

# Cooperation between IPI and Norway: Current and Proposed Framework Agreements

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# Cooperation between IPI and Norway: Current and Proposed Framework Agreements

Final Report



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**Project:** Cooperation between Norway and the International  
Peace Institute

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

CWC	Coping with Conflict (IPI program)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UN)
DPKO	Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
FA	Framework Agreement
GO	Global Observatory
ICM	Independent Commission on Multilateralism
INCAF	International Network on Conflict-Affected and Fragile States (DAC)
IPI	International Peace Institute
MEP	Middle East Program
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PBC	Peace-Building Commission (UN)
SPR	Section for Peace and Reconciliation (MFA)
TOR	Terms of Reference

## 1 Executive Summary

Norad's Department for Economic Development, Gender Equality and Governance commissioned a review of the cooperation between the International Peace Institute (IPI) and Norway under the current three-year framework agreement 2010-2012 and an appraisal of a funding proposal for a new framework agreement for the period 2013-2015. This report presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of this review

### **Overall Usefulness of the Partnership**

The Framework Agreement provides Norway with privileged access to an important knowledge centre on the UN. It allows Norway to promote particular policy issues that are important to it when this also falls within IPI's remit, providing a visible and audible platform towards the UN and UN-accredited diplomatic missions.

The framework agreement is vague on the actual expected benefits to Norway from the arrangement, pointing instead to general objectives that are in common. Norway, however, is not exploiting IPI visits to Oslo as much as it could.

### **Relevance of the Partnership**

In the Norwegian MFA, staff involved with UN-related work, in Oslo and New York, appreciate IPI the most, both their services and knowledge products, and also are the ones with most exposure to IPI's outputs as a whole

The CWC program has components that Norway relies on and strongly supports while the Middle East program is seen as less relevant for Norway's activities on the ground.

IPI is an important knowledge producer and broker on UN matters: compiling relevant information including documenting important UN experiences for future reference and learning, producing focused analyses on UN-relevant matters, bringing actors together and facilitating their dialogue, transmitting this knowledge and these views in a timely manner into UN decision making processes but also, through the use of modern information technology/social media, disseminates these services well beyond its immediate reach in New York (and Vienna). All IPI outputs are of course available to Norwegian policymakers and MFA staff through the web.

### **Efficiency of the Partnership Structures and Processes**

The IPI is very well located with geographic proximity to the UN, and thus has a strong comparative advantage for hosting learning events relevant to the UN and UN Delegations.

Norway has benefited from IPI's location and services to promote its own events, in particular the annual Trygve Lie Symposium, but also consultations that either present policies or issues of interest and relevance to Norway, or provide inputs from leaders and knowledgeable informants in New York for Norwegian policies and decisions.

Overall transaction costs appear low, a number of them more related to internal dialogue and decision-making in the MFA than to the interactions between the MFA/Oslo and the IPI. The transactions costs to the Norwegian UN Delegation appear very low due to close personal relations.

The costs of approving or changing agreements or programs also appear low and flexible, especially when compared with the normal procedures and time lags in the UN system.

### **Effects of the Partnership**

The CWC program has produced the most tangible Outputs across a range of sub-fields. Where IPI has been most useful is when it combined original research with hosting international roundtables of experts to discuss and arrive at conclusions and thereafter produced knowledge products for various audiences for practical follow-up. This kind of contribution has been particularly noticeable in recent areas of concern such as transnational and cyber crime, terrorism and to some extent fragile states.

The Middle East program (MEP) continues to facilitate dialogue processes, though without any clear change in approach or clear results to point to. Within MEP, the *Arab Spring* projects are interesting initiatives with civil society rather than governments, but since they are very recent no outputs are yet available.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation**

It is clear that IPI has increased its activity levels over the last couple of years, not least of all its ability to disseminate its results electronically, so IPI is able to reach a much wider audience. As of now, however, the IPI does not have instruments for gauging the Outcomes of this on the various user groups and policy processes.

IPI results reporting is largely delivered as narrative on activities and Outputs. The so-called five indicators point to some potential Outcome reporting, but in their current form are not sufficiently well specified for documenting results out the delivery chain.

IPI would benefit from developing a more rigorous results framework that structures reporting either by core activity (program) or service (events), and clarifies how its Outputs are to contribute to monitorable Outcomes that are aligned with its own Mission statement.

### **Outreach, Dissemination and Use of Knowledge Products**

IPI has modernised its dissemination system, reaching new audiences across new platforms with a wider range of its services, though little is known about who the wider audience is and to what use these groups put IPI services/products.

Norway is well serviced by IPI's outreach though the use by Norway of IPI products varies according to whether an MFA unit finds the product directly applicable or not.

### **Financial Management**

IPI maintains detailed budgeting and accounting data broken down by relevant categories by year, so that both on the revenue and expenditure sides IPI can provide the insight required by the framework agreement. The details regarding revenues and expenditures are potentially much more detailed and can provide further insights to the extent requested by a donor.

IPI accounts are audited on an annual basis by an external authorized auditor in line with internationally accepted accounts standards.

IPI financial management as far as budgeting and accounting are concerned thus appear in line with expectations and agreements with no negative remarks to date.

### **Relevance of the Proposed Activities**

The Middle East program continues with its interactions with state actors and events at head office but is also starting up civil society activities based on consultations with actors on the ground. While IPI recognizes the political fragility of these activities, the concern raised here is with regards to IPIs financial, technical and managerial resources to address such a range of actions without clear prioritisation and costing.

The CWC has identified a series of core UN concerns that it intends to support through a mix of analysis, facilitated events and disseminated knowledge products. Of particular note is the proposal for an *Independent Commission on Multilateralism* which, if politically accepted and properly operationalized, could be an innovative way of searching for new solutions to old UN challenges.

The capacity development program under the *Nansen* school seems to lack clear justification and outputs relevant to Norway. While it is important to see how the accumulated field-based experience in the UN can be transmitted, IPI does not seem to have a cogent strategy to attain this goal so far.

The seminars and conferences are often important and relevant events, and structuring series around key issues and actors enhances the effects of this.

### **Sustainability and Risks**

IPI addresses issues that are concerned with volatile environments. There is little reason to expect this to substantially affect IPI's own work, however, since IPI is not actually embedded in these environments.

Formal risk, sustainability and anti-corruption analyses are missing, but given the size and structure of IPI these are not considered major concerns.

Staff volatility, a perceived lack of staff diversity, and limited time availability of IPI President are the more real risks, and these are issues IPI should address.

### **Assessment of the Program Design**

Program design is weak: there is little analysis of options or arguments for choices, little discussion of complementary and competing activities and IPI's comparative advantages, so the program profile could benefit from a more substantive justification.

The results framework for tracking program performance also lacks specificity. Gender and other concerns, such as coverage of vulnerable groups and particular issues, are not highlighted in terms of objectives for the IPI's program.

The particular nature of the IPI and its "information gateway/knowledge broker" role must be acknowledged as highly valuable. Important parts of IPI's activities thus will remain demand driven *ad hoc* responses to opportunities and requests. But as a funding request a better structured program proposal should be provided.



### Recommendations

- Norway should continue supporting the IPI as an important cross-roads for information and views within, to and from the UN on matters relating to peace, security and development.
- Norway should request a clearer program-to-results framework based on IPI's comparative advantage in terms of delivering research, analyses, facilitated events, and dissemination of information and views.
- Regarding the substance areas, Norway should request a clearer results-framework regarding the fields of peace and conflict negotiations. The geographic focus on the Middle East needs more elaboration in terms of IPI engagement. Overall, a focus on “value for money” when looking at probable results would be helpful, even if these are indirect.
- The training program should have a clearer strategic and long-run focus to understand how the different components fit together and how IPI intends to track results.
- The results framework should make it clearer how IPI expects Outputs will be used and can be assessed. At the same time, Norway should be realistic when requesting such a framework: IPI is a knowledge institution that produces for others to use – the limits of accountability should be recognised.
- Funding particular programs does not add any value-added to Norway's access to the IPI, but it may strengthen particular policy areas of importance to Norway. In this light Norway, the CWC and the Conferences and Seminars would be the two that are most worth selecting. In principle, Norway could provide half of its funding as untied direct support and the other half for the earmarked activities, if this is seen by IPI as providing them with some funding flexibility.
- Norway should consider what share of IPI's funding it is willing to carry, where around 10% would seem reasonable. Since Norway should continue being a predictable partner by committing a fixed annual contribution, this could be set at NOK 8 million.

## 2 Background and Purpose of Review

Norad's Department for Economic Development, Gender Equality and Governance commissioned a review of the cooperation between the International Peace Institute (IPI) and Norway under the current three-year framework agreement 2010-2012 and an appraisal of a funding proposal for a new framework agreement for the period 2013-2015. This report presents the main findings, conclusions and recommendations of this review.

### 2.1 Objectives of the Review

The Terms of Reference (TOR) state that the review has two purposes:

- Review the benefit from the partnership between IPI and Norway with an emphasis on *relevance, efficiency and effectiveness* of the cooperation with regard to the specific goals and objectives as outlined in the framework agreement covering 2010-2012. The main focus should be on direct benefits of IPI activities to diplomatic efforts by the MFA. However, activities that contribute to high priority Norwegian foreign policy goals in general should also be given consideration.
- Carry out an *appraisal* of the new proposal for framework agreement between IPI and Norway for the period 2013-2015. The appraisal should be based on conclusions and recommendations from the assessment of the current framework agreement and focus on *relevance and efficiency with regard to expected results*. It is expected that a risk analysis is included. The appraisal analyse the goals set for the proposed agreement, assess the usefulness of a budget increase from NOK 8 to 11 million annually, and suggest prioritizations of the proposed areas of activities.

### 2.2 Deliverables

The team is to produce the following *deliverables*:

- **A Draft Report** that will be structured according to how the team foresees the Final Report itself and in accordance with Norad's Guidelines for Reports.
- **The Final Report** will be produced once all observations have been received from the various stakeholders that have been invited to comment. They will be responded to so that it will be transparent how Scanteam has handled the various observations made in the final version of the report.
- **A Dissemination seminar** is foreseen organized by Norad to which the team will prepare the presentation. It is the understanding of Scanteam that any costs beyond the direct costs to the team of preparing and participating in the seminar will be borne by Norad and thus are not included in the budget.

### 3 Task Understanding and Methodology

There are two tasks that are to be addressed: a backward looking review of results against agreed upon goals and objectives during 2010-2012, with particular focus on contributions to Norway's foreign policy goals and efforts, and a forward looking appraisal of the funding proposal for the three-year period 2013-2015 (see Annex A for the complete Terms of Reference).

#### 3.1 Structure of the Study

The Terms of Reference (TOR) defines the objectives and scope of the work to be done. As noted above, the task is divided in two. The *Performance Review* is divided into seven areas that the team is to look into, and which are addressed in chapter 4.

The *Appraisal* of the new framework agreement and the final assessments and *Recommendations* are presented in chapter 5.

#### 3.2 Challenges of the Study

In the TOR, the *Review* is divided into 33 bullet points with nearly 50 questions. For 17 of the bullet points, specific examples are asked for as documentary evidence.

The *Appraisal* has similarly 18 bullet points and nearly 30 questions. A number of the questions are to be addressed for each of the four components of the framework proposal.

In total there are hence nearly 100 questions/issues posed in the TOR.

This study was to be carried out in the course of just over one month: signature of contract took place on 12 November while the first draft of the report had to be presented on 17 December.

During the contract meeting between the parties it was agreed that Scanteam would consult closely with Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) since it was clear that some issues are more important and would require relatively more of the team's attention than others. *Flexibility* was therefore seen as important, but also *prioritisation*. The MFA and Norad were clear that their main concern is with the *relevance and utility* to Norway of the collaboration with IPI, and that the team therefore should pay particular attention to these dimensions of the various issues raised.

#### 3.3 Methodology and Data Sources

This study has been based on two key sources of information:

**Documents:** The overwhelming share of documentation is that produced by IPI, but overall the team has reviewed five kinds of documents (see Annex C for a complete list of documents consulted):

- The *framework agreements* – the current one for 2010-2012, and the proposal for 2013-2015, with relevant attachments;
- *Results reports* by IPI, largely annual reports to Norway on the activities funded by Norway but also more general reporting and some internal review material;

- Financial reporting, again largely annual, and on Norwegian-funded activities, but also more general revenue and expenditure data, focused on the period 2010-2012;
- General information material – research reports, policy briefs etc – prepared by IPI for public dissemination;
- One external evaluation of IPI.

*Informant interviews:* The team has had conversations with about 75 persons, from a range of institutions and settings. The overwhelming number of interviews was carried out by Ms. Rasul-Rønning and Ms. Vik in New York during the week of 3-7 December. Most interviews were done in person, both in New York and in Oslo, but all those outside these two cities and also some of the New York and Oslo conversations were by phone.

The persons spoken with can be grouped into the following categories (see Annex B for a complete list of persons spoken with):

- IPI staff, largely at the New York head office, but also some from the Vienna office;
- UN staff at various UN offices in New York;
- Staff from various country delegations to the UN based in New York;
- Staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo;
- Norwegian diplomatic staff stationed in the Middle East;
- Researchers and staff of knowledge institutions in a number of countries.

### 3.4 Finalisation Process

Once the draft report was ready, it was circulated to the various parts of the MFA and Norad, as well as IPI, for comment. IPI provided a comprehensive and constructive reply, walking through a number of the issues raised, providing further information/explanation. It has in particular noted the background to a number of its proposals and thus question some of the findings of the report. What has also emerged is – reasonably enough – a different perspective on several issues from that coming from some of the Norwegian actors.

The challenge for the team has been that this is *not* a review of the IPI and its activities as such – the team did not have the mandate, time or resources for this. The objective is to look at the usefulness to Norway of its collaboration with the IPI. At the same time, this latter question can of course only be answered in light of what the IPI actually delivers. The team therefore has to consider the sometimes contrasting perceptions on the usefulness of IPI services. IPI clearly has fuller knowledge about the reasons for selecting the deliverables it ends up providing, but Norwegian actors are the ones who employ them and thus in practice experience their usefulness.

The task has been to summarise the utility of the collaboration, but in particular assess likely usefulness of continued cooperation in the fields proposed by IPI. At the end of the day, this remains a subjective exercise, based on information and views received, but the finalisation process has undoubtedly strengthened the solidity of findings and recommendations

## 4 Review of Results

There are a large number of specific questions that are raised in the TOR, as noted in point 3.2 above. The team tried to address those for which there was useful information available, and where the team felt it was competent to pass judgment. Some questions require a better overall understanding of the IPI and its work than the team can comfortably claim, since this task is primarily about the relationship between Norway and the IPI.

In each section the key questions in the TOR are first presented. Then the major issues are provided in the form of sub-headings for each paragraph with the information received, from documents and conversations, provided. Finally, the main findings/conclusions are presented as a series of bullet points at the end of the section.

The starting point is the Framework Agreement (FA) for the period 2010-2012, signed 30 June 2010. In this, Norway agrees to support particular program areas: (i) Coping with Crisis (CWC) program, including the *Right to Protect* sub-program, (ii) the Middle East program, and (iii) Conference, Seminars and Research area of activities.

The Purpose of the 2010-2012 agreement was two-fold: (i) support the parties' shared interest in promoting development, state building, peace and reconciliation, and (ii) strengthen these actors' capacities with special focus on supporting the role of the UN.

### 4.1 Overall Usefulness of the Partnership

*What are the main benefits of the partnership between IPI and Norway; are they captured in the framework agreement; and in particular what are the main benefits of IPI's dialogue facilitation?*

**Norway has privileged access to IPI resources.** IPI's main assets are its staff with their unparalleled access to senior UN staff and UN-accredited diplomats, and its location and facilities. Through the framework agreement Norway has access to and has to a considerable extent taken advantage of IPI physical and human resources:

- On the staffing side, the IPI has recognized expertise in the key fields the Institute covers, as IPI has a number of senior scholar-practitioners who are credible resources in policy-debates, and can act as facilitators and convenors for bringing together researchers and decision makers for advancing implementable proposals. By co-sponsoring or supporting IPI's promulgation of certain proposals or policy initiatives that Norway wishes to strengthen, such as on gender, "right to protect" etc, Norway gains a strong bull-horn vis-a-vis the UN diplomatic community and the UN system itself.
- There is no other body that is as proximate to the UN Secretariat as the IPI, and thus it can most easily attract busy UN staff and visitors to the UN. With the refurbishment of its facilities, including the *Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security and Development*, the IPI also has unparalleled possibilities for hosting meetings in various formats. With the increasing use of dissemination technology such as web-casting, the IPI has also dramatically increased its potential reach and thus utility to actors outside the IPI and its direct vicinity. As part of its staff, IPI has dedicated professionals organising events and disseminating IPI's services and products.

- A majority of informants interviewed in New York were aware that Norway was a major financial supporter of IPI and this implies that the linkage of Norway with IPI's product disseminations, conferences, seminars and research is tangible.

*For IPI, Norway is a predictable and important supporter.* Norway provides three-year framework agreements that allow medium-term planning around reliable funding levels, as well as political support for IPI's objectives. While Norway gets access to and benefits from IPI resources in return, these are above-board requests which in content are in line with IPI's objectives and programs and thus do not distort IPI's own planned activities and priorities.

*Norway benefits to some extent from IPI's networks.* A key aspect of IPI is the number of networks that it as an institution has established, and the networks that its staff as well-known figures in their fields have around them. These are often wider and better placed than ones Norway on its own may have access to. The extent to which Norway exploits these networks varies. Some IPI networks and knowledge fields are fairly unique and at the same time of great interest to Norway, such as trans-border funding of terrorism, while the IPI's networks in the Middle East are appreciated at general policy level but not experienced as directly applicable for day-to-day work on the ground.

*Norway could exploit IPI visits better.* IPI staff visit Norway on a regular basis and while a number of MFA staff point to such meetings and briefings as often interesting, IPI staff feel that a number of these events could have been exploited better. One of the challenges is clearly that in a busy working day, MFA staff often are not able to attend. But it would seem possible to plan such events better in terms of contents and potential audience – including Norwegian research institutions and others – to maximize the benefits of the presence of senior IPI experience (events could perhaps be hosted by such institutes in Norway to reduce the administrative burdens on the MFA).

*IPI is an efficient dialogue facilitator.* IPI is considered an effective dialogue facilitator. A number of member state and UN informants stressed the role that IPI plays in hosting high-level personalities like Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), and in convening timely discussions on key countries and subjects before Security Council or General Assembly debates. While a number of such events include ministers and other high-ranking officials from UN member states, it is difficult to document actual tangible results, except to note that key actors themselves have found a number of these events useful.

- The Framework Agreement provides Norway with privileged access to an important knowledge centre on the UN. It allows Norway to promote particular policy issues that are important to it when this also falls within IPI's remit, providing a visible and audible platform towards the UN and UN-accredited diplomatic missions.
- The framework agreement is vague on the actual expected benefits to Norway from the arrangement, pointing instead to general objectives that are in common. Norway, however, is not exploiting IPI visits to Oslo as much as it could.

## 4.2 Relevance of the Partnership

*How does the FA support the overall goal of IPI, how does it enhance Norway's capacity to play an active role in development, peace and reconciliation efforts, to what extent does the FA reflect Norway's priorities?*



***IPI of greatest relevance to UN-focused staff.*** The relevance to Norway is primarily felt by MFA-staff engaged with UN-matters, i.e. in the UN-sections in Oslo but first and foremost at the Norwegian UN-delegation in New York. Here IPI is regarded as a professional, service-minded and flexible partner that organizes high level events as well as low-key informal substantive dinners/meetings, events that the delegation lacks adequate resources to organize itself. The annual *Trygve Lie Symposium* is a key event that provides Norway visibility and profiling during the High-level Segment week, but other events during the year are also seen as very useful.

***Coping with Crisis (CWC) important.*** CWC was established in 2006 to engage the UN, member states, and experts in the search for innovative policy and institutional responses to challenges to global security. CWC's activities are organized in two clusters: Peace and Governance, and Transnational Security Challenges. IPI provides analyses, platforms for dialogue, and support to policy processes in the UN and members states. Interviews identified relevance on two particular series. On *Peace and Governance*, MFA-staff note that IPI has shed light on and brought to the table views and information that support policy views held by Norway. They thus view IPI as a relevant and effective tool when it comes to organizing events to promote UN Resolution 1325 on *Woman, Peace and Security*. It is viewed as positive and in Norway's interest that IPI in this field supports member states with small delegations and limited resources with substantive input and support to strengthen their constructive participation in the UN. The second cluster includes projects on *Transnational Organized Crime* which is partly implemented in partnership with Norway through a former Police Councillor at the Norwegian Delegation and includes knowledge production and briefings, as well the hosting of meetings of key international law-enforcement experts and practitioners. Interviewees highlighted the program's relevance and innovative approach to the challenge of battling transnational crime. The partnership in this field is heavily dependent on the capabilities of a senior IPI staff who ends his engagement at IPI in 2013. Continued relevance of IPI cooperation is thus to a large extent dependent on the replacement of this skills- and experience set.

***The Middle East program: not central to Norwegian Middle East engagement.*** The core objectives of IPI's Middle East program are to (i) explore ways to push the Middle East peace process forward through policy facilitation and dialogue, and (ii) deepen knowledge and expertise on issues related to the Middle East through research and convening. It comprises two pillars: (a) informal policy facilitation and dialogue, and (b) research and development of projects to engage/support civil actors role in political transitions in Egypt/Tunisia. The program has two distinct arenas of action – the Middle East itself with the various visits and missions carried out, and in New York. – Regarding the activities in the field, there is no direct contact or collaboration between IPI and Norway on activities in the Middle East. The MFA's Middle East section and Norway's embassies rely on research papers and policy briefs from a number of knowledge centres but IPI is not considered among the most central ones<sup>1</sup>. There is little or no contact with Norwegian embassies in the

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<sup>1</sup> IPI disputes this, noting that Norway in fact has privileged access to briefings and situation updates that it believes are unique and not available through other channels, including that Norway's Minister is invited in to more limited gatherings and processes under the aegis of the IPI. The story conveyed to the team, however, and

region and embassy staff are not familiar with IPI projects or processes in their host countries.

***The Middle East program: spin-offs and attribution.*** IPI and its President provide frequent, sometimes daily policy briefs and updates to senior policy makers, including Norway's Minister of Foreign Affairs. While these are often confidential in nature, one common reaction has been that these are useful but that they largely confirm and enrich information from other sources rather than provide substantively different insights (something IPI might dispute – see footnote 2). A confounding factor when assessing IPI's value-added is what it is that can be ascribed to the IPI program since it is not clear if most activities of the IPI President in the region are due to his role as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Security Council Resolution 1559 or Senior Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General<sup>2</sup>. The attribution of activities and results of IPI's Middle East program is thus problematic since IPI's president also fulfils special envoy tasks in the region.

***Middle East program in New York: constructive and useful.*** In New York, focus is on IPI's meetings, both open and restricted, that can be for policy discussions, information dissemination, or more closed sharing of views and deliberations. IPI has also initiated an "Arab Intellectual series" (which is to be replaced by a new "Dialogue on Contemporary Developments in the Arab World"), where Arab leaders and scholars share their insights on political developments in the region to the UN-community in New York. This is a useful and highly relevant series of events, and a service that probably no other institution could offer to that UN-centred target group.

***General peace, security and development products less relevant.*** IPI's knowledge products such as policy analyses are disseminated in the MFA but are generally not seen as equally interesting to the reports from larger and more specialist research milieus. The relevance of IPI's products is seen as higher by the MFA sections engaged on UN/ multilateral issues. The general view is that while IPI was at the centre of a number of peace and policy debates a decade ago, this space has been taken over by larger research centres (Center on International Collaboration/New York University, Brookings Institution, International Crises Group, among others). IPI remains useful in key fields where it does innovative work, such as its studies on transnational crime and corruption, or transition issues in OSCE countries (IPI notes that it does not consider itself a general development research institute but has limited its range of activities to those linked to peace and security – see box 4.1). Norwegian researchers in the fields of peace, security and development are generally well acquainted with IPI, but IPI knowledge products get less attention compared to previously. There are few examples of direct collaboration and partnership, though the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and IPI co-hosted a seminar in 2010 when NUPI needed an entry point to reach out to key people in the UN system. IPI is thus viewed as a natural partner for Norwegian research centres when organizing events in New York especially around the security-peace-

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confirmed by several different sources, is the one presented above. How such divergent perceptions are possible on a reasonably clear matter is frankly a little puzzling.

<sup>2</sup> IPI notes that there is an identifiable budget for IPI activities for the Middle East, but much of this is presumably for the FACT and youth programs discussed later and not for the activities that form the basis for the briefings by the IPI president.



development nexus.

#### **Box 4.1: IPI as Knowledge Producer**

This report focuses on the role of IPI as a knowledge broker rather than as a knowledge producer. IPI believes this is an incorrect understanding of its role. It points to several areas where it produces primary data for research. At the same time it recognises that it is not a general research institute and focuses on areas that at their core address peace and security:

- IPI is producing a series on *UN Offices and mediation engagements*, where a report on Myanmar has been produced and similar volumes on Yemen and Lebanon are forthcoming.
- Another series on the *Histories of UN Peacekeeping Operations* has produced a first volume on Sierra Leone and ones on Guatemala, Bosnia and Somalia are under preparation.
- IPI is preparing and making available in digitized form data on military and police contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, including profiles by contributing country.
- The *Middle East Peace Process Compendium*, which is to be published shortly, is considered a major tool box for academics and practitioners engaged in this field.

IPI also delivers original analyses and does not simply transmit the work of others. The analyses on the Global Observatory – which covers a wide range of issues – are produced by IPI staff or affiliates. And in more specific fields, like transnational crime and terrorism, IPI has delivered a major study, *Spotting the Spoilers*.

There is a need to distinguish what can be seen as IPI-driven programs, such as the publication series, and fields where the work is linked to individuals. Some of the innovative work comes from staff who have been contracted by IPI for limited periods, and thus constitute less of a permanent capacity. This may not be a bad policy – identifying specific niche areas where IPI sees that new work can be value-adding to what it does without having to build big permanent programs in that area. The question is how the long-term permanent tasks are balanced with the more *ad hoc* issues-based work, and the policy on this does not appear totally clear.

***IPI convening and facilitation important.*** UN staff confirmed IPI's convening power as its key comparative advantage, due to its location, linkages and access to key stakeholders. IPI allows UN and member states staff to meet and listen to policy views and presentations by key UN and international policymakers with confidence and convenience that would not be possible if IPI did not exist. According to key users and target groups, IPI provides a unique space for the UN and Member states to conduct discussions without national agendas ("*Chatham House rule*").

***Role as "knowledge broker" increasing in importance.*** IPI has an active research portfolio in several areas (see box 4.1), but it is its knowledge synthesis and dissemination through social media (webinars, Twitter, Facebook), the Global Observatory (GO) website daily updated analyses on peace and security issues etc, that are viewed as the more innovative services by IPI. The Global Observatory and other social media platforms have enabled IPI to increase its outreach with a growing number of visits. It has an active dissemination list of nearly 7,000 contacts in about 150 countries, and has seen the number of "hits" on its web-sites grow from 27,200 in 2008 to an estimated 180,000 in 2012. The synthesizing, "packaging" into shorter policy and status briefs with much shorter lead-time and thus greater time-relevance – in short acting as a knowledge-broker in key fields where issues move quickly – is seen as an important value-added service by IPI both to its traditional constituencies – UN offices and staff, UN delegations and some knowledge centres – to potentially a much wider, decentralised and perhaps on-the-ground users of more timely and action-oriented information.

- In the Norwegian MFA, staff involved with UN-related work, in Oslo and New York, appreciate IPI the most, both their services and knowledge products, and also are the ones with most exposure to IPI's outputs as a whole.
- The CWC program has components that Norway relies on and strongly supports while the Middle East program is seen as less relevant for activities on the ground.
- IPI is an important knowledge producer and broker on UN matters: compiling relevant information including documenting important UN experiences for future reference and learning, producing focused analyses on UN-relevant matters, bringing actors together and facilitating their dialogue, transmitting this knowledge and these views in a timely manner into UN decision making processes but also, through the use of modern information technology/social media, disseminates these services well beyond its immediate reach in New York (and Vienna). All IPI material is of course available to MFA staff through the web.

### 4.3 Efficiency of the Partnership Structures and Processes

*Is IPI perceived as using its resources efficiently, and are activities carried out according to plan? How are programs selected, is there flexibility in the FA, and what are main transaction costs?*

**Location, experienced staff and technology use key sources of efficiency.** As noted previously, all informants see the IPI as extremely well located for meetings and other arena-based events. This is exploited by having professional events-staff and further enhanced by the increasingly sophisticated technology platforms used for live dissemination and subsequent follow-up on the most important events, so as an events organiser the IPI is considered highly efficient.

**Timeliness and relevance of events largely good.** The IPI is seen to track trends and policy discussions in the UN within its sphere of interest well and thus able to organise events and provide short knowledge products like policy briefs at short notice. This means that not all events are equally well prepared or had the same degree of consultation in the planning, so there is a perceived trade-off between speed and in-depth knowledge behind some events. This is largely unavoidable in a very fast-paced environment where IPI itself has limited staff and must to a large extent rely on bringing in relevant skills from the outside. However, this is at the same time one of IPI's strengths: it has a vast network and easy access to senior skills in the UN system, and thus can schedule clustered events such as SRSG reporting; discussions on topics such as Security Council Resolution 1325; etc. This is a unique aspect of IPI and thus a highly efficient service.

**Events hosting efficient.** Norway has used the IPI to host such events on issues it deems important. The best known example is the annual Trygve Lie Symposium during the High-level Segment week (see section 4.6), but other examples are roundtables or workshops both on topics that Norway wishes to support, but also on issue where Norway would like inputs from a range of actors both within the UN system and in the larger knowledge network in New York. One example of this is the workshop organised in connection with the MFA's White Paper to Parliament ("*Stortinget*") on the United Nations. Furthermore, when MFA visit New York and wish to meet with IPI staff, this is normally arranged. For the

Norwegian UN Delegation, it is even easier: they have direct access to the key persons they normally work with, and these connections can be used when urgent issues arise.

**Transaction costs of framework agreements identifiable, probably low.** The programming of the support to the IPI is through the Section for Peace and Reconciliation (SPR) in the MFA, since they are the ones funding and managing the contract. The discussions on substance matters depend on what the issue is and thus which offices in the MFA are involved. The internal coordination within the MFA comes across as often being a greater issue than the coordination between the IPI and the MFA. Feed-back from the various offices in the MFA to the draft FA, for example, has been fairly sparse, since most offices see this as the responsibility of SPR. The main transaction costs thus seem to be the ones internal to the MFA – the dialogue between IPI and the SPR/MFA appears relatively straight forward.

**Framework arrangements flexible.** While most of the initiatives for programming come from IPI, normally in connection with either the presentation of a framework agreement or related to discussions around annual work programs, Norway can also put forward program proposals. The program on *Peace without Crime* managed by the IPI Vienna Office was one such new initiative that came up during the framework period (implementation began in 2011). While the framework agreement lays out the basic parameters for Norway's support, it also is flexible and can allow for new initiatives, and without much work: the Norwegian informants said they accepted the IPI proposal quite readily because it was seen as being well designed and thought-through and ready to roll, and hence could be approved quite easily. So the transaction costs for approving and revising seem to be low.

- The IPI is very well located with geographic proximity to the UN, and thus has a strong comparative advantage for hosting learning events relevant to the UN and UN Delegations .
- Norway has benefited from IPI's location and services to promote its own events, in particular the annual Trygve Lie Symposium, but also consultations that either present policies or issues of interest and relevance to Norway, or provide inputs from leaders and knowledgeable informants in New York for Norwegian policies and decisions.
- Overall transaction costs appear low, a number of them more related to internal dialogue and decision-making in the MFA than to the interactions between the MFA and the IPI. The transactions costs to the Norwegian UN Delegation appear very low due to close personal relations.
- The costs of approving or changing framework agreements or specific programs also appear low and flexible, especially when compared with the normal procedures and time lags in the UN system.

#### 4.4 Effects of the Partnership

*What are major achievements under the FA – in the Middle East program, the CWC, UN peace building architecture, aid effectiveness, counter terrorism and responsibility to protect?*

**Middle East program continues facilitation, results unclear.** IPI continues to host a series of events for a range of actors involved in the various Middle East processes, though the valued added of these activities is difficult for an external actor to gauge. What is clear is that the various conflicts are driven by much more powerful forces than negotiation

conversations, whether hosted by the UN directly or UN-affiliated bodies like the IPI. Whether this region is so volatile and with potentially such disastrous negative consequences that any effort that involves relevant actors is worth the try is for others to decide. In terms of documentable results of IPI efforts, there are of course none to point to, though this obviously is due to the situation on the ground – no other body has produced anything either.

***Arab Spring projects rejuvenating the Middle East program?*** IPI initiated a series of activities in response to the Arab Spring: (i) the *Arab Intellectuals Series* as a platform for new voices from the Middle East, (ii) in partnership with UN Women supported civil society women, to begin with in Tunisia and Egypt, to establish a forum for exchanging ideas, later on conceived as a regional think-tank, the *Forum for Arab Citizenship in Transition* (FACT), and (iii) an *Arab Youth Project* based on a better understanding of the aspirations and roles of youth as agents of change. – While these initiatives are interesting they are too recent to have produced tangible results, and they raise questions regarding relevance and realism that are discussed in the context of the proposed FA 2013-2015 (see section 5.1).

***Coping with Crises, Conflicts and Change delivering Outputs.*** The CWC supported a range of sub-projects that have contributed to concrete Outputs. It delivered think-pieces to the Secretary-General's report on *Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results* with studies on preventive engagements across the globe, and supported Turkey organising a Security Council retreat on the topic. In collaboration with Canada's *Pearson Peacekeeping Centre*, it continued its regional roundtables on *Being a Peacekeeper* to strengthen information on and support for peacekeeping operations around the world, also providing inputs to the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations regarding reforming working methods. It produced a *Management Handbook: A Practical Guide for Managers in UN Field Missions* for civilian managers in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and political missions, and provided specific advice on the Peacebuilding Commission's engagement in Liberia and Guinea. A think-piece on transitional political arrangements after conflict was produced as input to the UN Secretariat's review of experiences from a number of countries. Finally its *Peace without Crime* project developed further work begun on transnational crime and corruption, leading to several publications and roundtables to discuss policy and practical implications – a program Norway has been closely involved in including on the funding side (the 2012 IPI Progress Report provides a long list of more specific activities and products delivered). – When the TOR asks for Effects this is normally meant to be results at the Outcome level – what has been produced with the Outputs that a project has delivered. Most of what the IPI can be held directly accountable for are inputs to other larger processes such as to a report by the Secretary-General's office or a UN committee or office. What these other actors have then done with these inputs is largely out of IPI's hands. What IPI *can* do is assess the likelihood of their Outputs actually being applied. To the extent this can be tracked, IPI seems to have responded to genuine requests for support or clearly identified needs (the Handbook was an IPI initiative where the need for a handbook was identified by the IPI and then a collaboration with UN offices was established for producing the book). But there are no Outcome/Impact results from these activities that can be found in the reporting.

***Some engagement in fragile states.*** The Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (November 2011) decided on new principles for external assistance in fragile states. The OECD's International Network on Conflict-Affected and Fragile States (INCAF) was given

particular prominence in this work since it was already heavily engaged through its production of manuals and studies. IPI partnered with INCAF to produce a study on the UN experiences with transition compacts in a series of fragile states, it has participated in joint efforts with the UN, DAC and the fragile states group (the “g7+”) to implement the Busan principles, and worked with the DPA to look at experiences of transitional political arrangements. – The novelty of the studies seems to vary. A study on the assessment frameworks and tools used by the international community in fragile contexts was published by the UK Governance and Social Development Resources Centre as an innovative study. The reports on aid effectiveness in fragile contexts have been helpful in documenting problems and poor performance but the prescriptions regarding issues like increased aid coordination are in line with what have been standard findings for a long time. So while the studies have largely been demand-driven, there appears for the time being to be no documentable Outcomes to show for the efforts in this field.

***Innovative work on transnational crime and terrorism.*** IPI work in fields of transnational security is seen as useful, contributing to general global strategy thinking and new ways for international law enforcement to collaborate. It has looked cybercrime and cyber security, international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and ways to counter such threats including how to handle extremist groups. In these fields, IPI often combined background research, facilitation of meetings with international experts, and the production of follow-on reports that presented the analyses and summarised the work. A number of informants have stated that the work in these areas has been useful and supposedly is being applied by some.

- The CWC program has produced the most tangible Outputs across a range of sub-fields. Where IPI has been most useful is when it combined original research with hosting international roundtables of experts to discuss and arrive at conclusions and thereafter produced knowledge products for various audiences for practical follow-up. This kind of contribution has been particularly noticeable in recent areas of concern: transnational and cyber crime, terrorism and to some extent fragile states.
- The Middle East program (MEP) continues to facilitate dialogue processes, though without any clear change in approach or clear results to point to. Within MEP, the *Arab Spring* projects are interesting initiatives with civil society rather than governments, but since they are very recent no outputs are yet available.

## 4.5 Monitoring and Evaluation

*Do annual progress reports document and analyse results, and are the current five indicators sufficient for monitoring progress? What can be improved in terms of results tracking including periodic evaluations?*

***Annual reports detail the activities.*** The reports received by this team are the annual reports provided to Norway 2007-2010, IPI’s general report for 2011 and a comprehensive Progress Report to Norway for the entire period 2010-2012 (dated August 2012). The reports are structured according to the main fields of activity (programs), and at the end contain detailed overviews of publications and events organised, structured by field/program. The annual reports through 2010 are fairly short narrative synopses that provide clear overviews of what has been delivered.



***Progress Report with results reporting.*** The Progress Report is comprehensive and with a much more detailed presentation of what IPI has produced (Outputs) and some stories regarding how these Outputs have been applied (Outcomes)<sup>3</sup>. A ten-page section entitled *Impact* provides IPI's documentation of these more downstream results<sup>4</sup>. In general, the Progress Report shows that IPI largely produces Outputs that serve as inputs for processes managed by others. The number of knowledge products – research studies, synthesis reports, policy briefs and summaries from events – has increased in number and covered the fields that had been promised. The number of events of various kinds has increased, so all in all IPI's *potential* results list is quite impressive. What the *Impact* section does is provide a number of credible stories regarding how a partner requesting a service has put it to use towards policy decisions or implementable changes of practice such as the contributions to the Secretary-General's reporting. In the case of Norway, the best example is the support for the preparation of the MFA's White Paper to Parliament on Norway's UN policy.

