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Institutional Development promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations

Development through Institutions? Sub-study 4

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Acronyms

ADIC	Alcohol and Drug Information Centre
BN	Funksjonshemmedes Bistandsstiftelse (Norwegian Missionary Council)
CB	Capacity building
CBO	Community based organisation.
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DDCAS	District directorate of Social Welfare (Acçaõ Social)
DPCAS	Provincial directorate of Social Welfare (Acçaõ Social)
DF	Norwegian Development Fund
DiS	Diakonhjemmets internasjonale Senter
FIOH	Future in Our Hands
HRD	Human resource development
ID	Institutional development
ID/RD	Institutional Development and Resource Development (a Red Cross program in Southern Africa)
IGP	Income Generating Project
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INTRAC	International NGO Training and Research Centre
IRD	Integrated Rural Development
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MSSEs	Micro and Small-scale Enterprises
MRCS	Mozambique Red Cross Society
NANGO	National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NRC	Norwegian Red Cross Society
OD	Organisational Development
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance or Overseas Development Agency (of the UK)
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORAP	Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PVO	Private Voluntary Organizations
RBM	Redd Barna Mozambique
RBZ	Redd Barna Zimbabwe
RD	Regional Delegation (for the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies)
RLF	Revolving Loan Fund
SAP	Southern Africa Program (of the Red Cross) or Structural Adjustment Program
SAPRCS	Southern African Partnership of Red Cross Societies
SEEP	Small Enterprise, Education and Promotion
SF	Strømme Memorial Foundation

SP	Siri Prabodha
TARSC	Training and Research Support Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
ZAMFI	Zimbabwe Association of Micro Finance Institutions
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Program for Economic and Structural Transformation
ZWB	Zimbabwe Women»s Bureau
ZWFT	Zimbabwe Women»s Finance Trust

Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

This document reports on a study of the institutional development efforts promoted by Norwegian NGOs in the South, and is one of a series of parallel studies covering five channels of Norwegian bilateral assistance: universities; public institutions; private firms; consulting companies; and NGOs. These studies were commissioned by the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and co-ordinated by Diakonhjemmet internasjonale Senter (DiS), which also is responsible

for producing a synthesis report. The North-South Institute (NSI) was engaged to undertake the study of the NGO channel and it, MFA, and DiS agreed case studies should be selected from Norwegian NGO projects in three Southern countries: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Sri Lanka. Each of the selected case studies focussed on the relationship between a Norwegian NGO and a Southern counterpart. The participating organisations are listed below.

Norwegian NGO	Counterpart Organisations		
	in Mozambique	in Zimbabwe	in Sri Lanka
Redd Barna	Ministry of Social Welfare (Acção Social)	Training & Research Support Centre	Siri Prabodha
Norwegian Red Cross	Mozambique Red Cross	Southern Africa Partnership of Red Cross Societies	
Norwegian People's Aid		1. Zimbabwe Women's Finance Trust	
		2. Zimbabwe Women's Bureau	
FORUT			Alcohol and Drug Information Centre
The Development Fund			Future in Our Hands (Sri Lanka)

METHODOLOGY

The NSI mobilised a study team comprising one researcher from Canada (Ted Paterson), who served as team leader, two Norwegian researchers (Grete Brochmann and Ivar Evensmo), and one each from Mozambique (Jacqueline Lambert-Madore), Sri Lanka (Arjuna Parakrama), and Zimbabwe (Phillip Bohwasi). The study lasted from late June to December 1997, and entailed a number of steps. The team reviewed Norwegian aid policies plus the literature on institutional development and related concepts as these relate to NGOs. The team conducted a questionnaire survey Norwegian NGOs concerning their institutional development activities, and met with a number of NGOs in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Britain to discover what approaches these took to promote the development of counterpart organisations and institutions in the South. Finally, team members undertook field missions in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Sri Lanka to study specific cases of institutional cooperation involving Norwegian NGOs.

It must be emphasised that the NGO team undertook a study rather than a full evaluation. Given a tight schedule, the full cooperation of participating Norwegian NGOs and their Southern counterparts was required. Therefore, the NGO team used a «self-selection» approach by inviting Norwegian NGOs to suggest cases which they believed to be interesting and successful examples of institutional cooperation: the selection was then finalised after the relevant Southern organisations agreed to participate. The study aims to glean lessons from successful projects, and makes no claim that the cases described are representative of NGO projects in general, in the focus countries, or in the portfolio of projects supported by the participating NGOs. The NGO team did, however, receive the full cooperation of the participating organisations, and supplemented the rich case study information with data from its survey and literature review before undertaking the analysis leading to its conclusions and recommendations. In brief, the NGO team believes the study has been a very successful exercise leading to some interesting findings

that are relevant to decision makers in the Norwegian government and NGO community, and to their counterparts in the South.

CO-ORDINATION ACROSS STUDIES

DiS arranged a series of workshops bringing together the different study teams to effect co-ordination and ensure each study included certain common elements. The terms used in this field – institutional development, capacity building, organisational development – are notoriously slippery, and it was important for the teams to use common definitions. It was agreed to use institutional development (ID) as the broadest term, embracing five levels: individual; organisational; network; sectoral; and national. The first two of these levels involve human resource development (HRD) and organisational development (OD) respectively, while the last three all entail some form of system development.

In addition, the different study teams prepared a long list of research questions or issues, loosely termed «hypotheses,» and agreed each study would try to address these as a basis for drawing comparisons across the different channels. The cross-channel comparison is provided in the synthesis report by DiS. The findings of the NGO study team are summarised below.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The review of literature revealed a number of strands that have direct relevance to the study of institutional development promoted by NGOs. In brief these are:

- increased awareness that laws, norms, and other institutions comprising «the rules of the game» have a tremendous impact on whether organisations and individuals will co-ordinate effectively to promote development of a society;
- traditional methods employed to strengthen organisations and institutions are too costly and often ineffective;
- NGOs are increasingly important in the international aid system, and particularly so in some Southern countries; and
- there is little hard evidence to support many of the «articles of faith» concerning the comparative advantages of NGOs relative to other development organisations.

In turn, these strands in the literature are reflected in trends in development practice. Most lists of «best prac-

tice» now centre on the concept of local «ownership,» which is thought to result in better targeting and smoother implementation, and to increase the likelihood that achievements will be sustained. In turn, local ownership is most likely to emerge if counterpart staff and intended beneficiaries actively participate in planning, implementing, and monitoring development activities, which implies that «process» rather than «blueprint» approaches to project implementation should be employed. Increasingly, official development agencies are involving NGOs, which have long advocated participatory approaches, while current best practice for Northern NGOs is strengthen Southern NGOs which are better able to relate to, and work with, the target communities.

NORWEGIAN AID POLICY

The NGO team found Norwegian aid policy is very conducive to NGOs that wish to promote ID in the South, and likely encourages some Norwegian NGOs that traditionally have implemented projects directly to experiment more with implementation through local counterpart organisations. This supportive policy environment is based in part on the priorities given to institutional development, recipient responsibility, and linkages between various Norwegian NGOs and their natural partners in the South; a concept termed the «Norwegian axis.» Also important however is a supportive funding policy for Norwegian NGO activities. Generous funding is available on a matching basis to NGOs through Norway's official aid programme, often on the basis of multi-year «frame agreements» which provide reasonable assurance concerning the level and duration of funding.

There is little evidence that the policy mix outlined above is perceived by many in Norway's development NGO community as an imposition. Indeed, many Norwegian NGOs espoused a North-South partnership approach to development – incorporating elements of institutional development, recipient responsibility, and linkages with Southern NGOs – well before such policies assumed prominence in the country's aid programme. As such, these elements of the government's policy represent a shared, rather than an imposed, agenda.

SURVEY FINDINGS

The majority of Norwegian development NGOs, including all the larger organisations, responded to the

survey.¹ In brief, the majority of NGOs reported that they had introduced new policies on capacity building, organisational strengthening of counterparts, and partnership and that their support for institutional development has been increasing. Over 90 percent of the respondents reported that efforts to build capacities in their Southern counterparts have resulted in positive changes, such as increased participation, better dialogue, and (more modestly) enhanced awareness of environmental, gender, and human rights issues.

At the same time, survey responses suggest that many Norwegian NGOs still focus their capacity building efforts principally on the provision of funding, equipment, and training to their Southern counterparts, rather than taking a broader organisational development approach. None of the Norwegian NGOs reported the use of specialised tools for organisational assessment or for the diagnosis of specific performance constraints; rather, they defined needs in the course of project or programme reviews, or reacted to crises experienced by their partners, or simply adopted an extended «getting-to-know-you» process. Still, the survey data suggest Norwegian NGOs are increasing their support for organisational consultancies, the development of local sources of funding, and the use of local NGOs (service organisations) that specialise in providing support services to the country's NGO community. As well, Norwegian NGOs often provide support for networking among Southern NGOs on a sectoral, national, or regional basis, thereby attempting to institutionalise Southern NGO communities.

CASE STUDIES

Team members examined a total of nine cases in the three focus countries. Five Norwegian NGOs participated, along with eight Southern NGOs and one government ministry. One Norwegian NGO (Redd Barna) participated in all three countries, while Norwegian Red Cross projects in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe were studied. In Zimbabwe, two different partners of Norwegian People's Aid participated. Therefore, the cases allowed comparisons across countries (for the same Norwegian NGOs) and across local partners of the same NGO in the same country. Cases also varied by sector, duration of the institutional cooperation, and institutional development goal.

¹ We calculate that the responding organisations account for over 99 percent of the Norwegian bilateral assistance channelled through Norwegian NGOs.

While nine cases represent a limited sample, these did provide a wealth of information concerning how Norwegian NGOs are grappling with institutional development. It is clear the participating Norwegian NGOs are supporting more, and a wider variety of ID activities. The Norwegian NGOs studied are eschewing direct implementation of projects in favour of building capacities in local organisations and developing more robust relationships (partnerships) with local counterparts, which in turn are responsible for implementation. The participating Norwegian NGOs are also active in fostering NGO networks at the national, sectoral, regional, and international levels. In one case, the Norwegian NGO and its local counterparts are seeking to change the national institutional framework (laws and legal administration, cultural norms, support systems) with respect to children's rights.

The case studies strongly suggest that the local context dictates to a significant degree the ID goals, strategies, and activities pursued by Norwegian NGOs operating in a country. Specific contextual factors of clear import are (1) whether the country is in or emerging from a state of emergency, (2) the vibrancy of the local NGO community, and (3) the degree of political polarisation. For example, Norwegian NGOs still assume direct implementation roles in emergency situations, and their ability to subsequently transfer responsibility to local counterparts is largely based on the maturity and capacity of the local NGO community. Such transfer has largely been effected in Sri Lanka but remains a serious problem in Mozambique, where Redd Barna's principal partners are the provincial secretariats of government ministries. In Sri Lanka however, political polarisation is now so pronounced that it is risky for foreign agencies to select partners from among local organisations, as each choice could be interpreted as a political one. Interestingly, in two of the three Sri Lankan cases the local organisation had been «incubated» by the Norwegian NGO (and so represented a known, and apolitical, quantity).² Zimbabwe has a fairly robust NGO community and it is not wracked by partisan political conflict. In this environment, Norwegian NGOs are promoting a wider variety of institutional development activities, with a broader range of local counterparts.

While it is difficult to make firm pronouncements on the basis of a limited number of cases examined over brief

² The third Sri Lankan case featured a longstanding partnership, predating the country's intensified politicisation of recent years.

duration, some of the cases seem extremely successful and most have successful elements. A common but not necessarily causal factor in the most successful cases is that an adaptive approach had been used, which allowed the Norwegian NGO and its local partner(s) to learn-by-doing. While this observation may of course be an artefact of the method used to select the cases for study (i.e., cases were not randomly selected but were suggested by Norwegian NGOs then confirmed with the Southern counterparts), it also is consistent with the literature on «best practice».

Those Norwegian NGOs that are new to ID approaches are also making great efforts to develop new capacities within their own organisations. All the participating organisations are taking steps to learn how to better support ID, capacity building, and partnerships, and in most cases they are updating their corporate policies to better reflect their recent experience. Most of the Norwegian NGOs have been experimenting with strategic planning and medium-term country programmes to ensure their activities are coherent, consistent with their organisation's strategic goals, and appropriate to the local context. At the same time, none of the participating NGOs appear to use formal organisational assessment or performance diagnostic tools to supplement their understanding of what type of capacity building assistance is most required by their Southern counterparts. In a few cases, the Norwegian NGOs seem to have been slow in offering specific types of technical expertise in addition to funds, equipment, and general training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The evidence from the survey and case studies, bolstered by the literature, suggests a number of recommendations. In summary form, these are:

1. If the Norwegian government wishes the country's NGOs to expand their institutional development efforts, its current policy mix featuring a secure funding environment plus the high priority placed on institutional development, capacity building, recipient responsibility, and the Norwegian axis should be maintained.
2. Norwegian NGOs are experimenting with new institutional development approaches and NORAD should promote conferences and workshops to encourage NGO personnel, plus representatives from their Southern partners, to share experiences.
3. Norwegian NGOs involved in emergency programmes should develop plans for the transition to development at an early stage and should field personnel with long term development experience well before the emergency phase ends to prepare for the transition.
4. Norwegian NGOs that seek to develop partnerships with Southern organisations need to acquire additional skills in organisational assessment, organisational development, and consulting, and to make greater use of the organisational assessment instruments now available.
5. Supportive approaches to partnership are not adequate remedy for the lack of the technical skills and knowledge required for the specific activities being promoted. Norwegian NGOs seeking to be good partners have a responsibility for ensuring their Southern partners have access to the specialised technical expertise appropriate to their programmes. Norwegian NGOs could develop such expertise in-house, engage outside consultants, draw-upon the skills available through other donors, or broker south-south links with other developing nations more experienced in the specific field.
6. Given the importance of local factors in determining what types of ID are both feasible and high priority, Norwegian NGOs should be wary of standardised approaches to institutional development. At the same time, NORAD should avoid giving the impression that promoting partnerships with local NGOs is appropriate in every country or for every Norwegian NGO active in a particular country.
7. Northern NGOs and their counterparts must give greater attention to the need for southern NGOs to offer adequate incentives to attract and retain capable staff, particularly in countries in the midst of economic adjustment programmes.
8. NORAD and Norwegian NGOs should re-examine whether financial sustainability is a feasible target in cases where southern NGOs are delivering services to poor communities in poor countries. Organisational sustainability may be a more feasible target, yet one which is still worthwhile.
9. Greater attention must be given to strategies for phasing-out funding subsidies.
10. Norwegian NGOs need to continue experimenting with partnership approaches and how to structure agreements so there are (1) incentives for the partner to improve performance, (2) means to monitor whether performance is improving, and (3) regular opportunities to change the scope and scale of joint endeavours to capitalise on success.

1. Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

We do not know in any concrete way why some countries prosper while others do not. Development policy prescriptions have changed over time from an early emphasis on physical investment, to meeting basic needs, to «getting prices right», to a focus on human capital formation. But results have never been consistent across countries, in part because institutional structures vary widely.³ For example, central planning approaches to development have sometimes achieved impressive early gains in capital accumulation and social welfare. However, such experiments have failed to cope with the administrative demands arising from the very process of development, which increases the pace, variety, and complexity of social transactions. Failures such as these led to structural adjustment programmes in many developing countries which typically sought to establish the primacy of the market, in part by restricting the scope of state and largely ignoring other non-market institutions.

The record of structural adjustment has been mixed at best. However, it was not only the disappointing results achieved by market-dominated solutions in large parts of the South that led to the resurgence of interest in institutional development among development theorists and practitioners. Rather, it was a combination of events. First was the success of the «Asian tigers» in achieving both rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. This was attributed by many to effective action by the state in, for example, channelling credit to favoured industries.

A second factor leading to renewed interest in institutional development was the World Bank and IMF experience in Russia and parts of Eastern Europe, where the retreat of the state led to various forms of «gangster capitalism» precisely because these countries now lack effective institutions for regulating their markets.

The third factor behind the new interest in institutional development is simply that the findings generated by

academic researchers from a number of fields are both interesting and relevant. Douglass North won the Nobel Prize for Economics for his work demonstrating the central importance of institutions on economic growth in history. Robert Putnam wrote how differences in civil society might explain why Northern and Southern Italy have performed so differently over recent centuries. Francis Fukuyama examined the role of trust in the creation of prosperity.

For a variety of reasons therefore, institutional development has become one of the major preoccupations of development theorists, policy makers, and practitioners.

1.2 PURPOSE

The government of Norway has, in recent years, put institutional development squarely at the centre of its official development policy as a means for promoting the type of economic growth that reduces poverty in a sustainable fashion. Accordingly, Norway's Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has commissioned a series of studies on how institutional development is promoted through different channels of its bilateral development programme. This report covers the NGO channel, while parallel studies examined (1) universities, (2) public institutions, and (3) private companies and consulting firms.⁴ The overall objectives of these studies are:

1. to examine and compare institutional development strategies, experiences and outcomes within channels for Norwegian bilateral aid,
2. to increase the understanding of what factors influence and contribute to institutional development, and how public and private organisations in the South change and interact within this context,
3. to contribute towards revising strategies for improved institutional development.

³ The word «institutions» is used in at least three different ways: to signify «the rules of the game» including laws, norms, and accepted patterns of behaviour; as a synonym for organisations; or embracing both «the rules» and organisations. It is used mainly in this last, encompassing sense in this study.

⁴ In addition, a synthesis report examines the similarities and differences across these channels of Norwegian bilateral assistance.

1.3 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS AND TERMS EMPLOYED

1.3.1 What is institutional development? Levels and dimensions

The terminology used for institutional development is still evolving. We have tried to avoid inventing new definitions for this study, and to remain as close as possible to those employed by influential actors in development. We have been guided in part by the UNDP,⁵ but have decided to use «institutional development» rather than «capacity development» as the encompassing term. The concepts and their definitions provided below were discussed and agreed by all teams during the first workshops. We do not claim these are the only possible definitions, only that these will be used consistently in this study. The concepts are discussed in more depth in the Synthesis Report.

1.3.2 A multi-dimensional model of institutional development

A point of departure is that institutional development, used in the broad sense, consists of several dimensions and levels, and that the concept can be decomposed along two variables:

- level of intervention (from individual through organisational to sectoral and systemic levels);
- type and composition of activities typically used at each level, from education and training, to orga-

nisational development activities, to establishing and enforcing rules and regulations for entire sectors and systems.

Defined in this manner, institutional development includes a broad range of activities at various levels of society, with different sets of interventions typically employed within each of these levels. Distinctions are often blurred, and the broader terms often build upon and presuppose the narrower. The terms and levels are as follows:

Human resource development is concerned with how people are educated and trained, how knowledge and skills are transferred to individuals and groups, and how competencies are built and people prepared for their current or future careers. This includes the broad areas of educating and training individuals and groups for general or particular purposes, and represents the first and basic building block of institutional development.⁶

Organisational development has another entry point and seeks to change and strengthen structures, processes, and management systems in specific organisations to improve organisational performance. There are various OD approaches, but in its «pure» form OD has the following characteristics:

- a focus on individual formal organisations and, particularly, their internal functioning;
- limited attention is given to how the external context influences performance;
- most concern with internal organisational changes;

Institutional Development		
Process dimension	Level	Focus
1. Human resource development	Individuals and groups	Transfer and use of competence
2. Organisational development	Organisations	Changes in individual organisations
3. System development	(a) network linkages	(a) Patterns of communication/ collaboration between organisations.
	(b) sector	(b) Policies, rules, legislative framework.
	(c) overall context	(c) Macro-level policies and conditions. Cultural values, norms and traditions

⁵ UNDP (1994) «Capacity Development: Lessons of Experience and Guiding Principles.»

⁶ Institutional development would most likely include and depend on some training and education components, but it is not necessarily true that training and education have an institutional development objective. This is an important distinction in the study since some practitioners simply assume training promotes institutional development.

- major activities and inputs include education, training, technical advice, and equipment;
- organisational change occurs as a result of planned internal changes (in management, culture, administration, etc.) with support from external inputs.

System development is not a term commonly employed in institutional development,⁷ but is used in this study to signify work at levels beyond organisational development. It is a broader concept than OD, and focuses on the organisation's environment.

While organisational development starts inside an organisation, system development looks outside the organisation to its linkages and interactions with the environment, plus how individual and organisational behaviour is regulated and affected by external constraints, pressures and incentives, norms and rules, etc. In addition, contrary to the former organisational viewpoint, the system perspective implies that organisational innovations both affect and are influenced by external variables.

The system dimensions can be further broken into:

- **The networks and linkages among organisations**, including the networks and contacts between organisations which facilitate or constrain the achievement of particular tasks, and which underlie the interdependence of organisations.
- **The sector environment**, referring to the overall policy and institutional structures of the public, private, and civil sectors which constrain or facilitate organisational activities and affect their performance, including legislative frameworks, formal and informal rules, financial resources, etc.
- **The overall context**, which encompasses the broad action environment for the organisations beyond the sector, including the political and socio-economic milieu (macro-policies and conditions) and the prevailing cultural norms, values, and traditions which facilitate or constrain the functional capacity of organisations.

The following definition of institutional development draws on the preceding discussion and underlines the

⁷ Systems development is often called institutional development, but we have found it useful to distinguish the encompassing term and the systemic elements that go beyond organisational development.

interaction between micro (internal) and macro (external) factors in determining how organisations translate capacities into actual performance.

Institutional development is a composite process of change that optimises the performance of organisations in relation to their goals, resources and environment.

1.3.3 Capacity development

Capacity development is also a term used in connection with institutional development and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. We prefer to define **capacity** as the ability of individuals, organisations, or systems to perform their functions more efficiently, effectively, and sustainably. **Capacity development** includes activities, which seek to improve and strengthen such abilities at the individual, organisational, or systemic level. Some suggest that capacity development is a broader concept including also political issues like good governance, transparency, and reform, but such issues are adequately covered in the institutional development framework as we have described it above.

1.3.4 Institutional cooperation

This term is used in a different sense to the concepts covered above. It is a collaborative strategy to strengthen organisations by job-specific skill upgrading, procedural improvements, training and advice, etc. In this study, institutional cooperation represents formalised, long-term cooperation between two similar or like-minded organisations in the North and South to achieve capacity strengthening in one or both organisations, and is one of the key strategies in Norwegian bilateral aid to enhance institutional development in the public, private, and civil sectors.⁸

1.4 Description of methodology employed

Requirements

The study entailed five main components of work: (1) a broad survey on the institutional development policies and practices of Norwegian NGOs; (2) a review of

⁸ Organisational cooperation includes collaboration in all sectors and not only the public sector twinning arrangements.

trends and «best practice» based on available literature and interviews with NGO personnel and researchers; (3) more in-depth studies of specific cases of institutional cooperation between Norwegian NGOs and Southern counterpart organisations; (4) analysis and reporting on the findings from the NGO study; and (5) co-ordination with the researchers conducting the parallel and synthesis studies.

Methodology

The NGO study team comprised one researcher from Canada (Ted Paterson), who served as team leader, two Norwegian researchers (Grete Brochmann and Ivar Evensmo), and one from each of the focus countries (Jacqueline Lambert-Madore from Mozambique; Arjuna Parakrama from Sri Lanka; Phillip Bohwasi from Zimbabwe). The study lasted from late June to December 1997, and entailed a number of steps, briefly outlined below.

- A review of Norwegian aid policies, particularly as these relate to NGOs and to institutional development.
- A literature survey, augmented by meetings with researchers and NGO representatives in Sweden, Denmark, and Britain, to identify trends and «best practice» with respect to institutional development.
- A preparatory meeting of the entire NGO team, held in Oslo in September, at which time team members also met representatives from Norwegian NGOs interested in participating in the exercise.
- Missions to the focus countries (Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Sri Lanka) in October to meet representatives from the Norwegian NGOs and their local partners.
- The preliminary write-up of the findings of the survey and case studies.
- Distribution of the write-up to participating organisations for comments and validation.
- Submission of the draft report to the co-ordinating committee for its review of reports from all channels for quality and consistency.
- Completion of the final report.

The study centres on the case studies of cooperation between Norwegian NGOs and their counterparts in the

South, bolstered by data from the survey, literature review, and interviews with researchers and practitioners in other donor countries. Because of time and budget constraints, the study team could not hope to conduct a true evaluation of cases selected via standard sampling approaches. To obtain the range and quality of information required, the team had to work with Norwegian and Southern organisations that were willing to participate and to openly discuss their objectives, activities, strengths, and weaknesses. Therefore, cases were selected using a four-stage process:

1. the NGO team first selected the focus countries;
2. the team invited a number of Norwegian NGOs active in those countries to indicate their willingness to participate and suggest specific cases;
3. from the long list, nine cases were selected for the study; and finally
4. Norwegian NGOs obtained agreement from their Southern partners.

This final selection was made to allow the comparisons across:

- countries, for the same Norwegian NGO;
- types of Norwegian NGOs, (e.g., NGOs that have direct implementation capacity versus those which only work through local organisations)
- size of Norwegian NGOs;
- type of Southern partner (e.g., local NGO, NGO coalition, government agency);
- type of project (e.g., primarily capacity-building versus primarily service delivery);

This «self-selection» process did not result in a sample that fully reflected the diversity of Norwegian NGOs or their projects in developing countries. For example, no religious NGOs⁹ or professional associations were included among the case studies. However, the study team received excellent cooperation from all participating organisations.

The NGO team also took steps to guard somewhat against a «northern» bias. Consultants active in the local NGO communities were engaged in each of the focus countries. They and the other researchers spent a week in Oslo in advance of the field missions to review plans for the study and to meet representatives from participating NGOs. Upon their return, they made preliminary contacts with the participating national organisations to provide these with information on the study. During the

⁹ Three of the major church-affiliated NGOs and their evolving approaches to institutional development are briefly described in box 2.6.

field missions, the study team held separate meetings with representatives of the Norwegian NGOs and the Southern organisations. The sequence of interview questions were structured to obtain an understanding of the Southern organisation – its history, current operations, and future plans – before proceeding to any discussion of its relationship with the Norwegian NGO. Following the field missions, descriptive write-ups of the cases were distributed to participating organisations for validation, and these validated write-ups then provided the basis for the analytic summaries included in this report.¹⁰

Co-ordination across channels

The NGO study is one of four parallel studies examining institutional development supported through different channels within the Norwegian aid programme: universities; public sector institutions; private compa-

nies and consulting firms; and NGOs. The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned the studies and Diakonhjemmet's internasjonale Senter (DiS) co-ordinated the exercise and is producing a synthesis report.

DiS brought the four study teams together for co-ordination meetings on three occasions: in late June to discuss plans for the individual studies and the overall exercise; August in advance of the field missions to compile a list of common issues for each team to address; and December to review draft reports and discuss the synthesis report.

At the second co-ordination meeting, the teams compiled a list of study questions, loosely termed «hypotheses,» to ensure each study would address certain common issues. These are listed and discussed at the end of section four of this report.

¹⁰ The longer, descriptive write-ups are included for the interested reader in the appendices covering Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka.

2. Institutions, Organisations, and International Development

2.1 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THINKING

Much of the theoretical work in fields such as the New Institutional Economics is of direct relevance to the theory and practice of development. At the start of this decade, economic historians, including Nobel laureate Douglass North, who had demonstrated the central importance of institutions in explaining past economic performance, began to turn to today's economic development efforts (North 1990, 1997). Others revived interest in institutions and organisations within the economics profession as they developed models without some of the simplifying assumptions underpinning the standard picture of perfect competition. The majority of these new models, starting with Coase (1937 and 1960), relax assumptions relating to full and costless information and introduce the concepts of transactions costs and «strategic behaviour.»¹¹ While much of this material remains safely in the domain of economists, these models have been applied to many issues of direct relevance to international development, institutional development, and NGOs.¹² They also have influenced the research of other social scientists, including organisational theorists and political scientists.¹³ In the words of one in the field, the core concept linking the different approaches, from a variety of social science disciplines, is the effort to avoid both «institution-free» economics and «incentive-free» approaches to social change.¹⁴ Simply put, the new models seek to add realism in understanding the incentives that influence the behaviour of people and organisations, and these models then provide tools to analyse real-life cases with more rigour.

The aid system has also played a major role in efforts to accelerate international development and, in particular, to develop the requisite institutions, organisations, and skills. Aid has been far from universally successful in these tasks, and there are many recent studies in search of explanations. One consensus is that traditional ways of trying to improve organisations and skills are too

expensive and often ineffective. Foreign technical assistance experts often do not improve the performance of organisations in developing countries, while graduates from standard training programmes often are equipped with the wrong skills or do not use their new skills as intended because they return to work in dysfunctional organisations or leave their positions altogether, sometimes to emigrate. Therefore, agencies working in the aid system, including NGOs, are experimenting with different methods for providing institutional development assistance, including «twinning» organisations, organisational partnerships, «participatory» approaches to involve the intended beneficiaries in the planning, implementation, and monitoring of projects, and «process» rather than «blueprint» approaches to aid management.

2.2 Evolution of Norwegian policy on institutional¹⁵

2.2.1 General policy

Like many other donors, the Norwegian government has emphasised the concept of institutional development in their aid policy for the 1990s. Institutional strengthening or capacity building for sustainable development has become a cornerstone for Norway's international cooperation as part of its strategy to focus on recipient responsibility for development.

The history of Norwegian support for institutional cooperation and organisational development began with the first development decade. However, the evolution of its current policy starts in 1989-90 with NORAD's *Strategies for Development Cooperation*. This strategy was based on Parliamentary White Papers St.m. nr 36 (1984) and St.m. nr 34 (1986/87), which noted the importance of strengthening key public and private institutions in developing countries while admitting the difficulty in separating technical aid and institutional support.

¹¹ Strategic behaviour is a concept from game theory. The possibility of this exists when the actions of one «player» affect the outcomes available to another player, which is to say, almost always.

¹² See, for example, Hirschman (1970), Brett (1993), Harriss et. al. (1995), Klitgaard (1995), Picciotto (1995), Stone et. al. (1996), Clague (1997), Melinda and Ruttan (1997), Olson (1997), and Ostrum (1997).

¹³ See, for example, Miller (1997).

¹⁴ Incentive-free social engineering is «...any approach to social change that neglects the incentives facing individual actors or that relies for its success on moral exhortations to people to do things that are quite contrary to their self-interest as they perceive it.» (Clague 1997c, p. 370)

¹⁵ For an in-depth discussion about the Norwegian policies and strategies for institutional development, see the synthesis report.

NORAD's strategy emphasised a change from recipient orientation to recipient responsibility in their aid policy. «Responsibility for own development presupposes robust, stable institutions ... For the concept of recipient responsibility to be meaningful, Norwegian development contributions must also in the future be used to enhance proficiency and to reinforce public administrative capacity – institutional development – so that these institutions can become independent of aid as far as possible.»

The same strategy paper stated that «NORAD must actively encourage participation of Norwegian organisational and institutional life in development work,» which was later presented as the **Norwegian axis** in development cooperation. This concept holds that principal responsibility for planning, implementing, and reporting rests with the co-operating partners; in Norway and in the recipient country; while NORAD acts primarily as a source of funding and co-ordination.

The 1991 NORAD strategy for institutional support¹⁶ follows up the broader 1990 strategy. Support to institutional development should aim at improving: (1) the structure and «construction» of the institution (management, lines of authority, rules for decision-making, planning mechanisms, contextual framework, etc.); (2) human resources of the institution (level of education, skills profile, organisational culture, working conditions, etc.); and (3) material resources.

In 1991 MFA released White Paper 51 (1991-92), *Trends in North South Relations and Norwegian Cooperation with Developing Countries*. Competence-building, institutional development, and research were cast as partly overlapping and partly complementary activities. Capacity development occurs primarily through education and training, research, and on-the-job experience, while institutional development is based in institutional circumstances (e.g., administration, leadership, decision-making systems, planning capacity, mandate, etc.).

The White Paper states that support to institutional development can consist of training programmes, institutional support, personnel assistance, institutional cooperation, or any combination of these. Government objectives are to increase the role of institutional cooperation in areas where developing countries express

demand, and where Norwegian institutions have relevant competence and knowledge. White Paper No. 51 confirms the policy change from recipient orientation to recipient responsibility, and argues for a dialogue with recipient governments about such policy issue as democracy, good governance, poverty reduction, and gender to create an enabling environment for development.

To implement the new policies, NORAD presented a second part of their strategy in 1992, focusing on some basic principles for bilateral cooperation:¹⁷

«Norwegian development cooperation must contribute towards strengthening institutions in partner countries, so that in the longer term they will be able to carry out their responsibilities independently of foreign assistance. Such institutions may be in the public, semi-public or private sectors, at central, regional and local levels. Important measures will include:

- supporting reforms and organisational development which will increase the efficiency of the public administration at the central, regional and local level;
- supporting the establishment and development of institutions which may improve the functioning of business, industry and the market;
- emphasising the importance of institutional conditions for all development cooperation – if necessary by making financial support conditional upon the development of expertise and organisational changes;
- identifying and evaluating those institutions in partner countries which are suitable for Norwegian assistance. There will be emphasis on framework conditions and the possibilities for development;
- identifying and strengthening Norwegian institutions which are suitable for institutional cooperation in selected sectors;
- giving priority to using local expertise in projects and programmes supported by Norway;
- supporting training programmes, with particular emphasis on organisational development, administration and management training.»

The next relevant document is the Public Commission of 1995: *A Norwegian Development Cooperation Policy for a Changing World* (NOU 1995: 5). The commis-

¹⁶ A NORAD strategy for institutional support: Institutional Development – Possibilities and Restrictions. (1991)

¹⁷ NORAD, Strategies for Development Cooperation, Basic Principles, Edited 1992

sion discusses the aim and contents of a long-term programme for competence-, capacity-, and institutional-development without defining what it means by institutional development or how it relates to the channels of cooperation. The issue receives relatively less emphasis than in the previous document, but it is clearly noted that institutional development is a priority area. The commission pointed to problem-solving capacity as the key phrase, both at individual and organisational levels, and hence the reason to treat these subjects jointly. It made five main points:

First, institutional development can occur at both local and national levels, and not only in public institutions, but also organisations like voluntary associations, private firms, welfare societies, and others. *Second*, the commission emphasised that cooperation should aim at changing the development framework, and should be based on recipient responsibility. *Third*, cooperation can be built on mutual advantage; that is, both donor and recipient should gain. *Fourth*, poverty orientation should be the guiding light. *Fifth*, it appears logical to concentrate long-term cooperation in a smaller number of least developed countries, where there is a NORAD representative.

The Government White Paper St.meld 19 (1995-96),¹⁸ based mainly on the Commission's report, sees capacity building and institutional development as prerequisites if developing countries are to take responsibility for their own development. Development of expertise and administrative capacity are also important in order to prevent aid dependency. Increased emphasis on capacity building and institutional development was signalled as follows: «past experience of cooperation between Norwegian organisations and institutions and their counterparts in developing countries has been good, and the Government wishes to ensure that this type of cooperation is further developed.»

2.2.2 Policy for assistance through NGOs

In 1991, NORAD published its own NGO-support guidelines.¹⁹ This stated the main goal of Norwegian assistance through NGOs was:

«To strengthen local organisations and beneficiary groups in the host countries. Cooperation between NORAD and these organisations is therefore intended to contribute towards developing the capacity and competence of the local co-operating partner, thereby ensuring that decisions in connection with projects and their management take place at the local/national level.»

This strategic vision made NORAD's NGO division a leader in emphasising institution strengthening through capacity building. This priority was also reflected in the project criteria, although more implicitly, as they emphasised the sustainability of project activities rather than of the organisations themselves.

2.3 NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The term «non-governmental organisation» was first coined in the 1945 UN Charter, but organisations now thought of as NGOs have existed for well over a century, often created to aid war victims. Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross (originally, the International Committee to the Wounded) in 1862 in Geneva. In 1919 Save the Children was established in Britain to assist child victims from the First World War, while the following year saw the formation of World University Service in Geneva as a vehicle for mobilising assistance for the reconstruction of European universities.

2.3.1 Definition

There is no universally accepted definition of «non-governmental organisation» except in the negative: it is neither a UN agency nor an agency of one of the member states of the United Nations, and does not seek to earn profits.²⁰ Fowler's definition of formal NGOs seems one most observers would accept:

- *They are not established for [profit] and cannot distribute any surplus they generate as a profit to owners or staff.*
- *Formed by private initiative, they are independ-*

¹⁸ Report No. 19 to the Storting (1995-96) *A Changing World. Main elements in the Norwegian policy towards developing countries.*

¹⁹ «Support to Non-Governmental Organisations» *Activities in Developing Countries.* (1991)

²⁰ Although details vary by jurisdiction, «profits» are surpluses that ultimately can be appropriated for the use of a legal person – an individual or corporation. NGOs and other not-for-profit organisations can earn surpluses so long as these are used for the «good purposes» of the organisation. Depending on the jurisdiction, the income of a not-for-profit organisation may be subject to income tax. See ICNL 1997.

Transnational NGOs:

A number of the oldest and best known NGOs operate in some way or another in many countries in both the South and North. For example, CARE started in the US, and has at one time or another provided emergency and development assistance to the majority of countries in Central Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But CARE also has affiliates in Canada, Australia, Britain, Norway, and a number of other European countries. In 1980 the original organisation became CARE-US, and a new CARE International was established in Paris to co-ordinate the affiliates. Similarly, Oxfam established Oxfam-Canada in the early 1960s as a fundraising endeavour. There now are separate Oxfam affiliates in Québec, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, and an Oxfam-International has been created in Washington to co-ordinate advocacy efforts at the World Bank and IMF on behalf of the «family.»

Smillie (1995, pp. 197-213) has categorised such networks as transnational NGOs which, like transnational corporations, can capitalise on some organisation-specific asset, like «brand recognition,» to facilitate expansion to other countries where they acquire location-specific advantages, such as public donations or funding from that nation's aid agency.

The International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA) is one such NGO. In 1920 one of the founders of Britain's Save the Children Fund (SCF) established the International SCF Union in Geneva, and drafted a first version of the Rights of the Child; adopted by the League of Nations the following year. The UN adopted the latest version of this document in 1989,

and the defining feature of all SCF organisations remains that their work is based on the rights of the child.

After 1928, the SCF Union went into abeyance until 1976 when various SCF organisations began meeting within a loose association called the SCF Alliance. In 1988, the Alliance was renamed the International Save the Children Alliance, with a small secretariat and a full-time executive director based again in Geneva. Its original role focused on external representation but it now aims to, *inter alia*:

- build a world-wide movement for children's rights;
- protect Save the Children's corporate identity;
- establish Save the Children as a leading global brand;
- build the Alliance's global fundraising competence; and
- raise significant additional net income.

(International Save the Children Alliance. «Planning Framework 1997-2000.» 24 February 1997, Geneva.)

Among ISCA's specific objectives are to (1) raise at least \$100 million by 2003, and (2) establish an ISCA regional office in South-East Asia as a pilot effort to save costs by the use of shared facilities and support services.

The SC Alliance currently has 25 members, including Redd Barna (Norway), Red Barnet (Denmark), and Rädde Barnen (Sweden).

Box 2.1: Transnational NGOs

ent, in that they are not part of government nor controlled by a public body.

- *Within the terms of whatever legislation they choose to register themselves, they also govern themselves.*
- *Registration means that the founders wish to have social recognition; this calls for some degree of formalisation and acceptance of the principle of social accountability.» (Fowler: 1998, p. 38)²¹*

For our purposes, this study is concerned only with development NGOs – those working in some way to promote international development. The majority of or-

ganisations commonly referred to as NGOs are not legally registered; mainly the so-called grassroots or community-based organisations (CBOs).

Whatever definition is used, NGOs are an extremely diverse group. In Norway alone there are NGOs affiliated with churches, labour unions, the co-operative movement, political parties, professional associations, and community organisations.²² Some NGOs operate overseas, while others provide money or services to Southern partners. Some NGOs have a tradition of emergency response, while others only support long-term development. There are NGOs that restrict themselves to single issues (e.g., gender) or countries, while others operate internationally in a variety of fields. Some Norwegian NGOs are also members or affiliates of an international family or network. [see Box 2.1: Transnational NGOs]

²¹ A similar definition, based on a Johns Hopkins study, is given in Smillie: 1995, p. 34.

²² The Tvedt study (1995) uses «shared values» to classify Norwegian NGOs into five groups: humanitarian, missionary, special interest, trade and vocational, and political/ideal.

Nonprofits in the Developing World²⁴**Brazil:**

- 200,000 nonprofits country-wide, of which 45,000 are in Sao Paulo alone and 16,000 in Rio.
- Total employment is easily one million, or about 2 percent of total employment.
- Most are funded by fees and charges rather than by funds from abroad.

Egypt

- 20,000 non-profits exist nation-wide.
- Most are urban, but 30 percent work in rural areas
- Included are 22 professional groups whose members number 3 million.

Thailand

- Of the some 11,000 registered nonprofits country-wide, 2,200 are based in Bangkok.
- Many more are non-registered.
- An important segment of the sector is made up of traditional cremation societies.

India

- At least 2 million associations are at work country-wide.
- 15,000 NGOs receive some \$460 million in foreign funds.

Ghana

- 800 formal nonprofits are registered.

Box 2.2: Nonprofits in the Developing World

Today estimates vary widely, but there are more than 4,000 NGOs in Europe alone that work primarily in, or on behalf of, peoples in the developing world.²³ If one counted all community-based organizations and other non-profit groups that were neither governmental nor private sector, were at least partly voluntary, and did not exist to generate a profit, one could easily count on millions world-wide. [see Box 2.2: Non-profits in the developing world]

The growth in numbers has been paralleled by a growth in funding, geographic spread, scope of activities and, for some, size. BRAC (formerly Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) has 12,000 staff, operates 35,000 primary schools, and involves millions as volunteers, participants, and beneficiaries. One NGO in Zimbabwe claims more than 1 million members. [see box 2.3: ORAP] In 1993, World Vision had 5370 staff, 20 offices, and expenditures of \$261 million (Smillie 1995, p. 199).

The proportion of official development assistance (ODA) channelled through OECD country NGOs has increased from less than 1 % in the mid-1970s, to well over 10 % by 1994, representing at least \$6 billion (ODI 1996). USAID alone provided more than \$1.6 billion to 419 PVOs via grants, contracts, subsidies, and food grants – it provided another \$200+ million to NGOs in developing countries (Jordan 1996). The proportion of

ODA flowing through NGOs varies significantly by donor country, ranging from a high of about 30 % for Sweden and 25 % in Norway, to perhaps 1 % for Japan (ODI 1996, p. 2). While total ODA has fallen in the last few years, the proportion delivered through NGOs appears to have increased.

The trend to provide increasing aid through NGOs is driven by a number of factors. First, donors clearly share a number of assumptions about the «comparative advantage» of NGOs in delivering assistance. Among these «articles of faith» are that NGOs:

- provide low-cost and cost-effective services;
- are innovative and flexible;
- are in touch with local communities;
- employ participatory approaches which increases beneficiary ownership;
- empower local NGOs and communities;
- are successful at poverty alleviation;
- reach marginalised groups and the poorest of the poor; and
- provide certain services (e.g., networking, community mobilisation, and sharing information) that neither governments nor businesses can or are willing to provide.

Delivering aid through NGOs is also supported by many because it increases the number and type of organisations engaged in development, and «...they can add an important dimension to the organizational environment, expanding the range of individual choice and human freedom» (Brett 1993, p. 299).

²³ OECD, Directory of Non-Governmental Organisations Active in Sustainable Development, Part 1: Europe, OECD Development Centre, Paris, 1996. **

²⁴ From Anheier and Salamon (forthcoming).

ORAP:

The Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP) was registered in 1981 by a group of Zimbabweans with experience using participatory research methods. Its basic aim is «*To promote Rural Development on the basis of Rural Associations through which rural people can co-operatively realise their aspirations for self-employment and self-reliance and to provide such associations with financial, informational and technical support.*»

ORAP has a multi-tier structure based on Amalima (family participatory development), in which five or more households form family units, then ten to 25 family units form a village group, five or more groups elect an umbrella, and five or more umbrellas elect an association. The family units, groups, umbrellas, and associations constitute what is commonly known as the «ORAP movement.» Each association has an elected executive, and representatives from each of the 16 associations constitute the Advisory Board, which is the supreme decision-making authority and meets every six weeks. A seven-person Executive Committee is elected from the Advisory Board and Board of Trustees.

ORAPs structure has facilitated rapid expansion. It claims a membership of 1.5 million. Geographically, ORAP grew from covering six wards in 1980 to five hundred wards and hundreds of projects. Its work programme includes food security/ environment;

water; women and child care; community mobilization; education and training; and an Economic Programmes Division to earn income for ORAP itself. ORAP's staff complement has grown from three in 1981 to 120 in 1997.

As the following makes clear, ORAP is a self-confident organisation: «*ORAP will write half-yearly reports about its work ... its cooperators... in turn, will be expected to present written comments on the report ...Cooperators should also submit to ORAP periodic reports about their work.*» (ORAP, 1993, p. 138)

ORAP has established its own Zenzele College and offers diploma and degree-level programmes in «Grassroots Development and NGO Management,» in conjunction with the School for International Training in Vermont and BRAC's Centre for Development Management in Bangladesh.

ORAP donors have grown from three in 1981 to about 17 today, including Norwegian People's Aid. Since 1992 ORAP has organised biennial conferences involving all its donors, at which it presents its programme for the coming three years, and asks its donors to make pledges. ORAP also has two «open weeks» each year, when it invites all its partners plus other organisations working in the same communities, for field visits and information sharing.

Box 2.3: ORAP

Increasing resort to the NGO channel also reflects the widely held view that much aid has been wasted by bilateral and multilateral donors, and by recipient governments. Reducing the size and scope of the state has featured prominently in structural adjustment programmes. In many other countries, the failure to secure World Bank/IMF endorsement led to a withdrawal of aid, prompting fiscal crises that curtailed the state in even more draconian ways. The vacuum left by government cutbacks often will not be met by businesses because they cannot make money from providing those services, at least in poor or remote communities: if not government or business, then perhaps NGOs.

A more sweeping variant of this view has been termed «the new policy agenda» (Hulme and Edwards 1997b, pp. 5-6). In some cases, NGOs are seen as the preferred means of delivering services that traditionally had been provided by the state: they are thought more efficient and they keep the state at bay by serving as substitute providers of social services. They are also seen as the

remaining means for «democratisation,» and run the danger of being coopted into a role as a safety-valve; allowing for the control release of public pressures for radical reform in a world of mammoth businesses and withered states. NGOs thus became the «magic bullet,» solving all problems at a stroke.

The privileged position of NGOs is not an unalloyed blessing. For years some in the NGO community have warned about dangers inherent in accepting government funding. Collectively, the share of NGO income from official sources rose from perhaps 1.5 % in the early 1970s to perhaps 30 % by 1995. NGO dependence on government funding is far higher in some countries: an estimated 85 % in Sweden, 80 % in Belgium, 70 % in Canada, and 66 % in the United States (ODI 1995, p. 2). As well, much of the growth in funding has been for emergency relief rather than development. Finally, more of the funds flowing through NGOs are for projects designed to put a «human face» on structural adjustment programmes, whose core objectives are inimical to

NGO values. In such situations, NGOs run the risk of serving twin deceits: as band aids covering life-threatening wounds in developing countries, and as placebos to the conscience of their domestic publics.

2.3.2 Recent assessments

International

Until recently the comparative advantages of NGOs have largely been taken on faith – these had to be, because few independent evaluations had been undertaken of NGO performance, and even fewer became part of the public record. The situation changed dramatically in the past decade, in part because official donor agencies had to commission such assessments once they began transferring large sums to NGOs. The initial results were sobering. NGO critics have interpreted the evaluations as showing:

«1. the quality of NGO development cooperation is not better than aid provided by bi- or multilateral organizations. 2. NGOs do not reach the poorest of the poor in the Third World. 3. NGOs have become bureaucracies, only interested in their continuation as an institution. 4. Northern NGOs give the wrong image of what is happening in the Third World, because they are too much concerned with fund raising. 5. Big NGOs have become too dependent on governments. And 6. Northern NGOs behave in a paternalistic way in respect to Southern NGOs» (van Dijk 1995, p. 27).

Similar evidence has continued to roll in. Recently ODI listed 11 major donor evaluations of NGO impact undertaken between 1988 and 1995 (ODI 1996, p. 1). The report summarised the findings as: (1) the vast majority of NGO projects did succeed in achieving their narrow project objectives, but (2) these projects fail in the main to achieve a broad impact. In spite of the fact that participation, gender sensitivity, environmental awareness, flexibility, and innovation are common refrains in the NGO liturgy, the findings cast doubt on NGO performance in these areas. As well, a high percentage of the NGO projects assessed were financially unsustainable, and cost-effectiveness could not be determined in most cases.

In 1996 the OECD/DAC went further, commissioning a synthesis survey of NGO evaluations, which found that «...in spite of growing interest in evaluation and rising numbers of evaluation studies, there is still a lack of firm and reliable evidence on the impact of NGO devel-

opment projects and programmes» (Kruse et al. 1997).

Indeed, it would be highly suspicious if evaluations did not raise some uncomfortable questions about NGO performance. The significant expansion of official funding to NGOs encouraged many to grow rapidly, expanding into activities for which they lacked the requisite experience, or into countries where tried-and-true methods did not work. Much of this expansion in activity and scope was in response to emergencies, often of a scale never before addressed by any non-governmental agency. Also, NGOs increasingly found themselves in the role of contractors implementing projects designed by the funders. More basically, NGOs – perhaps even more so than businesses – are remarkably heterogeneous, and it would be surprising if consistently good results were obtained on NGO projects.

While these studies have usefully debunked some of the hoary myths surrounding NGO effectiveness, they say little on balance about the comparative advantage of NGOs relative to other organisations working in the aid system. If NGOs are not always better, are they *relatively* more effective at *certain* tasks? There then is the fundamental dilemma of the aid system: those beneficiaries – whether countries, organisations, communities, or individuals – most in need of assistance are often the ones with which achievements are hardest to glean and sustain. Although the recent spate of evaluations shows NGO projects do not reach «the poorest of the poor,» it confirms that NGOs reach deeper into poor and marginalised communities. Here, project implementation and sustainability problems abound due to the same factors that resulted in the poverty in the first place.

In spite of these caveats, the recent evaluations of NGO performance and the impact of NGO projects have, on balance, been useful. NGOs, donors, and their partners have a better understanding of NGOs, the diversity within the NGO community, and that NGOs are staffed by mere mortals.

Norwegian

As with most countries, Norway's support of NGOs in the 1980s was motivated more by ideological sympathy than documented evidence of their comparative advantages vis-à-vis other aid channels. This changed in 1993 when two important studies were undertaken. The first was by the OECD, which focused on government-NGO cooperation in several European countries, including

Norway.²⁵ The second study was carried out within Norway itself, with findings reported in 1995. This latter report drew attention to the complexity of the NGO sector, and attempted to debunk the myths associated with NGO work. One significant conclusion of the report was that «...there are no empirical data that can substantiate the conclusion that they [NGOs] are «better» in poverty alleviation and sustainable development work.»²⁶

Finally, the 1996 OECD/DAC synthesis study reviewed Norwegian NGO-initiated studies on evaluation methods and impact assessments, and found clear evidence that there had been a rapid expansion in the number of

evaluation reports on Norwegian NGO activities in the prior five years. The quality of these reports varied enormously, but an increasing number are of high quality, with recommendations that are followed up by the organisations. The OECD/DAC study also confirmed that an increasing number of Norwegian NGOs have started to focus more on institutional development objectives and that many institutional development and partnership evaluations are now under way.

Such evaluative exercises are particularly important in Norway, where government funding through NGOs is high. [see box 2.4: Norwegian funding to its NGOs]

Norwegian funding to its NGOs:

Norwegian NGOs can receive government funding through a number of different channels. The main distinction is between funding for NGO-initiated activities, which are funded on a matching basis,²⁷ and funding to an NGO implementing a project on behalf of NORAD (for development projects) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for emergency relief),²⁸ which are financed entirely with government funds. Some NGOs, and particularly those with emergency relief traditions such as Redd Barna, receive very substantial sums via this channel.

NORAD's 1997 budget for matched-funding is about NOK 589 million,²⁹ an increase of 10 percent from 1996 and 24 percent over two years. About 90 percent of the total is for «frame agreements» while the remainder covers funding to specific projects.

Larger and more established organisations can obtain frame agreements in support of their self-initiated activities. The duration is normally five years. It does not specify the amount of money budgeted over the life of the agreement, and each year the NGOs apply for the money they think they can match. In 1996, 17 organisations had such agreements, the biggest of which are with (in order) Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian Missionary Council (BN), Redd Barna, and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).

Most of the frame agreements are «project-based» (i.e., the NGO specifies the projects that

will be supported by government funds), but the Redd Barna and Norwegian Church Aid agreements are «programme-based.» This variant has been promoted by NORAD and involves a further delegation of authority to the NGOs themselves, while NORAD limits its involvement to discussions about sector policies and programme objectives. The difference between project- and programme-based agreements has become less pronounced in recent years as NORAD has delegated greater responsibility to all NGOs covered by frame agreements, while maintaining responsibility for broad policy direction, and for quality and financial oversight.

NGOs not covered by frame agreements can apply for funding on a project-by-project basis. The NGO must document its professional competence and development expertise, submit audited accounts for the last two years, and document that it can raise its 20 % share of the budget. Project-specific agreements cover periods up to three years.

The total quantity of funding available is as important as the choice of mechanism. In this, Norwegian NGOs have been more fortunate than NGOs in many other donor countries such as Canada, where aid budgets have been slashed significantly in recent years. On the other hand, unlike most European NGOs, Norwegian NGOs do not have ready access to EU funds.

Box 2.4: Norwegian funding to its NGOs

²⁵ Smillie and Helmich (1993).

²⁶ Tvedt (1995, p. 19).

²⁷ Normally matching agreements are on a four-to-one basis (i.e., 80 percent government funds and 20 percent funds raised by the NGO from other sources such as public donations).

²⁸ The new government recently announced that responsibility for emergency projects will be transferred to the Minister for Development and Human Rights.

²⁹ This includes NOK 33.4 million shown separately for the South Africa programme.

2.3.3 Recent developments and good practice

International

The impact of the impact evaluations ultimately may prove more concrete than their findings. Members of the NGO community have expended huge effort and much ink in grappling with the failure of these studies to conclusively demonstrate the superiority of social justice approaches to development. Many of the most thoughtful in the NGO community felt the studies vindicated their unease with the growing dependence of NGOs on public funding, the co-optation of NGOs into roles as contractors, and the motivational muddles engendered when value-based organisations compete with one another – and with businesses – for funds and contracts. They are using the opportunity to strengthen NGO policies and operations. This section follows two of these paths to improved practice.

Striking a Balance³⁰ – One broad avenue of exploration has been the attempt to reconcile professionalism with altruism.

Despite concerns about the logic of pursuing development via discrete projects, projects remain the «privileged particles of development» (Hirschman 1967) and provide the vehicle for most NGO activity. In light of criticism, NGOs have given more attention to project planning, striving for more explicit goals and objectives, clearer specification of outputs required to promote those objectives, and better assessments of the inputs required to attain the output targets. This then sets the stage for greater interest in evaluations, both to demonstrate effectiveness and to learn from successes and failures.

This type of performance improvement requires more attention both to staff development and organisational learning, and soon leads to documents outlining how to do things well. Many NGOs have developed impressive manuals, handbooks, and sourcebooks covering policies and procedures, techniques and resources. Bigger dollops of funds from donors mixed with the NGO penchant for self-criticism, then added to growing demands for efficiency and accountability from donors, gives a recipe for a thriving market for specialised NGO services. A number of support NGOs now exist to provide

training and consulting services specifically to NGOs [see Box 2.5: Service NGOs]. These often promote modern management techniques, derived especially from Peter Drucker's management-by-results approach³¹ and from organisational development theories. Specialised programmes in NGO management have proliferated at all levels, including the university level.

Some argue this drive for professionalism within NGOs is fundamentally at variance with the culture of a values-based organisation. Increased focus on rigorous planning, on efficient and effective implementation, on documentation of what is learned and codifying this into policies and procedures manuals, sounds (and is) bureaucratic. NGOs are using project LFAs, developing contract templates specifying reporting and disbursement schedules for their «partners,» monitoring procedures, and more. What place does this leave for community participation, and does this create too arid an atmosphere for partnership to thrive? In a very real sense, some NGOs are becoming more like the government agencies they love to hate.

Others see this tension between the professional virtues of efficiency and accountability and the values espoused by social justice organisations as a healthy prod to NGOs, challenging them to strike a new balance between the two. Efficiency and accountability is essential if NGOs are to contribute significantly to the practice of development (Brett 1993), but it must be used in the service of the legitimising populations if this contribution is to be unique.

Sustainability, Partnership, and Capacity Building

– The other broad thrust in the NGO self-improvement programme starts with the community's growing recognition of the importance of sustainability. This is, of course, a nettlesome concept and there are a variety of dimensions to sustainability. For example, many question whether financial sustainability is a reasonable target to impose on projects involving the very poor.

However, acceptance of any reasonable definition of sustainability immediately calls into question some traditional NGO practices, including direct implementation of development projects by Northern NGOs: what happens when the foreign NGO leaves the country? This then leads to the questions of capacity building as a

³⁰ This phrase is the title of Fowler's recent book (1997).

³¹ See, for example, Fowler (1997, Chapter 7) and Drucker (1990).

Service NGOs:

One category of NGO is the «service NGO.» Also termed support organisations, these agencies provide specialised support services to the voluntary sector, such as project formulation and planning, management or organisational consulting, training and education, or research. One of the best known is INTRAC in the UK, which provides training, consultancy, and research services relating to (1) NGO management and organisation, (2) improving development projects and programmes, and (3) media management and policy advocacy. Others in the North include PACT (Private Associations Cooperating Together) from New York, and the Institute for Development Research in Boston.

Other well-known NGOs are based in the South, including PRIA in India and the PRIP Trust in Bangladesh, CDRA (Community Development Resource Association) in South Africa, and EASUN (Eastern Africa Support Unit for NGOs) in Tanzania.

A number of service NGOs exist in Zimbabwe, although many of these have a regional mandate. For one example, Mwelekeo wa NGO (MWENGO), is a «reflection and development centre» for NGOs in Southern Africa with three programmes: (1) NGO

identity and legitimacy, (2) civil society and advocacy, involving networking to strengthen the sector and help it mobilise on certain policy issues, and (3) strengthening organisations and programs, through which it seeks to build NGO capacity.

IREN is an international network based in Geneva, and with four regional offices in each region of Africa, Asia/Oceania, Latin America, and the North. The current president of its Assembly of Delegates (i.e., Board) is the founder of ORAP in Zimbabwe. Its Harare office offers a development resource centre, policy analysis and advocacy services, and publications relating to two main programmes: (1) democracy for economic empowerment, and (2) the people's economy («an economic base that is owned and managed by the people»).

A few specialised consulting firms would be included in the somewhat broader term of support organisations. Perhaps the best known of these in Zimbabwe is Symacon of Harare, which provides management consulting services principally, but not exclusively, to the NGO sector. (For a case study on Symacon's work, see Sahley: 1995, pp. 96-106.)

Box 2.5: Service NGOs

means for sustainability and, perhaps, as a worthwhile end in itself.³²

Increasingly, members of the aid system are suggesting that Northern agencies should not be directly involved in the implementation of activities in the South; rather, they should support implementation by Southern counterparts. Many in the NGO community are in the vanguard on this point, and go further to suggest NGOs, as value-based organisations, should seek to link with like-minded partners in the South, and then to support the work of these partners. Partnership has become a new NGO mantra.

The arrival on the scene of the partnership model of development management has received mixed reviews in the South. Most Southern NGOs would, of course, welcome a spin at partnership with their funders if the Southern partner leads the waltz. However, the perceptive or paranoid (depending on one's view) in the South

doubt much initiative will rest with Southern organisations. In its most excoriating form, the view from the South suggests the partnership model is simply the latest phase of Northern domination:

«At the turn of the century, Taylorian methods were designed to control people's muscles. In the late 1960s and 1970s, flexible management systems evolved as a means of controlling people's minds. Today, the language of shared values, partnerships, and ethics is intended to control people's souls.» (reported by S. Zadek and cited in Andersson 1997)

In spite of the ambivalence and suspicion that some in the South have, clearly many Northern NGOs are trying hard to find means to make the partnership model work [see box 2.6: Norwegian cases]. In many cases this entails the use of participatory methods to open lines of communication with their partners as well as with target groups, before, during, and after interventions. In a few cases at least, this has expanded to broader consultations with stakeholders.³³

³² See Bebbington and Mitlin (1996) for a description of three conceptions of capacity building – as a means, as a process, and as an end.

³³ See for example Zadek and Gateard (1995).

However, ever more Northern NGOs; some with extensive experience, professional methods, and substantial funding; are in the market for Southern partners. The supply of capable partners in some Southern countries

has not been able to meet the demand. This risks a new phase of «institutional destruction resulting from donor and project proliferation» (Morss 1984) and puts a premium on capacity building of counterpart organisations.

Some Norwegian Cases:

Many Norwegian NGOs are strong advocates of partnership with Southern NGOs, and among the most experienced in institutional development in the South are those affiliated with churches. Partnership has long been an ideal in Christian circles, having been discussed for more than four decades.³⁴ As it emerged as a key concept in the wider development debate around 1990, these organisations took the lead in developing the concept further.

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is the largest of the church-affiliated NGOs in Norway, and has the largest of all frame agreements with NORAD. Its budget in 1995 was NOK 232 million: 97 million for development work and NOK 135 million from MFA for emergency aid.

NCA works with emergency aid, long-term development, and advocacy on a wide scale, operating programmes through many channels and in most sectors. It has regional programmes in all Southern continents. NCA has a strict non-operational policy and supports 215 projects implemented by more than 150 local partners, most of which are affiliated to the national council of churches in each country, although some are government agencies or other local organisations without religious affiliation. On the basis of strong ecumenical conviction, NCA has defined partnership as a long-term relationship of mutual respect, reciprocity and transparency, formalised by a partnership agreement. Institutional development is one of its nine strategic objectives.

NCA has staff in Oslo and regional field offices, and also engages external consultants. A special OD advisor – a first for NCA – was recruited recently for the East Africa regional office to supply partners with organisational assessment tools and training in their use.

The **Norwegian Missionary Council (BN)** acts as a secretariat for the 14 major mission organisations. Its frame agreement for 1997 is NOK 89 million, and covers 118 projects. Since 1989 BN has worked systematically on facilitating transfers of projects from their mission members to local partner organisations, mostly national Lutheran churches. These efforts

include manuals for field-workers covering project assessment and the analysis of organisational capacity in both Northern and Southern organisations. Analysis of project sustainability has been institutionalised through specially adapted NORAD application and reporting forms. After several years of capacity building for project implementation, BN has now started to address organisational capacity as well.

The **Strømme Memorial Foundation (SF)** is a medium-sized Christian development organisation supporting evangelical work and development projects in cooperation with mission agencies, churches, and other development organisations. Its turnover in 1995 was above NOK 60 million.

With its Christian philosophy, the Strømme Foundation gives special value to justice, participation, sustainability, and self-reliance. While institutional development and training have been integral elements of all projects, the SF has recently started to specialise in capacity building of local partners, focusing particularly on the local fund-raising function. Since 1996 one of its main activities has been an institutional development programme based in its Bangladesh regional office, supporting 22 NGOs in six Asian countries. This programme provides services through consulting, workshops, and training courses using modules developed in-house. It works in the following thematic areas: needs assessment and project planning; strategic planning; financial management and assessment of accounting systems; study of indigenous culture; evaluation; and partner relationships. Other modules will be introduced in the near future.

In 1997 SF issued «Partnership and Capacity Building,» a policy paper defining both terms³⁵ and explaining how the Foundation will work to achieve these. Partnership principles are defined by the following parameters: commitment, equality, integrity, mutuality, openness, and transparency. Strømme's approach is the outcome of a long period of practical experiments, studies, and policy evaluations, and may represent the cutting edge of Norwegian NGO work in institutional development.

Box 2.6: Some Norwegian cases

³⁴ The concept was launched officially at the International Missionary Council meeting in Whitby in 1947.

³⁵ Strømme follows the INTRAC definition of capacity building: «An explicit outside intervention to improve an organisation's performance in relation to its mission, context, resources and sustainability.»

2.3.4 Recent surveys on institutional development by NGOs³⁶

Two recent surveys provide solid evidence that increasing numbers of Northern NGOs are giving greater priority to institutional development and capacity building. The International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) carried out a survey of NGOs in Europe and North American in 1993-94 to document how NGOs seek to strengthen organisational capacity of Southern partners. The NGO team conducted a similar survey of Norwegian NGOs as part of the current study. For comparative purposes, we included many of the INTRAC survey questions, in addition to questions directly relevant to this study. A number of questions invited open-ended responses, and many Norwegian NGOs took the opportunity to expound at some length.

Response rate to the Norwegian questionnaire

The questionnaire was sent to 80 NGOs of which 56 responded. Seven of these said the survey did not apply or they had no capacity to answer. The remaining 49 organisations returned completed forms. Many also enclosed policy statements, planning documents, and other relevant papers. The gross response rate was 70%, while the net was 61 % if we exclude the seven that did not complete questionnaires. However, the responding organisations accounted for NOK 487.7 million (99.5 %) of the ordinary NGO budget line in 1996. All NGOs with NORAD frame agreements for 1996 are included. The respondents thus account for the overwhelming bulk of Norwegian ODA disbursed through NGOs and should give an excellent picture of the overall situation.³⁷

Understanding Capacity Building (CB)

Half the Norwegian organisations have policies or guidelines for CB, while the other half have some activities or resources devoted to CB. When asked to give examples, the latter group pointed to support for personal visits, investments, core funding, access to international information, skills training, assisting programme development strategies, and community mobilisation. In gen-

eral, the Norwegian NGOs have a good understanding of CB, and believe their work supports it.

Responses to the open-ended questions seem to indicate two main strategic approaches to counterpart CB. Some Norwegian NGOs emphasise organisational strengthening, while others focus on networking and alliances. As well, some Norwegian NGOs clearly see CB as a means to an end, while others value this as an end in itself.

None of the Norwegian NGOs indicated use of specialised tools for organisational assessment³⁸ or diagnosis of specific performance constraints; rather, they defined such needs in the course of project or programme reviews, or reacted to crises experienced by their partners, or simply through an extended «getting-to-know-you» process.

Types of Support

Training and consulting

In both the 1993 and 1997 surveys, management training and consulting services are by far the most common method for strengthening partners. Most Norwegian NGOs undertake such work themselves, with a minority contracting-out. Some organisations have either created their own training and evaluation units or facilitate links to local training institutes or regional organisations.

Both surveys found management training overlapped with human resource development, training in personnel or financial management, and strategic planning. These last items were achieved through various methods, such as exposure training, exchange programmes, and NGO network meetings. Hiring consultants to conduct OD work is a growing trend in both the North and South. The table below summarised these findings.

Seconding staff

A majority of Norwegian NGOs use staff secondments involving (i) their own staff to Southern counterparts, (ii) hosting counterpart personnel, or (iii) both.

Core or institutional funding

Respondents in 1993 indicated the provision of «institutional funding» to Southern counterparts had varied results – in some instances this helped overcome constraints on organisational performance, while in others it

³⁶ See also Appendix 5, which contains the questionnaire.

³⁷ If their collective share of emergency aid from the MFA had been included, they would have dominated the picture even more.

³⁸ See, for example, Hailey (1995) for examples of organisational assessment instruments.

Table 2.1: Types of support for capacity building.

Nature of support (source table in 1997 survey)	1997 Survey of Norwegian NGOs (percent yes)	Move 1993 to 1997	1993 Survey of N. American & European NGOs (percent yes)
Technical or management training (table 9)	93 %	→	87 %
OD consulting (table 10)	89 %	→	74 %
Seconding staff (table 11)	61 %	→	47 %
Core financing (table 12)	71 %	→	85 %
Support for local financing (table 12)	80 %	→	60 %
Support networks (table 14)	67 %	-	68 %
Service NGOs (table 15)	65 %	→	44 %

provided a cushion for local managers, allowing them to defer adjustment to difficult local economic realities. Fewer Norwegian NGOs provide such funding, perhaps in recognition of the difficulties it can create in some instances. Still, in the 1997 survey a majority of Norwegian NGOs say they provide core funding to counterparts, and almost a quarter of this group do so with over 50 percent of partners. Most of these agreements last for three-to-five years, and are formalised through written agreements.

Support for local financing

Programmes to increase local financing programmes were run by 60 percent of respondents to the 1993 study. The proportion of Norwegian NGOs carrying out such programmes is even higher (80 percent), with ten organisations allocating more than half their support to such activities.

Southern NGO Networks and Resource Centres

The INTRAC survey indicated 68 percent of respondents gave support to the development of Southern networks. Smaller Northern NGOs were most likely to offer such support, while funding for support organisations in the South was much more likely from larger NGOs and those with field offices.

Reported outcomes

In 1993 few NGOs supporting CB claimed to have evaluated these programmes. Four years later the situation has improved among Norwegian NGOs, with over half the respondents saying they have a CB evaluation system in place, with frequent reports and evaluation visits cited as important tools. Upon closer inspection, however, it is evident that many Norwegian NGOs use regular project monitoring systems, not a separate evaluation system for CB *per se*.

Table 2.2: Monitoring and observed outcomes

	Percentage responding yes
Monitoring system in place (table 16)	54 %
Have observed changes (table 17)	93 %
Observed outcomes (for those responding yes to the above question)	
Better objectives (table 18)	2 %
Greater participation (table 18)	8 %
Other changes (table 18)	2 %
More than one of the above (table 18)	88 %

Observed changes in partnership relations

The 1993 survey concluded that Northern NGOs can no longer aim to fashion their Southern partners in their own image. To test Norwegian perceptions on this issue, the NGOs were asked whether they have perceived changes in the way their partners operate during the period of cooperation. An overwhelming proportion answered in the affirmative. Eighty-seven percent had noticed one or more changes, although many respondents also indicated that CB assessments are difficult to aggregate or generalise, and that results vary greatly depending on the country, organisation, and local conditions.

Table 2.3: Changes in partnership relations observed by Norwegian NGOs

Changes observed	Very big	Big	Moderate	Little effect or no answer
More trust (table 19)	13 %	50 %	34 %	3 %
Better dialogue (table 19)	18 %	39 %	41 %	2 %
Broader partnership focus (table 19)	11 %	54 %	30 %	5 %

Observed changes in counterpart awareness with respect to specific issues

The observed impact of the CB measures on the Southern partners' awareness or sensitivity to various issues was less pronounced. In the majority of cases, awareness of the importance of environmental, gender, and

human rights issues increased only moderately, if at all, in the eyes of Norwegian NGOs.


