

# EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

REPORT 5/2016



## Evaluation of Norway's Support for Advocacy in the Development Policy Arena

Synthesis Report

### CONTENT

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</b> .....  | 3  |
| <b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b> .....   | 4  |
| <b>1. INTRODUCTION</b> .....   | 11 |
| 1.1 Objective and scope of evaluation .....                            | 11 |
| 1.2 Evaluation questions .....   | 12 |
| 1.3 Overview of policy processes in Norway .....                       | 13 |
| <b>2. DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION METHODS USED</b> .....                 | 15 |
| 2.1 Defining and assessing advocacy .....                              | 15 |
| 2.2 The mapping database .....   | 18 |
| 2.3 Thematic summaries .....   | 20 |
| 2.4 Case studies .....   | 20 |
| 2.5 Cross-case analysis .....  | 21 |
| 2.6 Limitations .....  | 22 |
| <b>3. FINDINGS</b> .....   | 23 |
| 3.1 Nature and scope of the engagements .....                          | 23 |
| 3.2 Decision-making process and information base .....                 | 34 |
| 3.3 Timing of the engagement .....                                     | 37 |
| 3.4 Norway's comparative advantages .....                              | 39 |
| 3.5 Achievements of the engagement .....                               | 42 |
| 3.6 Drivers .....  | 45 |
| 3.7 Challenges and constraining factors .....                          | 47 |
| 3.8 Sustainability of the engagement .....                             | 50 |
| <b>4. CONCLUSIONS</b> .....  | 52 |
| 4.1 Decision-making .....  | 52 |
| 4.2 Comparative advantages and drivers .....                           | 53 |
| 4.3 Approach .....   | 53 |
| 4.4 Achievements .....   | 54 |
| <b>5. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</b> .....                            | 55 |
| 5.1 Balancing scope and ambition with resources .....                  | 55 |
| 5.2 Maintaining flexibility .....                                      | 57 |
| 5.3 Engaging others .....  | 57 |
| 5.4 Strategic communication and messaging .....                        | 58 |
| 5.5 Designing and managing a portfolio<br>of advocacy activities ..... | 59 |
| <b>ANNEXES</b> .....   | 60 |
| <b>LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES/BOXES</b> .....                              | 73 |
| <b>ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS</b> .....                                | 74 |
| <b>FORMER REPORTS FROM<br/>THE EVALUATION DEPARTMENT</b> .....         | 75 |

**Commissioned by**  
the Evaluation Department

**Carried out by**  
FCG SIPU International AB (SIPU)  
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

**Written by**  
Helen Tilley, Research Fellow, ODI  
Anne L. Buffardi, Research Fellow, ODI  
Simon Hearn, Research Fellow, ODI  
Jonas Lövkrona, SIPU  
Johanna Lindström, SIPU

SEPTEMBER 2016

This report is the product of its authors,  
and responsibility for the accuracy of data included  
in this report rests with the authors alone. The findings,  
interpretations, and conclusions presented  
in this report do not necessarily reflect the views  
of the Norad Evaluation Department.

**Norad**  
Norwegian Agency for  
Development Cooperation  
[www.norad.no](http://www.norad.no)  
[post-eval@norad.no](mailto:post-eval@norad.no)

September 2016  
Photo: Trond Viken,  
Utenriksdepartementet (cover)  
ISBN: 978-82-7548-835-8

# Acknowledgements

FCG SIPU International AB (SIPU) in collaboration with ODI was commissioned to conduct this evaluation by the Norad Evaluation Department in 2015. This report has been written by the deputy team leader Helen Tilley and the team members: Anne Buffardi, Jonas Lövkrona, Johanna Lindström and Simon Hearn. This report has been quality assured by Kim Forss (QA Adviser) and Pierre Robert (Team Leader). The team benefited from project management support and guidance from Christian Carlbaum. The evaluation team has addressed comments received from the QA adviser, the team leader and the Norad Evaluation Department.

This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of the data included within rests with them. The findings, interpretations and conclusions presented do not necessarily reflect the views of the Norad Evaluation Department.

The authors are grateful to the focal points in various Norad and MFA departments and to each of the interviewees for their time and thoughtful insights. Balbir Singh and his colleagues in the Evaluation Department at Norad provided valuable guidance and support to the team throughout the evaluation.

# Executive summary

The objective of this evaluation is to identify the driving factors that determine the achievement of Norway's advocacy outcomes and, in turn, lessons for improving the Norwegian government's future programming of policy advocacy as an instrument for pursuing its development policy objectives. This evaluation is concerned with advocacy activities funded, commissioned or implemented by the Norwegian government between 2005 and 2014/15.

This evaluation comprises four main components: a summary of Norway's main advocacy engagements based on an analysis of its grant agreements database; thematic overviews of 11 issue areas (as presented in the inception report in October 2015); more detailed case studies of four of these issue areas (maternal and child health (MCH); education; women, peace and security (WPS); and illicit financial flows (IFF)), as presented in the annexes; and this synthesis, which presents a comparative analysis across the four issue areas.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A rigorous quality assurance process was pursued involving an independent evaluation expert.

A broad perspective on advocacy has been applied, and the Norwegian government recognises advocacy as a distinct field of activity. The case studies applied operational definitions of advocacy tactics, activities and results, recognising the fluidity and overlap between the categories. This reflects the complexity of advocacy activities.

## **NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ENGAGEMENTS**

Norway's advocacy engagements over the past decade have been broad and diverse, covering a wide range of thematic issues, using a mix of tactics and approaches, and working with, through and aiming to influence other governments, multilateral institutions, civil society and the private sector at both global and national levels. Across the four cases, Norway was involved in direct advocacy, led by state officials, as well as indirect advocacy, channelling funds through multilateral, civil society and academic intermediaries.

The four cases have similarities in their nature but also highlight differences, for example regarding the timing and nature of engagements, funding channels and availability of financing

and level of engagements – that is, global, regional and national level.

All of the case study engagements pursued strategic engagements with **multilateral organisations**. In the case of education, multilateral agencies are used primarily as channels for disbursing funding for education, although representatives of some of these agencies have also been engaged in advocacy initiatives spearheaded by Norway. Regarding IFF, Norway did not embark on a strategy to lead the global agenda, but rather found itself in an influential position based on its experience and consistent diplomatic engagement with international organisations. It targeted multilateral organisations to change policies to regulate illegal company practices.

Indirect advocacy through CSOs was a prominent shared feature. CSOs were particularly important strategic allies and a substantial amount of funding was channelled through them.

**Bilateral engagements** with governments from other high-income countries were central primarily for MCH and education, and to a lesser extent for WPS.

While the role of the **private sector** did not feature at all in WPS, and was not prominent in the MCH, education or IFF cases, there has been strong private sector opposition to the global IFF agenda.<sup>2</sup>

All cases featured diplomacy, brokering and/or lobbying, convening and evidence generation. Prominent tactics included **convening and coalition building** and this was used across the cases. Engagements were predominantly collaborative; there were no examples of highly confrontational tactics.

All four cases used **diplomacy**, and at very high levels of government, such as through ministers, and through the Prime Minister. Diplomacy was carried out in both formal fora, such as at global

conferences and bilateral meetings with other governments, and informal contexts, such as discussions on the sidelines of global meetings and impromptu meetings and phone conversations with other leaders.

**Evidence generation** was directly commissioned, such as financial support for the UN Women Global Study on the implementation on UNSCR 1325. Across cases, this information was used to identify the problem, inform stakeholder dialogues, guide advocacy and intervention strategies, generate public awareness, and maintain pressure for action.

IFF, WPS and education invested in **capacity development** in partner countries.

The only aspect of these dimensions that was not observed entailed efforts to directly influence the behaviour of the general public, such as public awareness campaigns to change the patterns of individuals.

## **DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND INFORMATION BASE**

The decision-making process underlying the engagement was explained partially by Norway's comparative advantages, which was strongest for WPS and IFF, as one of the few countries with experience and credibility in peace negotiations and in managing oil and gas revenues.

The extent to which an information base was available and was used in informing the decision to engage in a particular issue area varied across the cases. Some unique characteristics of the cases were the prominent role of information (IFF), the way information was used to inform the dialogue and to provide evidence-based solutions to problems (education and MCH) and the strong link between academics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) (WPS and IFF).

---

<sup>2</sup> While these were the findings of this study, the role of the private sector warrants further investigation.

## **TIMING OF THE ENGAGEMENT**

Both international and domestic influences affected all cases to a varying degree. Changes in domestic political priorities and attention given to specific areas appear to have been the most decisive factor affecting the timing of the engagements.

Global processes and developments also had an influence in the sense that they provided Norway with a justification to engage on certain issues and offered opportunities to step up engagements as the international political, social and economic context influenced the level of global attention paid to different issues at different times. The most salient example of this was the effect of the financial crisis in bringing IFF into the global arena and onto the agendas of multilateral institutions. While global developments played a substantial role in elevating the agenda for IFF, in none of the cases do global process and developments explain why an engagement started or ended at a particular time. This suggests the prominence of Norway's domestic political agenda yet illustrates responsiveness to global events.

## **NORWAY'S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES**

Norway's key comparative advantages were identified as 1) commitment to human rights and gender equality; 2) its impartiality and historical role in peace-building; 3) a collaborative approach working with others; 4) experience and expertise in particular issue areas; 5) the country's small size and lack of bureaucracy, which gives staff greater flexibility and access to decision-makers; and 6) financial strength, which, if strategically applied, can maximise the potential advantage. Norway has effectively adapted its approach to fill gaps others were not addressing. In addition to selecting engagements based in part on the country's comparative advantage, Norway has also adapted its approach to fill gaps others were not addressing.

The success of the advocacy areas can be explained partially by these comparative advantages. In the cases of IFF and WPS in particular, Norway had unique comparative advantages that meant it was well placed to play a leadership role. Even where comparative advantages were not prevalent, Norway was able to play a leading and influential role.

These comparative advantages may be latent or passive attributes. Across the issue areas, Norway's comparative advantage was the strongest for WPS and IFF, in that there were fewer other countries with experience in peace negotiations and managing oil and gas revenues.

## **ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ENGAGEMENTS**

For all four case studies, one of the most significant achievements was some kind of elevation of the issue on the global agenda through the building of coalitions with a shared agenda. All of the cases, apart from WPS, highlighted Norway's contributions to the establishment and implementation of new global initiatives. The increased display of political will and commitment by actors other than Norway demonstrated that issues had been put on the global policy agenda.

All four of the engagements examined in the case studies pursued very ambitious goals that were not possible to achieve by a single country alone or by a particular point in time, but instead require ongoing inputs. That noted, achievements were broad and all cases demonstrated

progress towards more interim results: increased attention to the issue; political and financial commitments; and the creation of new global initiatives and platforms. For some of the more mature engagements – that is, MCH and WPS – there are examples of results further along the results chain, although these are difficult to trace back to Norway’s advocacy engagements directly.

In four areas the tactics are also achievements (convening and coalition-building, evidence generation, capacity development, public awareness). Diplomacy, lobbying and brokering – a tactic in all four cases – can be linked to the achievement of increased political will and commitment in all of the cases. In some way, all cases included development of the capacity of other actors and individuals in some way. Generating a reliable evidence base was highlighted in the IFF case as an intermediary goal and also a tactic. In terms of policy change, achievements include changes in legislation (IFF), although these require long-term engagement, policy diffusion (WPS) and the institutionalisation of policies and initiatives (WPS and MCH).

MCH and education specifically aimed at leveraging Norway’s resources to mobilise further investments. This was not a feature for IFF and WPS. Specifically for MCH, Norway was perceived to be part of a core group of actors that helped facilitate the decline in child and maternal mortality from 1990.

#### **DRIVERS**

Drivers are active elements that can cause an engagement to be initiated, or continued through the maintenance of momentum. High-level leadership accompanied by financial resources and strong technical capacity; generation and use of evidence; and strategic partnerships with other actors were perceived to be key drivers influencing change. Sustaining political will and translating commitments to action, particularly at the national and subnational levels, was noted as the primary challenge. Stakeholder participation in global platforms, attention by new political leaders and resourcing the continuous inputs required for education and health systems remain vulnerable to weakening over time, posing risks to sustainability.

#### **CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINING FACTORS**

All of the engagements faced or are continuing to face a number of challenges and constraints that are holding back results and restrict Norway’s ambitions. Some of these challenges were crosscutting in nature and shared by more than one engagement, such as resource and capacity constraints, which constrained efforts in IFF and education. Across cases, there were concerns about cuts in official development assistance budgets and the increasing gap between available funding and existing needs.

Staff and technical capacity were a challenge, and in all cases there was a perceived mismatch between capacity and the scope of Norway’s agenda. This suggests that, despite Norway’s comparative advantage of financing, prioritising between and within agendas remains difficult.

All four engagements are facing an unfinished agenda. This was what provided the overall justification for Norwegian involvement in the particular engagements in the first place, but also means challenges continue to present themselves. These include challenges related

to disparities in schooling, education in emergencies, education quality and the increasing funding gap and reducing preventable deaths for millions more women and children in complex environments.

Others challenges relate to the intrinsic nature of one specific engagement. For instance, in IFF, tensions between Norwegian agencies and adversarial lobbying by corporate actors were identified as important challenges. In MCH, there are challenges related to fragmentation of efforts among a large, diverse field, with many subgroups along the newborn, child, adolescent, reproductive and maternal continuum of care.

### **SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ENGAGEMENTS**

In the cases examined, Norway promoted sustainability by adopting advocacy approaches and tactics geared towards creating and reinforcing platforms for interaction and funding, capacity development of state and non-state actors and expanding and/or proactively using the already existing information base to make a case for advancing certain priorities.

Norway's approach can be said to have in-built sustainability safeguards. Working with others and creating new platforms and financing mechanisms provide formal, structured ways for activities to continue when Norway is less involved or not at all.

Alongside these facilitating factors are several risks to sustainability. Stakeholder participation in global platforms, attention by new political leaders and resourcing the continuous inputs required for education and health systems remain vulnerable weakening over time. Where the main drivers were individuals, the engagements are likely to be less institutionalised and therefore at greater risk of efforts not being sustained. All cases pursued very ambitious aims with relatively few staff and a mismatch between capacity and scope, which presents a risk for continuation. In IFF, this was mitigated somewhat by the strong networks built with civil society.

The cases are ongoing so they are unable to offer insights on how and why engagement ends, or to determine the sustainability of Norway's investments following their withdrawal.

Despite this, it is clear that change in political priorities is a decisive factor.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The four cases contain both similarities and differences that present insights into the Norwegian government's advocacy engagements. The evaluation did not find a standard model of advocacy that was followed across the cases, and this reflects a flexibility and responsiveness to the different contexts of each engagement. This is identified as an important comparative advantage.

Norway's engagements aimed to influence (targeted) multilateral organisations, other governments in high-, middle- and low-income countries, civil society, foundations and the private sector. Through the cases, we discovered no clear and consistent distinction between channel, or intermediary, and target. Sometimes, even during one engagement, a target may also be a channel.

The design and approach to implementation of the advocacy engagements was based on



a range of influences at different times, from the drive of key individuals (IFF, MCH), the information base (IFF), the use of information to inform dialogue (education, MCH) and the link between academics and the Norwegian government (WPS, IFF).

The success of the advocacy areas can be explained partially by Norway's comparative advantages, which helped Norway play a leadership role. Even where comparative advantages were not strong, Norway was able to play a leading and influential role. If Norway's financial strength were used to further leverage these advantages, influence could be even greater. Key drivers influencing change were perceived to be high-level leadership accompanied by financial resources and strong technical capacity; generation and use of evidence; and strategic partnerships with other actors.

Achievements were broad and all cases demonstrated progress towards more interim results: increased attention, political and financial commitments, and the creation of new global initiatives and platforms. In some way, all cases

included development of the capacity of other actors and individuals. Generating a reliable evidence base was particularly important in the IFF case, as understanding the scale of the diversion of aid was at the core of the argument. Support to multilateral organisations sometimes indirectly supported evidence generation. In terms of policy change, achievements include changes in legislation (IFF), although these require long-term engagement, policy diffusion (WPS) and the institutionalisation of policies and global initiatives (WPS, MCH).

In the MCH, education and WPS cases, there is a need to give more attention to the national and subnational level to bring about real impact. This shift highlights the importance of leadership at the national level and of investing in capacity.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend that Norway deepen advocacy engagements by prioritising along its comparative advantages and matching scope to capacity and plans for the medium to long term. The global scope and aims of Norway's ambitions necessitate long periods of engagement, which should be planned for while maintaining flexibility and responsiveness to the different contexts within each engagement. By prioritising along comparative advantages and matching ambition to capacity, Norway could identify a select number of issues on which to engage for a substantial amount of time, supported by sustained political, financial and technical resources. We recommend commissioning an evaluation to specifically consider sector staffing and capacity issues in-depth.

### **Balancing scope and ambition with resources**

- 1.** Political engagements should be backed up by technical expertise housed in Norad; if Norad is taking the technical lead on an area, there is also the need to increase resources to support technical capacity.
- 2.** Rotation between embassies, Norad and MFA needs to be reinstated, with secondments between agencies.
- 3.** Political support should be accompanied by substantial financial contributions, particularly when Norway is advocating a new or less common approach.

### **Maintaining flexibility**

- 4.** Norway needs to continue to take a flexible approach to achieving the ultimate advocacy goal and avoid pressures to formalise small- to medium-scale engagements.

### **Engaging others**

- 5.** A broad coalition should be developed and maintained to improve the sustainability of advocacy engagements. This should be backed up by financial resources over the medium term to allow individuals and their institutions to function.
- 6.** The capacity and experience of Norwegian non-governmental organisations and the private sector should be tapped into to link global and national efforts to build and sustain a global commitment to change and to find solutions to real country-level problems, including in terms of policy obstacles.
- 7.** Norway could consider conducting stakeholder analysis particularly given its partner-focused approaches. A stakeholder mapping of Norway's advocacy targets and partners would be useful, particularly in the WPS field. Developing indicators of behaviour change for these key actors could be a useful subsequent addition.

### **Strategic communication and messaging**

- 8.** Norad/MFA should use two aspects of messaging to maximise the effectiveness of advocacy engagements: 1) balancing and tailoring the message for different constituency groups; and 2) linguistic labels and rhythms for branding of advocacy activities to increase visibility.

### **Designing and managing a portfolio of advocacy activities**

- 9.** If Norway is interested in managing a portfolio of advocacy activities, as suggested by the ToR, we recommend Norad/MFA could convene a task force or advocacy position supported by a secretariat to oversee advocacy, with sufficient capacity to enable Norway to map resources and financing for cross-cutting areas and to review progress over time and share lessons across issue areas.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE OF EVALUATION

The objective of this evaluation is to identify the driving factors that determine the achievement of Norway's advocacy outcomes and, in turn, lessons for improving the Norwegian government's future programming of policy advocacy as an instrument for pursuing its development policy objectives. The evaluation is concerned with advocacy activities funded, commissioned or implemented by the Norwegian government between 2005 and 2014/15.

The terms of reference (ToR) requested a broad interpretation of advocacy activities that goes beyond specific advocacy activities to include efforts made at the political and diplomatic levels. For the purpose of this review, an engagement is a policy area in which the Norwegian government has made a commitment to work and that involves the influencing of external organisations or institutions.

Norway has for a long time endeavoured to play a catalytic role in global development policy by focusing on system-wide change.<sup>3</sup> Alongside its direct development assistance and traditional service delivery programmes, Norway supports a wide array of policy advocacy initiatives, although these are not always recognised as such. Most often packaged as part of other programmes, these take many forms: some target direct change through diplomatic and non-diplomatic channels; others seek to influence change indirectly through development assistance to governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or multilateral partners at national or international levels.<sup>4</sup>

As these initiatives are rarely treated as standalone projects, the documentation of learning and evaluation is often dispersed and locked up in tacit knowledge; hence, this evaluation was commissioned to bring together this information

<sup>3</sup> The term 'catalytic' is used in the ToR. This metaphorical term, likening Norway to an agent in a chemical reaction, suggests advocacy work is meant to encourage other agents to take similar action to Norway's, or to follow its recommendations. The crux is that Norway's advocacy, though small in scale, is meant to impulse larger changes by influencing the actions of others.

<sup>4</sup> The terms NGO and CSO are used interchangeably throughout the report.

and identify potential lessons that may be relevant across issue areas.

