



Review of three Programmes
for Natural Resource Management
and Disaster Risk Reduction in
Departement du Sud, Haiti

Final report



Photo: Ken Opprann

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REVIEW OF THREE PROGRAMMES FOR NATURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND DISASTER RISK
REDUCTION IN *DEPARTEMENT DU SUD*, HAITI



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ASEC	Assemblées des Sections Communales (Assemblies of Communal Sections)
CASEC	Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales (Administrative Councils of Communal Sections)
CATIE	The Tropical Agricultural and Research and Higher Education Center
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
COSDERSLS	Coordination des Organisation pour le Développement Rural de St Louis du Sud
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSI	Côte Sud Initiative
DDA	Departmental Direction of Agriculture
DDS	Departmental Direction of the South
EI	Earth Institute – Columbia University
ES	Earth Spark
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIPPN	Groupe d'Initiatives pour un Pot-a-Piment Nouveau
GOH	Government of Haiti
GON	Government of Norway
HRF	Haiti Reconstruction Fund
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IHRC	Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
MARNDR	Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MLFM	Movement to Combat Hunger in the World
MOPROPS	Mouvement Progressiste Port-Salutain
MPCE	Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation
MTPTC	Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communication
MVP	Millennium Village Project
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
ORE	Organisation for the Rehabilitation of the Environment
ORPES	Organisation pour la Protection et l'Environnement du Sud
PADI	Pêche Artisanale et Développement Intégré
PARDH	National Recovery and Development Action Plan
PDNA	Post Disaster Needs Assessment
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents a review of three programmes that were set up to address natural resource management and disaster risk reduction in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The Government of Norway funds the programmes through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The programmes are:

- *Haiti South West Sustainable Development Programme (SWSD)*, executed by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS);
- *Vulnerability reduction in watersheds/agriculture*, executed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); and
- *Natural Disaster Mitigation in the Southern Department*, executed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR).

Since the approval of the three programmes in October 2010, significant problems have been encountered within the individual programmes and in the coordination between them.

This is not a technical evaluation, which would have required more time and different competencies, but a forward-looking review. It recommends improvements and adjustments to the three programmes and the coordination between them with a view to strengthen local ownership. It builds on a desk study and a two-week field visit, and extensive comments on a first draft from all the reviewed parties.

The SWSD implemented by UNEP and UNOPS is an integrated regional development plan that targets a wide range of areas including agroforestry, catchment management, marine development, tourism, social services and energy. A central component of it, the Côte Sud Initiative (CSI), was launched in January 2011 with a publicised ambition of a USD 200m and 20-year timeframe. It was meant to constitute the core of Norwegian support to the Southern Department.

The start up of the programme was delayed due to various hiring and procurement issues, and major components of the programme only received funding by Sept/Oct 2011. The programme had thus been running for less than a year at the time of the review. The programme has been granted no-cost extension till Oct 2012 and is on schedule to deliver according to plans.

The CSI is divided into a number of thematic areas and with separate components implemented by its partners:

- **UNEP and UNOPS stood for the largest part of the CSI budget**, with a combined budget of almost USD 4.2m.
- **Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was contracted to do a series of short-term projects in the areas of health, education, agriculture, erosion control and reforestation** that were ultimately to be part of a five year strategy. CRS was selected for its ability to produce “quick wins”. At the time of the review, the projects seemed short-term and of uncertain sustainability.
- **The Earth Institute (EI) of Colombia University was to play a key part in the CSI by providing a comprehensive baseline and extensive analytical services.** EI has significant technical and research capacities and has produced a number of analytical reports. The institute has assisted the other subcontractors with analysis and support for monitoring systems. The delay of the EI’s baseline

study, and the lack of more concerted efforts to integrate the EI research in CSI's other activities, has limited the usefulness of the EI.

- **The Organisation for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE) is a Haitian NGO that was contracted to work with forestry and agricultural value chains.** The review team noted the scientific approach of ORE. The visited projects compared favourably with similar projects supported by other organisations.
- **EarthSpark (ES) is a US-based NGO contracted to work on the CSI energy programme.** ES has set up a retail supply chain for renewable/efficient energy products and developed technology for a pre-paid mini-grid. The organisation is small and innovative and has proved itself to be adept at adjusting its approach to what works on the ground.
- **The Nature Conservancy (TNC) is a US-based NGO contracted to provide technical leadership of CSI's marine and coastal management programme.** TNC has worked with a national NGO and technical staff of the MARNDR to strengthen capacities and to develop a regional strategy for marine and coastal management. The status of the strategy is uncertain and it appears to have been developed by UNEP with limited input from government, TNC and other partners.

The review team makes a number of higher-level observations on the design and implementation of the CSI:

- **The mechanisms set in place for ensuring national ownership have not been fully effective.** The role played by the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE) and other Departmental heads in the Management Committee appears not to have worked well.
- **The weak integration in national and local processes has also had negative impact on the capacity building provided by the programme.** The absence of a needs assessment and contextual analysis at the beginning of the programme has not facilitated designing appropriate capacity building initiatives.
- **Monitoring, reporting and communication have been weak.** Ambitious M&E systems designed by EI are not yet in place and reporting has been weak and output based. The dissatisfaction and distrust of the programme expressed by a number of stakeholders reflects poor communication by the programme on its objectives and how decisions are made.

The planning of CSI has continued to be in a flux, largely due to the uncertain funding situation. The latest proposal is for CSI to wind down its headquarter in the next year, to integrate more closely with government partners, and to focus its activities on the energy, marine development and tourism programmes.

The second programme covered by this review is **Reducing the Vulnerability of the Population in the Southern Department**, implemented by UNDP and FAO. The USD 8m project aims to contribute to disaster risk reduction through the development of watershed basins, mitigation activities, job creation and agricultural development in the South. The project has set up a solid structure that has delivered the following outputs against its key objectives:

- A **methodology guide** for watershed management in cooperation with a regional international organisation based in Costa Rica. The Ministry of Environment has decided to adopt the Guide throughout Haiti;
- A **co-management plan** for the hydrographic unit of Aquin and St. Louis du Sud by UNDP and the Ministry of Environment, which will be expanded to the whole department in the next phase and

- **16 sub-projects** in the fields of reforestation, agroforestry, riverbank protection and cleaning, soil conservation and ravine correction, reduction of flooding risks, environmental education and rehabilitation of irrigation systems.

Overall, the following was observed regarding the UNDP programme:

- **The programme has in place a strong mechanism to assure national ownership.** The programme's Steering Committee is involved in setting priorities and selection of projects. The record of local level ownership is more mixed.
- **UNDP has fairly strong provisions for capacity building.** The Ministry of Environment has received support to set up a regional hub. UNDP has also assisted CBOs in drafting proposals. Little support has been provided for local government offices.
- **Systems in place for monitoring and evaluating projects supported are relatively weak.** There is also limited information on the projects and project monitoring publicly available.
- **Gender is integrated in a structured manner in projects supported by UNDP** with guidelines in place to ensure a gender balance in project beneficiaries.

Several respondents described the UNDP programme as a "lean, mean implementing machine." The structure of the programme focuses human and financial resources on the delivery of activities. The review team assesses that UNDP is likely to achieve its objective of contributing to disaster risk reduction through the development and management of watershed basins, mitigation activities, employment generation and agricultural development in the Southern Department.

The third programme covered by the review is the program for **Natural Disaster Mitigation in the Southern Department**. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) are responsible for the program to which Norway committed USD 14m, topping up the existing budget of USD 20m. The project is implemented by MARNDR, but implementation is yet to start in earnest and none of the Norwegian funding has been disbursed to date. Reasons for the delays were variously given as cumbersome IADB procedures, to weak capacities at the Ministry, which has resisted hiring external staff to improve capacities. A recent decision determined to redirect the Norwegian funding to a co-financed IADB project to protect Parc Macaya and to a renewable energy program.

The coordination between the two operational programmes (UNEP and UNDP) has been relatively weak. The plan was for coordination to be addressed through the CSI Management Committee meetings, which turned out to be a venue poorly suited for interagency coordination. Consequently, most coordination efforts have been informal, with limited technical interaction.

The summary recommendations of the review are the following:

1. **The overarching recommendation is for Norway to continue funding programmes in the Southern Department.** The first phase of programming has put in place a valuable base for continued programming. The UNDP project should be considered the core initiative, with UNEP providing support in a limited number of focus areas, such as the energy programme. The review team supports the decision to redirect the funding of the IADB programme funding to the on-going, co-financed project to protect Parc Macaya and a renewable energy programme.
2. **Norway should commit funding for a minimum of three years.** Predictability of funding is necessary to enable long-term planning. The transaction cost of the

present phased funding approach has been high, and there is now a need to shift attention fully to programming.

3. **Decisions on the distribution of funding should be based on an informed assessment of the capacity of the implementing partners to use the funds efficiently.** Fragmentation of activities should as far as possible be avoided, and the division of responsibilities between partners should be as clear as possible.

The following recommendations address the need for programming to be better grounded in the local context:

4. **Prepare easy to understand summaries of project documents and progress reports that are available in French and Creole,** and make sure that the copies are available down to the CASEC level in all communes.
5. **Ensure and employ clear procedures for selecting CBO partners in all relevant projects.** Calls for proposals and decisions should be made public and all applicants should receive answers with explanations of why they were not selected if unsuccessful.
6. **Conduct a thorough analysis of the various levels of the local administration, from the Department, to Communes and Sections Communales.** The analysis should pay attention to the political economy of decision making, capturing both formal and de facto decision-making processes.
7. **Work with officials at Department, Commune and Section Commune levels to agree on a minimum standard of consultation and information sharing.** These standards should inform the support for the *Tables de Concertation Communales* that both UNEP and UNDP have planned for the second phase.
8. **As far as possible, work through official structures and avoid setting up parallel structures.** For example, the most recent proposal from UNEP to wind down the CSI and shift its operations to government-owned localities is a sound one.
9. **Programmes should be better anchored in local communities and should include a feedback loop that involves beneficiaries and civil society.** Needs assessments must include consultations with CBOs. Civil society can also be involved, for instance, in M&E activities.
10. **Gender considerations and vulnerable groups should be included in the elaboration of a concrete theory of change.** Vulnerable groups, including the handicapped and the most destitute, should be considered in programmatic design.

In order to strengthen efficiency and learning:

11. **The projects should seek to significantly strengthen their M&E systems.** All supported projects, such as tree planting, should be monitored also after the completion of projects, and information should be gathered on the sustainability of interventions.
12. **In order to enhance learning, it is necessary to provide incentives for reporting failures.** Current reporting structures bias reporting towards successes, which in turn significantly weakens the scope for learning.
13. **Research should be designed to inform projects and not simply generate information.** Findings should be shared with all partners in a timely manner to inform their interventions. All research written up in English should as a

minimum be translated to French, and popularised versions should be produced and shared in Creole.

14. **Coordination should be used not simply to avoid geographical and project overlap, but as a way to facilitate cross-learning.** This means sharing research findings, good practices and techniques between organisations and engaging in joint training/capacity building. It involves using the information to inform programming and to change directions when needed.

Final recommendations on financing modalities:

15. **If financing of ORE is continued, efforts should be made to ensure that it is long term and predictable.** If funding of ORE is budget through the UNDP programme, care should be taken to ensure that UNDP procedures allow for long-term commitments of the allocated budget.
16. **All implementing partners should actively seek to diversify their sources of funding.**

1. SECTION ONE: INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND

The Final Report is delivered to Norad under ILPIs contract to “Review three programmes for natural resource management and disaster risk reduction in *Department du Sud*, Haiti.” Section 1 provides a background and overview of the programmes and a description of the assignment and the methodology. Section 2 assesses the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of the programmes; Section 3 addresses coordination and efficiency; and Section 4 contains conclusions and recommendations.

The assignment is to review three programmes that were set up to address natural resource management and disaster risk reduction in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The programmes are funded by Norway through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF).¹ Since the approval of the three programmes in October 2010, significant problems have been encountered within the individual programmes and in the coordination between them.

The purpose of the review is to investigate the reasons for problems encountered and to propose arrangements to rectify them. It is a forward-looking review, aiming to provide analysis and recommendations regarding programme implementation and coordination. The review is organised according to the following key themes:

- **Relevance, effectiveness and sustainability:** Assessment of progress; likelihood of achieving objectives; the solidity of local and national ownership; adequacy of capacity development; and quality of management, monitoring and reporting.
- **Coordination and efficiency:** Integration of the programmes in the wider development portfolio of the Southern Department; linkages between the three programmes; quality of government leadership and UN coordination and efficiency in the use of financial and human resources.

It must be noted that the observations, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report are not intended as absolute statements regarding the agencies and their capacities. The report does not constitute an evaluation of the programmes, which would have required a more structured assessment of the activities, more time and also different technical competencies. Rather, it is a forward-looking review that recommends improvements and adjustments to the three programmes and the coordination between them with a view to strengthen local ownership. The aim is to inform decisions of the executing agencies, the Government of Haiti (GoH), other implementing partners (international, national and local) and donors for a potential next phase of support.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the assignment are provided in Annex 1. The review team was composed of a political scientist with extensive experience in governance, political economy analysis and evaluations of complex programmes (team leader), a policy analyst with experience working in Haiti, and two senior Haitian consultants.

¹ The HRF has a Steering Committee that reviews programmes submitted for funding. It includes government representatives, key donors, representatives from the UN, World Bank, IADB, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and civil society and is chaired by the Ministry of Finance.

I. METHODOLOGY

The review covered the following activities:

- A literature review of academic articles, background documentation and program documentation (Annex 11);
- A preparatory field visit organised by a member of the review team on May 21 to 23, 2012 to the Southern Department. The goal was to identify key issues to be considered by the review and a list of civil society stakeholders² to be consulted;
- Fieldwork in the Southern Department between May 28 and June 6, 2012, involving extensive stakeholder consultations with executing agencies, national, departmental and local authorities, businesses, international and national Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs); site visits organised by partner agencies to Fierville, Rendel, Les Anglais, Couteaux, Port-a-Piment, Camp Perrin, Les Cayes, Aquin, and St. Louis du Sud; and beneficiary focus groups. The itinerary and list of people met are presented in Annex 2.
- Coordination roundtables were held with UNEP, UNOPS and UNDP in Les Cayes on June 6 and with UNEP and UNDP in Port au Prince on June 7. The IADB was invited but did not attend.
- A draft report was submitted to the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the executing agencies as per the ToR one week after the fieldwork for comments and corrections. Following the request of UNEP, partner agencies were given the opportunity to respond to the draft report prior to finalisation.

II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF PROGRAMMES

The January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti devastated the already fragile country, killing an estimated 220,000 people and wounding 300,000. The disaster struck close to Port-au-Prince and deeply affected the West, Southeast and Nippes departments and indirectly affected Grand-Anse. The March 2010 Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) set damages and losses at USD 7.8b and reconstruction needs at almost USD 11.5b. The disaster did tremendous damage to infrastructure and considerably weakened the capacity of the administration.³

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was established after the earthquake to provide strategic direction for reconstruction and ensure that the reconstruction projects are consistent with Government priorities. The HRF, administered by the World Bank, was set up as a multi-donor trust fund to provide grant funding for projects and programs in support of the National Recovery and Development Action Plan (2010-11).⁴

The Government of Norway contributed NOK 205m for humanitarian aid following the earthquake and pledged to contribute NOK 600m (approx. USD 100m) over four years to the reconstruction work in Haiti. The support was to be based on the GoH Action Plan.⁵

² List of names available upon request.

³ World Bank Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Haiti for CY 2012.

⁴ Haiti Reconstruction Fund – Rebuilding Together – Six Month Progress Report, 17 June - 16 December 2010.

⁵ The plan centres on improving infrastructure, decentralising economic activity, reducing vulnerability, and developing growth industries, such as agriculture, manufacturing and tourism. National Recovery and Development Action Plan (PARDH), p. 9.

Areas of focus were disaster preparedness and sustainable rural development, including agriculture, reforestation, watershed management and alternative energy. Priority would be given to providing decent jobs and sustainable livelihoods to the poor, especially women.⁶ The support from Norway would emphasise capacity development, national and local ownership, long-term sustainability and results orientation. Norway underlined the need for cooperation, coordination, and the development of joint UN programmes.⁷ The programs financed by Norway through the HRF are:

- **The Haiti South West Sustainable Development Programme**, executed by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) with a budget of USD 8m. The programme objectives are reduction of poverty and disaster vulnerability and the restoration and sustainable management of natural resources within a defined geographic area and in an integrated manner.
- **Vulnerability reduction in watersheds/agriculture**, executed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), with a budget of USD 8m. The programme seeks to contribute to disaster risk reduction through the development and management of watershed basins, mitigation activities, employment generation and agricultural development in the Southern Department.
- **Natural Disaster Mitigation in the Southern Department**, executed by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) with a USD 14m budget. The objective is to reduce long-term vulnerability to natural disasters of inhabitants in the watersheds of Grand Riviere du Nord, Ravine du Sud and Cavaillon in the southern department.

The decision of the Government of Norway to concentrate a considerable part of the long-term development assistance in the Southern Department of Haiti was based on consultations in April-June 2010 with national and local authorities. The Southern Department is one of the six development centres in the GoH Action Plan, and Norway emphasized the need for visible results on the ground and presence in departments and local communities outside the capital.⁸ Norwegian delegations visiting the Dominican Republic and Haiti in May and June 2010 met with UNDP, UNEP, FAO, relevant ministries⁹ and local authorities to explore opportunities for cooperation. Based on these discussions, it was agreed that UNEP and UNDP would present two joint concept notes for a programme in the south of Haiti.¹⁰

UNEP presented a first draft for circulation in June 2010. The planning process moved quickly from this, and at one stage it was decided that instead of a One UN approach, UNEP and UNDP would have separate but complementary projects. This was by and large due to the different, although not apparently conflicting, approaches of UNEP and UNDP. Prior to approval by the HRF, the UN Resident Coordinator reviewed the proposals according to criteria that included reinforcement of national capacity, producing “quick wins”, efficiency, supporting existing capacity and involving national

⁶ Other focus areas were to be the protection of women and children, political dialogue and confidence-building. See Norway’s statement at the International Donors’ Conference Towards a New Future for Haiti, 3 March 2010.

⁷ Norad. “Pre-appraisal of inception notes from UNEP/UNDP and project proposal from IADB,” 30 August, 2010.

⁸ Meeting with the Norwegian MFA and Norad, 20 March 2012.

⁹ Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, the Ministry of Public Works, Transport, Communications and Energy, and the Ministry of Environment.

¹⁰ FAO was added later following mainly bilateral consultations between UNDP and FAO.

partners in consultations.¹¹ A separate meeting was held with the IADB regarding their program proposal for the southeastern region.¹²

The Government of Norway has been in discussions with the executing agencies since November/December 2011 regarding adjustments and continued support to the programmes. Decisions regarding future funding are pending. These discussions continue to date, and this review is meant to inform the decisions that will be made on the next phase of programming.

2. SECTION TWO: RELEVANCE, EFFECTIVENESS AND SUSTAINABILITY

The following section addresses the progress in the programmes, local and national ownership, adequacy of capacity development, quality of management, monitoring and reporting, and the likelihood of achieving objectives in each of the three programmes. Each of the programmes are considered in turn, starting with the UNEP project and followed by the UNDP project. The IADB project, which is dealt with last, is only dealt with briefly, as implementation never fully commenced and the funding has recently been diverted to other programmes.

I. THE HAITI SOUTH WEST SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNEP/UNOPS)

The Haiti South West Sustainable Development (SWSD) programme is implemented by UNEP, in partnership with UNOPS and the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE). In addition to working in the field of post-earthquake recovery, a core objective of the SWSD programme has been mobilising the Côte Sud Initiative (CSI). The CSI is an integrated regional development plan that targets agriculture, forestry, catchment management, marine and fisheries development, water, sanitation and health, food security, education, disaster risk reduction, business development, electricity and tourism. Although initially only a 21-month programme with a budget of USD 8m, the CSI was launched with a 20-year vision and a projected budget of USD 200m.

The programme was meant to constitute the core of Norwegian support to the Southern Department. The region was identified as a priority during Norway's first reconnaissance missions to Haiti after the earthquake. Norway expressed a preference for a long-term programmatic approach and for channelling the support through a joint UN programme. At the time, UNEP already had plans for an integrated development intervention and was in contact with the Earth Institute (EI) of Columbia University which was providing technical support and developing plans for a development model based on the Millennium Development Goals in the design of a Millennium Village in Haiti, with financial support from a US family foundation.

The HRF approved the UNEP project with a budget of USD 8m at the end of October 2010. In January 2011, the Norwegian Minister for Development and Environment attended a high profile launch of the programmes supported by Norway in Camp Perrin which included a presentation of the CSI and the Port-a-Piment Millennium Village

¹¹ Principes Généraux et Critères de Sélection pour la révision de notes conceptuelles de l'UNCT.

¹² Norad. "Pre-appraisal of inception notes from UNEP/UNDP and project proposal from IADB," 30 August, 2010.

Project.¹³ The funding was disbursed in March 2011 to UNEP and UNOPS, and in September/October 2011 to Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and EI.

The project had four main outputs planned for its first phase:

1. Mobilization of the CSI, including logistics, communication and coordination;
2. A detailed baseline assessment;
3. A 5 –year plan and a plan for 2012;
4. A wide range of technical development and field activities, sometimes referred to as “quick wins”

An overview of the budget of the project by components is provided in Annex 5.

The mobilisation of CSI has been completed. An office has been rented and equipped and a logo for CSI has been developed to help establish an independent identity. Staff, cars and a boat (to be used for marine research purposes) have been deployed.

The baseline study was meant to inform the five-year plan and provide a long-term monitoring and planning framework. The start-up was delayed and at the time of writing this report, the data collected is being analysed by the EI, the responsible partner. The report is expected in July 2012.

The five-year plan has been presented as a working draft with a two-year proposal to Norway, as part of a larger five-year programme.¹⁴ This is not the type of detailed workplan that was originally expected as the funding scenario has changed significantly.¹⁵

The technical developments and field activities have been ongoing since the beginning of the project. There were a number of delays, mainly due to contracting and hiring issues. The project has had a no-cost extension from the originally planned completion of the first phase in June to October 2012.

UNEP invested heavily initially to find and assess several partner organisations to form a consortium and launch the CSI. Assessment criteria included niche/added value, capacity to deliver and the extent of co-financing secured. The partners were then given delegated authority to collectively develop scopes of work. The review team notes that this approach clearly differs from the more typical UN agency-subcontractor model.

It should also be noted that the CSI, although criticised by the donor and members of local communities for emphasising research and planning and having a high level of operational costs, the agencies involved are largely delivering according to what was agreed. UNEP has received significant pressure to deliver more in terms of “quick wins”, but this was only one of four objectives that were agreed upon with the organisation at the outset of the funding agreement. It is also worth noting that Norway was not necessarily against the high level of operational costs at the beginning of the programme provided it would lead to enhanced local capacity.

The review of CSI refers to the joint efforts of UNEP/UNOPS. The activities to date are described below, after a discussion of the management structure of the project.

¹³ A map of the Southern Department is provided in Annex 3.

¹⁴ “UNEP Haiti Mer Sud Programme Document - Working draft,” UNEP, 9 June 2012. See also: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37202&Cr=Haiti>.

¹⁵ Norway has largely adhered to its original funding plan until the end of 2013. CSI was supposed to be part of a much longer term effort, but not necessarily financed by Norway. Norway sought to jumpstart development in the region and not be the sole funding actor. The focus has gradually changed in view of issues on the ground and the high, unsustainable level of operational costs.

i. Management structure

The project has an **oversight committee** consisting of a representative from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the GoH, the MPCE, and UNEP/UNOPS.¹⁶

The strategic decision-making is intended to occur through the **Management Committee**, consisting of the CSI core team and chaired by UNEP and the Departmental Delegate (the most senior official in the Department) or the Departmental Director of the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation. Other senior government members include departmental representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture, Tourism, and Public Works and Environment. Other members are the programme partners Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the Organisation for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE), EarthSpark (ES), Self, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), UNDP and local government officials. Since the second meeting, local Community Based Organisations (CBOs) are also free to participate.

The Management Committee meets on a three-monthly basis. According to its ToR, decisions in the Committee will be made by voting and minutes in French are to be shared with the members. In practice, this does not appear to have happened. Minutes have not been shared with the members, and it appears that there has never been a vote during a meeting or in any other forum. Due to the large number of members in the meetings and long agendas, the meetings mostly became venues for information sharing and discussions.

ii. Thematic Development Programmes and Projects

CSI supports a number of partners to implement a range of integrated and multi-sector field activities. Each of the partner programmes are discussed in turn, in the order of their relative budget allocation. In this review emphasis has been placed on agriculture, energy and marine programmes, as it was not possible to cover all sectors and geographical areas within the available timeframe. The education, health, business development and community support projects in Port-a-Piment are only made reference to and have not been reviewed in any detail.

a. Catholic Relief Services (CRS)

CRS has been in Haiti for more than 50 years, and has a long presence in the Southern Department. The organisation is active in a wide range of areas, particularly health and education. It was therefore a natural choice as a partner for delivering quick results, as well as for providing input to the first year of implementation of the MVP in Port-a-Piment. The organisation was contracted to do a large number of short-term projects in health, education, agriculture, erosion control and reforestation that were ultimately to be part of a longer-term (five-year) strategy. The budget for the CRS component is USD 1,687,700.

The individual projects supported are typically 2-3 months in duration with budgets of around USD 20,000. CRS used a fairly structured way of selecting CBOs with which to cooperate, in the sense that they mapped relevant CBOs for each of the areas of work they identified and selected them according to a defined set of criteria. This was not done in an open and competitive process, however, and it appears to the review team

¹⁶ An organogram of the management structure is presented in Annex 4.

that it was not apparent to CBOs that had not been selected why they were not successful.

The review team visited a number of projects, including mothers' groups, forestry and erosion control sites. It is stressed that the reviewers do not have special expertise in the CRS intervention areas. The field visits focused on agroforestry and erosion control activities, although these comprise only 35% of the allocation whereas CRS is also involved in water, sanitation, disaster risk reduction, education and health efforts under the CSI. It must also be noted that the review took place after only six months of actual partner and CBO engagement. Based on our field visit, comparisons with other interventions in similar areas, like UNDP's riverbank protection (*gabionnage*) and ORE's forestry projects (see sections below), we made the following observations:

- Although intended as scale-up programs, the interventions at present seemed fragmented and small.
- The short-term nature of the partnerships with the local organisations that had been contracted to do the work meant that the sustainability of the interventions might be limited.
- We asked for evidence of a system to monitor the longer-term impact and sustainability of the interventions but did not find that such a system had been established. While we were assured that a system was being put in place for long-term monitoring, the fact that this had not been prepared ex-ante did little to reassure our concerns.
- We did not see any evidence that the CRS interventions were explicitly linked with other partners' interventions to facilitate learning of others from CRS activities.

Our concerns were shared with a wide range of respondents, including the core CSI team. The key motivation for choosing CRS as a partner appears to have been that, firstly, they were already active in the region (mostly through USAID financed programmes), and secondly, because they were well placed to deliver the "quick wins".

In response to the concerns of the review team regarding the lack of an M&E system, CRS responded that the organisation "maintains a rigorous system for M&E in all its projects. CRS also described investing

"...an enormous amount of time and resources in the creation of and implementation of the baseline survey (...). Sector specific M&E indicators, methodologies and tools were supposed to be agreed on by implementing partners in their respective sectors. However, the disjointed start dates and lack of senior coordination prohibited this from happening. A common Indicator Performance Table was never designed nor agreed to by the partners."

The review team finds that the observed lack of integration with other CSI activities and the lack of a system to monitor impact and capture learning across organisations are not weaknesses that are particular to CRS, but reflect broader design and implementation flaws with CSI at large.

b. The Earth Institute (EI) – Columbia University

Unlike CRS, EI is a partner that from the outset was seen to be central to CSI's approach. EI had been present in Haiti since 2005 and UNEP had formed a partnership with the Institute in order to leverage their substantial research capacity and knowledge on integrated development before the launch of CSI. The decision to design a program based on the Millennium Village model was taken under a specific discussion and

agreement with UNEP and the Government of Haiti. The MVP was originally planned for the central plateau but efforts refocused based on the joint agreement with UNEP and funding from Norway. EI conducted desk research and started the Land Degradation Surveillance Framework (LDSF) study in the Port-a-Piment watershed, an area under Parc Macaya, prior to the program launch. From the outset, there was an understanding that the partnership would be based on a mutual financial responsibility with EI putting in USD 3m of its own funding. EI's share of the CSI budget is USD 1,355,000.

CSI provided funding for the research component of the MVP as well as regional baseline assessments across all 10 communes and technical support and design for nine focus areas of the CSI. EI had supplemental funds from several foundations, the largest part of which was from a US foundation, which subsequently withdrew its commitment. EI has completed the agreed analysis that was co-funded according to the original CSI workplan. The lack of funding will, however, most likely lead to the substantive parts of the Millennium Village Project not taking place.

EI's most important contribution to CSI will be the comprehensive baseline study for the 10 original communes covered by the Initiative. The baseline study, one of CSI's four outputs in the first phase, was meant to inform the first five-year plan (which is another of the first phase outputs). The start of the survey was delayed due to UNOPS' contracting and hiring issues and avoidance of the rainy and hurricane season, and is due to be completed by July 2012. A preliminary survey, primarily based on deskwork, was completed in October 2010, before the launch of the CSI. It has been released to CSI partners and new staff, but is not available online.

The delay of the baseline study has added to the criticism of EI's approach as being overly academic and biased towards planning. The review team notes that this emphasis is according to the EI mandate, as EI was contracted to provide planning, analysis and technical assistance, and did not have action-based deliverables. All EI's work is supposed to be paired with ground level implementation from partners. This does not, however, appear to have been conveyed to members of local communities. One reason for this may be that a local CSI UNOPS communication officer was in the workplan but was never hired, hence limiting local communication.

Other EI outputs include multi-sector GIS mapping as part of the survey work, technical assistance for program design and analysis across the thematic areas addressed by CSI for integrated planning, monitoring and evaluation activities. On the technical level, EI has written 80 percent of the ToRs, training material, execution plans, purchase orders and technical specifications for UNOPS and CRS. While partners like ORE and CRS state that they have found EI's scientific input to be useful and that it has informed their approach, they also state that the EI input is not indispensable to their work.

EI's reliance on Columbia students who are not permanently based in the country has added to the criticism of their approach being externally conceived and not sufficiently integrated with local capacities. This has been rectified by hiring a technical team of Haitian experts under UNOPS contracts based in Port-a-Piment, two of whom are from the community itself. To further improve local involvement, EI has put forward proposals for linking CSI to universities and is now pursuing that independently of CSI, establishing links with FOKAL and the consortium of Les Cayes Universities.

Interestingly, an EI researcher produced an insightful analysis of the local government structure that included observations of the local political economy – the only study of the kind seen by the review team.¹⁷ Relevant recommendations of this study include:

- Be careful to build on and support existing structures. Rather than building new visitors' centre, use and improve existing and un-used administration building.
- Build on existing community development plans, rather than construct new ones.
- Devise structures that provide incentives for local politicians to support plans.
- Use the existing local government institutions and systems rather than create parallel processes.
- Ensure that website and all documentation are presented in French and Creole, as well as English.
- Partner with local universities and use local students field experience.

Unfortunately, this report and its recommendations do not appear to have had a significant impact on the work of EI or CSI, although according to EI, this was planned in year two of the MVP.