Table 2.4: Changes observed in partner's awareness of issues

Issue	Very big	Big	Moderate	Little effect or no answer
Environment (table 19)	2 %	11 %	55 %	32 %
Gender (table 19)	15 %	26 %	44 %	15 %
Human rights (table 19)	5 %	35 %	35 %	25 %

Strengthening counterpart organisations

INTRAC's findings showed NGOs had a limited understanding of what OD entails – deep organisational change which builds the capacity for self-managing change. While most Norwegian NGOs say they engage in capacity building, not all of these appear to focus on strengthening the organisations of their partners as opposed, say, to training individual staff in counterpart organisations. Almost 45 percent of responding NGOs could not point to a policy aimed at strengthening counterpart organisations, although some may of course do this in the absence of an explicit policy. Of the NGOs with such a policy, about half adopted it before the NORAD NGO Division's 1991 guidelines first stated strengthening of local organisations was a priority for its support of Norwegian NGOs.

Graph 2.1: Date NGOs adopted a policy on organisational strengthening of partners



3. Case Studies

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Table 3.1 identifies the organisations participating in this study in the various countries, while Table 3.2 pro-

vides some basic information on the participating Norwegian NGOs.

Table 3.1: Participating Organisations

Norwegian NGO	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Sri Lanka
Redd Barna	Ministry of Social Welfare (Acção Social)	Training & Research Support Centre	Siri Prabodha
Norwegian Red Cross	Mozambique Red Cross	Southern Africa Partnership of Red Cross Societies	
Norwegian People's Aid		1. Zimbabwe Women's Finance Trust 2. Zimbabwe Women's Bureau	
FORUT			Alcohol and Drug Information Centre
The Development Fund			Future is in Our Hands (Sri Lanka)

Table 3.2: Basic Information on Participating Norwegian NGOs

NGO	Value of 1997 Frame Agreement (NOK)	Number of projects ³⁹	Year started in development ⁴⁰	Type of NGO ⁴⁰
Redd Barna	80,000,000	135	1961	Humanitarian
Norwegian Red Cross	26,019,820	18	1877	Humanitarian
Norwegian People's Aid	76,520,772	118	1975	Humanitarian
FORUT	12,084,000	12	1981	Political/ideal
The Development Fund	12,658,720	18	1978	Political/ideal

The nature, scope, and intensity of NGO activities vary greatly from country-to-country. NGOs, both Northern and local, are affected by government attitudes, the legal framework, culture, history, and many other factors which together make-up the national context for NGO activity. The institutional development strategies employed by Northern NGOs are also influenced by donor policies – particularly those of their own country's official aid agency – and by the history and current health of the local NGO community.

The case studies described in this section are from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Sri Lanka. Table 3.3 provides summary data for these countries, but the interested reader is encouraged to review appendices 1, 2, and 3 for additional information on the context affecting NGO activity in each of the countries.

All three are considered to be in the «least developed» group of countries. Mozambique clearly is the poorest of the three, and has the worst figures with respect to social wellbeing, with Sri Lanka the most developed and Zimbabwe in the middle. The country ranking is exactly reversed however in terms of economic performance over the past decade: per capita income is growing in Mozambique – particularly since the peace accord in

³⁹ Number listed in the frame agreement.

⁴⁰ Tvedt (1995), pp. A11-A12.

Table 3.3: Basic country data

	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Sri Lanka
Area (km ²)	802,000	391,000	66,000
Population (1995)	16.2 million	11.0 million	18.1 million
Life expectancy	47 years	57 years	72 years
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births-1995)	113	72.8	16
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births)	1,512	283	30
GNP/capita (US \$-1995)	\$80	\$540	\$700
GNP/capita avg. annual growth rate (1985-95)	3.6 %	-0.6 %	-2.6 %
GNP/capita (PPP ⁴¹ est. 1995)	\$810	\$2,030	\$3,250
Aid (% of GNP-1994)	101 %	10.2 %	5.1 %
HDI ⁴² (rank)	166 of 175	129 of 175	91 of 175
HPI ⁴³ (rank)	50.1 (72 of 78)	17.3 (17 of 78)	20.7 (22 of 78)
GDI (rank)	139 of 146	109 of 146	70 of 146
Formal NGO numbers (est.)	100+	800	3,500
NORAD funding to local NGOs (budget 1997)	NOK 2.4 million	NOK 3 million	NOK 10.7 million

Sources: World Bank (1997) *World Development Report 1997*
UNDP (1997) *Human Development Report 1997*

1992 – while it has declined in Zimbabwe and, even more precipitously, in Sri Lanka.

All three countries are democratic, with executive presidents and unicameral legislatures. Each country has had periods of extremely autocratic government in the recent past, due in part to extended periods of civil war or ethnic strife, which in Sri Lanka's case continue. Governments in all three countries have attempted to introduce new NGO legislation or tighter regulation of NGOs since the beginning of this decade, and government-NGO relations remain unsettled. At the same time, local NGO activity has been increasing in all three countries, although in Mozambique from a very low level. In contrast to Mozambique, the local NGO community is reasonably robust in Zimbabwe and, in common with other countries in South Asia, quite developed in Sri Lanka.

3.2 Zimbabwe Cases (see also Appendix 1)

3.2.1 Redd Barna and the Training and Research Support Centre

Redd Barna

Redd Barna is the Norwegian Save the Children orga-

nisation. Founded in 1946, by 1994 Redd Barna had 65,000 members, 45,000 sponsors, and more than 200,000 donors. It is extremely successful in raising donations from the Norwegian public, which in turn qualify it for substantial matching funds from NORAD. Its 1996 expenditures approached US \$35 million. Redd Barna has approximately 90 staff in Oslo, and has 11 country offices and about 1,000 people overseas.

Over the past decade, Redd Barna has re-evaluated its mission in fundamental ways. In 1991 it decided on two major changes for its overseas programming: (1) it would sharpen its focus and become more «child-centred;» (2) it would seek to work through local partners rather than directly implementing projects.⁴⁴ Its transition has been guided by two planning exercises, culminating in strategic plans covering 1994-97 and 1998-2001. This latter document states clearly that «large operational programmes managed by Redd Barna will not be established.»

Redd Barna has also committed to enhancing cooperation among 24 national sister members of the Save the Children Alliance. [see Box 2.1: Transnational NGOs]

⁴¹ PPP = Purchasing Power Parity. This measure attempts to compensate somewhat for the distorted picture given by comparisons based on per capita income figures (e.g., gross national product or GNP), which fail to reflect the different cost structures in various countries.

⁴² HDI = Human Development Index. A higher number for the ranking indicates a lower level of human development.

⁴³ HPI = Human Poverty Index. A higher number for the ranking indicates more intense and/or widespread poverty.

⁴⁴ These guidelines were aimed at Redd Barna's child-centred development and child advocacy work, rather than its emergency operations.

Redd Barna Zimbabwe (RBZ)

These changes have had very significant implications for Redd Barna's overseas operations, including those in Zimbabwe. RBZ commenced operations in 1983, covering both Zimbabwe and, until 1989, Mozambique. From 1987 RBZ focused increasingly on integrated rural development (IRD) projects in the communal areas. RBZ's initial emphasis on physical infrastructure was roundly criticised in a 1992 country programme review.

In response to this review, RBZ re-thought its programme, setting as objectives: (1) child-centred community development, (2) children in difficult circumstances, (3) emergency relief, and (4) child advocacy. It began emphasising human rather than physical development, and sought local organisations as implementation partners. To enhance its own capacity to discharge the new strategy, RBZ undertook more systematic staff development. With the transfer of responsibility to local organisations, RBZ has dramatically reduced its staff from 126 in 1994 to 32 today and 25 for end-1998.⁴⁵

RBZ also developed a new *Zimbabwe Strategy: 1998-2001*, with three objectives in support of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child:

- increasing children's access to basic education;
- reducing the number of sexually exploited children; and
- reducing the number of children who are economically exploited.

To support its further evolution, RBZ held workshops with local organisations in 1996 to flesh-out *Guidelines for Partnerships*, documenting partner selection criteria, the procedures for establishing a partnership, and a standard partnership agreement. In September 1997, RBZ initiated a «partnership forum» of existing and potential partners, which will meet quarterly. Importantly, RBZ retains the initiative for setting its programming agenda. In the words of one of its managers, «Redd Barna (Zimbabwe) supports projects which address our priorities, and will support capacity development of the partner as it relates to the project.»

The Training and Research Support Centre (TARSC)

TARSC was formed in 1993 by two independent researchers. Its work portfolio has grown rapidly since

then, focusing on public and workplace health, children's rights, NGOs, and social issues. TARSC receives little non-earmarked funding, working mainly on a fee-for-service basis for various UN agencies, bilateral donors, Northern NGOs, as well as local organisations. TARSC works both nationally and regionally, and makes extensive use of participatory approaches.

In addition to commissioned work, TARSC initiates its own research projects, which it then shops for funding. Its lack of core funding has begun to be a constraint. For example, TARSC would like to examine policy links across studies to produce policy discussion papers, but its researchers lack time and funding. In spite of the growth in workload, TARSC has made a conscious decision to remain small – its present complement is four professionals and three support staff. Its principals are active networkers, and prefer to collaborate with other researchers than add staff.

The Child & Law Project

The Child & Law Project started in 1992, before TARSC was established, when RBZ commissioned one of TARSC's founders, Dr. Rene Loewenson, to review Zimbabwe's child rights laws. Based on that preliminary study, RBZ and Dr. Loewenson continued with an action research project focussed on the sexual abuse of children. TARSC was formed during the life of this project, and it identified 22 organisations, both governmental and non-governmental, interested in co-operating in the child sexual abuse research. This participatory research generated information on the distribution and determinants of child sexual abuse, plus ideas about actions needed to address the problems. The 22 co-operating organisations met in January 1995 and agreed to take the programme forward in four areas:

- crisis intervention and long-term management (i.e., counselling);
- an education programme (both at schools and for the general public)
- legal programme, concerned with reforms to law and legal administration to make the justice system more accessible to children and their families, and on traditional law;
- ongoing research and co-ordination.

TARSC co-ordinated the action programme which mobilised community-based information, drama, and dis-

⁴⁵ RBZ's budget for projects in 1997 was about Z \$12.5 million.

cussion groups and linked these with professional training and reviews of the legal framework, including traditional law. An evaluation documented significant achievements by June 1996, including:

- amendments to the criminal procedures and evidence act to provide for «victim friendly courts;»
- mandatory HIV testing of perpetrators;
- increased sentences for child sexual abuse;
- a policy of «fast-tracking» child sexual abuse cases;
- increased reporting of offences.

In addition, a judicial conference was held to review crime and sentencing in this area, and the availability of information plus the advocacy by the network raised the profile of child sexual abuse.⁴⁶ Additional work was recommended in the following areas:

- further legal reform, including long-term management of cases;
- traditional law;
- information and awareness (both in schools and among the general public);
- research on (1) child prostitution and (2) perpetrators;
- further skill development and clarification of roles for the participating organisations.

The co-operating organisations discussed the findings, and designated a lead agency for each of four major areas of work, as follows:

- Ministry of Justice for the legal programme and victim-friendly courts;
- Department of Social Welfare for the crisis intervention and long term management;
- Ministry of Education for the schools component;
- Ministry of Health for public education.

TARSC was asked to continue co-ordinating the information and networking among the programme areas, and to research issues where knowledge gaps remained. The follow-up project started with RBZ funding in January 1997.⁴⁷ To date, progress has been good in Justice, Education and, after delays occasioned by the death of

its original co-ordinator, Health. Progress has been slow in Social Welfare, which likely needs a field worker supplied by the project.⁴⁸

TARSC has been experiencing «problems of success.» Interest is very high among the co-operating organisations and the general public, so co-ordination, networking, and the provision of information are all taking more time and money than originally had been estimated. RBZ has been very supporting however, and agreed to increase the budget for these activities six months into the project.

3.2.2 Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Micro-Credit for Women

NPA is a humanitarian organisation with roots in the trade union movement. Since its establishment in 1939, NPA has stressed both political solidarity and poverty alleviation in its work. In 1992 NPA produced *Solidarity Across Borders: Policy for international activity in the 1990s*, which emphasised that NPA was a «solidarity organisation» seeking a more «evenly distribution of wealth» together with «sustainable development.» NPA stated it would focus on the following:

- organisational development;
- political awareness and organisation among poor people and weak groups;
- vocational training and training in administration and organization;
- productive activities in the areas of fisheries, trade, and agriculture.

As a basic principle, NPA would ensure that «... professional and administrative responsibility is fully transferred to the recipient organisation ... [which] ... must also fully control all employment of external expertise.»

NPA in Zimbabwe

NPA has operated in Southern Africa since 1976 providing humanitarian relief to liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. In 1983 NPA

⁴⁶ During the field mission to Zimbabwe for this study (12-25 October) there were front-page newspaper stories on child sexual abuse or victim friendly courts almost daily.

⁴⁷ RBZ signed separate contracts with each of the implementing partners, plus one overall «Agreement on Partnership» signed by all partners. Funding for 1997 amounts to about Z\$1.343 million (US \$110,000), with slightly less budgeted for 1998.

⁴⁸ Justice and Education have full-time co-ordinators paid for by the project.

opened a regional office in Harare, but started decentralising in 1989. The Harare office became a country office staffed, since 1992, entirely by local personnel. NPA-Zimbabwe's work has centred on community groups such as co-operatives, although it has also provided emergence relief to the local population affected by droughts.⁴⁹ NPA's main activities have included vocational training, water supply, food distribution, and income generation.

The Zimbabwe programme began to change significantly following a 1993 review that concluded NPA's support to small-scale production was, «...characterised by weak management, inadequate accounting and auditing routines, weak planning routines and a general lack of ability to function according to modern business principles.»⁵⁰ NPA then commissioned a study in 1995 to examine strategic directions for its Zimbabwe programme. NPA's local partners indicated that «...NPA is perceived as a reliable, flexible and responsive organisation with good planning and management competence, but with less experience and knowledge in technical matters.» (Kruse et al., p. 29) The consultants noted their initial impression of «...a country programme consisting of a number of discrete and isolated projects without a coherent focus.» On closer examination however they found NPA's work fell into three broad categories: training, community development, and small-scale enterprises. The consultants recommended NPA target the informal sector (Kruse et al., p. 46).

NPA-Zimbabwe has implemented a number of the recommendations contained in the 1996 Country Study. In addition, it drafted a *Country Strategy Paper: 1998–2000*. This targets poverty in the informal sector, and spells-out a strategy «...to work closely with like minded NGOs, CBOs, GoZ departments and local authorities to develop their capacity to create economic opportunities for employment and wealth generation for the poor as well as promoting an equitable distribution of wealth

among all the sectors in society...» The draft country strategy outlines the following priorities:

- supporting the informal productive sector;
- institutional development; and
- organisational development of local partners.

In this document, NPA drew a clear distinction between institutional development and organisational development (OD). To NPA, the former «...is growth of civil society or different players in society to be able to understand the social and economic institutions that embody basic power relations in society...», while NPA will support OD through:

- training in planning and management;
- raising awareness about participatory, democratic, and professional management procedures;
- training in lobbying, advocacy, and networking skills, and
- assistance to «...acquire the operational capacity to carry out their work.»

As part of the process to refine its country strategy, NPA held a planning workshop for its partners, and plans to hold a second workshop in December 1997.

With a budget of about NOK 4.5 million, NPA-Zimbabwe supports 13 partners, plus an «organisational network» project.⁵¹ It works only with established groups and aims to support both the partner's organisation and its activities. It also will not provide «just» funding, but seeks to take «a holistic approach.» NPA-Zimbabwe has standardised a «Framework Agreement Plan,» typically of three years duration supplemented by annual contracts. This provides a useful guide concerning types of information required (e.g., expected results, indicators, planned activities). However, NPA has not formalised criteria and processes for project or partner screening, nor does it use systematic organisational assessment tools.⁵²

Clearly, NPA-Zimbabwe places great emphasis on partnerships. In April 1997, NPA brought together representatives from many of its partners in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola for a regional workshop, held in South Africa.⁵³ This workshop was an

⁴⁹ NPA also worked with Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe, but this was not part of its country programme.

⁵⁰ Quoted in Johannessen & Sørbo (1994), p. 4. Such problems were common with co-operatives and small-scale production projects in Zimbabwe. See for example Riddell and Robinson, 1995.

⁵¹ NPA supports four «networks» of current and former partners, plus other invited groups, covering (1) credit institutions, (2) training institutions, (3) women entrepreneurs, and (4) staff development. Each network meets once a year.

⁵² It does, however, make a gender assessment.

⁵³ This also was part of an organisation-wide process leading to the NPA Global Seminar on Partnership, held in Norway on 22-25 September 1997.

excellent step towards making the partnership concept more concrete, ensuring «...that capacity building is placed as a central aspect of every partnership agreement» and stressing the importance of South-South partnerships in addition to the North-South dialogue with NPA. (Andersson 1997) At the same time, the workshop facilitator commented that:

«NPA exhibits an awareness that partnership implies full attention to the strengthening of all aspects of a partner organisation ... Nevertheless it was apparent ... that very little thought has been given, by NPA or its partners, to the ways by which NPA could facilitate and catalyse this capacity enhancement.» And further:

«...there are questions about NPA's own ability to understand and sensitively address certain organisational dynamics ... The organisation would do well to explicitly define competence in the basics of organisational behaviour and organisational development as a desirable quality in its professional staff.» (Andersson, 1997 p. 20)

Zimbabwe Women's Finance Trust (ZWFT)

ZWFT's origins lie in a private company – Zimbabwe Women's Business Promotions (ZWBP). In 1985, 40 Zimbabwean women invested in ZWBP in the hope it might establish a loan facility for women entrepreneurs. It was unable to raise capital and in 1989 some of the ZWBP investors conceived of ZWFT, which they registered as an NGO. Operations began in 1991 and the following year they obtained a loan from the Ecumenical Development Cooperation Society, and subsequently received their first grant from NPA to establish a revolving loan fund (RLF).

ZWFT's goal is «...to empower women economically by promoting the development of Micro and Small Scale Enterprises (MSSEs).» To further this goal, it provides the following services:

- credit to women owners of MSSEs;
- mobilisation of members' savings;
- business management training; and
- vocational skills training.

Although its annual report states its mission is to assist poor women, it appears any Zimbabwean woman is eligible for training and loans upon payment of a membership fee. ZWFT has provided loans to some more

established women entrepreneurs, including shareholders of ZWBP, which continues to exist.

ZWFT is a member of the Women's World Banking network, and has a working relationship to «graduate» borrowers to Barclays» Bank. ZWFT also has received support from the ILO, a number of bilateral agencies, and NGOs. ZWFT also participates in three new micro-finance networks in Zimbabwe.

- Small Enterprise, Education and Promotion Zimbabwe (SEEP-Zimbabwe) was formed in 1996 by some Northern NGOs which support local micro-finance NGOs. CARE provides the secretariat for SEEP-Zimbabwe, which aims to strengthen micro-finance practice in Zimbabwe.
- Zimbabwe Association of Micro Finance Institutions (ZAMFI) was formed under the auspices of SEEP and comprises local organisations supporting micro-finance projects, together with all SEEP members. ZAMFI's aims are to facilitate communication, spread micro-finance «best practice,» and lobby the government for policy changes with respect to small and medium-sized enterprises.
- The Micro & Small Scale Enterprise Promotion Program (MISSEP) is funded by GTZ and based in Bulawayo. MISSEP has formed the MISSEP-Network of eight microenterprise organisations working in Matebeteland, and supports technical assistance, training, and equipment & materials. Staff at ZWFT's Bulawayo office participate in the MISSEP-Network, and MISSEP is a member of SEEP.

ZWFT has seen rapid growth in membership, loans, and the value of its revolving loan fund. Expenditures in 1996 were Z\$1.6 million, with a staff complement of 13. In addition to its Harare headquarters, ZWFT now has regional offices in Bulawayo and Gokwe, and two sub-offices. Demand for ZWFT's services, especially loans, is very high. For example, 80 women in ten groups remain on the waiting list at the Bulawayo office.

ZWFT's growth has not been entirely smooth however. In 1995 its director left, and her replacement resigned in 1997. Until recently, ZWFT's loan operations were not adequate, with loan repayment rates remaining far below what was required for sustainability. NORAD temporarily suspended its support following a frankly critical evaluation of the organisation. The evaluators recommended ZWFT revise its constitution, define the role

of the executive chairperson⁵⁴ vis-à-vis the board and staff, clarify its target group and lending criteria, and re-design its training program so it better supported the lending operations – ZWFT's primary function.

Fortunately, in January 1996 CARE International started a US \$500,000 project with ZWFT in support of a revolving loan fund, technical assistance, training, equipment, and operational expenses. CARE brought in a micro-finance expert from Kenya and attached him to ZWFT for one year, during which time he converted ZWFT to a peer-group lending program, trained staff, and developed a credit operations procedure manual.⁵⁵ CARE also assisted ZWFT with strategic planning, and helped recruit some highly qualified professionals to join the ZWFT Board. [See box 3.1: CARE]

NPA supported ZWFT during a pilot phase from 1992-94, and is in a second phase covering 1995-97, with funding for the current year at NOK 350,000. A new three-year agreement is planned for 1998-2000, with NOK 600,000 available in 1998, then NOK 350,000 and 300,000 for subsequent years. NPA funding is split between the revolving loan fund,⁵⁶ salaries and administrative costs in four districts, training for staff and clients, plus exchanges for board members. ZWFT participated in the NPA partnership workshop in South Africa. It is clear that ZWFT greatly appreciates the support from NPA, together with that organisation's partnership approach.

Zimbabwe Women's Bureau (ZWB)

Zimbabwe Women's Bureau (ZWB) started in the early 1970s and was formally registered in 1978, initially to: sensitise women about their unequal legal status;⁵⁷ undertake research and disseminate information pertaining to women; and promote cooperation to improve the quality of women's lives. Following independence, ZWB conducted a survey and published its findings as *We Carry a Heavy Load: Rural Women in Zimbabwe Speak Out*.

By 1982, ZWB started making grants for projects. It has focused on income generating projects (IGPs), but also provides training in literacy, food security and nutrition,

⁵⁴ The executive chairperson (and ZWFT founder) has just stepped back into the managing director's position for the second time, following the resignation of the new managing director.

⁵⁵ The CARE expert continues, on a part-time basis, to assist ZWFT with a computer system for loan management.

CARE started in the US to provide humanitarian relief to Europe following the Second World. It has grown into one of the largest NGOs in the world, and has affiliates in a number of countries, which co-ordinate via CARE-International in Paris. CARE implements or supports projects in dozens of countries, including Zimbabwe. One of its areas of expertise is micro-finance, and CARE-International has a unit of micro-finance experts to support such activities. Some of CARE's micro-finance projects in Africa have been well documented. (See Appendix, plus Sahley: 1995, pp.134-140 and Smillie: 1995, pp. 91-92) Typically, CARE has initiated these programmes on its own, then incubated a local organisation to keep it running.

CARE International in Zimbabwe also was involved in micro-finance from the late 1980s, working initially with commercial banks. In 1995 Britain's ODA contributed US \$2.232 million to the Credit for the Informal Sector Project (CRISP). With CRISP, the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe provides small loans backed by a US \$800,000 loan guarantee fund, while CARE provides technical support in community banking.

Since then CARE International in Zimbabwe has successfully introduced a peer-group lending approach into ZWFT. It also has been instrumental in founding SEEP and ZAMFI to facilitate co-ordination within Zimbabwe's micro-finance sector, foster «best practice,» and lobby for policies that better address the needs of small-scale entrepreneurs. In Zimbabwe CARE has chosen to strengthen established micro-finance organisations rather than directly implementing a project and subsequently starting a local organisation to manage it. However, this seems related as much to the strength of the commercial banking sector – and its willingness to support community banking schemes – as to the pre-existing capacities of those local NGOs involved in micro-finance.

Box 3.1: CARE

and legal rights awareness to members of IGP groups. Most of the training and monitoring is provided or ar-

⁵⁶ NPA's micro-credit emphasis is poverty alleviation, and favours credit to rural areas and poorer clients. In this it differs from CARE which places greater stress on financial sustainability.

⁵⁷ Women were considered minors under the law until the Age of Majority Act of 1982.

ranged by 13 district field officers. ZWB also has about 30 adult trainers, who receive allowances but no salary.

In 1991, ZWB constructed a training centre, financed by Oxfam America, which now serves as its main source of self-generated income. ZWB started a revolving loan fund in 1994. It lends only to groups rather than individuals, and charges 15 % interest on loans. Groups may receive a small start-up grant, and would then be eligible for two loans to a maximum of Z\$20,000 each. ZWB currently has about Z\$330,000 in loans outstanding.

There are over 20 staff at headquarters and 13 districts, headed by the director.

ZWB has received financial support from about 14 donors.⁵⁸ NPA started funding ZWB in 1984, with initial support targeted to a pottery co-operative. NPA's recent support has focused on capacity building of ZWB. It provided assistance for strategic planning, staff training, training to group members, exchanges, board member orientation, and the information programme, equipment, and contributions to the RLF.

As with ZWFT, ZWB has received criticism from donors in recent years. A 1996 evaluation of agriculture and nutrition projects found reasons for optimism, but stated that ZWB had not capitalised on opportunities due to lack of technical skills, inadequate staffing, organisation, and communication, and poor cooperation among donors. A recent NPA study of micro-enterprise projects found little development in the majority of ZWB-supported groups despite ten or more years of existence. It questioned the impact of the micro-finance loans in terms of income generation and project sustainability, the viability of specific IG endeavours, and the appropriateness of support from ZWB. However, the NPA study also found most ZWB group members «...indicated remarkable changes in their standards of living as a result of their participation in the ZWB programmes. A common response was related to the upgrading of the literacy levels among group members ... other skills like knitting, sewing and small scale vegetable growing all acquired through the ZWB pro-

gramme seem to play a major role in the day to day lives of the group members.» (Mpande: 1996, p. 19)

A third evaluation commissioned by HIVOS in 1996 was very critical, but stated ZWB's traditional donors: «...cannot escape culpability for some of ZWB's problems ... This is not the time for donors to cut and run. Morality demands that they clean up the mess together with ZWB.» (HIVOS: 1996, p. 6)

Clearly, NPA has decided it is not the time to «cut-and-run.» It provided NOK 350,000 to ZWB in 1996, and plans NOK 500,000 and NOK 200,000 for 1998 and 1999 respectively. ZWB's leadership clearly appreciates NPA, which is «unlike most of the donors... NPA is always willing to discuss plans, and then allow flexible implementation.» They appreciate in particular the fact that NPA will fund salaries and administrative costs, and generally adhere to ZWB priorities. The director of ZWB attended NPA's regional partnership workshop in South Africa, which she saw as valuable.

NPA is, of course, concerned about the impact and sustainability of ZWB as an organisation. Its approach is to work with ZWB management while encouraging the organisation's members to participate more effectively in setting policies and priorities.⁵⁹ ZWB does seem to have taken the recent criticisms to heart. For example, it translated and printed summaries of the various evaluations for distribution to all its districts.

3.2.3 Norwegian Red Cross and SAPRCS

The Norwegian Red Cross and the Federation in Southern Africa

The Norwegian Red Cross (NRC) is a member of the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (the Federation).⁶⁰ NRC has actively supported the Red Cross movement in Southern Africa since the 1970s⁶¹ and it continues to provide significant assistance to Mozambique and at the regional level. As is well known, the region has seen many conflicts, resulting in hundreds of thousands of refugees and damaging the

⁵⁸ It currently has agreements with the Kellogg Foundation, ICFID, Africa 2000, Brucke der Bruderhilfe, UNDP, EZE, Oxfam-America, and NPA.

⁵⁹ NPA reported that ZWB members have been far more assertive at recent national assemblies, and have demanded greater accountability from the staff and executive council.

⁶⁰ There also is an International Committee of the Red Cross based in Switzerland, which operates as an independent organisation.

⁶¹ In Red Cross terminology, NRC and other societies from donor countries are «participating societies» in national or regional programs, as opposed to the local «national societies» of Southern Africa.

capacity of these societies to respond to natural disasters. As a result, the international Red Cross family has traditionally focussed on disaster response and preparedness.

Normally, most of the support from NRC and the other Northern societies is channelled through the Federation. This sometimes has caused friction. As well, NORAD prefers Norwegian NGOs to link directly with Southern counterparts when utilising bilateral aid funds. In the case of Southern Africa, there may also have been tensions arising from what has been termed «the disaster response ethos» of the Federation, versus the priority placed on long-term development by NRC and certain other societies. In an attempt to better support the region's national societies, the Federation established in 1986 a Regional Delegation (RD) for Southern Africa in Harare.

NRC has long been an important participating society for Southern Africa. Until 1994-95 it had bilateral links with Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, plus a delegate stationed at the RD to support these bilateral programmes. NRC continues its large bilateral programme in Mozambique, and is applying NORAD funding in support of the regional programmes for (1) disaster preparedness and (2) institutional development.

The Southern African Partnership of Red Cross Societies (SAPRCS)

In 1979-80 the Nordic Red Cross societies, joined by a few others, established the Southern Africa Programme (SAP) in Geneva as the first Federation programme for regional co-ordination of development programmes. From its beginning, SAP focussed on institutional development of the national societies. Through biennial meetings of donor and recipient members of SAP, the Nordic Red Cross societies planned their commitments in concert and agreed upon a lead society for each program. As well, each of the Nordic countries took a lead role for institutional development in one of the Southern African countries (Norway was linked with the national society in Swaziland). Eventually, SAP's focus shifted to local income generation, and the members raised funds to construct headquarters buildings for most societies in the region. These were large enough that the national societies could rent much of the space, using the income to cover administrative costs. The SAP approach succeeded in creating a number of well-functioning national societies, and in enhancing cohesion among its regional members.

By 1994, most of the Nordics began shifting assistance to other regions, so the SAP mechanism became less central for their programming. At the subsequent biennial meeting of SAP, the national societies assumed control of the mechanism, renaming it the Southern African Partnership of Red Cross Societies (SAPRCS), and confirming that the RD would serve as its secretariat.

Through SAPRCS, the region's national societies are in the process of assuming greater control over, and ownership of, both their own development and the priorities embodied in the regional programmes. In recognition of this, each national society will pay an annual subscription of at least CHF 1,000. SAPRCS has assumed the role of a forum for discussion and interaction with other regional technical programmes, and ensures the work of the RD is appropriate to the needs of the national societies.

The Regional Programme

Given the SAPRCS is now a creature of the ten national societies, the role of the RD will revert to co-ordination and support. In particular, the new medium-term plan specifies the following functions for the RD:

- stimulating cooperation and exchange among the national societies;
- serving as an information focal point;
- co-ordinating appeals and assisting in negotiations with participating societies;
- co-ordinating disaster preparedness and response;
- co-ordinating specific regional programmes.

Since November 1996, the RD also serves as the secretariat for SAPRCS. With regard to regional programmes, targets are (1) health (because of the AIDS pandemic), (2) water, (3) disaster preparedness, (4) information, and (5) institutional development/resource development (ID/RD). This latter program is critical given the assumption by the national societies of more responsibilities, coupled with reduced donor funding. The overall goal of the ID/RD programme is to support the ten national societies in «...attaining the characteristics of «well functioning national societies».» The principal components address:

- strengthening governance, leadership, and management capacity;
- strengthening the organisational structures, systems, and procedures; and
- increasing flows of income from domestic sources.

In addition to funding planned activities, the ID/RD programme emphasises the use of Red Cross personnel from the region. The ID/RD delegate at the Regional Delegation office will be responsible for the co-ordination, follow-up, and technical support of national programmes, with priority given to supporting the more advanced national societies to assist others attain a similar level of competence (regional best practice). Staff exchanges will be used to ensure that experiences garnered and lessons learnt are shared among national societies. The NRC is a strong supporter of the ID/RD programme, and also is one of the few participating societies willing to finance Federation Delegates recruited within the region.

3.2.4 Findings for Zimbabwe

Institutional development: intentions, strategies, and actions

The three Norwegian NGOs participating in the Zimbabwe portion of this study clearly place a high priority on institutional development. Redd Barna-Zimbabwe (RBZ) seeks to entrench the principles of the UN Convention within Zimbabwean law and culture. This clearly implies institutional development (ID) at the highest levels – laws, rules, and norms of behaviour. To accomplish this, it is supporting its key partner, TARSC, to animate a national coalition of 22 organisations to carry forward the work started child sexual abuse. RBZ then helps its partners so they can better implement the projects supported by RBZ. Once project parameters have been agreed, RBZ provides ample space for its partners to be involved in the detailed planning, implementation, and monitoring of project activities, and in the evaluation of results. RBZ does not strengthen local organisations as an end in itself.

NPA has poverty alleviation and political solidarity as twin goals. It embraces the partnership concept both as an end in itself (solidarity) and as a means to fight poverty. NPA recognises it cannot adequately address poverty in Zimbabwe by directly implementing projects, so it seeks to strengthen capacities of its local partners in the long fight against poverty. NPA also sees capacity building as a means to enhance participatory

and democratic processes, within both the partner organisation and the relationship between the organisation and NPA.

Unlike RBZ, NPA is focused principally on institutional development at the organisational, rather than the higher systems development levels. This seems appropriate because its chosen focus – the informal sector – is not so sharp as Redd Barna's. NPA is also supporting networks, but these play a supporting rather than a lead role. One of the networks comprises NPA's partners, while others are organised of thematic bases (credit, training, women, and staff development). The networks meet infrequently as a group, and their orientation is introspective – how can they work better together as partners.⁶² NPA's strategies and tactics in this regard are consistent with its concepts and intentions. Its target of poverty alleviation will not yield to quick solutions, so it is right that NPA seek to build robust local organisations to continue the effort.

Norwegian Red Cross is itself a member of an «institution» – an international movement that embodies a widely-held set of values, and which demands a response to disasters on humanitarian grounds. NRC therefore seeks to strengthen its sister societies, both as an effective means to prevent or respond to disasters, and to strengthen the international movement as a goal in itself.

In addition to their work at the national level, all three Norwegian NGOs clearly believe there is a higher, international dimension to ID they must address. For example, Norwegian People's Aid believes the international economic system creates inequalities and that the negative aspects of this international system are growing with the spread of neo-conservatism. Redd Barna promotes an international movement based on the UN Convention. NRC is a member of an international movement whose capacity to mobilise support throughout the world, and to operate anywhere, is central to its ability to respond to disasters.

Among the three, both Redd Barna and NRC are actively working for institutional reform and development at the international level (e.g., the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child). NPA's roots are within the labour movement, which traditionally is internationalist, but it does not typically operate within a formal international structure. Summarising, the international dimension is an **essential** factor in

⁶² Another Northern NGO (CARE International) has fostered a network covering the same sub-sector as one of the NPA networks (SEEP together with ZAMFI in micro-finance), and this network does work directly to change the institutional framework for the small and medium-sized enterprise sector.

NRC's strategies and actions, a **central** element in those of Redd Barna, and an **aspect** in NPA's.

The three organisations also recognise the importance of regional (i.e., Southern Africa) trends on their work in Zimbabwe. Regional considerations were often paramount for NPA and Redd Barna before the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa. NRC has long wrestled with how best to co-ordinate its regional programme and to co-ordinate with its sister Nordic societies. NRC's support to SAPRCS clearly represents a further experiment in institutional development at a regional level. It is supporting a regional organisation (the Regional Delegation) and a regional network of national organisations (SAPRCS), which is promoting a strategy based on the diffusion of «regional best practice» via regional experts.

Clearly, the three participating Norwegian institutions are engaged in institutional development to an increasing extent. They all provide support to strengthen their partners organisations by funding core costs, staff development, client training programmes, and information collection and dissemination. They all stimulate networking. In addition, NRC and NPA go further in supporting explicit organisational strengthening components, which could include consulting services, exchanges at the staff or board levels, and very explicit efforts to assist their partners towards so modicum of financial sustainability.

NPA's work centres on organisational development, using both HRD and networking as complements. The main goal of Norwegian Red Cross is to strengthen national societies, but its support through the regional SAPRCS network is now its main strategy for promoting this goal. Redd Barna has a broader institutional development goal to alter the nation's institutional framework with respect to children's rights, and uses OD, HRD, and networking to further this goal.

All local organisations participating in this study are redolent with praise for their Norwegian NGO partners, but they differ markedly in how they themselves understood the partnership. Some seemed uncritical because they simply need the money. A second group see their Norwegian partners as strategic assets – an NGO willing to respond flexibly. In interviews, these latter organisations typically spoke of the innovative initiatives they put forward for Norwegian funding, or how they approach their Norwegian partner when a rapid response is

essential. Group 1 organisations, however, spoke of the value of the Norwegian funds in meeting costs in categories most other donors do not cover. Counter-intuitively, it was organisations in the second group that were most suspicious of the idea that the co-operation should continue after the funding stopped. To them, Norwegian money to further their programme was central to the relationship, and they would have to weigh the costs and benefits of a purely «platonic» partnership.

Outcomes

Normally it is extremely difficult to arrive at firm conclusions concerning the results achieved in institutional development projects, especially concerning broad systems development. However, in the opinion of the NGO study team, RBZ has been remarkably successful at advancing its goal to alter the national institutional framework relating to child sexual abuse. Twenty-two local organisations, cutting across the public, private, and voluntary sectors, are co-operating within a network that has shown itself capable of agreeing upon priorities, agreeing upon different roles for the network members, agreeing upon a co-ordinated programme of work, and (more or less) carrying-out the programme. Collectively the network has had a clear impact on public attitudes towards the rights of the child and the sexual abuse of children, and so begun the long process of changing social norms and the informal institutional structure. These are impressive achievements indeed, and at least some are likely to endure even if the project collapsed, which seems unlikely.

Neither NRC nor NPA have set explicit targets for institutional development at the national level. NRC's programme is, however, focused on strengthening the institutional framework for cooperation among the national societies in the region. The recent «take-over» of the Southern African Partnership by the national societies in the region, and its reconstitution into SAPRCS, does represent a very real joint achievement stemming in part at least from the extended support offered by NRC and the other participating societies of SAP.

NPA it prides itself on its focus on organisational strengthening of its partners, and it will be at this level that NPA's current approaches will be shown successful or not. In cases we studied, NPA has not yet been successful in making ZWFT or ZWB into well-functioning organisations that can stand on their own feet. While ZWFT and ZWB are expanding, and there is

great demand for their services, both organisations have significant problems related to leadership, governance, and acquisition of technical skills. A major issue is whether the partners have programmed the right balance of training. There is a good deal of general purpose training provided to ZWB and ZWFT members and staff, but less training in specific skills (e.g., micro-credit, organisational management) or even more specific competency-based training (i.e., specific skills in a specific work setting).

Concluding comments

The Zimbabwe cases show clearly that the new emphasis on institutional development and partnership places great demands on the organisational capacity of the northern partner. Both RBZ and NPA-Zimbabwe have had to devote a great deal of attention to building their own capacities to fit their new strategies. RBZ has downsized significantly, and adjusted its approaches to programming, because it chose to «sharpen its focus.» NPA-Zimbabwe followed a more iterative process. NPA and outside consultants first assessed feasible strategic directions, based in part on the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation and its staff.⁶³ Once it confirmed its strategic direction, NPA-Zimbabwe then considered what implications this had regarding the further development of its own capacities.

A second observation is the importance of donor co-ordination, particularly in a country such as Zimbabwe in which many donors are active. A co-ordination network for micro-finance is just recently in place in spite of the fact that activity in this sector by donor and local organisations has been increasing for years. SAP and SAPRCS give a fine example of what can be achieved with a modicum of donor co-ordination over an extended period. Of particular interest is the sudden flip in roles when leaders of the region's national societies suddenly shifted from being «recipients» within SAP to «owners» of SAPRCS. This flip occurred as donor interest was on the wane, but it seems then to have re-kindled some of that interest.

Third, it seems clear that Norwegian NGOs – and its aid programme in general – are highly valued in Zimbabwe for flexibility and willingness to fund salaries and core expenses. Of the cases we observed, NPA is particularly

interesting in this regard because it seems the most understanding and supportive supporter of two sick but not mortally ill local NGOs. Does this special relationship then imply special responsibilities, and what might these be? This clearly is an important but difficult role to play. The central dilemma seems to be how to determine when flexible support will hasten organisational development, and when will it allow the recipient organisation to delay difficult but necessary changes. While always there will be specific factors that make every local organisation unique in some sense, what are the factors that hold true generally, and how can a donor like NPA learn to assess these?

Fourth, the Zimbabwe cases provide a varied range of networks and partnerships. The bases of these different relationships might be termed «blood relations» (Red Cross societies), «extended family» (Save the Children Alliance), «common values» (NPA), and «collective action» (RBZ/TARSC). In spite of the obvious differences, most organisations are now using the same terminology (i.e., all relationships seem now to be «partnerships») and very similar partnership agreements (e.g., three-year frame agreements outlining the purpose, administrative procedures and monitoring, coupled with annual contracts specifying the work plan and budget). It seems the variety of relationships might warrant a richer vocabulary and different types of contracting instruments.

3.3 Mozambique (see also Appendix 2)

3.3.1 Redd Barna and the Ministry of Social Welfare

The Redd Barna Mozambique (RBZ) Programme

Relief and rehabilitation

Redd Barna started a relief programme for Mozambique in 1987. Headquartered in Chimoio, RBM had a budget averaging US \$7 million, up to 160 staff, and covered three provinces: Manica, Sofala and Tete.⁶⁴ During the emergency phase, RBM defined its programme mainly by geographical area and responded to general relief needs. RBM implemented its projects directly and established several well-equipped offices in the Beira Corridor. Although it identified women and children in difficult circumstances as its target group, the relief benefited all segments of the population in the selected

⁶³ See, for example, the assessment scheme presented in Kruse et al., p. 40.

⁶⁴ This case study focuses on RBM's activities in two districts: Dondo in Sofala province, and Gondola in Manica.

areas. RBZ's main activity with a long-term and child-centred perspective was the Unaccompanied Children's Programme, implemented through the Provincial Directorates of Social Welfare in Manica (1989-1994) and Sofala (1992-1994). In 1994, both programmes were renamed Child Development Programmes.

Following the 1992 peace agreement, RBM concluded that «dependence on relief could become a long term constraint against the sustainable development of the target population.» It decided to transform its programme from relief to development, but first entered a phase of rehabilitating both infrastructure and human capital. As well, RBM chose to maintain some relief for vulnerable families. Programmes included:

- reconstruction of schools and health posts;
- distribution of essential education materials and agriculture inputs;
- financial and management support to pre-schools; and
- working jointly with Social Welfare (Acção Social) in Manica and Sofala, to unite unaccompanied children with extended or substitute families. RBM also introduced an institutional development component to help Acção Social establish follow-up services for unaccompanied children.

RBM's continuing implementation role was inconsistent with the shift announced in 1991 by Redd Barna that the organisation would (1) sharpen its focus and become more «child-centred;» and (2) seek to work through local partners rather than directly implementing projects.⁶⁵ Given Mozambique was still in transition from civil war and the capacities of any conceivable local partner remained extremely weak, an immediate shift to introduce Redd Barna's new development strategy would have been disruptive. However this gap between Redd Barna's overall strategic direction and its country programme in Mozambique was to feature prominently in three reviews.

The 1996–2000 Country Strategy

In late 1994, RBM started defining a new country strategy with encouragement from RB-Oslo. RBM invited its counterpart governmental departments to participate in a joint planning process. Although it had already identified its programme focus, both RBM and its counter-

parts saw the initiative as a step towards better understanding of each other's priorities and limitations. The resulting programme featured child-centred community development (CCCD) projects in four districts, each with five components:

- child development (in cooperation with Acção Social);
- primary education;
- food security (agriculture);
- maternal and child health;
- credit and income generating projects (IGPs).

These plans incorporated somewhat the shift from direct implementation towards working through counterparts, and better defined the responsibilities and roles for each party. RBM was to serve as a facilitator, while government organisations were to manage and implement. However, the weaknesses of the government agencies coupled with the dearth of local associations led RBM to maintain its district offices, and to maintain responsibility for implementing «experimental» community programmes. Given its work on emergency relief had ended, RBM's budget had fallen to approximately US \$4 million, with a staff complement of 97.

1990-95 Programme Review

Redd Barna commissioned a review in late 1995 which stated «RBM has no vision or mission statement though this can be inferred from policies and statements ... [and] ... there is a general awareness on the change to long term development (LTD), but it is not clear what this means to all.» (p. iv) It also criticised that, as of 1995, only 20 % of RBM's total budget was allocated to LTD.

The review concluded RBM's relations with counterpart organisations «tended to emphasise the provision of vehicles and material and salaries which makes its long term viability questionable.» The review team recommended a gradual reduction of the funding of recurrent costs.

In response RBM set-up a «Strategy Nucleus Team,» comprising RBM staff, counterparts, and community members. They decided RBM's mission was to stimulate and advocate policies and programmes in the areas of basic education, psychosocial rehabilitation of children in emergencies, and the promotion of the UN Convention and the African Charter of the Rights of the

⁶⁵ See also section 3.2.1 above.

Child. The implementation strategy was to work in partnership with governmental and non-governmental organisations.

The Redd Barna Strategic Plan

At about the same time, Redd Barna headquarters in Oslo began working on its 1998-2001 strategic plan. By early 1996, only months after RBM had completed its country plan with its counterparts, it was clear there remained differences concerning how quickly to transform the country programme to a child-centred focus and shift implementation to local organisations. Headquarters decided RBM should terminate its health, agriculture, and IGP components. RBM notified its counterparts for health and agriculture that its support would stop at the end of 1996, while termination of IGPs was postponed to 1997.⁶⁶

Current situation

In 1997, RBM again consulted its current and potential partners to discuss appropriate project models. RBM emphasised it was now working on a more child-centred thematic basis, and attempting to meet RB-Oslo's desire that it become more a facilitator and advocate, working with a network of organisations. It also seeks closer co-operation with other members of the Save the Children Alliance working in Mozambique. Until 2001 RBM's plans to maintain its Chimoio headquarters, three district offices, and a stable budget of about US \$2.5 million. However, it will extend its activities to other districts of the two provinces, thus spreading the same amount of assistance over a broader geographical area. Duty tours for both the resident representative and programme director end soon, and a new organisational structure will be implemented in 1998.

The Ministry of Social Welfare (Acção Social)

In 1995 the government created the Ministry of Social Welfare (Acção Social) to assume responsibility for the needs of vulnerable groups including the war-affected, children in difficult circumstances, the elderly, disabled, other segments of the population in extreme poverty. Its mandate gave less emphasis to direct government delivery of social services than on policy development, planning, and standard setting to better co-ordinate activities

by a range of welfare organisations. Its guiding principles are, *inter alia*:

- a «non-institutionalisation» approach, building on indigenous helping systems;
- decentralisation;
- promotion of social justice to ensure equitable access to services.

With support from the UNDP, the Ministry is developing an integrated approach to programme delivery, bringing together ministries such as Labour, Education, Health, Sport and Youth, as well as non-governmental organisations to address the needs of its target groups. It is also attempting to make social welfare a higher priority in government policy-making.

The Provincial Directorate of Social Welfare in Sofala and the Dondo district

Within the Ministry's new role, the Provincial Directorate of Acção Social (DPCAS) for Sofala province develops annual plans based on the information provided by its district offices. Its main objective is to provide assistance to the vulnerable segment of the population. Of the 1.6 million population, approximately 53 % are classed as extremely poor.

DPCAS-Sofala is responsible for seven institutions addressing special needs (the blind, mentally handicapped, mutilated, and elderly, plus an orphanage, crèche, and pre-school). Of its 1997 annual budget of US \$159,000, 75 percent is for the institutions, leaving \$23,000 for salaries and \$16,000 for other recurrent costs.⁶⁷

Given its minuscule budget allocation, DPCAS-Sofala has authority to directly seek donor funding. In 1997, DPCAS-Sofala is receiving assistance from RBM and UNICEF. Collaboration between RBM and DPCAS-Sofala started in 1989 with the unaccompanied children and the reunification programmes. RBM provided financial resources and on-the-job training to staff at the provincial and district offices to develop skills in dealing with unaccompanied children. In 1996, RBM introduced annual funding agreements to cover a portion of DPCAS-Sofala's recurrent costs, plus the salary of its personnel in the district offices in which RBM is active. Each agreement includes:

⁶⁶ The impact of RBM's withdrawal on its counterparts' own programmes has not been assessed.

⁶⁷ Including district staff, DPCAS-Sofala has 120 state employees plus 35 on a contract basis.

- list of planned activities, objectives, and implementation schedule;
- anticipated results;
- operational budgets, disbursement calendar, and payment procedures;
- administrative procedures and reporting schedule.

Progress monitoring is done prior to each disbursement and a final assessment is conducted at the end of the planned activities.

In addition to social welfare, institutional funding, and capacity building activities, RBM constructs or rehabilitates facilities required for programme delivery and supports training to personnel in counterpart organisations. RBM also included counterpart personnel in its own training for Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation, and paid for the delivery of bookkeeping training by a local firm. RBM also has been «building» Acção Social capacity to supervise social welfare services by providing transport to the technicians to visit communities.

To adhere more closely with its mandate, RBM has insisted on the construction of pre-schools and training of pre-schools educators, although this age cohort are not an Acção Social priority. One of DPCAS-Sofala's major concerns is the rate of HIV among women, implying growing numbers of orphans and elderly persons without family support. Another concern is continuity of NGO social welfare programmes. DPCAS-Sofala would like to see RBM enlarge its geographical coverage to provide a more consistent level of service throughout the province.

The Dondo district office (DDCAS) has two technicians, and its activities are conducted jointly with RBM personnel.⁶⁸ Community visits communities are a DDCAS responsibility, although for all activities, DDCAS-Dondo relies heavily on the RBM district office for transport and funding. DDCAS does not have its own bank account, and RBM delivers cash directly from its office. The RBM district co-ordinator regularly visits the communities to monitor the activities. A major constraint at the local level is the refusal by communities to assume responsibility or initiative without obtaining some «gratification» from RBM, which is a major impediment in having communities assume responsibility for the support of pre-schools.

⁶⁸ RBM directly handles identification of material needs, the review of alternatives for pre-school material, and the supervision of pre-school monitors.

The Provincial Directorate of Social Welfare of Manica and the Gondola district.

Like DPCAS-Sofala, DPCAS-Manica is responsible for the development of its own provincial plan based on information provided by its district offices. It has a similar organisational structure and encounters similar difficulties in recruiting adequately qualified technicians. DDCAS-Manica also has had serious cases of financial mismanagement, culminating in the departure of its director in 1996.⁶⁹

Some technicians in Manica districts are paid by RBM and are not civil servants. RBM has discussed the absorption of these technicians within Acção Social, but this has not materialised. In other respects, RBM support to DDCAS-Manica is similar to that for Sofala. DDCAS-Manica also receives direct support from UNICEF, NORAD (a technical assistant in planning), and Inter-Country People Aid. Unlike Sofala, it also works closely with local NGOs, particularly the Association of Disabled Mozambicans (ADEMO).

The Acção Social «director» in Gondola district worked for RBM prior to his current appointment with the Ministry, which remains temporary. The district office does not receive funds from Acção Social, but depends entirely on RBM to cover recurrent costs and provide transport. The district director is accompanied by the RBM district co-ordinator for all community visits. Despite the fact that transport is available, field visits are not frequent because «daily allowances» are not paid. Since the beginning of 1997, only eight field visits took place to 11 foster families and 14 pre-school monitors.

3.3.2 Norwegian Red Cross and Mozambique Red Cross

Norwegian Red Cross Society in Mozambique

The Norwegian Red Cross Society (NRC) started supporting the Mozambican Red Cross Society (MRCS) in 1987 with a bilateral project to establish a training centre in Chimoio, and through assistance for institutional development channelled via the International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (the Federation). In 1993 NRC decided to convert its institutional development support into a bilateral relationship and fielded a

⁶⁹ The new director was appointed at the end of 1996 and therefore was not able to provide the history of the relationship with RBM, nor detailed information regarding the current and prior-years budgets.

representative to Maputo. Several reasons led to this change. First, NRC had a conviction that «twinning» societies helps with institutional development work, and a direct relationship is more effective for this than working through the Federation. As well, NORAD preferred that NRC had a bilateral agreement for this large programme. NRC and MRCS signed an initial bilateral agreement covering goals and objectives, each party's responsibilities, the three-year budget limit (US \$3,000,000), and financial procedures. The aims of the agreement were to:

- assist MRCS to become a well-functioning society;
- further the effectiveness of NRC international aid;
- strengthen the MRCS's operational capacity; and
- improve the efficiency and economy of the NRC aid to MRCS.

Major objectives were to:

- contribute towards the costs of the MRCS's national headquarters and its provincial branches, and towards income-generating projects;
- support institutional development;
- support selected programmes and provide emergency relief aid as required.

Instead of an end-of-project evaluation, the parties agreed to a self-assessment with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Federation. Regarding institutional support, the assessment concluded the availability of timely funding had enabled the MRCS to implement planned activities. Support to institutional development in terms of capacity building, training, and strengthening financial administration had all worked well. The assessment provided recommendations for further institutional strengthening, which provided the basis for a new agreement signed in June 1997.

The broad aims of co-operation remain unchanged, while specific objectives focus on organisational strengthening. In addition to specifying support to certain MRCS programmes, the bilateral agreement added the objective of strengthening the relationship between the two parties through exchange of personnel and information. As a consequence of deterioration in MRCS's financial management,⁷⁰ NRC added an addendum to the

agreement specifying additional conditions and setting an eight-month deadline.

Founded in 1981 by Frelimo party members and government officials, the MRCS originally was financed by the government and accountable to the Ministry of Health.⁷¹ MRCS was admitted to the Federation in 1989, but its mission remained the same: to assist the government in providing basic health care to victims of armed conflict and natural disasters, and in social and disaster management and preparedness. MRCS works mainly with government ministries, and is still perceived by many officials as an extension of the state's health facilities, albeit with access to significant resources from donors.

During the armed conflict, MRCS received large grants from international organisations for emergency activities. International funding also allowed MRCS to equip its provincial offices, and both the national and the provincial societies engaged large staffs. The organisation was ill prepared to manage such rapid expansion or, after the cease-fire, to design and implement social projects. Gradually the MRCS lost control over its financial and material resources and was unable to provide reliable figures on the number of staff, volunteers, inventories, or vehicles. As a consequence of this and the decline in emergency requirements, many funding agencies ended their financial support.

The organisation has an estimated 70,000 members and over 4,000 volunteers. It employs 46 people at head office plus a total of 120 in the provinces. Each provincial branch has, in addition to the provincial secretary, an administrator and technicians for each of its programmes. The MRCS currently reaches 117 of the country's 128 districts.

At the June 1994 General Assembly, ten policy resolutions were adopted which clarified the MRCS's future direction. Among the defined objectives were to:

- promote the Principles of the Red Cross Movement with emphasis on peace and the prevention of future conflicts;
- consolidate and strengthen the health, youth, and social programmes;

⁷⁰ Among other things, the MRCS finance director resigned in 1997.

⁷¹ This of course runs contrary to the principles of the Red Cross movement, which stress independence and neutrality.

- improve the MRCS's and community's capacity to respond to disasters; and
- encourage women's involvement in defining needs and assessing current programmes.

During the emergency phase, the MRCS annual budget amounted to millions every year. After the war and once most of the refugees had returned, MRCS faced a financial crisis, trying to maintain the infrastructure and staff it had built during the war. With a major cut in donors' funding, MRCS was forced to downsize – selling some of its assets and reducing its staff first at the national headquarters. The NRC has been instrumental in assisting the MRCS in its downsizing strategy.

The organisation now struggles each year to meet its financial commitments. Given shortfalls in terms of requested contributions from donors, it is forced to seek additional support from its major partner, the NRC. Few other donors agree to cover the administrative costs. Local fund-raising activities have generated significant contributions, but recurrent expenses at national headquarters and provincial branches remain well above what MRCS can sustain. The organisation is in the process of initiating further actions to continue the downsizing, this time at the provincial level.

In its strategic plan for 1997-99, MRCS defined its mission as improving the situation of the most vulnerable by strengthening capacities through community-based health and social programmes. Target groups are (1) returnees, (2) rural populations in resettlement

areas, and (3) poor people in peri-urban areas. Particular attention is given to the neediest women, children, and old people within the selected groups. The MRCS has chosen to adopt a participatory approach, involving the target groups in the full project cycle. Besides re-affirming the priorities defined in the last General Assembly of 1994, the MRCS plan stresses the need to continue the institutional development efforts.

3.3.3 Findings for Mozambique

Institutional development: intentions, strategies, and actions

Redd Barna & Acção Social

RBM is attempting to focus on institutional development in Mozambique after a number of years of direct implementation, during which period it supported its counterpart organisations (mainly government departments) with physical infrastructure, vehicles and equipment, logistical support, payment of salaries, and training. Since 1996, RBM has begun to address counterpart management capacity issues through, the provision of different types of training (e.g., bookkeeping), and the development of funding agreements that specify the responsibilities of each party.

RBM has also sought to stimulate community development by working with «activists,» and supports local associations providing social welfare services, although these are invariably small, with limited capacity for implementation. Finally, it now hosts joint-planning workshops with its current and potential counterparts,

Financial data (US \$ 000s)

Expenditure Items:	1996 ^a Spent	1997 Budgeted	1997 Spent-6 months	% age spent 1 st half 1997
Programmes	857.3	2,300	342.9	15 %
Institutional Development	931.7	350	126.0	36 %
Disaster preparedness		150	51.8	35 %
Administration	**	700	141.4	20 %
Capital projects		1,200		0 %
Total:	1,789	4,700	662.1	14 %
Funding sources:				
NRC	949.1	975.8	325.7	33 %
(% age of expenditures)	53 %	21 %	49 %	
Other donors	244.3	322.2	106.4	33 %
Income Generation		300	(19.7)	
MRCS (i.e., unfunded)		282.7	3,102	249.7

^a Source: Annual report 1996

** New budget category

which have provided an opportunity to discuss how RBM-supported activities might best be implemented. Counterparts clearly found the exercise beneficial in providing practical training on planning and stimulating networking.

The institutional support provided to and through provincial directorates of Social Welfare started during the relief operations and has remained since. However, Acção Social remains weak because of severe budget constraints and its inability to attract and retain staff given general shortages of qualified personnel, limited salaries, and the difficulty in getting good personnel to work outside of Maputo and provincial capitals. No clear phase-out plan has yet been agreed with the provincial directorates. There is no study on the impact of RBM's institutional support to the overall functioning of the Ministry, and the consequences of RBM's sudden withdrawal of support in 1996 to the provincial directorates for education and agriculture have not yet been assessed.

RBM is making efforts to link with other actors at the provincial level and to identify other potential partners. However, capacity-building remains centred on the payment of salaries and recurrent costs coupled with technical training and the provision of offices and equipment. In both Sofala and Manica, the value of RBM's financial and non-financial support is several times higher than the entire provincial budgets for social welfare. Given the economic situation in Mozambique and the massive social welfare needs, it is very doubtful that the Social Welfare Ministry will, in the foreseeable future, be able to maintain the scale of operations currently supported by RBM. Unsurprisingly in this situation, some programmes (e.g., support for pre-schools) reflect Redd Barna's priorities more than those of Acção Social. As well, Redd Barna supports levels of service provision in some districts that Acção Social cannot hope to deliver throughout each province, let alone Mozambique as a whole. This runs counter to one of the Ministry's guiding principles; «the promotion of social justice to ensure equitable access to services,» and RBM will be expanding its district coverage from 1998.

More fundamentally, Acção Social's new mandate focuses on enhancing co-ordination rather than directly delivering social welfare services itself. Unless this national policy changes, the Acção Social in Sofala and Manica will likely balk at assuming full responsibility for the implementation of services supported by Redd

Barna. The sustainability of a strategy based on the government assuming direct responsibility for the level and type of social services promoted by RBM seems questionable.

Red Cross

After many years of assistance during periods of conflict to Mozambique and Southern Africa generally, Norwegian Red Cross is focussing on helping its sister society in Mozambique become a «well-functioning» national society. It is providing both financial support and technical assistance in the form of a long-term adviser.

Since the start of this institutional cooperation, the MRCS has gone through numerous changes to meet the requirements of the Red Cross movement, adjust to peace, and improve its performance. To do so, MRCS created in 1993 an Institutional Development Department with objectives to:

- consolidate the institutional base and promote the MRCS and the Movement's image;
- develop the management capacity in programming, finance, personnel, and disaster response;
- improve service quality by training its staff and 4,000 volunteers in management, community participation, and gender issues.

The NRC has sought principally to:

- strengthen operational and management capacity in MRCS;
- provide financial support and training;
- address financial vulnerability stimulating the development of income-generating activities and downsizing.

The NRC adviser works closely with the Institutional Development Department in MRCS to address organisational development issues such as the functioning of the governance structure, development of the volunteer base, and strategic planning. A number of unforeseen problems such as the sudden departure of the new financial director and the cost of redundancy payments during the staff reductions have created financial problems, but NCR has been flexible in the allocation of its funds, helping MRCS to meet its obligations, at least temporarily. NRC subsequently sent clear messages regarding drastic decisions required, which have been discussed with MRCS and agreed upon.

The institutional development plan for 1997 is very ambitious, with detailed action items and projected measurable results. However, MRCS faces major constraints including the difficulty in hiring qualified staff, especially in key management areas; time constraints, especially concerning the development of income-generating activities; and resistance to changes, especially from the «old guard» at the provincial levels. Still, the close relationship has, over the years, enhanced dialogue and trust.

Institutional development outcomes

Both RBM and NRC aim to promote institutional development in Mozambique principally at the organisational and individual levels.⁷² It seems clear that neither Norwegian NGO could expect their ID achievements to be sustained if assistance were terminated, but neither NGO is yet planning to end their programmes.

NRC has a very formidable task working with a partner that must improve organisational performance on many fronts within an environment where hard-won gains can disappear through the loss of a key member of staff. Periodic achievements have not been sustained in certain central functions such as financial and general management. It seems clear that organisational strengthening in Mozambique's NGO sector remains, at best, a «two-steps forward and one-step back» process. The endeavour requires extended commitment based on dialogue and trust. NRC clearly is able to raise difficult issues with its partner, and the joint self-assessment exercise illustrates the level of transparency both partners wish to maintain, which bodes well for the future. The addendum to the 1997-99 agreement signalled that MRCS must urgently take steps to convince NRC of its commitment to transformation. At the time of our mission, progress was being made but questions invariably remain regarding the depth and permanency of such changes.

The task RBM seems to have set for itself seems even more daunting. Unlike the partnership between NRCS and its sister society in Mozambique, the provincial directorates of Acção Social are not naturally part of the Redd Barna «family» and do not share common values, principles, and priorities. As well, organisational changes are still taking place within the Ministry of Social

Welfare, and the future direction of these changes is far from clear. The government has re-defined Acção Social's role away from direct implementation towards co-ordination of the various groups providing social welfare services. This seems inconsistent with RBM's efforts to transfer responsibility for programme implementation to the provincial directorates and their district offices.

Concluding remarks

Demands on the capacities of Norwegian NGOs have increased over the years. They are pressed to deliver services quickly and at the same time to design more focused programmes and run these cost-effectively. These demands manifest themselves in the relationships Norwegian NGOs develop with local counterparts, with the result that field offices are sometimes caught between demands from the North and the reality of the South. In the case of Mozambique, a commitment to a partnership model, and particularly one based on a *Norwegian axis* of similar organisations, presents very difficult problems to an NGO. There are as yet very few capable local NGOs, and the ones that do exist are concentrated in Maputo. In the case of RBM, the new approach is further complicated by its heritage of direct implementation for emergency relief and rehabilitation.

In both case studies, the Norwegian organisations have extensive experience in Mozambique. However, successful capacity-building depends not only on a profound knowledge of the local context, but also on a thorough diagnosis of the target organisation, based on a detailed understanding of its objectives and its operational strengths and weaknesses. The decision by the NRC to field a resident representative is an example of an effort to gain such understanding.

In the case of the RBM, the assessment of the partner's potential is much more difficult. To date, RBM's institutional development plans have been guided by its own assessment of the social welfare needs of its target population, without a thorough assessment of the existing capacities of its main counterpart. These needs are substantial by any objective reckoning, but there remains little possibility that Acção Social will be able to meet these.

Organisations working with government agencies in the provinces also need to monitor national developments. The Acção Social mandate has changed repeatedly, and

⁷² The Zimbabwe case makes clear that NRC is also supporting the Mozambican society through the regional mechanism, SAPRCS.

the Ministry is almost certain to be buffeted by the impending transformation of the entire state apparatus. There is intense pressure on the government to reduce the direct delivery of public services to a «sustainable» level, and to decentralise the delivery of those services that will remain a government responsibility.⁷³ In this environment, the likelihood of Acção Social being asked to assume increased responsibility for direct programme delivery seems rather remote. Even if it is recognised that, in the absence of capable local NGOs in the provinces, Acção Social must fill the breach, it will not have the capacity in the foreseeable future to finance and staff the level of services currently supported by RBM for child-centred programmes.

RBM clearly has some fundamental choices to make. Needs of the communities in which it has been working remain immense, but there is no chance within a realistic planning horizon that Acção Social, local NGOs, or both in concert will be able to meet those needs without RBM. There also seems little likelihood that Redd Barna will provide funding to raise child-centred service delivery in all districts of the two provinces to levels provided in the districts in which RBM now operates. There also seems little likelihood that Acção Social will be able to find other donors to support social services not now covered by RBM (i.e., other than child-centred services).

It is hard to gauge progress, especially with institutional development, unless a «weaning plan» is designed at an early stage. In light of its previous experience with the sudden withdrawal from education and agriculture, RBM should agree upon a phase-out strategy and plan with each of its partners, and eventually for its country programme. In doing so it would achieve two things. First, there will be an incentive for counterpart organisations (e.g., Acção Social) to maximise capacity building opportunities before RBM funding ends. Second and more importantly, it will force RBM and its counterpart to document the service levels that might feasibly be sustainable once RBM's financial assistance ends.

RBM's vast experience in developing countries and extensive networks make it a key source of information. By stimulating linkages, RBM provides opportunities

for its public sector counterparts to learn successful strategies undertaken in neighbouring countries, which might then be adapted to meet Mozambique's specific needs and capabilities.

A final point. In Mozambique today, many local organisations do not offer adequate incentives to staff, volunteers, and members, either for current performance or for retaining their most capable personnel. This fact alone endangers organisational sustainability.

3.4 Sri Lanka (see also Appendix 3)

3.4.1 Redd Barna and Siri Prabodha

Redd Barna Sri Lanka (RBSL)

Redd Barna (RB) activity in Sri Lanka started in 1974. Although it has gone through different phases, child care-oriented community development and emergency aid have featured prominently in the programme since its inception. In 1995 RB-Oslo gave its resident representatives the mandate to change RBSL thoroughly from a project implementer to a non-operational facilitator for local partners. This was based on an understanding that the country programme «...had stagnated, created dependency, had too much of a generalist approach to development with an unclear focus, low cost efficiency and low coverage in terms of number of children.» (Redd Barna, «Sri Lanka Country Programme Strategy 1998-2001.» p. 2) It also was felt there was no realistic strategy for sustainability. In addition, NORAD's influence must also be taken into account: Redd Barna was one of two Norwegian NGOs with a «programme agreement» with NORAD, and had to demonstrate willingness to abide by the country's aid philosophy of working through partner organisations.

The original RB projects were gradually phased out in 1996-97. Simultaneously, a total reorganisation of all Redd Barna activities in Sri Lanka was started. Four strategic workshops were held in which RBSL analysed its activities and organisation with reference to the policies and new vision of RB.⁷⁴ The organisation decided to shift from a community development focus to more child-centred programming. This exercise identified the following strategic issues for children in Sri Lanka:

- early childhood development, centred on pre-schools;
- children in especially difficult circumstances;

⁷³ There will be decentralisation following local elections, and there is talk of a public sector reform project, with possible funding from the UK.

⁷⁴ See also section 3.2.1 or the Zimbabwe appendix.

- child advocacy, initially through the establishment of a «Children's Desk», and co-operation with Save the Children Fund (UK).

On the organisational side, the aim was set to become a professional partnership agency supporting selected bodies with common interests and values to those of Redd Barna. Emphasis was to be on women and children, and popular participation. RB would also promote networking among child-oriented organisations, nationally and internationally.

The strategy also shows understanding that the protracted ethnic conflict will endure for the foreseeable future. Hence, the programme still reflects the conflict and the specific challenges this implies for the organisation. RBSL will thus split its activities between psychosocial work in the war-affected areas, and pre-schools in the western and central parts of the country. RBSL will keep some of its own staff in the North and East «...at least until proper partnerships have been developed.» As well, NOK 1,259,000 out of a total budget of NOK 8,100,000 remains budgeted for emergence aid for 1997.

RBSL is now collocated with Save the Children (UK). The two organisations have a common mission centred on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and membership in the International Save the Children Alliance.⁷⁵ In addition to sharing facilities, they are now co-operating closely, especially in promoting the Convention, networking, and the collection and dissemination of data.

Establishing partnership

The drastic change in programme and structure was handled by RBSL with clear support from the head office. The local representative was told to «make the pain short.» This aim has been accomplished in what must be record time, but of course, not without costs. During a two-year period starting in 1996, RBSL completely changed approach: a new programme focus; new partnership relations; and a drastic reduction of local staff from 356 to 24 by the end of 1998. Although a number of the former RB employees are now in similar positions within partner organisations, some have lost their jobs. RB is facing, to date, seven court cases.

After the four initial strategic workshops, the field staff was asked to look for possible partner organisations locally, and a list of these was produced. During this short time span RBSL was to phase-out their operational work almost entirely,⁷⁶ while simultaneously establishing partnership relations. A difficulty in this process was the task of motivating the staff to perform in a process that could lead to the elimination of their positions. On balance however, the «partner finding mission» proved easier than expected, a fact RBSL attributes partly to its good reputation and partly to the number of competent local NGOs. By the end of 1996, 12 partner agreements were in place, and RB decided on a hiatus until the new system is consolidated. During this process, some RBSL employees took the opportunity to establish separate organisations, one of which is Siri Prabodha (SP).

Siri Prabodha (SP)

RBSL decided in February 1996 to grant NOK 295,000 to the establishment in Kandy of the Grassroot Oriented Pre-school Teacher Training College, headed by its former Senior Programme Co-ordinator. SP's mission is to promote early childhood development involving, *inter alia*, measures to encourage and sustain existing pre-schools and, at the same time, disseminating the knowledge gained through RBSL's programmes to villages outside RBSL's project areas. Through SP, Redd Barna wants to facilitate training of teachers in 75 pre-schools in the existing community development projects. These are mostly in Sinhala areas, but training in the Tamil language is offered for pre-school teachers from former projects and the new partner-managed projects in the East, West, and North. SP is also undertaking a pilot project in Home Based Child Care in the plantation area, with a Tamil advisor funded by UNICEF.

It is clearly stated in a RB head office document that «the long term goal is to make SP completely independent of RB, and to see the organisation develop into a locally based and locally focused educational institution for children, which serves society both nationally and internationally.» (Oversikt over partnerprosjekter per 8 oktober 1997, Redd Barna Sri Lanka)

SP is, after one year and a half, an organisation of six employees (all of whom worked previously with RBSL) and a team of professional resource persons whose ex-

⁷⁵ See box 2.2: Transnational NGOs.