The evaluation is intended for use primarily by the Norwegian government to inform managerial decisions in policy advocacy programming, in particular:

- the timing of policy advocacy activities
- the choice of institutional 'channel', or the way Norway could exert its influence
- the design and management of a portfolio of advocacy activities

This evaluation comprises four main components: 1) a summary of Norway's main advocacy engagements based on an analysis of its grant agreements database; 2) thematic overviews of 11 issue areas (both presented in the inception report in October 2015); 3) more detailed case studies of four of these issue areas (maternal and child health (MCH); education; women, peace and security (WPS); and illicit financial flows (IFF)); and a comparative analysis across the four issue areas.

This synthesis report presents the cross-case analysis, with four case studies included in the annex. The emphasis of the evaluation is across the range of Norway's engagements, rather than providing a comprehensive assessment of the country's involvement in each issue area.

## 1.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The data sources used for each evaluation question were: 1) the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) grant agreements database; 2) Norad and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) documents and website; 3) interviews with Norad/MFA staff and other key stakeholders; and 4) other external sources, including publically available statistics, organisational websites and articles and reports published in the grey and academic literature. The use of these sources varies between the case studies depending on the particular nature and timing of the engagement.

The overview of the Norad grant agreement database enables us to characterise the sector, recipient country, type of assistance (bilateral, multilateral), year, disbursement, agreement

partner and implementing partner for over 60,000 agreements. The 11 thematic overviews categorise advocacy tactics, targets, intermediary and level of engagement. This information enables us to answer evaluation question 1a 'What were Norway's main engagements?' The case studies enable us to better understand the decision processes underlying the engagements, their policy context and their capacity to adapt to varying circumstances and to develop insights into the factors driving the perceived effectiveness of advocacy and the sustainability of outcomes.

Responses to the evaluation questions are in the following sections of Section 3 on findings:

- The nature of the engagements (evaluation question 1) is described in Section 3, and Section 3.1 discusses evaluation question 1b: What primary channels, targets and tactics were used in Norway's advocacy engagements?

- Section 3.2, on the decision-making process and information base, summarises the findings that concern evaluation question 1c: What was the decision process underlying engagements?
- Section 3.3, on the timing of the engagement, summarises the case studies' responses to evaluation question 1d: To what extent did the policy context influence the timing of engagements?
- Section 3.4, on Norway's comparative advantages, summarises the findings that concern evaluation question 1e: To what extent was the engagement adaptive to context, Norway's comparative advantage and Norway's priorities?
- Section 3.5, on the achievements and challenges of the engagement, summarises the case studies' responses to evaluation question 2: What were the advocacy outputs and outcomes, both successes and failures?

- Section 3.6 and 3.7, on drivers and constraining factors, summarises the case studies' findings concerning evaluation question 3: What were the main factors driving achievement or non-achievement of desired outputs and outcomes?
- Section 3.8 summarises the findings that concern evaluation questions 4, 4a and 4b: How did the implementing agencies/partners manage the factors within their control to promote sustainability of the advocacy outcomes? How to keep momentum given the need for continuous drive for change and possibility of failures/no change? How and why do engagements end/pull back?

### 1.3 OVERVIEW OF POLICY PROCESSES IN NORWAY

Norway has been classified as a cooperative state, where there are formal procedures for close dialogue between government, NGOs, academics, the private sector and the media. Through this formal consultation process, the government tries to include the views of a wide range of actors. This evaluation explores

the decision-making processes underlying the engagements. Even though policies are said to often be research-based, feeding evidence from academic research into White Papers, other factors may inform political decisions as well. Recognising that there are alternatives depending on the nature of the consultation required, the points below summarily describe the essential steps in the policy process, although there is considerable scope for different designs and different processes under each step:

1. The starting point is that an issue is being defined. Often, this is quite a complex process, with many actors involved. At some point in time, a critical mass of opinion is reached so that action is initiated. The first such action could well be that the government invites sector actors to informal meetings.
2. The next step is often some form of formalisation of the issue, to turn it from an area of concern into an issue on which it is possible to take political action. The Scandinavian tradition of public committees can be used for this purpose. Such committees can be quite

inclusive, and there are many different designs available. The aim is often to include all relevant stakeholders, either directly in the committee or through the consultations the committee undertakes.

3. A public committee concludes with a report (*Norges offentlige utredninger*, Official Norwegian Reports), which contains research and analysis and recommendations. The report (which can also be called a White Paper) is sent for comments to all stakeholders, and afterwards it forwarded to Parliament. If the report contains legislative proposals, it will have to have these approved from a constitutional viewpoint.
4. Parliamentary discussions take place that respond to the White Paper and the comments, or take these further. There is no formal limit to what the debate can, or cannot, consider. It is also possible for such debates to be continued in the media and among external stakeholders.

Complementing this formal process are close informal relations between top decision-makers, as ‘everyone knows everyone’. These informal relations are very important, although the formal processes have been particularly important since the 2013 elections. Nordic cooperation frames the development of key legislation, and Sweden, Norway and Denmark are close. Within Europe, Norway has an element of flexibility, being outside the European Union (EU) but a member of European Economic Area.

Until 2012, the minister of foreign affairs led foreign policy-making and the minister of international development led development cooperation. The embassies managed state-to-state development cooperation. Although this is less the case now, Norad’s traditional role is to advise MFA and the embassies on development issues and to manage funds channelled through intermediaries. In 2010, MFA administered 65% of total Norwegian official development assistance (ODA), including funds for multilateral organisations. In addition, 20% of ODA was delegated from MFA to Norwegian embassies and 12% to Norad.

Norad manages funds for the development activities of CSOs, Norwegian enterprises and educational and research organisations, and is in charge of evaluation and quality control (SEEK, 2013). The rotation of staff to and from the field has been, in the past, an important means of sustaining capacity, although interviewees felt this now happened less frequently. The 2013 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review considers it important for keeping ‘knowledge current and relevant’ (OECD, 2013b: 19).

Civil society plays an important role in development and foreign policy decision-making and implementation in Norway. This ‘Norwegian model’ of development is based on institutionalised collaboration between government and domestic and international civil society actors, as well as academic institutions and think tanks. This is underpinned by broad consensus between political parties on the application of this collaboration as a foreign policy instrument (Neumann, 1999; Tryggestad, 2009; 2014; Toje, 2013). The 2008 DAC peer review characterised the dialogue between civil society organisations

(CSOs) and the government as ‘open and frank’ (OECD, 2013b).

## 2. Description of evaluation methods used

This section describes our overall approach and the methods involved in each of the four evaluation components: a summary of Norway's main advocacy engagements based on an analysis of the grant agreements database; thematic overviews of eleven issue areas; more detailed case studies of Norway's engagement in MCH, education, WPS and IFF; and a comparative analysis across the four issue areas.

### 2.1 DEFINING AND ASSESSING ADVOCACY

In their recent review, Tsui et al. (2014) characterise policy influencing and advocacy along four dimensions. Advocacy can be:

- changing policy and/or changing behaviour: some advocacy is aimed at changing policy or preventing change to policy; other approaches are about changing the behaviour of the general public (e.g. public health campaigning)
- direct and/or indirect: advocacy can aim at changing decision-makers' beliefs, opinions, behaviours and policies, either directly through Norwegian government diplomatic and non-diplomatic channels or indirectly through

development assistance to governments, NGOs or multilateral partners at national or international levels – that is, via other actors who might have influence on decision-makers (e.g. the media, voters)

- inside track and/or outside track: advocacy from within comes by working with decision-makers or from outside by confronting, exposing or challenging decision-makers
- formal and/or informal: advocacy can work through formal/official channels such as policy reforms, but sometimes advocacy finds alternative ways through informal routes such as relationship-building

Different combinations of the above approaches yield different types of advocacy interventions. For example, approaches that use direct and formal channels and work on the inside track tend to centre on dialogue and advice. Those that use direct and formal channels but work on the outside track tend to use public campaigning as the intervention of choice.

These dimensions encompass Norway's broad characterisation of advocacy presented in the introduction: efforts made at the political and diplomatic levels, targeting direct change through diplomatic and non-diplomatic channels, and influencing change indirectly through development assistance to governments, NGOs or multilateral partners at national or international levels. Moreover, the Norwegian government considers advocacy a distinct field of activity (rather than a sector or subsector) that distinguishes itself by focusing on system-wide change; leveraging Norway's financial contributions to achieve greater impact; influencing or informing decision-making through generating reliable evidence; promoting or defending the interests of specific population groups, particularly those that are marginalised; strengthening capacity of organisations to engage in policy debates; forming alliances and coalitions to coordinate action; building public awareness and political will for change; and supporting institutionalisation, implementation and diffusion of policy change.

Advocacy engagement is distinct from conventional service delivery interventions, and as such,

requires an evaluation approach that is appropriately tailored to its unique orientation. As Coffman (2010) notes, because advocacy is often a long-term effort involving multiple actors, the evaluation approach must recognise the unique, collaborative and complex nature of the work. Much of the complexity of advocacy work reflects the nature of the policy processes it aims to influence, which is itself complex and chaotic (Clay and Schaffer, 1984; Grindle and Thomas, 1990; Lindblom, 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Anderson, 1994; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995; Kingdon, 1995; Marsh, 1998).

Box 1 identifies seven aspects of programmes or interventions that can contribute to their complexity. The engagements examined in this evaluation featured many stakeholders, approaches that needed to and did adapt to changing circumstances, multiple change pathways and unintended outcomes. An aspect of complexity that is particularly salient in advocacy is the highly contextually dependent nature of policy-making: what works in some settings and at some times may not in others, or not without windows of opportunity being present.

Advocacy frameworks have been developed predominantly in a US context and oriented towards NGOs advocating with a national government, rather than bilateral and multilateral relations at global levels, so are not explicitly aligned with definitions of diplomacy. Different studies have used different terminology to describe similar behaviours. The UK Department for International Development (DFID), for example, suggests that, rather than describing its ‘influence’ on other organisations, terms such as ‘advice’, ‘negotiation’, ‘policy dialogue’ or ‘engagement’ may be more palatable (DFID, 2013), as talking about ‘advocacy’ and ‘influencing’ can be politically sensitive in different contexts. While different approaches such as negotiation, policy dialogue and policy engagement all vary in how they operate, they all have the common characteristics of policy influence.

#### **BOX 1:** COMPLEXITY PARAMETERS

- Stability of objectives (is the goal simple and fixed or does it vary over time?)
- Governance (how many stakeholders are involved in decision-making?)
- Consistency of implementation (does the intervention need to adapt to changing circumstances?)
- Necessity of activities to produce specific outcomes (are there many different ways of achieving the same impact?)
- Sufficiency of activities to produce intended outcomes (are the programme activities sufficient or are other factors necessary to produce the required impact?)
- Predictability of the change pathway.
- Propensity for unintended outcomes.

Source: Funnell and Rogers (2011).



Against this background of complexity and the different approaches to advocacy, we apply the following categories and definitions of advocacy tactics and results. There is fluidity across the categories, such that in some contexts an activity may be considered to predominantly involve convening, whereas in other contexts it may be viewed as being diplomacy. Some activities may simultaneously fall into more than one of the categories below:

- **Diplomacy, lobbying and brokering:**

*Diplomacy* involves meetings among government officials, with the aim of influencing decisions. Supporting diplomatic activities may include leadership and participation on committees to draft recommendations and strategy documents. *Lobbying* refers to actively engaging legislators, members of the executive and other decision-makers to influence policy decisions, such as establishing a new programme, passing a new regulation or revoking an existing provision. It can encompass individual meetings with decision-makers, participation in committees to draft proposed legislation, testifying at legislative hearings

and submitting written testimony on proposed policies. *Brokering* is defined as negotiating among parties with polarised interests. It is not always possible to distinguish between the three tactics in reality as the same activities can be described in different ways when performed by different people; a diplomat meeting with a partner government official is diplomacy but a non-state actor meeting with the same official for similar reasons is lobbying. The same can be said for brokering and diplomacy.

- **Convening and coalition-building:** This entails bringing together different sets of actors, and may include hosting meetings, conferences, seminars and dialogues to highlight shared interests or how parties could benefit from working together. A result of this might be the formation of an alliance with a shared agenda.

- **Evidence generation:** This is commissioning or providing research or technical input to build a body of evidence on a topic; it includes problem analysis, policy monitoring, programme and policy evaluation and tracking

the implementation of a policy and/or results over time.

- **Capacity development:** Skills and capability development may involve technical and specialised skills, incentives, opportunities, relationships, resources advocacy skills or awareness of an issue; it may also include money for staff who are placed in an organisation to support the development of their colleagues, for example in a mentoring or coaching capacity.

- **Community mobilisation** entails actively encouraging or supporting citizens and members of the community to pursue an issue, either directly or through organised groups such as CSOs or NGOs.

- **Public awareness** involves increasing understanding of an issue and its importance; as a tactic, this could happen by providing expert comment, communicating and sharing information in public arenas.

- **Political will and commitment:** This relates to the willingness of decision-makers to act in support of an issue or policy proposal. This may involve demonstration of a continuity of effort, the allocation of resources and the mobilisation of stakeholders (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Some of the other categories can be considered to indicate political will, highlighting the non-exclusive nature of the categories.<sup>5</sup>
- **Policy change** means enacting new or changing a policy, regulation or resolution.
- **Mobilisation of financial resources** means committing and disbursing funds, and providing catalytic funding to encourage others to mobilise resources.
- **Diffusion of a policy or institutionalisation of an initiative:** This occurs when a policy in a given jurisdiction is adopted in another jurisdiction or when an initiative is formally established, with dedicated resources to enable its operations.

<sup>5</sup> The concept of political will is challenging and a number of authors recognise how its inconsistent application does not add analytical value (Hammergren, 1998; Leftwich, 2009). We are unable to present a full analysis here.

- **Improvements in the situation of special population groups:** This relates to changes in access to or quality of services and/or well-being of individuals, particularly marginalised groups.

There is some fluidity among categories: Diplomacy and lobbying may take place at a convening event, for instance. Moreover, these categories may be situated at different phases of the change pathway. An advocacy initiative may aim to improve evidence and develop capacity of other actors. Evidence generation and capacity-building could also be tactics to increase political will and improve policy analysis or implementation. Norway committed and disbursed substantial financial resources for health and education as a tactic to attract new and increased sources of funding from others.

The four cases were at different stages of development, so advocacy goals varied in terms the phase of the policy cycle they emphasised, and what was considered a tactic or an achievement. Since all four cases featured engagement at the global level, the overall emphasis was on more

upstream phases – agenda-setting, policy formation and adoption – more so than policy implementation at national and subnational levels and subsequent changes in the lives of individuals.

To address the complexity of advocacy, and the wide variation of advocacy activities, our approach draws on principles of Outcome Harvesting (Wilson-Grau and Britt, 2012). Rather than focusing on what an organisation does, Outcome Harvesting focuses on what was achieved and then identifies factors associated with these changes. This approach acknowledges that multiple pathways can lead to multiple outcomes, and helps identify unplanned or unexpected changes. Moreover, the long time period under review, 2005 – 2014, increases the likelihood of observing changes that may not occur within a three- to five-year project cycle.

## 2.2 THE MAPPING DATABASE


The evaluation began with a review of Norway's grant agreements database. The aim of this was 1) to learn whether the database is suitable for identifying and understanding Norway's engagements, 2) to see the extent and variation of

Norway's advocacy engagements through project grants and 3) to support the identification of the initial set of 8 – 10 engagements. This exercise considered the engagements implemented through grants to multilaterals and NGOs. It did not capture the substantial advocacy engagement that happens 'off the books', as informal or informal activities that are not set up as specific projects.

The database contains 61,752 entries for the period of interest, from 2005 to 2014 (2015 data were not available). Each entry represents an individual agreement, understood to be related to a single grant contract between Norad/MFA and their recipients. Using Excel's build-in filter function, we filtered the full list of 61,752 agreements to find the 1,703 (or 936 unique) agreements that include the word 'advocacy'. We then identified multiple keywords to search for to ensure agreements that do not use 'advocacy' were not excluded.

As Figure 1 illustrates, the largest category of agreements is general government and civil society, which is supported by the largest two partner

**FIGURE 1: RELEVANT AGREEMENTS BY MAIN SECTOR (TOP 15 ONLY)**



categories being Norwegian and local NGOs. This classification is a general category that does not indicate the thematic area of focus, and that potentially conflates channel and target group, raising questions about the usefulness of the classification in the database. Conflict prevention and resolution was the second largest area of agreements.

### **2.3 THEMATIC SUMMARIES**

The mapping of the database resulted in the selection of 11 possible themes/engagements for further review. These themes were elaborated on in thematic summaries, which helped us decide if any relevant advocacy engagements related to the themes could be case studies and whether there was sufficient information or access to knowledgeable persons to support the development of the case study.

The initial set of themes identified in the ToR included primary education, UN reform, mine action, women and children's rights, MCH and peace and conflict prevention. The six initial themes were later supplemented with

five more:<sup>6</sup> clean energy for all, human trafficking, IFF and fight against tax havens, oil for development and WPS. Further discussions resulted in combining the two areas of peace and security and gender into WPS to focus on a particular engagement relating to a specific UN resolution. This illustrates the fluidity of the categories.

Short overviews of each of these thematic issue areas were prepared based on a rapid document review and, where possible, a phone interview with Norad staff members involved in that engagement. This scoping determined the suitability of each issue area and feasibility to develop it into full case.

### **2.4 CASE STUDIES**

The aim of the case studies was to analyse the nature and scope of the engagement, the decision-making process, the timing, the relevance and Norway's comparative advantage, the achievements and challenges,

---

<sup>6</sup> The initial six themes were also adjusted: women and children's rights became child rights and primary education became education.

the drivers and constraining factors and the sustainability. Each case study was allocated 14 days. Given the purpose of the evaluation and the time available, the case studies are not exhaustive accounts of these very broad issue areas or of Norway's engagement. Rather, they seek to take advantage of existing information, supplemented by a select number of interviews with key actors who could provide insights into decisions and processes that have been less well documented.

#### **2.4.1 Case Selection**

Criteria for the case selection were devised to ensure the cases were feasible, sufficiently diverse and comparable. These include the time-frame of the engagement, with at least one current engagement and one engagement that has concluded or where support has declined in order to assess sustainability; diversity in four dimensions, including intermediary/partner (multilateral, bilateral, CSO/NGO), advocacy tactics (diplomacy, research, core financial support), advocacy targets (multilateral, bilateral, CSO/NGO) and level of engagement (global/national); sufficient data availability; and a sufficient advocacy component.

With the use of these criteria, the team narrowed down the 11 thematic summaries to propose four case studies: MCH, education, WPS and IFF.

Although all four engagements included work at the national level, in order to bind the scope of the evaluation we focused primarily on Norway's involvement at the global level. WPS also considers how advocacy has influenced the selection of national-level programmes; IFF presents a brief overview of capacity development support to Zambia and Tanzania.

Other than in the grant agreement database, we were unable to find comparable data on the amount of funding allocated across the four issue areas. The government allocates a large amount of ODA to MCH and education, which is often used as catalytic funding, intended to attract new and increased sources of funding from other governments and the private sector. The decentralised management of IFF and WPS within the government of Norway and the channelling of funds through multilateral organisations for MCH

and education present challenges in comparing levels of funding across each issue area.

#### **2.4.2 Data Collection and Analysis**

Together, the case studies are based on a review of 280 documents and semi-structured interviews with 104 key informants, conducted from November 2015 to February 2016. Interviews were held by phone or Skype or face to face, and followed a standard guide, slightly adapted for each case. We employed a purposive sampling strategy, identifying individuals who were knowledgeable about the issue and evaluation questions, and who represented a range of viewpoints. MFA/Norad provided initial suggestions of potential interviewees, which was supplemented by recommendations from others in order to provide a balanced perspective. Most respondents were serving in senior level political and administrative positions (state secretaries, executive directors, department heads, senior advisers, etc.). The face-to-face interviews involved travel to Oslo, New York and Washington, DC.

Based on these sources of data, we then classified the tactics, intermediaries or chan-

nels, targets and achievements of each case. These categories were drawn from commonly used frameworks and indicators for assessing advocacy (Reisman et al., 2007; Tsui et al., 2014; Coffman and Beer, 2015) and diplomacy (Katz et al., 2011; Kleistra and Willigen, 2011). Our categories included the activities identified in the evaluation ToR and mentioned at the start of this section.

