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Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan

by COWI


A report submitted to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry does not accept any responsibility for the information in this report nor the views expressed, which are solely those of the consultants

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Major Project Sites of NCA and NPA, Southern Sudan



List of Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AIC	Africa Inland Church
ACF	Action Contre La Faim
ARAP	African Rehabilitation and Educational Programme
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CHW	Community Health Worker
CONCERN	(Irish NGO)
COU	Church of Uganda
CRC	Chukudum Resource Centre
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DHA	UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DOT	Diocese of Torit
ERP	Emergency Relief Programme (of Sudan Council of Churches)
GOAL	(Irish NGO)
GOS	Government of Sudan
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Bilateral Aid)
HAC	Humanitarian Assistance Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Agency for Drought and Development
JRC	Joint Relief Committee
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MSF/H	Médecins Sans Frontières/Holland
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NIF	National Islamic Front
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NRC	Norwegian Red Cross
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OLS	UN Operation Lifeline Sudan
PHCC	Primary Health Care Centre
PHCU	Primary Health Care Unit
RASS	Relief Association of South Sudan
RDC	Relief and Development Commission
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SMC	Sudan Medical Care
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SRRA	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association
SSIM	South Sudan Independence Movement
VRP	Voluntary Repatriation Programme
WCC	World Council of Churches
WFP	UN World Food Programme

Executive Summary

Introduction

1. The purpose of the *Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan* is to examine the impact of Norwegian humanitarian assistance upon the continuing civil war and efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation in the country. Attention will be focused on the extent to which humanitarian assistance has been able to relieve distress, hunger and suffering, and on the effect of the aid on various parties' willingness to seek peace and reconciliation. The evaluation is intended to provide a basis for the assessment of further Norwegian involvement in the Sudan.
2. In particular, the intention of the evaluation is to assess the effectiveness of two Norwegian non-governmental organisations – Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) – to determine the consequences of their activities upon those whom they seek to assist and upon the overall peace and reconciliation process. These two organisations are of particular relevance to the Norwegian government since they serve as channels for the bulk of the approximately 50 million NOK provided for the Sudan annually.

Key findings

General Findings

3. Norway has provided large amounts of assistance to the Sudan. During the last 10 years the main emphasis has been on humanitarian assistance, which has improved the situation of people suffering from the effects of civil war. There has been substantial shorter term effects as well as longer term impact of the aid provided in terms of relieving suffering and improving livelihoods of people. The impact of the assistance on the willingness of the parties to seek peace appears to be marginal.
4. Although conflict resolution has become an integral part of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance Policy, the funding provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through NCA and NPA was never primarily intended as a resource to promote peace and reconciliation.
5. The civil war in Sudan – and Norwegian efforts to limit suffering and promote peace – illustrates the need for a two-tier international response system,

which includes an impartial humanitarian response, which will be provided automatically irrespective of the political context to meet the basic needs of people affected, and a political response, which links further support to areas in conflict to the willingness of the parties to reduce violence and promote peace and stability.

Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan

6. The institutional structure within the Government of Norway which can formulate a comprehensive and coherent policy that links political and humanitarian objectives, has not had sufficient capacity to monitor all relevant interventions and ensure policy integration. Therefore Norwegian efforts in Sudan appears to have been more a result of disjointed incrementalism than of a clearly defined Sudan-policy.
7. The effectiveness of Norwegian aid to the Sudan has been constrained by the lack of agreed criteria for the utilisation of funds allocated for humanitarian assistance.
8. Norwegian assistance to the Sudan during most of the 1970s was intended to facilitate repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as to support the re-emergence of peace in the aftermath of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. During this period, NCA established its programme in Eastern Equatoria, focusing upon human resource training and development.
9. The ebullience of the 1970s turned sour as the peace process began to unravel. By the end of 1983, civil war had returned to the Sudan. NPA would three years later establish itself as a major supporter of the anti-government SPLA/M, while NCA concentrated on protecting the development network that had been created during the previous decade. For both, relief aid was emerging rapidly as the primary institutional concern.
10. With the intensification of conflict and the ensuing famine of 1988, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was created by the UN and actively supported by many major donors. A combination of obligations arising from OLS and intensified insecurity at the operational level resulted in changes in the strate-

gies and operational procedures of the NCA and NPA. NCA implementation methods «split» conceptually and practically. In the north, NCA's «working through approach» led to strengthening local capacities to provide services. In the south, NCA intensified its relief efforts through expatriate staff. For its part, NPA reacted against the «neutral and impartial» constraints of OLS assistance, and forged strong links with the SPLA/M.

11. Since 1992, the Sudanese conflict has become more complex and even more politicised. Violence and alignments have spilt across Sudan's borders, and governments such as the United States have dropped any pretext of diplomatic even-handedness.
12. Norwegian funding over almost three decades has witnessed significant changes in the objectives as well as the implementing agencies used to distribute assistance. Prior to the 1980s, Norwegian assistance was directed towards development, mainly through the NCA's own programme infrastructure. During the last half of the 1980s, funds for relief to both the NCA and NPA increased substantially. The NPA's portion of Norwegian assistance, predominantly for relief, increased dramatically during the 1990s, in no small part due to the fact that insecurity had resulted in other partners withdrawing from Southern Sudan.

Programmes of NCA and NPA in the Sudan

13. NCA's «working through approach» has led to the creation of a cadre of exceptional professionals, highly sought after by other organisations. Underlying this transfer and promotion of skills is the hope that once there is a peace agreement, the work of NCA could be undertaken through qualified, effective and efficient local structures, e.g., church-based organisations.
14. This aspiration is more immediately on the horizon in the north than in the south, where pressures from the SPLA/M and continuing dangers for local staff require a greater involvement of expatriate staff. Through its operational partners, NCA as a whole provided a unique combination of programmes, each very important to specific clientele. Its efforts in Khartoum were essential to the needs of an all too often alienated population of displaced persons. In Juba, NCA was only one of three non-governmental organisations that normally could be relied upon for assistance; and, clearly the importance of

NCA as the major NGO in Eastern Equatoria has become legion.

15. NPA's approach is that of a «solidarity group» in which it has taken clear sides in the civil war, and supports the political objectives as well as the relief requirements of the SPLA/M. This has developed out of a political analysis of the situation and a concern for the victims of the war, in direct extension of NPA's approach to conflicts in many other parts of the world.
16. Throughout its eleven year involvement in Southern Sudan, NPA's programme and staff have been notable for the courage that they represented under the most trying conditions. When assassinations of expatriates in 1992 saw the withdrawal of all OLS agencies, the NPA remained in Sudan to provide relief aid.
17. NPA successfully ran three hospitals close to the fluctuating front lines that divided the SPLA and the Sudanese army, and also was able to respond with considerable alacrity to identified food needs.

Evaluation of Operations

18. When it comes to delivering goods and services to targeted beneficiaries, NPA's strength lies in the room for manoeuvre that it has created for itself outside OLS and alongside the SPLA/M. NPA has placed a high priority on developing its logistics capacity from the outset.
19. It is very evident that both management problems and the close ties that NPA has with the SPLA/M make effective monitoring and accountability problematic. Also the lack of effective management procedures combined with the operational flexibility required in conflict zones make procurement and delivery unpredictable. In fact, while there is much to commend about NPA's determination and delivery of relief food, it is clear that had management been more systematic in prioritising projects, even more could have been accomplished, for example, with its well developed logistics capacity.
20. Despite the operational divide between NCA/Khartoum and NCA/Nairobi, the Sudanese government looks upon the NCA as one organisation and, hence, with a degree of suspicion. The Government's attitude has directly affected NCA's operational effectiveness, which has led NCA/Khartoum to focus more upon training and institutional development rather than relief or development programmes. This said, however, the NCA's oper-

ational capacity remains an important factor when it comes to sensitive and fragile situations such as that of Juba.

21. NCA/Nairobi, which since 1996 has become fully operational, continues to tread a delicate balance between maintaining good relations with the SPLA/M and with the church organisations in the area. The latter two compete for the same resources, and clearly the positive relations which NCA's Nairobi office has with the SPLA/M does little to enhance NCA's overall relations with the Government of the Sudan.
22. NPA's information management has been weak. Lack of assessment, monitoring and accountability standards has meant that inaccuracy and even re-creations imbue much of NPA's written and oral reports. NCA/Khartoum has periodic reporting, but its regularity is hampered by a range of external factors beyond its direct control. NCA/Nairobi has a seemingly effective and regular reporting system.
23. In general, NPA's operations have been hampered by reported cases of misuse of resources. Although audit reports in the early 1990s mention irregularities in procedures, such suggestions have not been subjected to systematic independent investigation until late 1996.

Evaluation of Impact

24. The evaluation's principal concern, viz. the impact of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan in relation to the civil war situation and efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation, was analysed from three different perspectives: conciliation, direction and prevention.
25. Conciliation concerns the process by which the attitudes and interests of leadership in conflict can be modified. In that regard an NGO can serve as a catalyst by bringing the two conflicting parties together through various mechanisms: exploration, e.g., an NGO can support a forum such as IGADD where reconciliation options can be explored. NCA/Nairobi in that regard supports an informal working group, i.e., the Sudan Working Group, whose ideas and contacts have been used to strengthen IGADD's peace initiatives; unification, e.g., an NGO directly serves as the intermediary to bring conflicting sides together. NCA/Khartoum has been instrumental in helping to unify the positions of opposition groups in Government-held areas;

rewards, e.g., an NGO can provide positive incentives to those conflicting parties that undertake peace initiatives. NCA-Nairobi, for example, has funded and given other material support on two different occasions in 1996 to peace meetings between elders and chiefs from warring ethnic groups; training, e.g., an NGO can fund various training activities to enhance understanding and awareness of central peace-building concerns such as international humanitarian law. NPA has been providing training sessions for the SPLM in international humanitarian law; facilitation, e.g., an NGO can help other groups undertake the sorts of activities noted earlier. NCA's support for the New Sudan Council of Churches has enabled the latter to play a much more active role in peace conferencing.

26. Direction reflects efforts to change the balance of power between hostile parties. NGOs can contribute to strengthening or weakening a party, for example, by either withdrawing or supplying goods and services or by exposing or legitimising a party's policies, declared objectives or principles. Both NPA and NCA used such techniques quite effectively in ways that affected balances of power on intermittent bases. However, they neither had the weight nor the essential overall political support that would have been needed to truly alter the scales in one direction or another.
27. Prevention seeks to avoid the recurrence or occurrence of violence by influencing the underlying attitudes of important groups. In looking for ways to promote prevention, NGOs can focus upon areas of unequal development or upon changing the perceptions of communities about each other. The leverage that NPA and NCA had on many of the poorer and most accessible communities in the Sudan had indeed some preventative potential, but in the final analysis they neither felt obliged nor had the resources to undertake such activities with the consistency and scope that would have been required.
28. Despite many incidents of positive peace initiatives, the involvement of NCA and NPA in certain ways actually exacerbated hostilities. NCA's focus upon Eastern Equatoria has been interpreted by Sudanese outside that area as reflecting a biased «ethnic agenda», contributing to a small degree of intra-ethnic animosity both in rebel and government controlled territory. The NPA's involvement with the SPLM and the reliance of the latter upon the former for resources have contributed to the

weakening of the all important interaction between the SPLM and traditional chiefs and governance structures. The Movement could afford to rely on the outside, and the ability of a small core of its liaison experts (the SRRA), to obtain some vital resources. In general, however, none of the agencies individually or in concert have adequate resources to undertake the level of support necessary to promote the peace process.

Conclusions

29. The discontinuities between the programmes and projects of the NCA and NPA and the peace process can best be understood from four inter-related perspectives: (1) the origins of the NCA's and NPA's involvement in the Sudan; (2) their institutional objectives; (3) the dynamics and constraints imposed upon each by their respective partners, e.g., the Government of the Sudan and the SPLA/M; and (4) their respective management styles.
30. The origins of the involvement of the NPA and NCA in the Sudan did not stem from any coherent or uniform set of overall objectives, and certainly do not reflect any abiding commitment to fostering peace and reconciliation. The involvement of the NPA stemmed from a standard institutional response in 1985 to a specific request, and the NCA's involvement during this same period can be traced to a commitment to developing the most underprivileged areas of the Sudan after the Addis Ababa agreement.
31. The institutional objectives of the NCA and NPA differ significantly. NPA was seen as an essential supplier of institutional and resource support to the SRRA. In this role, it was often a vociferous critic of ostensibly neutral initiatives such as Operation Lifeline Sudan, and was openly willing to act as a conduit for humanitarian assistance that might not necessarily be deemed neutral. NCA was seen as committed to capacitating its church organisations but also needing to balance this interest with the demands of the SRRA.
32. The dynamics and constraints imposed by their respective partners go a considerable way towards explaining the reality of the objectives and implementation methods of both the NCA and NPA. Since 1987, when civil war affected access to rural areas and when criticisms about NCA's «surrogate government» role had reached a crescendo, NCA in the north established a policy of «working through» local partners. This transfer of skills from expatriates to Sudanese has been very effective, but leaves the programme exposed to Khartoum authorities. NCA's operations in the south have not made this transition yet, and it has a number of expatriates who remain in the field. The NPA, on the other hand, rests on the whole quite comfortably in its close relationship with the SPLM/SRRA.
33. The respective management styles of the two NGOs also explain the differences in programming and contributions to the peace process. In the past, NPA's powerful Resident Representatives determined the direction of the organisation and how the SPLA/M would be supported. NCA's programmes and peace initiatives in contrast were more determined by the organisation's own goals and its long-term strategies.
34. The assistance provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through NCA and NPA has reached considerably more areas than most other programmes of its kind. NPA, for example, worked in areas where many OLS-registered agencies were reluctant to go; the NCA worked in both Sudan's north and south.
35. Nevertheless, one must not underestimate the complexities that any assistance programme will have to face, given the attitudes of authorities in both the north and the south and the conflict that continues in the south. Such factors may create differences in the objectives and operational modalities of the NCA and NPA; differences which the Norwegian Government may regard as complementary, but which in fact may well be dysfunctional.
36. There is no indication that the present level of conflict will abate, and to the contrary there is considerable evidence that the conflict will intensify, particularly across the borders of Southern Sudan. To some extent this sad conclusion reflects a persistent inability of concerned governments to develop a coherent and coordinated strategy for dealing with Sudan's tragedy, one which is increasingly becoming an inter-state crisis. On another level, this conclusion indirectly reflects the consequence of donors' unwillingness or inability to develop a coherent and coordinated strategy with their own operational agencies.
37. Rather than develop a coherent and coordinated strategy, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has opted for a looser arrangement, one based upon perceived mutual advantage. The MFA has

been able to use the NPA and NCA to gain information and maintain contacts, and in turn the agencies have used their relationship with the MFA to gain considerable administrative and operational latitude which has not improved accountability.

Recommendations

38. The very scale of the crisis facing the Sudan and neighbouring countries requires a more coherent and committed international response. It is all too evident that the moral as well as resource commitments of Norway will really only bear fruit if they are part of a larger and far more strategic approach to peace and development in the region. Consistent with the Government of Norway's very positive approach to UN humanitarian reform, it would be increasingly important for the Government more profoundly to relate its humanitarian commitments to those of other actors.
39. It is evident that the Norwegian government's diplomatic objectives and the aid objectives of the NCA and NPA must be more closely linked. In particular if the Norwegian government wishes to seek ways to promote peace in Sudan, then this objective must be reflected in the sorts of pro-

grammes that it is funding through the NCA and NPA. Towards this end, the Government should establish a Sudan policy with clear objectives and agreed criteria for its assistance.

40. There is no doubt that, despite the operational difficulties that the NCA and NPA face in the course of their work, both organisations must reassess their objectives and strategies. In so doing, they must weigh more carefully their impact upon Sudanese society, and reconcile their different institutional roles and bases in terms of that society's needs. Reduction of violence should be made an explicit objective of programmes and more preventive assistance should be provided.
41. At the same time, it is essential that NPA continues to improve its level of accountability not only in terms of administration and management, but also in terms of programme and project development and implementation.
42. The Ministry should undertake a review of how projects and programmes are approved and how reporting procedures are supervised. The review might lead to enhanced accountability, more systematic documentation of results and consistent guidelines for NGO partners.

1 Introduction

The long-standing Norwegian commitment to the Sudan is unique. In the last three decades large amounts of assistance have been provided and many Norwegians have served in the Sudan. The focus of the present evaluation is on the humanitarian assistance, provided by Norway, in particular since 1983, when civil war returned to the country.

The purpose of the *Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan* is to examine the impact of Norwegian humanitarian assistance upon the continuing civil war and efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation in the country. Attention will be focused on the extent to which humanitarian assistance has been able to relieve distress, hunger and suffering, and on the effect of the aid on various parties' willingness to seek peace and reconciliation. The evaluation is intended to provide a basis for the assessment of further Norwegian involvement in the Sudan.

The main emphasis of the evaluation has been on the programmes of Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid – two large NGOs, which have been channels for most of the approximately 50 million NOK provided for the Sudan annually. The Terms of Reference, which have guided the evaluation, are included in Annex I.

The evaluation was undertaken by a team of consultants from November 1996 to April 1997. After initial discussions in Norway in November 1996, a desk study of relevant documentation, and further consultations in Norway, the field study team worked in the Sudan and Nairobi for five weeks in January and February. The findings were analysed in February-March and the draft report was ready on 7 April 1997. Comments received from NCA, NPA and different departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were taken into consideration when preparing the evaluation report, which was sub-

mitted to the MFA in June 1997. In July the Ministry decided to make more information available to the evaluation team. Additional documentation was studied and supplementary interviews were held in Norway in August and the revised evaluation report was submitted in September (draft) and October (final) of 1997. In the revised evaluation report a new section on the «Oslo Back Channel» was added (section 2.4) and changes were made in the Executive Summary. For information on the itinerary, limitations and documents consulted, please see Annexes II, III and V.

By the end of December 1996, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested COWI to undertake a rapid verification of the status of the programmes of the NPA in Southern Sudan. The verification, which had separate Terms of Reference, was added as an extension to the present evaluation and the results were reported in February 1997.¹

The evaluation team wishes to express its sincere appreciation of the open, friendly and constructive cooperation extended by the Ministry and representatives of the NCA and NPA in Oslo, in Sudan and in Kenya. The information provided, the logistical support and the comments to the draft report have greatly facilitated the work. Our sincere thanks go to the personnel of the two agencies in the field and to the staff of ACF-Juba and WFP who contributed actively to keeping up the spirit of the team while house-stranded in Juba for five extra days.

The evaluation is intended to provide a basis for the assessment of further Norwegian involvement in the Sudan. In addition, it may be useful in the context of the current international concern, which is shared by Norway, about the effects and impacts of humanitarian assistance and the links between aid and conflict.

¹ «Verification of the Norwegian People's Aid's Activities in the Sudan», Field Study Report, COWI, February 1997.

2 Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan

2.1 Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance Policy

Since the 1950s solidarity with the poor and those affected by emergencies has been an important part of Norwegian Foreign Policy. The relatively large sums of money provided by Norway for short-term humanitarian relief and long-term development programmes were justified not only on grounds of solidarity, but also because the funds were seen to promote the interests of Norway in various ways. The «security»-dimension, which has always been part of the justification, has changed in content and increased its importance over the last few years with the development of a broader concept of security. Most observers will agree that the external threats, which Norway is facing to-day, are less related to military concerns. Inequality and personal insecurity, which is fuelling social, ethnic and religious conflicts in many parts of the world, represent a growing threat. Conflicts and the many different environmental threats can lead to migration of a magnitude which has not been seen in recent times.

There is no single statement or document, which has been given status as «the humanitarian assistance policy of Norway», but «preventing and alleviating distress arising from conflicts and natural disasters» is one of

the five main points in Norwegian South Policy². Two important policy elements, which are both highly relevant to the evaluation of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan, can, however, be identified by studying various sources and the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is conducting its business:

1. *Conflict resolution is regarded as an integral part of Norwegian humanitarian assistance. Therefore the Ministry tries to combine emergency relief with the promotion of peace, reconciliation and – to the extent possible – the prevention of further conflict. The demand by governments for non-interference in internal affairs must be weighed against people's need for protection.*
2. *A higher degree of international co-ordination of emergency relief is promoted within the framework of the UN, while emergency relief efforts are mainly channelled through Norwegian NGOs. They «have often proved to have an advantage over other channels in emergency relief situations»³.*

To facilitate the first point of policy coordination the Government has concentrated efforts related to humanitarian aid, emergency relief, refugee issues and human rights in one department of the Ministry. The Govern-

Table 2.1 Programme Category 03.40: Relief, Human Rights, Peace and Democratisation (1.000 NOK)

Description	Disbursed 1995	SIII 1996	1997 Proposal	Changes 96 to 97 (%)
Humanitarian Assistance, Natural Disasters	140 753	130 146	130 150	0,0%
Assistance to Refugees and Support for Human Right Activities	1 275 484	1 216 100	1 300 100	6,9%
Support to Peace and Democratisation	96 052	91 900	91 900	0,0%
Development and Disarmament	1 756	2 000	2 000	0,0%
Support to refugees in Norway	60 000	85 000	174 000	104,7%
Total	1 574 045	1 525 146	1 698 150	11,3%

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs: St. prp nr. 1 (1996–97) for Budsjetterminen 1997

² Report No. 19 to the Storting (1995–1996). A Changing World – Main elements of Norwegian policy towards developing countries, page 5–6.

³ Ibid, page 19

ment can put together a well designed package combining different instruments, because most of the relevant budget appropriations have been clubbed into one «Programme Category», as illustrated in Table 2.1

The second point is more difficult to document, in particular because there are very few evaluations of the effects and impact humanitarian assistance, provided by Norwegian NGOs and no evaluations, which provides a comparative analysis⁴. It is clear that compared to governments in other Nordic countries, the Norwegian Government is channelling a very large part of its humanitarian assistance through NGOs⁵ at the expense of the UN-system and other international agencies.

It remains an open question how effectively the Norwegian Government is «promoting international co-ordination of emergency relief within the framework of the UN», taking into consideration the priority, which is given by the Government, to providing humanitarian assistance through the UN.

There is a lack of an agreed set of criteria for the utilization of funds, allocated for humanitarian assistance. There is a long tradition in Norway for a very close relationship between the Government and NGOs in the execution of this important part of Norwegian foreign policy. Large parts of the budget for humanitarian assistance are allocated in response to applications prepared by the NGOs. Although the Ministry is getting information from the UN, Norwegian Embassies/Representations and other sources, the assessment of needs in various parts of the world, undertaken by the NGOs themselves, play an important role in decisions made by the Ministry on the allocation of resources.

The present evaluation relates to the humanitarian assistance programmes of Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid in the Sudan. The scope of Norwegian funding to the Sudan is discussed in Section 2.3. It is sufficient here to indicate that both NGOs are important partners to the Government with regard to utilization of the Norwegian allocation for humanitarian assistance. The allocations have increased dramatically during the last five years. This is also the period, where NPA has managed to increase its share of the resources available substantially, as indicated in Table 2.2.

The good cooperation between the Government of Norway and the non-governmental sector has been institutionalised in the «Katastrofeutvalget», where the top-management of the Ministry meets with representatives of the five most important NGOs in this field⁶, representatives of related parts of the Government⁷ and «Norges Eksportråd». The Norwegian capacity to intervene in emergency situations and situations of conflict has increased by the creation of facilities such as NOREPS⁸, NORDEM⁹ and NORTEAM¹⁰.

The separation of the short-term humanitarian assistance, administrated by Utenriksdepartementet, and the longer-term development assistance, administrated by NORAD, has been an issue for discussion in Norway for several decades. In 1995 the «Commission on North-South and Aid Policies» in fact proposed that the responsibility for emergency relief be transferred from MFA to NORAD. The recommendation, however, was turned down by the Government, which felt that «the clear political considerations often related to emergency relief are a major argument against this proposal»¹¹. This issue has a number of important implications for

⁴ A comparative analysis of the efforts of Norwegian NGOs in the Sudan vis-à-vis the efforts of UN-agencies and other international agencies is not part of the TOR of the present evaluation either. Reference is made to Annex 1 to this Report.

⁵ The Finnish Government channels less than 5% of its humanitarian assistance through Finnish NGOs. About half of the Swedish and Danish humanitarian assistance is channelled through NGOs, while more than 75% of Norwegian humanitarian assistance is channelled through NGOs.

⁶ Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian People's Aid, Norwegian Save the Children and Norwegian Refugee Council.

⁷ Including representatives of the Department of Defence and «Forsvarets Sanitet»

⁸ Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System, which was established during the Kurd crisis in 1991. Sector-specific preparedness systems, such as NORSHELTER and NORHOSP, have been established later.

⁹ Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, established in 1991-1992, administrated by the Human Rights Institute, provides various types of expertise related to elections, the media, protection of minorities, promotion of human rights, etc.

¹⁰ NORTEAM is a group of specially trained aid workers, who are prepared to go to disaster areas at extremely short notice. This facility, which was established in 1995, is administered by the Norwegian Refugee Council.

¹¹ Report No. 19, op.cit., page 47

Table 2.2: Humanitarian Assistance disbursed worldwide through NCA and NPA 1981–1996

Disbursements. Mill. NOK.	1981	1986	1991	1996
Norwegian Church Aid	19	80	103	143
Norwegian People's Aid	10	15	46	223
Total Norwegian Hum.Ass.	N/A *	461	925	1 369

Source: Evaluation Report 3.92 (page 63) and Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

* Not available

Norwegian aid policies in relation to Sudan and several other countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America:

- The policy implication is that there is no institutional base for the development of a comprehensive and coherent Norwegian Sudan-policy, which combines short-term interventions (emergency relief, facilitation of processes of peace and the protection of human rights) with longer-term perspectives in terms of sustainable development.
- The resource implication is that it is difficult to take well informed decisions about the relative size of allocations for short-term and long-term interventions, in particular in a context which is undergoing rapid change. In addition, some important programmes, like the efforts to strengthen civil society in various parts of Sudan, may fall «in the grey zone», which do not easily attract funding from any of the two parts of the Government
- The operational implication is that NGOs like NCA and NPA have to relate to two very different parts of the Government to obtain funding for their programmes in countries like the Sudan. It may not be a big problem for large agencies to relate to different modes of operation, but smaller NGOs may not have sufficient capacity to cope with this challenge.

It appears that the Government has left it to the NGOs to create the institutional base for linking relief with development.

2.2 The Development of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan in a Historical Perspective

This section will concentrate on the evolution of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan between 1972 and 1995; and in so doing, place the roles played by the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) in their historical context. The approaches adopted by the two very different agencies are

also reviewed in light of important changes, which have occurred in the thinking on humanitarian assistance.

2.2.1 The Area Focus of 1970s

In the early seventies disaster relief was of relatively minor importance in the wider picture of international assistance. Policies to promote self-reliance and social development were sweeping the international scene with the main emphasis given to enhancing productive capacities and satisfying basic human needs.

In Sudan the Addis Ababa Agreement, signed in March 1972, provided the promise of a stable context for much needed development aid. The agreement had been facilitated by many parties, including the All Africa Council of Churches and the Sudan Council of Churches. After the agreement had been signed, NCA was asked by SCC to participate in the programme for returnees. Following this, both GOS and the new regional government asked NCA to participate in the socio-economic development of the southern region by establishing a long-term assistance programme in Equatoria, which was already known to NCA.

The programme had a dual purpose of facilitating repatriation and supporting the peace process. The aid was then seen clearly as enhancing the attractiveness of the peace agreement, and was conceived from the origin as a peace-building device. It also fitted into the strategies of other aid organisations. The UNHCR for example announced a programme to repatriate some 180,000 refugees from neighbouring areas, many of them to Eastern Equatoria.


The Choice of Eastern Equatoria

The choice of geographic focus was made in favour of Eastern Equatoria for a variety of reasons. Eastern Equatoria was an area of low development and it was hit harder than any other area by the civil strife. The closest

tarmac road began only at Eldoret in Kenya, and the communications up to it were rendered haphazard by rains and flash floods. The area of eastern Equatoria presented a double advantage to NCA. It was devoid of

other development agencies of any significant capacity, and it was a self-contained, relatively accessible area of south Sudan.

Ethnic Groups in East Bank, Equatoria, the Sudan



Sources: NCA - Nairobi, February 1997

Eastern Equatoria covered an area of 85,000 square miles, and contained a population of 300,000 to 400,000 people. Most of these belonged to the Toposa, Didinga, Acholi, Lotuho, Lokoro, Madi and Bari tribes. A multitude of smaller tribes also lived in the area. NCA gave itself the task of facilitating the complete development of the Province through integrated rural development. This development, it was believed, would culminate in the hand-over of all the projects to local partners.

In November 1974 the government of Sudan signed a four year agreement with NCA, to set the framework for the transition from relief aid to development. Each programme was discussed with the regional line ministry in Juba, and approved by the Ministry of Planning in Khartoum. Priority was given to agriculture, co-operatives and health, using six Rural Development Centres as bases. Infrastructure development in key areas such as water, education and roads was also carried out extensively. Some of the carpentry and mechanical workshops set up by NCA to support its programmes were expanded to serve the needs of the main towns. NCA also made funding available to the local authorities to buy vehicles and equipment. In all areas the emphasis

was on development of human resources, including training.

In December 1977 the vice-president of the regional government, Dr Abel Alier, wrote to NCA to extend its services beyond the area of the East Bank of Eastern Equatoria. He also requested an intensification of the training aspects of the programme, and advanced a suggestion that the local authorities contribute financially to some of the projects. The latter was in fact not feasible, due to lack of resource on the part of the regional government, and the first was not carried out, because NCA felt that a more diluted effort might prevent it from achieving satisfactory results in the province. This became an entrenched position of NCA over the years. The possibility that this position could clash with the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of ethnic group does not seem to have been noticed at the time.

Lack of Sustainability in the Promotion of Stability

In 1977 Juba University was opened, and the Nile Printing Press was handed over to the regional government by NCA. This was later assessed on the request of the

Government in 1988, as it had become nearly completely dysfunctional. The assessment concluded that there had been no control on recruitment, leaves and benefits, and that the general manager had little effective control. The Press should be privatised, the report concluded, and NCA should be one of the major shareholders. The recommendations were not implemented, due to the fact that no other resources were forthcoming from the local side. The weaknesses of the Press highlight the limits of sustainability in the current context.

A report of 1978 notes:

«The planning of the activities has been based on the conception of what the major constraints could be for development. An absolutely essential pre-condition for stable economic development is peace. It is believed that a continuation of the NCA/Sudan Programme also after 1978 will play an important role in the stability and peace-keeping in the area. The contribution NCA activities have made to meet the expectations of the local population can of course not be measured. The facts are, however, that this region has been peaceful since the Agreement»¹².

The jubilant tone was justified by the general political evolution of the country. 1978 marks the signing of the Camp David Agreement, the normalisation of relations with Egypt, Ethiopia and Libya. US assistance was steadily increasing to reach a record high for sub-Saharan Africa in the early eighties. Many observers inside Sudan believed that the country had reached its take-off stage. The Jonglei Canal Scheme is a good illustration. This project, of record proportion in the world, was to have a significant political impact. It was hoped that it would improve the wealth of all the areas bordering the Nile, liberate vast areas in the south for intensive agriculture, and allow commercial development to reach the area. Even NCA staff saw this as a guarantee of stability, and a way of overcoming the historical cleavage, which had separated south from north. NCA reports of 1979 show that there was enormous optimism about the agency's programme.

This is in contrast to the critical remarks voiced in Norway regarding the lack of sustainability of the aid, and the detrimental substitution of local authorities and

public administration in the area. Some observers have also advanced the hypothesis that by contrasting its high quality services to those of the regional government, NCA indirectly undermined the authority of the new structures put in place by the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. This opinion was clearly not shared in south Sudan, on either side of the current SPLA front line, and by the members of different tribes. They contend that the fact that the programme was not sustained is not due to any intrinsic quality, but rather to the fact that war broke out. That NCA supplemented the government is seen here as a gesture of wise understanding in the context of the active discrimination by the centre against equatorians. The people of the region, it is argued, would never have had access to these services without NCA.

Increased Tension

The year of 1979, when NCA renewed its four-year programme, began to send out mixed signals about the future of the Sudan. Conflict increased in Ethiopia, a religious revolutionary movement toppled the Shah of Iran, and East/West cleavages precipitated increased tensions with Ethiopia and Libya. There was an influx of refugees from Uganda, at the same time as the French company «Compagnie de Construction Internationale» began implementing the Jonglei Canal Project, funded by Egypt and France. The US oil company «Chevron» discovered large deposits of oil near Bentiu. Difficult economic conditions led to riots in Khartoum and many governmental reshuffles took place.

In October 1981 a southern Moslem was appointed to the post of President for the Southern Regional High Executive Command, replacing the former Anya Nya leader Joseph Lagu. In 1982 President Nimeiri took over the posts of Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Minister of Agriculture, and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Elections in the south highlighted tensions between the Equatoria province and the other provinces, in particular the Nilotic ethnic groups. The President took advantage of the tensions to propose a redivision of the south into three separate regions, Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile, thus weakening the north/south cleavage, increasing the cleavages

¹² «Proposal for a Continuation of the Sudan Programme, 1979/1982», prepared by the NCA Resident Representative.

in the south. This measure in June 1983 was followed by another one in September linking «spiritually and organically» the legal code to Islamic law.

2.2.2 *The Response to Civil War*

In December 1983 a revival of the first civil war took place in the Nuer areas under the names of the Anya Nya II and the SPLA. Development projects were the first targets of the rebels, with the intention of highlighting the absence of participation and consultation, which characterised these grand schemes vis-à-vis a large part of the southern population.

The security situation had deteriorated sharply in Eastern Equatoria, while in the rest of the country structural adjustment was accompanied by political instability, refugee outflows and a sharply deteriorating economic situation. The development personnel, who left, as well as the emergency technicians, who took their place, continued to see the events as temporary interruptions in the development continuum. Neither they, nor the rebels and certainly not the Government in Khartoum foresaw that the conflict would continue for more than a decade without signs of resolution.

In March 1986 the headquarters of NCA were attacked, and an NCA staff member was taken hostage by the SPLA for seven weeks. By the end of the year the areas of operation were limited to a small zone around Kapoeta, Torit, Pajok, and the Juba/Madi area. Several international organisations gave alarming reports of a looming famine in the south, while elections in the north brought in the new government of Sadiq Al Mahdi.

Norwegian People's Aid became operational in 1985/86, along the so called «Narus corridor», a strip of dirt road connecting the SPLA controlled displaced camp of Narus to the Kenyan town of Lokichokio. There were very few relief agencies present in the rebel held areas, but NPA, after an extensive assessment mission, seized the opportunity for a new solidarity operation. The operation was led by Mr Egil Hagen, who worked for the Red Cross and later a private company in Kenya. The SPLA had already established a civilian arm in the

small office of the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Agency in Nairobi. The SRRA had no personnel in the field at the time, and found a partner in NPA, both to challenge other agencies, and to manage a food relief logistical operation, including effective distribution in SPLA-held areas. The whole NPA operation, which was supported by World Vision, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and gradually also by other agencies, was very personalised, composed as it was of only three key staff members up to 1991.

NCA, based out of Juba between 1986 and 1989, decided to continue rehabilitation operations wherever possible in accessible areas, to protect its property, and to keep in contact with the personnel in which great hopes had been placed. The loss of its assets, including a large amount of documentation, highlighted to the agency the importance of maintaining a focus on human resources. However by the end of the year 1989 practically all NCA-inputs became a relief operation, centred around the major towns.

Changes in the Operational Context

The international community became aware of the humanitarian disaster under way in the South. During 1987–88, a serious famine raged, partly due to drought and flooding, but mainly due to the escalating war, and the ICRC, UN and several NGOs were looking for ways and means to overcome the complexity of the situation. Initiated by UNICEF's Director, Operation Lifeline Sudan was launched in March 1989 with its Headquarters in Khartoum and a southern line out of Nairobi/Loki¹³. Operation Lifeline Sudan's basic tenet was that relief agencies could be able to reach the greatest number of victims only by negotiating the conditions of access with all parties involved. Under the leadership of the UN, OLS recognised the sovereignty of the Government, and consequently the right to veto certain activities, such as flights in Sudanese airspace. This was not acceptable to the solidarity organisations, in particular NPA, which chose to remain outside the framework.

By 1989 the remaining 45,000 Ugandan refugees had left the south of Sudan. The next four year plan of the NCA was drawn up under very significant doubts re-

¹³ OLS is a negotiated access agreement, signed in March of 1989, between the Government of the Sudan, the United

Nations and its implementing partners, and the SPLA/SPLM.

garding access. A new director was appointed, while Sudanese staff had to be cut from 1,200 to 170, and expatriates from 22 to 7. Meanwhile with insecurity in northern Uganda the use of airlifts and armed convoys along the roads became increasingly necessary. When the towns of Torit and Kapoeta fell to the SPLA in 1989, NPA sent relief food and medical supplies in big quantities. New roads of access began to open up under the OLS-agreement, or in parallel to it.

The Red Cross had previously concentrated on large cumbersome airlifts into inaccessible areas. Some ICRC personnel wanted to exploit the water channels, which presented a much more cost-effective and reliable means of distributing relief. No river-worthy boats had been found however, and even the SPLA did not have satisfactory options to transport large amounts of food. In September 1989 the Norwegian Red Cross offered ICRC a large barge funded by the Norwegian Government. The barge arrived in July 1990 on the Nile, by air from Norway to Nairobi, and from there by lorry. Unfortunately the government clearance was withdrawn, or possibly never fully given, to the ICRC Delegation in Khartoum. The barge, which could carry up to 60 tons of cargo, was, however, already on the Nile, and in late 1990, after prolonged wrangles and a ban on ICRC flights, it was agreed that NPA should take over the responsibility for the operation of the barge. At that time NPA had already become a loud critic of the UN's inability to operate freely in response to need because of the control over it exercised by the government. NPA was appearing as the main alternative to the OLS and Red Cross negotiated access frameworks: a third force with a potential for a more political approach to the crisis in the South. It began to adopt more closely the aims of the SPLA and developed from 1992 a growing field presence¹⁴.

¹⁴ The barge, the largest on the Nile, was considered to be of strategic interest. In fact, the Government of the Sudan tried to bomb it several times. After October 1991, NPA had to hide the boat in a swampy area near Shambe. Sometimes the barge would disappear. NPA would be told that it had developed technical problems and was under repairs. There have also been allegations that the barge was used for transporting arms, although this has never been proved. The barge is now under supervision of SRRA. It lacks fuel, lubricants and spare parts.

¹⁵ The direct cause of the SPLA split was the downfall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia which till then had been the main supplier of SPLA. The split, which came as an at-

tempted coup d'état against Garang, was directed by Riek Machar and Lam Akol. The coup failed, but had a severe effect on the situation. The new group called themselves SPLA/United, but was mainly geared by dissident nuer, shilluk and partly Dinka commanders who were dissatisfied with Garang's leadership. A series of attacks were launched against SPLA Mainstream with serious outcomes and great human sufferings. It started with the attack on Bor, but continued in many places in the Upper Nile area. The split was a direct sign of the leadership conflict in SPLA, based on ethnicity and power struggle within and among the commanders who had developed a typical guerilla war-lord practice.

Pressures emerged in the south to replace the leadership of the SPLA with a new leadership, able to mobilise the grassroots and non-Dinka groups, while at the same time generating support from the international community. As a result a split occurred in the SPLA command in August 1991, which considerably changed the geopolitical scene¹⁵. For the first few months considerable amounts of aid and publicity went to the new faction, and it seemed that the SPLA Chairman John Garang's control was threatened. In October 1991 Riak Machar's Nuer military elements led a deadly attack against the civilian Bor Dinka populations, an event which was to have an unexpected impact. A video film taken by an NPA staff member on the massacre was widely distributed to western television companies. The horrific spectacle it revealed turned the current of foreign opinion against the movement. It belied Commander Riak Machar's claim to respect human rights, and again strengthened the position of what later came to be called the «mainstream» SPLA. It also signalled a dramatic increase in the importance of NPA to the SPLA, while international sympathy for Southern Sudan as a whole suffered to a certain extent.

Emergency Relief and Capacity Building in Complex Emergencies

The term «complex emergencies» began to be used in early 1992 to justify the exceptional circumstances in which a higher degree of humanitarian interventionism is justified. The concept emerged in the UN in New York during the negotiations for General Assembly Resolution 46/182, which endorsed the «right to assistance» and led to the creation of the post of UN Emergency Co-ordinator. This was also the year when Somalia and Bosnia became mediatic emergencies, and when the UN Secretary General published his «Agenda for

Peace». Crises were more widely seen not only as events but also as processes, which called for carefully designed combinations of interventions, many of them having long term consequences. Political linkages became more explicit, and the interface of the dynamics of aid and the dynamics of conflict was brought into the limelight.

A slow revolution then began in the way agencies conceived their programmes, which is still not finalised today. This is characterised by a new emphasis given to rehabilitation and capacity building assistance, whose objective is to allow communities to adapt to changed circumstances and take advantage of an expanded spectrum of techniques and resources. The concept of food security became more widely applied, and agencies began to question the automatic nature of the continuum from relief to development, or the inadequate cleavage which had been established between situational and structural forms of assistance. New notions, such as assistance to prevent conflict, began to emerge.

In Sudan the operational context had changed again. By early 1992 the government started a large offensive from the Ethiopia border and from Juba. NPA helped those displaced by the offensive to settle in Aswa Populations (25,000), Ame (45,000) and Atepi (35,000) forming the so called «Triple A» zone. NPA was the only NGO with a completely independent supply chain, and its lorries would pick up supplies from Arapi where commercial transporters refused to go further. These supplies would go to Magwe where the displaced coming from Torit and Kapoeta were converging, and vulnerable persons would be picked up. NPA developed Aswa hospital to serve a population of half a million people in the area of Eastern Equatoria south of Torit. The hospital was based on the «Norhosp» modules, provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

An extraordinary event further changed the flow of aid. The violent death of three expatriates, including a Norwegian journalist, in September 1992, led to the protest departure of all the OLS agencies. The humanitarian agencies were also being threatened by inter-communal insecurity in rebel areas, which were not controlled by

the SPLA. Northern sector NGOs did not have access to the areas recovered by the government forces. The displaced people in the «Triple A» camps, many of them pastoral Dinka who had lost their cattle, became completely dependent on aid. The withdrawal of OLS lasted four months. In December 1992 the BBC and the CBS showed a dramatic documentary film on the conditions in the camps («Dereliction of Duty»), which embarrassed the UN and brought renewed support to NPA. A full fledged return of agencies began, orchestrated by NPA, and supported by the agreement on «Ground Rules»¹⁶.