⁷⁶ Three small offices are maintained in the North and East given these areas have few qualified personnel and local NGOs.

expertise enhances the quality of the training provided. SP's director has 33 years of experience in the childcare field, including nine in RBSL. RBSL has provided her with significant international training in both leadership and courses to upgrade her substantial skills.

SP's director was the first to establish an independent partner organisation in relation to RBSL. In addition to her commitment to early childhood development, it seems that the good reputation of RBSL has given SP valuable momentum. SP has also voluntarily selected the RB resident representative to serve on its Board of Management.

RB has initially given four-year commitments to its partners. In the case of SP, RBSL stressed there would almost certainly be funding beyond the initial four years. However, RBSL has also encouraged SP to run the organization according to «business rules,» (i.e., cover costs by income from the college's training courses).⁷⁷ SP is now formally registered as a company: «profit making – but not profit-sharing.» SP trained 500 teachers in 1997, but almost all its trainees are staff from other RB partners or volunteers from pre-schools in the former RBSL community development areas, and their fees are covered by RBSL. In essence, Redd Barna has facilitated an independent structure that nevertheless remains profoundly dependent on RB financing. The idea is that SP should diversify in future, thereby reducing its dependence on RB's fee-for-service payments. Already SP has given courses funded by UNICEF and, according to RB's resident representatives, other financially strong agencies are queuing for training from SP. Still, for full cost recovery, fees have to be substantial in Sri Lankan terms, making SP dependent on a few wealthy agencies.

RBSL has promoted the concept of full cost recovery, but Siri Prabodha feels it is too early to be in a sink-or-swim situation. There was great confidence expressed by RB in SP's prospects, which explains the speed with which this process was implemented. It remains moot whether this confidence in the organisation and its market will prove justified. However, RBSL's other preoccupation was to secure quality teacher training for the benefit of other partner organisations. RBSL is attempting to institutionalise this training through SP, and has

invested in the SP director as a strategic ally in its transition to a partnership organisation.

3.4.2 FORUT and the Alcohol and Drug Information Centre (ADIC)

FORUT

FORUT – «Campaign for Development and Solidarity» – is a Norwegian NGO working for the international peace and solidarity. It is part of the International Order of Good Templars (IOGT) movement. In Sri Lanka since 1982, FORUT works in collaboration with the Swedish IOGT-NTO under the name FORUT Sri Lanka, which is currently involved in 234 villages with a 1997 budget of approximately NOK 11 million.

FORUT's involvement in Sri Lanka (its first overseas programme) has increased and evolved since 1982. Early projects were primarily welfare oriented, but from 1988 a «participatory people oriented development approach» has taken over. Temperance work is the central mission of FORUT, but due to the war its programme in the North also features emergency aid and rehabilitation.

FORUT retains an implementing role in Sri Lanka, but its work through partner organisations has increasing priority. Its special preoccupation – temperance – is but one of the fields of activity of its counterparts, some of which were newly established with FORUT support. FORUT's strategy encompass four phases: survey and planning; implementation; localisation;⁷⁸ and finally, training and networking among compatible organisations. The strategy is for partners to receive financial support (plus training and networking support) during the initial phase, until a revolving fund gives them financial independence. However, the scale of operations of the Alcohol and Drug Information Centre (ADIC) – the partner organisation met during this case study – makes it unrealistic for it to depend entirely on a revolving fund.

ADIC

ADIC was established within FORUT in 1987 as a vehicle for temperance work. Its preoccupation is moti-

⁷⁷ The only exception being a small amount for staff capacity building.

⁷⁸ Defined as «the creation of a sound economic foundation for the independence of the partner organization and the human resources within it.»

vating young persons to avoid drugs, and youth involvement has featured centrally in ADIC's work. Volunteers are generally recruited among students waiting to enter university.

ADIC wishes to promote a new value system through: (1) combating positive images relating to drug and alcohol use; (2) demystification of alleged alcohol and other drug effects and reducing unacceptable drunken behaviour, especially directed against women; (3) drug prevention as a component of health and development; and (4) drug prevention as an aspect of general education and individual enrichment and empowerment. (1996 Annual Report: p. 19)

A 1989 evaluation of ADIC queried its dependence on FORUT. FORUT-Norway (FORUT-N) encouraged ADIC to establish independently in 1990 as partnership was then becoming the preferred approach within NGO circles.⁷⁹ ADIC's leadership also wished independence as it had well-trained people and a solid reputation. At the time its activities were mainly confined to Colombo, but in 1991 ADIC started «Innovative Community Level Approaches» in the districts. This included awareness creation, integrating drug prevention issues into organisations, and mobilising volunteers for district, divisional, and village level prevention work. ADIC established and trained a network of 146 young volunteer groups in 12 districts. Some groups have become independent and today require minimal support from ADIC.

According to ADIC's 1996 Annual Report, the volunteer system serves two purposes. It represents a resource enabling ADIC to expand its activities. As well, it provides training for young people, the majority of whom are also active in other NGOs which then profit from ADIC's ideas and experience. The vast majority of activists in ADIC are male, and it discourages young women as fieldworkers due to parental restrictions. However, women do volunteer work in the ADIC library.

From the outset, Sinhala personnel have predominated in ADIC. ADIC states that it wanted to establish activities in the North, but this was considered impossible. It recently has started work with Indian Tamils working in plantations. While recognising the extensive alcohol

problem on the estates, the lack of Tamil-speaking resource persons has constrained expansion of this initiative, although recently, ADIC has recruited Muslims who speak both Tamil and Sinhala.⁸⁰

While still a part of FORUT, ADIC used half its budget to fund local NGOs. This approach subsequently changed, and by 1991 this item represented only 15 percent of the budget. In a generally positive 1991 evaluation, ADIC was advised not to increase the number of collaborators, but instead to broaden existing arrangements. Today less than 5 percent of its budget is directed towards these organisations.

ADIC co-operates to an extent with education and health authorities. It implements a School Based Drug Demand Project, and a WHO-funded staff training programme to integrate drug prevention into the public health network. In 1996 ADIC also approached workplaces through trade unions. It networks with other anti-drug organisations, both in Sri Lanka and internationally. Over the past six years it has also attempted, with varying success, to encourage other organisations to integrate drug prevention into their activities.

ADIC used to be fully financed by FORUT, which continues as its major donor and has just extended the partner agreement for five years. In 1996, support from the European Economic Commission allowed ADIC to start an «outreach initiatives for community responses» project in the districts. It has also received small sums from UNICEF and WHO, and is working hard to further diversify its funding.

ADIC's director is dedicated and competent. At the same time ADIC's strong leadership also represents its vulnerability. The director is currently the only staff member proficient in English, which implies too heavy a workload for her and a problem in terms of sustainability and competence building among the staff. ADIC salaries are low and the market for experienced personnel who speak English is very competitive. Staff it has trained have moved to international organisations at more than double the salary. A question now raised is whether to reduce the staff level in favour of higher salaries.

⁷⁹ Although NORAD also was promoting this approach, it was not instrumental in the decision.

⁸⁰ FORUT is itself heavily involved in the North, and its organisation better reflects the country's ethnic diversity.

Relationships among FORUT, ADIC, and local collaborators

There are four links in the organisational chain studied: FORUT-N; FORUT-Sri Lanka; ADIC, and a local collaborating organisation.

FORUT-N is proud of ADIC, which today a strong and independent entity which «does not need FORUT for much more than the money.» While it believes the «independent ADIC» has developed in a different direction than would have been the case within FORUT, this is seen as a strength. FORUT-N is also pleased with the partnership aspect. «The project has taught us to cooperate. Earlier we only dealt with our own projects.» FORUT-N believes it has gained from ADIC both substantially and organisationally.

While FORUT-Sri Lanka emphasises that ADIC is successful, it has a differences with ADIC over objectives and strategy. Although temperance binds the two organisations, for ADIC temperance is the principal means to further community development. «When ADIC funded integrated community development efforts, it seemed to be the result of coincidence more than a consequence of planning and goal-orientation in the ADIC management» (ADIC 1991 Evaluation Report: 45). Its premise is that communities are spending too much on drugs, so drug prevention is «...in a sense community development in itself.» FORUT-SL on the other hand has community development as its focal point, and temperance is an integrated part of its community development projects. This difference may reflect that ADIC has the middle class as a target group, whereas FORUT emphasises poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, FORUT uses ADIC to provide services in some of their projects, and now sees a major challenge is to make better use of ADIC in its work. The partnership-aspect is toned down in ADIC, which believes it can stand on its own feet, and does not need FORUT beyond its funding. In their words, «We do not want to be just another project of FORUT.»

ADIC has itself turned into a «mother organisation» of five local organizations – a process strongly encouraged by FORUT. One of these local organisations (LIFE) started by ADIC was visited by the mission. It has 500 student volunteers working in villages. LIFE today receives funds from ADIC and organisations, and its staff continues to receive getting training and material from ADIC.

ADIC has been reducing its financial support to the local IOGT collaborating organisations. The IOGT organisations feel they can carry out the village work for less than ADIC, due to lower overhead expenses. ADIC on the other hand, sees its work as more cost-effective. The 1991 evaluation report noted the competition between ADIC and the collaborating organisations, which perceived ADIC activists «arrogant». ADIC leadership claims this problem has improved, but also underlined that it faces a dilemma in motivating activists by given them pride in their work, but at the same time having them remain humble in the field.

3.4.3 Norwegian Development Fund and Future in Our Hands

Norwegian Development Fund

The Norwegian Development Fund (DF) was founded in 1978 by the Norwegian popular movement, The Future in Our Hands (FIVH). For its first eight years it had limited funding and small projects, but from 1985 it substantially increased its resources through fund-raising campaigns and other sources, including NORAD. The DF qualified for a frame agreement with NORAD from 1994. In 1996 the DF was one of the five beneficiaries of the annual Norwegian Broadcasting Union's TV fund-raising campaign, which helped secure its finances for the next five years (Partner Evaluation Report, p. 8).

The DF's aim is «to facilitate the capability of local development organisations to empower the rural poor to improve their own lives in an environmentally sustainable manner,» which is to be achieved through «institutional support to local organisations which work with marginal rural groups, women and indigenous peoples» (ibid. 9). Currently DF has 15 partner organisations in eight countries. It seeks long-term funding relationships, and some of these partnerships go back 12 years. In addition, the DF has initiated South-South exchange networks among its partners.

FIOH (Sri Lanka) is one of the DF's oldest partners, with the relationship starting virtually from the birth of the two organisations. DF appears proud of the achievements of FIOH, and feels it receives more than FIOH does from the relationship, in terms of credibility, experiential learning, and assistance to other project partners in the region. FIOH provides leadership at the regional level, and is often called upon to train other NGOs supported by DF.

The key to the relationship's success is the complete consonance of their visions and strategies. This agreement of principle has been enhanced through long-standing personal relationships and, lately, excellent communication via e-mail. A sense of equality prevails, though mechanisms of accountability and reporting systems are well in place. FIOH and the Development Fund sign a contract each year. Two reports are required and there is an auditing agreement, coupled with at least one annual visit from Norway. Neither DF nor FIOH thinks the absence of a DF representative in Sri Lanka impedes either cooperation or institutional development. On the contrary, there is a shared perception that the experience in Sri Lanka has demonstrated that the current arrangement facilitates trust and local capacity building. There may however be need for a regional DF representative somewhere in the subcontinent. At present, the officer responsible for South Asia travels from Oslo, but infra-regional networking and support mechanisms have reduced his workload appreciably. In this sense, DF sees the ability of partners like FIOH to facilitate newer partners as institutional strengthening.

DF would like to continue working with FIOH in the present manner. DF continues to use FIOH in working towards its own institutional development as well as those of its other partners. Input from DF to FIOH, however, seems limited. Perhaps an area of sharing could be to facilitate a process through which the FIOH leadership can be broadened and deepened.

Future in Our Hands (FIOH)

FIOH in Sri Lanka started in the late-1970s when a European couple visited the remote hamlet of Dambana – home of members of the Veddah or aboriginal population – as tourists and then decided to settle. In 1979-80 they initiated a revolving loan fund for 40 farmers with FIVH aid, but communication problems and differences of attitude affected the program from the beginning. In 1984 an evaluation by FIVH culminated in a public meeting at which the villagers rejected the couple and their program. In the words of one, «the day you came here we were having one meal a day, now after 4 years we are still having one meal a day.»

Subsequently, under the leadership of a high-ranking government officer in the area, and a researcher who had been associated with the Europeans, an attempt was made to reorganise FIOH in Sri Lanka. The researcher underwent one year's training in alternative develop-

ment through PIDA. The re-formed FIOH-Sri Lanka realised that the initial project in Dambana had created an unhealthy dependency, and since Dambana was itself highly exploited by tourists, they moved to poor communities in the area. Nearly 15 years later, FIOH has been able to return to Dambana, albeit on a small scale, as its achievements in the surrounding areas dispelled the original suspicion.

FIOH's vision and strategies of intervention have been transformed over time and, though its leadership remains the same, its organisational structure is perceived as egalitarian and sensitive to changing community needs. The acid test may be FIOH's ability in the near future to induct a new leadership to assure continuity in change within an empowered organisation.

FIOH operates an integrated community development program among poor farmers in seven Divisional Secretary Divisions in Uva Province. The lynchpin of this is a social mobilisation and sustainable development program. With a modest annual budget of 3 million rupees, community volunteers conduct most activities. Of the 50 full-time social mobilisers working in their respective communities, 35 are women. The oldest of these programs is a network of village-level thrift and development societies that have formed the Svashakthi Sanvardana Parshadaya (SSP), an apex body which brings together local organisations from four divisions. Their savings records are impressive, and repayments are nearly 100 % because, in the rare instance of default, other members of the savings group volunteer to repay to maintain good standing with the SSP.

Decision-making is said to be de-centralised with individual organisations free to determine their own rates of interest for loans. This individualistic approach, however, combined with an incomplete understanding of the mechanisms at work, may lead to some problems of equity in the future, but none have been identified by the membership as yet. The absence of an appeals process and the non-recognition of possible conflict of interest situations in the determination of loan requests from member organisations, are possible areas for further dialogue.

The SSP executive committee has produced its own plan-of-action for the next three years through a process of dialogue with its affiliates and subcommittees. Facilitation by the full-time FIOH co-ordinator has been indispensable in this process. The plan includes budgets,

estimates, and targets. Notable is an incentive scheme for employees (mobilisers) based on the number of groups they organise within the target community.

For FIOH's president, institutional strengthening is more about a strong and self-reliant decision-making process than financial independence. FIOH perceives itself strong not so much in terms of its own capacity, but in terms of the strength of people's participation within the organisation. What FIOH feels it gets out of the relationship with the Development Fund is a sharing of experience – particularly in the South Asian region but also with its Latin American program – and its networking with other DF partner organisations, with which it meets on a regular basis.

FIOH is one of the oldest partners of the Development Fund. It maintains the DF really came into its own as a professional organisation only in 1989-90. Until then, FIOH felt there was no relationship beyond regular funding arrangements. In 1989-90 DF become more independent from FIOH, and this led to a stronger relationship for the realisation of common goals.

An important aspect of the relationship is that the Development Fund provides moral support in the pioneering work in which FIOH is involved at the moment. Both organisations are learning from FIOH's experiences. According to FIOH, «the Development Fund is willing to learn even from our bad experiences.» The recurrent metaphor within the discourse between FIOH and DF is that of the family. Thus, the initial parent-child relationship has now developed into a brother-sister one in which neither side is dominant.

FIOH believes there will be some reduction in its financial dependency on DF in the future, but partnership on common issues will continue. In fact, even if funds stopped entirely the relationship will not end, although this would be a hard blow.⁸¹ Some components of FIOH's programme are now self-sustaining, but at the moment overall financial self-sufficiency is not a primary concern.

FIOH also works directly with NORAD and other Northern NGOs.⁸² It, together with another DF partner organisation, also was instrumental in the formation of

an NGO-collective. The concerns and foci of this NGO forum are those on the common agenda of FIOH and DF, but the umbrella organisation is too new to demonstrate significant results in terms of its capacity-building and advocacy roles.

FIOH is self-confident enough to assert that the Development Fund is not entirely necessary for its future development. In fact FIOH feels that DF benefits more, as its credibility in Norway as a lobbying group and a source of information on the development world is the result of its relationship with Southern partners, such as FIOH.

3.4.4 Findings for Sri Lanka

Institutional development: intentions, strategies, actions, and outcomes

It is clear that institutional development (ID), widely defined, lies at the core of what the NGOs involved in the three Sri Lanka cases are trying to achieve. At the higher levels of ID, all the participating NGOs seek to mobilise local resources to affect the broader social system:

- FORUT through community development;
- ADIC by changing attitudes towards drugs and alcohol;
- Redd Barna by improving conditions for children;
- SP through pre-school development and training;
- Norwegian Development Fund through community development and environmental protection; and
- FIOH by strengthening community organisation and empowerment.

All the NGOs see that progress towards these goals requires effective organisations, which themselves must have capable personnel as their foundation plus links to other organisations advancing in broadly the same direction. Using the terms employed in this study, all the participating NGOs have system development (sectoral, overall, or both) as a goal, and see networking, organisational development, and human resource development as strategies for progress to the goal. Institutional development through partnership seems in particular to be a credo shared by the three Norwegian NGOs and

⁸¹ The Development Fund provides salaries while FIOH works with other agencies on specific issues.

⁸² Although FIOH said it received DF's blessing prior to approaching NORAD, the sentiment at DF headquarters appeared less unalloyed.

their counterparts. Further, the three sets of partners have all taken concrete steps to implement their strategies. They train local personnel (both staff and volunteers), they provide financial and other forms of support to establish or strengthen community organisations, and the Northern NGOs support the organisational development of their local partners, often by facilitating network linkages at the national and regional levels.

Unsurprisingly given their different origins and histories, the process of strengthening the Southern partner is more advanced in some cases, and particularly with FIOH. It is premature to assess the sustainability of SP, and whether this can be achieved by delivering training on a full cost-recovery basis in Sri Lanka, but ADIC and FIOH seem firmly established, at least until they eventually face a transition in leadership. It is impossible to pronounce firmly on whether any or all of the organisations, considered singly or as partnerships, have had a sustainable impact at the system levels beyond networking, but it is clear their services are valued and they continue to make progress.

Given the above, the analysis will focus on some premises underlying the partnership model, and then try to tease out some mechanisms that may contribute to an impact in the social environment. It also is possible to highlight some basic problems, contradictions, and dilemmas involved in institution building through NGOs – some of which are specific to the Sri Lankan context, and some probably of a more general value.

Partnership

There seems to be a growing consensus within NGO circles that co-operation with partner organizations is the preferred *modus operandi* when working in developing countries. The basic hypothesis underlying this understanding is that it increases impact and sustainability. This is in accordance with the philosophy contained in the term *recipient responsibility*, which is a basic principle for Norwegian aid.

The three partnerships subject to this study have different histories. FIOH was an established organisation when approached by DF in the mid-1980s. ADIC was created as a separate NGO after an external evaluation queried why it continued as a component of the FORUT organisation. SP was established by Redd Barna staff as RB sought to alter its approach from direct implementation to working through partners. The six organizations

also have different perceptions of what partnership is or should involve.

At the most general level, mutual benefits (explicit or subtler) accrue from each partner arrangement. The Development Fund never established a physical presence in Sri Lanka, and so always needed a local partner for project implementation. Now that Redd Barna and FORUT are trying to avoid the direct implementation role, all three Norwegian NGOs need local counterparts for at least two reasons: (i) to fulfil NORAD's expectations and (ii) to implement projects. However, the Norwegians see other benefits. Both Redd Barna and the Development Fund stated they also needed the partner for sharing views and learning, but Redd Barna's resident representative went further still. He saw partnership also as an argument for a continuing physical presence. Without this, Redd Barna could be reduced to a conduit for money, which would not be a true partnership.

The view from the South is somewhat different. Both Siri Prabodha and ADIC feel gratitude at having been born within, respectively, Redd Barna and FORUT. Undoubtedly there are still important connections in the two relationships, especially for Siri Prabodha, which is continuing the same work as was undertaken within Redd Barna prior to the split. However, FORUT Sri Lanka sees the ideal would be for ADIC to co-operate on a common strategy and then function as the project implementing agency, but ADIC is now operating largely on its own following a somewhat different strategy than FORUT. It is possible the obvious differences between these two partnerships may stem largely from a natural «life-cycle» for North-South partnerships. ADIC has been independent for seven years whereas SP is only two years old. Alternatively, the explanation may lie in organisation-specific factors, such as the predisposition of senior managers.

Interestingly, there also is friction between both Siri Prabodha and ADIC and their own local partners at the community level. An evaluation of ADIC noted the accusation of «arrogance,» while SP is seen as privileged compared to the other local Redd Barna partners. Comments were made during the mission that both SP and ADIC had been «too successful too quickly.» Such assertions represent human reactions that probably exist everywhere, but they may point to a deeper dilemma. On the one hand, it is important to encourage success, but this may risk the creation of «islands of excellence,» alienating collaborators and the community.

Funding

What is beyond doubt is that the three local NGOs are «recipients» and the Norwegians are the «donors.» What implications does this asymmetrical relationship have for patterns of decision-making and strategic calculations? Does it also affect the perceptions of partnership as an organisational model? Both ADIC and Siri Prabodha have financial worries, a fact which is not in itself surprising given prevailing conditions in Sri Lanka. What is more important for this study is to discover possible structural limitations or constraints induced by financial hardship.

The director of Siri Prabodha wanted to start on her own after having been encouraged by Redd Barna. She had already begun the task of establishing a new organisation when she learned that RB was going to alter its approach in terms of financial support. In short, RB wanted SP to adopt a business concept. RB has consistently assured SP's director not to worry about money, and have encouraged her to take loans if necessary to invest in personnel or more permanent housing. The director feels it is wrong to plan that fees will cover all expenses. She wants to offer courses for those who are not supported by foreign funders, and her preference would be a mixed system, with some subsidy for administration in addition to course fees. She believes it reasonable to reduce, but not eliminate, the subsidy over time. She reported that these financial worries force her to use too much energy on running courses, and she does not dare to hire more personnel even though they might generate more money. The current situation is harmful to organisational development and the extra time the director spends on course delivery restricts the opportunity to improve course design and planning. The new approach gives the partnership a «service contract» flavour according to the SP director.

In our view, it seems that RB's resident representative has acted very competently in effecting a complete re-organisation within a very short period of time, and RB offers its partners and opportunity to learn under secure conditions. Nevertheless, problems are present at least at the conceptual and psychological levels. These can be significant for the partnership if one party feels overruled. Even though RB-Sri Lanka's «crash-operation» is understandable given the shift in its mandate, it might be true that a more flexible step-by-step approach based on mutual adjustments would have been preferable.

As we have seen, it seems that FORUT values the partnership concept more than ADIC does. Some of the tension that exists appears to originate from the funding situation. ADIC sees control of funds as its major constraint. ADIC's leadership believes «self-sustainability is a dream.» When the annual budget was reduced by 10 percent a few years back, ADIC wondered «why are they punishing a child who is behaving well?» After serious protests from ADIC, and agreement was reached in 1996 to stabilise funds for five years. ADIC accepts the idea of funding diversification, yet the leadership now questions this from a cost-benefit perspective – too much time has to be used for fundraising with the result that less effort can be channelled into institutional development and capacity building.

Staff

With the exception of FIOH, local NGOs face great difficulty in recruiting competent people. Wages are highly competitive, and both the RB/SP and the FORUT/ADIC partnerships complained of losing their trained staff to international agencies (including NGOs). This emphasises the vulnerability of the local organisations. ADIC and Siri Prabodha are highly dependent on dedicated leadership. However, unless the current leaders are able to train successors, their organisations will be in trouble. It seems that the relevant labour market is still tightening due to the conflict and the lack of trust and opportunities in society. Competent people leave Sri Lanka every year, and the few who subsequently return often have lost touch with Sri Lankan reality, and would have problems adjusting to the type of fieldwork practised by many NGOs. This situation means organisation must be flexible on wages.⁸³ For young organisations still in a learning process and dependent on foreign donors, increasing wage bills present grave difficulties.

Sustainability

As we have argued earlier, a premise underlying the partnership approach is that sustainability will be more likely if local, rather than foreign, organisations handle implementation. If by «sustainability» we mean lasting independence of foreign donors, many in the NGO sector will be in trouble. Few NGOs – in Sri Lanka or in countries like Norway – are soon likely to be sustainable in the sense that the organization can operate entirely on earned funds, as opposed to donations or grants. Even though SP is developing a business unit concept, it

⁸³ Redd Barna has doubled salaries lately.

remains utterly dependent on Redd Barna, plus a few other donors that can afford to purchase full-cost training services.

Obviously, sustainability has different dimensions, including ecological, cultural, political, and financial. *Financial* independence may not be a realistic goal for an NGO working with poor people in a poor country. *Substantial* sustainability in the sense that the local NGO may direct and monitor its own work without regularly oversight and training by the donor NGO, is a more realistic target. In a country like Sri Lanka, *political* sustainability also is a significant issue. Graduating from dependency on politically «neutral» foreign donors may lead to co-optation and dependence on local partisan political structures.

As a corollary to the issue of sustainability, the question of «phasing out» arises. An aim, implicit or explicit, of most donors is complete withdrawal. Redd Barna's perspective on partnership gives the sustainability question a new logic. When partnership is the *raison d'être* of aid, the question of pulling out becomes irrelevant. The whole idea of mutual learning implies presence, at least

according to RBSL's current conviction. Partnership is seen as being a lasting relationship, where trust and stability are central ingredients.⁸⁴ According to the Development Fund there has never been a question of resident representation in Sri Lanka.

Concluding remarks

Some important themes would require closer study than was possible in this study. Both Siri Prabodha and ADIC are weakly represented in Tamil areas – both presenting the argument «I can't risk my staff.» At the same time both FORUT and Redd Barna are involved in areas of conflict.

Another issue is gender. Both ADIC and Siri Prabodha have a clear gender bias, both stemming from traditional societal constraints, although with opposite outcomes. ADIC has a male bias among their activists because «women would have problems going out in the field campaigning for temperance.» Siri Prabodha's courses have so far been taught by women almost exclusively. As women traditionally care for children, therefore women instructors are used for training.

⁸⁴ In spite of not having a physical presence, the Development Fund's partnership seems to be meaningful in their view.

4. Findings

4.1 General

4.1.1 Are Norwegian NGOs Supporting Institutional Development?

The evidence both from the case studies and the survey of Norwegian NGOs indicates that these organisations are significantly, and increasingly, engaged in institutional development (ID). Why?

In general terms, institutional development is very congruent with NGO thinking. Many NGOs work purposefully to affect values, norms of behaviour, and government policies because ID corresponds to their value-based orientation to development – an orientation that has strengthened since the recent series of evaluations could not confirm the «articles of faith» concerning the comparative advantages of NGOs. If NGOs cannot demonstrate they are, say, more efficient and better at reaching the poorest groups, they need another basis for demanding more funds from official aid agencies and the public.

At the same time, ID involves very real incentive problems. Obviously, policy advocacy can lead to conflicts with governments, which could be costly. As well, many NGOs have used their direct experience in emergencies and poverty alleviation projects for fundraising purposes. It will be harder to sell nebulous concepts such as institutional development. More generally, success in augmenting capacities of local organisations means international NGOs are reducing the need for their continued presence. This problem is even more pointed for staff members. An organisation can alter its profile by recruiting new people, but individuals have specific skills and habits of mind that take time to change. Can we expect personnel whose experience is in emergency relief to be effective as OD facilitators?

As well, most people and organisations prefer certainty to risk (they are «risk-averse»), and typically will behave more conservatively when they perceive risk. Development is inherently risky, and implementation through a local agent or counterpart increases risk.

⁸⁵ They may not have even jumped onto the same partnership bandwagon, as different NGOs have very approaches to partnership, and the definition may well vary within the same NGO. Redd Barna in Zimbabwe sees partnership in instrumental terms – as a means to its end of securing child rights. In Sri Lanka Redd Barna sees partnership as an end in itself, which is so central it justifies their continued presence after it ceases direct operations.

[See box 4.1: Partners, agents, and imperfect information].

Of course, these incentive problems exist in different strengths and combinations in different organisations. The stronger the incentives against change, the more inertia the organisation will exhibit. In this case, we would not expect all organisations to convert to a new development approach simultaneously. The evidence from our survey is clear that Norwegian NGOs have not all jumped on the partnership bandwagon at the same time.⁸⁵

4.1.2 The role of government policy

The new institutional economics stresses the importance of incentives, but it also recognises that other economic actors influence these incentives. For example, the development policy and funding environment could lessen or increase the inertia within NGOs against shifting to an ID approach. The evidence suggests the policy and funding environment of the Norwegian government serves to reduce, if not overcome, such inertia. Placing priority on capacity building, recipient responsibility, and the «Norwegian axis» creates incentives to adopt the ID approach to development, while assurances of stable funding reduces risk-avoidance conservatism.

The cross-country evidence seems consistent with a hypothesis that innovative approaches will be adopted more readily in countries whose policies clearly support such innovations, and whose funding is at least stable. For example, Riddell (1997, p. 31) cites a study that found: «the contribution Canadian NGOs make toward reinforcing institutional capabilities of their southern partners is small. In fact (the NGO programme) is not designed to do so ... many Canadian NGOs are incapable or hesitant to undertake institutional development programmes aimed at their southern partners...»⁸⁶

While supportive government policy may promote the shift to ID approaches, it appears not to be a necessary or sufficient condition for this change, at least with respect to NGOs. Our survey shows one Norwegian NGO adopted an explicit policy to support organisation-

⁸⁶ The Canadian aid budget has been cut significantly this decade and percentage cut to the NGO program was higher than the average. As well, ID is not among the six priorities set for Canadian ODA.

Partners, agents, and imperfect information:

Individuals and organisations often have problems in co-ordinating their actions because information is imperfect in two main ways:

- the world is complicated, making it costly to obtain and process information;
- different economic actors typically possess different information (it is «asymmetric»);

From these flow the two core informational problems: adverse selection and moral hazard.⁸⁷ Adverse selection deals with the question of how one determines, in advance, the «quality» of an individual under consideration for, say, a job or insurance coverage. Does she have the skills required? Does he lead a healthy lifestyle? For our purposes, the following might be common questions. Is this NGO *bone fide*, or is it a business in masquerade to obtain funding? Does this charismatic NGO leader allow participation from the board and staff? Will this NGO manager take «ownership» of an organisational development exercise, or is she just saying what she thinks we want to hear?

Moral hazard relates to whether someone will behave in a specified manner after an agreement has been reached. For our purposes, questions such as these might arise. Will a counterpart manager use core funding to strengthen the organisation or to delay necessary decisions? Will a staff member leave for a better paying position if he receives training?

Adverse selection raises the question of how a northern NGO might best identify suitable local agents (counterparts) to implement projects.⁸⁸ Moral hazard infuses what are termed «principal-agent» or, in short, «agency» relationships in which one person (the principal) appoints another to act as an agent on his or her behalf (e.g., shareholders appoint managers to run a firm). How does a northern NGO know its support will be used by its counterpart for agreed purposes? In the cases covered in this study, Norwegian NGOs

used a variety of approaches to help cope with adverse selection. In some cases the dilemma is somewhat reduced because the Norwegian NGO has natural partners which are «blood relatives» (Red Cross societies) or «extended family» (members of the Save the Children alliance). In situations where adverse selection poses particularly grave dangers (e.g., highly politicised Sri Lanka), Norwegian NGOs often incubated their own local partners. In other cases such as RBZ & TARSC in Zimbabwe, a relationship started modestly and then blossomed when it proved a good fit.

Moral hazard however is omnipresent in agency relations, and is not solvable with a single decision because any two organisations will have different interests. It becomes even more complicated when the agent has multiple principals, as often happens when a southern NGO has more than one funder, each pursuing its own objectives. For one example, ZWFT in Zimbabwe receives support from NPA, which is interested in poverty alleviation, and from CARE, which is interested in a self-sustaining micro-credit operation. NPA encourages subsidised credit to poor and remote communities, while CARE wants economic interest rates and a focus on small entrepreneurs in communities large enough to sustain small businesses.

The concept of NGO partnership complicates the issue further, as it is the southern NGO (agent) that legitimises the northern partner (principal). The case of DF and FIOH in Sri Lanka provides an interesting example, as both partners are very conscious of this feature of their relationship.

The concepts of local ownership and recipient responsibility may provide a direction forward, as these imply a fundamental change from a principal-agent relationship. Asymmetric information issues will, however, remain.

Box 4.1: Partners, agents, and asymmetric information

al strengthening of partners as early as 1935⁸⁹ and about half the NGOs that now have such a policy adopted this before NORAD issued its strategy for institutional development in 1991. At the same time, about 45 percent of NGOs that responded to the survey do not yet have a

formal policy on organisational strengthening of partners.⁹⁰ These survey results, plus evidence from the field missions, suggest that some Norwegian NGOs have been in the vanguard supporting the partnership approach, likely because it was congruent with their values.⁹¹ These NGOs then reinforced the shift in policy within NORAD's NGO division and the agency as a

⁸⁷ These originally were defined by economists working on insurance problems; hence the odd names.

⁸⁸ Of course, southern NGOs also face an adverse selection problem, as not all northern NGOs make good partners.

⁸⁹ This policy originally related to their partners in Norway, and later was applied overseas when the NGO began more extensive work in the South.

⁹⁰ Some may of course support such activities in the absence of a written policy.

⁹¹ Among our cases, NPA in Zimbabwe and the Norwegian Development Fund (DF) in Sri Lanka were early adherents to partnership. NPA and DF both stress «solidarity.»

whole. Once NORAD policy was unequivocal in support of recipient responsibility and partnership, this pushed more NGOs into accepting the new approach as a way of operating if not an ideal.

4.1.3 Scale and scope of institutional development efforts

The case studies suggest Norwegian NGOs are becoming more ambitious with their ID efforts. While the various organisations have different goals, Norwegian NGOs are promoting ID efforts at every level: individual; organisational; network; sectoral; and national. In some cases, Norwegian NGOs are working to affect institutional frameworks even at regional and international levels. Why?

In many ways, NGOs seem ideal vehicles for ID activities. Their *raison-d'être* is development rather than profit or, for public servants, vocation. Their value-based approach leads them to seek linkages with like-minded organisations. Their focus on poverty and marginalised communities means they are often working in communities in which they need agents from the local milieu to overcome language and cultural divides.

As well, almost by definition, value-based approaches entail ID. Participatory approaches piloted by NGOs are designed to give voice to the marginalised. Democratic governance of organisations is a core value of membership and community based NGOs. NGOs have led the fight for gender-awareness. The advocacy of such values is explicitly designed to change institutions or «the rules of the game.»

In summary, given many NGOs are predisposed toward ID approaches, the right policy environment in the home country appears to result in an acceleration of ID activity from the «supply-side.»

4.1.4 The demand side

While the Norwegian NGOs participating in this study all are increasingly involved in institutional development, there are significant variations in the goals, strategies, and activities. The evidence from this study indicates these variations stem in large part from differences in the host country context. The NGO team examined cases involving Redd Barna in all three countries. While Redd Barna is going through a major change in policy and operational approach, and this is reflected in

each of their country programmes, there remain very significant differences across countries in Redd Barna's goals, strategies, and actions. In Zimbabwe it is working with a coalition of established private, public, and voluntary organisations to alter the national institutional framework with respect to child rights. In Sri Lanka Redd Barna is supporting many new partners, some of which it incubated, to strengthen organisations within the pre-school education sector. In both Zimbabwe and Sri Lanka, RB has dramatically downsized in a very short period, whereas in Mozambique it retains a large staff to provide close support to public sector counterparts. This is strong evidence, albeit from a small sample, of the central importance of the local context.