#### **2.5 CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS**

Following preparation of the draft case studies, the cross-case analysis was conducted. The case study authors and two evaluation specialists convened for a two-day workshop to analyse findings across the cases according to each evaluation question, identify similarities and differences and craft recommendations. This involved initial review of the four case studies and consolidation of tactics, channels, targets, decision-making, timing, comparative advantage, achievements, challenges, drivers and sustainability across the cases. We then analysed variation across the cases to identify prominent patterns. Case study authors then went back to their cases to probe further for

themes that emerged in others cases, and to revise classifications as necessary to ensure consistency of definitions. We characterised each of the four issue areas, which informed our interpretation of the findings and identification of recommendations, since an option that may be particularly relevant in one issue area may not be feasible in another.

The draft report was reviewed by two evaluation experts for quality assurance and subsequently revised. Finally, in order to correct misinterpretations and validate the findings, Norad and MFA staff reviewed both the individual cases and the cross-case analysis.

## **2.6 LIMITATIONS**

The challenges in assessing advocacy are well known. Specific to the cases examined here, all four of the engagements pursued ambitious goals – exposing and eliminating IFF; reducing maternal and child mortality; providing all children with the same opportunities to start and complete school and learn skills; and enabling women’s participation at all levels of decision-making and protection from and prevention of

sexual and gender-based violence. These ultimate goals require ongoing efforts and so cannot be considered ‘achieved’ at a particular point in time.

By nature, decision-making processes and less visible advocacy approaches like diplomacy are difficult to definitively substantiate since they are often not documented. Key informant interviews are vulnerable to social desirability and confirmation biases. Interviewees directly involved in advocacy may have strong incentives to demonstrate the ‘success’ of their work and be prone to provide information that supports their initial beliefs, both of which may overestimate the actual outcome and the role of different actors. For earlier advocacy engagements, informants’ recall of events may be less reliable than documents or informants speaking about more recent events.

We have attempted to mitigate against potential biases by triangulating information across multiple informants and information sources. Recall bias is potentially more problematic in the more mature engagements (MCH, WPS and IFF).

In contrast, for education, since it is such a recent initiative, triangulation with documents was limited and reliance on triangulation using interview data was greater, so more interviews were conducted for this case.

We report multiple or conflicting opinions where they arose. The cases distinguish between perceptions of external actors and perceptions of government interviewees. Overall, there was fairly strong consistency among interviewee responses and among information sources.

We identified key actors, events and features in the political, economic and institutional context, prior to and throughout the engagement period, and incorporated these factors into our analysis and interpretation. We noted findings and recommendations that may not be readily generalised or may be affected by characteristics of the specific issue area. The cross-case analysis enabled us to identify common features across the case studies.

## 3. Findings

The analysis that follows summarises the findings to respond to the evaluation questions. For more information on the case studies, see the annexes. Most of the analysis has been drawn from the case studies but it also includes analysis from the mapping of the database and the thematic summaries.

### **3.1 NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ENGAGEMENTS**

This section provides a short overview of each issue area, including aspects that may be unique to the sector and therefore influence the extent to which lessons can be applied to other areas, responding to evaluation question 1: What was the nature of the advocacy engagements? It then summarises the case studies responses to evaluation question 1b: What were the primary channels (intermediaries), targets and tactics used in Norway's advocacy engagements?

#### **3.1.1 Nature of the Engagements**

Table 1 summarises the engagements in each of the four case study areas. Important aspects include the level of the engagement: all were global, but WPS and IFF considered aspects of national engagement. The role of the global environment in facilitating the IFF agenda was particularly prominent. The youngest engagement is education and the most mature WPS. The entry point in the advocacy process for three of the cases was agenda-setting; only WPS involved policy diffusion. WPS is a foreign policy concern, in contrast with the other cases, which are development issues. Concerning the measurement of results, health results are easiest to measure, education faces challenges around measuring quality, WPS is difficult as marginalised groups do not have a voice (a challenge shared with MCH) and identifying results is difficult. IFF faces an extensive opposition and is highly politicised and the change process is therefore lengthy. On financing data availability, WPS and IFF are particularly challenging owing to their crosscutting nature.

In this chapter, we discuss in more detail the background to the issue areas and the nature of each of the cases, and the sections below discuss the channels, targets and tactics in detail. In order to draw out differences across the cases, Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 highlight what were perceived to be the key features of each case, rather than all activities, achievements and actors. The identification of key features was based on how Norway characterises its work in core documents and how interviewees responded to questions: 'What have been the most significant achievements?', 'Who were the key actors involved?' and 'What were the key aspects of your/their approach?'

**TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF NORWAY'S ENGAGEMENT IN EACH OF THE FOUR CASE STUDY AREAS**

| Aspect                                    | Maternal and Child Health (MCH)   | Education  | Women, Peace and Security (WPS)   | Illicit Financial Flows (IFF)   |
|---|---|--|---|---|
| <b>Level of engagement</b>                | Primarily global  | Global with some national  | Global with some national   | Global, regional and national   |
| <b>Timeframe</b>                          | 2007 – ongoing  | Young. 2013 – ongoing  | Mature – ongoing  | Early 2000s – ongoing   |
| <b>Stage of policy process</b>            | Problem identification and agenda-setting/ political and resource mobilisation  | Agenda-setting   | Policy diffusion  | Problem identification, agenda-setting, policy development and implementation   |
| <b>Importance for Norway</b>              | Health is a public good, a human right and vital for development. MDGs 4 and 5 were lagging behind, in 2007, prime minister wanted to see results | Education is an opportunity for global leadership. The White Paper highlights education as a human right as well as for security | Norway has been a global key player in peace negotiations and gender equality, providing support to WPS through its comparative advantage | Norway played a key role in bringing the area onto to the international agenda. Norway has significant experience in developing a fair and effective tax system |
| <b>Intermediary/partners</b>              | Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (PMNCH), based at WHO, Every Woman, Every Child (EWEC) movement, UN Foundation                 | Multilaterals, bilateral donors, CSOs and academia   | Academia, civil society, multilaterals, other UN member states  | Bilateral donors, multilateral organisations, CSOs  |
| <b>Direct tactics of MFA/Norad</b>        | Political will and diplomacy, convening and coalition-building, economic support/ catalytic funding   | Conveying, evidence generation, coalition-building, lobbying and capacity development  | Brokering, diplomacy, lobbying, convening and coalition-building, capacity-building, evidence generation, dissemination of information    | Diplomacy, lobbying, convening and coalition building, capacity building, evidence generation   |
| <b>Indirect tactics of intermediaries</b> | Evidence generation, convening and coalition-building   | None   | Evidence generation, policy monitoring, capacity-building, lobbying, convening and coalition-building, community mobilisation             | Lobbying, convening and coalition building capacity building, evidence generation and policy monitoring, public awareness                                       |
| <b>Targets</b>                            | Heads of State & senior officials in high income countries & donor organisations<br>Multilaterals   | Multilaterals, bilateral, recipients   | Multilaterals, other UN member states   | Partner governments, national authorities, multilateral organisations   |
| <b>Level of engagement</b>                | Primarily global with some national   | Global with some national  | Global, national  | Global and national   |



**Maternal and child health (MCH):** This case study focuses on Norway's engagement in global efforts to reduce maternal and child mortality in order to fulfil Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 4 and 5. This is a mature, ongoing engagement: Norway's leadership in international institutions addressing health began prior to 2005 and was a priority issue for former Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg during his second term (2005 – 2013).

Aspects of MCH both facilitate and complicate advocacy around this issue area. Relative to IFF and WPS, health is an issue that directly affects everyone. It is relatable and personal, with highly visible consequences that are easy to communicate. Moreover, the cross-border nature of disease epidemics and commodity and health workforce flows is more evident in health than in other development issues. Core MCH indicators are relatively straightforward to measure, calculate the return on investment for and assess over shorter timeframes than those for education or gender relations. Innovation, which has played a large role in the field of health, may be less straightforward in other areas.

Three issues complicate advocacy around MCH. First, women and children represent population groups with relatively little power and are less well mobilised. Children cannot vote. MCH is different to other health campaigns, particularly HIV advocacy, which has had a great deal of success: unlike HIV activists, there are no movements of husbands who have lost their wives or parents who have lost their children, for example. Second, explaining innovative financing mechanisms like volume guarantees and using capital markets to mobilise funds is difficult to describe in a simple way. Third, there are many subspecialties in health, so other development areas with a more concentrated base may have to devote less attention to developing partnerships.

**Education:** Norway has played an active role in international cooperation on education and development for many years. However, the 2013 election of the new coalition government marked the beginning of a significant escalation of the engagement, especially at the global level.<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> The coalition comprises the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, with parliamentary support from the Left Party and the Christian Democrats.

With inspiration from previous engagements on health and environment, Norway has made policy advocacy a central part of its global education engagement. The specific aims are to work for increasing awareness of the connection between the level of education and economic growth; to actively promote a global effort to achieve quality education for all in the period up to 2013; to build alliances and partnerships with developing countries, other donor countries, multilateral organisations, civil society and the private sector; and to reverse the trend of reducing the share of Norway's international development budget for education. As the engagement is still developing, it may be too early to identify contributions to outcomes.

The concept of 'education for development' conveys that education is both a fundamental human rights and a precondition for economic growth, poverty reduction and employment generation. There are also strong links between education, health and democratic development. Education is therefore an important public good. While significant progress has been made in terms of access, the sector is facing

an unfinished agenda. Further progress is hampered by lack of political commitment and funding and uncoordinated efforts, at both the global level and the country level. Improving education quality is considered a key priority, but monitoring and measuring progress remains a significant challenge, since quality encompasses a wide range of factors, from school infrastructure, teacher supply and participation in school management to curricula and language of instruction.

The education case study considers a new engagement with a clear focus on the education drive starting in 2013 with the new government's White Paper on education, approved in 2015. It looks specifically at advocacy efforts at the global level by Norwegian actors and as pursued through multilateral organisations.

**Women, peace and security (WPS):** Support to WPS and the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) has been ongoing since before 2000, and a new Action Plan was launched in 2015. For Norway, as a key player in peace negotiations and as one of the world's more

gender equal societies, there is a suggestion it should set an example and provide support where it has a comparative advantage. Norway's engagement is motivated by the right of women to take part in decision-making processes that affect their own future, and based on the understanding that, when women participate, broader-based and more sustainable peace is often the result.

The case study is primarily focused on Norway's advocacy through the UN for increased participation of women in peace processes and peace-building, from 2005 to 2015.<sup>8</sup> It uses the examples of Colombia and South Sudan to see how Norway's long-standing country-level efforts in the area of WPS are linked to this normative agenda at the global level.

The global WPS agenda is a global normative agenda, specifically tied to UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000 and its subsequent resolutions. The resolution reaffirms

---

<sup>8</sup> This case study extended the time period of the analysis to 2015 to capture recent developments.

the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.

This area is perhaps more related to foreign policy than development cooperation in comparison with the other case studies, although much of Norway's activities are funded from the ODA budget. It also represents a juncture between hard (security policy) and soft (gender politics) and is crosscutting as it involves a consideration of gender in all aspects of peace and conflict resolution. Although the data on women as victims of conflict and the benefits of women's participation in conflict resolution are improving over time, this has traditionally been a sector with lack of data, and arguments used in advocacy have been based on norms, values and rights.

**Illicit financial flows (IFF):** ‘Illicit financial flows are transboundary financial transactions involving money that has been earned, transferred or spent illegally’.<sup>9</sup> They caused by three types of flows: corruption, criminality and commercial tax evasion. Tax evasion is illegal, whereas tax avoidance is the process of avoiding tax by taking advantage of loopholes to reduce or avoid tax obligations and is therefore not illegal. Some of the practices involving tax havens involve both tax evasion and tax avoidance, although this report aims to focus on the largest component of IFF – commercial tax evasion. IFF are estimated to amount to approximately 10 times global ODA.<sup>10</sup> The benefits that accrue to multinational corporations (MNCs) and the international elite network, combined with the secrecy surrounding tax havens, have led to it being a pervasive and growing problem (Schjelderup, 2015). The persistent nature and growing scale of the challenge makes

9 <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/meld.-st.-25-2012-2013/id721514/?ch=9>

10 GFI estimation using World Bank and OECD data, December 2013: ‘Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 2001-2010’. While there are estimates of the scale of IFF, there are no accurate figures: [http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2013/Illicit\\_Financial\\_Flows\\_from\\_Developing\\_Countries\\_2002-2011-HighRes.pdf](http://iff.gfintegrity.org/iff2013/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries_2002-2011-HighRes.pdf)

the progress achieved and the influence of the Norwegian government’s advocacy work particularly notable.

The case study considers Norway’s advocacy globally and directly via diplomacy with other governments and at the country level in Tanzania and Zambia; globally and indirectly through international CSOs and via multilateral organisations; and nationally and indirectly via Norwegian CSOs.

The IFF sector is differentiated primarily by the secrecy surrounding it and the strength of the opposition to reducing IFF. This opposition is not an organised coalition but rather is based on the vast financial resources of each MNC, which employs professionals including lawyers, accountants and auditors to ensure the maintenance of commercial tax advantages through exploiting corporate structures based on secrecy and tax havens. Government and civil society efforts to reduce IFF, recently supported by global developments beyond the end of the evaluation period that have increased the international focus on IFF, are directly challenged by these

wealthy and powerful MNCs, who also campaign to influence governments and international legislation. This makes the agenda both highly contested and highly politicised. The sector is similar to the other cases as it is crosscutting, dispersed with limited measurability. Therefore, in addition to the data challenges associated with understanding the scale of IFF, understanding government of Norway funding and human resources directed towards the sector is problematic.

### 3.1.2 Channels and Targets

Across the four cases, Norway had been involved in direct advocacy, led by state officials, as well as indirect advocacy, channelling funds through multilateral, civil society and academic intermediaries. Norway’s engagements have aimed to influence (targeted) multilateral organisations, other governments in high-, middle- and low-income countries, civil society, foundations and the private sector. Table 2 on the next page, summarises channels and targets for each case.

Through the cases, we discovered there is no clear and consistent distinction between channel, intermediary and target. At times,

**TABLE 2: TARGETS (T) AND CHANNELS (C) FEATURING IN EACH CASE STUDY**

| Aspect  | MCH | Education | WPS | IFF |
|---|-----|-----------|-----|-----|
| <b>Multilateral organisations</b>                 | TC  | T         | T   | TC  |
| <b>CSOs</b>                                       |     |           | C   | C   |
| <b>High-income country governments</b>            | T   | T         | t   |     |
| <b>Low- and middle-income country governments</b> | t   | T         | T   | T   |

Note: Lower case letters indicate lower levels of engagement.

intermediaries funded by Norway will be conveying the same advocacy message as MFA and/or Norad; at other times, these partners will be the recipients or targets of the advocacy engagement, when they need to be influenced to further a cause. For example, funds may be channelled through multilateral organisations as an intermediary, and/or Norway may try to influence the behaviour of these organisations, in which case they are a target of Norway's advocacy.

All of the case study engagements pursued strategic engagements with **multilateral organisations**. WPS explored Norway's role as a driver of

the WPS agenda within the UN Security Council agenda and the UN more broadly. Norway's work in MCH sought to mobilise others to take action on the health MDGs through PMNCH and the EWEC movement. The education engagement has similarly been geared at giving Norway a leading role globally in efforts to ensure education for all. This has included through convening global meetings and building coalitions to promote joint action, with an initial focus on mobilising additional funding for education. In this case of education, Norway primarily uses multilateral agencies as channels for disbursing funding for education. On IFF, Norway did not embark on a strategy to lead the global agenda,

but found itself in an influential position based on its experience and consistent diplomatic engagement with international organisations.

For WPS and IFF, **CSOs** were particularly important strategic allies and a substantial amount of funding was channelled through them. In IFF, support aimed to strengthen popular engagement in and public debate on taxation and capital flight issues and involves direct assistance to CSOs advocating for increased transparency and accountability in the spending of tax revenues. It was directed to Norwegian, international and local NGOs and media, as well as civil society coalitions, and influenced other governments and multilateral organisations. In WPS, both Norwegian and international CSOs were important. In Norway, MFA consults with Forum 1325, a network of CSOs, academia and ministries. Norway has also provided funding to both global advocacy networks and local grassroots organisations advocating for women's increased involvement in conflict prevention and resolution. Although CSOs and NGOs have and continue to be active in global efforts to reduce maternal and child mortality, channelling

funds through these was not a key component of Norway's approach. In education, Norwegian CSOs played a critical role in shaping the priorities and strategies outlined in the White Paper. Some CSOs were even invited to draft specific sections. These later played an important role in the organisation of the civil society side-event to the Oslo Summit on Education for Development. In general, however, indications are that MFA could have made greater use of the experience and capacity of Norwegian CSOs in the implementation of the advocacy engagement, including by involving the CSOs in decisions on particular approaches and tactics and extending more funding to their country-level advocacy and policy engagement.

**Bilateral engagements** with governments from other high-income countries were central primarily for MCH and education, and to a lesser extent for WPS. While the MCH and education engagements (and cases) were focused predominantly at the global level, both also supported low- and middle-income country governments. In education, priority is given to a few selected countries that show political will and leadership

by giving priority to education in national plan and budgets. Norway has invested in bilateral MCH partnerships with India, Nigeria, Pakistan and Tanzania. In IFF, Norway has conducted research and also provided technical and capacity-building support to tax authorities in low-income countries. In WPS, Norway has had a formal role in peace negotiations and advocated for women's increased participation in these. It has also partnered with other Nordic UN member states and the members of the Friends Group on Women, Peace and Security, coordinated by Canada.

The role of the **private sector** did not feature at all in WPS, and was not prominent in MCH, education or IFF.<sup>11</sup> Catalytic funding and innovative financing mechanisms for health and education aimed to increase resources from foundations and the private sector. Former Prime Minister Stoltenberg's address at the 2011 World Economic Forum discussed private sector engagement in MCH and PMNCH includes the private sector as one of its seven constituency

---

<sup>11</sup> This may be related in part to our sample selection and warrants further investigation.

groups. However, in both cases, the primary allies and targets for Norway's engagements appeared to be other governments and multi-lateral organisations.<sup>12</sup>

Private sector opposition to the global IFF agenda has been strong. MNCs, which also lobby to influence governments and international legislation, have directly challenged government and CSO efforts to reduce IFF. Norway's engagement has targeted multilateral organisations to change policies to regulate illegal company practices. Outside its 2008 public commission, opportunities for members of the private sector to support the global IFF advocacy agenda have been limited, with engaging through CSOs seen as the most constructive route.

---

<sup>12</sup> In feedback on the final report, the Department for Global Health, Education and Research expressed their viewpoint that engaging the private sector is a prominent aspect of their approach, indicating that Norway has put a considerable amount of resources into this area.

**TABLE 3:** SUMMARY OF KEY TACTICS BY CASE STUDY

| Tactic  | MCH | Education | WPS | IFF |
|---|-----|-----------|-----|-----|
| <b>Diplomacy, brokering, lobbying</b>                   | x   | x         | x   | x   |
| <b>Convening/coalition-building</b>                     | x   | x         | x   | x   |
| <b>Evidence generation, including policy monitoring</b> | x   | x         | x   | x   |
| <b>Capacity development</b>                             |     | x         | x   | x   |
| <b>Economic support/catalytic funding</b>               | x   | x         |     |     |
| <b>Public awareness</b>                                 |     |           | x   | x   |
| <b>Community mobilisation</b>                           |     |           | x   |     |

### 3.1.3 Tactics

A range of approaches were employed across the four issue areas, directly by the government and indirectly via intermediaries (Table 3). All cases feature diplomacy, brokering and/or lobbying, convening and evidence generation. Mobilising citizens and members of the community has been used least often, only in WPS. The sections below discuss the interpretation and application of the tactics.

**Diplomacy, lobbying and brokering** are closely related and may also involve convening and building coalitions as supporting tactics. This highlights that the tactics, as defined here, are not mutually exclusive.

All four cases used diplomacy, and at very high levels of government: ministers in the cases of IFF and WPS and through the prime minister in the cases of MCH and education. Diplomacy was carried out in both formal fora,

such as at global conferences and bilateral meetings with other governments, and informal contexts, such as discussions on the sidelines of global meetings and impromptu meetings and phone conversations with other leaders.

The Norwegian prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, alongside the Norwegian special envoy on education, have been very active in dialogue on education. In 2014 and early 2015, diplomacy was important to sell the idea of the Oslo Summit on Education for Development and ensure broad-based and high-level participation in this event, aimed at influencing other governments to increase financing for education. At the Oslo Conference on Safe Schools, Norway took a leading role in increasing attention to the need for protection of schools from attack in conflict situations and the passage of a Safe Schools Declaration.

