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**CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
THE UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN**

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Evaluation Report
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**The Socio-cultural Conditions of Relevance
to Development assistance**

**An evaluation of
their incorporation in Norwegian Development
assistance to Africa**

A report presented to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

by

Abdel Ghaffar Mohammed Ahmed
Salah El-Din El-Shazali Ibrahim
Eldar Bråten
Gunnar M. Sørbo

VOLUME ONE: MAIN REPORT

Ikke til hjemlån

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMREF	African Medical Research Foundation
BRALUP	Bureau of Resource Assessment and Land Use Planning
CBHC	Community Based Health Care
CBD	Community-Based Distributor
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CMED	Central Mechanical Engineering Department
CPHEP	Community Participation Health and Education Programme
CPO	Community Participation Officer
CSD	Child Survival and Development
DA	District Administrator
DANIDA	Danish Aid Agency
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DC	District Commissioner
DCDO	District Community Development Officer
DDC	District Development Committee
DDF	District Development Fund
DEC	District Executive Committee
DHEO	District Health Environmental Officer
DHSA	District Health Services Administrator
DHT	District Health Team
DMO	District Medical Officer
DNO	District Nursing Officer
DVDC	Divisional Development Committee
EEC	European Economic Community
EO	Executive Officer
EPI	Expanded Programme on Immunisation
FHP	Family Health Project

FINIDA	Finnish Development Agency
FP	Family Planning
GMA	Game Management Area
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
IADP	Integrated Agricultural Development Programme
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IRA	Institute of Resource Assessment
IRDP	Integrated Rural Development Programme
IRDPS	Integrated Rural Development Projects
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
IRT	Improvement of Rural Transport
IRWSS	Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KON	Kingdom of Norway
KRDP	Kigoma Integrated Rural Development Project
KWAHO	Kenya Water for Health Organization
LDC	Locational Development Committee
LGMA	Lupande Game Management Area
LGPO	Local Government Promotion Officer
LIR	Labour Intensive Roadworks
LIRDP	Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Programme
LUP	Land Use Planning
MCCD	Ministry of Cooperative and Community Development
MCDWA	Ministry of Community Development and Women's Affairs
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MDC	Ministry of Development Cooperation
MEWRD	Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Development

MFEPD	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
MLARS	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Settlement
MLGRUD	Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOPW	Ministry of Public Works
MOTC	Ministry of Transport and Communications
MOW	Ministry of Works
MOWD	Ministry of Water Development
MRP	Minor Roads Programme
mt	my translation
n.d.	no date
NAC	National Action Committee
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NCDP	National Commission for Development Planning
NCU	National Coordination Unit
NFF	Norwegian Football Association
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIF	Norwegian Confederation of Sports
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for International Development
NORAD	Norwegian Development Agency
NORAD	Norwegian International Development Agency
NPWS	National Parks and Wildlife Services
NSC	Norwegian Sports Confederation
NWMP	National Water Master Plan
O & M	Operation and Maintenance
ODA	Overseas Development Administration (UK)
ODA	Overseas Development Agency
OPD	Out-Patient Department

ORS Oral Rehydration Solution
ORT Oral Rehydration Therapy
PD Project Document
PHC Primary Health Care
PMD Provincial Medical Director
PNO Provincial Nursing Officer
PPU Provincial Planning Unit
PSIP Public Sector Investment Programme
PWO Provincial Water Officer
RARP Rural Access Road Programme
RC Regional Commissionair
RDD Regional Development Director
READ Regional Economic Department
RHC Rural Health Centre
RIDEP Regional Integrated Development Plan
RRR Rehabilitation of Regional Road
RUDEP Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme
SAD Sports Association of Disabled
SCF Save the Children Fund
SD Styredokument
Board Document
SEO Senior Executive Officer
SIDA Swedish Development Agency
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
SIDO Small Industries Development Organization
SLDC Sub-Locational Development Committee
SLNP South Luangwa National Park
SPB Special Projects Branch

STD	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
SUDECO	Sumbawanga Development Cooperation
SW&S	Water Supply and Sanitation
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendants
TM	Traditional Midwife
TOR	Terms of Reference
TU	Technology Unit
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIP	United National Independence Party
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UWT	Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania
VAP	Village Agricultural Programme
VC	Village Council
VCW	Village Community Worker
VHW	Village Health Worker
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
VIP	Ventilated Improved Privy
VIS	Village Industry Service
VPC	Village Productivity Committees
VWA	Village Water Attendant
VWC	Village Water Committee
VWF	Village Water Fund
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WAZAZI	Jumuia ya Wazazi Tanzania
WCC	Ward Community Coordinator
WHT	Ward Health Team
WID	Women In Development

WP Water Point
WPC Water Point Committee
WWF World Wildlife Fund
ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Unition (Patriotic Front)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

Since its inception, Norwegian development assistance (NDA) has been guided by a cardinal policy objective that it should be recipient-oriented and poverty-focussed. Over the years, new NDA objectives and policy concerns were added. These include the women-in-development (WID) orientation, the focus on the environment, the concern with sustainability, the search to promote self-reliance and the ideal of community participation. One of these relatively new NDA policy concerns is the incorporation of the **socio-cultural conditions (SCC)** of the target populations into NDA-funded programmes and projects.

The concern with SCC was formally stipulated in a separate chapter in the White Paper on Norwegian Development Assistance (No. 36, 1984/85). There it is envisaged that the **cultural dimension** is to be at the core of a development strategy with self-reliance as an objective, and that the Norwegian Government will put more emphasis on the cultural dimension in all its development activities.

The interest in the issue of incorporating SCC is largely a manifestation of a growing awareness among development assistance organizations worldwide that assisted development interventions have not been sufficiently responsive to the conditions of the target populations. This raised a question of whether the development assistance process has given sufficient attention to the "*basic socio-cultural premises*" of target populations. In the absence of a clear concept of SCC and how they might be better incorporated, a major task was to clarify the type of knowledge regarding SCC which needs to be acquired, how it can be acquired within a reasonable time, and how it can be communicated in usable form to decision-makers and other users in order to accommodate the cultural dimension in development assistance.

In the spring of 1987, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation commissioned a study on the issue of incorporation of SCC into NDA, which resulted in Klausen's (1987) Preliminary Report. The report expressed a view that NDA does not, in practice, conform to the desired extent to the objective of incorporating SCC. The reasons are partly related to the organizational structures of the development agencies themselves, in both donor and recipient countries. Achievement of involvement by target populations therefore requires reconsideration of the organizational, professional and politico-ideological conditions at interplay in the development assistance process. In order to obtain the necessary information, the report recommended two models (monograph and value-circulation analysis).

The present evaluation study was commissioned on the basis of the Klausen Report. The final terms of reference stipulate an evaluation of the degree of incorporation of socio-cultural conditions in NDA, and require the evaluation team to undertake, *inter alia*, the following main tasks;

1. To supplement, and if necessary correct the impressions and conclusions presented in the preliminary report as regards the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance;

2. Based on a study of how specific projects in Africa have developed over time, collect data which can be used to suggest improvements in the methods employed for preliminary studies which focus on the socio-cultural conditions of the target groups;
3. Based on the above study, expose the consequences for projects when the socio-cultural aspects have been/have not been given proper consideration, and;
4. Based on the above - and on a review of the problems discussed in the preliminary report - help to improve the general planning, implementation and evaluation of development assistance activities.

The evaluation study initially selected six programmes/projects in four African countries. Subsequently due to a request by NORAD Country Office in Harare and a search for in-country comparisons in Kenya, two other projects were added. The selected cases are;

1. Rural Access Roads (RARP), Kenya;
2. Kwale Water and Sanitation Project, Kenya;
3. Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme (RUDEP), Tanzania;
4. Sports For All Project, Tanzania;
5. Village Agricultural Programme (VAP), Zambia;
6. Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRD), Zambia;
7. Family Health Project (FHP), Zimbabwe, and;
8. Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (IRWSS), Zimbabwe.

Defining Socio-Cultural Conditions

NORAD and Ministry officials generally tend to define "culture" as a sector of society dealing with expressive activities of various kinds. This definition is reinforced by current practice in NORAD, where an specialized (sectoral) office is assigned responsibility for "cultural development assistance projects" (e.g. museums, restoration of antiquities and collection of oral traditions). Another definition, adopted in the Klausen report views culture in terms of cognitive processes relating to ideas, values and norms. Such narrow definitions of culture may be useful for certain purposes, but are largely irrelevant to the objective of incorporating SCC into NDA. To achieve its objective, NORAD should adopt a sufficiently wide concept that renders possible

- conceiving culture as an aspect of all activities in a society rather than a specific set of activities;
- incorporating as component the material, non-cognitive constraints which individuals and groups encounter in realizing their ideas, values and norms, inclusive of constraints imposed by larger politico-administrative and economic systems;
- accommodating significant differences in the ideas, values and norms embraced by different categories of the same population (e.g. men Vs women);

- recognizing social change and as such projecting SCC as varied processes that are changing over time.

A recommended definition satisfying the above requirements conceptualizes SCC as:

sets of dynamic ideas, values and norms that a group of people embraces, and the way these sets are realised in the context of constraints the group encounters.

Socio-cultural conditions thus do not consist only of cognitive phenomena comprising beliefs, values and norms. They also encompass the social relations and organization; patterns of resource allocation and utilization; and the forms and techniques of production, inclusive of indigenous technical and environmental knowledge. In short, SCC are **on-going processes; they are varied, complex, under constant change and only partially determined by local factors.** Hence the incorporation of SCC requires participatory approaches and flexible planning and implementation models.

Conceiving of SCC in terms narrower than proposed above would most likely result in simplifications and even misinterpretations of people's conditions. But while it is recommended that NORAD should strive to think in terms of this complex definition, narrower and more focussed conceptions of SCC are needed in practical development work. This report is intended to provide a discussion and some recommendations about how one can fruitfully work in terms of a concern for SCC in NDA.

SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS

The evaluation study indicates that the reviewed projects have either grossly overlooked, or only partially incorporated, SCC in their planning, implementation and subsequent re-direction. RUDEP, and to a lesser extent VAP, scored highest in the degree of their incorporation of SCC. This is no doubt partly due to the distinctive contribution of social scientists to their planning and implementation. Besides benefiting from the a relatively systematic pre-study, RUDEP has had a social anthropologist in the position of Programme Coordinator, while VAP had a social anthropologist acting as advisor to the Coordinator. In neither case, however, was the anthropological expertise fully utilized in the generation of information on SCC. The RUDEP coordinator was constrained by managerial tasks while the VAP anthropologist was constrained by the role envisaged for him by NORAD.

The better performance of RUDEP is also, perhaps largely, attributed to its distinctive participatory philosophy, which has the greatest potential for a higher degree for incorporation of SCC into NDA. All the other projects are based on the **delivery model**, typically with rigidly pre-set resource allocation, financial targets and implementation phases. Within such a planning framework, concern is mainly with resources and infrastructure, and members of the target population are accorded a minimal, if any, role in planning, decision-making and implementation processes. In contrast to this, RUDEP

is based on a processual, learning model. It is based on an annual cycle within a three year rolling framework, which constitutes an in-built flexible mechanism whereby community participation and other objectives could be easily integrated at a later stage even when no account of them was taken at project conception. Though this study considers the baseline information made available during the planning of RUDEP as insufficient (though better than in any other project), the processual planning model facilitated the incorporation of SCC in the course of monitoring.

The Status of Information on SCC

In the assessment of information on SCC, it is important to note a distinction, by no means dichotomous, between two types of information. The first is **baseline information** on the local communities, including its **preconditions** for the development efforts. The second relates to the perceived or actual **consequences**, positive or negative, a project may have on a target population. Such information concerns the impact of a project, and serves to provide guidelines as to the need to consolidate, or mitigate, certain of the project consequences in order to bring them into line with overall development policy objectives. Both types of information are indispensable for the initial planning and subsequent re-direction of projects. **The incorporation of SCC into Norwegian development assistance would, however, be promoted when baseline information is requested, retrieved and utilized in planning processes.** The assessment of the quality of information pursued in the evaluation study is based on this criterion.

In the cases of RARP, Sports for All and LIRD, virtually no information on local SCC was made available in the decision making processes, although more information was requested. In the specific case of RARP, however, even if the information requested was made available, the result would have not been radically different: the type of requested information related exclusively to a consequence or impact analysis reflecting concerns about perceived undesirable effects the programme might have. Had the information requested in LIRD been made available, however, a considerable difference in project planning would have been noticed. This should be so because most of the questions raised concerned the socio-cultural preconditions (e.g. division of labour, position of women, socio-economic adaptations). This seems a significant difference in the way NORAD personnel have come to pose questions regarding local conditions. Simultaneously it indicates an improvement in assessment procedures within NORAD, taking into consideration that RARP planning was undertaken in the mid-1970's while LIRD is a relatively new programme whose final negotiations took place in 1989.

In RUDEP and VAP some information was made available, though differences in both scope and quality are noted between the two projects. The decision-makers in the planning of RUDEP were better placed than those in the other projects. The planning of RUDEP was preceded by a relatively comprehensive survey undertaken by a local Tanzanian research institution, BRALUP (now IRA), as well as other studies. Though no pre-study was undertaken in the case of VAP, decision-makers also had access to relatively considerable information on local SCC, but little information actually related to **preconditions**. The work of the social anthropologist in VAP was particularly instrumental in

providing information on the local conditions, and some of the findings were internalized in due course into the planning process.

The specific items of information on local SCC requested by the NDA officials were rather restricted and mainly related to i) economic issues, and ii) the social situation of women. It seems not unwarranted to conclude that few, if any, attempts were made to understand the local political situation and other aspects of the local organisation outside the field of gender differences. In none of the projects was information requested on local perceptions, aspirations and/or anxieties over how identity might be retained under conditions of rapid change partly initiated by the development process itself.

Constraints on Collection of Information on SCC

The review of projects indicates that NDA personnel were generally aware of the significance of information on local SCC to planning processes. General or focussed studies of a social anthropological nature were requested in all projects, but in none was the requested study carried out before the ratification of agreement. What seems striking is that while in the planning processes of the reviewed projects there was actually ample time (up to four years) to conduct socio-cultural baseline studies, no study materialized. The reasons for this are varied, complex and hardly susceptible to cross-project generalization. But it seems that while NORAD lacks bureaucratic routines which ensure the initiation of baseline studies, partner countries demonstrate a degree of reluctance to initiate pre-studies so as not to expose certain latent objectives that may contradict some NDA policy objectives and concerns. Likewise, there seems to be a general lack within NORAD of routines whereby already existing material could be retrieved and utilized in the process. The volume of such material in various local academic and research institutions as well as government archives is almost invariably considerable. In all projects the discrepancy between existing and retrieved information seems massive. Simultaneously, however, it only takes engagement of a research student or junior researcher to retrieve that material. This is one area in which improvement in data collection may readily be achieved.

The review also indicated prevalence of other, project-specific constraints on data collection that include;

- **Multi-donor contexts** (e.g. RARP) may establish formal operational frameworks that severely restrict capacity to request information not regarded essential by the majority of donors;
- **Economy considerations** may prompt NDA organizations to await the results of on-going studies commissioned by others rather than commit NDA funds to initiate independent studies. Promised studies may not materialize in good time to be utilized in planning prior to signing of agreements (e.g. World Bank Impact Study of RARP);

- Lack of clear commitment to a project (e.g. LIRD) may prompt NDA personnel to disregard initiation of pre-studies in an attempt to avert commitment to follow-up and implement recommendations;
- Limited role envisaged for social scientist (e.g. VAP) whereby NDA organizations constrain the potential scope of input by social scientists. Rather than engaging in intensive studies to feed the planning process, the VAP social anthropologist seem to have found himself a "hostage" of the VAP management;
- Pressure by country offices to speed up processing to sign agreements and commence implementation on the assumption that monitoring might be a viable alternative to pre-studies.

Utilization of Available Information on SCC

The project histories indicate that the scanty material on SCC actually gathered in the process, was seldom utilized in planning and decision-making. The integration of information on SCC into the bureaucratic process (internal discussions, explicit demands in relation to recipient governments etc.) was mainly successful when the information related directly to Norwegian policies and concerns or to topics specifically asked for by a certain actor(s) in the process. Under-utilization of available information may be explained by one or a combination of probable factors:

- Some projects are predominantly technical in nature, and information on SCC was therefore assumed "not immediately relevant" for planning purposes;
- There is often a belief embraced by NDA personnel to the effect that correct internal processing of project plans renders redundant an analysis of the socio-economic conditions for development. In effect, socio-cultural conditions that are necessary for a project are assumed to be existent when in fact they might not be present at all.
- With the progress in project planning processes, and more often than not as a project assessment is submitted, the focus of attention of NDA personnel tended to shift from concerns with information on the local situation to organizational and technical issues;
- In at least one project, RUDEP, the planning process is envisaged to accommodate SCC through the direct involvement of the beneficiaries, who are conceived as active in identifying needs, formulating plans and implementing projects on the basis of their own socio-cultural preconditions. In such a case, efforts to collect and utilize information at the higher levels of NDA hierarchy may be regarded superfluous;
- Though a project is known to affect directly the socio-cultural conditions of the target population (e.g. VAP), the provided information may not be internalized in planning processes as it is judged unusable.

The last factor, usability of information, has two aspects. The first concerns the quality and relevance of information made available in planning and re-directing the reviewed projects. Much of the information was impressionistic and unsystematic, emanating largely from reports on brief field visits. The survey of Rukwa undertaken by IRA is perhaps the most systematic report, but it lacked the rigour and intensity of anthropological techniques. Other studies undertaken by social scientists either did not materialize (e.g. LIRDP) or were of such a low quality that the impressions contained in them could not constitute a guide for decision-making or action. This has to do with the credentials and calibre of the contracted researcher and the procedures adopted by NDA organizations to ensure delivery, quality and relevance of social science input. The second, and perhaps more important aspect concerns the **intelligibility** of information to NDA personnel, particularly the sectoral professionals.

The limited information on SCC requested, provided and utilized in project planning and decision-making processes corroborates a conclusion that **within NORAD and Ministry**, there seems to be a serious problem of cross-cultural translation. Put simply, it is a problem of understanding and evaluating socio-cultural phenomena in target communities, not in terms of Norwegian and/or Western standards, but in the terms upheld by these communities. In other words, while NDA officials seem to have a genuine feeling that knowledge about local socio-cultural conditions is of importance for development planning, their understanding of the realities underlying these conditions seems quite limited. They almost invariably tend to request and utilize information of a *readily comprehensible nature*, or of the type which would "make sense" in a Norwegian and/or Western socio-cultural context. This implies that NDA officials tend to disregard the fact that non-Western ways of thinking and living are *real*, and tend to think of other people as "*basically Westerners*", denied of the benefits of modern scientific thinking by embracing inexorable, seemingly superstitious "traditions". Unfamiliar ideas and practices, such as witchcraft and sorcery, were most likely regarded as exotic and somehow irrelevant aspects of local culture. The officials were interested largely in issues relating to NDA policy objectives and concerns; and their questions were confined to issues such as the "position of women" in the local communities. By so doing, however, the NDA officials simultaneously demonstrated an inability to comprehend the "*otherness*" of the information they were actually requesting.

Operationalization of NDA Policy Objectives

Operationalization of NDA policy objectives and concerns entails a process whereby abstract ideas conceived and adopted in a Norwegian/Western socio-cultural context are *translated* into concrete and practical measures commensurate with ideas embraced in other, often radically different socio-cultural settings in partner countries. The review of projects, however, suggests that in many instances NDA policy objectives and concerns tended to be conceptualized either in terms of a Norwegian context or in a socio-economic and historical vacuum. Policy objectives and concerns were seldom operationalized so as to confront differing concrete realities.

The inability to undertake context-specific operationalization of NDA policy objectives and concerns has resulted in a situation in which **policy issues tended to remain a purely bureaucratic exercise**. The immediate objective of the assessment and processing of project proposals was mere formal **adoption** of (or reference to) policy issues in project designs and agreements. As policy formulations remained extremely general and mostly unrelated to the specific conditions they were to confront in project implementation, the whole exercise attained a ceremonial character. This is clearly manifested in the tendency by NDA personnel to *affix policy formulations* rather than *integrate policy perspectives* into project documents and agreements. Thus while scrutinization tended to place pressure on planners in recipient countries to include phrases about women's roles and local participation in designs and formal agreements, the discrepancy between the letter of the agreement and the reality of the context remained conspicuous.

Operationalization of the WID-orientation is a good case in point. In none of the reviewed projects was the WID-orientation based on an understanding of the actual situation of women in the societies concerned. NDA personnel tended to overlook the different constraints facing implementation of their concept of women's participation. These constraints relate to prevalent forms of division of labour among the sexes, systems of property rights and inheritance, women's general work-load, access to informal political systems, and an array of other questions relating to how women are in fact valued in their various roles in the target communities. **The manner in which the WID-orientation is implemented tended to result in securing formal access by women to certain of the project components.** Such formal access, however, did not seem to benefit women, address their real needs or promote their cause. However, the interviews with NORAD and Ministry staff corroborate awareness in some circles that "*gender roles*" rather than "*position of women*" ought to be the focus of concern for NDA policy. This awareness does not merely signify a change in terminology; it also opens new horizons for a more context-based operationalization of NDA policy concerns.

The Significance of SCC

The case for incorporating SCC into development planning processes rests with considerations of relevance, acceptability, sustainability as well as replicability of projects. Development interventions stand the best chance of success when tailored to the specific experiences, potentialities and constraints of those they are intended to benefit. Needless to point out, the basic assumption of a development project is that certain interventions will produce changes which will somehow bring forth improvements or solve what is seen as problems, e.g. low productivity, low standard of living or poor infrastructure. It follows that the implementation of a project may be regarded as a testing of hypotheses concerning the relationship between means and ends. A sensible planner should thus seek information pertaining to the most important conditions that may affect the realization of objectives. But while it will never be possible to fully anticipate or predict the outcomes of alternative interventions, a good planner will always try to reduce the margin of error by having as much relevant information as possible made available to him/her before deciding on any intervention. **In the reviewed projects, however, planners failed to seek and/or utilize sufficient information on the socio-cultural conditions of the target populations.**

Evidently, the need for information on SCC varies with different projects. The kind of information needed for building a road (RARP) is not the same as that for digging a well (RUDEP; IRWSS), introducing income-generating activities for women (VAP), teaching a new sport or running a health campaign (FHP). One common requirement, however, is that the design and management of new development cannot be pursued in a socio-economic or historical vacuum; **planning and implementation processes must be carried out with a clear concept of pre-existing potentialities and constraints at different levels.** This common requirement is satisfied by generation of **baseline information** exposing the salient features of the basic socio-economic institutions and processes as well as the politico-administrative set up at the different levels relating to the proposed project. On the basis of baseline studies, more focussed information of immediate or direct relevance to the project may be sought. **Monitoring**, the assessment of progress as well as impact of projects, is another common requirement, though its scope varies considerably with the scale and time horizon of interventions.

Information on Local SCC

Baseline information should not be considered exclusive to the community of the target population. Information on local SCC is of course important and its inclusion or disregard may have serious consequences for project implementation and subsequent operation and maintenance. Incorporation of socio-cultural conditions promotes project implementation and sustainability. In the particular case of VAP, information (incidentally?) provided by the VAP sociologist on the local land tenure system (that land use establishes undisputed title) spared NDA organizations the relatively considerable costs of a planned survey. In Zimbabwe's Family Health Project, awareness of the latent functions of the traditional birth-attendants (soliciting confessions in cases of pre-marital pregnancy) drew attention to the social need to recruit local women for training.

The disregard of local SCC may compromise the relevance of projects and threaten their sustainability. In all the reviewed projects the adverse implications are clear. RUDEP's water component is typical in this respect. Firstly, project personnel disregarded, presumably on economic and technical grounds, advice by local people, based on indigeneous technical knowledge, regarding siting of construction of water catchment area. As problems with the selected site became evident, the local people generally refrained from carrying out maintenance of the catchment area which they knew was not suitable. The long term sustainability of the project was thereby questioned. Secondly, it was *a priori* assumed that the water programme would encourage women to use more water and thereby improve sanitary conditions. Subsequent to implementation, however, it became clear that women **did not** use more water; they started instead to rely on children to bring the same volume of water as before, but in smaller quantities and more frequently. The whole objective of the intervention was thus defeated simply because it was not preceded by a study of existing and potential needs and patterns of water use in the local community.

Information on Extra-Local SCC

There is a general tendency to discuss the socio-cultural dimension only in terms of "what we need to know about local communities and populations". Development, however, should be viewed as consisting of several social magnitudes rather than of particular projects in particular places, affecting particular populations and regions. Development assistance programmes are implemented in contexts of larger cultural, socio-economic and politico-administrative settings affecting the realization of goals. Analysis and understanding of these extra-local SCC, their potentials and constraints, are indispensable for NDA personnel. In none of the reviewed projects has planning processes been based on a clear understanding of these extra-local conditions.

Many different, often conflicting, motives and values are operative in the development assistance process, but tend to be ignored in project documents because they are difficult to handle. In all four countries where the reviewed projects are located, "nation building" efforts are underway, but it is obvious that the approach underlying these efforts differs from one country to another. Such differences have significant implications to both conception and implementation of development interventions. Likewise there are significant differences in the response by the population to the nation building efforts. In many African countries, the hopeful phase of nation building has been seriously questioned, imperiled and even reversed by eruption of ethnic conflicts. Ethnic identity and affiliation are in many instances overriding other social cleavages and challenging the primacy of social class and the nation-state for purposes of mobilization for socio-political action.

Furthermore, though the political and bureaucratic elite vary greatly in social background and ideology, they seldom come from the poorest strata of society. Recruited by patronage, or from an educational system which itself reflects elitist values, the elites are rarely eager for measures which would entail redistribution of wealth or any threat to their own status or prospects. A conspicuous cleavage thus often persists between the ideals of the different categories of elite (who by no means constitute a homogenous, monolithic group) and those of the general population. Norwegian development assistance takes place in countries fraught with many such problems and conflicts, and there is, therefore, a need to be particularly sensitive to and knowledgeable about such extra-local issues in order to operate the aid programmes. Such knowledge serves to define what is feasible and/or possible for NDA to achieve through its interventions.

LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main lessons derived from the evaluation study with respect to the question of incorporation of SCC into NDA are:

- Projects stand the best chance of success if they are tailored to the experiences and constraints of those they intended to assist. They will always be implemented in specific socio-cultural contexts which will affect the realization of objectives. It

follows that the socio-cultural dimension must always be taken into account when planning and implementing development assistance programmes. **Baseline studies** are consequently indispensable in planning processes.

- **Need for monitoring:** Social and cultural investigations can never provide a blueprint for development. But since such studies can discover the unintended consequences of interventions, it follows that they also have an important role in monitoring development projects.
- Monitoring research should be connected to projects as a technique necessary for formulation of adequate inputs which can reverse undesirable trends. This presupposes the adoption of flexible and participatory, processual/learning planning models;
- Need for knowledge must be matched by the capacity to use knowledge at the different levels of NDA organizations, recipient government planners and target populations.
- The socio-cultural dimension of relevance to development assistance operates on different, local and extra-local levels. The politico-administrative set-up in partner countries is one extra-local which posits need for knowledge.
- The question of incorporating SCC into NDA is relevant to all types of NDA interventions and not only to a special category of projects. It follows that no simple handbook can be compiled to handle the task. Of the requirements for the promotion of SCC into NDA are;
 - (a) Capacity strengthening within NORAD in both Oslo and representations and;
 - (b) Capacity building and strengthening in recipient countries, particularly in relation to improved planning procedures and capacity of people to participate effectively in decision-making and implementation processes.
- Persistence by NDA personnel on pursuance of NDA policy concerns (e.g. WID orientation of projects) almost invariably prompts positive, if only formalistic, response by recipient governments;
- Unless operationalization of NDA policy objectives is pursued in terms of the particular circumstances in recipient countries, policy issues raised in agreements would remain divorced from the realities of projects;
- Officials in partner countries have acquired competence in the language of NDA organizations. The stated objectives contained in project submissions are tailored to enhance acceptability and funding possibilities; the real, unstated objectives may be geared to fulfillment of other priorities.

On the basis of the findings and lessons, detailed recommendations for future improvements at the different levels of the development assistance processes have been formulated in the Main Report. The general focus of the recommendations concerns the following;

Social Science Input

Knowledge produced by social scientists has an important role in identifying key entry points for interventions. But assumption of such a role can only be attained when social science input is geared towards elucidation of interrelationships between (a) interventions and (b) the behaviour of social systems subject to the control of human beings. A common problem is either that studies are being too narrowly conceived in relation to the objectives of projects and the complex of relationships within which they function, or that they tend to be descriptive, listing characteristics and traits of social systems without relating them to the conditions under which they are produced, maintained or changed. The result is that many studies are of limited use to the consumers to whom they are supposedly targeted.

In the process of development assistance, as in project planning, usually an interval of years elapses in the course of negotiations between donor and recipient governments. This interval provides more than sufficient time to complete baseline studies. NDA organizations may allocate funds for such research to be carried out through collaboration between Norwegian and national institutions. Such allocations simultaneously contribute to human resource development by building capacity and competence in local academic and research institutions. Close association between such institutions and NDA supported projects facilitates subsequent monitoring by cultivating local expertise on projects.

Where the option of allocation of funds for longitudinal studies is not feasible, or when time becomes a critical constraint, an alternative can be sought in "instant anthropology".

Guidelines for the satisfaction of the research requirements are provided in Chapter Four of the Main Report.

Differential Research Requirements

The research requirements vary with the nature, scope of activities and time horizon of projects. In the short-term, small scale projects an intensive baseline study prior to the inception of intervention may be the most important requirement to be followed up by periodic evaluations. External consultants, or senior social scientists to be recruited to NORAD's Country Offices may undertake such relatively small research requirements.

In the case of large scale, long term programmes, the research requirements are greater. Both intensive baseline studies and diligent monitoring are essential. To satisfy such a considerable requirement, it is recommended that small socio-cultural research units be created as part of project organization and attached to management.

Capability to Utilize Information by NDA Personnel

In order to enhance the capability of NDA personnel to utilize information on SCC, the sharp differentiation between the roles of researcher, planner and administrator should be reconsidered. This differentiation currently separates knowledge from decision-making from action. Unless planners are aware of their own information needs, researchers may not be well placed to undertake their tasks. Likewise if decision-makers and project administrators lack capacity to undertake cross-cultural translation, utilization of information presented by social scientists would be deficient. To enhance this capability it is recommended that;

- NORAD and Ministry personnel, particularly the sectoral professionals, should be sufficiently sensitized to the need for and requirements of incorporation of SCC into NDA. This may be pursued through a reconsideration of initial orientation and subsequent in-service training programmes currently adopted.
- NORAD and Ministry should undertake an inventory of the expertise in social science among their staff and assess the degree into which it is utilized in a (social science) professional capacity. The social science expertise encountered in the reviewed projects seems to be under-utilized as staff are primarily assigned bureaucratic tasks;
- The posting policies of NORAD may need reconsideration in order to cultivate expertise on the political culture and other socio-cultural conditions in partner countries. Such a course should avail fuller awareness of the realities in partner countries and the horizons of potentials and constraints for NDA interventions.
- The institutional memory within NORAD and Ministry is one sphere for future improvements. Archiving procedures need to be further improved, and across-country and across-project dialogue should be promoted, and successful experiences should be widely disseminated.

Capacity Building in Partner Countries

For development interventions to be successful, they must generally work out models responsive to beneficiary needs at a particular time and place and build a strong organization capable of subsequent operation and maintenance. In most partner countries the administrative capacity remains limited, and an approach to human resource development becomes essential.

It is also important to build up the ability of local populations to participate in decision-making and implementation processes. Particularly in contexts of absence of substantive democratization processes, a positive link between development assistance and human rights becomes both desirable and necessary. In the pursuit of planned development the rich repertoire of indigenous social organization and technical knowledge seem to be marginalized in the name of progress. This not only stifles opportunities for a better

incorporation of SCC into NDA, but also denies the target populations from fully benefiting from the developmental interventions.

INTRODUCTION

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0. Introduction

0.1. Background and terms of Reference:

In December 1988, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation (MDC) forwarded to the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University of Bergen, a request to undertake an "Evaluation of the Socio-Cultural Conditions of Relevance to Development Assistance". The main objectives of the evaluation as expressed in the forwarded Terms of Reference (TOR) are to identify the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance in 10-12 specific projects in Africa and Asia; to assess the degree of incorporation of these conditions in the projects studied; and to suggest improvements in the processes of planning, implementation and evaluation of development assistance activities so that a higher degree of incorporation of these conditions could be achieved. These TOR were thoroughly discussed by representatives of the CDS and the Evaluation Unit in the MDC before the CDS accepted to undertake the evaluation. Both CDS and the Evaluation Unit agreed to limit the study to Norwegian partner countries in Africa and to choose six projects for that purpose.

The proposed team leader made a familiarization visit to NORAD missions and some Norwegian development assistance projects in four countries in Eastern and Southern Africa before delivering an inception report for the study. On the inception report delivery (in April 1989) its objectives were to present an interpretation of the TOR, and explain and expose some conceptual and methodological considerations to be adopted for the socio-cultural conditions in Norwegian development assistance projects in Africa. The comments on the TOR were considered as amendments and were addressed to the conceptual framework and focus of the study. It was also emphasized that the study shall provide the MDC with guidelines that may help to ensure the integration of the socio-cultural conditions in the development process rather than provide a manual. It is believed that a provision of a manual is not possible since different cultural contexts of each project determine the kind of emphasis needed under its given circumstances.

The inception report also identified the criteria for the selection of the projects to be studied. It suggested that the following four criteria should guide this selection:

- i. The six projects should be chosen in order to provide sufficient variation regarding the type of project activity, form of administration, form of technology employed, category of target population involved, as well as the project history. This range of variation is necessary to ensure a fruitful comparison between the different projects, i.e. it provides the opportunity to compare different variables deemed to be important for the position of the socio-cultural conditions.
- ii. With a limited number of cases, however, it is also important that the differences between the cases are not too large, a fact which may threaten the feasibility of the evaluation and background study. However, the choice was made to ensure that some of the projects are having an impact on both

rural and urban communities and hence the impact of development assistance on the wide society can be assessed.

- iii. The study is intended to be prospective and the focus is on how one can learn from previous experiences. This led to the selection of projects with a long history, as well as projects in their starting phase.
- iv. Some of the projects selected have used sociological and anthropological expertise to a great extent, while others have made no or little use of such expertise. This is a very important variable for the present study as one of our aims is to evaluate the usefulness of such expertise.

On the bases of these criterion six projects within four countries form the Norwegian partners in Eastern and Southern Africa were selected. They were:

A) Kenya:

1) Rural Access Road Programme

B) Tanzania:

2) Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme

3) Sports for All

C) Zambia:

4) Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project

5) Village Agricultural Programme

D) Zimbabwe:

6) Family Health Programme

0.2. Team selection and the study Method:

Using his professional contacts and guided by the results of his familiarization visit mentioned above the team leader selected an all African team for the country studies. A core team consisting of three members in addition to the team leader, whose task is the coordination, sensitization and integration of the research results in all the different phases of the study was selected. The team leader and the assistant team leader (who are member of this core team) had the responsibility for the coordination of the fieldwork in the different selected countries. Two member of the team who are Norwegians, in addition to their professional input in the area of development studies, gave the team the necessary

insight for understanding the principles, policies and objectives informing the Norwegian development assistance.

The study was carried out in three phases of field studies and workshops followed by a fourth phase being the writing of the main report. The phases can be divided as follows:

Phase One: the team leader and assistant team leader visited the selected countries during the period July 2 - August 10, 1989 where they held a three-days workshop with the national team members in each country. These workshops were also attended by the relevant NORAD project officers or those who represented them. They discussed the TOR with special attention paid to their focus, the method and the duration of field studies and the report format. In all four workshops it was agreed that a review of the literature, guided interviews and, where and when possible, participant observations should be followed in order to obtain the qualitative data called for by the nature of the topic to be studied. All the minutes of the workshops were communicated to the Evaluation unit in the MDC in Oslo for comments; and immediate response was received. After the workshops the team leader and assistant team leader joined the country teams in their preliminary field visits to the selected projects. It is important to note that in two countries the team members, seeking to maintain a high standard of comparability between projects in one country or between countries, volunteered an addition of one project. The end result was the study being carried in eight projects instead of six (two in each country).

