



**Save the Children**

# **School Feeding and Cash Transfer Project: Chimanimani and Muzarabani Districts**

## **End of Project Evaluation Report**



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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

Agritex	Agricultural Technical and Extension Services
BEAM	Basic Education Assistance Module
CPC	Child Protection Committee
CSB	Corn Soya Blend
CSI	Child Status Index
CT	Cash Transfer
DA	District Administrator
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
MoESAC	Ministry of Education, Sports, Arts and Culture
MoHCW	Ministry of Health and Child Welfare
NAP	National Action Plan
OVC	Orphaned and Vulnerable Children
PISI	Police Internal Security Intelligence
POSB	Post Office Savings Bank
RDC	Rural District Council
SC	Save the Children
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Scientists
SDC	School Development Committee
SFP	School Feeding Programme
US	United States
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document details findings of an End of Project evaluation for Save the Children's School Feeding and Cash Transfer project. The project was implemented as an emergency project in the districts of Muzarabani and Chimanimani. The aim was to mitigate the effects of food insecurity so that children's education is not unduly disrupted on account of hunger and lack of resources. The main objective of the emergency project was to improve the 2010/2011 primary school attendance rates for 32,000 primary school children in grade 0-3 and food security situation for households with orphans and other vulnerable children in the two target districts. In this regards, end of project evaluation meant to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability of the school feeding and cash transfer project and make recommendations thereof. It also aimed at identifying lessons learnt and advocacy issues that Save the Children can pursue in future programming.

The evaluation was a cross sectional study, employing mostly participatory research techniques. Data collection was mainly through consultative meetings, desk review, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, direct observations and questionnaire survey. A team of consultants from Innovative Minds conducted the evaluation exercise. These were supported by Save the Children Field Monitors who were trained as enumerators and assisted in the collection of household data. Overall supervision and quality control was provided by the consultants during the data collection exercise. Random sampling was used to select schools and households that participated in the evaluation. Sampling was in such a way that a representative sample of both schools and households was obtained. Approximately 19% of total households that benefited from the cash transfer and 16% of schools that participated in the school feeding were reached during the evaluation.

The major findings of the evaluation were that SF and CT project was to a greater extent able to achieve its intended objectives. At an output level the project achieved most of its planned outputs except for the cash transfer programme which failed to reach 550 households in the first three months of the project. At an impact level more impact was achieved through the cash transfer programme especially in terms of improving household income, increasing food security, making sure that vulnerable households are able to pay school fees for OVC. The school feeding programme also managed to significantly reduce school dropouts in the two districts and had a positive impact on school attendance. However the evaluation has shown that school enrolment for ECD and Grade 1-3 did not change that much and in fact ECD enrolment for 2011 is lower than that of September 2010.

The evaluation also revealed that after the end of the project there will likely be an emergency situation that warrants further support. The positive impact described above is largely short-term as there is greater possibility of supported households and children returning back to their vulnerable situation or even worse after the end of the project. In most schools, OVC supported under the SC project were excluded from the current BEAM programme whilst there is general food insecurity among vulnerable households in both districts due to the poor 2010/2011 season which also affected the *Zunde raMambo* programme. However the concept of the *Zunde raMambo* is evidently an effective strategy for enhancing food security of vulnerable and child headed households. Findings also show that the success of such a programme is determined by the scale of implementation and the environment under which it is implemented, factors that SC should consider if it is to support the implementation of *Zundes* in the future.

There was extensive involvement and participation of stakeholders at all levels in the project from planning to implementation. The involvement and participation of stakeholders at planning and implementation stages in the project was an effective strategy in ensuring ownership of the project. However the failure of the cash transfer intervention to take off in Muzarabani district shows that all stakeholders are important. Disgruntlement of one stakeholder has the potential of delaying or completely stopping the implementation of a project.

The evaluation makes the following general recommendations:

- It is important that beneficiary verification process even in an emergency situation be conducted before the project implementation. Verification at the onset of the project affected the cash transfer output for the first three month as the project did not manage to replace beneficiaries that had been removed from the list.
- Resources permitting the school feeding programme should continue to be implemented in the current year (2011) until the next harvest. School feeding should be extended to all grades. SC should also mobilize resources and find ways of supporting child headed households and those headed by the elderly who are incapacitated and can no longer support themselves.
- In future, for similar sensitive emergency programmes, SC should engage the government at all levels and ensure that the necessary approval and documentation is available which will guarantee smooth flowing of the project activities at implementation and make certain that intended beneficiaries are not robbed of their benefits.
- If *Zunde raMambo* is to be implemented as a main programme, it is important to conduct a situational analysis in each community to determine the situation as regards the *Zunde raMambo*, especially people's perceptions, opportunities and threats for such a programme and suggestions of improving community participation. This will ensure that the design of the programme take into consideration the different dynamic situations possible thereby increasing its chances of success.
- SC should consider decentralizing the *Zunde raMambo* to headman or village level as part of scaling up of the *Zunde raMambo* programme. This will ensure micro management of the *Zunde* whilst achieving a fairly extensive reach of vulnerable households and OVC that benefit out of such a programme. This strategy has the potential of greatly reducing food insecurity among vulnerable households in both districts.

The evaluation also makes the following recommendations on advocacy issues that SC should consider:

- Most parents and SDCs fail to pay for ECD education and ECD para-professional teachers respectively. SC should lobby the MoESAC to consider paying for ECD para-professional staff, the same way it supports temporary teachers. The rolling out of ECD trained teachers should be expedited so that each school should at least have one ECD trained professional. Currently all visited schools have no ECD trained professionals.
- There are gaps and or contradictions in the government policy especially as it relates to ECD education. As much as ECD education is a prerequisite for a child to be accepted into Grade One, children in ECD are not considered for support under the BEAM programme. SC should advocate for ECD education to be treated the same way as the mainline education, i.e., ECD should be considered under BEAM and support in terms of trained professionals and materials resources should be availed to schools.

- SC should also advocate for the NAP II Cash Transfer programme to also cover Chimanimani and Muzarabani districts. This will ensure that vulnerable households that were supported under the cash transfer programme have an opportunity to be supported under the new government programme.
- SC should advocate for the Ministry of Labour and Social Services to increase the US\$20 to possibly US\$50 per month if meaningful and long lasting impact of the intervention should be realised.
- The complete shift of most households in upper Muzarabani from food to cash (tobacco) cropping reduces food self sufficiency and increases food insecurity in the district. SC should lobby the Agritex department to educate farmers in upper Muzarabani on the importance of food cropping so as to reduce artificial hunger and food insecurity emergencies.



# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background

This report has been developed as an output of the End of Term Evaluation for the emergency project which was implemented by Save the Children (SC) in Muzarabani and Chimanimani districts. The project was meant to mitigate the effects of food insecurity through implementing a child oriented cash transfer and school feeding project in the two districts, so that the children's education is not unduly disrupted on account of hunger and lack of resources. School feeding encourages children from food insecure homes to attend school. It enhances child participation, attentiveness and improves daily attendance. Cash transfers on the other hand have been found to be a good response to food insecurity situations through empowerment of beneficiary households and breaking of the deepening dependency of rural families on food aid. The approach provides a way of helping people to avoid harmful coping strategies such as borrowing food/cash, migration, selling livestock or assets and withdrawal of children from school. Cash transfers do not only address the monetary constraints of the vulnerable households, but if well implemented ensure investment in long term solutions. The main objective of the emergency project was to improve the 2010/2011 primary school attendance rates for 32,000 primary school children in grade 0-3 and food security situation for households with orphans and other vulnerable children (OVC) in the two target districts.

## 1.1 Evaluation Objectives

The following were the specific objectives of the evaluation:

- To assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the school feeding and cash transfer project.
- To assess the enrolment and attendance trends for grades 0 up to 3 primary schools children and for orphans and other vulnerable children in particular, in Chimanimani and Muzarabani districts since October 2010 to March 2011.
- To assess the number of school going age children in the cash transfer targeted households that were enrolled in schools and attended school from October 2010 to March 2011.
- To assess household food security situation in households receiving cash per month during October 2010 to March 2011.
- To assess the *Zunde raMambo* concept.
- To identify advocacy issues and interventions based on comprehensive situational analysis.
- To document any lessons learnt and make recommendations for future programming.

## 1.2 Report Outline

This report is structured into six sections. The initial section provides a brief background and objectives of the evaluation whilst section two provides the methodology and approaches used in conducting the study. The third section gives an outline of the project design while the following section provides the evaluation findings. Section five gives the major conclusions and recommendations of the study as well as advocacy issues emanating from the study findings. The annexes form the last section of the report.

## 2 METHODOLOGY

### 2.1 Evaluation design

The evaluation was a cross sectional study, employing participatory research techniques. The study was conducted in Muzarabani and Chimanimani districts. A team of consultants undertook the study and were assisted by Save the Children Field Officers in administering the household questionnaire in Chimanimani. The evaluation design was such that each Field Officer would administer the household questionnaire in their wards of operation. This would facilitate the identification of beneficiary households and observation of community and cultural dynamics that are crucial for the success of such a study. It was also envisaged that the household would be more at ease with a Field Officer that they are familiar with and thus improving the chances of obtaining valid data especially in relation to income sources and expenditure. Enumerator training was carried out before administering the questionnaire. Overall supervision and quality control was provided by the consultants during the data collection exercise.

Sampling was done for the household questionnaire survey and school assessments. To ensure statistical representation of the findings, the study targeted at least 10% of the beneficiary households and schools. Random sampling was used to select household to participate in the survey. Beneficiary registers provided the sampling frame from which the households were selected. One hundred and five (105) households representing 19% of the population was achieved during the evaluation. Weighted random sampling was used to select schools to participate in the survey. Sampling was done at district level to ensure that the sample was representative of the distribution of schools in the two districts. The study managed to cover 21 schools which translate to 16% of the 133 targeted primary schools. The target of 10 children per school was achieved in all schools except in two due to the closure of schools for the holidays.

### 2.2 Data Collection Methods

The data collection methods that were used ensured that both qualitative and quantitative data were collected. This was to ensure that issues captured are comprehensive and adequate. The methodologies were largely participatory, involving children, the community and stakeholders. Five methods were used to gather data for the evaluation and these are discussed below:

***Consultative meetings*** – Consultative meetings with Save the Children were conducted prior to the field work. This was necessary so as to establish common ground. This also allowed the consultants to obtain a better understanding of the assignment and the overall scope of the project.

***Desk Review*** - A detailed review of project documents was conducted so as to obtain a detailed understanding of the CT and SF programmes as well as *Zunde raMambo* component. Other literature relevant to the study was also reviewed. The documents reviewed are listed in the references section.

**Focus Group Discussions** (FGDs) – Four FGDs were held in each district implying that a total of eight FGDs were carried out in the two districts. FGDs were held as a means of gathering group opinions on particular issues of the evaluation. The FGDs were designed in such a way that community members were able to air their views as regards issues that the evaluation sought to investigate. FGD participants comprised of community leaders, school development committees, CSB cooks as well as beneficiaries of both the project.

**In-depth Key Informant Interviews** – These were conducted with selected stakeholders at district and community levels. Key informants constituted the following;

- All district stakeholders that worked closely with SC prior and during the project implementation
- School Heads
- Teachers in charge of the CSB project at every school
- CSB cooks
- Chiefs /Zunde raMambo representatives

**Questionnaire survey** - A questionnaire survey was conducted at two levels, household and child levels. Questionnaires were designed mainly for the purposes of collecting quantitative data pertaining to key issues under investigation. The respondent for the household questionnaire was the household head or the next senior person because some questions required information on household income and utilization. The child survey involved collecting information used to compute the Child Status Index (CSI). The questionnaire sought to gather information pertaining to child rights and gender issues that have an impact on the well-being of a child; that is – the child’s quality of life. The questions were simplified for ease of comprehension considering that most of the target group were children between the grades of 0 – 3. The questionnaires were administered to both project beneficiaries and non beneficiaries in Chimanimani district. The results of the two surveys were instrumental in determining the impact of the emergency project.

**Direct Observations** – The consultants were able to observe the distribution of cash at seven schools namely Charleswood, Chikukwa, Nyahode, Muchadziya, Fairfeild and Kushinga and Kwirire Primary schools. The consultants managed to visit four of the five fields under the *Zunde raMambo* scheme in Chimanimani namely, Chikukwa, Ndima, Mutambara and Ngorima. In Muzarabani the consultants were able to visit Chief Hwata’s field. Plans had been made to visit Chief Chiweshe’s field too but the Chief was not available when the consultants got to his area. The consultants were also able to observe children being fed at Ngangu Primary school in Chimanimani. In Muzarabani, the consultants witnessed children carrying dry rations that had been distributed to them at the end of the term.

### **2.3 Data Analysis**

Quantitative data entry and analysis was done using a SPSS. Descriptive statistics such as frequency tables and cross-tabulations were used to do most of the analysis. Graphical illustrations and tables were used for presentation of results of the findings. Qualitative data was analyzed through the collation of not only most frequent responses but also of unique responses. Interpretation of these responses sought to further elaborate on the responses without losing the true meaning of the response.

## **2.4 Limitations**

There were no major limitations to the evaluation except that the study was held at the time when schools were closing for holidays. The consultants were thus unable to visit the envisaged number of schools in the two districts. However, effort was made to reach the targeted number of children in the two districts. The consultants were unable to administer the child questionnaire at the last target schools in Muzarabani as the children had already dismissed on the schools closing day.

### **3 BRIEF PROJECT DESCRIPTION**

The project had one goal which was to improve school attendance and enrolment and food security for OVC in ECD to grade 3. This was to be achieved through the implementation of two components which are the Cash Transfer and School Feeding Programmes. The third component of the project – the *Zunde raMambo* - was implemented as an exit strategy. The emergency project was designed for implementation in two districts namely Chimanimani in Manicaland province and Muzarabani in Mashonaland Central province. However, the CT programme was not implemented in Muzarabani district. Concerns were raised by one stakeholder during the first stakeholders meeting requiring SC to seek clearance regarding the implementation of the CT from the Ministry of Labour and Social Services. Delays in obtaining the clearance resulted in SC, in consultation with the donor, leaving out the CT component in Muzarabani. The funds meant for the CT programme in Muzarabani was used for the SFP which was then expanded to cater for all grades including ECD. Although clearance was later obtained, it was too late as the funds had already been committed to the SFP.

#### **Overview of the Cash Transfer Programme**

The CT programme targeted 550 households in each district and therefore benefitting 1 100 households in total. This was expected to reach out to approximately 5 500 members. The target households were those with OVC in grade 0 – 3. The beneficiary selection process was to be community driven, utilising existing community-based structures and databases. Selected households would receive US\$20 per household per month. Initially it was envisaged that money will be distributed through the use of the formal banking system, utilising the Post Office Savings Bank (POSB) as the beneficiaries' bank. This was however abandoned for a number of reasons. Foremost, it was realised that there were a few Post Offices (including sub-offices) in the two districts and this meant that the beneficiaries would have to travel long distances in order to access the money. This had other implications and some are as follows;

- It meant that some of the beneficiaries would have to use public transport. This would reduce the CT amount at the disposal of the household since part of it would be diverted to cover the transport costs.
- It was going to be burden for some household heads especially the elderly and children to travel to the bank on a monthly basis.
- It was also going to inconvenience children who are household heads as they would at times miss lessons in order to go and withdraw the money.

Therefore instead of the transferring the money to beneficiaries' P.O.S.B accounts, SC decided to transport the money to communities.

Seventy four schools were selected to be the distribution points for the cash transfer. The beneficiary households were to be alerted on the distribution date by Field Monitors a few days before the distribution. The registered household head was then supposed to present themselves with their national identity cards. In cases where no member of the household was able to collect, the cash was to be collected by the relevant Field Officer. Nominated Advisors of the CT programme were to be trained on monitoring the programme. They also had the mandate of advising beneficiary households on the utilisation of the transfer. The initial plan

was to give these Advisors a monthly incentive of US\$25. Due to the increased number of Advisors, they ended up getting \$10 per month each. Their major role was supporting the vulnerable household on the transfer scheme by making regular follow-ups and reporting the situation to SC responsible staff. Other stakeholders in the district including the MoESAC, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Police Internal Security Intelligence (PISI), Chimanimani Rural District Council, and District Administrator (DA)'s Office were to play active roles in the distribution of cash.

### **Overview of the School Feeding Programme**

The SFP was meant to benefit 32 000 primary school children in grades 0 - 3 in the two districts. This target group were school children between 4 to 9 years, who would be fed with Corn Soya Blend (CSB) porridge during break-time everyday at school for six months. This was meant to cut on short term hunger to enable children to concentrate in class. The project planned on setting up feeding point committees to improve accountability and correct targeting. Stakeholders including the community were assigned different roles (refer to annex 3). The community was supposed to support the feeding scheme through collection of fire-wood, water, cooking utensils and provision of labour for the actual preparation of porridge. The evaluation found out that most School Development Committees (SDCs) in Chimanimani employed permanent cooks that prepared the CSB instead of relying on the community taking turns to prepare the porridge. On the contrary, in Muzarabani CSB was prepared by community members who provided labour on a rotation basis daily.

### **Overview of the *Zunde raMambo* component**

The *Zunde raMambo* concept has been in existence in the country and has been implemented as a way of supporting vulnerable households. However, performance has been below expectation in most parts of the country due to shortage of inputs and erratic rainfall. As an exit strategy Save the Children supported the *Zunde raMambo* concept in the two districts by way of providing inputs comprising of fertilizer (Compound D and Ammonium Nitrate), seeds and lime. The community through the chief would be responsible for providing the field and labour for the *Zunde raMambo* programme. When the project was being designed, consideration was for one chief per district. It however, emerged that there were five chiefs in Chimanimani and three chiefs and a headman in Muzarabani. Consequently the inputs had to be shared among the chiefs equally in each district.

## **4 FINDINGS OF THE STUDY**

### **4.1 Relevance of the SFP and Cash Transfer Project**

This section considers the relevance of the project to the organisation and also to the needs on the ground. It also demonstrates how the project fits in with national and global trends of supporting vulnerable children.

#### **4.1.1 Relevance to Save the Children**

The project was found to be relevance at an organisational level as it furthered the mission and mandate of Save the Children. The organisation's mission<sup>1</sup> is to inspire breakthroughs in the way the world treats children, and to achieve immediate and lasting change in their lives. Other than campaigning for long-term change in the lives of children, Save the Children also provides shorter-term support to improve children's lives. The project which sought to bring immediate relief to children on a short-term basis was therefore within the scope of the organisation. Furthermore, the project was complementary to other programmes that are already being implemented by SC. The organisation has a basic education support programme that focuses on improving access to education and this project sought to complement this. The project also complemented efforts of improving rural livelihoods being made by the organisation through the implementation of a Livelihoods programme. To ensure integration of programmes, SC found it more relevant to implement the project in districts where they already have a presence. This would further the efforts of the organisation to provide a more comprehensive and holistic package to OVC.

The cash transfer and school feeding programmes are not new to SC. Cash transfers have been implemented by Save the Children-UK before the merger with Save the Children – Norway in 2010. Cash transfers are still being implemented on a longer term basis in other areas such as Karoi. Similarly, Save the Children has been implementing the school feeding programme since 2003. It is also important to note that cash transfers are in line with global trends of offering support to OVC. They are considered more favourably than other OVC support strategies as they provide immediate relief to households whilst maintaining household autonomy on the use of funds and building self-sufficiency. The NAP for OVC programme that the country seeks to implement prioritises cash transfers therefore it can be concluded that the project was in line with national and international trends of supporting OVC.

#### **4.1.2 Relevance to community needs**

Prior to project implementation, children from vulnerable households were experiencing food insecurity due to limited or unavailability of food in their households. Vulnerable households such as the elderly (above 65 years) and child headed households and those living with chronically ill and/ or disabled households members have limited capacity to produce enough food due to several factors that include lack of farming inputs (seeds and fertilizers), limited or lack of drought power and limited labour availability. Due to these factors, critical agricultural processes such as planting and weeding are delayed resulting in very low harvests. So even if there is enough rainfall to produce a good yield, such households are always food insecure.

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<sup>1</sup> [www.savethechildren.net](http://www.savethechildren.net)

There are limited livelihood options for vulnerable households. Most survive from farming. In Chimanimani East banana farming presents a livelihood option but as indicated in the baseline report lack of a proper marketing strategy results in farmers selling their bananas to middlemen for a paltry one rand per kilogram. In Chimanimani West which exhibits predominately Natural region 4 and 5 characteristics, gardening is an option but the same factors that affect field crop cultivation including limited water availability also affects gardening. In Upper Muzarabani most households are commercial farm workers who are paid an average of US\$30 per month. Most do not have time to engage in other livelihood activities as they risk being chased away from the farms and hence their only homes. Thus they end up surviving from small monthly rations (one bucket of maize per month per household) that they get from their employers which is not enough to last for the whole month.

The result of the above is that OVC found in such households suffer the most as their families cannot afford to provide some of the basic provisions such as food, education and clothing. Before the start of the programme OVC were not regularly attending school, with some dropping out of school because of the inability of their families to pay school fees and provide food to eat. Parents indicated that if they do not have anything to eat at home they do not send children to school.

School authorities indicated that before the start of the project there were clear signs of hunger that could be observed on OVC especially those from child headed households. These included drowsiness, sleeping in class, stomach pains and minor headaches and even fainting during school time. This situation was also reported in the project's baseline report. Before the start of the programme some OVC at Charleswood Primary school (Chimanimani) were always seen scrounging for unripe fruits around the school yard which was a clear sign of hunger. Generally children participation in extra curricula activities at school such as sports was limited because children were generally weak and hence did not have enough energy to effectively exert themselves in such activities. It is on the basis of these evaluation findings that it was concluded that the project was relevant to felt needs on the ground.

## **4.2 Review of the selection of beneficiaries**

### ***Beneficiary selection criteria***

The project sought to provide support to OVC in grade 0 - 3 living in child-headed households, elderly-headed households (65 years and above), households living with a terminally ill or disabled member and other vulnerable children in that specific priority order. This selection criterion was for particular use for the CT programme implying that the rest of the sections under this heading are in relation to the programme only. This was relevant as it considered the vulnerability of households and thus enabling SC to target the most vulnerable households in the community.

The school feeding programme was designed to cater for both OVC and non-OVC to avoid stigmatisation of the former by the rest of the children. According to SC, the initial proposal was to feed all children at primary school level including ECD. This had to be changed due to



financial constraints since the funds that had been secured for the project were inadequate<sup>2</sup>. This resulted in the programme targeting children in Grade 0 – 3. Although it is generally accepted that the lower grades are more vulnerable to hunger-induced challenges as compared to upper grades, it was argued by some key informants that the difference is minor warranting that all grades be fed if resources are permitting. Furthermore, it was felt that the school-based feeding programme was supposed to be complemented by a community based feeding programme so as to cater for younger children who are not yet enrolled in school.

### ***The beneficiary selection process***

Beneficiaries of the CT programme were selected through a rigorous process that primarily comprised of a registration and a verification exercise. The registration process was driven by the Community Selection Committee and/or the Schools Beneficiaries Committees<sup>3</sup>. The committee also incorporated relevant stakeholders and representatives of the Child Protection Committee (CPC). The resulting list had inclusion errors especially the inclusion of household heads below the age of 65 years. It was also perceived that there were some able-bodied individuals who should not have been included in the list. Those who were deemed ineligible were removed during the verification exercise which coincided with the first CT distribution. This resulted in 109 households being removed from the target of 550 households. It however came to light that some of the people who were thought to be ineligible since they appeared to be able-bodied where in fact HIV positive and were reluctant to publicly disclose their HIV status. Some had terminally ill members in their households. Some of these household heads were later re-admitted into the project after they brought medical records or had credible individuals to vouch for them. The eliminated households were subsequently replaced by more deserving households.

### ***Effectiveness of the beneficiary selection process***

The use of community based structures in the registration process enabled the identification of eligible households for the project. In allowing the communities through already existing structures to select the households to benefit from the project, SC ensured that selection was done by those who live in the community and know the most deserving people. This also benefitted the project as the structures already had a database of OVC or households that are in need of support. The use of a community based structure was also beneficial in that it enhanced transparency, accountability and ownership of the project. The eligibility criteria was clear and understood by most project beneficiaries as observed during some CT distributions and through the FGDs.

However, some of these eligible households did not qualify to be beneficiaries considering the high demand for assistance vis-a-vis the target number of households. The rigorous verification process was effective as it enabled the project to reach out to the most vulnerable households in the community. Evaluation findings show that all the households that were randomly selected for the study (105) qualified to benefit from the project. Foremost it should be noted that all the households had at least one orphan. According to key informants, the limited number of beneficiaries forced the selection committee to prioritise orphans ahead of other vulnerable children. Findings shows that 17.1% of the household heads were children below the age of 18

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<sup>2</sup> School Feeding and Cash Transfer Letter of Agreement (31/05/2010)

<sup>3</sup> The structure is also referred to as the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) committee since the structure has the mandate of selecting children to benefit from the government-driven programme.

years and 41% were elderly headed households. Furthermore, 42.9% of the sampled households had a terminally ill member. It was however noted that the verification process was conducted during the initial distribution. This prejudiced some households and also meant that SC was unable to achieve the target of 550 households per month.

### **4.3 Effectiveness of strategies used in the project**

The project had some key design elements that were found to be critical for the success of the project. This section reviews the critical design components and strategies, assessing how these were meant to enhance the chances of attaining the goal of the project.

#### **4.3.1 Key design components**

##### **a) Participation and involvement of stakeholders**

There was a high involvement of key stakeholders in all the components of the project, i.e. the SFP, CT and *Zunde raMambo*. Key stakeholders for the project included Ministry of Education, Sports and Culture (MoESAC), Department of Social Services, Ministry of Health and Child Welfare (MoHCW), Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX), District Administrator's (DA) Office, Rural District Council (RDC), target communities, among others. The involvement of stakeholders was done in such a way that SC still maintained control of the project whilst allowing stakeholders to identify with the project. It was beneficial to involve stakeholders as this improved transparency. Furthermore, the stakeholder provided technical knowledge which enhanced the chances of attaining the project objectives whilst minimising negative outcomes and risks to the project. Stakeholders were primarily involved at both the planning and implementation levels as discussed below.

##### *Planning*

All stakeholders were involved during the planning phase of the project and their inputs helped shape the project interventions. They were instrumental in identifying structures that were to be used in the selection of beneficiaries and also recommending that each ward should have an Advisor. The MoESAC through the District Education Officer's office provided the schools list and initial enrolments figures. They were also instrumental in raising awareness about the pending project prior to its implementation as they introduced SC to schools. AGRITEX District offices provided technical information on the types of soils for each *Zunde raMambo* and recommended seeds and fertilizer applicable for each area.

##### *Implementation*

A number of stakeholders were involved in the implementation of the project. SC ensured that for every CT distribution two or more stakeholders would accompany the SC team to the field and take part in the verification and other processes that precede the handing over of the cash to the beneficiaries. Communities participated in the selection of beneficiaries of the CT



*Chief Chikukwa observing cash transfer distribution at Chikukwa Primary*

project using the given selection and eligibility criteria.



*Community members feeding children and cleaning pots at Hwata and Ngangu Primary schools.*

In all schools, the community provided labour for the preparation of CSB porridge for children (See annex 3). In some schools, the community members took turns to prepare the CSB following a village duty roster that was designed for the project. On the other hand, some SDCs employed two cooks. Communities also built the kitchen sheds. The MoHCW, through their District Nutritionist and community-based Environmental Health Technicians (EHTs), supported the programme by training the cooks for the

SFP especially on hygiene standards and expectations. The District Nutritionist checked the quality of the CSB and the expiry dates before distribution. Regularly the EHTs would visit schools to monitor the implementation of the project in terms of adherence to recommended hygiene issues such as cleanliness of the cooking area and utensils, availability of clean sanitary facilities and water for washing of hands, presence of a rubbish bin and proper place for washing and drying of cooking pots, plates and other cooking utensils (*dara*). For example because of the MoHCW monitoring visits and their recommendations the SFP was stopped in two schools in Chimanimani East as a prevention measure after reported cases of cholera outbreaks in two schools in Ngorima area. In Muzarabani the EHTs identified and destroyed four bags of CSB that were affected by rats. This was done so as to avoid possible cases of food poisoning as a result of consuming CSB porridge cooked from the affected bags.

In the *Zunde raMambo* component, communities provided labour for the field preparations, planting, weeding and harvesting. AGRITEX officers provided technical support in the cultivation, planting and general management of the field before harvest. They also monitored the implementation of these processes. In assessed communities the AGRITEX officers were part of the *Zunde raMambo* committee which oversaw the implementation of the *Zunde raMambo*. In Chimanimani, the DA's Office and RDC also assisted with the distribution of inputs for the scheme.

### **b) Use of Field Monitors**

The use of field monitors stationed in the community ensured achievement of project objectives. The strategy allowed the community to interface with the project at a local basis. This allowed point monitoring and enhanced communication between the community and SC district offices. The strategy also enhanced community ownership of the project.

### **c) Training prior to project implementation**

Advisors Training workshop on cash transfers were conducted in both districts. These were attended by all the Advisors, stakeholders, and Emergency District staff. It should be noted that preparation for the CT programme were carried out in both districts even though it was later implemented in one district. The training was effective as all the above-mentioned exhibited high knowledge level of the project even at evaluation. Bringing together all the above-mentioned was critical as it ensured a common ground had been established prior to project

implementation. Other than increasing their knowledge levels, the training was meant to enable the Advisors to educate the community on the objectives of the CT and how best to use the money. This was essential as the utilisation of the money was not dictated by the project and there was the risk of it being used for other purposes that are not necessarily beneficial to the household and children in particular. Evaluation findings indicate that there was only one such case and this was picked up and dealt without delay. This can be attributed to the presence of Advisors and Field Monitors who were resident within the communities. The effectiveness of the training was apparent as the community were able to articulate the objectives of the project and the implementation processes. Note that the Advisors are the Child Protection Ward Focal Points and it was strategic to involve them.

#### **d) Integration of the Project with Child Protection and Child Rights Issues**

The integration of the project activities with a training workshop on child protection and child rights in Chimanimani district strategic as it ensured that the community appreciated child protection and rights issues which in the long run will result in the improved welfare of OVC in the district. It was evident during the evaluation exercise that communities in Chimanimani are now aware of child protection and rights issues. It was indicated that there was an increase in the number of cases of child abuse reported by Advisors just after the training workshop. Some of the cases have already been prosecuted. The challenge now is that ZRP does not have enough resources especially transport to investigate and support the prosecution of the perpetrators.

#### **4.3.2 Effectiveness of Specific project strategies**

This section of the report reviews the effectiveness of the strategies and activities that were adopted for implementation of the project. This entails assessing whether the methodologies and activities that were used in the project were effective and appropriate. Of importance to this review is the extent to which the agreed objectives have been reached and whether the activities were sufficient to attain the desired impact.

##### **a) School feeding programme**

The SFP was found to be effective as it resulted in the attainment of the project objectives. The programme was also appropriate as it enabled SC to know that children were indeed eating the CSB and in the recommended amounts. This is unlike in cases where dry rations are given and organisation cannot determine whether the child has eaten the right quantity or not. CSB is also good for its nutritional value and can thus address short term hunger successfully. In comparison to other livelihoods strategies such as school based nutritional gardening, the SFP was found to be more effective and appropriate as it limits the time when children are out of class. Considering the goal and duration of the project, the strategy was appropriate as it had immediate benefits unlike other projects whose benefits accrue in the medium to long -term.

Below are the core activities that had to be implemented under the project:

*Establishment of cooking committees in schools* – The cooking committees were established at school level to oversee porridge preparation processes at the school. The committee comprising of a chairperson, teacher representative and a secretary was also set up to deal with any matters arising related to the school feeding programme.

*CSB porridge preparation* – Initially the programme was designed in such a way that communities through schools were supposed to organize themselves such that villagers take turns to prepare porridge for the children. Although the strategy was quite effective in a few

communities, most communities experienced several challenges which threatened to derail progress in implementing the project. These included:

- Unreliability of parents in terms of fulfilling their duty. This resulted in the porridge not being cooked on some days implying that children would not be fed and/ or teachers or upper grades children cooking the porridge. Having teachers or children in upper grades being involved in the preparation of porridge was disrupting lessons and thus contradicting the goal of the project.
- Some children refusing to eat the porridge after it had been cooked by persons who the community is sceptical of.

As a strategy to avoid conflict in the community and disruption in the project implementation, communities through the SDC employed an average of two cooks who were paid a small token of appreciation on a monthly basis. The strategy also meant that there was no need of continuous training of community people to participate in the cooking duty roster. This led to better management of the school feeding at schools and enhanced ownership of day to day decisions made during the course of the project implementation.

#### **b) The Cash Transfer programme**

The programme as a whole was found to be effective as it contributed to the attainment of the goal of the project. According to some key informants, the CT amount paid out to each household was insufficient to improve the food security situation considering that some households have many orphans. They indicated that the households under the programme did not have other viable livelihoods programmes or other reliable sources of income. Although this is appreciated by SC at planning stage, it had to settle for the \$20 as this is the amount that the NAP for OVC programme will be giving out and thus the caution not to set the wrong precedence.

All the key activities that had been planned under the project were implemented. These include the selection of beneficiaries, training of beneficiaries, establishment of distribution points, and actual distribution of cash. The effectiveness of the beneficiary selection process has already been discussed in previous sections. The following strategies that were used in the programme were evaluated in terms of their effectiveness.

*Direct distribution of cash to the beneficiaries* – This was effective as it eliminated any possible costs that could have been incurred by the beneficiaries in order to access the cash. It also ensured that the money actually reached the intended beneficiaries. Some parents/ guardians failed to turn up to receive their monthly cash allowances. In such situations the households were allowed to send representatives who were requested to produce their own personal identification and that of the beneficiary before being allowed to collect the money. This enhanced transparency and accountability. Even so SC field monitors would then make follow up visits to confirm if the money had reached the intended beneficiary. If for any reason the household could not send a person to receive cash, field monitors were tasked to take the money to the beneficiary households. For accountability purposes SC District Coordinator would then make follow ups to the households or at the next distribution to verify if indeed the cash reached the household. This ensured that the money went to the right beneficiaries and thus reducing cases of fraud.

*Establishment of numerous distribution points* - As stated in section 3, 74 distribution points were established. The points had to be many so as to reduce the distance travelled by beneficiaries from their homes. Given that some of the parents/ guardians of the benefiting OVC were incapacitated due to ill health and old age cash distribution points were planned in such a way that beneficiaries did not have to travel long distances. Although this was necessary, the strategy added to the implementation costs of the project. It was noted that some distribution points serviced a small number of people which was not cost effective. According to key informants, the extra costs were inevitable as reducing the number of distribution points could have inconvenienced the beneficiaries.

*Selection of schools as CT distribution points* - Schools were used as distribution points and these were ideal as they are located within communities. According to key informants, the points were strategic as some beneficiaries were seen paying school fees soon after receiving cash and thus minimising chances of having other needs being prioritised ahead of education. Schools also had the necessary facilities to afford privacy and security during the distribution process.

*Late pronouncement of distribution dates* - As a security measure, SC did not pronounce dates for the next distribution well in advance. Beneficiary households would be alerted of the date by the Field Monitors a few days before the distribution. The same was done for stakeholders.

*Training of trainers* - SC conducted TOT workshops (one in each district) for its monitors and the community through the Community Advisors which was meant to educate the cash transfer beneficiaries on how best they could use money received. Thus field monitors and the advisors were equipped with tools for assisting the community in the CT project. The results of the workshop were quite evident as the evaluation observed that each benefiting household kept records of cash use on a monthly basis. This meant that it was easier to monitor cash used and whether the project was on course in achieving its objectives. Through the same system SC was able to identify a case of total misuse of funds and the household had to be discontinued from the project.

*Community-based Advisors* - The creation of Advisors post in the CT project was a strategy that ensured efficient use of cash received by beneficiary households through close monitoring of use of funds and offering advice on how funds received could be used. Thus the strategy enhanced achievement of project objectives. Advisors existed for every ward in Chimanimani district. Given the burden of monitoring the three different interventions which rested upon field monitors, Community Advisors lessened this burden which meant monitoring of the CT project was more effective. In addition Community Advisors had more information concerning the beneficiaries and their communities as they were part of those communities. Through the same structure, after the child protection training, it was easier for the community to report cases of abuse through the Advisors who also serve as the Ward Action AIDS Committee focal persons.

### **c) Zunde raMambo Programme**

*The design of the Zunde raMambo project* - The project was implemented as part of an exit strategy. The initial design of the *Zunde raMambo* was such that it affected even the implementation and the possibility of attaining project objectives. Since this was an emergency programme, the lack of a situational analysis led to incorrect assumptions that could have negatively affected the project. One such assumption was that at design stage it was assumed

there was only one Chief in each of the districts yet this was not the case. Hence resources that were planned for one Chief had to be shared among five chiefs in Chimanimani district and three chiefs plus a headman in Muzarabani district. This led to inadequacy of inputs (seed and fertilizers) resulting in the cultivation of small pieces of land (quarter of a hectare) in Chimanimani.

*Distributions of inputs* – Inputs for the *Zunde raMambo* project were distributed late, i.e., in November 2010. This delayed the planting of the *Zunde raMambo* as Chiefs had to organize themselves and their people to decide on the *Zunde raMambo* fields and other logistical arrangements regarding the management of the fields. With the exception of Chief Ndima and Chief Muusha in Chimanimani, all the other Chiefs planted very late between mid-December 2010 and early January 2011. Even though there were plenty of early rains in both districts, late planting increased the risk of the crops being affected by mid-season droughts. Interviews with the *Zunde raMambo* Chairperson in Chief Chikukwa, Mrs Chikukwa, indicated that given their climatic conditions, the community would have preferred to plant earlier probably in October for the crop to be successful. In Muzarabani, under Chief Hwata, the message about the *Zunde raMambo* was heard by the Chairperson, Mr Jena, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2010. The field was planted on the 4<sup>th</sup> of January 2010.

*Cultivation and management of the fields* – The concept of the Chiefs granary has always been there in the two districts. Ideally the fields are prepared and managed by the community with the proceeds being shared among the poor and vulnerable in the community. However some chiefs in the two districts were no longer practicing the concept because of a number of reasons including lack of inputs, type of settlement and mismanagement of the proceeds from the *Zunde raMambo* field. In the latter two cases even if SC would provide the inputs, the likelihood of the *Zunde raMambo* to succeed was minimal unless other strategies for developing a common vision and sense of responsibility among community members were devised. This was the case for Chief Chiweshe in Muzarabani whose subordinates are predominately from resettled farms, with most being farm workers and peri-urban dwellers around Centenary. It was also the case with Chief Mutambara in Chimanimani who had experienced problems regarding the distributed of the previous harvest from the *Zunde raMambo*.

In both cases the two Chiefs could not rally their community to participate in the *Zunde raMambo* thereby affecting the possibility of achieving the project objectives. Thus the normal strategy for management of the *Zunde raMambo* cannot be assumed to be functional in all communities. It was also observed that young people in the two districts seem not to appreciate the idea because they do not understand how the proceeds are being distributed and thus fear being *used* for the benefit of undeserving people. It is thus recommended that efforts by relevant stakeholders especially the government be made to concertize communities about the importance of the concept.

#### **4.4 Efficiency of the project**

This section seeks to evaluate the adequacy of resources and also determine whether resources were allocated in the most cost effective manner. It also discusses the financial management of the project as a whole.

#### **4.4.1 Adequacy of resources**

*Financial resources* – SC managed to secure 80% of what they had initially requested for. This meant that SC had to adjust the project so as that activities matched the available funds. SC adjusted the project by reducing the number of households per district to benefit from the cash transfer, grades to be covered by the school feeding programme and the duration of the project. The project was supposed to start in May 2010 but was delayed to start in October 2010 ending in April 2011. Since the adjustments were done in line with the available financial resources, it can be concluded that finances were adequate for planned activities.

*Human resources* - The human resource was also adequate for the management and implementation of the project. The project had ten Field Monitors in Chimanimani and eight in Muzarabani. These were allocated communities and schools that each had to monitor. These monitors had the required expertise as they had worked on the Emergency Programme before and were thus well acquainted with SC procedures. This contributed to the efficiency of the project since the monitors did not require a lot of training under the project. A once off training was carried out with the monitors at the onset of the project. At Head office level, the Emergency Department is managed by the Emergency Response Manager. Unlike other departments within the organisation, the Emergency department works through other departments. This is on the basis that emergency is cross-cutting and cannot be confined to one department. It is thus feasible to work through other departments without any challenges.

*Technical equipment and vehicles* – Each district office had one computer and the Chimanimani office felt that they could have managed better if they had another computer. Other office equipment and supplies were said to be enough. District Co-ordinators had cell-phones provided by SC and the usage costs were also being met by the organisation. Access to the internet was the major communication challenge that was encountered. This improved when the offices were given 3G modems and \$100 for internet use. This improved communication but the effectiveness of solution was constrained by frequent power cuts.

All field officers had motor bikes and this facilitated their mobility within the geographic areas allocated to them. One challenge that affected mobility was that some of the motor bikes were frequently breaking down especially in Chimanimani. In Muzarabani, there were delays in distributing the motor bikes such that some of the monitors had to walk to schools. This meant that they could only visit a few schools a day. Head office had one vehicle allocated to the project and there were no challenges with its availability. In the event that it was not available, there was provision for hiring one. There were adequate trucks to ferry CSB from district warehouses to schools but these at times experienced break-downs. This resulted in delays in the distribution of CSB to some schools.

*Food-stocks and other project materials* – The food that was purchased was enough for the programme as more tonnes were bought to cater for the extra grades in Muzarabani. In some schools, cooking utensils were observed to be too small for the preparation of CSB. This resulted in some schools using drums which were not ideal for use. It is recommended that SC provides bigger pots if a similar intervention is implemented in future. Some schools especially in Chimanimani had plates obtained from past feeding programmes. However, the majority of schools had to ask children to bring their own plates and spoons on a daily basis. A comparison of the two systems revealed that keeping utensils at school and availed during feeding time facilitated the maintenance of required hygiene standards and minimised loss of the utensils. Of



major concern was the fact that in the two districts, only a few children were observed to be using spoons. Most had to eat the porridge with their hands. As with the pots, it is recommended that the issue of spoons be considered during the design of future feeding programmes. The *Zunde raMambo* inputs were said to have been inadequate in all the communities and this is elaborately covered under section 4.3.2.

#### **4.4.2 Cost effectiveness**

Save the Children adopted cost effective strategies in the general management and implementation of the project. By opting to deliver cash using own staff and vehicles, SC was able to minimise implementation costs. Direct delivery of cash is cost effective if the CT project involves small amounts as was the case in this instance. Using other delivery strategies such as the formal banking system was going to be more costly especially to the beneficiaries. Considering the duration of the project, it was also going to be time consuming to ask potential beneficiaries to open bank accounts. Similarly, engaging a security company could have been more costly even though the risk associated with transporting cash could have been reduced significantly.

Procuring CSB from local manufacturers proved to be difficult due to the high prices caused by shortage of soya beans in the country. The alternative available to the organisation was to import. This was however going to be more costly than procuring CSB locally considering that the amount involved were not very big. Furthermore, procuring the CSB locally saved on time since importing meant that the CSB had to be cleared first by relevant government departments.

Save the Children adopted the workshop approach in training Advisors and monitors on the CT and the expected utilisation of the amount. The approach ensured a cost effective way of reaching out to many people using limited resources. The training of trainers (TOT) approach in particular meant that information would be cascaded to the rest of the community without the continued involvement of SC.

#### **4.4.3 Financial management**

The budget available to the project was largely used as per the proposal. The exception was due to the change in the project that saw the CT component being dropped in Muzarabani. However, the amount that was meant for the CT was used for the benefit of the children. It is worth-noting that such changes were done in consultation with the donor. The total amount of funds that went towards the beneficiaries directly comprised 53% of the budget. This includes the CT amounts disbursed to households, CSB and other costs associated with the distribution of cash. It was noted that indirect costs exceeded 20% which is normally adhered to by most organisations including SC. However, it was explained that the project was funded before this general rule was generally adopted.

Most of the finances were managed at Head Office level. Most of the procurement for the project was done at Head Office level. Similarly, most payments for project staff were done at this level. This includes salaries for monitors and incentives for advisors which were deposited directly into their accounts. Allowances for stakeholders who participated during distributions were paid out by the Head Office staff handling the CT distributions. The costs that the district offices had to cover were mainly their running costs and wages for labourers who were involved in off-loading CSB from trucks to the warehouses. It was learnt during the evaluation that the Chimanimani office has a bank account whilst Muzarabani does not have one. Although the

evaluation did not learn of specific challenges associated with the lack of a bank account, it is recommended that each office has one as it enhances the management of funds and minimises risks.

Financial management procedures for request, procurements and acquittals were clear and well communicated to the implementing department and the district offices. Officers within the Operations and Finance departments visited the districts during implementation of the project and explained procedures and policies. This ensured compliance at district level enhanced efficiency of financial management in the project.

## **4.5 Project Outputs, Outcomes and Impact**

The SF and CT project design document indicates that the project was expected to improve household food security and access to basic education by OVC. The results were to be measured using the following indicators of goal achievement:

- proportion of household expenditure spent on food
- number of households receiving cash transfers
- % of actual beneficiaries fed under the project by gender and age.
- proportion of households expenditure spent on school fees
- % of actual tonnage distributed of food distributed in schools
- improved school attendance

It is against this background that this section evaluates the achievement of expected results/ impact of the project.

### **4.5.1 School feeding programme**

#### **Outputs and achievements**

- *Schools reached* – The project planned to reach to 133 schools in the two districts. This output was achieved as the SFP was conducted in all the primary schools in the two districts.
- *Target beneficiaries* – The project planned to reach out to 32000 children in ECD and Grade 1-3 with the SFP. This output was surpassed in the two districts. As shown in Table 1 below a total of 40721 children were fed from October - December 2010 and 50217 children from January - February 2011. There was a significant increased in number of children fed between January and February 2011 because feeding was extended to all grades in Muzarabani district.

Table 1: Children reached with the SFP

			Girls	Boys	Total
Oct-Dec 2010	Muzarabani	ECD	2206	2246	4452
		Grade 1-3	6934	7408	14342
	Chimanimani	ECD			5635
		Grade 1-3			16292
		<b>Total</b>			<b>40721</b>
Jan-Feb 2011	Muzarabani	ECD	1506	1354	2860
		Grade 1-7	13274	13255	26529
	Chimanimani	ECD	2713	2607	5320
		Grade 1-3	7548	7960	15508
		<b>Total</b>	<b>25041</b>	<b>25176</b>	<b>50217</b>

- *Tonnage of CSB distributed* – SC planned to distribute 392MT of CSB for the two provinces. This output was achieved and even surpassed because of the extended feeding in Muzarabani district. A total of 453.25MT was distributed in the programme. Between October and December 2010, SC managed to distribute 167MT of CSB (Chimanimani – 101.9MT; Muzarabani – 66MT). From January to April 2011 a total of 286.25MT was distributed to the two districts (Chimanimani – 100.75MT; Muzarabani – 185.5MT). However 0.02MT did not benefit children because they went bad and were destroyed whilst some were stolen.

## Outcomes and impact

- *Impact on school attendance*

The project led to an improvement in school attendance in most of the grades in the two districts except ECD. Although class registers from the visited schools show that the increase was marginal, the project actually managed to maintain regular school attendance during times when hunger was at its peak (Table 2). Children who were not regularly attending school could have been affected by other factors which could not be addressed by the project such as ill health and attitudes towards education, among others.

Table 2: School attendance rates at baseline and evaluation

	Muzarabani		Chimanimani		Total	
	B	EOP	B	EOP	B	EOP
Grade Zero	70%	40%	86%	66%	79%	53%
Grade One	86%	88%	94%	97%	91%	93%
Grade Two	88%	91%	94%	95%	91%	93%
Grade Three	87%	85%	95%	97%	92%	91%

Source: School registers

Overall ECD school attendance decreased from 79% in September 2010 to 53% in March 2011. FGDs and key informants indicated that this is so because some children bound for ECD are very young and find it difficult to walk long distances of between 5-8 km on a daily basis whilst some

parents do not allow such children to attend school when there are heavy rains and possibility of flooding is high. School attendance by district show a situation obtaining at baseline where attendance rates in Chimanimani are higher compared to Muzarabani.

- *Impact on child participation in class and school activities*

The SFP had a positive impact on child participation especially in class and extra-curricula activities. Interviews with school teachers indicated that children’s mental alertness and hence concentration in class had improved significantly. Cases of children sleeping in class, complaining of stomach pains/ headaches and fainting because of hunger have virtually disappeared among the targeted grades in the two districts. A significant improvement in participation in school activities such as sports has also been noticed. School heads indicated that although there were no scientific verifications, it was observed that children’s physical health improved since the start of the SFP. This means children were more energetic and could effectively participate in sporting activities. For example the School head of Gatu primary school in Muzarabani attributed the success of the school in zonal sporting competitions to the SFP.

- *Impact on School enrolment and dropouts*

The project had a marginal impact on school enrolment. In fact minimal changes were expected in enrolment because the baseline information showed very low averages of school dropouts in the two districts for ECD and Grade 1-3. During the school assessments most key informants indicated that their enrolment had increased due to the project. However further analysis show that in most cases the increase was just by a small margin, usually less than 10. However they are some schools that recorded a decrease in enrolment in January 2011 in both districts especially for ECD. All visited schools in the two districts actually indicated that enrolment of ECD is always very slow in the first term of every year. This is largely because of the inability of some parents to pay school fees and ECD is not covered by BEAM. It was also noted that most ECD classes are run by para-professionals who are paid by the SDC using funds collected as school fees. This has an impact on the quality of education delivered at this level. It is a combination of these factors that forces parents to only enrol their children in the third term so that they can be accepted for Grade one the following year. In other cases enrolment is delayed to second or third term even if children are ready for ECD given the hazards of flooding and crossing of rivers in the first term.

However the project had a positive impact on school dropouts. The project managed to keep children in school and reduced school dropouts in the two districts. A closer look at average school dropouts experienced in 2010 by the time of conducting the baseline study show that the project has managed to reduce average school dropout to insignificant figures. In this regard, Muzarabani is even performing better than Chimanimani (Table 3).

*Table 3: School dropouts at baseline and evaluation*

	Muzarabani		Chimanimani		Total	
	B	EOP	B	EOP	B	EOP
ECD	4.0	0.0	2.0	0.4	3.0	0.2
Grade One	6.0	0.1	4.0	0.6	5.0	0.4
Grade Two	8.0	0.0	3.0	0.3	5.0	0.1
Grade Three	5.0	0.0	3.0	0.1	4.0	0.0

## 4.5.2 Cash transfer programme

### Outputs and achievements

- *Target beneficiaries* – The Cash Transfer programme planned to distribute cash to 550 households for seven months. This output was partially achieved. In the first three months of the project SC only managed to reach 360 households because verification was conducted during the initial distribution. However in the remaining 4 months the target of 550 households was achieved.
- *Advisors* – The programme planned on engaging 10 Advisors to assist in the Cash Transfer programme. This output was achieved. SC ended up engaging 23 Advisors based on the advice from stakeholders.
- *Advisors Training Workshop* - SC planned on conducting an Advisors training workshop on cash transfers. This output was achieved. The training workshop was held at Chimanimani Hotel on the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> of November 2010. The workshop was attended by 10 Chimanimani District Emergency staff, 23 Advisors and 8 stakeholders.

### Outcomes and impact


#### a) *Impact on income and expenditure patterns*

Household monthly income increased by over 100% due to the Cash Transfer programme. At baseline average total income per household was US\$13.7 per month but at evaluation it was US\$33.4. This translates to an average per capita income of US\$6.2 which is quite high considering the fact that approximately 56% of the Zimbabwean population survives on US\$1 per day<sup>4</sup>. Expenditures also significantly improved in the positive with a monthly total expenditure of US\$45.3, up from US\$26.4 recorded at baseline. Households indicated that the CT provided them with a stable income and the ability to afford most of their basic needs on a monthly basis. Through the records that are kept at a household level and data from the household study the major household expenditures are school fees, groceries including food, buying medication and clothes. Average expenditure on educational expenses increased significantly from 4.6% at baseline to 20.4% at evaluation. Likewise average expenditure on food also increased from 42% at baseline to 48%.

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<sup>4</sup> Central Statistical Organization, March 2009

Figure 1: Use of cash transfer




However the evaluation also showed that the increase in household income was mainly because of the cash transfer. Without the cash transfer approximately 28% supported households would not have had any income in the month of February 2011, whilst overall 76% supported households would have had less than US\$20 in the same month. The average monthly income without the cash transfer would be US\$13.4 which is the same as the baseline situation. This shows that when the cash transfer programme ends vulnerability of supported OVC will increase with the most affected being child headed households.

b) *Impact on the food security situation*


- *Number of meals eaten by children the day before the survey* – Generally the average number of meals eaten by children has improved from 2 meals at baseline to 2.5 meals per day at evaluation. This improvement is quite evident in figure 2 below where there is a 10% increase in the percentage of households with children eating three meals per day. However the same figure shows that for some households the situation has not improved but has actually worsened. Such households indicated that children in their households did not eat any meal the day before the survey. Rather they relied more on the CSB porridge given at school. This was mostly found in bigger families with little or no harvest from the last season.

Figure 2: Number of meals eaten by children: baseline vs evaluation



- Food Consumption Score** – Generally food diversity among benefiting households improved significantly during the course of the project. Average FCS increased from 2.82 at baseline to 5.34 at evaluation. This means that most households moved from low food diversity to average food diversity. This is also shown in figure 3 where the % of households with low food diversity decreased from 94.4% to 35.6% whilst that of households with average food diversity significant increased from 4.8% to 60.6%. These results show that the CT programme enabled households that were previously not able to afford a diversity of basic food items with the buying power to do so.

Figure 3: FCS at baseline and evaluation



- Food availability**- Food availability at household level did improve during the course of the project implementation due to two major reasons, i.e., increases in food purchases and own production. Results show that percent household relying on food purchases increased from 40.3% at baseline to 74.8% at evaluation. Heavy reliance on casual labour as a source of food declined from 53% households to only 8.7% at baseline. This means that there was a

reduction in child labour and exploitation tendencies that were reported at baseline. On the other hand, such a decline would be counter-productive if able-bodied adult members are also involved as it reflects the setting in of a dependency syndrome. It is therefore worth investigating by SC determine whether this is the case. Table 4 also shows an improvement in food availability at a household level compared to the baseline situation.

*Table 4: Comparing availability of food in the household*

	Never (%)		Rarely (%)		Sometimes (%)		Often (%)	
	B	EOP	B	EOP	B	EOP	B	EOP
did you worry about not having enough food	7	4	12	42	38	40	43	14
household member not able to eat kinds of food preferred because of lack of resources	9	3	11	30	27	45	53	23
have to eat some food you did not want to eat because of lack of resources to get other food	12	16	12	33	30	34	47	16
ate limited variety of foods due to lack of resources	7	10	7	31	31	43	54	16
had to eat a smaller meal than needed	7	17	10	31	38	39	45	12
ate fewer meals in a day	7	16	12	30	41	37	41	17
was there ever no food to eat in the house to eat	25	67	32	20	27	10	16	3
had to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food	46	67	18	25	26	9	10	0
had to spend the whole day and night without eating anything	55	84	16	13	20	3	9	0

**Key:** B – Baseline; EOP – End of Project Evaluation

Given the fact that the evaluation was conducted at the end of the 2010-2011 agricultural season, generally households were expected to rely more on their own production. However most vulnerable households did not manage to harvest much (if any at all) as a result of late planting, lack of inputs and the mid-season drought. Observation during the evaluation field visit showed a sorry situation in the fields in both districts. The status is confirmed by Food security monitoring reports, such as World Food Programme's Community and Household Surveillance, that show that by March people were already employing negative coping strategies in order to be in a position to feed their children. Food stocks were already running out, and the food security situation of households with limited purchasing power was under severe strain.



*Fields in Chimanamani West Chikwakwa area. Picture taken in March 2011*



Whereas households in Chimanimani planted maize which in most cases did not reach maturity, the situation in upper Muzarabani was different in that households preferred to plant tobacco instead of maize or other food crops. Their argument was that they would buy food after selling their tobacco. However due to the low tobacco prices at the auction floors and the huge debt that most farmers incurred in the production of their tobacco, they will not be able to sufficiently feed their families hence their children. As for lower Muzarabani, besides the mid-season drought, pests especially armoured crickets have drastically reduced yields from the few fields that managed to pull through. Efforts to control them have been hampered by lack of financial resources to buy the requisite pesticides.

*c) Impact on children's welfare*

This analysis was only conducted for Chimanimani district where SC managed to implement the Cash Transfer programme. Results overall show an improvement in the welfare of children in Chimanimani compared to the baseline situation. At baseline CSI scores showed that 66% children in Chimanimani needed support in various aspects of their lives compared to only 33% at evaluation. There is an improvement in all aspects of the children's wellbeing except for health care services. However there is still room for further improvement in the lives of children in the district especially on issues to do with food security, material support and health care services.

*Table 5: Chimanimani CSI Scores at baseline and evaluation*


	Good		Fair		Bad		Very Bad	
	B	EOP	B	EOP	B	EOP	B	EOP
Food intake	13%	41%	62%	36%	25%	23%	0%	0%
Shelter	15%	61%	48%	34%	37%	5%	0%	0%
Care	47%	70%	42%	30%	12%	0%	0%	0%
Material support	15%	36%	55%	61%	30%	4%	0%	0%
Wellness	15%	80%	77%	20%	8%	0%	0%	0%
Health Care Services	28%	16%	50%	64%	20%	19%	2%	0%
Abuse and exploitation	62%	91%	25%	9%	13%	0%	0%	0%
Emotional Health	40%	71%	55%	29%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Behaviour	50%	98%	43%	2%	3%	0%	3%	0%
Performance	53%	84%	35%	13%	8%	4%	3%	0%
Access to education	62%	89%	38%	11%	0%	0%	0%	0%
<b>Average scores</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>67%</b>	<b>48%</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>15%</b>	<b>5%</b>	<b>1%</b>	<b>0%</b>

**Key:** B – Baseline; EOP – End of Project Evaluation

*d) Impact on general school enrolment and presence of school dropouts*

Household data show that generally the project managed to improve school enrolment in Chimanimani district. At baseline 73% households indicated that they had children who were not enrolled at school whilst this situation improved to 83% at evaluation (Figure 4). However households that have children of school going age not attending school indicated that this was because of lack of school fees (59%) and ill health (24%).

Figure 4: % households with children enrolled in school



Similar to the baseline situation, 60% households indicated that their children were absent from school in the past week before the survey. This is because the evaluation coincided with the week were most SDCs were sending children back home because of non-payment of school fees, thus affecting school attendance. Thus although results in earlier sections show an overall improvement in school attendance, non payment of school fees and subsequent sending away of children affected attendance in the week before the survey. This clearly shows that US\$20 per month received as cash transfer was not enough to send all children in the household to school. The programme only provided a blanket cash income regardless of number of vulnerable children in a particular household.

#### 4.5.3 Zunde raMambo programme

##### Outputs and Achievements

- *Establishment of the Zunde raMambo* - SC managed to establish one field per chief under the programme. Nine Chiefs implemented the *Zunde raMambo* (Chimanimani -5; Muzarabani - 4) in total.
- *Inputs for the Zunde raMambo* – At project design SC planned on distributing inputs equal to \$450 per district to be used for the *Zunde raMambo*. This output was achieved as evidenced by the total value of inputs bought and distributed to the Chiefs in the two districts. However because the number of chiefs on the ground had surpassed the planned number, the inputs were inadequate.
- *Area planted under the Zunde raMambo* – SC planned that each chief was supposed to plant at least  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a hectare of land under the *Zunde raMambo*. This output was achieved with some Chiefs especially those in Muzarabani planting approximately one hectare of land.

## Possible Outcomes and Impact

The evaluation team managed to make observation in some of the *Zunde raMambo* fields. Three of the fields in Chimanimani have done quite well regardless of late planting. However these fields are too small to have any major impact. If the harvest from the fields was to assist only vulnerable households that benefited from the project, then it could go a long way in enhancing food security in these households. However the evaluation revealed that the Chief Granary supports all vulnerable households in the Chiefdom. Hence the harvest would not be enough considering the need on the ground. In Muzarabani the fields have also been affected by the mid season drought and pests especially in the case of lower Muzarabani. Chief Chiweshe failed to rally his community to participate in the *Zunde raMambo* and hence conducted all the operations on his own. Although Chief Kasekete's crop performed well initially it was later drastically affected by the mid season drought and hence the expected harvest is now very limited.

The evaluation revealed that the technical advice from the AGRITEX district offices was refuted by some communities on the ground. Communities indicated that they would have preferred seed from Seed Co rather than Panner. In Chief Mutambara area, the community indicated that they would have preferred to plant maize compared to sorghum arguing that maize crop actually performs better than sorghum and is not labour intensive. Evidence in the adjacent fields in the same area showed that the maize crop that was planted early with adequate inputs actually faired quite well.

*Chief Chikukwa* – The crop in the field has done well but the field is too small (quarter of a hectare). Expected harvest is less than 1.5 tonnes. However this harvest is expected to support vulnerable households in two wards under Chief Chikukwa.



*Mrs Chikukwa –Advisor  
(Chief Chikukwa)*



*Mr Mutisi –Zunde Chairpeson  
(Chief Ndima)*

*Chief Ndima* – This field has done quite well compared to all the other *Zunde* fields in Chimanimani. The planted field is 2 acres. The community donated additional inputs (50 kg Compound, 50 kg AN and 3kgs of maize seed. The expected harvest from the field is 3 tonnes.



*Mrs Ngorima – Zunde Chairperson  
(Chief Ngorima)*



*Chief Mutambara Zunde field –part of the field  
is weeded whilst the other part is not.*

*Chief Ngorima* – The field had done well. The size of the field is 350 square metres. The expected harvest is at most 2 tonnes.

*Chief Mutambara* – The field has not performed as expected (see picture above). There was a misunderstanding of duty allocation leading to late planting and weeding. The *Zunde raMambo*

committee was initially not involved in the project hence little cooperation from the general community and AGRITEX officer. No harvest expected in the field.

*Chief Hwata* – The field has done quite well and expected harvest is 2-2.5 tonnes. However key informant indicated that this harvest might be greatly reduced if there are no pesticides to reduce crop destruction by armoured crickets.



*Mr Gwekwerere and Kraal Head Dzapasi show ChiefHwata's field. Far right is a sorghum plant destroyed by armoured crickets*

## 4.6 Monitoring and Reporting

### 4.6.1 Monitoring

Monitoring in the project was done at different levels, i.e. through field monitors and stakeholders. Primary project monitoring was conducted through the field monitors who were stationed in the target communities. A number of tools were designed to assist with monitoring of project implementation. Field monitors were responsible for monitoring daily food usage using stock cards in schools, storage of CSB, preparation and feeding of children, adherence to cooking and hygienic standards, cash distribution and use of cash. This entailed visiting schools, cash transfer distribution points and beneficiary households. In Chimanimani field monitors were assisted by Community Advisors who were present in each ward. In the same district, the District Emergency Coordinator designed a tool to monitor school visits by field monitors. The tool was



*An OVC signs for cash whilst Mrs Mahoso (SC), Mrs Marange (RDC) and Coline Zhuwawo (SC Finance Officer) looks on.*



*Field Monitor's Cash Transfer's Monitoring Register*

completed after each school visit and signed and stamped by the school head. The strategy was effective in monitoring the extent to which field monitors were fulfilling their duties. During cash transfer distributions SC used a double checking


system were CT beneficiaries were required to sign against their name on the District CT Distribution list before receiving cash and also in the Field Monitor CT Monitoring Register after receiving the cash. At the end of every month the two accounting systems were reconciled and any differences investigated.

District stakeholders also played an important role in project monitoring as indicated in Section 5.1. However their role in this regard was constrained by limited own resources such that they could not make monitoring visits independent of SC.

#### 4.6.2 Reporting

Reporting in the project was clear and is depicted in figure 5 below. A report format was provided for use at district level. That made it easier to report on critical important project issues. Most of the reporting was done on a monthly basis. Field monitors produced and submitted a combined monthly report to the district office for the three interventions. Through these field reports a district project report was produced, detailing planned activities, progress, achievements and challenges in project implementation. This, together with the monthly financial report was submitted to the SC National Office in Harare. The project monthly report was also submitted to each key stakeholder at the district level. There was an effective feedback mechanism which responded to any issues raised in the district reports. District Coordinators alluded to the fact that most of the issues raised in the monthly reports were responded to. Reporting to the donor and government was done through the organisational annual report. However, important updates were shared with the donor and government as and when necessary.

Figure 5: Reporting line under the project



Other reports that were generated were the monitoring reports. These were done each time a visit was made to the districts. There were no major challenges encountered in term of reporting at all levels, that is – both in terms of content and adherence to deadlines.



## 4.7 Sustainability

### 4.7.1 Ownership of the project

Generally community ownership of the project was quite high. Communities contributed to the school feeding programme through construction of cooking kitchens, provision of resources such as firewood, plates, spoons and the actual preparation of the CSB porridge. As indicated in section 5.4.1 some communities prepared a duty roster where villages took turns to prepare the porridge and in cases where the communities could not do this, the SDC which is a school-community structure took the responsibility for payment of cooks.



*Community built kitchens at Dzingire, Chikwakwa and Ashford Primary Schools respectively*

In one community in Muzarabani some women volunteered to prepare the CSB for no payment as part of the community's contribution to the project. Communities also availed labour to offload the CSB in the schools and work in the *Zunde raMambo* fields. In a sure sign of ownership the Member of Parliament for Muzarabani South provided transport for ferrying of CSB bags from the district office to Mawari Primary school after delays in transportation.

Some communities generally showed that they do not own the problem of OVC in their communities. The very fact that there are several child headed households existing in the community, living on their own, some as young as 11 years, shows a failure of the community social protection systems. At the time of conducting the evaluation most BEAM selection committees in Chimanimani had removed or excluded OVC supported under the SC CT programme from the list of children to be supported under the current BEAM programme. However through awareness creation on child rights and issues by NGO including SC, some communities have started to implement several initiatives through the Child Protection Committees, meant to benefit OVC. One community in Muzarabani reported that the kraal head organises the community to contribute mealie-meal and food items for child headed families. Some community have projects such as sewing and baking that they sell and the money is used to buy basic food items for OVC (this has been very inadequate though). Out of school OVC are also being trained on carpentry in Muzarabani Ward 6. Needless to say, most communities in the two districts have no strategies in place to support OVC because, as they indicated, they are equally affected by hunger and lack of resources.

### 4.7.2 Sustainability strategies

Although the project was designed as an emergency project, there were elements of sustainability that were embedded to ensure sustainance of the project impact. The project timing was such that when the programme ends beneficiaries would benefit from the harvest from their fields and hence improve their food security. However the challenge is that most

vulnerable household do not have a good harvest due to several reasons explained earlier in section 4.1.2, such that their food security situation is not good. Another strategy that was implemented as an exit strategy is the *Zunde raMambo* that is supposed to benefit OVC and other vulnerable families. However despite the obvious positives seen in the *Zunde raMambo* concept, the strategy was affected by scale of implementation, late planting and the prolonged mid-season drought resulting in poor harvest in most of the fields.

Further review indicates that information at baseline and evaluation show that there are primary two major reasons why children dropout of school or do not attend school regularly, i.e., non payment of school fees and food insecurity. However the above mentioned sustainability strategies focused more on the food security aspect and were silent on how OVC enrolment at school would be sustained in terms of schools fees. Evaluation results show that except for a few schools that acted on their own discretion, most BEAM selection committees in Chimanimani did not consider OVC who were supported by SC through the CT for the current BEAM programme. What this means is that after the project ends, affected children are bound to drop out of school. SC did not sign a memorandum of understanding with the schools to guarantee that supported children will be absorbed under the BEAM programme at the end of the project. Similarly the Ministry of Labour and Social Services together with UNICEF are planning on a national CT programme. Since the Department of Social Services was a key stakeholder in the project, SC could have tried to secure an undertaking from the department that its beneficiaries would be absorbed under that national programme. As it stands there is no guarantee that the CT project beneficiaries will be supported under the proposed national programme.

However interviews with SC programme management indicated that they have a Basic Education and a Livelihood Programme which should be used to complement and sustain the impact of the current project. It will be good if SC can find ways of supporting affected OVC so that they can continue with their education.

#### **4.8 Other Challenges**

Below are some of the challenges that were encountered during the implementation of the project.

- *Inability to pay CSB cooks* -The majority of communities were uncomfortable with the arrangement where they rotated in preparing the CSB (community beliefs in witchcraft). The school through the SDC employed at most two women to prepare the CSB. Some communities employed cooks and had to mobilise resources for remuneration. However this arrangement posed challenges within the communities as some cooks complained that they had not been paid by the communities.
- *Inadequate toilets* - Keys informants in both districts explained that some schools do not have adequate toilets. Out of the 59 schools in Muzarabani only 12 are said to have adequate toilets. This situation poses a health hazard to the school and the community especially in Chimanimani where some areas are prone to cholera.
- *Amount of porridge for each feed*- Community women who prepared the CSB explained that the amount of porridge each child was entitled to was little. This was evidenced by

some children continuously asking for more porridge. Women during FGDs confessed that most children go to school hungry because there would be no food at home. Some children expected to get more quantities as their next meal would be supper.

- *Unfriendly learning environment* - Some schools especially in Upper Muzarabani have very few classrooms. Most of these schools converted tobacco barns to classrooms and these are not conducive for learning. Inadequacy of classrooms has resulted in some children being accommodated in a beer hall at a certain school in Muzarabani; some 200 -300 metres away from the main school. This is not a child friendly environment and has the potential of negating the positive impact on enrolment, attendance and academic performance of children. It is recommended that SC advocates for the construction of proper classrooms.
- *Community expectations* - Community people whose children are not yet in school and are in ECD A were brought to school for feeding. In Muzarabani it was reported that some crèches changed venues and moved to schools so that they also benefit from the feeding programme. Some women preparing the CSB brought with them younger children and these were not allowed to consume the porridge. This was against their expectations as they felt that their children were supposed to benefit considering that the women left home with the children early in order to prepare the porridge. Community people through FGDs felt that the fact that the project did not include rations to cater for such unexpected cases at the school create unnecessary antagonism between the community people, field monitors and the teachers responsible for the feeding programme.
- *Lack of resources for key stakeholders* - Key informants indicated that they faced challenges with transport to carry out independent monitoring visits of the SFP and the Zunde raMambo programme. Stakeholders from the MOHCW and Agritex at district level explained that their departments would have wanted to randomly monitor the project to further strengthen the monitoring system. However as indicated earlier in section 4.6.1 these departments are well represented through their community structures such as the Environmental Health Officers and Agritex Officers. These structures extensively participated in the monitoring of the project activities at community level.

#### **4.9 Lessons learnt**

- Local stakeholders are a resource that can be utilised in implementing programmes. Working with and through the community, including children can actually enhance greater achievement of project objectives and goals.
- School feeding is a factor that indeed motivates school children to attend school.
- In designing a project, there is need to take into account community dynamics, beliefs and peculiarities as they can have a negative impact on project implementation. As demonstrated earlier in this report the initial design of the school feeding programme could not be applied in all communities because some communities were reluctant to



provide labour on a rotational basis for cooking and feeding of the children whilst others were not comfortable/ or did not trust certain individuals in the community to cook for their children. The Zunde raMambo programme also met with the same challenge were some community leaders found it difficult to mobilize parents in farm and peri-urban communities to provide labour for the Zunde programme.

- The current strategies for conducting Zunde raMambo do not work in farm communities where most households are farm workers/ labourers who cannot effectively participate/ provide labour for the Zunde programme. There might be a need to develop other strategies that can be employed in such situations.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1 Major conclusion and recommendations

Below are the major conclusions made from the evaluation findings and the relevant recommendations made thereof.

To a greater extent the project was able to achieve its intended objectives. At an output level the project achieved most of its planned outputs except for the cash transfer programme which failed to reach 550 households in the first three months of the project. At an impact level more impact was achieved through the cash transfer programme especially in terms of improving household income, increasing food diversity, making sure that vulnerable households are able to pay school fees for OVC. The school feeding programme also managed to significantly reduce school dropouts in the two districts and had a positive impact on school attendance. However the evaluation has shown that school enrolment for ECD and Grade 1-3 did not change that much and in fact ECD enrolment for 2011 is lower than that of September 2010.

**Recommendation:** It is important that beneficiary verification process even in an emergency situation be conducted before the project implementation. Verification at the onset of the project affected the cash transfer output for the first three month as the project did not manage to replace beneficiaries that had been removed from the list.

The evaluation has shown that the project had a positive impact on the lives of OVC. However this impact is largely short-term as there is a greater possibility of the supported households and children to return back to their vulnerable situation or even worse after the end of the project. As shown in the report in most schools OVC supported under the SC project were excluded from the current BEAM programme. There is also general food insecurity among vulnerable households in both districts as most of their harvest for the 2010/2011 season was very poor. While the *Zunde raMambo* was a good programme, the scale of implementation and poor harvest has also affected the programme. Thus the emergency situation is still present in most vulnerable families.

**Recommendation:** Resources permitting the school feeding programme should continue to be implemented in the current year (2011) until the next harvest. In Chimanimani the most affected schools are those in Chimanimani West whilst in Muzarabani schools in Lower Muzarabani will be most affected. There school feeding programme should be extended to all grades. SC should also mobilize resources and find ways of supporting child headed households and those headed by the elderly who are incapacitated and can no longer support themselves. There is a greater likelihood that OVC in such households will be worst affected.

Full involvement of stakeholders is key to the success of any project especially when the project is being implemented in a polarized environment. The involvement and participation of stakeholders at planning and implementation stages in the project was an effective strategy in ensuring ownership of the project. However the failure of the cash transfer intervention to take off in Muzarabani district shows that every stakeholder is important. Disgruntlement of one

stakeholder has the potential of disrupting or even stopping the implementation of a project that could have benefited thousands of vulnerable people in the community.

**Recommendation:** In future, for similar sensitive emergency programmes, SC should engage the government at all levels and ensure that the necessary approval and documentation is available which will guarantee smooth flowing of the project activities at implementation and make certain that intended beneficiaries are not robbed of their benefits.

The concept of the *Zunde raMambo* is evidently an effective strategy for enhancing food security of vulnerable and child headed households. However the dynamic environment that exists in the different communities in Zimbabwe poses challenges in the implementation of such a programme. A *Zunde raMambo* programme is grounded on the following conditions, i.e., positive relationships, common visioning, commitment and sense of belonging that exists in a given community. If these conditions are not met then it will be difficult to implement such a programme.

**Recommendation:** If *Zunde raMambo* is to be implemented as a main programme, it is important to conduct a situational analysis in each community to determine the situation as regards the *Zunde raMambo*, especially people's perceptions, opportunities and threats for such a programme and suggestions of improving community participation. This will ensure that the design of the programme take into consideration the different dynamic situations possible thereby increasing its chances of success.

**Recommendation:** SC should consider decentralizing the *Zunde raMambo* to headman or village level as part of scaling up of the *Zunde raMambo* programme in the two districts. This will ensure micro management of the *Zunde* whilst achieving a fairly extensive reach of vulnerable households and OVC that benefit out of such a programme. This strategy has the potential of greatly reducing food insecurity among vulnerable households in both districts.

## 5.2 Other recommendations

- For authenticity purposes, future programming should consider using a thumb print as a signature for beneficiaries who are unable to write their signature other than using an 'X'.
- There is need to find ways of motivating young adults to find value in participating in community-driven projects such as the *Zunde raMambo*.

## 5.3 Recommendations on advocacy issues

- Most parents and SDCs fail to pay for ECD education and ECD para-professional teachers respectively. SC should lobby the MoESAC to consider paying for ECD para-professional staff, the same way it supports temporary teachers. The rolling out of ECD trained teachers should be expedited so that each school should at least have one ECD trained professional. Currently all visited schools have no ECD trained professionals.

- There are gaps and or contradictions in the government policy especially as it relates to ECD education. As much as ECD education is a prerequisite for a child to be accepted into Grade One, children in ECD are not considered for support under the BEAM programme. SC should advocate for ECD education to be treated the same way as the mainline education, i.e., ECD should be considered under BEAM and support in terms of trained professionals and materials resources should be availed to schools.
- SC should also advocate for the NAP 2 Cash Transfer programme to also cover Chimanimani and Muzarabani districts. This will ensure that vulnerable households that were supported under the cash transfer programme have an opportunity to be supported under the new government programme.
- Through the project it was clear that US\$20, though appreciated, it is not enough to cover household's basic needs and sustainably improve the household's welfare so that they move from vulnerability to self sufficiency. SC should advocate for the Ministry of Labour and Social Services to increase the US\$20 to possibly US\$50 per month if meaningful and long lasting impact of the intervention should be realised.
- The complete shift of most households in upper Muzarabani from food to cash cropping reduces food self sufficiency and increases food insecurity in the district. Whereas upper Muzarabani received good rains, most households might be without food even at harvest because they did not grow any food crops but tobacco. SC should lobby the Agritex department to educate farmers in upper Muzarabani on the importance of food cropping so as to reduce artificial hunger and food insecurity emergencies.

## **6 REFERENCES**

- MFA school feeding and cash transfer proposal
- Cash Transfer School and Feeding baseline report
- Quality Programs for Orphans and Vulnerable Children: A Facilitator's Guide to Establishing Service Standard
- Minutes of district Staff meetings
- Minutes of Training workshops
- Internal memos
- District monthly reports
- Field monitors' report
- Cash transfers' beneficiaries expenditure note books
- Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies (Oxfam GB)

## 7 ANNEXES

### Annex 1: List of key informants

#### Save the Children Head Office

	Department	Respondent	Title
1	Program	Angeline Matereke	Emergency Manager
2	Operations	Tsitsi Nyoni	Logistics Manager
3	Finance	Shahzad Hassan	Finance and Grants Director
4	Finance	Danai Chitumwa	Accounting Manager
5	Program	Sharon Hauser	Program Director
6	CaLP	Deborah Gourlay	CaLP Coordinator

#### Schools

	Name of School	Respondent	Title	District
1	Charleswood	Mr Nyabanga	Headmaster	Chimanimani
2	Ngangu	Mr Mahoso	Headmaster	Chimanimani
3	Kushinga	Mr Sibiya	Headmaster	Chimanimani
4	Kwirire	Mr Tarwekuona	TIC/Headmaster	Chimanimani
5	Fairfield	Mr Mandidzidze	Deputy Head	Chimanimani
6	Dzingire	Mr Kundlande	Headmaster	Chimanimani
7	Ndima	Mr Rusinga P	Headmaster	Chimanimani
8	Hlabiso	Mr Chirandu	Deputy Head	Chimanimani
9	Mhakwe	Mr Tinofa	Headmaster	Chimanimani
10	Chikwakwa	Mrs Rusinga/Mr Nechora	Headmaster	Chimanimani
11	Shinja	Mr Jabes	Headmaster	Chimanimani
12	Charleswood	Mrs Murisa	CSB -TIC	Chimanimani
13	Ngangu	Mrs Mukonde	Cook	Chimanimani
14	Ndima	Mrs Sithole	Supervisor	Chimanimani
15	Kwirire	Mrs Danda/Chirowa	Cook	Chimanimani
16	Fairfield	Mrs Sibanda/Muchiri	CSB-TIC	Chimanimani
17	Nyadhevi	Mr Nyamandi	Headmaster	Muzarabani
18	Gatu	Mrs Tauzeni	Headmistress	Muzarabani
19	Silverstroom	Mr Nyamupfukudza	TIC	Muzarabani
20	Gee Jay	Mr Madondo	Deputy Head	Muzarabani
21	Mawari	Mr Hwata	Headmaster	Muzarabani
22	Utete	Mr Mandengu	Headmaster	Muzarabani
23	Muzarabani		Headmaster	Muzarabani
24	Hwata	Mr Machingauta	Headmaster	Muzarabani
25	Ashford	Mr Chidavaenzi	Headmaster	Muzarabani
26	Chipata	Nyakabande	Headmaster	Muzarabani

**List of key informants - district level**

	Name	Organization	District
1	Ass Inspector Kawanzaruwa	ZRP	Chimanimani
2	Mr Mugani	AGRITEX	Chimanimani
3	Mr Mutogo	DSS	Chimanimani
4	Mr Chisero	DSS	Chimanimani
5	Mr Sibanda	Save the Children	Chimanimani
6	Mrs Mahoso	Save the Children	Chimanimani
7	Mr Chigogwana	DEO	Chimanimani
8	Mrs Chikukwa	Chikukwa Zunde Advisor	Chimanimani
9	Mrs Ngorima	Ngorima Zunde Advisor	Chimanimani
10	Mr Bvumisai	Nutritionist –MOHCW	Chimanimani
11	Mrs Mazino	Kushinga Primary School Cook	Chimanimani
12	Mr Mutisi	Ndima Zunde Chairman	Chimanimani
13	Mrs Mazino	Cook – Kushinga Primary School	Chimanimani
14	Mrs Chisiwa	Cook- Kushinga Primary School	Chimanimani
15	Mr Chiromo	Field Officer	Chimanimani
16	Mrs Marange	RDC	Chimanimani
17	Mrs C. Marange	Ward Focal person	Chimanimani
18	Joshua Nekwani	Ndima Ward Advisor	Chimanimani
19	Mr Chiromo	Field Officer	Chimanimani
20	Mrs Marange	RDC	Chimanimani
21	Mr Khoza	Mutambara Zunde Chairperson	Chimanimani
22	Mr Mutaaurwa	DEC	Muzarabani
23	Mr Zombe	District Nutrionist	Muzarabani
24	Mrs Marowa	RDC	Muzarabani
25	Mr Hungwe	District Administrator	Muzarabani
26	Mr Yahwe	President’s office	Muzarabani
27	Mr Muchati	Ministry of Education	Muzarabani
28	Mr Gupudza	ZRP	Muzarabani
29	Mr Chasiwa	DAC	Muzarabani
30	Mr Munyoro	Agritex Extension Officer	Muzarabani
31	Mrs Muzondo	DSS	Muzarabani
32	Mr Gwekerere	Chief Hwata Zunder Chairperson	Muzarabani
33	Mr Dzapasi	Headman – Chief Hwata	Muzarabani

**Annex 2: List of FGD Participants**

**FGD Participants - Kushinga Primary School Ward 15**

	Name	Title
1	Violet Chinyai	Focal Person
2	Hebert Kubacha	WAAC Chairperson
3	Rhoda Chaonwa	Village health worker
4	Loice Muchazoreka	Beneficiary
5	Madoroka Mwasodzi	Beneficiary

6	Stella Muyambo	Beneficiary
7	Ronica Mugobiyo	Beneficiary
8	Mariya Mapuranga	Beneficiary
9	Margaret Sigauke	Beneficiary
10	Lena Mukwadu	Beneficiary
11	Sarah Chemura	Beneficiary
12	Joyce Shahwa	Beneficiary
13	Auxillia Mafake	Beneficiary
14	David Munanju	Councillor

### FGD participants Ngangu Primary School - Ward 13

	Name	Title
1	Vhumisai Machisi	Village Head
2	Joseph Mwatsamwa	Village Head
3	Patience Sithole	Ward Advisor
4	Memory Chitemba	Beneficiary
5	Jane Manase	Beneficiary
6	Getrude Muzati	Beneficiary
7	Chipo Mupuza	Beneficiary
8	Ester Maraicho	Beneficiary
9	Maria Sangu	Beneficiary
10	Loicy Kombo	Beneficiary
11	Laina Mukwemu	Beneficiary
12	Tamari Mukwema	Beneficiary
13	Alice Breki	Beneficiary
14	Chinoza Gatura	Member Present
15	Liah Mupinda	Member Present
16	Zhuwana Gowana	Member Present
17	Rudo Mutondoro	Member Present
18	Witney Tendayi	Beneficiary
19	Eunice Madzora	Member Present
20	Sibongile Musepe	Member Present

### FGD participants Dzingire Primary School - Ward 21

	Name	Title
1	Kuhlante Nekwani	Ward Advisor
2	Dirani Chigidi	Beneficiary
3	Njajojo Mwaimbodei	Beneficiary
4	Grace Kubvanyika	Beneficiary
5	Taremba Sunduza	Beneficiary
6	Sophie Taakanyi	Beneficiary
7	Juliet Nemangwinya	Beneficiary
8	Gladys Ndumiyana	Beneficiary
9	Sipho Machanani	Member present



**FGD participants Mhakwe Primary School – Ward 18**

	Name	Title
1	T.J Chikukutu	Village Head
2	Mukuwanedaye	Village Head
3	Shayamano	Child protection teacher
4	Joyce Chikanhanga	Ward Focal person
5	Enock Manyakufa	Beneficiary
6	Marian Zvemusha	CT Beneficiary
7	Timbira Jena	Beneficiary
8	Winnie Jack	CT Beneficiary
9	Lillian Tumburuka	VHW
10	Cilia Tsatsi	CT Beneficiary
11	Enaily Timbira	Beneficiary
12	Tinofa	Headmaster
13	Portia Mutenda	Beneficiary

**Utete Primary School Wards 3 &19**

	Name	Title
1	P. Chatambarara	S.D.C Chair
2	S.D. Muzeredzo	School Health master
3	Gandiwa A	School Health mistress
4	Mangore S	Beneficiary
5	Maposa F	Beneficiary
6	Chaputsira P	Beneficiary
7	Mukikani A	Beneficiary
8	Hotainabanhu	Beneficiary
9	Chakonera M	Beneficiary
10	Paiona B	Beneficiary
11	Chinduta B	Beneficiary
12	Govere R	Beneficiary
13	Mugomba C	Beneficiary
14	Huku V	Beneficiary
15	Mubariki F	Beneficiary

**Hwata Primary School Ward 6**

	Name	Title
1	Tracey Bangira	Chairwoman
2	Grace Shoshore	Beneficiary
3	Precious Mangena	Beneficiary
4	Abigail Nyanhenda	Beneficiary
5	Sibongile Kuradu	Beneficiary
6	Victoria Mujuru	Beneficiary
7	Brenda Warambwa	Secretary
8	Josephine Marata	Beneficiary
9	Evelyn Tembo	Beneficiary

### Ashford Primary School Ward 14

	Name	Title
1	Livingstone Jonga	Secretary
2	Lameck Goronga	SCB Chairperson
3	Patronella Muchenje	Focal Person
4	Clever Chabaya	Member
5	Takawira Mukonyo	Beneficiary
6	Abraham Kuudzadombo	Beneficiary
7	Cephas Kwaramba	Beneficiary
8	Janet Danhi	Beneficiary
9	Beauty Njara	Beneficiary

### Chipata Primary School Ward 28

	Name	Title
1	Forbes Kumire	SDC Chairperson
2	Mabel Karichi	SDC member
3	Enock Chigumba	Treasurer
4	Tapedza David	member
5	Davis Danda	Secretary to Kraal Head

### Annex 3: Stakeholders in Chimanimani and Muzarabani

Stakeholder the SFP	Key Responsibilities
Save the Children	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Procure, deliver, distribute CSB to all FDPs</li> <li>• Monitor project implementation</li> </ul>
RDC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Co-ordinate all NGO activities</li> <li>• Provide storage and office space</li> <li>• Mobilise the community through councillors</li> <li>• Monitor the project</li> </ul>
MoESAC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide storage space</li> <li>• Provide a focal person</li> <li>• Monitor project implementation</li> <li>• Own the project</li> <li>• Mobilise the community</li> </ul>
MoHCW	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mobilise the community</li> <li>• Monitor project implementation</li> <li>• Provide health related technical advice</li> <li>• Dispose of ALL foodstuffs unsuitable for human consumption</li> </ul>
Community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide non-food items such as pots, plates, water, firewood</li> <li>• Provide the human resource and its labour to manage and man the project</li> </ul>
Environmental Management Authority (EMA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide technical knowledge on environmental degradation and other negative practices affecting the same</li> </ul>

**Annex 4: Inputs distributed under the Zunde raMambo programme**

District	Chief	Inputs received					Date of planting	Area planted (ha)
		Compound D	AN	Maize seed	Sorghum seed	Lime		
Chimanimani	Chikukwa	50	50	10	-	50	18/12/10	0.25
	Muusha	50	50		5	-	15/11/10	0.25
	Ngorima	50	-	10	-	50	15/12/10	0.25
	Ndimba	50	50	10	-	-	24/11/10	0.25
	Mutambara	50	50	-	5	-	18/12/10	0.25
Muzarabani	Hwata	100	50	-	10		04/01/11	1
	Chiweshe	100	50	20	-	-	End of Dec	1
	Kasekete	100	50	-	10	-	End of Dec	1
	Muzarabani	100	50	-	10		End of Dec	1