In MCH, former Prime Minister Stoltenberg created the Network of Global Leaders, comprising heads of state and government from the Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Liberia, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Senegal, Tanzania and the UK,

as well as Graça Machel. Former Foreign Minister Støre and French Minister Douste-Blazy reached out to ministers of foreign affairs in Brazil, Indonesia, Senegal, South Africa and Thailand to create the Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative and 2007 Oslo Ministerial Declaration and Agenda for Action. Senior officials meet with their counterparts in Canada, Germany and the US and with the UN secretary-general and the Gates Foundation; and chaired and served on global commissions including the High Level Committee on Innovative Financing for Health, the EWEC Innovation Working Group, the Commission of Life-Saving Commodities and the Commission on Information and Accountability.

In the IFF engagement, Minister of International Development Erik Solheim conducted diplomatic efforts, chairing the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development in 2006 and the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development, with senior advisers supporting diplomatic efforts by providing briefing notes. In the WPS case, diplomatic efforts focused on the UN Security Council and further develop-

ment of the WPS agenda. This involved making statements (either individually or supporting joint Nordic statements) in the annual open debates on WPS in the Security Council and co-sponsoring new Security Council Resolutions. Norway also took an active role as co-chair of the UN Peace Building Commission 2006 – 2008 to push for WPS (Tryggestad, 2014). WPS is the only case where Norway has served as a broker in talks – in the Colombian and South Sudanese peace negotiations.

**Convening and coalition-building** involves bringing together different sets of actors, and may include hosting meetings, conferences, seminars and dialogues to highlight shared interests or how parties could benefit from working together. Convening events is only the formal and outward-facing part of the advocacy process Norway has adopted, as the case studies identify. These meetings are often preceded by months of preparations, including discussions with political leaders and other key stakeholders to persuade them to participate; as such, it is often linked to diplomacy efforts. Convening and coalition-building was used in all cases, and was a central tactic.

In IFF, the convening work aimed to establish a coalition with engaged actors outside government and with other governments, seen in Norway's presidency of two leading groups: the Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Development and the Leading Group on Solidarity Levies to Fund Development. Norway also convened several expert groups: the Commission on Capital Flight and a research committee to develop a programme document for the TaxCapDev research programme. Coalition-building was an important part of the IFF agenda: the achievements of the advocacy engagement were perceived to owe substantially to the coalition built between the government of Norway and Norwegian and international civil society. Coalition-building also featured in the WPS engagement in Colombia. At the UN, the Norwegian Delegation regularly organises events on WPS, together with UN agencies and CSOs.

In education, much of the advocacy pursued during 2014 and 2015 was geared towards organising the Oslo Summit on Education for Development, seen as a means of establishing

Norway as a leading global education actor and at the same advancing joint action, especially for investing in education. In MCH, Norway provides financial and technical support to multi-sector global networks (PMNCH and EWEC) that convene large numbers of diverse constituency groups: academic, research and teaching institutions, donors and foundations, health care professional associations, multilateral organisations, NGOs, partner countries and the private sector.

**Evidence generation** commissioning or providing research or technical input to build a body of evidence on a topic is an advocacy strategy that can serve to raise awareness of an issue and generate political and public awareness and interest. The evidence generated can also be used to inform decision-making and make the case for increasing commitments and action on a particular issue. One type of evidence generation is **policy monitoring**, tracking the implementation of a policy and/or results over time.

For the education, IFF and WPS cases, evidence generation was directly commissioned, such as in financial support for the UN Women Global Study.

For MCH, Norway used publically available data and supported PMNCH, which hosts Countdown to 2015, to improve the evidence base. Norway also financed and contributed to a Lancet series on stillbirths in 2011 and on midwifery in 2014, and to the Lancet Commission on Investing in Health in 2013 and the Commission on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in 2015.

In all cases, this information was used to identify the problem, inform stakeholder dialogues, guide advocacy and intervention strategies, generate public awareness and maintain pressure for action.

In IFF and WPS, CSOs supported by Norway monitored developments on financial secrecy and associated legislation, published through online newsletters and blogs, and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and how the agenda developed, for instance through the Security Council Report.

On **capacity development**, we have taken a broad definition, using it to refer to skills and capability development, which may involve

technical and specialised skills, incentives, opportunities, relationships, resources advocacy skills or awareness of an issue. It may also include money for staff placed in organisation to support the development of their colleagues, for example in a mentoring or coaching capacity. It can, however, be difficult to distinguish this from gap filling where there is no active development of incumbent capacity.

Three of the cases featured capacity development in partner countries. Education and IFF involved government agencies, providing technical support to revenue authorities in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, and supporting embassies in pilot countries to play a more strategic role in education dialogues. The education engagement also included capacity support to multilateral agencies and NGOs. WPS supported capacity development of CSOs in South Sudan and Colombia, at the global level in the area of inclusive mediation and domestically within MFA. Capacity-building, as defined here, was not a core element of the global engagement strategy in MCH.



**Economic support and catalytic funding:** for education and health, providing substantial economic support was used as an important tactic for mobilising other public and private financial resources. Termed ‘catalytic funding’, this tactic sought to attract new and increased contributions from others. In multiple instances, Norway was a founding donor for new initiatives, including the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund, the Results in Education for All Children (REACH) Trust Fund and the Global Financing Facility.

**Dissemination of information to increase public awareness** entails providing expert comment and communicating in public arenas. It entails engaging the media to spread messages to a wider audience and/or to place pressure on decision-makers. A more explicit example of using this tactic is Norway’s support for organisations that disseminate knowledge and information about WPS – for example the International Civil Society Action Network’s Better Peace tool.

The general public was not a primary target in any of the cases, nor was increasing public awareness a key area of advocacy. That said,

WPS, MCH and IFF cases noted that ministers and the prime minister often spoke publically at high-level events, issued press releases and wrote comment pieces, in effect raising public awareness through the dissemination of information. An example is the launch of the latest WPS National Action Plan, for which MFA wrote a press release. The deputy ambassador at the UN in New York is also known to be very active on Twitter in the area of WPS.

After IFF’s 2008 Commission on Capital Flight activities, follow-up work placed Norway clearly at the forefront of the agenda. Key to this was the dissemination of information through Minister of International Development Erik Solheim, speaking about the conclusions of the Commission in different settings. The context of the financial crisis and the media scandals involving MNCs provided a backdrop to growing media, civil society and international interest.

In MCH, annual reports of the Global Campaign for the Health MDGs and other activities were intended to serve as amplifiers, to use leaders’ voices and new data to repeatedly raise MCH

issues on domestic and international agendas. Each report included a one-page statement written by leaders of government, UN agencies, international NGOs and corporations, as an explicit strategy to mobilise and publically highlight their support. The former prime minister and other officials spoke at high-level events and issued statements and press releases and published comments and articles in academic journals on the topic. Norway, through PMNCH, initiated a five-year global media campaign led by an international public relations firm, which launched 25 media campaigns on maternal, newborn and child health. This reached an estimated 12.5 billion people through radio, television, print, internet and social media.

**Community mobilisation,** actively encouraging or supporting members of the community to pursue an issue, was found to be used as an explicit advocacy tactic only in the WPS case. In Colombia, the Norwegian-funded FOKUS programme on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 focused on supporting the mobilisation of women’s organisations over a long period of time, with the aim of preparing for an eventual

peace process. This entailed working with locally based women's groups and supporting formal and informal meetings for women and their networks in conflict areas.

### **3.2 DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND INFORMATION BASE**

This section summarises the findings that concern evaluation question 1c: *What was the decision process underlying engagements?*

Decisions are made about advocacy engagements at different stages. First, the decision to engage in an area is made, and subsequently decisions are made about the design of the interventions, including levels of spending and disbursement mechanisms, advocacy tactics to employ and intermediaries with whom to engage. We discuss these different levels of decision-making below, along with an analysis of specific characteristics that the case studies found to be attributed to Norway and relevant in how decisions were made.

#### **3.2.1 The Origin of the Engagements**

For WPS, the human rights-based argument for the engagement was an important basis. The WPS case study was not able to trace a conscious political decision to engage in the area of WPS; rather, the area is seen as encompassing 'a set of norms on women's rights that fit hand in glove with what is seen as Norway's normative state interests, and the UN has become the central organizational arena for the promotion of these interests' (Tryggestad, 2014: 465), meaning many argue it was self-evident that Norway would focus on WPS.

The political decision to pursue IFF as a central aspect of development policy was motivated by the need to defend aid in the public sphere and by the recognition that achieving even a small reduction in IFF would amount to substantial financing redirected to public sector spending (MFA, 2009).

The education engagement has its origins in the political platform document of the Conservative Party, which explicitly conveys the ambition for Norway to take a leading role globally in efforts

to ensure education for all. However, a combination of other factors also influenced the engagement. These include the influence exerted by education sector stakeholders in Norway and internationally, experience from Norway's previous engagements, particularly in health and the environment, and, to some extent, research carried out as part of the implementation of Norway's engagement. The main argument pursued by Norway is that education is both a human right and a prerequisite for economic growth, poverty reduction and employment generation.

A multifaceted rationale was given for Norway's engagement in MCH: the enormous unmet need; the cost-effectiveness of interventions; the moral imperative to prevent millions of women and children from dying and to ensure their basic rights to health; the economic benefits of investing in health; the global effects (infectious disease, security); urgency (the MDG deadline); and the feasibility, demonstrating that progress was being made, but not quickly enough.

In both the MCH and the IFF cases, there was recognition that Norway's resources, human and financial, were limited relative to the enormous need and so the aim was to use them strategically to leverage greater resources and take advantage of the unique capacities of others. For example, the establishment of the Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development in 2008, hosted by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), provided a platform for the global lobbying campaign. Since 2004, there has also been a formal WPS group where civil society, researchers, and government have discussed the issues on a regular basis. Similar groups exist for Colombia and South Sudan, although it is uncertain how much these focus on WPS issues specifically, as opposed to broader issue around the peace processes and Norway's engagement in these.

### **3.2.2 Actors Involved in Decision Processes**

Senior leadership drove the decision process itself, but this varied across the case studies. In the case of MCH, Prime Minister Stoltenberg initiated the engagement soon after taking office for the second time in 2005. This involvement

represented the evolution of the country's progressive engagement on the issue, following former Prime Minister Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland's service as a former director general of the World Health Organization (WHO) and Dr Tore Godal's as the first CEO of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), and the decades-long close working relationships among Stoltenberg, Brundtland, Godal and Jonas Gahr Støre (who served as Stoltenberg's chief of staff during the latter's first term as prime minister in 2000 – 2001 and as minister of foreign affairs during his second term). Norad also analysed the issue and made recommendations regarding the country's engagement, and senior technical advisers guided the engagement throughout.

In the IFF and WPS cases, decisions were based on a range of influences at different times. Personal/professional interest, centred on the experiences of key individuals, appears to have motivated the development of an interested coalition of actors within the government of Norway, which, with support from the political leadership, drove the agenda forward. As discussed above, there was also openness to civil society, whose

voice was important in shaping the agenda, reflecting the role CSOs play in development policy in Norway. In the WPS case, the three National Action Plans on WPS all involved consultations with civil society, through Forum 1325. For the IFF case, the relationship between MFA and Norad was considered important in providing technical input for the agenda and sharing experiences from embassies, particularly in the earlier years of the engagement.

In the education case, Norwegian actors, including NGOs, academia and individuals involved with the drafting of the White Paper, as well as international stakeholders, particularly the UN special envoy on education, exerted an influence. The latter was highly influential in the decisions to organise the Oslo Summit on Education for Development and to create the Education Commission (the UN special envoy chairs the Education Commission).

The Norwegian model of inclusivity, involving civil society and government cooperation, was found to be an important principle in the WPS and IFF advocacy cases, where decisions were formed

through maintaining an awareness of civil society perspectives. Although the WPS and IFF engagements have different original justifications, underpinning these decisions were advocacy approaches based on the ‘Norwegian model’ of civil society and government cooperation. The agendas developed in a consultative way, and as such it is difficult to determine who influenced whom and where decisions were made. In the IFF case study, a number of interviewees expressed mutual respect for their counterparts either in civil society or in government.

This principle of inclusivity influenced the way a research fund was developed in the IFF case study. A recommendation from the 2008 public inquiry of the Commission on Capital Flight was to establish a Norwegian centre of expertise on tax evasion, and, although the Bergen Business School could have expanded its capacity to include developing countries, the egalitarian principles of Norway’s approach resulted in the funds being allocated to the research council to allow others to apply. A research committee was ultimately formed to develop the programme document collaboratively.

Norwegian CSOs lobby Parliament and also government, for example on country-by-country reporting (CBCR) legislation. Norwegian civil society also implements development projects and, through the partnership built during the implementation process, has access to government decision-makers. Openness and transparency are important principles of the Norwegian government, and this can be seen in efforts to make information available in the public sphere and in the dialogue and relationship maintained with civil society.

The case study on education serves to illustrate the consultative nature of the Norwegian policy process, where civil society has been able to exert a considerable level of influence. As earlier elaborated, the White Paper on Education for Development, while eventually an MFA publication, was drafted through a highly consultative process. Meetings were held to gather the opinions of NGOs, academia and other education sector stakeholders in Norway. The Norwegian Ministry of Education and Research and Norwegian NGOs were invited to prepare specific sections and had a close working relationship

with MFA throughout the drafting process. In general, indicators are that the Norwegian stakeholders involved in the preparation of the White Paper were indeed able to influence the strategic choices made. The Norwegian Parliament more or less unanimously endorsed the White Paper in early 2015.

### **3.2.3 The Evidence Base for Decisions**

The extent to which an evidence base was available and was used in informing the decision to engage in a particular issue area varies across the cases.

In the IFF case, Norway has commissioned and disseminated research since the 1990s. Apart from stimulating debate and generating increased public interest, the research has informed decisions on particular advocacy approaches and tactics. The best example is the 2009 report of the public Commission on Capital Flight, which led on to the creation of a research committee and formulation of the TaxCapDev programme and corresponding country-level research initiatives.

In the education engagement, research commissioned and/or funded by Norway informed the dialogue, made a case for greater attention to particular themes (girls' education, financing of education, ICT and education, etc.), and identified evidence-based solutions to particular problems. Specifically, the background papers for the Oslo Summit on Education for Development brought forward a number of recommendations, some of which Norway and other stakeholders are currently implementing in practice. Illustrative examples include the creation of an education commission and a 'champions group' on education in emergencies and the development of new global funding mechanisms for education.

With regard to WPS, there has been a strong link between academic experts and MFA. For instance, the first Norwegian National Action Plan on 1325 was as co-drafted with academic experts on gender, peace and security at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). PRIO has also supported the MFA as a resource partner on WPS and provided inputs into the later NAPs. Although a normative standpoint can be seen as the basis for WPS advocacy, the evidence for

the benefits of involving women more has been used to influence decision-making within MFA. In MCH, Norway relied on the existing evidence base when justifying and developing its engagement. The UN's first MDG progress report (2005) conveyed the magnitude of need relating to MCH and was used to make a case for Norway's global engagement.

### 3.3 TIMING OF THE ENGAGEMENT

This section summarises the case studies' responses to evaluation question 1d: *To what extent did the policy context influence the timing of engagements?*

The time period under review, 2005 - 2014, saw some important global developments and political changes in Norway. Global developments included the final push for the MDGs (2000 - 2015) and formulation of the post-2015 agenda; the 2008 economic crisis and more recent downturns; the rapidly worsening migration crisis in Europe since 2013; and resultant changes in ODA commitments and development country budgets. Political change in Norway was manifested by the 2013 elec-

tions, which saw a new centre-right coalition, led by Erna Solberg, replacing the red-green coalition (led by Jens Stoltenberg) that had been in power since 2005.

The WPS engagement is the most mature of the four cases, having begun prior to 2005, and education, initiated in 2013, is the most recent. WPS, MCH and education are ongoing, whereas IFF emerged and declined during the period of study.

The entry point for the engagements refers to the status of the area or sector at the time of Norway's decision to engage. Two different stages of the advocacy process were identified: agenda-setting and diffusion of policy change. Agenda-setting was the entry point for all cases apart from WPS, where Norway engaged to diffuse policies as the agenda was more advanced (although agenda-setting was an earlier feature of the engagement pre-2005). Norway's domestic political agenda dominated the timing of engagements, but there was also responsiveness to global events.

In the WPS case, there was renewed political commitment following the 2008 - 2009 appointment of a new state secretary, who had a personal/professional interest in the topic, and closer engagement with the US, especially with Hillary Clinton, the-then newly appointed US Secretary of State. The evolution of conflicts worldwide also led to increased focus in the UN on WPS. The new centre-right Norwegian government under Erna Solberg initially appeared to give lower priority to WPS than the former government had, but, with the launch of the new Action Plan in 2015, the issue was back on the political agenda. 2015 also marked the 15th-year anniversary of 1325, which has renewed attention.

International networks and initiatives to address MCH began in the 1980s, and from the late 1990s funding for global health increased significantly. Norway's involvement during the time period under study was preceded by Norwegian leadership in international institutions addressing health and existing relationships among a core set of people. The decision to deepen Norway's engagement in child and sub-

sequently maternal health followed the coming on board of the red-green coalition in 2005 and reflected the new prime minister's (Stoltenberg's) personal/-professional commitment on the subject. The engagement was framed by the MDGs, with the review periods in 2005 and 2010 serving as key moments to focus attention on the issue.

The global financial crisis in 2008 pushed taxation onto the global political agenda in Europe and the US, increasing momentum and international interest from governments and civil society and placing IFF on the agenda of the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The agenda started to be increasingly taken up at the international level, with 2011 onwards seeing developments in the EU and the OECD. The IFF engagement increased in momentum until 2009/10, when it could be considered at its peak. As the uptake of IFF issues on the international agenda consolidated, Norway's leadership reduced, particularly following the 2013 elections. Emphasis was further affected by restructuring and funding cuts and the increasing financing demands of the refugee crisis.

The education engagement was launched in 2013 by the new centre-right coalition and based on the Conservative Party's political platform, which explicitly states that Norway should take a leading role globally in efforts to ensure education for all. The timing of the engagement was indirectly influenced by ongoing global processes, especially the final push for the MDGs and the Education for All goals (EFA) and formulation of the post-2015 agenda, and the challenges identified in that context, including the declining share of global ODA spent on education. Although Norway and several other education actors have accorded priority to education in emergencies for several years, a new sense of urgency emerged with the migration crisis, which made Norway pay even greater attention to the issue.

In summary, both international and domestic influences affected all cases to a varying degree. Changes in domestic political priorities and attention given to specific areas appear to have been the most decisive factor affecting the timing of the engagements. In the MCH, education and IFF cases, the engagements either began or

were pulled back as a direct result of a change in government. In the WPS case, domestic politics and interest of political leaders played an important role in shaping commitments. Global processes and developments also had an influence in the sense that they provided Norway with a justification to work on certain issues and offered opportunities to step up engagements. However, in none of the cases do global process and developments explain why an engagement started or ended at a particular time.

### **3.4 NORWAY'S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES**

This section summarises the findings that concern evaluation question 1e: *To what extent was the engagement adaptive to context, Norway's comparative advantage and Norway's priorities?*

The OECD DAC defines relevance as the extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor. While this relevance is oriented more towards service delivery than towards advocacy, we discuss some general observations.

Aspects of the engagements also capitalised on Norway's comparative advantages – the areas where it has a different endowment of attributes that places it at an advantage over other nations. These comparative advantages may be latent or passive attributes, in contrast with drivers that are more active elements. Across the issue areas, Norway's comparative advantage was the strongest for WPS and IFF, in that there were few other countries with experience in peace negotiations coupled with a high commitment to gender equality and human rights and managing oil and gas revenues.

Norway's key comparative advantages were identified as 1) commitment to human rights and gender equality, 2) its impartiality and historical role in peace-building, 3) a collaborative approach working with others, 4) experience and expertise in particular issue areas, 5) the country's small size and lack of disabling bureaucracy, which gives staff greater flexibility and access to decision-makers, and 6) financial strength (presented as an additional possible comparative advantage). In addition to selecting engagements in part based on the country's compar-

ative advantage, Norway has also adapted its approach to fill gaps others were not addressing.

First, Norway's commitment to democracy, human rights, gender equality and rule of law and its support of open societies have underpinned its pursuit of progressive issues (OECD, 2013b). The strong human rights underpinning was apparent in WPS, MCH and education. Gender equality is seen as engrained in Norwegian culture, and Nordic culture more generally. Health and education are seen as public goods, and these efforts combined human rights- and investment-focused rationales for engagement.

Second, in the case of WPS, another comparative advantage was Norway's historical and effective role in peace-building through the UN and the multilateral system, partly because of its impartial status and lack of colonial history.

Third, external actors saw Norway as playing a convening role, leading from behind, sharing ownership, and as a country that recognised the importance of not going it alone. Relative to other actors, partners perceived

Norway as less ideologically driven and pushing its own political agenda; rather, in some cases, it was willing to put the interests of the broader movement above its own. This willingness was thought to give Norway greater credibility, legitimacy and trust. Although Norway is a major funder of the research and action currently under way in the area of education in emergencies, the role of coordinating this work has been passed on to the UK and Canada (which co-chair the Technical Strategy Group). This attribute promotes trust and alliance-building. The ability to effectively combine active multilateralism and bilateralism in education and health was reflected in efforts to mobilise bilateral funding for multilateral initiatives.

However, this focus on progressive policies, coupled with a collaborative spirit, should not be confused with pure altruism. In the case of WPS, some interviewees mentioned that work could be partly related to Norway's political priorities, in that the endeavour had allowed senior political figures to share a platform with, for instance, the US president and secretary of state. Gaining visibility in certain

areas through advocacy can support other political goals.

Norway can as such be seen to have positioned itself strategically as a 'norm entrepreneur', a position small states with limited traditional (e.g. military) power sometimes take (Björkdahl, 2008).<sup>13</sup> This allows Norway to have an influence on the global stage, in its historical role as a self-interested supporter of the multilateral system and the UN. This is particularly noted for the area of conflict resolution and peace-building, but also in multilateralism more generally, which aims to contribute to strengthening international law and order (Taulbee et al., 2014; Tryggestad, 2014). This is thus an influence for all of the cases, either directly or indirectly.

Fourth, in some of the case studies, Norway's experience and established network developed a reputation that brought influence. This was

---

<sup>13</sup> This concept has been used to explain the role that smaller states take within the UN and other multilateral institutions to raise moral consciousness about particular issues, using norm advocacy as a form of non-coercive, persuasive argumentation.

particularly notable in IFF, where its reputation for managing revenue flows from the oil and gas sectors meant it had a strong understanding of the wider policy environment and the institutional capabilities necessary to manage resource flows. Norway has gained a reputation as a knowledge partner in WPS, partly because of the international credibility PRIO's research in the area of gender, conflict and peace-building enjoys. Although the government financed this, it is not clear there was a specific strategic government intent behind the development of this resource base (Norad, 2014b).

Health was a sector in which Norway had experience, although its expertise is less unusual than in WPS and IFF, in that there are more actors engaged in global health than countries with experience brokering peace negotiations and managing oil and gas resources, as in WPS and IFF. Previous leadership of WHO and GAVI positioned Norway well to coordinate global efforts and laid the foundation for the relationship with the Gates Foundation. Norway's experience with managing results-based financing systems, both domestically and through GAVI, offered lessons



in the development of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund and the Global Financing Facility. Its experience in global health and climate also strengthened its credibility in the education sector, despite it having less experience in this issue area. This indicates an element of transferability in experience and credibility from other sectors.

The high technical competencies, commitment and dedication of the staff working on IFF, WPS and MCH were noted as being particularly important for Norway's engagement, helping the country's input to be consistent and predictable. In contrast, a factor that works to Norway's disadvantage in education is the (perceived) lack of expertise. While Norway is considered to play a catalytic role and to raise important issues, interviewees commonly expressed that both MFA and Norad relied on others to do the technical work and identify solutions. As the focus turns from the initial stages of consensus-building to implementation, a stronger technical profile is warranted.

Fifth, Norway's approach was described as nimble, adaptive, creative and entrepreneurial,

and seemingly less constrained by institutional bureaucracies. It is perceived as forward-thinking in terms of both advocacy and funding; in terms of results-based financing, it was considered a first mover. The high degree of managerial autonomy of embassy staff permits them the flexibility to respond to country needs and changing contexts (OECD, 2013b).

The circulation, albeit declining, of staff from country offices from Norad to MFA provided an understanding of developing country issues and challenges. This rotation was particularly important in the highly technical area of taxation. Moreover, the small bureaucracy facilitated short linkages between the top political and technical levels, perceived as key a comparative advantage.

In IFF, the DAC peer review highlights Tax for Development as an example of 'willingness to try out new ideas and approaches' to development (OECD, 2013b: 19). Part of this willingness to be innovative and flexible may owe to avoidance of the strong audit culture and results management that have restricted the work of other donors: 'it would appear that informal practices challenge formal reporting requirements in such

a way that the MFA preserves its autonomy from interventional mechanisms' (Gulrajani, 2015: 12). Further independence and scope for individual initiatives is gained from being outside the EU (Odén, 2011).

Sixth, while comparative advantages allow a lot to be achieved when they are applied effectively, availability of funding and resources increases the leverage possible. Therefore, financial strength could be seen as a further comparative advantage that Norway possesses. If this is explicitly recognised, it can be strategically applied to maximise potential advantage.

Finally, in addition to *selecting* engagements in part based on the country's comparative advantage, Norway has also *adapted* its approach to fill gaps others were not addressing. In WPS, Norway chose not to focus on sexual violence, as the UK and US were prioritising this. In education, Norway was credited with filling vacuums, with flexibility observed in the increased attention to education in emergencies with the evolving Syria crisis. When existing initiatives in the area of IFF lost steam,

Norway worked with civil society to form a new coalition that generated new momentum. Norway's responsiveness to civil society funding requests was also critical in supporting intermediary organisations to build and maintain their advocacy capacity. Similarly for WPS, some civil society stakeholders wondered where they would 'be without Norway'. However, Norway's gap-filling role is difficult to verify without assessing what the situation would be without its presence.

### 3.5 ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE ENGAGEMENT

This section summarises the case studies' responses to evaluation question 2: *What were the advocacy outputs and outcomes, both successes and failures?* As noted in the methods section, all four of the engagements examined in the case studies pursued very ambitious goals that are not possible for a single country alone to achieve, or by a particular point in time, but instead require ongoing inputs. All cases

demonstrated progress towards more interim results: increased attention, political and financial commitments and the creation of new global initiatives and platforms. For some of the more mature engagements, there are examples of results further along the results chain, although these are difficult to trace back to Norway's advocacy engagements directly. Table 4 shows achievements covering a broad range of areas.

Considering the achievements in turn, the following commonalities and distinguishing features can be discerned.

For all four case studies, one of the most significant achievements was some kind of **elevation of the issue on the global agenda**, through the building of coalitions leading to formation of strong and stable alliances converging on a shared agenda, including global initiatives. All of the cases, apart from WPS, highlighted Norway's contributions to the establishment and implementation of new global initiatives. Considering that all the case studies selected had a global focus and were in some way deemed successful by Norad and MFA, this is

**TABLE 4:** SUMMARY ACHIEVEMENTS BY CASE STUDY

| Achievement description  | MCH | Education | WPS | IFF |
|--|-----|-----------|-----|-----|
| Political will and commitment                                  | x   | x         | x   | x   |
| Alliances/coalitions with a shared agenda                      | x   | x         | x   | x   |
| Improved evidence base   | x   |           |     | x   |
| Improved capacity  |     | x         | x   | x   |
| Leverage additional funding                                    | x   | x         |     |     |
| Public awareness   |     |           |     | x   |
| Policy change  | x   | x         |     |     |
| Diffusion of a policy or institutionalisation of an initiative | x   | x         | x   | x   |
| Improvements in the situation of special population groups     | x   |           | x   |     |

not surprising. This elevation on the global policy agenda was evidenced by the display of **political will and commitment** by actors other than Norway.

In MCH, Norwegian leaders publically championed the issue and engaged heads of state and government, ministers of finance and other senior officials in other countries and multilateral institutions. Here, Norway was seen as ‘punching above its weight’ in terms of influence on the global agenda. It was perceived to be among a core set of actors driving global efforts to improve maternal and child health, including the Global Strategy for Women’s and Children’s Health and the EWEC movement. Norway also led the development of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund and, most recently, the Global Financing Facility.

In education, Norway has contributed to advancing the agenda on education in emergencies and protracted crisis. In particular, proactive engagement on this topic and the attention it received at the Oslo Summit on Education for Development helped push the dialogue on a new fund

and platform forward. The Education Commission, set up in the wake of the summit, also elevated the agenda on education financing in general.

Apart from the creation of the Education Commission, Norway contributed to the establishment of a trust fund, managed by the World Bank, on innovative and results-based financing of education.

In WPS, Norway contributed, in alliance with other actors (civil society, key UN actors within UN agencies, other member states), to keeping and elevating the issue on the agenda within the UN Security Council and other multilateral institutions. Over time, a proliferation of actors have supported the WPS agenda, and political will is seen as increasing.

Norway played a role in getting IFF on the international agenda, as well as influencing the quality of the public debate in terms of how the issues were discussed. Public awareness increased as a result of indirect advocacy with Norwegian and international CSOs as interme-

diaries. This also contributed to political will and commitment, evidenced by progress in adjusting international legislation and the passing of the 2010 Dodd Frank Act in the US to share information for tax purposes.

Three of the case studies supported the development of **capacity** of other actors and individuals in some way. This was most prominent in WPS and IIF. In WPS, active support to civil society was seen as particularly successful in enabling global and grassroots women’s organisations to raise their voices. In IFF, examples of recipients of such support are the Financial Transparency Coalition (previously the Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development) and GFI.

MCH and education specifically aimed at **leveraging Norway’s resources to mobilise further investments**. This was not a direct feature for IFF and WPS, although this is an ultimate aim of reducing IFF. Norway’s own funding for MCH, as well as that of other donors, increased steadily throughout the time period. The political ambition to take a leading role globally on education has been followed up in a number

of commitments, most notably in the pledge by the current Norwegian government to double the development cooperation budget for education within four years. Data from 2014 suggest the government is taking steps to meet this commitment as well as to give education higher priority within the development cooperation portfolio as a whole. There are also examples of Norway having been able to influence other donor government, particularly Germany, to invest more in education for development. It is also noteworthy that the EU pledged to increase its financial commitment to education in emergencies at the Oslo Summit.

Only one case study mentioned a reliable **evidence base** as an intermediary goal achieved, IFF, although this also serves as a tactic, as it does in the other cases. In IFF, increased attention was achieved through an increased evidence base, in part contributed to by Norway's funding of civil society and research, including a research centre on tax and development. This led to increased media coverage and public opinion and enhanced public debate on IFF. In MCH, key informants identified advances

in knowledge and innovation as a key achievement of global efforts over the past decade: significant progress in the availability, quality and visualisation of data, which has helped reduce knowledge gaps, develop more effective interventions and guide decision-making.

In terms of **policy change**, there are some examples of achievements. In IFF, Norway is seen to have had an indirect influence on legislative developments, as a result of the generation of a body of evidence and changes in the technical debate, although the adjustment of legislation is a long and protracted negotiation experience, given the powerful opposing forces. With regard to the education engagement, it is generally too early to expect any real policy change beyond Norway's own political commitment to step up its engagement and double its funding to education. However, it is noteworthy that the EU pledged to increase its financial commitment to education in emergencies at the Oslo Summit.

In WPS, Norway has consistently co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolutions, but support to direct policy change at the global level

was not a prominent feature of the advocacy engagement, probably because the policy is more or less set through Resolution 1325. However, Norway contributed to **policy diffusion** in its support for National Action Plans on 1325, the most prominent example being Nepal.

In terms of **institutionalisation of policies or global initiatives**, WPS and MCH provide examples. In MCH, Norway made substantive contributions to the first and second Global Strategy for Women's and Children's Health, supported the EWEC movement and PMNCH, which are supported by secretariats at the UN Secretary General's Office and WHO, respectively, and created the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund and Global Financing Facility, managed by the World Bank – all of which have formalised structures to coordinate and finance efforts to improve MCH. In WPS, Norway used the power of the chair to internalise the consideration of Resolution 1325 in the UN Peace-Building Commission.

In terms of **results closer to intended beneficiaries**, WPS and MCH also provide some examples of achievements. At the country level, in WPS, Norway, as part of a collective effort through the formation of alliances, contributed to women's participation and the increased consideration of gender issues (with the potential of improving conditions for women when the peace agreement is implemented) in talks between the Colombian government and FARC. This was facilitated by bottom-up support for the mobilisation and capacity development of women's groups in Colombia, through support through a Norwegian NGO (FOKUS) and UN Women, coupled with advocacy for WPS directly by the Norwegian delegation to the peace talks. Stakeholders noted very few other member states could provide such specific examples of successful country-level engagements.

Child and maternal mortality has dropped significantly since 1990. These are trends that preceded Norway's active involvement in global efforts, but Norway was perceived to be part of a core group of actors that had helped facilitate these achievements.

In addition, and although not necessarily a stated goal of advocacy activities within any given area, the WPS case also noted that Norway had achieved visibility through its involvement in these thematic areas. Within WPS, this is implicitly implied as a motivation for prioritising the issue, in terms of enabling Norway to gain visibility for other policy areas.

### **3.6 DRIVERS**

This section summarises the case studies' findings concerning evaluation question 3: *What were the main driving factors for achievement or non-achievement of desired outputs and outcomes?* It identifies key factors perceived to be associated with achievements. Since many of the same approaches were used across all of the cases, and each case demonstrated progress towards its aims but more still needs to be done, we are unable to systematically compare where tactics were present and absent and corresponding achievements or non-achievement of specific outcomes. The relatively long time-frame does enable us to look at changes over time, and key informant interviews provide insights into factors perceived to be particular-

ly important. Across the cases, three factors emerged as most salient: high-level leadership accompanied by financial resources and strong technical capacity; generation and use of evidence; and strategic partnerships with other actors.

#### **3.6.1 High-Level Leadership, Plus Financial Resources and Technical Capacity**

In all cases, senior government officials led the advocacy agenda. Individuals both within and outside of Norway consistently cited global leadership on MCH by former Prime Minister Stoltenberg, his senior adviser and the head of Norad's Global Health Section. The ability of Norway's leaders and technical team to connect the political to the personal/professional was perceived to have been quite influential for MCH. Similarly, commitment and engagement on education for development by current Prime Minister Solberg is considered critical to the achievements made so far. Both the prime minister and minister of foreign affairs took an active role in developing the White Paper and participated personally in the dialogue and decision-making process related to major activities. A senior diplomat was appointed Norway's special envoy on educa-

tion and has been leading the team working on education in MFA's Section on Global Initiatives. Ministerial leadership was also important for WPS and IFF.

Internally, high-level leadership was perceived to prioritise and speed up action and deepen the involvement of ministries and technical staff on particular issues. Such leadership demonstrated externally that the country was committing the government as a whole, and helped influence other high level leaders to take action, illustrating the 'power of a phone call when you talk from one head of state to another'. Political statements were backed up by White Papers on IFF, foreign policy and global health and education and the WPS Action Plan.

Even more so, Norway's ability to back up political support with financial resources signalled the country's commitment and enhanced its credibility in MCH, WPS and education. Often, Norway was one of the early investors, as was the case with the Global Financing Facility and the World Bank trust fund on results-based investment in education (REACH).

Targeted financial support to hire senior staff in international organisations and to women's organisations, at global and grassroots level, was perceived as very important for IFF and WPS.

The drive and capacity of key people working in the government of Norway was perceived to be both a comparative advantages and a key driver of the progress achieved. Interviewees spoke both of their technical competency and of the persistence and persuasiveness of key individuals who could think outside the box and relentlessly pursued a number of avenues to prompt action. Senior advisers in Oslo were perceived to have the vision of creating synergies to drive a global movement, and technical staff in embassies and Norad were recognised as crucial for driving implementation forward.

### **3.6.2 Generating and Using Evidence**

Generating and using evidence featured in each of the cases, as a strategy to influence change and as a key output. For IFF, MCH and WPS, it was also considered an influential driver of change.

The importance was particularly notable for IFF, where information was deliberately withheld. The evidence base on IFF has been gradually built over time, which has informed decisions and also generated more interest in IFF. Since the 1990s, Norad has been generating research and evidence on tax and development issues, providing more evidence on policies at country levels. Notably, the 2008 Commission on Capital Flight both generated interest in the agenda and drove Norway's advocacy for the proceeding years as its recommendations and the 2009 MFA *Climate, conflict and capital* White Paper were implemented.

In MCH, evidence illustrated the extent of the problem and identified and costed potential solutions. It was perceived to be especially important in fostering dialogue on these issues among diverse stakeholders. The ability to demonstrate gains that could be achieved within a politician's timeframe was very persuasive in generating high-level support in Norway and elsewhere.

In WPS, the evidence base is gradually being built, supporting arguments for an increased focus on women in peace and conflict resolution. This includes Norway's support for PRIO's research and the Global Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

In the case of education, evidence generation has been an important strategy but not necessarily a driver of achievements thus far. In several areas, recommendations provided by the research have been relatively vague and/or have not been followed up on in a way that has generated visible action or results.

### **3.6.3 Building Strategic Partnerships**

All cases highlighted the importance of building strategic partnerships with other actors, including other governments, multilateral organisations and civil society.

The growing momentum of the MCH movement and formal structures to push changes forward, particularly PMNCH and the EWEC movement, were identified as important drivers of increased attention, resources and reductions in mortality. These networks were more mature and coordi-

nated than in previous years, and much more diverse. The membership expanded beyond actors with technical health expertise to include powerful political advocates (Smith and Rodriguez, 2015).

In education, in addition to increasing funding to several multilateral organisations, Norway was strategically involved in their overall management, including through its participation in board meetings. Norway's engagement with the UN special envoy on education led to the creation of the Education Commission.

In the IFF case, mutual respect was noted among the key actors from government and civil society for the role each played and their respective influences on the agenda. As well as the networks being informal and based on relationships between individuals, they were formalised in the Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development, founded by MFA, Norad and civil society in 2008, which provides a platform for the global lobbying campaign.

For WPS, the type of partner was considered important, including support to civil society at all levels. In Colombia, the comparable strength of the women's movement and its ability to mobilise and agree on a joint way forward was seen as important. The parties were also seen as sensitised to WPS and saw the value of women's participation in the peace process. The partnership with the UN at the global level (UN Women, UN Department of Political Affairs) and in Colombia (UN Women) was also perceived to be an important driver.

As noted above, the role of the private sector did not feature at all in WPS or education, and to a lesser extent than might have been expected in MCH and particularly IFF. This may be related in part to our sample selection and warrants further investigation.

### **3.7 CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINING FACTORS**

While the drivers can explain why certain results have been achieved, all of the engagements have also faced (or are continuing to face) a number of challenges and constraints that are

holding back results and restrict Norway's ambitions. Some of these challenges are crosscutting in nature and shared by more than one engagement. Others are related to the intrinsic nature of one specific engagement. For instance, in IFF, tension between Norwegian agencies and adversarial lobbying by corporate actors were identified as important challenges. In MCH, there are challenges related to fragmentation of efforts and lack of coordination.

### **3.7.1 Inadequate Resources and Capacity**

In the IFF and education cases, there is a common understanding that, despite the successes noted above, it might have been possible to achieve more if more resources and capacity had been available. With regard to IFF, had the capacity of the Norwegian government been greater, particularly in the early years of the engagement, the agenda could have been taken forward further, perhaps increasing the lobbying and capacity-building in multilateral agencies. Although the education engagement is still in a start-up phase, there has been limited follow-up to the dialogue initiated by Norway on certain priority themes, which to some extent can be

explained by capacity constraints. Across cases, there are concerns about cuts in ODA budgets and the increasing gap between available funding and existing needs.

Staff capacity and technical competence is an issue in IFF and education alike. In the case of IFF, a highly technical area, the impact of high turnover is particularly acute, and interviewees recognised the high turnover of embassy staff and the associated loss of institutional memory as a challenge. This has been of increasing relevance in recent years as the agenda and associated financing has declined as a priority in Norway. In education, there was a perception among interviewees that MFA and Norad would have to increase their education expertise and strategic advocacy competence to be able to consolidate Norway's leading role, and not rely completely on others to lead the technical aspect. In both areas, there is a perceived mismatch between capacity and the scope of Norway's agenda. Several education sector stakeholders remarked that the broad scope of Norway's agenda had created expectations that might be difficult to meet given cuts in ODA

budgets, shifting political priorities and Norway's capacity to follow-up on pertinent issues. In WPS, some argued Norway could carve out a stronger role as an outside voice in terms of holding other member states and UN organs to account and focusing on issues that others do not, such as early prevention of conflict and positive peace.

### **3.7.2 The Unfinished Agenda**

All four engagements are facing an unfinished agenda. The unfinished agenda provided the overall justification to why Norway got involved in the particular engagements in the first place. Some of the elements of this agenda continue to act as a drag on Norway's efforts.

In MCH, a number of interviewees commented on the unfinished agenda – the challenge of reducing preventable deaths for millions more women and children. This will entail working in more complex environments, including fragile states, where mortality rates are among the highest; working more with health systems and on human resource issues; developing urban health systems, which in some places are less organised than they are in rural areas; working



more closely with private health care providers; addressing gender equality and power imbalances; and better integrating sexual and reproductive health into the maternal, newborn and child health continuum, an issue that has faced greater political resistance in the past.

In education, the unfinished agenda is similarly far-reaching, including the need to address disparities in schooling, education in emergencies, education quality, the increasing funding gap, the lack of attention given to relevant education plans and systematic education sector reform, etc. The migration crisis has further accentuated the need to address these constraining factors but have at the same time made it more difficult to do so given further cuts in ODA budgets and the increasing gap between available funding and existing needs.

### **3.7.3 Translating Global Efforts to National and Subnational Levels**

In the MCH, education and WPS cases, there is a common need to give more attention to the national and subnational level to bring about real impact.

In MCH, there is recognition that, while advocacy and building partnerships have been extremely important, these efforts need to be followed through with visible actions and improvements at the national level, or the movement risks losing momentum and commitments. This shift highlights the importance of leadership at the national level and of investing in capacity. It may involve refocusing attention from the global to national and subnational spaces, and devolving some efforts that have previously taken place through global venues, often based in high-income countries. Although resources for MCH have been growing, key informants acknowledged that sustainable resourcing for health would require sufficient and dedicated domestic resources. How best to balance domestic, international and private sector resources and provide health insurance and financial protection for the poor remains an unanswered question.

Similarly, in education, questions were raised about whether the funding of global initiatives could have been better used at the country level to bring about reform and solutions on the ground. While Norway has an implicit strat-

egy for strengthening its presence in selected countries, this initiative is still very new and additional efforts will be required for Norway to move towards more strategic collaboration with national authorities and multilateral agencies at the country level. In addition, with the decrease in ODA budgets, there is new impetus for pushing more for increased domestic spending on education in partner countries.

In the case of WPS, some argue that Norway, in its official role as peace facilitator, would achieve more with a stronger hand – for instance applying more conditionality in the case of South Sudan in relation to donor funds. On the other hand, it is argued that one of the reasons Norway has been relatively successful as peace negotiator and as such been able to promote women's participation in this role is its perception as an impartial actor, which does not attach strings or push a specific agenda. Coupled with that is the political context in South Sudan, which has limited the ability for success in WPS.

### 3.8 SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ENGAGEMENT

This section summarises the findings that concern evaluation questions 4a and 4b: How to keep momentum and *How and why do engagements end/pull back?* Three of the four cases (and some projects that are still carrying on with IFF) are ongoing, so they are unable to offer insights on how and why engagement ends, or to determine the sustainability of Norway's investments following withdrawal. That said, key characteristics of Norway's advocacy approach and continued challenges identify several opportunities and concerns related to the sustainability of Norway's efforts.

#### 3.8.1 Factors Promoting Sustainability

Norway's approach can be said to have in-built sustainability safeguards. Working with others and creating new platforms and financing mechanisms provide formal, structured ways for activities to continue when Norway is less involved or not at all. Examples include the EWEC movement and results-based trust funds for health and education. In the area of education in emergencies, Norway's engagement is tied to an already existing process that involves

a number of different actors, including Norwegian NGOs. This process is likely to continue even without the direct engagement and participation of MFA and Norad.

Norway's capacity development efforts support sustainability. In WPS, this was true for both civil society and officials, who are capacitated to work in a more gender-inclusive way. Similarly, through support to civil society, Norway has contributed to building awareness about the international financial system and built the capacity of CSOs. These implementing agencies have, in turn, built their own networks within Europe and internationally, increasing the sustainability of their advocacy outcomes.

A stronger evidence base is also facilitating the sustainability of advocacy efforts. In MCH, improved data have helped define targets for subsequent initiatives and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), based on what could realistically be expected in a given time-frame. CSOs have continued building a body of research, holding conferences and publishing newsletters and opinion pieces in the media,

increasing public awareness on IFF and WPS. Research programmes have been conducting dissemination work, involving working with civil society, presenting findings to embassies and Norad/MFA and publishing papers. Research has been funded to build a case for investment in education and the possible creation of a new financing mechanism. Domestically within Norway, WPS has been institutionalised as a key issue within MFA, including the political leadership, certain embassies and civil servants. WPS is an established agenda. This owes in part to internal advocacy in MFA that has been set up to promote sustainability. The 1325 coordinator has a specific advocacy role, which has been successful in terms of institutionalising and building capacity around WPS. It has been less institutionalised within other ministries, such as the Ministry of Defence and MFA section working on security policy.

#### 3.8.2 Risks to Sustainability

Alongside these facilitating factors are several risks to sustainability. Stakeholder participation in global platforms, attention by new political leaders and resourcing the continuous inputs

required for education and health systems remain vulnerable to being weakened over time. MCH interviewees questioned whether the combined health goal as one of 17 goals in the SDGs, rather than three of eight of the MDGs, and Solberg's prioritisation of education would dilute the focused attention MCH health received in the Stoltenberg and MDG eras.

Where the main drivers were individuals, the engagements are likely to be less institutionalised and therefore are at greater risk of efforts not being sustained. This was particularly evident in the case of IFF. As strong local ownership is necessary to achieve notable results from supporting national governments, as observed in the IFF case study, the absence of local ownership also presents as a risk factor for sustainability.

All cases pursued very ambitious aims with relatively few staff. In the case of education, Norway has opted for a very broad agenda and made a large number of commitments (76 in the White Paper) that may be difficult to meet and sustain given the emergence of competing political interests (e.g. refugee assistance) and the less than optimal capacity of both MFA and Norad.

As the WPS agenda is broad, it is difficult to get a good overview of all the activities Norway supports. There is therefore an associated risk of a mismatch between capacity and scope. A process of focusing activities is currently underway at the country level, but it is unclear if this includes global advocacy. Such a mismatch was present for IFF, such that a small group within Norad and MFA was working on a substantial international agenda. This did, however, require the building of strong networks with civil society, which provided some sustainability safeguards, as highlighted above.

In summary, the analysis shows Norway has kept momentum and promoted sustainability by adopting advocacy approaches and tactics geared towards creating and reinforcing platforms for interaction and funding, capacity development of state and non-state actors and expanding and/or proactively using the already existing evidence base to make a case for advancing certain priorities. In the case of WPS, the institutionalisation of the engagement within MFA has also promoted sustainability. This has not yet been seen in the other cases.

Although the selected engagements may not offer adequate insights into why engagements end, it is clear that change in government/political priorities is a decisive factor.

## 4. Conclusions

This evaluation comprises four main components: a summary of Norway's main advocacy engagements based on an analysis of Norway's grant agreements database; thematic overviews of 11 issue areas (as presented in the inception report in October 2015); more detailed case studies of four of these issue areas (MCH; education; WPS; and IFF), as presented in the annexes; and this synthesis, which presents a comparative analysis across the four issue areas.<sup>14</sup>

The four cases contain both similarities and differences that present insights into the Norwegian government's advocacy engagements. The evaluation has not found a standard model of advocacy followed across the cases, and this reflects a flexibility and responsiveness to the different contexts of each engagement, identified as an important comparative advantage.

The design and approach to implementation of the advocacy engagements were based on

a range of influences at different times, from the drive of key individuals (IFF) to the information base (IFF), the use of information to inform dialogue (education, MCH) and the link between academics and the Norwegian government (WPS, IFF).

We present our conclusions, organised into decision-making; comparative advantages and drivers; approach; and achievements.

### 4.1 DECISION-MAKING

Different stages of decision-making were identified. First, the initial decision on which areas to prioritise as advocacy engagements appears to have been political, taken by the political leadership of ministries or the prime minister. The origin of the decision was specific but variable for three of the cases, ranging from Norway's comparative advantage of a human rights basis (WPS, MCH, education) to an economic argument (MCH, education, IFF) and the need to lead the global agenda for education. The entry point, or the status of the area or sector at the time of Norway's decision to engage, was agenda-setting for all cases apart from WPS, where

Norway engaged to aid policy diffusion, given that the agenda was more advanced. Norway's domestic political agenda dominated the timing of engagements, but there was also responsiveness to global events – although in none of the cases did global process and developments explain why an engagement started or ended at a particular time. Norway sought political support for MCH from individuals, countries and institutions with which it had existing relationships and that were like minded. In education, the organisation of high-level events provides good entry points and generates quick wins but also increases expectations.

The emerging or unfinished agenda provided the overall justification as to why Norway became involved in the particular engagements in the first place, but this continues to present challenges such as disparities in schooling, education in emergencies, education quality and the increasing funding gap. In MCH, the challenge of reducing preventable deaths for millions more women and children requires working in increasingly complex environments.

<sup>14</sup> A rigorous quality assurance process was pursued involving an independent evaluation expert.

Second, once the decision to prioritise an engagement had been made, the design and approach to implementation of the advocacy engagements appear to have been based on a range of influences at different times. The personal/professional interest and drive of key individuals was particularly important for IFF and MCH. The extent to which an information base was available and was used in informing the decision to engage in a particular issue area varied across the cases, and was important for IFF. Other unique characteristics of the cases included the way information was used to inform the dialogue (education, MCH) and the strong link between academics and the Norwegian government (WPS, IFF).

#### **4.2 COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES AND DRIVERS**

The success of the advocacy areas can be explained partially by Norway's comparative advantages. This was particularly in the cases of IFF and WPS, where Norway has unique advantages that meant it was well placed to play a leadership role. Even where comparative advantages were not prevalent, Norway was able to play a leading and influential role.

Norad and MFA's willingness to lead an area, to build coalitions that draw on the expertise of others and to take action where the outcomes were uncertain allowed it to be a first mover. When this took place at a time when international events facilitated uptake on the global agenda, leverage was substantial. If Norway's financial strength were used to further leverage these advantages, influence could be even greater.

Where comparative advantage is low (e.g. in education) but other important dimensions like political and financial support are high, Norway should strengthen other key dimensions, such as technical capacity to compensate for the lower comparative advantage.

Key drivers influencing change were perceived to be high-level leadership accompanied by financial resources and strong technical capacity; generation and use of evidence; and strategic partnerships with other actors.

#### **4.3 APPROACH**

Norway's engagements aimed to influence multilateral organisations, other governments in high-, middle- and low-income countries, civil society, foundations and the private sector. Through the cases, we discovered there was no clear and consistent distinction between channel, or intermediary, and target. Sometimes, even during one engagement, a target may also be a channel. Often, those in receipt of funding are the target of attempts to influence – one such example being IFF funding via multilateral agencies. This highlights the challenge of classifying advocacy engagements and fitting the approaches to well-defined categories; rather, their complexity should be allowed for.

Issue areas championed by Norwegian prime ministers did not always channel a significant amount of advocacy resources through intermediaries. While education channelled a substantial amount of core funding through the general budget of multilateral organisations and NGOs, the advocacy engagement remained direct, led by MFA. Indirect advocacy through CSOs was a prominent feature for IFF and WPS.

In the case of IFF, civil society was influential in influencing other governments and multilateral organisations. This strategy allowed Norway to increase its leverage and influence.

All of the case study engagements pursued strategic engagements with multilateral organisations. In the case of education, multilateral agencies are used primarily as channels for disbursing funding for education, not as intermediaries for the actual advocacy engagement. Regarding IFF, Norway did not embark on a strategy to lead the global agenda, but found itself in an influential position based on its experience and consistent diplomatic engagement with international organisations. It targeted multilateral organisations to change policies to regulate illegal company practices.

Bilateral engagements with governments from other high-income countries were central primarily for MCH and education, and to a lesser extent for WPS. While the MCH and education engagements (and cases) were focused predominantly at the global level, both also supported low- and middle-income country governments. The role of

the private sector did not feature at all in WPS, and was not prominent in MCH, education or IFF.

A range of approaches were employed across the four issue areas, directly by the government and indirectly via intermediaries. All cases featured diplomacy, brokering and/or lobbying, convening and evidence generation. Prominent tactics included convening and coalition-building and diplomacy, used across the cases. Engagements were predominantly collaborative; there were no examples of highly confrontational tactics, even in the highly contested case of IFF. For education and health, in contrast to IFF and WPS, providing substantial grant support was used as an important tactic for mobilising other public and private financial resources. Mobilising citizens and members of the community was used least often – only in WPS.

#### **4.4 ACHIEVEMENTS**

All four of the engagements examined in the case studies pursued very ambitious goals that are not possible to achieve by a single country alone or by a particular point in time, but instead require ongoing inputs. That noted, achieve-

ments were broad and all cases demonstrated progress towards more interim results: increased attention, political and financial commitments and the creation of new global initiatives and platforms. For some of the more mature engagements, there are examples of results further along the results chain, although these are difficult to trace back to Norway's advocacy engagements directly. In some way, all cases included the development of the capacity of other actors and individuals. Generating a reliable evidence base was particularly important in the IFF case, as understanding the scale of the diversion of aid was at the core of the argument. Support to multilateral organisations sometimes indirectly supported evidence generation. In terms of policy change, achievements include changes in legislation (IFF), although these require long-term engagement, policy diffusion (WPS) and the institutionalisation of policies and global initiatives (WPS, MCH).

## 5. Lessons and recommendations

We have highlighted a number of lessons from the cases, presented here to illustrate important aspects of the approach to advocacy. The recommendations (in bold and summarised below) are guided by the types of decisions regarding policy advocacy programming that the evaluation was intended to inform: the selection and scope of advocacy activities; balancing scope and ambition with resources; maintaining flexibility; engaging others; strategic communication and messaging; and designing and managing a portfolio of advocacy activities. In response to comments on internal staffing issues and other issues that are specific to each sector, we recommend an evaluation be commissioned to explore this in detail, as making specific recommendations on team composition and the optimal skill mix for the sectors is beyond the scope of this review.

Our overarching recommendation is that Norway deepens advocacy engagements through prioritising along its comparative advantages and matching scope to capacity and plans for the medium to long term. The global scope and aims of Norway's ambitions necessitate long

periods of engagement, which should be planned for while maintaining flexibility and responsiveness to the different contexts within each engagement. By prioritising along comparative advantages and matching ambition to capacity, Norway could identify a select number of issues on which to engage for a substantial amount of time, supported by sustained political, financial and technical resources. We recognise that the final decision on prioritisation is essentially a political one.

### **5.1 BALANCING SCOPE AND AMBITION WITH RESOURCES**

Despite Norway's comparative advantage of financing, prioritising between and within agendas remains a challenge. Across cases, there are concerns about cuts in ODA budgets and the increasing gap between available funding and existing needs. Stakeholder participation in global platforms, attention by new political leaders and resourcing the continuous inputs required for education and health systems remain vulnerable weakening over time, posing risks to sustainability.

Had the engagements been narrower in scope such that capacity was better aligned to the reach of the advocacy engagement, they may have been more effective, but we have not been able to verify this. A number of interviewees mentioned the importance of Norway focusing its efforts on specific issue areas because of the country's small size and limited financial resources and number of staff. This logic has not been applied across its engagements, which include work on 11 broad issue areas, nor within some of the individual engagements that attempt to cover diverse areas. This was demonstrated in the WPS and IFF cases, where the scope of the engagement was considerable, relative to staffing and financial capacity. The WPS work on assessing the comparative advantage at country level is a step in this direction, but it is also important to more closely link these country-level efforts to the global advocacy agenda. This would also allow Norway to retain a strong voice in WPS, in a context with a proliferation of other actors.

The MCH case illustrates a progressive expansion of what was initially a quite targeted approach, focusing first on vaccines and later expanding to child health more broadly, then to maternal health, and subsequently newborn, reproductive and adolescent health. This experience suggests the importance of starting with a more narrow focus in order to secure attention and resources, and subsequently broadening in scope and integrating in practice to reduce fragmentation and facilitate implementation and sustainability.

**We suggest Norway consider how to match prioritisation and the comparative advantage it holds with its capacity, in terms of time and resources.** For example, by selecting a few issue areas in which to work, rather than a dozen or more, Norway could provide sustained political, financial and technical resources to support the continuity of engagements. The matching of scope to resources could be achieved by balancing higher- and lower-intensity engagements or activities, or balancing across direct and indirect advocacy approaches.

**Political engagements should be backed up by technical expertise housed in Norad; if Norad is taking the technical lead on an area, there is also the need to provide resources to support technical capacity.**

This would also allow Norad to take a more central role in global advocacy processes in education, for example. Norway's global agenda to promote education for development is very broad in focus and scope. While this may have been necessary to ensure political support for the agenda, as the engagement develops strategic choices should be made about which issues to focus on considering Norway's capacity to follow up. This is, however, not only about increasing funding but also about coming up with solutions to policy obstacles, which in turn requires technical capacity in Oslo and in countries to support the translation of the global agenda into local solutions. This technical capacity could be supported by continuing to engage individuals within CSOs and senior academics with a long history working in the area, as discussed below. The circulation of staff between embassies, Norad and MFA previously provided experience and an understanding of developing country issues and challenges to

inform new agendas. **We recommend the rotation of staff between embassies, Norad and MFA be reviewed, with consideration given to the benefit of increasing the exchange between agencies.** This would benefit from a disaggregated consideration for each sector.

In addition, further investigation of how advocacy engagements within portfolios can best be managed across Norad and MFA would be beneficial, addressing questions such as: What kind of competences are needed in teams? How can existing resources be better used? What types of capacity are needed and how might these be resourced? This discussion extends beyond the remit of this evaluation but would be a valuable line of investigation for a future study.

When Norway is advocating a new or less common approach, as was the case with results-based financing and trust funds, **political support should be accompanied by substantial financial contributions.**



## 5.2 MAINTAINING FLEXIBILITY

The cases suggested that taking a flexible approach to achieving the ultimate advocacy goal is important. For three of the four cases, the evaluation team was not given formal, written advocacy strategies. The cases illustrated the ability of actors to think and act strategically without formal, bureaucratic processes. Indeed, Norway's flexibility and nimbleness were identified as a key comparative advantage. In the IFF and MCH cases, key individuals (both political and technical) were perceived to be highly influential and crucial to the progress of the engagement. For MCH, interviewees mentioned individuals and Norway's involvement in global initiatives and platforms much more than the specific initiatives of the engagement (Foreign Policy and Global Health Initiative, Network of Global Leaders, Global Campaign for Health MDGs). **We recommend that Norway continue to take a flexible approach to achieving the advocacy goals that have been prioritised and avoid pressures to formalise small- to medium-scale engagements.** It may be that, as engagements grow in size, some element of formalisation may become

advantageous and developing a written strategy may be useful. In this instance, we suggest ensuring the written strategy is regularly updated so it captures changes during implementation and therefore still retains flexibility.

## 5.3 ENGAGING OTHERS

For all four case studies, one of the most significant achievements was some kind of elevation of the issue on the global agenda, through the building of coalitions with a shared agenda. All of the cases, apart from WPS, highlighted Norway's contributions to the establishment and implementation of new global initiatives. This also contributed to Norway's visibility as its influential role was recognised. This elevation of issues on the global policy agenda was evidenced through the display of political will and commitment by actors other than Norway. This influenced Norway's ability to leverage further investment, as seen in MCH and education.

**We recommend a broad coalition be developed and maintained to improve the sustainability of advocacy engagements.**

**This should be backed up by financial resources over the medium term to allow individuals and their institutions to function.**

In MCH, new global platforms (PMNCH, EWEC) helped bring together more diverse players; previous networks had not included high-level officials or the private sector. In the IFF case, individuals within CSO and senior academics with a long history working in the area were drawn on and within government there was a narrow, but influential, coalition. Subsequently, Norway's leadership of the agenda diminished, and leadership may have been maintained had the coalition been broader.

**For WPS and education, the capacity and experience of Norwegian CSOs is further tapped into to link global and national efforts to build and sustain a global commitment to change and to find solutions to real country-level problems.** This is based on the experience of IFF, and to a lesser extent WPS, where engagement with CSOs was an important driver of the achievement of results. Since the government and Norwegian NGOs share the same agenda, the shared goals are the same,

and the latter have existing capacity and, in some cases, such as IFF, long-term expertise. Norway has a strategic dialogue with multilateral agencies and CSOs at the global level, but this dialogue is not necessarily informed by country-level engagements between the same agencies.

In general, country-level engagements are less strategic and more project-focused. Although there are examples of linking country-level efforts to the global advocacy agenda in the WPS case, for instance by supporting the representation of women activists in the UN, there is more to be done in this area. As this is a clear advocacy tactic, which seems to be successful in supporting the prioritisation of WPS, this could be part of an explicit advocacy strategy that is regularly updated and therefore flexible. In the development of the new results framework in the National Action Plan, more should be done to share information about country-level activities and achievements, to allow these to be used at global level. Currently, education's advocacy model has lower CSO involvement. Norway could more consciously support the advocacy of other actors in education,

including financial and technical support to multilaterals and developing a more strategic dialogue with CSOs to capitalise more on their capacity. The involvement of NGOs and other Norwegian actors should not be confined to the process of developing policy on the engagement but should continue throughout the engagement. There is potentially also more to be done in terms of linking the work of Norwegian CSOs with their partners at country level, with the advocacy of CSOs with a global reach. An effective engagement should centre not only on building global commitment to change but also on finding solutions to real country-level problems, including in terms of policy obstacles. This is another area where the experience and capacity of Norwegian CSOs and the private sector could be tapped to a greater extent.

Norway could consider conducting stakeholder analysis particularly given its partner-focused approaches. **A stakeholder mapping of Norway's advocacy targets and partners would be useful, particularly in the WPS field.** Developing indicators of behaviour change for these key actors could be a useful subsequent addition.

This would enable Norway to consider how to develop more strategic relationships with its partners, based on comparative advantages, and to more explicitly target its messaging for specific audiences, discussed further below.

#### **5.4 STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION AND MESSAGING**

Using strategic communication to influence different audiences can increase the effectiveness of advocacy engagements, leveraging greater results. Increased efforts to define and communicate Norway's advocacy goals may leverage greater results, as stakeholders would be better informed about what Norway intends to achieve and how it plans to follow up on its commitments and advocacy engagements.

**We recommend Norway consider two aspects of messaging to maximise effectiveness of advocacy engagements: 1) balancing and tailoring the message for different constituency groups; and 2) whether using linguistic labels and rhythms would increase visibility.**

First, different groups are likely to be responsive both to different messages and to different ways

of communicating the same message. Conducting stakeholder mapping, as mentioned above, would enable Norway to appreciate the specific audiences it needs to target. It is then possible to consider how the message can be tailored for different constituency groups, such as politicians, academia, youth groups, activists and the private sector. Evidenced-based, succinct messages were perceived to have been key in generating high-level support among politicians.

Second, the influencing role of language through the use of linguistic labels and rhythms is often overlooked. The coining and uptake of the term ‘illicit financial flows’ played an important role in getting the issue on to the international agenda. It is an umbrella term that communicates effectively and in a non-threatening way what the subject is. This functions in a similar way to branding, making an issue or agenda easily accessible. A different way in which branding has been used was the grouping of activities under the Tax for Development banner. This made Norway’s support to IFF accessible for external audiences and presented an appearance of coherence and coordination.

## **5.5 DESIGNING AND MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF ADVOCACY ACTIVITIES**

As noted in the ToR, advocacy is not considered by Norad and the MFA as a sector, but rather as a field of activity, and advocacy initiatives are often packaged as part of other development programmes. Therefore, there is not a discrete portfolio per se. There does not appear to be an overall strategy for Norway’s advocacy engagements, nor has oversight for this work been assigned to a specific individual to manage.

If Norway is interested in managing a portfolio of advocacy activities, as suggested by the ToR, **we recommend Norad/MFA could convene a task force or advocacy position supported by a secretariat to oversee advocacy, with sufficient capacity to enable Norway to map resources and financing for cross-cutting areas and to review progress over time and share lessons across issue areas.**

Where the advocacy engagement is broad (e.g. IFF), a task force could comprise representatives from the different areas of the engagement; where the engagement is specific

(e.g. education), a dedicated advocacy officer position could support both MFA and Norad.

This overarching perspective could help calibrate the intensity of different efforts over time, planning towards and responding to key moments. It would help Norway transition out of engagements, as there did not appear to be explicit transition strategies in place for IFF and these have not yet been developed for education.

This task force or person could continue to map resources and financing for crosscutting areas. A lack of data on financing presents a challenge for monitoring progress towards meeting targets and pledges. In common with other governments, Norway faces the challenge of monitoring spending in crosscutting areas such as WPS and IFF, given the dispersed management of programmes and the large number of projects.

# Annexes

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| <b>ANNEX 1:</b> Terms of reference ..... | <b>60</b> |
| <b>ANNEX 2:</b> List of documents .....  | <b>69</b> |

The following annexes are available for download at <https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/>

**ANNEX 3:** Case study on Norway's Engagement in Global Efforts to Improve Maternal and Child Health

**ANNEX 4:** Case study on Norway's Engagement in Education for Development

**ANNEX 5:** Case Study on Norway's Engagement in Women, Peace and Security

**ANNEX 6:** Case study on Norway's Engagement in Fight against Illicit Financial Flows and Tax Havens

# Annex 1: Terms of reference

## **NORWAY AS A STRATEGIC PRIME-MOVER – EVALUATION OF NORWAY'S SUPPORT FOR ADVOCACY IN THE DEVELOPMENT POLICY ARENA**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

In addition to providing direct development assistance, Norwegian development policies also aim to play a catalytic role in development policy arena through supporting initiatives that focus on system-wide changes. This reflects a widely shared idea that Norway can and should make a difference well beyond the direct effects of its financial contributions. The main objective in such initiatives often is to influence decisions about allocation of resources in favor of a specific cause or the interests of a specific population group; particularly a cause or a group that is at a risk of being ignored under the current policy environment.

Policy advocacy is an important instrument in this context. Policy advocacy here refers to activities undertaken for promoting change in policy and practice in the national or international development policy arenas. Policy advocacy may be pursued directly through diplomatic and non-diplomatic channels, and /or indirectly through

providing development assistance to government, non-government or multilateral partners working in relevant policy arenas at the national or international levels. Policy advocacy engagement may be directed towards various entry points in policy processes, ranging from agenda setting, to institutionalization, implementation and/or diffusion of policy change.

How much of the Norwegian development assistance that falls under policy advocacy, is difficult to measure from the aid-disbursement data. Most often assistance for advocacy is bundled with service-delivery projects. Advocacy is not a sector or a sub-sector in development assistance data and there are not many projects where the sole objective is to support advocacy activities. A preliminary text analysis of project documents in the Norwegian aid-assistance data<sup>15</sup> can provide some indication about the thematic distribution of the advocacy portfolio. However, such estimates at best are an approximation. Many projects may indirectly include advocacy activities even if not

<sup>15</sup> See <http://www.norad.no/no/forside;jsessionid=6DA901A66234B-D00A0A99EE6F81581E1>.

explicit in the project documents. Moreover, policy advocacy undertaken through diplomatic channels at the bilateral and/or multilateral levels to promote specific development policy issues are normally not reflected in disbursements data.

A preliminary document search using keyword "Advocacy" in title or description of grant agreement indicates that three sectors: government and civil society in general, conflict prevention, peace and security, and health together account for over half of the identified projects in value terms. Some of the sub-sectors, within these main areas include democratic participation, human rights, peace building, women and child rights, and removal of land mines. In the recent years, Norway has focussed on climate change issues, and basic education with primary education being the main priority area for the current government. With respect to the choice of channels, data indicates that development assistance to advocacy has been channelled mainly through the UN system and non-governmental organizations.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> See annex A for detail distribution.

## 2. PROGRAM THEORY


Advocacy engagements often involve a portfolio of activities that are expected to collectively promote a desired policy change. This portfolio could include both direct participation of the donor through diplomatic and non-diplomatic channels in the political arena and indirect grants to government, non-government or multilateral partners working in the relevant policy arena. As a starting point, one may indicate four desired outcomes for advocacy.

- Strengthening the capacity of the involved organizations.
- Establishment of reliable evidence that legitimizes the targeted cause.
- Formation of strong and stable alliances converging to a shared agenda.
- Development of a supporting constituency to strengthen private and public will for introduction and diffusion of a policy change.

The final success of advocacy engagements depends on a complex interaction between the efforts to promote the above outcomes and the external political, social and economic processes governing the relevant policy arena. A prototype logical framework for policy advocacy engagement using a portfolio approach can be illustrated as follows:

## 3. RATIONALE

In the past, Norway has engaged in a number of development policy areas, often taking on a catalytic role in international development policy arena. Over the years, Norway has engaged in policy development in areas ranging from international mine action, human trafficking, gender equality, maternal and child health, peace building, illicit financial flows and fight against tax havens, climate change issues, reforms in the UN system etc.



An important priority area for the current government is primary education where Norway aims at a catalytic role at the global level.<sup>17</sup> The government has also launched a White paper on human rights, where a large share of the action points, concern influencing policies and practices of governments.<sup>18</sup> Since policy advocacy is a key component in these engagements, more knowledge about when, under which circumstances and how Norway can succeed in its advocacy efforts is important for improving effectiveness of Norway's catalytic role in development policy arena.

#### 4. PURPOSE

*The main purpose of this evaluation is to improve future programming of policy advocacy as an instrument for promotion of Norwegian development policy objectives.*

The evaluation will inform decision-making concerning policy advocacy engagements including the timing, the choice of institutional 'channels', design and management of a portfolio of advo-

---

<sup>17</sup> Report to the Storting (White paper) no. 25 (2013-2014).

<sup>18</sup> Report to the Storting (White paper) no. 10 (2014-2015).

cacy activities directed towards a common goal. The main users are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad. Other users include non-governmental organizations, multilaterals and other donors with interest in understanding the effectiveness of policy advocacy.

#### 5. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

*The main objective is to understand the driving factors that determine the achievement of the desired advocacy outcomes; by analyzing a sample of specific Norwegian engagements in development policy arena where Norway has aimed at a catalytic role to drive the policy change.*

All Norwegian advocacy engagements since 2005 form the universe for this evaluation. The evaluation shall map the main engagements during this period and identify a small sample that will be analyzed using a case study approach. For selection of cases, see methodology section 7.

#### 6. EVALUATION QUESTIONS

This evaluation identifies following three main evaluation questions to identify and understand

the role of the main factors that determine the achievement of the desired advocacy outcomes.

#### Relevance

- *How persuasive was the reasoning behind Norwegian advocacy engagements?*
  - > What were the main advocacy engagements supporting specific policy issues?
  - > What was the nature and content of direct participation and indirect grants and other activities in each engagement?
  - > How was the decision-making in terms of procedural rationality,<sup>19</sup> politics or heuristics in the decision process underlying the specific engagement.
  - > How favorable was the policy context and timing for the chosen engagements?

---

<sup>19</sup> Defined as the extent to which the decisions process involved collection of relevant information and reliance upon the analysis of this information.

- > How well were the engagements adapted to the policy and institutional context, the Norwegian comparative advantage and priorities of Norwegian foreign and development policy?

### **Effectiveness**

- *What were the main driving factors and how did these affect the attainment of the desired advocacy outputs and outcomes? The relevant outputs and outcomes could include but are not limited to strengthening and/or developing:*
  - > Professional capacity of the recipients
  - > Knowledge generation and provision of evidence supporting or legitimizing the respective cause
  - > Formation of alliances and shared agenda across the advocacy community
  - > Building of public awareness and political will for policy change
  - > Institutionalization, implementation and diffusion of the policy change

### **Sustainability**

- *How did the implementing agencies/partners manage the factors within their control to promote sustainability of the advocacy outcomes?*
  - > Is there evidence for that the monitoring and evaluation routines of the implementing agencies/partners provided necessary information to follow-up developments in the policy context
  - > How did the implementing partners use this information to make strategic changes to promote the achievement of the desired outcomes

The analysis shall in particular focus on the role and contribution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and their external advisors/partners/consultants in management of the advocacy engagements. The analysis shall also assess the contribution of the decision-making process in achieving the desired outcomes.

### **7. METHODOLOGICAL**

Evaluation shall be in accordance with the prevailing DAC OECD Evaluation Quality Standards and criteria, as well as relevant guidelines from the Evaluation Department. The evaluation team shall outline a well-formed research strategy and methodology to ensure a transparent and objective assessment of the relevant issues addressed in this evaluation based on the general approach outlined below. The analysis shall as far as possible be in a comparative mode. Comparisons across advocacy engagements, implementing partners (multilateral versus non-governmental organizations), advocacy levels/ entry points, activities etc. are of particular interest for this evaluation

#### **Desk review**

The evaluation team will undertake a desk review supplemented by stakeholder interviews to map major Norwegian advocacy engagements for the evaluation period and suggest a preliminary selection of 8 - 10 engagements for a detailed analysis. The selection shall take into account the differences in thematic focus, levels and entry points in the policy advocacy process,



main implementing agency, size of allocation, grant portfolio, decision strategies etc. across advocacy engagements. The identified sample shall also reflect variation in achievement of desired outcomes and degrees of perceived success, as indicated by the document review and perceptions of the interviewed stakeholders. To minimize the errors associated with retrospective reporting of stakeholders experience, the sample is expected to include engagements where it is possible to trace managers who were closely involved in the relevant engagements. At least one recent or currently active engagement shall also be included in this selection. A number of Norwegian service-delivery engagements within the policy areas of international mine action, human trafficking, gender equality, maternal and child health, peace building, illicit financial flows and fight against tax havens etc. have had advocacy as one of the components. Some of these have been evaluated by Norad.<sup>20</sup> In most of these evaluations, the focus was on assessment of the service-delivery component.

---

<sup>20</sup> A list of some relevant evaluations is given in the annex B. List of all Norad reports and evaluations is available on Norads website.

These engagements may be suitable candidates for inclusion in the sample.

### **Case studies**

A final sample of 3-4 engagements will be analyzed using case study approach to provide insight into the factors driving the effectiveness and sustainability of the advocacy outcomes. The tenderer may include innovative assessment methodologies such as outcome harvest-ing approaches in design of the cases studies. The sample shall be finalized in consultation with EVAL based on the findings in the desk review and stakeholder comments. The case studies shall reconstruct the program theory for the specific engagements. Data for the case study shall be obtained through document reviews and interviews with different levels of management in MFA/Norad and their advisors, and implementing and collaborating partners.

The data collected shall be supplemented/tri-angulated with data from other relevant primary and secondary sources.

## **8. DELIVERABLES**

The **deliverables** in the consultancy consist of the following outputs:

- **Desk review including inception report for cases studies** – for comments by stakeholders, before final approval by the Evaluation Department (EVAL).
- One work-in-progress **seminar** in Oslo reporting the findings of the desk review and inception report for case studies.
- **Draft Final Report** for preliminary approval by EVAL and circulation to the stakeholders. The stakeholders shall provide feedback that will include comments on structure, facts, content, and conclusions.
- **Final Evaluation Report.**
- **Seminar for dissemination** in Oslo of the final report. Direct travel-cost related to dissemination in international fora, if any, will be covered separately on need basis, and are not to be included in the budget.

All data, presentations, reports are to be submitted in electronic form in accordance with the deadlines set in the tender document. EVAL retains the sole rights with respect to all **distribution, dissemination and publication** of the deliverables.

## ANNEX A: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF AID-DISBURSEMENT DATA

Raw data can be downloaded from Norad's website.

**TABLE:** NORWEGIAN BILATERAL AND MULTI-BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AID TO ADVOCACY-RELATED\* ACTIVITIES, BY THE 10 LARGEST DAC SUB-SECTORS, 2004 - 2013 (NOK 1000)

| DAC Sub sector   | DAC main sector  | 2004           | 2005           | 2006           | 2007           | 2008           | 2009           | 2010           | 2011           | 2012           | 2013           | Grand total      | Share        |
|--|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|
| 50 – Democratic participation and civil society                  | 151 – Government and civil society, general                  | 35 635         | 33 576         | 38 689         | 42 500         | 45 432         | 52 215         | 52 363         | 42 797         | 32 011         | 38 078         | 413 298          | <b>16,2%</b> |
| 60 – Human rights  | 151 – Government and civil society, general                  | 7 650          | 7 636          | 9 392          | 15 899         | 15 899         | 63 213         | 62 892         | 66 223         | 64 812         | 75 608         | 391 347          | <b>15,4%</b> |
| 70 – Women's equality organisations and institutions             | 151 – Government and civil society, general institutions     | 2 032          | 4 054          | 4 726          | 11 972         | 11 972         | 29 129         | 14 357         | 45 615         | 30 969         | 31 884         | 187 552          | <b>7,4%</b>  |
| 40 – SID control including HIV/AIDS                              | 130 – Population policies/programmes and reproductive health | 729            | 729            | 2 628          | 1 118          | 1 118          | 1 067          | 47 117         | 47 030         | 41 962         | 7 102          | 151 274          | <b>5,9%</b>  |
| 50 – Removal of land mines and explosive remnants of war         | 152 – Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security | 5 000          | 7 000          |                |                |                | 27 250         | 1 000          | 18 988         | 41 519         | 39 081         | 139 789          | <b>5,5%</b>  |
| 20 – Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution | 152 – Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security |                | 292            | 3 063          | 3 970          | 3 319          | 31 454         | 28 643         | 24 789         | 19 447         | 18 431         | 133 408          | <b>5,2%</b>  |
| 10 – Environmental policy and administrative management          | 410 – General environmental protection                       | 545            | 313            | 972            | 1 372          | 5 410          | 22 094         | 30 499         | 31 908         | 27 850         | 7 202          | 128 167          | <b>5,0%</b>  |
| 20 – Primary education   | 112 – Basic education  | 6 250          | 6 288          | 20 592         | 16 271         | 25 189         | 18 699         | 6 858          | 6 482          | 10 722         | 9 966          | 127 317          | <b>5,0%</b>  |
| 10 – Social/welfare services                                     | 160 – Other social infrastructure and services               | 2 416          | 6 316          | 5 066          | 17 282         | 15 395         | 13 071         | 9 624          | 6 610          | 6 803          | 6 917          | 89 529           | <b>3,5%</b>  |
| 40 – Informal/semi-formal financial intermediaries               | 240 – Banking and financial services                         | 21 732         | 13 341         | 16 634         | 14 484         | 14 159         |                |                |                |                |                | 80 351           | <b>3,2%</b>  |
| Other sub-sectors  |  | 27 044         | 36 479         | 48 358         | 45 139         | 43 456         | 95 289         | 153 874        | 72 359         | 67 746         | 115 029        | 704 775          | <b>27,7%</b> |
| <b>Total</b>   |  | <b>109 035</b> | <b>116 026</b> | <b>150 119</b> | <b>170 007</b> | <b>184 988</b> | <b>353 481</b> | <b>407 228</b> | <b>362 802</b> | <b>343 841</b> | <b>349 279</b> | <b>2 546 806</b> |              |

\* Disbursements where "Advocacy" is present in title or description of agreement

**TABLE: NORWEGIAN BILATERAL AND MULTI-BILATERAL DEVELOPMENT AID TO ADVOCACY-RELATED ACTIVITIES, BY THE 20 LARGEST AGREEMENT PARTNERS, 2004 - 2013 (NOK 1000)**

| Agreement partner  | 2004           | 2005           | 2006           | 2007           | 2008           | 2009           | 2010           | 2011           | 2012           | 2013           | Grand total      |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| <b>UNICEF – United Nationsa Children's Fund</b>                    | 1 250          | 1 850          | 11 500         | 9 948          | 7 952          | 45 022         | 41 000         | 40 000         | 40 000         | 40 000         | 238 522          |
| <b>Kirkens Nødhjelp</b>  | 13 867         | 9 068          | 11 237         | 10 090         | 10 069         | 11 646         | 20 589         | 24 300         | 25 259         | 24 476         | 160 602          |
| <b>Strømmestiftelsen</b>   | 31 744         | 31 864         | 31 801         | 29 817         | 31 821         |                |                |                |                |                | 157 047          |
| <b>Norsk Folkehjelp</b>  | 3 421          | 5 273          | 4 745          | 2 536          | 20 604         | 32 500         | 26 000         | 11 996         | 24 915         | 20 561         | 152 552          |
| <b>IPPF – International Planned Parenthood Federation</b>          |                |                |                |                |                |                | 45 000         | 45 500         | 40 000         | 10 000         | 140 500          |
| <b>Redd Barna Norge</b>  | 5 403          | 9 686          | 3 113          | 14 243         | 24 435         | 21 182         | 9 968          | 7 993          | 11 405         | 15 176         | 122 604          |
| <b>Norges Røde Kors</b>  | 729            | 729            | 1 534          | 778            | 875            | 16 729         | 44 326         | 8 862          | 797            | 4 082          | 79 441           |
| <b>Regnskogfondet</b>  | 1 405          | 1 945          | 1 503          | 1 442          | 1 165          | 11 085         | 14 620         | 17 554         | 16 316         | 4 227          | 71 262           |
| <b>Atlas-alliansen</b>   | 3 862          | 4 539          | 4 834          | 6 977          | 8 786          | 9 929          | 6 373          | 6 495          | 6 901          | 6 836          | 65 532           |
| <b>Caritas Norge</b>   | 12 735         | 14 191         | 17 976         | 17 539         |                |                |                |                |                | 548            | 62 989           |
| <b>Flyktninghjelpen</b>  | 934            | 815            | 11 000         | 3 626          |                | 11 278         | 3 923          | 8 700          | 200            | 21 100         | 61 576           |
| <b>UN Women</b>  |                |                |                |                |                | 9 800          |                | 29 632         | 14 247         | 6 521          | 60 201           |
| <b>WWF Norge</b>   |                |                |                |                |                | 14 232         | 12 524         | 17 346         | 7 000          | 8 266          | 59 367           |
| <b>UNDP – UN Development Programme</b>                             | 6 143          | 7 000          | 1 550          |                | 6 040          | 10 400         | 12 600         | 400            | 3 700          | 4 150          | 51 983           |
| <b>CARE Norge</b>  |                |                | 6 964          | 6 853          | 9 189          | 9 396          | 6 600          | -376           | 6 000          | 5 854          | 50 481           |
| <b>ICBL – International Campaign to Ban Landmines</b>              | 5 000          |                |                |                |                |                |                | 10 500         | 14 304         | 16 170         | 45 974           |
| <b>Utviklingsfondet</b>  |                |                | 972            | 3 591          | 3 700          | 4 491          | 7 003          | 10 498         | 8 591          | 6 937          | 45 774           |
| <b>WHO – World Health Organization</b>                             |                |                |                |                |                | 42 360         | 3 000          |                |                |                | 45 360           |
| <b>UNOCHA – UN Office of Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</b> |                |                |                |                |                | 8 000          | 36 500         |                |                |                | 44 500           |
| <b>FAWE – Forum African Women Educationalists</b>                  |                | 4 000          | 4 000          | 4 000          | 5 000          | 5 000          | 5 000          | 5 000          | 5 000          |                | 37 000           |
| <b>Other Agreement partners</b>                                    | 22 543         | 25 066         | 37 390         | 58 568         | 55 350         | 90 431         | 112 202        | 118 410        | 119 204        | 154 374        | 793 538          |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>109 035</b> | <b>116 026</b> | <b>150 119</b> | <b>170 007</b> | <b>184 988</b> | <b>353 481</b> | <b>407 228</b> | <b>362 802</b> | <b>343 841</b> | <b>349 279</b> | <b>2 546 806</b> |

**ANNEX B: SOME RELEVANT EVALUATION REPORTS FROM THE EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, NORAD**

| Thematic focus                   | Report nr. / Title   |
|----------------------------------|--|
| <b>Democracy</b>                 | 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa<br>1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support (2002 – 2009)<br>2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures<br>10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations  |
| <b>Human Rights</b>              | 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)<br>7.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights<br>1.12. Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm. Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.<br>1.13. A Framework for analyzing Participation in Development  |
| <b>Peace building</b>            | 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together: Overview report of the Joint Ulstein Study of the Peacebuilding.<br>2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead<br>5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building<br>5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti (1998 – 2008)<br>5.11 Pawns of Peace. Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka (1997 – 2009)<br>6.14 Building Blocks for Peace. An Evaluation of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme   |
| <b>International Mine Action</b> | 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid   |
| <b>Networks</b>                  | 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk<br>4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen<br>2.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development assistance<br>5.14 Evaluation of Norwegian support through and to umbrella and network organizations in civil society  |
| <b>Women and child rights</b>    | 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society<br>2.05 Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans<br>3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report (1997 – 2004)<br>5.05 Evaluation of the “Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997 – 2005)<br>1.06 Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation<br>1.07 Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation<br>11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking |
| <b>Anti Corruption</b>           | 2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review<br>4.11 Study: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned<br>6.11 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts (2002 – 2009)  |
| <b>Health</b>                    | 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses<br>1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millenium Development Goals<br>4.12 Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund<br>2.13 Local Perceptions, Participation and Accountability in Malawi's Health Sector<br>7.14 Baseline. Impact Evaluation of the Norway India Partnership Initiative Phase II for Maternal and Child Health  |
| <b>Education</b>                 | 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004 – 2009 Sector Programme  |

## Annex 2: List of documents

Anderson, J.E. (1994) *Public policymaking*. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (1993) *Agendas and instability in American politics*. 3rd ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Björkdahl, A. (2008) 'Norm advocacy: A small state strategy to influence the EU'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(1): 135–54.

Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of a theory of practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brinkerhoff, D. (2010) Unpacking the concept of political will to confront corruption. Bergen: CMI. [www.cmi.no/publications/file/3699-unpacking-the-concept-of-political-will-to.pdf](http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/3699-unpacking-the-concept-of-political-will-to.pdf)

Clay, E.J. and Schaffer, B.B. (eds) (1984) *Room for manoeuvre, an explanation of public policy in agriculture and rural development*. London: Heinemann.

Coe, J. and Majot, J. (2013) 'Monitoring, evaluation and learning in NGO advocacy'. Findings from Comparative Policy Advocacy MEL Review Project. <http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/media/files/mel-in-ngo-advocacy-full-report.pdf>

Coffman, J. (2010) *Monitoring and evaluating advocacy: Companion to the advocacy toolkit*. Washington, DC: UNICEF. [www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/Advocacy\\_Toolkit\\_Companion.pdf](http://www.unicef.org/evaluation/files/Advocacy_Toolkit_Companion.pdf)

Coffman, J. and Beer, T. (2015) *The Advocacy strategy framework*. Washington, DC: Center for Evaluation Innovation.

Department for International Development (2013) *How to note: Evaluating Influence*. London: DFID. <http://advancefamilyplanning.org/sites/default/files/resources/HTN%20on%20Evaluating%20Influence%20March%202013.pdf>

Funnell, S. and Rogers, P. (2011) *Purposeful program theory: Effective use of theories of change and logic models*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bas

Grindle, M. and Thomas, J. (1990) 'After the decision: Implementing policy reforms in developing countries'. *World Development* 46(1): 1–35.

Gulrajani, N. (2015) *Bilateral donors in the 'beyond aid' agenda: The importance of institutional autonomy for donor effectiveness*. Global Economic Governance Programme Working Paper.

Hammergren, L. (1998) *Political will, constituency building, and public support in rule of law programs*. Washington, DC: Democracy Fellow Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research, USAID.

Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (1995) *Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy sub-systems*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Kalberg, S. (1980) 'Max Weber's types of rationality: Cornerstones for the analysis of rationalization processes in history'. *The American Journal of Sociology* 85(5): 1145–179.

- Katz, R., Kornblat, S., Arnold, G., Lief, E. and Fische, J.E. (2011) 'Defining health diplomacy: changing demands in the era of globalization'. *Milbank Quarterly* 89(3): 503–523.
- Kingdon, J.W. (1995) *Agendas, alternatives and public policies*. 2nd ed. New York: Harper Collins College.
- Kleistra, Y. and van Willigen, N. (2011) 'Evaluating diplomacy: A mission impossible?' *Evaluation* 16(20): 119–35.
- Leftwich, A. (2006) *From drivers of change to the politics of development: Refining the analytical framework to understand the politics of the places where we work*. York: Department of Politics, University of York.
- Lie, S.O, Gulati, D., Sommerfelt, H. and Sundby, J. (2011) 'Millennium Development Goals for health – will we reach them by 2015?' [http://tidsskriftet.no/article/2150697/en\\_GB%20from%202011](http://tidsskriftet.no/article/2150697/en_GB%20from%202011)
- Lindblom, C.E. and Woodhouse, E.J. (1993) *The policy making process*. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Marsh, D. (ed.) (1998) *Comparing Policy Networks*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Moore, M., Fjeldstad, O. H., Isaksen, J., Lundstøl, O., McCluskey, R. and Prichard, W. (2015) 'Building tax capacity in developing countries'. Policy Brief. Brighton, ICTD, IDS.
- Odén, B. (2011) *The Africa policies of Nordic countries and the erosion of the Nordic aid model: a comparative study*. Oslo: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
- Reisman, J., Gienapp, A. and Stachowiak, S. (2007) *A handbook of data collection tools*. Companion to 'a guide to measuring advocacy and policy'.
- Sabatier, P. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (eds) (1993) *Policy change and learning: An advocacy coalition approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Schjelderup, G. (2016) 'Secrecy jurisdictions'. *International Tax and Public Finance* 23(1): 168–89.
- SEEK Development Donor Tracker (2013) 'Financing and policy making for global development in Norway'. [www.donortracker.org/sites/default/files/SEEK%20Donor%20Profile%20Norway%20November%202013.pdf](http://www.donortracker.org/sites/default/files/SEEK%20Donor%20Profile%20Norway%20November%202013.pdf)
- Shiffman, J., Quissell, K., Schmitz, H.P. et al. (2015) 'A framework on the emergence and effectiveness of global health networks'. *Health Policy and Planning* 31 (Suppl 1): i3–i16.
- Smith, S.L. and Rodriguez, M.A. (2015) 'Agenda Setting for Maternal Survival: The Power of Global Health Networks and Norms'. *Health Policy and Planning* 31(Suppl 1): i48–59.
- Start, D. and Hovland, I. (2004) *Tools for policy impact: a handbook for researchers*. London: ODI. <http://odi.org.uk/resources/download/156.pdf>

Taulbee, J., Kelleher, A. and Grosvenor, P. (2014) *Norway's peace policy – soft power in a turbulent world*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Toje, A. (2013) 'State Capture of Civil Society: Effects of Patronage in the Norwegian Aid Industry', in L. Trägårdh, N. Witoszek and B. Taylor (eds) *Civil Society in the Age of Monitory Democracy*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Tryggestad, T. (2009) 'Trick or treat? The UN and implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security', *Global Governance* 15: 539–57.

Tryggestad, T. (2014) 'State feminism going global: Norway on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission', *Cooperation and Conflict* 49(4): 464–82.

Tsui, J., Hearn, S. and Young, J. (2014) *Monitoring and evaluation of policy influence and advocacy*. Working Paper 395. London: ODI. <http://www.odi.org/publications/8265-gates-monitoring-evaluating-advocacy>

Wilson-Grau, R. and Britt, H. 2012. *Outcome Harvesting*. Ford Foundation MENA Office.

### Reports

MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) (2009) *Climate, conflict and capital – Norwegian development policy adapting to change*. White Paper. Oslo: MFA. <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/report-no.-13-to-the-storting-2008-2009/id545698/?ch=1andq=>

MFA (2011) *Global health in foreign and development policy 2011-2012*. White Paper. Oslo: MFA.

MFA (2012 – 2013) *Illicit financial flows from developing countries*. Meld. St. 25. 8 Oslo: MFA. <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/meld.-st.-25-2012-2013/id721514/?ch=9>

OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2013a) *Development Assistance Committee peer review reference guide 2013-2014*. Paris: OECD. [http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/DAC\(2013\)19\\_1.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/DAC(2013)19_1.pdf)

OECD (2013b) *Development co-operation peer review Norway*. Paris: OECD. [http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Norway\\_FINAL\\_2013.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Norway_FINAL_2013.pdf)

Norad (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) (2013) 'Health and education'. Results report. [http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/results-report-2013-health-and-education\\_web.pdf](http://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/results-report-2013-health-and-education_web.pdf)

Norad (2013) 'Tax for Development'. Annual Report. [https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/skatt-for-utvikling\\_2014.pdf](https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/vedlegg-til-publikasjoner/skatt-for-utvikling_2014.pdf)

Norad (2014) *Review of PRIO's project: Gender, conflict and peacebuilding*. Report 7/2014. Oslo: Scanteam.

UN Women (2015) *Preventing conflict transforming justice securing the peace: A global study on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*. New York: UN Women.



# List of tables/figures/boxes

## LIST OF TABLES

**TABLE 1:** Summary of Norway's engagement in each of the four case study areas

**TABLE 2:** Targets (T) and channels (C) featuring in each case study

**TABLE 3:** Summary of key tactics by case study

**TABLE 4:** Summary achievements by case study

## LIST OF FIGURES

**FIGURE 1:** Relevant agreements by main sector (top 15 only)

## BOXES

**BOX 1:** Complexity parameters

# Acronyms and abbreviations

|              |  |              |                                       |
|--------------|--|--------------|---------------------------------------|
| <b>CBCR</b>  | Country-by-Country Reporting                           | <b>PRIO</b>  | Peace Research Institute Oslo         |
| <b>CSO</b>   | Civil Society Organisation                             | <b>REACH</b> | Results in Education for All Children |
| <b>DAC</b>   | Development Assistance Committee                       | <b>SDG</b>   | Sustainable Development Goal          |
| <b>DFID</b>  | UK Department for International Development            | <b>TfD</b>   | Tax for Development                   |
| <b>EFA</b>   | Education for All                                      | <b>ToR</b>   | Terms of Reference                    |
| <b>EU</b>    | European Union   | <b>UK</b>    | United Kingdom                        |
| <b>EWEC</b>  | Every Woman Every Child                                | <b>UN</b>    | United Nations                        |
| <b>FARC</b>  | Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia                 | <b>US</b>    | United States                         |
| <b>FOKUS</b> | Forum for Women and Development                        | <b>WHO</b>   | World Health Organization             |
| <b>GAVI</b>  | Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations         | <b>WPS</b>   | Women, Peace and Security             |
| <b>GFI</b>   | Global Financial Integrity                             |              |                                       |
| <b>ICT</b>   | Information and Communication Technology               |              |                                       |
| <b>IFF</b>   | Illicit Financial Flows                                |              |                                       |
| <b>MCH</b>   | Maternal and Child Health                              |              |                                       |
| <b>MDG</b>   | Millennium Development Goal                            |              |                                       |
| <b>MFA</b>   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs                            |              |                                       |
| <b>MNC</b>   | Multinational Corporation                              |              |                                       |
| <b>NGO</b>   | Non-Governmental Organisation                          |              |                                       |
| <b>Norad</b> | Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation           |              |                                       |
| <b>ODA</b>   | Official Development Assistance                        |              |                                       |
| <b>OECD</b>  | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |              |                                       |
| <b>PMNCH</b> | Partnership for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health     |              |                                       |

# Former reports from the Evaluation Department

All reports are available at our website: [www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/](http://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/)

|             |   |             |   |
|-------------|---|-------------|---|
| <b>2016</b> |   |             |   |
| 4.15        | 'Striking the Balance' Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis | 5.15        | Basis for Decisions to use Results-Based Payments in Norwegian Development Aid  |
| 3.15        | Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Literature review and programme theory                        | 4.15        | Experiences with Results-Based Payments in Norwegian Development Aid  |
| 2.15        | More than just talk? A Literature Review on Promoting Human Rights through Political Dialogue   | 3.15        | A Baseline Study of Norwegian Development Cooperation within the areas of Environment and Natural Resources Management in Myanmar |
| 1.15        | Chasing civil society? Evaluation of Fredskorpset   | 2.15        | Evaluation of Norway's support to women's rights and gender equality in development cooperation                                   |
|             |   | 1.15        | Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)  |
| <b>2015</b> |   | <b>2014</b> |   |
| 10.15       | Evaluation of Norwegian Support to capacity development   | 8.14        | Evaluation of Norway's Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake   |
| 9.15        | Evaluation series of NORHED: Evaluability study   | 7.14        | Baseline. Impact Evaluation of the Norway India Partnership Initiative Phase II for Maternal and Child Health                     |
| 8.15        | Work in Progress: How the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Partners See and Do Engagement with Crisis-Affected Populations     | 6.14        | Building Blocks for Peace. An Evaluation of the Training for Peace in Africa Programme  |
| 7.15        | Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education   | 5.14        | Evaluation of Norwegian support through and to umbrella and network organisations in civil society                                |
| 6.15        | Evaluation Series of NORHED Higher Education and Research for Development. Evaluation of the Award Mechanism                                | 4.14        | Evaluation Series of NORHED Higher Education and Research for Development. Theory of Change and Evaluation Methods                |
|             |   |             | 3.14  |
|             |   |             | Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Synthesising Report 2007-2013                       |
|             |   |             | 2.14  |
|             |   |             | Unintended Effects in Evaluations of Norwegian Aid  |
|             |   |             | 1.14  |
|             |   |             | Can We Demonstrate the Difference that Norwegian Aid Makes? Evaluation of results measurement and how this can be improved        |
|             |   |             | <b>2013</b>   |
|             |   |             | 5.13  |
|             |   |             | Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Measurement, Reporting and Verification             |
|             |   |             | 4.13  |
|             |   |             | Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP                      |
|             |   |             | 3.13  |
|             |   |             | Evaluation of the Norway India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health   |
|             |   |             | 2.13  |
|             |   |             | Local Perception, Participation and Accountability in Malawi's Health Sector  |
|             |   |             | 1.13  |
|             |   |             | A Framework for Analysing Participation in Development  |

**2012**

- 9.12 Evaluation of Norway's Bilateral Agricultural Support to Food Security
- 8.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
- 7.12 A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society Organisations
- 6.12 Facing the Resource Curse: Norway's Oil for Development Program
- 5.12 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations
- 4.12 Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
- 3.12 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001-2011
- 2.12 Hunting for Per Diem. The Uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries
- 1.12 Mainstreaming disability in the new development-paradigm

**2011**

- 10.11 Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana
- 9.11 Activity-Based Financial Flows in UN System: A study of Select UN Organisations
- 8.11 Norway's Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations: A Synthesis Study

- 7.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights
- 6.11 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, 2002-2009
- 5.11 Pawns of Peace. Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
- 4.11 Study: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned
- 3.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South
- 2.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance
- 1.11 Evaluation: Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO's in East Africa

**2010**

- 18.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 17.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Tanzania
- 16.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Indonesia
- 15.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Guyana
- 14.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo

- 13.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Brasil
- 12.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)
- 11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
- 10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations
- 9.10 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives
- 8.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International
- 7.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans
- 6.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Uganda Case Study
- 5.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Bangladesh Case Study
- 4.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Africa Case Study
- 3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
- 2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures
- 1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002-2009

**2009**

- 7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid
- 5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008
- 4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage
- 4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
- 3.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)
- 3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
- 2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
- 2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
- 1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millenium Development Goals
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme

**2008**

- 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
- 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation the EEA Grants
- 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
- 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
- 2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
- 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise
- 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries

**2007**

- 5.07 Evaluation of the Development -Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development -Support to Zambia (1991 - 2005)
- 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
- 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
- 2.07 Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
- 1.07 Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn
- 1.07 Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation

**2006**

- 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
- 1.06 Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation

**2005**

- 5.05 Evaluation of the “Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)”
- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
- 2.05 – Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
- 1.05 – Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 – Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme

**2004**

- 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
- 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
- 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR’s activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
- 2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead

- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peace-building.

**2003**

- 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk
- 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for Africa in the World Bank
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)

**2002**

- 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMA An ILO program for “Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives” in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMA Un programme du BIT sur l’« Appui associatif et coopératif aux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l’Ouest de 1978 à 1999
- 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)

**2001**

- 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
- 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
- 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
- 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
- 1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund

**2000**

- 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway’s Special Grant for the Environment
- 9.00 “Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?” Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East
- 8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme
- 7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation

- 6.00 Making Government Smaller and More Efficient.  
The Botswana Case
- 5.00 Evaluation of the NUFU programme
- 4.00 En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand  
gjennomfrivillige organisasjoner 1987–1999
- 3.00 The Project “Training for Peace in Southern Africa”
- 2.00 Norwegian Support to the Education Sector.  
Overview of Policies and Trends 1988–1998
- 1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development  
Cooperation 1988–1997

## **1999**

- 10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of European  
Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI, The African  
European Institute
- 9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital  
Development Fund (UNCDF)
- 8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness
- 7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction  
in Norwegian Development Aid