The NGO team also looked at Norwegian Red Cross projects in two countries. Again, the projects differed in almost every respect except their focus on, broadly, institutional development. Even in that, NRC's goal in Mozambique is the development of a single organisation, whereas in Zimbabwe it is supporting a regional network which in turn supports its member national societies.

From the cases studied, at least three aspects of the national context warrant special mention: whether the country is in a state of emergency; the strength of the local NGO community; and the degree of politicisation. For some countries, recent NGO activity has focused on emergency relief rather than development. Redd Barna is trying to disengage from activities it started during Mozambique's civil war, and NRC in the same country is struggling to help its sister society find a sustainable role for peacetime.

Some countries – most obviously Mozambique in our sample – have a nascent NGO community and few natural partners for Norwegian NGOs. As a result, Redd Barna's principal counterparts are government departments, which represent different OD challenges. In some ways Sri Lanka represents the opposite situation, as it has a vibrant civil society. Indeed, the three Norwegian NGOs studied all had very competent local partners. However, the prolonged ethnic conflict means Sri Lanka is intensely politicised, and an unwary northern NGO may find that in choosing a local partner it has unwittingly chosen political sides. Interestingly, two of the Sri Lankan cases featured local partners (SP and ADIC) that were incubated within the supporting Norwegian NGO.

In these terms, Zimbabwe's environment is conducive for NGO activity. National life is not dominated by war or political partisanship, and there is a reasonably rich ecology of local NGOs. Perhaps as a result, the cases from Zimbabwe showed the greatest diversity in terms of goals, strategies, and activities. A conducive environment may encourage more experimentation by northern NGOs and their partners as they grapple with such difficult concepts as partnership and institutional development.

4.1.5 To what purpose?

The evidence suggests that Norwegian NGOs are increasing the scale and scope of their institutional development efforts. Such efforts are conditioned by contextual factors that vary across countries, but where local conditions permit there is evidence that there will be more variation in the ID activities, which may signify more experimentation. Of course more is not necessarily «better.» However, the evidence is that Norwegian NGOs are improving their performance with respect to ID by building their own capacities and by learning from experience.

It is clear that some of the Norwegian NGOs we studied are engaged in enhancing their own capacities, both in their country programmes and organisation-wide. Redd Barna stands out because it was so heavily oriented to direct implementation until recently, but NPA in Zimbabwe is another obvious example.⁹² As well, an explicit goal of the 1994 agreement between NRC and MRCS in Mozambique was to further the effectiveness of NRC's aid programme. The Norwegian NGOs we studied are also experimenting with new forms of organisational learning. Finally, most have recently developed new strategic plans featuring their partnership approach, new definitions of partnership, and new partnership agreements. This strongly suggests these organisations seek to improve their performance and, in particular, become better at partnership approaches.

4.1.6 The trouble with institutional development

To summarise, the evidence suggests that Norwegian NGOs are almost certainly doing more institutional development, and probably are doing it better. Are they doing it well? It is too early to pronounce in general

terms, and while some of the case studies are extremely encouraging, institutional development is not a game that players can expect always to win. In particular, partnership approaches to development pose problems that cannot be «solved,» only managed. What do we know about how best to manage such initiatives? [See box 4.2: Adaptive projects for institutional development].

4.2 SPECIFIC HYPOTHESES

The following research questions or, loosely, hypotheses⁹³ are organised around five key dimensions of the study: concepts and intentions; strategies and actions; relevance and outcomes; explanations; and comparisons. The list was generated on the basis of issues queried in the Plan of Implementation plus discussion among team members in the August 1997 workshop. The set of hypotheses is to be addressed in all studies to the extent that observations and findings are available. For the study of the NGO channel, the answers are based on data from (1) responses to the survey questionnaire sent to all Norwegian development NGOs, (2) meetings with NGO representatives and researchers in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, and Canada, (3) a review of the relevant literature, and (4) nine case studies in three countries.

Concepts and Intentions

H 1. Norwegian organisations involved in aid are increasingly engaged in institutional development, and there has been a gradual shift in emphasis from physical to human and social capital.

True. Responses to the survey indicate Norwegian NGOs are increasingly engaged in ID, and both the survey and case study data suggests the emphasis of their aid is shifting to HRD, OD, and social capital.

H 2. Objectives are used with multiple meanings, are unclear and difficult to measure.

True, but Norwegian NGOs also are developing written policy statements covering ID, partnership, and capacity building, and are employing written agreements covering their relations with southern counterparts. These agreements generally specify objectives and desired

⁹² January 1998, NPA will also implement a major reorganisation at its headquarters.

⁹³ Hypothesis is used here to mean «an expected empirical finding to be discussed in the studies,» rather than a hypothesis in the strict sense of the scientific method.

Adaptive projects for institutional development:

Many development researchers have criticised «blueprint» approaches for project planning, and particularly for projects intended to augment human and social capital rather than physical infrastructure. At the same time, clear plans are necessary at least to guide decisions and monitor progress. In addition, accountability demands that development agencies have a basis for reporting whether public funds have been used in the intended manner and with reasonable efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. Public officials are therefore loath to commit significant sums to development projects unless these are thoroughly planned.

Randinelli (1993) suggests a better approach is to avoid making substantial commitments until local priorities are well understood, objectives are clearly specified, and appropriate implementation strategies are identified. Development projects should start as small «experiments» and expand as experience warrants. He terms these «adaptive projects.»

CIDA uses a similar approach in what it terms «iterative projects.» It approves a large budget for a multi-year project that is only loosely specified. This budget then is available to finance smaller sub-projects. Plans for these sub-projects are fully specified as a basis for monitoring progress and determining whether the sub-project should be expanded, re-designed, or discontinued, but in the latter case only modest amounts have been spent. The overall project plan is updated through annual iterations, and becomes more tightly focused on local priorities, fruitful approaches, and

capable local partners as project managers learn from experience.

This combination of fully planned sub-projects within a larger, loosely specified project, seems to offer advantages for initiatives to promote institutional development. Start a number of small projects with various counterparts and focus support increasingly on the fruitful activities and successful counterparts. Prepare clear plans for the small projects so progress and achievements can be assessed, but let the relationship with each counterpart evolve (or disappear) as both parties learn from experience. Convert successful counterpart relationships into partnerships once both organisations have learned enough to make an extended commitment.

The Redd Barna Zimbabwe/TARSC project seems to be almost a textbook example of such an approach. It started modestly but quickly expanded once its initial success became clear. What was learned in the preliminary phase informed the plans for subsequent action. A few component leaders emerged from a large network of organisations. Plans for the follow-up phase specified objectives and approaches more clearly.

Such an approach features (1) incentives to improve performance, (2) means to monitor whether performance is improving, and (3) regular opportunities to change the scope and scale of joint endeavours.

Box 4.2: Adaptive projects for institutional development

outcomes and expected outputs, and often include some attempt to identify progress indicators. While in many cases these outcomes, outputs, and indicators are not yet adequate to measure progress, they represent a start and can be improved over time.

H 3. The institutional development objectives of the funder dominate those of the recipient throughout the chain.

False. While Norwegian government policy clearly influences at least some Norwegian NGOs, this policy also seems to reflect the influence of some Norwegian NGOs on the government's aid policies. Similarly, policies of Norwegian NGOs often influence the behaviour of southern counterparts, many of these counterparts influence their Norwegian partners even more strongly. In short, there is causation both up and down the aid chain.

Strategies and Actions

H 4. There are few relevant operationalised objectives that allow organisations to effectively target institutional development.

Generally but not universally true. Objectives specified by NGOs in partnership agreements and project plans are often simply the outputs expected, or else open-ended indications of the type or direction of change desired. The former do not specify the desired results while the latter give no guide as to how progress achieved compares to what was planned or envisaged. However, in some cases (e.g., the Child Law Project in Zimbabwe) objectives are well specified and in most cases current efforts in specifying objectives provide at least a basis for future improvement.

H 5. Institutional development is mostly understood as support to specific organisations, and refer seldom to

strengthening of organisational linkages, sector or system support.

False. While in some cases ID is understood by NGOs as support to specific organisations, the majority of cases studied included components for networking, and a significant number of cases featured components aimed at changing the sectoral or national institutional framework.

H 6. Most of what is carried out as institutional development represents transfer of hardware and technical knowledge, and is not specifically geared towards human and organisational capacity building in the recipient organisations.

False. A good case could be made that all but one of NGO case studies are geared toward capacity building.

H 7. In spite of new policy directions that emphasise institutional development the realities of programmes remain the same.

False. Many Norwegian NGOs have changed their programmes significantly in an effort to emphasise ID, and many of those that have not changed recently have focused on ID for some time (e.g., Norwegian Development Fund, the three church-affiliated NGOs noted in box 2.6).

H 8. There is a movement from value driven to commercially driven incentives in institutional development efforts.

False, except in the sense there is increased concern for cost effectiveness and financial sustainability, and for the RB/SP case in Sri Lanka.

Relevance and Outcomes

H 9. Systems for monitoring and evaluating changes in institutional development are not in place, and there are few benchmarks/standards to assess quality of performance.

True. Survey responses indicate that, while about half the NGOs state they have a monitoring system in place for capacity building activities, they really are referring to their regular monitoring system, and have nothing additional for ID. While many NGOs report improved performance by their partners, it seems clear that there

are few benchmarks or standards that allow NGOs to be more specific about performance by local partners.

H 10. The policy intentions (rhetoric) of institutional development are not reflected in implementation.

False. NGOs clearly are engaged in ID, capacity building of partners along the Norwegian axis and, in many cases, encouraging the recipient to assume responsibility.

H 11. Activities aimed at addressing lower level concerns (e.g. individual skills) are more likely to achieve their short term objectives than those aimed at higher level outcomes.

True, although our cases suggest Norwegian NGOs are successfully pursuing higher level outcomes.

H 12. Activities that successfully address lower level concerns are less likely to achieve sustainable improvements than those that successfully address higher levels concerns.

Probably true, but we cannot be more definite because we cannot yet determine the sustainability of improvements observed in most of the cases.

13. Differences in objectives and design have less of an impact on institutional development than do difference in organisational capacity to implement programmes.

Do not know. There is a good deal of evidence from the cases that the organisational capacity of the southern-partner is critical, and Norwegian NGOs may think highly of such partners even though they have differences over programme objectives and strategies (e.g., FORUT and ADIC in Sri Lanka). There also is evidence that the same organisation (e.g., Redd Barna in the different countries) is having much greater success in some ID projects than in others, but it is difficult to assess the degree to which this is due to the objectives and design.

14. There is frequent disagreement between key stakeholders on the relative importance of project outcomes.

True. Clear cases are Redd Barna/SP in Sri Lanka, FORUT/ADIC in Sri Lanka, and Redd Barna/Aççaõ Social in Mozambique.

H 15. Institutional cooperation ends when donor support discontinues.

Cannot say from the cases studied. There are clear cases when cooperation ended abruptly with funding (e.g., Redd Barna's ending of funding for agriculture and health in Mozambique). However, other cases suggest cooperation could continue after donor support ends (e.g., NPA's efforts to build partner networks in Zimbabwe, and the DF/FIOH cooperation in Sri Lanka), but as this cooperation continues these cases do not provide a test of the hypothesis.

Explanations

The following factors tend to promote institutional development:

H 16. When cooperation is initiated by Southern organisations and based on their demands (demand driven), and not by Northern donors and organisations (supply driven),

Probably true, but depends very greatly on the Southern organisation.

H 17. When Northern and Southern counterparts have similar and not conflicting commitment to and/or understanding of institutional development,

Probably true, but the cases do not provide an adequate test of the hypothesis.

H 18. When collaboration is initiated and mobilised by committed individuals, and later incorporated and supported by broader network of actors and organisational structures,

Probably true, and the Child Law project in Zimbabwe is an excellent example of this happening, but we do not have the information to make a broader statement.

H 19. When an emergent, flexible step-by-step approach based on continuous mutual adjustment is followed in planning and implementation, and not a fixed blueprint strategy,

Probably true, although the cases do not provide an adequate test of the hypothesis because of the self-selection method used.

H 20. When both parties are trained and have the skills to handle the technical and social/cultural aspects of cooperation,

Probably true, although the NPA/ZWFT case in Zimbabwe indicates that knowledge gaps in technical areas such as micro-credit can be bridged by other donors or local networks.

H 21. When there are «strong» Southern organisations (with high levels of efficiency and ability to manage change),

Probably true, although the cases indicate Norwegian NGOs often pursue different types of ID with strong local partners than with weaker ones, so the cases do not provide an adequate test of the hypothesis.

H 22. When the external environment is relatively stable and not too turbulent and unpredictable,

Probably true, although the cases indicate Norwegian NGOs often pursue different types of ID in convivial environments, and the vitality of the local NGO community may compensate for a turbulent environment (e.g., Sri Lanka) so the cases do not provide an adequate test of the hypothesis.

H 23. When support from several donors to the same organisations are co-ordinated,

True, based on cases such as the support from Nordic Red Cross societies via the Southern Africa Partnership and the micro-credit sector in Zimbabwe (i.e., NPA with ZWFT and ZWB). Further, evidence from SAPRCS and ORAP (box 2.3) indicates it is preferable if the recipients effects co-ordination of the donors than when the donors co-ordinate among themselves.

H 24. When there is clear policy direction, but no strong supervision and monitoring from NORAD,

The cases do not provide an adequate test of the hypothesis as we did not observe situations in which NORAD exercised close supervision and monitoring.

H 25. When the selection of co-operating partners is based on systematic sector studies and organisational assessments.

Probably true. Although the cases do not provide an

adequate test of the hypothesis, the Child Law project supported by Redd Barna in Zimbabwe demonstrates the usefulness of systematic study coupled with an adaptive approach.

Generally, for hypotheses 16 through 25, implementation factors dominate the outcomes achieved, together with contextual factors, of which the country context, life-cycle stage of the local partner, organisational capacity of the local partner, and mission or intent of the northern NGO appear particularly important. As a result of the complex mix of factors, a study based on self-selected case studies cannot provide clear answers.

Comparisons

(a) Between countries

H 26. Observations and findings in comparable international studies reveal similar patterns as in the Norwegian cases.

True with respect to some findings (e.g., generally increased ID activity by NGOs).

(b) Between sectors

H 27. Aid organisations from different sectors have consistent objectives in respect of institutional development.

False, based however on the scant evidence of one case (Redd Barna and Acção Social in Mozambique). The synthesis study is likely to have better evidence on this.

H 28. There are some key variables that explain variation in outcomes in all channels.

Left to the synthesis report.

H 29. There are specific factors in each channel that explain internal variation.

False for the NGO channel, which indicates a complex mix of factors at play (country context, vibrancy of the local NGO community, strength of the local counterpart, project intent).

H 30. Local ownership and sustainability is generally higher when the organisations are business-oriented

firms or value oriented NGOs than public institutions. (The structure of incentives is different between the sectors.)

Left to the synthesis report as we did not study institutional cooperation between public institutions.

(b) Between strategies:

H 31. Institutional cooperation (twinning as opposed to individual technical assistance) is based on the following assumptions:

(a) stable long term partnership as opposed to short term contracts and/or funding of single projects,

Increasingly true based on evidence from the survey and cases.

(b) organisational continuity as opposed to individual vulnerability,

True, although charismatic leadership in NGOs can often call into question organisational continuity. Most southern organisations (e.g., FIOH in Sri Lanka) have not been through a transition in leadership.

(c) access to broad organisational resources as opposed to limited individual knowledge,

Increasingly true from the side of the Norwegian NGOs.

(d) higher cost effectiveness than other forms of international technical assistance.

The survey and cases do not provide an adequate test of the hypothesis.

H 32. Institutional cooperation (twinning) has a limited impact on improving organisational performance compared to other factors.

Cannot say. Although other factors (country context, vibrancy of the local NGO community, strength of the local counterpart, project intent) clearly are important, this does not mean institutional cooperation has a limited impact.

5. Recommendations

The evidence from the case studies and survey suggests a number of recommendations for NORAD, Norwegian NGOs, and southern counterparts. *First*, it seems clear that Norwegian NGOs are increasing their collective efforts to support institutional development in the South, and Norway's current development policy mix at least supports and likely encourages this trend. Two elements of the policy mix seem particularly important:

- the high priority placed on institutional development, capacity building, recipient responsibility, and partnership along the Norwegian axis;
- the reasonably secure funding environment.

Assuming the Norwegian government wishes Norwegian NGOs to continue their institutional development efforts, the current policy mix seems appropriate.

Second, Norwegian NGOs are in a period of experimentation with institutional development approaches, and it would be extremely useful if they could share their experiences, plus hear from a variety of southern organisations receiving support from northern NGOs. NORAD could play a useful role in promoting conferences or workshops for NGO personnel (especially those operating in the field), plus representatives from their southern partners.

Third, shifting to support institutional development and capacity building for southern partners requires significant capacity building on the part of the Norwegian NGO as well. There is clear evidence that the Norwegian NGOs participating in this study have made great efforts to build their capacities and acquire new skills. Shifting a country programme from emergency to development seems particularly difficult (Riddell 1997, p. 29). Even when this shift is successful from the organisation's perspective, its staff (both local and international) often pay a heavy price.

Organisations with emergency programming capacity, such as Redd Barna and NPA, will certainly be asked to respond to future emergencies. They could learn a great deal from their own recent experiences and those of similar organisations in Norway and elsewhere. One of the lessons is the importance of early planning for the transition to development and eventual withdrawal. A second lesson is that many managers and staff who are effective in emergencies do not have the right skills or

habits of mind for long term development programs, or for building local partnerships. One strategy would be to field additional personnel with long term development skills and experience, even before the emergency phase ends, with the specific mandate to prepare for the transition.

Fourth partnerships imply new responsibilities for northern NGOs. The effective discharge of these responsibilities requires different skills than does direct implementation. Norwegian NGOs need to acquire skills in organisational assessment, organisational development, and consulting. These could be provided by outside consultants or NGO support organisations, but the NGO's own staff will still need to be trained sufficiently so they know when to call for specialised expertise, and what expertise is required. As well, INTRAC, PACT, and other support organisations have developed organisational assessment instruments. Norwegian NGOs should explore the use of these.

Fifth, a supportive approach to partnership is not adequate remedy for the absence of the technical skills and knowledge relevant to the development activities being supported. One example from Zimbabwe is NPA's increasing focus on micro-credit for women. This is a field in which a great deal is known about good practice, and Norwegian NGOs could engage specialists to provide the requisite technical support to their partners. Norwegian NGOs could also facilitate south-south links to help accelerate learning for their partners and themselves. Similarly, Redd Barna in Sri Lanka is encouraging its partner, Siri Pradbodha, to follow a business model for the delivery of pre-school teacher training. This seems to be an innovation for Sri Lanka, but does it operate successfully in other countries in the region or elsewhere? If so, Redd Barna could bring someone with specialised knowledge and experience to assess the feasibility of such an approach in Sri Lanka?

Sixth, the cases studied indicate the central importance of the national context in influencing what institutional development goals, strategies, and activities are attempted or feasible. Norwegian NGOs should be wary of standardised approaches to institutional development, and NORAD should avoid giving the impression that promoting partnerships with local NGOs is appropriate in every country or for every Norwegian NGO active in a country. Mozambique is an obvious example. If every

northern NGO decided it should only implement through local partners, the local NGO community would be overwhelmed by partnership demands and by the establishment of pseudo-NGOs seeking funding.

Seventh, there is a common need for northern NGOs and their counterparts to recognise the need for southern NGOs to offer adequate incentives to attract and retain capable staff as the foundation for organisational sustainability. This does not always require matching the market for salaries, as NGOs can and do motivate skilled and experienced staff to remain for less pay. However, adequate attention must be given to the issue and staff must be paid at least a living wage. This problem is particularly acute in countries implementing economic adjustment programmes, as relative prices can change dramatically when the currency is devalued or subsidies are reduced.

Eighth, Norwegian NGOs and NORAD should examine closely the concept of sustainability as it relates to southern NGOs delivering services to poor communities in poor countries. Financial sustainability may not be a feasible target in such cases, but organisational sustainability would still represent a worthwhile achievement.

Ninth, greater attention must be given to strategies for phasing-out funding subsidies. If a northern NGO can foresee when it will end funding, it should of course alert its local counterpart as soon as possible and jointly review how to provide for organisational sustainability. If no definite plans exist, some ground rules to guide a future phase-out could still be discussed and agreed.

Finally, Norwegian NGOs seeking southern partners need to continue experimenting with methods to cope with problems arising from asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard. One approach is to stress recipient ownership and responsibility. But what happens if the counterpart does not assume responsibility or, worse, abuses it? A second and complementary approach is to stress dialogue, but this has costs and does not guarantee performance (Brett, 1993). An approach suggested in this study is to view development projects and partnerships as experiments, and to structure agreements so there are (1) incentives to improve performance, (2) means to monitor whether performance is improving, and (3) regular opportunities to change the scope and scale of joint endeavours.

Appendix 1: Mozambique Country Context

1. POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

The Republic of Mozambique lies on the eastern coast of southern Africa, with its Indian Ocean seaboard stretching over a length of 2,470 km. It occupies an important strategic position in southern Africa as its ports and railways giving sea-access to the landlocked countries of Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe, the south-east of Zaire, and the South Afri-

can province of Transvaal. Mozambique has substantial and valuable mineral resources, fertile agricultural and grazing lands, vast forests, rivers, lakes, and coastal waters teeming with fish. The majority of the country's population is of Bantu descent with minorities of Asian or European origin.

Mozambique at a glance¹

Area	799,389sq. km
Total Population [1995]	17.4 million
Percent women [1993]	53 %
Rural Population [1993]	73 %
Population Annual Growth Rate [1996]	2.87 %
Population density/km ² [1995]	21.8
UN Human Development Index [1993]	167/174
Life Expectancy M/F [1995]	44/46
Adult Literacy Rate M/F [1990]	45/21 %
Percentage of schools destroyed during the war	45 %
Infant Mortality Rate	167/1000
Maternal Mortality Rate	300/100,000
Population with Access to Health Care U/R [1989]	100/30 %
Population with Access to Safe Water [1990]	24 %

The Mozambican people share many ethnic and historical links with the other peoples of Southern Africa. Extensive trading developed with India, China, Persia and, above all, the Arab world, traces of which still remain, particularly in the north of the country.

Given the economic, financial, and administrative weakness of Portugal, its colonisation of Mozambique to the beginning of the 1950s assumed some special features:

- leasing of vast territories to private companies;
- direct administration by the colonial state government in certain regions of the country;
- slavery and deportation of Mozambicans;
- expropriation of the local population's land;
- compulsory cultivation of certain cash crops;
- exportation of Mozambican labour to the mines and plantations of South Africa and Rhodesia; and

forced labour for plantations, construction work, and bearer transport.

Faced with such deplorable conditions, the Mozambican people organised against the Portuguese and, after a 12-year struggle, independence was declared on 25 June 1975. Sixteen years of civil war ensued, causing widespread destruction to roads, bridges, railways, schools, and health facilities, particularly in the rural areas. In addition to the hundreds of thousands of lives lost, the war orphaned 200,000 children and displaced approximately 3.5 million people, the great majority of whom were elderly or women and young children.

Historical dates:

1975	Independence of Mozambique
1987	Economic Recovery Programme begins
1989	Economic and Social Recovery Programme
1990	New Constitution
1992	Cease-fire and General Peace Agreement signed between FRELIMO and RENAMO
1994	First democratic elections

Profound political and economic changes have been

¹ Sources: Direcção Nacional de Estatística, Moçambique: Panorama Demográfico e sócio-económico, Abril 1995
Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report – 2nd quarter 1996
Third World Guide 1995
UNESCO Report 1995

underway in Mozambique since 1987. Alongside these changes, a new Constitution came into force on 30 November 1990, containing the principles of a multi-party system with separation of powers, plus guarantees of human rights, the right to strike, and the freedoms of speech, association, press, and religion. The Constitution defines the Republic of Mozambique as an independent, sovereign, and unitarian state of democracy and social justice.

With the adoption of the multi-party system as the expression of political pluralism, various parties have been formed with different ideas and political orientations. The Constitution also paved the way for the conclusion of peace talks between the FRELIMO and RENAMO, and the signing of the General Peace Agreement on 4 October 1992. Mozambique's first ever multi-party general elections were held on 27 October 1994, and were considered to have been essentially free and fair.

FRELIMO is the main and ruling party; the main opposition group is the rebel Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO). There is a host of small parties (18 registered), but the only other group to win the 5 % of the electoral vote needed to secure parliamentary representation in 1994 was the União Democrática [UD].

Agriculture constitutes the basis of the Mozambican economy, providing a livelihood for the vast majority of its people, raw material for agro-industry, and the bulk of the country's exports. During the colonial years the economy was in the throes of a deep recession, with its industry highly vulnerable to external market fluctuations. Virtually all factors of production, including skilled manpower, had to be imported. More than 90 % of the population was illiterate. The sudden departure at independence of nearly all the entrepreneurs, managers, and civil servants – mostly Portuguese – left a vacuum that could not be readily filled by Mozambicans. While some had managed to acquire limited education during the last years of colonial rule, they had no experience in economic or business management, or in public and social administration.²

With independence there emerged a new economic system and new forms of ownership, with the family and private informal sectors existing alongside the state and co-operative sectors. In 1987, the Mozambican Govern-

ment drew up and launched a wide-ranging set of policy reforms, known as the Economic Recovery Programme [the «PRE»]. It aimed at creating the basis for renewed economic growth and development by targeting, *inter alia*:

- rehabilitation of vital economic sectors and infrastructure;
- cutting government deficits;
- reducing direct state involvement in non-strategic areas of economic activity;
- promoting efficiency in state enterprises; and
- reviving the private sector.

These initial policy reforms placed heavy costs on many sectors of society. The urban and sub-urban poor, in particular, suffered from the removal of price subsidies while unemployment and low wages persisted. To address these adverse social impacts of the economic adjustment process, various additional measures aimed at alleviating poverty were added to the reform programme. With the introduction of this specific social component in 1989, the PRE became known as the Economic and Social Recovery Programme [PRES]. It aimed at:

- agricultural development, and particularly the family sector;
- rehabilitating and developing economic and social infrastructure, particularly in rural areas;
- mobilising concessional external finance, including official development assistance, for the productive sectors;
- developing the capacity of the state's administrative apparatus;
- improving the management and control of public spending.

For Mozambique, 1994 proved to be a pivotal year, as it saw the successful conclusion of the Peace Agreement. However, subsequent achievements such as the elections, the formation of a new army, and the establishment of democratic institutions came at a high cost. These costs had to be borne by the Mozambican government, leading to a worsening of macroeconomic imbalances in 1994.

With improved security, better rains, the partial restoration of infrastructure, and continued structural reforms, economic growth accelerated to 19 % in 1993 and 5.3 % in 1994. Agriculture experienced its fastest growth since

² See, for example, Fallon and da Silva (1994)

1988, while increased marketing of agricultural products and improved security led to more commercial activity in rural areas. Furthermore, as a result of the reconstruction of road and rail links throughout the country, as well as private home construction, the construction sector expanded at a real rate of 7.5 % in 1994.

Mozambique is in a strong position to maintain rapid economic growth. Over 30 % of its population have now resettled within the country. Provided that support services for smallholders (agricultural extension and marketing) are developed, and that basic social and economic infrastructure is rehabilitated in rural areas, agricultural production could rise rapidly.

The challenge now facing the Mozambican people is to reduce poverty through economic and social development. Government policy is therefore directed at sustaining growth in the economy and employment, and rehabilitating the economic and social infrastructure needed for this growth. Besides consolidating democracy and governance, the creation of meaningful employment opportunities is seen as a fundamental requirement for future development. The emphasis is on the restoration of productive activities and the normalisation of life in rural areas. Both the social infrastructure (schools, health and water supply) and the essential economic infrastructure (marketing infrastructure and access roads) will need to be rebuilt.

Foreign donors are pushing for a devolution of power to elected local authorities. The first elections for mayors and councils is expected to take place in 1998 in at least 33 cities and towns. With local government come local responsibilities, including greater burdens to both finance and manage public services. Because no cities except Maputo are able to sustain these recurrent costs, negotiations will take place between municipal government and central authorities over municipal responsibilities, budgets, and local fiscal powers.

2. INTERNATIONAL NGO ACTIVITY

Before 1980, a small number of progressive organisations sharing Frelimo's early vision of post-independence social re-construction provided technical assistance to ministries at the national, provincial, and local levels. Over the 1980s, this number rose to 47, with expansions coinciding with the government's appeal for assistance in drought-relief in 1983 and the beginning of ideological changes within Frelimo, which opened the country to Western aid. With the intensification of the war-related emergency, the drought, and the impact of the Economic Rehabilitation Programme, the total number of foreign relief and development organisations reached 180 by 1992.

Following the end of armed conflict with the signing of the peace accord, international NGOs have expanded to all areas of the country, and agencies specialising in repatriation, demobilization and re-integration, support to war victims, and the like have opened in-country programs. The total number of international NGOs was estimated at approximately 200 in 1995. Over the years, it has become increasingly difficult for the state to monitor the international NGOs. The government's reduced human resource capacity and the lack of legislation and regulations governing NGO activities have left the international NGOs more-or-less free to design and implement programmes, without any obligation to take into account the policies and priorities of the relevant ministries.

Apart from the increase in their number, the international NGOs represent a powerful economic force. The Ministry of Cooperation estimates these have brought-in an average of US \$200 million per year, mostly in the form of emergency assistance during the period 1987-1993. This is roughly equivalent to 20 % of 1992 GDP. Most of the NGO's budgets for relief have ranged in the millions of dollars, which carries significant political and economic weight at provincial and local levels.

Economic Indicators:	1993	1994	1995	1996*
Real GDP growth %	19.3 %	4.8 %	3.0 %	6 %
Inflation (CPI) %	49.8 %	52.5 %	55 %	16.6 %
Exports US \$m	\$132	\$147	\$170	\$220
Imports US \$m	\$955	\$1,019	\$784	-
External Debt US \$m	\$5,012	\$5,491	\$5,518	-
Average Exchange rate MT/\$	3,874	6,039	9,024	11,140

* Estimates

Humanitarian assistance to Mozambique	1991-92	1992-93	1993-94	Total
Total (US \$ millions)	\$170.28	\$315.41	\$564.33	\$1,050.02
Channeled through NGOs (local or international)	\$55.80	\$98.93	\$210.78	\$365.51

The international NGOs vary greatly in terms of their missions, goals, strategies, resources, and expertise. Other distinctions, such as their size and whether they are confessional or secular, and whether they are publicly or privately funded, are also important.

A large number of international NGOs have come to recognise that their assistance should address three key needs: strengthening political institutions; consolidating internal and external security; and inaugurating economic and social revitalisation. Several programs have been launched to build capacity within the state, the parliament and its commissions; for civic education and strengthening of civil society; support for the development of a free press and human rights organisations; the promotion of gender issues; and so forth.

An increasing number of international NGOs have chosen to work closely with local NGOs, either jointly or through them. Several factors have contributed to this shift including:

- the global trend to work with non-state counterparts;
- political changes in the country;
- the emergence of local organisations;
- government inertia and corruption;
- decentralization of services; and
- recognition that local partners have valuable assets to offer to donors in terms of knowledge of the country, its culture and languages, and success in mobilising the local population.

3. LOCAL NGOS

Prior to 1975, the local non-governmental community comprised professional associations, youth organisations, sport associations, and charitable organizations linked to the churches. At independence these organizations were proscribed by FRELIMO and replaced by «mass organizations» based on the socialist model, each with its own sphere of activity. In 1990 the new Constitution allowed for the formation of free associations. With a shift in donor priorities towards working with and through local partners, and thus to the provision of direct institutional support, the number of na-

tional NGOs has increased from just ten in 1990 to over 100 by 1995.

Mozambican NGOs now are a diverse group which, based on their mandates and orientations, could be categorized as follows:

- socio-professional associations, providing services and acting on behalf of their memberships:
 - professional groups,
 - trade union associations,
 - public and private cooperatives;
- former mass democratic organisations;
- umbrella bodies: Link, Forum Mulher, and more recently the provincial NGO fora (grouping solely national NGOs).

Mozambican NGOs face a number of significant constraints. For example, since 1990 national NGOs have functioned primarily in an intermediary capacity between international NGOs and local recipient communities. Having been constituted and nurtured primarily with support from external donors, only a limited number can be considered as spontaneous, grassroots, self-help initiatives. They thus lack a meaningful social base within society and, like their international partners, frequently must formulate projects on the basis of hasty community consultations and commissioned studies. Typically, national NGOs are 90 to 100 percent dependent on foreign donors for their operations.

Secondly, there are virtually no local funding sources, as government spending is restricted, the private sector is still weak, and the Mozambican level of income is too low to represent significant income from membership fees or service charges.

A low level of technical know-how represents another significant constraint, with capacity-building initiatives funded by international agencies seldom having gone beyond the secretarial, «activist,» or «multiplier» level. Consequently, few national NGOs have the capacity to formulate and carry-out specialised projects in the field.

The government has yet to draft a new law on NGOs, and appears, for the moment, to have abandoned its efforts to regulate the sector in any meaningful way.

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Appendix 2: Zimbabwe Country Context

The Republic of Zimbabwe is a land-locked country in Southern Africa, bordered by Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, and South Africa. It has a tropical climate, moderated in much of the country by altitude.

Basic facts:	
Area	390,580 km ²
Population	11,271,314 (July 1996 est.)
Percentage female	51 %
Percentage under 15	44 %
Ethnic make-up	Shona 71 %; Ndebele 16 %; other African 11 %; white 1 %; Asian 1 %
Infant mortality rate	72.8/1,000 live births
Maternal mortality rate ..	283 per 100,000 live births.
Life expectancy	57 years
GNP per capita (1995) ..	US \$540; PPP estimate \$2,030
Avg. annual growth	-0.6 % (1985-95)
Poverty estimate ¹	41 %
Aid	10.2 % of GNP (1994 est.)
HDI value/rank (1994) ..	0.513/129 of 175 countries

1. POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

Following a protracted struggle against the Ian Smith regime, Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. The constitution provides for an Executive President with a unicameral parliament. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), headed by Robert Mugabe, has won each of the four elections since independence. The only serious opposition party, ZAPU-PF was effectively absorbed into the ruling party following the 1987 «Peace Accord» that ended the simmering civil war in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions.

Although the ruling ZANU-PF won a landslide victory in both the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections, many observers believed this reflected the fragmented opposition and widespread voter apathy – turnout was 54 % in the general election and only 31 % for the presidential contest – as much as the popularity of ZANU-PF. In addition, although the print media is injecting more non-governmental views into the public debate, radio and television stations, plus the major national newspapers, continue to provide a generally uncritical view of the government and the ruling party.

¹ Percentage of people living on less than \$1/day on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) basis.

² Statistics from World Bank (1997): *World Development Report*, and CIA (1996) *World Factbook*. <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/nsolo/factbook/zi.htm> (28 July 1997)

Undoubtedly, some of the voter apathy stems from the country's indifferent economic performance over the past decade. Zimbabwe infrastructure was comparatively well developed at the time of independence, and it had a reasonably diversified economy based on manufacturing (30 %), agriculture (15 %), and mining (5 %). In many respects however, agriculture is the economy's motive force. Almost 70 % of the workforce are employed in agriculture, and the sector accounts for almost 40 % of exports plus much of the inputs for manufacturing. As such, the economy is very dependent on the weather and on world prices for a narrow range of agricultural products. Zimbabwe has experienced severe droughts in recent years, with the 1992 drought considered the worst in recorded history, bringing about a drop in GDP of 8 %. The country's net barter terms of trade have also dropped 16 % from 1987 to 1995.²

The distribution of income and wealth in Zimbabwe remains very skewed. Much of the economy, including most of the productive agricultural land, remains in the hands of the white minority.³ The government espoused socialist policies throughout the 1980s, which featured an initial period of growth coupled with rapid increases in government spending and an expansion of state-owned enterprises. In particular, expenditures on education and health increased significantly to redress blatant social imbalances. Primary school enrolments almost doubled from 1.2 million in 1980 to 2.2 million in 1989: over the same period, the number of students in secondary schools rose by a dramatic 800 %, from 74,000 to 671,000. Infant mortality fell by 30 %, while immunisation rates increased from 15 % to 85 % of children.

The government also actively encouraged producer co-operatives, in part to create opportunities for demobilised veterans. But the state and co-operative sectors did not produce the rates of investment, employment, and economic growth required to meet the needs of a rapidly growing population, while high rates of taxation and socialist policies discouraged both domestic and foreign private investment. By 1991, rising government deficits, sluggish growth and investment, and alarming unemployment rates led the government to enter an Economic

³ According to the Lancaster House peace agreement, the government agreed to limit purchases of commercial farms to a «willing buyer-willing seller» basis (i.e., no expropriation).

Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) with the IMF and World Bank.

The principal objectives of the ESAP were to first restore the fiscal and external balances, and then to liberalise both trade and the domestic economy to encourage investment and stimulate growth, with the ultimate goal «...to improve living conditions, especially for the poorest groups...by generating sustained higher growth.» (Moyo: 1997) Specific policy moves included: deregulation of domestic prices and trade (including agricultural prices and marketing monopolies); liberalisation of the trade and financial regimes; deregulation of foreign and domestic investment; parastatal reform; labour market reform; reform of monetary and fiscal policies (including the introduction of user fees for education and health); and civil service reform, including a 25 % reduction in staffing.

Such draconian moves, even if successfully implemented, were certain to have adverse political and social welfare implications. The government took immediate steps to pay compensation to those groups in the formal sector (retrenched civil servants, plus employees let go by parastatal and private firms) that could most likely mobilise to political effect. However, public sector expenditure cuts, the introduction of user fees, elimination of price controls, and the initial period of inflation occasioned by the currency devaluation stemming from the deregulated foreign exchange markets,⁴ were certain to cut into the effective purchasing power and direct entitlements received by the poor. A broader effort to address the Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) seems to have been cobbled together as an afterthought.

The centrepiece of the SDA was the creation of a Social Dimension Fund (SDF) within the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, and Social Welfare. As fiscal and civil service reforms limited the state's ability to address social issues directly, the government sought to involve NGOs in poverty alleviation strategies via social wel-

fare, training, and employment programmes financed through the SDF. However, the SDF has had limited impact, in large part because of its inadequate size. Over the period 1993/94 the programme was allocated Z\$100 million, which did not increase substantially over the years. According to Kaseke (1993), the welfare function of the Fund was not meeting most needs: the School Fees scheme, was benefiting only 20 % of the target, while the Food Money Scheme was reaching only 4 %.

Results from the initial ESAP were generally disappointing owing to the devastating 1992 drought and the inability of the government to reduce the fiscal deficit. This latter problem, stemming in part from the economic decline caused by the drought, meant the government continued to borrow heavily in the domestic market, keeping interest rates high and crowding-out private investment. As a result of the direct and indirect effects of the ESAP measures, and the programme's failure at raising growth and employment, poverty has certainly increased and further progress on many measures of well-being has stalled and, in some cases, reversed. In addition, the AIDS pandemic is reaping a tremendous toll, both in human and, given so many of those infected are in the prime of their working lives, economic terms.

The government entered a second ESAP with the World Bank in 1996.⁵ Once again, however, government has not controlled its fiscal deficit and has continued to borrow heavily in the domestic market, keeping interest rates extremely high. Very recently, the government announced substantial payments – estimated at Z\$5 billion (US \$420 million) – to war veterans, which it had not provided for in its budget and fiscal plan. As a result, the World Bank has suspended further disbursements on the ESAP agreement.

More promisingly, the government has also announced its intention to develop ZIMPREST (Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Structural Transformation) – a «home grown» economic adjustment programme to be developed, in part, through a process of national consultations. A National Economic Consultation Committee has been established. As well, Zimbabwe is one of the countries participating in the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) of the World Bank and Development GAP.⁶ SAPRI is intended to «...im-

⁴ The relative value of the Zimbabwean dollar fell by 80 % from US \$0.44 at the start of 1990 to US \$0.084 today.

⁵ The IMF suspended its balance of payments support of US \$60 million in September 1995, citing concerns on the government's fiscal performance. It declined to participate in the second ESAP until the government halved its budget deficit to 5 % of GDP, and reduced annual inflation from 37 % to 17 %.

Machipisa, L. «Two years in Zimbabwe without an IMF crutch.» *Electronic Mail & Guardian*. 10 February 1997.
<http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97feb1/10-feb-zimimf.html>

⁶ The Development Group for Alternative Policies (Development GAP) is a Washington-based umbrella NGO whose mandate is to advocate for policy reforms in the World Bank and IMF.

prove understanding about the impacts of adjustment policies as well as about how the participation of local, broad-based civil society can improve economic policymaking.» (World Bank, n.d.) The Zimbabwe SAPRI exercise, to be launched in November 1997, is being co-ordinated by the Poverty Reduction Forum, housed at the Institute of Development Studies. The Poverty Reduction Forum is also a member of the National Economic Consultative Committee, and so can serve as a conduit for the SAPRI research to the national economic management process.

2. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NGOS

Prior to independence, most local NGOs in Zimbabwe focused on welfare and relief activities, while a number of international NGOs provided support to the liberation struggle. Both groups began to shift to a more development-oriented agenda after 1980, and their work was facilitated by «Zimbabwe's comparatively well-developed infrastructure, its fairly efficient public administrative system, and its generally benign attitude to NGOs...» (Riddell & Robinson: 1995, p. 238) Most local NGOs registered under provisions of the Welfare Organisation Act,⁷ while foreign NGOs typically registered with whatever ministry had responsibility for the sector in which they worked.

While the government has often encouraged the activities of foreign and local NGOs because they deliver services to groups the government is not reaching, cracks in the relationship gradually became apparent over the years. In part this was due to the sometimes authoritarian ethos of the ruling party, including its handling of the strife in the Matabeleland and Midlands regions prior to 1987. Relations were further strained when a campaign led by a northern NGO against the imposition of health system user fees became an issue in the last election.

In 1995 the government passed a Private Voluntary Organisations Act, amending the existing Welfare Organisation legislation and expanding its scope to cover foreign NGOs as well. The new act required all foreign and local NGOs to re-register, and gave the Minister of

Social Welfare authority to replace so-called «dangerous» members of NGOs from their positions. The Minister did subsequently take action against the Association of Women's Clubs (a local NGO), but the NGO community and its supporters organised workshops and a court challenge, which resulted in portions of the act being struck down by the Supreme Court in early 1997.

Subsequently, the government has revised not the act but only its regulations. While it made some accommodations by establishing a 20 person board (including 14 representatives from the NGO community) to handle registration and monitoring, and by specifying that suspension of an NGO must be preceded by a hearing, final authority remains vested with the minister responsible for social welfare. Many in the NGO community are concerned both by the possibility for unwarranted action by the existing or a future government, and by the «chilling» effect that even the threat of such action would have on legitimate, albeit critical, NGO actions.

Donor concerns over the PVO legislation mirrored those of the NGO community. In a typical response, the World Bank invited a mission from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law in Washington, who left a report on «best practices» for NGO legislation. The issue seems, however, to have fallen from the government's current policy agenda. It is not moving to revise the legislation, but it also has avoided any confrontation with members of the NGO community. The government has also made space for NGOs on the National Economic Consultative Committee and signed-on to the SAPRI process, signifying a degree of openness far greater than exists in a number of countries in the region. As well, working relationships between specific government departments and NGOs often appear both cordial and effective.

While NGOs are not subject to income tax, and some (especially Northern NGOs) receive import duty exemptions, taxpayers cannot deduct private donations to NGOs from their taxable income. As well, the national government provides only modest support to local NGOs, and what is offered is generally technical rather than financial.⁸

⁷ Zimbabwean NGOs can also legally establish themselves by incorporating as not-for-profit corporations under the Corporation Act. In doing so, they seem not to fall under the Minister responsible for social welfare.

⁸ The government does pay salary grants to mission schools and hospitals.

3. NGO activity

3.1 Local NGOs

There are approximately 800 organisations registered under the Welfare Organisation legislation that would be included in a broad definition of NGO. Moyo suggests a typology of:

- CBOs;
- intermediary NGOs, some of which are CBO umbrella organisations;
- service organisations, which provide a range of support services to the voluntary sector; and
- trusts, which generally provide financing or specialised technical assistance to the voluntary sector, or act as advocates of their members' interests (e.g., Zimbabwe Farmers Union). A few of this group engage in lobbying or research.

The majority of the registered organisations are small CBOs, many of which are inactive: however, it is also likely many CBOs that are active have never registered. (Moyo: 1995) Local NGOs can also be categorised by affiliation (church, political faction, independent), and by whether their aims are oriented to development or welfare. (Riddell et al: 1995)

NGOs in Zimbabwe vary greatly in size (from 100,000+ members down) and geographical scope of operations (local, provincial, and national). Moyo estimates that perhaps 50 foreign and local NGOs are of significant size (20 or more staff and budgets of Z\$200,000 or more per annum before 1995), and around 20 of these are «large» with budgets (in 1995 Zimbabwean dollars) in excess of Z\$1 million. Some of the most successful local NGOs are linked to important politicians (e.g., the President's Fund, and Zimbabwe Development Trust). In 1995, Riddell estimated the total activity of the sector to be between Z\$300 million to Z\$500 million (US \$35-\$58 million).

In terms of sectoral orientation, the largest groups are involved in agriculture/rural development (30 % of the total), assistance to women or women's issues (30 %), relief (15 %), education and training (10 %), and health and sanitation (5 %). There are smatterings of organisations servicing children/youth, the environment/conservation, AIDS, culture, seniors, the disabled, and human rights. A number of not-for-profits exist mainly to represent the interests of, or provide services to, their members (e.g., professional associations, business advocacy groups).

The oldest NGOs often were affiliated with churches, and provided social welfare services, typically in the rural areas. Following independence there was an explosion of NGO activity, fuelled in part by the priority the new government placed on development of the black majority, and in part by increasing flows of aid from the North. Much of this new activity was expressed as community mobilisation efforts (often in the communal areas), income generating schemes, and support to producer co-operatives. The bulk of the undertakings initiated during this period seem not to have been sustainable, in large part because the NGOs promoting the schemes lacked the requisite skills. (Riddell et al: 1995) The economic and policy environment underpinning many such community- or collective-based activities has also altered significantly with the break-up of government marketing monopolies, the ending of «financial repression,» and the general liberalisation of the economy under the ESAP programme.

Until recently at least, NGOs also seem to have had only a marginal impact on policy due to their project-specific focus (often directed to welfare or emergency relief) and their atomised approach. Local NGOs have also been criticised for frequent dependence on their founders, who tend to be visionaries rather than sound administrators, weak boards lacking in technical and managerial skills, nebulous links to a constituency of members or beneficiaries, and extreme financial dependence on foreign donors. (Moyo: 1995) This means the activities of many Zimbabwean NGOs reflect donor rather than local priorities.

As is often the case, the weaknesses of individual NGOs in Zimbabwe are reflected in their umbrella organisation. The first umbrella body – Southern Rhodesia Council of Social Services – was formed in 1962, and subsequently became VOICE (Voluntary Organisations in Communal Enterprise) in the late 1970s. Following criticisms that VOICE had failed to adapt, that its centralised systems and management structures lacked accountability to its members, and that there was limited member participation due to poor communication, its constitution and management was changed, and it was re-established as NANGO (National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations) in 1991. NANGO itself is on the verge of collapse, in spite of efforts earlier this year to reaffirm the need for an umbrella body and to breath new life into the organisation. (Madzima: 1997)

Recent developments do, however, indicate continued development of the sector. At least one Zimbabwean NGO has the size, reputation, and confidence needed for international recognition.⁹ A recent case study suggested the Campfire movement represented a potentially important innovation that merited wider recognition and replication. (Riddell et. al.: 1995) A variety of support organisations (e.g., IRED, MWENGO,¹⁰ plus some specialised consulting firms) serving the voluntary sector in Eastern and Southern Africa are based in Harare, which serves to strengthen the local NGO community. In the absence of an effective umbrella body, NGOs have established a number of sector- or issue-specific fora (e.g., Poverty Reduction Forum, SEEP/ZAMFI), some of which seem quite effective.

The AIDS crisis, growing poverty stemming from the droughts and ESAP, plus the growth of an indigenous middle class following the massive expansion of secondary schooling some 17 years ago, has also led to the formation of a new generation of Zimbabwean NGOs. Often these have a stronger urban base, more professional staff and trustees, and a greater willingness to advocate policy changes in areas such as women's rights (especially abortion rights and inheritance laws), affirmative action for indigenous business persons, rights of the disabled, local community rights over land and natural resources, human rights and – a recent controversy – gay and lesbian rights.¹¹

Local NGOs face some obvious challenges and opportunities. There is growth in the number of NGOs, the intensity of their networking, and the range of activities supported or causes espoused. Certainly, a number of specific organisations are growing in size and capacity. While the total quantum of aid to Zimbabwe appears to be declining, significant amounts continue to flow from bilateral donors and Northern NGOs, and multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and the UNDP are increasingly interested in engaging NGOs in policy dialogue.¹² While the government's opinion of national NGOs may be ambivalent, its actions are not consis-

tently hostile, and it has opened new channels for consultations on such sensitive issues as national economic management. However, it remains to be seen whether Zimbabwe's NGO community will take advantage of the opportunities to exert a positive influence on policy formulation and implementation, as well as improve and sustain the results achieved from their project activities.

3.2 Northern NGOs

There are a large number of Northern NGOs working in Zimbabwe. Many of these simply channel support to local partners or affiliates, but Moyo estimated that about 30 are physically present, often with offices that service their regional operations. A number of Northern NGOs had provided support to the liberation movement. Following independence, many of these simply continued their established relationships by working directly with the new government (e.g., volunteer teachers to support the expansion of the secondary school system), or by supporting government policies in areas such as producer co-operatives and income generating projects in communal areas. Other NGOs became involved as part of their general support to the front-line states as the international campaign against apartheid gathered momentum, which coincided with the expansion of donor funding via NGOs.

Direct implementation by Northern NGOs seems to have peaked in the early 1990s, when substantial relief operations existed both for Mozambican refugees and drought relief. Gradually, Northern NGOs appear to be cutting back on direct implementation, a trend which seems to be accelerating for a number of inter-related reasons: the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa; peace in Mozambique; policy differences with the Zimbabwean government, which have magnified since the introduction of the ESAP; growth in local NGOs, coupled with demands that they, rather than Northern NGOs, implement projects and work with CBOs; the general lack of success with co-operative and income generating projects; and the increasing acceptance by Northern NGOs that their appropriate role is to support, rather than compete with, the local voluntary sector. This trend looks likely to continue, especially as the general decline in ODA translates eventually into reduced government funding to Northern NGOs.

⁹ See Box 2.3 in the Main Report, on ORAP.

¹⁰ Following the government's suspension of the Association of Women's Committees in 1996, Mwelekeo wa NGO (MWENGO) and ZIMRIGHTS (a human rights NGO) organised a series of workshops which eventually led to a successful legal challenge to the Supreme Court.

¹¹ See for example, de Waal, Shaun. «The gay rights test for Africa.» *Electronic Mail & Guardian*. 23 May 1997. <http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97may2/23may-gayrights.html>

¹² The World Bank talks of convening meetings with «lead» NGOs in such areas as poverty reduction, health, education, the environment, and gender, while the UNDP finances the Poverty Reduction Forum. In addition, the EU will involve NGOs in its review of the Lomé arrangements.

4. Donor support for NGOs

4.1 General

After the controversy over the new PVO legislation, funding is likely the main issue within the local NGO community. There is little tradition of fund-raising from the local community, and many of the larger local NGOs do not address the priority issues of the wealthier businesses and individuals, many of whom are white and/or urban. Local NGOs are therefore extremely dependent on funding from donor agencies or Northern NGOs, and experience all the attendant problems such dependency implies.

In line with world-wide trends, donor countries have been channelling increasing funds through NGOs. By 1991, disbursements to NGOs operating in Zimbabwe were estimated at more than US \$40 million per annum (de Graaf, et al., 1991). In Zimbabwe, the proportion of ODA flowing through NGOs has been estimated at 12 %-20 % (Moyo: 1995), likely approaching the higher figure when significant relief operations are underway, as during the 1992 drought and when support was provided to Mozambican refugees.

Most donors provide the bulk of such funds through NGOs based in their own countries, and these then use the money to support their own operations or the activities of their partners (NGOs, CBOs, or sometimes government agencies) in the South. A number of bilateral donors engage local NGOs as contractors on specific projects, or support projects, administered by an NGO or other contractor from the funding country, which are designed to finance local NGOs or other civil society organisations. For example, CIDA funds the Southern Africa AIDS Training project, managed by the Canadian Public Health Association, which in turn finances the work of local NGOs working on AIDS education. Similarly, USAID has recently invited bids for a new NGO strengthening program for AIDS/HIV prevention, which is designed to (1) bring local NGOs to «institutionally sound» or «grant-worthy» status, and (2) assist them in expanding their programs.¹³

The bilateral donors that do work with local NGOs hold co-ordination meetings about every three months, on a rotating basis. As well, a bilateral donor may be designated as the lead agency for co-ordination purposes for a

specific sector. For example, USAID is the lead agency on micro-finance, and it recently produced a report on donor support to micro-credit operations in Zimbabwe.¹⁴

The multilateral agencies play a modest but increasing role in supporting NGOs active in Zimbabwe. The EU is the multilateral agency providing the most funding, which reached over ECU 2 million by 1994 (Tvedt 1995, p. 13). While large sums are not involved, recent initiatives by two multilaterals deserve special mention. The UNDP is funding the Poverty Alleviation Forum, and the World Bank has funded work by the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law to advise the government and NGOs on «best practice» relating to NGO legislation. (ICNL 1997)

4.2 NORWEGIAN POLICY AND NGO PROGRAMMING

A few bilateral donors – Norway included – provide grant funding directly to Zimbabwean NGOs, in addition to funding their national NGO's activities in Zimbabwe. NORAD commissioned a study entitled «Zimbabwean NGOs in Development» shortly after it opened its Harare office in 1989, and it started direct funding to local NGOs in 1987. Moyo estimates that, over the 1992-94 period, NORAD provided financial support to about 70 NGOs, or over 20 % of all «formal NGOs» (i.e., not CBOs) in Zimbabwe. To that point, NORAD provided mainly project and training support, and met few core costs. Moyo concluded that this suggests «...NORAD support is less concerned with institution building than it is with the direct development results of projects.» (Moyo: 1994, p. 133) Funding to NGOs was mainly for (1) the environment, (2) culture, (3) AIDS, (4) women's activities, or (5) small enterprises, or (6) general support to local NGOs. Moyo estimated about NOK 8.5 million per year was granted to local NGOs, with the average grant at about NOK 150,000/year, and representing perhaps 20 % of the total funding received by the NGO on average. (Moyo: 1994, pp. 140-143)

NORAD has changed its funding policies for local NGOs since 1994. It no longer earmarks all its funds, so these can be used by the local NGO for any purpose consistent with its mandate. Norway is unusual in that it does not preclude a local NGO receiving funds both

¹³ USAID. (1997): «NGO Strengthening Program – HIV/AIDS Prevention: Request for Applications.» (USAID: mimeo)

¹⁴ Zimbabwe Donor Consortium for MicroFinance. (1997): «Status Report of Donor Support for Microfinance: July 1997 –DRAFT.» (USAID, Harare: mimeo).

from a Norwegian NGO and from the embassy, and a few organisations such as the Zimbabwe Women's Finance Trust (ZWFT) receive money from both sources. Grants to an NGO normally are continued for three years, at which point an evaluation is commissioned. Norway provides grants via the Norwegian embassy of about NOK 3 million per year to local NGOs, through one of six channels:

- general NGO support;
- culture;
- environment;
- gender;
- AIDS;
- capacity building.

As is the case with most bilateral donors, NORAD channels far more funding through its national, rather than local, NGOs. For example, in 1992 Norwegian NGOs received NOK 32.1 million for their Zimbabwean operations, while local NGOs received NOK 5.7 million. (Tvedt 1995: p. 88)

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Appendix 3: Sri Lanka Country Context

1. GENERAL

Sri Lanka is an island country in the Indian Ocean, approximately 25,222 sq. miles in area. The current population is estimated at 18.1 million with an annual growth rate of 1.2 %. About 78 percent of the population live in the wetter South-Western part of the country. The ethnic ratio of the population is 74.0 percent Sinhala, 18.2 percent Tamil, 7.0 percent Moor and 0.8 percent Other. In terms of religion 69.3 percent are Buddhists, 15.4 percent Hindus, 7.6 percent Muslims, and 7.6 percent Christians.

Sri Lanka (Ceylon) lays claim to a recorded history of over 2,500 years in which migrations, invasions and general exchanges, both commercial and cultural, have taken place with India, and occasionally with other areas in the region. There is controversy as to when the «ethnic groups» or communities we **now** identify as Sinhala and Tamil began to see themselves in these specific terms within this history, but it is accepted that distinct identities based on language, religion, location, economic activity and, generally speaking, culture have co-existed in the island for many hundreds of years. Yet, these two groups share many commonalities as well.

The nearly four-and-a-half centuries of varying colonial control – 1505 to 1948 – transformed the feudal, subsistence agrarian economy into a mainly export-oriented one dependent on fluctuating prices for its tea, rubber, and coconut produce, which has been the mainstay of the economy for four decades after independence. The British were the only western power of control the entire island (1815–1948) and one of their strategies of control was the creation of an urban, educated, anglicized and Christianized elite drawn from both the Sinhala and Tamil communities who were able to amass considerable wealth and power in the colony.

The Buddhist Revival in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which also influenced the nationalist struggle for independence, was clearly inflected by anti-Tamil sentiment. It prepared the groundwork for a Sri Lankan identity that was exclusively and intolerantly Sinhala Buddhist, and which is systematically drawn upon in the recent discourse of extremist Sinhala organisations, including those spearheaded by the Buddhist clergy.

The British established plantations in the central hills to grow coffee, later replaced by tea after a coffee blight in the 1860s. Tamils from South India were indentured to work on these vast estates, and their descendants remain tied to the tea plantations under appalling conditions. The predicament of this group of landless workers, numbering over 800,000 and mainly confined to the central mountain zone, was compounded when, through a series of bilateral agreements with the Indian government, it was determined to repatriate a large proportion to India. The Citizenship Act of 1948 clearly discriminated against Tamils by denying the right to citizenship «by descent» as in the case of other groups in the country – instead they had to «be registered», selectively, as citizens. Pacts drawn-up in India in 1954, 1964 and 1974 dealt with repatriation of Tamils to the state of Tamil Nadu, but conditions there were abysmal for those forced from Sri Lanka. It was only in 1984 that all those remaining were granted citizenship upon application, although in this respect too there is still an administrative lag in implementation.

2. POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

In the post-independence period the inability of the majority Sinhalese to address the power-sharing aspirations of the minority Tamils led to a situation where the Tamil youth decided violence was the only way they could claim their legitimate share of power. They have justified violence by pointing to a history of frustrated attempts by Tamil politicians to negotiate with successive Sri Lankan governments. The Sinhala Only Act of 1956 is often cited as the cornerstone of discriminatory policies of the majority-dominated state in Sri Lanka, but this is, in fact, only the most obvious instance of a whole range of actions which systematically marginalised Tamils and other minorities. At the other end of the spectrum, the Maoist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurrection in 1971 whose perpetrators were disaffected – mainly Sinhala – youth drawn from the universities, was ruthlessly crushed with an estimated 50,000 deaths in under six months.

Legitimate grievances stemming from the denial of citizenship, discrimination against the Tamil language, and limiting access to employment and education, were exacerbated by communal riots which took the form of

widespread brutal attacks on Tamils and their property in 1958, 1960/61, 1977, 1981, and 1983. Now, in the face of a civil war and atrocities on both sides, Tamils fear for their physical safety, and hence the claim of equal rights has taken second place to an even more urgent need to ensure their basic security.

The United National Party assumed power at the General Election in 1977 and pursued a policy of economic liberalization which involved, *inter alia*, the establishment of Free Trade Zones, the gradual reduction of welfare subsidies such as the rice ration, the dismantling of trade protection measures, and the privatisation of state industries and commercial ventures. This dramatically reversed the quasi-socialist policies of their predecessors. The encouragement of non-traditional exports resulted in gems and foreign employment becoming crucial foreign exchange earners. Imports of luxury items and the emphasis on quick profit by entrepreneurs did not bode well for local industry in the short-term.

With the liberalization, income disparities widened, with the share of the top 5 percent exceeding 40 percent of income, while the bottom quintile earning than 5 percent. Competition heightened and the ever-present antagonism among communities was exacerbated. University admission, always a contentious issue given the fact that fewer than one-in-ten of those who qualify can be afforded places, became a bone of contention. Thinly disguised ethnic quotas appeared in the form of admission allocations on the basis of language, and these significantly increased proportion of Sinhalese entering the university for the prestigious faculties of Medicine and Engineering, among others. This proved extremely frustrating to the Tamil youth whose only means of upward mobility was, and whose entire energies had been dedicated towards, higher education.

In the decade to 1994, the nationwide emergency was lifted only for a few months in early 1990. The UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances has recorded that disappearances in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1991 were the highest in the world. Moreover, deaths by violence per capita in Sri Lanka during the latter part of this period is the highest for any comparable timeframe in any country, with the single exception of El Salvador during the height of the repression there.

It was in such a context that the People's Alliance government was ushered in, in August 1994, with the hopes of many concerned groups that the existing impasse would be resolved. Here was a government that had pledged to resolve the ethnic crisis through political means by devolving maximum power within a united Sri Lanka. A measure of its initial success was the sharp decline in deaths and disappearance during its first year in office. Amnesty International recorded 55 cases of «disappearance» and approximately 40 extra-judicial executions in 1995,¹ which is orders of magnitude lower than in previous years.

The initial phase produced a cease-fire in early January 1995 and, for the first time, a government on its own initiative was sponsoring negotiations in Jaffna. An extensive media campaign was launched, outlining the wars human and material cost. There was international support and encouragement for the government's endeavour, particularly since they were seen to be consulting the Tamil parties, as well as concerned NGOs, to provide as broad a platform as possible for the proposed devolution package.

Sri Lanka has all along been an agrarian economy. About 80 percent of the people depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Traditionally Sri Lanka's main exports have been tea, rubber, and coconut products, although lately garment exports have risen to prominence. Despite constant efforts to diversify into other products, these cash crops still remain the high value-adding exports.

Since Independence, recognizing the importance of rural development, successive governments pursued policies that took the middle path. They promoted basically mixed economies with the specific admixture varying from government to government. These policies, though not described thus, had many similarities to the «basic needs» strategy. The maintenance of the welfare structures continued after independence leading to a relatively high physical quality of life (PQLI) index, including over 80 percent literacy.

A Structural Adjustment Program to make Sri Lanka an NIC by the year 2000 was put in place, which required substantial capital inflow. Sri Lanka was marketed as an investor-friendly gateway to South Asia, with cheap labour and lax labour laws. Export processing zones were set up. Many public enterprises were privatized. Later arrangements to provide a safety net, first under

¹ (AI Index: ASA 37/04/96 of Feb 13, 1996)

the Janasaviya Poverty Alleviation Program and later through the Samurdhi (Prosperity) Program for the poorest of the poor, have not produced the desired impact, however.

The present government (despite its left-leaning partners) came to power promising «a market economy with a human face.» But with the ever-increasing war expenditure (standing at nearly 20 % in the latest budget) to contend with, the economy has not recorded adequate growth in conventional economic terms, nor in the alternative indices of equity and egalitarianism.

3. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NGOS

Registration of local and foreign NGOs can be effected under a variety of legal mechanism in Sri Lanka. Foreign NGOs must sign a Memorandum of Understanding with (currently) the Ministry of Planning. Local NGOs can be registered under the Voluntary Social Organisations (Registration and Supervision) Act No. 31 of 1980. Approximately 3,500 NGOs have been registered, but since the Sri Lankan context allows organisations to function without official registration, there are no comprehensive and up-to-date figures available. Most of those NGOs registered with the Social Service Department are those in the social, welfare, relief, rehabilitation and development sectors, and many advocacy NGOs cannot be so registered. Moreover, as has been pointed out «due to the absence of any central point which collects data on funding to these organisations it is difficult to give accurate figures on the amount of donor funding absorbed by these organisations. But the sheer expansion in the number of organisations which call themselves NGOs and the emergence of several large organisations² highlights their expanding role in the Sri Lankan society. The emphasis given to these organisations by various donors include the World Bank points in the direction of further growth in the future.» (Sunil Bastian: unpublished manuscript)

International NGOs function in Sri Lanka either directly or through local partners. In some politically sensitive areas such as the war ravaged North East, international

NGOs are the only ones that can operate with any kind of recognition and efficacy. However, while the NGO sector is rapidly growing, and while its influence remains strong, particularly in the advocacy arena, there is in parallel a growing antagonism and disillusionment against NGOs at the popular level. The high point of this antagonism was the appointment in 1990 of a Special Presidential Commission to investigate NGOs. Reasons for the deterioration of relations between the government and NGOs included differences on human rights, divergence on the ethnic conflict, and the breakdown of individual patronage links.

Although numerous umbrella organisations exist in Sri Lanka, these are invariably factional and/or sectoral. Currently no code of ethics or supervisory legislation on these lines binds NGOs. Various moves to establish such codes have been made over in the last two years, and it is only the flexibility of the current legal framework vis-à-vis NGOs that has permitted the statue quo to continue.

In this context, the largest national NGOs have become virtual service delivery organisations to the state and private sectors, while medium-sized NGOs both implement programs and work through local CBOs, and grassroots NGOs have a high turnover. Yet, in the peculiar nexus of war and tenuous peace in Sri Lanka at present, the NGO sector has a vital role to play. On the one hand only it has the reach and breadth to work in the conflict areas supplying urgent basic needs. On the other hand, only NGOs have the credibility and commitment to build bridges between and among the protagonist communities so as to begin the painful and painstaking process of reconstruction and rehabilitation. In addition, advocacy NGOs have the potential to maintain pressure against violations of human rights, the criminalization of the minority Tamils, and even the imminent repression against radical youth in the South. Yet, paradoxically, the NGO community's strength is also its weakness. The role of the NGO in the current context will, if effective and interventionist, always be perceived as being political, and thereby cast into the light of suspicion by a society riven asunder by strife.

² Some NGOs in Sri Lanka employ more than 5,000 people.

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Appendix 4: Terms of Reference

1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

In recent years Norwegian development assistance has focused increasingly on a policy of «recipient orientation». In practice this means transferring greater responsibility for implementation from the donor organisation to the recipient of development assistance. However, many of the organisations and institutions responsible for implementation are not sufficiently equipped with human, technical and financial resources.

To improve this situation Norwegian development assistance has introduced new strategies and programmes with a view to strengthening national capacities and capabilities in partner countries. NORAD is currently channelling support through three sectors in the Norwegian society (public, private and civil sector) which are collaborating with institutions and organisations in selected countries:

- Norwegian public institutions and their «twinning arrangements» with similar institutions in the South.
- The private for-profit sector which has two sub-sectors as follows:
 - a) Norwegian companies involved in providing goods and services to the public and private sector in developing countries, and
 - b) Norwegian consulting firms managing specific programmes for NORAD.
- Norwegian NGOs and their southern counterparts.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has decided to undertake a comprehensive Evaluation of Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistance in the course of 1997. The evaluation will be undertaken in the form of five inter-related sub-studies. The principal findings will be synthesised in a composite final report. The five sub-studies are as follows:

1. A Study of Institutional Cooperation («twinning»)
2. A Case Study of the Cooperation between Sokoine and Ås Agricultural Universities
3. A Study of Private Companies
4. A Study of Private Consulting Firms
5. A Study of the NGO Channel

Each sub-study will be undertaken by independent teams, but MFA has requested Diakonhjennets International Senter (DiS) in cooperation with Nordic Con-

sulting Group (NCG) to prepare a common framework for all the studies and coordinate the implementation in order to identify a core of common cross-cutting issues and concerns which should be traced in all channels and provide a basis for comparative analysis.

2. INTRODUCTION

Norwegian NGOs increasingly call themselves partner-organisations and identify strengthening of organisations in the South as an important aid-strategy. Many NGOs even define their main role as «building the capacity of partner organisations in the South» rather than providing support to special programmes and projects.

The competence and capacity of NGOs to carry out institutional cooperation as a development strategy has never been systematically studied. The aim of the present study is therefore to document and analyse NGO-experiences in this field. This will later be fed into a comparative analysis of institutional cooperation in other channels.

Norwegian NGOs are not a homogeneous group of organisations; neither are their partners. Their mode of cooperation and the context in which they operating are anything but complex. The sample of organisations for this study will not be selected on a random basis, but as a deliberate attempt to identify alternative, promising and «best» cases in order to strengthen the learning potential of the study (ref. Implementation Plan, section 5.1).

3. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES

The *purpose* of this study is to collect and analyse experiences with institutional cooperation between Norwegian and Southern NGOs in order to increase the understanding of what factors influence and contribute to institutional development.

The *objectives* are:

- (a) to examine institutional development strategies, experiences and outcomes among a group of Norwegian NGOs and their partner organisations,
- (b) to analyse the preparation, processes and outcomes of collaboration and in particular assess the perceptions by Southern partners,

- (c) to contribute towards improved policies and practices in the area of technical co-operation and institution building.

4. Outline of issues and questions

4.1. General

The present tendency to merge 'organisational cooperation' with 'capacity building' seems to come from the North: from NGOs, official and multilateral agencies. The types and extent of Northern capacity-building initiatives (strategies, programmes and practice) and the responses from Southern NGO perspectives need to be studied in details.

Capacity building is embedded in the concept of 'partnership' between NGOs in the North and the South, where Northern NGOs provide financial, technical and organisational support to a group of like-minded Southern partners based on regular dialogue and interaction. To what extent does reality reflect a practice where partnership implies interaction and interchange of human, financial and intellectual resources between equals? Partnership agreements should be part of the study.

Many Northern NGOs define their role in capacity-building as contributing to «*empower*», «*strengthen*» or «*develop*» local organisations in the South and in a broader perspective to *strengthen civil society* as an intermediary and countervailing structure vis á vis state and market. How are these goals operationalised in terms of actual cooperation? What do the strategies look like, how are they implemented and how is the outcome monitored and assessed?

There are vast differences in self-perception and normative orientation of Southern NGOs located at different societal levels (national, regional and local), as well as between organisations rooted in the traditions of different cultures and religions. There has been comparatively little reflection on how Western institutional strategies could be transplanted, transformed and adopted to fit the situation of non-Western countries. Do organisations in countries in Africa, Asia or Latin America function and change along the lines of Western NGOs? The challenge is to understand innovative processes among Southern NGOs, and what specific social and cultural factors influence their development.

Another set of issues relates to possible reconciliation ('convergence') of traditions and influences derived from location in different cultural and organisational settings. Is the outcome of institutional cooperation a greater ability among Southern NGOs to negotiate their own process towards organisational development – under the influence of approaches, values and beliefs based in other social and cultural traditions? Is it possible to substantiate that all sides would benefit from a merge; and that cross-fertilisation therefore is both feasible and desirable ('synergy' effect)?

And finally, the study will be concerned with to what extent Norwegian NGOs as a result of institutional cooperation have been able to build in recipient organisations:

- Trust, equality and reciprocity in the partnership?
- Dialogue in the process of local planning and budgeting?
- Broader focus on management and manpower training needs?
- More consciousness of environmental, gender, human rights or other issues?
- Higher quality and quantity of project reviews and evaluations?
- Greater independence of foreign funding for project activities?
- Larger global networks of like-minded NGOs and resource persons for mutual exchange of experience and evaluation?

The study should address these issues as they can be identified in organisational development effort or as integrated elements in the larger programmes.

4.2. Questions and issues

All studies shall address the following five general questions which will be specified later:¹

1. What are the objectives for institutional development?
2. How are the objectives achieved?
3. What factors support/impede the processes of implementation?
4. What are the results at various levels?
5. Compare and assess the relative strengths and weaknesses for institutional development.

¹ See explanation in 4.2. in Plan of Implementation.

In order to address these questions the following issues should be examined

Overview of study area

1. What are the policies and strategies, resources used and experiences gained from a broad range of Norwegian organisations/institutions within the respective study area.²
2. What is the «State of the art» in institutional development in similar organisations in other contexts (international comparative perspective).

Organisational assessment

1. Background and evolution of institutional development efforts within the organisations.
2. Motivation and interests in the organisations for institutional collaboration.
3. Formulation of policies and aims for institutional development.
4. Operationalisation of institutional development (specific strategies and working methods defined as institutional development).
5. How improved organisational practices are perceived, promoted and sustained.
6. Level of competence and capacity in the organisations to effectively handle all aspects of institutional cooperation (technical, cultural, managerial, administrative etc.) and efforts to strengthen the same.
7. Quality and effectiveness of collaborative programmes within each institution to facilitate effective communication, maintain stability in relationships, control quality of programmes, etc. (Assess expressed relative strengths of institutional cooperation.)

Process of mutual adaptation (implementation)

1. Strengths and weaknesses (critical factors) in the preparation and mutual adaptation of collaborative programmes.
2. Extent to which principles like recipient responsibility, national ownership and participation have guided the preparation and implementation of programmes.
3. How counterparts and collaborative programmes are perceived and valued by the organisations involved.

4. Scope of convergence or conflict between Northern and Southern perspectives and experiences.

Contextual issues

1. Linkages and interactions with other organisations in the sector.
2. Role and impact of other donors.
3. Organisational and institutional development within the context of political and administrative reforms and social and economic progress.
4. Level of coordination and communication between institutional development efforts through the various channels in Norwegian bilateral assistance in planning and implementation. Potential for synergy effects.

Outcomes and impact

1. Availability of proper monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, indicators and data to assess outputs and effects.
2. Extent to which institutional programmes are reaching their short- and long term objectives.
3. Potential for sustaining and replicating institutional development programmes without external assistance.
4. Effectiveness and efficiency of institutional development strategies in a comparative perspective.

5. Study plan

5.1 Plan

The study will have the following key components:

A. SURVEY AND DESK STUDY PHASE

1. Carry out a survey among a broad range of Norwegian organisations in order to provide an overview and summary of objectives, strategies, resources (expertise, funds etc.) and experiences.
2. Briefly summarise «state of the art» in organisational development among a sample of influential international NGOs, based on available literature, evaluation reports and interviews with a few European NGOs. What are their expressed policies and priorities and their underlying assumptions on how organisational change takes place in non-Western countries?

B. CASE STUDY PHASE

1. Analyse and assess in more detail the suggested cases:

² Guidelines for the survey instrument will be worked out by the coordinating team.

- Record and analyse policies and strategies adopted by the Norwegian NGOs, and assess their capacities and capabilities.
- Assess how Southern counterparts perceive the involvement of Norwegian institutions.
- Assess the process of implementation (institutional learning and development), and the outcomes and impact of joint programmes.

C. SYNTHESIS PHASE

1. Identify lessons learnt and recommendations for improvement of future policy and practice.
2. Generate common issues and concerns which are shared among all studies.

5.2 Methods

The studies will use multiple methods, but after the initial survey and document/literature review primarily follow a case study approach where review of documents and interviews will complement information collected through the case studies.

- Survey including a broad range of Norwegian institutions.
- Interviews with NORAD and the relevant Norwegian institutions.
- Case studies in selected countries with interviews.

5.3 Selection of cases and countries

From the total number of cooperation agreements between NORAD and Norwegian NGOs at least four cases will be chosen for closer examination. The study will focus on their cooperation with one «twinned» organisation in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka or Bangladesh.

The NGOs are not a homogenous group, and it is difficult to determine what sample will provide sufficient depth and variation. All of them should for some time have been involved in capacity building of partners through intervention strategies of various intensity and complexity. Southern partners could represent church structures, development NGOs, professional associations, trade unions and cooperative movements. The consultants will be requested to present a package of

mutual enriching case studies which may illustrate promising and different approaches and experiences.

The table in Chapter 9 presents a list over projects³ where Norwegian participate. The consultants are free to suggest case studies in the listed countries, and may also suggest additional case studies in optional countries. The study plan must include a minimum of four case studies from minimum two of the listed countries. Both the continent of Africa and Asia must be represented. When ranking the competing evaluation plans the package of case studies offered will be considered. It is, however, possible to alter the case study plan in cooperation with the coordinators if necessary in a later phase of the study.

The following organisations are potentially interesting since all of them for some time have been involved in capacity building of partners through intervention strategies of various intensity and complexity:

- a. Norwegian Church Aid – a large development organisation with a traditional strong operational profile which has lately changed to partnership strategy, being a part of an international church network and maintaining a broad project portfolio within a large number of sectors and countries.
- b. Redd Barna – a large development organisation with a clear thematic profile (children) and professional basis, a weaker counterpart structure and in the process of defining future approaches and profile.
- c. Norwegian Nurses Association – a medium sized organisation with the combined interests of being a trade union and a professional association with the aim to promote nursing as a highly qualified medical discipline, but only a small portion of it is involved in development aid. NSF has a well-established Western network of cooperation partners through the International Council of Nurses (ICN), but has in more recent years gone into development cooperation with sister organisations in the South as well.
- d. Caritas Norway – a relatively small organisation with a strong affiliation to Caritas Internationalis and other international Catholic relief organisations, but also to national partner organisations in the South and with organisational development as one of its main activity areas.

³ The list may be incomplete.

5.4 Organisation and coordination

DiS is coordinating the study on behalf of MFA and the teams will communicate and report regularly to the appointed Team leader. NCG provides support, advice and quality control at critical junctures in the process.

All teams shall participate in joint workshops to prepare methods and instruments for field visits, to discuss draft reports and contribute to the synthesis process. Teams are professionally responsible for their own products according to mandates prepared for each study. DiS/NCG in consultation with the Advisory Group is responsible for the review and quality control of reports.

5.5 Time frame

The study will commence when teams and consultants are approved by MFA, and not later than end of June 1997. Major events and deadlines will be in accordance with the time-schedule presented in the general study plan. Deadline for draft report is 15 November and final report 15 December 1997.

6. STUDY TEAM AND QUALIFICATIONS

The team should consist of two international and one national consultant in each country to be recruited by the international team. The national consultant should collect relevant background information and in particular cover the analysis of the selected national organisations. The consultants should be familiar with the roles of NGOs in institutional development and Norwegian development policy and strategy.

7. REPORTS

The results of the study should be presented in a study report. The team is responsible for the validity of data, analysis and the overall quality of the report. Details will be regulated in accordance with specifications in the contract.

The report should contain all major findings, models for future organisational cooperation and recommendations for specific policy and institutional mechanisms. It will provide inputs for the synthesis report which will make a comparative assessment of institutional cooperation in the different channels.

9. COUNTRY LIST

Country/Case NGO	Activity
Ethiopia/Eritrea	
Adra Norway	Mother/child project
Care Norway	AWASH, Food security, nature management
Evangelical Lutheran Free Church	Integrated development, health
Norw. Missionary Society	Integrated rural development
Norw. Church Aid	Rural development, organisational development, health, edu.
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	Health, schools
ORT Norway	Mother/child, family planning, kindergartens
Redd Barna (Norw. Save the Children)	Rural development, child centre, education
The Development Fund	Agriculture, women
Norw. Ass. for the Blind and Partially Sighted	Health, organisational development
Norw. Assoc. for Disabled	Community based rehabilitation
Norw. Conf. of Trade Unions	Professional training
Norw. People's Aid	Agriculture, Food security
Mozambique	
Norw. Council for Africa	School rehabilitation, education
Norw. Refugee Council	Legal protection, repatriation
Norw. Church Aid	Repatriation, rural development
Norw. Conf. of Trade Unions	Professional training
Norw. Ass. for the Blind and Partially Sighted	Organisational support, health projects
Norw. Red Cross	Children, health, organisational development
Norw. People's Aid	Education, women, rural development
Norw. Nurses' Association	Organisational development
Pentecostal Mission of Norw.	Rehabilitation of youths
Redd Barna (Norw. Save the Children)	Rural development – children, street children
Zimbabwe	
The Salvation Army	
Norw. Church Aid	Media, rural development, education
Norw. Conf. of Trade Unions	Professional training, «trade union economy»
United Methodist Church Norw.	Development centre, maintenance
Norw. Ass. for the Blind and Partially Sighted	Organisational development, health projects
Norw. Federation of Sports	Sports for all
Norw. People's Aid	Fundraising, credit, human rights
Norw. Psychological Assoc.	Development of institutional cooperation
Redd Barna (Norw. Save the Children)	Rural development, organisational support
Norw. Students' & Academics' I A Fund	Hospitals, health centres, education
Norw. Assoc. for Disabled (FBS)	Development of institutional cooperation
Sri Lanka	
Care Norway	Rural development
Delta Internasjonalt YWCA/YMCA	Rural development
FORUT	Integrated development, drug abuse
Lions	School for the deaf

Country/Case NGO	Activity
Norw. Housewives' Assoc.	
Norw. Union of Teachers	Professional training, organisational support
Redd Barna	Rural development, credit, street children
The Development Fund	Consciousness raising, organisational support
Bangladesh	
Care Norway	
Delta Internasjonalt YWCA/YMCA	YMCA School, training centre, office support
Norw. Santal Mission	Health projects
Norw. Church Aid	Rural development
Norw. Ass. for the Blind and Partially Sighted	Organisational development
Norw.Ass. Mentally Handicapped (FBS)	Organisational development
Rev.Strømme Mem.Found	Competance building

Appendix 5: A Survey of Norwegian NGO Support to Institutional Development¹

INTRODUCTION

As a part of the thematic study on institutional strengthening efforts in Norwegian bilateral aid programmes, the NGO team conducted a survey of Norwegian development NGOs. The survey was designed and conducted by Ivar Evensmo between July and August 1997.

The survey data was meant to complement information from (1) interviews with NGO practitioners and researchers in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Britain, (2) a review of the relevant literature, and (3) in-depth case studies in Sri Lanka, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. For comparative purposes many of the questions about capacity building were the same as those used in an INTRAC survey of European and North American NGOs (James 1994). A preliminary design was presented to several Swedish NGOs in early July, and adjustments made based on their suggestions.

In order to avoid misunderstandings about key concepts, the questionnaire included definitions of the terms «institution», «institutional development», «organisation», and «capacity building».

Response rate

The questionnaire was sent out to 80 organisations, and 56 organisations responded. Seven organisations said the survey did not apply to their situation or that they had no capacity to answer it. The remaining 49 organisations returned completed forms, thus constituting the total sample. Many enclosed policy and planning documents or other relevant papers with their responses.

The gross response rate was 70 percent, while the net was 61 percent, excluding the seven which for various reasons declined to participate in the survey. However, the 49 responding organisations handled NOK 487.7 million or 99.5 percent of the ordinary NGO budget in 1996 (including NOK 14.8 million allocated for the special programme for support to indigenous people). All 16 organisations with agreements with NORAD in 1996 were included. The respondents thus represent the

overwhelming majority of organisations receiving bilateral Norwegian development aid through the NGO channel, and thus give an accurate picture of the overall situation.²

After the questionnaires were returned, the quantitative answers were coded and processed by standard statistical methods. The answers to qualitative and open-ended questions were written out as text statements and have been subjected to a qualitative analysis.

Relevance

The focus of this inquiry is on the bilateral cooperation between Norwegian NGOs and their partners in the South. This means that the questionnaire is less relevant for those organizations which co-operate mainly through multilateral organisations (like Norwegian Refugee Council and the Central Labour Organisation). It may also be less relevant for some large organisations with small aid windows like SNV, or organisations like Caritas and the Salvation Army, which are small aid organisations in Norway but affiliated to large international aid networks.

Organisations concentrating on advocacy nationally or internationally have indicated in their comments that support to networks and alliances with like-minded organisations have become more important than capacity building with bilateral national partners, whether they are NGOs, CBOs, or governments and parastatal organisations.

Many organisations which used to be strongly operational are now looking for other modes of operation. The situation varies greatly between countries in Latin America and those of Asia and Africa. In the latter cases the number of able partners are often limited, forcing international NGOs to be more operational and collaborative with government structures than they prefer. This forces development agencies to adopt a very flexible approach in choosing their national partners and the nature of co-operation.

¹ A more complete analysis of the survey can be obtained from Ivar Evensmo, c/o DiS, Diakonveien 14, P.O. Box 23 Vinderen, N-0319 Oslo, Norway or via e-mail: evensmo@dis.no

² If their share of emergency aid handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been added, they would have dominated the picture even more.

Quantitative Figures from the Survey of Norwegian NGOs, July 1997

Table 1 – Number of fully employed persons working at head office

Fully employed persons	NUMBER	% OF VALID
0–49	35	79.54
50–99	6	13.63
100–200	2	4.54
Above 200	1	2.27
No answer	5	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 2 – Number of part time and voluntary staff at head office

Part time/voluntar	NUMBER	% OF VALID
1–5	24	77.42
6–10	6	19.35
23	1	3.23
No answer	18	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 3 – How do the organisations implement their support?

How is the support implemented?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Operationally (1)	2	4.35
Non-operational (2)	5	10.87
Own field office (3)	1	2.17
Directly from head-quarters (4)	1	2.17
ticked off for 1 and 2	1	2.17
ticked off for 1 and 4	3	6.52
ticked off for 2 and 3	4	8.70
ticked off for 2 and 4	13	28.26
Other kombinations	17	34.78
No answer	2	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 4 - Who are the partners of Norwegian NGOs?

Who are your partners?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Intermediary NGOs (1)	20	41
Community/based (2)	4	8.51
Government/Parastatals (3)	1	2.13
Ticked off for 1 and 2	9	18
Ticked off for 1, 2 and 3	13	27
Ticked off for 1 and 3	1	2.13
No answer	1	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 5 - How many partners do Norwegian NGOs have?

Number of partners:	NUMBER	% OF VALID
1–10	24	50.00
10–50	17	36.96
50–150	5	10.87
Above 150	1	2.17
No answer	2	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 6 - What percentage of Norwegian NGO support goes to?

Percentage of total support to NGO	NUMBER	% OF VALID
<25 percent	8	20.00
25–50 percent	7	15.00
>50 percent	26	63.00
No answer	8	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 6 cont.

Percentage of total support to CBO:	NUMBER	% OF VALID
<25 percent	6	22.73
25–50 percent	11	50.00
>50 percent	6	27.27
No answer	26	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 6 cont.

Percentage of total support to government org's	NUMBER	% OF VALID
<25 percent	8	57.14
25–50 percent	4	28.57
<50 percent	3	14.29
No answer	34	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 7 - Do you have policy statements or guidelines on how to provide CB to your partners?

Policy statement on CB to partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	24	50.00
No	25	50.00
SUM =	49	100.00

No policy, but support CB in project work	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	29	90.32
No	3	9.68
No answer	17	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 8 - Do you employ specialist staff at headquarters or overseas to assist in CB of partners?

Do you employ specialist staff?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	28	61.36
No	17	38.64
No answer	4	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 9 - Do you use any of the following methods for strengthening your partners?

Do you provide technical skills and management training to partners?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	44	93.48
No	3	6.52
No answer	2	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Do it yourself or engage others?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Own organisation (1)	13	30.23
Identify and fund (2)	9	20.93
Ticked off for both 1 and 2	22	48.84
No answers	5	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 10 - Providing organisational development consultancy services

Do You provide OD consultancy services?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	41	88.89
No	5	11.11
No answer	3	–
SUM =	49	100.00

If Yes, who is it provided by:

Provided by:	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Own staff field visits (1)	6	15.38
Cons. from the North (2)	2	5.13
Local consultants (3)	4	10.26
Ticked off for 1 and 2	5	12.82
Ticked off for 2 and 3	1	2.56
Ticked off for 1, 2 and 3	17	41.03
Ticked off for 1 and 3	5	12.82
No answer	9	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 11 - Staff support to partners

Does your organisation give staff support?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	28	61.36
No	17	38.64
No answer	4	–
SUM =	49	100.00

If Yes, which categories of staff do you second?

Second staff to following categories	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Expatriate staff (1)	6	20.69
National staff (2)	12	41.38
Ticked off for both 1 and 2	12	37.93
No answer	19	39.58
SUM =	49	100.00

Distribution (in %) of partners the NGOs are able to give such support

Proportion of partners you are able to give such support	NUMBER	% OF VALID
0–10 percent	8	29.63
10–25 percent	3	11.11
25–50 percent	3	11.11
50–100 percent	14	48.15
No answer	21	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Financing

Table 12 - Do you provide financial core support to any of your partners?

Core support to partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	30	70.73
No	12	29.27
No answer	7	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Proportion of your partners you are able to do this:	NUMBER	% OF VALID
0–10 percent	6	21.43
10–25 percent	2	7.14
25–50 percent	9	32.14
50–100 percent	12	39.29
No answer	20	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Are you supporting your partner with self-supporting programmes?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	34	80.49
No	8	19.51
No answers	7	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Proportion of your partners you are able to do this?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
0–10 percent	8	22.58
10–25 percent	5	16.13
25–50 percent	9	29.03
50–100 percent	10	32.26
No answer	17	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Partnership relations

Table 13 - Giving partners increased power in the partnership relation (e.g. negotiated contracts, two-way accountability etc.)

Increased power	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	39	92.68
No	3	7.32
No answer	7	–
SUM =	49	100.00

With what proportion of your partners you are able to do this:

Proportion of partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
0–10 percent	3	8.33
10–25 percent	2	5.56
25–50 percent	6	13.89
50–100 percent	26	72.22
No answer	12	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Developing NGO support structures in-country

Table 14 - Supporting Southern NGO networks and other collaborative bodies

Support to Southern NGO networks	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	30	66.67
No	16	33.33
No answer	3	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Number of projects	NUMBER	% OF VALID
1	6	26.09
2	5	21.74
3	2	8.70
4	1	4.35
7	3	13.04
8	1	4.35
9	2	8.70
10	1	4.35
15	2	8.70
No answers	26	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 15 - Supporting Southern training/consultancy/ research institutions

Support to Southern training/consultancy/ research institutions	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	30	65.22
No	16	34.78
No answer	3	-
SUM =	49	100.00

If Yes, approximately how many such projects?

How many projects?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
1	5	33.33
2	2	13.33
3	1	6.67
4	1	6.67
7	1	6.67
8	1	6.67
9	3	20.00
15	1	6.67
No answers	33	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 16 - Does your organisation have a system to monitor at a regular basis the output of the CB input you provide to partners?

System monitor	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	22	53.66
No	20	46.34
No answer	7	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 17 - Has there been any changes in the way your partners operate during your period of cooperation?

Changes in partners' operations	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	42	93.18
No	3	6.82
No answer	4	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 18 - Have you observed changes in any of the following areas?

Observed changes in the following areas	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Better objectives (1)	1	2.44
Greater participation (2)	3	7.32
Other changes (3)	1	2.44
Ticked off two or more of 1, 2 and 3	37	87.80
No answer	7	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 19 - Have these changes had any influence on the following issues

More trust in the partnership	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	5	13.16
Big	20	50.00
Moderate	13	34.21
Little	1	2.63
No answer	10	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Better dialogue in the partnership	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	7	17.95
Big	16	38.46
Moderate	16	41.03
Little	1	2.56
No answer	9	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Broader partner focus	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	5	10.81
Big	20	54.05
Moderate	11	29.73
Little	2	5.41
No answer	11	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Higher environmental awareness among partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very Big	1	2.04
Big	4	11.11
Moderate	20	55.56
Little	7	19.44
No	5	13.89
No answer	12	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Enhanced gender sensitivity among partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	7	15.38
Big	10	25.64
Moderate	17	43.59
Little	6	15.38
No answer	9	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Enhanced human rights awareness for partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	3	5.71
Big	12	34.29
Moderate	12	34.29
Little	8	22.86
No	1	2.86
No answer	13	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Higher awareness on other issues among partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	1	9.09
Big	10	81.82
No	1	9.09
No answer	37	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Higher quality in project reviews and evaluations among partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	1	2.86
Big	16	42.86
Moderate	16	45.71
Little	3	8.57
No answer	13	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Enhanced independence of foreign funding among partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	1	2.78
Big	1	2.78
Moderate	19	50.00
Little	15	41.67
No	1	2.78
No answer	12	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Enlarged networks between partners	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Very big	1	2.70
Big	18	48.65
Moderate	16	40.54
Little	3	8.11
No answer	11	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 20 - Does your organisation evaluate the results of your CB strategies?

Evaluate results of CB strategies	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	32	74.42
No	12	25.58
No answer	5	–
SUM =	49	100.00

How often?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Every half year or more	2	7.41
Annual	11	40.74
Less frequent than biannual	3	11.11
It varies	11	40.74
No answer	22	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 21 - Does your organisation have policy statements or guidelines on organisational strengthening (OS) of partners?

Have policy statements or guidelines for OS?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	16	44.44
No	21	55.56
No answers	12	–
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 22 - Is OS an explicit objective in your development goal hierarchy?

Explicit objectives	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	30	75.00
No	11	25.00
No answer	8	-
SUM =	49	100.00

A) In the overall mission/vision statement

In overall mission	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Ticked off	18	75.00
not ticked off	7	25.00
No answer	24	-
SUM =	49	100.00

B) At the programme level

At programme level	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Ticked off	20	86.96
Not ticked off	4	13.04
No answer	25	-
SUM =	49	100.00

C) At the project level

At project level	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Ticked off	19	90.48
Not ticked off	3	9.52
No answer	27	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 23 - When did OS become an official policy in your organisation?

Official year of first OS policy:	NUMBER	% OF VALID
1935	1	3.70
1981	2	7.41
1982	3	11.11
1983	1	3.70
1985	1	3.70
1987	1	3.70
1989	3	11.11
1990	2	7.41
1991	1	3.70
1993	1	3.70
1994	4	14.81
1995	4	14.81
1996	1	3.70
1997	1	3.70
Said yes, but no date	1	3.70
No answer	22	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 24 - Has there since then been any changes in what your organisation understands this to mean?

Has there been changes?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	17	58.62
No	12	41.38
No answer	20	-
SUM =	49	100.00

A) Answers in terms of policy

Has there been a change in policy?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Ticked off for yes	9	90.00
Not ticked off	1	10.00
No answer	39	-
SUM =	49	100.00

B) Answers in terms of implementing strategies

Has there been a change in implementing strategies?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Ticked off for yes	7	87.50
Not ticked off	1	12.50
No answer	41	-
SUM =	49	100.00

C) Answers in terms of practical working methods

Has there been a change in practical work?	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Ticked off for yes	7	87.50
Not ticked off	1	12.50
No answer	41	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 25 - Has there been any changes in the priority of resources allocated for OS since the policy was adopted?

A change in priorities	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	15	55.56
No	12	44.44
No anwere	22	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 26 - How many new projects with OS as the specific aim has this resulted in?

New projects	NUMBER	% OF VALID
1	3	33.33
2	1	11.11
5	1	11.11
7	1	11.11
9	2	22.22
19	1	11.11
No answer	40	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 27 - Have other projects had their OS components strengthened at the expense of other activities?

Other projects	NUMBER	% OF VALID
No answer	49	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 28 - General increase to OS activities as measured by % of the total programme budget

General increase to OS activities	NUMBER	% OF VALID
7	1	14.29
9	2	28.57
10	2	28.57
30	1	14.29
70	1	14.29
No answer	42	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 29 - Does your organisation have any written statements as to how it understands the term institutional development (ID)?

Have a written statement	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	10	26.32
No	29	73.68
No answer	10	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Table 30 - Does your organisation have separate objectives, strategies and programmes for ID and OS?

Have separate objectives, strategies and programmes	NUMBER	% OF VALID
Yes	4	13.33
No	27	86.67
No answer	18	-
SUM =	49	100.00

Appendix 6: Participating Organisations

NORWEGIAN NGOS

FORUT

Norwegian Development Fund

Norwegian People's Aid

Norwegian Red Cross

Redd Barna

Southern Organisations

Mozambique

Provincial Directorate of Social Welfare (Acção Social) – Manica Province

Provincial Directorate of Social Welfare (Acção Social) – Sofala Province

Mozambique Red Cross Society (MRCS)

Sri Lanka

Alcohol and Drug Information Centre (ADIC)

Future in Our Hands (FIOH)

Siri Prabodha (SP)

Zimbabwe

Southern African Partnership of Red Cross Societies (SAPRCS)

Training and Research Support Centre (TARSC)

Zimbabwe Women's Bureau (ZWB)

Zimbabwe Women Finance Trust (ZWFT)

Appendix 7: Itinerary and List of Persons Met

INTERVIEWS IN ENGLAND (VARIOUS TIMES)

Jacques Desrosiers	ACORD
Roger Riddell	ODI
Diana Mitlin	IIED
Sue Elliott & Liz Goold	INTRAC
Chris Roche	Oxfam

INTERVIEWS IN NORWAY (VARIOUS TIMES)

Staale Stavrum & Terje Hegernes	FORUT
Andrew Kroglund & Dyre Vaa Sætre	Development Fund
Markus Aksland & Tove Wang	Redd Barna (for Sri Lanka)
Sidsel Grimstad	Noragic
Nina Mjøberg	Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
Inger Sagness	Redd Barna (for Mozambique & Zimbabwe)
Kari Kjaernet	NPA

MISSION TO MOZAMBIQUE (5-11 OCTOBER 1997) TED PATERSON AND JACQUELINE LAMBERT-MADORE

5-Oct-97: 19h00	Maputo	Oscar Marleyn, Consultant	FOS (Belgium) & INTRAC
6-Oct-97: 10h00	Maputo	Anny Brenne Swenden	Norwegian Embassy
11h30	Maputo	Douglas Masson, Consultant	Canadian High Commission & Economist Intelligence Unit
15h00	Maputo	Guy Mullin, Co-ordinator	Forum LINK
16h30	Maputo	Francisca Sales	Acção Social, (Ministry of Social Welfare)
19h00	Maputo	Salomaõ Moyana, Editor	SAVANA Newspaper
7-Oct-97: 09h00	Maputo	Fernanda Texeira, Director, Institutional Development	Mozambique Red Cross
10h00	Maputo	Bodil Rava, Adviser	Norwegian Red Cross
12h00	Maputo	Terezinha da Silva, Researcher	Institute for African Studies
16h00	Maputo	Célia Dinis, Representative	African American Institute
18h00	Maputo	Aniceto Bila, NGO Liaison Officer	World Bank
8-Oct-97: 08h30	Maputo	Cydia Monteiro, Co-ordinator & Soila (Consultant)	Forum Mulher
11h30		Flight to Beira	
14h30	Beira	Antónia Charre, Provincial Director, plus the management team	Acção Social, Sofala Province
9-Oct-97: 08h30	Dondo	Catarina Antonio, Officer	Acção Social, Dondo District
14h30	Chimoio	Jackie Mansourian, Program Director	Redd Barna-Mozambique
10-Oct-97: 08h30	Gondola	District Director	Acção Social, Gondola District
14h30	Chimoio	Provincial Director	Acção Social, Manica Province
19h00	Chimoio	Jackie Mansourian, Program Director	Redd Barna-Mozambique
11-Oct-97: 08h30	Chimoio	Joanna Siabamba, Programme Coordinator, & Azaria Massuque, Chair	Organização de Mae Educadoras
11h00	Chimoio	Field visit	Organização de Mae Educadoras (performance in bairro)
13h00		Travel to Mutare, Zimbabwe	

MISSION TO ZIMBABWE (12-25 OCTOBER 1997) TED PATERSON AND PHILLIP BOHWASI

12-Oct-97	Arrive in Harare		
13-Oct-97: 08h00	Harare	Mr. Kasere, Director	Department of Social Welfare
14-Oct-97: 09h00	Harare	V. Chipunza & M. Hwindingwi	Norwegian People»s Aid-Zimbabwe
12h30	Harare	Mike Mispelaar, Director	Care Zimbabwe
14h30	Harare	P. Myhren, ResRep.; J. Mathe, Program Director; L. Mushonga, Snr Program Adviser	Redd Barna-Zimbabwe
15-Oct-97: 09h00	Harare	Ebrahim Jassat, Program Officer	The World Bank
11h30	Harare	Linda Stoddart, Acting Head of Delegation	Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, Regional Delegation for Southern Africa
13h30	Harare	Dr. Rene Loewenson	Training and Research Support Centre (TARSC)
14h30	Harare	Naira Khan	TARSC
16-Oct-97: 09h00	Harare	Esinath Mapondera, Exec.Chairperson, & Like Sayr, Operations Manager	Zimbabwe Women»s Finance Trust (ZWFT)
12h30	Harare	Florence Pawadyira, Consultant	
15h00	Harare	Mrs. Tarusenga	Norwegian Embassy
16h30	Harare	Leonard Maveneka, Co-ordinator	Poverty Reduction Forum
17-Oct-97: 09h00	Harare	L. Chikwavaire, Director; S. Zenda, Agric. Officer; J. Chimbadzwa, Mktg. Officer	Zimbabwe Women»s Bureau
15h00	Harare	Ester Okwanga, Secretary General	Zimbabwe Red Cross Society
19-Oct-97: 17h00		Flight to Bulawayo	
20-Oct-97: 09h00	Bulawayo	Richard Kudzingo, Credit Officer	Zimbabwe Women»s Finance Trust (Bulawayo)
11h00	Bulawayo	Sue Wilkinson, Project Co-ordinator	Micro & Small Scale Enterprise Promotion Programme (MISSEP)--(GTZ)
13h00	Bulawayo	Mrs. Zikhali, Owner-Rainbow Pre-school (recipient of ZWFT Loan)	
21-Oct-97: 09h00	Bulawayo	V. Ncube, Manager Savings & Credit Programme; T. Dube, Academic Prog. Coord.	Organisation of Rural Associations for Progress (ORAP)
11h30	Bulawayo	visit to meeting of ORAP Savings & Loan Group	
14h30		Flight to Harare	
22-Oct-97: 09h30	Harare	Cynthis Mungofa-Matiza, Information Officer	Development Innovations & Networks (IRED-East & Southern Africa)
23-Oct-97: 09h00	Harare	Rejean Hamel & Roger Roome	Canadian High Commission (CIDA)
10h30	Harare	V. Chipunza & M. Hwindingwi	Norwegian People»s Aid--Zimbabwe
14h30	Harare	Lois Mushonga	Redd Barna--Zimbabwe
16h00	Harare	V. Chipunza & M. Hwindingwi	Norwegian People»s Aid--Zimbabwe
		Øystein Gudim, Head of Region S. Africa	Norwegian People»s Aid--Norway
24-Oct-97: 09h00	Harare	Twisema Muyoya, Head-Strengthening Organisations Programmes	Mwelekeo wa NGO (MWENGO)
12h30	Harare	John Lwande, Co-ordinator, Small Enterprise Technical Assistance Programme	CARE Zimbabwe

MISSION TO SRI LANKA (14-24 OCTOBER) GRETE BROCHMANN AND ARJUNA PARAKRAMA

15-Oct.-97 : 04h00	Arrive	Briefing with Dr. Arjuna Parakrama	
16-Oct-97 08h00	Colombo	Ms. Kushlani Amarasuriya	ADIC
09h45	Colombo	Mr. Thor Stegne, Asst. Res. Representative	Redd Barna
11h00	Colombo	Excellency Jon Westborg, Ambassador	Norwegian Embassy
12h30	Colombo	Dr. P. Saravanamuttu, Executive Director	Center for Policy Alternatives
15h00	Colombo	Mr. Sunil Bastian, Consultant	International Center for Ethnic Studies
17-Oct-97 10h00	Colombo	Mr. Dankert Vedeler, Country Rep.	FORUT
14h00	Colombo	Ms. Kushlani Amarasuriya, Director	ADIC
16h00	Colombo	Mr. Charles Abeysekera	MIRJE and Social Scientists Assoc.
19-Oct.-97 A.M	Kandy	Siri Prabodha Movement officials	Sri Prabodha (Redd Barna Project Partner)
20-Oct.-97 A.M	Mahiyangana	Officials	FIOH Project Partner
20-Oct.-97 P.M.	Badulla	Meeting with FIOH officers	FIOH
	Badulla	Mr. K.A.J. Kahandawa, President	FIOH
21-Oct-97: 11h00	Colombo	Roberto Bentjerodt, Resident Representative	World Bank
22-Oct.-97 14h00	Colombo	Mr. R. Ariyasighe, Director-Publicity	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
23-Oct.-97	Colombo	Mr. Rohan Edirisinghe	Faculty of Law, University of Colombo
24-Oct.-97	Departure		

OSLO – 1-5 DECEMBER 1997

1-2 Dec-97 – Third Coordination Workshop (DiS)

4-Dec-97: 12h00	Oslo	Terje Vigtel, Director	Department for Non-Governmental Organizations, NORAD
4-Dec-97: 14h00	Oslo	Øystein Gudim, Head Region S. Africa	Norwegian People's Aid
4-Dec-97: 15h00	Oslo	Bente MacBeath, Head, Africa/Americas	Norwegian Red Cross
		Iris Aslaksen	Norwegian Red Cross
5-Dec-97: 09h00	Oslo	Inger Sagness	Redd Barna

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- 4.87 NORAD's Provisions for Investment Support
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- 1.88 UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women
- 2.88 The Norwegian Multi-Bilateral Programme under UNFPA
- 3.88 Rural Roads Maintenance, Mbeya and Tanga Regions, Tanzania
- 4.88 Import Support, Tanzania
- 5.88 Nordic Technical Assistance Personnel to Eastern Africa
- 6.88 Good Aid for Women?
- 7.88 Soil Science Fellowship Course in Norway
- 1.89 Parallel Financing and Mixed Credits
- 2.89 The Women's Grant. Desk Study Review
- 3.89 The Norwegian Volunteer Service
- 4.89 Fisheries Research Vessel - "Dr. Fridtjof Nansen"
- 5.89 Institute of Development Management, Tanzania
- 6.89 DUHs forskningsprogrammer
- 7.89 Rural Water Supply, Zimbabwe
- 8.89 Commodity Import Programme, Zimbabwe
- 9.89 Dairy Sector Support, Zimbabwe
- 1.90 Mini-Hydropower Plants, Lesotho
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- 4.90 Energy support in SADCC Countries
- 5.90 International Research and Training Institute for Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)
- 6.90 Socio-cultural Conditions in Development Assistance
- 7.90 Non-Project Financial Assistance to Mozambique
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- 3A.95 Rapport fra presentasjonsmøte av "Evalueringen av de frivillige organisasjoner"
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- 4.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations
- 5.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistance. Synthesis Report

