

EVALUATION OF CITIZENS' VOICE & ACCOUNTABILITY



Evaluation Report EV668
July 2008

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Evaluation Report EV688

**Citizens' Voice and
Accountability Evaluation
Mozambique Country Case Study
Final Report**

July 2008



Abbreviations

ANEMO	<i>Associação Nacional de Enfermeiros de Moçambique</i> (National Nurses' Organisation Mozambique)
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AWEPA	Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CC	<i>Conselho Consultivo</i> (Consultative Council)
CCD	<i>Conselho Consultivo Distrital</i> (District Consultative Council)
CCL	<i>Conselho Consultivo de Localidade</i> (Locality Consultative Council)
CCPA	<i>Conselho Consultivo de Posto Administrativo</i> (Administrative Post Consultative Council)
CGE	<i>Conta Geral do Estado</i> (Annual State Budget)
CIP	<i>Centro de Integridade Pública</i> (Centre for Public Integrity)
CLUFP	Community Land Use Fund Project
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CCS	Country Case Study
CTA	<i>Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique</i> (Confederation of Economic Associations in Mozambique)
CTV	<i>Centro Terra Viva</i> (Living Earth Centre)
CVA	Citizens'Voice and Accountability
CLUFP	Community Land Use Fund Project
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Danida	Danish International Development Assistance
DFID	Department for International Development
DIDENA	District Development in Nampula
DO	Development Observatory
ECG	Evaluation Core Group
Frelimo	<i>Frente de Libertação Nacional</i> (National Liberation Front) / ruling political party
G19	Group of 19 Programme Aid Partners
G20	Group of civil society organisations participating in the Poverty Observatory
GBS	General Budget Support
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoM	Government of Mozambique
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IPCC	<i>Instituições de Participação e Consulta Comunitária</i> (Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation)

ITC	<i>Iniciativas de Terras Comunitárias</i> (Initiatives on Community Land; former CLUFP)
KPMG	International audit/consulting company
LDH	<i>Liga dos Direitos Humanos</i> (Human Rights League)
MASC	<i>Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil</i> (Civil Society Support Mechanism)
MDG	Millenium Development Goals
MICOA	<i>Ministério de Coordenação Ambiental</i> (Ministry for Environmental Coordination)
MINAG	<i>Ministério de Agricultura</i> (Ministry of Agriculture)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MP	Member of Parliament
MSC	Most Significant Change
NOC	National Oversight Committee
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Aid
ODAmoz	Overseas Development Aid Mozambique (database)
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OE	<i>Orçamento do Estado</i> (State Budget)
OIIL	<i>Orçamento de Investimento de Iniciativa Local</i> (Seven Million fund)
OMM	<i>Organização da Mulher Moçambicana</i> (Mozambican Women's Organisation)
ONP	<i>Organização Nacional de Professores</i> (National Teachers' Organisation)
PAP	Programme Aid Partners
PARPA	<i>Plano de Acção para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta</i> (Action Plan for Reduction of Absolute Poverty = PRSP)
PES	<i>Plano Económico Social</i> (Socio-Economic Plan)
PLWA	People Living With Aids
PO	Poverty Observatory
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
RDC	République Démocratique de Congo
Renamo	<i>Resistência Nacional de Moçambique</i> (Nacional Resistance Mozambique) / opposition party
Renamo-UE	<i>Renamo União Eleitoral</i> (Renamo Electoral Union)
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SNAO	Swedish National Audit Organisation
SNV	Dutch Volunteer Service
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SISTAFE	<i>Sistema de Administração Financeira do Estado</i> (Public Financial Management System)
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach
SWAP	Sector Wide Approach Programme
SWOT	Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats

TA	<i>Tribunal Administrativo</i> (Administrative Court)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNAC	<i>União Nacional de Camponeses</i> (Peasants' National Union)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children and Education Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
V&A	Voice and Accountability

Executive Summary

Introduction

S1 The **focus on Citizens' Voice and Accountability (CVA) is part of the overall development agenda of good governance**. It is essentially a political process of bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it. Despite efforts to enhance the ability of the most vulnerable in society to articulate their needs, and with partner governments to provide the mechanisms and capacity to respond, there is a lack of evidence and real understanding of the dynamic and complex nature of factors influencing voice and accountability. There is thus a need to more systematically examine and evaluate current interventions¹. **In Mozambique, Voice and Accountability (V&A) are rather unknown concepts**², which are not easily translated – into Portuguese or into the Mozambican socio-political context. *Voice* is a relatively simple concept, related to the expression of preferences, opinions and views, whereas *accountability* in the Portuguese-speaking context is expressed as *responsabilização* (which means holding someone responsible) and *prestação de contas* (more linked to the idea of answerability).

S2 The CVA evaluation in Mozambique took place in the period of late October 2007 to January 2008. The **main objectives of the CVA evaluation**³ are to assess the selected interventions against their intended objectives and to draw conclusions on what works and what does not; to assess the relevance of the interventions for strengthening voice and accountability; and to provide an overall assessment/analysis of donors' role, success and failures in supporting V&A. **Seven case studies of selected CVA interventions** were carried out. The case studies are a key element in the collection of information on how V&A are practised in donor-financed interventions. The selected interventions cover national, provincial and district level, as well as a municipality; four out of the seven Evaluation Core Group (ECG)-donors are represented; state and non-state actors are involved, as well as different funding modalities.

Context

S3 V&A activities in Mozambique operate in a **social and political landscape** framed by multiethnic cultural aspects, a historical background of mono party system, civil war and profound political and economic reforms undertaken since the eighties. The country's structural dependency on external resources that account for more than 50% of the state budget, is an important part of the setting in which V&A operate. Poverty remains the reality for the vast majority of the population in spite of an 8% growth rate.

S4 Some **current events of particular importance for V&A** are the strengthening of formal and informal institutional mechanisms of accountability; the improvement of the public financial management system and other accountability mechanisms; the strengthening of the capacity of CSOs to engage in public policy debate; and donor support to the strengthening of citizens' V&A through support to reforms in the judiciary sector, the public sector and the Parliament; and the formulation of anti-corruption strategies and support to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

¹ Terms of Reference (TOR), Annex A1

² See Annex C1: Context Analysis, pp. 4-6.

³ See Annex A1: Terms of Reference, p. 4.

S5 **Risks for V&A in Mozambique** are framed by historical legacy, including a bipolarised party system with reduced scope for political competition and participation; cultural relations preventing marginalised groups like women and people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWA) from voicing their preferences and holding their representatives accountable for promotion of their interests; the critical survival of V&A actors like the media and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) being dependent on alignment to the governing party's economic elite, or access to donor funds.

S6 **ECG donors have a fairly common approach to V&A** relying on the idea of a liberal political framework building on good governance and an active civil society counterbalancing the state. All donors make references to both horizontal and vertical relations of accountability. Several donors make a direct link between V&A and an increased focus on corruption. All the donors focus on a number of political challenges in the Mozambican context. There is a general perception of weak government capacity to ensure an efficient public financial management and the possibilities and restraints of the political framework are mentioned. Reference is also made to the relatively weak capacity of civil society. Aid flows to Mozambique are likely to increase over the next four years and become organically more integrated with public finances. The total amount committed as General Budget Support (GBS) for 2007 represents approximately 15% of the total State budget; donors' total support to Mozambique surpasses 50% of the State's budget.

S7 Findings

Opportunities, constraints and entry points for V&A were clearly interlinked processes. The analysis has shown that the distinction between opportunities and entry points is not always very clear. Entry points are opportunities, which have been explored, and opportunities are potential entry points. On the other hand, constraints can be overcome and turned into either opportunities or entry points. During the analysis, focus has inevitably been turned towards the innumerable constraints existing for effective V&A, and only a few opportunities (i.e. potential entry points) have been found. Bearing in mind, however, that **constraints are also potential opportunities or entry points**, it is equally important to analyse the constraints and learn from the difficulties encountered to find new ways for promoting V&A.

S8 **Opportunities** were identified in the relatively conducive legal environment, where issues like anti-corruption, human rights and gender equality rights are officially verbalised. The existence of a diversified civil society also provides an opportunity for V&A. Donor harmonisation and alignment provide joint funding mechanisms and a focus on accountability. Support to formal and informal oversight mechanisms provides an excellent instrument for civil society to hold government accountable. The increased availability of reliable information, as well as the political and administrative decentralisation further provides opportunities. Capacity-building efforts strengthen both the demand and supply sides. The ongoing administrative and political decentralisation gives citizens – not least women – in municipalities and rural areas opportunity to actively voice their concern and interact with government.

S9 **Constraints** for V&A were identified as poverty, weak governance and increased corruption, as well as the peculiar electoral system with blocked party lists, where MPs are accountable to the party rather than to the voters. The weak horizontal accountability, i.e. the lack of coordination between the three powers (Legislative, Judiciary and Executive) is a constraint, as V&A interventions seem to be isolated. Access to information is limited by geographical isolation and high rates of illiteracy. The donor focus on government processes driven by the Paris Declaration indirectly

threatens support to an independent civil society with a role in advocacy and as watchdog. The fact that many CSOs lack internal democratic structures hampers their scope for truly participating in advocacy for democratic procedures. The culture of obedience towards authorities, especially in rural areas, restricts citizens' active engagement in V&A, as the relationship to Government is basically perceived as a patron–client relationship. Finally, but not of least importance is the platform for women's active participation in public fora created by the official pro–gender discourse.

S10 Some of the most important **entry points** identified are the decentralisation process accompanied by the availability of the Seven Million Metical development fund, as well as the Poverty Development Observatories established for the monitoring of the PARPA (Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty = PRSP) implementation.

S11 The CVA evaluation found that in most of the intervention case studies, the **underlying models of change** are based on the assumption that low capacity leads to lack of participation, i.e. lack of active voice and holding government institutions accountable. Consequently, activities have been directed at capacity building: the capacity of the Administrative Court to analyse the General State Account and financial auditing of government, municipal and public enterprises; Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA's) capacity building in Parliament of MPs, working committees and staff; Centre for Public Integrity (CIPs) internal and external organisational capacity; the organisation of Development Observatories; and District Development in Nampula (DIDENA's) capacity building in rural citizens to participate in Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation (IPCC)s. These interventions have, however, met certain constraints, for example in terms of withdrawal of funding. Lack of synergy between parallel V&A interventions is another constraint to increasing capacity for V&A, just as the lack of follow-up on issues such as information on corruption within the state apparatus, where it is rare that someone is held accountable for corruption or taken to criminal court.

S12 The trend to focus on direct budget support reinforces the fact that donor assistance is essentially a government-to-government relation, which has implications on the focus and nature of V&A interventions; more specifically on the approaches and options adopted in supporting **actors and mechanisms**. Case studies represent V&A interventions targeted at state and non-state actors, as well as the interaction between those two groups. The examples show that interventions aimed at supporting actors, if not integrated in a broader context that avoids the exclusion of other actors, can be ineffective or at best produce only outputs without remarkable outcomes. There is a tendency to focus on urban-based or formal mechanisms thus downplaying the importance of informal mechanisms (which are often not donor supported).

S13 Nevertheless, there are underlying problems that can prevent these interventions from attaining their goals. For example, donors are taking for granted the effectiveness of the formal mechanism and assuming that contributing to the strengthening of formal mechanisms, automatically contributes to improving V&A. This approach stems from the lack of a sound understanding of the *realpolitik* dynamics or for the need to stick to the Paris Declaration recommendation to support national systems and mechanisms. At the local level, the experience is that voice is very weak, almost silent in terms of holding district authorities accountable to plans and budgets. Furthermore, there is a problem of representativeness and legitimacy of the Consultative Councils (CCs), as the influence of the District Administrator and party political interests provide room for co-opting members. Integrated interventions, and securing synergy and interaction

between parallel interventions, both work to provide positive experiences of support to mechanisms and actors. Donors should be aware of possible negative effects on emphasising the application of frameworks conflicting with the organic processes of civil society.

S14 Since most of the V&A interventions are mainly output based, they will tend to influence **changes in policy, practice and behaviour, but there is likely to be less change in power relations**, which depend on national, political processes. Interventions like support to the Poverty Observatories and CCs, where actors are involved in policy making and oversight, do not necessarily ensure changes in state responsiveness and public service delivery, because they tend to focus on strengthening the mechanism itself, and less on actors. Consequently, informal power structures and mechanisms that determine the way these bodies actually function may be overlooked.

S15 Donor-driven processes like the joint reviews also contribute to improved accountability and impact on resource allocation, public revenues and expenditures. Joint reviews are opportunities that allow for more dialogue on accountability than bilateral reviews, even on sensitive issues, due to the considerable influence that donors have on budgetary decisions, because of their support to more than 50% of the State budget. However, donors' leverage on Government can yield unintended consequences, such as erosion of the authority of formal V&A actors, like the Legislative and the civil society at large. Budget ceilings, for example, depend on donors' commitment to fund the State budget deficit, which also stems from their assessment of government performance in the execution of the previous year's budget, an exercise with little or no participation of the Legislative and the civil society. What is lacking in terms of impact is an integrated approach to identification and strengthening of all the relevant actors involved in a particular V&A process, taking into account the enabling environment and the favourable and unfavourable factors influencing the process. Donors are part of the puzzle, since their role in the joint review yields positive (more accountability and availability of information) and unintended negative results (erosion of formal/constitutional accountability and by-pass of citizens' claims). Donors' position in the balance of power in V&A - at least in policy and budgetary decisions key to the attainment of development outcomes - is much stronger than the citizens' and Legislative's position vis-à-vis the Executive.

S16 The increasing trend of channelling the country assistance through direct budget support is a factor favouring a close linkage between V&A interventions and the **broader development outcomes**. This trend is stronger in interventions supported by the Programme Aid Partners, which are monitored in the bi-annual processes of joint review, and are mainly implemented by state/government actors. In the case of interventions involving non-state actors, the pathways can be more complex, because the outcomes of these initiatives have to be inexorably combined with others at the state level to trigger the necessary developmental outcomes. The intervention case studies are sub-divided in three categories: those with an explicit linkage between V&A and development outcomes (Administrative Court, Poverty Observatory/Development Observatory (PO/DO), Community Land Use Fund Project (CLUFF), DIDENA); those which focus on direct results in voice and accountability, but with foreseeable but not explicit outcomes (AWEPA); and those aiming at strengthening actors to voice their preferences or/and address citizens' claims on key public issues (CIP, Urban Environmental Management Project). Based on the case studies, it can be said that in general the linkage between V&A outcomes and development outcomes is present and tends to be more explicit in those interventions using government mechanisms (mainly direct budget support) or involving state actors. This supports the increasing concern for harmonization

stemming from the Paris Declaration. However, when state actors are not involved, the chain tends to be more complex and the results may be very difficult to foresee. Non-involvement of state actors can limit the impact of the results of the interventions. This limits effective voice and reduces the prospects of effective accountability. Therefore, to attain direct outcomes in V&A, donors have to find ways of supporting state and non-state V&A channels to ensure that necessary mechanisms are created and operational. Furthermore, state and non-state actors must be able to embark on a balanced non-hierarchical interaction allowing for effective voice of relevant societal actors combined with true accountability of state actors.

