







# Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa

Report 1/2011 – Evaluation

Volume I



**Norad**

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# **Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa**

**Volume I  
March 2011**

**Ternstrom Consulting AB**



## Preface

In 2006 the Rattsø Commission, established by the Norwegian Government with the mandate to assess the role of the Norwegian civil society in development cooperation, recommended that the Government should take more responsibility for evaluation of the work of Norwegian Civil Society.


The evaluation of the results of development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa is the third evaluation report commissioned by Norad's evaluation department in response to the Rattsø Commission. It aims at assessing the achievements of Norwegian organisations and their partners in 15 randomly selected long-term development projects operating in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda from 2005-2009. The evaluation questions focused on how and to what extent intended results have been achieved and to what extent the organisations apply results based management approaches. This also included an assessment of how results are documented, how the organisations and project activities contribute to strengthening local civil society and whether the projects are relevant to the target groups.

The report concludes that the studied projects were in line with Norwegian government policy for development assistance and achieved their intended results to a high extent, and that in most cases the project activities do contribute to strengthening local civil society. The projects' objectives were in line with Norwegian priorities, and with the priorities of the host governments. There was a focus on poverty alleviation, women and children. However, the system has significant scope for improved transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. The report documents great variation among the NGOs in terms of the extent and quality of preparation and documentation, and a lack of transparency in the funding chain. In most cases the NGOs do not invest sufficiently in project preparation, and insufficient documentation were found at all phases of the project cycle.

The target groups were vulnerable or excluded and many of the projects were located in marginal and insecure areas in the poorest regions of their countries. This may partly explain that there were little or no involvement of target groups in project design and monitoring. Active participation was seen as a result rather than as a process in a majority of the projects.

The overall achievement, assessed to be 73-85 per cent of intended results, is a bit higher than more general findings in evaluations, i.e. that between two thirds and three quarters of development programmes succeed in achieving their intended results. One should, however, take into account that only projects that had been active for a certain number of years were selected, thus excluding possible projects stopped at an early stage due to failure.

The evaluation has been carried out by Ternstrom consulting AB supported by experts in the countries studied.



Asbjørn Eidhammer  
Director of Evaluation

## Acknowledgements

It has been a privilege, and great learning, to meet the children, women and men who have chosen to engage in the various projects that we have studied.

The staff and volunteers of the NGOs, the officers of local and national authorities, learning institutions and representatives of other stakeholders have all accepted our intrusion into their busy schedules and given their time with generous mixes of hospitality and professionalism.

We have met a great number of people willing to share information, describe the challenges and successes of their lives and professions and, from time to time, engage in debate on the issues.

Everywhere, we have been treated with grace and patience.

The evaluation team wishes to thank the many people who, by choosing to take time out of their daily chores to welcome us into their villages, homes or offices, made this evaluation possible.

Stockholm, March 2011,

Björn Ternström  
Team Leader

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This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of Norad's evaluation department.



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
Volume II of this report containing the case studies in full is available electronically at [www.norad.no/Evaluation](http://www.norad.no/Evaluation)

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABEK	Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja
ACT	Alliance of Churches Together
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ARC-Aid	Action Resort for Change (Norway based)
ARC-Kenya	Action Resort for Change (Kenya based)
CAT	Change Agent Training
CBR	Community Based Rehabilitation
CCT	Centre Coordinating Tutor
CIK	Care International in Kenya
COWA	Companionship of Works Association
CPTC	Core Primary Teachers' College
CSWD	Chole Society for Women's Development
CVTS	Centenary Vocational Training School
DIAC	Dodoma Inter-African Committee
DPO	Disabled Persons Organisation
EAC	East Africa Cup
ECDE	Early Childhood Development and Education
ELCK	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Kenya
EMACK	Education for Marginalised Children in Kenya
EMIMA	Education, Sport and Physical Activity (Elimu Michezo na Mazoezi)
FBOs	Faith Based Organisations
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FOKUS	Forum for Women and Development
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IRCPT	Inter-Religious Council for Peace Tanzania
KCA	Kenya Change Agent Association
KES	Kenyan Shillings
KF	Kvinnefronten
KRIK	Christian Sports Organisation in Norway (Kristen Idrettskontakt)
LAP	Legal Aid Project
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
LO	Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge)
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NAD	Norwegian Association for the Disabled
NAFGEM	Network Against Female Genital Mutilation
NBA	Norwegian Bar Association

NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NLM	Norwegian Lutheran Mission
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty
NWD	North West Diocese (ELCK)
NWF	Norwegian Women and Family Association (Norges Kvinne- og Familieforbund)
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PTC	Primary Teachers' College
PWD	Person With Disabilities
QEP	Quality Education Project
RB	Redd Barna
RBM	Results Based Management
SCiU	Save the Children in Uganda
SCN	Save the Children Norway
SCS	Strengthening Civil Society
SF	Stromme Foundation
SMC	School Management Committee
SMFEA	Stromme Microfinance East Africa Ltd
SNGO	Southern Non-governmental Organisation
TAMWA	Tanzania Media Women's Association
TZS	Tanzanian Shillings
UGX	Ugandan Shillings
VCAT	Village Change Agent Training
WCRP	World Conference on Religions for Peace
WCRP-T	World Conference on Religions for Peace-Tanzania
WHO	World Health Organisation
VICOBA	Village Community Bank
ZATUC	Zanzibar Trade Union Congress

## Approximate Project Locations



NB! Multi-location projects are placed in the host country capital with a dotted arrow.

## List of Projects and Project Acronyms Used in this Report

Norwegian organisation(s)	Southern organisation(s)	Project name in Norad Document	Project Acronym
<b>Tanzania</b>			
FOKUS Women's Front of Norway <i>Kvinnefronten</i> (KF)	Dodoma Inter-African Committee (DIAC)	Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation, Dodoma	KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma
FOKUS Women's Front of Norway <i>Kvinnefronten</i>	Chole Society for Women's Development (CSWD)	Women and health project, Chole Island	KF/Women and Health, Chole
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) <i>Kirkens Nødhjelp</i>	The World Conference on Religions for Peace (WCRP), Tanzania	Capacity Development for Interfaith Cooperation	NCA/Interfaith Cooperation
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions <i>LO – Landsorganisasjonen i Norge</i>	Zanzibar Trade Union Congress (ZATUC)	Education and Organisational Development	LO/ZATUC
Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) Christian Sports Organisation in Norway	EMIMA	Youth Rights, East Africa Cup (EAC)	NPA/Youth Rights EAC
Strømme Foundation	Stromme Microfinance East Africa Ltd.	Microfinance in Tanzania	SF/Micro-finance

<b>Norwegian organisation(s)</b>	<b>Southern organisation(s)</b>	<b>Project name in Norad Document</b>	<b>Project Acronym</b>
<b>Kenya</b>			
Bistandsnemda Norsk Luthersk Misjonssamband (NLM)	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Kenya (ELCK)	Chesta Girls Secondary School	NLM/Chesta Girls School
CARE Norway	CARE International in Kenya	Lok Pachi - Change Your Attitude	CARE/Lok Pachi
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	Norwegian Church Aid Kenya, Habiba International Women and Youth Affairs	Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Awareness Creation and Mobilisation	NCA/ Habiba FGM Awareness
Action Resort for Change (ARC), ARC-Aid <i>Stiftelsen ARC-Aid</i>	Uganda Change Agent Association (UCAA), Foodsnet, Kenya ARC-Kenya Kenya Change Agents	Change Agent Training Programme	ARC/Change Agent Training
<b>Uganda</b>			
ATLAS –Alliansen, Norwegian Association for the Disabled (NAD)	Government of Uganda, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development	Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) in Uganda	NAD/ Community Based Rehabilitation
Norwegian Bar Association (NBA) <i>Den Norske Advokatforening</i>	Uganda Law Society	Legal Aid Project (LAP)	NBA/Legal Aid
FOKUS Norwegian Women and Family Association (NWF) <i>Norges Kvinne- og Familieforbund</i>	Companionship of Works Association (COWA)	Vocational Training to Disadvantaged Girls	NWF/ Vocational Training
Save the Children Norway (SCN) <i>Redd Barna (RB)</i>	Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU)	Early Childhood Development and Education (ECDE)	RB/ECDE Education
Save the Children Norway <i>Redd Barna</i>	Save the Children in Uganda	Quality Education Project (QEP)	RB/Quality Education





# Executive Summary





## Executive Summary

This evaluation of the results of development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa was commissioned by Norad's evaluation department. It was undertaken in the summer and fall of 2010 and seeks to identify what results were achieved by projects implemented by non-governmental organisations, funded by the Norwegian government.

As laid out in the *Terms of Reference*, the evaluation has a dual *purpose*:

- i. to respond to a need for evaluations of development cooperation through NGOs,
- ii. to enable a more nuanced and evidence-based perspective and policy debate on the role of Norwegian NGOs as a channel of official development assistance. This implies that it shall contribute to learning as well as accountability.

The *objective* of the evaluation is to *document* and assess the

- i. *results* brought about by projects supported by Norwegian NGOs and the
- ii. *processes* behind the changes.

The evaluation consists of a main report and 15 case studies containing supportive information. The case studies are rapid assessments based on document reviews, project visits and key stakeholder interviews, not regular in-depth and rigorous project evaluations.

### **Overall Findings**

We present our findings in five sections; Background and Contextualisation, Results Based Management, Approach, Achievement of Results and Cost and Scale.

#### *Background and Contextualisation*

We found that the funding system lacks transparency. Allocated funds need to pass six to nine administrative levels on their way from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the affected people for which they are intended. Different administrative levels budget and report in different ways; some have a programmatic approach, some focus on themes or projects. Field level expenses in the host country were, in general, clear but transparency decreased as we moved up through the levels. We could not identify how much the different administrative levels cost and such information was, to our knowledge, not always shared with southern partners, even when funded with Norad funds for the project. Norad's systems were not always project based and when combined with an NGO system that was programme or theme based, it was not always possible for us to identify even the total of how much money had been used per project, per year.

NGO north-south partnerships had developed over time in a number of ways. This process was better characterised as matchmaking than systematic selection. Partnerships based on “vertical coherence”, i.e. similar mental models in north and south appeared to work better, refer for example members of the same international network (e.g. CARE and Save the Children) or similar professional background (e.g. Bar Association in Norway working with Bar Association in Uganda or LO Norway working with ZATUC its counterpart in Zanzibar). The same comment can be made for the vertically integrated organisations (e.g. Stromme).

Overall, the projects were knowledgeable about local conditions and had adapted to opportunities and constraints. They were also in line with host government stated priorities and kept local authorities well informed on their activities. There were large variations in how well they collaborated with local authorities, some doing the minimum, some designed with close host government interaction as a core project strategy.

#### *Results Based Management*

Results Based Management (RBM) is a methodology intended to support management and other implementers in focusing their efforts on achieving results. The methodology is an adaptation of the commonly used Logical Framework Approach, which structures project design by requiring definitions of e.g. overall objectives, immediate objectives, planned activities and outcomes, indicators for measurement of progress, needed input and potential risks. Norad encourages NGOs to use it.

Most projects did not use RBM systematically. Basic understanding of the methodology was there and projects had defined overall and more immediate objectives.

Documented baseline data was lacking in most projects as was an appropriately operationalised strategic plan. This implies that any attempt to systematically measure progress towards the intended results will fail for lack of a starting point for comparison. Only six projects undertook systematic, documented monitoring although more than half of the projects had developed usable indicators for a significant proportion of their activities.

There was, however, a clear pattern of improved understanding for and use of results based management over time. A few NGOs had built results based management principles into their organisational systems and procedures. They generated management decisions and reporting focused on results. Norad’s reporting requirements were flexible and accommodated the organisations’ own reporting formats when these fulfilled basic criteria.

#### *Approach*

Some NGOs had an understanding of what Strengthening Civil Society meant but none could give a clear definition of what it comprised. This was the case even when project activities clearly contributed to such strengthening. There were multiple examples where such strengthening took place.

Target groups were vulnerable or excluded or both. Many of the projects were located in marginal and insecure areas, in the poorest regions of their countries. The projects were assessed to be highly relevant and important to the target groups.

Project design and monitoring were to a large extent done without the involvement of target groups. Some project designs involved the target groups more in project implementation. Active participation was seen as a result rather than as a process in a majority of the projects.

#### *Achievement of Results*

Most projects lacked the data and information required to be able to measure changes in indicators for key results accurately. We therefore had to rely on the qualified assessments of the evaluators on the team. We assess that there was a reasonable-to-good correspondence between achievements reported in project documents/reviews and what we observed.

We assess the results achievement to be high – or very high. (Achieving 73-85% of intended results, depending on assessment method). In our opinion there was a clear causal link between project activities and achieved results. This means that the results observed were thanks to the projects, not caused by environmental changes, national development or other external factors. The identified unintended side-effects of the projects' activities were mainly positive.

#### *Cost and Scale*

The overall field level cost-effectiveness, taking side-effects into account, is assessed to be high on average. It varies markedly across the different projects however. As many project designs were based on significant contributions from other stakeholders, including the local government and the beneficiaries themselves, reported expenditure systematically underestimated the real cost of results achieved.

There were significant economies of scale. Projects with small target groups had higher, or very much higher, costs per beneficiary.

Most projects reached less than 25 % of their target population<sup>1</sup>. This was in general a result of ill-defined target populations or unrealistic targets. However, we also note that the system, the “NGO channel”, did not scale up and/or replicate best practice to the extent possible.

---

<sup>1</sup> We differentiate between target group, i.e. the planned immediate beneficiaries of a project (e.g. “these 67 poor women with HIV in village A”) and target population i.e. the people in the project area that fulfil the criteria for getting assistance through the project (e.g. all poor women with HIV living in the district).

## Overall Conclusions and Recommendations

We conclude that the studied projects were in line with Norwegian government policy for development assistance<sup>2</sup> and achieved their intended results to a high extent. However, the system has significant scope for improved transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. Some basic methodological/administrative improvements are proposed. Most build on existing Norad and NGO initiatives (e.g. improved documentation and more focus on results). Some might require decisions by parliament (replace current funding system with a more prioritised process).

### *Conclusion: The projects' objectives were in line with Norwegian priorities*

We found no project that had objectives in contradiction with Norwegian government policy for development assistance. There was a focus on poverty alleviation, on women and children. Methods included capacity building of individuals, groups or institutions through formal education, informal training and development of methods, policies and physical infrastructure. Target groups were excluded or vulnerable or both. Most projects were also adapted to the local context and in line with host government stated priorities.

### *Conclusion: The projects achieved their intended results to a high extent*

We assess that the projects achieved their intended key results to a high – or very high – extent. Due to a lack of baseline studies and properly identified intended results, we were not able to *measure* the extent to which the projects had achieved their intended results. However, having gone through project documentation, interviewed key informants and conducted field visits we could make a qualified assessment of how well the projects had achieved their intended key results. Overall, they had done well, or very well.

### *Conclusion: Preparation and Documentation was often of poor quality*

There was great variation among the NGOs in terms of the extent and quality of preparation and documentation. In most cases the NGOs did not invest sufficiently in project preparation. We found serious problems with documentation at all phases of the project cycle. The gaps ranged from missing baseline data, non-documentation of the analysis underlying the chosen project strategy, reports on activities without links to results, absence of or inadequately analysed cost data to information overload in the form of detailed data collected regarding activities in projects where results were not documented at all. Some of the problems were quite basic.

Like Norad, some of the NGOs had budgets by programme, not project, and could not identify how much of an overall grant had been invested in a particular project. Funds passed through multiple levels and we were not able to identify the cost of each level and how they were funded. Project objectives were seldom linked to evidence based documented analysis of the situation in the project area. Indicators, when identified, commonly lacked base values and ambitions were not quantified, time bound or measurable.

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2 As summarised in Report to the Storting No. 35 (2003-2004), Fighting Poverty Together  
[http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/stp/20032004/0003/ddd/pdts/stp200320040003ud\\_dddpdts.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/stp/20032004/0003/ddd/pdts/stp200320040003ud_dddpdts.pdf)

We see four serious problems with the poor quality of documentation; loss of potential effectiveness, loss of learning, reduced potential for sharing best practice with other development stakeholders and lack of accountability.

*Recommendation to Norad:* Norad should, by 2012, ensure that its own follow-up systems are adapted to its level of ambition for follow-up (for example, if Norad has the ambition to evaluate at project level, grants cannot be tracked at programme level only).

*Recommendation to Norad:* Norad should require organisations receiving funds to increase investment in results based management capacity building until they can show that the principles are applied in project implementation at all administrative levels, including the implementing field level. Applications with vague objectives and un-measurable indicators should be turned down, starting 2013.

*Recommendation to NGOs:* NGOs should invest more in helping their staff understand the potential for improved implementation effectiveness that results based management has, if sensibly implemented. Incentive structures, appraisals etc. should be based on results achieved, not activities implemented. As a minimum ambition, NGOs should aim to have clear objectives and SMART<sup>3</sup> indicators for all projects by 2013.

*Conclusion: Small projects cost significantly more per person reached*

There were structural reasons for this. Most of them were related to economies of scale. The quality of documentation makes the estimates approximate but the largest projects cost less than NOK 100 per beneficiary, the smallest several thousand NOK.

Several of the small projects did not expand, even if they could have made a difference for more people (“we cannot expand further, the compound is not big enough”). In some projects, a lack of broader analysis led to activities with limited scope and impact (e.g. building a school instead of improving the existing school system or working on attitudinal change).

It is important, however, to place these characteristics of small projects in context. These projects may well be extremely beneficial and worthwhile. This is true in cases where the project contributes something beyond the good or service delivered to the beneficiaries. Pilot projects designed to try out a new methodology or test a new stakeholder relationship are good examples of where it may be argued that such special circumstances exist. Another example would be projects where one of the planned objectives is to contribute to the development of the Norwegian NGO in Norway for example by contributing to better public awareness around a particular development issue. These were not stated objectives of the small projects within our sample.

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3 There are multiple definitions of SMART. We refer to Specific, Measurable, Agreed-upon, Realistic and Time-bound.

*Recommendation to Norad:* Norad should continue to fund small projects but only if special circumstances exist and can be clearly identified, and should instruct the umbrella organisations to act in the same way. By 2012, it should be a requirement that such particular circumstances be explicitly highlighted and convincingly described in any small-scale project proposal.

*Conclusion: The system failed to replicate and scale up successful activities*

Large projects also missed opportunities to scale-up. In at least one case, a successful rapidly expanding project activity (microfinance) was not expanded further as it did not match organisational priorities. In other cases, successful large projects were not continued, nor repeated in other areas of the host countries. Project organisations were therefore disbanded, experience lost and the wheel will need to be reinvented next time (an effect that was accentuated by the poor documentation).

We note that these instances – where a lack of competence, organisational will or resources for expansion cause tried and tested ways of development not to be scaled up – are systemic failures resulting in human potential lost.

*Recommendation to NGOs:* NGOs should develop their “surge” capacity and be prepared to focus on successful programme components where results are clear and positive. They should actively seek to expand and replicate successful programmes. Getting good results replicated on a large, even massive, scale should be an explicit aim.

Expansion and long-term maintenance of programmes requires a different skill set and resource base than that needed to run a pilot project, start up a programme, capacity build emerging civil society organisations, explore new methodologies etc.

*Recommendation to NGOs:* NGOs should actively explore new organisational arrangements when blessed with a highly successful programme that should be expanded and replicated. Such arrangements might include franchising, splitting off mature programmes in the form of independent, new NGOs or foundations, transfer of management to government, larger NGOs or even private companies etc. The question to be addressed is “Where would the positive results of this programme grow most rapidly for the benefit of our target groups?”

*Conclusion: There are gaps in the system for prioritisation of resources*

Based on our discussions with the organisations there seems to be a common perception, strengthened by the fund-raising tactics of some organisations, that any NGO with a project will get funded by Norad if some rather basic criteria are fulfilled. Norad’s Department for Civil Society denies that this is the case and cites the many organisations that do not get support as evidence of effective prioritisation.

The Principles for Norads Support to Civil Society in the South (Norad 2009) and the Rules for Support to Civil Society Actors – Chapter 160.70 (Norad 2009) are the documents governing selection.



The Principles are quite broad while the nine criteria to be applied when assessing organisations in the Rules are more specific. We would argue that at least five of the criteria are difficult, if not impossible, to measure given the quality of data being systematically collected. We believe that this indicates gaps in systematic prioritisation within the application process which needlessly decrease the quality and quantity of benefits reaching the target groups.

*Recommendation to MFA;* The MFA should task Norad to propose indicators allowing prioritisation to take place based on the specified criteria and to develop an incentive structure to support such priorities. Quality of documentation and systematic benchmarking should be accorded greater weight in the allocation of scarce resources.

We propose that projects be given preference if they systematically document:


- Results for the target group;
- Strengthening of civil society, including capacity building of southern partner;
- Methodological development, including pilot projects;
- Increased productivity/decreased cost per result at all administrative levels;
- Good interaction with other development actors, including host government;
- Ability and willingness to replicate and scale up successful activities.

*Recommendation to Norad:* Based on the above, Norad should develop, and recommend to MFA, a new funding system with continued long term framework agreements. Allocation of limited resources based on percentage NGO contribution or historical level of budgets should be phased out. NGO funding should instead be based on an assessment of the NGOs quality of programming and subsequent prioritisation. Such assessment should combine documented achievement of results with the NGO's level of capacity and ambition in terms of innovation and risk.

This recommendation is formulated to take a balanced position in relation to the debate on managing *by results* or *for results*. Managing *by results* involves allocating resources based on historical performance, skewing distribution in favour of simple, proven methods targeted at easy-to-reach target groups. Managing *for results* focuses on the quality of programme design and learning, allowing innovative approaches to be tested in difficult to reach areas. Proven cost-efficiency is less emphasized with this approach. Effective overall development programming requires elements from both approaches.



# Main Report





# 1. Introduction and Background

This evaluation was commissioned by Norad's evaluation department and was implemented in the summer and fall of 2010. The focus of the evaluation is development cooperation through Norwegian non-governmental organisations (NGOs)<sup>4</sup>. Information from 15 different projects in three countries of Eastern Africa is used to explore questions relating to achievement of results and processes that may have contributed to this.

The evaluation consists of a main report and 15 case studies containing supportive information. The case studies are rapid assessments based on document reviews, project visits and key stakeholder interviews, not regular in-depth and rigorous project evaluations.

The *purpose* of the evaluation is to respond to a need for evaluations of development cooperation through NGOs, and to enable a more nuanced and evidence-based perspective and policy debate on the role of Norwegian NGOs as a channel of official development assistance. It thus has a dual purpose covering accountability and learning.

The *objective* is to document and assess the results brought about by projects supported by Norwegian NGOs and the processes behind the changes. In doing this the evaluation also addresses some of the issues that feature in current criticism of development aid through NGOs, such as results orientation and documentation, the meaning of strengthening civil society, and relevance for the target group.<sup>5</sup>

The evaluation can also be seen as a Norad response to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' challenge that the NGOs need to become better at documenting their results in the fight against poverty.<sup>6</sup>

## 1.1 Overall context of the evaluation

NGOs are well established actors on the international development arena. They may be local or national, from developing or donor countries and they may be international. Most government donors channel some of their official development assistance through NGOs, meaning that the organizations receive grants directly from the donor government.

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<sup>4</sup> The term non-governmental organization is used throughout this document. It is understood to carry the same meaning as civil society organization and is here interpreted in a broad sense to include e.g. trade unions.

<sup>5</sup> See Terms of Reference, Annex 4.

<sup>6</sup> Report No 13 to the Storting (2008-2009).

In the final decades of the 20th century the amount of resources for development activities that were channelled through NGOs increased enormously, as did the number of registered NGOs, both national and international.<sup>7</sup> This took place in parallel with a series of processes including the end of the Cold War, the increased prominence and importance of emerging markets, especially China, India and Brazil, continuing high level of extreme poverty, rapid political changes and increased implementation capacity of many southern governments. These processes catalysed a significant critique of the way that development was being supported through the international system.

One result of this critique was the process that led up to the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the year 2000. The Norwegian government took an active part in this process and its current development policy strongly supports the fulfilment of MDGs.<sup>8</sup>

In 2008 NOK 4,86 billion of the total Norwegian official development assistance of NOK 22,6 billion was channelled through NGOs. This equals 21 percent and the proportion has remained approximately the same in recent years. Most of the NGOs receiving this support are Norwegian; in 2008 they received about NOK 3,44 of the total 4,86 billion that was channelled through NGOs. This means that Norwegian NGOs play a significant role in Norwegian development cooperation – they manage 15 percent of the annual development budget of the government.<sup>9</sup>

## 1.2 Norwegian context of the evaluation

The broader context of this evaluation relates to the role of civil society in Norwegian history. Norad defines civil society as “an arena separate from family, state and market where individuals voluntarily associate to advance common views and interests on their own or on others’ account. This definition is more inclusive than one based on a narrow understanding of self-interest. It thus embraces a broad spectrum of organisational forms in the south, ranging from professional NGOs and social mass movements to traditional structures and local and informal networks” (Norad, 2009a, p.5).

There is a Norwegian tradition of an extremely strong civil society. The Norwegian political system and the welfare state are widely seen as a result of the interaction between civil society and the state. In political science this has been described as the ‘two-channel system’ (Rokkan, 1987), the parliamentary system with political parties, and a corporate system with both interest organisations and idealistic altruistic organisations. The possibility for Norwegian citizens to participate in the political process through a variety of different channels has been seen as very important for the shaping of society.

In Report No 35 to the Storting (2003-2004) it is stated that “Norway gives high priority to strengthening civil society in its partner countries. Norway’s contributions in this field aim at reinforcing the role of civil society as a driving force to achieve

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7 See e.g. Riddell (2009).

8 Report No.35 to the Storting (2003-2004)

9 The national budget, Report no.1 (2009-10), pp. 39 – 41, as quoted in the Terms of Reference, Annex 4.

national and international development goals, promote respect for human rights and foster more open, democratic societies. By providing support for specific joint projects which entail cooperation between Norwegian organizations [...] and local organizations and companies in developing countries, Norway contributes towards the development of sustainable economic activities.”<sup>10</sup>

The role of Norwegian NGOs in development has been manifest in four main forms, each of which has been assisted by Norad:

- a. Norwegian NGOs as professional subcontractors of development activities, or part of international organisations that have that same role, refer e.g. ‘the big five’. This is a group of relief and development organisations with big headquarters, strong international networks, and a professional approach to their work. Complementing the work of these larger agencies is a growing number of smaller organisations that have many of the same characteristics. The big five are Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross), Save the Children (Redd Barna), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC);
- b. Norwegian NGOs that have been active in international, primarily missionary, work who have repositioned themselves into development aid;
- c. Norwegian NGOs with expertise focused on activities in Norway which could be used internationally, e.g. fisheries in the early days, more recently the oil industry; and
- d. Norwegian NGOs whose work was focused entirely on domestic issues but who were then stimulated to think “out of the box” and “out of the country”. The national women’s association is an example.

The government’s main means to get NGO engagement was money. In the 1970s, Norad introduced an “80-20” principle which meant that projects accepted by Norad could get up to 80% funding if the NGO raised the remaining 20%. The implementation of this principle has been a huge success in the sense that by 2002, more than 100 Norwegian NGOs had projects part-financed by Norad, jointly receiving more than 3.000 MNOK (Report No. 35 to the Storting, 2003-2004, p 190). In 2001 the percentage was changed to “90-10”.

Relief funding is administered by MFA and Norad is responsible for NGO long-term development programmes. In development programming Norad commonly enters into Frame Agreements for 3-5 years at a time with each NGO, either directly or through an umbrella organisation. There are three umbrella organisations, all funded by Norad; Atlas coordinating NGOs support people with disabilities, Bistandsnemda, coordinating the smaller Christian organisations and FOKUS which coordinates Women’s NGOs.

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<sup>10</sup> Report No 35 to the Storting (2003-2004), p. 182

The Frame Agreements give the NGO some assurance of funding over the agreed time period. This provides it with greater predictability for planning and allows the NGO to build a deeper relationship with southern partner NGOs than would be possible with one-off discrete funds provided on a project-to-project basis.

The administrative arrangements surrounding development assistance through NGOs began to develop in the sixties. Over time it came to be called the “NGO channel”. In the eighties it began to expand rapidly, in line with global trends. As earlier mentioned these global trends also led to critique and eventually to the MDG process. In Paris on March 2nd, 2005, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions made a solemn pledge to adhere to certain commitments aiming at improving aid effectiveness. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasises five commitments: *Ownership*; emphasising partner country leadership and capacity development and donor country willingness to support such strengthening; *Alignment*; emphasising partner country strengthening of administration and financial management and donor country acceptance of national development priorities; *Harmonisation*; emphasising partner country clarity and openness regarding how they view donors’ comparative advantages and donor country improvement of coordination and harmonisation of procedures and policies; *Managing for results*; both partner countries and donor countries commit to re-focusing on results in their joint efforts for development; and *Mutual accountability*; emphasising accountability and transparency in the use of development resources.<sup>11</sup>

All questions in the Terms of Reference can be directly or indirectly linked to one of the five commitments of the Paris declaration. This evaluation may therefore be seen as part of the Norwegian government’s assessment of its efforts to live up to its commitments under the Paris declaration.

In the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed a committee to review the role of Norwegian NGOs in official development cooperation. The report of the “Rattsø Commission” as it became known, pointed at weaknesses in the evaluation of the development work of NGOs and asked government authorities to take more responsibility for evaluations in this field.<sup>12</sup> As a response to this Norad’s evaluation department initiated a series of evaluations of development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs and their partners at country level. In 2007 an evaluation was completed in Guatemala<sup>13</sup>, the following year another evaluation was done in Northern Uganda<sup>14</sup>. This evaluation may also be seen as the next step in that process.

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11 OECD (2008).

12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006).

13 Norad (2007).

14 Norad (2009c).



## 2. Methodology and Analysis

### 2.1 Evaluation purpose, role and scope


The objective of the evaluation is to document and assess the *results* brought about by projects supported by Norwegian NGOs and the *processes* behind the changes.

The role of the evaluation is to provide evidence-based data and analysis that can be used in the policy debate on Norwegian NGOs described in the ToRs.

The scope of the evaluation focuses on long-term development interventions and is limited to the study of 15 projects in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The projects were pre-selected by Norad's evaluation department by a random sampling procedure, which makes it possible, to some extent, to generalize beyond the specific results obtained.

The tender document lists 13 evaluation questions to be addressed (Refer Annex 4). There, the questions are grouped in three clusters: (1) *Background information on the projects*, including project, implementation partner and contextual information. (2) *Managing for results*, which asks if the NGOs have understood and applied Results Based Management approaches. The third cluster consisted of two parts, which we have divided into (3) *Approach*, inquiring about the understanding of and approach regarding strengthening of civil society and capacity building of local partner, involvement of and relevance for target group and cost-effectiveness and (4) *Achievement of results*, focusing on intended and unexpected results. Our approach to the evaluation and to answering the 13 questions has encompassed activities at four conceptual levels as illustrated below:

**Figure 1. The four conceptual levels of this evaluation**



## 2.2 Limitations

During the evaluation process, we encountered a number of limitations that affected the way the work could be carried out:

- Many of the projects were located in areas with very limited transportation and communication infrastructure, forcing the team to spend a lot of time travelling.
- The security situation prevented some team members from visiting certain projects NCA/ Habiba FGM Awareness (Mandera) and RB/ECDE Education (Karamoja) on the advice of their embassies.
- Several of the projects had already ended, making it difficult to find key informants and also to locate important parts of project documentation.
- The evaluation period coincided with school holidays and in several cases public holidays were declared at short notice.
- A lack of project documentation, as well as the quality of the documentation that was obtained, forced us to change and adapt the methodology to be used for measuring achievement of results.

We have tried to accommodate for these disturbances as best we could, but they have to some extent affected the quality of the results. The last limitation is the most serious one, and is discussed at length below under “Measuring achievement of results”.

## 2.3 Respecting context, team bias and ensuring consistency

The organisations involved in the case-study projects encompass a wide and rich variety of different civil society bodies, operating at different levels and in very different contexts. Their members and staff and the ultimate beneficiaries of their programmes and projects come from societies whose social, economic and cultural practices may be difficult for outsiders to interpret, even if they have a multi-year presence in-country. This led us to select an evaluation team that drew together people from different backgrounds and with a range of different skills enabling them to analyse organisations and projects from multiple perspectives.

We do not believe that any team is free of bias. The interested reader should therefore know something of who has produced the text. The country teams were recruited from the four case countries.<sup>15</sup> Methodological specialists, quality control and team leadership were all recruited from non-studied countries. These were all from northern countries, most with significant personal experience of living and working in countries of the South.

In total 13 persons were part of the team, of these seven were male and six female. Each country team had both female and male members. All team members had academic degrees, several were full time academics and all lead comfortable lives compared to the vast majority of the people in the target groups and even in the project staffing structures. More than half of the team members were so deeply involved in the international aid/development sector that they were financially dependent on it, although none worked for Norad or any of the organisations studied. Apart from their own consultancies, only four team members had significant

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<sup>15</sup> Kenya, Norway, Tanzania and Uganda. In Norway the country team consisted of the team coordinator and a Norwegian policy specialist, in the East African countries there was a country coordinator and a research assistant in each country.

private sector experience. Throughout our work we tried to maintain an awareness of how we were different from, and similar to, the studied organisations and target groups.

