ROYAL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Norway

Evaluation Report 5.91

THE SPECIAL GRANT FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

by
Scanteam International and
Nordic Consulting Group

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1987 Kenya	1988 Tanzania	1988 Botswana	1989 Zimbabwe	1990 Mozambique

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Final Report

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ACRONYMS

ACED	Advisory Committee for Environment and Development
AFTEN	Africa Environment Division
AKRSP	Aga Khan Rural Support Northern Areas and Chitral, Pakistan
ASTEN	Asia Environment Division
CDC	Conservation for Development Centre
CFSOC	Official Cofinancing Group
DAC	Development Advisory Committee
EAP	Environmental Action Plan
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EMTEN	Environment Division for Europe and the Middle East
ENV	Environment Department
ENVPR	Environment Department
EPSDS	Environmental Policy Studies Programme for the Sahel
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESMAP	Energy Sector Management Assistance
FCP	Focal Country Programme
GEF	Global Environment Facility
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank)
ICE	Internal Committee on Environment
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
IUCN	World Conservation Union
LADU	Division for Agriculture and Rural Development
LATEN	Latin America Division
LEEC	London Environmental Economic Centre
MDC	Ministry of Development Cooperation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOE	Ministry of Environment
MULTI	Multilateral Department
NARESA	National Research Agency
NATUR	Natural Resources Management Division
NCS	National Conservation Strategy
ORCA	IUCN Regional Office for Central America
PDF	Project Development Facility
PLAN	Planning Department
PROG	Programming Department
SGED	Special Grant for Environment and Development
SIEP	Environmental Impact Assessment Services
SOR	Sahelian Operational Review

SSE	Sudano-Sahel-Ethiopian
TAGPE	Technical Assistance Grant Program for the Environment
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNSO	United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office
WB	World Bank
WCED	World Commission for Environment and Development
WCMC	World Conservation Center
WCS	World Conservation Strategy
WHO	World Health Organization

PREAMBLE

The initial phase of the evaluation of the Special Grant for Environment and Development was undertaken by the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research - NIBR - and Chr. Michelsen Institute - DERAP, who presented their Inception Report in April 1990. The second phase of the evaluation, which was initiated in February 1991, has been carried out by the team presented overleaf.

The evaluation has benefitted very much from the work carried out by NIBR/DERAP during Phase 1. The Evaluation Team wishes to express their gratitude to NIBR/DERAP for their kind cooperation in providing the team with all background material compiled and prepared during this phase.

Throghout the work the Evaluation Team has received considerable assistance from a large number of people and institutions, listed in annex 4. The team wishes to thank all these for their valuable cooperation. In particular the team wishes to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for having provided special assistance for the establishment of the database for the evaluation.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Special Grant for Environment and Development (the Grant) was established in 1984, with an allocation of NOK 10.0 Mill. which, by 1991 had increased to NOK 67.0 Mill. Justification for the Grant was the considerable need in developing countries to strengthen professional competence in environmental issues and to finance direct environmental activities. It was clear that the Grant was a provisional arrangement, on a trial basis, and that the ultimate objective was to integrate environmental considerations and concerns into the existing and normal aid channels.

2. Since 1984 Norway's focus on environmental issues in her development assistance has increased. The Government estimates that in 1990 NOK 1,167.5 Mill. was directed towards environment and development, which was 15 % of total Norwegian development assistance. Within this perspective the Grant allocation in 1990 of NOK 64 Mill. is not very significant. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion that the Grant has contributed to this shift in focus of Norwegian development assistance, through its flexible and expedient source of funding for selected issues.

3. From 1984 to 1990, NOK 250 Mill. have been disbursed by the Grant on 357 projects, ranging in size from NOK 5,000 to NOK 31 Mill. The Grant has financed seminars, conferences, information, institution building and various studies. Relatively few projects have included implementation of direct physical activities. The environmental issues addressed through the Grant have been mostly of a general nature and have tended not to focus on specific environmental problems.

4. The funds for the Grant have been divided amongst various departments and NORAD, each have managed their allocations differently:

4.1. 42.5 % (NOK 113 mill.) of total Grant disbursements have been channelled through NORAD for 262 projects, first and foremost aiming at awareness-raising among Government officials, the public and specific target populations. NORAD has also used the Grant for professional competence strengthening, with a large portion of activities including specific studies. Furthermore, the Grant has financed participation in academic conferences and individual study tours.

When looking at Grant activities as a whole, with a view to the overall objectives of the Grant to be catalytic and integrative, the conclusion is that NORAD, by and large, has not achieved optimal application of the Grant as the strategically important tool it was supposed to be. The following are the main reasons for this conclusion:

a) NORAD did not develop any operational guidelines or strategies for the application of the Grant. This means that the resident representatives, who were supposed to play a key role in Grant activities, did not receive

the guidance and support required for this task.

b) The management of the Grant within NORAD was not integrated within the development of Norway's bilateral assistance. The Grant was run in isolation and not associated with the development of the various country programmes.

c) To a large extent projects were approved on their individual environmental merits, but without taking sufficiently into account fundamental developmental aspects such as institution development and project sustainability as well as the projects' potential in relation to the country programme. Too often projects have been implemented on an ad hoc basis.

d) Most resident representatives have passively managed the Grant, not using it as a tool to build up contacts with relevant environmental institutions.

e) NORAD soon came to rely heavily on one outside organization, IUCN, both for the identification and development of projects, as well as for the provision of personnel. IUCN has been the largest single channel of Grant aid, accounting for 43 % of NORAD's total disbursements.

4.2. 34.1 % (NOK 85 mill.) of total Grant Disbursements covering 31 projects have been channelled through the Multilateral Department. The department has channelled their allocation to multilateral organizations with whom they normally work i.e. United Nations organizations and the World Bank. Funds channelled to UN organizations have been mostly for projects where Grant funding has been combined with multi-bi funding. Funds channelled to the World Bank (48.2%) have been employed to strengthen the environmental capacity and competence of this international organization and to facilitate faster and more in-depth integration of environment project components into Bank operations.

The Department manages the different funds for environment activities available to the Bank in a coordinated and integrated way. At the same time, the use of these funds is integrated with Norway's overall Bank policy: the Grant is used to strengthen the underpinning of Norwegian aid goals in multilateral aid cooperation.

The Grant and other Norwegian funds have had a significant additionality and catalytic effect in the case of the World Bank. This effect has been magnified due to the rigidity and unavailability of other trust funds for such activities, in a number of areas of very high priority to Norwegian development cooperation. The Grant has contributed to institutionalizing research, methodological approaches and has strengthened emphasis on ecology-economy linkages at micro- as well as macro level thinking in the Bank. Manuals, procedures and internal training have been affected. Environmental awareness within the Bank has accelerated, and this has also affected recipient negotiators.

4.3. It was initially envisaged that the Program Department would play a focal policy role in regard to the Grant. With the decentralization of the Grant to the different departments and conflicting interests and opinions, both inside and outside the Ministry, the Department's policy role was gradually reduced. With the separation of NORAD one may say that it ceased to exist. Today there is

little overall policy guidance for the Grant.

13.8 % (NOK 35 mill.) of total Grant disbursements, covering 42 projects, has been channelled through this department. These include undertakings by e.g. IIED/LEEC that have affected and altered international awareness, attitudes and thinking regarding follow-up issues and operationalization of WCED-recommendations. As well as the execution of some outstanding research projects of crucial importance for aid policy in special areas.

4.4. 6.9 % (NOK 17 mill.) has been channelled through the Information Department. From 1991 the Department receives no more funds from the Grant. The Department concentrated its efforts on maintaining a long term relationship with a selected number of NGOs doing broad-based people-oriented information dissemination activities. PANOS in London is one of the selected information NGOs. Several examples of awareness raising through PANOS activities have been identified, and it is our conclusion that PANOS has a good set of planning tools and has developed a broad and effective range of products and services.

5. 24.1 % (NOK 60 mill.) of total Grant funds have been channelled through The International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). The major part of these funds has been NORAD's Grant allocation, where 43 % of total disbursements have been through IUCN. IUCN accounts for the majority of Grant disbursements in most of Norway's partner countries.

IUCN's promotion of National Conservation Strategies (NCS) in developing countries in the mid-1980s and their strategic input to the World Commission for Environment and Development, coincided with a broader set of Norwegian aid cooperation goals where environmental issues became a focal point. It was thus quite natural that NORAD and the Ministry established a close working relationship with IUCN when the Grant was established. The following summarizes the main findings on the Grant cooperation with IUCN:

a) NORAD is a major source of funding for IUCN. In 1989 approximately 30 % of IUCN's overall project revenues came from NORAD. NORAD has become professionally and strategically dependant on IUCN in applying the Grant.IUCN has not, however, been involved in NORAD's regular environmental work outside of the Grant.
b) IUCN's strength is in identifying and formulating project ideas. IUCN's lack of implementation experience has lead to local complaints, that project proposals are vague and short of directions and lack the necessary elements and foundation for sustainable institutional and managerial integration. This relates to the fact that IUCN's professional strength is concentrated in biophysical areas, whereas IUCN is short of comparable experience and expertise in the complementary socio-economic and cultural fields.
c) IUCN's organization, reporting, accounting, monitoring and internal evaluation systems are cost-effective and satisfactory.

d) IUCN seeks to staff their regional and local offices and projects with local experts and consultants whenever possible. This has been achieved in Central America and Asia, but so far to a lesser extent in e.g. East Africa.

e) The country studies have revealed, however, that many in recipient countries have different perceptions of what role IUCN should play in relation to the Grant. IUCN's autonomy in the project formulation and pilot study stages risks leaving the impression that IUCN is a donor. Widespread local perceptions of IUCN's role relative to authorities and local interest groups in projects, deviate substantially from IUCN's own perceptions. IUCN's staffing and recruitment practices as well as administrative ministrative set-ups for projects have been criticized for not strengthening local competence and institutions, particularly in East Africa. These different areas of concern indicate some problems in IUCNs way of relating to the recipients, and should be taken as warning signs by all parties concerned.

f) NORADs administrative procedures have no established routines for informing resident representatives in partner countries of IUCN-activities. They have often been uninformed of IUCN activities and this has been detrimental to the integration of such activities within the frame of overall development assistance.

g) NORAD's use of IUCN in a Grant context has not contributed to the development of Norwegian aid-related environmental competence. Norwegian researchers and consultants have not been considered qualified to render Grant-services for NORAD, and hardly any active attempts were made to involve them with IUCN in such work. This is in spite of the 1987 Framework Agreement containing a significant consultancy trust fund.

6. On the basis of this evaluation the following recommendations are made:

6.1. The areas of environmental protection, natural resources management and sustainable development are all in the forefront of attention. In this arena all countries are weak, and developing countries are particularly vulnerable. It is therefore important that the Program Department, being the focal policy point of Norwegian development assistance, has the necessary and flexible funding that the Grant assures.

6.2. The Multilateral department has been successful in achieving the relevant objectives of the Grant. The Department may, through other funding, have the same possibilities to influence environmental considerations and priorities of multilateral development banks as presently provided by the Grant. For reasons of administrative efficiency it is therefore recommended that this multilateral share of the Grant be transferred to MULTIs other channels for flexible funding, which have successfully coordinated and combined with the Grant in the past. For the remaining MULTI-share of the Grant for various UN-organisations, such flexibility would be impossible to achieve without the Grant. In order to maintain the influence and momentum achieved by means of the Grant in these UN-institutions, this share of the Grant should be retained.

6.3. The Grant still has an unused potential to be an important instrument in rendering bilateral assistance environmentally more conscious, through e.g. the country programmes. It is therefore recommended that NORAD should maintain such a Grant. However, it is recommended that the Grant in the future shall be exclusively managed by the resident representatives, with the necessary technical support from NATUR, INFO, and other NORAD departments. This means that the Grant allocation administered from Oslo should be gradually phased out. To this effect it is recommended that no new projects should be approved for financing from NORAD/Oslo and that on-going projects should be phased out.

6.4. The proposed decentralisation of bilateral Grant administration and the more active and targeted NORAD efforts towards integration of environment concerns in country programming, requires stronger professional support and underpinning. The professional support of MOE should be sought on a formal basis, and a much more active and systematic drive to engage and train Norwegian experts for this purpose should be initiated. The agreements with IUCN, IIED and the World Bank should be used more actively for this purpose.

6.5. It is recommended that Grant funds should be channelled through national Government or Non Governmental institutions. The representatives of the recipient countries should be directly involved in the management of the Grant. This will probably be best achieved if the relevant ministry is given a direct role in the management of Grant activities. To the extent that other institutions are involved, as for instance IUCN, this should only be subsequent to request and approval by the national institution involved, and only for technical assistance not project implementation. Nevertheless, on these premises, it is recommended that NORAD continues its cooperation with IUCN and not exclusively within the frame of the Grant.

6.6. In view of the previous conclusions and recommendations it follows that the financial frame of the Grant should be reduced to finance of the following two components only:

a) resident representative allocation, starting at NOK 1-2 mill. per mission and increasing as required. Total budget frame NOK 20 mill.
b) The Program Department: total budget frame NOK 5 mill.
c) The Multilateral Department: total budget frame NOK 5 mill.

The conclusion is that the Grant should be scaled down to a total of NOK 30 mill.

Chapter 1. THE SPECIAL GRANT FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

1.1. BACKGROUND

In the Parliamentary Bill St.prp. no 1 1983-84, the Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation (the Ministry) introduced a Special Grant for Environment and Development (the Grant), together with another special grant, the Women's Grant. The justification was the great need in developing countries to strengthen professional competence within the environment and to finance direct environmental activities. The Grant was a provisional arrangement on a trial basis. The ultimate objective was to integrate environmental considerations and concerns into normal aid channels.

1.2. OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE GRANT

The obvious overriding objective of the Grant is to integrate environmental considerations more fully into Norway's development cooperation. In each year's Budget Proposition the Grant is justified and the operational objectives discussed. Over the years such new objectives have been added and the scope expanded. Today there is no single document which states the current set of objectives and guidelines for the Grant. However, the following sums up those objectives and guidelines which have been presented in different annual budget propositions and in the guidelines from 1986, which are still valid (no priorities implied):

a) increase development assistance within the field of environment and long term natural resource management;
b) strengthen professional competence in the field of environment in recipient countries;
c) strengthen the administrative capacity of developing countries regarding environment;
d) finance concrete activities to prevent deterioration of the natural resource base;
e) increase the willingness and capacity of recipient countries to integrate environmental considerations in their development endeavours;
f) initiate and prepare environmental activities which may eventually be financed through ordinary aid allocations;
g) increase the willingness of main recipient countries to finance concrete environmental activities within the normal development assistance to the main recipient countries;
h) strengthen the general understanding of environmental problems;
i) finance activities, primarily in the main recipient countries;
j) finance follow-up activities from the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED);
k) support preparation of national strategies for management of natural resources;
l) strengthen the environmental capacity and competence of international organizations.

No strategy or guidelines for operationalizing or implementing these objectives have been made.

1.3. FINANCIAL FRAME OF THE GRANT

Table 1.1. presents the annual Grant allocation from 1984-91. The largest increases in the Grant took place in 1987 and 1988 and were mostly justified as follow-up of the World Commission for Environment and Development (WCED).

Table 1.1 ANNUAL ALLOCATION FOR THE GRANT (NOK MILL.)

1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
10.0	15.0	16.5	33.5	52.5	59.5	64.0	67.0

1.4. NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE IN PERSPECTIVE

The concept of sustainable utilization of natural resources has gradually been integrated into Norwegian development aid policy. In Government White Paper no. 34 (1986-87) this aim was given priority among Norwegian aid principles.

In Government White Paper no. 49 (1990-91) "On Norway's Cooperation with Developing Countries in 1990", the assistance to environment and development is presented. This is defined as assistance aimed at conservation and improved management of the natural resource base and assistance activities having several specific objectives. Among these environment is prioritized. Activities addressing population growth are also included.

The White Paper estimates that in 1990 NOK 1,167.5 mill. were spent on assistance for environment and development. This is 15 % of total Norwegian development assistance. Although there are ambiguities regarding definitions and comparability between different years, it is nevertheless clear that there has been a significant increase in environmentally oriented development assistance during the 1980s. The different channels for assistance to environment and development are presented in table 1.2.

Table 1.2. CHANNELS FOR ASSISTANCE TO ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 1990 (NOK Mill.)

*	Special Grant for Environment and Development	66.6
*	Sudano-Sahel-Ethiopia Grant	151.4
*	Multi-bi program	123.6
*	Bilateral assistance	458.4
*	Multilateral assistance	367.5
	TOTAL	1,167.5

Of the various channels for assistance to environment and development the Grant represents only 5.7 %.

1.5. ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP FOR THE GRANT

At the initiation of the Grant a set of policy guidelines and internal administrative procedures for management of the Grant were formulated. A fundamental aspect was that the Grant would be managed jointly, in an integrative manner, by the different departments and divisions concerned:

* The Planning (later Programme) Department of the Ministry (PLAN later PROG)
* The Multilateral Department of the Ministry (MULTI)
* NORAD
* The Information Department (INFO)

Organizational responsibility for planning, coordination and administration of the Grant was placed with an internal Reference Group.

In 1986 procedures were revised and decentralized as follows:

a) each year NORAD, MULTI, PLAN and INFO were given an annual frame allocation from the Grant.
b) each NORAD Resident Representative was allocated a lump sum for mission administered activities (Initially NOK 0.5 mill. and presently NOK 1 mill.).
c) activities of principle importance which were new or innovative, or which had a total value of more than NOK 1 mill., had to be submitted to the Minister through PLAN, after having been submitted to the Advisory Committee for Environment and Development (ACED) - "Kontaktutvalget" (See below).

The overall administrative responsibility for the Grant was located to the Planning Department, which was also given a policy coordination role. The amount allocated to each department was based on request within the total budget frame. Otherwise, there were no clear criteria for this distribution. Table 1.3. shows the amounts disbursed by the different departments from 1986 through 1990. The major share of the Grant has been channelled through NORAD (45 %) and MULTI (34 %).

In chapter 3 the management of the Grant in the different departments is discussed. Within the Ministry there has been one "in-house" committee associated with the Grant, "The Internal Committee on Environment - Det interne miljøutvalg" (ICE) with members from the Ministry and NORAD. This committee has had no formal responsibilities in connection with the Grant, but has functioned more as a "sounding board" on Grant related matters.

TABLE 1.3. GRANT DISBURSEMENTS PER DEPARTMENT (NOK MILL.)

	Total Disbursed	up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
NORAD	84.565	16.407	14.327	11.005	18.528	24.298
NORAD Res. Re.	28.054	3.959	2.021	6.580	9.259	6.236
NORAD Info	17.258	1.400	6.801	1.859	3.376	3.822
MULTI	84.937	11.282	5.000	12.701	30.791	25.160
PROG	34.394	7.721	6.569	5.241	7.782	7.081
TOTAL	249.205	40.769	34.718	37.386	69.735	66.597

In addition there has been an interministerial committee, set up by the Ministry of Development Cooperation(MDC) and the Ministry of Environment (MOE) associated with the Grant. This committee, "The Advisory Committee for Environment and Development" (ACED) - Kontaktutvalget", was established in 1983 with 4 members from each of the two ministries. Up to 1985 MDC submitted all Grant projects to the ACED. From 1986 and onwards only projects of more than NOK 1 mill. were submitteted to the ACED.

After the 1989 reorganization of the Ministry and NORAD, the administrative set-up of the Grant has become even more decentralized. With this reorganization the two committees mentioned above (ICE and ACED) also ceased to play any role in relation to the Grant.

1.6. OVERVIEW OF GRANT ACTIVITIES

In connection with this evaluation the Ministry provided assistance to establish a Project Inventory of Grant-financed activities and the categorization of these, presented as an unpublished enclosure to this report. This is described in annex 3.

Annex 3 shows the geographical distribution of total Grant funds for the period. Those activities which are not geographically specific account for 46 % of total disbursements. Of the remaining disbursements (NOK 133.310 mill.) 69 % have gone to Norway's partner countries. The remaining has gone to 14 other countries, including 4 countries with whom Norway has close relations (Ethiopia, Namibia, Uganda and Nepal).

Table 1.4. below shows grant disbursement per type of institution. The table only shows the primary recipient (one per project) and does not reveal how these institutions then may subsequently pass on funds to final recipients. Nevertheless, the table shows that 69 % of Grant disbursements have been channelled through multilateral organizations and international NGOs. Only 4 % went directly through national governments.

Table 1.4. GRANT DISBURSEMENT PER TYPE OF INSTITUTION (NOK mill.)

Inst. Type	Up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total	No. of Proj.
Multilateral	12.020	7.864	12.732	31.260	29.063	92.939	40
Government	1.376	2.312	2.041	3.241	693	9.663	18
Local Auth.	0	0	601	87	28	716	4
Res. Inst.	418	132	532	1.750	2.439	5.271	36
NGO Internat.	12.038	11.023	12.012	19.304	24.829	79.206	65
NGO Other	1.515	0	832	2.301	3.920	8.568	56
Individuals	0	110	150	446	581	1.287	21
Other	3.736	9.786	6.589	8.254	4.866	33.231	48
Not reg.	9.666	3.491	1.897	3.091	178	18.323	69
TOTAL	40.769	34.718	37.386	69.735	66.597	249.205	357

In annex 3 the categorization of projects by activities and environmental issues is described. The methodology has been a survey where involved staff have indicated activities and issues for each project. For a given project several activities and issues were often indicated. Therefore, the total disbursement for a project has been divided among activities and issues, as explained in detail in annex 3. This gives a rough estimate of the emphasis on activities and issues.

The major findings of the two tables are:

a) The most widely addressed types of activities are:

   i) Seminars and conferences
   ii) Information, publications and films
   iii) Establishment of institutions and administrative capacity strengthening
   iv) Studies

b) A relatively small number of projects include implementation of concrete, physical activities

c) The type of issue addressed by most projects is "General Environment"

d) Excluding the categories "General Environment" and "unknown" almost one half of the projects (128 of 278) addressed issues related to forests or land degradation.

e) Other activities are equally distributed amongst the different environmental issues.

Table 1.5. THE GRANT AND TYPE OF ACTIVITIES (Estimates)

	Activity	No. of Projects including activity	Total NOK mill
a)	Estab. of inst.-adm. strength	65	33.602
b)	Seminars and conferences	70	22.057
c)	Campaigns	22	4.591
d)	Study Tours	17	3.478
e)	Scholarships	8	762
f)	Support to staffing of inst.	10	2.402
g)	Studies	53	19.008
h)	Policy Design	15	9.714
i)	Project planning, pre-studies	25	13.772
j)	Research	30	6.542
k)	Environment impact analysis	11	10.789
l)	Implementation of projects	33	14.066
m)	Information, publications, film	69	25.828
n)	Consultancies	18	13.706
*)	Not registered/unknown	118	68.890
Total disbursed			249.205

Table 1.6. THE GRANT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Estimates)

	Environmental issue	No. of projects addressing issue	Total NOK mill.
a)	Desertification	31	9.924
b)	Woods and forests	64	29.696
c)	Pollution (air/water)	31	15.817
d)	Erosion/soil degrad.	33	9.498
e)	Inland water resc. prot.	19	11.025
f)	Wildlife	26	15.608
g)	Energy	26	6.568
h)	Costal zones - marine env.	17	2.847
i)	General environment	130	70.501
j)	Human development	31	6.905
*)	Not registrered/unknown	124	70.816
Total disbursed			249.205

Chapter 2. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

2.1. TERMS OF REFERENCE[1]

Terms of Reference (TOR) for this evaluation are in two parts: one regarding the overall use of the Grant, and a separate TOR regarding Norwegian aid cooperation with IUCN. Nevertheless, the Ministry requested an integrated evaluation report combining the findings from the two separate TORs into one study.

2.1.1. The Grant

The TOR of the evaluation describes the multitude of tasks that the Grant is designed to cover. It provides a detailed outline of specific issues to be addressed in the form of analyses and assessments in the evaluation under the following four headings:

* objectives and framework,
* utilization, follow-up and control of the Grant,
* management and administration, and
* role and effects of the Grant.

Key issues to be addressed and assessed as a basis for conclusions and recommendations in the evaluation relate to:

* clarity, conciseness and realism of the Grant objectives in relation to Norway's aid goals and Norway's WCED-follow-up commitments, and the concurrence between goals, strategy and Grant utilization;
* a complete and structured overview of Grant-supported activities as a basis for assessing the degree of recipient orientation and degree of success in integrating environmental concerns, priorities and activities into the administrative systems of the recipient;
* an assessment of the management model for the Grant, in particular as regards Grant distribution, coordination and the functional division between and within the Ministry and NORAD. The evaluation should in particular assess how the management model has functioned with regard to the Ministry and NORAD's liaison with the resident representatives, with the Ministry of Environment, and the cooperation with external agencies such as the World Bank, IIED, IUCN, etc.;
* the impact of the Grant in terms of catatalytic effects, awareness raising, capacity/capability-development and participatory planning. The evaluation should attempt to identify to what extent the Grant has contributed to these developments over and above trends that would have occurred regardless, as a result of normal Norwegian aid (additivity versus substitutability), to the extent that this is possible to distinguish.

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1 The complete TORs for the Grant and for the aid cooperation with IUCN are presented in Annex 1.

2.1.2. Norwegian Aid Cooperation with IUCN.

The key issues listed under 2.1. apply to the evaluation of the aid cooperation with IUCN. The Terms of Reference regarding IUCN focuss on concurrence between goals and conceptual approaches in Norwegian aid cooperation and those of IUCN.

Next, the specific mode of cooperation between Norwegian aid authorities and IUCN, and the adequacy of the adopted Norwegian procedures for involving and using IUCN are addressed. Important issues are how Norway defines and assigns tasks to IUCN; the complementary/competitive relationship of IUCN and Norwegian professional environments; and catalytic effects of the IUCN cooperation on competence in Norway's aid administration and among other Norwegian professionals. The evaluation addresses the following issues in particular:

* Concurrence of development cooperation goals of IUCN and Norway;
* Definition of Environment and Development, changes over time;
* Norway's managment and administration of the cooperation;
* IUCN's cooperation with recipient countries, with emphasis on:
  - Project entire cycle interaction with local parties;
  - Policy and practice on training and technology transfer, etc;
  - The flexibility built into the project cycle;
  - The process versus project orientation;
  - The cost-effectiveness of IUCN's administration.
* Effects on Norwegian competence.

2.2. KEY CONCEPTS FOR THE EVALUATION

Objectives for the Grant were presented in paragraph 1.2. These objectives provided an important framework for the evaluation, and chapter 5 summarizes the extent to which these objectives have been achieved. Some of the key concepts require further clarification. The following is the team's interpretation of these concepts and how they were assessed during the evaluation.

2.2.1. Catalytic effect

Catalytic effect is taken to mean the supposed additional effects of Grant activities as compared to what would have been the outcome without the use of the Grant. Examples could be a change in e.g. governmental project cycle procedures, a change in budget priorities and allocations, a country program profile change, local environmental initiatives, a change in staffing (recruitment, training programs etc.). Catalytic effects would be indicated by the following:

a) Projects originally funded under the Grant are transferred to regular program funding.
b) Projects are transferred to another budget post outside the country program but within the bilateral program; e.g. NGO, research, volunteer, scholarship, etc.
c) Changes in regular aid programs can be attributed directly to initial funding by the Grant.

d) Other donors continue the project or take up similar activities within their regular programs.
e) Projects are replicated or generate new models, insights and ideas which are followed up by bilateral donors, NGOs, multilateral agencies, and government bodies.

It is important to distinguish the with/without impact from the observed before/after situations. This is particularly difficult because the Grant is a marginal contribution established at a time when it became virtually compulsory to pay attention to environmental issues in developing institutions and recipient countries. The evaluation team has been conservative in attributing positive environmental developments to the Grant, unless direct connections back to activities funded by the Grant can be traced.

2.2.2. Awareness raising

The objectives and guidelines for the Grant imply that it aims to contribute to increased awareness about environment and environmental issues. However, this ambitious goal is so broad that it makes selection of appropriate methods for analyzing goal attainment very difficult. Increased awareness can be taken to mean anything from positive attitudes towards environmental issues in general, to practical actions dealing with defined environmental problems. Furthermore, on the general level it is nearly impossible to distinguish the source of such awareness, be it Grant activities or other sources or processes. Another issue is to define awareness by whom: Central government institutions, local administrators or local population affected by the project? Awareness raising would be indicated by the existence or amount of:

a) Environmental education (school programmes, curriculae)
b) Environmentmental information programmes/campaigns,
c) Media programmes,
d) Publications,
e) Training (seminars, courses, study tours),
f) Dissemination of project results and information,
g) Affected target groups (general public, politicians, teachers etc.).

2.2.3. Administrative capacity strengthening

The objectives and guidelines for the Grant specify that the Grant aims to strengthen the administrative capacity of the recipient country, usually referred to as institution building.

Building of administrative capacity involves actions to enable the institution to develop and/or operate effectively, as measured by the Grant contribution to e.g.

a) supply/support of needed manpower,
b) logistic support,
c) improvement of overall administrative infrastructure,
d) administrative studies.

2.2.4. Strengthening of professional competence

Building of professional/scientific competence involves acquisition of knowledge and/or training. This may be acquired in many different ways and measured by the Grant contribution to e.g.

a) training courses,
b) seminars,
c) study tours,
d) enhancement of professional knowledge and experience through participation in studies or projects.

2.2.5. Recipient orientation and prioritization

The extent to which aid projects are genuinely recipient-oriented and reflect recipient rather than donor preferences is not readily determined. Projects that the donor presents are "recipient-oriented" in the sense that they have been identified and formulated either with the consent of, or on behalf of, recipient governments. When assessing the degree of recipient orientation it is also important to assess the extent to which recipients themselves have initiated, or participated in, the formulation of the project and its implementation.

However, this does not necessarily mean that the recipient country genuinely prioritizes the project. The real test of the degree to which environmental projects are prioritized by recipient governments is their opportunity value. That is the extent to which recipient governments are willing to finance projects out of local funds, by borrowing from institutions such as the World Bank, or by reallocation in long-term donor agreements such as the country programme in the case of NORAD cooperation.

2.3. METHODS

There are several methodological issues to be addressed as a premise for an unbiased and sound evaluation. Some methodologically critical issues and the approaches adopted to deal with them in this particular evaluation are addressed in the following.

The evaluation has consisted of two phases. The first phase was undertaken by the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research - NIBR - and Chr. Michelsen Institute - DERAP, who presented their Inception Report in April 1990. During this phase a large number of interviews with key relevant staff in the Ministry, NORAD and the Ministry of Environment were carried out and questionaires sent to resident representatives. This information was kindly put at the disposal of the second phase of the evaluation and an effort was made not to unnecessarily interview persons who had already been interviewed. With this background of existing data, the second evaluation phase went into more detail on questions that remained open from the first phase.

2.3.1. Project Inventory and Categorization of projects

In connection with the evaluation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided special

assistance in the form of a Project Inventory of Grant activities. This lists all projects with the following information:

* Project ID number. This is the code for the country where the project is implemented and a number for each project.
* Disbursing unit, which will be NORAD/Oslo, NORAD/Res.Rep., MULTI, PROG or INFO.
* Cooperating institution, which is the institution to which the funds are transferred
* Code for country where project is implemented. Projects which are not country-specific have the code GLO.
* Project title
* Annual and total disbursements

The complete project inventory of 357 projects is presented in an unpublished enclosure to this evaluation, entitled "Statistics on the Special Grant for Environment and Development, Disbursements 1984-1990", from which all statistical information in this report has been taken. This also includes a categorization of projects by activities and environmental issues addressed. In annex 3 the constraints of the project inventory and the categorization of the projects are discussed and the most important tables presented.

2.3.2. Information Gathering, Sampling and Field Work Methodology

Constraints of time and budget required that the evaluation be selective in its approach. Only a sample of Grant-financed activities could be evaluated, and the amount of time available for each selected activity was limited. To strike a balance satisfying the different individual demands for in-depth analysis from all countries, projects and affected parties is obviously an impossible task. Efforts were therefore concentrated both geographically and as regards projects and institutions studied.

Geographically, the decision was made to emphasize use of the Grant in areas where Norway prioritizes aid cooperation, i.e. in main partner countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and to a lesser extent in South Asia. Three such countries were therefore selected as representative for closer field examination by joint teams of local and Norwegian experts: Tanzania, Zambia and Sri Lanka. In addition, Botswana was visited in order to examine more closely a National Conservation Strategy process. At the same time it was acknowledged that the first two countries - while representative - pose particular difficulties with regard to achieving Grant objectives. It was therefore decided to undertake brief desk reviews of a limited sample of recent evaluations of IUCN performance in other regions, i.e. Central America, Nepal and Pakistan, where the conditions for meeting some of the Grant goals would perhaps be more favourable. The purpose was to establish a more balanced and diverse picture of bilateral field-oriented use of the Grant involving IUCN.

Among the several hundred activities supported by the Grant, only a limited number could be looked at in detail. These were selected in the chosen countries, so as to cover a representative sample of sectors, activity types and institutions involved.

The Grant has supported a multitude of organizations and agencies. Again it was

necessary to be selective. In the case of NORAD, IUCN has played a very dominant role and Terms of Reference specified that this was to be studied in particular. Regarding multilateral use of the Grant, it was decided to look at the World Bank allocations in more detail because the Bank has been the second most important recipient after IUCN. In addition to these two, it was decided to look more closely at one of the international NGO-collaborative agreements -- IIED - and finally one of the information cooperation agreements -- PANOS. One shortcoming of this necessarily limited sampling was the deletion of UN-agencies such as UNSO and the WCED-Secretariat from a more detailed evaluation.

Detailed, tailormade questionaires and question letters were prepared for interviews with World Bank, IIED, PANOS and IUCN. Inteview guides were used for field work in the four countries. Responses to questionaires and minutes from interviews constitute the major part of the information basis of this evaluation. (Institutions interviewed are listed in annex 2).

Evaluation of Grant activities at field level has been restricted to bilateral assistance in three partner countries, Tanzania, Zambia and Sri Lanka. The work was carried out by teams of 2 local consultants and 1-2 Norwegian consultant(s), following the same methodology:

a) Preparation of two reports prior to the field studies;
   * Presentation of all Grant activities in the country
   * Environmental Profile of country.
b) Selection of representative and appropriate agencies, institutions, projects and persons to be contacted for possible interviews, and refinement of interview guides.
c) Completion of the interviews, field visits and document reviews for the respective countries/agencies, and write-up of country reports and chapters as regards the various recipients.

It turned out -- not surprisingly perhaps -- that communications did not always succeed in relaying information and messages as anticipated. The field teams had to improvise in some cases. This has been taken into due consideration throughout the evaluation work.

It has been an important methodological principle that the selection of what institutions to contact and whom to meet be decided on the basis of the projects and their institutional link-ups, and not to allow involved implementing parties to guide or censor the work of the consultants. While advice from the Resident Representative of NORAD and other evaluation-affected parties, e.g. Panos, IIED, or IUCN play an important part, it would have been methodologically questionable to be entirely guided by them in selecting interview subjects. All of the project sites selected for in-depth studies were visited by all members of the teams in Zambia, Tanzania and Sri Lanka. In addition several other field sites of projects funded by the Grant were visited.

The team attempted for each project studied to get a balanced picture of the constellation of actors around a project situation and of how a project had operated. This

included the NORAD Resident Representative and the officer in charge of the Grant; project officials; local scientists and experts; target population and local people involved in the implementation of the projects; involved Government departments and NGOs. Regarding IUCN, national, regional and headquarter personnel was interviewed. However, it should be kept in mind that within a frame of 1-2 days visit per site, there are obvious limitations as to the number and scope of persons interviewed.

2.4. Discussions

This evaluation is based to a large degree on qualitative information harvested through interviews and direct observation at project sites. As such, though, some of the statements cannot be substantiated on the basis of statistical surveys, they are based on attitudes and opinions that were revealed to the team during the field studies. Such opinions and attitudes are important to convey in the evaluation, even if it cannot be scientifically proven the number of people or situations to which they apply. For one thing, such opinions and attitudes reflect the degree to which the confidence of national and local government, NGOs, national experts and local communities has been established and maintained through the Grant. For another, candid opinions of this kind can give vital signals for redirecting important aspects of project and programme planning, design and implementation. The evaluation team has therefore deliberately included such subjective views, if they proved to be widespread or held by central people, in the spirit that such knowledge is needed as a basis for strategy shifts for the benefit of the implemententing agency and not least, the beneficiaries.

It is important to bear in mind that the goals aimed at in the use of the Grant vary for the different channels. Perhaps the greatest discrepancy is found when comparing NORAD's bilateral use of the Grant, in specific field projects in main partner countries, to the use of the Grant for awareness-raising, to speed up adoption by World Bank of environmental action plans and routine environmental economic analysis.

In the first case, the well-known difficulties and frustrations of establishing an effective and sustainable development process in a low-income recipient country may lead to rather negative comments from those affected and involved locally in the aid cooperation. In the second case, the issue is rather to what extent the Grant has contributed genuine "additionality", such as more in-depth environmental impact studies, or to speed up the development of more environmentally oriented project cycles and policy procedures in a major multilateral development agency. It is not the intention of this evaluation to compare relative performance of the various channels based on comments derived from the questionaires and interviews, but rather to consider the merits and shortcomings of the way the Grant has been handled in the context of the particular goals and organizational parameters prevailing.

A third and different situation pertains to use by the Ministry and NORAD of the Grant to support international environmental awareness raising and understanding of key issues, through allocations to e.g. IIED and Panos. Here the anticipated effects are of a broad and hard-to-measure, awareness-raising nature. By reviewing media reactions and target group coverage and conducting interviews with various affected organizations and people, the team believes it is nonetheless possible to make a qualitative impact assessment.

Chapter 3. APPLICATION OF THE GRANT: DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT

3.1. NORAD

3.1.1. Overview

Since the inception of the Grant in 1984 and through 1990, NORAD has spent NOK 112.619 mill. on 262 projects, as shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1. NORAD EXPENDITURE AND PROJECTS 1984 - 1990

	NOK mill.	Projects
Global	17.004	16
Partner countries	85.887	229
Other countries and regional allocation	9.728	17
Total	112.619	262

There are 16 "global" projects. These are not country specific and range in disbursements from NOK 0.049 to NOK 4.163 mill. per project. One of the types of projects financed is support to different international organizations, conferences and campaigns. In this allocation NORAD is financing two projects, "Environmental Impact Assessment Services" and "Project Development Fund", with the purpose of supporting developing countries in formulating projects and carrying out environmental impact assessments. This global allocation has also financed the development of NORAD's own guidelines for Environmental Impact Assessment.

NOK 9.728 mill. has been spent regionally (Africa and Central America) and in non partner countries (Ethiopia, Nepal and Uganda). Of this, NOK 8.711 mill. has been spent in Uganda, primarily on two projects (Mount Elgon and Sump Area Management).

The disbursement of the Grant in the partner countries varies considerably, as shown in Table 3.2.

In annex 3 the categorization of projects by activities and environmental issues is described. The methodology has been a survey where involved staff have indicated activities and issues for each project. For a given project several activities and issues were often indicated. Therefore, the total disbursement for a project has been divided among activities and issues. Tables 8 and 9 in annex 3 present the estimated distribution of NORAD Grant financing for different activities and environmental issues. The

categories of activities addressed by most projects are "Establishment of institutions and administrative strengthening", "Information", "Seminars and conferences" and "Studies". The "General Environment" and "Woods and Forests" are the categories of environmental issues addressed by most projects. The emphasis on woods and forests is even more marked within NORAD than for the Grant as a whole (table 1.6.).

Table 3.2. NORAD GRANT DISBURSEMENTS IN PARTNER COUNTRIES (NOK MILL.)

	Up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
Bangladesh	770	1.570	2.511	2.289	2.646	9.786
Botswana	1.698	1.905	288	659	953	5.503
India	2.893	275	1.137	664	910	5.879
Kenya	2.591	2.720	4.218	4.257	2.388	16.174
Sri Lanka	1.076	991	1.992	1.199	229	5.487
Madagascar	300	0	0	163	103	566
Mozambique	0	352	662	2.053	897	3.964
Nicaragua	136	0	653	1.433	3.485	5.707
Pakistan	754	720	252	301	3.244	5.271
Tanzania	2.430	1.384	2.690	2.252	3.181	11.937
Zambia	2.827	2.262	1.661	894	509	8.153
Zimbabwe	1.622	2.504	680	1.896	758	7.460
TOTAL	17.097	14.683	16.744	18.060	19.303	85.887

3.1.2. NORAD's Management of the Grant

With the establishment of the Grant in 1984, NORAD was given a means to implement Norway's new objective for sustainable management of natural resources in Norwegian bilateral development assistance. The philosophy was that the Grant should be a catalytic and integrating mechanism which would permeate all aspects of development assistance. The NORAD management model for the Grant hinged on some implicit assumptions, viz.

a) that the management of the Grant in NORAD/Oslo would be integrated with other aid activities, particularly country programming (catalytic effect);
b) that NORAD staff both at headquarters and at the resident representative

offices would receive the necessary training and guidelines to ensure that the Grant would have such a catalytic effect;

c) that institutions in partner countries would be made aware of the existence of the Grant, its objectives and guidelines;

d) that institutions in partner countries would be motivated to submit projects for financing from the Grant;

e) that governments in partner countries would see the intended linkage between the Grant and country program activities and be interested in following this up in country programme negotiations.

Until 1989 the total NORAD Grant allocation was administered by the Division for Agriculture and Rural Development (LADU). With the separation of NORAD from the Ministry in 1989 the set-up and the procedures have been somewhat altered. From 1991 the NORAD allocation is divided in three portions:

a) "Global" for which the responsibility is assigned to the Assistant Director and administered by NATUR (Natural Resources Management Division) - formerly LADU.

b) Regional Department for Africa (AFR)

c) Regional Department for Asia and Latin America (ALAT)

The allocations for the regional departments cover Grant activities in the partner countries, including the mission administered allocations assigned to the resident representatives.

There are three basic channels through which NORAD manages the Grant:

a) NORAD/Oslo

The overall administrative and professional responsibility was placed with LADU. They managed parts of the allocation directly themselves, while other parts where managed by the resident representatives and international organizations (see below). Projects with budgets exceeding NOK 0.250 mill. were decided by LADU. For these projects, negotiations were mostly done directly between LADU and the implementing agencies, while the disbursements could be both from the global or the resident representative part of the allocation.

LADU had the overall professional responsibility for the Grant, where it was placed with the Environmental Advisor and associated staff. The capacity in LADU has varied, and it has often been stated that it has been insufficient. The competence of those allocated to Grant activities has been primarily in natural sciences and less on development assistance.

b) NORAD Resident Representatives.

Since 1986 the resident representatives were given mission administered allocations as annual lump sums. The allocations increased from NOK 0.5 mill. in 1986 to presently NOK 1 mill. (more on request). Within these budgetary frames the resident represen-

tatives could disburse up to NOK 0.250 mill. per project. Projects exceeding this amount were managed by NORAD/Oslo. Larger and long term projects in individual countries were therefore managed by NORAD/Oslo, with limited involvement of the resident representatives. It is generally perceived that this limited local involvement in the management of larger projects has been detrimental to the implementation of Grant objectives.

Table 3.3. shows the degree to which the total allocations to resident representatives have been disbursed since 1987. It is clear that they have not been able to disburse these allocations (57.4 % for the period). Table 2 in annex 3 shows how the disbursement rates vary between the different countries.

Table 3.3. MISSION-ADMINISTERED GRANT DISBURSEMENTS IN RELATION TO MISSION ALLOCATION (NOK MILL.)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
Mission allocation	6.000	12.000	12.000	12.000	42.000
Mission admin. disbursements	2.021	6.580	9.258	6.286	24.104
Disbursement rates	33.7%	54.8%	77.2%	52.4%	57.4%

The capacity and capability to manage the Grant at the different resident representative offices have varied. Normally the responsibility for the Grant has been placed with a programme officer who is also charged with other and usually more demanding responsibilities. The Grant has therefore often become a marginal activity, with inadequate professional competence (see paragraph 3.1.4.6.).

c) International organizations

Given the limited capacity and/or capability of the resident representative offices to generate project proposals from the partner countries and the pressure on NORAD with the increasing Grant allocation, NORAD decentralized the management of the Grant in another direction, turning to the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) for assistance. The NORAD - IUCN cooperation is described and discussed at length in chapter 4. Here it suffices to note that 43 % of NORAD's total allocation since 1984 has been implemented by IUCN, who have come to play a central role in both formulation and management of Grant financed projects.

The management pattern of the Grant has been inconsistent. In accordance with the guidelines an increasing amount of Grant funds has been decentralized to the resident

representatives, but with limited success. In NORAD/Oslo, on the other hand, the tendency was to centralize the management of the Grant to LADU and the Grant was little integrated with the rest of NORAD. Until recently projects being initiated or developed jointly with other divisions of NORAD were exceptions. The final tendency was that LADU decentralized their management of the Grant to IUCN, who came to play an increasingly important role. These trends created conditions of polarization that led to some of the problems in implementing and achieving the goals of the Grant described in the evaluation.

While this evaluation has been undertaken, NORAD has actively reviewed its guidelines and procedures for use of the Grant in particular, and for environment considerations in NORAD work in general. The action plan proposal and strategy is in the process of being presented for the NORAD management. This new initiative implies a much more active involvement of the Resident Representatives in defining and prioritizing environmental aid activities in cooperation with the authorities. Environmental country profiles shall form the basis for rotating action plans and budgets to coincide with multi year country programs. The Resident Representatives will take on the implementing responsibility if this initiative is approved. To assist in this process, NORAD is increasing its environmental training efforts for its staff.

3.1.3. The grant and NORAD's partner countries - the cases of Tanzania, Zambia and Sri Lanka

In the following sections application of the Grant in Tanzania, Zambia and Sri Lanka is discussed. Here an overall assessment, as well as observations on a limited number of projects, is made. A comparative assessment is made of specific issues related to the use of the Grant in the three countries.

3.1.3.1. Tanzania

During the period 1985 - 90, total disbursements from the country programme to Tanzania were NOK 1,252.713 mill. In the current country programme the main objectives for assistance are to contribute to economic reconstruction, basic needs and sustainable management of natural resources. Environmental aspects are to be an integrated part of the assistance. Special reference is made to deforestation and soil degradation and priority will be given to afforestation and soil protection. An action plan for environmental protection and natural resource management within the frame of Norwegian assistance will be made.

In the current country programme it is first and foremost within agriculture, forestry and district development that activities addressing environment and natural resource management are included in on-going projects. In addition there are specific projects such as soil protection, afforestation and watershed protection.

Annex 3 lists the Grant financed projects in Tanzania. During the period 1985 - 90 NOK 11.937 mill. was spent in Tanzania. To put this amount in a proper perspective it should be noted that this is no more than 1 % of country programme disbursements, 3% of Norwegian assistance to natural resource management.

In Tanzania the 21 projects financed by the Grant cover a wide range of environmental issues and activities. Concentration is on wildlife- related activities and forest conservation and management. The activities funded have been mainly studies (47 %), seminars, conferences and campaigns and dissemination of information and publications (22 %). Only 9 % of funds have been used for implementation of concrete physical activities (tree planting etc.). A large and broad range of relevant institutions have at one stage or another been supported by the Grant. However, surprisingly enough, most of those interviewed were not aware that this support came from the Grant.

The NORAD resident representative has not been very successful in spending the mission administered allocation. In no year has the allocated amount been spent. During the period 1984 - 90 NOK 1.858 mill. has been disbursed by the resident representative office. For the period 1987 - 90 only 28.5 % of resident representative allocation was disbursed.

Another characteristic is the reliance on IUCN, which has been in charge of 6 of 9 projects administered from NORAD/Oslo. This accounts for 73 % of total Grant disbursements during the period.

Regarding the projects studied, the team's impressions of these as individual projects are generally favourable. However, when viewed against the Grant as a whole, and in the wider context of the country programme, several issues emerge, which are addressed in paragraph 3.1.4.

In Tanzania the team studied the following projects, for which the main characteristics and observations are summarized below.

Singida School Forestry Project

The main objectives of this project are to raise awareness of deforestation and soil fertility loss and to promote afforestation through production of seedlings in school and village nurseries, in cooperation with Government extension staff. The project is implemented by the NGO Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (an agency of the Lutheran World Federation). The Grant has supported this project with NOK 0.426 mill. as part of a larger integrated rural development project. The project has also received funding over the NGO allocation.

The team's observation on the project are:

a) The project addresses environmental problems with high Government priority - land degradation due to agricultural practices and desertification.
b) The project is recipient-oriented at both the local level (villages, schools and Forest Division staff, although relatively unsuccessful in villages) and at central level (Forest Division and the Ministry of Education).
c) The project has contributed to strengthening the administrative capacity, of the extension system and of the involved schools, to administer environmental education projects with a fieldwork component

d) The professional competence of teachers and forest extension officers has been strengthened regarding environmental issues.
e) The project is an example of how concrete physical project activities (growing and planting of seedlings) may be used as a means to awareness-raising, institution-building and competence-raising.
f) The project is an example of how environmental education/awareness-raising may be applied in rural Africa.
g) The project was initially supported by the Grant and subsequently received funding from the NGO allocation.

Ngorongoro Conservation and Development Project

The objectives of the project were to provide the technical framework for a long-term management policy for the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, aimed at reducing land-use conflicts between conservation requirements and the development needs of the human population. The activities have consisted of producing 14 technical reports, which formed the basis for a major workshop and assistance to the ad hoc Ministerial Commission on Ngorongoro. The project was implemented by IUCN with NOK 1.706 mill. from the Grant.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project addresses in an integrated way the problem of wildlife resource degradation in relation to the development needs of the population in the area.
b) The project has been an important contribution to the ongoing Government deliberations on policy for the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. This resulted in the Report of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Commission on Ngorongoro. The project has thus contributed to awareness-raising.
c) The Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority played a subordinate role in the preparation of the technical studies, and should have been better integrated into the project as a whole. The project did not significantly strengthen the administrative or professional competence of the Authority.
d) 27 consultants participated in the preparation of reports. Of these 13 were Tanzanian citizens or residents. Nevertheless, it was expressed locally that more Tanzanians should have been involved and this would have reduced the cost.
e) The work was of good technical quality. However, the reports consisted mostly of collation of existing knowledge rather than new research.
f) The animosities between the local Masai population and the authorities remain. The Masai feel left out and disillusioned, and technical reports do not solve their fundamental development needs.

Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy

Phase I consisted of a major workshop (1985), which brought about the document "Toward a Regional Conservation Strategy for the Serengeti". The objective of Phase II, which started in 1987 is to design and implement a package of integrated and cross-sectoral activities in the Serengeti region aimed at ensuring the long-term conservation of the protected areas. Activities include stabilising land-use, improving farming

practices, providing benefits from wildlife utilization to local communities, and promoting the effective management of the protected areas themselves. The Grant has financed a total of NOK 3.067 mill. with disbursements each year since 1984. The project is implemented by IUCN through an independent project organization, under the guidance of a Steering Committee.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project addresses the objective of the Government to come up with a strategy to combat all forms of poaching and enable the nation to derive sustainable benefits from wildlife resources, as well as involve the local people in wildlife conservation.
b) The major achievement of the project is its contribution to raising awareness of wildlife issues and the need for a participatory approach to wildlife conservation amongst residents in the area, wildlife management institutions and in the Government.
c) The Project has expanded from studies and the workshop to also include concrete activities benefitting the local population.
d) The recipient orientation of the project is ensured through a broadly-based Steering Committee and the continuous integration of local people in different project activities.
e) The project has its own administrative set-up. This is perceived by some in Tanzania as a parallel organization with limited potential for strengthening Tanzanian institutions administratively or professionally. In this regard the exclusion of the Serengeti Wildlife Research Centre is a shortcoming.
f) The project has been supported annually since the inception of the Grant. This is in contradiction with the short term nature of the Grant. Recently, some efforts have been made to transfer the project to the Country Programme, but so far to no avail.

Coral Reef Study in the Dar es Salaam Area

The main objective of the project was to protect and conserve the coral reef by developing a plan to combat dynamite fishing and preparing a detailed proposal for marine parks and reserves. The project was implemented by the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC) who received NOK 0.353 mill. in support for this.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project was implemented in two phases, as phase I did not bring about the expected results.
b) In phase II relevant institutions were involved to a greater extent.
c) The project contributed to awareness-raising, bringing the marine and coastal environmental issues into focus.
d) The project was initiated locally. Funds were applied for and channelled through NEMC, while the execution of different components (studies) was done by a broad range of local institutions identified by NEMC.

e) The project contributed in particular to professional and scientific competence strengthening of involved institutions
f) The NORAD resident representative was much involved in this project, which was perceived as important in order to develop a relationship with the focal national environmental institution.

The East Usambara Forest Inventory

The objective of the project is to conserve the rich natural resources of the remaining forests in East Usambara mountains and to promote development, especially with regard to agriculture and women. The activities financed by the Grant were to carry out an inventory of the flora and fauna of the forest community, to study the catchment properties of the forest and to provide a synthesis of this in the form of a management plan. All study aspects were completed as planned and several workshops held involving the local people, after which the book, "Forest Conservation in the East Usambara Mountains Tanzania" was compiled with technical reports and a master plan. The project was implemented by IUCN.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The conservation and sustainable development of the forest resources in the Usambaras is a priority of the Forest Division as indicated in the Tanzania Forest Action Plan.
b) The project contributed to professional and scientific competence strengthening of Tanzanians through training courses, inventory work and the involvement of national researchers.
c) Project activities have increased the awareness among relevant institutions, the Government and local communities regarding the status of the forest resources and the need for conservation and sustainable development.
d) Although the project has not led to any follow-up through the country programme or other Norwegian aid channels, other donors have continued the work in the area.
e) As the project was administered through an ad hoc project administration, the Grant had little impact on administrative capacity of existing Tanzanian institutions.

3.1.3.2. Zambia

The Norwegian development assistance to Zambia between 1985-90 must be seen in the context of the difficult and uncertain macro-economic situation in the country during that period. NORAD's main emphasis has been to concentrate and consolidate on-going projects rather than expanding into new sectors. Total disbursements by the country programme between 1985 - 90 amounted to approximately NOK 1,005 mill. with a relatively stable annual average of NOK 167 mill. Major components of the country programme are rural development/agriculture (36.2%), water development (13.6%) and education (8.6%). The country programme encompasses environmental issues regarding both rural development/agriculture (e.g. mono-cropping of hybrid maize, misuse of fertilizers), and water supply (groundwater level, contamination, use of asbestos in water

pipes). Studies have recently been undertaken to address some of these issues (Environmental Profile of Western Province and Environmental Study of the Northern Province). Within the Northern Province multi-sector programme there are also several projects which have been recognized to have positive environmental impact.

Annex 3 lists the Grant-financed projects in Zambia. During the period 1985 - 90 NOK 8.153 mill. was spent in Zambia. This is no more than 0.8 % of the country programme disbursement and as such insignificant in relation to Norway's bilateral aid involvement in the country.

Grant projects and funds in Zambia have been concentrated on wildlife-related activities. These represent 5 of 9 projects and 69 % of disbursements, mostly in connection with one project, Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project. Most of the rest of the Grant was spent on two follow-up projects of the National Conservation Strategy, which have a potential for being important but which have not proven so yet. The funds have been largely used for studies (52 % of disbursements) and only 3 % on implementation of concrete physical activities. A relatively narrow scope of relevant institutions has been supported by the Grant, and the NORAD resident representative has not been very successful in spending the mission-administered allocation.

In Zambia the team studied the following projects, for which the main characteristics and observations are summarized below.

Luangwa Valley Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP)

LIRDP has been included in the country programme since 1988 as a major multipurpose project with an annual budget of NOK 18.912 mill.in 1990. The Grant has financed NOK 4.198 mill. for this project since 1985, starting with the project identification study. The overall objective of LIRDP is improvement of the standard of living in the central Luangwa Valley through the use of the area's natural resources.

The team's observations on the project as it is today are:

a) When assessing the project's contribution to environmental awareness-raising, one has to distinguish between wildlife and other natural resources. While awareness as to the conservation of wildlife has increased in the project area, nationally and even internationally, there has been little awareness-raising regarding the conservation of soil, fisheries, forestry and water resources. In fact the project's emphasis on famine relief and alleviation of immediate poverty has stimulated unsustainable exploitation of these other natural resources.

b) As an environmental project one would have expected,in addition to economic monitoring, a more careful monitoring of environmental consequences of various activities. Particularly as this is a pilot project in which new models for integration of economic growth and environmental concerns are to be tested out.

c) Since the project operates from its own project office, it has done little to strengthen administrative capacity of existing institutions. Over the period, the project entrenched itself as the only development authority in the area. The project has therefore been moving away from the Grant's objective to enhance the

existing administrative capacity.

d) The project has only to a very limited extent contributed to the strengthening of professional/scientific competence by financing one year training courses for 7 wildlife officers (scouts) at the Mweka Wildlife College in Tanzania.

e) There is a general feeling in Zambia that the project has had a positive impact on illegal hunting, to the extent that animal numbers may be beginning to increase. (But this is not professionally verified).

f) There are constraints to the sustainability and replicability of the project because of its cost structure and dependency on previous investments, its dependency on costly infrastructure and its political sponsorship.

g) LIRDP is the only case which was initiated by the Grant and eventually transferred to the Country Programme, thus in accordance with one of the key objectives of the Grant. However, using the Grant for speeding up integration of a project into the Country Programme is not unproblematic, particularly if important steps in normal project planning are dropped.

The Natural Resources Data Bank

The National Conservation Strategy recommended the establishment of a Natural Resources Data Bank (NRDB), which would improve accessibility to and identify gaps in existing natural resources data. The Grant has contributed NOK 1.194 mill. to NRDB through IUCN.

The team's observations on this project are:

a) The establishment of the Natural Resources Data Bank has contributed to increased insight and awareness of the need for a database on environment for the purpose of policy formulation and programme development. NRDB assisted in the production of the first "State of the Environment Report" that was presented at the Environmental Council seminar.

b) The NRDB is manned by two Zambians and administered by the University of Zambia, which has been administratively strengthened by the provision of computers.

c) The two Zambians manning the NRDB are being professionally strengthened by the project. In addition University students were involved in the survey of existing natural resources data, which also included a training course for the students.

d) NRDB has been reserved special funding by the Government and the University of Zambia has provided office space.

Decentralization of the National Conservation Strategy

This project was a direct consequence of the recommendations of the National Conservation Strategy. The Southern and Western provinces were chosen for project implementation because of the critical environmental situation in these areas (mainly soil erosion and deforestation due to fuelwood shortage). The funds were channelled through IUCN, which was also responsible for the implementation. The Grant disbursement has been NOK 0.391 mill.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project was slow in taking off and when it did in 1989, there was a rush for implementation of microprojects with little effort made to strengthen the institutional structure at provincial level.

b) So far the project has brought few results. Shortly after the project was approved in 1988 the political situation in the country deteriorated, and consequently the implementation of the National Conservation Strategy in the provinces became difficult. Furthermore, the IUCN consultant to the project was transferred by IUCN to its Regional Office in Harare. The present status of the project is that funds are scarce, technical assistance required and the project far from completed. Project staff were unaware of the fact that the project was financed by the Grant and thus of the possibility to request additional funds. It was perceived that this all depended on IUCN.

c) Nevertheless, Zambia has taken steps to strengthen provincial environmental structures through Provincial Conservation Committees. Provincial Councils are therefore now in a better position to implement the decentralization of the National Conservation Strategy.