Changes had begun to occur in the strategies of Norwegian agencies in the Sudan. In line with the «working through approach», NCA in the northern sector developed a «resource centre approach», in which its primary role was to strengthen existing capacities of local partners to deliver services. NCA in the southern sector returned into rebel held areas in 1993, after an absence of more than one year. NCA struggled to recreate its operational space near the Kenyan and Ugandan borders, where it hoped to renew the support to the church structures, in particular the then expatriate led New Sudan Council of Churches and the Diocese of Torit.

In 1995 NPA ended a phase of rapid expansion begun at the time of the evacuation of the OLS agencies at the end of 1992, and caused by the expansion of needs in the high risk areas to the south of Juba in 1993 and 1994. The expansion was based on a needs assessment conducted by NPA in Bor County which led to a long list of projects mostly centred in the area of Nimule and Chukudum, with a smaller presence in the Narus, Akot and Panyagor areas. Two logistical bases with storage capacity had been developed, the larger one in Lokichokio, Kenya, and a smaller one in Koboko, Uganda. The 27 January 1995 the first medical operation was carried out in Chukudum hospital. The location itself was bombed 17 times, and had a high strategic significance for the SPLA. This rapidly became the main NPA centre inside Sudan. The programmes for unaccompanied minors, as well as the widely publicised support to one side of the war, attracted more funding, from the US in particular, and confirmed its position as

¹⁶ The «OLS Ground Rules» included mutual assurances of neutrality and security. It was intended to clarify «minimum acceptable standards of conduct», and was grounded in the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention on the

Rights of the Child. This was the first case of the introduction of international law into the humanitarian delivery of aid to rebel-controlled areas. In effect it led to a recognition of standards of international human rights law by the SPLA and the SSIM.


the operation with the largest capacity on the ground outside the ICRC and the OLS. The strategic importance of the support provided by NPA and its political implications became increasingly evident¹⁷.

2.3 Scope of Norwegian Funding Since 1983

In the period under review, there have been significant changes in Norwegian assistance to the Sudan, not only in the total amount of funds disbursed but also with regard to implementing agency and the type of funding.

Before 1983, the majority of Norwegian funds was used to finance development projects, such as the Equatorial Programme of NCA. Over the last 10 years Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid have been the main channels of assistance, as can be seen from Figure 2.1. The «Other»-category includes bilateral co-operation between the governments of Norway and the Sudan in addition to support, provided through other NGOs (including the Red Cross and Save the Children) and multilateral agencies (including UNICEF).

Figure 2.1: Norwegian Aid to the Sudan by Implementing Agency 1983–1995 (Million NOK)



Source: Norad

¹⁷ The following quotation from an NPA-employee met by the evaluation team illustrates the point: «When Ame camp was abandoned there was 500MT of surplus food left, which Ugandan traders were selling in Gulu. CRS made efforts to bring it to the camps, but even that agency knew they were supplying food to the front lines. At least people in the field did. Food was militarily more important than


weapons at the time to SPLA. This area had become the centre of the SPLA's resistance to the government offensive. The SRRA HQ was in Arapi. This relief aid was the biggest need of the front line. The GOS knew that closing the «Triple A»-camps would shut off the spotlight for the SPLA, and their supply line. These were the main Dinka camps left, and their presence was necessary to the morale of the troops.».

From 1986 to 1991, the share of funding to NCA and NPA increased to above one third of total funding, with NCA, operating a programme both in the North and in the South, being allocated significantly more than NPA. From 1992 to 1995, NPA's share of Norwegian funding increased significantly. This change can be attributed to the withdrawal of NGOs, with the exception of NPA, after the killing in 1992 of three expatriates, including a Norwegian journalist. As NPA was the only international NGO, which for a period was able to provide support to people in the South, it started to receive more funds from several donors, including the Norwegian MFA.

Only a relatively small part of Norwegian funding, which has been used to finance programmes of UN-agencies in the Sudan. Before the establishment of OLS, Norwegian funding for UN programmes had been reduced to zero by 1988. Then, with the commencement of OLS, the UN-agencies received considerable amounts up to 1991. Since then, UN funding has decreased to less than 10% of total funding.

The type of Norwegian aid has also changed. The most important change in the type of aid provided is the increased focus on humanitarian aid at the expense of long-term development assistance, reflected in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Norwegian Humanitarian and Non-Humanitarian Aid to the Sudan 1983 – 1995 (Million NOK)



Source: Norad

Please note that Food Relief also includes other current import financing. Other Humanitarian Aid (excluding food) includes assistance to refugees, transportation of emergency aid, storage, communication equipment, emergency hospital equipment, medicine, etc.

The dominance of humanitarian aid is especially pronounced from 1991 onwards, when it constitutes more than half of all Norwegian aid to the Sudan, a clear reflection of the continuing war situation.

The change in the composition of Norwegian assistance to the Sudan is illustrated in greater detail in Table 2.3

Table 2.3: Norwegian Aid to the Sudan 1983–95 (Relative Distribution in %)

Year	Food Relief	Other Hum. Aid	Public Utilities	Agriculture	Multi-sector	Other
1983	4%	2%	5%	6%	45%	38%
1984	0%	4%	24%	10%	0%	62%
1985	10%	19%	5%	20%	38%	8%
1986	0%	22%	0%	12%	51%	14%
1987	0%	64%	3%	0%	2%	31%
1988	0%	26%	24%	5%	27%	19%
1989	32%	2%	27%	5%	31%	3%
1990	0%	40%	13%	10%	18%	19%
1991	4%	52%	0%	3%	21%	20%
1992	0%	63%	0%	6%	21%	10%
1993	30%	47%	0%	0%	14%	9%
1994	5%	76%	0%	3%	6%	10%
1995	4%	60%	6%	5%	9%	15%

Source: Norad. Notes: Public Utilities include Water Supply and Physical Infrastructure. The following DAC-categories have been clubbed under «Other»: Social Infrastructure; Health & Population; Education & Science; Banking & Finance; Industry, Mining & Handicrafts; and Public Administration.

Throughout the period under review, the category «Multisector», which includes the integrated rural development programmes in Equatoria and Torit, has been an important component of Norwegian assistance to Sudan.

The amounts of *humanitarian assistance* provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Sudan through NPA and NCA are recorded in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan Provided by MFA through NPA and NCA

	1980–85	1986–90	1991–93	1994	1995	1996	Total
Norwegian Peoples Aid	5	11	24	14	19	17	90
Norwegian Church Aid	15	55	38	16	22	21	167
Total	20	66	62	30	41	38	257

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In conclusion, the figures in this section of the report clearly illustrate the long-term, sustained Norwegian commitment to the Sudan, even if the amounts differ in absolute terms from year to year. The composition of the assistance has changed from long-term development assistance to an emphasis on humanitarian aid. It is fair

to say that the Norwegian government has increasingly relied on Norwegian NGOs, in particular NCA, NPA and to a lesser extent the Norwegian Red Cross (NCR), as channels for assistance to Sudan, while the support for international efforts, such as OLS, in recent years has been minimal.

2.4 Norwegian Efforts to Promote Peace in the Sudan – the «Oslo Back-Channel»

Over the years, Norway has had many contacts with the parties in the Sudan civil war. In addition to the contacts established by NCA and NPA through the humanitarian assistance provided, there have also for many years been contacts on a more academic level between the University of Khartoum and the University of Bergen¹⁸.

At the political and diplomatic level contacts intensified in 1993 and 1994, when the Norwegian Government facilitated negotiations on a possible peace settlement between the two main parties of the war.

The chronology of events in 1993–94, which unfortunately did not lead to a successful result, is provided in the text-box below.

The «Oslo Back-Channel» – Chronology of Events

Preparatory Consultations

- May 1993 The SPLA leader, Dr. John Garang, had talks in Oslo with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Oct 1993 Dr. Riak Marchar (the then leader of SPLA United) had talks in Oslo with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Intensive Peace Facilitation

- Nov/Dec 1993 The MFA is approached twice by the Government of Sudan (GOS). Norway is expressing her willingness to help to establish contact between GOS and the SPLA.
Jan 1994 A Norwegian Delegation secretly travels to Khartoum to discuss the basis for a Norwegian initiative.
Mar 1994 A Norwegian Delegation is visiting Southern Sudan and has lengthy discussions with Garang, who has reservations about the «timing» of the Norwegian initiative.
April 1994 A first round of exploratory talks with representatives of SPLA and GOS takes place outside Oslo. Agreement is reached to meet again, but meetings at expert level to deal with a number of legal issues have to take place first.
Beginning of May 1994 Two Norwegian experts visit Khartoum for meetings with Sudanese legal experts.
End of May 1994 SPLA failed to attend a prearranged Norwegian/SPLA meeting of experts in Oslo as well as the subsequent joint meeting where representatives from Khartoum participated.
Beginning of June 1994 A new joint meeting of representatives of SPLA and GOS takes place in Oslo. Despite the fact that the talks actually broke down, it is agreed that MFA is to draft a peace proposal for comments by both parties.
June/July 1994 A proposal drafted by MFA is sent to the parties. Comments are received from GOS but not from SPLA.
July 1994 Norway gives a contribution of USD 100.000 in support of the Sudan peace negotiations under the auspices of IGADD.

Source: The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Norwegian peace-initiative ran parallel to four rounds of intensive peace negotiations within the IGADD framework¹⁹. The IGADD-process started in

September 1993, when a four-member committee (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea) was set up under the chairmanship of Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi to

¹⁸ In 1989 a symposium on «Management of the Crisis in Sudan», in which representatives both from SPLA and the Government of Sudan participated, was organized by the University of Bergen, under sponsorship by the Norwegian Government.

¹⁹ IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development), which was founded in 1986, has seven member-countries: Djibuti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and (from 1993) Eritrea. While the main objective of the organisation is to deal with regional issues of drought, increasingly it has been used as a conduit for political negotiations between member countries.

mediate between the warring parties. The first common meeting was held in Nairobi in January 1994. After four rounds of negotiations (in March, May, July and September) IGADD's mediator concluded that it would be a waste of time to continue. In September 1994, however, President Moi called a summit of all Heads of States of IGADD-countries and representatives of the two fraction of SPLA to continue the dialogue which is still – three years later – considered by many to be the most proper negotiating framework.

An assessment of the «Oslo Back-Channel» does not lend itself to easy or self-evident conclusions. It would seem that the Norwegian Government sincerely tried to explore the willingness of the conflicting parties to seek peace. Such an initiative seemed totally consistent with the level of resources expended by the Government and the well-established network it fostered. After a few rounds of secret talks between the parties in Norway, it became clear that it was not possible to reach an agreement. The interpretation of this negative result was that the SPLA in fact was not prepared to enter into an agreement with the Government in Khartoum.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the unilateral initiative taken by the Norwegian Government at best confused the parallel peace effort by IGADD, at worst undermined or derailed it. The Norwegian Government saw the «Oslo Back-Channel» as being in support of the IGADD-process, but it was actually quite separate from and not co-ordinated with the negotiations within the IGADD framework. In subsequent consultations regional actors such as the Eritrean Government as well as international actors such as the United States Government have criticised Norway for opening up what was considered to be an alternative channel to the IGADD-process.

It is not within the scope of the present evaluation of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan to conclude on the appropriateness of this political initiative. What should be explored in greater detail, however, are the lessons which can be learned from this experience about the relations between humanitarian and political efforts of the Norwegian Government in response to the

civil war in Sudan and the interaction between the Government and the two NGOs, NPA and NCA, in this respect. A number of observations can be made on this subject. The following appear to be of particular importance:

- The long-term commitment of Norway to the Sudan, the good relations that different Norwegian government and non-governmental actors had with all important parties to the war, and the substantial amounts of humanitarian assistance, provided by Norway to people on all sides, affected by the war, paved the way for a unilateral Norwegian peace initiative
- The Norwegian humanitarian assistance to people in SPLA-controlled areas in the South was actively used by the Norwegian Government as a leverage to bring SPLA to the negotiation table. Although Dr. Garang, from the very beginning expressed reservations with regard to the «timing» of the Norwegian initiative and the likelihood of achieving results, he accepted to send representatives to Oslo for talks.
- While the «Norwegian Peoples Aid» as such did not put pressure on SPLA, the active involvement of the NPA Resident Representative (in managing transport arrangements, in conveying messages between MFA and SPLA, in providing Dr. Garang with a mobile satellite phone²⁰, etc.) was a *sine qua non* to the efforts on the part of the Norwegian Government to open up and sustain the «Oslo Back-Channel»
- Neither NCA, nor the headquarters of NPA, was aware of the secret negotiations until they were reported by a Norwegian newspaper. MFA did not make use of the expertise and experience of the two agencies in defining the facilitating role, which could be played by MFA, and in defining options that the MFA could pursue to promote peace.
- The independent role played by the NPA Resident Representative to facilitate the contact between MFA and SPLA helped to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the NPA HQ in the conflict over management issues, which evolved between them.

²⁰ The phone was financed by the Norwegian Government over the humanitarian assistance appropriation to facilitate

easy communication between the MFA and Dr. Garang, who was often moving around between different military camps in Southern Sudan.

In conclusion, it can be observed that humanitarian assistance is increasingly being used, not only by the Norwegian Government, but also by many other important governmental and non-governmental players, including USAID, to promote political agendas. This may not always be in the best interest of the people affected by the humanitarian crisis. The civil war in Sudan illustrates the need for a two-tier international response system, which includes an impartial response which will be provided automatically irrespective of the politi-

cal context to meet the basic needs of people affected, and a political response, which links further support to areas in conflict to the willingness of the parties to reduce violence and promote peace and stability. Norway should provide resources for both «tiers» of this emerging international response system. This appears to be the most important lesson, which can be learned from the analysis of the «Oslo Back-channel» in terms of its relevance to Norwegian humanitarian assistance policy.

3 The Programmes of NCA and NPA in the Sudan

This chapter gives a brief overview of the programmes of NPA and NCA in Sudan. The first section describes the different intervention approaches adopted by the two NGOs and their choice of partners. The second section presents the organigrammes and staffing, while the third section explain the funding situation of the NGOs. As NCA is working both in the northern sector (out of Khartoum and Juba) and in the South (out of Nairobi) the first two sections of the chapter are divided into three subsections.

3.1 Intervention Approach and Choice of Partners

NCA/Khartoum: The «Working Through» Approach

1987 was a critical year for NCA/Sudan because it was the year when NCA decided to change its intervention approach. The new strategy is a move away from direct implementation to one where the capacity of local partners is strengthened so that the local partner can ultimately undertake the tasks in a sustainable manner without outside support. This new approach is a continuum, which range from «working with» to «working through» until «contributing to» local partners, adopted by most of the church-based NGOs of the Lutheran World Federation.

This new philosophy arose in a time of intensified civil war when NCA's access to rural areas declined, and during a period when NCA was criticised by many for its role in the 1970's and early 1980's when the agency acted in many ways as a substitute government within the East Bank area.

Now, ten years later, NCA/Khartoum has reached the «working through» stage. A cadre of exceptional professionals is the result of intensive development of human resources. These persons are highly sought after by other organizations for leadership positions. For instance, the new Secretary General of Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) is the former Director of NCA's Equatoria Programme. He has been given the great challenge of reorganizing the SCC. Likewise, on another level, a former NCA nutritionist was transferred to SCC to run their nutrition and AIDS awareness programmes in

Juba. She is known for being the best nutritionist in Equatoria. These two individuals are just two examples of many former NCA personnel, who are making a difference in their new workplace.

In 1997, NCA/Khartoum has only one expatriate staff person to head the organisation. The current NCA staff are mainly there to assist other local structures with their humanitarian work, and many have already been seconded to indigenous organisations. This is a type of transfer of skills that NCA is actively promoting so that once there is a peace agreement, NCA can phase out of Sudan in a short span of years. At that point in time NCA would only be funding the local structures it has contributed to in the past (the «contributing to» stage) through partnership agreements, according to the current philosophy of NCA.

As NCA is a church-based organisation, it has decided to work with and through SCC. NCA is supporting the Emergency Response Programme and the Voluntary Repatriation Programme (VRP) of SCC. The funds going to these two sections of SCC are primarily used to assist recently displaced persons with food and non-food relief items and to assist longer-term displaced persons to return to their places of origin.

In addition, Sudanaid, the Sudan Popular Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation (SPCR) and African Inland Church (AIC) are all partners of NCA. Sudanaid is using funds from NCA to undertake scholarship programmes for Southern Sudanese university students. The Darfur drought relief programme of 1994–1995 was supported by NCA through SPCR and AIC is the local health partner in Juba.

NCA/Nairobi: The Operator Approach

In contrast to the intervention approach, adopted by NCA/Khartoum, the staff of NCA/Nairobi is actively implementing activities as most other agencies do in emergency situations. In other words, NCA/Nairobi is still at the «working with»- stage of the continuum mentioned above. As it is difficult for NCA to recruit qualified Sudanese staff, it still has to rely heavily on quite a high number of expatriate staff.

There are three main reasons why NCA/Nairobi is still an active «working with» operator:

- When OLS was created and NCA opened an office in Nairobi, the SPLA/M wanted NCA to return to its old ways of working, partly because the rebel movement had no governmental structures to speak of
- The Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA) needed strengthening; therefore, it competed with the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) for funding and capacity building.
- Most of the NCA trained staff were in government-held areas, and many of those who were not became SRRA staff; consequently, NCA/Nairobi did not have a pool of qualified staff to draw upon.

NCA's major partner is the SRRA, which has actively sought the co-operation of NCA and other NGOs. The Diocese of Torit and the Africa Inland Church are other important partners of NCA. DOT and AIC run health, relief, and education programmes. The co-operation between NCA and its partners, however, is more that of a donor providing supplies than that of a partnership where the local partner makes the major decisions in programme planning and administration.

By deciding to operate under the OLS framework, NCA in south Sudan took on a profile in the conflict which is typical of many humanitarian operations in the nineties. This is an approach which, while accepting that aid provided in a situation of conflict will be manipulated by all the parties to suit their objectives, will always try to balance these advantages so that no side is seen to be unilaterally gaining. Even though the two main parties often accuse OLS of favouring their opponents, it is remarkable that none of them has accepted to bear the cost of being the one to deny access and completely suspend OLS. The approach does in fact present substantial advantages to the parties, while allowing the agencies to maintain contacts with all sides.

NPA: The Solidarity Approach

NPA's intervention approach is that of a solidarity group. It has taken a clear side in the war. It supports the causes of SPLA/M and its humanitarian wing SRRA.

NPA's solidarity approach means that in practice the activities of NPA are closely related to the political and military strategies of the rebel movement. For example,

NPA chose to be outside the OLS framework to be able to access areas, which the Government of Sudan has forbidden OLS members to come to. NPA opened hospitals near the front line where there were many war-wounded persons. NPA's food distributions are often in areas where there has recently been or will soon be fighting. These are all examples of humanitarian activities that support the political and military struggle of the SPLA/M.

NPA's partners are the SRRA and the indigenous medical NGO called Sudan Medical Care (SMC). Although NPA is still working on formally establishing these relationships in a contractual form, the partnerships are very close. NPA has a good working relation with SPLM and SRRA and has tried to keep a flexible and pragmatic approach in its response to growing needs. The objective has been to assist the victims of the war. Whenever feasible the programme is also trying to strengthen local communities through a rehabilitation development strategy. NPA has 500 Sudanese staff inside the Sudan and training, particularly of health staff, is the major focus. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, 75% of the assistance to SRRA came from NPA. Today, UNICEF, NCA and others support SRRA, and NPA's role has diminished as a result.

NPA has in critical dialogue with SPLM continuously raised the issues of human rights and democracy, criticised the violations by SPLM and through advocacy attempted to contribute to a more democratic development and reconciliation between the different tribes and factions. This issue will be further examined in the section on the impact on peace.

3.2 Programme Personnel

NCA/Khartoum: Emphasis on Sudanese Staff


The most important feature about the Khartoum NCA office is that it is run by Sudanese with the exception of the Resident Representative. NCA/Khartoum has two offices, one in Khartoum and one in Juba. The Khartoum office has eleven employees (including maids, mechanics, etc.) plus the Resident Representative. The Juba office has 32 employees (including watchmen, etc.). The NCA management team consists of the Resident Representative and four managers.

The Resident Representative deals with the capacity building issues of the NCA staff and the partners, works on the peace/reconciliation issues, liaises with the Oslo

office, supervises the Juba office and coordinates with the Government and the UN Agencies. The Programme Manager is responsible for all the programmes run out of the Khartoum office. The Equatoria Programme

Manager works in Juba and runs that office. The division of responsibilities is illustrated in the organigramme:

Organigramme of NCA/Khartoum



NCA/Nairobi: Strong Field Presence of Expatriate Staff

As NCA has two offices for its operation in Sudan, it is striking how different they are. NCA/Nairobi’s professional staff consists almost exclusively of expatriate staff, the majority however from Kenya and other countries in the region.

The NCA/Nairobi office has 29 employees on fixed contracts. The Director is in Nairobi with her Administrative Officer. There are four sub-stations:

The *Ikotos* station has the greatest number of staff with 18 persons. This includes the Norwegian Health Coordinator, a Norwegian Education Coordinator, a Kenyan Programme Support Coordinator, a Sudanese Women’s Situation Consultant, in addition to a number of health/nutrition facilitators, a Water Coordinator, a Medical Officer, an Administration Officer and support staff.

Lokichokio has three non-Sudanese workers, dealing with the logistics of the field operations.


An Ethiopian nurse is heading the activities of NCA in *Logutok*.

The *Acholi/Parajok* area has four employees, headed by a Kenyan nurse who will start the health activities in that area once the security situation improves.

There is a Kenyan Education Consultant who is mobile because she does the teacher training programme in various places.

The *Leer* post is filled by a Women’s Coordinator. Leer is a satellite post of NCA in a RASS area.

Organigramme of NCA/Nairobi Programme




Also, it should be mentioned that the NCA/Nairobi office is part of the East Africa NCA Regional Office, which is located in Nairobi. The Director reports to the Regional Representative, who primarily deals with peace/reconciliation issues of the Southern Sudan programme. The NCA/Nairobi office receives office support from the regional office.

NPA: High turn-over of staff

In 1996 NPA experienced an unusual high turn-over of staff with employees leaving, resigning and being hired. A new organisational structure is still in the making. Therefore, at this point, the organigramme and staff arrangements presented are tentative.

In the past all the programme and administrative officers reported directly to the Resident Representative. Now there is a layer between the non-food security programmes and the Resident Representative. This new layer, which is the post of Liaison Officer, reflects a growing emphasis on non-relief activities and on maintaining a good relationship with donors and the media. The Resident Representative will focus more on administrative and relief activities, areas where NPA has experienced considerable management problems in the past. The provisional organigramme is as follows:

Current NPA Organigramme



With respect to the field, the staffing situation is much more stable. The majority of NPA employees inside the Sudan are attached to the three areas with hospitals (Chukudum, Labone, Nimule) and the logistical base in Lokichokio in Kenya.

3.3 Funding and Budget

NCA and NPA receive substantial amounts of money from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a variety of projects as illustrated in Tables 3.1. and 3.2. It is interesting to note that relief supplies, including food, is only a small part of the total allocations. There has been a move towards developmental relief with an emphasis on human resource development.

Table 3.1: Funding by MFA for NCA Activities in the Sudan in 1995 and 1996 (NOK)

Activity	1995	1996	Total
Peace and Reconciliation	900,000	1,000,000	1,900,000
Emergency Equipment	6,182,000	0	6,182,000
Hum. Aid and Rehabilitation	1,500,000	1,467,750	2,967,750
Hum. Aid and Rehab. in Equatoria	4,500,000	4,403,250	8,903,250
Hum. Aid and Rehab. in SPLA Areas	7,500,000	12,720,500	20,220,500
Voluntarily Repatriation Program	494,000	489,250	983,250
Refugee- and Rehabilitation Program	200,000	0	200,000
Emergency Aid to Students/Pupils	494,000	489,250	983,250
Emergency Aid to Displaced	300,000	489,250	789,250
Pastoral visit from Norway	102,588	0	102,588
Total	22,174,583	21,061,246	43,235,829

Source: The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

During the last few years the allocations for projects of NCA-Khartoum have been about half the size of the allocations for projects of NCA-Nairobi, which have a focus on Equatoria and Torit.²¹

Table 3.2: Allocations by MFA for NPA Projects in the Sudan in 1995 and 1996 (NOK)

Project Title	1995	1996	Total
Food Relief	985,000	2,310,000	3,295,000
Agricultural Rehabilitation	1,554,000	2,180,000	3,734,000
Support to SRRA	700,000	1,300,000	2,000,000
Relief Supplies	1,922,000	532,000	2,454,000
Veterinarian Project	2,254,000	1,977,000	4,231,000
Vocational Skills Training	0	1,204,000	1,204,000
Community Development Projects	0	1,293,000	1,293,000
Support to Unaccompanied Minors	630,000	500,000	1,130,000
Support to Sudan Medical Care	252,000	800,000	1,052,000
Chukudum Hospital	1,526,000	0	1,526,000
Labone Hospital	2,088,500	2,014,000	4,102,500
Nimule Hospital	2,088,500	2,506,000	4,594,500
Chukudum Medical Training School	0	309,000	309,000
Reallocated Additional Support	4,416,930	0	4,416,930
Administration	700,000	846,250	1,546,250
Total	19,116,930	17,771,250	36,888,180

Source: The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs


²¹ The total MFA-allocations for humanitarian assistance programmes undertaken by NCA were NOK 139 million and

NOK 143 million in 1995 and 1996 respectively. During the two years the Sudan programmes absorbed about 15% of the total MFA-allocation for NCA.

It is interesting to note that almost one third of the MFA-funding for NPA-projects in 1995 and 1996 has been used to run three hospitals and the programme of SMC.²²

It is a striking feature about NPA is that as a Norwegian NGO its largest donor in recent years has been the US Government, as illustrated in Figure 3.1

Figure 3.1: MFA's Share of NPA-Funding, 1992-95 (in 1000 NOK)



Sources: Norwegian Peoples Aid and Norad

In 1995 USAID financed 68% of the NPA-programme, while MFA was funding 22%. The remaining 10 percent came from other donors, including ECHO and the Dutch Government. While the programme of NCA is

almost fully funded by the Norwegian Government, the programme of NPA has received increasing support from several donors.

²² The total MFA-allocations for humanitarian assistance programmes undertaken by NPA were NOK 166 and NOK 223 in 1995 and 1996 respectively. During the two years the Sudan programme absorbed about 10% of the total MFA-allocation for NPA.

4 Evaluation of Operations

In this chapter the implementation process in relation to Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan will be analysed, based on observations from the field visit, interviews with key informants, discussions in the field offices of NCA and NPA and the review of related documentation. The evaluation will focus on the effectiveness and efficiency of operations. While effectiveness is closely related to degree of goal achievement, efficiency, in this context, is related to the costs of operations²³. The evaluation of operations is distinct from the analysis of impact, which will be undertaken in the next chapter.

The analysis of the implementation process is focusing on two interrelated aspects: aid delivery with main emphasis on access and logistics; and the management of resources with main emphasis on human resources and information. The areas of administrative procedures and financial control have not been included in the evaluation. The different modes of operation applied by NCA/Khartoum, NCA/Nairobi and NPA have been reflected in the various sub-sections of the chapter.

4.1 Effectiveness of the Aid Delivery Process

Access to areas, where people live, and the management of logistics are important issues in any complex emergency. Difficult negotiations about access, the complexities of a long management chain, and uncertainties about delivery all impose significant constraints on the agencies.

4.1.1 Effectiveness of NPA in Terms of Access and Logistics

The primary strength of NPA lies in the room for manoeuvre it has created for itself outside OLS, as well as its willingness to take risks. This is based on its endorsement of the cause of the SPLA/M in the war. Even

though NPA at times has expressed critical views on the SPLA/M, its aims have never been put in question. As a consequence of this recognition it has been possible for NPA to have free access to almost all SPLA/M controlled areas, while permissions of access from the government of Sudan were out of the question. NPA, as a consequence, has been able to waive the need to clear its flights through the OLS procedure.

Over the years there have been many events, which have impeded or distracted the delivery of supplies of most other agencies. This, for example, was the case in the SPLA/M-controlled Southern Sudan between 1986 and 1989, in Bor County in 1991/1992, in the areas north of Nimule in 1993/1994. NPA has made it a principle that it would always seek to be present. This mobility was based in large part on the good contacts NPA had established with private contractors, both lorry drivers and flight operators. Even though some of these contacts appear to have been doubtful in terms of good business practices (in exchange for flexibility and quickness), they had the undeniable advantage of allowing the organisation to rely confidently on external capacities.

NPA has placed a high priority on logistics from the beginning of its operations in Southern Sudan. It has developed a storage capacity, which is quite satisfactory. NPA is capable of stockpiling important supplies in Lokichokio in preparation for emergencies (600 MT capacity under Rubb Hall tents). The capacity in Koboko (Uganda) is half of that, but also quite sufficient, when one considers the reduced degree of access there. All stores visited (in Akot, Lokichokio, Chukudum) are dry and secure. The inventories for supplies stored were kept updated.

The costs of the means of transportation for NPA have probably been less than that of other agencies, such as Save the Children Fund which operates mainly through

²³ As further explained in Annex III, cost effectiveness analysis is not feasible in the context of emergency operations in the Sudan. The analysis of efficiency is more applicable to the way the humanitarian system works. A humanitarian agency appeals to donors on the basis of an assessment of needs and what it can reasonably carry out. The resources

given may have to be reallocated a number of times in the course of the operation to take into account unforeseen changes in access, target groups, or needs. This requires a flexibility, which does not exist when the results are specified too narrowly, as is necessarily the case for cost-effectiveness analysis.

flights in Upper Nile and northern Bahr El Ghazal, due to two factors:

- the geographic concentration of the programmes in areas accessible all year round by road, avoiding the tenfold increase of costs, which air transportation implies;
- the willingness to move resources even without obtaining clearances from the Khartoum government, cutting the time supplies spend in warehouses.

The inability of the flight co-ordinator to prioritise cargo and the low quality of the maintenance of vehicles and equipment in the field has, however, reduced effectiveness. There has been an unusual amount of complaints that requests and purchase orders were respected only with long delays, at times of twelve months duration. In addition, it seems, priority has often been given to important visitors. This situation partly reflects the personalisation of relations in the operation, allowing extra-professional judgements to cloud an appropriate appreciation of programme needs.

The advantage of being outside OLS is counterbalanced by the increasing insecurity in northern Uganda and eastern Zaire. This means that many programmes located in the regions west of the Nile will have to be accessed by air. Previous efforts to bring supplies in through Zaire, to circumvent the risks in northern Uganda and southern Sudan along the Ugandan border, had shown that ground transportation costs could reach practically the same level as the air transportation into those areas. Transporters are now refusing to travel inside Zaire. Fortunately all the major NPA programmes are located to the east of the Nile. Some of these areas (Nimule, Labone) will be affected to a certain degree. Others (Narus/Natinga, Chukudum) will not be.

Inadequate Management

There is, however, an excessive sense of project focus in the NPA approach, where each individual project shares with other NPA-projects nothing more than a certain geographic focus. Logistical management has been a competitive process. Project requirements are often sought in parallel, the development of new objectives is the result of individual initiatives and informal groups, rather than of a clear assignation of priorities in an overall scheme.

The control over resources exercised by NPA has been poor. A belated inventory of vehicles began in December 1996 after many complaints about the lack of an inventory from several donors. Beginning with a total of 19 vehicles, the inventory had uncovered 26 more, not all, however, under NPA control, by February 1997. The individualist ethos of the office meant that cars and office equipment could be used for purposes unrelated to work. It has not been part of the evaluation to verify the level of loss from theft.

A large management chain operation such as this one should have included a good accounting system following the supplies from port to end user. Among the large NGOs, NPA falls behind in terms of monitoring the movement of commodities. This is due to the fact that it relies on the transporters to confirm delivery, that NPA food monitors are often untrained and ill equipped, and to the chaotic administrative procedures in place. There has been the usual share of stories of outdated or unfit supplies being delivered, or of the wrong items being sent, or arriving at the wrong time. Nothing of this has been directly witnessed by the evaluation, which cannot, therefore, elaborate beyond the fact that the controls appear to be quite insufficient.

The quality of commodity items and of the equipment is quite unequal over time and across the operation. This is due to the fact that there was never a procurement policy. Within the agency itself offices have often operated independently, e.g supplies were sometimes bought by staff members of programme departments without consultation with the procurement department.

4.1.2 Effectiveness of NCA/Khartoum in Terms of Access and Logistics

NCA has had to adapt to the widest range of events. From a classical development programme with a large transport capacity, NCA had to make a transition to the protection of the residual structures in the early eighties. The war became progressively a central element of the constraints and the needs of Equatoria. In 1990 the internal climate of the Sudan had changed from one in which a Christian organisation was welcomed to one in which it was suspected of sedition just because of its presence. This defensive position was further aggravated by the renewed prominence of Norwegian aid agencies, including NCA itself, in the rebel held areas, in the late eighties and nineties. The concept of neutrality has always been difficult for authorities to accept in identi-

ty-based conflicts, and this posed serious threats to the freedom of operation of NCA out of Khartoum. The office in Khartoum was progressive in negotiating access for NCA assistance.

It is difficult to perceive the enormous obstacles posed by the link which the Government of Sudan naturally makes between NCA in Khartoum, NCA in the rebel areas, and NPA. Norwegian assistance, in this perspective, implies common funding and coherence of policy. NCA Khartoum is at great pains to point out that most of its funding comes from church organisations and not the Norwegian Government. While some high ranking officials in GOS understand the autonomy of NGOs, and in this connection perhaps even the policies of NCA, most security personnel are much more sceptical towards the motives of Norwegians. This has severely limited the access of NCA to different areas and various parts of the society.

A similar but much more modest problem has been caused to NCA/Nairobi by the presence of NCA/Khartoum. The SPLA/M has questioned the existence of other NCA programmes just across the frontline. It has long been necessary to exclude NCA from the regional co-ordination established in Nairobi. Far from being neutral, NCA has emphasised its loyalty to the churches and the people, as opposed to political parties, and has carefully limited the amount of information exchanges between its Khartoum and Nairobi offices.

The Government of Sudan legitimately asks the question why parts of Norwegian humanitarian assistance takes place in violation of international law on air space. The response of the NCA has been quite original, and very appropriate. It has managed to strike a unique balance between its loyalty to the populations of Eastern Equatoria and developing a Sudan-wide concern for human suffering, remaining one step removed from political issues in the field, while protecting actively the interests of the churches. This delicate balance has allowed NCA to survive and remain one of the larger foreign NGOs in government controlled Sudan. The agency has been considerably helped in this by the fact that it could retain a large pool of very qualified staff members, and that its continual presence made it fully aware of the local complexities. Thanks to its emphasis on training and loyalty, the organisation is well prepared for continuity.

Limited Access and Limited Response Capacity

For an evaluation of the effectiveness of operations, however, it appears that NCA/Khartoum has become excessively concerned about institutional development and the maintaining of contact networks. It may have lost some of its capacity to act fast in emergency situations. A combination of at least two factors has contributed to this development:

- First and foremost the Government controls access to people and logistics, flights in particular. In 1989 the Government for example expropriated all NGO radios, requiring that the only radio communications used be those of the UN humanitarian agencies. This control has led to a constant state of negotiation and internal coalition building, which requires an inordinate amount of skill and time from the Khartoum office.
- Secondly NCA has been following a steady trend of handing over to local actors the implementation of all its programmes, while supporting the self-sufficiency of these same actors. Complete self-sufficiency in Sudan is practically impossible, but NCA has taken this to the limit of what is feasible. The result has been that the weaknesses of the local actors have become the weaknesses of NCA. This may not be the most satisfactory situation in a context such as that of Juba, where local agencies are starved of resources.

NCA/Khartoum has become an agency, which is more geared to rehabilitation and development, than to rapid response in emergency situations.

4.1.3 Effectiveness of NCA/Nairobi in Terms of Access and Logistics

NCA has been hampered in its efforts to reach the populations of Equatoria by the prevalence of political considerations. It became involved in 1990 in the Torit area while it was still controlled by the SPLA, but under the umbrella of the New Sudan Council of Churches. All NCA staff left for a year in protest after the death of the expatriates in September 1992. NCA's involvement from then on was guided by the need to become firmly operational and regain the confidence of the SPLM. This gave it a high level of operational capacity, and it responded well to new requirements in all its current locations.

The logistical chain established and the recruitment of

qualified staff were prerequisites for the good response. The operation has mostly concentrated in areas accessible by road from Uganda and Kenya in all seasons, which has considerably reduced the cost, as compared to other operations based on flights, such as the one by MSF-Holland, which was of similar scale. The exception has been the women's income generation programme in Leer, which was only accessible by air, but did not involve bulk transportation.

The NCA assistance came «on line» again only in 1996, when all the field stations had been established. The need to explain the position of NCA in the Sudan, working with opposite parties, has consumed a lot of time.

4.2 Effectiveness of Resource Management

Effectiveness of resource management is an important component in evaluations of humanitarian aid operations. In the present evaluation of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan, which is far from a full fledged capacity assessment of NPA and NCA, the focus is on the management of personnel and information.²⁴

4.2.1 Effectiveness of Human Resources Management

This sub-section will examine the processes of recruitment, training and guidance of personnel applied by NPA and NCA.

Norwegian People's Aid

The commitment of the staff is commendable, they are often ready to undertake completely unforeseen actions at great personal cost. Personnel policy, however, (recruitment, staff assessments, rewards, dismissal and staff development) has never been developed in NPA. Many key staff members have been recruited at very short notice after minimal interviews with the Resident Representative. Although this may work in smaller programmes, the rapid expansion of the programmes of NPA, in particular from 1993, called for more standardised procedures.

The differentials in treatment has been a significant source of grievance, leading to suspicions of bias, or even of corruption. There have been repeated and reliable allegations of misconduct. The lack of personnel guidance and appraisal systems also led to big differences in performance, to the co-existence of many individual initiatives, even of anxieties regarding the status of one's work and its priority within the organisation. This has led to an unusually high level of job insecurity.

This tension erupted in 1996 after the initiation of significant personnel changes in Nairobi. The disproportionate reactions could not have been dictated entirely by the scale of the changes. Personal conflicts became more public, and may have been encouraged actively by parties wishing to put pressure on NPA.

Norwegian Church Aid

NCA/Khartoum has managed personnel carefully since the early years in Equatoria. The quality of the staff is good, the allocation of responsibilities clear and accepted. There is a salary structure, and staff turnover is very small. The difficult climate in which the agency operates has woven the operation together to an unusual degree, even to the point of eliminating the normal cleavage between field stations and the main office in the capital.

The agency's focus on Equatoria, and the Torit County in particular, had resulted in the predominance of particular ethnic groups. This is particularly strong in Juba, where one very industrious group, nicknamed «the Norwegians» by the inhabitants of the city, make up slightly less than one third of the NCA office. This is practically unavoidable in the context, and has not had any negative effect. It reinforces, however, the perception of subjective bias for one ethnic group by outside observers.

The re-start-up of the NCA-programme in the South, managed from Nairobi, after 1993, was based on individuals available, many of them with experience of the old NCA programme. The number of expatriates employed in the rebel held areas contrasts the importance

²⁴ The evaluation has no comments to the management of funds by NCA. As indicated in the introduction to this report, the quality of the management of funds in relation to the programme of NPA in Sudan is currently under review.

of Sudanese staff in the Government held areas. This apparently partly reflects a lack of qualified Sudanese staff available for employment in the south, and the need to preserve a degree of distance from the structures of the SPLA/M.²⁵ Because there was a need to establish a presence in many locations quickly, roles were defined by the order of priority of tasks, rather than by the most logical combination of geographic and sectoral responsibilities. In recent months a more logical and decentralised allocation of tasks has been implemented.

4.2.2 Effectiveness of Information Management

The management of information relates to the systems of monitoring and evaluation, which are used to report on needs, account for progress of implementation and document results of interventions.

Norwegian People's Aid

Needs assessments are determined to a large extent by the expertise of the staff members involved, the willingness of donors, and the appeals coming from the SPLM. There are no general reporting formats and no systematic documentation of results. Post-delivery monitoring has been rather poor, particularly in the relief sector. In 1996 an «NPA Field Monitor Handbook» was published, but the document is very general and needs to be improved.

Donor reporting and public information appears however to have been quite unaffected by the lack of good internal quality monitoring. This is partly because donor requirements in this area are at a low level, and partly because dedicated staff members have provided a lot of information through verbal accounts during visits etc. The Representative in a way made up for the weak-

nesses of the internal information flow, weaknesses which were clearly not perceived by many donors. At different points in time, public relation interventions of NPA have had a significant impact, as discussed in greater detail in chapter 2 of the report.

Norwegian Church Aid

There are no standard formats of reporting in NCA/Khartoum, but there is a periodic (monthly) reporting system, which provides a good idea of the evolution of the operation. In the day-to-day situation, the flow of information is considerably hampered by the uncertain nature of transport, including flights to Juba, the lack of telephone lines with the periphery, and the lack of access to radios. In NCA/Nairobi there has been a continuous system of reporting to the Director and a good filing system has been maintained in all offices. The documentation of results has been poor in both offices.

4.3 Conclusion on the Evaluation of Operations

There are many dimensions in the evaluation of the operations of the two Norwegian NGOs. The presence of NPA in areas inaccessible to other agencies calls for a high rating in terms of responsiveness. NPA has been an exceptional agency in terms of its capacity to provide food and other relief supplies to different areas of Southern Sudan. Serious weaknesses in the management of resources have, however, reduced effectiveness and efficiency of the NPA-operation. Flexibility and capacity to adjust to changes in the operational context has been one of the characteristics of NCA, working on both sides of the war. Constraints imposed by GOS, however, reduced the effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian operations.

²⁵ The importance of maintaining this distance is illustrated by the case of a driver, who was killed in a car ambush in December 1996. He was killed in all probability because he had been pressured into accepting a local SPLA Commander as passenger. This person had been involved in violence

against the local tribes, and the ambush was no more than an act of revenge. A vehicle is an exorbitant asset in such an environment, and it is extremely difficult for local personnel not to give in to pressure and risk becoming part of the dynamics of the conflict.

5 Evaluation of Impact

5.1 Humanitarian Assistance and Rehabilitation

In this section of the report, Norwegian humanitarian assistance is discussed in terms of its direct impact on the livelihoods of those displaced near Khartoum and those affected by the civil war in Southern Sudan. The discussion has been organised in five sub-sections relating to health, food security, education, voluntary repatriation and community development. The impact is primarily discussed in terms of coverage and sustainability.

5.1.1 Health

Due to the civil war and the economic situation in the Sudan, the health status of the Sudanese population is very poor. Immunisation rates are among the lowest in the world. The Sudan has the highest incidence of guinea worm infections. The health infrastructure is in a state of collapse. It is therefore only natural that substantial amounts of the resources made available by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to both NCA and NPA have been channelled to activities in the health sector.

NCA/Khartoum: Supplier of Drugs and Human Resource Development

In line with NCA/Khartoum's «working through approach,» NCA does not implement health activities. Instead its health activities are limited to providing its partners with health supplies and capacity building. What is happening in the government-held areas is that NCA is playing a complementary role to UNICEF. While UNICEF is the drug supplier and providers of technical assistance to the Ministry of Health, NCA is the drug supplier and provider of technical assistance to the church's health care network. As the needs in Juba and Khartoum are unmet, UNICEF and NCA complement each other since one primarily supports the public sector and the other focuses on the private sector.

NCA/Khartoum's other major achievement in the field of health is human resources development. NCA's partners often prove to be the best providers of health services in an area. In most situations, the health staff, who were formerly hired or trained by NCA, demonstrate an exceptional level of motivation, technical knowledge

and commitment to their work. This is the case, for example, in the SCC-run clinic in the Jebel Aulia Displaced Camp which is the referral clinic of the camp. It is the sole provider of laboratory services and a tuberculosis treatment programme in the area.

NCA/Nairobi: Part of the OLS Framework

NCA/Nairobi, in contrast, does not have strong local partners for the implementation of its health programmes and does not have its own supply lines. Instead, the NCA/Nairobi health project is closely linked to the UNICEF health programme. UNICEF is the sole provider of essential drugs, vaccines, cold chain equipment, etc. of NCA's primary health care units (PHCUs). NCA devotes all its energy to training and setting up well-running PHCUs. Currently, NCA's programme covers 33 PHCUs and one primary health care centre (PHCC).

The most positive aspect of the programme is that it is true to the spirit of primary health care. The NCA/Nairobi staff is doing an excellent job in trying to convince communities that basic health care services must come from the community itself. Last year NCA/Nairobi started a community health worker school where persons selected by the communities undergo a nine-month training programme in Ikotos. In 1996, 19 students graduated, and they have returned to their communities to run PHCUs (see Annex IV for details).

In addition to the typical primary health care activities, NCA/Nairobi also engages in other relevant health programmes. Through the SRRA medical officer NCA has been implementing a leprosy treatment programme in the East Bank area since May 1996. NCA/Nairobi's PHC and Guinea Worm Supervisor is running the guinea worm eradication programme with three other NGOs (ADRA, DOT, SMC) in the Eastern Equatoria region under the auspices of the Carter Centre. This programme has had a significant impact. In 1995, over 100,000 cases of guinea worm were reported. This figure dropped to around 34,000 in 1996. The flip chart, produced by NCA/Nairobi to explain the guinea worm infection process to illiterate persons, has been very well received. The Carter Centre now uses it as its model and has mass-produced it.

NPA: Curative Services in Three Hospitals

The general intervention approach of NPA, as discussed in Section 3.1., is reflected in the kind of activities supported by NPA in the health sector. Setting up hospitals near the front line makes good sense if an NGO is primarily concerned with the military advances of the rebel movement. That is exactly what NPA did when it set up the first hospital in Aswa near the then current front line. Afterwards, as the needs changed, NPA dismantled the Aswa hospital to set up three smaller hospitals, the current Labone, Nimule and Chukudum hospitals.

However, although the curative services of a hospital may not be the most relevant health care intervention in the war-torn region of a poor country, and although its scope is limited because only those patients who can walk or catch a ride to the hospital are covered, and although hospitals are less sustainable because they are costly, it must be said that the hospitals are run in an excellent fashion. The Norwegian medical staff of the past and the current regional staff are qualified professionals. The organisation and the hygiene in the hospitals are impressive. The fact that the Chukudum hospital has an X-ray section and a complete laboratory is unique.

Since 1996, NPA has slightly changed its focus in some programme areas from relief to rehabilitation activities. One such example in the health sector is the newly established Medical Training School in Chukudum (see Annex IV for details). This programme shows a greater sensitivity to primary health care concerns. As Southern Sudan needs to train many more nurses and laboratory technicians to run PHCUs, this is a positive development towards meeting more effectively the health needs of the communities. With such changes the impact of the assistance provided on the health status of the population is likely to increase.

5.1.2 Food Security

Several types of interventions aim at increasing food security in various parts of the country. The interventions range from the mere distribution of food which NPA is doing on a large scale, over the assistance provided by NCA for feeding centres, to longer-term agri-

cultural rehabilitation projects which both NGOs are supporting to enhance food security at the household level. Only a small part of Norwegian humanitarian aid is used to buy and distribute food.

NPA Provides Large Quantities of Food

The food provided by NPA has helped ordinary people survive in many parts of Southern Sudan. NPA has proved to be able to reach areas which no other agency could reach. Many sources, including some within the NPA (see e.g. footnote 17) confirm that food relief has also been used to feed SPLA troops. The 1995-audit of USAID²⁶ makes reference to the following incident which illustrates this point: In February/March 1995, 200MT of sorghum valued at about USD 100,000 that was being transported for NPA was diverted from Manglalore to Kaya, allegedly to feed SPLA soldiers. NPA officials believe that the waybills were physically carried to Manglalore where they were fraudently stamped by SRRA officials. This case was acted upon by NPA, but other cases showing insufficient control have been reported to the evaluation team.

It is not possible to say what would have happened in Southern Sudan, if NPA had not been supplying food. It goes without saying, however, that the food relief supplied by NPA has been extremely important to people, who would otherwise have starved or died, and to the SPLA which managed to sustain its position as a strong rebel movement.

In many locations NPA has developed a programme of agricultural production of great quality since 1994. This has been particularly the case in Akot in Yirol County, and in Chukudum. These programmes represent a welcome development which reflects the increasing emphasis given to local capacity building.

NCA/Khartoum Supports Feeding Centres

In the Sudan, the rule-of-thumb is that if a population has a malnutrition rate above 10%, a feeding centre should be opened. Otherwise, individual cases of malnutrition should be dealt with at the clinics or the PHCUs. *NCA/Nairobi* is not working in areas with a high incidence of malnutrition. Therefore, the nutri-

²⁶ USAID Evaluation of Title 3 Food Aid to South Sudan. The Office of the Inspector General, USAID.

tional activities supported by NCA/Nairobi are integrated parts of the work at the PHCUs. In contrast to this, NCA/Khartoum's main partner, SCC, works in many areas with very high malnutrition rates. Both the town of Juba and the Khartoum displaced camps constantly undergo periods of severe hunger.

In the displaced camps near Khartoum, NCA does not supply the food items that are necessary in the feeding centres. The feeding centres rely on UNICEF's UN-IMIX or produce their own local porridge. NCA's role is limited to supplying BP-5 and training staff. Apparently, however, other NGOs, such as MSF/H, are doing most of the capacity building of the nutrition section of SCC. NCA was seen more as a donor, providing money and supplies. Some of the feeding centres, e.g. the Dar es Salaam Camp for Displaced, really need assistance as they are run like kitchens.

In Juba, the impact of NCA's activities in the field of nutrition is likely to be higher. This is to a large extent a reflection of the fact the NCA employs the best nutritionist in the area. This woman is known for her vitality and is excellent in mobilising social support. She was recently seconded to SCC/Juba, and all reports indicate that she is finally succeeding in convincing the residents of Juba that a feeding centre is not a kitchen for everyone, which was the case not too long ago when CART had more than 60 feeding centres in Juba. The feeding centres supported by NCA are running in a proper manner. For example, all children and vulnerable persons met wore bracelets, indicating their stage of recovery from malnutrition.

NPA is Changing the Lifestyles of the Pastoralists

NPA has been encouraging the Akot Dinka pastoralists, who lost their cattle, to start cultivating crops. This is a remarkable achievement since it is very difficult to convince people to change lifestyle. NPA started the process by setting up an agricultural rehabilitation training centre for extension workers. Vegetable gardens were established near water holes so that women, while fetching water, got interested in growing vegetables to diversify the diets of their families. The project also consists of a cattle vaccination component, which is very successful because the life of the Dinka is centred around the cattle. This has allowed for a cost sharing scheme to be created for vaccinations. The project is only two years old, but so far it is successful in terms of

responding adequately to important problems in a sustainable manner.

NCA/Khartoum: Impact Hampered by Natural Conditions

In Juba, NCA distributes seeds and tools and provides communities with technical advice. The activities cover about 5000 households. Unlike other agencies working in Juba, NCA can be relied upon with regard to sending seeds and appropriate tools to the farmers in time for the cultivation season. The impact, however, has been negatively affected by bad weather conditions and other natural conditions. For example, the big issue in January 1997 was the striga weed, which was killing all sorghum crops. An FAO study recommends that the farmers plant tubers such as sweet potatoes because the land's nutrients have been extracted by the sorghum plant in the past ten years.

5.1.3 Education

NCA and NPA are implementing many different types of educational activities with funds from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These include support for general improvements in primary education, support to Southerners receiving higher education as well as interventions in favour of specific target groups.

NCA Supports Primary Education as well as Higher Education

NCA/Khartoum provides SCC with school materials for its eleven basic education schools and five pre-schools in Juba. In the field of education, NCA plays a complementary role to UNICEF in much the same way as in health. While UNICEF works through the Ministry of Education, which caters to all residents of Juba, NCA works exclusively through the SCC schools, which principally cater to pupils from the East Bank. The assistance includes support for teacher training workshops.

In collaboration with UNICEF, NCA/Nairobi and the SRRA have embarked on the long process of rehabilitating the destroyed school system in Equatoria. During 1996, six teacher training courses were conducted and 52 primary schools received school supplies. It is too early to judge the impact. Much will depend on the ability of NCA to convince the school teachers that

regular supplies and further training opportunities will be provided over a longer period of time.

NCA/Khartoum is funding a Centre of Remedial English and Science Courses, which per year prepares around 250 disadvantaged Southerners for university. NCA also provides scholarships for Southerners to enable them to study in institutions of higher education such as the College of Technological Science and the Ahfad University, which is a women's university. *NCA/Nairobi* is sponsoring Southerners, women in particular, who are studying in Uganda and Kenya under various programmes.

In the long-term perspective, the support for primary education is important in the two rather limited geographical areas. In the short-term perspective, the support provided to Southerners undergoing higher education may turn out to be of critical importance. If NCA would not have provided this kind of support, the percentage of Southerners studying at Khartoum universities would probably be near zero. The impact of the support to students studying in Uganda and Kenya is more doubtful and depends, of course, to a large extent on how many of them will return to the Sudan.

The School in Natinga

NPA was running a school in Natinga, funded by the Dutch and the Norwegian Governments. The school mainly catered for Dinka boys, many of whom were sons of army officers. In 1995, a Dutch team visited Natinga. The team raised a number of issues which have all been explained by NPA:

- Important school supplies had not been provided to the school, contrary to what the Dutch had been told in NPA reports.
- The population figure, used by NPA, was found to be excessive.
- NPA-facilities were used by the SPLA. The Dutch team saw SPLA-soldiers in NPA vehicles and USAID-marked sacks of sorghum in the SPLA-camp.

Funding by the Dutch Government was drastically reduced, and in early 1996 the school was closed. NPA

explained that the school was closed because of a water shortage in Natinga. NPA is now rethinking its educational strategy, considering the fact that not many donors are willing to fund a programme which educates the elite of a military movement.

5.1.4 Voluntary Repatriation

The Sudan Council of Churches is implementing a programme, funded by NCA and several other donors, to repatriate the displaced, living in camps near Khartoum, to their places of origin in Southern Sudan. More than 3000 people were repatriated in both 1995 and 1996. The demand for this programme is, however, much higher because many Southerners are unhappy about staying in Khartoum. Most of them are unemployed, not accustomed to the climatic conditions and subjected to different kinds of threats, including threats from the Government to be moved to other parts of the Sudan. A recent evaluation was quite critical towards the programme²⁷. Inadequate screening processes and lack of follow-up were some of the serious weaknesses, according to the report. With its large network of churches and dioceses, the SCC is, however, extremely well placed to undertake the task.

5.1.5 Community Development.

Support for community development is an important, but not very costly, part of Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan. The many different types of projects, which are discussed in this section, are all concerned with strengthening the capacity for development at the local level. Several of them have women as their main target group.

NCA/Khartoum: Unsustainable Income-Generating Projects

In Juba, NCA works with over 23 male community leaders who engage in a number of income-generating activities such as tailoring, carpentry, and farming on credit. They have also opened a savings and credit union that provides loans to its members. So far the activities have not been very successful. The community leaders always face the same problem of not being able to cover the costs of their activities. This is due to a

²⁷ «Evaluation of the Emergency Response Programme of the Sudan Council of Churches», November 1996. Paper re-

ceived from the Resident Representative of NCA/Khartoum.

number of reasons that are typical of a garrison town: all goods are imported; imported goods are expensive; prices rise with hyperinflation; etc.

Similarly, the Women's Self-Help Cooperative/Society, supported by NCA since 1994, cannot maintain itself. This large income-generating project has around 12,000 women participants, who come from all over Southern Sudan. The cooperative is divided into six sections: health training; handpump maintenance; sanitation; literacy classes; household food security (agricultural extension and forestry); and community development. Many of the women engage in income-generating activities like basket-making, bread baking and brick burning. The profits are shared among the members to buy small items like soap. However, since GTZ pulled out and stopped funding the start-up of new projects, the cooperative has faced severe financial constraints.

Most of the activities undertaken by the two projects are relevant to the needs of the communities. They are, however, not sustainable under the conditions presently prevailing in the project areas of NCA/Khartoum in Southern Sudan.

NCA/Nairobi: Improvement in the Situation of Women

The typical women's project of NCA/Nairobi consists of adult education classes and tailoring. In general, adult education classes are very popular because many illiterate women are eager to learn how to write their names, basic arithmetic, etc. A typical class meets in the afternoon on the school premises of the local school. In Ikotos, for example, four teachers teach 70 women for three hours from Monday to Friday afternoon. The tailoring group started after UNICEF realised that children were not attending school because they were naked. Therefore, UNICEF is supplying the material. The women earn an income from selling school uniforms through the local teachers. Now UNICEF will also send cloth to the women's groups so that they can sew some new clothes for themselves. The Ikotos group wants to sell clothes and buy a grinding machine using the proceeds. The grinding machine will save many women many hours of hard labour and the charges of grinding will be another source of income for the women's group. The impact of this project is not impressive in quantitative terms, but the women are enthusiastic about the training they receive. At this stage, the input

from UNICEF for the tailoring group is crucial, but the project has the potential of becoming sustainable in a longer-term perspective because there is a money market in the area where NCA is providing its support.

The situation of women will also improve through the *rural water supply programme, supported by NCA on the East Bank*. When NCA re-entered the area in 1994, only 37 of the more than 500 handpumps provided before the war were in working order. UNICEF and NCA work together on water activities. While UNICEF focuses on the hardware side of water, NCA focuses more on soft issues. UNICEF has, for example, water teams that do major repairs, while NCA is responsible for setting up water maintenance teams. Both are providers of spare parts. The efforts that have been put into convincing the communities of the importance of clean and safe water has had an impact which was easy to notice. The handpumps were fenced in and generally the women in charge tried to keep some order in the queuing for water. The women also repaired the broken handpumps. The impact in terms of reducing the very high incidence of diarrhoea could further be enhanced if NCA included a sanitation component, e.g. pit latrines in public areas such as the Isoke school. Once the problem of recruiting a suitable contractor to do the drilling has been solved, the programme will have a good coverage.

NPA: Income-generation and Vocational Training

Several of the projects, supported by NPA, in the field of community development suffer from inadequate planning and project design, including *the soap-making and the tailoring project in the Akot Area*. The soap-making project flew in distilled water and a jerry can of cooking oil from Nairobi. Not only was this expensive, but also unnecessary. Soap can be made using regular water and the local oil available from the lulu nut. Similarly, the tailoring project imported cheap cloth from Nairobi. Although the women make the dresses, they themselves do not like to wear them because of the weak cloth and its light colours. In addition, there are markets in the Akot area that sell second-hand clothes at a cheap price. In sum, these projects are not sustainable. The net impact may be negative because of the images of development which they have created among the people involved.

In contrast, the *Chukudum women's projects* run well because they were designed taking local conditions into account. Other NPA-activities in the area have created a market for the goods produced by the women in the tailoring workshop and the tea shop. NPA pays the women for sewing hospital uniforms and mosquito nets. Many people from the Chukudum Resource Centre went to the shop to have their tea break. As long as the women are given some more support to increase their capital, they are likely to run profitable businesses in the future.

In 1996, NPA started a *vocational skills training programme*. The Chukudum Resource Centre (CRC) trained 45 trainees from all over Southern Sudan in the fields of (i) agriculture/forestry, (ii) blacksmithing/tin-smithing, (iii) carpentry, (iv) building construction, and (v) appropriate technology. The trainees received basic education in all five fields and then specialised in one field. In early 1997, the first batch of trainees returned to their homes. The intention is that they will be able to improve their livelihoods through their newly acquired skills. It is, of course, too early to judge the impact, but chances are that it will be significant because the subjects taught were relevant and all the training undertaken used locally available materials.

In conclusion, the community development projects supported by NPA and NCA illustrate the importance of adequate project design and careful planning which takes local conditions into consideration. The appraisals that the agencies are doing before new projects are started have not always been of a sufficient standard.

5.2 Capacity Building and Institutional Development

In addition to the direct impact that Norwegian humanitarian assistance has had with regard to saving lives, relieving suffering and improving livelihoods, it is relevant to ask: What has been left behind? How successful have NCA and NPA been in training people and building viable institutions? Has vulnerability been reduced? A discussion on these issues, which cuts across the different individual projects, has been organised in two sub-sections.

5.2.1 Training and Capacity Building

NCA and NPA are following quite different approaches, reflecting the different time perspectives of the two

agencies. Broad-based development of human resources has been the approach of NCA for decades. The NPA concern for capacity building is new and the focus so far has been on skills training in a few important areas.

NCA: Human Resource Development

The impact of the long-term commitment of NCA to the Sudan is remarkable. In Eastern Equatoria one constantly runs into well-educated persons who have been trained by or formerly worked for NCA. Many of them are now holding key staff positions in various organisations.

Development of human resources is still high on the NCA agenda, in particular in the fields of health and education. NCA is raising the awareness and building capacity at the community level through adult education classes, women's groups and village committees for water and health. It requires much social mobilisation to set up committees, to appoint village water pump caretakers, and to train community health workers. In a few locations, NCA has managed in a relatively short time to convince villagers that it is in their own interest to do so. And the groups seem to work. The number of new cases of guinea worm has, for example, decreased substantially and the usage of water from clean sources has increased.

NCA is also strengthening the capacity of institutions which are serving the communities. Training workshops for primary school teachers, training of primary health care staff and training of agricultural extension workers are all important activities which help to build local capacity.

NPA: Focus on Skills Training

There is a growing awareness within NPA that training and capacity building are important parts of the assistance required in Southern Sudan. NPA is supporting the training of veterinarians who are now earning an income from the services and drugs they provide. NPA is also supporting the training of agricultural extension workers who, in turn, are training farmers in how to select and store seeds, which tools to use, how to use an ox-plough, etc. This is a kind of capacity building which directly reduces the vulnerability of the people who are benefiting from the services.

Two training projects were started by NPA in Chukudum in 1996. The Medical Training School has presently two disciplines: nursing and laboratory sciences. The Chukudum Resource Centre provides skills training in five areas which are all highly relevant to the needs. It is too early to judge the sustainability and the impact of the projects, but they do represent a reorientation of the assistance provided by NPA to Southern Sudan.

5.2.2 Institutional Development

The long-term commitment, the often excellent personal relations and the considerable amounts of resources that they have been able to mobilise, have given the NCA and NPA important roles to play in relation to their major partners in the Sudan.

NCA/Khartoum: Strengthening of Local Partners

An important result of the «Working-with, Working through»-approach followed by NCA is that partner institutions, in particular church structures such as the Sudan Council of Churches and the African Inland Church have been strengthened. NCA takes an active role within these organisations in helping them define their mission, organisational structure, management style, and training programmes. By transferring its staff to church organisations or by monitoring the organisations supported by them, NCA transfers its ideas and work methods. A significant current example of this is the transfer of the former NCA Director of the Equatoria Programme to the SCC. He is presently reorganising the structure of the SCC, implementing a new management style, setting a new tone in the organisation, all of which are extraordinary achievements in assisting an organisation in reorganising itself.

NPA: Crucial Support for SRRA

NPA has been a very important partner of the rebel movement for more than a decade. In particular the humanitarian wing of the SPLA/M has been strengthened. As the SRRA leaders said, «Without the Norwegians we would not be at this point». The relationship between SRRA and NPA started in 1985, when SRRA was established in Nairobi. At that point in time, SRRA

consisted of three people in Nairobi and a few in the field. Between 1985 and 1989, when OLS was established, NPA was the only NGO assisting SRRA.

Since the early 1990's, more and more organisations have been supporting SRRA, including UNICEF, CRS, CHRISTIAN AID, and LWS. The Norwegian Church Aid has been instrumental in constructing the regional headquarters of New Cush and contributed to the rehabilitation of the road to New Cush. NCA also supports all running costs of the SRRA Torit County office.

Presently, NPA pays the rental bills of SRRA employees in Nairobi and puts money into training activities. NPA has also been instrumental in a number of the organisational improvements, which have taken place within the rebel movement over the last few years, including a clearer demarcation between civil and military authorities.

5.3 Impact on Willingness to Seek Peace

The purpose of the evaluation is to examine «the impact it (Norwegian humanitarian assistance, ed.) has had in relation to the civil war situation and the ongoing efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation in the country. Attention will be focused on..... the various parties willingness to seek peace and reconciliation»²⁸. Because this section of the Report is addressing directly the main purpose of the evaluation, the analysis will go a little deeper within the framework outlined in the following introduction.

5.3.1 Introduction

Over the years both NCA and NPA have developed their understanding of the political consequences of their work, but none of them have seen the reduction of violence in the Sudan as their main objective. It was not considered appropriate for a «solidarity» (or «second party») organisation like NPA, nor for a third party like NCA, which has adopted a co-operative approach. This was probably consistent with the intentions of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which did not see the funding provided primarily as a resource to promote peace.²⁹

²⁸ Terms of Reference, Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan, prepared by Utenriksdepartementet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Annex 1.

²⁹ Peace in the context of this evaluation is defined as a process, which reduces the probability of acts of violence.

The prevention of conflict has been a general benefit deemed to come out of all the developmental and emergency work of NCA. It was seen as a result of the injection of resources leading to a more just equilibrium between different identity groups in the Sudan. Development, it was believed, would naturally increase the willingness of parties to seek peace.

In fact the analysis of the impact of the aid on peace has many more nuances than this; much less optimistic, as we shall see below. There has been several initiatives by NCA to promote peace through seminars and to unify the positions of parties to the conflicts through personal diplomacy. Some resources have been dedicated to the support of peace conferences (transport, food and shelter items) in the agency's programming, but this has not been frequent and focused enough to warrant an evaluative analysis.

NPA has deliberately oriented its aid to one side in the conflict. The will for peace, in the interpretation of NPA, could only come if either a «hurting stalemate» is experienced by both sides, or a decisive victory is achieved by one. Only peace with justice is considered sustainable by NPA. The cause of the SPLA, as expressed by John Garang and his leadership group, is just, according to NPA. The prevention of conflict, in this context, is entirely subordinated to the pursuit of partisan advantages.

The relation between aid and conflict in dynamic situations is a new field in evaluations. Very few systematic attempts have been made to gather and analyse information, which lead to conclusions relevant to specific on-going conflicts. The methodology proposed for the present evaluation has had to be modified as explained in greater detail in Annex III. The analysis will concentrate on the modes of influence inside the Sudan, which agencies like NCA and NPA may have had on the willingness of different parties to seek peace. This will be done by focusing on certain key events and the determining factors which surrounded them. The analysis has been organised according to three distinct different ways, through which aid agencies can influence the dynamics of peace and war:

- by conciliation, i.e. processes by which contending attitudes and interests of leadership are modified
- by direction, i.e. efforts, which change the existing balance of power

- by prevention, i.e. interventions, altering deliberately the attitudes of important societal groups.

The evaluation has not covered the advocacy and facilitation work of the NGOs in Norway and in other countries, which may be significant, but outside the terms of reference.

5.3.2 Conciliation

Conciliation has been the most important mode of influence, which the agencies have been deliberately using. They have been doing this in five different ways:

- **To explore:** The Sudan Working Group, a network of individuals whose contacts and ideas have been used to strengthen the momentum of IGADD, receives assistance from NCA/Nairobi. The Sudan Working Group has been a source of position papers and informal suggestions to facilitate the intergovernmental peace processes. The Group has encouraged and supported i.a. the efforts of SPLA to establish legal structures, and the enlargement of the IGADD mediation process to include more Islamic states. It should be noted that NCA itself has not engaged in these research efforts.
- **To unify:** NCA/Khartoum has been instrumental in helping to unify the position of some groups in the government-held areas of Sudan. This was particularly evident at the time of the signing of the Khartoum Political Peace Charter. Based on the slogan that «peace from within» could only be achieved by circumventing the uncompromising position of the leadership of the SPLA, the government negotiated with as many groups as possible the loose framework of a constitutional arrangement whereby all parties renounced the use of violence. The Charter has the declared objective of leading to a referendum in which the South should decide on the degree of autonomy it should be granted. This document took the Sudan opposition by surprise, and nearly led to a fragmentation in which different individuals took radically opposite stands. The elaboration of a common position rejecting the Charter gradually emerged. Although the result of this was to close one possible avenue of negotiation, it was nevertheless a powerful catalyst of the often isolated and divided opposition.
- **To reward:** NCA/Nairobi has on two different occasions in 1996 supported peace meetings in the South between elders and chiefs from warring eth-

nic groups. These meetings were often initiated by the leaders themselves and orchestrated by the SPLM, as they all became concerned about the development of cattle raiding far beyond the customary norms. The NCA-support was an important incentive in political terms because it implied a recognition of the authority of the participants and in material terms because of the supplies, which were provided for the meetings.

- **To train:** NPA has been supporting training sessions in international humanitarian law for SPLA/M officials. This has been praised as significantly improving the level of communication with the SPLM in international fora. Although the Geneva Conventions and other instruments are not primarily concerned with peace issues, they improve the level of accountability by developing common references and language regarding to the treatment of civilian populations.
- **To facilitate:** NCA has on many occasions supported the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), which has been very active in organising church peace meetings, or meetings based on religious authority involving political leaders. The NSCC carried out such apparently successful peace conferences as the Lou-Jikany Nuer talks in September 1994, and supported the Sudan Working Group role in the IGADD negotiations in 1996.

It has not been possible to assess in any systematic way the usefulness of the NCA and the NPA as channels of information and channels of access to key individuals in the parties to the conflict. This role, reportedly played by both and considered to be one of their main advantages by the Ministry, has developed differently within the two agencies. In NPA it has been more linked to individuals than to specific agency functions. It has, however, shown itself to be vulnerable to rapid change, as well as dependent on individuals not specifically selected for this kind of work.

NCA has adopted a more institutionalised approach by establishing a post as senior advisor for human rights, peace and reconciliation with a regional responsibility and by making the activities described above a regular part of the work performed by the offices of NCA in Khartoum and Nairobi. The capacity, however, dedicated to this work has remained small. Some of the NCA literature on its work in this field draw heavily on the examples set by institutions more or less related to IGADD and the World Council of Churches, and do not

reflect the relative lack of interface that this mode of influence enjoys with the relief work of NCA.

At this stage, it may be important to ask whether even the most effective conciliation can have any significant impact on the conflict. Three factors were identified which militate against success of conciliation in the context of Sudan:

1. The constant shifting of international alliances, which allows any party to find a backer and resources to pursue its own goals. The roles of Libya and the United States illustrate this most starkly.
2. The inability of the leaders to ensure fidelity to the agreements. This has been seen as the main weakness of the Addis Ababa agreements, which were the object of considerable reinterpretation in the years leading up to 1983, especially on the part of the government.
3. The unwillingness of the population to endorse agreements, which have been reached by its leaders. This is a particularly acute problem in what ICRC has called the destructured conflicts, where the authority of both traditional chiefs and military commanders may be questioned, and deep-rooted identity definitions underlie the conflict. In the conflict resolution literature it has been called the «re-entry problem», and remains the key problem in Sudan.

These problems have plagued the IGADD process, and are to be found at all other levels, even in the villages on the issue of cattle raiding. Little has been attempted to strengthen the authority of tribal elders among the Equatorian tribes, where the ready availability of guns is allowing younger age groups to mock the customary respect. The few communal peace meetings, which have been held, have not led to any sustainable peace between the communities involved.

In conclusion, Sudan and the surrounding international environment has been extremely fragmented. This fundamental problem has limited the extent to which foreign actors, including the Norwegian NGOs, have been able to play an effective conciliatory role. The review above of the five different ways of conciliation reveals that this mode of influence has been used most intensively by NCA, which apparently consider it to fit well with the general co-operative approach of the agency.

5.3.3 Direction

Extreme fragmentation highlights the need to apply modes of influence, which are stronger and imply a wider degree of engagement. The directive influence on the willingness of parties to seek peace can be assessed using two interrelated parameters: i) to withdraw or supply; and ii) to expose or legitimise.

To Withdraw or Supply

Apart from the attempt to withdraw all assistance from the «Triple A» area, there have been no outstanding examples of actual *withdrawal*. There has been a constant practice of evacuating or withholding the distribution of supplies until certain minimum conditions of access security and accountability were met by the local authorities. This has been enshrined by OLS in the Ground Rules, which state that violations will be «taken up» at the highest necessary level. The aid agencies, always in a situation of competition, have, however, rarely been in a position of strength.

The position of NPA in *supplying* resources to one party in the conflict has been quite exceptional. The agency has repeatedly stepped beyond the boundaries of what is generally considered humanitarian practice in its support to the rebel movement. This may not have been support in the form of military supplies, or at least not as an agency policy decision.³⁰ It came, however, from the sharing of logistical capabilities, from the supplying of food and medical services very close to the front-line, from allowing families to remain in inhospitable areas to support soldiers on the front, from allowing the sale of relief supplies to generate resources for military procurement and from allowing the education of young men whom the SPLA hoped to recruit as its future cadres.

The publicity, which NPA has been able to supply in favour of the Movement, has perhaps been even more significant. NPA briefed journalists and guided them in the field. This was particularly decisive to the SPLA on three occasions. The first one was in the early stages of Operation Lifeline Sudan, when the Movement needed all the legitimacy it could obtain to gain recognition and acceptance from the UN. The foreign agencies took a long time to compare the SPLA to other rebel move-

ments such as the Eritrean Relief Association. This cultural gap was bridged early on by NPA. The second was in 1991, at the time when Riak Machar's split from the mainstream SPLA seemed to have gained a large degree of external support. This changed dramatically after television coverage publicised the horror of ethnic warfare against the Bor Dinka, and returned legitimacy to John Garang's campaign. The third was when the government forces and allied militia were pushing up the Aswa river near the border of Uganda in 1993. Decisive humanitarian support allowed the SPLA to resist and hold the last kilometres of terrain which, if they had been lost, would have cost the Movement all physical access to the outside.

To Expose or Legitimise

NCA has developed as its single most important priority in this area the maintenance of links between isolated church leaders and the outside world. As a foreign-based organisation, NCA has been able to travel abroad and pass on information on what is occurring in the country. It has also been able to organise visits by foreign officials and to put pressure on the Government to authorise these visitors to contact individuals, whom the Government has tried to place in isolation. This is the case, for example, for the Archbishop of Juba. He has taken a very clear stance on religious liberty and can only be visited on the occasion of Pastoral visits.

Similarly, in September 1992 NCA/Nairobi was able to lobby effectively the OLS to hold the SPLA accountable for the breakdown of authority, which led to the death of four foreigners, one of them a Norwegian journalist covering NCA's work. NCA was part of the UN-NGO community, which evacuated the area until March 1993. NCA itself returned only in 1994. The evacuation was designed as a form of conditionality as much as a symbolic gesture of protest. It was partly nullified in terms of its resource pressure by the continued presence of some non-OLS actors, particularly NPA. It occurred, however, at an extremely difficult time in the history of the SPLA. The fact that such a degree of co-ordinated protest has not been achieved in other crises, most notably neighbouring Somalia, does not detract from the value. It cannot be judged as an excessive reaction to a normal incident in a time of war because it in fact

³⁰ Instances where such services have been rendered seem always to be the result of a personal decision by individual staff members of NPA.

impelled the SPLA into a considerable re-examination of its humanitarian wing and internal issues of discipline and public image.

NCA/Nairobi also supported the UNICEF Humanitarian Principles Unit in its efforts to build coalitions with certain parts of the SPLM on the OLS Ground Rules and on specific human rights instruments. Although this belongs more in the realm of quiet diplomacy as it took the form of personal meetings between the Resident Representative and certain key officials, the fact that a rich and influential aid agency was inclined to express its views strongly means that a better reception was given to the initiative. The Humanitarian Principles Unit sees the establishment of a «constructive engagement» as one of its tasks, carrying out investigations of atrocities against civilian populations

NPA has also been actively involved within the SPLA in increasing the level of accountability of key officers. The diplomacy of one NPA staff member greatly facilitated the release of a few missionaries in Yirol County in late 1996 and apparently led to the punishment of the officers involved. The degree to which a «critical dialogue» has indeed been established between NPA and the SPLA leadership is extremely hard to measure, but the potential for such a dialogue undeniably exists.

It is interesting to note that none of the Norwegian agencies operational in Southern Sudan have tried to replicate the structures, which «African Rights» has established in the Nuba mountains. Local human rights monitors are given the means of contacting the outside world and report on mass violations of human rights. This is a weapon of protection against intimidation by both the SPLA and the government troops or militia. The unwillingness of NPA and NCA to engage in this sort of work can be attributed to the specific roles they play. This kind of work requires a neutral «third party-approach», quite distinct from the solidarity approach of NPA and the co-operative approach of NCA.

The present report illustrates how difficult it is to assess the exact weight of the directive influence of NCA and NPA. There are many networks of influence at play,

covert or official, foreign or local, whose aims cut cross those of the agencies. The contributions of NPA and NCA, even though very real and high compared to other foreign NGOs, still appear to be relatively marginal. At times, they may even cancel each other out. This is due to the limited reach of aid agencies in general, and to the absence of a common evaluative framework of the Norwegian assistance. There are many depths in Sudan of a cultural, geographical and military nature, which foreign actors do not touch. There has however been a marked difference between the engagement by NCA of the NIF and that of NPA with the SPLA. The directive mode of influence appears to suit better an agency like NPA, which has adopted a solidarity approach. The lack of directive influence on the part of NCA may partly be explained by the fact that many agency workers are still uneasy with applying conditionalities, which can easily lead into a loss of trust, and consequently a loss of access.

5.3.4 Prevention

Prevention is popularly understood as an intervention, which takes place before a conflict occurs, or becomes violent. Observers rarely note that it can be used to avoid recurrence, reduce the probability of violence, or contain its spread.³¹ The sphere of prevention is where attitudes of different groups of society are legitimised. The weakness, from the point of view of this evaluation, is that aid personnel has not been trained to establish a link between their work and the prevalence of certain attitudes, including attitudes towards violence. The work which the agencies perform at the societal level remains relatively uninformed by its impact on those attitudes.

Prevention through Rehabilitation and Development

Agencies can alter the perception of unfairness or oppression by directing resources towards the development of certain sectors of society, or certain regions. This has been the main effort of the UNDP Resident Representative for the Sudan, although there have been very few funds available to take it from the realm of

³¹ Prevention does not apply to the traditional aspects of power in political science: the intentions of leaders and their ability to set agendas (for whom conflict resolution, mediation and conciliation are designed), or the pure balance of

power (in terms of resources and people). It is more directed at the foundations of conflict: the social ground of interactions, the premises through which legitimacy will be judged, the definition of identities and the threats to them.

ideas into practice. The notion has clashed with that of a needs-based approach, as well as the predominance of considerations of access in agency programming. NCA and NPA have had too few resources to engage in a country-wide strategy of «area rehabilitation», or demobilisation.

The civil war has naturally led to the erosion of all the mechanisms which used to exist for the arbitration of disputes over the allocation and the administration of public resources. With the widening of cleavages between groups, the notion of neutral judgements has suffered. NCA has attached hopes to the growing authority of Christian religious authorities. This, however, leaves significant groups outside any arbitration framework, such as the million and a half inhabitants of the displaced settlements around Khartoum. In the South, there is a growing support in the SPLA to the idea of legal structures, but the legitimacy of these structures is unclear.

Prevention through Cultural Intervention

The main political problem in the Sudan, as seen by many observers, has been the failure to concretise a Sudanese identity which, while respecting the differences, would bind together – in some elementary way – all the communities of the country. War and economic asphyxiation have added their toll on the ever-increasing sense of difference between tribes, regions and religions.

The leverage which NPA and NCA have had on many of the poorer and most accessible communities is enormous. Still, it has not been possible to find systematic efforts designed to recreate a Sudanese identity, or to facilitate the growth of more favourable perceptions between groups such as the Dinka and the Nuer. The support given to meetings of leaders to make treaties has already been mentioned, but this does not appear to have extended to the societal level. The sermons of religious authorities at least from the Christian side, are replete with calls for inter-communal understanding and respect. These calls find little echo, however, in the text books, which the Sudan Literature Centre is publishing. Agencies make an effort to work across cleavages, but do not seem to have been able to overcome their tactful reserve in becoming advocates for a new vision for Sudan. This would require a different degree of commitment on the part of the agencies. It would also require a country expertise which is rare, particularly in

the field. But, in relation to NCA, it could for example take the form of support to the religious prophets such as Woutgnang, whose interpretations of the narratives from other magicians, particularly Ngundeng Bong, regarding the inevitability of wars between the Dinka and the Nuer have played a key role in the Bor Dinka massacres.

It appears that *prevention has not been used by NCA and NPA in any substantial way* to influence the willingness of the parties to seek peace. There are, as we shall see in Chapter 6, a number of very specific forms of preventive support, which – most likely – would produce important results in the present context of Sudan.

5.3.5 The Possible Negative Influence

There are three kinds of influence, which have been recorded as counteracting the positive benefits gained by the use of conciliation, direction and prevention.

1. The tendency of NCA to match the ethnic cleavages in Southern Sudan by continuing the concentration of its assistance into Eastern Equatoria and some of the dominant tribal groups there. Although the primary intention of the NCA personnel is to respect a unique bond of loyalty with the people in that province – based to some extent on personal memories, and the vague sense of an unfulfilled promise – it is interpreted by other Sudanese as an ethnic agenda. It has been the sole source of criticism met of NCA's work inside the Sudan, and it may have contributed to the general inter-ethnic animosity both in rebel and government controlled areas.
2. The support of NPA to the higher levels of the SPLA has reinforced the tendency of SPLA to rely on its own external diplomacy to obtain critical resources, such as food, rather than seeking the support of the indigenous populations of the areas where it operates. There has been a marked lack of interface between the SPLA's higher ranks and the «traditional» chiefs and governance structures of the tribes, particularly the Equatorian tribes. It is possible that the movement towards a civilian administration may compensate for this, but NPA's role in this matter has not been decisive so far.
3. In spite of many efforts of co-ordination, there have been significant differences in how aid agencies, including the Norwegian, have approached the so-

ciety. At the small end of the spectrum, the emphasis placed on the role of the Joint Relief Committees has varied much.³² At the upper end, the nature of the relation between authorities and populations varies enormously with the identity of the group in control in specific geographical areas. Agency preferences and political orientation further increase these differences. Beneath the English-Swahili/Arabic cleavage, for example, lie differences in the understanding of history, which are enforced by different teaching curricula and different systems of education. The legal system has begun to re-emerge in the forms of traditional courts, Sharia courts, and a western inspired legal system. Considering the length of the conflict, now reaching 14 years in many areas, the balance is not all negative. The most successful in maintaining some homogeneity has been the SPLA/M. There is increasing clarity in the division of labour between the provincial structures (Governors, Commissioners, Secretaries), the SRRA and the SPLA. The OLS Ground Rules have been generalised to a surprising degree in comparison to many other protracted emergencies (e.g. Afghanistan, Liberia). But the danger exists that every rebel Commander can claim autonomy and the right to the recognition and control over resources. The aid agencies, it appears, are not equipped to do more than reflect the fragmentation of the society. It goes without saying that it will be very difficult for any future authority to standardise institutions, relations and structures when peace comes.

5.3.6 *The International Dimension*

It is striking to observe that in all these exercises of influence none of the aid agencies have been allowed to insert their effort into wider international efforts to promote peace. IGADD has never sought leverage through the agencies, inside or outside OLS. The UN Security Council deliberations have taken place quite independently of the aid community, with the exception of episodic information exchanges between different parts of the UN-system. The UNESCO/UNDP Barcelona initia-

tive was carefully delinked from the aid programming, and recent efforts by the UNDP Resident Co-ordinator to implement the concept of Area Rehabilitation to eliminate some of the causes of conflict have not met with any approval yet.

Support to human rights and international humanitarian law has indeed been a contribution to peace made by the international aid community, including the Norwegian NGOs. The recent OLS Review carried out under the aegis of DHA, has attributed a lot of credit to UNICEF for the elaboration of the OLS Ground Rules and Humanitarian Principles. The important role played by other agencies in mobilising support for these instruments, in particular the role played by NPA through its privileged access to the SPLA leadership, should, however, not be overlooked.

5.3.7 *Conclusion*

The Norwegian NGOs, and most other aid agencies, have not given priority to increasing the security of the populations for which they work. They see themselves as limiting the suffering and the dying, but paradoxically not the acts of violence, at least certainly not in the short run. All evidence points to the fact that there is a large impact which could be achieved by making the reduction of violence another general objective of the aid agencies.

The long term commitment of NCA, its substantive knowledge about the very complex mix of interests at stake, and the high standing the agency enjoys with most parties of the war, allows NCA to play a role in the promotion of peace and the reconciliation. NCA is aware of this, and is committed to contribute, but the agency needs a broader approach and a larger set of tools to play the role effectively. For a solidarity-agency like NPA, the reduction of violence and the promotion of peace is a longer term objective, subordinated the short-term aim of strengthening the position of one of the warring parties. The leverage which NPA has with SPLA/M could be used effectively to promote peace, provided that NPA was able to analyse the options

³² Joint Relief Committees was an idea, promoted by USAID and applied mainly by CRS, designed to ensure the participation of civil society. Critics say that the notion of civil society (women's groups, church leaders, traditional chiefs,

etc.) is still too foreign to the culture to be implemented rapidly. Clear hierarchies continue to function in this new «democratic» structure. Moreover, they are truly functional only on the delivery sites where certain agencies and certain individuals, are keen to develop them.

available to SPLA/M in greater depth. At present, the capacity of NPA appears to be a serious constraint to the realisation of the role the agency could play.

There has been a lack of strategic focus in the promotion of peace. Nobody has been given the overall responsibility for the search for peace in Sudan, and there

is a need for all the actors involved, including the Norwegian NGOs, to achieve a certain degree of international co-ordination and agree on a scale of priorities. Unless this is done, there is a risk, as we have seen, that the policies pursued by different aid agencies will result in greater fragmentation in Sudan.

6 Options for Future Norwegian Involvement in the Sudan

Norway has provided large amounts of assistance to the Sudan over several decades. During the last 10 years main emphasis has been on humanitarian assistance, which has improved the situation of people suffering from the effects of civil war. There has been substantial shorter term effects as well as longer term impact of the aid provided in terms of relieving suffering and improving livelihoods of people. The impact with regard to the willingness of the parties to seek peace appears to be marginal. This is partly a reflection of the fact that Norway does not have a clearly defined Sudan-policy and the non-governmental organisations like NCA and NPA have been supported in pursuing quite different, but not always very clear, objectives. This chapter will introduce a discussion on opportunities for future Norwegian involvement in the Sudan. The conclusions of the chapter are reflected in the recommendations offered in the Executive Summary.

6.1 Causes of the War and Future Perspectives

In the ever changing and very complex context of Sudan, it has turned out to be beyond the scope of an evaluation of this kind to actually project scenarios as regards future developments in the Sudan. This could at best be achieved by a large research project, combining several disciplines, which would go deeper into a substantive analysis. However, understanding the causes of the war may be helpful for a discussion of future perspectives.

There are many explanations for the causes of the war. For the purpose of clarity, in the following, they are grouped into three general categories:

- It is a fight for power and control over resources in a conflict charged with political ideologies and tensions between different religious and ethnic groups
- The artificial nature of the post-colonial borders and the inability of all the rulers to establish a common identity on which to create a united nation
- The loss of traditional wisdom and the absence of education in the rapid transition from a poor agrarian to a modern society has led to an erosion of traditional methods of conflict resolution.

The centre of the country, roughly defined as the areas populated by the Nile Arabs, has preserved the key to power. While changing its own orientation through frequent changes of government, it has thwarted all other interests by exacerbating the tensions between rival parties. At times when it appeared that all other parties would form a coalition against the centre, a coup in the centre would throw the alliances into a new configuration. States in the proximity have ensured that there be a constant support for opposition groups.

The sustained influence of neighbouring powers, such as Egypt, and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia, has maintained this hegemony of the centre. Egypt has pursued a policy based on what has been called «the political ecology of the Nile». This is the proposition that the waters of the Nile are just too important for Egypt. For Egypt it is preferential to deal with one large state having influence over the Nile, instead of many smaller ones, each pursuing different water policies. Egypt, therefore, is very keen to preserve the unity of Sudan under the sovereignty of Khartoum.

It is not possible to prioritise all the causes of the war, but rather the evaluation is seeing the war as the result of a combination of multiple conflicts, some fading away over time, only to be replaced by others. This is a situation which is likely to continue. Actual warfare may stop – in the best of scenarios – at a certain point of time, but conflicts are likely to remain. Some of the conflicts underlying the war may be resolved in the peace process, but others will emerge. The long term impact of the war has been an erosion of a culture in favour of peace. The brake down of value and norms and the widespread availability of small arms, often in the hands of young boys, has undermined the authority of communal chiefs and other traditional leaders.

6.2 Norwegian Involvement

An important point of departure for the discussion on the further Norwegian involvement in the Sudan would be an appreciation of the unique position of Norway in relation to that country. The long-term commitment of Norway to the people of Sudan; the substantive knowledge which is found in Norway about the society and the very complex mix of interests at stake; the access

and high standing that Norwegians, belonging to different constituencies, enjoy with most parties of the war are all unique features of Norwegian relations with the Sudan. Combining these features with the general advantage of being a small state with a large pot of money, which can be used to finance the costs of a peaceful settlement, provides Norway with both opportunities and responsibilities. A continued Norwegian involvement is both required, possible, and wanted in Sudan.

Humanitarian aid should not become a poor substitute for adequate political intervention. A Norwegian Sudan-policy, therefore, should allow the government to follow a three-pronged strategy. In brief, the Government should:

- Intensify political and diplomatic efforts both in the context of wider initiatives and in bilateral contacts to obtain a just and lasting peace in Sudan.
- Give higher priority to the provision of preventive assistance to reduce the use of violence, avoid that it reoccurs or contain its spread.
- Continue the provision of humanitarian aid, however with clear objectives, criteria for prioritising interventions and better documentation of results.

While it is outside the scope of this evaluation to comment further on the political and diplomatic efforts, which could be intensified to promote peace, a few important aspects related to the two other parts of the strategy are discussed below.

6.2.1 Preventive Assistance

Reduction of violence should be made a general explicit objective of the Norwegian policy in relation to the Sudan. This general objective could be particularly well served by developing the capacity of agencies to provide preventive assistance. To illustrate the point a few specific ideas, to be further developed, are offered in the following:

- Priority should be given to co-opting the growing bands of cattle rustlers and disenfranchised youth, who are engaging in looting in the South. These groups may possibly be rewarded for certain forms of work through the provision of resources (e.g., soap, mosquito nets, tools). This work could be arranged to divert them from more destructive activities. Resources may even be used in exchange for weapons, although such a policy could only be

implemented with careful, and therefore expensive, co-ordination and monitoring.

- The Diocese of Torit has been developing a very original plan for rehabilitation of mainly roads and water points in the Toposa areas to counter the growing sense of discontentment of the marginalised but warlike group in the area.
- There are many values in Sudanese culture regarding the validity and codification of violence. These values are only beginning to be tapped in the work of the Humanitarian Principles Unit of UNICEF. The International Committee of the Red Cross is also examining the issue of the cultural translation of the principles underlying the Geneva Convention and Protocols to make them more viable in the context of a protracted civil war. These initiatives are all at very early stages of development, but could be explored and more widely applied. One practical application would be emphasising the difference between killings resulting from «government war» and killings of a much less legitimate form resulting from local forms of feuding. This separation has been extremely important among the Nilotic groups, and appears, according to some anthropologists, to be disappearing.
- It would also seem important to find ways of strengthening or protecting the authority of village elders, to thwart the growing autonomy of armed men in the younger age groups.

6.2.2 Humanitarian Assistance

NCA and NPA have pursued different objectives and followed different approaches in the support they have provided to the Sudan. NCA has been the developmental relief agency, working on both sides of the war, with an all-time focus on capacity building and the longer term implications of the efforts, however at times with a fairly limited coverage. NPA, being the big provider of food relief and curative health care, has followed a more action-oriented, political approach by deciding to support one side of the war.

Most of the projects reflect very well the different intervention approaches, adopted by the two agencies, but the criteria for selection of priority projects have not always been clear. There is no systematic approach to programming. Rather the agencies are responding to needs and opportunities as they see them. The question is, if the Ministry is simply funding programmes, developed by the NGOs with their respective partners or

seeing NGOs as implementing agencies of the policies of the Norwegian Government – or both?

NCA should ask itself whether its role is to be the large operation that many think it could become again, as soon as conditions permit, or something akin to an Embassy. The latter role (liaison, symbolic presence, information) may be combined with other roles, which are quite important to the churches of Sudan: such as being a voice for those who cannot speak. Is this a new formula for NGOs in complex emergencies: to focus most efforts on advocacy and the creation and maintenance of structures, rather than the provision of services and resources?

In the last few years that NPA has engaged itself in programmes, which are likely to reduce vulnerability of people in the South in a little longer perspective. The question is if NPA can and should play a stronger, catalytic role in efforts to establish a civil society and a civil administration in the parts of Southern Sudan,

which are under the control of SPLA/M? At present, however, NPA is struggling to recover from a long period of management deficiencies. The capacity of NPA as it is now appears to be a serious constraint to increasing the role of the agency in Southern Sudan.

Norway has a unique potential for playing a catalytic role in co-ordination of the international response to the situation in Sudan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs might wish to consider holding a meeting of key NGOs, donor governments and UN-representatives to discuss ways to promote collaboration in all aspects of humanitarian operations in the Sudan. In Norway the Ministry might wish to increase Norwegian capacity for political intervention and the provision of preventive assistance. An ad-hoc advisory group of experts from different Norwegian constituencies may follow and support the development of Norwegian policies and the implementation of specific programmes to ensure a co-ordinated and coherent Norwegian response to the complex emergency of Sudan.

Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan

1. Background

A sum of approximately NOK 50 million has for many years been granted annually in humanitarian assistance to the Sudan. These funds are mainly channelled through Norwegian non-governmental organizations. Norwegian Church Relief (NCR) and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) are the largest Norwegian organizations operating in the Sudan. The evaluation is to focus on the activities of NCR and NPA.

2. Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of evaluating Norwegian humanitarian assistance to the Sudan is to examine the impact it has had in relation to the civil war situation and the ongoing efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation in the country. Attention will be focused on the extent to which the humanitarian assistance has been able to relieve distress, hunger and suffering, and on the effect of the aid on the various parties' willingness to seek peace and reconciliation. The evaluation is to provide a basis for the assessment of further Norwegian involvement in the Sudan.

3. Focus and design of the evaluation

The various stages in the conflict in the Sudan should be taken into account in all aspects of the evaluation.

3.1 Description of goals and means

A review of Norwegian humanitarian assistance provided by non-governmental organizations should be drawn up, with a description of goals and means, as well as the scope of the aid and the channels through which it is provided. A description should be given of the way aid efforts have been organized, including a list of NCR's and NPA's partners, and their relationship to internal actors and to the parties to the conflict.

3.2 Analysis of goals, means and results

Goal achievement, cost effectiveness and the impact of particularly important individual measures should be assessed, as well as the short-term humanitarian effects of the aid. Furthermore, the extent to which and the ways in which NCR and NPA have, through their efforts, actively contributed towards increasing the parties' willingness to enter into negotiations and accept a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Sudan should be discussed, as well as any results that may have been achieved. Emphasis should be placed on how NCR and NPA's cooperation have developed over time, and the consequences this has had for the form of the assistance provided.

The relevance and appropriateness of the long-term strategies on which the organizations have based their activities should be assessed in relation to the nature and development of the conflict. In particular, factors which have resulted in a change of strategy or measures should be identified.

The impact of Norwegian humanitarian aid on cultural, religious and social conditions in the Sudan should also be analyzed.

3.3 Recommendations regarding measures to promote a peaceful conflict resolution

On the basis of projected scenarios as regards future developments in the Sudan, recommendations should be made as to which forms of further Norwegian support should be given priority. Measures should aim at promoting a peaceful resolution based on negotiations between the parties to the conflict. Proposals should be presented for alternative, supplementary measures to be implemented by Norway and other countries, both in the Sudan and in relation to other countries in similar war situations.

4. Methods

Available documents should be analyzed, interviews should be conducted with key actors in Norway, including the Ministry, and field visits should be made in the Sudan to projects run by NCR and NPA. The evaluation should also include interviews with local and international partners, as well as interviews with representatives of the various warring factions such as the Sudanese Government and the rebel movement, and with international organizations in Khartoum and Nairobi. The report from the international evaluation of the UN's «Operational Lifeline Sudan» will be significant for the Norwegian evaluation.

5. Time and cost framework

The evaluation should be carried out within a limit of seven man-months. Field work and data collection in

the Sudan and Nairobi should be completed within a period of two months. The total costs should be limited to a maximum of NOK 750,000.

6. Qualifications

The consultant, who preferably should have a background in political science, sociology and/or social anthropology, must have a good knowledge of the country, be familiar with the work of non-governmental organizations in the field of humanitarian aid and peace and reconciliation processes, be skilled in the analysis of political processes, and have broad experience of evaluating emergency relief and aid.

Annex II

List of Persons met and Itinerary

Oslo, Norway, 27-28.11.1996

Erik Berg, Evaluation Unit, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Marit Sørvald, Evaluation Unit, MFA
Tormod Eriksen, MFA
Kjell Harald Dalen, Regional Adviser on Africa, MFA
Ståle Stavrum, Consultant, NORAD
Halvor Aschjem, Senior Adviser, Department of International Programmes, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Odd Evjen, NCA
Dan Eiffe, Liaison Officer, Norwegian People's Aid/Sudan (NPA)
Sven Olesen, NPA/Oslo

London, 6.12.1996

Andy Mawson, Sudan Desk Officer, Amnesty International

Bergen, Norway, Tuesday, 7.1.1997

Gunnar M. Sørbø, Director, Christian Michelsen Institute
Leif Manger, Professor, University of Bergen, Centre for Development Studies
Terje Tvedt, Professor, University of Bergen, Centre for Development Studies

Oslo, Norway, Wednesday, 8.1.1997

Marit Sørvald, Evaluation Unit, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Erik Berg, Evaluation Unit, MFA
Jorunn Maehlum, Assistant Director General, Department of Political Affairs, MFA
Kjetil Paulsen, Head of Division, Humanitarian Affairs and Human Rights, MFA
Halle Jørn Hanssen, Secretary General, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)
Egil Steen Wisløff Nilssen, Head of International Department, NPA
Kjell Harald Dalen, Regional Adviser on Africa, MFA

Travel to Khartoum, Thursday, 9.1.1997

Taha El Sayed El Rouli, Consul General of Norway

Khartoum, Friday, 10.1.1997

Sankar John Nathan, Resident Representative, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
Kamal Abu Zeid, Administration Manager, NCA
Victor Nawi, Programme Manager, NCA
El Gizouli A., Finance Manager, NCA
Wilson Nagib, Chief Accountant, NCA
Rev. Enock Tombe Stephen, General Secretary, Sudan Council of Churches (SCC)
Henri Danime, Acting Chairman of Relief Committee, SCC
Esther Ayak Daniel, Member of Relief Committee, SCC
Kenneth Duku, Acting ERP National Coordinator, Voluntary Repatriation and Rehabilitation, SCC
Aggry Abbes, Acting Program Director, SCC
Steven Lomeling, Program Director, SCC
Rev. Samuel Nyawelo Ador, Director, Church and Society, SCC

Khartoum, Saturday, 11.1.1997

Jerry Bailey, Emergency Unit, World Food Programme (WFP)
Dr. Fatih El Rahman El Ghadi, Commissioner General, Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC)
Abdel Khalig El Hussein, NGO Department, HAC
Mohamed Rahamtalla, Deputy Commissioner, HAC
Salem Tayyarah, Senior Programme Officer, Emergency Unit, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Bob McCarthy, Emergency Unit, UNICEF
Lise Grande, Officer in Charge, UNHCU (UNDP Emergency Unit)
Maeve Lynch, UNHCU (UNDP Emergency Unit)
Caesar Arkangelo Suliman, Executive Secretary, Sudanaid
John Ellario, Student, College of Technological Sciences
Awad Elkarim Mohamed Yousif, Acting Principal, College of Technological Sciences
Dr. Awatif Mustafa Abdel Halim, Deputy Dean, Ahfad University
Margaret Joshua, Student, Ahfad University
Rebecca Alum William, Student, Ahfad University
Dinner with Opposition Leader Dr Abel Alier, the Bishop of Malakal, and the Directors of Sudan Council of Churches and Sudanaid

Flight Khartoum-Juba, Sunday, 12.1.1997
Matia Omera, Manager, Equatoria Programme, NCA
Fernando de Cominges-Chao, Coordinator, Action
Contre la Faim (ACF)
Cécile Piron, Nurse, ACF
Caroline Wilkinson, Nutritionist, ACF
Patrick Danard, Water Engineer, ACF
Luay Basil, Food Aid Monitor, WFP

Juba, Monday, 13.1.1997

Captain Moussa, Head of State Security, Ministry of
Interior
Tongun Swoka, Chairman, HAC
Jackson Tokwiny, Agriculture Coordinator, HAC
Benjamin Cammander, Coordinator Education, HAC
H.E. Juma Said Worju, Minister of Social Welfare and
Information
Awad Elkarin Ibrahim, HAC Representative
Caesar Baya, Wali of Eastern Equatoria
John Afong, Acting Secretary General of Government
John Horong, Minister of Peace and Reconstruction
Col Arkanjelo Thomson, Commissioner of Province
Matong
Patrick Robert, HAC
Suzana Ayiba Hakim, Coordinator, Women»s Self-
Help Cooperative, GTZ
Lucy Akelo, Acting Chairwoman, Women»s Self-Help
Cooperative, GTZ
Felix Alimu, NCA Cooperative and Business Officer

Juba, Tuesday, 14.1.1997

Eng. Adam Al Tahir Hamudun, Acting Wali Bahr el
Jebel
Aziak Kenyi, Inter-Church Committee Chairman, SCC
Nikala Madiar, Acting Executive Director, SCC
Tiberio Lesser, Education, SCC
Rev. Valente Otvari, Acting Chairman, Africa Inland
Church (AIC)
Pastor Oliver Doku Wani, Administrator, AIC
Chairman of CART
Mr Jackson, Agricultural Coordinator, HAC
Yasmin Nabuke, Nutritionist, SCC
Health centres visited: Buluk and Nakassongola
Feeding centres visited: Hainakama, Hai Commercial
and MTC
Meeting with 23 male community leaders

Juba, Wednesday, 15.1.1997

Flight cancelled
Steven Ashdown, Veterinarian, UNICEF

Juba, Thursday, 16.1.1997

Mr Emanuel, Administration and Finance, UNICEF
Mr Francis, Household Food Security, Field Monitor,
UNICEF

Juba, Friday, 17.1.1997

Jean Pierre Ruhlmann, GTZ Programme Coordinator

Juba, Saturday, 18.1.1997

Juba, Sunday, 19.1.1997

Flight Juba-Khartoum

Khartoum, Monday, 20.1.1997

El Khider Daloum Mahmoud, Deputy Field Director,
Save the Children Fund, SCF(UK)
Helmut Rössler, Consultant, SCF(UK)

Khartoum, Tuesday, 21.1.1997

Peter Post, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Nether-
lands, Khartoum
Laurent Mannonini, French Ministry of Cooperation,
Khartoum
Rukia Yacoub, Nutritionist, Emergency Unit, UNICEF
Hashim Zakaria, Executive Director, Sudanese Popular
Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation (SPRC)
Elfatih Mustafa, Programme Manager, SPRC

Khartoum, Wednesday, 22.1.1997

Joshua Dau Diu, Administrator, Center of Remedial
English and Sciences Course Center
Archbishop of Khartoum
Jacques Esmieux, European Union Ambassador, Khar-
toum
Site visits to SCC clinics in Jebel Aulia and Mayo
displaced camps

Flight Khartoum-Nairobi, Thursday, 23.1.1997

Hans Havik, Resident Representative, NPA

Kirsten Carelius Svendsen, Director, NCA
Dan Eiffe, Liaison Officer, NPA
Patricia Kormoss, Technical Assistant, ECHO
R. Treffers, Ambassador, Dutch Embassy
Gilles Plug, Dutch Embassy

Nairobi, Friday, 24.1.1997

Carolyn Hall, Health Coordinator, NPA
Ove Christian Danbolt, Ambassaderåd/Chargé d'affaires
Mr Kiplagat, former Secretary of State-Foreign Affairs, Kenya
Kirsten C. Svendsen, Director, NCA

Flight Nairobi-Akot, Yirol and Rumbek Counties, Saturday, 25.1.1997

John Namasa, Agriculture Project Manager, Rumbek County
Dan Eiffe, Liaison Officer, NPA
John Wagner, Programme Coordinator, NPA
Diress Mengistu, Agriculture Programme Manager, NPA
Ezana Getahun, Agriculturist/Training, NPA
Maiwa Kibata, Veterinarian, NPA
Pur Ciengan, Agriculturalist, NPA
John Mana, Camp Manager, NPA

Akot, Sunday, 26.1.1997

Site visits:

Barpakeny marketplace

*Mabui Training Centre for Agricultural Rehabilitation
Mapordit SRRA and Centre for Community Development*

Horich Soap-making Project

Cattle Camp

Jok Mayong, SRRA Secretary, Rumbek County
Daniel Makur, SRRA Secretary, Yirol County
Mr Andre, SPLM Commissioner, Yirol County
Mr Enoch, SPLM Acting Commissioner, Rumbek County
Mr Daniel, SPLA Commander, Yirol County
Dr Elijah, Medical Coordinator, Billing Hospital (formerly run by Italian NGO)
Chief Tut, Akot
Geleta Gemechu, Save the Children, Coordinator
Logistics Manager, Oxfam

Flight Akot-Lokichokio, Monday, 27.1.1997

Jan Kolaas, Area Representative, NPA Lokichokio
Meetings with NPA and NCA Lokichokio camp staff
Anne Simpson, Assistant Logistic Officer, NCA
William Oduor, Storekeeper/Assistant Logistics Officer, NCA
Mike Keem Lokwakol, Assistant Logistic Officer, NCA

Lokichokio, Tuesday, 28.1.1997

Mgr Paride Taban, Bishop of Torit
Dominik Stillhart, Head of Sub-Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
David Kagunda, Deputy Programme Officer, UNICEF
Alosio Emor Ojetuk, SRRA Liaison Officer
William Simpson, OLS Security Officer
Vincent Imoo, National Programme Officer, UNICEF
Ydo Jabobs, Programme Coordinator, Diocese of Torit (DOT)

Drive Loki-New Cush-Chukudum, Wednesday, 29.1.1997

CRS Staff in New Cush
SRRA Staff in New Cush

Chukudum, Thursday, 30.1.1997

Mr Åge, Camp Manager, NPA
Site visits of Chukudum Hospital, Training School, Chukudum Resource Center, Women's Projects

Chukudum, Friday, 31.1.1997

H.E. Commissioner Peter Longuale, Kapoeta County
Maximilo Alam, Member of National Liberation Council
Father Emilio Paul Lotiki
Commander Jacob Lebok
H.E. Regina Amoris, Community Development and Mobilization
Victor Odon, SRRA Field Advisor
Paul Atome, Secretary Commissioner
Moris Aricori, Peace Administrator
Mr Josef, Secretary Payam Administrator
Lino Atiolo, Acting Civil Administrator
Paterino Lege, SRRA Agricultural Coordinator
Meeting with students of NCA's Medical Training School

Drive Chukudum-Ikotos, Saturday, 1.2.1997

Gunnar R. Johansen, Education Coordinator, NCA
Gunvor Holtet, Health Coordinator, NCA
Hillary Gachinga, Logistics Coordinator, NCA
Deputy Commissioner, Province of Eastern Equatoria
Daniel Okae Erupon, Primary Health Care and Guinea
Worm Supervisor

Ikotos, Sunday, 2.2.1997

Site visit to Isoke to see education, health and water activities of NCA

Meeting with women from Women's Group Activities

Chief of Lorima and village elders
Chief of Urma and village elders

Ikotos, Monday, 3.2.1997

Judith Alice Nyakoa, Health/Nutrition Facilitator and Manager of Parayok

Site visit to two Ikotos hand pumps, Community Health Care Training Centre, Ikotos Primary Health Care Centre

William Oniama, AIC Representative
Programme Assistant, Diocese of Torit (DOT)

Drive Ikotos-Logutok

Melke Tefferi, Health Coordinator, NCA Logutok

Site visits to primary health care unit, school, two hand-pumps, and SRRA

Flight Logutok-Lokichokio-Nairobi, Tuesday, 4.2.1997

Bjorg Mide, former Director of NCA Nairobi

Nairobi, Wednesday, 5.2.1997

Kirsten C. Svendsen, Director, NCA

Gaim Kebreab, Regional Representative, NCA

Risper Omondi, Education Consultant, NCA Logutok

Nairobi, Thursday, 6.2.1997

David Deng, Technical Assistance, SRRA

Arthur Akuien, SRRA

Samson L. Kwaje, Acting Secretary for Information, SPLM

Mario Muor Muor, General Secretary, SRRA

Chuol Rambang, Upper Nile, SRRA

Larry Meserve, Chief, Sudan Field Office, USAID

Dr. Dau Aleer Abit, Managing Director, Sudan Medical

Care (SMC)

Alier Riak Makol, Deputy Managing Director and Projects Officer, SMC

Nairobi, Friday, 7.2.1997

Peter Avenell, Food Security Programme Manager, NPA

Kenneth Miller, Deputy Food Security Programme Manager, NPA

Carylus Odiango, Chief Finance Officer, NPA

Sapientia Mkok, Personal Assistant to the Resident Representative

Nicolas Southern, Country Field Director, SCF South Sudan

Lual Deng, currently Project Coordinator, UNSO

Nairobi, Saturday, 8.2.1997

Day-off

Nairobi, Sunday, 9.2.1997

Day-off

Nairobi, Monday, 10.2.1997

Vidar Andzjoen, Procurement and Administration Manager, NPA

Dr. Pauline Riak, Chairperson, Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi (SWAN)

23 members of SWAN and Sudan Women Voice for Peace (SWVP)

Ted Chaiban, Director, CRS Southern Sudan Programme

Nairobi, Tuesday, 11.2.1997

Dan Eiffe, Liaison Officer, NPA

Hamish Young, Humanitarian Principles Unit, UNICEF/OLS

Paulette Nichols, Programme Coordinator, OLS/Southern Sector

Simon Wood, Auditor, KPMG-Peat Marwick

Catherine Karuno, Personnel Officer, NPA

Hans Havik, Resident Representative, NPA

Geoff Loane, Head of Regional Delegation, ICRC

Graham Wood, former Acting Resident Representative, NPA

Flight Nairobi-Copenhagen, 12.2.1997

Copenhagen, Friday, 14.2.1997

Stein Villumstad, Assistant Director of International Programmes, Emergency Assistance, NCA/Oslo

Oslo, Thursday, 17.7.1997

Marit Sørvald, Evaluation Unit, MFA
Jan Egeland, Deputy Minister, MFA

Oslo, Monday, 18.8.1997

Jan Egeland, Deputy Minister, MFA

Oslo, Wednesday, 20.8.1997

Halle Jørn Hanssen, Secretary General, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

Egil Steen Wisløff Nilssen, Head of International Department, NPA

Odd Evjen, Programme Co-ordinator, NCA

Stein Villumstad, Assistant Director of International Programmes, Emergency Assistance, NCA

Kjell Harald Dalen, Regional Adviser on Africa, MFA

Oslo, Friday, 22.8.1997

Jan Egeland, Deputy Minister, MFA

Evaluation Process and Methods Used

1. Evaluation Process

1.1 General Calendar of Visits

The field visit to the Sudan lasted five weeks, starting on the 9th of January and ending on the 11th of February. It began in Khartoum, and the original plan was to spend three days in Khartoum and three days in Juba in order to visit NCA/Khartoum projects. However, as the Consultant could not leave Juba as expected (flights were cancelled), five extra days were added to the Juba visit and two more to the Khartoum visit (no daily flights to Nairobi).

Upon arrival in Nairobi, the Consultant decided to fly immediately to the field. The first field sites that were visited are two of NPA: Akot in Bahr el Ghazal and Chukudum in Eastern Equatoria. These sites were visited between 25 January and 1 February with a two-day transition stay in Lokichokio in order to visit the logistical bases of both NCA and NPA. Between 1 and 4 February, the Consultant visited the NCA activities in Ikotos, Isoke and Logutok. During most visits, the Team split into separate groups.

The last week of the field trip was spent in Nairobi. The Consultant met the HQ staff of both NPA and NCA and interviewed others like OLS members, SRRA staff and indigenous NGOs.

1.2 Criteria for Selection of Projects

As time was too short to visit all the project sites of the two NGOs, it was decided to see the NGOs' best programmes in the areas where they have the highest concentration of activities and to get an overview over all types of projects that the NGOs engage in.

With respect to the NCA activities in the northern sector, the Consultant covered all major activities. In Khartoum, the Consultant met the two main partners of NCA, the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and Sudanaid (the Sudanese version of Caritas). SCC engages in relief and rehabilitation activities, and the Consultant visited their major projects in the two displaced camps Jebel Aulia and Mayo. Sudanaid, on the other hand, is a NGO which provides university scholarships for young Southern Sudanese. The Consultant visited and spoke to

students and professors of the universities Ahfad University and College of Technological Sciences. In addition, the Consultant interviewed the governmental bodies NCA works with: the Sudanese Government's Humanitarian Assistance Commission (HAC) and the United Nations Agencies UNICEF, UNHCU and WFP.

As NCA's historical ties and main programmes lie in the Eastern Bank of Equatoria, it was necessary to visit Juba. In Juba the Consultant spend much time going through the formal protocol of conducting courtesy visits with all the main civil servants. The Consultant also interviewed the two major partners of NCA in Juba, SCC and African Inland Church (AIC), and governmental bodies like CART and HAC. Site visits were done to SCC's and AIC's best health centres (Buluk and Nakassongola) and feeding centres (Hainakama, Hai Commercial and MTC).

In comparison to most other NGOs, NPA is quite thinly spread over southern Sudan. In addition to having concentrated areas of work along the Ugandan border in Eastern Equatoria (Labone, Nimule and Chukudum), it has relief projects in areas like Boma (near the Ethiopian border) and relief and agricultural activities in the Akot area (Yirol and Rumbek counties of Bahr el Ghazal). As it was impossible to visit all sites with our time constraints, the Consultant decided that it was best to visit Chukudum and Akot. Labone, Nimule and Chukudum have hospitals that are attached to other projects. However, as Chukudum is the only one with a Medical Teaching School and a large Resource Centre for vocational training, it was best to visit that site instead of the other two. Similarly, Akot offers more activities than other comparable areas where NPA has provided relief food with some agricultural rehabilitation. Akot is the only area outside the Nimule-Labone-Chukudum corridor where NPA engages in cattle vaccination campaigns, started a training centre for agricultural production and did some community development activities.

NCA/southern sector's work is concentrated in the Ikotos area where it has its largest compound and largest concentration of staff. Again, in order to get a good

overview over all the various activities that NCA engages in, it was felt that it was best to concentrate one's time there. The Consultant also visited one of NCA's better projects in the Ikotos area, namely Isoke projects, and also visited Logutok where NCA has a small compound.

In sum, the Consultant has seen among the best of the projects of the two NGOs, covered all programme areas of the NGOs' portfolio and visited those sites where there is the highest concentration of activities.

1.3 Difficulties in Data Collection

There were a number of factors which detracted the Consultant from getting first-hand knowledge or from receiving documentary evidence. The factors are divided into four: lack of indicators and documentation, weaknesses in verification, unpredictability of access to information, and lack of time for verification of reports.

1.3.1 Lack of Indicators and Documentation

The lack of indicators and documentation is quite common among humanitarian assistance organisations. The typical excuse is that relief work, in particular, requires a versatile working environment where one cannot be bogged down with bureaucratic procedures. Although the gist of the argument is correct, the complete lack of indicators used to monitor and evaluate activities is unacceptable.

Some of the problems the Consultant encountered in the field are the following. In the NCA/Khartoum office, for instance, it was accepted for a long time that NCA's main counterpart SCC distribute food without accounting for it. When finally in 1996 an evaluation of SCC's Emergency Response Programme was conducted, the evaluators concluded that:

1. An overall picture of relief food use cannot be gained.
2. The relief food was primarily used for beneficiaries who are longer-term residents in camps or shanty settlements instead of recently displaced persons.
3. Needs were not identified- needs were based on the proportional representation of the churches.
4. No rigorous selection criteria were used, instead the social pressures on church leaders seemed to be the overwhelming criterion.

5. Monitors often cannot do their work due to threats of physical violence.
6. There is no clear distinction between food allocation for vulnerable groups and church empowerment.
7. SCC staff received relief food for incentives.
8. Etc.

The point of illustrating this one example is to show a typical example of what happens with emergency assistance, in particular a valuable item like food. Often it is difficult to monitor relief food distributions, but the consequences of that should be clear to the donors. For an evaluator like the Consultant, it is almost impossible to judge how activities went in the past as there is no tangible evidence left by the time the evaluator arrives. However, the Consultant has had access to two reviews on SCC and NPA which give an indication of the past activities.

A specific and not typical problem that the Consultant encountered in this assignment was the disappearance of documents in the NPA Nairobi office. Apparently former employees left the organisation with documents. This meant that often the Consultant did not receive the requested documentation because it was simply not available anymore.

1.3.2 Weaknesses in Verification

By weaknesses in verification the Consultant means in particular problems that were encountered in the government-held areas. As the Sudanese Government is not willing to show outsiders everything that is happening in its country, their security officers make sure that foreigners' mobility is limited. Before the Consultant started working in Juba, a work programme had to be presented to the Juba security officer. He, for example, decided that we shall not see the outspoken and controversial Archbishop of Juba. We were also forbidden from crossing the river to see the displaced camp with the most vulnerable persons. A security person had the option of attending all our interviews and site visits. In conclusion, our eyes only saw what the authorities wanted us to see and that is a slanted view on Juba.

The Consultant also had more common problems like the fact that we reached southern Sudan when the Sudanese children were on their holidays and the cultivation period was over. Therefore, children in primary school and cultivated fields were never seen. However, in the

north of Sudan, schools were open, and the Consultant did speak to university students.

1.3.3 Unpredictability of Access to Information

Although we stayed a week in Juba, most of that time was lost. The Consultant would have liked to have interviewed more persons and seen more sites, but we were told that we had seen what we wanted to see and we should not expect more. Thus, the extra days in Juba were a type of house arrest as the Consultant was not allowed to leave the NCA compound.

There are also a few occasions when the Consultant asked to see something repeatedly and the NGO personnel «refused» to facilitate such encounters. One was in Juba when the Consultant repeatedly asked to see a few voluntarily repatriated persons. Another was when the Consultant asked to see the unaccompanied minor project in Natinga. Regrettably the Consultant suspects that

on both occasions the NGOs preferred not to show us one of their less successful projects. The SCC Voluntary Repatriation project has received negative remarks when it was evaluated by an independent consultant in 1996, and the NPA Unaccompanied Minor project's funds have been put on hold after its main donor visited the project in 1995.

1.3.4 Lack of Time for Verification of Reports

Finally, there is the real constraint of lack of time to do an extensive review of every single activity. The Evaluation relied heavily on the rapid appraisal approach which has its strengths but also its serious weaknesses. The Consultant, for example, did not have the time to live with the Dinka to find out whether the NPA agricultural activities in Yirol and Rumbek counties are really successful in changing significantly pastoralists' lifestyles.

2 Methods Used

This section on methods used discusses deviations made from the Technical Proposal. Unless otherwise mentioned, the methodology suggested in the Technical Proposal applies.

2.1 Cost-Effectiveness and Efficiency

Chapter 4 deals with the NGOs' operations. Originally, in the Technical Proposal, it was suggested that both cost-effectiveness and efficiency should be studied. However, while in the field, it was realized that a cost-effectiveness analysis would be almost impossible as determining the economic costs of inputs and outputs is a huge task. Moreover, the Consultant realized that efficiency analyses are more appropriate for humanitarian work because relief agencies' real task is to make the maximum use with their limited inputs. In other words, as a NGO cannot foresee its activities for the year, because in emergency work there is a high degree of unpredictability, the NGO cannot decide beforehand which is the cheapest way of getting a certain output. Instead, the NGO should be efficient by utilising its given resources in such a way that it maximizes its outputs.

2.2 Impact of Humanitarian Aid

The Technical Proposal had decomposed the impact of humanitarian aid into three different levels of analysis:

1. The humanitarian impact (also labelled the palliative impact (section 5.1.)
2. The impact on livelihoods and economic institutions (also labelled capacity building impact (Section 5.2.)
3. The impact on peace (Section 5.3.) which is either
 - peace as an intended primary objective of aid (also labelled preventive practice), or
 - peace as an unintended effect from the pursuit of other objectives (also labelled prudential practice, aid with integrity, or do no harm practices).

The changes in the Main Report are on the impact on peace as preventive practice.

During the Evaluation, the Consultant realized that for both NCA and NPA preventive assistance was not, until this date, an important part of their work. None of the two agencies saw their main objective directly in terms of reducing violence in the Sudan. This did not seem appropriate to the solidarity approach of NPA, nor to a neutral third party approach in the case of NCA. As a

result of this finding, it was decided to alter the evaluative framework.

Using the normative position of the Ministry, according to which the will to seek peace is an important outcome of the aid programmes (aside then from the equally important capacity building and humanitarian effects), it has been decided to analyse the impact the varied forms of influence of the NGOs have had on the dynamics of the conflict.

There are three ways in which aid agencies can influence the dynamics of peace and war:

1. by direction, i.e., changing the existing balance of power;

2. by conciliation, i.e., changing the way in which values and interests of leaders are formulated; and
3. by prevention, i.e., altering deliberately the attitudes of significant societal groups.

In order to analyse the three types of influences, the Consultant will assess their relative importance by distinguishing two levels of impact:

- the constitutional or statal level of laws and systems, and
- the societal or civilian level of attitudes towards violence.

The distinction is made to distinguish political from social sciences issues.

Annex IV

A Description of Three of the Projects Visited

Introduction

A description of every project visited by the evaluation team in Sudan would be too lengthy. This Annex, therefore, describes only three projects, supported by Norway through NCA/Nairobi, NPA and NCA/Khartoum. Three educational projects were chosen, which represent the recent trend of moving from the provision of relief supplies to rehabilitation and development. A full list of projects visited is included in Annex II.

Community Health Care Worker (CHW) Training School in Ikotos

NCA/Nairobi started a Community Health Care Worker (CHW) Training School in February 1996 in Ikotos. The School offers a nine-month course to people selected by their village committees to become CHWs, from areas where NCA works. NCA is in charge of running the School, although it also collaborates with other institutions. German Agro Action provided food for the workers constructing the School premises and dormitories. CRS currently supplies the School with food. SRRA undertakes social mobilisation and collects local materials. NCA has employed the Administrator and the Deputy Administrator of the School.

The purpose of opening the CHW School was the need to place qualified CHWs in the many PHCUs that NCA is opening. Every community that has more than 2000 citizens is approached by SRRA to discuss the possibilities of opening a PHCU. Once the community agrees that they are willing to run a PHCU, the village is asked to set up a village committee to select those who should undergo health training. In 1996, SRRA mobilised 21 people who decided to live and study for nine months in Ikotos. 19 of the 21 graduated. In 1997, 16 students have already arrived and have started taking courses. Four more are expected to arrive (they come from insecure areas).

The experience from the last batch is positive. Many communities were so happy to receive a trained CHW for their newly rehabilitated PHCU that they celebrated it by slaughtering a bull. Although NCA is trying to promote women as CHWs, it is difficult. Last year four women were selected for training. Two never arrived

because their husbands refused to release them in the last minute. Two managed to come. One graduated with honours and her husband was so proud of her that he threw a party which lasted several days. This year only one woman is attending the School. NCA is trying gradually to instil the importance of training women.

Once students return to their villages to run the PHCUs, they are «paid» in kind by the community. The communities either donate food or cultivate a field or do something else to compensate the CHW for his/her labour. Each village with a PHCU selects a village health committee whose chairperson receives a two-day orientation from NCA on how to supervise the CHW in non-medical issues. The School Administrator and a medical doctor help the CHWs supervise the clinic in medical issues and boost the morale of the CHWs.

In the future, CHWs will be called to attend special workshops to improve their knowledge. In March 1997, also a medical laboratory school will open. These students will share accommodation with the CHWs and receive practical training in the nearby Ikotos PHCC.

Medical Training School in Chukudum

NPA also started a new training school in 1996. It attached a Medical Training School to its hospital in Chukudum. In 1996, 35 students working for NGOs of the area in the field of primary health care were selected to start a programme in either nursing or laboratory sciences. The 1996 students come from the following NGOs and areas: NPA (Nimule, Labone and Chukudum), NUBRA (Nuba), DOT (Narus), NCA (Ikotos), SMC (Narus), ADRA (Lorena, Kiruaton, Nagashu) and IMC (Tambura). The number of the 1997 entrance class has risen to 49.

The students may choose whether they want to study for one, two or three years, depending on their specific subject of specialisation. The nursing school graduates hospital auxiliary nurses after one year, enrolled nurses after two years, and certified nurses after three years. Similarly, the laboratory sciences school graduates auxiliary laboratory assistants after one year, laboratory assistants after two years, and laboratory technicians

after three years. The theoretical work is accompanied by excellent practical experience in the Chukudum hospital. The nursing students have to assist the certified nurses in the hospital wards and the laboratory science students are trained in the hospital laboratory.

NPA plans to start a medical storekeeper course in March 1997. The possibility of obtaining practical experience in this case will also be excellent since the Chukudum hospital has a very large medical store. As opportunities of the young Sudanese of receiving proper training have been very limited during the war, the Medical Training School, upon request from the students, wants to enhance the level of education by also offering basic education in mathematics and English. The purpose of this is to strengthen the students' basic skills.

ECHO is funding the salaries of the three tutors of the School. As the School wants to expand, it will need to find more funding for more tutors, establish a library, and procure textbooks and educational materials, including a photocopier. NPA is the only organisation which trains students at this level.

Scholarships for Southern Sudanese

MFA (and since 1995 NORAD) is funding scholarships for Southern Sudanese so that they can attend colleges in Khartoum. 500,000 NOK may cover the scholarships of about 2,000 students at a cost of 250 NOK per student per year. The scholarships generally cover school expenses only and do not include living expenses.

NCA/Khartoum grants scholarships through Sudanaid (Sudanese Caritas) which is responsible for administering the funds. The funds go to various colleges. Of the many colleges that receive Norwegian-supported students, the Consultant visited College of Technological Science, Ahfad University for Women and Centre of Remedial English and Sciences (a preparatory school for underprivileged Southerners).

Although Norwegian funding does not raise the number of southern students to that of northerners, its impact is quite significant in that it supports a large proportion of those educated Southerners who will be the leaders of the future Sudan. There are no universities in the rebel-held areas. Therefore, Southerners from those areas, who do receive higher education, must leave the country to do so. It is only the few Southerners in the north who are presently receiving higher education within the Sudan.

The life story of a Southern student we met, John, is typical. John was born in Central Africa as his parents were displaced due to the war. When his family returned to Raga, Bahr el Ghazal, John was seven and was able to receive two years of education in Raga. As John was highly motivated to learn, he left his family and moved north, attending school while doing odd jobs to earn a living. When John became an adult, he moved to Khartoum to study. Now, through NCA's funding, he is able to devote all his time to studying at the College of Technological Science. Upon graduation, he will be one of the 0.3% of the Southerners graduating from the College. He hopes to find a job, preferably in Southern Sudan.

There are many Southerners like John. NCA, for instance, supports about 7% of the Southern female students, who have entered Ahfad University. These women, who graduate in the fields of child development, organisational management, medicine, rural extension or family sciences, are likely to be female leaders of the South, comparable to the Arab women who graduate from this university. Similarly, the 250 students who graduate every year from the Centre of Remedial English and Sciences generally continue their studies at the Wau Health Training Institute, which is known for graduating the South's medical professionals.

Annex V

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