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Citizens' Voice and Accountability

Democratic Republic of Congo Country Case Study

Final Report

March 2008

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Contents

Contents 2
Executive summary 4
Abbreviations 10
Part 1: Introduction 13
Part 2: Methodology 15
2.1. General context of the evaluation 15
2.2. Inception phase 15
2.3. Main evaluation phase 18
2.4 Feedback on evaluation framework 20
Part 3: Context of CV&A 21
3.1. The socioeconomic context 21
3.2. The political context 22
3.3. The institutional context: from the Transition to democratic elections 23
3.4. Good governance: the challenge of development 24
3.5. Civil society 26
3.6. The context of foreign aid 27
Part 4: Findings 30
4.1. Enabling environment 30
4.2. Institutional, organisational and individual capacities 36
4.3. V&A channels 39
4.4. Change in policy, practice, behaviour and power relations 43
4.5. Broader development outcomes 47
Part 5: Conclusions/ lessons learnt 49
5.1. Question 1: Channels, mechanisms and processes 49
5.2. Question 2: results and outcomes 52
5.3. Question 3: Pathways to broader development outcomes 53
5.4. Question 4: V&A and aid effectiveness 54
Part 6: Recommendations 55
6.1. On the overall approaches to V&A 55
6.2. On operational issues 56
6.3. On policy dialogue 58
ANNEXES 60
Annex A: Terms Of References 61
Annex B: Methodology 70
1. General context of evaluation 70

2. Inception phase 71
3. Main evaluation phase 78
4. Feedback on evaluation framework 82
Annex C: Analysis of Context *83*
1. Profile of DRC 83
2. Historic perspective: from dictatorship and war… to peace and democratic stability 83
3. The socioeconomic context 86
4. The institutional context 90
The transition period 90
The new institutions emerging from the elections 92
5. Good governance: the challenge of development 93
6. Civil society at the centre of development 95
7. The context of aid in DRC 98
The 1980s: aid coordination 99
The 1990s: the political context 101
The 21st century: the resumption of international aid 102
Annex D: Interventions Summary Sheets *108*
Annex D1: Support to Radio Okapi 108
Annex D2: Support for Institutions de la Transition – AIT 113
Annex D3: Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA 121
Annex D4: Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace - Search for Common Ground/Centre Lokolé 126
Annex D5: Initiative for joint work in the leadership and State cohesion (ILCCE) - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 132
Annex D6: Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the DRC – Global Witness 137
Annex D7: Supporting the National Council for NGOs Active in the Development Sector (CNONGD) 142
Annex D8: Capacity building Programme for trade union - Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC) 148
Annex D9: Strengthening the rule of law and restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu 154
Annex D10: Support programme for development initiatives in the Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke (PAIDECO-Kin) 159
Annex E: List of people consulted/interviewed *165*
Annex F: Interview guides *171*
Annex G: Documents consulted *175*
Case Studies documentation 178

Executive summary

Within the context of a comparative evaluation carried out in 5 countries[1], the objective of the DRC case study was the analysis of pertinence and the results of a sample series of ten operations geared towards reinforcing Voice and Accountability (V&A) which can be seen as constituent element of governance in the broad sense, implies the existence of actors that are able to make their preferences, opinions and views heard on the one hand and the ability of the governing bodies (such as the state) to act transparently and respond to such appeals on the other.

Using the framework developed by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) this country case study aims to contribute to the following overall objective of the joint evaluation:

- An improved understanding of CVA among development partners by mapping and documenting their approaches and strategies for enhancing CVA in a variety of country contexts and to learn lessons on which approaches have worked best, where and why.
- An assessment of the effects of a range of donor CVA interventions on governance and on aid effectiveness and whether these effects are sustainable.

1. Findings

The Democratic Republic of Congo is generally regarded as a (very) bad example in terms of governance. The long period of dictatorship, armed hostilities of international origins, internal conflicts and violence and corruption have made a mockery of all the indicators of good governance, transparency and respect for human rights. However, in spite of such a dark recent past, following its stabilisation in 2003, the DRC has embarked on a process of political reconstruction which has progressively, if only very partially, come to involve all the constituent foundations of democracy and the state of law, including fundamental laws, free elections, freedom and regulation of the media, the restoration of justice, reforms in the security sector, freedom of assembly, the participation of the people, and so on.

Enabling environment

In spite of the fragility of the state, which is only just emerging from a very long period of crisis, the V&A support operations carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo were able to take advantage of **a number of opportunities**.

The most important of these are political first and foremost:

- the Lusaka ceasefire and *Global and Inclusive Agreement* of Pretoria offer a minimum level of stability and regional security and provide a precise definition for the political institutions in a period of transition and the means of involving the different actors in the implementation process;
- the *determination of the international community* to see DRC emerge from its state of crisis.

Other opportunities are of a more internal nature within Congolese society:

- *the eagerness for information and participation* which exists among the population of Congo in general;
- *the diversity and dynamism of the organisations of civil society.* The long Congolese tradition of association and the ability of the organisations to make up for the

[1] Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nepal and DR Congo.

shortcomings of the state have led to their being recognised as political actors in every sense;
- the setting up of progressive, though still rudimentary, *legislative texts and frameworks* to act as a point of reference for a number of the operations assessed.

In a continuing situation of great fragility, many important **obstacles and constraints** act against the reinforcement of V&A in RDC, including the political fragility of the country (ongoing conflicts in the east of the country, insecurity, and so on), the complexity of the Institutions de la Transition, most of which are not fully in place and lacking in permanence, the situation of extreme and widespread poverty, the unavailability of many legislative and administrative tools, the dilapidated state of the infrastructures and widespread lack of material and human resources in the public administration, and a long tradition of mismanagement, to name but a few.
The broad range and diversity of these obstacles go a long way towards explaining the fact that the V&A process in DRC is still very much unfinished.

Faced with these obstacles, the first priority for the various donors was the identification of **entry points** within the institutional developments and recent politics of DRC, through which they might be able to develop their support activities for the reinforcement of V&A. In this sense, the priority entry points are the Institutions de la Transition defined in the Pretoria agreements, the organisation of elections and peace-keeping efforts (the creation of a civic sense, prevention of conflicts, etc). With the end of the Transition, new opportunities for intervention have emerged, including elected institutions, permanent regulatory bodies (CENI and CSAC[2]), the decentralisation programme, and so on.

To achieve these objectives, the various support interventions for V&A bring three **essential strategies** to light:
- a strategy for the reinforcement of the quantity and quality of expression and citizens' demands (expression by election, expression in the media, expression for local government, expression and defence of rights, expression and negotiation of socioeconomic demands, expression of a model of alternative society, etc), based on better access to information;
- a strategy for the backing up of the state institutions and their leaders and officials, to enable the state to retrieve its essential functions and perform them within an atmosphere of greater transparency;
- a strategy to facilitate a closer relationship between state and citizens, to reduce mutual mistrust, improve mutual understanding, and lay down the limits of responsibility of the institutions.

Institutional, organisational and individual capacities

The main contributing factor to the capacity building of the **public institutions**, which was also the most urgent given the initial context, was the provision of base materials and infrastructures. Other forms of reinforcement were also supplied through the interventions assessed here, including financial resources for salaries of civil servants, with a view to making them work more efficiently and reducing the risk of corruption, training, supervision and the pooling of experiences to strengthen the drafting and negotiating capacities of the

[2] National Independent Electoral Commission and Higher Audiovisual and Communications Council.

legislations, and the organisation of discussion workshops and meetings between leaders to reduce tensions.
However, there is still a lack of support in DR Congo for the specific reinforcement of accountability among the public authorities. The interventions are targeted above all at the preliminary development of the capacities of these public bodies, to enable them to resume their fundamental responsibilities.

The reinforcement of the abilities of the **CSOs[3] to take part in public debate and political dialogue** takes different forms in the interventions assessed, and includes encouragement to gather information through a network of local CSOs, to fuel an external lobbying campaign organised by an international NGO, on the one hand, and support, based on a longer-lasting partnership, for the organisations developing more general long term debate and insisting on a more structured consultation and negotiating process with the public authorities on the other.

In summary, greater emphasis was found to be placed on capacity building of CSOs to express citizens' voice than capacity building of public authorities in order to improve transparency and accountability.

V&A channels

The analysis of the channels used for the support of V&A in DR Congo has brought to light the following general trends:

- the emphasis is placed on the **reinforcement of the mechanisms of change,** and at the same time on the **actors** taking part in that process: support for the prevention of conflicts as a preliminary to the reinforcement of V&A and support for the electoral process on the one hand, and on the other support for the role actors in the Transition, the platforms for the expression of citizens' voices and the decision-making structures at local level;
- the **means by which such support for change is developed** are relatively traditional, and include exchanges and transfers of knowledge and experience, training, logistical structures, and so on. The less traditional means can be found at the level of local interventions and, to a certain extent, in the advocacy of rights;
- the **link between Voice & Accountability** remains relatively weak. The interventions frequently focus on the reinforcement of expression among the citizens (where the strategy is firmly on the side of support for Voice) and the overall reinforcement of the capacities of the public institutions (with only a limited strategy in terms of greater accountability on their part).

Change in policy, practice, behaviour and power relations

Generally speaking, the **changes are still of a limited nature** in relation to the many essential conditions which have to be satisfied in a state of law. It is **at the level of general policy** and the setting up of the legal frameworks that the most significant progress can be noted, while in terms of the **day to day conduct** of the representatives of the public authorities inefficiency continues to be very widespread. In such a context, the electoral process engaged upon will lead to a greater awareness of the theoretical need for accountability and the limited duration of an elected mandate. The division of powers between the legislation and executive is visibly more clear-cut at the present time, if we compare it to the situation during the period of

[3] Civil Society Organisation.

transition. The dynamics of power remain highly underdeveloped in a number of areas, however, including controls on the political practices of elected representatives, the struggle against legal impunity, poor management practices in public companies, the management of natural resources, and so on.

A number of more concrete factors provide evidence of significant changes in **certain aspects of the relations between the state and its citizens,** including the Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) within the context of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP), and the channels of information (such as radio) which facilitate the greater awareness of the citizens and offer a more direct way of questioning the policy-makers. However, it is still difficult to assess the real effects of these interventions in terms of long-lasting change in practices and behaviour. Indeed, while the importance of civil society (or community dynamics, to be more precise) is recognised in the documents, this still has to manifest itself in a concrete manner in the drafting of future policies.

Broader development outcomes

Detecting the effects of donor-supported V&A interventions on broader development in DRC is a highly unpredictable process, given the context of fragility and the recent nature of the political transformation of the country. A few hypotheses may be put forward, to the effect that greater stability and security create an environment which facilitates socioeconomic development, or that the greater capacities of civil society organisations will make it possible to defend the interests of the most vulnerable members of society more effectively in the design of government policies; however, it is impossible to identify any precise link between such hypotheses and the interventions assessed.

It is at local level that the evaluation was able to reveal a number of examples of limited improvement in the living conditions of those affected by the interventions, including contributions to community investments and employment opportunities in the local NGOs created through the operations of the local development committees, work on water supply problems following appeals over the radio, and so on. Such examples are of a very limited nature, and cannot lead us to conclude that a truly widespread effect on development, growth or the reduction of poverty has taken place.

2. Conclusions/lessons learnt

Channels, mechanisms and processes

Strengthening voice and accountability in the DRC can be divided into three areas of support:

1. Supply-side: efforts to strengthen governments' ability to address its citizens' needs (e.g. transparent decision-making).
2. Demand side: support to citizens' expression of voice and preferences.
3. Supply-demand interaction: providing a space where the state and citizens interact.

Most efforts have been made around basic institution-building during the transition and organising the first free elections. While the lack of political will is cited frequently as one of the major obstacles to increase transparency and accountability in the DRC, this area has received little donor attention and direct interventions are few, small-scale and success sporadic. While some activities—aiming at creating the space for demand-supply intervention (e.g. decentralisation and access to justice)—have achieved increased understanding and to some extent trust between citizens and public authorities, these are mainly pilot projects and thus geographically limited to certain areas. A lot of attention during and after the transition

has been paid to supporting traditional civil society organisations (NGOs, media, trade unions) to raise the population's awareness of their citizens' rights and the state duties, in particular around the elections. This kind of demand-side support could successfully build on the long tradition of civil society and the huge popularity of radio as information and communication media in the DRC.

Results and outcomes

While the rapidly changing and fragile institutional environment during the transition and after makes it very difficult to isolate the contribution of donor interventions to increased citizens' voice and state responsiveness examples of success could be observed. Support to civil society and radio stations have contributed to the high participation in the referendum and subsequent elections, the relatively peaceful election process and the acceptance of the results. Furthermore, donor support has enabled civil society to play a more active role in policy formulation (e.g. through the PRGSP process) and citizens have successfully used radio stations as channel to press public authorities to deliver better services (e.g. water supply in Mbuji May and sanitation in Kinshasa), respect citizens' rights (e.g. property rights) and decrease petty corruption. Currently, these successes are more likely to be isolated events rather than representative of a general increase in accountability. As one key informant summarises: *"Citizens are allowed to say anything without going to jail but the state is still not listening."*

Pathways to broader development outcomes

In DRC there is the strong hope and assumption that democracy will not only finally bring peace but a reduction of wide-spread poverty, in particular through a more equal distribution of the country's natural resources. However, in an environment where examples of increased voice and accountability are individual incidents rather than sustainable outcomes it is hard to identify broader development outcomes as results of donor interventions. Currently, there are first disappointments among citizens that the new democracy and in particular the long-awaited elections have not brought the desired improvement in living conditions and reduction of poverty. It will be a challenge for future donor intervention to support the translation of these isolated success stories in resource allocation and asset distribution to achieve an overall poverty reduction.

V&A and aid effectiveness

While the transition was supported through UNDP-managed basket funds donor-donor coordination is at a very early stage in DRC; there is limited dialogue between the donors — some very new to DRC— about V&A, its specifics in DRC and a common support strategy. Subsequently there is not much strategic thinking across donors how to address the frequently-cited obstacle of political will and increase transparency around resource exploitation. During the transition ownership has been hampered by the weak capacity of state authorities and was compromised by the urgency to organise the elections given the logistical challenges. It now remains to be seen if donors take the chance and challenge to increase ownership in this post-transition period.

3. Recommendations

On the basis of the results and conclusions, three groups of recommendations emerge from the evaluation.

With regard to the **general approach to strengthening V&A**:

- more realistic expectations on the part of the donors, taking the historic realities of DRC into account. The first principle of the OECD for international commitment in fragile states is essential in this sense : "take the context as the starting point";
- an improvement in the coordination of aid and donors: the current empirical group structure of donors is insufficient. A genuinely concrete coordination system is necessary if we are to improve the pertinence and consistency of V&A support and ensure that our Congolese partner plays an important role in the coordination process;
- improved coordination of each actor, to guarantee more effective assessment of the constraints and detection of the shortcomings, more efficient mutual involvement and the more widespread application of the positive results achieved;

With regard to the **organisational aspects**:

- make better use of the expertise of the international NGOs without preventing the emergence of local actors. Intense discussions have taken place on this matter in DRC;
- the use of external advocacy (e.g. through international NGOs) to support rather than replace the process of strengthening voice within the country;
- the flexible, complementary use of the different V&A support channels, in the light of the state of advancement of the democratisation process;
- the setting up of mechanisms which will make it possible to reap the benefits of successful local experiences to bring about more global change;
- the implementation of Communication for Development – C4D strategies to sustain the progress achieved through the V&S support interventions.

With regard to **political dialogue**:

- the integration into the V&A support process of a substantial part of the operations carried out to strengthen the capacities of the public authorities, in this way applying a further OECD principle on fragile states in a more effective manner;
- greater focus on the concept of 'lack of political will', to go beyond a simple acknowledgement of the need for accountability and transform this into a real modification of behaviour and practices;
- due consideration of the impact of the reinforcement of civil society on the transfer of a part of the framework of that society to the political bodies;
- due consideration of economic and social rights, which have to be regarded as an integral part of fundamental human rights.

Abbreviations

ACIDH	*Association contre l'Impunité et pour les Droits de l'Homme* (Local NGO)
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
ADF	African Development Fund
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFDL	*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques de Libération* - Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces
AIT	*Appui aux Institutions de la Transition* – Support for les Institutions de la Transition
AMED	*Association des Mamans et Enfants Défavorisés* (Local NGO)
AMP	*Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle*
APEC	*Appui au Processus Electoral au Congo* - Support for Electoral Process in Congo
APNURC	*Appui au Programme National d'Urgence de Renforcement des Capacités* - Support for the National Emergency Programme for Capacity Building
ASADHO	*Association Africaine des Droits de l'Homme* (Local NGO)
AWEPA	Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa
BDC	Belgian Development Cooperation
BIEL	*Bureau d'Information Electoral* - Office of Electoral Information
BTC	Belgian Technical Cooperation
C4D	Communication for Development
CAF	Country Assistance Framework
CCRE	*Comité de Coordination des Ressources Extérieures* - Coordinating Committee for External Resources
CDCs	Community Development Committees
CDCE	*Cadre de Concertation de la Société Civile pour l'Observation des Elections*
CEI	*Commission Electorale Indépendante* - Independent Electoral Commission
CELC	*Commission de l'Ethique et de la Lutte Contre la Corruption* - Commission for Ethics and the Elimination of Corruption
CENADEP	*Centre National d'Appui au Développement et à la Participation populaire*
CENI	*Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante* – National Independent Electoral Commission
CIAT	*Comité International d'Appui à la Transition* - Committee for the Support of the Transition
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CL	*Centre Lokolé* – Lokolé Center
CNCD	*Centre National de Coopération au Développement* (Belgian NGO)
CNONGD	*Conseil National des ONG de Développement* – National Council for NGOs active in the development sector.
CONAFED	*Comité National Femmes et Développement* - National Women and Development Committee
COPIREP	*Comité de Pilotage de la Réforme des Entreprises Publiques*
CRONGD	*Conseil Régional des ONG de Développement*– Regional Council for NGOs active in the development sector.
CSAC	*Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel et de la Communication*
CSC	*Confédération des Syndicats Congolais* - Congolese Trade Unions Confederation

CSC-B	*Confédération des Syndicats Chrétiens* - Federation of Christian Trade Unions - Belgium
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CVR	*Commission Vérité et Réconciliation* - Truth and Reconciliation Commission
CV&A	Citizens' Voice and Accountability
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DGDC	Directorate General for Development Cooperation - Belgium
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRIS sprl	Development, Rehabilitation, Integration, Security
DSCRP	*Document Stratégique pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté* - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
DSI	Democracy Support Institutions (CEI+HAM+CVR+CECL+ONDH)
EDF	European Development Fund
EEC	European Economic Community
EISA	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EL	Elector League
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
ESSEC	*Ecole Supérieure des Sciences Economiques et Commerciales - Paris*
EU	European Union
FNED	*Formation aux Notions Elémentaires de Droit*
GEDI	*Groupe d'Encadrement pour le Développement Intégral* (Local NGO)
GPS	Global Positioning System
GW	Global Witness
HAM	*Haute Autorité des Médias* - Higher Authority for the Media
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HQ	Headquarter
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - WB
ICTJ	International Centre for Transitional Justice (South African NGO)
IDA	International Development Association - (WB)
IEOI	*Institut d'Education Ouvrière Internationale*, Belgium
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILCCE	*Initiative pour un Leadership Collaboratif et la Cohésion de l'Etat*
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRENE	Institute for Research and Education on Negotiation in Europe
ITIE	*Initiative pour la Transparence de l'Industrie Extractive* - Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
LDCs	Local Development Committees
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MIBA	Mining company of Bakwanga
MLC	*Mouvement de Libération du Congo*
MONUC	*Mission d'Observation des Nations Unies pour le Congo* - United Nation Mission in DRC
NADYC	*Noyau de la Dynamique Communautaire*
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OCEAN	*Organisation Concertée des Ecologistes et Amis de la Nature* (Local NGO)

ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFIDA	*Office des Droits et Accises*
ONDH	*Observatoire National des Droits de l'Homme* - National Human Rights Observatory
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PAIDECO	*Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Développement des Communes*
PAP	Priority Action Plan
PNURC	*Programme National d'Urgence de Renforcement des Capacités* - National Emergency Programme for Capacity Building
PO	Peasant Organisation
PPA	Participatory Poverty Analysis
PRGSP	Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RAID	Rights and Accountability In Development
RCD	*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie*
RCN	*Réseau des citoyens* (Belgian NGO)
RECIC	*Réseau d'Education Civique du Congo* (Local NGO)
RENADHOC	*Réseau National des Droits de l'Homme du Congo* (Local NGO)
RENOSEC	*Réseau National pour l'Observation et la Surveillance des Elections au Congo*
RODHECIC	*Réseau d'Organisations des Droits Humains et d'Education Civique d'Inspiration Chrétienne en République Démocratique du Congo*
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SENAREC	*Secrétariat National pour le Renforcement des Capacités* – National Office for Capacity Building (Ministry of Plan)
SERACOB	*Service de Renforcement des Appuis aux Communautés de Base en Afrique Centrale* (Network of NGO's)
SEU	Special Evaluation Unit (Belgian Development Cooperation)
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SPF	*Service Public Fédéral* – Federal Ministry in Belgium
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UK	United Kingdom
UN	Union for the Nation
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNTC	*Union Nationale des Travailleurs Congolais* – National Union of Congolese Workers
UNTZa	*Union Nationale des Travailleurs du Zaïre* – National Union of Workers in Zaïre
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
V&A	Voice and Accountability
WB	World Bank
WSM	World Solidarity – Solidarité Mondiale (Belgian NGO)
WWICS	Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Part 1: Introduction

Background and reasons for the choice of the country case study

Governance in the broad sense of the term is a democratic process which brings about the involvement of the public powers, civil society and private sector, at both central and local levels, in the development of a given society. This process of balanced interaction between citizens and the state requires actors capable of making their interests and concerns known (Voice) on the one hand and, on the other, the ability of the governors to account for their actions when called upon to do so (Accountability).

Within this context, a core group of DAC partner (Evaluation Core Group) decided to carry out a joint evaluation of development aid provided to strengthen Citizens' Voice and Accountability (CV&A). The joint evaluation is based on five case/country studies, carried out in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nepal and the Democratic Republic of Congo using a common evaluation framework developed by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).[4] The DRIS sprl Study and Consultancy Office was commissioned by the Special Evaluation Service of the Belgian Department for Foreign Affairs to carry out the case study in DR Congo.

There are several reasons for carrying out a case study on DR Congo. The country is generally regarded as a (very) bad example in terms of governance. The long period of dictatorship, armed hostilities of international origins, internal conflicts and violence and corruption have made a mockery of all the indicators. Consequently, DRC is regularly found at the bottom of the league table in terms of good governance, transparency and respect for human rights, as well as in terms of all the other, more general, indicators of development. However, in spite of such a dark recent past, following its stabilisation in 2003, the DRC has embarked on a process of political reconstruction which has progressively come to involve all the constituent foundations of democracy and the state of law, including fundamental laws, free elections, freedom and regulation of the media, the restoration of justice, reforms in the security sector, freedom of assembly, the participation of the people, and so on.

Objectives of the country case study

The objective of the case study in DRC was therefore the evaluation of the relevance of a series of interventions geared towards reinforcing V&A and analysing the successes and failures of these. A summary analysis of each of the interventions assessed is set out in Annex D and the table 1. However, the objective of the evaluation was not an in-depth analysis of each individual operation, but to learn from the common lessons in terms of the impact of the series of interventions on the reinforcement of V&A within the specific context of such a fragile state as DRC. This is the subject of the main focus of this report.

The lack of a historic overview makes this analysis particularly hazardous on the one hand, but particularly interesting and profitable on the other, if we consider the diversity of the realms approached, the originality of the context and the unfinished nature of the transformations. The study also paid close attention to the specificity of perception of the concept of V&A, which originates from the English speaking countries and is still relatively unknown in the francophone world. It is important at this preliminary stage to emphasise that

[4] "Evaluation of CV&A – Evaluation framework. And Annex A: Evaluation framework, Methodological Guidance for Country Case Study – August 2007

the concept of V&A in DRC is still something of an innovation in the sense of the terminology used, and only a few people are familiar with it. When the meaning of the expression was explained, however, it emerged from the evaluation that the people interviewed mostly focused on the relationship between civil society and the state, less on the relationship between individual state institutions. Historically speaking, in fact, civil society has played a particularly important role in the relations between citizens and the state in Congo over the last few years while the notion of horizontal accountability legislative, executive and judicial arms of the state are relatively new to DRC. Civil society has taken on the socioeconomic functions that the state frequently abandoned (or played to different extents in different geographical areas of the vast country), was recognised as an institution in the mid-nineties, on the occasion of the National Sovereign Conference, played a role in the institutions which drove the process of democratic transition, and so on.

This report takes into account the results of the two phases (start-up and main) of this evaluation, which took place from 20th October 2007 to 20th January 2008. Among other factors, these phases include:

- analysis of the base documents,
- consultation with the DAC partner companies,
- a preliminary field mission to Kinshasa from 4th to 11th November 2007,
- a main field mission to Kinshasa and Mbuji Mayi from 23rd November to 21st December.

Structure of the report

With a view to ensuring coherence and comparability, the report attempts to follow the common framework specifically developed for this multi-country evaluation as closely as possible, as set up during the consultancy process involving the various partner countries which took place in Bonn at the end of October.

Parts 2 and 3, which are developed in greater detail in the Annexes, offer a brief outline of the context within which the evaluation took place:

- a presentation of the methodology explains the reasoning behind the choice of interventions analysed and the tools used;
- an analysis of the context offers a succinct description of the situation in the country and the aid supplied to it.

The last three parts of the report present a summary of the general results of the study obtained from around a dozen different interventions. These results include the elements used to assess the contribution of the interventions to the reinforcement of V&A (Part 4), the lessons to be learned from the interventions analysed (Part 5) and the recommendations expressed (Part 6).

Part 2: Methodology

2.1. General context of the evaluation

This evaluation is a country case study (CCS) conducted by the DRC in relation to V&A projects. It forms part of a joint evaluation conducted by a restricted group of seven DAC/OECD partners. The various case studies are based on a common methodology drawn up by the ODI. This methodology has been the subject of a determined appropriation between the DAC partners' countries and the consultants responsible for the various case studies.

This CCS is the result of a joint effort by consultants under the leadership of Pierre Grega. The evaluation team was put together in such a way as to include different cultural sensitivities (Congolese to facilitate the local approach; French-speaking and English-speaking to overcome the diverse perceptions of the concept of CV&A). Continuous collaboration between the consultants during the field missions and drafting phase increased opportunities for discussion. All sections of the report were reviewed by every team member. This report, therefore, illustrates a viewpoint that is shared by all of the consultants.

The evaluation team comprised Pierre Grega, Sabine Garbarino, Georges Tshionza Mata and Manuel Eggen. Pierre Grega, team leader, has over twenty year's experience in the various sectors of development cooperation (non-governmental cooperation, bilateral and multilateral cooperation). His principal field of expertise is institutional support and good governance. He also has a thorough knowledge of Central Africa, particularly the DRC where he has already carried out some thirty short and medium-term missions throughout his career. Sabine Garbarino is a consultant at the British consultancy firm, Oxford Policy Management (OPM). She has a very sound knowledge of development policies and public governance in economic and social fields (such as support programmes financed by the DFID and the World Bank). Georges Tshionza Mata is Director of the Service for the Reinforcement of Support for the Base Communities of Central Africa (SERACOB), a regional network working with civil society organisations. He was greatly involved in the Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA), which gave civil society a role in the preparation of the PRGSP. During the drafting of the report, the team was also supported by Manuel Eggen, lawyer specialising in human rights and research consultant at DRIS for over two years.

It has been decided to split the country evaluations into two parts. The **inception phase** was designed to analyse the context and increase the mutual understanding of the term "V&A", ensure that the partners make proper use of the evaluation, and select the V&A interventions that will be the subject of the analysis. The **main evaluation phase** should allow an in-depth analysis to be carried out on the interventions selected and conclusions to be drawn for the study as a whole.

2.2. Inception phase

Initially, the aim of this first phase was to explore the varying perceptions and interpretations of the concept of V&A. During a series of semi-structured interviews, the consultants therefore obtained qualitative data on the way in which these concepts were understood by the principal stakeholders in the co-operation in the DRC, grouped into four categories:

- the Congolese authorities met, both political and administrative;
- the local Congolese actors;

- the international actors active in the DRC (multilateral organisations, bilateral agencies and international NGOs);
- the donors.

The second principal aim of the inception phase was to finalise the selection of interventions to be subjected to evaluation, in association with the various donors concerned.
The field visit to a number of projects that could potentially be evaluated, the examination of the evaluation reports on some of these projects, and the semi-structured interviews with each of these donors, revealed which interventions were the priority areas to be accepted for each of the donors taken individually.
A selection of about ten interventions was chosen by the team of consultants and presented for approval at the debriefing meeting for the inception phase, which confirmed the selection set out below, proposing the acceptance of Mbuji-Mayii in Eastern Kasaï Province, as a second place of evaluation.

This second location was chosen for the following reasons:

- this is a province in which radical opposition was particularly apparent, and a sizeable part of civil society was therefore highly critical towards the public authority;
- this province, subject to the Mining Code, contains substantial natural resources mostly exploited on an informal basis. It is therefore a good specific illustration of the continuous inherent contradiction within the DRC, between its great wealth of natural resources and the extreme poverty of its population;
- the level of poverty in this province is one of the highest in the DRC;
- external evaluation teams seldom visit this province[5].

[5] For more information on Eastern Kasaï Province compare Part 3.

Table 1: List of interventions selected according to selection criteria

	Project	Donors	Actors	Themes	Location[6]
1	Support to Radio Okapi	UK	International NGO: Foundation Hirondelle /, MONUC, Radio Okapi	Media	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
2	Support for Institutions de la Transition	UK	International organisation: UNDP	Media, election support, capacity building for state institutions	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
3	Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA	SE / UK	International NGO: EISA	Elections	Kinshasa
4	Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace - Search for Common Ground/Centre Lokolé	UK / SE /BE	Iinternational NGO: SFCG LNGO: Lokolé Centre	Conflict resolution and peace-building through media programmes and community development	Kinshasa
5	Initiative for joint work in the leadership and State cohesion (ILCCE) - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars	UK / SE	International NGO: WWICS	Training initiatives for leaders to support conflict resolution, peace-building and build state capacity	Kinshasa
6	Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the DRC – Global Witness	SE	International NGO: Global Witness	Advocacy for transparency in extractive industries; support for national CSO	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayi
7	Supporting the National Council for NGOs Active in the Development Sector (CNONGD)	BE	International NGO: 11.11.11	Support for civil society (through NGO umbrella organisation)	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
8	Capacity building Programme for trade union - Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC)	BE	National CSO : CSC	Support for civil society (trade unions)	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
9	Strengthening the rule of law and restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu	BE / UK	International NGO: RCN	Justice	Kinshasa
10	Support programme for development initiatives in the Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke (PAIDECO-Kin)	BE	Bilateral government co-operation: BTC	Decentralisation, community development programme	Kinshasa

[6] Location of premises in which the interventions were evaluated: many of these interventions have a presence in places other than those mentioned in the columns. They are often active in most main provincial towns and sometimes at more local level (see Annex B with more comprehensive table showing levels of intervention (national/provincial/local) for each project).

This selection thus meets most of the criteria accepted:

- three interventions will be located in Kinshasa only, while the seven others, in addition to their location in the capital, will have similar establishments or projects in the interior of the country, five of them being evaluated in Mbuji-Mayii;
- the interventions cover the various types of actor involved, even though a majority of the projects are conducted by international NGOs, this being representative of the method of involvement in DRC during the transition period;
- there is a level of equilibrium between projects focusing on supply and demand-side, even though donor support to supply-side (i.e. state accountability) are the least frequent, this being representative of the Congolese nature of getting out of the crisis;
- there is equilibrium between the projects financed by the various partner donors in the evaluation, and over fifty per cent of these projects are financed by several donors. This is also typical of the Congolese situation.

2.3. Main evaluation phase

The **main evaluation phase** has examined the general situation of V&A in the DRC in depth. A second field mission thus met the points of view of key informants representing the public authorities, international NGOs and local actors. It then focussed on an analysis of the ten interventions accepted using as a basis the examination of the five components of the V&A interventions as identified in the Evaluation Framework (A. Opportunities, constraints and entry points for CV&A, B. Institutional, organisational and individual capacities, C. Voice and accountability channels, D. Changes in policy, practice, behaviours and power relations and E. Broader development outcomes) and the DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, durability).

For each of these interventions accepted in the sample, a consultation of available documents was carried out beforehand and often complemented through further documents obtained in the field. Contact was made beforehand with the persons responsible for monitoring these projects with the various donors. Finally, a systematic data gathering was carried out in the field.

The following methodological tools in particular were used during this data harvest in the field:

- secondary data review of available documentation;
- Focus Group Discussions[7];
- group discussion;
- semi-structured interviews with donors, key informants and persons involved in the projects;
- passive observation.

In addition, for several projects, the qualitative data gathering were accompanied by a field visit including to the studios of Radio Okapi, radio studios broadcasting SFCG programmes,

[7] The evaluation did not encounter any problems of participation in the Focus Group: the presence was spontaneous in each case and the level of involvement in discussions high. No participant was paid for their involvement in the Focus Group, although in some groups (radio auditors, CSC, PAIDECO) transport costs were refunded. This is further testimony to the Congolese population's intense desire to voice its opinion and participate in the public phenomenon.

IEC and HAM offices, a provincial government and parliament, a regional office of the CNONGD, RCN training premises, PAIDECO project realisation premises etc.

In terms of the data gathering, the evaluation mission encountered a number of difficulties:

- the period that preceded the inception phase was clearly too short to allow proper collective assessment by the team of consultants of the methodological range on offer;
- in the particular context of the Democratic Republic of Congo (fragile State, emerging from crisis, public authorities with particularly limited means etc), the quantitative and documentary data are difficult to access and lack continuity;
- the inception phase chose to accept ten interventions for analysis in order to provide a balanced sample between donors, one that represented the wide variety of actions undertaken during the transition. The large size of the sample and the logistical conditions on the DRC necessitated a reduction in the number of methods used.

In view of the general difficulty in obtaining quantitative data, the stage prioritised semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in order to target most effectively the principal sources of direct information. The evaluation mission thus made use of a range of methodological tools, which proved very suitable and helpful. Among these were:

- understanding of the widely scattered direct beneficiaries: random selection, Focus Groups in two different cities, diversified sections of the public, Venn diagram;
- analysis of a project-facilitated confrontation between police officers and representatives of civil society: passive observation of a workshop followed by a Focus Group with some of the people involved in that workshop.

In addition, all the interviews and meetings were started with a systematic explanation of the concept of V&A, in an effort to overcome the lack of familiarity with this concept in the French-speaking world.

Finally, during the main evaluation mission in the field, a representative of the SES of the Belgian Foreign Affairs Ministry accompanied the team of evaluators. To ensure completeness of transparency, this person was introduced to everyone who was interviewed. The SES representative was not a member of the evaluation team; his function throughout the mission was to observe only, and the aim of having him present was to obtain a better personal knowledge of the evaluation mechanisms. It is difficult to measure the impact of this presence on the answers given, even though at the beginning this impact seems to have been very limited in view of how the interviews turned out.

On completion of the two missions (inception mission and main evaluation phase), the initial conclusions were presented to the majority of the participating parties, who were able to give their observations and responses (workshop in Kinshasa on 17th December 2007, see participants in Annex E). An initial draft of the report was submitted for comment to several stakeholders (such as the representatives of financial backers in Kinshasa, SEU of the Belgian cooperation, SIDA, DFID and 11.11.11). It was also sent to the Quality assurance panel (PARC), responsible for monitoring the quality of the Country Cases Studies. All of the various stakeholders' comments, after being discussed and reviewed, were incorporated in the final version of the report.

2.4 *Feedback on evaluation framework*

The evaluation framework represents a very useful and unusually detailed means for analysing V&A interventions which is well grounded in a thorough analysis of both, voice and accountability. It is well designed to guide the country case studies and allows the team to focus on a broad range of factors connected to CV&A.

At the same time, the framework is very complex and has more than one layer, i.e. the five components of the framework, the four evaluation questions and the DAC criteria. While the components and the evaluation questions represent an adequate guidance and useful means to analyse V&A intervention, the DAC criteria feel like an add-on to the framework. Moreover, given that this is not an evaluation of individual projects the DAC criteria may not be necessarily the most appropriate means to evaluate the overall donor support to V&A in one country.

Given the complexity of the framework and the number of interventions (10 in the case DRC) we struggled with the time available for the design mission (including the selection of interventions) and the actual field-work. In praxis this sometimes meant compromising on quality of data gathering; e.g. we would have liked to spend more time for each intervention using the opportunities to work more carefully on sequencing of methods, using more diverse tools, using the models of change to a larger extent during the data gathering rather than the analysis. Moreover, the evaluation team felt that the framework has been interpreted in various ways for too long during the evaluation process and that this framework could have placed greater importance on the selection criteria for the project interventions.

Part 3: Context of CV&A

3.1. The socioeconomic context

DRC is the third largest country in Africa. Its central position in Africa and its wealth of natural resources and raw materials have always been a source of attraction for the western powers, as well as for the country's neighbours in the region. This privileged situation is however in total contrast with the widespread poverty of the country.

Nearly four hundred ethnic groups coexist in the vast territory of DRC[8]. French is the lingua franca, but four local languages (Kikongo, Lingala, Tshiluba and Swahili) and numerous dialects are also spoken. The majority of the population, estimated at 58 million, live below the threshold of poverty (71%)[9]. The poor management of the national resources and a succession of wars have led to the overall deterioration of the socioeconomic situation of the country, with the dilapidation of its basic economic and social infrastructures, the shrinking of the formal private sector, loss of millions of human lives, hundreds of thousands of people displaced, a general lowering of life expectancy, and the emergence and development of CSO activities to ensure the survival of the population, in the face of the abandonment by the state of its essential public service responsibilities.

As a result of all of the above, DRC has become one of the poorest countries in the world. With a Human Development Index of 0.411 (2005 HDI), DRC is below the averages for both Sub-Saharan Africa (0.493) and the least developed countries (0.488).

The province of Eastern Kasai

Poverty affects all the national territory and every social category, even though there are several examples of marked inequality. The province of Eastern Kasai, for example (where a part of the evaluation process took place), with its enormous mineral riches, is at the present time one of the poorest parts of the country. This province is the leading producer of industrial diamonds, but its economic development has been ravaged by particularly violent political and ethnic conflicts and the inappropriate management of foreign and domestic investments.

From 1996 to the end of 2001, Eastern Kasai did not escape the devastating effects of the various wars. Its natural resources (diamonds, timber and livestock, among others) were exploited to an excessive degree by both the allied forces and the rebels. The main diamond exploitation company in the country, MIBA, was spoiled of its main financial and material resources, either to support the war or simply to enrich the aggressors. It is currently in a state of insolvency.

Other, earlier conflicts, especially the ethnic warfare of 1992-1993, affected the Kasai communities in the neighbouring province of Katanga. These events forced more than 500,000 Kasai families living in Katanga to return to Eastern Kasai after losing most of their

[8] Figures obtained from several cross-searches over the Internet. See for example Website page: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9publique_d%C3%A9mocratique_du_Congo#_note-7, which quotes a number of sources which speak of 200 to 450 ethnic groups. These are in turn divided into a number of sub-groups (the Bantu, Sudanese, Nilotic, Hamitic and Pygmy peoples).

[9] PRGSP, p. 24

possessions and, frequently, several members of their families. Today, many of these displaced persons live in subhuman conditions[10].

The proportion of the population in this province living on less than a dollar a day is estimated at 83%. The GDP per capita is 14% less than it was in 1999[11].

During the years of unrest, the division of power in the DRC was characterised by the state's abdication of its primary responsibilities, the absence of national monitoring mechanisms and a decaying legal framework. As a consequence of this abdication, power was monopolised, in certain regions of the country, by local potentates and tribal chiefs, which sometimes resulted in inward-looking identities and violent internal or inter-ethnic conflicts (such as the Katangan-Kasai conflict). The east of the country (Kivus, Ituri) saw the proliferation of warlords who spread terror among the civilian population and waged bloody battles driven by the desire to control the country's natural wealth. These warlords did not hesitate to use child soldiers to increase their numbers and were responsible for the worst acts of violence against civilian populations, particularly women (sexual violence).

In spite of this, in their fight for survival, the Congolese people were able to rely on community dynamics (see §6) and family. In spite of the disastrous economic situation, interpersonal solidarity, encouraged by a broad view of the family group, is a powerful binding agent in Congolese society, which to some extent mitigates the worst effects of the economic crisis. As a result of this solidarity, several networks of donations and counter-donations have emerged, some of a very long-term nature. The vast majority of the population of Congo regard the family as the nucleus for development. Families dedicate a significant part of their income to health and education, which, for better of worse, goes some way towards making up for the abandonment of these two sectors by the state.

Religion also provided a significant refuge from the harsh reality of daily life. The churches are one of the country's most influential institutions. Catholicism, Protestantism and Kimbanguism (a protestant Christian community which worships the memory of Simon Kimbangu, a martyr to religious intolerance during the colonial period) are the most widespread religions. Islam has several thousand followers. Alongside these major religions in DRC are many revival churches and sects, whose sources of finance are not always paragons of transparency. Overall, the Congolese practise their religions in a spirit of tolerance. DRC does not appear to be a fertile breeding ground for fundamentalism. Religious practices do however often overlap with superstitions, fetishism and even sorcery. It is not rare for children, regarded as possessed by spirits, to be subject to sexual abuse or abandoned by their families.

