on sustainability, Haiti may be the wrong country in which to work. There is to our knowledge not a single major externally-funded program in Haiti that would not cease immediately if foreign

funds were withdrawn. The Haitian government itself is non-sustainable. It would have to shut down in the absence of “foreign aid”. In this context the MFA / NDI program can be unambiguously and unapologetically classified as non-sustainable.

- The sustainability of the ICs is in danger for other reasons as well. The 11 person IC structure is an exogenous organizational model with a rigid homogeneous structure, imposed nationwide, with no basis in Haitian tradition. If this exogenous advocacy model were producing an outburst of governmentally funded roads, water systems, electric systems, health centers, schools and the like, it would be warmly embraced, internalized, and enthusiastically continued. It has produced none of this and shows little promise of doing so because of the nature of the GOH. When funding ceases the eventual disappearance of the IC must be seen as a much more likely outcome than its sustainability.
- A donor should lower expectations and aim, in Haiti, for continuity rather than self-sufficient sustainability. Continuity is best pursued by plugging into vibrant ongoing local economic and social subsystems that were present before the program and that will continue after the program.
- In that sense the domain where a donor is most likely to achieve continuity is in the support of Haitian female market activities. The day after the earthquake the indefatigable women of Haiti were sitting alongside the urban rubble selling their wares and generating income for their children, with no outside help. Female marketing activities, however, though totally self-sustaining, can benefit from outside help and should be a major object of donor attention (the border market issue could be a spectacular example). And a donor can be absolutely certain that the marketing activities will continue after the funding ceases, enhanced by whatever inputs were made available during life-of-program. Donors for whom the theme of sustainability is important, in other words, should direct their attention to the market women of Haiti.
- As a final comment on sustainability, one of the most misused sustainability slogans heard around the world is that “...it is better to teach a man to fish than to give him a fish.” We have heard that used in Haiti to denigrate projects that build roads or water systems and to justify programs whose entire budgets are spent on organizers of committees and teachers of “minds and hearts”, with nothing left over for material activities. Getting back to the fish: there is nothing more objectionable than the squandering of developmental budgets on elaborate fishing workshops to people who have no money to buy boats, fishing poles, or nets. *Haitians suffer from resource deficits, not knowledge deficits.* The salaried itinerant pedagogues, and the institutions that hire and deploy them to organize or educate, benefit from the funds, but not necessarily their impoverished audience. A hybrid strategy is required. It will be argued below that, with creative programming, MFA / NDI democracy-building goals can be pursued in the context of activities that simultaneously provide resources for real-life material activities.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Because the current program will come to an end in less than three months, the recommendations are directed to hypothetical future programs similar to the present one. There should be no disruptive interventions into current activities.

## General

1. Both members of the review team concur in a strong recommendation for a resolution of the problems discussed in the report and a continuation of the partnership between Norway and NDI. Despite problems, the review team concludes that NDI has carried out the activities to which it agreed, though at a high price, and recommends that MFA continue in partnership with NDI. NDI has a global track record in democracy building matters, an issue that is of great interest to Norway. In addition the new field director, with her expertise and background in gender issues, is well matched to Norway's interest in gender programming.

## Managerial recommendations

2. Departmental coordinators should have offices and motorcycles and program-supplied laptops. That is, the staff hired with Norwegian funding should be given the same level of support as we found among staff hired with U.S., Canadian, or other third-party funding.
3. They should have a rolling fund for discretionary use in renting meeting places for larger assemblies, in providing food and drink, and in other types of locally valued support. They should not have to get written permission ahead of time for every expenditure. They will of course need to justify and document all expenditure, and should be a ceiling, but the ceiling should be reasonably high.

## Strategic recommendations

4. The geographic scope of the program should be reduced to make it conform to budget realities.
5. There should be a shift away from emphasis on senators and deputies and more attention given in program documents to local elected leaders, mayors and village *kazek*.
6. The concept of "government" should be broadened beyond the currently narrow definition which focuses on elected officials. Service ministries (agriculture, health, public works, etc.) and their local branches are also parts of the government and should become targets of advocacy.
7. The NGOs who currently supply so many services should also be seen as valid interlocutors.
8. Longer multi-session training courses should provide a certificate to those completing the course. Throughout the field review people constantly spoke not only of their interest in receiving training, but of the possibility that they could then pass the knowledge on to others. Certificates would be a socially important symbol that they are qualified to do so. Fund raising strategies should also be among the skills taught to ICs.
9. Though not envisioned in current budgets, a permanent training center in a town such as Jacmel could be the venue for systematizing training, giving individuals sent there a sense of dignity, and providing a basis for issuing certificates of competence.

### Gender issues

10. The program in its next phase should make a systematic effort to reach out to the women's groups - mothers' clubs, market women associations, and others – that dot Haiti. We have seen even articulate woman clam up when in a mixed gender group. The IC is by definition a mixed gender group and is not the venue where women would speak most freely.
11. The issue of domestic violence against women and of rape – both mentioned in interviews – could be made an explicit topic of concern in the next phase. This could mesh nicely with existing ICs. The IC could be encouraged to become a buffer between a battered woman or raped girl and the authorities. Women may be afraid to approach the authorities on their own. The local authority will react quite differently to the incident if an elected IC brings it to him.
12. NDI should aggressively pursue, in the next phase, the development of the borderland advocacy coalition, focusing on the dilemmas of Haitian women in the border markets.

### Re-examining assumptions about the State

To place Norway's focus on democracy building on a sounder foundation, we recommend some critical rethinking concerning assumptions about the State.

13. There should be no systemically naïve assumption that the organization of a demanding civil society is somehow, through advocacy and electoral procedures, going to create service delivery mechanisms in a State that has never had them, or to curtail extractive traditions which are still alive and well.
14. There should be a healthy, modest recognition of what outsiders can and cannot do. We recommend a downplaying of donor attempts to exert influence on the central government and the Parliament. We recommend instead a decentralized model in which the principal focus is on interactions between the population and local municipal and village leaders (mayors and *kazek*). Future proposals will do well to downplay current emphasis on dialog with parliamentarians and replace it with emphasis on interacting with mayors, *kazek*, local GOH service ministries with discretionary budgets (health, education, public works, agriculture).
15. Re-examine the project's core assumption about the causal chain: (a) citizens contact parliamentarians, (b) parliamentarians then structure the budget on the basis of citizen concerns, (c) the money then flows outward from the government and downward to towns and villages to implement activities. In Haitian context this posited causal sequence bears little relationship to reality. It is an inappropriate fiction on which to base a program. Up till now it has functioned as a latent, unspoken assumption.
16. A compromise less-than-ideal situation is required. One scenario is for an external donor to make funds available locally, on the condition that the activities will be carried out, not in a way that bypasses the mayor and *kazek*, but in conjunction with them. For this reason the conclusion of the report suggested the creation of a \$250,000 LAF – local action fund – that would be allocated in grants of \$20,000 to those communities that meet certain criteria, including the presence of a demonstrably strong IC and a harmonious relation between the population and the mayor or rural *kazek*.

We will end the recommendation section with some detailed recommendations for two new activities: (1) the above mentioned Local Action Fund to permit collaboration between citizens and elected officials on the solution of locally defined problems even in the absence of centralized GOH funding; and (2) a strategy for dealing with the issue of women in the border markets.

### **Creation of a Local Action Fund for mature ICs.**

The recommendation is being made to create a Local Action Fund to provide a mechanism to translate the dialogue process into actual delivery of services. This is seen as a necessary strategy in order to maintain the momentum of the more successful ICs. This is also seen as a welcome and needed opportunity to provide a demonstration of the use of public resources that is based on agreed priorities and that is implemented in a transparent and accountable manner.

If resources do not start flowing in a manner that permits local elected leaders to engage in service delivery, then the ICs, after a few years of enthusiasm, will most certainly wither and die. It is in the beginning exciting for a citizen to confront local elected leaders in an organized group, rather than have to go alone with hat (or kerchief) in hand. The committees, however, are not sustainable unless they produce results – not the meetings and committees and dialogues that are incorrectly called “results” in the proposal, but rather genuine service results that entail a flow of resources.

The team has discussed an alternative, a compromise series of measures, with NDI staff. We are in agreement that action is necessary among the more mature ICs, action that involves, not bypasses, local leaders. We are also in agreement that money is unlikely to flow outwards from the central government, no matter how many exciting “dialogues” are held with senators and deputies.

