

# EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

Report 3 / 2020



ANNEXES 3-7

## Blind Sides and Soft Spots – An Evaluation of Norway's Aid Engagement in South Sudan

**Commissioned by**

The Evaluation Department

**Carried out by**

Tana Copenhagen in association with Overseas Development  
Institute (ODI) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)

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## ANNEX 3: OVERVIEW OF NORWEGIAN AID 2011 - 2018

This annex provides an of Norwegian support to South Sudan in the 2011-2018 evaluation period. It provides an overview of the volume of development aid and channels used to disperse the funding and then presents the main programmes and projects supported.

### Volume and Channels

Norway has been one of the largest contributors of development and humanitarian aid in the period. Currently it is the sixth largest donor after the US, EU, UK, Germany and Canada. The total amount disbursed was NOK 4.3 billion. The bulk of this – between 80 and 90 per cent - has been channelled through either Norwegian NGOs or through the UN and other multilateral agencies.

The evaluation team relied on Norwegian Aid statistics and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Grant Portal of ongoing and new projects to compile these figures.<sup>1</sup> These data sources have some minor – but important – gaps with a number of important contributions to South Sudan from the aid budget not captured. This core funding to UN agencies and funds are not included although in some cases significant portions of this may be allocated to South Sudan. There are also a number of bilateral Norwegian aid-funded global programmes with specific components on South Sudan that are not captured in these statistics. This includes the deployment of Norwegian police officers to the UN Mission in South Sudan (114 police officers at the cost of NOK 137 million in the period), support to higher education and research through Norad's NORHED programme (involving several universities and programmes in South Sudan) and some of the support to the AU and IGAD for their engagement in South Sudan. Additionally, there is substantial funding to the UN peacekeeping mission in the country which are not funded by the aid budget (this included Norwegian core funding to the mission and deployment of Norwegian military officers).

#### The NGO channel

Norwegian NGOs have remained the biggest channel for disbursement of Norwegian aid to South Sudan in the evaluation period. NOK 1.8 billion of the 4.3 billion – or about 44% - of the aid was channelled through these Norwegian organisations. An additional small amount of 92 million was channelled directly through international and local NGOs. Only in 2018 did we see a bigger amount channelled through multilateral channels (NOK 353 million as against 232 million through NGOs). Funding through Norwegian NGOs covers several sectors but are dominant in what the aid statistics classify as governance sector (0.7 of the 1.2 million disbursed) and education (0.3 of 0.5). In the major humanitarian aid sector (1.8 billion) the bulk of the funding (1.2 billion) is disbursed through the multilateral channel (see below) with about 0.6 billion being disbursed through Norwegian NGOs.

The main Norwegian NGOs were the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) with more than 570 million from the aid budget in the evaluation period; the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) with over 350 million, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) with over 295 million and the Norwegian Red Cross (NorCross) with over 257 million. Another major Norwegian NGO, Save the Children Norway (SC-N) has received some 76 million. SC-N channels the funds through Save the Children International which is responsible for implementation through their country office.

Outside this group of five nearly 260 million has been disbursed through a smaller group of NGOs –

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<sup>1</sup> (Knudsen & Hatlebakk, 2018).


including the Stromme Foundation, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), YMCA-YMCM, Caritas and others.

It should also be added that some of the bigger Norwegian NGO have significant funding from non-Norwegian sources. This applies in particular to NPA and NRC. NRC has a 2018 budget of about NOK 160 million for their South Sudan operations.<sup>2</sup> The direct MFA/Norad funding for that year was 45 million (although some of the other donor funding to the NRC were from UN agencies also supported with Norwegian funds). The situation is similar for the NPA. Until recently USAID was a major funder of NPA's program in South Sudan. The NCA also has significant funding from the EU for their work with the South Sudan Council of Churches.

### The multilateral channel

From 2011 to 2018 Norway signed agreements with a total value of NOK 1.79 billion with multilateral organisations. The total amount value of the agreements per year increased from a little over NOK 100 million in 2011 to more than 350 million in 2018 as seen in Figure A to the right. A total of 16 recipients<sup>3</sup> entered into agreements during 2011-18. Agreements were almost exclusively with UN organisations.

FIGURE A: TOTAL VALUE OF AGREEMENTS PER YEAR




Five recipients (the CHF, FAO, UNDP, WFP, and UNICEF) had agreements worth 85% (NOK 1.5 billion) of the total value of all agreements.

### Direct bilateral support

Norway's aid to South Sudan has largely been provided through multilateral agencies/funds and through Norwegian NGOs. However, Norway has also made funding available through direct bilateral engagements. A small amount of NOK 106 million has been used directly to the public sector in South Sudan – this was mainly to the Ministry of Petroleum and for higher education (Juba university). The bulk of the bilateral funding has however been channelled through the public sector in Norway. This amounts to NOK 241 million through the public sector in Norway, mainly in governance (NOK 75 million), health (120 million), education (19).

FIGURE B: VALUE OF AGREEMENTS BY YEAR AND MAJOR



### **Norwegian Priorities, Programmes and Projects**

The evaluation mapped the various programmes and projects funded through the allocations above. We classified them according to in three main categories: long-term development aid; peace and

<sup>2</sup> This figure is derived from the NRC website - <https://www.nrc.no/countries/africa/south-sudan/>

<sup>3</sup> Funding to CHF is technically speaking part of UNDP/OCHA but has due to its uniqueness and size been separated for this analysis.

security; and humanitarian aid and recovery.

### Long-term development aid

The main priorities and components of the first development aid programme were outlined in the Norwegian Embassy's 3-year work plan from 2011. This guided the Embassy's thinking and funding priorities for the coming years – until the crisis from December 2013. This led to a major reshaping of the programme, including closure and redesign of many programmes and with a shift of emphasis from long-term aid towards humanitarian relief.<sup>4</sup> The 2011 plan was also the platform for the first consultation in mid-2012 between the South Sudanese Ministry of Finance and Norway on long-term bilateral development cooperation. On October 2012 Norway and South Sudan entered into an agreement regarding cooperation for promotion of the economic and social development of the Republic of South Sudan.

The team classified the interventions into three broad sub-categories:

#### *1: Capacity building of the public sector*

The main Norwegian-funded programme, and the only programme to have run up to the present, is the *IGAD Regional Capacity Building Programme* implemented by UNDP. Norway, the sole financial donor, contributed NOK 240 million (and is preparing for support to a new phase from July 2019). The programme revolved around deploying civil servants from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda for up to two years in public institutions in South Sudan where they would mentor counterparts ("twins").

In addition to this programme, Norway also provided bilateral support directly to central government institutions. This included the *Ministry of Finance* (macroeconomic analysis and statistics with technical assistance from Statistics Norway); the *Ministry of Oil and Petroleum* (with technical assistance from the OfD programme and several Norwegian government agencies and consultants); *the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Rural Development and Co-operatives* (mapping of forest resources and capacity building, with technical assistance from the Norwegian Forestry Group); and *the Ministry of Electricity and Dams* (this included hydropower development through the planned Fula Rapids dam with support from Norfund and others and capacity building in the Ministry through the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate).

These programmes were all put on hold or terminated in the 2014-16 period. The forestry project was stopped immediately as the new phase had not yet started.<sup>5</sup> For the three other programmes efforts were made to continue, primarily by bringing officials from South Sudan to neighbouring countries (Nairobi and Entebbe) for short term training, also by linking this to IMF's capacity building programme.<sup>6</sup> The major hydro power project – revolving around the construction of the Fula Rapids dam and generation for electricity for Juba – was at first continued. A new agreement was signed in August 2014 between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) for capacity building support to the Ministry.<sup>7</sup> Norfund had invested in the construction of the dam and power plant. However, it soon proved too difficult to implement. The

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<sup>4</sup> (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011c). This was at one level a regular 1-year work plan approved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Embassy also used this to develop a 3-year rolling work plan to guide their own aid programming. See also (Ofstad, 2019) for memo prepared specifically for the team in April 2019 by the last Consul General and first ambassador to South Sudan. The subsequent annual work plans from the Embassy, together with interviews, have provided the data for this discussion. On the 2014 reallocations, see (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014c).

<sup>5</sup> (Republic of South Sudan with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Rural Development and Co-operatives and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway with the Norwegian Forestry Group, 2013). The project document - a NOK 34 million 3-year capacity building project - was finalized and completed in the second half of 2013 but had not yet been signed when the war broke out in December 2013.

<sup>6</sup> (Norwegian Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and Statistics, 2016) On macroeconomic analysis and statistics.

<sup>7</sup> (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, 2014). It provided NOK 24 million for the two-year programme.

construction of the dam was stopped, Norfund exited from the programme and NVE concluded that they could not deliver. The main flagship project – OfD – was scaled down in 2014 and then put on hold from 2016. It has continued with support to NGOs (NPA and Global Witness) and the IMF and its support fund for capacity building on macroeconomic policies and statistics (through the IMF Trust Fund for South Sudan). They provided short-term training in Nairobi and elsewhere.

From 2011 also provided funds - channelled through the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) - for the physical construction of government offices in the energy sector.

Additionally, Norway provided small funds (NOK 3.8 million) for a 2017-20 programme to support South Sudan's National Audit Chamber. This was implemented through Intosai's Development Initiative (the Secretariat is hosted by the Norwegian Auditor General). The project seeks to provide peer review support to the Audit Chamber.<sup>8</sup>

## *2 Governance and civil society*

Support for good governance, democratization and human rights have also been a recurrent theme in the Norwegians support. This has revolved around support for improved management in public institutions (a crosscutting issue in the capacity building support discussed above); support for security sector reform and police training; political party support, constitutional reform and preparations for elections; and civil society support.

The main component in support for security sector reform was the preparation for a cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and the South Sudan Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs. An agreement was signed in 2012 and program document for institutional cooperation covering the 2013-16 period was developed.<sup>9</sup> It focused on defence sector reform and efforts to ensure civilian and democratic oversight and control of the South Sudanese armed forces. This was also highlighted in the 2012 Norwegian Government Budget on Defence (2011-2012).<sup>10</sup> Following the December 2013 crisis the project was terminated.

Support for police and training was mainly channelled through UNMISS and with deployment of Norwegian police officers there (Cf. the section on peacebuilding). Additionally, there was also a separate project between 2011 and 2013 (NOK 7 million) where the South African Police Service was commissioned to provide training to the South Sudanese police. The activities were implemented, but the financial reporting and accountability was poor and the project came to an end in 2013 (information provided in interviews). In 2011-2012 Norway also supported (through UNDP) the construction of a dormitory for female students at the national police training academy.

Norway also launched through UNDP projects to address the planned constitutional review and the 2015 election.<sup>11</sup> Related to this a project was also developed through international IDEA to support political parties. These projects were all terminated following the December 2013 crisis.

After 2013 the Embassy assumed a more direct role in providing funding for civil society. This included a contribution of NOK 13.7 million (initially for 2016-19) to a pooled Civil Society Fund managed by the Dutch embassy. The fund has struggled to take off, but with a new grant manager in place in 2019 they

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<sup>8</sup> (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Intosai Development Initiative, 2016).

<sup>9</sup> (Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs, Republic of South Sudan And The Ministry of Defence, Kingdom of Norway, ca. 2013)

<sup>10</sup> See Prop. 1 S (2012–2013) para 2.3 in the proposal related to the Defence Ministry: "The Ministry of Defence aims to implement a Defence Security Sector Reform project in South Sudan in 2013, where the task will be to strengthen the South Sudanese Defence Ministry ability to ensure democratic control over the armed forces" (unofficial translation).

<sup>11</sup> (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2013g) The goal of the constitutional project was to strengthen national capacity for the implementation of a transparent, impartial, inclusive, participatory and credible constitution making process. It was funded through a basket fund managed by UNDP. . The Embassy provided NOK 4.3 million to the UNDP's election support program. See (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2013f) for information on the IDEA project was derived from Embassy work plans.

expect that Fund will be able to play a more important role. Norway also begun to provide direct funding to think-tanks in Juba. This includes the SUDD Institute (NOK 3.7 mill for 2017-19) for its work on governance issues and the Ebony Institute (NOK 2.9 mill 2018-19) for its work on natural resource management.

The main channel for support to civil society is through Norwegian NGOs – with funding both from the Embassy/MFA and from Norad's civil society grant which explicitly seeks to promote and strengthen civil society. The two main recipients of Norwegian aid for this purpose are the NPA and the NCA. They have both developed strategic guidelines and programmes for supporting civil society in South Sudan.<sup>12</sup>

Both NCA and NPA have a range of partners in different areas. Currently NCA has a total staff in South Sudan of about 70 at the head office in Juba and 3 regional offices. NPA has a staff of more than 200 at the head office and its regional offices. They have received some NOK 570 million from the Norwegian aid budget since 2011.

Norway also funded another major initiative that ended with December 2013 crisis: Through the NPA the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided NOK 41.5 million in the 2007-2013 period as capacity building support for the SPLM. This project was meant to contribute to a thorough restructuring of SPLM from a liberation movement to a democratic political party.<sup>13</sup> The SPLM was also keen to have the Labour Party involved in the project. A special agreement was made in 2008 whereby the NPA would provide logistical and secretarial support to the Labour Party's cooperation with SPLM. The Labour Party would concentrate on political dimensions with a focus on support for the development of SPLM's political programme. The NPA would concentrate on organisational development, including training of party agents at different levels.

The political upheavals in mid-2013 was the beginning of the end not just of this project and its efforts to help transform SPLM from an army to a political party, but also the end of the special relationship between NPA - "NGO No 1" - and the SPLM. Some efforts were done in the latter half of 2013 by senior NPA officials to engage with SPLM leaders on both sides, but the results were limited.<sup>14</sup> In 2014 NPA and the Labour Party returned unspent money from the project to Norad.

### *3 Higher education and other interventions*

The third and final main pillar of the Norwegian development aid in the period is support for higher education. It has been a consistent theme in the Norwegian support. It originated in the CPA period with a decision to fund (through the UNDP) the relocation of the Juba University's College of Law from Khartoum to Juba and the support to a special higher education programme to build capacity in Southern Sudan.<sup>15</sup> Since independence there has been three main funding streams to Juba University and mainly to the College of Law. One has been continued funding for buildings and infrastructure development (this also included a quest house to facilitate cooperation with visiting Norwegian academics). This has now been completed.

A second stream has been direct funding from Norad's section for higher education and research to two research programmes at the Juba University. One was a programme related to ecology and

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<sup>12</sup> (NPA, 2013); (NPA, 2011); On NCA see (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015); (NCA, 2016); (NCA, 2019)

<sup>13</sup> (NPA & Norlat, 2010) Reviews Phase 1 (NOK 24 million from 2007-10), (NPA & Norlat, 2013) reviews Phase 2 (NOK 17.5 million from July 2011 to end 2013. See also (Hanssen, 2017)

<sup>14</sup> (Hanssen, 2017; 2013)

(Scanteam, 2011) The 2011 review of the Norwegian Cooperation Programme for Capacity Building in Sudan.

<sup>15</sup> (Scanteam, 2011) The 2011 review of the Norwegian Cooperation Programme for Capacity Building in Sudan.

management of the Sudd Wetland (NOK 17.8 million from 2013 to 2019). The second was NOK 18 million (2013-19) to the Centre (from 2017 Institute) for Peace, Development, and Security Studies based at the College of Law. (Additionally, the bulk of Embassy support to the Women, Peace and Security purpose channelled to UNWOMEN – see the peace and security section below - is disbursed to the other main research centre at the College of Law – the National Transformational Leadership Institute).

The third stream has been funding from Norad through the programme (now Norhed) for research cooperation and postgraduate education between universities in Norway and developing countries, or between universities in developing countries. Juba University (and other regional universities in South Sudan) are involved in several such joint programmes.

Outside these three funding streams there are also other Norwegian funding to higher education through Norwegian NGOs. NCA and others are for example supporting several projects. This includes teacher training and education of mid-wife's.

The Embassy-support to the two think-tanks discussed in the section on civil society should also be seen in this context.

In 2011, the Norwegian Government offered the new nation of South Sudan a special independence gift in the form of a National Archive. This was in recognition of the long road to freedom, the special relation between Norway and South Sudan, and the importance of preserving South Sudan's National Heritage and Identity. The South Sudan Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports has since been working with UNESCO (lead agency), UNOPS (supporting agency) and Rift Valley Institute (implementing partner for the urgent safeguarding of the current collection at the time of independence). By 2014 the plans, architectural drawings and design for a building to house the archives had been completed. Norway decided not to continue with funding for the construction in the current political climate. (NOK 27 million had been planned for this). The support was reduced to NOK 2 million in 2014 with a focus on preservation/digitalization of the documents in the archives. This was managed through UNESCO (NOK 7.7 million in 2018-19).

Funding for basic education is discussed in the humanitarian and recovery section below.

### Peace and security

This has been the second main pillar of the Norwegian support in the period. The Norwegian-funded interventions can be put in four categories:

#### *1: UNMISS*

The main support for UNMISS is the direct financial contribution. This amounts to NOK 410 million in the period. This is funded from the regular foreign affairs (non-aid) budget. However, Norway is also funding a number of initiatives from the aid budget intended to strengthen certain aspects of UNMISS. This includes deployment of Norwegian police officers – a total of 114 from 2011 to 2018 at a cost of NOK 137 million.<sup>16</sup> A number of Norwegian military staff officers was also deployed and funded directly by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence outside the aid budget.

Through the Norwegian-funded Training for Peace in Africa programme pre-deployment and in-mission training has also been provided for police officers from African countries deployed in South Sudan.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> The data is supplied by the Ministry of Justice and the Norwegian Police Directorate. Email communication 5 July 2019.

<sup>17</sup> (Evaluation Department Norad, 2014b)



NOK 50 million was provided (2011-15) for UNDP to support UNMISS and UN resident coordinator and their work at county level. The aim was to construct offices and facilities for UN police and civilian affairs at county level. This were to be co-located with government facilities/development centres (county support bases). The second component was to expand the UN Resident Coordinator's presence at state level in order to facilitate interaction between and with county authorities and UN agencies. The county-bases were to be located in the main conflict affected counties.<sup>18</sup>

### *2: AU, IGAD and implementation of peace agreements*

Funding has been provided to the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and South Sudan (led by Thabo Mbeki) and to IGAD's mediation efforts in South Sudan. This has been provided as support to AU's and IGAD's peace and security work but also as direct support for their work on South Sudan. This has included support for the IGAD Special Envoy and his work. This included also financial support in 2014-15 to the IGAD Joint Technical Committee and Monitoring and Verification Mission.<sup>19</sup>

Following the signing of peace agreements in 2016 and 2018 Norway also provided direct support and secondment of experts to implementation mechanisms. For 2017-2019 this included direct support to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism (JMEC) and JMEC's Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM). It also included NOK 11.1 million for the secondment of 2 experts to JMEC (economics/finance and security) and 2 to CTSAMM (monitor/observer and gender advisor). These 4 experts were recruited and deployed through Norway's Norcap facility.<sup>20</sup>

### *3: Women, peace and security*

With the adoption of Norway's Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security in 2015 South Sudan was selected as one six priority countries. This led to support to new projects from 2016. This mainly revolved around project support to UN Women (NOK 14.3 million for 2017-2019). The objective was to create and sustain leadership capacity among women leaders in South Sudan, thereby enhancing their greater role, participation, and influence in all decision and policy-making processes and institutions relevant to peace-building and peace consolidation in South Sudan. This was mainly used to fund the National Transformational Leadership Institute based at the University of Juba. NOK 2.9 million (2017-2019) was provided through a local NGO – EVE (Organisation for Women Development).<sup>21</sup> The support to CTSAMM (see above) and a 2018 grant (NOK 28 million) to UNFPA for their work on sexual and gender based violence is also included (see below under health).

Norad civil society department also funds a South Sudan project of an international NGO under this agenda with an allocation to LAW (Legal Action Worldwide) (5.8 mill 2018-20).

### *4: Peacebuilding from below*

Norwegian NGOs received funding for a variety of local level peacebuilding projects from 2011. The funding was scaled up from 2014. The main recipients were NCA and NPA. NPA has received much support, mainly linked to land issues and their work on community resilience and livelihoods security, but also to various projects working with their youth, women and media civil society partners. The

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<sup>18</sup> (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2013b) This was prepared in connection with an extension of the project to cover 2013-14. A no cost extension was provided for 2015.

<sup>19</sup> Much of this support was managed from the Embassy in Addis Ababa. Information was collected through interviews in Addis. See also e.g., *Joint Programme Support Arrangement and joint finance financing arrangement for the South Sudan Mediation Process. Implementation Period August 2014 – July 31 2015, Between Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Signatory Partners.*

<sup>20</sup> On secondments of experts see the MFA grants portal (<http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/en/agreement?agreementNo=SSD-17/0005>)

<sup>21</sup> Data is derived from the MFA grants portal (<http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/en/partner/details?country=182&programArea=4&year=2019>); from the Government of Norway (2019), *Annual Report 2018. Implementing Norway's National Action Plan 2015-2018. Women, Peace and Security*; and from interviews.

support to NCA has mainly been linked to their work with the South Sudan Council of Churches and their Action Plan for Peace.<sup>22</sup> Other Norwegian NGOs has also received grants for work in this area. The main grant outside NCA and NPA is the support to YMCA/YMCM.<sup>23</sup>

In the 2011-13 period about NOK 12 million was also provided to PACT, a US-based international NGO and their work in South Sudan.

Beginning in 2016 the Embassy in Juba also began to support several local initiatives to promote peace and reconciliation. This included NOK 15 million (2016-19) to the Justice Africa's Citizens Peace Project. This is an international NGO which focuses on strengthening local level coping and conflict resolution measures. The project targets both conflict and non-conflict areas in Equatorias, Lakes and Jonglei and work with local partners. BBC Media Action is provided with NOK 25 million (2017-2019) for a radio drama ("Life in Lulu") which is broadcasted through several local radio stations. NOK 9.7 million (2018-19) is provided to the Catholic Pax Christi to strengthen youth involvement in resolving local conflicts and peace making by producing educational film and initiate dialogue and discussions. The SUDD Institute – a local think-tank – was provided with NOK 3.7 mill (2017 -19) for work on governance and violence.<sup>24</sup>

NPA also implemented a mine clearance programme, but this ended in 2013 (about NOK 30 million was provided for this).

#### Humanitarian aid, food security/livelihoods, and basic social services

We have classified the support under four main headings:

##### *1 Emergency relief*

Norway has been a main contributor of unmarked funds to the South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF), a pooled fund set up in 2012. By 2018 Norway has contributed nearly NOK 500 million to the Fund.<sup>25</sup>

Through the World Food Programme Norway has provided about NOK 211 million in the 2011-18 period according to Norwegian Aid Statistics. For 2017 and 2018 NOK 76 million was provided to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

NOK 34 million was provided for UNOCHA office in South Sudan (2012-18).

Several of the Norwegian and International NGOs funded also have numerous projects in this area. This included he Norwegian Refugee Council, the Norwegian Red Cross and the International Committee of Red Cross/Red Crescent. Several also receive funding from the CHF and organisations above. Both NRC and NPA are contracted by the World Food Programme to assist with food distribution. NPA also receive direct funding from MFA to work with the World Food Programme.

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On NPA's projects on this see especially N. Shanmugaratnam & Alfred Sebit Lukuji (2012), *Securing Land Rights in Southern Sudan in a context of large-scale land acquisitions, Interim Evaluation Report* (commissioned by NPA), NPA (2018), *Unlearning Violence and Promoting Peace in South Sudan*, Report to Norad, and NPA (2019) *Conflict transformation through livelihood project*, Report to Norad. ON NCA see NCA (2015), *4-Year Report NCA South Sudan*, and NCA (2018), *Final Midterm Review Report on NCA peacebuilding programme*.

<sup>22</sup> On NPA's projects on this see especially N. Shanmugaratnam & Alfred Sebit Lukuji (2012), *Securing Land Rights in Southern Sudan in a context of large-scale land acquisitions, Interim Evaluation Report* (commissioned by NPA), NPA (2018), *Unlearning Violence and Promoting Peace in South Sudan*, Report to Norad, and NPA (2019) *Conflict transformation through livelihood project*, Report to Norad. ON NCA see NCA (2015), *4-Year Report NCA South Sudan*, and NCA (2018), *Final Midterm Review Report on NCA peacebuilding programme*.

<sup>23</sup> YMCA-YMCW was provided with NOK 11.2 million for 2016-19 to work with youth through their Just Peace programme.

<sup>24</sup> Data in this paragraph is derived from the MFA grants portal

(<http://udtilskudd.regjeringen.no/#/en/partner/details?country=182&programArea=4&year=2019>) and from interviews

<sup>25</sup> (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2012b). Data on disbursement are from Norwegian Aid Statistics.

## 2 Health

Norwegian funding for this has mainly been through Norwegian NGOs. The NCA, in particular, has received funding for several projects related to reproductive health and gender based violence. This has also included funding to support education and training of mid-wives. Much of NCA's humanitarian and emergency relief projects have a focus on water and sanitation.<sup>26</sup> NPA has received funding from Norwegian aid budget and other sources for the Yei Health Training Institute.

The Embassy in Juba provided NOK 64 million (2012-15) to the Emergency Medicines Fund, a joint initiative by the three troika counties and managed by USAID.

In late 2018 the Embassy signed an agreement with the UN Population Fund for a one-year grant of NOK 38 million) related to reproductive health and gender based violence (Sustaining Delivery of Reproductive Health and Gender-Based Violence Services in South Sudan). This revolves around establishment of 4 one-stop centres providing STD clinics/medical aid, HIV/AIDS counselling, legal aid, and more as well as a national tutor training facility for midwives/nurses and a program for awareness among youth.

For the 2011-15 period NOK 31 million was provided to Medecins Sans Frontieres.

## 3 Food security and livelihoods

Support to this has been a main component in the support channelled through NPA during the whole period. In the latter part of the evaluation period they implemented four main programmes with a focus on this.<sup>27</sup>

FAO has received NOK 321 million (2014-18) for their *Emergency Livelihood Response Programme*.

## 4 Basic education

Prior to 2015 most funding for basic education was channelled through Norwegian NGOs. Funding expanded after 2015 with South Sudan becoming a focus country becoming for a new Norwegian global priority of focusing on basic education and girls education in aid to conflict and crisis situations. NOK 375 million was disbursed for this in in the 2011-18 period – the bulk after 2015. Of this 230 million was channelled through Norwegian NGOs. NOK 104 million was disbursed through the Refugee Council (NRC) and NOK 45 million (from 2016) through Save the Children Norway. NOK 85 million was channelled through several smaller NGOs with the Stromme Foundation and ADRA receiving the bulk of this. NOK 144 million has – beginning in 2015 - been channelled through UNICEF and its "Back to learning" programme. UNICEF have also relied on some of these Norwegian NGOs – especially NRC - for implementation.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> (NCA, 2018d).

<sup>27</sup> (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Grant Portal, 2019) The new agreement provided for NOK 21 million in 2019.

<sup>28</sup> (Evaluation Department Norad, 2017). Updated figures are from Norad's aid statistics. See also (Office of the Auditor General of Norway ,2019)

## ANNEX 4: ASSESSMENT TABLES

### Gender Assessment on Projects Funded by Norwegian Aid in the Period 2005-2011

The team assessed documents from 18 projects made available by MFA. Six projects or 33.3% of the projects have greatly integrated gender perspective. Nine projects or 50% of the projects have included gender perspective to some extent. Three projects or 16.7% of the projects has not included gender perspective. Note that this is indicative and complete as is evident from the list below.

Assessment marker:

1. Gender perspective greatly integrated

2. Gender perspective included to some extend

3. Gender perspective not included

Partners	Projects	Gender Inclusion	Gender inclusion Assessment
Multilateral Organisation	World Bank "The Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds 2005-2013"	1	Gender was not mainstreamed into most projects nor integrated into the Strategic Priorities.
Multilateral Organisation	South Sudan Recovery Fund 2009-2015	1	No specific attention made for gender equality. No gender segregated data. No emphasis on women's inclusions, rights or issues.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme "Emergency, Preparedness and Response" 2007-2008	3	Attention to inclusion of men and women (gender parity). Use of gender segregated data. The needs of men and women are analysed and addressed.

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NCA	Humanitarian Programme in South Sudan 2007-2008	3	The project targets women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data. The different needs and issues of women are recognised and addressed.
NCA	WASH 2010-2012	3	Use gender segregated data. Both men and women consulted. The needs of women are analysed or addressed.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme "Water and Sanitation" 2007-2008	2	Attention to inclusion of men and women (gender parity). No specific activities addressing gender issues.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme "Resettlement" 2007-2008	2	Attention to inclusion of men and women (gender parity). Use of gender segregated data.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme " Food Security" 2007-2008	2	Attention to inclusion of men and women (gender parity). Use of gender segregated data. No specific gender analysis.
NCA	Health Programme 2010-2012	2	The project target women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data. Efforts to address the needs of women but insufficiently.
NGOs	ADRA "Eastern Equatoria Sustainable Education System 2011-2014"	3	The project aims at addressing gender inequality in education and also promotes women's inclusion in many levels. The needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. But gender sensitivity in the implementation could have been improved. Use gender segregated data.
NGOs	ADRA "Budi Education Support Project Eastern Equatoria State 2007-2009"	2	The project aims at addressing gender inequality in education. Insufficient efforts to apply gender sensitivity in the implementation and efforts to include equal number of women. Limited attention to engaging men in the project. Use gender segregated data.
NRC	Humanitarian Programme "Management and Support System, Shelter, WASH, Emergency Food Security and Distribution, ICLA " 2010-2012	2	The programmes commonly target women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data. Some evidence of gender analysis. Efforts to address the needs of women but insufficiently. Specifically ICLA, cases relating to GBV are not included for safety reason.
Norwegian Red Cross	Community Health Volunteer Program (NCHVP) 2007-2009	2	Women are engaged during the planning and implementation stage. Efforts to address the needs of women but insufficiently. No gender segregated data.
NPA	Community Based Resource management Project (COREMAP) 2005	2	Attention to inclusion of men and women (gender parity). Use of gender segregated data.

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NPA	Securing Rural Land Rights 2011-2012	2	Women's inclusion is evidence although still rather low. No specific attention made to address gender issues. Limited gender analysis.
UNDP	Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) 2008-2010	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequalities. The needs, roles and opportunities of women and men are analysed or addressed. Gender analysis was made.
UNDP	Good Governance and Equity in Political Participation Project	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequalities. The needs, roles and opportunities of women and men are analysed or addressed. Gender analysis was made.
World Bank	The Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds 2005-2013	1	Gender was not mainstreamed into most projects nor integrated into the Strategic Priorities.

### Gender Assessment on Projects Funded by Norwegian Aid in the Period 2012-2013

The team assessed documents from 24 projects made available by MFA. Seven projects or 29.2% of the projects have greatly integrated gender perspective. Eight projects or 33.3% of the projects has included gender perspective to some extent. Nine projects or 37.5% of the projects have not included gender perspective. Note that this is indicative and complete as is evident from the list below.

Assessment marker:

1. Gender perspective greatly integrated

2. Gender perspective included to some extend

3. Gender perspective not included

Partners	Projects	Gender Inclusion	Gender inclusion Assessment
Government of South Sudan	MoFED "Defence Security Sector Reform in South Sudan 2013-2016"	2	There is awareness of gender issues and efforts to address gender inequality but insufficiently. No evidence of gender analysis.
Government of South Sudan	Cooperation between the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics and Statistics Norway 2013-2015	1	There is awareness on gender issues on the planning stage. No emphasis on women's inclusions, rights or issues. No specific attention made to gender equality.
Government of South Sudan	GoSS "The Cooperation Programme for Sustainable Development and Management of the Petroleum Sector in South Sudan 2012-2014"	2	There is awareness of gender issues. The project promotes women's inclusion. No gender segregated data.
Multilateral Organisation	OCHA "Common Humanitarian Fund/South Sudan Humanitarian Fund 2012-2014"	3	Gender is recognised as instrumental to the project's framework. The different needs and issues of women and men are analysed and addressed. Gender is reflected sufficiently in project proposal. Use gender segregated data.

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Multilateral Organisation	South Sudan Recovery Fund 2009-2015	1	No specific attention made for gender equality. No gender segregated data. No emphasis on women's inclusion, women's rights or issues.
Multilateral Organisation	FAO in South Sudan 2013-2015	2	The programme targets women's inclusion. The needs, roles and opportunities of women were analysed but insufficient. Some evidence of gender analysis. No gender segregated data.
Multilateral Organisation	CHF "Common Humanitarian Fund South Sudan 2012"	3	Different needs of women and men were analysed and addressed. Gender is mainstreamed into project design and implementation. The project aims at addressing gender inequality.
Multilateral Organisations	UNIDO - Developing the National Quality System for South Sudan to enhance trade capacities enabling economic growth and consumer protection 2013-2017	2	The projects to some extent aware of gender aspects. Efforts to achieve gender parity but insufficient. No gender segregated data. No specific attention on women's rights or issues.
NGOs	International IDEA "Support to South Sudan Constitutional Review Process 2012-2014"	1	No specific attention made for gender equality. No gender segregated data. No emphasis on women's inclusions, women's rights or issues.
NGOs	ADRA "Eastern Equatoria Sustainable Education System 2011-2014"	3	The project aims at addressing gender inequality in education and also promotes women's inclusion in many levels. The needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. But gender sensitivity in the implementation could have been improved. Use gender segregated data.
NGOs	MAG "Improving security and stability in South Sudan through Physical Security and Stockpile Management 2013-2014"	1	No specific attention made for gender equality. No gender segregated data. No emphasis on women's inclusions, women's rights or issues.
NPA	Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Capacity Building 2013-2014	2	Some evidence of gender analysis. The project targets women's inclusion. Efforts to address the needs of women but insufficiently. Use gender segregated data.
NPA	Civil Society Development Program Media Development in Collaboration with Gurtong 2013-2014	1	The project aware of gender issues. No emphasis on women's inclusions and specific women's issues. No specific attention made to gender equality.



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NPA	Securing Rural Land Rights In The Context Of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions In South Sudan, Phase 2 - 2013-2014	2	The different issues of women and men are recognised. The project targets women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data.
NPA	Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) 2012-2014	3	The project targets women's inclusion. Gender analysis was made. The needs, roles and challenges of women are recognised and addressed. Use gender segregated data.
NRC	School Construction and Skills Training in South Sudan 2012-2013	3	The project aims at addressing gender inequalities relating to education. Use gender segregated data. The different needs of girls and boys were analysed and addressed. Projects activities promote gender inclusion at great level.
NRC	South Sudan Emergency Response Phase I 2013-2015	1	No gender segregated data. No emphasis on women's inclusions, women's rights or issues. No specific attention made to gender equality.
NRC	South Sudan Emergency Response Phase II 2013-2015	1	There is some awareness on gender aspect. Use gender segregated data. No emphasis on women's inclusions, women's rights or issues. No specific attention made to gender equality.
UN-other	FAO Emergency Livelihood Response Programme (ELRP) Phase I 2013-2015	2	The project equally targets women and men. Efforts to address the needs of women but insufficiently.
UNDP	Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSAC) 2012-2017	3	The needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. But SGBV issue could have received more attention considering emergency rate of this issue. Some evidence of gender analysis. The project targets women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data.
UNDP	Elections Project Initiation Plan (PIP) 2013-2014	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender issues. Gender analysis was made. Use gender segregated data.
UNDP	Country Support Bases 2013-2014	1	No specific attention made to gender equality. No emphasis on women's inclusions, women's rights or issues. No evidence of gender analysis.

UNDP	International Support to Constitutional Review (ISCR) 2013-2015	1	The project somewhat aware of gender issues. However, no specific attention made to gender equality. No gender segregated data.
UNDP	Access to Justice Project 2013-2017	2	The project aims at addressing gender issues mainly SGBV but insufficiently. The needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed, but not men although men are main perpetrators of violence and also victims of specific types of violence. Some evidence of gender analysis. Efforts to support women's inclusion but insufficiently. Use gender segregated data.

**Gender Assessment on Projects Funded by Norwegian Aid in the Period 2014-2018**

The team assessed documents from 33 projects made available by MFA. 26 projects or 58.8% of the projects have greatly integrated gender perspective. 3 projects or 9.1% of the projects have included gender perspective to some extent. 4 projects or 12.1% of the projects have not included gender perspective. Note that this is indicative and complete as is evident from the list below.

Assessment marker:

1. Gender perspective greatly integrated

2. Gender perspective included to some extend

3. Gender perspective not included

Partners	Projects	Gender Inclusion	Gender inclusion Assessment
Government of South Sudan	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Rural Development and Co-operatives (MAF/GoSS) "Forest and Land Sector Programme Phase II 2014-2016"	3	There is awareness on gender aspects to a great level. Gender analysis is part of the proposal. The project promotes women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data.
Government of South Sudan	Ministry of Petroleum and Mining "Sustainable Development and Management of the Petroleum Sector in South Sudan 2014"	1	There is awareness on gender issues on the planning stage. No emphasis on women's inclusions, women's rights or issues. No specific attention made to gender equality.
Government of South Sudan	MoFEP "Institutional cooperation for strengthening the capacity for macroeconomic analysis and strategic fiscal policy in MoFEP 2015-2016"	2	There is awareness of gender issues and efforts to address gender inequality but insufficiently. No evidence of gender analysis.
Multilateral Organisation	IMF " South Sudan Trust Fund (SSTF) for Capacity Building on Macroeconomic Policies and Statistics" 2014-2016	1	No specific attention made to gender equality. No emphasis on women's inclusions, rights or issues. No evidence of gender analysis.
Multilateral Organisation	Join Donor with the Netherlands "Civil Society Funds 2016-2018"	3	The project aims at addressing gender inequalities in term of GBV, girls education, social cohesion and SRHR. The project promotes women's inclusion. Some evidence of gender analysis. Use gender segregated data.
NCA	Peace Building Programme 2017	3	The project targets women's inclusion. The different needs of women and men and recognised and addressed. The roles and opportunities of women in peace building are recognised. Some evidence on gender analysis. Use gender segregated data.

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NCA	WASH 2017	3	The projects targets women's inclusion. The needs of women are recognised and addressed. Men and women were consulted. Use gender segregated data.
NCA	Reproductive Health and Gender Based Violence Programme 2017	3	The project aims at addressing gender issues (GBV). Gender analysis was made. Both women and men were consulted and engaged equally.
NCA	Community Based Teachers Training Programme 2017	3	The project targets women's inclusion. Promoted awareness of women's rights through International Women's Day. There are efforts to address the needs of women but insufficiently. Use gender segregated data.
NCA	Emergency Programme 2017	3	The project targets women's inclusion in the implementation and decision making process. However no specific attention made to women's needs or issues. Use gender segregated data.
NGOs	EVE Organisation for Women Development "Enhancing the Capacity of Women Parliamentarians for Effective Political Participation in South Sudan 2016-2017"	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequality in political participation. The project targets women's inclusion. The needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. Gender analysis was made. Limited attention to engaging men in the project. Use gender segregated data.
NGOs	Global Witness "Mitigating the Impact of the Natural Resources Curse 2017-2018"	1	No specific attention made for gender equality. No gender segregated data. No emphasis on women's inclusions, women's rights or issues.
NPA	Women's Rights Project on "Enhancing Participation of Women in Local Government and Conflict Resolution 2014-2015"	3	The needs of women are analysed. The project clearly aims at addressing gender issues. There is evidence the project has changed attitudes and perception against specific gender issues.
NPA	Emergency Crisis Response Project (ECRP) - Phase II 2014	3	The needs and opportunities of women are recognised and addressed. The project targets women's inclusion. Men and women were consulted and engaged as project's committee. Use gender segregated data.

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NPA	Art For Change 2016-2018	1	The project aims to engage women in peace building efforts but lack of clarity and insufficient efforts. No gender segregated data. No specific attention made to gender equality.
NPA	Building Resilience of Smallholder Producers and Market Actors in South Sudan (BRSM) Phase I 2016-2017	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequalities. The needs and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. Use gender segregated data.
NPA	Building Resilience of Smallholder Producers and Market Actors in South Sudan (BRSM) Phase II 2016-2017	2	Continuing phase I but attention to gender issues are lacking.
NPA	Training health workers 2016	3	The projects recognised and addressed women's health problem such as maternal health and GBV. Gender analysis was made.
NPA	Building Resilience and Fostering Peace through the Voices of Youth and Women 2016	3	The needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. The project targets women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data.
NPA	Unlearning Violence and Promoting Peace 2016-2019	2	Some evidence of gender analysis. Efforts to address the needs of women but lack of elaboration. The project targets women's inclusion.
NPA	Conflict Transformation through Livelihoods Recovery Project (CTLR) - Phase II 2017	3	The needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. The project targets women's inclusion. Use gender segregated data.
NPA	Building community resilience to prevent GBV 2017	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequalities. The needs and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. Use gender segregated data.
NRC	Alternative Education System	3	Use gender segregated data. Gender inclusion was applied at many levels of the projects. The project aims at addressing gender inequalities in education field.
Save the Children	Child Protection (CP) and Education in Emergency (EiE) response to the South Sudanese refugee crises 2016-2017	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequalities in education. The needs and opportunities of girls and women are analysed and addressed. Use gender segregated data. Gender was mainstreamed at all stage of project.

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Save the Children	South Sudan Food Insecurity Response in Jonglei state 2016-2017	3	The project target's women's inclusion. Gender analysis was made. The different situation and needs of female and male are recognised. Use gender segregated data.
Save the Children	Enhancing equality education & Peace Building – phase I 2017-2018	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequalities in education. The needs and opportunities of girls and women are analysed and addressed. Use gender segregated data. Gender analysis was made.
Save the Children	Enhancing equality education & Peace Building – phase II 2017-2018	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender inequalities in education. The needs and opportunities of girls and women are analysed and addressed. Use gender segregated data. Gender analysis was made.
Save the Children	Enhancing equality education & Peace Building – phase III 2017-2018	3	The project clearly aims at addressing gender issues, such as access to education for girls, women's inclusion, GBV and enhancing community on gender sensitive attitudes. Gender analysis was made. Use gender segregated data.
Save the Children	Norad Education Phase II 2017-2018	3	The project targets women's inclusion in education. The specific needs, roles and opportunities of women are analysed and addressed. Gender analysis was made. Specific gender issues are included such as GBV. Use gender segregated data.
UN-other	FAO Emergency Livelihood Response Programme (ELRP)Phase II 2015-2017	3	The project mainly targets female-headed households. The needs, roles and opportunities of women are recognised and addressed.
UNDP	Governance & Economic Management Support (GEMS) Project 2019-2022	3	The project targets women's inclusion in decision-making positions. The different needs of women and men and recognised and addressed. Some evidence on gender analysis. Use gender segregated data.
UNICEF	GBV Prevention and Response 2015	3	The project aims at addressing gender issues (GBV). Gender analysis was made. Both women and men were consulted and engaged equally.
UNICEF	Back to Learning (BTL) 2015-2017	3	The project promotes women's inclusion in education. The needs and challenges of girls and education were recognised and addressed. Use gender segregated data. Gender analysis was made.

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### Vulnerability Assessment on Projects Funded by Norwegian Aid in the Period 2005-2011

The team assessed documents from 18 projects made available by MFA. Three projects or 16.7% of the projects have approach vulnerable group to a great degree. Seven project or 38.9% of the projects have approached vulnerable groups but insufficiently. Eight project or 44.4% of the projects have not approached vulnerable group. Note that this is indicative and complete as is evident from the list below.

Assessment marker:

1. Great approach to vulnerable groups

2. Insufficient approach to vulnerable groups

3. No approach to vulnerable groups

Partners	Projects	Vulnerable Inclusion	Vulnerable Inclusion Assessment
Multilateral Organisation	World Bank "The Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds 2005-2013"	1	Vulnerable group aspects are not being paid sufficient attention.
Multilateral Organisation	South Sudan Recovery Fund 2009-2015	1	Vulnerable group aspects are not being paid sufficient attention.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme "Emergency, Preparedness and Response" 2007-2008	3	Attention to inclusion of vulnerable groups. The needs of vulnerable groups are recognised and addressed.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme in South Sudan 2007-2008	3	The project analyses and addresses vulnerable groups' needs.
NCA	WASH 2010-2012	2	The needs of vulnerable groups are analysed and addressed (youth, IDPs). No specific attention to the disabled persons.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme "Water and Sanitation" 2007-2008	2	Attention to inclusion of vulnerable groups.