3.2. The political context

Very soon after gaining independence in 1960 and the assassination of its democratically elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, Congo found itself living under the authoritarian regime of President Mobutu, which squandered a considerable part of Congolese wealth and

[10] Provincial Technical Committee for the PRSP-Kasaï Oriental : PRSP of the Province of Kasaï Oriental, december 2006. For an analysis of the conflict between Katanga and Kasaï see : Donatien DIBWE dia Mwembu, *Mémoire collective. Le conflit Katangais – Kasaïen et le rôle des universitaires dans l'espace public (1991-2005), Université de Lubumbashi*, 2005, available on the Website : http://web.univ-pau.fr/RECHERCHE/CREPAO/pdf/pau_intelec_092006/dibwe.pdf

[11] Idem

progressively isolated the country at international level. In 1997, a coalition led by Laurent Désiré Kabila of the AFDL party (Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces) overthrew this regime with the assistance of outside allies. However, Laurent Désiré Kabila soon demonstrated his independence from his eastern allies of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. These latter used the inability of Kinshasa to bring the Interhamwe Hutu rebels exiled in DRC after the Rwanda genocide of 1994 under control as an excuse to intervene militarily in the Congolese territory. Congo was divided by this long period of war until 2003. The conflict cost the lives of more than 3 million people[12] and saw the assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila in January 2001. He was succeeded as leader of the country by his son Joseph Kabila. The Global Inclusive Agreement of Pretoria (2002) officially put an end to these years of war, even though pockets of conflict remained and remain to this day, especially in the east of the country. DRC became involved in a process of political transition which continued until the democratic elections held in 2006 under the supervision of the international community (CIAT and MONUC).

In spite of electoral campaigns involving hatred-fuelled speeches and the uneven distribution of the resources at the disposal of the candidates, the population of Congo demonstrated its attachment to a democratic and non-violent way of appointing its leaders, with dignity and determination. The elections were the culmination of a long, difficult process of restoring peace and stability to the political institutions of DRC. They made it possible to take a decisive step in the direction of consolidating democracy and adopting a policy of appeasement which involved all the political actors in the country. However, a number of recent events (confrontation between armed groups of Bemba and government troops in March 2007, new conflicts in the east of the country, and others) have shown that the road towards the consolidation of peace and democracy is a long one.

3.3. The institutional context: from the Transition to democratic elections

The Pretoria Global Inclusive Agreement opened up the period of transition on June 2003 amid a particularly precarious political and economic climate. Under the terms of article 89 of the Transitional Constitution, a government was set up on the basis of the untried logic of '1 + 4', that is, 1 President of the Republic and 4 Vice-presidents from different warring parties and the democratic opposition. A parliament, whose members were designated by the various signatories to the Sun City Agreement, was charged with voting in the laws which were to form the basis for the evolution of the new political order and lay down the ways in which the state would be run. The institutional framework of the Transition was completed by the setting up of institutions known as 'democratic support' organisations. The purpose of these was to erect a protective barrier against the remnants of the classical political institutions, and consisted of:

[12] Among the most important studies carried out on the humanitarian situation in DRC during the war years, we will refer to the reports by the American NGO known as the International Rescue Committee. Between 1998 and 2002, the IRC estimated that more than 3.3 million people had died in the Congolese conflict. See International Rescue Committee, "*Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Results from a Nationwide Survey"*, conducted September-November 2002, reported April 2003.
A new report published in 2007 shows that the humanitarian crisis did not end with the political Transition, as the additional number of deaths has been estimated at 5.8 million. See International Rescue Committee, "*Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo, An Ongoing Process*", fifth and latest survey, covering the period from January 2006 to April 2007 (available on http://www.theirc.org/resources/2007/2006-7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf). The IRC report makes it clear that after transition few of these deaths were due to violence, and that most of them are in fact the result of illnesses that could easily have been avoided or treated, such as malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and malnutrition.

- the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), whose mission was to organise free, transparent, democratic elections;
- the Higher Authority for the Media (HAM), which was to guarantee the pluralism, regulation and public service nature of the media;
- the Commission for Ethics and the Elimination of Corruption (CELC), which was a guarantor of good governance, transparency and the restoration of good public conduct;
- the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), whose mandate was to help the Congolese reassess their history and obtain the truth on the causes of violations of human rights and the victims of crimes, with a view to bringing about a reconciliation;
- the National Human Rights Observatory (ONDH), for the observation and control of respect for human rights.

It has emerged from our interviews with personnel involved that while CEI and HAM substantially succeeded in achieving their objectives this was not the case with CECL, CVR or ONDH, due to lack of resources and, at times, political will.

Since 29th October 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has held major elections, which should have put an end to the period of transition. There are important signs which indicate that DRC is progressively entering that alliance of nations that can be defined as democratic.

The elections made it possible to set up new institutions, as laid down in the new Constitution adopted by means of the referendum of 19th December 2005. The most important of these institutions are the following:

- the President of the Republic,
- the Lower Chamber of Parliament (the National Assembly),
- the Upper Chamber of Parliament (the Senate),
- and in each province of the country: a Governor elected by indirect suffrage, a Provincial Assembly and a Provincial Government.

3.4. Good governance: the challenge of development

Decades of dictatorship have cancelled out the most elementary principles of good public management, and the situation deteriorated further during the years of warfare. All the indicators of governance are at their lowest level since 1998 and DRC is below the average with respect to the other countries in the region. In 2006, DRC achieved a score of 5.8 out of 100 for the World Bank Voice and Accountability indicator[13]. All the indicators were in the red zone (overall rating: "very weak") in the 2006 Global Integrity Report, which measures the existence and effectiveness of national anti-corruption mechanisms, and DRC is classified in 144th position out of 158 countries in the Transparency International Report, which measures the level of corruption (see the reference in Annex C).

During the Transition, a number of initiatives were set up in an attempt to recover the level of governance among the public powers and their ability to respond to the concerns of the citizens. One of the organisations created as a result of this was the National Office for Capacity Building (SENAREC). Its mission was the drafting of a Support Document for the National Emergency Programme for Capacity Building in DRC (APNURC), with the backing

[13] Source: World Bank, *Worldwide Governance Indicators: 1996-2006.* The World Bank analyses several governance indicators, including Voice and Accountability.

of outside partners[14]. In spite of the ambitions of this programme, financed by no fewer than seven donors[15], we can only conclude that up to the present time the achievements of the APNURC have been limited. According to the people we spoke to, this can mainly be explained by the fact that it was exclusively geared towards the capacity building regarding macroeconomic management and, even within this context, solely at the level of the central administration of public services. Certain areas of the public sector at central and provincial levels, the private sector and civil society as a whole were not taken into account in the APNURC, in spite of their determining role in the reconstruction of the country. The limited range of the programme is also the result of a lack of coordination and dialogue between the different donors and a lack of leadership on the Congolese side[16].

The new Constitution also takes governance as the central priority. Among the issues it regards as fundamental are the setting up of good governance as one of the priorities in the fight against poverty, the creation of new provinces, decentralisation and the unity of the country. Also at stake is the improvement of horizontal accountability, in the form of the clarification of the division of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial authorities.

The setting up of good governance and the achievement of a minimum of macroeconomic stability will only be possible if the main national development actors, that is, the government, private sector and the civil society organisations, reach a joint, durable, concerted agreement on the reconstruction of the country. In this sense, one of the most important decisions was the setting up in 2004 of a Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) at national level. Breaking away from the traditional top-down decision-making and planning process, the representatives of the local communities, non-governmental organisations, civil society and the private sector throughout the country were asked to take part in the Participatory Poverty Analysis and suggest ways and means of improving the living conditions of the population.

The fundamental objective of the PPA was to supply quality data for the drafting of the DRC Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in the form of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP). The participatory analysis demonstrated that as far as the population was concerned the main cause of poverty was poor governance. As most of the provincial reports in the analysis indicated, poor governance is fuelled by abuses of power on the part of the authorities at every level, corruption, impunity and the plundering of public assets.

The programme of the new government of DRC, approved on 24th February 2007, is based on the PRGSP. The foreword to the programme states that the elections give the Congolese people a power of control and sanction over the government, through their elected representatives. Good governance is defined as "*the cornerstone of the programme. Its restoration will facilitate the construction of a strong, prosperous state, which will guarantee long term development and a stable economy capable of reducing poverty*"[17]. In addition, the

[14] For a presentation of SENAREC and PNURC, see SENAREC, *Note de présentation du Secrétariat Général pour le Renforcement des capacités*, Kinshasa, July 2003 (version available on the website page : http://www.ccre.cd/senarec/senarecapropos.pdf).
15 ACBF, AfDB, Belgium, CIDA, France, UNPD and the WB.
[16] Interviews with members of the BTC and UNPD.
[17] Government of DRC, *Programme du Gouvernement 2007-2011,* Kinshasa, July 2007, p. 39, available at http://www.un.int/drcongo/archives/ProgrammeGouvernementFinal.pdf

fact that DRC regarded 'community dynamics' as one of the five pillars of the PRGSP is a unique starting point for a participatory approach to the reduction of poverty.

3.5. Civil society

After the state abandoned its public service functions, there was an explosion of new, small and medium businesses in the informal sector and organisations inspired by community dynamics within civil society. The civil society movement brought about new prospects for the population and created new jobs. Many citizens also attempted to set up their own businesses within the sector, which led to a multiplication of organisations with limited resources, whose charters and objectives are not always particularly clear.

In spite of the limited means available, the influence of the civil society organisations on the running of the elections, as well as at the institutional, socioeconomic and political lobbying levels, both during and after the transition, was certainly of an essential nature[18]. Some of the Civil Society Organisations **(CSOs)** with more significant popular and institutional powers than others showed great determination in affirming their role of opposition. This was especially the case with the CNONG (National Council of NGOs), which coordinates the action of the **NGOs** in DRC.

However, within this proliferation of organisations, there were also many which came up against acute problems that reduced their ability to act (problems of internal management, failure to fully comprehend the dimensions of the situation, limited impact with the citizens, resignation of office holders, and so on). In addition, the frequent use of the NGO formula by individuals in DRC to develop their businesses or sustain their personal political careers tends to have a negative implication for the actions of NGOs whose aims truly are of a social nature.

One important element of civil society is the network of **churches**. With religion being at the core of Congolese society the churches are among of the country's most influential institutions. In particular the Catholic Church—with Catholicism being the most wide-spread religion in DRC—has a well-established network of churches over the country including hard-to-reach rural areas.

DRC from colonial times has inherited a strong culture of **trade unions**; precise figures on the number of trade unions are not available and estimates range from 117 to 380 trade union country-wide. Low rates of formal employment and the current socio-economic situation make the trade unions' work difficult; as a result of this, trade union representation is limited. Nevertheless, trade unions are at the centre of social dialogue trying to contribute to promoting reconciliation and greater equality between men and women and action against child employment.

With low literacy rates and low purchasing power of a majority of Congolese print **media** and TV are not wide-spread. This makes radio by far the most important source of information. Moreover, radio is hugely popular with the majority of Congolese and plays an important part in most peoples' days, listening to news, radio soap and music. However, radio stations are often local and struggle with logistical and infrastructure obstacles, such as the frequent cuts in electricity. Moreover, skilled radio journalists are rare and are badly (if at all) paid putting

[18] Interviews with those in charge of coordinating the organisation of the elections and the heads of international organisations in DRC.

their independence at constant risk.

3.6. The context of foreign aid

It is difficult to determine the context of aid in DRC in a precise manner. The records kept by the Congolese institutions on the amounts of aid received and the areas affected tend to be patchy and of limited comparative usefulness.

Up to the start of the eighties, DRC (known at the time as Zaire) was able to make use of a number of outside resources in the form of loans and donations. In the absence of an appropriate management framework for the handling and follow-up of these resources, the mobilisation of aid took place took place in a disorganised manner. With a view to making up for this management problem, the regime of the time created a Coordinating Committee for External Resources (CCRE).

During the eighties, the CCRE data showed a number of variations in foreign aid in line with the context and the capacity of absorption of DRC. From 1982 to 1989, the bilateral partners accounted for 50.03% of the resources, foreign loans and donations granted to DRC, while the multilateral partners contributed 41.2% of the same resources. Foreign private institutions, for their part, contributed 8.77% of this foreign aid.

During the nineties, the trend in foreign aid was strongly influenced by the political and institutional context. From 1991 onwards, the Mobutu regime put a stop to most of the state to state cooperation, which led to the freezing of structural aid. The operations of the CCRE were reduced to the minimum, and in the early nineties a form of financial cooperation emerged which was based on the virtually exclusive allocation of foreign resources to the NGOs. From 1991 to 1993, the volume of foreign aid dropped rapidly, following this break.

Table 2: Foreign aid in DRC from 1990 to 1999 (in millions of USD)

	YEAR									
	1990	**1991**	**1992**	**1993**	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**
TOTAL	**469.6**	**266.38**	**94.66**	**107.6**	**148**	**313.7**	**324.35**	**240.47**	**124.5**	**195**

Source: CCRE, report on foreign resources mobilised for the development of DRC (2001-2002 financial years), Kinshasa, December 2002

During the war years, it was noted that the main source of aid was donations (77%) rather than repayable loans (23%), and that most of these were in the form of emergency aid and foodstuffs assistance. The multilateral partners contributed to 60.65% of this aid, with only 36.8% coming from the bilateral partners.

The first few years of the new millennium showed a sharp recovery in official development assistance (ODA), which intensified from 2002 onwards with a view to dealing with the humanitarian crises and sustaining the political transition process. Most of this aid consisted of donations (79% in 2002-06), with 21% taking the form of loans. As from 2003, with the progressive resumption of state cooperation, bilateral aid once again formed the greatest contribution, according to the OECD, while multilateral aid accounted for no more than 22%[19] (2003 to 2006)[20].

[19] OECD, Calculations based on gross disbursements.

[20] The figures received from the DRC Ministry of Planning and those of the OECD do not coincide. For 2006, the Ministry of Planning recorded foreign contributions of only 1,117.8 US dollars, 73% of which came from

Table 3: ODA in DRC, 1997-2006

Donor	All Donors, Total									
Amount	Current prices (millions of USD)									
Type of aid	ODA total, net disbursements									
Year	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**	**2004**	**2005**	**2006**
Congo Dem. Rep. (Zaire)	**157.61**	**125.47**	**132.38**	**177.12**	**243.11**	**1174.95**	**5416.03**	**1824.06**	**1827.3**	**2055.72**

Source: OECD

This recent aid to DRC, which may seem significant at first glance, regards debt repayment operations first and foremost. This was particularly the case in 2003, when DRC obtained a large reduction in its debts within the context of the HIPC initiative. The reduction of these debts, which were built up during the years of dictatorship, had become essential for the very survival of the country. The HIPC initiative made it possible to avoid the virtual bankruptcy of the country and probably made a contribution to putting the fragile democratic transition back on the rails. However, these debt reduction operations within the context of the recent foreign aid to DRC led the international NGOs to complain that this was merely apparent aid to DRC, which did not benefit the population and whose purpose was to repay the loans that had built up over the decades of authoritarian, 'kleptomaniac' rule, to the extent that in spite of these reductions the repayment of the debts still accounts for 19.6% of the total outlay of the state.

If we consider this trend towards increased foreign aid and the importance of reducing the debts, DRC appears to be one of the main beneficiaries of international aid in Africa (first in 2002 and 2003) and the world as a whole (seventh in the world in 2006).

More recently (2004-2005), the main donors of RDC in order of importance were the World Bank, the European Union, Belgium, the UK, the USA and France. Most of these donors had already been present in the nineties, with the exception of the UK, which was the only newcomer in the group of main donors.

Although it is difficult to obtain precise figures on the breakdown of aid by sector which are directly comparable over time, it is possible to note a general evolution. During the first years of the 21st century, the debt repayment operations and emergency aid accounted for most of the contributions to DRC. But from 2006 onwards, additional aid has been supplied to sustain the electoral and democratisation processes.

From that time onwards, good governance and support for democracy and the rule of law are the areas which have benefited most, and it is probable that this trend will continue in the future, given that the political strategy documents (PRGSP) emphasise the importance of sustaining good governance.

multilateral donors (Ministry of Planning – Department for the Coordination of External Resources, *Statistiques de la RDC relatives aux décaissements extérieurs en 2006*).

Table 4: Disbursement by sector of activity, 2006-2007

Sector of activity	Annual disbursements		Commitments declared	
	2006	%	2007	%
Good governance	486.56	44	470.29	21
Infrastructures and equipment	177.431	16	355.489	16
Production sectors	25.34	2	70.633	3
Social sectors	415.439	37	1102.963	50
Environment	6.076	1	44.233	2
Multi-sectoral	6.988	1	171.775	8
Total	**1,117.84**	**100**	**2,215.38**	**100**

Source: Ministry of Planning (Department for the Coordination of External Resources), 2006

Part 4: Findings

4.1. Enabling environment

Opportunities

Although they took place within a fragile state newly emerged from a very long period of crisis, the V&A support interventions carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo were able to take advantage of a number of opportunities which, in some cases, facilitated the achievement of the objectives.

The **main opportunity** was political first and foremost: after decades of dictatorship and six years of warfare, the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and Pretoria global inclusive agreement offer that **minimum of regional stability and security** which is essential for the resumption of the political, social and economic activities of central Africa and DRC. More specifically, the Pretoria agreements offer a further opportunity – that of producing a precise definition of the political institutions for the period of transition and specifying the way in which the various actors (warring parties, politicians and civil society) will be involved and contribute to the setting up and running of these Institutions de la Transition.

The **determination of the international community to see DRC emerge from its crisis** is the second important political opportunity. Several factors bear witness to this determination: the creation of the United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC) in 1999, which will go on to become the most important peacekeeping mission on which the United Nations are currently involved; the involvement of the main partners of Congo in the joint monitoring of the political evolution of the country through CIAT; the global volume of foreign financing to be made available to complete a number of stages in the transition (the elections above all), and so on.

Example of CIAT intervention:

"CIAT is delighted with Parliament's adoption of the electoral law on this Tuesday 21st February. This is a decisive step in the organisation of the elections by the Independent Electoral Commission. However, CIAT notes with regret that the law has not yet been passed on to the President of the Republic.

For this reason, CIAT appeals to Parliament to forward this law to the President of the Republic as soon as possible, to enable it to be passed without further delay. The people are awaiting the elections with impatience, and any additional delay could postpone the electoral process beyond 30th June 2006…."

CIAT statement – Kinshasa, 25th February 2005.

The experience of several processes of democratisation set up or successfully completed in Sub-Saharan Africa has led to the emergence of new opportunities, with examples to be analysed or adopted, exchanges and sharing of responsibilities, and so on. The post-apartheid situation in South Africa and the end of the civil war in Angola certainly enabled these two major neighbours of DRC to play a more active part in supporting the transition process (mainly, but not exclusively, through CIAT).

There are also internal opportunities within Congolese society. At this level, most of the people we spoke to during the evaluation mentioned first and foremost the **eagerness for**

information and desire to take part of the Congolese population in general[21]. The long period of crisis, depth of the recession and disastrous effects of bad governance on the daily lives of the people of Congo have all led to an urgent desire among the population in general to do everything possible to emerge from the crisis situation as quickly as possible. In addition, in spite of the years of civil war and the attempts to exacerbate ethnic differences, a feeling of national identity and price in belonging to the same nation have remained deep-rooted in the majority of the Congolese population.

In addition to this general attitude among the majority of the population, the evaluation also noted another opportunity in Congolese society, in relation to the **diversity and dynamism of the civil society organisations.** The country has a long tradition of forming groups and assemblies of individuals, and the organisations created in this way are also very skilled at compensating for the shortcomings of the state, as a result of which they have come to be recognised as political actors in every sense of the term. Already well represented during the political transformations of the nineties, these organisations were one of the four entities which signed the global inclusive agreement, and their contribution was essential during the Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) and the drafting of the PRGSP.

> *"**The citizens' institutions** (supporting the transition), that is, the Independent Electoral Commission, the Higher Media Authority, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the National Observatory on Human Rights and the Commission for Ethics and the Elimination of Corruption, **are chaired by representatives of the Civil Society/Forces for Life".***
>
> Political agreement for the consensus management of the transition in DRC, 2002.
>
> *"The division of responsibilities within the institutions of transition... takes place on the basis of the principle of inclusion and fair sharing... in accordance with the criteria of competence, ...*
>
> ***"The functions of the Presidents of the Institutions for the backing of democracy are laid down by the members of the Forces for Life. The Presidents** of the Institutions for the backing of democracy **have the rank of Minister**. The Institutions for the backing of democracy operate independently of the transitional government".*
>
> Global Inclusive Agreement, Pretoria, 17/12/2003

Finally, the evaluation was able to identify a further important opportunity for the carrying out of the V&A support interventions: **the progressive, though still highly rudimentary, drafting of the various legislative texts and frameworks** adopted at the start-up of the period of Transition. These texts in themselves are one of the first results of the reinforcement of governance, which will be able to provide support for the future V&A actions. By way of example, we can mention may the principle of decentralisation confirmed by the adoption of the new constitution, the conclusions reached by the Lutundula[22] commission on the mining

[21] The high turnout for the elections, the use of the radio to question politicians and the willingness to respond to this evaluation further demonstrate the willingness of the population to become involved in public affairs.

[22] In June 2005, the Lutundula Commission, a special commission of the National Assembly chaired by the MP Christophe Lutundula, published a report on the inquiries carried out over a period of more than six months on the mining and other business contracts signed by the rebels and government authorities between 1996 and 2003, when war was raging in Congo. This report, drawn up by members of the Transitional Parliament, stated that dozens of these contracts were illegal or of limited value for the development of the country. The report

contracts signed between 1999 and 2003, and the adhesion of DRC to the 2005 initiative for transparent management in the mining industries, among others.
Most of the donors active in DRC support the determination of the international community to emerge from the crisis, and have intensified their operations in the sector of governance as a result. In this sense, the growth in the volume of interventions since the start of the 21st century is significant. However, the number of donors remains limited, and their operations have been sporadic and patchy (the intensity of support has fluctuated with the uncertainties over the evolution of the democratisation process).

Obstacles and constraints
In a situation of continuing fragility, there are several obstacles and constraints in the path of V&A reinforcement in DRC.
The main obstacles, with particular reference to those encountered during the interventions analysed, can be summed up as follows:

- the political context: the fragility of the democracy (post-election disturbances), the persistence of pockets of conflict, especially in the east of the country, the low overall level of security (especially in Eastern Kasai) and the large number of victims of the conflicts and lack of security (hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, atrocities committed against civilians, especially against women);
- the complexity and unfinished and provisional nature of the Institutions of Transition and the way in which power is divided up, as a result of which parties who have recently been at war with each other are expected to run a country together. This means that there is significant inequality of representation in this division of power. Those who are aware of their over-representation in the bodies of transition are equally aware of the loss of power that the electoral process will imply for them. This specific situation in the institutions of transition brings about a number of constraints. Some actors have adopted delaying strategies, the local representatives of power are not yet legitimately elected, the institutions for the support of democracy were suspended at the end of the Transition, and so on;
- the widespread level of extreme poverty: this is a factor which could create a favourable climate for the emergence of petty corruption and the unofficial exploitation of natural resources. It leads to a multiplication of concerns over survival, which hold back the ability to play an active part and invest in V&A.
-

> *"Our entire investment in the LDCs is of a benevolent nature, but there is a lack of motivation. When you spend half the day in a meeting, that's time wasted … You have to come home in the evening with something to feed your children on".*
>
> Member of the PAIDECO LCD, Kinshasa 05.12.2007
>
> *"It's often difficult to assemble people for a meeting or demonstration,… because what they're looking for above all is money,... they've got to live, after all".*
>
> Company delegate, CSC, Kinshasa, 11.12.2007

recommended their annulment or renegotiation. It also recommended taking legal action against a certain number of high ranking politicians and business actors who were involved in these operations. After a delay of several months, the report was distributed to all the members of parliament, but its official examination by the chamber has been postponed on a number of occasions. The civil society organisations continue to make use of this report to demand the review of the contracts.

- the non-existence or unavailability of several legislative and administrative tools which form the basis of the organisation of the state and its relations with its citizens. These shortcomings lead to disregard of the law, even among those whose duty is to apply it and ensure that it is upheld;

> *"There was a 1978 law, but we were never able to make use of it. We never received the text. RCN was the first institution which gave us the text, and finally gave us the chance to examine the law".*
>
> *Police Officer, Kinshasa, 13.12.2007*

- the dilapidated state of the infrastructures and the widespread absence of material and human resources at public administrative level. Given the size of the country, these shortcomings lead to crucial logistical problems for most of the interventions;
- the consolidated practice of mismanagement, in the form of corruption, impunity, patronage, discretionary powers and similar phenomena, reduce the possibility of openness or the political willingness to accept change;
- the lack of political will, often quoted but rarely explained, mainly as a consequence of the two obstacles mentioned above;
- the strong dependence of DRC on foreign aid, in the form of technical assistance, financial and logistical resources, and similar. This can lead to a reluctance to take responsibility for the interventions due to the emergency situation, which means that the administrative authorities in Congo are often too weak to make use of the foreign assistance received to carry out certain steps towards democratisation[23];

The broad ranging nature and diversity of the obstacles and constraints go a long way towards explaining why the support currently given to V&A in DRC, in the form of interventions financed by the partners in the evaluation, is still partial and to a great extent unfinished.

Taking these constraints into consideration, most of the donors initially took the deliberate decision not to support the public authorities directly (the government and transitional parliament), in the belief that the unreliability of these institutions would render their support ineffective. This will of necessity have an impact on the type of V&A support that can be identified in DRC, with particular reference to the support given to civil society and the demand side.

[23] The Congolese Ministry of the Interior, for example, was too disorganised and weak to make use of the results and experiences made available by the implementation of the two electoral processes by the CEI.

Entry points

The recent historic evolution of DRC has had a powerful influence on the selection of the entry points by the various donors which financed the support for the reinforcement of V&A. The global inclusive agreement laid down the objectives of the transition, several of which were used as reference for most of the interventions assessed.

> *"The main objectives of the transition are:*
> 1. *the reunification, pacification and reconstruction of the country, the restoration of territorial integrity and the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country;*
> 2. *national reconciliation;*
> 3. *the formation of a restructured, integrated national army;*
> 4. *the organisation of free, transparent elections at all levels, to ensure the setting up of a constitutional democratic regime;*
> 5. *the setting up of structures which will lead towards a new political order".*
>
> Global Inclusive Agreement, Pretoria, 17/12/2003

The **institutions which emerged from this political agreement** were priority entry points for the V&A interventions:

- the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI)
- the Higher Media Authority (HAM)
- the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR)
- the National Observatory on Human Rights (ONDH)
- the Commission on Ethics and the Elimination of Corruption (CELC)

The setting up of these reorganised institutions formed part of the creation of a new political order supported by the international community. This support led the various donors to contribute to the setting up of these institutions. The AIT support project (see Annex D2) essentially made use of this point of entry, while other projects also indirectly supported this implementation, including the WWICS (see Annex D5), GW (see Annex D6) and RCN (see Annex D9).

The organisation of the elections was undoubtedly the entry point which made the greatest contribution towards mobilising foreign financial backing. Such initiatives as the support for AIT and the EISA election support project (see Annex D3) operated specifically from this point of entry. As the elections were a factor of particular priority for the international community, the AIT project was also backed up by an APEC project dedicated exclusively to these. A number of other projects, such as Radio Okapi (see Annex D1), SFCG (see Annex D4), WWICS and CNONGD[24] (see Annex D7) also dedicated a part of their intervention to supporting the electoral process. By regarding the quick holding of elections as the absolute priority, the international community brought about the massive mobilisation of the donors on this specific point of entry. Several of the people we interviewed complained that these decisions, based on the universal conception of democratisation based on universal suffrage had operated to the detriment of a more country-specific approach to participation.

[24] By way of an illustration of the statements made in this part of the study, some of the projects to which these statements refer are mentioned by way of example. The process of quotation is not exhaustive, but merely serves as an example (the projects mentioned do not necessarily correspond exactly with the data provided for them).

Particular attention is paid to **peace-keeping** as a entry point for the interventions (civic education campaign, prevention of conflicts, national reunification). In this sense, particular use was made of the media, the radio especially, in the Congolese context. The flexibility of the radio made it a favourite entry point for the widespread distribution of information on the peace process (through the use of the local languages), and it was also increasingly deployed as a tool for extending the discussions on these matters of pacification. Such projects as Radio Okapi, SFCG and RCN, made particular use of this point of entry.

Citizens' participation, one of the main focal points of this evaluation, was in itself a point of entry, and the almost exclusive target of such projects as CNONGD and CSC (see Annex D8), and to a certain extent of the Radio Okapi, AIT and SFCG projects. The Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) in particular was another important entry point for the citizens' voice.

The end of the period of political transition and the elections opened the way to **new means of access, which are now beginning to be exploited** by some donors:

- the new institutions which have emerged from the elections (the presidency and, above all, the national assemblies);
- the re-emergence of CEI (renamed CENI) and HAM (renamed CSAC);
- the new constitution, adopted by means of a referendum in 2005, by means of which governance is at the centre of development;
- the PRGSP, which is the reference document for future country-led development policies, the first pillar of which is good governance;
- the ambitious process of decentralisation in preparation for the national assembly. The PAIDECO project (see Annex D10) falls within this context.

The V&A strategy of the donors

Generally speaking, support for V&A was somewhat sporadic at the start of the 21st century. On the basis of the priorities identified by the international community, the donors operating in DRC were asked one by one to take part in one intervention or another. This meant that several of the interventions analysed were financed in parallel or successively by different donors, including the members of the restricted group of partners in this evaluation, without necessarily drawing up a common strategy. It was more a question of providing additional support or interventions rather than laying down an intervention strategy.

More recently, especially following the end of the transition period in DRC, the strategy of the donors has become more effectively structured, while remaining highly compartmentalised. In 2007, Belgium decided to focus nearly a quarter of its aid on governance and concentrate on certain areas of intervention in a more strategic manner, with particular reference to capacity building of the Congolese ministries (justice and public administration above all). DFID decided to take part in the multi donors' programme with the UNPD and focus its support for governance around five main areas: political, administrative, economic, local and legal/security governance. Over the last few years, Sweden has dedicated a third of its DRC budget to two areas of support for governance – peace and the prevention of conflicts on the one hand and human rights and democratic government on the other.

At the more specific level of the various interventions financed by the donors who are partners in this evaluation and on which this study focuses, three essential strategies have emerged:

1. The reinforcement in quantity and quality terms of the expression of citizens' claims. This includes the expression of choice by the electors (AIT, EISA), expression by the citizens through the media (Radio Okapi), expression by the citizens on local administration (PAIDECO), expression and defence of rights (RCN), the ability to express coherent claims and negotiate them with employers and politicians (CSC), expression of more general claims (lobbying), models of society (GW, CNONGD, CSC), and so on. Improvements in the quality of claims also took place through better knowledge (of rights, duties, etc). The operations geared towards reinforcing the spread of information (Radio Okapi, SFCG) also approached this dual aspect of the strategy (access to more effective information on the basis of which more effective citizens' claims could be presented).
2. A strategy of supporting the state institutions and their leaders and officials, to enable the state to retrieve its essential functions and perform them in a climate of greater transparency (AIT, EISA, WWICS, RCN, PAIDECO). This reinforcement of transparency and change in the behaviour of the public powers partly depends on a greater questioning capacity on the part of civil society, which is sustained by the donors, and involves lobbying, the presentation of claims, the use of the media and negotiation (Radio Okapi, GW, CNONGD, CSC).
3. A strategy which facilitates closer relations between the state and its citizens with a view to reducing mutual mistrust, improve mutual understanding, laying down the limits of responsibility of the institutions and reinforcing these relations with V&A: EISA (members of parliament and representatives of the international community), WWICS (political leaders and civil society), RCN (legal specialists and civil society) and PAIDECO (local administration and civil society).

4.2. Institutional, organisational and individual capacities

The description of the general context of DRC has brought to light the weakness of the country's institutional and organisational capacities, those of the public authorities in particular. In this sense, the situation of DRC is an exceptional one which is rarely encountered. One of the results of the Transition, essentially on the basis of a political agreement between the warring parties, was the reconstruction of the main bodies of public authority, which were fully staffed, deliberately provisional, and obliged to give way to their democratically elected successors within a given period of time. In this sense, a significant part of the investment channelled into the capacity building of these institutions involved the capacity building of the individuals who have to run them. There was therefore the risk of seeing these investments made during the transition disappear upon the completion of the process.

In most cases, the V&A support interventions analysed in this assessment regarded the capacities of the transitional institutions first and foremost. They had a more partial effect on the capacities of the new elected institutions, to the extent that the two are strictly dependent on each other, and to the extent that a part of the individual capacities reinforced during the transition could be safeguarded.

The reinforced capacity of the state institutions to respond to the demands of the citizens and account for themselves. The technical skills necessary to develop or maintain a system of accountability

The main reinforcement of the capacity of public institutions, and the most urgent if we take the initial context into account, was a contribution in terms of base materials and

infrastructures, with the requisitioning of buildings, rehabilitation of infrastructures, basic operating equipment, materials for the education of the electorate, means of transport and security equipment for the elections, and so on. This massive concentration on material support was subject to strong criticism by the local organisations.

> "*At the start, we had nothing. The governor requisitioned this building as it stands now. There's an old counter, and they installed our offices here, then a few tables and chairs appeared, and we started working...*"
>
> *(*Representative of Civil Society in the CEI, Mbuji Mayi, 07/12/2007*)*
>
> "*Certainly, the international community supported the elections, but it focused on the hardware and software... lots of these materials (for the creation of awareness of the elections) was created without taking into account that it already existed at local level. And in any case, it was late in arriving and it was no longer possible to distribute it…"*
>
> *(*A member of RODHECIC, 14/12/07*)*

But other capacity reinforcements were also supplied to the public institutions:

- financial resources for the payment of personnel (the transitional institutions for the AIT project, the local PAIDECO officials), to render their work more effective and reduce the risk of corruption. This is an important factor in the creation of greater responsibility in the public authorities with regard to the citizens. It has been generally acknowledged that the agents financed by the interventions are now behaving with greater integrity[25];
- training, supervision and exchange of experiences, to reinforce legislative drafting abilities and enable the actors involved to negotiate the wording of the texts (AIT, EISA, WWICS, RCN, PAIDECO);
- organisation of discussion workshops and meetings between leaders to reduce tension and indirectly reinforce national security, one of the functions of the state (WWICS).

As DR Congo has only very recently emerged from a situation of crisis, the interventions analysed still provide little specific support for the reinforcement of accountability on the part of the public authorities. At the present time, they have to be regarded as offering a preliminary level of general reinforcement of the capacity of the public institutions, with a view to enabling them to resume their fundamental responsibilities.

Within this context, the effectiveness of the interventions therefore continues to be limited, especially in terms of the accountability of the public institutions affected. The expectations of the donors as to the impact of the operations on accountability are therefore over-optimistic at times. The fact of ensuring the resumption of a minimal level of state operation does not necessarily mean that all the conditions of governance will be satisfied automatically, which is something that the international community often expects to take place immediately. In the best of hypotheses, the financing of the electoral process will ensure the fair, transparent

[25] For several representatives of the public authorities (the heads of the CEI and the Ministries of Justice, the Interior and Planning), the fact of being able to pay regular salaries to the officials meant that they could be more demanding in terms of the quality of the work carried out, independence of attitude and incorruptible conduct, even though these are not the only factors which influence the integrity of the officials.

selection of the elected representatives, but will not automatically guarantee their integrity. This is the point where formal democracy has its limits.

Ability of the CSOs to become involved in advocacy or political dialogue
Some projects focus exclusively or mainly on this objective. The GW campaigns for the reduction of the link between the exploitation of natural resources and corruption have adopted an outside strategy of encouraging and facilitating the collection of information through a network of local CSOs to fuel a lobbying campaign mainly based outside the country. The advocacy process makes use of the professionalism and reputation of the international organisations to place increasing pressure on the public authorities. Limited support in terms of technical resources and training enables the local CSOs to improve their ability to gather information in a professional way (GPS, mapping, etc). In a certain sense, this strategy replaces the direction action of the local CSOs, which can partly be explained by the urgent nature of the situation. The matter raised in the advocacy process is a crucial and a pressing one, but the transitory context in which DRC finds itself is not yet able to guarantee the adequate or autonomous running of the local CSOs (risk of repression, limited organisational and professional resources, a reputation still to be built up, and other factors). This means that the tasks are divided up between the collection of data by the local network and the transfer of the advocacy process to the public state by the international organisation. This type of indirect action regards the effectiveness of the advocacy process first and foremost, rather than the capacity building of the local CSOs.

Support for the CNONGD and CSC are two further interventions which mainly regard capacity building in terms of advocacy of the CSOs, but the context here is different. What we have here is a long term partnership whose aim is to reinforce the acknowledged position of these organisations as points of contact in their sector. The aim is to back up the organisations which are engaged in a more general long term advocacy process, and which therefore claim the right to take part in more structured discussions and negotiations with the public authorities (the expression of a variety of needs to defend the global interests of their members and become a recognised point of contact which is regularly asked for an opinion by the public authorities). The methods of support are more traditional (pauses for reflection, training, etc), and their effectiveness is at times called into question when their objective is the more collective reinforcement of an organisation which plays a role in V&A.

> *"Training is all very well, but the process isn't particularly widespread (120 out of a total of 3,000 members trained). And other operations and initiatives are also required in addition to training, if more progress in capacity building is to be made".*
>
> Trade union delegate, Mbuji Mayi, 08/12/2007

Most of the other interventions also involve the capacity building of the CSOs to some extent, even when this is not their main purpose. This is the case for the creation of educational tools, such as support for the education of the electorate, the training of trainers in the AIT and EISA projects and the training of representatives of civil society in the RCN and PAIDECO projects.

In a general sense, then, support for the CSOs concentrates more directly on the reinforcement of the abilities to appeal to and question the public authorities. Support for the public institutions, on the other hand, is of a much more general nature, and its global aim is to

reinforce their ability to take on their responsibility as authorities, rather than to strengthen their accountability capacities. There are various reasons for this unbalance, including the urgent need to respond to the essential requirement of getting the state to work, the fact that the state structures were still unstable or too provisional at the time of emergence from the crisis, and the fact that most of the donors have very limited confidence in the reliability of the public institutions.

The strengthening of institutional and organisational capacities is often defined as one of the essential objectives of the interventions analysed. However, the results are limited within the fragile state of Congo, where the interventions are frequently still geared towards resolving urgent situations. In some cases, then, their purpose is to assist the public administrative bodies to operate in the first place, facilitate the process of advocacy in raising matters of a pressing and crucial nature through the international NGOs, and respond to the immediate demands of the international community for elections through such ad hoc institutions as the CEI and international NGOs. In the immediate term, the investments are partially made to the detriment of a reinforcement of a more long terms strengthening of institutional and organisational capacities.

4.3. V&A channels

Involvement and support for the actors**, CSOs**

Some of the V&A support projects look to the CSOs for the actors who, due to the position in which they find themselves, represent the area they come from, and as such are able to appeal to the public authorities in person. This is the case with the CSO representatives in contact with the powers of justice in the RCN products or in the LDCs[26] with PAIDECO. The objective here is to bring about a change in individual behaviour that could lead to improved V&A.

> *"At the same time, we also organise training for members of civil society, to enable them to use this tool more effectively to defend their rights.*
>
> *If these people appeal to justice, they give an example. And given their reputation, they encourage the rest of the population to take part in the process".*
>
> RCN staff member, Kinshasa, 08/11/2007

In other interventions, civil society is a channel through which a part of the operation is carried out, such as in the projects which appeal to the NGOs to bring about the awareness of the electorate, in whole or in part (the AIT and EISA projects), those which fuel the advocacy process with a view to obtaining first hand information (GW) and projects for the construction of certain local infrastructures (PAIDECO).

Among the state actors, parliament and the five democracy support commissions are the channels most frequently used to develop the interventions analysed (the AIT, EISA and WWICS projects in particular). There are several factors which explain this:

- the commissions took on a part of the accountability of the state during the Transition (to guarantee the correct organisation of the elections, regulate the media, investigate levels of corruption, human rights, and so on);

[26] The Local Development Committees (LDC) are consultative bodies consisting of representatives of the local civil society, which negotiate the local development priorities with the local authorities.

- the responsibility of parliament was prior to that of the other institutions (to a certain extent, the process depended on the adoption of the legislative texts). It would seem that parliament has taken advantage of this initial investment, as it now appears to be the most dynamic of the elected institutions.

Finally, radio was used as an important channel for the V&A support process. Radio is the most accessible of all the media in low revenue societies, and in Congo it became increasingly effective as a means of creating awareness among the people and providing them with correct information, as well as giving them a channel through which they could express their claims and giving the authorities a channel by means of which they could justify and explain their actions.

Spaces and processes for expression, dialogue and claims of rights

Traditionally, the culture of dialogue and the promotion of civil society organisations are approaches which have frequently been adopted in Congolese society, even though the periods of authoritarian rule have tended to limit the use of practices of this kind. The interventions support the setting up and organisation of certain opportunities for dialogue. Among the many examples of this phenomenon, we can mention the following:

- civil society has taken over the running of the transitional support institutions and is represented in their bodies (the AIT and EISA projects);
- the more structured coordination of such civil society organisations as CNONGD and CSC enables these to operate more regularly as vehicles of expression for the pressure groups, and they are often invited to take part in dialogue and consultation processes, even though they have had little impact in this sense up to now;
- in two of the interventions, spaces for consultancy and experimental dialogue were set up – the meeting workshops for representatives of justice and civil society (RCN) and the local development committees created within the context of the PAIDECO project.

Approaches, methods and tools for involvement in political dialogue

By creating the transitional support institutions, the global inclusive agreement set up a very interesting mechanism for dialogue, by involving civil society in crucial institutions for the construction of democracy. But by setting up these institutions in haste, the transitional authorities provoked a multiplication of transitory CSOs. The organisations chosen to act as transitional institutions were not always the most representative of those available. In addition, only the two most essential of these for the urgent organisation of the elections (the CEI and to a certain extent the HAM) obtained sufficient support from the state and international community to take on most of the tasks required of them. It is therefore within these two institutions that a partial dialogue between the public authorities and the CSOs has been able to take place.

Concrete mechanisms for the development of V&A

Proximity is a factor which facilitates the success of the V&A approach, as the evaluation was able to note for the RCN project, by means of which justice approaches the citizens and in so doing encourages a reduction in abusive practices.

> *"By dealing with the problems of justice at local level, we can show the people that they can take control of their own situations. The population moves away a little from the easy logic of 'the state has to do this and the state has to do that'... In addition, people learn to know themselves. It isn't so easy to embark on a process of arbitrary arrests when people know what's going on".*
>
> RCN staff member, Kinshasa, 13/12/2007

Local radio broadcasts are another example of how to set up concrete V&A mechanisms, with the chance to call into question the practices in DRC, especially in the major towns.

> *"In my district, an MP used his position of power to take over the land of a neighbour. In spite of the protests, he refused to give in or to acknowledge that his action was illegal. In the end, a neighbour phoned Radio Okapi, which decided to do a programme on the question... Consequently, journalists from the radio turned up to interview the various people involved, the MP gave in immediately and went away, and we've never seen him since"*
>
> Kinshasa radio listeners focus group, 15/12/2007.

As a result of listeners' complaints via radio stations, namely Radio Okapi, public authorities did give in to the public pressure and respond to citizens' needs, both in and outside of Kinshasa. Concrete examples were improved water provision in Mbuji May, less petty corruption by local police in Mbuji May, works to improve the canalisation in Kinshasa and enforcement of property rights (see box above).

A Venn Diagram which Focus Group Participants have drawn up shows the importance of Radio Okapi to voice citizens' preferences and views (see graphic below).

Diagram: Venn diagram for radio stations in Kinshasa



Note: The size and the colour of the circle symbolises the importance of the radio (e.g. the influence on public authorities) while the distance to the community represents the access (reaching the radio stations by phone, email etc. and the ability of the radio to respond).

We can conclude this analysis of the support channels used by stating that the interventions back up the strengthening of the mechanisms of change as well as the capacities of those taking part in the process, by means of:

- support for the achievement of peace and the prevention of conflicts as a preliminary to the reinforcement of V&A (SFCG, Okapi), and support for the electoral process (AIT, EISA) on the one hand;
- as well as support for the actors in the Transition (AIT, WWICS), the platforms by means of which the citizens express their voice (CNONGD, CSC) and the decision-making structures at community or local level (RCN, PAIDECO).

But what emerges above all from the evaluation is that the channels that should create a link between voice and accountability are to a great extent absent in Congo. There are very few channels through which the voices of the citizens are taken into consideration and acted upon by the authorities. The V&A evaluation in DRC does in fact reveal that the interventions mainly focus on demand (reinforcement of the CSOs) rather than supply (reinforcement of the public institutions), without enabling the two to meet. There are at least two factors which explain this situation:

- the public institutions are so dilapidated that it is necessary to concentrate first and foremost on their minimal re-emergence, before we can expect them to respond to the concerns of the citizens;

- the very concept of V&A, whose precise purpose is to create the link between the questions of the citizens and the answers of the public authorities, is much less familiar in DRC than the concept of 'capacity building', which limits the intervention to a single aspect of the relationship.

There are, however, a number of important exceptions to this negative overview:

- the elections are clearly the most significant of all the channels by means of which the population can express its choices to the ruling powers;
- the meeting between civil society and the politicians in the running of the two democracy support commissions which have really worked (CEI and HAM);
- the Participatory Poverty Analysis is also an innovative channel, by means of which the CSOs were able to promote their opinions in the drafting of the PRGSP;
- the media, and radio especially, which not only improved in quality terms, but were also able in certain cases to give the citizens a channel through which they could question the politicians;
- the less traditional initiatives tested at the level of the more local interventions (RCN, PAIDECO) set up the most original mechanisms for change (such as direct confrontation between the police officers accused of atrocities and their victims, and the creation of useful mechanisms to take into account the interests and claims of the local populations).

Finally, the evaluation was unable to note any operations which targeted specific vulnerable groups of the population. This is a difficult concept to deal with in DRC, where 70 to 80% of the population is vulnerable. There are many projects which benefit the population of Congo as a whole, and which mainly affect the vulnerable populations. However, few of the projects currently financed by the donors specifically address one or another category of vulnerable people. Among these, we should mention a few projects specifically geared towards women (mainly with regard to sexual violence) and child soldiers. As most of these projects are localised in the east of the country, in zones where there is no security, it was not possible to include them in the study. We should point out however that, in the situation of a DRC emerging from a crisis, the donors overwhelmingly focused their support on interventions which benefit the population of Congo as a whole, rather than projects geared towards specific groups.

4.4. Change in policy, practice, behaviour and power relations

Generally speaking, the evaluation has brought to light the fact that the changes in policies, practices, behaviour and power relationships are still limited with respect to the many conditions that need to be satisfied if a state based on the rule of law is to be set up. The starting point was a very remote one, and this means that the road to be travelled is long.

It is probably at the level of **general policy**, in the setting up of the legal frameworks, that we can note the most significant steps forward, while it is in day to day practice that we can see the most frequent losses of control in the conduct of the representatives of the public authorities.

This distance between theoretical progress and changes in daily practice, this extreme distance between the catastrophic starting situation in terms of governance and the minimum conditions necessary to live in a state of law, often leads the least informed outside observers to express a highly negative judgement of the V&A situation in Congo.

However, this evaluation at least partially contradicts such a negative view. We are still only at the beginning, but we have been able to note signs of the process of change at a number of levels.

At the level of accountability of the public institutions

The fact that the process of transition led to the holding of elections which were globally assessed as satisfactory[27] is regarded by the international community and the majority of the Congolese people as a major step forward towards peace and democracy in DRC. The projects which back up this process have achieved their objectives and brought about a real change in the level of accountability of the Congolese political institutions. Most of the political class in Congo is aware of the need to account for its actions at the end of its mandate.

But the daily conduct of the elected representatives and the political class in general does not yet bear witness to a real sense of accountability. For many, accountability and appearance in the media frequently coincide.

> *"The influence of a project such as AIT is perceptible. The Congolese people are more willing to have their voices heard, more prepared to take part in the political process. Some civil society organisations, the church above all, are more involved in this process than others…*
>
> *At the level of state accountability, we can also see the first signs of change ... clearly arbitrary actions are becoming less common, there's a change in the relations between members of parliament and a change in the political attitude. They're becoming more aware of the need to run the state…"* (UNPD Governance Consultant, Kinshasa)
>
> *"Accounting for your actions goes well beyond simply saying what you've done. At times that's just advertising in disguise, a way of saying that you've done things without explaining why, to what extent they're relevant, whether they were economically justified, …"*
>
> Ministry of Planning representative, Kinshasa, 07/11/2007

The successful electoral process is therefore a highly significant first stage in creating awareness of the theoretical need for accountability, as confirmed by the limited duration of the mandate of the elected representatives. But this awareness still has to be consolidated at the level of behaviour. Once again, we have to conclude that formal democracy is not in itself an automatic guarantee of a change of behaviour.

At the level of expression and claims by the citizens

Overall, the results of several interventions lead us to conclude that the citizens are in possession of more correct information, due to training in the NGOs, the presence of the CSOs in the political debates, freedom of expression and the spread of the advocacy campaigns among the local and international organisations. But the medium which has certainly had the greatest effect on the improvement of access to information is radio, which

[27] The direct elections (legislative election to parliament, the presidency and the provincial assemblies) were regarded by all the observers as free and transparent overall. The indirect elections (to the senate) were seen as distinctly less correct.

has recently evolved in the direction of greater professionalism[28] and diversity. Some radio stations have consolidated their position as important sources of information, while at the same time gradually becoming a real tool of challenge.

In addition, the CSOs are still the main channels for the expression of the voice and claims of the citizens in Congo. The Congolese political authorities and international community tend to appeal to these organisations for their opinions, or even to exploit them in their information and awareness campaigns.

The questioning and control operations carried out by the CSOs have become more regular and structured than in the past, especially in addressing parliament. The public authorities are therefore becoming more and more prepared to allow the CSOs to express their position and ask questions, even though the impact of such questioning is still very difficult to assess.

At the level of power relations and dynamics

On the basis of its analysis of the results of the interventions, the evaluation has brought to light a number of changes which directly regard the dynamics of power:

- the investments geared towards the prevention of conflicts, bringing about secure elections, and promoting mediation, demobilisation and similar actions, has had an impact on the levels of tension and is bringing about a progressive but very gradual improvement in the level of security. Pockets of insecurity continue to exist in some parts of the country, where the mediation initiatives have multiplied (the SFCG investment in South Kivu, for example);
- the reality of multiparty politics has been imposed on the political class of Congo. It is still fragile, regularly undermined[29] and difficult for the average Congolese to detect (with a plethora of political parties, frequent alliance movements among the parties, and so on) The multiparty situation has however led to the emergence of new practices, such as the very long, highly contradictory debate which has taken place to determine the political position of the opposition, and the live broadcasting of parliamentary debates, from beginning to end. According to the President of the National Assembly, consensus is regularly reached between the majority and opposition MPs on proposed legislation, for example;
- the division of powers and the distinction between legislative and executive powers are currently very clear, by comparison with the situation during the period of transition[30].

[28] We refer here to the impact that the presence of Radio Okapi has had throughout the country, as a result of its more professional supply of information (shorter broadcasts, a clearer distinction between facts and comments, and so on) and more pluralist approach, which has shaken up the traditional broadcasting media, though clearly without eliminating all the radio channels from the previous regime. There are still radio channels which are linked to individuals, whose broadcasting is subjective or takes the form of blatant propaganda. The setting up of a control and regulatory body has limited the most flagrant abuses, however.

[29] Especially during the open conflict between Jean Pierre Bemba and Joseph Kabila in March 2007.

[30] In December 2007, for example, the President of the Republic did not follow up a proposal for the review of the Constitution presented by members of his own party, with a view to reducing the areas of incompatibility with regard to the functions of members of parliament. This proposed review was widely criticised by the opposition, who saw it as giving the elected representatives of the presidential majority the chance of multiplying the accumulations of mandates. Another example of this progressive separation of powers was the adoption by parliament at the end of 2007 of the law on the Upper Council of Magistrates, which partially formalised the autonomous position of justice. One third of the new members of this council are designated upon the initiative of the President of the Republic, while the other two thirds are appointed by parliament meeting in congress (national assembly and senate) and the magistrates. The division of influence is clearer than in the past.

On a number of points, however, the dynamics of power are still limited in their evolution[31]: the control mechanisms on the actions of the elected representatives, the struggle to remove impunity in Justice, mismanagement in public companies and the handling of natural resources, and so on.

At the level of equity and the involvement of the most vulnerable groups
In the interventions analysed, little change has been noted in the involvement of the most vulnerable groups. Limited effects are evident in certain local projects, such as involvement in the RCN and PAIDECO projects, and the greater accessibility of radio. However, such effects are still highly limited.

At the level of the regulatory and political framework
The process of transition and the elections held with universal suffrage have led to a number of regulatory and legislative transformations. A number of laws were reviewed and adopted prior to the setting up of the electoral process (the constitution, electoral law, law on nationality, and others). A number of legislative texts were also examined by the newly elected parliament, including those on decentralisation, public companies, and so on. This important parliamentary mission is currently taking place at both national and provincial levels, and is generally regarded as a significant step forward in the reorganisation of the legal framework of the state.

This re-ordering of the legal texts on the running of the state is however only one stage in the reorganisation of the Congolese legislation. Congolese criminal and private law (civil, commercial and labour law, etc) requires radical updating. Given the material and human resources at the disposal of the Congolese administration at the present time, and those available to the Ministry of Justice in particular, it is highly improbable that this mammoth task will be taken on in the medium term. In the PAIDECO project, for example, the local consultancy structures assessed have been regarded by the Interior Ministry as innovative and useful, within the context of possible decentralisation, but up to the present time that ministry has done nothing to incorporate the consultancy structure in question into the legislation.

In conclusion
The most significant changes noted are policy changes. The political agreements, backed up by interventions to build capacity, have made it possible to set up the transitional institutions, organise democratic elections and adopt fundamental legal texts. These interventions have clearly come down on the side of the emergence of this new policy framework.

There are also several factors that enable us to assess the significant changes that have taken place in certain practices. The participatory poverty analysis carried out within the context of the PRGSP, for example, is a break away from the previous practices introduced with the authoritarian regime. The channels of information (such as the radio) are able to offer the citizens better information which they can use in an original and direct way to challenge the political leaders. A number of capacity reinforcement programmes are beginning to show the first signs of evolution in the conduct of those in charge (such as a more effective approach to negotiations within the context of the WWICS project). However, it is still difficult to observe

[31] Several examples can be mentioned in a wide variety of areas. A very large number of individuals known to be guilty of crimes against humanity or war crimes have been able to elude all investigation, for example, and the international and national trials taking place in this area are exceptions. In addition, the concrete review of the mining contracts deemed illegal by the Lutundula commission has been subject to delays.

the real effects of these interventions in terms of a long-lasting change in practices and behaviour. The possibility of change is still met with considerable scepticism among the population, and the indicators of governance still show no significant reversal of trends. There are also very few factors that enable us to conclude that there have been any profound developments in the power relationships. Thus, while the importance of civil society (or, more precisely, community dynamics) is acknowledged in the texts, this still has to manifest itself in the form of a real impact on the drafting of future policies.

The Congolese state, newly emerged from its crisis situation, is still in the preliminary stages of the creation of a state of law. Like many other authors, we believe the citizens of Congo will only be able to live in a full democracy when they are in possession of three groups of essential rights: 1) the right to freely choose the people that represent them, 2) the right to all the fundamental individual liberties (of expression, association, meeting, etc), and 3) the right to take part in the public administrative process by expressing their wills and calling upon the elected representatives to account for their actions.

The process of transition which has been taking place in DRC since 2003 has enabled the citizens of the country to gain at least imperfect access to the first of these essential rights, and has given them extremely partial access to the second. But their right to take part in the public administrative process is still a long way from being achieved. It is however only the effective application of all these constituent parts of democracy that will enable us to truly take stock of the extent to which conduct and practices have changed.

In this sense, the impact of the V&A support interventions therefore remains limited at the present time. It is probable, however, that the new Congolese institutions will require the support of the international donors if they are to make any progress in the construction of democracy, given that the state budget is not yet ready to take on these commitments on its own. Any lasting change in the practices and conduct will therefore probably require a long lasting relationship between DRC and the donors, with a view to offering continuing support to the new institutions.

4.5. Broader development outcomes

Poverty, democracy, human development and growth

The effects of the V&A support interventions on the overall performance of a country's development programme are generally very difficult to identify. A large number of publications on development take a prudent view of the existence of a direct, automatic causal link between improvement in democracy or governance and progress at the level of development[32]. This identification of a causal link is probably even more elusive in DRC than in other countries, given the fragile environment within which the operations have been carried out. It is however possible to express a few hypotheses:

- an improvement in mutual understanding and a reduction in inter-group tensions, reinforced by support for interventions such as those sustained by the SFCG, encourages the emergence of a climate of stability, which in itself lays the basis for more durable development;
- a social consultancy process structured around regular trade union negotiations may in time help improve the quality of life among the categories defended by the trade unions in the first instance (public administration or formal sector workers, for

[32] See Marie Soleil Freres, Gilbert Rist or the UNPD International Report on Human Development, 2002.

example), and subsequently have an indirect impact on the standard of living of the population in general;
- stronger CSOs in possession of better resources to defend the interests of their members could help improve the conditions of the most vulnerable sections of the population.

But in the case of these hypotheses it is impossible to identify the causal link in a precise manner.

It is at local level that the evaluation was able to reveal a number of examples of limited effects on the improvement of living conditions and the development of the people affected by the projects:
- the PAIDECO project has had an impact on local development through the contributions it has made to local investments, the work it creates for the local NGOs, and so on. But the effect of this outside contribution on the ability of the local authorities to invest in the development of their territories on a long term basis remains entirely theoretical for the time being;
- the use of radio as a means of seeking answers may lead to the improvement of certain local social conditions (work on the Mbuji Mayi water supply system following a number of questions asked on the radio, for example).

These very limited examples do not enable us to conclude that there has been a truly widespread effect on development, growth or the reduction of poverty.

Part 5: Conclusions/ lessons learnt

This section summarises the conclusions on channels of V&A, results of the interventions, and how this links to broader developments outcomes and aid effectiveness.

As outlined in the precedent chapters, V&A support in the DRC has to be seen in the context of the country's history of recent conflict and transition. Only since end of 2006 has DRC an elected government, therefore much of the V&A support happened around the transition and elections. Moreover, many donors have relatively recently re-established their DRC programmes, so many of the project interventions are at an early stage.

Notably, due to capacity constraints in terms of individual capacities (both government and non-government), organisations and mere logistics, such as basic materials, building, means of transport, any intervention faces huge challenges.

The transition—while still providing only a fragile basis for supporting V&A—at the same time was an entry point for donors to re-engage with the DRC and for the first time support the country's effort of democratisation.

5.1. Question 1: Channels, mechanisms and processes

Strengthening voice and accountability in the DRC can be divided into three areas of support which will also act as framework to represent the channels and mechanisms of support:
Supply-side: efforts to strengthen governments' ability to answer to its citizens' needs (e.g. transparent decision-making).
Demand side: support to citizens' expression of voice and preferences.
Supply-demand interaction: providing a space where the state and citizens interact.

Supply side interventions: state-building & "political will"
Supply-side support to V&A can be divided into two periods in the DRC, during the transition and after the elections. In particular during the transition period donor-supported V&A interventions in the DRC had a strong angle of conflict prevention and state building. Many efforts went into supporting the 'Institutions de la Transition', especially the Media Authority and the Independent Electoral Commission, as basis of building a democratic DRC and undertaking the first free elections. While parts of this intervention worked well, other aspects faced difficulties around resource mobilisation (resources did not always reach the provinces as planned as reported through the field work in Mbuji May). Much of this institution-building was basic support in terms of staffing, materials, and general logistics. While this was not directly strengthening accountability, this support was well contextualised and necessary given the political environment at the time and provided the basis for more specialised V&A support.

After the end of the transition, donors have probably too little used the window of opportunity which opened with the elected government which now for the first time had legitimacy through the popular vote. Very little direct support has gone to the government and political leaders to strengthen their capacity. One of the few examples is the Woodrow Wilson leadership initiative which takes conflict-resolution as a starting point to provide training in more general leadership skills on a very small scale; this has worked well in bringing leaders from different high-level political and military factions together for the first time and provide the platform to learn about collaborative decision-making. Partly, the success can be

attributed to the awareness of the political context and the fact that the training was labelled as 'training for leaders'—an appealing notion for the target group.

A rather unusual mechanism to enhance government transparency was chosen with the support to Global Witness, an international NGO with a reputation in highlighting corruption and lack of transparency in natural resource exploitation. Through publishing information, Global Witness has successfully brought cases of corrupt behaviour, e.g. around the review of mining contracts, to the attention of international organisations and donors who in turn put pressure on the Congolese government to change its behaviour. While it is difficult to draw general conclusions from one example, this experience suggests that relatively isolated interventions to increase transparent decision-making struggle to have a wide impact on government accountability. Moreover, this intervention uses external mechanisms—through an international NGO and donors—rather than internal channels to address the lack of transparency raising the question if this may be a counter-productive strategy. One could sometimes think that the government is more accountable to international community and to external donors than to the Congolese population.

This limited focus by donors to work with government directly to improve its accountability to citizens is surprising. It is unclear whether the limited donor engagement in this area is due to the fact that the elected government only came to power recently or a general distrust from donor side with public officials. It is also noteworthy that, while the lack of "political will" was frequently cited as main obstacle in improving government accountability, there is not a lot of analysis about the nature of this "political will", how to support potential drivers of change or work around obstacles of reform. Improved understanding of the nature of political will (e.g. the incentive structures, personal interests, obstacles for change) will be necessary to work on improving government accountability.

Demand side interventions: civic education, radio & supporting CSOs

Radio stations are the most popular and widely accessible media in the DRC; most Congolese are radio experts—knowing the daily programme of several radio stations by heart and switching between programmes on an hourly basis. Donor support in raising citizens awareness about their rights (e.g. the constitutional referendum, the transition period, the elections) was often successfully channelled through specific radio programmes ("Voting with Mopila") or more general support to informative radio programmes (Radio Okapi). The interventions worked well as they successfully used existing infrastructure (MONUC in Radio Okapi's case or the collaboration with local radio stations for SFCG) and managed jump on the bandwagon of the increasing popularity of DRC's evolving radio culture. In addition the radio is the media which has the potential to overcome the logistical challenges any intervention faces in DRC and can thus reach areas of the countries which are not traditionally in the spotlight of donor attention (e.g. Mbuji May).

A lot for support to strengthening demand-side accountability is aimed at national civil society organisations during and after the transition. A good understanding of the Congolese civil society landscape proved crucial to make this work in the successful examples. Knowledge of CSOs enabled the use of a wide network of NGOs (e.g. civic education before the elections) in all parts of the country. Often the support to national NGOs is channelled through international NGOs who from their side find it easier to work with the known actors often based in Kinshasa. In the long term this runs the risk to widen the capacity gap between those NGOs receiving a lot of international attention (and often based in the capital) and those NGOs without access to international funding. Despite these limitations, good long-term

relationships were established between national and international NGOs, in particular in those cases were capacity building for national CSOs was the main mandate of the donor funding to the international NGO and support is long- rather than short-term.

Due to the size of DRC most demand-side V&A initiatives either aim at building the capacity of umbrella organisations (e.g. network of NGOs) or training individuals that are believed to play a special role in their community. Donors therefore hope to achieve a broader coverage through a spill-over effect to civil society organisations and other members of the communities.

Not much attention has been paid to less traditional civil society organisations so far. While much of the work has been focused on NGOs and media, main donors have not widely supported alternative actors, such as the country-wide network of churches.

Finally, none of the interventions of this evaluation had a specific focus to strengthen the voice of specific social, ethnic groups or women. Limited attention has so far been paid to who are those whose voice is heard less. One could argue that targeting specific groups has (rightly) been sacrificed for general outreach. In a country where more than 70% of the population is poor it can be considered that virtually the whole population is marginalised. Moreover, through the efforts to prevent and end violent conflicts in all parts of the country donors hope to improve living conditions of those groups that are particularly badly affected by the violent conflict, e.g. women or children.

Demand and supply side interaction: supporting pilot initiatives

Creating opportunities for public officials and citizens to interact are at a very early stage of support in the DRC and are mainly in a pilot stage. While it is therefore difficult to come to general conclusions several lessons can be learnt from the few initiatives regarding the interaction between public officials and citizens, the evaluation has looked at.

By facilitating meetings between those who enforce the rules (e.g. police) and the citizens who are subject to those rules understanding for the other group's problems have evolved relatively quickly and mutual mistrust could be reduced substantially in the community despite the small scale of the intervention.

Donors need to be aware that participatory decision-making has a cost, especially for the poorest who cannot earn any income during the time they e.g. attend local council meetings. So, while the initiatives piloting decentralisation in two communities in Kinshasa, Kisenso and Kimbanseke, have seen citizens that eagerly decide on development priorities in their communities there is the observation that participation can be a luxury some people cannot afford.

While the local city councils deciding about the allocation of grants to finance small development projects have successfully completed small project (e.g. the building of a morgue, fighting again erosion) community-based decision making is likely to struggle when solving the big problems of the community (e.g. access to water, roads).

In addition, radio is not only used in providing information to citizens but also acts as channel to voice complaints. People contact radio stations with problems of all kinds, e.g. security issues, water provision, injustice. Often the publicity puts enough pressure on authorities to change. According to radio listeners themselves, this is an accessible way for everyone to

make their opinion heard. Moreover, the support from donors enabled individual radio stations to become more professional, radios confront different opinions by undertaking interviews on the streets, organise discussions with politicians. According to radio listeners this has already had a spill-over effect to other radio stations that undertake efforts to become more professionally themselves.

5.2. Question 2: results and outcomes

Problems in assessing results of V&A interventions in DRC

Assessing the results and outcomes of V&A support in DRC faces a range of challenges, some may be relevant to or even typical for fragile states other are very specific to DRC's context.

Firstly, the most evident and important outcome of V&A interventions is surely the success of the transition period and the organisation of the elections. But theses elections only open the door to the possibility of reinforcing V&A in DRC beyond the implementation of a formal democracy. That's why much of the donor support started recently (while some projects are continuations of earlier support by other donors). Many of the projects assessed are still ongoing and it is often too early to make a judgement about their results.

Secondly, the results of many donor-supported V&A interventions are difficult to assess due to the fact that interventions are taking place in a complex and rapidly changing environment, e.g. increase of conflict, political transition. It is therefore often hard to isolate the project attribution or make a judgement in the causality relationship. E.g. many factors are likely to have contributed to the high participation in the referendum or the relatively peaceful elections. To attribute this to one project (e.g. Radio Okapi) is close to impossible.

Finally, donor support hardly strengthens V&A directly but prepares the conditions for improved V&A.[33] On one side this is achieved through strengthening information provision to enable citizens to participate in political processes (e.g. civic education explaining the nature and importance of the elections), claim their rights and entitlements (e.g. awareness of property rights and subsequent the availability of a channels—mostly prominently radio programmes—to protest against a violation of these rights). On the other hand, donors attempt, often through capacity building, to provide tools for Government institutions and civil servants to act more transparently and respond to citizen's needs.

Results and outcomes

Despite the difficulties mentioned above, the evaluation has found examples where interventions indirectly (e.g. better informed population) and directly (e.g. public authorities responding to citizens needs) contributed to enhance V&A.

Although it is hard to isolate the contribution of different interventions, the high participation in both the constitutional referendum and in the parliamentary and presidential election was in part due to the extensive information campaigns supported by different donors, including Radio Okapi and EISA.

Capacity support to national civil society organisations has enabled NGOs to play a more effective role in providing information to citizens and provide basic services. The close

[33] The DRC study can confirm the findings from the earlier ODI research, compare p. 4 of the evaluation framework.

involvement of CSOs in the Participatory Poverty Analysis to inform the PRGSP has also ensured civil society engagement in policy prioritisation.

However, an overall and sustainable increase in government transparency and responsiveness as result of citizen initiatives cannot be observed at this early stage. Citizens increasingly have channels to voice their preferences.

"After a big and long struggle the people have finally conquered the space. […] You can say what you want and you will not go to jail for it." (Civil society representative, Kinshasa)

On the other hand the State is only responding to its citizens' need in individual cases rather than on a general basis suggesting that there has not happened a change in practice or a change of behaviour beyond individual cases.

"The people can say what they want, but the State does not listen." (Civil society representative, Kinshasa)

5.3. Question 3: Pathways to broader development outcomes

In an environment where the results of V&A interventions are individual successes rather than sustainable outcomes, it is hard assess broader development outcomes of donor-funded V&A. Two aspects are nevertheless worth highlighting in the context of poverty reduction

Given that there are many monetary and non-monetary aspects of poverty, powerlessness can be a form of poverty in itself. Taking DRC's long history of dictatorship and conflict, providing opportunities for citizens to express their opinions freely and attempt to claim their rights under new political freedom is a small success story in itself. The high voter participation during the elections[34], the popularity of radio stations focusing on news and reports and the eagerness to take part in community meetings can be taken as good indicator of the population's appreciation and eagerness to participate.

In addition to V&A being a means in itself, it can contribute to poverty reduction through better services or more generally policies that make a difference to poor people's lives. And while individual improvements have taken place (as outlined above) there is still a long way to go to see overall improvements in poverty in the DRC. However, there are first disappointments among citizens that the new democracy and in particular the long-awaited elections have not brought the desired improvement in living conditions and reduction of poverty.

"The elections have not changed anything. You cannot achieve change without a clear vision and leadership." (civil society representative, Kinshasa)

In summary, donor-supported V&A in the DRC have contributed to the political stabilization of the country and have helped the organisation of the first democratic elections in more than 40 years—a major progress in terms of citizen's political participation in itself. However, it is too early to speak of more global impact on the development of the DRC, particularly in terms of poverty reduction. V&A interventions probably helped to create the preconditions for a long-term development of the DRC; but certainly more work will be needed.

[34] Electoral Observer Mission of the European Union in DRC : "Elections présidentielle, législative et provinciales en 2006. Rapport final", Brussel 2007.

5.4. *Question 4: V&A and aid effectiveness*

Ownership
According to the Paris Declaration, donors commit to "respect partner country leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it". Given the political transition and rapidly changing environment until now, it has not been easy to support government institutions to exercise leadership in developing national planning documents. During the PRGSP design process positive steps towards greater country ownership were taken and a country-wide participatory poverty assessment was undertaken in close collaboration with civil society. It will be a challenge—also regarding greater alignment—to build and expand these efforts.
It will remain to be seen if donors respect government leadership now after the transition. For example, currently there is only limited awareness among donors of the existence of SENAREC in the Ministry of Planning who has the mandate to coordinate capacity building support for government, civil society and private businesses.

Harmonisation
The Paris Declaration aims at increased harmonisation and transparency of donor action. Particular attention is paid to harmonisation in fragile states: "While the guiding principles of effective aid apply equally to fragile states, they need to be adapted to environments of weak ownership and capacity and to immediate needs for basic service delivery." Among other principles the Paris Declaration stresses that "harmonisation is all the more crucial in the absence of strong government leadership."

In order to manage support around the transition and the elections more efficiently, basket funds managed by UNDP were set up (project 2 this evaluation looked at). It is worth noting that while basket funds were probably the only means to manage the large amount of funds necessary to organise the elections it had its downsides. Many civil society organisations—national and international—highlighted the danger of basket funds not providing necessary support to NGOs, e.g. around the civic education before the elections.

Part 6: Recommendations

On the basis of the results and conclusions presented in the previous sections, the evaluation has come up with three groups of recommendations[35], which we will consider in order below:

- for the groups of donors, in terms of the general approach to V&A;
- for the various contributors to the projects, in terms of the operating aspects;
- for the donors and other main contributors, in terms of the political dialogue.

6.1. On the overall approaches to V&A

1. More realistic donor expectations: many of the V&A support interventions have particularly ambitious objectives. As the analysis of the impact on capacity building of the state institutions emphasises, the level of backer expectations for DRC is high, especially if we consider the particularly fragile condition of the country at the time when the operations were carried out. If is therefore important for the donors as a whole to be made sufficiently aware of the realities which derive from the recent history of this country. The at times unrealistic expectations could lead to a premature value judgement along the lines of "they don't want to change, they don't have the political will for it".
In the case of DRC, we therefore recommend the strict application of the first OECD principle international commitment in fragile states: "take the context as the starting point", and have realistic expectations as to the duration of the operations, given that on some occasions these will need more time if their objectives are to be achieved.

2. Improvement in the coordination of aid and donors: the analysis of donors' strategy has brought to light a dispersal of the initial contributions to V&A. We have been able to note a succession of contributions from different donors and, even more frequently, the progressive addition of contributions following the issue of requests to the first actors or representatives of the international community charged with monitoring the Transition (the facilitator Ketumile Masire, CIAT, etc). This empirical method of grouping donors has not up to the present time been a real form of coordination.

To improve interaction between the V&A support interventions, permit structured consultation to take place with the Congolese authorities in this sector and improve the effectiveness of the operations, we recommend the implementation of a genuinely concrete coordination mechanisms whose basis already exist through the Country Assistance Framework (CAF). The recent adoption of this CAF is a first important step in the right direction. Given that this sector of governance requires particularly comprehensive appropriation on the part of the Congolese state, we would suggest that this latter take on central responsibility for the driving of this coordination effort.

3. Improved coordination between technical aid and the political strategy of donors: the analysis of the V&A channels has enabled us to bring to light the way in which support initiatives often act in a parallel way. This is the case for example with the support for the CSOs as questioning bodies and as agents for the carrying out of V&A interventions, support for state actors, support for pilot initiatives (RCN or PAIDECO) without any real generalisation strategy, and so on. This has led us to conclude that it is often the support initiatives that facilitate the link between Voice and Accountability which are lacking.

[35] These recommendations are presented in order of decreasing priority in each of the three groups.

In the field, more concrete coordination would be useful between those entrusted with political monitoring on behalf of donors in the field (political divisions of the embassies, in general) and those with responsibility for the technical aspects of the interventions (the various actors). Coordination of this kind would make it easier to assess the technical constraints or requirements imposed by political will, while at the same time reducing unrealistic expectations. It would also make it possible to reinforce the complementary areas and obtain a clearer view of the areas in which there are shortcomings, by facilitating the general extension of the impact of the positive results of a pilot project, comparing the approaches of the international NGOs and the bilateral and multilateral actors appealed to by donors, and so on.

Clearly, coordination of this kind does exist among some of the donors, but we recommend that it be extended to all of them, or reinforced.

6.2. On operational issues

4. Make use of the expertise of the international NGOs without preventing the emergence of local actors: discussions on this matter have been intense in DRC. Insufficient use was probably made of the diversity and varying experiences of the local actors during the Transition, due to lack of time or confidence, or other factors. There is a real risk of the support interventions being regarded in a negative light by the local actors, and the analysis has shown that this was the case for a number of projects which backed up the electoral process (AIT and EISA).

In addition, the urgent nature of the situation and the limited resources available to the local actor have led to the frequent use in V&A support interventions of actors, methods of action or processes which were implemented and tried out in a similar situation of instability. The analysis of the WWICS and GW projects has provided examples of this. While an approach of this kind is comprehensible in terms of effectiveness, there is a serious risk of smoothing out the differences and applying a false equation such as 'fragile state A = fragile state B'.
We recommend carrying out a systematic examination of the relevance of using outside experts and its impact on local capacities during the identification of each new V&A intervention. By means of such an examination, it will also be possible to:

- check for the existence of local actors – perhaps of a highly skilled nature – within the less traditional channels (example: the quality of the network of churches in creating awareness among the electors was acknowledged by foreign observation missions in hindsight, while in reality there can be no doubt that insufficient use was made of this network);
- where applicable, lay down a quota of support that of necessity has to pass through the local actors to guarantee the durable nature of the interventions;
- lay down the methods for exchanges of skills between the international NGOs and their local partners.
- We recommend that this examination seek the advice of the Congolese party concerned – the NGO coordination group at the Ministry of Planning and SENAREC.

5. Use of outside advocacy as an addition to the internal advocacy capacities, rather than as a replacement for these: some donors sustain outside initiatives (GW advocacy, for example) which promote greater transparency in sensitive areas (the mining sectors) by means of publications and lobbying geared towards the international organisations and donors. The evaluation has shown that this approach has the effect of amplifying internal advocacy by putting more pressure on the government to place additional emphasis on transparency. It is

quite possible however that this use of an outside approach will be unable to replace the essential questioning role that has to be created within the country between the citizens and public authorities with a view to achieving truly durable vertical accountability. We recommend that in each project which sustains outside advocacy mechanisms a significant part of the resources be set aside for capacity building of local actors and the transfer of capacities between the international and local actors.

6. The flexible, adaptable use of the diversity of the V&A support channels: the analysis of the V&A support channels in DRC has brought to light that little use is made of state actors, which consequently weakens the interventions whose aim is to create or reinforce the link between Voice and Accountability. In the period immediately after the crisis, the frequent use of state actors was rendered essential by the emergency situation, and during the period of transition, the use of non-governmental actors was justified by the absence of a democratically elected public authority. Now that the transition has been completed, the donors are able to engage in direct dialogue with an elected government. This takes us to another of the OECD principles for international involvement in fragile states: "Make the reinforcement of the state one of the fundamental objectives".

Given the evolutionary nature of any democratisation process, we recommend that the donors reflect on the timing schedule to be adopted in their selection of V&A support channels before taking any action, to take the evolution of that process into account. This reflection on the part of the donors should take place along with the various actors used by them to ensure the coherent nature of their selection strategy.

7. Make positive use of the local success stories to bring about more global change: the evaluation has shown that the local interventions and pilot experiments (RCN, PAIDECO) carried out in DRC have at times achieved more concrete results in terms of changes of attitude and behaviour. However, the impact of these results has frequently not been exploited as effectively as it could have been, due to the inability to transpose them at a more global level. In the case of interventions of this nature, we recommend that donors prepare for their consultancy with the Congolese authorities in the most concrete way possible during the project formulation stage. Upon completion of the intervention, it will then become possible to reflect on the results achieved and, if these are positive, adopt them at a more general level and/or take them into account in the drafting of the legal provisions.

8. Make good use of communications: with regard to the PAIDECO project, we were able to note that the executive body for the project, CTB, considered the matter of accountability from an innovative viewpoint, by emphasising the need for transparency and accountability not only on the part of the political authorities, but also from those involved in the cooperation projects. This policy of communications was then developed to make the best use of the results obtained in the interventions, with particular emphasis place on those that supported V&A. The adoption of Communication for Development – C4D strategies to sustain interventions of this kind is an interesting concept, that should be developed further.
We recommend that donors and their Congolese partners reflect on the creation of a coordinated communications strategy for the results of the interventions, with a view to encouraging transparency and accountability and avoiding a drift towards a logic of promotion or propaganda.

6.3. On policy dialogue

9. The use of non-state actors: the evaluation has shown that when the V&A support interventions were carried out successfully in DRC the donors prevalently made use of non-state actors at local level or the international organisations. This method of proceeding poses the crucial question as to the confidence of donors in the state as a partner and the limits of its reinforcement. What has become of the priority OECD principle for international commitment to fragile states which advocates " Make the reinforcement of the state one of the fundamental objectives"? How can a state drive its own development if an important part of its foreign aid is conveyed through channels which do not have the necessary knowledge, let alone the skills, to make use of it? What has become of appropriation?
With a view to making up for these shortcomings, we recommend setting aside a substantial part of the intervention in the V&A support programmes for capacity building the public authorities.

10. The lack of political will is frequently mentioned by a number of donors and the key informers as the main obstacle to change. However, only a few of those actors provide a precise definition for the notion of 'political will'. Permanent reflection on the nature of this political will and the factors, actors and features which encourage this reluctance to change may be of some use.
We recommend that this in-depth analysis be carried out before the start-up of the interventions. In this way, it will be possible to determine the mechanisms that need to be implemented in the project if its results are to go beyond a simple awareness of the relevance of accountability and enable a genuine change in behaviour and practices to take place.

11. The reinforcement of civil society and its transfer to the political domain: the evaluation has brought to light the phenomenon whereby some of the civil society actors are transferred towards the political bodies (in the transition support institutions, for example). There is a clear risk here of weakening civil society if its most dynamic and effective human resources are to aspire towards politics. However, the contribution of experience and capacity which enable these transfers from civil society to take place may also contribute to the reinforcement of accountability in the public institutions, while at the same time offering a major opportunity to take the claims of that civil society into consideration.
We recommend that due account be taken of this phenomenon of transfer, with a view to integrating it into the CSO support interventions, such as training on the specific nature of the roles to be played by each actor, the obligations and constraints imposed on those who wish to make the transfer, the nature and ethical aspects of the relationships between the person who has transferred and his source organisation, and so on.

12. Economic and social rights: the existence of a trade union project within the group of interventions assessed has brought to light a matter which is considered too infrequently when we speak of support for V&A: the fact that economic and social rights form an integral part of fundamental human rights. In a country in a profound state of socioeconomic crisis, evidence of this is impossible to ignore, but the consideration of these rights is often relegated to a secondary level when we are urgently called upon to deal with human rights which are more generally acknowledged or of a more immediate nature (freedom of expression and the press, etc).
When we are dealing with V&A, we recommend that the trade union dimension be taken into account in a more systematic manner, and that we consider the complementary nature of

fundamental human rights and socioeconomic rights, the place of the trade unions in civil society and the possible synergies between the V&A support given to these two groups of actors (trade unions and the other members of civil society).





ANNEXES



N° 4201 samedi 15 décembre 2007 - 500 Fc

le Potentiel

Membre du réseau Médiaf

Sommaire

SUPPLÉMENT «MUSIQUE-LITTERATURE&CULTURE»

Il y a dix ans mourrait Eboa Lotin

Il y a dix ans mourait l'artiste-musicien

Les syndicalistes congolais associés à l'élaboration du budget de l'Etat

Déposé le 27 novembre dernier à l'Assemblée nationale par le gouvernement, le projet du budget 2008 a été déclaré recevable par les députés nationaux. Après débat entre les élus de l'Opposition et ceux de la Majorité parlementaire, le projet a été transmis à la Commission économico-financière (Ecofin) de l'Assemblée nationale afin d'y apporter quelques réajustements.

Dans son allocution devant les députés nationaux, le Premier ministre Antoine Gizenga a indiqué que le budget 2008 va s'appuyer sur «une stratégie d'investissement axée de manière plus résolue et plus précise sur les cinq chantiers du président de la République et du gouvernement».

D'après le chef de l'Exécutif national, «plus de 70% de l'enveloppe globale seront consacrés aux secteurs prioritaires suivants : Infrastructures 41%, Energie 14%,

fier d'annoncer que, depuis 2001, le budget de l'Etat est en accroissement réel : 300 millions de dollars américains en 2001, 400 millions USD en 2003, 500 millions USD en 2004, 554 millions en 2005, 1 milliard de dollars 2006, 1,6 milliard

moyen se trouve placé dans une zone d'insécurité alimentaire».

Le même constat est fait quant à l'enveloppe réservée au secteur de l'enseignement national qui passe de 13% en 2007 à 5% en 2008. Les députés de l'Opposition regrettent

de certains services pour financer le budget des salaires», a suggéré Vital Kamerhe, le président de l'Assemblée nationale.

La contribution des délégués syndicaux

A la demande du président de l'Assemblée nationale, les syndicats de l'Administration publique ont été associés à la Commission économico-financière à l'examen du projet du budget de l'Etat 2008 en vue d'y apporter des modifications nécessaires avant son adoption.

Neuf centrales syndicales du personnel de l'administration publique de la RDC prendront part à ce travail, notamment la Dynamique de l'Enseignement supérieur et universitaire, le Syndicat national des enseignants des écoles conventionnées catholiques (Synecat), le Syndicat national des magistrats du Congo (Synamac).

Tout en saluant l'initiative de Vital Kamerhe, les responsables des syn-

Annex A: Terms Of References

SPECIAL SPECIFICATIONS n°S0.4/2007/02

TECHNICAL PRESCRIPTIONS
GENERAL TERMS OF REFERENCE:
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES: CITIZENS' VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY EVALUATION

1. A core group of DAC partners (Evaluation Core Group/ECG[36]) agreed in 2006 to collaborate on a joint evaluation of development aid for strengthening Citizens' Voice and Accountability (CV&A). As an initial stage in this process, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) undertook development of an evaluation framework to assess CV&A interventions[37] and piloted the framework and methodology in two countries. The ECG now wishes to use this framework and its accompanying methodology to evaluate interventions across a range of country types. At the end of this process, a synthesis report will be produced which will make recommendations for donors to consider. These will draw on lessons about CV&A interventions from the case studies and, importantly, place them within the broader context of existing literature on the subject and extant policy approaches.

2. These TORs outline the generic requirements for each country case study (CCS), which will be commissioned by donor partners separately. Additional information specific to the country or region used as a CCS will be agreed by the contracting donor and the consultancy undertaking the assignment. **It should also be noted that although commissioned by a single donor each CCS will evaluate interventions across all ECG partners active in the country or region.** Additionally, in order to gain a holistic understanding of the scope of CV&A initiatives across the country, a minor mapping exercise to record other relevant donor and national interventions will be necessary.

Background and Rationale

3. There is an increasing emphasis on governance in development as the key dimension to addressing poverty reduction and inequality and promoting economic stability and growth. This goes beyond the institutional framework of government to the interaction between formal and informal actors, processes, customs and rules. It is a process of bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it. But only those who can convey their views have a "voice" and only governments or states who are accountable, and can be held so, will respond.

4. Good governance thus requires a just and responsive relationship between citizen and state. Development actors have long recognised this and worked on programmes to enhance the ability of the most vulnerable in society to articulate their needs, and with partner governments to provide the mechanisms and capacity to respond. Despite these efforts, there is a lack of evidence and real understanding of the dynamic and complex nature of factors

[36] Donor partners from the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Norway and Germany

[37] It should be noted that donors are unable to work directly on voice (an action) or accountability (a relationship). In practice, donors strengthen CV&A by seeking to create or strengthen the preconditions for the exercise of CV&A and/or particular channels and mechanisms that underpin actions of CV&A relationships. In the context of this evaluation, such activities are referred to as 'CV&A interventions'.

influencing voice and accountability and there is thus a need to more systematically examine and evaluate current interventions.

5. This donor initiative seeks to identify both what works and what does not and why, and to identify gaps, overlaps and duplication in donor provision. By becoming more effective and transparent in our delivery of assistance to this vital area of both governance and social development aid provision, it also, as espoused by the Paris Declaration, seeks to improve donor coherence and accountability to those with whom, and on whose behalf, we work.

6. Quality of governance is recognised as a key factor correlated with poverty reduction and macroeconomic stability, and therefore influencing the achievement of the MDGs and preventing conflict[38]. Good governance is concerned with how citizens, public institutions, and leaders relate to each other, and whether these relationships lead to outcomes that reduce poverty.

7. Voice and accountability are concerned with the relationship between citizen and the state, which is a core feature of the governance agenda. A large body of research and experience has demonstrated that active participation of citizens in the determination of policies and priorities can improve the commitment of government to reduce poverty and enhance the quality of aid and outcomes.

8. Similarly, it is increasingly recognised that government/state accountability, and the ability of citizens and the private sector to scrutinise public institutions and to hold them to account is an important facet of good governance. Failures of accountability can lead to pervasive corruption, poor and elite-biased decision making and unresponsive public actors[39].

9. Thus Citizens' Voice and Accountability[40] are important for developing more effective and responsive states and for enhancing the effectiveness and sustainability of aid, particularly in the context of country led approaches. The Paris Declaration includes specific commitments on these issues by development partners[41].

10. There are many forms of accountability relationship (for example formal and informal accountabilities; social, political, and electoral accountabilities, accountabilities between different public institutions). This evaluation is focused on donors' support to the development of citizens' voice and accountability, focusing on downward or vertical accountability i.e.: that operating between the state and citizens.

[38] This association and the direction of causation is the subject of a significant body of research, for example many of the papers by Kaufmann & Kraay, and discussion of this subject in the Global Monitoring Report 2006 (pp. 121-2)

[39] In development debates a stronger focus on participation emerged during the 1980s, in relation to projects, and has since been taken into the consultation of poor people on development priorities for Poverty Reduction Strategies, with varying degrees of success (see for example McGee, Levene, J. & Hughes, A Assessing Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers , IDS research report 52; World Bank & IMF (2005) Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Approach). A range of information on the topic of Voice and Accountability will shortly be available from the Governance & Social Development Resource Centre website (www.grc-dfid.org)

[40] The "ODI Literature Review and Donor Approaches on Citizens' Voice and Accountability" highlights the complexity of this subject and the various interpretations of what constitutes V and A in different contexts.

[41] Principally Sections: 14 &15 on ownership; 38 on Fragile States; and, 48 on Mutual Accountability.

11. Strengthening CV&A is pursued through a wide range of approaches. Examples include civic education, media strengthening, national and local policy and planning processes (including decentralisation), participatory budgeting and expenditure monitoring, social auditing and civil society and advocacy programmes. But the processes of empowerment and fostering an environment conducive to accountability and responsiveness are complex and dynamic as are the difficulties of attributing the factors that provoke change – both negative and positive. Donors have thus recognised that there is a need to develop a more comprehensive understanding of this area by using a common framework to evaluate interventions in a number of different country contexts.

Purpose and Use

12. The purpose of the evaluation is twofold:

a) To improve understanding of citizens' voice and accountability among development partners by mapping and documenting approaches and strategies of development partners for enhancing CV&A in a variety of developing country contexts; and to learn lessons on which approaches have worked best, where and why;
b) To assess effects of a range of donor CV&A interventions on governance and on aid effectiveness, and whether these effects are sustainable.

13. In enhancing learning about CV&A interventions, the evaluation will hence make a contribution in an area of development co-operation which is allocated increasing resources but in which there is still little evidence on results. The evaluation also serves an important purpose of enhancing the transparency and accountability of donors.

14. As an instrument of both learning and accountability, the evaluation will contribute to policy development, improved practices and understanding in an important aspect of governance, and be of use to a wide audience: policy makers, desk officers, country offices and implementing partners and evaluators.

15. This multi-donor initiative will culminate in a synthesis report to be published in April 2008. It will analyse the lessons learned from the various case studies and make recommendations for donors to consider and implement. **The country case studies are thus a vital part of this process,** and need to be reflective of different governance contexts and provide examples of the variety of approaches to Voice and Accountability.

Objectives and Scope of the Country Case Studies

16. Against the described background and purpose of the evaluation the objectives of each of the country case studies are to:

a) Assess the selected interventions against their intended objectives, and on the basis of that draw conclusions on what works, and what does not, in relation to intervention programme theories.
b) Assess the relevance of the interventions for strengthening voice and accountability in the specific developing country context.
c) Provide an overall assessment/analysis of donors' role, success and failures in supporting V&A in different country contexts

Scope

17. In accomplishing the objectives of the assignment a thorough understanding of, and familiarity with, the CV&A and Evaluation Framework and associated documentation[42] will be necessary. The evaluation will be based on the common Framework and it will be carried out according to the processes/steps outlined in the methodological guidance attached as an annex to that document, which provides references to a choice of methods and tools for the evaluation.

18. Prior to undertaking the evaluation phase itself, considerable work will be required by the CCS Team to finalise with donor partners in country those interventions selected for evaluation. Critical to this process is gaining an understanding of the context against which CV&A interventions can be gauged and establishing a dialogue with key international and national actors to explore the various interpretations of "voice and accountability" and , in some contexts, "citizen".

Tasks

19. Using the Evaluation Framework and Methodology, and adapting it to the specific country context, the Country Case Study Team (CCS Team) will provide answers to the following overarching evaluation questions:

- **Question 1: Channels, mechanisms and processes**

  What are the concrete channels, i.e. actors, spaces and mechanisms supported by donor-funded interventions for: (i) citizens' voice and empowerment; (ii) increased role of poor and excluded groups, and women or their representatives in governance processes; and (iii) accountability of governments to citizens?

  How do these channels work and how important are they to achieve CV&A outcomes?

- **Question 2: Results and outcomes**

  To what extent have the different approaches and strategies adopted by donors contributed to enhanced CV&A in partner countries?

- **Question 3: Pathways to broader development outcomes and impacts**

  In what ways are CV&A interventions contributing to broader development goals, such as poverty reduction and the MDGs? In particular, what are the main pathways leading from improved CV&A to such broader development outcomes?

- **Question 4: V&A and aid effectiveness**

  What can we learn from experience to date of donors' effectiveness in supporting CV&A interventions with particular reference to the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration?

Process

20. Two pilot studies were conducted in Benin and Nicaragua. They indicated that there was insufficient mutual understanding of the meaning of "voice and accountability" among ECG donors and partners. Without such an understanding amongst donors, host nation and implementing partners it will be difficult to identify appropriate interventions for study. To

[42] See attached zip files. It is important to note that the Evaluation Framework and Methodology is integral part of the present generic TOR for country case studies.

overcome this, each country case study will consist of two phases and the commissioning donor [43] will play an active part in the first phase along with the CCS Team leader.

First "Inception" Phase

21. The first phase will occur some weeks in advance of the second "main" phase. Initially desk based research and work to initiate the context analysis and identify, with "in country" donor partners, potential interventions for evaluation. This will be followed by an "in country" visit (probably capital based) of some 5-7 days (tbc) to:

- Conduct introductory meetings and/or workshops to explain the Framework and Methodology and explore the different perceptions and interpretations of "Voice and Accountability";
- Finalise, in close consultation with relevant country offices (and the commissioning donor's representative), the range of interventions to be evaluated ensuring balance between "supply and demand" side policies, programmes and projects and spread of rural/urban, formal/informal, empowered/disempowered actors.
- Determine the most appropriate evaluation methodology and tools (drawn from the options contained in the Methodological Guidance);
- Ensure that there is adequate background material and expert advice on the country context[44];
- Arrange a programme of appointments and field visits in preparation for the full team's visit;
- Ensure logistics and accommodation arrangements are in hand;
- Report progress and observations in the form of an inception report to the commissioning donor and donor partner country offices (indicative length 4-6 pages); and,
- Be prepared to attend and discuss/present the inception report at a meeting of the ECG in Germany (Bonn 22-23/10/2007)

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Second "Main Evaluation" phase

22. The second main phase of the mission will involve all members of the CCS Team. The duration of the field study should not exceed three weeks. The CCS Team will conduct an evaluation of the interventions identified based on, and drawing questions from, the Evaluation Framework and accompanying Methodological Guidance.

23. At the end of the evaluation period the CCS Team will:

- Conduct a debriefing seminar on the preliminary findings; and
- Write the CCS Evaluation report.

24. As the Team will be using a new framework and approach for evaluating citizens' voice and accountability, it will be important to note, throughout the evaluation exercise, aspects of the Framework which proved of most value (and vice versa) and areas where additional guidance would have been of benefit.

[43] From Donor HQ or the Country Office as appropriate/convenient.

[44] This knowledge may be available through the selection of consultants for the CCS Team but it may also be necessary for the Team to commission additional work (included within the terms of the consultancy contract) from a national expert.

25. Apart from the country mission, time should be also allocated for pre reading, documenting and writing up the Evaluation (CCS) Report. A Quality Assurance (QA) panel for this process has been established and all CCS reports, in addition to being submitted to the commissioning donor, have to be copied to the QA Panel for their advice. The QA Panel will be available (by telephone) to the CCS Team leader for advice on standards and queries on methodological approaches.

26. A one-day workshop may be arranged, probably on completion of all CCS (mid – late January 2008), to further share experiences and comments on the CCS, the Framework and methodologies employed with other consultancy teams, ECG members, the QA panel and Synthesis report authors. All of this is designed to contribute to a greater understanding of the issues involved and assist in the compilation of the Synthesis report.

Outputs and Deliverables

27. The following specific reports and outputs are required over the period of the assignment:

- In country Introductory Workshop - CCS Team leader
- "Inception" Report - CCS Team Leader (prior to initiation of second phase);
- Evaluation Debriefing Seminar (prior to end of "in country" mission)
- Debriefing Note summarising the findings, conclusions and recommendations (to be presented at the end of the in country mission, max. five pages);
- Draft Evaluation Report (indicative length 40 pages) to be delivered to the commissioning donor and the QA panel within three weeks of the end of the in-country mission;
- Final Evaluation report (indicative length 40 pages) – to be delivered to the commissioning donor and copied to the QA Panel within two weeks of receiving comments on the draft report from the commissioning donor;
- Attendance, as available by CCS Team members and Team Leaders at a feedback workshop (location tbc and date tbc – probably mid Jan 2008); and,
- A brief post-mortem note (max four pages) as a feed-back to the commissioning donor of the evaluation process as experienced by the team.

28. All Country Case Study reports are expected to adhere to DAC reporting standards and conventions but for ease of the Synthesis Report's compilation and analysis the following layout is to be adopted:

- Executive Summary
- Part 1: Introduction
- Part 2: Process undertaken to complete the assignment: rationale for interventions selected and methodologies employed; challenges encountered in using the Framework and Methodological Guidance; field trips undertaken, logistics challenges etc
- Part 3: Pilot Country/Regional context relevant to CV&A
- Part 4 (MAIN): Interventions evaluated. Use the Evaluation Framework and describe the outputs, outcomes and impacts against the evaluation questions and, specific criteria and indicators used to answer them. Use specific interventions to illustrate key issues. Conclusions drawn and intervention-specific recommendations made.
- Part 5: Lessons learned and general recommendations

29. The main report's indicative length is some 40 pages but Annexes may be attached as required to cover, inter alia, TORs, Inception Report, Context Analysis; Interviews/meetings conducted etc.

Team Composition, Contracting and Reporting Arrangements

30. The work should be conducted by a small team of up to 4 consultants (including the nominated Team Leader). The Consultancy team, at least one of whose consultants must be from/based in the CCS country/ should possess the following:

- Experience of complex evaluations;
- Experience and knowledge of participatory approaches to evaluation, and of joint evaluation (desirable);
- Expertise in Governance, Social development and, as appropriate, conflict prevention issues;
- Strong analytical, reasoning and writing skills;
- Experience of working in sensitive environments
- Regional/country knowledge and expertise including awareness of the political context of development interventions in this area;
- Knowledge of French, English and preferably Dutch

31. All team members should be sensitive to issues relating to working with the poor, marginalised and vulnerable members of society.

32. A consultancy company will be appointed on the basis of the skills demonstrated in the team composition, costs, availability and access to in house expertise and reach back.

33. The working language of the Evaluation is as agreed by the Commissioning donor but all reports should be translated into English for the Synthesis report. Consideration will be given to translating each report and the follow on synthesis report into the most common languages used by donors and beneficiaries.

34. Consultants will be responsible for making their own logistics and accommodation arrangements in country but introductions to relevant development offices and embassies will be made. Individual sponsoring development partners will be responsible for determining the Duty of Care provision they wish to make.

35. The start date for this work will be **10 October** and the concluding date no later than end January 2008.

36. Evaluation Management: The various roles of the ECG, Evaluation Theme Leader, commissioning donor, QA Panel, and the local donor representatives, are as outlined below:

The Evaluation Core Group provides overall endorsement of, and direction to, the key components of this initiative e.g. Terms of Reference, timing, reports' publication and dissemination decisions etc. Chairmanship of the Group is shared, rotating as per the location of ECG meetings. ECG members are the key interlocutors between consultancy teams engaged in the work and donor colleagues in both capitals and country offices.

The Evaluation Theme Leader: DFID provides the management and administrative support for this initiative through its nominated Evaluation Theme Leader.

Commissioning donor is the donor which undertakes to commission, fund and manage a specific component of CV&A work

The Quality Assurance Panel has been commissioned by DFID on behalf of the ECG to ensure that the DAC Evaluation Quality standards are adequately reflected in the final Evaluation Framework, Methodological Approach, Country Case Studies and Synthesis Report; and, that reporting standards are uniformly observed as per the TORs for CCS. It is an advisory role and it reports through the Evaluation Theme Leader to the ECG.

SPECIFIC TERMS OF REFERENCE: COUNTRY CASE STUDY: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

37. The Special evaluation Office, member of the ECG group, is responsible for the execution of a country case study in the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of a broader CV&A evaluation. In this CCS not only interventions of the Belgian development cooperation will be taken into account but also interventions of other donor countries involved in the broader CV&A evaluation.

38. By choosing the different countries for the country case studies, a mixture of countries with a clearly different CV&A context has been made. Within this range of countries, the DRC, a country in transition, offers the opportunity to evaluate CV&A in a country where CV&A is little developed. In the percentile rank[45] (0-100) of the V&A indicator of the World Bank, which is a governance indicator, the DRC is ranked at the 5,8 percentile (0 corresponds to the lowest rank and 100 to the highest).

39. Given that DRC is a vast country, this country case study will not aspire to evaluate interventions in the whole country. In the first phase of the evaluation (desk study and first mission) a number of regions will be chosen in close consultation with the Special evaluation office and the representation of the Belgian development cooperation in DRC.

Phasing and indicative schedule[46]

40.

Phase 1. Kick-off meeting, Brussels (10/10/2007)
Phase 2. Desk study (10/10 – 25/10/07):
- to master the framework and the methodology
- to elaborate the CV&A context in DRC
- preparation of the first mission
- first selection of possible interventions and actors

Phase 3. ECG meeting in Bonn (22-23/10/07)
Phase 4. First mission + inception note (25/10-14/11/07)
Phase 5. Main evaluation mission + draft evaluation report (15/11-14/12/07)
Phase 6. Writing of the final evaluation report. (15/01/2008)
Phase 7. Participation at feedback workshop (end January 2008)

[45] Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, "Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006" (July 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999979

[46] See point 20 to 27 higher up

41. The reporting[47] should be done in English or French, the final report should be done in English and French. The reports must be submitted to the Special Evaluation Office and the quality assurance control panel.

Technical tender

42. The technical tender consists of:

- an explanatory memorandum about the background to the contract as proof that the terms of reference and the subject under evaluation have been fully understood.
- showing good comprehension of the methodology, which is already developed.
- schedule/work programme
- team composition[48] (organisation, tasks carried out by each team member and their CV); the team leader must be clearly identified
- references for previous contracts carried out by the consultancy
- budget.

[47] See 27,28 en 29 higher up
[48] See 30-31 higher up

Annex B: Methodology

1. *General context of evaluation*

This evaluation is a Country case study (CCS) conducted in the DCR on the subject of V&A projects. It forms part of a joint evaluation conducted by a restricted group of seven partner countries from the DAC/OECD. The various case studies were based on a common methodology drawn up by the ODI[49]. Two pilot missions have been carried out in Benin and Nicaragua, allowing the methodological approach to be revised on the basis of the first results. The methodology was also discussed in depth between donors and consultants responsible for the various country case studies, during a meeting held in Bonn in October 2007.

The evaluation framework formulated four principal questions of evaluation:

Question 1: Channels, mechanisms and processes

- What are the specific channels – that is, the actors, forums and mechanisms benefiting from interventions financed by the donors – that contribute: (i) to letting citizens speak for themselves and increase their independence; (ii) increasing the role of poor and excluded people groups and the role of women or their representatives in the processes of government; and (iii) making governments responsible before their citizens?
- How do these channels function, and to what extent to they contribute to the results obtained in relation to V&A?

Question 2: Results

- To what extent have the various approaches and strategies adopted by the donors contributed to improving the image of V&A in the partner countries?

Question 3: Roads that lead to results, and a greater impact in the field of development

- In what ways do V&A interventions allow progress in the realisation of wider development objectives, such as reducing poverty and OMD? In particular, what are the principal scenarios that allow the progress made in citizen participation and increased responsibility that have wider repercussions in the field of development?

Question 4: V&A and effectiveness of development aid

- What lessons can be learnt, in terms of effectiveness, from the experience gained so far in aid to donors to V&A interventions, if reference is made in particular to the principles set forth in the Declaration of Paris?

The study is the result of a joint effort by consultants under the leadership of Pierre Grega. The evaluation team was put together in such a way as to include different cultural sensitivities (Congolese to facilitate the local approach; French-speaking and English-speaking to overcome the diverse perceptions of the concept of CV&A). Continuous

[49] Evaluation of CV&A – Evaluation framework. And Annex A : Evaluation framework, Methodological Guidance for Country Case Study – August 2007

collaboration between the consultants during the field missions and drafting phase increased opportunities for discussion. All sections of the report were reviewed by every team member. This report, therefore, illustrates a viewpoint that is shared by all of the consultants.

The evaluation team comprised Pierre Grega, Sabine Garbarino, Georges Tshionza Mata and Manuel Eggen. Pierre Grega, team leader, has over twenty year's experience in the various sectors of development cooperation (non-governmental cooperation, bilateral and multilateral cooperation). His principal field of expertise is institutional support and good governance. He also has a thorough knowledge of Central Africa, particularly the DRC where he has already carried out some thirty short and medium-term missions throughout his career. Sabine Garbarino is a consultant at the British consultancy firm, Oxford Policy Management (OPM). She has a very sound knowledge of development policies and public governance in economic and social fields (such as support programmes financed by the DFID and the World Bank). Georges Tshionza Mata is Director of the Service for the Reinforcement of Support for the Base Communities of Central Africa (SERACOB), a regional network working with civil society organisations. He was greatly involved in the Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA), which gave civil society a role in the preparation of the PRGSP. During the drafting of the report, the team was also supported by Manuel Eggen, lawyer specialising in human rights and research consultant at DRIS for over two years.

The two pilot missions also revealed that there was insufficient mutual understanding of the concept of V&A in the donor countries and partner countries, thus making it difficult to identify interventions that could be used as a basis for the study. It was thus decided to divide the country evaluations into two sections. **An Inception phase** was aimed at analysing the context and increasing the mutual understanding of the concept of "V&A", and ensuring that the partners made the most of the evaluation and the V&A interventions to be analysed were selected. The **main evaluation phase** was aimed at allowing an in-depth analysis of the interventions chosen and drawing general conclusions for the study as a whole.

2. *Inception phase*

Initially, the aim of this first phase was to explore the varying perceptions and interpretations of the concept of V&A. During a series of semi-structured interviews, the consultants therefore obtained qualitative data on the way on which these concepts were understood by the principal stakeholders in the co-operation in the DRC, grouped into four categories:

- the Congolese authorities met, both political and administrative;
- the local Congolese actors;
- the international actors active in the DRC (multilateral organisations, bilateral agencies and international NGOs);
- the donors.

The second principal aim of the design phase, as outlined in the terms of reference, was to finalise the selection of interventions to be subjected to evaluation, in association with the various donors concerned. During the meeting in Bonn between the donors and the consultants, a number of selection criteria were agreed upon for taking into consideration as part of a global approach. To ensure consistency with the other case studies, the team of consultants in the DRC used these criteria as a basis[50].

50 Geographical dispersion; diversity of lenders concerned; diversity of actors involved (NGOs, multilateral, governmental); capacity of projects for reaching vulnerable groups; level of intervention (national/regional/

The field visits to a number of projects that could potentially be evaluated, the examination of the evaluation reports on some of these projects, and the semi-structured interviews with each of these donors, revealed the basis on which the priority interventions to be agreed for each individual donor could be drawn up. During this first stage, about twenty-five projects were pre-selected.

The team of consultants then once again addressed the various interventions that could potentially be evaluated, taking account of the following additional criteria:

- limiting the selection to a maximum of ten interventions;
- releasing a portfolio of interventions working in two separate locations, namely Kinshasa and a second establishment in the interior of the country;
- favouring the interventions supported by several of the donors involved in the evaluation;
- selecting interventions in progress as a matter of priority, to guarantee greater accessibility to the beneficiaries.

In addition, this initial more general list of 25 pre-selected projects eventually lost a number of projects, on the basis of:

- their location (area of poor security or location limited to an area not visited by the mission);
- the fact that they doubled up with other similar projects sometimes considered by the donors to be more pertinent;
- potential difficulties in establishing contacts;

Table 5: Overall list of 25 projects pre-selected, and determination of final choice

	Project	Donors	Themes	Region	Selection
1	Support to Radio Okapi	UK	Media	Kinshasa + Provinces	Selected
2	Support for Institutions de la Transition	UK	Media, Elections, State reinforcement	Kinshasa + Provinces	Selected
3	Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA	SE-UK	Elections	Kinshasa	Selected
4	Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace - Search for Common Ground/Centre Lokolé	UK-SE- BE	Conflict resolution, media	Kinshasa	Selected
5	Initiative for joint work in the leadership and State cohesion (ILCCE) - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars	UK-SE	Conflict resolution	Kinshasa	Selected
6	Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the DRC – Global Witness	SE	Extraction industries: support for society	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii	Selected
7	Supporting the National Council for NGOs Active in the	BE	Support for society	Kinshasa + Provinces	Selected

local); opportunity for learning from these interventions; fields of intervention (V&A as a central or peripheral theme); equilibrium between participation and accountability; equilibrium between supply and demand in relation to V&A; logistical considerations and specific opportunities.

	Development Sector (CNONGD)				
8	Capacity building Programme for trade union - Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC)	BE	Support for society – trade unions	Kinshasa + Provinces	Selected
9	Strengthening the rule of law and restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu	BE -UK	Justice	Kinshasa	Selected
10	Support programme for development initiatives in the Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke (PAIDECO-Kin)	BE	Participative management: de-centralisation	Kinshasa	Selected
11	Support for rehabilitation of young men and women affected by the Kivu war – Diobass platform	BE	Conflict resolution	Kivu	Not selected as located in unsecured zone
12	National Women & Development Committee, CONAFED – women and elections in the DRC	BE	Elections – support for society – type	Kinshasa + Provinces	Not selected because of difficulties in organisation
13	Preventing conflict and building peace in North Kivu: stretching along the Rives du Lac – Pax Christi	BE	Conflict resolution	North Kivu	Not selected as located in unsecured zone
14	Support for reinforcement of the senate by the Belgian senate	BE	State reinforcement	Kinshasa	Not selected as project too tightly targeted
15	Reinforcing the Parliament documentation centre (National Assembly and Senate)	BE – UK	State reinforcement	Kinshasa	Not selected as project only started recently
16	Support for reform of the civil service in the DRC	BE	State reinforcement	Kinshasa	Not selected as project only started recently
17	REJUSCO – Reforming Justice in Congo	BE	State reinforcement	North & South Kivu	Not selected as project only started recently
18	Support for New Trade Union Dynamic	BE – UK	Support for society	Katanga	Not selected as principally based in Katanga
19	Support for SADHO, human rights NGO	BE - UK	Support for society	Kinshasa + Provinces	Not selected as support for specific NGO, in comparison with CNONGD
20	Support via Global Rights for CSO for involvement in drafting of laws	SE	Support for society	Kinshasa	Not selected as project less relevant than other projects selected
21	Support via ICTJ to strengthen the justice sector in the DRC	SE	Justice	Kinshasa	Not selected as project less relevant than other projects selected
22	Support for international committee of transition experts	UK	Conflict resolution – State reinforcement	Kinshasa	Not selected as project less relevant than other projects selected (WWICS)
23	Support for resolution of electoral disputes	UK	Conflict resolution	Kinshasa + Provinces	Not selected as project less relevant than other projects selected (EISA)
24	RCN Katanga	UK	Justice	Katanga	Not selected as in Katanga Province
25	Support via PANOS for reinforcement of media	UK	Media	Kinshasa + Provinces	Not selected as project comparable to other selected interventions (Okapi, SFCG)

Finally, a selection of some ten interventions was chosen by the team of consultants and presented for approval at the debriefing meeting for the design phase, which confirmed the selection set out below, suggesting that Mbuji-Mayii should be accepted as a second evaluation site in addition to Kinshasa.

This second location was accepted for the following reasons:

- this is a province in which radical opposition (which remained on the edge of the transition process and refused to participate in the elections) had a particular presence. It was interesting to analyse the interventions in support of V&A in an environment in which a sizeable part of civil society was highly critical of the public authority;
- this province, subject to the Mining Code, contains substantial natural resources mainly exploited on an informal basis. It is therefore a good specific illustration of the continuous inherent contradiction within the DRC, between its great wealth of natural resources and the extreme poverty of its population. Against this particular background, support for V&A contains specific problems that it appears useful to address;
- the level of poverty in this province is one of the highest in the DRC; an evaluation in this area will allow a better assessment of the impact of extreme poverty on the interventions and development of V&A;
- this province rarely has visits from outside evaluation teams; choosing it has allowed interventions or parts thereof that are not often analysed to be examined.

Table 6: List of interventions selected according to selection criteria

	Projects	Donors	Actor	Themes	Level[51] of intervention	Target group	V&A balance	Supply-demand balance	Location[52]
1	Support to Radio Okapi	UK	International NGO: Foundation Hirondelle /, MONUC, Radio Okapi	Media	N/P/L	General	V&A	O/D	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
2	Support for Institutions de la Transition	UK	International organisation: UNDP	Media, election support, capacity building for state institutions	N/P/L	General	V&A	O	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
3	Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA	SE / UK	International NGO: EISA	Elections	N/P/L	General	V&A	O/D	Kinshasa
4	Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace - Search for Common Ground/Centre Lokolé	UK / SE / BE	Iinternational NGO: SFCG LNGO: Lokolé Centre	Conflict resolution and peace-building through media programmes and community development	P/L	The vulnerable	V	D	Kinshasa
5	Initiative for joint work in the leadership and State cohesion (ILCCE) - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars	UK / SE	International NGO: WWICS	Training initiatives for leaders to support conflict resolution, peace-building and build state capacity	N	Leaders	A	O/D	Kinshasa
6	Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the DRC – Global Witness	SE	International NGO: Global Witness	Advocacy fo transparency in extractive industries; support for national OSC	N	The vulnerable	V	D	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
7	Supporting the National Council for NGOs Active in the Development Sector (CNONGD)	BE	International NGO: 11.11.11	Support for civil society (through NGO umbrella organisation)	N/P	The vulnerable	V	D	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii
8	Capacity building Programme for trade union - Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC)	BE	National NGO: CSC	Support for civil society (trade unions)	N/P	The vulnerable	V	D	Kinshasa + Mbuji-Mayii

[51] N/P/L = National / Provincial / Local.

[52] Location of places where interventions have been assessed: many of these interventions have a presence in various other regions of the country as well as those in which they were evaluated (thus, for example, projects with N/P/L intervention level work at the various provincial levels and also at a more local level).

9	Strengthening the rule of law and restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu	BE / UK	International NGO: RCN	Justice	N/P	The weak	V&A	O/D	Kinshasa
10	Support programme for development initiatives in the Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke (PAIDECO-Kin)	BE	Bilateral government co-operation: CTB	Decentralisation, community development programme	L	The weak	V&A	O/D	Kinshasa

This selection of interventions finally chosen therefore meets most of the criteria:

- three interventions are located in Kinshasa only, while the seven others, in addition to their location in the capital, will have similar establishments or project in the interior of the country, five of them being evaluated in Mbuji-Mayii;
- the interventions cover the various types of actor involved, even though a majority of the projects are conducted by international NGOs, this being representative of the method of involvement in the DRC during this transition period;
- most of the projects relate to vulnerable sections of the population;
- there is a level of equilibrium between projects centred on supply and demand, even though the support interventions with sole accountability are the least frequent, this being representative of the Congolese way in which the crisis is being left behind;
- there is equilibrium between the projects financed by the various partner donors in the evaluation, and over fifty per cent of these projects are financed by several donors. This is also typical of the Congolese situation.

However, in view of the logistical restrictions that did not allow many places to be visited or the current state of affairs in the DRC to be assessed (delicate balance in the immediate aftermath of the elections), this selection, probably unsatisfactorily, covers three aspects:

- the reality of the situation in remote rural areas; communication restrictions have limited the opportunities for the team to travel to the remotest rural areas, even though the choice of Mbuji-Mayii as a second location could have partly compensated for this problem;
- projects that build capacity of state institutions (centred specifically on the accountability aspect) are less well represented. This is however indicative of the current Congolese situation: the donors' priorities for support are not concentrated in this area. The occasional and sometimes over-selective support (such as support for the Senate) could not be selected in view of the competition posed by the large volume of support for the electoral processes;
- the genre aspect: this is definitely not sufficiently present in the sample of interventions. Here also, however, this situation is indicative of the current Congolese situation: the donors' urgent priorities are to leave a significant portion of the finances aside for specific groups, such as women.

Most of these projects started only recently. The recent start dates are explained partly by the fact that political stabilisation in the DRC did not begin until September 2003, following the signature of the Accord Global et Inclusif (Global Inclusive Agreement), which led to the starting or restarting of a number of projects in or shortly after 2004. However, during the very troubled time that preceded this stabilisation, many donors financed interventions of the same type, often with the same partners, but with shorter finance periods (generally one year): this at least was the case for half of the projects in the sample. The duration of the partnership between donors and project actors is therefore longer than the project start date would suggest. The evaluation therefore examined interventions and areas of V&A support that often had a history longer than just the period of their most recent financing. The effects or conclusions obtained from an analysis of these interventions are necessarily based on all the experience accumulated in previous phases, even when the evaluation looked to concentrate as far as possible on analysing only the phase of the project accepted in the sample.

3. *Main evaluation phase*

The **main evaluation phase** of the evaluation examined the general situation of V&A in the DRC in depth. A second field mission thus met the points of view of a group of resource personnel representing the public authorities, international NGOs and local actors. Annex E contains a complete list of individual persons met and interviewed, most of them according to one of the interview guides reproduced in Annex F.

A sizeable part of the principal mission concentrated on evaluating the ten interventions selected. These interventions were mainly evaluated using an examination of the five V&A intervention components, as identified in the Evaluation Framework[53] and the CAD criteria (relevance, effectiveness, effectiveness, impact, durability).

For each of the interventions included in the sample, the documents available were consulted prior to the mission and often complemented by a "document harvest" in the field. Preliminary contact was made with the people responsible for monitoring the projects in the head offices of the various donors. Finally, a systematic "data harvest" was conducted for all ten interventions in the field. The following methodological tools in particular were used during this data harvest in the field:

- secondary data review of available documentation;
- Focus Group Discussions [54];
- group discussion;
- semi-structured interview with donors, key informants and persons involved in the projects;
- passive observation.

When using these methodological tools, the team of consultants took the following precautions:
Method of evaluation: Selection, for all interventions of the project team set aside to talk to the founders (e.g. international NGOs, donor), project implementer and beneficiary/ies. Special attention was paid to having separate interviews with the beneficiaries of the intervention, to allow them to speak freely about the benefits and problems. However, the project team was often the only link between the consultants and the beneficiaries and, given the short timeframe to evaluate ten projects, the evaluation team did not always have total control over the selection of the beneficiaries.

Focus Group Discussion: In order to allow for a maximum focus group diversity of Focus Group Participants, the following factors were taken into account, both in Kinshasa and Mbuji-Mayii: gender of the participant, poverty status, education and age.
Focus Group Participants in Kinshasa, through the visual means of a Venn Diagram, mapped landscape of radio stations in the capital along two actors: (1) the importance and influence of the radio stations (How easily can this radio make its voice heard?) shown by the size of the

[53] A) Opportunities, constraints and entry points for CV&A. B) Institutional, organisational and individual capacities. C) Voice and accountability channels. D) Changes in policy, practice, behaviours and power relations. E) Broader development outcomes.
[54] The evaluation did not encounter any problems of participation in the Focus Groups: the presence was spontaneous in each case and the level of involvement in discussion high. No participant was paid for their involvement in the Focus Group. although in some groups (radio auditors, CSC, PAIDECO) transport costs were refunded. This is further testimony to the Congolese population's intense desire to voice its opinion and participate in the public phenomenon.

circle (and colour) and (2) the radio's proximity to the citizens in terms of access (How easily can citizens contact the radio stations and does the radio pass the complaint on?) shown in the distance of the radio station to the community. See below for results.

Interview scripts: Different semi-structured interview scripts were developed for the key informants' interviews, the donor interviews and the focus group discussions, both in English and in French. While allowing the required flexibility, the interview scripts were developed with regard to the ODI framework and thus ensured comparability between the different interventions.

Confidentiality: Confidentiality was assured to all resources persons, key informants and focus group participants.

Table 7: Methodologies used[55]

	Project	Methodology used[56]	Location
01	Support to Radio Okapi Support for Institutions de la Transition Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA	○ 1 SSI (Radio Okapi)	Mbuji-Mayii
		○ 1 SSI with beneficiary local radio stations	Mbuji-Mayii
		○ 2 FG with radio auditors ○ 1 Venn diagram	Mbuji-Mayii, Kinshasa
02	Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace - Search for Common Ground/Centre Lokolé Initiative for joint work in the leadership and State cohesion (ILCCE) - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the DRC – Global Witness	○ 2 SSI (HAM, CEI)	Mbuji-Mayii
		○ 1 FG with IAD representatives	Mbuji-Mayii
		○ 2 SSI with project managers (UNDP)	Kinshasa
03	Supporting the National Council for NGOs Active in the Development Sector (CNONGD) Capacity building Programme for trade union - Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC)	○ 1 SSI with project co-ordinator	Kinshasa
		○ 2 SSI with national NGOs involved in the elections	Kinshasa
04	Strengthening the rule of law and restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu	○ 2 SSI with project managers	Kinshasa
		○ 2 FG with radio auditors ○ Venn diagram	Mbuji-Mayii, Kinshasa
05	Support for Radio Okapi Support for Institutions de la Transition	○ 1 ISD with government sector manager (UNDP)	Kinshasa
		○ 1 SSI with one project manager (by telephone)	Brussels

[55] This table summarises the interviews conducted using the interview scripts with the stakeholders in the projects. The data harvest was further enriched through the numerous contacts and interviews that the consultants enjoyed with the representatives of lenders and resource personnel, allowing a good overall vision of the context within which these analysed interventions were conducted.
[56] ISD = Semi-structured interview, generally one or two people questioned.
FG = Focus group: discussion with a small group (between 5 and 8 participants).
GD = Group discussion: conversation involving more than 10 participants.

06	Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace - Search for Common Ground/Centre Lokolé	○ 2 SSI with national NGO actors	Mbuji-Mayii, Kinshasa
		○ 1 SSI with project manager (by telephone)	London
07	Initiative for joint work in the leadership and State cohesion (ILCCE) - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the DRC – Global Witness Supporting the National Council for NGOs Active in the Development Sector (CNONGD)	○ 1 SSI with a donor	Kinshasa
		○ 1 SSI with one project manager	Kinshasa
		○ 2 SSI with beneficiary NGOs	Kinshasa
08	Capacity building Programme for trade union - Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC) Strengthening the rule of law and restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu	○ 2 SSI with beneficiaries and project managers	Kinshasa Mbuji-Mayii
		○ 1 GD with beneficiaries	Kinshasa
09	Support programme for development initiatives in the Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke (PAIDECO-Kin) Support for Radio Okapi Support for Institutions de la Transition	○ 1 SSI with project managers	Kinshasa
		○ 1 observation (police workshop, civil society)	Kinshasa
		○ 1 FG with beneficiaries (police, civil society)	Kinshasa
10	Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA	○ 1 SSI with project managers ○ 1 SSI with local authorities	Kinshasa
		○ 1 GD with members of CCD and CLD	Kinshasa
		○ 1 GD with beneficiaries and local NGOs	Kinshasa

In addition, for several interventions the qualitative data gathering were complemented by a project visit in the field: visit to the studios of Radio Okapi, radio studios broadcasting SFCG programmes, the offices of CEI and HAM, a provincial parliament and government, a regional office of CNONGD, RCN training premises, PAIDECO project realisation and development premises, etc.

The main evaluation phase concluded with a restoration workshop held in Kinshasa on 17 December 2007, which allowed the stakeholders to receive the first elements of the conclusions of the evaluations. A list of the participants in this workshop is shown in Annex E.

In terms of the data gathering, the principal task encountered a number of difficulties:

- the period that preceded the design phase was clearly too short to allow proper collective assessment by the team of consultants of the methodological range proposed by ODI (allocation of the evaluation contract was finalised on the day before the Bonn seminar, just ten days before the start phase);

- in the particular context of the Democratic Republic of Congo (fragile State, emerging from crisis, public authorities with particularly limited means etc), the quantitative data and documents for several projects were difficult to access (not reliable, not continuous, not consistent). In addition, the quantitative data on the general state of the country are often lacking in continuity, thus making comparison over time difficult;
- the design phase chose to accept ten interventions for analysis, in order to provide a balanced sample between donors, one that represented the wide variety of actions undertaken during the transition. This diversity also partly illustrates the dispersion of the donors' interventions in a context of fragility and transition (little or no structured programme over the longer term, numerous donors for the same intervention, diversification of most donors' portfolios etc). The large size of this sample, and the general logistical conditions in the DRC, forced a reduction in the number of methods used. In terms of logistical constraints, the following in particular must be pointed out: limited availability of persons to interview during December, the distances and reduced mobility in Kinshasa with the resulting limits on the number of meetings possible per day, difficulty experienced by persons interviewed in obtaining quantified and material data even after several days of searching, the limited presence of certain international NGOs in the field, etc.

In view of the general difficulty in obtaining quantitative data, the mission prioritised the semi-structured interviews of the stakeholders in order to target principal sources of direct information better. Also, in the Focus Groups or Group Discussions, the evaluation gave priority to separate meetings between various actors (rather than bringing all the stakeholders together, as envisaged in the design phase report), in order to give each person involved a greater opportunity to speak.

The evaluation phase then made use of a range of methodological tools, which proved most suitable and helpful in analysing specific qualitative situations. Among these were:

- for addressing widely scattered direct beneficiaries (radio auditors): random selection, Focus Groups in two different cities with very different sections of the public, Venn diagram;
- for analysing a delicate workshop procedure that brought police officers and representatives of society before each other: silent observation of the workshop, followed, in a different time and location, by a Focus Group of beneficiaries in which some of the workshop participants took part.

In addition, all the interviews and meetings were started with a systematic explanation of the concept of V&A, in an effort to overcome the lack of familiarity with this concept in the French-speaking world.

The evaluation team also made collective work a matter of priority. As far as possible on each occasion, the various team consultants available met the resource personnel together, rather than talking about the different interviews to be conducted with them beforehand. This method allowed a multiple vision to be obtained for most of the data obtained, and this allowed an additional, diversified analysis to be supported. The choice of this method of work reduces the potential number of meetings held.

Finally, during the main mission in the field, a representative of the SES of the Belgian Foreign Affairs Ministry accompanied the team of evaluators. To ensure completeness of transparency, this person was introduced to everyone who was interviewed. The SES

representative was not a member of the evaluation team; his function throughout the mission was to obtain a better personal knowledge of the evaluation mechanisms. It is difficult to measure the impact of this presence on the answers given, even though at the beginning this impact seems to have been very limited in view of how the interviews turned out.

On completion of the two missions (inception mission and main evaluation phase), the initial conclusions were presented to the majority of the participating parties, who were able to give their observations and responses (workshop in Kinshasa on 17th December 2007, see participants in Annex E). An initial draft of the report was submitted for comment to several stakeholders (such as the representatives of financial backers in Kinshasa, SEU of the Belgian cooperation, SIDA, DFID and 11.11.11). It was also sent to the Quality assurance panel (PARC), responsible for monitoring the quality of the Country Cases Studies. All of the various stakeholders' comments, after being discussed and reviewed, were incorporated in the final version of the report.

4. *Feedback on evaluation framework*

The evaluation framework represents a very useful and unusually detailed means for analysing V&A interventions which is well grounded in a thorough analysis of both, voice and accountability. It is well designed to guide the country case studies and allows the team to focus on a broad range of factors connected to CV&A.

At the same time, the framework is very complex and has more than one layer, i.e. the five components of the framework, the four evaluation questions and the DAC criteria. While the components and the evaluation questions represent an adequate guidance and useful means to analyse V&A intervention, the DAC criteria feel like an add-on to the framework. Moreover, given that this is not an evaluation of individual projects the DAC criteria may not be necessarily the most appropriate means to evaluate the overall donor support to V&A in one country.

Given the complexity of the framework and the number of interventions (10 in the case DRC) we struggled with the time available for the design mission (including the selection of interventions) and the actual field-work. In praxis this sometimes meant compromising on quality of data gathering; e.g. we would have liked to spend more time for each intervention using the opportunities to work more carefully on sequencing of methods, using more diverse tools, using the models of change to a larger extent during the data gathering rather than the analysis. Moreover, the evaluation team felt that the framework has been interpreted in various ways for too long during the evaluation process and that this framework could have placed greater importance on the selection criteria for the project interventions.

Annex C: Analysis of Context

1. *Profile of DRC*

DRC is the third biggest country in Africa, after Algeria and Sudan, and the biggest of the central African countries. Its territory extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the eastern plateau, and covers most of the Congo river basin. The north of the country contains one of the world's largest areas of equatorial forest, and the east borders the great rift valley of East Africa, an area of mountains, hills, great lakes and volcanoes. The southern and central regions are areas of arboreal savannah, forming a mineral-rich high plateau. The country's central position in Africa and its richness in natural resources and raw materials attract the attention of the western powers and its local neighbours. This privileged situation is in total contrast with the overall poverty of the country.

Nearly four hundred ethnic groups coexist in the vast territory of DRC[57]. French is the lingua franca, but four local languages (Kikongo, Lingala, Tshiluba and Swahili) and numerous dialects are also spoken. In spite of this ethnic and linguistic diversity, the Congolese are generally proud of belonging to a large country situated in the heart of the African continent, and the years of warfare appear to have done nothing to weaken this national feeling.

2. *Historic perspective: from dictatorship and war… to peace and democratic stability*

Following independence from Belgium in 1960, Patrice Lubumba became the prime minister of the independent Congo. He was assassinated a year later. This was followed by a civil war, which ended with the takeover of power by Joseph Désiré Mobutu in 1965. Mobutu transformed the republic into an authoritarian regime. With a view to restoring African authenticity, the country was renamed Zaire, by which name it was known from 1971 to 1997. The Mobutiste regime largely squandered the wealth of the country and progressively isolated it at international level.

In 1997, a coalition led by Laurent Désiré Kabila of the AFDL party (Alliance of Democratic Liberation Forces) overthrew this regime with the assistance of outside allies. However, Laurent Désiré Kabila soon demonstrated his independence from his eastern allies of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. These latter used the inability of Kinshasa to bring the Interhamwe Hutu rebels exiled in DRC after the Rwanda genocide of 1994 under control as an excuse to intervene militarily in the Congolese territory. Congo was divided by this long period of war until 2003. The conflict cost the lives of more than 3 million people[58] and saw

[57] Figures obtained from several cross-searches over the Internet. See for example Wikipedia http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/R%C3%A9publique_d%C3%A9mocratique_du_Congo#_note-7, which quotes a number of sources which speak of 200 to 450 ethnic groups. These are in turn divided into a number of sub-groups (the Bantu, Sudanese, Nilotic, Hamitic and Pygmy peoples).

[58] Among the most important studies carried out on the humanitarian situation in DRC during the war years, we will refer to the reports by the American NGO known as the International Rescue Committee. Between 1998 and 2002, the IRC estimated that more than 3.3 million people had died in the Congolese conflict. See International Rescue Committee, "*Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Results from a Nationwide Survey"*, conducted September-November 2002, reported April 2003.
A new report published in 2007 shows that the humanitarian crisis did not end with the political Transition, as the additional number of deaths has been estimated at 5.8 million. See International Rescue Committee, "*Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo, An Ongoing Process*", fifth and latest survey, covering the period from January 2006 to April 2007 (available on http://www.theirc.org/resources/2007/2006-

the assassination of Laurent Désiré Kabila in January 2001. He was succeeded as leader of the country by his son Joseph Kabila. The unconditional acceptance by Joseph Kabila in 2001 of the Lusaka Agreements (1999)[59] set up a movement for peace with the outside world and the division of internal power, while the United Nations deployed an important mission for the restoration of peace, MONUC.

The global inclusive agreement[60] ratified in Sun City in 2003 marked the official end of the war years and committed DRC to a process of political transition. This involved the sharing of power between the Kabilists, rebel groups (mainly the MLC of Jean-Pierre Bemba and the RCD of Azarias Ruberwa), the unarmed opposition and representatives of civil society, as well as the holding of democratic elections. A Transitional Constitution was also adopted (2003). During the first two years of the Transition, the '1+4' institutions were hampered by their internal contradictions[61]. They proved incapable of reaching decisions on the various issues and were held back by a number of events, including the confrontations in the east (in North and South Kivus and Ituri), the attempted coup of June 2004, the withdrawal of DRC from the institutions in August 2004, the rise in tension with Rwanda at the end of 2004, and the threat by the MLC to withdraw from the institutions at the start of 2005. Each time, the tensions abated, mainly thanks to the intervention of the international community, whose role in DRC was also officially acknowledged in the texts of the Sun City agreement, which set up an International Committee for the Support of the Transition (CIAT)[62], with powers of intervention. The constitutional referendum held on the basis of universal suffrage in December 2005 was a decisive step on the way to pluralist democratic elections. In spite of an electoral campaign tainted by a proliferation of hate-filled speeches and the uneven distribution of the resources at the disposal of the candidates, the population of Congo demonstrated with dignity and determination that it favoured a democratic, non-violent way of selecting its leaders during the elections organised in the second half of 2006.

These elections were the culmination of a long and difficult process of restoration of peace and the stabilisation of the political institutions of the DRC. They made it possible to achieve a decisive step towards the consolidation of democracy and a policy of appeasement involving all the political actors in Congo. However, a number of events have demonstrated that the consolidation of peace and democracy will be a long process. While the elections were held in a climate of relative calm, under the supervision of the international community, the results of the count led to disturbances. There were major confrontations between armed

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7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf). The IRC report makes it clear that after transition few of these deaths were due to violence, and that most of them are in fact the result of illnesses that could easily have been avoided or treated, such as malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia and malnutrition.

59 This ceasefire agreement was signed in Lusaka on 10th July 1999 by Angola, Uganda, Namibia, DR Congo, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. In August of the same year, MLC and RCD also adhered to the agreement. This agreement made it possible to set up the negotiation process (Inter-Congo Dialogue) which was to lead to the global inclusive agreement of late 2002, but without entirely putting an end to the conflicts and massacres, which continue to this day in some regions of the country.

60 The global inclusive agreement signed in Pretoria on 16th December 2002 marked the official creation of a government of national unity and the transitional institutions, whose principle had been sealed in the transitional management agreement signed by all the parties in Sun City, South Africa, on 19th April 2002. The global inclusive agreement was later ratified in Sun City in 2003, and laid down the holding of elections, among other factors. These agreements were further confirmed by the transitional Constitution adopted in April 2003.

61 1+4 refers to the specific composition of the supreme state authority during the Transition, with 1 President and 4 Vice-presidents, representing each of the parties who signed the agreement.

62 CIAT consists of representatives of South Africa, Angola, Belgium, Canada, China, the European Commission, USA, France, Gabon, MONUC, UK, Russia, the African Union and Zambia.

groups close to the losing candidate (JP Bemba) and the government troops of President Kabila (heavy weapons exchanges in Kinshasa between the two ballots of the presidential election, violent confrontations in Kinshasa and Northern Nord Kivu in November 2006, and fierce fighting in Kinshasa in March 2007).

Finally, with regard to the situation in the east of the country, the theatre of the most important confrontations between rebel groups and grave atrocities against the civilian population, the agreement signed between the Kinshasa government and the three rebel groups in Ituri finally appears to be bearing fruit. The situation is more complex in the two provinces of Kivu, where the 'mixing' agreement of January 2007 between the Tutsi rebels of Laurent Nkunda and FARDC has failed. President Kabila therefore decided to engage the government troops in a confrontation with the rebels, which ended in relative failure. However, new hope for the end of the conflict emerged during the peace conference among the Kivus, which was attended by the warring parties, the civil society organisations and representatives of the public authorities. This conference led to the signature by the armed groups on 23rd January 2008 in Goma of a 'deed of commitment' for the immediate cessation of hostilities. "*This deed (...) will, if it is followed up, represent the most important effort for peace singe the signature of the Sun City agreement in 2002. It should make it possible to restore peace in the last zone of the republic which is still a theatre of armed confrontation*"[63].

[63] C. BRAEKMAN, *Le Soir*, Wednesday 23rd January 2008, 2235 hours.

3. *The socioeconomic context*

The vast majority of the estimated population of 58 million live below the threshold of poverty (71%)[64]. The mismanagement of natural resources and a succession of wars have led to an overall deterioration of the socioeconomic situation of the country, with the dilapidation of its basic economic and social infrastructures, the shrinkage of the formal private sector, losses of millions of human lives, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, a general lowering of the standard of living of the population, and the emergence and development of activities by the civil society organisations to ensure the survival of the population following the abandonment by the state of its essential public service responsibilities. Consequently, DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world, a situation which is in contrast with the enormous potential of its human and natural resources.

Natural resources in the DRC[65]

Many commentators have remarked that conflict in the DRC has been partly driven by the trade in natural resources. The UN Expert Panel reports on the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the DRC in April and November 2001 and in May and October 2002, all came to the clear conclusion that greed over the DRC's natural resources has played a significant role in prolonging the conflict. The conflict has become mainly about access, control and trade of five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold. The other resources of the DRC are:

- Cassiterite - Uranium, zinc and silver - Oil and gas – Manganese – Lead – Coal -
- Timber

With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) recently estimated at US$ 123 per inhabitant per annum[66], the country was in 168th place out of 177 in the 2005 classification of human development[67]. The HDI for DRC (0.411) is in fact below the average for sub-Saharan Africa (0.493) and the least developed countries (0.488). In addition, this overall situation conceals significant disparity between the various provinces, from a pro capita GDP of US$ 32 in Bandundu and the Eastern provinces to US$ 138 in the provinces of Lower Congo and Katanga.

[64] PRGSP, p. 24

[65] UN Security Council. (2001) Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 12 April , S/2001/357. ; UN Security Council. (2001) Addendum to the report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 13 November, S/2001/1072; UN Security Council. (2002) Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 23 October, S/2003/1027. Global Witness, Same Old Story, A background study on natural resources in the Democratic Republic of Congo, June 2004

[66] Economic result indicator (no. 14) in the World Report on Human Development, 2007/2008, *The fight against climate change: an imperative of human solidarity in a divided world*, UNPD, 2007/2008.

[67] 2005 HDI in the World Report on Human Development, 2007/2008, *The fight against climate change: an imperative of human solidarity in a divided world*, UNPD, 2007/2008.

Table 8: Socioeconomic statistics for DRC with comparison for the mean for sub-Saharan Africa[68]

	DRC	Sub-Saharan Africa
Population (in millions)	54	659
Pro capita GDP (in USD)	111.3	470
Population growth (in %)	2.7	2.8
Infant mortality rate (per 1000)	128	91
Child mortality rate (per 1000)	207	162
Male illiteracy (in %)	49.7	85
Female illiteracy (in %)	44	71
Persons suffering from malnutrition (in %)	73	33
Primary school attendance (in %)	51.6	59
Life expectancy at birth (in years)	50	46.9
Access to drinking water (in %)	26.1	54

Source: DSRP-I (2002), IMF (2003) and UNDP (2000 et 2003).

The main indicators of poverty are alarming. According to the ADB, "*The level of poverty in DRC is one of the highest in Africa. According to the figures at our disposal, absolute poverty has increased over the last three decades, and now affects more than 80%*[69] *of the population. The pro capita daily revenue dropped from US$ 1.31 in 1973 to US$ 0.30 in 1998, and was US$ 0.23 in 2000"*[70]. Due to population migrations and acts of war, it is estimated that the rate of prevalence of HIV/AIDS almost doubled from 4.5% in 1990-94 to nearly 8% in 2003[71]. The degradation of sanitary conditions and the environment has also led to an upsurge in malaria, which is the first cause of disease, with several episodes per person per year, and children in particular affected[72].

Poverty makes its presence felt throughout the country and no social category is spared, even though significant levels of inequality do exist. Women are more affected than men. According to the ADB, the life expectancy of birth for a woman was no more than 50 in 1999, there is limited coverage in terms of prenatal care (68%) and in 2003 alone only 60% of women were assisted by a qualified midwife[73]. The citizens' voice analysis carried out in close cooperation with the CSOs in each province in preparation for the drafting of the PRGSP highlighted the different facets of this overall poverty and the essential causes of the deterioration in detail[74].

As is the case in many developing countries, there has been a significant movement away from the countryside in DRC. Wars and the advanced state of dilapidation of the transport infrastructures have led to particularly difficult living conditions in the rural areas. Each year, the towns expand into new districts which, more often than not, have no basic infrastructures (water, electricity or sewage).

[68] Arnaud Zacharie, *La stratégie DSRP-PPTE en R. D. Congo*, CNCD, Brussels – 2003, p. 3.
[69] Some of the ADB figures differ from those of the PRGSP and UNPD, but they are equally eloquent as examples of the particularly negative socioeconomic situation of the country.
[70] African Development Bank Group, *République Démocratique du Congo, Document de stratégie par pays axés sur les résultats 2005-2007*, Country Operations Department, Central Region, October 2005, p. ii.
[71] Idem, p. 10
[72] Idem, p. 10
[73] African Development Bank Group, Democratic Republic of Congo: Country Strategy Document, 2003 – 2006, Operations Department, Tunis, October 2003, p. 7
[74] Poverty, Inclusion and Exclusion, in the Province of … , Provincial Committees against Poverty - 2007

The Province of Eastern Kasai

The evaluation mission did not extend to this province, merely by chance.

The province of Eastern Kasai has enormous mineral riches, but is currently one of the poorest provinces of the country. Paradoxically, this province is the leading producer of diamonds, but its industrial development has been brought to a halt by the political and ethnic conflicts in the area and inappropriate legislation on foreign and even domestic investment. According to the World Bank, around 83% of the population live on less than a dollar a day (69% of the urban and 100% of the rural population). The pro capita GDP is less than 14% of its 1999 level[75].

From 1996 to the end of 2001, Eastern Kasai did not escape the devastating effects of the various wars and conflicts of so-called liberation that took place in the country. Throughout its northern part (the 6 territories of the Sankuru district) and the territories of Lubao, a part of Kabinda and the territory of Gandajika were fully occupied by the armed forces of the former rebellion. To resist the rebellion, the town of Mbuji-Mayi was transformed into a military base, where various allied forces grouped, including the armies of Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, which were deployed to support the government troops.

All these wars caused enormous damage to the civilian populations and the public and private institutions of the province. The natural resources were over-exploited by both the allied and rebel forces (diamonds, timber and livestock especially). Most of the basic infrastructures (hospitals, schools, water and electricity supplies, roads and railways) were completely laid waste.

The main diamond exploitation company in the country, MIBA was despoiled of its main financial and material resources to sustain the war effort and enrich the aggressors. The company is currently in a state of insolvency.

Other, earlier, conflicts, especially the ethnic warfare of 1992-93, affected the Kasai communities living in the neighbouring province of Katanga. These conflicts forced more than 500,000 Kasai families in Katanga to return to Eastern Kasai after losing most of their possessions and, frequently, several members of their families[76].

Today, many of these displaced persons live in inhuman conditions. They have received no compensation for the goods and people they have lost! Considerable intolerance is still widespread in this province. Harassment by the police, military and administrative authorities is still frequent, especially in the rural areas.

The electoral process was endangered in this province, which is controlled by the opposition not involved in the transitional institutions. There was considerable tension here from 2003 to 2006, which even led to fears of an imminent armed intervention by national and

[75] Comité Technique provincial du DSRP-Kasaï Oriental : DSRP de la Province du Kasaï Oriental, déc. 2006.
[76] Comité Technique provincial du DSRP-Kasaï Oriental : DSRP de la Province du Kasaï Oriental, déc. 2006. For an analysis of the conflict between Katanga and Kasaï see : Donatien DIBWE dia Mwembu, *Mémoire collective. Le conflit Katangais – Kasaïen et le rôle des universitaires dans l'espace public (1991-2005), Université de Lubumbashi*, 2005, available on te website : http://web.univ-pau.fr/RECHERCHE/CREPAO/pdf/pau_intelec_092006/dibwe.pdf

international forces, to guarantee the holding of the elections. Thanks to cooperation on the part of a number of institutions which support democracy, such as HAM and CEI, as well as the Catholic church and media, it was possible to restore a certain calm, to enable the elections to go ahead without any major clashes, even though the turnout was particularly low.

During the years of unrest, the division of power in the DRC was characterised by the state's abdication of its primary responsibilities, the absence of national monitoring mechanisms and a decaying legal framework. As a consequence of this abdication, power was monopolised, in certain regions of the country, by local potentates and tribal chiefs, which sometimes resulted in inward-looking identities and violent internal or inter-ethnic conflicts (such as the Katangan-Kasai conflict). The east of the country (Kivus, Ituri) saw the proliferation of warlords who spread terror among the civilian population and waged bloody battles driven by the desire to control the country's natural wealth. These warlords did not hesitate to use child soldiers to increase their numbers and were responsible for the worst acts of violence against civilian populations, particularly women (sexual violence).

In spite of this, in their fight for survival, the Congolese people were able to rely on community dynamics (see §6) and family. In spite of the disastrous economic situation, interpersonal solidarity, encouraged by a broad view of the family group, is a powerful binding agent in Congolese society, which to some extent mitigates the worst effects of the economic crisis. As a result of this solidarity, several networks of donations and counter-donations have emerged, some of a very long-term nature. The vast majority of the population of Congo regard the family as the nucleus for development. Families dedicate a significant part of their income to health and education, which, for better of worse, goes some way towards making up for the abandonment of these two sectors by the state.

Religion also provided a significant refuge from the harsh reality of daily life. The churches are one of the country's most influential institutions. Catholicism, Protestantism and Kimbanguism (a protestant Christian community which worships the memory of Simon Kimbangu, a martyr to religious intolerance during the colonial period) are the most widespread religions. Islam has several thousand followers. Alongside these major religions in DRC are many revival churches and sects, whose sources of finance are not always paragons of transparency. Overall, the Congolese practise their religions in a spirit of tolerance. DRC does not appear to be a fertile breeding ground for fundamentalism. Religious practices do however often overlap with superstitions, fetishism and even sorcery. It is not rare for children, regarded as possessed by spirits, to be subject to sexual abuse or abandoned by their families.

Now, the period of transition and the democratic elections offer hope for a brighter socioeconomic future. The growth rate resumed its upward trend with the end of the war, and could soar if the investment conditions can be clarified and stabilised in the country.

Table 9: Economic growth of DRC in % of GDP



Source: Country Assistance Framework

4. *The institutional context*

The transition period

The Sun City global inclusive agreement between the government, the various rebel groups, political forces and civil society organisations saw in the transition period, which began in June 2003. The objectives of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue process were mainly the setting up of a new political and institutional order, based on legitimate rule on behalf of the people.

The following intermediate objectives had to be achieved before this process could begin:

- the reunification and pacification of the country, the restoration of territorial integrity and the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country;
- the reconstruction of the country;
- national reconciliation;
- the organisation of free elections with transparency at every level, with a view to setting up a democratic constitutional regime;
- the formation of a restructured, integrated army.

Under the terms of article 89 of the Transitional Constitution, the government was made up of the President of the Republic, Vice-presidents, Ministers and Vice-ministers. Each of the 4 Vice-presidents was to head a government commission with responsibility for a certain number of ministries. These commissions were as follows:

I) the Political, Defence and Security Commission
II) the Economic and Finance Commission
III) the Reconstruction and Development Commission
IV) the Social and Cultural Commission

The global inclusive agreement also involved the creation of a parliament consisting of a national assembly and senate responsible for voting in the laws on which the new political order was to be based, and laying down the operating methods for the state. Its members were designated by the various signatories to the agreement.

Finally, a number of 'democratic support' institutions were created during the transition period. Generally speaking, these were supposed to support the democracy. They were regarded by the Congolese as a protective barrier against a drift back to the classic political institutions, and consisted of the following:

- the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), with the delicate, sensitive mission of organising free, transparent, democratic elections;
- the Higher Authority for the Media (HAM), which had to guarantee pluralism and the public service mission of the media and lay down the rules for their use by the various political, economic and social actors;
- the Commission for Ethics and the Elimination of Corruption (CELC), whose mission was to guarantee good governance, transparency and the cleaning up of public conduct;
- the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR), with a mandate to assist the Congolese to reassess their history and find out the truth on the violations of human rights and the crimes committed, with a view to bringing about a reconciliation and collective process of catharsis and preventing similar tragedies from ever happening again;
- the National Human Rights Observatory (ONDH), which had to ensure that group logic was replaced by compliance with the universally acknowledged principles of observance and respect for human rights.

All these institutions were headed by members of civil society. Although the political classes claimed the right to occupy most of the posts in the permanent bodies of these institutions, their general assemblies were made up solely of representatives of civil society.

It has emerged from our interviews with personnel that while CEI and HAM were largely able to achieve their objectives, thanks to a great extent to the support of the international community and donors, this was not the case with CELC, CVR or ONDH, due to lack of resources and, at times, political will.

There are other transitional institutions which deserve a mention: the Parliament of Transition, Courts and Tribunals, and CIAT whose role was to ensure that the commitments taken on by the Congolese actors to achieve the objectives of the transition were fulfilled.

The new institutions emerging from the elections

Since 29th October 2006, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has held a series of major elections which should mark the end of the period of transition. These are important steps which confirm the progressive entry by DRC into the group of democratic nations, even though significant efforts are still required.

Following these elections, it was possible to set up the new institutions specified in the new Constitution adopted by the referendum of 19th December 2005. The institutions in question were mainly the following:

- the President of the Republic
- the lower chamber of parliament (National Assembly)
- the upper chamber of parliament (Senate)
- and in each province: a Governor elected by indirect suffrage, provincial assembly and provincial government.

The legislative elections directly nominated 500 members of the national assembly. No fewer than 69 political parties are represented in this, in addition to 63 independent members. In spite of this fragmentation, a bipolarisation process was able to emerge. The Kabilists, who won the presidential election, set up a platform known as the Alliance for the Presidential Majority, or AMP, which claims a government majority of more than 300 seats, a figure that was confirmed on the investiture of the government on 25th February 2007. Jean-Pierre Bemba, the unsuccessful candidate at the second ballot of the presidential election, created the Union for the Nation, or UN, which announced that it would represent a 'strong, republican' opposition.

The provincial elections were organised on 29th October 2006. The provincial councils elected the governors and vice-governors of nine provinces on 27th January 2007 and those of the two provinces of Kasai on 10th February 2007. The number of provinces will be progressively increased from 11 to 26 on the basis of the principle of decentralisation adopted by the new constitution. On 20th January 2007, the provincial councils elected the 108 members of the Senate.

The legitimisation of the political landscape through the ballot box will only be complete following the local, municipal and urban elections. These elections were initially scheduled to take place in 2007, but were postponed to 2008 following the delay in passing the laws on decentralisation and the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI)[77]. It is important for these elections to take place in 2008, as there will be a reduction in the personnel of MONUC at the end of its mandate in 2009, and this will make the supervision of elections more difficult.

[77] CENI replaced CEI after the Transition.

5. *Good governance: the challenge of development*

The decades of dictatorship have cancelled out the elementary principles of good public management, and the situation further deteriorated during the war years. All the indicators of governance are at their lowest level since 1998, and DRC is below the average for the other countries in the region. In 2006, DRC obtained a score of 5.8 out of 100 in the World Bank's Voice and Accountability index[78]. All the indicators were in the red zone in the 2006 Global Integrity Report, which measures the level of governance, and DRC is 144th in a list of 158 countries in the report by Transparency International[79], which measures the degree of corruption. While in a context of this kind it is necessary to bring about such an important reform and administrative decentralisation at the same time, the detrimental effects of this poor governance could multiply considerably and compromise every effort to improve the destiny of the people of Congo for some time to come.

Table 10: World Bank Governance Indicators

Governance Indicator	Sources /1	Year	Percentile Rank /2 (0-100)	Governance Score /3 (-2.5 to +2.5)	Standard Error /4
Voice and Accountability	10	2006	5.8	-1.62	0.16
	5	2002	1.9	-1.88	0.2
	3	1998	2.4	-1.9	0.28
Political Stability	8	2006	1	-2.31	0.23
	5	2002	1.4	-2.24	0.29
	4	1998	0	-3.08	0.28
Government Effectiveness	10	2006	1.9	-1.61	0.18
	8	2002	0.9	-1.77	0.2
	5	1998	1.9	-1.88	0.17
Regulatory Quality	9	2006	6.3	-1.51	0.18
	7	2002	4.9	-1.71	0.22
	6	1998	0	-2.99	0.36
Rule of Law	13	2006	1.9	-1.68	0.16
	10	2002	1	-1.82	0.18
	8	1998	0.5	-2.09	0.2
Control of Corruption	10	2006	2.9	-1.43	0.17
	7	2002	1.5	-1.48	0.2
	6	1998	1.9	-1.69	0.21

Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators: 1996-2006
Notes:
/1 Indicates the number of individual data sources on which the aggregate indicator is based.
/2 Indicates rank of country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100 corresponds to highest rank.
/3 Estimate of governance measured on a scale from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values correspond to better governance.
/4 Captures the precision of the estimate of governance. Lower values indicate more precision.

[78] Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo, "Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006" (July 2007). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4280
[79] Transparency International, *Index of Perceptions of Corruption 2005*, Berlin, 2005

Table 11: Global Integrity - Report on RDC 2006



During the Transition, a number of initiatives were put in place in an attempt to restore the level of governance of the public powers and their capacity to respond to the concerns of the citizens. This led to the setting up of a National Office for Capacity Building (SENAREC). Its main mission was to draw up a Support Paper for the National Emergency Programme for Capacity Building in DRC (APNURC), with the assistance of foreign partners[80]. In spite of the ambitions of this programme financed by at least seven donors[81], up to now the capacities of APNURC have been limited. According to the personnel we interviewed, this can be explained by the fact that it was exclusively geared towards the reinforcement of macroeconomic management capacities, and even that only took place at the level of the central administration of public services. Certain public sector areas at central and provincial levels, the private sector and civil society were not taken into consideration in the APNURC, in spite of the determining role that these played in the reconstruction of the country. Lack of coordination and dialogue between the various donors and the absence of Congolese leadership also help explain the limited range of the reform[82].

[80] For a presentation of SENAREC and PNURC, see: SENAREC, *Note de présentaiton du Secrétariat Général pour le Renforcement des capacités*, Kinshasa, July 2003 (version available at http://www.ccre.cd/senarec/senarecapropos.pdf).
[81] UNPD, ADB, ACDI, ACBF, France, Belgium and the WB.
[82] Interviews with members of CTB and UNPD.

The new constitution also regards governance as a central priority. It regards the following factors as fundamental: the creation of good governance as one of the priorities in the fight against poverty, the dividing up of the territory with the creation of new provinces, decentralisation and the unity of the country.

The creation of good governance and a minimum of macroeconomic stability will only be possible if the main national development actors, that is, the government, private sector and civil society organisations, agree to play a concerted role in the reconstruction of the country over a long term period. In this sense, one of the most important decisions was the setting up in 2004 of a Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) at national level. Breaking away from the 'old' methods of façade style, bureaucratic planning, the representatives of the local communities, non-governmental organisations, civil society and the private sector throughout the country were asked to take part in the analysis of the state of poverty that existed and suggest ways and means of improving the living conditions of the population.

The fundamental objective of the PPA was to supply quality data for the drafting of the DRC Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in the form of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP). The participatory analysis demonstrated that as far as the population was concerned the main cause of poverty was poor governance. As most of the provincial reports in the analysis indicated, poor governance is fuelled by abuses of power on the part of the authorities at every level, corruption, impunity and the plundering of public assets.

The programme of the new government of DRC, approved on 24th February 2007, is based on the PRGSP. The foreword to the programme states that the elections give the Congolese people a power of control and sanction over the government, through their elected representatives. Good governance is defined as "*the cornerstone of the programme. Its restoration will facilitate the construction of a strong, prosperous state, which will guarantee long term development and a stable economy capable or reducing poverty"*[83]. In addition, the fact that DRC regarded 'community dynamics' as one of the five pillars of the PRGSP is a unique starting point for a participatory approach to the reduction of poverty.

6. *Civil society at the centre of development*[84]

Since the state withdrew from its service public functions, the 1990 freeze on structural cooperation between Zaire and its main outside donors and the abandonment of the single party system in the mid-nineties, there has been considerable development in the operations of the small and medium companies in the informal sector and organisations inspired by community dynamics within society. In this way, the assembly movement opened up new prospects for the population and helped create jobs. A number of citizens also attempted to set up their own businesses in the sector, as a result of which there was an upsurge in the number of organisations with limited resources, whose charters and objectives are not always particularly clear.

[83] Government of DRC, *Programme du Gouvernement 2007-2011,* Kinshasa, July 2007, p. 39, available at http://www.un.int/drcongo/archives/ProgrammeGouvernementFinal.pdf

[84] The civil society analysis was carried out by the Congolese consultant to the mission. It is based on consolidated experience in the sector within the SERACOB NGO (Service for the Reinforcement of Support for the Base Communities of Central Africa).

Trade union action in DRC

The context of trade union action is a good example of the importance of civil society in DRC, but also of the difficult conditions in which such action takes place.

While on the one hand it is not possible to speak of a genuine trade union culture in DRC, there is a considerable number of trade unions, even though the precise figures vary from one source to another. What is certain is that there are in any case more than 200, while some sources speak of as many as 380. At official level, the Ministry of Labour states that 117 trade unions were registered at the time of the elections of December 2005, when the Confederation of Congolese Trade Unions (CSC) supplanted the omnipotent National Union of Congolese Workers, born from the remnants of the single trade union that existed during the Mobutu period (UNTZa)[85].

National employment policy in DRC is governed by law no. 015/2002, which reviewed the labour code inspired by the international agreements on labour. But the socioeconomic context is a particularly chaotic one[86]. As a result of this, trade union representation is limited. The presence of the trade unions is limited by the low proportion of formal paid jobs. The presence is more widespread in the public sector (which continues to be the main employer), in which lack of mobility is the norm, with high levels of corruption and a lack of clarity in trade union representation. There is little consultancy or competition with other civil society representatives, a lack of job stability at individual and collective level which limits trade union militancy on the one hand, due to the fact that the delegates are themselves taken up by the search for a means of subsistence (due to unpaid wages), while on the other hand there are limits to the number of claims that can be addressed to companies in an extremely fragile economic situation (it often comes down to choosing between indecent employment conditions and loss of a job).

In spite of this extreme situation, trade union action essentially remains at the level of social dialogue. The trade unions are 'promoters of peace and reconciliation'[87], whose objectives are 'fairer globalisation, in a situation of greater equality between men and women, gender politics and action against child employment'.[88]

The civil society organisations have played an important role in the transition process. It was these organisations which demanded and obtained the organisation of the National Sovereign Conference. After the signature of the Lusaka agreement, they took action once again to ensure that the Inter-Congolese Dialogue of Sun City in South Africa went ahead, which in

[85] See SPF Foreign Affairs, Belgian Trade Union Cooperation, 2003-2005, Report on the Evaluation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo – Rwanda, May 2006, p. 11.

[86] The crisis situation in Congo made a significant contribution to the aggravation of unemployment levels, under-employment and, consequently, human poverty. The potentially active population represents more than 48% of the total. 41.7% of the active population are women, and the majority of these are unemployed. The informal part of the economy which creates jobs has grown constantly, and the reduction in public sector workers which began at the start of the decade has continued, to the point where workers in the formal sector account for no more than 3.1% of the active population. The informal sector is decidedly dominant in trade (92.5%), construction (74.2%), manufacturing (70.3%), and transport (55%). See African Development Bank Group, *Democratic Republic of Congo, Country Strategy Paper Based on the Results for 2005-07*, Country Operations Department, Central Region, October 2005, p. 11.

[87] SPF Foreign Affairs, Belgian Trade Union Cooperation, 2003-2005, Report on the Evaluation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo – Rwanda, May 2006, p. 4.

[88] Idem, p. 4.

turn gave rise to the global inclusive agreement, which was the reference framework within which the transition process took place.

Table 12: Civil society strategy during the period of transition

STRATEGY	CSO ACTIONS IN DRC
1. Positioning	Represented within transitional institutions other than CIAT
	Acting as: - a critical force for social advocacy - a base for proposals from the population for the success of the process - social mobilisation structures at each stage in the process
2. Role with respect to t objectives of the Transition	
A. Reunification, pacification, creation of territorial integrity and the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country	- national education initiatives - inter-community reconciliation initiatives - campaigns against the pillaging of resources - campaigns against sexual violence - promotion of human rights - integration of former combatants
B. The reconstruction of the country	- contribution to initiatives for the rehabilitation of workers - campaign against corruption - critique of the draft budgetary law and monitoring of the implementation of the state budget - contribution to the drafting of the PRGSP
C. National reconciliation	- social advocacy or mobilisation initiatives - civic education - critical analysis of the transition actors
D. Organisation of free, transparent elections at all levels, for the setting up of a democratic constitutional regime	- contribution to the drafting of the new constitution and electoral law - electoral education campaigns - training of national observers - participation in the elections as observers - assessment of the electoral process
E. Creation of a restructured, integrated army	- socioeconomic reintegration initiatives - psychological and social rehabilitation of traumatised persons

In terms of its structures, there is great diversity in civil society. Some organisations are highly informal, even ephemeral, while other institutions are much more durable. These organisations can be classified into three levels:

1. **Micro level,** with more informal and often ephemeral groupings, such as unions for specific initiatives and mutual aid groups. These organisations are active at village and district level.
2. **Mid level**, made up of more formal associations, such as ASBLs in a variety of sectors, approved by the Ministry of Justice and/or the relevant ministry for the sector in question. These organisations are active at territorial and municipality level.
3. **Macro level**, including such major structures as the churches, cooperatives, federations and provincial, national or specific sector networks. These operate on a provincial and/or national scale.

Alongside the transition process, civil society also played a key role in the drafting of the PRGSP, which became the main reference framework for all the reform policies in DRC (see above). In a country in which the means of communication are almost non-existent or totally dilapidated, it is the civil society organisations in DRC which carried out consultations with around 35,000 people throughout the country, to determine how poverty is perceived by the population.

In spite of their limited resources, the contributions by the civil society organisations towards the holding of the elections, as well as at institutional, socioeconomic and political lobbying levels, both during and after the Transition, were certainly of an essential nature[89]. Some Civil Society Organisations (CSO) with the greatest humanitarian and institutional capacities played their role of opposition with determination. This was especially the case with the CNONG, which has coordinated the operations of the NGOs in DRC since 1990.

However, amid this profusion of organisations, many have had to face up to acute problems which reduce their potential for action.
Among these problems, the following should be mentioned:

a) At the level of internal governance:
   - limited democratic practices, especially in terms of decision-making and the nomination of office holders.
   - shortcomings in the mobilisation and management of human, material and financial resources.
   - strong reliance on outside assistance.
b) At the level of influence: lack of a joint consultation framework with their bi- and multilateral partners on the one hand and the national and provincial governments on the other.
c) Inability to take into account the gender dimension in the operation of their organisational structures.
d) In terms of impact: most of their activities are still of a formal, unreliable nature, which prevents them from putting their full weight behind the fight against the spread of poverty and the decision-making process at public level.

Law no. 004/2001 of 20th July 2001, containing general provisions on Non-profit Making Associations and Public Utility Bodies, is not sufficiently known among or generally accessible to the community organisations.

Following the example of its actions in the public sector, the government intends to take action through SENAREC to set up a national programme for the reinforcement of the institutional and human capacities of the private sector and civil society[90], with a view to transforming these into credible, responsible partners with the necessary human, institutional and financial resources to deal with the various questions of national interest at economic, social and political level.

7. The context of aid in DRC

The context of aid in DRC is very difficult to determine with precision. The data on the amounts of aid and the sectors of intervention available from Congolese institutions[91] are lacking in continuity and unreliable as a base for comparison. This means that we often have to analyse the context of aid in DRC on the basis of the data available from the donors. At

[89] Interviews with those in charge of the coordination of the elections and the heads of international organisations in DRC.
[90] Ministère du Plan, *Proposition d'un sous-programme national de renforcement des capacités pour le secteur prive et les organisations de la société civile de la RDC «PRONAREC »* 2007 – 2011, Kinshasa, Nov. 2006
[91] The most recent report on foreign aid in DRC dates back to 2002. It was drawn up with the assistance of UNPD. See CCRE, *Report on Foreign Resources Mobilised for the Development of DRC (2001-2002 financial years)*, Kinshasa, December 2002. We also obtained the data for 2006 and the commitments for 2007 from the Ministry of Planning.

this level, the data are relatively succinct by comparison with the figures available for other countries. The main sources are essentially the OECD statistical data (Development Database on Aid Activities), which provide an overview of the main donors and public development aid actors among the OECD members. Very few of the useful complementary documents which often exist for other countries are available from such institutions as the UNPD or World Bank, on the other hand.

The 1980s: aid coordination

Up to the start of the eighties, DRC (then known as Zaire) received a number of foreign resources in the form of loans and donations. In the absence of an appropriate management and monitoring framework for these foreign resources, the mobilisation of aid took place in a non-systematic manner. With a view to compensating for this management problem, the regime set up a Committee for the Coordination of Foreign Resources (CCRE) by means of its ruling no. 83/173 of 22nd September 1983. The CCRE's mission was to eliminate the disorganised mobilisation of foreign aid and the profusion of decision-making centres on international cooperation on the one hand and, on the other, to achieve greater efficiency in the management of the resources. During the eighties, the CCRE data showed a number of variations in foreign aid in relation to the context and absorption capacity of DRC. According to the CCRE, 42% of the foreign aid registered at that time took the form of loans and 58% were donations[92].

Table 13: Summary of disbursements during the eighties (in millions of USD)

ITEM	YEAR							
	1982	**1983**	**1984**	**1985**	**1986**	**1987**	**1988**	**1989**
A. Repayable foreign resources	**172.83**	**141.77**	**130.63**	**168.5**	**311.65**	**395.94**	**366.73**	**406.55**
1. Of bilateral origins	118.74	63.3	75.9	59.9	82.51	96.56	121.79	122.04
2. Of multilateral origins	54.09	78.47	54.73	108.6	229.14	299.38	244.94	284.51
B. Donations	**275.21**	**302.79**	**200.05**	**227.27**	**204.63**	**259.53**	**236.16**	**258.09**
B.1. Public donations	166.86	192.87	179.04	195.58	194.99	221.27	217.78	238.4
1. Of bilateral origins	130.51	159.29	139.49	161.18	148.18	195.18	173.91	181.16
2. Of multilateral origins	36.35	33.58	39.55	34.4	46.81	26.09	43.87	57.24
B.2. Donations from private foreign institutions	108.35	109.92	21.01	31.69	9.64	38.26	18.38	19.69
1. To the state	4.4	2.72	0.98	2.29	9.64	0	0	0
2. To private local bodies	103.95	107.2	20.03	30.4	0	38.26	18.38	19.69
GRAND TOTAL (A+B)	**448.04**	**444.56**	**330.68**	**395.77**	**516.28**	**655.47**	**602.89**	**664.64**

Source: CCRE, report on foreign resources mobilised for the development of DRC (2001-2002 financial years), Kinshasa, December 2002

[92] CCRE, *Report on Foreign Resources Mobilised for the Development of DRC (2001-2002 financial years)*, Kinshasa, December 2002, no. 82.

From 1982 to 1989, the bilateral partners accounted for 50.03% of the total resources, loans and donations granted to DRC. The contribution to the same resources by the multilateral partners was 41.20%. The private foreign institutions accounted for 8.77%[93] of foreign aid.

Table 14: Main donors during the eighties

Resources in the form of foreign loans		**Resources in the form of donations**	
Bilateral	**Multilateral**	**Bilateral**	**Multilateral**
1. Germany	1. IDA	1. Germany	1. IRDB
2. Saudi Arabia	2. BEI	2. Belgium	2. EDF
3. Belgium	3. ADB	3. Canada	3. United Nations
4. Canada	4. ADF	4. Denmark	
5. Spain	5. IADF	5. USA	
6. USA	6. EEC	6. France	
7. France	7. IRDB	7. Italy	
8. Italy	8. EDF	8. Japan	
9. Japan	9. ABEDA	9. Netherlands	
10. Yugoslavia	10. IFC	10 China	

Source: CCRE, report on foreign resources mobilised for the development of DRC (2001-2002 financial years), Kinshasa, December 2002

[93] Idem, no. 83

The 1990s: the political context

During the nineties, the evolution of foreign aid was significantly influenced by the political and institutional context. From 1991 onwards, the Mobutu regime put an end to most state to state cooperation initiatives, which led to a freeze on structural aid. The operations of CCRE were put on hold, and a form of financial cooperation which focused on the virtually exclusive allocation of foreign resources to the NGOs became a feature of the nineties. From 1991 to 1993, the volume of foreign aid dropped off considerably, as a result of this break. There was a new increase in the level of foreign aid in 1994-95, but this fell sharply once again following the outbreak of civil war in 1996.