EI has informed that capacity building was integrated in MVP health and education initiatives. According to EI, the health sector has done every activity alongside the Ministry of Health and local health officials. Funding is running through government institutions. According to EI, the national government has requested to scale up several initiatives piloted in Port-a-Piment, including Community Health Workers, Land Degradation and Surveillance Framework analysis, and the facilities inventory.

EI and Columbia University have significant technical and research capacities, and there are still plans to integrate these capacities into the CSI. However, the delay of the baseline, and the lack of more concerted efforts to integrate the EI research in CSI's other activities has limited the usefulness of the EI role. In some ways, it may have contributed to compromising CSI's reputation, as it has contributed to the public perception of CSI being overly academic, foreign and removed from the realities on the ground. This perception must also be seen in light of the significant delays on the part of UNOPS in terms of delivering the results on the ground that EI research sought to inform.

c. Organisation for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE)

ORE is a Haitian NGO working with forestry and agricultural value chains. ORE is based in Camp Perrin, where the CSI was launched. It has been active in the region since 1985, and has a relatively well equipped base with research and fruit processing facilities. The budget allocation for ORE is USD 380,000.

The review team visited several ORE projects and was impressed with their scientific approach. ORE staff presented records of trees planted since 1985 with statistics of survival rates of planted fruit trees. The survival rate of trees planted in the 1980s still stood at about 33%, while the survival rates of trees planted in more recent years (2000) were over 60%. The rate of top-grafted trees stood generally at more than 80%.

ORE emphasises teaching techniques to farmers and supervision to ensure quality, skilled labour. Beneficiaries were unanimous in their support for the ORE approach due

¹⁷ The Centre for Sustainable Urban Development. "CSI Strategic Planning and University Partnership: Brief on Initial Findings," Colombia University. Not dated, research was completed in August 2011. A summary of the local government structure, which is informed by the study, is provided in Annex 4.

to new techniques they have learned and the positive results, expressing it as the advantage of “training people to fish” rather than giving them fish.

More than any organisation the review team met, ORE recognised the importance of ensuring economic incentives for tree conservation. This is the reason for the prioritisation of fruit trees in nurseries and grafting. ORE is also experimenting with direct seeding, rather than using nurseries, arguing that this is the most effective way of replanting large areas. They experiment with innovative methods, such as planting pigeon peas in association with trees (forestry and fruit trees) in order to incentivise farmers to keep animals off the area.

ORE is focusing on high value fruit species such as mangos, coffee, avocados and citrus, and some traditional fruit species that are easy to transport, such as cashew, soursop, and anona. ORE also provides technical assistance to women trader groups by increasing their storage capacity with silos and providing access to a revolving fund. This allows them to buy when the price is low at harvest time and sell when the price is higher with minimum storage losses. ORE also has plans to promote agribusiness by supporting the processing and export of fruit.

ORE has an experimental, scientific and entrepreneurial approach that is ideally suited for monitoring impact and enabling learning. The fact that they use the financing to recruit and train their own extension officers also helps ensure the sustainability of the work. They should have strong prospects for securing continued activity at the current level or higher.

d. EarthSpark (ES)

ES is a US-based NGO, and a partner in the CSI energy programme. They have a budget allocation in CSI of USD 182,175.

Their activities in Haiti started with a request from a Haitian businessman who wanted to use windmill energy to provide street lighting for his hometown in the Southern Department. ES responded positively to the request and travelled to Haiti to assess the situation. Before starting the planning process they decided to do a survey to see if street lighting was a priority among the local population. They gave respondents a menu of renewable products and services that they could provide. The survey showed that street lighting was not a local priority. Instead, the highest scoring products were in-door lighting, portable lighting and efficient stoves. Based on this, they developed a project to supply these goods.

By this stage, ES had become a CSI partner for the energy thematic area. In addition to setting up a retail supply chain for renewable/efficient energy products, they developed and delivered technology for a pre-paid (by use of mobile phone) mini-grid. The project delivered by ES, connected 40 households to a mobile phone signal tower using its generator’s spare capacity.

To start with, ES supported a local organisation to set up a shop in Les Anglais to supply the energy saving products. The aim was to open similar shops in the major towns in the region. However, they changed this model as they realised it would be more effective to set up supply deals with existing shops. Using this method they are now supplying their products to a growing number of shops in the region.

ES is a small and innovative organisation that has proved itself to be adept at adjusting its approach to what works on the ground. The partnership with CSI has worked well, as CSI has provided logistic assistance to ES that has helped the organisation to extend its reach.

e. **The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Pêche Artisanale et Développement Intégré (PADI)**

TNC is a US-based conservation NGO, with programmes in over 30 countries. The office in the Dominican Republic is responsible for the Haiti program. TNC provides technical leadership for CSI's marine and coastal management theme, initiated by UNEP. It operates in partnership with its Haitian partner PADI, an organisation for small-scale fishermen. The CSI budget for TNC is USD 200,000. The review team did not manage to visit any TNC/PADI project sites as the organisations were not present at the time of the fieldwork, but the review team interviewed TNC by Skype.

The cooperation through CSI is TNC's first experience working in Haiti. The partnership entails developing a baseline, multi-objective coastal and marine assessment to identify priority areas and indicators and designing a five-year strategy for marine conservation.

Although TNC does not have an office in Haiti, a Haitian coordinator has recently been hired to contribute to programmes on the ground. TNC is conducting a Marine Spatial Planning process with sound-based science that involves developing a baseline database of marine habitats and human activities (fisheries, tourism) via field visits, workshops and surveys. A detailed coastal/marine habitat and fisheries assessment includes a GIS database, maps and decision support tools. PADI, under supervision of TNC, is in the process of preparing a fishery survey to shed light on how fishermen use marine resources and ecosystems. TNC has worked with technical staff from CSI, the Ministry of Agriculture and fishermen in the field assessments to improve local capacity. With private funds, TNC is implementing a training program at the national level to increase the government's capacity on GIS, remote sensing and conservation by design to establish marine protected areas. The draft outline of the five-year marine conservation strategy has been submitted to UNEP.

Contact with Haitian authorities has mainly gone through UNEP. TNC has participated in the quarterly Management Committee meetings, but this interaction has not been sufficient for technical knowledge transfer, planning and realising synergies. TNC is awaiting feedback on the marine conservation strategy, assuming that it is being shared with government counterparts and other stakeholders. The CSI Mer Sud strategy, in the meantime, appears to have been developed by UNEP with limited input from government, TNC and other partners.

iii. National ownership of CSI

Ownership and integration with national and local structures are important factors to ensure sustainability and relevance of supported interventions. This is one reason why it is usually advisable to avoid setting up parallel planning structures. In a way, the very concept of CSI introduces a parallel structure. The idea of having a Côte Sud Initiative comes from UNEP, and does not build on a local initiatives or precedence.¹⁸ Attempts have been made to ground the initiative in local processes, through linking with the Ministry of Planning and the Departmental *Tables Sectorielles* (see Annex 6 for a description of the local government structure). Important as they are, both of these strategies for ensuring ownership have been of limited effectiveness, although perhaps they could have greater success with sustained efforts over time.

¹⁸ Some respondents also commented that even the name of the programme, Côte Sud Initiative (CSI), was an English language import. The correct name in French would have been Initiative Cote Sud, with the acronym ICS, rather than CSI.

Efforts have been made to ensure strong and consistent links with the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE), the lead national counterpart of CSI. An arrangement was made with the Ministry and the Departmental Director of Planning that the Ministry's office at the Department level in Les Cayes would second a relatively senior officer to work at the CSI office in Port Salut. This was done, but due in part to transport issues, the Planning official ended up spending limited time at the CSI office. The drive from Les Cayes to Port Salut is 30-60 minutes each way. As far as the review team could ascertain, the Ministry official was never fully integrated in the day-to-day operation of planning and implementation. It is therefore difficult to conclude that the secondment of the official has contributed significantly to national ownership of the programme. A larger and related issue, according to UNEP, is the limited influence and jurisdiction of the MPCE as compared to the more influential and politically appointed Departmental Delegate.

The integration of CSI in the Departmental planning processes has been through CSI participation, as an observer, in the *Table Départemental* and the relevant *Tables Sectorielles Départementales* (for planning, agriculture, environment and tourism). This has been useful for information sharing, but considering the limited policy making input from these fora, it cannot be said to have had an appreciable impact on planning. The participation of the Departmental officials in CSI's Management Committee, on the other hand, has had a potentially greater space for government officials to influence the CSI planning processes. Nominally, these meetings were supposed to be co-chaired by the Delegate (the most senior official in the Department) or the Departmental Director of the MPCE. There is not much evidence that this has, in fact, succeeded in ensuring national ownership. The Management Committee meetings have tended to be large, with 15-20 participants, and have functioned more as venues for information sharing than decision making, per se.

Civil society organisations do not appear to be significantly involved in the CSI and are often sceptical or even hostile to the initiative. The review team encountered this attitude when meeting civil society partners at the CSI office in Port-a-Piment. They described CSI as "mostly talk" with little action, and did not understand CSI or how it works. There was an expectation that CSI would work with local organisations, but this was not done initially. One civil society representative described that they "did not understand why CSI didn't want to work with them". Some organisations were later chosen for cooperation through CRS, but civil society still expressed the need to be more involved. The organisations ultimately got organised and selected *Groupe d'Initiatives pour un Port a Piment Nouveau* (GIPPN) from Port-a-Piment to interface with CSI on their behalf.

There is no open, competitive process through which civil society can participate to access CSI project funding. This may be ascribed to the partnership approach in CSI described by UNEP as a contrast to the typical UN-subcontractor setup. There is also low public understanding of the nature of CSI and significant expectations and suspicions about the size of "the envelope" (funding from the Government of Norway) and how it is being used. The venue through which civil society organisations could become more involved and influence the direction of the programmes would ideally be through local and departmental authorities. There are significant constraints to this end, however, given the level of distrust that is common between elected officials and civil society in Haiti. The level of government that is most accessible to civil society, the *Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales* (CASECs) and *Assembles des Sections Communales* (ASECs), have limited involvement with CSI partners and no involvement in nor knowledge of CSI.

iv. Capacity building

The weak integration in national and local processes also has negative consequences for CSI's contribution to capacity building. The most effective form of capacity building is usually through working with and alongside national and local institutions and processes. This point was made by a Guidance Note commissioned by Norad on "Reconstruction and Long-term Capacity Development in Haiti." This study was published in October 2010, at the time when the programmes in the Southern Department were still being designed.¹⁹ The study distilled ten principles of capacity building in fragile situations, which are reproduced in full in Annex 7.

Some of the principles identified by the Guidance Note are of particular relevance to this review:

- It is stressed that capacity development is a long-term commitment that is "knowledge, management, skills and funding intensive" (Principle 1);
- "Capacity development efforts must be based on analysis of ... existing and potential capacities" (Principle 2);
- "Capacity development requires a concerted and closely coordinated approach between key stakeholders" (Principle 4);
- "Post-crisis capacity development must build on existing capacities" (Principle 5); and
- Capacity building should initially "focus on core *functions* and *services* of the state and produce *tangible* results" (Principle 6).

The recommended approach is clearly one in which an intervention strategy needs to build on a thorough assessment of existing capacities and needs. Also, capacity building needs to be built into the programme, and not feature as an add-on. The review found weaknesses in CSI's approach to capacity building that reflect a failure to adhere to these principles. The core ambition in the approach appears to have been to strengthen the capacity of CSI, rather than any government institution that it is supposed to support. In order to formulate theories of change and objectives it is also necessary to conduct a thorough context analysis and needs assessment. Although EI has conducted a preliminary context analysis, there is no evidence of a needs assessment of local government institutions. There has been little coordination with UNDP on how best to deliver capacity building, and there is limited evidence of linking the project's "quick wins" with capacity building for government counterparts.

None of UNEP's officials on the ground had seen the Norad Guidance Note, which is regrettable, as many of the shortcomings observed regarding capacity could have been ameliorated had the 10 principles been considered in the design of the project. Still, it can be argued that all foreign actors intervening in Haiti should be familiar with the OECD-DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.

There is some evidence, however, that there is a realisation within the programme of the need for a more solid approach to capacity building. The most recent version of the phase two project document, dated February 2012, contains a component for support to the *Tables de Concertation Communales*. This could provide welcome support to the local level decision making processes, although it is still not clear to what extent the decision

¹⁹ Norad. "Guidance Note: Reconstruction and Long-term Capacity Development in Haiti," Norad Report 23/2010 Discussion, October 2010, Oslo.

to support this level is based on a solid needs assessment. Issues that could benefit from closer study are the capacities at the levels of the *commune* and *section communale* to engage in and document planning decisions, reporting of finances, regulations on decision-making and the documentation thereof, and the opportunities for wider stakeholders to gain insight into the decision making process.²⁰

There is some evidence of CSI supporting cross-learning between programmes. Some of the CRS partners working on forestry have received basic training in grafting techniques from ORE. There is probably scope for expanding this type of cross-programme learning, as discussed in greater detail below.

v. Monitoring, reporting and communication

Having solid systems for monitoring and reporting in a project like CSI is important for a number of reasons. The project is supporting a range of activities of varying scales, and monitoring impact is important in assessing which approaches are more and less successful. Good quality, accurate and honest reporting of the performance of the programme enables cross learning between partners and with other programmes.

EI is developing an elaborate M&E system for the MVP, which was also meant to cover the 10 communes originally covered by CSI. EI was also to create the M&E system to measure performance on a regular basis. Launching this system has been delayed due to a lack of personnel in Haiti, communication among partners, re-design of the objectives and the Millennium Development Goals Information System. Delays were also in part due to the lack of definition of specific activities from partners on the ground. A field mission to implement the reporting system was scheduled for October 2012, while process evaluation was scheduled to take place once intervention programs were operational, and was scheduled to start during the spring of 2013.

As discussed above, a CSI partner that has a strong monitoring programme is ORE. It's longstanding system of monitoring the survival rate of trees planted and grafted is ideally suited for ensuring sustainability and for learning which approach works best. The organisation continues to experiment with new approaches, such as the recent experiment with sowing tree-seeds and using fortified fertiliser.

There is some evidence that CSI is leveraging the ORE monitoring system in order to support learning across the programme. All the forms of ORE have been converted into the ICT4Ag mobile phone monitoring program and listed as on-going performance indicators that could be incorporated into the platform. This keeps changing, however, due to changes in priorities and stated goals by the funders and UNEP for Year 2. Work has been done to improve the ORE monitoring platform, reduce costs with mobile technologies, and increase specificity with GPS-enabled tracking.

Outside of ORE, the monitoring and reporting in CSI is largely output based. There was no common ground on M&E, making it difficult to compare interventions. Sector-specific M&E indicators, methodologies and tools were supposed to be agreed on by implementing partners in the respective sectors. However, disjointed start dates and the lack of coordination prohibited this from happening. A common Indicator Performance

²⁰ UNEP underlines that the CSI concept was presented to the Government at the Table de Concertation in Q2 2011 and the GoH participants strongly endorsed it. However, the SWSD project budget was already allocated and there was little real scope to expand capacity building at that time. It is also worth noting is the situation in the Department at the time of project formation. In Q4 2010 to Q2 2011, the Department was struck by cholera and in Q4 2010 to Q1 2011, the Presidential elections provoked major instability (riots and arson in Les Cayes and virtual paralysis of government). The GoH called for practical action. UNEP decided in Q4 2010 that it was not the right time to engage in government capacity building with an 18-month project.

Table was never designed nor agreed to by the partners. Reporting by CSI is essentially a list of activities done and outputs delivered. There is little discussion of problems encountered and of the likely longer-term impact of the activities. The weak M&E system impacts negatively on learning, which in turn reduces the likelihood of a sustainable impact.

The relative weakness of CSI's reporting has an impact on the programme's reputation. This is compounded by problems in its communication strategy. A common complaint from people interviewed by the review team was that "we do not know what CSI is doing". The perception was that it is an expatriate dominated programme that seems to have a lot of money that is being spent on studies, rather than delivering on the ground. There are several levels to this reputational problem:

- The launching of CSI as a USD 200m, 20-year programme set public expectations at an almost impossibly high level.²¹ With the benefit of hindsight, it seems ill-advised to publicise that level of ambition without having any solid commitments for that level of funding. Although there never was a given commitment by Norway or any other donor for the sum of USD 200m, this is also the sum stated on the front page of the UNEP Project Document. Several of the respondents recalled that this was the sum that was often stated in early discussions about the programme after its launch.
- The delivery of activities and outputs by CSI has actually been largely according to plan, with only a few months delay. Of the USD 8m budget for the first 20 months, only about USD 2m has been budgeted for "quick wins" or activities and services visible to local beneficiaries. It may have been advisable to keep a lower profile in the first year while the majority of resources were spent on surveying and planning.
- CSI has not been very effective in communicating locally what it is and what it is doing. Reporting appears to have been geared more towards the donor. Partners spend time editing and adding information to reports that are never released, such as the annual and quarterly reports. The main office in Port Salut does not have a public information centre or noticeboard providing news of its activities. CSI does not have its own website, but shares one on the Haiti Regeneration Initiative, which comprises three other UNEP programmes.²²

In conclusion, the review team is of the opinion that the significant effort that has been spent on branding and profiling the CSI has backfired. Rather than succeeding in raising awareness of what the programme is doing and in mobilising support for it, it has raised unrealistic expectations, failed to convey the current priorities of the programme and eroded public confidence and support. CSI appears, not incorrectly, as an externally conceived concept. Likewise, the branding of the various thematic areas – *Terre Sud* (agroforestry and environment), *Mer Sud* (the marine programme), *Destination Sud* (tourism) and *Energie Sud* (renewable and micro energy projects) – has added complexity to an opaque policy agenda in a manner that seems to be more geared towards creating visibility of the programme than to strengthening national ownership.

²¹ See CSI Framework document.

²² The other three UNEP programmes on the Haiti Regeneration Initiative website are Sustainable Development Solutions, the Millennium Village Project and Haiti 2040 (www.haitiregeneration.org).

vi. Cross-cutting issues: gender, disadvantaged groups and cholera

The integration of gender issues into the CSI is described as a “founding principle” in programme documents, and the CSI strategy is to provide “real expertise on gender directly to the programme and project management, planning and design teams”.²³ The review team notes that economic empowerment of women is addressed in several partner projects, although not across partners in a comprehensive manner. Still, there are several positive examples of how women are benefiting from partner projects. CRS has trained 100 women on vegetable gardening in five different zones. The trained women have established home vegetable gardens and in addition to selling produce from their gardens, they are now transferring the tomatoes into jam. A team from CRS is doing a small study to confirm the vegetable gardens’ land coverage in each zone.

Women are involved in a number of ORE activities, including grafting, storage, and marketing. The review team visited seed storage facilities used by women’s groups supported by ORE that allow for selling seeds out-of-season when the prices are higher. ORE described their approach to gender as one in which “the ground gives us priorities”, and where women are “part of the economy, not benchmarks”. For instance, women will seldom be involved in grafting due to household work and the family structures in Haiti. Instead, ORE supports them in ways that allows them to fulfil their pre-existing responsibilities. The organisation makes sure they are represented in meetings, and described that women generally are strong enough in family structures to pursue what is beneficial to them.

The most vulnerable and poor individuals are not at the core of the CSI or partner programmes. There is some sensitivity to these groups and how they may benefit. For instance, as the ORE programmes focuses on landowners, the poorest individuals will not benefit from farm-level interventions. Still, the value chain approach allows poorer individuals to find work elsewhere in the value chain – for instance in sorting and packaging of fruit.

Since the end of 2010, cholera has been endemic in the Southern Department and CSI partners, in particular CRS, are responding on several levels. CSI partners are addressing cholera under the theme “Social Sud” focusing on health, water, nutrition and hygiene. This involves the rehabilitation of potable water systems in Roche a Bateau, Les Anglais, and Tiburon, the construction/rehabilitation of latrines in 12 schools, deploying 100 community health workers and holding awareness meetings and distributing cholera-prevention materials. CRS has supported cholera sensitisations and delivered aquatabs for water purification in support of a request from national directorate for water and sanitation (DINEPA). The team was also told about a cholera outbreak in Rendel where CRS was mobilized and delivered cholera-prevention materials by helicopter to the difficult-to-access area.²⁴

vii. Status of progress and recent developments

As stated earlier, the programming situation at the time of conducting this review is very much in flux. The lack of funder commitment and the shift in program areas makes much of the Year 1 work irrelevant, as this is a scale-up program that requires commitment over time. The planning for the next phase started in February 2012 and was completed by March for the July 2012 – June 2013 workplan. Partners and government agencies and technical advisors reviewed this, while the community review was planned once

²³ CSI Framework Document 2011, p. 31.

²⁴ CSI Partner Catholic Relief Services, Internal Update, 5 June 2012.

funding was secured. There has been a no-cost extension of the project till October 2012, and planning and programmatic changes have continued throughout the limited duration of this review. This has, naturally, proven challenging for partners, as the entire CSI strategy has changed since the original program, including geographic expansion and funded sectors. The integrated approach has been removed beyond limited coordination support, and partners were not given voting rights or a voice in the process. In fact, the latest proposals have been delivered at the time of finalising the report, partly in response to findings presented in a debrief in Port-au-Prince. The fact that the programming under review has been changing during the review has also made the exercise more complex and demanding.

In this section the focus is on capturing the latest development, in order to maximise the relevance of the report. It is worth noting that the documents shared with the reviewers have not been circulated to CSI partners. Since the start of the review in late May 2012, the following UNEP-related programme documents have been produced:

- A “Haiti Sustainable Energy Project”, which is a one-year, USD 2.5m agreement between UNEP and the Norwegian MFA. The proposal is to extend the financing to June 2015 and supplement it with further financing and support from the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and IADB, totalling USD 15.4m over three years;
- A document titled “Haiti Côte Sud Initiative – Reform Proposal,” which has been drafted by UNEP, dated 11 June; and
- “UNEP Haiti Mer Sud Programme Document – Working Draft,” dated 9 June.

The Haiti Sustainable Energy Project has been developed with significant input from the Energy Advisor that is provided by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). It consists of four main components: 1) the provision of further renewable energy at the household level, building on the pilot conducted by EarthSpark in the first phase of CSI; 2) The development of a Haiti Rural Electricity Cooperative using conventional and renewable hybrid mini-grids; 3) Larger scale renewable energy generation for the Southern Department; and 4) renewable grids for the Western Department.

It is beyond the scope of the review and the competency of the review team to provide a detailed assessment of the proposed project. Comments are therefore limited to the strategic dimension of the project. The project has the support of the Minister and the State Secretary for Energy under the Ministry of Public Works. It builds on the comparative advantages of UNEP and the Government of Norway, and there is an arrangement in place for continued technical backstopping and support through the provision of expert consulting services from NRC. The choice of UNEP as the implementing partner also seems appropriate, considering the agency’s experience of energy projects in Haiti, including in the Southern Department with CSI.

The Côte Sud Initiative – Reform Proposal is the most recent document provided to the review team and it presents what appears to be an exit strategy for CSI. The document provides a concise assessment of the progress to date. It assesses as successful its networking and coordination activities and its support of logistical services (website, offices, transport, procurement and data management services). It is more self-critical of CSI’s contribution to capacity building and planning. On capacity building, it notes that the needs are larger than what can be provided by the programme. In terms of planning, it notes that the plans developed by CSI on, for example marine development and tourism, have “vague” legal and policy status due to weak government ownership and engagement.

The document observes that the original ambitions of extensive resource mobilisation have not been successful, and that the planned scaling up of activities cannot take place.

It therefore recognises that the high fixed overhead of the present set-up is not sustainable. It therefore proposes to scale down the CSI presence by closing the Port Salut office within a year and rehousing remaining staff in the Ministry of Planning office in Les Cayes “and elsewhere”.

The document proposes to reduce logistical services to communications, databases, and GIS. It is proposed to stop delivery of Departmental level planning under the CSI label, instead the project will support planning through the local government’s own processes. It proposes to continue supporting partners and to create “voluntary CSI networks” that can be supported by the CSI secretariat. Capacity building activities will be transferred from the central CSI secretariat to the individual partners.

On the whole, the proposal is a pragmatic and pro-active effort to adjust the plans to fit funding realities. It also addresses some of the more fundamental issues of ownership, although it is not evident from the proposal whether the need to strengthen national ownership was the key motivation for the proposed changes or if it was just a matter of necessity due to budgetary constraints. Regardless, the move to improving local involvement is a positive one.

The Haiti South Department Marine and Coastal Sustainable Development Project provides the substantive and financial part of the second phase of the CSI. It comprises support to three thematic areas: fisheries, tourism and agroforestry, as well as support to environment and marine protected area management and commune level administration. The budget is USD 4.1m for the three years up to June 2015.²⁵ The proposal comprises three components:

1. *Department and communal level coordination, planning and government capacity building:*
 - The creation and support of a Southern Department Sub-table for **Fisheries** under the existing *Table Sectorielle Départementale* for agriculture;
 - Development of a marine and coastal zone management plan for the South Department and establishment of a government base for **marine and coastal management** in the Southern Department; and
 - **Local administration capacity building** for 6 coastal communes.
2. *Thematic technical assistance.* This comprises assistance for the development and implementation of projects within fisheries (indicative budget of USD 1.5m), tourism (USD 0.3m) agroforestry (USD 1.0m), and the delivery of a marine and coastal zoning map and annual environmental monitoring and reporting for the three Departments of the Southern Peninsula.
3. *Community projects in fisheries, tourism and agroforestry.* This focuses support on local CBOs to develop smaller projects, with an indicative number of projects of 20, with a budget of USD 2.5m.²⁶

The project document incorporates the above-mentioned proposal that the CSI Port Salut office will close in 2013. The proposed alternative is to establish “an economically sustainable and government owned base for marine and coastal environmental programme activities in the Southern Peninsula”.

²⁵ It is stated the Norwegian funded project is part of a larger, multi-donor project over 5 years with a planned budget of \$11m. It is beyond the scope of this review to describe and discuss the large project.

²⁶ It is noted that the combined budget of just components 2 and 3 exceed the stated total of USD 4.1m. This may be due to an overlap.

viii. Likely achievement of objectives

Ultimately, CSI's concept of linking sectors in an integrated framework and committing to a 20-year timeframe is a positive one. However, CSI did not appear to have clearly defined objectives for what the initiative aimed to accomplish in the long-term.²⁷ The initiative was fragmented over a large number of components and themes, many of which were overlapping, "quick wins" were not well integrated with the overall strategy and perhaps most importantly, the initial strategy was not based on an assessment of local institutions and capacities. Rather than focusing on capacity building and integration in national and local structures, CSI focused much of its early efforts on establishing its own identity. It may be argued that the approach could have potentially attracted additional contributions and investments because it avoided international flag-waving. The focus on branding when the initiative was still in its early stages and had little to show for in terms of results has instead, not surprisingly, backfired.

Although CSI is set to deliver the four outputs it has committed to, it is not on track to deliver the higher-level objective of "sustainable recovery and development of the 10 communes over a 20-year period".

II. REDUCING THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POPULATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT – PHASE I (UNDP/FAO)

UNDP has worked in Haiti for more than 30 years. Over the last five years, UNDP has explored options to develop tools for planning and watershed management in the Southern Departments. UNDP has implemented a vulnerability reduction program in Gonaïves in addition to the program supported by Norway in the Southern Department. The program in the South aims to contribute to disaster risk reduction through the development of watershed basins, mitigation activities, job creation and agricultural development in the South. The four objectives are to:

1. Manage and protect the watersheds of Aquin, St. Louis du Sud, Tiburon-Port Salut, Les Cayes and Cavaillon (UNDP);
2. Support the agricultural sector to protect the environment and improve food security (FAO);
3. Develop guidance tools for local planning and management of the watershed area of Aquin and St. Louis du Sud (UNDP);
4. Strengthen and develop national, local and community capacities responsible for watershed and disaster risk management (UNDP/FAO).

The programme proposal was drafted in two weeks due to time pressure. It has a budget of USD 8m and duration of 13 months. The UN Resident Coordinator signed the project document on 21 February 2011, and implementation began in March 2011. The first phase of the program concluded on June 30.²⁸ The implementing partners include FAO, the Ministry of Environment, the departmental offices for Environment, Planning and Agriculture, the Town Halls of Aquin, St. Louis du Sud, Les Cayes and Chantal and international and local NGOs. The program is proceeding according to schedule (delivery rate of 74 percent in March 2012) and has achieved the following to date:

²⁷ The objective of the Port-a-Piment project component sought to obtain the MDGs through integrated watershed management.

²⁸ Haiti Reconstruction Fund, Status Update as of 15 December 2011.

- A **methodology guide for watershed management** in cooperation with the Tropical Agricultural and Research and Higher Education Center (CATIE), a regional international organisation based in Costa Rica. The guide was launched on June 5, 2012 together with the Ministry of Environment in Aquin. The original plan was to use the guide in UNDP areas in the Southern Department, but the Ministry of Environment has decided to adopt the Guide throughout Haiti.
- A **co-management plan** for the hydrographic unit of Aquin and St. Louis du Sud by UNDP and the Ministry of Environment, with technical assistance from CATIE. This will be expanded to the whole department in the next phase.²⁹
- **16 sub-projects** (see Annex 10) in the fields of reforestation, agroforestry, riverbank protection and cleaning, soil conservation and ravine correction, reduction of flooding risks, environmental education and rehabilitation of irrigation systems.

The projects concerned with riverbank protection, drainage and rehabilitation of infrastructure have sought to reduce the vulnerability of populations in the short-term. For projects concerned with soil conservation, reforestation and environmental education, objectives will be realised in the long-term. UNDP has submitted a proposal for a second phase, two-year USD 15m program focusing on territorial rebuilding, to be executed in cooperation with the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Planning.³⁰ The proposal builds on the co-management plan of the hydrologic unit Aquin-St. Louis du Sud and lessons learned from project implementation in the hydrologic unit of Les Cayes. Co-management plans similar to the one in Aquin-St. Louis du Sud will be developed for the whole department in 2012 to guide activities.

i. Management structure

A **Steering Committee** was formed after consultation with the government to establish priorities and study the feasibility of projects proposed for financing. It is chaired by a representative from the Southern Department and includes representatives from the Ministries of Planning, Public Works, Environment, Agriculture, the Economic and Social Assistance Fund (FAES), the Department of Civil Protection and UNDP. The Steering Committee meets every three months and makes occasional field visits to review projects and progress. Minutes from the Steering Committee meetings are in French and are shared with partners.

The Head of the Environment Unit of UNDP is responsible for **quality assurance** of projects while the UNDP field office in Les Cayes has the overall responsibility for **project management**. The office has eight staff, seven of which are Haitian nationals and several of them come from Les Cayes. Teams from the Ministry of Environment, UNDP and FAO provide technical support to implementing partners. Each implementing partner has a **project committee** that is responsible for the general orientation of the project; a chief of project for planning, management and financial management; and one or two assistants for project support.

UNDP has **clear and transparent procedures for providing funding** for the sub-projects (the third of the main outputs) that are managed by UNDP. Applicants are required to fill out forms on technical and budgetary issues and organisational capacity. All projects must be approved by the Steering Committee and project documentation must be signed by UNDP senior management and by the relevant government ministry.

²⁹ Meeting with UNDP in Les Cayes, 4 June 2012.

³⁰ UNDP Phase II project document, p. 2.

Funding is disbursed to the implementing partner in three stages (50, 40 and 10 percent), with required reporting at each stage. Prior to the final 10 percent disbursement, UNDP assesses the report according to project plans, writes a note in support of the report, and seeks approval from UNDP in Port-au-Prince.³¹ Some organisations view the procedures as rigid and lengthy, taking at least 3 months from application to disbursement of funding. Non-profit organisations may struggle to complete projects and pay workers where part of the funding is not disbursed until the project is completed. This creates frustration, potential social strain and is not good for the reputation of the project. They urged greater flexibility in the disbursement schemes and splitting budget lines according to project implementation.³²

ii. Implementing partners and arrangements

The review team has the overall impression that the UNDP programme is efficient in producing outputs. At the time of the evaluation, 18 contracts had been signed with government and NGO partners. 18 percent of the committee funds are for projects that are executed in cooperation with local and international NGOs, while 82 percent of funds are for projects that are implemented in collaboration with the Southern Department representation ministries and municipalities.³³ UNDP generally has strong collaboration with government counterparts on the national and departmental level, varied involvement of municipalities, and low level interaction with *Sections Communales* and civil society.

The Steering Committee evaluates project proposals, budgets and organisational capacity and votes on these. There is no official call for proposals, but all organisations and other interested potential partners are invited to participate in a one-day information session after which they can submit their proposals. Several organisations send proposals based on personal knowledge or prior experience working with UNDP.

The departmental direction of the Ministry of Environment in Aquin did not have set procedures for selecting CBOs to implement the co-management plan run out of the Ministry of Environment's office in Aquin (see below). The organisations selected had to be legally registered and working in the area, but there was no open and competitive selection process. An officer described going to the community they wanted to work in and selecting organisations. This procedure vests decisions with the national institution, but the absence of a set procedure could call the integrity of the process into question. NGOs had different procedures for selecting beneficiaries. Movement to Combat Hunger in the World (MLFM) schools were selected based on a list from the education department in the south, prioritising vulnerable schools and schools near the road.³⁴

The UNDP program aims to create jobs for members of surrounding communities. The percentage of project funds for job creation ranges from 30 to 45 percent of the budget for each funded project.³⁵ The percentage is sometimes lower than 30 percent in practice; for instance, the personnel component is 19 percent of the budget for the project in Chantal. Several UNDP partners implement projects using cash-for-work, but recognize limitations to this approach particularly in the agricultural sector. They see cash-for-work as acceptable in labour intensive projects such as *gabionnage*, but

³¹ Meeting with UNDP in Les Cayes, 4 June 2012.

³² Meeting with UNDP partner organisations, 5 June 2012.

³³ UNDP: Liste des Projets avec Accords signes, Coûts des Projets et Fonds engagés.

³⁴ Meeting with UNDP partner organisations 5 June 2012.

³⁵ UNDP Rapport d'Avancement No. 2: Programme de réduction de la vulnérabilité des populations et infrastructures dans le Sud.

inappropriate in agricultural projects given the need to ensure ownership and monitoring.³⁶ The review team notes variations in budgeting between organisations when it comes to salaries and protection equipment. Efforts should be made to standardise this, and this is recognised by UNDP as a lesson learned for the next phase.

iii. National ownership and involvement

The composition and mandate of the Steering Committee explains the strong sense of ownership of the program at the departmental level. All implicated ministries on the departmental level are members of the Steering Committee and are involved in setting priorities and selecting projects for funding. The departmental directors describe it as a participative process. UNDP has, however, identified difficulties with integrating local authorities into the programme due to the high-level composition of the Steering Committee. The Mayor tends to be integrated only when the projects are executed within a commune, as are the cases in Les Cayes and Chantal. When the Mayor is not an implementing partner, the level of integration is much lower, as was the case in Aquin. The review team also notes that there is no civil society participation in the Steering Committee, which could be important in facilitating local ownership. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that the members of the Steering Committee are different from the organisations submitting proposals.

Sections Communales were generally not informed or integrated in the UNDP program.³⁷ This is in part due to the absence of a clear, legal mandate and structured relation between the office of the Mayor and the CASECs and the ASECs. There are no regular meetings for setting priorities or sharing information, and there is disagreement on the nature of reporting lines. Furthermore, CASECs and ASECs lack the authorization to manage grants and projects. CASECs in Aquin and Les Cayes described the need to involve them in identifying needs and projects due to their close relationship with local communities.³⁸

CBOs implementing projects for UNDP generally report a positive experience. According to GIPPPN and Konbit Pou PotaPiman (KPP), the community in Port-a-Piment was consulted about its needs.³⁹ Those not working with UNDP had a negative impression of UNDP and international organisations at large. In Aquin, the review team met representatives from some of the communes' 212 registered organisations, including the head of the umbrella organization COSDERSLS (Coordination des Organisation pour le Développement Rural de St Louis du Sud). The organisations experience that the international community works with the government without consulting the population. They perceived a lack of monitoring and named projects they believed not to have been executed.⁴⁰ A group of CBOs in Les Cayes described a lack of information about how to apply for funding and urged donors to look more actively into which organisations exist and are active. They expressed that winners are often known in advance when calls for proposals from INGOs are launched. They also described their role in identifying community needs as important.⁴¹

The second phase of the UNDP programme addresses to some extent the need for greater involvement of local authorities and Haitian civil society, elements that are

³⁶ Meeting with MOPROPS, Port Salut, 31 May 2012.

³⁷ Meeting with Mayor of Les Cayes, 5 June 2012.

³⁸ Meeting with CASECs in Aquin, 30 May 2012.

³⁹ Meeting with CBOs in Port-a-Piment, 1 June 2012.

⁴⁰ Meeting with CBOs in Aquin, 30 May 2012.

⁴¹ Meeting with CBOs in Les Cayes, 5 June 2012.

essential for achieving local ownership. The UNDP program document describes the importance of working with Town Halls, ASECs, CASECs and communities while prioritising technical aspects of the projects. In terms of local participation, UNDP emphasises selecting organisations that have successfully implemented pilot projects and presenting all objectives and planned activities. The issue of selecting partners according to transparent criteria and processes should be addressed in the second phase. Also, municipalities should be encouraged to involve CASECs in informing civil society organisations about potential and on-going projects. To improve local participation, civil society organisations should be encouraged to gather into platforms and submit joint requests for funding.

iv. Capacity building

UNDP's emphasis on national and departmental authorities is reflected in capacity building efforts. UNDP supports the Ministry of Environment with technical staff, an office, materials and logistics in Aquin. The office serves as the hub for the development of the co-management plan for Aquin and St. Louis du Sud. When the review team visited, the staff, all Haitian, were working together with a UNDP officer on mapping and explained the agricultural efforts applied to different types of land. The workspace and technical facilities were evidently being used and staff appeared motivated. This stood in stark contrast to the facilities and motivation the review team encountered at any other government office.

The capacity building provided for the Ministry of Environment in Aquin contrasted sharply with the capacity and implication of the Mayor's office. The Mayor was familiar with the UNDP projects in the municipality, but had not been involved in the design or selection of the projects. The Mayor expressed a need for training, but said such support had not been offered. The Mayor of Chantal also expressed a need for capacity building, including in the area of project management and reporting. According to the program document, UNDP will reinforce the management and administrative capacities of the Town Halls and Aquin and St. Louis du Sud in the second phase of the program. Such efforts should build on capacity assessments and should include capacity building to increase the abilities of local authorities to manage projects.⁴² The project is also looking into the possibility of putting in place a communal sectoral table for strengthening capacity within the Mayoral offices.

UNDP engages in some capacity building with CBOs. They receive assistance in drafting proposals and KPP and GIPPN were positive to support they received in preparing budgets. In Phase II, UNDP highlights the need to contribute to structure existing local organisations while strengthening their long-term management capacity and strengthening technical management of projects through training. The Phase II program document also describes working with and training CBOs, families, schools and parish churches on plant nurseries.⁴³

v. Monitoring, reporting and communication

UNDP monitoring and evaluation efforts include reports submitted by the project lead, a journal of problems and risks encountered, and documenting lessons learned. The project committee is to organize an annual review to assess performance according to

⁴² Les Cayes partner debrief (UNDP, UNEP, UNOPS), 6 June 2012.

⁴³ UNDP Programme document, p. 7.

the workplan. According to UNDP, the technical team has a monitoring function executed in part through frequent field visits.

Monitoring of individual projects is not, however, systematic and fully integrated in UNDP programme design. Some implementing partners have systems and incentives for monitoring, while it is absent in others. Several partners and local authorities interviewed identified significant challenges in agricultural projects, where trees are planted but nothing has grown after 2-3 months. In the Oxfam Italy reforestation project, owners who show the best results after three months will be rewarded.⁴⁴ Other partners say they monitor plant survival due to their desire and motivation to see things grow. An approach that is based on individual motivation, rather than systems and incentives, does not appear sustainable.

UNDP has documented lessons learned in the first phase of the program. Several of the issues identified are similar to those described by their partner organisations, such as the failure to address root causes and the need for long-term projects and incentives. Lessons learned include:

- In order to protect the works, a watershed approach must be applied. This includes upstream activities such as reforestation and soil conservation.
- The banks adjacent to protective structures (gabion walls), must be stabilized with plants.
- The heads of local authorities and communities must be involved in reforestation activities to improve success rates.
- Planting should be paid per hectare rather than per diem. In general all activities of high intensity manpower must be paid for work carried out.
- Owners should be given an annual incentive award for the maintenance of reforested plots.
- To achieve the objectives actually covered by the project, it is absolutely necessary to sustain the activities over several years.

The documentation of lessons learned indicates an on-going learning process. There is also evidence of integrating these and other lessons learned in planning the second phase of the program. The review team notes how UNDP has identified activities in Aquin and St. Louis du Sud on the basis of the co-management plan and the zoning map developed in 2011. Research results will be used to identify intervention areas such as stretches of river to be protected.⁴⁵ Reporting of challenges faced in project implementation could be improved in order to facilitate learning. The UNDP risk log in the online project management system could also be used more actively.

UNDP project documents provide guidelines for community information and recruitment processes. In reality, however, public information about on-going projects appears limited and should be improved. There are billboards with the title of the UNDP project, the donor, implementing partner, budget and the project duration. Many organisations criticise the lack of transparency in the recruitment of beneficiaries. Civil society organisations also hold that there are no community meetings organised by UNDP or local authorities to inform about new projects in a zone or about the progress of a project. CBOs say that local politicians (Mayor, CASEC, ASEC) do not support the participation of the organizations and only people close to them really benefit. When they receive funding, NGOs take initiative to hold meetings to which they invite local

⁴⁴ Meeting UNDP partner organisations, 5 June 2012.

⁴⁵ UNDP programme document Phase II, p. 6.

authorities and share information about the budget and duration of the project. This is frequently done both at the inception and conclusion of the project.⁴⁶ Efforts should be made to ensure that procedures are in place to guarantee access and broad-based participation.

vi. Cross-cutting issues: gender, disadvantaged groups and cholera

Gender is integrated in a structured manner in projects supported by UNDP. UNDP enters into agreements with implementing partners to ensure that at least 30 percent of the employees and beneficiaries are women. In projects involving agriculture, the percentage of women may be higher than this, while labour-intensive projects such as the construction of canals may have slightly lower female participation. The review team did not, however, find discussions or reflection on the extent to which women's participation in projects has an effect (especially long-term) in the local communities in terms of access to resources and empowerment. It was more of a box-checking approach than one involving an established theory of change. The review team did not find evidence of integration of disadvantaged groups, such as the poorest segments of the population and handicapped people.⁴⁷ Both the integration of gender and reaching the most disadvantaged groups should be considered more thoroughly in future programming.

When it comes to cholera, UNDP procedures are not adapted to respond quickly to urgent proposals for funding that fall within the mandate of UNDP. The Haitian NGO ORPES (Organisation pour la protection et l'environnement du Sud) expressed the urgency of funding for their latrine project given the alarming cholera situation and was frustrated with the lack of response from UNDP.⁴⁸ Civil society organisations urged projects to provide more information about how to avoid cholera. UNDP, through its on-going or planned activities, can do better in integrating cholera awareness components.

vii. Efficiency and likely achievement of objectives

Several respondents described the UNDP programme as a "lean, mean implementing machine." It has a structure that focuses human and financial resources on delivery of activities. Of the eight staff in the project implementation unit at the Les Cayes office, seven, including the project manager, are Haitian nationals. They have avoided building project offices, and run the operation out of the MINUSTAH "Logbase" camp in Les Cayes. They have made a significant investment in the Ministry of Environment's new departmental headquarter in Aquin, but this is owned and run by the Ministry itself, thus contributing directly to local capacity building.

The advantages of the UNDP procedures are the predictability and uniformity they provide. The fact that a government-chaired, multi-stakeholder committee reviews projects means that decisions are made in a transparent manner, reducing the likelihood of suspicions in the community about how funds are used. To further improve transparency, the agency should consider issuing a formal and accessible call for proposals.

Overall, the project is on track to deliver its outputs, and the review team assesses that UNDP is also likely to achieve its objective of contributing to disaster risk reduction

⁴⁶ Meeting with UNDP partner organisations, 5 June 2012.

⁴⁷ UNDP Rapport d'Avancement No. 2: Programme de réduction de la vulnérabilité des populations et infrastructures dans le Sud.

⁴⁸ Meeting with UNDP implementing partners, 5 June 2012.

through the development and management of watershed basins, mitigation activities, employment generation and agricultural development in the Southern Department.

III. NATURAL DISASTER MITIGATION IN THE SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT (IADB/MARNDR)

The support of the Government of Norway to IADB was for an existing USD 20 million programme in the Southern Department. Norway committed an additional USD 14m, in order to expand the scope of the programme. The programme is to be executed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR) under the supervision of the IADB. It is aligned with the GoH Action Plan and the National Agriculture Investment Plan. The programme is considered important given that it covers the upper watershed in the department.

The programme has yet to be initiated by the MARNDR, and none of the funding from the Government of Norway has been disbursed to date. From the pre-existing funding, the MARNDR has been reinforced with two high level technicians to boost disbursements. Equipment for the MARNDR has been purchased and a study for the watershed management plan has just been completed.

Management and coordination of the programme is entirely in the hands of the MARNDR. The IADB is only involved on the level of financing and technical supervision in order to avoid undermining national ownership. This approach has, according to the IADB, been hampered by a lack of human resources in the MARNDR, a problem that has increased in the two years after the earthquake. The IADB has identified weak management capacity as a key challenge moving forward, and is discussing further external recruitment with the MARNDR to rectify the situation. On their side, the Ministry blame cumbersome IADB procedures for the delays. The rules for procurement and issuing contracts are seen as lengthy and complicated. The Ministry believes that UNDP and UNEP have moved more quickly due to more flexible and less cumbersome procedures. IADB, in the meantime, contends that the IADB procedures should not be a barrier as the MARNDR has 30 years experience working with them and the project unit in charge of the execution of the project in the South has a fulltime procurement specialist.

Other donor officials interviewed by the review team shared concerns about IADB's procedures not being appropriate in a setting like Haiti, where there are serious capacity constraints with national implementation partners. But there is also another side to the significant delays of the programme. A key concern for the Ministry appears to be to ensure control over the allocation of finances and using funds to pay top-ups for their own staff, rather than hiring external technical expertise. While IADB had wanted to hire an external expert to act as a coordinator of the programme, the Ministry insisted on appointing one its own officials. This has not worked out very well, and according to IADB, the coordinator has not assumed sufficient authority to ensure efficient implementation of the programme.

Senior Ministry officials also complain that the IADB insists that they hire external consultants for studies, while the Ministry says that the best experts for this in the country are their own staff. Basically, the Ministry's preference for using programme resources to pay their own staff appears to be one of the reasons for the slow implementation of the programme. A study by Oxfam to inform the start of the programme was due by November 2011, but was not completed until May 2012. There does not appear to be significant pressure from the Minister and beneficiaries to begin the programme, which may be due to there still being limited awareness, particularly at the local level, that there are funds available and that they are being held up by implementation issues at the national level.