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NCA	Humanitarian Programme "Resettlement" 2007-2008	2	Attention to inclusion of vulnerable groups. The needs of vulnerable groups are recognised and addressed.
NCA	Humanitarian Programme " Food Security" 2007-2008	2	Attention to inclusion of vulnerable groups.
NCA	Health Programme 2010-2012	2	Attention to inclusion of vulnerable groups. Efforts to address the needs of vulnerable groups but insufficiently.
NGOs	ADRA "Eastern Equatoria Sustainable Education System 2011-2014"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups like children with disability. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NGOs	ADRA "Budi Education Support Project Eastern Equatoria State 2007-2009"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups like children with disability. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NRC	Humanitarian Programme "Management and Support System, Shelter, WASH, Emergency Food Security and Distribution, ICLA " 2010-2012	3	The needs of vulnerable groups were analysed and addressed.
Norwegian Red Cross	Community Health Volunteer Program (NCHVP) 2007-2009	2	Vulnerable groups are engaged in the planning and implementation stage. Efforts to address the needs of vulnerable groups but insufficiently.
NPA	Community Based Resource management Project (COREMAP) 2005	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NPA	Securing Rural Land Rights 2011-2012	1	No inclusion of vulnerable groups.
UNDP	Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) 2008-2010	2	Specific vulnerable group (victims of GBV) is their main target. But not emphasis on other inclusion, rights or issues of vulnerable people.
UNDP	Good Governance and Equity in Political Participation Project	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
World Bank	The Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds 2005-2013	1	Conflict sensitivity aspects are not being paid sufficient attention.

**Vulnerability Assessment on Projects Funded by Norwegian Aid in the Period 2012-2013**

The team assessed documents from 24 projects made available by MFA. 10 projects or 41.7% of the projects have approach vulnerable group to a great degree. Two project or 8.3% of the projects have approached vulnerable groups but insufficiently. 12 projects or 50% of the projects have

not approached vulnerable group.

Assessment marker:

- 1. Great approach to vulnerable groups
- 2. Insufficient approach to vulnerable groups
- 3. No approach to vulnerable groups

Partners	Projects	Vulnerable Inclusion	Vulnerable Inclusion Assessment
Government of South Sudan	MoFED "Defence Security Sector Reform in South Sudan 2013-2016"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Government of South Sudan	Cooperation between the South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics and Statistics Norway 2013-2015	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Government of South Sudan	GoSS "The Cooperation Programme for Sustainable Development and Management of the Petroleum Sector in South Sudan 2012-2014"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Multilateral Organisation	OCHA "Common Humanitarian Fund/South Sudan Humanitarian Fund 2012-2014"	3	The project aims to improve the conditions of vulnerable groups. The needs of vulnerable groups are thoroughly analysed and addressed. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Multilateral Organisation	South Sudan Recovery Fund 2009-2015	1	Vulnerable group aspects are not being paid sufficient attention. No specific attention to the disabled persons.

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Multilateral Organisation	FAO in South Sudan 2013-2015	2	The project clearly targets vulnerable households. The needs of vulnerable groups are analysed but insufficiently addressed.
Multilateral Organisation	CHF "Common Humanitarian Fund South Sudan 2012"	3	The needs of vulnerable groups are recognised and addressed.
Multilateral Organisations	UNIDO - Developing the National Quality System for South Sudan to enhance trade capacities enabling economic growth and consumer protection 2013-2017	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NGOs	International IDEA "Support to South Sudan Constitutional Review Process 2012-2014"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups like children with disability. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NGOs	ADRA "Eastern Equatoria Sustainable Education System 2011-2014"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups like children with disability. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NGOs	MAG "Improving security and stability in South Sudan through Physical Security and Stockpile Management 2013-2014"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NPA	Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction and Capacity Building 2013-2014	3	Vulnerable groups in general are main target and beneficiaries of the project. Insufficient attentions to more specific vulnerable persons like people with disabilities.
NPA	Civil Society Development Program Media Development in Collaboration with Gurtong 2013-2014	1	The project aware of issues faced by vulnerability groups. But limited efforts to engage vulnerability groups.
NPA	Securing Rural Land Rights In The Context Of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions In South Sudan, Phase 2 - 2013-2014	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NPA	Community Based Disaster Risk Reduction (CBDRR) 2012-2014	3	Vulnerable groups are the main targets. The needs of vulnerable groups were recognised and addressed.

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NRC	School Construction and Skills Training in South Sudan 2012-2013	3	The projects main targets are IDPs, returnees and youths. The needs of vulnerable groups related to education infrastructure were recognised and addressed.
NRC	South Sudan Emergency Response Phase I 2013-2015	3	Vulnerable groups are the main targets. The needs of vulnerable groups were recognised and addressed.
NRC	South Sudan Emergency Response Phase II 2013-2015	3	Vulnerable groups are the main targets. The needs of vulnerable groups were recognised and addressed.
UN-other	FAO Emergency Livelihood Response Programme (ELRP) Phase I 2013-2015	3	The project clearly targets vulnerable people including the displaced and severely food-insecure people.
UNDP	Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSAC) 2012-2017	3	The conditions and needs of vulnerable groups are analysed and addressed but insufficiently. The vulnerable and most vulnerable groups like marginalised women and IDP women are engaged in the project. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
UNDP	Elections Project Initiation Plan (PIP) 2013-2014	3	The project aims to the inclusion of vulnerable groups. The needs of vulnerable groups are recognised.
UNDP	Country Support Bases 2013-2014	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
UNDP	International Support to Constitutional Review (ISCR) 2013-2015	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
UNDP	Access to Justice Project 2013-2017	2	There is awareness of vulnerable groups and their needs, but approaches are insufficient (SGBV victims, youths, women, children IDPs, ethnic groups, etc). No specific attention to the disabled persons.

### **Vulnerable Approach Assessment on Projects Funded by Norwegian Aid in the Period 2014-2018**

The team assessed documents from 33 projects made available by MFA. 17 projects or 51.5% of the projects have approach vulnerable group to a great degree. 9 projects or 27.3% of the projects have approached vulnerable groups but insufficiently. 7 project or 21.2% of the projects have not approached vulnerable group.

Assessment marker:

1. Great approach to vulnerable groups

2. Insufficient approach to vulnerable groups

## 3. No approach to vulnerable groups

Partners	Projects	Vulnerable Inclusion	Vulnerable Inclusion Assessment
Government of South Sudan	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Rural Development and Co-operatives (MAF/GoSS) "Forest and Land Sector Programme Phase II 2014-2016"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Government of South Sudan	Ministry of Petroleum and Mining "Sustainable Development and Management of the Petroleum Sector in South Sudan 2014"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Government of South Sudan	MoFEP "Institutional cooperation for strengthening the capacity for macroeconomic analysis and strategic fiscal policy in MoFEP 2015-2016"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Multilateral Organisation	IMF " South Sudan Trust Fund (SSTF) for Capacity Building on Macroeconomic Policies and Statistics" 2014-2016	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
Multilateral Organisation	Join Donor with the Netherlands "Civil Society Funds 2016-2018"	3	The project aims to improve the conditions of vulnerable groups. The needs of vulnerable groups are thoroughly analysed and addressed. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
NCA	Peace Building Programme 2017	2	The needs of vulnerable groups are recognised. Limited engagement of vulnerable groups (youth).
NCA	WASH 2017	2	The needs of vulnerable groups are analysed and addressed (youth, IDPs). No specific attention to the disabled persons.
NCA	Reproductive Health and Gender Based Violence Programme 2017	3	The needs of specific vulnerable group (victim of GBV) are analysed and addressed.
NCA	Community Based Teachers Training Programme 2017	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.

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NCA	Emergency Programme 2017	2	Vulnerable people are the main target. But no specific attention to implement disability sensitive approach or accommodate the needs of specific vulnerable groups-
NGOs	EVE Organisation for Women Development "Enhancing the Capacity of Women Parliamentarians for Effective Political Participation in South Sudan 2016-2017"	2	There is awareness of vulnerable groups' needs. Efforts to include or represent vulnerable groups but insufficiently.
NGOs	Global Witness "Mitigating the Impact of the Natural Resources Curse 2017-2018"	1	No specific attention made to vulnerable groups. No evidence of analysis on vulnerable groups and their needs or involvements.
NPA	Women's Rights Project on "Enhancing Participation of Women in Local Government and Conflict Resolution 2014-2015"	3	The project has reached and supported the most vulnerable people like children, IDPs, people with disability and the elderly.
NPA	Emergency Crisis Response Project (ECRP) - Phase II 2014	3	The project clearly aims to address problems faced by vulnerable groups (IDPs). Vulnerable groups were consulted and included.
NPA	Art For Change 2016-2018	1	No emphasis on vulnerable groups inclusion, rights or issues.
NPA	Building Resilience of Smallholder Producers and Market Actors in South Sudan (BRSM) Phase I 2016-2017	3	The needs of vulnerable groups are recognised and addressed.
NPA	Building Resilience of Smallholder Producers and Market Actors in South Sudan (BRSM) Phase II 2016-2017	2	The needs of vulnerable groups are recognised and addressed. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
NPA	Training health workers 2016	3	The needs of vulnerable groups are analysed and addressed.



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NPA	Building Resilience and Fostering Peace through the Voices of Youth and Women 2016	2	The project aware of issues faced by vulnerability groups. But limited efforts to engage vulnerability groups (only youth).
NPA	Unlearning Violence and Promoting Peace 2016-2019	3	Vulnerable groups are main target (youth and ethnic groups). The needs, roles and opportunities of vulnerable groups are recognised and addressed. No attention to disable persons.
NPA	Conflict Transformation through Livelihoods Recovery Project (CTLR) - Phase II 2017	2	The needs of vulnerable groups are analysed and addressed. No specific attention to the disabled persons.
NPA	Building community resilience to prevent GBV 2017	2	Specific vulnerable group (victims of GBV) is their main target. But not emphasis on other inclusion, rights or issues of vulnerable people.
NRC	Alternative Education System	3	The projects clearly aims at addressing vulnerable groups' needs, in this case is children, youth, IDPs and returnees.
Save the Children	Child Protection (CP) and Education in Emergency (EiE) response to the South Sudanese refugee crises 2016-2017	3	The project aims at addressing vulnerable groups' issues related to education. The needs of vulnerable groups were analysed and addressed. Voices of vulnerable groups are taken into account.
Save the Children	South Sudan Food Insecurity Response in Jonglei state 2016-2017	3	The project clearly aims at addressing vulnerable groups' problem. The vulnerable groups are the main target (children).
Save the Children	Enhancing equality education & Peace Building – phase I 2017-2018	3	The project aims at addressing vulnerable groups' issues related to education. The needs of vulnerable groups were analysed and addressed. Voices of vulnerable groups are taken into account.
Save the Children	Enhancing equality education & Peace Building – phase II 2017-2018	3	The project aims at addressing vulnerable groups' issues related to education. The needs of vulnerable groups were analysed and addressed. Voices of vulnerable groups are taken into account.
Save the Children	Enhancing equality education & Peace Building – phase III 2017-2018	3	The needs and conditions of vulnerable groups particularly children with disabilities are analysed and addressed. The projects target's inclusion of children with disabilities.

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Save the Children	Norad Education Phase II 2017-2018	3	The needs and conditions of vulnerable groups particularly children with disabilities are analysed and addressed. The projects target's inclusion of children with disabilities.
UN-other	FAO Emergency Livelihood Response Programme (ELRP)Phase II 2015-2017	3	The project engages people living with disabilities.
UNDP	Governance & Economic Management Support (GEMS) Project 2019-2022	3	Vulnerable groups are main target, although mainly youth. The needs, roles and opportunities of vulnerable group are recognised and addressed. There is attention to people with disability, albeit minimum.
UNICEF	GBV Prevention and Response 2015	3	Vulnerable groups related to GBV are the main target. The conditions and needs of specific vulnerable group (GBV survivors, child survivors of GBV, female single headed household) are analysed and addressed. There is a strong attention to inclusion of vulnerable groups in the project.
UNICEF	Back to Learning (BTL) 2015-2017	2	Approaching vulnerable communities targeting children and adolescents. No attention to specific vulnerable groups like people with disability.

## Conflict Sensitivity Assessment on Projects based on Decision Documents (DD)

### Category

	No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project	14 (70%)
	Some analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project	4 (20%)
	Good analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project	2 (10%)

Document Number	Project	Conflict Sensitivity Assessment
QZA-15/0443	NPA 2016- 2019 (Oil for Development)	There are some analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project, although limited to corruption case.
GLO-0613 QZA-15/0443	NPA Building resilience and fostering peace through the voices of youth and women in SSD	No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
GLO-3768 QZA-13/0585	ADRA Norway "Education in Emergency, Juba County (EIE-Juba)"	Despite showing good analysis on the conflict context, the document does not have analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
QZA-15/0443	NPA Samarbeidsavtale 2016 -2019	There is adequate analysis/consideration on the implementation of conflict sensitive strategies (do no harm) in the project, as well as analysis on corruption that might increase triggered by the project. However, other potential issues such as social friction, environmental impact, gender and human rights impact, are not discussed.
QZA-12/0827	Norwegian Red Cross "Strengthening community resilience through improving vulnerable people's health and RCRC National Societies' role as civil	The document has good conflict context analysis. Potential conflict triggered by the project is also analyses, but limited to corruption and environment. No analysis on social friction that might occur due to the project.

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	society actors"	
QZA-17/0195	NRC "Continuation of education support South Sudan and education and Information, counseling and legal assistance (ICLA) support Afghanistan"	There is no assessment/analysis of the potential conflicts arising out of the project apart from stating " <i>Korrupsjonsrisikoen er høy både i Afghanistan og South-Sudan</i> ".
SDN-2156	South Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund	No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
SSD-0008	GoSS - IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan	No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
SSD-13/0024	UNIDO - Developing the National Quality System for South Sudan - Phase I	The project doesn't relate to conflict. No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
SDN-2155 SDN-11/0075	UNDP - County Support Bases	Only limited on the assessment on how conflict may affect the project, not on potential conflicts as a result of the project
	GoSS - Elections Project Initiation Plan (PIP)	The project doesn't relate to conflict. No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
SSD-13/0001	GoSS - International Support to Constitutional Review (ISCR)	The project doesn't relate to conflict. No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
SSD-14/0028	IMF South Sudan Trust Fund Macroeconomic Statistics and Policies	The project doesn't relate to conflict. No analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
SSD - 14/0013	FAO Emergency Livelihood Response Programme (ELRP)	The document has thoroughly assessed the conflict context and how it may affect the project implementation. There is good analysis on potential conflicts might occur triggered by the project, such as gender, corruption and social friction (conflict between returnees and the host communities).
SSD - 14/0035	UNICEF - Back to Learning (BTL)	The conflict analysis is limited to on-going conflict happening in South Sudan that might affect the project. Although it briefly mentioned about conflict sensitive approach, but

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		no assessment/analysis on potential conflicts as a result of the project/programme
SSD – 17/0008	UNICEF - Back to Learning (BTL) Phase II	This version of document very briefly mentions how the project might positively contribute to the conflict. But there is no analysis on the potential conflicts arising out of the project seemingly due to missing conflict sensitivity explanation in the project document itself. And there is request/advise stated in the decision document that conflict sensitivity should be incorporated in the next project document.
SSD-17/007	FAO - Emergency Livelihood Response Programme (ELRP)	In this version of decision document, there is no analysis on the potential conflicts arising out of the project, nor how the project/programme might reduce conflicts seemingly due to missing conflict sensitivity explanation in the project document itself. And there is request/advise stated in the decision document that conflict sensitivity should be incorporated in the next project document.
SSD-17/0002	Common Humanitarian Fund /UNDP Multi Partner Trust Fund Office – South Sudan Humanitarian Fund	The document has adequate assessment on the potential conflicts arising out of the project, such as risks that the project might “do harm” to human rights, gender and equality, environment and anti corruption.
SSD-17/0013	EVE Organization for Women Development - Strengthening South Sudan Women Leadership and Political Participation for durable peace and stability in South Sudan	The assessment is only limited on how conflict may affect the project, not analysis on potential conflicts might be stirred/triggered by the project
MUL-1870018	UNFPA - Sustaining Delivery of Reproductive Health and Gender-Based Violence Services in South Sudan	There is limited assessment on how the project might “do harm” to human rights, gender and equality, environment and anti corruption.

## ANNEX 5: SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENTS ASSESSED

### 1.1: ENGAGEMENT 1: IGAD REGIONAL INITIATIVE FOR CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN (2010 – 2019)

#### **Project Background and Description**

Norway has provided NOK 240 million as the sole donor to this programme implemented by UNDP. This is often referred to by Norway as a flagship project. It is the only large development programme that has been funded by Norway from 2011 to the present. In mid-2019 Norway was finalizing the documents for a USD 28 million support to a new third phase (July 2019 – 2022).

The project provides for secondment of civil servants from three IGAD countries (Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) to public institutions at national and state level in South Sudan. 199 were seconded in the first phase (2010-2015) and 121 in the second (2013-2019). They are seconded for up to two years. During secondments they mentor and coach South Sudanese counterparts and provide technical assistance in the departments where they are posted. 1200 persons were mentored in 22 institutions in the first phase. 1000 persons in 48 institutions in the second. The planned third phase. - now termed the Governance and Economic Management Support project – will provide for 70 experts based in 38 institutions and mentoring up to 600 civil servants. However, the third phase will be based on recruitments from the region, including of South Sudanese diaspora and South Sudanese citizens living in the country, but currently not employed in the public service. All institutions will be national and are linked to the implementation of the peace agreement.

#### Data sources

Data for the assessment of the IGAD project was collected from a wide range of sources

- UNDP/IGAD project documents. We reviewed formal projects documents for the three phases, annual reports (including some quarterly) and all reviews and evaluations;
- Norwegian documents (appraisals, decisions-making documents, embassy reports and work plans);
- Interviews with a range of individuals and stakeholders. The includes senior officials and staffs at the Norwegian Embassy, UNDP's project management unit, the Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development (coordinator on the South Sudan side), IGAD officials and other past and current stakeholders; and
- Interviews with senior officials and former counterparts at four selected participating subnational (state) institutions in Wau. In the second phase seven of the 40 participating institutions were in the Wau State.

There are certain limitations to these data. We have not interviewed officials at participating national institutions in Juba (they were subject to another parallel review commissioned by the Norwegian Embassy) or experts deployed to South Sudan (they had completed their assignments and had left the country when this study was undertaken). Logistical challenges also prevented a proper selection and sampling of institutions and individuals in Wau. We interviewed those that could be tracked down and were available during our brief visit in June 2019.

#### Norwegian policies and priorities

The formal origins of this programme are linked to the Oslo donor conference in 2010 although unverified reports indicate that Norway had floated the idea for some time on how to make more systematic use of experts from neighbouring countries in the capacity building of state institutions.

This paved the way for the 2010 agreement with UNDP to manage the new three-year IGAD Regional Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan programme. It began in July 2011. In the early Norwegian documents, the programme is seen as highly relevant and appropriate in South Sudan considering the absence of a functional aid architecture coupled with very low state capacities. The programme also responded to another consideration: South-South cooperation. It was assumed that civil servants from neighbouring countries would make the capacity building support more effective and cost efficient.<sup>29</sup>

With the first phase of approaching its end and UNDP preparing for a second phase the Embassy through Norad did an appraisal of the new project document. The appraisal was positive but made several recommendations to improve performance and results. This included more strategic and long-term perspective on capacity building; poor assessment of risks; and adjustment in the management.<sup>30</sup>

The crisis from December 2013 and again from 2016 led to numerous delays in project implementation. The Embassy and MFA after some considerations decided to continue to support the programme.<sup>31</sup> According to interviews one factor in deciding to continue to support the project was also relations with IGAD and neighbouring states. It was considered important to ensure their continued commitment to the peace process through this capacity building project.

In 2019 it was decided to provide funding for a new and revised version of the programme. The focus should be on national state institutions considered important for the implementation of the peace agreements, experts should be recruited on the open market in the region, including from inside South Sudan and the participating individuals in the state institutions should be identified "change agents". This was considered a high-risk intervention requiring strong management by UNDP, ability to identify change agents and required experts and political commitment by the government. The Embassy assumed that the programme – given its strategic nature and Norway's position – would have a positive impact on the peace process itself. An assumption expressed was that Norway would have close interaction with UNDP and that the programme would be redesigned and if need be stopped if the assumptions do not hold.<sup>32</sup>

### **Implementation and Results**

The project documents tell a story of a programme that has largely delivered on its outputs. Experts from the neighbouring have been recruited as planned and deployed at public institutions, mostly working under very difficult and challenging conditions. Twins have been identified and mentored, and numerous new guidelines for improved public administration have been developed. The programme has however, seen numerous delays in implementation. At times both the experts and the UNDP management had to be evacuated. The delays have largely been outside the control of the programme (the political crisis affecting the targeted state institutions) but it has been aggravated by uneven management of the programme. Still, being able to deliver such a demanding programme in the South Sudanese context, is an achievement.<sup>33</sup>

The reviews note a high degree of satisfaction. More than 90% of experts and participating institutions and 80% of the twins respond very positively to UNDP's survey questions. The quantifiable targets – the number of experts and twins – also suggest that implementation targets have been met. This applies also to the number of women participating as experts or twins - although the achievements

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<sup>29</sup> (Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum, 2010a); and (Norwegian Embassy in Juba, 2011c).

<sup>30</sup> (Norad, 2013)

<sup>31</sup> (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014c)

<sup>32</sup> (UNDP, 2019) and interviews with officials at the Embassy, UNDP and South Sudan Ministry of Labour, Public Service and Human Resource Development.

<sup>33</sup> (UNDP, 2015); and UNDP (2013a)

are less than the targets.<sup>34</sup>

However, the results in relation to the objective of strengthening capacities in and improving performance of the participating institutions is far more uneven and overall far less than originally assumed. Several reasons are identified in projects documents. This includes

- (1) Insufficient needs assessments and targeting of institutions. The programme has covered a very large number of institutions at national level and sub-national level – from air traffic control in Juba to teaching English to teachers at a county teacher training facility.
- (2) Insufficient transfer of capacities from experts to institutions. This is partly linked to limited continuity in the deployment. Few institutions participated in more than one round. Furthermore, there was frequent mismatch between the qualifications of twins and experts. The applied both to relevance of expert qualifications and the qualifications of the twins.
- (3) Insufficient transfer of skills with experts often doing gap filling and performing tasks which the host institution does not have the capacity to do.
- (4) Poor sustainability. Many twins may have benefitted but institutional performance is not materialising to the extent expected. This is partly due to poor motivation for the twins. Many, perhaps most do not receive any regular salary with payment delays of often several months. Furthermore, many of the administrative guidelines and policies suggested by the experts to improve performance have simply not yet been adopted by the relevant ministries, cabinet and council of ministries.

## Findings

The interviews in Wau State together with the parallel review by the Sudd Institute of the programme's impact at the national level provide additional basis for a number of findings.<sup>35</sup>

### Effectiveness

The programme has been implemented and delivered on its main commitments. It is considered highly relevant by all, and is aligned both with Norwegian, South Sudanese and IGAD priorities. The results in relation to capacity building of state institutions on the other hand have been limited and highly uneven. The activities have been thinly spread across too many institutions with little attention to building capacity over time. It has not – despite claims to the contrary – managed to make the capacity building strategic. It has attempted to achieve too much with too little.

The four institutions visited in Wau illustrate some of the findings from earlier reviews, but also adds more. The effectiveness has been highly uneven; ranging from zero results for the twins or the participating institution to very successful. In two of the institutions additional funding from other donor funds in the form of top-up salaries or financial incentives for some of the twins helped motivate continued work and sustainability. In one of these the host institutions also took a strong lead in the selection of the recruited experts and helped ensure motivation for all twins from the start. In one case the institution was unaware of the purpose of the arriving expert and few efforts seems to have made to ensure transfer of skills.

### Gender and vulnerable groups

The programme had specific target for female experts and twins (30%). The precise figures for the whole period is not listed in the documents, but the target was not reached (they managed just over half the numbers). The bulk of the females are also found in the health institutions, especially among

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<sup>34</sup> (UNDP, 2013b) An early research assessment (data from 2011 with some supplementary data from 2013) is the much quoted: (Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2013); (Rosén & Tarp, 2012).

<sup>35</sup> (Sudd Institute, 2019) This appraisal also contains a review of the past achievements at national level.



nurses and midwives. The project documents do not really report beyond these numbers and we know little of the impact on polices and performance in relation to gender issues or vulnerable groups. In Wau the participating social workers (twins) working with child welfare and child protection informed us they had benefitted much from twinning and mentoring. The Ministry also reported on improved institutional performance in the area (but this was also linked to subsequent projects implemented by UNICEF and the International Organisation of Migration providing financial incentives for some of the social workers). None of four policy proposals developed with the help of experts in the 2015-17 period have been approved by the Council of Ministers (due to frequent changes of the responsible Minister, the 2015 crisis, and/or inability to submit to Council).

#### Conflict sensitive

The programme was conceptualized as a development program responding to the need for capacity building of the new state institutions. The attention to conflict dynamics and risks were limited in the first project phase. This was also emphasized in Norad's appraisal of the draft programme document for the second phase. The proposed third phase carries a high risk that project implantation may suffer from the political conflict and government objection. The current draft risk mitigation measures are weak.

#### Coherence

Norway is the sole external funder of this programme. It has been relevant and coherent with other Norwegian support for statebuilding, other donor support for peace building and South Sudan government priorities. There is however limited or no direct efforts to learn from other capacity building efforts to South Sudan, such as other Norwegian capacity building support to government departments, or from other donor efforts.

The political crisis, especially since 2016, has reduced the coherence of the programme. The IGAD programme is now one of the very few donor-funded capacity building targeting national government institutions. Other donor agencies working in this area focus on subnational institutions and want to see government commitment to peace agreements and its implementation before they provide direct support to government at central level.

#### Adaptation and results management

The main features of the programme have remained constant in phase 1 and 2. There has been shifts in the selection of institutions with more deployments to subnational institutions in the second phase. Some of the weaknesses identified – such as insufficient needs assessment and poor selection of institutions – have officially been addressed, but this has apparently not led to any improved results. We do not have sufficient data to make any firm statement on the quality of the Norwegian Embassy engagement with UNDP relating to project implementation, but we did note that Embassy officials interviewed emphasis that much more engagement by the Embassy is required in the planned third phase.

#### **Reflections and Lessons Learnt**

The IGAD capacity programme has been an extremely difficult programme to implement. It is difficult to build and consolidate capacity in fragile and conflict-affected states. It is a process – and at times exploratory in nature. It is difficult to achieve tangible results, impact and higher-level outputs to be realized in the short- or medium-term. The programme must get credit for his ability to implement activities and deliver outputs under most difficult conditions. However, there is considerable scope for improving on delivery.

The planned and drastically revised third phase seeks to address key challenges. For this to succeed it not only assumes strong government commitment to the peace process, but also much better targeting and identification of experts and twins (now termed “change agents”). Several persons

interviewed also expressed strong reservation regarding a shift to consultancy payments and the challenge of having South Sudanese experts working side by side with civil servants experiencing severe delays in payments of low salaries.

Such a programme requires much stronger programme management and more direct engagement by the Embassy. Embassy officials interviewed see this a high-risk effort, but also that this is a potentially strategic initiative that can make a difference also in the peace process. Norway's strong position in South Sudan may help make this work, they claim.

## 5.2: ENGAGEMENT 2: OIL FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH SUDAN 2011-2018

### Project Background and Theory of Change

The Norwegian Oil for Development (OfD) Programme, initiated in 2005, contributes to improved petroleum sector management through long-term institutional cooperation with partner countries. The main approach in the Programme is cooperation where Norwegian civil servants provide direct support and advice for the benefit of host country counterparts. NOK 163 million was disbursed through the programme in 2018. That year OfD was active in 14 countries. NOK 42 million was disbursed to eight Norwegian and international NGOs to deliver on the objective of enhancing transparency and accountability in the petroleum sector<sup>36</sup>. Additionally, OfD also has a partnership with the IMF and UNEP.

As described in the main evaluation report, OfD has been a key intervention area for Norway in South Sudan stemming from the importance of the oil in the wealth sharing agreement under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed 2005. Norway started its assistance to the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) as early as 2006. The significance of the OfD programme in the Norwegian portfolio is substantiated through interviews with key civil servants and the political leadership at the time, which emphasized the importance of the OfD, with some stating the it was 'the most important development project' in support of the peace process. See also the theory of change section of the main evaluation report.

Initially, the support was provided to the two administrations to assist with the wealth sharing part of the peace process. This was complemented by still more emphasis on management of the oil revenue and eventually, around the time of independence, support was in particular focused on accountability and transparency around the oil revenue. With the latter focus, OfD also approved an application from NPA for support to awareness raising, training of journalists and a new Oil Workers Union. OfD also supports Global Witness and their work to expose corruption in in the oil sector in the country. Following the outbreak of civil war in December 2013 the programme was scaled down. In July 2016, when conflict once again erupted in Juba, the institutional cooperation with South Sudanese government institutions was put on hold. However, an agreement was reached with the IMF and its Trust Fund for South Sudan providing capacity building on macroeconomic policies and statistics. They provided short-term training in Nairobi and elsewhere. The support for the IMF programme will come to an end in 2019.

Further OfD support to South Sudanese authorities is contingent on political commitment to implementing the peace agreement, and the extent to which the OfD programme possesses the tools needed to support the same peace agreement.<sup>37</sup>

The theory of change for the OfD programme can thus be divided into two mutually supporting work streams:

- 1) If Norad provides assistance for the capacity development of the oil production and sector in the form of assistance to the Ministry of Petroleum and the MOFED aimed at improving the extraction and management of oil and oil revenue; then GoSS will have the needed the capacities to manage the oil in a sustainable and transparent manner; leading to GoSS using the oil to provide for improved services to the people of South Sudan.

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<sup>36</sup> (Norad, 2019b)

<sup>37</sup> See the 2018 Annual Report above and the presentation of the current status of OfD in South Sudan at the programme website - <https://norad.no/en/front/thematic-areas/oil-for-development/where-we-are/south-sudan/>

- 2) If Norway provides funding, through NPA, for capacity development of civil society and media. Then media will investigate the oil sector and civil society will advocate their rights to services and an environmentally sound community to GoSS. Prompting GoSS to enhance its performance and improve the management and use of the oil revenue and the control with oil corporations.

The support is based on a number of assumptions required to make change happen. These include:

- 1) That the partners are receptive to capacity building activities and own the processes
- 2) That they are able to turn the capacity development into institutional changes to enhance effectiveness of the work (be it oil management or journalism and advocacy)
- 3) That the CSOs are able to gain access to dialogue with GoSS
- 4) That GoSS is ready to change and improve its transparency and performance based on OfD induced institutional changes and civil society and media pressure

### **Short Description of Itinerary and Evidence Base**

This annex to the South Sudan evaluation draws on the following pieces of evidence:

- Desk analysis of relevant OfD documents from Norad, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), NPA as well as external resources (see reference list in main evaluation report)
- Interviews with key informants in Norway
- Interviews with present and former government officials in the ministries of finance and petroleum in Juba
- Interviews with NPA staff and civil society partners in Juba
- Interviews with resource persons on Skype and in Juba

The interview methodology used focuses on allowing individuals more time to in greater detail explain what worked well (and what worked less well) to extract lessons learned. So, rather than following a strict interview guide, the discussions focus on change processes and may take unexpected directions in this process.

While this approach provides for a greater in-depth understanding of processes leading to expected results, there are also a number of limitations to the approach. First and foremost, the same strict evidence rule applied in the main evaluation report (three independent sources for each piece of evidence) is here replaced by a story-telling tool which in greater detail reflects on lessons learned, but with less quantitative significance. Secondly, this is not an evaluation of the OfD but serves as a piece of evidence of input to the overall South Sudan evaluation.

Note that the assessment does not include the specific support for Global Witness and the IMF Trust Fund.

### **Findings**

The OfD programme is addressing issues of high relevance to the South Sudan context as confirmed by interviews with multiple stakeholders as well as desk research. First and foremost, wealth sharing was a key element in the CPA. Second, following independence, oil comprised 97-98% of (non-ODA) GoSS revenue<sup>38</sup> further emphasising the importance of an effective and efficient extraction process as

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<sup>38</sup> (Oil for Development, 2014)

well as management of oil revenue.

There is also strong evidence pointing to the fact that at independence there were still major challenges in terms of limited transparency in the management of oil revenue as well as significant capacity challenges.<sup>39</sup> At the local level environmental degradation and health hazards as a consequence of the oil production required action to limit the negative effects on people, livestock and nature in the oil extraction sites.<sup>40</sup> There was thus merit in supporting the GoSS apparatus in its oil management as well as the demand-side aspects of holding the government to account.

Several outputs and outcomes have been achieved with the support of the Norwegian assistance, in particular up until 2013. These include the drafting and passing of key legislation around the oil. Most significant, the Petroleum Act of 2012 and the Petroleum Revenue Act of 2013.<sup>41</sup> There are also some evidence of capacity enhancement having occurred within the Ministry of Petroleum. While there are not capacity assessments as such available showing pre- and post-Norwegian support scenarios, interviewees could point to improvements in capacity in terms of: (i) oil whole sale processes; (ii) calculating oil production and export through the pipeline; and (iii) examples of staff trained who have been promoted through the system or seconded to oil corporations working in South Sudan.<sup>42</sup> The team however, also notes that the bulk of these results quoted were before 2012 as also stated in the latest Review (Norad 2015).

On the demand-side, interviews describe how several outputs and some outcomes have been achieved through the support to NPA. On the media front, several investigations have been carried out concerning the environmental degradation and the effects on this for the local population in the oil fields, as well as articles related to the lack of transparency in the transfer of the 2% and 3% oil revenue to communities and authorities in oil producing states. The awareness raising sessions of local communities around the oil has also, according to interviewees, resulted in community members approaching decision-makers at county as well as national level to demand changes. These efforts feed into other related efforts of other CSOs and advocacy groups<sup>43</sup> and have resulted in the summoning of ministers to parliament to demand explanations and actions on these two fronts.<sup>44</sup>

Prior to end-2012, there were significant outcomes and also contributions to impact of the OfD programme in terms of improved legislation and contribution to an important element of the peace process and peace agreement. 2012 onwards the programme has less significant results to show. The following key events and findings exemplify this:

- Allegedly more than USD 4 billion of oil revenue was lost on the GoSS system prior to and in the years after independence, showing limited transparency in the administration of the oil revenue.<sup>45</sup> Interviewees explain how this process has continued to varying degrees 2012 onwards.
- The 2% and 3% revenue sharing with state and communities continue to be implemented without transparency and with no evidence of the funds benefitting the communities in the oil producing states in contrast to the requirements in the legislation. Furthermore, there is

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<sup>39</sup> Confirmed in interviews with all stakeholders: GoSS; Norwegian MFA; resource persons

<sup>40</sup> (Oil for Development, 2014)

<sup>41</sup> (Norad, 2015a)

<sup>42</sup> (Norad, 2015a) and interviews with current and former staff and ministers from the Ministry of Petroleum and Ministry of Finance. Also (NPA, 2018a)

<sup>43</sup> (Sudd Institute, 2018)

<sup>44</sup> (Francis & Akile, 2019) The latest of such outcomes was evident during the evaluation when the Council of States demanded action by the Minister of Finance on the transfer of oil revenue. <<https://everadio.org/council-of-states-grill-finance-minister-over-2-oil-money/>>

<sup>45</sup> (BBC News, 2012)

lack of evidence of allocation of remaining funding taking place in accordance with the Petroleum Revenue Management Act.<sup>46</sup>

- Journalists continue to document significant environmental problems around oil production in South Sudan.<sup>47</sup>

It should also be acknowledged that the OfD – as other programmes in South Sudan – are impacted by political decisions of GoSS and opposition parties which have resulted in financial crippling of the country as well as the latest rounds of civil war. These include, but are not limited to: the GoSS decision to seize the Heglig oil field in Sudan in March 2012 and the following short armed conflict; the decisions to stop the oil export through Sudan in 2012 after which the oil production never regained the same volume as in 2011; and the eruption of civil war in 2013 and reengagement in the same in 2016.

There were a few other findings from the OfD case study, which serve as evidence for the overall evaluation. These include:

- Policy coherence: The OfD support falls well in line with the overall theory of change of the Norwegian support to South Sudan in the full period evaluated. Until the outbreak of the civil war in 2013, it was also fully aligned with the Norwegian policy emphasis on supporting GoSS statebuilding. Similarly, the termination of the support in 2016 is aligned with the policy and Troika decision of not working directly with TGoNU.
- Conflict sensitivity: The supply-side support to GoSS was at first seen as part of the CPA and a means of conflict reduction in line with the CPA (which it has, arguably, also contributed to). There is however, in interviews and in the documentation limited reflection of the importance of oil and its role in South-South stability and conflict, and how the programme will address this.

The demand-side activities work with CSO and journalist advocacy and confrontation as a means for change. Some interviewees pointed to the fact that lack of political will to change creates frustrations and that peaceful means to change will not work: 'only by taking up arms can we get the money that is ours'. The NPA and partners are aware of these issues and ask people to try to make change happen through peaceful means. However, none of the documentation made available reflects on this risk, or possible mitigating actions.

- Gender: In the two programmes under the OfD there are some aspects of gender included. These first and foremost include ensuring women's representation in awareness raising activities and training, though the actual numbers remain limited. Gender issues are also reflected in the Petroleum act. However, the actual number of women involved and trained remains very limited and there is little evidence to suggest that gender has been a priority in any of the programmes.<sup>48</sup>

## Reflections on Effectiveness and Lessons Learned

The OfD programme has managed to contribute to significant outputs and some outcomes as well in the course of the implementation. Interviewees point to a number of reasons why the programme was

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<sup>46</sup> (Sudd Institute, 2018) and Interviews with interest groups. Also (Oil for Development, 2014)

<sup>47</sup> (Al Jazeera, 2015; Gatluok, 2018)

<sup>48</sup> (Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2014), for the OfD programme it is stated that no activities were undertaken related to gender. In interviews, people quoted 2-5 female participants in training events. Finally, see (Norad, 2015a). Also, (NPA, 2018a) does not report on gender at all.

able to achieve many of its outputs and outcomes, which are aligned with the Norwegian approach to development. These include:

- Ensuring ownership by allowing partners to define processes and outputs through alignment with their policies and objectives.
- Embedding advisers in the Ministry of Petroleum was by several interviewees highlighted as the most effective approach to capacity building allowing for learning by doing. While the outside workshops and trainings were appreciated it was more difficult to point to results stemming from these (this would also in part explain the limited results in the later years, in addition to the conflict context).
- Providing flexibility of the funding allowing for programme design change when the programme was less effective (such as moving from the defunct Oil Task Force to the NGO approach and coalition building under the NPA programme). According to interviewees, Norway was fast in its decision-making process allowing for rapid changes with the context.

However, the OfD programme has had limited success in terms of achieving the overall programme objective. To achieve this objective of environmentally, economically and socially responsible management of the oil eventually would require that GoSS and later TGoNU would be willing to change. Managing resources in accordance with the legislation and acting upon environmental degradation is feasible if the political will is there. However, in spite of more than a decade of capacity development and support the problems and challenges remain in the sector.

There were two assumptions underlying the OfD support to South Sudan at objective level: (i) that the advice and technical support through Government to Government cooperation resulting in improved legislation and capacities would also prompt the Government in South Sudan to act accordingly; and (ii) that pressure from media and communities would pressure the Government in South Sudan to respond to the needs of its people. None of these assumptions were upheld.

Oil remains a main trigger for conflict in South Sudan, and the lack of transparent management and accountability in the oil sector is according to interviewees a key element in this.

### 5.3: ENGAGEMENT 3: NORWEGIAN CHURCH AID PEACEBUILDING PROJECT

#### Portfolio Background and description

Norway's peacebuilding and conflict resolution engagement since South Sudan's independence has been multi-faceted, implemented through multiple channels and at various levels of society. Norway works directly and through Norwegian partners on peace: internationally by supporting UNMISS, IGAD and others, on the national level through for example through support to the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) and on the local level through various Norwegian, international and local NGOs. These various approaches need to be seen in correspondence with each other, however, work on the international level can in practice often be quite removed from the local conflicts. Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) is one of Norway's main partners on peacebuilding.<sup>49</sup> NCA has had a presence in South Sudan since 1971, which means that relationships and local presence are well established.

NCA positions itself on the nexus between development/ humanitarian aid and peacebuilding. The most recent programme strategy focuses on peacebuilding through a national focus, assessing that it has improved peace for 120,000 people. A holistic approach to peacebuilding means that also NCA's Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) programmes are often viewed in conjunction with more traditional peacebuilding on the community level. Working on SGBV, NCA reports a marked drop in reporting of SGBV cases, which they attribute to educational interventions via different channels and the training of community counsellors.

NCA works in peacebuilding through a number of specific pathways towards change: empowerment of women in the peace process and the fight against SGBV, supporting peace structures in churches (including at the national level through the South Sudan Council of Churches) and community-based peace committees. In its most recent country report, NCA reports increased participation of women in peacebuilding, including in local peacebuilding structures.<sup>50</sup>

NCA supported a delegation of the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) to the IGAD talks in 2014. While the peace talks ultimately produced an unsustainable agreement, programme documents highlight the role of the SSCC in maintaining communication channels with communities and keeping people far removed from the Addis talks updated.<sup>51</sup> NCA's own assessment of this initiative is that at the time it 'increased the momentum for peace talks and often helped to break deadlocks and gain some trust to secure progress in the peace talks'.<sup>52</sup> We found this view confirmed in interviews with people working closely with or observing the SSCC at the talks in Addis Ababa. A major factor that is noted both in NCA's programme documents, but also in interviews is that communities trust the churches to seek the best solution for South Sudan. From NCA's point of view, its long-standing association with the churches has been 'an asset in contributing to building space for civil society strengthening'.<sup>53</sup> As per interviewees, NCA is aware that working with churches as civil society partners—while the churches view their mandate as spiritual leadership that is mandated not from society but from divinity—creates a challenge, which most often seems to manifest itself in accountability and management challenges.

#### Funding

NCA's work in South Sudan is mainly funded through Norad and the MFA with minor additional funding

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<sup>49</sup> (Norad, 2017) NCA currently receives one mio USD from Norad for SSCC activities, such as meetings, reconciliation, and dialogue) while EU funding covers the organisational costs of the SSCC (just over 1 mio USD) according to interviewees

<sup>50</sup> (NCA, 2019) Country Results Report South Sudan

<sup>51</sup> (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

<sup>52</sup> (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

<sup>53</sup> (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)



from the EU. The EU funding is mainly for national level support to the South Sudan Council of Churches.<sup>54</sup> Funding for peacebuilding has increased in the current 2016-20 period.

#### Peacebuilding approaches and Theory of Change

NCA champions 'programmatically connectivity' between thematic areas (emergency assistance, development and advocacy) as well as between the levels from *boma* to the international.<sup>55</sup> NCA's approach to peacebuilding is rooted in a holistic conflict analysis that includes livelihood struggles, lack of access to water, corruption, or local boundaries as conflict drivers.<sup>56</sup> Key programme areas in the previous programme period are Community Violence and Small Arm Control; Health; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Women in Governance); and Emergency Preparedness.<sup>57</sup> For 2016-19 this was consolidated into peace building; WASH; reproductive health and gender based violence; and community based teachers training<sup>58</sup>. In addition, there is a humanitarian programme (emergency response).

Thus programming is based on a theory of change that stipulates that a vision of a peaceful South Sudan can be achieved through empowerment, participation in decision-making and ability to claim rights for both individuals and local capacities; through using the churches as a unifying force; and through meeting emergency needs because identified conflict drivers are 'lack of participation, lack of governance structures at local level and lack of access to basic rights, such as health, water, sanitation, hygiene and education and fundamental *root causes* in the form of deeply rooted, historical grievances and traumatic experiences amplified by the recent crisis have been addressed.'<sup>59</sup> Work aims to 'promote harmonious relations amongst citizens through inclusive local and national level peacebuilding structures that serve as neutral forums for the reconciliation process'.<sup>60</sup>

Some of these reconciliation efforts have been very prominent nationally—such as facilitating the peace agreement between David Yau Yau's Cobra Faction and the GoSS in 2014, which NCA identified as 'one of the most destabilizing factors in South Sudan during 2011 -2014'—or internationally, such as the support for the South Sudan Council of Churches.<sup>61</sup> Other engagements in people-to-people peace processes on the local level are less visible, but possibly also less controversial. NCA has also provided emergency assistance, including through WASH programmes which are considered part of peacebuilding, with a reported 155 000 people having gained access to clean water between 2011 and 2014.<sup>62</sup>

Most of the local peacebuilding work in the previous period fell under the headline of 'Community Violence and Small Arms.' The activities captured under the community violence level are diverse and range from vocational training, teacher training, formation of local governance councils at the *boma* level, or community reconciliation committees and savings clubs. The 2016-19 period has a sharper focus and identifies three main areas in the peace building programme: Increased Participation of Women in Peacebuilding; Inclusive gender sensitive peacebuilding structures and mechanisms prevent and transform conflicts at local level; and support to SSCC and member churches in their efforts to contributed to sustainable peace by addressing key drivers of conflict.

#### **Data sources**

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54 (NCA, 2016)

55 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015); (NCA, 2010)

56 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

57 (NCA, 2015b)

58 (NCA, 2019)

59 (NCA, 2016)

60 NCA website

61 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

62 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

This case study relies on the following data:

- NCA programme documents, such as strategic plans covering the time period from 2011 - 2019
- Independent evaluations of NCA projects
- Interviews with a range of individuals and stakeholders, including NCA staff in Juba and in Kuajok, NCA partners, beneficiaries or those with an informed perspective on NCA's work. These were conducted during two trips to South Sudan in May and June 2019, covering Juba, Wau and Kuajok.

This data has limitations: Peacebuilding work is an extraordinarily broad portfolio and even with a perspective that zooms in on a small part of NCA's work, the many aspects of peacebuilding cannot be captured in a few short interviews, nor can an accurate measurement of success. The reports from successful implementation of peacebuilding projects and subsequent decline of community violence are based entirely on reporting by the implementing partner.

#### **Implementation and results: Peacebuilding Work in Gogrial**

NCA has worked in the former Warrap State since the drought of 1998. Today, NCA is conducting local peacebuilding work in Gogrial State, which used to be part of Warrap. Gogrial is an area in which government has been historically absent,<sup>63</sup> although more recent research highlights that local leaders have long had the ability to link to a government that has been primarily experienced as a violent force.<sup>64</sup> It is considered to be one of South Sudan's least developed areas.<sup>65</sup>

Since 2014, NCA has supported Daughters of Mary Immaculate (DMI) in building communities for peaceful coexistence through formation of Peace and Reconciliation Committees (PRCs) and Peace Groups at Boma level. Since 2017, violent conflict between the communities of Anouk and Apuk primarily over grazing has led to loss of lives, displacement and cattle raiding, prompting suspension of NCA activities for a while.<sup>66</sup>

However, in total DMI and NCA through the peacebuilding project supported the formation of 13 PRCs in the former Warrap state with a total of 245 members (51 men and 194 female). The purpose of the PRCs is 'to ensure resolutions are implemented and communities live in harmony and address arising local disputes at their respective Bomas and Villages.'<sup>67</sup>

Peace committee members were trained by DMI in the SSCC Action Plan for Peace (APP), the 'biblical context of peace, Conflict Resolution, National Identity and dialogue, forgiveness and reconciliation, Trauma healing, Role of Culture/intermarriage in peace, mediation and peacebuilding process.'<sup>68</sup> These have been evaluated as having contributed to easing tension and improving humanitarian access.<sup>69</sup> In addition, DMI organises so-called VICOBA groups—Village Community Banks—for women.<sup>70</sup> VICOBA exist in three counties and use financial training to promote peace and leadership for women.<sup>71</sup>

NCA's emergency response programme is in many ways closely linked to its peacebuilding work. WASH programmes—often implemented in response to displacement—<sup>72</sup>are in the eyes of programme staff explicitly part of the peacebuilding approach, as they address tensions between IDPs and host communities. Since December 2013, the emergency response has been broadened to other states.

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63 (Lienhardt, 1982)

64 (Cormack, 2014)

65 (NCA, 2015b)

66 (NCA, 2018a)

67 (NCA, 2018a)

68 (NCA, 2018b)

69 (Norad, 2017)

70 (NCA, 2018b)

71 Focus Group NCA partners Kuajok- 24.6.19

72 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

Within the emergency approach, NCA has continued to pursue a people-focused response, meaning that they use the churches as an entry point to reach remote areas and communities in hiding. In interviews, respondents regularly noted that NCA was the first organisation to respond to crisis situations in Wau and Gogrial States. That this was done through quickly-mobilised local partners is correctly highlighted as an achievement by NCA.<sup>73</sup>

## Findings

### Effectiveness

The local peacebuilding work in Gogrial has been evaluated broadly as effective, however, it has also been noted that this effectiveness is largely measured by achievement of outputs, rather than outcomes.<sup>74</sup> Previous evaluations also noted that due to lack of systematic measurement, genuine insight on the outcome level is currently not possible.<sup>75</sup> However, effects noted are reduced conflict in the targeted areas—reported by both programme staff and the ACLED database—<sup>76</sup> with the PRCs proactively identifying conflict dynamics, seeking to establish clear grazing areas to protect farms and organise sharing of drinking water. Further, it was noted that interaction between different communities has increased.<sup>77</sup> After dialogue in 2013 and 2014, the situation seemed to at first improve, as evaluated in 2015, but deteriorated again, thus work continued.<sup>78</sup> A noted positive side effect of the interventions has been the creation of credible local peace actors and that operating costs have been reduced.<sup>79</sup> DMI considers its peacebuilding work effective since it has opened the boundaries between communities.

While the close collaboration with the SSCC and other church-based groups allows entry into communities, two points of concern were noted: The inability of the SSCC to effectively deliver,<sup>80</sup> and the limitations that come from working only with church-based partners can impede the broad undertaking of peacebuilding.

Programme planning, implementation and accountability comes with challenges as local realities, differing capacities and NCA reporting requirements can collide and create administrative transaction costs and obstacles to implementation.

### Gender and vulnerable groups

NCA prioritises the inclusion of women at various levels in peacebuilding as part of implementing UNSC1325.<sup>81</sup> Much of the peacebuilding activities through the PRCs focuses on including women and shows an impressive participation rate of women, often reaching the aimed-for 30%, women outnumbering men in some of the training provided and in forming peace groups.<sup>82</sup> In practice, however, according to interviewees, DMI's challenge remains that men do not participate as much as women in peace trainings, which points to the difference in measuring outputs and outcomes.

Yet maybe more significantly is how NCA's holistic peacebuilding approach relates to gender. NCA adjusted its gender approach in its peacebuilding programmes based on an evaluation that

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73 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

74 (NCA, 2018a)

75 (NCA, 2015b)

76 ACLED records 17 violent incidents in the Gogrial area in 2017, with 80 fatalities to three incidents in 2018 with 17 fatalities, one of them being disarmament exercise by the police. See Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED).

77 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

78 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

79 (NCA, 2015b)

80 (NCA, 2015b)

81 (NCA, 2016)

82 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

recommended including women's economic empowerment.<sup>83</sup> The VICOBA groups provide a reflective approach to adjusting gender relations as they explicitly seek to find ways to allow men to participate in changing gender roles. According to interviewees, the VICOBA work has empowered women because the effect is seen as positive by men, who now encourage their wives to take part in VICOBA.

Reaching out to vulnerable youth is considered a challenge,<sup>84</sup> with a previous recommendation being to utilise NCA's holistic peacebuilding to emphasise non-violent livelihood options for youth.<sup>85</sup>

#### Conflict sensitivity

Many of NCA's programme documents and evaluations highlight that conflict sensitive approaches are NCA's standard, put in practice by offering sensitization, appropriate selection of meeting participants and venues, and do no harm training.<sup>86</sup>

However, while it is the case that NCA's conflict analysis underpinning its peacebuilding programme considers many of the layers that make South Sudan a conflictual society, conflict sensitivity is deployed solely as an outward-looking concept. While competition for resources is explicitly identified as a driver of conflict and the various types of competitions and resources are clearly spelled out,<sup>87</sup> there is less evidence that NCA considers itself and its intervention as a resource over which specific types of conflict dynamics can also develop.

This might not be unreasonable, considering that recent peacebuilding has occurred in remote areas that have seen little donor money coming in. However, in its engagement with the SSCC, where competition over resources has quite different implications as some of the broader national conflict dynamics are repeated within the churches, consideration of the role of injecting money into these processes might help to redefine relationships. It has also been noted that South Sudan's churches are not conflict-free and apolitical spaces and in some cases can be too ethnically-homogenous to be inclusive.<sup>88</sup> NCA's support to the churches does of course strengthen the churches—or as one respondent said, it 'gives us a good name for the church.' It is thus vital that NCA is clear that the church structures are not inherently non-conflictual. Local partners interviewed, even those that are church-based, view NCA's focus on church-based organisations as limited for peacebuilding as they view peacebuilding not only as a spiritual exercise, but deeply connected to livelihoods.

A similar dilemma occurs when working with authorities. In a programme covering the period 2010 - 2012, conflict sensitive was summed up broadly as a do-no-harm approach; however, there was no consideration that the proposed collaboration with 'relevant authorities' to select areas of intervention was potentially a highly conflictual undertaking.<sup>89</sup> Today, the PRCs continue to work with local authorities to provide security, which requires careful consideration of how this might drive violence.

Improving the integration of conflict sensitive thinking into the full programme cycle, as previously recommended, will only address this challenge to a certain extent.<sup>90</sup> Training also seems to have had a limited impact on how programme staff deployed conflict sensitivity in their work, suggesting that the

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83 (NCA-Act Alliance, 2015)

84 (NCA, 2015b)

85 (NCA, 2019)

86 (NCA, 2018a)

87 (NCA, 2016)

88 (NCA, 2018a)

89 (NCA, 2010)

90 (NCA, 2018a)

emphasis on conflict sensitivity was mainly happening on paper.<sup>91</sup> In conceptualizing its peacework, NCA, according to interviewees, distinguishes between national and local-level peacework, which might be conducive to overlooking the dynamics that link the two.

#### Coherence

Local peacebuilding can easily be viewed in isolation: It is seemingly far removed from broader political developments. A coherence consideration must be, however, to what extent local-level conflicts are connected to national politics and whether there is a danger in supporting different actors at different levels. Thus, while local-level peacebuilding is necessary, a broader tension between local efforts and national level engagement undoubtedly exists. To avoid this, NCA ought to make the best effort to have analysis at hand that clearly links local-level conflict to national-level developments and ways of holding conflict-drivers at the national level accountable.<sup>92</sup> NCA is in a good position to do this, as programme staff at the country level is clearly committed to maintaining links with local implementing partners. It was noted by partners that country representatives come to visit even remote projects and that this shows a genuine commitment to local partners.

#### Adaptation and results management

Peacebuilding programmes have been adapted as the conflict situation changed, both locally and in response to the outbreak of civil war in 2013. NCA highlights that the funding modalities passed to them from Norway are flexible and necessarily so, given the unpredictable context. While this means annual planning with higher transaction costs, on the country-office level this, according to interviewees, is seen as a way to ensure that programming stays relevant and on the implementation level it helps with accounting. What is locally implemented is necessary adapted due to seasonal needs. NCA's flexibility in adapting programmes has been highlighted.<sup>93</sup> Many respondents said that in agreeing to partner support, NCA is a fast and responsive partner: 'With NCA, in a week a problem is solved.' This speedy administration is experienced by beneficiaries as doubly supportive: NCA is credited with being the first organisation to respond to emergencies, paving the way for others, according to interviewees.

However, programme partners found in practice that flexibility is not necessarily a strength of NCA, due to Norway's broader global policies on reporting and a zero-tolerance approach to corruption.<sup>94</sup> The limited flexibility exuded in zero tolerance to corruption and delayed reports is however also a positive learning point. In reality, these global policies from Oslo trickle down to implementing partners in Gogrial in unhelpful ways that do not do justice to an emphasis on locally-owned work. Paperwork needs to be delivered to bigger offices, often without transport access. Even smallest sums need to be receipted (whereas other donors have bulk accounting) and in the very rural areas, few traders can issue invoices that meet NCA standards. NCA's requirement to procure three quotations for every purchase is difficult to put into practice on small items such as drinks for a peace meeting in an area where only one person sells drinks. This leads to a high workload on accounting, which in turn affects programme cycles: Often accounting is delayed by a few months on small technicalities. Since new agreements cannot be issued until accounts are closed, the implementation often starts only once rains have started, cutting short the operational season.

According to interviewees, NCA's work with its partners in South Sudan is much more hands on

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91 (NCA, 2018a)

92 For a similar recommendation, see NCA (2016)

93 (NCA, 2015b)

94 (NCA, 2019)

compared to other countries, particularly on paperwork, provides advances and conducts audits in slightly different ways in South Sudan in which it works. This can be experienced as empowering by some partners and as part of capacity building, while others interviewed find it a strain on their ability to function and note an emphasis on bureaucracy over substantive engagement.

#### Reflections and lessons learnt

NCA's local peacebuilding work in Gogrial works under extremely challenging conditions with dedicated partners and holistic approaches. It faces a number of operational, political, administrative and measurement challenges that emanate from broader Norwegian approaches. There is currently no framework that allows partners to assess these in coherent ways, as the notion of conflict sensitivity is not deployed as a reflective tool on the programming itself. Some of NCA's—or rather Norway's—operational requirements are difficult to match with local realities, decreasing the effectiveness of otherwise flexible and responsive programming. NCA's approach of working with church actors only has limitations in a field such as peacebuilding, where effectiveness is inherently dependent on working with as diverse a set of actors as possible. Focusing on one set of actors only also increases NCA's vulnerability to the shortcomings of these actors. To increase effectiveness, finding a way to address the challenges within the SSCC and broadening the partner base to allow other types of CBOs to work on local peacebuilding might be advisable.<sup>95</sup>

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95 (NCA, 2015b)

## 5.4: ENGAGEMENT 4: NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID FOOD SECURITY ENGAGEMENT - THE BUILDING RESILIENCE OF SMALLHOLDERS AND MARKET ACTORS (BRSMA)

### Project background and theory of change

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) is the largest recipient among the Norwegian NGOs with over NOK 570 million received during the evaluation period. The funding is currently spent on three main programmes; i) civil society strengthening, ii) rural/agricultural development, iii) and emergency relief.<sup>96</sup> NPA has been active in South Sudan since 1986. After the signing of the CPA and independence, NPA worked towards empowering communities and government institutions with socio-economic and infrastructure changes expected to affect land access and ownership, potentially leading to conflicts.<sup>97</sup>

The support included livelihood engagements such as the Smallholder Production and Marketing Project (SPMP). The SPMP was approved in June 2013 and aimed at facilitating farmer groups to increase produce for local markets by building their marketing and business capacities, ensuring improved crop varieties were available, and through credit to small businesses facilitate supply of agricultural inputs and increased purchase of local produce. The project was implemented in 10 counties in three states, including Bor County in Jonglei state.

When the conflict broke out in late 2013, the SPMP continued until mid-2016 when it was replaced by the Building Resilience for Smallholder Production and Market actors. The main differences from the SPMP were an increased focus on seed production and grain banks as well as an addition of school feeding. The BRSMA approach is similar to the SPMP approach with provision of training and small revolving grants to groups and to businesses. Added to the BRSMA compared to the SPMP was increased focus on rebuilding the private sector (for purchase of agricultural produce and provision of agricultural inputs) after the looting in 2013, grain banks, Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) and a school feeding programme. Surprisingly, the BRSMA project documents, however, does not include any references to lessons learned from the SPMP.

The project's theory of change is that increased access to agricultural inputs, including quality seeds and veterinary drugs, will contribute to increased agricultural production. The increased production, including of seeds, will in turn, through the market, be available for consumption or in the case of seeds for production to entire communities. Grain banks will contribute to weather lean seasons with high food prices. School feeding is expected to provide an increased market for producers, and improve education and child nutrition - the latter, although not mentioned in the project documents, will presumably contribute to longer-term resilience in the form of increased human capital.

The BRSMA support is provided to existing groups, e.g. farmers groups, fish trader groups, private business, etc. based on applications. The direct beneficiaries of the BRSMA are end-users such as farmer group members, VSLA members, business owners and school children. The indirect beneficiaries include families of the direct beneficiaries, members of the County Technical Committee (CTC) (local government representatives), and the wider community benefitting from increased supply of agricultural inputs and food and seeds at the market.

The BRSMA use state and county extension workers for the training of groups in e.g. financial management, approval of applications (in the CTC), which has complicated matters in some states where trained govt staff has been replaced or been moved to newly created states. In Bor, there has only been minimal replacement of counterparts. Implementation in Bor can, however, by logistical challenging during the rainy season and insecurity continue to require caution when traveling.

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<sup>96</sup> See NPA's official website at <[www.npaid.org/Our-Work/Development-Cooperation/Where-we-work/Development-cooperation-in-South-Sudan](http://www.npaid.org/Our-Work/Development-Cooperation/Where-we-work/Development-cooperation-in-South-Sudan)>  
<sup>97</sup> (NPA, 2018b)

The BRSMA is funded through regional one-year transitional GAP funds from the MFA, and phase III has just ended. The next phase of the project has not yet been funded and NPA has had to lay off some staff and transfer others to other locations and to other projects.

### **Short description of itinerary and evidence base**

The evaluation had access to project documents, including applications, decision documents and progress reports. Also accessed was a 2018 review of the BRSMA and three other NPA projects. The documents were reviewed as background to the field mission.

In order to gain a better understanding of the BRSMA project and its results, the evaluation held interviews in Juba with the NPA Senior Project Officer and travelled to Bor for meetings with the NPA Project Officer responsible for the BRSMA project, government authorities, and end-beneficiaries, including members of VSLAs, farmer/fishing groups, business and government officials. Two full days, from June 19 to June 21, were spent in Bor.

Both the NPA Senior Project Officer and the Project Officer have been working with NPA for more than 10 years, thus had a good knowledge of the history of the BRSMA project.

Due to security concerns and time constraints the evaluation team was only able to visit beneficiary groups located in the vicinity of Bor town. This also meant that the evaluation team did not engage with the pastoralist component. Due to the proximity to Bor, the groups visited might have received additional attention from extension workers and is located closer to the main market in Bor, facilitating both purchase of inputs and sale of produce, thus potentially making them more successful than groups located further away from Bor.

### **Findings**

In line with progress reports, all interviewees in Juba and Bor, including beneficiaries, representatives of local authorities and NPA staff, were satisfied with the results of the project. Reports and interviews show a very positive picture of the achievements with multiplication of agricultural outputs, improved access to inputs, access to credit, etc. For more on some of the results as evidenced by interviews and progress reports, please refer to box 1 on the next page.

The project is found to have overall successfully improved food security in Bor through improved agricultural production via improved agricultural practices, better access to markets and credit. Providing that there are no new displacements, looting, or replacement of county staff, the results of the projects are likely to be sustained also without future NPA support.

The above echoes the findings from the 2018 external review that found the project was highly relevant although implementation was slower than planned.<sup>98</sup> The review also notes that results have been achieved, although the extent to which this has translated into longer-term resilience can not be ascertained.

The decision documents for the BRSMA project show that the embassy has followed the project closely, including held meetings with NPA on follow-up to the 2018 review. A follow-up plan on the recommendations of the review has been developed and relevant action is being taken.

As indicated above, gender issues have been an integrated part of the project with women in some locations constituting a majority of beneficiaries. During the field mission women's only (almost)

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<sup>98</sup> (NPA, 2018b)



groups such as a widow's farmer group, a women dry fish group and a youth mama group were met. The BRSMA result framework includes many gender disaggregated indicators although more indicators could have been gender disaggregated. The project documents, as also noted by the 2018 review and the 2018 Decision Document, do not reflect on gender issues or makes reference to resolution 1325.

Women often belong to some of the most vulnerable groups in South Sudan, and support to e.g. widows' groups as provided in the BRSMA project is highly relevant. Furthermore, the women interviewed during the field mission all praised to empowerment achieved by being a member of a group and the stronger voice they have when in a group. The fact that a criterion for participation in the BRSMA project is that the group are pre-existing, however, undoubtedly leaves out the more vulnerable segments of the population. On the other hand, ensuring sufficient agricultural production to increase resilience of entire communities might require a focus on beneficiaries/groups with existing skills.

Box 1: Findings from field mission on progress reports

- Group members interviewed stated that their financial management skills had improved.
- VLSA loans used to pay school fees, health bills, agricultural inputs, purchase of goats and chicken for breeding, repair of car used for transport of goods.
- Learned new agricultural skills such as spacing and row planting.
- Increased agricultural production, according to progress reports yields were up to a factor four higher than average outputs (note that this might be misrepresentative of the actual result of the project as the groups possibly to begin with were better at agriculture than the average farmer).
- Funding of groups is more efficient in groups as could have joint fences for larger areas of cultivated land, renting of tractors for cultivation, stronger position when negotiating prices.
- Profit from groups invested in future production, e.g. two instances of purchase of tractor for own use and renting out to other farmers, a fishing group planning to purchase a boat for expanding business, expansion of cultivated land, purchase of grinding mill.
- Import of veterinary drugs has been facilitated after everything was looted in 2013.
- Local varieties of seeds and other agricultural inputs are more readily available. Availability of credit to sellers is necessary as NGOs and UN agencies sometimes pay late.
- Joint responsibility towards group members who e.g. falls sick.
- Empowerment of people by being in a group, including women, people in groups has a bigger voice: "*if one person is crying, nobody listen, but if you cry as a a group they will hear you*", female member of Youth Mama Group, a farmers group.
- The project is being replicated by non-beneficiaries (anecdotal evidence only).
- Skills learned by country extension workers, group members and business owners will remain also if NPA support ceases.

There are no reflections on conflicts that might arise as a result of the BRSMA. Although the evaluation team probed if there was some kind of jealousy expressed by non-participants, nobody reported on this. There is a risk that BRSMA beneficiaries will gain an unfair advantage over others, e.g. provision of free credit to dealers of drugs and seeds might be perceived as unjustifiable to non-participants. Reflections on potential conflicts if VSLA members default on repayment of loans are also absent. Given that the judicial system in South Sudan is very rudimentary, some reflections on how to handle such cases would be beneficial.

The BRSMA project is well aligned with the expressed Norwegian wish to support improved food security in South Sudan. Norway is the sole funder of the BRSM, and the project will be useful to learn

lessons from if future scaling-up becomes possible, and if future more close engagement with local or national authorities become feasible. Given the good performance of the BRSMA it could possibly be used as a model for other large-scale recovery projects currently underway in South Sudan.

Given that the BRSMA is aiming at building resilience, which takes time, this evaluation finds that one-year funding is insufficient and produces uncertainty among beneficiaries and NPA staff. The staff that has been laid off might not return even if new funding is made available; and with the staff gone valuable experiences have also been lost.

### **Reflections on Effectiveness and Lessons Learned**

The resilience/food security project implemented by NPA in Bor has been very effective in increasing incomes for farmers, traders and others, contributing to increased food security for not only direct beneficiaries but also indirect beneficiaries and the larger community. It has assisted in promoting production and sale of local seeds and other agricultural inputs, including veterinary drugs. The project on many accounts also appears to be sustainable insofar it cooperates closely with relevant local authorities, including assist in developing their capacity. The focus on groups rather than individuals is more efficient and empowers group members, including groups.

There is limited attention to gender issues, and conflict concerns are not clearly spelt out. The project is a good example of a project that takes a developmental approach in a fragile and uncertain context, building on what is possible, one small step at a time.

## **ANNEX 6: INDICATORS FOR SOUTH SUDAN**

## Blind Sides and Soft Spots: An Evaluation of Norway's Aid Engagement in South Sudan

Key indicators	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
HDI	0,436	-	-	-	-	0,413	0,416	0,388	0,392	0,397	0,399	0,394	0,388	-
GDP total (\$ billions)	26,524	35,822	45,898	15,550	12,231	15,727	17,826	10,368	13,257	13,282	12,374	3,070	-	-
GDP per capita (\$)	2.450,74	2.702,90	3.011,10	3.786,91	3.830,45	3.930,56	3.701,00	1.976,87	2.222,63	2.296,77	2.039,75	1.811,68	-	-
<b>Health:</b>														
Life expectancy at birth	51,2	51,6	52,1	52,6	53,1	53,7	54,2	54,8	55,3	55,8	56,3	56,8	56,8	57,3
Maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 100,000 live births)	450	-	-	750	-	730	-	-	730	-	789	-	556	-
Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women aged 15-19)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75,3	75,3	65,9	-	-	-
HIV prevalence in adult (% age 15-49)	1,6	-	1,4	1,8	1,8	-	-	2,7	2,2	-	2,5	2,7	-	-
<b>Education:</b>														
Expected years of schooling	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,4	4,5	-	7,6	4,9	-	4,9	-
Literacy Rate (aged 15 and older) in %	60,9	60,9	60,9	69,3	70,2	71,1	-	-	-	-	31,9	26,8	-	-
Pupil-teacher ratio, primary school	-	-	-	-	-	50	50	47	47	47	47	47	47	-
Out-of-school children	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.011.581	-	-	-	1.297.786	-	-	-
Out-of-school children (female)	-	-	-	-	-	-	559.104	-	-	-	682.632	-	-	-
Out-of-school children (male)	-	-	-	-	-	-	452.477	-	-	-	615.154	-	-	-
Out-of-school adolescents	-	-	-	-	-	-	259.635	-	-	-	348.687	-	-	-
Out-of-school adolescents (female)	-	-	-	-	-	-	153.606	-	-	-	190.728	-	-	-
Out-of-school adolescents (male)	-	-	-	-	-	-	106.029	-	-	-	157.959	-	-	-
<b>Primary Education</b>														
Gross enrollment ration (%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	84,76	-	-	-	66,59	-	-	-
Gross enrollment ration for female (%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	67,4	-	-	-	55,1	-	-	-
Gross enrollment ration for male (%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	101,76	-	-	-	77,8	-	-	-
<b>Poverty:</b>														
Population Below National Poverty Line (%)	-	-	-	-	50,6	-	-	50,1	50,6	55,1	65,6	82,3	-	-
People live under \$1.90 a day (%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42,7	42,7	-	-
<b>Food insecure people (thousands)</b>														
	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.138	1.604	2.165	3.925	4.335	6.040	6.062
<b>Gender:</b>														
Gender Development Index / GDI	0,502	-	0,516	0,708	-	-	0,611	0,604	-	-	-	-	0,826	-
Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)	16,4	-	17	16,8	-	-	24,2	24,1	24,3	24,3	24,3	-	26,6	-
Labor force participation rate (female) % aged 15 and older	-	-	-	-	30,8	-	30,9	-	-	-	71,2	-	72,2	-
Labor force participation rate (male) % aged 15 and older	-	-	-	-	73,9	-	76,5	-	-	-	75,3	-	73,9	-
<b>Human security:</b>														
Displaced People (thousands)	-	-	-	-	-	-	560	345	331	2.158	2.568	3.284	4.329	4.152
Internally Displaced Persons (thousands)	-	-	-	-	-	-	560	345	331	1.645	1.790	1.853	1.903	1.878
Refugees from SS (thousands)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	513	778	1.431	2.426	2.274
<b>Supplementary indicators:</b>														
Education quality (% satisfied)	-	58	58	58	58	-	43	-	-	33	33	-	34	-
Health care quality (% satisfied)	-	50	48	48	48	-	-	-	-	21	21	-	24	-
Standard of living (% satisfied)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	25	-	22	-
Trust in national government	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	45	-	46	-
Freedom Rating (1= best, 7 = worst)	7	-	7	7	7	7	7	5,5	5,5	6	6,5	6,5	7	7
Corruption Perceptions Index (0=less corrupt, 100=more corrupt)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	11	12	13

NOTE:

\* blue: using data from Sudan

\* pink: using data from South Sudan

## ANNEX 7: DEFINITIONS

<b>Term</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Assumption	An expected precondition necessary for realizing the theory of change of a development engagement
Attribution	It represents the extent to which observed development effects can be attributed to a specific intervention or to the performance of one or more partner taking account of other interventions
Baseline	An analysis describing the situation prior to an intervention, against which progress can be assessed or comparisons made
Beneficiaries	The individuals, groups, or organisations, whether targeted or not, that benefit, directly or indirectly, from the intervention
Coherence	The need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency
Coordination	Horizontal coordination of development goals, funds and policy dialogue among development partners
Development Partner	Bilateral or multilateral institution providing development and/or humanitarian funding to a developing country
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, organisation, time, etc.) are converted to results
Engagement	A project, programme, or a clearly defined activity (including a policy dialogue process) funded by a development partner. Synonymous with intervention

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Evaluability	Extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion
Finding	Triangulated evidence (see main report) which allow for a factual statement
Impact	Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended
Indicator	Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes connected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a development actor
Input	The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention
Lessons learned	Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations
Monitoring	A continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds
Most Significant Change	A method for collection of significant change stories emanating from the field level, and the systematic selection of the most important of these
Objective	Intended impact contributing to physical, financial, institutional, social, peace-related, environmental, or other benefits to a society, community, or group of people via one or more interventions
Outcome	The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs. Note: an implementer is not fully in control of the outcome, yet accountable in terms of ensuring effectiveness of the engagement in meeting the said outcome
Output	The products, capital goods and services which result from an intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes. Note: an implementer is fully in control of and accountable for an output

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Partner	The individuals and/or organisations that collaborate to achieve mutually agreed objectives. Note: partners may include governments, civil society, non-governmental organisations, universities, professional and business associations, multilateral organisations, private companies, etc.
Performance	The degree to which a development intervention or a development partner operates according to specific criteria/standards/guidelines or achieves results in accordance with stated goals or plans
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirement, country needs, global priorities and partners' and donors' policies
Result	The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or negative) of a development intervention
Result-Based Management	A management strategy and application focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts
Stakeholder	Agencies, organisations, groups or individuals who have a direct or indirect interest in the development intervention or its evaluation
Sustainability	The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development assistance has been completed. The probability of continued long-term benefits. The resilience to risk of the net benefit flows over time
Theory of Change	A comprehensive description and illustration of how and why a desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It illustrates the causality between the inputs provided and the objectives sought and the assumptions underpinning this expected causality
Triangulation	The use of three or more theories, independent sources, or types of information, or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment