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Photo: Liv Rahnebak Bjergene

Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education: **Madagascar Case Study**

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Development Portfolio Management Group

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This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of Norad's Evaluation Department.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFD	Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency)
BE	Basic Education
CPD	Country Program Document
CPRS	Contrat Programme de Réussite Scolaire (School Success Contract Programme)
DPMG	Development Portfolio Management Group
ECE	Early Childhood Education
EFA	Education for All
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESP	Education Sector Plan
FPE	Fiche Primaire d'Enquête (Primary Survey Form)
FRAM	Fikambanan'ny Ray Aman-drenin'ny Mpianatra (Parents' Association)
FTI	Fast-Track Initiative
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLPE	Groupement Local de Partenaires pour l'Education (Association of Local Education Partners)
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
IR	Intermediate Result
LEG	Local Education Group
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEN	Ministère de l'Education Nationale (Ministry of National Education)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
PASEC	Program on the Analysis of Education Systems
PCRs	Program Component Results
TFP	Technical and Financial Partners
TPP	Tri-Annual Performance Plan
UAT	Unité d'Appui Technique (Technical Support Unit)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund

Executive Summary

Purpose and methodology

1. The Madagascar case study is one of four case studies conducted for the Evaluation of Norway's Support to Basic Education through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) from 2009 through 2013, the other three being Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nepal. The two main questions for the Evaluation are these: 1) what are the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the basic education initiatives that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds indirectly through two agents, GPE and UNICEF; and, 2) what is the value-added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for its investments.

2. Two causal pathways are used to assess these questions: the research team's theory of change that can be expected to improve three goals of interest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (learning outcomes, gender equality, and equity) and the processes and quality assurance mechanisms that increase the probabilities of good aid management of the project/program cycle.

3. Each case study is based on multiple sources of evidence: interviews with relevant staff at UNICEF's headquarters in New York, GPE's Secretariat, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Norad; analysis of the financial management of UNICEF, GPE, and partner country government education programs and budgets; desk reviews of multiple documents prior to the field work; and extensive fieldwork in each country. The fieldwork complemented and deepened the desk reviews of documents for each case. It involved interviews of outside observers and all parties that affected the GPE and UNICEF programs, such as members of the Local Education Group, supervising or managing entities for GPE programs, UNICEF staff, and Ministry of Education leaders and technical staff.

4. The methodology has certain limits. Educational outcomes cannot be directly or solely attributed to Government or donor-sponsored programs--events such as economic trends and natural disasters also affect outcomes. Each case study thus assesses the contextual variables (enabling conditions) in the theory of change that can affect outcomes, such as economic and political events, population growth, and governance. For example, the Madagascar case covers a period of a military coup and severe economic downturn, forcing programs from development objectives to ones of maintenance and damage limitation. Each case uses process tracing, a method of checking whether the intervening steps in the theory of change were realized, to strengthen attribution of outcomes. This helps establish whether inputs and outputs were related to outcomes through the processes outlined in the theory of change. However, unlike statistical and experimental methods, process tracing cannot estimate the magnitude of the effects of each variable in the theory of change or of each enabling condition.

5. A second limitation is that the cases selected for study are not necessarily representative of the population of developing countries that received aid. Indeed, the case studies and desk studies were purposively sampled to include fragile states that pose difficult challenges for successful aid to basic education. Broad generalizations therefore cannot be made directly from any one case to the population of developing countries. It is possible, however, to make narrower, contingent generalizations from one or a few cases to subsets of cases that share key similarities. The challenges common to the several fragile states in the sample, for example, are more likely to be shared by other fragile states than by developing countries generally.

6. The case studies and desk studies are also constrained by the limitations of the available data. The programs being evaluated often tracked inputs and outputs, but they did not always have clear results frameworks, nor did they consistently measure baselines and outcomes.

Findings

7. The four basic education programs evaluated were the GPE grant (2010-2013, including a one year no-cost extension), with UNICEF as the managing entity for the grant; UNICEF's core program; and

two programs of bilateral aid from Norway to UNICEF: Ensuring the Right to Quality Education for All Children in Madagascar (2008-2011) and Minimizing the Impact of the Political Crisis on Education in Madagascar (2009-2010).

Theory of change

8. Enabling conditions. Prior to the coup, the sector had achieved or was committed to achieving most of the system and sector conditions that enable better learning outcomes, gender equality, and equity. After the coup and for the period of this evaluation, with some notable exceptions, these conditions were absent or seriously compromised for Madagascar.

9. Relevance and outcomes. The outcomes of interest were the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of Norwegian aid to basic education through UNICEF and GPE, focusing particularly on the achievement of Norway's policy objectives of the quality of learning, gender equality and equity.

10. The objectives and activities of all programs were **relevant** to the *country*, pre-coup and post-coup. However, pursuing UNICEF's grant from Norway, "Minimizing the Impact", during the coup was, in the event, unrealistic. UNICEF learned which activities lacked political support after the coup early in the case of the GPE program it was managing, its own core program, and the "Ensuring Rights" program. Thus, it is puzzling that UNICEF and Norway pursued a program during the coup that the parties might have anticipated would encounter a lack of political support (teacher training, competency-based curriculum, school manuals tied to the new curriculum).

11. For each of the four programs, Table A shows if the program had any intervention that could be related to the **outcomes** sought by Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (improved learning outcomes, improved gender equality, and improved equity). Income levels and residence (urban versus rural and food insecure regions) create significant education inequities. Gender inequalities, although they exist--sometimes to the disadvantage of boys, are muted.

Table A: Did education program include activities possibly related to Ministry of Foreign Affairs outcomes?

Basic education program	Inclusion of activities possibly connected to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' outcomes		
	Improved learning outcomes	Improved gender equality	Improved equity
GPE grant	✓		✓
UNICEF core program	✓	✓ (post-primary)	✓
UNICEF Norway "Ensuring Rights" program	✓	✓ (big sister)	✓
UNICEF Norway "Minimizing impact" program	✓		

12. All four programs included, with UNICEF's grant from Norway, "Minimizing the Impact", concentrating on, activities related to improving the quality of teaching (teacher training and competency-based curriculum). However, these activities, although completed in some cases, struggled or failed because of the political environment. The redesigned programs thus focused primarily and appropriately on limiting the damage to access to and retention in school. Access and retention are not outcomes specified by Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but are obviously necessary conditions for progress on its priorities. The redesigned programs pursued activities that reduced the educational costs for parents in vulnerable regions (e.g., school feeding, school kits for children), decreased the distances to and physical attractiveness of school (construction of classrooms, schools, sanitary facilities, and access to potable water), and helped keep teachers and schools afloat financially through paying teacher subventions for a third of the year and Local Catalytic Funds to schools.

13. It is hard to believe that these programs did not positively affect the access and retention of beneficiaries to school. *However, we do not know what outcomes were achieved for any of these programs relative to baselines at the time of the coup or relative to outcomes during the coup for regions or groups not receiving the interventions.* None of the programs had a well-defined causal path from activities to outputs to outcomes, although a plausible link could be made between those activities targeted on access and the access objectives sought. None had outcome indicators or baselines, and none measured whether and to what degree the outputs of activities affected outcomes. For example, targets for several programs were the number of teachers trained. However, a major independent assessment of training financed by the World Bank found that completing a training program was a poor predictor of the improved workplace performance sought, with teacher training programs notable for their failure rates. Counting the number of teachers trained may have nothing to do with better teaching performance.

14. **Unintended consequences.** The field team assessed whether providing aid had any of six unintended consequences and found two possibilities: 1) incentives for government to divert spending away from basic education to other budget areas, and 2) aid programs becoming a political weapon or source of tension among competing factions in the government or different regions or ethnic groups. The share of the education budget going to basic education steadily eroded from 64% in 2010 to 44% in 2013. These data are consistent with government diverting spending away from basic education to other budget areas, but the relationship is associational only. It is not known if in fact the availability of aid for basic education *caused* government to reduce the budget for this sub-sector.

15. In terms of aid programs becoming a political weapon or source of tension, some politicians apparently tried (unsuccessfully) to use the aid programs to portray Government in a positive light--for example, distributing school kits just before the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. The distribution of aid to basic education and to vulnerable zones generated negative reactions among champions of other educational sub-sectors (junior high schools, high schools, and vocational education) and the residents in other zones, especially among the natives of the highlands.

Theory of good aid management

16. The aid management performance of the GPE Board and Secretariat falls somewhere between moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. The GPE Board took calculated risks in making three tranches of aid available to Madagascar during the crisis. It knew the outputs of its aid, the Board and the donors could not judge whether the effects of these outputs on the outcomes sought warranted the risks, although, the outputs achieved almost certainly increased enrolment and retention rates in basic education in the vulnerable areas targeted beyond what they would have been in the absence of aid. The GPE Secretariat broke new ground in creating the role of "managing entity" when donors could not work directly with Government. However, both the Secretariat and the Board, which released funding on the basis of UNICEF's *Action Plan*, failed to assure the quality of that Plan, at least in terms of a simple results framework that could guide corrective action during implementation and yield even rough conclusions about the effects of the aid.

17. The performance of the Technical and Financial Partners, a subset of the full LEG, Groupement Local de Partenaires pour l'Education (GLPE), seems to have been moderately satisfactory. That of the GLPE was unsatisfactory.

18. As managing entity for the GPE program, UNICEF did many things right in a very difficult environment and under a new role for GPE and UNICEF: that of managing entity. Its performance is judged to have been satisfactory with one caveat. It balanced the risks associated with moving quickly under emergency conditions with careful and intensified supervision later in the operation. It conducted post-reviews, audits and other measures.

19. However, the GPE-funded basic education aid program in Madagascar during the coup period was overshadowed by an activity-driven design and reporting, leaving all parties flying somewhat blind in terms of the effects of these activities on the outcomes sought and unable to judge during implementation if the aid should be restructured in some way to improve its performance. At the end of the aid program, donors

had learned some important lessons, but not about the limits to or opportunities for affecting outcomes under fragile state conditions. This failing diminished the quality of the aid management.

20. It is recognized that the accountabilities for emergency operations such as this one are complicated. GPE noted that they operated in a context of continuous deadlines for a political resolution being set by negotiators. Thus, in the first two years a potential political solution was always just months away, leaving GPE and UNICEF believing that they were engaged in short-term emergency measures. In line with good practice for emergency projects, the indicators for the development objectives of such projects can legitimately consist of *output* indicators that are based on simplicity, achievability, and measurability and are directly attributable to the project's activities. However, this approach requires a good logic model with very tight and empirically-based links between activities, outputs, and the outcomes sought. If the outputs occur for the intended beneficiaries, it is then reasonable, although hardly definitive, to infer positive effects on the outcomes sought...

21. As the manager of these programs, UNICEF is directly accountable for this design and implementation flaw. *However, the GPE Board, Secretariat, and the Madagascar LEG are complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of these projects.*

22. UNICEF's management of its own program and those funded by Norway was moderately unsatisfactory. Although educationally relevant, one of the Norwegian-funded programs was rendered irrelevant by the country's political circumstances. All three programs were analytically weak. They failed to specify causal paths between activities and the outcomes sought and had weak internal systems for monitoring and evaluation. Their designs and results matrixes relied on the fulfillment of large numbers of quantitative activity targets, making these the primary "drivers" of the programs. Activities and outputs could not be related to the outcomes and impacts sought. In this case *Norway was complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of these projects.*

Financing

23. The most recent public expenditure and financial accountability assessment for Madagascar indicated a general deterioration in the public financial management system between 2008 and 2013 that affected the financing and delivery of basic education.

24. Madagascar averaged high annual variations in actual expenditures versus budgeted amounts. Although the variance had decreased by 2013 (87%), in 2010 and 2011 education expenditures were only 77% of the amounts initially budgeted. Such variances can stem from late delivery of funding that prevents sub-national units from being able to procure goods and services during the fiscal year or mid-term reallocation of money from the education sector to other sectors. Variances this high make it difficult for government agencies to plan and implement effectively.

25. The education sector received a decreasing share of GDP (3.2% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2013) and the same share of the national budget (22.6%). Since the national budget pie was shrinking over this time period, the same share of a smaller pie is less. The high levels of variance between the budget and actual spending levels only compounded a smaller share.

26. Trends in the share of the education budget going to basic education are alarming. They are consistent with Government's substituting GPE and UNICEF contributions for Government fiscal effort. The share for this sub-sector has declined steadily since 2010, representing 50% of the amount budgeted for the entire sector in 2012 and declining further to 44% of the sector's total budget in 2013. Since these figures refer to the planned budget, not the actual expenditures, the picture for the funding actually available to education entities for basic education is even worse.

Lessons learned

27. The GPE program and UNICEF's programs yielded a number of lessons for funding and managing aid in Madagascar. These may have broader implications, especially for countries whose fragile conditions stem from power struggles. However, each country in a fragile condition presents different obstacles and opportunities. A country devastated by a natural event, such as an earthquake, is entirely different from one engulfed in power fights.

- **Think a theory of maintenance or damage limitation, not development.** The design of projects or programs in fragile states will often have to be based on a theory of maintenance, damage limitation, or recovery, not the usual development perspective appropriate to stable situations.
- **Always think through the causal pathways.** Country fragility tends to be associated with emergencies. However, project designs in these conditions still need carefully thought through causal chains from activities to the maintenance or damage-limiting outcomes sought. They still need indicators, and arrangements to measure progress toward outcomes. The lack of these frameworks (and their use) results in sub-optimal implementation and inadequate accountability for the effective use of resources.
- **Stay flexible.** Flexibility in means and sometimes in ends is necessary to operate effectively in fragile conditions. However, especially when ends must change, the theory that links activities to outputs to outcomes must be revised, as well as its associated indicators and measurement arrangements. All changes need to be clearly documented.
- **Be alert to substitution effects.** The financial data for the sector (table 4) show steady erosion in the share of the education budget going to basic education: from 64% in 2010 to 44% in 2013. These trends are consistent with Government's substituting GPE and UNICEF contributions to basic education for Government's fiscal effort in the sub-sector, although this relationship is associational only, not causal. Donor aid can be made contingent on Government's maintaining its fiscal effort.
- **Keep it simple.** The onset of the political crisis in 2009 put acute pressure on the education system. Basic needs became the top priority, as evidenced by the fact that programs moved from a development focus to a "system survival" approach. The design of aid thus needed to become simpler and to focus on key necessities such as teacher payments, school grants and school feeding, and the distribution of school kits. It should omit more complex issues such as curriculum development.
- **Keep it as apolitical as possible.** Partly because the external players did not anticipate (and could not have anticipated) years, instead of months, of political instability, UNICEF, EFA, and the partners tried to keep the pre-coup Education Reform alive. The coup leadership did not support the paradigm shift embedded in the Reform. In the absence of strong political support, substantial progress on elements of the Reform was unlikely and in fact did not materialize.
- **Minimize the use of parallel systems.** Parallel systems disempower and discredit the Government and reduce the accountability of the systems and the personnel in place. If working through the central Government is not an option for political or other reasons, delivering the aid as directly to beneficiaries as possible minimizes the creation of centralized systems with powerful interests in sustaining their new role. Interests will be created even when delivering the aid as directly to beneficiaries as possible, but if direct delivery is working well, it is more efficient and should become a permanent delivery system.
- **Political choices by donor nations can complicate support to fragile states.** Withdrawing aid or not channeling it through the central government is one of the few levers available to donor Governments for expressing their condemnation of illicit coups. These are policy decisions that can only be made in the capitols of donor countries. However, Agence Française pour le Développement (AFD) continued to finance their aid through a special account in the National Treasury, managed by the Ministry of Finance and transferred to the account of the MEN. AFD

also continued to deliver their aid through MEN's Directorate General of Basic Education, Training and Literacy. The effectiveness and relevance of that aid is unknown, although financial audits of AFD's aid did not indicate financial irregularities. The AFD case shows that financing and implementing outside of the central government is a political choice and that it complicates aid delivery.

- **Carpe Diem--seize the day.** Crises can force the use of innovative ways to keep the system running that can reveal previously unrecognized capacities, build new capacities, and reveal significantly more efficient ways to get things done than had been previously used. When successful, these innovations can become institutionalized post-crisis. For example, UNICEF transferred the GPE share of school grants directly to the public primary schools, shortening the implementation chain and increasing the timeliness of fund transfers.
- **High turnover rates in the sector make efforts to develop capacities at worst fruitless and at best demanding of creative and situation-specific solutions.** UNICEF and the partners needed to develop capacities within the sector, but faced damaging turnover at every level of the system--from the top leadership of the MEN down to sub-national units. Good staff left, not to be replaced or replaced with ones of lesser competence, and units were politicized. Efforts to develop needed capacities at local levels floundered because without clear political directives from the central level, many regional and local level actors were hesitant to initiate or maintain activities.
- **Use education aid strategically.** Aside from the financing provided by UNICEF and GPE, these grants can be used strategically to prevent the donors from fragmenting and to constrain damaging actions by Government.

Conclusions

28. The first question asked of this evaluation was to identify the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the basic education initiatives that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds indirectly through GPE and UNICEF. All programs, as initially designed or redesigned, were relevant directly or indirectly to Norway's objectives and to children's learning needs, but not necessarily to the priorities of the coup government.

29. All programs reported on outputs. The second Norwegian bilateral aid managed by UNICEF ("Minimizing Impact") tried to pursue the reform in place prior to the coup and was least successful in achieving its output objectives because of political opposition. None of the programs reported on outcomes. It is hard to believe that at least three of the four programs did not positively affect the access and retention of beneficiaries to school. *However, we do not know what outcomes were achieved for any of these programs relative to baselines at the time of the coup or relative to outcomes during the coup for regions or groups not receiving the interventions.* None of the programs had a well-defined causal path from activities to outputs to outcomes, although a plausible link could be made between those activities targeted on access and the access objectives sought.

30. The second question asked of the evaluation was the value-added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for its investments. For GPE the value-added was mixed. The aid management performance of the GPE Board and Secretariat falls somewhere between moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. The performance of the Technical and Financial Partners, a subset of the full Local Education Group, Groupement Local de Partenaires pour l'Education, seems to have been moderately satisfactory, but that of the full LEG unsatisfactory.

31. As managing entity for the GPE program, UNICEF did many things right in a very difficult environment and in a new role for UNICEF and for GPE: as managing entity. Its performance is judged to have been satisfactory with one caveat. Its activity-driven design and reporting left all parties flying somewhat blind in terms of the effects of these activities on the outcomes sought and unable to judge during implementation if the aid should be restructured in some way to improve its performance.