Table 15: Foreign aid in DRC from 1990 to 1999 (in millions of USD)

ITEM	YEAR									
	1990	**1991**	**1992**	**1993**	**1994**	**1995**	**1996**	**1997**	**1998**	**1999**
A. Repayable foreign resources	**233.02**	**146.89**	**81.34**	**44.7**	**1**	**4.43**	**2.49**	**8.61**	**1.39**	**0**
1. Of bilateral origins	101.68	58.39	16.89	5	0.35	4.43	2.49	8.61	1.39	0
2. Of multilateral origins	131.44	88.5	65.45	39.7	0.65	0	0	0	0	0
B. Donations	**236.58**	**119.49**	**13.32**	**62.92**	**147**	**309.2**	**321.86**	**231.09**	**123**	**195**
B.1. Public donations	213.67	103.34	6.84	60.91	147	309.2	321.86	85.77	123	195
1. Of bilateral origins	157.76	82.28	0	17.83	35.77	97.01	37.08	144.04	46.3	82.3
2. Of multilateral origins	55.91	21.06	6.84	43.08	111.3	212.2	270.21	2.05	77.6	112
B.2. Donations from private foreign institutions	22.91	16.15	6.48	2.01	0	0	8.58		0	0
1. To the state										
2. To private local bodies	22.91	16.15	6.48	2.01			8.58	2.05		
GRAND TOTAL (A+B)	**469.6**	**266.38**	**94.66**	**107.6**	**148**	**313.7**	**324.35**	**240.47**	**124.5**	**195**

Source: CCRE, report on foreign resources mobilised for the development of DRC (2001-2002 financial years), Kinshasa, December 2002

During this period of internal troubles, most of the aid received was in the form of donations (77%) rather than repayable resources (23%), and most of these donations took the form of emergency aid and foodstuffs assistance. The multilateral and bilateral partners accounted for 60.65% and 36.80% of this aid respectively, while the contribution from private foreign institutions was 2.55%[94].

[94] Idem, nos. 87-88

Table 16: Main donors in the 1990s

Resources in the form of foreign loans		Resources in the form of donations	
Bilateral	**Multilateral**	**Bilateral**	**Multilateral**
1. Germany	1. IDA	1. Germany	1. BIRD
2. France	2. BEI	2. Belgium	2. UE (FED)
3. Italy	3. ADB	3. Canada	3. United Nations
4. China	4. ADF	4. Denmark	
5. Kuwait	5. IADF	5. USA	
6. Others	6. EEC	6. France	
	7. IRDB	7. Italy	
	8. EDF	8. Japan	
	9. ADEBA	9. Netherlands	
	10. OPEC	10 China	

Source: CCRE, report on foreign resources mobilised for the development of DRC (2001-2002 financial years), Kinshasa, December 2002

The 21st century: the resumption of international aid

The first decade of the 21st century show a distinct recovery in public development aid (ODA), which began to speed up from 2002 onwards, to assist with the humanitarian emergencies and sustain the political transition process. Most of this aid consists of donations (79% in 2002-06), with loans accounting for 21%. As from 2003, with the progressive resumption of state cooperation, bilateral aid once again made up the majority of the total received, according to the OECD, while multilateral support accounted for no more than 22%[95] (from 2003 to 2006)[96].

Table 17: ODA in DRC, 1997-2006

Donor	All donors, total									
Amount	Current prices (millions of USD)									
Type of aid	ODA total, net disbursements									
Year	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
DR Congo	157.61	125.47	132.38	177.12	243.11	1174.95	5416.03	1824.06	1827.3	2055.72

Source: OECD

Recent aid to DRC, which may seem considerable at first sight, mainly consists of debt repayment operations. This was the case in 2003 in particular, when DRC was granted a significant reduction in its debts within the context of the HIPC initiative. This relief on the debts built up during the years of dictatorship had become essential for the very survival of the country. The HIPC initiative prevented the virtual bankruptcy of the country and probably made a contribution to keeping the fragile democratic transition on the rails.

[95] OECD, calculations of gross disbursements.

[96] The figures received from the DRC Ministry of Planning differ from these OECD figures. For 2006, the Ministry of Planning registered foreign disbursements of only 1,117.8 million USD, 73% of which was received from multilateral donors (See Ministry of Planning – Department for the Coordination of Foreign Resources, DRC statistics on foreign disbursements for 2006).

Table 18: ODA in DRC, 2001-2006

Democratic Republic of Congo						
Amount	current prices (millions of USD)					
Year	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Recipient						
ODA total, net disbursements	243.11	1174.95	5416.03	1824.06	1827.25	2055.72
ODA total, gross disbursements	249.94	1,541.22	5594.17	1,903.23	1,895.32	2,111.18
ODA loans, gross disbursements	,,,	969.76	624.69	306.22	654.41	172.02
ODA multilateral, gross disbursements	102.42	1,177.83	436.26	693.53	826.48	592.1
ODA total, excl. debt	99.58	823.68	402.83	652.78	787.15	555.95

Source: OECD

In spite of this very important debt relief operation within the recent foreign aid received by DRC, the international NGOs have complained of apparent aid to DRC, which is of no benefit to the population and used merely to repay the loans built up during the years of authoritarian, 'kleptomaniac' rule. All the more so if we consider that, in spite of these relief operations, the repayment of debts still accounts for 19.6% of the total outlay of the state[97].

If we take this upward trend in foreign aid and debt relief into account, DRC is one of the main beneficiaries of international aid in the African continent (the leading beneficiary in 2002 and 2003) and in the world as a whole (seventh overall in 2006).

[97] 2008 budget: http://www.ministeredubudget.cd/budget2008/budget_2008_synthese_depenses.pdf. See CADTM, press release: "CADTM deplores the weighting allocated to debt in the 2008 budget of DRC and supports the wish of Congolese civil society for an audit of the debt and natural resources", 8th January 2008.

Table 19: Top 10 ODA recipients in Africa

In millions of USD, receipts from all donors, net disbursements

	2002	2003	2004	3 year average	overall %
1. DRC	**1 188**	**5 421**	**1 815**	**2 808**	**11%**
2. Tanzania	1 233	1 704	1 746	1 561	6%
3. Ethiopia	1 307	1 553	1 823	1 561	6%
4. Mozambique	2 203	1 039	1 228	1 490	6%
5. Egypt	1 239	988	1 458	1 228	5%
6. Ghana	650	954	1 358	987	4%
7. Uganda	712	977	1 159	949	4%
8. Cameroon	657	900	762	773	3%
9. Zambia	641	581	1 081	768	3%
10. Madagascar	373	539	1 236	716	3%
Other beneficiaries	11 340	12 125	15 415	12 960	50%
	21 540	**26 781**	**29 080**	25 800	**100%**

Source: OECD, development aid at a glance, statistics by region, Africa

Table 20: Top 10 ODA recipients in Africa with indication of share of debt write-off

In billions of USD, current prices, net disbursements



Over the most recent period (2004-05), the main donors of DRC in order of importance are: WB, the European Union, Belgium, UK, USA and France. Most of these donors, with the exception of the UK, were already among the leading group in the nineties.

Table 21: OECD: Aid at a glance

Congo, Dem. Rep.

Receipts	2003	2004	2005
Net ODA (USD million)	5 416	1 824	1 828
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	92%	64%	56%
Net ODA / GNI	98.5%	29.3%	27.5%
Net Private flows (USD million)	-2 005	- 19	- 155

For reference	2003	2004	2005
Population (million)	54.2	55.9	57.5
GNI per capita (Atlas USD)	100	110	120

Top Ten Donors of gross ODA (2004-05 average)	(USD m)
1 IDA	354
2 EC	232
3 Japan	214
4 Belgium	212
5 United Kingdom	189
6 United States	166
7 France	133
8 Germany	65
9 SAF & ESAF (IMF)	59
10 Netherlands	52



Sources: OECD, World Bank.

Even though it is difficult to obtain precise figures on the distribution of aid by sector which allow a comparison over time, we can see a general trend emerge. During the first years of the 21st century, debt relief and emergency aid operations accounted for most of the aid granted to DRC. But since 2006, additional aid has been provided to back up the electoral and democratisation process. From that year onwards, good governance and support for democracy and the rule of law have received particularly intense support.

Table 22: Disbursements by sector of activity, 2006-07

Sector of activity	Annual disbursements		Commitments announced	
	2006	%	2007	%
Good governance	486.56	44	470.29	21
Infrastructures and equipment	177.431	16	355.489	16
Production sectors	25.34	2	70.633	3
Social sectors	415.439	37	1102.963	50
Environment	6.076	1	44.233	2
Multi-sectors	6.988	1	171.775	8
Grand total	**1,117.84**	**100**	**2,215.38**	**100**

Source: Ministry of Planning (Department of Coordination of Foreign Resources), 2006

Table 23: Disbursement by type of aid

Type of foreign aid	Annual disbursements	
	2006	%
Food aid	11.45	1
Budgetary aid	0.36	0
Emergency aid	26.6	2
Humanitarian aid	299.97	27
Support for democracy and the rule of law	222.73	20
Capacity building	79	7
Technical assistance	18.1	2
Equipment and infrastructures	163.98	15
Micro-projects	34.34	3
Development projects	168.62	15
Multiple types	93	8
Total	**1,118.16**	**100**

Source: Ministry of Planning (Department of Coordination of Foreign Resources), 2006

After the civil wars and political transition, structural aid ought to progressively replace emergency aid. The PRGSP has also announced clear strategies geared towards the reduction of poverty, based on five fundamental factors:

1. the promotion of good governance and consolidation of peace to reinforce the institutions;
2. consolidation of macroeconomic stability and growth;
3. improvement of access to social services and reduction of vulnerability;
4. the fight against HIV/AIDS;
5. support for community dynamics.

This strategic direction should guide the future contributions of the donors of DRC. Good governance therefore occupies a prominent position in this development strategy, and is indeed already the subject of careful attention on the part of some of the main donors, especially those who are partners in this evaluation.

The European Union (EU) has declared governance as the priority sector of intervention and discussion in the programming of the 10th EDF[98].

Belgium has intensified its interventions for the prevention of conflicts and its support for governance and civil society through a number of channels, including local and international NGOs, multilateral basket funds, and so on. These areas accounted for nearly ten per cent of its total aid[99] over the last few years, and are relatively scattered. Following the signature of a new General Cooperation Programme in March 2007, Belgium decided to set aside an even more significant portion of its aid for governance (23% of its bilateral aid budget, equivalent to 45 million Euros for 2008-10), which it intends to concentrate on certain areas of intervention in a more strategic manner, with particular emphasis placed on capacity building of the Congolese ministries (justice and public administration especially).
Aid from the UK to DRC grew rapidly from the £5.6 million of 2001-02 to £62 million in 2006-07, a significant part of which was dedicated to the re-establishment of security, the

[98] EU, Democratic Republic of Congo – European Community, Country Strategy Paper and 10th General National Programme, EDF 2008 – 2013.
[99] http://www.dgcd.be/fr/pays_partenaires/congo/ODA_BE_RDCONGO.xls

reform of the security sector, support for the transition and elections and improved management of natural resources. In 2006, the UK adopted a new strategy of support for governance within the context of its aid to DRC[100] in the years to come. DFID will be taking part in the multi donors' programme with UNPD, which will focus on five fundamental aspects of governance:

- political governance (support for parliament and provincial assemblies, the political parties, the CSOs and media)
- administrative governance (support for inter-ministerial coordination, the reform of the public administration, the rationalisation of public administrative personnel and transparency in public management)
- economic governance (support for budgetary steering, the national statistics system and the coordination of foreign aid)
- local governance (support for decentralisation and the development of local and provincial units)
- legal and security governance (justice and SSR/DDR)

In 2005-06, Sweden dedicated 31% of its DRC budget to two areas of support for governance: 1) support for peace and the prevention of conflicts, and 2) human rights and democratic governance. It will extend its contribution in these sectors by means of support for the media (Radio Okapi) in particular.

In its support for governance, Canada has focused on three areas of intervention: 1) Women and democracy, 2) Civil society and democratic development and 3) Governance and citizens' voice. The financial assistance provided concentrates above all on the voice of citizens and education on the democratic process. Over the next three years (2008-10), Canada plans to dedicate 20% of its financial assistance to support for governance.

USAid has also set aside a significant part of its aid (nearly 20% of its 2004-06 budgets) to two essential areas: 1) the resolution of conflicts, and 2) democracy and good governance. These actions, carried out exclusively through NGOs, have also been scheduled for the next two years.

Conclusion: governance is therefore clearly included in the programmes of the main donors as an essential element of their support for DRC, which is in accordance with the wishes of the Congolese (PPA) and the strategy of the new government (PRGSP and PAP). However, the success of the programmes will depend to a great extent on the real will of the new elected representatives of Congo to transform the system of governance, and on their ability to provide strong leadership to bring about the reforms. On the part of the donors, better aid coordination will be essential if the support provided is to be effective and coherent. A first step towards this process of harmonisation was taken with the recent adoption of the Country Assistance Framework (CAF), by means of which a certain number of donors have developed a common strategic approach to economic assistance for DRC during the post-election period.

[100] DFID: "*Eliminating world poverty: Making governance work for the poor. Helping to build states that work for poor people*" - July 2006.

Annex D: Interventions Summary Sheets

Annex D1: Support to Radio Okapi

I: Profile of the Intervention

1.Donor Agency	DFID
2.Partners/implementing agency	Fondation Hirondelle, Radio Okapi, MONUC
3.Objectives	To make a lasting contribution to peace in the DRC by broadcasting locally, regionally and nationally, on an impartial basis, accurate, credible and reliable information on the role and activities of MONUC, the peace process and humanitarian assistance activities and programmes and to accompany the on-going transition until the elections.
4.Main CV&A and other activities	Radio broadcasts, radio debates, listener clubs, election coverage
5. Target Group / Beneficiaries	Radio Okapi staff, media professionals / population of DRC
6. Key linkages	UN Mission in Congo (MONUC)
7. Duration	Two years
8. Starting date	2005
9. Total budget	N/A

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

DRC has an estimated 58 million inhabitants and a territory as large as Western Europe which suffers from a severe lack of infrastructure. Press freedom in the country is restricted, journalists are badly paid (if paid at all) and thus at risk of being susceptible to pressure from people with money and influence. The number of newspaper issues published is low due to a relatively low literacy rate and low purchasing power. The radio for most Congolese is therefore the most important source of information. In a period of transition with the first democratic elections in over 40 years there is a huge demand of high-quality information throughout the country. Radio Okapi is the only radio that covers the whole territory; given that the target group is the whole population in DRC Radio Okapi is a highly appropriate means to reach the poor and marginalised in remote areas.

Efficiency

Radio Okapi has 26 partner radio stations and uses four different technological vectors to cover all of DRC: FM, short wave, satellite (DSTV channel 69), broadcasting via the internet (www.radiookapi.net). Using MONUC's infrastructure Okapi does not suffer electricity cuts and other infrastructural problems as local radios. From its headquarter in Kinshasa and 8 regional studies Radio Okapi provides programmes in French and all local languages (maximising the outreach and minimise exclusion based on language barriers), such as news magazines, one hour regional coverage, bulletins, interview with people on the streets. Moreover, Radio Okapi has special coverage before the elections including debates between candidates, programmes to explain the electoral process and general civic education programmes and during the Election Day. The radio is probably the most efficient mean to

offer general civic education to a large public in a very large country composed in the majority of illiterate people.

Effectiveness
During focus group discussions with radio listeners in Kinshasa and Mbuji May, Radio Okapi emerged as the most popular radio station in DRC. Congolese are very fond of the radio and are often 'radio specialists', knowing the programme of different radio stations by heart, switching from one station to the other repeatedly during the day to follow their favourite programmes (e.g. not to miss 'Dialogue between Congolese'). It was in particular appreciated that Radio Okapi broadcasts in all local languages and French and provides high-quality and independent information people believed in, particularly before the elections. Little criticism emerged during the group discussions; participants in Mbuji May requested more local coverage not just an hour a day. While this project does not focus on any groups in particular Radio Okapi successfully reached out to large parts of the population and managed to include groups in all areas of the country—a large challenge in itself given the lack of infrastructure in DRC.

There was awareness from the start that Radio Okapi runs the danger of being perceived as the "Voice of MONUC"; and in fact 60.9% of respondents of one study replied with 'yes' to this question. However, at the same time the association between Radio Okapi and MONUC is perceived to be an essential guarantee for professionalism and credibility. On balance radio Okapi—being aware of this danger—has now a reputation for credibility, accuracy and impartiality.[101] This was confirmed by the Focus Group discussions, both in Kinshasa and Mbuji May.

Impact
Focus group participants stressed the impact Radio Okapi had on other radio stations that increasingly try to copy some of Okapi's reporting, e.g. interviews on the streets, radio listeners clubs and the possibility to call the radio station. In addition to contributing to the increasing professionalism among radio stations Radio Okapi reportedly has played a crucial role in civic education before the elections contributing to the high participation in the elections, the relatively peaceful process and the subsequent accepting of the results (although isolating Radio Okapi's impact from other civic education programmes is difficult). In several occasions Radio Okapi was reported to have had direct impact on the state's willingness and ability to respond to citizens' needs. Examples where citizens' complaints via Radio Okapi were successful include:

- Improved security on the streets of Mbuji May.
- Police reportedly asks for less bribes in Mbuji May.
- Increased and more regular water supply in Mbuji May after months of no or irregular supply where individuals sold water on the streets (complaints to Okapi were accompanied by other forms of protest, e.g. demonstrations of NGOs).
- An elderly woman in Kinshasa got her house and land back after a local politician (Parliamentarian) took it away from her without legal basis.
- Complaints to Radio Okapi (and a subsequent discussion with listeners and officials from the public authorities) about flooding due to lack of proper canalisation in Kinshasa led to reparation and maintenance works.

According to focus group participants everybody—no matter of age, gender, and poverty status—can call Radio Okapi: "*If someone does not have a phone he or she can ask a*

[101] Myers 2005.

neighbour or friend and borrow one." While these examples demonstrate the positive impact and the increased citizens' awareness about their right to hold the state into account, a general increase of accountability is not reached yet; as one focus group participants in Kinshasa puts it: *"The Government keeps its ears closed."*

Sustainability

Radio Okapi is currently heavily dependent on the MONUC and the support by international staff. The future support to national staff and handover over the next period (support proposal by SIDA) will be crucial in order to transform Radio Okapi into a national institution run by Congolese with sustainable financing. According to Mid-Term Evaluation (Myers 2005) "an excellent sustainability study has been written" which outlines different scenarios for Okapi's future after the MONUC. While the mid-term evaluation provides further suggestions on ensuring sustainability, no information was made available to assess if any steps towards sustainability have been taken in the three years since the mid-term evaluation.

Lessons Learned

Use of popular medium: If V&A interventions are able to jump on a bandwagon of a popular medium, as e.g. the radio, you can easily reach a large amount of people.

Careful analysis of V&A channel: A careful analysis on which channels are available to which target groups can help the identification of the most appropriate channel for e.g. civic education campaigns.

The power of information: Example what importance the availability of independent information plays in the early steps of a democratisation process. People are hungry for information. Moreover, a well informed population can make its voice heard better.

Capacity building & role model: While Radio Okapi does only limited direct capacity building to other radio stations it has played a big role in setting standards for other radio stations, thus acting as a role model for other radio stations during the development of professionalism of DRC's media. This shows the potential of spill-over effects of V&A interventions.

Comments on the model of change

Although no 'hypothesis' has ever been articulated per se, the rationale behind Radio Okapi is that peace, national unity and good governance can be significantly helped if there is a national news, education and information service which everyone can rely on for timely and accurate reporting and for the airing of diverse voices and debates from all levels of society.[102] Through time and accurate information provision Radio Okapi were able to successfully jump on the bandwagon of the current development of a popular radio culture in the DRC. In addition to contributing to accurate information provision during a crucial phase in DRC's transition Radio Okapi became a medium for people to voice their problems and claim their rights including better service delivery or adherence to rules by political leaders.

[102] Myers 2005, p. 5.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

Fondation Hirondelle (2006): What's new. News bulleting from Fondation Hirondelle. Number 13. March 2006.
Radio Okapi/MONUC/Fondation Hirondelle. Charte Electoral.
SIDA (2007): In-depth preparation of foundation Hirondelle, Radio Okapi in the Democratic Republic of Congo 2007-2010. Memo. 25 June 2007.
Myers, Mary (2005): Mid-Term Evaluation of Radio Okapi. Democratic Republic of Congo.

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Key informant interview with BA Amadou, Radio Okapi, Mbuji Mayi, 07/12/07.
Focus Group Discussion with radio listeners in Kinshasa and Mbuji Mayi, 08/12/07.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"I know the telephone number of Radio Okapi by heart. So if there is a problem I can phone them anytime." (Focus group participant, Kinshasa)
"I'd like a TV Okapi." (Focus group participant, Kinshasa)
"Radio Okapi works with the MONUC but it is not the MONUC's radio." (Focus group participant, Kinshasa)
"Radio Okapi has influenced other radio stations, the way they report. For example many radios now have interviews on the streets." (Focus group participant, Kinshasa)
"The Government keeps its ears closed." (Focus group participant, Kinshasa)
"Radio Okapi does not have all the electricity problems other radios have." (Focus group participant, Mbuji May)
"*If there is a problem with security in Mbuji May, I call Radio Okapi [...]. I would not call the police as I don't have their telephone number*." (Focus group participant, Mbuji May)
"Radio Okapi is the radio for all Congolese." (Focus group participant, Mbuji May)
"Radio Okapi have the best information, they do the research themselves. They have the money so they are free." (Focus group participant, Mbuji May)
"Radio Okapi does not bring enough information on the region, just an hour a day. We need not only the 'Dialogue between Congolese' but a "Dialogue between Kasai Oriental." (Focus group participant, Mbuji May)
"Radio Okapi's ever-popular flagship programme, 'Dialogue Entre Congolais', is a forum for daily political and social debates. Because this programme has given the opportunity for many prominent politicians and faction leaders to debate on-air, many see this programme as Congo's alternative parliament, and a 'school for future democrats." (Mid-term evaluation, p. 25)

Annex D2: Support for Institutions de la Transition – AIT

I: Profile of the Intervention: This project centres mostly on strengthening public institutions' management capacity and transparent decision-making. It is therefore involved directly in increasing their accountability.

1. Donor Agency	Initial finance: - Government of the United Kingdom (DFID): USD1,700,000 - UNDP: USD1,070,000 - Government of Italy: USD260,000 1st Prolongation: - UNDP: USD645,000 2nd Prolongation: - DFID: USD1,797,761
2. Partners/ implementing agency	UNDP, Government Unit
3. Objectives	The principal aim of the project was to contribute to the success of a peaceful transition to the elections, to lay the basis for a democratic system in the DRC and to consolidate peace within the region. It involved strengthening the capacity of the institutions during the transition by support in terms of expertise, study and training, and providing equipment and financial support. The project also aimed to promote the setting up of a truly democratic culture through specific activities.
4.Main CV&A and other activities	The project's activities were centred on six specific areas of intervention and products: 1) Five citizens'[103] commissions, with legal executives and organisational and management tools. 2) Increased technical capacities of the IEC in terms of organisation, management and control of elections. 3) Parliamentary institutions (National Assembly and Senate) strengthened in their various functions. 4) Principles and rules of good government popularised. 5) The transition institutions have developed a communication strategy. 6) Setting up of transparent and effective administrative and financial procedures.
5. Target Group / Beneficiaries	The political representatives of the two Parliamentary Chambers and the members of the five Transition Support Institutions: - The CEI (Independent Electoral Commission). - The CLEC (Commission for Ethics and the Elimination of Corruption). - The CVR (Truth and Reconciliation Commission). - The HAM (Higher Authority for the Media). - The ONDH (National Human Rights Observatory).
6. Key linkages	In the context of the general assistance given by the UN to the DRC,

[103] These five commissions are also known as the "Transition Support Institutions" or "Democracy Support Institutions". See point 5 for description of the target groups.

	the AIT project is being conducted in parallel with the APEC project (Support for Electoral Process in the Congo). The project's aim was to support the IEC before the coming of the APEC project in July 2004. In particular, it provided the IEC with training in electoral administration, support with communication and the application of a web site. After the APEC project was launched, the AIT, alongside the electoral process, fulfilled the mandates of other DSI: the HAM (regulation of access by political parties to the media, the BIEL (office of electoral information), the CVR (reconciliation missions) and the ONDH (round tables on public liberties). It thus provided support for Parliament (essential legislation, electoral law, law of referendum).
7.Duration	Three years
8.Starting date	June 2004
9.Total budget	USD5,524,761 or EUR4,032,672

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

On the basis of the 2004-2006 annual reports for the project and the latest evaluation report dated 2007, and by comparing these data with the elements obtained in key informant interviews, the evaluation considers that the AIT project appears relevant in V&A terms. It has been vital in the application of the decisions taken by the participants in the "Inter-Congolese Dialogue"[104]. It was through this project that the transition institutions acquired most of their operational and technical capacity. It contributed to the emergence of Congolese public institutions that were more representative of the population than in the past. Also, the project is to play the role of facilitator and catalyst in several negotiations with other donors. It has confirmed the added value of the UNDP[105], as an interface organisation in the facilitation of exchanges between bilateral and multilateral partners.

Efficiency

Beyond the electoral process of which it supported the start, the AIT project has mostly supported the various Citizens' Commissions in the fulfilment of their objectives. Although some funds were released for the HAM's activities, it had to seek further finance to extend its activity further. In contrast, the support given to the CVR, the CECL and the ONDH was limited, aimed mainly at the central operation of these institutions, and this did not allow much real work to be done at provincial level.

The project suffered delays in the implementation of certain activities, in particular because f the composition of the transition institutions and the complexity of the structures[106]. However,

[104] Once the international cease-fire agreement was signed in Lusaka, this internal discussion was started by the International Community with the aim of bringing all the warring parties progressively around the negotiating table. This discussion process, internal to the Congo, was termed the "Inter-Congolese Dialogue" and led to the signature of the global and inclusive Pretoria Agreement.

[105] For the general financing of transition support, a Trust Fund has been set up by the Congolese Government, the World Bank, the European Union, Belgium and the DFID. The UNDP is responsible for overseeing the general co-ordination of this Trust Fund.

[106] Support for Institutions de la Transition: "Dex reporting sheet", November 2006.

given the overall objective of the project, it was difficult to adopt any other approach. The introduction of so many different institutions to support the transition, with relatively large structures (at both national and provincial level) was a political decision taken without assessing the cost that such a decision would involve or verifying the likely availability of the means to cover the cost. It was therefore difficult to imagine alternative approaches for bringing about the results, but in the eyes of many observers, this political decision made the cost of this intervention particularly high: "*it was one of the most significant contributions by the International Community to an electoral process*".

Effectiveness
In view of the size and ambitious nature of this intervention, it is difficult to state whether the objective as a whole have been met.

In particular, the work of the CEI (in terms of organisation, material preparation and security of elections) and of the HAM (especially in terms of regulating and monitoring the quality of information and managing opinions about the electoral process) has made the process more secure and allowed it to be applied even in areas at risk (the two Kivu Provinces, where pockets of rebellion still remain, and the Kasaï Provinces, considered the stronghold of the opposition to the transition).
The electoral process, considered by the International Community to be an absolute priority in the transition, has been financed separately from another direction since 2005.
Apart from the successful introduction of the electoral process, other results have been obtained on a much less comprehensive basis:

- institutional and organisational strengthening of the institutions supported;
- partial transfer of skills amongst the staff members of the institutions supported;
- strengthening of certain capacities, even at provincial level, especially in the assemblies;
- a cautious but appreciable start to popularising the principles of good government;
- an electoral process that benefited, partly through the activity of these institutions, from an easing of the political atmosphere and better information circulation;
- the re-establishment of elected bodies essential for democracy, namely the National Assembly, the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies.

The AIT project also offered a forum that allowed the Congolese leaders and representatives of the population to think and exchange thoughts with the aim of suggesting ways in which the culture and practice of good government could be promoted.

The fact that the success was only partial could be explained by the political context and the large number of obstacles encountered during the realisation of the project: internal and external security regularly called into question, highly variable levels of willingness by those involved in the inter-Congolese dialogue to bring about the transition, very deficient public organisations and infrastructures, widespread corruption and nepotism, long-term abandonment of the tradition of transparency and good management, wholly compromised general infrastructures, large size of the country etc.

Impact
The essential impact that must be mentioned first is clearly the maintenance of generally satisfactory electoral processes (census of electors, constitutional referendum, and presidential, legislative and provincial elections)[107]. The fruit of this process is a basic law, legitimate national and provincial institutions, and human and material resources that can all effectively be used in the post-transition period. The synergy concentrated on the electoral process has led to the creation of a network of actors, and this in turn has led to good information management and complementarities between institutions in the transition.

Sustainability
The crucial stakes of good government that these elections represent have led to great interest and loyalty from the electors. This has facilitated support for the AIT from the various stakeholders (members of government, members of parliament and members of democracy support institutions).

The setting up of democratically elected institutions (national and provincial assemblies), and the perpetuation by the new constitution of two of the democracy support institutions beyond the transition period (the CEI is now the CENI or Independent National Electoral Committee, and the HAM is now the CSAC or Supreme Communication and Audio-visual Council), will guarantee the changes brought about by this intervention long-term. In contrast, few specific measures have been taken to make the missions of the three other democracy support institutions long lasting, their activity having already been weak during the transition. With regard to human rights, the independent watchdog has not been extended as such; a specific human rights minister was appointed following the elections, but he never had sufficient resources to develop a true policy. In addition, this ministerial post disappeared during the first government reshuffle in November 2007, and a Vice-Minister is now responsible for this department.
The positive changes brought about by the project have turned the tables more toward democracy, but there remains the risk of the process being reversed: the risk of a coup by the exiled J-P. Bemba, who is still looking for alliances in the West, attempts at continued destabilisation in 2008, etc.

Lessons Learned
Co-ordination or competition by actors: significant co-ordination work was provided by the UNDP for this intervention. However, a degree of competition between the actors was often reported: a struggle for influence between multilateral organisations and international NGOs on one hand and international and national NGOs on the other hand. The urgency of the matter and the huge external support was not greatly conducive to actor co-ordination.
Appropriation: One of the most frequently heard criticisms was that the intervention did not call enough on local experience, especially with regard to electoral training and making the population aware. Educational material was created without using material that already existed, local actors were used as instruments without really being involved, and so on.
Involvement of the international community (especially through the CIAT) It certainly made a contribution to realising the aims of the intervention within a reasonable time, but at the same

[107] The level of turnout for an electoral process generally high: 62% in the Referendum of 18 December 2005, 70.54% in the first round of the presidential elections and the legislative elections on 30 July 2006, and 65.36% in the second round of the presidential elections and the provincial elections on 29 October 2006.

time this was a risk factor and a stumbling block because of the suspicion that any calls on outside bodies aroused during the process.
Genre: Taking the genre aspect on board remains a major challenge in the implementation of any development programme, and the AIT project is no exception to this rule. The level of participation by women in the elections and in the management of the transition institutions, and their level of representation in the elected bodies, remains low.

Comments on the model of change
Working on the hypotheses that there was sufficient willingness on the part of the authorities, and especially on that of the population, to bring about the introduction of democratically elected institutions, the International Community hugely supported the introduction of an electoral process carefully guided by the transition institutions. By progressively bringing about recognition of this process and the institutions that govern it, the basic foundations were laid with the support of the project (provisional legislative framework, systems for popularising the concept of government). On the basis of these foundations, democratically elected institutions could be chosen.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

AIT/UNDP, 2004 annual report, Kinshasa, February 2005.
AIT/UNDP, 2005 annual report, Kinshasa, December 2005.
AIT/UNDP, 2006 annual report, Kinshasa, December 2006.
UNDP, Evaluation of Transition Institutions Support (AIT) project, Kinshasa, December 2007.
UNDP, Evaluation Report on the Electoral Process Support Project (APEC) in Congo, Kinshasa, May 2007.
UNDP, Dex Reporting Sheet, November 2006

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

In Kinshasa:

Conversations with Léon Kengo Wa Dondo, President, Modeste Mutsinga, Rapporteur, and Martine Masika Katsuva, Secretary-General, Senate, 21/12/2007.
Conversations with Felix Vunduawe Te Pemeko, Deputy, Constantin Tshisuaka Kabanda, Secretary-General, Manya Riche, Presidential Adviser, Willy Albert M. Kalengay, Political Adviser, M. MOLAMBA, Director of Studies, and Norbert Libya Djubu, Adviser, National Assembly, 22/12/2007.
Interview with Elisabeth Bailly, HR Manager, UNDP / Service Centre, 20/11/2007.
Interview with Oliver Blake, Claude Disasi and Bonaventure Magongo, DIFD, 23/11/2007.
Interview with Bonani Bubaka, National Expert, Marc Ngwaza, Consultant and Danielle Stroux, Principal Technical Adviser, UNDP/AIT, 19/11/2007.
Interview with Loïc Duarte, French Ambassador, 22/11/2007.
Interview with Fundi Elongo, Co-ordinator, Youth Government of Kinshasa, 24/11/2007.
Interview with Esdras Kambale, Vice-President & AI President, Primo Mukambilwa, AI Vide-President, and Eddy Mukuna, Adviser, HAM, 24/11/2007.
Interview with Keita Kaounga, Team Leader, UNDP, Governance Unit, 13/12/2007.
Interview with Célio MAYEMBA, Belgian Ambassador, 22/11/2007.
Interview with Raoul Ndiaye, Co-ordinator, MONUC Electoral Division and Amadou Amani, Adviser, MONUC Rule of Law Division, 20/11/2007.
Interview with Teresa Polara, European Commission, 22/11/2007.
Interview with George ZACHARIAH, Program Officer, UNDP, Governance Unit and Daniel Mukoko, Adviser, UNDP Policies and Strategies Unit, 19/11/2007.

In Mbuji-Mayii:

Interview with Ghislain Banza Kamuela, Provincial Co-ordinator, BIEL, 06/12/2007.
Interview with Kabala Ilunga Mbidi, President, Provincial Assembly, 04/12/2007.
Interview with Faustin Mutembo Hanshi, Provincial Co-ordinator, HAM, 06/12/2007.
Interview with Alphonse Ngoy Kasanji, Governor, East Kasaï Province, 06/12/2007.
Interview with Stanislas Tshiongo, Provincial Co-ordinator, ONDH, 05/12/2007.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"They were emerging from the war, the warring parties had never agreed to the elections being directed by the Ministry of the Interior, what was needed was a more independent institution, and it was the CEI that was appointed to organise the elections… It was a battle, a fight for democracy, and the ideal had to be held onto, as the conditions were unstable… There were many attempts at intimidation, but this never really had the effect of blocking the process. Sometimes material was set on fire, but we immediately looked to replace it… to show that the process was gaining ground…" (CEI Provincial Co-ordinator, Mbuji-Mayii).

"If there had not been that support, the elections would not have been held" (HAM Provincial Co-ordinator, Mbuji-Mayii)

"Reducing poverty is an essential element in strengthening democracy: reducing people's poverty is giving people greater freedom to choose their representative according to their personal opinion" (Provincial Parliament Members, Mbuji-Mayii)

"We were pushed, we were told that we would have to get fully involved with the CVR Bureau Member's mandate, that we would have the means to work…it was put down on paper that we would have to resign from our previous duties to take on these responsibilities within the CVR. Some people did that, and then nothing… the UNDP never honoured its commitments. We already called on them, but no reply…" (CVR Member, Mbuji-Mayii)

"It was impossible to be everywhere, but we had to listen as much as possible. The situation in Lodja was tense, with three politicians each with their own radio stations peddling hate. We called upon them, it was not easy, and only one of the politicians agreed to hear our opinions and our suggestions" (HAM Provincial Co-ordinator, Mbuji-Mayii)

"Despite the fact that the HAM stopped operating when the transition ended on 31 December 2006 and we are still waiting for the effective introduction of its replacement organisation, the Audio-visual Monitoring Committee, the rhetoric of hate and the lack of control have not noticeably increased… The radio stations have shown more restraint, more professionalism…" (HAM Provincial Co-ordinator, Mbuji-Mayii)

"Thanks to the introduction of the Electoral Information Offices right across the country, the radio speculation on the election results, which could have exacerbated the post-election tension, have not had any effect on public opinion" (BIEL Regional Co-ordinator, Mbuji-Mayi)

"Letting the interim government finance the organisations most crucial for its survival (control of the media, corruption and human rights) is to take the risk of nothing happening except a complete blockage. The international community therefore supported the work of these five commissions. In the new constitution, only two commissions have been formally taken on to assume the responsibilities of the HAM and the CEI. However, the Parliament could create more if it wished… It could create a human rights observation commission, and there's been some discussion on a proposed law currently being drafted" (UNDP Governance Adviser, Kinshasa).

"In any international initiative, the national bodies have to be involved" (MONUC Adviser, Kinshasa).

"The influence of a project such as the AIT is noticeable; the Congolese population is keener to participate, it wants to get more involved in politics and in public organisations, and the churches in particular are getting more involved in the process… At State accountability level also, we are seeing the beginning of changes… there are less obviously arbitrary acts, relations between Members of Parliament are changing, there is a change in political attitudes. They are showing an increased level of awareness of the need to manage the State" (UNDP Governance Adviser, Kinshasa).

Annex D3: Capacity building to actors involved in organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections – EISA

I: Profile of the Intervention: This project is directly linked to the V&A problem in that it is entirely dedicated to the organisation of democratic elections.

1.Donor Agency	DIFD, SIDA (and to a lesser extent Switzerland, BCDC & UNDP)
2.Partners/implementing agency	Electoral Institute of Southern Africa – EISA
3.Objectives	To support the transition institutions (Transition Parliament and CEI in particular), society organisations and political parties in the organisation of democratic, credible and transparent elections
4.Main CV&A and other activities	To strengthen the capacities of senators in laws essential for organising elections. Training members of the CEI Bureau through regional missions (SADC). Dialogue between the CEI and Civil Society in the preparation of elections (electoral awareness campaigns and education). Setting up of a National Network of National Observers (Renosec) for the elections. Training of a group of international observers for the elections. Creation of a mediation panel for electoral disputes. Training political party witnesses.
5.Target Group / Beneficiaries	Members of the Transition Parliament, the Independent Electoral Commission, the political parties and the OSC.
6.Key linkages	Project No. 2: Support for the Transition Institutions. Very selectively – Project No. 7: Support for the CNONGD
7.Duration	Two years
8.Starting date	2005 (A previous phase of this programme was financed by DIFD alone during 2004, for a total of €604,217)
9.Total budget	USD6,960,000 or EUR5,080,000

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

Our evaluation compared the data collected in the project files and the national and international assessment reports on the progress of the elections with the information obtained through interviews with the project members and with local NGOs critical in relation to that progress. On the basis of these elements, the team of consultants estimates that this project has a real relevance in the Congolese pre-electoral situation. It is aimed at the Congolese population as a whole and aims partly to reach the most vulnerable people in the rural zones by working with local CSOs provide better awareness of the election process. In fact, profiting from its experience of monitoring election processes in Southern Africa and of sending Congolese observers and mediators to scrutinise other elections (most notably in Haiti and Mauritius), the EISA organisation[108] has been invited to support the organisation of elections.

[108] The President of the Board of Directors of EISA is Ketumile MASIRE, former President of Botswana and facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2001–2002).

The intervention concentrated exclusively on the conclusion of elections: strengthening the parliamentary organisations during discussion on the constitution and compilation of the legal texts organising the elections, facilitating the acceptance of the process by Members of Parliament through sharing of knowledge of similar experiences (benchmarking), supporting society in its participation in elections (election education), strengthening the institutions responsible for setting up the election process, providing observation, and training political party members. The project is based on the hypothesis that the success of elections depends on every phase in the process being properly organised and monitored.

Efficiency
The originality of the intervention lies firstly in the contribution of experience from other countries in the region, which allowed comparisons to be drawn with a process of which few local actors have any experience. The financial contributions to this project were significant and came in steadily, their frequency depending to some extent on how the process advanced. An alternative approach would have been to work more directly with local actors (NGOs, universities etc) for both electoral education and training of political executives; however, this would probably have required more time but increased the chances of wider appropriation.

Effectiveness
The intervention concerns an electoral process that could be realised through a multitude of contributions. It is thus difficult to isolate the specific effect had by this intervention on the overall progress of the elections. The intervention should certainly contribute to the overall realisation, which fulfilled a good number of its objectives in that the institutions and actors required to be involved in the process almost all participated (the only limitation was when a significant number boycotted and turnout rates were unusually low in two provinces).

However, in view of the declared objectives, the level of participation by populations and of involvement by local NGOs in the electoral process was undoubtedly still too low (for example, people participated in the referendum without yet being fully aware of what they were doing). In addition, there is a shortage of data allowing the impact on the most vulnerable people to be assessed and a distinction to be made in terms of genre.

Quite clearly the obstacles encountered by this intervention were numerous: lack of experience in the electoral domain on the part of most institutions and persons required to be involved, suspicion of a highly stimulated democratisation procedure that was the desire of the International Community, and recourse to rhetoric of hate and xenophobia by some politicians poorly trained in political debate.

Impact
By organising a national seminar in Kisangani, the intervention sparked debate between Senators and foreign experts, and this broke down the suspicions of Members of Parliament of the International Community's insistence on seeing the transition process successfully concluded. This opening approach allowed the final versions of legislative texts to be produced. The project provided the basic knowledge for some CEI agents, allowing them to assume their responsibilities, and for the representatives of the political parties, who were thus able to understand their role better (for example, continuity of legislative work between the transitional parliament and the elected parliament, better awareness of the role played by the parties during the elections, etc). The organisation of electoral conflict mediation teams and the involvement of national and international observers in the deployment helped the

elections to be held under conditions of sufficient stability and transparency. In all probability, however, the project achieved less of its aims in the field of electoral education; being unfamiliar with the lay of the land, it called on local NGOs to conduct this education, in a way that was doubtless not sufficiently co-ordinated or strategic.

The intervention brought about various changes in behaviour: free participation in an electoral process, practice of election observation processes, monitoring of party witnesses, and familiarisation of Members of Parliament with participative compilation of legislative texts using comparison and integration of similar experiences gained abroad. However, as several reports by observers pointed out, the successful conclusion of the electoral process was also, and quite possibly specifically, the result of the general anxiety of much of the population to get through the transition period quickly, as this period was not truly legitimate and did not allow development to restart in the true sense.

Sustainability
Thanks to its success, the electoral process led to the setting up of legitimate executive and legislative powers. The rapid implementation of legislative power in particular allowed the durability of the results to be ensured (processing of objections, formal confirmation of results, commissioning of persons elected etc).

Of the institutions involved in the electoral process, the CEI is one of the two (of the five) institutions to be formally renewed in the context of the New Institutions of the Third Republic through the creation, via the law, of the National Independent Electoral Commission or CENI. This is an indicator of durability. An electoral process at local level is planned for 2008, and this would consolidate the whole of the electoral process at all levels of power. However, areas of instability remain (especially insecurity in some of the provinces), and pose a risk to these results, which may yet be contested by force even though this risk is tending to decrease.

Lessons Learned

Benchmarking: In a process that is unstable and not yet fully appropriated by the local actors, recourse to outside experience may be a means of accelerating the implementation process.
Impact of the International Community: In the context of a fragile State, the impact and pressure of the International Community remains important in the introduction of democratic institutions. However, there is still a latent risk of low appropriation levels.
Priority of interventions: Faced with the enormous challenge inherent in holding the first free elections in the DRC for decades, priority choices often went to logistics and provision of security to the exclusion of in-depth participation. This is a choice that may adversely affect the duration of the intervention.

Comments on the model of change
Working on the hypothesis that successful elections depend on proper training and proper monitoring, the intervention developed support activities for the various persons involved in the electoral process with the aim of creating conditions (increased capacities for organisers, better informed and trained electors, absence of tension and insecurity) that allowed the elections to be held with significant participation by the population.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

CDCE: Observation report on the presidential, legislative and provincial elections in the DRC, March 2007.
EISA: Technical project file: Strengthening the capacities of those involved in the institutions during the compilation of the Draft Constitution of the Third Republic during the preparation for the general elections, year 2004-2005.
EISA: Technical project file: Strengthening the capacities of those involved in the institutions during the compilation of the Draft Constitution of the Third Republic during the preparation for the general elections, year 2005-2007.
EURAC: DRC – Elections held on 30 July and 29 October 2006, report on the EURAC-CDCE joint observation task, January 2007.

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Interview with Sabin Banza, Vice-President, LE, Kinshasa, 13/12/2007.
Interview with Hector Lubamba, Expert, EISA, Kinshasa, telephone and e-mail contact.
Interview with Raphael Nguyi, Partner Relations Chargé, LE, Kinshasa, 13/12/2007.
Interview with Rigobert Minani Bihuzo, Permanent RODHECIC, Kinshasa, 14/12/2007.
Interview with Vincent Tohbi, Resident Director, EISA, Kinshasa, 10/12/2007.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"The success of the elections now appears, over and above all else, to have been a successful logistical process thanks to the essential contribution from the Basket Fund managed by the UNDP, but this is deceptive; the success is due above all to the training, the cultivation of awareness amongst the population, the mediation… the tasks taken on especially by society and the international ONGs" (EISA resource staff member)
"The International Community has supported the elections, to be sure, but has concentrated on the hardware (that is, equipment and logistics)… It said that there was no real civil society in Congo, and that's an insult!" (Civil Society Resource Staff Member)
"EISA has made an effort to reach Congolese civil society, but here also there was too much rushing about, too much money… they created Renosec out of nothing, but there were already local networks". (Civil Society Resource Staff Member).
"A significant number of projects started before the first round of elections were unable to benefit from the support of the APEC project (Support for Electoral Processes in Congo) because of the financial constraints brought about by the complexity and prolongation of the electoral process. In addition, the CEI awareness programmes broadcast by the media, already insufficient at the time of the first round, were subsequently reduced. The churches did however continue to play a fundamental rile of civic education and inculcation of awareness". (EU Electoral Observation Mission on the DRC, 1 November 2006).

Annex D4: Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace - Search for Common Ground/Centre Lokolé

I: Profile of the Intervention

1.Donor Agency	DFID
2.Partners/implementing agency	Search for Common Ground (known as Centre Lokolé 'CL' in DRC)
3.Objectives	To lay foundations for sustainable peace in the DRC by (1) enhancing informative and participative communication around the transition process and (2) contributing to the reduction of tensions in the Eastern Congo.
4.Main CV&A and other activities	Radio programmes and other documentation (comic strips, posters for elections) distributed to local radio stations; participatory theatre for conflict transformation; training of media professionals
5.Target Group / Beneficiaries	Radio stations and media professionals / Population where radio stations broadcast
6.Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	CL has working links with Panos and Radio Okapi (the two other media organisations funded by DFID in DRC) with cooperation less developed with Radio Okapi. To a lesser extent CL is in contact with DFID's other peace-building partners (International Alert, Christian Aid, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and the Life and Peace Institute) in Eastern DRC.
7.Duration	3 years
8.Starting date	October 2004
9.Total budget	£1,200,000 or EUR 1,765,000

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

The project relies on the media to support the facilitation of a peaceful transition, promoting free and fair elections and build functioning state institutions through civic education and the promotion of solving conflict through non-violent means. CL uses mainly the radio which is the most important and wide-spread medium in DRC. Given that most radio stations are very local and have limited outreach CL collaborates with many stations all over the country. Other activities aiming at a reduction of tensions (e.g. participatory theatre, community reconciliation projects including awareness raising on children's rights and demobilisation) have their geographical focus in the East of the country where tensions and conflict are most wide-spread. The programme was well-aware of the complex situation in East DRC from the start; the programme was allocated the risk category 'medium', which means "relatively high because of the fragile nature of the political transition and the volatility of the sub-region" (DFID summary review 2007). The programme undertook an internal strategic review in April 2005 which reoriented the programme in the light of the peace of the transition process (e.g. postponement of elections) to make the programme more relevant given the political developments.

Efficiency

The mid-year review (March 2006) reported progress against the following outputs:

- Weekly radio programmes which are distributed to a total of 84 radio stations (including the production of six weekly radio programmes broadcast through around 35 stations in the Kiswahili zone). In return the radio stations receive in-kind support from CL, e.g. CD player, mixer, microphone etc.
- Other media activities which reinforce messages on the transition, e.g. comic strips or posters around the referendum/elections.
- 3 training opportunities per year for a total of 200 journalists/writers in 'common ground' journalism and conflict transformation approaches, writing for specific formats such as talk shows, vox pop and soap operas, technical processes (e.g. digital editing). Five 'joint reporting weeks' were held for journalists from Burundi, Rwanda and DRC.
- Promotion of cross-border dialogue through radio outputs and support to partner organisations which have regional communication/reconciliation goals. While activities have taken place these are hampered due to the conflict.
- Community awareness-raising on children's rights and the demobilisation process in the east. The main element is the 'Sisi Watoto' radio magazine, a programme which is designed and made by a team of around 12 child journalists under CL supervision.
- Training and capacity-building for local peace leaders, though an item in the original proposal, was de-prioritised due to funding constraints (see below).
- Cultural activities to increase social harmony: 4 facilitated community reconciliation projects, 2 theatre troupes specialising in participatory theatre for conflict transformation, 2004 peace song contest publishing 11 best songs on CD.

Funding/disbursement: The programme did not originally receive 100% funding because DFID agreed to partially fund the proposal on the understanding that Search would seek complementary co-funding; other funding took some time to materialise (e.g. USAID suspended funds to DRC), so before this happened, the situation required a slight re-prioritisation of activities, e.g. less training and capacity building.

Effectiveness

The intervention's underlying assumptions is that tensions can be decreased and violent conflict can be prevented through provision of high-quality information and community-level activates which aim at strengthening communication between different actors. Peace-building in turn is seen as prerequisite of accountable and functioning institutions.

The mid-year review (March 2006) reported: "SFCG is making a significant contribution to building popular information resources by distributing audio material to key local radio stations in all provinces. There is evidence that the material is widely appreciated for its informative and entertainment value and its positive influence on attitudes." Furthermore an evaluation of Mopila[109] has shown that the sketch has increased the understanding of the length and nature of the transition.

DFID's summary review stated in February 2007: "All its outputs are on track but the reason they are likely to be largely rather than completely achieved is because of the very difficult country context, and because cause-and-effect relationships between the outputs and the purpose are very hard to attribute specifically to the project activities."

[109] Soap opera exploring topics around the transition through the adventures of Mopila, a taxi-driver

Impact
The mid-year review reported: "It is not possible to judge exactly how far SFCG contributed to the high turn-out or the calm conduct of the referendum, but it certainly contributed. It remains a key partner for the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) in the run-up to the elections." There is evidence that SFCG has supported a behavioural change in several instances, e.g.

- Military commanders have brought children forward for demobilisation.
- Violence was headed off as a result of CL programmes, e.g. student elections in Bukavu.
- Sisi Watoto, which explorers topics around child demobilisations prepared by children, has been found effective in promoting the release of child soldiers and discouraging them from re-enlisting.

However, the overall increase/decrease of violent tensions in the East is impossible to be attributed to one single intervention given the complexity of the conflict.

Sustainability
Given the recent increase in tensions in the East or the outbreak of violence in March 2007 in Kinshasa, the sustainability of CL's contribution to peace-building remains unclear. However, CL's contribution to raising the quality standards of radio emissions is likely to last, also given the training they provide to journalists and writers.

Lessons Learned
Innovative use of a mass medium: Innovative methods (e.g. participatory theatre, radio sketches) work for civic education and attract a large number of people, thus increasing outreach at a low cost.
Careful analysis of V&A channel: A careful analysis on which channels are available to which target groups can help the identification of the most appropriate channel for e.g. civic education campaigns.
Targeting and languages: Donors must be aware of language barriers in targeting V&A. SFCG/CL produces most emissions in French and all four national languages (not in any dialects though) to avoid excluding people from listening to the programmes because of language barriers. However, the radio stations decide in which languages to broadcasts and more importantly, some of the programmes are seen as 'intellectual' and thus do not reach all segments of the population.
Focus: If budget constraints exist donor need to be realistic and focus on one activity using the comparative advantage of the project implementer. While SFCG's radio emissions are very successful fewer efforts were placed in the community development aspect and the capacity building for local peace leaders. While SFCG's strength lies with the radio emissions, other organisations may be more appropriate to support communities.
Realistic funding assumptions: Realistic project logframes means that funding is available for all objectives. Constraints around funding (and relying that SFCG/CL finds other funders in addition to the DFID grant) have led to re-prioritising of capacity building and community development initiatives.

Comments on the model of change
Like other intervention this programme assumes that a better informed population is on one hand less likely to be influenced by propaganda through local military groups and on the other hand more likely to participate in the elections. Through innovative activities (such as radio sketches, participatory theatre, and training children as journalists) SFCG successfully contributed to a better informed population that participated responsibly in relatively peaceful

elections (DFID review, Feb 07). However, the recently increased violent conflict in the East has many underlying causes many of which cannot be addressed by this programme. So it would not be appropriate to contribute this failure specifically to SCFG's work.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

CL/SFCG (2005): Sisi Watoto: Program Analysis. By Christina Glavas, Grover Jamie Jones. Columbia University. School of International and Public Affairs.
CL/SFCG (2007): Liste des radios partenaires.
CL/SFCG (2007): Rapport de suivi audiences radiophoniques, activités culturelles et sportives génératrices de revenue. Document interne de travail. Coordination Design Monitoring et Evaluation. June 2007. Bukavu.
DFID (2005): Summary Review. SFCG/CL.
DFID (2006): Mid-Term Evaluation of Search for Common Ground (Centre Lokolé) "Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace" programme in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Final report. 22nd March 2006 by Mary Myers and Judy El-Bushra.
DFID (2007): Summary review. Search for Common Ground - Supporting Congo's Transition Towards Sustainable Peace

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Key informant interview with Lena SLACHMUIJLDER (Country Director SFCG in DRC) and Sosthène Serge NSIMBA (Chargé du Programme Média) in Kinshasa, 05/12/07 and 11/12/07.
Key informant interview with two local radio stations (Radio Fraternité, Radio Mont Carmel) in Mbuji May, 06/12/07.
Focus Group Discussion with radio listeners in Kinshasa, 15/12/07 and Mbuji May, 08/12/07.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"The quality of the emissions produced by Centre Lokolé is really high. That's why we like them." (Key informant, radio station, Mbuji May)
"Mopila is really popular. I often hear people say: 'Switch the radio on. Mopila starts in five minutes.'" (Key informant, Mbuji May)
"*Mopila is really popular. But only Radio Okapi airs it in all local languages, other radios only air it in French*." (Focus Group Participant, Mbuji May)

Annex D5: Initiative for joint work in the leadership and State cohesion (ILCCE) - Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

I: Profile of the Intervention

1.Donor Agency	DFID, EC, Canada, SIDA, Norway, Netherlands (funds managed by UNDP), USA, Canada (bilateral). US$ 2.6 Mio (through UNDP fund), 345,000 (bilateral)
2.Partners/implementing agency	Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (WWICS) in partnership with the Institut pour la Recherche et l'Education sur la Négociation en Europe (IRENE) based at Paris's ESSEC business school
3.Objectives	Seeks to enable leaders from the main political parties and civil society groups to meet four principle challenges in achieving durable peace: shift from a zero-sum mindset to one that recognizes interdependence, rebuild trust between leaders, which had been shattered by war, strengthen communication and negotiation skills; and rebuild a consensus on how power should be organized and decisions made.
4.Main CV&A and other activities	Workshops
5.Target Group / Beneficiaries	Leader from political parties, civil society, media / Congolese population if conflict is reduced due to more collaborative decisions-making
6.Key linkages of intervention with other programmes	The initiative is modelled on the Burundi Leadership Training Programme. An evaluation encouraged the WWICS to build closer ties with the UNDP governance programme.
7.Duration	2 years
8.Starting date	October 2005
9.Total budget	USD 2,945,000 or EUR 4,035,000

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

The programme was designed to help leaders from political parties and civil society to navigate the difficult political transition in preparation of the first Congolese multi-party election in four decades. It is based on training strategies and techniques that have been used in Burundi since 2003 and which were assumed to be equally relevant to the Congolese context. The basic assumption of the capacity building measures was that leaders of diverse communities “mix” and talk about the conflicts this will contribute to the prevention of further outbreaks of violence and stimulate a more collaborative decision-making culture in the long-term. The programme was well aware of the risk that leader of different political factions will not want to participate in the training; by promoting this as leadership training rather than reconciliation or conflict mediation this risk was mitigated.

Efficiency
19 training workshops involving almost 460 individual leaders from both the political class and civil society, including leaders of national and provincial influence, and across ethnic and political affiliations, have been conducted in Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu, Butembo, Uvira, and Minembwe.

The workshops use a combination of single and multi-day trainings that include case-studies, simulations, collaborative exercises, and problem solving. They include opportunities for leaders of diverse communities to meet and discuss the conflicts between them. Participants are taught critical negotiation and mediation skills, such as the importance of active listening. According to the independent evaluation the fact that three entities (WWICS for overall strategy, IRENE provided the trainers, ILCCE for organisation of the workshop) on three continents have to come together to organise a workshop transaction costs were high and numerous coordination problems were observed. Moreover, there have been problems with timely disbursements of funding due to delays in donor payments; the complex partnership agreement (donor, UNDP as separate fund manages, WWICS as main contractor, in collaboration with IRENE and a national team, ILCCE) further aggravates this. Delays in the programme realisation were the result; between August and November 2006 only three compared to the six planned workshops have been organised. This raises the question if the same aim could have been achieved with different means and lower transaction costs; however, due to the nature of this evaluation (V&A rather than a programme evaluation) it is hard to make this judgement given the data available.

Effectiveness
The workshops enabled previously antagonist figures that had played, or are still playing, important roles in local (often violent) conflicts. In some cases these actors have never met before or have never had an opportunity to talk to each other. E.g. in the first workshop in Kinshasa in January 2006, Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumanza, the former Governor of Katanga, met several long-time bitter antagonists, most notably Jean-Claude Muyambo, who was one of the victims of the 1992 expulsions of Kasaians from Katanga. The workshop brought these two together for the first time and, by the workshop's last day, both leaders were publicly affirming their desire to work together in addressing the problems of Katanga and Kasai, and were urging the application of what they had learned in the workshop to a resolution of the conflicts within their area. An independent evaluation found, that leaders attending the workshop have mostly spoken positively of their experience and are convinced that the training changed their thinking about finding collaborative solutions to problems.

Impact
An independent evaluation found that "72% of interviewed participants say they have contributed to the reduction of all kinds of conflicts around them […] due to a reinforced negotiation and listening capacity that they acquired during training." Feedback at the end of workshops/follow-up workshops and observation show an increase in collaborative decision-making skills of participants and increased networking. People, sometimes former enemies, were reported to pick up the phone and discuss rumours e.g. about troop movements. However, a capacity building initiative on its own may have limited influence on the overall peace-building efforts without a wider mediation process.

Sustainability

The next phase of the initiative plans to use increasingly national trainers (compared to the entirely international team in the past). Sustainability—after the withdrawal of funds for WWICS—will heavily depend on the degree national training organisations are increasingly involved in the intervention and parallel conflict mediation processes and capacity building initiatives (e.g. an independent evaluation has encouraged increased collaboration with the UNDP governance programme).

Lessons Learned

Copy & paste: While the experience from Burundi helped in the implementation of the DRC training programme, donors should be careful in copying programmes from one to another country. While learning from other experiences can add value, there may be the danger to neglect the contextual differences which were found to play an important role in making V&A interventions work.

Transaction costs: A complex management agreement with donor, separate funds manager, international contractor, international partners and national organisation can considerably increase the (transaction) costs of the intervention. Cost-benefit and added value of two international entities?

Realistic expectations: The programme is realistic that its interventions need to be tied into wider efforts to strengthen V&A (i.e. mediation process).

Comments on the model of change

The key assumption for this programme was that if one can successfully influence the mindset and way of decision-making of selected key leaders this will have an impact on the general decision-making in DRC and thus contribute to an overall reduction in conflict. While the programme successfully stimulated encounters between leader of different political and military factions and had an impact on their collaborative decision-making it is less clear that this has added to an overall reduction in conflict. As with other V&A interventions aiming at peace-building, it is difficult to attribute the (non)achievement of the overall objective to the project's activities on their own.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

UNDP (2007): Initiative pour un Leadership Collaboratif et la Cohésion de l'Etat (ILCCE). Evaluation externe a mi-parcours du projet. Ely Dieng, Francesca Bomboko, Said Abass Ahamed. Juin 2007.

WWICS (2006). The Inaugural Workshop of the DRC Leadership Training Initiative. Held in Kinshasa, DRC, 17-21 January 2006. By Howard Wolpe.

WWICS (2007): Building Cohesion among Diverse Actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo DRC Leadership Training Initiative. Internet overview. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1417&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=195889

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Key informant interview with George Zachariah (Unité Gouvernance), in Kinshasa, 15/12/07.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"This seminar and training really enriched my knowledge and especially convinced me that the problems can be managed only through dialogue. Dialogue makes it possible to better include/understand the intentions of the other and to lower the prejudices which constitute a major obstacle to national cohesion. Without cohesion there will never be peace." (Participant of Nganda 1, cited from the report on the workshop, p. 19)

"This retreat [..] offered an occasion to believe that together we can succeed in overcoming our differences." (Participant of Nganda 1, cited from the report on the workshop, p. 19)

«*People who have met during the workshops have now each other's telephone numbers and can ring each other if there are problems. They have picked up the phone and dealt with rumours, for examples about troop movements.*" (Key informant interview, Kinshasa)

"*WWICS is a training initiative it is not a mediation process in itself. It needs to be supported by other activities.*" (Key informant interview, Kinshasa)

"*These leaders possess an incredible influence on the opinion and consciousness of the population.*" (Interview with Michel Kassa, Le Potentiel, Kinshasa, 12/06/06)

Annex D6: Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the DRC – Global Witness

I: Profile of the Intervention

1.Donor Agency	SIDA
2.Partners/implementing agency	Global Witness
3.Objectives	The campaign aims to address how natural resources should be managed in the context of post-conflict reconstruction. GW make efforts in reaching fundamental changes in the way natural resources are exploited so that the resources are no longer used to enrich certain individuals and groups at the expense of the wider population.
4.Main CV&A and other activities	Improving transparency in natural resource exploitation through information provision, e.g. publication of press releases.
5.Target Group / Beneficiaries	Population of DRC though more equal access to revenues from natural resources.
6.Key linkages	N/A
7.Duration	3 years
8.Starting date	November 2006 (earlier SIDA support from 2005)
9.Total budget	SEK 10,200,000 or EUR 1,094,000

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

DRC has Africa's richest mineral deposits of copper and cobalt, as well as abundant reserves of gold, diamonds and coltan. Although potentially a very wealthy country, DRC is in fact one of the poorest countries in the world. Traditionally the country's natural resources have benefited a small elite (national and foreign) rather than the Congolese population and corruption is rife in the sector including a huge informal economy existing around natural resource extraction (income frequently been used to finance and fuel conflict). In general decisions around natural resources are made among a small group of insiders and lack transparency.

While the ongoing transition have provided an entry point for GW's campaign (GW's DRC campaign was officially launched in July 2004) the programme's goal—"reaching fundamental changes in the way natural resources are exploited" (Logframe, 09/10/06)—is highly ambitious. The programme's logframe clearly lists major risks, including ongoing conflict, the outcomes of the elections, etc but does not mention one major risk, namely the "lack of political will" which was mentioned as main obstacles in interviews with project staff. It is unclear how realistic GW's objectives are given the complex environment and GW's traditional approach to raise awareness without engaging in direct dialogue with the Government of DRC. As this main phase of the Global Witness DRC campaign (2006-2009) has been ongoing only for one year we focus on two interventions, namely (1) the support to the implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), more specific the review of the mining contracts[110] and (2) the campaign for the trial of Kilwa massacre.[111]

110 The EITI is an international, voluntary mechanism aimed at encouraging transparency in the extractive industries through the full publication and verification of payments by companies to government and

Efficiency
In its first year under the current contract GW has published numerous report and press releases (in French and English), e.g. "*Kilwa Trial: a Denial of Justice*", or "*The Congolese Mining Sector in the Balance. Lack of transparency risks undermining review of mining contracts*" for a national and international audience, has had meetings with DRC government officials and international organisations/donors on natural resource issues. However, Global Witness' narrative report states that many of the activities outlined in the 2006-2007 plan were not carried out, given that GW acts flexibly, e.g. responds to requests from NGOs or campaigns on unforeseen activities, e.g. the Kilwa trial.[112]. The question is also if national NGO's couldn't have been funded to do the same work.

Effectiveness
EITI and the 'revisiting' of the mining contracts: GW has issued press releases and has had discussions with embassies of those countries who are driving the EITI (e.g. UK, US, SIDA) and the World Bank who then brought this to the Government's attention; direct negotiations between GW and the Ministry have not taken place. On a parallel initiative a group of national NGOs and parts of the extractive industry approached the Minister (Memo). Most importantly, there was the danger that DRC would have been excluded from the EITI process if it had not cooperated with civil society, so clear external pressure.

Kilwa massacre and trial: GW's lobbying activities around the trial and support for ACIDH and ASADHO/Katanga have contributed to greater national and international awareness of the Kilwa incident, and of the failure of the Congolese government to make significant steps to address the culture of impunity in the country. Despite the acquittal of those accused, the evidence gathered (e.g. eyewitness testimony, evidence of inconsistencies in the statements of some of the defendants) could benefit the appeal. National organisations face obstacles of publishing sensitive information on resource extraction themselves, the most frequently cited being the lack of financial resources and the professional means to widely distribute information. Despite this high need of support the intervention does not envisage formal capacity building while in the past GW has successfully collaborated with national NGOs, e.g. the court case of the Kilwa massacre. The Global Witness campaign in DRC is thus not a typical V&A intervention as the 'voice' mainly comes from the outside, i.e. an international NGO.

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government revenues from the extractive industries. Launched at the World Summit for Sustainable Development 2002 the EITI brings together governments, companies and representatives of civil society. The DRC officially signed up to EITI in 2005. However, implementation has been severely hampered by a number of factors, including attempts by the government to interfere with the process by imposing representatives on the national EITI committees and adopting regulations without consultation. In April 2007, the Government of DRC announced the creation of a commission to review mining contracts signed between private companies and state/public enterprises. Again, this process suffers from a lack of transparency, limited involvement of civil society and there are concerns that the independence of the Commission is not adequately protected.

[111] In 2004 a massacre took place in Kilwa (Katanga) during which more than 70 people were estimated to be killed in the mining town. The subsequent court trial at the beginning of 2007 was held against Congolese soldiers and employees of Anvil Mining, an international mining company accused of helping the Congolese military in committing this massacre.

[112] This evaluation cannot and does not want to make a judgement if this re-prioritisation is appropriate and demonstrates a flexible response to a rapidly changing environment or hints towards problems in the programme implementation.

Impact
While an overall increase in transparency in the extractive industry is hampered by vested interests in the current allocation of resources and the project is in an early status to assess impact, GW's campaign has contributed to an increased attention of the Government to resource issues. However, it is hard to isolate GW's contribution to the increased dialogue with civil society in the review of the mining contracts (and the subsequent appointment of the EITI coordinator with agreement from all actors) given the high external pressure on DRC around the EITI. While international attention to the Kilwa trial can in part for sure be attributed to GW the appeal of the case will show the whole impact of the initiative.

Sustainability
There are many questions around sustainability of the programme. Given that the V&A channels are external (though international actors) rather than national, the sustainability of any improved transparency once the international actor's support ceases will depend very much on DRC's adherence to its commitments and agreements, e.g. the EITI. Moreover, national NGOs will need to take the role Global Witness is playing at present, which will be challenging given the current capacity and funding constraints.

Lessons Learned
External pressure to strengthen Government transparency and accountability: A widely known international organisation can successfully use its name to lobby for more transparency.
External accountability: Is strengthening government transparency through external actors an effective and sustainable way to strengthen a country's accountability to its citizens? Is there the danger that national governments listens to international actors rather than to its citizens?
Flexibility versus programme log frames. The programme shows that there is a certain conflict between the need to act and respond flexibly to a rapidly changing environment and timeframes and programming/planning needs of donor-funded V&A interventions.
How much can a project achieve on its own? An ambitious project aiming at improving transparency and accountability in an area, i.e. natural resources where many actors have a vested interest and benefit out of a lack of accountability. Is it realistic that a project intervention on its own can overcome these major obstacles?
Capacity building and collaboration with national organisations: The intervention does not envisage formal collaboration with national organisations apart from information sharing. As closer collaboration between GW and national NGOs has worked very well in the past rising the question if partnership between international and national NGOs increases the potential for the success and sustainability of V&A interventions.

Comments on the model of change
The programme assumes that accountability in decision-making can be strengthened through highlighting cases of corruption and lack of transparency. Moreover, the programme believes that this can be done through external actors, such as an international NGO, without entering a relationship with the Government or build capacity with national civil society. Relying on GW's international reputation to publish information and negotiate with international actors to put pressure on the Government of DRC GW has achieved several outputs. However, currently these are isolated events rather than representative of a broader change in the way decisions are made, raising the question how much one single intervention can achieve given the complexity of the problem.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

Action contre l'impunité et pour les droits humains (ACIDH), Association Africaine de Défense des Droits de l'Homme/Katanga (ASADHO/Katanga), Global Witness, Rights and Accountability in Development (RAID) (July 2007): Victims of Kilwa massacre denied justice by Congolese military court. Press release.

DECLARATION de la société civile de la RD Congo sur la « revisitation » des contrats miniers, 5 mai 2007.

Global Witness (2007): Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Narrative Report for the period 1st October 2006 – 30th September 2007.

LOGFRAME. Breaking the links between natural resource exploitation, conflict and corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 09.10.06.

MEMO des organisations de la société civile et des industries extractives. Membres du Comité Technique de l'ITIE/RDC. A l'attention de son excellence Monsieur le Ministre du Plan. Concerne : le processus de mise en œuvre de l'ITIE en RDC. Kinshasa 2007.

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Key informant interview (telephone) with Carina Tertsakian (Lead Campaigner (DRC) for Global Witness). Oxford, 19/12/07.

Key informant interview with René Ngondo (Organisation Concertée des Ecologistes et Amis de la Nature, OCEAN). Kinshasa, 04/12/07.

Key informant interview with Nestor Mwamba (Chargé des programmes, CRONGD), Mbuji May, 08/12/07.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"*Why don't donors directly give money to NGOs here in Congo? If we had the money we would publish the information ourselves rather than giving it to Global Witness; despite of the intimidation from public authorities*." (Key informant, civil society, Mbuji May)

"*The information is read and understood but the public authorities have not changed.*" (Key informant, civil society, Mbuji May)

"*If we write a report people say 'it's just written by a Congolese NGO'. If the report is written by Global Witness it has much more weight.*" (Key informant, civil society, Kinshasa)

"*You hardly pay any tax but you need to pay the person who protects your interest.*" (Key informant, civil society, Kinshasa, about business in the natural resource extraction)

"*NGOs, including […] Global Witness, have played an important role in the round-table group to find alternative forest uses that benefit all DRC citizens, as well as the global environment. The UK government knows how important rainforests are and has earmarked £50m for the Congo Basin Forest Fund to tackle deforestation.*" (UK Minister for Trade and Development, Gareth Thomas, October 2007, cited in Global Witness, report to SIDA)

Annex D7: Supporting the National Council for NGOs Active in the Development Sector (CNONGD)

I: Profile of the Intervention. This is functional support for the principal co-ordination of Development NGOs in the DRC. It is primarily a support for the lobbying and pleas of members in their relations with the public authorities. Most of the intervention therefore supports the V&A activities of CNONGD.

1. Donor Agency	The Belgian Development Co-operation (BDC) 11.11.11. – International NGO – Belgium Christian Aid – International NGO – UK CNCD– International NGO – Belgium
2. Partners/implementing agency	National Council of Non-Government Organisations for Development
3. Objectives	In a situation of decentralisation, the intervention aims to strengthen the capacities of NGOs and Peasant Organisations (POs) in the making of speeches during decision-making at both provincial and local level.
4. Main CV&A and other activities	Training the trainers: creation of expertise centres in each CRONGD in the various provinces. Reflection days on the subject of organic legislation (decentralisation etc), company and economic law, and budget analysis. Pleas and lobbying. Compilation of opinions and analyses and focal point of civil society in terms of development.
5. Target Group/ Beneficiaries	Those responsible for regional co-ordination of NGOs (CRONGD) in the ten provinces, and the member NGOs.
6. Key linkages	During the elections: link with project no. 2 AIT, the NGOs and all the CSOs have been invited to participate in the proceedings of the various transition support institutions.
7. Duration	Five years
8. Starting date	2002 (start date for actual programme, although the partnership between CNONGD and 11.11.11 has existed almost continuously since 1990).
9. Total budget	EUR405,500

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

Congolese civil society has a long tradition of involvement in political debate, especially since the time of the National Sovereign Conference in the mid-nineties. In this relatively eclectic mix that is the civil society of today, the Development NGOs are a structured group with an organised representative network, relying on a wide decentralised network of members. This active member of civil society has, for many years, fulfilled the function of lobbyist and opinion maker for which it has now become known, especially through the role played in the Participative Analysis of Poverty conducted during the compilation of the DSCRP.

The entry point of this intervention is therefore at the level of this relationship between state and citizen, which exists through these intermediate civil society structures at both national and regional level. The concept of NGO is used in the DRC to refer to a variety of non-state actors that enjoy varying levels of both repute and quality. In this context, the strengthening of the consistency, specificity and quality of the Development NGOs must pass first of all through the capacity reinforcement strategy being co-ordinated by the national structure. The intervention also involves the current changes in state structure towards probable decentralisation and a probable increase in the opportunities for dialogue with the authorities that are now democratically elected.

The intervention postulates that strengthening the national co-ordination of these NGOs will allow the member NGOs to be supported in their capacity for calling on the public authorities and for defending their members' interests. The evaluation, principally based on the collation of qualitative data through interviews, concludes that this intervention, which works on the premise that V&A will be long lasting, is relevant. In addition, it is one of the interventions studied that is aimed most directly at vulnerable people in general: it does not relate to a specific group, but to the whole of the Congolese population living below the poverty line, without distinguishing between genres.

Efficiency

The intervention diversifies the fields in which it organises the training of trainers with a view to strengthening the capacity of the NGOs: civic education to prepare for the elections, analysis of budgetary controls, training in organic decentralisation laws, and internal exercises in good management. This training has been able to be applied specifically in:

- popular speaking platforms with electoral candidates, who were called on by the NGOs in relation to their management;
- public presentation of the way in which the NGOs are managed by the Control (Planning) Ministry, to set an example and facilitate calling on the government.

The financial resources released for this programme are still proportionally limited to the logistical costs required for working on a national programme bringing together representatives from all the provinces. The diversity of donors and their demands makes for limited harmony in the financing of the co-ordination.

It is mostly through training that the intervention ensures that the organisation is strengthened: it is a classic resource and regularly used, but its effectiveness is difficult to quantify. To reach this objective, it would perhaps be useful to think of other, more alternative approaches centred on more specific realisations: more regular facilitation, production of tools or pleading through the various CRONGD brought together, for example.

Effectiveness

Strengthening the capacities of this vast network of NGOs is an ongoing work, to which the intervention analysed here is only making a partial contribution. At national activity level, the CNONGD increases the level of the public authorities' undertakings: DSCRP, national budget, international negotiation such as APE, etc. It strengthens the NGO leaders' capacities for making pleas, which are now being addressed more specifically to the elected authorities (and specifically the Parliament).

A major restriction on this intervention is the diversity of actors in civil society. Their level of representation and finality are often called into question: a NGO as a springboard to power, a NGO as a channel for creation of personal jobs, and making organisations into the instruments that civil society wants (NGO as an actor of government programmes).

CNONGD and its member NGOs are trying to distance themselves from these criticisms, especially through providing more professional work and a greater degree of internal transparency.

Impact
This intervention has been deliberately placed in a long-term perspective the immediate impact or effect of which is often difficult to discern, especially when in a State such as the DRC, which is still very fragile, the perspective is most often one of working as a matter of urgency. This trend shows in the development of the NGOs' world. In such a situation as this, existing (or nascent) organisation are often seen to deal selectively with subjects crucial to the moment (elections, followed by decentralisation, followed by…) without a real long-term strategy. In this situation of fragility, the public authorities and the International Community also frequently call on actors in civil society for the implementation of certain programmes (especially during elections: civic education, observation etc): and this aggravates the trend towards a proliferation of networks, the emergency of new and sometimes short-lived groups or networks, and a degree of confusion and weakening in the representation of civil society.

The longer-term work within CNONGD, in the meantime, will have the effect of stabilising a network that is already well anchored locally, whose expertise is strengthened long-term (such as, for example, during the DCRSP preparatory participative analysis) and provides lobbying strategies on questions that its members have identified as being of priority.

Sustainability
The practice and tradition of involving the NGOs (and especially the development NGOs) in the debate with the authorities is reinforced by the legitimacy of the authorities; the NGOs are now calling on authorities that are required to produce reports at the end of the legislature. By itself, this new situation tends to increase the durability of these relations.
On a financial level, in contrast, co-ordination activity remains by nature dependent on outside finance; in the short and medium term it is difficult to envisage the Congolese state having sufficient means in itself to subsidise the associative world. Long experience of structuring development NGOs throughout national territory, and their permanent links with international NGOs, are elements that could ensure that their intervention lasts.

Lessons Learned
Support in the long term: In a situation dominated by urgency, continued support for CNONGD will help strengthen its capacities and enhance its legitimacy as one of the priority contacts with the public authorities. It is doubtless relevant, in the V&A support programme for a donor, to diversify its support by combining the more selective forms of support with activities clearly delineated in time and with long-term strengthening of organisations.
Internal transparency: CNONGD is working to improve transparency and standards of internal government within all the NGOs, estimating that this will strengthen their capacity for calling on the public authorities. It is difficult to assess the impact of the "force of example", but it can be estimated that this will generally reinforce the movement of the NGOs, which will be more reliably organised etc. Increasing transparency levels and standards of government within the NGOs is certainly a line to be taken into consideration by the donors.
Political involvement of NGOs: The NGOs put forward several candidates during the first democratic elections, and the phenomenon of individuals from an association gravitating into the world of politics is quite widespread. It illustrates the representation and repute of the organisations from which the candidates appear. In a fragile state, however, it raises the issue

of the civil society organisations being weakened when the best-trained or most ambitious people leave them behind.

Comments on the model of change

Working on the hypothesis that strengthened co-ordination of development NGOs improves the organisations' capacity for lobbying in the context of their calling on the State, then intervention through training and awareness activities is aimed at making these organisations more professional so that they can involve themselves in the areas of lobbying (DSCRP etc) more efficiently and concertedly and thus make a contribution to the steering of development policies.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

11.11.11: proposal for 2008-2011 CNONGD programme.
11.11.11: CNONGD data sheet.
Declaration by the DR Congo Civil Society, concerning the "re-visitation" of mining contracts, 5 May 2007.
Civil Society forum for an open society in the DRC, www.forumrdc.org

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Interview with Aleki Banywesize Chimanuka, Joint Co-ordinator 11.11.11 Contact Office, Kinshasa, 07/11/2007.
Interview with Jeannette Bintu Matabaro, President, AMED, non-CNONGD member NGO, Kinshasa, 14/12/2007.
Interview with Rigo W. Gene, Programme Manager CNONGD, Kinshasa, 08/11/2007 & 12/12/2007.
Interview with Bart Horemans, 11.11.11 Contact Office Co-ordinator, Kinshasa, 07/11/2007 & 12/12/2007.
Interview with Robert Mabala, Executive Secretary CNONGD, Kinshasa, 08/11/2007 & 01/12/2007.
Interview with Jacques Miaglia, Christian Aid Co-ordinator, Kinshasa, 12/12/2007.
Interview with Jean-Marie NKANDA, Co-ordinator of GEDI, CNONGD member NGO, Kinshasa, 12/12/2007.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"The CNONGD workshops on the stakes of decentralisation, with RECIC, the Civic Education Network in Congo, has led to our internal budget training programme; we now better understand the financial independence of the decentralised entities and can negotiate residential taxes at our communal level better" (Interview with CNONGD member NGO).
"The support of CRONGD and CNONGD allows more professionalism: they stress the importance of regular documents (annual reports), the regularity of statutory relations), and the tax obligations of NGOs. Each year they visit a number of NGOs to ensure they are being properly managed" (Interview with CNONGD member NGO).
"We were members before, and the CNONGD training helped strengthen our capacities (we have set up a mutual credit union, our member numbers have increased etc). What's missing in CNONGD, however, is a financial fund for supporting NGO members' micro-projects. For now, we're no longer involved" (Interview with non-CNONGD member NGO).
"There are lots of civil society organisation networks (CRONGD, lay NGOs with economic vocations, churches, trade unions, women's organisations etc): there are criticisms on the levels of representation of these organisations, but it often comes from those who, through their method of offering finance without discernment (WB, foreign donors), favour selective creation of new NGOs, which sometimes increases network numbers and causes weakness. CNONGD concentrated on the development NGOs and endeavours to strengthen these organisations which have direct contact with the base" (Interview with CNONGD manager).

Annex D8: Capacity building Programme for trade union - Congolese Trade Union Confederation (CSC)

I: Profile of the Intervention: The aim of this intervention is to globally reinforce the action of trade unions. In their role as representatives of the workers, defenders of the interests of one section of the population, trade unions are capable of calling on the political power and this intervention is therefore partly connected with the problem of V&A.

1. Donor Agency	The Belgian Development Co-operation (BDC)
2. Partners/implementing agency	The International Working Education Centre (IEOI) The Congo Trade Union Confederation (CSC)
3. Objectives	To strengthen the CSC's capacity for participating in Congolese social dialogue, to defend the interests of workers and to analyse the government's development plans critically. To increase the involvement of women and casual sector workers in the workings of the CSC.
4. Main CV&A and other activities	Training sessions. Production of educational and teaching tools. Creation of provincial advice and legal defence centres. Conducting surveys and gathering data on social indicators. Awareness and claims campaign.
5. Target Group/ Beneficiaries	The permanent members and business delegates of the CSC trade unions, in their provincial organisations (the 11 provinces).
6. Key linkages	Regular contact with other actors in civil society, therefore action in fields close to Project No. 7 (CNONGD), without formal link.
7. Duration	Five years.
8. Starting date	January 2007 (start date for current programme, which was preceded by an initial partnership programme between SCS and IEOI from 2003 to 2006)
9. Total budget	EUR1,590,000

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

The work of trade unions is directly linked to the socio-economic changes that the Congolese public is expecting now that the electoral process has allowed the appointment of elected public authorities. The "socio-economic dividends" of peace and democracy are a matter or urgency for the population, given its level of extreme poverty. Strengthening the trade unions' capacities for intervention and negotiation in this difficult situation is the start point for this programme. An embryonic social dialogue was maintained during the war and the transition period, plurality of trade unions started again in the mid-1990s and there is the legal framework for such discussion. Moreover, the trade unions have had a presence within the civil society delegation during negotiations with the authorities for the last ten years.

On the basis of the project analysis, the general assessment report on trade union co-operation for 2006, and data obtained through interviews, this intervention therefore appears relevant to the strengthening of V&A in a Congolese context even though it is confined to a specific

domain. A strictly limited part of the intervention is aimed more directly at two specific vulnerable groups: casual sector workers and women.

Efficiency
Trade unions have developed an internal basic training programme (the role of the trade union, capacities for negotiation etc). On the basis of this internal training experience, the programme is centred on workers' capacity to defend themselves, the capacity for analysing development plans, and the capacity for analysing the effects of deregulation and globalisation (privatisation, takeover bids etc). In 2007, about 14 training sessions of this type were conducted, involving more than five hundred delegates and permanent members.

The delay in the provision of finance (often granted during the second half of the year) compels the trade unions to provide most of their training in a concentrated burst towards the end of the year, making the work less efficient. In addition, as for the support for CNONGD, it has been noticed that it is most often the training that is used as the classic means of reinforcing the organisation. An alternative approach in this context would be to use resources that lead to more specific actions: local legal cells and social indicator surveys are examples that have been found in the technical file for the project but have not, as yet, been anything like systematically applied.

Effectiveness
Training has helped improve trade union delegates' knowledge and thus given them means of acting in their place of negotiation: that is, at company level and in the structures set up for discussions with the State (such as COPIREP, the Pilot Committee for Public Enterprise Reform).

Calling on the government is a process directly applicable to the management of public enterprises: non-payment of salaries, recourse to "the employer's discretionary power", and failure by these enterprises to fulfil their tasks, are specific failings by the public enterprises on which the delegates are calling on the basis of their training.

There are numerous obstacles to achieving results: a trade union presence limited because of the low number of formal salaried jobs; the need for a more organised presence in the public sector (the main job provider), which is characterised by considerable levels of inertia and corruption and lack of transparency in trade union representation; lack of discussion combined with competition with other actors in society; an individual and collective weakness that limits the militancy of the delegates who are distracted by the quest to find enough to live on (unpaid salaries); and the level of social claims that can be made against enterprises that are greatly weakened economically (choice often limited between very bad working conditions and simple loss of job).

Of the objectives set by this intervention, the provision of training is the most affected, as the creation of study cells and databanks on job situations, and the production of educational documents, has been very limited mostly because of the delay in receiving finance.

Impact
Where training has been given, "*we can express the hope that the discussion, negotiation and conflict resolution skills acquired through the trade union co-operation training will be profitably used in reducing the post-electoral tensions, which are not in the interests of the*

trade union cause"[113]. However, the impact of training on changes in behaviour remains difficult to verify, generally speaking.

This intervention should, however, help galvanise the trade unions' action following the period of war: mobilising and calling on the government in connection with the adverse effect of deregulation and privatisation policies on job prospects, mismanagement in public enterprises, the proposed reform of public enterprise, and the government's budgetary choices. This mobilisation has led to a change in behaviour by the public authorities, which are now starting to join with, or at least consult, the trade unions when decisions are taken in relation to employment policy. This progress is however not yet complete; the trade unions' points of view are being heard, but the authorities still only very rarely take them into consideration.

Trade unions' capacity for negotiation is also being restored: 93 collective work agreements currently exist, signed by the CSC, which has set itself a target of 168 signed agreements by the end of the programme in 2011. On the basis of the latest social elections, the CSC is now the principal Congolese configuration, and therefore presides over the Congolese Trades Union Congress and has additional mobilisation capacity. This strengthening of trade unions is one element of the strength that needs to be established between workers, employers and public authorities in order to ensure redistribution of the future growth of the DRC.

Sustainability
The durability of the work involved in this intervention depends on the trade union's capacity for real development of the programme's other assets alongside training: study groups at provincial level, production of teaching documents, and creation of a databank. Training by itself is not sufficient to guarantee long-term reinforcement of the trade unions' capacity for calling on the authorities.

The fact that Congolese legislation provides a more precise definition of the conditions and methods for acknowledging trade unions and for social dialogue works in favour of the stability and durability of trade union activities. The diversification of the areas of activity in which the trade union is present is another factor on which the durability of the effects of this intervention depends; action started in the casual sector is pursuing this objective. Finally, stronger relations with other actors in civil society and a clarification of the roles and relations of these actors will help further stabilise the effects of the intervention; this aspect of the intervention is probably not sufficiently developed.

Lessons Learned
Link between economics and politics: The shortcomings in public enterprise management shown up by this intervention stress the need for thought on methods of government in both the political and the economic sector. This is an essential element of long-term government, which requires a real acknowledgement of economic and social rights, which are still too weak in a country such as the DRC, where the militancy and mobility of the trade union delegates are sapped by their extreme personal poverty (the search for income in place of their unpaid salaries) and by the great economic weakness of the enterprises (social demands that risk causing the enterprise to close completely).

[113] SPF Foreign Affairs : Belgian Trade Union Co-operation 2003-2005 – DRC evaluation mission report – Rwanda , May 2006, André Niemegeers & Floriane Bacconnier, Ramboll Management. p.60

Diversity of actors in civil society: while they deal with similar themes (globalisation, deregulation etc), trade unions and NGOs still appear to be working in parallel, each expressing a level of suspicion of the other. The consistency of each civil society actor's strategy is a short-term stake that is not taken sufficiently into account by donors in the DRC.

Comments on the model of change

The programme works specifically on the hypothesis that the organisation's capacity for negotiation involves strengthening its delegates' and permanent members' capacities by means of training. This should allow an increase in capacity for calling not only on employers but also on the public authorities. By being more active in terms of demands as well as negotiation, trade unions should be capable of bringing in a power relationship that allows better distribution of the rewards of the country's socio-economic development.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

IEOI: Five-year programme 2007-2011 – CSC Congo – Submitted to the DGCD – Ministry for Co-operation in Development, Brussels, 2006.
SPF Foreign Affairs – Belgian Trade Union Co-operation 2003-2005 – DRC Evaluation Mission Report – Rwanda, May 2006, André Niemegeers & Floriane Bacconnier, Ramboll Management.
SPF Foreign Affairs – Trade Union Co-operation Programme Evaluation 2003-2005, July 2006, Ramboll Management.

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Interview with Constantin Biuma, CSC Secretary, Mbuji-Mayii, 08/12/2007.
Interview with Karin Deboey Karin, CSC-B, International Relations, 05/11/2007.
Interview with Symphorien Dunia Symphorien, CSC President, 05/11/2007 & 10/11/2007.
Interview with Basile Kamanga Basile, CSC Secretary, Mbuji-Mayii, 08/12/2007.
Interview with Martin Lofete Nkaka, Training Programme Manager, CSC, Kinshasa, 10/11/2007, 03/12/2007 & 11/12/2007.
Interview with Jean Mayombe, Vice-President, Public Sector, CSC, Kinshasa, 11/12/2007.
Interview with Hilaire Mbuandi, Vice-President, CSC, Kinshasa, 10/11//2007.
Interview with Célestin Mwambay, Vice-President, CSC, Kinshasa, 11/12/2007.
Discussion group with 22 delegates and permanent members of the public sector, 11/12/2007.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"Despite the mobilisation, the calls and the demonstrations, the public enterprise reform text was kept in its initial version. The demands of the trade unions were not taken into account, even though the State has created a permanent framework for dialogue" (Participant in discussion group in Kinshasa)
"All trade unions are also within civil society, but they need to have a more representative place in it; they have a less purely political vision than the NGOs." (Secretary in Mbuji-Mayii)
"There are insufficient resources: 120 people trained out of the 3,000 delegates in our province is not enough. We keep up our activities between training sessions (information sessions, visits etc) but we need to be able to go further." (Secretary in Mbuji-Mayii)
"The first results, although minimal, have been gathered in; the OFIDA has agreed to pay a premium to Bracongo, the delegates have obtained a rise, a thirteenth month for the very first time…" (Secretary in Mbuji-Mayii)
"I have more confidence in myself, but when my employer is in front of me, he sees that I know the subject…" (Participant in discussion group in Kinshasa)
"It's amazing that a problem of such importance to us (our country's economy) as the APE is still unknown in our enterprises. It's a huge subject but we've been able to popularise it somewhat with the documents that have been received…" (Participant in discussion group in Kinshasa)

Annex D9: Strengthening the rule of law and restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas-Congo and Bandundu

I: Profile of the Intervention. The action under this intervention is mainly concentrated on aspects of P & I, specifically in the area of Justice.

1. Donor Agency	The Belgian Development Co-operation (BDC) DFID is financing a comparable RCN programme in Katanga province[114]
2. Partners/ implementing agency	RCN – Réseau des Citoyens – Citizen's Network
3. Objectives	1) To improve the capacities of legal professionals and increase their level of responsibility. 2) To improve the legal knowledge of resource personnel and administrative and customary law authorities, and increase the population's awareness. 3) To strengthen the links between the legal system and the population (meeting and dialogue areas).
4. Main CV&A and other activities	1) Ongoing training of legal personnel and, alongside, training in the rudiments of law for resource personnel in order to make calling on the legal system easier for the population. 2) Meeting forum between legal staff and resource personnel given the training. 3) "Open door" days for legal institutions. 4) Popularisation campaign for concepts of law: theatre plays, brochures, cartoon strips, radio and TV broadcasts.
5. Target Group / Beneficiaries	Legal professionals: judges, *police judiciaire*, lawyers etc. Resource personnel (chosen for their social standing from managers of associations, regional chiefs, religious leaders etc).
6. Key linkages	Project 10: Support programme for development initiatives in the Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke (PAIDECO-Kin).
7. Duration	Two years.
8. Starting date	2006 (preceded by renewable annual finance from 2001 onwards)
9. Total budget	EUR2,108,000

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

At a time when political institutions are being elected democratically and thus asserting their legitimacy, the concept of "rule of law" is still largely discredited in the DRC, especially because of the dysfunctional nature of the justice system and a predominance of impunity. The intervention has encountered some of the many reasons for the dysfunction in Congolese justice: the lack of skills on the part of legal staff (lack of initial and ongoing training), absence of collaboration between various courts, and problems in accessing justice for a

[114] The programme realised by RCN in Katanga is designed to last two years (May 2005 – April 2007) with a subsidy of €1,453,500 from DFID.

population that is often the victim, through ignorance, of abuse of the system by the judicial authorities and the police.

The programme works on the hypothesis that a population better informed of its rights can better protect itself against the unfair practices of the public authority (such as arbitrary arrests) and that better training of people responsible for administering justice can help them understand that their essential role is to meet the population's real need for better protection.

On the basis of the project documents, the results of the Formation aux Notions Elémentaires de Droit (FNED) assessment and the data obtained through interviews with resource personnel, our evaluation estimates that this project is relevant in V&A terms, especially in that it realises the link between participation and accountability on various levels. The intervention in this case is limited, but it will be useful to draw on the lessons learnt for a more generalised application right across Congolese territory.

Efficiency
The intervention is working in the various areas of legal relations: capacity building of legal personnel, civic education for civil society leaders and resource personnel, and information on general issues of law with the population in general (information on the scope of customary law, which is still being called upon through force of habit and proximity when it is often less beneficial and contrary to the actual law).

The intervention concentrates on bringing the citizen and the legal system together through basic work in the field in a number of provinces (Kinshasa, Bas Congo and Katanga through the similar intervention financed by DFID). An alternative approach could have been activity at the central level in the Ministry of Justice, as was taken by a support project from the European Union (Rejusco). This, however, would have required enormous financial outlay that not even the European project could release (it is not active everywhere in the territory, but concentrates on the Eastern part of the country).

Effectiveness
By calling specifically on local legal personnel (lawyers, *judiciary police* officers etc) close to the population and therefore more easily accessible to it, the intervention is more likely to realise its objectives. For the resource personnel, the intervention initially called on CRONG and then on NGOs specialising in human rights issues to identify the people whom the population recognised as being representative.

The obstacles, however, are many: bad operation of the formal justice system (with impunity, corruption and nepotism), wide recourse to customary justice even in the cities, still not enough awareness or willingness of the need to have the security sector mentality modified (role of protector, not predator, of the population), lack of resources allocated to the restoration of the legal system in general (lack of reference works or infrastructure), legal staff often paid insufficiently or not at all (which feeds and reinforces corruption on a wide scale), and general suspicion on the part of the population as regards justice in general and the security forces in particular.

Impact
Those involved in the project have noted that training the professional staff has had a more positive impact on the *judiciary police* officers than on the magistrates, who are less ready to

alter their behaviour. Thanks to the project, police officers now have access to the text of laws that they were unable to consult before.

The workshops that bring legal personnel into contact with citizens' representatives have allowed specific questions of law to be addressed together, the other person's point of view to be discussed and understood, doubts to be dispelled and confidence to be strengthened. In these workshops, the legal personnel justify their approaches, and the civil society representatives ask for reports but also better understand where the levels of responsibility lie. This strategy of proximity strengthens the interpersonal relations between legal professionals and citizens, relations that reduce the practice of abuse of power. The communication campaigns are giving the populations a better understanding of the relevance and value of certain elements of actual law in comparison with customary law.

Sustainability
The fact that training leads to changes in attitude and behaviour on a daily basis and strengthens the closeness of relations between those responsible for upholding the law and those subject to it, is an indicator of durability in itself.

In contrast, the continuation of the training and workshops still depends wholly on outside finance; the Ministry of Justice does not appear to have included this process as part of its global strategy, which still concentrates heavily on the restoration of general infrastructures and the operational reorganisation of the courts. On the other hand, the standard for a security sector (including police, army and justice) that serves the population rather than holding it down appears to be being introduced more and more, and is now a constituent element of rule of law even though it is still being applied haphazardly in many places.

Lessons Learned
Force of proximity (Bottom up): Starting with specific cases, by training law professionals and those subject to the law together, allows immediate appropriation and involves the population to a significant extent. How these results born of specific interventions can be transposed into the global strategy of the Ministry of Justice is a question that this intervention has left unanswered, but cannot be avoided if the changes of policy and behaviour are to be generalised. This question must be addressed by the donors wishing to maintain a real change in the Congolese justice system.
Establishing relations: Creating structured mechanisms for bringing together groups (legal professionals and general public) between which suspicion is deep-rooted will allow methods of mutual understanding, viewing the other person's situation and placing oneself progressively in that situation, to be established. These mechanisms refer partly to the logic of the truth and reconciliation committees.

Comments on the model of change
Working on the hypothesis that a population that knows its rights better can defend itself better, the project is developing training in areas of justice and bringing together the professionals responsible for upholding the law and those subject to it. By giving the population a better perception of the increased value of justice and the responsibilities that weigh on the professionals, the project allows abuse to be reduced and confidence in justice to be strengthened.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

Evaluation FNED – RCN/RDC Kin East – Impacts and Increasing Effects of FNED.
RCN – Democratic Republic of Congo – "Support for reinforcement of the rule of law and the restoration of justice in Katanga", 2006-7 programme – intermediate activity report for the period 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006.
RCN – Democratic Republic of Congo – "Support for reinforcement of the rule of law and the restoration of justice in the City of Kinshasa and the Provinces of Bas Congo and Bandundu", 2006-7 programme – intermediate activity report for the period 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006.

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Interview with Aurore Decarnières, Deputy Co-ordinator, RCN, Kinshasa, 08/11/2007 & 13/12/2007.
Interview with Gaétan Duhamel, Co-ordinator, RCN, Kinshasa, 08/11/2007.
Interview with Michèle Laborde, Legal Specialist, RCN, Kinshasa, 13/12/2007.
Interview with Benoît Mudindi, Educational Tools Manager, RCN, Kinshasa, 13/12/2007.
Interview with Odon Mupepe, Project Manager, RCN, Kinshasa, 13/12/2007.
Interview with Harriet Solloway, Legal Specialist, MONUC HQ, Kinshasa, 13/12/2007.
Observation: Workshop for 30 people (10 police officers, 18 civil society representatives and 2 moderators), Kisenso, 13/12/2007.
Focus Group with 9 trainees (police and civil society), Kinshasa, 13/12/2007.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"This training is strengthening us in our role as a human rights NGO; we are being called on in the districts to witness the correctness of the proceedings during certain arrests" (Participant in trainees' discussion group, a civil society representative).
"By addressing problems of justice at communal and local level, we are showing people that they can influence their own situation; the population has moved away a bit from the facile logic of the State should do this, the State should do that. Also, people are learning to know each other, and it's difficult to practice arbitrary arrest when you are known to the people" (Resource Personnel interviewee, RCN Kinshasa).
"Cases are being submitted to us, the law is being re-read, we are being asked to help settle questions of succession, land law etc" (Participant in trainees' discussion group, a civil society representative).
"A theatre piece on taxation was stopped by the Burgomaster of Kisenso as it was taking too much tax, a fact that was eventually established by an authority for five Presidential building sites. The local authorities still showed some reflex suspicion when the supreme authority of the President of the Republic was mentioned, even though it was not critical. We had to alter the theatre piece scenario before we could go on" (Resource Personnel interviewee, Kinshasa).
Even thieves run to the police when the population chases them, because they know that the police will be less arbitrary than the population" (Participant in trainees' discussion group, a Judiciary Police Officer).

Annex D10: Support programme for development initiatives in the Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke (PAIDECO-Kin)

I: Profile of the Intervention

This intervention provides general development support for two communities in Kinshasa with the aim of improving access to basic social services, combating erosion and energising economic activity. Some aspects of the intervention are more directly linked to aspects of V&A: 1) creation of a discussion mechanism between representatives of the population and the local authorities, 2) restoration of communal infrastructures and provision of district administrative personnel, and 3) promotion of a district-wide communications policy.

1. Donor Agency	The Belgian Development Co-operation (BDC)
2. Partners/ implementing agency	The Belgian Technical Co-operation (BTC) The Ministry of Plan The Ministry of Internal Affairs The Governorate of Kinshasa The Communities of Kisenso and Kimbanseke
3. Objectives	To provide long-term improvements in living conditions for the populations of Kisenso and Kimbanseke, through improved local government.
4. Main CV&A and other activities	1. Implementation of communal and local development plan through participative operation of LDCs and CDCs. 2. Restoration of public and Para public infrastructures. 3. Promotion of local development. 4. Capacity building of local actors' for management. 5. Promotion of public communication. 6. Provision of community staff.
5. Target Group/ Beneficiaries	The population and district authorities of two semi-urban communities on the edge of Kinshasa: - Kisenso: a community of 230,000 inhabitants, the poorest in the capital. - Kimbanseke: a community of 700,000 inhabitants, the most populous in the capital but one of the poorest.
6. Key linkages	Support for reinforcement of rule of law and restoration of justice in the DRC – RCN Kinshasa/Bas Congo.
7. Duration	Four years
8. Starting date	January 2006.
9. Total budget	EUR5,950,000[115]

II: Overall Assessment

Relevance

PAIDECO is an intervention that has provided support for community development provided by the Belgian Co-operation Survival Fund in Kisenso Community since 2001. This

[115] This intervention forms part of a global programme finance by the Belgian Co-operation, bringing together three PAIDECO (Kinshasa, Bas Congo/Bandundu and Katanga), which together account for a €18,400,000. The three interventions are each developing at their own rate. The evaluation relates to the Kinshasa PAIDECO only.

continuity has allowed specific account to be taken of the nature of the environment in which the intervention is being conducted.
Beyond the logic of participation and strengthening the capacities of local actors, already promoted in one of the two communities since 2001, the PAIDECO project has integrated itself into the political and institutional logic chosen by the DRC, to develop **decentralised administration of the territory**.

The PAIDECO project thus uses participative processes of local development to test and pre-configure possible future decentralisation methods that may arise from the legal tests adopted on the subject of decentralisation. It therefore looks to reinforce:

- a strategy of giving local actors greater responsibility and strengthening their capacities;
- a new joint work relationship with representatives of the central power, concentrated on rendering of accounts to the population;
- bringing about consistency of community policy between infra-community (district) choices and supra-communal policies (province and central administration);
- respect for principles, linked to democratic government, which themselves have inspired and formed the basis of the option of decentralised administration of the territory.

This project is being implemented with a power level, namely the community, which traditionally has had very little autonomy, capacity or responsibility since the DRC became independent. It is working in the poorest areas of Kinshasa, and this is both an opportunity (high demand) and a constraint (huge needs, very difficult logistics and conditions of intervention).

The intervention works on the hypothesis that the application of the decentralisation principles adopted in the DRC's constitution will be effective in the short or medium term.
By comparing the analysis of the project documents with the data obtained through interviews and discussion groups, we deem that this project is relevant. Its aim is to improve local government by acting on the way in which development plans are managed. The project will affect vulnerable sections of the population, namely the poorest districts of Kinshasa and women's groups organised into NGOs etc., without concentrating on one or another vulnerable group in particular.

Efficiency
From the outset, the PAIDECO intervention has invested most of its means in improving social and public communal infrastructures. This strategy has allowed the immediate needs of the population (schools, health centres, anti-erosion measures, community halls etc) to be met. On this basis, the discussion structures set up (local development committees or LDCs, and community development committees or CDCs) have been able to concentrate directly on problems particular to the population.

The resources reserved for the operation of participation and government mechanisms (operation of LDCs and CDCs, community-wide communication, capitalisation and sharing of experience) can thus appear limited, and this evident limitation has been criticised by the members of the discussion groups. Additional means for the direct function of the community structures have been provided more recently, with the provision of community staff. An alternative approach could have been to introduce the community discussion mechanisms by means of law and then implement them. The pragmatic approach adopted here is probably the most effective, insofar as it allows greater involvement of the local population.

Effectiveness

The PAIDECO counts on the good function of the participative local and community-wide discussion mechanism to bring about changes in policy, behaviour and practice. This objective has been partly reached, in terms of behaviour and practices, through an approach that is more objective, more collective and more structured in terms of community development choices.

There are however still a number of obstacles to fulfilment of this intervention:

- the difficulty of managing the intervention under Belgian State control;
- the fact that the district authorities are still appointed and not elected[116];
- uncertainty over the way in which the lessons from this pilot project will be taken into account for possible general application (will the functions of the CDC be absorbed into the elected district councils of the future, or be transformed into permanent consultative committees as the project suggests?).

Impact

The PAIDECO intervention has certainly allowed real participative choice in development investments at both district and community level. This function is in itself a process of learning about local government: democratic choice of projects, objective listing of priorities, use of the procurement contract procedure, publicising of decisions and reasons for choice etc. The intervention also introduced the practice of communication at community level (publication of magazine, radio broadcasts, public poster campaign etc), even though the level of communication is, for some civil society representatives, still insufficient and too much imbued with the local authorities' point of view. This communication strategy has been adopted more widely by the CTB, which is following a policy of transparency (or accountability) in its own work. Here it is integrating an innovative dimension in terms of V&A, stressing that the requirement for accountability is not limited only to public authorities but also affects others involved in the projects.

The identification analyses conducted prior to this intervention highlighted the impact of previous support (2001-2005) provided in the community of Kisenso only: improvements in access to water and education were much more significant in Kisenso than in Kimbanseke, where the project did not begin until 2006. In addition, a significant difference was also observed in perception of well being and in increased confidence in the district authorities[117]. The intervention, by continuing with this project in Kisenso and widening it to include Kimbanseke, will further increase this type of effect.

The impact of this intervention on changes in behaviour in general will only be a real possibility of this pilot experiment is taken into account by the national authorities and the donors with a view to applying it generally.

[116] The first community elections in the DRC are planned for some time in 2008.

[117] Changes from 2002 to 2005:
Access to water : Kisenso 68% → 81%, Kimbanseke 59 % → 55 %.
Perception of well-being: Kisenso 65% → 75%, Kimbanseke 62 % → 61 %.
Confidence in district agencies: Kisenso 13% → 17%, Kimbanseke 12 % → 8 %

Sustainability
The restoration and construction of community infrastructures and mechanisms for discussion and communication between the district authorities and the population, are such as to increase the durability of the project.
This durability, however, depends on at least three factors:

- the local elections, planned for 2008, which may call the discussion mechanisms into question when the local councils are set up;
- the political and administrative capacity of the Minister for the Interior to generalise the setting-up of local discussion mechanisms in keeping with the context of this intervention;
- the budgetary impact of decentralisation on local finance, which should allow the communities to offset the loss of external finance in the future.

Lessons Learned
Specific development action: In a society beset with great poverty, the taking into account of essential needs is a mobilisation factor that will galvanise the V&A realisation process. This will require a strategy from the donors; it is a better idea to conduct V&A support interventions dedicated exclusively to this problem, or to provide V&A support in the context of more global projects?
Impact of legislative changes: The adoption of legislation that transforms the political system could bring about a desire for change, but the change could be difficult to implement when the administrative mechanisms are not strengthened. Here, against a background of serious poverty in the Congolese administration, the first texts on decentralisation have created expectations, at both provincial and local level, which have not been met. Combining legislative change with administrative capacity for implementation is certainly a crucial factor to be taken into account by the donors.
Limitation of local intervention and "pilot activities": The aim of the PAIDECO exceeds the means and responsibilities of both the project itself and the local authorities (certain parties in the community development plan depend on action to be taken at provincial or national level); the participative method allows the actors in the project a better perception of respective responsibilities but also leads to frustration in that the higher levels responsible are not directly involved in the intervention. This alerts the donors to the need, when supporting pilot interventions such as PAIDECO, to support a programme for integrating these initiatives into a wider legislative and development strategy at the same time.

Comments on the model of change
Working on the hypothesis that participative management of development plans at community level can improve their effectiveness; the intervention has increased the number of places for discussion and communication between population and public authorities. This step has brought the parties closer together and allowed better understanding of mutual responsibility. On the basis of this improvement in confidence, the population is bow better informed and more involved in choices relating to development and taken at local level.

III: Model of Change



IV: Relevant Primary and Secondary data collected during the field work

1. Key documents consulted

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DGCD: DRC Strategic Note, December 2002.
DGCD: The Belgian Co-operation for Development in the DRC, October 2007.
Nzela Ya Lobi, The Journal for the Belgian Co-operation in East Kinshasa, No. 3, November-December 2007.

2. Quantitative and qualitative data consulted and/or collected

Interview with Mussa Abdul Razac Mussa, Burgomaster of Community of Kisenso, 05/12/2007.
Interview with Hervé Corbel, Technical Assistant, Kinshasa, 05/12/2007.
Interview with Erwin Dickens, Principal Technical Assistant, Kinshasa, 06/11/2007 & 05/12/2007.
Interview with Marie Nyange, Adviser, Kinshasa, 05/12/2007.
Discussion Group with 24 representatives of the Kisenso District Development Committee and the Mission District Local Development Committee, Kisenso, 05/12/2007.
Discussion Group with 20 representatives of project beneficiaries and civil society organisations in Kisenso, 05/12/2007.

3. Quotes from relevant stakeholders and key informants

"The public authorities have taken note of the operation of the CCDs and CLDs. It's up to the Ministry of the Interior to continue and recognise these structures now and in the future. It's more of a political issue, which has more to do with the department of the co-operation attaché from the Belgian Embassy" (Technical Assistant, CTB).
"The participation by the population's representatives on the CLDs and CCD is still voluntary; for us who have to survive on a daily basis, half a day or a whole say spent at a meeting without income is hard, there's no motivation to do it" (Representative on CCD discussion group).
"The training that we follow is positive, but sometimes people are suspicious of us. There is still much to do with regard to local authorities, who are not yet used to change and are suspicious of it" (Beneficiary during group discussion).

Annex E: List of people consulted/interviewed

Representatives of public authorities

Ministry of Plan	BONGE GIBENDE Benjamin, Director of External Resources
	BONGOLO LEBADU C.D., Coordination of the Technical Assistance
	KANENE MUKWANGA Théo, Division of NGO and civil society
	KAMITATU ETSU, Minister of Plan
	KASUMBU BORREY Armand, Chief of Cabinet
Ministry of Human Rights	LOKWA ILWALONA Eugène, Minister for Human Rights
	OLENA OKONDJI Basile, Chief of Cabinet
Ministry of Internal Affairs	ETCHUMBA Albert, Advisor, Division for the decentralisation
Ministry of Justice	LATEBO EKWA Inier, Legal Advisor
National Assembly	KALENGAY Willy Albert, Political Advisor
	LYBIA DJUBU Norbert, Advisor
	MOLAMBA M, Study Department
	RICHE Manya, Advisor of the chairman
	TSHISUAKA KABANDA Constantin, General Secretary
	VUNDUAWE te PEMEKO Felix, Member of the Assembly
Senate	KENGO wa DONDO Léon, Chairman
	MASIKA KATSUVA Martine, General Secretary
	MUTSINGA Modeste, Rapporteur, Former chairman of HAM
	MWEMBO MUKISHI Jean Claude, Communications Advisor
HAM	KAMBALE Esdras, Chairman a.i., National Office
	MUKAMBILWA Primo, Vice Chairman a.i., National Office
	MUKUNA Eddy, Advisor, National Office
Provincial Autorities	ILUNGA MBIDI Kabala, Chairman, Provincial Assembly, Mbuji Mayi.
	NGOY KASANJI Alphonse, Governor, Province of Kasaï Oriental, Mbuji Mayi.
	NGALULA Félicité, Questeur, Assemblée provinciale, Mbuji Mayi.
	NUMBI Alidor, Secrétaire, Assemblée provinciale, Mbuji Mayi.
	SHUNGU Lucie, Vice-Présidente, Assemblée provinciale, Mbuji Mayi.

International Governmental & Multilateral Partners

BDC	CARTIER Paul, Senior Cooperation Advisor, Belgian Embassy
	GALLEZ Alain, Cooperation Advisor, Belgian Embassy
	GODFROID Ivan, Conflict Prevention Division, HQ
	MAYEMBA Célio, Cooperation Deputy Advisor, Belgian Embassy
BTC	BOEVE Marie Christine, Communication Department, HQ
	DEMEURE Manolo, Resident Representative
	FRANCOYS Michel, Operation Department, HQ
	MESSIAEN Laurent, Senior Technical Advisor, Civil Service Reform
	SACRE Carol, Communication Department, HQ
CIDA	SAINT LAURENT Luc, Second Secretary, Embassy of Canada
DFID	ABBOT Joanne, Social Development Adviser, British Embassy
	BAL-MAYEL Adi, Programme Officer, British Embassy
	BLAKE Oliver, Governance Advisor, British Embassy
	DISASI Claude, Advisor, British Embassy
	MABAYA Jean-Paul, Assistant Governance Adviser, British Embassy
	MAGONGO Bonaventure, Advisor, British Embassy
EU	POLARA Teresa, Kinshasa Office
FRANCE	DUARTE Loïc, Advisor, French Embassy
MONUC	AMANI Amadou, Advisor, Rule of Law, Kinshasa Office
	NDIAYE Raoul, Coordinator, Electoral Division, Kinshasa Office
SIDA	ETZELL Christina, First Secretary, Swedish Embassy
	HELLGREN Anders, Country Program Coordinator, Africa, HQ
	LADEBORN Eva, Desk Officer DRC, Headquarter
	PALMGREN Asa, Development Officer, Swedish Embassy
	THUNBERG Jenny, Program Officer, Democratic Governance, HQ
UNDP	BAILLY Elisabeth, HR Department, Kinshasa Office
	KALASI NGAY Guy, Program Officer, Governance, Kinshasa Office
	KAROUNGA Keita, Team Leader Governance, Kinshasa Office
	MUKOKO Daniel, Advisor, Political Unit, Kinshasa Office
USAID	ADAMS Kaya, Democracy and Governance Officer, Kinshasa Office

International NGOs

11.11.11	BANYWESIZE CHIMANUKA Aleki, Deputy Coordinator, Kinshasa
	HOREMANS Bart, Coordinator of the Liaison office, Kinshasa
	VERLEYEN Han, Africa Desk Officer Africa, HQ
Broederlijk Delen	CALMEYN Stefaan, Desk Officer Africa, HQ
Christian Aid	MIAGLIA, Jacques, Coordinator DRC
IEOI	DEBOEY Karin, International Relations, CSC, HQ
	MUSABYIMANA Tatien, Desk Officer Africa, WSM, HQ
	ROUSSEAU Véronique, International Relations, CSC, HQ
RCN	DUHAMEL Gaétan, Coordinator, Kinshasa

Civil Society Organisations

CNONG	MABALA Robert, Executive Secretary
CSC	DUNIA Symphorien, Chairman
	KIPULU KATANI Angélique, Member of the Ececutive Board
	LOFETE Martin, Vice Chairman in charge of the training pogram
	MBUANDI Hilaire, Vice Chairman
LIGUE DES ELECTEURS	BANZA Sabin, Vice Chairman, Kinshasa
	NGUYI Raphaël, in charge of relations with partners, Kinshasa
RODHECIC	MINANI BIHUZO Rigobert, Coordinator of the Jeremie Group, Kinshasa
3TAMIS	MWEZE Franck, Coordinator, Bukavu

Resources Persons

DSCRP	KALONJI NTALAJA, Coordinator, Kinshasa
SENAREC	TANSIA Michel, Coordinator, Kinshasa
NADYC	MBAMBI MAZEBO Pierre, Secrétaire Permanent, Kinshasa
CENADEP	HAMULI KABARHUZA Baudouin, Directeur Général, Kinshasa

Project Stakeholders

Radio Okapi	BA Amadou, Head Radio Okapi, Mbuji Mayi
	1 FOCUS GROUP with 6 radio listeners in Mubji Mayi
	1 FOCUS GROUP with 5 radio listeners in Kinshasa
AIT	BANZA KAMUELA Ghislain, Coordinator, BIEL, Mbuji Mayi
	BUBAKA Bonani, National Expert, UNDP/AIT, Kinshasa
	KAMUANYA Christine, Member, CVR, Mbuji Mayi
	MBAYA MBABU Célestin, Member, CVR, Mbuji Mayi
	MUISANGIE Marie Thérèse, Chairman, CVR, Mbuji Mayi
	MUTOMBO HANSHI Faustin, Coordinator, HAM, Mbuji Mayi
	NGOLO KAUMBU Sophie, Member, CVR, Mbuji Mayi
	NGWAZA Marc, Consultant, UNDP/AIT, Kinshasa
	STROUX Danielle, Technical Advisor, UNDP/AIT, Kinshasa
	TSHIBONDO MUTSHITA Michel, Chairman, CELC, Mbuji Mayi
	TSHIONGO, Stanislas, Coordinator, ONDH, Mbuji Mayi
	TSHISWAKA Hubert, Coordinator CEI, Mbuji Maji
EISA's support for elections.	LUBAMBA Hector, expert, EISA, Kinshasa
	TOHBI Vincent, Resident Director, EISA, Kinshasa
Support SFCG/Centre Lokolé	BANZA KAMUELA Ghislain, Director, Radio Fraternité and Association Congolaise de Presse, Mbuji Mayi
	NSIMBA Sosthène Serge, Program Officer, Lokole Center, Kinshasa
	NTUMBA Cédric, Director, Radio Mont Carmel, Mbuji Mayi
	SLACHMULLDER Lena, Coordinator SFCG, Kinshasa
	2 FOCUS GROUP with radio listeners in Mubji May and in Kinshasa (see above)
WWICS Initiative	ZACHARIAH George, Governance Unit, UNDP, Kinshasa
GW – Link natural ressources exploitation and conflict	MWAMBA Nestor, Project Officer, CRONG, Mbuji Mayi
	NGONDE Amigo, ASADHO
	NGONGO René, Coordinator, OCEAN, Kinshasa
	TERSTAKIAN Carina, Lead Campaigner RDC, GW HQ (telephone interview)
Support of CNONG	BINTU MATABARO Jeanette, Chairman, AMED, Kinshasa
	NKANDA, Jean-Marie, Coordinator, GEDI, Kinshasa
	GENE W. Rigo, Program Officer, CNONG, Kinshasa

Training program of CSC	BIUMA Constantin, Secretary, CSC, Mbuji Mayi
	KAMANGA Basile, Secretary, CSC, Mbuji Mayi
	LOFETE Martin, in charge of the training program, CSC, Kinshasa
	MAYOMBE Jean, Vice-Chairman, Public Sector, CSC, Kinshasa
	MBUANDI Hilaire, Vice-Chairman, CSC, Kinshasa
	MWAMBAY Célestin, Vice-Chairman, CSC, Kinshasa
	1 GROUP DISCUSSION with 22 people (delegates and permanent members of the Trade Union in the Public Sector)
RCN	DECARNIERES Aurore, Deputy Coordinator, RCN, Kinshasa
	LABORDE Michèle, Legal expert, RCN, Kinshasa
	MUDINDI Benoît, in charge of pedagogy, RCN, Kinshasa
	MUPEPE Odon, Project Officer, RCN, Kinshasa
	SOLLOWAY Harriet, Rule of Law, MONUC HQ, Kinshasa
	1 OBSERVATION : workshop with 30 people (10 policemen, 18 representatives of civil society and 2 moderators)
	1 FOCUS GROUP with 9 training beneficiaries (policemen, civil society)
PAIDECO	ABDUL RAZAC Mussa, Mayor of Kisenso City
	CORBEL Hervé, Technical Advisor, PAIDECO, Kinshasa
	DICKENS Erwin, Senior Technical Advisor, PAIDECO, Kinshasa
	NYANGE Marie, Advisor, PAIDECO, Kinshasa
	1 GROUP DISCUSSION : 24 people of the local council of Kisenso
	1 GROUP DISCUSSION : 20 beneficiaries and civil societies of Kisenso

Participants of the Restitution Workshop

ADAMS Kaya, USAID
AMOROS Anne-Marie, Radio Okapi
BAMBA Gertrude, AWEPA
CORBEL Hervé, PAIDECO
DUHAMEL Gaetan, RCN
GARBARINO Sabine, OPM/DRIS
GREGA Pierre, DRIS
HOOGHE Ivo, SES
HOREMANS Bart, 11.11.11
KALONJI NTALAJA, DSCRP
MABALA Robert, CNONG

MABAYA Jean Paul, DFIFD

MASIALA Innocent, NADYC

MAYEMBA Célio, BDC

MAYOMBE Célestin, CSC

MIAGALA Jacques, Christian Aid

NGIMBI Hector, EISA

NGONGO René, OCEAN

NSIMBA Sosthène Serge, Centre LOKOLE

RUKENGWA Pascal, CEI

SWINNEN Johan, Ambassador of Belgium

TSHIONZA MATA Georges, SERACOB/DRIS

Annex F: Interview guides

1. CV&A evaluation: case study RDC. Main evaluation phase: interview guide for project evaluation

1. Introduction and presentation to the evaluation (depends on what they know already)
This is an evaluation of a group of DAC donors on citizens' voice and accountability relationships. The aim of this evaluation is to

- Improve the understanding of how donors support countries in improving citizens'' voice and accountability relationships, between the state and its citizens / between state institutions [explain what is meant by "voice" and "accountability" based on the findings of the inception mission]
- Evaluate the effects of donor interventions if and how they had a sustainable effect on governance in the country;
- this evaluation if limited to 10 projects supported by DFID, Swedish SIDA and the Belgium Development Cooperation which were selected during the inception mission

Several case studies on this topic are being undertaken in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mozambique, Nepal and DRC.

We have already undertaken key informants interviews (government staff here in Kinshasa, civil society, few international organisations) and donor representatives (UK DFID, Swedish SIDA, Belgium Development Cooperation).

2. General project overview
Can you briefly give an overview over the project which is supported by [add donor]?
Probe into:

- Which actors and groups are involved in the project and why? What is the relationship between the actors? [graphical representation]
- What are the main beneficiaries of the project?
- How do the actors of this project support citizens do express their views, concerns, preferences and generally support participation? (training, workshops, information campaigns, public hearings)
- How does this project support the state institutions (local authorities, Government etc.) to be more responsive the needs of the citizens and act in a transparent manner?
- Did this project intervention come at the right time given the socio and economic context? Was there an initial analysis of the context before the actual start of the project? [relevance]

3. What are the problems and constraints you face in the project implementation? What are the opportunities and the strengths?
Probe into:

- Entry points: decentralisation, transition, elections
- Strengths: change in government, more stability, more financial aid
- Constraints: corruption, fragile state, conflict, instable institutions, financial constraints

4. What are the outcomes and resultants of this project regarding increased citizen participation and state responsiveness and transparency?

- What has been achieved at this point in time? Is this consistent with the programme objectives? [efficiency]
- Are the results achieved in proportion to the inputs for the project implementation? Do you think there would have been other ways to achieve these results more efficiently? [Efficiency]
- How would you explain that certain results have not been achieved or don't meet the objectives? Have certain results been achieved that have not been planned? And why? [Effectiveness]

5. How does this project contribute to strengthen good governance and democracy in Congo?

- Change in policy, practice and behaviour of different actors (beneficiaries-in particular vulnerable groups, civil society, media, government institutions)?
- Do you think the project results will be sustained once the project support is over?
- In general, do you think in a fragile state, it is more important to support citizens participation or strengthen state institutions to be able to respond to the citizens' needs?

6. How would you evaluate the relationship between the project and the donor?

- Is the support well coordinated between different donors?
- How does the donor support adapt to the context the project is operating in?
- Is there continuity in the donor support to this project?

2. CV&A evaluation: case study RDC. Main evaluation phase: interview guide/checklist for interviews with donor staff

1. Introduction and presentation to the evaluation (depends on what they know already)
This is an evaluation of a group of DAC donors on citizens' voice and accountability relationships. The aim of this evaluation is to

- Improve the understanding of how donors support countries in improving citizens'' voice and accountability relationships, between the state and its citizens / between state institutions
- Evaluate the effects of donor interventions if and how they had a sustainable effect on governance in the country ;
- this evaluation if limited to 10 projects supported by DFID, Swedish SIDA and the Belgium Development Cooperation which were selected during the inception mission

The evaluation is based on a framework which has been developed by the Overseas Development Institute in the UK. Now, several case studies are being undertaken including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mozambique and DRC.

We have already undertaken key informants interviews with government staff here in Kinshasa, civil society and a few international organisations.

Now, we are talking to donor staff to

(i) To gain an overview over donor's approaches and strategies on V&A in DRC;
(ii) To explore the drivers and priorities of donors' actions in this sector, including the context, political priorities etc.
(iii) To better understand the programme logic underpinning the V&A interventions supported by donors

2. Views on the situation of voice and accountability here in DRC.
Voice in terms citizens' free expression of preferences, views and state response and accountability in terms of responsible relationship between state and citizens (including the accountability between different state institutions, Parliament, government, judiciary)
Probe into:

- Entry points: elections, decentralisation
- Constraints: corruption, ideological division, partisan politics, social exclusion
- Mechanisms: (1) Actors: media, NGOs, civil society, national state institutions, provincial institutions, traditional authorities, parties, social movements, church, business, trade unions, community institutions; (2) Mechanisms: elections, judiciary, consultation processes, policy dialogue, public hearings
- Problems/constraints: corruption, fragile state, social exclusion, conflict
- Changes in policy, behaviour, practice?
- Fragile state like DRC: priority to strengthen demand side (citizens voice and civil society) or supply side, i.e. an accountable state?

3. Overview over donor strategies and approaches to support these efforts. [Focus on specific donor, e.g. DFID, SIDA, BE].
Probe into:

- Brief overview of donor engagement after conflict/transition
- Donors entry' points: PRGSP, transition, decentralisation, sector support (e.g. health, education, sanitation)?
- Which approach has donor taken? Did this change over time? How?
- Which up-front assessments informed the strategy?
- How does a support to CV&A in a fragile state differ from donor support in non-fragile states?
- Support to state institutions, civil society, and community organisations: priorities?

4. DFID/SIDA/BE support to capacity building for different actors.
Probe into:

- Focus on state, non-state actors (civil society, private sector)? Problems?
- Nature with cooperation with SENAREC?
- Coordination with other donors?

5. How did DFID/SIDA/BE support link with approach of other donors in the sector?
Probe into:

- Project funded by several donors?
- Any sector-wide approaches?
- How is the donor support around the PRGSP implementation?

6. How do you think did donor support strengthen CV&A in the DRC? What are the results, problems? Changes in policy, behaviour of different actors?

7. What does need to be done to make sure that the achieved results are sustainable and translate into results that the population can feel? What can donors do to support this?

[ask about project documents for relevant projects to be evaluated.]

Annex G: Documents consulted

Evaluation Framework

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Case Studies documentation

The documentation is included in the summary sheet