Another way of avoiding bias is to ensure good triangulation. We systematically sought to triangulate both sources and methodological tools used in the data collection. Document reviews and key informant interviews were part of the data collection for all the case studies. In all but two cases beneficiary opinions were sought, mostly via group interviews or focus group discussions, although the sample sizes in some cases were small. Triangulation approaches were used with those interviewed from local authorities in twelve cases and with other organisations or institutions in ten. Project logframes were either reviewed or reconstructed in all cases but one. In all cases but one we visited the project in the field. The exception was Stromme microfinance, a financial wholesaler which funds microfinance institutions, not the ultimate clients at grass-roots level. A summary of the data collection tools may be found in Annex 1.

In order to ensure consistency of assessments across cases and countries we developed three concept notes<sup>16</sup> and standardised data collection instruments, including a questionnaire and quite detailed interview guidelines, refer Annex 1. In order to facilitate a more unified interpretation of results between projects and across countries, we held evaluation team workshops at the beginning and end of the field work, of three and four days respectively. During the field data collection phase, the team leader spent 3-7 days each with the country teams. The second workshop concluded the field phase. In this workshop we shared data, jointly analysed and undertook a preliminary overall scoring of the projects. This was later revised by each country team after revisiting the project data with knowledge of how counterparts had scored.

## 2.4 Data collection tools

In order to fulfil the purpose of the evaluation, we have sought to answer the 13 evaluation questions for the 15 projects in such a way that the information from all projects is comparable. As the projects range from very small to country-wide and involve a large variety of activities and objectives we have developed indicators and scores that enabled us to assess projects along transparent and identical criteria.

In order to facilitate data collection and learning at field level, the evaluation questions were rearranged and grouped together into areas that corresponded to the level of organization or type of information requested. One such area is the “target group”, another is “monitoring”. Interview guidelines were developed prior to the first team meeting in Arusha in July 2010, discussed and finalized during the meeting and further refined after they had been tested during the first round of data collection. During this pilot run, the team leader was part of the group of evaluators. The resulting Interview Guidelines are attached in Annex 1. These include all sub-questions of the 13 “core questions” together with explanatory comments and keys for coding scores that are consistent across projects and asks for comments

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16 A “Primer on the Norwegian context regarding NGOs, development policy and civil society”; a “Note on Team terminology” and a “Note on the Team’s approach to stakeholders and tasks during the evaluation work”.

supporting the selected score. The result is that we have a very rich set of information on most evaluation questions. This has been the main basis for the analysis carried out in the coming chapters.

Data collection was also documented in interview protocols, documenting main topics discussed and summarising interviews. Questions on facts and figures were collected in a separate questionnaire which was distributed to and filled in by the respective NGO (see Annex 1). Separate work plans were developed for each project. The overall team work plan is found in Annex 2. Itineraries and lists of persons interviewed may be found in Annex 3.

Data was collected using a selection of different methodological tools. For a table providing an overview of the different methods that were used in each project, see Annex 1. The broad range of methods enabled the country coordinators to adapt to local and project circumstances and increased triangulation.

## 2.5 Measuring achievement of results

The core question of the assignment asks for changes in indicators for “key results”. The term *results* is used, rather than impact, and refers to intended results as defined by the NGO. In accordance with the inception report and discussions with Norad’s evaluation department, we have interpreted this broadly to imply that *results* refer to outputs, outcomes and impacts as identified by the NGO.<sup>17</sup> Thus, the specific variable to be examined is dependent upon how it has been defined in each project.

The Terms of Reference also asks about the likelihood that observed changes are due to the project, if there are any unintended side-effects and what are the key factors contributing to the achievement of results. Regarding the likelihood that the achieved results are actually due to the project, we concluded in the inception report that while causality would be examined, no rigorous counterfactual analysis would be possible within the constraints of the assignment.

When planning the evaluation, we anticipated that not all projects would have robust enough indicators for key results to enable firm conclusions to be drawn, and that for some projects a proper baseline study would not have been undertaken, so that there would not be a clear basis upon which to measure and assess change. We were planning to address these problems by up-dating or developing logframes *ex-post* in cases where key information was either missing or of questionable quality.


However, we found that only *one* project had both baseline data and properly formulated indicators for results of a quality sufficient to be able to measure change in indicators for key results. Two other projects had well-formulated indicators for intended results but lacked proper baseline data against which to assess change. Four projects had done a proper baseline study but lacked well-formulated indica-

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<sup>17</sup> See e.g. Jerve and Villanger (2008).

tors for results for several key objectives. The rest of the projects had very poor information on baseline data and intended results.<sup>18</sup>

**Figure 2. Information available for measuring the achievement of results<sup>19</sup>**



Based on this analysis, we reluctantly had to revise our initial intentions to address the deficient or missing baseline data by re-creating baseline data and to re-create or extend existing logframes as a way of identifying and specifying results indicators. Given the time constraints and the realisation that such an approach carried with it an unacceptable degree of risk of bias, we decided to abandon this approach as unreliable.

Against the backdrop of these constraints, and in order to develop and analyse as comparable information as possible, we did the following:

First, the *intended key results* for each project were identified by drawing together information from questionnaires, key person interviews and document reviews. Secondly, after reviewing all the information we could obtain for each project, the country coordinators made judgements and scored

- the extent to which each project had achieved its *impact-related overall intentions*; and
- the extent to which each project had achieved its *intended outputs*.

Thirdly, we took the identified intended key results and separated these out into single-target statements in order to avoid mixing up different objectives. The country coordinators then judged the extent to which each objective had been achieved, scoring this in percentage terms.

<sup>18</sup> See further in the section below on Achievement of Results.

<sup>19</sup> *Quality of Baseline*: How detailed, profound, deep was the baseline? 0=Not done, there is no baseline; 1=Basic information available, not systematically compiled; 2=Baseline available, not complete; 3=Detailed, comprehensive and appropriate baseline is available

*Formulation of Results*: Have the results been formulated with appropriate indicators and realistic targets? 0=No indicators; 1=Some objectives have indicators, some of which are useable; 2=Most objectives have reasonable indicators formulated; 3=Appropriate (SMART) indicators formulated for each objective

While this method is likely to have given a more biased assessment than a comparison of changes in the value of the indicators for key results would have provided, given the experience of the country coordinators and the thorough discussion we had within the team, we believe that this was the best available approach and sound enough to provide a “good enough” assessment of results achieved.

The matter of attribution and side-effects were handled by making sure that, as a first step in collecting information in the projects, questions were asked about other changes and events that had taken place in the project areas. These were then used as a way of triangulating the questions that were asked about whether the project was regarded as being the main contributor to the results that were achieved. Similarly, we asked about unintended side-effects in direct questions and compared the responses with the list of overall changes and events that had taken place.

## 2.6 Analysis

The first level of analysis was led and principally carried out by the country coordinators in the field and shared, where feasible, with stakeholders during the field visits for data collection. This was also used as a way of triangulating the information that had been collected.

The second level of analysis took place before and at the second team meeting in mid-September. At the meeting, draft case studies were presented for the 15 projects and scores were discussed. Findings and impressions from the different projects were compared and analyzed with respect to the results on the different questions and the general conclusions drawn by the country coordinators. Common characteristics and possible ways of grouping the projects were also discussed. As an effort to further ensure the comparability of data across projects and decrease team bias, an “overall scoring” exercise was carried out at the end of the meeting, where a number of key questions that had emerged during the presentations and discussions were given scores for each project. This enabled an overview of the projects and a way of further triangulating the results presented in case studies and interview guidelines.

The analysis of each case is summarised in a case study narrative report, which should not be confused with a proper and rigorous “project evaluation”. The purpose of the data collection was primarily to inform the overall evaluation and we do not wish to give stakeholders the impression that it was or would have been possible to conduct in-depth project evaluations within the limited time frame of this overall evaluation.

The completed interview guidelines, containing scores on the various evaluation questions were merged into an overall data base covering all projects and questions. The information in the completed interview guidelines and the case studies were then analysed, summarised and presented in findings on each of the four clusters and illustrated in diagrams and tables. Based on the findings, conclusions and recommendations were developed for each cluster of questions and overall.

### 3. Introduction to the Projects

We have studied 15 projects in East Africa, specifically in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The projects were randomly selected by Norad's evaluation department among the projects run by NGOs and funded, wholly or in part, by the Norwegian government. Each project is discussed at more length in the case studies found in Volume II at [www.norad.no/Evaluation](http://www.norad.no/Evaluation), which is available electronically from Norad's evaluation department. Note that the intention has not been to make full project evaluations, but to collect data to inform the overall analysis of the coming sections. However, we believe the information may be of value to various stakeholders and have therefore summarised our findings, conclusions and recommendations in case studies of each project.

The text below contains summaries of the case studies, with the hope that this shall give the reader a flavour of the projects and some idea of the diversity and differing contexts of them. Note that the summaries below only include a selection of the findings, conclusions and recommendations that are presented in the case studies. Hence, we do not always present the full chain of finding-conclusion-recommendation here, and the recommendations that are included here should not be taken out of the context that is given in the case studies. We have chosen to include them anyway as we feel that all three components enhance the reader's understanding of the projects and the implementation processes involved in their execution. For a more complete discussion and further detail please refer to Volume II which contains case studies of each project.

### 3.1 NLM/Chesta Girls School

#### **Bistandsnemda – Norsk Luthersk Misjonssamband – Evangelical Lutheran Church of Kenya: Chesta Girls Secondary School**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Chesegon Division, Kapenguria District
<b>Population Coverage</b>	308,000 (1999 Census)
<b>Target Group Size</b>	Estimated to be over 300 children per year
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2003 – 2008
<b>Financial support</b>	NOK 3,447 mill (2005 – 2008)
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – NLM – ELCK – North West Diocese (NWD) – Chesta School Implementation Committee
<b>Description<sup>20</sup></b>	Fight FGM (female genital mutilation) by giving capacity to girls and work for change of attitude in general towards FGM and girls right to education.

*Background:* The Chesta Girls Secondary School was built in response to community needs. Until this school was built, the nearest secondary school was located 30 km from the community. Not only could poor parents not afford to send their girls such distances, they also worried for the girls' safety while travelling to and from school. Additionally, there was pressure from girls who were trying to escape from the practice of female genital mutilation by seeking refuge within the church. With these needs in mind, community leaders approached the Norwegian Ambassador to Kenya who eventually connected them to Norad and the Norwegian Lutheran Mission. While there were some clear needs, no systematic situation analysis was carried out and the solution proposed was limited to the construction of the school-building. The objective of the project was to establish the necessary physical facilities for a fully functional four-year secondary boarding school for girls in Chesta. The School is registered and administered by the Ministry of Education and the Government, under the Teachers Service Commission, supplies all the teachers.

*Results-Based Management:* No logframe was developed for the project however, based on the 2005- 2009 project plan, the research team was able to construct one. For construction of the school, clear indicators were developed. The other key result, Female Genital Mutilation awareness was not clearly identified and no targets were set. On the other hand, everyone we spoke to mentioned FGM as one of the main causes for the project identification and it was assumed to have been a key result. However, the project plan did not include FGM awareness. While no formal monitoring system was developed for the project, the steering committee meetings, which were carried out on a monthly basis served as the review and learning structure during implementation.

*Approach:* Project implementation partners were selected based on previous experience of building a primary school in the area. Partners were also selected

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<sup>20</sup> The descriptions are quoted from Norad's database of the projects.



based on shared religious values. There was no systematic partner analysis conducted however, given the remoteness of the area, there were few partners from which to choose. The project team worked with a steering committee that mobilised communities throughout project implementation. However, it was not clear just how community members were involved in decision-making nor was it clear how accountable the project leaders were to their community constituents.

*Results:* The school was constructed within the planned time period and is fully operational. Approximately 80 girls are enrolled annually, the majority coming from the West Pokot area. Water has been supplied not only to the school but also to the community near the school. However, other motivating factors for construction of the school, such as FGM awareness raising, seem to have been left out.

*Recommendations:* The Norwegian Lutheran Mission should have supported the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Kenya (ELCK) to develop its capacities in terms of e.g. situation analysis, strategic planning, operational planning and monitoring and evaluation should have been developed so as to reduce misunderstandings. It should have also been the responsibility of the NLM to capacitate the ELCK to strengthen civil society to advocate for retention of girls in primary school, inclusion of FGM in the project implementation, etc.

There is a need to address some social and economic aspects that have not received sufficient attention, including primary school dropout rates for girls and FGM awareness, which is still a great challenge for the area. These should be addressed in order to increase enrolment and retention of girls in primary school and hence completion of primary school certificate, to be eligible for joining secondary school.

The school is now being run under government regulation and systems. This should not, however, stop the school from addressing issues that are pertinent to the girls from this area. FGM should be dealt with in Chesta Girls Secondary School in the same way as HIV/AIDS are addressed. A stronger relation between the school and the Ministry of Health District Nursing Officer could help to increase FGM awareness for school children, not only at Chesta but in all schools in the area.

### 3.2 CARE/Lok Pachi

#### CARE Norway – Care International in Kenya: Lok Pachi – Change Your Attitude

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Bondo and Siaya Districts, Nyanza Province
<b>Population Coverage</b>	740,000 (Census 1999)
<b>Target Group Size (if applicable)</b>	Planned 25,000, achieved 35,000
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2005 – 2009
<b>Financial Input per year</b>	2005: NOK 2,479 mill 2006: NOK 2,805 mill 2007: NOK 2,782 mill 2008: NOK 3,030 mill
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	MFA/Norad – CARE Norway – CARE International in Kenya
<b>Description</b>	Support to women, group mobilization, capacity building in saving and loans and enterprise development in the fight against hiv/ aids.

*Project Background:* The Lok Pachi Household Livelihood and Security project was conceived in response to a call for proposals from CARE Norway. CARE Norway set the priority areas to which Care International in Kenya (CIK) had to find target groups, which corresponded to the choice of sectors as identified by CARE Norway. Decisions on what to do and who should lead the groups were left to group members. A group savings and loan approach was used to reach people with both economic and social development messages. The project aimed at reaching the poor sector of the community who have no collateral to access credit from financial institutions. The project convinced the community members to establish groups based on trust and trained them in skills such as leadership and bookkeeping.

The project planned to create over 5,000 groups with a total of at least 25,000 people and a cumulative transaction of about KES 8 million (equals approximately 0,72 NOK mill). However, by the end of 2009, the project had achieved over 7,200 groups with a membership of more than 35,000 people and a cumulative transaction of KES 21 million (equals approx. 1,9 NOK mill).<sup>21</sup> Despite the fact that the project ended in December 2009, new groups continue to form with facilitation from the Community Resource Persons.

*Managing for Results:* The project developed a 2005 – 2009 logical framework presenting specific objectives and results and included targets in their description. However, the logical framework included an indicators column which was rather vague, not giving any information that further clarified the objectives and results. In May 2009, the project developed a revised Lok Pachi logical framework. However, like the 2005 log frame, the indicators did not specify the narrative summary and

21. Exchange rates have varied over time but were similar in 2006 and 2009; rate used 0,09 NOK/KSH. Ref <http://www.oanda.com/lang/sv/currency/historical-rates/>, downloaded 2001-03-31.

outputs were not specified in a correct way. This indicates that CIK lacked the necessary skills to effectively use the logical framework approach in their planning.

The project prepared detailed Annual Operational Plans which broke down the main activities into sub-activities with detailed indicators and material requirements. The thinking behind the detailed plan is commendable as it supports monitoring and short-cycle management. The project also used a sophisticated system for tracking outputs and outcomes as part of its monitoring system. Comparing these with reports at the CIK Siaya Centre, we found that the reports did not reflect the detailed plan or the monitoring system and did not report on activities implemented by the project. Milestones at the activity level were vague and, as a result, the reporting at short project cycles or periods could not be supported by the planning system.

*Project Approach:* The choice of implementing partner was somewhat automatic, since CARE was already present in Kenya. An analysis of implementing institutions in the districts would have revealed that ARC – Kenya, which is also funded by Norad through ARC – Aid in Norway, is implementing a similar project in the same districts.

The project did not have a clear definition for strengthening of civil society, as this was not seen as a specific objective of the project. The project strengthened the capacities of the organisations developing the systems to be used through training the groups on the approach and systems. The project also provided on-the-job support to develop skills of the groups. Capacity building accounts for the greatest achievement and sustainability of the project effects.

*Achievement of Results:* The project has achieved about 150% of its original targets. By mid-term, the project had already realised about two-thirds of its planned results and by the fourth year it had exceeded its objectives. The project used the groups established to pass on economic and social messages to the people. The approach was well received and community members responded positively as they wanted to improve their living conditions. Group members integrated HIV/AIDS and social mitigation measures in their activities. Members, especially women, are empowered on these aspects and have managed to reduce stigma amongst themselves. The groups continue forming with the help of the community resource persons, even though the project funding from Norad ceased in December 2009. This shows how sustainable the approach is likely to be; not only are existing groups and knowledge that has been planted thriving, but new groups are forming. To this regard, the Lok Pachi project is an outstanding example that needs to be known to all implementing development activities in the area.

In this respect the project can be considered very cost effective. However, despite the fact that the project has reached more people than the original target group, this still corresponds to only about 10% of the target population (the poor population in Bondo and Siaya Districts). Despite the fact that the project outputs are going on as new groups are still forming, failure to influence permanent institutions, e.g. the government, to take over this approach has – to a certain extent – reduced

its cost effectiveness. As one staff member of CIK commented, self-help cannot stand next to free handouts, which is the approach used by the government.

CARE Norway is recommended to *i)* strengthen the RBM capacities of CIK to increase the learning effect within the organisation while implementing projects; *ii)* advocate for permanent, local institutions to take over project activities as a means of increasing sustainability; *iii)* foster relationships with other local institutions implementing similar development approaches; *iv)* ensure that permanent institutions, especially the local government, the ministry of health, ministry of agriculture etc, are aware of and use this effective approach to extension services; and *v)* develop a system of information flow that captures the developments of the approach without direct support from the project.

### 3.3 NCA/ Habiba FGM Awareness

**Norwegian Church Aid – Norwegian Church Aid Kenya – Habiba International Women and Youth Affairs:  
Female Genital Mutilation Awareness Creation and Mobilisation**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Mandera District, Kenya
<b>Population Coverage</b>	About 330,000 (from 1999 Census)
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2003 – 2010
<b>Financial support</b>	2005: NOK 216 000 2006: NOK 270 000 2007: NOK 216 000 2008: NOK 216 000
<b>Route of Financial Support</b>	MFA/Norad – NCA Norway – Habiba International
<b>Description</b>	Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) awareness creation and mobilisation at local community level in Madera, North East Province through HABIBA International.

*Background:* Habiba International Women and Youth Affairs is a registered local NGO working in Mandera District of the Northern Eastern Province, Kenya. Habiba International is the Southern NGO partnering with the Norwegian Church Aid Kenya (NCA) programme in running the Female Genital Mutilation Awareness Creation and Mobilisation Project in Mandera. Nomadic pastoralists of Somali origin inhabit the greater Mandera District predominantly. These pastoralists practice infibulations, one of the most severe forms of FGM.

Habiba International was established in May 2000 with a mission to empower women and youth economically and socially and, in so doing, contribute to improving their living standards. In 2003 Habiba International and the Norwegian Church Aid Kenya signed an agreement to work together to fight FGM in Mandera District. Working in this mainly Islamic area, the relation between NCA (an organisation that espouses Christian values) and Habiba International is quite an interesting one.

*Managing for Results:* The project did not carry out a baseline survey. It derives from the personal commitment by a local woman to end the practise of FGM and could therefore be said to be well founded on local information. The project team had a clear understanding of the problem and its root causes, even though these were not in written form. Judging from the many log frames and quarterly and annual reporting systems, it is evident that the organisation has tried to educate itself and practice results based management. However, the plans and reports are not sufficiently detailed, probably due to a lack of training and on-the-job support.

*Project Approach:* This is an awareness creation project intended to mobilise local communities against harmful FGM practises. The project used the energy of the people (mainly women) as the main tool to fight FGM and empower women within the communities. The project touched and mobilised all different types of people, ending up as a movement. With a focus on advocacy, the project has created networks of actors to allow the mobilisation of civil society against the humiliation and suppression of women. Women in different wards/districts, schools, young boys and girls, chiefs, etc. are now speaking out against FGM and supporting the empowerment of women, including the importance of sending girls to school. The project had a clear approach towards strengthening civil society and capacity building despite the fact that they were not explicitly defined objectives of the project.

Habiba International works in association with other partners, including Rainbo (an organisation working on health and rights for African women), Education for Marginalised Children in Kenya (EMACK), Solidarity Not Charity UK, and Amnesty International.

*Achievement of Results:* Habiba International has accomplished quite a lot under very difficult conditions including permanent and long droughts, wars with elders and religious leaders and a precarious security situation in the area. Despite this harsh environment, the project has managed to create awareness on the evils harmful effects of FGM in many small towns, schools and amongst women, leaders and elders. Schoolgirls spoke to us with confidence and were not shy to discuss FGM-related issues.

The recommendations below are based on the evaluation team's field visit to Mandera and discussions during the feedback sessions with project staff. During these discussions it became clear to the team that there was significant interest in RBM as a project management methodology and that lack of long-term financial stability was perceived as a concern for the people involved.

*Recommendations:* NCA Kenya is recommended to *i)* Negotiate for longer-term periods and secure financial commitment for the project period with Norad to ensure funding certainty at implementation level. *ii)* Secure RBM support to guide the project through its lifetime and build capacity within the organisation to complement the work done under the Community Conversion activities. *iii)* Support the School Board of Governors to publicise the experiences made where two organisations with

a different faith base cooperate on humanitarian grounds and highlight the benefits of such cooperation.

Habiba International is recommended to *i)* Improve their implementation management system to be more systematic with the monitoring system in the centre, feeding information not only for reporting but also for management of the project. *ii)* Develop civil society alliances in order to advocate for the rights of women as a movement; and *iii)* Ensure data collection and follow up of girls who enrol in school without going through FGM and track this information and to support them after graduation to continue to avoid circumcision.

Project Staff is recommended to *i)* Develop more awareness materials targeting boys; and *ii)* Develop means to reach the rural areas with FGM awareness messages, in order to reach girls from remote areas.

**3.4 ARC/Change Agent Training**

**ARC-Aid – ARC-Kenya – Kenya Change Agents:  
Change Agent Training Programme**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Siaya and Bondo Districts in Nyanza Province Kenya
<b>Population Coverage</b>	300,000
<b>Target Group Size</b>	10,000
<b>Years of Operation</b>	8 years (2003 – 2010)
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2005: NOK 490 000 2006: NOK 700 000 2007: NOK 1 000 000 2008: NOK 800 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	MFA/Norad – ARC-Aid – ARC-Kenya – Kenya CAT
<b>Description</b>	Arrange courses for leaders and central staff members in local NGOs and establish a local administrative platform for Change Agent Training. The goal is longterm change of attitudes.

*Project Background:* Change agents training (CAT) is a development methodology that promotes self-reliant, participatory development by training individuals who, working in the communities in which they live, help to improve the living standards of the rural poor through encouraging savings and credit schemes, income generating activities and other group functions.

CAT was introduced in Kenya in 2003 when ARC-Aid contracted through the Uganda Change Agent Association to conduct training courses. Change agent training had proven to be very effective in changing the lives of poor communities in Uganda. In 2004, trainers from Kenya initiated their own organisation called Kenya

Change Agents (KCA). To date, KCA has carried out 26 training courses with an average of 23 participants in each course.

In addition to training of change agents, the project runs a centre called ARO, which is in a rural area. The centre offers various training courses on development as well as serving as a health clinic, providing space for some groups to carry out their income generating activities and also supporting HIV/AIDS and other orphans. The project has an HIV and AIDS component, which deals with awareness creation through the groups established by the Change Agents. Another important element in the ARO centre is the Fabrication Laboratory (Fablab), which is high technology centre used for designing and fabricating different kinds of electronic equipment like low-cost battery and solar lamps, etc.

The project was implemented in the Bondo and Siaya Districts, among the poorest districts in Kenya and heavily affected by HIV and AIDS. ARC-Kenya was established in the early ninties. Kenya Change Agents (KCA) is a registered non-governmental organisation since 2005. KCA and ARC-Kenya are cooperating closely. KCA is responsible for change agents training and administration of funds at community level and ARC-Kenya is implementing a number of other small projects mainly at the ARO Development Centre and takes care of the overall management of the programme.

*Managing for Results:* The project had a long-term objective of carrying out ten CAT sessions per year; however they realised that this was too ambitious and instead they only carried out the number of courses that were funded by ARC-Aid. The project also implements a number of other small projects, which are also budgeted on an annual basis but some not fully funded by Norad funds. No clear targets are planned with these projects. The project does not have a systematic and written down system for monitoring and evaluation but managed to track results anyway as they keep records of the trainees who go through the CAT workshops. However, they have a challenge in tracking the results of the Village CAT (VCAT), which is now gaining momentum, and with very little direct involvement of the project. Annual project internal evaluations are carried out but an analysis of the different annual evaluation reports showed that of the ten pages, only one page was actual evaluation content wise. The rest was a repetition of what is already known about the project and quotations from community members.

The project needs technical support in both change management and professional management of development processes. Whereas the project is managed using a lot of passion and empathy, a necessary energy for such an endeavour, this is not a satisfactory condition for realising results. The Change Agent Training is well founded in self-help, demand oriented development principles.

*Project Approach:* The project cooperates with government ministries responsible for various extension services needed by the groups. The project is well known at the district level, with the District Commissioner explaining the project concept as well as if he was an extension officer there. Despite this, the project has not managed to influence any change in the local government extension approaches

and it was not apparent that there have been any intentional activities towards this. The project works with groups, which are freely formed by interested community members who receive leadership and facilitation training. While this builds capacity within the groups, there is no particular orientation towards strengthening of civil society.<sup>22</sup>

*Achievement of Results:* The project has conducted 26 Change Agent Training workshops with approximately 600 participants trained as change agents, which is in accordance with the funding provided by ARC-Aid. Assuming that each change agent reached on average 12 people, it is estimated that at least 10,000 people have been reached by the project. Unfortunately, we did not find a target for the number of people to reach. Starting with income-generating groups, before going over to issues like HIV and AIDS is a very good approach as this gives people other reasons for bonding than just HIV. Group members stated clearly that they benefited from the project. Women now own assets such as oxen, ploughs, houses, farms, cattle, etc and feel empowered to speak in the open, including before men.

*Conclusions:* In summary, we conclude especially the Change Agent Training component has achieved a lot at both output and outcome level. In this respect the project was highly relevant and effective to the issues of the communities, despite not having done a baseline survey.

*Recommendations:* ARC-Aid should provide support to the SNGO to improve development management skills. Building the capacities of the SNGO and the projects on the use of Result Based Management will reduce the time of communication on reports and other demands. It is important that projects have profound long-term plans that are then broken down into shorter-term (annual) plans. It is essential to have monitoring systems that track not only results but also activities and that support internal management of the project through shorter learning cycles of about three years.

ARC-Aid should negotiate with Norad for a longer-term engagement and certainty of resources to reduce the annual anxieties and waste of time due to dependency on the annual allocation of funds. If the governments are already planning on a medium term expenditure framework budget system, projects should do the same. ARC-Aid should also make clear what the role of this project has been and what the end of funding means. As a temporary organisation, the role of the project should have been to introduce an innovation, but this should be combined with a clear strategy on who will continue with it beyond the innovation/pilot stage.

ARC-Kenya should strive to improve its professional capacities regarding change management in general and development management in particular. Understanding and use of RBM and its related instruments (e.g., operational plans, monitoring systems, evaluations, etc.) is absolutely necessary for a development organisation like ARC-Kenya. The success realised in the change agent training is partly due to the development principles applied in the project, including self-targeting, self-

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<sup>22</sup> In its comment tot the draft of this report, ARC challenged this statement, arguing that the changes stimulated by the groups' activities amounted to strengthening of civil society.



reliance, self-determination, demand orientation, etc. These same principles should be applied in designing future interventions.

The project staff (ARC-Kenya and KCA) is dedicated to their work but need to improve their professional capacities with the current development management discussions as well as discussions on “Change Agency” using the innovation diffusion approach.

### 3.5 KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma

#### **FOKUS –Women’s Front of Norway – Dodoma Inter-African Committee: Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation, Dodoma**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	24 rural villages of Mpwapwa, Kongwa and Chamwino districts in Dodoma Region, Tanzania.
<b>Population Coverage</b>	118,485 <sup>23</sup>
<b>Target Group Size</b>	Approximately 5,760 <sup>24</sup>
<b>Financial support</b>	2005: NOK 151 000 2006: NOK 174 000 2007: NOK 166 000 2008: NOK 166 000
<b>Route of Financial Support</b>	Norad – FOKUS – Women’s Front– DIAC
<b>Description</b>	Elimination of female genital mutilation through community involvement in implementation of alternative rites of passage.

*Project Background:* The Inter-African Committee, Dodoma Chapter (DIAC) was established in 1996 as one of seven national chapters of the Inter-African Committee (IAC) on Traditional Practices. Main activities of the project include sensitisation of communities, lobbying and advocating for human rights and gender equality with the overall intention of fighting against FGM practices. The project seeks to change the attitudes of children, women and men, government officials and leaders at various levels.

DIAC has been partnering with the Women’s Front of Norway since 2002 but funding was channelled through IAC headquarters in Ethiopia until 2004. The Women’s Front is a member of FOKUS, an umbrella organisation that groups together women’s organisations in Norway. The main element of the partnership is capacity building for DIAC members and other members of the community for effective engagement in the fight against harmful traditional practices.

The project is implemented in Dodoma, where communities are characterised by high levels of poverty, food insecurity and illiteracy. The project is in line with

<sup>23</sup> Project Agreement, 2008.

<sup>24</sup> Including policy and decision makers and law enforcers at various levels, teachers and health workers, children in primary and secondary schools (training of trainers), traditional and community elders, religious leaders, parents, circumcisers and traditional birth attendants. Source: Multi-Year Project Agreement for 2010-2012, p. 4.

government policies including the National Gender and Development Policy and the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP).<sup>25</sup>

*Managing for Results:* DIAC has only recently started using results based management and has used a log frame approach to planning since 2009. The knowledge of the use of log frames is to date insufficient and components are not well elaborated. DIAC uses interviews and questionnaires during field visits to monitor the project. We found that these reflect views of the communities with reasonable accuracy and that lessons are being integrated in DIAC strategies. Nevertheless monitoring does not generate sufficient information to inform on the worthiness of the investment and strengths of the strategies used. There is a need for improving knowledge and skills to engage in effective monitoring especially in terms of elaborating objectives, clarifying targets and monitoring and measuring impact.

Nevertheless, the project adapts and learns as shown by the fact that lessons and recommendations from an evaluation undertaken in 2004<sup>26</sup> were incorporated in the design of the project during subsequent planning cycles.

*Project Approach:* DIAC targets vulnerable girls and women who cannot make decisions and/or protect themselves against inhumane actions performed by people who are close to them. Activities are implemented in rural areas of Dodoma region.

DIAC members, especially office bearers, form the core implementing team who work on a voluntary basis to sensitise and train community representatives and engage them in further implementation of the project. The implementation makes use of existing formal and informal structures such as schools, village government, religious groups and youth networks. In this manner DIAC has been able to reach many people and local communities are empowered to take responsibility for their own development.

DIAC collaborates with other stakeholders including the Christian Council of Tanzania, World Vision, the Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA), the Women's Legal Rights Centre and the Network Against Female Genital Mutilation (NAFGEM). Collaboration focuses on strategic issues such as lobbying and advocacy for human rights.

*Achievement of Results:* DIAC reports having reached 5,760 individuals in 24 villages with sensitisation activities. These were targeted at teachers, health workers, judicial personnel, police forces and community members (circumcisers, influential leaders, youths, girls, boys, men and women). There is some anecdotal evidence of changing attitudes and efforts to stop the harmful practice as some parents are publicly denouncing FGM and protecting their girls.

According to discussions with beneficiaries and staff, increased awareness has resulted in an increase in the number of cases of violence against women and children being brought to the police, courts of law and to activist organisations by

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<sup>25</sup> National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (2005) p. 48.

<sup>26</sup> Lie et. al. (2004).

women. Increasingly, men (as parents or brothers) are supporting women and girls to obtain their legal rights. We do not have sufficient data to clarify whether these changes are attributable to DIAC activities but note that DIAC is perceived as willing and able to assist those seeking their rights. This is evidenced by the increased demand for services which is challenging the capacity of DIAC.

On the other hand it is also being revealed that after becoming aware that there are various activists working against FGM and enactment of law, FGM activities are kept secret by the communities. The underground activities are difficult to address.

*Conclusions:* The project has relevance in addressing harmful traditional practices such as FGM and other forms of gender-based violence, early marriage and early pregnancy in Dodoma region. It targets appropriate and relevant target groups (girls and women who are subjected to decisions of their elders).

DIAC has delivered planned outputs and there is some evidence of changing attitudes and efforts to stop FGM. Dodoma communities, men and women are publicly denouncing FGM. The use of volunteer DIAC members and facilitators at community level significantly contributed to reducing overhead costs and building a sense of ownership.

The project has the potential to contribute to eliminating harmful deep-rooted traditions and contribute to improved health among women and girls and women securing their human rights. These achievements are likely to be sustained through community structures and enforcement of laws.

*Recommendations:* FOKUS/Women's Front should make an investment to improve results based management knowledge and skills to ensure that partners at all levels understand these systems and procedures. The use of field coaching services could be considered in this regard.

During planning, FOKUS/Women's Front should support their partners to conduct an in-depth contextual analysis, including a stakeholders' analysis. This should be regularly updated as stakeholders' views change (e.g. shifts in the pattern of resistance). This should inform on the services to be delivered and the strategies to be used. FOKUS should also assist Women's Front/DIAC in an analysis of the cost and activity implications of a small project vehicle.

Results based management can help DIAC get more impact without increasing cost or pressure on members, facilitator and staff. Greater contextual understanding will lead to better use of people's time, better use of the available budget, better coordination with other stakeholders. For this to be possible DIAC needs to continue investing in capacity building, including project management. DIAC should continue with its participatory approach and intensify training of community representatives. Alternative means of earning income should be clearly analysed to avoid wasting resources.

### 3.6 KF/Women and Health, Chole

#### **FOKUS – Women’s Front of Norway – Chole Society for Women’s Development: Women and Health Project, Chole Island**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Chole Island in Mafia District, Tanzania.
<b>Population Coverage</b>	Jibondo ward
<b>Target Group Size</b>	Approximately 3,405
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2000 – 2010
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2005: NOK 428 000 2006: NOK 518 000 2007: NOK 503 000 2008: NOK 503 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – FOKUS- Women’s Front – Chole Mjini Conservation and Development Hotel – Chole Society for Women’s Development
<b>Description</b>	Improve women and children’s health and to empower women economically through training in income generation and microfinance.

*Project Background:* Contact between FOKUS/Women’s Front and the Chole group began in 1997 through one of the co-owners of the Chole Mjini Hotel. Living in Chole and believing that she knew the real situation, she presented the case to one of the people in Women’s Front. As it appealed to them she was allowed to develop a proposal that was approved and funded. The co-owner became the first project manager and devoted part of her time to the project, facilitating activities such as training and study trips. The women of Chole were initially an informal group and the project presented an opportunity to organise. The group registered as the Chole Society for Women’s Development (CSWD) in 2000. CSWD started to receive Norad financial support in 1997 from the Women’s Front of Norway (*Kvinnefronten*) through FOKUS, an umbrella organisation that groups together women’s organisations in Norway. Since 1997 CSWD has gone through different cycles of planning and implementation. The main focus of the intervention has been the economic empowerment of women and exercising their basic rights. Project services have been delivered in the form of training, financial support and construction of facilities, including a health clinic, a market and a nursery school.

The project proposal’s problem analysis demonstrates a sound knowledge of people in Chole but there was limited analysis on policies and regulations in the respective sectors. The problem range was also very broad, indicating that CSWD and the Women’s Front have been trying to address many problems through the project and to bring together multiple agendas. Inadequate adherence to policy guidelines (health) and regulations (land) have affected the quality of the project and caused loss of property owned by CSWD. The CSWD project therefore demonstrates the importance of proper analysis and understanding of implications of related policies and regulations.

*Managing for Results:* Plans and budgets are developed in a participatory manner. However, there is a weakness in logic between the project activities and the planned outputs and indicators. The Women's Front translated its objectives into funding decisions in ways relevant to address the problems faced by communities in Chole and CSWD carried out planned activities to full completion, with significant positive effects, although outcomes were not documented systematically.

CSWD has no monitoring system and the project was developed on broad generalised background without specific baseline data. It is therefore difficult to say in detail how much the interventions have achieved. Generally, project management focused little attention on reflections as to effectiveness of the strategies employed, thus not adequately consolidating and learning from already implemented activities. Therefore, reality has not adequately informed subsequent project phases/cycles.

*Project Approach:* The choice of partner for Women's Front was based on an overarching objective to redress gender inequality. In Chole the main target groups have been women and girls. Given the gender inequalities, poverty levels in Chole, and the mission of Women's Front, the relevance of the choice of CSWD as a partner and the target group can be readily demonstrated.

*Achievement of Results:* The projects implemented by CSWD were addressing both individual (e.g. skills development) and systemic (e.g. building groups and addressing stakeholder relations) change. The lack of management systems and baseline study makes it impossible to draw conclusions about achievement of results based on the project's own documentation. However, based on key informant interviews and the short field visit, we assess them to have had positive effects and impact at the individual and community levels including: Improving resources for the CSWD organisation; improving individual income mainly for women; improving girls' access to education; improving accessibility to services by the community; and addressing cultural norms and exclusionary practices. We also note that project activities and management processes have contributed to conflicts within the target group. We lack sufficient data to assess the significance of these negative side effects.

*Conclusions and Recommendations:* The strategies of the Women's Front are relevant to a number of members of communities in Chole. Project resources were utilised for key project activities, which seem to have contributed to the development in Chole. We lack sufficient data to comment on the efficiency of their utilisation but the cost per beneficiary is high and some aspects of the project have clearly been in-effective, e.g. the ultimate location of the market far from tourist areas. The project addressed issues of equity on multiple levels and implemented a prolific number of activities. There is not adequate data to support firm conclusions, but reports indicate and key informants are of the opinion that the outputs have contributed to improving individual incomes, accessibility to education by girls; education classes in a wide range of subjects, AIDS awareness programmes, accessibility to health services by the community and high self-esteem and confidence on women.

While there has been no specific attempt to assess the specific impact that the project has contributed to, the analysis demonstrates that CSWD have contributed to improving the well-being of the communities in Chole. We would include attitudinal change, the extension of governmental health services and the introduction of pre-school facilities in this. CSWD have been heavily depending on the Women's Front in funding and maintaining the projects. While it appears clear that some of the project outcomes are sustainable, the issue of sustainability of project activities remains a big challenge. The health clinic is a positive exception in that it has been accepted into the government's health service delivery structure.

FOKUS and the Women's front are recommended to improve plans to ensure that outcomes and impacts are an integral part of project design and formulated in terms of measurable indicators. Project appraisal also needs to be strengthened to check logic between the various elements. It is recommended that plans clarify how the impact will be monitored. Partners, especially at grassroots level, have low management capacity. Efforts should be made to develop the ability of partners in thinking through how the projects will be made more useful and sustainable. Any new funding mechanism needs to have such capacity or be able to contract it.

The emergence of conflict in the village is a signal that the project has had negative effects on social and economic structures in the communities. In a positive perspective, such conflicts might be seen less as a problem and more of a challenge for learning. It is, therefore, important that interventions include capacity building for conflict management as an integral part of the projects.

CSWD needs to link more with the District Council for project management support as well as invest in strategic thinking that will support transforming current assets to effective economic ventures and sustainable projects. It is recommended that CSWD reviews the objectives and indicators for the entire project, formulates a monitoring and evaluation plan and engages in joint reflection sessions and learning.

### 3.7 NCA/Interfaith Cooperation

#### Norwegian Church Aid – The World Conference on Religions for Peace, Tanzania: Capacity Development for Interfaith Cooperation.

<b>Geographic Area</b>	There are project activities both at national level and at local level in a number of districts throughout the country.
<b>Population Coverage</b>	All the people of Tanzania
<b>Target Group Size</b>	All faith based organizations present in Tanzania <sup>27</sup>
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2005-2010
<b>Financial support</b>	2005: NOK 360 000 2006: NOK 640 000 2007: NOK 495 000 2008: NOK 1 000 000 <sup>28</sup>
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to Final Recipient</b>	MFA/Norwegian Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam – NCA – IRCPT <sup>29</sup>
<b>Description</b>	Facilitation of religious leaders on different levels in conflict transformation, and support to local interfaith initiatives to prevent faith-related conflicts. Includes also VICOBA (vilage community banks), with a local NGO used as a resource partner.

*Background and Context:* The World Conference on Religions for Peace (WCRP), the largest worldwide coalition of religious communities, seeks to promote collaboration towards peace and development. The WCRP Tanzania Chapter (WCRP-T) was founded in 1999 and became legally recognised in 2000. The main focus of the work of the WCRP Tanzania has been on promoting interfaith dialogue and action from the grassroots to national level and on developing an integrated interfaith approach. While the project has changed over the years, the approach and focus have remained consistent.

In October 2005, WCRP-T started a project with support from Norwegian Church Aid (NCA). The project was relevant to the core strategy of WCRP Tanzania to build the capacity of Faith-Based Organisations (FBOs) as implementing partners for peace building and development. The project work has both a community outreach strategy focus, grounded in FBOs, and a community social and economic empowerment component from top leadership level down to the grassroots level. In recent years, the project has been guided by the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) 2005-2010. Pilot activities were implemented in five

<sup>27</sup> NCA has pointed out in comments to this report that number of beneficiaries is not the most appropriate means to measure impact, since WCRP is a resource organization in partnership with NCA. WCRP is building the capacity of other NCA partners.

<sup>28</sup> These are allocated amounts as stated in NCAs Audited Annual Financial Statements for 2005 (Eastern Africa Office, Nairobi), and 2006, 2007, 2008 (NCA Tanzania).

<sup>29</sup> NCA has pointed out in its comments to this report that NCA/Interfaith Cooperation has been funded through a Strategic Partnership agreement with the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam. In 2005 the funds were transferred through NCAs Eastern Africa Office, Nairobi, as NCA opened its representation in Tanzania in October 2005. It should be noted that in 2008, this project was merged with three other projects of WCRP; National Governance Interfaith Initiatives, Tanzania Women Interfaith Network (TWIN) and Interfaith OVC response.

districts (Kilolo, Kisarawe, Ilala, Lushoto and Babati), and thereafter extended to additional districts.

*Managing for Results:* WCRP and NCA use log frame analyses in planning but weaknesses were observed in defining indicators. While implementation has led to some lessons learned, there are weaknesses in systematic analysis and reflection on emerging issues and experience has not been adequately used to steer project implementation.

*Project Approach:* The choice of WCRP as a partner to NCA was based on its potential to contribute to interfaith cooperation. The project was designed in a way that the WCRP had the role of resource partner for capacity building in support of FBOs and their networks for piloting the VICOBA (Village Community Banks) concept. Effective use of existing FBO networks and their acceptance within communities has led to intensification of project activities.

*Achievement of Results:* The two main intended objectives were *i)* to build capacity of FBOs to respond to the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty, mainly by establishing VICOBAs; and *ii)* to transform WCRP-T, a branch of an International organisation, into the Inter-Religious Council for Peace in Tanzania (IRCPT), an autonomous domestic organisation.

Concerned FBOs did engage in poverty alleviation activities and a lot was achieved. By and large, the ultimate objective of improving social and economic conditions at the grassroots level was achieved despite the fact that the WCRP was not transformed into the IRCPT. This raises the question of whether the two objectives were coherently integrated and formed a logical progression in attempting to achieve the higher goal.

The project addressed priority needs of the FBOs. The project also responded to the needs of poor people to access microfinance by starting Village Community Banks (VICOBAs). The approach of using VICOBAs was appropriate to the target group as it built on the capacity of the target group. In this regard the project is considered relevant to the target group, coherent with the national priorities and contributes to poverty alleviation objectives.

The financial resources allocated for fieldwork have been used in a cost-efficient manner to achieve the desired results. The approach of developing the capacity of FBOs to implement activities in the field is an efficient way to extend and improve the delivery of services. The partnership between NCA and WCRP has contributed to improving the social and economic conditions at the grassroots level.

While there has been no specific attempt to assess the impact that the project has contributed to, we find it to be clear that the VICOBAs have contributed a lot in increasing incomes. In addition, VICOBA groups are emerging as effective mechanisms for exploiting existing opportunities in production and business sectors.



The NGOs are heavily dependent on donor funding and organisational sustainability remains a big challenge. However, the VICOBA groups are likely to be sustainable.

*Recommendations:* The investment made in projects should be complemented with a coherent strategy for continuous learning. This should include reviews of project results, analysis of what went wrong or what went well and appropriate inter-organisational feedback mechanisms. The analysis should then be translated into improved procedures, staffing requirements and management competencies.

NCA Tanzania should initiate and facilitate regular discussions to deal with the imbalance in the power relationships between the partners and to ensure that there is an effective communication system with clearly elaborated feedback mechanisms. There is a need for WCRP-T to develop a strategy for sustainability.

### 3.8 LO/ZATUC

#### **Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions – Zanzibar Trade Union Congress: Education and Organisational Development**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Zanzibar
<b>Population Coverage</b>	40,000 people are engaged in formal sector
<b>Target Group Size</b>	19,000 approx. current membership size
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2002 to date
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	NOK 150,000 – 200,000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – LO – ZATUC
<b>Description</b>	Education and technical equipment, Zanzibar Congress of Trade Unions.

*Background:* Zanzibar is situated on the East African Coast in the Indian Ocean and forms part of the United Republic of Tanzania. It consists of two main islands, Unguja (also simply known as Zanzibar), Pemba and numerous small islets. Unguja and Pemba cover an area of 2,332 sq km. The population of Zanzibar was 984,625 in 2002, the date of the last census, with an annual growth rate of 3.1%. Approximately 40,000 people are employed in the formal sector which is dominated by plantation agriculture, tourist industry and the public sector.

The project presented here is about cooperation between the Zanzibar Trade Union Congress (ZATUC) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (*Landsorganisasjonen/LO*). ZATUC was formed following changes in the Trade Union Act of 1998, enacted in July 2000. The Act did not apply to Zanzibar or Pemba, necessitating the Government of Zanzibar to enact its own Trade Union Act, No. 4 of 2001. ZATUC was officially established on 5 April 2003 under this Act.

The decision to support ZATUC was based on the perceived need to establish strong and responsive trade unions, which would defend workers against social and economic injustice. The plan was essentially to create a national Trade Union

Congress and the project was designed to focus on four priority areas: *i)* Organising and membership recruitment; *ii)* Institutional capacity building, including the development of administrative systems and support in a consolidation process within which affiliate members<sup>30</sup> have been urged and encouraged to merge; *iii)* Services to individual members, primarily collective-bargaining, legal assistance and support in discussions with employers relating working conditions and workplace safety; and *iv)* Workers' education, with a focus on dissemination of rights and leadership development for potential shop stewards.

*Managing for Results:* Since its establishment, ZATUC has prepared and implemented two strategic plans with objectives and some clear indicators. ZATUC has monitoring as an integral part of the project, but informants reported that lack of skills and financial resources affects regular data collection, analysis and reporting and the capacity of affiliates to systematically keep accurate data. ZATUC keeps its operational costs low by maintaining only two full-time paid staff members. Activities are delivered using existing human resources in ZATUC affiliates, some of whom are paid a daily subsistence allowance during execution of activities. A lot has been achieved through this approach and ZATUC is considered a highly cost-effective and efficient organisation.

*Project Approach:* The choice of ZATUC as a partner to LO Norway was based on its strategic position and potential to contribute to organising workers to strengthen the collective voice of workers, to protect workers' rights and promote their wellbeing. The target population comprises the national centre,<sup>31</sup> its affiliates and their members. While there is competition between two rival trade unions in the tourism sector, ZATUC is the only national level Trade Union Congress. The project is seen as important as it helps workers to address challenges and the adverse consequences arising from the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and 1990s.

ZATUC affiliates are invited to discuss and approve plans and provide some of their members and leaders with a pool of resources for participating in implementation of project activities such as training, mobilising and organising members.

*Achievement of Results:* The organisational capacity of ZATUC has improved over the project period. The project has been highly supportive in helping ZATUC to establish internal mechanisms for improved governance and transparency, including elaborating financial regulations, a code of conduct and a Constitution, and holding elections. The project support has included some significant external pressure, e.g. to make changes in the modalities for dispersing funds, in the face of improper financial management. As a result, ZATUC has improved as an organisation and increased its membership. Workers are well represented in national decision making structures.

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30 The affiliate members of ZATUC are the unions that together comprise the Congress. In order to distinguish organisations from the workers themselves we choose to use the terms "affiliate members" and "individual members".

31 The term "national centre" refers to a confederation of trade unions for a single country.

The use of project resources for key union activities has contributed to union growth and organisational strengthening, which are key objectives. However, the new modalities for distributing funds, although caused by misuse of the previous system, have caused delays and inefficiencies.

*Conclusions and Recommendations:* Without the project Zanzibar would not have a functioning national trade union congress. There are examples of salary increases and improvements in working conditions for members but efforts to introduce collective bargaining agreements have, to date, failed. While informants were of the opinion that additional resources for follow-up activities would have improved their results significantly, they also stressed the high value of the project's contribution to their union's activities and resources. ZATUC human resources consist of two staff and the office bearers of the affiliate members, a low cost solution in line with the likely long-term carrying capacity of the organisation. Even this structure is unlikely to be sustainable without outside support. The project covers all recurrent costs for the national centre and activities for both the centre and its affiliates.

ZATUC should invest time and effort in making members, both affiliate and individual, aware of how it contributes to their well-being. Currently, planned efforts to improve the internal resource base and contribute to recurrent costs on a gradual basis are bound to fail as the value added of the organisation appears to be unclear to the members.

### 3.9 NPA/Youth Rights EAC

#### Norwegian People's Aid – Christian Sports Organisation in Norway – EMIMA: Youth Rights, East Africa Cup

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Target area: Zambia, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, and Sudan. The event itself is held in Moshi, Tanzania.
<b>Population Coverage</b>	Target population: youth under the age of 16 in the target area. Approximately 1,500 participants annually.
<b>Years of Operation</b>	Since 2004
<b>Financial Input</b>	2005: NOK 500 000 2006: NOK 980 000 2007: NOK 1 297 000 2008: NOK 140 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	The support to EAC stems from the strategic alliance agreement between the NPA and the Norwegian Embassy in Tanzania. Based on this the funding is transferred via MFA (Embassy) – NPA Oslo – NPA Tanzania – Southern partners in participating countries.
<b>Description</b>	Originally: Awareness building amongst youth in urban slum areas on HIV/Aids, environment, sanitation, gender issues. Remains: development through sports, East Africa Cup football tournament and related activities.

Norad's evaluation department's original intention was for us to assess the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) youth rights programme. However at the time of the evalua-

tion this had been closed, in part due to irreconcilable differences between NPA and Education, Sport and Physical Activity (*Elimu Michezo na Mazoezi*, EMIMA), its main partner in the programme. This is therefore a case study of the remaining component of the Youth rights programme, i.e. the East Africa Cup (EAC) project.

The team conducted a document review and interviewed key informants in both the Norwegian and the East Africa organisations. One team member has also visited Moshi during the 2010 EAC Tournament and interviewed a number of beneficiaries and other stakeholders. The tournament is an annual event and took place prior to the evaluation inception report and design was completed. At the request of Norad and NPA, the evaluation team agreed to do the field visit before the common methodological tools used in the other case studies having been developed.

*Project Background* The EAC project began in 2003, originating from the bilateral relationship that existed between the Christian Sports Organisation in Norway (*Kristen Idrettskontakt*, KRIK) coordinator in Tanzania and the then NPA Country Director in Tanzania. The overall objective is to empower youth through the use of sports. The tournament has been used as a tool for both raising awareness on HIV/AIDS and environmental issues as well as providing an introduction to life skills in the areas of first aid, leadership training, gender equality, refereeing and coaching, conflict resolution, sports medicine and media.

The tournament is in line with Tanzania's Child Development Policy (1996) and the National Youth Development Policy. Implementation involves sports for development organisations for two youth age groups in East Africa: under 16 and under 13. Initially, the age groups were under 16 and under 20 but the age limits were changed, in part to ensure that awareness building started at an earlier age, in part due to difficulties managing young adults mixed with children.

*Managing for Results* While a number of "success stories" have been reported, there is no systematic follow up and tracing of the NPA/Youth Rights EAC participants. In terms of an effective monitoring system, the partners have not come to a common agreement to have a monitoring system that would have allowed them to produce joint reports. This has limited learning for participating organisations and national authorities involved. Results based management was not systematically applied nor documented. Key informants expressed appreciation for the methodology as a potential tool for improving project management and learning, but emphasised that skills gaps need be addressed to utilise it more fully.

*Project Approach* The NPA/Youth Rights EAC comprises a network of four organisations that promote the concept of "sports for development". The network brings together financial resources, technical competences and experience in organising and executing the EAC tournament. Through the key committees all members take part in planning and decision making processes. Over time, more organisations have participated in the tournament by organising and mobilising youth at community level and bringing teams to the tournament. Others participate by imparting life skills during the tournament through seminars and training sessions. Youth are drawn from both rural, post-conflict areas (e.g. Sudan) and peri-urban communities.

Both girls and boys are encouraged to participate. Organisers perceive the project as cost-effective and efficient. We note that the level of documentation does not allow for any evidence based assessment of these aspects of the project.

*Achievements of Results* The project aims to reach significant numbers of youth through football tournament and life skills training. The numbers of participants has doubled since 2005, with 1,500 youth participating in the event of 2010. The organisation of the event (in terms of logistics, selection of themes for seminars, arrangements for lodging etc.) has improved every year as competencies and structures improve with experience. Generally participation in the tournament has helped to build confidence and self-esteem for youth and, for some, has led to opportunities to join premier leagues at home. Staff and volunteers for the event have been empowered with increased capacities in leadership and organising skills in addition to the awareness building carried out on issues of importance to the region (e.g. HIV/AIDS, environment). NPA emphasizes that the tournament is the annual climax of yearlong efforts by the involved partners in their own schools and communities. In the view of the organisation indirect beneficiaries in the home communities are crucial to the impact of the programme.

NPA/Youth Rights EAC has become a platform for sharing best practice, in terms of refereeing, tournament logistics, combining sports with life skills etc., and has provided opportunities for youth leaders and organisations across the expanded East Africa. Two crucial challenges remain: *i)* To demonstrate with appropriate documentation that the tournament is not only a recreational event but a developmental tool and *ii)* To involve potential sponsors such as private sector organisations without compromising the objectives of the NPA/Youth Rights EAC.

*Relevance, sustainability* We find the EAC project to be a relevant intervention seeking to address problems faced by youth in innovative ways. The project is aligned with relevant policies in Tanzania (e.g., youth development policy). The skills imparted are likely to be sustained and memories treasured by many. However, the tournament itself is unlikely to survive unless the EAC network members rapidly invest in securing sponsorship from new sources. We lack data to draw any conclusions on the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the project.

*Recommendations* Since the establishment of the EAC, NPA and KRIK have been the main funders of the event. All partners in participating countries now need to seek support from local communities, private sector organisations and the respective government sports departments.

It is recommended that NPA facilitate development of an effective monitoring system and mechanism for joint reporting to generate data and information on the development impact and effectiveness of the event. Such a system should include processes for joint reflection to allow partners to share relevant insights and learn from each other; and

While result based management was found to be a helpful tool to track changes, there were gaps in terms of the skills needed to effectively apply it. It is recommended

that NPA should provide training to its partners on the effective use of results based management for evidence based interventions and develop the skills needed.

### 3.10 SF/Microfinance

#### **Stromme Foundation – Stromme Microfinance East Africa Ltd.: Microfinance in Tanzania<sup>32</sup>**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Tanzania
<b>Target Group Size</b>	117.000+ clients in 2009
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2005: NOK 1 323 000 2006: NOK 1 811 000 2007: NOK 937 000 2008: NOK 1 429 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – Stromme Foundation- Stromme Microfinance- Stromme Microfinance East Africa– Tujjenge
<b>Description</b>	Empowering poor people, particularly women through group mobilisation, savings and credit, networking, advocacy and capacity building of micro finance institutions, MFIs. In practice, capacity building and funding of MFIs.

*Background:* Stromme Foundation (SF) is a Norwegian foundation based on Christian values, with a mission to eradicate poverty by working in the education and microfinance sectors. Its holding company, Stromme Microfinance, functions as a wholesaler of venture capital with a social profile and is represented in the region by its partially owned subsidiary; Stromme Microfinance East Africa Ltd (SMFEA). Based in Uganda, the company implemented support to microfinance institutions in the region including seven MFIs in Tanzania.<sup>33</sup> The support consisted of capacity building, loans and active ownership based on limited equity. Partners were selected according to set criteria based on e.g. financial health, growth potential, reach in underserved, mainly rural, areas and their competence.

The project was aligned with government priorities e.g. promoting access to financial services, as stated in the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.

*Managing for Results:* Stromme maintained a management system based on results-based-management principles. Financial objectives were formulated appropriately in line with micro-finance ambitions. Stromme was in the process of developing indicators to reflect its other objectives, related to social performance. Financial risks were regularly assessed and monitoring was integral to projects design. Capacity building of partners included introducing and developing similar management information and control systems.

<sup>32</sup> Methodological note: In the Stromme case we were not able to do a field visit. The case study is therefore based on interviews with SF staff in Norway, SF East Africa Ltd staff in the regional office in Kampala, Tujjenge staff in Daar es Salaam and document reviews.

<sup>33</sup> BRAC, (Bringing Resource Across Communities) Tanzania, Tujjenge Microfinance Ltd , Tujjenge Tanzania Limited, YOSEFO, PRIDE Tanzania. SELFINA (since 2009). Tanzania Home Economics Association handling community managed micro finance. A former partner, Mara Microfinance, was mismanaged and therefore absorbed by Tujjenge Microfinance .

*Project Approach:* Target groups were not excluded or vulnerable, but the project areas were. Beneficiaries were not involved in overall project design or monitoring but were highly involved in savings, group management and their own investments. Operations were adapted to opportunities and constraints of the projects areas and the sector.

*Achievement of Results:* For Tujjenge: Tenfold increase of portfolio, number of clients increased from less than 200 to 3800 clients, Number of members grown up to 4500, Portfolio at Risk reduced from 74% to 11% by July 2010.

For Stromme in Tanzania: (2009) Stromme's partner micro-finance institutions received 5 loans worth NOK 14,089,100 were disbursed during the year, a 19% increase from 2008. The Tanzania portfolio as at the end of 2009 was NOK 19,552,281; more than 35% of the overall portfolio of SMF EA Ltd. Overall portfolio of SMF EA grew by 54%. A total of 117,562 (73,834 female and 43,728 male) poor micro clients were reached. A total of 60 Community Managed Micro Finance groups were mobilised and trained. Total membership of the Community Managed Micro Finance groups was 1,620 members (780 male, 840 female). A total of 35,338,050 TSH or approximately 170,000.- NOK in savings were mobilised during the year. In addition, various capacity building investments, mainly technical trainings were implemented.

*Conclusions and Recommendations:* Given the specific nature of Stromme activities and the fact that it was not possible for us to visit the field, the team did not feel that our competencies and our insight in operations were sufficient to give recommendations.

### 3.11 NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation

#### **ATLAS – Norwegian Association of the Disabled – Government of Uganda: Community Based Rehabilitation in Uganda**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Busia, Kayunga and Tororo Districts
<b>Years of Operation</b>	The remodelled programme was implemented from 2002-2009. From 2002-2005 the programme was piloted in Tororo and then spread to Busia and Kayunga in 2006
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2006: NOK 3 357 780 (962.040 NOK to MoF) 2007: NOK 2 505 387 (1.058.445 NOK to MoF) 2008: NOK 1 705 036 (285 000 NOK to MoF)
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – Atlas alliance – Norwegian Association of the Disabled (NAD) – Ministry of Finance Uganda – CBR Districts. Also Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development HQ would receive funds directly from MoF.
<b>Description</b>	Mobilise relevant resources in society to ensure social integration in for highest possible number of persons with disabilities, with government and disabled persons.

This is a case study of the Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) project, an initiative of the Government of Uganda and the Norwegian Association of the Disabled (NAD), implemented through the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. The programme advocates for social inclusion and access to services, education and work and income opportunities for persons with disabilities (PWDs) in Uganda.

*Project Background:* Community Based Rehabilitation was introduced by the Government of Uganda in 1992, as its official strategy for addressing the needs of the disabled in Uganda. The government was assisted by NAD, who provided advisory and technical support. The initial programme was implemented in seven districts of Uganda. Between 1993 and 2000, three external evaluations were carried out on the CBR programme. One conducted in 2000 recommended consolidation of the programme through a clear, strategic plan to improve programme coverage and the quality of services provided to disabled people. As a result, in 2002 the programme was implemented in Tororo as a pilot and later expanded to Busia and Kayunga in 2006.

*Managing for Results:* The CBR programme, through integration of implementation activities, has managed to fully adapt to existing systems, government programmes and NGO structures and it has achieved great impact in the lives of PWDs and the communities in which they live. The programme has influenced policy changes and issues of disability have been mainstreamed in various government programmes. Increasingly, PWDs are participating in community activities, which have resulted in changes in community attitudes towards the disabled.

*Project Approach:* The CBR programme is integrated into various local and central government programmes, which means that it involves numerous stakeholders. CBR is heavily involved in strengthening civil society through empowering Disabled Persons Organisations (DPOs) and in sensitising communities on dealing with issues of disability. This has led to involvement of PWDs in project implementation.

*Achievement of Results:* The CBR programme, through integration of implementation activities, has managed to fully adapt to existing systems, government programmes and NGO structures and it has achieved great impact in the lives of PWDs and the communities in which they live. The programme has influenced national policy and issues of disability are mainstreamed at various levels of government programme implementation and increased participation of PWDs in community activities is bringing about positive changes in attitudes about disabled persons.

*Conclusions and Recommendations:* The CBR programme has been implemented through government structures and over the years these structures, systems and policies have been strengthened by NAD, which means that sustainability of the programme is largely assured. There is strong evidence that even after NAD funding had ceased, CBR activities were still being carried out normally and there was a lot of enthusiasm for continuity. With the increasing number of PWDs and families requiring the services of the CBR, the government should facilitate transportation



for the project implementers in order to ease their work since they are moving around more and dealing with more people.

### 3.12 NBA/Legal Aid

#### Norwegian Bar Association – Uganda Law Society: Legal Aid Project

<b>Geographic Area</b>	All over Uganda
<b>Target Population Size<sup>34</sup></b>	14,000,000 (Number of Ugandans living in poverty)
<b>Years of Operation</b>	1992 – 2010
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2005: NOK 1 654 000 2006: NOK 2 500 000 2007: NOK 1 414 000 2008: NOK 1 500 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – Norwegian Bar Association – Uganda Law Society – Legal Aid Project
<b>Description</b>	Establishment of legal aid services; pro-bono program; out-reach clinics; legal awareness seminars. Target population: poor people, especially women. In addition special programmes directed at authorities and local government.

*Project Background:* The Legal Aid Project was established by the Uganda Law Society in 1992, with assistance from the Norwegian Bar Association, to provide legal assistance to indigent and vulnerable people in Uganda. The project was born out of the realisation that, apart from the state brief system that handles only capital offences, and the huge backlog of cases, there was no statutory free legal aid provision in Uganda despite the fact that a large part of Uganda’s population live in poverty with no access to justice.

*Managing for Results:* The Legal Aid Project is results focussed and is based on planning with clearly defined objectives, expected results, and indicators, all of which link coherently. LAP has very comprehensive monitoring and evaluation and reporting functions and this has ensured proper tracking of performance and progress, which is then used for planning.

*Project Approach:* LAP has been involved with various civil society players and community stakeholders in raising awareness of legal and human rights in Uganda. LAP has also been instrumental in bringing together legal aid service providers into a network that has helped consolidate delivery of legal aid services in Uganda.

*Achievement of Results:* The Legal Aid Project has attended to thousands of indigent men, women and children and has also helped thousands of prisoners to access free legal services. The project has grown from an initial 4 legal aid clinics to

<sup>34</sup> Project documents refer to target group, we have redefined it as target population for the purposes of this report. In our terminology target group would be the intended immediate beneficiaries i.e. the recipients of legal aid.

the current 7. The success of the project has raised the profile of and highlighted the need for legal aid in Uganda.

The Legal Aid Project has been a success given the nature of its mandate and the thousands of people that are its potential target groups. LAP has managed to carry on providing free legal aid services to many indigent Ugandans mostly due to continuous support from the development partners and staff that is committed to serve. While this has ensured sustainability and progress of the project, LAP has also faced challenges in its operations that have constrained the achievement of results as planned and its ability to achieve more.

The Uganda Law Society is recommended to conduct research to determine how it can deliver legal aid services to more people given the current resources as it lays out a strategy for long-term sustainability.

### 3.13 NWF/Vocational Training

**FOKUS – Norwegian Women and Family Association – Companionship of Works Association:  
Vocational Training to Disadvantaged Girls**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Kampala
<b>Target Group Size</b>	120 girls per year
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2001-2010
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2005: NOK 421 000 2006: NOK 372 000 2007: NOK 375 000 2008: NOK 371 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – FOKUS – NWF – COWA – CVTS
<b>Description</b>	Vocational training to disadvantaged girls

*Project Background:* The Centenary Vocational Training School (CVTS) was established in 1992 by Father Steve Collin of the White Father Society, under the Catholic Diocese of Kampala, to provide training opportunities to girls orphaned due to HIV/AIDS. The CVTS was initially managed by the AIDS Widows Orphans Family Support (AWOFS), an organisation supporting HIV/AIDS orphans, especially girls. In June 1998, the Catholic Church asked the Companionship of Works Association (COWA) to take over management of the CVTS. In 2000, a member of the Norwegian Women and Family Association (NWF) who volunteered at the school connected the school to NWF, a member of FOKUS, an umbrella organisation that groups together women’s associations in Norway. In 2001, the project was initiated with NWF/FOKUS, through funding from Norad. The school has since expanded its reach to a wider range of disadvantaged girls, mostly school dropouts, with a view to equipping them with practical vocational and entrepreneurship skills as a means of empowerment.

*Managing for Results:* COWA – CVTS has a clear planning, management and reporting structure that ensures that the project is implemented according to well-developed objectives and activities. This makes the project implementation run smoothly and makes monitoring simple and beneficial to project learning.

*Approach:* CVTS has managed to cultivate relationships with a variety of organisations which have benefitted it and contributed to its learning, this included a German NGO giving capacity building training and local companies providing internships market adaptation advice. The school has also vastly benefited from the technical support and advice that has greatly increased the capacity of CVTS to manage the school and project activities.

*Achievement of Results:* Hundreds of girls have been trained at CVTS during the course of the project and most of these have gone on to employment or have started their own businesses. This has made them financially independent and able to help their families.

In summary, we conclude that the support to vocational training for disadvantaged girls has had a positive impact on the lives of many girls who would otherwise not have had access to education and would not have learnt skills to help them get employment and be financially independent. The project has grown over the years and the organisation has shown an ability to learn and adapt.

COWA should explore alternative sources of funding (e.g. offering courses to the general public for a fee) since, according to the school principal, NWF funding will cease from 2011. NWF could look into ways of extending the funding to COWA for an extra year or two to allow CVTS time to secure alternative sources of funding and develop its income generating activities, which will help it get closer to becoming more self sustaining.

### 3.14 RB/ECDE Education

#### **Save the Children Norway – Save the Children in Uganda: Early Childhood Development and Education**

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Karamoja Region (North Eastern Uganda)
<b>Target Group Size</b>	20,000
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2004 – 2010
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2006: NOK 225 000 2007: NOK 225 000 2008: NOK 225 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – Save the Children Norway – Save the Children in Uganda – District Local Governments
<b>Description</b>	Early childhood development and education programme with interventions ranging from provision of supplies to training caregivers and motivating parents to engage with the schools.

*Project Background:* The Early Childhood Development and Education project (ECDE) was conceived as a component of the Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja (ABEK), a non-formal basic education programme providing opportunity for children from 6 to 18 years of age in Karamoja. ABEK reviews had highlighted the detriment to learning faced by children, especially girls, who had responsibility for caring for their underage (0-5 years) siblings and had to bring them to school. In an effort to solve this problem, Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU), with funding from the Bernard Van Leer Foundation, commissioned a feasibility study in 2003 to establish baseline benchmarks as well as propose modalities for implementing an ECDE intervention. It was the findings of this study that led to the ECDE pilot programme.

*Managing for Results:* The ECDE project was designed to integrate local traditional child rearing practices. Its use of an existing ABEK structure has helped its adaptation to a framework of project management that was already established. Through this framework the local government, community implementers and SCiU are able to manage the project with a view to achieving planned results.

*Project Approach:* The ECDE project has invested in building the capacities of different categories of stakeholders and service providers to enable project success. SCiU supports implementing districts to build the capacity of community structures, including village, sub-county and district committees, to own and sustain ECDE initiatives. In this way local governments and communities participate actively in running the project.

*Achievement of Results:* The ECDE project seeks to increase enrolment of children into ECDE centres and to get the participation of the communities in project activities while improving the health, nutrition and condition of the children. The project has, for the most part, achieved its results but it has faced some challenges that have not allowed full achievement of all planned results.

*Recommendations to Stakeholders:* SCiU should consider giving the community members additional training that will enable them to take some of the monitoring and supervisory roles as a means of relieving the burden on project implementation staff that are stretched thin on the ground and cannot effectively cover the vast area and numerous centres. The local governments should seek ways to include the ECDE activities in their plans and budgets so as to ensure the sustainability of the project and to build on the results that have been achieved.

*Overall Conclusions:* The Early Childhood Development and Education project has generally managed to adapt to the early childhood development needs and has set a foundation for the development of informal education in Karamoja. The project has set a foundation for transition to ABEK for many children and consequently has led to a change in community attitudes towards early childhood education. The health and nutrition component of the project has not only improved the health of the children but has also benefited communities with sensitisation on improving sanitation and hygiene conditions within their own homes. Therefore, the ECDE

project has had an impact in Karamoja that, if steps are taken to ensure its sustainability, is likely to last for years to come.

### 3.15 RB/Quality Education

#### Save the Children Norway – Save the Children in Uganda: Quality Education Project

<b>Geographic Area</b>	Iganga, Moroto
<b>Target Group Size</b>	31,982 (primary)
<b>Years of Operation</b>	2005 – 2010
<b>Financial Input Per Year</b>	2009: NOK 1 227 000
<b>Route of Financial Support from MFA/Norad to the Final Recipient</b>	Norad – Save the Children Norway – Save the Children in Uganda – District Local Governments/ Core PTC
<b>Description</b>	Programme designed to improve the quality of education with interventions ranging from provision of supplies to training of teachers and engaging parents in school management and supervision

This Quality Education Project (QEP) is an effort by Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU), through funding from Save the Children Norway (SCN). The project is designed to complement government policies and programmes to increase access to basic education for all, improve quality and increase retention, achievement and completion of the primary education cycle.

*Project Background:* In January 1997, the Government of Uganda introduced its strategy of education for all in the Universal Primary Education Programme. As the government's main policy tool for achieving poverty reduction and human development, it promised to meet the cost of primary education of four children per family (this commitment by President Museveni was eventually extended to all people that wanted access to primary education). While the Universal Primary Education has increased primary school enrolment, there has been no corresponding increase in secondary school enrolment rates and many children who actually complete the primary cycle can barely read or write. The increase in primary school enrolment has not been supported by an increase in teaching and learning facilities, which has compromised teaching and learning standards in primary schools across Uganda. Furthermore, poor working conditions and poor remuneration for teachers has led to low teacher morale. Such prevailing conditions prompted Save the Children in Uganda, Kyambogo University and the Ministry of Education and Sports to conduct an in-depth study to investigate and identify the factors that impact on the quality of primary education in Uganda. The findings of this study became the basis for the Quality Education Project.

*Managing for Results:* QEP utilises existing structures and systems within the primary education sector and the local government such as the Teacher Development and Management System that use Core Primary Teacher Colleges (CPTCs) to deliver teacher training services, thus it is well aligned with government programs

and priorities in both primary education and child welfare. SCiU has a monitoring and supervisory role over many project activities and it encourages regular project monitoring through quarterly reports and annual reviews which track the progress on achievement of results.

*Project Approach:* QEP involves stakeholders at many levels and as part of its strategy, integrates capacity building at all levels. The project builds the technical capacity of the CPTC as an institution and of the teachers that it trains while it, at the same time, improves and builds the capacity of school administrators. The project also involves the community through formation and strengthening capacity of the School Management Committees (SMCs) and the Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and by involving and engaging local authorities and community leaders. An initial target of reaching 20 pilot schools was expanded during the project period leading to greater reach, but perhaps also to less impact per school as resources were stretched. The Ministry of Education and district authorities tried to apply some of the methodologies developed across all schools in the involved districts. The project has offered children channels of self-expression and awareness through the activities of extracurricular clubs and activities that are part of the QEP design. All this leads to a stronger civil society that appreciates and is willing to contribute to the improvement of the quality of education of the children.

*Achievement of Results:* Apart from increasing enrolment and attendance of children in QEP schools the project has also managed to improve school management and teacher training; increase government involvement in promoting QEP methods in non-QEP schools; increase community and parent interest and participation in school affairs through SMCs and PTAs; and improve the learning and teaching environment in schools. QEP has largely achieved its results and has also had an impact beyond its objectives: QEP activities and methods have been adopted by many schools that are not part of the QEP and teachers who graduate from QEP-supported CPTCs use QEP methods in schools to which they are posted.

*Conclusions:* In summary, we conclude that the project was planned based on sound baseline information and it has managed to integrate well into existing government systems, which has contributed to the success of its operations. However the project has faced challenges, including the increase in number of schools leading to reduced funds available for each.

*Recommendations:* Save the Children Norway should consider increasing the funding towards the project to accommodate the increased number of schools under the project. Save the Children in Uganda could help improve the capacity of the implementers for self-monitoring. SCiU should also start preparing the Core Primary Teacher Colleges staff for the end of the project and sustainability. The CCTs should be more vigorous in supervision because in at least one school the CCT was not known.

## 4. Cluster One: Background and Contextualisation

The questions in the Terms of Reference are clustered into three groups. We have grouped them slightly differently in four clusters as described in the methodology section above. In the following sections we use the four clusters as a point of departure to report on our findings, conclusions and recommendations. We have also added a section on scale and cost. The presentation within each cluster broadly follows the questions originally posed in the Terms of Reference. All information in the following sections is based on the case studies found in Volume II and the data from completed interview guidelines, unless otherwise stated.

The studied projects were very varied in terms of scale, ranging from a single school to nationwide programmes. Norad's evaluation department's case selection excluded projects that were initiated less than five years ago. It was therefore not surprising that all the projects had been supported a long time period, some of them for a very long time. Most, while administratively seen as discrete projects, are best described as phases in continuing long-term relationships. The exception, NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness may well be the start of a long term relationship. Five of the projects had reached the end of their project period and been concluded (NLM/Chesta Girls School, CARE/Lok Pachi, KF/Women and Health, Chole, NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation and RB/Quality Education) while one had been discontinued due to implementation problems and reorientation of the Norwegian NGOs strategy (NPA/Youth Rights EAC). Several were in the process of being phased out from Norad funding e.g. ARC/Change Agent Training, NWF/Vocational Training and NPA/Youth Rights EAC component. All of the latter intended to continue without Norad support.

In this chapter we discuss how funds reached the projects, how north-south partnerships were established, project coherence and how well adapted the projects were to the local context.

### 4.1 Project Funding

The flow of funds from the Norwegian taxpayer to people in the South encounters a maze of different Norwegian, international and host country organisational entities on the way. The process of getting funds to beneficiaries involved a series of agencies, networks, organisations and groups. At each handover point in this chain a new set of agreements, plans, reports and formal checks were required.

#### **4.1.1 FINDING; The funding system lacked transparency**

Figure 3 below illustrates that funds passed six to nine administrative levels moving from the Norwegian MFA to the household or person it was intended to support. Most of these layers were, directly or indirectly, funded by the Norwegian government. We have not been able to clarify what percentage of the funds allocated was spent at which level of the system.

The Norwegian parliament decided on the overall policy and budget of Norway's aid and the MFA administered all funds related to Norway's external relations. Funds for development assistance through NGOs were transferred by the MFA to Norad. Norad established implementation policies and guidelines for the use of the funds and distributed them to umbrella organisations in Norway which coordinated groups of NGOs. Some NGOs that did not fit in existing umbrella organisations and "the Big Five" group of large established NGOs, had bilateral agreements directly with Norad.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> The big five are Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross), Save the Children (Redd Barna), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).



**Figure 3. Route of funding from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to affected people**

<b>Administrative Level</b>	<b>NLM/Chesta Girls School</b>	<b>CARE/Lok Pachi</b>	<b>NCA/ Habiba FGM</b>	<b>ARC/Change Agents</b>	<b>KF/Elimination of FGM</b>	<b>KF/Women and Health</b>	<b>NCA/Interfaith</b>	<b>LO/ZATUC</b>	<b>NPA/Youth Rights EAC</b>	<b>SF/Microfinance</b>	<b>NAD/CBR</b>	<b>NBA/Legal Aid</b>	<b>NWF/Vocational Training</b>	<b>RB/ECDE Education</b>	<b>RB/Quality Education</b>
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norad (fully funded by MFA)	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norwegian umbrella organisation, fully funded by Norad (Atlas, Bistandsnemda or FOKUS).	X	-	-	-	X	X	-	-	-	-	X	-	X	-	-
Norwegian NGO in Norway, allowed to retain 8% of project cost for overhead which, in some cases, implies full cost coverage by Norad.	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Norwegian NGO in Host Country/ region, funded by Norwegian NGO, cost – at least in some cases – included in project budget i.e. up to 100% funded by Norad.	X	-	X	X	-	-	X	X	X	X	-	-	-	-	-
Southern NGO National level, commonly – at least in part – funded by project.	X	X	-	-	-	-	X	X	-	X	X	X	-	X	X
Southern NGO local level, usually fully funded by project.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Local community based organisation or users group, in general minor project contribution to overheads.	X	X	-	X	-	X	X	-	X	X	-	-	-	X	X
Affected person.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Number of administrative levels involved.	9	7	6	7	6	7	6	6	7	8	7	6	6	7	7

The umbrella organisations were fully funded by Norad and Norwegian NGOs were allowed to keep 8% of project budgets for overhead costs. At least in some cases this covered 100% of the NGOs administrative costs. For some projects the Norwegian NGO was required to cover part of the cost from its own funds. In at

least one case, the required 10% own contribution was year by year covered from the funds received from Norad for overhead costs the year before.

Most of the studied development projects were part of three-to-five year frame agreements between Norad and either the umbrella organisation or the concerned Norwegian NGO. When the umbrella organisations were involved they in turn had framework agreements or project agreements with the Norwegian NGO held accountable for project implementation.

The Norwegian NGO in turn sent the funds to its international federation, its regional or national office or directly to a southern NGO. Interestingly, agreements (at least the budgets) written with southern partners were commonly annual, even when the Norwegian NGO had long term agreements with Norad.

The next level was the southern NGOs national level, which then administered the project through regional or local project offices. Field level activities were often organised in some form of community based organisation, e.g. credit-, parents'- or women's groups.

Structural reasons clearly contributed to the lack of transparency.

#### **4.1.2 FINDING: It was not possible to identify the cost of some projects**

Norad sought to administer its assistance at programmatic, not project, level and its data collection was adapted to this. Therefore, project-specific cost data were often not maintained by Norad. This was also true of some of its immediate Norwegian partners, e.g. Save the Children and Stromme. In several cases it was difficult to match project costs according to project applications and reports with that found in Norad compilations.

## **4.2 Partner Selection**

The Terms of Reference asks us to address how local partners were selected and to what degree the method of selection was systematic and took the development and political context into consideration.

#### **4.2.1 FINDING: NGO partnerships were the result of a matching process, not a systematic selection**

The establishment of partnerships was characterised more by an organisational matching process than by a Norwegian NGO implementing partner selection. In this process network membership, organisational history and individual initiatives were the dominant forms of matchmaking between partner NGOs. In six of the cases the Norwegian NGO belonged to an international network, federation, or similar. In these cases the Norwegian NGO, for constitutional or other reasons, did not have a free choice as to which party it was going to work within the host country. Examples of this would be CARE/Lok Pachi, ARC/Change Agent Training, NCA/Interfaith Cooperation, RB/ECDE Education and RB/Quality Education. LO/ZATUC is a similar example.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> The international networks referred to are CARE International, ACT – Norway/Uganda /Rwanda/Kenya, Alliance of Churches Together, Save the Children Alliance and the international labour movement respectively.

In some cases, the southern partner had been developed or even created by the Northern organisation or international network. For example, Norwegian NGOs played crucial roles in the establishment of SCiU and CAT-Kenya. Similarly, CARE Kenya was developed under the mentorship of CARE Australia within the CARE confederation. Typically, an organisation had initiated work several decades ago. Initially this work tended to be of the direct, operational, service delivery nature such as running schools, health clinics, vocational training or capacity building for the organisation itself. With changing politics and developed capacity, host country organisations matured. Over time the Southern NGO either took, or was given, greater responsibility for operational issues and gradually for its own development.

In the Save the Children Alliance similar processes had taken place in several countries leading to collective pressure from the southern partners on the northern networks to have a more joint approach to all phases of the project cycle. This had led to more independent southern organisations and changed relationships with their northern partners. Southern organisations were gradually taking on greater responsibility for their own development as well as for the application of principles and policies to their own development context.

In other cases it was hard to discern whether a Southern partner NGO existed other than in terms of the project organisation itself. In these cases, e.g. NLM/Chesta Girls School, NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness, NPA/Youth Rights EAC or KF/Women and Health, Chole, it was difficult to say that a southern partner has been selected. It would be more appropriate to say that a project had been started or given support.

We also found examples of southern selection of northern partner i.e. where the Norwegian NGO had been approached, directly or indirectly. Several partnerships were formed based on joint initiatives, interventions by the Embassy or thanks to efforts by concerned individuals. Examples of this include NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness (started by an individual later supported by NCA), NPA/Youth Rights EAC (the Pemba Cup was started at the specific request of the Embassy), NBA/Legal Aid (started at a conference in New York when lawyers from Uganda and Norway met) and NWF/Vocational Training (which developed its Norwegian partnership thanks to the intervention of an individual connected to the Embassy).

The single systematic selection process, in terms of being clear and documented, was that practiced by Stromme. They researched multiple potential partners and ranked them according to set criteria prior to launching cooperation. It should be noted that this may reflect that their activities were limited to funding and capacity building of micro-finance institutions and such activities may be easier to quantify than those of other projects. Key informants described partner selection processes in other organisations, e.g. NCA and NPA, but these were more based on the personal opinions and connections of staff, pre-existing partners and other stakeholders.

### 4.3 Coherence

There were two quite different aspects of project implementation which may be referred to as coherence. The first is whether the different stakeholders involved in implementation *in the project area* understand the intentions and design of the project in the same way. The issue is whether the project documentation, planning and monitoring, matches the image that the project has in its relationship with for example the target group, local authorities and other stakeholders. We term this *horizontal coherence*.

#### **4.3.1 FINDING: There was reasonable or good horizontal coherence in all but two projects**

We found that in 13 of the 15 studied projects, the various stakeholders, to the extent that they knew the project, had a similar understanding regarding what the project was trying to achieve, i.e. there was reasonable to good horizontal coherence. Such common understanding is crucial if the project hopes to tap into the existing resources from the society within which it is being implemented.

In the two cases where horizontal coherence was lacking (NLM/Chesta Girls School and NCA/Interfaith Cooperation), the project design combined quite practical interventions with abstract motivations and objectives. In the NLM/Chesta Girls School case the building of the secondary school for girls was easily comprehensible and broadly understood. The intention that this school would contribute to decreasing the incidence of female genital mutilation in the target population was not well understood. This less direct and immediate objective was also lost along the way, project implementation was not adapted to support it and the ambition was not followed up.

The other project without horizontal coherence, NCA/Interfaith Cooperation in Tanzania, was a highly complex project combining highly abstract strategic objectives (interfaith dialog for peace) with very practical easily grasped activities (e.g. micro-finance groups). The project attempted to achieve abstract objectives on multiple administrative levels, with multiple partners, in multiple geographical areas. The project included research to achieve evidence-based lobbying at the national level, the establishment of micro-finance groups in multiple locations, and efforts to establish (or at least adapt) institutional structures for interfaith dialogue. The number of stakeholders was therefore great as were the differences in their conceptual understanding of what was the overall objective. Such a project is not likely to achieve horizontal coherence as the various stakeholders are only involved in part of the overall project vision.

The second aspect of coherence relates to the degree that the Northern NGOs strategy, policies, methods and professional background match that of its southern partner(s). When this similarity of mental models *at different administrative levels* is combined with organisational representation at the different levels,<sup>37</sup> the organisation can act coherently and present a similar image to stakeholders at all levels. We call this *vertical coherence*.

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<sup>37</sup> E.g. Norwegian office, international presence, host country national level and project area.

LO/ZATUC and LO Norway had a common view on a variety of issues ranging from workers' rights via the role of unions in society to how unions can support common goals through a trade union congress. Save the Children in Uganda and Save the Children Norway shared goals, opinions on children's rights and on overall practical approach, management methodological tools and membership in the Save the Children Alliance. CARE was not as tightly focussed but had Confederation-wide standards and methodologies and a shared history. The Norwegian and Ugandan Bar Associations shared many aspects of professional and educational background, including a professional language, views regarding management basics and a similar understanding of the legal rights of defendants for whom they worked. Both ARC and Stromme were highly vertically integrated organisations, although they are both likely to argue the autonomy of their National/Regional structures. These examples show what we mean by high vertical coherence.

In contrast to the above examples, projects like NWF/Vocational Training, NWF/Vocational Training or NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness were run through partnership between organisations that shared a common aim but without obvious commonality of mental models, policies etc. They illustrate low vertical coherence.

#### **4.3.2 FINDING: Six projects had high vertical coherence**

We assess six of the projects to have high vertical coherence, meaning that the Norwegian NGOs strategy, policies, methods and professional background matched that of its southern partner(s) and that there was representation at both regional/national and local level in the host country. These projects were CARE/Lok Pachi, LO/ZATUC, SF/Microfinance, NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation, NBA/Legal Aid, RB/Quality Education and RB/ECDE Education.

#### **4.3.3 FINDING: Projects with vertical coherence were better at interacting with the host government structures**

In all of the above mentioned projects interaction with the government, at local or national level, were part of these projects' strategy. This interaction involved sharing information but also utilising existing technical resources and, in several cases, joint work to develop methodology and/or policy. The latter effect on methodology and policy is likely to have supported a greater reach of these projects.

We are also asked to find out if the strategy for selection of local partner was coherent with the Northern NGOs overall strategy. Given our above comments regarding the absence of selection strategies this question became irrelevant. What remains relevant is whether the projects accepted by the Northern NGOs were in line with *their* overall strategy. We will therefore discuss coherence of organisational values with implementation strategy rather than coherence in terms of selection strategy of southern partners.

With the larger and more vertically-integrated partners as described above (for example CARE and Save the Children) the parties involved had often developed joint approaches, policies and strategies. While this did not lead to complete coherence,

as each organisation had sufficient independence to have its own priorities, the result was a high degree of coherence between the partners' respective strategies.

In the case of the faith-based organisations there is a clear coherence in terms of the philosophical approach, emphasising the close ties between spiritual and other development. Yet the practical application of these principles may vary significantly between partners. In a case like NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness, interfaith cooperation for a common goal was possible precisely because NCA completely avoided the spiritual dimension. In NCA/Interfaith Cooperation, the intervention strategy was based on the hypothesis that common respect for spiritual values would, if appropriately supported, be sufficient to create dialogue among religiously diverse stakeholder groups.

There are also examples of secular organisations, or a secular mode of professional cooperation, where organisations find common ground in the practical application within a particular project while accepting that the overall organisational characteristics and objectives may be quite different. Refer for example NPA in Tanzania which engaged sports interested people in activities (a football tournament for youth) which NPA intended to support a rights based approach to development (by building skills among the youth involved in terms of leadership, gender attitudes, fair play etc.). Similarly, the staff of DIAC and Kvinnefronten keeps the anti-FGM project running despite large organisational differences.

#### **4.4 Legal Framework and Local Adaptation**

Each host country had a legal framework that, to a greater or lesser extent, affected NGO operations. That and the prevailing social, economic and political context presented opportunities and constraints to project implementation.

##### **4.4.1 FINDING: NGOs did not feel affected by legal framework**


Most NGOs do not find themselves affected by the legal framework governing NGOs (12 cases). For the exceptions only a component of the project was affected. We believe it to be likely that a majority of the respondents interpreted "affected by" in terms of "hindered by". In many cases the NGO responded that they "were not affected" although it was clear that the NGO was adapting to working within the existing legal framework, and were aware of the boundaries of that framework.

##### **4.4.2 FINDING: Projects were adapted to local context**

Project designs show that NGOs were often aware of local opportunities and constraints. Most organisations had taken local constraints and opportunities into consideration when designing projects. Some were clearly based on such conditions. In RB/ECDE Education the ambition levels and intervention models were developed using local conditions as point of departure. The project grew out of a realisation that the children were having difficulties in school due to their responsibility for younger siblings during school hours. The support to LO/ZATUC was developed based on the opportunities which developed with political changes. The natural resource research component of the Interfaith project, which supported joint, multi-religious lobbying, was initiated in response to developments in the

extraction industry. Similarly, the Pemba Cup element of NPA/Youth Rights EAC was designed in response to political developments in the field, prompted by ear-marked funding from the Embassy. The fact that the latter did not survive does not necessarily imply that it should not have been initiated.

**Figure 4. Which particular opportunities/constraints does the local context provide?**




Scores: 0 = Not clear; 1 = No particular ones; 2 = Some opportunities/constraints; 3 = Project is totally dependent on context.<sup>38</sup>

There were several examples of projects where either changes in the local context or a greater understanding of existing circumstances led to changes in project design and implementation, i.e. examples of good organisational learning. Such examples include the NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness project which regrouped and developed a new (and ultimately successful) strategy in reaction to having encountered stiff resistance from religious elders. The interfaith project responded to the popularity of its VICOBA groups by supporting the establishment of many more groups than was originally intended, as did CARE/Lok Pachi. The NPA/Youth Rights EAC institutionalised a system of annual learning sessions which led to changes in both target group and content of awareness rising.

<sup>38</sup> Note that the scores here and in several other figures do not refer to continuous, but to ordinal scales.

**Figure 5. Is there knowledge, adaptation and alignment to the local context?**



0 = Not at all; 1 = Some; 2 = Much; 3 = Full.<sup>39</sup>

The projects were in general in line with government priorities. We have however seen instances where projects were in line with the government’s stated priorities but despite this encountered resistance from government representatives at local or regional level. This was usually because the government was not “walking the talk” at all levels of the administrative structure. Examples of this include that the official line on anti-female genital mutilation activities was not always followed by the local administration or courts at the local level.

The legal aid project in Uganda, the Interfaith project’s lobbying and periodically LO/ZATUC were examples where there appeared to be a clear tension between project activities and elements of host government policy.

Gaps also existed in terms of linkages to the national level with consequences for establishing national level co-ordination in the cases where the project was big enough to have an impact on national level. Maintaining links to the national level was not always easy however. The National Aids Control Council was critical of CARE as they were not aware of the HIV/AIDS component of the CARE/Lok Pachi project. Meanwhile, project staff maintained that the local government officer responsible for reporting on HIV/AIDS activities was fully aware of everything that was done.

Insufficient linking at national level is likely to have limited the replicability and the indirect impact of the projects due to the fact they were not widely known and therefore good practice could not be followed by others. This obviously has implications for the potential for the scaling up of activities.

<sup>39</sup> *Knowledge*: Was there knowledge about the relevant development plans, regulations, political, social, cultural, economic opportunities and constraints, other organisations (complementary or competing) in the field that the project works in. 0 = Not at all; 1 = Some knowledge; 2 = Much knowledge; 3 = Full knowledge.  
*Adaptation*: Does the project reflect adaptation to relevant existing local institutions (government and other formal or informal organisations/ networks)? 0 = No sign of adaptation to existing local institutions; 1 = some non-systematic adaptation; 2 = systematic adaptation but not fully exploited; 3 = Full adaptation to local institutions, including shared planning and sharing of resources/inputs.  
*Alignment*: Is the project aligned with the government’s local/national action priorities and with interventions by other organizations? 0 = Not at all; 1 = some activities aligned; 2 = most activities aligned; 3 = Fully aligned.



## 4.5 Conclusions and Recommendations: Background and Contextualisation

The scale or scope of the projects varied greatly. The issues related to scale and scope are discussed in greater detail in section Cost and Scale below.

### The funding chain and costs

The route of funds between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the projects' ultimate beneficiaries was elaborate and multilayered. It has not been possible for us to identify the cost of the various levels of administration. Elsewhere in this report we comment on the poor quality of documentation and the lack of measurability of results *at field level*. We also note that we have seen significant efforts to improve the measurability of results at field level. However, we have seen no attempts to develop indicators for or measure the results expected at the different administrative levels.

The details of funding per project, per year were difficult to clarify. This was partly due to structural reasons such as Norad administering its funds on a programmatic level, rather than on a project level. It was also partly due to project costs being derived from multiple funding sources. Whatever the precise case-by-case circumstances, it is hard to avoid the more systemic conclusion that there was also an underinvestment in the quality of documentation.

**Conclusion:** There is a lack of cost transparency in the funding chain.

**Conclusion:** Norad does not require reporting on how the NGOs administer the funds placed at their disposal for overheads. Hence, organisational efficiency cannot be a criterion for fund allocation. The manner in which Norad funds activities therefore lacks incentives to focus on and develop cost-efficiencies within the NGO structures.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should task the 'big five' together with the umbrella organisations to agree on a standard for reporting overheads at each administrative level by the end of 2012. Norad should then require recipient NGOs to report costs throughout the funding chain according to the agreed standard. The results should be published every three years in a benchmarking paper, starting no later than 2015.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** NGOs should seek assistance from the private sector to develop their ability to track *and analyse* expenditure. The main purpose of this would not be to report on funding but to learn to use cost data for management in a systematic way. Results should be openly available and NGOs should use the data both to improve efficiency and to improve their chances in the competition for funding.

We also noted that agreements and budgets generally included southern NGO costs in some detail while Norwegian budgets, even parts funded by Norad allocations for the project, were not included. This lack of transparency was intentional and makes the development of full partnership between Norwegian and Southern NGOs

unlikely as it removes the possibility of jointly assessing resource allocation. Control over resource allocation lies at the heart of organisational power. In consequence, as long as the Norwegian party maintains sole control over this part of the budget, while the Southern partner needs to negotiate in detail its part of the budget, any partnership will remain fundamentally skewed.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** Norwegian NGOs should initiate a process to be more open about their own costs in their relationships with southern partners. A first step would be to include all costs, including those incurred in Norway but funded by Norad, in project documents and agreements.

Given the common absence of baseline data, the level of funding for projects does not appear to have been defined using needs or an analysis of the development context in the project area as the point of departure. Budget levels appear to have been developed using the perceived absorption capacity of the receiving NGO, the money available from particular budget lines, or the funds needed for a particular intervention that an NGO wished to implement as point of departure.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should offer NGOs earmarked funds for feasibility studies to be conducted prior to making an application for project funding. Framework organisations should be required to earmark a noticeable percentage of their budgets for feasibility studies, monitoring and evaluation.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** A documented, systematic, baseline analysis of the development context in the area where a project is planned should be a prerequisite for initiating a project. Such an analysis should, typically, include an analysis of how the proposed project will relate to and be coordinated with inputs and activities of other stakeholders working in their technical field/geographical area. Renewed agreements with partner NGOs should require documentation of what was achieved and learned from the previous agreement.

**Recommendation to Norwegian NGOs:** Norwegian NGOs should require their southern partners to map and document the activities of other stakeholders working in their technical field/geographical area. Proactive engagement especially focused on better coordination should be supported and encouraged; passivity or resistance to coordination should be openly discussed and explored in partnership meetings and learning reviews. This needs to be addressed at all organisational levels from the field to the Governing board, in the South and in Norway. Governing boards should make themselves available to “oil the machinery” of inter-NGO coordination and should require updates on progress in coordination to be included in annual reporting.

### **Can matchmaking be improved?**

We have noted that the establishment of north-south partnerships seldom takes place through systematic selection. The exact nature of the process differs between organisations but is best described as matchmaking. An NGO seeks a partner or a project to get funded or to invest in. Another NGO has money or a project idea or managerial resources etc. The partnership develops when needs and resources

match. We have also noted that vertical coherence was correlated with better use of RBM and greater potential for scaling up. There may be a circular argument here as the organisations with vertical coherence also tended to be bigger organisations, but NBA/Legal Aid for example indicates that vertical coherence may be as important as size.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad is recommended to collaborate with the umbrella organisations to conduct further research on the concept and reality of vertical coherence. The aim of such research would be to improve future match-making between Norwegian and southern NGOs.

### **Local government, opportunities and constraints**

We found that the NGOs have understood the importance of keeping local government and authorities informed on their intentions and activities. They were also good at adapting activities to changing local opportunities and constraints.

We also found large variations in how much the NGO interacted with government structures. Some projects actively engaged in and exploited existing technical and other resources, and shared their own skills and methodologies, thereby improving local governance. Some projects did the bare minimum, registering and informing to the extent they had to, but also building parallel structures.

**Recommendation to NGOs not already doing so:** NGOs should systematically invest in close interaction with existing local and national service delivery structures and adapt activities in order to complement and strengthen permanent (i.e. non-project) structures. Adaptation to government priorities and implementation systems is particularly important in activities that clearly fall within the governments mandate e.g. health, education. National standards of various kinds etc.

## 5. Cluster Two: Results Based Management

Results Based Management (RBM) is a methodology intended to support management and other implementers in focusing their efforts on achieving results. The methodology is an adaptation of the commonly used Logical Framework Approach (LFA), which structures project design by requiring definitions of e.g. overall objectives, immediate objectives, planned activities and outcomes, needed input and potential risks.

The first step of such a process is to find out what the situation is when the project is initiated. This would involve some kind of baseline study or, at the very minimum, documentation in some form which describes and analyses the situation on the ground when the project begins.

When baseline conditions have been mapped, documented and analysed, the project needs to develop some form of strategic plan describing objectives and expected results, resources needed, activities to be undertaken etc. in an appropriately operationalised format. The goal of utilising both RBM and LFA methods is to increase the likelihood of success by ensuring that activities undertaken are linked to and have an impact on the intended results, i.e. to clarify how the project intends to influence that situation. The project design needs to establish the logical relationship between the activities undertaken and the intended results. Management then needs to ensure that the project is implemented along these lines.

Results Based Management differs from the Logical Framework Approach in its emphasis on results. These may be defined beyond output, i.e. including outcomes and impact. Output refers to the immediate results of an activity, for example that 15 people have been trained in improved teaching methods. Outcome refers to the direct results of an output, for example that the trained people have used their skills in schools. Impact refers to the indirect results, over the longer term, often focused on or linked to broad development goals. In our example this could be higher quality education leading to an increased percentage of the students in an area being able to, and choosing to, proceed to secondary level education and thereafter obtaining gainful employment. Impact may at times be very broadly defined. In our example this could include reducing child mortality, increasing economic activity, greater popular involvement in local politics etc. assuming that one could show that these effects were causally related to more of the children choosing to get a secondary education.

Both LFA and RBM have an emphasis on documentation and measurability, the latter generally through quantification. The methods require that the project design phase includes attention to how success will be defined and how project implementers are going to assess what has been achieved. In consequence, it is essential to the use of both methodologies that indicators are clearly defined and their progress is possible to monitor. Management can then monitor progress during the project implementation period. The development and use of appropriate indicators, which fulfil SMART criteria,<sup>40</sup> requires skill and experience. The more abstract the results that the project is aiming for, the more challenging this becomes.

During the implementation phase of a results based managed project, changes in indicators are followed up with the help of a monitoring system. This supplies management with data on how well the intended results are being achieved. The monitoring data generated affect management decisions, including resource allocation. The data is also used for developing best practice and organisational learning and – ultimately – to inform the design of new projects or the decision to close.

## 5.1 Findings

In four of the 15 projects studied here, RBM was not used, in five projects the use of RBM had a clear and positive impact on project management and in six projects RBM was found useful but there were some problems. RBM was not perceived as having a negative impact on project management in any project.