32. UNICEF's management of its own program and those funded by Norway was moderately unsatisfactory. The relevance of one of the Norwegian-funded programs, given Madagascar's political situation, was questionable. All three programs were analytically weak. They failed to specify causal paths between activities and the outcomes sought and had weak internal systems for monitoring and evaluation. Their designs and results matrixes relied on the fulfillment of large numbers of quantitative activity targets, making these the primary "drivers" of the programs. Activities and outputs could not be related to the outcomes and impacts sought. In this case *Norway was complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of these projects.* .

Recommendations


- 1) No matter the aid delivery context or project size, always ensure that any aid project or package meets two conditions. First, the design of the aid should demonstrate a clear and plausible analytic understanding of the causal path for the aid from activities to outcomes. Second, the design should specify a measurement framework and monitoring arrangements that can: a) track the progress of the aid during implementation, and b) allow conclusions--even if only rough estimates--to be drawn about the effects of the aid at completion. *The fundamental issue here is clarity of thought and the design of a measurement regime fit for management and accountability purposes.*
- 2) In fragile state conditions, at the design stage model the likely trend in outcomes with and without the aid interventions that are contemplated. Are the projected effects sufficient to warrant the draining complexities of implementing under fragile conditions?
- 3) Hold the agents (those creating the design and managing its implementation) accountable for the quality of aid design and implementation. Even if the principals delegate the responsibility to others to assure that projects that they finance meet standards, the principals have a responsibility to set standards for good practice.
- 4) When designing aid, be wary of outcomes and activities less likely to succeed under fragile conditions. Success requires the political support of Government, no matter how unattractive that Government might be. If that support is not present, focus first-- as UNICEF did so well--on upstream policy dialogue to create political support. Since fragile states often have high turnover at national and sub-national levels, pursue capacity development activities only if the intended beneficiaries have the incentives to change and only if better capacities will not be quickly lost to further turnover. Recognize that some objectives, especially those involving quality, require longer time frames to succeed and thus relatively stable conditions that only infrequently exist in fragile states.
- 5) Under fragile state conditions, keep the design of the aid and the arrangements for delivering it as simple as possible. Aid management under these conditions is extraordinarily demanding, and Government sources of implementation expertise are apt to be in disarray or unavailable.

I: Introduction: Objectives, methods, theory of change

1.1. The Madagascar case study is one of four case studies conducted by the Development Portfolio Management Group (DPMG) for the Evaluation of Norway's Support to Basic Education through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the other three being Ethiopia, Malawi, and Nepal. The time period for the evaluation is 2009-2013. The two main questions for the Evaluation are these: 1) what are the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the basic education initiatives that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds indirectly through two agents, GPE and UNICEF; and, 2) what is the value-added to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for its investments. Annex 1 displays the Terms of Reference for this evaluation.

1.2. Two causal pathways are used to assess these questions: a) the research team's theory of change or causal path in table 1 for improving three goals of interest to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (learning outcomes, gender equality, and equity), and b) the processes and quality assurance mechanisms that increase the probabilities of good aid management of the project/program cycle, diagrammed in annex 2.

Figure 1: Theory of Change



1.3. Each case study is based on multiple sources of evidence: interviews with relevant staff at UNICEF's headquarters in New York, GPE's Secretariat, Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Norad; analysis of the financial management of UNICEF's, GPE's, and partner country governments' education programs and budgets; desk reviews of multiple documents prior to the fieldwork; and extensive fieldwork in each country.

1.4. Except for Nepal, where the field team included an international consultant, two person teams of local consultants whom DPMG had recruited conducted the fieldwork. The team leader worked with the local teams in the three African countries at the start of data collection to resolve any questions about the case study instruments, including the specification of those to be interviewed. Annex 4 lists those interviewed in the field.

1.5. The fieldwork deepened the desk reviews of documents for each case. Given Madagascar's political crisis and the suspension of many donors' aid, the case study instrument displayed in Annex 5 focused especially on problems confronting and creative solutions to aid management. It involved interviews of parties that affected the GPE and UNICEF programs, such as members of the Local Education Group, supervising or managing entities for GPE programs, UNICEF staff, and Ministry of Education leaders and technical staff.

1.6. The Madagascar case differs from the other three cases assessed in that Madagascar was in political and economic crisis throughout the evaluation period of 2009-2013. Initially GPE, UNICEF, and Norway, as a bilateral donor to UNICEF, had hoped to maintain some momentum for the impressive education reform of the previous Government. However, they rapidly had to focus, not on making progress, but on arresting real damage to the sector and its beneficiaries. For GPE this country represented an early trial of what became in 2011 a GPE strategic objective: support for fragile and conflict-affected countries. It also represented GPE's first contract with an agent (UNICEF, in this case) to serve as a managing entity: an entity that both implemented and supervised the delivery of GPE aid, in contrast to its normal contract for supervision only. Thus, this case focuses especially on lessons learned about the limits to and opportunities for supporting the education sector under unfavorable country contexts.

1.7. The methodology had limits and potential biases. Educational outcomes cannot be directly or solely attributed to Government or donor-sponsored programs. Economic trends, natural disasters, and other factors can also affect outcomes. Each case study thus assesses not only the independent variables in the theory of change related to government and aid programs, but also the contextual variables (enabling conditions) in the theory that can affect outcomes, such as economic and political events, population growth, and governance. Each case uses process tracing, a method of checking whether the intervening steps in the theory of change were realized, to strengthen attribution of outcomes. This helps establish whether inputs and outputs were related to outcomes through the processes outlined in the theory of change. However, unlike statistical and experimental methods, process tracing cannot estimate the magnitude of the effects of each variable in the theory of change or of each enabling condition.

1.8. A second limitation is that the cases selected for study are not necessarily representative of the population of developing countries that received aid. Indeed, the case studies and desk studies were purposively sampled to include fragile states that pose difficult challenges for successful aid to basic education. Broad generalizations therefore cannot be made directly from any one case to the population of developing countries. It is possible, however, to make narrower, contingent generalizations from one or a few cases to subsets of cases that share key similarities. The challenges common to the several fragile states in the sample, for example, are more likely to be shared by other fragile states than by developing countries generally.

1.9. The case studies and desk studies are also constrained by the limitations of the available data. The programs being evaluated often tracked inputs and outputs, but they did not always have clear results frameworks, nor did they consistently measure baselines and outcomes. The programs being evaluated occurred some years ago (2009-2013). Some key players in the design and implementation of these programs, especially for the early part of the period from 2009 to 2013, were no longer available, or, if they were still in place, had to try to remember details. Respondents and authors of documents that were reviewed often had a natural interest in presenting events in a positive light. Where available, data from disinterested parties were triangulated with views that might be positively biased.

1.10. The report is organized into six additional sections. Chapter II summarizes Madagascar's country and sector context. Chapter III describes the interventions of GPE and UNICEF programs for the 2009-2013 period and assesses their outcomes. Chapter IV identifies the unintended consequences of UNICEF's and GPE's aid programs during this time period. Chapter V has multiple sections. It assesses the quality of aid management by GPE and UNICEF. It analyzes the Government's public expenditure system, especially as it affects the basic education sub-sector, and Government's fiscal effort in the education sector and in basic education. It assesses Madagascar's status of the conditions identified as enabling progress on the outcomes of concern to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chapter VI identifies

the lessons learned, especially about aid delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states. Chapter VII focuses on the conclusions from the evaluation and recommendations.

II: Country and Sector Context

2.1. Table 1 shows basic data on Madagascar's context and that of its education sector. Note that Madagascar has not conducted a population census since 1993. Thus, the validity of all statistics based on population estimates, such as enrolment rates, is of concern.

Table 1: Basic Information on Country and Sector Context

Variable		2009	2013
1	Population*	20.5 million	22.92 million
2	Population growth rate*		
a	Growth rate between 2009-2013		11.8%
b	Annual growth rate		2.36%
3	Percent urban*	31%	34%
4	National economic growth rate	-4%	2.4%
5	GDP per capita	\$417.2 (USD)	\$463 (USD)
6	Infant mortality per 1000 live births	45	40
7	Poverty rates (2010)		
a	Percent of population below national poverty line	75.3%	Estimated to have increased by 10% between 2008 and 2013 with most increase occurring between 2011 and 2013.
b	Percent of population living on \$1.25/day at 2005 international prices	87.7%	NA
8	Net primary enrollment ratio*	89%	Estimates unreliable, but some decline in 2011
a	Female/Male ratio**	0.98	0.99
9	Net pre-primary enrollment ratio*	Gross rate (2009): 10% Net rate (2010): 7.4%	Gross rate (2013): 12%
a	Female/Male ratio	NA	NA
10	Net secondary enrollment ratio*	(2008) 23%	(2012) 31%
a	Female/Male ratio	0.94	0.96
11	Primary school completion rate	74%	68%
a	Female	74%	70%
b	Male	76%	67%
*Madagascar has not conducted a population census since 1993. Thus, the validity of all population estimates and all enrolment rate estimates based on population estimates is of concern.			
**This ratio states the number of girls enrolled in primary education divided by the number of boys, with parity or equality being 1.0.			
Source: World Bank indicators, 1980-2014, by country			

A. Country context

2.2. On March 17, 2009, a coup d'état that included the dissolution of Parliament started what became a prolonged and deep political crisis. This crisis is still not fully resolved, although a political transition back to democracy began in early 2014.

2.3. The crisis has had devastating effects on the economy, poverty and social outcomes. The political crisis transitioned into a severe economic downturn, exacerbated by a series of external shocks and the withdrawal of most external funding. Overall, economic growth between 2009 and 2012 averaged 0.6 percent per year. Given high annual population growth (2.9 percent), income per capita in 2012 fell to its

2003 level. Poverty has risen and is now among the highest in the world. The economic and social effects of the crisis were intensified by the suspension of many donor activities which, in a country where international aid represented 40 percent of the government budget, led to significant cuts in investments and a sharp decline in the delivery of services. In the education sector only l'Agence Française de Développement (AFD) continued to finance their aid through a special account in the National Treasury, managed by the Ministry of Finance and transferred to the account of the Ministry of National Education (Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale, or MEN).¹

2.4. By 2012-13 a sharp deterioration in governance during the crisis contributed to the lowest level of private sector investment of the decade.² Although Madagascar had not ranked high in various governance indicators before the crisis, there had been an upward trend. However, according to Worldwide Governance Indicators, between 2008 and 2013, Madagascar's percentile rank for "government effectiveness" fell from 30.1 to 13.9; "rule of law" fell from 38.5 to 19.9; and "control of corruption", from 54.9 to 27.3. The absence of leadership and resistance to change during the crisis stalled the efforts that were underway to improve the rule of law and public sector efficiency. Bodies that should have provided oversight to public finance, such as the Court of Auditors and the Parliament, only partially fulfilled their roles. The civil service had difficulty in providing public services and enforcing laws and regulations.

2.5. Because of its geographic location Madagascar is prone to natural disasters, such as recurrent cyclones, flooding and endemic droughts that add hardships for an already vulnerable population. Since the lean food season coincides with the cyclone season (December-April), seasonal food insecurity is often aggravated by the effects of natural disasters such as cyclones and floods.

B. Sector context and plans

Sector context

2.6. In Madagascar education is compulsory for children between the ages of six and fourteen. Primary education lasts five years, and nominally children attend from six to eleven years of age.³ Secondary education lasts for seven years and is divided into two parts: a junior secondary level of four years from ages twelve to fifteen, and a senior secondary level of three years from ages sixteen to eighteen. At the end of the junior level, graduates receive a certificate, and at the end of the senior level, graduates receive the baccalauréat (the equivalent of a high school diploma). A vocational secondary school system, the collège professionnell (professional college), is the equivalent of the junior secondary level; the collège technique (technical college), which awards the baccalauréat technique (technical diploma), is the equivalent of the senior level.

2.7. Just prior to the coup, the sector had achieved a remarkable increase in access to primary education. The Net Enrolment Ratio had increased from 70 percent in 2001 to 89 percent in 2008, and the sector had achieved gender parity. (As discussed below, learning outcomes were another story.) The sector had initiated an important pilot of the reform in 20 school districts to test the effectiveness of reform ideas, such as using the mother tongue for the first five grades of primary school, and to identify implementation challenges. However, after almost a decade of steady progress on the Education for All (EFA) Initiative and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Madagascar's key education indicators entered a rapid decline that heightened the risks of real damage to the country's social fabric and human capital base. The pilot of the reform was stopped.

¹ AFD also continued to deliver their aid through MNE's Directorate General of Basic Education, Training and Literacy.

² Total investment declined from an average of 25% of GDP in 2004-2007 to 17.5% of GDP in 2013.

³ A new framework law for the Malagasy educational system was enacted in June 2008. It established that basic education would be restructured as ten years (seven years of primary and 3 years of secondary undergraduate (college) three years) and upper secondary (high school) as two years. During the period of the coup (2009-13), these changes were not instituted.

2.8. Budget cuts reduced access and equity. To compensate for the revenue shortfall and to maintain reasonable macroeconomic performance, the coup leadership cut social spending, transfers to lower levels of the government, and capital expenditure.⁴ The impact on education outcomes was substantial. Empirical evidence from the National Household Survey conducted for Madagascar in 2010 shows that lack of income is the main reason that students drop out of school or fail to enroll in the first place. Families' inability to pay the rising out-of-pocket costs resulting from sharp cuts in public spending thus reduced their children's access to and retention in primary education. Spending per primary student decreased 15 percent. Grants provided to management committees for learning materials declined by two-thirds, from US\$ 1.50 per pupil per year before the crisis to US\$ 0.45 in 2011. As many as two-thirds of primary school teachers are hired by communities, and a share of their salaries comes from parental contributions—which now had to compensate for the gap in public spending on teacher salaries. For these reasons, expenditures on education as a share of household consumption rose from 2.2 percent in 2005 to 3.1 percent in 2010 on average.

2.9. Learning outcomes have continued to deteriorate. Student learning outcomes have decreased continuously over the last decade. National data on learning outcomes is still rare, with only three comparable student assessments carried out since 1998. Results of the Program on the Analysis of Education Systems (PASEC) show a sharp decline in grade 5 student learning achievements from 1998 to 2005. French and mathematics test scores decreased by 11 and 8 points, respectively. This trend has worsened considerably over the last few years, especially in the mathematics scores, which dropped by another 11 points.

2.10. Analyses of the diagnostic surveys associated with the administration of the PASEC isolate the key determinants of learning outcomes. Outcomes are negatively affected by: (i) having a non-civil-servant community teacher (supported through the Parents' Association (FRAM));⁵ (ii) teacher absenteeism; (iii) students' socioeconomic status (children engaged in livestock activities have lower performance); (iv) distance to school; and (v) overall quality of school infrastructure. Learning outcomes are positively related to: (i) in-service teacher training; (ii) the availability of teacher guides/materials; and (iii) the availability of learning materials for students, especially textbooks for French and mathematics.⁶

2.11. Inadvertently, pre-coup policies that had been adopted to significantly increase access and retention undermined learning outcomes. Coup policies have only continued to erode them. To cope with rapidly increasing enrolment in primary education, which grew from 2.4 million in 2001 to 4.31 million in 2010, the government decided in 2002 to subsidize the payment of community (non-civil-servant) teachers, who were hired locally (and originally financed) by parents' associations (FRAM). Massive recruitment of these community teachers, who by 2013 constituted about two-thirds of all primary teachers, enabled the total primary teaching force to expand significantly from 49,410 persons in 2000 to 81,791 in 2010 at a much lower cost. It let Madagascar eliminate school fees, implement its policy of free primary education, and thus reduce the direct costs of education to families.

2.12. Although this expansion of the teaching force was critical to improving access to primary education over the past decade, most community teachers were poorly qualified and had received no or very little training. Their weak understanding and mastery of the curriculum and of effective pedagogical approaches and practices was compounded by limited competency in the language of instruction-- for example, the last PASEC evaluation found that more than two-thirds of the teachers for grade 5 (the last primary grade) do not speak French regularly, the language of instruction in that grade. However, existing mechanisms to improve community teachers' skills and qualifications--pre-service and in-service training programs, inspectorates, and mentoring--are completely inadequate. By 2012 school inspectors had virtually disappeared; the ratio of pedagogical counselors to teachers in the school districts stood at a low of 1:173;

⁴ Capital expenditure was at its lowest level in 2012 and 2013: only 2.7 percent and 3.1 percent of GDP, respectively, compared to the pre-crisis average of 8.8 percent from 2004-2008. These levels are grossly inadequate for a country with large development needs.

⁵ Fikambanan'ny Ray Aman-drenin'ny Mpiandra or Parents' Association or Association des Parents d'Elèves.

⁶ World Bank. March 2013. "Emergency Project Paper on a Proposed Global Partnership For Education Fund Grant to the Republic Of Madagascar for an Emergency Support To Education For All Project". Paragraph 12, p.5

and the sub-district officers (Zone Administrative et Pédagogique (Administrative and Educational Area (chefs ZAP)), who are closest to schools, lack the resources, time, and skills to support teachers with limited teaching and language skills. De facto, poorly trained teachers were left to fend for themselves.

2.13. The lack of basic supplies, such as paper and chalk, has also been a key constraint to improving learning achievement. The availability of basic supplies was reduced by the drastic cuts in domestic financing for school grants since 2010. That year, the total amount available for school grants in the Ministry of Education budget was US\$ 2.07 million instead of the US\$ 5.3 million initially envisaged. Poor health and nutrition among pupils, especially in areas prone to food insecurity, also constitute significant constraints to children's school attendance and learning capacity. Finally, in specific areas, a lack of school infrastructure or infrastructure in poor condition constitutes a significant impediment to improving learning outcomes. The School Construction Strategy (2008–15) estimated annual classroom needs at about 3,000 classrooms. Over 2008–09, Madagascar added about 1,500 classrooms, but financial constraints stopped this rapid progress in 2009. The slow progress triggered a dramatic increase in communities' involvement in building primary classrooms using their own means. As a result, the share of substandard classrooms almost doubled, increasing from 7.5 percent to 13.3 percent. Access to a safe water supply and adequate sanitation also deteriorated.

2.14. Equity issues have only been exacerbated. Who enters—and who remains—in primary school depends markedly on income level, geographic location, and (to a much lesser extent) gender. While 98 percent of the richest 20 percent of the population had access to primary education in 2009, only 77 percent of children from the poorest 20 percent of households did. This gap was even more pronounced with respect to retention, with a 63 percentage point difference between the richest 20 percent and the poorest 20 percent. Geographic inequalities and disparities are also pervasive. For example, access and retention rates are between 6 and 19 percentage points lower in rural areas than in urban areas. Further evidence for the rural-urban divide in school enrolment is that the majority of out-of-school children, 80 percent, live in rural areas. Children in the regions of Anosy, Androy, Atsimo Andrefana, and Atsimo Atsinanana have the greatest difficulty accessing education. Although gender inequalities are not nearly as pronounced in Madagascar as in other developing countries, boys tend to lag behind girls in access to education, but girls drop out more often, especially if they are from rural areas or poor families.

Sector plans

2.15. Madagascar joined the Global Partnership in 2005 when development partners endorsed its first Education for All Plan. The country received an EFA/GPE grant of \$60 million for the period from 2006 to 2008. The plan consisted of a set of reforms to address gaps in school infrastructure, a growing proportion of untrained community-recruited teachers, curriculum and language of instruction issues and low education management capacity.

2.16. A new EFA plan was endorsed by the development partners in 2008, leading to an Education for All-Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) financial commitment of \$85.1m for a 3-year period (2009-2012). The plan was supplemented in early 2009 by an implementation strategy document, the Tri-Annual Performance Plan (TPP). The TPP focused on three key areas: (i) access and retention; (ii) quality of teaching; and (iii) institutional performance/capacity development.

2.17. After the March 2009 coup d'état, the World Bank and other donor agencies suspended operations. The new Minister of the National Ministry of Education (MEN) rejected the 2008 EFA plan. Subsequently, in an extraordinary collaboration between the Local Education Group, UNICEF, and GPE, GPE ultimately released a total of \$64 million for the 2009-2013 period to mitigate the effects of the crisis, conditional on Government's meeting certain requirements. As the country has started to stabilize, Madagascar was allocated a GPE grant of \$85.4 million in 2013 for a project supervised by the World Bank.

2.18. In the interests of coherence, the interventions and outcomes of the GPE program are discussed in their entirety first, followed by the discussion of the UNICEF program. UNICEF managed the GPE program and its own core program and bilateral Norwegian aid program, and all programs were aligned

first around the EFA reform and then around limiting the damage to the sector. Thus, unintended consequences and lessons learned are discussed in relation to the package of aid programs.

III: GPE and UNICEF programs for the 2009-2013 period: interventions and outcomes

A. GPE Program

3.1. The GPE project evaluated here is the GPE implementation grant for \$64 million that was managed and supervised by UNICEF from 2009-2013.⁷ Figure 1 shows the timeline for key events in this project.

Figure 2: Timeline for 2009-13 GPE Madagascar Grant

Feb. 2008	13 technical & financial partners endorse Madagascar EFA plan
2008	EFA allocates US\$85.1 million for a 2009-12 GPE project
March 2009	Military coup d'état. New MEN Minister rejects endorsed EFA plan. Education Reform ends. Almost complete turnover of MEN technical staff
2009	World Bank suspends operations; partners suspend financing through Government.
Fall 2009	Sept.: Partners propose release of \$15 million to UNICEF as managing entity for Jan to June, 2010. Nov.: EFA Catalytic Fund releases \$15 million; reduces grant limit from \$85 to \$64 million.
June 2010	MEN revalidates endorsed EFA plan, a condition for EFA to release \$22 million for school year 2010-11.
July 2010	UNICEF submits <i>Action Plan</i> to EFA Catalytic Fund as condition for release of \$49 million for 2010-12 school years.
May 2011	Joint Review finds most EFA activities delayed; MEN at risk of failing to achieve objectives. Sets 3 conditions that MEN has to meet to obtain 3 rd tranche of funding.
Dec. 2011	4 Ministers of Education and 4 MEN senior leadership cadres since coup.
March 2012	MEN finally meets 3 conditions for 3 rd tranche of \$27 million in EFA funding; UNICEF able to start disbursing.
1 st half 2012	Progress slows: delay in MEN meeting 3 conditions; upheaval associated with installation of new MEN Minister and Secretary General in November 2011; teachers' strikes for most of the first half of 2012.
Jan.-Nov. 2012	Development of Interim Education Plan (IEP) by Government and Partners
Last half 2012	UNICEF requests one year no-cost extension for GPE grant
October 2013	World Bank Board approves Emergency Support to Education For All Project, with World Bank as Supervising Entity. Project becomes effective January, 2014.
Dec. 2013	FINAL FTI PROGRESS REPORT

3.2. GPE funding was disbursed in 3 tranches: \$15 million for the second half of the 2009-10 school year (January-June, 2010), \$22 million for the 2010-11 school year; and \$27 million for the 2011-12 school year. The first tranche was short-term emergency funding. However, the second and third tranches focused on limiting the damage to: a) educational access, retention, learning, and equity; and b) implementation

⁷ The GPE grant was for 2009-2012. However, UNICEF successfully obtained a one year, no-cost time extension until December 31, 2013, to compensate for slow implementation on construction activities attributable to Government's delay in meeting the conditions for GPE's release of the third tranche of GPE funding.

capacities. The activities selected for funding were aligned with the 2008 EFA Action plan as much as possible, given the crisis.

3.3. Tranche 1. This emergency tranche focused on access and retention, with targeted beneficiaries selected on equity grounds. (See table 2.) UNICEF met its output goals. Given the short-term and emergency nature of this tranche, the effects of the outputs on outcomes were not measured.

Table 2: Results for Tranche 1 (2009-10 school year)

Outcome variables/theory of change outcomes	Indicators	Results by indicator #	Effects on outcomes
<p>Access and retention</p> <p>Note: Access and retention are not outcomes modeled in the theory of change that guides this evaluation. However, access and retention are implicit in the theory's focus on learning outcomes, gender equality, and equity.</p>	<p>Note: UNICEF's reports to FTI do not indicate the targets for each indicator.</p> <p>1.# of FRAM teachers paid on time for January-April (Target: national coverage, 38,585 teachers)</p> <p>2.# of schools received school cash grants by March 2010 (Target: school grants to 9,755 public primary schools in 55 school districts in 10 vulnerable regions)</p> <p>3.# of classrooms constructed (Target: 263 schools for communities without schools and incomplete cycle schools)</p>	<p>1. Salary subventions paid for 38,583 community teachers for January-April 2010</p> <p>2. 10,079 schools. # of schools targeted increased to 10,079 on basis of updated data on public primary schools in the targeted regions UNICEF used own resources to cover additional costs attributable to this adjustment.</p> <p>3. Budget committed for construction of 226 classrooms in Phase I.⁸</p>	<p>Effects of outputs on outcomes not measured.</p>
<p>Quality of teaching and learning</p> <p>Note: this outcome is related to the learning outcomes specified in the theory of change.</p>	<p>No activities targeted on quality of teaching and learning outcomes under tranche 1.</p>		
<p>Institutional performance/capacity development</p> <p>Note: the theory of change does not specify this as an outcome. It is in fact not an outcome in itself, but an interim outcome that should facilitate advances on the other outcomes.</p>	<p>No activities targeted on Institutional performance/capacity development under tranche 1.</p>		
<p>Gender equality (This issue is not high priority for Madagascar)</p>	<p>No activities targeted on gender under tranche 1.</p>		

⁸ Selection of sites done with MEN, resulting in reduced # of schools to 231 as a result of the remoteness of the sites selected (leading to higher unit costs) and increased cost of construction materials and transportation.

Outcome variables/theory of change outcomes	Indicators	Results by indicator #	Effects on outcomes
Equity (between parental income categories; regions; urban/rural) GPE does not identify this as a separate outcome, but targets activities in ways that increase equity.	School cash grants were targeted on the most vulnerable 10 regions; communities without schools and incomplete cycle schools were targeted for school construction.		

3.4. Tranches 2 and 3. In July 2010 UNICEF submitted an *Action Plan* to GPE for 2010-2012 that served as a proposal for the second and third tranches. The *Action Plan* organized its proposed priorities for GPE support for 2010-2012 around the three priorities of the 2008 EFA plan and the TPP: (i) access and retention, (ii) quality of teaching and learning, and (iii) institutional performance/capacity development. Annex 6 lists the detailed activities proposed. Table 3 shows that the design of UNICEF's *Action Plan* and its supervision reports for 2010-2012 focused on the operation's outputs, not on its outcomes or damage-limiting effects.

Table 3: Results for Tranches 2 and 3 (2010-11 and 2011-12 school years)

Outcome variables	Indicators	Results by indicator #	Effects on outcomes
Access and retention Note: Access and retention are not outcomes modeled in the theory of change that guides this evaluation. However, access and retention are implicit in the theory's focus on learning outcomes, gender equality, and equity.	1.# community (FRAM) teacher salary subventions 2.# school canteens (implemented by the World Food Programme), targeted on food-insecure South 3.# classrooms and latrines constructed 4.# schools received local catalytic funds 5.# of school kits ⁹ distributed	1. 122,755 teacher subventions delivered. Receipt verified. 2. 2010-11: canteens established for 569 schools & about 96,000 pupils. 2012: canteens previously established in 1138 schools for 192,000 pupils supplied with food and non-food items. 3. 596 classrooms + 298 latrines constructed 4. 2010-11: 10,554 schools in 10 regions + 7000 schools in 8 additional regions. Receipt verified. 2011-12: all 21,467 primary schools in all 22 regions. Receipt verified. 5. School kits for 3,723,720 students and 57,677 teachers in all public primary schools nationwide were delivered by UNICEF to 114 school districts. School level receipt verified.	See comments in text.

⁹ There were 3 types of school kits: student, teacher, and school. For students the kits consisted of notebooks of 48 pages and 96 pages, drawing books of 48 pages or 96 pages, a black or blue pen, a wooden pencil, and apparently a back pack. For teachers, it consisted of notebooks and pens. For schools it consisted of a register book, white chalk boxes, and colored chalk boxes.

Outcome variables	Indicators	Results by indicator #	Effects on outcomes
<p>Quality of teaching and learning</p> <p>Note: this outcome is related to the learning outcomes specified in the theory of change.</p>	<p>(Note: since some activities under access and retention should enhance teaching and learning--e.g., school feeding, better infrastructure, school kits, check results for these activities above.)</p> <p>1. # of teachers receiving in-service training</p> <p>2. # of students in basic education provided with school manuals and pedagogical materials (target: all students)</p> <p>3. <i>Action Plan</i> specified finalization of new primary curriculum, extension of primary cycle from 5 to 7 years, and introduction of French as language of instruction from grade 6.</p>	<p>1. As of Nov. 2011: 699 local teacher professional development networks mobilized, organized and equipped with training materials and training budgets for the 2011-12 school year. 1,398 network teacher training facilitators were trained and in-service professional development of approximately 9,530 teachers delivered in 11 regions.</p> <p>2. None delivered to students. However, UNICEF managed activities preparatory to provision.¹⁰ See comment for curriculum.</p> <p>3. Political resistance to this initiative. UNICEF June 2012 FTI Report: "Work on curriculum and school manual development on hold until education sector goals are clearly defined and accepted. The [re-coup] Education Reform is a state of disarray with varying levels of implementation in the pilot 20 school districts. Given its affiliation with the previous administration, it also now lacks widespread political support and its future is questionable.</p>	<p>1. Independent evaluation found that professional development networks had been established and teachers trained. Also found several problems that cast doubt on the effectiveness of the training: a) teachers were often not motivated to attend network sessions; b) teaching materials or teaching aids needed were insufficient; c) networks had no operating budget, with teachers having to purchase small supplies such as chalk and paper; d) Educational Resource Centers intended to support networks were not operational; and e) school districts had received no official instructions on how to operate the networks.¹¹</p>
<p>Institutional performance/capacity development</p>	<p>1. Conduct Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E)</p>	<p>1.a. Spot checks UNICEF, Unité d'Appui Technique (Technical</p>	<p>See comments in text.</p>

¹⁰ Between July, 2010-May, 2012 UNICEF managed two preparatory activities. One was an audit of school manuals (types and stocks, etc.), conducted at regional, district and pedagogical zone levels. A list of the manuals to be reproduced and distributed was subsequently completed. Second, a study on how existing manuals were being used by teachers was completed in late 2011.

¹¹ School-to-School International, Education Network, 2013. Evaluation de l'appui À l'Education Pour Tous à Madagascar : La mise en oeuvre des activités clés Du plan EPT 2007 Financées par le Fast Track Initiative Durant la période 2009-2012.

Outcome variables	Indicators	Results by indicator #	Effects on outcomes
<p>Note: the theory of change does not specify this as an outcome. It is in fact not an outcome in itself, but an interim outcome that should facilitate advances on the other outcomes.</p>	<p>2. Improve education information system (EMIS) 3. Build capacities of regional education authorities (Regional Directorates for Education)</p>	<p>Support Unit (UAT)) and MEN technicians to verify receipt of outputs by intended beneficiaries.</p> <p>1. b. Independent evaluation of GPE 2009-12 program.</p> <p>1. c. Independent evaluation of pilot EFA reform in 20 school districts.</p> <p>2. a. TA for MEN Department of Planning, responsible for the EMIS system. On-line database now operational.</p> <p>2.b. UAT funded to support regional workshops for the Department of Planning to improve completion of the annual data collection forms by primary schools (the Fiche Primaries d'Enquête - FPE)</p> <p>2.c. MEN funded to enter data from 2011-12 FPE forms</p> <p>2. d. As of December 2013: raw data for FPE forms released, but analysis of data to calculate national and regional indicators not completed.</p> <p>3. a. UAT funded to continue its capacity building of regional education offices (DRENS) in planning, implementation and monitoring of GPE funded activities, particularly teachers' salaries and school grants.</p> <p>3. b. Complete audit (financial and systems) of all 22 Regional Education Authorities (DRENS) that received GPE funds in 2012, final reports to be used to help build the capacity of the DRENS in the management and implementation of funds.</p>	
<p>Gender equality (This issue is not high priority for Madagascar)</p>			

Outcome variables	Indicators	Results by indicator #	Effects on outcomes
Equity (between parental income categories; regions; urban/rural) GPE does not identify this as a separate outcome, but targets activities to increase equity by region, poverty, and urban/rural.			See comments in text.

3.5. As table 3 indicates, UNICEF was more successful in delivering outputs targeted on access and retention than on the quality of teaching and learning or institutional performance/capacity development.

3.6. This is not surprising. Interventions targeted on access create political and economic winners, thus enjoying broader political support. The benefits are visible, broadly distributed, rapid, and fairly certain. Communities get new schools. Construction companies get more business. Individuals get teaching jobs.

3.7. Quality reforms are more attractive than efficiency reforms that inevitably entail losers. However, relative to access reforms, they are technically more complex and yield benefits that are less certain, less visible, and more distant in time. Even if the reform succeeds, their payoffs often do not occur when those who initiated the reform are still in office and able to take credit for success. They are less certain of successful implementation because they require sustained implementation and thus stable institutional and managerial capacities.

3.8. The coup leadership was ambivalent about, if not averse to, the quality reforms in the 2008 EFA Plan. The rapid turnover of the leadership and technical staff in the sector did not provide for the stable implementation capacities required to "stay the course" for a quality reform. These turnover rates also compromised many opportunities to build performance capacities at the central and sub-national levels. Even at the sub-national levels staff looked to the central level for leadership and "signals" and, in their absence, were reluctant to make changes.

3.9. As noted, the effects of outputs on the outcomes sought were not measured. The accountabilities for emergency operations such as this one are complicated. GPE noted that they operated in a context of continuous deadlines for a political resolution that were set by negotiators. Thus, in the first two years a potential political solution was always just months away, leaving GPE and UNICEF believing that they were engaged in short-term emergency measures. In line with good practice for emergency projects, the indicators for the development objectives of such projects can legitimately consist of *output* indicators that are based on simplicity, achievability, and measurability and are directly attributable to the project's activities. This approach requires very tight and empirically-based links between activities, outputs, and the outcomes sought. If the outputs occur for the intended beneficiaries, it is then reasonable, although hardly definitive, to infer positive effects on the outcomes sought.

3.10. On the other hand, although UNICEF had its hands full just getting the money disbursed on the appropriate activities, with checks on whether beneficiaries in fact received the intended outputs, this operation was an early trial for GPE of support to fragile and conflict-affected countries. Inherent in any such support is the question of whether, how much, and the conditions under which external donor funding can help the country's education sector progress or arrest the damage arising from crises. The need for selectivity and strategic sequencing, while important for all countries, is particularly critical for fragile or conflict-affected countries because of the severe limitations in state capacity and the potentially distorted priorities of those in power. These operations impose heavy supervision burdens on donors and, given weak state capacities, heavy implementation burdens on Governments. The returns on these costs must be considered in decisions to support fragile and conflict-affected countries. In this case the opportunity to

learn how much beneficiaries might be expected to gain from such operations was lost--although understandably so.

3.11. Even if the effects of outputs are not measured for all beneficiaries, rapid surveys of even a small sample of beneficiaries can shed some light on their "before" and "after" status. Since implementation was often staged for budget or other reasons, what happened to access in communities targeted by local catalytic funds, or teacher subventions, or classroom construction, or school kits, relative to those communities that had not yet benefitted from these interventions? Alternatively, the range of possible effects of donor funding on access and retention might have been simulated, even if pre-coup data had to be used. Are there data on the effects of reducing families' costs for education or their distance to the nearest school on their children's participation in schooling?

3.12. In fairness, UNICEF acknowledges this M&E gap in its final report to GPE: "The lack of an agreed logical framework with clearly defined progress indicators at the start of the project did not provide the impetus for strengthening systems to then report on the outputs and impact of GPE funded activities."¹²

3.13. Also in fairness, UNICEF commissioned an ex post evaluation of the EFA pilot reform and the GPE 2009-2012 project from School to School International.¹³ The consultants confronted constraints that undermined their ability to draw conclusions about effects. There were no or few baselines that could be used to measure impact, thus compromising conclusions about attribution or contribution. Key data were often not available, or not complete, or not current. It was hard to find reports, or key reports were not available.

3.14. The evaluation concluded that, in general, no significant progress could be noted with respect to the evolution of key education indicators over the duration of the project. However, note that this finding is also consistent with the GPE program having prevented deterioration. The evaluation found that the provision of school kits and school grants (the Local Catalytic Funds), contributions made to community teachers' subventions, as well as the support provided to school canteens allowed primary schools to continue to operate without substantially increasing households' financial contributions. Such efforts directed to schools and families have contributed to slight increases in access rates at Grade 1 since 2011, and boosted enrolment rates at primary level especially in traditionally underserved regions which received significant support under this project. Between 2009 and 2012, the number of pupils enrolled in primary schools increased by 27% in Androy, by 15% in Anosy and by 18% in Atsimo Andrefana.

B. UNICEF Program

3.15. UNICEF managed two programs in basic education during this period: direct bilateral funding by Norway to UNICEF and its own program. Annex 6 lists the activities associated with each UNICEF program.

3.16. Norwegian bilateral aid. Norway funded two strands of work during the 2009-2013 period: Ensuring the Right to Quality Education for All Children in Madagascar (2008-2011) and Minimizing the Impact of the Political Crisis on Education in Madagascar (2009-2010).

3.17. *Ensuring the Right to Quality Education for All Children.* This program continued Norway's previous support to UNICEF from 2005 to 2007 that had focused on strengthening the quality of teaching and learning in the country's primary schools. The grant for 2008-2011 had five objectives, and a set of activities and indicators was specified for each. However, the political crisis in Madagascar in March, 2009 dramatically changed the conditions for implementing this program. Many activities had to be put on hold, and UNICEF's upstream work on the Education Reform was no longer possible. The whole education

¹² UNICEF Madagascar. *Fast-Track Initiative (FTI)/Global Partnership for Education (GPE)*. Final Donor Report 7 of 7. December, 2013.

¹³ School-to-School International, Education Network, 2013. Evaluation de l'appui À l'Éducation Pour Tous à Madagascar : La mise en oeuvre des activités clés Du plan EPT 2007 Financées par le Fast Track Initiative Durant la période 2009-2012.

system, including those at regional and local levels, had become politicized, and UNICEF could no longer transfer financial resources through the national system.

3.18. In recognition of the new political realities, UNICEF and the Government of Norway adjusted the design and focus of the program in April 2009. They decided to scale up the direct support to the school level in vulnerable regions in order to minimize the impact of the crisis on school children. The redesigned grant focused the upstream work on inclusive education and on improving the quality of teaching and equity, with minor attention to gender. The main vehicle for the direct support to schools was the school development plan, called Contrat Programme de Réussite Scolaire (School Success Contract Programme (CPRS)), already an important activity of the pre-coup program.

3.19. The independent evaluation of the two strands of bilateral aid from Norway to UNICEF by Oxford International drew the following conclusions about the first strand.¹⁴ The grant was relevant. It fit the national educational priorities prior to the coup and children's learning needs well. UNICEF's re-design after the coup focused even more strongly on the school level--a sensible and appropriate adjustment.

3.20. In terms of effectiveness, the evaluation describes a more mixed picture. It found that most of the planned activities in the areas of teacher training, inclusive education and support to vulnerable regions were partially, mostly, or entirely achieved. It credits UNICEF's technical expertise and its dual strategy of focusing strongly on the local level while simultaneously staying engaged at the national policy arena as keys to its success. The success of the component that constituted about 75% of the total expenditures, support to vulnerable regions,¹⁵ meant that the program as a whole was relatively successful.

3.21. However, it also found that UNICEF focused on inputs (financial resources and activities) and outputs from those activities in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the program. It did not focus on outcomes or on measuring outcome indicators. The results matrix was not only too detailed and difficult to follow, but entirely focused on a large number of quantitative activity targets. These activity targets were the primary "driver" for program implementation and reporting. Although the evaluators could use interviews to obtain some insight into outcomes, they could draw no convincing conclusions.

3.22. The problem posed by UNICEF's focus on activities and outputs at the expense of outcomes is not trivial. For example, the evaluators flag the growing demand for CPRS, but the lack of a proper impact evaluation of the influence of this school improvement tool on children's access and quality of education. Under the quality of instruction component, 1400 professional network facilitators and 827 teachers were trained. The concept of professional networks is a good one and was popular at the school level. However, a major independent assessment of World Bank-financed training¹⁶ found that completing a training program was a poor predictor of the improved workplace performance sought. Among the most egregious examples of failed training investments were teacher training programs in education projects. To imply, if not conclude, that completion of a training program translates into the outcome sought, improved teaching performance, is a dubious leap of faith.

¹⁴ Oxford International. December 2012. "End review of the government of Norway's support to two UNICEF education programmes in Madagascar (2008-2011)."

¹⁵ By the end of 2011 the major achievements of UNICEF's support to the four vulnerable regions were: a) more than 3,000 schools had developed CPRS, benefiting about 480,000 pupils. At the national scale, this translates into approximately one out of ten of Madagascar's primary pupils; b) as part of the CPRS process, nearly 50,000 excluded children in the four regions had been identified by working with 'excluded children mapping'; c) more than 4,000 girls across more than 2,000 vulnerable schools have been assigned a big sister as part of the girl-to-girl strategy; d) rehabilitation and reconstruction of 253 classrooms and 69 latrines; e) improved access to potable water in 187 schools, benefiting nearly 45,000 students; and f) distribution of school kits to more than 53,000 children across the four vulnerable regions.

¹⁶ Independent Evaluation Group. 2008. *Using Training to Build Capacity for Development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

3.23. *Minimizing the Impact of the Political Crisis on Education.* The main objective of this grant was "to contribute to ensuring that the education reform is successfully implemented in the 20 pilot school districts for the school year 2009-2010".¹⁷

3.24. The donor's and UNICEF's desire to keep the reform alive, pending the country's return to political normalcy, was understandable. Norway had already invested several million United States dollars in curriculum development. The country had not had a curriculum review since independence, and a reformed curriculum was considered essential to improve quality. At the time of the coup the curriculum had been only half revised. Norway had two choices, probably made when the coup was expected to be short-lived. Norway could drop the curriculum development initiative, leaving a half-developed curriculum and writing off earlier efforts as a loss. Or it could finalize it. Norway selected this option. The Secretary General of the Ministry of National Education verbally expressed the view that the curriculum would be used whether or not the 5-year primary cycle ended up being expanded to 7 years. Discussions were also held to see how to build on it to create a seamless curriculum for years 8 through 10.

3.25. Unfortunately, the coup was much more prolonged than anticipated, and most of the objectives of this program ended up being misaligned with the priorities of the political leadership. The program thrust failed to meet a key enabling condition for reform: Government's political support for the reform.

3.26. The picture for the grant's effectiveness was again mixed. Despite the inhospitable context, the evaluators found that the program achieved some of its quantitative targets, especially for teacher training and school manuals for the new curriculum. UNICEF also provided high quality expertise in the development and design of those areas. However, they found that the program suffered from weak planning, monitoring and reporting and focused too narrowly on the achievement of quantitative output targets without attending to their effects on outcomes of concern.

3.27. UNICEF's own program. Reflecting UNICEF's Country Program Document (CPD) for 2008-11, the Country Program Action Plan specified these expected results for Education for Development and Gender Equality:

The program will help to achieve a completion rate of primary education of 85 percent through the following key results:

- a) 75 percent of primary schools located in vulnerable areas apply national standards for quality and strategies for school quality;
- b) 95 percent of primary teachers have the skills and tools to apply the approach;
- c) 95 percent of the schools in targeted vulnerable areas have access to child protection networks and / or services health;
- d) supply and logistics system for education is in place; and
- e) program will promote the increase of 100 percent in the number of girls in education post-primary.

3.28. The 2010 Mid-Term Review sought similar results:

- a) 75% of primary schools in priority regions implementing national quality standards and strategies for child friendly schools
- b) 95% of primary school teachers have the capacity and tools to use the competency-based approach
- c) 95% of primary school teachers have the capacity to use new teaching practices and pedagogical techniques

¹⁷ An example of the program's objectives is: Ensure continuity in the pedagogical/curriculum reform, specifically by ensuring that the reform retains and expands on achievements obtained through the implementation of the Competency-Based Approach (CBA).

- d) 95% of schools in priority regions have access to child protection networks and/or health services
- e) An established and functional education procurement and logistics system able to cope with emergencies
- f) 100% increase in number of girls in post-primary education
- g) 75% of families benefit from parental education programs in priority zones

3.29. However, the 2008-11 Country Programme Document was extended until 2014. UNICEF has a comparison matrix that shows changes in their program component results (PCRs) and their intermediate results (IRs).

PCR / IR 2012 work plan signed with government	PCR / IR 2013-2014 proposed revision in agreement with national counterparts	Explanation The order of programs follows that in VISION.
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3.30. The row in this matrix for Basic Education and Gender Equality says the following. "The revised PCR responds to the request from the Ministry of Education (MEN) for UNICEF and partners to align its 2013-2014 education programmer with the new Education for All (EFA) plan.

3.31. The new EFA plan, which came into operation in 2013 and was the result of a comprehensive participatory process, outlines a clear structure that responds to the impact of the crisis on the education sector. The overall content of UNICEF's support will stay the same (with an increased focus on out of school children). Thus the PCR has been simply reworded to ensure coherence with the overall objective of the new EFA plan (the "Interim Education Plan"). The structure of the IRs below aligns completely with the EFA plan in terms of 1) Institutional Strengthening ii) Access and iii) Quality."

3.32. **Bottom line for UNICEF's own programs.** All three UNICEF programs suffered from a lack of identified causal paths from activities, to the outputs expected from the activities, and to outcomes. Several targets for UNICEF's own program seem wildly optimistic. The programs had weak internal systems for monitoring and evaluation. Program designs and results matrices relied on the fulfillment of a large number of quantitative activity targets, making these the primary "drivers" of the programs. During implementation UNICEF relied on information about activity outputs to guide its management of these programs, without knowing if these outputs mattered relative to the outcomes of interest. It thus missed opportunities to increase the impact of these programs by modifying their design or implementation.

IV: Unintended Consequences

4.1. Respondents were specifically asked about six possible unintended consequences of the education aid programs. These were: a) incentives for teachers to go on strike; b) incentives for unqualified people to become teachers just to earn a paycheck; c) incentives to divert government spending away from education to other budget areas; d) aid programs becoming a political weapon or resource in competition among competing factions in the government or different regions or ethnic groups; e) incentives for the diversion of funds to other purposes (including other legitimate educational purposes) at the level of individual schools; and f) unintended good outcomes, including development of strong management procedures, that were then copied by the MEN or school personnel.

4.2. Incentives for teachers to go on strike. The teachers did go on strike during the coup period. However, those interviewed saw these strikes as responses to failures of Government to pay their share of the subventions. Although the crisis increased the levels of teachers' dissatisfaction, the strikes were not specific to the crisis. Those interviewed felt that the education aid programs, if anything, reduced the probabilities of strikes because aid money was used to pay four months of subventions to community teachers each year, mitigating the effects of payment delays by Government.

4.3. Incentives for unqualified people to become teachers just to earn a paycheck. The pre-coup policy of hiring community teachers jointly financed by the Parents' Association or FRAM and Government had already created a channel for bringing in unqualified teachers. (By the time of the coup two-thirds of primary school teachers were community teachers.) There is no documentary or interview evidence that teaching became a de facto "jobs program". The severe economic pressures on Parents' Associations and on the sector's salary budget had to have constrained any such expansion.

4.4. Incentives to divert government spending away from education to other budget areas. The financial data for the sector in table 4, below, show steady erosion in the share of the education budget going to basic education: from 64% in 2010 to 44% in 2013. These trends are not only alarming, but are consistent with Government's substituting GPE and UNICEF contributions to basic education for Government's fiscal effort in the sub-sector.

4.5. Aid programs become a political weapon or a source of tension among competing factions in the government or different regions or ethnic groups. UNICEF confirmed that some politicians had tried to use the aid programs to portray Government in a positive light--for example, distributing school kits just before the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. UNICEF used a communications strategy to block these moves. The distribution of aid to basic education and to vulnerable zones generated negative reactions among champions of other educational sub-sectors (junior high schools, high schools, and vocational education) and the residents in other zones, especially among the natives of the highlands.

4.6. Incentives for the diversion of funds to other purposes (including other legitimate educational purposes) at the level of individual schools. Respondents reported instances where the schools used aid funds in illegal ways. For example, they used aid funds to buy oxen and to resell them at a profit that seems to have been returned to the schools. This was not legal, but it did allow them to be more effective. However, all respondents agreed that any diversions at the school level were small compared with those that could have occurred at the level of the Central Ministry and Regions. Although UNICEF did perform spot checks on the distribution of funds, respondents expressed concern that there was little control or audit of funds, an issue that was of greater concern at the Regional Directorate levels because of the large sums involved.

4.7. Unintended good outcomes, including development of strong management procedures that were then copied by education ministry or school personnel. The MEN did adopt some activities and new modalities pursued by UNICEF. For example, the MEN decided to generalize the contract program approach / school projects initiated by the pre-coup Ministry and used by UNICEF during the crisis. These were the school development plans or CPRS.

V: Aid management, financial management, and enabling conditions

A. Aid management

5.1. GPE program. The GPE Board and its committees, its executive arm, the Secretariat, the Madagascar Local Education Group (LEG), and UNICEF, the managing entity for GPE's 2009-2012 aid, are the accountable parties for managing the donor funding channeled through GPE to Madagascar. At the same time, the performance of Government partly and obviously defined these parties' opportunities for effectiveness.

5.2. The bottom line for the parties accountable for the quality of aid management is the following. The performance of the **GPE Board** and **Secretariat** falls somewhere between moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. The GPE Board's decision to extend a grant to Madagascar was risky. The risk was arguably justified, given donors' decisions to suspend aid financing to Madagascar. The sector had made substantial progress earlier in the decade, and its 2008 EFA Plan, endorsed by the donors, had been designed to continue the reform direction. Thus, GPE hoped to be able to protect and further the reforms already started--or, at the least, to arrest reversals in the sector. Although most donors had suspended direct financing to the sector, those interviewed agreed that the GPE grant keep the donors together and, via UNICEF, its managing entity, created a platform for dialogue with the Government. However, given the riskiness of this investment, the Board--and especially its Catalytic Fund Committee--should have insisted on a well-defined monitoring and evaluation regime that tracked the effects on the outcomes sought by the GPE grant.

5.3. The GPE Secretariat broke new ground in creating the role of "managing entity" when donors could not work directly with Government. It worked out contractual arrangements with UNICEF for this role. However, both the Secretariat and the Board, which released funding on the basis of UNICEF's *Action Plan*, failed to assure the quality of that Plan, at least in terms of a simple results framework that could guide implementation and yield at least rough conclusions about the effects of the aid. Even though the predecessor to GPE's independent Quality Assurance Reviews, the External Quality Review, was in force at the time, the Secretariat did not submit UNICEF's *Action Plan* to a quality review conducted by independent reviewers. Had it done so, the reviewers would have caught UNICEF's lack of attention to outcomes and their measurement. UNICEF might then have been able to clarify the causal path that it was pursuing and revise the monitoring and evaluation approach so as to measure the effects of GPE's activities on the outcomes sought.

5.4. UNICEF did many things right in a very difficult environment, and its performance is judged to have been satisfactory with one caveat. It stepped into a chaotic situation. As a pilot for GPE's new mechanism of managing entity, both it and the GPE Secretariat had resolve ambiguities and problems as they surfaced. For example, UNICEF tried to integrate the management the GPE grant into its core program. In its final report on the GPE grant, UNICEF acknowledged that in retrospect it should have negotiated funding for staff and consultancy positions that could be fully dedicated to the implementation of the GPE activities.¹⁸ By trying to integrate the stewardship of the GPE grant into UNICEF's core program, UNICEF overburdened existing staff and compromised attention to UNICEF's core activities.

5.5. UNICEF's 2010 *Action Plan* was aligned with the 2008 EFA Plan. In the event, the *Plan* was not realistic, especially with regard to interventions supportive of the quality of teaching and learning and capacity development. However, at the time none of the parties could have known that the political crisis would be as prolonged as it in fact turned out to be.

¹⁸ UNICEF's final report suggests that amounts of over \$50 million would seem to justify the creation of a mini "Project Implementation Unit" with its own coordinator, programme specialists, a monitoring office and finance officer.

5.6. UNICEF balanced the risks associated with moving quickly under emergency conditions with careful and intensified supervision later in the operation. It conducted post-reviews, audits and other measures. It did a good job of trying to get budgeted activities implemented and measuring their outputs. It tried to minimize the establishment of parallel implementation systems that would further undercut Government's¹⁹ standing—for example, using the Regional Directorates for Education (DRENs) and school districts (CISCOs) as conduits for school grants. It creatively used other delivery modalities—implementation by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), UNICEF's field staff, communities themselves, and other international agencies such as the World Food Program for the canteens. It conducted at least spot checks on whether the outputs reached the intended beneficiaries. It conducted continuous dialogue with Government to try to move the activities forward and resolved what must have seemed like an endless stream of problems. (See figure 1.) It reported on outputs faithfully and, as time proceeded, more helpfully. As coordinating agency for the LEG and through policy dialogue with Government and the use of GPE's Education Sector Plan Development Grant, it created the platform for developing the Interim Plan for Education that led to the next GPE grant.

5.7. However, the *Plan's* project design was not undergirded by what in this case should have been a theory of maintenance. It lacked a carefully thought through causal path from activities to the outcomes sought, indicators of the outcomes, or arrangements for measuring the indicators. All basic education aid programs in Madagascar during the coup period were overshadowed by activity-driven designs and reporting, leaving all parties flying relatively blind in terms of the effects of these activities on the outcomes sought and unable to judge during implementation if the aid should be restructured in some way to improve its performance. To its credit, at project completion UNICEF commissioned an independent evaluation of the project's effects. However, since the project design had such serious flaws, the evaluation could draw only weak and poorly substantiated conclusions.

5.8. At the end of the aid program, donors had learned some important lessons, but not about the limits to or opportunities for affecting outcomes under fragile state conditions. This fundamental failing diminished the quality of aid management. As the manager of these programs, UNICEF is directly accountable for the design and implementation flaws. However, the GPE Board, Secretariat, and the Madagascar LEG are complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of these projects.

5.9. In evaluating the performance of the **LEG**, those interviewed in Madagascar distinguished between the Technical and Financial Partners (TFP) and the Groupement Local de Partenaires pour l'Education (GLPE), the former consisting of the donors and the latter of the full local education group—donors, Government, NGOs, and civic organizations. The performance of the TFP was moderately satisfactory; that of the GLPE, unsatisfactory. The consensus was that the TFP was somewhat effective and the GLPE ineffective in discharging its functions: conducting sector planning, harmonizing the donors' support around the GPE project that UNICEF was managing, monitoring and overseeing project implementation, conducting policy dialogue in education, and bringing about changes in Government policies. The crisis seems to have had the unintended positive effect of stimulating the TFPs to strengthen their dialogue and coordination.

5.10. Given the tumultuous implementation environment, the TFP's/GLPE's oversight of the GPE was surprisingly modest: a joint review in May 2011 and a mini-review in January 2012. Those interviewed implied that the LEG had not yet developed joint supervision traditions, which may account for the light supervision of this grant. The May 2011 review did specify conditions for releasing the third tranche, including Government's paying its share of the school grants and FRAM teachers' salaries and social security contributions. Thus, at least the Technical and Financial Partners used GPE financing to pressure Government on actions key to GPE's goal: arresting the decline of the sector. However, they did not seem

¹⁹ Several interviewees pointed out an odd unintended negative consequence of UNICEF's stewardship. Prior to 2009 all goods purchased with donor funds carried the logo of the MoE, regardless of how they were financed. However, under UNICEF goods (e.g., school kits) were marked with the UNICEF logo. This undermined beneficiaries' confidence in the Malagasy education system, conveying visually that the Ministry could not help them.

to pursue the obvious question: was the GPE grant succeeding in maintaining, expanding, or slowing the decline in access and retention?

5.11. UNICEF's core program and Norway's bilateral aid to UNICEF. UNICEF's management of its own program and those funded by Norway was moderately unsatisfactory. Of the 3 UNICEF programs, two preceded the coup. Their alignment with the EFA plan prior to the coup and UNICEF's adjustment of these two programs after the coup were both appropriate. However, the focus of the third program, Minimizing the Impact of the Political Crisis on Education, showed questionable judgment, given the lack of Government's political support. All three programs were analytically weak. They failed to specify causal paths between activities and the outcomes sought and had weak internal systems for monitoring and evaluation. Their designs and results matrixes relied on the fulfillment of large numbers of quantitative activity targets, making these the primary "drivers" of the programs. Activities and outputs could not be related to the outcomes and impacts sought. In this case Norway was complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of its bilateral aid.

B. Financial analysis

5.12. Public financial management. The most recent public expenditure and financial accountability assessment for Madagascar indicated a general deterioration in the public financial management system between 2008 and 2013. This deterioration affected the financing and delivery of basic education. Performance improved in four areas such as in the collection of domestic revenues relative to budget estimates, budget classification, and budget documentation. The rating for nine of the indicators deteriorated, including the annual budget preparation process, the multi-year perspective in fiscal planning and expenditure policy, public procurement systems, and internal audit. The ratings for other indicators did not change from 2008.

5.13. Maintaining macroeconomic stability since 2009 has been increasingly difficult. Internal revenue has declined from 12.3% of GDP in 2010 to 11.1% in 2012, tax fraud has increased, and the ability to maintain the level of overall expenditures was undermined by political pressure, strikes and shocks. Expenditures decreased from 15.1% of GDP in 2010 to 13.5% in 2012. Official aid during the period 2010-12 dropped by about 20%, and a significant proportion of that aid was transferred to humanitarian programs.

5.14. Madagascar does not have a strategic plan for public finance reform. However, the various branches of the Ministry of Finance and Budget and other structures involved in the management of public finances have initiated a number of specific reforms, assisted by institutional support projects. In order to consolidate these specific public finance reforms, in 2013 Government launched a recruitment process for a consultant who will help Government develop the vision and strategy of reform.

5.15. Credibility of the budget. Madagascar averaged annual variations in actual expenditures versus budgeted amounts that were much higher than they should have been. The variance in 2013, although still too high, had decreased to 87%. However, in 2010 and 2011 education expenditures were only 77% of the amounts initially budgeted, in part because of the economic crisis and policy of austerity. Other factors behind the high variances include: a) late delivery of funding that prevents sub-national units from being able to procure goods and services during the fiscal year; and b) mid-term reallocation of money from the education sector to other sectors.

5.16. Variances this high reveal a lack of effective budget planning and execution and make it difficult for government agencies to plan and implement effectively. The credibility of the budget was further undermined by the high deviation in the composition of the expenditures from the initial budget (2010 and 2012). There are no reliable data on the stock of expenditure payment arrears for the last two years (2011 and 2012). The rating for the credibility of Madagascar's budget was low (D+) in 2008 and declined further to a D in 2013.

5.17. Predictability and control in budget execution. Relative to 2008, the predictability and control of budget implementation improved in terms of access to information about taxpayers, tax and customs duties, and the control of the taxpayer registration system. Nevertheless, in 2013 (and from 2008) the procurement system remained weak due to the non-functioning of the body responsible for investigating complaints. The internal audit function was also weakened by the limitation of the systems audits.

5.18. A lack of reliable information on the availability of resources made the availability of funds for spending unpredictable. The management of the public debt is adequate, and the consolidation of account balances managed by the Treasury is done every week. However, the controls for payroll are weak, and the procurement systems are still very limited. Nevertheless, internal controls for non-salary expenses such as internal audit systems are quite effective.

5.19. The predictability and control of budget implementation in 2013 remains virtually unchanged from 2008 in terms of the predictability of the availability of funds for commitment as expenditures, the management of cash balances, debt and guarantees, payroll controls, and the internal controls for non-salary expenditures. Overall, between 2008 and 2013 the performance of these systems and sub-systems changed only slightly, as indicated by the rating for this category declining slightly a C+ in 2008 to a C in 2013.

5.20. Fungibility and/or additionality. Given the weak public financial management systems, the high level of budget variances, and the lack of resources, it is likely that resources allocated to the education sector will not be used for their intended purposes. In other words, the budget can indicate a level of support that demonstrates commitment to the education sector plan. However, during the execution of the budget, some of those funds may end up being diverted to other sectors. If there is limited transparency in the execution of the budget, this reallocation (variance) may go un-noticed. Table 4 indicates that this happened in Madagascar: there is a high level of variance between the actual levels of spending on the education sector compared to the budgeted amounts.

5.21. Ratio and trend analysis. Table 4 also displays the Government's financing of the education sector. The education sector received a decreasing share of GDP (3.2% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2013) and the same share of the national budget (22.6%). Since the national budget pie was shrinking over this time period, the same share of a smaller pie is less. The high levels of variance between the budget and actual spending levels only compounded a smaller share.

Table 4: Trends in Education Financing for Madagascar (2010-2013)

Category	2009 ¹	2010	2011	2012	2013
% of GDP allocated to education	3.2%	3.4%	3.6%	2.9%	2.8%
% of national budget allocated to education	22.6%	19.8%	23.3%	23.9%	22.6%
% of actual education expenditures compared to amount budgeted	NA	77.8%	77%	91.3%	87.3%
% of education budget allocated to basic education		64%	59%	50%	44%

¹ The data for 2009 come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators; the data for 2010-2013, from the Madagascar Government.

5.22. Trends in the share of the education budget going to basic education are alarming. They are consistent with Government's substituting GPE and UNICEF contributions for Government fiscal effort. The share for this sub-sector has declined steadily since 2010, representing 50% of the amount budgeted for the entire sector in 2012 and declining further to 44% of the sector's total budget in 2013. Since these figures refer to the planned budget, not the actual expenditures, the picture for the funding actually available to education entities for basic education is even worse.

5.23. Exacerbating the effects of funding shortfalls for basic education was the fact that the funds for sub-national entities were not released on a predictable and consistent schedule. Inconsistent and presumably late budgetary releases occur when Government's receipts and expenditures, as a percentage of the GDP, have been declining and where the public financial management system is weak and undisciplined. These late budgetary releases are a partial explanation for the high levels of variance between budget and actual expenditures because the unpredictable nature of the releases makes it difficult for the local entities to plan for and procure the items that had been budgeted for.

C. Basic education enabling conditions

5.24. DPMG's theory of change (Annex 2) identifies system-level and sector-specific basic education enabling conditions for achieving improved learning outcomes, gender equality, and equity. As table 5 shows, prior to the coup, the sector was achieving or was committed to achieving most of these conditions via its 2005 and 2008 EFA plans. For example, it was piloting the use of the mother tongue of Malagasy as the language of instruction through grade 5, introducing French only in grade 6. However, with some notable exceptions, these conditions were absent or seriously compromised for Madagascar during the 2009-2013 period. For example, the Local Education Group (LEG) functioned, coalescing around GPE's grant. However, serious cuts in funding for the sector after the coup undercut the fee-free policy, school feeding, and scholarships for the disadvantaged.

Table 5: Pre-coup and post-coup status of sector on system and basic education enabling conditions

System enabling conditions	Status pre-coup and post-coup	Basic education enabling conditions	Status pre-coup and post-coup
A costed national ESP showing commitment to improved quality, gender equality & equity in Basic Education (BE) incl. Early Childhood Education (ECE).	Pre-coup: 2008 EFA Plan endorsed by donors Post-coup: March 2009 coup leadership rejected EFA Plan. Revalidated it in June 2010 to get tranche 2 of GPE funding, but with little effect on leadership's actions.	Community/ parental involvement and supports esp. for girls/ disadvantaged	Pre-coup: communities involved via school development plans and as employers of community teachers. Post-coup: Role (and capacities) of community Parents' Associations probably deepened, but because of UNICEF, not Government.
Gov't ownership of & agency alignment w/ externally supported program.	Pre-coup: Government instrumental in framing the 2008 EFA Plan; sector budget and donor financing aligned with EFA Plan Post-coup: no Government ownership; donors withdraw financing	Fee free policy, school feeding, scholarships and/or cash transfers for disadvantaged	Pre-coup: fee-free policy, school feeding, scholarships in place. Post-coup: family costs increase; school feeding by Government declines; scholarships late
High share of national budget for education (trend over time)	Reasonable, but not high, shares prior to and post-coup. 2009: 3.2% of GDP and 22.6% of Government budget 2013: 2.8% of GDP and 22.8% of Government budget	Institutional capacity at national and local level (for planning & implementation)	Pre-coup: Substantial capacity development needed at all levels, but with islands of strength--e.g., UAT-EPT. Post-coup: high turnover at all national and sub-national levels; replaced on political grounds and/or less competent individuals.
Conflict/disaster sensitive mechanisms in place.	Pre-coup: not known Post-coup: interviews imply that some mechanisms allowed to lapse	Strong budgetary support for BE, including ECE	Alarming decline in basic education share of education budget. Pre-coup (2010): 64% for basic education Post-coup (2013): 44%
Functioning Local Education Group.	Pre-coup: functioning, but relatively embryonic Post-coup: functioning and stronger		
Appropriate multi-lingual policy in place & funded	Pre-coup: present in EFA Plan and being piloted in 20 school districts Post-coup: coup stopped pilot in March 2009; resumed to get GPE funding, but with no political backing		
Disaggregated EMIS & learning assessments in place,	Pre-coup: learning assessment (PASEC) in place, but not administered frequently: 1997–98 and 2004–05. Post-coup: Government administered PASEC in 2012 as part of preparing Interim Education Sector Plan with donors.		

VI: Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

A. Findings

6.1. Each country case study addressed two questions. What are the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the basic education initiatives that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds indirectly through two agents, GPE and UNICEF? What is the value-added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for its investments? A theory of change informed the analysis of the first question; a theory of good aid management, the second one.

6.2. The four basic education programs evaluated were the GPE grant (2010-2013, including a one year no-cost extension), with UNICEF as the managing entity for the grant; UNICEF's core program; and two programs of bilateral aid from Norway to UNICEF: Ensuring the Right to Quality Education for All Children in Madagascar (2008-2011) and Minimizing the Impact of the Political Crisis on Education in Madagascar (2009-2010).

Theory of change

6.3. Enabling conditions. Prior to the coup, the sector had achieved or was committed to achieving most of the system and sector conditions that enable better learning outcomes, gender equality, and equity. After the coup and for the period of this evaluation, with some notable exceptions, these conditions were absent or seriously compromised for Madagascar.

6.4. Relevance and outcomes. The outcomes of interest were the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of Norwegian aid to basic education through UNICEF and GPE, focusing particularly on the achievement of Norway's policy objectives of the quality of learning, gender equality and equity.

6.5. The objectives and activities of all programs were **relevant** to the *country*, pre-coup and post-coup. However, pursuing UNICEF's grant from Norway, "Minimizing the Impact", during the coup was, in the event, unrealistic. UNICEF learned which activities lacked political support after the coup early in the case of the GPE program it was managing, its own core program, and the "Ensuring Rights" program. Thus, it is puzzling that UNICEF and Norway pursued a program during the coup that the parties might have anticipated would encounter a lack of political support (teacher training, competency-based curriculum, school manuals tied to the new curriculum).

6.6. For each of the four programs, table 6 shows if the program had any intervention that could be related to the **outcomes** sought by Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (improved learning outcomes, improved gender equality, and improved equity). Income levels and residence (urban versus rural and food insecure regions) create significant education inequities. Gender inequalities, although they exist--sometimes to the disadvantage of boys, are muted.

6.7. All four programs included, with UNICEF's grant from Norway, "Minimizing the Impact", concentrating on, activities related to improving the quality of teaching (teacher training and competency-based curriculum). However, these activities, although completed in some cases, struggled or failed because of the political environment. The redesigned programs thus focused primarily and appropriately on limiting the damage to access to and retention in school. Access and retention are not outcomes specified by Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but are obviously necessary conditions for progress on its priorities. The redesigned programs pursued activities that reduced the educational costs for parents in vulnerable regions (e.g., school feeding, school kits for children), decreased the distances to and physical attractiveness of school (construction of classrooms, schools, sanitary facilities, and access to potable water), and helped keep teachers and schools afloat financially through paying teacher subventions for a third of the year and Local Catalytic Funds to schools.

Table 6: Did education program include activities possibly related to Ministry of Foreign Affairs outcomes?

Basic education program	Inclusion of activities possibly connected to Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' outcomes		
	Improved learning outcomes	Improved gender equality	Improved equity
GPE grant	✓		✓
UNICEF core program	✓	✓ (post-primary)	✓
UNICEF Norway "Ensuring Rights" program	✓	✓ (big sister)	✓
UNICEF Norway "Minimizing impact" program	✓		

6.8. It is hard to believe that these programs did not positively affect the access and retention of beneficiaries to school. *However, we do not know what outcomes were achieved for any of these programs relative to baselines at the time of the coup or relative to outcomes during the coup for regions or groups not receiving the interventions.* None of the programs had a well defined causal path from activities to outputs to outcomes, although a plausible link could be made between those activities targeted on access and the access objectives sought. None had outcome indicators or baselines, and none measured whether and to what degree the outputs of activities affected outcomes. For example, targets for several programs were the number of teachers trained. However, a major independent assessment of training financed by the World Bank found that completing a training program was a poor predictor of the improved workplace performance sought, with teacher training programs notable for their failure rates. Counting the number of teachers trained may have nothing to do with better teaching performance.

6.9. Unintended consequences. The field team assessed whether providing aid had any of six unintended consequences and found two possibilities: 1) incentives for government to divert spending away from basic education to other budget areas, and 2) aid programs becoming a political weapon or source of tension among competing factions in the government or different regions or ethnic groups. The share of the education budget going to basic education steadily eroded from 64% in 2010 to 44% in 2013. These data are consistent with government diverting spending away from basic education to other budget areas, but the relationship is associational only. It is not known if in fact the availability of aid for basic education *caused* government to reduce the budget for this sub-sector.

6.10. In terms of aid programs becoming a political weapon or source of tension, some politicians apparently tried (unsuccessfully) to use the aid programs to portray Government in a positive light--for example, distributing school kits just before the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. The distribution of aid to basic education and to vulnerable zones generated negative reactions among champions of other educational sub-sectors (junior high schools, high schools, and vocational education) and the residents in other zones, especially among the natives of the highlands.

Theory of good aid management

6.11. The aid management performance of the GPE Board and Secretariat falls somewhere between moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. The GPE Board took calculated risks in making three tranches of aid available to Madagascar during the crisis. It knew the outputs of its aid, the Board and the donors could not judge whether the effects of these outputs on the outcomes sought warranted the risks, although, the outputs achieved almost certainly increased enrolment and retention rates in basic education in the vulnerable areas targeted beyond what they would have been in the absence of aid. The GPE Secretariat broke new ground in creating the role of "managing entity" when donors could not work directly with Government. However, both the Secretariat and the Board, which released funding on the basis of UNICEF's *Action Plan*, failed to assure the quality of that Plan, at least in terms of a simple results framework that could guide corrective action during implementation and yield even rough conclusions about the effects of the aid.

6.12. The performance of the Technical and Financial Partners, a subset of the full LEG, Groupement Local de Partenaires pour l'Education (GLPE), seems to have been moderately satisfactory. That of the GLPE was unsatisfactory.

6.13. As managing entity for the GPE program, UNICEF did many things right in a very difficult environment, and its performance is judged to have been satisfactory with one caveat. It balanced the risks associated with moving quickly under emergency conditions with careful and intensified supervision later in the operation. It conducted post-reviews, audits and other measures.

6.14. However, the GPE-funded basic education aid program in Madagascar during the coup period was overshadowed by activity-driven design and reporting. It left all parties flying somewhat blind in terms of the effects of these activities on the outcomes sought and unable to judge during implementation if the aid should be restructured in some way to improve its performance. At the end of the aid program, donors had learned some important lessons, but not about the limits to or opportunities for affecting outcomes under fragile state conditions. This failing diminished the quality of the aid management.

6.15. It is recognized that the accountabilities for emergency operations such as this one are complicated. GPE noted that they operated in a context of continuous deadlines for a political resolution being set by negotiators. Thus, in the first two years a potential political solution was always just months away, leaving GPE and UNICEF believing that they were engaged in short-term emergency measures. In line with good practice for emergency projects, the indicators for the development objectives of such projects can legitimately consist of *output* indicators that are based on simplicity, achievability, and measurability and are directly attributable to the project's activities. However, this approach requires a good logic model with very tight and empirically-based links between activities, outputs, and the outcomes sought. If the outputs occur for the intended beneficiaries, it is then reasonable, although hardly definitive, to infer positive effects on the outcomes sought.

6.16. As the manager of these programs, UNICEF is directly accountable for this design and implementation flaw. *However, the GPE Board, Secretariat, and the Madagascar LEG are complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of these projects.*

6.17. UNICEF's management of its own program and those funded by Norway was moderately unsatisfactory. Although educationally relevant, one of the Norwegian-funded programs was rendered irrelevant by the country's political circumstances. All three programs were analytically weak. They failed to specify causal paths between activities and the outcomes sought and had weak internal systems for monitoring and evaluation. Their designs and results matrixes relied on the fulfillment of large numbers of quantitative activity targets, making these the primary "drivers" of the programs. Activities and outputs could not be related to the outcomes and impacts sought. In this case *Norway was complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of these projects.*

Financing

6.18. The most recent public expenditure and financial accountability assessment for Madagascar indicated a general deterioration in the public financial management system between 2008 and 2013 that affected the financing and delivery of basic education.

- Madagascar averaged high annual variations in actual expenditures versus budgeted amounts. Although the variance had decreased by 2013 (87%), in 2010 and 2011 education expenditures were only 77% of the amounts initially budgeted. Such variances can stem from late delivery of funding that prevents sub-national units from being able to procure goods and services during the fiscal year or mid-term reallocation of money from the education sector to other sectors. Variances this high make it difficult for government agencies to plan and implement effectively.

- The education sector received a decreasing share of GDP (3.2% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2013) and the same share of the national budget (22.6%). Since the national budget pie was shrinking over this time period, the same share of a smaller pie is less. The high levels of variance between the budget and actual spending levels only compounded a smaller share.
- Trends in the share of the education budget going to basic education are alarming. They are consistent with Government's substituting GPE and UNICEF contributions for Government fiscal effort. The share for this sub-sector has declined steadily since 2010, representing 50% of the amount budgeted for the entire sector in 2012 and declining further to 44% of the sector's total budget in 2013. Since these figures refer to the planned budget, not the actual expenditures, the picture for the funding actually available to education entities for basic education is even worse.

Lessons learned

6.19. The GPE program and UNICEF's programs yielded a number of lessons for funding and managing aid in Madagascar. These may have broader implications, especially for countries whose fragile conditions stem from power struggles. However, each country in a fragile condition presents different obstacles and opportunities. A country devastated by a natural event, such as an earthquake, is entirely different from one engulfed in power fights.

- **Think a theory of maintenance or damage limitation, not development.** The design of projects or programs in fragile states will often have to be based on a theory of maintenance, damage limitation, or recovery, not the usual development perspective appropriate to stable situations.
- **Always think through the causal pathways.** Country fragility tends to be associated with emergencies. However, project designs in these conditions still need carefully thought through causal chains from activities to the maintenance or damage-limiting outcomes sought. They still need indicators, and arrangements to measure progress toward outcomes. The lack of these frameworks (and their use) results in sub-optimal implementation and inadequate accountability for the effective use of resources.
- **Stay flexible.** Flexibility in means and sometimes in ends is necessary to operate effectively in fragile conditions. However, especially when ends must change, the theory that links activities to outputs to outcomes must be revised, as well as its associated indicators and measurement arrangements. All changes need to be clearly documented.
- **Be alert to substitution effects.** The financial data for the sector (table 4) show steady erosion in the share of the education budget going to basic education: from 64% in 2010 to 44% in 2013. These trends are consistent with Government's substituting GPE and UNICEF contributions to basic education for Government's fiscal effort in the sub-sector, although this relationship is associational only, not causal. Donor aid can be made contingent on Government's maintaining its fiscal effort.
- **Keep it simple.** The onset of the political crisis in 2009 put acute pressure on the education system. Basic needs became the top priority, as evidenced by the fact that programs moved from a development focus to a "system survival" approach. The design of aid thus needed to become simpler and to focus on key necessities such as teacher payments, school grants and school feeding, and the distribution of school kits. It should omit more complex issues such as curriculum development.
- **Keep it as apolitical as possible.** Partly because the external players did not anticipate (and could not have anticipated) years, instead of months, of political instability, UNICEF, EFA, and the partners tried to keep the pre-coup Education Reform alive. The coup leadership did not support the paradigm shift embedded in the Reform. In the absence of strong political support, substantial progress on elements of the Reform was unlikely and in fact did not materialize.

- **Minimize the use of parallel systems.** Parallel systems disempower and discredit the Government and reduce the accountability of the systems and the personnel in place. If working through the central Government is not an option for political or other reasons, delivering the aid as directly to beneficiaries as possible minimizes the creation of centralized systems with powerful interests in sustaining their new role. Interests will be created even when delivering the aid as directly to beneficiaries as possible, but if direct delivery is working well, it is more efficient and should become a permanent delivery system.
- **Political choices by donor nations can complicate support to fragile states.** Withdrawing aid or not channeling it through the central government is one of the few levers available to donor Governments for expressing their condemnation of illicit coups. These are policy decisions that can only be made in the capitols of donor countries. However, Agence Française pour le Développement (AFD) continued to finance their aid through a special account in the National Treasury, managed by the Ministry of Finance and transferred to the account of the MEN. AFD also continued to deliver their aid through MEN's Directorate General of Basic Education, Training and Literacy. The effectiveness and relevance of that aid is unknown, although financial audits of AFD's aid did not indicate financial irregularities. The AFD case shows that financing and implementing outside of the central government is a political choice and that it complicates aid delivery.
- **Carpe Diem--seize the day.** Crises can force the use of innovative ways to keep the system running that can reveal previously unrecognized capacities, build new capacities, and reveal significantly more efficient ways to get things done than had been previously used. When successful, these innovations can become institutionalized post-crisis. For example, UNICEF transferred the GPE share of school grants directly to the public primary schools, shortening the implementation chain and increasing the timeliness of fund transfers.
- **High turnover rates in the sector make efforts to develop capacities at worst fruitless and at best demanding of creative and situation-specific solutions.** UNICEF and the partners needed to develop capacities within the sector, but faced damaging turnover at every level of the system--from the top leadership of the MEN down to sub-national units. Good staff left, not to be replaced or replaced with ones of lesser competence, and units were politicized. Efforts to develop needed capacities at local levels floundered because without clear political directives from the central level, many regional and local level actors were hesitant to initiate or maintain activities.
- **Use education aid strategically.** Aside from the financing provided by UNICEF and GPE, these grants can be used strategically to prevent the donors from fragmenting and to constrain damaging actions by Government.

B. Conclusions

6.20. The first question asked of this evaluation was to identify the intended and unintended outputs and outcomes of the basic education initiatives that Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds indirectly through GPE and UNICEF. All programs, as initially designed or redesigned were relevant directly or indirectly to Norway's objectives and to children's learning needs, but not necessarily to the priorities of the coup government.

6.21. All programs reported on outputs. The second Norwegian bilateral aid managed by UNICEF ("Minimizing Impact") tried to pursue the reform in place prior to the coup. It was least successful in achieving its output objectives because of political opposition. None of the programs reported on outcomes. It is hard to believe that at least three of the four programs did not positively affect the access and retention of beneficiaries to school. *However, we do not know what outcomes were achieved for any of these programs relative to baselines at the time of the coup or relative to outcomes during the coup for regions or groups not receiving the interventions.* None of the programs had a well-defined causal path from activities to outputs to outcomes, although a plausible link could be made between those activities targeted on access and the access objectives sought.

6.22. The second question asked of the evaluation was the value-added to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of using GPE and UNICEF as conduits for its investments. For GPE the value-added was mixed. The aid management performance of the GPE Board and Secretariat falls somewhere between moderately satisfactory and moderately unsatisfactory. The performance of the Technical and Financial Partners, a subset of the full Local Education Group, Groupement Local de Partenaires pour l'Education, seems to have been moderately satisfactory, but that of the full LEG unsatisfactory.

6.23. As managing entity for the GPE program, UNICEF did many things right in a very difficult environment and in a new role for UNICEF and for GPE: as managing entity. Its performance is judged to have been satisfactory with one caveat. Its activity-driven design and reporting left all parties flying somewhat blind in terms of the effects of these activities on the outcomes sought and unable to judge during implementation if the aid should be restructured in some way to improve its performance.

6.24. UNICEF's management of its own program and those funded by Norway was moderately unsatisfactory. The relevance of one of the Norwegian-funded programs was questionable. All three programs were analytically weak. They failed to specify causal paths between activities and the outcomes sought and had weak internal systems for monitoring and evaluation. Their designs and results matrixes relied on the fulfillment of large numbers of quantitative activity targets, making these the primary "drivers" of the programs. Activities and outputs could not be related to the outcomes and impacts sought. In this case *Norway was complicit in not requiring of UNICEF more rigorous designs and systematic measurement of indicators during the implementation of these projects.*

C. Recommendations

- 1) No matter the aid delivery context or project size, always ensure that any aid project or package meets two conditions. First, the design of the aid should demonstrate a clear and plausible analytic understanding of the causal path for the aid from activities to outcomes. Second, the design should specify a measurement framework and monitoring arrangements that can: a) track the progress of the aid during implementation, and b) allow conclusions—even if only rough estimates—to be drawn about the effects of the aid at completion. *The fundamental issue here is clarity of thought and the design of a measurement regime fit for management and accountability purposes.*
- 2) In fragile state conditions, at the design stage model the likely trend in outcomes with and without the aid interventions that are contemplated. Are the projected effects sufficient to warrant the draining complexities of implementing under fragile conditions?
- 3) Hold the agents (those creating the design and managing its implementation) accountable for the quality of aid design and implementation. Even if the principals delegate the responsibility to others to assure that projects that they finance meet standards, the principals have a responsibility to set standards for good practice.
- 4) When designing aid, be wary of outcomes and activities less likely to succeed under fragile conditions. Success requires the political support of Government, no matter how unattractive that Government might be. If that support is not present, focus first— as UNICEF did so well—on upstream policy dialogue to create political support. Since fragile states often have high turnover at national and sub-national levels, pursue capacity development activities only if the intended beneficiaries have the incentives to change and only if better capacities will not be quickly lost to further turnover. Recognize that some objectives, especially those involving quality, require longer time frames to succeed and thus relatively stable conditions that only infrequently exist in fragile states.
- 5) Under fragile state conditions, keep the design of the aid and the arrangements for delivering it as simple as possible. Aid management under these conditions is extraordinarily demanding, and Government sources of implementation expertise are apt to be in disarray or unavailable.

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Annex 1. Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Norwegian Multilateral Support to Basic Education Terms of Reference

1. Background

1.1 Global trends in education aid over the past decade

The overarching goals for education aid globally are the Education for All (EFA) goals and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 2 and 3. We are half a year from 2015, the year when the Millennium Development Goals are to be achieved. A lot of progress has been made since the start of the millennium. The global pre-primary education gross enrolment ratio increased from 33% in 1999 to 50% in 2011, equivalent to almost 60 million more children enrolled²⁰. The number of children out of school fell almost by half by 2011 but has since stagnated.

Yet we will not meet the global education goals. 58 million children are still out of school, and poor quality schooling is a major obstacle to ensuring that adequate learning is taking place. Inequality in access and learning impede the achievement of quality education for all. One major reason for this is inadequate funding. Basic education is underfunded by USD26 billion per year²¹. The cost of such underfunding to the individual and to society includes lost well-being, productivity and health.

Domestic spending on education globally has on average increased from 4.6% to 5.1% of GNP from 1999 to 2011²². A suggested goal post-2015 is that countries should spend between 4 and 6% of their GNP on education²³. Another international benchmark is that education should be allocated between 15 and 20% of the national budget, which for various reasons is the case in very few countries. Widening the tax base could help some countries meet the education goals, but especially the poorest countries will need external funding in addition²⁴.

Globally, the volume of financial aid for education has increased considerably since 2000, though it decreased by 10% from 2010 to 2012 (OECD). The education sector has a narrow donor base and is as such vulnerable to low aid predictability and delivery. In 2011, the top five funders of basic education²⁵ were the World Bank, the United Kingdom, The United States, EU Institutions and Germany²⁶. UNICEF is one of the five most important multilateral channels in terms of total financing to education²⁷, and together, the multilateral agencies contributed 25% of total ODA to education over the past decade. The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) does not report to the OECD, but would be the fifth largest multilateral donor based on its own financial data²⁸. Even so, the share that these agencies contribute to basic education has

²⁰ Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4 "Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all".

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ The OECD average was 6.3% of GDP (GNP and GDP are not directly comparable. Information taken from [http://www.oecd.org/edu/eag2013%20\(eng\)--FINAL%2020%20June%202013.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/edu/eag2013%20(eng)--FINAL%2020%20June%202013.pdf)

²⁴ Rose, P. and L. Steer (2013): "Financing for Global Education. Opportunities for multilateral action. A report prepared for the UN Special Envoy for Global Education for the High-Level Roundtable on Learning for All: Coordinating the financing and delivery of education".

²⁵ Percentage share of donor's aid to basic education as a share of all donor's aid to basic education, source OECD/DAC.

²⁶ Rose, P. and L. Stee, op.cit.

²⁷ The largest multilateral donors as reported by the OECD-DAC in terms of total financing to education are the Asian Development Bank, The African Development Bank, The European Union Institutions, the World Bank and UNICEF.

²⁸ Rose, P. and L. Stee, op.cit. (footnote 3)

declined over the last decade relative to that of bilateral donors.


1.2 Trends in Norwegian aid to education over the past decade

The EFA goals and the MDGs 2 and 3 also guide Norwegian aid to education. Basic education is a priority, and two of the main goals for Norway are enhanced access to education and improved quality of the education provided²⁹. There is a particular focus on girls' education and on provision of education in a safe learning environment, both during peace, and during war and conflict. Norwegian development cooperation is guided by the principle of a human rights- based approach.

Norwegian bilateral and multi-bilateral³⁰ aid to education increased from NOK 1293 million in 2004 to NOK 1690 million in 2013. Aid to education as a share of total aid peaked at 13.5% in 2006 and has since gradually decreased to reach 7.2% in 2013³¹. During the past decade, there has been a significant shift in the channelling of Norwegian aid to education from the bilateral to the multilateral channel. Of Norwegian bilateral and multi-bilateral aid to basic education, the latter increased from 30% in 2000, to 73% in 2013.

Most of the aid to education goes to the basic education sub-sector (86% in 2013). The total Norwegian multi-bilateral funds to basic education over the last five years amounts to NOK 3.79 billion. As illustrated in Figure 1, nearly three quarters (74%) of this has gone to UNICEF. Almost a quarter (24%) of the funds have gone to the GPE. For this reason, UNICEF/BEGE and GPE have been chosen as evaluation objects for this evaluation.

Figure 1: Norwegian Multi-bilateral aid to basic education by partner, 2009-2013³²



Source: Norad's Database

Allocations to UNICEF for basic education increased steadily in the beginning of the decade, and have stabilised around NOK 480-560 million per year during the latter half of the decade. Norwegian support to GPE started in 2003, and stabilised around NOK 100 million per year but

²⁹ Key document: http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/35167823/PDFS/PRP201120120001_UDDDDPDFS.pdf

³⁰ Bilateral aid here includes both government-to-government funds as well as funds from the Norwegian aid administration to/through NGOs and CSOs. Multi-bilateral aid includes both earmarked funds from the Norwegian administration to multilateral organisations (MO) centrally and funds from Norwegian embassies to the MO's local country offices. Pure multilateral funds (i.e. core funding) is not included in this evaluation.

³¹ The share to education does not include core funding to multilateral organisations, of which some is used to support education, or expenses for administration in Norway.

³² The two largest recipients in the "other UN" category up to and including 2009 are ILO (NOK 87 million) and the International Institute for Education Planning (NOK 83 million).

doubled in 2011 to reach NOK 200 million.

Norway is actively engaged in GPE as member of the Board, and participating in the constituency group as well as in one of the four committees advisory to the Board of Directors, namely the Country Grants and Performance Committee. Norway has bilateral annual meetings with UNICEF and participates in UNICEF's Executive Board and in working groups as relevant (e.g. the working group on Results Framework, 2014-2017).

1.3 UNICEF's Thematic Focus Area Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE)

In the period under review, UNICEF was guided by the second Medium-Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) 2006-2013³³. According to the UNICEF Basic Education and Gender Equality Thematic Report for 2013, UNICEF aims to play a significant global leadership and advocacy role across the education sector, as well as working with key partners at the country level. UNICEF is committed to working for an evidence-based equity focus in education systems analysis and policymaking, for expanding coverage of basic education for the marginalised and for improving the quality of education.

UNICEF identifies five focus areas³⁴ that all receive "thematic funding"³⁵. This evaluation concentrates on one of these; "Basic Education and Gender Equality (BEGE)".

The 2013 expenditure for BEGE was almost USD 713 million, with USD 112 coming from thematic contributions. Norway contributed almost 76% of the thematic funding for BEGE. Learning outcomes and equity including gender equality (the key focus areas in the current evaluation) accounted for the majority (72.2%) of expenditure for BEGE³⁶. The contributions from Norway to UNICEF's Basic Education and Gender Equality for 2006–2013 have varied between USD 72 and 91 million per year³⁷.

1.4 The Global Partnership for Education (GPE)

The Global Partnership for Education (GPE)³⁸ is a global partnership of developing and donor countries, multilateral agencies, civil society organisations, the teaching profession, and private sector actors supporting the education sector in developing countries. It currently has 59 developing country partners. Focusing on coordinating action at country level, GPE does not operate as a traditional global fund. While it allocates funds to countries based on an agreed-on formula, it puts primary responsibility on national governments and in-country partners to mobilise and deliver support for education sector plans endorsed by the Local Education Group (LEG) and provides a global platform for mobilising additional resources nationally and internationally.

The LEG, intended to include all actors involved in the education sector, lies at the heart of the

³³ A new Strategic Plan (2014-2017) has just been instituted.

³⁴ The thematic focus areas as outlined in UNICEF's Medium Term Strategic Plan (MTSP) for 2006-2013 are: Young Child Survival and Development; Basic Education and Gender Equality; HIV/AIDS and Children; Child Protection from Violence, Exploitation and Abuse; Policy Advocacy and Partnership for Children's Rights; and Humanitarian Response.

³⁵ This is an alternative funding modality created to support the goals and objectives of the MTSP. It is more flexible than traditional earmarked funds (sometimes referred to as softly earmarked), and allows for longer term planning and sustainability of the programmes.

³⁶ The other two focus areas are "early learning" and "education in emergencies".

³⁷ UNICEF Thematic Report 2013, table page 48. Note that figures before and after 2012 cannot be compared.

³⁸ GPE started as the Education for All Fast Track Initiative in 2002, but was renamed the Global Partnership for Education in 2011 to reflect key changes in the governance structure.

GPE as a collaborative forum for policy dialogue, alignment and harmonisation of donor support to the national education plan. It seeks to keep all parties fully informed of progress and challenges, and collates and disseminates information, including on GPE partner and non-partner funding. The specific composition, title, and working arrangements of LEGs vary from country to country. When a program implementation grant is requested from the GPE, a supervising entity (SE) or a managing entity (ME) must be designated by the LEG³⁹. The SE or ME will play a key role in the LEG, and in supporting implementation.

Following an evaluation published in 2010⁴⁰, the partnership was restructured and its mandate broadened. The largest donors to the partnership in terms of cumulative contributions by May 2014 are the UK (USD 857 million), the Netherlands (649 mill), Spain (353 mill), Australia (307 mill), Denmark (288 mill) and Norway (USD 285 mill)⁴¹. This year, the GPE's independent evaluation committee is commissioning an interim evaluation of the partnership. This evaluation will to the extent possible be coordinated with the GPE evaluation so that the two evaluations can complement, inform and support each other.

1.5 The difference between UNICEF and GPE

There are important differences between UNICEF and GPE, and how they engage in the education sector, which warrant some clarification. At the country level, UNICEF is involved from the national through to the school level contributing to both upstream policy and on-the-ground programme activities and outcomes. While UNICEF participates in the national policy dialogue, UNICEF's funding is often channelled outside the national education budget and targeted to specific groups and/or regions. UNICEF implements some projects directly, some through government and some through civil society. UNICEF has significant presence nationally and sub-nationally, and actively collaborate with government offices at all levels. GPE on the other hand has no direct in-country presence and builds on its partners, including UNICEF in certain countries, for implementation. The GPE Secretariat engages remotely or through periodic in-country short-term visits by secretariat staff or consultants.

2. Rationale, Purpose and Objectives

The current Norwegian government places education on top of the development agenda, and has recently launched a White Paper on Global Education⁴². Much of the funding for basic education is channelled through multilateral actors – notably through UNICEF and GPE. More knowledge on the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency⁴³ of these institutions will be important for future allocations of aid. The White Paper explicitly states that better results reporting and delivery is expected, and both UNICEF and GPE are potential candidates for substantial scaling up of Norwegian support to education. This is the rationale for assessing the degree to which Norwegian support to basic education through UNICEF and GPE provides quality results in an

³⁹ The SE or ME are a bilateral or multilateral development agency. The SE will transfer grant funds to the developing country government, who will implement the programme, whereas the ME will manage programme activities directly.

⁴⁰ See <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/reports/2010/02/01/mid-term-evaluation-of-the-efa-fast-track-initiative-final-synthesis-report-volume-5-appendices-vi-viii.html>.

⁴¹ See <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/reports/2010/02/01/mid-term-evaluation-of-the-efa-fast-track-initiative-final-synthesis-report-volume-5-appendices-vi-viii.html>.

⁴² <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2013-2014/Meld-St-25--20132014.html?id=762554>.

⁴³ As defined by the OECD-DAC, see <http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

efficient and cost-effective manner.

The purpose of the evaluation is to facilitate more evidence based policy and programming decisions both in Norway and in UNICEF and GPE, with a dual focus on accountability and learning. This will be achieved through generating evaluation evidence on the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of Norwegian aid to basic education through UNICEF and GPE, focusing particularly on the achievement of Norway's policy objectives quality of learning⁴⁴, gender equality and equity⁴⁵, and through increasing the knowledge base of basic education.

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

- a) Assess the relevance and coherence of Norway's, UNICEF's, GPE's and selected national government's development objectives. Because a rights-based approach is a key principle for Norwegian development cooperation, the evaluation shall assess if and how this principle is followed by UNICEF, GPE and governments in the selected case countries.
- b) Assess the efficiency and effectiveness of financial and technical inputs provided by UNICEF and GPE in generating results at the country level, with a particular focus on quality of learning, equity and gender equality.
- c) Identify the added value, or comparative advantage, of GPE and UNICEF respectively. 'Added value' is defined as the degree to which UNICEF and GPE make a difference, positively or negatively, beyond the sheer volume of aid⁴⁶.
- d) Identify good practices and lessons learned.
- e) Provide evidence-based operational recommendations for consideration and action by decision makers and practitioners in Norway, in UNICEF and in GPE, and to the sector more generally.

3. Scope and Evaluation Questions

3.1 Scope

The evaluation covers all of GPE's and UNICEF's support to basic education during the period 2009-2013⁴⁷. It will assess contributions of GPE and UNICEF to achieving results at national level, focusing on outputs and outcomes rather than impact⁴⁸, and emphasising the quality of

⁴⁴ Quality is defined here in line with UNICEF who sets out the desirable characteristics of learners, processes, content and systems. See http://www.unicef.org/education/index_quality.html. The aspect of learner achievement should carry particular weight.

⁴⁵ Equity is defined here as "all children hav[ing] an opportunity to survive, develop and reach their full potential without discrimination, bias or favouritism.", ref. UNICEF and consistent with the Convention of the Rights of the child. See http://www.unicef.org/about/partnerships/index_60239.html. This goes beyond equitable access to include equity in the quality of learning.

⁴⁶ This includes the way in which UNICEF and GPE interact with each other and with national governments, the quality of their technical inputs, additionality of funds, as well as other factors influencing whether results are achieved in an efficient and effective manner.

⁴⁷ To the extent that it is seen as relevant, activities spanning 2014 might also be included. Similarly, the evaluation team can argue for going further back in time.

⁴⁸ "Impact evaluation" here refers to rigorous evaluation design to identify the causal effect of an intervention or a policy/reform, including the use of a counterfactual comparison group.

learning, equity and gender equality dimensions of the basic education sector (pre-primary, primary, lower level secondary and including teachers' education and non-formal education⁴⁹). Vocational-, adult- and informal education have been excluded as these areas do not constitute a substantial part of what is supported by either UNICEF or GPE.

GPE prioritises support to fragile states. Quality education for all is no less important in such contexts, and the evaluation will therefore assess how basic education sector plans cover allocation of resources to children who live in conflict- or disaster affected areas, and how they cover disaster risk reduction, conflict sensitivity and other measures relevant to such contexts. Beyond this, humanitarian aid is excluded from this evaluation.

As outlined below, the evaluation is planned with three separate but related parts: A Financial Assessment, a Results Assessment, and a Scoping Exercise for a potential Impact Evaluation. Each part is specified in detail under approach and methodology (Section 4). The Impact Evaluation might be commissioned in a separate tender following the Scoping Exercise.

The evaluation will include in-depth study in four pre-selected countries, and a desk review of 10 countries based on available documentation. Selection of countries for the desk review will be made during the inception phase.

The countries selected for in-depth studies are Malawi, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Nepal. The selection criteria were: the main geographical focus should be Africa; GPE and UNICEF had been present in the countries for some time and preferably since 2009; quality, equity and gender are important areas in national education plans and interventions; potential candidates for future increase in Norwegian development aid to education; at least one country is a fragile state.

3.2 Evaluation Questions

In response to the purpose and objectives of this evaluation, the team should design the evaluation to answer the questions outlined in this section. The questions are organised according to the different parts of the evaluation outlined below, although some may overlap.

1. What results⁵⁰ (outputs and outcomes) of basic education interventions have been achieved at the country level? What are the contextual and other factors contributing to or impeding progress on each goal? Have the interventions resulted in any unintended effects?
2. Given the different roles and mandates of UNICEF and GPE; how and to what extent do they complement each other?
3. To what extent are UNICEF and GPE working in ways that support national efforts towards fulfilling the relevant EFA goals in terms of 1) Quality of learning, 2) Gender equality and 3) Equity? This includes assessment of the quality of the technical inputs⁵¹ and the extent to which the inputs are in accordance with the principles of aid

⁴⁹ Non-formal education should only be included to the extent that it is included in national education budgets.

⁵⁰ The focus should be on measures of quality (e.g. learner achievements, drop-out and repetition rates), equity (e.g. Benefit Incidence Analysis, Equity Gap) and gender, but general measures such as enrolment, completion and survival rates should also be included

⁵¹ "Impact evaluation" here refers to rigorous evaluation design to identify the causal effect of an intervention or a policy/reform, including the use of a counterfactual comparison group.

effectiveness⁵² and serve to strengthen the ability of governments to achieve their goals. The role of UNICEF and GPE vis-à-vis the education sector group in each country is key to answering these questions.

4. What have been the global patterns of financial allocations to basic education over the past five years? This is further specified in the methodology section.
5. To what degree is there stability and predictability of funding for education from national governments, UNICEF (and within UNICEF), GPE and other relevant actors, and in what ways does the degree of stability and predictability affect the ability to deliver results?
6. To what extent have resources been allocated and utilized in an efficient manner? This should include a minimum assessment of value-for-money, i.e. the extent to which the programme has obtained the maximum benefit from the outputs and outcomes it has produced within the resources available to it.

4. Approach and Methodology

4.1 Specific methodological considerations

The evaluation will consist of three parts:

1. A Results Assessment.
2. A Financial Assessment.
3. A Scoping Exercise: Preparation for a potential future Impact Evaluation⁵³.

All three parts are expected to inform and build upon each other.

For data collection purposes, visits to UNICEF and GPE headquarters are needed in addition to country visits to the four pre-selected countries.

Results Assessment

The evaluation shall document and assess results of the national basic education⁵⁴ interventions directly or indirectly supported by UNICEF and GPE at the country level, in relation to prevailing national policies.

In addition to in-depth country studies, this part of the evaluation shall include a desk study of 10 countries. The selection criteria will be similar to the criteria for the four in-depth case countries (see 3.1), and the countries will be selected during the inception phase. The desk review shall include results reporting from the relevant agency offices and/or governments, as well as review and analysis of relevant strategies, expenditure data, programme documentation, any reviews or evaluations, and a rapid review of available census or survey results to provide a general socioeconomic setting and a sense of educational status. The desk reviews should also include phone interviews with key personnel to allow for a deeper understanding of country processes.

⁵² The focus should be on measures of quality (e.g. learner achievements, drop-out and repetition rates), equity (e.g. Benefit Incidence Analysis, Equity Gap) and gender, but general measures such as enrolment, completion and survival rates should also be included.

⁵³ The Impact Evaluation itself will be commissioned in a separate tender.

⁵⁴ As defined above.

The results assessment shall focus on three key areas in the basic education sector: Quality, Gender and Equity. These areas represent major obstacles to achieving the EFA goals⁵⁵, and it is important to assess the extent to which the relevant actors deliver results that make a difference on the ground. At the same time it is important to be aware of possible trade-offs between equity on the one hand and quality of learning on the other. Improving equity by including marginalised and poor students could potentially reduce the average level of learning in the short-term, unless extra resources are spent to counteract this, even though increased equity will pay off in the longer term. This perspective should be included in the analysis.

The education sector group in each country, be it a local education group (LEG) or its equivalent, plays a key role both in UNICEF's and in GPE's work at the country level. The focus in this evaluation should be to assess the value added of UNICEF and GPE to the group, or if relevant, in any other forum for dialogue with national government. This includes assessing how UNICEF and GPE contribute to the effectiveness of the education sector group and its role in achieving country results. Particular priority should be given to assessing the extent to which the national government takes leadership in the group including if and how it is supported to do so, and the role of any Joint Financing Agreement between donors. The role of GPE Supervising Entities and Managing Entities is also key.

GPE is currently formulating a new financing model, which could have implications for its work on statistics and results. The mentioned GPE evaluation will focus at the global level in addition to the country level, but it is important that the evaluation team is aware of these and other reform processes taking place at the global level.

Financial Assessment

A Financial Assessment study shall collect and analyse available statistics to establish the patterns of financial allocations to basic education, i.e. allocations to and from UNICEF and GPE and allocations to and within the selected countries. The Financial Assessment should be limited to the following:

- Characteristics of, and trends in Norwegian ODA funding to education, compared to ODA funding as a whole.
- For national education budgets: Provide an overview over the case countries' share of GDP allocated to education, the share of the national budget allocated to education, and the education budget going to basic education, for the period 2009-2013. This analysis should be related to availability of external funding, including but not limited to funding from UNICEF and GPE.
- For UNICEF and GPE:
 - o Provide a simple overview of characteristics of, and trends in total funds received by the agency from donors (in general and for education), and in the agencies' allocations to education in different geographical areas. For UNICEF this should also include a specification of key focus areas⁵⁶ including BEGE and any further specification of BEGE funds.
 - o Provide an overview of criteria for allocations of funds within UNICEF and to UNICEF's partners and to GPE-endorsed countries.
 - o Provide an overview of flow of funds and identify any bottlenecks, e.g. caused by the timing of allocations to recipients (NGOs, national governments or others) or other factors.
 - o Assess the fungibility and/or additionality of domestic and international funds

⁵⁵ Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4 "Teaching and learning: Achieving quality for all".

⁵⁶ Key focus areas are specified by the Medium-Term Strategic Framework 2006-2013.

(e.g. for UNICEF how thematic funding influences thematic allocations of core funding and its relationship to non-thematic funding).

The Financial Assessment study shall base its findings on available statistics from each entity and country administrative data.

All data shall be cross-referenced in tables, graphs and text, analysing patterns within and between the categories over the past decade. Relevant categories for cross-referencing shall be identified by the evaluation team, and include as a minimum themes, sectors and countries.

The findings from the financial mapping shall be used as background data for the evaluation's wider analysis, especially with regard to assessment of the programme theories of change.

Scoping Exercise: Preparation for a potential future Impact Evaluation⁵⁷

Given the recent reforms in GPE, and with reference to scoping study undertaken by White (2010) as part of the mid-term evaluation of EFA-FTI, the Evaluation Department does not foresee an impact evaluation of GPE at this point. In any case, an impact evaluation of GPE is planned by GPE for the years 2017 and 2018.

The scoping exercise should rather aim to identify what possibilities exist in terms of an Impact Evaluation preferably of a) a UNICEF intervention or alternatively of b) a reform or policy change in the basic education sector in one or more of the four selected case countries. If option b) is chosen, the reform or policy change should be one where UNICEF and/or GPE have played a major role, so that the Impact Evaluation can be combined with a contribution analysis. The Evaluation Department plans to use the information from the scoping exercise in the Terms of Reference for the Impact Evaluation. The scoping exercise should include information about any impact evaluations undertaken of the UNICEF interventions under review.

For potential candidates for a future Impact Evaluation, the scoping exercise could address questions and tasks such as;

- Mapping UNICEF basic education interventions including their duration. For each intervention: Has there been any major changes during the intervention period; what was the baseline situation?
- Which basic education sector reforms and/or major policy changes have taken place in the selected countries since 2009? How and to what extent have these reforms or policy changes been supported by UNICEF and/or GPE?
- What is the data needs and availability for analysing these changes, and what is the quality of the data, and needs for collection of primary data? Note that the Evaluation Department foresees that the main source of data will be secondary, and that primary data collection will be limited.

4.2 General methodological principles to be adhered to

The tender shall follow the OCED Development Assistance Committee's quality standards for development evaluation.

Details on evaluation methodology will be developed by tenderers in their proposals. The

⁵⁷ "Impact Evaluation" here refers to rigorous evaluation design to identify the causal effect of an intervention or a policy/reform, ideally including the use of a counterfactual comparison group.

methodology should take cognisance of the data routinely collected (by GPE and/or UNICEF and/or other relevant actors), any previous evaluations and studies from the basic education sub-sector including literature on multilateral aid effectiveness, and relevant progress and other results reports at the global and country levels.

Proposals should include the appropriate treatment of gender and other equity considerations, both in terms of assessing the relevant DAC criteria, and in the data collection and analytical approaches of proposed methodologies.

The evaluation should be based on a theory /theories of change approach, explicitly linking inputs, activities and results, and identifying factors influencing successful outputs and outcomes within a range of contexts and factors that inhibit achievement of stated objectives. This will provide a framework for assessing the efficiency and effectiveness at the country level (and at the global level as relevant, for example when assessing technical inputs). Within the overall analytical framework, mapping of financial flows will be conducted both at the global and country levels. The GPE is currently establishing their own theories of change at the country level. UNICEF has developed a theory of change for BEGE⁵⁸.

The informants shall include a broad range of key representatives in the Norwegian aid administration, UNICEF and GPE as well as National Government representatives, donor representatives and other participants in the Local Education Groups (especially those taking the role of Supervising Entity or Managing Entity for GPE, as defined in section 1.4), in addition to relevant education staff (district officers, head teachers, teachers, etc.), parent-teachers associations and students.

The evaluation team shall develop an appropriate methodology that can respond to these Terms of Reference. The evaluation should draw on mixed methods. The methods adopted shall be described in detail in the tender, such as the following suggestive list (not exhaustive):

- a) Document search and reviews.
- b) Analysis of relevant databases and statistics for UNICEF, GPE and case countries.
- c) Interviews with key staff at Headquarters (Oslo, New York and Washington D.C).
- d) Interviews with key representatives of LEGs (or similar sector group if a LEG does not exist) in the selected countries, including government staff.
- e) Field visits to relevant intervention sites in the selected countries, including interviews with key officials, head teachers, teachers, parents and pupils.
- f) Document reviews including research.
- g) Surveys.
- h) Sampling.

The tender should describe the planned approach for the field studies, including how relevant beneficiaries/stakeholders will be selected for participation in groups and how groups will be

⁵⁸ http://www.unicef.org/parmo/files/FA2_Basic_Education_and_Gender_Equality.pdf, page 17.

organised (e.g. women only? children only? without authority figures?)

The evaluation shall demonstrate how triangulation of methods and multiple information sources are used to substantiate findings and assessments.

5. Deliverables

The deliverables are:

- Inception report not exceeding 20 pages to be approved by the Evaluation department
- Country reports for each pre-selected case country, including financial assessment and results assessment.
- Brief report presenting results of the scoping exercise for impact evaluation.
- Draft report.
- Final report not exceeding 60 pages excluding summary and annexes.
- Two policy briefs not exceeding 2 pages each, one targeting a wider audience and one targeting relevant personnel involved in development cooperation.
- Dissemination in Oslo.

All reports shall follow the Evaluation department's guidelines. All written material will be submitted electronically, and all supporting data will be made available to Norad. Norad retains all rights with respect to distribution, dissemination and publication of the deliverables.

6. Organisation

The evaluation will be commissioned and managed by Norad's evaluation department. Norad will be responsible for the final decisions concerning the Terms of Reference and the evaluation outputs.

A Reference Group will be constituted with separate Terms of Reference. It will include relevant staff from Norad, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNICEF, GPE as well as other relevant stakeholders. Reference Group members will be invited to comment on all evaluation outputs before finalisation.

The evaluation will be carried out by an independent team of consultants contracted by Norad's Evaluation department. The evaluation team is entitled to consult stakeholders pertinent to the assignment but it is not permitted to make any commitments on behalf of the Government of Norway, UNICEF or GPE. The evaluation team leader will report directly to Norad's Evaluation department.

Annex 2: Schematic of the project cycle and questions that reveal the quality with which it is implemented

Step
<p style="text-align: center;">Decision to Invest in a Country</p> <p>Does the agent have transparent standards for allocating its funds among candidate countries? These standards can be based on various criteria—the country's or sector's performance, its educational needs, or its fragile condition. The key questions are how these allocation standards are set, whether they are applied as intended, and whether they reflect the priorities of the agent's principals, including Norad. For example, given Norad's education goal of funding "education in crisis", is some funding allocated to countries in conflict or recovering from natural disasters?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Decision on Project Focus</p> <p>This refers to the broad goals of the project, not to the selection of the investment sector or sub-sector. GPE and UNICEF/BEGE fund only the basic education sector, but they can select a range of project goals. The key questions are how these goals are arrived at and whether they reflect the priorities of the agent's principals, including Norad's several goals, such as educational quality, girls' education, instruction in the mother tongue, and equitable access to education.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Project Design</p> <p>The quality of a project's design is strongly related to its ultimate effectiveness.⁷ The design stage is also the best opportunity to maximize the efficiency of the project. The project design should include an economic analysis, which is most useful when conducted very early in the project cycle to weed out bad projects and bad project components. This analysis should evaluate the classic counterfactual questions.</p> <p>For example, does the agent assess whether the program design is coherent and realistic relative to the country's past track record? Does it require a results framework with performance indicators, baseline data, and M&E arrangements? Does the agent require an economic analysis sensibly scaled to the data available, and does the agent use its findings to make decisions? Do implementation arrangements reflect a realistic evaluation of capacities? Have risks, such as sustainability and political economy risks, been identified and, if possible, addressed? Are proper safeguards in place to ensure that the project's money is spent on its intended beneficiaries?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Project Approval</p> <p>Does this stage require a final tough review of the proposed project before money is contractually committed to it?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Project Implementation</p> <p>Does the agent require and adequately fund systematic oversight of the project's progress, including at least annual measures of the status of outputs and outcomes? Does it routinely review these data to identify projects that are failing on one or more components? Since actions to turn problem projects around during implementation are found to markedly increase their odds of achieving their objectives, does it encourage proactive adjustments to the project design to rescue failing projects or project components? Is the agent willing to cancel projects that, for whatever reason, seem doomed?</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Project Closure</p> <p>Does the agent require an independent evaluation of the project's results, including an analysis of the apparent reasons for success or failure? Does it capture the lessons learned from these evaluations and use them to modify those policies and processes of the agent that affect the project cycle?</p>

Annex 3: List of those interviewed in the field

Organization	Representative	Notes
UNICEF Madagascar	Matthias Lansard & team Margarita Focas Licht	Ms. Licht, with UNICEF in Madagascar until 2011, is now with GPE and was interviewed in Washington, D.C.
World Bank	Harisoa Danielle Rasolonjatovo	Knowledgeable about transitional period
Partner Organizations in the Local Education Group (LEG)		
The Norwegian Embassy	Janne Knutrud	
The EU (European Union)	Pablo Isla-Villar	In Madagascar since 2012
The AFD (Alliance Française pour le Développement)	Danielle Rabenirina	Current education manager, held the same position during the crisis
The NGO Aide et Action	Evelyne Hantamalala	Current education manager, held the same position during the crisis
Representatives of the Government / the Ministries		
Ex-Managing Director of Basic Education – Training and Literacy (DGEFA 2011-2012)	Fofa Dominique	
Technical Support Unit		
The UAT – EPT (Technical Support Unit for Education For All)	Josiane Rabetokotany	
The DPE (Directorate for the Educational Planning)	M. Sabass	Board of Education Management Information System (EMIS)
The DTIC (Directorate for Information Communication, Technology)	Rolland Rabeson	

Annex 4: Madagascar case study instrument

Respondents to interview

1. UNICEF Officials. Any Country Education Specialist and/or Officer involved in the management and supervision of GPE funds during 2009-2013. Since Country Office staff has changed since then, it may be necessary to track down the relevant officials in their current assignments and interview them by telephone or internet.
2. World Bank Officials. The World Bank (WB) was originally the Supervising Entity for GPE 2009-2012 but that changed after the 2009 coup. UNICEF was subsequently assigned this role. The World Bank was involved again at the end of the 2009-2012 period and then played a leadership role in the preparation of the new (current) GPE grant (2013), and is serving as the Supervising Entity for that grant. The most appropriate World Bank person(s) to interview would be whoever was involved in WB missions at the end of GPE 2009-2012 (Bank staff or consultant), and/or the WB task team leader (TTL) for the preparation and/or supervision of the current (2013) GPE project. (At least one person should be selected but two would be better). If the appropriate person(s) is/are not currently located in Antananarivo then an interview by telephone or the internet will be required.
3. Partner organizations in the Local Education Group (LEG). The Local Education Group (or equivalent group with a different name) is a coordinating mechanism for basic education which is led by the Government and includes partner development organizations, both bilateral and multilateral, plus NGOs and/or civil society organizations (CSOs). In many cases there also is a Coordinating Agency which takes the lead in organizing involvement of partner organizations. In Madagascar the partner organizations include those from EU and Norway, the *Agence Française de Développement*, UNICEF, the World Bank, and several NGOs/CSOs. For these interviews include Norway's representative, plus someone from one other donor agency, UNICEF (which is the Coordinating Agency), and at least one NGO or CSO. The WB official(s) selected in category #2 above can also be interviewed in his/her role in the LEG. If any of the selected interviewees are not located in Madagascar at this time, they will need to be contacted by telephone or internet.
4. Government/Ministry Officials. Persons to be interviewed should include any Ministry of Education officials who were active in the "Transition Authority" particularly any who would have attended LEG meetings during 2009-2013, and/or Ministry Officials who currently have some leadership role in implementing the interim education sector plan supported by GPE 2013 and who have also been involved with the LEG (attending meetings, leading supervision missions, etc.).
5. Country-based technical support units: In addition to interviewing the MEN's leadership in their roles on the LEG, managers/leaders of the following two technical units should be interviewed:
 - a. UAT-EPT. This is the Education Technical Support Unit–Education for All (Unité d'Appui Technique–Education pour Tous), or the GPE "Project Implementation Unit;"
 - b. Education Management Information System (EMIS) office.

Interview Guide

Questions and responses of those interviewed	Respondents to interview
1. Were there ways aid programs were able to bypass the state and go directly to the beneficiaries? Could this have been done more or better?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
2. Were there ways that aid programs were insulated from Madagascar's institutional instability? Could this have been done better?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
3. Were there ways that aid programs were insulated from Madagascar's institutional instability? Could this have been done better?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
4. Did unintended consequences of education aid programs include any of the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. incentives for teachers to go on strike incentives for unqualified people to become teachers just to earn a paycheck b. incentives to divert government spending away from education to other budget areas c. aid programs becoming a political weapon or resource in competition among competing factions in the government or different regions or ethnic groups d. incentives for diversion of funds to other purposes (including other legitimate educational purposes) at the level of individual schools e. good unintended outcomes, including development of strong management procedures, which were then copied by education ministry or school personnel? 	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
5. What general lessons learned would you offer to other country teams to prepare for and deal with government coups and frequent turnover of government personnel?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
Questions about UNICEF's own program	
6. Between 2009 and 2013 UNICEF implemented a variety of activities in basic education and gender equality under its own Country Programme. What evidence can you give that these activities made important contributions to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Improved access to basic education for disadvantaged groups; b. Improved access to basic education for girls? c. Improved quality of basic education? d. Improved student learning outcomes? 	1, 3, and 5.a.
7. Given the economic and political challenges faced by Madagascar during 2009 to 2013 what were the factors that made it possible for UNICEF to keep its own basic education programs/activities and outputs moving during that period?	1, 3, and 5.a.
Questions about GPE	
8. In your view, what were the most important education outputs or outcomes that GPE funding made possible during 2009-12?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
9. Were there any important upstream changes/improvements (changes in policies/plans/children's rights/etc.) that were made possible by the presence of GPE funding during 2009-2012?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
10. Did the availability of GPE funding during 2009-2012 stimulate or leverage the allocation of funds for education by other development agencies or by the NGO community?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
11. What lessons do you take away from the GPE experience in Madagascar during the 2009-13 time period about designing and implementing a project under politically sensitive conditions? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What was tried under GPE that should not have been tried? b. What was not tried that should have been tried? 	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a

Questions and responses of those interviewed	Respondents to interview												
12. UNICEF was the Managing Entity for the GPE project. What do you think that UNICEF did well?	Ask of all, including 5.a and 5.b												
13. What do you think that UNICEF as Managing Entity for GPE did not do well?	Ask of all, including 5.a and 5.b												
14. When designing the new Emergency Support to Education for All Project, what did you wish that each of these players had done under the previous GPE project that they did not do? a. Government (Transitional Authority) leadership b. UNICEF c. Donor members of the LEG d. GPE--the Secretariat, Catalytic Fund, or the Board e. UAT-EPT f. EMIS staff	Ask of 2 only												
15. During the 2009-13 period, how well did the LEG perform each of the following functions? Ask each respondent to use this scale for rating each function: 1 = Effectively 2= Moderately effectively 3 = Moderately ineffectively 4 = Ineffectively NA = Unable to judge effectiveness <table border="1" data-bbox="142 926 992 1304"> <thead> <tr> <th>LEG Function</th> <th>Effectiveness rating</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Conduct sector planning?</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Harmonize the donors' support around the GPE project that UNICEF was managing?</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Monitor and oversee project implementation?</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Conduct policy dialogue in education?</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Bring about changes in Government policies?</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	LEG Function	Effectiveness rating	Conduct sector planning?		Harmonize the donors' support around the GPE project that UNICEF was managing?		Monitor and oversee project implementation?		Conduct policy dialogue in education?		Bring about changes in Government policies?		Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a
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16. How effectively did the LEG work together during the 2009-13 period? ___ 1. Effectively ___ 2. Moderately effectively ___ 3. Moderately ineffectively ___ 4. Ineffectively ___ NA. Unable to judge effectiveness	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a												
17. If you could change how the LEG operates internally, what would be the most important changes that you would like to make?	Ask of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5a												
18. Government (Transitional Authority) implementation of GPE project. a. In your view, which units at both the central government level and sub-national government levels were key to implementing the GPE project? Please list them here.	Ask of 1, 2, 3, and 5a.												

Questions and responses of those interviewed				Respondents to interview																																																										
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19. If you could change how the implementing agencies operate, what would be the most important changes that you would like to make?				Ask of 1, 2, 3, and 5.a																																																										
20. During the 2009-13 period, what do you think that the UAT-EPT unit did well and why?				Ask of 1, 2, 3, and 5.a.																																																										
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22. If you could improve how the UAT-EPT unit performs, what would be the most important changes that you would like to make?				Ask of 1, 2, 3, and 5.a.																																																										
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Questions about financial Management																																																														

Questions and responses of those interviewed	Respondents to interview
For the last 5 fiscal years	
26. What is the education budget compared to the overall GDP? FY 1 _____ FY 2 _____ FY 3 _____ FY 4 _____ FY 5 _____	Ask of 3.
27. What is the education budget compared to the total national budget? FY 1 _____ FY 2 _____ FY 3 _____ FY 4 _____ FY 5 _____	Ask of 3.
28. What is the basic education budget compared to the education budget? FY 1 _____ FY 2 _____ FY 3 _____ FY 4 _____ FY 5 _____	Ask of 3.
29. What were actual levels of education expenditures as compared to budgetary allocations? Actual/ Budget Percent FY 1 _____ Percent FY 2 _____ Percent FY 3 _____ Percent FY 4 _____ Percent FY 5 _____	Ask of 3.
30. What was the capital and recurrent education budget and what were the actual capital and recurrent expenditures for the same period? FY 1 FY 2 FY 3 FY 4 FY 5 <u>Budget</u> Capital _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Recurrent _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ <u>Actual</u> Capital _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ Recurrent _____ _____ _____ _____ _____	Ask of 3.
Over the last 3 fiscal years	
31. Have the budgetary releases to local entities been regular and predictable? FY 1 Yes / No FY 2 Yes / No FY 3 Yes / No If no, please explain _____	Ask of 3.
32. What percentage of the total budget was released in each of the first three quarters of the fiscal year? FY 1 _____ _____ _____ FY 2 _____ _____ _____ FY 3 _____ _____ _____	Ask of 3

Annex 5: Activities of Basic Education Aid Programs 2009-2013

1. GPE: Activities of the Action Plan for 2nd and 3rd tranches of GPE funding

The Action Plan focused on three outcomes: access and retention, the quality of teaching and learning, and capacity development. The objectives had these activities.

Access and retention. The GPE activities/outputs focus on equity to mitigate the effects of Government budget cuts on families' abilities to access education.

1. In times of crisis, when the poor are the first in line to experience a drop in disposable income, the reduction of costs to parents, especially with regard to teacher salaries and the provision of basic learning equipment and school materials, should remain an important equity strategy. School Kits to first graders are believed to have been a contributor to rising initial enrolments and deserve continued support.
2. In the same line of reasoning, the school feeding program should continue to benefit from EFA FTI support.
3. School construction targeting poor and remote regions should remain a priority for the next two academic years. School construction represents a major and costly investment in an economic recession, and sound arrangements for tight supervision of construction and budgetary control is of key concern. Priority consideration needs to be afforded to cyclone-prone regions, incomplete cycle schools, and communities without schools. Recent experience has indicated that "ownership" of school construction is important to local communities. In the present context of weak governance, it is especially important to promote their involvement and to raise the capacity of local communities to manage construction and particularly maintenance. Provision of school latrines and school furniture as an integral part of school building remains of paramount importance.
4. The EFA-FTI should continue to support the decentralized Local Catalytic Funds⁵⁹ while the Ministry of Education should finance the school capitation grants that have been central to ensuring the functioning of the school despite the frequent delays in financial and other material support from the Ministry at central level.
5. Even in times of crisis, data collection and processing, monitoring of policy implementation and research into its impact, remain crucial if sound evidence-based and cost-effective solutions to educational challenges in access and equity are to be found. It is thus recommended that some funds be allocated to capacity development in this area, albeit recognizing that making progress in this domain will be difficult, given the current political context.

Quality of teaching and learning

1. Support a sustained effort to provide in-service training to an increasing number of community teachers, successful completion of which would be linked to a revision of their professional status and salary as planned by the revised EFA plan. Such training would ensure that an increasing proportion of community teachers have essential linguistic and pedagogical skills usually imparted through pre-service training.
2. Support the finalization of the development of the new curriculum, including the consolidation of the APC (competencies approach) and the APS (situational approach), production of teaching materials, and the related teacher training and a related assessment mechanism. Regardless of the way forward for the extension of primary education, it is proposed that such a national curriculum for basic education be, as soon as possible, extended to all of the country's 114 school districts.
3. Ensure that all students in basic education, regardless of the curricular approach, be provided with essential textbooks or alternative learning aids.

⁵⁹ Local Catalytic Funds have a two-fold objective; increasing enrollment and enhancing institutional capacity in poorly performing districts

4. Support the training of teachers in learning assessment techniques; to improve the quality and reliability of the CEPE; to introduce a new assessment yielding a certificate at the end of year 7; and to create the capacity for nation-wide assessment of learning outcomes on the basis of representative sampling.
5. Support a mechanism to monitor and evaluate the reform process in the 20 first phase reform school districts as a basis for future policymaking.

Capacity Development and Institutional Reinforcement

1. Improve the functioning of decentralized administrative structures (Regional Directorates for Basic Education, school districts, Administrative and Educational Zones, and schools) by providing material assistance, including delivery of the intended vehicles and office equipment by the Ministry of Education.
2. Support the Education Management Information System (EMIS) to provide a sound statistical basis for policy making and planning.
3. Prepare a Human Resource Development Plan for ministry personnel, including school teachers, to create opportunities for in-service training and professional development. Such a plan would address the issues of operational handbooks for key ministry personnel, internal and external communication, performance appraisal and staff capacity development.
4. The implementation of a sensitization program at grass root level for local communities pertaining to their responsibilities with regards to the construction and maintenance of school buildings.

2. *Activities of the Norway bilateral aid to UNICEF: Ensuring the Right to Quality Education for All Children in Madagascar (2008-2011)*

Pre-coup

1. Ensure continuity in the pedagogical/curriculum reform, specifically by ensuring that the reform retains and expands on achievements obtained through the implementation of the Competency-Based Approach (CBA).
2. Support the development and implementation of a flexible in-service teacher training and career development system, particularly for FRAM teachers, implemented in teacher networks with local pedagogical support.
3. Ensure the educational rights (in terms of access and achievement) of excluded children and children at risk of dropping out, with specific attention to children with disabilities.
4. Strengthen MEN capacity to communicate efficiently and effectively internally within the education system and externally to communities and the Malagasy population in general, to mobilize support for the Educational Reform.
5. Improve local capacity to implement the EFA Plan in at least 4 selected regions (Melaky, Atsimo Atsinanana, Sofia and Diana), to contribute to reduced disparities and overall national improvement in access and completion of primary education.

Post-coup adjustments

After the coup the program was reoriented around three domains.

1. Teacher training and career development
2. Support to inclusive education
3. Support to vulnerable regions.

The activities and targets for these three domains were these:

- At least one thousand teachers cater their teaching to the learning needs of children
- Establishment of CPRS in 1350 schools
- The CPRS in 300 schools include an action plan for inclusion
- 10% of children in 300 schools identified as vulnerable are assigned a big brother or sister

- CPRS in 300 schools include school management plans
- Children in 300 schools have child friendly learning environments
- Children in 300 schools have access to library books, classroom kits and recreation kits
- 300 schools have a 50:1 ratio of students per latrines that meet basic quality standards
- Children in 300 schools have access to potable water
- Teachers and students in 300 schools trained in WASH
- School canteens established, equipped and managed by parents and students in 300 schools
- 10,000 children in 300 schools at risk of dropping out because of financial difficulties remain in school
- 300 schools' CPRS include child protection measures
- 300 schools have a 50:1 ratio of students per latrines that meet basic quality standards
- Children in 300 schools have access to potable water
- Teachers and students in 300 schools trained in WASH
- School canteens established, equipped and managed by parents and students in 300 schools
- 10,000 children in 300 schools at risk of dropping out because of financial difficulties remain in school
- 300 schools' CPRS include child protection measures
- 100 CPRS action plans support the preparation of birth registration documents

3. Norway bilateral aid to UNICEF: Minimizing the Impact of the Political Crisis on Education in Madagascar (2009-2010)

This program focused on these activities and output targets.

1. Teacher training for the new curriculum in 20 pilot school districts (CISCOs). 2,714 ESS teachers updated in 6th grade curriculum and trained for 7th grade curriculum. 6,600 1st grade teachers upgraded for 1st grade curriculum. 12,500 2nd and 3rd grade teachers trained in new curriculum, 300 teachers from private junior secondary schools upgraded for 6th grade curriculum and 520 teachers from private colleges upgraded for 7th grade curriculum.
2. Strengthening of ENS: ENS has developed a curriculum research plan and at least 10 staff have the capacity to carry out curriculum research. At least 3 research reports developed.
3. Development and printing of school manuals for the new curriculum: 1,100,000 fascicules printed for grade 1 and 6. 1,687,500 fascicules edited and printed for grade 2, 3 and 7. 750,000 fascicules edited and printed for grade 4 and 5.
4. Development of teacher training module in Malagasy as Language of Instruction: module developed printed and used in teacher training.
5. Teacher training in Anosy, Androy and Ampanihy: 300 networks functioning. 4,500 teachers trained.
6. EFA Mapping: Various studies on the state of implementation of the EFA strategies: Comprehensive perspective of the sector development so far used as a base for further policy development by MEN.

4. UNICEF core program

1. 75 percent of primary schools located in vulnerable areas apply national standards for quality and strategies for school quality;
2. 95 percent of primary teachers have the skills and tools to apply the competency-based approach;
3. 95 percent of the schools in targeted vulnerable areas have access to child protection networks and / or services health;
4. supply and logistics system for education is in place; and
5. 100% increase in number of girls in education post-primary
6. 75% of families benefit from parental education program in priority zones (added at 2010 midterm review)