Forindeco Exotic Charcoal Project

In 1989 The Women NGOs Co-ordinating Committee, through the Department of Energy (DOE), approached NORAD to fund a project to manufacture charcoal from exotic trees, using waste wood from logging operations. Production and transportation of charcoal was done by the Norwegian company FORINDECO. The Grant has disbursed NOK 0.452 mill. for this project.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project increased the awareness about natural resource conservation through the use of industrial plantation waste wood for making charcoal; the use of the improved charcoal stove; and the commercial production of charcoal from exotic trees for use in the industry. However, the project failed to enhance the acceptance of the improved stove.
b) The project has acted as a catalyst, initiating charcoal production from exotic plantation trees on a commercial basis.
c) The project did not strengthen local administrative capacity nor professional and scientific competence because it was implemented by a foreign company with no training and research components. In addition charcoal production was based on known technology.

Save the Rhino

The Save the Rhino Trust (SRT) was established in 1970 as an NGO to assist the National Parks and Wildlife Services in anti-poaching activities. The Grant provided NOK 0.767 mill. for SRT anti-poaching activities in South Luangwa National Park during

1984 and 1985.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The SRT anti-poaching activities received good publicity and contributed to awareness raising, especially among policy makers. However, the activities included arrests of poachers, harassment of local populations in game management areas and even paramilitary operations. This caused great resentment against wildlife conservation among the local people. In spite of these anti-poaching operations the rhino and elephant populations continued to decline.
b) The project was not aimed at strengthening the administrative, professional and scientific capacity of the Zambian institutions involved.
c) No direct catalytic effects of the project have been observed. However, it may be that the failure of the SRT approach did contribute to the development of the alternative approach to wildlife conservation, as developed through the LIRDP project.

Nature of Zambia

INFO has disbursed NOK 0.2 mill. on the publication "Nature of Zambia". It has been produced by IUCN as a follow-up of the World Conservation Strategy and the Zambian National Conservation Strategy. It presents Zambia's natural resources and draws the attention to some of the country's most serious environmental problems. The booklet has been published in nearly 10,000 copies. It has had several effects and has contributed to awareness-raising, as pointed out in paragraphs 3.1.4.1. and 3.1.4.2.)

3.1.3.3. Sri Lanka

During the period from 1985-90 total disbursements from the country programme to Sri Lanka were NOK 317,187 mill. Civil unrest has created extremely difficult field conditions for implementation of the country programme. This is dominated by Hambantota and Moneragala IRDP's, welfare activities in the plantation sector, commodity assistance and import support, and humanitarian assistance/repatriation. Environmental considerations in the country programme are addressed primarily through the IRDP's and, since 1990, through CENOPEC (see below).

Annex 3 lists the Grant financed projects in Sri Lanka. Activities and funds are concentrated on forest conservation and management and pollution control, with emphasis on studies and institution building. Grant activities have been particularly effective in strengthening national environmental institutions, raising awareness at the political level and among the public. The NORAD resident representative has been relatively successful in fulfilling his role in relation to the Grant. Between 1987 and 1990 58 % of the total resident representative allocation was disbursed. Of particular importance is the resident representative's involvement in the pollution control and institution building projects, supporting the Central Environmental Authority and the District Environmental Authorities. These were instrumental for the inclusion of the CEA/NORAD Programme for Environmental Cooperation on the Country Programme. Through this the environmental component of the normal assistance channels has

increased dramatically.

The Project Inventory for Sri Lanka reveals that a large and broad range of relevant institutions have at one stage or another been supported by the Grant. Another "institutional" characteristic is the role IUCN has been playing as implementing agency for four projects, accounting for 52 % of total disbursements.

In Sri Lanka the team studied the following projects, for which the main characteristics and observations are summarized below.

Environmental Protection and Management

The objective of this project was for the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) to become operational in the field of water and air pollution control and monitoring. The main activity was to purchase and install pollution monitoring equipment and carry out data collection. The Grant has disbursed NOK 1.300 mill. for this project. In 1989 CEA/NORAD Programme for Environmental Cooperation (CENOPEC) was included in the Country Programme, including this project.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The activities of the laboratory correspond to the proposed activities but the extent of monitoring is severely limited by staffing. The work holds a high scientific standard, but the laboratory falls short of its goal of being operative in effectively monitoring water and air pollution and industrial effluents.
b) The project was formulated by CEA responding to the Government's priorities and CEA as an institution has been firmly in control of this.
c) The administrative capacity of the CEA Environmental Protection Division has been strengthened through the project, but far short of what is necessary. The CEA laboratory is evolving as a referral laboratory, thus strengthening other relevant institutions. The project also plays a role in the long term administrative strengthening of the CEA as a whole.
d) The CEA has become professionally more competent in the field of pollution monitoring due to this project.
e) The project had a key role in the development of the CEA/NORAD Programme for Environmental Cooperation (CENOPEC), which has become an important part of the country programme.
f) The project as part of the NORAD CEA programme has (along with other developments) increased awareness of pollution issues, particularly at the political level, and contributed to the creation of the Ministry of Environment and the National Environmental Steering Committee. Awareness-raising in the industrial community has apparently been less effective. The project did emphasize the public awareness component. Nevertheless, the pollution control activities of CEA have been covered by the media and the public response has been excellent, as indicated by the number of inquiries and complaints received.
g) The project set the whole development of the CEA pollution control, licensing and monitoring program into motion.
h) The industrial community's response to CEA licensing and monitoring activities

has brought about a discussion at high governmental level regarding how to work with industry to prevent pollution.

Strengthening of District Environmental Agencies (DEAs)

This project was formulated by CEA together with the above mentioned project. The overall objective is to provide institutional and financial support and assistance to DEAs for the protection and management of the environment in the district. DEAs are composed of representatives of line agencies, local NGO's and IRDP's. They are chaired by the Government Agent. The activities have included conferences for DEA members, training workshops in environment protection and management with 600 key officials in all districts, preparation of training material and drafting of environmental profiles for three districts.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project has contributed to awareness raising at different levels. Schools, local people and NGO's have been involved in participatory projects in cooperation with government bodies at the local level in a number of districts. The DEAs have enabled key officials to accept and endorse the intersectoral nature of environmental issues through training programs and joint activities. The DEAs have also become a focal point to which interest groups can relate.
b) The DEAs have evolved in diverse ways, developing their focus, activities and expertise through interaction with others at the local level.
c) Although most DEA's have not developed to the point that they are an operational "arm of the CEA" at the district level, the model of the DEA as an intersectoral environmental management body at the district level has been firmly established. It is being further developed under the Country Programme (CENOPEC) project "Model DEAs in Moneragala and Hambantota".
d) The training workshops contributed to professional capacity strengthening and were followed up by a handbook. Joint activities between the DEAs and various institutions also contributed to this.

Mobilization of Community Support for Environmental Conservation and Awareness in the Moneragala District

The broad objective of the project was to mobilize the participation of the community to assist the state institutions in protecting forests and wildlife. This was to be achieved by raising the awareness of the community regarding environment issues. Activities have included printing of posters from a poster competition, two seminars, a participatory agroforestry project, formation of environmental school brigades and support to the Wildlife Department. The Grant has provided NOK 0.150 mill. for this project.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project is an example of a recipient-oriented project at grass roots level. It arose from of a felt need among district and local officials, NGOs and the public, springing out of their interaction with the DEA (see above). The NORAD

resident representative also played an active role in project formulation.

b) All activities in the project are aimed at awareness-raising of the local population. In addition both the DEA and the Moneragala Integrated Rural Development Project have become more aware of environmental issues in the district.

c) DEA activities are now funded by the country programme under CENOPEC.

Sinharaja Rainforest Conservation Project

The objectives of the project are to ensure long-term stability of the forest, including demarcation of boundaries and the consolidation of the legal status of the forest, development of the surrounding area by buffer zone activities and strengthening of public support for the forest. The main activity has been the preparation of a management plan. NOK 1.142 mill. has been disbursed for the project, which was implemented through IUCN.

The team's observations on the project are:

a) The project has been in the forefront of conservation issues. It has contributed to increased awareness of the unique biodiversity of the rainforest and the need to address human development in the bufferzone in connection with the management of the forest.

b) As in-depth evaluations of both the Sinharaja and Knuckles projects are being conducted in the summer 1991, this evaluation will not comment on the extent to which the implementation methods and activities were successful in achieving the project goals of human development and awareness-raising as a basis for nature conservation.

c) The strengthening of administrative capacity by the project has been achieved through staff recruitment and infrastructure development. This was initially in the form of a project unit but this staff is now being absorbed into the Forest Department.

d) The officers involved in the project have developed their professional competence, both through deepening their knowledge in traditional forest disciplines and through widening of the scope of their knowledge of botany, zoology and ecology. In addition socio-economic surveys have been undertaken.

e) As a consequence of the Sinharaja project the Knuckles Rainforest Conservation Project (see below) was formulated and financed by the Grant and 13 other areas identified.

g) The project has been transferred to the country programme under CENOPEC.

Knuckles Rainforest Conservation Project

The Knuckles project was a direct follow-up to the Sinharaja Project. It has been implemented by IUCN and the Grant has disbursed NOK 0.965 mill. Phase I of the project was preparatory, the main objective being to formulate a management plan for Knuckles. Research studies on flora, fauna, socioeconomics and some concrete actions to police and protect the forest (road-building, housing, boundary marking) were

included. Due to civil unrest, the implementation of this project and the completion of the management plan was delayed. Nevertheless, the boundaries of the Knuckles reserve have been marked and several other significant concrete activities have been undertaken. Otherwise, the observations of the team regarding the Sinharaja project apply.

3.1.4. Use of the Grant in relation to the Key Concepts

In paragraph 1.2. objectives for the Grant were presented and in paragraph 2.2. certain key concepts, which have provided an important framework for the evaluation were discussed. These concepts are catalytic effect, awareness-raising, administrative capacity strengthening, professional competence strengthening and recipient orientation. These concepts are discussed below on the basis of NORADs use of the Grant in the three countries.

3.1.4.1. The Grant and Norwegian development assistance - The catalytic effect of the Grant

In both Zambia and Sri Lanka, there are examples of projects funded under the Grant which have eventually been transferred to the country programme, while in Tanzania there is no such example yet.

In Zambia the Luangwa Valley Integrated Resource Development Programme (LIRDP) was initiated by the Grant and then transferred to the Country Programme in 1988. There seems to be a general consensus that access to the Grant during the planning stage was one of the reasons for LIRDP taking off the ground as fast as it did. Without readily available financial means, the process of establishing such a large programme within the country programme would have been much slower. LIRDP may be taken as a positive example of the Grant's utility in the achievement of this objective. However, such expedient financing may be detrimental to the more substantive aspects of the programme, particularly if this implies by-passing important steps in the project cycle, such as feasibility studies, socio-economic studies, assessments of the country's administrative and professional capacity to take over the project etc. As pointed out there are reasons to question both the environmental adequacy of this project as well as its sustainability.

Another example of catalytic effect is the contribution of Grant project "Nature of Zambia" to environmental education in the country. As a consequence of this publication the Zambia Environmental Programme (ZEPP) was established. ZEPP is developing a Teacher's Guide to environmental education at primary school level and several workshops and courses have been held. ZEPP will become one of the committees under the umbrella of the Environmental Council and will be financed by the national budget. The project is presently funded by World Wildlife Fund, USA.

It is in Sri Lanka that the Grant has been used most consciously to initiate activities which have developed into components of the country programme. In 1989 the Central Environmental Authority/NORAD Programme for Environmental Cooperation (CENOPEC) was agreed upon and in 1990 the activities of CENOPEC were financed as part of the country programme. CENOPEC now encompasses a wide range of

activities, including 5 projects previously funded by the Grant.

In addition there are several other elements of the CENOPEC program, which follow up or expand on institution-building and awareness-raising activities begun under the Grant. In the case of Sri Lanka one may safely conclude that not only has the Grant been used to finance activities which have eventually been transferred to the country programme, but it has also influenced and strengthened the environmental substance and orientation of the programme. Nevertheless, the effect of Grant activities, for example on the environmental components of the IRDP's and commodity support, have been minimal.

In Tanzania there are no Grant projects which have eventually been financed by the country programme. There are, however, two projects which have been financed by the Grant for so long and which have become so large, that they should either have been transferred to the country programme or Grant funding should have been discontinued. These projects are the Serengeti Regional Conservation Study, which first received funding in 1984 and then in 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990, totalling NOK 3.784 mill. and the Ngorongoro Conservation and Development Project, which has received funding through four years 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990, totalling NOK 1.706 mill. For both projects some discussions have occurred with a view to the transfer of these to the Country programme, but so far to no avail. It seems that the issue has not been pushed. But if a sector agreement for natural resources are included in the country programme (see below), it is intended that these two projects will be transferred to this.

As to Grant activities being transferred to other normal budget posts outside the country programme but within the regular bilateral programme, e.g. NGO, Research, Volunteer, Scholarships etc, there are a few examples of such cases. Generally, when this has occurred, it has been more because of convenience than in order to achieve synergetic effects.

In the three countries there are examples of Grant funds being used on activities in support of on-going projects under the country programme.

In Tanzania there are two cases, Shinyanga and KIRDEP, where the Grant has been used to finance environmental activities in connection with on-going projects in the country programme. These included initial environmental studies and awareness raising activities, which were then incorporated into ongoing activities. In Zambia Grant funds have been used to finance training through scholarships of LIRDP personnel. In Sri Lanka the Grant project "Strengthening Capabilities of District Environment Agencies" have supported the two Norwegian financed Integrated Rural Development Projects (HIRDP and MONDEP) and the Moneragala Community Awareness Project.

There are some fundamental issues linked to whether and if so, how the Grant may be used to support on-going activities under the country programme. In some cases it may be justified in order to influence a change in the orientation and substance of on-going activities, given that continued financing will be provided by the ordinary project budget. This was the case of Shinyanga and KIRDEP in Tanzania. Whether this was also the case with the IRDPs in Sri Lanka is not quite clear. However, the use of Grant funds to finance normal project activities, such as training in LIRDP, is questionable. It is a

well accepted principle that environmental concerns and activities should be part and parcel of all projects, financed by normal project funds, and not by additional funds. In this regard it would be contrary to the intentions of the Grant to provide easy and extra financing for activities and concerns which should have been integrated into the project and its budget. The only exception would be where the short-term nature and expected catalytic effect of such additional finance are made quite clear.

There is no doubt that Norwegian bilateral assistance has become more environmentally inclined, and the environmental orientation and substance of the country programmes much clearer. During the last country programme negotiations it was agreed to start discussions on a sector agreement for natural resources: to include present and possible future assistance to the sector. Studies in this regard, financed by the Grant, have been initiated. Nevertheless, the emergence of such a sector agreement is a result of the fact that Norway cannot continue year after year to support individual projects from the Grant, with no apparent recipient initiative to incorporate such activities in the regular country programme.

To the extent that the development of LIRDP in Zambia is defined as the strengthening of the environmental substance of the country programme, this may to some extent be attributed to the Grant. However, it seems that the environmental achievement of LIRDP is mostly limited to curtailing poaching. It should be considered whether LIRDP is developing into a rural development project addressing basic needs in a sustainable way. The Grant support to National Conservation Strategy related activities could have influenced the Zambia country programme, but this is not the case.

In Sri Lanka the Grant has definitely influenced the country programme. It was instrumental for the CENOPEC Agreement which, once incorporated into the country programme, has grown in size to encompass new environmental areas and issues. The Mapping Forest and Ecosystems Project is also being followed up by a boundary-marking project funded by the Grant under the Grant allocation to the World Bank.

Both in Tanzania and Sri Lanka there are projects, initiated by the Grant, which have eventually developed through financing by other donors. This is not the case in Zambia.

3.1.4.2. The Grant and awareness raising

It is the general conclusion that Grant activities in all three countries are associated with increased awareness raising among Government officials and participating target populations.

In Tanzania the scope of Grant activities is relatively broad, involving Government employees, local population and the public. Government officials recognize that the Grant has in particular contributed to increased awareness of the relationship between the population in buffer zones and protected areas. This has been the case with the wildlife-related projects (Serengeti and Ngorongoro) and the forest protection project of the East Usambaras. Government officials also point out that Grant activities related to the marine environment in Dar es Salaam and Tanga have contributed to getting these issues on the agenda and increased awareness among both Government officials and the

local population. The Grant has also been used to finance a significant number of workshops and seminars as well as participation in conferences, seminars and study tours, which have undoubtedly contributed to increased awareness.

The project which is most directly aiming at awareness raising amongst the local beneficiary population is the Singida School Forestry Project, where an estimated 50 - 80.000 school children have now participated in raising seedlings in school nurseries and planting them out in the field. This is supported by environmental education in the school curriculum. Furthermore the project extends treeplanting promotion to the villages, which includes the involvement of Forest Department employees.

In Zambia there are few projcets which are specifically aiming at awareness-raising and environmental information. However, the publication "Nature of Zambia" may be considered as having awareness-raising potential. As a consequence of the positive response by the public, the government took action to introduce environmental education in the schools and the Zambian Environmental Education Programme (ZEEP) was established. LIRDP is supposed to have an effect on environmental awareness related to wildlife management and anti poaching schemes. The project has contributed to reduced poaching, but the local population does not seem to perceive the strong linkage between economic benefits from safari hunting and their own welfare which is the basic philosophy of the project. Apart from this, the project has brought about a wide public concern on wildlife issues, both nationally and internationally.

In Sri Lanka, Grant activities are perceived as having been consciously directed towards contributing to awareness-raising on a wide scale. To this effect one may talk about a multi- pronged strategy, consisting of:

a) Public awareness programmes including televised documents, skits, posters, school programmes, film shows, workshops and seminars.
b) Institutional support to CEA and DEA with focus on air and water pollution, and increased awareness of these issues amongst government officials, industrialists, NGOs and the public.

Government institutions such as Central Environmental Authority and District Environmental Authorities have performed a significant role in public awareness raising. The District Environmental Authorities were identified as focal points for environment-related issues to be raised by the affected groups and NGOs, leading to the public occasionally functioning as watchdogs for the environment. The salient point in Sri Lanka is concerted and broad institution building and strengthening with a view to awareness raising. Initially a chain of informal bodies with an environmental focus came into being as the result of the strengthening of the Central Environmental Authority and its monitoring laboratory with Grant funds. This informal chain comprised the District Environmental Authorities, the Provincial Environmental Committees, the divisional level organizations and village clusters, NGOs, supported at national level by the National Environment Steering Committee. As in the other countries, the Grant has financed conferences, seminars and study tours, which have aimed at increased awareness raising.

It may be concluded that Grant activities in the three countries have all contributed to awareness raising of relevant environmental issues. However, it is difficult to distinguish impact of the Grant from other simultaneous sources of awareness raising.

3.1.4.3. The Grant and administrative capacity strengthening

In Tanzania there are no Grant projects which specifically have aimed at administrative strengthening or providing "hardware" inputs to this effect. This is so because most projects are studies and do not include inputs which would contribute to administrative strengthening. Nonetheless, in some projects, studies have addressed administrative issues, such as for instance the Ngorongoro Conservation and Development Project.

The NORAD resident representative has tried to develop cooperation with two important national environmental institutions as a step in national administrative capacity strengthening. The first one is the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC) where Grant financed cooperation was initiated in 1987 with the Coral Reef Study in the Dar es Salaam area, followed by other and continuing efforts. The second case is the National Land Use Planning Commission (NLUPC) which received Grant support for a Training Workshop on Village Land Use Planning. Unfortunately, this relationship has not been developed further.

The conclusion is that the larger projects have been implemented through ad hoc/project administrative set ups. This is by many perceived as detrimental to support to environmental administrative capacity strengthening. Other projects are often for such short periods that it is hard to conceive that they may have any administrative capacity strengthening impact. This points to an inherent conflict between different Grant objectives: On the one hand, administrative capacity strengthening takes time and requires patience, on the other, the nature of Grant activities shall be short term.

In Zambia the Grant has only to a very limited extent contributed to administrative capacity strengthening. In the Natural Resource Data Base project, two computer officers have been recruited and the computer facilities may contribute to the computing capacity of the School of Natural Sciences at the University of Zambia. Through the project "Decentralization of the NCS" National Conservation Committees at provincial level have been established, composed of members from line agencies. However, so far these committees have to overcome several constraints before they may function properly. Regarding LIRDP, there has certainly been comprehensive capacity strengthening within the project administration, but this has only to a limited extent benefitted existing administrative structures. It may even have been detrimental to existing local structures as LIRDP has taken over responsibilities from for instance District Councils.

Sri Lanka is the country where the Grant has had the most sustainable impact on administrative capacity strengthening within existing institutions, both at central and district level and appointment of the Natural Environmental Steering Committee (NESCO).

At central level the Grant supported the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) first by support to studies and then by providing laboratory equipment for pollution control.

By its activities the CEA gave rise to a chain reaction which led to the entire structure of administration for environmental matters undergoing rapid and crucial change, ultimately bringing about the new Ministry for Environment.

At district level the District Environmental Authorities (DEA) were set up and have been supported by the Grant. The DEAs developed their own strength administratively by getting key officials together to interact with Integrated Rural Development Programmes by introducing an environmental focus. The proximity to grass roots problems naturally led the DEAs to forge links with lower levels at Divisional and Village levels and with NGOs. The administrative capacity of the DEAs was further enhanced by the formulation of projects.

Similarly, the Grant has had repercussions in the Forest Department where the Extension Section and the Environment Management Divisions were set up. In the case of Sinharaja and Knuckles, project officers recruited under these projects have eventually been recruited by the Forest Department.

3.1.4.4. The Grant and Professional/Scientific Competence Strengthening

In Tanzania a large portion of Grant activities have been aiming at professional and scientific capacity strengthening. This has been in the largest projects - Serengeti, Ngorongoro and Usambara - where a considerable amount of studies have been included - and in seminars, symposia and workshops as well as study tours, both for groups and individuals. In Tanzania the involvement of national consultants, although in some cases not considered adequate, has been important. In the cases where local institutions have benefitted from workshops and training courses, it is often claimed that these have been rather haphazard and not properly based on institution and staff development schemes. COSTEC, the National Research Council, feels that the Grant could have been used more directly and consciously to the benefit of environmental research. However, in spite of shortcomings, it is the general perception in Tanzania that Grant activities have contributed to professional competence strengthening amongst those involved.

In Zambia the Grant has to a limited extent contributed to professional/scientific competence strengthening. In LIRDP the professional competence strengthening has been concentrated to a few workshops, and apparently with limited effect. This also applies to the two projects the Natural Resources Data Base and the Decentralization of the National Conservation Strategy.

In Sri Lanka one of the most significant achievements of the Grant is the strengthening of the pollution monitoring capability of the Central Environmental Authority. The Grant has also helped to strengthen two other laboratories at the National Building Research Organization (NBRO) and the Ceylon Institute of Scientific and Industrial Research (CISIR). The setting up of the DEAs has contributed to professional competence strengthening of different dimensions. It has encouraged a holistic intersectoral approach where several administrative and technical officers with different expertise.
In the Sinharaja and Knuckles projects, however, the objectives pertaining to professional competence strengthening remain still largely unachieved.

Finally, as with the administrative capacity strengthening, there is an inherent inconsistency between the objective of professional competence strengthening and the short term nature of Grant activities. This is further compounded by the ad hoc nature of many activities and the lack of systematic institutional links.

3.1.4.5. The Grant and the Environmental profile of the country

Environmental profiles have been prepared for each of the three countries, highlighting problems and issues. Two types of environmental issue are revealed:

a) concrete problems of degradation of the environment
b) shortcomings and constraints in institutional set-ups and policies to address and remedy the concrete problems.

The question is obviously whether the Grant has been addressing the relevant environmental issues. When evaluating the Grant against this perspective, certain realities must be taken into account. Firstly, the limited amount of funds available imply that there were limitations as to the scope of actions which could be undertaken. Secondly, in 1984, none of the partner countries had the amount of information on environmental issues that they have to-day, nor did they have environmental policies, and environmental institutions did not exist or were very weak. Finally, at the inception of the Grant NORAD was quite uncertain as to how it would go about its implementation.

In Tanzania the Grant should be given credit for having addressed a wide scope of concrete environmental issues, such as conservation of wildlife, conservation and management of forest, deforestation and protection of coastal and marine environment. However, in spite of these efforts, it remains a fact that the Grant has been concentrated on wildlife-related issues, although some of these projects have widened their scope in the direction of integrated rural development. Nevertheless, some Government officials expressed regret that the Grant is not sufficiently addressing other fundamental issues such as deforestation and land degradation.

The merits of each individual wild-life related project and the importance of integrating buffer-zone development in an operational way should be recognized. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the Grant in Tanzania has been allowed to develop so one-sidedly. The country programme emphasis on forestry may mitigate this somewhat to the extent that these forestry activities are environmentally oriented.

There are certainly many reasons why the Grant has developed in this way. By and large the resident representative has not been able to develop contacts and projects with local institutions, which might have brought about projects addressing a broader scope of environmental issues. This is not exclusively the fault of the resident representative, but also reflects the limitations and lack of effectiveness of Tanzanian institutions.

On some issues, particularly on wildlife, the Grant has also addressed important policy issues. For instance in the case of the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, the project contributed to the policy recommendations of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Commission on Ngorongoro.

Where the Grant has been least successful is in relation to institution building. One explanation for this is that the resident representative never succeeded in developing such projects with relevant Government institutions, such as the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC), the National Land Use Planning Commission (NLUPC) and different branches of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Tourism and Environment. Another explanation is that the strength of IUCN, on which NORAD relies so heavily, is more that of concrete conservation issues and project formulation, rather than institutional issues and development assistance in the broader sense.

In Zambia wildlife is one of the country's most valuable resources and poaching is a very serious threat. In this sense LIRDP is addressing a concrete problem of environmental degradation in accordance with the environmental profile. The two institution building projects, Decentralization of the National Conservation Strategy and the Natural Resources Data Bank, address the institutional constraints in the environmental profile of the country.

Both in Zambia and Tanzania the situation is changing. Zambia, for instance, has developed both a policy framework (National Conservation Strategy), legal framework (Environmental Act) and institutional framework (Environmental Council). The same type of development is going on in Tanzania. This should imply that the possibility to formulate environmental development assistance more in line with national priorities and issues should now exist.

It is in Sri Lanka that activities financed by the Grant seem to have been most in accordance with the country's environmental profile. The bulk of the Grant has been spent on two environmental issues, conservation of two unique ecosystems (Sinharaja and Knuckles rainforests) and pollution control, including institutional and policy aspects of these.

There are many reasons for this success both on the Norwegian side and on the recipient side. On the Sri Lankan side the situation was such that the Central Environmental Authority had existed for three years and that there was a growing awareness related to environmental issues, of which the conservation of Sinharaja was one. NORAD did not play a particularly active role, but should be credited for having recognized the potential of these projects and for having nourished them into becoming so crucial for the Grant's profile and the development of Norwegian assistance to Sri Lanka.

The conclusion seems to be that the extent to which the Grant will concur with the environmental profile of the country will to a large extent depend on NORADs own capability to recognize issues and opportunities and develop these.

3.1.4.6. The Grant and the role of the NORAD Resident Representative

From the inception of the Grant it has been a clear intention that NORAD resident representatives in partner countries should play an important role in the management of the Grant, ensuring that project requests in partner countries were presented. Table 3.2. shows total NORAD disbursements and table 2 in annex 3 shows the total disbursements and the mission administered disbursements per year. In paragraph 3.1.2. it was

explained that each year NORAD allocates NOK 1 mill. to each resident representative for mission administered Grant activities. Table 3.4. shows two things: the percentage of mission administered disbursements in relation to total Grant disbursements for the country and the percentage of disbursements in relation to annual mission administered allocations. It thus gives an indication of the role of the resident representative in relation to total Grant activities in the country.

Table 3.4. PERCENTAGE OF MISSION ADMINISTERED DISBURSEMENTS IN RELATION TO TOTAL GRANT DISBURSEMENT AND RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE ALLOCATION

	87	88	89	90	Total
Tanzania					
Total Disb.	0	5.5	29.9	9.9	12.0
Miss. alloc.	0	14.9	67.4	31.5	28.5
Zambia					
Total Disb.	0	17.9	89.0	11.2	21.6
Miss. alloc.	0	29.8	79.6	5.7	28.8
Sri Lanka					
Total Disb.	9.2	44.5	77.9	95.6	48.3
Miss. alloc.	9.1	88.7	93.4	21.9	53.3

In Tanzania the resident representative has played a peripheral role in relation to the major part of Grant activities (12% of disbursements), which are administered by NORAD/Oslo and implemented by IUCN. For these activities IUCN reports directly to NORAD/Oslo and the resident representative has no active role to play in project formulation or monitoring. With the exception of 1989 the resident representative has also been rather unsuccessful in spending his mission administered allocation (28.5% for the period). In Zambia the situation is similar to Tanzania. With the exception of 1989 the resident representative has not been able to spend his Grant allocation. In Sri Lanka the resident representative has played a more active role in the management of the Grant, accounting for a larger share of total disbursements (48.3%) and has been more successful in spending his allocation (53.3 %).

There are many factors which may explain the varying degree to which resident representatives have succeeded in fulfilling their envisaged role in relation to the Grant. Below some of these are discussed.

a) Awareness among Resident Representative staff

In discussions staff members revealed general environmental awareness and knowledge about Norway's objectives for environment and development. Most staff members had taken courses in Environmental Impact Assessment. Knowledge about environmental issues, policies and institutions in the partner countries varied. Staff members were aware of the Grant but few, with the exception of the programme officers, were familiar with its guidelines and objectives, nor with projects funded by the Grant. A general and serious complaint was that staff members had not been adequately briefed about different aspects of the Grant. It was felt that direct management of major Grant activities by NORAD/Oslo was not conducive to environmental awareness of staff members

b) Capacity and competence

In all resident representative missions there has been limited capacity to manage the Grant. All programme officers in charge of the Grant have other larger responsibilities, such as e.g. management of large sector programmes, most often agriculture and/or forestry or Integrated Rural Development Programmes. This means that the Grant receives less priority than is justified by its ambitious objectives. To a certain extent this limited capacity explains the restrained promotion of the Grant by the resident representatives.

The other constraint is the competence of the programme officer in charge of the Grant. This competence should be a combination of knowledge of development assistance and relevant environmental professional background. Often the Grant has been managed by people with an academic background in agriculture, forestry or social sciences. Given the multidisciplinary nature of environment and natural resource management it is not possible to identify which professional discipline represents the most appropriate competence for the Grant. Actually it seems that the question is more related to capacity, priority and integration of the Grant with other activities.

c) Recipient orientation

Interviews with relevant institutions in the three countries revealed that officials involved often did not know if a given project was financed by the Grant, and if so, the specific objectives and guidelines for this. Government institutions have not participated in the management of the Grant as such, only in specific projects. Overall the philosophy of the resident representatives has been more to receive requests and less to actively promote the Grant. Consequently, the Grant has only been successful to a limited degree in establishing a basis for longer term environmental cooperation with national institutions.

d) Strategies for the application of the Grant

In the three countries it was often expressed that over the years it has been a problem that unlike the other special Grant for Women, this Grant has no strategy for its application. The need for specific environmental country strategies has also been mentioned. Recently this has been or is being remedied. In Sri Lanka NORAD has carried out an environmental strategy study and this is now being done in Tanzania. In

Zambia there is no similar strategy. The country has its National Conservation Strategy, but this has had little impact on NORADs own environmental activities.

e) Other donors.

In all the three countries few other donors are aware of the existence of the Grant. They are, however, aware of Norway's priorities and overall efforts related to environment and natural resource management in development assistance. In Tanzania and Sri Lanka there is cooperation between several donors on environment and development.

3.1.5. Conclusions

As a point of departure for these concluding observations the particular nature of the Grant should be reiterated. The Grant was established as a pilot effort to promote environmental protection and natural resource management in Norwegian development assistance. It was intended to set in motion activities which would lead to a general change in the content and direction of development assistance. This means that in this assessment of the Grant one must look both at this overall goal as well as the more specific objectives of the Grant.

Since the inception of the Grant NORAD has financed a myriad of environmental projects and activities. Actually one cannot help but be impressed with the scope of activities and environmental issues which have been addressed by the Grant in the partner countries. The evaluation of the Grant in the three countries have revealed considerable merits and achievements of individual projects.

Viewed as a whole, Grant activities have first and foremost contributed to awareness-raising among Government officials, the public and specific target populations. Examples of different types of catalytic effects of various Grant activities have been observed. The Grant has also contributed to professional competence strengthening as a large portion of activities have been projects including specific studies. Furthermore, the Grant has financed participation in academic conferences and individual study tours.

The Grant has been generally less successful in administrative capacity strengthening (general institution building). This is basically because NORAD has not succeeded in establishing the institutional basis for such cooperation and because many projects are administered on an ad hoc basis. It must be noted that this goal conflicts most directly with the intended short term nature of Grant activities.

When looking at Grant activities as a whole, with a view to the overall goal that the Grant should be catalytic and integrative, the conclusion is that NORAD has not applied the Grant optimally as the strategically important tool it was supposed to be.

To substantiate this conclusion, attention is drawn to the following:

a) NORAD did not develop a concrete, operational strategy for the application of the Grant. This means that the resident representatives, who were supposed to

play a key role in ensuring Grant activities, did not receive the guidance and support that this task required.

b) The management of the Grant within NORAD was not integrated within the development of Norway's bilateral assistance. The development of the Grant was run in isolation and not associated with the development of the Country Programmes in the different countries.

c) To a large extent projects were approved on their individual environmental merits, without taking sufficiently into account fundamental developmental aspects such as institutional development, recipient orientation and project sustainability. Neither was the projects' potential in relation to the country programme taken into account. Too often projects have been implemented on an ad hoc basis.

d) Most resident representatives have passively managed the Grant, not using it optimally to build contacts with relevant environmental institutions and to reflect the environmental priorities of the recipient country.

e) Little by little NORAD came to rely too heavily on one outside organization, IUCN, both for the development of projects, the implementation of these and the provision of personnel. IUCN has been the largest single channel of Grant aid, accounting for 43 % of NORAD's total disbursements. At the same time IUCN has not been engaged in NORAD's regular bilateral environmental cooperation. This stands in contrast with the goals of integrating Grant activities into Norway's mainstream development assistance.

Finally and notwithstanding achievements and shortcomings in NORAD's application of the Grant, it should be reiterated that quantitatively the Grant is marginal in relation to NORAD's total efforts to address environmental issues through Norwegian bilateral assistance. Norway's bilateral assistance has become increasingly environmentally oriented. But there are few cases where this strengthening can be traced directly back to activities funded by the Grant.

3.2. MULTILATERAL USE OF THE GRANT.

3.2.1. A Brief Overview of Multilateral Grant Cooperation Volume and Structure.

It is a clearly stated political goal that Norwegian aid shall be divided relatively equally between multilateral and bilateral aid. The multilateral agencies receiving such funds shall provide the necessary technical and administrative expertise to manage Norwegian funds in an efficient and effective way and in accordance with stated Norwegian aid goals and defined criteria.

From 1984 through 1990 NOK 85 Mill from the Grant has been disbursed by the Multilateral Department (table 3.5.). Out of NOK 41 million disbursed from the Grant through 1986, they disbursed 28 % through UNSO and ESCAP. In 1988 the multilateral use of the Grant doubled to NOK 12.7 million, which amounted to 32% of the total Grant use that year. Half of the multilateral use was disbursed by the World Bank (NOK 6.3

million), while IMO (NOK 1.5 million), ESCAP (NOK 0.400 million), IFAD (NOK 1.07 million), ILO (NOK 1 million), and UNSO (0.9 million) disbursed most of the rest.

In 1989, when overall Grant disbursement approached NOK 70 million, the multilateral share amounted to NOK 29.6 million, or 42% of the total. This share corresponds closely to the share of multilateral aid in overall Norwegian aid. Again, the World Bank dominated with NOK 16.4 million, or 53% of the multilateral disbursement. For the first time UNDP received Grant funds and became the second largest multilateral recipient with NOK 4.2 million, with ILO in third place with NOK 4 million, and UNSO in fourth place disbursing NOK 2 million. The Bank's disbursement remained at NOK 16.5 million in 1990, reinforcing the Bank's position as the largest user of the Grant. As outlined in chapter 2, it was decided that the evaluation of Grant activities through multilateral organizations should be focused on the World Bank.

Tables 10 and 11 in annex 3 show how these funds have been used on different activities and environmental issues. Classification difficulties notwithstanding, the lion's share of the funds have gone to various types of studies (14%), project planning (10%), environmental impact analyses (10%), seminars/conferences (10%) and consultancies (12%). The multilateral use of the Grant has evenly addressed different environmental issues, although "pollution" (14%) and General environment" (13%) are by far the largest. Of total multilateral disbursements only 19 % is for specific countries, among which two, Pakistan and Tanzania, are Norwegian partner countries. The bulk of the disbursement is for global (69%) and regional activities (12%).

Table 3.5. MULTILATERAL DEPARTMENT USE OF THE GRANT 1984-90 (NOK MILLION)

Organisation	Up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
WB	225	1.400	6.274	16.465	16.550	40.914
UNSO	6.170	2.200	930	2.000	0	11.300
UNDP	0	0	0	4.200	860	5.060
UNEP	487	0	0	0	550	1.037
PANOS	0	600	1.000	600	0	2.200
ESCAP	4.400	200	400	575	650	6.225
UNESCO	0	0	527	0	0	527
IFAD	0	600	1.070	0	1.211	2.881
ILO	0	0	1.000	4.000	0	5.000
UNIDO	0	0	0	0	5.000	5.000
WHO	0	0	0	0	1.300	1.300
UNRFNRE	0	0	0	990	0	990
IMO	0	0	1.500	500	0	2.000
Other	0	0	0	250	250	500
TOTAL	11.282	5.000	12.701	29.580	26.371	84.934
Total Grant	40.769	34.718	37.386	69.735	66.597	249.205

Disbursements of the Grant to multilateral organizations and international institutions have been conducted by all the different departments of the Ministry. The disbursement pattern of the various departments as regards recipient organizations such as ESCAP, PANOS, IIED, IUCN, WCED, etc., appears rather confusing to the outside observer. In the following, however, only the disbursements undertaken by the Multilateral Department are discussed as a basis for selecting one of their recipient organizations for in depth study.

3.2.2. The Diversity of Multilateral Grant Cooperation.

A key political goal for multilateral development cooperation is to make sure that guidelines and practice in multilateral institutions conform as much as possible with Norway's general aid cooperation priorities, e.g. in the area of environment. Such influencing is undertaken a.o. through active board participation and by means of project cooperation. Special grants such as the Grant provides for a great deal of flexibility and scope for early action in the latter context.

Multilateral aid cooperation covers a wide range of rather diverse institutions, and the modalities available to influence these with regard to their environmental orientation and awareness varies substantially.

Core financing is rather rigid and determined on the basis of some form of global formulae. It is the governing board of each of these institutions that decides on the allocation and use of their respective available funds. Increase or cutbacks in general core fundings will have but a marginal impact in the activities and guidelines of an organization in a particular area. One may say that core funding is not a well suited modality for affecting the priorities and practices of particular activities, e.g. environment issues, of an organization.

Co-financing and multi-bi financing are principally the same and will therefore be referred to as project cooperation. Among the more than 40 multilateral agencies with which Norway cooperates, project cooperation is practised with the multilateral development banks on a relatively large scale, and on a much smaller scale with a total of 9 UN agencies.

Project cooperation with these UN-agencies is small in volume and the amounts are often tied to projects that last for years. The flexibility of this modality in this particular context is thus rather limited, and provides little scope for pointed action in a timely fashion to initiate and formulate e.g. an environmental activity. The flexibility is further reduced since project cooperation with each agency is listed as a separate budget position.

The multilateral development banks, on the other hand, have a very special position and a set of financial modalities that provides for a rather large degree of flexibility, that will be shown in the special review of the Grant cooperation with the World Bank in the subsequent sections of this evaluation.

For the majority of UN agencies there is no project cooperation. The Grant has been used as a kind of substitute for project cooperation in the following agencies: UNDP,

UNEP, IFAD, UNIDO, WHO, UNRFNRE, and will be applied in such a way with ESCAP in 1992. For these agencies there is presently no alternative catalytic modality to achieve the influence over the decision making and priorities of these agencies. In the cooperation with these agencies the Grant provides "seed money" that MULTI can use to raise important environmental policy and operational issues, and thus signal in a much more explicit and direct way Norway's wishes and priorities in the environment field.

At the same time, the Evaluation Team is concerned that there is a limit to how many different UN.agencies MULTI could effectively impact on by means of the Grant, given the scarce staffing of MULTI. Perhaps concentrating the Grant effort to a limited few would give the largest overall impact.

3.2.3. A Brief Overview of Grant Cooperation with the World Bank.

Norway uses her special grants and trust funds to promote Norwegian goals i.e. environment considerations and women in development in all Bank activity areas. With the trust funds and the grants, Norway can call explicit attention to sectors and activities of the Bank where she holds the opinion that the Bank is lagging behind. This may be in terms of thinking, staffing, methodology, priorities, she can use the trust funds and the grants to expand and strengthen activities in these areas.

The Nordic countries are closely coordinated through their joint Executive Director. Thus they support and propose changes in various country strategies and sector policies presented in credit- and lending documents. The Executive Director is closely following the preparation of the 1992 World Development Report which is on the environment. Compared to the policy- and overall monitoring role of the Executive Director, the Grant is but a minor activity, but with environmental issues being so focused in Bank policy and project preparations, the Grant provides the Executive Director with additional leverage. At the same time it is reasonable to assume that the Nordic policy profile provides leverage for the use of the Grant.

In 1987 the World Bank underwent a major reorganization. An important result of this was the establishment of the Environment Department as one of five sector policy and research departments within the Senior Vice Presidency of Policy, Research and External Affairs. This department was organized into two divisions: The Policy Research Division and the Environmental Operations and Strategy Division. At the same time regional environmental technical divisions were established in each of the regional technical departments under the respective regional Vice Presidencies. The purpose of this restructuring of the Bank's organization was to place environment and natural resource management issues at the core of policy making both strategically and in the formulation of programs and projects.

The establishment of the new department and the new technical regional divisions in the Bank have increased the full time staff of the Bank on environment issues from approximately 12-15 before the reorganization to around 50 full time staff in 1988. To this one should add a large number of external consultants, many of whom are engaged on a very long term basis. The total professional manpower input in 1988 on environment issues have thus been estimated at 100 man-years.

The Bank felt it was very important to become operational as soon as possible to convince sceptics inside and outside of the Bank of the importance of such new units. The Bank also felt it had to expedite, in negotiations with developing member countries, the work on operational methods for integrating environmental considerations in program and project activities. Furthermore, they needed to get started with coordination of environment activities with other specialized agencies of the U.N. system, for example with the bilateral donor agencies, and NGOs. Clearly, the Bank was in need of support to master this broad range of tasks with a minimum of delays. Requests for support were sent to a number of donor member countries, including Norway.

Based on Stortingsmelding 34, 1986/87, the Grant objective to "***strengthen the environmental capacity and competence of international organizations***" (see paragraph 1.2) was given high priority. Grant cooperation with the World Bank was a rather obvious choice in view of the reorganization discussed above.

From playing no role in the first two years, and an insignificant role in Norway's allocation strategy for the Grant in 1986 and 1987, the Bank's disbursements of the Grant took on a dominant role with more than 50% of multilateral disbursements in the years 1988-1990. It has emerged as by far the largest single multilateral recipient of such funds. Grant projects implemented by the Bank have addressed environmental issues through various types of studies, e.g. project planning (40%), consultancies (22%), and Environmental Impact Assessment (20%) (see Annex 3 for definition of categories). By 1989 only IUCN had received more Grant funds than the Bank. There are thus good reasons for a more in depth evaluation of Grant funding of Bank activities.

Grant cooperation with the Bank has been structured around a limited number of specific projects in low income countries. There has also been an "Environment Package" to the Bank's Environment Department in support of a set of high priority policy and research issues and a Technical Assistance Grant Program for the Environment (TAGPE) to do EIA's and more in depth environmental studies prior to final project formulation and design. The key activities supported have been:

1.	Water Harvesting in Africa, 1986-88	NOK 2.600 mill.
2.	Pakistan Environment Protection, 1988-89	NOK 3.300 mill.
3.	Environment Package to Environment Department, 1988-91	NOK 4.000 mill.
4.	Environment Action Plans, 1989	NOK 0.975 mill.
5.	Wildlife Development and Management in Africa, 1989	NOK 0.975 mill.
6.	Environmental costs and Benefits of Gas Use, 1990	NOK 0.975 mill.
7.	Environmental Road Impact Study, Ethiopia, 1990	NOK 0.975 mill.
8.	Technical Asst. Grant Program for Environment (TAGPE)	NOK 31.100 mill.

3.2.4. The Ministry's Integrated Administration of the Bank's Share of the Grant.

In Norway the Grant allocation to the Bank is administered by the "Bank-Divison" in the Multilateral Department of the Ministry. The Director is responsible for the Multilateral share of the Grant. Clearly, the Grant allocation is a very minor amount relative to the overall Norwegian allocation to the Bank.

Trust funds/special grants could have required a disproportionate amount of Bank Division staff member time relative to the amount of money allocated. It therefore seems to be a very rational and efficiency-oriented approach by the Bank Division to harvest whatever administrative economies of scale are available by taking an integrated "framework" approach in their treatment and allocation of the various special grants/trust funds of relevance to environmental activities in the Bank. It appears to the Evaluation Team that so long as the guidelines of the various special grants and trust funds are mutually compatible, to single out the Grant for independent treatment would be a waste of Ministry staff time and development assistance resources.

This evaluation is solely concerned with the Grant, but in the case of it's use on World Bank activities, it would be meaningless to analyse the Grant in isolation from other special Norwegian grant funds available for environmental activities of the Bank. The following allocations must be seen in context as a basis for evaluating the Grant:

a) Untied co-financing, including the Consultant Trust Fund and the Consultant Trust Fund - Plus, and pure environmental programs as e.g. natural resource management in Burkina Faso, and in Madagascar;
b) The Sudan-Sahel-Ethiopia (SSE) Grant,
c) The Grant (including disbursements to TAGPE).

The Norwegian use and operation of these funds are based on their complementarity and they are allocated for environmental uses compatible with the terms, guidelines and restrictions applicable to each one, so as to maximize the environmental "mileage" from the total of the four funds. This has been the underlying assessment approach of the Multilateral Department since the first Bank activity was financed under the Grant in 1986 (Water Harvesting in Africa). It became very clear following the Bank reorganization in 1987 when they prepared a work program with an associated budget for development of environmental policy for five priority areas. Ever since 1986, however, the Multilateral Department has reviewed Bank requests against available trust funds and their guidelines as a basis for deciding whether the Grant or other allocations would be the optimal mode for a particular Bank activity.

The budget and the request for Norwegian financing to implement the above-mentioned, comprehensive, 5-priority work program for the Bank's Environment Department far exceeded prior Grant allocations to the Bank from Norway. The Ministry immediately realized that the Grant allocation for Bank activities would be insufficient for Norway to take a lead in this activity. The Ministry therefore chose to appraise this request for overall work program support against all available Norwegian grant allocations (see above) for untied cooperation with the Bank. No attempt was made to appraise any element of this proposed program in isolation as e.g. earmarked for Grant funding only.

The goal was to find the most practical and efficient solution and the funding from the Grant was treated as one among several elements in this context. It would be meaningless, in such an evaluation context, to treat the use of the Grant for funding of Bank environmental activities in isolation from other available Norwegian grant allocations, so long as the guidelines of the different grant allocations allow their use to be mutually reinforcing.

In this particular case the final solution was to use NOK 4 million from untied co-financing and another NOK 4 million from the Grant for the 1988 disbursement. Having decided on the overall volume of Norwegian support for this program, it was decided that the NOK 4 million from the Grant should cover the bulk of expenditures for the "Biodiversity" component and the "Impacts of large dams" component, with the remaining NOK 1.6 million for these two components covered by the untied co-financing fund. The remaining untied co-financing NOK 2.4 million was allocated to "environmental health" and "environmental economics". However, both the Ministry and the Bank felt that these co-financed activities were of utmost importance for the creation of awareness within the Bank and among recipient governments of the environmental importance of the economic setting, macro-constraints, and economic policies, in the interlinkages between economics and the natural environments upon which economies depend.

When the second phase of this "Package" came up for financing in the late summer of 1990, it was decided that the core work had established itself in such a way that it could all be financed by means of established untied co-financing whereas the SSE-program fund would carry the two SSE parts totalling NOK 8 million. This transfer of activities from initial Grant funding to conventional untied co-financing could well indicate the kind of catalytic effect from the Grant's seed money that is one of the proclaimed goals of the Grant.

Three Norwegian experts have been seconded to work full time on environment issues in the Bank. All three are financed from the untied co-financing fund and have been and will be actively involved in the use of Grant, such as "policy and research core fund" projects, and TAGPE activities. However, some are also involved with activities funded by the SSE-special grant and environment projects financed with untied co-financing, which again shows the close interlinkage between the various grant allocations.

This dynamic Norwegian integrated approach to policy and funding administration seems logical and rational. One may feel that it plays down the explicit role of the Grant, but that is an illusion. Rather the impact of the Grant is magnified as a result of combining all available Norwegian grant allocations and trust funds. This maximises the Norwegian impact on Bank efforts in these policy areas and the catalytic effect of increased visibility of the Grant could be quite significant in the case of the policy and research program. The fact is that (as discussed in the next sections) the recipients, in this case the various affected Bank departments, are very much aware that they have access to untied Norwegian grant allocations for such activities, but they are rather indifferent to the Norwegian name on each of the available funds for such activities, so long as the funding becomes available.

3.2.5. The Complex Myriad of Special Grants and Other Funds in the World Bank.

The central Environment Department as well as the regional environment divisions of the Bank claim that the fact that there are several Norwegian grants and trust funds available for environment operations does not create any particular problems, because they are mostly complementary.

In the Bank, most staff involved in the planning, budgeting, and execution of environment activities are very much aware of Norway's unique and leading role in providing largely untied quick disbursing funds for environment activities. However, they are unaware of or have at best a hazy picture of the distinctions between the various Norwegian grant allocations and trust funds available for environment activities. This should not come as a surprise.

After all, there are now around 1,000 different funds labelled trust funds, of which 37 are consultant trust funds, available in the Bank from many different donor countries. In addition come the many grant allocations that are not trust funds, such as the Norwegian special grants (the Grant, the Special Grant for Women in Development, and the SSE-Grant). Each such grant and trust fund has its own set of guidelines and restrictions and for many there are continuing changes in conditions attached to them.

Such grants and trust funds -- including the Norwegian ones -- are modalities established by the various donors in order to promote and achieve their national goals and interests. In the case of Norway these are clearly stated as the goals of Norwegian development cooperation, but in most other cases the conditions attached to the release of funds tie the Bank to use the donor country's own national consultants who act as a spearhead for their national exporting industry and trade activities. It is believed that for many donors such strategies, quite apart from recipient oriented development cooperation, constitute important goals of such funds.

3.2.6. Within-Bank Administration of Norwegian Grant Funds: Alternative Options.

Norwegian grants to the Bank, eligible for environmental work, can either be disbursed from Norway directly to the Environment Department and to the regional environment divisions, or be disbursed to the Bank's Co-financing Office (CSFOC).

a) The Ideal Solution.

The director of the Environment Department, for reasons of operational flexibility, administrative efficiency and coherence of criteria and conditions, appears -- at least in an ideal world -- to favour the co-financing route. Ambiguity in the definition of "environment" also favours this approach. This would be especially valid if all, or most of, the many different trust funds from different countries were untied and could be combined to form project-designed funding packages. This would provide the Bank with a genuine and quick disbursing modality where one could easily tap several funding sources in combination. As a result the recipient rather than for the donor would be the focal point.

The regional divisions held a similar position, suggesting that one possibility would be for CSFOC to allocate specific amounts to the different regional environment divisions in the Bank. Use of the money would be at the discretion of the environmental managers, subject to a full review at specific intervals. This, it is claimed, would ensure efficient resource allocation, maximum flexibility, and maintain adequate transparency and accountability.

b) The Real Constrained Situation.

In practice, however, it has proven very difficult to combine funds from different national trust funds, since they are all branded differently. Therefore, the theoretical flexibility is nowhere near being available for planning, budgeting and allocation purposes. However, the complex mix of trust fund conditions and changes in these, suggests that they should be managed by one unit with special insight into all these constraints and potentials. Thus the operations offices in the field of environment can concentrate their skills on environmental issues instead of fund raising "hide and seek" games among all the different small trust funds.

The regional environment managers appear to be quite a bit concerned with the tremendous constraints on flexibility in internal allocation and distribution mechanisms that such inter-nation variability in grant fund conditionality implies. It is very difficult for environment managers to know where to seek funding in an efficient way without the help of CSFOC.

On the other hand, the very nature of trust funds and technical assistance grants allows an individual donor to get more return on his own goals than with untied fungible allocations to the Bank. Therefore to press for untying of such funds could imply a danger of the funds being withdrawn, since they would then no longer give the exposure that the donor set out to achieve. Thus the very purpose of such funds makes the majority of them rather inaccessible as flexible, quick disbursing, tailor-made financing packages to the eventual benefit of the recipient.

c) Norway's Pragmatic Solution.

The alternative to allocating the environmental funds to CFSOC is for donors of special funds to allocate directly to the Environment Department and/or to the regional environment divisions. The two phased core funding for environmental policy and research was allocated directly to the Environment Department and coordinated internally between its activities and the regional environmental divisions. In the first phase the entire NOK 17 million was allocated to the Environment Department because this was by far the simplest administrative procedure for the Ministry.

However, the Environment Department and the regional environment divisions act and budget independently of each other. The Ministry had not indicated any distributional preferences for the Environment Department to follow in the Bank-internal distribution, creating some initial internal confusion in the Bank. At the time of the second phase, late summer 1990, Norway indicated what it wanted earmarked for the Environment Department and for the different regions. For purely practical reasons the total funds

were transferred to the Environment Department and special internal accounts were established for the regions to draw upon when need be. This approach is clearly more direct and provides Norway a much better control as regards allocations of Grant funds within the Bank.

3.2.7. The Complex Task of Establishing an Operational Technical Assistance Grant for Environment (TAGPE).

To ensure that the Norwegian allocations are quickly committed, Bank applications for Norwegian technical assistance grants, e.g. TAGPE, and other environmental assistance programs, are based on carefully prepared programs and strategies. Nonetheless it can still take quite a bit of time before the Bank is able to disburse this grant money from Norwegian and other trust funds. This should not be surprising because lead times are long in all project oriented development cooperation and environment issues, being rather new on the agenda in most borrowing countries, naturally takes some time to negotiate and agree with the affected recipient governments. The case of TAGPE which has received by far most of the Bank's Grant allocation, see 3.2.3. above, clearly illustrates this.

The pregnancy, birth and infancy of TAGPE has been accompanied by disappointments and headaches of many different kinds, some of them unrelated. Being "born" at the same time as a much more media focussed "twin"; the Global Environment Facility (GEF), TAGPE had no choice but to accept a back seat position and wait for the climate and dust around GEF to settle, so that it would be "safe" to place TAGPE on the agenda. However, being the weaker and less media-focused of the two twins was not the only problem.

TAGPE had a very promising start. Japan had established the first and by far the largest ever untied environment trust fund. The Bank therefore established a Bank-wide Screening Committee headed by the Director of Environment Department, to ensure that the Bank's work program would be in conformity with its overall policies and priorities. Actual and potential donors to TAGPE expressed interest in seeing this committee operational as a form of guarantee that (i) proper consultation has taken place within the Bank prior to allocating consultants trust funds to individual tasks, and (ii) tasks supported under consultant trust funds are given equal attention as those supported through the Bank's own budget. This should facilitate the administrative task of CFSOC.

The initial optimism about this untied grant contributed further to the Bank being somewhat slow in asking other countries to contribute to the TAGPE. However, experience showed that the Japanese untied grant fund was very difficult to release from Japan for disbursement to the Bank. It appears (at least to an outside observer) that Japan's goal is to make sure that the Bank's use of such funds is complementary to Japan's own foreign policy, i.e. Japan reserves the right to turn down environment projects or projects with environmental components prepared with recipient governments to Bank standards, e.g. protection of tropical forests, which appears to conflict with more immediate Japanese trade and industry interests. This Japanese influence cannot be ignored since Japan has now become a very heavy funding partner for environmental activities. In fact, Japan's rejection of carefully prepared TAGPE projects prevented

commitment of Japanese funds, and the Bank was left with the untied Norwegian US$ 2.4 million equivalent Grant contribution to TAGPE. Since this contribution was earmarked for IDA-eligible countries, and Africa was the preferred region, it soon appeared that there was no real need for such a large controlling committee, and it ceased to function.

Several senior staff in the Bank claim that TAGPE only makes sense if it is untied, stable, and in the order of US$ 30-50 million. That much is needed in order that each of the regions shall have some funds and be able to prioritize. In practice each project preparation facility (PPF) or environmental impact assessment (EIA), which the TAGPE typically shall cover assumes US$ 0.5 million. Clearly, with no more than US$ 2.4 million from Norway there would be very little reason for the committee to meet!

On the other hand, one cannot ignore the positive aspects of strict screening procedures like those of Japan for TAGPE funds. Some would claim that the very nature of such special grants result in them being used for lower priority activities and therefore they have a lower opportunity value than regular financing. Furthermore, the initial unexpected delays in committing Japanese trust funds for TAGPE have now been reduced, and the Japanese funds are now as quick to commit as those of tied consultant trust funds.

The recent (early 1991) TAGPE allocation (some untied and some tied) from several additional countries has increased the TAGPE to more than US$ 21 million. This does not include the US$ 100 million Japanese grant that has been redirected into a Japanese Trust Fund which is available also for typical TAGPE activities. Each of the TAGPE contributions have different ties and conditions attached. It remains to be seen how easy it will be to combine them to undertake the implementation of optimally sized project preparation facilities and environmental impact assessments from a prioritized list that stretches far beyond those 11 projects to which the initial Norwegian TAGPE disbursement was committed.

The May 1991 discrepancy between committed and disbursed TAGPE trust funds should therefore be carefully watched and monitored, but not necessarily be taken as a sign that TAGPE is a cul-de-sac for environmental action. Out of a total TAGPE allocation from six countries of US$ 21.3 million, US$ 8.2 million had been committed for 54 approved individual assignments and 32 studies (of which 11 are from the first Norwegian TAGPE contribution and 1 is from the second). This meant that US$ 13.1 million were still available, and less than US$ 1 million of committed funds had been disbursed.

Some do not see this as abnormal or alarming. They point out that disbursements are usually done at the end of an assignment, and most commitments are very recent. A lot of project preparatory work has been done for Bank funds that have been paid out before disbursing TAGPE. Perhaps, therefore, in a few months time TAGPE disbursements within the Bank will increase significantly in response to normal project cycle time tables. A check appears to confirm this impression. Out of the four Grant funded TAGPE projects, the one in India is almost finished, the one in Bangladesh is well underway, while the ones in Vietnam and Sri Lanka are currently being modified to take account of work being undertaken in support of the GEF. These two will begin in

September 1991. Perhaps even a scarcity of TAGPE funds will emerge. The Bank's Africa Environment Office for example, have indicated that they can produce 10 good TAGPE projects for each proposed GEF project, and they consider TAGPE to be of crucial importance. So do the other regional environment offices, but their access to Norwegian Grant funds are very limited due to the IDA-eligibility constraint.

Nonetheless, there is genuine concern in the Bank that the current less than impressive record of commitment, combined with the slow disbursement situation of TAGPE, could lead to lower levels of replenishment or even to reconsideration of the suitability of the current mechanism for participating in supporting the Bank's work. Ideas and suggestions are being prepared and discussed in the Bank to remedy this situation, and the re-establishment of a review committee with more efficient internal selection and decision making procedures for the use of TAGPE funds, is one of these proposals.

3.2.8. Catalytic Impacts of The Grant: Additionality or Earlier Startup.

Four categories of possible Grant impacts have been assessed in the case of the Bank: (1) Ideally one would like to identify specific environment activities and procedures in the Bank as being a direct result of the Norwegian Grant, i.e. activities that would otherwise not have taken place. In practice things are not that simple. Perhaps one would have to settle for statements to the effect that (2) a particular activity was started and completed sooner and quicker than otherwise would have been possible, or (3) that the Grant permitted a more in depth Environmental Impact Assessment or National Environmental Action Plan than otherwise. There is also the possibility (4) that the Grant has done no more than offset Bank funds, and thus allowed the Bank to allocate its own funds to other activities that might be less preferred from a Norwegian perspective.

In depth interviews with and questionaires to senior Bank staff suggest that the offsetting alternative can be rejected. Bank staff seem most certain that the impact of the Grant (and other Norwegian funds) has been to speed up environmental actions (relative to the alternative of no Norwegian grant funding). The Bank is careful about saying these achievements would not have taken place otherwise, but they emphasize that it would have taken longer, started later and in many cases had a less comprehensive approach. Several examples have been given to the Evaluation team to document this:

(1) Under "Dryland Management - Phase I", equipment was financed, an environmental database was established, Nigerian soil studies conducted, and dryland workshops held, all of them earlier than otherwise. The Sahelian studies required the Bank to move ahead from its own budget, since they were Bank priorities. The Norwegian funds made it possible to intensify the work and complete it faster.

(2) National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) are Bank priority projects. Therefore the Bank would need to move ahead with Bank budgets, but the Norwegian funds have made it possible to speed up the process. The environmental action plans in Brazil and Madagascar would have started later and with less intensity without the Norwegian environment funding from the Grant or other Norwegian trust funds. Africa Environment Division says Norwegian funding

provided them with resources that allowed them to accelerate work programs by several years. Similar co-financing was not readily available from other sources.

(3) The bio-diversity component in the "core program" on policy and research underwent the same acceleration and increased intensity of effort. It facilitated seminars and the preparation of papers, as well as the preparation of a global action plan on the protection of bio-diversity, and a study on the valuation of secondary forest products.

This component has been particularly large in Asia where Asia Environment Division has given a detailed account of the various environmental activities involving, or made possible by, the Norwegian grants (the Grant, untied co-financing and consultant trust funds). So far, 6 out of 14 projects with bio-diversity components have received crucial funding from the Norwegian grants. These components were prepared in part by staff or consultants supported from Norwegian funds. The countries are Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Laos, Thailand (all of them with important forestry components) and China. The Division admits that it is very difficult to determine whether a little, a lot or all of this would have happened without access to these Norwegian funds since it is impossible to disaggregate training and awareness increases (as a result of seminars), incentives to task managers (free help), and absorptive capacity. They suspect their work on bio-diversity is about twice as large as it would otherwise have been as a direct result of Norwegian support, in other words a significant degree of additionality. Interestingly they claim, that for reasons of fungibility of funds, any offsetting effects would simply have freed resources for other aspects of their environmental work. General support from the Grant for bio-diversity in Asia in fiscal year 1989/90 amounted to US$ 0.2 million and went to 6 projects where US$ 28.36 million of bio-diversity conservation investments resources were mobilized: US$ 1.3 million in Sri Lanka, US$ 2.5 million in Indonesia, US$ 15 million in Bangladesh, US$ 4.6 million in China, US$ 4.96 million in Laos, and a so far undetermined amount in Thailand. All together, for 14 Asian bio-diversity preparatory activities (of which 6 have been funded by the Grant) a total of US$ 91.66 million of conservation component resources has been mobilized. It seems fair to conclude that the catalytic effect (multiplier effect) has been substantial.

In Latin America a similar overall catalytic multiplier from the Grant phase 1 allocations to the core program for policy and research work appears to have been observed. Overall Grant disbursement from this allocation in fiscal year 1990/91 is US$ 121,407 on 12 different projects (averaging US$ 10,000 each) under 6 different headings. Two environmental economics projects reviewed the Latin America experience with environmental issues papers, and have provided the theoretical underpinning for environmental issues papers for the countries in the Region. Two projects under the environmental assessment heading have covered the effects of beach sand mining in the Caribbean and environmental management of petroleum developments in tropical forests. The latter involved a case study from Ecuador and has resulted in a manual which is now being applied. Three projects have addressed indigenous land regularization and natural resource management. One in lowland Bolivia led to the incorporation of an

important tribal land tenure component in the Eastern Lowlands Project. The second, a regional study on land regularization in special Amerindian Components of Bank-funded projects in lowland South America led to a big tribal component. The third was development of a proposed regional seminar on these issues, its implementation is awaiting approval. Three bio-diversity activities have been funded and two of them have had clear catalytic impacts. One of these was a report on the environmental effects of gold and tin mining in the Brazilian Amazon, which has led to a very large project on gold mining impacts. The other activity was a report on the economics of fisheries development in the Brazilian Amazon. This has also led to a significant project. The third activity looked into the scope for debt-for-nature swaps for Bank involvement in the protection of bio-diversity and wildlands protection, but this has not led to any further action. Under the heading of "cultural property protection", reports have been prepared for Guatemala and Costa Rica which have led to the explicit inclusion of such protective measures in two Structural Adjustment Programs. The final area funded was a seminar on Geographic Information Systems and urban land use planning in the Region, but this has not had any catalytic effects.

In Africa the bio-diversity component has been much less dominant, but Norwegian grants have been used to speed up the preparation of the bio-diversity conservation element of the Cameroon Forestry Project.

(4) In Asia Norwegian funds have enabled the Bank to focus on regional environmental work. Most bilateral trust funds are tied to country specific work only. Obviously then, work would have been severely delayed or shelved had Norwegian sources not been available.

(5) The Norwegian grant has been used to fund a number of important policy oriented low cost environmental research activities, which would -- according to the Director of Environment Department -- not have been undertaken without the Norwegian funding. A typical example is the funding to prepare the book "The Impact of Development Policies on Health" which has helped World Health Organization (WHO) understand inter-linkages between policy, economics, health and environment, and thus focus on environmental health as a topic. It also played a crucial role in integrating outside research in the process of preparing the book "Economics of Sustainable Development" (in process), which emphasizes the role of macroeconomic policy in environmental management. One should also mention the small but crucial funding of the air pollution studies for Ankara, Beijing and Mexico City.

(6) It is the flexible nature of the Norwegian funds (as contrasted to the rigidity and in practice, unavailability of other trust funds) that makes it possible to blend Norwegian grants in small amounts to design optimal research activities that would otherwise be restricted to less than optimal designs.

(7) However, there appear to be important cases where Norwegian funding has been genuinely additional with no offsetting effects. An illustration is the Machakos environment-population nexus study, in Kenya. Here Norwegian grants were

available, flexibly, at the right time and provided seed money allowing the more rigid funds of British ODA to come in afterwards and complete the study, in timescales compatible with their procedures. In Sub-Saharan Africa the initial preparation of the bio-diversity component of the Cameroon Forestry Project was funded by the Grant. It resulted in the Government giving increased emphasis to the country's national parks and wildlife program.

3.2.9. The Grant's Awareness-Raising Role Through Bank-Funded Work.

The findings under the "Catalytic" heading above, suggest that it is likely that the Norwegian grants for environment activities have been critical in generating greater awareness, acceptability and priority for environment considerations in projects and programs from their very identification and formulation. Access to Norwegian funds has made it possible (when alternative funding was hardly available) to integrate economic considerations in the analysis of environmental issues. This has contributed to the changing of attitudes, perceptions and approaches to externalities and environmental issues. These were seen merely as growth-inhibiting factors among conventional economists (those not among the so-called "environmental economists"), in both the Bank and in borrowing governments.

The launching of the Environment Department Working Paper Series in 1988, which has now issued some fifty important research and policy oriented studies, is a significant element in this context. Norwegian grant money has played an important role in funding some innovative and path-breaking studies published in this series (e.g. the first economic analysis to establish the limitations and merits of Debt-for-Nature Swaps; the study that created consensus for emphasizing "dryland management" rather than "desertification"; important studies on policy options for dealing with urban air pollution, raising the awareness on urban pollution control and modalities available throughout the Bank's operational structure; studies that enhanced the understanding (far beyond the Bank) that macroeconomic policies in the form of adjustment operations have serious and important natural resource management impacts; studies focusing on natural resource accounting and on the full costs of land degradation, such as soil degradation, to mention but a few). These papers have a wide influence and circulation both within and outside the Bank. Several papers have served as guidelines for policy preparation and project formulation and have provided important methodological progress which is being adopted in the project cycle in the Bank and elsewhere.

The Norwegian funding to the core program for policy and research was instrumental for the Bank in helping WHO (see para. 3.2.8. (5)) above) and this has established the need for a lot more empirical work. Important research areas have been identified in the border area labelled environmental health. This has helped to broaden WHO's scope and views and is instrumental in their present policy formulation for the 1991 WHO summit in Tokyo. If this relatively modest, Grant-financed, Bank research leads to the generation of funds for WHO's strategic policy design, the catalytic effect will be massive.

Grant funding to the core program for policy and research has been instrumental for the forthcoming book "Economic Policies for Sustainable Development". It has made it possible to integrate pioneering research with ongoing Bank research and will make it

possible to disseminate findings widely. In the process of preparing the book several internal seminars and training courses have been arranged for country economic staff. The contribution has thus indirectly contributed to awareness raising among Bank operational staff. It is well established that there is widespread curiosity and interest in how to operationalize the sustainable development concept which has topped the environmental meeting agenda since the Brundtland Commission Report in 1987.

A very important contribution to raised awareness and changed perceptions within and outside the Bank has been the uniquely flexible nature of Norwegian grants. This has enabled the Bank to arrange numerous seminars and workshops involving local participants from borrowing countries. This contribution is emphasized by virtually every Bank staff member contacted during the evaluation.

Africa Environment Division makes it clear that this raised awareness has enhanced the environment consciousness in early project identification. It claims that the work done on dryland management under the SSE-contribution (they do not distinguish that from the Grant!) provided for a series of studies and workshops which helped in the rethinking of projects preparation efforts in very difficult countries. The catalytic and awareness effects are seen in the recent emphasis on participatory natural resource management projects.

In Asia, the Bank has used the bulk of their core fund allocation on preparing projects with bio-diversity components, a regional strategy for bio-diversity, and seminars and workshops in relation to these. While they point to the difficulty of quantifying the awareness raising effects, they feel confident that such awareness raising has been significant. They refer to the massive amount of resources mobilized and flowing to the bio-diversity sub-sector following the bio-diversity project preparation work undertaken by staff and consultants financed from the Grant.

Moreover, Norwegian funds permitted the Bank to engage academics and NGOs to participate in developing the environmental policy agenda. This not only permitted a more informed dialogue with the Governments, but also enhanced the Bank's image among its traditional critics. In addition it has opened up numerous new channels of communication that will ensure broad-based support for the Bank's future activities.

3.2.10. Awareness and Catalytic Effects: The Case of National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs).

Another example is the contribution to disseminate the various National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs) so as to give these wide publicity. The Grant has helped the Bank's Africa Environment Division organize a number of work shops and seminars. These have brought together technical and political participants from many African countries for an extensive interchange of experience with initiation and implementation of this difficult process. This Bank Division claims that being permitted to operate on the basis of a demand-driven, government led in-country process, has made it possible to avoid the pressure to submit premature NEAP documents that would run the risk of aborting the fragile sustainability of the NEAP process. One may, however, ask if this progress has been "too successful", because the recent IDA IX directive that all

borrowing countries shall have their NEAPs by 1993 could prove to be rather counter-productive. The perceived NEAP-success so far appears to related to the close mutual cooperation between the governments and the Bank. The idea has been that the NEAPs must be allowed to emerge at a speed compatible with the rate of growth of national environmental. NEAPs are supposed to be the property of the countries and they must acquire this property at a speed they can cope with. From this perspective the recent IDA IX directive could be counterproductive.

It is acknowledged that while comprehensive NEAPs are useful in some countries, Bank sector work on environment provides an important policy perspective in others. The Asia Environment Department, for example, favours a pragmatic, iterative approach to environmental analyses and action, rather than a uniform process or even a central role for the Bank in all cases.

There has been a long-standing debate in the Bank about the relative merits of NEAPs versus broad-based environmental strategies. Generally, it has been found that NEAPs can be usefully developed in small countries where it is easier -- at least in principle -- to establish a popular consensus. In larger countries, the Bank sees no alternative to supporting a program which allows for the gradual maturing and integration of environmental considerations into all aspects of government planning, legislation, monitoring, costing, revenue generation and budgeting. Real improved environmental management can be achieved only through a gradual and time-consuming process. It must be based on dedicated and well-functioning institutions which are not dependant on a few individuals who happen to have benefitted from interaction with foreign or foreign-supported personnel.

This gradual process has also had a major benefit within the Bank, where it has helped shape the work programs of several divisions. In addition to what has been previously described in the case of the Africa Environment Division, this occurred in the case of e.g. Indonesia Department and it is gradually developing in the Divisions working on Eastern Europe, as well as in a number of others.

As of today, about 15 African countries have initiated a NEAP process and are at different stages of development. The lead group of countries is made up by Madagascar, Mauritius, Lesotho, and the Seychelles, all of whom have completed their NEAPs. Madagascar and Mauritius are already implementing theirs. Ghana and Rwanda make up the second group with their NEAPs near completion, while Burkina Faso, Guinea and Togo are already well advanced. Uganda, Burundi, Gambia, Benin, and Guinea Bissau have just started, while Cote d'Ivoire, Congo, and Gabon are exploring the possibility of doing the same. Nigeria has completed a study "Towards a National Environment Action Plan" and is preparing such a plan at both the federal and state level.

3.2.11. Conclusions.

Norway has no, or very small, amounts of project financing with most UN-agencies. Such fund - where available - is usually tied up for extended periods, and provides very limited scope for raising specific environmental concerns where and when such opportunities

arise. There is thus no readily available substitute for the Grant for catalytic environment impacting on such agencies.

With regard to the multilateral development banks the situation is altogether different, as shown in the review of the Grant cooperation with the World Bank.

The Grant constitutes but a small portion of Norway's contribution to environment work in the Bank. Norway manages the different funds eligible for environment activities in the Bank in a closely coordinated and integrated way. At the same time, the use of these funds is integrated within Norway's overall Bank policy: the Grant is used to strengthen the underpinning of Norwegian aid goals in multilateral aid cooperation.

Available documentation suggests that Norwegian funding available for environment activities, the Grant being one of them, has had a significant -- some would say substantial -- additionality effect in the case of the World Bank. This effect has been magnified due to the rigidity and unavailability of other trust funds for such activities in a number of areas of very high priority to Norwegian development cooperation. In many other cases where it is difficult to establish pure additionality, there is convincing evidence that Norwegian funding has helped to speed up and/or provide for more in depth analysis in priority areas. The Evaluation Team has been unable to identify examples where Norwegian funding has been offsetting in a negative sense. One cannot leave out the possibility that Norwegian funds have freed Bank funds for other activities. It appears, however, that Bank funds freed up as a result of such trust funding, have been put to use in other environmental priority areas.

The catalytic effects are directly linked to additionality/speeding up. The Grant has contributed to institutionalizing research, methodological approaches and has strengthened emphasis on ecology-economy linkages at micro- as well as macro (adjustment operations) level within the Bank. Manuals, procedures and internal training have been affected. The rate of increase in environmental awareness within the Bank has accelerated, and this has effected recipient negotiators as well.

The Norwegian administration of the Grant contribution to the Bank is efficient and well coordinated with other Norwegian and Nordic Bank activities. The coordinated use of different Norwegian funds available for environmental activities in the Bank has been most imaginative and innovative, and encourages considerable autonomy by the multilateral Grant administrators in the Ministry.

Within the Bank, administration of trust funds and other funds earmarked for environmental activities has encountered several difficulties. The main reason is the myriad of small funds with special ties and conditions attached. These make efficient coordination virtually impossible. In addition, it has taken long to disburse e.g. TAGPE funds from the Bank to recipients, but this is not necessarily an alarming sign. However, it would be unfortunate if the money disbursed from Norway to the Bank cannot be used in time. It remains a fact that the Bank could get much more "mileage" from the totality of environmental funds from different donors, if the donors were willing to prioritize third world environment and development issues above their own national strategic goals. Only then could the Bank begin to combine the funds and tailor environmental program

packages on a larger scale. Norway's contribution has, since its very inception, represented the untied almost ideal model that the Bank hopes other donors will gradually follow in this respect.

In conclusion, there appears to be no reason for maintaining the kind of criticism that has been voiced from e.g. the Ministry of Environment, over the use of the Bank as a channel for the Grant. With regard to environmental awareness and procedures the Bank of today is quite different from the institution 15-20 years ago, and the Grant has helped in speeding up the process of change. Considering the Bank's policy impact in recipient countries the desired environmental multiplier effect of Grant allocations examined above could be quite substantial.

3.3. USE OF THE GRANT BY THE PROGRAM DEPARTMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

3.3.1. Overview of Roles and Activities.

The Program Department has replaced the former Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) after its recent reorganization. This department's role in relation to the Grant has been manifold. The idea for the Grant emanated from this Department, which perceived this as a means to ensure a speedier implementation of the new focus on environment and natural resources management in Norwegian development assistance. This Department was therefore assigned the responsibility for the coordination of the Grant. As per the Guidelines for this (see chapter 1.2.) this coordinating responsibility included

a) being the focal point for budgetary preparation for Grant
b) preparation of overall reports on Grant activities to the regular Meeting of the Department directors
c) being the focal point for the cooperation between the Ministry and Ministry of the Environment
d) presentation to the Advisory Committee for Environment and Development of projects exceeding NOK 1 Mill.

Initially it was envisaged that the Department's role would be exclusively one of coordination and that it would not be given any allocation from the Grant to administer. This was changed in 1986, and by 1990 the Department had disbursed a total of NOK 34,394 Mill. from the Grant. Most of this has been spent on seminars, conferences, campaigns, information, publications, establishment of institutional strengthening, etc. but some 40% of the spendings have not been classified. From these statistics it is equally unclear what specific environmental issues have been financed, since 80% of the spendings are classified as "general environment" or "not registered/unknown", see table Annex 3.

The Department has disbursed the major part of its Grant allocation through international organizations, as shown in table 3.6. below. IUCN has been the largest recipient from this part of the Grant allocation (IUCN's role in the use of the Grant is addressed in chapter 4 below).

The Department has also channelled a substantial part of its Grant allocation through another international NGO, the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), through a frame agreement (NOK 5,001 Mill.). A major part of the allocation (NOK 4,589 Mill.) was spent on support to the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), and has also supported information activities through PANOS (formerly Earthscan of IIED) (NOK 2,551 Mill.). This cooperation is addressed in chapter 3.4. The remaining part of the allocation has been spent on support to international conferences of which several were regional follow-up conferences of the WCED.

70 % of this allocation of the Grant is Global (not country or regional specific). It is worth noting that none of the countries listed explicitly as having benefitted from the Grant are Norwegian partner countries, (see table Annex 3 for details). These may be covered under "Global" or "Regional", e.g. both Tanzania and Kenya have benefitted in the form of IIED's general networking activities, Small Grant Fund works, Pastoral Tenure workshops, NGO-support, and the Dryland Network Program. Some of the projects have also come about as a result of initiatives from outside the Ministry, as for instance from the Ministry of Environment.

Table 3.6. PROGRAM DEPARTMENT'S GRANT DISBURSEMENT BY INSTITUTION. (NOK MILL.)

	Up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
IUCN	1.817	1.526	500	2.176	1.990	8.009
IIED	0	1.000	1.500	1.186	1.315	5.001
WCED	738	3.464	387	0	0	4.589
PANOS (Earthscan)	2.042	200	59	250	0	2.551
UNCED	0	0	0	0	1.747	1.747
Center Common Future	0	0	200	562	350	1.112
ELC	400	0	627	62	0	1.089
ESCAP	0	0	0	515	485	1.000
WRI	0	0	777	0	0	777
UNEP	0	0	644	0	0	644
Support to Governments	1.839	0	0	1.050	0	2.889
Miscellaneous	885	379	547	1.981	1.194	4.986
TOTAL	7.721	6.569	5.241	7.782	7.081	34.394
TOTAL GRANT	40.769	34.718	37.386	69.735	66.597	249.205

Of the Departments's different activities, the Evaluation Team has chosen to look more closely at the cooperation with IIED. This is not simply because IIED has received a major part of the Department's allocation. It is more because the bulk of this cooperation was set up as a frame agrement and was quite innovative in relation to the different activities financed under this agreement. Furthermore, the goals of this cooperation complements much of the cooperation with IUCN and the World Bank, in the sense that IIED has been supported to raise international awareness regarding many policy issues such as how to operationalize sustainable development as set forth in the WCED.

3.3.2. A Brief Overview of the IIED Cooperation.

IIED was established in 1971 as a private institute in London. Today it specializes in environmental research and advisory services, primarily in developing countries. Until 1986 IIED also included a very active, high profile, information activity called Earthscan[1]. Internal controversies led to separation of the two and the subsequent formation of PANOS with most of the Earthscan staff of IIED. Both IIED and PANOS achieved international fame for their activities in pursuing the sustainable development goals and spreading the messages that were emphasized in the WCED-Report.

The Ministry agreed in 1984 to a 3-year funding for Earthscan's so-called Focal Country Programme (FCP), aimed at increased interest and awareness for environmental issues in 7 developing countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka among Norway's main partner countries, plus Indonesia). In other words, a typical information project. This was one of the very first activities financed under the Special Grant. After the breakup in 1986, the responsibility for FCP activities were taken over by Panos (See chapter 3.4.).

Several Ministry departments were involved in the early Grant allocations to IIED/Earthscan. The present Program Department headed general talks on organization of the cooperation, research and advisory services with IIED, whereas NORAD's Information Department maintained most of the contacts with Earthscan and subsequently PANOS. The Ministry's Multilateral Department was also involved from the start because IIED/Earthscan was seen as an international organization. This Department's role was, however, often limited to budget control and to paying out the annual contributions.

Once the division of responsibilities between IIED and PANOS had been established IIED developed a new work program with much emphasis on issues relating to the drought belt problems and economic recovery in Sub-Sahara Africa. IIED was considered to have professional and administrative competence to assist the Ministry, as well as other Norwegian institutions, with lecturers, arrangement of seminars, training of Norwegian experts, internships for Norwegians at IIED headquarters in London and assistance in project evaluation. Such forms of cooperation formed the basis for a 3-year framework/umbrella agreement, to be financed by means of a so-called Trust Fund from

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[1] IIED continues to run Earthscan Publications ltd but without financial support from previous Earthscan funds.

the Grant. It was signed in March 1987 and the first NOK 1 million was disbursed that year. The bulk of it used for a rural energy study in Sub-Sahara Africa and the rest for technical assistance via IIED staff to the Ministry/NORAD, for NORAD/Ministry-seminars with IIED-staff participation and for preparation of reports and other information about how donor agencies contribute to the promotion of sustainable development.

This framework agreement Trust Fund was renewed for three more years in 1990, with a similar budget frame. This second three year period concentrates on environment-economy linkages and is co-sponsored by the Dutch development cooperation authorities, i.e. the preparation of publications and textbooks in environmental economics emphasizing the issues and methodologies of relevance to the preparation of strategies, plans and implementable programs in developing countries. Furthermore, it contains an element on the sustainable development of dryland areas in Sub-Sahara Africa, a preparatory project on the integration of wildlife management in rural development planning in Zambia, and environment studies in Bungoma and Turkana in Kenya. Finally, the Trust Fund has been earmarked for a more active use of IIED staff to advise the Ministry and NORAD on environmental issues in development, in the field and as lecturers on seminars, e.g. the women and environment seminar in Paris in 1989, and the Bergen Conference in 1990, and in their capacity as colleagues when Norwegian staff are seconded to IIED. The renewed Trust Agreement was only for work requested by the Ministry and very little such work has evolved so far.

In addition to the Trust Fund agreement another NOK 1 million agreement was signed in August 1987 whereby IIED was contracted to produce a series of easily accessible follow-up documents to promote the WCED-Report internationally, and arrange for world-wide dissemination in several languages of the findings and conclusions of the WCED to the NGO community, private industry, governments, etc.

In 1987 under this agreement a Norwegian employee from the Ministry of Environment was seconded to IIED to liaise, for an extended period, between IIED and Norway on the WCED follow-up project financed under the umbrella agreement and to undertake personal upgrading in environment issues through the close collaboration with IIED researchers. Another Norwegian was seconded for a shorter period in 1988, and a senior person from the Ministry was seconded in the spring of 1991.

In 1989 a separate Grant financed NOK 0.5 million agreement was signed whereby IIED should identify, map, survey and evaluate network organizations covering environment and development in four countries in the Sahel. IIED has a quarterly newsletter - "Haramata" - with a circulation of over a 2,000 in English and French, mostly to readers in Sub-Saharan Africa. It informs its estimated 10,000 readership of new activities and projects of relevance, and provides a link between different people, organizations and language groups, otherwise rarely if ever brought into communication. In 1990 this Survey and Evaluation project was followed by a NOK 1.050 million allocation for IIED's broader Dryland Network Programme which includes support for "Haramata", and several operational activities related to network building, training in participatory appraisal and problem analysis, mobilization of indigenous research resources from local NGOs, and exchange study visits for local NGO-personnel. It was decided, however, that

this should be financed over the Norwegian Sahel Sudan Ethiopia (SSE)-Grant rather than the Grant (a parallel situation to that seen in the combination of the SSE-Grant and the Grant for environment programs in the World Bank).

In 1990 the Ministry decided to support IIED's 3-year programme to prepare for UNCED 92 in Brazil with US$ 65,000.- for each of the three years, to operate on:

a. The underpinning of Sustainable Development - called the Academic Debate.
b. The building of a broad coalition for Sustainable Development - the NGO Debate
c. To construct up to five developing country inputs to the event.

3.3.3. Catalytic- and Awareness-Raising Effects - An Assessment.

A. The Woodfuel Crisis: Myths and Facts.

The first major IIED-project financed by the Grant after PANOS had been established was a fuelwood project in Malawi. This led to a rural energy survey for Africa which started in 1987. The survey was the most comprehensive and thorough survey of the various aspects of biomass fuels ever conducted for Sub-Sahara Africa, and therefore a key, internationally renowned reference work. It approached a lot of the "conventional wisdom" about fuelwood scarcities and the role of fuelwood gathering in deforestation in a very cautious manner, carefully disaggregating available statistics to show that much of what had become undisputed truth in this field was in fact grossly misleading.

The policy implication following from their research was very significant for the strategies of donor organizations worldwide, including the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and United Nations. This particular research must have had more of a catalytic effect on the international understanding of the fuelwood crisis and its role in deforestation than any other research in this field undertaken so far. There is no doubt that this undertaking is a major success story as far as the use of the Grant is concerned.

While the awareness-raising and catalytic impact of the book has been most impressive outside of Norway, it appears that rather few operational and policy oriented staff in NORAD and the Ministry have familiarized themselves with the main findings, let alone applied the recommendations in country work. Admittedly, a brief internal note from a NORAD officer acknowledges that the report contains potentially very valuable and novel findings, but it appears that this note has passed through the system unnoticed. Given that this is a sound observation, it is saddening to note that such policy oriented research projects, financed by a Norwegian environment grant, are virtually ignored or overlooked in the Ministry/NORAD's own internal process of policy making and program formulation.

B. The Blooming of Environmental Economics.

IIED and the University College of London agreed in the late 1980s to establish the joint London Environmental Economic Center (LEEC). This center was staffed with leading international economists specializing in the field of environmental policy and environmental economic appraisal. IIED and the Ministry agreed that the Grant was a very suitable

means of contributing to financing of the start-up of LEEC. At the time modest but significant Grant of £ 20,000 was disbursed for developing research resulting in working papers on environmental economics in general, and on the economics of sustainable development in particular.

This research was pulled together in a few books and reports that addressed head-on some very contemporary environmental policy issues, in clear and pedagogical language and maintaining sound economic analysis. The first of the books, a paperback titled "Blueprint for a Green Economy", was published in 1989 and became the first environmental economics books widely sold in airport book-stores! It received tremendous media-focus and became a political reference work matched only by the WCED-Report from 1987. It's popularity is largely due to the fact that it took the general recommendations from the WCED-Report a step further and presented a series of practical proposals for financing sustainable development. The "Blueprint" is read and taken seriously worldwide and has had a significant impact on the role of environmental issues in economic policy and planning in industrialized and developing countries. More than anything, it affected the attitudes of leading politicians in the U.K. The reviews in the leading media were front page stories with fat headlines.

The remarkable thing about the "Blueprint" is that it would not have come out without the Grant support to LEEC via IIED from Norway, and similar financial support from Sweden. The foreword of the book states that it was originally prepared as a report for the U.K. Department of Environment, and this undoubtedly was important for the book's awareness-raising impact in the U.K., but it is a fact that the U.K. Government support of LEEC's "Blueprint work" work has been minimal. It was Norwegian and Swedish financial support (which was never acknowledged in the foreword) that made such environmental awareness-raising in the U.K. possible!

The Grant support for this environmental economic program at LEEC also made (to various degrees) some other very important books possible. These have proven very influential in aid agencies, among ministerial staff world wide, and as text books, but have not received the same media-ovations as the first "Blueprint". Norwegian financial support is acknowledged in the forewords in some of them. A series of other environmental economic research projects such as e.g. the ivory trade study, have also fundamentally depended on this funding. Since the Brundtland report came out in 1987, this applied research may well represent the most influential and effective use of Norwegian funds for the worldwide dissemination of methods to operationalize the core messages of the WCED-Report. As for the fuelwood research, Norwegian authorities appear to be unaware of the widespread positive impact of this funding.

C. Promoting the WCED-Report 1987.

Outside the Trust Fund of the Grant, but inside the Grant disbursement from MFA to IIED, two contracts have materialized following up on the Brundtland Report. These were for £ 80,000 and £ 55,000 in 1987 and 1988 respectively, and were used together with funds from three other governments. The first of these, designed to coincide with the launch of the WCED-Report, was a conference on the "Greening of Aid", organized by IIED. This led to the highly acclaimed book of the same title.

IIED then drafted a "Readers Guide to Brundtland". The English version alone has gone to 50,000 direct sale readers and has been published in Norwegian, Spanish, Arabic, and Portuguese. This shortened and popularized guide to the almost 400 page long "Our Common Future" (The WCED-Report) is likely to have helped significantly to make the Brundtland Report so widely and internationally recognized.

IIED also did a Grant funded contract (£ 10,000) in the wake of the WCED-Report on the role of NGOs in sustainable development. The report was submitted to the Development Advisory Committee (DAC) but became too wordy and too vague and thus was never published or followed up. This use of the Grant must be considered a failure.

Overall, however, the Grant support for IIED in the follow up of the WCED-Report appears to have been invaluable, in that it allowed IIED to pursue the concerns of the WCED-Commission into:

a. UNEP resolutions leading to the UNCED 1992;
b. Over 600 public audiences and events;
c. Raising the contents of the WCED-Report among academics and NGOs;
d. Keeping the debate alive in the U.K. at the highest political level, in certain circles in the USA, and in continental Europe; and perhaps most importantly
e. to filter the somewhat generalized recommendations of the WCED-Report down into credible actions cutting across sectors, interests and disciplines.

D. The Drylands Program.

Grant allocations to IIED's drylands agenda started when the SSE-program was new, and has resulted in a good and trusted relationship with the SSE program coordinator in the Ministry, and with the NORAD coordinator. IIED researchers appear to be very strong in this area and are widely referred to. The program covers the following areas:

* The network newsletter, Haramata;
* Specific research in e.g. wetlands in drylands;
* General policy work for the whole Sahel region;and
* The pastoralists land tenure program.

E. Secondments of Norwegian Ministry Staff to IIED.

The secondment program was meant to be an important component in the initial Ministry and IIED Trust Fund Agreement financed under the Grant. The idea was for Norwegian staff of the Ministry and NORAD to have the opportunity to take a leave from their daily tasks to get in-depth insight into one or more key areas researched by IIED, by being at IIED as part of one of the research groups at IIED. Based on such sabbaticals it was expected that new policy related ideas and prospects would be discussed and aired in the Ministry and NORAD.

The first secondee went to IIED from the Ministry of Environment (MOE), in 1987 and stayed for 9 months, working on the design and execution of follow up activities to the WCED-Report, researching environmental law in Europe and assisting the senior

management at IIED with its liaison with the Norwegian Government. Another Norwegian, from NORAD, was seconded to IIED for a very short period of time (3 weeks) in late November-early December 1988 and covered several programme areas, among others the Drylands Agricultural Programme and the NGO Network Programme. Since early spring 1991 a senior staff officer of MFA has been seconded to IIED. His area of interest is related to small industrial activities and is an area which is not entirely in line with IIED activities.

The secondment program goal has not been fulfilled in any satisfactory way. There appears to be a complex set of reasons for the failure, some relate to operations at the Ministry and NORAD, while others pertain to the nature and organization of IIED. These are discussed in chapter 3.3.4. below.

F. Indirect "Spin-offs".

The core support from the Grant has allowed LEEC to disseminate the results of the environmental economic research by means of:

a. training seminars for Ministry staff,
b. participation in the Bergen Science Conference on Sustainable Development,
c. participation in the first annual LIRDP review mission in Zambia, and
d. economic evaluation of tropical wetlands benefits for Central America.

For IIED Norway's Grant support has made it possible for key IIED staff to give a large number of talks on IIED-supported activities. This has thus spread the message and created awareness by people in decision-making positions in politics, as well as the public and private sectors.

3.3.4. Utilization, Follow-up and Cooperation with IIED

IIED has proven since its key role in the WCED-Commission work and follow up activities, that it has a very valuable capacity to respond to policy problems, to demonstrate new ideas and to publicise concepts, attitudes and information. The establishment of LEEC with University College of London has resulted in a wealth of valuable, applied research, reports containing a broad spectrum of practical proposals for sustainable development finance. The staff has a broad experience from developing countries as well as from the policy dialogue in industrialized countries, and several of them are excellent lecturers and writers who fearlessly propose controversial hypotheses for testing, e.g. their woodfuel book on Africa.

The Grant should provide a unique opportunity for Norway to tap this valuable policy oriented research institute, and at the same time fertilize the institute with field oriented development cooperation ideas developed through Norwegian experience. Both these functions appear to have been far too little used in the seeking of ways and means to benefit from the Grant window.

The penetration of the policy relevant findings from, e.g. the Grant financed pioneering fuelwood study and the environmental economics activities of IIED/LEEC, into

Norwegian aid strategies and operationalization of aid policies and programs, appears to be thin. The reason could be shortage of capacity as well as capability in both the Ministry and in NORAD.

Norway seems to lack the kind of policy research "counterpart" to IIED that one finds in e.g. Sweden, where the Beyer Institute and the Stockholm Environment Institute play an important catalytic role between IIED and SIDA/Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden. The research oriented policy analyses of IIED may therefore seem somewhat too theoretical and abstract to many in the Ministry, and in the NORAD-NATUR.

At present - perhaps as a consequence of the above developments - IIED is using only a fraction of the trust fund framework available under the Grant. It appears that the Ministry is short of capacity and capability to develop ideas and form these into projects and activities suitable for IIED to undertake with the Grant trust fund financing. At the same time, it appears that IIED has been unable to produce and develop ideas into projects and concrete activities acceptable to the Ministry as fulfilling the guidelines and criteria for using the trust fund part of the Grant. Both of these "explanations" are unsatisfactory. The Ministry's environment policy formulation capacity is clearly limited, but if there is sufficient trust in IIED's comprehension of Norwegian development priorities, its competence and its research capacity, then perhaps the Ministry should "risk" giving IIED some more freedom to develop special studies and projects using the trust fund. If these developments are found worthy of continued support, the Ministry could switch the funding mode from the Grant trust fund, which is meant for new initiatives, to the Grant special program for more established activities. Since the Ministry only operates the Grant and the SSE-Grant with IIED, such a sub-division of the Grant would parallel the initial use of Grant funds before more permanent use of the untied co-financing facility in the World Bank. This would be in accordance with the Grant guidelines.

The occasional seminars that have been arranged result in frustrated participation by overly stressed NORAD/Ministry staff, who have had no time to prepare themselves by studying basic texts in the key topic areas. No wonder they often fail to see the relevance of the courses and end up considering their contents as being "academic" in a derogatory way. The signal to IIED/Ministry from such experience is that they must tailor their lectures and cases for an audience that appears to be somewhat negatively inclined to both the seminar and the message. Such a setting provides little leverage for a constructive and comprehensive aid policy debate, in which environmental economics constitute an increasingly important component. This is a difficult but not impossible challenge.

The reason for the failure of the secondment arrangement must be seen in the same context. Ministry/NORAD staff simply do not find time to maintain or upgrade their own intellectual capabilities because of the heavy day-to-day pressure to keep their in-baskets under control and meet all the urgent bureaucratic deadlines. Talk about sustainable development appears to be dismissed in-house in the sense that their own human capital formation is largely neglected.

As a result of such bureaucratic pressures and under-staffing in NORAD/Ministry and the rather tied up and busy program of staff at IIED, it appears at present that the IIED/Ministry-relationship is unsatisfactory. An allocation is there but neither party seem to be able to "break the ice" and revitalize the facility in a mutually beneficial way. IIED finds too much uncertainty with regard to the Norwegian trust fund, and cannot really plan and budget with it as decisions are presently taken. Apparently, the working relationship is easier with e.g. SIDA, perhaps for reasons of the close, catalytic role played by the Stockholm Environment Institute in the cooperation agreement with the Swedes.

If the Ministry strongly feel they cannot mobilize the internal manpower to monitor an IIED agreement, then this should be signalled to IIED and the agreement cancelled. Before taking such a step, the Evaluation Team suggests some face-to-face in depth discussions between the two parties to determine what are the nature of the obstacles, and if there are ways to remove them, so that the Norwegian aid and research community can take advantage of the IIED/LEEC-resources in the formulation and implementation of our development assistance programs.

3.3.5. Conclusions.

Despite the many success-stories with regard to the awareness-raising impact of the Grant in IIED/LEEC activities, the follow-up and utilization of the outcome of this Grant cooperation appears to have been far from ideal.

It was initially envisaged that the Ministry's Program Department was going to play a focal policy role in regard to the Grant. With decentralization of the Grant to the different departments and the conflicting interests and opinions linked to the Grant both inside and outside the Ministry, the Department's policy role was little by little watered out. With the separation of NORAD one may say that it ceased to exist. To-day there appears to be little overall policy guidance for the Grant.

As a result the Ministry has not been able to utilize the framework agreement and draw effectively on the IIED/LEEC-expertise in the formulation of Norway's environment dimension of development cooperation policy.

Nevertheless, it can safely be concluded that the Grant has financed a series of IIED/LEEC undertakings that have strongly affected and altered international awareness, atitudes and thinking regarding follow-up issues and operationalization of WCED-recommendations. It has also been the source of some outstanding research projects of crucial importance for aid policy in special areas. Considering the modest allocations for these activities the international catalytic and awareness-raising "mileage" has been most impressive.

3.4. THE USE OF THE GRANT FOR INFORMATION ACTIVITIES.

3.4.1. Overview of Activities and Structure.

The Special Grant for Environment and Development (The Grant) has, since it's inception in 1984, been used for a myriad of information projects. NORAD's Information Department (INFO) disbursed their first amount in 1986, for BBC films, and had by the end of 1990 disbursed some NOK 17 million. 92 % of INFO's activities are Global (not country specific), and address general environment issues. INFO has supported a very large number of small activities. These may be summed up as follows:

* Distribution and presentation of the WCED report "Our Common Future" (NOK 5.324 Mill.)
* Support to Audio Visual Productions (NOK 3.432 Mill.)
* Support to International Conferences etc. (NOK 1.828 Mill.)
* PANOS (NOK 1.777 Mill.)
* Support to Production and Distribution of Publications (NOK 1.181 Mill.)
* Miscellaneous (NOK 3.716 Mill.)

It is not easy to determine the overall allocation and disbursements from the Grant for information activities. In fact, it is virtually hopeless to draw a clear line between information oriented activities and many other ones. A research project may result in a book which, if the content is good and it is efficiently disseminated to the right audience, will be of tremendous information value. News of other projects may accidentally reach the media and have important though somewhat negative information effects. What is quite clear, however, is that NORAD-, and Ministry departments have been involved in selecting and Grant-financing projects where information activities have been a key area. A typical case would be the Focal Country Programmes (FCP) of Earthscan, and later PANOS, where financing has been through the Multilateral Department. Also there are the many WCED-related and environmental economics publications from IIED, financed from the Program Department's allocation of the Grant (see chapter 3.3.). Many conferences and seminars with a direct information goal, have been financed via the Grant but by NORAD's NATUR-division, or by the Ministry.

3.4.2. The Information Department's Use of the Grant.

This chapter concentrates on the information activities of NORAD's Information Department. Following an introduction, a more detailed discussion is presented of the collaboration with PANOS, which has been a key channel for activities.

The Information Department had originally no detailed plan or program for the use of the Grant. It received applications, had them accumulate and appraised them once every quarter. Since 1988, however, the Department has been given a fixed budget ceiling for such spendings. It has tried to narrow down its area of responsibility as regards the use of the Grant. It has concentrated on maintaining a long term relationship to a selected number of NGOs doing broad-based, people-oriented information dissemination activities. These are organizations found to do a good and reliable job. It is the information value of projects that the Department is fit to judge. It thus prefers other

NORAD/Ministry-departments to take responsibility for seminars, conferences, workshops, etc.

The core NGOs in the Grant portfolio of the Information Department are:

1. Environmental Liaison Centre (ELC) which represents developing countries. ELC is seated in Nairobi and has a very well developed communications network in Africa and Asia.
2. ICSF; International Collective in Support of Fish-workers is seated in Brussels but works mainly in India.
3. IUCN with headquarters in Gland, Switzerland, receives INFO support for publications on nature and environment in Norway's partner countries, e.g. "Nature of Kenya", "Nature of Zambia".
4. PANOS, seated in London, has an impressive network in developing and developed countries: publications, radio programs, syndication of articles, features, and videos.
5. Centre for Our Common Future in Geneva is the secretariat for the WCED.
6. TVE and BBC both receive Grant support for film-projects directed at environment issues and their relation to developing countries, e.g. "Battle for the Planet." and "Only one Earth."

In addition a number of other projects have received Grant funding, but the Department has constantly tried to limit itself to the core NGOs, and on occasion has been prepared to enter into framework agreements for future cooperation.

Since 1991 the Department receives no separate allocation from the Grant as information activities are to be financed over NORADs Global allocation (see chapter 3.1.).

3.4.3. Activities of Collaboration with PANOS.

IIED in London had their information activity organized under the name of Earthscan until early 1986. Internal conflicts then resulted in the Earthscan leader leaving, and immediately forming PANOS to carry on Earthscan activities. Ind the end, PANOS took over all Earthscan activities in a "truce" agreement with IIED.

After the breakup with IIED, PANOS took over responsibility for the joint Nordic/Dutch financed Focal Country Program (FCP) which was one of the first activities supported with the Grant (see chapter 3.3. above). FCP was to help media and NGOs in those countries to run their own information programmes, and to encourage more substantial policy awareness of the links between environment and development in their own countries. Initially the programme concentrated, in Asia, on India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia in Sub-Saharan Africa. The FCP consisted of traditional Earthscan outputs such as features, briefing documents, paperbacks, a radio tapescript service, etc. In addition FCP arranged for additional activities in these seven countries to assist journalists with raw materials, facts, ideas, international experience, etc to improve their ability to assess and report the issues. PANOS received continued financing for the FCP with NOK 0.6 Mill. in 1987, NOK 1 Mill. in 1988, and NOK 0.6 Mill. in 1989. In other words, FCP has been supported regularly since the inception of

Grant in 1984, and had by the end of 1989 received NOK 3.352 Mill., thus making it one of the largest recipients of Grant support for information activities.

Another major PANOS activity in receipt of Grant support is the PANOS Feature Service, launched in early 1987. This provides a regular bi-weekly supply of feature articles and news briefs to newspapers, magazines and other media outlets throughout the world. Via co-syndication schemes arranged through the FCP, features are being translated to 9 languages in developing countries, and provides a major input into PANOS' NGO magazine "Panoscope".

By 1989 the PANOS activities could be structured into the following main themes:

a. Regional Partnerships such as the FCP, and its expansion into a Sahel Programme, and programmes for Caribbean and Central America.
b. Thematic Information Programmes on AIDS, rural electrification, agroforestry and biotechnology.
c. PANOS Publications such as PANOS Pictures, Panoscope, WorldAIDS, Down to Earth Radio, PANOS features and PANOS-Infos.
d. Gemini-PANOS, to combine the editorial and distributional resources of Gemini News and PANOS Features to reach 20 million third world readers weekly in over 100 countries.

3.4.4. Evaluation of the PANOS Use of the Grant.

Since its very startup in 1984, Earthscan/PANOS' FCP programme progress has been carefully and systematically reported to donors. They carry out regular internal reviews of their activities to evaluate and tighten up their own arrangements. The "Reports to Donors" carefully review both the good and not so good experience. To illustrate, during the first period (February 1984-March 1985) FCP failed to establish the planned correspondent network in Zambia. This failure is explicitly spelled out in the report to the donors for that period. In their reporting on Features during that same period it is interesting to observe that a feature on environment and development issues in Africa by President Kaunda of Zambia, syndicated in English and French was reported to have been, "***extremely useful in enhancing the political climate necessary to promote the National conservation Strategy***", but it was also reported that its importance was missed by the world press and the U.N. information departments. It was also reported to the Nordic and Dutch donors that it was initially (in 1984) difficult to operate efficiently in Bangladesh and Tanzania due in part to a weak administrative setup in those two countries, but also due to a general lack of local NGOs with an interest in environmental issues. The latter was, of course, a good reason for starting up the FCP in the first place. The reporting to the donors thus appears to be balanced.

In June 1987 PANOS submitted the final donor report on FCP Phase 1. This is a comprehensive description of their activities and suggests that they have consolidated what they set out to do, but it provides no information of value for an evaluation, i.e. answers to questions about the catalytic effects of such a programme, its cost-effectiveness compared to alternative information methods/channels, etc.

The PANOS Feature Service uses material from journalists worldwide, and provides a rare channel for South-North and South-South communication since so many of the participating journalists are from developing countries. Already in its first year of operation this service was being used in 32 countries. As for the FCP, PANOS continued its tradition of comprehensive and clearly edited reporting of Feature Service activities and progress. The known usage of the PANOS Features, along with a selection of clippings from feature service and the correspondence from editors around the world, are good indicators of the penetration of its environmental messages into the target area of international mass media.

It is PANOS philosophy is that arguments originating in the South, from within Grant aided developing countries are more effective at creating local awareness and institutional changes than are external pressures from the North. PANOS has therefore placed increasing attention on information not just as a product, but on the production of information as a process, permanently strengthening the information capacities of PANOS' partners in the South.

The relationship between product and process in the case of PANOS activities was presented in 14 reports on Nordic-assisted development projects, which PANOS prepared in 1987 for the Nordic Conference on Environment and Development at Saltsjøbaden in Sweden. One of these reports was "Farming with Ahimsa" by local PANOS correspondent Mallika Wanigasundara from Sri Lanka. This covered NORAD's Hambantota project from the Buddhist doctrine of non-violence to nature, ahimsa. It was therefore more culturally appropriate and thus relevant to Sri Lanka than something produced by external consultants. The author was invited to the Saltsjøbaden Conference and, with PANOS assistance, was given the opportunity to meet with FINNIDA to express the concern of Sri Lanka Environment Congress (SLEC) about a FINNIDA financed forest master plan for the World Bank. This was believed to be in conflict with the notion of sustainable development. This meeting resulted in renewed FINNIDA enquiry about environ-mental impacts, which led FINNIDA to notify the Bank that they would not support any project based on the unreviewed plan.

At present a newspaper feature, co-syndication service is operated by SLEC supported by PANOS. Four PANOS articles and two SLEC articles are, each month, translated and edited into Sri Lankan format and distributed to Sinhal and Tamil newspapers, where they are widely used. The pattern of this kind of PANOS operation is as follows: A little seed money from PANOS, i.e. from a donor like the Grant of Norway, a lot of enthusiasm and judicious advice from PANOS, an information resource from PANOS, resulting in a local, e.g. SLEC feature service adapted to national needs creating local awareness and strengthening permanently the information and publication capacities and capabilities of individuals and organizations in the recipient countries.

While the operation of PANOS went smoothly in Sri Lanka, it has taken a lot longer and required a lot more effort in Bangladesh. Here two feature services were started and failed. It took three years to hold the first media/NGO workshop, but the result was a report "In Search of a Gold Dream" which shifted Government environmental policy significantly. Today, the NGO that was born out of that workshop in Bangladesh is now independently funded and playing an important role.

PANOS firmly believe that taking a "back seat" when local initiatives take off has been the correct strategy. In the case of Kenya, PANOS played a minor role in putting together a media-NGO workshop in 1985 on environment issues. The local NGO's decision to concentrate the workshop on genetic resources was taken against the recommendation of PANOS. PANOS feared, needlessly as it turned out, that it would be to academic. The workshop focused on Kenya's native tree species and the planting of exotics and resulted in a study of Kenya's native trees and the uses traditionally made of them. This study in turn impacted significantly on the opinion among Kenya's tree planting movement against exotics and in favour of native species. PANOS in retrospect believe that they could have ruined this development process if they had taken a lead role and tried to dominate the preparations for the workshop.

In Tanzania PANOS has faced problems with partners who prove unable to undertake what they propose, or have totally unrealistic ideas of what are the pressing environmental issues of the country. Recently, however, cooperation with the Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA), which is believed to be the first (and still only) publication on women and environment to have been written wholly by African women, holds promise for existing developments.

PANOS has also been involved in the AIDS information campaign of the Red Cross in Africa. Red Cross have terminated this relationship claiming that PANOS provided inadequate reporting, and that PANOS' activities were more elitist than alternative NGOs (i.e. Ahrtag) which are more "grass root-oriented" in their "Action Aid" publications. The Red Cross believes that Ahrtag has a wider outreach than PANOS in this particular campaign, and that with limited funds they have to prioritize.

INFO of NORAD claims that PANOS has a good set of planning tools and have developed a broad and effective range for their products and services by means of their strategy and good staff. PANOS has been good at reporting to the donors, and have managed to use resources from both NORAD and the Ministry.

3.4.5. Assessment of the Administration of Grant Financed Information Activities.

In late 1989 the administration of the Norwegian Grant seemed rather confused, not just to an external evaluator, but apparently also to PANOS and to the involved Ministry staff. The Multilateral Department repeatedly expressed their discontent with their budgetary responsibility for IIED and PANOS allocations, where the professional considerations and communications with the organizations were maintained by what is now the Program Department and NORAD's Information Department respectively. Administrative changes were however hard to come by. The PANOS technically belong to the Information Department, but the disbursement responsibility has been spread around in what appears as a rather haphazard manner. The FCP has been financed over the Multilateral share of the Grant, while the PANOS Feature Service was first financed by the Program Department (formerly called Planning Department), later to be financed by NORAD's Information Department. The direct support to the Panoscope magazine, and to their miscellaneous magazine services has been financed by the Information Department.

The Information Department has expressed particularly difficulty in arranging for Grant support for the information part of projects because of a lack of Grant coordination within NORAD and between NORAD and the Ministry. The coordinating role of the Ministry's environment advisor in the Program Department's Environment Unit lost its effect when NORAD was separated from the Ministry. No one appears to be charged with the responsibility of allocating applications to the Grant nor for overview and control over the inflow of such applications. Those external institutions that are aware of this internal disarray in the organization of the Grant, have the opportunity to take advantage by dealing with both NORAD's and the Ministry's different departments, without the other ones knowing it.

PANOS praise NORAD for allowing them to operate very flexibly in planning and programming of work. Such flexibility is considered essential in the kind of trial and error work that PANOS is very much involved in. PANOS is confident they could spend twice what is presently allocated to them and retain the high information value of this incremental work for the donor.

On the other hand, PANOS claim that the continuous reorganizations of the Ministry and NORAD have been a major brake on their effective use of the Grant. In spite of very good liaison with a number of NORAD individuals in e.g. the Information Department, this cannot compensate for what they see as a lack of Grant management in the Norwegian Government. Time and again PANOS has not known whom they were meant to report and respond to in NORAD or in the Ministry, or both. However, in response to a question posed by the Evaluation Team, on which department of NORAD or the Ministry PANOS would prefer to liaise with, PANOS was unable to give a simple and clear answer. In fact, PANOS indicated they might need to work with all those department they have so far worked with. This clearly is of little guidance as to where the Grant responsibility for information activities should be placed. Perhaps the most important conclusion is that clear guidelines should be prepared for the roles of the various departments so that stability in roles and responsibility is assured.

IUCN, IIED and PANOS would all like to sign a long term framework agreement with NORAD or the Ministry, in order to be able to plan and staff their activities carefully and effectively. The delays in committing and disbursing annual Grant funds in 1990 and 1991 have been very frustrating for PANOS. They find NORAD's decision-making model in this context confusing and disrupted. If a more stable decision making procedure for annual disbursements could be established, then perhaps PANOS would feel less need for a 3-5 year framework agreement.

3.4.6. Conclusions.

The Grant has financed a myriad of mostly rather small information activities, the large majority of which are not country specific. By the end of 1990, a total of NOK 17 million were spent on such Grant activities by several Ministry departments and NORAD.

The Information Department -- initially in the Ministry, now in NORAD -- has had a major role in these activities. It concentrated on maintaining a long term relationship with

a selected number of NGOs doing broad-based people-oriented information dissemination activities. Since 1991 it receives no separate allocation from the Grant.

PANOS in London is one of the information NGOs selected. PANOS has a series of activities including the Focal Country Program that helps media and NGOs in developing countries run their own information programs and tries to stimulate environmental policy awareness. The PANOS Feature Service is another major activity supported by the Grant.

Several examples of awareness raising of PANOS activities are identified, and it is the conclusion that PANOS has a good set of planning tools and have developed a broad and effective range for their products and services, by means of their strategy and good staff. Their reporting to donors is good.

The apparent continuous reorganization of Norwegian aid administration has made it difficult for PANOS to determine which part of the aid administration to liaise with. On the other hand, PANOS has not been able to determine if they really would like to tie up to only one unit in the aid administration. Due to confidence in PANOS, NORAD has allowed them to operate very flexibly, as far as planning and program-ming of work is concerned. However, clearer guidelines, division of responsibilities, and stable decision making procedures for annual disbursements from the aid administration would greatly facilitate PANOS' own planning and budgeting.

Targeted information activities should be closely integrated with NORAD's overall strategy for use of the Grant. NORAD must determine the role of INFO in this context and how INFO shall continue or discontinue use of the Grant on PANOS and other well established informative expert groups.

Chapter 4: NORWEGIAN AID COOPERATION WITH IUCN.

4.1. IUCN - WHAT IS IT, HOW DOES IT WORK?

4.1.1. Transformation towards Conservation for Development.

IUCN is the acronym for the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources; but in recent years it has chosen to refer to itself as the World Conservation Union. It is a union of members and was founded in 1948 to care for the soils, lands, waters and airs of our planet and the life they support.

IUCN is now a body active in 103 countries. Its members include 54 States, 89 government agencies - more than half of them in developing countries, and 484 NGOs. In addition, IUCN has some 700 non-voting individual and organizational supporters in 65 countries[1]. It is the only organization in the world in which States, government agencies, and NGOs participate equally in the cause of conservation.

The IUCN members form a General Assembly which meets every 3 years to determine the priorities, policies, and activities of IUCN. The General Assembly elects the IUCN President, the 24 Regional Councils, and the chairmen and mandate of the 6 Commissions (these last being voluntary), professional unions with limited formal relations to IUCN. These constitute IUCN Board of Directors, which in turn appoints the Director General who is the Chief Executive of the IUCN Secretariat. Thus one faces a complex interrelationship and power structure between the IUCN membership -- which is a democratic organization --, the IUCN Commissions -- i.e. the professional network organization --, and the IUCN Secretariat -- which is a hierarchical organization[2].

IUCN was from the outset scientifically focussed on conservation in the traditional preservation sense; i.e. "anti-growth" oriented, and concentrated on the OECD countries. The orientation of the Commissions was very much that of protection or conservation in a conservative sense. With increasing capacity of the Secretariat, IUCN gradually expanded relations to Eastern Europe and then to developing countries, through its Conservation for Development Centre (CDC). This is illustrated by its route of expansion in recent years. As recent as in 1985 there were only 4 staff members in developing countries and 60 at the Secretariat headquarters in Gland, Switzerland. In 1991 this had dramatically changed to 120 in developing countries and 85 at headquarters. This suggests that IUCN is a very young institution in terms of developing country experience[3]. Considering the complex challenges and difficulties of becoming efficient advisors in developing countries it can be concluded that IUCN has expanded into this field at a very high rate since the establishment of its Conservation for Development Centre in 1981.

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1 IUCN (1991), "Membership List 1. June 1991." Gland.

2 Gabor Bruszt (1990), "Studie av IUCN." Preliminær Rapport, Stockholm.

3 Gabor Bruszt (1990), op. cit., p. 13.

Success here depends fundamentally on recruiting highly skilled and experienced staff, who combine professional, administrative and diplomatic talent, so that such a broadbased drive can be given a "flying start". The unique membership model may have contributed to that.

IUCN -- especially the Secretariat, but also the Commissions -- has moved from its scientific orientation towards a more field oriented set of activities, with an increasing emphasis on developing countries. In this process IUCN has come to see conservation problems increasingly as related to poor development. The Serengeti National Park Study in Tanzania (discussed in chapter 3.1. above) can serve to illustrate this emerging systems approach to integrated conservation and development studies.

As a consequence of this approach a conservation strategy has emerged that integrates conservation and development. The heartland of IUCN is in living natural resources, and this dictates where IUCN does most of its work. IUCN emphasizes the social dimensions and the inter-linkages/inter-dependencies of living natural resources, i.e. the issue of sustainable use of living natural resources and of the environment spectrum. IUCN has adopted the principle of sustainable renewable natural resource utilization; thus the focus on sustainable development which in 1980 resulted in the World Conservation Strategy (WCS). This served as a crucial input to the work of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). This development emphasis is different from the more conventional conservation stand of many environmental NGOs in the OECD countries. It has, however, been noted that of the 6 Commissions, the three concerned with development and IUCN's role in ensuring the WCED recommendations, are much less influential than the more homogenous conservation oriented Commissions. In the transition from nature protection to integrated conservation and development, the Secretariat is facing the risk of departing from the conservation orientation of the membership[4]. The challenge is to find a constructive balance between conservation and development. The Secretariat has to be very cautious of the heavy influence and dominance of the more traditional conservationist membership and Commissions.

4.1.2. Organizing towards Development Issues.

IUCN's General Assembly meets every three years to approve the program. Clearly, the program is influenced by what is reported from the field through the regional offices. Not surprisingly continuation is by far the largest component, since follow up of the activities started during the previous 3 years is a priority issue. Recipient orientation is claimed to be incorporated in this program approval process because the Regional Councils, the Regional Offices, and the National Offices are all staffed with local - often official, e.g. high level executives of Ministry of Environment - members, as in the case of e.g. Uganda. In the Southern Africa Regional Office in Harare, the Regional Advisory Council, which is fully African, governs the work of the Regional Office. In West Africa 50 people review the entire program twice a year and have complete program control. IUCN thus has 3 rather different program formulation and review setups in the 3 Africa Regions. Common to all three of them is that, with such staffing of the local offices and

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4 Gabor Bruszt (1990), op. cit.

the councils, IUCN can help governments in a partnership relation to develop programs for the governments to present to donors for funding. In Central America all 45 members meet once a year to review the entire program on all issues. The plan is to meet twice a year in the future.

The gradual move from conventional and rather academic conservation, towards conservation in an applied development perspective, led to a restructuring of IUCN's scientific network and in 1981 IUCN established its Conservation for Development Centre (CDC) as a financially independent unit within IUCN. To make this function required the establishment of a closely linked field oriented network. As a result regional and country offices were established, with regional and local staff as far as possible and practical, in order to establish a mutual conservation and development dialogue with the recipient constituency, so as to assist in identifying and formulating recipient priorities and demands and to translate these into programs and projects. Since the late 1980s, the CDC has served as the Field Operations Branch of IUCN. It can safely be stated that this massive and fast decentralization and regionalization to developing countries, combined with the firm commitment to sustainable development, is a radical departure from the rather pure conservation union IUCN was at the end of the 1970s.

However, no rigid model of decentralization has been adopted. There is a continuous need to strike a balance between headquarter dominance and local autonomy of national and regional offices. In some cases regional offices have developed, while in others national offices have been founded. The development towards a regional office is an organic process that can take a long time and the reason for establishing one varies from place to place. In some places a country office may be larger than a regional office, e.g. the Pakistan Office is larger than the Regional Offices for Central America, West-, East- and Southern Africa. In Asia there is no Regional Office.

As IUCN has turned increasingly to work in developing countries, decentralization and regionalization has been accompanied by a drive towards employing local and regional staff. This has been fully achieved in some regions such as Central America where 21 out of the 23 staff members are Latin American, Pakistan where all 26 are locals, and in Sri Lanka. IUCN is about to hire locals in Ecuador. In the Southern Africa Office in Zimbabwe the Head is from Zambia and five others are locals. In addition there is one German. The transition towards locally managed regional offices has yet to materialize in the West- and East Africa offices; areas where the shortage of local experienced and qualified experts is more strongly felt. IUCN attaches high priority to fill the key positions in their Africa offices with Africans, and the formal personnel policy of IUCN is now to fill as many vacancies as possible with regional staff. This reflects IUCN's sensitivity to the fact that their rapid expansion into the development field has not been matched by their headquarter personnel experience. IUCN's headquarter staff has been rather "anglosaxon" with few people of developing country origin[5]. Even those coming from developing countries have left their developing country habitats long ago, and were recruited to IUCN from other international organizations. Recruitment is based on

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5 Gabor Bruszt (1990), "Studie av IUCN", Preliminær Rapport, Stockholm, October 1990, p. 13.

advertising openings in the media, and IUCN recruits from the same markets as consultants, NGOs and research organizations.

4.1.3. The IUCN Partnership and Membership Strategy.

IUCN is a partnership of its 627 member organizations. However, it is not in the interest of IUCN to limit activities to the membership community. IUCN wants to expand ahead of membership, and works closely with its various members as well as the United Nations system, the Specialized multilateral agencies such as e.g. the World Bank, national aid agencies, e.g. NORAD, SIDA, DANIDA, etc., various foundations, e.g. Ford, Rockefeller, etc., national and multinational NGOs and corporations.

A unique characteristic of IUCN is that all members enjoy (at least in principle) an equal standing with direct communication. State members are not stronger than NGO members. Due to this unique membership structure IUCN has proven that it can, at the same time, join forces and cooperate with the State and express concerned criticism of the performance of the State in the same country. As a result of this, IUCN now makes an active and deliberate attempt to establish a membership balance that will contribute most efficiently towards lobbying sustainable development. This commendable and challenging goal does, however, impose severe limitations on e.g. Norway's ability to influence IUCN's strategy and working methods through our membership (the Ministry of Environment). NORAD, which has developed into an important collaborator and user of IUCN, has apparently been less actively involved in a strategy dialogue with IUCN than e.g. SIDA.

Typically, IUCN links up to Governments through the Ministries of Environment and/or through Directorates for Nature Management. This has been the case with its membership of Government agencies in Norway, and in the Nordic countries. However, in many developing countries environmental ministries and agencies are newly established and enjoy a low and rather non-influential standing in government. In such cases IUCN seeks membership from additional and more influential government agencies, e.g. Ministry of Planning, Prime Ministers Office, etc. The membership structure is fundamental to establish smooth project operation logistics. With a centrally placed government agency it is often possible to establish a system for speedy transfer of funds which again is a condition for avoiding delays and in the more critical cases, breakdown of project implementation.

It is important to note that it would be counter to the goals of IUCN to restrain it's activities to work through members only. Non-members of various kinds must be brought in as partners and collaborators on a case-by-case basis. IUCN must make sure that it does not become a rival to local NGOs seeking to meet the same goals. IUCN claims that, in their developing country work, they strive to identify and cooperate with such NGOs by setting up appropriate teams of qualified staff with the right contacts with those affected by the project. This flexibility is particularly important if the local IUCN member(s) do not possess the right experience, professional background, contacts, leverage, and staff capabilities to undertake the projects by themselves. Their strategy is to establish efficient goal oriented coalitions of various partners (NGOs, corporations and government) to pull in the same direction towards sustainable development. This is a very

ambitious and difficult target, and the findings from the field work of this evaluation suggests that there is still some distance to be covered before one can claim this strategy to be working smoothly.

4.1.4. IUCN's Operational Goals and Implementing Activities.

All IUCN members are required to endorse the World Conservation Strategy (WCS) whose major principles can be summarized as follows[6]:

To ensure the optimal relationship between the human population and the natural world, through promoting the maintenance of essential ecological processes and life-support systems, preserving biological diversity, and ensuring that any utilization of species and ecosystems is sustainable.

In accordance with the WCS, IUCN recognizes that most conservation problems are caused by inappropriate uses of resources by humans. The solutions to these problems, as IUCN sees it, involve more effective management of human activities. To promote the WCS, IUCN strives through its international network and with its own staff to:

a) Evaluate status, trends and policies related to renewable natural resources;
b) Analyze the obstacles to more effective management of this resource base;
c) Catalyze action to achieve more effective conservation of this resource base;
d) Generate increased awareness of the population, economy, environment nexus;
e) Link the conservation constituency for more effective conservation impact; and
f) Provide leadership and promote a common approach for better achievement of the above.

These six operational goals are coordinated by the IUCN Secretariat on behalf of the membership, and implemented through seven general activities:

1) Maintenance and use of scientists networks, conservation organizations, and technical experts to formulate policies, strategies and programs to promote the WCS;
2) Promotion and undertaking of conservation action activities;
3) Gathering, integrating, and synthesizing data, conducting studies and surveys, and making the information output widely available;
4) Providing expert advice and assisting in the execution of policy;
5) Research and development work relating to conservation and facilitating the application of the results at the local level;
6) Assisting conservation institutions to enhance their management capacity through technical assistance and training; and
7) Provision of technical support to conservation treaties, conventions and agreements, and advising on new conventions and national legislation.

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6 IUCN (1990), "Report to the Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation on IUCN Projects Carried out With Norwegian Funding August 1989 - November 1990." Gland.

Through it's membership and network IUCN sees itself to be in a unique position to combine the comparative advantages of the three main vehicles of development cooperation in its pursuits to make the WCS come through:

* Official aid agencies whose comparative advantage is authority and clout;
* Consultants who are highly efficient and professional; and
* NGOs who are flexible and innovative.

At the same time IUCN is (at least theoretically) in a position to avoid or steer away from the dominating weaknesses of the same three aid-vehicles:

* The bureaucracy and resulting slow speed of official aid agencies;
* The high costs of some consultants; and
* The inefficient and weak policy dialogue of NGOs.

4.1.5. IUCN and the Project Cycle.

Fundamental throughout the project cycle is a dialogue between IUCN and the recipient government agency. The above described setup with regional councils and offices is meant to facilitate this process. IUCN negotiates its role vis-a-vis the recipient with the donor in each country and in most cases an agreement with the donor is reached whereby IUCN is to act in place of the donor on the matters pertaining to the project. IUCN is thus in the middle role between the funding source and the recipient, but does not see itself as a middle-man or broker. IUCN can document that it only takes on this middle role when it sees a genuine professional role for IUCN which it believes cannot be readily filled by others in the envisioned environment project. This role is normally at the front end of a project, i.e. in the identification, formulation, and pilot study/project phases.

All IUCN projects are externally funded. IUCN uses its membership and extended network to try to match the preferences signalled from the "grass roots level" with the national priorities expressed by the central authorities, extracting project ideas and concepts promoting the WCS at the national and local level. It thus acts as a catalyst in assisting recipients to formulate projects (and sometimes formulating them on behalf of recipients) compatible with the WCS and the stated priorities of the recipient, and which are suitable for donor financing. The advantage to the donors is that environmental projects of recipients which have evolved from a dialogue with IUCN are presented in a form acceptable to donors, meeting major donor criteria in the fields of environment and development. The operating concept is that IUCN thus saves donors a lot of work by presenting them with WCS-compatible projects on behalf of recipients.

It is a principle of IUCN that local institutions and companies implement projects and that IUCN provides technical assistance. IUCN's role is dominant in the identification, formulation, and pilot stages of a project. Then IUCN's role gradually reduces and it drops out, or plays a minor role as provider of technical assistance for a locally appointed project director during implementation.

4.1.6. IUCN Accounting, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting.

IUCN sets up simple accounting systems for the project managers to follow, i.e. one set of computer software. Every project has a separate account on the same format. Each funding agency has its own financial reporting requirements: NORAD requires a summary financial report where it is made clear that NORAD can have all the supporting documentation they require. IUCN's external audit is out to open tender every three years. There are selective audits on the regional offices and now there are annual audits by local auditors. IUCN undertakes to audit their own projects, but e.g. NORAD has never audited IUCN projects. The financial officer at IUCN headquarters goes to each regional office every year to advise and monitor financial management.

The monitoring of projects is completely decentralized to the regional offices. IUCN has no rigid system for this activity. Evaluation is done jointly with monitoring, but IUCN is experiencing a lack of feedback between the projects and the IUCN network. It has been pointed out that IUCN should institutionalize an internal monitoring and evaluation ability[7]. IUCN is evaluated quite often, but evaluation/reviews should be budgeted into project proposals in a more systematic way.

Reporting is done from each project directly to the regional office. IUCN's reporting procedures to the donors are determined by donors. Reporting is time consuming and a big burden on staff, but at the same time it is seen as an important disciplining element, and proper information to donors is a must. In the case of NORAD a comprehensive summary report[8] is prepared annually with numerous annexes. The whole package of documentation thus becomes rather voluminous and it is the experience of IUCN that donor staff rarely have time to read and study the content of these reports.

4.2. IUCN'S ROLE IN NORWAY'S ENVIRONMENT GRANT.

4.2.1. IUCN - a Natural Choice for NORAD's Use of the Grant?

IUCN has played a central role as a channel for allocation of resources from the Grant since it's inception. A combination of factors appear to explain this development:

- IUCN's key role in the development of the World Conservation Strategy (WCS) and of National Conservation Strategies (NCS) were very much in line with key objectives of the Grant, and formed a basis for initial Grant guidelines. As a result both NORAD and the Ministry were inclined to seek IUCN advice in the use of the Grant;

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7 Craig MacFarland, Trond Norheim, James Hirsch (1990), "IUCN Central American Programme Review - Final Report." Prepared for IUCN.

8 IUCN (1990), op. cit.

- NORAD's Grant administrators had aquired a high respect for IUCN and their professional staff as a result of their key role in the development of the WCS and NCSs;

- The Norwegian government through Ministry of Environment (MoE) is a member of IUCN. MOE played an active Grant role in the 1980s through the Advisory Committee for Environment and Development - ACED (Kontaktutvalget);

- Likewise, the MOEs or national environment agencies in Norway's main partner developing countries are also IUCN members. In addition several NGOs in our main partner countries are IUCN members. Norway and governments of our main partner countries can thus communicate and try to influence IUCN's program and priorities in the areas of conservation and development through the membership, e.g. during the general assembly of IUCN.

- The Grant became an additional burden for NORAD to administer. In order to minimize the time required to administer the Grant and at the same time secure a use of the Grant in line with Grant goals, NORAD had strong incentives to use a limited number of organizations, hence the dominant role of IUCN, once it had been chosen;

- The competence and capacity in Norway to carry out activities in line with the Grant objectives listed above were considered or assumed by NORAD to be relatively limited;

- IUCN has a large operational network of consultants with competence on design and development of projects and project components in the areas of conservation and bio-diversity, and NORAD assumed that no one else would be able to effectively access such international networks.

All the above factors considered, it thus appears quite natural and convenient for NORAD in particular, but also for the Ministry, to rely heavily upon IUCN as a channel for disbursing Grant funds.

4.2.2. Structure and Development of IUCN's Grant Portfolio.

Since the inception of the Grant in 1984, IUCN has been used as the major channel for allocation of Grant funds. By the end of 1990 IUCN had received support for more than 45 projects, i.e. more than 10% of the total number of Grant supported projects, totalling NOK 60.034 million, i.e. 24% of the accumulated NOK 249.2 million disbursements.

The overall country and regional profile of IUCN's use of the Grant, since its inception in 1984, is presented in tables in Annex 3. A summary is presented in table 4.1. below. The table shows that around 50% or NOK 28.7 million of total IUCN disbursements of NOK 57.33 million have gone to African countries, of which Tanzania has received the most (NOK 8.8 million followed by Uganda with NOK 6.2 million). Asian countries have received NOK 11.55 million amounting to 20% of the total. Global projects have received

almost NOK 15 million or 26%, whereas Central America (Nicaragua) has received the remaining NOK 2.16 million or 4%.

The activity and issue weighted project profiles (see detailed explanation in annex 3) of IUCN disbursements is dominated by "general environment" (more than 50%), followed by "woods and forests" (20%), and "unknown" (15%). "Wildlife", "pollution", soil degradation", "protection of inland water resources", and "human development" account for 2% each. There are important integrated development components to be found in most of these categories.

Table 4.1. GRANT 1984-1990 DISBURSEMENT PER COUNTRY TOTAL AND VIA IUCN, NOK MILLION

	IUCN Disb.	Total Grant	IUCN % of Total Grant
Bangladesh	7.686	9.786	78.5
Botswana	3.275	5.803	56.4
Central America	3.067	3.277	93.6
Global	14.923	115.895	12.9
Kenya	946	16.174	5.9
Sri Lanka	3.367	5.491	61.3
Mozambique	1.131	3.964	28.5
Nicaragua	2.160	5.707	37.9
Pakistan	3.193	8.571	37.3
Tanzania	8.819	14.037	62.8
Uganda	6.183	8.711	71.0
Zambia	1.785	8.353	21.4
Zimbabwe	3.499	7.460	46.9
TOTAL	60.034	249.205	24.1

4.2.3. IUCN's Role in the NORAD Market for Project Identification and Formulation.

NORAD has, from the very beginning of the Grant, been hard pressed to identify and formulate enough meaningful projects for Grant disbursement. To achieve this goal NORAD has been continously encouraging IUCN to take initiatives to cooperate with local authorities, local NGOs and national government agencies to help them in the process of identifying and formulating environmental projects fitting to the Grant guidelines for submission for approval before year-end deadlines.

NORAD believes that only IUCN has been prepared to mobilize relevant expertise from international networks to go to recipient countries and liaise with the authorities in order to prepare project documents for approval that can subsequently (and on short notice)

be submitted to NORAD for Grant financing. IUCN's strong position is further underlined by the following observation regarding the Grant management practices in NORAD. NORAD's NATUR divison has every year been waiting for the NORAD resident representative missions to take a more active part in using the Grant, and has therefore systematically waited until autumn each year before setting out to spend unused Grant funds. However, as seen in chapter 3.1., the Resident Representative of NORAD have not been able to play the envisaged active role in the use of the Grant. Once NATUR has waited until that late, they have to act quickly, as funds may not be carried over to next financial year.

It is in response to such a need that NORAD has "tailor-made" a system for IUCN to serve as a subsidiary that specializes in identifying and formulating projects suitable for Grant financing on behalf of recipient governments. This system was established in 1987 when NORAD decided to contribute to IUCN's Project Development Fund (PDF) which had been established with SIDA-support in 1985. NORAD gives - on the average - NOK 1 million every year to facilitate IUCN's ability to identify, choose and formulate projects in developing countries. This funding facility has made it easier for IUCN to initiate project concepts for consideration by local and national authorities, so that approved project documents can be forwarded to NORAD for final approval and Grant financing. It is the experience of NATUR that IUCN had acquired the ability to understand what kind of projects NORAD and the Grant can accept. The likelihood of IUCN presenting an unacceptable project on behalf of a recipient government on short notice is very small.

NORAD claims that Norwegian reseachers and consultants have not offered to work in this particular way, which is a requirement for such use of the Grant. NORAD also believes that the availability of Norwegian experts with relevant expertice and experience for this kind of work is limited. While there is undoubtedly some truth to this, it remains a fact that Norwegian experts have been widely used by NORAD for non-Grant regular environmental program work in the same countries for years. And, equally important, IUCN explicitly states that their specialty is not project implementation: someone else has to make, what they propose and test out in pilot studies, actually happen. A closer link with these "someone else" would seem a very natural step towards preparing the ground for sustainable projects.

4.3. IUCN AS A GRANT EXECUTING AGENCY FOR NORAD.

4.3.1. Norway's and NORAD's Role as IUCN-Contributor- and Client.

In 1989 the overall IUCN budget was US$ 11.8 million (roughly equal to NOK 82.5 million). This overall budget was structured as follows:

*	Membership dues (largely from developed countries official agencies)	US$ 2.7 million
*	Further support to IUCN' central management	US$ 1.4 million
*	Evaluations and assessments paid by governments	US$ 1.4 million
*	Project commissioned work	US$ 6.7 million

The annual Norwegian contribution to the membership dues is around SFR 0.1 million, which is equal to around US$ 0.07 million, or 3% of total membership dues. NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were responsible for a proportionally much larger share of IUCN's revenue through disbursements to commissioned projects, with NOK 13.1 million (roughly equal to US$ 2 million) in 1989, sharply up from previous years, and this amounted to 30% of IUCN's overall project revenue that year. The sharp increase in Norwegian project turnover channelled through IUCN in 1990 to NOK 20.3 million suggests that Norway's role as a client for IUCN has continued to increase.

It would appear from the above that Norway plays a rather unique and dominating role in IUCN's project portfolio. It must be assumed that IUCN's expansion and sustainability very much depends on continued project work commissioned by NORAD, which again means a continuation of NORAD's access to Grant allocations. It appears to the Team that it would be in the mutual interest of IUCN and NORAD if IUCN could diversify the client portfolio to become much less dependant on a special Grant whose nature may not even be permanent. NORAD has not been commissioning other project contracts to IUCN for environment related program work, and such work annually is estimated to amount to several hundred million NOK for NORAD alone. This is partly explained by the unique role of the Grant in starting up new activities and initiatives, many of which are suited to IUCN's strategies and goals, but it remains a surprise that IUCN is not involved in the regular program work of NORAD, since much of this is also of an innovative nature suitable for use of IUCN experts.

Furthermore, Norway's modest membership contribution is in sharp contrast to Norway's use of the organization. Because of IUCN's stated goal that all members be equal (in order to promote and encourage NGO membership and collaboration) it would be reasonable to assume that Norway's influence on IUCN's policies and strategies is rather modest. On the other hand, IUCN repeatedly welcomes an aid policy dialogue with the Ministry. Perhaps if Norway sees the need it could have some impact after all.

4.3.2. Management and Administration of the IUCN-Cooperation.

Whereas the first few years of cooperation between IUCN and NORAD/Ministry was on the basis of individual projects, and then project packages, it gradually developed into a system of annual meetings and annual reviews, and eventually the Project Development Fund was established to facilitate the identification and formulation of fundable projects.

Initially, the plan was to budget for IUCN under the multilateral share of the Grant, as was the practice for international NGOs. The unique relationship and use of IUCN that soon developed, with NORAD as the dominating user of IUCN, resulted in a solution whereby NORAD took on the budget share. However, in view of the increasingly dominant role of IUCN in the use of the Grant, a broadbased framework agreement was signed in November 1987, between the Ministry and IUCN, for a three year period, establishing procedures and guidelines for Norwegian Grant funding of

* IUCN consultancy services to the Ministry or institutions/organizations designated by the Ministry;
* Personnel cooperation between IUCN and the Ministry; and

* Projects to be implemented by IUCN in developing countries.

A consultancy trust fund was established as part of this agreement with a yearly allocation of NOK 1 million, so that the Ministry may make available personnel to assist IUCN in the implementation of agreed activities. This well-intentioned attempt to facilitate a mutually fertilizing, professional, cooperation never materialized to any noticable extent.

Instead, project cooperation increased in importance and NORAD's NATUR Divison took charge of the active IUCN cooperation. NATUR now manages the IUCN portfolio and has instructed IUCN to report directly to NATUR in Oslo. IUCN has no formal relationship with other parts of the NORAD system, e.g. the Africa Department. Furthermore, IUCN does not have to report to NORAD's Resident Representatives. The extent to which there is an active dialogue and communication between Res-Rep and IUCN locally on aid and development issues, is very much at the initiative of dedicated Res-Rep staff.

IUCN has a rather different arrangement with e.g. FINNIDA, where the reporting and liaison is the same to the Resident Representatives as to FINNIDA headquarters in Helsinki. IUCN cannot see why NORAD/Oslo cannot revise their reporting system so as to encourage a more active dialogue locally, because they find that the FINNIDA setup works very well. The Evaluation Team fully agrees and urges a change in procedures, so that such reporting from IUCN to the Res-Rep becomes a routine matter.

The IUCN-routines for reporting, monitoring, accounting and internal evaluation have been described in section 4.1.6. above. By and large this set up is an efficient part of the overall IUCN/NORAD cooperation. A problem, however, is that NORAD does not have capacity to digest the reports and supporting documentation and thus provide IUCN with the client-feedback they deserve and need. The Evaluation Team finds the reporting informative, but it is rather void of discussions regarding problems, bottlenecks, their causes and how to solve them. Too many "motherhood" statements contribute negatively to credibility. The Evaluation Team recommends that NORAD instructs IUCN to submit relevant periodic and project specific reports to NORAD's Res Reps, because in some countries, e.g. Zambia the Res Rep knowledge of Grant-financed IUCN activities administered by NORAD is minimal.

IUCN -- like IIED (see chapter 3.3) -- would have liked an overall policy guidance and priority listing from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to guide them in their efforts to use the Grant to the utmost satisfaction of the donor. IUCN claim that it is difficult to establish an aid policy dialogue with the Ministry. NORAD is fully occupied with aid implementation and does not engage in a policy dialogue with e.g. IUCN. IUCN claim that such a dialogue is working with the developing agencies of other donor countries, e.g. Sweden, and the Netherlands. They would very much welcome a more active and formulated role from the Environment Unit of the Program Department. IUCN feel they have to guess what the prevailing thinking is in Norway as regards priorities, because the Ministry is not prepared to "show their cards" even to those delegated to play their cards for them.

4.4. EFFECTS OF THE IUCN-COOPERATION ON NORWEGIAN COMPETENCE.

4.4.1. Has the Collaboration Improved the Competence in Norway's Aid Administration?

The use of IUCN by NORAD and the Ministry, as described above, has the potential of raising both competence and awareness of environmental issues in general and conservation strategy issues in particular. The Agreement of 1987 was designed to secure such cooperation. However, for this potential to materialize Norwegian aid authorities must make committments to use IUCN as more than just a subsidiary to relieve NORAD of the administrative and professional burden of completing the crucial initial project cycle steps required for a target oriented and timely disbursement of Grant funds.

There are very few indications that such a potential has materialized. As described above, NORAD has overwhelmingly used IUCN to relieve itself of an additional work load created as a result of the establishment of the Grant. This was an inevitable NORAD response to the Grant since the additional work load and comptetence requirements of the Grant were not matched by a proportional increase in staffing.

NORAD could, however, have availed itself much more actively of the opportunity provided by the Grant and the IUCN cooperation to second NORAD staff to IUCN headquarters or field offices for shorter or extended time periods. Such secondments hold a potential for considerable competence raising and for establishing a better understanding of IUCN's comparative strengths and weaknesses as a consultant to NORAD and the Norwegian aid administration. In terms of awareness raising, such a program committment from NORAD would increase the likelihood of a stronger drive for integrating Grant activities into country programs, because the NORAD staff would get a much stronger feel for the real world context of the conservation strategies.

When properly planned and integrated with the strict time schedules of both parties, the experience with such training/competence upgrading has been positive, whereas when the timing and integration has not been properly handled, it has created tension. Unfortunately there is only one observation of each kind, which is far too little for a general conclusion on the potentials. It appears, however, that the initiative to realize the potential rests with NORAD and the Ministry, and that IUCN would welcome a well planned and coordinated effort of this nature from such an important client. The Agreement and the consultancy trust fund was obviously not activated as intended to achieve such goals.

4.4.2. Potential and Actual Competence Impacts on the Norwegian Professional Community.

Many Norwegian researchers and consultants claim they have the expertise and experience to undertake similar up-front environmental activities such as project identification, -formulation, and pilot studies. One cannot claim that IUCN operates in an area free from other interested parties and where there is no competition from researchers and consultants.

However, IUCN does not see its role in the major logistics of project implementation. They have refused to take on the implementation stages where there are researchers, consultants and NGOs available with the appropriate expertise and experience. IUCN headquarters therefore do not aknowledge the presence of such competition. In spite of this, in e.g. Central America, IUCN members and other inter-national and bilateral agencies are expressing concern that IUCN might tend to become a direct competitor for external funds and gradually be converted into a consulting firm. Two recent IUCN-evaluations point out that IUCN needs to be sensitive to these concerns and avoid being involved in direct management and implementation of "on the ground" projects[9].

While IUCN focusses solely on the early stages in the project cycle, many consultants and researchers will often see the early identification and formulation stages as strategic to position for a stake in the larger implementation contracts. On the one hand, IUCN clearly competes with researchers and consultants in the early stages of the project cycle, but on the other hand, to the extent that IUCN generates additional environmental projects for implementation by creating increased environmental awareness among recipients and donors, it may contribute to expand the portfolio of environmental projects for consultants and contractors (local as well as foreign) to implement. It has not been possible for this evaluation to establish whether the net impact of IUCN on the volume of environmental consultancy contracts has been positive or negative.

There has been hardly any collaboration between IUCN and Norwegian consultants or researchers relative to the NOK 57.3 million volume of Grant financed IUCN activities. IUCN representatives have visited Norwegian research organisations but lasting collaboration has not resulted. In spite of the policy signal in 1987 Agreement and the annual NOK 1 million Consultancy Trust Fund established as part of that Agreement, there is very little evidence that NORAD has tried to stimulate any such collaboration. In one instance NORAD induced NORAGRIC to use two IUCN-consultants on their project in Zambia. In another case a Norwegian forestry expert participated in the preparatory phases of the Ngorongoro project in Tanzania.

NORAD's consistent use of IUCN and consistent non-use of Norwegian expertise has created a negative attitude among many Norwegian researchers and consultants towards IUCN. However, IUCN is not to be blamed for having been successful in achieving NORAD's confidence in this market niche. After all, a key determinant when establishing the Grant in the first place was the concept of National Conservation Strategies, which was an IUCN product.

Norwegian researchers interviewed by the Team claim, however, that they have been prepared all along, but have been turned down by NORAD. It appears that NORAD is not very different from other aid agencies in that they prefer to stick to consultants they are familiar with in specialized areas, simply because it provides for expediency and known quality, and thus much less day-to-day operational concerns. This is rational practice for hard-pressed bureaucrats with funds that have to be spent before the year

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[9] Gabor Bruszt (1990), op. cit., pp. 20-23, and Craig MacFarland, Trond Norheim, James Hirsch (1990), "IUCN Central American Programme Review - Final Report." Prepared for IUCN.

runs out, but the danger of creating market monopolies must be carefully watched. It must be stated that NORAD could be much more active in encouraging those Norwegian resarchers and consultants who have current or potential competence in this, gradually broadening, development area. For instance, by informing them as to how they qualify for NORAD financing of project preparatory work, of the kind that IUCN presently virtually monopolize.

By using solely IUCN on such Grant projects, NORAD inadvertently contributes to improve the competitiveness of European and other non-developing country consultants and researchers over their potential Norwegian competitors. While it is doubtful if the Grant could be used purely for competence raising in Norwegian institutions, the issue here is the hiring of experts from Norway or abroad, to do a job which would add further experience and knowledge to their curricula vitae and thus making them more competent and competitive. This effect would be the same regardless of whether the expert comes from Norway or is e.g. a U.K. citizen on IUCN's network. In fact, to use qualified Norwegians more actively, as anticipated with the establishement of the Consultancy Trust Fund, would encourage IUCN to enlist them in their network and increase the likelihood of more frequent use of Norwegians on Grant financed and other IUCN projects where local developing country experts are not available. It would appear that both NORAD and IUCN could have done more to make this happen.