### 5.1.1 **FINDING: Most NGOs did not use results based management systematically**

Several of the organisations used management information systems based on results based management principles. In cases where an organisation or network (e.g. Save the Children Alliance, CARE or Stromme Foundation) had a functioning management information system that generated reports of reasonable clarity Norad accepted reports in the organisation's own format without insisting that this be translated on to Norad forms.

Several of the projects used a results oriented management style but did not document it, nor systematically apply the methodology. NLM/Chesta Girls School, for example, were clearly results oriented in their follow-up of the construction work but 'lost' the anti-FGM component partly due to inadequate planning and follow-up systems. Had RBM been applied, the problem analysis would have made the lack of logical links between baseline conditions, planned activities and likely impact on traditional practices apparent early in the project period. Implementation would then have followed a different design. In NCA/ Habiba FGM Awareness, an early application of RBM principles could have avoided the initial clash with religious leaders. However, the project's way of dealing with difficulties along the way show an intuitive understanding of the principles that RBM is based on. Project stakeholders, especially staff, showed great interest in the methodology when they were exposed to it in connection with the team field visit. With basic training it would be easy to introduce the methodology.

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<sup>40</sup> There are multiple definitions of SMART. We refer to Specific, Measurable, Agreed-upon, Realistic and Time-bound.

### **5.1.2 FINDING: Projects with vertical coherence were generally better at applying RBM**

We have described vertical coherence as a similarity of ‘mental models’ between Norwegian and southern partners when combined with a representation at both national and local level. There is a correlation between such coherence and proper application of RBM.

### **5.1.3 FINDING: Most projects were initiated without documented baseline data and without an appropriately operationalised strategic plan**

Only a third of the projects studied had systematically documented baseline data outlining the initial conditions at project-commencement. Two of the projects had no documented baseline data whatsoever. Eight had some basic information which was not systematically compiled.

We note that the lack of documented baseline data does not necessarily imply that the people designing the projects knew nothing about the situation and the conditions they were seeking to address. A number of the projects grew out of long-term cooperation and were implemented by people with significant experience, local knowledge and professional expertise. Nevertheless, the absence of documented baseline data has implications both for accountability and effectiveness as discussed below.

The projects were generally not started from scratch nor were they based on systematic, documented assessments of needs and resource gaps in the targeted community. More commonly the projects developed in one of the following ways:

- as a continuation of an existing activity without documented reflection as to whether the activity was the most effective way of assisting people (monitoring and reviews generally focused on strengths and weaknesses of the project activities undertaken not on whether such activities best served the target groups needs). Questioning the project strategy and the presence of the NGO was rare;<sup>41</sup>
- as a continuation of an existing activity but with adaptation to new developments or to the organisation’s deepened knowledge about the developing context in which the project was being implemented;
- as a continuation of an existing activity where the aim of the new activity was adapted to perceived funding availability. For example Kvinnefronten changed from women’s development/leadership in Chole to anti-FGM in Dodoma and NPA went from being a major relief provider in North-western Tanzania via various rights focused projects to ‘development through sports’ in NPA/Youth Rights EAC;<sup>42</sup> and
- in response to requests from the Norwegian embassy as in the cases of the NPA/Youth Rights EAC and the support from the Norwegian Women and Family Association to COWA.

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41 Meanwhile, both NPA and Kvinnefronten deserve recognition for having chosen to cease working with partners or close projects that were not functioning well.

42 This may be regarded as opportunistic strategies aiming at the preservation of the organisation rather than as an action intended to address perceived needs in the communities concerned. It can also be viewed as an organisation that is applying learning and is willing to adapt its activities to the policy goals of the funding agencies concerned, in this case the Norwegian NGO or Norad.

We analysed the projects to ascertain whether the ones studied had an operationalised strategic plan (i.e. was the strategy translated into a work plan with defined, time bound activities, assigned responsibilities, etc.?). We found that more than half of the projects either lacked such a plan or that the plan that they used had significant gaps.

Only two projects, the NBA/Legal Aid project and the RB/Quality Education had well developed strategic plans which clearly identified objectives and expected results and had operationalised them appropriately.


Four projects (SF/Microfinance, NWF/Vocational Training, RB/ECDE Education and NCA/Interfaith Cooperation) had well developed strategic plans but with some gaps.

Another component of RBM is monitoring and the Terms of Reference asks whether monitoring “is an integral part of project implementation”. We chose to define this as systematic, documented monitoring. There were major differences between the projects studied in this regard.

**5.1.4 FINDING: Only six projects undertook systematic, documented monitoring. The organisations implementing these projects made use of the data that the systems generated to inform management decisions on project implementation**

The projects that had systematic monitoring systems in place and made use of them were: Stromme/Microfinance, NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation, NBA/Legal Aid, NWF/Vocational Training, RB/Quality Education and RB/ECDE Education. The remaining nine projects had ad hoc, partial, non-systematic, undocumented or non-existent monitoring.

**Figure 6. Quality and use of monitoring in the projects<sup>43</sup>**



There was significant evidence that where monitoring took place, monitoring systems did in fact feed into both the management practices and the learning of the organisations concerned. The evidence included the existence of structures for regular learning reviews and, in some projects, a pattern of monitoring-based management decisions intended to improve results. Such decisions included adjustments in budgets and plans, shifts in target groups, changes of objectives and project implementation strategy, all of which were traceable to documented monitoring. NWF/Vocational Training for example introduced changes in the curriculum and improved on-the-job training following feedback from follow-up studies of alumni. RB/ECDE Education made multiple adjustments to project design in reaction to draught and periods of insecurity that was reported through their monitoring system.

There was significant anecdotal evidence of managerial action based on monitoring even in the projects that did not have systematic and documented monitoring systems in place. NCA/ Habiba FGM Awareness refocused on awareness building of religious leaders after encountering serious resistance from this group. DIAC began assisting abused women who had dared to report the abuse but were having difficulties with police and courts. The NCA/Interfaith Cooperation project allowed VICOBA activities to expand far beyond what was initially planned in response to unexpected demand. The difference between these projects and those mentioned above was that the pattern of management decisions was not systematic. Furthermore, in these projects, the evidence of management action based on monitoring was ad hoc and not easily traceable to documented monitoring.<sup>44</sup>

43 Note that scores on "Monitoring done" and Monitoring results used" range from 0 to 2, while scores on "Monitoring documented" range from 0 to 3.

Is monitoring an integral part of the project? (Monitoring done) 0=Not at all; 1=Ad hoc/partial/selective/monitoring activities done; 2=Monitoring is an integral part of project design and implementation and done systematically with adequate professionalism/credibility.

Are monitoring findings being acted upon? (Monitoring results used) 0=No evidence of management action based on monitoring; 1=Some ad hoc examples of management action based on monitoring; 2= Management decisions show a pattern of systematic and appropriate action based on monitoring.

Is there documentation of monitoring of results? (Monitoring documented) 0=Not at all; 1=Some, random documentation; 2=Systematic monitoring but clear documentation gaps; 3= Systematic and appropriate documentation

44 In their comments to the draft of this report, NCA disagree with this. They describe their monitoring programme as rigorous, citing their reports and that at one point an independent audit had been conducted and later followed up by their internal audit function.



### **5.1.5 FINDING: All projects had both overall and more immediate objectives**

We found that all projects had placed their activities in a broader context by defining overall objectives. This was true even of the projects where implementation was activity focused.

### **5.1.6 FINDING: Three projects had appropriate indicators for all objectives**

There was a large variation in how well the projects had developed indicators for objectives and only three projects had appropriate indicators for all objectives. All of the projects studied were characterised by multiple objectives, mixing quite distant or abstract overall intentions with more or less hands-on practical and tangible goals in terms of project activities. Assessing progress and achievements of some of these immediate objectives may have been quite straight forward in terms of measurement (e.g. number of savings and loans groups established, percentage repayment over time) while the same programme struggled with formulating indicators to measure its more abstract goals (e.g. enhancing interfaith dialogue or reducing the stigma due to HIV/AIDS ).

We saw several examples of fairly abstract overall ambitions e.g. “contributing to interfaith dialogue” in NCA/Interfaith Cooperation, “changing traditional attitudes to female genital mutilation” in NLM/Chesta Girls School or “reducing HIV stigma” in CARE/Lok Pachi. In general these were combined with very practical interventions such as micro-finance groups, income generating programs, separate toilets for girls in schools and public expenditure tracking. The hope was that the practical interventions would contribute to the overall goal.

Three projects had developed appropriate indicators for all objectives. Five projects had reasonable indicators for most objectives. In five cases some project objectives had indicators of which some were useful. The two remaining projects had no specific indicators although they did have annual work plans which were followed up and adjusted according to available resources and implementation.

### **5.1.7 FINDING: All projects contained some internal logic indicating that planned activities would contribute to achieving planned results**

There were logical links between planned activities and intended overall objectives. At times these links were quite weak however, commonly due to overall ambitions well beyond feasible project impact such as “constitutional government” in NBA/Legal Aid or “that economically marginalised people [...] secure effective representation of their priorities in processes of governance and allocation of land and other natural resources [in Tanzania]” in NPA/Youth Rights EAC.

Looking at the studied projects we found that all project designs had some logical link between the activities and the intended results. In six projects we found that there were fully developed logical links between all activities and objectives. It is interesting to note that five of these six projects also exhibited a high degree of vertical coherence, as defined above.

### **5.1.8 FINDING: Most projects combined several strategies e.g. support to group income generation and awareness raising on HIV in the same groups**

A number of the projects had combined strategies where practical, easily measurable activities (e.g. start and train micro-finance groups, build school) in support of reasonably measurable objectives (increase income, school built) were combined with a separate, difficult-to-measure, objectives such as reducing HIV/AIDS stigma or increased awareness about female genital mutilation. This appears to have been a useful and practical approach. For example, the increased financial strength of HIV infected participants in Lok Pachi was cited as having reduced stigma.

There were examples of projects where there was a divergence between the overall aim of the project and the areas in which the majority of the funds were used. NLM/ Chesta Girls School, for example, was intended to contribute to changing FGM related practices, a goal which was lost on the way.

Another example of mixed aims and implementation was the NCA/Interfaith Cooperation project where the intention of contributing to interfaith dialogue at the national level encountered implementation difficulties. Meanwhile the project chose to attempt to contribute to interfaith dialogue at the grass-roots level by the establishment of micro-finance groups where criteria for membership were that members come from several faiths. While these groups multiplied rapidly and were very popular with members of the target population, it was unclear as to whether these groups were significantly different from other micro-finance groups established in Tanzania. It was therefore unclear whether this activity contributed to the overall goal of the project i.e. supporting interfaith dialogue in Tanzanian society.<sup>45</sup>

### **5.1.9 FINDING: There was a clear pattern of improved understanding for and use of results based management over time**

There were multiple examples of development in the capacity to use RBM methods and approaches over time. A number of the projects began without any use of indicators and Norad's introduction of RBM-based formats has clearly led to a development of the documentation of project proposals and reporting along the lines of RBM.

## **5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations: Results Based Management**

Without systematic baseline documentation RBM is not possible to implement effectively as it becomes very difficult to identify what changes have taken place and which results may be attributed to the project. A lack of information about results is serious as it indicates that management does not focus on achieving them (it is hard to focus on something you know nothing about). Assuming management affects the implementation of a project, a lack of management focus on results will lower project effectiveness.

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<sup>45</sup> In their comment to the draft of this report, NCA emphasize that their VICOBAs are different from microfinance groups as they "are a 'vehicle' for development – through which various issues can be channeled" and "platforms for community mobilization" Babati and Kondoa are cited as examples of how VICOBAs groups promoted interfaith dialog. While we respect that this reflects NCA perceptions, it was not the description of VICOBAs we were given in the field. The VICOBAs were very popular, primarily for their direct and almost immediate impact on poverty.

It is important to note that systematic does not mean complex. It is perfectly feasible to have documented baseline data and systematic monitoring without this becoming overly burdensome at any level of system. The documentation requirements of Norad were flexible and quite reasonable, emphasizing content and utility over bureaucratic format.

Despite this there were key informants who were frustrated with the documentation required. When considering the degree of documentation that is necessary within a project it is important to remember the impact of staff turnover. A common feature of these projects was the lack of written documentation on key aspects of the project's evolution: in such circumstances, letting institutional memory and organisational archives reside in the ever capable mind of trusted staff members or volunteers poses a significant risk to a project. This was illustrated by the negative consequences for project implementation encountered by an Interfaith partner when a key staff member in the VICOBA programme chose to leave and in KF/Women and Health, Chole when the key organiser chose to withdraw from active managerial involvement. The management structure in NWF/Vocational Training is highly dependent on one individual leaving it open to the risk of serious consequences the day she chooses to leave.

The lack of documented baseline and monitoring data also leads to problems with accountability. The NGOs implement projects with resources supplied by others. The planned interventions in the daily lives of people in the target population may or may not have positive effects on the affected people. All interventions will have both direct effects and side-effects, whether positive or negative. In the absence of baseline and monitoring data it is not possible to assess with reasonable certainty whether project activities contribute to or detract from the well-being of affected people, be they members of the target group or not. In the absence of baseline data it is also impossible to share well-founded assessments of what impact the project has had with the various stakeholders. This implies that;

Conclusion: The project implementers were disempowering stakeholders by under-investing in and failing to share sufficiently robust project documentation. The lack of good documentation reduced stakeholders' ability to make informed decisions regarding whether or not they should support the continuation of the project.

Conclusion: The overall lack of systematic documentation limited the potential for sharing innovative and successful implementation approaches. It also reduced the probability that projects be scaled up effectively. It is likely that it limited fundraising potential due to the fact that even projects that were heralded as successes were not able to document clearly the precise scale of the successes claimed.

Conclusion: The projects assessed lacked sufficient clarity regarding causality i.e. which activities actually led to which results. This is likely to have decreased effectiveness and raises questions about cost efficiency. In several cases, field level project staff was pleased when our country coordinators introduced them to methodologies that could help them address these weaknesses. They also expressed

disappointment at not having had access to these methodologies and approaches earlier in their task.

A distinction needs to be made between projects that did not document the monitoring that took place and projects that did not in fact monitor. There were several examples of projects where implementation showed clear signs that management was aware of what was happening in the project and adapted to a changing context, even though the projects had not documented the data based on which that informed decision was made. Each NGO implementing a project needs to address the balance between capacity building in terms of developing systems for documentation and monitoring and capacity building in terms of other investments for learning. That learning did take place is clear from changes in program implementation that were based on contextual changes.

For small organisations with limited funds and short budget cycles, investing heavily in developing the competence and the organisational infrastructure to maintain sophisticated monitoring systems may not be a rational or good use of resources. Meanwhile for larger scale projects such investment is clearly worthwhile as they are likely to have significant impact on particular target groups or local institutions. This is also true for projects of a pilot nature due to their potential impact on methodology applied in other projects.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should require organisations that receive funds to increase investment in RBM capacity building until they can show that the principles are applied in project implementation at all administrative levels, including the implementing field level. Applications with vague objectives and un-measurable indicators should be turned down, starting 2013.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** NGOs should invest more in helping their staff understand the potential for improved implementation effectiveness that results based management has, if sensibly implemented. Incentive structures, appraisals etc. should be based on results achieved, not activities implemented. As a minimum ambition, NGOs should aim to have clear objectives and SMART<sup>46</sup> indicators for all projects by 2013.

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<sup>46</sup> There are multiple definitions of SMART. We refer to Specific, Measurable, Agreed-upon, Realistic and Time-bound.

## 6. Cluster Three: Approach

This section addresses the NGOs' understanding of and approach regarding strengthening of civil society and capacity building of local partner and involvement of target group.

### 6.1 Strengthening Civil Society

The strengthening of civil society is a core ambition of the Norwegian government in its aid policy. There have been a number of attempts to define what civil society is. Current (2009) Norad guidelines define it as;

"...an arena separate from the family, the state and the market, where individuals voluntarily associate to advance common views and interests on their own or on others' account. This definition is more inclusive than one based on a narrow understanding of self-interest. It thus embraces a broad spectrum of organisational forms in the South, ranging from professional NGOs and social mass movements to traditional structures and local and informal networks."<sup>47</sup>

The guidelines also outline general principles for working with civil society in the south, i.e. to:

- Mobilise NGOs at all levels in the struggle against poverty and oppression;
- Strengthen civil society actors working towards development, democratisation and the redistribution of power;
- Support civil society organisations in their international work;
- Ensure better documentation and reporting of results;
- Support effective work against corruption in all its forms; and
- Increase diaspora participation in Norwegian development co-operation.

As these principles and guidelines are quite general, it is not difficult for Norwegian NGOs to formulate programmes and projects consistent with them.

Norad's evaluation department requested us to explore how the organisations understood the concept of strengthening civil society and capacity building of local partners. The responses to the questions regarding these two concepts were very similar. Most organisations differentiated little between them. We therefore chose to report primarily from the perspective of strengthening civil society.

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<sup>47</sup> Norad (2009 b).

**6.1.1 FINDING: Some NGOs had an understanding of what Strengthening Civil Society meant. None could give a clear definition of what it comprised, even in the cases when project activities clearly contribute to such strengthening**

We found that NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation, NBA/Legal Aid, RB/ECDE Education and RB/Quality Education had a clear understanding of the meaning of the term. Several of the other NGOs whose projects we examined were aware of the concept but they had not discussed it or worked through what it meant for them. None of the projects had a clear definition of the term; five regarded it as a process and three as both process and result.

**6.1.2 FINDING; Several projects clearly contribute to strengthen civil society. There were multiple examples where such strengthening took place**

Despite difficulties in understanding the concept, 11 of the projects could cite examples of how they had affected civil society through their activities. Examples include increased volunteerism within the target group in RB/ECDE Education, NLM/Chesta Girls School and NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness as well as behavioural change in the form of people demanding their rights in many projects including NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation, NBA/Legal Aid, NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness, KF/Women and Health, Chole and KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma as well as attitudinal changes on both sides in the relationship with local authorities. Clearly related to the strengthening of civil society was the establishment of grassroots groups of various kinds, ranging from informal networks in support of girls trying to avoid FGM to the very popular microfinance groups in CARE/Lok Pachi and NCA/Interfaith Cooperation.

Six of the projects had indicators, or proxy variables, which they thought made it possible to measure progress in terms of SCS. These ranged from quantitative indicators at activity level such as Save the Children in Uganda's "number of media spots" or "number of consultative meetings held", the Legal Aid Project's "number of people who seek assistance after becoming aware of their rights" to more vague indicators such as "participation" or "level of activeness". Five projects had made some kind of measurement that could be related to strengthening civil society.

The four projects that had a clear understanding of the term strengthening civil society – the Community-Based Rehabilitation project, the Legal Aid Project and the two Save the Children projects – had strategies that included activities specifically designed to strengthen civil society. They also had constructive, if not always good, relations with state structures. They all achieved structural changes in relation to how key processes, regulated by the state, were implemented in their field of expertise. The changes included adaptations to curricula for nomadic children used in the Ministry of Education in the SCiU projects, procedural changes in legal process in favour of the accused in NBA/Legal Aid and changes to the legal framework regulating state relations with disabled people in the NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation project.


## 6.2 Target Groups

The ToR ask us to comment on how and to what extent target groups were involved in project design, implementation and monitoring, and whether active participation was seen as a key process or a result of the project. They further inquire about the relevance of the project results for the target group and whether there was a jointly agreed upon plan for the sustainability of the results. The way the questions about sustainability plan were answered indicates that there was a mixed understanding of this question: while in some cases the answer referred, as it should have, to a *jointly agreed on* sustainability plan, in many cases it referred to the existence of *any* sustainability plan. For this reason we have placed the discussion about sustainability plan in the above section on results based management, as we felt that the link was stronger to management issues than to the discussion about target groups.

### 6.2.1 FINDING: Target groups were vulnerable or excluded or both

The main target groups were women (4 projects), poor (3 projects), semi-poor (4 projects) and children (3 projects). Most projects targeted the most vulnerable people: two thirds of the projects targeted vulnerable people in vulnerable, excluded areas. NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation, NBA/Legal Aid and NWF/Vocational Training all targeted vulnerable people but not in a very vulnerable area, as they did not reach the most excluded areas. Only two projects, LO/ZATUC and SF/Micro-finance, could be said to target people that were not among the most vulnerable. ZATUC was a trade union coordinating body and as such its ultimate beneficiaries were people who did in fact have employment, Stromme's micro-finance projects targeted stronger segments of the micro-finance market; e.g. loans for the installation of solar power in areas not served by the national grid.

**Figure 7. Are the target groups justifiably the right ones?<sup>48</sup>**



This being said, we also note that while key informants stated that the project worked with the poor or poorest, and the limited field visits we made appeared to confirm this, there was seldom any evidence that studies or surveys had been undertaken to show that this was so or to improve the targeting to such groups. Given the heterogeneity within target groups, along with many projects relying on

<sup>48</sup> Are the target groups justifiably the right ones? 0 = Target group does not belong to most vulnerable group and project area is normal or privileged; 1 = Target group is not excluded or vulnerable but the project area is; 2 = Target group is vulnerable or excluded but the project area is normal; 3 = Target group belongs to most vulnerable group in an area the is vulnerable and excluded.

self selection for inclusion, targeting is likely to have been skewed away from the most vulnerable.<sup>49</sup>

### **6.2.2 FINDING: Most projects reached less than 25 % of their target population**

All projects reached some part of the target population.<sup>50</sup> Four projects (KF/Women and Health, Chole, NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation, RB/ECDE Education and RB/Quality Education) reached a significant share (between 25% and 75%). Ten projects reached only a small part (less than 25%) of their target populations. However this was in general a result of ill-defined target populations or unrealistic targets. The focus of project planning often lay on target groups, not target populations. This may have contributed to the inability to scale up some of the projects. In NLM/Chesta Girls School, for example, a potentially more cost-effective strategy, getting girls into existing schools and working on attitudes towards FGM there, was not considered and a new school was constructed instead. Confronted with questions why the project had not reached a larger proportion of the target population, project Governance was clearly taken aback by the thought that this might have been an alternative. Core to the choice made was that the problem analysis was based on a particular group of girls, not the target population's needs. Less clear-cut, but similarly questionable resource allocation took place in other projects with target group, rather than target population focus, notably KF/Women and Health, Chole and NWF/Vocational Training.

### **6.2.3 FINDING: Projects were highly relevant and important to the target groups**

Regarding relevance to target groups, we asked both how *relevant* the project results were to the target group, and how *important* the project support was to the target group. On both these questions, most projects received very high scores. However there is a potential bias in the answers here as some respondents may have answered positively for fear of a cutting of future funding flows.


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49 Members of microfinance groups for example, by definition have some resources allowing them to save and set aside time for capacity and group development.

50 We differentiate between target group, i.e. the planned immediate beneficiaries of a project (e.g. "these 67 poor women with HIV in village A") and target population i.e. the people in the project area that fulfil the criteria for getting assistance through the project (e.g. all poor women with HIV living in the district).



**Figure 8. Relevance and importance to target group<sup>51</sup>**



In all but three cases, the results of the project were found to be highly relevant to the target group. The three exceptions were NLM/Chesta Girls School and NWF/Vocational Training where, although important to the individuals directly supported, low scores were motivated by the low coverage and NCA/Interfaith Cooperation where the intended key result that related to interfaith relations was deemed to be of less relevance to the target group (although it was an important objective for the organisation).

The scores on the importance of the project support to the target group were almost as high. In six cases, the project support implied a significant improvement for the target group, in nine cases project support was perceived as crucial for the target group.

When judging the achievement of a project, an important issue is how difficult or challenging it is to work with the target groups. NLM/Chesta Girls School, KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma, NBA/Legal Aid and RB/Quality Education thought a significant part of their target groups were particularly challenging to work with, while CARE/Lok Pachi, ARC/Change Agent Training, KF/Women and Health, Chole and NPA/Youth Rights EAC did not think any of their target groups were particularly challenging. The rest thought a small part of the groups posed challenges.

Regarding participation of the target group in taking the initiative in establishing the project and participating in its design, implementation and monitoring, we find that this was in general quite low.

<sup>51</sup> *Relevance*: How relevant are the results of the project for the target group? 0 = Not relevant at all, 1 = Somewhat relevant, 2 = Quite but not totally relevant, 3 = Fully relevant.  
*Importance*: How important is the project support to the target group? 0 = Not at all, 1 = Project support seen as bonus but not necessary, 2 = Project support significant improvement for target group, 3 = Project support is crucial for the target group.

#### **6.2.4 FINDING: Target groups were never the ones taking the initiative to create the project**

First of all we should note that in all cases, it was clear from where the initiative came from. Perhaps surprisingly, in five projects the initiative came from one or a few individuals (NCA/Interfaith Cooperation; concerned bishop, KF/Women's Development KF/Women and Health, Chole; ex-pat hotel owner through Norwegian visitor, NPA/Youth Rights EAC; sporting country director, NWF/Vocational Training; Catholic father through Norwegian visitor and NBA/Legal Aid; Lawyers meeting at conference). In CARE/Lok Pachi, NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness and KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma the initiative was taken by project staff. Norwegian NGOs took the initiative to ARC/Change Agent Training, SF/Microfinance and RB/ECDE Education and in the remaining five cases, the project was initiated in collaboration between two to three organisations or groups at different systems levels.


#### **6.2.5 FINDING: Project design and monitoring were to a large extent done without the involvement of target groups. Some project designs involved the target groups more in project implementation**

In CARE/Lok Pachi, NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness, KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma and NPA/Youth Rights EAC the target groups were fully involved in project implementation. In two projects, NBA/Legal Aid and RB/Quality Education, the target groups were not at all involved in project design. In the case of RB/Quality Education, this is explained by the fact that the target group is young children. It should be noted, however, that their parents were involved.

Target groups were usually involved in project design only to a small extent. In three projects they were involved quite a lot, but this should be taken with caution: In KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma they were involved via project facilitators, in LO/ZATUC it was the affiliates that were involved and in EAC it is likely that key informants refer to partner organisations rather than the individual participants.

The scores on monitoring were even lower. In all but two projects, the target groups were only somewhat involved in monitoring, and again KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma, where the project works via facilitators, was the one that had a high score. As above, the low score for RB/Quality Education was based on the fact that the target group consisted of children.

**Figure 9. To what extent are target groups involved in project design, implementation and monitoring?**



0 = Not at all involved; 1 = Somewhat involved; 2 = Quite a lot and; 3 = Fully involved.

### **6.2.6 FINDING: Active participation was seen as a result rather than as a process in a majority of the projects**

In NPA/Youth Rights EAC, LO/ZATUC, KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma and ARC/Change Agent Training active participation was seen as a key process rather than a result for the project. In the remaining projects it was seen as a key result.<sup>52</sup>

## **6.3 Conclusions and Recommendations: Approach**

In the studied sample of organisations and projects, few were able to articulate precisely what they meant by “strengthening civil society”. None had it as an explicit high priority, although some (primarily rights-based NGOs) recognised its importance and some even tried to measure the impact they thought they were achieving in this regard.

The Norwegian government’s ambition to support the strengthening of civil society is unproblematic as an aim for NGOs in contexts where this goal is supported by the host government. In countries where civil society organisations are viewed with suspicion by the government in power, strengthening civil society can be risky, even dangerous, for NGOs. In such contexts, actively working towards strengthening organisations that are seeking to extend citizen’s ability to demand their rights may be seen as a hostile act by the authorities, placing project implementation, partner NGOs and even staff and volunteers at risk. In all three case-study countries, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, there have been instances of governments expressing concern with the activities of some NGOs. It is therefore not surprising that most NGO avoided the issue either by regarding strengthening civil society as beyond their mandate or by interpreting partner NGO development as strengthening civil society, *by definition*, allowing them to see their capacity building efforts as contri-

<sup>52</sup> Apart from KF/Women’s Development Chole and NBA/Legal Aid where it could not be discussed, and Stromme where the question was not relevant as Stromme only works with other organisations.

butions towards the Norwegian government's goal. This is in line with Norad's definition of strengthening civil society, as quoted above.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should continue accepting that many NGOs are unlikely to contribute to strengthening civil society beyond building the capacity of their partners. This is in itself commendable, if it is done well.

**Recommendation to Norwegian NGOs:** Each NGO should clarify its perspective on strengthening civil society and capacity building and then communicate its level of ambition on these issues to Norad in their next frame application.

Target group selection was well in line with Norwegian government policy. Although we note that there is a lack of documentation that beneficiary selection *within* target groups was appropriate, we regard the degree of vulnerability and exclusion of the selected target groups to be such that it was acceptable not to invest in more detailed targeting.

We note that target group involvement in project design, monitoring and evaluation has been limited. However, participation and involvement in, often self-selected, activities was high in many cases. Given the cost to beneficiaries of being involved we are not convinced that more participation in project administration is always to be preferred. Finding ways of identifying beneficiary preferences without placing too great a demand on their time (for discussions, meetings etc.) is a challenge for the NGOs.

**Recommendation to Norwegian NGOs:** Norwegian NGOs should seek feedback from their stakeholders, including beneficiaries, as to what is seen as an appropriate level of participation by beneficiaries.

**Recommendation to Norwegian NGOs:** Norwegian NGOs should creatively explore other ways of identifying beneficiaries' preferences. Self selection for activities is one that has shown itself to be successful. Although sure to generate significant resistance in the prevailing NGO culture, charging fees is another proven method of finding out if people value a particular service. This method has the added benefit of contributing to sustainability and Norwegian NGOs are recommended to experiment with it in activities not targeting the most vulnerable.

One of the reasons participation is sought is to increase the likelihood that a project will be sustainable. NGOs commonly underestimate the added burden on the target group implicit in sustainability strategies which require ever-increasing engagement and participation from project beneficiaries. An alternate strategy would be to intentionally adapt project design to support and complement activities consistent with government policies and/or undertaken by local authorities. This would increase the likelihood that project activities would be integrated in host country structures when funding ceases. It would also build in another degree of accountability, given that the government is the legal representative of the population. There are situations (working with minorities, with corrupt governance) that may lead an NGO to question the representativity of government structures. In such situations combining

close coordination with initiatives such as public expenditure tracking may be better than building un-sustainable parallel structures. Not coordinating with local government may be damaging to the areas' overall development by undermining local authorities, reducing economies of scale etc.

On the other hand, if the sustainability strategy is based on projects being handed over to the target group, it is important to develop management skills and a sense of ownership.<sup>53</sup> In these cases target group involvement would serve a different purpose.

**Recommendation to Norwegian NGOs:** Project coordination that is consistent with and adapted to local government strategies and plans should be actively pursued unless self-management is an explicit objective of the project. NGOs that choose not to interact closely with local and national authorities should openly document their rationale for doing so.

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<sup>53</sup> See e.g. Ostrom (2002).


## 7. Cluster Four: Achievement of Results

We were asked to assess to what extent the projects had achieved their intended key results, to what extent these could be attributed to the project and whether any side-effects occurred as a result of the projects. This was by far the most difficult cluster of questions to answer, and we have combined several approaches in order to provide answers that give an accurate picture of reality. When planning the evaluation, we anticipated that not all the projects would have reliable and robust enough indicators to enable us to measure the key results. We also assumed that some NGOs might not have undertaken a proper baseline study for their respective projects. These turned out to be correct but understated expectations.

### 7.1 Findings

#### 7.1.1 FINDING: Most projects lacked the data and information required to be able to measure changes in indicators for key results accurately

**Figure 10. Information available for measuring achievement of results in each project<sup>54</sup>**



Only one project, RB/ECDE Education, had baseline data *and* properly formulated indicators for results. The existence of both is required to be able to measure changes in indicators for results. Two projects, NBA/Legal Aid and NWF/Vocational

<sup>54</sup> *Formulation of Results:* "Have the results been formulated with appropriate indicators and realistic targets?"  
 0=No indicators; 1=Some objectives have indicators, some of which are useable; 2=Most objectives have reasonable indicators formulated; 3=Appropriate (SMART) indicators formulated for each objective.  
*Quality of baseline:* "How detailed, profound, deep was the baseline?" How detailed, profound, deep was the baseline?  
 0=Not done there is no baseline; 1=Basic information available, not systematically compiled; 2=Baseline available, not complete; and 3=Detailed, comprehensive and appropriate baseline is available.

Training, had well-formulated indicators for intended results but lacked sufficiently good baseline data against which to compare these. Four projects had done a proper baseline study but lacked well-formulated indicators for results on several objectives (CARE/Lok Pachi, SF/Microfinance, NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation and RB/Quality Education). Two projects had neither baseline information nor indicators for results. The remaining projects were weak in both respects.

As discussed above in the section on results based management, very few projects had, or were monitoring, clearly identified results – only three projects had appropriate (SMART) indicators, two had no indicators at all and seven had only some (in many cases rather vague) indicators for results. Furthermore, while five projects had adequate baseline data, for seven projects the baseline information was patchy and not systematically compiled, while three projects had no documented baseline information at all.

Although systematic measuring of result was lacking, there was reporting. There was project documentation and/or reviews as well as financial documentation such as auditing reports, from all projects.<sup>55</sup>

**7.1.2 FINDING: There was a reasonable to good correlation between achievements reported in project documents/reviews and what we observed**

Our findings are broadly consistent with the evidence and results from the different monitoring and other reports and studies made of the different projects: there was a reasonable correspondence of and consistency with the findings in eleven of the projects reviewed and very strong correspondence and consistency in the case of four projects. It should be noted in this context that the evaluation methodology tends to create a bias towards a seemingly greater correlation for larger projects. This is because the findings were based on a mix of sources – document reviews, key person interviews and own observations – and the larger the project the greater the extent to which the results are based on document reviews and key person interviews at a higher organisational level, as there was no practical way, in the time available, of verifying all results (e.g. the 7,500 savings and loans groups reported in CARE/Lok Pachi). Hence while field level observations in the smallest projects have covered a substantial share of project activities, field level observations in the larger projects have only covered a small sample of project activities. Thus, the findings presented here and the way they are interpreted need to be viewed in the light of these considerations: the noted more favourable consistency between reports and reality for larger projects should thus not be carried too far.

As discussed in the methodology section above, the lack of baseline data and indicators for key results made it impossible to measure the change in indicators for key results, as was the intended way to assess results achievement. However, given the good correspondance between documented and observed achievements, we judged that the best approach to get comparable measures of achievement of results was to let our country coordinators make assessments based on the infor-

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
<sup>55</sup> We saw examples of financial reporting in all projects and were informed that audits had taken place. Such audits were also a requirement for further funding of projects. We did not obtain copies of audit reports from all projects but have no reason to suspect they did not exist.

mation they gathered from different sources (documents, interviews and own observations). This approach involved two methods for assessing the achievement of results *i)* an assessment of the projects' achievement of their *overall intended results* at impact and output level; and *ii)* an assessment of the extent to which they had achieved their *identified key results*.<sup>56</sup> By applying this approach, we found that:

**7.1.3 FINDING: We assess the results achievement to be high – or very high**

Most projects obtained high scores using both methods. The overall average percentage rate of results achievement was 78%. The overall intended results were achieved to 83% and the identified key results were achieved to 74%. In projects with low average rates of results achievement, this was due to a failure on one specific part of their intended results while other parts were achieved to a high extent.

**Figure 11. Evaluators' assessment of the percentage achievement of impact-related overall intentions and intended outputs<sup>57</sup>**



Using the first method – assessing the achievement of overall intended results, we found that most projects scored highly on both impact-related and output-related results. One exception is NLM/Chesta Girls School. This project initially had two objectives: to offer formal secondary education to Pokot girls and to reduce the incidence of FGM among Pokot children. The objective relating to education was well achieved (achievement score above 75%), while the FGM objective was hardly achieved at all (0 – 25%). This lowered the average rate of achievement for the project. NCA/Interfaith Cooperation had a similar duality in its intended results; while many more micro-finance groups than planned were established, the intended result related to transforming WCRP (the World Conference on Religions for Peace) to ICRPT (the Inter-Religious Council for Peace Tanzania) was not achieved, resulting in an average output achievement of 50%. CARE/Lok Pachi established many more savings-and-loans groups than planned, which, in the figure, is represented by an

<sup>56</sup> This approach was chosen in part to avoid bias caused by selected 'key results' being unrepresentative in cases where projects had multiple intended results. For details refer the section on methodology.

<sup>57</sup> In the figure above, data for Stromme/Microfinance is missing. The reason is that we do not feel we can make a reasonable assessment of results based on the data we have about this project. As it was not possible for the country team to conduct a field visit we do not have observations of activities or results at field level.




above-100% score. The average impact-related results achievement score was 82 % while for outputs the achievement score was 83%.

The second approach to measuring the extent to which the projects have achieved their intended results is summarised in the diagram below. There is a varying number of identified key results per project. The key results are defined in terms of impact, outcome or output. The diagram shows project average percentages for all identified key results (blue); impact-related results (red); and output- and outcome-related results (green).

Impact-related key results were not identified for all projects, and in the case of NBA/Legal Aid, the impact related key result that was identified was formulated in such a way that it could not reasonably have been achieved. As there is not much difference in impact-related and other key results for the other projects, the focus when reading the table should be on the project average (blue).

**Figure 12. Evaluators' assessment of the percentage achievement of identified key results<sup>58</sup>**



**7.1.4 FINDING: Having identified impact-related key results is correlated with successful implementation of the project**


The figure above shows that there are only six projects for which impact-related key results had been identified. These six are among the more successful projects.

The distribution of different types of key results differed across projects. Assuming that the selection of intended key results was *not* biased by country coordinators having used different criteria, but that it reflects the accurate distribution of key results in the projects, we note the following: All projects had some intended key results that referred to outcome; 8 projects had intended key results related to output, 8 projects had intended key results that related to impact, and only three projects had a combination of output, outcome and impact related intended key results.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

The figure and table below compare the two methods and give the project average achievement of results by combining them.

**Figure 13. Comparison of the two methods for assessing results<sup>59</sup>**



The scores obtained by using the two different methods are quite similar. The difference in scores is markedly higher in KF/Women and Health, Chole, LO/ZATUC, NBA/Legal Aid, RB/ECDE Education and RB/Quality Education and in all of these the achievement of overall results is higher than the achievement of intended key results. This may be interpreted as a sign that even if the *identified* key intended results in a project are not reached to a high degree, the project may still be successful in achieving its *overall* purpose or objectives, i.e. failure to achieve a specific key result may not indicate an overall failure of the project.

The table below summarises the average scores of each method per country and overall:

**Figure 14. Percentage achievement of results, average scores by country and assessment method**

Average Scores	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	All projects
Overall intended results	84	77	87	83
Identified key results	87	69	70	74
Country average	85	73	79	78

The average percentage achievement of results for all projects is 83 percent in the overall scoring and 74 in the key results scoring, while combining the results of the two methods gives an average score of 78 percent for the achievement of results. Comparing the project averages obtained from the two different approaches to scoring, (achievement of key results and overall scoring) we found that they were very consistent in the case of Kenya, which also achieved the highest country

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

average. Tanzania's results were more dispersed and achieved the lowest scores using both methods. Uganda recorded the greatest variation, with an overall average score of 87 and a key results score of 70.

**7.1.5 FINDING: In our opinion there was a clear causal link between project activities and achieved results**

In eleven of the projects, the country coordinators stated that in their view there were clear causal links between project activities and achieved results – and that it was highly likely that these changes were caused mainly by the project. In no case was it judged unlikely that the project had anything to do with achieved results, but in two projects, there was only some evidence of project influence on some of the changes. In one project there was clear evidence of influence but only in relation to some of the observed changes.

The results here are further reinforced by the comments presented in the interview guidelines section on situational analysis. Here, other changes and important events that have taken place in the project area have been discussed. There were several cases where the wider context positively influenced the project, such as improved government services, laws that changed in favour of project activities, economic development, increased education levels and the presence of other NGOs. However, these outside influences do not seem to have been of a magnitude that would have affected the projects to a large extent. One exception may be CARE/Lok Pachi, which was implemented in an area where a similar project was already run by ARC, but at a smaller scale. There is evidence that staff trained in this smaller project were “poached” by the larger CARE/Lok Pachi project. This is likely to have contributed to the success of CARE/Lok Pachi and been a challenge for ARC.

**7.1.6 FINDING: The identified unintended side-effects of the projects' activities were mainly positive**

There was a large variety of unintended side-effects of the projects, including:

- women's position in the family being strengthened as a result of their improved economic well-being;
- higher attendance of girls in primary school as the availability of secondary level education makes it “worthwhile” to study at the lower levels;
- project staff divorcing abusive husbands;
- improved infrastructure resulting from construction work needed expand transportation capacity in connection with project implementation;
- changes in the mining laws as a result of lobbying as a way of strengthening interfaith relations; and
- local positive economic spill-over effects of the increased purchasing power of the members of micro-credit groups.

However, there are also examples of negative side-effects, such as the alarming suspicion that in some project areas FGM is now carried out at earlier ages, before girls come in contact with outside influences. There was also evidence that the project in KF/Women and Health, Chole created conflicts.

**7.1.7 FINDING: Four of the five cases where the funding from Norad has ceased continue to carry out significant activities with funding and management by the host Government**

In all four projects, the host government has integrated project related staff into its own structures (e.g. is paying teachers or health personnel in schools or clinics started by projects). In two projects (NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation and RB/Quality Education) the host Government has integrated significant aspects of the project methodology in its own structures and policies.

## **7.2 Conclusions and Recommendations, Achievement of Results**

Although not well documented we can say with confidence that the projects achieved their intended results to a high degree. The evidence from the field clearly indicated that there was a causal link between the activities undertaken by the NGOs and the identified changes.

There were unintended side-effects associated with project implementation. The side-effects we identified were mainly positive.

It was evident that NGOs were making efforts to improve documentation of the achievement of results. Project proposals and reports submitted to Norad showed a clear trend towards a better understanding of a results-based focus.

However, field level systems, structures and management style continued to be predominantly activity focused. There was also evidence of weaknesses in terms of the nature and relevance of the documentation gathered or to which priority was given. We found detailed reporting on the wrong things, absence of baseline data, work-plans detailing activities but without sufficient links between these and expected results etc. In consequence, despite our assessment that there was reasonable-to-good correspondence between the results that NGOs reported and the reality that lay behind it, NGO reporting systems were still not very good at showing the difference NGOs were making to the lives of people in their target groups.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** The organisations should continue to accelerate their capacity development in terms of documentation of results and the associated costs. The main purpose of this recommendation is not better financial accounting but more effective use of limited resources.

Although the projects suffered from a paucity of hard data, it is evident that the projects studied have resulted in noticeable improvements in the well-being of tens, maybe even hundreds, of thousands of people. With better documentation and a sharper focus on results, it is likely not only that the evidence of improvements in well-being would be better, but also that more people would have benefitted to a greater extent from the projects.

## 8. Cost and Scale


### 8.1 Findings

We found that the issues related to cost and scale were important enough to merit a separate section.

**8.1.1 FINDING: The overall field level cost-effectiveness, taking side-effects into account, is assessed to be high on average. It varies markedly across the different projects however**

The figure below summarises the overall cost-effectiveness of the projects, as estimated by the evaluation team country coordinators. Please note that they assessed the cost effectiveness of project implementation in the field, not overall project costs. The average score is 74 out of 100, and only three projects get a score lower than 70 (NLM/Chesta Girls School, NCA/Interfaith and KF/Women and Health, Chole).

**Figure 15: What is the cost-effectiveness of this project, taking positive and negative side-effects into account?**



Scores from 0 to 100. The assessment relates to field level costs and does not include the administrative costs of the various administrative levels.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>60</sup> As above, Stromme/Microfinance is not included due to the lack of field data.

**8.1.2 FINDING: The reported expenditure systematically underestimated the real cost of results achieved**

The reported expenditure did not capture contributions from other stakeholders. These were often quite substantial. Therefore, reported expenditure systematically under-estimated the real cost of results achieved.

The southern partners commonly funded projects from multiple sources e.g. COWA implemented several capacity building efforts with support from a German NGO, SCiU pooled overhead costs and had all participating member Save the Children organisations share such costs and ZATUC received support through the ILO. Technical support in kind from local government was also common e.g. agricultural extension services and health department support in CARE/Lok Pachi and ministerial staff time in projects like RB/Quality Education and NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation. We found no attempts to assess the cost of such input. Furthermore we found no attempt to estimate the value of the target groups' own time, labour and skill contributions.

**8.1.3 FINDING: There were significant economies of scale. Projects with small target groups had higher, or very much higher, costs per beneficiary**

The table below shows reported number of people reached, reported total cost across projects and the cost per beneficiary. The five smallest projects, in terms of number of people reached, are marked with yellow. The five largest projects are marked with blue. Note that the deficiencies of documentation mean that this table, in some cases, is based on estimates. Also note that qualitative differences are not captured in the comparison; learning the workings of a savings and loans group is not comparable to being reached in an anti-FGM awareness programme. Nevertheless, if resources are limited, it is clear that small scale projects need to be able to show *significant* additional value added to be worthy of support.

**Figure 16: Norad funding by project (in 1000 NOK) [in square brackets: NGO supplied data] and per beneficiary (in NOK, based on Norad cost data)**

Project	Benef.s reached	Norad funding by project 1000 NOK					Total	Cost per benef. NOK
		2005	2006	2007	2008			
NLM/Chesta Girls School <sup>1</sup>	320 (2000)	711 [681]	782 [852]	584 [667]	1 370 [1 632]	3 447 [3 833]	10 771 (1 723)	
CARE/Lok Pachi <sup>2</sup>	35.000	2 479 [263]	2 805 [228]	2 782 [322]	3 030 [304]	11 096	79	
NCA/ Habiba FGM Awareness <sup>3</sup>	46 542 (11 635)	216	270	216	216	918	20 (79)	
ARC/Change Agent Training <sup>4</sup>	500 (60 000)	490	700	1 000	800	2 990	5 980 (498)	
KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma <sup>5</sup>	5 760	151	174	166	166	657	114	
KF/Women and Health, Chole <sup>6</sup>	3 400	428	518	503	503	1 952	558	
NCA/Interfaith Cooperation <sup>7</sup>	N/A	360	640	495	1 000	2 495		
LO/ZATUC <sup>8</sup>	19 000	0	223	156	165	544	29	
NPA/Youth Rights EAC <sup>9</sup>	7 500	500	980	1 297	140	2 917	389	
SF/Microfinance <sup>10</sup>	117 000	1 323	1 811	937	1 429	5 500	47	
NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation <sup>11</sup>	19 500	5 013	3 068 [3 358]	2 116 [2 505]	1 935 [1 705]	12 132	622	
NBA/Legal Aid <sup>12</sup>	8 141	1 654	2 500	1 414	1 500	7 068	184	
NWF/Vocational Training <sup>13</sup>	480	421	372	375	371	1 539	3 206	
RB/ECDE Education <sup>14</sup>	20 000		225	225	225	675	34	
RB/Quality Education <sup>15</sup>	30 000					2009: 1 227	41	

*Dark blue: The five smallest projects in terms of target group size.*

*Light blue: The five largest projects in terms of target group size. Notes in footnote.<sup>61</sup>*

61 Source for financials: Norad Excel document entitled "oversikt over utvalg 20100629.xlsx", provided by Lise Bendiksen, sheet one; Figures in [square brackets] are data as supplied by the NGOs in the facts and figures questionnaire; Source for target group size estimates: various sources, refer case studies and notes to the table:

- To date 320 students. School remains. Assuming current annual intake for 25 years gives figures in parenthesis.
- Total number of microfinance group members.
- Total population of four target areas 2009. Figures in parenthesis assume 25% were reached.
- Number of change agents trained approx 500. Figures in parenthesis assume these reached on average 12 people (some left, some were active).
- Reported number of individuals reached by sensitisation activity.
- Number of members of the Chole Society for Women's Development
- See footnotes 27 and 28.
- Target group was institutional, consisting of trade unions, figure used is total union membership.
- Total number of participants, players and leaders.
- Number of clients reached by institutional partners in 2009.
- Number of disabled registered in Tomoro district x 3, as three districts are involved and assuming same number of disabled in all three districts.
- Cost 2008 divided by reported number of clients 2009.
- 120 girls per year for four years.
- 20000 students in the targeted schools.
- 2009 total project costs as per SCIU project documents Million UGX 361, exchange rate 0,0034, jan 2009 gives Thousand NOK 1.227. Norad document does not specify amount for the project.

#### **8.1.4 FINDING: The system did not scale up and/or replicate best practice to the extent possible**

We saw several examples where tried, tested and successful projects or project components were not scaled up. In some cases their expansion was intentionally halted, in some the project was concluded and, to our knowledge, not replicated.

We encountered several reasons for this sub optimization;

- Inability to “think outside the box”; “we cannot expand, there is no more room in our compound”, “we did not know we could plan for more”, “ we had done what we planned and the project period was over” (sources withheld);
- Lack of collaboration; best practice was not shared with stakeholders who could have replicated the success;
- Lack of human resources/inflexibility of organisation; “we could not manage further expansion”;
- Lack of funding/inflexibility of funding system; “it is not in the budget/the agreement”; and
- Organisational priorities allowed to dominate, “this is not really what our organisation is about”.

#### **8.1.5 There were a number of common characteristics among the smaller projects**

The cost per beneficiary in the small projects was significantly higher than in the larger-scale projects. Small projects tended to be highly dependent on the competence and skills of a few key individuals. In the small-scale projects in our sample of projects, development was commonly defined in terms of skills, attitudes or complex attributes and capabilities such as “leadership”. Target group sizes were small in these projects.

## **8.2 Conclusions and Recommendations; Cost and Scale**

The cost per beneficiary in the small projects was significantly higher than in the larger-scale projects. There were structural reasons for this. Most of them were related to economies of scale. It takes approximately the same time to assess the project proposal for a project that reaches 100 beneficiaries as it does to assess a project proposal that reaches 10,000. Setting up systems and maintaining specialist staff to properly monitor and follow up a project involves an initial minimum investment in capacity building and establishing the systems and structures required for project implementation. It is therefore an important – though not a surprising – finding that the costs per beneficiary tended to be greater for smaller-scale than larger-scale projects. Some projects managed to compensate for this by linking well with existing capacities in local government. In KF/Women’ development, Chole, the project managed to get its clinic into the government health structure, in Karamoja RB/ECDE Education had very close collaboration with the Ministry of Education. There were also examples of links to the private sector; NPA/Youth Rights EAC was sponsored with security services and NWF/COWA Vocational Training had close relationships with a local private enterprise which was involved in developing the curriculum and provided internships to students.



Other economies of scale were related to the organisational partnership; a monitoring visit from Norway is not likely to cost significantly more when the project to be visited is large as compared to when it is small, unless a larger “team” is deemed necessary.

An aspect of project implementation which is often overlooked is the degree to which interaction with local authorities takes up valuable management time and absorbs the scarce managerial resources of those authorities. This feature of NGO activities on the ground has most commonly been highlighted in relation to large disaster relief operations;<sup>62</sup> it tends to take place in recognition of the fact that project effectiveness is likely to be (considerably) enhanced when good coordination with local authorities takes place. This interaction also has a scale dimension for the local authorities; it takes a government officer a similar length of time to have a meeting with an NGO whose project reaches 48 beneficiaries as it does to have a meeting with an NGO whose project reaches 4,800 beneficiaries. Hence, government staff who give priority to small projects sub optimise unless they see great potential for scaling up.

Small projects tended to be highly dependent on the competence and skills of a few key individuals. This characteristic has been a feature of many organisations in the early stages of the organisational life cycle, where it has also been noted that this can sometimes lead to growth-efficiency constraints when growth and expansion does not lead to the necessary changes in approach that larger-scale projects usually require.<sup>63</sup> The prominent role of individuals or small groups in small projects allows creativity and the dedication of the individuals concerned is often worthy of significant respect. Dependence on individuals or a small group of people without the support of an established organisational structure, monitoring system and support mechanisms in technical fields is risky however. Risks include the possibility of the project being hijacked for personal gain (refer e.g. KF/Women’s Development Chole where the boundaries between project activities and property and those of the ex-patriot project manager-cum-hotel owner were fluid) and difficulties in finding replacements for the dominant personalities (refer e.g. NWF/COWA Vocational Training where the competence and dedication of the headmistress remains core to the institution’s current *modus operandi*). This increases the risk that projects might not be sustainable.

LO/ZATUC are to be commended for the fact that they, admittedly under significant financial pressure, recognised some of the above dangers and managed to act upon them by merging several member organisations. Similarly, Stromme was instrumental in merging a small non-performing MFI into a larger, more professional, competitor.

Small-scale projects also tended to be characterised by more intensive activity at a number of different levels, which tend to have higher unit-cost implications for the NGO in question. For example, they were likely to require more contact between individuals in Norway and host country field level implementers and to have a

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62 See e.g. Telford and Cosgrove (2006).

63 See e.g. McNamara (2011).

greater focus on individual or small group development. In the small-scale projects in our sample, development was commonly defined in terms of skills, attitudes or complex attributes and capabilities such as “leadership”. They were also characterised by a high degree of personal commitment which was often emotionally charged, and an in-depth understanding of at least parts of the intervention intended. However, they were also, commonly, associated with a lack of professionalism.<sup>64</sup> This resulted in deficiencies in terms of how systematic the approaches used were and how well the context of the intervention was analysed. There were, for example, missed opportunities in terms of not sharing best practice, not scaling-up, underinvestment in coordination and underinvestment in contextual analysis, to a greater extent than in the larger projects.

Target group sizes were small in these projects. The target group identification tended to be informed and shaped less by an analysis of exclusion or vulnerability and more by the fact that the groups involved were close to the people initiating the project or the places where it was implemented.

It is important, however, to place these characteristics of small projects in context. These projects may well be extremely beneficial and worthwhile. This is true in cases where the project contributes something beyond the good or service delivered to the beneficiaries. Pilot projects designed to try out a new methodology or test a new stakeholder relationship are good examples of where it may be argued that such special circumstances exist. Another example would be projects where one of the planned objectives is to contribute to the development of the Norwegian NGO in Norway for example by contributing to better public awareness around a particular development issue. These were not stated objectives of the small projects within our sample.

**Conclusion:** Given the above we conclude that small projects carry additional cost and higher risk for a funding institution such as Norad. The following five recommendations are based on this conclusion.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should continue to fund small projects but only if special circumstances exist and can be clearly identified, and should instruct the umbrella organisations to act in the same way. It should be a requirement that the particular circumstances for support to small-scale projects be explicitly highlighted and convincingly described in any small-scale project proposal.

**Recommendation to Norwegian NGOs:** Norwegian NGOs should reconsider if they should send proposals for small-scale projects to their umbrella organisations or Norad. If a project proposed by a southern partner is worthwhile but small the Norwegian NGO should systematically pursue available possibilities for scaling up.

**Recommendation to Norwegian NGOs:** Small Norwegian NGOs wishing to be internationally involved in development activities at the grassroots level in low-income countries should soberly assess the extent to which their organisation adds

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<sup>64</sup> Professionalism is here used to summarise the organisations’ use of systematic planning, implementation and monitoring systems as shown by the data presented in the RBM and approach sections above.

value. Their governing boards should work actively to establish consortia or networks in order to attain economies of scale. If they are not able to clearly articulate the value-added *for the ultimate beneficiaries* of their NGO remaining independent, they should merge with like-minded NGOs or cease to work internationally.

**Recommendation to southern NGOs:** Southern NGOs should systematically explore the possibilities for expanding the reach of their projects. Such exploration should go beyond merely expanding the activities of their own organisation; networking, lobbying, sharing project designs and collaboration with other NGOs or authorities should be actively pursued. Just as in the case of the Norwegian NGOs, the governing boards of southern NGOs should work actively to establish consortia or networks in order to attain economies of scale, refer the positive example of T-ZATUC which managed to merge several small organisations. If they are not able to clearly articulate the value-added *for the ultimate beneficiaries* of their NGO remaining independent, they should merge with like-minded NGOs or cease to work internationally.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad's evaluation department should invest in comparative studies where quality and cost comparisons are made across multiple projects with similar objectives, starting 2012. For example a comparison of ten projects supporting the establishment of micro-finance groups or of ten projects working with FGM or HIV/AIDS awareness would allow lessons learned to be summarised and benchmarks to be developed. Cost per beneficiary should not be the sole determinant of project success, neither should it be ignored.

**Conclusion:** The potential for expanding best practice is not sufficiently exploited.

The picture is often mixed, even within a single project. CARE/Lok Pachi increased its ambition for establishing microfinance groups from 5000 to 7000 and then disbanded the project organisation instead of replicating their success in new areas. NCA Interfaith managed a significant expansion of VICOBAs but now find that they are becoming too large in the organisation's portfolio.

The above reluctance or inability to expand partially explains that target group size was often quite small in comparison with the potential target population. Greater standardisation, closer collaboration with government and other large scale implementers are steps in the right direction that have been taken by some projects.

**Recommendation to involved NGOs:** NGO Governance should task, and appropriately resource, their organisations to proactively seek out potential for scaling up of best practice activities. This would include strengthening administrative systems, seeking the "right" rather than the "best" quality and systematically exploring possibilities for collaboration across organisational boundaries. It also requires a greater governance attention to cost issues.

## 9. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations

We conclude that the studied projects were in line with Norwegian government policy for development assistance and achieved their intended results to a high extent.<sup>65</sup> However, the system has significant scope for improved transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. Some basic methodological and administrative improvements are proposed. Most build on existing Norad and NGO initiatives (e.g. improved documentation and more focus on results). Some would require decisions by parliament (replace current funding system with a more prioritised process).

### 9.1 The projects' objectives were in line with Norwegian priorities

We found no project that had objectives in contradiction with Norwegian government policy for development assistance. There was a focus on poverty alleviation, on women and children, on capacity building of individuals, groups or institutions through formal education, informal training and development of methods, policies and physical infrastructure. Target groups were excluded or vulnerable or both. Most projects were also adapted to the local context and in line with host government stated priorities.

### 9.2 The projects achieved their intended results to a high extent

We assess that the projects achieved their intended key results to a high – or very high – extent. Due to a lack of baseline studies and properly identified intended results, we were not able to *measure* the extent to which the projects had achieved their intended results. However, having gone through project documentation, interviewed key informants and conducted field visits we could make a qualified assessment of how well the projects had achieved their intended key results. Overall, they had done well, or very well.

### 9.3 Preparation and documentation was often of poor quality

There was great variation among the NGOs in terms of the extent and quality of preparation and documentation. In most cases the NGOs did not invest sufficiently in project preparation, in ensuring that they had robust and reliable documentation and in liaising and coordinating their activities with other stakeholders.

We found serious problems with documentation at all phases of the project cycle. The gaps ranged from missing baseline data, non-documentation of the analysis underlying the chosen project strategy, reports on activities without links to results, absence of or inadequately analysed cost data to information overload in the form

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<sup>65</sup> As summarised in Report to the Storting No. 35 (2003-2004), *Fighting Poverty Together*  
[http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/stp/20032004/0003/ddd/pdts/stp200320040003ud\\_dddpdts.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/stp/20032004/0003/ddd/pdts/stp200320040003ud_dddpdts.pdf)

of detailed data collected regarding activities in projects where results were not documented at all. Planning, budgeting and reporting were in general activity, not results, based. We see this as a clear indication of where project management focused its attention.

Some of the problems were quite basic. Like Norad, some of the NGOs had budgets by programme, not project, and could not identify how much of an overall grant had been invested in a particular project. Funds passed through multiple levels (e.g. Norad – Umbrella organisation in Norway – Norwegian NGO – Host country NGO – Project Office – community based group) and we were not able to identify the cost of each level and how they were funded.

This lack of proper documentation became very apparent when we reviewed the degree to which the NGOs applied results based management. Many NGOs had reached a level of proficiency in defining objectives, deciding on activities and estimating the resources needed to implement those activities. Unfortunately objectives were seldom linked to an evidence based, documented analysis of the situation in the project area. Indicators, when identified, commonly lacked base values and ambitions were often not quantified, time bound or necessarily measurable.

We see four serious problems with the poor quality of documentation; loss of potential effectiveness, loss of learning, reduced potential for sharing best practice with other development stakeholders and lack of accountability.

*Effectiveness lost;* If management is not able to identify change over time and to link that change with its cost, how will they decide how resources are best allocated? Activity focused management (number of trainings, number of group meetings) is likely to lead to lots of activities but in no way guarantees results. Increases in effectiveness, i.e. decreasing cost per achieved result, are unlikely unless management can track the cost per unit of result (average exam scores of the children in a school, percentage point decrease in child mortality of girls subjected to FGM) rather than the cost per activity.

*Learning lost;* The poor documentation lessens organisational learning and amplifies problems with staff turnover. While there were clear examples of organisational learning, there were also examples of serious difficulties in connection with staff turnover. Such difficulties are normal but can be decreased with better documentation.

*Best practice lost;* NGOs are active in the development sector because there is an overall scarcity of resources. If an NGO wishes to contribute to goals such as alleviating poverty, improving education, eliminating harmful traditional practices etc. the organisation has a responsibility to share its own best practices, learn from others and actively pursue scaling up of successful activities and methodologies. Without systematic documentation this is not possible to do effectively. An NGO that invests in monitoring what activities lead to positive results and continuously

adapts implementation accordingly, improves its own effectiveness. If it documents and shares its learning it contributes to the effectiveness of the whole sector – and vice versa.

*Accountability lost;* Accountability can be seen as accountability to the funders or to the affected people. We found the formal requirements for accountability to funders to be fulfilled; in general financial reports were being compiled, audited and submitted as per requirements. We have greater concerns regarding accountability to the affected people, the supposed beneficiaries. When results, and the costs to achieve them, are not being documented and shared with those participating in the activities, how are they going to be able to make informed decisions about whether they wish to participate? In this perspective we find the poor documentation to be disempowering.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should, by 2012, ensure that its follow-up systems are adapted to its level of ambition for follow-up (for example, if Norad has the ambition to evaluate at project level, grants cannot only be tracked at programme level).

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should require organisations receiving funds to increase investment in results based management capacity building until they can show that the principles are applied in project implementation at all administrative levels, including the implementing field level. Applications with vague objectives and un-measurable indicators should be turned down, starting 2013.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** NGOs should invest more in helping their staff understand the potential for improved implementation effectiveness that results based management has, if sensibly implemented. Incentive structures, appraisals etc. should be based on results achieved, not activities implemented. As a minimum ambition, NGOs should aim to have clear objectives and SMART<sup>66</sup> indicators for all projects by 2013.

#### 9.4 Small projects cost significantly more per person reached

There were structural reasons for this. Most of them were related to economies of scale. The quality of documentation makes the estimates approximate but the largest projects cost less than NOK 100 per beneficiary, the smallest several thousand NOK.

Several of the small projects did not expand, even if they could have made a difference for more people (“we cannot expand further, the compound is not big enough”). In some projects, a lack of broader analysis led to activities with limited scope and impact (e.g. building a school instead of improving the existing school system or working on attitudinal change).

It is important, however, to place these characteristics of small projects in context. These projects may well be extremely beneficial and worthwhile. This is true in

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66 SMART defined here as Specific, Measurable, Agreed-upon, Realistic and Time-bound.

cases where the project contributes something beyond the goods or services delivered to the beneficiaries. Pilot projects designed to try out a new methodology or test a new stakeholder relationship are good examples of where it may be argued that such special circumstances exist. Another example would be projects where one of the planned objectives is to contribute to the development of the Norwegian NGO in Norway for example by contributing to better public awareness around a particular development issue. These were not stated objectives of the small projects within our sample.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Norad should continue to fund small projects but only if special circumstances exist and can be clearly identified, and should instruct the umbrella organisations to act in the same way. By 2012, it should be a requirement that such particular circumstances be explicitly highlighted and convincingly described in any small-scale project proposal.

### 9.5 The system failed to replicate and scale up successful activities

Large projects also missed opportunities to scale-up. In at least one case, a successful rapidly expanding project activity (microfinance) was not expanded further as it did not match organisational priorities. In other cases, successful large projects were not continued, nor repeated in other areas of the host countries. Project organisations were therefore disbanded, experience lost and the wheel will need to be reinvented next time (an effect that was accentuated by the poor documentation).

We note that these instances – where a lack of competence, organisational will or resources for expansion cause tried and tested ways of development not to be scaled up – are systemic failures resulting in human potential lost.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** NGOs should develop their “surge” capacity and be prepared to focus on successful programme components where results are clear and positive. They should actively seek to expand and replicate successful programmes. Getting good results replicated on a large, even massive, scale should be an explicit aim.

Expansion and long-term maintenance of programmes requires a different skill set and resource base than that needed to run a pilot project, start up a programme, capacity build emerging civil society organisations, explore new methodologies etc.

**Recommendation to NGOs:** NGOs should actively explore new organisational arrangements when blessed with a highly successful programme that should be expanded and replicated. Such arrangements might include franchising, splitting off mature programmes in the form of independent, new NGOs or foundations, transfer of management to government, larger NGOs or even private companies etc. The question to be addressed is “Where would the positive results of this programme grow most rapidly for the benefit of our target groups?”

## 9.6 There are gaps in the system for prioritisation of resources

Based on our discussions with the organisations there seems to be a common perception, strengthened by the fund-raising tactics of some organisations, that any NGO with a project will get funded by Norad if some rather basic criteria are fulfilled. The understanding is that the 90-10 rule for funding implies that an organisation that puts up 10 % of the cost of a project will get the remaining 90% funded by government almost by default. Norad's Department for Civil Society denies that this is the case; the 10% are a requirement for those who get support, not a guarantee of getting the other 90% for those who can put up the initial 10 %.<sup>67</sup> They cite the many organisations that do not get support as evidence of effective prioritisation and refer to the Principles for Norads Support to Civil Society in the South and the Rules for Support to Civil Society Actors – Chapter 160.70,<sup>68</sup> as the documents governing selection.

The Principles (Norad 2009a p.5) are quite broad while the nine criteria to be applied when assessing organisations in the Rules (Norad 2009b p.3) are more specific. They are (numbering added):

1. Capacity and competence to achieve the organisation's objectives.
2. The organisation's cost-effectiveness, i.e. its capacity to achieve the organisation's objectives on the basis of the smallest possible outlay.
3. Systems for follow-up of results.
4. Capacity to identify and manage risk.
5. Financial control, including corruption prevention measures.
6. The organisation's added value, i.e. its capacity to provide assistance beyond pure transfer of funds.
7. The organisation's involvement in Norway in relation to development and development assistance. Capacity for long-term planning.
8. Sustainability and exit strategies, cf. Norad's publication: "Assessment of Sustainability Elements/Key Risk Factors" (May 2007).
9. Inclusion of cross-cutting topics: Women, gender equality, the environment, HIV/AIDS, conflict sensitivity and anticorruption measures.

We would argue that at least number 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 of these are difficult, if not impossible, to measure given the quality of data being systematically collected. We believe that this indicates gaps in systematic prioritisation within the application process which needlessly decrease the quality and quantity of benefits reaching the target groups.

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<sup>67</sup> Telephone interview, Gunvor W. Skancke.

<sup>68</sup> Norad 2009a and Norad 2009b, respectively.



**Recommendation to MFA:** The MFA should task Norad to propose indicators allowing prioritisation to take place based on the specified criteria and to develop an incentive structure to support such priorities. Quality of documentation and systematic benchmarking should be accorded greater weight in the allocation of scarce resources.

We propose that projects be given preference if they systematically document:

- Results for the target group;
- Strengthening of civil society, including capacity building of southern partner;
- Methodological development, including pilot projects;
- Increased productivity/decreased cost per results at all administrative levels;
- Good interaction with other development actors, including host government;
- Ability and willingness to replicate and scale up successful activities.

**Recommendation to Norad:** Based on the above, Norad should develop, and recommend to MFA, a new funding system with continued long term framework agreements. Allocation of limited resources based on percentage NGO contribution or historical level of budgets should be phased out. NGO funding should instead be based on an assessment of the NGOs quality of programming and subsequent prioritisation. Such assessment should combine documented achievement of results with the NGO's level of capacity and ambition in terms of innovation and risk.

This recommendation is formulated to take a balanced position in relation to the debate on managing *by results* or *for results*. Managing *by results* involves allocating resources based on historical performance, skewing distribution in favour of simple, proven methods targeted at easy-to-reach target groups. Managing *for results* focuses on the quality of programme design and learning, allowing innovative approaches to be tested in difficult to reach areas. Proven cost-efficiency is less emphasized with this approach. Effective overall development programming requires elements from both approaches.



# Annexes





## Annex 1a: List of Documents

### List of Selected Documents

- Aasen, B., Haug, M., Hellevik, S.B., Mosha, A. and V. Halvorsen, 2008, *Organisational Performance Review of FOKUS*, Norad Report 13/2008 Review, Norad, Oslo, Norway.
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## List of Project Documents

The team has had access to the following project documents:

### **NLM/Chesta Girls School**

Annual Plans: 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008.  
Budgets: 2005, 2005 Revised, 2007, 2008.  
Budget Longterm.  
Final Evaluation Report 2008.  
Final Report 2008.  
Kenya Plan for Chesta GSS 2008.  
Norad Application 2005.  
Project Document, Board of Directors Chesta, 2005.  
Project Plan 2007 – 2011.  
Project Proposal 2005 – 2008.

### **CARE/Lok Pachi**

CARE International in Kenya website (<http://www.care.or.ke/inside.php?articleid=91>).  
Final Baseline Report 2006.  
LogFrame Analysis 2009.  
Norad Proposal Lok Pachi 2005.  
Ongudi, G. and M. Onyango, undated, *Bondo/Siaya Household Livelihood Security (Lok Pachi) Project Mid-Term Review Final Report*, CARE.  
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### **NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness**

Activities Report Habiba Summary Report 2007.  
Adjusted Workplan 2008.  
Annual Narrative Report Kenya Country Programme 2007.  
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## Annex 1b: Data and Survey Instruments

### Data Collection Methods Used

Method	Chesta, Kenya	Lok Pachi, Kenya	Habiba, Kenya	ARC, Kenya	DIAC, Tanzania	Chole, Tanzania	NCA, Tanzania	ZATUC, Tanzania	EAC, Tanzania	Stromme, Tanzania	CBR, Uganda	LAP, Uganda	COWA, Uganda	SciU ECDE, Uganda	SciU QEP, Uganda	No of projects
Stakeholder analysis*	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	15
Key informant interviews, host country	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	15
Key informant interviews, Norway	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	15
Focus group discussions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	13
Feedback session	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	5
Staff consulted	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	15
Beneficiaries consulted	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	13
Non-beneficiaries consulted	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	9
Local authorities consulted	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	10
Other local organisations/ Institutions consulted	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	10
Dynamic inquiry	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	4
Logframe review	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	11
Logframe reconstruction	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	3
Project document reviews	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	15
Secondary data from authorities, institutions, other NGOs, UN	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	11
Own observation	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	14
Total no of methods used in project	13	14	12	14	12	12	11	9	8	4	11	11	11	10	11	

\*Informal, intended to identify information sources, not systematically documented.

## Facts and Figures Questionnaire

	<b>QUESTION:</b>	<b>Short answer</b>	<b>Comment: If needed give several e.g. If target group has changed over time, give the number at some different points in time?</b>
	1. Project Information		
1x.a	Name of Project (name used by Norad and, if different, the name used by your organisation)		
1x.b	Name of Norwegian organisation that holds the agreement with Norad		
1x.c	Name of Implementing partner organisation		
1x.d	Names of other Northern NGOs involved with the implementing partner		
1x.db	Names of other Northern NGOs also funding the project		
1e	What was the starting year of the project		
1ex.	Has the project ended? When will it end?		
1a	In which geographic area is the project implemented?		
3x	Was an analysis done on relevant development plans, regulations, political, social, cultural, economic context, other organisations (complementary or competing) in the field that the project works in. <i>Key: Yes, partial, no</i>		
1b	What is the size of the target population?		
1c	What is the size of the target groups?		
1f	Financial input from the Norwegian NGO per year ( <i>Note: May not be total project budget!</i> )		
1fx.	What percentage of the total project budget comes from the Norwegian NGO?		
1fxx	What is the percentage of this project's total budget relative to the total budget of the Implementing partner organisation?		

	<b>QUESTION:</b>	<b>Short answer</b>	<b>Comment: If needed give several e.g. If target group has changed over time, give the number at some different points in time?</b>
1g	<p>Describe the route of the financial support from Norad to the final recipient.</p> <p><i>Example: NORAD – NNGO – International NGO – Tanzania NGO – Local NGO – Local NGO office – Local NGO department for water and sanitation – LNGO womens group – recipient.) Parts of this will be filled out in Norway!!!</i></p>		
1gx	<p>For each of the steps identified above, how much (%) does the organisation keep to cover its administrative costs?</p>		
4.1	<p>What are the planned KEY results of the project (as defined in project documentation)</p> <p>Please note that we seek KEY results, not all results. If the project does not have planned results state “Not defined”.</p>		
5.5	<p>Is there written documentation of monitoring of results? Yes or no</p>		

## Interview Protocol

### INTERVIEW PROTOCOL (Internal Use Only)

#### Reference Number:

##### i. Interview Details

Date of Interview:	Project Name and Location:
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##### ii. Interviewers

Name and Title/Role	Affiliation/Organisation	Gender (F/M)

##### iii. Persons Interviewed

Name and Title/Role	Affiliation/Organisation	Length of Time Involved in the Project/ Organisation	Gender (F/M)

##### iv. Describe Briefly the Main Issues Discussed

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##### v. Comments and Conclusions

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## Interview Guidelines

<p><b>Situation analysis, Baseline</b></p>	<p>The purpose of this section is to get background information, both about the project and about other things that have happened during the project period that may have affected the project. The intention is to get a “forward tracing” of things that have happened in order to find out if they have affected the achievement of the planned key results of the project. The intention is also to get a “backward tracing” of things that are in line with the project’s planned key results in order to find out what are the causes for these – hopefully the project will be one of these causes... In order to avoid getting only project-related causes, I think it is important to ask the questions in a way that the project is not mentioned.</p>		
Question	Finding and evidence	Score	Source
<p>S. 1 What are the most important changes (over a period including the project period) for the people of the ‘area’ (= target population of the project)</p>			
<p>S.2 What important events have taken place (over a period including the project period) in the ‘area’ (= target population of the project)?</p>			
<p>S.4 What are important changes within thematic areas of the project? (again, without mentioning the project)</p>			
<p>S.5 What are the causes for the changes identified above</p>			
<p>S.3 How have these important events and changes affected the project</p>			
<p>S6. Has the project contributed to these events and changes, how?</p>			
<p>S7. Are there other things that the project has contributed to</p>			

S8. Without the project, which important changes would not have occurred / what would be different? (give examples)

S.9 Why does this project exist?

0 = *Not clear;*

1 = *researched 'area'-specific needs;*

2 = *replacing unsatisfactory approaches;*

3 = *policy-initiated;*

4 = *external initiative;*

5 = *other (specify!)*

S.10 How was the project identified? (Baseline study? If not, how else?)

0 = *No baseline at all*

1 = *Some baseline information*

2 = *There is a simple baseline survey which includes some key information*

3 = *There is a baseline survey that covers all necessary data to be able to follow-up the results*

S11. How detailed, profound, deep was the baseline?

0=*Not done there is no baseline*

1=*Basic information available, not systematically compiled*

2=*Baseline available, not complete*

3=*Detailed, comprehensive and appropriate baseline is available*

S12. Briefly characterise core problems, which justify this project and explain their causes

S13. How do you assess the solution, which the project pursues to address the original needs/ problems?

**Conclusions**

**Recommendations**

<b>Frame conditions for designing the project</b>	The institutional, legal, cultural context that the project needs to fit in with. (Things that you can't change)		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
<p>F1. Was an analysis done on relevant development plans, regulations, political, social, cultural, economic opportunities and constraints, other organisations (complementary or competing) in the field that the project works in.</p> <p><i>0= no analysis done</i>  <i>1= Partial analysis done</i>  <i>2= Analysis done but has significant gaps</i>  <i>3= comprehensive, appropriate analysis done</i></p>			
<p>F2. How is the project or its implementation affected by national regulations governing the NGO sector and the conditions for operations of foreign and local NGOs? (Do not ask for a list of all conditions!!!)</p> <p><i>0=Not affected</i>  <i>1=Some activities affected, but marginal to implementation</i>  <i>2=some activities are highly affected</i>  <i>3=The core of the project or its implementation is highly affected by regulations or conditions</i></p>			
<p>F3.a Which particular opportunities (and constraints) does the political, social, cultural and economic context provide?</p> <p><i>Opportunities:</i>  <i>0 = Not clear</i>  <i>1 = No particular opportunities</i>  <i>2 = Some opportunities</i>  <i>3 = The project is totally dependent on context</i>  <i>(Give examples)</i></p>			
<p>F3b. Constraints</p> <p><i>0 = Not clear</i>  <i>1 = No particular constraints</i>  <i>2 = Some constraints</i>  <i>3 = The project is totally dependent on context</i>  <i>(Give examples)</i></p>			

F4. Does the project reflect adaptation (= Find a niche or complementarity?) to relevant existing local institutions(*government and other formal or informal organisations/networks*)?  
*0 = No sign of adaptation to existing local institutions*  
*1 = some non-systematic adaptation*  
*2 = systematic adaptation but not fully exploited*  
*3 = Full adaptation to local institutions, including shared planning and sharing of resources/inputs*

F5. Are such institutions (government and others) aware of the project?  
*0 = Not at all aware*  
*1 = some have heard of it*  
*2 = most have heard of it and know some facts*  
*3 = Local institutions are fully aware, know key facts*

F6. Is the project aligned with the government's local/national action priorities and with interventions by other organizations?  
*0 = Not at all aligned*  
*1 = some activities aligned*  
*2 = most activities aligned*  
*3 = Fully aligned*

<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>

<b>Planning – Strategy</b>			
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
<p>Strategy is a reflected approach to achieve results with related means. Efficiency and effectiveness of resource utilisation matter. A core indication of the quality of a strategy are the alternative options considered during the strategy-finding process.</p>			
<p>P1. What are the planned <u>key</u> results of the project? (Document how you select “KEY” also compare comments regarding logframes at the end of the interview guideline below...)</p>			
<p>P2. Have the results been formulated with appropriate indicators and realistic targets? <i>0 = No indicators</i> <i>1 = Some objectives have indicators, some of which are useable</i> <i>2 = Most objectives have reasonable indicators formulated</i> <i>3 = Appropriate (SMART) indicators formulated for each objective</i></p>			
<p>P3. Are the results a logical continuation from the inputs of the project? <i>0 = No logic</i> <i>1 = Some objectives and activities logically linked</i> <i>2 = Most activities have logical link to objectives</i> <i>3 = Fully developed logical links between all objectives and activities</i></p>			
<p>P4. Were the risks appropriately identified during planning? <i>0 = Not done</i> <i>1 = Some risks identified but clear gaps</i> <i>2 = Most risks identified but some gaps</i> <i>3 = Done well</i></p>			

P5. Is the strategic plan – which describes objectives and results –appropriately operationalised?

*0 = Not done*

*1 = Parts well developed but clear gaps*

*2 = Most well developed but some gaps*

*3 = Done well*

P6. Is there coherence between documents, management/ staff, beneficiaries, other organizations, local government and third parties as to what the project seeks to achieve?

*0 = Not at all*

*1 = Project-internally coherent – but stakeholders have different view of what project is about*

*2 = Project organisation and stakeholder views are coherent but project docs do not reflect same reality*

*3 = Project internally coherent and some stakeholders have the same view*

*4 = there is full coherence*

**Conclusions**

**Recommendations**

<b>Achievement of results</b>	Observed changes may or may not be the effect of the project. The attribution gap needs to be narrowed as much as possible.		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
R1. What is the change in value on indicators for key results? (compare comments regarding logframes at the end of the interview guideline below...)			
R2. How do the findings correspond to existing monitoring, reports and studies? <i>0 = Monitoring system does not exist or does not function</i> <i>1 = Significant differences between reports and reality</i> <i>2 = Reasonable correspondence between reports and reality</i> <i>3 = Full correspondence between reports and reality</i>			
R3. What is the likelihood that observed changes are due to the project (counterfactual information)? <i>0 = Not likely, clear outside influence/ cause</i> <i>1 = Some evidence of project influence on some changes</i> <i>2 = Clear evidence of project influence on some of the changes</i> <i>3 = Highly likely, clear causal links identified for most changes</i>			
R4. Are there any evidenced side-effects of the project?/Unintended effects			
R5. What are the key factors contributing to the achievement (or lack thereof) of results?			
R6. Has there been any other impact, positive or negative that should be noted (outside planned results)?			
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>		

<b>Monitoring – Learning</b>		Want to know if management observe what is happening and do they reflect on what is observed and act upon it?	
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
M1. Is there documentation of monitoring of results? <i>0 = Not at all</i> <i>1 = some, random documentation</i> <i>2 = systematic monitoring but clear documentation gaps</i> <i>3 = systematic and appropriate documentation</i>			
M2. Is monitoring an integral part of the project. <i>0 = Not at all</i> <i>1 = ad hoc / partial / selective / monitoring activities done</i> <i>2 = monitoring is an integral part of project design and implementation and done systematically with adequate professionalism / credibility</i>			
M3. Are monitoring findings being acted upon? <i>0 = No evidence of management action based on monitoring</i> <i>1 = Some ad hoc examples of management action based on monitoring</i> <i>2 = Management decisions show a pattern of systematic and appropriate action based on monitoring.</i>			
M4. How does the project learn from its experiences, which are gained during implementation?			
<b>Conclusions</b>		<b>Recommendations</b>	



<b>RBM and Steering/Leadership</b>	This section refers to Norad's ambition to stimulate the use of RBM through its procedures and processes. The questions focus on whether application and reporting formats support the use of RBM in Norad's partner organisations.		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
<p>RBM 1. To what extent do the application and reporting formats of Norad highlight the need for results-based management? <i>Overall assessment to be made during september meeting.</i></p>			
<p>RBM 2. To what extent do the application and reporting formats of Norad facilitate results-based management? <i>0 = Formats seen to be hindering RBM 1 = No effect 2 = overall they are helpful but there are identified problems with them 3 = Clear and positive impact on results based management.</i></p>			
<p>RBM 3. How useful do you find RBM as an approach for steering this project? (opinion of interviewees) <i>0= RBM has negative impact on project management 1 = RBM not used 2 = Overall they are helpful but there are identified problems with them 3 = Use of RBM has a clear and positive impact on project management</i></p>			
<p>RBM 4. Which key factors appear to affect the quality of results-based management?</p>			
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>		

<b>Cooperation</b>	<i>Norwegian NGOs strategy for selecting implementing partner(s) and the appropriateness of the selected implementing partner(s) refers to: who is part, who is not, where are the boundaries of the project, how is cooperation negotiated, how is the power distribution?</i>		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
C1. How deliberate does the selection of local partner organization(s) appear? <i>How was it done? Was there a selection/choice?</i> 0 = Not deliberate at all, random 1 = Several partners were considered, process not clear 2 = There was a systematic selection process but some key factors not considered 3 = Very well thought through			
C2. How was the local partner organization(s) selected? 0 = No strategy 1 = For legal, constitutional, membership or other organisational reasons no other choice was possible 2 = systematic selection process based on criteria 3 = selection made by other external funders 4 = partner created by Norwegian NGO 5 = other (specify)			
C3. Is there coherence between the strategy of the Norwegian NGO and the selection of partner organisation that was made, taking the local context into consideration? <i>(Is strategy and selection coherent, considering local context?)</i> 0 = No coherence 1 = some elements match 2 = most elements match 3 = completely coherent			

C4. Taking the local context into consideration, was the selection of local partner effective from the perspective of achieving the goal of the project

*0 = Not at all, local partner a constraint*

*1 = Given the circumstances selection of local partner was OK but some problems*

*2 = Given the circumstances selection of local partner was good*

*3 = Given the circumstances this was the best possible partner*

C5. How and to what extent is the agenda of the partner organizations (SNGO) steering the partnership?

*0 = Not at all steering, implementation only*

*1 = SNGO agenda influencing some parts of the partnership*

*2 = Equal partnership, joint planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation*

*3 = NorwNGO passively funding/ following or controlled by SNGO*

*4 = NorwNGO lead partner in international network*

*5 = NorwNGO junior partner in international network*

*6 = other (specify)*

**Conclusions**

**Recommendations**

**Strengthening Civil Society**

Norad wants to know how its partners understand “Strengthening Civil society” (SCS) and “Capacity building” Do they use these terms? Do they think there is a difference between them? As we make the assumption that more organisations will be familiar with the term “capacity building” we start by exploring how they view “Strengthening Civil Society”. The latter questions are intended to capture to what extent the organisation plans to SCS and what the results are.

Question	Finding and evidence	Score	Source
CS 1. How is Strengthening of civil society understood / what is its concept?			
CS 2. How is it defined = put out?			
CS 3. Is it seen as a process, or a key result? <i>0 = Not discussed</i> <i>1 = Process</i> <i>2 = Result</i> <i>3 = both process and result</i>			
CS 4. Which indicator(s) is used to measure it			
CS 5. Has any measurement taken place? <i>0 = No measurement made</i> <i>1 = Discussed but not measured</i> <i>2 = Measured but not documented</i> <i>3 = Documented measurement</i>			
CS 6. Can results be identified now? <i>0 = No change or negative trend</i> <i>1 = Some improvement, random examples given</i> <i>2 = Clear improvements, multiple examples cited</i> <i>3 = Significantly strengthened</i>			
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>		

<b>Capacity building of local partner</b>	Same clarification as above concerning Strengthening Civil Society.		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
CB 1. How is Capacity building of local partners understood?			
CB 2. How is it defined			
CB 3. Is it seen as a process, or a key result? <i>0 = Not discussed</i> <i>1 = Process</i> <i>2 = Result</i> <i>3 = both process and result</i>			
CB 4. Which indicator(s) is used to measure it?			
CB 5. Has any measurement taken place? <i>0 = No measurement made</i> <i>1 = Discussed but not measured</i> <i>2 = Measured but not documented</i> <i>3 = Documented measurement</i>			
CB 6. Can results be identified now? <i>0 = No change or negative trend</i> <i>1 = Some improvement, random examples given</i> <i>2 = Clear improvements, multiple examples cited</i> <i>3 = Significantly strengthened</i>			
CB 7. What do you see as the link between Capacity Building and Strengthening Civil Society?			
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>		

<b>Target groups</b>	Target groups (as part of the target population) are the intended beneficiaries. The basic paradigm that justifies any project is that groups of the population cannot access (= are excluded from) opportunities and required services, because they are vulnerable (= devoid of power to change their situation). Hence they are targeted by a project. Target groups differ in their conditions, hence they need to be addressed differently by specific adjusted measures. Are such professional standards applied? Are they applied professionally?		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
TG 1. Target group degree of exclusion and vulnerability			
TG 2. Are the target groups justifiably the right ones? OR: The degree of exclusion or vulnerability of the target group <i>0 = Target group does not belong to most vulnerable group and project area is normal or privileged</i> <i>1 = The target group is not excluded or vulnerable but the project area is</i> <i>2 = The target group is vulnerable or excluded but the project area is normal</i> <i>3 = Target group belongs to most vulnerable group in an area that is vulnerable and excluded</i>			
TG 3. Which share of the vulnerable target population is actually reached by the project? <i>0 = They are not reached</i> <i>1 = a small part (less than 25%)</i> <i>2 = a significant part (25-75%)</i> <i>3 = All or almost all</i>			
TG 4. Are any of the target groups of this project particularly challenging to work with? <i>0 = No, none</i> <i>1 = a small part (less than 25%)</i> <i>2 = a significant part (25-75%)</i> <i>3 = All or almost all</i>			

TG 5. How relevant are the results of the project for the target group?  
*0 = Not relevant at all*  
*1 = Somewhat relevant*  
*2 = Quite but not totally relevant*  
*3 = Fully relevant*

TG 6. How important is the project support to the target group?  
*0 = not at all*  
*1 = project support seen as bonus but not necessary*  
*2 = project support significant improvement for target group*  
*3 = project support is crucial for the target group*

TG 7. Is there a plan for the sustainability of results that the target group has agreed to?  
*0 = No plan*  
*1 = Some discussion/ thoughts on a plan*  
*2 = Plan but not jointly agreed on*  
*3 = Jointly agreed on plan*

TG 8. Is the plan for sustainability being followed?  
*0 = No plan*  
*1 = Not followed*  
*2 = Followed to some extent*  
*3 = Fully followed*

**Conclusions**

**Recommendations**

<b>Participation</b>	Involvement of role-players in information sharing (asking them), decision making (taking ownership and responsibility) and strengthening their capacity to solve their problems better themselves are the quality improvement- and emancipation-goals of participation. To what extent was participation adequate, and how does it contribute to achieving results and impact is the area of research.		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
TG 9. Who took the initiative to the project? 0 = <i>Not clear</i> 1 = <i>Individual</i> 2 = <i>Target group</i> 3 = <i>Project staff</i> 4 = <i>Norw NGO</i> 5 = <i>other (specify)</i>			
TG 10. How and to what extent are target groups involved in project design, implementation and monitoring?			
TG 10.a Design 0 = <i>Not at all involved</i> 1 = <i>Somewhat</i> 2 = <i>Quite a lot</i> 3 = <i>Fully involved for a,b,c below.</i>			
TG 10.b Implementation 0 = <i>Not at all involved</i> 1 = <i>Somewhat</i> 2 = <i>Quite a lot</i> 3 = <i>Fully involved for a,b,c below.</i>			
TG 10.c Monitoring 0 = <i>Not at all involved</i> 1 = <i>Somewhat</i> 2 = <i>Quite a lot</i> 3 = <i>Fully involved for a,b,c below.</i>			
TG 11. Is active participation a key process or result for the project? 0 = <i>Not discussed</i> 1 = <i>Process</i> 2 = <i>Result</i>			
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>Recommendations</b>		



<b>Cost-effectiveness</b>	Asks for the organisation's views, and your assessment of whether the organisation has a good picture of the actual cost-effectiveness of the project, given what you have observed – the terms do not ask you to do any calculations and very precise estimates.		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
<p>CE 1. How does the organization view the project's cost-effectiveness (total cost compared to results achieved)?</p> <p><i>0 = Organisation does not know</i></p> <p><i>1 = Low</i></p> <p><i>2 = Medium</i></p> <p><i>3 = High</i></p>			
<p>CE 2.</p> <p>In the view of the evaluator: How does this compare with achieved results and the cost/input of the project? In the comment, specify if the organisation is over- or underestimating how effective it is.</p> <p><i>0 = The organisation does not know whether it is cost efficient</i></p> <p><i>1 = Organisation knows its cost efficiency in some activities but is unrealistic in its assessment of some others</i></p> <p><i>2 = Organisation has a reasonably realistic view of most of its costs</i></p> <p><i>3 = Organisation has a very realistic view of its cost-effectiveness</i></p>			
<b>Conclusions</b>		<b>Recommendations</b>	

<b>Key causes for success or failure</b>	What do the interviewees see as main reasons why they consider the project to be successful, or what do they think failures are due to? If the evaluator has a different assessment, mention this separately.		
<b>Question</b>	<b>Finding and evidence</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Source</b>
K1. What are the main success factors for the project?			
K2. What are the key challenges for the project?			
<b>Conclusions</b>		<b>Recommendations</b>	

## Annex 2: The Team and Overall Team Workplan

The Evaluation was implemented by a team consisting of:

### **Team Leader, Report author:**

Björn Ternström, MSc. Econ, is an independent consultant who combines a Swedish management consultancy with development assistance evaluations. He has been part of 23 evaluations of which he has been team leader on 11. These include i) complex multi-country evaluations such as the Norad evaluation of the use of M-621 trucks, ii) multi-NGO evaluations such as the review of Sida's system for channeling humanitarian funds through NGOs, iii) a series of "capacity assessments" of NGOs and iv) a range of real time and ex-post project evaluations. Prior to becoming a consultant he spent 14 years managing development assistance in the Red Cross and three years on research in Developmental Economics at Stockholm School of Economics.

### **Overall methodology, Report author:**

Dr Ingela Ternstrom, PhD Econ. Dr Ternstrom's research focuses on measuring and explaining local level changes in southern communities that manage common pool resources. She currently works at the Beijer Institute at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, researching the impact on natural resource use and management of HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.

### **Field methodology:**

Dr Jochen Lohmeier, PhD. Dr Lohmeier is an Extraordinary Professor at the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. He is specialized in carrying out quantitative and qualitative analyses in preparation of interventions on regional, sectoral, and on organizational levels, design, planning, M&E methodologies, participatory approaches, and implementation management of a variety of projects and programs of varying complexity, usually in intercultural contexts. Since 1980 he has conducted numerous evaluations, primarily in Southern and Eastern Africa.

### **Norwegian policy specialist:**

Assoc. Prof. Hans-Einar Hem, Cand.polit. in social anthropology. Prof Hem is Head of the Institute for Health Promotion at Vestfold University College. He has multiyear experience of health promotion, field research, development assistance, Norwegian NGOs and Southern contexts, including long term missions in the Sudan, Tanzania, the Balkans and South Asia as well as evaluation missions to Ethiopia, Malawi and Palestine. Assoc Prof Hem is well informed about the development of Norwegian

policy vis-à-vis NGOs and the on-going debate regarding their role in Norway's development assistance over time.

**Team coordinator, Norway:**

Ms Roberta Bensky, BA Fr & Psy. Ms Bensky is an independent consultant with a distinguished career in management including the World Bank, OECD and the Norwegian Red Cross. She has worked for 2 years with Norwegian Red Cross and as a consultant for Norwegian Church Aid in Malawi and has conducted several project and programme reviews.

**Country coordinator Kenya:**

Mr Nathaniel Mjema, MA Soc Sc. Mr Mjema has extensive practical experience of applying RBM, developing and managing monitoring and evaluation systems, participatory planning and evaluation training and methodology etc. He is also a skilled facilitator. He has done this repeatedly during a 25 year career in East and Southern Africa.

**Research Assistant, Kenya:** Esther Mbiyu

**Country coordinator Tanzania:**

Ms Eutropia Ngido, MSc Dev Pol & Plan. Ms Ngido is a development management consultant with 20 years experience of RBM, PRA, development planning, evaluations and assessments. She has developed and established the Monitoring and Evaluation framework for Legal Sector Reform programme of the Ministry of Justice, Dar es Salaam. She is also a skilled facilitator.

**Research Assistant, Tanzania:** Simon Daffi

**Country coordinator Uganda:**

Ms Elizabeth Bamwine, MA Training & Performance management. Ms Bamwine has over 20 years experience of rural development, including NGO management, developing RBM based monitoring and evaluation systems, conducting reviews and evaluations etc. She has specialised experience of education and gender issues and is a skilled facilitator.

**Research Assistant, Uganda:** Julian Mwine

**Overall Quality Control:**

Mr Roger Riddell, M.Phil. Mr. Riddell is a development specialist with 30 years' experience and a Member of the United Kingdom Government's Department for International Development's (DFID's) Independent Advisory Committee on Development Impact (IACDI). His work on NGOs include three major evaluations for bilateral aid agencies on the impact of NGO development projects, two major studies for the former British Overseas Development Administration, the first on the direct funding of southern NGOs and the second on cost-effectiveness issues for NGOs. Mr. Riddell was the main author of a two-volume synthesis study of the impact of NGOs commissioned by the OECD Expert Group (through FINNIDA) on Evaluation including 13 country case studies. In 1998, he was team leader of a study on NGO-government relations for the Government of Uganda.





## Annex 3: Itinerary and List of Persons Interviewed

<b>OVERALL</b>		
11.03.11	Department for Civil Society, Norad	Gunvor W. Skancke, Dep. Director.
<b>KENYA</b>		
07.09	National Aids Control Council	Prof Alloys Orago, Director
08.09	Norwegian Embassy, Nairobi	Geir Arne Schei, First secretary, Humanitarian organisations
<b>NLM/Chesta Girls School</b>		
11.08	NWD Project Team (briefing)	Rev. Francis Kamondich Loyce Kariwonyang Samwel Jomo Rev Lokal Narongar
12.08	ELCK – NWD Project Team	Same as above
	Yang'at Organisation	Deborah Katina
	DPHN	Moses Mochar
13.08	School Choir	37 school girls going for School Choir competition in Kakamega
	Project Steering Committee Chairman	Rev. Philip Lodwar
	Head Master	Mr. Lawrence Ptekwenyo
	Chief	Mr. Yohana Loretai
	School Chairman, Board of Governors, Chesta Secondary School	Rev. Pkemoi
	Church FGM Counsellor	Veronica
	Visit to Chesta shopping centre	
14.08	Feedback to NWD Project Team	Bishop William Lopeta NWD Project Team (as above)
02.09	Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemd	Marianne Skaiaa

<b>CARE/Lok Pachi</b>		
10.08	CIK Project Manager	Alan
16.08	CIK Field Office Manager	Jude Ottogo and Ogwala
	Tumaini Cluster	50 members of the Tumaini Cluster
	Masita Cluster	30 members of the cluster
17.08	District AIDS Coordinator	Victor Anyiko
	Mango and Liunda clusters	30 members of the two clusters
	Regional Administration, Nyangoma Sub-Location Central Sakwa	Chief Julius Nyerere Area Assistant Michel Osare Amolo
	Representatives of 7 groups at Nyangoma Sub Location	7 representatives from the groups 10 participants from one group
	Nyamase group	28 members
18.08	Field Manager (feedback meeting)	Meeting Jude Ottogo and Ogwala
02.09	CARE, Norway	Salem Hailemichael, Programme Officer
10.09	Feedback to CIK	Meeting with CIK Project Manager – Alan
<b>NCA/Habiba FGM Awareness</b>		
26.08	NCA, Norway	Benedicte Petersen
07.09	Project Team	Abdi Ali (PO) Abdi (Field Officer) Habiba Junior Habiba Issack (Director)
	Malkamar Community	39 Malkamar women's group, Headmaster, 4 School girls, the Imam and elders
	Boys organisation	The chairman of the boys group
	Women's Group Maize Mill Project	The women's group
08.09	Meetings at Rhamu	Women's group, The Chief, 5 School girls, a Lady Councillor
	Kamor Primary School	Mr. Mohamed Gaya Ade, Headmaster Teachers School girls
	School FGM activities	Two female teachers
	Project Team (completed matrix)	Project Officer, Field Officer, Accounts Assistant
09.09	Project Team (feedback)	Habiba Issack, Abdi and Habiba Junior, Wasye Musyoni from NCA



<b>ARC/Change Agent Training</b>		
19.08	Meeting with the ARC-Kenya and Kenya Change Agents (KCA	Millicent Otieno, Paul Ojigo, Alex Omino and Phoebe Okoth
	Followed a training session and met CAT members at Malele Church	Peter Ojuong, John Marogo, Vincent Owono, Julian Okoth, Betha Atieno, Julius Odiek, Jacob Siwa, Fred Owino, Thabitha Ogombo
20.08	Touring Aro centre at Majiwa	
	Meeting Social Workers who support orphans	Celestine Odhiambo Olga Awer
	Meeting with the Mia Branch of East Asembo Location	Met 26 members
	Kogelo Asembo Branch	Met 7 members
	Barchando Branch	Met 8 members
	Meeting with members of Ginya West	Chief and Chairperson Chairman Wilson Oyamo Awange
23.08	Meeting the DFO and a Forester	James Omare (DFO) Moris Omoro (Forester)
	Courtesy call at the District Commissioners Office	Mr. Saidi Mohammed
	Ochogo Kwi group	Grace Atieno, Shop Keeper
	Asembo Bay Micro-Finance group	John Otieno Oyombo, Chairman Alex Otieno Owino
30.08	ARC-Aid, Norway	Kjellan Spinnagr
<b>TANZANIA</b>		
<b>KF/Elimination of FGM, Dodoma</b>		
20.08	DIAC Leaders and Coordinators	Jenifer Chiwute, Coordinator DIAC Hilda Nkungu, Member Gertrude Mawalla, Member Columba Mapembe, Member Theresia Mwakasasa, Coordinator Singida Inter-African Committee
	Victims of FGM and Others Who Resisted	Name withheld, Manzaze Chamwino village Name withheld, Mother from Bahi district who accompanied her daughter to DIAC Name withheld, Victim of rape Name withheld, Victim of property inheritance from Dodoma
	Religious Leaders	Sheik Shabani Saidi Kitila, Dodoma Rev. Joseph Chakato Kingu, Evangelical Lutheran Church, Dodoma
	Journalists Cooperating with DIAC	Twaha Omari, Star TV Martha Mtango, Habari Leo Newspaper Peter Mkwavita, The Guardian, Nipashe and Msemakweli newspapers

