



Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability

Intervention Analysis: results and implications for the evaluation framework

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March 2007

Revised January 2008

Summary of main findings

- The V&A interventions vary considerably in terms of their size and thematic focus. The variation is less marked in relation to the actors involved, funding mechanisms and expected results.
- V&A is not always the main focus of the interventions: 40% have V&A as a **component** of a broader set of objectives and activities, such as local development or governance.
- Approximately 60% of all actors involved in V&A projects are **state actors**, mainly national and local government. The remaining 40% come from civil society, largely national NGOs and to a lesser degree local CSOs.
- Parliamentary committees, anti-corruption commissions, human rights bodies, the judiciary, ombudsmen, citizens' watchdogs and faith groups are all under represented¹. The **media** is the only 'non traditional' actor significantly involved in V&A interventions.
- Strengthening the **capacities** of governments to become more accountable or of NGOs to become more influential and effective in holding institutions to account is the key aim of the interventions. Very few focus on concrete mechanisms to improve government accountability or enhance democratic spaces for citizens to express their voice and take action.
- **Single donors** fund two thirds of the interventions. The multi donor interventions mostly involve multilaterals (EU, UN and World Bank), the Nordic bilaterals and, to a lesser extent, DFID.
- Most of the **funding** is either directed at national NGOs and national governments (50%) or channelled through international intermediaries (30%). A relatively smaller proportion reaches out to local organisations or less traditional channels.
- **Context** is a complex factor in the analysis and its role in determining donors' choices for V&A interventions remains unclear. There is some evidence linking the type of interventions with the country context and timing (e.g. elections in DRC) or the type of funding mechanism with the specific circumstance of a country (e.g. Ethiopia). However, the IA did not reveal a clear correspondence between intervention types and country profiles.

¹ This could be partially explained by the criteria for selecting the sample of interventions. The TOR for the evaluation originally excluded examples of horizontal accountability such as ombudsmen as well as specific institutions such as the judiciary

1. Introduction

- 1.1 This report sets out the main findings from the intervention analysis (IA) of a selected sample of voice and accountability interventions selected by the Evaluation Core Group donors². The IA is the bridge which leads from the literature review on voice and accountability, towards the elaboration of the evaluation framework and its piloting.
- 1.2 The main purposes of the IA are to test and revise the main findings of the literature review and to provide the main hypotheses and building blocks for the evaluation framework. In particular the IA tests and revises the hypotheses, categories and concepts introduced in the literature review, refining them so that they can be more effectively employed in the evaluation framework, whilst also introducing new ones where necessary. The IA also enables us to identify and explore a number of patterns and hypotheses about how voice and accountability interventions actually work. These patterns and associated hypotheses will provide some of the building blocks for the evaluation framework, helping us to revise the evaluation questions.
- 1.3 Our report proceeds as follows: first, we provide some basic descriptive information about the sample of interventions analysed. Second, we explore in greater detail the specific findings of the IA in relation to the themes of the interventions, their funding mechanisms, and the actors involved. Third, we examine the sorts of outcomes envisaged under the interventions, and the gap between expected outcomes and actual outcomes. Finally, we tease out the implications of the intervention analysis for the evaluation framework itself.

² DFID, DANIDA, SIDA, SDC, DCGD, NORAD AND BMZ

2 Basic description of the interventions analysed

2.1 The IA provides a useful database of nearly 90 voice and accountability interventions, with each intervention or project classified in relation to a number of key categories. The categories used for classifying the interventions are available in Annex A. It is important to note that whilst 90 interventions is a sizeable sample, it is **a self selected sample and as such it is not representative of all the work that donors do in relation to voice and accountability**. And, with some donors – DGCD and Sida – providing information about only a small number of projects, particular caution must be exercised when interpreting the data. With regards to both the range of interventions and the information available about them, our analysis rests on the quality of information provided to us.