Discussions have been held with the Government of Norway with respect to finding other uses of the USD 14m, and after two years of inaction, finding a solution became urgent. Different avenues have been explored and there has been strong support, including at the political level, to re-programme the existing USD 14m toward renewable energy and to protect Parc Macaya and manage its buffer zone. Norway and the Government of Haiti have recently decided to allocate USD 9m to the protection of the Macaya Park as co-financing of an existing project financed by the IADB and the GEF, and executed by the Ministry of Environment. The remaining USD 5m will be used for energy.

3. SECTION THREE: COORDINATION AND EFFICIENCY

This section elaborates on the substantive issues identified that relate to coordination and synergies between the programmes, and the issues relating to programme management.

I. COORDINATION AND SYNERGIES BETWEEN THE THREE PROGRAMMES

The three programmes deal with related, and often identical issues. They also have some geographical overlap and deal with many of the same national counterparts. The need for cooperation is at the national and inter-agency level, at the departmental level, and between projects at the level of implementation.

There has been limited coordination at the national level. The most active interaction took place at the planning stage. The initial intention was for UNDP and UNEP, with UNOPS, to submit a joint UN proposal, but that was dropped when it was found that the agencies had different, though not necessarily conflicting, approaches. After the start of the implementation of the various programmes there has been less interaction. Periodic meetings have been more to exchange information than to coordinate and plan jointly. IADB has not attended any of the joint meetings.

The interaction between UNEP, UNOPS and UNDP at the Departmental level has been slightly more structured. The main venue has been through the CSI quarterly Management Committee meetings, but as mentioned earlier, these were used more for exchange of information than actual decision making. Also, UNDP did not attend all the meetings. The majority of coordination efforts between UNEP and UNDP have been informal and have included several working sessions.

A recent note from UNEP on the collaboration between CSI and the UNDP project notes that:

“In 2011 the two projects have been implemented in parallel in different parts of the Department without any interface issues but also with only relatively limited and informal technical interactions.”⁴⁹

This suggests that there was little effective coordination between CSI and the UNDP project. The interaction and communication between the projects have been mostly at the level of simple exchange of information. The one example we found of cross-learning with an impact on programming is the decision of CSI made early in 2012 to adopt the

⁴⁹ UNEP. “UNEP UNDP CSI Projects in South Department Haiti. Cooperation potential and Action Plan,” 3 February 2012.

model of watershed management that UNDP developed in collaboration with CATIE for the second phase.

There was no interaction with IADB at the departmental level. We found no evidence that IADB has attempted to mobilise any pressure from the local level to speed up implementation of the IADB/MARNDR project. This might have been a valuable opportunity missed, as both UNEP and UNDP had regular interactions with the Departmental Sectoral Table for Agriculture.

For the proposed next phase, UNEP and UNDP have prepared a joint document delineating the agencies' respective responsibilities and collaboration. UNDP is to be responsible for the Terre Sud programme (agriculture, forestry, mitigation infrastructures, solid wastes, water management and co-management), while UNEP is proposed to cover Energie Sud, Mer Sud and Destination Sud. The agencies propose a division of labour for support to the Tables de Concertation Communales, Sector Tables and Ministries. The agencies are to share and jointly finance environmental education and communications and share office spaces in Port Salut and Aquin. The review team notes positive plans to establish a common monitoring and evaluation system and databases.⁵⁰ Discussions are on-going as to who will support the Table de Concertation Departementale. The Departmental Directors most concerned (Planning, Agriculture, Tourism and Environment) have been directly involved. The new direction builds on the comparative advantage of each organisation. This is also the main reason for why geographic division has been dropped in favour of thematic division of labour.

II. EFFICIENCY OF PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

A number of issues that have an impact on the efficiency of programming and on the management of programming have been discussed in this report. These include the following factors:

- **The lack of a thorough context analysis and capacity needs assessment at the planning stage** has likely reduced the effectiveness of capacity building. In the absence of a good understanding of the local context and capacity gaps, it is difficult to design and deliver effective and efficient capacity building. There is, for example, little in existing programmes from UNEP and UNDP that addresses the need for better flow and sharing of information between the different levels of local government.
- **Ownership is best ensured when national processes are used, and parallel structures are avoided.** The processes used by UNDP are largely aligned with national processes and institutions. In Les Cayes, the prioritisation and selection of projects and partners occurs by vote in the project Steering Committee, which consists of the relevant sector directors at the Department level. Although the Steering Committee is a parallel institution, the fact that the members are also members of the Departmental Table, the highest decision making organ in the Department, gives them sufficient authority. UNDP's approach in Aquin, where the Ministry of Environment makes without a set procedure, is lacking in terms of transparency, but does ensure ownership. The process used by UNEP, on the other hand, where the CSI Management Committee is nominally the decision making organ, but where decisions are de facto made by the senior advisors, is the furthest from the ideal in terms of securing national ownership.

⁵⁰ Les Cayes debrief with partners (UNEP, UNDP), 6 June 2012.

- **Planning and selection processes need to be transparent and predictable.** One of the key concerns of many of the stakeholders and beneficiaries interviewed by the review team was that they wanted to know “the envelope”. In other words, what funds were available, how were they being used and how could they be accessed. There is a need for all programmes to develop processes for being far more transparent in the way they plan and allocate resources. The present systems undermine public confidence in, and support of, the system. The UNDP process in Les Cayes comes closest to having a transparent system of selection, but even there the documentation of the process, and access to it, could be improved.
- **There is a significant and unmet potential for gathering learning on what works from the relatively large number of initiatives supported.** ORE is the only one of the organisations and partners observed that has a strong system in place for monitoring long-term sustainability and impact. Learning needs to be intentional, and both UNDP and UNEP at present seem to rely on ad hoc measures. Although the gathering of lessons learned presented in UNDP’s latest draft project document is valuable, there is a need for more systematic and organised monitoring in order to assess the sustainability of interventions. UNEP does not seem to facilitate applying lessons learned by one organisation to others, although there is significant potential for this. There is evidence that UNDP is applying successful approaches from Phase I to other geographical areas in Phase II.
- **Programming for “quick wins” is often not the best way to secure public support or to ensure efficient and integrated programming.** This has particularly been a problem for UNEP, where a large part of the quick wins have been implemented through CRS, where the activities supported are not closely integrated with research and long-term objectives. Other organisations (ORE and ES) showed that it is possible to combine a long-term, science-based approach with tangible results.
- **Coordination can increase efficiency of programme outputs if used to facilitate cross-learning.** UNDP and UNEP have had significant programmatic and geographical overlap, but do not appear to have maximised the synergies that this could afford. The UNEP decision to use the CATIE approach to watershed management in a following phase of funding is an example of how using successful approaches of other agencies can save time and funds.
- **There is little evidence of the use of the “One UN” approach in the planning and implementation stages of the programmes.** Coordination has been informal, and not based on programmatic approaches and content. On the contrary, there appear to have been significantly different approaches at the outset resulting in separate UNEP and UNDP programmes. There is no evidence of strategic discussions as to which of these approaches would be more successful, although both agencies were working in the same department and in some of the same sectors.
- **The consideration of gender and the integration of vulnerable groups are not based on a clearly elaborated theory of change in any of the programmes.** While both programmes address gender to some extent, it is not done in a strategic manner. Neither UNEP nor UNDP pay significant attention to integrating the most poor and vulnerable groups as beneficiaries.

In addition to the points raised above on the efficiency of the observed approaches by the implementing partners, the review team also observed that the role of the donor had an impact on the efficiency of the programmes. The following points apply:

- **The regular consultations between representatives from the Norwegian Government and senior GoH officials added another layer of complexity to the policy process.** Although the objective of Norway has been to ensure Haitian ownership, this seems to have undermined the responsibility of programming for the implementing partners (particularly UNEP and UNDP) and may have had a negative impact on the continuity of programming. Norway has contributed to more realistic and sustainable goals, but the interventions have at times occurred without the agencies always being present, adding to the complexity of donor communications and possibly to an already high level of mistrust that tends to be associated with the contest for resources in the Haitian context.
- **Norad has not been effectively used as a technical resource.** Norad delivered two analytical reports to inform the design of the programmes. This was the pre-appraisal of the earlier stage concepts from IADB, UNDP and UNEP,⁵¹ and the above-cited Guidance Note on capacity building in Haiti. Both of these reports anticipated many of the issues raised in this report, such as the need for a stronger contextual analysis, building on existing structures and avoiding parallel processes. Only one of the officials interviewed by the team could recollect having seen the pre-appraisal and none had seen the Guidance Note. The MFA requested Norad's technical support for the renewable energy component of the UNEP program, but Norad was not at that time able to provide support due to constraints in human resources. It may also be relevant to note that the original plan of Norad joining the review team with one person as an observer had to be dropped due to budget constraints. Considering the budget of the combined interventions, and the investments already made, Norad participation in the review could have been a cost-efficient way of ensuring continued technical backstopping from Norad, to supplement the more political support by the MFA.

4. SECTION FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

As stated in the introduction and the methodology section, this is a forward-looking review of the programmes. It is not a formal evaluation, which would have required a more structured assessment of the activities, more time and different technical competencies. The primary focus of the review has been on the processes of planning, implementation and monitoring, and the extent to which these have supported local ownership, through transparent and accountable processes that are conducive to learning and that are likely to support sustainable change. In the spirit of a forward-looking review, the team has strived to make the recommendations practical and realistic.

Recommendations regarding decisions of continued financial support by the Government of Norway:

1. **The overarching recommendation is for the Norwegian Government to continue funding of programmes in the Southern Department.** The first phase of programmes have put in place a valuable base for continued programming. The UNDP project should be considered the core initiative, with

⁵¹ Norad. "Pre-appraisal of inception notes from UNEP/UNDP and project proposal from IADB," 30 August, 2010.

UNEP providing support in a limited number of focus areas, such as the energy programme. The decision to channel IADB funding to the on-going, co-financed project to protect Parc Macaya and use the remaining funding for renewable energy seems to be a positive move given the standstill in the originally funded programme.

2. **Norway should commit funding for a minimum of three years.** Predictability of funding is necessary to enable long term planning. The transaction cost of the present phased funding approach has been high, and there is now a need to shift attention fully to programming.
3. **Decisions on the distribution of funding should be based on an informed assessment of the capacity of the implementing partners to use the funds efficiently.** Fragmentation of activities should as far as possible be avoided, and the division of responsibilities between partners should be as clear as possible. For example, rather than considering having two partners implement parallel support programmes to Town Halls, it may be a more effective and efficient approach to opt for a single programme.

The following recommendations address the need for programming to be better grounded in the local context:

4. **Prepare easy to understand summaries of project documents and progress reports that are available in French and Creole,** and make sure that the copies are available down to the CASEC level in all communes.
5. **Ensure that there are clear procedures for selection of CBO partners in all relevant projects.** Calls for proposals should be made public and decisions should also be public and all applicants should receive answers with explanations of why they were not selected if unsuccessful.
6. **Conduct a thorough analysis of the various levels of the local administration, from the Department, to Communes and Sections Communales.** The analysis should pay attention to the political economy of decision making, capturing both formal and de facto decision making processes. The analysis should also consider the role and position of CBOs. The preliminary context analysis cited earlier that was done by a Columbia University researcher provides a good base for a more thorough analysis, and the planned follow-up would provide a good response to this recommendation. When the study is done, it should be translated to French and Creole, and shorter versions in popularised language should be prepared for wide distribution. This would serve to increase awareness of the role of local authorities and to foster a debate on how these formal structures could best be supported.
7. **Work with officials at Department, Commune and Section Commune level to agree on a minimum standard of consultation and information sharing.** These standards should inform the support for the *Tables de Concertation Communales* that both UNEP and UNDP have planned for the second phase.
8. **As far as possible, work through official structures and avoid setting up parallel structures.** For example, the most recent proposal from UNEP to wind down CSI and shift its operations to government owned localities is a sound one. It could also go further and invest in localities that are already owned by the government, rather than handing it over at the end of the project. Continuing to use the CSI brand may only add unnecessary complexity to a system and processes that are already difficult to understand for most stakeholders. The decision regarding CSI should be made together with Haitian authorities and partners. The IADB approach of working with the MARNDR and channelling funding through the Departmental Direction of Agriculture (DDA) is positive as it

avoids setting up parallel structures, but should be coupled with capacity building and incentives to improve the speed of delivery.

9. **Programmes should be better anchored in local communities and should include a feedback loop that involves beneficiaries and civil society.** Needs assessments must include consultations with CBOs. Civil society can also be involved, for instance, in M&E activities. A feedback or complaint mechanism should be established where beneficiaries can report back on the projects or activities to the implementers in order to hold them accountable to the beneficiaries. This is important in ensuring ownership of the projects and long-term sustainability.
10. **Gender considerations and vulnerable groups should be included in the elaboration of a concrete theory of change.** Vulnerable groups, including the handicapped and the most destitute, should be considered in programmatic design.

In order to strengthen efficiency and learning:

11. **The projects should seek to significantly strengthen their M&E systems.** All supported projects, such as tree planting, should be monitored also after the completion of projects, and information should be gathered on the sustainability of interventions. The information produced should be made publicly available in easy to understand formats. This will also assist in continued selection of CBOs and other partners who produce the best results. M&E needs to be planned and resourced, with assigned staff that is preferably not also responsible for implementation in order not to mix roles of implementation and monitoring. M&E can also be improved through substantive coordination meetings that include joint planning and sharing lessons learned.
12. **In order to enhance learning, it is necessary to provide incentives for reporting failures.** The existing bias in the reporting structures to bias reporting towards successes significantly weakens the scope for learning. Only by encouraging reporting of failures will it be possible to leverage the valuable learning that is to be had from comparing different approaches.
13. **Research should be designed to inform projects and not simply generate information.** Findings should be shared with all partners in a timely manner to inform their interventions. All research written up in English should at the very least be translated to French, and popularised versions of research that is relevant to CBOs should be produced and shared in Creole, as EI has done for executive summaries of recent reports.
14. **Coordination should be used not simply to avoid geographical and project overlap, but as a way to facilitate cross-learning.** This means sharing research findings, good practices and techniques between organisations and engaging in joint training and capacity building. It involves using the information to inform programming and to change directions when needed. This approach may also facilitate the adoption of a “One UN” approach where programming and learning are truly integrated.

Final recommendations on financing modalities:

15. **If financing of ORE is continued, a solution should be found to ensure that it is long-term and predictable.** If funding of ORE is budgeted through the UNDP programme, care should be taken to ensure that UNDP procedures allow for long-term commitments of the allocated budget. Consideration should also be made regarding whether it would be preferable to continue funding ORE through

UNEP or whether it would be possible for Norway to provide funding directly to ORE.

16. All implementing partners should actively seek to diversify their sources of funding.

In conclusion, the review team recognises the considerable challenges of programming in the context of Haiti in general, with weak capacities and a poor incentive structure for political leadership at the national level, and even weaker capacities and unclear formal processes at the local level. These factors impose considerable challenges for ensuring national ownership and sustainable development with the best of programmes.

Within this context, the UNDP programme has made a very promising start, and has a good opportunity of supporting capacities for enhancing disaster preparedness, agricultural development and environmental protection. UNEP's record has been more mixed, but it also has an opportunity to continue contributing with technical assistance in the energy sector.

Each agency should take time to consider and reconsider the objectives of the programmes and their respective theories of change. In order for the programmes to be effective and efficient, they will need to be better anchored in local processes, both within and outside local government. They need to be more informed by the local context and stakeholders, and need to significantly strengthen their systems of learning and improve feedback loops. Only through such concerted efforts can they contribute to equitable and lasting improvements.

5. ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Terms of Reference (ToR)

Review of three programmes for natural resource management and disaster risk reduction in *Département du Sud*, Haiti,

The main focus of the review shall be on governance, local ownership and capacity development, as well as coordination between the parties responsible for the implementation of the programmes. Any other issues that the team considers of importance for the goal attainment of the programmes, should be included in the review.

1. Background

After the earthquake that devastated Haiti on 12 January 2010 and following a request from the Haitian Government, Norway has taken on a special commitment to support reconstruction and development in the Département du Sud (Southern Department) in Haiti. This is in line with the “Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti” finalised in March 2010. In addition, Norwegian support will seek to align with existing sector strategies and to strengthen local capacities. Working through partners (UNDP, UNEP, IADB, Haitian Government and civil society/ private sector), Norway supports the sustainable management of natural resources, access to clean energy, private sector development and initiatives to reduce the impact of natural disasters.

In particular, Norway, through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), is supporting the following three programmes in the region (2010-2011):

- **Vulnerability reduction in 10 watersheds / agriculture (USD 8 mill.)**

The programme objective is: to contribute to the reduction of vulnerability by strengthening the watershed management in the Southern Department, with focus on local involvement in watershed planning and management, including disaster risk management, environmentally sustainable socio-economic activities that generate employment and strengthening of food security.

The programme will be implemented in the following geographic areas: the watershed of Cavaillon and the three hydrographic zones Tiburon-Port Salut, Les Cayes and Aquin-Saint Louis du Sud.

The programme is executed by UNDP in collaboration with the Ministry of Environment, municipalities, FAO, WFP, Caritas and local civil society organisations.

- **Haiti South West Sustainable Development Programme 2010-11 (USD 8 mill.)**

The programme objectives are, abbreviated:

- reduction of poverty,
- reduction of disaster vulnerability and the restoration and sustainable management of natural resources.

The programme is in the first phase of a long term recovery and sustainable development programme for the southwest region of the southern peninsula of Haiti. The programme includes quick win activities to support the recovery process, but has multi-year plans and a 20 year vision aimed at sustainable recovery and development of an entire area. This is sought through a multi-thematic programme that addresses the

underlying drivers of poverty, the environmental degradation, the disaster vulnerability and the lack of access to social services.

A new implementation model is proposed, with a focus on coordination, national and local ownership and development of institutional capacity of the government and local partners.

The programme is executed by UNEP/UNOPS in collaboration with the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Public Works/ Energy Sector, the Ministry of Tourism, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Organisation for the Rehabilitation of the Environment (ORE), Nature Conservancy, Earth Institute/ Columbia University and EarthSpark.

• **Natural Disaster Mitigation in the Southern Department (USD 14 mill.)**

- The objective of the Programme is to reduce long-term vulnerability to natural disasters of some 360,000 inhabitants in the watersheds of Grand Riviere du Nord, Ravine du Sud and Cavaillon in Southern Department. The activities will focus on disaster prevention and reduction through: Investments in infrastructure to prevent excessive flooding which has contributed substantially to impoverish the region. The activities include feasibility studies and public works, in particular re-profiling of the river, strengthening riverbanks and building micro-dams.
- Support to sustainable agriculture through enabling farmers to introduce anti-erosion techniques. The component includes financial support (grants) to farmers associations and individual farmers established in particularly vulnerable areas through a scheme to be designed by national ministries. The beneficiaries will be the farmers who are ready to introduce anti-erosion techniques.
- Local capacity building to ensure sustainable watershed management, mainly through capacity development in Ministries in the Southern Department, with a small subcomponent that will enable the central ministry to take on its leadership responsibility. It will also allow for the creation of local committees for management of the watersheds.

The programme is executed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development under the supervision of the Inter American Development Bank.

The concept notes for all three programmes were approved for financing by the Steering Committee of the HRF on 21 October 2010 and funds were transferred from the fund to UNDP, UNEP and IADB in March 2011.

In the planning stage, efforts were made to avoid duplication between the three programmes and ensure that they provide support in different geographic areas. Each programme has a different approach and operates in parallel in their respective areas of support. The programmes are in an early stage of implementation. However, significant challenges have been encountered in the individual programmes as well as in the coordination between them, which has affected the pace of progress. In spite of a relatively early stage of implementation, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as an HRF contributor, has offered to take the lead in a joint review with the Government of Haiti, the HRF and the executing agencies, of the challenges in order to inform further implementation as well as decisions on further engagement of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Government of Haiti.

2. Purpose

The purpose of the review is to identify the challenges in programme implementation and coordination encountered so far and likely bottlenecks in the future. Focus shall be on local priorities and ownership (by local government and civil society) within the larger context of national recovery and development policies and oversight by the national government, as well as decision-making processes and institutional capacity development within government and between government and the society, as required to assure local ownership in the future. The review shall recommend improvements and adjustments to consolidate progress and ensure achievement of the programme objectives.

In addition, the review shall assess and recommend improvements in the coordination of the three programmes with a view to local ownership and priorities.

The review is expected to inform decisions by the executing agencies, the Government of Haiti, other implementing partners (international, national and local) and donors on the refinement of programme design and engagement for the remaining implementation period, as appropriate.

3. Scope of work

As stated above, the review will assess both operational aspects of the programmes and coordination between them.

In view of the spread of the cholera epidemic to the whole of Haiti, the review will assess the implications for the three programmes, and present proposals for adjustments in, and inclusion of activities pertinent to the respective programmes, which may contribute to mitigate the consequences of the epidemic.

The review shall as a minimum focus on governance, local ownership and capacity development, as well as coordination between the parties responsible for the implementation of the programmes. Any other issues considered of importance by the team for the goal attainment of the programme, including those listed below, should form part of the review.

The review shall focus on the following dimensions:

- ***Relevance, effectiveness and sustainability***

The review shall assess progress, or lack of progress, according to plans, so far, with a view to achievement of programme objectives. Focus shall be on obstacles and opportunities in the institutions of local authorities, civil society as well as the relations between them, within the larger framework of relevant national policies, systems and structures. Are there any factors external to the Southern Department that create obstacles? Are obstacles and opportunities different for men and women?

Based on this assessment and on the programme documents as well as progress reports, an analysis shall be made of the likely achievement of the objectives in the remaining period. For each programme and objective, it should be assessed whether the theory of change, or the assumptions on which the programme is based, are still valid. Do the programmes have a clear, coherent and consistent set of objectives? Are adjustments called for and if yes, what kind of adjustments?

If adjustments are warranted, which actors and institutions (in the public sphere and in civil society and between them) are likely to make good use of the planned capacity development support? Are any of them, for systemic or structural reasons, irrelevant because support would be wasted or do more harm than good? If capacity development support is recommended, what kind of support? That is, what kind of support directed at the individual, organisational and/or society levels is recommended to achieve the objectives? Is gender an issue in this respect, i.e. should capacity development activities be planned differently for men and women? Regarding organisational and societal development, are there any significant groups in the population who have an interest in any programme component, but whose voice is not heard? If so, what changes could make their voice heard? How can local ownership in government and civil society be strengthened?

Regarding ownership at the Southern Department and national levels, it should be assessed to what extent the programmes are embedded in a larger coherent development strategy for the Southern Department? Should anything be done differently to ensure ownership and donor alignment with government strategies at these levels? Are the interventions well in tune with the development policies and administrative systems of the Southern Department? Are they consistent with a policy of supporting partner country ownership? Are the interventions consistent and complementary with activities supported by other donor organizations?

- ***Coordination and synergies between the three programmes***

To what extent are the results of the programmes expected to extend beyond the individual programmes? In what ways are the programmes forming an integrated part of the wider development portfolio of the Southern Department? How can the linkages between the three programmes become strengthened to facilitate real synergies between them in terms of strategic approaches, substantive coordination (management and operation) and joint planning? How can formal Government (central and local) leadership be strengthened? What has been and should be the role of the UN (incl. "One UN") and IADB in the coordination of the programmes?

- ***Efficiency***

Regarding the management of the programmes, it should be assessed what measures have been taken during planning and implementation to ensure that resources are efficiently used? Could the interventions have been implemented with fewer resources without reducing the quality and quantity of the achievements so far? To what extent are there adequate human, technical and physical resources to manage the programmes efficiently? To what extent do the operational and institutional frameworks, the monitoring and reporting facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the programmes? To what extent have the financial dealings under the programmes, i.e. disbursement of installments, utilization of funds in accordance to approved budget, transfer of funds to partner organizations, and reporting facilitated the achievements so far? How can the frameworks be enhanced to increase efficiency and results?

4. Analytical and methodological approach

The review will be based on:

- A desk study which shall include collection and review of documentation such as strategic documents, programme documents, programme progress reports, financial reports and materials produced as outputs of the programmes as well as political

economy studies of governance in Haiti available from the donor community, universities and research institutes and Internet.

- Interviews of a broad spectrum of key informants, including primary beneficiaries, civil society representatives, government officials, executing agency staff, donors and other resource persons;
- A country visit to Haiti for the purpose of quality assurance of the desk study and collecting complementary information to the desk study. Briefing sessions shall be organized with stakeholders as relevant.

The review shall focus on governance, local ownership and capacity development and make use of political economy analysis of interest and power relations in state and society with focus on actors and institutions at the local/department level. Relevant historical factors as well as formal and informal power relations shall be considered. The review should not be a countrywide, all-encompassing study of Haiti. It shall include only the relevant factors in a larger context that can elucidate the challenges faced by the programmes.

Gender analysis and protection of vulnerable groups will be fully integrated at every stage and in all aspects of the review.

5. Products expected from the review

- An inception note based on the desk study and a plan for the field-visit, including a tentative plan of interviews. The inception note and time schedule shall be discussed with and approved by Norad.
- Debriefing with relevant stakeholders at the end of the country visit, presenting the most important preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations.
- Consolidated report not exceeding 25 pages (excluding annexes), comprising an executive summary of not more than three pages, methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations. The content of the report will express the views of the review team.

The draft report shall be submitted to Norad, MFA/Latin America Section, IADB, UNEP, UNDP, HRF within two weeks after finalization of the field visit. The project holders will then have one week to provide written feed-back to the review team. The final report shall be submitted two weeks later. The report shall be written in English. The team shall then provide a French translation within two weeks.

The team leader is responsible for the technical quality of the report, as well as the editing and quality control of the language. The reports should be submitted in electronic form to Norad with a copy to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Latin America Section.

6. Implementation arrangements

Team

The Review team will consist of 1-2 international consultants, of whom one will be the team leader, in addition to a local consultant to be engaged by the international team, and a representative from the Norwegian Development Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The representative of Norad will take part as an observer.

Qualifications

The Review team should have:

- Experience in international development, including reviews and evaluations, rural development and sustainable livelihoods, institution building and capacity development, and gender issues.
- Knowledge of development programmes and projects undertaken by multilateral organizations, including administrative and financial management.
- Knowledge of democratic governance and the use of political economy analysis in a development context.
- Familiarity with the development situation in Haiti, including the socio-economic and cultural context, national and local development plans and policies, including those pertaining to the Southern Department.
- Working knowledge of the French language.
- Exceptional writing skills in English.

Management arrangements

The task manager (NORAD) will:

- Draft the ToR for the review in consultation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Recruit the consultants.
- Participate as observer in the review, including the country visit, and provide input to the team leader in the desk review and the organization of the country visit.
- Facilitate consultations on the draft consolidated report with relevant stakeholders.
- Disseminate the report in appropriate channels.

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) will:

- Facilitate consultations with executing agencies and the Government of Haiti on the ToR
- Identify key programme documentation for the review
- Assist in the identification and recruitment of a local consultant
- Facilitate identification and organization of meetings with key stakeholders during the country visit

Tentative time schedule

The assignment is scheduled for a total of 30 working days for the international consultants and 15 working days for the national consultant with the following proposed time schedule:

- 2 weeks preparatory work and desk study
- 2 weeks field visit in Haiti
- 2 weeks report writing and dissemination

The review is expected to take place in March-April 2012. The timing will take into account on-going or planned processes relevant for the review, to the extent possible.

7. Cost

The cost, including travel, per diem and fees of the consultants, shall not exceed NOK 450.000.

ANNEX 2: FIELD ITINERARY AND LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Itinerary⁵²

<i>Date</i>	<i>Agency</i>	<i>Contact</i>
Monday, May 28	UNEP and UNOPS	Andrew Morton, Antonio Perera, Felipe Munevar
Tuesday, May 29	IADB	Gilles Damais
	MARNDR	See names below
	Ministry of Public Works/Energy Sector	Rene Jean Jumeau
	Office of UN Res Coordinator	Jean Phillipe Bernadini
Wednesday, May 30	CASECs, ASECs, CBOs in Aquin	See names below
	UNEP, UNOPS office in Port Salut	Antonio Perera, Maxmilien Pardo, Jacqueline Fabius
Thursday, May 31	Meeting with SWSD Sustainable Development Project Executing Partners, (CRS, ORE, EI, EarthSpark)	Aysha Kassim, Mrs Mousson Finnigan, Eliassaint, Dan Schnitzer, Greg Levin
	MOPROPS	Julio Forges, DG
	MTPTCE (DDS)	Fritz Merville
	Local Business (hotel owner)	Mr Cherestral
Friday, June 1	Field visit with CRS/ORE to Fierville, Randel	Ms Mousson Finnigan/Eliassaint, Aysha Kassim
	Beneficiary focus groups with ORE and CRS beneficiares, Port-a-Piment	See names below
	Meeting with CASECs, Port-a-Piment	See names below
	Roundtable with CRS partners: GIPPN, OBALAR, Plante Plus, Fondation Macaya, Konbit Pou PotaPiman (KPP)	Yvette Marsan, Julnord Vital, Bruno Mentor, and others
	Private sector/hotel	Jean Pierre
	Private sector/hotel	Daniel Evinx
	FONDAM	Michel Monin

⁵² Skype calls were arranged with The Nature Conservancy (Eddy A. Silva) on 15 June 2012 and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (Operations Officer Pauline Zwaans) on 21 June 2012 from Norway.