21.08	Children Manungu village	Felicia Mtaze Lenifrida Semundi Fomesiana Simba Emiliana Mtaze
	Focus group discussion with DIAC Facilitators	Ernest Kutta – Macheenje village Anna Mahinyila – Macheenje village Wilson Masigoze- Macheenje village Maria Kutta – Macheenje Amoni Mtaze – Coordinator Manungu village Peter Lemabi – Mohamed Juma, Group Chairman
27.08	FOKUS	Anita Sæbø
30.08	Kvinnefronten/the Women's Front	Agnete Strøm Project coordinator
<b>KF/Women and Health, Chole</b>		
16.08	Mafia District Commissioner	Honourable Mangochie
17.08	Visits to marketplace, dispensary, vocational training centre and nursery school	
	Focus group discussions with CSWD members and leaders	Hindo Hassan, Chairperson Mwanaisha Hassani, Vice Chairperson Zainabu Issa, Secretary Aisha Hassani, Treasurer Hamiza Bwashehe, Member Hamisa Nahoda, Member Mwajuma Mohamed, Member Amina Mzee, Member Mlashi Shomali, Member Bahati Hassani, Member Rehema Juma, Member Asia Kasimu, Member Rehema Issa Ally, Member
	Chole Village Chairperson	Mabruki Sadiki,
	Ward Executive Officer	Augustin Hoza
	Chole Hotel Investor	Anne de Villiers, Manager, Chole Mjini Hotel
18.08	Visit to Old Market Site, Chole Forodhani	
	Mafia Executive Director and District Commissioner	Mr William Shimwela Honourable Mangochie
	Other stakeholder	Mama Harambee (Jina)
27.08	FOKUS	Anita Sæbø
30.08	Kvinnefronten/the Women's Front	Agnete Strøm Project coordinator

<b>NCA/Interfaith Cooperation</b>		
07.08	Amani VICOBA Group – Temeke Dar es Salaam:	
	Huruma Nyaulile-Chairperson	Tatu Athmani
	Venant M. Kashaija –Secretary	Fatuma Juma
	Matokeo Mbegalo	Catherine Yusufu
	Daniel Nyenza	Emelia Kisala
	Eleonora J shayo	Asia Yusufu
	Mary N. Kobeja	Rozy J Mloti
	Pili Machage	Yusta Makobibe
	Helena S. Milanzi	Veronica Kadunda
	Rose F Joachim	Hidaya Hasan
	Sharifa Yusufu	Anna Nzari
	Upendo Dickson	Eustella Chilambo
	Melisiana Michael	Agness Machege
	Sabina Zakaria	Esta Myonga
	Stamil Athmani	Halima Kondo
	Mwajuma Omari	Hamidu Mwilu
	Mafanikio VICOBA Group –Temeke, Dar es Salaam:	
	Leornad John Ngulo, Chairman	Nana Hasani
	AshuraMussa Mtoka, Secretary	Mlae Mahamadu
	Benadeta Raphael	Zuena Hemedi
	Salivata Nyasi	Zitumai Bakari
	Simon Chengula	Hadija Selemani
	Joha Ahamadi	Hidaya Abdallah
	Rozana Gohage	Asha Mpanda
	Pili Juma	Zeti Kassim
	Mariam Ally Kindande	Semeni Mussa
	Mwanahamisi Mpunga	Victoria Laswai
	Julius Ndyasi	Amina Manyasi
	Havijawa Hussein	Zainabu Nassoro
	Alistide Kyarusheka	Kingone Mussa
	Maria Massoro	Julia Ng'ingo
	Ahmedi Mwiru	
	District Interfaith Committee Members	Mr. Robert Chacha, Chairman Mr. Omary Twanga, Secretary
	Temeke VICOBA	Remmy Ngaiza, VICOBA Coordinator Temeke District Julius Ndyasi, VICOBA Facilitator, Amani and Mafanikio Groups
09.08	NCA Tanzania	Gunstein Instefjord, Country Director Tina Mosha, Programme Manager Rev. Godfrey Walalaze, Programme Officer
	WCRP/IRCPT Leaders	Alhaji Ayoob Omari, Secretary General Bertha Macha, Assistant Secretary General Gideon Mandara, Trustee Asia Said, Administrator

10.08	VICOBA Coordinators	Rev. Amos K. Mushendwa, Programme Officer, Youth Development CCT Zaria Said, Programme Officer, BAKWATA Fr. Gallus Marandu, Secretary, Interfaith Cooperation Dialogue, TEC Ephraim Mkenda, Assistant Project Coordinator
	Partners Advisory Group	Robert Charles, Deputy General Secretary, Social Services, ELCT Eastern and Coastal Dioceses Fr. Anthony Makundi, Secretary General, Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) Grace Masalakulangwa, Team Leader, African Evangelistic Enterprise Bertha Macha, Assistant Secretary General, WCRP/IRCPT Jane Magigita, Executive Director, Women Legal Aid Centre Ustaadh Suleiman Lolila, Secretary General, BAKWATA
11.08	Project Implementation Team	Mr. Mande D. Mwanjela, Lushoto Mr. Goma M Gwaiti, ELCT Mbulu Diocese
01.09	NCA, Norway	Berit Strømme Johnson, Program Coordinator
<b>LO/ZATUC</b>		
02.08	ILO Geneva, Telephone Interview	Dr. Mohamed Mwamazingu, Senior Economist
03.08	LO Norway, Telephone Interview	Alice Siame, LO Norway Consultant based in Zambia
04.08	Secretary General, ZATUC	Mr. Hamisi Musa Mohamed
	Zanzibar Employers Association	Mr Juma Hamad Musa, Senior Officer
05.08	Commissioner of Labour, Zanzibar	Iddi Ramadhani Mapuri
	Zanzibar Local Government Union	Mr. Talib Mbwana, Senior Officer
06.08	Secretary General, ZATUC	Mr. Hamisi Musa Mohamed, Secretary General, ZATUC
02.09	LO Norway, Oslo	Camilla Houeland, Advisor – Africa

<b>NPA/Youth Rights EAC, June 2010, during the 2010 EAC Tournament</b>		
31.08	Norwegian People's Aid, Norway	Svein Olsen, Advisor (former Country Director for Tanzania)
03.08	Norwegian People's Aid, Daar es Salaam	Odvar Bjørknes, Country Director for Tanzania Oliver, Programme officer
June 2010	Norwegian People's Aid, At the tournament in Tanzania	Svein Olsen, Advisor (former Country Director for Tanzania)
	EAC Tournament Staff and Participants:	
	George Kamau, Chairperson Organising Committee	
	Michael Wachira, CHRISC Regional Coordinator	
	Mpande, Moshi Technical School teacher and member of the Organising Committee	
	Paul Otieno, CHRISC Rwanda, Member of Technical Coordinating Committee	
	Omary Mandari, Right to Play, Team Manager under 13, Msimamo Youth Educators	
	Nick Raistrick, BBC	
	Elizabeth Wairimu, CHRISC First Aider	
	Maqulate Atieno Onyango, MYSA Referee Assessor/Instructor	
	Hassan Mohamed Abdala, Chairman Elimika Youth Centre Wete Pemba	
	Dedan Njoroge, CHRISC Technical Committee and Facilitator	
	Enos Karani, MYSA First Aider	
	Shedrack Juma, MYSA Technical Committee, Statistics	
	Erick Osia, MYSA	
	Emma Muthoni Marichu, CHRISC Facilitator for "Kicking Aids Out"	
	Several under 13 and under 16 players	
<b>SF/Microfinance</b>		
Several contacts	Stromme Foundation, Kampala	Priscilla Mirembe Serukka Regional Director, Stromme Foundation/ Chairperson, Stromme Microfinance EA Ltd
	Tujjenga Microfinance	Jimmy Makugira – General Manager
27.10	Stromme Finans AS, the holding company for Stromme Foundation microfinance activities	Lars Erik Harv, CEO

<b>UGANDA</b>		
<b>NAD/Community Based Rehabilitation</b>		
17.08	Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development.	Sylvia Ntegyereize, Assistant Commissioner, Department of Elderly and Disabled Beatrice Kaggya, Former Coordinator CBR
20.08	Kayunga District Local Government	Abdu Kasule, Ag. Community Development Officer/Probation & Welfare Officer
	Youth and Persons with Disability Integrated Development Association, Kayunga District	Idris Kabali, Director
27.08	Tororo District Local Government	Moses Moiza, District Community Development Officer Vincent Ogutti, Assistant Community Development Officer Susan Alamai, Probation Officer
	Tororo District Councilor	Michael Owori
26.08	Atlas Alliance / Norsk handikapforbund, Norway	Berthe Stenberg/ Svein Bodtkorb/ Bergdis Joelsdottir
28.08	Busia District Local Government	James Wandera, Community Development Officer/Special Needs Education Coordinator
<b>NBA/Legal Aid</b>		
25.08	Jinja LAP Clinic	Moses Kiyemba, Legal officer Sheila Turaysingura, Assistant Legal officer Benon Rwanguha, Chief Administrative Officer
31.08	Kabarole LAP Clinic	Angela Bahanzire, Legal Officer
	Kabarole LAP Clinic, Meeting with Clients	Adolf Akadumukya Estella Mary Kugonza Elisa Kabundu Salome Banobire
01.09	Norwegian Bar Association, Norway	Project coordination group; Jannicke Knudsen, Coordinator, Grethe Larsen, and colleague
02.09	Masindi LAP Clinic	Susan Zemei, Legal Officer- Masindi clinic
03.09	Gulu LAP Clinic	Henry Komakech, Advocate LAP Gulu Lydia Nekesa, Administrator Gulu Clinic
	Gulu High Court, Resident Judge	Justice Remy Kasule

09.09	Kabale LAP clinic	Jacinta Nuwangye, Legal Officer John Kabigumire, Legal Assistant Thiston Tayebwa, Legal Clerk Aisha Kagoya, Paralegal Anthony Maseke, Paralegal
	Ndorwa Government Prison, Kabale	Frank Byamugisha, Officer in Charge Charles Ogwal, Assistant Officer in Charge Adolf Kugonza, Welfare and rehabilitation Officer
	Uganda Law Society	Sylvia N. Mukasa, Executive Director
	Legal Aid Project	Aaron Besigye, Head of Legal Aid Project
<b>NWF/Vocational Training</b>		
09.08	CVTS Principal	Francesca Romana Bilak, Member of COWA Management team/Principal, CVTS
22.09	UGAPRIVI	James Ogwang, Programme Officer
22.09	Centenary Vocational Training School (CVTS)	Miriam Emecu, Head Catering Trainer Francis Okello, Head Information and Communication Technologies Trainer Mildred Kyomuhendo, Tailoring Instructor and former student Michael Nkuruma, 1st year catering student Florence Kyakwa, 2nd year tailoring student Teopista Mitoparwoth, 1st year catering student Sulaina Nairuba, 2nd year catering student Matilda Akello, Former catering student
<b>RB/ECDE Education</b>		
09.08	Save the Children in Uganda Head Office	Peter Nkhonjera, Country Director, SciU Monica Zikusooka, Design and Evaluation Officer Luc F.E. Vanhooricx, Programme Development Assistant Director
11.08	SCiU Moroto Office	Farouk Semwanga, Project Coordinator Education Karamoja SCiU
12.08	Kotido District Education Office	Romano Kapel, Senior Education Officer Angelo Lowari, District Inspector of Schools
	Potongor and Nangayum ECDE Centres in Kotido	Caregivers and Children
	SCiU Kotido Field Office	Michael Mudeng
31.08	Redd Barna/Save the Children, Norway	Ms. Anne Pedersen, Regional Director for Africa, Dr. Tove Nagel, Special Adviser Education, Mr. Rasmus Kleppe, Adviser Education, Ms. Ann Stewart Pedersen, Adviser Planning and Reporting

<b>RB/Quality Education</b>		
09.08	Save the Children in Uganda Head Office	Peter Nkhonjera, Country Director, SCiU Monica Zikusooka, Design and Evaluation Officer Luc F.E. Vanhooricx, Programme Development Assistant Director
11.08	SCiU Moroto Office	Michael Mudeng, Team Leader QEP Kotido Farouk Semwanga, Project Coordinator Education Karamoja SCiU
11.08	Moroto KDA Primary School	Joseph Korobe Osaag, Headteacher Vincent Ngilo, CCT Moses Mudeng, School Management Committee member
11.08	Visit to Nadunget Primary School, Moroto	Hellen Aligoi Amulen, Headteacher Max Lomuria, Chairman, School Management Committee
12.08	Kotido District Education Office	Romano Kapel, Senior Education Officer Angelo Lowari, District Inspector of Schools
26.08	Visit to Bishop Willis Core Primary Teacher College	Teachers (Names missing)
26.08	Canon Ibura Primary School, Iganga	Centre Coordinating Tutor (Name missing)
31.08	Redd Barna/Save the Children, Norway	Ms. Anne Pedersen, Regional Director for Africa, Dr. Tove Nagel, Special Adviser Education, Mr. Rasmus Kleppe, Adviser Education, Ms. Ann Stewart Pedersen, Adviser Planning and Reporting



## Annex 4: Terms of Reference

### Terms of Reference

#### 0.1 *Evaluation of the results of development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa.*

##### **Background and knowledge gap**

Non-government organizations<sup>69</sup> (NGOs) are well established actors on the international development arena. They may be local or national from developing or donor countries and they may be international. Most government donors channel some of their official development assistance through NGOs, meaning that the organizations receive grants directly from the donor government. In 2008 NOK 4,86 billion of the total Norwegian official development assistance of NOK 22,6 billion was channelled through NGOs. This equals 21 per cent and the proportion has remained approximately the same in recent years. Most of the NGOs receiving this support are Norwegian; in 2008 they received about NOK 3,44 of the total 4,86 billion that was channelled through NGOs. This means that Norwegian NGOs play a significant role in Norwegian development cooperation – they manage 15 per cent of the annual development budget of the government.<sup>70</sup> While the four largest NGO recipients together receive about half of this support, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) – who in 2008 only managed a little over NOK 1 billion of the support to Norwegian NGOs – works with around 100 Norwegian NGOs in 80 developing countries.

What is now termed the `NGO channel` started in 1963 with the first support for Norwegian NGOs, though their role was marginal until the 1980s. By the mid-90s allocations to Norwegian NGOs made up about 25 per cent of Norwegian bilateral support.<sup>71</sup> The NGO growth was a global phenomenon, and in Norway like elsewhere there has been considerable optimism in relation to the role of NGOs in the development cooperation process. However, there have also been critical voices who have questioned many of the hailed advantages of the NGO sector.<sup>72</sup> In its new 2009 guidelines for NGO support, Norad points to specific challenges in the cooperation with NGOs: Their contribution to strengthening civil society through local partners is unclear, and Norwegian NGOs sometimes dominate their local partners

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69 To ensure consistency the term non-governmental organization is used throughout this document. It is understood to carry the same meaning as civil society organization.

70 The national budget, Report no.1 (2009-10), pg 39, 41.

71 NGOs as a Channel in Development Aid. The Norwegian System, Terje Tvedt, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995. Evaluation Report 3.95. Today NGOs make up for 30 per cent of bilateral aid.

72 NGOs as a Channel in Development Aid. The Norwegian System. Terje Tvedt, Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen, for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995. Evaluation Report 3.95. In addition to its own critical views, the report refers to similar reports from other donor countries.

in developing countries. As a result their work may not be fully representative of their target groups.<sup>73</sup> In its most recent white paper to the Parliament on the overall development policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs challenged the NGOs to become better in documenting their results in the fight against poverty.<sup>74</sup>

In 2005 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed a committee to review the role of Norwegian NGOs in official development cooperation. The report of the 'Rattsø Commission' as it became known, pointed at weaknesses in the evaluation of the development work of NGOs and asked government authorities to take more responsibility for evaluations in this field.<sup>75</sup> As a response to this the Evaluation Department of Norad initiated a series of evaluations of the cooperation through Norwegian NGOs and their partners at country level. In 2007 an evaluation was completed in Guatemala, the following year another evaluation was done in Northern Uganda.

These evaluations focused on assessing the impact and results of the NGO channelled funds – in Guatemala at country level and in Northern Uganda at the NGO level. Neither evaluation assessed systematically and in detail the effects of the NGOs' work at the project level: creating change in people's lives.

### **Purpose and objective**

The purpose of the evaluation is to respond to the above stated need for evaluations of development cooperation through NGOs, and to enable a more nuanced and evidence-based perspective and policy debate on the role of Norwegian NGOs as a channel of official development assistance. It thus has a dual purpose covering accountability and learning.

The objective of the evaluation is to document and assess the results brought about by projects supported by Norwegian NGOs and the processes behind the changes. In doing this the evaluation will also address some of the issues that feature in current criticism mentioned above, such as results orientation and documentation, the meaning of strengthening civil society, and relevance for the target group.

The main users of the evaluation in Norway will be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Norad, Norwegian NGOs and the wider community of development cooperation agents and observers, including research institutions and the media. In the case country users include the evaluated NGOs and other local or foreign organizations working in the same area either thematically or geographically, government authorities (local and/or central), and people affected by the projects.

### **Scope**

The evaluation will focus on long-term development interventions and thus not include emergency or conflict related projects. It will cover three countries in East Africa; Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.<sup>76</sup> The share of bilateral development coopera-

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73 Principles for Norad's Support to Civil Society in the South, Norad 2009.

74 Report No 13 to the Storting (2008-2009): Climate, Conflict, Capital. Norwegian Development Policy adapting to change.

75 New Roles for Non-Governmental Organizations in Development Cooperation, Report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs committee for the evaluation of non-governmental organizations as a channel in Norway's development cooperation, submitted 15 June 2006.

76 The evaluation in Northern Uganda in 2009 focused on humanitarian support. The current evaluation looks at long term development support.

tion that is channeled through NGOs varies – from Kenya with 30 per cent to Uganda with 23 per cent to Tanzania with 8 per cent (see Table 1 below). In all, about NOK 195 million were spent by Norwegian NGOs in the three countries in 2008.

**Table 1. Norwegian bilateral development aid through Norwegian NGOs, 2008 (NOK 1000).<sup>77</sup>**

Recipient country	Total Norwegian bilateral support	Support through Norwegian NGOs	Proportion of bilateral support that is channeled through Norwegian NGOs	Number of Norwegian NGOs
Kenya	121 441	36 924	30 per cent	18
Tanzania	728 521	60 393	8 per cent	16
Uganda	427 916	97 870	23 per cent	22

In 2008 a total of 36 Norwegian organizations were supported in the three countries. Five were present in all three countries, 10 were present in two countries, and the remaining 21 were in one country. These organizations together ran about 40 projects in each country. Thematically the interventions are spread widely, covering among others health, education, microfinance, legal aid, female genital mutilation, HIV/Aids, natural resource management, violence and discrimination against vulnerable groups, water supply and hygiene, fisheries, housing, indigenous people and farmers associations.<sup>78</sup>

The evaluation shall include 15 projects in total from the three countries. Due to the focus on results, only projects that have run for a minimum of five years were eligible for selection. In order to ensure that different types of interventions are well covered, the projects were grouped into the following categories: service delivery (SD), awareness (AW), income generation (IG), and capacity building (CB) based on what appears to be the main focus of the project (see Table 2).<sup>79</sup>

**Table 2. Projects eligible for the evaluation.**

	Total	SD	AW	IG	CB
Kenya	13	6	3	3	1
Tanzania	19	6	6	1	6
Uganda	22	11	4	2	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>

Evaluations of development cooperation commonly use purposive sampling when selecting cases. This means that selection is based on the judgment of the researcher as to which subjects best fit the criteria of the study. For the present

<sup>77</sup> Numbers provided by Norads Department of Quality Assurance, January 2010. The numbers include all support through Norwegian NGOs, also humanitarian or emergency support. The support is managed by Norad, different departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo and Norwegian embassies abroad.

<sup>78</sup> Based on a preliminary reading of the project list for 2008.

<sup>79</sup> A short description of each agreement in the statistical database of Norad was the basis for this categorization.

evaluation it was decided that random sampling should be used. The empirical basis for the evaluation report will hence be unbiased according to such pre-judgment.

All 54 relevant projects (the population) were assigned a number from 1 to 54. The requested sample of 15 projects was selected according to the principle of a having random starting value (minus 12), which made project 43 the first one to be selected, then continuing with every 15<sup>th</sup> project (the requested sample size). Since this procedure exceeds the number of projects in the population, the principle of “clock math” was used when continuing from the top of the list again, until the sample size was reached and completed. The sampled projects are in Table 3.

**Table 3: Projects sampled for the evaluation.**

<b>Kenya</b>		
Norwegian Missions in Development	Chesta Girls Secondary School	SD
CARE Norway	Lok Pachi – Change your attitude	IG
Norwegian Church Aid	FGM Awareness Creation and mobilisation	AW
ARC-aid	Change agent training programme	CB
<b>Tanzania</b>		
Forum for Women and Development	Elimination of FGM, Dodoma	AW
Forum for Women and Development	Women and health project, Chole Island	AW
Norwegian Church Aid	Capacity devt for Interfaith cooperation	CB
The Norwegian Conf. of Trade Unions	Education and organisational development	CB
Norwegian People’s Aid	Youth rights	AW
Strømme Foundation	Microfinance in Tanzania	IG
<b>Uganda</b>		
The Atlas Alliance	Community Based Rehabilitation in Uganda	SD
The Norwegian Bar Association	Legal Aid Project	SD
Forum for Women and Development	Vocational training to disadvantaged girls	SD
Save the Children Norway	Early Childhood Devt and Education	SD
Save the Children Norway	Quality Education Project	SD

Due to differences in funding and planning systems, all sampled units may not be at a comparable project level. If a sub-unit has to be selected, the evaluation team will do this in a transparent manner while ensuring that relevance is maintained.

## Evaluation questions

The evaluation shall cover but is not necessarily limited to the questions below.<sup>80</sup>

### *Background information on the projects*

1. Project information: Geographic area and population coverage (if relevant), target group size and degree of exclusion or vulnerability, years of operation, financial input per year and the route of financial support from MFA/Norad to the final recipient.
2. Implementation partner information: How deliberate does the selection of local partner organization appear? What is the coherence between the strategy of the Norwegian NGO and the selection that was made, taking the local context into consideration?
3. Contextual information: (i) Is the project or its implementation affected by national regulations governing the NGO sector and the conditions for operations of foreign and local NGOs? (ii) Does the political, social, cultural and economic context provide *particular* opportunities and constraints for the project? (iii) Does the project planning reflect knowledge of relevant existing local institutions? Are such institutions (government and others) aware of the project? Is the project aligned with the government's local/national priorities and interventions by other organizations?

### *Managing for results*

4. What are the planned key results of the project? Is there coherence between documents, management/staff, beneficiaries, other organizations, local government and third parties as to what the project seeks to achieve?
5. Have the results been formulated with appropriate indicators and realistic targets? Are the results a logical continuation from the inputs of the project? Is there a baseline or what functions as the basis for the project? Is monitoring an integral part of the project and is there documentation of monitoring of results?
6. Are there any key factors that appear to affect the quality of results-based management? To what extent do the application and reporting formats of Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) highlight the need for and facilitate results-based management?

### *Achievement of results*

7. What is the change in value on indicators for key results? (e.g. changes in health, education, knowledge and behavior indicators). Where a baseline is incomplete or does not exist, the evaluation is expected to seek to identify some form of pre-project comparison.
  - a. How do the findings correspond with existing monitoring, reports and studies?
  - b. What is the likelihood that observed changes are due to the project (counterfactual information)?
  - c. Are there any evidenced spillover effects of the project?
8. What are the key factors contributing to the achievement (or lack thereof) of results?
9. Has there been any other impact, positive or negative that should be noted (outside planned results)?

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<sup>80</sup> The profile of the sample may lead to additional interesting questions.

10. How is 'strengthening of civil society' and/or 'capacity building of local partner' understood? Is it a process, or a key result? How is it defined, which indicator is used to measure it, has any measurement taken place? Can results be identified now? How and to what extent is the agenda of the partner organizations steering the partnership?
11. How and to what extent are target groups involved in project design, implementation and monitoring? Is active participation a key process or result for the project?
12. How relevant are the results for the target group? Is there a plan for their sustainability that is jointly agreed between the target group, partner NGO and Norwegian NGO?
13. How does the organization view the project's cost-effectiveness? How does this compare with achieved results and the cost/input of the project?

The narrative analysis should be complemented by matrices rating the 15 projects on the evaluation questions. Findings and recommendations should be summarized for the three clusters of evaluation questions listed above.

A final overall analysis should include a summary of what, if any, are the common characteristics of the projects that have succeeded in creating lasting change. Based on findings, the evaluation should identify lessons learned and give operational recommendations that are relevant for planning and implementation of development cooperation through Norwegian NGOs.

### **Methodology**

The evaluation team shall develop an appropriate methodology that can respond to the information needs arising from the list of evaluation questions. The evaluation team may make use of various empirical methods, e.g. questionnaire surveys, interviews, focus group discussions and participatory rural appraisal.<sup>81</sup> The presentation of the methodology should indicate any significant advantages and limitations of the chosen approach.

Indicators should be developed by the evaluation team to reflect all evaluation questions – it is important that projects are assessed along transparent and identical criteria. Using indicators will also facilitate and guide the development of table overviews rating all sampled interventions.

Evaluation question seven forms the core of the evaluation; to measure change in result indicators. The methodology, indicators and tools for data collection will be directed by the projects' aim and the work of the team in uncovering these and making them measurable. Thus evaluation question seven requires a subset of methodological approaches, tools, and indicators in addition to the overall methodology for the evaluation as a whole.

The informants should involve a broad spectrum of people so that in addition to the targeted community and project staff, the evaluation will also include the voices and

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81. If FGD or other group-based information gathering is used, the number of groups and key information on participants (number, age, gender or any other relevant variable) should be provided in the final report.

impressions of other organizations (including government) and individuals not involved or benefiting from the project.

The evaluation shall make full use of existing relevant information. Some suggestions are in Table 2 below.

**Table 2. Non-exhaustive list of existing sources of information.**

<b>Context/background for the evaluation</b>	Rattsø commission report; Norad guidelines for civil society support (for relevant years).
<b>Previous evaluations</b>	Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organizations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007), Norad 2009; Evaluation of the Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala, Norad 2007.
<b>Other similar or relevant studies and evaluations</b>	Thematic Evaluation of Support by Danish NGOs to Civil Society in Ghana and Ethiopia, Danida 2009; Mapping of Monitoring and Evaluation Practices among Danish NGOs, Danida 2008; Supporting Civil Society Organizations for Empowerment and Economics Progress of Small Farmers and People Living in Poverty, Sida 2008; Swedish Democracy Promotion through NGOs in Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru, Sida 2008; Study of the Impact of the Work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society, Norad 2004, Study of the Impact of the work of Forut in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society, Norad 2004, the Danish NGO Impact Study, Danida 2000 <sup>8</sup> ; Searching for Impact and Methods: NGO Evaluation Synthesis Study, OECD/DAC, 1997.
<b>Information on the selected NGOs</b>	Norad organizational reviews; relevant reports from the Auditor General's office, if any.
<b>Information on the selected projects</b>	Project documents, including annual and other reports, monitoring, studies, surveys and evaluations. Reports to Norad (periodic results report and others).
<b>Data and statistics on the geographic area, population or indicator.</b>	Government information systems by line agencies such as Education Management Information System (EMIS) and Health Management Information System (HMIS) and Population Census. National surveys such as National Living Standard Survey (NLSS, supported by the World Bank), National Demographic Health Survey (NDHS, supported by Measure), Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS, supported by Unicef), and other surveys at national or local level supported by organizations such as UNDP, WFP, INGOs.

Information should be triangulated and validated, and data quality assessed in a transparent manner. All findings need to be substantiated and referenced/documented.

### **Organization**

The evaluation will be carried out by an independent team of consultants contracted by Norad. Evaluation management will be carried out by Norad's Evaluation Depart-

ment. All decisions concerning this terms of reference, inception report, draft report and final report will be taken by the Evaluation Department. Any modification to the ToR is subject to approval by the Evaluation Department. The evaluation team is entitled to consult stakeholders pertinent to the assignment but it is not permitted to make any commitment on behalf of the Government of Norway. The evaluation team leader is responsible for reporting to the Evaluation Department.

Stakeholders will be identified to advise and comment on the evaluation process and the quality of products.

### Composition of the team

The evaluation team should include full members who are familiar with both the Norwegian development cooperation context and the selected case countries. To ensure this, partnership between institutions is encouraged.

The team shall cover the following competencies (these must be documented in the tender):

Competence	Team leader	At least one team member
Academic	Higher degree	Higher degree (PhD)
Discipline	Social or other relevant sciences	Social or other relevant sciences
Evaluation	Experience managing multi-country and multi-disciplinary evaluations	Experience applying evaluation standards, principles and methods
Sector	Experience carrying out similar evaluations, reviews or research, particularly results/outcome analysis	Experience carrying out similar evaluations, reviews or research, particularly results/outcome analysis
Sector	Experience with results based management tools	Experience with results based management tools
Sector		Experience in anthropological fieldwork and/or community-based social inquiry
Sector		Thematic experience in areas such as microfinance, capacity-building, awareness, service delivery in health and education.
Development cooperation	Yes	Yes, particularly Norwegian development cooperation and the role of NGOs
Country/region	East Africa	East Africa
Language	Excellent English	Excellent English
Language		Reading ability of Norwegian
Language		Speaking ability of local language in case countries (e.g. Swahili)



**Budget and deliverables**

The estimated work of the evaluation is 55 consultant weeks excluding national research assistants/enumerators. Due to the emphasis on results at project level, the thrust of the work will be done at field level.

The deliverables consist of the following:

- An inception report shall be prepared in accordance with the Evaluation Department's guidelines given in Annex 3 of the Tender Document. It will be discussed with the team and the hearing group before approval by the Evaluation Department.
- The evaluation team shall present its preliminary analysis to relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, at the end of each project/country visit, allowing for feedback and discussion.
- A draft final report shall be prepared for feedback from the hearing group and the Evaluation Department. The feedback will include comments on structure, facts, content, and conclusions.
- A final evaluation report shall be prepared in accordance with the Evaluation Department's guidelines in Annex A-3 Guidelines for Reports.
- A seminar for dissemination of the final report in Oslo and/or in the case countries, to be organized by the Evaluation Department. Travel cost related to dissemination in case countries will be covered separately by the Evaluation Department on a need basis, and are not to be included in the budget.

All presentations, reports, data collection tools and raw data are to be submitted in electronic form in accordance with the deadlines set in the time-schedule specified in the Tender Document (Part 1 Tender Specifications).

The Evaluation Department retains the sole rights with respect to distribution, dissemination and publication of the deliverables.

## EVALUATION REPORTS

### Cooperation

- 11.98 Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict  
 12.98 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation between Norway and Nicaragua  
 13.98 UNICEF-komiteen i Norge  
 14.98 Relief Work in Complex Emergencies
- 1.99 WID/Gender Units and the Experience of Gender Mainstreaming in Multilateral Organisations  
 2.99 International Planned Parenthood Federation – Policy and Effectiveness at Country and Regional Levels  
 3.99 Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Psycho-Social Projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Caucasus  
 4.99 Evaluation of the Tanzania-Norway Development Cooperation 1994–1997  
 5.99 Building African Consulting Capacity  
 6.99 Aid and Conditionality  
 7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction in Norwegian Development Aid  
 8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness  
 9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)  
 10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI, The African European Institute
- 1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development Cooperation 1988–1997  
 2.00 Norwegian Support to the Education Sector. Overview of Policies and Trends 1988–1998  
 3.00 The Project “Training for Peace in Southern Africa”  
 4.00 En kartlegging av erfaringer med norsk bistand gjennomfrivillige organisasjoner 1987–1999  
 5.00 Evaluation of the NUFU programme  
 6.00 Making Government Smaller and More Efficient. The Botswana Case  
 7.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Plan of Action for Nuclear Safety Priorities, Organisation, Implementation  
 8.00 Evaluation of the Norwegian Mixed Credits Programme  
 9.00 “Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?” Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s Political Past in the Middle East  
 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway’s Special Grant for the Environment
- 1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund  
 2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products  
 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999  
 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999  
 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction  
 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000  
 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa  
 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)  
 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross  
 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMA ILO program for “Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives” in Western Africa 1978–1999  
 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMA programme du BIT sur l’« Appui associatif et coopératif aux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l’Ouest de 1978 à 1999  
 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)  
 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for Africa in the World Bank  
 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringnettverk
- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peace-building. Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead  
 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR’s activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway  
 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen  
 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society  
 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society  
 1.05 –Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme  
 2.05 –Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCIDI programme in the Western Balkans  
 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004  
 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)  
 5.05 Evaluation of the “Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)”
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?  
 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset  
 1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance  
 1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn  
 1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation  
 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance  
 2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America  
 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations  
 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991–2005)  
 5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)  
 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise  
 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries  
 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)  
 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings  
 2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review  
 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation the EEA Grants  
 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses  
 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building  
 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal’s Education for All 2004–2009 Sector Programme  
 1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millenium Development Goals  
 2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan  
 2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations  
 3.09 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003–2007)  
 3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study  
 4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage  
 4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan  
 5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008  
 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People’s Aid  
 7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad’s Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- 1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009  
 2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures  
 3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance  
 4.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Africa Case Study  
 5.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Bangladesh Case Study  
 6.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Uganda Case Study  
 7.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans  
 8.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International  
 9.10 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives  
 10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations  
 11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking  
 12.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)  
 13.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Brasil  
 14.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo  
 15.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Guyana  
 16.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Indonesia  
 17.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Tanzania  
 18.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative. Executive Summaries from Country Reports

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