***Results reporting remains limited.*** The IPI results-reporting is based on what it calls five indicators. These five indicators constitute a step towards tracking the effects of IPI activities since several of them note how IPI's Outputs are to contribute to more important Outcomes (box 4.2). The major weakness is the vagueness when IPI tries to define the expected Outcomes (“*have been useful in informing the work of ...*”, “*to promote the better understanding of an issue....*” ) or where there are no clear Outcomes foreseen (“*Ability to reach increasingly broad and diverse audiences...*” – but for what purpose?). The challenge for a knowledge centre like IPI is that it can seldom be held accountable for the use of its products, especially in a highly political setting like the UN: lack of consensus is generally not due to lack of knowledge and understanding but because actors genuinely disagree and have explicitly differing agendas. If an IPI recommendation is not adhered to it may have nothing to do with the relevance and quality of the proposal. This makes the *accountability* aspect of IPI results reporting problematic, since there needs to be clarity on what IPI in fact can be expected to deliver. The IPI approach of providing narratives for showing how specific services and products that were requested have been applied is understandable: IPI hosted a brain-storming workshop for the planned Norwegian White Paper, and this paper was in fact produced – but Norway could have decided not to go ahead, in which case the IPI Output would have produced no Outcome, namely a debate and hopefully a change in Norway's UN policies.

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<sup>3</sup> The reader is referred to the Progress Report for the specifics, since the results reporting takes 10 pages, the lists of publications run for four pages containing nearly 60 titles, and while IPI hosts over 100 events annually, the progress report pinpoints 36 of particular relevance to Norway.

<sup>4</sup> The use of the term “*impact*” is a little shaky when compared with normal usage in logical framework or results-chain approaches, where *Impact* is understood to be “long term, planned and unplanned, positive and negative, effects of a given intervention”. That is, it is a fairly comprehensive concept that looks at the final results of an activity, which is further out the delivery chain than IPI's indicators really go. IPI might more appropriately have called this section *Results*, which would include *Outputs*, *Outcome* and possible *Impact*.

#### **Box 4.2: IPI Results Framework**

The IPI uses what it calls “*five indicators to track and measure the intended impact of its activities*”:

- Requests by the United Nations and member states for IPI to partner on initiatives that support the priority issues on their agendas.
- Evidence that policy analysis and policy recommendations generated by IPI have been useful in informing the work of the UN and member states.
- Cases where the UN, member states, and the media have solicited and relied on the knowledge and expertise of IPI staff.
- Demand for IPI to convene meetings to promote the better understanding of an issue or to facilitate political consensus.
- Ability to reach increasingly broad and diverse audiences through the dissemination of IPI’s research, policy analysis, and meeting outcomes.

The IPI “indicators” are in fact composites that mix results levels and indicators: “Evidence (*Empirical verifier*) that policy analysis and policy recommendations generated by IPI (*Outputs*) have been useful in informing the work of the UN and member states (potentially *Outcomes* if the language were clearer – that something is “useful” is too subjective to count as documented actual use).

*There is little analysis of strategies and IPI’s comparative advantage.* When presenting achievements, these are largely in terms of outputs delivered. There is little in the way of discussing how priorities are set for example in function of UN issues, or why IPI collaborates with some bodies (such as INCAF) and not with others. A more strategic presentation of how IPI sees its comparative advantages in the knowledge field could therefore be useful. One particular aspect in this connection would be to hear how IPI sees the linkages between its research, events and dissemination capacities, since these are key services that can be considered to be sequential steps in a knowledge delivery chain. While in some fields this link is clear from the description, there is no general discussion of whether such inter-linked services are a core strategy or if this simply has occurred in some cases but not in others.

*Risks and shortcomings in IPI deliverables.* The TOR asks the team to assess the extent to which IPI provides risk analyses with its results reporting. Classic risk and deviation analyses do not appear very relevant when it comes to IPI deliverables. An important part of IPI services are “consumables” – events taking place in the “here and now” – or knowledge products meant for other actors. There is little risk to producing either – they usually have been agreed to and sometimes partly financed by the other party. The short-comings in terms of delivering on budget and on time or not being able to produce relevant services also appear limited since the dialogue between IPI and its partners, both on the funding and the user sides, seems to be fairly close.

*A program-based results framework?* As far as the framework itself is concerned, one can restructure according to program areas rather than types of services and outputs, something that would make results reporting against funding more transparent. A key shortcoming today is that it is not possible, with the five indicators used, to link the results back to any specific program, for example the Middle East program or CWC as such – one needs to go into the specific case histories to attribute results. To set up a results framework in the classic sense for something like the Middle East program may not be all that useful, however: the intended or desired results, apart from the activities themselves, are clearly beyond IPI’s reach and responsibility (“the Middle East program will contribute to a clear, just and

sustainable peace based on a two-state solution” is hardly something IPI should be held accountable for achieving). However, a more critical results focus on what has been achieved with the funding for the Middle East program is clearly justified, among other things because it would allow the parties to discuss whether resources might for example be better applied to the collaboration with the African Union. Several years of flying in and out of various Middle East capitals without anything to show for it may lead to the conclusion that the kinds of services IPI provides really are not relevant in the situation the Middle East finds itself whereas IPI’s facilitation and knowledge products may be quite useful in the context of certain African situations. Without a clearer and more critical results reporting on key programs, it becomes difficult for IPI management and its funding partners to have such strategic discussions.

***An Outcomes-focused results framework?*** The classic results framework would have a clearer medium-term focus for reporting its achievements. The IPI mission is stated as “*IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing and outreach*”. One results framework could thus be shaped around the four services/products *policy research, convening, publishing and outreach* and their resultant Outputs and see to what extent they strengthen peace and security institutions (Outcome) that prevent and settle conflicts (Impact). That is, IPI should be challenged to document whether or not its Outputs really are used, because if they are not, there should be a discussion on why not, and thus if it is worthwhile spending scarce IPI resources producing more Outputs that are not likely to be used.

***Tracking user application of IPI information.*** One possibility IPI may consider, as it increases the use of social media, is tracking the “electronic chatter” IPI products generate. There are firms that can trace how groups talk about particular issues or products like IPI reports over social media like Twitter, Facebook etc. This may be more expensive and in-depth than IPI and its partners may wish to consider today – but at the same time opens up for very interesting identification of how actors on the ground, for example, may be reacting to and using IPI inputs, which can be of great help to the UN in general regarding how its work is being used and understood<sup>5</sup>.

- It is clear that IPI has increased its activity levels over the last couple of years, not least of all its ability to disseminate its results electronically, so IPI is able to reach a much wider audience. As of now, however, the IPI does not have instruments for gauging the Outcomes of this on the various user groups and policy processes.
- IPI results reporting is largely delivered as narrative on activities and Outputs. The so-called five indicators point to some potential Outcome reporting, but in their current form are not sufficiently well specified for documenting results out the delivery chain.
- IPI would benefit from developing a more rigorous results framework that structures reporting either by core activity (program) or service (events), and clarifies how its

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<sup>5</sup> For an example of such a service, look at Canadian MediaBadger : [www.mediabadger.com](http://www.mediabadger.com)



Outputs are to contribute to monitorable Outcomes that are aligned with its own Mission statement.

## 4.6 Outreach, Dissemination and Use of Knowledge Products

*To what extent has IPI reached more diverse audiences? To what extent have IPI activities and products enhanced Norway's capacity to play an active role in development, peace and reconciliation?*

***Outreach significantly increased.*** In the last two years, IPI has increased the types of products it uses to disseminate its research, policy analyses and events conclusions through meeting notes, issue and policy briefs in addition to the more classic policy papers and book-length reports. Since 2010, IPI has published a total of 68 publications disseminated in hard copy and electronic form, and electronic dissemination allowed IPI in 2012 to almost triple its reach compared to 2010, reaching as noted before nearly 6,800 recipients. UN member states received the bulk of IPI's printed reports (68%). In terms of geographic outreach, in 2012, clients in Africa or African representations in New York received 33% of electronic publications, North America 29%, Europe 28%, Asia (5%), Middle East (3%) and Latin America (1%).

***Link-ups with UN bodies could be stronger.*** While this is an impressive outreach, the interviews conducted in New York highlight a desire to see IPI's events and publications being more strategic, focused and research-based. Not all relevant UN offices had been consulted in program and publication research while these departments expressed their interest to collaborate with IPI. A number of informants made it clear their offices would like to be consulted in advance of finalization of programs and initiatives so that the diversity of opinions could be reflected in the knowledge products of IPI<sup>6</sup>.

***Dissemination succeeding in "democratising" access to relevant information.*** Within the UN, its agencies, funds and programmes including field offices, IPI has increased its distribution network considerably, especially via electronic distribution. IPI publications create a more level playing field around the UN in terms of access to information and analysis, and allows for increasing policy cohesion within the UN.

***Symposium as key event for Norway.*** The Annual *Trygve Lie Symposium* is the largest and most significant Norwegian sponsored event during the UN High-Level Segment week. It is an occasion for Norway's leadership to initiate discussions with foreign leaders as well as important UN managers. Viewed as one of the more prestigious events to be invited to during that week, the Symposium gives Norway high visibility and a unique opportunity to directly discuss and try to influence global issues. The 2012 Symposium, the fifth in a row, was considered less successful and well attended, presumably due to more competition from other events – a general trend that IPI as an institution is facing: there are an increasing number of actors and events "encroaching" on what has been a traditional IPI activity.

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<sup>6</sup> In its reply to the draft report, IPI notes that it consults with UN bodies on larger events and activities, and makes reference to a number of specific cases and offices. It therefore believes this observation is not justified. – Scanteam is not in a position to pass judgment on the differing perspectives, but the statements come from staff in different offices and were among other things related to the accuracy of information used. It might be worthwhile to review a couple of cases to see what might lie behind such concerns of non-involvement.

*Norwegian actors well represented on IPI dissemination lists.* IPI confirmed that a large number of MFA staff were on their mailing lists for publications and reports, something confirmed by MFA staff in Oslo. However, as noted previously, the perceived relevance of IPI work varies across MFA units. In fields like transnational security and crime MFA staff have looked to IPI (including its Vienna office) for important inputs, while the Middle East staff, as noted, find that IPI information is of less importance.

- IPI has modernised its dissemination system, reaching new audiences across new platforms with a wider range of services, though little is known about who the wider audience is and to what use these groups put IPI services/products.
- Norway is well serviced by IPI's enhanced outreach though the use by Norway of IPI products varies according to whether an MFA unit finds it directly applicable or not.

## 4.7 Financial Management of the Framework Agreement

*Does the use of funds comply with the FA and the financial reporting comply with requirements?*

*Budgeting, accounting and audits appear solid and potentially with great detail.* The IPI has a professional budgeting and accounting system that allows for detailed break-downs on both the funding and the disbursements sides. IPI has its accounts audited by an external authorized auditor, and is audited to expected international standards.

- On the *budgeting* side, IPI tracks revenue by source (individual donor, own savings and funds) by key financing areas. These are the specific programs and sub-programs that funding partners have expressed preference for, so that IPI can report back on disbursements by the activities that the individual donor wishes to support. In the case of Norway, this has been across a set of activities, such as *the Middle East program*, the general *Coping with Crisis* program but also specific sub-areas such as *Peace without Crime* project, and more untied funding for conferences, seminars and research. These data are of course recorded by year and can be aggregated over time, to the extent this is required.
- On the *expenditure* side, the break-downs are extremely detailed, and allow for genuine activity-based accounting. In a presentation of the 2011 accounts, for the "Meetings, Events and Dialogue" expenditure category, there is a general staff cost category for IPI staff who work directly in this field, and then over 30 specific cost-categories. There are for example 6 Travel cost items: two for ground travel where one is for IPI staff and the other for guests; two for hotels broken down in the same way, and two for meals. These *costs* are furthermore broken down by key program areas – a dozen in total, such as the Middle East program, the Coping with Crisis, etc.
- IPI can thus provide Travel costs by functional area (Ground travel, Meals, Hotels), by personnel category (IPI staff versus guests), broken down by specific program area or aggregated across all programs etc.

*Donor funding linked to programs, not sub-component.* The detailed expenditure data cannot – except in some very particular circumstances – be traced back uniquely to any particular donor, but that is of course never intended or desired by any of the funding partners either. What it does do is allow for very detailed insight into expenditure patterns

and changes over time, something that IPI management clearly is using in connection with the cost containment program that has been taking place over the last couple of years.

*Accounting is according to agreements signed and standards expected.* IPI has provided annual accounts to Norway in accordance with the agreement, and as far as the team has been informed, to the full satisfaction of the Norwegian stakeholders.

- IPI maintains detailed budgeting and accounting data broken down by relevant categories by year, so that both on the revenue and expenditure sides IPI can provide the insight required by the framework agreement.
- The details regarding revenues and expenditures are potentially much more detailed and can provide further insights to the extent requested by a donor.
- IPI accounts are audited on an annual basis by an external authorized auditor in line with internationally accepted accounts standards.
- IPI financial management as far as budgeting and accounting are concerned thus appear in line with expectations and agreements with no negative remarks to date.

## 5 Appraisal of New Framework Proposal

Norway has previously funded two three-year framework agreements – for the period 2007-2009 with NOK 11 million annually, and 2010-2010 with NOK 8 million/annually.

The funding has in principle been for particular core IPI programs: the Middle East Program, the Coping with Crisis program, and to IPI's Conferences, Seminars, and Research. Building on the experiences from these framework agreements, IPI has forwarded a proposal for a similar framework agreement for 2013-2015 with a total annual funding of NOK 11 million, allocated to four areas of cooperation:

- *Middle East Program*: NOK 3 million
- *Coping with Crisis (CWC)*: NOK 4 million
- *Diplomatic Training Program*: NOK 2 million
- *Conferences, Seminars, and Research*: NOK 2 million

The appraisal looks at the proposed framework agreement, the programs that are included, the level and structure of funding suggested, and the results reporting foreseen.

### 5.1 Relevance of the Proposed Activities

*Are the proposed programs relevant for the IPI-Norway objectives? Do they reflect Norwegian priorities, are they coordinated with other donors and planned with other actors?*

**New framework: continuity and extension.** The proposed FA 2013-2015 represents a continuation of the current FA, as three of the four program areas are the same as for the previous period – only one program area is really new. At the same time, the *contents* of some of the programs have changed:

- The Middle East program (MEP) is structured around four components: (i) *research and facilitation* is a continuation of current activities, where the *Arab Intellectuals Series* will become *Dialogue on Contemporary Developments in the Arab World* and a special event is proposed to commemorate the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Oslo accords, (ii) a new initiative is the *Incentives for Good Governance and Good Neighbourly Relations* that can be structured along four different models; (iii) the *Forum for Arab Citizenship in Transitions* (FACT) is to be supported as a regional think-tank with some specific work areas; and (iv) *Social and political trends*, building on the experiences with the Arab Youth project.
- Coping with Crisis, Conflict and Change (CWC) will remain the largest and most complex IPI program, with a total of eight sub-programs suggested but with a particular initiative being an *Independent Commission on Multilateralism* (ICM) for enhancing the capacity of the UN system in the areas of peace, security, development, human rights and humanitarian affairs. The CWC will have three objectives: (i) strengthen a common vision, analysis and understanding of emerging trends, threats and challenges; (ii) build (UN) capacity to respond to challenges; and (iii) improve accountability in leadership and decision making.
- Diplomatic Training and Professional Development (*Nansen School of Diplomacy*) is a new program as far as Norwegian support is concerned that builds on earlier training

and professional development activities, and would cover an advanced course in diplomacy, negotiation and conflict resolution; in-country trainings; visiting IPI Fellows; the annual New York seminar; and the African Junior Professionals Fellowship program.

- Conferences, Seminars and Research. This is a continuation of the current program, where the major changes have to do with the contents of some events series such as on *Women, Peace and Security* and *Humanitarian Affairs*. The IPI web-site and Global Observatory are considered part of this program area.

***The Middle East program.*** The program of facilitation visits in the region and events in New York is being continued without an analysis regarding how this contributes to the Middle East peace processes. While perhaps cynical, the question is if the limited funding the IPI has for its activities could be better used elsewhere. The team would also have liked a discussion regarding the *Incentives* program, since the four options provided for the structuring of the program are so dissimilar that it is difficult to understand the underlying concept<sup>7</sup>. The real novelty in MEP is the shift to a stronger engagement with civil society actors – intellectuals, women, youth. A key question is the extent to which IPI is well placed and resourced to take on such a role. While this shift addresses key regional challenges, questions relating to concretization, ownership and linkages linger. In the comments to the draft report, IPI presents the consultation processes that have taken place both with stakeholders in the region and delegations in New York, arguing that these both reflect the comparative advantage IPI has for engaging with these groups and also thus the implicit mandate and explicit capacity to take on these tasks. – Scanteam has no reason to doubt the arguments regarding both legitimacy and ability to manage these initiatives so if in fact these programs have the requisite local anchoring/ ownership, then the proposed IPI support to FACT and the youth initiatives appears to make sense. The proposed *Dialogue* series will undoubtedly be a useful and relevant IPI product, but is a traditional New York-based activity rather than a regionally-embedded one. The challenge, as far as Scanteam can see, is the extent to which IPI will have the resources – financial, technical, managerial – to take on such a divergent portfolio of activities in its MEP program. A better prioritised and costed program would be helpful for assessing support levels.

***CWC remains highly relevant.*** The CWC program, as noted, comprises a wide range of activities. But this is where the combination of analysis, convening power, and outreach seems to reveal IPI's major comparative advantage and relevance by building capacity in the UN and members states for addressing peace and security challenges. The relevance and importance of these eight work areas undoubtedly will hinge on the degree to which IPI is actually able to deliver on rather ambitious objectives. But most of these areas are based on

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<sup>7</sup> In its note the IPI points to the consultations that have gone into this idea, and that one reason for very different options being considered is that the parties still need to agree on which approach is seen to have the best chance of success. While this team supports the open and inclusive path proposed, it would still claim that some experience of such bodies exist and thus some choices could be made. A better option may be to wait till the picture is clearer and a specific proposal with documented buy-in from key actors is in place, and then request funding for what can be seen as a “winner”. The framework agreement does not block Norway's ability to take on board new activities either as replacement or as new funding, as has happened previously.

on-going activities, and to the extent there are realistic work programs that can be implemented with the staffing foreseen, this seems a worthwhile area for Norwegian support. Of particular note, however, is the Independent Commission on Multilateralism, ICM, initiative that Norway probably will find of great interest since it addresses a real challenge that the UN system faces. If the ICM can deliver on its promise, this will be in line with Norwegian aspirations for the UN. IPI intends to include Norway at minister level in the process and this will support Norway's role and its visibility in the UN community while also providing a concrete and constructive process that IPI can take lead on.

***Gender is a more visible IPI concern.*** IPI will continue to monitor and evaluate women's role in peace and security in support of UN's Resolution 1325, an area of high priority and relevance to Norway. In addition to events that are tied to specific programs/projects, IPI will organize the new events series noted above to draw attention and increase knowledge of the gender dimension in peace and security. The IPI FA proposal confirms that IPI has to continue to ensure a high level of substance in 1325 programming and also ensure that the issues of equality, international law and diversity of voices are kept visible and supported.

***The Nansen School of Diplomacy: worth the effort?*** The 2013-2015 FA suggests an extended training program under the rubric *the Nansen School of Diplomacy*. The five activities listed raise a number of questions, however. One thing is that there is no clear needs analysis for the various activities. While the beneficiaries/participants undoubtedly appreciate the opportunities these activities offer – the feed-back on them is evidently highly positive – there is no documentation of longer-term effects – a typical weakness in many capacity development activities. No tracer study on how former participants have applied new knowledge, skills or experience is available. The common criticism of donor-funded capacity programs of being supply-driven rather than demand-based therefore should be addressed, since the *per capita per day* cost of the proposed *Advanced Course ...* is high. While there is clearly an argument to be made for taking advantage of the unique experience base that exists in the UN in these matters, it is not clear that IPI has found the best solution. The issue of relevance needs to better answer the long-term expected results from the various interventions, including the extent to which the IPI program supplements or contributes to similar or related programs conducted by other resource centres<sup>8</sup>.

***Conferences, seminars and research.*** While conferences and seminars are events-focused activities, it is not clear why research has been included in this program area. It would seem that to the extent that IPI should support research, it should be to underpin substance work such as in CWC. It would therefore perhaps make more sense to have conferences and seminars as facilitated events as one program area, and only fund research to the extent that continuous substance issues – such as in CWC – require original informational foundations. If this is in line with IPI's concept – and the list of events series seems to indicate this – then the conference and seminars program in general seems to make sense as it allows IPI to take advantage of its proximity to UN actors and activities and provide facilitated venues for

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<sup>8</sup> In its comments to the draft report, IPI notes the various kinds of requests and feed-back it has received to the current training and internship opportunities, and the consultations that have gone into the new programs. These observations do not really address the concerns that Scanteam has regarding the relative importance and



analyzing relevant issues of the day. As agreed by all informants, this is a role that IPI fills extremely well.

***Role of the Board and Norway's interaction with other actors.*** The team was not able to gather information about the extent to which the Board plays a pro-active role in designing and deciding IPI programs and priorities. The team also did not get information regarding Norway's memberships on the International Advisory Council and the Vienna Advisory Council. These are bodies that some informants consider more formal appendages to the IPI, but at the same time they include individuals of high merit and experience who no doubt provide opinions and inputs to the IPI. The implication is that the team does not have sufficient information to assess the degree of guidance and institutional policy input provided through these formal bodies. From the information collected, it seems that the most important such venue is the bilateral meetings directly between IPI and Norway. The questions regarding coordination with other actors on programming, funding and implementation are thus not addressed.

- The Middle East program continues with its interactions with state actors and events at head office but is also starting up civil society activities based on consultations with actors on the ground. While IPI recognizes the political fragility of these activities, the concern raised here is with regards to IPI's financial, technical and managerial resources to address such a range of actions without clear prioritisation and costing.
- The CWC has identified a series of core UN concerns that it intends to support through a mix of analysis, facilitated events and disseminated knowledge products. Of particular note is the proposal for an *Independent Commission on Multilateralism* which, if politically accepted and properly operationalized, could be an innovative way of searching for new solutions to old UN challenges.
- The capacity development program under the *Nansen* school seems to lack clear justification and outputs relevant to Norway. While it is important to see how the accumulated field-based experience in the UN can be transmitted, IPI does not seem to have a cogent strategy to attain this goal so far.
- The seminars and conferences are often important and relevant events, and structuring series around key issues and actors enhances the effects of this.

## 5.2 Sustainability and Risks

*Are risks to successful implementation described and analysed? How are financial sustainability and dangers of corruption addressed? How is the institutional and organisational set-up?*

***Volatile environment a challenge.*** A number of IPI activities, including those proposed and currently being conducted in the Middle East as well as CWC programs, are affected by regional political and/or organizational dynamics that could impede their implementation and the attainment of program objectives in a variety of ways. The main risk to MEP is deterioration in the political environment in different parts of the Middle East, with perhaps an increased distrust of the UN and related bodies like IPI in the region. For CWC, challenges may lie in how the various programs are accepted by the UN bodies to which they are directed – and this may vary over time or according to whether key actors in the UN see the IPI proposals as constructive and realistic. So far, however, such changes in the

operational environments have not posed major challenges to the IPI, and as an independent body with its own Board it should have the flexibility to respond to such problems in a manageable fashion.

***Loss of key staff major worry.*** IPI as an institution is quite solid, but as a relatively small organisation it is sensitive to changes in experts and senior staff. The departure of several key staff may affect its ability to continue to deliver quality and relevant products. A number of these staff are considered by interviewees as a fundamental factor of IPI's success in convening and presenting relevant and cutting edge insights and programs. While IPI management is obviously aware of the challenge, it notes that it is not always easy to find expertise with the right mix of practical field experience, theoretical knowledge and UN understanding – and who are interested in spending a certain period of time with the IPI in New York.

***Lack of staff diversity a credibility risk?*** A significant number of interviewees mentioned the importance of geographic, religious, cultural and political diversity amongst IPI staff. They went further to underscore the need to ensure that diversity of opinions and points of view are also represented within the programs, events and research, because IPI is seen to have a North-Atlantic policy bias that may undermine its credibility as independent and neutral actor, facilitator and knowledge provider. IPI believes this view is incorrect, noting the range in the countries of origin of its staff. But while this issue may in part be due to lack of knowledge among external actors, the impression seems to be there and thus remains as a possible concern.

***Formal risk and sustainability analyses missing.*** There are no risk analyses with the various programming proposals, so the consequences of for example a short-fall in funding are not clear. While the logical response is to trim programs to fit the financial envelope, the IPI has some own trust funds it can apply if it believes it simply needs to bridge a temporary funding hole. But there is no overall financing priorities presented. – Whether this is a real challenge or not is questionable. IPI management and Board clearly discuss such matters as a matter of routine, so this is presumably not a major issue to the Institute. – When it comes to sustainability of the IPI, the Institute has made an effort to diversify its donor base, looking at new or emergent donors such as the GCC states and Saudi Arabia for financial support. In the interviews conducted, it is clear that countries and UN divisions value collaboration with IPI and when possible, offer financial participation in planned joint activities or programs. However there is scope for more exploration and expansion of the donor base both with traditional and non-traditional donors and organizations. A reduction or cancellation in Norwegian funding would of course be a headache for the IPI, but not threaten the Institute's sustainability: Norwegian funding over the last three-year period represented 12-13% of IPI's annual budget.

***No specific measures to prevent, discover or sanction corruption presented or necessary.*** The FA proposal does not raise the issue of corruption and therefore has no responses to this issue. The corruption risk would seem to be very low, however. The overwhelming share of funding goes to non-negotiable costs: rental of premises and payments for staff. The discretionary funding tends to be for particular events, such as paying for catering services or the visits of guests. The budgeting and accounting appear to be of a high standard, and budgets are largely handled by substance managers so the individual contract levels are generally quite small. The knowledge products are the result of fairly transparent processes



so there is little chance of influencing policy recommendations, and the interest of doing so must also be considered minimal.

*The institutional/organisational set-up appears reasonable but with one potential issue.*

While the team does not, as noted above, have a clear picture regarding the roles, responsibilities and policy contributions of the Board of Directors versus the International Advisory Council versus IPI Management, it would seem that management has the normal set of planning, fiduciary and implementation responsibilities. In the FA proposal, contents responsibilities are presented in terms of who is going to be in charge of what, so this appears as clear as can be expected. There are no obvious gaps or short-comings in the organisational structure. The one concern that several interviewees have raised is that the President, who obviously plays an important role in providing leadership and direction to the institution, is only able to allocate a limited share of his time to IPI because of his other commitments in the UN system and internationally<sup>9</sup>. If and when the institution faces difficult situations, this may be a problem. The team does not know how and if IPI and its governing bodies have discussed this issue.

- IPI addresses issues that are concerned with volatile environments. There is little reason to expect this to substantially affect IPI's own work, however, since IPI is not actually embedded in these environments.
- Formal risk, sustainability and anti-corruption analyses are missing, but given the size and structure of IPI these are not considered major concerns.
- Staff volatility, a perceived lack of staff diversity, and limited time availability of IPI President are the more real risks, and these are issues IPI should address.

### 5.3 Assessment of the Program Design

*Assess the quality of the program design, the indicators for results monitoring, the integration of the gender perspectives, and the budget for the framework agreement.*

**Program designs generally vague on objectives.** The CWC program discusses its eight sub-fields in some detail, where both the topic is justified and some expected results are noted. In the other three programs, however, the proposal largely discusses the activities that IPI would like funding for – there is little in the way of clear justification for the activities in terms of IPI's value added or comparative advantage in the field, nor what the expected results are. Some of this is understandable: seminars and workshops are often *ad hoc* events that arise due to specific needs or requests, and their objective is thus the immediate one of providing a forum for airing ideas, presenting proposals, testing out options. But for the more planned series such as the one on gender and UN SCR 1325 it would have been helpful to know if the series was based on some partnerships with UN offices or programs with the intention of strengthening or clarifying policy or practices. Without these kinds of linkages it is unclear what the expected results are, for example in the form of a structured program to push for improvements in at least parts of the UN system as far as gender issues are

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<sup>9</sup> It is not clear what share of his time actually is IPI related, since the original figure quoted to the team was corrected by IPI in its comments but without providing an alternative estimate to replace it.

concerned. This disquiet arises in a number of places in the proposal because little is said about other actors, linkages, and thus how IPI actions fit into the larger picture. The CWC program on fragile states is the clearest exception, where there is a presentation of some of the other key processes in place which thus provides a better understanding for the selection of IPI's particular interventions.

***There is no formal monitoring framework.*** As discussed in section 4.5 above, there is no formal results framework for the program but rather a listing of what IPI calls “*five primary indicators to determine the impact of its work*” (IPI Funding Proposal p. 41). While some of these contain elements that are important to a more formal results framework (see box 4.1), they are not systematically designed to track results along a classic Inputs ⇒ Outputs ⇒ Outcome ⇒ Impact delivery chain. While this is in part understandable given IPI's status as a knowledge centre and not an implementing body, a more rigorous analysis of expected results would have allowed IPI to address some of the weaknesses in its current proposals (i.e., what is the Nansen school to achieve? Who is the target audience/beneficiary groups, and how will they apply their acquired knowledge? What are the competing training programs available, where does IPI have a comparative advantage, and how are results going to be documented?). As far as formal results reporting is concerned, IPI does not have a reasonable framework for monitoring results for most of its program activities.

***Consultation basis for program design.*** One issue that came up in several conversations in New York was the extent to which IPI consulted with other actors before designing its programs. Several UN officials felt their offices should have been more involved in some of the initiatives, and thus questioned the ownership to the results from the activities. In its comments to the draft report, IPI documents considerable documentation on a number of the programs, however. While there undoubtedly are officers who might have liked to be more involved, it appears that IPI has had conversations with a range of actors in preparing the proposals. In light of the new information provided, it seems that the participatory foundations for the proposals are reasonable.

***The gender dimension is a greater priority .*** IPI is increasing the visibility of gender in its program through the UN SCR 1325 meetings series and the support to women's initiatives in the Middle East. IPI notes that it actively encourages better gender balance in its participatory activities (trainings etc), and that the increased attention to UN SCR 1325 will have spill-over effects to other IPI activities. There is currently no performance measures proposed for tracking gender within the IPI program, though there will be activity reporting on the specific programs and thus certain distributional measures will undoubtedly be possible. The gender dimension could still be made clearer and the monitoring more operational .

***Norway's role as funding partner.*** One of the questions the team has been asked to address is the level of funding that it is reasonable that Norway provides for the coming period. – Clearly there are no “objective” criteria for settling this issue. It is interesting to note that Norway in 2011 provided funding for more than 40 think-tanks in the US for a total of over NOK 250 million. Norway ought thus to have a clear investment-to-results policy on why it is financially engaged in so many knowledge centres, and some simple rules of thumb for tracking “value for money” from its support. One clear rule is obviously to look at the question posed for this study – “what's in it for Norway?” Another is that the commitment should be seen as fairly long-term – there is little purpose in engaging knowledge-producers

in short-term agreements. Finally, if Norway is going to commit itself over a longer time-horizon such as a three-year framework period, there needs to be certainty that the political commitment to the continued funding is in place since formally Norway cannot commit more than one budget period at a time (Parliament only votes funding for one calendar year at a time). The first question has been attempted addressed above, the second one has been clearly signalled through Norway already having funded two 3-year framework agreements. The third point is worth considering, because here IPI may be in a somewhat different situation than the other think-tanks. The fact that IPI's president is Norwegian is well-known and has led to questions if the funding level is in part connected to this. While Norway provided over 20% of the IPI budget in the first three-year period, this has fallen to a more reasonable 12-13% in the preceding period, in large part due to successful fund raising from other states. This trend will hopefully continue. NOK 8 million/year would thus represent somewhat around 10% of annual IPI expenditures, which would seem a reasonable share for any one country to shoulder and should not raise serious objections about level of effort and future obligations back in Oslo.

- Program design is weak: there is little analysis of options or arguments for choices, little discussion of complementary and competing activities and IPI's comparative advantages, so the program profile could benefit from a more substantive justification.
- The results framework for tracking program performance also lacks specificity.
- Gender and other concerns, such as coverage of vulnerable groups and particular issues, are not highlighted in terms of objectives for the IPI's program.
- The particular nature of the IPI and its "information gateway/knowledge broker" role must be acknowledged as highly valuable. Important parts of IPI's activities thus will remain demand driven *ad hoc* responses to opportunities and requests. But as a funding request a better structured program proposal should be provided.

## 5.4 Recommendations

*What are the team's final recommendations to Norad and MFA concerning the proposed Framework Agreement with IPI for the coming three-year period 2013-2015?*

- Norway should continue supporting the IPI as an important cross-roads for information and views within, to and from the UN on matters relating to peace, security and development.
- Norway should request a clearer program-to-results framework based on IPI's comparative advantage in terms of delivering research, analyses, facilitated events, and dissemination of information and views.
- Regarding the substance areas, Norway should request a clearer results-framework regarding the fields of peace and conflict negotiations. The geographic focus on the Middle East needs more elaboration in terms of IPI engagement. Overall, a focus on "value for money" when looking at probable results would be helpful, even if these are indirect.
- The training program should have a clearer strategic and long-run focus to understand how the different components fit together and how IPI intends to track results.

- The results framework should make it clearer how IPI expects Outputs will be used and can be assessed. At the same time, Norway should be realistic when requesting such a framework: IPI is a knowledge institution that produces for others to use – the limits of accountability should be recognised.
- Funding particular programs does not add any value-added to Norway's access to the IPI, but it may strengthen particular policy areas of importance to Norway. In this light Norway , the CWC and the Conferences and Seminars would be the two that are most worth selecting. In principle, Norway could provide half of its funding as untied direct support and the other half for the earmarked activities, if this is seen by IPI as providing them with some funding flexibility.
- Norway should consider what share of IPI's funding it is willing to carry, where around 10% would seem reasonable. Since Norway should continue being a predictable partner by committing a fixed annual contribution, this could be set at NOK 8 million.

## Annex A: Terms of Reference

*Review of the cooperation between IPI and Norway under current framework agreement and appraisal of proposal for new framework agreement.*

### 1 Background

The International Peace Institute (IPI) was founded in 1970 and is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank with offices in New York and Vienna. IPI works with and supports multilateral institutions, governments, civil society, and the private sector on a range of regional and global security challenges. IPI carries out work in and on Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Central Asia. The thematic focus of IPI also involves policy support for ongoing UN reform efforts. Furthermore, IPI has developed a research and policy agenda addressing transnational peace and security challenges and global response capacities beyond the UN. Since 2005, IPI has been headed by Terje Rød-Larsen, who is the fourth President of the organization.

The overall goal of IPI is *promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions*.<sup>10</sup> Sub goals for work streams on Africa, Middle East, Europe and Central Asia, Peace Operations and Peace-building and Transnational Challenges have also been formulated and progress towards these goals are tracked in the Annual Reports.<sup>11</sup>

IPI is governed by the Board of Directors (chaired by Dr. Rita E. Hauser, with UN Secretary Ban Ki-moon as Honorary Chair). The International Advisory Council and the Vienna Advisory Council advise and provide assistance to the Board, IPI and its officers. Norway is represented in the International Advisory Council with Ambassador Geir O. Pedersen, and in the Vienna Advisory Council with Ambassador Jan Petersen.<sup>12</sup>

In 2010 the Vienna Office was founded with the purpose to develop strategic partnerships with other parts of the UN system in Vienna, as well as in Geneva and Rome, and to engage other multilateral organizations in Vienna such as the OSCE.

#### **Norway's support to the IPI under the current framework agreement (2010-2012).**

30 June 2010, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter referred to as the MFA) entered into its second framework agreement with IPI, covering the period from 1 January 2010- 31 December 2012.

The purpose of the Framework Agreement is (i) *to promote the Parties' shared interest in development, state building, peace and reconciliation and (ii) to enhance their respective capacities to play an active role in development, peace and reconciliation efforts, with special emphasis on*

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<sup>10</sup> Please refer IPI web pages at <http://www.ipacademy.org/about.html> for more information on IPI, its history, its work and its organization.

<sup>11</sup> Please refer the 2011 Annual Report for further details.

<sup>12</sup> Please refer the IPI web pages for a list of all members of the board and the advisory groups: <http://www.ipacademy.org/about/board.html>

*supporting the role of the United Nations.* For the agreement period, the MFA has committed a contribution of 8 million NOK annually.

Under the current framework agreement, Norway's support for IPI is channelled to the following three areas of activities:

**The Middle East Program**, with the core objectives to (i) *explore ways to propel the Middle East peace process forward through policy facilitation and dialogue* and (ii) *deepen knowledge and expertise on issues related to the Middle East through research and convening.*

**The Coping with Crisis (CWC) program** was established in 2006 to engage the United Nations, its member states, and leading independent experts in the search for innovative policy and institutional responses to challenges to global security. During 2010–2012, CWC provided policymakers with analyses of conflict management tools and transnational threats to peace and security and offered a platform for decision makers to build consensus on ways to strengthen multilateral response capacity. The areas of CWC's activities are organized in two clusters: Peace and Governance, and Transnational Security Challenges.

**Conferences, Seminars and Research:** IPI's convening activities are designed to facilitate strategic thinking and policy development on issues related to peace and security. These activities take place at the Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security and Development, at the Vienna office and other locations. IPI events aim to strengthen public awareness through the generation of policy recommendations and the dissemination of research findings within the UN community, as well as academic, political, and civil circles.

Please refer the Framework Agreement, included in Annex 1, where goals, purposes, outputs and inputs for the above are described in detail. Please refer annual reports for progress towards the identified goals and objectives.

#### **Proposal for new framework agreement (2013 – 2015)**

IPI has requested Norway to consider a renewed framework agreement, covering the years 2013–2015, with proposed funding in the amount of NOK 11 million per year, allocated as follows to four areas of cooperation:

1. Middle East Program: NOK 3 million
2. Coping with Crisis (CWC): NOK 4 million
3. Diplomatic Training Program: NOK 2 million
4. Conferences, Seminars, and Research: NOK 2 million

While the proposed new framework agreement represents continuity with the current framework agreement, three new initiatives have also been included in the proposal:<sup>13</sup>

#### **The Coping with Crisis Proposal - Independent Commission on Multilateralism (ICM):**

IPI proposes to establish an Independent Commission on Multilateralism, with the primary focus on capability and effectiveness of the United Nations system to prevent and respond to future global and regional challenges in an evolving global context. The focus areas of the

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<sup>13</sup> Please refer the Proposal for new framework agreement, enclosed in annex 2. Additionally, please be advised that each of these proposals is elaborated in individual concept papers. These should also be consulted.



ICM will be peace and security, development and human rights and humanitarian affairs. The ICM will be composed of a Ministerial-level Board, a Steering Group, New York-based Working Groups and a small Secretariat.<sup>14</sup>

### **The Middle East Program –the promotion of the establishment of a regional institution**

In consultation with key players and donors in and outside the region, the program will initiate work to explore the possibility of forming a new regional mechanism to provide incentives for good governance and good neighbourliness. IPI's role could involve providing support to consultations, through convening and background research on the experiences of other regional organizations. IPI envisions four options for such a mechanism:

1. A structured, membership-based institution;
2. A financial coordination mechanism;
3. An informal steering group; or
4. A personality-driven process.

IPI proposes to carry out work to assess ways of promoting such a mechanism. Related activities could include convening consultations, for which IPI could prepare background documents, and carrying out research to arrive at lessons learned from the experiences of other regional organizations. IPI will seek the support of key players and donors.<sup>15</sup>

### **The diplomatic training program- The Nansen School Proposal:**

In 2013 IPI plans to launch a new Training Program, the Diplomatic School, which will leverage IPI's previous and ongoing training experiences to provide increased training opportunities to representatives of member states and the UN. IPI proposes that the Government of Norway be its principal partner in this initiative, and as such, the school could be officially named "The Nansen School of Diplomacy." The program encompasses several new initiatives, plus IPI's established training programs. Please refer the proposal for new framework agreement in addition to the project document for the Nansen School Proposal.

### **Reporting, Monitoring and evaluation:**

Requirements for reporting, monitoring and evaluation are specified in the framework agreements. This includes an annual narrative report for the previous year within March each year, an annual financial statements for Projects financed under this Agreement certified by Project Manager and Financial Controller, showing receipts/income and expenditures as well as the cash/bank/financial position of the Agreement as per 31. December the previous year, within March each year, a budget and work plan for the coming year with an updated revolving plan for the entire Agreement period, final report for the whole Agreement period, as well as financial statements from end of the previous

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<sup>14</sup> Please refer the full proposal for further details.

<sup>15</sup> Please refer the proposal for new framework agreement as well as IPI's Incentives for Good Governance and Good Neighborly Relations Non-paper Background Note.



annual reports until completion of the Agreement within April, the audited annual financial statements of the entire organisation within July each year.

For both the ongoing and the proposed framework agreement, IPI will report against the following five indicators:

- 1) Requests by the United Nations and member states for IPI to partner on initiatives that support the priority issues on their agendas.
- 2) Evidence that policy analysis and policy recommendations generated by IPI have been useful in informing the work of the UN and member states.
- 3) Cases where the UN, member states, and the media have solicited and relied on the knowledge and expertise of IPI staff.
- 4) Demand for IPI to convene meetings to promote the better understanding of an issue or to facilitate political consensus.
- 5) Ability to reach increasingly broad and diverse audiences through the dissemination of IPI's research, policy analysis, and meeting outcomes.

## 2 Purpose

The purposes of the assignment are as follows:

1. *Review* the main benefits from the partnership between IPI and Norway. The emphasis should be on the *relevance, efficiency* and the *effectiveness* of the cooperation with regard to the specific goals and objectives as outlined in the framework agreement covering 2010-2012. The main focus should be on direct benefits of IPI activities to diplomatic efforts by the MFA. However, IPI activities that contribute to high priority Norwegian foreign policy goals in general should also be given consideration.
2. Carry out an *appraisal* of the new proposal for framework agreement between IPI and Norway, covering 2013 – 2015. The appraisal should be based on conclusions and recommendations from the assessment of the current framework agreement and focus on *relevance and efficiency with regard to expected results*. It is expected that a risk analysis is included. Finally, the appraisal should analyze the goals set for the proposed agreement, assess the usefulness of a budget increase from 8 million NOK annually to 11 million NOK annually - and suggest prioritization of the proposed areas of activities.

Finally, the appraisal should analyze the goals set for the proposed agreement, assess the usefulness of increasing the budget from 8 million NOK annually to 11 million NOK annually - and suggest prioritization of the proposed areas of activities.

Based on conclusions and recommendations from analysis of 1) and 2), it is expected that the Consultant provide guidance on if and how the cooperation between IPI and Norway should continue. Further details are provided in the sections below.

## 3 Scope of work

Based on the current framework agreement (2010 – 2012) and the proposal for a new framework agreement (2013-2015), other relevant documents and interviews with relevant shareholders and stakeholders, the Consultant is expected to assess the overall *usefulness*

(relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, including value-for-money-perspective) of the partnership between Norway and IPI.

## **Review of the current framework agreement**

### **Assessment of the Perception of Overall Usefulness of Partnership**

Based on interviews with key stakeholders (IPI staff, Norwegian MFA and Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN; permanent missions of other IPI government donors and partners; UN staff, particularly in DPA, DPKO, UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and UN Women; and the members of the Advisory boards):

- What are the main benefits of the partnership between IPI and Norway? Are the perceived main benefits captured in the framework agreement? What are the major areas of improvements?
- What are the main benefits of IPI's dialogue facilitation? To what degree is IPI successful in its role as dialogue facilitator?

### **Relevance of the Partnership**

- How does the framework agreement between Norway and IPI contribute to the advancement of the overall goal of IPI? Please provide examples.
- How does the work performed by IPI relate to other organizations / institutions performing similar work (i.e. overlap, additionally, synergies)?
- How does the partnership with IPI contribute to enhancing Norway's capacity to play an active role in development, peace and reconciliation efforts, with special emphasis on supporting the role of the United Nations? What is perceived as the main benefits, seen from Norway's perspective, on the collaboration with the IPI?
- To what degree do the main program areas of the framework agreement reflect Norway's priorities? Please provide examples.
- How have specific Norwegian priorities, including gender equality considerations, been reflected in the framework agreement?

### **The Efficiency of the Partnership's Structures and Processes:**

- To what degree is IPI perceived by the UN system and Norway as a donor to use its resources efficiently and for putting its efforts into the right issues at the right time? Based on documents analysis and interviews, please provide examples.
- To what extent has the partnership between Norway and IPI fostered dialogue and allowed for sufficient flexibility for discussions of mutual priorities, also during the implementation period of the framework agreement? Are the established cooperation mechanisms (i.e. annual/ semi-annual consultations, distribution of briefings and other publications, informal meetings) perceived as satisfactory? What are the main areas of improvement? Please provide examples.
- What are the main transaction costs related to the framework agreement? Please provide examples.
- What are the main benefits of Norwegian representatives in the International Advisory Council and the Vienna Advisory Council?
- How are programs/ activities selected for Norway's support? Who are consulted, and is their opinion taken into account in the decision making process?

- To what degree are activities implemented according to the plan, with regard to outputs, outcomes and disbursements? To what degree are identified obstacles for successful implementation identified and overcome? Please provide examples.

**Effects of the partnership:**

- Recognizing the short time span since inception of activities under the framework agreement: What are the major results achieved (outcomes and possible impact) of work streams and activities supported by Norway under the current framework agreement? Please provide examples.
- In what ways and to what extent has the Middle East program succeeded in policy facilitation and dialogue? Please provide examples.
- To what extent has the Middle East program contributed to deepened knowledge and expertise on issues relate to the Middle East? Please provide examples.
- To what extent and how has knowledge products created through the Middle East program been useful for Norway? Please provide examples.
- To what extent and how has knowledge products created under the Coping with Crisis program (including handbooks, policy briefs, workshops and the [www.global.observatory.org](http://www.global.observatory.org) ) been useful for its targets groups? Please provide examples.
- To what extent has IPI contributed with support for the UN peace building architecture (particularly UN Peace-building Commission, UN Peace-building Support Office and UN Peace-building Fund), and are IPI contributions perceived as relevant by key actors? Please provide examples.
- To what extent, and how, has IPI supported international efforts to promote aid effectiveness and sustainable development in conflict-affected and fragile state? Please provide examples.
- How, and to what extent, has IPI, through its program on Transnational Security Challenges , contributed to the development of more effective multilateral responses to Transitional and organized crime and the new threats it poses, most notably in conflict zones and fragile states? Please provide examples.
- How, and to what extent, has IPI contributed to UN's counter terrorism work? Please provide examples.
- How, and to what extent, has the IPI contributed to the advancement of the responsibility to protect agenda? Please provide examples.

**Monitoring, reporting and evaluation mechanisms:**

- To what extent does the annual progress report provide useful information on - and analysis of- results (outcomes and possibly impact)? Are risks, challenges, shortcomings and deviations described, analyzed and accounted for? Please provide examples.
- To what degree do the current five indicators used by IPI for its monitoring of overall objectives sufficiently capture the objectives of the framework agreement with Norway? If not, what should have been added and/ or changed? To what degree is the results framework perceived as adequate?

- What are the major areas for improvement with regard to the monitoring, reporting and evaluation system as described in the framework agreement? Please provide specific recommendations.
- Does IPI initiate periodical, independent evaluation of its overall work? What are the main lessons from previous evaluations and to what degree are these lessons integrated in the framework agreement with Norway?

#### **Outreach, Dissemination and use of knowledge products**

- To what extent has IPI succeeded in reaching increasingly broad and diverse audiences through the dissemination of IPI's research, policy analysis, and meeting outcomes?
- What is perceived as the main outcomes of the Annual Trygve Lie Symposium?
- To what degree, and how, does activities financed under conference, seminars and research pillar of the framework agreement enhance Norway's capacity to play an active role in development, peace and reconciliation efforts, with special emphasis on supporting the role of the United Nations?
- To what degree does the MFA benefit from IPI knowledge products, including policy briefs? To what extent has Norway succeeded in making use of knowledge products created through the framework agreement?

#### **Financial management of the framework agreement**

- Does the use of finances comply with the framework agreement and annual working plans?
- Does financial reporting comply with the requirements as stated in framework agreement, and is the reporting considered as satisfactory? If not, what is missing of information?

#### **Appraisal of the proposal for new framework agreement (2013-2015)**

The appraisal of the funding proposal for a new framework agreement (hereafter referred to as the proposal) should be conducted based on main insights and conclusions from the review of the current framework agreement, and against the same objectives as in the current framework agreement. Norwegian development; state building - and peace and reconciliation policy should be taken into account.

It should be noted that the proposal suggests that the organization of the cooperation, including the structures for dialogue, monitoring, reporting and evaluation, should continue more or less as in its present form. New for this proposal, however, is an emphasis on reporting and evaluation of IPI's work / activities to promote women's role in peace and security and the further incorporation of the gender perspective into its work. The Consultant is requested to assess the proposed organization of the cooperation, including the monitoring, reporting and evaluation efforts, against this backdrop, and pay particular attention to the gender sensitiveness perspective.

#### **Relevance of the proposed activities**

**Please note that the different program components should be assessed individually.**

- Are the proposed main programs and activities relevant for reaching the overall objectives set for the cooperation between Norway and IPI? Does the proposal focus on the most pressing/ interesting issues for the parties and relevant stakeholders (first and foremost the UN system)?
- Assess how specific Norwegian policy priorities, including gender equality considerations and the promotion of the UN resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security been reflected in the framework agreement?
- Please assess to what degree the cooperation between IPI and Norway is well-coordinated with other donor's cooperation with IPI (additionality, synergies or possible overlaps).
- How, and to what extent, does the proposal build on knowledge generation from previous framework agreement? Does the proposal reflect lessons learned from the previous framework agreement? Please provide examples.
- How, and to what extent, have other stakeholders outside the IPI been involved in the planning process and identification of programs and activities included in the proposal (UN secretariat, other donors, users of IPI products such as seminars and knowledge product and so on)? Please provide examples.
- Assess IPI's coordination with other relevant actors and institutions when relevant. Please provide examples.

#### **Sustainability and risks**

- To what extent are risks to the successful implementation of the proposed activities described and analyzed in the proposal? Are adequate risk mitigating actions identified and integrated in the program design?
- Assess the economic aspects of the proposed activities. What measures have been taken in order to obtain financial sustainability? What are the risks involved should Norway chose not to finance (all of) the proposed activities?
- What measures will be taken in order to prevent corruption? Assess the systems in place for preventing, discovering and sanctioning corruption. Assess whether these measures are adequate.
- Assess the institutional and organizational set-up for the support of the implementation of the proposed activities.
- Please identify / assess any other significant risks that may prevent achievements of results, including the need for willingness to take risk when working in the area of development, peace and conflict.

#### **Assessment of the program design**

- Assess the quality of the design elements in the proposal (goal, purpose, outputs, inputs), particularly with reference to consistency and realism. Are the objectives set for the cooperation precise and is it feasible to monitor and measure results? Are the objectives realistic and consistent?
- With reference to the review of the current framework agreement, please assess whether the identified indicators are sufficient to give valid and reliable information on outcome and impact? In order to monitor progress towards the identified objectives and goal.

- Please assess the integration of gender perspectives in the proposed activities.
- With reference to the review of the current framework agreement, please the quality, simplicity and user friendliness of IPI's monitoring system for the program.
- Please assess the proposed budget for the framework agreement.

#### **Funding and Prioritization of Activities**

- The proposal suggests a budget increase from 8 million NOK annually to 11 million NOK annually. The Consultant is requested to assess, based on insights from the review, what this increase is expected to represent for Norway and IPI. A scenario where the budget is kept at same level as today (8 million NOK annually) should also be explored.
- Based on the review and the assessment of aspects above, assess and prioritize the different components of the proposed programs/ activities and present well-founded options for which parts of the proposal Norway should choose to fund. An assessment of the option of non-earmarked funding should also be included.

#### **4 Presentation of Proposals**

The technical part of the Proposal shall include, but not necessarily be limited to:

- A work plan with proposed work methodology and (tentative) time schedule for the deliverables. Reference is made to chapter 5 in this TOR.
- List of personnel with input and role in the assignment
- CVs

If the Consultant has any comments to the TOR, they could also be included in the technical part of the Proposal.

Reference assignments (maximum 5 references, maximum ½ pages for each assignment)

Financial part of the assignment:

- Fee rates for all personnel
- Specified budget with input (man weeks) for all personnel and other expenses (travels, per Diems, equipment). The budget should include an amount of 5% for unforeseen expenses (physical contingency) and shall serve as a ceiling for the services to be rendered.

All rates and other expenses shall be given in NOK. The proposal should be written in English and should not exceed 5 pages (CVs not included).

#### **5 Implementation**

##### Information sources and methodology

The assignment should be based on document analysis and interviews with relevant actors as defined in Annex 3. This could include field visits to New York and/ or Vienna.

##### Team composition

The team should consist of 2-3 people with formal background and working experience from social, economic or political sciences with a strong methodological background. The



team leader should have a minimum of 8 years of directly relevant working experience. English proficiency is a prerequisite. Further, it is expected that the team should:

- Have well-documented knowledge of the thematic areas of peace, conflict and security and the international organizations, initiatives, research and discourses related the same thematic areas.
- Additionally, well-documented in-depth knowledge of the UN is a prerequisite. Strong knowledge of IPI is highly desirable.
- At least one of the team members should possess strong, documented methodological competence in particularly qualitative research methods, including application interviews
- Have experience from similar assignments
- Have excellent analytical skills and strong competence in qualitative and quantitative methodology

The team composition will be given special attention in evaluation of the tender.

Deliverables / Schedule:

	<b>Report</b>	<b>Deadline</b>
Implementing phase	Draft report	17 December
Finalisation	Final report	27 December
Dissemination	Presentation of the report to the donor (the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	January 2013

The final report should be approximately 20 single-spaced pages (annexes not included). The report should include an executive summary (major findings, conclusions and recommendation, not exceeding 2 pages). Note that dissemination of findings is included as a part of the assignment.

## Annex B: List of Informants

### United Nations Offices

#### Department for Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO

- Mr. Ned Kostov, Office of the Under Secretary-General Mr. Ladsous
- Ms. Nishkala Suntharalingam, Political Affairs Officer, Office of Operations Office of the Assistant Secretary-General
- Mr. Jens Andersen, Special Adviser to the UN Military Adviser, Office of Military Affairs
- Mr. Naresh Perinpanayagam, Political Officer, Africa I
- Mr. Alain Seckler, Political Affairs Officer, Africa II Great Lakes Integrated Operational Team
- Ms. Judy Hylton, Political Affairs Officers Asia/Middle East Integrated Operational Team
- Mr. Chris Stevens, Integrated Operational Team (IOT) for Middle East
- Mr. Christopher O'Donnell, Policy and Coordination Officer, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
- Ms. Leanne Smith, Deputy Chief, Best Practices
- Ms. Ann Marie Orler, Police Adviser, Police Operations

#### Department of Political Affairs, DPA

- Mr. Sebastian Einsiedel, Policy officer, Policy and Mediation Division
- Mr. Rox Bazargan, Mediation officer, Policy and Mediation Division
- Mr. Mansur Sadeghi, Electoral Political Affairs Officer, Elections
- Ms. Ayaka Suzuki, Deputy Director, Africa I
- Ms. Cherie-Ann Vincent, Political Affairs Officer, Africa II
- Mr. Jehangir Khan, Deputy Director, Middle East
- Mr. Wolfgang Grieger, Chief, Palestine

#### Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA

- Ms. Christina Bennett, Chief, Policy Planning and Analysis
- Mr. Rahul ..., Policy analyst, Policy Unit

#### Peacebuilding Commission, PBC

- Mr. Henk-Jan Brinkman, Chief, Policy Planning and Application Branch, Peacebuilding Commission

## Country Missions to the United Nations

### Brazil

Mr. Ricardo Rizzo, Second Secretary

### Denmark

Mr. Erik Laursen, Deputy Permanent Representative

### Germany

Mr. Heiko Nitzschke, First Secretary

### Kenya

Mr. Salim M Salim, Minister Councillor

Mr. Tom M. Adala, Second Secretary

### Mexico

Mr. Rodrigo Pintado, Senior Political Councillor

### Norway

Ms. Tine Morch Smith, Deputy Permanent Representative

Mr. Knut Langeland, Minister Counsellor

Mr. Per Erik Ronning, Counsellor and Military Advisor

Ms. Hilde Klemetsdal, Counsellor

Ms. Meena Syed, First Secretary

### Sweden

Mr. Gunnar Aldén, Councillor

### Uruguay

Mr. Martin Vidal, Deputy Permanent Representative to UN

## IPI Staff

Mr. Terje Rod-Larsen, President

Mr. Francois Carrel-Billiard, Managing Director

Mr. Francesco Mancini, Senior Director of Research

Mr. Abdullah Saidi, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program

Ms. Maureen Quinn, taking over as Director of Programs in January 2013

Mr. Yousuf Mahmood, Senior Fellow Middle East Program

Mr. Peter Gastrow, Director of Programs

Ms. Marie O'Reilly, Publication Officer

Mr. Adam Smith, Senior Policy Analyst

Ms. Mary Ann Feeney, Director of Events

Mr. Chris Perry, Senior Policy Analyst

Mr. Adam Lupel, Editor and Senior fellow

Mr. Arthur Boutellis, Research Fellow

Ms. Jill Toddart, Web designer/social media

Mr. Warren Hoge, Senior Advisor External Relations and IPI Events Moderator

Ms. Nur Laiq, Senior Policy Adviser, Middle East program

Ms. Andrea Pfanzelter, Director, *IPI Vienna Office*

Mr. Walter Kemp, Director for Europe and Central Asia, *IPI Vienna Office*

### **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo and Middle East**

Mr. Kai Eide, former UN SRSG Afghanistan

Ms. Tone Allers, Deputy Director, Section for Peace and Reconciliation, *Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs*

Ms. Kjersti E. Andersen, head, Minister's Secretariat

Mr. Trond Rudi, Section for Human Rights and Democracy, *Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs*

Ms. Elisabeth Schwabe-Hansen, Section for UN Policy and Gender Equality, *Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs*

Mr. Gjermund Sæther, Senior Adviser, Section for UN Policy and Gender Equality, *Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs*

Mr. Espen Lindbeck, Senior Adviser, Section for UN Policy and Gender Equality, *Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs*

Mr. Sverre-Johan Kvale, Senior Adviser, Section for UN Policy and Gender Equality, *Department for UN, Peace and Humanitarian Affairs*

Ms. Torunn Viste, Deputy Director, Section for the Middle East and North Africa, *Department for Regional Affairs and Development*

Mr. Lars Nordrum, Section for the Middle East and North Africa, *Department for Regional Affairs and Development*

Ms. Anne Kjersti Frøholm, Deputy Director, Section for Security Policy and North America, *Department for Security Policy and the High North*

Mr. Odd Berner Malme, former Minister Councillor, Norwegian UN Delegation

Mr. Tor Wennesland, Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy to Egypt, Cairo

Mr. Vejbjørn Dysvik, Minister Councillor, Norwegian Embassy to Israel, Tel Aviv

### **Other Informants**

Mr. Morten Wetland, former Norwegian Ambassador to the United Nations

Ms. Mariska Beijnum, Senior Researcher, *Clingendael* Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague, Netherlands

Mr. Asbjørn Wee, Senior analyst, International Network on Conflict-Affected and Fragile States (INCAF), OECD/DAC, Paris

Ms. Torunn Tryggestad, Researcher, Dimensions of Security program, Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), Oslo

Mr. Cedric de Coning, Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo

Mr. Mariano Aguirre, Director, Norwegian Peace-building Resource Centre (NOREF), Oslo

Mr. Stein Villumstad, Former Deputy Director-General, Religion for Peace (NGO), New York

Mr. John Bell, Director, Middle East and Mediterranean Program, Toledo International Center for Peace, Madrid

Ms. Sharon Rosen, Co-director, Search for Common Ground, Jerusalem

## Annex C: Documents Consulted

- International Peace Institute (IPI) (2012), Letter to Norway on proposal to renew framework agreement, 31 August 2012
- IPI (2012), „Norway Framework Agreement 2010-2012 Progress report“, Submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2012
- IPI (2012), “2012 Funding Proposal 2012, Pilot Session of the Advanced Course in Diplomacy, Negotiation, and Conflict Resolution; Humanitarian Affairs: Fostering Dialogue and Research on Humanitarian Challenges; and *Enabling Peace in Guatemala: The Story of MINUGUA*”, August 2012
- IPI (2012), “Framework Agreement 2013-2015 Funding Proposal”, Submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 2012
- IPI (2012), 2013 Programs and Activities for support by the Government of Norway (and other donors)
- IPI (2012), „Nansen School of Diplomacy and International Affairs“, August 2012
- IPI (2012), „Middle East in Transition: Incentives for Good Governance and Good Neighbourly Relations“, Non-paper Background Note, May 2012
- IPI (2012), „Independent Commission on Multilateralism“, Draft Concept Note and Workplan, April 2012 New York
- IPI (2012), Letter to Norway confirmation of submission of reports and proposed workplan for 2012, 2 April 2012
- IPI (2012), Work Plan: Norway Framework Agreement (2010-2012), 28 March 2012
- IPI (2012), Annex 1: Agreed Project Summary Norway
- IPI (2012), 2012 Budget for support by the Norway Framework Agreement (and other funding sources)
- LABBE, Jeremie (2012), „Rethinking Humanitarianism: Challenges and Adaptation for the Humanitarian System“, International Peace Institute, Draft Version 17 July 2012
- IPI (2011), Letter to Norway confirmation of submission of reports, 28 March 2011
- IPI (2011), 2010 Narrative Report, Norway Framework Agreement (2010-2012), 28 March 2011
- IPI (2010), 2010 Work Plan Norway Framework Agreement (2010-2012), Revised 25 August 2010
- IPI (2010), IPI 2010 Revenue (received, committed, or projected), updated August 2010
- IPI (2010), 2010 Operating Budget (USD) Submitted for Framework Agreement with the Government of Norway
- IPI (2010), 2010 Financial Report Programs and Activities Funded by Norway Framework Agreement (and other funding sources)
- IPI (2008), “Norway Financial Report 2007”, New York.



## Annex D: Conversation Guide

“Scanteam has been asked by Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review the framework agreement 2010-2012 between the International Peace Institute (IPI) and Norway. In that connection we would be interested in hearing your experiences and views regarding the issues raised below, but also other questions you feel may be pertinent in this connection”.

*NOTE: This Conversation Guide was modified (reduced) depending on informant group. The team developed more specific guides for (i) UN officials, (ii) UN Delegations, (iii) Norwegian UN Delegation, (iv) Norwegian MFA staff, (v) IPI staff. The below is the “maximum issues”-guide to cover all questions that was the basis for informant-group specific guides.*

### Relevance of Norway-IPI partnership

- What is the value added to IPI of the partnership with Norway? In what ways has Norwegian support strengthened IPI’s agenda?
- Which of IPI’s products/services do you believe are of greatest value to Norway? What is unique and value adding of these?
- In what ways do IPI events (seminars, conferences and formal/informal gatherings) relate to Norway’s concerns in development, peace and reconciliation efforts? In what ways do you believe IPI has contributed to strengthening Norwegian capacities in these fields?
- How do we know that IPI products, services and events are valuable (is it possible to document this in any way)? Which ones (specific programs? specific events?) seem to have been particularly valuable, and how do we know this?
- What are IPI’s contributions to developing solutions or consensus among stakeholders on key challenges? What is unique/value adding of IPI’s contributions? What are alternatives/complementarities to IPI in such situations?
- How has the profile of IPI’s products, services and events changed over time, and what has caused these changes? How do you see this as possibly changing the relevance of IPI to Norway?

### Effects of the partnership

#### **Middle East program:**

- In what ways and to what extent has the Middle East program succeeded in policy facilitation and dialogue? What are the value-adding aspects of IPI’s engagement? What is the basis for attributing such results to IPI?
- To what degree has IPI been instrumental to Norway in building political contacts and allowing access to key players in the Middle East?
- What is IPI’s added value on research/knowledge production compared to other institutions working on the same issues?

## **CWC program**

- To what extent and how has knowledge products created under the Coping with Crisis program (handbooks, policy briefs, workshops, [www.theglobalobservatory.org](http://www.theglobalobservatory.org)) been useful for its targets groups?
- In what ways has IPI contributed to support the UN peace-building architecture? What is the basis for attributing such results to IPI?
- To what extent and how has IPI supported international efforts to promote aid effectiveness and sustainable development in conflict-affected and fragile states? Are there concrete examples of where IPI's work has directly contributed to specific policy/program consensus or progress?

## **Outreach, Dissemination and Use of Knowledge Products**

- Which audiences does IPI reach through the dissemination of its research, policy analysis and meetings? How has this audience changed over the last years? What do we know about the effects of this dissemination?
- To what degree does the MFA benefit from IPI knowledge products created through the Framework Agreement?

## **Assessment of the program design/monitoring and evaluation**

- What kinds of assessments/independent evaluations have been carried out of IPI activities? What were the main lessons from these reviews, and are these being implemented?

## **Norwegian Funded Activities**

- How are programs/activities for Norwegian funding identified and selected? Who is consulted?

## **Sustainability and risks**

- Is IPI's usefulness to Norway mainly relying on individuals and their competences/network or on IPI's total organizational resources? Specifically, what is IPI's relevance for Norway if Terje Røed-Larsen leaves the organisation?

## **Efficiency**

- How are Norwegian funded programs/activities selected? Is the Norwegian UN Delegation consulted, and are your opinions taken into considerations in the decision making process?
- To what extent do you believe IPI provides value for money?

**We appreciate you taking the time to share your views with us on these questions!**