To wait for money to flow from Port-au-Prince would be an exercise in make believe, as would be the founding of more and more ICs, when few of the ones that have existed for over a decade have yet to see concrete results. A compromise “system priming” measure would be for the establishment of an IC action fund. This would consist of a macro-fund, for example, of \$250,000 that would be available for well developed ICs to undertake democratically determined local action plans of no more than \$20,000 each. The recipients would be the organizationally most mature ICs.

There are two possible modes. The first is a matching grant mode. Each mayor in principal has a budget of \$250,000 per year from the Ministry of the Interior. Transparency in the use of these funds is a matter of local conflict. MFA could make available a local action fund of \$20,000 for a specified activity if the mayor will allocate a corresponding amount from his municipal budget. It is impossible for a local committee to place pressure on a Port-au-Prince ministry. Nor would pressuring the deputy or senator help, since they have little control over the use of budgeted funds. But it would be easier for local ICs, with matching funds from Norway, to pressure the local mayor to allocate an equivalent amount from his budget. And a mayor who turned down such a publicly-made offer would have to justify publicly why he refuses. The issue could even be aired on local radio stations. If they mayor indicates that the expected funds have not arrived from Port-au-Prince, that also would be aired in a way that reaches Port-au-Prince. The basic strategy would be to use MFA funding as a lever for exercising pressure on local authorities. This offer of matching activity funds might be a more effective strategy for mobilizing government action than the current strategy of ever more dialog (which is Greek for talk).

If the matching grant mode is considered unrealistic by knowledgeable Haitians, the action could be carried out exclusively with MFA funds. However, to maintain the framework of democracy enhancement, the requirement would be that there be direct involvement of the elected village kaze and (in towns) the majistra. They would NOT be given managerial control of the \$20,000 subgrant. There is still too much mistrust of local officials. But they would be involved in authorizing disbursement, monitoring, and in other tasks yet to be determined. It would involve civil society and their elected leaders in real action plans that go beyond talking, dialoguing, advocating, and all the other types of purely verbal behavior that up till now have been so central to the program. The action fund would focus on local leaders – kaze and majistra – instead of on the parliamentarians who up till now have received excessive emphasis in proposals and other program documents, but who were on a three month vacation and impossible to contact during the field review.<sup>11</sup>

A final caution. This should not be done hastily. Several critical decisions have to be made. Who will manage the macro-fund? And how will the micro-grants be managed? What will they be used for? *This cannot be planned in Washington or Oslo.* These things cannot be decided without several weeks of careful, thoughtful exploratory conversation with the intended participants themselves in different parts of Haiti. They are in a better position than any outsider to propose arrangements that would prevent such an effort from degenerating into one more disappointing development fiasco.

In an ideal world the money for such activities would come from the Haitian government in Port-au-Prince. We do not however live in an ideal world. If some other source of funding is available, we can at least begin the process of forging bonds of trust and collaboration between a population and its leaders at the local level.

### **Creation of a program for market women along the Haitian / Dominican border**

We alluded to the convening of a border coalition that occurred during the review. The event received support not only from NDI's national coordinator, who gave intellectual guidance to the development of the manifest and presented the first draft to a group of over 80 people, many of them notab (socially prominent individuals). Financial support was given, also with Norwegian funding, (1) to underwriting the transportation, food, and lodging of individuals who had to travel long distance, (2) to renting the locations where the various events took place, and (3) to providing a meal for all the individuals who had participated in the presentation of the manifest. None of this activity could possibly have taken place without the logistical and intellectual support of NDI with the financial support of Norway.

The principal issue along the border is the mistreatment of Haitian market women by Dominican soldiers in the biweekly binational markets, all of which are held on the Dominican side of the border. Pressure could and should be exerted on Haitian authorities to carry out several tasks that would ameliorate the situation of the women.

1. The ideal would be to pressure the Haitian government to provide an armed uniformed contingent of Haitian authorities to be deployed on market days as a symbolic counterweight against the Dominican army. Such a "border patrol" might have to be

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<sup>11</sup> We expected them to be conveniently in their towns during this period. NDI staff laughed and said they were more likely to be in the team leader's Florida town.



created, as the Haitian army was disbanded by Aristide and the Haitian police are dispersed and ineffective.

2. Secondly pressure should be placed for the Haitian State (or for European organizations) to build markets in the Haitian border towns as they did somewhat naively in Dominican border towns. Haitian women all along the border have pleaded for a situation in which they would go to the Dominican market on one of the twice-weekly market days, and Dominicans would cross over into a Haitian market on the other market day. This would provide balance and a reduction of the mistreatment of Haitian women on Dominican soil.
3. Thirdly, Haitian civilian authorities, both in Port-au-Prince and in the border departments, should be pressured into making active contact with Dominican civilian authorities in the border towns to demand equal treatment in these presumably “binational” markets. Haitian women should be able to bring in Haitian produce to sell, and not confined to the role of purchasers of Dominican produce, as they currently are. Because of inertia on the part of the Haitian State, the “binational markets” have evolved into Dominican markets controlled by Dominican soldiers and customs personnel.
4. Fourthly, media campaigns should be mounted, first to accurately document, and secondly to bring attention to, the current treatment of Haitian women in these border towns. .
5. Fifthly and finally, the option of boycotts should be considered. If the thousands of Haitian women who currently cross the border on market days to purchase from Dominicans ceased to do so, thousands of Dominican merchants who count on Haitian buyers would be seriously affected. It is not the behavior of these Dominican civilians, but that of Dominican soldiers and officials, that is causing suffering to the Haitian women. These Dominican merchant groups are in a better position than Haitians to be able to place strong pressure on Dominican authorities to desist from abusive behavior toward Haitian women.

From the point of view of gender advocacy, such real-life issues are of much greater importance, both objectively and subjectively, to Haitian women than the somewhat more ethereal issue of gender quotas on Initiative Committees. NDI has recently become involved in these issues with its new borderland advocacy coalition. For the sake of the women affected, it is to be hoped that the borderland becomes a permanent, discrete focus of MFA / NDI concern in any future collaboration. It would constitute a dynamic merger of Norway’s concern for civil society advocacy mechanisms, on the one hand, and on the other, with Norway’s concern for promoting the wellbeing of women.

## ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

### **Review of Norwegian Support to Strengthening Citizens' Political Influence in Haiti through National Democratic Institute (NDI)**

The review is undertaken by MFA's Section for Development Strategy and Governance for the Section for Peace and Reconciliation in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The program to be reviewed is called Promoting Dialogue, Tolerance and Citizen Participation.

#### **1. Background**

Governance and dialogue between citizens and government are major subject areas in Norwegian development co-operation with Haiti. The motivation is increased engagement by the citizens in the development of the country, including the reconstruction after the earthquake in 2010.

The most significant political divisions in Haiti are social class and centre-periphery, and the divisions are strong. The differences between the rich living in Port-au-Prince and the majority of the population living in poverty in rural areas or in urban slums are extreme. The elite in the capital are limited in numbers but they control the economy. The history shows a population without any influence on the governance of the country. Occasional attempts at grasping political power by actors with popular support have been short and unsuccessful in terms of democratic development. Consequently, there is no tradition of constructive dialogue between the elite and the citizens. Antagonism rules the relationship. Elections have often been marred by violence. Interference since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century by external powers has contributed to strengthening the power base of the elite and arguably directed the interest of the elite and politicians in power away from building a legitimate state.

Norway has for some years been involved in efforts to develop a meaningful dialogue between the political elite and representatives of the population. The parties involved have found the involvement of Norway acceptable because of its neutral history in the country. Norway is also among the countries giving most development assistance to Haiti. The others are USA, France and Canada. In recent years Latin American countries have become more involved. UN organisations are involved in support of governance but do not have a leading role. As compared to all of these, Norway has longer experience in promoting local ownership, including ownership by the people, in development assistance in general. This gives Norway an advantage, and an impetus, to take the lead among the donors in developing constructive relations between citizens and the elite.

Formally Haiti is a democracy. The Norwegian support is aimed at strengthening the democratic influence of the citizens whether through political parties and elections (the electoral channel), civil society organisations, or the media. All arenas are poorly developed. Of the approximately 100 registered political parties, few offer citizens a political ideology or program that is followed up when in power. When elected, most politicians act independently of any party. Consequently, there is no tradition of politicians who are elected to any office being held accountable by the citizens. Civil

society organisations are being developed as non-partisan, mostly with external guidance and financing, for the purpose of increased involvement by citizens in local development. This is opposed to civil society organisations being developed to represent the interests of a membership such as farmers, workers, teachers, students, women, youth, etc. in government affairs, or civil society organisations encouraged to cultivate democratic values such as faith based and individual leaders in society trusted by the citizens. The media has little investigative capacity and journalists have limited education and experience in holding the government accountable. Radio-stations have more outreach than other media but struggle economically.

There are considerable obstacles to getting citizens involved in democratic governance. With few political leaders representing citizens' interests and little proof of political will in the ruling regime to provide citizens with security from violence and essential services in health and education and infrastructure, citizens' trust in the authorities is practically non-existent. It will take a long time to build a legitimate state even with sincere political leaders in power.

**NDI** has for more than a decade been responsible for setting up and running local "people's committees" (comités d'initiative) in more than 40 municipalities throughout the country. People are mobilised to take responsibility for the development of their local communities through so-called "town-hall meetings". After the earthquake the meetings have also been used for communication with the citizens about reconstruction. The meetings are reportedly non-partisan. Thus, the aim is not to develop organisations which can represent the particular interests of groups of citizens in public decision-making, whether as political parties or civil society organisations. Local authorities have on occasions been invited to meetings but have not themselves taken charge to consult citizens. Norway has supported this program since 2008. USA, through US AID, has been a significant supporter of the program but has now withdrawn.

NDI also run programs aimed at developing capacity and competence in the electoral channel including increased participation of women in politics and social affairs. Norway is supporting a program in support of female members of parliament. Another program supported by Norway covers civic education of youth. This review will cover the "peoples' committees" program only. However, the special needs of women and youth will be thoroughly dealt within the "peoples' committee" program.

The goal and objectives of the program "Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation, are, as in the program document for January 1 to December 31, 2012 (submitted 21.11.2011):

Overall goal: To increase government responsiveness to citizen priorities around reconstruction and development.

Specific objectives: To encourage citizen participation and advocacy around reconstruction and development issues, and increase opportunities for citizens to more effectively engage government leaders around the reconstruction and development process.

## **2. Purpose**

The purpose of the study is to review the results of the program in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability against agreed goals and objectives, plans, budgets, resources and methodology and the relevance of the program with a view to the Norwegian motivation of increased political influence for citizens.

### 3. Scope of work

The study shall cover questions indicated below. It may be constructed in three parts as indicated. The first part should be a review of the results achieved in terms of the stated goal and objectives against plans, budgets / resources and methodology laid down in the program documents, and an assessment of the likely achievements of the objectives in the remaining period.

The focus in the first part shall be on obstacles and opportunities in public institutions and the political and civil society as well as the relations between them, and obstacles and opportunities within the larger framework of relevant national policies, systems and structures. In addition, are there any external factors that create obstacles? Are obstacles and opportunities different for men and women? The first part shall include assessment of the explicit or implicit theories of change or the assumptions that are guiding the program. Does the program have a clear, coherent and consistent set of objectives? Are adjustments called for and if yes, what kind of adjustments?

Regarding the sustainability of the program, it should be assessed to what extent the results of the programs are expected to extend beyond the program period. Important questions in that respect are: Who "owns" the program? Is there a demand for the program in Haiti? Is the program forming an integrated part of the wider context? Are women and youth, discriminated groups and the population in rural areas duly catered for? How can the involvement of the government (central and local) be strengthened? What has been, and should be, the role of the UN/MINTUSAH?

Second, regarding the management of the programmes, the review shall make an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of the administrative and organisational set-up, including the role of the headquarters in Washington. Relevant questions to be considered include: What measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are used efficiently? Could the program have been implemented with fewer resources without reducing the quality and quantity of the achievements so far? To what extent are there adequate human, technical and physical resources to manage the program efficiently? To what extent have the financial dealings under the program and the reporting facilitated the achievements so far? How can the frameworks be enhanced to increase efficiency and results?

Third, the relevance of the program shall be assessed with a view to the Norwegian motivation of increased political influence for citizens through the electoral channel, civil society organisations, and media respectively. Further, with a view to the Norwegian goal of contributing to increased trust between the ruling regime and the population at large, an analysis shall be made of the political influence of citizens within a framework of the legitimacy of the state. In such an analysis the focus is on the relations between the state and the citizens. The approach is based on the belief that a state is legitimate if the citizens perceive it to be legitimate.<sup>12</sup> The legitimacy analysis

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<sup>12</sup> Citizens' perception whether a state is legitimate or not is formed by their perception of how the state performs, on one or more of the duties that the citizens want the state to perform. The duties of the state can include creating possibilities for the citizens to influence public decision-

will indicate how the relations between the ruling regime and the citizens in Haiti can be improved, what should be the priorities and what can an external donor like Norway do to assist. When assessing the relevance of the program, due attention should be paid to efforts by other foreign or domestic actors who are active in the same field. Who are these actors and are the programs overlapping or complementary? We do not require an extensive analysis of the comparative advantage of each actor.

The study should end with an assessment of the theories of change, or the assumptions on which the program is based. Are they still valid? If a continuation of the program is recommended, which adjustments are warranted, which actors and institutions (in the public sphere and in civil society and between them) should be targeted in the future? Is gender an issue in this respect, i.e. should support activities be planned differently for men and women? And the youth?

Although of secondary importance, the study shall provide a brief analysis of the role of NDI in view of the historical relationship between USA and Haiti, and point out possible challenges.

The study shall be guided by “Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation – A practical guide” issued by MFA and the MFA.

#### **4. Analytical and methodological approach**

The review will consist of:

- Desk research based on program documents such as plans, progress reports, financial reports, and material produced as outputs of the program, to be provided by MFA and the MFA, as well as relevant studies of Haiti available from the donor community, universities, research institutes, internet, etc.
- Fieldwork in Haiti where interviews are to be made with a broad spectrum of key informants, including beneficiaries of the program, civil society representatives, politicians, government officials, media representatives, executing agency staff, donors and other resource persons in geographical areas. Interviews may be undertaken one-on-one or in groups.
- The review shall, as relevant, make use of political economy analysis of interest and power relations in state and society with focus on actors and institutions at the local level, and analysis of the legitimacy of the state as outlined above.<sup>13</sup> Relevant historical factors incl. external influence as well as formal and informal power relations shall be considered. The review shall not

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making, as in this program, or public service delivery (health, education, infrastructure, etc.), safety from violence and aggression, facilitation of economic growth and income, and the respect, or lack of respect, that people in power show for social values and norms, and faith or beliefs. This understanding of the legitimacy of the state is according to Séverine Belina, Dominique Darbon, Stein Sundstøl Eriksen and Ole Jacob Sending (2009) *The Legitimacy of the State in Fragile Situations*, Report for the OECD DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility. The understanding is also used in OECD-DAC (2008) *Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building in Fragile situations: From Fragility to Resilience*.

<sup>13</sup> See for example MFA (2010), Political economy analysis with a legitimacy twist: What is it and why does it matter? and DFID (2009). Political Economy Analysis. How to Note. Problem-Driven Governance and Political Economy Analysis. Good Practice Framework.

cover the whole country, but select geographical areas that are representative for the subject.

## **5. Reports**

The reports shall include a consolidated report not exceeding 20 pages (excluding annexes), comprising an executive summary of not more than 2 pages, methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressing the views of the review team. The TOR shall be attached.

A draft shall be submitted to MFA within two weeks after finalization of the field visit. MFA, MFA and NDI will then have two week to provide written feed-back to the review team. The final report shall be submitted to MFA two weeks later. The final report shall reflect comments by MFA, MFA and NDI and acknowledge any substantive disagreements. The report shall be written in English.

A team leader will be responsible for the technical quality of the reports, as well as the editing and quality control of the language. The reports shall be submitted in electronic form to MFA.

## **6. Implementation**

### **6.1 The team**

The team will consist of an international consultant as team leader, and a local consultant. The local consultant will be hired by the international consultancy firm/institute and included in the offer.

The review team must as a minimum have the following qualifications:

- Experience with international development, including reviews / evaluations of democratic governance programs and capacity development in that respect,
- Knowledge of gender programming,
- Knowledge of administrative and financial management of development programs,
- Knowledge of the use of political economy analysis in a development context,
- Familiarity with the social, economic, political and cultural development of Haiti at present and in an historical context,
- The teamleader must as a minimum have a working knowledge of French and be fluent in English. The local consultant must be fluent in French and Creole and have as a minimum a working knowledge of English.

The consultants should familiarise themselves with the Norwegian policy and strategic approach to development co-operation in Haiti.

## 6.2 Financing and Time Frame

The time frame of the study is up to 4 weeks of which 1-2 weeks in the field. Whereas the teamleader will be paid a maximum of 4 weeks, the local consultant will be paid a maximum of 3 weeks. The review, including the field work is expected to take place in September-November 2012.

Hotel costs and per diem will be covered for both consultants in accordance with the official rates in Norway. For the local consultant, these costs will be covered when he/she is away from home.

NDI may assist the team in making arrangements for interviews. Some travelling may be required. The team must arrange for its own local transportation. Reasonably priced transportation will be covered according to presentation of receipts. Local transportation may include rental car and driver. The cost of local transportation shall not be included in the tender price.

## ANNEX 2: ITINERARY OF TEAM LEADER

Wed. Sept. 19.	Arrival in Haiti. Meeting in the NDI office.
Thu. Sept. 20	Meeting in the NDI office.
Fri. Sept. 21	Jacmel. Meeting with Departmental Coordinating Committee
Sat. Sept. 22	Cayes Jacmel. Meetings
Sun. Sept.23	Les Cayes. Port Salut.
Mon. Sept.24	Port-au-Prince
Tue. Sept. 25	St. Marc
Wed. Sept. 26	Port-au-Prince
Thu. Sept. 27	Flew to Cap Haitien. Interviews in Ouanaminthe.
Fri. Sept. 28	Ouanaminthe / Cap Haitien
Sat. Sept. 29	Port-au-Prince
Sun. Sept. 30	Thomazeau / La Hatte
Mon. Oct. 1	Port-au-Prince / NDI office.
Tue. Oct. 2	Return to U.S.



## ANNEX 3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN HAITI

### National Democratic Institute (NDI)

Jane Hurtig  
 Jude Jeudi  
 Sandrel Cherenfant  
 Gabin Jean-Pierre  
 Marilyn Cossou-Louis  
 Jacqueline Jean-Pierre  
 Dena Noel  
 Frantz Joseph Fortuné  
 Jean Luc Fénéus (former dept. coordinator)

Persons participating in field interviews .

### PLATEFORME DU DEPARTEMENT DU SUD/Cayes

Bataille	Pierre Jeannot
Colagène	Philogène
Pantal	Jean Guillio
Rosevez	Gracou P.

### Foyer des Jeunes de Ouanaminthe

Bruno	Steeve
Charles	Manex
Elizias	Joseph
Joseph	Cherline
Joseph	Lynda
Pierre	Islande
Saint-Fort	Hernsly
Saint-Vil	Miourva
Saint-Vil	Samuel

### PLATEFORME DES ORGANISATIONS DE LA SOCIETE CIVILE DE SAINT-MARC

Belotte Blood
Castelly Louis
Chery David
Denéus Nixon
Innocent Ernst
Joseph Carl
Joseph Guefrid
Meres Jean Micado
Oginé Noël L. Marie Josée
Cadet Jarlens
Destiné Jimmy

Gentilhomme Ilés
Guillaume Joël
Isaac Louis Nord
Jn Baptiste G. Absalar
Joseph Carl
Philemons Linda
Umélus Elina

#### PLATEFORME NORD/NORD-OUEST

Gracia Jocelyn
Jean Blanco
Bernard William
Almonor Patrick
Bazile Gabriel
Cheristil Céluca
Charles Huguette
Pierre Franscique

Cayes Jacmel

Felito Janvier Pierre (former mayor)

La Hatte / Thomazeau

Jean-Tal Rebeca (former elected Casec)

Coami Michel (current elected Casec)

Edvic Emilien (member Communal Initiative Committee)

Ouanaminthe

Christa Jeudi

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Rob Clausen

Pan American Development Foundation

Daniel O'Neil

International Office of Migration

Francois Fournier

Tanja Berqvist

Agence Canadienne de Developpement International

Abner Steny

Island Systems International

Bertrand Laurent

## ANNEX 4: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

### MFA Documents

Moen, Eli and Stein Sunstol Eriksen. 2010. Political economy analysis with a legitimacy twist: Why does it matter?

MFA. n.d. Results Management in Norwegian Development Cooperation: A Practical Guide

Sundet, Geir. 2012. Review of three programmes for natural resource management and disaster risk reduction in Departement du Sud, Haiti.

Sundet, Geir and Max Mmuya. 2009. Review of Norwegian Support to National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Kenya, MFA.

Sundet, Geir and Eli Moen. 2009. Political Economy Analysis of Kenya, MFA, August 2009, Oslo

2009 Administrasjonstilskudd. Retningslinjer Gjeldende Fra 1. Januar 2010. Norwegian guidelines on maximum allowances to be paid to grantees for “uspesifiserte administrative utgifter” (unspecified administrative costs), commonly known as “overhead” in English. The memo sets 8% as the maximum.

### Miscellaneous MFA correspondence

18/8/10 Utenriksdepartementet: Beslutningsnotat: National Democratic Institute. (A memo containing the decision of the the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning NDI application)

20/8/2010 Letter of acceptance to NDI’s grant application Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation in the reconstruction and electoral period

23/9/2010 Letter to NDI requesting progress reports on the 2010 program.

31/5/2011 Letter approving no cost extension of the 2010 program

28/11/2011 Letter to NDI indicating that the add-on proposal needed a stronger gender component.

1/12/2011 Prosjektvurdering seksjon for fred og forsoning. (An analysis of NDI’s proposal by MFA’s project evaluation office in the Peace and Justice Section. )

1/12/2011 Internal MFA memo discussing the amount of money that would be retained by NDI Washington headquarters.

7/12/2011 Letter from MFA authorizing NDI to make adjustments to budget line items, with limitations, but without prior approval.

3/4/2012 Budget Revisions for MFA Grants to NDI: HTI-11/0019 and HTI-11/0027

### NDI documents

5/8/2010 Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation in the reconstruction and electoral period. Proposal submitted to Norwegian Ministry of Foreign affairs

21/11/2011 Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation in the reconstruction and electoral period. Draft of add-on Proposal submitted to Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NDI Budget Notes to proposal “Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation in the reconstruction and electoral period” (2010 program)

Preliminary budget for the proposal “Promoting citizen participation in the reconstruction and development process” (2012 program)

Budget notes to the proposal “Promoting citizen participation in the reconstruction and development process” (2012 program)

Budget notes to the expanded Budget (2012 program) that had been upwardly adjusted to accommodate exchange rate fluctuations.

NDI Final Report to MFA. Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation in the reconstruction and electoral period. (Project Dates: August 1, 2010 to January 31, 2012)

NDI final Report to USAID. Building responsive and representative political parties.

NDI final Report to USAID. Civil society advocacy

### **Misc. NDI correspondence**

9/28/2010 Letter to MFA discussing NDI support to political debates in Haiti with GIAP

30/8/2011 Letter to MFA confirming receipt of NOK 9,000,000

21/11/2011 Cover letter from NDI about the add-on proposal to program "Promoting dialogue, tolerance and citizen participation in the reconstruction and electoral period. "

1/12/2011 Cover letter to MFA sent with the revised proposal with a stronger gender component.

6/12/2011 Letter to MFI identifying budget changes.

### **Cahiers de Charge**

Cahier de Charge National  
Cahier de Charge Artibonite  
Cahier de Charge Centre  
Cahier de Charge Grand' Anse  
Cahier de Charge Nippes  
Cahier de Charge Nord  
Cahier de Charge Nord' Est  
Cahier de Charge Nord Ouest  
Cahier de Charge Ouest  
Cahier de Charge Sud  
Cahier de Charge Sud Est

Newsletters (produced bimonthly)

### **Miscellaneous documents**

SIGIR (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction)

2010 National Democratic Institute grant's security costs generally supported , but Dept. of State oversight limited.

<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545970.pdf>

DAC Network on Governance (GOVNET)

2012 Trends in Assistance to Democratic Accountability Actors and Institutions: Elections, Political Parties, the Media and Parliament

United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti/ Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.

2012 Haiti Civil Society Organizatons (CSO)

Olson, Craig, and Sara Guthrie, Marc-Antoine Noel, Phares Pierre, Glenn Smucker  
"Local government and civil society in Haiti: An assessment of two components of  
USAID / Haiti's Democracy Enhancement Project. " Washington, D.C.:  
Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI)  
[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDACG767.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACG767.pdf)

Zeric Kay Smith

"*Fe Womble ou Fe Kombit?: Political Advocacy and CSOs in Haiti -- Baseline Data and  
Preliminary Progress.*" Washington, D.C.: Management Systems International.  
[http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNACH154.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACH154.pdf)

### **News articles**

27/9/2011 "Un cahier de charges pour le développement du Nord-Est " *Le  
Nouvelliste*

17/5/2012 "Jossie Etienne, chanter de l'équité" *Le Nouvelliste*

27/7/2012 "Des Ouanaminthais formés sur la gestion des organisations de jeunes"  
*Le Nouvelliste*

29/7/2012 "La société civile plaide pour une méthode participative". *Le Nouvelliste*

10/9/2012 "Les députés partent en vacances." *Le Nouvelliste*

21/9/2012 "Un engagement pour le changement à Port Salut" *Le Nouvelliste*

## ANNEX 5: OVERVIEW OF INITIATIVE COMMITTEES

1. Comités d'Initiatives (rencontres internes) Jan.2012 – Aout 2012

<i>Departement</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Section communale</i>	<i>Femmes</i>	<i>Hommes</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Nord</b>	<i>Cap-Haïtien</i>	<i>Haut du Cap</i>	11	30	41
	<i>Milot</i>	<i>2e section</i>	6	17	23
	<i>Quartier Morin</i>	<i>Centre-ville</i>	4	11	15
			11	10	21
<i>Grde riv. du Nord</i>	<i>Centre-ville</i>	5	11	16	
			<b>37</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>Nord-Est</b>	<i>Ouanaminthe</i>	<i>Savane Longue</i>	1	6	7
			32	4	36
		<i>Savane au Lait</i>	2	5	7
			2	8	10
			2	7	9
			28	15	43
		<i>Acul des Pins</i>	1	10	11
	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	6	14	20	
	<i>Gens de Nantes</i>	35	6	41	
		16	17	33	
	<i>Fort-Liberté</i>	<i>Acul Samedi</i>	2	6	8
			35	21	56
			5	15	20
	<i>Carice</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	6	29	35
			4	7	11
		<i>2e sect. Bonite</i>	17	35	52
		<i>Bois Gamelle</i>	23	28	51
	<i>Trou du Nord</i>	<i>Acul des Pins</i>	1	6	7
	<i>Perches</i>	<i>Haut-Perches</i>	15	30	45
		<i>Bas-Perches</i>	12	17	39
		<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	19	21
	<i>Terrier Rouge</i>	<i>Fond Blanc</i>	22	13	35
				<b>269</b>	<b>318</b>
<b>Nord-Ouest</b>	<i>Saint-Louis du nord</i>	<i>2e section</i>	47	4	51
	<i>Anse-à-Foleur</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	20	6	26
			<b>67</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>77</b>
<b>Centre</b>	<i>Hinche</i>	<i>Aguahedionde Rive Droite</i>	0	7	7
		<i>Centre-Ville</i>	5	13	18
	<i>Boucan Carré</i>	<i>1e sect. Des Bayes</i>	3	8	11
			4	10	14
			1	3	4
			1	7	8
		<i>Centre-Ville</i>	3	7	10
	<i>Mirebalais</i>	<i>1<sup>e</sup> sect. Grd Boucan</i>	11	16	27
<i>Gascogne 3e section</i>		0	6	6	

		<i>Crête Brulée</i>	11	19	30	
	<i>Lascahobas</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	1	5	6	
	<i>Saut D'eau</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	4	6	10	
			4	5	9	
	<i>Thomonde</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	3	6	9	
	<i>Thomassique</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	6	8	
	<i>Cerca-Cavarjal</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	7	9	
		<i>Rang</i>	0	6	6	
			<b>55</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>202</b>	
<b>Grand-Anse</b>	<i>Jérémie</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	3	9	12	
			<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>	
<b>Sud</b>	<i>Camp Perrin</i>	<i>1e section Levy</i>	21	35	56	
			1	3	4	
	<i>Cayes</i>	<i>2e section</i>	3	6	9	
			<i>3e section Laborde</i>	0	3	3
			<i>5e sect. Mercy</i>	22	17	39
	<i>Aquin</i>	<i>6e section lacolline</i>	7	13	20	
			<i>3e sect. Brodequin</i>	0	6	6
				1	5	6
	<i>Port-Salut</i>	<i>2e section (Saint-Table)</i>	11	29	40	
			10	33	43	
<i>St Jean du Sud</i>	<i>La Hatte</i>	5	15	20		
			<b>81</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>246</b>	
<b>Sud-Est</b>	<i>Jacmel</i>	<i>Bas coq chante</i>	3	9	12	
		<i>La voute</i>	1	8	9	
	<i>Cayes-Jacmel</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	8	15	23	
		<i>4e section</i>	4	11	15	
		<i>Minchineau</i>	12	23	35	
			<b>28</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>94</b>	
<b>Artibonite</b>	<i>L'Estere</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	29	67	96	
			6	22	28	
		<i>Poteau</i>	14	53	67	
	<i>Marchand Dessalines</i>	<i>5e sect. Perodin</i>	16	22	38	
			<i>Centre-Ville</i>	1	34	35
		<i>1e section Villard</i>	1	34	35	
			1	9	10	
	<i>Saint-Marc</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	5	48	53	
			5	30	35	
			5	30	35	
		<i>2e section</i>	1	7	8	
		<i>3e section</i>	1	9	10	
		<i>6e section</i>	1	5	6	
		<i>Pte Riv. de l'Artib</i>	<i>1e sect. Bas Coursin</i>	2	7	9
			<i>2e sect. Bas Coursin II</i>	3	33	36
	<i>3e section</i>		4	9	13	
<i>4e section</i>	4		33	37		
	2		11	13		
		1	7	8		

		<i>Centre-Ville</i>	7	28	35
			7	28	35
			<b>116</b>	<b>526</b>	<b>642</b>
<b>Ouest</b>	<i>Carrefour</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	0	7	7
	<i>Thomazeau</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	6	8
		<i>1e section</i>	1	7	8
			3	22	25
		<i>2e section</i>	2	7	9
		<i>3e section</i>	1	8	9
			17	23	40
	<i>Croix-des-Bouquets</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	1	6	7
			0	6	6
			1	7	8
			8	2	10
		<i>1e sect. Belle Fontaine</i>	2	7	9
		<i>1er Petit Bois</i>	4	5	9
		<i>2e Petit Bois</i>	1	5	6
	<i>Varreux</i>	<i>1e section</i>	2	6	8
			2	5	7
	<i>Ganthier</i>	<i>1e section</i>	1	6	7
			9	16	25
		<i>2e section</i>	2	6	8
		<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	8	10
		45	15	60	
<i>Petit-Goave</i>	<i>2e Plaine</i>	2	8	10	
<i>Grand Goave</i>	<i>3e section</i>	1	8	9	
<i>Leogane</i>	<i>11eme section</i>	7	16	23	
			<b>116</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>328</b>
<b>Nippes</b>	<i>Paillant</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	4	1	5
			18	12	30
		<i>1e sect. Salaniac</i>	0	9	9
			<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>44</b>
<b>111 rencontres</b>			<b>794</b>	<b>1554</b>	<b>2348</b>

## 2. Comités d'Initiatives (rencontres avec OSC)

<i>Departement</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Section communale</i>	<i>Femmes</i>	<i>Hommes</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Nord</b>	<i>Limonade</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	4	7	11
	<i>Cap-Haïtien</i>	<i>Haut du Cap</i>	7	27	34
		<i>Bande du Nord</i>	7	21	28
			7	21	28



	<i>Milot</i>	<i>1e section</i>	3	8	11	
		<i>3eme section</i>	2	7	9	
	<i>Quartier Morin</i>	<i>1e section</i>	12	23	35	
				<b>42</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>156</b>
<b><i>Nord-Est</i></b>	<i>Ouanaminthe</i>	<i>Haut Mariboux</i>	4	6	10	
		<i>Centre-ville</i>	27	8	35	
		<i>Gens de Nantes</i>	3	9	12	
			29	15	44	
			30	20	50	
			10	6	16	
			22	16	38	
			46	20	66	
			6	22	28	
		31	12	43		
		<i>Savane Longue</i>	27	8	35	
		<i>Acul des Pins</i>	4	27	31	
			1	26	27	
		<i>Savane au lait</i>	15	21	36	
	<i>Fort-Liberte</i>	<i>Bayaha</i>	6	22	28	
		<i>Acul Samedi</i>	29	27	56	
			35	30	65	
	<i>Centre-ville</i>	3	12	15		
	<i>Capotille</i>	<i>4e section</i>	10	17	27	
			25	1	26	
	<i>Trou du Nord</i>	<i>Cachiman</i>	10	20	30	
		<i>Roche Plate</i>	45	3	48	
			7	12	19	
		<i>Pilette</i>	8	12	20	
	<i>Carice</i>	<i>Centre-ville</i>	4	7	11	
				<b>437</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>816</b>
	<b><i>Nord-Ouest</i></b>	<i>Chansolme</i>	<i>Centre-ville</i>	4	6	10
<i>Saint-Louis du nord</i>		<i>Centre-ville</i>	2	9	11	
			<b>6</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	
<b><i>Centre</i></b>	<i>Boucan Carré</i>	<i>1e sec. Desbailles</i>	16	16	32	
		<i>Bayes 3e section</i>	1	7	8	
			2	7	9	
	<i>Hinche</i>	<i>2e section</i>	86	71	157	
	<i>Thomonde</i>	<i>1e sect. Savanette C.</i>	33	58	91	
	<i>Belladère</i>	<i>1e section</i>	15	31	46	
			0	11	11	
	<i>Maïssade</i>	<i>3e sect. Hatty</i>	3	2	5	
	<i>Saut D'Eau</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	5	7	
	<i>Mirebalais</i>	<i>Crête brulée 2e section</i>	2	8	10	
<i>Grand Boucan 1e sect</i>		3	5	8		
		4	6	10		

	<i>Lascahobas</i>	<i>Centre-ville</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>
			<b>168</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>401</b>
<b>Grand-Anse</b>	<i>Moron</i>	<i>1e section</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>24</i>
			<b>6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Sud</b>	<i>Torbeck</i>	<i>4e section Lahatte</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>43</i>
	<i>Camp Perrin</i>	<i>1e section Levy</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>26</i>
			<i>11</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>31</i>
		<i>Vieux Terre</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>6</i>
	<i>Aquin</i>	<i>Brodequin 3e section</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>29</i>
			<i>31</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>32</i>
		<i>6e section la colline</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>29</i>	<i>45</i>
	<i>Port-Salut</i>	<i>2e section</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>33</i>
		<i>Centre-ville</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>0</i>			<i>8</i>	<i>8</i>	
<i>Cayes</i>	<i>6e section Boulmier</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>22</i>	
			<b>133</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>307</b>
<b>Sud-Est</b>	<i>Marigot</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>12</i>
			<i>2</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>10</i>
		<i>Michineau</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>11</i>
			<i>5</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>16</i>
		<i>Jacmel</i>	<i>Bas Coq Chante</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>8</i>
	<i>5</i>			<i>12</i>	<i>17</i>
	<i>Cayes-Jacmel</i>	<i>Gaillard</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>97</i>	<i>167</i>
			<b>87</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>242</b>
<b>Artibonite</b>	<i>Petite Rivière</i>	<i>1e sect. Bas-Coussin I</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>58</i>	<i>60</i>
			<i>3</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>13</i>
		<i>6e section</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>41</i>
			<i>3</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>11</i>
	<i>L'Estère</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>37</i>
	<i>Gonaïves</i>	<i>5e sect. Labranle</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>63</i>
			<i>17</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>53</i>
	<i>Saint-Marc</i>	<i>5e section</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>11</i>
	<i>Dessalines</i>	<i>Centre-ville</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>4e section</i>		<i>4</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>20</i>	
			<b>87</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>329</b>
<b>Ouest</b>	<i>Ganthier</i>	<i>1e section</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>8</i>
			<i>2</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>12</i>
		<i>2e section</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>
	<i>Thomazeau</i>	<i>3e section</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>
	<i>Petit-Goave</i>	<i>1e sect. Violet</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>
		<i>12e sect. Fougues</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>8</i>
	<i>Gressier</i>	<i>3e section</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>5</i>
	<i>Croix des bouquets</i>	<i>Centre-ville</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>10</i>
			<b>14</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Nippes</b>	<i>Paillant</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>5</i>
		<i>Bezin 2</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>60</i>
			<b>15</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>65</b>

<b>86 rencontres</b>	<b>995</b>	<b>1432</b>	<b>2427</b>
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### 3. Comités d'Initiatives (rencontres avec les autorités)

<i>Department</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Section communale</i>	<i>Femmes</i>	<i>Hommes</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Nord-Est</b>	<i>Ouanaminthe</i>	<i>Gens de Nantes</i>	0	6	6
			3	6	9
		<i>Acul des Pins</i>	1	8	9
			0	6	6
			26	09	35
	<i>Fort-liberté</i>	<i>Bayaha</i>	6	42	48
			2	5	7
	<i>Capotille</i>	<i>6e section Lamine</i>	3	8	11
			6	29	35
	<i>Trou du Nord</i>	<i>Acul des Pins</i>			
			<b>53</b>	<b>133</b>	<b>186</b>
<b>Nord-Ouest</b>	<i>Port-de-Paix</i>	<i>1e section</i>	13	40	53
			<b>13</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>53</b>
	<i>Saut-D'eau</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	8	32	40
		<i>2<sup>eme</sup> section la Selle</i>	23	41	64
	<i>Belladère</i>	<i>1e section</i>	8	37	45
		<i>Quartier Baptiste</i>	18	37	55
		<i>2e section</i>	9	30	39
	<i>Hinche</i>	<i>Marmont</i>	131	104	235
		<i>Juanaria</i>	1	3	4
	<i>Thomonde</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	6	8
<i>2e sect. Narrang</i>		3	3	6	

	<i>Maïssade</i>	<i>3e sect. Hatty</i>	3	2	5	
			<b>206</b>	<b>295</b>	<b>501</b>	
<b>Grand-Anse</b>	<i>Jérémie</i>	<i>Fond rouge d'Ayer</i>	6	9	15	
		<i>7e section</i>	9	38	47	
	<i>Chambellan</i>	<i>2e section Boucan</i>	6	37	43	
		<i>Centre-ville</i>		21	28	49
				9	17	26
			<b>51</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>180</b>	
<b>Sud</b>	<i>Cayes</i>	<i>3e section Laborde</i>	1	8	9	
	<i>Torbeck</i>	<i>Beraud</i>	2	6	8	
	<i>Camp Perrin</i>	<i>2e section</i>	26	9	35	
			16	14	30	
	<i>Aquin</i>	<i>Vieux Bourg 5e sect. François</i>	15	24	39	
			<b>60</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>121</b>	
<b>Sud-Est</b>	<i>Jacmel</i>	<i>La Montagne</i>	4	11	15	
	<i>Marigot</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	4	12	16	
			<b>8</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>31</b>	
<b>Artibonite</b>	<i>Gonaïves</i>	<i>Basin</i>	18	47	65	
		<i>4e section</i>	42	34	76	
		<i>Poteau</i>	39	76	115	
		<i>Centre-Ville</i>	2	7	9	
		<i>Bayonnais 3e section</i>	2	11	13	
		<i>Labranle 5e section</i>	7	16	23	
	<i>Petite Rivière</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	8	31	39	
			3	11	14	
	<i>Marchand Dessalines</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	4	42	46	
		<i>1e sect. Bourdet</i>	3	6	9	
		<i>2e section</i>	3	6	9	
		<i>3e section</i>	5	10	15	
	<i>Saint-Marc</i>	<i>2e section</i>	2	7	9	
				<b>138</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>442</b>
<b>Ouest</b>	<i>Thomazeau</i>	<i>3e section</i>	1	7	8	
	<i>Ganthier</i>	<i>1e section</i>	6	14	20	
		<i>2e section</i>	1	6	7	
			0	6	6	
	<i>Croix-des-Bouquets</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	0	3	3	
	<i>Petit-Goave</i>	<i>Centre-Ville</i>	21	62	83	
			2	4	6	
		<i>3e sect. (trou chouchou)</i>	3	10	13	
		<i>6e section</i>	1	8	9	
<i>11e section</i>		3	8	11		

			38	128	166
<i>Nippes</i>	<i>Paillant</i>	<i>2e sect. Bezin</i>	0	8	8
			0	8	8
<b>57 rencontres</b>			<b>567</b>	<b>1121</b>	<b>1658</b>

#### 4. Coordinations Communales (rencontres avec le réseau des CI)

<i>Departement</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Femmes</i>	<i>Hommes</i>	<i>Total</i>	
<i>Nord</i>	<i>Limbé</i>	2	5	7	
		6	9	15	
		1	5	6	
	<i>Cap-Haitien</i>	5	8	13	
		7	11	18	
		13	43	56	
		<b>34</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>115</b>	
<i>Nord-Est</i>	<i>Ouanaminthe</i>	1	5	6	
		3	12	15	
		1	6	7	
		2	11	13	
		2	11	13	
		1	6	7	
	<i>Fort- Liberté</i>	0	6	6	
		4	12	16	
		2	12	14	
		3	11	14	
		14	40	54	
		0	5	5	
	<i>Capotille</i>	0	7	7	
		1	5	6	
		0	16	16	
		1	4	5	
		7	13	20	
	<i>Trou-du Nord</i>	5	10	15	
		2	13	15	
		0	5	5	
		12	33	45	
			<b>61</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>304</b>
	<i>Centre</i>	<i>Hinche</i>	1	5	6
8			31	39	
1			13	14	
5			8	13	

		1	5	6
		27	30	57
	<i>Mirebalais</i>	1	5	6
		1	5	6
		1	5	6
	<i>Maïssade</i>	15	27	42
	<i>Thomassique</i>	15	36	51
	<i>Cerca-Cavarjal</i>	12	22	34
		<b>88</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>280</b>
<i>Grand-Anse</i>	<i>Jérémie</i>	2	11	13
		17	26	43
	<i>Moron</i>	5	9	14
		17	59	76
		12	34	46
	<i>Chambellan</i>	13	23	36
		<b>66</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>228</b>
<i>Sud</i>	<i>Aquin</i>	7	27	34
	<i>Port-Salut</i>	7	18	25
	<i>Torbeck</i>	0	4	4
	<i>Cayes</i>	0	15	15
	<i>Camp Perrin</i>	9	6	15
		<b>23</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>93</b>
<i>Sud-Est</i>	<i>Jacmel</i>	1	5	6
		3	9	12
		1	6	7
		0	5	5
		6	5	11
		1	5	6
		3	5	8
	<i>Marigot</i>	16	30	46
		26	28	54
	<i>Anse-à-Pitre</i>	18	46	64
	<i>Cayes-Jacmel</i>	8	34	42
		3	4	7
			<b>86</b>	<b>182</b>
<i>Artibonite</i>	<i>Saint-Marc</i>	1	6	7
		1	6	7
		1	7	8
		7	20	27
		1	6	7
		1	5	6
		1	9	10
		1	11	12
	<i>L'Estere</i>	4	31	35
		6	22	28
	<i>Pte Riv. de l'Artibonite</i>	1	10	11
		6	29	35

		18	59	77
		1	6	7
	<i>Gonaïves</i>	5	39	44
		9	42	51
	<i>Marchand Dessalines</i>	1	5	6
		<b>65</b>	<b>313</b>	<b>378</b>
<i>Ouest</i>	<i>Petit-Goave</i>	27	58	85
		0	11	11
		0	5	5
		2	9	11
	<i>Gressier</i>	3	9	12
		1	4	5
		0	4	4
	<i>Carrefour</i>	3	13	16
		16	9	25
	<i>Grand Goave</i>	2	6	8
	<i>Ganthier</i>	1	5	6
		0	6	6
	<i>Croix-des- Bouquets</i>	1	5	6
		2	5	7
		2	9	11
		2	14	16
	<i>Léogane</i>	4	10	14
<i>Thomazeau</i>	1	5	6	
		<b>67</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>254</b>
<i>Nippes</i>	<i>Miragoane</i>	9	3	12
	<i>Paillant</i>	6	14	20
		<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>99 rencontres</b>		<b>505</b>	<b>1447</b>	<b>1952</b>

### 5. Coordinations Communales (rencontres avec les autorités)

<i>Departement</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Femmes</i>	<i>Hommes</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Nord</i>	<i>Cap-Haïtien</i>	1	9	10
	<i>Limbé</i>	13	25	38

		6	9	15
		<b>20</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>63</b>
<i>Nord-Est</i>	<i>Trou du Nord</i>	0	6	6
	<i>Fort-Liberté</i>	2	14	16
		3	11	14
	<i>Ouanaminthe</i>	1	6	7
		<b>6</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>43</b>
<i>Nord-Ouest</i>	<i>St-Louis Nord</i>	1	10	11
		16	36	52
		<b>17</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>63</b>
<i>Centre</i>	<i>Lascahobas</i>	9	21	30
	<i>Hinche</i>	5	20	25
		5	20	25
		1	11	12
		10	28	38
		5	8	13
	<i>Savannette</i>	3	23	26
	<i>Mirebalais</i>	3	6	9
	<i>Thomassique</i>	17	38	55
<i>Thomonde</i>	23	21	44	
		<b>81</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>277</b>
<i>Grand-Anse</i>	<i>Chambellan</i>	3	13	16
		12	26	38
		7	10	17
	<i>Pestel</i>	5	42	47
	<i>Jérémie</i>	4	16	20
		11	12	23
		17	26	43
<i>Moron</i>	9	37	46	
		<b>68</b>	<b>182</b>	<b>250</b>
<i>Sud</i>	<i>Camp Perrin</i>	7	9	16
	<i>Cayes</i>	2	10	12
	<i>Port-Salut</i>	3	11	14
	<i>Torbeck</i>	1	10	11
		<b>13</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>53</b>
<i>Sud-Est</i>	<i>Marigot</i>	16	30	46
		<b>16</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>46</b>
<i>Artibonite</i>	<i>Pte Riv. de l'Artibonite</i>	6	31	37
		4	37	41
	<i>Gonaïves</i>	11	24	35
		<b>21</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>113</b>
<i>Ouest</i>	<i>Carrefour</i>	0	5	5
	<i>Petit-Goave</i>	20	52	72
		0	5	5
	<i>Croix-des-Bouquets</i>	6	22	28
<i>Thomazeau</i>	4	32	36	
		<b>30</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>146</b>



<b>40 rencontres</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>782</b>	<b>1054</b>
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**6. Coordinations Départementales (rencontres avec le réseau des CI)**

<b>Department</b>	<b>Femmes</b>	<b>Hommes</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>Nord-Est</i>	1	7	8
	10	20	30
	2	6	8
	<b>13</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>46</b>
<i>Nord-Ouest</i>	2	5	7
	1	6	7
	0	3	3
	<b>3</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>17</b>
<i>Centre</i>	20	75	95
	1	6	7
	6	9	15
	<b>27</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>117</b>
<i>Sud</i>	2	13	15
	<b>2</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>
<i>Sud-Est</i>	3	15	18
	3	14	17
	<b>6</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>12 rencontres</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>230</b>

**7. Coordinations Départementales (rencontres avec les autorités)**

<i>Department</i>	<i>Femmes</i>	<i>Hommes</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Nord</i>	0	8	8
	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
<i>Nord-Ouest</i>	0	6	6
	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
<i>Grand-Anse</i>	2	8	10
	19	47	66
	19	37	56
	<b>40</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>132</b>
<i>Sud</i>	34	93	127
	<b>34</b>	<b>93</b>	<b>127</b>
<i>Artibonite</i>	1	11	12
	0	5	5
	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>8 rencontres</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>290</b>

#### 8. Rencontres Sectorielles

<i>Department</i>	<i>Commune</i>	<i>Femmes</i>	<i>Hommes</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Artibonite</i>	<i>Petite-Rivière</i>	6	37	43
<i>Nord-Est</i>	<i>Ouanaminthe</i>	8	38	46
<i>Centre</i>	<i>Lascahobas</i>	20	61	81
<i>Nippes</i>	<i>Arnaud</i>	12	28	40
<i>Sud</i>	<i>Camp-Perrin</i>	8	28	36
<i>Grand-Anse</i>	<i>Jérémie</i>	4	16	20
<b>6 rencontres</b>		<b>58</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>266</b>



## ANNEX 6: NDI, THE U.N., AND THE US / HAITI RELATIONSHIP.

This final appendix will briefly discuss some issues that were raised in the TOR but which were tangential to the central thrust of the body of the report.

### NDI AND THE U.N. MISSION FOR THE STABILIZATION OF HAITI (MINUSTAH).

**Background to occupation of Haiti by foreign troops.** Haiti was occupied by American troops from 1915 to 1934. In September of 1994, this time with the authorization of the U.N. 20,000 American troops arrived back in Haiti to return deposed President Aristide to power. Unlike the earlier occupation, however, this was received with popular approval and with no resistance. Though some critical media sources still refer to it as “the American invasion of 2004”, this writer was present shortly thereafter and was surprised to see Haitians on the street waving to and cheering the American humvees and other U.S. military vehicles. The American military presence and the return of Aristide signalled the end of an economically stressful embargo, the end of a repressive military regime, and the return of a president who, though now hated by many popular sectors, was strongly idealized by others. He was still seen by many as “Pè Titid”, Father Titid, alluding to his popular image as a Catholic priest who had dared to protest under the reign of Jean Claude Duvalier. The last contingent of 3,000 U.S. troops departed in the year 2000.