While the country teams went on doing their fieldwork and compiling their reports the team leader and the assistant leader devoted time to the study of the projects' and other documents which they collected during their country visits (their base being Khartoum). In Norway one of the team members went through the documents in NORAD offices in Oslo and did an intensive review and evaluation of basic project documents, project reviews, evaluation reports as well as correspondence related to the projects selected for the study.

In October 1989 the team leader visited the CDS and the evaluation unit in the MDC in Oslo and had discussions on the progress of the evaluation study.

Phase Two: A workshop bringing together the teams from the different countries, the core team and representative from the NORAD representations in the countries studied was held in Nairobi during the period November 27 - December 2, 1989. This workshop discussed the findings and recommendations, and deliberated the conclusion of the country reports. A draft of the report on the review of the literature conducted in Oslo was also presented and its findings were related to the country studies.

Phase Three: The team leader and assistant team leader visited the CDS in Bergen and NORAD offices in Oslo during the period January 12-22, 1990. They had discussions with the other two members of the core team on the results of the revised final drafts of the country reports received after the incorporation of the

issues raised by the comments during the Nairobi workshop. Three of the core team members had the opportunity, during this period, to carry out intensive guided interviews with leading officials in NORAD and the ministry of Foreign Affairs. These interviews were focused on the principles, policies and objectives informing Norwegian development assistance in general and those which pertain to the selected projects in particular. Some individuals, who were at one point in time posted to some of the projects studied but are no longer with NORAD, were also interviewed. Two members who contributed to the 1987 preliminary study commissioned by the MDC on the same topic were also interviewed. The end result of these interviews proved to be very helpful to the team in understanding some aspects of the process of policy formulation in NORAD and hence contributed to a better understanding of the findings of the country reports.

Phase Four: It is on the bases of the above phases, and through a careful coordinated analysis, by the core team members, of the material resulting from the country studies, reviews, reports, correspondence and other form of available literature on the topic that this main report is compiled.

0.3. The Structure and the content of the report:

The report is divided into two volumes. Volume one is the main report which contains the analysis and evaluation of the state of incorporation of the socio-cultural condition (SCC) in development assistance in four Norwegian partners' countries. It consists of four major chapters each of which addresses certain issue pertaining to the topic under discussion.

Chapter one presents and discusses basic concepts related to the socio-cultural conditions of relevance and debates the way in which they are incorporated in Norwegian development assistance. It looks into the different forms of cultures and sub-cultures of the donors and recipients and assesses the way in which they are articulated in the process of development. It also discusses the different approaches and delivery models used in extending development assistance to local communities in recipient countries and presents the model which the teams sees as the most appropriate for obtaining the relevant information on this topic.

Chapter two assesses the position of the socio-cultural dimension in project planning basing its discussion and analysis on a case study of four of the eight projects selected for the study. It argues that achievement of meaningful incorporation of the SCC into Norwegian development assistance (NDA) requires both access and use of extensive background information on local and extra-local levels in recipient countries. However, even with the availability of this information the assumption of its spontaneous utilization is unwarranted. The scope and quality of information, its utilization, the focus of attention and the constraints in its collection together with the nature and extent of compromise of objectives, principle and policy concerns are assessed. The operationalization of the Norwegian development policy objectives and the intelligibility of information on SCC are also discussed.

Chapter three draws attention to the practical and applied nature of this study. It explains that the task undertaken is not merely the evaluation of the degree of incorporation of local SCC into projects funded by NDA but also is to advise on ways and means by which the Ministry and NORAD could build competence and become able to incorporate such conditions more fully in the future. This incorporation is not a simple task of enumeration of types of SCC to be taken account of in formulating and implementing development assistance project, but also it is equally important to examine whether the principles of NDA themselves promote or impede such a process of incorporation. The chapter formulates a general synthesis of issues and lessons emerging from the evaluation. These lessons may guide future action in NDA projects in general and the studied projects in particular.

Chapter four emphasizes the fact that development assistance as a planned and organized intervention process involving donors and recipients whose cultural orientation may differ immensely is a problematic issue that requires different strategies and patterns of interaction. Cultural mediation in dynamic social systems which are subjected to local and extra-local interventions have to be approached carefully through the genuine understanding of the "otherness". More attention have to be accorded to SCC in any development assistance which is a normally a "well-meaning" intervention in the life of the others. The chapter addresses itself to the task of putting forward recommendation to improve on the NDA in the field of incorporation of SCC.

Volume two of this report contains five annexes. Four of these are the country studies which give detailed analysis of the projects selected for the evaluation together with the discussion of the reactions of the recipients to the principles and objectives of the NDA. The fifth annex documents, through an intensive literature review in both Oslo and the NORAD missions, how the issue of the incorporation of the SCC is dealt with. It also discusses and illustrates in detail the kind of difficulties encountered in obtaining information necessary for the understanding of the recipients' (country and/or local communities) viewpoint while simultaneously pursuing the NDA principles and objectives and abiding by current policies.

0.4. The Team Membership:

The following team members have contributed to the country studies and participated in the Nairobi workshop:

Prof. John Okumu (Kenya)
 Dr. Edda Wacheke Gachukia (Kenya)
 Dr. Ernest N. Maganya (Tanzania)
 Mrs. Rose Shayo (Tanzania)
 Dr. John T. Milimo (Zambia)
 Mrs. Robie Jean Siamwiza (Zambia)
 Dr. Nginya Mungai Lenneiye (Zimbabwe)
 Mrs. Daisy Stella Savanhu (Zimbabwe)

The following team members represent the core team which produced the main report in addition to the other tasks they had to undertake during the different phases of the study:

Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed (Team Leader)
Salah-el-Din el-Shazali Ibrahim (Assistant team Leader)
Gunnar M. Sørbø
Eldar Bråten

Finally it has to be stated that by narrating the history of this study we would like the reader to keep in mind that NORAD, for a long time, has had an interest in evaluating its own performance in relation to the socio-cultural condition issues, but sometime there might be a lag of time between thinking about things and doing them as will be clearly illustrated throughout this report.

1981-1982

1981-1982

CHAPTER ONE

ISSUES IN INCORPORATION OF SOCIO-CULTURAL CONDITIONS INTO NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1981-1982

1.1. BACKGROUND

1.1.1. Africa's current problems of underdevelopment must be solved if prospects of long term catastrophes for humanity at large are to be averted. The global environmental crisis, currently exacerbated as much by industrial pollution as by clearance of tropical forests, is one such prospective catastrophe. The problems of Africa's underdevelopment are soluble, but they can be solved neither by Africans alone, nor in a short term perspective (cf. Shepherd, 1985:46). Development assistance as an instrument has gained recognition by virtue of its prevalence, if not for its objectives as well. In recent years, however, increasing numbers of development assistance organizations have come to question the relevance of the programmes and projects they fund to the needs and interests of the intended target populations in recipient countries. This has resulted in the emergence of vague notions that the process of development assistance has perhaps given little or no sufficient consideration to the "*socio-cultural*" premises of the populations defined as the target of development assistance. The issue of the incorporation of the socio-cultural dimension into the development assistance process has thereby become a matter for some speculation by development assistance organisations. Very little is known about the requirements of that incorporation, and even less about the nature and scope of background information. What was urgently required was the clarification of what kind of knowledge that had to be acquired, how it could be acquired within a reasonable time, and how it could be communicated in usable form to decision-makers and other users.

1.1.2. The organisations of Norwegian development assistance (NDA), NORAD and the Ministry, were pioneering in the attempt to clarify the issues involved. The White Paper on Norwegian development assistance (No. 36, 1984-85) devoted a chapter to the cultural dimension of development aid (chapter 18). It is clearly stated that the cultural dimension is at the core of a development strategy with self-reliance as an objective, and that the Norwegian government will put more emphasis on the cultural dimension in all its development activities. In the spring of 1987, the Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation commissioned a preliminary study of these issues. The result was Klausen's (1987) preliminary report, *Sosio-kulturelle forhold i bistanden. Et bakgrunnsnotat og noen anbefalinger til Departementet for utviklingshjelp* (Socio-cultural Conditions of Relevance to Development Assistance. A Background Report and some Recommendations to the Ministry of development Cooperation).

1.1.3. Klausen expresses a view that Norwegian development assistance does not, in practice, conform to the desired extent with the principal NDA policy objectives. Some difficulties seem to face the fulfilment of the requirement that NDA should be responsive to the conditions of life of the target population, and for this it is recommended that the relevant target groups should become more actively involved in the development process. These difficulties, it is asserted, are partly related to the organizational structures of the development agencies themselves, both in donor and recipient countries. Achievement of involvement by target populations therefore requires reconsideration of the organizational, professional and politico-ideological conditions at interplay in the development assistance process. In order to obtain the necessary information, Klausen recommends two models (monograph and value-circulation analysis).

1.1.4. It is on the basis of Klausen's report that the present study was commissioned. The final terms of reference (Annex 6), stipulate an evaluation of the degree of incorporation of socio-cultural conditions in NDA, and require the evaluation team to undertake, *inter alia*, the following main tasks;

1. To supplement, and if necessary correct the impressions and conclusions presented in the preliminary report as regards the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance;
2. Based on a study of how specific projects in Africa have developed over time, collect data which can be used to suggest improvements in the methods employed for preliminary studies which focus on the socio-cultural conditions of the target groups, and;
3. Based on the above - and on a review of the problems discussed in the preliminary report - help to improve the general planning, implementation and evaluation of development assistance activities.

1.1.5. The objective of this Chapter is three-fold. The first is to fulfil the requirement concerning Klausen's preliminary report, to which reference will also be made in the Annexes. The second is to discuss and clarify some of the issues involved in the notion of "incorporation of socio-cultural conditions into development assistance". Central to this objective is a reconsideration of the concepts of **socio-cultural conditions and development**. The third is to provide the Ministry with recommendations as to how knowledge of the socio-cultural conditions can be obtained, and how incorporation of this knowledge into the development assistance process can be better achieved.

1.2. *SOCIO-CULTURAL CONDITIONS: RECONSIDERING KLAUSEN'S REPORT*

1.2.1. Most anthropologists will probably argue that the debate on Culture and Development is at best merely old wine in new bottles, and that it reflects a belated realization in development circles that projects stand the best chance of success if they are tailored to the experiences and constraints of those they are intended to assist. Capital, skills and guidance from outside may initiate change, but in the last instance, on some level or other, development will have to come about through the decisions and behaviour of a multiplicity of individuals, households and local populations. Only through the systematic analysis of such units and the inter-relationships between them does it become possible to plan intelligently and to anticipate the consequences of alternative interventions. In other words, understanding the socio-cultural context becomes a prerequisite for development planning.

1.2.2. Klausen, in his preliminary report, emphasizes the confusions that may result from various uses of the term "culture". NORAD and Ministry officials generally tend to define "culture" as a sector of society, namely the sector dealing with expressive activities of

various kinds. This definition is reinforced by current practice in NORAD, where a specialized (sectoral) office exists to deal with "cultural development assistance projects" (e.g. museums, restoration of antiquities and collection of oral traditions). Klausen is critical of this narrow definition, and provides as alternative a wider concept whereby culture is to be understood as the total "set of ideas, norms and values that a group shares, has received from former generations and try to pass on to the next" (Klausen, p.5). In this second sense, "culture" is an aspect of all activities taking place in a society rather than a specific set of activities. Notwithstanding reservations to be discussed below regarding this definition, we generally subscribe to this wider concept, and find reason to reiterate Klausen's important point: **Culture is not a term for specific kinds of activities in a society. It relates to the factors that seem to lie behind and guide all kinds of human action.**

1.2.3. Klausen's definition seems to conceive of socio-cultural conditions wholly in terms of cognitive processes, "values, norms and ideas". It thereby highlights how people perceive and orient themselves (conceptually and emotionally) in relation to their world. Cognitive processes are no doubt basic components of SCC, but these comprise more than ideational or cognitive phenomena. Klausen's definition, however, may place serious constraints on the search to incorporate SCC into the development process. This is so because in order to understand human action in specific societies and under specific circumstances, there is need to consider the various non-cognitive incentives and constraints underlying, and informing human action. It cannot be taken for granted that people always have the capacity or opportunity to put their values and norms into practice. Concrete, and often typical, examples of such constraints are environmental conditions and position in the economic and political systems. In view of this, a meaningful definition of the term "socio-cultural conditions" should explicitly recognize the constraints involved. Klausen himself has recognized this in his statement that "for aid purposes one needs a concept that embraces something more than just the cognitive dimension" (p.22). But he does not elaborate on this wider concept. In this study a sufficiently comprehensive concept is adopted; and by "socio-cultural conditions" we denote:

the sets of dynamic ideas, values and norms that a group of people embraces, and the way these sets are realised in the context of constraints the group encounters.

Socio-cultural conditions thus do not consist only of beliefs, values and norms. They also encompass the social relations and organization; patterns of resource allocation and utilization; and the forms and techniques of production, inclusive of indigenous technical and environmental knowledge.

1.2.4. The contention that an understanding of constraints on social action is significant to the description of SCC draws attention to constraints pertaining to a scale larger than the small, local communities. Although these communities may be of immediate interest for the present evaluation and for NDA in general, it should not be overlooked that they are incorporated into, and integral parts of larger systems. The recognition of extra-local constraints underlines one basic difference in perspective between this study and Klausen's report. Whereas Klausen does not deal explicitly with socio-cultural conditions on a scale

larger than single local communities, the present study contends that **the conditions of local communities can only be adequately grasped through an understanding of how local people are constrained by their interaction with local and extra-local systems.** The different *levels* of socio-cultural conditions will be discussed later in the chapter.

1.2.5. Klausen's definition of SCC as ideas, values and norms shared by a group of people tends to over-emphasize cultural uniformity in local communities. It is not in doubt that a local community, for many practical purposes, can be taken to consist of people who in an essential sense share a basic set of ideas, values and norms. Nevertheless, however, the differences in perspectives and motives among various categories of people in a community should not be overlooked. The gender debate has merely highlighted one of many potential ways in which people, presumably sharing a common culture, may be differentiated in important cultural respects.

1.2.6. In current anthropological works, the notion of uniform, local cultures is strongly debated. Two insights emerging from this debate are relevant to the issue of "SCC of relevance for development assistance". The first concerns the fact that ideas, values and norms (often fused in the term "knowledge") are unevenly distributed in any population. No relation of identity can be assumed between the perspectives of men and women, elders and youth, or leaders and followers. In concrete societies, obviously, such discrepancies, and the categories of people involved in them, are empirical questions to be investigated.

The second insight is that the pattern of distribution of knowledge in a society is seldom incidental. Access to specific types of knowledge is often an asset relevant to political manipulation, and certain ideas and skills may be monopolized and safe-guarded in intra-community struggles for control and influence. It is thus observed that authority over the formation of ideas, values and norms by various influential local actors sustain political and economic inequality. Within the gender perspective, for example, it is argued that those who succeed in maintaining local norms about division of labour simultaneously sustain male dominance.

The foregoing discussion is to stress that the proposed definition of SCC is not to suggest that ideas, values and norms are "common" or "shared" in any absolute sense. Research into local SCC should expose such local variations, which are of much practical value in development work.

1.2.7. Social scientists agree that **socio-cultural conditions should not be conceived as being static or unchanging.** Klausen's definition, however, does not explicitly warn against such a misconception. It states that ideas, values and norms are "*received from former generations*" and "*passed on to the next*". Basically, this is of course true. But such a formulation tends to project SCC as fixed and unchangeable, as everlasting "*traditions*", before which people are denied of capacity to adjust, modify or change their traditions. In fact, changes in social and cultural conditions occur even in totally isolated local communities. The pace of socio-cultural change has been particularly accelerated by the incorporation of local communities into larger systems, as the larger systems tend to consistently introduce and impose new ideas, norms and values.

1.2.8. The conceptual framework of this study thus projects SCC as an on-going process; they are varied, complex, under constant change and only partially determined by local factors. In respect of initiatives to incorporate SCC into NDA, qualitative and intensive baseline studies as suggested by Klausen (monograph models and value circulation analyses) are essential requirements as they provide insights into the local structures and processes relevant to development planning. The implementation of the planned project will, however, simultaneously accelerate the pace of change in the socio-cultural conditions accounted for by the pre-studies. To grasp these changes, and to accommodate them in the course of implementation, two requirements need to be met. Firstly, planning exercises should be flexible to cater for mid-course changes. Secondly, monitoring of changes should be treated at least as important as the baseline research; and mechanisms to ensure such monitoring, and the subsequent communication of changes to planners, need to be accommodated for as an integral part of the implementation process.

1.2.9. Acknowledgement of social change as an on-going process is one land-mark in paving the way towards serious contemplation to incorporate SCC into Norwegian development assistance. Firstly, it indicates that the seeming persistence and resilience of SCC should not be over-estimated: socio-cultural conditions are constantly changing. Secondly, it projects the development assistance process itself as part of the larger systems that continually accelerate change in local SCC. Both points may seem obvious: changing of local conditions is more often than not an explicit objective of development assistance interventions. Nevertheless they require recapitulation to corroborate the conclusion that the notion of sustaining or conserving local SCC in the course of the development assistance process amounts to a virtual impossibility, if not to absurdity as well. Even efforts specifically aiming at conserving local traditions may turn out to be change factors; the local people may relate creatively to these efforts and, in the process, transform their conditions.

1.2.10 This being the case it is also important to point out that much of the literature dealing with the socio-cultural conditions in development aid programmes suffers from some serious deficiencies. There is a tendency to ignore the fact that the need for knowledge must be matched with the capacity allowing for its utilization. It is often assumed that the knowledge required for the preparation and implementation of programmes can be generated independently of the organizational capacity required for its utilization. This is often reflected in a sharp differentiation between the roles of researcher, planner, and administrator, which inevitably separates knowledge from decision from action. However, the effectiveness of a given program design is at least as dependent on the presence of institutions with a well developed capacity to make it work as it is on the specifics of the design itself. Recipient countries have a crucial role to play in drawing up consistent and effectively coordinated policies that spell out the gap-filling role that aid funds are expected to play in promoting development at the national and local levels, and they should all be encouraged to do so. Donor-exclusive or donor-dominated initiatives, executed in isolation from the recipient-country decision-making process or attempted in opposition to the recipient's aims and objectives, will tend to have only a limited chance of success, particularly in the long run. It follows that any discussion of the importance of

the socio-cultural dimension in aid programmes must also be related to the competence and capacity of organizations involved in assistance programmes.

1.2.11 There is also a tendency to discuss the socio-cultural dimension only in terms of "what needs to be known about local communities and local populations". Development must be viewed as consisting of several social magnitudes, but when anthropologists speak of development, they usually mean what the field representatives of the foreign aid agencies mean: particular projects in particular places, affecting particular populations and regions. This is a narrow view. For all the diversity of their history and tradition, the possibilities of nationhood in a technologically sophisticated world seem to impose on all societies the need to achieve a much larger scale of social organization than ever before. The major obstacles to development are deeply rooted in the structure of society on many different levels. Recently, it can be seen how nation-building efforts have been frustrated by ethnic and other conflicts in a growing number of "new nations", and the optimism of those who predicted the onset of the "integrative revolution" and inevitable decline of kinship, caste and ethnicity has by now waned and dimmed with disenchantment. **There is clearly a need, therefore, for incorporating complex, large-scale systems of relationships in any discussion of the socio-cultural dimension in development aid.**

1.2.12. The previous point raises an important question concerning the precise meaning of incorporation, which Norwegian development assistance contemplates in relation to the local SCC in partner countries. As pointed out, incorporation cannot imply efforts to sustain and conserve, *en toto*, local socio-cultural conditions. Not only does NDA seeks to introduce planned change into these conditions, whereby the living conditions of people may be improved, but also change is an on-going and inevitable process. Another connotation denotes a process whereby "cultural identity" is promoted through NDA. But then governments in partner countries, seeking promotion of nation-building and national identity, will often block any such orientation. Civil strife in many African countries is fuelled by vitalization of ethnic and cultural identities. An alternative connotation, which this study advocates, refers to a process whereby SCC are taken as a resource for, and part of the planning framework in the development assistance process. An elaboration of this proposed form of incorporation cannot, however, be pursued before considering issues concerning the levels of "socio-cultural conditions" and the concept of "development".

1.3. *LEVELS OF SOCIO-CULTURAL CONDITIONS*

1.3.1. Early thinking on development tended to discard "culture", and by implication SCC, as neither a goal nor an instrument in development interventions. Culture, at the level of the target community, was more often than not seen as an obstacle to development. It was held that the continuing and obstructive persistence of tradition would block substantial modernization because traditional values and institutions were incompatible with modernity. The projection of development as linear progression implied the transformation of traditional societies into modern ones; abandoning traditional institutions was thus considered a precondition for development.

The development process, conceived as modernization, simply meant Westernization. There was no or little concern that existing social structures, systems of belief, and patterns of behaviour may be endangered or destroyed without provisions for their replacement in the process. It was only much later that the possibility that modernization is not necessarily a process of Westernization was articulated¹. Gradually, but consistently, culture has come to be conceived as a potential resource for development. Two readily identifiable components of this resource are indigenous technical knowledge and local forms of socio-economic organization. Notwithstanding its own record in utilizing this resource, the World Bank has recently released a report stressing that:

"Future development strategies need to recognize that, far from impeding development, many indigenous African values and institutions can support it. For instance the persistence of primary group loyalties, although often deplored by outsiders, has been significant force for development. Communal culture, the participation of women in the economy, respect for nature - all these can be used in constructive ways. The informal credit systems successfully draw on customary values and patterns of social organization. Many indigenous cultivation practices, such as mixed cropping, were once much criticized but are now seen to have technical merit. More generally, while the modern sector has been in malaise, the informal sector, strongly rooted in the community, has been vibrant. In particular it has shown a capacity to respond flexibly to changing circumstances" (The World Bank, 1989:60).

The case regarding the relevance of local socio-cultural conditions to the development assistance process has thus been well articulated conceptually. In practice, however, little seems to have been achieved so far by way of operationalizing such a strategy. Simultaneously, very little attention was accorded to investigating the implications of the extra-local constraints for such operationalization. In the specific case of Africa, one formidable extra-local constraint is the placement of the target communities within the framework of the larger political system. The levels of socio-cultural conditions involved in the development assistance process are illustrated in Fig. (1) at the end of this section.

1.3.2. The initial emergence of the nation-state, which is an integral part of the European historical experience, was based on the idea of shared ethnic identity, national language, common culture etc. During both the colonial and the post-independence periods, Europeans have come to propagate and impose their own models of personal and societal development, including the concept of the modern state, which they also imposed upon the colonies. In contrast to the Western nation-state, African states are characterized by marked ethnic and cultural diversity. In attempting to cater for SCC, therefore, Norwegian development assistance personnel should be sensitive to the fact that even within the same

¹ The Japanese "miracle" was particularly instrumental in promoting a recognition that modernization could be achieved without necessarily undermining non-Western institutions, beliefs and values.

partner countries, a multiplicity of socio-cultural conditions are encountered and have to be tackled each on its own terms.

1.3.3. Socio-cultural diversity in African countries is further exacerbated by the educational system, which remains a major instrument influencing social change. "Modern" education, starting during the early days of colonial domination, had as its top priority the education of a group of indigenous population that could help run the daily affairs of the colony. Education was urban oriented and biased, and later on resulted in the emergence of an educated group far removed from the local communities in the rural areas. Members of this group have come to be the ruling elite, decision-makers and planners after independence; and the socio-cultural gap between them and their rural communities has continued to widen. The prevalence and persistence of this gap corroborates the complexity of SCC in partner countries and the multiplicity of its levels.

1.3.4. The socio-cultural gap between the ruling elite and local communities is most apparent in the unfolding of the development process. The development objectives which the elite seek to promote in rural areas are often not only divorced from the values and beliefs of local communities, but also generally irrelevant to the basic needs of these communities. They sometimes conflict sharply with what these communities consider as important aspects of their cultural heritage. For example, a development initiative to introduce cash crops is simultaneously an indirect call for indigenization of the concept of individualism, which obviously contradicts notions of solidarity and collectivism held by local communities in many parts of rural Africa.

1.3.5. The African ruling elite does not, however, seem to face a similar socio-cultural "lag" when discussing visions of development with donors. Both have shared the benefit of the modern educational systems. The socio-cultural gap between, on the one hand, elite and donors and, on the other, the local communities is a constraint that has to be reckoned with in the attempt to incorporate SCC into the development assistance process. This is so not only because planners (national and donors) do not know or understand much of SCC, but also because their vision of development may also preclude incorporating SCC, even when understood. This issue will be explained in more detail in the following section on "development". This is basically due to the fact that the African elite, like other elite groups in the Third World, are not a uniform category. Their members may have different and conflicting interests according to the place they hold within the social stratification ladder. However, the fact that they tend to share more of the vision of the donors than that of their masses has to be emphasized. The point here is to note that incorporation of SCC would require new approaches to the planning and implementation of development assistance projects. It requires an understanding on the part of planners (both national and expatriate) that the SCC in target communities are not vestigial remains of an ancient past, and a recognition that there is no universal or single vision of what development should be.

1.3.6. The socio-cultural gap between planners (national and donors) and target communities seems to be widening every day, and the phenomenon of public planning itself has done much to increase the gap. Nevertheless, the homogeneity between the African ruling elite and donors should not be exaggerated. It is of course true that the

two groups are brought closer in their cultural perspectives through the Westernization process promoted by the modern educational systems. But whereas the former are Western, the latter are only partially Westernized. Conspicuous conceptual discrepancies, not least stemming from significant differences in the socio-cultural conditions they experience in their respective countries, in fact persist. A case in point concerns the interpretation of the principles informing Norwegian development policy. For the NDA officials, the principles of participation, justice and self-reliance are expected to involve everybody in the target community. The WID-orientation is rarely questioned; inequality on the basis of ascribed status is not recognized in modern society, nor is dependence on the basis of status or gender expected. For the African elite, the interpretation, based on knowledge of the local realities, would be in contradiction to virtually all the assumptions of the donor representative. Participation cannot mean involvement by every community member, since the whole social organization is commonly based on roles prescribed by an elaborate and meticulous division of labour (along lines of sex, age and, as often the case, lineage or family background, etc.). Likewise, self-reliance is conceived in narrower terms; and recognition is conceded that certain groups and individuals survive on the basis of complementarity rather than self-reliance. The African elite, however, tend to underplay such discrepancies, unless donors actively pursue imposition of their own interpretation in the course of the development assistance process. In fact, to ensure flow of development assistance, the elite seems anxious to appear embracing visions identical to those of donors. They often deliberately incorporate such visions into proposals submitted in application for development assistance, but almost invariably these visions are borrowed on short-term basis, and rarely carried on into implementation.

1.3.7. An added complexity to the socio-cultural scene in recipient countries stems from the existence of certain sub-cultures among the elite and donor representatives. With regard to the elite, the culture of corruption is, in many places, a formidable phenomenon that has to be reckoned with. This is so due to its direct impact on the process of "trickling down" of development assistance. Many projects intended to be "poverty focused" tend to "trickle up", benefitting the rich.² In the context of steady, often sharp decline in the real incomes of professionals and civil servants, this culture seems to be gaining ground rapidly. But the dynamics of this sub-culture are not entirely indigenous. In projects where firms from donor countries are involved in project implementation, some may, and do, subscribe to this sub-culture. Extension of direct bribes is vulgar, but nevertheless adopted in some cases. Entertainment budgets tend to serve a similar purpose. But more sophisticated and subtle methods, for example repeated invitations to "inspect" the head office, are often preferred.

Representatives of donors, stationed in recipient countries, have also come to develop a sub-culture of their own. Besides promotion of Western models of personal and societal development, this sub-culture projects a view that these models are superior and should be

² In the Nairobi workshop organised to present and discuss the country reports of this study, one scholar volunteered the concept of "trickling up", stressing the "anti-gravity" nature of the impact of poverty-focused projects in some African countries.

accepted by both the national elite and the target communities. In effect, it perpetuates the disregard of indigenous technical knowledge in the development assistance process. Simultaneously, this donor sub-culture enshrines concepts of time, significance of social relations in using public property, allocation and organization of production that are both ethnocentric and often incompatible with local socio-cultural conditions. The prevalence of this sub-culture often leads to direct confrontation between the donor representatives and the African elite and masses.


1.3.8. Recipient governments and donors have their respective, and often conflicting strategies in approaching the development assistance process. NORAD country offices seek to abide by the principles and guidelines of NDA. However the recipient governments may have their own priorities which they decide on with little, or no popular participation. The quest for national identity creation in the multi-ethnic state is often high on these agenda; integration into the market economy is another; while the issue of national security remains a top concern. Almost invariably, governments lack the necessary resources through which these priorities may be realized. Donors may find it inexpedient to get involved in implementation of such priorities, not least because of accountability before their own public. Under such circumstances, a recipient government may submit to donors a project proposal with facade objectives tailored in a way that satisfies donor's requirements, but simultaneously aiming to realizing their hidden agenda. A road project, for example, may promote agricultural development in a region, but it also opens up that region for faster deployment of troops. It is at this level, of scrutinization and selection of project proposals, that donor countries may be led to compromise the principles of their development assistance policy. Some donor representatives, however, may have fairly sufficient knowledge of the economy and polity of the recipient country as to be able to block effecting such compromises. Others may sense the compromise, but in negotiations seek to obtain compromises on the part of the recipient government to ensure implementation of other principles of donor assistance policy. Such deliberate compromises are generally effected without participation from the public in their respective countries.

In brief, it is important for development agencies to realize (1) that non-economic goals may be at least as compelling as economic ones, and (2) that planning as a process of choice must be designed in such a way that the processes by which decisions are really made in a society do not remain entirely outside its scope. Somehow the process of planning needs to be designed to fit the political and administrative structure of a country. Today, there is a tendency to devote too large a share of resources - of personell and time - to making plans, and too little to ensuring that what is in the plans will be assured of enough political support to ensure that it will be carried out. This does not mean that international development agencies must entirely accept the priorities and procedures adopted by a recipient country. **It means, though, that the only constructive answer to the multifaceted problem of development is to start thinking analytically and strategically about political and social change.**

1.3.9. In the absence of substantive democratization processes in recipient countries, donors have a moral responsibility to ensure that their development assistance is relevant to the needs and aspirations of target groups. Such a responsibility entails promotion of human rights issues through development assistance. This should in no way constitute an

infringement of sovereignty to the recipient government. In fact, it is common practice among donors to link development assistance to issues of human rights, albeit in a negative way. Sanctions against governments committing gross violations are common. Such a negative link has led to a rather harsh judgement that donor countries are interested in human rights, but only as long as no funds are entailed in the process (Tomasevslo, 1989:21ff). The link in fact can be made positive, through provision of assistance specifically to promote human rights, inclusive of substantive democratization, as an integral part of the development assistance process. Incorporation of local SCC into the development process constitutes one feasible mechanism by which a positive link may be promoted. But before moving to this issue, there is a need for dealing with the concept of "development".

FIGURE (1.1)
SOCIO-CULTURAL LEVELS IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE



The diagram illustrates the interaction between the different socio-cultural levels within the development assistance process. It has to be noted that on levels (A) and (B), wholly within donor countries, there is normally a high degree of cultural homogeneity in the nation-state structure and an acknowledged general public opinion influencing the decision-making process. In contrast to that, in recipient countries cultural heterogeneity is a basic feature of the multi-ethnic state and popular participation is either restricted to certain levels of the decision-making process or totally denied. Levels C1, C2, D, and E have their respective, and often conflicting (sub-) cultures, a situation inhibitive to the emergence of any uniform public opinion to inform or influence the decision making process. In the case of level E, the different local communities within a region may have different ethnic backgrounds and/or socio-cultural characteristics. It is therefore necessary to take that heterogeneity into consideration in the development planning process. The rural-urban divide in the multi-ethnic state seems to magnify the cultural heterogeneity. Interaction between local communities and different levels of regional bureaucracies, expatriate project coordinators, volunteers and NGO representatives add more complexity to this heterogeneity.

1.4. *DEVELOPMENT: RECONSIDERING THE CONCEPT*

1.4.1. Past development efforts seem to have left little evidence to suggest that their successes do outweigh their failures. Donors and recipients agree that some development assistance funds were virtually wasted on ill-conceived projects that failed to achieve their objectives.

Early initiatives in development assistance emphasized economic and technical modernization. The main objective was to direct local communities to break away from traditional subsistence economy and provide them with the means that allow for their integration into the market economy. Insofar as these initiatives were undertaken without understanding the nature of the ensembles of social relations governing the socio-economic structures and processes of target communities, new and parallel structures were created and new processes were set into motion. The result of this has been the emergence of a dual system where the forces and mechanisms of the market economy compete with those governing the subsistence systems in rural areas. As the processes of the market economy were, and continue to be, augmented by central state machinery and the international market, the subordination and exploitation of rural areas has become an integral aspect of the operation of the dual system.

1.4.2. The early initiatives raised doubts concerning the relevance of wholesale transfer of modern technology in the development process. A call for the introduction of appropriate technical knowledge was accordingly propagated. Nevertheless, neither was indigenous technical knowledge (ITK) considered in attempts to introduce appropriate technology, nor was its socio-economic context understood or investigated. Very limited accounts of indigenous systems of production were made. Modernization, in recipient countries, was generally equated with the process of Westernization, thereby brushing aside the whole cultural context of the local communities and providing a new context enforced from above.

1.4.3. More recently, a shift from the general strategy of modernization towards a model of satisfying basic needs has taken place. Increased food-crop production, even at the cost of reduced export crop production, was advocated. But the new strategy was aborted by conflict between donor and recipient governments over priorities. Though some donors supported the idea of improving the capability of African countries for food production, in effect consolidating the strategic shift of development assistance objectives from modernization to satisfaction of basic needs, the results leave a lot to be desired.

1.4.4. The new shift in development assistance policy amounted to a virtual reconsideration of the concept of development as a whole. Modernization policies implicitly called for the introduction of outside mechanisms (technology, resources, institutions and values) into recipient countries in order to affect change. The strategy of satisfying basic needs places emphasis on the identification of local needs as a precondition for development planning. Simultaneously, it purports to mobilize the target communities, through popular participation, in the implementation of the projects. Norwegian development assistance policy endorses this strategic shift. NDA policy is constrained, however, by the ambivalence of the criteria by which it defines its target groups. The "poorest of the poor" is a case in

point. Ambivalence, however, seems to be partly underlain by the dominant conception of "development" to which NDA subscribes, in both theory and practice. Simultaneously, this conception tends not only to preclude, but also rule out altogether, possibilities for meaningful incorporation of SCC. Needless to stress, it also underlie aspects of the failure of development initiatives to alleviate poverty in recipient countries. A reconsideration of this conception, based on the realities of recipient countries, is therefore urgently needed.

1.4.5. To begin with, the term "development" has two different connotations. The first conceives of development as a linear process of "growth", and simply means "more". This is the dominant conception adopted by the majority of scholars and practitioners in development circles in both donor and recipient countries. Such a conception, as will soon be explained, is both narrow and static and imposes serious limitations on planning initiatives based on it.

The second connotation, whose adoption is advocated as a credible alternative, is based on an analogy between processes in social and biological organisms. All organisms have lives or natural histories. Somehow they begin, then grow or develop, and eventually die. Since they reproduce, however, the death of a single organism is never the extermination of the species. The processes of social entities may be likened to those of the biological organism. This analogy, needless to stress, is hardly new in the social sciences. All scholars would agree that social entities, societies, (or nations, states, etc.) somehow (and somewhere) begin, then grow or develop. But the analogy is rarely pursued further. There are few, if any, discussions of the likelihood that social entities would eventually die and the species would survive through a process of reproduction. Nevertheless the pursuance of the analogy provides a fruitful perspective into the nature of social change. That is to say, the process of reproduction of the social entity is not repetitive; and results in a process of change in which the reproduced social entity is different from the old. Insofar as social change is a slow, but consistent process, the nature and magnitude of change may not be conspicuous, except for the keen observer.

1.4.6. The main emphasis in the dominant conception of development centres on what can be taken as normalities or abnormalities of the middle segment of the sequence of the above analogy, namely the presumed growth process. Debate in development circles has accordingly been over characterization and analyses of the processes through which a society develops economically. A major assumption is that economic development will be achieved in a society when its members jointly increase their capacity to utilize those available resources which are significant to their needs. Capacity is said to refer to the extent to which these members understand the laws of nature and become able to put that understanding into practice - by devising tools and organize their work in a manner conducive to efficient utilization of resources.

1.4.7. By focusing exclusively on induction of growth, the dominant conception postulates a superficial dichotomy between **economic development** and **social change**. The former is conceived as a deliberate intervention within a certain aspects of human activity, whereas the latter is generally viewed as a by-product of the former that affects different spheres of the social system. As explained earlier, social change is an on-going process; and no society is in a static state. Each society has its internal change dynamics, but rarely have these

dynamics been consciously acted upon by planners to influence the pace and direction of social change (which is spontaneous) to render it as **social development** (which is planned). However it is only on the basis of such a comprehensive concept of planning that pursuing the third sequence of the analogy becomes possible. By becoming conscious of the far-reaching implications of planning for the socio-cultural conditions, development planners would be better placed to deal with objectives of **social development**.

1.4.8. **Social development** may be looked at as the expanding adaptive capacity of society to satisfy the increasing and changing (material, spiritual or aesthetic) needs of its members. It is a movement of a whole social system towards defined and specified strategies. The means and resources available, however, may not be sufficient to pursue such a movement; and the development process becomes arrested. It is at this point that outside assistance becomes essential. This view is not intended to overlook or trivialize the socio-economic and political context in which assistance to developing countries is actually embedded. Recipient governments may, and usually do, have agendas other than promoting development processes in the sense being advocated here. Likewise donors have their concerns and strategies as to whom, when and how to extend assistance. But these issues are of no immediate relevance to the current argument. The point is simply this: if assistance is to become **development assistance** (there are military and other forms), then it should be geared towards the promotion of movement in the social system in the manner outlined above. Such a comprehensive concept of development allows the incorporation of SCC into development assistance.

1.4.9. The starting point for planning social development is intensive studies to achieve a rigorous and thorough understanding of the socio-cultural conditions of the social system to be affected by development interventions. Such an understanding would help identify the potential skills, techniques and resources available that could be integrated into the development process. Simultaneously, it would expose planners to the felt- and perceived-needs of the target populations, their aspirations and concepts of the desirable and sacrilege. Planners would accordingly be better placed to cater for the relevant and useful parts of the system by giving them the necessary support to survive and become adequately incorporated in development plans. Such is the proposed form of incorporation of SCC into Norwegian development assistance. The formulation of development projects on such a basis would serve to promote both the **sustainability** and **replicability** of development exercises. Sustainability is promoted insofar as the target population becomes better-placed to undertake subsequent operation and maintenance without resort to external assistance. Replicability, on the other hand, is promoted insofar as the project can be carried out without support from government or donors, by a population with its existing development resources and potentials. The concept and research requirements for the achievement of this form of incorporation, however, need to be formulated taking into consideration the planning models currently adopted by NORAD and the Ministry.

1.5. NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PLANNING MODELS

1.5.1. It would appear that Norwegian development assistance (NDA) projects in Africa are still generally planned and implemented on the basis of the so-called "delivery model". This model typically stipulates rather rigid pre-set objectives of resource allocation, financial targets and implementation phases. It likewise places emphasis on resources and infrastructures to a virtual disregard of members of the target population, who are conceived as passive recipients or beneficiaries of development. Insofar as the model is based on a heavy top-down approach, serious criticism has sometimes been levelled against its susceptibility to inhibit promotion of NDA policy objectives. Meaningful recipient-orientation and poverty-focus require a degree of participation on the part of the target population, to whose needs and benefit projects should to be relevant. The delivery model, as in current practice, generally tends to rule out such participation. It nevertheless provides a relatively convenient model for NDA personnel to discharge their duties. It cannot be readily adjusted and made amenable to incorporation of the socio-cultural conditions of the target communities.

1.5.2. Not all NDA funded projects are based on the delivery model. As in the case of RUDEP in Tanzania, NORAD has recently begun implementation of what is called the "processual model." In contrast to the rigid plans based on the delivery model, the concept of RUDEP is based on an annual cycle within a three year rolling framework. It therefore provides a reasonable scope of flexibility whereby new or added objectives, concerns and activities can be integrated at a late stage even though no account of them was provided at the initial stage of project conception. By means of this flexibility, RUDEP has been better-placed to integrate community participation and the WID-orientation much more than projects based on the delivery model seem to be.

1.5.3. The processual model furnishes a feasible ground for the incorporation of SCC, if certain features constraining its relevance are eliminated. Its feasibility stems from its capacity to internalize information on SCC, not only at the initial planning process, but also throughout project life. This implies ability to incorporate SCC in a dynamic process, whereby social change is accommodated, and not just catering for SCC only on the basis of the baseline information provided at the initial planning stages. Lack of continuous monitoring, conspicuous in RUDEP, is one feature that has to be seriously dealt with. RUDEP suggests little evidence that consistent and/or systematic monitoring is actually being carried out. An equally important constraint is the top-down approach apparent in the planning of certain components of RUDEP. This has in instances rendered the RUDEP interventions irrelevant to the target population (e.g. the education component of the Community Participation and Health Project). The socio-cultural gap between planners and beneficiaries continues to persist in RUDEP. The most manifest expression of this gap is the continuing disregard of indigenous technical and environmental knowledge, which probably constitutes the single largest resource not yet mobilized in RUDEP's development initiatives. A feasible proposal to adapt the processual model for the incorporation of local SCC is through what we propose to call the Transitional Integrative-Generative Model of research (TIM)

1.6. *THE TRANSITIONAL INTEGRATIVE-GENERATIVE MODEL*

1.6.1. It can be generally agreed that assumptions behind aid efforts in certain Norwegian funded projects have been based on insufficient knowledge about SCC including lack of proper understanding of the dynamics of existing social/productive systems in the project area (ie. see Turkana evaluation report, Sørbo 1988). External interventions will necessarily interact with the specific system of activities which has evolved among a population prior to the intervention. Plans have to be implemented within a particular socio-cultural context, and the critical issue is how the population will respond to development inputs as well as what secondary and unsought human repercussions may follow from innovation and change. Social systems have a complexity and variety so that technological and economic inputs may have very different consequences in different such systems, and even where innovations in their immediate consequences may increase aggregate material welfare, their secondary consequences may yet affect adversely a population's chances of realizing their own conceptions of the "good life".

Any region or community is a complex going concern, and only through a knowledge of this going concern does it become possible to plan intelligently how one can effect organizational or other changes, and to anticipate the consequences of alternative interventions. It follows that knowledge produced by social scientists have an important role to play when it comes to the task of identifying key entry points for intervention. However, it can only play this role if it is deliberately geared towards arriving at statements on the inter-relationships between (a) interventions and (b) the behaviour of such systems subject to the control of human beings. A common problem today is either that such studies are being too narrowly conceived in relation to the objectives of projects and the complex relationships within which they function, or that they tend to be descriptive, listing characteristics and social traits of social systems without relating them to the conditions under which they are maintained or changed. The result is that many studies are of limited use to the consumers to whom they are supposedly targeted.

1.6.2. For development programmes to be successful, they must generally work out a programme model responsive to beneficiary needs at a particular time and place and build a strong organization capable of making the programme work. Between the programme and the organization, the critical fit is between the task requirements of the programme and the distinctive competence of the organization. Very often, such "fits" can only be achieved through a learning process, whereby new knowledge and the organizational capacity to put it to work are created simultaneously by one and the same process. We believe that this must be a crucial part of any discussion of how to incorporate the socio-cultural dimension in development aid programmes. In most countries, absorptive and administrative capacity remain limited and resources are scarce relative to the possible demands on them. There are therefore limits to the rate at which information can be analyzed and acted upon, projects implemented or innovation adopted. It is on the basis of the lessons gained from this learning process that the TIM, which is outlined below, is proposed.

1.6.3. Incorporation of SCC into Norwegian development assistance can be positively achieved when informed by TIM. The concept of this model advocates the adoption of a processual planning framework based on the basic tenets of the social system in which

the planners contemplate development interventions. Such a framework, when properly adopted, provides considerable opportunities for the achievement of socio-economic development with minimal sacrifices in human dignity and cultural integrity. Before accounting for the merits of the proposed model, an explanation of the three key terms involved (transitional, integrative and generative), is in order.

- (a) **TRANSITIONAL:** This term is used to acknowledge the transient nature of the baseline information on local socio-cultural conditions furnished by research findings and the inevitability of the process of change in human communities. Though of limited historical validity, the model nevertheless promotes insights into local needs and aspirations, potentials and constraints, as well as the nature and context of indigenous technical and environmental knowledge.
- (b) **INTEGRATIVE:** The socio-cultural conditions identified are to be integrated into processual development planning exercises through internalization at different levels. The model thereby constitutes an integrative instrument, bridging the socio-cultural gap between planners (national and donors) and the target local communities. One level of the internalization process concerns the compatibility between, on the one hand, the macro (national and donor) policy objectives and, on the other, local needs and aspirations. Another relates to incorporation of ITK as a development resource in project planning and implementation. A third pertains to adoption of certain elements of indigenous social organisation as organisational forms in project implementation. The list can be made longer, but the point is simply that planners should seek to integrate and internalize the transitional model of socio-cultural conditions as an input to, and a part of the framework for their exercises.
- (c) **GENERATIVE:** Subsequent to the process of integrative planning, implementation of development projects commences. Implementation implies effectuation of change in the socio-cultural conditions of the target communities. Monitoring such changes through continuous generation of data on the changing socio-cultural conditions is essential, both for assessment of performance and progress in fulfilling objectives, and for updating the model as a planning tool to introduce adjustments and redirection in the course of implementation.

1.6.4. Construction of TIM requires in-depth, continuous research throughout project life. Baseline studies are conducted at the initial stage of planning. With commencement of project implementation, continuous monitoring studies are undertaken to inform action during the rest of project phases.

For baseline studies, local expertise of social scientists, who are not in short supply in many partner countries, may be deployed together with, or without, expatriate researchers. Such deployment also contributes to building local research competence relating to the specific project. When external funding for the project ceases, that competence will be of

considerable importance in consolidating the capacity of developing countries to assume subsequent operation and maintenance.

Monitoring studies can best be ensured through the creation of socio-cultural research units within large scale projects. The experience of such units in development projects in some African countries, particularly those of the Rahad Agricultural Scheme and the Jonglei Canal in the Sudan, corroborates their relevance and cost-effectiveness in development planning and implementation.³ Besides discharging their research responsibilities, the units can be instrumental in consistently sensitizing the other sectoral professionals of the continuous need to consider socio-cultural dimensions in project implementation. The point to be emphasized here is that:

with respect to the human factors, development requires not just periodic evaluation but quite extensive investigation and fact finding through much of its course, leading to adjustment of targets and modification of policies, if the basic objectives of development are to be reached. (Barth, 1972).

1.6.5. In their functioning, socio-cultural research units should not become isolated from the wider research community or encapsulated within the project. It is important that they develop links with similar units in other development projects. By so doing, they will have wider impact, be able to coordinate and synchronize activities, and simultaneously contribute to a mutual process of competence and capacity building and strengthening. Similar links may also be developed with research and academic institutions both locally and in the donor country. Consultancy firms from donor and recipient countries may be involved in the undertaking of research activities requiring types of expertise lacking in research and academic institutions.

1.6.6. The relevance of TIM as a resource and framework is indirectly corroborated by the failure of decentralization plans carried in post-independence Africa. With modern visions of community participation, many African leaders sought to impose decentralization models which ignored or abolished the old local government systems inherited from the British

³ The Rahad Agricultural Scheme, established in the late 1970s, is the second largest plantation-like project in the Sudan. At the phase of project planning, Ford Foundation provided a research grant to faculty and students in Khartoum University. A number of students undertook research on themes relevant to the scheme, and Rahad management accepted them as a nucleus for a socio-economic study unit within the scheme and linked to management. University staff supervising the students were deployed as consultants whenever a socio-cultural problem of a complicated nature arose. With the progress of research, the unit has become institutionalized within Rahad management, and continues to feed the project with necessary information on different socio-economic issues. It has proved immensely relevant to processes of adjusting and redirecting scheme activities. The same can be said about the socio-economic unit established in the Jonglei Canal Project in Southern Sudan. The ability of the Jonglei unit to articulate local concerns and administrative targets has led to re-alignment of the canal in 1979-80.

colonial era. The old systems, whose introduction was informed by insights provided by anthropologists, were based on (modified) elements of indigenous social organization. In contrast to this, the new decentralization was based on concepts of justice, freedom and achievement entirely alien to the local setting. Decentralization models have thus shown dismal failure, as the African masses could neither readily relate to them, nor participate in their implementation. Ex-President Nyerere has recently conceded a statement in tacit support for the contemplation of development interventions on the basis of the realities of the indigenous social organisation:

There are certain things I would not do if I were to start again. One of them is the abolition of local government and the other is the disbanding of cooperatives. We were impatient and ignorant ... We had these two useful instruments of participation and we got rid of them. It is true that the local governments were afraid of taking decisions but instead of helping them we abolished them. Those were our two major mistakes (Nyerere, 1984, quoted in Olowu, 1989:212).

1.6.7. The construction of TIM thus starts with the undertaking of intensive conventional social anthropological research. In the process of development assistance, as in project planning, usually an interval of years elapses in the course of negotiations between donor and recipient governments (cf. Chapter Two). This interval provides more than sufficient time to complete baseline studies. Donors can allocate funds for such research, which simultaneously contribute human resource development by building capacity and competence in local academic and research institutions. Where the option of allocation of funds for longitudinal studies is not feasible, and time becomes a critical constraint, an alternative can be sought in "instant anthropology".

N.B. In proposing TIM, the intention is neither to overglorify and idealize, nor to protect "traditional systems". In fact in most parts of Africa these systems are already being consistently undermined. As a result of this, the masses living in their context have become vulnerable, no longer able to fend themselves and dependants or cope with the consequences of environmental and socio-economic degradation. The point is simply that if development initiatives are to advance the cause of these masses, then such initiatives should be based on the needs, skills and resources of the masses. Otherwise development becomes irrelevant to the needs, or requires skills which are not readily accessible. In either case, the masses become further marginalized. Needless to emphasize, however, are the negative features of traditional systems. In them, inequalities are perpetuated, and power remains concentrated in the hands of a few elite. Likewise, environmental concerns may not be given due attention in the face of changing circumstances in the biosphere.

1.7. *INSTANT ANTHROPOLOGY AND PARTICIPANT INTERVENTION*

1.7.1. The anthropological method combines empirical social research, through participant-observation (a technique entailing "immersion" in communities to be studied), with the formulation of concepts and hypotheses. It has proved particularly fruitful in studies of local communities in developing countries, about whose socio-cultural conditions generally very little is known or understood. Anthropologists always study communities directly at the local level. By virtue of this, they are well-placed to assess the nature and implications of interaction between the local community and national and/or international levels (inclusive of the development process). Due to these characteristics, anthropological research serves to rectify the inadequacies in the yardstick that other professionals use in conceptualizing and measuring development. While measures like per capita income and gross national product tell nothing about the actual distribution of wealth, anthropological studies at community level can not only provide a detailed account of the pattern of distribution, but also explain the process by which inequalities emerge.

1.7.2. Dissemination of anthropological research reports, however, typically takes place long after the completion of data collection in the field. This is due to a necessary interval between data collection and report writing - an interval during which processes of data collation and analyses are carried out. The anthropologist is very sensitive that simplification and generality can often distort the complexities of the data he/she analyses. And it is social complexities, not a travelogue of custom, which requires conceptual understanding and explanation. The marriage of empirical data and concepts does take time, and any unwarranted shortening of this process is a compromise both with the subject matter of social relations and with the scholar's own expertise. Critics of the anthropological method see this interval as its major inherent limitation, particularly for purposes of development planning which has to be achieved under critical time constraints. Instant anthropology provides a credible approach to mitigate and transcend this seeming limitation.


1.7.3. Any anthropologist, following a relatively short stay in the field, should be able to provide a general but nevertheless well-informed descriptive account of the social organization and the major socio-economic structures and processes in the community under study. An experienced anthropologist, however, is able to achieve much more than that. Even when no previous general accounts on the community are available, an experienced anthropologist can undertake intensive research within a short period of time, particularly as he/she is able to guide and monitor inexperienced researchers in a team effort. Tentative analyses of the collected data, to aid the construction of TIM, should be possible to formulate while the small research team is still in the process of field-work. This competence of experienced anthropologists is the basic requirement for engagement in instant anthropology aiming towards contribution to planning processes. *The inexperienced anthropologists in the team may be recruited as researchers-designate in the socio-cultural research unit to be established during the implementation process.* The functioning of the units with commencement of implementation serves to continually generate information on the changing socio-cultural conditions, thereby consistently updating TIM.

1.7.4. Instant anthropology at once defines the limits of investigation and the priorities concerning data collection. Rather than carrying out an extensive and/or intensive social survey or administering a questionnaire, information is gathered mainly through participant observation. Research starts by compilation of an ethnographic account describing the salient features of social organization and the major social relations and institutions. According to the nature of the contemplated development intervention, special emphasis may be placed on the values, concepts and normative frameworks pertaining to particular aspects such as land tenure; organization, forms and techniques of production; division of labour and gender roles; relation to and utilization of the environment; power and authority structures and processes; placement of the local community in the larger polity and economy; marketing chains; magnitude and patterns of water use, etc. On the basis of the ethnographic account, the team refines its focus to concentrate on issues of immediate relevance to the contemplated development intervention. This refinement enables identification of the potential development resources within the community. The identified resources (institutions, types of activity, techniques, etc.) are then reported to planners, who then internalize them in the planning framework.

1.7.5. Instant anthropology seems in several ways a violation of the anthropological method. By engaging in it, researchers are required to transcend the conventional limits of anthropological practice, participant-observation, to achieve **participant-intervention**, the task of consciously identifying and proposing spheres for development planning whereby the studied community is to be changed. Anthropologists generally refrain from being involved in such commitments, and as far as possible tend to assume no direct responsibility of the use into which their "neutral" research findings are put. This stand is largely underlain by the ethical issues that emerged subsequent to past attempts by some anthropologists to be action-oriented. The charge that anthropology was "hand-maiden of colonialism" generated defensive attitudes, and these have become further entrenched when it became known, nearly two decades ago, that some anthropologists engaged in "counter-insurgency research". The ethical considerations are of course warranted; but these should not rule out in the process applied research *per se*. Indeed, such research should be welcome not only because it seeks to advance the cause of the studied communities, but also because, by aiming towards the construction of TIM, that search is on concepts and visions closest, if not virtually identical to those for which these communities stand. No anthropologist needs reminder that social change as such is an on-going and inevitable process.

1.7.6. Adapting TIM to the processual planning model currently adopted by NORAD and the Ministry is not entirely, or even mainly a matter of acquiring insights into the socio-cultural conditions of target populations. First and foremost it requires a *transformation* of the current perspectives of NDA personnel as well as recipient government officials into the realities of recipient communities. NDA officials in particular should be sufficiently sensitized that it is fallacious to assume that the process of development is unilinear or teleological resulting in reiteration of Western experience. Sensitization, however, is not induced solely by shedding pre- and mis-conceptions, but also by actively learning to become more *open-minded*. In no way, of course, is NORAD expected to rely exclusively on anthropologists who, in dealing with other cultures, are trained to transcend the conceptual and normative frameworks of their own culture. Sectoral professionals are indispensable in the process of development assistance. But these have to be exposed, through training in social science perspectives. Only then would the critical requirements for the operationalization of TIM and, by implication, for the incorporation of the socio-cultural dimension in Norwegian development assistance, be fulfilled.

The Operationalization of TIM



CHAPTER TWO

**THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSION IN PROJECT PLANNING
A CASE STUDY OF FOUR NDA PROJECTS**

2.0. GENERAL

2.0.1. Achievement of meaningful incorporation of SCC into Norwegian development assistance projects requires both access to and use of extensive background information on local and extra-local levels in recipient countries. Chapter One has dealt with the question of how the relevant information on local SCC may be obtained. However, it is unwarranted to assume that when the necessary information is made available to NDA personnel, such information would be spontaneously utilized. Assessment of the manner in which background information on SCC was actually internalized in the course of planning processes by NDA personnel, both in Oslo and country offices, seem to defy any such assumption. A detailed, largely descriptive account of project planning and decision making processes in NDA organs, exemplified by the six main programmes covered by the study, is presented in Annex (I) as well as the country reports (Annex 1-4). On the basis of insights and conclusions accounted for there, this chapter seeks to analyze aspects of current practice, within NORAD, regarding background information, especially on local SCC, in planning processes. The main objective is to shed light on the factors promoting or inhibiting internalization of information. Such an objective is envisaged to expose potentialities, relating to both scope and methods, for future improvements.

2.0.2. The chapter focuses on four of the reviewed programmes, and starts with a brief introduction to each of them. These programmes are:

- 2.1. The Rural Access Roads Programme, (RARP), Kenya,
- 2.2. The Village Agricultural Programme, (VAP), Zambia,
- 2.3. Rukwa Development Programme, (RUDEP), Tanzania and,
- 2.4. Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Programme, (LIRD), Zambia.

The introductions consist of an overview of each programme, and summarize the main issues raised in correspondence within NORAD, both in Oslo and the country offices, regarding the initial decision-making process of scrutinization, assessment and approval of proposals. On the basis of the largely descriptive introductions, the chapter turns to analyze aspects of the issue of how information on local SCC was handled. The presentation in this second part of the chapter is thematic and covers the following:

- 2.5. The Scope and Quality of Information on SCC,
- 2.6. Utilization of Information on SCC,
- 2.7. The Focus of Attention,
- 2.8. Constraints in Data Collection,
- 2.9. The Nature and Extent of Compromise,
- 2.10. The Operationalization of NDA Policy Objectives and,
- 2.11. The Intelligibility of Information on SCC.

A PROFILE OF FOUR NDA PROGRAMMES

2.1. THE RURAL ACCESS ROADS PROGRAMME

2.1.0. The conception of the Rural Access Roads Programme (RARP) in Kenya was underlain by influence on the part of both the International Labour Office (ILO) and the World Bank. The two institutions had formerly explored the feasibility of "appropriate technology", and RARP constituted an opportunity to devise and implement labour-intensive techniques in the field of road construction.

As part of its World Employment Programme, the ILO organised an Employment Mission to assist Kenya in formulating a comprehensive development strategy for "employment, growth and equality". The Mission submitted, towards the end of 1972, a draft report recommending utilization of the development potentials of the so-called "informal sector", and emphasizing the feasibility of promoting labour-intensive development projects. These recommendations were adopted by the World Bank, which was instrumental in implementing them. In the course of negotiations with Kenya Government concerning the Highway V loan, IBRD indicated its serious intent to consider favourably a proposal for a labour-intensive rural access roads programme in case Kenya Government sought to formulate and submit such a proposal. A loan application for the Rural Access Roads Programme was prepared in March 1974 and submitted to IBRD and the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). Simultaneously, discussions were carried out between the Kenya Government (Ministry of Works, MOW), ILO and NORAD concerning initiation of a research project on labour-intensive road construction techniques to aid implementation of the proposed RARP.

RARP was initially to construct access roads in only 22 selected districts during the first seven years of its operation (1975-82). To achieve this target, a total of 74 construction units were planned with each unit employing 270 casual employees.

In October 1974, the first RARP implementation unit located in Nyeri District started its operations with British (ODA) funding. A month later, the research project financed by NORAD commenced.

2.1.2. In 1976, NORAD Nairobi office was informally approached to support RARP implementation. By then, the programme had already involved, beside IBRD and UK, the Netherlands and USA. The Asst. Res. Rep. described the programme as congruent with NDA former activities in the country and potentially endowed with considerable impact on subsequent development interventions in rural districts.

In deciding whether or not to support implementation, the results of the research project financed by NORAD formed part of the background material. Scanty and unsystematic information on some of the RARP areas also seems to have been made available to NORAD but, as described by the Project Brief of October 1976, that information was "neither sufficient nor representative". The Brief explicitly stated that "[t]here is ... a need for better baseline data to provide a basis for subsequent evaluation. Likewise there is a need for continuous reporting. The design suggested to NORAD is mostly connected to questions of engineering and not to social and economic aspects".

2.1.3. The Project brief was met with differing reactions within NORAD Oslo. Some pointed out the "*additional work [implied by] long investigations which require disproportionately much work time*", others were "*somewhat sceptical to the possibilities of getting definite answers (relatively definite answers) to the questions being raised*". Those responsible for the Project Assessment, however, requested even more information in both the revised version of the Project Brief (January 1977) and the final Project Assessment (May 1978).

The correspondence and written comments on RARP within NORAD/MDC were both critical and thorough. NDA personnel, both in Oslo and Nairobi, were generally of the opinion that more information on socio-economic issues ought to be provided. Oslo more than once requested information relating to the local communities' terms of trade, local effects of the introduction of a market economy, RARP's competition with the local agricultural sector over labour, effects of imported mass products on local production, effects of export orientation on subsistence crops, probability of a widening gap between rich and poor regions, and the nature of perceived changes in the situation of women in the context of a cash-crop oriented production, etc. The view that RARP could have adverse effects on several neighbouring sectors grew stronger throughout the process and seem to have provided the basis for the requests for more information. As the NORAD leadership accepted the Brief, it simultaneously noted that "*some socio-economic side effects that were not treated in the Brief, should be investigated further during the project assessment*".

2.1.4. In the interval between the formulation of Project Briefs and the presentation of the Project Assessment, NORAD personnel participated on RARP review meetings, visited programme sites, and sought to retrieve further background material. The information gathered up to the submission of Project Appraisal did not, however, provide data on local SCC. All donors involved were awaiting a promised World Bank impact study, which was repeatedly postponed.

In February 1977 a donor meeting was held and it was resolved that background information on 12 specified points ought to be provided. None of the points related to socio-economic conditions of the target populations. NORAD Oslo commented on the list but did not utilize this chance to request further investigations of the points raised in its internal correspondence, except for a question whether "*complementary activities within the agricultural sector*" would be discussed with the Kenyan authorities at a later point of time. Commenting on a draft report from the donor meeting, NORAD Oslo stated that "*it is acceptable that the text be adopted as it stands*". In November 1977, four years following initiation of both RARP and the related NORAD-funded research project, NORAD Nairobi office conceded that:

One has not yet gained enough experiences to state anything about the programme's socio-economic consequences".

2.1.5. From August 1977 onwards, NORAD Nairobi started to demand a speedy project assessment. This was repeated in October with the comment that "*[i]t does not seem justifiable if we on the one hand ask for detailed plans from the Kenyan side, while we, on the other hand, impede such a planning by committing ourselves at a late point of time. ... There is now, from [our] point of view, so much background material about*

the programme that one should be careful not to investigate things already investigated by others". The Nairobi officials themselves expressed, however, some very critical remarks concerning the effects of RARP in a letter to Oslo in November. Several issues were raised, such as whether provisions for public facilities would accompany RARP, the problems of deforestation emerging in the wake of RARP, aggravations of migration from the countryside, unrealistic objectives due to uncommitted authorities, biased transfer-of-knowledge effects as well as several of the points raised earlier in the project briefs. It was also concluded that *"[t]he project may absolutely produce social and economic damage"*.

Notwithstanding its critical views, NORAD Nairobi wanted to see the project agreement signed as soon as possible. This demand was repeated in a telex the same month, and in April 1978 release of some funds prior to agreement was requested. In May 1978 the Project Assessment was finally submitted, but in the following month Oslo requested more information on the RARP areas from Nairobi. The Resident Representative sent further information to Oslo, but simultaneously maintained that *"[o]ne wishes to conclude that it is fully understandable that the questions about development plans now raised, are basic and that they are answered too generally. They should, however, have been raised in November last year..."*. Nairobi suggested as a compromise that, to forestall damaging consequences of the programme, it should be **monitored** and *"followed up with activities in neighbouring sectors"*.

The Project Assessment was approved in a NORAD Board meeting in August 1978, and the Project Agreement with the Government of Kenya was signed in December the same year. Provision was made, however, to incorporate the proposed impact study (which by then was to be limited to a traffic and farm survey only) in due time. The Agreement thus stipulated that *"[t]he results of the Impact Study are understood to have a guiding influence [on] the implementation of the Programme (..)"*.

2.1.7. Under the RARP, 14,000 Km of unclassified roads were initially planned to be constructed to provide all-weather farm-to-market access in 26 districts covering medium to high agricultural potential areas of Kenya. By the end of 1983, 7,265 km of such roads were completed of which 3,611 Km were gravelled. RARP was funded by the Government of Kenya which contributed the requisite infrastructural and human resources with additional assistance in the form of loans and grants from a number of donors including CIDA, the World Bank, ILO, UNDP, USAID, ODA (UK), NORAD, the Netherlands, DANIDA and Switzerland.

2.1.8. The most salient feature in the implementation of RARP was the steady improvements in performance. This was facilitated by the ability of the programme to internalize results of continuous monitoring, undertaken by the Technology Unit which was established as part of its organization. The functions of the unit was to continuously investigate and assess the technical and organisational aspects of RARP/MRP, as well as to coordinate and synchronize studies undertaken by consultants. By so doing, the unit was able to improve considerably the Technical Manual, the quality of Courses and seminars through infusion of new information into the programme. The unit, however, had very little to do with socio-cultural information.

2.2. THE VILLAGE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMME

2.2.1. From 1964 to 1974, resettlement schemes were central to Zambia's rural development policy. Resettlement took the form of establishing relatively large villages, and was intended to rationalise and facilitate the delivery of social services to a formerly hard-to-reach population. When, in 1974, NORAD indicated its intent to extend assistance to the Northern Province, Zambia requested support to the resettlement schemes (SS). From the outset, NORAD expressed its interest in having an intensive social anthropological study of the relevant areas, but no such study was conducted throughout the history of the SS. While negotiations were being undertaken, NORAD became involved in the resettlement schemes of Northern Province. The negotiations resulted in the conception of VAP, which was designed and implemented by Norwegian technical assistance personnel. The first formal agreement concerning VAP, however, was not signed until 1979, five years following the commencement of project planning and two years after VAP itself became operational.

2.2.2. During the five-year interval, much information on various aspects of the local situation was gathered, a task that was facilitated by the involvement of social anthropologists and anthropologists. Most of the initial information, however, took the form of criticism of resettlement schemes.

The first critical report on resettlement schemes stemmed from a Peace Corps seminar as early as December 1974. It stated that the schemes aggravated inequalities in the countryside and suggested their replacement by initiatives towards improvement of communications and agricultural training. NORAD Lusaka did not, however, "attach importance to [that] criticism". But more criticism kept flowing. In August 1975, two Norwegian technical assistance personnel, working on Zambia's Third National Development Plan, forwarded the view that the Settlement Schemes were a failure. Lusaka labelled that view as "surprising" and emphasized that the schemes ought to have been initiated with a social anthropological study. NORAD Oslo consulted agricultural expertise which opposed the report's views, and the Agency accordingly argued that "[t]he report's content will not be attached sufficient importance, [and we will] not suggest changes in NORAD's attitudes to the project". A letter from Oslo in mid-September informed Lusaka that NORAD Oslo regarded the views raised by the planners as "totally unofficial" and that their report should not be used as information towards newly recruited professionals unless its "significant weaknesses" were pointed out. But before this letter arrived in Zambia, NORAD Lusaka had received another critical report from one of the planners, and this report was sent to Oslo with renewed emphasis on the need for a social anthropological study. Further criticism was also received from the (Norwegian) Planning Officer in Kasama, Northern Province. Towards the end of September NORAD Lusaka suggested that the Zambian Ministry of Rural Development should convene a round-table meeting to discuss the emerging criticism.

2.2.3. NORAD Oslo responded by end of September 1975 supporting Lusaka's stand. The latter forwarded the Kasama Officer's report with information that he had been instructed to "engage himself in the work with a willingness to be objective". Lusaka found "no reason to comment or take a stand to his statements and conclusions at this point of time". The Planning Officer's report was, however, received with great interest in Oslo. Although NORAD Oslo noted that it had to "correct some wrong views", it nevertheless seemed to have taken the report seriously; in a letter a few days later,

information from the report was actively utilized in an attempt to correct steps taken by Zambia.

The failure of the schemes, however, was soon to become common knowledge in Zambia. In mid-November NORAD Lusaka was visited by a delegation, formed of Swedes and Danes, who made critical views similar to those expressed earlier. Lusaka forwarded the comments and, during the course of the following months, a series of analyses in Zambian daily newspapers as evidence of the problems faced in the agricultural sector.

2.2.4. The failure of the Settlement Schemes in Zambia produced a situation in which the need for knowledge about local conditions was realized by most planners and officials connected to the programme. However it seems no active steps were taken by NORAD in order to adjust the settlement schemes in accordance with the substantial criticisms received. It was on the Zambian side that the problems were realized and the experiences were utilized in an attempt to create a better model for agricultural development. This change seems to have been received with some reluctance in Norway, and NORAD insisted on proceeding with settlements in the two areas in Northwestern Province still acceptable to Zambia. But the appointment of a sociologist, contemplated very early during negotiations, was seriously pursued by NORAD¹. Upon appointment, however, the social anthropologist did not embark on intensive studies of the communities. He was severely constrained by the job description: he was called upon to make the implementation of settlement and re-grouping policies more effective. His task was to provide knowledge that could ease the problems of transition into a totally new way of life. He was specifically instructed not to evaluate the programme.

Effective implementation of VAP was thus started in 1977, two years before the formal agreement was ratified. VAP was initiated as an alternative to existing rural development strategies. Concentrating on selected villages, VAP sought to promote agricultural development through an integrated approach orienting activities towards the whole village community rather than individual farmers. It involved provision of free agricultural inputs to encourage cash cropping while simultaneously providing complementary assistance related to infrastructure and marketing, such as roads, depots as well as water supply. Extension was to be given particular attention. In the meantime, consultations between NORAD and Zambia continued to reach final agreement concerning the settlement project in Northern Province.

2.2.5. The first social anthropological report was submitted by the social anthropologist Hans Hedlund in June 1977. Based on observation of local SCC, the report proved critical by pointing out the implications of the schemes. It gave examples of the social and political problems arising when people from different areas were settled together in an administrative structure where the *"old system of...villages and districts built on headmen and chiefs" is ... being broken down*.

The original VAP proposal (as stated in the 1982 VAP Evaluation Report) was an extension of the idea of settlement schemes into already settled areas. Emphasis was

¹ The way NORAD personell used the terms "sociologist" and "sociological study" is rather confusing insofar as their **intention** was to denote studies of an anthropological nature.

placed on clearing new land "*in the outskirts of the village*". Hedlund's first report addressed these ideas directly. On the basis of insights into the local land tenure system and agricultural adaptations, he formulated numerous recommendations regarding the implementation of VAP. He underlined, for instance, that the demarcation of new land emphasized in the VAP proposal was unnecessary; in these communities, land use established indisputable title to land. The report was, however, mainly focused on the economic organisation of the local areas and as such did not provide thorough information on political, social and cultural aspects.

Hedlund's report was welcomed by the Zambian side, but NORAD Oslo requested more information on a whole array of topics. These covered use of draught animals versus tractors; road construction and the state of infrastructure; property structure, nutritional aspects and possibilities for beef production. Particular emphasis, however, seem to have been placed on further information regarding the position of women. Additional information was requested on family structure, division of labour, rights of inheritance and attitudes towards female labour. The report was also forwarded by Oslo to the Liaison Committee for Women Organisations for further comments. The latter responded by severely criticizing the whole outline of the programme.

2.2.6. The first social anthropological report was instrumental in bringing to the fore the issue of women in the VAP. Thereafter women's participation in VAP became a major policy issue and was accorded prominence in the Project Assessment. The assessment, based on a mission to Zambia in March 1987, was submitted two months later. It included a whole chapter on women (comprising a few first impressions of the situation of women in two VAP villages). Hedlund's important points relating to the local system of land use and rights were not outlined in the Project Assessment. The latter in fact contained negative, if not simplistic views about "*traditions*", which were said to hamper agricultural investments, demand conformity and "*counteract all modernisation efforts*". It did, however, endorse Hedlund's point that the Village Productivity Committees (VPC) did not function, partly because they had been forced on the local communities from above. Overall, the Project Assessment provided no new information on local SCC.

2.2.7. In July 1978 Hedlund submitted an evaluation report, in which he was primarily concerned with the emerging reactions among local people to the free and/or subsidised agricultural inputs provided by VAP. A major concern was new crop preferences, female-male ratio of participation, etc. The functioning of the Village Group Classes in the VAP villages was another focus in his report. But the report did not provide systematic information on social organisation (gender roles, family structure etc.) and various cultural aspects (beliefs, norms, values etc.). The information conveyed by Hedlund seems to have been quickly internalized by NORAD in subsequent negotiations with Zambia relating to VAP. Both the situation of women and the status of VPCs became central issues of debate. In October 1978, however, Zambia voiced views on both issues that conflicted with Norwegian policies. Zambian officials argued that "*[t]here is no discrimination against women in Zambia*" and that the VPCs should be strengthened "*when they are ready*", but that "*[t]here is ... still need to give the villagers sustained guidance to help them make the right type of decision*".

2.2.8. In January 1979 a draft agreement was submitted to the Zambian Government. During the subsequent negotiation, however, a new issue was raised when Zambia suggested that fertilizers ought to be sold to the farmers. At that time a new social anthropologist, Erik Eriksen, joined VAP; and by March '79 he was already engaged in a survey of VAP areas. In his preliminary report he specifically treated the situation of women, and provided additional information on cultural factors (witchcraft beliefs) that were influencing the performance of the extension workers. He also discussed the functioning of informal systems of credit within the villages and the new relations of dependence they seemed to generate. Likewise Eriksen documented the adverse effects of the proposed sale of fertilizers, particularly on the situation of women. It is not clear at what point of time this information was forwarded to NORAD Oslo, but, in any case, the views expressed in a statement to Zambia towards the end of April were totally consistent with Eriksen's points. Oslo demanded that fertilizer for a sufficiently large area of land should still be provided free of cost. This view was repeated and further substantiated by the beginning of May in a letter to the NORAD Lusaka. However, NORAD Oslo seemed to worry that their points of view might occasion another postponement of the signing of agreement and a few days later informed Lusaka that *"we are prepared to reconsider our points of view"*. Zambia, however, accepted NORAD's suggestions on both the question of women's position and the provision of free fertilizer.

2.2.9. The formal VAP Agreement was signed in October 1979. Under it the programme operated in three selected areas of the Northern Province providing four separate components. The first component, the Village Programme, was oriented to the totality of the population in a cluster of villages, a single village or a section of a village. The second, the Individual Programme, was oriented to assisting individual persons. The third, Area Programme, was designed to cater for improvements in services and living conditions. The fourth and final component, the Building Programme, aimed at improving the extension services in the areas, inclusive of working conditions and efficiency within the programme itself.

2.2.10. The first evaluation of VAP was undertaken in 1982, but no much significance was attached to it because it was conducted by NORAD/VAP personnel. External assessors were called upon in 1985 and VAP was subjected to a major review. The review brought to the fore issues of overall increased maize production and the construction of physical infrastructure. It also indicated the considerable contribution by VAP to awareness raising among the local population, who started to demonstrate willingness to participate in self-help projects. But the review also pointed to several shortcomings and undesirable features. Basic among these was the failure of VAP to capitalize on the population's aptitude towards participation. Implementation in the programme seemed to treat the target population as a passive recipient of assistance. VAP was taxed for its general neglect of women's needs and potentials, and for its tendency to provide insufficient guidelines for the women coordinator. Likewise it was criticised for its inconsistency in criteria whereby villages and individuals were selected for provision of free and subsidized inputs. A further criticism was the lack of due attention to adoption of appropriate technology in all aspects of the programme.

2.2.11. The Project Review Team recommended introduction of a Plan of Operations for the subsequent phase of VAP, but though they drafted a proposal, no such plan was subsequently adopted. Nevertheless many other recommendations made by the Review

Team were implemented. In 1985 two new features were introduced: an expansion of the programme to another district (Kaputa) and the inclusion of women as a special target group. The leader of the Review Team became VAP Coordinator in January 1986, and this was conceived as conducive to the implementation of the recommendations. The progress in implementation was scrutinized in 1988, when another major evaluation was conducted. This evaluation has had far reaching implications for VAP's structure and operation. At the time of this study, the programme was in the process of redefining its scope and activities.

The 1988 evaluation indicated the tendency in VAP to operate independently and in virtual isolation from the Zambian governmental structures. In the long run, such a tendency would undermine the programme as the counterparts would not be competent to undertake subsequent operation and maintenance. The report accordingly stressed the need to develop sufficient linkages with the line departments. At present, VAP is shifting its focus to work through the local government structures and to concentrate on human resources development. A further issue raised in the report concerned the identification of the target population for the extension and training programme, which has remained the largest component of VAP. The target was originally intended to be the small, particularly female, farmers. This target population, it was indicated, has only been marginally assisted. Recommendations were made to correct this situation, and VAP is presently in the process of implementing other recommendations presented in the report and which were widely acceptable as desirable.

2.2.12. Over the years since the programme was initiated, VAP areas have achieved a marked increase in agricultural productivity. Though it would be an exaggeration to ascribe this increase exclusively to VAP, the target populations nevertheless tended to emphasize their appreciation of the benefits VAP provided. They accordingly point out material evidence of these benefits: roads, bridges, farm storage sheds and depots, water wells, schools and rural health centres - all of which VAP has assisted through establishment and/or maintenance.

2.3. *RUKWA INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME*

2.3.0. Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme, RUDEP, is a multi-sectoral project initiated in 1985. It does not, however, constitute the first involvement of NORAD in Rukwa Region. In the late 1970s, NORAD launched a major Water Supply and Sanitation Project (WSSP) for Rukwa and Kigoma Regions. In its initial form, WSSP was based on the "delivery model planning", with emphasis on infrastructure and disregard of community participation. In RUDEP, however, NORAD has made a significant shift in its planning concept, and a prominent role was accorded to community participation in all its phases (planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). WSSP was integrated with RUDEP in 1988. Owing to RUDEP's decentralized planning, the profile to follow differ from the other three profiles in one significant aspect that should be explained from the outset.

The decentralized decision-making structure of RUDEP makes it particularly difficult to assess the formulation of policies and strategies at project level. The material on RUDEP, amassed from the NORAD archives in Oslo and Dar, does not provide

insights into how decisions were made in Rukwa. NORAD had its representative at regional level, the RUDEP Coordinator, who played a prominent role in activity planning - supposedly incorporating NDA policy objectives in the process. The submitted activity briefs, annual reports, etc., do not provide information on how individual projects were envisaged to relate to the SCC of local communities, nor do they indicate how projects performed with respect to non-technical issues through time. Very few of the submitted proposals were rejected by NORAD, and in those cases where additional information was requested before final approval, the questions mainly related to technical issues. The discussion of the extent to which NORAD incorporated information on SCC in the planning and decision-making process is thus primarily based on an analysis of responses at Oslo and Dar, not at the level of the region, where in fact projects were planned and concerns for SCC were supposed to be accommodated.

2.3.1. Long before NORAD contemplated assistance to RUDEP, BRALUP (later IRA) of Dar Es Salaam University surveyed and formulated a development plan for Rukwa Region. The concept of the plan forcefully argued for a pattern of development based on the local resources and capacities and pursued in a multi-sectoral, flexible and gradual approach attacking the problems where they might arise. BRALUP put efforts into the investigation of the local conditions which were supposed to provide the basis for the development process. The report contained a lot of scattered information on local SCC and did to some extent also provide a systematic understanding of some aspects of the local societies. The planning concept advocated by BRALUP provided the essential framework for the RUDEP model. Thus when, in 1982-83, negotiations over RUDEP started and a follow-up of the 1977 BRALUP's plan was requested, NORAD Dar took steps to involve the institute in the work. All the available background material was asked for, but, according to NORAD Dar, cooperation with BRALUP (by then IRA) proved very difficult, and the material presented was judged to be insufficient. The difficulty seemed to stem from the insistence of IRA on the adoption of a multi-sectoral approach, while NORAD Dar (and Oslo?) preferred a sectoral approach. IRA, as an institution, was thus excluded from further planning for some time, and a Norwegian pre-feasibility team was subsequently formed to undertake the task. But it was agreed that some of the personnel of IRA could be assigned specific tasks. The Norwegian team carried out the study, and its report, which drew heavily on BRALUP's, constituted the essential background information for the Project Document for RUDEP.

2.3.2. The Project Document on RUDEP, approved in December 1984, contained mainly scattered and unsystematic information on local SCC in Rukwa. Nevertheless it presented a fairly realistic view of the social and cultural aspects pertaining to the local administration and the relations between regional and national levels of administration. It highlighted various factors resulting in weak discipline in the public sector, corruption, the development of black and parallel markets, and the problems of recruiting competent personnel to a region as backward as Rukwa. Perceptively, the document indicated that community participation to a large extent depended on willingness on the part of officials really to work with local people. As it were, the document endorsed the IRA view of the need to adopt a gradual, flexible and multi-sectoral approach. In view of the administrative set-up, RUDEP was to work partly with the objective of strengthening local administrative structures and partly through local NGOs.

2.3.3. NORAD seems to have submitted the document to IRA for comment. The IRA Director raised several critical issues. As the document did not endorse a "grain basket of the nation" approach to Rukwa, that is stressing the region's role in the national economy, the IRA levelled the criticism that no alternative conception of the component of agricultural development had been articulated. The Director also viewed as counter-productive the implicit strategy to involve international NGOs in implementation, maintaining that the creation of parallel structures would not necessarily lead to better planning and implementation processes. In a letter to Oslo the Acting Res. Rep. dismissed the criticisms raised by pointing out that *"the comments demonstrate ill-feeling and a wish to misunderstand and find weaknesses. During our conversation it appeared that [IRA] had not read the whole report. Additionally, it appeared that there are few differences between the report's and [IRA's] views and suggestions on how a development programme in Rukwa should be approached"*. A NORAD Oslo official familiar with both the region and the institute commented that while he agreed to much of the criticisms raised by IRA, he thought some of the criticism had stemmed either from a misunderstanding or a wish that IRA ought to be involved in the study. There was for some time differing views within NORAD concerning the necessity and/or desirability of a multi-sectoral approach to the problems of Rukwa. With the submission of the Project Document, however, it became policy to adopt a multi-sectoral approach and debate on the issue was not pursued any further.

As the Project Document was approved, the focus of attention within NORAD shifted to the administrative design of RUDEP, and very little of the correspondence and reports of the subsequent 4 1/2 years related to the content of the programme. The primary concerns pertained to division of responsibility among Oslo, Dar and RUDEP, the integration of WSSP and RUDEP, assignments for NGO's, and production of control routines, etc. With progress in implementation, however, the concern over women's situation and integration in RUDEP started to mount.

2.3.4. In the initial stages of RUDEP, Norwegian assistance was mainly spent on building infrastructure for the programme. Project proposals reflected the need of project personnel for housing and other facilities, particularly vehicles which rated high among regional officers in Rukwa. To some extent NORAD attempted to restrict spending on vehicles. Nevertheless claims of misuse of project cars drew considerable attention.

By the end of 1988, the misuse of cars in Rukwa was described as "enormous" by a NORAD official, and the departments and persons implicated were named. It was suggested that a controller should be assigned the task of monitoring use of cars and that NORAD should have a firm attitude towards the problem. The car issue was discussed with the Regional authorities in the course of January and February 1989, and a series of measures were proposed as steps to control the misuse. The Agreed Minutes emanating from the March 1989 Annual Meeting explicitly stated that "[t]he proportion of the budget absorbed by transport had risen to unacceptable heights. The Region must take immediate and appropriate action to reduce these costs". It was accordingly resolved that "NORAD will not give final approval to purchase of any more (new or replacement) vehicles at this stage". An on-site inspection of car use in June 1989 revealed that only one of the RUDEP cars was found where it ought to be.

The development of the case after June 1989 is yet to be known. However, it is clear that this competition for vehicles impeded the work of the CP team of RUDEP for a long period during 1988 and 1989. As explained in the Tanzania country study, the CP team was literally without means of transport after the integration of the CP unit into Maendeleo.

2.3.5. Correspondence relating to RUDEP's project proposals and briefs seems to suggest that only a few of these were sent back with a request for more information. Apparently, NORAD Dar had much confidence in the planning process conducted at the regional level and assumed that the policies at the base of the project formulations were in line with Norwegian considerations. There was, however, one exception: in the course of RUDEP's developments, several actors in the process strongly voiced the need to support women and children specifically.

Apart from a general statement in the Project Document to the effect that women and children ought to have their living conditions improved through RUDEP, the emphasis on women was rather weak in the initial concept. In September 1986, NORAD Dar expressed hopes that a new post at the Regional Planning Office would be occupied by a woman. Simultaneously Dar started to insist that the project briefs to be sent to Oslo ought to contain special measures to ensure female participation, and demanded such participation in both road construction and the MAD project.

In November 1986 LADU submitted a comprehensive memo about the question of women in RUDEP. The programme was said to have a positive framework in this respect, but LADU expressed the need for a tighter specification of objectives and a constant monitoring of developments. Studies on women's roles in the whole production process were specifically requested. LADU also indicated that in order to *"ensure that the locally based community development project in Mwimbi Division really achieves local participation, the Norwegian side should encourage the identification of techniques that would solicit the views of women"*. The need to concentrate more on the part of the infrastructure related to women and children (health, education, training etc.) was likewise emphasized, as improved living standards for women was taken to imply improved living standards for all. Finally, the question of securing women's influence in the decision-making process was stressed, and it was suggested that a women coordinator be assigned to promote women's interests.

2.3.6. The role of women under WSSP was also stressed in various letters and reports. The CPHEP 1986 Review Report held that active involvement of women in water and sanitation projects *"is a prerequisite for the success of such projects"*. It accordingly recommended that women should be involved from the planning stage and throughout the project period. However, the danger that projects might be conceived as exclusively *"women's projects"*, with the consequence that men disregard their duties under the projects, was also recognized. The annexes of the Review Report presented glimpses of village meetings for women and impressions from visits to a health class. They highlighted aspects of local, political conditions and especially of the position of women in local political life. The report indicated that some village meetings under the Water programme were turned into religious occasions by Norwegian NGO personnel, opening the meetings with prayers.

2.3.7. In February 1987, NORAD Dar forwarded a project report to Oslo stressing that the question of greater concern over "women's cause" ("kvinnesaken") under RUDEP had been raised in discussions with the management. The proposal to initiate a health project under RUDEP was also partly justified on the ground that it would particularly benefit women and children. The submitted project report was revised by PRO, which strengthened the phrases related to women. In addition PRO resolved that women's needs should be catered for under any single activity proposed by RUDEP. The Norwegian delegation to the Annual Meeting was specifically instructed to ensure women's participation and women's interest at all levels of RUDEP and to demand that, prior to the following Annual Meeting, the Region should produce a plan outlining strategies to achieve such participation.

In April 1987, LADU submitted another memo, in which the question of women was raised once more. It proposed that a team should be formed to assist the Region in producing the requested plan. Over and above plan formulation, it was asserted, the exercise would constitute a form of training for the regional administration personnel in how women's needs and interests could be internalized into planning processes. The women coordinator was recruited to the job towards the end of 1987, but when the Annual Meeting of March 1989 was convened, no plan was submitted. The issue was discussed in the meeting and the Norwegian side demanded that, from then onwards, the standard form for activity proposals under RUDEP "*must include an item under which the strategy for involving women in planning and implementation and reaching women as a target group, shall be elaborated*". Integration of women has thus become a conditionality for Norwegian development assistance.

2.3.8. Information on local SCC in Rukwa continued to be generated, but was not internalized into the discussions within NORAD. Various travel reports from visits to Rukwa provided some material on local conditions, particularly the situation of women, but were generally impressionistic and quite unsystematic. There are some references in various documents that under the CPHE programme implemented by Norwegian Church Aid, comprehensive household surveys were carried out, and a case study of a traditional healer was conducted. We have not succeeded in getting hold of this material and have also not seen further references to it in internal correspondence. IRA carried out a socio-economic pre-study in Rukwa in 1986 and, in cooperation with RUDEP, formulated a project proposal for a full-scale study of a wide range of topics relating to social and cultural conditions in Rukwa. The proposed research was to be spatially limited and based on case studies. Its justification was the need for an understanding of local corporate groups, the relationships between formal and informal groups (social organisation), leadership and decision-making (politics), and people's perceptions of self-help, role of government and cooperatives, etc. If successfully conducted, it seems that this study would provide immensely important information on the local conditions and on the problems facing the community participation approach of RUDEP.

In 1987, a travel report from African Medical Research Association (AMREF), which applied for a cooperation with NORAD in the health sector in Rukwa, held that traditional medicine was regarded as one of the major health problems in the Region. It mentioned "*the strongly held beliefs in traditional concepts of disease, healing and witchcraft*", indicating that there was a special ward for cases of overdoing local medicine

at Sumbawanga hospital where widespread practice of "*parallel (secret) traditional management of patients*" seem to prevail.

Further information was obtained when RUDEP engaged, on consultancy basis, an expert from Sri Lanka to formulate a popular participation strategy for the programme. The report was frank about some aspects of the local administrative structure. It pointed out how poor salaries led to private economic activities during office hours, how the remoteness of Rukwa impeded control over such practices, and acknowledged the general failure of the Government's villagization attempts. But the report lacked rigorous understanding of local SCC, and the exposition of village society as a homogenous entity, with no social and economic differences whatsoever, seems quite unreliable.

Researchers from the Nutrition Research Institute of Oslo University Oslo, conducted research on RUDEP relating to nutrition and the situation of women. The research results were well taken by the Region, which at one point expressed a willingness to incorporate the results into the formulation of a health programme in Rukwa.

2.3.9. In 1988 the CPHEP component of RUDEP was subjected to a unique form of participatory self evaluation, which served to generate significant information about the potentialities of the target population. A consultant engaged by NORAD involved Kasanga villagers in the evaluation of the Community Participation and Health Education Project with the intention of preparing workshop material for district and regional level workshops. The exercise dealt, *inter alia*, with the factors constraining participation in the operation and maintenance of the water supply project. Maintenance of the water system, particularly at the catchment area which broke seasonally due to floods, was a major problem. The villagers explained how the site of the catchment area had been selected by project personnel, ostensibly on technical and economic considerations, without consulting them. The villagers in fact had known that the selected site was not suitable, and suggested an alternative but their view was not heeded by the technocrats. Since villagers were not involved in the decision-making process relating to site selection, they did not feel responsible for the maintenance of the fragile catchment area. They were willing, however, to participate in other maintenance tasks, and generally felt responsible for the maintenance of the rest of the water supply system. This information should have sufficed to draw the attention of project officials, not only to the need to further the involvement of the target population in decision-making processes in general, but also to the relevance of indigenous technical knowledge. Neither point seem to have been internalized by RUDEP management or NORAD.

2.4. *LUANGWA INTEGRATED RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME*

2.4.0. The process of project formulation for Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Programme (LIRD) in Zambia grew out of the Lupande Workshop which was held in 1983. In 1985 a prestudy was conducted and Phase One of LIRD was launched in 1986. The purpose of the first phase was the establishment of an organizational structure capable of achieving project objectives. LIRD is currently in Phase Two, the purpose of which is said to be the implementation of a sustainable form of wildlife

management synchronized with promotion of a social development programme whereby the local population would benefit from the resources of the Valley.

Prior to the conception of LIRD, Luangwa Valley had for several decades been the focus of wildlife preservation initiatives, which largely overlooked, if not undermined, the interests of the local population. These early attempts, however, proved ineffective in protecting wildlife in general, and the endangered species in particular. The concept of LIRD was, and continues to be hailed as a breakthrough in preservation exercises. It envisages a form of conservation mindful of the interests of, and seeking active participation by the local human population. It purports to set into motion a sustainable form of wildlife management by which the local population would benefit in various ways from the resources of the Valley.

2.4.1. NORAD became involved in LIRD when, in 1985, Zambia requested assistance in carrying out a consultancy with the aim of designing the first phase of a proposed project in Luangwa Valley. NORAD funded the consultancy, whose July 1985 report constituted a project proposal. The report was received with approval on the part of the Zambian side and, by October, President Kaunda wrote a letter to the Norwegian Prime Minister requesting assistance to LIRD. In the meantime, NORAD Lusaka forwarded the report to Oslo supporting the project, but simultaneously expressing critical comments on the report. In a NORAD Board meeting convened in November 1985, the LIRD proposal was turned down with the comment that *"The Board realizes that we do not have the capacity to initiate this project now"*, but a draft letter in reply to President Kaunda's hinted that, were Zambia to secure assistance from other donors, the *"possibility of a limited assistance from Norway should not be excluded"*. A subsequent visit by the President to Norway proved instrumental in canvassing support to LIRD and NORAD started to become involved in implementation, initially in what was envisaged as *"limited assistance"*.

2.4.2. The report contained some scattered information on local SCC, but was mainly concerned with the ecological aspects of life in the Valley, particularly the deteriorating conditions of flora and fauna. But the exposition of the interface between human activity and ecological conditions seem to have been ridden by inconsistencies and contradictions. Little attention was paid to the socio-economic conditions of the local communities. The report itself pointed out this deficiency and recommended the undertaking of an agro-economic study to highlight the local SCC, particularly those aspects pertaining to local ecological and economic adaptations. The proposed study was envisaged to adopt a methodology similar to the *"value circulation analysis"* proposed by Klausen (cf. Chapter One).

2.4.2. NORAD Lusaka was critical of the omission of local SCC in the report. In November 1985 it expressed the view that *"The report's main weakness is that it focuses on wildlife and the potential for tourism, whereas the problems only to a limited extent are seen from the local population's point of view. The primary objective [of LIRD] should be to improve the quality of life ["livsstandarden"] of the local population and to utilize the resources within an ecologically acceptable frame. The report does not discuss the structural prerequisites for achieving this. The next phase in the planning process should, thus, be to define better the needs of the local population"*. Lusaka accordingly recommended that an anthropologist should be assigned to LIRD. Subsequent to the virtual rejection of the project proposal by Oslo, the limitations of the report were

acknowledged by the Zambian side, who in January 1986 pointed out that the report "is too dominated by the Wildlife aspects".

2.4.3. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) came to know that NORAD turned down the proposal on grounds that it did not have capacity. The IUCN offered its service as an executing agency, and has since become involved with LIRD. The IUCN subscribed to the critique of the proposal and expressed, in April 1987, the view that *"in the future it is necessary to emphasize more strongly socio-economic analyses and a more thorough assessment of the various activities' direct influence on the local population"*. Need for more information was thus shared by all the parties involved.

2.4.4. A socio-economic baseline study was commissioned under LIRD in 1987, but the consultant failed to submit a report. In view of this, NORAD requested in October 1988 that *"LIRD should as soon as possible finance another socio-economic study"*. NORAD *"regarded as a weakness that LIRD at this stage does not emphasize the integration of concern for local socio-cultural conditions in their activities. LIRD, being a district development programme, will influence several sectors and become a catalyst for often considerable changes in the local communities. Even if LIRD emphasizes local participation, there is a need for a socio-cultural prestudy, in which one attempts to map the way of life of the local population, production systems, traditional forms of natural resource management, gender specific divisions of labour within production and the management of natural resources, internal relations of power, struggle and conflicts of interest at the local level (political organisation), religious and ethnic conditions etc."* No such study seems to have materialized when the LIRD Agreement was signed in 1989.

2.4.5. The information on local SCC available for decision makers in the planning process was thus rather deficient. It nevertheless helped to assess the congruence between LIRD objectives and some aspects of NDA policy objectives. LIRD obviously tallied well with the emphasis NDA places on the environment and in the course of discussions within NORAD it was pointed out that LIRD is a *"feasible project from [the point of view of the] current interest for environment and development"*, NORAD personnel seem, however, to have been keen on ensuring that the focus on the environment should not be at the expense of the basic principles of assistance being poverty focused and recipient oriented.

2.4.6. Correspondence within NORAD also catered for the question of women in LIRD. It was argued that women, along with elders and children, were especially disadvantaged, and that their needs should be taken care of within the project. Later in the process, the view that women should be involved in all LIRD projects, was emphasized, *"so that the programme's women component not only appears as an alibi for a women's focus, with a possible neglect [of women's needs and interests] in other individual projects [as a consequence]"*.

2.5. THE SCOPE AND QUALITY OF INFORMATION ON SCC

2.5.0. The programme profiles corroborate the conclusion that NORAD and the Ministry personnel were generally aware of the significance of information on local SCC to planning processes. In all four projects, general or focused studies of a social anthropological nature were requested. In none of the projects, however, was the requested study undertaken prior to the ratification of agreement. As will be explained below, the reasons why studies were not undertaken are varied, complex and hardly susceptible to cross-project generalization. In the specific cases of RARP and LIRD, moreover, virtually no information on local SCC was available in decision making processes. But in RUDEP and VAP some information was made available, though in terms of its scope and quality significant differences may be noted between the two projects.

2.5.1. In the assessment of information on SCC, it is important to note a distinction between two types of information. The first is **baseline information** on the local communities, including its **preconditions** for the development efforts. **Baseline information** consists of a **comprehensive overview** of the community, its social organisation, basic institutions, and the development potentials and constraints. It exposes how a target community is equipped to incorporate a certain development project or programme into its socio-cultural set-up (relevance to local needs, skills, resources, values, etc.).

The other type of information relates to the actual or probable consequences, positive or negative, a project may have on a target population. Such information concerns the impact of a project, and serves to provide guidelines as to the need to consolidate, or mitigate, certain of the project consequences in order to bring them into line with overall development policy objectives.

The incorporation of SCC into Norwegian development assistance would be promoted when baseline information is requested, retrieved and utilized in planning processes. The assessment of the quality of information pursued here is based on this criterion.

2.5.2. Evaluating the status of data on the target population that was retrieved by NORAD in deciding whether or not to support RARP and LIRD is a relatively simple task. This should be so as the utilized information was almost free of reference to local socio-cultural conditions. In the case of RARP, there were very minor references to "*major ethnic groups*" and crop preferences in some of the programme areas, but aside from these virtually no information was presented concerning socio-economic, political, or cultural processes in the local communities; and absolutely no systematic information was provided on how these societies were constituted and functioned. In LIRD, on the other hand, a socio-economic study was commissioned, but the consultant failed to submit his report. Though some of the material collected might have been made available, in crude form, to NORAD personnel, there is no reference whatsoever in the correspondence and documents relating to LIRD to substantiate such a conclusion.

2.5.3. NORAD, both in Oslo and Nairobi, requested more information on local SCC in RARP areas. However, even if the information requested was made available, the result would probably not have been radically different regarding either the understanding or incorporation of socio-cultural conditions of the target population.

This should be so because the **type** of requested information reflected concerns about perceived undesirable effects the programme might have. The request was for a **consequence (impact) analysis**; and none of the questions raised related to the socio-cultural preconditions of the target populations.

2.5.4. The information requested by NORAD in the case of LIRD P could have made considerable difference in planning the project. This should be so in view of the fact that the bulk of the questions raised concerned the socio-cultural preconditions (e.g. division of labour, position of women, socio-economic adaptations). This seems a significant difference in the way NORAD personnel have come to pose questions regarding local conditions. Simultaneously it may be interpreted as an **improvement** in assessment procedures within NORAD, taking into consideration that RARP planning was undertaken in the mid-1970's while LIRD P is a relatively new programme whose final negotiations took place in 1989.

2.5.5. It is not in doubt that in terms of both scope and quality of information, the decision-makers in the planning of RUDEP were the best placed compared to those in the other three projects. The survey undertaken by BRALUP (now IRA) concerned the preconditions in Rukwa, and the preliminary development plan formulated on its basis drew directly from that information. The report on the situation of Rukwa is the most thorough and systematic document presented so far, not only in the history of RUDEP, but in all four projects. Regarding information on local SCC, it contains a systematic, pre-conditional analysis of some prominent aspects of the local situation. Several of the other research projects suggested or initiated under RUDEP tended to have the same quality. Up to 1989, however, little of the results of these other studies was presented. For a few years IRA was not included in the work on a project outline in Rukwa, but since 1986 the NORAD DAR began to collaborate with the Institute, and their joint research proposal, if carried out, promises generation of information that could be internalized into the flexible RUDEP planning process.

2.5.6. The case of RUDEP emphasizes the point that intensive precondition studies are indispensable for attempts to incorporate SCC into NDA funded projects. It also corroborates the conclusion that *long-term association* of local research institutions with NDA projects serves best the purpose of incorporation, not only in terms of pre-studies needed in the initial planning stage, but also in terms of monitoring to assess implementation and guide redirection and adjustment. Such association, needless to stress, serves the building of competence and experience in an independent research institution which, whenever need arises, could be called upon to assist the research units within the different NDA funded programmes.

2.5.7. The decision-makers in the case of VAP also had access to considerable information on local SCC. But very little of this information actually related to preconditions. Unlike RUDEP, however, no intensive pre-study was undertaken. Most of the available information concerned negative experiences with resettlement schemes. The work of the social anthropologist in VAP was, however, instrumental in providing information on aspects of the local conditions, and some of the findings were internalized in due course into the planning process. As the subsequent Village Agricultural Programme to a large extent was formulated by persons critical to the Settlement Schemes, experiences from impacts on certain aspects of local SCC were incorporated into the proposals from the outset.

2.5.8. In general, the specific items of information on local SCC requested by the NDA officials were thus rather restricted and mainly related to i) economic issues, and ii) the social situation of women. It seems not unwarranted to conclude that few, if any, attempts were made to understand the local political situation and other aspects of the local organisation outside the field of gender differences. This is particularly true with respect to cultural aspects (defined notionally as the world-views, beliefs, norms, values, etc). In none of the projects was information requested on local perceptions, aspirations and concerns over how identity might be retained under conditions of rapid change, partly initiated by the development process itself.

The project histories above also indicate that the scanty material on SCC actually gathered in the process, seldom was adhered to in planning and decision-making. The integration of information on SCC into the bureaucratic process (internal discussions, explicit demands in relation to recipient governments etc.) was mainly successful when the information related directly to Norwegian policies and concerns or on specific topics specifically asked for by various actors in the process.

2.6. UTILIZATION OF INFORMATION ON SCC

2.6.1. It was asserted in the beginning of this chapter that availability of information on SCC does not, by itself, ensure incorporation of local SCC into development assistance projects. In both RARP and LIRD, insufficient, if any, information on SCC was available for decision-makers. Assessment of incorporation of information is thus irrelevant in the two projects. But though more and better quality information was made available in the course of planning processes in both RUDEP and VAP, the way that information was actually utilized leaves much to be desired.

2.6.2. Generally speaking, very little of the rich information on SCC provided by IRA and others was incorporated by NORAD personnel into either the major RUDEP's documents or the discussions within NORAD and the Ministry. The specific information relevant to assessing whether or not RUDEP would build on local socio-cultural conditions was neither provided nor requested during the planning process at the NDA levels of Oslo and Dar. Though it is difficult to explain with certainty why that information was not requested, three scenarios may be formulated to explain the lack of interest in SCC. The first concerns the extent to which the information was readily usable by NDA personnel. As this is an issue relevant to the discussion in all four projects, its discussion would be better placed in a subsequent section. In this section the discussion is confined to the other two scenarios.

2.6.3. The second scenario ascribes indifference to SCC to the technical nature of the proposed RUDEP activities (component projects). The proposed activities were predominantly technical in nature, aimed at providing infrastructure (administrative capacity of RUDEP, road construction, irrigation). Information on SCC could thus be assumed "not immediately relevant" by NDA personnel in Dar and Oslo. However insofar as some of these projects were envisaged to be based on local participation, and would in any case affect local conditions, the disregard of information on local SCC cannot be justified. For one thing, how would local participation be ensured if not

based on an understanding of the communities themselves. Such an attitude towards SCC tends to corroborate Klausen's view that *"the underlying idea [embraced by NDA personnel] seems to be that correct internal processing makes an analysis of the socio-cultural conditions for development redundant. In other words, the socio-cultural conditions that are necessary for a project are assumed to be existent when in fact they might not be present at all"*.

2.6.4. The third scenario ascribes the lack of interest in local SCC to the planning philosophy upheld by RUDEP itself. This philosophy envisages a planning process in which local SCC are assumed to be accommodated through the involvement of the local people themselves, who are projected as active in identifying needs, formulating plans and implementing projects on the basis of their own social and cultural preconditions. But this is hardly a credible justification for the disregard of information on SCC in the bureaucratic process. Indeed the success of NORAD's efforts in Rukwa as a whole is to be assessed specifically in terms of whether or not RUDEP managed to ensure such a form of community participation, and it is only on the basis of information on SCC that such an assessment becomes tenable. Available evidence, however, seems to suggest a rather limited extent of participation. More details are presented in Chapter Three as well as the relevant Annexes.

2.6.5. As outlined above, under the Settlement Schemes/VAP an intensive social anthropological study was requested from the outset, but never materialized. Subsequent to the appointment of a social anthropologist, however, systematic, but focused and restricted information was made available. Hedlund's first report, though restricted in coverage, provided **precondition** analysis of local SCC, whereas his second report and most of the information on Settlement Schemes related to the **consequences** of development projects. Eriksen's preliminary report, though based on observations in the course of implementation, was also a **precondition** analysis that delineated social and cultural factors of relevance to project implementation. Hedlund's main contribution to VAP planning, however, seem to be confined to the information on local rights and land use. The data he provided concerning indigenous agricultural adaptation and organisation was not incorporated into any of the documents on which the decision-making process was based. Simultaneously, it is interesting to note that information on SCC not provided by Hedlund was requested by Oslo - particularly information regarding the situation of women. None of the requested information was provided in due time before the ratification of the VAP agreement, however.

2.6.6. The utilization of information on SCC need not be undertaken solely at the initial stage of planning. Even after commencement of implementation information is relevant in attempts to adapt or redirect projects. VAP seems to have benefited considerably from internalization of information generated at later stages of project life. The findings and recommendations of the two major VAP evaluations have had far-reaching implications for the nature and scope of VAP's objectives and activities. Subsequent to the first evaluation, the WID-orientation of VAP was given more emphasis; subsequent to the second, a phase currently underway, VAP has ceased to undertake direct implementation of activities, a task now carried out by the local government structures.

While the VAP evaluation reports served to redefine the whole concept of the project, the information provided by the VAP social anthropologist seems to have had limited

impact on implementation. Eriksen's information about witchcraft beliefs and how it affected the extension workers, for example, was simply ignored.

The basis, and strength in RUDEP's processual planning stems from the in-built flexibility to modify and adjust activities in order to accommodate new or added objectives in the course of implementation. Information generated at a late stage in project life thus is accorded potentially as much significance as that generated in the initial planning process. There is some evidence that RUDEP is continually being adapted to the realities of the local setting, but, as explained earlier, it is not readily clear to what extent these adaptations are based on knowledge of local SCC. At least not much could be deduced from the various project documents and internal reports. For example, the commendable participatory workshop referred to earlier should have sensitized RUDEP management of the necessity to consider the relevance of popular participation in seemingly technical decision-making processes, thereby accommodating indigenous technical knowledge. But there seems to be no evidence that such a consideration has actually taken place.

2.6.7. RARP has demonstrated a fine example of how a project could improve performance in the course of implementation through diligent monitoring. But this is true only as far as technical matters are concerned. The programme simply had no mechanism by which information on SCC could be generated through monitoring implementation. The long-awaited World Bank impact study, narrow in focus as it came to be, seems to have no effect whatsoever on either RARP or its successor MRP.

2.6.8. To recapitulate, the utilization of information on local SCC in all four projects seem to be generally limited. This indicates an area for future improvement within NORAD and the Ministry. NDA personnel, particularly the sectoral professionals who seem to be the main actors in the decision-making process, would benefit considerably from a training package addressing issues relating to how and why information on local SCC is relevant, if not indispensable, to planning. In recommending this, however, it should be stressed that through time NORAD personnel did improve their approach to matters regarding the local communities. This last contention is clearly corroborated by the significant shift in the focus of attention in the course of planning.

Furthermore, NORAD seems to lack clear procedures by which information generated through external evaluations or internal monitoring could be internalized in projects. At least the documents and correspondence found in both Oslo and the country offices do not corroborate the existence of such procedures, and in this connection the deficiencies relating to NORAD's archives should also not be overlooked.

2.7. THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION

2.7.1. The four projects under discussion are not, historically speaking, concurrent. They stretch over a span of just under two decades, extending from the early negotiations of RARP in 1974 to the LIRDPA agreement in 1989. Viewed in historical terms, the focus of attention in planning processes seem to have been characterized with one salient feature: Through time, discussions within NORAD and Ministry tended to demonstrate a steady decline in the magnitude of concern over the nature of impact

of projects, except in areas relating directly to NDA policy objectives ("poorest of the poor", women and the environment). Thus whereas the discussions on RARP expressed considerable worries about the impact of roads on various spheres of the local economy and society, in the case of LIRDIP the main focus of attention was the position of women. In general terms, the bureaucratic process seems to be proceeding smoother. This may have one of several reasons. In this section an attempt is made to explain this tendency, while analyzing issues relating to the focus of attention in the decision-making process.

2.7.2. The tendency not to express concern over impact may be incidental and typical only of the four projects discussed here. It may also indicate that, through time, NORAD and the Ministry have come to shoulder increasing workloads, and, as a result of that, the general working conditions are less conducive to pursuing time-consuming substance matters of project proposals. However, there is reason to believe that this tendency is primarily underlain by the fact that recipient countries and organisations through time have acquired competency in the "Norwegian development language". Proposals now tend to be submitted with formulations, though not necessarily intentions, more in line with Norwegian development assistance policy objectives.

2.7.3. The discussions that took place during planning processes in all four projects indicate that both NORAD and the Ministry have consistently focused on issues relating directly to NDA policy objectives. These issues included position of the poor, integration of women, focus on the environment and popular participation. In the particular cases of RUDEP and LIRDIP, special emphasis was placed on the issue of incorporation of local SCC as well. In all projects there were requests for more information on these focal issues. Almost invariably, however, the requested information tended to relate to the nature of impact. Before approving proposals, NDA personnel wanted to ensure that those groups of concern to NDA policy would not be adversely affected by projects. Such a focus, however, seems to warrant a conclusion that in instances NORAD officials tended to conceive of forestalling adverse effects on the poor and women as a fulfilment of NDA policy objectives. In other words, objectives were to be realized negatively rather than positively. Very rarely were the questions NORAD and the Ministry raised related to the socio-cultural pre-conditions of the groups of concern to their policy objectives. This raises a question concerning the way in which NDA policy objectives are operationalized in decision-making processes (See 2.10 below).

2.7.4. With the progress in the initial planning process in the four projects, and more often than not as a project assessment was submitted, the focus of attention of NDA personnel tended to shift from concerns with information on the local situation to organizational and technical issues. One reason for this is perhaps the fact that in all projects more information had been requested before the project assessment was submitted. But there simply seems to be no mechanisms or procedures to follow-up the requests. As concern for technical and organizational matters mounts, information on local communities seem to be regarded of a lesser significance to planning. As project agreements were ratified and implementation started, in the absence of the requested information as explained earlier, socio-cultural issues became even more marginalized in communication between projects, country offices and Oslo. This seems true even of RUDEP, which is envisaged to be built on the basis of local conditions. The bulk of the correspondence between Oslo and Dar es Salaam in the initial planning

stage dealt with various organisational and administrative issues relating to the design of RUDEP, division of responsibility between the project management, Dar office and Oslo. As implementation started, moreover, considerable attention was accorded to the question of the extent and form of cooperation with NGOs in Rukwa, the role and capacity of the regional administration, the problems of integrating the activities of TAN-055 and TAN-060, the integration of CP and HE activities into the appropriate regional departments. Finally, as RUDEP grew larger, an added theme was the need for more efficient control routines with respect to the use of cars.

2.8. CONSTRAINTS IN DATA COLLECTION

2.8.1. It may seem rather striking that in all four projects agreements were ratified between Norway and partner governments in the absence of the background material on the communities, especially that NDA personnel, in both Oslo and country offices, requested such material to aid the decision making process. In each of the four projects, however, certain constraints seem to have made access to information either very difficult or irrelevant.

Constraints in RARP

2.8.2. The inability of NDA personnel to secure the requested information on RARP communities could be interpreted in a number of ways. The first is that background material as demanded by NORAD was not available in the first place; and the promised, but consistently delayed, World Bank impact study might have well distracted NORAD from taking initiatives to generate information by commissioning a study on its own. During the process of planning RARP, however, there was actually ample time (four years) to conduct socio-cultural baseline studies. Similarly long intervals between start of negotiations and ratification of project agreements took place in the other projects. Nevertheless during none of these intervals was a study undertaken. It seems NORAD lacks bureaucratic routines which ensure the initiation of baseline studies. Likewise, there seems to be a general lack of routines whereby already existing material could be retrieved and utilized in the process. The volume of such material in various local academic and research institutions as well as government archives is almost invariably considerable. In all projects the discrepancy between existing and retrieved information seems massive. Simultaneously, however, it only takes engagement of a national research student or junior researcher to retrieve that material. This is one area in which improvement in data collection may readily be achieved.

2.8.3. The inability to secure information on RARP is partly the responsibility of NORAD and the way project documents are processed. At a time when minutes of donor-group meetings were submitted, NORAD had the opportunity to request once more the information it had asked for, but the only questions raised were of a technical nature. This begs a question whether different documents of the same project submitted to NORAD at different points in time were processed by different officials. NORAD and Ministry are said to delegate the responsibility for coordination and follow-up of project negotiation up to the submission of the project assessment either to an office or to a team, but in the specific RARP case the question becomes whether the same

officials followed the proposal all through up to ratification of agreement. Posting policies might be one factor at interplay in this connection. The Nairobi office indeed taxed Oslo for not having raised the questions at an earlier stage, and disregarded its late request for information and proposed continuous monitoring as an alternative to baseline information.

2.8.4. A further, and perhaps more serious constraint in the case of RARP was the fact that NORAD's opportunities to obtain the requested information were severely restricted by the formal framework established by the donor group. It was jointly stipulated that:

It was agreed by all donors that the views expressed in the final joint evaluation and review report would be the consensus view of all the donors. It will not include aspects which are considered to be of importance by only the minority. On the other hand the report will be considered by the donors as being the authentic, authoritative report of all donors to the MOW [Ministry of Work of Kenya] on the RARP .. It was also accepted that if individual donors wished to make further evaluations during the forthcoming year they could not expect the same level of service from the MOW than that which will be provided at the joint review meeting...

In a multi-donor context such as RARP's, constraints may arise in the course of NORAD's search to ensure that projects are in compliance with NDA basic policy objectives. However it may be worth noting in this connection that the idea of a joint evaluation was strongly supported by NORAD Nairobi and regarded conducive to improved efficiency of work.

What is striking in the RARP documents, however, is the seeming attempt by some NORAD officials, in the virtual absence of information, to justify the project as being sound, in socio-economic terms, as far as the local communities were concerned. The Project Assessment thus boldly stated that

"the prospects for a positive economic growth within the existing economic and social structure [is supposed to] be good" and "[t]horough-going changes in institutional [conditions] or property relations do not seem necessary in order to achieve the programme's main objectives".

Constraints in LIRD

2.8.5. In the case of LIRD, NORAD not only requested more information, but also stressed that due attention ought to be accorded to the socio-cultural factors in the formulation of a LIRD proposal. A social anthropological study was indeed commissioned, but the consultant did not deliver the report. Though another study was at one point contemplated, it never materialized. What seems to have inhibited the undertaking of this second study is NORAD's apparent resentment to the initiation of LIRD. The proposal seem to have been unanimously turned down by NORAD Oslo, MDC and the other Nordic assistance agencies. Due to indications of "limited assistance" undertaken by Norwegian political authorities, NORAD seems to have had

little option but to compromise the procedures and accept the proposal, even in the absence of requested information. In effect, the internal correspondence came to focus almost exclusively on how to minimize NORAD's involvement. In its disinclination to commission a further study, NORAD perhaps sought not to commit itself any further by having to respond to the recommendations such a study might provide.

Constraints in VAP

2.8.6. Norwegian officials processing the initial VAP proposal insisted on the involvement of social scientists during the early phases of the Settlement Schemes. In the context of mounting criticism of the schemes, and the absence of baseline information, a social anthropologist was appointed. Rather than engaging in intensive studies to feed the planning process, however, the VAP social anthropologist seem to have found himself restricted by the VAP management. The most serious constraint in the collection of information in VAP thus turned out to be the role envisaged for the social anthropologist.

The VAP social anthropologist was not recruited to provide a baseline information for planning purposes. He was instead supposed to map such problems as the settlements encountered and thus "*improve the results of the efforts*" and "*ease the transition [to a settled way of life]*". Indeed at the time when schemes were being heavily criticized, NORAD Oslo emphasized strongly that the social anthropologist to be recruited should not give advice as to whether or not schemes should be initiated. Although the reports of the social anthropologist were focused on questions of direct relevance to implementation, they proved critical of the project. Oslo in correspondence with Lusaka emphasized that the schemes should be initiated independent of the anthropologist's assignment. Nevertheless as the social anthropologist was responsible for working out some of the basic ideas of the programme in its early phases, he played a more prominent role than what NORAD seemed to have intended.

2.9. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF COMPROMISE

2.9.1. In the discussion of the focus of attention in the course of decision making processes within NORAD and Ministry, it was corroborated that issues relating to NDA policy objectives had generally been raised by officials. There is some evidence, however, to suggest that these issues were sometimes tacitly compromised through accommodation of external constraints encountered at an early stage of the bureaucratic process in Oslo. One such constraint concerns the limitations imposed in multi-doner programmes, as in the case of RARP. Another is the general tendency of NORAD country offices to demand approval or initiation of a project, even when Oslo had requested, and was still waiting for retrieval of sufficient background information. Thus in spite of insightful comments and systematic criticisms raised in the course of the internal discussions in NORAD/MDC, the drive to have agreements signed and projects initiated tends through time to override policy concerns on the Norwegian side.

RARP and Settlement Schemes/VAP are cases in point. In both projects, NORAD country offices either ignored information that would prolong the decision-making process, or insisted that the projects should be initiated despite the fact that great worries were expressed in the internal correspondence within NORAD.

2.9.2. NORAD seems to have compromised policy issues twice in the case of VAP. The first compromise was the seeming indifference demonstrated by NORAD, both in Oslo and Lusaka, that the resettlement schemes were a failure and counter to NDA policy objectives. NORAD subsequently conceded the failure, and started to question the request for funds to support the Village Productivity Committees (VPC), as the latter were said to be ineffective, lacking popular support and imposed from above. It also raised critical questions regarding the position of women in VAP. Oslo communicated its objections to Lusaka, which was supposed to convey it to the Zambian Government. But for the sake of a quick decision and ratification of the agreement by the Zambian Government, Oslo soon after informed Lusaka of its readiness not to attach importance to either issue in case the Government showed intransigence over the issue. Zambia accepted, however, NORAD's viewpoint. However, although stress was laid on issues relating to the provision of funds for the VPCs, there was neither understanding of, or request for baseline information relating to them.

2.9.3. The dilemma entailed in having to compromise policies for efficiency was more often than not resolved by insistence on the need for constant *monitoring* of project implementation. However, by approving and initiating the project, the project is simultaneously carried on into a new phase in which other considerations and other actors are usually involved. By emphasizing *monitoring* as an alternative to pre-studies and background information, compromises were effected. RARP provides an example of this. But this should not be construed as to rule out in some case the feasibility of monitoring as a supplement to background information. Emphasis on monitoring, however, is valid only under conditions where there is a willingness on the part of all actors, and where there is in-built flexibility to ensure that the potentials of monitoring are fully utilized. Within a flexible framework as of the RUDEP concept, for example, monitoring should be accorded prominence, although the necessity for sufficient baseline information in the initial planning process should not in any way be compromised. In other projects, and RARP in particular, there is reason to believe that few of the worries expressed in the initial decision making phases were ever incorporated into systematic monitoring and evaluation exercises.

2.10. THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF NDA POLICY OBJECTIVES

2.10.1. One of the major constraints to the fulfilment of NDA policy objectives relates to the articulation and communication of these objectives by NDA personnel. When background information is requested in the processes of deciding whether or not a proposed project may be accepted, NDA policy objectives and concerns must be operationalized and given substance. Operationalization of policies and concerns entails a process whereby abstract ideas are translated into concrete and practical measures relating to the concept, objectives and targets of proposed projects. The manner in which policy objectives and concerns were operationalized in the four projects under review suggests that in instances the process of operationalization tended to

compromise the spirit of NDA policy objectives and concerns. But this is not a consequence of a deliberate tendency to effect compromise. It is rather a result of constraints on operationalizing objectives in a socio-cultural context so radically different from the one in which these policies are conceived and adopted.

2.10.2. One serious implication of operationalizing NDA policy without regard to the context is that objectives and concerns may conflict with each other. No matter which option is chosen, some compromise of aspects of NDA policy objectives and concerns become inevitably effected.

A major NDA policy concern relates to the integration of women (WID-orientation) in assisted projects. In negotiations and correspondence relating to all four projects, NDA personnel sought to emphasize that concern. The question of women is probably the most recurrent theme in the negotiations. With a few exceptions, however, the operationalization of the concern took the form of attempts to secure for women opportunities to partake in access to various resources, fora and opportunities provided by the proposed project. More concretely, the WID-orientation was more often than not operationalized as a requirement that at least 50% of the participants in various projects, recipients of incentives, members of popular committees etc., had to be women. Very seldom was operationalization of the WID-orientation based on understanding of the women's actual position in the societies concerned. In the process, NDA personnel tend to overlook the material objective constraints facing implementation of their concept of women's participation. These constraints relate to prevalent forms of division of labour among the sexes, systems of property rights and inheritance, women's general work-load, access to informal political systems, and an array of other questions relating to how women are in fact valued in their various roles in the target communities. As discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, such operationalization of the WID-orientation has tended to result in formal access for women, without really benefiting them or promoting their cause.

There were, however, some exceptions to that trend. Both during the discussions about VAP and LIRD, a handful of NDA personnel were demanding information on the overall context of women's situation in the target communities. The interviews with NORAD and Ministry staff also corroborate the emergence of an awareness in some circles that "*gender roles*" rather than "*situation of women*" ought to be the focus of NDA policy concern. This awareness, it should be stressed, does not merely signify a change of terminology; it does open new horizons for a more context-based operationalization of the WID-orientation.

2.10.3. The focus on the environment is another NDA policy concern which NORAD diligently pursues in project planning. The operationalization of this focus almost invariably implies the undertaking of steps to put an end to those adaptations in developing countries which are viewed as destroying the environment. Typically, the adaptations involved are shifting cultivation, nomadic pastoralism, wood-cutting and hunting. In Settlement Schemes/VAP and LIRD of Zambia, and RUDEP of Tanzania, which involved agricultural and/or natural resource development, NORAD consistently argued that the traditional forms of agricultural adaptations had devastating effects on the environment. In the implementation of all these projects thus it was envisaged that permanent and intensified forms of agricultural production constituted

2.10.5. The inability to undertake a context-specific operationalization of NDA policy objectives and concerns promises a situation in which policy issues tend to remain a purely bureaucratic exercise. The most immediate objective for the scrutinization of project proposals would thus tend to be the mere adoption of the policy issues in project designs and agreements. As the policy formulations reached in the process remain extremely general and mostly unrelated to the specific conditions they will confront in the course of project implementation, the whole exercise may sometimes attain a ceremonial character. Thus while scrutinization tends to place pressure on planners in recipient countries to include phrases about women's roles and local participation in designs and formal agreements, the discrepancy between the letter of the agreement and the reality of the context remains conspicuous.

2.10.6. The ceremonial character of the processes of project assessment and approval in some cases suggests prevalence of a tendency by NDA personnel to *affix* policy formulations rather than *integrate* policy perspectives into project documents and agreements. The WID-orientation is a case in point. In the course of interviews with some NORAD and Ministry officials, this tendency was critically pointed out. It was thus asserted that a meaningful operationalization of the WID-orientation has to struggle to reach behind the formulations of agreements to real measures that can improve women's situation. The struggle seems demanding in view of the two-fold constraint facing the bureaucratic process: male-domination and lack of understanding of the socio-cultural realities in the target communities.

2.11. THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF INFORMATION ON SCC

2.11.1. Most NDA officials, particularly the sectoral professionals, tend to assert that research reports written by social scientists, particularly anthropologists, are largely unintelligible and generally not useful for planning purposes. In order to incorporate SCC in planning of NDA projects, they usually explain, the information on SCC should be provided in *usable form*. In the Terms of Reference for this study, the same point is reiterated; and the study team was called upon to advise NORAD and Ministry on ways and means by which information on SCC could be collected and communicated in usable form to planners and policy makers. The issue, however, is far more complicated than what NDA officials and the Terms of Reference seem to imply. Simultaneously the apparent focus on the style of presentation of anthropological reports seems to provide the basis for the formulation of irrelevant and mystifying questions regarding incorporation of SCC. The relevant question relates to the issue of what social scientists denote by the term *ethnocentrism*. In essence, it is a problem having to do with the ability to transcend one's own normative framework in dealing with other, often conspicuously different, socio-cultural contexts. The purpose of this section is to expose, in simple terms and on the basis of the lessons from the projects under review, that essence of the problem.

2.11.2. In view of the manner in which information on local SCC was handled in the four projects, it is not in doubt that, within NORAD and the Ministry, there seems to be a serious problem of cross-cultural translation. Put simply, it is a problem of understanding and evaluating socio-cultural phenomena in target communities, not

in terms of Norwegian and/or Western standards, but in the terms upheld by these communities themselves. Cross-cultural translation is the basic task in all social anthropological reports.

2.11.3. The limited information on SCC requested, provided and utilized in project planning and decision-making processes corroborates the prevalence of a problem of cross-cultural translation. In other words, while NDA officials seem to have a genuine feeling that knowledge about local socio-cultural conditions are of importance for development planning, their understanding of the realities underlying these conditions seems quite limited. They seem almost invariably to request and utilize information of a *readily comprehensible nature*, that is to say, of the type which would "make sense" in a Norwegian and/or Western socio-cultural context. This implies that NDA officials tend to disregard the fact that non-Western ways of thinking and living are *real*, and tend to think of other people as "*basically Westerners*", denied of the benefits of modern scientific thinking by embracing inexorable, seemingly superstitious "traditions".

2.11.4. As discussed earlier, the pre-feasibility studies, project assessments and early reviews carried out in connection with the four projects contained only to a very limited extent information on local SCC. The scanty material provided, however, did not inspire the generality of NDA officials processing the documents to pose questions relating to that material. Insofar as it was largely not utilized, the information might itself have been deemed irrelevant. Unfamiliar ideas and practices, such as witchcraft and sorcery, were most likely regarded as exotic and somehow irrelevant aspects of local culture. The officials were interested largely in issues relating to NDA policy objectives and concerns; and their questions were confined to issues such as the "position of women" in the local communities. By so doing, however, the officials simultaneously demonstrated an inability to comprehend the "otherness" of the information they were actually requesting.

2.11.5. Symptomatic of the inability to understand the otherness of local SCC is the way in which information on witchcraft beliefs was handled in the four projects. Various pre-feasibility studies, reviews and reports on projects pointed out that witchcraft suspicions occasioned totally unacceptable working conditions for extension workers (VAP), constituted one of the main health problems in Rukwa (RUDEP), and would severely hamper the efficiency of project personnel brought from other regions (RUDEP). Nevertheless, the question of witchcraft was never mentioned in the internal correspondence among NORAD officials dealing with these projects. Nor were the officials in the concerned projects able to understand what had been taking place and take action accordingly. Needless to stress is that information on exotic ideas and practices must somehow "make sense" for an official before he/she incorporates it into practical planning. When information is regarded as irrelevant, it is spontaneous that no action could be undertaken on its basis. In the process, however, important issues relating to the seemingly exotic phenomena are easily glossed over and swept away from the agenda. This point needs to be carefully recapitulated.

2.11.6. Witchcraft as a theory of causation, of how occurrence of unfortunate events is explained by villagers, is absurd by modern scientific standards. For one thing, how could malaria be caused by an evil eye? For another, how could the evil eye be involved when the body of which it is part (the accused person) was not physically present in the village when malaria was contracted? Such is the typical reaction of Westerners on

hearing of witchcraft cases. And they are no doubt right in their view. Nevertheless, they completely misunderstand what the whole case was about. In witchcraft cases, no one is interested in causation, of how unfortunate events come to occur. The event itself is not interesting, and usually incidental to the case and as such may be substituted by any other event (collapse of a hut, divorce of a daughter, loss of an animal, etc.). Witchcraft cases, exotic and unscientific sets of ideas as they are, are of interest as a means of defining tensions in social relations among the persons involved. Witchcraft cases provide a theory of accusation, and the notions expressed in their course are not adopted in "normal" everyday life as a guide for action. Underlying witchcraft cases thus are conflicts and rivalry over rights, resources or persons (incidence of witchcraft accusation among co-wives tend to be normally high). When a VAP extension worker, who belonged to the same Northern Province as the target population, was accused of witchcraft, a message was actually being conveyed. The details of that specific case are not known. It might be personal and as such irrelevant to VAP: the extension worker might have got involved with a village woman. But it could have well been of paramount significance to VAP management: the extension worker, being from the same area, might have unwarrantedly favoured his own immediate relatives in the distribution of the free and/or subsidized inputs provided by VAP. By disregarding a witchcraft case, the VAP management might have denied itself an opportunity to assess the performance of its extension workers, who are pivotal to the realization of programme objectives.

2.11.7. Unless the totality of the socio-cultural context is understood by NDA officials, the seemingly exotic beliefs and practices of the target populations would not "make sense". Such a comprehensive understanding has to be promoted through the background information presented in the pre-studies. Pre-feasibility teams consisting exclusively of sectoral professionals would not, however, be competent to provide such information. Such scanty information on local SCC as usually provided, is unsystematic and more often than not distorted. This does not only point to the need to involve social anthropologists in pre-studies. It also indicates the indispensability of intensive, longitudinal anthropological studies in those communities where no previous research has been undertaken. Social anthropologists study each community on its own right. But though their previous research experience may be relevant in undertaking subsequent research in other communities, the limits of this relevance should be emphasized. Relevance concerns the perfection of research methods and techniques, not the anticipation *a priori* of what values, ideas, institutions or processes that might be encountered. Projection of SCC in one local community in terms of the normative framework of another local community is not, methodologically speaking, in any way different from projecting them in terms of Norwegian and/or Western normative frameworks.

2.11.8. One of the long term problems facing NORAD and the Ministry, in the attempt to pay greater attention to SCC of local communities, is how to improve capacity and competence of their personnel in cross-cultural translation. The form of training currently availed to NORAD personnel and consultants is seriously deficient in that respect. The "role playing" package whereby technical assistance personnel are supposed to be introduced to the "otherness" of target populations is, probably too simple with respect to the elimination of barriers to achievement of cross-cultural translation. Training packages for the purpose need to be formulated in close collaboration with anthropologically competent academic institutions and personnel, both

in Norway and developing countries. Such forms of training, moreover, need not be construed by NORAD and Ministry staff as an "added workload". The staff have to be sufficiently sensitized that cross-cultural translation is crucial to their job performances.

2.12 Conclusions

All the projects discussed in this chapter (as well as the two remaining projects described in Annex 5) are indicative of the lack of effective routines in NORAD/the Ministry both to acquire knowledge about relevant aspects of social and cultural conditions in the localities in which NORAD operates, and to incorporate such knowledge into the planning process. The problem is many-sided and complex.

2.12.1. It is important to emphasize that in most of the projects discussed individual planners (within NORAD and in other organisations with which NORAD cooperated) did request information on several aspects of SCC of relevance for project planning and implementation. These requests seem mainly to spring from strong concerns about possible unfortunate effects of the planned projects on specific target groups of NDA, such as "the poorest" and "women". There were, however, also strong actors at work within NORAD who struggled to initiate projects and programmes before the requested information had been gathered. Most prominent among these forces were the NORAD missions abroad. Subject to internal bureaucratic routines and political pressure from recipient governments, these missions were instrumental in initiating projects despite the many critical comments and questions raised in the internal discussions within NORAD.

2.12.2. This tendency to force projects through did, however, still leave ample time to conduct pre-studies, as in most cases 4-5 years elapsed prior to project initiation. Very little information on SCC was, however, gathered, and important questions were thus left unanswered. The failure to provide the material partly reflects a lack of effective routines within NORAD for designing and executing pre-studies and partly NORAD's weak or problematic relations to Norwegian and/or African research institutions capable of conducting such studies. As in most cases there would already be considerable material on local conditions gathered in various academic and administrative institutions, archives etc., the cases above also indicate a substantial under-utilization of already existing material.

2.12.3. The information on local conditions in fact provided was of two kinds: i) various field visit reports, comments etc. submitted by NORAD planners, and ii) professional reports, comments etc. submitted by consulted social scientists and others. Information from the former source was quite impressionistic and with a strong focus on aspects of (seemingly) immediate relevance for official Norwegian concerns (especially the situation of women). The latter type of information seems also inadequate from a professional point of view. Although there are some exceptions, the few anthropological contributions seem neither to provide all-embracing background pictures of the communities in question (monographic presentations), nor more specific analyses of project relevant aspect. The restrictions placed on the social scientists involved in the projects, in terms of work descriptions and time constraints, account to some extent for this deficiency. Partly, NORAD did not allow the consultants to investigate the conditions they themselves found relevant, partly NORAD did not, and still does not,

fully acknowledge the specific methodological characteristics inherent in anthropological investigations (prolonged fieldwork etc).

2.12.4. The tiny information on local SCC provided by these few contributions was adhered to in different ways. Although the cases are very few and, accordingly, inferences far from certain, it seems to be case that information provided on the situation of women was picked up and utilized in the negotiation process. Information on unfamiliar aspects of the local social organisation (for instance unaccustomed ways of arranging land rights) and on significant cultural aspects (like witchcraft beliefs) was, on the contrary, not adhered to in the further planning process on the projects. This indicates a problem of comprehension on the part of NORAD when it comes to differently constituted realities. Only information of an easily understandable and acceptable nature seems to be incorporated into the planning process.

2.12.5. On a more basic level this tendency reflects the constant dilemma of having to operate in unfamiliar environments, ie. in the midst of communities with strikingly different ways of living and thinking, with a Western (or Norwegian) frame of conceptualization. The cases above illustrate that among most NORAD planners, information tends to be adhered to in terms of focuses of the Norwegian political debate and on the basis of Western conceptualizations, not in terms of the actual realities of the communities with which NORAD interacts. This pertains also to the phrasing of requests for prestudies and additional information. As most of the cases above illustrate, information of a very broad and unfocused nature was requested (on "the situation of women", "people's traditions"), and it seems generally to be the case that planners seldom are capable of formulating substantial questions informed by the reality with which they are dealing. This problem is partly springing from the inadequate training in cross-cultural understandings granted NORAD officials. It is also a reflection of the fact that competent persons seldom are assigned the task to serve as cross-cultural translators of foreign and unfamiliar ways of life during project planning.

CHAPTER THREE

**NORWEGIAN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE POLICY
AND
THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSION**

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3.1. GENERAL

3.1.1. Though development assistance to Africa is a recent phenomenon that emerged following de-colonization, it has nevertheless become central to the operation of socio-economic processes in many African countries. The expression "aid addiction" does not merely constitute a characterization of a tendency by both officials and target populations. It is rather a manifestation of a new "culture" comprising sets of perceptions, expectations and attitudes upheld not only by recipients, but also by some of the technical assistance personnel posted by donor governments and organizations in recipient countries.

3.1.2. Technical assistance personnel are ostensibly posted in developing countries specifically to help, and no matter how they resent the "aid addiction" syndrome, they often become prey to the "development assistance culture". Their placement tends to reinforce a situation in which they may be tempted to see themselves, as they are being seen by the locals, as something of super-men and -women: at least they control funds, vehicles and all the necessary inputs and resources to which both local officials and people aspire. This puts technical assistance personnel in an unenviable predicament on deciding which course of action to follow. They may tend to believe in **their superiority**, reminiscent of the White Man's Burden, and become "charitable", thereby furthering aid addiction. Alternatively they may tend to resist and start denying "easy money" to those who seek it, which would often hold the prospect of falling behind in **disbursement schedules**. Such a prospect, however, worries many technical assistance personnel, precisely because **keeping to disbursement schedules is often taken by superiors as a significant indicator of performance**. Failure to disburse funds may consequently affect renewal of contract or, in the case of tenure positions, promise transfer to limbo at head office.

3.1.3. For the recipient government officials and target populations, development assistance may easily be conceived of as an effective way to solve immediate problems quickly and easily. Government officials are often most interested in the *institutional support* they would get through development assistance projects. The first activities in any development assistance project are therefore almost invariably procurement of vehicles and construction of accommodation facilities for project staff. In numerous projects, assessment of actual priority suggests that the project goals (service or output) come last and least in both implementation and allocation from project funds. It seems an irony that the real beneficiaries in many development assistance ventures are project personnel and related government departments. But no matter how little of project funds reaches the intended target population, the local people would nevertheless be pleased. It is not in doubt, of course, that they would ask for more, and would take it if offered.

3.1.4. The benefit a target population may get from development assistance, it is worth noting, may sometimes conflict with the benefit intended by the donor when the project was initially conceived. This indirect benefit is most common in cases of relief aid, where famine victims may have no taste for the air-lifted "luxury" food items (wheat flour, biscuits, jam, sardines, etc.), which they would be glad to barter for local foodstuffs. But it is also encountered in cases of development assistance, such as when subsidized agricultural inputs (say tractor service) are used for crops other than those for which the project was launched. Through "aid addiction", development assistance

becomes one of several opportunities utilized to solve immediate problems. Long-term solutions may not be sought at all, especially when the flow of development assistance seems regular.

3.1.5. NDA policy seems to challenge this new culture by its emphasis on the *sustainability* of projects. But in almost all reviewed projects, and notwithstanding that many show impressive success in meeting schedules and technical targets, the question of sustainability is an issue of major concern. The Norwegian policy makers sought to ensure sustainability through provisions for, *inter alia*, *community participation* (CP), which is deemed difficult to operationalize in some projects. National energy projects and commodity-aid programmes, for example, seem difficult spheres into which community participation may be incorporated - although it is desirable to provide for it even at such levels. Typically, CP is conceived to relate to projects dealing directly with communities, as in agricultural, health services and water projects. NDA projects in these fields often demonstrate serious intent to promote CP, but much is still left to be desired.

3.1.6. The incorporation of local SCC into NDA is already facilitated by the current policy emphasis on sustainability and community participation. But to achieve incorporation of local SCC, NORAD and the Ministry have to recognize that the task is not merely to identify and attempt to integrate those SCC of relevance to development. The task also concerns investigating whether or not the current NDA objectives and concerns, in themselves, promote or impede such a process of incorporation. These objectives and concerns, needless to emphasize, are underlain by Norwegian socio-cultural conditions and policies, which are not necessarily congruent with those of the recipient governments and/or target communities. The discrepancy between these sets of socio-cultural conditions seems to be generally trivialized by personnel of the studied projects, but its consequences remain prominent. The purpose of this chapter is to formulate a general synthesis of the issues and lessons emerging from the evaluation and how these lessons may guide future action in NDA projects in general, and the studied projects in particular. In order not to be too general, and in the process vague too, the synthesis focuses on a number of specific issues considered of paramount significance to NDA policy principles. These issues are;

- 3.2. Community participation,
- 3.3. Indigenous technical knowledge,
- 3.4. Integration of women in development,
- 3.5. The focus on the environment, and
- 3.6. Sustainability as integration in local structures.

3.2. *COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION*

3.2.1. It is generally accepted today that a precondition for achievement of sustainability is to overcome the new culture of development assistance. A re-orientation, whereby external funding is to be perceived, and used by recipients as a supplement to local resources for attainment of long-term solutions for structural problems is essential. It

is in this context that community participation is viewed as a crucial instrument for the promotion of such a new orientation.

In all the reviewed NORAD-funded projects, awareness of the significance of community participation (CP) prevails. But clear understanding of the precise nature, extent and content of CP seems to be generally lacking. Nevertheless, project officials seem to be aware that, to ensure CP, it is not sufficient that technical assistance personnel, in alliance with local officials, seek to formulate projects conceived to be beneficial to the local people. The people themselves should ideally take the initiative for the conception of project idea and, in accordance with the nature of the project, participate in its implementation.

Of the reviewed projects, RUDEP seems to have the greatest potential for the promotion of community participation. This should be so, not on account of its achievements (although these should not be under-estimated), but because of its planning concept. Whereas the majority of NORAD-assisted projects are based on the delivery model, RUDEP is based on a processual planning model. The delivery model of planning, typically with rather rigidly pre-set resource allocations, financial targets and implementation phases is generally most concerned with resources and infrastructures. Within such a planning framework, members of the target population are accorded a minimal, if any, role in implementation: they are passive recipients who may be consulted only when it is imperative to do so. In contrast to such a planning framework, RUDEP exemplifies a significant shift in planning of NDA projects. It is based on an annual cycle within a three year rolling framework, and this constitutes an in-built flexible mechanism whereby community participation and other objectives could be integrated at a later stage even if no account of them was provided at project conception. More significantly to the question of incorporation of socio-cultural conditions, moreover, is that the processual model does not depend entirely on the base-line data provided (or required) at the initial planning stage. In view of these merits, processual planning is envisaged as a credible planning framework in the operationalization of the transitional integrative-generative model recommended in Chapter One.

3.2.2. Much of the project personnel (national and expatriate alike) would however express strong reservations to the generalized adoption of CP, which is viewed as fitting for some but not all levels of project activity. They are most reluctant to incorporate CP into decision-making processes, especially when decisions are supposed to be based on technical considerations. In the water sector, for example, community participation may be sought to identify the magnitude of water shortage, and to ensure contribution of (paid/unpaid) labour for construction and subsequent operation and maintenance. But engineers would not tend to listen to people on where a well should be sited, or which river should be used for construction of water catchment area. Such issues are considered "technical" and, given the attitude of project personnel towards *indigenous technical knowledge* (cf. below), advice by the local people is generally not sought and, when volunteered, is not normally heeded. This is an issue to be dealt with in more detail later. Its importance to the present discussion is that though project personnel often complain about lack of interest in CP on the part of the target population, the former in their turn do sometimes impede CP, especially in decision-making processes - and usually at the expense of subsequent operation and maintenance of projects.

3.2.3. The participation of the target populations in the conception of development projects guarantees the relevance of the project to their felt-needs. Simultaneously, it should satisfy the two basic principles of NDA policy of poverty focus and recipient orientation. But these principles are not commonly adopted in development planning in recipient countries. The regimes in the four countries in which the studied projects are located differ in many and significant respects. In terms of ideology and rhetoric, for example, they range from "scientific marxist-leninist but also African socialist" to a pseudo-liberal laissez faire approach. In all of them, however, the planning is a heavy top-down exercise, even when, as in the case of RUDEP in Tanzania, community participation is envisaged to be central.

Development planning in recipient countries is often geared towards expansion of the production base to promote increased foreign exchange earnings. The concerns of governments in adopting (or being pushed by requirements of structural adjustment programmes to adopt) such a strategy may be understandable. But in practice very little attention is given to the question of identifying those who would undertake increased production; how intensified cash-cropping would affect small farmers and pastoralists; or whether or not the rewards from such increases would be equitably distributed, etc. Development projects based on such strategies in Africa almost invariably ended up worsening the conditions of the poorer sections of the population, who hardly participate in them, except in so far as they become subjected to marginalization processes.

3.2.4. The discrepancy between the macro objectives of government and the felt-needs of people at the local level is often not banal to donors, unless representatives of the latter acquire a fairly thorough knowledge of the polity and economy of partner countries. Various forms of compromise, implying incorporation of incentives for local people, are usually provided by government. Though a project may be of no immediate relevance to the local people, due to the in-built incentives, they would usually show no overt opposition to it.

In some instances, however, the discrepancy may be of such a magnitude that the objectives of government are grossly incompatible with those of the target population or the donors. But none of the partner countries would explicitly engage in a controversial programme or project, which would certainly be opposed by both local people and donors. They would, however, seek realizing their unpopular goals indirectly through implementation of a seemingly desirable project. There is some speculation that in at least one of the reviewed projects the recipient government used the project to promote an unpopular policy explicitly stated to neither the local people nor the donors. While the local people wanted a *radical* policy of land reform involving redistribution of the fertile land which is at present inequitably distributed, the government for various considerations sought mitigating the severity of the land question by resettling people within the marginal lands. The government could not, however, make public its intentions, and would surely not have been able to secure external (particularly Norwegian) funding for the programme if it did. It alternatively sought to promote its objectives indirectly. Firstly, it did not formally adopt a land policy, although all the technical pre-requisites for the formulation of such a policy were completed some years ago. Secondly, it presented to donors a proposal for a programme involving the extension of a service known to be needed by the local population, and began to extend the service but in such a way as to promote

resettlement. Those opposed to resettlement, however, refrained from participating in the service programme. The fusion of the explicit and implicit objectives in such a development assistance programme does not seem to have been grasped by donors, who tend to contract consultants to analyze the low level of community participation in parts of the programme area. Had the local people been involved in the conception of the service programme, or in decisions concerning the siting of service points, the programme would have been substantially different from what it is at present.

3.2.5. In some projects it is reported that community participation was sought even in the conception of project. The RUDEP water supply component is reported to be among these projects. But the type of participation involved seems a mockery of the concept. As reported by Lexow and Skjønsberg (1989), villagers in the RUDEP area were asked whether or not they wanted the inclusion of their village in the project. No question, however, was raised whether water supply is the most urgent need for villagers. To the extent that government officials and representatives of donors think they know better what is good for the villagers, community participation would be severely constrained, and the development assistance projects may be of limited relevance to the aspirations and needs of the beneficiaries.

3.2.6. Community participation should not be construed solely in terms of conception of project idea, provision of labour and/or use of service by the target population. It should also be viewed as a process promoting the identification of the project with the target population. One method for achieving this is to formulate development assistance projects in such a way as to deploy aid as a supplement to local resources. Though the beneficiaries may not have much in the form of resources to fund implementation, it is necessary to secure the maximum contribution they can reasonably afford. Contribution may be in cash or kind (e.g. labour). No matter how little in proportion to the actual cost, such a contribution would identify the target population with the project, provide them with the dignity of owner when dealing with project personnel, and ensure their involvement in project activities.

The concepts of "harambee" in Kenya and "self-reliance" in Tanzania are currently being invoked to promote contributions by the local communities to cover part of project costs. The establishment of a Village Water Fund in Rukwa, for example, serves to underline the responsibility of villagers towards operation and maintenance of their water supply system and routine maintenance is easily financed by the fund. Soliciting local contribution, however, should be approached with caution. Many recipient governments (and indeed some donors, such as the World Bank) may demand a large contribution through implementation of a "cost-sharing" strategy, whereby beneficiaries are expected to cover a significant portion of project costs (particularly in operation and maintenance). It would simply be unrealistic to expect, for example, the poor Rukwa villagers to finance major repair work at the catchment area, if their poverty is not alleviated first.

3.2.7. Community participation is more often than not sought through deployment of social mobilizers. The latter are usually recruited to encourage target populations to articulate their needs, conceive of solutions in the form of projects, and share in the cost of projects. As animators, these mobilizers play a significant mediatory role in communication between target populations and project personnel. Consequently their recruitment becomes an important process, and much care needs to be exercised in

their selection. One significant consideration is to ensure that mobilizers would not be subject to the same communication constraints as ordinary government officials do in their dialogue with communities. Suspicion and mistrust characterize the concept of local people regarding government officials. In some projects, it was found that the social mobilizers are recruited on part-time basis from among the ranks of government workers in the area. Continuing assumption of their old profession does not help the dialogue process - as it is known from experience that the government would do things the way it wants and irrespective of what villagers might think or demand. A further constraint that may face social mobilizers relate to their background and whether or not they belong to the population with which they are interacting. Government workers are often posted in other than their home regions, and in such cases recruitment of outsiders, who do not understand the local culture or have strong views against it, may result in communication problems. Social mobilizers should therefore preferably be from the region and engaged on full-time basis. Dissociation from official position would facilitate further the process of communication with local communities.

3.2.8. A task of paramount significance which social mobilizers may perform concerns informing project personnel not only of local perceptions, values and beliefs, but also of the nature and context of indigenous technical knowledge. In a context such as that of RUDEP where the planning framework is sufficiently flexible to incorporate new information, the role of social mobilizers can hardly be over-estimated. But there are certain constraints facing mobilizers which need to be emphasized. As relatively educated locals, mobilizers may be alienated not only from local production systems but also local culture. For this reason, they need to be sensitized and convinced of the necessity of acquiring and relaying such information. The implications of basing plans on such local information, especially on indigenous technical knowledge, for the promotion of community participation, are far-reaching.

3.3. *THE RELEVANCE OF INDIGENOUS TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE*

3.3.0. In spite of the controversy over the definition and/or meaning of "development", it is generally agreed that the concept carries connotations of abandonment of pre-existing patterns of doing things. This notion is by no means confined to donors; it is indeed often even more pronounced among national policy-makers, planners and technocrats in developing countries. The latter, particularly the national politicians may, at least in rhetoric, take pride in the "deep-rooted" and "humane" values and morals of their societies. But nevertheless they emphatically emphasize the need to "modernize" the "traditional" methods and techniques that their compatriots adopt in pursuance of productive activities. These techniques are pointed out as the primary constraint in the search for development; and to achieve development the adoption of new techniques, based on scientific knowledge, is advocated. In effect, indigenous technical knowledge (ITK, which covers environmental knowledge as well) is categorically discarded. The reviewed NDA projects are no exception in this respect.

The Encounter Between Two Knowledge Systems

3.3.1. Though not based on an abstract understanding of the "inner laws of motion" of natural and physical phenomena, indigenous technical knowledge is practical. It is a product of careful observation of the results of diligent practice, in a trial and error fashion, that has assumed the status of established wisdom accumulated over generations. Given the constraints imposed by the relatively low level of technology, members of "traditional communities" have come to improve and perfect their ITK in pursuance of understanding the potentials and constraints of their environment so they could decide on options for effective actions. For example, in all indigenous farming communities forms of folk taxonomy of seed varieties are adopted. Small farmers thus distinguish between fast-maturing, drought-resistant and "standard" (preferred under normal conditions because it is "heavy", though slow-maturing) varieties of the same crop. In accordance with calculated strategies taking into account urgency of need for crop, prospects of drought, etc., specific varieties are sown. Such wisdom is normally vested in old people, and gets disseminated to the new generations in the course of the normal socialization process in these communities.

3.3.2. In all parts of the world traditional communities have been incorporated, often initially under conditions of full-scale colonization, into larger political units with central governments, modern economic institutions and regular forces, etc. The colonial governments introduced a new educational system based on *scientific knowledge*. In contrast to ITK which rested with the elders of the community, the new knowledge system came to be vested in the younger generations. Access to positions of power and authority in the larger system has thereafter come to depend largely on acquisition of this new knowledge.

Upon the attainment of independence, the emerging new states kept the colonial educational system intact: the national leaders and state functionaries have all passed through the modern educational system and possessed the new system of knowledge associated with it. Two systems of knowledge have thus come to dominate the lives of traditional communities.

3.3.3. The encounter between the two systems of knowledge was not achieved in a socio-economic and politico-historical vacuum. Scientific knowledge, initially associated with the colonial order and subsequently with the national government, was, and continues to be, vested in those with power and authority. ITK belonged to the subjects. The encounter has thus been biased against the latter from the outset. Rather than assuming the form of a dialogue and complementarity, the relation between the two systems was asymmetrical. Scientific knowledge has come to establish, perforce, its superiority over ITK. With the advent of Independence and the ideology of development, little attention was paid to investigating the basis, content or context of ITK. The holders of the new knowledge, particularly those trained in the technological sciences, have simply assumed ITK to be superstitious, useless, or "traditional" (meaning pre-scientific) and held that it ought to be relegated to the dust-bin of history. Simultaneously transfer of the new technology and knowledge has become synonymous with development.

3.3.4. Of the major factors underlying the bias against ITK seems to be the issue of literacy and abstract thinking. Traditional communities, more often than not, were

illiterate at the advent of colonial government. As scientific knowledge is vested in books, illiteracy for the colonial regime (and its post-colonial counterpart) has come to mean "ignorance", and this has sufficed to validate the disregard of ITK. Simultaneously it legitimized colonization and, after independence, developmental interventions as *civilizational processes*. Technical assistance personnel and national technocrats and professionals cherish virtually identical views on ITK.

3.3.5. The fact that ITK consists largely of practical sense rather than theoretical explanations has enticed many Western observers to postulate that members of illiterate communities lacked the capacity for abstract thinking. As recent research shows, however, the contexts in which abstract categories are used in traditional communities often differ from what Western culture takes as the most appropriate (i.e. the level of scientific theory). Indeed, "the ease with which the average African traditionalist operates with abstract kinship categories leaves a Westerner groping for a glimpse of understanding" (Swartz, 1984:27). Prejudice, more than refutation, is what seems to underlie the disregard of ITK in the development process.

ITK and the Frustration of Young Extension Workers

3.3.6. The imposition of Western science and technology did not only undermine the wisdom and status of the elders in traditional communities. It also redefined the context for the interaction between elders and young people. In the words of Swantz (1986);

People who have not been formally educated have been treated as illiterate and, as such, ignorant. This, for the educated, has affirmed the need to act in a superior role as teachers in relation to the adult population, whose wisdom and knowledge about the use of their own social and natural environment has therefore been undermined and unutilized.

Insofar as development has come to be associated with the transfer of science and technology, extension, as a process of education to entice change of attitudes, started to assume prominence. The young extension workers began a mission to civilize traditional communities. The mission rested with the belief that ignorant people should be informed, or better still instructed, as to how things could be done scientifically - in agriculture, animal husbandry, health and all those spheres that bear direct impact upon survival. Initially to their surprise, and eventually to their frustration, the young extension workers found out that the traditional communities were not interested in wholesale adoption of scientific ways. It has of course been taken for granted that neither the song nor the singer were to blame: it is the uncultivated audience who was the culprit for lack of appreciation.

3.3.7. The reasons why efforts by extension workers are often in vain should not be difficult to identify. The spheres in which extension workers undertake their interventions are not new to these communities. Through the centuries, members of these communities managed to survive without resort to the new knowledge which the young are trying to preach. Moreover, the young are telling the elders to abandon ways of doing things without appreciation as to why these ways were adopted in the first place. Insofar as extension is taken as a process of unidirectional transmission, such

appreciation would be difficult to expect. The example of extension work in the VAP of Northern Zambia serves to illustrate the point.

In their effort to develop traditional agriculture in Northern Zambia, the young VAP agriculturalist tended to insist that it is scientifically proper that farmers should apply basal and top dressing fertilizers consecutively and at different times. Though use of fertilizers is nothing new to them, the traditional farmers did not abide by that advice. Especially in years of drought, when the prospects of a good crop are not promising, the farmers would wait until assured of germination of their seeds and then would mix the two types of fertilizer and apply them simultaneously. As the Zambia team reports it, "The result is often not worse than the very best the farmer who strictly follows the rules will get".

3.3.8. The case of fertilizer use by VAP farmers raises two crucial points. The first concerns, on the one hand, the lack of appreciation by the extension workers of the relative effectiveness of ITK and, on the other, the sheer arrogance these workers demonstrate in their interaction with farmers. Objectively, these young agriculturalists had no good reason to insist on applying fertilizers at different times when in fact the method adopted by the traditional farmers did not prove inferior to what is contained in text-books and project manuals. Had they accepted the practice of farmers, extension workers would have created crucial bridges for a productive dialogue. Such bridges would be instrumental in convincing farmers to adopt scientific methods on other occasions when these methods are known to be **definitively** superior and guaranteed to produce better results than traditional methods.

The practice of extension workers, however, is not envisaged to take the form of a dialogue as it is assumed that the farmers could only qualify for the role of passive recipients. The end result defeated the purpose of the whole extension exercise. Through misplaced insistence on the superiority of their methods, extension workers provided the farmers with a solid argument to defy whatever they may prescribe. At least in the case of the fertilizers, VAP farmers may contend, the scientific method was not superior to their own wisdom!

The second, and perhaps more important point emerging from the VAP example concerns the basis of the rationality of VAP farmers to wait until seeds germinate before applying the two types of fertilizer at the same time. What is at issue here is the socio-economic reality of the small farmers not only in the VAP but the whole of rural Africa: their poverty. In view of the little resources farmers possess, the cost of fertilizers, no matter how much subsidized, is substantial. If they had applied fertilizers and the crop failed, they would have lost most of what they had. Risk-taking under such circumstances becomes suicidal; and the farmers would naturally do all that is possible to minimize risks. Those farmers who follow the prescriptions of the extension workers are usually resourceful enough to bear the consequences of risk-taking. Extension workers dealing with poor farmers need to understand and base their advice on a recognition of the limited risk-taking capacity of poor farmers.

Technical Fetishism and Community Participation

3.3.9. The disregard of ITK and the assumption of the infallibility of scientific knowledge have more serious implications than the simple matter of whether or not

advice by extension workers would be heeded. They may also prove detrimental to the promotion of community participation and subsequent operation and maintenance of development projects. The CPHEP of RUDEP in Tanzania is a good case in point. It corroborates not only the limitations of technical decisions undertaken by project planners, but also the significance of community participation (based on learning from ITK) at the level of technical decision-making.

3.3.10. Kasanga village is part of the RUDEP area. As early as 1975, the villagers expressed their need for a water project. Though the villagers depended on the nearby Kapondwe stream for their water supply, they *suggested* using the Kasote river, further away from the village, for the construction of the catchment area. Their reason was common knowledge that the soil structure of Kapondwe, being prone to seasonal flooding, should not be considered a good site.

Insofar as RUDEP is envisaged to be based on community participation, the Kasanga villagers were involved in most phases of the project. The initiative was theirs, and when implementation started they worked on the construction site and later on contributed, through a Village Water Fund, to operation and maintenance. The villagers were not, however, involved in the technical process of selecting the catchment area. The project personnel decided it was both *technically and economically* feasible to construct the catchment area at the nearby Kapondwe river - which villagers would have opposed in favour of the more distant and costly site at Kasoto river.

As the construction of the catchment area was completed, the problems of the site became visible and the catchment area broke down seasonally. A unique participatory evaluation of the project highlighted the consequences of the exclusion of villagers in the process of selecting the catchment area. In the course of evaluation, the villagers generally conceded that they were responsible for maintaining the water project and meeting costs for minor repairs in the system. They did not, however, feel responsible for repairing the water-catchment area which broke down seasonally. Responsibility for the latter was seen to rest with those who had chosen the wrong site in disregard to the views of the villagers.

3.4. INTEGRATION OF WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT

3.4.0. The emphasis which NDA policy places on the integration of women in development (WID) is both necessary and desirable. This should be so because women not only assume responsibility for family sustenance (which includes food production), but also undertake activities affecting family health (integral to nurturing children and food preparation) and the environment (fetching fuel-wood and water). In all four countries covered by this study, women play a significant, if not the main, role in food crop production. Simultaneously, an increasing number of women have come to assume the role of sole or main providers for families, a phenomenon that dates back to the colonial era when systems of labour migration were first introduced. For example, in the communal areas of Zimbabwe, which seem most affected by male labour migration, the proportion of female-headed households is particularly high: between 35-40% of all households have female heads. It is thus understandable why in

the countries covered by this study, NORAD-assisted projects seem to emphasize, at least in rhetoric, the necessity for a WID-orientation.

Though in principle the focus on women should not be questioned, the *form* it has taken in NDA policy and practice tends to be ethnocentric and controversial. The WID-orientation is indeed a major area of contention, and has direct relevance to the issue of the socio-cultural dimension in NDA.

The Focus on Women

3.4.1. The WID-orientation has more and more become a conditionality for funding by NORAD. Initially NORAD officials would insist in their negotiations with partner governments on a certain women participation rate or the inclusion of a women component. At present, however, partner governments tend, on their own, to make provisions for WID-orientation in proposals submitted for funding. This tendency, if not out of commitment to a WID-orientation, is at least due to a realization that such provisions would enhance the acceptability of proposals by NORAD.

Two factors seem to have been instrumental in promoting a WID-orientation in NDA projects. The first concerns the general performance of projects. In this respect, it was gradually becoming evident that projects were not effective to the desired extent in improving the conditions of the intended target population. Very little positive impact seems to have concerned women in particular. The erroneous assumption that men and women would benefit equally from projects could no longer be entertained. In the case of VAP, for example, evaluation has revealed that men and women did not have the same access to various components of the programme such as free fertilizers, credit, improvement of infrastructure and limited assistance to health-care. Most of the inputs actually accrued to male household-heads and to the exclusion of married women. This was due to differences between men and women regarding access to productive assets (land in particular). Though female household heads did not face the same constraints as married women, they nevertheless faced other barriers which compromised their ability to fully benefit from VAP activities. The necessity of a specific focus on women was thus postulated.

The second, and perhaps more important factor promoting a WID-orientation relates to the women movement in the donor countries in general and Norway in particular. The domestic struggle for equal opportunities for women in Western countries was carried over to development assistance policy and practice. Women pressure groups in donor countries started to play a role of virtual guardians of Third World women. It is generally assumed that the latter are categorically discriminated against and that this discrimination is underlain by cultural premises precluding women's participation. As Third World women seemingly lacked effective organisation to articulate and pursue their interests, the assumption led to the conclusion that the initiative should be undertaken by the donors. It is indeed this second factor which has been more effective in promoting the WID-orientation in NDA. As will be discussed in more detail below, however, the underlying assumptions have serious implications for the incorporation of the socio-cultural dimension in development assistance.

3.4.2. In capitulation to domestic pressures within Norway, Norwegian policy has come to place much emphasis on integration of women. Review missions pay particular attention to the degree of integration and usually urges further steps to expand its scope. In the RARP in Kenya, the ratio of females in the composition of the construction work-force is regarded as an important indicator for performance. The RUDEP women coordinator in her reports emphasizes the impressive rate of participation by women in different project activities. On average, she reports, women represent about 39% of participants in the different activities; participation ranged from a low 25% for Forestry Department to 50% for each of Community Development and Health Departments. Keen interest is undoubtedly being shown in increasing the level of women participation.

Notwithstanding the reported impressive participation rates, serious criticism has been levelled against the way the issue of women's integration is handled. A recent evaluation commissioned by MDC (Lexow and Skjøsberg, 1989) has assessed the nature of the WID-orientation in three projects which were considered "good for women". The selected projects are the Labour Intensive Road Construction Project in Botswana, the RUDEP Water Supply and Sanitation Programme in Tanzania, and the Kenya Industrial Estates (credit) Programme. Though the choice of these projects was preceded by a careful process of screening 150 NORAD-funded projects, none has impressed the evaluation team as being particularly "*good for women*".

The integration of women into the three projects was achieved through an introduction of a "*quota*" system whereby a certain percentage was earmarked for women (in composition of the construction workforce, in membership of Village Water Committees and number of trainees, and in number of loanees in the three projects respectively). The team commended the committed NORAD staff in these projects as the prime promoters of a WID-orientation. The significance of project staff commitment was duly stressed in the recommendations for future improvements in performance of women component of projects.

Lexow and Skjøsberg discussed in some detail the question of why, despite commitment to a WID-orientation, none of the three projects achieved the desired results. An important issue raised concerned the observation that very little effort was exerted on assessing local women's own needs and priorities. For example, the education component of RUDEP project, in recognition of the link between sanitation and use of water, urges women to use more water. The women in the project area, however, have not followed the advice. Instead they seemed to use the same amount of water as before, but now water is collected in smaller amounts more frequently by children. The researchers seem critical that such an educational initiative is being undertaken without any study of women's present patterns of water use. Such an attitude in project formulation and implementation corroborates the earlier remark that project officials (expatriate as well as national) tend to think they know better the needs and problems of the target population (cf. 3.3. above).

3.4.3. Lexow and Skjøsberg provide in their account evidence of how concern over quantitative integration may defeat the object of NDA policy. In the Kenya Real Estates credit programme, NORAD stipulated in the agreement that 30% of the loanees of its funds should be women. But the stipulation failed to take into account "*the various conditions under which women apply for and get loans*" as:

Husband and wife partnership enterprises account for about one third of the loans to women. In many of the partnerships women were "sleeping partners" only. Given the prevailing socio-cultural conditions in Kenya, there is no guarantee that women benefit from such loans. About one third of the women loanees got very small loans, the so-called "character loans" of Kshs. 5,000 each, while the average loan size was well above Kshs 100,000.

The "character loans" have undoubtedly inflated the number of women loanees, and as such satisfied the 30% conditionality imposed by NORAD. But even if conditionality concerned the loanable fund rather than number of loanees, husband and wife partnerships would have satisfied the reformed conditionality.

Furthermore, recurrent reference is made by the researchers to one major factor impeding performance in the WID-orientation of projects: *socio-cultural barriers* prevalent in the recipient communities. By assigning special quotas for women, the team argues, women issues may be at risk of being marginalized. But nevertheless continued resort to quota systems is strongly recommended. Their logic is that, if "properly introduced", a quota "will serve as both a stimulation to women in general and as a notice to men that existing gender roles and attitudes towards women can and should be changed" (p. 18, emphasis added).

3.4.4. The view of Lexow and Skjønberg is typical of views expressed by women groups in Norway in general. In their evaluation report as in interviews with NORAD employees, an assumption prevails that *socio-cultural barriers* are wholly *ideational* or *attitudinal* and as such can be eliminated, or at least reduced, through consistent pursuance of integration of women in projects. But it is precisely this assumption informing the WID-orientation in NDA projects which is problematic. For one thing, *it does not only rule out incorporating the socio-cultural premises of the target population, but also in effect seek to transform these premises and bring them into line with those of the donor community.* This obviously raises the delicate question of the basis for evaluating other cultures and of deliberately intervening to change them. For another, *the WID-orientation seems to be largely based on the controversial assumption that by means of economic measures (provision of opportunities in projects) one can directly achieve socio-cultural targets (promoting women's social status and prestige in society).* Both points will be elaborated below.

3.4.5. The Tanzania team has also taken as one of its case-studies the RUDEP Water Supply and Sanitation Programme. The team suggests that the seemingly impressive women participation rates in RUDEP reveals evidence of a situation bordering on extreme formalism as the attention of the project staff has been more towards quantitative than qualitative aspects of participation. They suggest that the inclusion of two women in the Village Water Committee (VWC), subsequent to instructions by NORAD project officers, is a case in point.

The VWC initially had no female members, and the two women were included subsequent to instructions by NORAD project officers. The two, though formally members, do not participate in VWC activities, and have generally been ineffective in mobilizing other women. One reason behind their ineffectiveness was their status as fairly young women, who would find it difficult to influence older women. But the relationship between age and status is not the only socio-cultural factor which RUDEP

has overlooked (or unilaterally attempted to change?). *The whole context in which gender roles and the division of labour is envisaged and adopted in the local community seems to have been ignored.* The team thus passes a harsh judgement that NORAD has in effect avoided

the difficult task of understanding the cultural justification for the existing household division of labour on whose basis education work should be undertaken before insisting on abandoning the existing division of labour. Both men and women must be educated and convinced why a greater role of women in certain socio-economic activities is essential.

The point is not that the recipient communities (or men?) seek to exclude women from productive participation. In fact, the significant role of African women in rural communities hardly needs emphasis. The consideration that NDA policy should aim to "reduce the burden on women" is both well-founded and desirable. But in these communities gender roles are based on ideals of **complementarity**, not of **self-reliance** as in the current ideal (if not practice?) in Western societies. **Neither women nor men can abandon their prescribed roles without disruption to the prevalent division of labour as well as to all the productive activities pursued on its basis, unless a feasible alternative division of labour is simultaneously instituted.** Thus even if it is conceded that the new role advocated by NDA is to be assumed by African women (whose views on this should be investigated anyway), it should be clear that women can abandon their assigned roles no more than men could. A comprehensive approach, entailing a shift of focus from women to **gender roles**, is necessary. In discussions with MDC and NORAD officials in Oslo, awareness of the feasibility and necessity of such a shift has been underlined. But its operationalization as policy and practice remains unfulfilled.

Income-Generating Activities

3.4.6. The focus on women seems to invariably entail concern with improving the level of income by women. The assumption is often that when women earn more, they would be able to improve both their living conditions and their status in community. Such an assumption, however, seems controversial. For one thing, it ignores or tries to belittle the workload which women already have as part of their domestic activities. **Engaging in income-generating activities in addition to their current responsibilities would only add a burden on women.**

Before embarking upon a women's programme the project should have ascertained the needs, interests and aspirations of the women. **Women's programmes often operate as if all women are a homogeneous group with the same needs and concerns,** which is not necessarily true in all spheres. For example, a woman who is also a head of household may be more responsive to agricultural training programmes than a married woman. The former would have more control over her time as well as control over the money she earns from her crop. Married women have less flexibility and less control over their time, labour and productivity. But rarely are there several programmes operating to meet the needs of different categories of women. The VAP has attempted to adopt such a differentiating strategy, but the way it was adopted proved as inflexible as the current practice of having only one programme for all women. VAP insisted on

extending agricultural credit to **unmarried women only**; even interested married women were excluded. This brought to VAP the charge, on the part of husbands, that the credit scheme was enticing independence of women to the extent of breaking up marriages!

3.5. THE FOCUS ON THE ENVIRONMENT

3.5.1. The focus on the environment is currently a major issue in NDA policy. Commitment to this focus is so strong that Norway has become instrumental in promoting worldwide awareness of the necessity to adopt such a focus. The focus on the environment underlines concern over the **global crisis** (the "green-house effect") as well as interest in promoting **sustainable adaptations** by local target populations in drought-stricken African regions. The former relates to a prospective long-term catastrophe threatening continuity of human life on earth; the latter pertains to mitigating and eventually eliminating current human tragedies of famine and displacement.

3.5.2. As the case with the WID-orientation, the focus on the environment in NDA seems to have proved well-placed *in principle*, but problematic *in practice*. Its problematic nature stems partly from the difficulties inhibiting a context-based operationalization, and partly from a tendency to conceive accommodation of the focus in negative rather than positive terms (see Chapter Two).

3.5.3. The current practice in operationalizing the focus on the environment seems to be a stipulation that NDA projects should not contribute to environmental degradation. In projects involving agriculture, as in RUDEP and VAP, it simply means undertaking attempts to promote permanent cultivation in place of shifting cultivation. Considerable attention is also paid to deforestation processes, and attempts are also made to constrain it. The overwhelming majority of NDA projects adopt this **negative approach** to the fulfilment of the focus on environment. It is indeed only in the case of LIRDP where a **positive attitude** towards environmental concerns is demonstrated: the whole programme is intended to promote a sustainable form of natural resource management. Rather than signifying a shift in operationalizing the policy concern, however, LIRDP seems to be the only programme in which NORAD was initially unwilling to be involved. There is little evidence to suggest that, since the time NORAD has reluctantly accepted participation in the programme, its reservations were proved unfounded.

3.5.4. LIRDP's basic objective is to be the curbing of poaching. But poaching is defined in such narrow terms that it covers subsistence hunting. This has led to a situation in which the local population has already started to complain about the monotony of having to secure its protein requirements almost exclusively from rats (a socially acceptable practice). The programme is said to incorporate benefits to the local population, but implementation thus far is too recent to corroborate that any material benefits have actually accrued to them.

3.5.5. The negative approach to environmental sustainability, coupled with lack of sufficient background information on the target populations, may easily lead to a situation in which the focus on the environment is put on collision course with the poverty focus in NDA projects. Protection of forest trees is a case in point. It seems

that the process of deforestation often is conceived as a phenomenon relating wholly to the villagers' need for fuel-wood. In most African countries, however, the larger part of the demand for fuel-wood does not stem from the countryside, but from urban areas. The urban population requires fuel-wood not only for domestic purposes, but also for industrial uses as in construction (brick-making in particular) and traditional bakeries. Due to this, many African governments seem to be complacent by their anxiety to appease the urban population.

3.6. *SUSTAINABILITY AS INTEGRATION IN LOCAL STRUCTURES*

3.6.1. Development assistance projects are often set up and run parallel to existing government departments in recipient countries. The reasons for this situation are several and complex, but the end result is almost invariably identical: government departments would face considerable difficulties in operation and maintenance of projects when technical assistance personnel are phased out. Sustainability of projects, i.e. ability of local agencies to operate and maintain projects in the long run, is thus undermined or, at least, severely constrained by the course of events in early project years.

3.6.2. The main defence for setting up separate administrations for development assistance projects seem to be considerations of flexibility, efficiency and trust with project funds. Existing financial and administrative procedures (particularly for procurement) of recipient governments are often slow and cumbersome. Government departments would thus be inclined to ask technical assistance personnel to take over responsibility to ensure speedy processing. Simultaneously, donor agencies may be reluctant to place funds under disposal of national officials and/or government departments. Over and above anxiety that funds may be diverted to other activities in the department, the reputation of local officials as being corrupt seems a sufficient justification for intervention by donors. Donor agencies thus tend not only to monitor project funds, but also to take direct control of disbursements as well as of all project assets, particularly vehicles.

3.6.3. Insofar as government departments are known to be unable, on their own, to deliver the service/output for which the project is launched, they are usually categorized as inefficient by technical assistance personnel. The latter become entrusted with the day-to-day running of the project, and local project staff would work under their direct supervision and instructions.

Faced with prospects of marginalization in running of projects, national officials would tend to resent control by technical assistance personnel. Friction is often the least to result; and cooperation on the part of national officials may not be forthcoming, thereby affecting performance of projects. And when the project is eventually to be handed over, the department would be in no better placement to carry out operation and maintenance functions than before the project was launched. Expatriate staff would continue to complain about the inefficiency of the local institutions; but the latter would continue to perform the way they used to without anyone assisting them to improve methods.

3.6.4. A more productive course of action is one through which development assistance projects would spare no effort at working through local national agencies while simultaneously building competence among national staff. This course, however, would imply different functions for technical assistance personnel, who would then be dissociated from immediate, day-to-day, running of projects. Instead they would, concurrent with their search to realize project goals and objectives, aim at human resource development. Their basic responsibility becomes to increase the capability of the staff of the various departments connected with the project. By discharging this new responsibility, the negative aspects of the donor-recipient relationship would be dramatically reduced if not eliminated all together. Simultaneously, national agencies become fully prepared for eventual operation and maintenance of projects when technical assistance personnel are phased out.

3.6.5. The question of having national agencies taking responsibility of project implementation may be initially difficult in cases of inter-sectoral projects. Inter-sectoral planning and implementation (in early project life) is both necessary and desirable as it rules out duplication of efforts. But implementation of inter-sectoral projects seem to invariably entail establishment of new and cumbersome structures - often at high cost. For considerations of long-term operation and maintenance, however, leaders of inter-sectoral projects should also seek to contribute to human resource development and hand project activities over to their relevant sector as soon as procedures are clearly formulated.

A further consideration in attempts to integrate projects into existing structures concerns grassroots structures. New projects would have better placement working through existing structures (e.g. community development committees, water committees, etc.) rather than seeking to establish new ones. Existing systems have already been accepted in the area by the people and their leaders, and this should promote communication processes between project and target population.

3.7 Conclusions

3.7.1. Related to the point raised in Chapter two, that the internal Norwegian debate seems to shape the types of information that NORAD requests and incorporate into the planning process, it seems to be the case that also the policies of NDA are operationalized in terms of a Norwegian "universe of discourse". Any adaptation of abstract ideas and ideals to concrete, complex realities does of course entail various degrees of accommodation, and the existence of such processes of compromise should not by itself be leveled as criticism against NDA. It is, on the other hand, important to expose the often implicit premises on which the various Norwegian development policies are in fact operationalized in order to detect possible biases.

3.7.2. At the base of the problem is, again, the fact that NORAD in practical development work faces societies in which a taken-for-granted Norwegian way of thinking often is insufficient for grasping people's specific social and cultural reality. In addition, NORAD is often involved in contexts where a multitude of ethnic groups interact, most likely in highly complex ways. Apart from the fact that this aggravates problems of comprehension, it also sometimes embed development work in contexts of

strife and conflict, ie. in situations where one may expect competing views about appropriate ways of thinking and acting in the local population.

3.7.3. The policy of community participation is, for one, affected by the existence of this multitude of cultures. Apart from the danger of unknowingly favouring specific groups, the mobilization process itself may become more precarious than in homogeneous settings. The issue of employing people with the appropriate cultural background as social mobilizers becomes especially important. This problem of cultural heterogeneity is often aggravated by the existence of substantial cultural differences between the local communities and the national planners involved in the development efforts. Government officials may have radically different views, opinions and intentions at the base of their engagement in development projects, and even local mobilizers with the appropriate ethnic background may have been socialized into this way of thinking through education and training.

3.7.4. This problem of differences in world-views is especially apparent when it comes to questions of technology and environment. In the specific projects discussed in this evaluation, there are instances reflecting the general trend within development aid to regard Western scientific knowledge as superior to the more experience-based, practical knowledge acquired through centuries in the local communities. In at least two of the projects evaluated, indigenous technical knowledge proved equally, or even more, efficient than the methods adopted by the NORAD officials. Aside from the fact that this indicates insensitivity to local conditions and may hamper community participation (as the technicians may ignore the local population's explicit advice), the technical experiments may impinge directly on the local population's material basis. Living in a highly vulnerable economic situation, the consequences of a failure in production might be profound.

3.7.5. Based on the foregoing it is important to stress the need within any planning process of contextualizing the measures adopted, ie. of seeing the goals, ideas and methods of development projects in relation to the actual and specific ways of living and thinking in a given community. The policy of CP is, of course, most likely to succeed on the basis of project formulations that can be identified in terms of customary ways of thinking among the local people, and in most development efforts the accumulated local knowledge about technology and environment is a critical component in this respect. This requirement of carefully considering unfamiliar ways of thinking and acting should be applied to the other policies of NDA as well, most notably to the concerns for involvement of women in development and for environmental protection.

3.7.6. The formulations of the WID policy has strongly been influenced by the ongoing gender debate in Norway, and it seems that from the discussions on the specific projects evaluated here, the concern is based on an assumption that all women in the world are oppressed. As an empirical statement that may true or false. However, unless it is contextualized in terms of the differing and very specific ways of operating gender differences in various societies, the statement is merely irrelevant for NDA purposes. If we agree that the situation of women in a society should be improved, we simultaneously have to ask the question of in what ways the women are in fact disfavoured. The general trend within NORAD is to insist on the formal, quantitatively defined, access of women to decision-making fora, extended services, supplied resources etc. This is exactly an example of a context-free operationalization of the WID policy,

and, as Lexow and Skjønsberg (1989) are arguing, none of the NORAD projects they evaluated can be said to be "good for women". It is promising to see that there currently is a shift in the discussions within NORAD in the direction of more context-based, qualitative approaches to WID, epitomized in the substitution of the term "women" with "gender".

3.7.7. Also on the issue of designing projects that do not jeopardize environmental systems, NORAD faces the danger of applying understandings at odds with the actual and specific circumstances of the local communities. It seems that concerns for environmental sustainability are negatively phrased, ie. as questions of how to obstruct environmental degradation. If the implicit assumption at the base of this approach is the view that almost any ecological system in Africa is in a state of deterioration, NDA again runs the risk of operating in terms of abstract, over-all understandings rather than in terms of the specific circumstances of local socio-cultural and ecological systems. There was in fact a tendency in several of the projects evaluated here to accept without further inquiry the notion that settled agriculture was the superior form of production. Although there is a growing awareness within NORAD on the necessity and qualities of other and more unfamiliar production systems, there is still reason to stress that development efforts based on environmental concerns require in-depth understandings of the complex ways that various types of human adaptation actually interact in large-scale ecological systems.

CHAPTER FOUR

RECOMMENDATION AND THEIR OPERATIONALIZATION

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4.0. INTRODUCTION:

4.0.1. All through in the preceding chapters attempts have been made to accent the point that development is a human centred process. This makes it imperative to give more consideration to the human element in the process of development planning. It should be accorded a better position than what it occupies at present. There has been a tendency in the way of thinking of both donors and recipients to by-pass the human resources in the planning process. They are mostly considered at times of conflict when they are looked upon as sources of impediment to achieving development objectives and goals.

However, the reorientation from the general strategy of modernization towards the strategy of satisfying basic needs has brought the cultural conditions of relevance to development to the fore. The socio-cultural factors that may facilitate or impede the dialogue between the logical frame of thinking about activities and realizing such activities among the donors and recipient have to be understood. Moreover it must be emphasized that these socio-cultural factors are complex entities and any attempt to reduce them to a few dominant factors that can be easily incorporated into development projects can only result in distorting social reality.

4.0.2. Development assistance as a planned and organized intervention process involving donors and recipients, whose cultural orientation may differ immensely, becomes a problematic issue that requires different strategies and patterns of interaction. Cultural mediation, through a process of learning has to take various forms but must start from the genuine understanding of the different levels of the socio-cultural network of the "other". It has already been stressed in the preceding chapters that such an understanding is not a simple task. The complexity of this issue and the way in which individuals and groups can be encapsulated into their ethnocentric frames and the negative effect this may have on the development assistance process has been adequately illustrated with concrete examples.

The way in which the Norwegian government as a donor in the African setting has tried to realize its objectives, principles and policy concerns, which are cultural specific, and the way in which the recipient government responded on the bases of their own cultural context has been discussed in details. The local communities in recipient countries have their own reactions to all this since cultural heterogeneity is a common feature of the recipient countries. Difference in cultures and sub-cultures is best illustrated at this level. The way local communities react in this process of interaction and the way they adapt themselves to the development project organization has proved that the need for the understanding and incorporation of SCC in development assistance may remain a problematic issue for some time.

4.0.3. This study attempted to characterize the complexity of the interaction process in development assistance as well as identifying the areas of intervention where successes or failures have been made. Having concluded that more attention has to be accorded to the SCC of relevance to development assistance, the study came up with some recommendations that may hopefully provide for the smooth transfer of development assistance across cultural and social boundaries. To achieve this it has been clearly indicated that ready models of delivery cannot work as experience has

shown. The lesson to be learnt is that a processual approach that caters for gradual learning and accumulation of knowledge on the basis of respect for existing cultures in recipient societies may yield satisfactory results.

4.0.4. This chapter presents a number of specific recommendations addressing themselves to the task of identifying and incorporating the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to the process of availing development assistance to partner and other countries. It starts with recommendations of a general nature which are applicable in the case of most recipient countries. The summaries of findings of the country reports include recommendations of specific nature which address themselves to the Norwegian development assistance to these countries in general and to the implemented projects in particular (see annex 1-4). Beside their relevance to the future of planning development assistance these recommendations indicate the possible ways of restoring the existing projects through the possibility of incorporating issues of socio-cultural conditions. The recommendations presented here draw on these country studies and on the literature and interviews with NORAD personnel in missions and head office. The chapter concludes by outlining the way in which these recommendations can be operationalized and suggests guidelines that can inform NORAD and the Ministry on the incorporation of the socio-cultural conditions in its future development assistance.

4.1. RECOMMENDATIONS:

General:

4.1.0. The general recommendations stated here together with some of those included in the country studies, have to some extent, benefited from the recommendations in the Klausen report. However, more emphasis is given to the model suggested for identifying and incorporating the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance in the planning and implementation processes. The model differs from the one suggested in the Klausen's report both in the approach and method of collecting the relevant data as well as the way it proposes for the operationalization of the findings.

Emphasis is accorded to the need for in-depth understanding of the cultural heterogeneity in the Norwegian partner countries before embarking on project implementation. The different levels of socio-cultural conditions, whether viewed on ethnic bases or on bases of social stratification in a region or the state as a whole, have to be given their due consideration in the process of development planning. To realize this we acknowledge the need to make available the socio-cultural data of relevance in such a manner which is understandable, useful and practical to planners and decision makers in both recipient and donor countries. To achieve this we put forward the following recommendations:-

4.1.1. The transitional integrative-generative model (TIM), should be followed in collecting the relevant data and in feeding this data into the logical framework approach. As previously stated, meaningful change should be based on the basic tenets of the very social system which planners are trying to transform. The approach accompanying such a model should be a processual one which provides for feeding in new information of relevance and helping the planners, project managers as well as

local participants in redirecting the process of change when and if necessary. The method to be followed is participant intervention from the side of project management which should be supported by some expertise in social sciences as shall be explained below.

4.1.2. The magnitude of the involvement of the Norwegian personnel whether administrative, part of the technical assistance in the project area or volunteer at various levels of the project phases should be reduced to the minimum number necessary. This of course has to be followed by a well executed policy of building the capacity and competence of the national institutions with which NORAD is involved in the project implementation. This may at certain stages require on the job or off the job training and here NORAD has to look into the position of the relevant national training institutions and work with them. These institutions might need some support to strengthen their capacity. Such a support should be built in the development assistance fund granted for the project(s). However there may arise the need to have some individuals, who are selected to do certain jobs on the project, trained abroad either in Norwegian institutions or other relevant institutions in Africa or other parts of the world. This should also be taken up as a component in project planning.

Competence building in NORAD/the Ministry and recipient countries:

4.1.3. The question of training is also relevant in the case of Norwegian personnel who join these development assistance projects in different capacities. The training office in NORAD is doing an appreciated task of training for the different categories of people who attempt to join the Norwegian missions in partner countries. These are either full-time staff on the mission, administrative or technical assistance personnel on the projects or volunteers. However, by looking at the training programme offered at the NORAD home office the content and the approach may benefit a lot from looking into and integrating some of the methods used by other countries that have a long experience in dealing with African countries.

4.1.4. It will be interesting, and perhaps may offer a good insight, to individuals who are nominated to join missions in Africa to learn from the history of the colonial administration in the country they are to be posted to. The British experience in this area is very illustrative. District commissioners, on whom the responsibility for administration and development rested, were required to know the language of the groups in the area where they worked and the significant elements of the social organizations of these groups. Classes in language and anthropology were regularly conducted during the home leave of such staff either in Oxford or London Universities. Well experienced social scientists were involved in these training programmes. Judging by this experience an evaluation of the training programmes existing in NORAD at present is essential. It is also important to link the training section to social science institutions dealing with studies of human societies in developing countries in order to allow for up dating of information on these communities.

4.1.5. It emerges from this evaluation that projects which had social science contribution at their planning stages (e.g. RUDEP and VAP) show good signs of success and seem to provide a reasonable margin for adjustment of project activities to the realities of the local conditions. To facilitate such a process even further, direct engagement of national

research institutions as well as national researchers becomes essential. This can be undertaken through the provision of financial support for independent research in areas earmarked for development or by engaging a team of researchers through a national research institution on consultancy bases. This should not, by any means, be understood as an attempt to exclude expatriate researchers who might be knowledgeable on the area or intend to cooperate with such a team so that they can be part of the capacity building process in the donor community. However, this brings home the point of the need of building the competence of national personnel who have to develop a sense of responsibility and commitment needed for the purpose of sustainability. Expatriate researchers leave when their contract is over and/or when things go wrong without having to account for the mistakes that might have negatively influenced peoples' lives. It might be of interest also to help research institutions from the donor and recipient countries to work jointly towards producing detailed country profiles. Such profiles can help in making the necessary base-line data for most feasibility studies. In fact, NORAD does not need to go very far for experience in such a field. Its own involvement in supporting independent research in the Sudan through the Savannah project (1976-78) and the RESAP project (1986-) are excellent examples of competence building in both Norway and Sudan.

The idea of holding interdisciplinary workshops and seminars just before embarking on the implementation of the project should be promoted. This will allow for the testing of the project proposal against some real practical concerns of planners and administrators. If such workshops are well organized, community participation might be easily incorporated at this stage. The experience of the Lupande Development Workshop in Zambia (1983), though it might not have allowed for an ideal type of community participation, does serve as an illustration of what is proposed here. Such workshops are also necessary for salvaging existing projects through sensitizing their administrative and technical staff to the importance of the socio-cultural condition in the progress of the project. Such workshops and seminars will enable them to understand how they can enhance their achievements in projects if the local population become seriously involved in project implementation.

4.1.6. In the later stages of the project it is not enough to have a project coordinator who is a social scientist (or namely an anthropologist or a sociologist) and expect that the social conditions of relevance in the local community are well taken care of. Normally coordinators, who are expatriates, suffer from too much administrative tasks and day-to-day supervision of project activities. Some of them who are employed as social scientists/coordinators have beside the administrative task to undertake collection of data on social institutions which they then can use in executing their project plans. This in many ways hinders their job in both fields. It is very important to have one or more officials whose role should be feeding the project administration with the socio-cultural data relevant to execution of plans.

4.1.7. Larger Rural development projects should in fact make a point of creating socio-cultural units that should be an integral part of the project administration. The presence of such units will allow for the continuity of collection of base-line data on all relevant aspects of social life. It will also allow for the possibility of close monitoring of the process of social change since social change is understood as an on-going process and that local communities are dynamic entities. The presence of such units will facilitate the

work of the processual approach through the provision of the needed data for evaluation and, if necessary, redirection of the project.

Approaches to data collection on SCC and its internalization:

The personnel in such socio-cultural units should make the point of linking with national academic and research institutions and make use of the capacity of these institutions to build their own capacity and competence to handle research issues in their project areas. They should also cooperate with and help graduate students who might be interested in research problems that may be of relevance to the development of the area. They can help such research and academic institutions as well as students to build a profile of the region in which the project is implemented. It has to be emphasized that the establishment of such units is an integral part of the transitional integrative model suggested in this report.

4.1.8. Although manuals and checklists may be useful in directing the attention of planners and decision makers to some of the issues relevant to project implementation, it is very difficult to see such a use in the case of socio-cultural conditions. The checklists and manuals can not be general and embracing enough to cover all the necessary areas in the social and cultural context of the local community. This being the case, experience has shown that they only tend to identify those matters that have relevance to the frame of thinking of the donor agency. They cannot appropriately deal with differently constituted realities -i.e. it is difficult to include aspects related to the impact of witchcraft on cooperation or organization of production in a checklist. It might be argued that issues of this nature could be incorporated into the checklist provided that such a knowledge on the issue in the project area exists. It is precisely the lack of such a knowledge that renders the inclusion of these issues impossible. In addition, even when the knowledge is accumulated what is important is not to see these issues as independent topic in the life of the local community but it is the interconnection and interdependence between them and other aspects of social organization which is significant. This is why we are recommending all-embracing, general and flexible guidelines for checking the material necessary for project planning and implementation. Further material should be collected and the guidelines should be adjusted to allow for posing the right questions for further information that may be needed in the rest of the project life time.

4.1.9. The feature of the Norwegian development assistance as being recipient-oriented, is normally followed by the tendency to decide on the target population that benefits from such an assistance. Rather than having the decision on who the target population should be being one-sided, coordination with the recipient on this issue becomes an absolute necessity. This may lead to changing or improving on, the focus which is assumed in many development projects. Since, for example, there are no easily determined reliable indicators for who constitutes the "poorest of the poor" in the rural context, deliberation between the two parties may lead to a change in this focus. The emphasis may so well be on those who are disadvantaged and whose integration in the development process in rural areas may lead to improving the quality of life for a wider category of people. Also the NORAD focus on women, as it stands now, is not necessarily shared by planners in recipient countries. For those planners, the new re-

orientation of the issue, as suggested by some quarters in NORAD recently, may be more relevant, i.e. focusing on the "gender issue" which involves the dynamic relations between men and women. However, to improve the focus on this latter issue further we recommend that the smallest target unit in rural areas should be the "household unit". This recommendation is based on the fact that it is extremely difficult to look separately at the tasks of members of such a unit in daily activities in rural areas. There is always a relation of complementarity between the different individuals constituting such a unit at this level.

4.1.10. In places where traditional leadership may still command some esteem and authority we recommend that their skill and capacity for promoting community participation be strengthened. They can be used as contacts, mediators of knowledge and mobilizers. They can be educated and integrated in the regional administrative structure to which development projects are attached. Regional bureaucrats should be taught to realize that the promotion of this category is not by any chance to make them loose power in the region. These bureaucrats have to understand that in rural development projects there should be no winners or losers as such, but the major objective is to improve the quality of life of the whole local community. In a situation where a new category of mobilizers has been recruited from some of the junior government employees, such a group should be advised to cooperate and make use of the skills, capacity and knowledge of traditional leadership in their area of activity rather than assume the role of teaching this leadership.

4.1.11. Since it is expected that the process of social change shall lead to a changing situation in the structure of local communities during the life time of the project the channels of communication between the general public and its leadership on the local, regional or national level should be flexible. These channels should allow for the possible integration of newly emerging leadership, at the local level, in the process of decision making. This can not take place without decentralization and democratization of existing systems in such a manner that may abolish elements of inequality in traditional systems. This can only take place through the effective participation of local communities as well as ensuring equal opportunities for their own members in taking part in influencing change.

Genuine decentralization, rather than rhetoric of central government politicians and officials, involving a transfer of resources and responsibilities to local people should be encouraged. The donors, in trying to be concerned about their own objectives, should make an effort to influence their development partners in giving local communities a chance to participate in identification, designing and implementation of rural development projects.

4.1.12. Critical to this recommendation is the issue of creating public awareness and building capacity and competence within the local communities. The approach towards any improvement in this field is through the educational system which is a major instrument influencing change in developing countries. The reshaping and utilization of the human resources at the local community level has to be revitalized through this instrument. It has to be emphasized that local people across Africa possess much more knowledge concerning their local communities than is often appreciated by experts and officials; and they also possess greater organizational skills than is recognized. This, however, has to be married with "modern" education in order to be effective in the

present stage of development. Modern education, starting during the early days of the colonial domination, had as its top priority the education of a group of indigenous elite that can help running the daily affairs of the colony. Education was urban oriented and biased and resulted, later, in the emergence of a leadership which in some cases can be seen as far removed from communities in rural areas. It is recommended that recipient government be supported to reverse this orientation and bias in favour of the rural areas. Development assistance projects should carry a component directed towards reforming the educational system in the project area, and the region to serve the objectives of rural development. Regional and central government in recipient countries should be encouraged to establish educational institutions of relevance to the kind of development proposed to the regions in question. This may recall the concept of "education for self-reliance" which was coined, and, to a large degree implemented, by the government of one of the countries subject to this evaluation, namely Tanzania. Learning from the Tanzanian experience in this field is perhaps the most sensible line of action for other partner countries.

4.1.13. For the purpose of restoring existing projects and in the effort of establishing sustainable ones assistance to improve the capabilities of various government agencies involved in the process of project implementation is an essential one. There is presently, at the level of some of the projects studied, a strong feeling on the part of the management (which in most cases consist of expatriates project coordinators) that local agencies, particularly district councils, are weak and generally incapable of carrying out development projects effectively. The solution to this problem is to assist these weak agencies and not to continue to merely talk of their inefficiencies as this shall only help to worsen the relationship that exists between the management of these projects and the local government organizations. The type of assistance needed here includes inculcating proper skills of management and project planning and execution.

The various socio-cultural conditions discussed in this document have a lot to do with restoring existing projects and ensuring their sustainability. Full participation of local level institutions like district councils, keep an open eye, ear and mind to local social sensitivities and correct identification of the real needs of the target population, can be singled out as key areas which would make the projects more successful if adequately addressed. TIM as a model and the suggested socio-cultural units within its frame should ensure this sensitivity.

4.1.14. The logical framework approach (LFA) as an analytical tool for objectives oriented project planning and management is yet to be tested. However, it should be clearly emphasized here that for such a framework to be able to incorporate the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development planning flexibility become a key word. There is a need to determine from the beginning that starting with project identification the development process is a multi-party engagement. It involves the donor and the recipient; and since the recipient in most cases consist of multi ethnic communities the parties involved in the process increase in number. The cultural levels involved in the process are, as clearly explained in this document, many and each of them may have its own knowledge. The issue that immediately faces the LFA is that it has to deal with a multiplicity of logical frames whose premises may differ greatly. If it uses the logic of the donor it risks the chance of being one sided and in this case it can be subjected to the same criticism as the one raised against the checklists.

What is needed to make the LFA a useful analytical tool is the adequate explanation of its method to the development partners on the different levels mentioned above. To have it work and yield the expected results there is a need to secure the means through which the views of the different parties are sensitized and the logical framework of each culture is given equal opportunity in shaping the reality to be constructed. TIM can be the real helping hand in generating the information which is needed for the continuity of the performance of LFA from the recipient side. It can as well be used for the identification of the necessary criterion for the fulfilment of policy objectives mentioned.

Capacity to comprehend and utilize knowledge:

4.1.15. There is an obvious need to improve both the design of professional input and execution of preliminary studies conducted by NORAD. As the projects discussed above clearly illustrate, the themes and problems discussed in preliminary studies are both too narrowly defined and relatively incidental. The present evaluation particularly highlights the fact that local socio-cultural conditions normally are disregarded during such studies. Although there are instances of such information explicitly being assigned importance by pre-feasibility teams, the actual gathering of this material is almost always postponed to subsequent base-line studies, or impact studies. We recommend routines that can ensure the incorporation of knowledge of local SCC already at this early stage in the project cycle.

To ensure that existing knowledge is utilized in the process, the Terms of Reference for preliminary studies should include a demand that available literature on the relevant localities be gathered, read, and presented in the pre-feasibility report. A significant part of the team's assignment in this respect would be to provide a professional assessment of the available material, pointing out its weaknesses and strengths, and suggest themes and methods for further research that can improve the understanding of local conditions.

The design of ToR for preliminary studies should be improved so that a broader spectre of aspects of the local conditions can be covered. A basic description of the relevant local communities is a prerequisite for gaining a minimal understanding of local conditions. Such a description should in a succinct way cover the local community's social, economic and political organisation, and the main ideas, norms and values that seem to inform the life of the local population. In addition, however, a description of the various factors (local, regional, national, international) that constrain development in the local communities, is also needed. The relevant expertise should be called upon to ensure a proper investigation of these matters.

It should be acknowledged that preliminary studies of the sort proposed above do require quite thorough and time-consuming investigations. The measures related to institutional learning and competence building suggested above will in the long run facilitate the accumulation of knowledge of SCC in relevant institutions, and by implication less emphasis on the need for in-depth studies. Our proposal of "instant anthropology" is intended as a means to incorporate SCC into planning even under circumstances where sufficient time and resources are not available. We must maintain, however, that an adequate understanding of local SCC normally requires extensive

exposures to the local community (fieldwork) and a lengthy period of digestion and analysis, and the design of preliminary studies should allow sufficient time for such studies to take place.

4.1.16. Another very prominent set of factors constraining the incorporation of SCC in NDA pertains to "problems of communication". Unless the information on local SCC in fact gathered, is effectively communicated to decision-makers in the process, no improved performance can be expected. This is a problem that ought to challenge both parties in the communication process, ie. both the professionals providing the insights, and the officials receiving and adopting the information provided. The problem seems to pertain both to the form and content of the messages communicated in the process.

There is a general and strong-held attitude in NORAD and the Ministry that the works of social scientists are difficult to understand and relate to. The basis for this opinion can, of course, be sought in various aspects of the bureaucratic process, not conducive for in-depth investigations and understandings, and in other factors of an organisational nature. However, it should also be acknowledged that social scientists sometimes tend to adopt a form of presentation that strongly hamper the communication process, and there is indeed a need on their part to improve educational qualities. With respect to the issue of SCC, however, the major problem does not seem to be one of form of communication but of the content of the messages transferred.

4.1.17. As some of the cases above illustrate, NORAD officials seem to face a **problem of comprehension** in encounters with unfamiliar socio-cultural conditions. Aspects of the local conditions, which in fact may be essential for a successful development planning, often attain a somewhat exotic character, and may be so deviant from accustomed ways of thinking and perceiving that they are in fact disregarded. We have already alluded to the danger in the planning stage of identifying only those aspects of the local conditions that are already familiar within a Western frame of thinking, to the disregard of more unexpected aspects of the local situations. Preliminary studies are often designed in line with such predefined focuses and executed by professionals who do not have the proper training in transcending their accustomed frames of thinking. By implication, there is a tendency for pre-conceived Western conceptualizations of the world (the "third world" included) to be perpetuated in the process.

This tendency for accustomed ways of thinking to be encapsulated and safe-guarded in the midst of realities that are often differently constituted, constitute probably one of the major obstacles to the incorporation of SCC in Norwegian development assistance. On a specific and operational level, actual information on SCC of an exotic, but essential, nature tends to be disregarded in the process as officials have limited cultural competence to grasp and handle it. On a more general level, NDA tends to perpetuate highly abstract notions of the African reality, partly irrelevant to and partly inadequate for grasping the basic tenets of the local conditions, and, accordingly, NDA is insufficiently equipped to meet challenges during planning and implementation of specific projects. We strongly recommend measures that can improve the accumulation of general competence in the field of SCC, both in NORAD head office and on the mission level as far as the individual officials are concerned.

Above we have recommended a stronger emphasis on appropriate training for NORAD officials in issues pertaining to socio-cultural conditions. This is a minimal requirement

in order to approach a successful incorporation of SCC in NDA. In addition, however, several organizational aspects could be improved in order to allow country-specific knowledge and experience to accumulate. First, the posting system of NORAD should be reconsidered. At present the rather short assignment periods, the lack of sufficient overlaps and the occasional instances of deliberate re-placements, are not conducive for the accumulation of country-specific competence in individual officials. Secondly, the very restricted opportunities for NDA officials in Africa to come in contact with and experience the actual reality of their target groups, do not encourage attempts to transcend accustomed ways of thinking.

4.1.18. A more basic problem is, however, the tendency within NORAD to perceive of socio-cultural phenomena as analogous with issues of a technical nature. There is a tendency to severely under-estimate the complexity of socio-cultural systems, and, accordingly to misjudge the type of information provided on social and cultural phenomena. The first thing to be considered is that social scientists are dealing with phenomena that to a very limited extent are predictable in the very exact sense of the word adopted by the natural sciences. General rules or "laws" of social systems are very hard to reach, and the tendency not to grasp these preconditions of the social sciences gravely hampers attempts to achieve a dialogue on matters of SCC within NORAD and the Ministry. Officials tend to expect information of a very exact and operational character on these issues, and accordingly tend to think of the provided research reports as either true or false. It should be acknowledged that the social scientist's contribution in fact is on another level: expertise on SCC can provide sensible and substantiated hypotheses about more time and situation specific interconnections between various factors of socio-cultural systems, and they control an array of methods to test these hypotheses against empirical occurrences in the field. Through time the systematic accumulation of knowledge about the conditions of specific local communities may, however, provide the basis for very intelligent assumptions about future developments.

The second fact to be acknowledged is that these problems of prediction constitute perhaps the most basic challenge to any form of development assistance. Specific development efforts will necessarily face the same problems of uncertainty as to the relation between its inputs and the expected results of its efforts, and in this respect development project designs in fact equal sets of hypotheses and project implementation amounts to virtual experiments on socio-cultural systems. By implication, implementation of development projects furnish situations and conditions under which the social scientists may test their hypotheses about socio-cultural conditions of relevance for the development project, and in the process new insights are gained. Accordingly, we have proposed a model (TIM) which emphasizes a gradual and continuous accumulation of knowledge of SCC in persons and institutions engaged in development efforts. This model is based on a learning approach to development whereby new insights continuously are fed into the planning and implementation process, and it is based on the acknowledgment that social scientists' contribution to development efforts mainly is one of systematically facilitating the accumulation of such knowledge.

4.1.19. The model favoured in this evaluation requires a professional backing at all levels in the bureaucratic system. The decision to situate a special advisor on socio-cultural conditions centrally within NORAD is an appreciated measure, as it is a basic requirement for the incorporation of SCC at this level. One of the central tasks for this

advisor is to ensure a sufficient concern for socio-cultural conditions in the formulation, scrutiny and approval of Norwegian development projects. However, as this evaluation amply shows, the documents flowing to the head office in Oslo tend to be distant from the actual realities of the communities concerned, and can only to a limited extent reflect the many and complex conditions and challenges that face concrete development efforts in the field. Given the scope of NDA, and the immense variation in socio-cultural conditions facing the development efforts, it is obvious that the special advisor should have a backing of professional expertise in the recipient countries, ensuring the collection and incorporation of specific data on SCC in the regions, districts and communities of relevance for NDA.

Despite the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/NORAD must continue to rely on consultants, one will need crucial expertise inside the organization if one wants to translate a specific commitment into institutional priorities that can guide day-to-day decisions. It would be important that an inventory be made of the existing NORAD manpower trained in the social sciences, with a view of utilizing personell in optimal ways. There is reason to believe that this is presently not the case, which probably reflects the anomalous position of NORAD as being partly a bureaucratic organization, partly a professional institution. It has been argued in this report that there is a real need for professional expertise.

We have stressed the need for a general strengthening of the capacity of national research and academic institutions in order to fully make use of their potentials in development planning. On the NORAD missions such contacts with national research milieus would, if carefully cultivated, to some extent fill the gaps of research competence encountered in the planning process of most of the projects discussed above. National experts on SCC could, according to one model, be recruited to specific assignments on short term basis. A more satisfactory model would, however, be to ensure continuity in concerns for SCC by employing on a permanent basis the relevant expertise on the NORAD missions. The question of assigning competent nationals in such positions should again be favoured.

On the level of individual projects, we have strongly stressed the need for specific information on SCC continuously to be generated and fed back into planning and monitoring, and we have, accordingly, recommended that socio-cultural units be assigned to the larger projects to fulfil this important requirement.

Creating an institutional memory:

4.1.20. All the project cases discussed in this report illustrate the difficulties experienced during the retrieval of existing background material. We have specifically pointed out the discrepancy between existing and retrieved information, a discrepancy that may lead to a serious under-utilization of the planning potential. With increasing interests (academic and others) for developing problems, the information on specific topics, regions or local communities is continuously accumulating, and would, if properly utilized, represent a valuable planning asset. The sources of such information (national and foreign academic institutions, NGO's, various archives etc.) are, however, normally scattered and un-coordinated, and the retrieval of relevant material may prove extremely

difficult. The following recommendations suggest that various types of information systems should be strengthened.

The deficiencies of the NORAD/the Ministry's information basis should be taken seriously, and both the archives and the library should be strengthened. At present any person seeking to obtain an adequate view of a project or programme's history would encounter serious problems retrieving the necessary background documents. Specifically, the archives seem to have followed a policy of not to store more comprehensive reports on the projects. In addition, there have been successful attempts by archive leaders actively to dispose of material! Judging from the time-consuming exercise of retrieving material for the present evaluation, it can be concluded that the archives in Oslo and on the missions do not facilitate efficient information retrieval and they constitute a major constraint on the effective accumulation of an institutional memory.

The NORAD/the Ministry officials need to improve their awareness of the information problems. The problem of **unsystematic** archives may easily be solved with more resources allocated to the task, but the problem of **incomplete** archives also emerges from the weak awareness on the part of the officials that the archives are important for the accumulation of knowledge and experiences.

Several steps can be taken to improve the situation. First, the NORAD missions should **actively and systematically** collect and store information on the regions, districts and communities of relevance for their activities. This task should become part of the missions' routine activities, and resources and personnel should be allocated to the job with the aim of facilitating a basis for better planning and more efficient monitoring and evaluation.

Secondly, NORAD/the Ministry should make efforts to produce all-embracing **bibliographies** or **data-bases** of existing information relating to specific communities, districts or regions. In addition to presenting the form and content of information, these bibliographies/data-bases should explicitly contain information on where the material may be obtained. A highly valuable tool of planning would additionally be to work out comprehensive **summaries** of and **reading guides** to the existing material. To produce such guides is a professional task, and relevant expertise should be assigned to the job.

Thirdly, the NORAD library in Oslo should, specifically, be assigned the task of building a collection of books and reports (ethnographic studies etc.) on the SCC in the areas involved in Norwegian assistance.

Fourthly, sufficient resources must be allocated to the essential task of improving the storing and retrieval capacity of the archives, both in Oslo and the country missions.

4.2. SOME GUIDELINES FOR OPERATIONALIZATION

4.2.0. To realize all, or most, of the above recommendations some clarity on the level of the principles, objectives and orientation involved in NDA is essential. Underestimating the ideological difference and the silent intention of both the donor

and the recipient on the national level will not help in accelerating the process of operationalization of the results of this study. The socio-cultural dimensions involved in the development assistance on the state level and the compromise to be reached require open recognitions of the above mentioned issues.

4.2.1. However, once policy issues are solved, and agreements on the objectives and the magnitude of the assistance to the named country is reached, certain operational procedures have to be followed in order to ensure the incorporation of the SCC in the various stages of the project cycle. For this purpose the starting point in planning should be carrying out intensive studies in order to achieve rigorous and thorough understanding of the social system(s) to be affected by development interventions. Such an understanding, as previously emphasized, would help identify and depict the dynamic of socio-economic and cultural processes, as well as the objective potentialities and constraints. It is at this level that serious effort should be given to the understanding and incorporating of the ITK; and that planners should be willing to expose themselves to this type of knowledge and look at it with due respect.

By identifying the different cultural levels, as shown above in this document, the point to be emphasized is that in the development assistance process different forms of cultures with their different logical premises are involved. The process of interaction of the different population who are party to this process brings these logical frames in close encounters. This makes it pertinent to draw attention at all the stages of the project cycle to the ethnicity issue. When dealing with recipient countries one is not dealing with a nation state but in fact what is dealt with is a political entity that embodies different groups of people with their different cultures, even at the local community level, the issue of ethnic diversity becomes essential for understanding the relevance of SCC in development. Unless the cultural content, interest orientation and political articulation of ethnicity is understood planning on a regional level will encounter difficulties in recipient countries. This is why the understanding of the cultural symbols manipulated in the different sub-cultures become a precondition for the planning process.

4.2.2. TIM as a model advises as to how the necessary knowledge on SCC is generated and integrated either from existing literature, intensive fieldwork or through instant anthropology methods. Even when speaking about instant anthropology in this model the time envisaged is not less than two months in order to acquaint the social scientist with the local situation and give him/her the time to offer the relevant material for the planners and decision makers.

What is expected here is in-depth understanding of the "other" by the donor officials and the ability to shed away the temptation of ethnocentrism that characterizes the interaction of most officials from donor countries when dealing with recipient countries especially at the level of local communities. The best method to establish the required understanding is to ensure that the channels of information from the grass roots to the top level in the central government of the recipient country and the head office of the donors are flowing smoothly. The flow of information will help the process of community participation, allow for bottom-up approach and real trickle down of development assistance.

4.2.3. Key to the operationalization of the above recommendation is the role played by the social scientists either in the head office as prominent advisors in high powered positions with easy access to the board of directors or in the representation offices as advisors or consultants. As far as the project is concerned the role of the social scientists has to be seen as a continuous one and not only ending at the stage of the preparation of the project document. This is why the socio-cultural units are recommended as an instrument that has to exist during the whole lifetime of the project. Since the processual approach is taken as a corner stone in TIM the socio-cultural units feed the needed information for monitoring the progress of the project. The internalization of the results of studies undertaken by these units is granted in TIM.

4.2.4. To be more specific as to when and how should the material on SCC be collected and fed in the project cycle it is suggested below to follow the generally accepted subdivisions of this cycle into stages. These stages are project identification, planning, approval, implementation and evaluation with the monitoring stage seen as an integral part of the implementation as suggested by TIM. Each of these stages has its own logic, objectives and end result. At each stage crucial decisions are made to determine whether the SCC will be included or not. The guidelines offered here suggest how the material on SCC be collected, who should take part in that and how it should be used. It is our conviction that if the recommendations are adopted and the guidelines below are followed trickling down of adopted development assistance to the target population originally intended can be secured.

SOME GUIDELINES FOR THE INCORPORATION OF THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSION AT THE PROJECT LEVEL.

Project cycle

Project Identification: (i) Request:

- Proposal (from the recipient to be) outlining the project and specifying its objectives and stating its relevance to national planning policy.

(ii) Feasibility studies:

- Vigorous studies of existing literature on the project area (including published material and unpublished reports).

- Contact with national research and academic institutions to establish the possible relevance of their on-going research to the problem, to be addressed in the project area.

- Conduct a vigorous study of the local setting if the lapse of time between the project identification and the planning phase is long enough. Otherwise instant anthropology methods is to be followed in collecting data that serves to guide the following phases.

- Initial contacts should be established with significant sectors of the target population whose views on what direction development should take have to be taken into consideration. Social scientists should spearhead such an activity.

Project Planning:

Preparation of the project document: This should include definition of concepts, objectives, justification of components and setting the criteria for selection of technical assistance.

- Orientation of the project planning document to the basic needs of the target population and deciding the exact targets. Identify the ITK and other knowledge and make an attempt towards genuine understanding of the mechanisms governing the network of social relations in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts. Technical experts should recognize that there is knowledge in local

Essential Activities

- Resident Representation should ensure the proximity between the objectives of the project as suggested by the national authorities and the objectives of the NDA before forwarding the proposal to the head office in Oslo.

- The Resident Representation must help in collecting relevant material to strengthen base-line data. This can be done through establishing contacts with academic and research institutions in the donor country. Also there should be insistence on the recipient authorities to make available all necessary information and involve indigenous researchers in this undertaking.

- Resident Representation should have its own local social scientist as a staff member and/or consultant to check on these and other activities.

- develop the practice of helping local authorities to hold public meetings for members of local communities where these members can voice their opinions in their own language and on the basis of their conceptualization of the world. They should be encouraged to express their expectation and show the cooperation they may give to ensure the success of the project.

- Assembling the relevant baseline data and choosing the relevant expertise to put the plan together. Integrating the activities of various sectors and consulting national institutions. Providing for participation of local communities at this level through relevant forms of representation.

Institutional support

- Resident Representation should be in regular contact with the home office. Also establish informal contact with government and other relevant institutions in the recipient country.

- contact with academic and Research institutions on donor and recipient side. Seed money for conducting long term research in project areas should be made available. Attempt to create country profiles should be encouraged and financed.

- Use of mass-media to convey messages on objectives of projects to local communities.

- Holding regional workshops and seminars where local community members can take part together with government and donors' representatives.

setting the criteria for selection of technical assistance.

make an attempt towards genuine understanding of the mechanisms governing the network of social relations in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts. Technical experts should recognize that there is knowledge in local communities and it is the marriage of this knowledge with "scientific" knowledge which they are after.

national institutions. Providing for participation of local communities at this level through relevant forms of representation.

representatives.

b) Technical Analysis:

selections of technology, logistic, location and labour allocation. Identification of skills and capacity requirement analysis and plan operation.

- The appropriate technology to be selected should take in consideration the local community expertise and fully incorporate the ITK. It should be easy to accommodate in the local setting with the least possible disturbance to the social relations of the inhabitants. Planners have to take in consideration the existing IEK and the local community world view and categorization of space. This shall enhance the future sustainability of the project.

- Create awareness about new technology through explaining its difference from ITK. As much as possible avoid conflict and confrontation with established norms of labour relations or systems of ownership for ensuring local community cooperation.

- Link with and strengthen regional training institutions to help building the competence and capacity that will be needed to sustain the process of development in the area.

- Identify intervention points on bases of local people's reaction during the identification phase. Interventions should start with items that can yield quick results in order to create a demonstration effect.

- Training at different level should be a major component of the project plan. Mobilizers should be given adequate support. Support should be given to local and regional educational institutions to promote relevant educational programmes.

- Lines of authority should be flexible and based on cooperation, motivation and popular participation. Utilization of the favourable elements of the local social systems to the maximum.

- planned organizational model should be simple, with minimum involvement of government and donors representatives. Building on local community institutions, as much as possible, and utilizing mobilizers to encourage local community participation in this model. Flexibility should be a major feature of the model and adjustment during operational period should be possible. It should be a processual model accommodating the logical sequence understood by all parties involved.

Approval:

Preparation of agreements.

- Official commitment based on principles, objectives and necessary compromises by both donors and recipients.

- Total support from donor's head-office, recipient central and regional government.

- Contacts at the local level to ensure that the communities targeted for development are willing to commit themselves to the roles assigned to them in the project.

- Country negotiation should ensure the community participation through accepting a certain degree of decentralization. Community participation must be thought even at this "technical" level. The community role must be explained to the target population with some simplification, albeit without distortion.

Object Implementation:

Recruitment of project staff; setting the organizational model; monitoring the project with special reference to the local community reaction; establishment of the socio-cultural unit.

- Selection of competent staff with good experience in rural development and some familiarity with the project area. This staff should be able to cooperate with national and regional institutions if not totally integrated in them. The staff should be sensitive to issues and actions that may undermine the role and the image of these institutions in the project locality.

- The organizational model should provide for community participation and be responsive to change and able to easily adjust.

- The socio-cultural unit monitors change and advises on necessary change or new issues to be added to or removed from the organizational model and/or implementation chart.

- The base-line data made available through the socio-cultural unit, together with that collected by other institutions in collaboration with this unit and made use of through the processual model, should, provide the necessary bases for reformulation of objectives and adjustment of strategies. This should give substantial feedback to involved parties in the evaluation.

- adequate channels of information with regional and national authorities and the donor's resident representation.

- Involving national staff at this stage to build competence and create capacity that allows for easy transfer of project management to recipients in a short time.

- Socio-cultural units may use consultants, in early stages of their establishment, to help solve urgent problems. In the long run, and through establishing lasting links with academic and research institutions, at home and abroad, they can build their own capacity and competence.

- The terms of reference should emphasize the point that the evaluation team should look at the consequences of the project on the total social system and the world view of the local community.

- Socio-cultural units are built as an integral part of the project organizational model. They cooperate with national and other academic and research institutions.

- National development oriented, academic, research or consultancy institutions should be given a chance to participate with international experts on such evaluation missions.

Evaluation:

Selection of relevant indicators to assess the project progress.

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A P P E N D I X 1

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DIMENSION IN DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

An inception Report to
the Royal Norwegian
Ministry of Development Cooperation

By

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Khartoum/Bergen, April 1989

1. SUMMARY OF INCEPTION REPORT

This report exposes the conceptual and methodological frameworks as well as the work plan and schedule for the evaluation study "Socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance" commissioned by MDC. It is based on an interpretation of the Terms of Reference provided by MDC, relevant reports as well as the findings of a tour of four East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) undertaken by the proposed team leader (January 9-29, 1989).

The objective of the tour was twofold. Firstly, it was intended to sensitize aspects of the development assistance projects supported by MDC in order to devise criteria for the selection of projects to be covered in the evaluation. Meeting NORAD officials and Government planners in the visited countries facilitated this. Secondly, it was meant to avail an opportunity to identify, meet and recruit prospective team members to undertake project studies.

The selected projects for the evaluation are:

- A) Kenya:
 - 1) Rural Access Road Programme
- B) Tanzania:
 - 2) Rukwa Integrated Rural Development Programme
 - 3) Sports for all
- C) Zambia:
 - 4) Luangwa integrated Resource Development Project
 - 5) Village Agricultural Programme
- D) Zimbabwe:
 - 6) Family Health Programme

These projects are further described in Chapter Six.

The need for amendments of the given terms of reference has been mainly addressed to the conceptual framework. It is also expected that the study will provide the Ministry of Development Cooperation with guidelines that will ensure the integration of the socio-cultural dimension in the development assistance process rather than providing a manual which is believed not to be possible since different cultural contexts of a project determine the kind of emphasis needed under the circumstances and the type of data to be collected.

2. BACKGROUND

In December 1988, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation (MDC) forwarded to the Centre for Development Studies (CDS), University of Bergen, a

request to undertake an "Evaluation of the Socio-Cultural Conditions of Relevance to Development Assistance". The main objectives of the evaluation as expressed in the forwarded Terms of Reference (TOR) are to identify the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance in 10-12 specific projects in Africa and Asia; to assess the degree of incorporation of these conditions in the projects studied; and to suggest improvements in the processes of planning, implementation and evaluation of development assistance activities so that a higher degree of incorporation of these conditions could be achieved. The objective of this inception report is to present an interpretation of the TOR, and also to expose and explain some conceptual and methodological considerations adopted for the evaluation of the degree of incorporation of socio-cultural factors in development assistance projects in Africa.

It should be acknowledged here that use has been made of the Klausen report 1987 and his initial draft of an inception report submitted to the MDC in 1988. However, in this inception report the focus is mainly on the re-formulation and operationalization of the basic ideas put forward in the 1987 report as will be explained later.

3. *TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION AND BACKGROUND STUDY "SOCIO-CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE"*

1. Introduction

In recent years development assistance organizations have increasingly recognized the importance of the cultural dimension in development assistance activities. This has been expressed in two ways. In the first place, a number of development assistance agencies have defined the cultural sector in the partner countries as an area where assistance can be provided in the form of money and expertise (restoration of antiquities, establishment and development of museums, collection and recording of traditions, etc.). Secondly, there is a growing awareness that in development assistance, one has as yet not given sufficient consideration to the socio-cultural premises of the groups who are defined as the target of development assistance. In this connection the term socio-cultural premises refers to a concept of culture, namely culture in terms of ideas, values and norms in all sectors of the society, and not only to "expressive culture" and "cultural artifacts".

The acknowledgement of this fact led the Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation to commission a preliminary study of this aspect of development assistance in spring 1987. The result was a report entitled "Sosio-kulturelle forhold i bistanden. Et bakgrunnsnotat og noen anbefalinger til Departementet for utviklingshjelp" (Socio-cultural Conditions of Relevance to Development Assistance. A preliminary Report and some Recommendations to the Ministry of Development Cooperation) (Klausen, 1987).

The main view expressed in the preliminary report is that Norwegian development assistance in practice does not, to the desired extent, conform with the principal objectives. It seems particularly difficult to fulfill the requirement that development assistance should be responsive to the conditions of life of the target population and that the relevant target groups should become more actively involved in the development process.

This problem has two aspects, one related to knowledge, the other to communication. What kind of knowledge must be acquired, how can it be acquired within a reasonable time, and how can it be communicated to decision-makers and other users?

Another principal viewpoint expressed in the preliminary report is that the above mentioned weaknesses are related to the organizational structure of the development agencies themselves, both in the donor and recipient countries. Organizational, professional and ideological/political conditions therefore constitute another set of fundamental premises which it is essential to consider in this connection.

2. Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation programme is three-fold:

1. To supplement and if necessary correct the impressions and conclusions presented in the preliminary report as regards the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance. The preliminary report is based entirely on a review of documents.
2. Based on a study of how 10-12 specific projects in Africa and Asia have developed over time, collect data which can be used to suggest improvements in the methods employed for preliminary studies which focus on the socio-cultural conditions of the target groups.
3. Based on the above - and on a review of the problems discussed in the preliminary report - help to improve the general planning, implementation and evaluation of development assistance activities.

3. Problem areas and topics for study

In order to achieve these objectives, the evaluation team should give special attention to the following problems:

1. The six projects respectively in Africa and Asia selected for evaluation are very different. This has been done deliberately in order to provide an opportunity to assess how these differences reflect the requirement that development assistance shall be founded on the socio-cultural conditions of the target groups.
2. For the projects selected the evaluation team shall examine background documents and preliminary studies that have been conducted. This implies establishing what institution carried out the study, what expertise was involved, the time spent, the method of data collection etc. The purpose of this examination is to find out what factors impede and what factors promote an awareness of the need to base the development assistance conditions.
3. The sociological/anthropological contribution has been more evident in some projects than in others. The team shall try to find out if any systematic differences exist between these projects and others, and if not, seek to identify possible reasons for this.
4. The evaluation team shall also draw attention to how the other intersectorial goals of development assistance, such as environmental considerations and the emphasis on assistance to women are taken care of in the various projects, and shall analyse possible conflicts between these goals and local socio-cultural considerations in general. In this context the team will focus upon the significance of gender relations as well as local variation in the utilisation of natural resources.

5. The evaluation team shall consider how the awareness of socio-cultural conditions can be reflected at all levels of the development assistance process (the project cycle), from the concept stage, through planning and implementation to final evaluation and how planning manuals etc. can be developed accordingly.
6. The evaluation team shall assess changes within the target group(s) caused by Norway's development assistance and assess if such changes are in accordance with Norway's aid principles and the target group's own concept of desirable development.
7. The evaluation team shall also propose ways and means (recommendations) whereby the MDC/NORAD can develop its socio-cultural competency, improve its planning system and secure necessary participation in planning and implementation by the target group(s) within the context of the respective national administrations.

4. Method of work

In addition to the general guidelines defined in the Ministry of Development Cooperation's "Håndbok for evalueringsspørsmål" (Handbook for Project Evaluation), the evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Under the leadership of the two coordinators common parameters, criteria in a questionnaire or structured questions shall be prepared, in order to secure that the results obtained are comparable and can provide a basis for recommendations which can be operationalized.
2. The evaluation team shall prepare for its work in the field by studying project documents, planning manuals and relevant literature and by talking with responsible officials and others who have been involved in the projects.
3. In other respects the greater part of the data is to be collected in the field, based on own observations and talks with the local population and the persons responsible for the projects.
4. The evaluation team shall coordinate the results of the evaluation of the individual projects and present these in a single report, in addition to presenting separate sub-reports.
5. The evaluation team shall draw attention to what can be termed as "the development assistance process", from the initial concept, through decision-making and implementation to evaluation and modification, and to the ways in which the awareness of the importance of socio-cultural conditions, and knowledge of these conditions, are given relevance during the different phases. Such a perspective is also useful when trying to identify possible "bottlenecks", or weak links, in the system and to recommend improvements.
6. The evaluation team shall collect information about other relevant evaluations/studies being conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of

Development Cooperation, and as far as possible relate their work and recommendations to this information.

The following phases of the projects selected for study shall be examined. The points under each heading, however, are not intended to be complete and binding, but only to act as a guide:

A. DRAFT PROJECT AND TIME SCHEDULE

- where did the idea for the project originate?
- what was the target group's relation to the idea?
- what kind of background data/knowledge was the project based on?
- what kinds of preliminary investigations were carried out?
- which of the information required by the Project Handbook was in fact available?

B. THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS AT THE MINISTRY OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

- the documents presented for decision and the background data for these.
- how the socio-cultural conditions are referred to/problematized.
- whether preliminary studies were used or not used, possible reasons for non-use, strength and weakness of preliminary studies.
- the work situation of the official responsible, and other organizational conditions.
- putting intentions and plans into operation - how did they "confront" with reality. Reactions of the target group.
- the ability of projects, recipient country administration and the donor agency to "adjust" to reality. Are their structures adopted to the need to pick up signals and reactions on the part of the target group?
- how can their structures be made more adoptive to the fundamental premises of the local target groups?

C. EVALUATION AND MODIFICATION

- to what degree have evaluations/project reviews undertaken by the MDC concerned themselves with socio-cultural factors?

- have recommendations relating to socio-cultural conditions been followed up in practice?
- to what degree have evaluations undertaken by MDC involved the local target group, i.e. started a process of learning about the effects of development projects and contributed to stronger participation in project activities?

5. Consequences and recommendations

- what have been the consequences for projects when the socio-cultural aspects has been/has not been given proper consideration?
- recommendations and possible changes regarding selection of projects and arrangements for implementation of the different phases of the project, i.e. preliminary studies, decision-making, planning, implementation and follow up.

6. Work programme

1. The Inception Phase

Based on discussions with relevant institutions/project personnel/researchers and MDC officers in Oslo, as well as abroad, the Centre for Development Studies shall present an inception report before 1 March containing among others the following:

- Interpretation and operationalization of Draft Final Report with a uniform approach so that results obtained from different projects are comparable a proposed outline format of the final report.
- The final selection of projects to be studied.
- Work programme with time schedule for the consultancy.
- Proposal of final date for submission of Draft Final Report.
- An adjusted Terms of Reference regarding form and content.
- Proposal of local researchers to participate in the consultancy.
- Assessment of need for MDC/NORAD support in terms of documentation, reports, project documents etc.
- Budget proposal.

2. Field study

The field study shall not commence until MDC/NORAD has approved the Inception Report and the revised budget.

3. Language

All reports shall be presented in English.

4. *COMMENTS ON THE TERMS OF REFERENCE*

4.1. The conceptual framework

The deficiencies of earlier approaches to development assistance have been widely recognized in recent years. A basic lesson learned relates to the explanation of the factors underlying the failure of numerous development assistance projects to achieve their goal of benefiting the needy people in the recipient countries. Such a goal is particularly important in the case of Norwegian development assistance, which is based on the twofold objective of being poverty focused and recipient oriented. Norwegian aid thus seeks to fulfil the requirement that development assistance should be responsive to the conditions of the target population and that the relevant groups should become more actively involved in the development process. Many development projects, however, fail to fully satisfy these objectives and requirements. It is no longer credible to argue that failure is attributable to the resistance of indigenous cultures to planned change. Rather, it is becoming apparent that the poor performance of some development assistance projects often stems from the failure to accommodate aspects of the socio-cultural realities of the target population in the process of development planning, implementation and evaluation. An urgent task facing development assistance organizations in general, and Norwegian MDC in particular, is thus one of devising ways and means by which such accommodation of the socio-cultural dimension may be achieved.

Aspects of the socio-cultural conditions of relevance to development assistance are normally identified, albeit in passing, in reports on the different phases of development projects. These concern beliefs, attitudes, social relations and organization, norms and behavioural patterns, including indigenous technical knowledge. But it remains to be ascertained how this identification process has been pursued, and the degree to which this valuable knowledge is put to use in the different stages of the project life (planning, including project identification, feasibility studies and project formulation, implementation and evaluation). In order to ensure that development assistance shall continue to contribute to lasting improvements in the economic, social and political conditions of the population of developing countries, the resources allocated must be used as efficiently as possible. This requires adequate understanding of the system of social relations of the target population, their way of thinking, their traditions and beliefs and above all the way in which they organize production. The values which the target population hold, and the relations of such values to the way in which they utilize their

resources, have to be well understood. Such an understanding will show the possibility of inducing elements of change that can facilitate growth, equity and sustainability which are three major aspects of development. It is a common objective of development aid to eliminate the worst aspects of poverty. This can not be achieved without a major effort allowing for the satisfaction of basic human needs and human resource development, both of which can not commonly be reached without embarking on a broad-based development applying a more participatory approach. This would mean that the target for such a development is an investment in people. This is a process of strengthening the ability of people to control their own circumstances and to participate in the economy and in society. This can only be achieved if adequate information about the target population is made available prior to project formulation and use is made of such information in all stages of the project as well. Detailed knowledge of local institutions, whether these are religious, political, economic or otherwise, is an essential element in clearing the way for understanding of local systems and dealing with them.

Another aspect of the socio-cultural conditions relevant to development assistance comes up at the level of dealing with national institutions. The ideology and values held by national planners and politicians and those held by the representatives of the donor government may not always be in conformity with each other. What is meant or implied by equity, participation and self-reliance to a Norwegian planner may not necessarily be the same to a planner from a recipient country in Africa. Such differences will influence the type of development projects suggested and the way they are allocated to different communities. This calls for an understanding of the process of integration of socio-cultural aspects also at this level of planning.

By studying Norwegian development assistance projects in four African countries, the research team proposes to evaluate the degree to which the socio-cultural dimension has been appreciated and accommodated. Particular attention would be accorded to answering questions such as the following:

- Has there been any sensitivity at the stage of project identification and formulation to socio-cultural considerations?
- If socio-cultural considerations were taken into account in some projects but not others, did it make any difference in implementation? Did it promote participation by the target population?
- Has the target population participated in conceiving the project? In what way and with which implications for subsequent phases?
- Do the Norwegian principles in development assistance (participation, justice and self-reliance) apply to the project?
- Were the objectives put forward by national planners in conformity with those of Norwegian assistance? If not, how was the discrepancy redressed?
- Were the expectations of the target population in conformity with the objectives of national planners and/or Norwegian assistance? Were there any implications for the project as a result?

- At the national level, would our understanding of the socio-cultural dimension give us the necessary means to ensure that development assistance is trickling down to the poor to whom it is meant?
- What can be done in order to ensure that in the future the socio-cultural dimension could be provided for as both a tool and requirement for national planners and donors?
- Finally what are the ways and means through which the socio-cultural competence at the level of MDC/NORAD can be developed, the planning system can be improved and the necessary participation of the target population secured?

It is to be emphasized here that the conceptual framework offered here as a comment on the terms of reference does not come in contradiction with most of what the TOR have addressed themselves to. What is done here is just to start operationalizing the general statement and clearly define the areas to be covered.

4.2. Methodology

This section also clarifies the position of the team with reference to the method of work suggested in the terms of reference. The focus of the evaluation study will be twofold. The first is on the experience of the individual projects, and aims to assess the treatment of the socio-cultural dimension in the different stages of the project cycle. The selected cases were identified in such a way as to be sufficiently representative of the wide range of activities in which

Norwegian development assistance is involved. In addition to meeting the requirement that projects should be representative of the different stages in the project cycle, allowance is also made for location (whether rural or urban) and the nature of project (infrastructural, productive or servicing).

The second focus of the study will be on policy issues at the levels of both national planners and Norwegian MDC.

The tasks relating to the first focus will be carried out by

- (a) A core team formed of team leader and assistant with participation of
- (b) National small consultancy teams with highly experienced people who can do the fieldwork in a short time (8 weeks).

In two countries, two projects are selected. This would facilitate comparisons of results of different projects within the same country while simultaneously providing a good perspective for cross-national comparisons. In each country there will be a principal researcher, coordinating with the second national researcher. The team leader and the assistant team leader will provide direction for the focus of the micro-studies, and take a limited part in fieldwork in all four countries. In analyzing findings of the case-studies, the leader and assistant will synthesize results and relate them to the second, and more general, focus of the evaluation study.

In collecting their material the researchers will undertake a detailed description of the project area identifying the different local groups; their system of local organization; their existing relation of production; local leadership and different traditions, values and beliefs that influence these relations. The objective of this exercise is to make available qualitative data which, when related to the documents on projects histories and progress and supported by observations and interviews, will allow for possible evidence of the extent of the integration of the socio-cultural dimension in the process of planning, monitoring and evaluation of projects.

Before the start of the fieldwork in each country a workshop (3 days) will be held attended by the team leader, the assistant team leader and the team of country researchers. The relevant NORAD officers and some resource persons relevant to the selected projects will hopefully also take part. The workshop will discuss the general framework for the research, the kind of questions to be asked, the methods to be used and determine the exact location of the fieldwork. Some basic questions to be addressed to national institutions will be identified, guided interview plans will be discussed and the major focus for observation will be clearly outlined. The purpose of such an exercise is to ensure that the method used in all countries is to a large degree similar and can allow for comparison.

Upon completion of the fieldwork, a workshop for participants from all four countries to discuss the country reports will be organized. This workshop would avail a forum to refine the methodology for their integration in a final report on Africa. However, each country report would stand separately as an annex to the final report. Before submission of the final report, a unified summary report will be compiled integrating results of the evaluation study in Asia (if it is carried out).

The second focus of the evaluation concerns policy issues at the level of both national planners and Norwegian MDC. A list of present and previous people involved in project preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation will be compiled; and a sample of these people will be interviewed.

The national planners will be taken by the national teams of researchers while interviews with the Norwegians who have taken part in different stages of the projects (whether these individuals are still with the MDC or in their mother departments) shall be undertaken by the team leader and his assistant. Staff at CDS, Bergen will play a particularly important role during this stage of the project.

5. *OUTLINE FORMAT OF THE STUDY REPORT*

5.1. Reports from project studied in each country

Each national team of researchers will give a report on their country study. These reports will contain the following:

1. Summary, conclusions and recommendations concerning the development assistance projects studied.
2. Description of project
 - Description of background
 - Most important characteristics
 - Short presentation of history.
3. Description and analysis of socio-cultural conditions, target population study.
4. Project history and project administration
 - How the project was initiated
 - The decision process: Information available at each stage, how was the information used/not used.
 - Project organization and administration.
 - Relations to the target population.
 - Relations to local/regional/national agencies
 - The execution phase, evaluations, etc.: New information, new use of socio-cultural information.
5. Experiences and improvement areas.
6. Ideas for optimization of the project set-up: What could have been done better? Lessons learnt.

5.2. Outline format of final report

The final report will include:

- A summary of the findings and recommendations regarding each of the selected development projects;
- An analysis of the implications of these findings for developing improved tools for dealing with the socio-cultural dimension in development project design.
- Suggestions to improve the methods employed for preliminary studies focusing on the socio-cultural context of the target population.
- Suggestions on how to improve the general planning, implementation and evaluation of development assistance activities.

The content of the report may tentatively be divided into the following chapters:

1. Summary of conclusions and recommendations.
2. Main findings of the studies of the development projects: Reconsideration/validation of conclusions offered in Klausen's report 1987.
3. Bases for developing socio-cultural dimension methods and tools (i.e. tools and methods for handling the socio-cultural dimension in development assistance activities).
 - a) Assessment of the premises for development assistance activities in the Norwegian context with focus on the socio-cultural dimension.
 - b) Definition of a typology of development project activities.

- c) Qualitative baseline study and the study of socio-cultural dynamics: Major guide lines.
- 4. Revision of the methods for preliminary studies: Recommendations for improvement.
- 5. General observations and recommendations.

6. FINAL SELECTION OF PROJECTS

6.1. Selections criteria

In order to undertake the study it was found necessary that the proposed team leader should take a familiarization visit to the area of the study. This was undertaken during the period January 9. -29., 1989 where NORAD offices in four East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) were visited. Discussions with NORAD Resident Representatives and/or programme officers as well as national planners and researchers in national institution have led to the selection of the projects mentioned below. The selection of these projects has been made on a number of criteria:

1. The six projects should be chosen in order to provide sufficient variation regarding the type of project activity, form of administration, form of technology employed, category of target population involved, as well as the project history. This range of variation is necessary to ensure a fruitful comparison between the different projects, i.e. it provides the opportunity to compare different variables deemed to be important for the position of the socio-cultural conditions.
2. With a limited number of cases, however, it is also important that the differences between the cases are not too large, a fact which may threaten the feasibility of the evaluation and background study. However, the choice was made to ensure that some of the projects are having an impact on both rural and urban communities and hence the impact of development assistance on the wider society can be assessed.
3. The study is intended to be prospective and the focus is on how one can learn from previous experiences. This led to the selection of projects with a long history, as well as projects in their starting phase.
4. Some of the projects selected have used sociological and anthropological expertise to a great extent, while others have made no use of such expertise. This is a very important variable for the present study as one of our aims is to evaluate the usefulness of such expertise.

After visiting some of the project localities and reviewing basic documents in NORAD offices in the visited East African countries as well as discussing with programme officers, the projects listed below have been selected for case studies.

The selection came after a review of a number of projects in each country and the listed projects are found to be suitable for the purpose of the evaluation due to the facts that:

- a) They are different in nature, using different strategies, having different target populations which allow for different requirements in participation in the development process.
- b) They cover both rural and small urban centres and hence involve poor people as well as other strata in the society.
- c) Some of these projects are dealing with people from the same ethnic group while others are dealing with multi-ethnic entities and hence there will be a differing degree of socio-cultural impact of development assistance aid in each case.
- d) Each project makes a good case for testing and comparison within the country where it belongs and across national boundaries because of the similarities with other projects.
- e) The projects selected are at various stages of the project cycle, i.e. while some have just started, others have already finished. This will allow for the possibility of checking whether socio-cultural aspects are taken into consideration at different stages.

6.2. Selected Projects

a) **Rukwa Regional Integrated Development Programme (RUDEP), Tanzania.**

This is a fairly new project. It was started in 1985/86 in the remote Rukwa region. The main objective of the programme is to support the agricultural sector and to promote food production in the region. It aims "to improve the standard of living and general welfare of the people in the region, stress will be laid on the integration of women and children in various projects. The involvement of people in various stages of the project will be through their own institutions." This approach raises the issue of the degree of use of information in the pre-feasibility study. Are the institutions in such communities well identified and understood? Are activities assigned to local people acceptable to them or do they contradict the way of organization of activities in daily life? Do they have to be induced and offered incentives in order to participate or do they feel that the project activities are of benefit to their localities? What is the position of women and children in traditional communities and to what extent do people accept change in this area? In what way does such change help in the promotion of growth, equity and lead to sustainable development in the project area?

These questions and many others will be asked and the detailed description of the social relations, customs, values, religious beliefs as well as economic and political institutions will be checked to assess their relevance to the ideas suggested by the project organizers. The extent to which this understanding of the above dimensions of social life affects the performance of the project and its organization will be the subject of the team investigation.

This is a project that covers a wide area and deals mainly with the rural poor and seems to have been well prepared. It has already shown some signs of success, and emphasis have been made on understanding the social organization of the local communities during the prefeasibility studies.

b) Sports For All, Tanzania.

The feasibility study for this project was undertaken in 1982 and implementation started in 1983. The project is now completed. The objective of the project is to make sports (including its cultural and health aspects) available to as many as possible in Tanzania. This is a reflection of the international awareness of the concept of development through sports. The project involves an NGO, namely the Norwegian Association for Sports, and its activities are closely linked to the educational institutions i.e. schools. It involves both teachers and pupils in its activities in addition to its attempt to locally produce the needed equipment for its activities. Its main areas of emphasis are urban and semi-urban areas where educational institutions exist. An extension has been proposed.

This is an interesting project to investigate basically because it is suggesting new ideas to the local communities. The whole idea of sports for all is something which is new in the traditional African communities. When an attempt is made to involve men and women side by side in such activities an understanding of custom values and belief systems becomes very essential.

To what extent has this been given consideration? And to what extent did it promote or hinder the success of this project? The target population is a multi-ethnic, multi religious population; to what extent did this lack of homogeneity affect the performance and organization of the project?

c) Rural Access Road Programme (RARP), Kenya.

The Rural Access Road Programme was initiated in 1974 as a result of priorities given to rural development policy in Kenya. It involved a number of donors and NORAD decided to join the programme in 1984. The objectives of the programme were linked to an assumed impact in the broad sense of rural development by providing all weather access rural roads. Moreover, creation of employment opportunities (including women) and improvement of the rural economy in general were also among the objectives.

The programme was completed by 1988 and the activities have now been directed to the Minor Rural Access Road. The study will cover both projects.

Little emphasis has been given to the sociological impact of such a project. This is perhaps because the project covers a wide area and touches on the life of different groups. The target population inhabits large rural areas including both poor and well to do people. It is true that women's involvement has been given some emphasis, but whether they will come to take the offered opportunity or not will depend on the local community towards the involvement of women as part of the labour force and their engagement in income generating activities.

The project offers an opportunity to check the degree of incorporation of the socio-cultural dimension in the process of development based on the experience

of building rural access roads and minor rural roads. Since the project covers different areas and hence involves different ethnic groups the difference of reaction of different groups will be looked into and the reasons for active or passive involvement will be assessed.

However, more important in such a project is to see to what extent the results of such a project coincide with the Norwegian principles for development? Is this a project which mainly benefits the well-to-do people within the local communities, or does it have a positive impact also on the poor elements of the population?

d) **Village Agricultural Programme (VAP), Zambia.**

The programme which was located in one of the poorer provinces was designed as an alternative to a settlement scheme strategy, providing services and infrastructure to existing village communities. The programme was initiated in 1977 and is still in progress. The target population were primarily village households. The long term objective of the programme is village development. Basic to this is an improvement of quality of food and to increase food production to meet the needs of local people. Once this target is achieved, it might also be possible to produce surplus for sale. To achieve the set development objective the programme focuses on the improvement of agricultural methods through the use of improved agricultural technology, seeds and fertilisers. In addition, the improvement of infrastructure and marketing techniques in the area is set as targets.

This is a project which, if successful, will lead to the proper integration of the local communities in the national economy which is also influenced by the international economy. Many questions related to the issue of the relevance of such development effort to the quality of life in local areas should be raised. Was there enough understanding of local community life to support the direction towards such a line of development? Do the relations of production, systems of organization etc. offer the local communities a chance to perform in the new system of relations where the market system operates? Is there an adequate understanding of society and culture which may allow for a balanced growth without the danger of exploitation and loss of harmony within local communities? These are some of the questions that will be raised in connection with this project.

e) **Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRD), Zambia.**

The project is located in an area which can be classified as one of the poorest areas in Zambia. This area is isolated from the rest of the country due to the poor state of the infrastructure. The time plan for the project is 1988-1992. The goal of the project is to render the project area self-sustaining with respect to environmental, economic and human resources. Its objective is to improve the standard of living of the people of the project area through sustainable use of the full range of natural resources available to them, including agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water and wildlife.

The same kind of questions addressed to the above project will be asked here again. However, this is a different kind of project, since it deals with resource development. It offers an opportunity to see how a certain aspect of the socio-cultural dimensions of relevance to development is taken into consideration, namely indigenous technical and environmental knowledge. Do development planners, whether expatriate or national, take into consideration such knowledge or do they rely only on "scientific" knowledge? Do they make any effort to marry the two and if they do so, is the result satisfactory? Many questions in this direction will be developed and it is hoped that specific recommendations, based on the experience of this project, will be made.

f) **Family Health Project, Zimbabwe.**

The project aims toward helping to solve some of the health problems that the population of Zimbabwe are facing. The project attempts to achieve this target, for example through upgrading and extension of clinics and district hospitals.

It involves a number of donors and Norway is the largest among them. The project started in 1986 and it is planned to continue up to 1991. The development objectives of the project are: Strengthening the institutional capacity for planning, implementation and evaluation of mother/child/family planning services; improving health standards in the country, specially for mothers and children; and increasing the availability and use of family planning services and techniques. The target population is the rural people in the country.

This is in many ways an extension programme when it comes to the way it deals with local communities. It is true that the project activities start with upgrading of district hospitals and rural clinics activities which are mainly directed by the Ministry of Health. However, when it comes to the involvement of people who make use of the services offered by these hospitals and clinics, these are mainly people in rural areas. To attract these people to such services, there is a need for simple education advice and explanation of the benefit that individuals, families or villages may gain. It is a matter of relating knowledge from a different cultural background to the cultural heritage of the local community. For this to happen there is a need for a mediator. This is the village community worker who must be equipped with the necessary new knowledge to be introduced into the local communities without coming into confrontation with traditional culture. The project offers an opportunity to see how this role of mediation is played and to what extent the "scientific" knowledge is introduced. To what extent do these clinic and district hospitals make use of the indigenous knowledge of the local communities and in what manner does the understanding of local knowledge facilitate the progress of the project?

7. COMPOSITION OF CONSULTANCY TEAM:

1. As it shall appear from the work schedule and division of tasks given there, the team will consist of the members suggested below. There is the team leader and

his assistant whose task will be the preparation of the fieldworks in consultation with the local researchers. They shall also do the policy analysis and discussion and interviews with the MDC persons closely related to the project chosen. They are responsible for writing the final report on the basis of the country case studies and the workshop results. Finally, they shall produce the final report for the consultancy. The professional responsibility, however, falls mainly on the team leader. There will be an input from CDS side where the Director Gunnar Sørbo will contribute to the analysis of the Norwegian development assistance policies, and one more member of the CDS will be in charge of administrative issues related to the project.

2. The task of the local researchers shall be the undertaking of a detailed study of the project(s) chosen. In addition, they are expected to interview and assess the position of local planners with reference to the development assistance and its degree of incorporation of the socio-cultural dimension. The outcome of their activity should be a report that shall be presented and discussed in the suggested workshop in Harare.

In choosing the national researchers the relevant academic background was taken into consideration as well as the expertise in doing this type of consultancy work for national and international institutions. Most of those selected have been directly contacted and have shown interest in taking part. However, it should be pointed out that the Zambian team is still tentative and efforts are made to contact more people before holding the pre-fieldwork workshop.

3. The following are the proposed team members whose detailed C.V. are annexed to this report:

1. Prof. Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed,
Social Anthropologist (Team Leader)
2. Dr. Salah-el-Din el-Shazali Ibrahim
Development Sociologist (Assistant Team Leader)
3. Director Gunnar Sørbo (CDS Bergen)
4. Eldar Bråten (social anthropologist CDS Bergen)
5. Professor John Okumo.
political scientist (Kenya)
6. Dr. (Mrs.) Edda Wacheke Gachukia,
literature/education (Kenya)
7. Dr. Ernest N. Maganya,
Development specialist (Tanzania)
8. Mrs. Rose Shayo
Women Studies (Tanzania)
9. Dr. John T. Milimo
Anthropologist (Zambia)
10. Mrs. Robie Jean Siamwiza
Political Science/Urban Affairs (Zambia)
11. Dr. Nginya Mungai Lenneiye
Health and Rural Development (Zimbabwe)
12. Mrs. Daisy Stella Mukasa
sociology/public and social administration (Zimbabwe)

8. ASSESSMENT OF NEEDS FOR MDC/NORAD SUPPORT

1. It is hoped that NORAD offices in the countries where the project have been selected will give the researcher access to reports, project documents, policy papers and copies of agreements signed with the national governments. Also the programme officers are hoped to introduce the researchers to some of the resource persons they have been working with in ministries as well as local communities.
2. There will be need for office support at certain times, specially at the first stage when a small workshop is to be held between team leader, his assistant and the national team. Arrangements to use telephones, telexes and telefax with communication between team leader and national terms, the MDC and the CDS in Oslo are hoped to be facilitated.
3. Some support in organizing transport may be needed.
4. The team leader and his assistant will need all the documents related to the projects selected, including those on evaluation. There is a need for a comprehensive list with addresses of personnel who have been associated with the selected project for the purpose of selecting a sample for interviews on policy issues and development assistance principles.

9. PLAN AND TIME SCHEDULE:

Upon approval of this Inception Report by MDC, it is envisaged that evaluation activities would start in May, 1989. The schedule will be as follows:

May/June 1989

Preparations by leader (Bergen)
leader and assistant (Khartoum)

July 2-12

Leader and assistant to be in Nairobi

July 2-5

Workshop to decide on the frame of work, methodology and final contract.

July 6-12

Field visit to different locations to be studied.

July 13 - 23

Leader and assistant to be in Dar es Salaam

- July 13-16
Workshop
- July 17-23
Field visits
- July 24 - August 3
Leader and assistant to be in Lusaka
- July 24-27
Workshop
- July 28-August
3 Field visits
- August 4-14
Leader and assistant to be in Harare
- August 4-7
Workshop
- August 8-14
Field Visits
- August 15 - October 1
Leader and assistant to be in Khartoum
Review of policy documents and literature
- Oct. 2 - Oct. 17
Leader and assistant to be in Norway
- Discussions of policy issues with CDS;
- Discussions with MDC officials
- Collection of documents
- Interview project personnel
- October 18 - Nov. 19
Leader and assistant to be in Khartoum
- November 20 - 27
Workshop in Harare to present and discuss country reports
- Methodology of integration
- Resource people from some of the countries involved
- NORAD Programme officers
- December - January/February 1990
Leader and assistant to write draft report in Khartoum
- March 1990
Leader and assistant to be in Norway


- discussion and finalization of African report


May 1990

Submission of draft final report to MDC

August/September 1990

Submission of final report





NORAD

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