S17 **Conclusions**

Regarding **channels, mechanisms and processes**, voice and accountability are often separated. The case studies have shown that interventions tend to support, or be *either* voice *or* accountability based on the choice of actor and/or the context where they are applied. Articulation with Government is crucial for voice to lead to accountability. At central level, Programme Aid Partners (PAP) -Government V&A mechanisms tend to focus on accountability rather than on voice. For state responsiveness to take place, it is necessary that accountability is demanded. It is a risk that donor leverage on government can substitute Government's accountability towards own constituency, as accountability is often directed towards the donors and less towards Parliament or the citizens. It was also found that there is a strong urban bias in the support to V&A mechanisms, but that, for example, the DO holds opportunities for increased V&A at decentralised level. At local level non-state actor V&A interventions are often more voice than accountability.

S18 The case studies have shown that mechanisms like Institutions for Community Participation and Consultations (IPCCs) at local level and Parliament at national level give women room for active participation and a possibility to voice their opinions and priorities. Practices like co-optation of council members and selective allocation of funds in IPCCs are counterbalancing the efforts to capacitate council members to actively hold government bodies accountable - the voice remains silent and the accountability is not demanded. Knowledge about political processes, i.e. the informal, underlying dynamics and power relations, is essential for a genuine result in terms of improved V&A. Providing women with opportunities for an active voice is a pervasive issue in relation to V&A interventions.

S19 In terms of **results and outcomes**, support to V&A actors must be integrated in a broader context to yield impact. Horizontal accountability and coherent interventions are important for this to happen. For capacity building to result in sustainable change, the model of change must build on a thorough understanding and analysis of the context in order to be sufficiently clear. Donors hold an important opportunity to influence the development of a vibrant and critical civil society through increased support to civil society actors and mechanisms. Donors play an important role vis-à-vis Government as a partner constantly advocating for democratic practices. Urban and rural Mozambique represent two different realities, and opportunities and entry points at central level are better explored than is the case in rural areas. In spite of many district development programmes, rural communities and rural non-state actors remain underprivileged in relation to V&A; not only due to fewer interventions but also due to the different socio-political context. There is a need for specific measures to secure women's access to V&A at all levels.

S20 It is clearly easier to establish the link between V&A interventions and **broader development outcomes** in PAP-interventions than in interventions involving non-state actors. Support to non-state actors is not easily linked to overall development outcomes. Non-state actors are relatively more sensitive to changes and tendencies in the political environment and also dependent on the interaction with Government. The link between V&A interventions and poverty reduction is not very clear. It is a commonly recognised development assumption that a democratic society provides a conducive environment for poverty reduction. V&A interventions aim at contributing to building democratic structures. V&A interventions mainly address non-economic aspects of poverty, such as democratic rights and access to social services and information, but also provide better opportunities for access to economic development. Overall development policies and plans influenced by donor-driven, international agendas impact on overall policy development and government plans. It is, however, questionable to what extent the underlying power relations are influenced in favour of a truly democratic development. Directly or indirectly supported by donors, V&A interventions have promoted the democratic process, albeit there is ample room for exploring the opportunities for more active V&A.

S21 In terms of **aid effectiveness**, the striving towards alignment leads to strong government bias in the development assistance, which impacts on the opportunities for V&A. The harmonisation of donor support and the increased demand for effectiveness lead to major sector programmes, general budget support and consequently less attention to minor V&A interventions in the field of civil society. V&A interventions are by nature political and deal with processes in society. The demand for tangible results is highly relevant also in relation to the political process, but often difficult to meet. In spite of the limitations and constraints identified, there is a positive impact of the V&A interventions supported by the international aid agenda. Mutual accountability is extremely important, and civil society representatives see donors' reluctance to execute sanctions as a threat to democratic development. Securing Mozambican ownership to V&A interventions is important, especially considering the truly political character of V&A. For a government to listen to voice, true acceptance of its legitimate role in a democratic society is necessary, just as acceptance of values of transparency and accountability is prerequisite to secure state responsiveness.

S22 **Recommendations**


The recommendations are kept at a generic level, as it has not been the purpose of this exercise to present specific recommendations in relation to the intervention cases. Recommendations may appear obvious and down-to-earth, but they provide an evidence-based qualification of V&A in Mozambique. The recommendations provide a valid input for documentation of assumed correlations and an input to development of specific V&A strategies.

S23 **On overall approaches to V&A, it is recommended** to observe that public sector, government-to-government interventions do not set aside support to an independent civil society; to acknowledge the importance of a thorough context analysis to understand the mechanisms of the Mozambican society; and to ensure there is sufficient capacity to handle complex context analysis and design of adequate capacity building interventions, including securing institutional memory. Further, it is recommended to consider aspects of poverty and need for gender mainstreaming in all V&A interventions.

S24 **On operational issues it is recommended** that a conceptual clarification of V&A is made and corresponding categorisation of V&A interventions including indicators is applied in order to

ensure the tracking of V&A interventions; for donors to contribute – under PAP and direct budget support – to programme designs that integrate better the actors involved in accountability mechanisms; that attention is paid to informal actors and mechanisms; that the demand side should focus on proper access and use of the available information, including the capacity to make use of information; that voice in rural areas is supported; that women’s opportunities for influence in IPCCs are strengthened; that the official pro-gender discourse is used as a lever for women’s voice; that abrupt interruption of funding and change of plans are avoided and adequate long-term timeframes are applied; that donors secure financial sources for civil society to fulfil a necessary advocacy and watchdog role; and that a higher degree of harmonisation and alignment in CSO support take place.

S25 In terms of **policy dialogue it is recommended** that donors pay attention to the shifting balance of power through support to V&A interventions that increasingly strengthen internal actors and mechanisms; that attention is paid to organisational culture at all levels; that donors maintain not only a policy dialogue, but also a *political dialogue* on the issue of the functioning of the political system and the necessity for a vibrant, critical civil society, as an important part of securing long-term existence of accountability mechanisms.



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1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

1.1 The focus on Citizens' Voice and Accountability (CVA) is part of the overall development agenda of good governance. It is essentially a political process of bargaining between those who hold power and those who seek to influence it. Despite efforts to enhance the ability of the most vulnerable in society to articulate their needs, and with partner governments to provide the mechanisms and capacity to respond, there is a lack of evidence and real understanding of the dynamic and complex nature of factors influencing voice and accountability and there is thus a need more systematically to examine and evaluate current interventions⁴.

1.2 In Mozambique, Voice and Accountability (V&A) are rather unknown concepts⁵, which are not easily translated into Portuguese or into the Mozambican socio-political context. *Voice* is a relatively simple concept, related to the expression of preferences, opinions and views, whereas *accountability* in the Portuguese-speaking context is expressed as *responsabilização* (which means holding someone responsible) and *prestação de contas* (more linked to the idea of answerability). Because of its comprehensiveness in the Mozambican context, and to facilitate dialogue with local stakeholders, this definition has been applied during the CVA evaluation.

1.2 Background

1.3 The present evaluation of CVA in Mozambique is part of a major evaluation of CVA commissioned by a group of core DAC partners⁶ in five different countries: Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mozambique. The Country Case Study (CCS) in Mozambique has been commissioned by DFID, whereas the other four CCSs are financed by Switzerland (co-financed by DFID), Germany (co-financed by DFID), Denmark and Belgium respectively. The reports from the five CCSs will provide input for a synthesis report to be elaborated by a separate team of consultants and presented at the mid-term meeting for the Paris Declaration implementation, scheduled for September 2008 in Accra, Ghana.

1.4 The CCS in Mozambique took place in the period of late October 2007 to January 2008 and comprises two main phases: the Preparatory Phase, which was concluded by an Inception Report delivered on 26 November 2007. The Inception Report included a Context Analysis and a report on the Aid Environment. A key element of the evaluation is the CVA intervention case studies, of which seven were carried out in Mozambique. The selection of intervention cases was done in collaboration with the representatives of the ECG partners and other stakeholders. It was based on a number of selection criteria, of which the representation of donors, geographical and thematic coverage, as well as availability of documents and persons were the most important. As it turned out, limited time and logistical constraints caused severe problems in case selection and accessibility to information, and a considerable dose of pragmatism was applied at the end.

⁴ Terms of Reference (TOR), Annex A1

⁵ See Annex C: Context Analysis, pp. 4-6.

⁶ The Evaluation Core Group (ECG) consists of the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.

1.5 The CCS Mozambique has been carried out by a team of consultants, mainly based in Mozambique, assisted by two resource persons for specific input on case intervention studies and overall analysis⁷. During the evaluation, the team leader has interacted with the external quality assurance consultant and the synthesis report team. They have commented on the Inception Report and provided guidance for the methodology applied. The team leader also participated in the ECG meeting in Bonn on 21-22 October 2007, prior to the start of the assignment.

1.3 Objectives and scope of evaluation

1.6 The TOR for the CVA evaluation includes a comprehensive Evaluation Framework, outlining the detailed methodology to be followed. The evaluation has comprised a thorough preparation in terms of a context analysis for voice and accountability in Mozambique, as well as an understanding of the aid environment. Dialogue with key stakeholders on the concepts of voice and accountability has been established in order to provide a background for selection of intervention cases to be studied.

1.7 The main objectives of the CVA evaluation are⁸:

- a) Assess the selected interventions against their intended objectives, and on the basis of that draw conclusions on what works, and what does not, in relation to intervention programme theories⁹;
- b) Assess the relevance of the interventions for strengthening voice and accountability in the specific developing country context;
- c) Provide an overall assessment/analysis of donors' role, success and failures in supporting V&A in different country contexts;

1.8 The evaluation has been guided by four main evaluation questions¹⁰:

- 1) *Channels, mechanisms and processes for V&A.* What are the concrete channels, i.e. actors, spaces and mechanisms supported by donor-funded interventions for: (i) citizen's voice and empowerment; (ii) increased role of poor and excluded groups, and women and their representatives in governance processes; and (iii) accountability of governments to citizens? How do these channels work and how important are they to achieve V&A outcome?
- 2) *Results and outcomes.* To what extent have the different approaches and strategies adopted by donors contributed to enhanced V&A in partner countries? In particular, who have benefitted from V&A outcomes as a result of donors' interventions? Who hasn't and why?
- 3) *Pathways to broader development outcomes and impacts.* In what ways are V&A interventions contributing to broader development goals, such as poverty reduction, economic growth and the MDGs? In particular, what are the main pathways leading from improved V&A to such broader development outcomes?

⁷ See Annex A2 for a presentation of the team.

⁸ See Annex A1: Terms of Reference, p. 4.

⁹ *Intervention programme theories* are understood as *models of change*.

¹⁰ ODI: Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability. Evaluation Framework, August 2007, Annex 1a, p.8 and pp. 12-21.

- 4) *V&A and aid effectiveness*. What can we learn from experience to date of donors' effectiveness supporting V&A interventions with particular reference to the principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration?

1.9 The evaluation has been carried out in line with the OECD DAC ethical considerations¹¹ for evaluations, showing sensitivity to gender, beliefs, manners and customs of all stakeholders and is undertaken with integrity and honesty. The rights and welfare of participants in the evaluation are protected. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants has been protected when requested. Furthermore, the evaluation report has been subject to internal and external quality assurance to assure that it fulfils the Terms of Reference and has followed the Evaluation Framework provided for the exercise.

1.4 Structure of the report

1.10 The structure of the report follows the outline elaborated by the synthesis report team. After the Introduction, Chapter 2 comments on methodology and the experience with applying the comprehensive Evaluation Framework. This is followed by Chapter 3, where the socio-political context including an overview of the aid environment in Mozambique is analysed. Chapter 4 is the core chapter of the report, presenting the findings of the evaluation. The analysis of findings is organised according to the five main components of the Evaluation Framework, whereas Chapter 5, presenting conclusions, is structured according to the four general evaluation questions of the Evaluation Framework. Recommendations drawn from the conclusions are presented in Chapter 6. Annexes provide additional background information, of which special attention should be paid to Annex D holding the Intervention Summary Sheets with information on the seven CVA intervention case studies.

1.11 The report has been elaborated by the team of consultants and the content reflects the opinion of the team and not necessarily that of interviewed persons and agencies or that of DFID and the ECG.

1.12 Finally, the team expresses thanks to those who have spent time with us discussing V&A, provided information and facilitated the work.

¹¹ DAC Principles for Effective Aid, OECD 1992.

2 Methodology

2.1 The CVA evaluation in Mozambique has followed the comprehensive Evaluation Framework, including the step-wise guidelines provided by ODI for the CCS. The Evaluation Framework is extraordinarily detailed in terms of providing methodological orientation for the CCS on how to evaluate V&A. The team has made use of a number of tools and techniques for collection of information and applied an interactive process seeking to involve stakeholders actively in order to create ownership and interest to the evaluation.

2.1 Selection of intervention cases

2.2 The case studies are a key element in the collection of information on how V&A is practised in donor financed interventions. The selection criteria covered the issues of State or non-state actors; demand or supply side; formal or informal mechanisms; different levels; representation of different thematic areas¹²; funding modalities; considerations on even representation of ECG-donor involvement; and duration of intervention to secure a critical mass of evidence (documentation and access and availability of key stakeholders during field study period). A detailed description of selection criteria is included in Annex B: Methodology.

2.3 Pragmatism reigned when selecting the case studies, as the team was confronted by a series of limitations: no time buffer between the two evaluation phases, access to information for some cases turned out to be scarce, and the need for logistic arrangements. In spite of certain limitations, the selected interventions provide a mix of activities and characteristics, which mirror a major part of the V&A landscape. They cover national, provincial and district level, as well as a municipality, albeit cases from only one province and the capital have been included. Four out of the seven ECG donors are represented, and one case is supported by other donors than the ECG donors, but selected due to its importance as both demand and supply side. The possibility of including interventions not supported by donors was discussed but found outside the scope of the present evaluation. This would, however, have provided an opportunity for looking at true voice activities¹³. State and non-state actors are involved, although the selected interventions have a bias on central level, oversight mechanisms. Consequently, the selected interventions tend to yield more information on accountability than on voice. Availability and time did not allow for inclusion of more rural cases, just as interventions implemented by or through CSOs, NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) are not represented to the extent wished. Different funding modalities are represented among the selected interventions, i.e. project support and basket funding, but discussion of general and sector budget support is included through the Context Analysis and information from key informants.

¹² Foresti, Marta et.al. *Evaluation Citizens' Voice and Accountability. Intervention Analysis: results ad implications for the evaluation framework*, ODI, March 2007.

¹³ One such example would have been the movement of the returnees from former East Germany, who have a decade long dispute with GoM on the release of pension funds.

2.4 The seven cases are:

Case	Key activities focused by CVA evaluation
1 DIDENA - District Development Nampula	Capacity building of local community councils
2 Urban Environmental Management in 7 municipalities	Establishment/development of mechanisms for participation of urban communities
3 Development Observatory (Poverty Observatory)	Monitoring of PRSP/provincial development plans by government and non-state actors
4 Centre for Public Integrity	Watchdog organisation with focus on anti-corruption
5 Community Land Use Fund Project ¹⁴	Providing smallholders rights and access to land
6 Training of Parliamentarians	Accountability of Parliamentarians
7 Support to Administrative Court	Improvement of available information/documentation on government performance

2.5 Presentation of the selected interventions is found in Chapter 4: Findings and a detailed overview of the selected interventions are presented in Annex B: Methodology. Applied methods.

2.2 Applied Methods

2.6 A variety of tools and methods chosen for their specific applicability has been adopted during the evaluation. The combination of different methods has allowed for *triangulation of information and cross-checking*. As much as possible, the principle of *working closely together in sub-teams* has been applied. This approach ensured consistency and cross-fertilisation of knowledge and information. The team initiated the case studies by discussing the change model and in particular what the team understood as the underlying assumptions for the case. This allowed the team to look for and find relevant information in secondary data and through interviews.

2.7 The **methods** applied for collection of information can be categorised in four main groups:

- Literature and web site review, including search for statistical data
- Interviews with (key) informants;
- Field visits;
- Discussion and analysis;

A detailed description of applied methods is enclosed in Annex B: Methodology.

¹⁴ The project has been re-named after the CCS field work was concluded and is now designated ITC (*Iniciativas de Terras Comunitárias*). The term CLUFP is, however, maintained in the main report.

2.8 The team applied a series of **techniques** for data collection: mind mapping, SWOT analysis, Most Significant Changes (MSC), triangulation of information, semi-structured interviews with key and case informants, as well as focus group discussions and participatory workshops. Guidelines and interview matrices have been elaborated and used during interviews with key and case informants¹⁵.

2.3 Evaluation Framework

2.9 The complexity of the comprehensive Evaluation Framework was a challenge, given the time available for the evaluation. Much effort has been put into the elaboration of the framework - and much effort is required to grasp the many details. The Evaluation Framework offers a detailed description of the approach to be followed. It has been resource demanding to operate with the cross-analysis comprising five main components and four core evaluation questions, as they are partially overlapping. When further adding the third layer of analytical lens with the DAC evaluation criteria, the cross-checking leaves little room for independent interpretation according to the country specific context. This was particularly so when taking into account the underlying principles of a flexible, comprehensive, theory and evidence based, and out-come focused approach. The analytical framework could have been simplified and less overlapping, had it only comprised two dimensions with fewer repetitions.

2.10 The Evaluation Framework has offered a stepwise guidance to the implementation of the CCS which has been very helpful, but at times too detailed. For example, the orientation as to how workshops should be conducted turned out to be of little practical use, as the concrete context and the dynamic of the specific stakeholder composition should determine the way the workshops are conducted.

2.11 There is an imbalance between the resources which have been invested in the elaboration of the Evaluation Framework and the time available for the CCS. The emphasis on conducting an evidence-based evaluation should ideally pay more respect to the time required for collection of valid empirical data. The process has been rushed, and there is no doubt that the evaluation would have benefitted from more flexibility in terms of time and method to adapt to the specific local context of each CCS.

2.12 The interactive evaluation process with the group of ECG donors, external consultants for QA and for writing of the synthesis report has a strong bias on the donor side. No local anchorage of the process has been established during the CCS, which is a serious draw-back, especially considering the very topic of the evaluation!

2.4 Challenges and constraints

2.13 In general, most of the challenges were overcome. It is, however, worth noting that more flexibility in terms of timing would have helped to fulfil the expectations for geographical coverage, representativeness and in-depth analysis. In addition to the challenges mentioned above, the main constraints encountered were:

¹⁵ Interview guides presented with Inception Report, November 2007.

- Limited time and late start of CCS in Mozambique
- ECG donors' collaboration and lack of prior knowledge about the CVA Evaluation
- Limited geographical and donor coverage of case studies
- Access to informants and information
- Logistics
- Complexity of Evaluation Framework

A detailed description of the challenges and constraints is enclosed in Annex B: Methodology. Context for Citizens'Voice and Accountability.

3 Context for Citizens' Voice and Accountability

3.1 The context shaping citizens' voice and accountability features a considerable set of economic, political and social aspects stemming from the country's historical background and its peculiar dependence on external resources. To unveil these elements, the current chapter focuses on two main dimensions of the overall context: the socio-economic and political context analysis and the aid environment¹⁶.

3.1 Context analysis

3.2 The Context Analysis has four fundamental elements: political and institutional framework and its actual operation, mapping and key features of main actors, social and political landscape, and recent events that shape opportunities and risks for V&A.

Political and institutional framework and its actual operation

3.3 V&A in Mozambique operate in a context where the Constitution states that citizens participate in democratic governance. Hence, participation is through formal processes, like elections, through institutions for community participation and consultation (IPCCs¹⁷) at district and sub-district levels, and also through different informal institutions (e.g. traditional leaders, local fora, and community development committees) at the local level. At district and sub-district levels, these institutions do not necessarily guarantee an effective participation of citizens in the governance, due to the following:

- their representativeness is disputable and hence lack citizens' legitimacy and are not necessarily accountable to them;
- they are based on a top-down centralist model with considerable government influence;
- there are weak links between community-based organisations and government decision-making structures;
- there is a weak democratic culture due to the still young democratic system in Mozambique and to the legacy of the one-party regime.

3.4 **Access to information** is undermined by the fact that the informative and watchdog media role is limited by economic and technical capacity factors; state or government aligned media have higher coverage than relatively more independent media. Language barriers, illiteracy and geographic isolation are a further hindrance to access to information.

3.5 **Oversight mechanisms** are weak, because of the capacity constraints of relevant actors like the Legislative and the deficient integration among the state organs (Executive, Legislative and Judiciary) for effective follow-up on decisions taken.

¹⁶The full version of the Context Analysis report and the Aid Environment overview elaborated during the Preparatory Phase and presented as part of the Inception Report in November 2007 are enclosed as Annex C. The two reports have been revised according to the comments received from the QA consultant and the Synthesis Report team.

¹⁷ Consultative councils or bodies (*conselhos consultivos*) for districts (CCDs), administrative posts (CCPAs) and localities (CCLs)

3.6 Despite the fact that Government policy documents (e.g. Socio-Economic plan (PES), State Budget (OE) and Annual State Budget (CGE) are public, access to them is limited and they are too technical to be understood by ordinary citizens and even Members of Parliament (MP) do not have the necessary skills to analyse critically the relevant policy information. There are informal¹⁸ oversight mechanisms adopted by civil society organisations, like the League of Human Rights (LDH), Centre for Public Integrity (CIP), and G20¹⁹ in the Poverty Observatory (PO)²⁰. Civil society is, however, not considered a strong actor to counterbalance the State. In an inter-African context, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) operates with a focus on four areas, of which especially *Democracy and Good Political Governance* tallies with the overall focus of V&A through *'ensuring that the respective national constitutions reflect the democratic ethos and provide for demonstrably accountable governance and that political representation is promoted, thus providing for all citizens to participate in the political process in a free and fair political environment'*²¹. Mozambique has so far participated in peer reviews of other countries but not yet been subject to a peer review.

3.7 Although there is a principle of **separation of powers**, the President of the Republic appoints all chairpersons of the Supreme Court, Administrative Court (TA), Attorney-General Office and Constitutional Court. Despite the sensitive constitutional role of the latter, which demands impartiality, its composition is based on appointments by the two main parliamentary parties, Frelimo and Renamo, and with a particular advantage of the ruling party and legislative majority (Frelimo). Powers were decentralized to local municipal level in 1998. At provincial level, an appointed governor is supposed to function with elected legislative representatives, but the first provincial legislative elections were postponed *sine die* in 2007.

3.8 **Economic structures and institutions** are characterised by positive performance on macro-economic growth, with little impact at the micro level, i.e. on improvements of ordinary people's living standards and alleviation of poverty. Market-oriented reforms implemented in the eighties led to privatisation of state assets in favour of the mono-party regime elite with little business tradition. The State is still dominant in the economy through influence from the ruling party. Economic growth was also founded on huge dependence on external aid, and donors play a very important role in the economy and also in the decision making in Mozambique, due to their

¹⁸ In the present evaluation, *formal mechanisms* are government/state mechanisms defined in the country's legal framework (laws, constitution and other valid legislation). *Informal mechanisms* are not part of the legally defined state/government institutional setting. However, some formal mechanisms (e.g. traditional authorities) are still so weak and easily manipulated that they become informal. See also note 21 below.

¹⁹ G20 is the group of civil society organisations participating in the Poverty Observatory.

²⁰ In spite of being a government initiative with official participation of Government, donors and CSOs, the Poverty Observatory is in this context considered an *informal* oversight mechanism, as there are no binding follow-up of discussions and recommendations. Initiatives to establish binding regulations securing accountability have been taken but not yet decided upon.

²¹ There are 9 key objectives in this thematic area namely: Prevent and reduce intra- and inter-country conflicts; Constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, a Bill of Rights and the supremacy of the constitution are firmly established in the constitution; Promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights as enshrined in all African and international human rights instruments; Uphold the separation of powers including the protection of the independence of the Judiciary and of an effective Parliament; Ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants; Fighting corruption in the political sphere; Promotion and protection of the rights of women; Promotion and protection of the rights of the child and young persons; Promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, including displaced persons and refugees. <http://www.nepad.org/aprm/>

support to the more than 50% state budget deficit. The formal sector of the economy employs only a tiny part of the work force, hence the predominance of the informal sector, which has implications in the protection of the rights of the labour force working in this sector.

3.9 The social and political landscape is characterised by a number of anti-poles: state vs non-state actors²², central vs. local level, urban vs rural. Other factors like gender and poverty are influenced by these contrasting anti-poles.

3.10 The main **state actors** involved in V&A are the Judiciary (including the Administrative Court), the Executive (at the national, and local and grass roots levels – e.g. Consultative Councils – IPCCs), and the Legislative (including the Assembly of the Republic and Municipal Assemblies). The **non-state actors** are the medias, NGOs, political parties, watchdog actors, and trade unions. The private sector and international donors are also key actors in V&A, because they play a central role in accountability. For historic and institutional reasons, the Executive is the most powerful state actor and dominates the decision-making process as well as influences the way other branches function, due to the considerable constitutional powers of the President of the Republic and also to the strong ruling-party influence in the overall system. State-aligned media are more informative on government positive performance and, as mentioned, have higher coverage while relatively more independent media are more critical. Nevertheless, the survival of the independent media still depends on the liberalisation of the economic arena, which is dominated by the State and the political elites.

3.11 While there are some **civil society organisations** (CSO) working on V&A issues, like policy making and budget monitoring through the Poverty Observatory; only few (e.g. Centre for Public Integrity and League of Human Rights) deal with the watchdog role of civil and political rights. A wide range of national NGOs are engaged in service delivery projects and programmes. Their existence depends heavily on donor funding and their *raison d'être* is often rather to secure employment than to play a political role in terms of e.g. pro-poor advocacy or defending the rights of certain vulnerable groups. However, organisations working with people living with HIV/AIDS, people with disabilities, children or women are gaining strength, especially in the urban centres.

3.12 At local level, CBOs are mushrooming, but they are very often opportunity driven, i.e. initiatives to organise are taken based on the availability of funds, and are far too often driven by a few individuals seeking employment rather than a group of members with a common cause. CSOs in general are also heavily dependent on donors' funds, which impacts on their agenda-setting power and sustainability.

3.13 In the political landscape **informal power structures** also play a relevant role with a particular emphasis on the traditional authorities and ruling party secretaries. The former are chieftaincies based on consuetudinary law that have been largely used by the colonial authorities to

²² Reference is made to Annex C1: Context Analysis, pp. 17-20 for a further discussion of state and non-state actors. Mozambique, the most prominent state actors are represented by the three branches of the Government: the Legislative, the Executive (at central and local levels) and the Judiciary, but also provincial and district government authorities and the municipal councils are state actors. The non-state actors have often been created by the ruling party under the mono-party system, but has an increasing independence from party politics today. Among the non-state actors in Mozambique are NGOs, CBOs, professional organisations, trade unions, women and youth organisations, the media and political parties. Other important actors are the international donors and the private sector.

control the territory. However, after independence they were sidelined by the socialist regime. During the civil war, some of these structures were used by Renamo to ensure some legitimacy at community level in the military occupied areas. In the multiparty context these authorities have been retrieved and Government has approved a decree recognizing their role as complementary to state rule. At the same time, some community level structures used in the socialist era like the *secretários de bairro* were also reintegrated. This recognition, however, tends to reinforce the authority of the ruling party and often these structures are co-opted by government officials to whom they are de facto accountable. Secretaries of the ruling party at local level also hold considerable authority, sometimes bypassing those of the state agents. Ethnic groups play a minor role in Mozambique, where the north-south contradiction has sometimes been presented as an ethnic question, although it is rather a question of urban-rural or central-local.

3.14 Whilst the legislation opened space for the creation of many **political parties**, the Mozambican electoral system until recently had a 5% electoral threshold which limited the legislative representation to only two parties, Frelimo and Renamo-UE²³. The remaining small parties do not play a significant role in the policy-making process. Hence, outside Parliament, external donors appear to be the only actors that hold the Executive effectively accountable.

3.15 **Poverty** in Mozambique is officially on the decrease with a GDP growth of approximately 8%. The growth is, however, questioned by various academics, who argue that in spite of an overall economic growth, the gap is widening and an increasing part of the population is living in absolute poverty. Most poor people have no security in their economic situation and the downwards economic mobility is almost equalled by the upwards mobility. The inequality gap is widening, and it is estimated that only 20% of the population benefits from the growth in GDP. Lack of employment opportunities, especially in rural areas, low education and weak social networks are among the factors negatively influencing poor peoples' possibility for fighting poverty²⁴. The economic inequality leading to poverty clearly has a urban-rural bias, where the top 20% of the population, benefitting from the economic growth is also the part of the population, which in terms of other aspects of poverty is also relatively privileged, i.e. access to education, health services, information and rights. Pro-poor policies deriving from PARPA are to some extent stimulating economic growth and poverty reduction, but not inequalities and exclusion. The Ministry of Women and Social Welfare, despite the role it is expected to play in assisting **marginalized groups** such as elderly people, or people with disabilities, has in fact been a very low profile ministry and the voices of many excluded groups are not heard in decision-making arenas.

3.16 Since the pre-independence days, Mozambique has had a strong women's movement OMM (*Organização da Mulher Moçambicana*), which has been tightly connected to the ruling Frelimo-party. Mozambique's official policy is paying attention to gender issues and offers room for women's active participation in public fora. However, due to cultural and historical heritage, **gender relations** often exclude women from voicing their preferences and from decision making, despite the considerable progress of the country in this area after independence. Gender issues are not yet mainstreamed in key areas like management of the public sector and the budget, despite Mozambique being one of the signatories of the Beijing Declaration. Mozambique has a relatively high percentage of women MPs (33%), and the school attendance of girls is on the increase. As in many other African countries, there is a tremendous difference between the opportunities for women

²³ Renamo – UE is a coalition comprising the Renamo party and ten small parties.

²⁴ Joseph Hanlon: 'Is Poverty Decreasing in Mozambique?', Open University, England, Sep. 2007.

in urban, literate and economically relatively comfortable settings, compared to those found in rural areas, where illiteracy and poverty are more prevalent. Interviews with case informants showed an active participation of rural women in IPCCs and discussions of local development issues. The IPCCs provide a forum for rural women to participate actively in local development discussions, and the general political discourse in Mozambique favours women's active participation.

Recent events that shape opportunities and risks for Voice and Accountability

3.17 Current events shaping opportunities for voice and accountability are:

- strengthening of formal and informal institutional mechanisms of accountability, including the newly created APRM
- improvement of public financial management system and other accountability mechanisms under the implementation of public sector reforms
- strengthening of the capacity of CSOs to engage in public policy debate with the government and other public institutions, through various donor-funded projects
- donor support to the strengthening of citizens' V&A through support to reforms in the judiciary sector, the public sector, the Parliament, formulation of anti-corruption strategies and support to the APRM

3.18 Risks for V&A in the context of Mozambique are framed from historical legacy:

- Bipolarisation of party system reduces the scope of political competition and even participation, and may reduce the space where many social actors can voice their preferences and also distort the accountability mechanisms and processes
- Cultural relations prevent marginalised groups like women and people living with HIV/AIDS from voicing their preferences and holding their representatives accountable for promoting their interests
- The survival of actors playing a key role in V&A, like the media and CSOs, is shaped by its alignment to the governing party economic elite or access to donor funds

3.2 Overview of aid environment

3.19 The main purpose of the overview of the aid environment in Mozambique is to *position donors' support for V&A in the wider aid environment*²⁵ in Mozambique²⁶.

3.20 The main data sources for the overview are the database ODAmoz²⁷, a report commissioned by Government of Mozambique (GoM) and G19 donors as well as the web sites of the **ECG donors**. Secondary data and documentary analysis have been complemented by brief and in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants at embassies and resource persons. There is no

²⁵ Foresti, Marta et.al: *Evaluation Citizens' Voice and Accountability. Evaluation Framework. Methodological Guidance for Country Case Studies*, Annex 1b, ODI, August 2007.

²⁶ The full Aid Environment report is included as Annex C2.

²⁷ The ODAmoz database provides information on donor contributions to Mozambique, albeit the reliability of the information is not fully satisfactory. Donors report with varying accuracy and detail, not all donors report their contribution, and support to civil society is often not included. However, the tool provides the best possible overview of ODA to Mozambique. www.odamoz.org.mz.

official or public information of other donors such as international foundations or emerging donors like China which is intensifying its cooperation in Mozambique and Africa in general.

3.21 Different agencies classify their interventions differently and some of the **ECG donors** have not included (all) support to non-state actors. As only a few of the donors work with a clear concept and definition of V&A, and, as the ways of registering interventions in ODAmoz differ from donor to donor, this report only gives an indicative idea of the donor support to V&A activities. Based on the available information and estimates from the ODAmoz database, a short overview of budget for V&A interventions is presented as Annex C3²⁸.

3.22 **ECG donors** seem to have a common approach to V&A relying on the idea of a liberal political framework building on good governance and an active civil society counterbalancing the State. All donors make references to both horizontal and vertical relations of accountability. Accountability is understood as 'responsibility'. The donors make reference to Participatory Methodologies, the Perspective of the Poor and the Rights Based Approach, i.e. **V&A initiatives are interpreted as part of a crosscutting and underlying principle of strategies and support**. Several donors make a direct link between V&A and an increased focus on corruption. Donors explicitly link V&A to broader development outcomes. Support to civil society is not primarily a strategy to have 'CS as watchdogs to hinder corruption' but in order to empower citizens to take control of the development.

3.23 All the donors focus on a number of political challenges in the Mozambican context. There is a general perception of weak government capacity to ensure an efficient public financial management and the possibilities and restraints of the political framework are mentioned. Reference is also made to the relatively weak capacity of civil society.

3.24 The co-ordinated group of donors - programme aid partners (PAP) - is called G19. Some major donors like the UN multilateral institutions, USAID, Brazil, Japan and China support the Mozambican Government bilaterally. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Programme Aid aims at improving aid effectiveness as stated in the Paris Declaration, hence among other aspects the importance of domestic accountability is put forward. The MoU regulates a Joint Review process which constitutes the monitoring cycle of the execution of the PARPA. The Joint Review relies on the principal government planning and monitoring instruments. The PARPA should be developed and assessed through interactive and consultative processes with Mozambican political and economic stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society. The forum for this is called the Poverty Observatory, but has not yet developed into a proper mechanism for accountability.

3.25 Aid flows to Mozambique are likely to increase slightly over the next four years, although the magnitude of this scaling-up is impossible to predict with the existing information. Most donors are partly supporting the PARPA through a multi-donor General Budget Support (GBS) programme to GoM. The total amount committed as GBS for 2007 represents approximately 15% of the total state budget. The donors' total support to Mozambique, through GBS, sector-wide programmes and projects surpasses 50% of the State's budget. Available data show that there is a clear tendency of aid flows to become more organically integrated within the flow of public finance resources. Data on non-GoM aid is more problematic. Data from 19 donor strategies analysed

²⁸ During the main phase of the evaluation the **ECG donors** were repeatedly asked to hand in the information but reports were delivered only by Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

show that non-GoM aid varies from 10 to 15% of total aid. NGOs consistently absorb about two thirds of non-GoM aid flows and are to a great extent dependent on external funding. This is especially the case for CSOs working exclusively with V&A related activities, such as 'watchdog organisations'. The overall amount of aid for 2007 provided by donors registering their support in ODAmoz is USD 1,403,368,208. The **ECG donors** represent 31% of the support.

3.26 The ECG agencies all provide GBS. The main modality is SWAp. Off budget support is made to civil society and the private sector representing a minor part of the donors' total support. The donors generally point out the support to GoM and the cooperation framework developed in line with the Paris Declaration as strengthening V&A. Civil society does not enjoy the advantages of harmonisation and alignment. Few donors coordinate their support and even though there is an increased application of basket funding modality in relation to civil society, most CSOs have to deal bilaterally with donors which restrain them from developing strategies regarding V&A. In the study several actors referred to the importance of including civil society in a 'Paris Agenda'.

3.27 The mechanisms of planning, monitoring and assessing the PARPA are pointed out as crucial for V&A, i.e. policy dialogue accompanying the budget and sector support.

3.28 The **support to the Governance pillar of the PARPA** is presented as the base for V&A interventions. Support to Public Financial Management and Public Sector Reform, especially decentralisation is highlighted. Capacity building of local authorities and IPCCs is pointed out as a crucial component. Few of the **ECG donors** are directly involved in the **support to the Justice Sector** and a small number of **ECG donors** give **support to the Parliament**.

3.29 Interventions **supporting dialogue between state and civil society and civic education** are specified by the **ECG donors** as V&A support. The social audit of the PARPA is one example of this. There are also other examples of policy- and budget monitoring of different sectors or vulnerable groups such as children. The **ECG donors** define just a small number of NGOs as "watchdog organisations". The **ECG donors** also support NGOs monitoring global financial structures. **Support to media** forms part of the **ECG donors'** support to V&A. Several **ECG donors** support programmes strengthening Community Radios.

4. Findings

4.1 The present chapter contains an analysis of the findings on V&A as expressed through the seven case studies, supplemented by the primary information obtained through interviews with key informants. The presentation of findings seeks as much as possible to build on the concrete evidence from the field work carried out during the Main Evaluation Phase. The Context Analysis presented in the previous chapter provides the setting for the analysis of the case evidence on V&A. Much detailed information has been obtained through the field work. It is important to notice that not all available information is reflected in the present chapter, but is found in Annex D: Summary Sheets per intervention, as well as in Annex C: Context Analysis. The depth of analysis for each case study as well as the representativeness of the cases is limited due to the overall settings for the CVA Evaluation. Reference is made to Chapter 2 Methodology and Annex B: Methodology in relation to the limitations for the case studies.

4.2 The findings are analysed and presented within the frame of the five main components of the CVA Evaluation Framework:

- A. Opportunities, constraints and entry points
- B. Institutional, organisational and individual capacities
- C. V&A channels: actors and mechanisms
- D. Changes in policy, practice, behaviour and power relations
- E. Broader development outcomes

4.3 The seven case studies are:

Case	Donor(s)	Implementing agency	Location visited	Comments
1 DIDENA (District Development in Nampula)	SDA	Ibis (Danish NGO)	Mecuburi District	The case of DIDENA provides findings on the rural setting in Mozambique. It reflects the articulation between voice and accountability.
2 Urban Environmental Management in 7 municipalities	Danida	MICOA	Ilha de Moçambique	The Municipality of Ilha is in a special political setting due to the parallel District Administration and the party political antagonistic relationship between the two bodies. Findings on CVA may well have turned out very differently had another municipality been chosen.
3 Development Observatory (Poverty Observatory)	UNDP, UNICEF, SNV,	Provincial Government Nampula	Nampula	Main focus has been on the DO in Nampula, but information from experience in other provinces obtained from key and case informant interviews is also included.
4 Center for Public Integrity (CIP)	SDC, DFID, Sida, the Netherlands	CIP	Maputo	Findings regarding CIP are – due to the political character of the institution – useful for the overall understanding of V&A in the Mozambican context.
5 Community Land Use Fund Project (CLUFP)	DFID, SDC, Sida, Danida, Irish Aid, the Netherlands	KPMG	Maputo	Findings are based on interviews with organisational stakeholders to the programme. No beneficiaries are yet available for interviews.
6 Training of Parliamentarians	UNDP, Sida, Danida	AWEPA	Maputo	Interviews with MPs were unfortunately not carried out as the formalities required to gain access to MPs could not be fulfilled within the time available. Findings are based on interviews with other stakeholders.
7 Administrative Court (TA)	Sida	SNAO	Maputo	Findings regarding TA are relevant for the development of transparency and horizontal accountability within the public sector in general.

4.1 Opportunities, constraints and entry points

4.4 V&A in Mozambique operate in a social and political landscape framed by multiethnic cultural aspects, a historical background of mono party system, civil war and profound political and economic reforms undertaken from the eighties. The country's structural dependency on external resources that account for more than 50% of the State budget is an important part of the setting in which V&A operate. These aspects are all factors in determining the opportunities, constraints and entry points for V&A.

4.5 The analysis has shown that the distinction between opportunities and entry points is not always very clear. Entry points are opportunities, which have been explored, and opportunities are potential entry points. On the other hand, constraints can be overcome and turned into either opportunities or entry points. During the analysis, focus has inevitably been turned towards the innumerable constraints existing for full V&A, and only few opportunities (i.e. potential entry points) have been found. Bearing in mind, however, that **constraints are also potential opportunities or entry points**, it is equally important to analyse the constraints and learn from the difficulties encountered to find new ways for promoting V&A. Consequently, constraints as well as opportunities and entry points will be carried through to the recommendations in Chapter 6.

Opportunities

4.6 The political reform towards democracy has led to a **relatively conducive legal environment** for freedom of expression. Consequently, issues like human rights, the fight against corruption, gender equality rights and abuse are part of the public discourse and officially verbalized. The economic reform towards free market, building on democratic procedures of bringing all stakeholders together in the decision-making process, leads to a relatively stable ground for strengthening the ability of citizens to express their preferences on public policies, monitoring and evaluating policies by holding officials and or institutions accountable. The **diversified civil society** in Mozambique is part of this opportunity, and though weak in terms of resources and capacity, the mere existence of national NGOs, CBOs, faith-based and interest organisations is an important opportunity for voice to be expressed.

4.7 The **joint funding mechanisms and joint reviews**, which have been introduced over the last decade, provide an opportunity for increased voice and accountability. This goes hand in hand with the PARPA, the Public Sector Reform and other overall initiatives under the PAPs engagement with GoM. Although dominated by donors and high level government institutions, the focus on accountability is conducive to promotion of a general environment of transparency and sharing of information, which is a prerequisite for a democratic society. These mechanisms are, however, more conducive for accountability than for voice.

4.8 It was also found that the **increased availability of reliable information** from, for example, the Administrative Court and CIP, provides an excellent instrument for civil society to hold government accountable. As discussed in Chapter 3, access to this information is, however, a limitation to its applicability.

4.9 The **administrative and political decentralisation**, which was initiated in the late 1990s and formalised through the Law on Local Government²⁹, and the establishment of municipalities in 33 cities, also provides an excellent opportunity for citizens to actively voice their concerns, to influence development plans and to interact with government structures. The existence of the so-called **Seven Million Meticais development fund**³⁰ at district level is to a certain extent also an opportunity providing CCs and local associations with the possibility of financing their projects.

4.10 Opportunities for V&A are further strengthened through the public sector reform and the existence of various consultative structures at community (IPCCs), provincial (DO) and national (PO) levels. It has been verified that **capacity building** provides an opportunity for different actors and mechanisms: the Administrative Court (TA), members of Parliament (AWEPA) and CSOs³¹. At DO and IPCCs civil society organisations have benefited from capacity building through various donor funded projects.

4.11 In terms of promoting **women's voice and accountability**, the official discourse and the socialist legacy provide a platform for women's active participation in public fora, which represents an opportunity for a gender-balanced support to V&A. Only a few of the case studies in the present evaluation have a specific focus on women, i.e. AWEPA (training of female MPs) and DIDENA (training of female Consultative Council members). It is important to be aware of opportunities which could be explored through other kinds of V&A interventions, for example through initiatives working with the media, the legal system, public sector reform and capacity building of key stakeholders³².

Constraints

4.12 Some characteristics of the Mozambican society represent serious constraints to V&A. First of all, is the worrying development in terms of **poverty**. As discussed in Chapter 3, the increasing GDP does not necessarily represent reduction of absolute poverty. Rather an increasing gap between the better-off urban based elite and the majority of the population living under the poverty line in rural areas seems to be widening. Despite the relative success in implementing political and economic reforms, governance in Mozambique still remains weak and **corruption** is unfortunately an increasing problem and cause for much concern in the public debate. Increased levels of official corruption in Mozambique have been documented by Transparency International in 2006 (based on experts' opinions) and by the Afrobarometer in 2002 and 2005 (based on public opinion). The increased corruption is linked to deficient vertical and horizontal accountability, as well as lack of transparency in decision making.

²⁹ Law 8/2003 and Decree 11/2005.

³⁰ The Seven Million fund was introduced in 2005 and is formally called OIIL – *orçamento de investimento de iniciativa local* (Investment Budget for Local Initiatives). The fund was initially introduced to boost the development at district level, which was considered the backbone of development. The purpose was to provide funds for social infrastructure, but the President of the Republic has later changed this to target income and employment generation activities, and food production in line with the overall policy of targeting poverty through economic growth. This amount was allocated evenly in all districts, but now the criteria have been changed and elements like population and poverty rates will be used to determine the amount to be allocated to the 128 different districts of Mozambique. Funds are made available to eligible individuals and associations as loans with a very short repayment period. Problems related to the selection of eligible beneficiaries are discussed in Chapter 4 Findings and Annex D1 DIDENA.

³¹ Among other interventions not included in the case study is the MASC programme financed by DFID to provide funding for CSO.

³² Gender equality in Good Governance, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gender Toolbox, 2008.

4.13 The existence of a democratically elected Parliament would under normal circumstances provide an excellent forum for citizens' opportunity to hold politicians accountable. In Mozambique, the proportional representation electoral system for Parliament is based on **blocked party lists** which have a negative effect on (downward) accountability. Citizens vote for a party, not for a specific candidate, and candidates are nominated by the party. Consequently, there is no direct link (accountability) between a MP and his/her constituency. The party, not individual MPs, is accountable to the citizens, and MPs feel more accountable to their party than to their voters' constituency. Citizens therefore have difficulty in expressing their voice and demanding accountability from MPs.

4.14 The **weak horizontal accountability** between the Legislative (Parliament), the Judiciary (Administrative Court, Attorney General and criminal courts) and the Executive (government) represents a constraint to V&A. Based on inspection and audit reports by the Administrative Court, the Parliament often finds that there is too much irregularity in budget execution. Instead of taking consequent measures, the Parliament only recommends that Government improves General State Accounts in the following year. Irregularities are not reported to the Attorney General and Criminal Courts to enforce the rule of law. Consequently, law is not applied equally to everybody, as Government is not held responsible (accountable) by Parliament for verified irregularities or mismanagement of public funds. Another example of weak horizontal accountability is the politicians' discretionary power to limit public access to certain information in Parliament through the parliamentary petition committee that appreciates claims on State violations of citizens' rights. Each year the committee of petition receives an uncounted number of citizens' claims but these issues are discussed behind closed doors by the Parliament plenary and there is no follow up on the cases that are later sent to the Attorney General, if criminal acts are found.

4.15 **Availability of and access to information** is an opportunity, but also a constraint to V&A. This is an issue at various levels. First, in relation to general news and information available to citizens through the media. Secondly, in the form of relevant information produced and made available on an annual basis by the Administrative Court on inspection and auditing of State budget execution. However, access to information is de facto limited to people living in the capital or the few people with internet access in provinces. The overwhelming majority of Mozambicans living outside Maputo has no access to documents on General State Account produced by the Government and respective assessment produced by the Administrative Court. Even in Maputo this information is restricted and in practice only available to Parliament. Only very few copies are available from the Parliament's Library for public consultation. In the case of IPCCs, especially CCs, many rural community representatives are illiterate and have as such limited access, to enable them to understand and evaluate district plans and budgets. District plans are rarely available to the public in the districts. Availability of information often depends on where one is and who one is, but access is often further hampered by geographical isolation and high rate of illiteracy. Consequently, opportunities for accountability are weak.

4.16 The strong **government-to-government bias in development assistance** (endorsed by the Paris Declaration) represents an indirect threat to the need for strengthening civil society's advocacy (political) role. The strong focus on government support in combination with donors' need to reduce administrative costs and concentrate on fewer, major programmes tends to marginalize support to civil society. Furthermore, there is a risk of co-option of civil society through inclusion

in government/donor created institutions. An example is the Poverty Observatory/Development Observatories where civil society is invited to dialogue, but no formal, binding follow-up takes place.

4.17 **Donors' lack of a clear V&A policy** is a constraint, not only in terms of identifying V&A activities, but also in evaluating the degree of V&A, as well as the impact of V&A-like interventions. All ECG donors implement activities which can be classified as citizens' V&A interventions, although often designated as community participation, support to civil society or rights-based approach. This means that there is no uniform approach to V&A – and as such no uniform results registered³³. In the case of the Urban Environmental Management project with the Municipality of Ilha de Moçambique, community awareness raising or mobilization towards the urban environment component was understood as community participation, i.e. providing information or conducting hearings is seen as active participation from the community, although it is basically a one-way communication. Citizens' consultations on CCs and Development/Poverty Observatories have also been seen as V&A interventions. In CCs in Mecuburi District and the Municipality of Ilha de Moçambique, community representatives have been asked to list their main problems and then vote for a priority list. But this amounts only to voice and not to accountability.

4.18 According to some informants, **donors also face capacity constraints and problems of lack of institutional memory**. The first problem stems from the need to deal with many areas at the same time under the vast aid portfolio that donors manage, in a context of limited manpower and technical expertise to cover the various policy areas³⁴. The second problem has to do with the lack of continuity in projects and at delegations when staff turnout occurs; in some cases counterparts had to take the ad hoc role of explaining to the newcomer what the projects/interventions are about. This can be a constraint for the smooth implementation and even continuity of interventions.

4.19 The '**sectorization' of civil society** is another constraint to V&A in Mozambique. Through legislation, Government tries to categorise NGOs and CBOs as implementing agencies within certain sectors, rather than seeing them as political actors in a democratic society. The expectations of provincial governments in some of the Development Observatories are to hold CSOs accountable for the implementation of development activities in specific sectors. Criticism was raised by both CSOs and donors that provincial governments claim credit from the positive performance of CSOs in terms of fulfilment of provincial development plans.

4.20 **Many civil society organisations lack internal democratic structures**, which hamper their scope for truly participating in advocating for democratic procedures. CSOs are often characterised by a strong, central leadership, where internal structures tend to replica a government hierarchy, and organisations are at risk if the leader should leave the organisation. They also depend on external financial support to survive and much energy is channelled into securing survival. Donors' often unrealistically high expectations in terms of internal transparency and accounting capacity may divert efforts and indirectly weaken the focus on advocacy and external activities (CIP).

³³ Reference is made to Annexes C2: Overview of the Aid Environment, and C3: Budget information from **ECG donors** on V&A interventions

³⁴ Donors acknowledge this problem and are lately creating more specialized groups to cover more accurately the various policy areas (e.g. decentralization group, public sector reform group, economists' group, etc)

In the case of the media, the financial dependence on resources dominated by the political class is also a problem in terms of playing the watchdog role of citizens' rights.

4.21 In rural areas, ordinary citizens' **culture of obedience** towards authorities, be they traditional, government or party authorities, is in many cases a severe constraint to V&A. At district and sub-district level, the active participation of rural citizens in CCs is restricted by the fact that the relationship to government authorities is basically perceived as a patron-client relationship. Citizens do not feel that they are entitled to demand anything from their government authorities, rather they ask for favours, which may or may not be granted. If granted, the citizens feel a sense of obligation towards the authorities. This means that local governments are rarely held responsible in relation to district plans or budgets, and in the case of the Seven Million Meticaís development fund, the discretionary power of the authorities to decide is rarely questioned. The patron-client relationship is reinforced through a mixture of traditional power structures and the strong (Frelimo) party network existing in rural areas.

4.22 As mentioned in Chapter 3, women are often inhibited from active participation as a result of cultural barriers and traditions. When taking the rural-urban bias in terms of access to information, education and poverty into account, the situation of **rural women** in terms of access to V&A is especially vulnerable.

Entry points

4.23 Entry points are explored opportunities. The identified entry points are therefore mechanisms which provide a pathway for promotion of citizens' V&A. The CCS, including the context analysis, and the case study of seven V&A intervention cases have provided in-sight into a number of entry points. Albeit only two entry points are specifically spelled out here, it is important to see also constraints and opportunities in line with the entry points. As pointed out above, there is a close connection between the three issues.

4.24 The administrative **decentralization process accompanied by the availability of the Seven Million development fund** at district level and the establishment of IPCCs represent a strong entry point for V&A. The central government has allocated funds of Seven Million Meticaís at district level, initially for infrastructure and afterwards for loans to rural organisations to implement economic activities in line with the current government priorities, i.e. food production, rural trade, income and employment generation. The existence of the loans has, however, diverted the attention of the CC members from holding district authorities accountable in relation to district development plans and budget execution. The strong influence of party politics on the IPCC structures is a problem. In the case of DIDENA, where CC members are elected at grass roots levels, they are often first mobilized by community authorities with strong party affiliations. Consequently, the CC representatives indirectly represent a political party. In the political climate of increased mono-partyism, they are therefore less critical to government performance. This raises issues of representativeness and legitimacy of IPCC structures. This process is further reinforced by the political culture of obedience in rural Mozambique.

4.25 The Poverty/**Development Observatory** was identified as an entry point for V&A. It is defined as "consultative forum for monitoring the objectives, targets and action that have been specifically assigned to public and private sector within the context of PARPA. As a consultative

body, PO is expected to support the Government and its partners in the supervision and coordination, and draw on the combined energies of all stakeholders”³⁵. Although created officially by the government, the PO/DO remain an informal structure for CVA, since there is no legal frame that prescribes its existence and no formal follow-up on decisions. At provincial level, the DO functions according to the provincial governor’s defined rules and procedures. However, the issue of representativeness and legitimacy of civil society organisations is questionable – for example, the representatives of CCs in the DOs are the district administrators, with no district level civil society representatives. The level of representation afforded through CSO fora functions according to the will of Government. As an initiative to counter balance the relative government dominance, CSOs in Nampula have taken the initiative to create a **new platform for coordination of CSO interaction with provincial government**. The presidency is based on a six-monthly rotation to avoid being manipulated by the Government. The CSO platform represents an entry point for a more coordinated and united CSO response to provincial government. It can very well provide CSO with the strength and coordinated position, which is required to hold provincial government accountable to development plans and budgets.

4.2 Institutional, organizational and individual capacities

4.26 Almost all of the seven cases contain elements of capacity building. The underlying models of change are based on the assumption that **low capacity often leads to lack of participation, i.e. lack of active voice and holding government institutions accountable**. The success varies from case to case due to specific circumstances, but in a number of interventions the capacity building efforts have been found to be highly relevant for providing better conditions for V&A. Capacity building efforts in the case studies have been carried out in an institutional or organisational context. Involved stakeholders have benefitted at an individual level from the capacity building. Their permanence within the institutions/organisations is therefore important for sustainability. Especially in the case of the training of MPs has this been questioned due to the risk of turnover of MPs at elections.

Capacity building interventions

4.27 The **Administrative Court** plays a very important role in legislative oversight, because it provides the necessary inputs for the Parliament to oversee the execution of the State budget. The Administrative Court capacity development has been targeted to the following areas: strengthening capacity for analysis of the General State Account and financial auditing of central government, provinces, districts, municipalities and public enterprises, selection and training of personnel, strengthening internal management systems and practices, as well as organizational resources (including introduction and consolidation of use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs)). The intensive capacity building has led to a remarkable increase in activities, expansion in terms of staff to regional level and production of relevant documentation.

4.28 **AWEPA’s capacity building of MPs** aims at improving governance through strengthening of Parliament in key areas, such as representation, legislation and oversight capacity. To attain these objectives the programs focus on strengthening the general capacity of MPs, working committees and staff, training and information facilities in Parliament, and providing

³⁵ “Modelo de Comunicação, draft, UNDP, November 2007.

targeted inputs to selected priority sectors and areas (for example, dealing with HIV/AIDS and oversight of the implementation of the law protecting people living with HIV/AIDS³⁶).

4.29 Strengthening the **organisational capacity in CIP** was relevant because of the lack of organisations performing the watchdog role after the demise of *Ética Moçambique*, an organization that played a crucial role in the fight against corruption in the country. At the internal level, the focus was primarily on staffing and creating a management system; at the external level on promotion of evidence-based discussions about corruption. These efforts resulted in visibility of public accountability issues in the public debate as well as more demand for accountability and follow up on issues raised by the various V&A actors and mechanisms (for example, follow up on the findings of the administrative court assessment of the annual public account).

4.30 Donors' support to improving CSOs' capacity to participate in **Development Observatories** is important, as there is a need for a coordinated voice in relation to provincial government. The DO is a privileged space where CSOs can engage with government in discussion of development issues, including monitoring of the PARPA. Donors' strengthening of CSOs actors (e.g. the CSO platform in Nampula) to engage with government is crucial for strengthening of V&A.

4.31 For the **DIDENA project** implemented by Ibis, capacity building is an important component, creating awareness in local council representatives on the functioning and importance of IPCCs; organization of rural community in legalized associations; and drafting proposals to ask for part of Seven Million development fund. The CC members have through the capacity building obtained access to influence and therefore a more active (though still limited in terms of V&A) voice than before. The DIDENA capacity building is relevant to the extent that rural communities have knowledge of the functioning of consultative councils, their importance in the context of V&A, and that they represent a privileged arena to channel their views. Rural residents use CCs to voice their preferences to obtain loans from district government. Interventions on capacity development of CCs/IPCCs structures are needed, as these are new mechanisms of V&A at district, community and grass roots levels. With reference to the importance of informal power structures in rural Mozambique, the need for capacity building and awareness raising among rural communities become even more pertinent.

Constraints and success

4.32 In terms of expected results (outputs and outcomes) of donors' support for capacity development, there is some evidence that initiatives are strengthening V&A actors and mechanisms to engage with government in political and economic processes. However, due to initially unforeseen changes – such as interruptions in terms of delays in disbursement (Urban Environmental Management Project), or cancellation of second phase (DIDENA) – some donor support for capacity building and training initiatives of state and non-state actors involved in V&A interventions is less likely to be effective and sustainable. Villagers' associations interviewed about the DIDENA project said that if training on how to engage with consultative councils and district government was interrupted at this stage in time, it would be wasted.

³⁶ Law 5/2002

4.33 Some donor-supported capacity development initiatives aimed at state actors involved in V&A activities are successful and sustainable, but not necessarily effective due to lack of a holistic and integrated approach. This is the case with the Administrative Court which after donors' capacity building support produces timely reports to Parliament's external inspection, auditing of public accounts and execution of State budget. The problem arises when Parliament approves the General State Account, as many irregularities are found in the budget execution, but these issues are not taken to the Attorney General and criminal courts. The Parliament only recommends the Executive to improve the execution of State budget in the following year. There is no follow up and officials and institutions are not held accountable. For example, synergies between this initiative and AWEPA's, both with Swedish support, would improve the overall capacity for effective horizontal accountability, integrating the capacity development effort of the Administrative Court and Parliament with a clear focus (for example, to ensure that the annual state budget (CGE) has a proper analysis and follow up).

4.34 Donors' support for advocacy initiatives (CIP) has been successful and effective with CIP detecting corruption cases in the health and education sector through applied research. In education, CIP has elaborated a Code of Conduct for school teachers in collaboration with the National Teachers' Association (ONP). This will be submitted to the Ministry of Education for official approval. ONP succeeded in voicing their concern on this issue at the annual meeting (*Conselho Coordenador*) of the Ministry of Education. In the case of the health sector, the Ministry of Health has already welcomed the idea of a Code of Conduct for health sector professionals. On the other hand, many CIP reports advocating for civil, political and social rights, and revealing information on corruption within the state apparatus are published without any follow-up. It is rare that someone is held accountable for corruption or taken to criminal courts.

4.3 V&A channels: actors and mechanisms

4.35 In line with the Paris Declaration, donors are increasingly channelling their assistance through national mechanisms and relying on government structures. Currently 19 donors, known as Programme Aid Partners (PAPs), are channelling their resources through the state budget and hold bi-annual reporting and accountability exercises, known as annual joint reviews and mid-term reviews. The joint reviews are mainly donor-government processes and only more recently have civil society organisations been called to participate, but their role is still limited. The trend to focus on direct budget support reinforces the fact that donor assistance is essentially a government-to-government relation, which has implications in the focus and nature of V&A interventions; more specifically on the approaches and options adopted in supporting actors and mechanisms. This means that PAPs are supporting the government's poverty reduction plan (PARPA) and related mechanisms. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is, however, not necessarily enough to secure a pro-poor economic development, as the gap between poor and well-off has been widening over the past years. Donor's engagement in interventions directly targeted at poor people is to be found in the sphere of civil society and community based projects.

4.36 Actors include the different agents which participate in V&A; they are sub-divided in state (government institutions at national, provincial or local level) or non-state actors (CSOs, political parties, traditional authorities). The mechanisms used involve procedures, rules and processes, either formal or informal³⁷.

³⁷ Reference is made to Chapter 3.1.2 for the definition and presentation of actors and mechanisms and to the Evaluation Framework, Annex 1a, pp 16-17.

Actors

4.37 As a result of issues outlined above, the main target of donors' V&A interventions tends to be (or at least involve) **state actors**. Out of the seven case studies only one case (support to CIP) is targeted entirely to a **non-state actor**, two to state actors (AWEPA and support to Administrative Court), and four involve mechanisms **combining state and non-state actors** (urban environment project, DIDENA, CLUFP and Development Observatory)³⁸. Whilst there is no reason to see this as entirely negative, in some cases it can limit the possibilities for creating real capacity with non-state actors to ensure effective V&A and avoid the mere dominance of state actors in the process, with negative effects in the overall V&A.

4.38 The AWEPA support to Parliament illustrates this. The support was aimed at improving the dialogue between the MPs and their electorate in order to create conditions for inclusion of the constituencies' preferences in policy making and legislation. After the implementation of the activities, the concrete output of this process was the improvement of dialogue and the approval of the electoral legislation and the law protecting people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWA). Nevertheless, the outcome of this process should be the implementation of these policies and their effect on the electorate. Because the electorate was not capacitated to follow up on the legislation approved, the effective impact of this initiative was limited or even absent. The other gap in this project was its focus on training MPs, who, if not re-elected, will probably leave Parliament after one election period. Finally, weak management structures and practices in the Legislative rendered the disbursement and management of funds very difficult, and AWEPA had to centralise the funding of activities, which also limited the scope and quantity of activities supported.

4.39 Moreover, support to non-state actors is still problematic, and can be labelled as support to the political opposition. A donor informant reported that they designed a programme involving a government institution, a professional association and CSOs to strengthen the capacity of civil society organisations in public finance management accountability and oversight. When they presented the idea to the Government the reaction was not positive, because some public officials argued that the civil society organization's head was from the opposition and the Government could not work with his organization. The donor ended up funding the project but without the participation of the government agency; although the government agency would clearly benefit from it and their involvement would have rendered the capacity development process more effective.

4.40 The Urban Environment Management Project of Ilha de Moçambique provides another example. The project aimed at improving the living conditions of citizens through better environmental management with community participation. Because of the complex political environment of Ilha de Moçambique - where the elected Municipal Council was controlled by Renamo, and the District Government was controlled by Frelimo, yet both cohabitated in the same physical space - it has been very difficult to involve the communities. Rumours, misinformation and other issues all contributed to de-motivating civil society; and civil society is still closely linked to the informal mechanisms created by the central government. Nevertheless, the project has trained some municipal staff, but without the participation of the community and the cooperation of the district government, the impact will be low.

³⁸ Obviously this should not be interpreted as an evidence of this trend, since the aim of the selected interventions is not to make generalisations within an acceptable level of statistical significance.

4.41 These examples show that interventions aimed at supporting actors, if not integrated within a broader context that avoids the exclusion of other actors, can be ineffective or at best produce only outputs without remarkable outcomes. Inter-linkage and coordination with other interventions are important for success. V&A activities should not be implemented as stand-alone interventions focused on either actors or mechanisms. For example, in the question of budget oversight and accountability there is support to the Administrative Court, support to Parliament through AWEPA, and support to CIP. However, there are no mechanisms to link these interventions in a coherent way, which could work to ensure that these actors and mechanisms are strengthened through better coordination. For this to be effective, donors should have a kind of “Budget oversight group” with interventions under a common approach, in which specific outputs contribute to broader outcomes. At present, there are outputs, but not visible outcomes. In the specific case of actors, support to the Administrative Court should go hand-in-hand with support to Parliament and other actors. This would work to ensure the strategic application of information and resources available to hold the Government accountable. When supporting actors, mechanisms that can create the enabling environment for this to be effective must also be taken into account.

4.42 But donors have also been involved in successful experiences of supporting actors. In the case of the Administrative Court, for example, its capacity development paved the way for the availability of information on public management that can be used by a range of other actors, like the Legislative and others positioned to hold the executive accountable. The same applies to CIP, since the support to this watchdog actor enabled it to make information available on public integrity that can be used by others. Few of the case studies have a specific focus on promoting women’s voice and accountability. As discussed in Chapter 3, the official discourse and the socialist legacy provides a platform for women’s active participation in public fora.

Mechanisms

4.43 There is a **tendency to focus support on urban-based or formal mechanisms** (e.g. Poverty/Development Observatory, Administrative Court, joint reviews, Consultative Councils), thus downplaying the importance of informal mechanisms (which are often not donor supported). Nevertheless, there are underlying problems that can prevent these interventions from attaining their goals. For example, donors are taking for granted the effectiveness of the formal mechanism and assume that contributing to their strengthening is contributing to improving V&A. This approach stems from the lack of a sound understanding of the *realpolitik* dynamics or for the need to stick to the Paris Declaration recommendation to support national systems and mechanisms.

4.44 Support to the Development Observatory (DO) was supposed to bring the voice of the citizens close to the decision makers and also to improve the monitoring of the implementation of the poverty reduction strategy. However, DOs so far have a limited role in effective monitoring and their decisions are not binding to the Government. In some cases their functioning differs from province to province and its openness to voice and accountability depends on the will of its chairperson (in case of the provinces, the Governor). Informants reported different situations, ranging from reasonable openness to intimidation. In some cases, DOs are seen as the arenas where CSOs are supposed to report on their activities and account for them to the Government, instead of the opposite.

4.45 **At the local level**, Consultative Councils are also hailed as channels for V&A and tend to have the sympathy of donors. In fact, the legal framework that creates these bodies is consistent with that expectation. The experience from DIDENA is, however, that voice is very weak, almost silent in terms of holding district authorities accountable to plans and budgets. The possible access to funds through the Seven Million development fund is a strong entry point for rural communities to articulate with district authorities. The articulation is, however, still characterised by a paternalistic relationship, rather than that of an active citizenship demanding its right to benefit from the public funds as well as to hold Government accountable for its management.

4.46 In both mechanisms rules for selection and control of the representatives are not clear, hence raising problems of **representativeness and legitimacy**. In this context, those who represent the voice of the citizens can in fact represent other interests. For example, the District Administrator has the mandate to establish the CCs and he/she can also appoint the members. This gives room for co-opting the members of the CC, as they will probably not be in a position to hold the District Administrator accountable. Supporting these formal mechanisms without knowing the informal dynamics behind them can contribute to perpetuating voiceless and unaccountable channels. Therefore, strengthening CCs is very important for V&A but it is necessary to build the capacity of the civil society members to effectively express their voice and hold state officials accountable, as well as clarifying the representation processes, to avoid the presence of individuals that do not represent (or are not accountable to) the interests of the communities but only their own or someone else.

4.47 But there are also positive experiences in **supporting mechanisms and actors in a more integrated way**. Despite the problems discussed above, the approach adopted in strengthening the Administrative Court is a good example. In fact Sweden and other donors structured their support under a broad assistance to the improvement of Public Financial Management, involving TA, the General Inspectorate of Finance and the System of State Financial Administration. This approach is a combination of support to actors and mechanisms with encouraging results. The Public Financial Management System (SISTAFE) has contributed to the timeliness in the preparation and sending of the Annual Public Accounts (CGE) that are analysed by the TA and the Parliament, but at the same time TA is endowed with the capacity to audit the public sector as an external control actor while the IGF does the same as an internal actor. However, much more integration with other actors involved in horizontal accountability is needed, as shown in the previous section.

4.48 Donor-driven mechanisms, such as the joint reviews, while regarded as having deleterious effects on accountability (because it erodes the authority of the Legislative to hold the Executive accountable), can also have **positive by-products or side-effects**. Joint reviews are far more demanding on Executive than Legislative hearings, because they tend to be more detailed and facts-based and involve a strong leverage of donors on the Government, affecting the approval of the budget allocations for the following year. Joint reviews are also forcing the Government to improve the quality of reporting and information, which is published and thus available for any actor. In that sense, this parallel mechanism is contributing to V&A through provision of information that can be used to voice preferences as well as to hold state actors accountable. However, some **negative trends** can also be detected, as donors' focus on results based management (through LogFrames, plans, budgets and stricter accounting procedures) is often counterproductive to the more organic processes found in civil society. Another important issue in

this context is the definition of indicators for civil society's engagement in, for example, Poverty Observatory, where the number of sessions held is measured, but no attention is paid to the actual content or quality of Government-civil society dialogue.

4.3.3 Synergy between actors and mechanisms

4.49 Donor interventions are still fragmented and do not take into account the fact that V&A initiatives and outcomes are a mutual process, and need to be conceived as a process involving multiple actors and mechanisms, and involving a combination of both. The cases of CIP (actor) and Administrative Court (actor and mechanisms) are illustrative of this. For example, there is a complaint about the lack of follow up on the recommendations produced by the Administrative Court and adopted by the Parliament. The same is applicable to the reports on corruption in the public sector produced by a watchdog organisation like CIP. This shows that if not integrated and coordinated, interventions aimed at strengthening actors and mechanisms can only yield partial and incomplete results. To obtain effective voice (CIP) and accountability (Administrative Court), it is necessary to integrate interventions that strengthen actors and mechanisms, which can create the conditions for voicing of relevant opinions, effective oversight and follow up, as well as accountability, here understood as holding state actors responsible whenever necessary.

4.4 Changes in policy, practice, behaviour and power relations

4.50 Since most of the V&A interventions are mainly output based, they will tend to influence changes in policy, practice and behaviour and less in power relations, which depend on national, political processes.

Change in practice and behaviour

4.51 Clearly CIP and Administrative Court interventions have a considerable impact on the **change of practice and behaviour**. For example, the intensification of auditing at local level is also increasing the awareness of local public managers of the need to be more accountable. Obviously the impact of Administrative Court work could be bigger if some of the information produced was easily accessible to the public, CSOs and the media. Accessibility in this case is not only availability, but also a question of capacity to process, understand and use strategically this information for voice and accountability purposes. Nevertheless, the situation has clearly improved: from a scenario of complete absence of auditing and accountability, the picture is completely different now, because of the Administrative Court's presence in the field. This should also have an impact on state responsiveness, since it is expected that the *raison d'être* of public sector organisations is to provide public services to the citizens and respond to their demands. However, even interventions such as support to the Poverty Observatories and CCs, where actors are involved in policy making and oversight functions, do not necessarily ensure changes in state responsiveness and public service delivery, because they tend to focus more on strengthening the mechanism itself and less on the actors involved. Consequently, the informal power structures and mechanisms that determine the way these bodies actually function may be overlooked. Monitoring of budget execution at district level provides an example. It is further influenced by political and cultural barriers that place the state as the patron or provider, and citizens as clients who ask for something that the state might choose to provide or not.

4.52 Illiteracy and ignorance about the legislation, rights and obligations give much room for state agents to manipulate local level accountability mechanisms like the CCs. One informant reported that it was found out that in one district all who have benefited from the Seven Million development fund for local investment initiatives were members of the CC. It is clear that in this situation the oversight role of this organ is an illusion, because of the co-option by its members. Being heavily involved themselves, they cannot objectively demand accountability on budget execution and other issues. The example that POs and CCs functioning depends on the personality of its chair and his/her openness to involve or not non-state actors in a participatory dialogue, illustrates this point.

4.53 In fact, the above-mentioned interventions can allow for much voice but less or no accountability, because of their silo nature and lack of coordination with other complementary aspects. To avoid this, outputs from the Administrative Court should be complemented by follow up actions coming from other bodies, i.e. the Judiciary Tribunals and the Attorney General's Office. The same is valid for the work done by CIP and other watchdog organisations like the Human Rights League (LDH), which regularly produces reports on governance issues, often raising concerns of violation of elementary principles of governance and fundamental rights, but without a visible impact or effective reaction from relevant state actors.

Policy dialogue for accountability

4.54 **Donor-driven processes like the joint reviews also contribute to improved accountability and impact on resource allocation**, public revenues and expenditures. Joint reviews are opportunities that allow for more dialogue on accountability than bilateral reviews, even on sensitive issues, due to the considerable influence donors have on budgetary decisions, because of their support to more than 50% of the State budget. Under the joint review process, donors have consistently pressed for a forensic auditing of the *Banco Austral* accounts, which was rescued using public funds after being in serious trouble because of bad credit granted to people linked to the *nomenklatura*. Despite the importance of this issue, it has been more systematically (and with a sound technical justification) voiced by donors than other actors, and government ended up accepting to perform a forensic audit. However, until now the report has not been published. In this case, donor intervention has been more effective in forcing the Government to be more accountable in a situation where other actors failed. The other positive effect is the contribution to the availability of quality information relevant for V&A, as compared to the information produced for the formal state actors like the Legislative.

4.55 However, **donors' leverage on government can yield unintended consequences**, which is the erosion of the authority of formal V&A actors, like the Legislative and the civil society at large. For example, budget ceilings depend on donors' commitment to fund the state budget deficit, which also stems from their assessment of government performance in the execution of the previous year budget, an exercise with little or no participation of the Legislative and the civil society. But at the same time the Legislative is expected to approve the state budget and oversee its implementation, based on the mandate given by its constituencies. Since joint reviews also assess the allocations in key policy areas, they tend to influence future decisions on budget allocations without addressing citizens' claims, because so far the space for voice of civil society actors in this process is limited or non-existent³⁹.

³⁹ Although in recent joint-reviews donors are also involving civil society organisations. Nevertheless, it does not ensure that citizens' claims will be taken into account, since these CSOs might not represent properly the most relevant societal interests.

4.56 Citizens' claims are, however, attended to by other donor interventions. The CLUFP is aimed at promoting citizens' and communities' access to land rights. The Urban Environmental Management Project likewise seeks to promote an active influence from civil society organisations on priority-setting in choice of urban environmental activities; albeit this initiative is facing difficulties due to political dead-lock and a weak civil society in the case of the municipality of Ilha de Moçambique. Therefore, what is lacking for more impact is the identification and strengthening of all the relevant actors involved in a particular V&A process in a more integrated way, taking into account the enabling environment and the favourable and unfavourable factors influencing the process.

Influence on power relations

4.57 Changes in power relations are difficult to attain because of the existing complex relations between state and non-state actors, political culture and informal power structure and mechanisms. The reason why impact is low in power relations stems from what was pointed out in the context analysis: the dominance of a single political party which historically controls or influences heavily all the powers (Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary). For instance, the impact of the improvement in the capacity of the Administrative Court is hindered by the ambiguous dependence on the Executive to approve their budget. The President of the Administrative Court is appointed by the President of the Republic, who is also president of the ruling party. The same is applicable to the Legislative, which also has an oversight role, but at the same time its budget ceiling is defined by the Executive. In this context, the Executive still has some leverage over these actors and this can impact on the speed of change in power relations. In the short term, substantial changes in power relations do not depend mainly on the strength of these actors, but on the change of the balance of power inside the ruling nucleus (the ruling party), which still influences state and non-state actors heavily.

4.58 It is important to notice that donors are also part of this puzzle, since their role in the joint review yields positive (more accountability and availability of information) and unintended negative results (erosion of formal/constitutional accountability and by-pass of citizens' claims). Donors' position in the balance of power in V&A - at least in policy and budgetary decisions key to the attainment of development outcomes - is much stronger than the citizens' and Legislative's position vis-à-vis the Executive. Being external actors and in principle facilitators of the V&A internal processes, donors should pay more attention to shifting this balance of power through support to V&A interventions that increasingly strengthen internal actors and mechanisms.

4.5 Broader development outcomes

4.59 Although some interventions do not establish a clear relation, the increasing trend of channelling the country assistance through direct budget support is a factor favouring a close linkage between V&A interventions and the development outcomes. This trend is stronger in those interventions supported by the Programme Aid Partners, which are monitored in the bi-annual processes of joint review, and are mainly implemented by state/government actors.

4.60 In the case of interventions involving non-state actors, the pathways can be more complex, because the outcomes of these initiatives have to be inexorably combined with others at the state

level to trigger the necessary developmental outcomes. For example, the work of CIP in disclosing and voicing mismanagement and other problems in public integrity has to be incorporated in state actors' actions and be channelled through formal mechanisms to provoke the necessary changes. When it comes to non-state actors, this can be difficult, since their recommendations are not binding and are not necessarily taken into account by state actors.

4.61 The interventions selected for this study present some examples that can help understand to what extent there is a linkage between V&A and development outcomes. Based on the analysis of the empirical data from the cases, the interventions can be classified in three groups. The classification is tentative and a proposal for identifying what works and what does not.

Linkage between V&A and development outcomes

4.62 The first group of interventions are those with an *explicit linkage between V&A and development outcome*. In these interventions, the impact is relatively easy to foresee and to measure, although it is not always possible due to circumstances (it may be too complex to choose and donors do not have resources to deal with it) or sense of opportunity (some interventions can fit the specialization of the donors and the resources they have and can even have a considerable impact even if not necessarily **directly** linked to development outcomes). Among the case studies for the CCS, support to the Administrative Court, to PO/DOs, DIDENA and CLUFP are examples of this kind of V&A intervention.

4.63 The overall objective of the **Administrative Court** is to contribute to an improvement in accountability and transparency in all areas of the economy towards an optimal use of public resources. It is consistent with the need for strengthening the accountability mechanism within the public management systems, with particular emphasis on direct budget support. Outcomes tend to be sustainable, because measures were taken to ensure that the normal functioning of the Administrative Court is under the responsibility of the national actors. However, broader development outcomes depend on a more integrated and holistic approach, involving complementary actors and mechanisms, as discussed throughout this chapter.

4.64 The purpose of **PO/DO** is to monitor and evaluate the progress of PARPA actions and the level of PARPA performance and to provide useful feedback to Government as a form of broad-based monitoring and evaluation. However, whilst putting the mechanism in place is a good starting point, this does not ensure that the actors operating under these mechanisms will necessarily use them according to what they were created for. Findings of the present evaluation show that DO are indeed an arena where Government and civil society meet to discuss policy issues and report on the implementation of the poverty strategy. However, depending on the context, it can be a way of legitimizing decisions already taken if CSOs are not strong enough to hold the Government accountable and to freely voice their preferences.

4.65 The **CLUFP** aims to enhance the capacity to secure land tenure and natural resources rights of local communities in Gaza, Manica and Cabo Delgado provinces and to increase the sustainable management and utilisation of these resources for poverty reduction and economic growth, as well as to increase investments and more sustainable and equitable use of these resources. In fact, land and natural resources play a strategic role in Mozambique both as a potential source of long-term development and as the essential contributor to sustained food security. Mozambique's current and

future economic development depends largely on land and other natural resources, and effective resource management by local communities is a relevant activity for poverty reduction. This initiative has been launched in 2006, therefore it is too early to assess its achievements, but in principle the linkage between V&A and development outcomes is promising.

4.66 The **DIDENA** case focuses on strengthening and organizing civil society, aiming to involve fully the rural communities and interest groups in the planning and implementation processes at local levels through CCs. In this case, strengthening CSOs to effectively participate in the definition, implementation and monitoring of policies and plans is clearly a way of ensuring their ownership of the local development strategies that are aligned with the overall country strategies.

Foreseeable, but not explicit outcomes

4.67 The second type of intervention is that which focuses on *results in voice and accountability, but whose effects on development outcomes are not explicit but foreseeable*, i.e. an **intermediate linkage**. AWEPA's support to Parliament is an example of this. V&A outcomes are predicted, but seen as an end itself. This is an intermediate case, and donors may not always spell out the linkage with development outcomes, as they are not classified as V&A⁴⁰.

4.68 The **AWEPA** intervention contributes to broad governance and democracy goals, although the linkage with the development outcomes is not explicit. In fact it is worth mentioning the limited role that the Legislative still plays in defining development strategies and demanding executive accountability. The intervention includes also strengthening of staff, but so far the focus has been mainly on MPs. However, if this is not complemented with measures aimed at also capacitating the technical staff, the electoral fates of the MPs can have a deleterious effect on the role the Legislative will play in representing the citizenry, in policy-making and in oversight. Since the Executive has historically been stronger, this will impact on the overall governance and also on the way development strategies are designed, implemented and accounted for.

Strengthening of actors

4.69 Finally, the third group focuses on interventions aimed *at strengthening actors to voice their preferences or/and address citizens' claims on key public issues*, thus contributing indirectly to holding state actors more accountable or responsive, i.e. there is a **remote linkage** with broader development outcomes. This group includes interventions targeted to actors (or mechanisms). Output/outcome is seen as strengthening the actor/mechanism, but is not taken further. This is the case of CIP and the Urban Environmental Management Project interventions.

4.70 The objective of the **CIP** project is to promote integrity, transparency and responsibility in the public and private sectors, contributing to the social, economic and political development efforts. The activities undertaken have contributed to changes of practice in some public institutions that could lead to broader development goals (e.g. public service delivery). Examples are from the Ministry of Health, which has designed an anti-corruption strategy, and from the National Teacher's Organisation which has formulated a Code of Conduct based on evidence from research done about the corruption in the sector. Follow-up mechanisms are, however, needed on

⁴⁰ Reference is made to the Aid Environment Overview in Annex C2, where the fact that most donors do not refer explicitly to V&A is identified as an obstacle to identification of V&A interventions.

the watchdog role that this organisation is performing. Its voice alone cannot lead to broader outcomes, unless proper mechanisms that ensure effective accountability are in place.

4.71 The **Urban Environmental Management Project** aims at developing effective mechanisms for the active participation of urban communities in the partner municipalities in the identification, prioritisation and management of urban environmental threats⁴¹. In the case of Ilha de Moçambique, environmental management is a key developmental issue due to the exceptional geographical situation of this municipality. Therefore, strengthening civil society actors is a way to ensure that state actors address properly an issue that is crucial to the citizens' well-being, such as basic sanitation, in the complex environment of Ilha de Moçambique. However, the tense political climate resulting from the relation between the Renamo-controlled municipal government and Frelimo-based district government, renders involvement of state actors more limited than it should be, which is impacting negatively on the outcome of the project.

4.72 Based on the selected interventions, it can be said that in general **the linkage between V&A outcomes and development outcomes is present and tends to be more explicit in those interventions using government mechanisms (mainly direct budget support) or involving state actors**. This supports the increasing concern about harmonization stemming from the Paris Declaration. However, when state actors are not involved, the chain tends to be more complex and the results may be very difficult to foresee. Non-involvement of state actors can limit the impact of the results of the interventions, as the example of Ilha de Moçambique shows. This poses a serious challenge to V&A donor-funded interventions, because donor assistance is often biased towards state actors and mechanisms or actors under their sphere of control. This limits effective voice and reduces the prospects of effective accountability. Therefore, to attain direct outcomes in V&A, donors have to find ways of supporting state and non-state V&A channels to ensure that necessary mechanisms are created and operational, while at the same time state and non-state actors can embark on a balanced non-hierarchical interaction allowing for effective voice of relevant societal actors combined with true accountability of state actors.

4.73 The attempt to classify the analysed intervention cases in this third group, demonstrates the specific characteristics and the importance of securing inter-linkages, in order to ensure an impact on broader development outcomes. What is necessary is a sound definition of development indicators against which some outcomes can be measured.

⁴¹ The overall aim of the project is improved environmental conditions; the development of effective mechanisms for active participation of urban communities is a mean to obtain this, stated in immediate objective 3 of the project. For more details, see Annex D2.

5 Conclusions

5.1 Based on the presentation and discussion of findings in the previous chapter, conclusions from the CCS are drawn and presented according to the four overall evaluation questions related to⁴²:

- Channels, mechanisms and processes
- Results and outcomes
- Pathways to broader development outcomes
- V&A and aid effectiveness

5.1 Channels, mechanisms and processes

5.2 **Voice and accountability are often separated.** In the conceptual understanding of voice and accountability, the two concepts are interlinked and operate in a dialectic interaction. The case studies have shown that V&A are often separated, i.e. interventions tend to support or be *either* voice *or* accountability, based on the choice of actor and/or the context where they are applied. Consequently, the interactive process, which can lead to results in terms of changed practice, is either difficult to trace or remains halted. Interventions supporting voice through, for example, capacity building of MPs (AWEPA), village council members (DIDENA) or through organisational capacity building of a watchdog organisation (CIP) need to be seen in relation to the scope for the voice to demand accountability. **The articulation with government is crucial for the voice to lead to accountability.** In cases where the articulation is in focus (PO/DO) the uneven power structure and government dominance is posing an obstacle to V&A.

5.3 **Central level, PAP-government V&A mechanisms tend to focus on accountability rather than voice.** The V&A interventions supporting central level mechanisms (Administrative Court) in providing documentation and information do not assure that the information is disseminated and used. For state responsiveness to take place, it is necessary that accountability is demanded. Joint reviews and improvement of public financial management systems and capacity all focus on providing the platform for accountability, not necessarily on the existence or strengthening of voice. It is a risk that **donor leverage on Government can substitute Government's accountability towards own constituency**, as accountability is often directed towards the donors and less towards Parliament or the citizens as such.

5.4 There is also a **strong urban bias in the support to V&A mechanisms.** The administrative decentralisation effort in terms of establishing provincial Development Observatories for the monitoring of PARPA implementation is one of the few examples encountered, which supports the decentralisation of oversight mechanisms. In spite of the shortcomings discussed above, the initiative holds opportunities for increased V&A at decentralised level. The establishment of CLUFP is an example of the establishment of a (funding) mechanism which will facilitate the access of small-scale farmers and peasants to land.

5.5 **Local level, non-state actor V&A interventions are often more voice than accountability.** The capacity-building efforts in relation to local council members (DIDENA) or local interest groups (CLUFP) aim at reinforcing citizens' voice towards Government (IPCC or provincial government institutions).

⁴² Evaluation Framework, Annex 1a, p.8

5.6 The effort is, however, often not reinforcing the Government's capacity to act accountably. In this context, it should be stressed that **supporting voice in rural areas is extremely relevant**, acknowledging the low level of education, the obstacles posed by the culture of obedience, and the strong cultural hindrances for gender equality.

5.7 Practices like co-option of council members and selective allocation of funds in IPCCs are counterbalancing the efforts to capacitate council members to actively hold government bodies accountable – the voice remains silent and the accountability is not demanded. **Knowledge about political processes, i.e. the informal, underlying dynamics and power relations is essential** for a genuine result in terms of improved V&A. It is important to understand the context in order to design appropriate V&A interventions.

5.8 **Providing women with opportunities for an active voice** is a pervasive issue in relation to many of the V&A interventions. Activities in the field of training of politicians, for example, or support to CSOs and networks, media or public sector reform, should maintain a gender focus in order to secure that specific room is created for women to articulate their voice. The case studies have shown that mechanisms like IPCCs at local level and Parliament at national level give women room for active participation and a possibility to voice their opinions and priorities.

5.2 Results and outcomes

5.9 **Support to V&A actors must be integrated in a broader context to yield impact.** Results in terms of providing documentation and information which can be used to hold government institutions accountable have been verified in the case, for example, of the Administrative Court and CIP. Results have also been verified in terms of greater levels of participation among rural citizens with the establishment of the IPCCs and capacity-building programmes. It is, however, a fact that the V&A scope for these results remains limited if not linked to other processes in society. Horizontal accountability, as well as coherent interventions, is important for this to happen.

5.10 A general assumption for the case studies in this evaluation is that low levels of capacity hamper development. There is no doubt that capacity building is highly relevant and important – but it is also evident that it must be consistent with other activities. In the case of the Urban Environmental Project, capacity building of municipal council members yielded little result in terms of increased V&A due to the political deadlock in relation to the District Administration. The capacity building of MPs through the AWEPA programme may run the risk of not having long-term impact, if it does not also include other stakeholders, such as permanent staff. In all these examples, **the model of change needs to build on a thorough understanding and analysis of the context in order to be sufficiently clear.**

5.11 **Donors present an important opportunity to influence the development of a vibrant and critical civil society** through increased support to civil society actors and mechanisms. Donors play an important role vis-à-vis government as a partner constantly advocating for democratic practices. The risk is that their primary focus on government-to-government relations, overshadows the necessary development of an active and independent civil society. This is further reinforced by the donors' need to lower transaction costs, which often

results in a reduction of support to CSOs which is seen as more time and resource-consuming. CSOs' dependence on financial support from either donors or Mozambican sources poses a threat to their independence of expression and increases the risks of co-option. Diversification of financial sources is essential in this context, and donors can facilitate this.

5.12 Urban and rural Mozambique represents two different realities. Urban based, formal V&A mechanisms and actors have benefitted most from donor support, i.e. through joint reviews, general budget support, oversight mechanisms etc. Likewise, urban based non-state actors (CIP, LDH) benefit from donor support. Consequently, the opportunities and entry points at central level are better explored than is the case in rural areas. In spite of many district development programmes, rural communities and rural non-state actors remain underprivileged in relation to V&A; not only due to fewer interventions but also due to the different socio-political context. The room for a critical voice is wider at national level, and consequently the need for strengthening voice at local level is bigger. The traditional power structure as well as the hierarchical party structure influences negatively on the possibility for both media and CSOs to operate at local level.

5.13 The present CCS has not provided much evidence of specific attention paid to the **gender dimension of voice and accountability**. However, in order to provide women with access to actively voice their opinions and make an influence in development at local and national levels, specific measures must be taken at all levels. Key areas to address are CSOs, women's political participation, institutions targeting women's conditions, gender mainstreaming in poverty reduction strategies and gender budget initiatives⁴³.

5.3 Pathways to broader development outcomes

5.14 It is clearly **easier to establish the link between V&A interventions and broader development outcomes in PAP-interventions, than it is in interventions involving non-state actors**. The general budget support was mentioned by ECG donors as supportive to the overall V&A environment, as it entails transparent and accountable management systems. The examples drawn from the case study of the Administrative Court also demonstrate the importance of central oversight mechanisms as a vital element in overall support to V&A. Support to non-state actors is not easily linked to overall development outcomes. Non-state actors are relatively more sensitive to changes and tendencies in the political environment and also dependent on interaction with Government.

5.15 The link between V&A interventions and poverty reduction in economic terms is not very clear. It is a commonly recognised development assumption that a democratic society provides a conducive environment for poverty reduction. V&A interventions aim at contributing to building democratic structures. V&A interventions mainly address non-economic aspects of poverty, e.g. democratic rights and access to social services and information, but also provide better opportunities for access to economic development. Rural citizens' access to the Seven Million development fund at district level and the CLUFP focus on providing access to land are examples of an economic approach or dimension of the V&A interventions analysed. It has, however, not been possible to demonstrate any direct linkage between V&A interventions and (economic) poverty reduction from the cases studied.

⁴³ Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment, DFID Working Paper, March 2005.

5.16 **There are substantial changes in policy, practice and behaviour, but less in power relations.** Overall development policies and plans influenced by donor-driven, international agendas impact on overall policy development and government plans. It is, however, questionable to what extent the underlying power relations are influenced in favour of a truly democratic development. Analysis of power relations at national and local level has shown that in spite of a pro-democracy official discourse, party-political affiliations and traditional power structures are interwoven and still dominate much of the decision-making arena in Mozambique.

5.17 **V&A interventions support the development of democracy.** Directly or indirectly supported by donors, V&A interventions have promoted the democratic process in terms of enhancing available information and transparency, introducing joint reviews and institutionalised civil society hearings, supporting the establishment of mechanisms like the IPCCs and the municipalities, as well as activities of CSOs and the media. These activities are pulling in the right directions, albeit there is ample room for exploring the opportunities for more active V&A, especially at local level.

5.4 V&A and aid effectiveness

5.18 The striving towards **alignment** leads to a strong government bias in development assistance, which impacts on the opportunities for V&A. This is further reinforced by the political and legal environment, where Government seeks to place CSOs in the role of implementing agencies linked to specific sectors rather than recognising their role as political actors, i.e. in advocacy and as political watchdogs. This was evidenced by the experience of the Development Observatories, where CSOs and NGOs indirectly are held accountable for their contribution to the implementation of government development plans.

5.19 The **harmonisation** of donor support and the increased demand for effectiveness has led to major sector programmes, general budget support and consequently less attention to minor V&A interventions in the field of civil society. There is scope for harmonisation of support to civil society actors, and the examples of donors' joint efforts in CIP, CLUFP and other initiatives represent a positive trend toward harmonising support to civil society.

5.20 V&A interventions are by nature political and deal with processes in society. The demand for **tangible results** is highly relevant in relation to political processes, but often difficult to meet. The availability of information and documentation, the establishment of oversight mechanisms, the vivid debate and public focus on corruption, the active participation of rural citizens in IPCCs are all results of V&A interventions. In spite of the limitations and constraints identified, there is a positive impact of the V&A interventions supported by the international aid agenda.

5.21 Donors have been criticised for not taking the consequences of holding the Mozambican Government responsible in cases of corruption⁴⁴. **Mutual accountability** is extremely important, and civil society representatives see donors' reluctance to execute sanction as a threat to democratic development.

⁴⁴ See Annex F Notes from Stakeholders' Workshops, e.g. the case of Ministry of Education.

5.22 This leads to consideration over the need for **Mozambican ownership to V&A interventions**. In this context, it is important to bear in mind the truly political character of V&A. Voice is by nature critical and demanding. For a government to listen to voice, true acceptance of its legitimate role in a democratic society is necessary. For government to accept it should be held accountable, it needs to recognise the values of transparency and accountability. These political processes are not always linear, and there is still a long way to go for the Mozambican Government to truly assume ownership of V&A interventions. Mozambican ownership is, however, also critically relates to civil society and non-state actors, which often represent the critical voice. Securing the room for this voice is an important part of securing national ownership.

6 Recommendations

6.1 The following recommendations are based on the conclusions and findings from the evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability in Mozambique. Specific reference is made to *Chapter 4.1 Opportunities, constraints and entry points*, as these provide the basis for development of new V&A interventions. The recommendations are kept at a generic level, as it has not been the purpose of this exercise to present specific recommendations in relation to the intervention cases from where the empirical evidence has been taken. This methodology has been questioned during the evaluation, not least by the many representatives of V&A interventions, who have made time and resources available to the team. The recommendations may appear obvious and down-to-earth, but they provide an evidence-based qualification of V&A in Mozambique. The recommendations provide a valid input for documentation of assumed correlations and should provide input for the future development of specific V&A strategies.

6.2 At the final debriefing workshop with stakeholders held in January 2008 in Maputo, participants contributed to a short-listing of the top three findings and key recommendations⁴⁵. This contribution is used in the following analysis, in addition to the recommendations emerging from findings and conclusions. Recommendations are structured according to three main categories: overall approaches to V&A, operational issues and policy dialogue.

6.1 Overall approaches to V&A

6.3 One overarching recommendation is the **need for a thorough context analysis for donors to understand the mechanisms of the Mozambican society**. This recommendation was confirmed by different stakeholders and re-enforced at the January workshop. Workshop participants referred to the existence of “*two Mozambiques*”, i.e. the capital-based, government-donor environment, and the provincial and rural Mozambique, where underlying power relations have strong influence and where political norms and values are different from those of Maputo. Knowledge of the context, including awareness of the underlying informal power structures, which influence the way the formal power structures operate, is essential. This includes issues such as knowledge about the political culture, the risk of co-option, and consequences of party antagonism as well as the specific history of the local area in question. Related to this is the issue of **addressing corruption** as an entry point for promotion of V&A.

6.4 Donors as well as other key informants have emphasised the problems related to internal analytical capacity and the frequent turn over of (international) staff. The team recommends that **donors should ensure that sufficient capacity to handle complex context analysis and design of adequate capacity building interventions is available, including securing institutional memory**.

6.5 The core essence of the concept of V&A is the synergy and dialectic process between the two components: those voicing their opinions and demands, and those being held accountable. It is in this synergetic process that the building blocks for a democratic society are found. V&A represent a collective process, involving at the same time various actors and mechanisms. The articulation with government is crucial for the voice to lead to accountability. It is therefore **important to ensure**

⁴⁵ See Annex F Notes from Stakeholders' Workshops.

that public sector, government-to-government interventions do not set aside support for an independent civil society. General and sector budget support should not exclude independent support to CSOs, media, trade unions and other non-state actors. It is of particular importance that these actors are supported in their own right through, for example, capacity-building interventions.

6.6 V&A interventions should be considered as a vital aspect of overall efforts for **poverty reduction**, acknowledging the role of democracy in providing a conducive environment for poverty reduction. In this context, special attention should be paid to **mainstreaming gender** issues in V&A interventions right from the design phase, assuring that the specific actions are taken to promote women's access to voice and influence.

6.2 Operational issues

6.7 The concept of V&A is not widely applied among ECG donors. It is therefore difficult to trace specific V&A interventions, as they are rarely made explicit, but found as part of other interventions ranging from public sector reform and general budget support to community participation or support to civil society. Should ECG donors embark on a more comprehensive use of the V&A concept, including the ability to trace specifically the outcome of V&A interventions and the alignment with their country strategies, there is a need not only for a conceptual clarification, but also for a **corresponding categorisation of V&A interventions**. This would include also the formulation of specific qualitative indicators for measuring V&A, paying attention to the organic nature of V&A and the dialectic process between those raising voice and those being held accountable.

6.8 Horizontal accountability is one of the main issues discussed throughout the CVA evaluation. Checks and balances are weak, because capacity development interventions are not sufficiently coordinated. Capacity building should be part of an overall strategy to avoid ad hoc actions and ensure institutional sustainability. **Donors should contribute - under the PAPs and direct budget support - to programme designs that better integrate the actors involved in accountability mechanisms.** Actors and mechanisms involved in budget oversight at national, provincial and local levels should be identified to promote coherent and coordinated intervention.

6.9 Attention should be paid to **informal mechanisms and actors** as well, as they are often important in the overall picture of V&A. Donors tend - especially after the Paris Agenda - to focus their support on formal mechanisms, paying less attention to actors like CBOs, trade unions, cultural groups etc.

6.10 Availability of information is not sufficient, if access and capacity to use the information are not simultaneously secured. Many examples of donor supported interventions, which have improved the availability of information key to V&A, have been verified. To yield impact, it is, however, recommended that these supply side interventions be combined with demand-side interventions. **The demand side should focus on proper access and use of the available information, including the capacity to make use of the available information.** Using and promoting synergy are important aspects of V&A, as the interaction between different actors and mechanisms is the core issue for V&A to yield results in terms of increased open dialogue and concrete development outcomes, such as better public services and reduced corruption.

6.11 Existing opportunities for improved V&A are often not sufficiently explored. This is especially the case at local level, where the IPCCs could provide an excellent stepping-stone for enhanced V&A. As participants at the January workshop expressed: “Do not focus on urban-based, formal mechanisms alone!” Acknowledging the opportunities in IPCCs and the potential for promotion of democratic structures, the team recommends that **voice in rural areas is supported**. The team has verified that rural women through the IPCCs make use of the opportunity to participate, and **an increased focus on women’s opportunities for influence in IPCCs is therefore recommended**. **The formal discourse for involving women** and providing a room for their voice in public **should be explored on a systematic basis** through mainstreaming of gender issues in all V&A activities (for example, capacity building for women, focusing women’s networks, supporting development of female parliamentarians, gender equality systems in recruitment to government institutions, and women’s access to justice).

6.12 Examples of V&A interventions have been encountered, where plans have been changed and financing interrupted as a result of a change in donor’s overall policy or strategy. The result may be that investments already made in strengthening capacity for voice and accountability are wasted as plans are not carried through. Furthermore, it leads to disappointment and discouragement among beneficiaries. The team therefore recommends that **abrupt interruption of funding and change of plans should be avoided**. Linked to this issue is the question of **adequate time frames for V&A interventions**. It appears that most donors’ country strategies and programmes have a time horizon of 3–5 years, which is very short in a V&A perspective, where the need for thorough capacity building, knowledge of political processes and recognition of the role of informal mechanisms and actors requires a long-term perspective of at least 10–15 years.

6.13 CSOs are often dependent on financial support from either donors or Mozambican sources. The dependence poses a threat to their independence of expression and increases the risk of co-optation. The development of a democratic society depends on the existence of a critical and independent civil society. Involvement of CSOs in the implementation of government sector programmes is useful and an important contribution to implementation capacity, but it should not be seen as the only role of civil society. In the current political situation in Mozambique, this is of extreme importance, and it is recommended that **donors secure financial sources for civil society to fulfil the necessary advocacy and watchdog activities**.

6.14 Donor harmonisation has come a long way in government-to-government development aid through the adoption of the principles of the Paris Declaration. Examples of CSOs suffering from heavy transaction costs were encountered. Harmonisation and coordination are not practiced sufficiently when it comes to support to civil society. The team recommends a **higher degree of harmonisation and alignment in CSO support**.

6.3 Policy dialogue

6.15 Donors must recognise that there are possible negative effects from the substantial influence that joint donors make in terms of demanding accountability from national government, such as distortion of attention to national constituencies and Parliament. In order to ensure that this is counterbalanced and that national accountability mechanisms are strengthened rather than sidelined, **donors should pay attention to shifting the balance of power through support to V&A interventions that increasingly strengthen internal actors and mechanisms**.

6.16 In providing support to government institutions at different levels, donors should pay attention to the **organisational culture**, which at local level has been discussed as a culture of obedience. The phenomenon is, however, also embedded in government institutions at central and provincial levels and deserves specific attention if public sector reforms are going to lead to a situation where V&A can operate in a dialectic, democratic process.

6.17 Democracy and development of democratic structures is an important part of the policy dialogue. The functioning of the political system is a delicate issue, which donors have only hesitantly engaged with. It is a delicate balance of not disrupting the internal balances. However, it is **important that donors maintain not only a policy dialogue, but also a political dialogue on the issue of the functioning of the political system, as an important part of securing the long-term existence of accountability mechanisms**. In this respect, support to activities such as political processes, Parliament, political parties, MPs and trade unions is also important.

6.18 Along with this recommendation is also the consideration of **maintaining a dialogue with Government on the need for a vibrant civil society**, active in advocacy and performing the role of democracy's watchdog. The current political development in Mozambique with tendencies of mono-partyism calls for strong donor attention to the necessity of supporting civil society's specific role, not only as implementing agencies, but also as political players.

6.19 Finally, the conducive legal environment, the verbalised support to gender equity, the Paris Agenda, the PARPA, the APRM - all these mechanisms and institutions are officially in place and represent **accountability instruments** for donors to maintain a policy dialogue with government.



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