Saturday, June 2	ORE, Camp Perrin	Meeting with staff
Monday, June 4	UNDP, Les Cayes	Jean Renand Valiere, AV. (Chef de Projet Reduction Vulnerabilite Sud), Ovidio Ibanez-Lopez and other staff
	Departmental Delegate and departmental directors in the south (planning, environment, tourism, public works and agriculture)	Jean Gabriel Fortune, Joseph St Phard, Georges J Ernest, Fritz Mervil, Debalio Jean-Jacques
Tuesday, June 5	Mayor of Les Cayes	Pierre Yvon Chery
	CRS	Joseph Kelly/Aysha Kassim
	Roundtable with UNDP partners: ORPES, Caritas, MLFM, Oxfam Italia	See names below
	Meeting with CASECs, Les Cayes	See names below
	Meeting with CBOs, Les Cayes	See names below
Wednesday, June 6	Meeting with Mayor and co-Mayor, Aquin	Metellus Constant, Momperous Constin
	Debrief with UNDP and UNEP field offices, Les Cayes	Jean-Renand Valiere, Ovidio Ibanez-Lopez, Antonio Perera, Maxmilien Pardo, Jacqueline Fabius
	Meeting with UNDP partners, Aquin	Assosyasyon Pitye Pou Ayiti (ASSOPA), Association pour le Developpement de la Culture Haitienne et de Formation (ADCHF), Coordination des Organisations pour le Developpment Rural de St Louis du Sud (COSDERLS), PWODKOM, Organizasyon TetAnsanmpitota
Thursday, June 7	Coordination roundtable with UNDP and UNEP (IADB invited but absent)	Marc Andre Franche, Antonio Perera

List of interviewees/focus group participants

Meetings with CASECs		
	members of CASEC	
1 JUNE 2012	Jeannot Marseille	
	Yeye Marius	
	Guerrier Arnold	
	Guerrier Philoma	
5 JUNE 2012	Felix Jn Renold	

	Joseph Jn Leon	
	Joseph Jn Renaud	
	Itacy P. Buteau	
	Glax Jn Jislhomme	
Community-Based Organisations		
5 JUNE 2012 (Les Cayes)	OPREN-F	Sintima Denise
	BIDWAY HAITI	Mezil Lee-Mayjors
	AMECON 2000	Mesadiou Wilfrid
	FACIL	Charles Clebert
	MUSJEH	Roy Ritha Pierre Louis
	FONFHAC	Plaisimond Gilios
	OPELA	Joseph Jean Lanor
	OTREM	Samedy Louischance
	OPS	Tilus Enos
	ADESEBB	Ledan Jean Yves
	OPRD	Esta Estanor
	Source de Vie	Sandra Cantave
	MIRIPSUD	Kesnel Augustin
30 MAY 2012 (Aquin)	COCIDES	Dorfeuille Christma
	Fibrisous	Olsdy Jacqueline
	MKDA	Dorafils Ymithe
	JILAP	St Paul Obny
	AFDGE	Gaspard Golmann
	AFDGE	Gaspard Mie Jesula
	OPUDV	Dar Watson
	MODECHA	Sylne Louines
	AMFBF	Thomas Olnor
6 JUNE 2012	ASSOPH	Claude Rigaud
	Pitye Pou Ayiti	Anglade Gedeon
	ADCHF	Larena Jocelyn
	OTEP	Charles Wisner
	OTEP	Jacquet Marc
Local NGOs/ partners		
31 MAY 2012	ORE	Eliassaint Magloire
	ORE	Mousson Pierre Finnigan
	CRS	Dina Brick
	CRS	Aysha Kassim
	CRS	Pierre Andre Theogene
	ES/ENEJI PWOP	Mondesir Ernest
	ES/ENEJI PWOP	Greg Levin
	ES/ENEJI PWOP	Dar Schaitzer
	MOPROPS	Forges Julio
	MOPROPS	Darbouze Maxime
	MOPROPS	Saint-jour Ludier
	MOPROPS	Vava Residor
1 JUNE 2012	KPP	Isidor Jn Robert


	Plante Plus	Vital Laurore
	OBALAR	Francois Faude
	OBALAR	Auguste Marie Maglaine
	EPPES	Vital Jean dit Julnor
	GIPPN - ING URBANISTE	Massan Ferland
	GPPN	Yvette Marsan
2 JUNE 2012	ORE	Leonard Verous
	ORE	Edoine Nazaire
	ORE	Josepha Ricien
	ORE	Eliassaint Magloire
	ORE	Joseph Jean Francois
	ORE	Mousson Pierre Finnigan
	ORE	Jean Franck Constant
	ORE	Eberle Nazaire
5 JUNE 2012	MLFM	Wisler Chery
	CARITAS	Muscadin Edrice
	MLFM	Eusa chiesa
	ORPES	Shella M. Richard
	OXFAM ITALIA	Deceus Wedens Pierre
	OXFAM ITALIA	Martina Turri
SANS DATE	AVODCA	Wislin Robert
	AVODCA	Joint Juline
	COREA	Paget Jean Noel
	AVODECA	Toussaint Orcelin
	COREA	Jean Famil St Cyr
	COREA	Jean Charles Jacquelin
	ENEJUPROP	Francois Linaud
Beneficiary focus group - ORE		
1 JUNE 2012		
Louis	Evens	Roche - A - Bataux
Macene	Elvita	Roche - A - Bataux
Badio	Genor	Roche - A - Bataux
Balthazar	Arnold	Damassen
Moise	Anthony	Coteaux
Jn Pierre	Lanose	Rosier
Brunal	Joseph Yvon	Rosier
Sorel	Pascal	Port - A - Piment
Malbranche	Potis	Port - A - Piment
Lebrin	Lenes	Chardonniere
Yeye	Joseph Marius	Chardonniere
larochel	Paul	Chardonniere
Joseph	Jn Francois	
Durant	Clevil	
Joseph	Marseille	Despas Coteaux
Sagesse	Avis	
Ynetide	Dirozin	
Jeannot	Marseille	Despas Coteaux
Marie Yanique	Augustin	Despas Coteaux

Gorgette	Jn Saint Joie	Rendel
Salomon	Fredo	Rendel
Sanon	Roseni Eliodor	
Romelus	Duquest	
Guerrier	Carole	Port - A - Piment
Telemarque	Clemante	Port - A - Piment
St Corne	Onel	Les Anglais
Lamy	Jn Paul	les Anglais Digue
Alcide	Jn Antony	les Anglais
Jean Baptiste	Eluis	les Anglais
Joseph	Estoine	les Anglais
St Cyr	Kesnel	
Laurole	Kolaine	
Francois	Gerda	
Populaire	Adnel	
Renan	Clervil	
Beneficiary focus group - CRS		
Desir	Kethin	Sante
Pierre	Renauld	Sante
Guerrier	Arnold	Sante
Francois	Vidette	Sante
Bel Jean	Hosarre	Sante
Josil	Sonise	Sante
St louis	Renette	Sante Matronne
Alcindor	Clemante	Sante Matronne
Chery	Lonise	Education
Julien	Fenold	Educatin
Hyppolite	Marie Carolle	Sante
Herode	Francianna	Sante
Joseph	Eddy	Education
Jean Baptiste	Eliovil	Education
Chermul Alphonse	Lina	Agriculture
Toussaint	Ulysse	Agriculture
Joseph	Rio	Agriculture
Bel Jean	Yvonel	Agriculture
Joseph	Seramieux	Agriculture
AVIL	Maurine	Elevage
Salomon	Frido	Education
Louis	Jean Michel	Sante
Guillaume	Vaina	Sante

ANNEX 3: MAP OF THE SOUTHERN PENINSULA



ANNEX 4: CSI ORGANOGRAM



ANNEX 5: CSI BUDGET SUMMARY

SUMMARY BY CATEGORY		SUMMARY BY ORGANISATION & CONTRACT	
DEV - Project scoping and Development	96877	UNDP MDTF	80000
REM - Resource Mobilisation	95000	UNEP	1370900
FUN - Funds Management	598131	UNOPS	2814225
COP - Coordination, Planning	2641392	CRS	1687700
TAD - Technical Assistance and Development	1850200	EI	1335000
CAP - Dedicated Capacity Building	185000	ORE	330000
MEV - Monitoring and Evaluation	125000	TNC	200000
PAC - Practical Action	2243400	EarthSpark	182175
COM - Communications	165000		
Total	8000000	Total	8000000

ANNEX 6: POLITICAL DECENTRALISATION AND PLANNING IN HAITI

The following analysis and overview of planning structures is taken from *CSI Strategic Planning and University Partnership: Brief on Initial Findings* (The Center for Sustainable Urban Development; The Earth Institute at Columbia University), pp. 2-3.

According to legislation, the Haitian planning process is a bottom-up approach. Planning should begin with assessments of community needs at the lowest political jurisdiction, the section-communale. The needs assessment information should move up the chain of governmental units until it eventually reaches the Presidential office where the budget would then be developed in accordance with local needs and appropriate funds would flow back down to the commune level. However, the highly decentralised system of government in Haiti that is in theory to play an important planning role is neither fully implemented nor is it funded, creating disincentives to planning at the local level.

Levels of government and planning structures:

- Six national-level ministries are involved in planning activities on the regional and local levels. The Ministry of the Interior and National Defense administers the commune and commune-sections.
- On the departmental level, the *Table Departementale de Consultation* is administered by the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation (MPCE). It serves as a communication resource between government, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the private sector to enable coordination and avoid duplication. Meetings are to be held monthly to share information on what is being done in the department.
- The *Tables Sectiorelles* also function on the departmental level. They meet on a monthly basis and are administered by Regional Directors of thematic ministries. People and institutions relevant to the problems discussed are invited to discuss issues at hand.
- The *Mayoral office* comprises three individuals, the Mayor and two deputy Mayors, and is the elected head of the commune level of the local government. The *Table Communale* is supposed to function on the commune level, but in practice rarely exists.
- The *Conseil des Sections Communales (CASEC)* and the *Assemble des Sections Communales (ASEC)* are the elected heads of the commune-section level of local government. The CASECs comprise three members. The ASEC's membership varies from five to nine members depending on the population density of the given section. The delineation of the responsibilities of the CASECs and ASECs is unclear and varies within decision-making throughout the region and country based on context and political dynamics.
- The *Comite de Pilotage* (Steering Committee) is a temporary governing body set up to manage a given project.

ANNEX 7: SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR HAITI'S POST-CRISIS CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT⁵³

The following are ten principles that can be applied to capacity development efforts in Haiti, led by Haitian authorities, and supported by their international Development Partners. The principles draw on international experience in fragile states and post-crisis situations over the past decade.

Principle One: Capacity development is a long-term effort that is knowledge, management, skills and funding intensive. Strengthening the core organisations and institutions of state is central to achieving national recovery and development goals. Strategy should also balance efforts to build core capacities in civil society and the private sector. In the Haitian context, as with other crisis situations, change will be measured over decades; beyond the timeframe of typical development interventions. Progress requires predictable and sustained commitments on the part of all stakeholders.

Principle Two: Capacity development efforts must be based on analysis of the existing and potential capacities, within the framework of national priorities. Capacity development must be based on robust assessments that identify: a) the national capacity that already exists; b) the gaps between existing capacity and priority needs; and c) where the international community can best contribute. Assessments must be closely coordinated between national and international stakeholders. The effectiveness of coordination is strengthened when capacity development efforts have their own results framework and monitoring system.

Principle Three: National political commitment and leadership is essential for capacity development to be relevant and sustainable. Sustained national leadership is the single most important determinant of capacity development results. Efforts are most effective when they are demand-driven and respond to Government requests and priorities, preferably set out in a coherent strategic framework. In the absence of national ownership, sustainability cannot be achieved.

Principle Four: Capacity Development requires a concerted and closely coordinated approach between key stakeholders. Post-crisis situations are characterised by an increase of international resources and a large number and variety of stakeholders. The need to build coherence between the stakeholders is essential to long-term effectiveness. The financial and transaction cost involved in coordination efforts, therefore, are a necessary investment. To the extent possible, consultations should include national and international organisations (NGOS and CSO), as these currently deliver a significant portion of public goods in Haiti.

Principle Five: Post-crisis capacity development efforts must build on existing capacities. All societies have forms of capacity and social organisation, if not in the structures of state then in communities, social organisations or the coping mechanisms that exist precisely because the state is weak or absent. Capacity development efforts are most effective when they build on existing capacities, and do not undermine or compete with them. Context knowledge is critical. Efforts in Haiti must also consider the existing constitutional, state architecture and past internationally-supported efforts for state reform.

⁵³ The principles are taken from the Summary of the Guidance Note. Norad 2010, op. cited.

Principle Six: The early capacity development strategy should focus on core functions and services of the state, and on producing tangible results. Assessment and coordination efforts should result in a joint capacity development strategy between Development Partners and Haitian authorities as soon as possible. In its early phase, the strategy should maintain a tight focus on restoring the core functions and essential services of state. These should be a limited number of priorities, time-bound objectives that can be monitored and can deliver tangible results in short to medium-term. Haitian authorities and Development Partners should avoid complex and ambitious capacity development efforts in non-priority areas.

Principle Seven: Long term institutional and organisational development must be in accordance with strongly anchored national development objectives. The medium and long-term building of capacity is most effective when part of a clearly defined path for organisational and/or institutional development. Such plans are usually set out in National Development Strategies, or other processes that focus building the architecture of state in a comprehensive manner. Institutional development outside of a “whole of government” process tends to fail, or be inefficient.

Principle Eight: Capacity development efforts at the level of organisations and institutions need a network of “champions”. National leadership can be uneven across government in post-crisis situations. Where this occurs, Development Partners can work with “champions” inside of the system, to build areas of success. Ideally the “champions” should be as high up in the system as possible, as they are only able to support efforts within their area of influence. The process should be institutionalised as quickly as possible to ensure sustainability.


Principle Nine: International organisations must not worsen Haiti’s acute brain drain.

Haiti suffers from an acute problem of brain drain. Most educated persons migrate out of the country looking for economic opportunity, reducing the pool of human capital available for development. International organisations must not compound the problem by causing local labour market distortions and internal brain drain. This occurs when international organisations attract the most qualified persons away from national employers. The Development Partners must take concrete actions that are transparently monitored to avoid internal brain drain and encourage the return of skilled persons to national organisations.

Principle Ten: The trade-offs that the use of external assistance creates must be managed carefully. There is often a requirement to supplement national capacity with international technical assistance. While this is necessary, the role of international technical personnel must be clearly defined in the overall strategy. Personnel must be suited to the context, not only with professional skills but they must also have the aptitude to work under difficult physical conditions, in the specific cultural context with the challenges of low capacity surroundings. Capacity development should avoid long-term dependence on external assistance and ensure that knowledge, skill and roles are effectively transferred to national staff. The Haitian Diaspora may be a strategic resource that is currently not well used.

Crosscutting Principle: Capacity development must promote gender equality and ensure transparency, accountability and quality assurance. Any capacity development strategy must be based on gender equality. Strategies to promote equality must be based on a comprehensive assessment of gender inequalities and targeted interventions to address them. The principles of transparency, accountability and quality assurance must be integrated into all efforts.

ANNEX 8: UNDP ORGANOGRAM



ANNEX 9: UNDP BUDGET

Implementing agency	Type of organisation	Total project funding channelled through agency (planned or actual)
UNDP	UN Agency	USD 1,256,263
WFP	UN Agency	USD 2,000,000
FAO	UN Agency	USD 1,480,580
Ministry of the Environment, Direction Departementale du Sud	GoH	USD 1,918,945
MARNDR, Direction Departementale du Sud	GoH	USD 771,765
Town of the Southern department (Chantal, Cayes and Coteaux)	Local government (Mayor)	USD 1,115,894
Community Organisations, NGOs	International NGO	USD 380,586
Community Organisations, NGOs	Local NGO	USD 1,340,959

ANNEX 10: UNDP PROJECTS

No	Municipality	Project	Partner	Agency
1	Chantal	River bank protection and cleaning of Acul River	Mairie de Chantal	UNDP
2	Les Cayes	River bank protection of Ravine du Sud	Direction Agricole Sud Dep	UNDP
3	Torbeck	Drainage in Poteau and riverbank protection of Torbeck River	Direction Environnementale DDS/MDE Dep.	UNDP
4	Les Cayes	Cleaning of drainage canals in city of Les Cayes	Mairie Les Cayes	UNDP
5	Aquin	Soil conservation in Colline	DDS/MDE	UNDP
6	Port Salut	Soil conservation and ravine correction in Port Salut	MOPROPS	UNDP
7	Coteaux	Drainage and containment of Empereur ravine	Mairie de Coteaux	UNDP
8	Port-a-Piment	Riverbank protection and cleaning of Grand Passe river	GIPPN	UNDP
9	Cavaillon	Reforestation and agroforestry in Boileau	Oxfam Italia	UNDP
10	Aquin, St Louis	Pilot project on environmental protection	MLFM	UNDP
11	St Louis	Riverbank protection and cleaning of R. Mombin	DDS/MDE	UNDP
12	Aquin, St Louis	Strategic plant nurseries in put in place	DDS/MDE	UNDP
13	Aquin, St Louis	Regeneration of protection soil cover	DDS/MDE	UNDP
14	Port-a-Piment	Rehabilitation of system for distribution of drinking water in Port-a-Piment	KPP	UNDP
15	St Louis	Cleaning and rehabilitation of irrigation systems in Fidel	GRET	UNDP
16	Aquin, St Louis	Co-management plan of hydrographic unit of Aquin-St Louis du Sud	DDS/MDE	UNDP
17	Aquin, St Louis	Development of agroforestry parcels		FAO
18	Aquin, St Louis	Nurseries for fruit trees put in place		FAO
19	Aquin, St Louis	Establishment of farmers field schools		FAO

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