Table 1: Interventions by country and by donors

Country	Interventions	BMZ	DANIDA	DFID	DGCD	NORAD	SDC	SIDA
Benin	8	2	1		1		4	
Bolivia	10	2	2	2			4	
DRC	3			2	1			
Ethiopia	12	4		1		3		4
Ghana	10	3	4	3				
Indonesia	4	2		2				
Nepal	10	1	4	2			3	
Nicaragua	10	1	2	1	1	2	3	
Tanzania	12		1	2		4	3	2
Uganda	10		4	2	1	3		
Total	89	15	18	17	4	12	17	6

2.2 In total, 89 interventions were analysed, of which 50 had voice and accountability as their primary or exclusive focus. The remainder were projects where voice and accountability was a component of a larger project on, for instance, governance or service delivery. The projects ranged from those with a budget of over \$20 million, of which there were 12, to those with a budget of less than \$1m, of which there were 18. Indeed, the key finding as regards level of funding is that it is very variable.

2.3 The seven donors are not equally represented in the sample, primarily because of the number of projects for which donors provided information. Whereas BMZ, Danida, DFID, NORAD and SDC were well-covered by the analysis, only six Sida and four DGCD projects were analysed.

2.4 Twenty-six of the eighty-nine projects analysed (less than 30%) were multi-donor projects. The multi donors interventions mostly involve multilaterals (EU, UN and World Bank), the Nordic bilaterals and, to a lesser extent, DFID.

2.5 In terms of country coverage, the analysis included between eight and twelve projects from each of Benin, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal, Nicaragua, Tanzania and Uganda. Only four projects concerned Indonesia, and only three concerned the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

3. Specific findings


Focus and themes of V&A interventions

3.1 **V&A is not always the distinct and unique focus of interventions.** In nearly 40% of the projects considered V&A is only a component of a broader set of objectives and activities, which often include local development and governance. This is in line with our analysis of donors' policies and strategies, which showed that V&A cannot always be defined as a 'stand alone' sector. This makes the analysis of the specific V&A themes in the interventions somewhat complicated, although it is possible to identify some clear patterns.

3.2 The majority of DFID and DANIDA projects in the sample have V&A as the main focus. By contrast, in the majority NORAD and BMZ projects V&A is only a component, whereas V&A is the main focus in approximately half of SDC projects.

The figure below shows the distribution of the different V&A themes across the interventions examined. These are based on projects with V&A as a main focus as well as on the V&A components.

Figure 1: Voice and Accountability Themes³



3.3 The majority of the interventions analysed focus on **human rights, dialogue between state and civil society⁴, and civic education.** A closer look at these themes reveals that in a number of projects human rights is the main thematic focus, supported by a combination of civic education activities and efforts to strengthen dialogue between state and civil society. It is interesting to note that the related themes of citizen watchdogs and ombudsmen and, to some extent, the media are significantly underrepresented in the sample, making up only 8% of the total number of themes.

3.4 **There is relatively limited engagement with non-traditional channels or mechanisms for voice and accountability.** This is also confirmed by our

³ The interventions considered often have more than one theme as a focus.

⁴ This refers to the support of capacity of civil society efforts for participation, monitoring and advocacy of political processes.

analysis of actors involved in V&A interventions (see paragraphs 3.22 and 3.23). Donor policy acknowledges that improved governance and accountability requires diversification in the actors and themes they engage with, highlighting parliaments, ombudsmen and citizen watchdogs. However these are not well represented in the sample, possibly due to the relatively recent interest of donors in these sectors. However, there is some involvement with the media and elections which, combined, are the main themes in approximately 12% of the interventions.


3.5 Similarly, the focus on **dialogue between state and civil society**, by 16% of the interventions, is not reflected in equal measure by a parliament support, citizens' watchdogs or anti-corruption initiatives which are arenas or mechanisms for such dialogue to take place. This lack of reference to the more concrete dimensions of policy dialogue in the project documents makes the category of political dialogue a particularly complex one to interpret.

3.6 The focus on dialogue reflects the need to improve the opportunities for **interactions between citizens and the state** (further reinforced by the emphasis on decentralisation) and as such it can be considered a crucial theme for V&A. However, a more detailed analysis suggests that in most interventions dialogue between civil society and the state is not the main or stand alone theme, but rather it is combined with others such as human rights or anti-corruption.

3.7 **Budget monitoring and access to services** are both recurrent themes in most donors' portfolios (see figure 2). Budget monitoring is one of the few clear mechanisms aimed at holding government to account that is funded through V&A interventions directly. The focus on access to services is possibly the result of building on the existing networks of actors and activities aimed at improving service delivery at the local level as potential channels for citizens' voice.

The emphasis that donors place on the different themes varies. The Figure below shows the donors' composition of some of the key themes for V&A interventions.

Figure 3: Variance of donors contribution to V&A themes⁵



3.8 Given the self selected nature of the sample of interventions it is difficult to identify definitive patterns or typologies around individual donor's approaches⁶. However, the analysis shows some forms of **clustering by donors in specific areas**. Whereas most donors appear to be supporting interventions on civic education and budget monitoring, human rights seem to be a more of a specific focus for DANIDA and DFID⁷ funded interventions. Decentralisation appears to be a priority mostly for BMZ and SDC, often combined with a focus on access to services.

3.9 **There is some evidence linking the type of donor interventions and country context and timing.** This is demonstrated by the analysis of the data by country. In countries where donors face challenges working with government, human rights (Ethiopia, Nepal) and decentralisation (Ethiopia) emerge as significant themes. Electoral support, civic education and media are in focus in a country in transition (DRC). A more even distribution of themes is apparent in countries with relatively stable political institutions and more established civil society (Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda).


The Figure below shows the distribution of V&A themes by country:

⁵ This diagram does not include SIDA and DCGD due to the insufficient number of interventions analysed.

⁶ Given the particularly small samples of DCGD and SIDA interventions it is not possible to include them in the analysis of a particular theme

⁷ SIDA is also likely to focus on human rights, although the sample of SIDA projects is too small to support this.

Figure 3: Distribution of themes by country



3.10 **Context** is a complex factor in the analysis and its role in determining donors' choices for the focus of V&A interventions remains unclear. As the examples above show, there is some evidence linking the type of interventions with the country context and timing (e.g. elections in DRC, the instability of Nepal, the presence of thriving civil society in Ghana). However, the IA did not reveal a clear correspondence between intervention types and country profiles based on a pre-determined typology (e.g. WBI measures of governance). Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some patterns emerging in countries with more stable and sustainable conditions in the medium and long term, allowing donors to programme more articulated and diversified interventions. Such diversification cannot be achieved in contexts such as countries in transition or fragile state

Interventions' budget and resources for V&A

3.11 The project documents do not provide a good basis to analyse the level of resources invested in V&A interventions, and particularly for aggregating the data at donors or country level, for several reasons:

- not all documents provide information on the budget of the interventions (71 out of 89 have budget information)
- the budget information is not always split into annual budgets and the duration of the interventions is highly variable
- V&A is not always the main focus of the interventions, and when it is only a component there is no information of what the dedicated V&A budget is.

Despite these limitations, it is possible to comment on some issues related to resources invested in V&A.

Table 2: V&A interventions budget in \$Millions by donors
(NB: based on 71 interventions only)

	main focus	component	total budget
BMZ	1.1	112.5	113.6
DANIDA	97.6	49.9	147.5
DFID	155.9	56	211.9
DGCD	0.69	9.11	9.8
NORAD	2.17	76.53	78.7
SDC	38.34	25.76	64.1
SIDA	25.5	5	30.5
Totals	321.3	334.8	656.1

3.12 Table 2 shows that overall 50% of the overall budget for V&A interventions is allocated to single focused interventions, whilst the remaining 50% is presumable only in part allocated to V&A objectives. DFID, SIDA and to a lesser degree DANIDA channel their resource mostly through single focused interventions, whilst the support from BMZ, NORAD and DCGD is mostly channelled through interventions with V&A as a component. Overall DFID allocates the largest amount of resources to V&A interventions.

3.13 The overall size of interventions also varies considerably with a similar distribution between 'small' and 'large' interventions (Table 3). However, it is important to note that the large projects included in the sample are likely to be those with multitude of components and not necessarily focused on V&A per se. It would therefore not be that relevant or useful to calculate the average budget of a V&A interventions.

Table 3: Size of V&A interventions

	less than \$1 million	\$1-5 million	\$5-10 million	\$10-20 million	above \$20 million	total interventions
Total	18	18	14	7	12	69

3.14 In terms of themes, the majority of resources goes to human rights interventions (115 \$mil) and support to civil society to engage in policy dialogue (120 \$mil), whereas less than \$1mil is spent on citizens watchdogs and ombudsmen (see figure 1).

V&A Funding mechanisms


3.15 The project documents do not provide a good basis for understanding the complexities of funding mechanisms of V&A interventions. More detailed exploration of issues around funding will form part of the evaluation framework itself. Nevertheless, the intervention analysis has enabled us to identify some patterns or tendencies.

3.16 Overall, the analysis of all the actors involved in the various funding mechanisms reveals that **non state actors** are the funding recipients in 50% of the cases, mostly national NGOs, whilst national government and other state institutions received funding in 20% of the cases. The remaining 30% is given to other international actors such as donors' implementing agencies, multilateral organisations, etc.

3.17 Approximately 50% of the interventions were funded by the donor giving funds **directly to the project implementers**, the other 50% is channelled through **intermediaries** who, in turn, disburse funds to a wider set of actors who

are responsible for implementation. The reasons and choices underpinning these two different funding modalities are difficult to establish on the basis of the documentation analysis alone. However, it is possible that the choice of funding through intermediaries can be motivated by donor's specific needs and requirements such as BMZ channelling funds through GTZ or DFID attempting to reach out to a wider sets of actors through intermediaries.

Figure 4: Direct funding recipient (non- state actors shaded grey)



3.18 Figure 4 shows that the most likely recipients of direct funding from donors are either the national government (in 25% of the cases) or national NGOs (in 29% of the cases). Another 19% of projects were executed by the donors' own implementing agencies, although the majority of these cases reflect BMZ funding of GTZ's projects. The remaining 25% of direct funding recipients are a wide range of both state and non state actors, and include local government and local CSOs, who receive funding in much smaller proportions to their national counterparts.


3.19 In countries with more unstable conditions (e.g. Ethiopia and Nepal) direct forms of funding appear to be less frequent. This suggests that there are linkages between donors' approaches and the specific conditions of a particular country context.

3.20 Most donors use direct and indirect funding mechanisms in equal measure, with the exceptions of BMZ which directly funds GTZ in the majority of cases and DFID which only used direct funding mechanisms in 23% of its interventions. In the case of DFID, this might reflect an attempt to reach out to a wider set of 'non traditional' civil society actors, beyond national NGOs, which is made possible by the identification and use of reliable intermediaries within a given country.⁸

The figure below shows the breakdown of recipient of indirect funding mechanisms

⁸ This is the topic of a study commissioned by DFID to ODI, specifically investigating the role of different aid modalities in reaching out to 'non traditional' civil society and different form of civic engagement.

Figure 5: Intermediate funding recipients – Non state actors shaded grey



3.21 When money is disbursed through intermediaries, almost two thirds of them are **international actors** rather than national ones. These international actors tend to be multi-lateral agencies, funding bodies specifically designed to disperse the funds⁹ or international NGOs. The predominance of international actors appears to be consistent with the choice of indirect funding mechanisms in less stable countries (see paragraph 3.14).

3.22 The funds channelled through **intermediaries** are mostly distributed to NGOs and media organisations, although approximately 30% still reaches government bodies and, to a lesser extent, political parties. What is striking is that overall the funding is oriented towards the **national rather than the local level**, whether distributed through direct mechanisms or intermediaries. Where non state actors are the final recipients of funding, 70% of them are national NGOs, whilst only 27% are community based organisations and cooperatives. Even more significant is that only 7% of the CBOs are rural ones.

V&A actors involved


3.23 In our analysis we tried to distinguish between (a) actors directly engaged by the activities of an intervention, from (b) actors identified as being critical to improved V&A and explicitly targeted by the interventions, but not necessarily involved in project activities. Interestingly, the analysis of engaged versus targeted actors reveals little variance between the two groups, both for state and non state actors. In other words, **the same actors directly engaged in projects are also those targeted by the interventions to achieve change**. This suggests a general 'model' for V&A interventions which tends to directly engage those state institutions that it seeks to influence, rather than primarily operate through other channels.

⁹ The international actors identified local partners through their contacts and experience or used mechanisms such as small grants schemes to choose partners. However, there was insufficient information available in the data to analyse the funding mechanisms further.

3.24 The analysis of actors involved in V&A interventions is also useful to improve our understanding of the **level** at which these interventions are implemented. Although local government and local civil society actors are involved in many projects, the vast majority of interventions are primarily engaging and targeting actors at the national level. National government and national NGOs alone account for over 40% of the total actors involved in V&A interventions.


3.25 Of the **state institutions** (see Figure 6) there is a heavy emphasis on the involvement of the government, particularly at the national level. National government (including specific ministries) account for almost 30% of all actors involved, with a further 17% of state actors being local government and 5% the civil service. Therefore government bodies account for just over 50% of all actors involved in V&A interventions. This contrasts sharply with the lack of involvement of other state actors and channels such as the parliaments, anti corruption and electoral commissions, and human rights institutions which, combined, only account for less than 8% of all actors involved. This is particularly surprising since human rights is one of the key themes addressed by V&A interventions.

Figure 6: State actors involved in V&A interventions (as percentage of all actors)



3.26 Of the **non-state institutions** which the interventions work with (see figure 7) more than half of these involve NGOs and CSOs, which account for 23% of all actors involved in the interventions. Although the media accounts for 7% of actors, all other non state institutions including cooperatives, trade unions and professional associations, as well as faith groups, women’s groups or community based organisations remain overlooked in projects and only account for 8.3% of the total actors involved. This is a signal of a lack of innovative approaches involving new actors and channels representing the voice of the general population as well as specific interest groups who are increasingly considered to be crucial for V&A to work in practice.

Figure 7: Non state actors involved in V&A interventions (as percentage of all actors)



3.27 There is a degree of **consistency among** donors regarding their interaction with government (national and local) and civil society. With the exception of SDC (which worked with government and civil society in equal measure) all donors work more with state than non state actors. BMZ works most closely with government, which accounted for 65% of the actors they work with. Danida is the only donor to work with a range of different state institutions, beyond national and local government, whilst DFID and Danida are the two donors which engage the most with the media.

3.28 The involvement of different actors also varies depending on the country. In Ghana for example, national government and NGOs are involved in equal measure in V&A interventions (both in approximately 20% of interventions). In Ethiopia, in line with what we found in the analysis of funding mechanisms, 20% of projects involve NGOs and only 7% involve national government. In Benin state actors are involved in twice as many projects than non state actors, mostly due to the focus on decentralisation. The media is particularly involved in DRC and Ethiopia, mostly due to the role it played in recent elections. This further confirms our observations in relation to the role of the context, which appears to be country specific rather than subject to a general trend.

3.29 Finally it is worth noting that an analysis of end beneficiaries explicitly targeted by the interventions reveals that over **40% of the projects have the general public as the main target** of their activities and a much smaller proportion make reference to specific groups such as ethnic minorities or women. This was confirmed by a number of project evaluations which concluded that targeting specific groups was one of the weaknesses of V&A interventions.

4. V&A results and outcomes

V&A results and outcomes:

4.1 The main categories of expected results ¹⁰ emerging from the intervention analysis have been clustered around some potential categories of outcomes summarised in the table below


Table 2: Categories of outcomes and V&A expected results

Category of outcomes	Expected results
A. Changes to the enabling environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Changes in the legal, institutional or regulatory frameworks– Improved citizens' awareness, empowerment and participation– Changes in transparency, availability and dissemination of information to citizens
B. Strengthened institutions, organisations and actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Changes in capacities of state institutions, civil servants, parliaments etc.– Changes in capacities of CSOs/NGOs and citizens and improved participation
C. V&A channels and mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Improved/new channels, vehicles for citizens' voice (e.g. media, ombudsmen, citizens' groups etc.)– Improved/new democratic space for claims, questioning etc– Improved/new/innovative approaches, methods and tools for V&A
D. Strengthened V&A system	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Changes in accountability or responsiveness of state institutions– Citizens' voice and claims are 'heard' and acted upon– Changes in access to services (e.g. legal aid, more equal access to basic services etc.)
E. Broader development outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Reduced poverty and contribution to MDGs

The figure below shows the distribution of expected results in the V&A interventions examined.

¹⁰ We refer here to the expected results listed in projects documents

Figure 8: Categories of expected results of V&A interventions



4.2 The majority of interventions seek to improve institutional capacity of state and non state organisations (36%) or citizens' awareness and participation (12%). In contrast, very few interventions are aimed at strengthening mechanisms or creating new channels for citizens to take action so that their voices can be heard and to hold state institutions accountable.

4.3 The focus on capacity building suggests that a fairly common **underlying assumption** of the interventions examined is that the lack of institutional and organisational capacity at different levels is a significant obstacle to improved voice and accountability. However, the **lack of attention paid to concrete mechanisms and channels** (also confirmed by the analysis of actors involved in V&A) makes it difficult to see *how* more capable and responsive intuitions or empowered citizens will be able to take action in order to achieve real change.

4.4 Different aspects of the **enabling environment** are also included as expected results in a number of interventions. However, this is mostly related to citizens' empowerment and participation and, to a lesser degree, to the availability of transparent information. Changes in the institutional frameworks are less frequently mentioned as direct outcomes of interventions.

4.5 There is some degree of **donor variation** in the expected results of V&A interventions. In particular, whilst Danida and DFID focus in equal measure on state and non state institutions in their capacity building efforts, BMZ is mostly concerned with the increased capacity of state institutions and SDC focuses almost all its efforts to improve the capacity of NGOs and CSOs. Although very limited, the expected results related to concrete mechanisms and democratic spaces are mostly included in Danida's funded projects. Changes in citizens' awareness and empowerment are mostly results expected in Danida, DFID and SDC funded projects. Overall, Danida and DFID's interventions cover most areas of expected results whereas all other donors focus on specific categories only.

4.6 Interestingly, **broader development outcomes** such as poverty reduction and contribution to MDGs are rarely defined as expected results of V&A interventions. On the one hand, this is not surprising given the complex nature of the

relationship between V&A and broader development outcomes, which are rarely addressed by a single project or intervention. However, a significant number of interventions have poverty reduction as an overarching goal.

4.7 Our analysis of a selection of evaluation reports¹¹ of V&A interventions suggests that there are significant **discrepancies between expected and actual or unexpected results**. This can be influenced by a number of factors, including:

- Context. Sometimes the project assumes certain realities on the ground at the inception phase that turn out to be inaccurate or wrong. In other cases changes in the context (e.g. new laws, aftermath of elections etc.) occur during the course of the project.
- Capacity. Despite the investment in training and capacity building in V&A interventions, they do not always result in institutions more capable of taking action and achieving change. Frequent changes in personnel and weak organisational structures/system also contribute to
- Assumptions and change models. Assumptions on how change is supposed to happen in a given context are not always accurate and can lead to projects implementing 'models of change' which do not fit the local reality. In particular, some projects have revealed inaccurate assumptions about the role of local actors, their legitimacy, their relations with interest groups and their capacity to act as change agents for the community.

4.8 It is difficult to identify commonalities and trends in the evaluations considered, partly because they are conducted with different objectives and approaches, partly because they focus on very different types of projects and programmes. However, they provide some insights as to 'what works' in relation to V&A interventions, as well as what appear to be the main failures or shortcomings.

4.9 What works: success factors of V&A interventions. The key success factors appear to be (i) the clear focus and realism of objectives of an intervention and (ii) the creation of an enabling environment for dialogue between civil society and the state. V&A interventions suffer from too ambitious, broad and aspirational objectives: when they are concrete and realistic (e.g. BMZ supported programme on fiscal transparency in Nicaragua) and crucially targeted at specific actors and sectors, they are more likely to be achieved within the fixed time frame of the intervention. The focus on specific actors and sectors also allows to build effective partnerships with a limited number of stakeholders. Donors' supported interventions are also successful in the preliminary phases of V&A interventions, often dedicated to creating the space for policy dialogue. Even if the results in terms of policy changes are not achieved, V&A interventions can be successful at creating the pre-conditions for reform processes.

4.10 What does not work: failures and shortcomings of V&A interventions. The evaluations reviewed identify a number of constraints to the success of V&A interventions, including: (i) ambitious and unrealistic objectives, (ii) lack of political analysis and understanding of context; (iii) assumptions about the political will of the key players (iv) lack of follow up and commitment to capacity building and (v) superficial approach to civil society involvement. As mentioned above, often V&A interventions have very ambitious and unrealistic objectives. In some cases. These are grounded in paradigms or assumptions about how 'good governance' and democratic politics which are not sufficiently grounded in the reality of the country contexts. Some evaluations point to the lack of substantial commitment to capacity building initiatives, particularly those aimed at state actors. There is insufficient continuity and resources invested in substantial training activities, which are often inadequate and unsustainable. Finally, a number of interventions

¹¹ We reviewed 6 evaluation reports out of the 10 available in the database.

have underestimated the importance of securing political will to achieve policy change and to pursue reform processes. The buying in of government departments or local institutions cannot be assumed, and often V&A interventions fall short of exercising real influence on well established power structures.

Annex 1: Description of the database

In total 89 interventions were inputted into the database. The database sought to capture the key elements of the interventions, both the basic data as well as the more detailed information on project aims, funding mechanisms and actors. In terms of the basic data, we inputted the interventions' country, dates and budget, as well as the donors involved.

To capture information on the project's aims we looked at the themes, objectives and expected results. We categorised the themes according to a broad range of voice and accountability themes that we had noted in the literature review, whilst adding new categories when they arose in our initial analysis of the project documents. The stated objectives and expected results were taken from the project documents and captured as free text in order to capture some level of detail of the project.

Where there were evaluation reports available we inputted the actual results and indicators. As well as capturing the successes, we felt it was important to capture the failures or problems that a project faced.

In order to understand the funding mechanisms and modalities of a project we sought to identify the actors involved in the funding process and how the funds moved from the donor to the end user. We also categorised the type of funding mechanism as the specific modality used to disburse funds such as small grants schemes, SWAP, budget support, etc. and it was also key to note who was responsible for project implementation.

In terms of categorising project actors, we considered both actors directly engaged and targeted by the interventions. Finally, it was key to understand who were the actual end beneficiaries of the projects and at what level the intervention was taking place.

The final box was a free text box where we tried to summarise the key features of the explicit or implicit underlying logic or model of change of the intervention. We inputted both explicit and inferred logics of the intervention, whilst being careful to state whether the model was explicit or implicit in the documents.

Below is a list of the fields used to populate the database.

Title:
Full title of project:
Key document:
Key document (2):
Country(s):
Project dates:
Project duration:
Project status:
Budget (US\$):
Donor:
Multi donor:
Is V&A main focus or component of project?
Theme(s) of V&A intervention:
Stated objective of intervention:
Stated expected results:
Stated expected indicators:
Project activities:
Evaluation report available?
Actual results:
Actual indicators:
Failures/problems of project:
Type of funding recipient:
Direct recipient of funding:
Type of NGO?:
Indirect recipient of funding:
Type of NGO:
Financial end beneficiaries:
Other project partners:
Funding mechanism:
Project implementation:
State institutions targeted:
State institutions engaged:
Non-state institutions targeted:
Non-state institutions engaged:
End beneficiaries:
Additional end beneficiaries:
Level of intervention:
Describe the theory/model/underlying logic of the intervention:
Good quality info?: