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RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TANZANIA

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RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TANZANIA

A Study of Experiences with RUDEP and KIDEP and a Discussion of Alternative Strategies to District Development in Tanzania

By
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Preface

This report is the result of a study which has been commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to look into the experiences with the Norwegian supported rural development programmes RUDEP and KIDEP in Tanzania. On the basis of an assessment of experiences with these programmes together with a review of the experiences of other donors' support to similar programmes in Tanzania, the report discusses alternative strategies to supporting rural development and assistance to strengthening of local government institutions.

The project has been carried out by Jon Naustdalslid and Berit Aasen, with Jon Naustdalslid as project leader. The research has been undertaken partly as a desk study in Norway and partly as a field study in Tanzania.

The project team has been assisted by Stein Sundstøl Eriksen in preparing the bibliography. To assist the team in collecting relevant martial for the study in Tanzania NIBR sub contracted Institute of Development Management (IDM). Mrs. Divina Shio was responsible for this assignment and did an excellent job by compiling part of the bibliography. The team has also benefited greatly from discussions with Tanzanian colleagues. A mini workshop was organized as part of the field work in Tanzania in November 1994. A particular word of thanks is due to Dr. J. Kuzilwa, Dr. W. Mmbaga and Mrs. D. Shio for contributing to that workshop.

This report has been prepared jointly by Berit Aasen and Jon Naustdalslid.

NIBR, June 1995,

Arvid Hallèn
Director

Abbreviations

ALAT	Association of Local Authorities in Tanzania
BRALUP	Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of Dar es Salaam
CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi
CD	Community development
CPHE	Community participaton and health education
CRDB	Cooperative and Rural Development Bank
DANIDA	Department of International Development Cooperation (Denmark)
DCDF	District Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
DCDO	District community development office
DDC	Disttrict Development Committee
DDF	District Development Fund
DE	District engineer
DED	District Executive Director
DEO	District Extension Officer
DGIS	Direktoraat Generaal Internationale Samenwerking (Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation)
DPLO	District Planning Officer
DRDP	District Rural Development Programme (DGIS)
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
ESAP	Economic and Social Action Programme
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization (UN)
FC	Financial Controller
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoT	Government of Tanzania
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
HIMA	Hifadhi Mazingira (environmental protection)
HESAWA	Health through Sanitation and Water
IBRD	World Bank
IDM	Insitute of Development Management
IGP	National Programme for Action for Sustainable Income Generation
IRA	Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam
KIDEP	Kigoma Rural Integrated Development Program
KILIMO	Ministry of Agriculture
LAMP	Babati Land Management Programme
LDC	Least developed countries
LGSC	Local Government Service Commission
MAD	Mwimbi Area Development Project

M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MLNRT	Ministry of Lands, National Resources and Tourism
NBC	National Bank of Commerce
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non governmental organization
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
O&M	Operation and maintenance
OSO	Orgut Support Office
PC	Programme Coordinator
PILOG	Pilot Programme for Rural Development and Strengthening of Local Government
PMO	Prime Ministers Office
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RDC	Regional Development Committees
RDD	Regional Development Director
RE	Regional Engineer
READ	Regional Economic Affairs Department
RIDEP	Rural Integrated Development Programme
RPFB	Rolling Plan and Forward Budget
RPLO	Regional Planning Officer
RUC	RUDEP Coordinator
RUDEP	Rukwa Rural Integrated Development Programme
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SECAP	Soil Erosion Control/Agroforestry Project (GTZ - Lushoto)
SHISCAP	Shinyanga Soil Conservation and Afforestation Programme
SIDA	Swedish International Development Authority
SIDO	Small Industry Development Organization
TA	Technical Assistance
TAS	Tanzanian Shilling
TIRDEP	Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme (GTZ)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nation Development Fund
VDP	Village Development Programme (GTZ)
VWA	Village Water Attendant
VWC	Village Water Committee
VWF	Village Water Fund
ZCO	Zonal Coordinating Office


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Executive summary

Chapter 1

Since the late 1970s Norway has given support to rural development in Rukwa and Kigoma regions in Tanzania. In 1986 Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme (RUDEP) was established. Kigoma Integrated Rural Development Programme (KIDEP) was established three years later in 1989.

This report presents the results of a study to examine the experiences with the two programmes so far, and to suggest alternative approaches to supporting rural development. The project has been commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The study has consisted of four main elements:
First, it contains a summary assessment of the experiences with RUDEP and KIDEP. This has basically been a desk study. The results of this part of the projects is described in chapter 2, 3 and 4.

Secondly, the project has studied the experiences of other similar programmes in Tanzania. We visited a number of donor organizations in Tanzania which support rural development programmes and collected information about their experiences and their current policies concerning support to such programmes. This part of the project is reported in chapter 6.

Thirdly, the Terms of Reference call for an examination of alternative strategies for supporting rural development. This part of the study has to be seen in relation to the ongoing debate on a general reorientation of Norwegian development support to Tanzania. In the new strategy for development cooperation between Tanzania and Norway more emphasis is put on supporting institutional strengthening in the public sector. This should again be seen in the context of the ongoing Civil Service Reform Programme. Within this general context it was seen as an objective for our study to examine ways and means of reorienting the present RUDEP and KIDEP more in the direction of programmes to support local government institutional strengthening. Chapter 5 gives a summary overview of the ongoing reform processes in Tanzania, and in chapter 7 and 8 we discuss alternative strategies.

Finally, it was agreed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that as part of the project a bibliography of relevant literature and documents

should be prepared. This has been done, and the bibliography is found in chapter 9.

Chapter 2

Rukwa Region is situated in the south-west of Tanzania. The region has the lowest population density of all Tanzanian regions. The region is predominantly an agricultural region. In the national plans Rukwa has a role as a major food production region of Tanzania, and as a grain reserve area. Earlier agricultural campaigns have focused on the increase of maize production.

The region is one of the least industrialized regions in Tanzania. The lack of technical and economic infrastructure is a serious hinderance to economic development.

Rukwa scores low on social indicators for health and education, and the service provision of primary education and rural health services is low. Rukwa Region is regarded as a 'backward and remote' region. This contributes to the difficulties there have been in recruiting a sufficient number of qualified staff to the local administration.

Kigoma Region is located in Western Tanzania. Kigoma is also characterized as a remote area, and scores low on social indicators. Child mortality is among the highest in Tanzania, and life expectancy at birth is 40 years. Local government staff, as well as teachers for primary education are often reluctant to be transferred to Kigoma.

Due to good rainfall there is usually enough food year around. There is, however, some indication of malnutrition especially among the young children, 1-5 years old. Kigoma is the main palm oil producing region in Tanzania, with a long tradition of oil palm growing. There have been several attempts to upgrade the traditional and inefficient extraction of palm oil, but the attempts have made little success.

Kigoma does not have any specific place in national development plans. The region has traditionally been a labour reserve. High out migration seems to have continued even though opportunities in agricultural wage labour in other regions have declined.

There is a higher population density in the agricultural zone towards the Burundi border, and the areas are experiencing pressure on land, and increasing conflict over land.

Chapter 3

NORAD support to the rural development programmes in Rukwa and Kigoma started in the mid and late 1980s as a continuation and expan-

sion of earlier support in the water sector.

Rukwa Rural Integrated Development Program (RUDEP) was started up in 1985, after a feasibility study was conducted early 1984. A four year period, Phase I, was started in 1985-89. A new agreement for Phase II was signed in 1991, for four years 1991-1995. A total of 206.3 Mill. NOK has been granted to RUDEP over a period of 9-10 years.

RUDEP was designed as a multi sector programme, with a process planning approach, i.e. with a general overall objective of contributing to the social and economic development in the region. Projects and activities which should contribute to the objective were to be developed, planned and designed by the local institutions involved.

The design for the programme has been a process oriented planning approach, where institutional capacity and project input are developed simultaneously.

RUDEP has mainly been created as a regional programme. RUDEP had in 1994 six Programme Areas:

1 Management and operation
2 Improvement of social services (health, water and education)
3 Natural resources development (agriculture and forestry)
4 Infrastructure development (main rural roads and housing)
5 Local development through participatory planning (community development, area development funds, DDF)
6 Economic production and small scale industries (SIDO support)

Kigoma Rural Integrated Development Programme (KIDEP) was started up in 1989, after a feasibility study was conducted in 1987. The agreement was signed in 1989 for Phase I, for 3 years 1989-92. A second agreement was was signed in July 1993, for a two year period, 1993-1995. A total of 54.2 Mill. NOK has been granted to KIDEP over 5-6 years.

The overall objective for the programme has remained the same during the whole period, i.e. the programme is to contribute to lasting improvements of economic and social development, and to improve income generating activities, poverty alleviations and improved social services.

Institutional development is an important part of the programme. The development of planning and implementation capacity at the regional and district level is seen as a precondition for effective implementation of the programme.

The programme has included the following activities:

- a District Development Fund (DDF), to support self-help projects at village level, originating from the village and implemented by the villagers with assistance from the district
- projects in selected sectors, including:
  * afforestation and resource protection
  * ecological sustainable agriculture
  * distribution of agricultural products and support for cooperatives
  * transport, rural roads
  * technical and vocational training
- Insitutional development, training and infrastructure

Chapter 4

The existing documentation of the programmes is weak as a basis for analysing their impact. It is also weak on reporting on output and outcomes of the programmes and their activities. No baseline exists for any of the programmes.

On the basis of these shortcomings in the data, one has to be very cautious in one's conclusions. However, it seems fair to state that RUDEP and KIDEP have not been overly successful programmes, but neither have they been total failures. The programmes show weak results, and have had limited impact on the rural population's welfare and on the rural economy. There has been limited institutional capacity building, and weak sustainability in the programmes. If there is rapid phasing out of donor support, it is likely that most activities will close down. Institutional development is one area that is poorly documented in existing reports.

However, the programmes have only been in existence for a relative short period, between 5 to ten years. Given the fiancial and economic crisis in rural Tanzania, it would have been unrealistic to expect high results.

The programmes have witnessed some changes in the goals of support to the productive sector. There has been a shift in the goals away from support to agricultural development to supporting social infrastructure. This can partly be explained by the problems the agricultural sector experienced in Tanzania during these years. The crisis in the rural financing can explain why the investments in productive activities have been so limited.

Participation and community development has been an important part of the design of the programmes. The balance between institutional strengthening of local government administration as opposed to promoting popular participation and community development has been diffi-

cult. Although in principle the commitment to participatory planning and community development remains in the documents, the focus has shifted to institutional support for local government administration and its staff. There has also been an increased district focus, although this shift has been very slow in RUDEP.

In the regions, the support to the water sector is undoubtedly the most visible and noted achievement of NORAD support to the regions, and it is a general viewpoint in the regions that NORAD should continue the support to the water sector until it has secured an organizational and financial basis for operation and maintenance.

With a rapid phasing out of RUDEP and KIDEP, and with no support to the water sector after that time, it is most likely that the water supply schemes will deteriorate and that the number of people supplied with water will be reduced. With the current financial crises in local government funding, the districts can not maintain the water supply system installed during the last 10-15 years without outside financial support.

The DDF (district development fund) projects are another important component of the programmes. DDF projects were implemented in KIDEP from 1991, and in RUDEP from the financial year 1992/93. There were important weaknesses in the planning and implementation of the DDF projects. DDF finance activities like social infrastructure constructions, class rooms, secondary schools, workshops and staff houses. DDF projects can in many ways be seen as a way of subsidising the provision of social services by joining donor funding with local village contributions. In itself this might be relevant, but questions can be asked as to what extent DDF projects contribute to greater participation by the villagers in the local decision making, planning and implementation of the villagers' own projects.

Many villagers are tired of the repeated requests for labour and contributions to village self-help projects. They are also supposed to pay local taxes, and pay user fees for education and health services. Unless the delivery and quality of the social services is improved, there will be increased resistance to these demands.

Compared to management of aid to sector programmes and projects the management of district development programmes might seem cumbersome and resource intensive, both in the use of personnel and funds. They are seen as "expensive". RUDEP and KIDEP have approached district development through combining direct funding of activites with institutional strengthening. Institutional capacity building takes long time, and rural intervention programmes therefore usually have a long term commitment, with substantial input in institution building in an early phase of the programme, both in the form of funds

and technical assistance. If sustainability can not be evaluated in the short run, then there is a need for yardsticks to be used for programme reviews in the short term, to review whether the programme heads in the right directions. Cost awareness and phasing out plans can be two such issues. Simple guidelines can be developed to screen institutional aspects of other local level institutions.

If one compares the objectives, designs and outcomes of the programmes with the new NORAD strategy, several issues emerge:

(i) the objectives of the programmes are clearly within the priority areas of the new strategy, this include both institutional development, support to productive sector and social infrastructure

(ii) the development of parallel structures as in the case of RUDEP and to a much less degree with KIDEP, is clearly undesirable, and should be avoided. Integration into the district administration as in the case of KIDEP should continue

(iii) the emphasis on popular participation and community development is clearly within the new strategy

(iv) there is a need for strengthening the emphasis on sustainability, through improved competence within the programmes on financial and economic efficiency and control

(v) the new strategy recognizes that institutional development is a long term commitment, but may be unduly optimistic about the time frame necessary for reaching organizational and financial sustainability

The programmes are as far as we can see not in conflict with policies and strategies within Tanzania. Neither does donor support to district development necessarily contradict donor support to civil service reform on the national level. They can rather be seen as complementary. There is a need for pilot projects, and district level studies on aspects of improved planning and reporting routines. It is also a need to collect information and experience from the district level about local implementation of the reform.

Chapter 5

In agreement with the World Bank and IMF Tanzania embarked on a structural adjustment programme in 1986 to curb the economic crisis in the country. the programme included a range of policies aimed at liberalizing international and internal trade, unifying the exchange rate, reviving export, stimulating domestic saving, and restoring fiscal sustainability. In 1989 a second stage of restructuring was introduced with the "Economic and Social Action Programme" (ESAP). The latter programme also includes programmes for reform of the public sector, including financial reforms, parastatal reforms, planning and budget reforms and a civil service reform. So far local government is practically untouched by the civil service reform programme. The

programme for reduction of the public sector through retrenchment of employees has, however, also included local government.

For more than ten years (from 1972 to 1984) there was no elected local government in Tanzania. Local administration was all state administration, mainly concentrated to the regional level. The emphasis on Regional Integrated Development Programmes (RIDEPs) was seen as an element in the institutional development of the regions. In 1984 elected local government was re-introduced. The re-allocation of resources and finances from the regions to the districts which was supposed to go together with the reform did not take place, however. The new district administration has been weak and districts have had great problems due to a number of complex reasons: lack of qualified personnel, lack of resources, poor accountability, poor legitimacy and lacking ability and capacity to collect local revenue.

The district administration and district politics have also been closely controlled by central government. During One Party rule CCM played a clear statutory role in controlling local activities through its formal positions throughout the local government hierarchy. The village government was in practice an extension of the local CCM branch. With the transition to multi party rule the formal connection between party and local government has been weakened. But still local government is very much dependent on central government. At central government level local government affairs are placed in the Prime Minister's Office together with responsibilities for regional planning. This administrative structure seems to be motivated by a wish to integrate local government in the national planning system.

Presently the regional planning system has come under stress. There might now be room for reforms, also of the regional administration, which might leave room for a more autonomous local government at district level.

Chapter 6

In chapter 6 the experiences and current strategies of a number of donor supported rural development programmes in Tanzania are reviewed. The programmes and activities included in the review are:

- SIDA (Sweden): The HESAWA programme in North Western Tanzania and the Land Management Programme (LAMP) in Babati District.

- DANIDA (Denmark): The HIMA programme in Iringa region.

- DGIS/SNV (Netherlands): District Rural Development Programme (DRDP), covering 11 districts, most of which are

located in Northern and North Western Tanzania.

- Ireland: The Kilosa District Rural Development Programme.
- GTZ (Germany): Support to rural development projects in Tanga Region.
- UNCDF/UNDP: Planned support to district development in Mwanza Region.

The various projects and programmes cover a wide variety of approaches to supporting rural development. Some of the programmes are focused in the sense that the support is directed towards a more or less restricted area of rural development. This is the case with for example the HESAWA programme which addresses health and sanitation problems, and with programmes such as LAMP and HIMA which are concerned with environmental and land use problems. Others are more general district development programmes (such as the District Development Programme supported by the Netherlands).

The programmes also vary with respect to the emphasis they put on local institution building. Whereas the German-supported village development programme in Tanga Region explicitly excludes local government institution building from the programme, all other programmes have this as a more or less clearly stated objective. It is probably most explicit in the Dutch-supported District Rural Development Programme. Here, strengthening of local government is a key rationale for the programme itself. Most programmes are considering to give more attention to local government institution building.

In most cases concern with local institution building means support to strengthening the district administration and the district councils. To varying degrees the projects also focus their attention on strengthening institutional structures at the village level. In some programmes, like LAMP and HESAWA this seems to be an important concern. Measures are built into the programme procedures so that the villages shall be stimulated to play a more active role in planning and implementing project activities. On the other hand practically none of the programmes focus their attention on institution building at the regional level.

The projects are less concerned with institution building outside the public sector. This does not mean that they are not supporting private sector activities. Examples of activities which are targeted towards the private sector may be UNDP supported programme for Sustainable Income Generation (IGP). The point is that support is channelled to private sector activities and projects through project organizations. We have found no examples that programmes include targeted activity

aiming at strengthening the ordinary Tanzanian institutional infrastructure in the private sector. Such activities could be support to building credit institutions or producers' organizations at central and local levels.

There is a clear connection between the emphasis put on strengthening of local government institutions and the degree to which programme activities are integrated with the ordinary Tanzanian system at local level. The extremes are the German approach on the one hand and the approach followed by The Netherlands on the other hand. In the case of the Dutch policy, no separate donor organization exists at all at the local level. All activity and all support is channelled through the District Council system. The Germans, on the other hand, have their own project organization which is completely independent of the Tanzanian system. The other programmes which we have reviewed combine integration with some kind of programme organization at local level. The programme organization takes care of programme coordination, monitoring of resource use; and to varying degrees it also provides technical support and advise. Most donors express a wish to reduce the local presence. None, however, foresee the possibility that in the near future it will be possible to run district development programmes without any donor (i.e. expatriate) presence at the local level.

There seems to be a trade off between the degree to which the donor operates a separate project organization at local level and the degree to which the donor (i.e., the donor representative) has power to interfere directly into the district decision making system. Financial control is seen as particularly important. Again, this may be most clearly demonstrated by the Dutch approach. Here there is no parallel donor organization. Instead, the donor coordinator is placed within the district organization. He has wide power to even veto decisions made by the district council or administration if such a decision should be in conflict with the programme objectives. Other programmes have reserved more control over donor-provided resources outside the district system. An example may be the LAMP programme in Babati. This programme operates a car pool outside the district system, so that the district in practice has to rent the cars from the car pool. In this way the district may be controlled "from outside." As long as it operates within the framework drawn up by the programme the district may apparently be more autonomous.

The programmes also vary concerning their relationships to central government authorities. Some programmes have no explicit organizational attachment to the central government level. This applies to for example the Dutch supported district development programme. Here all contact goes directly between the embassy and the individual district programmes. Other programmes are more clearly sector oriented. These are usually related more or less closely to sector ministries. This

applies to for example HESAWA (Maendeleo) and LAMP (Ministry of Lands ...). Local government affairs are placed under the Prime Minister's Office. In spite of this, only few programmes involve the PMO directly in the programmes. In the case of HIMA the PMO has a coordinating role, whereas various sector activities of the programme relate to line ministries.

Some programmes, like LAMP, HIMA and HESAWA, have programme organizations at regional level. These organizational units provide backstopping services and coordinate the district activities. They also relate more or less closely to the Regional system on the Tanzanian side. Representatives for most programmes agreed that the role of the regional administration in Tanzania should be reduced, and that more activity should be shifted to district level. In line with this policy most donors aim at reducing their presence at regional level.

Chapter 7

Chapter 7 discusses a number of key principles for rural development and institutional strengthening at local level which may offer chances for a more sustainable approch to local development. The discussion is placed within the context of the new strategy for Norwegian assistance to Tanzania. In the strategy, support to district development is placed within the wider context of a programme to strengthen public administration. The basic approach is well in line with the "structural adjustment approach" where institutional shortcomings are seen as "bottle necks" for social and economic development. This may be a too narrow conception of the scope of current problems. The present crisis in Tanzania and other African countries can hardly be explained as only an institutional crisis. There is also a real need for increased transfer from the rich world and a change in the terms of trade between poor countries like Tanzania and the rest of the world. At the same time as we acknowledge the seriousness of the institutional problems, both at central and local levels of government, we also underscore the need to support rural development directly. Support to strengthening of local government institutions may be a precondition for more viable development strategies at local level, but such support should not be seen as an alternative to rural development. With this reservation the chapter goes on to discuss principles for local government institution building which may serve to strengthen the local capabilities for rural development.

The basic principles for more sustainable rural development programmes as seen in this perspective are summed up as follows:

- Integration of programme activities with the Tanzanian institutional system is important. As far as absolutely possible one should try to avoid building up a separate project organization as

a parallel structure to Tanzanian institutions.

- This should not necessarily be taken to mean unconditional integration, or integration without donor follow up and control. On the contrary: Conditionalities should be tied to decision making procedures, participation, accountability etc. instead of relating them to achievement of developmental objectives or to policy priorities. Within the agreed framework all priorities and policy decisions should be the responsibility of Tanzanian institutions.

- To the extent that institutional change is made an explicit objective of the programme the contract between the donor and the recipient must also contain clear conditionalities relating to the institutional objectives to be obtained. Such objectives should not be too detailed, but they should give a clear direction to the reform process to take place.

- Donor presence in the form of expatriate personnel should be kept at a minimum. All expatriates should be posted within the ordinary Tanzanian institutional system. Great efforts should be put into avoiding expatriates establishing themselves as "organizations within the organization." On the other hand expatriates may be given wide powers and key roles as long as they operate within the ordinary organizational context.

- The donor input into the district in terms of funds and activities should be kept at a relatively small scale. Capacity should be built up gradually and over time.

- Priority should be given to institution building rather than to implementing developmental objectives. However, institution building should not replace developmental projects. Economic aid to support rural development through projects at the local level should be combined with institution building.

- Local government cannot be seen in isolation from the national system of governance. A programme to improve local government therefor cannot be carried out in isolation at the local level. It also has to include institutional development at central government level.

- Institution building in local government is not only a question of training and development of new or improved skills. It is not only a question of reorganization and formal procedure. It is equally much - and perhaps more - a question of
  - attitudes and organizational culture.
  - resources (material and economic).
  - national context - i.e. relationships between central and local

government.
- the wider local context of civil society at the local level - such as activity by NGOs and interest groups.

- Institution building is not a simple linear process which can be easily programmed from outside. It is difficult to programme and it has to be based on and activate indigenous processes in the institutions themselves. Institutions are slow to change. One way to speed up change may be to place "change agents" within the organization/institution. In the case of Tanzanian local government institutions such change agents might help to increase the outside pressure for change.

- A programme for rural development and local government institutional strengthening should be organized as a learning process. This will require the programme to be set up together with a scheme for monitoring and evaluation. Such an evaluation programme should also be integrated in the Tanzanian system by involving Tanzanian professional expertise in developing the scheme and to carry out the monitoring/evaluation. This may be done in cooperation with Norwegian expertise.

Chapter 8

Based on the general principles outlined in chapter 7, chapter 8 contains an outline of a possible programme for strengthening local government. A basic feature of the strategy is its emphasis on change as a learning process. The proposal is therefore presented as "A Pilot Programme for Local Government Support" and referred to in shorthand as PILOG.

Some of the ideas to the experimental character of the proposed programme are based on the experiences with the Norwegian "Free Commune Experiment". It is emphasised that the programme should be particularly concerned with organising a monitoring and evaluation programme as an integrated element in the programme.

The programme should also be attached to the wider national programme of civil service reform, since local government can hardly be conceived of in isolation from the wider system of government. It is therefore important that a programme for strengthening of local government is organized at the national level and is seen as a learning experience both for central and local government.

At the local level the programme should focus on the districts and aim at improving both the administrative and the political functioning of the districts. Responsibility for the programme at district level should be with the district council. In line with the basic idea that there is a

need to keep up direct support to development projects at district level, it is suggested that the programme shall comprise of two main components: (i) an institution building component, and (ii) a district development component.

The formulation of such a programme must take as its point of departure the complex problems confronting local government in tanzania. Among the problems which should be recognized as a basis for formulating programme objectives should be mentioned:

- Insufficient revenue base and poor performance to collect local revenue.
- Lack of accountability in district administration.
- Lack of qualified staff at all levels. This leads (among other things) to poor planning and failure to carry out a number of important tasks and functions.
- Together with lack of qualified staff goes overstaffing of lower grade personnel.
- Low salaries which, together with other factors, may lead to low work morale among staff.
- Failure on the part of central government to transfer funds to local districts as required.
- Failure on the part of district authorities to involve people in political processes.
- Mutual distrust between district authorities and local people.
- Lack of coordination of donor support to local authorities.

We suggest that the programme be composed of four main components:

- Support to institutional strengthening through various measures directed towards capacity building, changing of practices and attitudes, improved revenue collection, vitalization of the political processes and a more active and constructive role to be played by councillors..

- A village development fund for each district. The fund shall make it possible to support development projects based on village initiatives. It is proposed that the fund is modelled on the matching fund principle.

- Support to selected priority development projects in each district. This would be bigger projects, i.e. projects which are beyond the capacity of individual villages. They may be infrastructure projects, like road projects, water supply, support to building of hospitals or training centres.

- A monitoring and evaluation component which will follow up

programme activities and support institutional learning.

It is important that such a programme is based on participation and acceptance by both central government and the districts which are to be involved in the programme. The programme should take the form of framework within which districts themselves can develop their own district PILOGs. It is therefor suggested that a project organization be established at central government level (PMOs office) and that local participation is based on applications from districts. It is acknowledged, however, that most districts will not have the political and administrative capabilities to develop relevant applications for such a programme, and that there is therefore a need for a prolonged project initiation phase to introduce the programme to districts and to support them in their development of their own applications for participation in the programme.

It is important that the programme as far as absolutely possible avoids establishment of parallel structures and extraordinary programme units within the government system both at central and local levels.The responsibility for implementation at all levels should be accommodated within the ordinary system of responsibilities and reporting relationships. This also applies to possible expatriate advisors to be involved in the implementation of the programme. They should without exception be placed within the reporting relationships of the ordinary Tanzanian system.

At central government level a Programme Coordinating Secretariat should be established in the Prime Minister's Office. The Secretariat shall be responsible for all aspects related to the running of the programme and to monitoring. At local level the responsibility for programme activities should be with the district council. The donor's need for control and monitoring of use of resources should, on the other hand be catered for by a control mechanism to be established outside the ordinary Tanzanian structure of central and local government. The basic principle to be followed is that the donor should in no way be involved in running the programme but should, on the other hand, have clearly defined rights concerning control of programme activities in relation to the agreement between Tanzania and the donor.

It is recommended that the PILOG programme be concerned mainly with support to improving local government in its basic functions as provider of public services and as a local political institution. Support to development of local industries and commercial activities more in general should be channelled outside local government. The report does not go into details concerning the possibilities to establishing a development fund for strengthening of local industries, but it is suggested that such support may be channelled through the local banking system.

Finally, the report comments upon the future of RUDEP and KIDEP and recommends that if a programme like PILOG be launched there would be considerable advantages connected with building on the foundation which has been laid through these two programmes.

1 Introduction

Since the late 1970s Norway has given support to rural development in Rukwa and Kigoma regions in Tanzania. In both regions the cooperation between Tanzania and Norway started with support to rural water sector programmes and was later extended into multi sector programmes aiming at supporting rural development more in general. In 1986 Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme (RUDEP) was established. Kigoma Integrated Rural Development Programme (KIDEP) was established three years later in 1989.

After the establishment of the programmes multi sector support to rural development has come under stress. This is a demanding form of development assistance. Criticisms have been raised that such programmes fail to spark off sustainable development processes in the regions (Birgegård 1987). Coordination between various activities is difficult. A general problem for KIDEP and RUDEP as well as for other similar programmes has been constraints concerning the integration of programme activities with the government institutions on the Tanzanian side, and weak implementation capacity in the local government administration.

This report presents the results of a study to examine the experiences with the two programmes so far, and to suggest alternative approaches to supporting rural development. The project has been commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The study has consisted of four main elements[1]:

First, it contains a summary assessment of the experiences with RUDEP and KIDEP. This has basically been a desk study. Over the years a number of reviews of the two programmes have been undertaken. Most of the reviews are looking at sectoral issues or partial problems. There is also a substantial documentary material available which gives insight into the progress of the programmes and which has served as source material for the assessment of experiences with the programmes. No comprehensive evaluations have been conducted, and systematic empirical documentation is lacking. The empirical documentation on programme implementation, as well as on

[1] The Terms of Reference for the study are attached as appendix 1.

institutional capacity development is particularly weak. The results of this part of the projects is described in chapter 2, 3 and 4.

Secondly the project should study the experiences of other similar programmes in Tanzania. This was done as a field study in Tanzania. We visited a number of donor organizations in Tanzania which support rural development programmes and collected information about their experiences and their current policies concerning support to such programmes. This part of the project is reported in chapter 6.

Thirdly, the Terms of Reference call for an examination of alternative strategies for supporting rural development. This part of the study has to be seen in relation to the ongoing debate on a general reorientation of Norwegian development support to Tanzania. In the new strategy for development cooperation between Tanzania and Norway more emphasis is put on supporting institutional strengthening in the public sector. This should again be seen in the context of the ongoing Civil Service Reform Programme. Within this general context it was seen as an objective for our study to examine ways and means of reorienting the present RUDEP and KIDEP more in the direction of programmes to support local government institutional strengthening. Chapter 5 gives a summary overview of the ongoing reform processes in Tanzania, and in chapter 7 and 8 we discuss alternative strategies.

Finally, it was agreed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that in addition to the tasks listed in the initial Terms of Reference, it would be useful if we, as part of the project also prepared a bibliography of relevant literature and documents. This has been done, and the bibliography is found in chapter 9.

2 Rukwa and Kigoma Regions

2.1 Rukwa Region

Rukwa Region is situated in the south-west of Tanzania. The region is bordering Kigoma and Tabora regions to the north, Republic of Zambia, and Mbeya region to the south, Lake Tanganyika to the west and Lake Rukwa to the east. The region has the lowest population density of all Tanzanian regions, 790.000 inhabitants in an area covering 69 000 square km. Most of the population lives in the Ufipa plateau, which has fertile soil and an average rainfall of 1000 mm per year. The elevation of the area varies from 800 at Lake Tanganyika to 2.400 meters in the Mbizi Hills. The major ethnic group living in Rukwa is the Wafipa.

The region was established in 1974, and consists of four districts, Sumbawanga Urban, and three rural districts, Sumbawanga, Nkansi and Mpanda Districts. There is pressure on land in the most populated agricultural areas of the Ufipa Plateau, and increased conflict over land. The size and population of the various districts are shown in the table:

DISTRICT	POPULATION	LAND AREA *	POP. DENSITY**
Mpanda	291.017	45.843	6
Nkansi	125.007	9.471	13
S'wanga R	268.158	12.414	21
S'wanga U	104.354	1.227	85
TOTAL	788.536	68.955	11

* in square km ** people per square km
Based on the 1988 Census.

The region is predominantly an agricultural region. In the national plans Rukwa is seen as the continuation of the Southern Highlands which provide the major food production region of Tanzania, and be the grain reserve area. Earlier agricultural campaigns have focused on the increase of maize production. The monoculture of maize production and limited agricultural inputs have contributed to soil degradation.

There is now more emphasis on the problems of mono-cropping. There are few studies of the social and economic situation in the rural areas. A study of peasant production in Rukwa shows, however, that the peasants have opted for a diversification strategy during the whole period, and that there has been a substantial production of finger millett and beans (that were sold illegally) on the private market in the 1980s as well as some limited border trade (Johnsen, 1991).

Maize production has however increased, and is the major cash crop in the region. The growth of maize production has been 3.8 % per year in the 1980s, while the population growth has been 4.4 % per year. The growth in regional GDP has been 10% per year during the period 1980-92 (3 E Economics, 1994, p. 2-3, no sources are given for these figures). Again one has to warn against the lack of reliable data that these figures are based upon.

The growth in maize production 1980-92



Source: 3 E Economics (1994), p. 2-2.

The region is on of the least industrialized regions in Tanzania. There are mineral deposits for potential exploitation of gold, silver, iron, lead, coal, limestone and gemstone (3 E Economics). There is also a potential for hydro power production. The lack of technical and economic infrastructure is a serious hinderance to economic development.

There is no proper harbour, but the larger ships that traffic Lake Tanganyika are served with smaller and medium sized wooden boats with engines as well as canoes from the villages along the coast. DANIDA is supporting the lake transport by providing financial and technical management for upgrading and maintaining the major ships. The main road connecting Sumbawanga Town with Tunduma on the main road from Dar es Salaam to Zambia has been rehabilitated recently. This will greatly improve transport opportunities between Rukwa and the rest of Tanzania, and there is already much traffic along the road.

There is conflicting information on economic and social indicators for the region, probably reflecting lack of reliable data. According to some the region is among the poorest regions of Tanzania, according to others Rukwa is among the five richest regions in Tanzania (3 E Economics). Rukwa scores low on social indicator for health (child mortality) and education, and the service provision of primary education and rural health services is low. Rukwa Region is regarded as a 'backward and remote' region. This contributes to the difficulties there have been in recruiting sufficient number of qualified staff to the local administration.

2.2 Kigoma Region

Kigoma Region is located in Western Tanzania, bordering to the west Lake Tanganyika, to the north-west Burundi, and to the east and south Shinyanga, Tabora and Rukwa regions. The population is 854.800 inhabitants according to the 1988 population census. The population density is 23 people per square km, an increase from 13 people per square km in 1967. The population annual growth rate is 2.8%.

Kigoma region consists of four districts, Kigoma-Ujiji Urban and three rural districts, Kigoma, Kasulu and Kibondo Districts. The size and population of the various districts are as follows (source 1988 population census):

DISTRICT	POPULATION	LAND AREA*	POP.DENSITY**
Kigoma U	84.647	0.403	210
Kigoma R	237.390	11.655	23
Kasulu	320.518	9.324	34
Kibondo	176.262	16.058	11
TOTAL	854.817	37.440	23

* in square km ** people per square km Based on the 1988 Census.

The districts are divided into 18 divisions, 76 wards, and 228 villages. Kigoma is characterized as a remote area, which scores low on social indicators. Child mortality is among the highest in Tanzania, and life expectancy at birth is 40 Years. Local government staff, as well as teachers for primary education are often reluctant to be transferred to Kigoma.

The major ethnic group is the Waha people. Other ethnic groups are the Watutsi, Hutu people from Burundi, and a number of smaller ethnic groups. There is also a substantional number of settled refugees from Burundi, as well as migrants from Zaire and Burundi. Historically there were a number of smaller kingdoms in Kigoma, ruled by the Watutsi people, who built their wealth on cattle (Havnevik et.al. 1987).

There are three main ecological zones of the region: (i) the lake shore zone, (ii) the lowland zone, and the (iii) the highland zone (Havnevik et.al. 1984).

In the lake shore zone the land drops steeply into the Lake in many places, but villages are found where there is flatter land. Land for cultivation is generally scarce, but there is some cultivation of cassava, oil palms, rice and cotton. Fishing is the main economic activity, and large volume of 'dagaa' (small dried fish) is sold as far as Dar, and exported to Zambia.

The lowland zone in the south-eastern part of the region is an extension of the Western Plateau, with an overall altitude of 1200 m, covered with woodland. Average rainfall is 900-1200 mm/year, and there are wide shallow river valleys, with a potential for irrigation. The main crops are maize and beans, with some production of cotton. The zone is sparsely populated, large areas are completely uninhabited. and most of the area is infested with the tse-tse fly. Large parts of the lowland zone are set aside as forest reserves and game controlled areas. Little documentation exist about the present situation in these areas, and the forest reserves are thought to be seriously reduced.

The highland zone is the economically most important area of Kigoma Region. It borders Burundi and reaches 1700 m altitude. The rainfall increases to 1200-1600 mm/year, and the vegetation changes from woodland to wooded grassland. Population density is high, and livestock is kept. Some of the area of the highland is exposed to soil erosion, and there is an acute shortage of land in some parts. In many areas there has been substantial deforestation, notably around Kasulu, and in Heru Juu in Kasulu District, which has contributed to a lack of fuelwood. The shifting cultivation and the widespread burning of grass before the new cultivating season, contribute to the slow regeneration of vegetation cover, i.e. trees and bushes.

Due to the rainfall there is usually enough food year around. There is, however, some indication of malnutrition especially among the young children, 1-5 years old. Most of the agriculture is subsistence agriculture, which includes production for local market. There is banana production in Kibondo for brewing of local bear. There is some cash crop, of coffee, cotton and oil palms, mostly in the border region towards Burundi, both in Kigoma and Kasulu Districts. Kigoma is the main palm oil producing region in Tanzania, with a long tradition of oil palm growing. There has been several attempts to upgrade the traditional and inefficient extraction of palm oil, but the attempts have made little success.

Kigoma does not have any specific place in national development plans. The region has traditionally been a labour reserve. During the colonial days the notoriously known German Labour Recruitment Office, which carried out forced labour recruitment had offices in Kigoma. The migration of young men out of Kigoma for paid labour outside the region continued, and in 1967 it was calculated that 30% of young men between 20-35 years old, had migrated out of the region in search of paid labour (Havnevik et.al. 1984). High out migration seems to have continued even though opportunities in agricultural wage labour has declined.

There is a substantial number of muslims in the region. The muslim presence goes back to the establishment of arab trade routes, and the early arab settlement in Ujiji in early 1880. The arab trade in ivory and slaves was stopped by the emergence of European colonialism and the European control over the trade around the lake area. Only minor trade remained in the hands of the arabs, but the muslim settlement remained.

There is a higher population density in the agricultural zone towards the Burundi border, and the areas are experiencing pressure on land, and increasing conflict over land. The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into Lands Matters made visits to villages in Kasulu and Kibondo, where there were large mass meetings. The rural population demanded new land from conservation reserves (game reserves and forest reserves), which serve as water catchment areas. There is strong pressure from the rural population for excision of part of the Mukuti Forest reserve in Kasulu. In the past the reserve covered 104 ha, while the estimate today is that only 12.800 ha are left to protect the water catchment area, and the springs that feed the river Mukuti (Tanzania 1994, p.277).

3 RUDEP and KIDEP: Presentation of the programmes

RUDEP and KIDEP are NORAD supported programmes for rural development in Rukwa and Kigoma regions in Western Tanzania. They are multipurpose programmes with process oriented planning. The programmes started up in the mid and late 1980s as a continuation and expansion of earlier support to the water sector.

In 1979 NORAD entered into an agreement with the Government of Tanzania about support to the water sector in Rukwa and Kigoma. A Norwegian consultancy firm, Norconsult, was contracted to develop Water Master Plan for the two regions, 1979-1983, as well as provide technical assistance for the implementation of the Water Supply and Sanitation Programme which started in 1983.

The part of the Water Programme which operated in Rukwa Region was integrated in RUDEP in 1989, the Kigoma Water Programme continued until July 1992, when it was integrated into KIDEP. These integrations have not been without their problems. The water programmes were to be integrated into the rural development programmes, but the water programmes had relatively larger funds and a much longer history of institution building (in the water sector). Different practices and procedures had also developed between the Water Programme and the Rural Development Programmes.

In the period from 1979 to 1992 a total of 309.5 Mill. NOK was allocated to the Water Programme, approx. half of this, 149.3 mill. NOK was spent on Norwegian consultants and other technical assistance (TA). Most of these funds were spent in the early period of the programme 1979-83, with the development of the Water Master Plan, employment of a large number of expatriates and the construction of staff houses etc. In comparison 206.3 Mill has been allocated to RUDEP (1985-95), and 54 mill. NOK to KIDEP (1989-95).

3.1 Rukwa Rural Integrated Development Programme (RUDEP)

During the country programme discussions in 1983 the issue of Norwegian support to a regional development programme in Rukwa was raised. Norway and Tanzania agreed in principle on support to the

programme during the country programme negotiations in 1984, when the first allocations to the programme was granted.

The background for the request from Government of Tanzania (GOT) goes back to the early 1970s, when regional development programmes were developed for all regions in Tanzania. This planning exercise was a direct result of the decentralization policy of 1972, when local authorities were abolished, the regional administration made into the main planning level for local development, and deconcentration of central government line ministries substituted the former decentralized structure with locally elected district councils.

After 1972 plans were prepared for Rural Integrated Development Programmes (RIDEPs) to be launched in 20 regions. Only 10 regions got follow up financing for implementation (Ngasongwa 1990). Norway financed the planning for the Mbeya Development Plan, but this plan was never accepted by the authorities. Most of the regional development programmes were developed with financial and technical support from donors.

Most of the programmes failed, both due to lack of funding, and overambitious objectives and programme designs. By 1985 all but three of the programmes were abandoned. Most commentators agree that the RIDEPs in Tanzania must generally be seen as a failure. A more positive view is offered by Ngasongwa (1989 and 1990) who attributed most of the problems to design flaws and failure to follow up with adequate evaluations and adjustments. As we shall see in chapter 6 there is a renewed interest among the donors for district development programmes, and that these differ from the RIDEPs of the 1970s both in design and scope.

Rukwa Region was a new region, constructed by bringing together Nkansi and Sumbawanga from Mbeya Region and Mpanda District from Tabora Region. One contributing factor to the establishment of Rukwa as a separate region, seems to have been the campaign for increased maize production in the mid 1970s. Rukwa was one of the main regions for the campaign, with distribution of new improved seeds and agricultural inputs and with the objective of doubling the maize production in 10 years.

However, no donor came forward to support planning for a regional development programme in Rukwa. GoT commissioned BRALUP (now IRA) to make a plan for Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme, during 1976-79. This plan was later accepted by the regional administration as the basis for development, although it seems to have played a minor role in the actual planning and implementation of RUDEP. Much data was collected on soil and natural resource data for the BRALUP study, including data on agricultural output. These have

served as the basis for a general description of the region, but the potential of using these data as some source of base line for the region does not seem to have been considered or exploited.

No donor came foreword to support the implementation of the programme, and this was the situation when GOT approached Norway for support in 1983. NORAD had at that time been in the region since 1979 with the Water programme, first with the preparation of a Water Master Plan, and then a programme for development of water supply and sanitation.

Rukwa Rural Integrated Development Program (RUDEP) was started up in 1985, after a feasibility study was conducted early 1984 (Eriksen et.al 1984). A four year period, Phase I, was started in 1985-89. The initial funds were 45 mill NOK, of which 9 Mill. NOK (20%) where to cover the expenses of technical assistance (TA) (programme staff from Norway). The preparation for Phase II was slow. Supplementary funds, 42 Mill. NOK, were given to cover the period 1.1.1990 to 1.7.1991. A new agreement for Phase II was signed in 1991, for four years 1991-1995, for 100 Mill. NOK. In addition 19.3 Mill. NOK was transferred to RUDEP from the Water Programme when it was integrated with RUDEP in 1988.

A total of 206.3 Mill. NOK has been granted to RUDEP over a period of 10-11 years. Ca. 10 Mill. NOK remain for 1995, which is the last year of the current agreement. No final decision has been taken at the time of this evaluation about the future of the programmes, although the statement that "the programmes will come to an end (at the end of the agreement) in their current form" has been repeated at several occasions during the last year.

There are several donor programmes operating in Rukwa Region, but RUDEP is the only one which is planned and implemented by the region and its district. One of the reports on RUDEP has attempted to get an overview of other donors in the region (Shio et.al. 1994:62). Based on information from RUDEP Coordinating Unit Regional Investment (1991), they were able to identify close to 20 other donors which operated in Rukwa in 1991, including bilateral, multilateral and international NGOs (See appendix 5 for the list of donors other than NORAD in Rukwa). Most of the donors operated from Dar, with little cooperation with the regional and district administrations. The problems occurred when donors in the same sector had different approaches and procedures (for examples principles for self-help, salaries, and incentives), as the report noted was the case in several areas.

3.1.1 The objective

RUDEP was designed as a multi sector programme, with a process planning approach, i.e. with a general overall objective where the projects and activities that were to contribute to the objective were to be developed, planned and designed by the local institutions involved, as bottlenecks and barriers to development were identified during the programme.

The overall objective of the programme, was to improve the welfare for the population in Rukwa Region. The objectives were developed by NORAD on the basis of the feasibility study and Norwegian aid policies, and approved by GOT. In order to fulfil this objective and to relieve Tanzania's shortage of food supply, activities that could improve food supply both in the short and the long run were to be given priority. Bottlenecks for improved food supplies were identified not within the production itself, but outside the agricultural sector, in marketing, industry and communications. A multisector programme was therefore identified as the relevant approach. Little was however specified as to how the objective could be reached.

Instead of specifying more detailed and partial objectives, much emphasis was put on the incremental and process oriented planning, whereby the local institutions (the regional administration) should identify the relevant projects and activities, and present these at the annual meetings for approval. Improved planning capacity at the local level, as well as popular participation were identified both as means for development, as well as a goal in itself.

A review was conducted in 1990 (Manger et. al 1990). On the background of this study as well as the experience of the programme so far, the objectives were slightly modified in the document of Phase II. More specific emphasis was put on institutional development and the local government institutions, the district administration was specifically mentioned as the institution that needed strengthening for the further decentralization and improved local implementation of the programme.

Although improved food supplies was kept as part of the objective, the changing situation (liberalization) and difficulties encountered (the break down of cooperatives and the crisis of rural financing) were recognized, and the expectations were lowered. It is referred to a "policy-document" to be developed by the region. It is expected that this document will substitute the policy of improved food production with mono-culture of maize, with a more varied agricultural production (multi cropping), and more emphasis on land management and soil conservation and management.

3.1.2 Activity profiles

In its overview of main areas of intervention the planning document for Phase II includes a long list of activities:

(i) Popular participation. The level of 6% was expected to continue, but the document warns against expecting rapid change, and that popular participation is an ambitious objective for public administration.

(ii) Industrial and economic activities. Again the document warns against high expectations and rapid results. Given the reform process and the crisis in many rural institutions, it is stated that one should be satisfied if "there was created a basis for productive development in the years to come, by trials and establishments of instruments (for economic development)" (p.11)

(iii) Social services. There should be continued support to the water sector, and primary health care. These sectors had received 40% of the funds during Phase I. Although the proportion was expected to be somewhat reduced, this remained the most important component of the programme.

(iv) Infrastructure. 20% had been given to rural roads. This proportion was recommended to be continued, but depending on proper organization (and funding) for future maintenance and repair.

(v) Natural resource management. It is clearly evident that this component originates from NORAD's objectives with the programme. It is given a low priority in the local institutions (as the situation is not seen as critical), and the intervention is both to improve the natural resource management by establishing nurseries, afforestation and fuelwood stoves, and to improve the awareness among the population and local institutions (public administration) about the need for management.

The multi sector approach is clearly continued, little effort is given to limit the areas for intervention. The funds are spread out on a multitude of smaller activities, which clearly would make monitoring and evaluation more difficult.

The review of RUDEP in 1990 (Manger et. al. 1990) recommended that the level of funding continued at the same level. This was done in Phase II, and 20 Mill. NOK/year for the Region and four districts might not seem to be high given all the sectors involved in the programme. It is certainly low compared to many other rural development programmes in Tanzania, and given the financial crisis of social services in rural Tanzania. As we shall see the questions that have been asked in various reviews have until recently not so much been concerned with the level of total funding, as with the relatively low amount being distributed through the district councils, and the high amount going into institutional strengthening, i.e. infrastructure at the regional level.

The design for the programme has been a process oriented planning approach, where institutional capacity and project input are developed simultaneously. The feasibility report states that "it is unrealistic to launch a region-wide integrated rural development project in Rukwa from the outset" (p.39), the projects are rather to take of in a gradual approach. It warns against building the programme on a comprehensive rural development plan, and advocates a "model of revolving planning" (p. 83), open for new projects in any sector. Projects are to be implemented both through local government, NGOs and other institutions in a flexible manner. Process oriented planning, flexibility, gradual implementation and revolving planning are preferred as opposed to the early RIDEPs' ambitious comprehensive planning and blue print models.

The report recommends that "the main emphasis should be on agriculture and nutrition, forestry and communication (roads)" (p. 83). Later on in the text the support to communication is specified to feeder roads, as well as support to various production oriented activities, like flour mills, blacksmiths, coal production and development of various other crafts.

RUDEP has mainly been created as a regional programme. Phase II of the programme has put more emphasis on the district focus, but it is still weak. RUDEP was merged with the Rukwa part of the Water programme for Rukwa and Kigoma (TAN 055) in 1989, i.e. the water programme was included in RUDEP.

RUDEP had in 1994 six Programme Areas:

1 Management and operation
2 Improvement of social services (health, water and education)
3 Natural resources development (agriculture and forestry)
4 Infrastructure development (main rural roads and housing)
5 Local development through participatory planning (community development, area development funds, DDF)
6 Economic production and small scale industries (SIDO support)

The programme areas are divided into projects and activities. A pilot project for community development was started in Mwimbi Division in Sumbawanga District in the early period of RUDEP. MAD is an area programme, with a multi sector intervention, as well as heavy input of community workers and village mobilizers. The origin of Mwimbi Area Development Project (MAD) is a bit unclear. In the RUDEP planning documents no mention was made of an area development project. The first evaluation of the MAD can not document the start of the project, neither the reasoning behind the decision (RUDEP 1990:3).

A total of 135 Mill. tas was spent between 1986-93 (Upton et al. 1993), funding six different activities:

ACTIVITY	FUNDS	PROCENT
Project Base Camp	18.484	13.7%
Training Centre	8.702	6.5%
Secondary school	20.193	15.0%
Health centre	17.395	12.9%
Village fund	41.207	30.6%
Planning and adm.	28.618	21.3%
TOTAL	134.599	100.0%

Source: Upton et.al. 1993.

Several reviews have been critical to the replicability of the programme, because of the resource intensive nature (RUDEP 1990, Upton 1993, Manger et. al 1990). A similar area based programme has, however, been started in Mpanda District.

3.1.3 Organization and implementation

RUDEP is a regional development programme. The planning, implementation and management of the programme is placed in the Regional Economic Affairs Department (READ) in the office of the Regional Development Director (RDD). There is a RUDEP Programme Coordinator (RUC) who is placed as an advisor to the Regional Planning Officer (RPLO). Within READ there are five coordination units staffed with planning officers, one for each of the main (technical) programmes of RUDEP. At the departmental level each project has a project officer. This person is the key link between the project level and programme level (Manger et.al. p. 5). At the activity level there are activity supervisors who are responsible for the day to day management. At the time of the Manger Report (1990) there were 6 programmes, 29 projects and 88 activities. In 1993 the programmes were divided into 25 projects with a total of ca. 100 activities (3 E Economics, p. 3-2).

RUDEP Organization:

RUDEP ORGANIZATION	IMPLEMENTATION
RUDEP	RUC/RPLO: Overall Coordination
Programmes (6)	Coordinating Unit: Planning officers
Projects (25)	Project officers
Activites (100)	Activity supervisors

Source: Manger et.al. 1990:5.

The RUDEP annual planning cycle follows the Tanzania government planning cycle for development funds to the districts and regions. The difference is that RUDEP gets the ceiling for next years budget from the Embassy (and not from the government) usually early in the year, after initial planning has started. This is often done in a meeting at the Embassy, where the RUDEP coordinator as well as the RDD is present. The other difference is that the annual meeting has the final say on the allocation of the budget. According to our information this leads to less discussion in the screening meetings in the financial and planning committees in the districts, as well as in full council meetings and the District Development Committees (DDC) and the Regional Development Committee (RDC), than is the case with projects financed from the development budget from central government.

RUDEP Annual Planning Cycle:

MONTH	TASK
November	Preparation for work plan proposals
December	Scrutinity by Planning Office
January	Forward work plan to NORAD
March	Annual Meeting
May	Detailed work plan and budget
July	Implementation
September	Quarterly progress report
December	Quarterly progress report
March	Quarterly progress report
June	Quarterly progress report

Source: Manger et.al. 1990:6

Local implementation capacity was limited in Rukwa. It was therefore agreed at the start of the programme funds could be used to pay salaries to staff involved in RUDEP activities. Little documentation exists on this, but according to the annual reports of RUDEP all planning officers for the coordination units for the programme areas, as well as project officers and activity supervisors seem to have been payed salaries out of RUDEP funds. In addition RUDEP has paid salaries to office administration support staff, as well as field workers. RUDEP has also recruited staff above and in addition to the establishment list for regional and district staffing, given by GOT. The number of staff on RUDEP pay roll was reduced from 175 to 125 during the financial year 1992/93.

There has been a high number of expatriate staff in the programme. The position as a programme coordinator was nationalized in 1993. The core expatriate staff is the Financial Controller, and the technical advisors to the District Executive Directors (DEDs) in all four districts. In addition to this there has been specialized Technical Advisors to various departments, Water, Roads, Agriculture, Community Development. In 1993 thirteen expatriate staff, including two expatriate volunteers (VSO/UK) and two ILO employees, supplemented national staff (RUDEP, 1993).

The Norwegian NGO, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), was given a contract by NORAD to support village development in water, health and sanitation, by helping to establish and train integrated teams on Community Participation and Health Education in the villages (Akre 1987, Bundala et.al. 1990, Gleditch et.al. 1986). This contract predated RUDEP. The contract was initially funded under the Water programme, and goes back to 1985. When the water programme was integrated with RUDEP, the CPHE work continued under RUDEP. The contract was terminated in 1991.

The NCA was actively involved in promoting popular participation and community development. This integration of CPHE teams in the administration disappeared when the special effort and funds to establish them were phased out. Health education was moved to the health department of the region. Less in known about the situation of the teams in the villages.

The delegation of funds and responsibility to the districts has been a slow process. The responsibility for implementation has gradually been transferred to the districts, but under the supervision of the region. The transfer of responsibilities for planning has been even slower.

RUDEP activites through the Nkansi District can serve as an example. Support for projects run by Nkansi District did not start until 1990/91. In 1992/93 the District Development Fund was started up (See Appen-

dix 4 for the budget figures for Nkansi). At the annual meeting in 1994, Nkansi District presented projects for funding for a total of 76.700 Mill TAS. In the region's budget 264.350 Mill TAS was allocated to Nkansi District, the majority of these funds (more than 70%) were still planned and implemented by RUDEP at the regional level. This is in stark contrast to KIDEP, where most of project activities are run by the districts. Even the activities for institutional development at district level is planned by the region. The district can give input to the institutional development component, but does not have the freedom to choose and plan their own programmes.

The distribution of the RUDEP funds between the districts and the region in the 1994/95 budget, was the following. Note that much of the funds allocated to the districts are still managed by the region.

	Funds 1000 TAS	Procent
Region	555.600	46.3 %
Sumbawanga U	68.450	5.7 %
Sumbawanga R	200.950	16.7 %
Nkansi	264.350	22.0 %
Mpanda	111.650	9.3 %
Total	1200.000	100.0 %

3.2 Kigoma Rural Integrated Development Programme (KIDEP)

The water programme for Rukwa and Kigoma (TAN 055) had been in operation in Kigoma Region since 1979. A regional Water Development Plan was formulated 1979-81, and rehabilitation and construction of new water schemes were conducted from 1981. In July 1992 the water programme was integrated into KIDEP. (See appendix 3 for the allocation of funds per year 1981-93 for the Water Programme (TAN 055) and KIDEP (TAN 054)).

The arguments used in the planning documents for establishing a rural development programme was partly an expansion of the development activities that could be complementary to the investments made in the water sector, and partly a poverty alleviation perspective referring to the low level of development and poor living conditions for large parts of the population (malnutrition, high child mortality etc.) in the region.

During the decentralization period the World Bank had funded an Integrated Rural Development Programme in Kigoma. It was a five year programme, with a total budget of 13.3 Mill. USD. The programme covered selected villages, with a population of half of the region's rural population. The programme was oriented towards intensified agricultural production (including an input package for maize, cotton and ground nuts production), and support to social infrastructure in the villages like water, health and education. The programme was ambitious, and run into difficulties at an early stage (Ngasongwa 1989, p. 7 ff).

The World Bank concluded in their own evaluation that the programme was a failure, and the programme was terminated in the early 1980s. The factors " contributing to this result, were:

- a blue-print, top down planning model in a situation with insufficient background information about the area
- a lack of involvement of both government officials and the villages in planning
- important institutional changes early in project implementation (villagization and dissolving of cooperatives)
- unrealistic assessment of the existing implementation capacity in the region

The experiences from the World Bank RIDEP was reflected in the feasibility study for KIDEP, and the team asked for the lessons to be learned from the World Bank programme to be used in the planning of KIDEP.

NORAD decided in 1987 to conduct a feasibility study for a rural integrated programme in Kigoma Region. The design of the programme differed in important respects to that in Rukwa. The most important of these are (i) the size of the programme, KIDEP is less than half the size of RUDEP per year, and (ii) the emphasis is on the district level, more funding goes through the districts, and more of the institutional strengthening is targeted on the district administration compared to RUDEP, where the Regional level was the main level initially and has remained so during the programme.

The feasibility study was conducted in 1987 (Havnevik et.al. 1987). The agreement was signed in 1989 for Phase I, for 3 years 1989-92, for 25 mill. NOK, and KIDEP was started up August 1989. Planning for Phase II was slow. There was some unused funds from Phase I, which together with some additional money covered the budget for 1992/93. In July 1992 the Kigoma Water programme was integrated with KIDEP. At the annual meeting in 1993, a two-year budget was discussed. An agreement was signed in July 1993 for a two year period, 1993-1995 (93/94, 94/95), for 26 mill. NOK. A total of 54.2 Mill. NOK has been granted, of which 11.9 Mill. NOK (ca. 22%) has

covered the cost of Norwegian personnel. Total funds allocated to the programme, 42.3 Mill. NOK over a period of 6 years 1990-95, of which 6-7 Mill. NOK remain for 1995.

The planning for Phase II was slow, but started early 1992. Disagreements about the future of the programmes emerged within NORAD, and Phase II was never effectuated. It is however of relevance to look closer at this process. Planning documents for a Phase II was prepared during 1992/93 for 4 years 1992-96, for 61 million NOK (NORAD 1992). The request from the Regional Authorities in Kigoma had been for 80 mill. NOK. The planning document was however never discussed and agreed upon in NORAD, and the agreement was never signed. These disagreements has led to a situation where there in reality only have been annual plans, and Phase II was never implemented.

During 1992 all aid projects were screened by NORAD/DAR using a checklist developed in NORAD/Norway to evaluate the economic and financial sustainability of all aid projects at all NORAD representations. This was part of the follow up of the new aid strategy of NORAD, where more responsibility should be entrusted in the recipient countries and institutions, and where NORAD saw a need for evaluating the project portofolie in view of the new strategy. Similar reviews were done in the other main countries of Norwegian development cooperation.

A result of the screening exercise in Tanzania was that the financial sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the district development programmes were questioned. A decision was taken in the Embassy in 1992 to conduct a financial and economic review of the programmes, and that the results from this review would have to be discussed before a decision could be taken on a possible Phase II.

Phase II in KIDEP was therefore stopped in 1992. The project documents for 1993-95, refer to the discussion in NORAD about "whether the time was right for deciding on a new 4 year period of the programme". It refers to the report from the Embassy which concluded that the district development programmes were "activities were the continuation was not secured, and where further evaluation was necessary". It was decided to conduct an economic and financial review of the programmes, and that the coming "country strategy" document for Tanzania, prepared by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, should evaluate the future strategy for district development programmes. There was disagreement in NORAD about the scope and relevance of an economic and financial review of the programmes, given their process oriented design and policy. The economic and financial review was however conducted late 1993 (3E Economics 1994) at the same time as the country strategy document was prepared. The draft version of the

country strategy document was ready late 1993, but the final version was not released until December 1994 (UD 1994).

When the first contract was signed in 1988, the first three year period was explicitly regarded as a start up period to gain experience through a slow start up, where the region should develop appropriate development plans. The annual meeting was to have an important management function to evaluate last years report, as well as approve next years budget. The idea was however that this was the start of a longer term involvement by NORAD in the region. This was repeated in drafts of planning documents for Phase II, that there were no changes that made Kigoma less relevant. On the contrary according to the documents for Phase II Kigoma was more relevant in a period of liberalization and support to non public economic activities. Kigoma's geographical situation with the closeness to Burundi and Lake Tanganyika should give great possibilities for improving economic activities in the region, and continued assistance from NORAD was recommended.

3.2.1 Objectives

The overall objective for the programme has remained the same during the whole period, i.e. the programme is to contribute to lasting improvements of economic and social development, and to improve income generating activities, poverty alleviations and improved social services.

Institutional development is an important part of the programme. The development of planning and implementation capacity at the regional and district level is seen as a precondition for effective implementation of the programme. Up to as much as 40% of the funds go to institutional capacity strengthening, including the administration of the programme, infrastructure (office equipment and car park), and training.

The objective has remained the same during the period. Little reorientation or adjustment has taken part, this can partly be explained by disruption in the planning for Phase II.

3.2.2 Activity profiles

The programme Phase I included the following activities:
- a District Development Fund (DDF), to support self-help project at village level, originating from the village and implemented by the villagers with assistance from the district
- projects in selected sectors, including:
    * afforestation and resource protection
    * ecological sustainable agriculture
    * distribution of agricultural products and support for cooperatives

* transport, rural roads
* technical and vocational training

KIDEP decided also on a strategy that in so far as other donors were present in the targeted sectors, KIDEP funds should be channelled through the other donor programmes and projects. The funds (input supplies and credit) for artisanal fisheries was channelled through FAO/Netherlands project for credits to this group. KIDEP funds to this credit scheme was stopped in 1992, due to alleged mismanagement of funds. A final report from KIDEP on the use of these funds, and the problems encountered is expected before the annual meeting in 1995.

The total KIDEP budget for the region and the three rural district for 1994/95 is 660.1 Mill TAS (appr. 8.8 Mill NOK).

KIDEP budget 1994/95 presented at the annual meeting 1994.

	KIDEP Budget for 1994/95						
		REGIONAL	KIGOMA	KASULU	KIBONDO	TOTAL KIGOMA	
	Components/Sectors/Projects	ACTIVITIES	RURAL DISTRICT	DISTRICT	DISTRICT	REGION	
1_	Institutional Support	135,876	50,905	55,400	30,215	272,396	41%
2_	Private Sector Support	11,800	7,000	0		18,800	3%
3_	Oil Palm Development	25,077		0		25,077	4%
4_	Livestock Development	2,450	0	0		2,450	0%
5_	Environmental Conservation	9,323	5,465	4,000	1,100	19,887	3%
6_	Rural Roads	17,000	14,910	10,000	9,000	50,910	8%
7_	Rural Water	7,098	60,372	51,000	47,700	166,170	25%
8_	Health	13,293	6,724	8,000	4,692	32,708	5%
	District Development Fund		40,500	16,000	12,000	68,500	10%
	Lands		3,200			3,200	0%
	TOTAL	221,917	189,076	144,400	104,707	660,099	100%
		34%	29%	22%	16%	100%	

The budget for KIDEP for 1994/95 shows that institution building and administration is by far the largest component of the programme. 41 % of the funds are allocated to this component. Of the total KIDEP budget the region receives ca. one third (3 Mill. NOK), of which 1.8 Mill. NOK (20 % of total KIDEP funds for 1994/95) is for administration of the programme, institution building, training, transport and infrastructure at the regional level. The districts receive between 1.4 Mill. NOK (Kibondo) and 2.5 Mill (Kigoma Rural) for all expenditures. Total funds to administration and institution building in the three districts are similar to the funds allocated to the same component at the regional level (1.8 Mill. NOK).

The activity profile today shows that there are three main areas of support in KIDEP (i) institutional support (41 %), (ii) water supply

(25%), and (iii) District development Projects (DDF) (10%). Together these three components make up 76 % of the budget for 1994/95. In the district budgets this profile is even stronger, the three components make up between 80 % in Kigoma District and 89 % in Kibondo District. If one calculates the remaining funds for activities in Kibondo, there remain ca. 15.400 NOK for rural development activities for the budget year 1994/95.

In appendix 3 we have included the accounts and budgets for both RUDEP and KIDEP, that appeared in the 3E Economics Report. The regional administration in Kigoma was asked by 3E Economics to prepare the figures according to the programme areas of RUDEP (to allow for comparisons). The KIDEP budget does however have a different structure than RUDEP. The figures in the appendix therefore only give an indication of similarities and differences. DDF projects are for example classified as community development in RUDEP, but under social infrastructure in KIDEP.

In KIDEP a decision was taken to classify direct support to the community development offices (CDO) under institutional support. The community development was seen as part of the administration, and as an important tool for an efficient management of public services through their ability to mobilize and initiate community participation.

There has been continuous work in KIDEP with a relevant presentation both of accounts and budgets. In 1992 the budgets for the different districts were presented separately for the first time. As a response to earlier demands from the annual meetings, at the annual meeting in 1994 the KIDEP administration presented integrated physical and financial implementation reports for the first time. In the Tanzanian budgeting and reporting system these two reports are presented separately.

There has only been two early reviews of the programme just when Phase I was starting up, in 1990 and 1992. The activities have however tended to cover many sectors, with the result that the funds are spread out too thinly to expect much visible result. Today, KIDEP therefore resembles more a bundle of individual projects, than an integrated programme.

3.2.3 Organization

The management of the programme was placed at the regional level, under the RPLO's (Regional Planning Officer) office. A programme coordinator (PC) was appointed. This has been a Norwegian national up to today. The (aborted) planning document for Phase II planned for the post to be nationalized from 1993, this will probably not take place due to the uncertainties about the future of KIDEP.

Phase I included 6 man years of technical assistance (TA) over 3 years, Project Coordinator and (PC), Financial Controller (FC). When the Water Programme was integrated into KIDEP in 1992 the job description for the technical advisors (TA) to the water departments was changed to become advisors to DED on project planning and implementation.

The original planning documents for Phase II included 13-14 man years over 4 years, with only the FC left for the fourth year. But as Phase II never was effectuated, the same number of expatriate will continue until 1995 when the present agreement terminates. It should also be noted that there has been vacancies in the technical advisors' (TA) jobs at the district level. Kigoma District did not have a TA in the period of January to August 1994, and Kasulu District did not have a TA from May 1994 up to today. A new TA has been recruited for one year (1995).

It is relevant to note that the first technical advisors to the districts were water engineers, and had in their terms of reference that they should be advisors to the district water engineers. These were funded by the Kigoma Water Programme. In 1992 with the integration of the Water Programme into KIDEP, their job descriptions changed, the TAs were to be advisors to the District Executive Directors, and advice on planning procedures, budgeting and administrative routines. However, new water engineers were recruited for some time, and it was not until Summer 1994 that TAs recruited specifically as advisors to DED and according to the new job description, started working in the districts. The current TAs in both Kigoma and Kibondo have relevant planning background from local government and rural development both from Norway and developing countries. The TA job descriptions were, however, not very detailed, and little systematic work had been put into defining the tasks and means for the new role of the TAs.

There was no job description for the first programme coordinator. The Inspection report on the water programme pleaded for new job descriptions for all expatriate staff, when the water programme was integrated into KIDEP. There exist to day job descriptions for all expatriate staff. The job description for the PC dates Feb. 1991, and the tasks described involve assisting and advising RDDs and DEDs offices in planning, implementation, and monitoring of KIDEP activities, and assist in the preparation of annual plans and reports on KIDEP to NORAD.

Specific aspects of PC's contribution to institutional strengthening is most clearly specified in relation to "Assist the RDD and DED's offices in establishing routines and procedures for accounting and disbursement in accordance with Tanzania Government regulations and NORAD's requirements", and to "assist the RDD and the DED's office

in improving their planning and monitoring systems to meet Tanzanian Government and NORAD's requirements".

A revised job description for the Financial Controller (FC) was given when the new FC was recruited in 1993. It gives the FC the role of an internal auditor for KIDEP funds. The FC shall also disburse funds on a quarterly basis to the districts, upon receiving satisfactory reports on financial and physical progress. This is a similar position to the District Coordinator in the Dutch District Development Programme (see chapter 6). Auditing and control is in itself a potential strong tool for institutional strengthening, if it is properly acted upon by the accounting offices. In addition the job description mentions specifically the "the FC shall provide on the job training to the KIDEP accountants at regional and district levels, aiming at creating a capacity to maintain a satisfactory level of financial control of the programme. The training may include establishing financial monitoring systems for budget control and project planning, an instructing the relevant departmental staff to their use".

The annual meeting is the main overall programme management tool. The members of the annual meeting are the representatives from the Districts and Regional administrations, the KIDEP PC and FC, and NORAD/Dar and Oslo, and representatives from the PMO's office. Also other state institutions have been present at the Annual meetings. In 1994 the State Planning Commission was represented in the delegation.

The preparation for the annual meetings follows the same procedures as for RUDEP. The annual report as well as the budget for next year are presented separately for the individual districts and the region for the first time at the annual meeting in 1992. There has also developed a tradition that the delegation to the annual meeting visits the districts before the annual meeting, to have separate informal discussions with DED's Office, as well as project visits. The district discussions before the annual meeting in 1994, were quite detailed, and concerned planning, implementation and reporting routines and procedures. The annual review in 1993 was cancelled due to the influx of refugees from Burundi. The detailed discussions with the districts at the annual meeting acted as a substitute for this review.

The agreed minutes from the annual meeting act as the instruction for the programme in the coming year, together with the final budget. Attached to the agreed minutes there is also a list of "Matters Arising", which the programme as well as NORAD have to act upon during the year, and report on at the next annual meeting. (See Appendix 6 for the "Matrix of action" discussed at the annual meeting 1993).

3.2.4 Implementation

A short summery of Phase I is given as an appendix in the planning document for Phase II. Its main conclusions are as follows:

* DDF were implemented from 1. July 1991.
* The planning capacity at the regional level to manage the programme has been improved. An indicator of this improvement (according to this appendix) is improved documentation from the region to the annual meeting in 1992 compared to the one in 1990.
* Most of the support for fisheries and agriculture is support to projects initiated by other development organizations, FAO (fisheries) and UNDP (agriculture). No comments in the report.
* The forestry projects were found to have satisfactory development, and continued support was recommended.
* Production of energy efficient stoves had started up. "The activity seems to have had a "lucky" start, and it has a good chance of becoming very successful".
* A feasibility study for natural resource management and afforestation project at Heru Juu was conducted, but had to be adjusted to implementation level where improved cooperation with villagers could take place.
* Little investment had been made in the transport sector.

Of the areas defined under the feasibility study that was not implemented were:

* Distribution of agricultural products and support for cooperatives. The cooperative that operated in Kigoma, BUHA Cooperative Union, had big management problems. This as well as the policy changes in Tanzania with regards to the role of the cooperatives, stopped KIDEP efforts in this direction.
* Vocational training. No initiatives were taken from the programme.

Phase II should in addition to the main objective and given reforms in Tanzania, consider to:

* Avoid increases in public sector expenditures, rather support decreases.
* Facilitate non public sector, including self help activities in the villages.
* Reduce and possible phase out subsidies.
* Establish a self-financing transport sector.
* Improve efficiency in the public sector.
* Focus on the district level in the public administration.

No details are given on how to do this, nor what areas to effectuate this. The second issue is however consistent with a continuation of DDF projects, as far as these can be defined as non-public sector activities.

An important change was that more emphasis should be placed on the district level, and that more of the funds for institutional strengthening should go to district staff. This was effectuated as we shall see in the next chapter.

Participation by women, and integration of their interest, was to be important principles in Phase II. The programme's emphasis on economic production and institutional development within the local government could leave out "softer" components. We will return to this issues later, i.e. the relationship between support for local government development and support to rural development projects (see chapter 8). It is however important here to note that the project document for KIDEP Phase II, did raise the issue whether it was relevant to keep poverty alleviation as part of the main objective for the programme, as long as the funds allocated to this purpose were small and scattered, and that no or little impacts on poverty alleviation could be expected.

No attempts have been made to collect an overview of other donors in the region. The region has been included in the Integrated Roads Programme (IRP) for rehabilitation of major trunk roads. Two roads in Kigoma District of a total of 1.350 Million TAS has been included for the two budget years 1994-1996.

Another major programme which is starting up is the World Bank/IDA programme for rural health management training at the district level, and rehabilitation of rural health centres and districts hospitals in Kasulu and Kibondo Districts. The total investment of the programme in Kasulu District for the three years 1994-97 is 868.8 Mill TAS, including a district hospital rehabilitation estimated to cost 700 Mill. TAS.

The Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) has operated in Kigoma for many years, and implemented a rural development programme, in cooperation with UNCHR, in villages with a substantial Burundi population (Havnevik et.al. 1987). The TCRS is also involved in the current refugee camps for refugees from Burundi and Rwanda.

4 RUDEP and KIDEP: Experiences and problems

4.1 Reports and reviews of RUDEP

Only two more comprehensive programme reviews exist, one is the review of RUDEP completed December 1990 (Manger et. al. 1990) the other is a financial review of both programmes carried out late 1993 (3E Economics, 1994). There have been two smaller evaluations of the Mwimbi Area Development Project (MAD), one interim evaluation by a team from READ and Regional Community Development Office (RUDEP 1990), and one internal evaluation by a team from the regional administration and the CDO advisor from VSO (UK Volunteers) (Upten et.al. 1993). There is also a study of RUDEP, made jointly by researchers from Institute of Development Management/Agder College, as part of the Academic Improvement Project at IDM (Shio et.al., 1994). In addition there are various sector reviews, workshop reports etc. Some of the most substantial reports relate to the water programme. In the late 1980s there seem to have been conducted regular reviews of the water sector programme (TAN 055) which at that time covered both regions.

The sector reviews relate mostly to technical aspects, and little to institutional, organizational and management issues. This is also commented in the Manger report.

4.1.1 The Manger Report - 1990

After Phase I, and as input to possible adjustments in RUDEP in Phase II, a comprehensive review was carried out of the programme in 1990 (Manger et al., 1990). The review notes that there were contradictions in the RUDEP strategy for Phase I. The strategy emphasised increased food production on the grounds that food scarcity was a national problem. But food scarcity was not a problem in Rukwa. "...i.e. RUDEP was a response to the prevailing national situation." (p.46).

However, the investment in agricultural development as well as in other production oriented activities remained small during Phase I. The review observes a shift away from the productive sectors (in the programme objectives) and to the social sectors (in the implementation). The shift is due structural constraints on the national level as well as to weaknesses in the local institutions for agricultural

development. There is a crisis in the rural credit system, as well in the cooperative sector. On this ground the review finds that this "shift away from agricultural and the subsequent choice of sectors to be emphasised (social services) has been justified. The challenge facing RUDEP now is therefore not one of the changing their sectoral emphasis but rather one of how to improve performance within the sectors which they are presently engaged" (p.4).

The review also discusses the integration of the programme into the regional system. RUDEP is part of the Regional Administration in Rukwa, but it controls its own resources and is described in the report as a well structured and effective organization. The planning system is well structured: "What appears (..) is a well organized and well run planning infrastructure that is geared towards making plans, monitoring and reporting. In principle this is run within the Rukwa regional government system." (p. 7)

But in spite of the fact that RUDEP is formally integrated with the regional administration, a very contradictory dynamic characterizes the interplay between the programme and the regional administration. The formal effectiveness of the programme is contradicted by the context. In spite of the fact that RUDEP is integrated into the Tanzanian system the different dynamics of the RUDEP system and the Tanzanian system counteracts this integration and makes the programme unsustainable. In the words of the report: "The RUDEP system is however emerging as a system in its own right. This is due to the fact that RUDEP has financial resources (including its own procurement system, stores, vehicles, and workshops) to run its activities and meets its obligations; it has man power resources, both expatriates and local, that can handle RUDEP activites, and it has the political opportunity to realize its aims by dealing with the Annual Meeting (donor backing) and PMO (central government backing) before dealing with the decision making bodies in the region (RMT, RDC). The key problem arising is the one of long-term sustainability, i.e. what will all the investment in the government structure actually yield; when will Tanzania take over, and with what result?" (p.7)

If one takes this seriously there is an apparent contradiction here that is of a structural nature, and which has to be faced regardless of what programme design one chooses to put forward: the programme aims at creating a rational planning organization in a context that is unable to sustain such an organization. As long as the "rational planning organization" only relates to donor funds, and acts on the requests of the donor, there are few expectations that this model will be sustainable when donor funds are phased out.

The main conclusions from the Manger report are summed up in six topics:

(i) RUDEP has been able to do little to promote agricultural development, although this was one of the main objectives of the programme. According to the evaluation this is due to the constraints in the Tanzanian society and political system; (i) the absence of a functioning cooperative system, (ii) weaknesses within KILIMO (agricultural department) in Rukwa, and (iii) high transport costs which makes access to markets problematic. Progress was observed with respect to capacity building for development budgeting and monitoring procedures, but the sustainablity of these capacities is questioned, as they seem dependent on donor financing and provision of extra donor funds for the services that are to be managed.

(ii) The review questions how much an integrated rural development programme can do when the problems are of a structural character that require political and structural changes on a national level. Neither the maintenance of the existing RUDEP service provision, nor the level of implementation can be maintained without a continuing assistance from RUDEP/NORAD.

(iii) The programme has had an emphasis on implementation to obtain results, but the operation and maintenance capacity in all sectors, water, health and roads is limited.

(iv) There are several positive aspects of the community participation work of RUDEP. The area development programme of Mwimbi Division is seen as too resource demanding to be replicated on any large scale. Instead a district focus with use of "village funds" is recommended. This has been implemented to some degree by introducing District Development Funds (DDFs) in all the districts. Villages can put forward applications for financial support according a set of criteria. (DDFs are now a common way of providing funds for locally mobilized projects). It is further recommended to utilize banks for the allocation of funds for credit schemes.

(v) RUDEP was predominantly a regional programme. The report recommends looking for other alternative implementing agencies: one is the districts, the other is NGOs. "the aim is to move attention away from building government departments towards activities on the ground" (p.ix). The report recommends that NORAD fund a Regional Development Fund, as a structure outside RUDEP, to provide NORAD with more than one channel through which development funds can be forwarded. This proposal was not acted upon. Instead a district oriented District Development Fund was established, which is administrated through the local government system at the district level (see pt. vi).

(vi) This relates to practicalities related to the a Regional Development Fund.

(vii) This relates to the need for not setting a time limit for the second phase of RUDEP, but keep up the level of funding, and proceed with a gradual disbursement of funds so as not to push for a rapid implementation.

Financial and manpower issues were given special considerations.

* RUDEP investments by far exceed Tanzanian government investments. The evaluation warns that the programme will have to be aware that these investments can not be operated without continued donor support.
* Community development is given strong emphasis by RUDEP. It is shown that community development (CD) departments are totally dependent on RUDEP support for their day to day operations. "A major conclusion (..) is that RUDEP will have to continue meeting operating costs of the CD - like in other RUDEP-funded development projects - otherwise they are likely to deteriorate if not collapse altogether." (p. 22)
* It is demonstrated that the water programme is totally dependent on RUDEP support and that "... any continuation of the existing services will depend to a large extent on RUDEP funding." (p. 24)
* The situation for local revenues and finances is critical. The evaluation points to the fact that the districts' ability to collect revenue is very poor. Collected revenue is down to a mere one third of the budget. Identified constraints include:
  - unrealistic estimates
  - inefficient collection
  - poor tax base (little cash crop production etc)
  - occasional outbreak of epidemic diseases
  - acute shortage of manpower for collection in addition to embezzlement by collectors.

  Lack of ability to collect revenue (combined with other factors such as high level of investment through RUDEP) means that there are no local resources available for development (investment) and that whatever is collected goes into recurrent expenditure. The evaluation concludes on this point that there may be a need for RUDEP to support even running costs to maintain established services since it will take a long time to develop local capacity.
* The acute shortage of competent manpower is documented and two alternative strategies for RUDEP are pointed out:
  - RUDEP to take further financial responsibility for making key personnel available in the region.
  - for RUDEP to adapt to a level of activities that can be maintained with the existing availability of manpower.

The report also discusses available alternatives. It recommends that more effort be put into finding alternative implementation channels to RUDEP (the region), i.e. NGOs, credit systems and district

administration. Because of shortage of skilled personnel and lack of funds it is warned against making "mini-RUDEPs" at the district level. Instead it is recommended to start a process of involving the districts councils in the planning, and strengthening certain aspects of the district administration, i.e. the capacity to "support good project ideas and to encourage alternative implementing agents" (p.13).

The report indirectly points to a possible contradiction and conflict of interest between upgrading and strengthening local government administration, and improving service delivery on the ground. It does not necessarily share the belief that strengthening local government capacity necessarily leads to improved service delivery (p.80). Rather capacity efforts could lead to excessive build up of bureaucracy. The service delivery can alternatively be seen as "imprisoned in the government structure" citation from an informant (p.82). And that services are best provided by other channels than local government.

Continued support to the water department and the community development department is recommended, but it is underlined that "it is not a general support to increase capacity that should be sought, but rather what good project proposals can be supported within existing capacity, and what alternative implementation agents can be supported" (p.43). A small project fund is recommended for the district councils. These funds could be "related to the ability to collect revenue, thus matching resources with responsibility" (p.43). It is interesting that this proposals of matching district development funds with local revenue collection was put forward already in 1990. The district fund materialized as the DDF (District Development Fund), but the matching of local revenue collection was never taken up. (Activities for improved local revenue collection has been absent, and has not been an issue at the annual meetings). As we shall see later the SIDA funded project in Babati, the Babati Land Management Programme (LAMP), releases part of its funds for district development projects as matching funds to the local revenue collected.

4.1.2 The Financial and Economic Review (3E Economics Report) - 1994

In November 1993 the Norwegian consultancy company "3E Economics" was commissioned by NORAD to carry out a financial and economic review of RUDEP and KIDEP (3E Economics 1994). Lack of relevant data made a proper evaluation difficult. The review also noted that RUDEP is more process oriented than output-oriented in its design: "Development is understood to be the outcome of a number of complex economic and institutional processes, rather than the achievement of physical targets within fixed financial allocations. It is the aim of RUDEP to support and strengthen the processes which underpin structural transformation, thereby resulting in much more

profound and longer lasting impact." (p. 3-2). At the same time it was pointed out that in its second phase (after 1991) the programme had been more output oriented.

In its discussion of the relevance of applying cost benefit and cost effectiveness analyses to the programmes (chapter 4) it concludes by asking ".... to what extent it is meaningful to pass judgement on an integrated programme as a whole by traditional economic measures, if the output is heterogeneous, long term and of no-economic nature." (p. 4-3)

The report maintains that one important reason why it is difficult to assess the economic effects of the programmes is their complexity and multi-sectoral character, together with the process orientation of the programmes (chapter 5). The question is raised if the programmes should be simplified and turned into sector activities.(p. 5-20)

One of the main conclusions of the review is that there is an absence of economic thinking in terms of financial and economic analysis in the design and follow up of the programmes. In order to address the issue of economic efficiency more efforts should be made to define objectives more clearly as well as to establish proper monitoring and reporting systems (suitable to undertaking cost-effective analysis (p. ii)). The report recommends that NORAD cooperate with other donors and the Government of Tanzania (GoT) to achieve common aims.

The report is cautious in its description of economic impacts of the programmes, as the data for analysing the impacts for the programme are lacking. However it asks for considerations to be given to how the activities of the program might distort prices and act as barrier to the development of the private sector of the regions, by operating car pools, water equipment and maintenance yards.

It is pointed out that RUDEP (and to a lesser degree KIDEP) operates as a parallel system to the local/regional planning and budgeting system even though formally RUDEP is integrated with the regional institutional system. The fact that NORAD (through the annual meeting) has to approve each project before it is included in the regional plan and the budget to be submitted to Parliament makes it impossible for the District and Regional organs to have a real impact on the selection of projects. Three problems are pointed out as arising from this system.

- The District Planning Committees have no role in the prioritizing and selection of projects.

- The RUDEP programme joins the regional plan after the decision has been made to implement and fund it. It is therefore more or less

impossible for the Regional Development Committee (RDC) to oppose a project since the only effect would be that the project is dropped (it cannot be replaced by another activity).

- The RUDEP programme has no relation to the district plan, and the councillors or district staff has no part to play in the formulation and implementation of the programme. "This puts a lot of pressure on RUDEP staff who have to spend significant time mobilizing and supervising... Support from local politicians would make life easier and less costly." (p. 7-6/7)

The report also questions the institutional logic of the Mwimbi Area Development (MAD), and asks why the division was chosen as the institutional base for the decentralization. ".... given the divisional resource base, it is unlikely that the institutional capacity in place through MAD can be sustained. But the more fundamental issue is the logic behind bypassing the district. Administratively and politically, divisions are not part of the local government system. There are no planning committees nor are there implementing agencies. The logical level for further decentralization would be the wards but, again, these would be too small for sustainability, if resources are not adjusted for size." (p. 6-7)

In this respect it echoes the criticism of MAD by the review from 1990 (Manger et.al., 1990) which found MAD much too resource intensive, and therefore not replicable on a larger scale in the districts. The RUDEP programme design, as many other integrated rural development programmes, includes an area-based approach, i.e. that the activities (including DDF) are concentrated in certain selected areas to maximize integration and impact. In the preparatory work for RUDEP the division was selected as the area focus. It is not evident from the review whether the team was aware of that, or whether they refute the approach.

The review also comments the socio-cultural context of the programmes: "One cannot ignore the possibility that some activities within RUDEP and KIDEP are in contradiction with local cultural values and beliefs. Since it is widely known and acknowledged that people from Kigoma and Rukwa have strong superstitious beliefs , it would be useful to commission a study which would, among other things, establish possible conflicts between the programmes as presently conceived and local values. This would assist in re-directing the programmes into areas with minimum conflicts and, thereby, raising support from the local communities and improving sustainability." (p. 6-11). This is a more fundamental questioning of the programme as popular participation and strengthening the status of women are not necessarily in accordance with traditional values, but in accordance

with the NORAD aid strategy and a fundamental basis for the design of the rural development programme in Rukwa.

4.1.3 Other reports

One of the research project under the Academic Improvement Project at IDM was a study of RUDEP as an example of integrated rural development programmes in Tanzania (Shio et. al. 1994). The study is based on fieldwork in 1992. Some of the main findings of the study were:

Integration in the local government, especially at the district level, has been weak: "So far RUDEP has spent most of its funds and efforts on the regional level and thus achieved a considerable degree of integration on this level but still lacks impact on the lower levels of administration. RUDEP has a strong regional focus and operates as a regional investment programme, but still seems to have a long way to go in terms of vertical integration." (p. 38)

There is a mutual distrust between the region and the district: "During our study regional officers in Sumbawanga warned against channelling money through the district administration 'unable as they are both to handle money and to do development work'. Such statements were countered by district officers pointing out 'that the regional administration is an extremely expensive intermediary between the donors and the recipients." (p. 40)

The study concludes that the programme has not had effective methods for identifying target group needs, e.g. in distinguishing between poor women and more well off women, referring to examples that relatively advantaged women groups had been more successful than poor groups to secure support(p. 45). But in spite of this the "main impression was that the assistance reached the poor and that development of the poor rural communities was promoted through RUDEP". (45)

There has been discrepancy between ideal and reality when it comes to community participation. The study also points out that many of the projects (e.g. water) are big projects implemented from above. Participation is more formal than real - and restricted to the implementation phases.

The study, however acknowledges that people do not always know their needs or that they are unable to formulate their needs in project terms: " ... in some cases people fail to present a project idea which is really a problem for them. In such cases they need the help of an expert at least to assist them in prioritizing their needs. For example they might express a need for a party office while they are actually in need of water not only for themselves but also for their animals." (p. 47)

As a general conclusion the report is positive in its assessment of programme achievement concerning community participation: "Only slowly has the bottom up approach come up to replace the conventional model first in special projects and through the Community Development Departments of the region and the districts. Today community participation is becoming the 'modus operandi' of more and more RUDEP projects at least on paper but to an ever increasing degree also in practice." (p. 51)

Commenting on the focus on women's participation in the programme, the report concludes that the programme has been successful in becoming "a change agent for making women come out of the traditional domestic roles and contribute to their own development." (p. 55)

4.2 Reports and reviews of KIDEP

The feasibility study of KIDEP (Havnevik et.al. 1987) recommended four areas of support :

* A village development fund
* A credit project for artisanal fishing activities
* A credit and import support scheme
* Support to infrastructural activities
  - Improvements of strategic rural roads
  - Assistance to agricultural marketing
  - Support to combat environmental degradation
  - Support to post primary technical education

The study further raises two issues, (i) the implementation capacity of the government, where the report recognized the limited implementation capacity, and a discrepancy between the ideal and the reality. Three problems were identified: (A) There is a top down planning system, with little participation from the villages, (B) Poor planning of activities, with a tendency to jump from sketch to implementation, without proper planning, and (C) The control of funds is poor, the sectoral district departments do not have control of funds, and development (investment) budgets are repeatedly exhausted without being properly spent, by rerouting the funds to cover recurrent spending in the district administration.

The other issue was (ii) level of integration. The report recommends that the various activities start up in an independent manner, where the annual meeting takes care of the most needed coordination. The report stressed the need for monitoring and evaluation as the institutional mechanism for learning through experience, as many of the KIDEP activities will have an experimental character, and be new to the administration. The report is however not explicit nor detailed on this

issue, and the monitoring and evaluation procedures and routines seem to have been repeatedly asked for, but never implemented. (We have however during our desk study come across references to a manual that was developed early in KIDEP's history for Evaluation and Monitoring, but this manual has not been used as far as we know.

The issues mentioned in the feasibility report show that issues discussed in later report were discussed from the very start of the planning period of KIDEP, i.e. institutional capacity, level of integration etc.

These limitations in implementing capacity have, according to the feasibility study, their roots in the poor economic basis of the district administration, shortage of funds and skills, and should be reflected in the planning procedures and in a program for upgrading the local government administration.

No comprehensive evaluation of he programme has been conducted so far. There have also been few programme reviews. According to the management of such programmes a review mission is supposed to take place each fall, and the results should be discussed at the annual meeting the next year. Two such reviews took place, both during Phase I, one in 1990, which mainly document the start up of the programme, and the second review in 1991, with TOR of looking at DDF (District Development Fund) projects. A financial and economic review (of both RUDEP and KIDEP) was conducted November 1993, but this was commissioned by NORAD. The result of this review was not discussed at the annual meeting, and the report has not been sent for comments to the region (a procedure that is supposed to be followed if this was an ordinary programme review). There were therefore no programme review in 1992, no review in 1993 due to the outbreak of war in Burundi, and the influx of great number of refugees, and no review in 1994, due to the uncertain future of the programmes.

4.2.1 The KIDEP Review Report - 1990

The annual review of 1990 had as its TOR to "discuss possibilities for stronger focusing on district development and ..division of labour between regional and district level,... and future organizational structure of community development and people's participation..". It concludes that "the present capacity at district level does not allow for further decentralization of planning duties". The review recommends that planning officers should be transferred from the region to the district, and that this issue should be raised with the Local Government Service Commission. This pointed to the need of a dialogue with national institutions concerned with local government. How well this was followed up by the programme as well as NORAD/DSM is not documented in the written records, but the links seem to have been weak.

The review also noted weaknesses in staffing and capacities of the Maendeleo offices at the district level, and that these offices need strengthening to secure popular participation in planning and implementation. At this time of the programme, there were plans for community mobilizers at the village level. This is similar to the notion of social mobilizers which has been an important aspects of NORAD funded rural development programmes in Sri Lanka. The pilot project MAD (Mwimbi Area Development Programme) under RUDEP also made use of social mobilizers. The programme for village mobilizers seems however not to have been effectuated in KIDEP. Instead there has been more traditional support to the Maendeleo Offices of the District Councils (DCDOs).

The review also raised the issue of sustainability. It observes that there is a tendency to ignore sustainability, as proposals for new activities do not include information on financial implication of maintenance and recurrent funds. It also notes that estimates for activities seriously overestimate the funds needed for transport and allowances.

The main recommendations of the review are: (i) strengthening of district councils' capacity within planning and community development, and filling of vacancies, (ii) further work to be done on strategy and organization of community development, (iii) to improve the sustainability aspects of the design of the projects.

These are points that the programme has struggled with throughout its short history. It is, however, important to note that the management of the programme was aware of these problems from the very start. What seems to have been lacking is the institutional mechanisms to follow up the identification of problem areas, to develop decision making structures and clear divisions of responsibilities, and act upon these decisions.

4.2.2 The KIDEP Review Report - 1991

The second review from 1991, had as its TOR to look especially at the DDF projects. These had started up the same year, and had been in operation for only six months when the review was done. The review concludes that the "start-up of the Fund has been satisfactory", however, it presents "some recommendations that require adjustments to be made". The review notes that due to the short preparation of DDF, no true "bottom-up" process was conducted to identify the projects. A list of projects "were 'collected' during a KIDEP promotion campaign arranged by the region". It also notes that the planning for the DDF projects for 1992 continues to use the original list of project, even without going back to the villages to get a feedback.

It also recommended that DDF should include women to a greater extent and that the councillors should be involved in the decisions in the project cycle of the DDF. We have no further evidence as to what extent these issues were followed up. But our general impression from the available documentation from annual meetings, is that these issues have remained a problem throughout the programme. However, according to information we have received the DDF programme is discussed in the Finance and Planning Committee as well as in the Full Council meeting in the District Council, as part of the general budgeting cycle (personal communication with district staff in Kigoma).

When there have been problems during implementation, the review relates this to weak leadership in the villages, rather that lack of transport or other input. The review warns against making the DDF programme into a new source for transport and allowances for the local government staff.

The final issue that is raised in the review is the clarification of objectives and strategies. The review makes a plea for approaching the two objectives of the programme: support to village level activities, and strengthening of the District Councils, with two independently managed strategies. (i) Support to village councils, groups and individuals in the form of grant and credits, a Village Development Fund, could be managed by a trust fund, a NGO or bank. While (ii) a Local Government Support Programme, with support to the District Council administration and its line departments should improve the capacity of the council to operate and maintain key public services, and "it should also be important to look for means to stimulate local revenue collection" (p.9).

This is one of the few documents from the programmes which includes Local Revenue Generation as part of the institution building concept of the District Councils. According to the documentation of the programmes, little evidence can be found that this issue was followed up. No special effort, targeted actions or incentive for local revenue generation seems to have taken place, until recently. During the second half of 1994 a consultancy for local revenue generation was conducted (by Internconsult), which both document the falling level of revenue collection in all districts in Kigoma region, as well as puts forward recommendations for improving the level of revenue collection. The report is still in drafts form, and is supposed to be discussed at present in the districts and regional administrations.

The review of 1991 ends with a warning against the danger of "making local initiatives too dependent on the planning capacities of the planning system of government and the managerial capacity of the Council" (p.9). Similar statements can be found in many of the documents and reviews of the programme, and in many other rural development

programmes. Development of local government capacity, and stimulating local participation in rural development is not necessarily seen as one and the same thing. Both due to the weaknesses of local government, but also due to the basic thinking of local mobilization for rural development, according to many reports these two issues should be kept separate.

4.2.3 The Kigoma Water Inspection Report (Lunøe and Krüger) - 1991

A review was made in 1991 of the Kigoma Water Programme (Lunøe and Krüger, 1991). This review was also to serve as input to the integration of the water programme into KIDEP (which took place July 1992). "The main findings and recommendations from the review were:

(a) The Decentralization policy may be accelerated by supporting an encouraging the process through the planning, implementation and budgetary support of the programme;

(b) The Regional administration's activities will consequently decrease with decreased support from the Programme;

(c) The Programme should improve its utilisation of the facilities and services which increasingly are made available on the local market, both at the District and the Regional level;

(d) The KIDEP integration shall be effective as from 1.07.92. The integration process must therefore start immediately and relevant recommendations are made to this effect;

(e) The Annual Meeting should be institutionalized as **THE** decision-making forum, necessitating corresponding procedures and authorised representations;

(f) The Programme's procedures and routines, particularly with reference to cost and activity reporting should be improved and correspondingly proposals are made;

(g) The future manpower requirements should be thoroughly assessed in the view of the planned activities with a corresponding plan for the phasing out of TAP;

(h) The roles and corresponding Job Description of the TAs and the key Tanzanian personnel should be considered in light of the Report's recommendations." (Lunøe and Krüger 1991, summary).

In its discussions of routines and procedures the review is highly relevant for an evaluation of KIDEP. The review notes that the position of

both the co-ordinator (PC) and the financial controller (FC) are problematic, and should be placed differently in the regional administration. The review proposes that the PC is placed as an advisor under RDD, but above the section heads. It further notes that there is no job description for the PC, and a rather incomplete job description for FC, where there is no mentioning of the responsibility for training, and supervision of district accountants.

The underlining of the importance of the Annual Meeting as the important decision making forum is another relevant issue. NORAD and KIDEP have this forum as a potential important programme management tool, where corrections in directions can be given, where substantial problems can be discussed, and both minor and major adjustments agreed upon. It seems as if this potential has not been fully exploited, and that there has been a lack of systematic use of the Annual Meeting as a management tool. Improved documentation, and explicit rules and procedures for project planning documents as well for implementation reports is underlined in the review.

4.3 Changing goals and goal fulfilment

The goals have not changed, although there have been shifts in sectoral emphasis, as well as implementing institutional level. But NORAD's policy and 'worldview' might have changed. Goal fulfilment has been low. This together with changes in NORAD's policy has prompted a reconsideration of the future of the programme.

The programmes have witnessed some changes in the goals of support to *the productive sector*. There has been a shift in the goals away from support to agricultural development to social infrastructure. This can partly be explained by the problems the agricultural sector experienced in Tanzania during these years, and this adjustments in the goals have been judged appropriate by the reviews in question given the current situation in Tanzania. The merger of the water programmes with RUDEP and KIDEP also led to a relative increase in support to the social infrastructure in the programmes.

The crisis in the rural financing (and institutions) can explain why the investment in productive activities have been so limited. *Support to the productive sector has however remained a goal throughout the programmes, and a clear commitment to rural credit schemes have been given by NORAD, if and when proper institutional arrangements can be found.* Structural and institutional problems which have to be solved at the national level mitigate rapid solutions.

Participation and community development has been an important part of the design of the programmes. There are two types of participation that

can be envisaged through district development programmes: (i) participation through the involvement of the local government and councils, (ii) participation through the direct involvement of the civil society, targeted population (women).

The documentation show that too little efforts have been put into specifying the content of it, and that there has been a certain "ambivalence", given the difficulties involved. The balance between institutional strengthening of local government administration as opposed to promoting popular participation and community development has been difficult. The solution has been to make use of the institution within the local government, i.e. the Community Development Offices, to mobilize villagers.

No proper reviews or studies have been conducted about this effort, but the documentation to the annual meetings indicate that much of the funds have been used for training of administrative staff, travelling and allowances and Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA) workshops and training. Staff from the Norwegian Church Aid worked with community development and health education from 1988 to 1990. Their handing over reports show much enthusiasm about the need for participatory planning in the regions, but admit that the work is difficult, given the authoritarian tradition of top-down planning in Tanzania, and lack of understanding and support for participatory planning in the programmes. *Although in principle the commitment to participatory planning and community development remains in the documents, the focus has shifted to institutional support for local government administration and its staff. There has also been an increased district focus,* although this shift has been very slow in RUDEP.

The commitment to the programmes within NORAD has changed. When the programmes started it is clearly stated that it should be a gradual build up, and that project activites could increase when implementation capacity was built up. A long term commitment from NORAD was envisaged, although never promised. It is also spelt out clearly in the planning documents that no short term impacts could be expected, and there were repeated warnings against expecting rapid results. *The demand for a reconsideration of the programmes on the basis of a financial and economic review was for many people seen as contradicting the very design and policy of the programmes, as well as NORAD's long term commitment.*

The design of the programmes was not very specific on economic evaluations. However, the issues of sustainability and the need for planning both for running cost for operation and maintenance, as well as for phasing out of activites, have been put forward in several earlier reviews. The need for increasing local revenue collection, and strengthening local financial and management capacity has been pointed

to at various times. *None of the issues that we have put forward in our report are new, they have all been commented on in earlier reports. It is not the inability to identify problems or deficiencies that have been lacking, but the institutional decision making structure as well as capabilities and will to act upon this information.*

4.4 Economic and social development - results in targeted sectors

The main sector support has been to *the water sector*. However, most of this support has historically been through the Water Programme. There are different views on the water programme. The Lunøe and Krüger Inspection Report (1991) concluded that the programme was not "worthy of support in its current form" referring to the high technology and cost, which hampered a high water supply coverage of rural population.

The Cooper and Lybrand Inspection Report from 1992, has an appendix (written by Åge Rønningen) where different cost-efficiency models are introduced to improve water supply coverage. The argument goes like this: The higher allocation (up to a certain point) you make to the water sector (as long as it is seriously underfunded) the cheaper the unit cost for the provision of clean water becomes. The fixed cost of management, and equipment can be divided on a larger number of supply units. Avoiding permanently stationed expatriate manpower is seen as another way of keeping down cost. The same arguments are forwarded in another report from the same author (Rønningen, 1994).

In the regions, the support to the water sector is undoubtedly the most visible and noted achievement of NORAD support to the regions, and it is a general viewpoint that NORAD should continue the support to the water sector until it has secured an organizational and financial basis for operation and maintenance. The MAJI Ministry regards the support to water sector through KIDEP and RUDEP as "basically sound, emphasizing low cost technological solutions and sustainable O&M policies. The present planning criteria applied under the programmes follow the national policies .... and operation and maintenance are essentially based on village water funds and local committees" (3E Economics, p. 5-15).

A major challenge to water supply programmes is to develop relevant organizational and financial systems for operation and maintenance. This has been a major problems for all donor programmes to water and sanitation programmes in Tanzania (Therkildsen, 1988). Unless this is secured, the donor find it difficult to phase out their support to the water programmes because they fear for the future of the water supply systems.

The national policy of MAJI is that the villagers are supposed to be responsible for the O&M. There is a system of village water committees (VWC), village water attendants (VWA) and village water funds (VWF). The current procedures are that before the village can get a water supply project they have to establish a committee, appoint an attendant and collect funds for the VWF. There is however little documented experience of how these systems will work over time. There has been one study in KIDEP of the current state of water supply schemes. The report gives a number of figures on breakdowns and repairs that have been delayed. The report is cautious in its conclusion, but indicates that the system of village based O&M is still not functioning, and that there is a special need to look into the communication and working relationships between the villages, the districts and regional water departments.

With a rapid phasing out of RUDEP and KIDEP, and with no support to the water sector after that time, it is most likely that the water supply schemes will deteriorate and the number of people supplied with water reduced. There are no indications that the government will make sufficient funds available for operation and maintenance. Today KIDEP funds 2/3 of the O&M cost of the water schemes (4 out of 6 mill. TAS). In a recent review of the water sector a possible strategy in case of a rapid phase out of the programme is put forward, of allocating funds for mainly rehabilitation of non-functioning schemes, adequate O&M of existing installations, and some new constructions (Rønningen, 1994). This will maintain existing supply, as well as contribute to O&M systems, and slightly expand the coverage of the rural population. Approximate cost for both regions would be 44 Mill. NOK (1994 cost level) for the period 1996-2002. No funds for expatriate experts are included. The district councils would be the implementing unit.

With the current financial crises in local government funding, the districts can not maintain the water supply system installed during the last 10-15 years without outside financial support. Even the funds allocated to O&M in the districts, together with village based funds and committees is evidently not enough given the high number of break downs, and slow repairs. A proper O&M system is not yet put in place, and it is not likely that it can function without external financial support (Rønningen 1994).

The villagers will probably be more interested in contributing to a fund for new projects, rather that O&M. Many of the water attendants are not receiving salaries, the water funds are either small or for some reason not used when equipment breaks down. There is therefore important problems still to be solved to get a system for proper user based O&M to work.

The *DDF projects* are another important component of the programmes. DDF projects were implemented in KIDEP from 1991, and in RUDEP from the budget year 1992/93. There were important weaknesses in the planning and implementation of the DDF projects. From the documentation, we can conclude that the weaknesses which the KIDEP review from 1991 pointed to, remained with the DDF during the whole period. The projects were mainly the result of the community development offices' list of projects which they collected from the villages when DDF was started in 1991. Most of the DDF projects are construction or rehabilitation of class rooms, teachers' staff houses, and rural health clinics. Most of the projects have been completed, although there are frequent delays and cost overrun. The same patterns are found in many African countries where various versions of district or village development funds based on villagers' contributions and co-financing are implemented.

The activities are mostly social infrastructure constructions, fulfilling central government plans for class rooms, secondary schools, workshops and staff houses. The villagers have often little interest in contributing to the projects, but are "forced" by district community development staff to contribute to the constructions. DDF projects can in many ways be seen as a way of subsidising the provision of social services by joining donor funding with local village contributions. In itself this might be relevant, but questions can be asked as to what extent DDF projects contribute to greater participation by the villagers in the local decision making, planning and implementation of "the villagers' own projects identified according to their own needs and priorities".

Many villagers are tired of the repeated requests for labour and contributions to village self-help projects. They are also supposed to pay local taxes, and pay user fees for education and health services. Unless the delivery and quality of the social services is improved, there will be increased resistance to these demands. The resistance is so widespread, that there are several stories of councillors, who in a year of local elections, promised their constituencies that they would have "free projects" (no self help needed), and no local taxes.

4.5 Economic and institutional sustainability

Are district programmes a cost-efficient way of promoting rural development? and to what extent is it relevant to try to measure cost-efficiency?

Compared to management of aid to sector programme and projects the management of district development programmes might seem

cumbersome and resource intensive, both in the use of personnel and funds. They are seen as "expensive".

District development programme can be seen second or third rural intervention programmes (first generation being the community development and IRDP approach). The reasoning behind the rural intervention programmes is that reform of national institutions and sector support is not enough to generate local development. Specific interventions and financial support to local level development is needed.

Some form of institutional strengthening is usually included, either support to local government, or local NGOs or civil society institutions. Institutional capacity building takes long time, and rural intervention programmes therefore usually have a long term commitment, with substantial input in institution building in an early phase of the programme, both in the form of funds or technical assistance.

According to the proponents of rural intervention programmes it is only in the long term, after 15-20 years time that one can evaluate the sustainability of the programmes. It is only then that one can expect that new planning and implementation routines have become entrenched in the existing (new) institutional structure, and the improved procedures and routines carried on after the programme is phased out, as well as an improved service delivery as a result of this.

If sustainability can not be evaluated in the short run, there is a need for yardsticks to be used for programme reviews in the short term, to review whether the programme heads in the right directions. Cost awareness and phasing out plans can be two such issues. The Centre for Development Research in Denmark has developed guidelines for institutional screening of local governments (CDR, 1994). Similar guidelines can be developed to screen institutional aspects of other local level institutions.

Another issue related to sustainability is the need for building cost awareness in the local planning and implementing management unit. Reporting and monitoring has so far been constructed mainly to contribute to financial control, and to timely implementation (3E Economics). Little effort has been put into promoting efficiency, or cost awareness. A basic question relating to this issue, is whether the local government administration in Kigoma and Rukwa are ready for cost awareness learning. This relates to the other problem they face, proper planning and implementation, which require basic routines and procedures for proper administration, i.e. financial control and simple and robust planning systems. Cost awareness (least cost solutions etc) and efficiency planning can be complicated planning tools. Given that there is a need for, and readiness for cost awareness learning, proper

systems should be developed in planning, implementation, reporting and monitoring. Costs have to be broken down for specific components, and over years. The 3E Economics report discusses these issues in some detail, and concludes "there has to be a genuine desire for better and relevant information and also a will to devote resources in order to achieve effective reporting and monitoring" (p.5-16).

Sustainability might have more to do with organization and funding of operation and maintenance (O&M), than with the cost efficiency. A technology that is relatively expensive in investment terms (gravity schemes) might demand a simpler organization for O&M (relative simpler to repair, and simpler systems to order spare parts), than a simpler technology, i.e. shallow wells, which might have frequent breakdowns in operation, and might incur higher cost and difficult procurement for spare part or new equipment (which again might demand a more complex organization). O&M is primarily an organisational issue. Proper O&M in due time might limit the total cost for repair and rehabilitation. The rural populations' preference for gravity schemes compare to other technologies, can in itself contribute to an easier organizational solution for O&M, if the technology is seen as the preferred solution.

To improve the awareness and culture of O&M, it might be efficient to have the villagers contribute to a village fund for O&M. This is done in the water supply programme, but not in the DDF projects where the villagers are supposed to contribute to the implementation of new projects. The UNCDF programme in Mwanza, plans to have villagers contribute to a O&M fund for rural road maintenance, rather than having them contribute with labour to the construction or rehabilitation of the roads (see chapter 6).

4.6 Programme design and objectives related to NORAD's and Tanzania's strategies and policies

NORAD presented its new Strategy for Aid Assistance in 1992. The discussion here is about how the programmes relate to NORAD's new strategy, and as well as to changing strategies and policies in Tanzania. The ultimate goal of the new strategy is *sustainability*, i.e. "to contribute to lasting changes in the economic, social and political conditions of the population in developing countries. The assistance shall be used in a way which gives the best possible effect for the poorest groups, channelled primarily to the poorest countries. It should also create as little dependence as possible" (NORAD 1992, p. 11).

It is recognized that "*Economic growth* is necessary if the developing countries are to alleviate poverty, develop welfare services..." (p. 12). Support for economic growth is therefore a priority, but taking into consideration environmental issues, distributional effects, and development of human resources and cultural identity. In the introduction to the priority areas for development cooperation it is stated that "The alleviation of poverty will be an essential factor. We must address the causes of poverty and contribute towards increasing incomes....This presupposes development of human resources, through for instance primary health care, education and training, as well as development of local institutions" (p.13). It is also stated that the "principles upon which development cooperation is based are just as important as the selection of priority areas" (op.cit.). Poverty alleviation remains an important principle for Norwegian development aid. Economic growth as a precondition for poverty alleviation is emphasised, and support to productive sector given priority, taking into consideration distributional as well as environmental impacts. However, support to social infrastructure can be seen as essential in order to promote the productive sector, and thereby alleviate poverty.

In the priority areas fisheries and agriculture are mentioned explicitly as areas of priority in productive sector support. Other than that there are no references to the rural population, nor rural development, or rural development programmes.

Work is underway in NORAD/Oslo on the development of sectoral guidelines as a follow up to the new NORAD aid strategy. So far guidelines have been published on energy aid, telecommunications and support to the productive sector and industrial development. A draft for new guidelines for district development programmes was ready in December 1993, but has not been sanctioned yet.

Institutional development is one of the priority areas for Norwegian development cooperation. NORAD shall "support reforms and organizational development which will increase the efficiency of the public administration at the central, regional and local level" (p.23). It is further stated that "Support to institutional development will normally have a long-term perspective. It will require not only detailed knowledge of the institutions with which we cooperate, but also knowledge of administration, management and leadership.....Support for the establishment of parallel administrative systems must be avoided" (p. 24).

Another priority area for Norwegian development cooperation is democracy and human rights. It is stated that "community participation in the process of their development is both a goal in itself and a means to achieve economic and social development. Participation relates to economic policy, decision making, strengthening of legal and democratic institutions, access and responsibility in public administration,

independent media, development of human resources, progress for women, among other things" (p.15). Participation and community development is thereby seen as essential in order to strengthen the civil society and secure social and economic development. This indicates a need to support development from bellow, in addition to support reforms at the national level.

If one compares the objectives, designs and outcomes of the programmes with the new NORAD strategy, several issues emerge:

(i) the objectives of the programmes are clearly within the priority areas of the new strategy, this include both institutional development, support to productive sector and social infrastructure
(ii) the development of parallel structures as in the case of RUDEP and to a much less degree with KIDEP, is clearly undesirable, and should be avoided. Integration into the district administration as in the case of KIDEP should continue
(iii) the emphasis on popular participation and community development is clearly within the new strategy
(iv) there is a need for strengthening the emphasis on sustainability, through improved competence within the programmes on financial and economic efficiency and control
(v) the new strategy recognizes that institutional development is a long term commitment, but may be unduly optimistic about the time frame necessary for reaching organizational and financial sustainability

The demands for sustainability and capacity building of recipient's national planning and financial capacity is definitely desirable. However some writers question the realism and feasibility of these demands in the short to medium perspective given the severe economic crises the African countries are experiencing (Havnevik 1993 and Therkildsen 1994). The question is not so much the objectives of sustainability, as the structural constraints for reaching this sustainability as well as the time horizon and commitment of donors.

The programmes are as far as we can see not in conflict with policies and strategies within Tanzania. Tanzania has not on any occasions that we know about made a case against district development programmes. There is a number of donor supported district programmes in Tanzania today. In chapter 5 we present some of these programmes. GoT demands that these funds are reported to the treasurer, but do not require that the funds should be channelled through central government institutions.

Neither does donor support to district development necessarily contradict donor support to civil service reform on the national level. They can rather be seen as complementary. In its report on "Strengthening of Budget and Planning in Health and Education", an EEC supported

project to the Budget Commission, the report states the need for supplementing the reform work on the national level, with experience on the local level. In the EEC funded project this is done through pilot districts where there will be training and workshops, as well as district level studies on aspects of improved planning and reporting routines. The report states that it is necessary to collect information and experience from the district level about local implementation of reform in the budget and planning routines, given that "there is no clear consensus over how such a system should be structures in order to be simple enough to be administratively workable, yet at the same time effective" (Budget Commission 1993, p.50).

The development of a parallel instititutional setup is in contradiction with Tanzanian policy. The strengthening of the regional level compared to the district level is not in accordance with current Tanzanian policy. However, the regional administration does have a role to play in coordination of planning, supervision and monitoring according to the local government system in Tanzania (Semboja and Therkildsen 1991). The development in the direction of decentralization of planning and implementation to the district level is in line with current policies in Tanzania.

As part of the structural adjustments and the Civil Service Reform Programme, a number of local government staff will be retrenched this year and the next. The recruitment of additional staff, and the funding of an extra 125 employees as in the case of RUDEP clearly contradict the present strategy of limiting the number of local government staff.

4.7 Conclusions

There is a great number of reports on RUDEP and KIDEP (see the bibliography). The documentation is weak, however, as a basis for analysing the impact from the programmes. It is even weak on reporting on output and outcomes of the programmes and its activites. No baseline exists for any of the programmes. There have been few regular reviews and no comprehensive evaluations have taken place. The objectives are very general. Limited work has been put into detailed objectives, and in the formulation of indicators. Reporting and monitoring has been weak or non-existent. The data on input and output are weak. No basis exists for proper calculation neither of cost-benefit nor cost-efficiency.

On the basis of these shortcomings in the data, one has to be very cautious in one's conclusions. However, some blunt conclusions could be given: RUDEP and KIDEP have not been overly successful programmes, but neither have they been total failures. The programmes show weak results, and have had limited impact on the rural

population's welfare and on the rural economy. The fulfilment of the objectives is weak. There has been limited institutional capacity building, and weak sustainability in the programmes. If there is rapid phasing out of donor support, it is likely that most activities will close down. Institutional development is one area that is poorly documented in existing reports. A proper empirical study of institutional capacity building through the programmes, as well as constraints and opportunities could have given much needed input in the evaluation of the programmes.

None of these results should be surprising, they are rather what could be expected, given the programme design, weak management capacity and weak adjustment capability and willingness, and a weak local government in financial and organizational crisis in a country undergoing difficult reforms. To this on could add a weak capability to manage the programmes in NORAD, partly due to discontinuity of staff and policies, disagreements about the scope and future of the programmes, and weak signals and policies on district development programmes within NORAD.

The main conclusion is that the findings (as far as we can confirm them) are what we most likely would expect given the situation as it has been described in the documentation, and given the situation in rural Tanzania, as well as in NORAD and Norwegian aid policy.

5 Social, economic and political change in Tanzania

5.1 Structural adjustment and social and economic change in rural areas.

Tanzania started to implement a structural adjustment programme in 1986, by implementing a substantial devaluation and introducing an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). The programme "included a broad range of policies aimed at liberalizing internal and external trade, unifying the exchange rate, reviving export, stimulating domestic savings, and restoring fiscal sustainability" (SASDA, 1994). In 1989 Tanzania introduced the second stage of the structural adjustment programme by introducing the "Economic and Social Action Programme" (ESAP). This programme also included reform of the parastatels, banking sector, agricultural marketing, government administration and the civil service.

The ERP was implemented on a background of serious crisis in the country. Tanzania had resisted the IBRD/IMF's proposals for structural adjustments during the early 80s, with the consequences that total aid received declined from 700 mill. USD in 1981 to 489 Mill USD in 1985. In the same period the value of Tanzania's export fell dramatically and total international debt increased from 2.5 to 5.1 Bill. USD. All development indicators clearly showed a substantial economic crisis in the country, that also implied social and political crisis (Havnevik, 1993). GDP fell by 1.5 % per year between 1979 and 1985.

The analysis of the developments after the introduction of structural adjustment has been contradictory. On the one hand the World Bank indicates an annual increase in GDP of 4%. The critics on the other hand claim that economic recovery is not taking place, and attribute the increased figure to the resumption of the inflow of aid, and the inclusion of parts of the black parallel market in the official economy, as the result of the devaluations and liberalization. Most recent documentation supports the notion that economic and trade activities are increasing. Food production is increasing, whereas traditional agricultural export production does not seem to have recovered.

Current official estimates of GDP is 300 USD/inh. Transferred into comparative figures for purchasing power, Tanzania may fare rather better, but it still remains one of the poorest countries in Africa.

It is generally recognized that the implementation of structural adjustments has been a slow process, with a lot of delays as well as "stops and go". The Consultative Group (CG) on Aid to Tanzania, the main donor meeting, cancelled the December meeting 1994, as a response to an IMF review of Public Expenditure in Tanzania, which revealed gross examples of tax evasions and tax exemptions given by central government for import of non-essential items. Norway as well as a number of other donors are withholding aid funds for the remaining of the year. The demand from the donors included a steep rise in Tanzania's own revenue collection, and improved financial management and control systems.

Few empirical studies exist of the social, economic and cultural impact of structural adjustment in rural Tanzania. One of the few studies is a study commissioned by SIDA, which is based on a empirical research in a sample of villages in rural Tanzania (Booth et.al. 1993). The research was carried out in 1992, and although some of the data are already out of date when it comes to reform implementation, most observations of the impacts are still valid. The following description is based on this study.

The study's general conclusion is that *the structural adjustment programme has had a slow and partial implementation.* The impact on the rural areas is therefore a result of this partial implementation, where many of the old structures of the former periods remain. One of their main conclusions is that *structural adjustment and the Economic Recovery Programme have not succeeded in recovery of the agricultural sector*. In the cases where agricultural production has increased, this has mainly been in food production, and to a large extent the result of the inclusion of earlier informal market into the official statistics. There are however, "signs that increased production costs are making life more difficult for staple food producers, but little indication of sustained recovery, or diversification, of export production" (op.cit.:118). The continued reform of the agricultural sector has tried to deal with obstacles to the recovery of the agricultural export sector (see 5.2.), but with little success so far.

The liberalization of import and trade liberalization has been positive for the rural population, "including those locally regarded as relatively poor, and perhaps especially poor women, as well as for the better off and those living in towns" (Booth et.al. 1993:118). All groups have benefitted from the access to goods, and no one wants a return to the old times.

There is *widespread break down in the ability of the local governments to provide the basic services*. This was a confirmation of earlier observations. The report notes however that "neglected precautions against cattle disease, resulting in substantial losses in the last few

years (which has also been years of drought), came as a surprise and went well beyond what we were prepared for" (op.cit.:120).

Although the *support for economic liberalization was almost universal, there was much more scepticism about political liberalization.* There was wide scepticism against multi-partism, especially among the women. The rural people were concerned about the possibilities of ethnic, religious or other conflicts. Since then the local government election at the district level was held in November 1994, and might gradually have some influence.

The social impact on the household economy is difficult to identify. The study concludes that so far the *impacts of the structural adjustments seem to have strengthened earlier strategies of rural households of income differentiations*. During the 1970s and 1980s survival strategies of households implied increasingly that the members of the household engaged in a variety of income generation activities, including outmigration and remittance back to the household of income. The income of the household was the result of a complex set of networks and flows of incomes and goods. *This income differentiation seems to have continued in the 1990s. In the short run this can open up new opportunities for women and younger men, but it does not have the same potential for long term economic development as an agricultural-based recovery would have given.*

A consequence of the continuation of the income differentiation strategies on the household level and migration, is that the households of the communities will derive a substantial amount of their income from outside the village. Serious questions can then be raised as to the whether the village community alone should be used as the basic unit for income and poverty studies.

5.2 Public sector reform programmes

There is a number of reform programmes in the public sector in Tanzania.

The financial sector reform consists of liberalization of trade and payment system, and restructuring of the financial institutions. The National Bank of Commerce (NBC) has been restructured, and retrenchment of staff has taken place. The Cooperative and Rural Development Bank is undergoing restructuring, and inviting private buyers as well as cooperatives to by shares in the "new" CRDB. The cooperatives have been unwilling to buy shares as a result of their indebtedness, and earlier experience with CRDB. DANIDA is supporting the restructuring and staff training, as well as purchasing 20% of

the new shares. These shares are supposed to be sold to Tanzanians in the near future.

The civil service reform consists of six components:
(i) retrenchment and redeployment
(ii) personnel control and management
(iii) pay reform
(iv) organization and efficiency reviews
(v) capacity building and training
(vi) local government reforms

The World Bank and other donors back the Civil Service Reform Programme. The Civil Service Reform Programme has been slow in its implementation. Three components are in the process of implementation:

(i) *Retrenchment and redeployment*. A second and third phase of retrenchment both in civil service and local government service have been taking place, and further retrenchments will take place in 1994/95.
(ii) Six ministries have been identified for *organization and efficiency reviews*. Four out of these have undergone reviews, that is Prime Minister's Office (PMO), Finance, Planning Commission, and Civil Service. The two remaining ministries are Health and Education.
(iii) Proposals for *pay reform*, that will limit the monetary allowances and monetize the in-kind benefits, are currently under preparation. The major constraints are lack of resources for wage increases.

The work on *local government reform* has hardly started. Two studies where undertaken in 1993: (i) A synthesization of previous reports on local government in Tanzania, focusing on main problems, and (ii) another report which also builds on earlier reports, and where the purpose was to discuss relations and linkages between central and local government. No new empirical research seems to have been commissioned related to the local government reform work. Reform of local government requires substantial policy changes in Tanzania. There is a need for financial strengthening of the councils, both through improved local revenue generation as well as increased transfer of funds from central government to the district level. There is also a need for strengthening the manpower situation on the district level, both through transfer of personnel to the district administration, as well as systematic training in local government issues. Several of the issues involved in local government reform require changes in laws and procedures.

Parastatal sector reform. By October 1994 38 parastatels had been divested, and there were negotiations with possible investors for possible joint ventures or sales of a number of companies.

Agricultural sector reform. The major focus is on the reform of marketing of traditional cash crops, with the establishment of reformed marketing boards. The reform also includes reform of the procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs, which gives a larger potential role for private traders.

Social sector reform consists of giving a larger role to private actors, increased financial transfers to the sectors as well as the introduction of cost sharing with the introduction of fees. The reform consist of four components, where most efforts so far have been devoted to (i) and (iv):

(i) increasing the role of the private sector as a part of the liberalization process
(ii) provision of essential resources to priority areas
(iii) increased investment on health and eduction
(iv) reduction of subsidies and introduction of cost recovery measures

The planning and budget reform is aimed at improved allocation of limited resources. As part of the Economic Reform Programme and Public Sector Reform in Tanzania a system of *Rolling Plan and Forward Budget (RPFB)* was introduced. The purpose of the RPFB is to increase financial management and control. It was recognized that Tanzania could not implement all ongoing projects and programmes. RPFB was introduced to

(A) projecting resources availability for the three years and dividing resources between sectors based on government priorities,
(B) identifying priority areas based on government objectives and policies,
(C) withdrawing from some activities so as to provide sufficient funds to fewer priority activities, and
(D) planning ahead for reallocation of resources and phasing out of activities.

Currently there is work in progress on four components of the RPFB:

(i) macroeconomic framework
(ii) sectoral policy formulation
(iii) annual and forward budget preparation
(iv) preparation for the Volume II of the second RPFB

It is recognized that the formulation of annual and forward budgets are still weak. Work has to be improved on collaboration between central government ministries, development of priority areas, and closer scrutiny of investment funds and its relationship to future demands for recurrent funds. Concerning budget preparation and forward budget, the districts and regions are supposed to give input to the budgeting process. The input from local government at district level was weak in the first RPFB, most of it originated for the Regional Administration. New Preliminary Guidelines have been introduced for District and Regional input to the Second RPFB, but there are clear indications that

the district councils neither understands nor are prepared to act on these guidelines.

5.3 "Local government - a system in distress"

"Local government - a system in distress" is the title of a World Bank paper from 1992 (IBRD, 1992), which describes the weaknesses in the financial and administrative capacity of local government in Tanzania. Local government, with elected councillors at the district level, was reintroduced in 1984. This happened 12 years after the district councils were abolished in 1972.[2] A system of deconcentration of government authorities replaced the comprehensive local government system which had existed since liberation 10 years earlier.[3]

The reform came after stark criticisms of the elected councils for lack of ability to create local development. Local government and local politicians were seen as obstacles to more rapid implementation of national development policies. "Decentralization", as was the label of the reform, should create a system whereby national policies could be more efficiently implemented at the local level. The region was established as the most important local level for planning and policy implementation. The launching of Integrated Regional Development Programmes is but one element in this institutional strengthening. Under the slogan "Madaraka Mikoani" (responsibility to the regions) the reform was implemented on the basis of the idea that central coordination and policy formulation should be combined with extensive participation at the local level. Participation should, however, be directly related to state policies and not be channelled through inefficient local councils.

"Those changes meant that the local and the central government responsibilities were merged, and this was meant to result into a strong central government organisation for coordinating and supervising rural development which, it was believed, would increase peoples control on the development process in their own areas." (Max 1991:83)

But, as Max also points out ..

".. by 1980 it had become quite obvious that the powers aimed for the people had actually been hijacked by the bureaucrats who tended to take decisions on behalf of the people. In other words, decentralisation was nothing but taking away from the people the little power they had prior to the abolition of the local government system." (ibid.)

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[2] One year later, in 1973 the same happened to the urban councils.

[3] For an extensive and informed account of the historical development of local government in Tanzania from the first colonial times up till 1990, see Max 1991.

When elected local government was reintroduced in 1984 the justification was partly the one emphasised by John Max as in the above quote, namely democracy. But it had also to do with financial stress. Decentralization was based on the idea that central government should collect all revenue and reallocate financial resources to districts and regions. When public finances broke down around 1980 the reintroduction of elected local government was also motivated by the idea that by giving local people responsibility for local matters they should also help to finance development through local revenue collection.

Thus the climate for reintroducing local democracy was hardly the best. Central government transfer of funds to the districts was declining, and there was a general economic crises in the country. The basis for local revenue collection was weak. And one of the effects of the decentralization policy was that people had been pacified and taught that all initiative and all financial resources should come from central government.

What was more, most of the resources, material as well as manpower, were retained at regional level. The newly established districts had few chances to perform the tasks which were expected from them.

There were few training opportunities for local government staff. The Local Government Service Commission (LGSC) have had very limited funds for training, and most training for district council staff has been though donor funded district development programmes. ODA/UK also funds some training for district accountants through Institute of Development Management (IDM) in Mzumbe. IDM was originally set up as a local government training school, but has turned into a more general management training school. There are, however, plans to set up a Local Government Unit at IDM, which would offer courses, degrees, research opportunities and consultancies. The Netherlands is also investigating possible programmes for support for training of district council staff.

The GoT have passed a bill in Parliament in November this year about setting up a Local Government Training Centre in Dodoma (GoT 1994). The donors are, however, so far reluctant to fund a new institution, and would prefer to fund courses through utilization of existing organization, and teaching capacity.

5.4 Local government: organizational changes and development trends

The system of local government which was established with the 1984 reform may be sketchily represented as in figure 5.1. The main features of this system are:

Figure 5.1
Central-local government relations after 1984)*



**) Reproduced from Semboja and Therkildsen: "Handbook on District Level Administration in Tanzania" (1991).*

- It is divided into three separate hierarchies: (i) A state hierarchy running from the Minister at the national state level down to ward at the local level; (ii) a local government hierarchy based on the District Council and with village councils at the sub-district level; (iii) a party hierarchy running from the National CCM Secretariat down to the neighbourhood level where the "ten-cell" would be the smallest unit.

- These three hierarchies are vertically interconnected in a number of ways: In line with the doctrine of the "supremacy of the Party" the party line "interferes" with the government lines in various ways, and at practically all levels. Thus the District Commissioner and the Regional Commissioner are political positions, and under the one party rule they were key party figures.[4] District secretaries held key administrative positions in the district administration; and at village level the administration and council were in practice serving as party organs.

With the abolition of the one party state, the party line (CCM) has no place in the formal organizational chart. Formally CCM is now on line with any other of the altogether 11 registered parties, organized completely outside the government structure. Also, as a corollary to this, CCM is supposed to have vacated all its party offices inside various branches of public administration[5]. Also, all public servants in high ranking administrative and planning positions are supposed to be politically neutral. That is taken to mean that civil servants (in any part of the public service - central or local) is supposed not to be politically active or member of any political party. Any civil servant who wants to stand for political election shall have to resign from his post.

Under the one party system the state and the party was supposed to be one and the same to the extent that the party was to be supreme in all activities of the organs of the state. And the party apparatus may in some regards be seen as an extension of state power to the local level. The role of the local party branches and cells was - among other things - to mobilize the people and to serve as an instrument for "explaining" government policies to the people. With the CCM government still in power CCM will continue to play this role, although not formally taking place as an explicit local government function. However, the CCM is the only political party with a developed organizational apparatus at all levels, and should still be seen as an important power factor that de facto serves as an extension of state power at various local levels as long as CCM stays in power at the national level.

One interesting question is to what extent civil servants in local government actually take on a politically neutral role. Experiences from the elections at sub-district and district level[6] indicate that in practice there is much confusion as to how the dividing line between CCM and government officials shall be drawn. CCM still sees itself as some sort

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[4] This continues to be so also under the multi party system as long as CCM holds political power

[5] On the other hand a number of the former party cadres may have been employed by the district councils when the one party system as abolished.

[6] Elections to the village councils were held in October 1993 and to the district councils in October 1994. In both elections CCM won convincingly.

of state organ, and there were a lot of complaints and formal protests against the way in which the elections were held. Whereas district authorities should prepare and carry out the elections in their capacity as "neutral" administrative organs, it seems as if in many cases this has been done as always used to be the case by "delegating" much of the practical preparations and responsibility for actually arranging the elections to CCM.

One should also keep in mind that the party in power at the national level still has a strong political channel to control District Council policies through the Regional and District Commissioners. These are not civil servants. On the contrary they are political agents of the national government at their respective local levels. The Regional Commissioner is "Proper Officer" (with District Commissioner as "Assistant Proper Officer") for the District Council. The District Commissioner has also decisive power over the Development Budget at district level. Before the budget is passed on to the regional level for further approval and prioritizing, it shall be approved by the District Development Committee. This committee is not an organ of the District Council but is chaired by, and is an organ for, the District Commissioner (i.e. a political local state body). Before the abolition of the one party system the budget - after having passed the DDC was also "vetted" by the district organs of CCM.

One may conclude that even though CCM has lost some of its formal role in local government, the central government's political grip on the District Councils is still strong. One feature of the system that should bee seen in the same perspective is central government control over staff recruitment to local government through the Local Government Service Commission (LGSC). This is an important aspect of the state centred system which still remains and which does not appear in the organizational chart. The top administrative officer of the Council, the District Executive Director, is even appointed directly by the Prime Minister (and for the most important town councils by the President) upon recommendation from the Local Government Service Commission. The fact that personnel recruitment and control (promotion, salaries, training, discipline etc.) is under a national state body may be seen as a control mechanism.

What may be generally observed is the widespread idea that government should be "unified" in the sense that all government has a common goal in implementing national policies. Policies are made by the Ministries; the role of the politicians at local level shall be to follow up these policies, explain them to the people and make sure they are accepted.

The most immediate and direct organizational changes following form the abolition of the one party system have so far taken place at the sub-district level. As is seen from the chart in fig 1, in the traditional system, the village was the basic unit at the sub-district level. The village chairman was appointed by the local CCM branch. I.e. there was a clear coupling of the village to the party hierarchy even though the village was also a sub-unit of the District Council. With the new system the village is formally a sub-unit under the District Council and the Village Executive Officer is now an employee of the District Council. The same applies the Ward Executive Officer. As compared to fig. 1, one will therefore see that the ward has now been moved from "the state hierarchy" to the "Local Government Hierarchy". All these changes should be seen as instrumental in strengthening the District Council. The chart in figure 5.2. gives a rough picture of the system as it appears after the introduction of the multi party system.

Figure 5.2
Central-local government relations in Tanzania



Below the he village level there were no local government or state structures under the old system. The organization was here left with the Party which organized the grass roots level into the so-called "Ten-

Cell" units, each consisting of around ten households with a chairman appointed by the party. This was the very nerve ends of the fused party/state control system. With the splitting of the formal links between the party and local government, the Districts and the rest of the government system lost its sensing organs at this most local level. To fill this void, a set of new structures has been put in place: In the rural districts a new basic structure has been formed called the kitongoji (plural vitongoji); in the urban districts the corresponding unit is called Mtaa (pl. mitaa)[7] It is the responsibility of the District Council to subdivide its area into sub units and to organize election of a chairmen for each unit.

In the urban councils a number of mitaa will form the ward. The ward is governed by the Ward Executive Officer, who is a District Council employee, and by the Ward Development Committee. The Ward Development Committee is composed of the district councillor from that ward and a number of heads of functional departments at the ward level and . As this was explained to me, the elected heads of the mitaa will not be part of any body at the ward level in the urban districts. In the rural districts the set up is slightly different. Here the vitongoji are subdivisions of the villages, and all chairmen of the vitongoji are members of the village council. In addition to the vitongoji chairmen the village council is composed of a number of directly elected members, out of whom at least 7 must be women. A number of villages will form a ward, and like in the urban districts the ward is the immediate level below the district council. In addition to the members mentioned for the urban wards, Ward Development Committees in rural districts will also comprise of Village Executive Directors of the villages under the ward.

At the national government level there are also some recent changes pertaining to how local government issues are handled. In 1991 the responsibility for the administration of local government was moved from the separate Ministry for Local Government to a division under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). One reason for this is said to be a felt need to improve the coordination of administrative and managerial issues relating to local government within central government. As it was, the responsibility for regional planning and development was already under the PMO. At present there are three directorates under the Minister of Local Government, one for local government administration, one for regional administration and one for planning.

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[7] So far these names have no recognized English translation. In Norwegian we could probably translate them into "nabolag" (kitongoji) and "rode" (mtaa).

The organizational structure is illustrated in figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3

Organization for local government issues in Prime Minister's Office



Up till 1994 regional administration and planning was grouped together in one directorate.

The Commissioner for Local Government is mainly responsible for legal and administrative issues pertaining to the councils. He is, for example, the one who is responsible for overseeing the elections throughout the local government system. Generally legal control of the district councils and support and advise concerning how they carry out their duties is the responsibility of the Commissioner for Local Government. At the regional level, as Head of Department under the District Development Director (RDD) there is placed a Regional Local Government Officer with much of the same duties at regional level. There is no line relationship between this officer and the Commissioner for Local Government. The position seems to be rather marginal with little substantial responsibility.

Up till recently it has probably been correct to say that as if the Commissioner for Local Government had a weaker position one as compared to the Commissioner for Regional Administration and Planning. The latter is responsible for issues relating to economic development in the regions - and therefore also for the planning and development

budgeting of the district councils. Simplified, one may say that whereas the more formal and institutional aspects of district councils (including issues pertaining to democracy) fall under the Commissioner for Local Government, the more "material subject matter" of council activities pertaining to development of infrastructure and services fall under the responsibility of the Commissioner for Regional Administration and Planning.[8] The power of the latter is clearly related to the centralized character of the Tanzanian regional planning system in general. This system leaves little room for genuine local decision making at district level. Most of the resources and real power locally is concentrated at regional level with the RDD as the key power figure.

With the splitting of the functions of regional administration and planning it may be more difficult assess the power relations. Generally the regional administrative and planning system is coming more under stress as a result of the ongoing Civil Service Reform Programme. Also within the Tanzanian government (irrespective of the CSRP) there seems to be an ongoing argument between forces who want more power and responsibility to be given to the districts (possibly combined with a clearer division of work between state and local government); and those who want more centralization with a further strengthening of the local state administration (regions, functional departments and central government).

[8] This is particularly so as regards development planning, and more generally to the extent that the responsibility is not with one of the sector ministries.

6 Donor Strategies

This chapter summarizes the experiences and current strategies of most other donors supporting rural development programmes or projects in Tanzania. The chapter is based on talks with representatives of the donor organizations in Dar es Salaam and on documentary material. Most of the material is provided through the embassies of the respective countries.

The following donor agencies and projects/programmes are included in the survey:

- SIDA (Sweden): The HESAWA programme in North Western Tanzania and the Land Management Programme (LAMP) in Babati District.
- DANIDA (Denmark): The HIMA programme in Iringa region.
- DGIS/SNV (Netherlands): District Rural Development Programme (DRDP), covering 11 districts, most of which are located in Northern and North Western Tanzania.
- Ireland: The Kilosa District Rural Development Programme.
- GTZ (Germany): Support to rural development projects in Tanga Region.
- UNCDF/UNDP: Planned support to district development in Mwanza Region.

A summary of trends and experiences is presented in the concluding section of the chapter.

6.1 The HESAWA programme

This is a SIDA supported programme covering the Kagera, Mwanza and Mara regions in North Western Tanzania (i.e., the three regions around Lace Victoria). This is not an integrated rural development programme in the sense that it covers all or most sectors in the regions where it is operating. HESAWA stands for **He**alth through **Sa**nitation

and Water, indicating that this is primarily a welfare-oriented programme.

The objective of the programme is formulated as follows in the evaluation undertaken in 1992:

"The overall aim of the programme is to improve the welfare of the rural population through improved health education, environmental sanitation, drinking water supply, community participation and capability and capacity building at village and district level." (Evans et al. 1992 p. ii)

As one may see the programme also includes procedural aims, pointing to the wish to involve and mobilize local people and to channel activities through the local communities. In our talks with the representatives of SIDA this general objective of the programme was also very much emphasised.

The programme started in 1985, but may be seen as a follow up of the more high technology water programme which already existed. One main objective of the new approach introduced with HESAWA was to reduce the use of advanced technology and to organize the programme so as to involve the beneficiaries to a much larger extent than had been the case. But also HESAWA is a large and complex programme covering an extensive geographical area with a target population of more than four million people. The 1992 evaluation recorded activities in more than 600 villages spread over more than 180 wards. All the 15 districts in the Lake Zone are in one way or another involved in the programme. The total cost of the programme is about SEK 50 million a year.

Unlike most other rural development programmes the management of the SIDA programmes is commissioned out to consulting companies. In the case of HESAWA the consultant is Business Care Services. The company then runs the programme under a detailed contract with SIDA.

The cornerstone of the HESAWA organizational structure is the Zonal Coordinating Office which is placed in Mwanza. The committee has its origin in the organization of the water supply improvement programme which preceded HESAWA. The committee is headed by the HESAWA Deputy Director and has a staff of around 60 people, most of them technical experts recruited locally on four years contract. Among the staff members are also six expatriates. The ZCO operates the central store for the programme and the team of consultants provide the technical expertise needed to support villages and districts in carrying out activities under the programme.

The Chart in figure 6.1. which has been copied direct from the HESAWA evaluation (Evans et al. 1992:50) shows the wider organizational structure of HESAWA from central to local level. The main thing to be observed in this organizational set up is the way in which HESAWA forms a parallel but relatively independent structure in relation to the Tanzanian government structure.

Figure 6.1.
HESAWA institutional and organizational structure



With the Zonal Coordinating Office as the cornerstone of the organization one will see that the programme organization spans all four levels of government:

At **central level** the HESAWA national programme directorate is located in Maendeleo (i.e., the Ministry of Community Development, Women's Affairs and Children). It is worth noting that the directorate is not placed under the Prime Minister's office, which would have been the more natural location had the objective been to emphasise the integration of the programme with local government institutional set up. The main role of the national directorate is to provide general guidance to the programme in close cooperation with SIDA and to promote the ideas of the programme at national level.

At **regional level** there is one HESAWA coordinator in each region who coordinates the work of the Regional Action Team (RAT). The RDD appoints the coordinator from among existing government officers. The regions provide technical advisory support to the districts.

A similar structure is found at **district level**. Each district has its District Action Committee (DAC) and District HESAWA Coordinator appointed by the District Executive Director. The primary responsibility for implementation of activities and for training and supervision placed at district level. The District Action Team prepares an annual work plan. All requests and project proposals from villages are channelled through the district and have to be given priority by the District Council.

At the grass roots community level the **village** is the key unit responsible for planning, implementing and maintaining the village size projects. All villages which are included in the programme have to form HESAWA committees.

Although this programme organization on paper is closely integrated with the ordinary government structure it may nevertheless be seen as a parallel structure. The programme strongly depends on non-government staff pooled in the Zonal Office. Much of the resources and materials needed in the programme is also procured and channelled through the Zonal Office and delivered to districts. The SIDA funds are channelled directly to the districts without passing through central government and the control of how money is spent is placed with the Zonal Office.

The evaluation also lists several achievements of the programme; such as improved health and hygiene conditions, increased coverage of water supply, use of more appropriate and affordable technologies, increased community participation, increases in knowledge and skill at village level and progress in transferring implementation responsibility from regions to districts.

In spite of these positive achievements the evaluation points to several problems and constraints. Among these, the following may be of particular relevance to our discussion:

It has been easier to reach the more technical goals related to building of infrastructure than reaching the more diffuse and procedural goals, such as strengthening of decision making capability and involvement of women and the local communities generally in decision making.

It has proved very difficult to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the programme because the objectives of the programme to a large extent relate to human and social rather than technical and more tangible goals. Many results may also take a long time to materialize. The evaluation calls for a better monitoring and reporting system to improve the cost effectiveness of the programme activities.

Of particular importance is the point made by the evaluation that the

> *".... long-term sustainability of the programme impacts and approach is very much open to question. Programme impacts have been important and substantial, and the approach is increasingly well understood. At the community level, however, the real prospects for sustainability have yet to be tested. Within the government system, HESAWA still has the character of an external programme with no guarantee as yet that the basic approach will be permanently absorbed."* (Evans et al. 1992:95)

In the HESAWA Phase III Plan of Action for the period 1994 to 1998 special attention is paid to increasing the sustainability of project activities and results at the district and village levels. The programme states explicitly that in the next programme phase **first priority** will be given to issues relating to sustainability and **second priority** to output orientation (HESAWA Phase II (1994), p. 6).

- The programme is going to strengthen the responsibility for installations by concluding formal contracts with all the villages which are included in the programme specifying conditions for phasing and take over of installations. A system will be introduced whereby the end-users are requested to pay part of the costs of physical installations. They are already required to contribute labour and to set aside savings for maintenance and operation.

- Community participation will be given more emphasis by ,e.g., employing and training "Ward Animators." The end users will gradually be made more explicitly responsible for maintenance and repair. The programme will also give more priority to involving local non-governmental groups in the villages (like associations, clubs, etc.) in the programme activities.

- "Simple but accurate participatory base-line studies" will be carried out to improve the ability to monitor progress at the local level and also to form the basis for evaluation of programme impacts by programme management. The mechanisms for monitoring will be included in the Village Contracts.

- The role of the districts will be more prominent in the next programme phase than has been the case up till now. Districts will be required to provide a local contribution to be paid into the District HESAWA account. This contribution will be a condition for programme involvement in the district. The amount will be graded according to the economic capability of the districts, varying between 3% and 5% of the external HESAWA budget for the district. In order to stimulate district contribution, HESAWA funds will be used to top up local contributions above the required minimum. The political leaders, including the councillors, will be required to play a more active role. The District council will be requested to appoint a qualified, full time District HESAWA Coordinator and a designated HESAWA accountant in each district. Support for strengthening capacity building in the district administration will be built into the programme.

- The role of the private sector in programme activities will be strengthened in the next programme phase. This will include such as training of villagers and private entrepreneurs in their respective roles. A strategy for privatisation of activities presently undertaken by district staff (construction works etc.) will be worked out. Supply of spare parts will gradually be supposed to be taken over by the private sector. The same applies to provision of transport facilities.

The SIDA programme officer emphasised that the general objective of the changes which are now being introduced in the third programme phase is to integrate the programme more closely with the district political and administrative system. The general objective is to transfer as many as possible of the functions now undertaken by the Zonal HESAWA Coordinating Office to the districts. Seen in the time perspective of around ten years it was indicated that the staffing of the Zonal Coordinating Office should be reduced from the present around 60 to a remaining core of key personnel of around 10.

6.2 The Babati Land Management Programme (LAMP)

This is a SIDA-supported programme. It started in 1988 with a pilot phase. During this pilot phase a review mission was established to look into the experiences and to revise the organizational set-up for the

programme. The review mission submitted its report in March 1990 and the present LAMP programme is, with some adaption, developed on the basis of the recommendations of the mission[9]. The total budget for the programme for the present financial year (94/95) is SEK 6.01 million.

Like HESAWA, LAMP is not an integrated rural development programme in the sense that it covers all or most sectors at local level. In the case of LAMP the aim is to improve land husbandry in Babati District. The output oriented goals of the programme thus relates primarily to environmental protection and improvement. At central government level in Tanzania the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources and Tourism (MLNRT) is therefore the lead ministry for the programme.

Also like HESAWA - and probably even more so in the case of LAMP - substantial emphasis is put on the procedural objectives related to strengthening the decision making and implementing capacity of the local institutions. The overriding objective of the programme is to strengthen the capacity of the village and district organizations to identify and to address their own problems. LAMP claims not to be a conventional development project in the sense that it is an apparatus involving the donor in the implementation of development activities. It presents itself primarily as a funding programme for activities related to land husbandry and environment which are initiated and implemented by the citizens and institutions in Babati District.

In practice the District Council and administration is supported by a LAMP organization at district level in the planning and implementation of programme activities. The responsibility for running this office is commissioned out to a consultancy firm, Orgut, and is named the Orgut Support Office (OSO). At present there are three long-term expatriate consultants at OSO. Plans are now in place to start similar programmes in two more districts. Provided this extension the staff will share responsibility for three districts. The local organization also comprises three book keepers.

The OSO office is physically located close to the district offices, and there is close contact between the OSO office and the district administration. Organizationally the LAMP coordinator reports to the DED. Activities are clearly separate, however; and the OSO office has defined functions in relation to the district. Among these functions are the responsibility for running the car pool. Cars are rented to the district at "commercial" rates which makes it possible to build up funds

[9] See Ericsson et al 1990. As an input to the review mission a study team conducted a study tour to a number of donor financed rural development programmes in Tanzania to collect experiences. Their report provides a useful overview. See Gerdén and Mnyanga (undated).

to replace the cars. The office also runs the project store and is responsible for procurement of equipment.

At central government level LAMP is formally under the Prime Ministers Office. In practice the PMO does not play a very active role, and the relevant line ministry (MLNRT) is the active partner for the programme at this level. There is a national LAMP Committee which in practice has an advisory role in relation to the programme. It is our understanding that the integration of the programme with central government institutions is fairly weak. Funds are channelled directly from SIDA to the districts through the Orgut Support Office twice a year.

LAMP supports activities at two levels:

A **District Level Activity** is initiated and implemented by the District Council in cooperation with villages and villagers. Activities at this level should be of more general interest to the district and may involve more than one village. Examples of such activities in the 1993/94 budget are such as development of land use plans, tree planting projects, establishment of veterinary centre etc. The plans and budget for the district level activities have to be included in the district plan and approved by the District Council.

A **Village Level Activity** shall be initiated, implemented, used and maintained by the USER (village, group of villagers or an individual). This type of activity was introduced in the 1993-94 budget and already during 1993 75% of the budget had been allocated to approved projects. A set of criteria has been developed for the purpose of evaluating and prioritizing the project proposals. The criteria include such as the relevance of the project in relation to programme aims; the project owner's preparedness to implement the project and maintain the investment; the owner's organization and the capacity to contribute to the costs of the project. All village project proposals have to be approved by the District Council.

Examples of district activities may be such as water drilling projects or local road projects. A distinguishing feature of LAMP is the strong emphasis on the condition that project initiatives shall be generated locally. Local project proposals have to be channelled through the district council system, and the district council is responsible for the priority of projects to be given support.

In addition to the project activity the programme includes training of district council staff and expenses for consultancies.

A particularly interesting feature of the LAMP model is that the size of the donor contribution to the village level activities is a function of the

district's own capacity to collect revenue. The Swedish contribution equals the amount which the District Council has collected. In this way the programme itself serves as an incentive to increase local revenue collection. This has yielded results. In two years the level of local revenue collection has increased from around 40 million shillings to around 70 million shillings. According to the information given to us, the scheme has also made the councillors more positive to improving the local revenue collection. The local routines for collection of revenue have been reviewed and made more efficient in order to improve collection.

6.3 The HIMA project in Iringa[10]

This is a DANIDA supported regional programme for soil and water conservation. HIMA is an abbreviation for the swahili *Hifadhi Mazingira*. The programme is implemented through the three district council projects of Iringa, Njombe and Makete District Councils. At central level four ministries are involved with the programme:

- Ministry of Community Development, Women Affairs and Children,
- Ministry of Tourism, Natural Resources and Environment
- Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Development and Cooperatives,
- Prime Minister's Office.

The Prime Minister's Office has the coordinating responsibility at central level. At programme level the three district projects operate autonomously, but are related through the Regional Programme Management Unit.

The Diagram in figure 6.2 gives a rough picture of the organizational structure of the programme.

[10] This section is based on interview with Peter Fredriksen of the Danish Embassy in Dar es Salaam and the following documentary sources (see reference section): Royal Danish Embassy 1994, Hambosho and Kismul 1994, Fredriksen (undated), Gerdén and Mnyanga (undated) also contains a section on HIMA in its early phase.

Figure 6.2 The HIMA organizational model)*



**) Copied from: DANIDA project document: "Makete District Natural Resources Conservation and Land Use Management Project. Phase 1, 1992-97" (DANIDA 1992)*

The programme started in 1989/90 and is presently operating within a time frame of 15-20 years. The Danish contribution is in the form of budget support to public expenditures given as grants. After initial investments the annual support is now in the range of US$ 2 million.

The main focus of the programme is development of more sustainable agriculture and in particular strengthening of institutions responsible for land management, improvement of the agricultural production systems and strengthening the sustainability of the natural ecosystem. Support is given to activities such as tree planting[11], livestock improvement, beekeeping and communal resource management.

[11] Initially the project was cocnceived of as a tree planting project, but has gradually expanded its scope to cover a wider spectrum of rural development.

Support to training, planning and institution building at the local level (districts and villages) is seen as key elements of the programme.

Together with its technical objectives the HIMA programme puts a strong emphasis on objectives pertaining to institution building and institutional strengthening (Hambosho and Kismul 1994). The ideal objective was explained as that of involving the programme in village activities rather than to involve the villages in the project activities. At the same time it was pointed out that this may be a long term goal. There is a need to strengthen the local capacity to formulate projects and plans. It was also pointed out as a serious constraint that the Tanzanian government system is not very conducive to bottom up participation in planning and development. People are not used to taking initiative and very often they are (with good reason) sceptical towards outsiders presenting new ideas and trying to "mobilize" them.

One will also see that much as the HIMA programme is based on a bottom up and participatory ideology it is also based on a rather strong and independent programme organization. Unlike a programme like LAMP and the Dutch district based programme, HIMA has an organizational structure that spans all levels of the Tanzanian Government. Like RUDEP and KIDEP there is a relatively strong project organization at regional level (the Regional Mazingira Management Team) providing back stopping services to the implementing activities which are supposed to take place at district and village level. The programme organization at regional level is closely related to the Regional Administration with the RDD as the coordinating link between the national government level, the region, the District Councils and the individual projects at district level.

The Chief Technical adviser for the whole programme at regional level is "supported" by an expatriate adviser responsible for financial control, procurement coordination, coordination of institution based training and staff development programmes and integration of all DANIDA supported environmental activities in Iringa Region. A similar system is found at district level where the expatriate adviser to the DED in practice controls the activities of the project.

Concerning sustainability it was pointed out that it is unrealistic to assume that a project like HIMA can attain financial sustainability since the very basic idea is to inject fresh funds into the region which the region does not have in the first place. Organizational sustainability is promoted by integrating all programme activities to the existing Tanzanian institutional system at all levels.

As a general summary characteristic of HIMA it seems fair to categorize it as a programme with a strong programme and project organiz-

ation established outside the ordinary government structure but linked to and interwoven with the government structure at all levels.

6.4 The District Rural Development Programme supported by The Netherlands

This programme started in 1986. The explicit aim of the programme from the very beginning was to provide support to the then recently reestablished district councils by channelling resources directly to the districts. The district focus was also a result of the negative experiences with regional integrated development programmes (RIDEPs), most of which were at that time stopped due to lack of support.

From its inception in 1986 the programme has now been extended to cover altogether 11 districts including Biharamulo, Bukoba, Kahama, Karagwe, Kondoa, Maswa, Mbulu, Meatu, Monduli, Ngara and Songea. With the exception of Songea which borders Mozambique in the South, all these districts are located in the North Western and Northern parts of Tanzania. Three of these programmes are run by the Dutch Volunteers' Organization which recruits programme coordinators.

The Netherlands' total contribution to the programme in 1994 is expected to be in the range of DFL 15 million.

Whereas most of the other rural development programmes which are surveyed in this chapter are sector oriented programmes (health, agriculture, environment, etc.), this is basically a district development programme. The overall objective of the programme is to improve the well-being of the rural population in the districts where it is operating in a sustainable way. Another basic feature of the programme is the strong emphasis it puts on a what it terms a "process-approach". By this is meant that the main development constraints and required activities to be included in the programme are determined by district authorities and other relevant actors locally. The role of the donor is mainly to provide the funds on the conditions agreed upon and to control that the funds are used according to these conditions.

The process-approach is taken to mean that the programme is not planned as a structured set of activities from the beginning. The programme provides the resource frames and rather general guidelines within which the concrete annual action plans are developed as a result of requests from the districts themselves. These general guidelines may be seen as an attempt to operationalize the general objective of the programme (i.e. the concept of 'well being'). The concept is viewed as having two levels:

At the first level basic needs are addressed, such as:

- food security
- safe drinking water within a reasonable distance
- shelter
- basic education
- health facilities.

At the second level bottlenecks in the development process are addressed. This may be:

- inadequate and poor quality of education,
- insufficient resources to fulfil subsequent needs.

In the programme documents it is pointed out that the administrative capacity of the district must be seen as such a major constraint. Therefore the programme has devoted considerable attention to institutional strengthening and training of personnel in the districts.

In a recent mid-term evaluation of the present five years phase of the programme (1991-95) it is pointed out that the programme has put too little emphasis on the productive sector, in casu agriculture[12]. On the other hand it may be claimed, as was done by the embassy representative, that provided the district focus of the programme and the weight given to the process-approach it may be difficult to goal orient activities towards certain sectors, and particularly towards agriculture since that is outside district responsibility and control.

A distinguishing feature of this programme is the lack of a parallel organizational structure. In practice there is no dedicated organizational structure for planning or implementation outside the district administration. The individual district programmes are operated by the districts themselves and relate directly to The Netherlands' Embassy in Dar es Salaam. The one crucial link between the Embassy and the district is the expatriate coordinator who is posted in each district. These coordinators are the only people who are recruited specifically for the programme with the exception on short term consultants. All other activities are carried out by the ordinary district administration staff and the district council members.

On the other hand the expatriate coordinator plays a very crucial role indeed. He is regarded both as a donor representative at the district level and as an advisor to the district management in all matters related to physical and financial implementation of the programme activities.

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[12] The evaluation is so far available only in draft version.

- As an **advisor** the coordinator takes part in the planning of activities through the ordinary district channels; and he is also providing advise on implementation (for example concerning selection of implementing agencies for programme activities).
- As a **controller** the coordinator is the accounting officer of the donor. As such he is responsible for the proper spending of funds provided under the programme, and he has a key role in working with the internal accounting and auditing staff to improve accountability and to secure efficient implementation of activities. He is also responsible for procurement of material not bought locally, and he plays a key role in the reporting of activities to the Netherlands' Embassy.

What strikes an outsider is the dominating power position of the expatriate coordinator. The way his mandate has been described he is actually in a position to veto all decisions of the district, and with his virtual control of all donor assistance to the district his informal influence on activities (both planning and implementation) must become substantial.

The Evaluation of Phase I noted the very strong position of the Dutch coordinator and recommended that his power to interfere directly with day to day decision making be reduced. This interference, the evaluation stated .....

"... can and should be limited as much as possible, thereby respecting and stimulating local responsibilities and procedures with regards to managing its own development. " (Consultants for Development Programmes, 1991:31)

At the same time the evaluation acknowledged the need for donor control and that the reduction of interference by the coordinator into daily affairs at district level might

" ..... be a gradual process, matched by necessary improvements in the management (monitoring) capacity of the local authorities. " (ibid.)

For planning, approval of progress reports and release of funds a three level authorization structure applies:

- The District Executive Director (DED) and the Dutch coordinator advice jointly on the release of funds based on quarterly progress reports.

- An annual review meeting between the Dutch Embassy and the main district actors agree on annual district plans and budgets which are submitted to the Dutch Ministry for Foreign Affairs for final approval.

- The Ministry (in Holland) has the sole mandate to approve annual budgets and d activity plans. Such approval is based on a number of criteria; such as objectives of the DRDP, financial sustainability, proper procedures and accountancy rules.

The Dutch coordinator is responsible for writing annual progress and financial reports (which shall be approved by the DED). These reports are the basis for the internal monitoring of the programme, supplemented by special monitoring missions and the annual review meetings.

The advantages and disadvantages of the approach of the programme was explained as follows by the representative of The Netherlands' Embassy:

- The positive experience is that all programme work, planning and implementation is done by the district. This is supposed to strengthen the sustainability of project activities and results. It is also an experience that local people are enthusiastic and do contribute to project activities.

- The most serious constraint of the approach is that progress may slow. Things take longer than could have been the case had the donor set up a supporting organization at local level. The fact that Tanzanian procedures are followed in all project matters, such as planning and budgeting, also makes implementation cumbersome, but is nevertheless seen as necessary in order to strengthen the sustainability of the programme. Changes have to come from within. It was pointed out that the main constraints in this respect are to be found at higher government levels. Enthusiasm, motivation and will to change decreases the higher up in government one moves, it was claimed!

On balance the experiences were judged as favourable. Among current issues which are up for debate is the need to improve the monitoring system at district level. A pilot project is being undertaken in cooperation with the University of Dar es Salaam to develop a simple indicator system which can be used and operated by the districts themselves.[13]

The need for integrating the programme better with central government authorities was also being discussed. The mid term review of the programme[14] proposes the establishment of a Steering Committee with representatives from national, regional and donor level. The need for closer coordination with central government in order to influence

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[13] For information about the system and the approach to constructing indicators, see Msambichaka 1993.

[14] ... which so far is only available in draft form.

central government policies towards the districts was also mentioned as a important, with the need to improve staff incentive schemes as a particular concern.

6.5 The Kilosa District Rural Development Programme Supported by Ireland

This programme has been running for more than ten years, staring in 1981. At present it is organized as a programme with a number of different components. From the beginning, however, it was more a collection of individual projects with advisors attached to each project. Among the present components of the programme may be mentioned:

- health
- roads
- rural development
- agro-forestry
- vocational training
- primary education
- capacity building
- assistance to the disabled
- assistance to district mechanical workshop
- construction advisor
- rehabilitation of Kilosa Town water supply
- repair of Mkondoa bridge

The Kilosa programme is largest in terms of spending and range of activities undertaken by Irish Aid in Tanzania. As a district programme it is also large in absolute terms. The 1994 budget is just over 2 million Irish £ (or roughly NOK 21 million), which is close to 50% of the total Irish allocation for Tanzania.

The programme has built up a relatively large programme organization in the district. At present the organization consists of 6 expatriates and 4-6 locally employed.The programme coordinator has a strong managerial function and is responsible for accounting and monitoring of activities. The rest of the expatriate staff are mainly technical advisors attached to various programme activities.

It was pointed out that part of the reason for the relatively large number of expatriates is the history of the programme as consisting of more independent projects with their own advisory staff. With the integration of activities into a more coherent programme the intention is now to reduce the number of permanent expatriate staff down to 2-3. The rest of the need for expatriate advise will be more based on short term consultancies.

The possibility of running the programme with Tanzanian management, or integrating it more completely with the District Council Administration was seen as very unrealistic, at least in the short term, due to the need for control of the use of programme funds.

Project activities are identified and decided in close cooperation with district and village authorities. The final decision concerning new activities to be included lies with the Annual Meeting. These meetings provide an opportunity for district officials to present the district priorities to the programme. Every second year the programme is reviewed in cooperation with the district.

A stated aim of the programme is to promote community participation, not only in contributing labour but also in the actual decision making. It was emphasised that all planning should, as far as possible be undertaken as part of the ordinary district and village planning, and that project activities should be reflected in district plans and budgets. It was, however, pointed out that the integration of the programme activities into the district's own administrative structure has not been good enough. A review undertaken in 1990 had recommended that in order to improve coordination and help insure the sustainability this integration should be closer. Still the district council has few possibilities to prioritize between project activities. It is now an expressed aim to move more towards a programme budgeting approach whereby the council will be allowed to shift between cost centres.

The programme has a very dominating role in the district. It accounts for no less than 98% of the district's development budget. No conditionality of own revenue collection or own contribution towards cost sharing is included. What is required is commitment from villagers to contribute such as labour to community projects. The low local contribution is seen as a concern and mechanisms are being considered to improve local revenue collection.

Institutional development is promoted through activities such as staff training, which is an important component in the programme. Local training institutions have been commissioned to develop and deliver tailor made courses. Staff is also sent for training and study tours abroad. Efforts are also put into improving the districts' internal accounting and auditing system. Upgrading of staff houses is seen partly as incentives to council staff and partly as institutional development.

6.6 Rural development projects supported by GTZ in Tanzania

For more than 20 years the German government supported the Tanga Integrated Rural Development Programme (TIRDEP).[15] The programme was dissolved in the beginning of the -90s and some of the activities were carried on as sector projects under different ministries. Among these are the "Village Development Programme for Tanga Region", a programme for support to the rural water sector, a "Draught Animal Project" in Korogwe and a "Soil Erosion Control/Agroforestry Project (SECAP) in Lushoto.

The main aim of all these projects is to provide technical support. Support to institution building at local level is not an objective. The projects are run through their own project organization headed by an expatriate manager for each project. In addition to the manager the project organization may involve a variable number of expatriate technical and advisory staff. All German support is channelled directly to each individual project.

On the Tanzanian side the Programmes fall under the responsibility of the RDD, who is also the main discussion partner for the donor concerning the planning and running of the activities. At no stage in the planning or implementation of activities are the district authorities involved. This is a deliberate policy since the district is seen as weak and inefficient. No change in this policy is being considered at present, but German authorities are awaiting the Public Service Reform, and may reconsider its policy should this reform lead to substantial changes in the capabilities of districts to support local development.

Concerning the Village Development Programme (VDP), this programme presented a new policy document in 1993 (GTZ 1993).

6.7 The UNCD/UNDP Mwanza Region Programme

UNCDF is preparing a program with district focus for Mwanza Region: The UNCD/UNDP Mwanza Region Programme (UNCDF/UNDP, 1994). UNCDF has recently decided to implement a new programming strategy, which is based on the assumptions that:

- there is a need to maintain and increase the flow of official ODA to LDCs
- there is a need to focus on poverty alleviations

[15] An evaluation of this programme is found in Shio et al 1988.

- due to public sector reforms and liberalization in many LDCs the private sector will play a new and larger role, and there will be a decreasing reliance on central government, and increasing opportunities for local authorities, communities and NGOs to manage development efforts.

The new UNCDF programming strategy therefore puts emphasis on an "area-based, multifaceted investment approach to poverty alleviation and socio-economic development" (p.2). The focus for implementation and support is the district level of the local government system. The preparatory report for the Mwanza programme makes special references to the Dutch District Development Programme, and recommends that a similar approach be used in the UNCDF programme.

It is however recognized that the District Councils are weak in "terms of financing, some aspects of staffing and operational resources, and that as a consequence their present implementation capacity is poor". The objective of the programme is therefore to increase the implementation capacity of District Councils. This will be done through training, providing transport and transport cost awareness, efforts to generate more local revenues, and improve self-help activities and local co-financing through DCDF (District Council Development Funds). The training will include on the job training and a "close and continuing working relationship between Technical Assistance advisors and the district staff" (p. 140).

The institutional model which is suggested in the preparatory report does however leave a role for the regional administration in the capacity of planning and monitoring. A Regional Consultative Committee will be formed to provide guidance to the programme. Members of the committee will be PMO, Regional Administration, District Councils and NGOs. Here the UNCDF programme clearly deviates from the Dutch District Development Programme, which does not involve the Regional Administration in their institutional set up or their support. The UNCDF programme also seems to opt to have a Programme Support Unit (PSU) in Mwanza town, which will provide "support to, and co-ordinate, with Regional Administration" (p.140). On the other hand the programme seems to share many of the design details of KIDEP and RUDEP, and may easily run into the same problems as these two programmes have encountered.

UNDP is supporting the National Program for Action for Sustainable Income Generation (IGP), which is a trust fund, developed by the Employment Council of Tanzania. IGP is a five year programme which started in 1994. It has a targeted budget of 100 mill. USD, and it is indicated that UNDP will contribute 15 mill. USD over the first five year period. UNDP has contributed some small start up funds. IGP will channel donor project funds to a number of partners through

its contacts with central and local government in Tanzania, as well as with NGOs and the voluntary sector. It is supposed to be a facilitator and go-between, and not an implementer in itself. In principle IGP shall subcontract to local partners through announcing call for bids.

IGP has a small secretariat which currently is financed by UNDP, but which is supposed to become self-financed, by charging a small overhead on all activities that will be channelled thorough IGP. A decision has been taken that all UNDP financial activities in Tanzania will be channelled through IGP. The district development programme which is being planned for Mwanza will therefore be channelled through IGP, and the districts in the respective geographical areas will be the collaborating partners.

The UNCDF investment programme for Mwanza Region is a five year programme that is supposed to have four investment components:

(i) District and feeder roads
(ii) District capital development fund (DCDF)
(iii) Fisheries
(iv) Agro-related credits

Currently the Programme for District and feeder roads is about to be implemented. The budget for the whole programme period (1995-99) is 4.5 mill USD. The funds are supposed to be channelled through IGP, and IGP will then subcontract the project to National Construction Council (NCC). They will work with the ILO Training Centre for Rural Road Rehabilitation (labour intensive road construction and maintenance systems) in Mwanza and Shinyanga.

The projects and programmes will be implemented by the subcontracting partner, NCC in the case of Rural Feeder Road Programme. The financial control will however remain with IGP. This is one of the issues where there has been disagreements between IGP and the subcontracting partners. IGP claims however that the financial control is a "must" if the projects are to obtain and sustain the confidence of the donors. The potential usefulness of the IGP is in its capacity to screen the development partners, and provide financial control (substitute for the donor's own financial control).

The partner in the Tanzania public administration system is the Regional Engineer's Office (RE), which also is supposed to represent the District Engineer's Offices (DE). The funds and the training activities will involve Kagera and Mwanza Regions. The training will involve staff from Regional and District Engineer's Offices, local consultant firms and local contractors. The training component for all partners will be both technical skills, and skills in contract management and planning.

Another sub-programme which will be started up in 1995 is the DCDF, District Capital Development Funds, with funds for rehabilitation of schools and health centres.

The two remaining sub-programmes: (i) credit and training to artisanal fisheries in Lake Victoria , and (ii) credits and training to retailers for distribution of agricultural input, are still in the planning stage, with possible implementation starting in 1996.

6.8 Summary of other donors' policies and experiences

The various projects and programme which have been surveyed in this chapter cover a wide variety of approaches to supporting rural development. Some of the programmes are focused in the sense that the support is directed towards a more or less restricted area of rural development. This is the case with for example the HESAWA programme which addresses health and sanitation problems, and with programmes such as LAMP and HIMA which are concerned with environmental and land use problems. Others are more general district development programmes (such as the District Development Programme supported by the Netherlands).

The programmes also vary with respect to the emphasis they put on local institution building. Whereas the German-supported village development programme in Tanga Region explicitly excludes local government institution building from the programme, all other programmes have this as a more or less clearly stated objective. It is probably most explicit in the Dutch-supported District Rural Development Programme. Here, strengthening of local government is a key rationale for the programme itself. Most programmes are considering to give more attention to local government institution building.

In most cases concern with local institution building means support to strengthening the district administration and the district councils. To varying degrees the projects also focus their attention on strengthening institutional structures at the village level. In some programmes, like LAMP and HESAWA this seems to be an important concern. Measures are built into the programme procedures so that the villages shall be stimulated to play a more active role in planning and implementing project activities. On the other hand practically none of the programmes focus their attention on institution building at the regional level.

The projects are less concerned with institution building outside the public sector. This does not mean that they are not supporting private sector activities. Examples of activities which are targeted towards the

private sector may be UNDP supported programme for Sustainable Income Generation (IGP). The point is that support is channelled to private sector activities and projects through project organizations. We have found no examples that programmes include targeted activity aiming at strengthening the ordinary Tanzanian institutional infrastructure in the private sector. Such activities could be support to building credit institutions or producers' organizations at central and local levels. This might be related to the current crisis in rural finance and cooperative sectors. Support to credit schemes and agricultural extension support is often channelled outside district development programmes. (PRIDE, NORAD credit scheme in Arusha)

There is a clear connection between the emphasis put on strengthening of local government institutions and the degree to which programme activities are integrated with the ordinary Tanzanian system at local level. Again, the extremes are the German approach on the one hand and the approach followed by The Netherlands on the other hand. In the case of the Dutch policy, no separate donor organization exists at all at the local level. All activity and all support is channelled through the District Council system. The Germans, on the other hand, have their own project organization which is completely independent of the Tanzanian system. The other programmes which we have reviewed combine integration with some kind of programme organization at local level. The programme organization takes care of programme coordination, monitoring of resource use; and to varying degrees it also provides technical support and advise. Most donors express a wish to reduce the local presence. None, however, foresee the possibility that in the near future it will be possible to run district development programmes without any donor (i.e. expatriate) presence at the local level.

There seems also to be a trade off between the degree to which the donor operates a separate project organization at local level and the degree to which the donor (i.e., the donor representative) has power to interfere directly into the district decision making system. Financial control is seen as particularly important. Again, this may be most clearly demonstrated by the Dutch approach. Here there is no parallel donor organization. Instead, the donor coordinator is placed within the district organization. He has wide power to even veto decisions made by the district council or administration if such a decision should be in conflict with the programme objectives. Other programmes have reserved more control over donor-provided resources outside the district system. An example may be the LAMP programme in Babati. This programme operates a car pool outside the district system, so that the district in practice has to rent the cars from the car pool. In this way the district may be controlled "from outside." As long as it operates within the framework drawn up by the programme the district may apparently be more autonomous.

The programmes also vary concerning their relationships to central government authorities. Some programmes have no explicit organizational attachment to the central government level. This applies to for example the Dutch supported district development programme. Here all contact goes directly between the embassy and the individual district programmes. Other programmes are more clearly sector oriented. These are usually related more or less closely to sector ministries. This applies to for example HESAWA (Maendeleo) and LAMP (Ministry of Lands ...). Local government affairs are placed under the Prime Minister's Office. In spite of this, only few programmes involve the PMO directly in the programmes. In the case of HIMA the PMO has a coordinating role, whereas various sector activities of the programme relate to line ministries.

Some programmes, like LAMP, HIMA and HESAWA, have programme organizations at regional level. These organizational units provide backstopping services and coordinate the district activities. They also relate more or less closely to the Regional system on the Tanzanian side. Representatives for most programmes agreed that the role of the regional administration in Tanzania should be reduced, and that more activity should be shifted to district level. In line with this policy most donors aim at reducing their presence at regional level.

7 Institution Building, Rural Development and Sustainability

7.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapters we have reviewed the experiences with the RUDEP and KIDEP programmes. We have also reviewed the experiences and present policies of other donors' support to rural development in Tanzania. The brief discussion of the ongoing government reform programme gives insight into national policies concerning the role of local government. In this chapter we are pulling together the threads from the previous chapters into a discussion of alternative models for rural development assistance.

The aim of the discussion in this chapter shall not be to design (or operationalize) an alternative detailed programme.[16] The terms of reference require that we formulate more general principles for alternative models, taking into consideration the type of experiences which we recorded in the preceding chapters. Another context for the formulation of alternative models is the framework for support to rural development which is included in the new strategy for Norwegian assistance to Tanzania.

In this strategy support to district development is placed within the context of a programme to strengthen public administration. The following components are emphasised:

- *Institutional development and competence-building within the district administration with a view to a more efficient utilization of resources. Institutional development may take place within the framework of cooperation with similar Norwegian institutions.*

- *Institutional development and competence-building within the popularly elected district councils in order to strengthen the administrative capacity of democratically elected bodies so that they are able to exercise their management and supervisory functions.*

[16] At the time of writing it is also unclear to what extent alternative programmes at local level will actually be designed to replace the present integrated rural development programmes.

- *Consider the feasibility of a rural development fund designed to provide support for operations and investment activities. Forms of support should be adapted to locally mobilized resources.*

Taking these three main points as our frame of reference we shall in this chapter discuss principles for support to rural development and institutional strengthening at local level which may offer chances for more sustainable aproaches to local development.

7.2 Institution building, structural adjustment and rural development

The basic reasoning which is reflected in the three main points above is well i line with the current trend of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to identify failure to promote development with lacking political and administrative capacity. Inefficiency of the government system is seen as a major bottle neck to social and economic development. Therefore, institutional strengthening is seen as a prerequisite for development in more general terms.

Projected down to the level of rural development the same logic may be applied. Malfunctioning of local government institutions is seen as a bottle neck for rural development.

Our discussion of alternative approaches to the present KIDEP and RUDEP programmes shall be based on the assumption that this model is relevant[17]. We shall, however, want to place the simple model of government as a bottle neck for development in a wider perspective.

In its simplest form the "bottle neck model" sees institutional strengthening as a technical matter; as a question of training of personnel, better routines and more efficient leadership. This is too simplistic. As it is indicated in the Norwegian strategy formulations, institutional strengthening also relates to the *political aspects of government*. It has to do with participation, with involvement of the people in decision making and with the legitimacy of the government institution in broad terms. Seen in this perspective "good governance" has something to do with the *reciprocal relationships between governors and the governed.*

[17] This is not to say that we share a view that the present crisis in Tanzania and in other African countries can be explained as an institutional crisis only. In addition to the institutional problems there is also a real need for increased resource mobilization and increased financial transfers from the rich world.

"In other words in the concept of good governance there must be reciprocity between the state capacity to fulfil its role and the articulate, active and organized civil society with the capacity to regulate and keep the state in check." (Mmuya 1993:2-3)

In such a perspective the efficiency of the state apparatus - be it central government or local government - is not only a question of technical capacity and professional skills, it is also a question of "political capacity", i.e. the ability to transform political interests into political participation in a way which does not endanger the legitimacy of government. Efficient governance presupposes a minimum of consent.

This assumes an interplay between government and civil society. Civil society with its organizations and interest groups forms the basis for the authority and legitimacy of government through appropriate mechanisms for participation in leadership formation, policy decisions, etc. (ibid.)

The following simple model (fig 7.1.) is an attempt to illustrate the point which we are making.[18]



Figure 7.1. A Framework for Institutional strengthening

For our discussion this perspective means that we shall be concerned with the reciprocal relationship between rural delopment and local government institution building.

[18] It is developed from the model presented by Mmuya 1993:3

7.3 The concept of sustainability and rural development

The concept of sustainability is crucial to this debate. One of the key elements in the critique of RUDEP and KIDEP is the claim that the programmes are not sustainable. They have failed to reduce the two regions' dependence on aid. It may even be claimed that this dependence has been increased as a result of the assistance which has been channelled through the programmes.

One may ask if it is at all realistic to create integrated rural development programmes which are "sustainable".[19] The question calls for a reflection on the concept of sustainability in relation to this kind of development support.

The term sustainability has gained much of its popularity after the Brundtland Report coined the term to denote a global development which "... meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." (World Commission .. p. 8). Seen in this context sustainability is a global concern relating to the ecological dimensions of the world system. With the coupling of environment and development the concept of sustainability has also been tied to development strategies of individual countries. In the "Memorandum of understanding on development cooperation between Tanzania and Norway" it is thus stated that ...

"The major objective of the development cooperation between Norway and Tanzania was agreed to be the promotion of a sustainable economy that is not dependent on development assistance."

The sustainability criterion is also applied at the level of individual programmes or projects, as is done for example by OECD when defining it as

".... survival of projects and programs after an initial period of investment - financial, physical, or technological" ... or, ... "A development programme is sustainable when it is able to deliver an appropriate level of benefits for an extended period of time after major financial, managerial, and technical assistance from an external donor is terminated." (OECD 1989, here quoted after Havnevik 1993:3)

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[19] For a review and a thorough critique of experiences with integrated rural development programmes up to the mid 1980s, see Birgegård 1987. Some of that critique may not apply fully to programmes like KIDEP and RUDEP. In general terms, however, RUDEP and KIDEP and other programmes which we have reviewed in this report struggle with many of the same contradictions which are discussed in Birgegård's paper.

Translated into the more specific context of rural development programmes, sustainability has been defined as:

" ... the prospect for maintenance after the programme period of the perspectives, the types of organizational structures, and the work procedures developed or promoted in the course of the programme period." (Dale 1992:511)

Summed up, sustainability may be understood as the in-built capacity of a programme or project to make itself superfluous!

The stress on sustainability, particularly the application of the concept down at the micro level of individual programmes or projects, has been criticised for not taking into consideration the wider contextual framework of development problems (Havnevik 1993:3) . Is it relevant - or indeed possible - to demand sustainability at the local or district level in Tanzania when the district (and in fact the whole country) is caught in an international network of unbalanced and basically unsustainable relationships? Is it at all possible to build sustainability from below - or from the periphery - when the main mechanisms causing unsustainability have their roots at the centre of the global system?

The immediate answer will be that this is probably not possible. In our view the demand for sustainability should therefore be linked to assumptions about changes and reforms in the wider structural system within which rural development programmes operate. If the demand for sustainability is based on a static perspective of the present system any injection of foreign aid into the local system will by definition be unsustainable.

To illustrate our point: Donor support to education in a region like Rukwa is probably not sustainable at all if the wider national and international framework for development of the region is not changed. In that case the regional economy can hardly be expected to " sustain" the economic burden of financing a modern educational system. On the other hand: Without a more adequate educational system at the local level the people of Rukwa will be left behind in taking advantage of a national developmental process which we shall have to assume will come as a sum effect of developmental efforts at all levels. If we don't assume such macro changes all individual development projects will, by closer examination, turn out to be unsustainable.

The criterion of sustainability should therefore be applied with some caution at the local and programme levels. The time perspective is very important. Few development projects will be sustainable in the short run. The way in which programmes and projects at the local level are linked to wider national and international strategies is also important. A basic premise for our discussion of sustainability in this report

shall be that problems at various system levels are interrelated and that it is therefore a need for assessing local strategies in a wider national and international perspective.

However, this should not lead to the conclusion that nothing can be done at the local level - that the international and national context has to be changed before any meaningful efforts can be done at the local level. Development aid can be more or less instrumental in strengthening a local community. It can put the recipient target group in a stronger or weaker position to improve its own conditions provided the present contextual framework.

The criticism directed towards the RUDEP and KIDEP programmes[20], as well as similar criticisms towards other rural development programmes for lack of sustainability, has focused on the fact that the support which has been given creates local dependence on outside inputs and resources. Instead of creating a development which makes the programmes superfluous, it has been maintained that they have created a development which makes the regions increasingly dependent on continued programme activity. The development programmes have created installations, such as for example water schemes, which the local community has not the financial, technical and manpower resources to maintain in the long run. It is frequently also pointed to the fact that the support is based on a technology which it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain given the local financial base. The programmes are based on expatriate personnel. Thy may introduce the use of computers and other expensive technical equipment which local authorities could hardly afford and which requires maintenance which may not be available locally. Most rural development programmes have established car parks which can be financed and maintained only as long as the programme continues to provide outside resources.

Lack of sustainability is not only related to technology and personnel, but also to the way in which programme activities are organized. As has been clearly documented in this report, most rural development programmes in one way or another establish themselves outside the ordinary institutional system of the recipient country. There is generally seen to be a connection between sustainability and "institutional integration" of rural development programmes.[21] What is commonly referred to as political and/or administrative "by-pass" is seen as an element that reduces the sustainability of the programmes. In this perspective lack of sustainability relates to a mis-match between the

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[20] See discussion in chapter 4.

[21] Institutional integration has been defined by Dale as " .. the degree of incorporation of the programme into durable organizational structures, the degree of compliance of its work processes with those more generally practiced for the same kind of activities, and the degree of compatibility with established political and administrative norms." (Dale 1992:499)

administrative and technological requirements of many programmes and the economic, social and managerial context of the recipient country.

The situation described by Biregård is very familiar to most programmes:

"Typical to the project environment is a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability. Seemingly endless problems arise. Deliveries are delayed, staff cannot be found, technical designs turn out to be deficient, intended beneficiaries respond in unexpected ways, central government policies change, just to mention a few of the conditions which tend to make crisis and contingency rule the day for project managements." (Birgegård 1987:6)

The typical, and understandable, response to such problems will be for project management (the donor) to do its best to protect its own operations from unpredictable environment. And the more unpredictable the environment the more need will be felt for protection of the project. And the more the project protects itself from uncertainty, the more explicit will be the political and administrative by-pass and the less sustainable will be the programme activities.

7.4 A closer examination on the conditions for sustainability

These criticisms call for a discussion of how the sustainability of programmes may be improved. As we focus on some issues which in our mind stand out as important in this respect, we shall at the same time discuss some of the problems which a more explicit focus on sustainability shall have to address. In this discussion we shall keep in mind the general point made above, that when the concept of sustainability is applied to local problem solving and projects at the local level, the basic criterion for sustainability should be the degree to which projects strengthen local capabilities for future development.

7.4.1 Bottom-up vs. top-down

Most commentators will maintain that one precondition for more sustainable programmes is a shift from a predominantly top-down, blueprint, planning model to putting more emphasis on local initiative and bottom-up planning. Most programmes which we have surveyed in connection with the present study also emphasise a general objective to strengthen bottom-up activities. Closely related to this objective is the objective to improve popular participation in the planning and implementation of projects. Among the measures and strategies most fre-

quently mentioned as instrumental in order to achieve this aim may be mentioned:

- Mobilization of villagers to come forward with proposals for local projects. Aid should ideally serve to support local initiatives and not solicit local support for programme initiatives.

- Formulation of conditionalities for support to local projects that the beneficiaries provide own inputs into the project. This may be commitment to provide local labour or to meet parts of the costs of a local project. In connection with village water schemes it may for example be put as a conditionality that the village has established a maintenance fund. Generally such conditionalities are put in order to serve as an indicator for local commitment.

- When support to rural development is channelled through the district council the donor may put as a conditionality that the district council base its priorities on local participation, e.g. proposals to be generated from village and ward level.

- Another obvious conditionality would be to demand participation by elected district councillors in the planning and prioritation of projects. Very often councillors are left on the side line and are only brought into the planning process at the very last stages and asked to endorse a plan which is more or less a fait a compli.

The general idea is that a programme activity which is generated more from the grass roots will also be more in line with local needs and local wishes, and therefore more sustainable once the programme itself is phased out. The recipient will feel more of an "ownership" to projects and activities which are generated from below than to those which are imposed from outside.

Bottom up planning in rural development programmes may, however, appear simpler in theory than in practice. It is a basic fact that programmes with their general objectives and policies are usually formulated by the donor in the first place. Negotiations concerning the general frames and directions of the programme are usually between the donor and the national authorities of the recipient country. The more specific the programme objectives the more difficult it will be to allow room for real bottom up processes. Bottom up processes may also lead to priorities which are in conflict with the programme objectives. There is, for example, no guarantee that bottom up initiatives will give priority to environmentally sound projects, or to projects which benefit women or the poor.

Another problem relates to lack of local initiative. This constraint may be particularly important in countries like Tanzania, which have been

characterized by centralized planning and a political-administrative system which over time has eroded independent structures of the civil society. Local people have become used to responding to centrally formulated initiative more than to formulating independent initiatives. Local politics has over years developed as a process where people are "mobilized" by government and party officials, and where the local elite is frequently coinciding with the local state apparatus.

This latter point touches on a more general condition for bottom-up participation: The problems concerning such participation can seldom be resolved only at the local level. More often than not the wider structural characteristics of the political, administrative and economic systems are the most important obstacles to viable bottom-up processes. In the case of Tanzania more than 20 years of one party rule and systematic attempts to control local initiatives from above have ruined the social, economic and political conditions for bottom-up processes.

Considerations like these call for a gradual approach to rural development and for more emphasis to be put on small scale activities. In order to stimulate bottom up processes it may also be relevant - and important - to support the establishment and strengthening of independent structures of the civil society outside the public sector. Real bottom up processes require a more active civil society and it requires empowerment of organizations and groups which can genuinely represent various interests at the local level. And in line with the discussion above, it should also be underscored that strengthening of bottom-up processes can not be achieved only by local reforms. Reforms at the local level have to be accompanied by structural changes and reforms of the wider institutional system. Strengthening of bottom-up processes requires top-down reforms!

7.4.2 Is small beautiful?

Closely related to the discussion of sustainability and bottom-up planning is the question of project scale. One precondition for sustainability of rural development projects is often said to be the degree to which the projects are adapted to local capacity. Again this relates to the capacity of the local community to take over and maintain the installations or activities. Small scale activities based on simple and available technology are seen as more sustainable than big projects requiring complex organizational set ups and perhaps a technology and expertise which may not be available locally. The bigger and the more technologically complicated a project, the more need there will be for expatriate personnel and other outside input both to develop and to operate the project.

On the other hand it may be maintained that in order for a poor rural community to develop in the sense that it gets a minimum of access to the amenities of the modern world there is a need also for projects and installations which are beyond the actual capacity of the local community. An important rationale for development aid is indeed to help developing countries to realize projects which they are not able to carry out with their own local resources. It may be argued that sustainability should be seen in a longer time perspective. The development process is an uneven process. It may require activities which may not be sustainable in the short run but should be seen as elements in a process with a time perspective of at least 20-30 years.

Examples to illustrate this point may be the need to build local hospitals to secure a minimum of health services. A reasonable level of local health services may again be seen as instrumental for other aspects of local development, e.g. strengthening of the local productive base.

In a poor and dry area the development of a water scheme or an extensive irrigation project to improve the basic infrastructure of the district and strengthen the economic base may be defended even though such a project would be far beyond the means of the local community.

The point which we want to make here is that it may be difficult to make conclusions about the degree of sustainability of individual projects. The sustainability of individual projects and activities should be judged in a wider perspective of time and developmental context.

7.4.3 Local resources and regional distribution

This discussion leads directly to a closely related problem: One of the most common criticisms against rural development programmes is that they inject too much resources into rural communities in too short time. Programme funds and activities should not become a dominating element of the local economy, but should, as far as possible, be matched by locally generated resources. Ideally the donor support should supplement and strengthen local efforts. It should definitely not replace such efforts.

Lack of ability to generate local revenue is a serious problem in most developing countries. Tanzania is no exception. In the case of Rukwa and Kigoma local revenue collection has actually gone down over the last years.[22] It may be argued that rural development programmes may actually serve as a disincentive to a more serious local effort to improve local revenue collection. Some of the representatives of donor

[22] An ongoing survey of local government at district level in the two regions shows that this is the case.

organization whom we interviewed also pointed to this as a possible effect of the support.

As an example it may be mentioned that the Irish supported rural development programme in Kilosa stands for 98% of the district's development budget. The programme has more or less totally taken over the "responsibility" for the district. In spite of the fact that each activity may be seen as constructive contributions to the local development process (schools, health posts, bridges, etc.), it may nonetheless be argued the programme adds to unsustainability because it does not at the same time strengthen local responsibility for future development. On the contrary, the fact that all support is provided as "gifts" may make it easier for local politicians not to challenge their voters by explaining the need to collect local revenue.

An example of an alternative approach to this problem is demonstrated by the LAMP programme in Babati. Here the level of donor support to village development projects is made dependent on local revenue contribution. The donor fund matches district revenue collection so that for each shilling collected in local revenue the donor adds one shilling to be spent on local development projects. In this way the donor support has a double purpose: It helps the district to finance relevant development projects, and it serves to improve the ability of the district to strengthen its own resource base.

We recommend that some kind of "matching fund mechanism" be built into donor support at district and village level in order to strengthen the sustainability of rural development programmes. One should, however, observe a few reservations concerning this type of conditionality:

- The donor should not offer matching funds as an incentive in order to influence district or village priorities. In other words: One should not make matching funds dependent on the selection of specific projects or activities. If the conditionality is tied to individual activities it may not necessarily lead to increased resource mobilization, but only to a shifting of local resources towards donor priorities. This will be the opposite to increased sustainability. *It is therefore important that matching funds are combined with frame budgeting and freedom for the local authorities to prioritize the use of the increased resources.*

- It will also be unrealistic to make all donor support dependent on matching local contributions. Such arrangement will probably be easiest to implement in the relatively rich districts. If matching funds are put as a universal conditionality it will have adverse distributional effects in the sense that the richer a district or village, the more aid it will receive. Conditionalities such as

matching funds should therefore be combined with redistributive mechanisms and measures to compensate the poorest districts and communities.

7.4.4 Institutional integration

One of the most serious criticisms which is frequently held against rural development programmes is their lack of institutional integration. In most cases, more or less independent programme organizations are established as parallel structures to national institutions or completely outside the ordinary institutional set up of the country. The reason for this is obvious: A need on the part of the donor to control programme funds and material, and an equally strongly felt need to secure a minimum of efficiency in implementing programme activities.

On the other hand such "by-pass" obviously serves to reduce the "sustainability" of programme activities. "By-pass" is usually motivated by a need to secure the implementation of the technical objectives of the programme. What is then neglected is the explicit (or more implicit) objectives related to improving the capacity and capability of local institutions to plan and implement their own development programmes.

Most commentators agree that there is a need to reduce "bypass" and to strengthen institutional integration. How this can be achieved is nevertheless a fairly unsettled issue:

- One reason for administrative and political bypass is in most cases that local institutions are weak. There may simply not be an institutional set up at the local level with which the programme activities can be integrated! This, of course, begs the question of the scale and size of programme activities as discussed above. It may be argued, for good reasons, that programme activities should be scaled down to a level that is more in tune with local administrative capacities.

- Local institutions may not only be weak. They may actually be malfunctioning to an extent that may jeopardize the whole programme. *Institutional integration should therefore in most cases be combined with an explicit programme (or programme component) for institutional strengthening or institutional reform.* This is an important point which we shall return to below.

- In most cases the donor will also have to choose among several alternatives for institutional integration. Should, for example, a rural development programme in a specific district or region be integrated into the government system at all levels (district, region

and central government)? Or should the donor enter into a contract with the local authorities at the local level and then actually "bypass" the ordinary government system. In the case of RUDEP and KIDEP the degree to which the programmes should be channelled through the regional administration is a topical issue in this respect.[23]

The general conclusion to be drawn at this point is that institutional integration is simpler in theory than in practice. Institutional constraints are probably among the most serious obstacles to development. Political and administrative integration without institutional change and improvement will therefore in most cases not be sustainable. On the contrary: if donors channel funds uncritically through local institutions which are characterized by poor leadership, mismanagement of funds, corruption and lack of democratic support, the donor contribution may actually help to prevent necessary change of institutions which may be said to be "unsustainable" in the first place. Such institutional integration will also easily get in conflict with other programme objectives, such as support to the poorest, community participation, strengthening of democratic processes and support to women. Therefore, one of our main points will be that institutional integration has to be combined with institutional reform. A minimum requirement should be that integration does not help to support and maintain institutional systems which are obstacles to development and change.

This raises the whole complicated question of how donor support can and should aim at institutional reform. Seen on the background of the changes which have been signalled for the Norwegian support to rural development in Tanzania this is a key issue, and we shall discuss it in more detail below.

7.4.5 The role of expatriate personnel

Closely related to institutional integration is the questions concerning expatriate personnel (See e.g. Catlett and Schuftan 1994). The arguments against the use of expatriate personnel are well known - and most of these arguments more or less directly relate to sustainability:

- Expatriates are expensive. For the cost of one expatriate the programme might have hired 10 (or more) local experts.

- If the project bases itself on expatriate personnel in key positions the recipient is not forced to take responsibility for the project.

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[23] See for example the approach followed by the Dutch-supported district development programmes as described in chapter 6.

Sustainability depends on the ability to, at least over time, to transfer real responsibility from donor to recipient.

- Expatriates are in most cases unfamiliar with local culture and traditions. Their technical expertise may not be easily integrated into the local social and cultural context and their solutions to problems may therefore turn out to be "unsustainable".

The main reason for involving expatriate expertise in a project is usually the donor's need for control combined with a more or less real lack of technical expertise on the recipient side. The problems related to lack of technical expertise may not be a strong argument in favour of expatriates. Here resources could probably be better spent by upgrading and developing local expertise.

As for the need for control this is a more real problem, and more or less the same arguments apply as those which were listed concerning institutional integration. In our talks with representatives for donor organizations practically nobody could foresee the possibility that a rural development programme in Tanzania could be run without an active donor presence at the local level.

If the emphasis is put more on institutional change it may also be maintained that the need for donor (i.e. expatriate) presence and participation may actually be greater than if programme objectives are more strictly confined to technical development objectives. It was pointed out to us, also by a number of Tanzanians, that in order to change present institutions the active presence of outside "change agents" may be of crucial importance.

7.5 Rural development and the potential role of local government

Institutional by-pass in rural development projects is usually taken to mean by-passing local government. In this section we are going to discuss in more details the possibilities and constraints concerning integration of rural development programmes/projects with local government institutions.[24] Such a discussion is particularly important as seen on the background of the signals for policy change concerning Norwegian support to rural development in Tanzania.

In the discussion of rural development and local government it seems sometimes to be taken for granted that a strengthening of local govern-

[24] A summary presentation of the government system in Tanzania with particular emphasis on the role of local government was given in chapter 5.

ment will also lead to rural development. This may be true, but there is no automatic relationship.

Strengthening of local government may lead to a stronger area-orientation of the political system. To the extent that rural development is a question of coordinated action across sectors stronger local government institutions may therefore be relevant.

As Huber Allen has pointed out in his discussion of decentralization in a development perspective, local government authorities may serve as an instrument for coordination at the local level. Seen in relation to the ideology of integrated rural development this is an important point. Allen's argument here is therefore worth quoting:

"If many local functions are separately managed by big central agencies, these will usually find it difficult to coordinate their activities: consequently the same street will often be dug up successively, week after week, by the gas board, the water corporation, the electricity company, the telephone service and the sewerage authority; or the Ministry of Health will plan a vaccination campaign during the Ministry of Education's examinations. What is more, the field agents often feel a conflict of loyalties between their duty to the central agency that employs them and their concern for the needs of the local people amongst whom they live and work. Decentralization to local bodies, with some efficient mechanisms for interdepartmental cooperation, can often reduce such wasteful and counterproductive episodes, and eliminate conflicts of loyalty, thus diminishing public inconvenience and hostility." (Allen 1990:16)

We underscore this point, since local government in this perspective is seems to fulfil more or less the same coordinating function which according the philosophy of integrated rural development is so much needed for rural development (See e.g. Birgegård 1987) . This also helps to explain why by-passing is so problematic: An integrated rural development programme[25] may function as a direct competitor to the coordinating role of local government.

Local government is frequently also seen as more effective than central government for distribution of benefits to local beneficiaries and for strengthening local participation. Decentralization brings decisions and service provision closer to the people.

By creating participation, elected local government is seen as instrumental for strengthening of bottom-up processes in society. In this

[25] In practice we will in most cases be talking about multi-sectoral programmes more than truely integrated programmes. The programmes will nevertheless have a more or less strongly expressed intention of coordinating their activities accross sectors.

way local government may be seen as an instrument for securing popular control over bureaucracy:

"The people themselves become concerned about what is being done with their tax money and how it is being used. They become better educated in the responsibility of citizenship . Through their own chosen representatives they become involved in decision-making and the exercising control over their own environment. They begin to understand the reason for new policies and the difficulty of establishing possible and expedient priorities for the use of scarce resources. And they become concerned to avoid wastage or corruption or extravengance." (Allen 1990:19)

A common argument in favour of decentralization is also that decentralized government is more efficient than central government for resource mobilization. Thesis supposed to apply to the mobilization of human resources as well as to mobilization of financial resources for development through local revenue generation.

To the extent that arguments like these, and other positive conceptions of det value of decentralization are tenable, it may be relevant to conceive of strengthening of local government as an instrument for rural development. Stronger local government, the argument would be, will serve as an instrument for the local rural community to become master over its own development. Very often this reasoning will be based on an underlying idea that the real potential for rural development is found locally. If this was the full story, strengthening of local government would be a good way of supporting, not only rural development, but indeed <u>sustainable</u> rural development.

However, what is described above is hardly the full picture. It is more or less the ideal picture of what decentralization ought to be. In reality things may be different: Councillors are often marginalized; councillors do not listen to their voters; and voters are not informed and enlightened to the extent that is required in order to put pressure on their representatives; participation is weak and resource mobilization fails. And, as Allen also points out, there is great variation form country to country , and there is no guarantee that a system which works well in one country at one time will work well in another country. We have already pointed out that in Tanzania the local government system has in fact been characterized more by top down governance than by bottom-up participation. So far, the reintroduction of elected local government has in no way led to more transparency and reduced corruption. The opposite may be closer to reality.

And irrespective of any specific malfunctioning, decentralization is generally seen as having a number of problems which are relevant for

implementation of rural development through integration with local government institutions.

When you bring decisions closer to the grass roots you also make yourself dependent on local interests and local power structures. As seen from the point of view of the development agency - or the national government - local power elites may not at all be "development oriented". There is no guarantee that by leaving more decision making power to district councils policy objectives like reaching out to the poorest in the rural society, promoting help to women or giving priority to the environment will be given priority. On the contrary: What we generally know about rural societies is that they are traditionalistic and slow to change. It is difficult to find examples of peasant communities where the peasants voluntarily agree to increase taxes in order to support public services.

Since existing local government institutions have been built more to serve the interests of central government than to actually serve the interests of the local population there is also a fair amount of distrust between government and local people. There are few control mechanisms allowing effective popular control of the local bureaucracy. Strengthening of local government may end up as strengthening of a local bureaucracy which is pursuing its own interests more than the interests of the local people whom they are supposed to serve.

We may conclude that there is no automatic connection between strengthening of local government and promoting rural development. Local government should primarily be seen as political-administrative institutions in their own right, and not as instruments for achieving any specific developmental objectives. Support to local government institution-building should therefore primarily be discussed and assessed in relation to the problems of local government - not in relation to the problems of rural development. Better functioning local government institutions may facilitate rural development but there is no automatic connection. As seen from the point of view of the donor organization, leaving more of the power and initiative for rural development to local government institutions will have to mean less donor control over the more specific objectives of rural development. One cannot on the one hand strengthen local government and on the other hand retain control over local government decision making!

7.6 Should institution building replace rural development?

The strong feeling that institutional constraints are blocking meaningful and "sustainable" efforts to support rural development through financial and technical aid to local projects seems to have led Norwe-

gian authorities to the conclusion that the rural development programmes as such should be stopped. Instead the efforts should now be focused exclusively on support to institutional improvement so as to make Tanzania capable of solving the problems related to rural development more by their own means and less through donor input.

This interpretation may be a simplification of the policies which are now emerging. It is also important to point out that at the time when we are writing this report Norwegian policies in this field are not finally decided. We are also not fully informed about the direction of the ongoing policy discussions. With these reservations clearly stated we nevertheless think it is relevant to comment briefly upon the principles related to such a major choice of policy direction.

First of all the new emphasis on institutional strengthening is based on the rationale that institutional factors are the main constraints for a more positive development in countries like Tanzania and other poor developing countries. The fairly recent emphasis on institutional constraints is replacing a concern with economic, technical and cultural factors which have dominated the debate on development assistance since the 1960s. It also reflects the frustration with 30 years of experience with technical support and general economic assistance.

Much as we agree that institutional factors are indeed important obstacles to development and sustainable project implementation we also want to caution against letting the pendulum now swing to an extreme where the need for economic and technical support to rural development is completely overlooked. It is important to underscore the fact that countries like Tanzania are poor countries, and that rural areas, both in the short and long run, will need outside support in order to give people reasonably acceptable living conditions.

Our main point in this respect may therefore be put as follows: *At the same time as institutional improvement and support to institutional change should be given much more consideration, one should not "throw the child out with the bathing water" and pull out all support to projects aiming directly at improving the living condition of local people and at strengthening the productive base of rural areas.*

Birgegård has cautioned against the uncritical and wholesale adoption of new fashions in development aid. His warnings against uncritically adopting the concept of integrated rural development as a panacea for rural development may apply equally well as a comment to a shift in strategy which would imply that project support to rural development is completely replaced by "institutional strengthening":

"A general but profound lesson seems to be that great caution is warranted, when new development concepts and approaches are

promoted be they community development, farming systems research, privatization of agricultural marketing institutions or integrated rural development. Careful analysis should clarify the theoretical and empirical foundation upon which they build before they are widely adopted. This is imperative in order to avoid the fashions and fads in development efforts at great costs in terms of benefits foregone." (Birgegård 1987:14)

If the launching of a programme for institutional strengthening is combined with the withdrawal of support to rural development directed towards the primary target groups in society this will also have negative effects on the institutional strengthening programme. One of the most crucial issues for any institution building effort in Tanzania will be to improve on the legitimacy of local government. If local authorities are not able to produce visible benefits to the local population it is difficult to see how legitimacy may be improved. It is therefore difficult to understand the logic behind launching a programme aiming at institutional strengthening and at the same time reducing the councils' ability to deliver services to the local community.

7.7 The duality of local government and the need to involve central government

A key issue in most discussions about institutional integration is the level contact between donor and recipient authorities. Four different models may be distinguished:

(i) No real integration. An independent project management unit is set up at the local level. This is the autonomous project organization which we have discussed, and which leads to a more os less clear by-pass of local institutions. The GTZ model as described in chapter 6 is the clearest example.

(ii) The "lead agency model": One ministry is the main "programme owner" on the recipient side. Institutional integration may take place both at central and local levels with a stronger or weaker involvement of the lead agency. This model is most commonly found in more focused programmes centred around one sector. An example may be the role of the Ministry of Lands .. in relation to the LAMP and Maendeleo in relation to HESAWA as described in chapter 6.

(iii) Integration with local government institutions (district council and district administration). The clearest example of this model in our material is the Dutch supported District Development Programme. This programme is clearly integrated in the

sense that it has no separate project organization outside the district administration. It has also no links to, or interaction with, institutions at central government level.

(iv) Programmes can also be based on integration into a national programme agency. This may be a ministry with a special mandate to promote integrated rural development and with local area representation. The degree to which such a national organization actually involves local government may vary. In our material we have no clear example of this organizational model. RUDEP and KIDEP may be seen as having elements of such a model built in (the role of the Prime Minister's Office and with channelling of funds through the ordinary government channels).

The general trend which we observed in our talks with representatives for donor organizations is for priority to be given to model (iii). The goal for most programmes seems to be to integrate programme activities more closely with district council authorities and at the same time define institutional strengthening at district level as a more explicit project goal. Very few, if any, of our informants were concerned with the need to integrate programme activities with central government institutions. On the contrary, most donors seemed to aim at achieving as much autonomy in relation to central government as possible.

We shall want to challenge this strategy and claim that institutional integration and "sustainable" institution building at local government level shall have to include also the development of "sustainable" relationships between central and local government. In order to explain our view it is necessary to explain briefly some key aspects of the nature of local government.

Local government institutions are generally assumed to serve a double function in the system of national governance: They are on the one hand *local institutions* in the sense that they provide the institutional framework for the articulation of local interests. As such local political institutions are arenas for local problem solving. On the other hand they are also *agents of state power* at the local level. In practically all countries, local government is defined within the context and framework of the national system of governance, and locally elected government carries out functions for central government.

True, the ability and capability of local political institutions to serve as local problem solving mechanisms depend on their local basis, such as resource base, legitimacy and the availability of local expertise. But problems can usually not be isolated to the local level only. The ability of local political institutions to perform may to a large extent also

depend on the relationships between central and local government. Local government may for example be given responsibility for tasks which it has not the resources or policy instruments to perform. In Tanzania local government to a very limited degree control their own staff, to mention just one example. And even if their formal control over staff had been stronger, most local authorities would not have been able to recruit the staff which they need to carry out all the tasks which central government has delegated to local authorities. Any "sustainable" solution of what might at the first glance appear to be a "local problem" shall therefore have to include measures to be taken both at the central and the local level.

The simple point which we here want to underscore is the following: Institution building and institutional strengthening of local government can not be approached as " local problems" only. Strategies to strengthen local government shall have to address all levels of government. Such strategies shall have to approach local government as integrated elements in the wider machinery of government. Decentralization basically has its origin at central government level and cannot be sustained if it is not supported by central government policies.

This is an important premise when we discuss the potential for integrating rural development work with local government institutions: If such an integration bypasses central government in the sense that the donor enters into a bilateral contract with the district authorities it is difficult to see how the strengthening of local government may be sustained. We shall claim that such donor support will create a more permanent dependence on donor support. Any learning experience which might come from the programme activity will also be confined to local government.

Our recommendation shall therefore be that a programme for strengthening of local government institutions shall have to be built on a contract between the donor on the one hand and both central and local government on the other hand. This should be a comprehensive contract in the sense that it should apply to all aspects of how local government is organized and run. Above all such a contract should be exclusive, in the sense that if other donors want to support local government institution building in one of the districts participating in the programme such support should have to be organized and coordinated by the programme. One of the reasons why it has been so difficult to develop a viable local government system in Tanzania has been the lack of coordination of donor intervention in relation to local authorities. Our outline for organizing such a programme chapter 8 shall be built on this basic premise.

7.8 Summary of basic principles for more sustainable rural development programmes

Based on the above discussion and more generally drawing on available literature on experiences with rural development programmes we may now formulate a few basic principles which shall guide our proposals concerning alternative approaches to rural development.

- Integration of programme activities with the Tanzanian institutional system is important. As far as absolutely possible one should try to avoid building up a separate project organization as a parallel structure to Tanzanian institutions.

- This should not necessarily be taken to mean unconditional integration, or integration without donor follow up and control. On the contrary: Conditionalities should be tied to decision making procedures, participation, accountability etc. instead of relating them to achievement of developmental objectives or to policy priorities. Within the agreed framework all priorities and policy decisions should be the responsibility of Tanzanian institutions.

- To the extent that institutional change is made an explicit objective of the programme the contract between the donor and the recipient must also contain clear conditionalities relating to the institutional objectives to be obtained. Such objectives should not be too detailed, but they should give a clear direction to the reform process to take place.

- Donor presence in the form of expatriate personnel should be kept at a minimum. All expatriates should be posted within the ordinary Tanzanian institutional system. Great efforts should be put into avoiding expatriates establishing themselves as "organizations within the organization." On the other hand expatriates may be given wide powers and key roles as long as they operate within the ordinary organizational context.

- The donor input into the district in terms of funds and activities should be kept at a relatively small scale. Capacity should be built up gradually and over time.

- Priority should be given to institution building rather than to implementing developmental objectives. However, institution building should not replace developmental projects. Economic aid to support rural development through projects at the local level should be combined with institution building.

- Local government cannot be seen in isolation from the national system of governance. A programme to improve local government

therefor cannot be carried out in isolation at the local level. It also has to include institutional development at central government level.

- Institution building in local government is not only a question of training and development of new or improved skills. It is not only a question of reorganization and formal procedure. It is equally much - and perhaps more - a question of
  - attitudes and organizational culture.
  - resources (material and economic).
  - national context - i.e. relationships between central and local government.
  - the wider local context of civil society at the local level - such as activity by NGOs and interest groups.

- Institution building is not a simple linear process which can be easily programmed from outside. It is difficult to programme and it has to be based on and activate indigenous processes in the institutions themselves. Institutions are slow to change. One way to speed up change may be to place "change agents" within the organization/institution. In the case of Tanzanian local government institutions such change agents might help to increase the outside pressure for change.

- A programme for rural development and local government institutional strengthening should be organized as a learning process. This will require the programme to be set up together with a scheme for monitoring and evaluation. Such an evaluation programme should also be integrated in the Tanzanian system by involving Tanzanian professional expertise in developing the scheme and to carry out the monitoring/evaluation. This may be done in cooperation with Norwegian expertise.

The next chapter will contain a sketch proposal as to how a combined programme for rural development and institutional strengthening of local government may be organized.

8 A Pilot Programme for Rural Development and Strengthening of Local Government (PILOG)

In this chapter we are going to outline - in very broad and general terms - some ideas about how a general programme for support to local government institution building may be designed. The ideas which are presented in the following may be taken as a basis for developing an alternative to RUDEP and KIDEP. But our ideas are not confined to a possible reformulation of the present rural development programmes. What we present is rather a fairly open ended and flexible model. Within the framework of the model as it is presented on the following pages one may develop a big and comprehensive programme including a large number of districts; or one might design a fairly modest programme with a few participating districts.

A basic feature of the strategy which we shall propose is its emphasis on change as a learning process. We shall therefore refer to our proposal as a "Pilot Programme for Local Government Support" (PILOG). The basic idea of such a programme would be to support rural development more indirectly through capacity building directed towards the local government institutions of the districts.

The main characteristics and features of PILOG as we conceive of it may, on this background, be summarized as follows:

- It should be organized as a pilot programme. By that is meant that the programme should be particularly concerned with organizing local government reform as a learning process, and by organizing a monitoring and evaluation programme as an integrated element of the development programme itself.

- It should be attached to the wider national programme of civil service reform and be based at national level in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), provided the responsibility for local goevrnment continues to be with the PMO.

- At the local level the programme should be focused on the districts and aim at improving both the administrative and the political functioning of the districts. Responsibility for the programme at district level should be with the district council.

- The programme should comprise of two main components: (i) an institution building component and (ii) a district development component.

- The programme should be launched in stages, starting with a programme development phase which should have as its main purpose to involve the districts in designing activity plans for their own districts. A main feature of the programme should be the active involvement of the districts themselves in planning the programme components for their own districts.

In the rest of this chapter we shall discuss various aspects of such a programme strategy in more detail.

8.1 PILOG as a pilot programme

The launching of PILOG as a pilot programme means that this is a programme to stimulate local government reform and improvement through an experimental approach. This is not a programme based on a blueprint plan for implementing local government reform. It is a programme for trying out alternative ways and means of achieving the not very precise objective "better local government". Nobody is actually in a position to define precisely what "better local government" is. It is also difficult (and probably more or less irrelevant) to copy models from other countries and transfer them to the Tanzanian context. what might be relevant, however, is to try to learn from the experience of others. These "others" might be found in other countries, but it should be seen as equally important to organize the programme so that participating districts can learn from each other.

Such a learning approach to institutional change is in itself something that has been absent in Tanzanian thinking about government reform. The more common approach has been to carry out sweeping changes from above without much involvement of those concerned. The role of those who are affected by the reforms has usually been to carry out implementation without much regard given to local constraints. In our opinion it would be a valuable contribution to the ongoing Civil Service Reform Programme if a NORAD supported programme for local government improvement could demonstrate a more participatory approach to institutional improvement.

On this score we also think the Norwegian (and in a wider context the Nordic) experience could be "exported". This is to say that instead of exporting our specific models for local government organization it might be relevant to "export" some of our experiences concerning approaches to government change and reform. One of these experiences is that institutional change takes place as a very gradual and piecemeal process. Among the more specific experiences

which can be built on is the so called "Free Commune Experiment". This was an experimental reform programme which was carried out in Norway between 1986 and 1990.[26]

Among the key characteristics of the Free Commune Experiment Programme which are relevant in this connection may be mentioned:

- The programme involved both central and local government. In each participating municipality the programme was based on a contract between the municipality and central government. One of the basic ideas of the programme was that municipalities (if necessary) were given exemption from ordinary laws and regulation in order to experiment with alternative ways of solving problems at the local level. Experiments might also include relationships between central and local government (e.g delegation of responsibilities).

- The general initiative was launched from central government as an invitation to local government authorities to submit applications for participation in the programme. Central government provided a framework for the applications, and central government had the power to approve or disapprove of the applications from local authorities[27].

- The fact that participation was based on applications from local authorities (the municipalities) meant that the content of the experimental programme varied from one municipality to the other.

- The programme included an extensive sub-programme for monitoring and evaluation. The general idea was that the learning experience from the individual experiments should be made generally available, not only to the participants (i.e. the involved municipalities and central government authorities) but to the general public as well. In this way the experiment also led to a more general awareness and a public debate about key issues in local government governance.

The fact that this particular programme implied exemption from ordinary local government law does not mean that such a requirement is a necessary condition for taking this programme as a basic model. From the Norwegian experience one may also refer to a number of

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[26] Similar programmes were carried out in Sweden and Denmark. The shared Nordic experience of these programmes may make them partcularly well suited as a learning background for a joint Nordic effort to support institutional reform in Tanzania.

[27] In the case of the Free Commune Experiment the programme had to be approved by Parliament since a number of the experiments involved exemptions from current legal regulations.

pilot programmes which are not based on exemptions from the law but on systematic testing out of alternative administrative and political forms within current law and regulations (Hovik 1991).

It is important to keep in mind that our recommendation is not to copy the content of the actual Free Commune Experiment or other Norwegian pilot programmes. The idea is to benefit from the experiences with pilot project approach to introduction of administrative reform.

8.2 Suggested components of a PILOG programme in Tanzania

The details and the actual content of such a programme have to be worked out during the development of the programme. It is also important to keep in mind that we suggest a process oriented programme, not a blueprint model. Based on the experience with local government in Tanzania and the general principles which we have explained in the discussion above a few basic principles to guide the content of the programme may be indicated.

From the very outset it should be made clear to all parties involved that the main objective of the programme is to improve the performance of local government. The basic objectives should be derived from this premise. It should also be recognized as a premise for the programme that the problems are not only at the local level but are found both at central and local levels of government. Among the problems which should be recognized as a basis for formulating programme objectives may be stressed:

- Insufficient revenue base and poor performance to collect local revenue.
- Lack of accountability in district administration.
- Lack of qualified staff at all levels. This leads (among other things) to poor planning and failure to carry out a number of important tasks and functions.
- Together with lack of qualified staff goes overstaffing of lower grade personnel.
- Low salaries which, together with other factors, may lead to low work morale among staff.
- Failure on the part of central government to transfer funds to local districts as required.
- Failure on the part of district authorities to involve people in political processes.
- Mutual distrust between district authorities and local people.
- Lack of coordination of donor support to local authorities.

The list could easily be extended. That is not the point at this stage. The point here is that this is the type of problems which the programme shall have to address. Since the programme will be individually tailored for each district the selection of problem areas may also differ from one district to another. Approaching the problems in an experimental manner shall mean that the programme does not provide a uniform answer to how the problems should be addressed. A couple of examples may clarify our point:

- There is a general agreement that local authorities must improve on their ability to collect revenue. There might, however, be various ways of achieving this. Within the framework of the programme different strategies for improving on the situation may be tried out and evaluated in a systematic manner.

- There is obviously no single answer to how relationships between councillors and ordinary voters can be improved. A programme like this would invite the districts to develop strategies for improving these relations. Different districts might have different answers. The PILOG programme could provide necessary support and at the same time be an arena for awareness about the problems which again would improve the sharing of experience among districts.

Taking into account the point which has been made above, that there is a need to combine institutional strengthening and rural development, the programme should be made up of the following main components:

- Support to institutional strengthening through various measures directed towards capacity building, changing of practices and attitudes, improved revenue collection, vitalization of the political processes and a more active and constructive role to be played by councillors..

- A village development fund for each district. The fund shall make it possible to support development projects based on village initiatives. It is proposed that the fund is modelled on the matching fund principle.

- Support to selected priority development projects in each district. This would be bigger projects, i.e. projects which are beyond the capacity of individual villages. They may be infrastructure projects, like road projects, water supply, support to building of hospitals or training centres.

- A monitoring and evaluation component which will follow up programme activities and support institutional learning.

We shall briefly discuss each of these four main components of the programme:

8.2.1 Institutional strengthening

As has already been pointed out, institutional strengthening is more than training, even though training and development of skills should be seen as key elements. We see the following elements as important:

Training: It is important that training is closely related to actual problems at the local level. We shall warn against theoretical training schemes and extensive use of scholarships which will take key personnel out of their functions. Instead, on-the-job learning should be encouraged. The experimental approach will allow different strategies to training and skills development to be tried and tested. It is also important to make experiments with problem-oriented training involving different sectors and staff at different levels in the organization. Training should bring different groups together, not be conducted separately for specialized groups. Training might also include targeted short courses, like for example the financial accounting course for district accountants at IDM.

Training should as far as possible be carried out by Tanzanian institutions. A number of Tanzanian training institutions have long experience with training both long and short courses for local government. Here, probably, the Institute of Development Management (IDM) is in the forefront. The institute is presently developing a new training programme, particularly tailored to combining on-the-job and classroom training.

Strengthening of infrastructure: The programme should provide funds for improvement of infrastructure at the local level. This might include improvement of council offices and support to acquisition of necessary equipment for the district administration. Economic support to equipment like cars and advanced office equipment like computers and copying facilities should, however, be kept within strict limits. It is important that the programme does not develop into a programme for financing a local government infrastructure programme which is out of proportion with what the district will be able to maintain without programme support.

Improved procedures and practices: This may be such as improved planning practices, including better systems for information gathering and monitoring for local planning. The local PILOGs may include modules aiming at strengthening such functions. This also includes ways and means of involving the councillors more actively in the planning and decision making processes; together with ways and means of activating the villages in these processes. In this respect we

see clear connections to our proposal for a village development fund (see below).

Of particular concern and importance under this heading is the need for improving local revenue collection. District authorities should be particularly encouraged to suggest ways and means of improving present practices, and the programme should include incentive schemes to support such attempts. We suggest that one such incentive should be the matching fund conditionality attached to the proposed Village Development Fund.

Improved central-local government relations: We have maintained that the it is important to treat local government in relation to the total system of national governance. This should also be reflected in the approach to institution building in PILOG. The programme should include efforts to achieve desired changes in the relationships between central and local government. This means that the programme should also include experiments with changes at central government level. District authorities may, for example, be given more authority over certain categories of personnel. Changes concerning personnel would have to involve the Local Government Service Commission. Some of the planning regulations which to-day put great demand on districts for qualified personnel may be simplifies on an experimental basis, thus making it possible to prepare simpler plans and reduce the need for top qualified planners in some of the rural districts with very simple planning tasks. The division of responsibilities between district council and sector administrations may be experimented with. To-day there is a uniform system of sector administrations in each district.

One of the main problems to-day is the failure on the part of central government to transfer funds to the districts as required. The donor support to the programme could to a certain extent take on the form of budget support. This would make district planning and budgeting more predictable. More generally a distinguishing feature of the PILOG concept would be the emphasis on changing the environment of local government.

8.2.2 Village Development Fund

A Village Development Fund should be established for each district participating in the programme. The Fund shall support small village projects like village roads, building of schools, local water supply schemes, etc. The beneficiaries could be the whole village or groups/NGOs in the village. However, the general rule should be that the fund supports public or non-profit projects, and not commercial projects. Commercial, private sector projects should seek support from other sources.

A condition for getting support from the fund should be that the village, or the beneficiaries, contribute actively to the project and that the project is based on a clearly formulated plan which is based on local participation in the planning process. Among the conditionalities should be active involvement of the Village Council in the generation of proposals from the villages. On the other hand, support to stimulate and facilitate village planning of such projects could be provided through for example training schemes under the institutional strengthening component of the programme (see above).

We propose that the matching fund model in one form or another be adopted as a basis for deciding the size of the Fund. That means that the donor contribution to the fund is made dependent on the districts ability to collect local revenue; i.e. the size of the Fund is made proportional to the amount of locally collected revenue. We shall not at this stage suggest a particular formula.

The Fund should be open to applications from all villages in the district, and the power to select projects should rest with the District Council.

The implementation of the projects should be the sole responsibility of the District. The PILOG programme should on no account build up any project organization for implementation of development projects.

8.2.3 District development projects

As part of their PILOG Programme districts may also apply for support to bigger development projets at district level. This would be projects which are beyond the scope of individual villages, and which are financed outside the ordinary Village Development Fund as described above. Such projects may be infrastructure developments like roads, rural clinics, secondary schools, etc. Like for the village projects, PILOG should only provide funding. In practice the funding will be accommodated within the ordinary budgeting and transfer mechanisms between central and local government. The district's participation in the PILOG programme would only mean that the donor support and participation serve to guarantee the transfer of funds as budgeted. The responsibility for implementation should be with the district itself, with the relevant sector authority, or the project could be implemented by an outside contractor.

The important point to be underscored here is that the release of funds for such projets should be linked to institutional improvement. This means that the phasing of such projects should be an element of the contract between the district and the PILOG programme. Demonstration of ability to improve managerial capability, e.g. to improve

accountability, would be followed up by supply of funds for new developments.

8.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation

This is a crucial component of PILOG. A systematic scheme for monitoring and evaluation should be worked out as part of the framework for the whole programme to be developed in the initial phase. Baseline data about the districts and about the structure and functioning of the district council and administration should be collected as part of the programme preparations.

One should make a distinction between, on the one hand monitoring of progress in relation to specific programme objectives, and on the other hand more research based evaluations aiming at more long term institutional learning. The two components of the monitoring and evaluation programme should, however, be seen in relation to each other, and may also support each other.

- Monitoring of goal achievement should be directly instrumental for releasing new funds from the programme, and for moving from one stage to the next in the implementation of the programme in each district. Except for the Village Development Funds which have their conditionality related directly to the level of the local revenue collection, the release of funds for other development projects at district level should be made conditional on achievement of defined milestones in the institutional improvement programme.

- The evaluation programme should be more concerned with describing and explaining the broader changes taking place (or to explain why changes may not take place). The general objective will be to improve knowledge about how changes take place, why there is change (or not), how the participants experience their roles in the process, assess the results of the programme, etc. Such an evaluation programme will require professional expertise and a well worked out evaluation design.

8.3 How to establish a PILOG programme

The approach to establishing a programme like PILOG would be an important element of the programme concept. The one most important guiding principle for the programme construction phase would be to secure wide participation in programme development and as far as possible make sure that all parties involved feel an "ownership" to the programme.

We shall be assuming that the initiative for such a programme will come from the donor. A group of donors may also join forces and establish a joint programme. In the context of the ongoing Civil Service Reform Programme in Tanzania a programme along the lines suggested for PILOG might well be accommodated as a donor initiative within the wider framework of this reform programme.

The very first step would in any case be to enter into a dialogue with Tanzanian authorities and try to "sell" the general idea of PILOG. The consent and active cooperation of central government would be an absolute precondition for introducing a programme like this.

Based on the agreement between the donor and GOT the next step would be to establish a Programme Planning Team (PPT) to design the programme. The team should consist of Tanzanian and donor representative. From the Norwegian side it would be important to include in the team people with practical experience from this type of pilot programmes. We would recommend that representatives from the Associations of Local Authorities both in Tanzania and in Norway (ALAT and KS) be involved in developing the framework for the programme. The general idea is that both central and local government should be involved in the designing of the programme, and that as much as possible should be done to organize this process so that all parties feel a firm "ownership" to the programme once it is launched.

It is also important that expertise on monitoring and evaluation of such reforms be involved in the planning from the start. Again, experts both from the Tanzanian and the donor side should be involved in the process.

The very nature of the programme (not a blueprint plan) prevents us from presenting detailed suggestions concerning the content of the programme at this stage. It is nevertheless important that the programme framework which comes out of the deliberations of the PPT be based on a systematic analysis of the problems of local government. Some of the headlines for such an analysis has already been indicated in our discussion above.

It is important that the plan is not in the form of a blueprint. It should provide a framework within which the districts themselves can further develop their own district PILOGs. Such district PILOGs may differ from one district to the next. This means that the national PILOG, once it is operational, will consist of a set of contracts between individual districts and the programme organization at the national level. These contracts shall contain obligations for both districts and central government authorities. The programme framework should contain guidelines for developing of such local PILOGs and also present the conditionalities which will apply. These conditionalities

will consist both of incentives and of demands concerning follow up and accountability.

Once the programme format has been designed, the next step would be to invite local district authorities to develop their own local PILOGs under the wider programme umbrella. There is a need to be realistic about the capability of districts to develop such plans. A support activity should therefore be designed to help districts in this process. One possibility would be to present the district authorities with alternative "packages" . Such pre-structures packages could then be adapted to local needs and priorities in negotiations between the district and the national programme authority.

This will be a critical phase in the whole programme. It is extremely important that districts involve themselves actively in the process, and one of the conditionalities for accepting a proposal from a district should actually be that the local process has involved the various groups and interests, e.g. that councillors have been actively participating in the process. This has all the time to do with "ownership" to the activities and with commitment. The local programmes should - within the general frames and objectives - reflect problems which are actually felt as problems at the local level.

Much as there is a need to underscore the importance of creating local ownership to the programme, one should not be too optimistic about the drive for reform at the local level. What we will expect to find is quite on the contrary considerable resistance to change. The programme would therefore need to have something to offer to the districts - incentives which will create a positive support for the programme. The way in which we have suggested that the institutional reform programme be combined with support for development projects should be understood in this perspective.

Institutional change is very often a process characterized with conflict. The introduction and running of the programme shall have to be aware of this. The programme should therefore be designed so as to activate those actors and interests within the local community that are likely to support change.

It is only when the various district plans have been adopted and included in the programme that the ordinary programme can start. We would think that there is a need for a total planning and programme generation period of around two years before the ordinary programme will be in place.

The programme has to be implemented in stages. It should be recognized right from the start that institutional improvement is a long term process. The whole programme should therefore be given a time

perspective of at least 10-15 years. Within this broad time horizon one should design the programme in phases with a five years planning perspective. This should not be organized as a rolling plan. Each phase should be thoroughly evaluated and the next phase should build on the experiences with the previous one.

8.4 Organization of PILOG

We shall not at this stage go into the details about the organization of a PILOG programme. There is, however, a need to sketch in very broad terms the principles for the organization of such a programme.

The most basic of all principles of PILOG is that the programme as far as absolutely possible should avoid establishing parallel structures and extraordinary programme units inside the government system both at central and local level. There should be no programme organization for implementing the programme with reporting relationships outside the ordinary channels. The responsibility for implementation at all levels should lie with the ordinary political and administrative structures.

This is not to say that there will be no need for extra strengthening of administrative capacity in order to implement the programme. There will also be a need for extra professional expertise in order to support the reform activity. Such support would actually be part of the programme. The point is that such strengthening of capacity should be accommodated within the ordinary system of responsibilities and reporting relationships.

Districts entering the programme should also commit themselves by contract not to establish parallel structures involving other donors. other donors' involvement in the districts participating in this programme should be channelled through the organizing mechanisms of PILOG and be accommodated within the framework of the PILOG programme.

We suggest that a Programme Coordinating Secretariat be established in the Prime Minister's Office under the Minister for Local Government. How such a secretariat should be more specifically fitted into the organizational structure of the ministry should be seen as a matter of convenience. But we recommend that the office be given a high ranking position within the ministry.

The Coordinating Secretariat should be given responsibility for tasks such as:

- All aspects of the day-to-day running of the programme at national level. Follow-up and supervision of programme activities.
- Support of various programme activities at local level (e.g. common activities related to training etc.).
- The main responsibility for organizing monitoring and evaluation should also be placed with the national secretariat.
- Coordination and contact between PILOGs at district level. E.g. organizing national seminars/arenas for exchange of experiences.
- Follow up programme activities in relation to line ministries and other government institutions which might be involved in the programme in one way or another.
- Progress of the programme; such as planning of new phases.

The local base for the programme will be the districts. The responsibility for all questions related to priorities and policy decisions should rest with the District Council. The DC should therefore also be responsible for finally deciding on the content of the district's application for participating in the programme. One important purpose of the whole programme is to strengthen the democratic processes at local level. The best way of doing this is to activate councillors in decision making. It is therefore important not to set up steering committees and other extraordinary institutional arrangements for running the programme.

The administrative responsibility for the programme at district level should rest with the District Executive Director (DED).

At both central and local level there might be strong cases for supplementing the Tanzanian administration with expatriate technical assistance. We do, for example, foresee the need for strengthening the district administration with expertise with broad experience with local government reform work. We see no serious objection to recruiting such expertise to the districts as long as the need is clearly defined and as long as the expatiates are placed clearly within the Tanzanian system, and as long as they are not given control functions on behalf of the donor outside the ordinary Tanzanian system. Such expatiate personnel would also serve an important function as change agents within the system.

On the other hand there will be a need for control and monitoring. The donor should formulate clear conditionalities concerning accountability, management of resources and progress in relation to stated objectives of the programme. An apparatus for controlling such

aspects of the programme should be built up outside the ordinary Tanzanian structure of central and local government. In our view it is important that the roles of technical assistance and those of control are kept apart. The full details concerning how such an inspectorate for monitoring resource use and programme progress should be organized needs to be agreed between the donor and GOT.

8.5 Constraints of PILOG as a strategy for rural development

For a programme like PILOG the target groups would be local government officials and politicians more than groups at the grass roots level (the poor, women, etc.) One should therefore be aware that by supporting rural development through such a strategy a number of links and causal mechanisms have to be assumed. Thus it must be assumed that capacity building in local government will lead to benefits for the rural poor. This is a highly debatable assumption. The donor will also have few opportunities to influence local government priorities. It is important to be aware that if the strategy is to build autonomous and independent political institutions the donor cannot (and indeed should not) control the decisions and priorities of these institutions.[28]

To a certain extent the channelling of support to specific target groups in society (such as women and the poor), or to specific purposes (such a health or community development etc.), can be influenced by agreeing with the district on certain guidelines for planning and policy making. But again, such conditionalities may easily lead to donor interference with the day-to-day politics of the districts.

If the support to rural development is turned more into support for local government there might therefore be a need for complementary support directly to specific target groups. *Such assistance should be channelled outside the government system altogether*. It may take the form of support to specific NGOs at local and national level which can work more directly with specific target groups[29]. It may also take the form of economic support to private sector productive activity.

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[28] One of the points made in the evaluation of the Dutch supported district development programme is precisely that the programme has failed to channel enough resources to the productive sectors (like agriculture). The evaluation here seems to overlook the fact that the programme has few possibilities to influence the priorities of the district authorities, and that if the idea is to strengthen the district's capacity to take on responsibility for its own decisions and priorioties the donor should be very reluctant to interfere in policy priorities.

[29] A survey of NGOs in Rukwa in 1990 listed 31 NGOs which were active in the region (Dutton 1990). According to the review many of these organizations were involved in projects and activities directly targeted at meeting local needs. Most organizations were also reported to involve the affcted target groups in their activities.

One should also keep clearly in mind that the strengthening of local government is not only a question of strengthening the capacity of the local government apparatus itself. In chapter 7 (see fig. 7.1.) we made the point that institution building is actually a reciprocal relationship involving both the government apparatus and the civil society.

In the case of Tanzania there is a particularly strong case for giving attention also to strengthening structures of the civil society as a parallel activity to strengthening the government apparatus. One important legacy of the One Party State is the deconstruction of an independent civil society. The unified party-state machinery over years pacified most of the independent forces of the civil society. Whatever duality existed between government and society, this duality has been destroyed by the more or less full state control of all independent organizations in society, such as private enterprise, workers' organizations, cooperatives, youth organization, organizations for women, peasants, etc.

The state's effort to control civil society has in fact led to extensive alienation and mistrust between government and society. Organizations which are supposed to represent people vis a vis the state are seen by people (and rightfully so) as part of the state. On the other hand the rural people have pulled back from cooperating with government institutions and resorted to non-compliance. The peasantry has remained "uncaptured" in spite of the fact that the state took control of most of the formal organizations of the peasant society. This is why the big state apparatus in Hydén's terminology at the same time is a weak state (Hydén 1987). It has failed to develop the kind of interdependence between itself and the civil society which is required for actually being able to govern.[30]

A programme for public administration institutional improvement should be based on an analysis which is capable of reflecting this reality.

Strengthening the government apparatus without at the same time paying attention to how to strengthen the independent structures of the civil society which should serve as checks on government power may have as its main effect the expansion of a parasitic bureaucracy. At the same time as the local government reform programme (what we have called PILOG) must include activities which are seen by the people as support to their development independent structures, organizations and interest group activities in the local communities must be strengthen so

[30] In an interesting report, submitted as a masters thesis in anthropology, Hilde Johnson has described the resistance of the Fipa peasants towards state intervention in Rukwa. Her analysis shows how the "uncaptured" Fipa peasantry easily could resist government policies to make them grow more maize. (see Johnson 1991)

as to become in a better position to interact with local government in a reciprocal relationship.

8.6 Support to the private sector: A District Development Fund?

With the current restructuring of the public sector in Tanzania government will not continue to have a comprehensive responsibility for the development of all aspects of society to the same extent as has been the case up till recently. The pilot programme for local government support which we have outlined here will not include direct support to the private sector. In principle support to productive activities (private business, income generating activities etc.) should not be part of the programme. To the extent that the donor wants to support rural development directly by stimulate productive economic development in the community this has to be channelled outside the direct support to district government strengthening.

The possibility of establishing a District Development Fund has been raised in the debate on the reorientation of RUDEP and KIDEP. The basic rationale behind such an idea would be to make a clearer distinction between the public and private sector aspects of rural development. We are not in a position to recommend any specific model for such a fund at this stage. So far there is no model for such a fund operating in Tanzania. Our examination of alterative approaches to such a fund shall therefore be on a very general level.

One possibility is to establish a Rural Development Fund (or more generally a Regional Development Fund) at the national level and integrate it with the Tanzanian government structure. The Fund would apply to specific geographical areas defined as particularly disadvantaged, and be set up with a decentralized structure for administration of support and handling of applications. District and regional authorities could be given a defined role in operating the fund. One might also envisage the possibility that some elements of the administration of the Fund be delegated to district or regional authorities.

Such a fund could be modeled partly on the Norwegian District Development Fund which was established in Norway in the beginning of the 1960s. This would be a major institutional set up and would probably require support from more than one donor.

At this stage we are not prepared to recommend the establishment of such a fund. It would add to the administrative overload of the Tanzanian government system. It would also create a complicated system which would be difficult to control and which would require substantial funds in order to give any meaning.

We are also sceptical to setting up such a fund as part of the government structure at this stage. A number of our informants in Tanzania advised against involving local government in any operation of a development fund aiming at giving support to private enterprises. The crucial issue now, we were told, is to develop clearer distinctions between the pubic and the private sector. With the political culture prevailing among local politicians they should not be involved in distribution of support to private sector, commercial projects.

We also think that if a local development fund is set up, it should be established on a local basis (regional or district) and not on a national scale. If we accept the idea that politicians should not be involved in the running of such a fund one might consider setting up for example a fund called "Foreign Aid to Rukwa" (or Kigoma) which is explicitly set up as donor financed and donor administered funds. Such a fund might also be a joint venture between more than one donor.

Such a fund would be a simple funding mechanism for local commercial projects. Support should be given on clearly defined conditions. Among the conditions should be documentation of plans showing the viability of the project. The recipient should also contribute a minimum of own resources to the project. Support might be partly in the form of favourable loan conditions and partly in the form of grants.

The "foreign aid fund model" could also be developed in a form which allows giving support also to non profit NGOs at the local level. Such support could be in the form of loans or grants or a combination.

Again we are not prepared to recommend the establishment of such a fund at the present stage. The fund would have to establish its own apparatus for screening of applications and for monitoring its projects. We shall advise against Norwegian involvement in establishing such a structure parallel to the Tanzanian system at the present time.

An alternative approach would be to channel economic support to private sector projects through the ordinary banking system at the local or regional level. This could take the form of a guarantee fund which would make loans available to local developers who would otherwise not be found credit worthy by the bank. Such a strategy will also help to strengthen the rural banking system in Tanzania. By channelling support through the ordinary banking system one would also utilize the existing system for screening of applications and for managing of credits and thus avoid setting up parallel structures.

8.7 The future of RUDEP and KIDEP

A programme constructed along the lines of the PILOG concept may, or it may not, build on the existing programmes of RUDEP and KIDEP. In our view there would be many advantages attached to building on RUDEP and KIDEP. Through the two programmes there has been built up a considerable administrative capacity for institutional change at district level. If Norwegian authorities want to reorient support more towards support for institutional strengthening of local government the basis which has been built up in those two regions should be taken advantage of. NORAD is already in a dialogue with district and regional authorities in the two regions. Such a dialogue may take a long time to establish in other districts. We also regard it an advantage if a programme like the one we have suggested could be established in a number of districts within one or two regions instead of spreading activities to a number of districts throughout the country. The establishing of the programme in one region will, on the other hand, not prevent the expansion to other districts if wanted.

Establishment of a programme like PILOG is a major operation. It will require lengthy talks and negotiations with central government and possibly with other donor organizations. There is no guarantee that such an effort will succeed. As seen from Norway's point of view as a donor a strategy whereby central government is approached for support to such a programme through a reorientation of RUDEP and KIDEP might be a more flexible approach than starting the PILOG concept from scratch.

Much as we have argued that a comprehensive programme for local government institution building should involve central government authorities one should be open to the possibility that such a programme might turn out not to be feasible, or at least take a long time to establish. In that case a reorientation of RUDEP and KIDEP might be a second best alternative.

If a comprehensive programme for district government support is established along the conceptual lines of PILOG there will still be a need for donor presence to take care of control and monitoring functions in relation to the districts (see section 8.4). In that case one might consider the possibility of retaining part of the RUDEP and KIDEP organizations as regional (or zonal) control units or "inspectorates" with a clear mandate to take care of the donor's interests in relation to the programme. Such an inspectorate function might be combined with a function as "regional donor representative" for managing support to the private sector outside the local government system as this has been discussed in sections 7.5 and 7.6 above.

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1992. **Lake Babati, Tanzania and its immediate surroundings. Part I: Baseline information**. Stockholm: SIDA.

1992b. **Lake Babati, Tanzania and its immediate surroundings. Part II: Management and Action Plan**. Stockholm: SIDA.

1992c. **The Wild Lake. The 1990 floods in Babati - rehabilitation and prevention**. Stockholm: SIDA.

1994. **Forestry and Environmental Sector Support Programme 1994/95**. Stockholm: SIDA.

Tanzania, Govt of. 1994. **Report of the Presidential Commision of Inquiry into Land Matters**. Uppsala.

Therkildsen, O. 1988. **Watering White Elephants: Lessons from Donor Funded Planning and Implementation of Rural Water Supplies in Tanzania**. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Scudies.

Therkildsen, O. 1994. **Economic Decline and Democratic Decentralisation in Rural Sub-Saharan Africa.** Paper presented at the Conference on Democratic Decentralisation in Africa and Asia. Institute for Commonwealth Studies. London 21-23 September 1994.

UD. 1994. **Landstrategi for perioden 1994-1997 - Tanzania.** Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oslo.

UNDP 1994. **Preparatory Report: Economic Development, Decentralisation and Local Governance in the Mwanza Region.**

Upten, S. et.al. 1993. **Evaluation of the Mwimbia Area Development Project.** Sumbawanga.

9 Bibliography

9.1 Background

As part of the evaluation of the rural development programs, RUDEP and KIDEP, the Foreign Ministry has asked the team to prepare a bibliography on the rural development programs (i) RUDEP and (ii) KIDEP, and the regions where these programs take place. We have also included literature on (iii) rural development and local government in Tanzania, and in (iv) developing countries generally. In addition we have included a separate section on literature on (v) institutional development. The bibliography has five sub-headings:

(i) *RUDEP - Rukwa Region.*
This is literature related to the RUDEP program and the Rukwa Region. There seems to be more literature on Rukwa than on Kigoma. As the RUDEP programme was started earlier there are more documents, studies and reviews on RUDEP than on KIDEP. BRALUP (now Institute of Resource Assessment) was involved in studies and documentation on various aspects during the IRDP in Rukwa in the 1970s, and has also produced reports commissioned by RUDEP in the 1980s. The BRALUP documents from the 1970s does not seem to have been used by the current program RUDEP, they does not seem to be accessible in the NORAD system. The documents could be of interest insofar as they contain figures on level of economic activity in the region that could be a substitute for a proper baseline. There exist an annotated bibliography made by the Library at the University of Dar es Salaam (Sikatzwe 1990). There has also been a few thesis and reports from Norwegian students and researchers (Johnsen 1991, Holmboe-Ottosen and Wandel 1988).

(ii) *KIDEP - Kigoma region.*
This is literature related to the KIDEP programme as well as studies from the region. So far few studies seems available. Little research or writing seems to have taken place about events in the region, or about the main ethnic group the Waha that lives in the area. The World Bank was the implementer of the integrated regional development program (IBRD) in the 1970s, but few studies seems to have be accessible in libraries or elsewhere. The programme was generally seen as a failure, and was given up by the World Bank in the late 1970s, although there are researchers

that think this verdict has been too harsh (see Ngasongwa 1989). There has never been collected a bibliography on the Kigoma region, similar to the one the University Library of Dar es Salaam has collected on Rukwa region. There has also been a few thesis and reports from Norwegian students and researchers (Lomøy 1983, Rønningen 1982).

(iii) *Tanzania - rural development and local government.*
The evaluation has as part of the work with alternative strategies for supporting rural development interviewed other donors in Tanzania about current changes in donor policy and strategies towards district development programmes. The evaluation has also made use of documentation and studies on rural development problems in Tanzania, as well as current studies on local government systems. Literature related to these issues is included in this section.

(iv) *Developing countries - rural development and local government.*
The evaluation has also where it has been relevant made use of other studies and project documents related to alternative models for supporting rural development. Relevant literature related to developing countries is included in this section.

(v) *Developing countries - institutional development*
The bibliography include a section on literature concerned with institutional development in developing countries. This is literature which does not deal explicitly with local government issues, but with more general issues on institutional issues, capacity building, organizational change etc. in developing countries.

9.2 RUDEP - Rukwa Region

Akre, S. 1987. **The Integration of the Health Education Component of CPHE into Governmental Health Services: The relation between the water and sanitation project in RUDEP and AFYA's village health worker program**. Sumbawanga: NORAD.

Beckman, M. og I.J. Temba. 1988. **Localisation of procurement services to NORAD sponsored projects in Rukwa and Kigoma**. NORAD.

Beier, M., C-M. Falkenberg, N. Mjema og A. Zewdie. 1990. Volume 1: National Policies and their Effects on Rukwa. I M. Beier [red.]: **The Southern Highlands Development and the Food Security Needs of Tanzania. The Case Study of Rukwa Region**. GTZ, Division 426.

Beier, M., N. Mjema og A. Zwedie. 1990. Volume 2: The Food Security Programme. I M. Beier [red.]: **The Southern Highlands Development and the Food Security Needs of Tanzania. The Case Study of Rukwa Region**. GTZ, Division 426.

Bjelland, Rolf. **Sluttrapport (med merknader etc.)**.

Bjelland, Rolv og Iddi Khaliki. 1993. **Public Administration and Administrative Regulations in Tanzania**. Sumbawanga.

Brandberg, Bjørn, Keziah Mwandemani, Issa Musoke og Hans Knut Otterstad. 1989. **Health Sector Review - Rukwa**.

The review is particularly concerned with preventive health care. Local health is seen in a community perspective. Particularly focussing on the resource situation and the integration of the health sector with the wider community/local development. Main recommendation that RUDEP should channel its funding for health to community health. Recommends expansion of Village Health Workers' programme to cover all villages in Rukwa within year 2000. Calls for strategic plan!!

Bundala, Joacim, Torild E. Borud og Ivar Evensmo. 1990. **CP in RUDEP - Tanzania**. A Paper for NCA's Conference on CP held in nairobi 2-5. October 1990.

Reviews (briefly) Tanzania's policy on community participation and summarizes main aspects of RUDEP in relation to community participation objectives. The second main part of the paper goes into a more detailed assessment of four cases of "applied community participation":
- the irrigation project
- the water, health and road works
- the Mwimbi area development project
- the District Community Development Department in Sumbawanga rural

Comments on the 1990 RUDEP review. A 17 p. comment on the "Manger report" from the Sumbawanga Region..

Dalland, Ø. 1988. **Organisational results of historio-ecological understanding at the village level. The case study of Msanzi village, Rukwa, Tanzania.** Dar es Salaam: Inst. of resource assessment.

DiS. 1991. **Evaluation of RUDEP/NORAD funded Village Health Workers Programme in Rukwa.**

Reviews the RUDEP Village Health Programme, based on key national policy documents and programme documents. Contains impact assessment and description of major obstacles

District Water Engineer, Sumbawanga. 1991. **Brief on Water Supply in Sumbawanga District (rural). Information Prepared for the Joint Water Review Team Visiting Rukwa Region in May 1991.**

The report contains some factual (and statistical) info on water projects in Sumbawanga Rural District and is prepared as input the the Joint Review of the water Sector Programme in 1991.

Dutton, Mary. 1990. **A Survey of Non-Governmental Organisations in Rukwa Region.** Sumbawanga.

Survey with inventory of all non-governmental organizations in Rukwa region. 31 NGOs were identified and data provided

For each organization infor is provided on:
- year of establishing org.
- chairperson
- membership
- staffing
- beneficiaries
- activities - future plans
- funding sources
- Comments

3-E Economics. 1993. **An Economic and Financial Evaluation of RUDEP and KIDEP. The NORAD Supported Rural Development Programmes in the Rukwa and Kigoma Regions, Tanzania.** Oslo: 3-E Economics.

Environmental Impact Assessment of NORAD Funded Programmes in Tanzania. The Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme (RUDEP). 1992. Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

The Final report from the Forestry Review Team. 1992. Sumbawanga: Rukwa Regional Admin.

Report from a committee appointed by the Rukwa Regional authorities to review the situation concerning afforestation/deforestation in Rukwa Region. The survey covers Sumbawanga urban, Nkansi, Sumbawanga rural and Mpanda districts. The report identifies a number of constraints pertaining to afforestation/deforestation in the districts and discusses various approaches to overcoming these constraints. Most recommendations are of a rather normative character and the institutional problems related to actual implementation are hardly touched upon.

Gleditsch, Mona, Jon Lomøy, Ophelia Mascarenhas og Knut Samset. 1986. **Review of Community Participation and Health Education Projects in Rukwa and Kigoma**. Dar es Salaam: NORAD.

Heggenhougen, K., R. Mnyenyelwa, A. Hoff og S. Akre. 1987. **Report from a NORAD Study Team on the Village Health Worker Programme in Tanzania**. NORAD.

Rather superficial report based on one weeks field work in Rukwa. Objective to provide NORAD with info on the ongoing Village Health Worker programme and to give recommendations concerning various aspects of the programme. The Team recommends comprehensive NORAD support for the programmeand also provides some practical recommendations concerning the equipment to be placed in villages. Also recommends that programme plan be developed.

Johnsen, Hilde. 1991. **Dilemmas in Development: Forms of Peasant resistance among the Fipas in Rukwa, Tanzania**. Thesis submitted to the cand. polit. degree. Oslo: Department and Museum of Anthropology, University of Oslo.

Kaale, B K., G S. Klem og A B. Temu. 1983. **Report to NORAD on Possible Projects within Forestry in Rukwa Region in Tanzania**.

Report from a study group commissioned by NORAD/Dar to make a two days field trip to Rukwa region to look into the possibilities for establishing forestry/agro forestry projects in the region. The group recommends three projects.

Kauzeni, A S. **Infrastructural development as practical measures to food security - The Case of the Rukwa Region.** Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

Water and Sanitation under Water Development Programme in selected villages of the Rukwa Region. Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

1984. **Increasing Agricultural Production and Productivity in Rukwa Region.** Research Report No. 61 (New Series). Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

Fairly general report on the possibilities for expanding agricultural production in Rukwa region. Identifies great, unexploited, potential for agricultural production. Main constraints identified as:
- absence of stable marketing system for peasant producers
- the remoteness of the region.

Points out need for improved infrastructure (transport, communication, godowns, agro-processing industries, improved extension services, crop marketing system, farm input supply and delivery system, agricultural credit facilities, domestic manufacturing of agricultural machinery, increased supply of farm machinery to the region, improved irrigation systems, etc.

The report contains som baseline type data on agricultural production.

1985. **Accelerating and Sustaining Village Development.** Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

1987. **Impact of villagisation on Agricultural Productivity and Development in Rukwa Region.** Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

1987. **Women Participation in Rural Water and Sanitation Development Programmes: The Case of the Rukwa Water Master Plan.** Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

Kauzeni, A S., E.K. Shishira og CG. Mungongo. 1988. **People's Organisation at Village Level: The Case Study of Four Villages in the Rukwa Region**. Dar es Salaam: Institute of Resource Assessment, University of Dar es Salaam.

King, R B. 1979. Volume 2. Land Systems. **Land Resources of the Rukwa Region: A Reconnaissance Assessment**. Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of DSM.

This volume describes the various land systems in detail. See description of volume 1.

King, R B., C W. Rombulow, I S. Pearse, G. Ley og J A. Kamasho. 1979. Volume 1. The Physical Environment. **Land Resources of the Rukwa Region: A Reconnaissance Assessment**. Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of DSM.

The report contains a comprehensive land resource assessment of Rukwa region: geology, topography, soils and vegetation, which together with an assessment of soil and water availability is used to produce land suitability maps for maize, cotton, flue-cured tobacco, rice and irrigation. Together with game and forest reserve potential these maps are used to produce a general land potential map.

King, R B., C W. Rombulow, I S. Pearse, I S. Kikula og J A. Kamasho. 1979a. Volume 3. Appendices. **Land Resources of the Rukwa Region: A Reconnaissance Assessment**. Dar es Salaam: Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning, University of DSM.

Contains methodology, data etc.
See main report (vol. 1.)

Eriksen, et.al. 1984. **Rukwa Region: A pre-feasability study on Social Development Activities. A study for NORAD**. Sumbawanga.

Lwambuka, Ladislaus og Anna Stella Kaijage. 1993. **RUDEP - L F A Workshop on Multi-Sectoral Planning in Integrated Development in Rukwa**. Sumbawanga: RUDEP.

The report is a workshop document containing full details of one week discusssion involving top leaders in Rukwa region. The work-

shop was organised to plan a multi-sectoral development programme to be coordinated by the regional administration. The workshop was based on the methodology of the Logical Framework Approach. The report contains brief summaries of discussion and a number of diagrammes summarizing e.g. role og NGOs, problem identification and means - end analysis for problem solving. it also contains a planning matrix for division of tasks and responsibilities between various actors in multi-sectoral approach to the problems identified.

Maganga, PF. 1988. **Emerging Trends in Foreign Aided Rural Development Programmes in Tanzania: The Case of TIRDEP and RUDEP**.

MA dissertation comparing design, administration and achievements of donor supported rural development programmes in Tanga and Rukwa

Maganye, E N. og Rose Shayo. 1989. **Socio-Cultural Conditions of Relevance to Development. The Case of Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme and Sports for All Project of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.** Consultancy report submitted to the Centre for Development Studies of Bergen University, Norway. Dar es Salaam: Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam.

Report from a study to assess the socio-cultural dimension of assistance to the two projects RUDEP and Sports for All.

The evaluation of RUDEP is part of a larger study involving the four countries Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Overall objective to "undertake a critical assessment of 'The Socio-Cultural Dimension in Development Assistance'"

The section on RUDEP focusses on:
- Community participation and health education
- Labour intensive roadworks
- Mwimbi development area
- Involving Women in RUDEP
- Integrating RUDEP in local administrative structures

Contains a section on recommendations and a bibliography.

Manger, Leif O., Elizaabeth Kleemeier, Suleiman Ngware og K. Keregero. 1990. **Development in Rukwa, Tanzania. A Review of the Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Project (RUDEP)**. Bergen.

Matomora, M K S. 1987. **Child Survival and Development Pro gramme. Proposal for Rukwa Region, Tanzania. Report of field visit undertaken between 16-25 May, 1987.** Nairobi: Department of Community Health. African Medical and Research Foundation.

The report contains mainly factual info on health and health services in Rukwa region.

Mazombwe, AJA. 1993. **An Evaluation of Performance of RUDEP Funded Women Income Generating Groups in Sumbawanga Rural District 1987-1993.**

Post graduate diploma dissertation analysing women's income groups in Tendawema and Jitegemee in Sumbawanga rual district. Analyses RUDEPs historical development, objectives, strategies and organisation. Gives recommendations on how to improve effectiveness of the programme

Ministry of Local Government and Co-Operative Development. 1991. **Comments on Review of the Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Project**. The Ministry's comments to the "Manger Report.

Mwambenja, Sabetha M. og Killonsi M. Mporogomyi. 1992. **Study of the Potential for Development of Production and Small Scale/Micro Enterprises in Rukwa..** Dar es Salaam.

The report is mainly a stock taking of the potential for development of productive small enterprises in the region. It also discusses various socio-economic and other contraints to the development of identified potentials.

Møgedal, Sigrun. 1989. **Community Participation for Health and Development. Notes and Observations April 1989**. Oslo: DIS (Center for Partnership in Development).

Møgedal, Sigrun og Sissel Hodne Steen. **The Household and the Health Services: Main findings related to Health Care policies**.

Nilssen, E.S.W. og D.A.K. Muchuguzi. 1992. **Study of the development of non-governmental organisations in the Rukwa region**. Dar es Salaam: NORAD.

Njau, F. **Comments on Rudep Review 1990, Health Sector - Rukwa**.

Dr. Njau was Regional Medical Officer in Rukwa at the time of the review and the comments should be viewd as reflecting the regional health sector's assessment of the review. The comment is very critical to the report - particularly to its emphasis on giving NGOs more responsibility for health services and the way in which the report made health projects conditional on economic sustainability.

NORAD. 1994. **Rukwa and Kigoma Regions, Tanzania: Rural Water Supply Development. Report from Mission October/November 1994.**

Norconsult Tanzania Ltd. 1993. **Draft Assessment of Norwegian Assistance to Women in Tanzania**. Dar es Salaam: Norconsult.

The report includes a summary of women related activities in RUDEP and KIDEP (chapter 2.2)

Norwegian Church Aid. 1990. **A Conference on Community Participation in Development. October 2 - 5, 1990, Nairobi, Kenya**. Sumbawanga.

The report contains contributions reporting experiences with community participation in Rukwa (Village Health Worker Programme) + a paper on general perspectives and case studies of community participation (case studies based on RUDEP).
The report also contains a bibliography.

Perkins, SC. 1978. **Small Scale Industry in the Rukwa Region: Survey Analysis and Recommendations.**

Paper describing the small scale industry i Rukwa, emphasising the importance of small scale industries for self-sufficiency and integration of rural economy and for income levels and welfare.

Regional Economic Affairs Department, Sumbawanga. 1991. **RUDEP Document for Phase II.**

Review of past experience and proposal for the next phase. The main change in phase two is that immediate beneficiaries, the private sector and NGOs will be the main implementors of the programme. Production, transport and human resources are also emphasised, along with environmental concerns.

1992. **Results of Evaluation of the Village Health Worker Programme, Rukwa.**

Evaluation covering findings from field studies in thirteen villages on the role of village health workers. Recommendations on how to improve their services

Regional Health Office, Rukwa. 1989. **Strengthening Health Services in Rukwa Region. Needs and Priorities in the Health Sector 1990-1994**. Regional Health Office, Rukwa.

Planning document prepared for a NORAD Health Sector review mission. Plan produced with support from DiS and based on a workshop sponsored by NORAD. The report contains some baseline data on health services.

Regional Planning Office, Rukwa. 1994. **Internal Evaluation of Mwimbi Area Development Project (MAD)**. Sumbawanga.

Reitan, J. og B. Aasen. 1994. **Information management in local government institutions in Tanzania. Rukwa and Kigoma**. Oslo: NIBR.

Report from the 1988 Joint Annual Review of RUDEP. Final report January 1989. 1989. Dar es Salaam: United Republic of Tanzania (PMO) and The Kingdom of Norway (NORAD).

Report of the Joint Annual Review of TAN 055 - Water Supply and Sanitation Development, Rukwa Region. TAN 060 - Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme (RUDEP). 1987. Oslo: NVE. NOrwegian Water Resource and Energy Administration.

Summary:

A. Water

The review mission notes impressive achievements as far as the number of water schemes is concerned. It does express serious doubt concerning the sustainabiliity of the effort over time and it points out that the human resource development component and the operation and maintenance aspects of the programme has not been adequately improved. Integration with Maji's organization is said to be satisfactory.

B. RUDEP

Mission observes slow start and the execution within the Regional Commissioner's Office has met with some difficulties. It is pointed out and underscored that RUDEP should not build its own implementing capacity but concentrate efforts on programming and monitoring. It is emphasized that the establishment of programme exec. functions e.g. accounting, procurement store, transport and workshop is temporary

Ruden, F. 1989. **The Namwele Environmental Project.**

Report on the prospects for extracting coal from the Namwele coalfield

RUDEP. 1984. **A Prefeasibility Study on Social Development Activities.**

Background information and recommendations on the possibilities of extending NORAD assistance beyond rural water supply

1990. **An Interrim Evaluation of the Mwimbi Area Development Project**. Sumbawanga: Regional Economic Affairs Department.

The Mwimbi Area Development Project is a sub-activity within RUDEP, started in 1987 and focusing on involving rural people themselves in the development within a limited geographical area.
The report gives a brief history of the project, its objectives, project design and organization. It also assesses the construction activities and the "Fund for Village Level Projects" which was established as part of the project.

Key (selected) recommendations :
- Need for clarification of objectives and strategies.
- Should employ two social mobilizers.
- More enphasis should be put on the productive sectors.
- More (50%) to village projects for women.
- More emphasis on training and on involvement of population
- Steering committe to be given more active role in planning and decision making. Also Ward Dev. Committees to be more involved.
- More emphasis on monitoring!, on training and on publicity

RUDEP Planning Handbook. A Manual for Coordination Units, Project Officers and Activity Supervisors. 1990. Sumbawanga.

Contains all relevant information regarding RUDEP, and makes clear objectives and strategies

RUDEP. **An Interim Evaluation of the Mwimbi Area Development Project**. Sumbawanga.

The evaluation concludes that the project is replicable on certain conditions; that the district Community Development Office is strong enough to oversee the project, that qualified staff is recruited, that the physical need of the project is properly planned, and that there is

carried out a feasibility study. The report recommends that an area programme is started up i Mpanda District.

Rugaiganisa, SE. og PA. Kowa. 1984. **RUDEP Regional Master Plan Project for the Road Sector. Preliminary Report for ZOOP Workshop in Mbeya 12-17 June 1984**.

Describes regional and district roads in Rukwa, recommends road classification standards for improvements and rehabilitation. Gives advice on organisation and implementation of rehabilitiation and maintenance of roads

Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Program. Forestry Sector Review. 1990.

Rukwa roads planning workshop, 12-16 June 1989. 1989.

Sandberg, A. 1976. **Rukwa Rural Development Programme: Draft Report Part I - Productive Sector Development**.

Report containing description of agro-economic zones and agricultural systems in Rukwa. Plan objectives, regional targets, rural transformation strategy and access to the means of production and to technology and information are also included

Shio, Leonard, Oddvar Smukkestad og Boneventura Mrina. 1994. **Rural Development Strategies in Tanzania. The Case of RUDEP Integrated Rural Development Programme**. Kristiansand and Mzumbe: Agder College and Institute of Development Management.

Sitna, MA. **Land Use in Selected Villages in the Rukwa Region**.

Research report on land use since before villagisation, through the transition period and after villagisation. 28 villages in the Rukwa region are analysed.

Status Report on the Implementation of Recommendations from the 1988 RUDEP Joint Annual Review. 1989. Sumbawanga: Regional Economics Affairs Department.

Status Report on the Recommendations of Water Sector Review of 1991. 1992. Comments to the Joint NORAD-Tanzania Water Sector Review 1991 from Sumbawanga Region. Sumbawanga.

Appended to this comment are a number of status reports on various review recommendations.

Sylte, O. et al. 1989. **RUDEP - Project review of the road sector**.

Assessment of performance of activities in the road sector of RUDEP, with recommendations on planning and implementation of ongoing activities

Sylte, Ole Kristian, John Marshall, Christine Hongoke, Gusbert Kinyero og Odo Tomeka. 1989. **Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme (RUDEP) Project Review, Road Sector**.

The report seems mainly to be concerned with more technical issues pertaining to road construction and maintenance, such as labour intensive methods, road standards, involvement of women in road construction (pointing out that this should not be encouraged further due to extensive mal- nutrition), selection of road projects to be given priority etc. Less concerned with isssues relating organizational problems and integration of road building and maintenance into the local governmental system. Points out, however, that the main strategy for RUDEP should be to
- improve regional transport planning, and
- to improve the technical capability of the Regional Roads Engineer.

TAN 060 - RUDEP - Arbeidsprogram 1992/93. 1992. Notat. NORAD - HELSE.

TAN 055. Review of the Community Participation and Health Education Projects in Rukwa and Kigoma. 1986. Dar es Salaam: NORAD.

TAN 060. The Water Programme in Rukwa. Report Joint NORAD - **Tanzania Review 1991**. 1991. Dar es Salaam and Oslo: Kingdom of Norway and Republic of Tanzania.

Review of the water sector programme undertaken by a team consisting of: Dr. P. Evans IRC, the Hague, Mrs. H.A. Gondwe, Min. of Water DSM, Mr. C. Igogo, Min. of Regional Adm. and Local Gvt. and Mr. A. Kruger, NORAD, Oslo (team leader).
Summary of key recommendations:
- Rudep should streamline and strengthen planning, financing and coord. procedures and bring them more in line with standard govt. procedures.
- Districts should be kept better informed about decisions affecting them - districts should be more involved.
- water component of RUDEP should not be further reduced.

-The Departm. of Community Dev. should be given stronger role (also in RUDEP) - More decentralization, participation and involvement of districts.
- Women to more actively involved.
-Continued emphasis on simple technology (shallow wells)
- Develop capacity for attendance and maint. at village level
- Sanitation programme to be given priority and expand to all districts.
-Priority to stimulate local suppliers and contractors

TAN 055. Water Supply and Sanitation Programme for Rukwa and Kigoma regions in Western Tanzania. Phase III. Report of the Review Mission 1985.. .

TAN 060. Water and Sanitation Sector Review. Brief Prepared by RWE's Office. 1991. Sumbawanga.

Report prepared G.E. A. Iddo, Ag Regional Water Engineer and B.T. Smith, assistant to RWE. The report gives a brief summary (8 p + appendices) of the development of the water sector programme within RUDEP, including some simple statistics concerning achievements, costs and distribution of activities.

Constraints emphasized:
- The long period between ordering of material and actual delivery. Requests funds to establish revolving buffer store.
- Channelling of all funds through RUDEP is a big problem - slow procedures for procurement etc.
- Low salaries result in low motivation for doing a good job. Calls for incentive system for staff.

Upten, S. et.al. 1993. **An Evaluation of the Mwimbi Area Development Project**. Sumbawanga.

Wigdel, H.Aa. og et.al. 1991. **Evaluation of RUDEP projects, Road Components, Dec. 4-16 1991. Report..** Sumbawabga.

The report concludes that the labour based methods have been successful and recommend that the road components should be expanded to include Nkansi and Mpanda Districts. It notes, however, that the RUDEP Handbook is insufficient
when it comes to planning of roads, and should be revised,- and that there are administrative complications for the implementation of projects as the District and Regional Engineer report to different authorities.

Willis, R. 1966. The Fipa and related peoples of South-West Tanzania and North-East Zambia. I D. Forde [red.]: **Ethnographic Survey of Africa**. London: Int. Africa Institute.

1970. The Kamcape Movement. I M. Marwick [red.]: **Witchcraft and Sorcery**. London: Penguin.

1978. **There was a certain Man: Spoken art of the Fipa**. Oxford: Clarendon.

1981. **A state in the making. Myth, History and Social Transformation in Precolonial Ifipa**. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

1985. Do the Fipa have a word for it? I Parkings [red.]: **The anthropology of evil**. Oxford.

1989. The peace puzzle in Ifipa. I S. Howell og R. Willis [red.]: **Societies at Peace. Anthropological Perspectives**. London: Routledge.

Zewdie, A. 1990. **Assessment Report on Rukwa Region's Potential and Constraints for the Cultivation of Horticultural Crops and Vegetables**.

A detailed analysis of agro-ecological conditions, crop pests and diseases. Lays the groundwork for promoting a horticultural/vegetable strategy, and gives information on the attitude of the population towards horticulture and vegetable production

9.3 KIDEP - Kigoma region

Basheke, M M., W B. Bategeki og E M. Urio. 1992. **The Situation of Underfive Children in Kigoma Rural, Kasulu and Kibondo Districts , Kigoma Region**. TFNC Report No. 1493. Tanzania Food and Nutrition Centre/WHO.

Reports a nutritional situation analysis for the three districts. The analysis inviolved collection of baseline data including a field nutritional status survey. Interview form included in appendix

Beckman, M. og I.J. Temba. 1988. **Localisation of procurement services to NORAD sponsored projects in Rukwa and Kigoma**. NORAD.

Coopers & Lybrand. 1992. **Management Systems Audit Report: KigomaWater Programme (TAN 055). Main Report**.

Describes in detail the accounting, budgeting and project implementation system of KIDEP

A Draft Proposal for Kigoma Regional Development Programme Organization and 1989/90 Budget. 1989. Kigoma: Regional Commissioner's Office.

3-E Economics. 1993. **An Economic and Financial Evaluation of RUDEP and KIDEP. The NORAD Supported Rural Development Programmes in the Rukwa and Kigoma Regions, Tanzania**. Oslo: 3-E Economics.

Ekner, Nils. 1987. **Soil Erosion in Kigoma-Ujiji. Support and Monitoring Report**. Copenhagen: Danida.

Gleditsch, Mona, Jon Lomøy, Ophelia Mascarenhas og Knut Samset. 1986. **Review of Community Participation and Health Education Projects in Rukwa and Kigoma**. Dar es Salaam: NORAD.

Havnevik et al . 1987. **Kigoma region - Feasibility Study of a Possible Rural Development Programme.** NORAD, Oslo. October.

Herfjord, Torstein og Mwesiga Lwakatare. 1990. **Kigoma-Ujiji Water Supply. Draft Report November 1990**. NVE, NORAD & Ministry of Water (TZ).

Describes existing water supply system and identifies needs for rehabilitation. Some info on the region (topography, climate, geology, economy and population) is included.

Joint Review of Community Participation and Health Education in the Kigoma Water Supply Programme. 1990.

Katundu, D R M. 1990. **Kigoma Region. Annotated Bibliography**. Regional Bibliographical Series. 2. Dar es Salaam: University of Dar es Salaam.

Kibondo Integrated Rural Development Project 1992 - 1996. 1991. Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service.

The report contains plans for a integrated rural dev. project at district level in Kibondo to be run by the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service

KIDEP: Annual Plan and Budget for 1993/94. 1993. Kigoma.

KIDEP: Annual Plan and Budget for 1994/95. 1994. Kigoma.

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Main themes covered are: agricultural development, drought and desertification, human resources development, planning and utilization and policy reforms.

The directory has been pruduced jointly by the Pan-African Development and Information System (PADIS) and the Eastern and Southers African Universities Research Programme (ESAURP).

It is published in Dar es Salaam by:
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Appendices

Terms of Reference
for

a Study of Rural Development Assistance in Tanzania

Background

Preparing a new strategy for further Norwegian development assistance to Tanzania, the rural development programmes have been highlighted.

The purpose of the Norwegian funded assistance programmes Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme (RUDEP) and Kigoma Integrated Development Programme (KIDEP) is to improve economic and social conditions for the people in these regions.

The programmes have been reviewed on different occasions by NORAD. Critisism have been made with reference to the large scale of the programmes and to the lack of local involvement and participation.

Purpose

To further promote rural development in Tanzania, on the basis of experiences with the existing programmes, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to elaborate alternative rural development approaches within the framework related to the overall Norwegian assistance to Tanzania.

Objectives

The Ministry accordingly wants to commission a study consisting of two main parts;
- a consentrated presentation and review of existing documentation, and
- an outline of possible alternative models of rural development assistance.

Scope

The review of existing documentation must focus on critical aspects of the programmes and sum up
- to what degree the purposes of the progammes have been achived,
- what kind of impacts the programmes have had, and
- how the programmes correspond to the actual policy of Tanzania as well as overall Norwegian assistance policy.

Proposals for alternative models of promoting rural development should be made with reference to the critical aspects of the existing programmes, and with reference to the ongoing decentralisation and other changes of particular interest in Tanzanian's public sector. The draft must discuss and design in broad

outline alternatives to the financing, organising and maintaining of rural development assistance in Tanzania, with particular emphasis on the question of sustainability of such efforts.

Methods

This study is primarily a desk-study. Necessary additional, updated information can however be provided by a limited visit to Tanzania.

Study team

To undertake the study we will require team members with particular knowledge of the rural development and rural assistance programmes in Tanzania and to the previous reviews and existing documentation on these programmes. The team also needs good knowledge of the public sector in Tanzania and the ongoing reform process, as well as general qualifications and experience from evaluation work.

The team can consist of 2 or 3 members. One of these should be a Tanzanian professional.

Time schedule

The study shall be carried out in the autum of 1994. Final report in english should be submitted finished by 30 of November.

APPENDIX 2

List of people met

De Boer, Martin W.; First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy, Dar es Salaam

Fredriksen, Peter; First Secretary, Royal Danish Embassy, Dar es Salaam

Habi, Rafael; Senior Lecturer, Institute of Development Management (IDM), Mzumbe

Haule, Martin L., Assistant Lecturer, Institute of Development Studies, University of Dar es Salaam

Henry, Shaun; Programme Officer, Embassy of Ireland, Dar es Salaam

Jerve, Alf Morten, Consellor, World Bank, Washington

Kachema, Mr.; Ag. Assistant Director, Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam

Kaguo, S. Y.; Director of Administration and Personnel, Local Government Service Commission, Dar es Salaam

Kolshus, Halvor J.; Liaison Officer/Team Leader, ORGUT Consulting AB, Dar es Salaam

Kullaya, C.; Deputy Director, GTZ Office Tanzania, Dar es Salaam

Kuzilwa, Joseph, A.; Director of Studies, Institute of Development Management (IDM), Mzumbe

Lomøy, Jon; Director, NORAD, Oslo

Manyama, S. R.; Head of Department of Training and Research, Local Government Service Commission, Dar es Salaam

Mmbaga, William, D. S.; Director of Studies, National Institute of Bankers, Dar es Salaam

Msambichaka, L. A.; Professor, Economic Research Bureau, University of dar es Salaam

Nissen, Dag; Embassy Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam

Norvik, Lars. H.; Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Development Cooperation Division, Dar es Salaam

Nyoni, Cashmir; Director of Personnel, Bank of Tanzania

Palmberg, Johanna; Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden, Development Cooperation Office, Dar es Salaam

Semboja, Joseph; Professor, Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam

Shio, Divina; Lecturer, Institute of Develoment Management (IDM), Mzumbe

Storøy, Carl Ivar, First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Dar es Salaam

Therkildsen, Ole, Senior Researcher, Center for Development Research, Copenhagen

Volan, Sissel, Head of Division, NORAD, Oslo

Table A: RUDEP and KIDEP, Accounts 1981/82 - 1992/93

TAS million (from programme bugets and accounts)

RUDEP (TAN 0060)

Programme Area	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	Total
Management and Operations	1.4	4.9	21.5	60.7	104.6	156.3	139.3	128.9	617.6
Social Services (Health, water & education)	3.0	10.0	43.9	124.1	192.0	302.7	313.1	316.7	1305.3
Natural Resources (Agric., Forestry)	0.4	1.4	6.3	17.8	43.2	46.3	55.1	86.4	256.9
Infrastructure (Roads, Houses, Vehicles)	2.9	9.9	43.4	122.9	81.6	172.7	148.8	146.8	729.0
Area Development (Comm. dev.)	0.4	1.4	6.3	17.7	26.2	83.7	101.9	99.7	337.3
Private Sector Support	0.1	0.3	1.1	3.2	1.4	0.3	1.4	12.2	19.9
Non-specified	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-total (C & D-funds)	8.3	27.8	122.5	346.3	449.0	762.0	759.6	790.7	3266.2
Expatriate staff	0.9	4.1	34.9	116.9	208.2	227.4	232.4	310.5	1135.3
Norwegian Government 1)	0.3	1.0	4.4	12.5	16.2	27.4	27.3	28.5	117.6
Sub-total project external overheads	1.2	5.1	39.3	129.4	224.3	254.9	259.7	339.0	1252.8
Total Norwegian Government	9.4	32.9	161.8	475.7	673.3	1016.9	1019.2	1129.7	4519.0

KIDEP (TAN 0054)

Programme Area	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	Total
Management and Operations					5.5	13.7	45.2	75.0	139.4
Social Services (Health, water & education)					4.6	12.7	15.2	189.6	222.1
Natural Resources (Agric., Forestry)					0.7	48.6	15.9	35.8	101.0
Infrastructure (Houses, Vehicles)					3.1	10.1	74.8	118.4	206.4
Area Development (Comm. dev.)					0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Private Sector Support					0.0	0.0	23.7	0.0	23.7
Non-specified					0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sub-total (C & D-funds)					13.9	85.1	174.8	418.8	692.6
Expatriate staff					11.4	36.7	90.7	171.4	310.2
Norwegian Government 1)					0.5	3.1	6.3	15.1	24.9
Sub-total project external overheads					11.9	39.8	97.0	186.4	335.1
Total Norwegian Government					25.8	124.9	271.8	605.2	1027.7

Table 1: RUDEP and KIDEP, Accounts 1981/82 - 1992/93 and Budgets 1993/94 - 1995/96

TAS million (from programme bugets and accounts)

RUDEP (TAN 0060)

Programme Area	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1981/82-1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96
	Accounts								Accounts	Budget		
Management and Operations	1.4	4.9	21.5	60.7	104.6	156.3	139.3	128.9	617.6	136.0		
Social Services (Health, water & education)	3.0	10.0	43.9	124.1	192.0	302.7	313.1	316.7	1305.3	280.5		
Natural Resources (Agric., Forestry)	0.4	1.4	6.3	17.8	43.2	46.3	55.1	86.4	256.9	93.5		
Infrastructure (Roads, Houses, Vehicles)	2.9	9.9	43.4	122.9	81.6	172.7	148.8	146.8	729.0	187.0		
Area Development (Comm. dev.)	0.4	1.4	6.3	17.7	26.2	83.7	101.9	99.7	337.3	136.0		
Private Sector Support	0.1	0.3	1.1	3.2	1.4	0.3	1.4	12.2	19.9	17.0		
Non-specified	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			
Sub-total (C & D-funds)	8.3	27.8	122.5	346.3	449.0	762.0	759.6	790.7	3266.2	850.0	0.0	0.0
Expatriate staff	0.9	4.1	34.9	116.9	208.2	227.4	232.4	322.3	1147.0			
Norwegian Government 1)	0.3	1.0	4.4	12.5	16.2	27.4	27.3	28.5	117.6	30.6	0.0	0.0
Sub-total project external overheads	1.2	5.1	39.3	129.4	224.3	254.9	259.7	350.7	1264.6	30.6	0.0	0.0
Total Norwegian Government	9.4	32.9	161.8	475.7	673.3	1016.9	1019.2	1141.4	4530.7	880.6	0.0	0.0
Tanzania Government allocations, Rukwa												
Central Government, Tanzania (L-funds)	141.7	177.0	245.1	386.3	378.1	512.2	377.2	837.0	3054.6			
of which donor funds	41.8	43.1	90.2	180.8	95.1	430.2	284.6	612.0	1777.8			
Local Government, Tanzania	49.0	0.0	0.0	85.0	0.0	77.0	0.0	0.0	211.0			
Total Tanzania Government (incl. donor funds	190.7	177.0	245.1	471.3	378.1	589.2	377.2	837.0	3265.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTALS (TAS million - Fixed 1992/93 prices) 2)												
Programme (C & D-funds)	163.4	241.3	599.0	1086.2	976.0	1240.1	923.3	790.7	6019.9			
Norwegian project external overheads	26.1	51.4	212.6	460.8	533.6	453.7	351.2	350.7	2440.0			
Total Norwegian Government	189.5	292.7	811.5	1547.0	1509.7	1693.7	1274.5	1141.4	8459.9			
Tanzanian Government excluding donor fun	690.2	473.0	402.0	612.1	518.0	228.8	107.0	225.0	3256.1			
Grand total	879.7	765.7	1213.5	2159.1	2027.7	1922.5	1381.5	1366.4	11716.0			
TOTALS (NOK million, current prices) 2)												
Programme (C & D-funds)	2.6	4.1	9.9	19.2	17.5	23.4	18.7	15.0	110.3	12.5	0.0	0.0
Norwegian Government	3.0	4.8	13.1	26.3	26.2	31.3	25.1	21.6	151.3	13.0	0.0	0.0
Tanzanian Government	60.8	25.8	19.9	26.1	14.7	18.1	9.3	15.9	190.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Grand total	63.8	30.6	33.0	52.4	40.9	49.4	34.3	37.5	341.8	13.0	0.0	0.0

KIDEP (TAN 0054)

Programme Area	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1981/82-1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1995/96
	Accounts								Accounts	Budget		
Management and Operations					5.5	13.7	45.2	75.0	139.4	193.8		
Social Services (Health, water & education)					4.6	12.7	15.2	189.6	222.1	148.9		
Natural Resources (Agric., Forestry)					0.7	48.6	15.9	35.8	101.0	42.8		
Infrastructure (Houses, Vehicles)					3.1	10.1	74.8	118.4	206.4	42.6		
Area Development (Comm. dev.)					0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0		
Private Sector Support					0.0	0.0	23.7	0.0	23.7	73.3		
Non-specified					0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			
Sub-total (C & D-funds)					13.9	85.1	174.8	418.8	692.6	503.4	0.0	0.0
Expatriate staff					11.4	36.7	90.7	177.8	316.6			
Norwegian Government 1)					0.5	3.1	6.3	15.1	24.9	18.1	0.0	0.0
Sub-total project external overheads					11.9	39.8	97.0	192.9	341.6	18.1	0.0	0.0
Total Norwegian Government					25.8	124.9	271.8	611.7	1034.2	521.5	0.0	0.0
Tanzania Government allocations, Kigoma												
Central Government, Tanzania (L-funds)					349.3	852.8	121.6	680.8	2004.6			
of which donor funds					38.9	78.7	52.8	494.8	665.2			
Local Government, Tanzania					0.0	111.0	0.0	0.0	111.0			
Total Tanzania Government (incl. donor funds)					349.3	963.8	121.6	680.8	2115.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTALS (TAS million - Fixed 1992/93 prices) 2)												
Programme (C & D-funds)					30.9	142.9	217.3	418.8	809.9			
Norwegian project external overheads					28.3	70.8	131.1	192.9	423.2			
Total Norwegian Government					59.2	213.7	348.4	611.7	1233.0			
Tanzanian Government excluding donor funds					568.1	1273.7	79.5	186.0	2107.3			
Grand total					627.3	1487.4	428.0	797.7	3340.4			
TOTALS (NOK million, current prices) 2)												
Programme (C & D-funds)					0.5	2.6	4.3	7.9	15.4			
Norwegian Government					1.0	3.8	6.7	11.6	23.1			
Tanzanian Government					13.6	29.6	3.0	12.9	59.1			
Grand total					14.6	33.5	9.7	24.5	82.2			

Sources:

1) Norwegian Embassy DSM and NORAD Head office, 3.6% of total programme cost

2) Deflators & exchange rates, see bottom Table 2

Table 2: RUDEP, KIDEP and Water in Rukwa and Kigoma (TAN 055), Accounts 1981/82 - 1992/93 and Budgets 1993/94 - 1995/96

NOK million, NORAD accounts (Plan II) 1)

RUKWA	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1981/82-1992/93		1993/9	1994/95	1995/96
	Accounts												Accounts		Budget		
Totals																	
RUDEP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	2.8	4.6	12.8	25.9	26.1	32.1	32.0	25.9	164.3				
Water - TAN 055	15.7	31.4	31.4	31.4	31.1	25.4	14.9	4.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	186.3				
Grand total	15.7	31.4	31.4	31.5	33.9	30.0	27.7	30.8	26.1	32.1	32.0	25.9	350.5				
Grand total fixed 1992/93 prices 2)	24.1	45.9	44.4	43.2	45.3	39.1	35.0	37.6	32.5	35.3	33.3	25.9	441.5				
Totals per calendar year	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1981-93	1993	1994	1995
RUDEP					0.2	5.4	3.8	21.8	30.1	26.1	38.2	25.8	17.3	168.5	26.0	26.0	19.0
Water - TAN 055	0.0	31.4	31.4	31.4	31.4	30.7	20.1	9.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	186.3			
Grand total	0.0	31.4	31.4	31.4	31.6	36.1	23.9	31.5	30.1	26.1	38.2	25.8	17.3	354.8	26.0	26.0	19.0
Grand total TAS (mn)	0.0	41.7	47.8	58.9	64.4	159.6	227.9	479.5	624.8	812.8	1292.9	1232.1	987.1	6029.4	1764.3	1764.3	1289.3

KIGOMA	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1981/82-1992/93		1993/9	1994/95	1995/96
	Accounts												Accounts	Budget	Budget		
Totals																	
KIDEP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.3	4.9	7.8	10.5	25.9				
Water - TAN 055	6.5	13.1	13.1	13.1	13.6	14.0	12.1	12.0	10.7	8.2	6.0	1.6	124.0				
Grand total	6.5	13.1	13.1	13.1	13.6	14.0	12.1	12.5	13.0	13.1	13.8	12.1	149.9				
Grand total fixed 1992/93 prices 2)	10.0	19.1	18.5	17.9	18.2	18.3	15.2	15.2	15.1	14.4	14.4	12.1	188.3				
Totals per calendar year	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1981-93	1993	1994	1995
KIDEP									0.8	3.7	6.1	9.5	8.5	28.6	11.5	21.6	
Water - TAN 055	0.0	13.1	13.1	13.1	13.1	14.1	13.9	10.2	13.9	7.6	8.8	3.2	0.0	124.0			
Grand total	0.0	13.1	13.1	13.1	13.1	14.1	13.9	10.2	14.7	11.4	14.8	12.7	8.5	152.6	11.5	21.6	0.0
Grand total TAS (mn)	0.0	17.4	19.9	24.5	26.6	62.4	132.7	155.4	305.4	354.2	501.8	607.9	483.1	2691.3	780.4	1465.7	0.0

Wate - TAN 055, 1992/93 prices	34.1	65.1	62.8	60.9	59.7	51.4	34.1	20.6	12.5	9.0	6.2	1.6	418.1
RUDEP and KIDEP, 1992/93 prices					3.6	5.5	15.4	29.3	29.7	36.1	30.7	33.2	183.6
Total	34.1	65.1	62.8	60.9	63.3	56.9	49.4	49.9	42.2	45.1	37.0	34.8	601.7

Deflators and exchange rates:

Exchange rates:	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93				
TAS/USD	9.2	10.2	13.2	16.4	25.1	48.5	81.8	121.4	169.3	207.2	258.1	351.5		475.0	475.0	475.0
NOK/USD	7.0	7.2	7.7	8.4	8.0	7.1	6.6	6.7	6.8	6.4	6.3	6.7		7.0	7.0	7.0
TAS/NOK	1.3	1.4	1.7	2.0	3.1	6.9	12.3	18.1	25.7	32.5	40.7	52.8		67.9	67.9	67.9
TAS deflators, 1992/93=1																
Deflator for D-funds 4)	0.016	0.018	0.023	0.027	0.044	0.100	0.185	0.281	0.420	0.562	0.739	1.000				
Tanzanian GDP deflator for C-funds	0.088	0.107	0.129	0.166	0.216	0.283	0.385	0.475	0.546	0.695	0.865	1.000				

Calendar year data	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
TAS/USD 3)	9.00	9.30	11.10	15.30	17.50	32.70	64.30	99.30	143.40	195.10	219.20	297.00	405.94
NOK/USD	7.00	7.00	7.30	8.16	8.60	7.40	6.74	6.52	6.90	6.26	6.48	6.21	7.11
OECD GDP deflator, 1985=100	0.85	0.91	0.94	0.97	1.00	1.02	1.05	1.09	1.13	1.20	1.26	1.33	1.37
Consumer price index (NCPI), 1977=100		254	323	439	585	775	1007	1322	1663	1991	2435	2972	3626
GDP deflator, 1976=100	188	224	274	330	445	562	761	1038	1177	1373	1870	2168	2500

Sources:

1) Original data by calendar year
2) OECD GDP deflator adjusted to financial year and applied to current price accounts in NOK
3) IMF, International Financial Statistics
4) OECD GDP deflator converted by official exchange rate TAS/NOK and scaled to reference year 1992/93 = 1

RUDEP SUPPORTED PROJECTS IN NKANSI DISTRICT 1984 - 1994/95.

	Budget in 1.000NOK				Budget in 1.000Tsh							
	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87	1987/88	1988/89	1989/90	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95	1994/95 Regional Draft
Water Department	470	185	500	250	3.300	8.900	14.390	19.459	29.508	31.019	34.948	35.400
Agriculture: Fruit growing							2.800	1.400	3.715	4.000	4.000	6.300
Community Development: Support to DCDO							3.000	6.730	7.430	9.000	9.000	8.000
District Dev. Fund									4.000	8.000	10.000	13.000
Rural Transport										4.150	3.000	3.000
Beekeeping Project										3.400	3.000	3.000
Modern Housing											3.000	—
Health Department: VHW's Programme										4.484	3.700	Regional Budget
TBA's Programme										1.302	1.800	
AIDS/HIV Prevention										1.147	1.146	
Natural Resouce Dep. Nkansi District Forestry											4.000	5.000
Planning Office												3.000
TOTAL	470	185	500	250	3.300	8.900	20.190	27.589	44.653	66.502	77.594	76.700

Table 4.6 List of donors other than NORAD in Rukwa

Donor	Activity/project	Target group	Sector	Area
AMREF	Primary Health Care	Peasants/workers	Health	Whole region
British Volunteers Service			Education	
DANIDA	Rehabilitation of Secondary Schools	Students/teachers	Education	Whole region
Don Bosco	Assistance to Laela Secondary School	Students/teachers	Education	Laela
EEC/ASSP	Agricultural Support	Peasants	Agriculture	Whole region
-	Extension Service	Peasants	Agriculture	Whole region
-	Food Security	Peasants	Agriculture	Whole region
-	Cooperative Unions	Cooperatives	Agriculture	Whole region
-	Vehicle and Tractor Repair	Cooperatives		
-	Feeder Roads Maintenance	General		Whole region
-	Construction of Godowns	Cooperatives/ Peasants	Food, Security Agriculture	
FAO	Large Grain Borer	Peasants	Agriculture	Stalike/ Kiiyamatundu
FRG (Federal Republic of Germany)	Construction of Godowns	Cooperatives/ peasants	Food Security	Whole region Agriculture
IFAD	Small Holder Food Crops	Peasants	Food Security	Whole region
ILO	Road Maintenance	General	Road Commun.	Whole region
ILO	Gravity Water Schemes	Village people	Water supply	
Moravian Church	Hospital Construction	Village people	Health	Mumba
The Netherlands/ UNDP	Gravity Water Schemes	Peasants/workers	Water	Kate/Mwazye/ Kitete/Kilesha/ Nkundi/Lula
Sasakawa Global 2000	Maizeproduction Agricultural credits	Peasants	Agriculture	Matai

Donor	Activity/project	Target group	Sector	Area
SIDA	Assistance to Folk Develop. Colleges	Adults	Adult educ.	Whole region
UNDP	Emergency Water Supply	General	Humanitarian	Mpanda
-	Traditional Livestock	Peasants/Pastoralists	Livestock	Whole region
UNHCR	Handicapped Refugees	Refugees	Humanitarian	Katumba/Mpanda
-	Handicapped Refugee Centre	Refugees	Humanitarian	Katumba/Mpanda
-	Strengthening Infrastructure	Refugees	Humanitarian	Katumba/Mishamo/ Ulyankulu
UNHCR/LWF/ DANIDA/ The Netherlands	Rural settlements	Rural population	Humanitarian	Katumba/Mishamo/ Ulyankulu/ Burigi
UNDP/ICARA II	Assistance to Cooperatives	Rural population	Cooperatives	Whole region
-	Mpanda Health Centre	Refugees & Nationals	Health	Mpanda
-	Mpanda District Hospital	Refugees & Nationals	Health	Mpanda
UNFPA	Commun. Analysis	General	Population	Whole region
WFP	Livestock improvement	Peasants	Agriculture	
WHO	Family Planning	Families		

Source: Compiled from the RUDEP Coordination Unit Regional Investment, Rukwa Region, 1991 Profile.

KIDEP
KIGOMA RURAL INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

ANNUAL MEETING 1993 - MATRIX OF ACTIONS

18 October, 1993

Ref. & Page	Action required	Actions taken	Respon sibility
1.1 p.2	KIDEP should involve the beneficiaries in planning, and create awareness among them so that the KIDEP infrastructure can be maintained	Participatory Rapid Appraisal exercises undertaken in 12 villages	Region Districts
4.1 p. 3	Coopers & Lybrand report will be sent to the Region and the central Government for information, comments, and action. NORAD may revert if there are issues requiring further investigation (emanating from the Water Inspection Report)	Region waiting for letter and report from Norad.	Norad Region
4.2 p. 3	The Manpower Training Plan should include due consideration to gender issues, and be translated into actions, based on available resources.	Preparation of Manpower Plan to go to tender	Region
4.3 p.3	The WID Strategy should be translated into actions to ensure constructive follow-up.	RCDO to continue work preparing fuller participation of women in all aspects of development	Region
4.4 p.3	The Procurement Contract should have the approval of Norad before signature.	Contract finalised with the procurement agent, and Norad approval obtained. Contract fully signed August 1993	Norad Region
4.5 p.3	Transfers of Water Technicians should be done in consensus between the region and the districts. Kidep funds may be utilised for transfer allowances	Issue to be further clarified by Regional Local Government Officer	Region Districts
4.6 p. 4	Oil Palm development proposal will be prepared jointly with Norad, UNDP and Govt.	Project formulation mission due in Region by October 1993	UNDP Region
4.7 p.4	KIDEP should take gender issues into account in preparing regulations for credit schemes. Regulations should be submitted to Norad for approval		Region Norad
4.8 p.4	Norad promised to send the final report from the 1991 annual review to the region as soon as possible	Draft report received. Apparently no final report prepared	Norad

5.1 p.4	Annual meeting documentation could improve further in terms of details concerning activities to be undertaken, targets, and indicators of progress		Region
5.2 p. 4	KIDEP and NORAD should work out further improvements on the reporting system within the first quarter of 1993/94. Annual statements of expenditure will in the future be presented to the Annual Meeting	Norad proposing to merge financial and physical reports	Region Norad
5.3 p. 5	The region should liaise with the Treasury so that funds accrued from the sale of project vehicles could be credited to the vehicle pool account		Region Treasury
5.4 p. 6	The total budget should be reduced to 500 mill TAS	Done during Annual Meeting	Region Districts
5.5 p. 6	CRDB should document a satisfactory level of loan recovery under the fisheries component, and a report on the theft case made available to NORAD, before any further funds are advanced to CRDB	Analysis of repayment up to 3rd quarter 1993 to be undertaken in October.	Region
5.6 p. 6	The maize project should submit a detailed report, including the regulations governing the credit.	Report with regulations to be submitted in October.	Region
5.7 p. 6	The meeting noted that the survival rates on the afforestation projects were low, and proposed that measures of correcting the situation be taken.	Staff employed to look after nurseries and plantations	Region
6.1 p.6	The Annual Meeting may be held before March, provided an indicative budget figure is given by Norad well in advance, to facilitate the preparation of realistic budgets.		Norad
6.2 p.7	NORAD will consider whether the 4th Quarter Report may serve the purpose of an Annual Report		Norad
6.3 p.7	NORAD will supply KIDEP with information material on AIDS	Some material received	Norad

EVALUATION REPORTS

4.85	REDD BARNA Development Efforts - Ethiopia and Sri Lanka
5.85	Lake Turkana Fisheries Development Project, Kenya
6.85	Development Centres for Women in Bangladesh
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2.86	Mali - matforsyning og katastrofebistand
3.86	Multi-bilateral Programme under UNESCO
4.86	Mbegani Fisheries Development Centre, Tanzania
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7.88	Soil Science Fellowship Course in Norway
1.89	Parallel Financing and Mixed Credits
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4.89	Fisheries Research Vessel - "Dr. Fridtjof Nansen"
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7.89	Rural Water Supply, Zimbabwe
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1.90	Mini-Hydropower Plants, Lesotho
2.90	Operation and Maintenance in Development Assistance
3.90	Telecommunications in SADCC Countries
4.90	Energy support in SADCC Countries
5.90	International Research and Training Institue for Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)
6.90	Socio-cultural Conditions in Development Assistance
7.90	Non-Project Financial Assistance to Mozambique
1.91	Hjelp til selvhjelp og levedyktig utvikling
2.91	Diploma Courses at the Norwegian Institute of Technology
3.91	The Women's Grant in Bilateral Assistance
4.91	Hambantota Integrated Rural Development Programme, Sri Lanka
5.91	The Special Grant for Environment and Development
1.92	NGOs as partners in health care, Zambia
2.92	The Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia Programme
3.92	De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand, Fase1
1.93	Internal learning from evaluation and reviews
2.93	Macroeconomic impacts of import support to Tanzania
3.93	Garantiordning for investeringer i og eksport til utviklingsland
4.93	Capacity-Building in Development Cooperation Towards integration and recipient responsibility
1.94	Evaluation of World Food Programme
2.94	Evaluation of the Norwegian Junior Expert Programme with UN Organisations
1.95	Technical Cooperation in Transition
2.95	Evaluering av FN-sambandet i Norge
4.95	Rural Development and Local Government in Tanzania

Country Studies and Norwegian Aid Reviews

(Most studies are available in English and Norwegian)

1985 Pakistan	1986 Bangladesh	1986 Zambia	1987 India	1987 Sri Lanka
1987 Kenya	1988 Tanzania	1988 Botswana	1989 Zimbabwe	1990 Mozambique

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