**The arrival of U.N. troops.** Whereas this American occupation preceded the arrival of Aristide back to power, the current U.N. military presence began in February of 2004 after his second departure. (There is still heated debate about whether he was overthrown by the U.S. France and Canada, or whether he voluntarily fled to save his life with the assistance of the U.S. embassy.) The U.N. military presence was first defined as a Multinational Interim Force sent to prevent chaos. No attempts were made to return Aristide again, nor was there massive majority mobilizations of the Haitian population to achieve that end. His presidency had been a period of division. His Lavalas Party engaged in acts of violence, some of them condoned by Aristide himself. And paradoxically his marriage tarnished his popular image of the Priest / President. (The religious dimension of popular support for Aristide is given insufficient attention in the secular, academic literature.)

Four months after their arrival, the U.N. Multinational Interim Force was officially converted into its present status, MINUSTAH. Though intended to be a short term presence, they have been kept on through continuing U.N. resolutions. As of Aug. 31, 2012, MINUSTAH has over 10,000 armed, uniformed personnel in Haiti, more than 7,000 of whom are military personnel and the remainder police.<sup>14</sup> Few American, Canadian, or French troops are present in MINUSTAH. The country that supplies the largest numbers of troops is Brazil. Uruguay, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Jordan follow in that order. These are countries which, unlike America, Canada and France, have no historical

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<sup>14</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/facts.shtml>

ties with Haiti and no large populations of Haitian emigrants sending back remittances. Nor do Haitians know enough about these countries to have any strong sentiments about them.

**MINUSTAH's controversial role.** The role of MINUSTAH in Haiti is a matter of controversy, and the facts emphasized will depend on the political stance of the beholder. The critics who want an end to the MINUSTAH presence allude to incidents in which MINUSTAH troops have killed civilians in Port-au-Prince raids, sexually abused minors, lynched a young boy for stealing, and – most seriously – introduced cholera into a country that had never had it before. (The Asian strain of cholera began in the vicinity of a Nepalese troop base near a major river that carried the disease downstream. That particular strain of cholera is endemic to Nepal. The accusation is not frivolous.) In MINUSTAH's favor are cited its activities in training the new Haitian police force, helping to establish a judiciary, doing search and rescue efforts after the earthquake, creating security for electoral purposes, and performing civic education.

**Norway, NDI and MINUSTAH.** It is in these last two roles that NDI has interacted sporadically with MINUSTAH. During this Norwegian phase of NDI funding there has been some minor collaboration between MINUSTAH and NDI in the Ouanaminthe area, for example, in matters of civic education. We received the impression, however, that NDI's association with MINUSTAH was occasional and totally non-controversial in the eyes of the local population. In the border town of Ouanaminthe, where this collaboration was reported to us, MINUSTAH has a neutral public image, neither positive nor negative.

Spanish speaking South American troops are deployed there because of the proximity to the Dominican Republic. They are forbidden by MINUSTAH policy to get involved in local policing matters. Their role is unclear to the population. We have heard some refer to them mockingly as TOURISTAH. We have seen them, on market days, simply forming a line in the middle of the bridge that leads across the river into the Dominican Republic where the market is located. They function as a silent traffic island; people going into the D.R. walk to the right; those coming out walk to the left. We were told by one of the groups we interviewed in Ouanaminthe that if any conflict arises between Dominicans and Haitians, the Dominican soldiers leap into action brandishing their weapons toward Haiti. At such moments MINUSTAH troops disappear. They are not allowed to get involved. The Haitians are helpless, with no soldiers of their own to defend their interest.

**The negative symbolism of MINUSTAH.** This in a sense reveals one harmful element in the presence of MINUSTAH, a problem that is related not to the behavior of foreign troops, but to their very presence. Haitians in Ouanaminthe have never expressed to us fear of Dominican troops on the other side of the border. Dominicans are not going to fire guns or rockets across the border, or storm into Haiti on troop vehicles. But Haitians have expressed to us humiliation and anger that, whereas Dominicans have a well organized government on their side of the border and are protected by Dominican soldiers and police, Haiti no longer has soldiers, and the Haitian State has virtually no presence in the border area. Dominicans are protected by their government; Haitians are not. It is less a matter of fear of invasion than a sense of socio-personal humiliation. In this sense the presence of the foreign troops of MINUSTAH, many from third world countries which Haitians neither know or respect, as the only armed security force in this border area, and all over Haiti, reduces the stature and the very legitimacy of the Haitian State in the eyes of the population.

This has practical implications, we believe, for NDI and for Norway or any country that wishes to fund programs to “build democracy”. For this reason we repeat the caveat stated in the annex that discussed the evolution of the Haitian State. Particularly during a period of military occupation, there is little that any foreign country can do to help the Haitian State at its highest centralized levels, including at its parliamentary level, via well-intentioned but essentially futile “governance” interventions” Interventions are much more likely to be effective – and not simply empty ritual gestures – if they are done at a local level. The task is first to organize citizens into non-partisan advocacy groups, as NDI has done. But then they must be funded, once they are organized, to carry out concrete local interventions that involve both citizens and elected officials in the honest, transparent management of real resources to solve real problems. If committees and dialogue do not result eventually in concrete action, the committees will eventually dissolve and the dialogues cease.

### NDI, THE U.S., AND NORWAY.

A final question that may be of concern to Norwegian development specialists concerns the possible implications to NDI of its status as an American NGO and its consequent association, in the eyes of Haitians, with the U.S. In countries where there is national or local hostility to the U.S., or suspicion of the possibly negative intentions of U.S. agencies, it might be counterproductive for a “third party government” to fund its activities through an American NGO.

In Haiti this is not the case for several compelling historical, social, and even linguistic reasons.

- The American occupation of the early 1900’s is not emphasized in Haitian schools as a cause for national anger. (This is in contrast to Dominican history textbooks, which in the past emphasized to the point of exaggeration the “evil character” of the Haitian occupation of the D.R. from 1822 to 1844 – as though it happened 10 years ago.) American mistreatment of Haiti in the past is a minor theme in Haitian schools and public discourse.
- Accusations about American connivance in the second removal of Aristide are emphatically not a matter of national rage. Many Haitians, even in popular sectors, were by then happy to see him go and still speak negatively of the violent behavior of his political party Lavalas. Furthermore it is unlikely that the mass of the population even agree with the accusation that he was removed by the Americans. It is known beyond a doubt that American troops came to restore him to power in 1994. But it was the imminent approach of Haitian rebels, not of American invaders, that triggered his flight in 2004. There is no collective anger among Haitians toward the U.S. because of the Aristide issue.
- Hundreds of thousands of Haitians live in the U.S., hundreds of thousands receive remittances from the U.S., and hundreds of thousands would leave to the U.S. tomorrow if they had visas and plane tickets. Knowledgeable Haitians have assured us that today, if we include the diaspora, there are more Haitians who speak English than French.

In short NDI's status as an American institution is no ways a liability in Haiti. And a country that funds NDI is not "stained" by the association.<sup>15</sup>

But its American status is not a particular asset either. In addition to the emerging status of English as Haiti's de-facto second language after Creole, there is another linguistic factor which somewhat neutralizes the importance of the nationality of foreigners. Haitians constantly refer in Creole to all foreigners as *blan*. The word comes from French, but it does not mean "white". It means "foreigner".<sup>16</sup> A foreigner in Haiti is first and foremost referred to as a *blan*. Across the border Dominicans referring to a foreigner will generally use the national label – americano, francés, ingles, etc. But Haitians will rarely use the national designator. A foreigner in the street will be addressed simply as *blan*. Foreigners are, in other words, all lumped under one lexical item. The nation they come from is a secondary element in the identification.

In that sense NDI is seen first and foremost as an organisation that is funded by *blan*, foreigners, not an *òganizasyon ameriken*. The same would be true of a French, Norwegian, or Taiwanese<sup>17</sup> NGO. The personnel are all lumped together first and foremost as *blan*, not as *fransè*, *nòvejen*, or *taiwanè*.

For this cluster of reasons – historical, social, and even linguistic – MFA need have no concern that its funding of an American NGO affects local Haitian response to the project.

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<sup>15</sup> It can also be noted that the former field director in Haiti was Costa Rican and the present one Canadian. There is no rule in NDI that field directors must be American. But this is essentially irrelevant to the status of NDI in Haitian eyes.

<sup>16</sup> An American black that came to our village was referred to as a *blan nwa*. It does not mean a "black white person" but rather a "black foreigner". To refer to the color white, Creole generally uses the term *blanch*, which comes from the feminine form of *blanc* in French. A white house would be a *kay blanch*. If you say *kay blan*, it means "the house of the foreigner."

<sup>17</sup> During the field visit the team leader interviewed managers of a Taiwanese-funded village project, but not about the NDI work.

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