4.5. IUCN AS A CHANNEL FOR COOPERATION WITH RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

The following observations and findings follow the outline in the Terms of Reference and the methodology outlined in chapter 2, and are based on the field work, interviews at Headquarters and in Norway, and review of project documents and other relevant reports and evaluations.

4.5.1. Project Identification, Formulation and Agreement Facilitation.

The field work of the Team has revealed a largely favourable picture as regards the adequacy of mutual exchange of views and ideas with local parties towards the identification of problems, definition of priorities and formulation of projects designs. After all, this is the area of environmental development assistance that IUCN specializes in.

In Tanzania, different aspects of project identification and project formulation are what most Tanzanians interviewed pointed to as UCN's area of specialty. Many Tanzanians referred to IUCN's strength in launching major workshops, such as the one for Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy, which was instrumental for the identification of this project. The field work found, however, a widespread local perception of inadequate involvement of local institutions, personnel and local population.

In Zambia it appears quite clear that in the development of the NCS IUCN has been instrumental in the process and has taken responsibility for the secretariat function. The development of the strategy itself was made by Zambian experts. There is a general opinion in Zambia that the cooperative system introduced with the development of the

NCS and later the establishment of the Natural Conservation Committee (the predecessor of the Environmental Council) is appreciated and well functioning.

In Sri Lanka the two rainforest projects have been the focus of the evaluation. IUCN formulated the Knuckles project with little consultation with local parties. This resulted in less project formulation experience for the Forest Department and for local NGOs. On the other hand, the eventual focus of the project and the involvement of local villagers in workshops, seminars etc at local schools and in the villages have apparently led to increased awareness of the local people.

In Central America IUCN's Regional Office (ORCA) it has been observed that the vast majority of projects and activities have been developed based on careful consultation with IUCN members and partners in the concerned countries and in direct response to their expressed needs. Projects have been selected and implemented in part based on proposals from national members and partners of IUCN, and in part based on IUCN's global and regional programs, where the local involvement in project formulation and planning has been rather marginal. While the Review noted that local target groups took part in implementation, only in a few cases were they involved in the identification and planning of the project. Altogether however, the recent review of these activities was positive in their assessment of this phase in the project cycle[10].

A USAID evaluation of IUCN's role in the formulation and implementation of the National Conservation Strategy in Nepal strongly commends the catalytic role of IUCN, and its ability to work with and involve the local parties in the formulation of the NCS as a step in the process towards institutionalizing environment planning and management in a cross sectoral way, directly attached to the National Planning Commission[11].

4.5.2. IUCN's Interacting Role between Recipients and NORAD in the Process leading to Project Agreements.

IUCN serves as a facilitator or vehicle of aid between the recipient government and NORAD. In practice, an agreement is signed between the recipient government and IUCN on the project, and a letter is prepared from the recipient government to NORAD requesting funding for the project (typically after IUCN has spent perhaps two years on project identification and formulation). This letter is then sent by IUCN (when this is what the recipient governments prefer), and an IUCN/NORAD agreement is drawn up when both the recipient government and NORAD prefer for reasons of facilitation, to have the arrangement through IUCN. A project memorandum is then signed by the two parties.

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10 Craig MacFarland et al (1990), op. cit., p. iv.

11 Cynthia Jensen and John Rigby (1991), "Site Visit to Nepal by Final Evaluation Team May 2-6, 1991." Report to USAID/Nepal from Final Evaluation Team, S&T/FENR Environmental Planning and Management Project, May 7, 1991.

The process of developing a project through identification, formulation and inception, to government acceptance and political commitment often takes a couple of years, sometimes less, other times considerably more. Vis a vis Norway the process is that NORAD never gets to see the project document until it has been approved by the recipient government. Sometimes -- in fact not infrequently -- IUCN engages in a relatively detailed pilot study prior to formulating a full project, and it is this pilot stage leading to project formulation that is the "project" which is the specialty of IUCN. This unique and dominant role in the early project cycle process may explain why the Evaluation Team repeatedly found in recipient countries that IUCN was perceived as the donor, or in some cases even criticized for posing as such.

4.5.3. National Conservation Strategies - Patience for a Sustainable Process Pays Off.

An important aid-cooperation question is whether the conventional, purely project-oriented, approach caters to the time-consuming, process-oriented goals of sustainable development, such as the establishment of NCS goals on a permanent and self-sustained basis. This issue is typified in the Botswana NCS case implemented with IUCN assistance, and it was therefore decided that the evaluation would look more closely at this.

In December 1990 the Botswana NCS was approved by the National Assembly, thus ending a seven year process, which everybody involved views as a success. The NCS process consisted of the following phases:

1983-85	Preparatory activities,
1986	Assessment of Conservation Problems,
1987-88	Designing the NCS,
1988-90	Government Deliberations and Approval of the NCS.

The immediate result of the process was an approved National Conservation Strategy, with a high degree of consensus on its content. Furthermore, as a result of the NCS, the National Assembly made two fundamental decisions:

a) provision of administrative and financial resources for implementation of the NCS;
b) preparation of necessary legislation to cover the measures proposed under the NCS (including mandatory Environmental Impact Assessment);

In addition, the NCS has triggered an awareness raising process amongst the general public as well as within different branches and levels of Government. The success is generally explained as due to adherence to four guiding principles for the preparation of the NCS. These were agreed upon early in the process.

First, the NCS should be "made in Botswana" and not prepared by short term foreign consultants. During the process 27 technical reports were produced by 42 persons, of whom just a very few were not Botswana nationals or residents.

Second, in accordance with national traditions on broad consultations, the people should be consulted about environmental problems to be addressed by the NCS. This consultation principle has permeated the entire NCS process since its inception. Already

in August 1985 the first public discussion meeting was held. Discussions were held with the National Assembly and the House of Chiefs. District officers and Central Government officers participated in a three-day seminar on the NCS. This principle of consultation was followed up at district and centre through the Assessing the Conservation Problems phase. In nine of Botswana's ten districts, consultations were carried out in most villages, identifying what renewable resources the local people believed to be deteriorating. NCS was discussed by the elected district councils and district officers analysed environmental problems and submitted reports. During the same period a public opinion survey of household opinions about renewable resource problems was conducted by the University of Botswana. Throughout this period NGOs were both consulted and assisted in the consultation process.

Third, the NCS should be based on existing knowledge. This principle was adhered to in as much that no research activities were launched.

Fourth, NCS related activities should be woven into ongoing activities, rather than standing apart as something separate from generally accepted forums and duties. As pointed out above, much of the consultations at local level was done through existing structures. At central level more than 25 persons were identified to prepare chapters for the NCS. Most of these people were working in ministries.

While everybody inside and outside Government applauds this major achievement, it is also generally agreed that during this two year deliberation and approval phase the NCS was watered down until it was acceptable, if not to everybody, then at least to the power structure of the country. This applies in particular to the major environmental problem in Botswana, rangeland degradation as a consequence of livestock and grazing patterns. This is also the issue with the hottest political implications.

During the two phases from 1986 to 1988, on Assessment of Conservation Problems and the Designing of the NCS, the issue of rangeland degradation was fully recognized and addressed, including some politically sensitive solutions. At the end of the NCS process the issue was recognized but the solutions had disappeared.

This case not only shows the importance of the four principles applied during the NCS process, it also illustrates the political realities of environmental issues. It highlights the inherent conflicts in the dilemma between the ideal solution and what is politically feasible. In the words of a key Government officer on this issue "***We lost the battle, but we are going to win the war***". His opinion was that the process had paved the way for the necessary solutions and actions, which could be taken within the next two years. It remains to be seen whether the NCS will be implemented so that this process shall be registered as a success story.

Before leaving the Botswana NCS, two issues should be mentioned. The first one pertains to the role of IUCN. The major input of IUCN were the two advisors, one following the other, with whom the Government has expressed unconditional satisfaction. It seems that they were complementary to one another, the first setting the stage for his successor. The principles laid down at the inception of the process were adhered to, and

the advisors supported the Government, without the Government feeling that they were losing the control.

The other issue pertains to the NCS and the Norwegian Country Programme. During Policy Consultations in 1988 Norway announced continued support to the NCS. In 1990 it was agreed to spend NOK 3.8 mill for this with an additional NOK 5.0 mill. in 1991. However, none of this money was ever allocated. For one, Botswana failed to request Norwegian assistance for this purpose pending the approval and start up of the NCC action plan. Furthermore, NORAD's country frame for Botswana was cut by NOK 10 million at a time which coincided in time with a NORAD strategy of not pressing the recipient too hard for donor-preferred projects. The Botswana NCS is therefore a case where NORAD has recognized the potential and implication of a major Grant financed project, but have been unable to follow it up due to economic realities and possibly, conflicting priorities.

It is a fundamental premise for the use of the Grant that the funding of the programs should cover a very limited period. One may therefore ask if it is at all appropriate to use such short term funds for typically long process oriented activities, such as the NCSs. Particularly when it is known that impatience and pressure from the funding agency may force the implementing agency to rush to complete the assignment on time, and in doing so put at risk the establishment of a sustainable process. It is the opinion of the Evaluation Team that if Norway consider NCSs and National Environmental Action Plans suitable for Norwegian grant funding, then the agencies asked to take charge of catalysing these processes, through the politically rough and often muddy waters on the recipient side, will require some form of core funding capable of lasting a much longer time than that intended for the Grant. It appears to the Evaluation Team that there has been Grant support for only two NCSs. This is not because the Grant is suited for supporting NCSs -- because it is clearly not --, but rather because of the enthusiasm and interest in NORAD for the NCSs, combined with easy access to funds through the Grant, and lack of other funding sources in Norway.

4.5.4. On the Adequacy and Efficiency of Liaison and Cooperation with Local People and Affected Parties.

The fundamental premise of IUCN's cooperative programs in the recipient countries is that they must be entirely integrated into the local communities and local structures. Furthermore IUCN holds, that making success of field programs involves not only designing and implementing good projects, but also maintaining the confidence of national and local governments, NGOs, national experts and local communities.

This however, is easier said than done, as experienced during field work, and especially in the case of Tanzania. Inherent conflicts and rivalries in the recipient country may make it impossible to please all of the affected parties. In addition, the pressure to meet severe deadlines may also obstruct the ability to liaise and cooperate effectively with the involved local parties in the design and implementation of pilot projects.

IUCN is obviously aware of these dangers and claims to have set up local project structures to secure as smooth a cooperation process as possible in which, they maintain,

ensuring local financial and managerial control over project activities is essential for the sustainability of project achievements:

- All implementation projects (as opposed to studies) have a Tanzanian Project Manager. He has overall management and financial responsibility for project activities on behalf of the Tanzanian Government Institution, which is executing agency; IUCN's role is to provide specialist technical support, financing, and logistics backstopping.

- Project Managers work for a Tanzanian Government Agency, not IUCN, and report to the head of that agency;

- Each project is guided both technically and managerially by a Steering Committee. This consists of a cross-sectoral group of Senior Tanzanian professionals under the leadership of a senior Tanzanian Chairman (e.g. the Regional Development Director for the Usumbara Project, and the Director of Wildlife for the Serengeti Project). IUCN sits as a member of the Steering Committee, with no extraordinary rights; and

- The Steering Committee is responsible for overseeing the technical program as well as financial control of the project;

Tanzanians interviewed by the Evaluation Team complain that although IUCN has in many cases assigned full responsibility on aspects of projects to local experts, the most strategic duties have usually been given to foreign experts. The Evaluation Team was repeatedly presented with allegations that Tanzanians were inadequately utilized and involved in all stages of the project cycle. It thus appears that some of the confidence IUCN requires for success has been absent in Tanzania. It would appear that a revised strategy for communication and confidence building is needed.

An illustration could serve to underline this point; several Tanzanians suggested to the Evaluation Team that IUCN has been too wildlife conservation oriented in e.g. the Ngorongoro Conservation and Development project. However, it remains a fact that IUCN completed 14 technical reports on this project, of which only one was primarily on the subject of wildlife. Another dealt with wildlife/livestock interactions, a third with forest conservation, a fourth with archaeological issues, and a fifth with vegetation change. The remaining nine technical reports all dealt with community development issues. An overall balance is sought in this formulation study of 14 technical reports based on the principle that conservation of natural resources can only be achieved through the positive interaction with and support from the affected local communities. Indeed, IUCN claims that their traditional wildlife conservation partners in Tanzania and elsewhere have been worried by what they perceive as, too great an emphasis on the development needs of local communities! In consideration of such a diversified and confusing image, it would appear urgent that IUCN launch a broad information drive in Tanzania to establish the confidence required for efficiency. While such a drive is necessary, it is far from sufficient. There may simply not be a consensus for many of the proposed actions. Where that is the case, IUCN cannot expect their approach to yield harmonious project solutions.

One must therefore ask if NORAD and the recipient have been in full agreement on the role IUCN should play at the different stages in the project cycle. For instance as regards the availability and involvement of qualified local experts and interested parties in the case of Tanzania. The Evaluation Team is concerned about IUCN standing in Tanzania. One must question whether IUCN with their present setup is in a position to operate efficiently in that country under the prevailing mixture of local attitudes and interests.

Based on interviews with the various Zambian parties involved in project implementation, the impression is that of a rather negative local perception of IUCN at the implementation stage. This is in contrast to the rather favourable impression regarding local liaison and cooperation issues reported at the identification and formulation stage of the National Conservation Strategy (NCS).

There can be no doubt about IUCN's catalytic role in pioneering the NCS concept. Also their role in promoting institutional adjustments and awareness in Sri Lanka, particularly at the government level but also at the local level, in the cases reviewed in this evaluation. It is important to note, however, that IUCN was not involved in the actual development of the Sri Lankan NCS. However, when it comes to IUCN liaison and cooperation with local NGOs and research groups outside the government sector, the Evaluation Team left Sri Lanka with the impression that IUCN could have been more actively involved.

In Sri Lanka, IUCN's orientation towards tangible results has prompted IUCN to take matters in their own hands for reasons of efficiency. This appears to have had a negative effect on the role IUCN should have played in transferring knowledge and capability for subsequent takeover of responsibilities for these activities by the Forest Department. The alternative would have been a much slower process of implementation, but with the benefit of a more profound integration into the political and administrative system. Ironically, the more efficiently IUCN implements its large projects, the more rapidly they seem to be transferred to the country. Thus strengthening the role of local institutions, in line with the goals of the Grant. It reduced, however, IUCN's freedom in disbursing fund allocations. In retrospect one should not one-sidedly criticize IUCN's strategy in Sri Lanka because the multiple goals of the Grant may simply have been in conflict if they were to be met all at the same time.

The recent evaluation of IUCN's cooperation and liaison with local people and affected parties in Central America, is rather positive. The Review states that IUCN/ORCA has come much further than most other international institutions in understanding that nature conservation is possible only in collaboration with local communities and user groups. The Review also states that to what degree that has been put into practice varies greatly from one project to another. The IUCN members and partners engaged in project work in the region constitute a heterogenous lot ranging from very strong to very weak. While ORCA has by and large found good local collaborators, very few directly represent target groups or resource users. ORCA has for the last two-three years actively begun to recruit members and partners which much more directly represent beneficiary and resource user groups in Central America. However, such target group representatives lack the sound ecological and natural resource use concept and practice of the conventional membership.

4.5.5. Appropriateness of IUCN Project Personnel.

IUCN has developed and continuously updates an international consultant register from which they search for personnel to match the job specifications of the selected studies. In some countries, e.g. Tanzania, IUCN established comprehensive national Environmental Expert Profiles. If IUCN cannot find the right person from the consultant register they will advertise. In the case of short consultancies IUCN themselves will look for the best person. For longer term contracts IUCN will liaise closely with the relevant government agency and submit a shortlist of candidates for the government agency to choose from. IUCN does all the recruitment and contracting locally through the regional or local offices; their procedures are genuinely decentralized, and no approval is needed from headquarters in Gland. IUCN expressed preference is to select local experts whenever possible. Nevertheless, considerable criticism has been expressed to the Evaluation Team during field work, and particularly in Tanzania and Zambia. Due to the importance of building local confidence, it is important that IUCN takes action to deal with such perceptions, regardless of their basis.

IUCN point to their success in recruiting virtually all experts and management personnel locally in e.g. Central America, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka the Grant has served as a recruitment model and these are gradually being transferred in to permanent positions. IUCN's response to criticisms of discrimination in the recruitment process in Zambia and Tanzania, is that IUCN is confident that as soon as the basis for recruitment in Africa becomes as broad and good as that in other regions, the profile of the experts will be as much local there as elsewhere. In the Ngorongoro project 27 technical specialists were engaged as consultants in addition to numerous government staff and professional individuals who volunteered the services. More than half of these 27 consultants (14) were Tanzanian nationals and/or residents.

4.5.6. Counterpart Training and Transfer of Knowledge.

It is a principle that all projects serve as on-the-job training. In addition there are training grants. IUCN firmly believe there is a high level of counterpart training and transfer of knowledge between international project technical advisors and national project managers and technical officers in their projects. In the case of Tanzania the locally voiced criticism on this point is a logical consequence of their general misgivings with IUCN's general mode of project execution as seen by the majority of Tanzanians interviewed. In Zambia no explicit counterpart training was found in the two Grant funded projects examined, but that does not necessarily imply a lack of counterpart training and transfer of knowledge via the project internal process described above. As is underlined by the fact that the project directors were Zambians.

In Sri Lanka the Evaluation Team found significant achievements in local professional and scientific capability strengthening in the wake of IUCN's management of the Grant. Not only scientists of the Forest Department have benefitted from this; many university scientists and NGO specialists have participated as well. The technical cooperation with IUCN has provided a structured systematic approach to management and made it possible to achieve the progress quickly because of IUCN expertise in this field. However, IUCN's need to show tangible results to the donor in the form of timely project

completion, meant that direct project execution was handled efficiently by IUCN, with a minimum of involvement of the national agencies, who had no prior experience in the bureaucratic intricacies of such development cooperation work. There was less interest in building up the Forest Department or transferring responsibility. Therefore, the transfer of knowledge and experience to the Forest Department became somewhat less than optimal from the perspective of sustainable development cooperation.

In the IUCN Central American Programme Review Report it is concluded that ORCA has no formal plan, structure, guidelines, nor procedures for personnel development and management. There are no standardized procedures for personnel recruitment. There is no plan or program for training/improving of ORCA staff, nor any standardized method, procedures or plans for evaluation of performance[12].

The overall impression on this point is that IUCN's focus on project identification and formulation through e.g. research oriented pilot projects, provides very limited expertise and experience for the training of local staff to take charge of the implementation stages of the projects initiated.

4.5.7. Contribution to Institutional Capacity Strengthening: Preparation for Local Take-over of Activities.

Many of the activities initiated with IUCN in Norway's main partner countries have been of such a pioneering nature that they have required an ad hoc administrative and institutional set up outside of the established bureaucracy to ensure efficient project execution. LIRDP in Zambia is perhaps the prime case, but some of the project set-ups in Tanzania fall in the same category, e.g. Serengeti. In Sri Lanka IUCN ended up -- for reasons of project execution efficiency -- managing some of the projects with a rather limited involvement of the national agencies.

Clearly, the locally involved experts and administrators have gained valuable experience in project management from these arrangements. In addition poorly staffed ministries and directorates have been relieved of the additional burdens of managing new, untraditional and cross-sectoral activities that do not naturally belong in one single ministry or agency. In that sense institutional capacity has been added to -- at least for the duration of the activity -- but ideally, the development "theology" dictates that such institution building should concentrate on working within existing institutional arrangements (even if it takes time and is frustratingly inefficient), or within arrangements that are established for permanency. Sustainable institution development is a slow and often frustrating process. It requires a lot of patience from the donor and stamina from the donors' consultant. The donor could contribute significantly by making it very clear from the outset if they are genuinely more concerned with sustainable institution strengthening than with tangible project completion within a fixed timeframe. As it is, the contribution of such projects to sustainable development is seriously reduced as successful local takeover and management is doubtful.

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12 Craig MacFarland (1990), op. cit. p. vi.

IUCN has been criticized by interviewees for creating parallel institutions, which cease to exist once the project is finished. Such set-ups may not only be counter-productive for local take-over and thus unsustainable, but could also undermine the development of existing institutions. On the other hand, there may be good reasons for locating a project outside a given institution, for instance in order to allow the project the necessary independence to be innovative. Be that as it may, in Tanzania it seems that IUCN (like many other experienced aid program executioners) has had limited success in ensuring an institutional framework leading to eventual local take-over and sustained management of all project activities.

In Zambia the Evaluation Team has not found any IUCN documentation that outlines a time schedules for local takeover. In spite of the fact that project directors are Zambian, it is the impression of the Evaluation Team that the IUCN effort at preparing their counterparts to take over project responsibilities is not very profound. For the two Grant funded projects reviewed, it is the impression of the Evaluation Team that the project activities came to a stand still when the IUCN consultant disappeared and the funds became scarce.

In Sri Lanka IUCN's mode of operation has helped NORAD transfer IUCN initiated projects from the Grant (with IUCN as executing agency) to the conventional Country Programme (with Sri Lankan authorities as executing agencies). This take-over has clearly been viewed with concern by IUCN. It has not proven easy or efficient, and transfer of funds to important project activities has been severely delayed simply because the Sri Lankan authorities involved have not been prepared for such a take over. IUCN has therefore been striving to strengthen its autonomy vis a vis the Sri Lanka Government and also as regards transfer of funds. IUCN's short term local fight for survival may conflict with the longer term sustainable development goal of NORAD, for local administrative capacity building for funding management.

In the cases of Central America, Nepal and Pakistan referred to in this chapter, IUCN has not been seen to face similar conflicts. Reviews available to the Evaluation Team and interviews with NORAD staff suggest that there appears to be more deliberate and smoother arrangements for local takeover of activities. IUCN appear to be more process oriented here than in e.g. Sri Lanka, and even more so than in Africa. It must be said in this context that there is no conflict between IUCN's wish to be present and active for several years, and the promotion of an administrative, technical and legislative process that may take perhaps decades to complete. In fact, it is IUCN's strength that it can prepare for a long term presence as a contributor and facilitator in such a transition. On reviewing the role of IUCN in this process in Nepal, the Evaluation Team sees no reason why such IUCN-initiatives should be discouraged by donors.

The fact that several local counterpart representatives in different countries are unfamiliar with the origin and availability of funding, does not suggest active IUCN effort to promote local takeover of responsibilities. Perhaps IUCN has assumed that knowledge of the funding source is obvious. Apparently it is not. Again, IUCN needs to strengthen its information system as an input to establishing the required level of confidence at the local level.

IUCN's rather myopic focus on project identification and formulation -- leading to implementation of extensive pilot projects is a matter of concern. IUCN's declared strategy of not taking on project implementation (where they would compete with a larger set of researchers and consultants) implies the development of an inherent weakness in the judgement of operationality, feasibility and sustainability of projects and accompanying administrative setups. IUCN's self-imposed remoteness from implementation, where all the real development problems are encountered, should be discouraged by e.g. such a large client as NORAD. This is especially important because of the poor linkage between IUCN and the Norwegian community of researchers and consultants specializing in the implementation stages of the project cycle. A closer link of this nature -- and of course with local parties involved in implementation -- is a must for project designs to be realistic and projects to be sustainable. Without it, IUCN risks being labelled "academic" or "theoretical" in a derogatory sense. The lack of implementation experience may explain why project documents may appear somewhat vague and short of directions at times. That should be avoided considering the important challenges and issues IUCN has brought to the world development agenda, and the many pioneering schemes they have designed and started up.

4.5.8. IUCN's Efficiency as a Means of Channelling Funds.

IUCN is preferred by both donor and the involved counterpart institution as the channel for Grant funds to bilateral projects. NORAD's extensive use of and preference for IUCN must have contributed significantly to this unique and strategic market position. This secures quick disbursement and efficient money transfers compared to channelling through official Government financial channels in the recipient country, which tend to be extremely slow and inflexible with respect to project activities. The negative side of this efficient channelling choice is of course that it serves as an excuse to not initiate improvements in the inefficient government financial systems. One is always in a hurry and no project manager is prepared to look beyond his or her own projects time horizon. Thus the efficiency of the channelling through IUCN impedes the development of more efficient channels for funds in recipient countries, is another necessary dimension of sustainable development.

Most Grant-involved counterpart institutions prefer funds to be transferred to projects via IUCN instead of through the official channels of the recipient country. IUCN also favours this most expedient method of disbursement. Transferring the funding for an activity from IUCN to the Government typically implies severe disbursement delays, perhaps years in some cases, and such financing uncertainty makes it extremely difficult for IUCN or consultants to enter into contracts with the government. The experience so far from transfer of IUCN disbursements to Government in Sri Lanka clearly illustrates this difficulty. However, as illustrated in the case of Sri Lanka, there is the possibility of transferring funds to an extended account for expedient operation if stated in the agreement. It is easy to understand the temptation to disburse quickly in order to initiate and complete projects on time. For those responsible, with a time-limited contract for project execution, it is a must. Relative to the overall development goal of sustainability of the changes made, the efficiency of such expediency may not be that impressive after all, but more important, for reasons of sustainable development promotion, the principle

should first and foremost be to use the Government for transfer of funds, and to help in making them more efficient in the role.

IUCN is concerned about the efficiency of the system for transfer of funds to Tanzania. IUCN's Regional Office prepares detailed monthly financial statements of all project expenditures, both local and overseas, which are available to anyone to see. For reasons of efficiency, funds have been held in a bank account in Switzerland until they are required by the project. Then and only then is the money transferred to the project account in Tanzania. There are no in-between stages. This procedure has been chosen to minimize fund erosion which would result from devaluation of local currency. In the future, however, funds will be held in a Tanzanian bank account until called for by the project. This would shorten the transfer time between Switzerland and Tanzania. In this context it is important that IUCN and NORAD provide and disperse sufficient information in the country about IUCN's role and procedures.

4.5.9. Cost-Effectiveness Assessment.

Based on one observation in Zambia, Norwegian experts are cost competitive with IUCN-experts from OECD countries of comparable experience. IUCN, research institutes, NGOs and consultants alike, recruit local experts from the same or overlapping networks. All have to pay competitive fees or salaries to be attractive employers. Therefore manpower costs cannot -- with the exception of perhaps a few private consultants -- be an argument in the choice process.

IUCN does, however, have a competitive advantage over consultants (but not over researchers) as regards overhead costs, for the simple reason that whereas consultants have to pay the full costs of their operations from revenues, IUCN and research institutes receive substantial donations in the form of general contributions or membership fees. These donations cover a substantial share of overhead costs. As seen in chapter 4.3.1. membership dues and support to IUCN's central management is equal to 50% of the revenue from project commissioned work plus evaluations and assessments paid by governments.

Having such a cost advantage is, however, not synonymous with cost-effectiveness. International consulting is a very competitive market. A random (but by no means necessarily representative) comparison of IUCN fees, Norwegian researcher fees, and Norwegian consultant fees at the time of the Zambia collaboration between IUCN and Norwegian researchers, would suggest that Norwegian researchers may be less expensive than comparable (measured as years of experience since graduation) IUCN experts. Private Norwegian consultants cost more, but would charge less than their comparable IUCN counterpart if they were to recieve donations equal to those received by IUCN and researchers to cover their overheads and central administration.

In conclusion, based on the above comparison and based on the examination of the visited projects and the review of IUCN's organization, reporting-, accounting, monitoring-, and internal evaluation systems earlier in this chapter, IUCN's cost-effectiveness is not a concern. Given the considerable transfer of donations from non-

Norwegian sources to cover IUCN's administration and overheads, NORAD is likely to get "good mileage" for their money.

4.6. CONCLUSIONS.

IUCN is a worldwide union of Governmental- and NGO-members founded to care for the soils, lands, waters and airs of our planet and the life they support. After formulating the World Conservation Strategy in 1980, the volume of IUCN's activities has increased rapidly in recent years. Their planned rate of expansion by 1993 is a trippling of their budget from 1987. The expansion has concentrated on developing country activities. In 1985 there were 4 staff members in developing countries, in 1991 the number was 120. The developmental experience is thus rather short, but is rapidly accumulating. The 1989 turnover was almost US$ 12 million, of which 1/3 was membership dues and other support for central management, while the rest was commissioned work. NORAD has been a dominant client since the focussing on developing countries in the mid-1980s. Around 30% of overall project revenue in 1989 came from NORAD.

IUCN's promotion of National Conservation Strategies (NCS) in developing countries in the mid-1980s and their strategic input to the World Commission for Environment and Development, coincided with the presentation of a broader set of Norwegian aid cooperation goals where environmental issues became a focal point. It was thus quite natural that NORAD and the Ministry established a close working relationship with IUCN when the Grant was established. IUCN soon became the most important channel for Grant disbursement, in particular for NORAD's share of the Grant. By 1990 NOK 60 million or 24% of the Grant had been disbursed through IUCN which has a dominant Grant role in most partner countries.

The following summarizes the main findings on the Grant cooperation with IUCN:

* IUCN has become financially dependant on NORAD. At the same time NORAD has become professionally and strategically dependant on IUCN in the use of the Grant.

* IUCN has not, however, been involved in NORAD's environmental early project cycle activities in country program work. This is surprising in view of the envisaged catalytic role of the Grant in bilateral development assistance.

* IUCN has shown ability to respond quickly to NORAD's need to disburse Grant money before year's end, by assisting recipient governments in formulating appropriate and acceptable projects for Grant funding.

* From a pure disbursement perspective, IUCN is undoubtedly an efficient means of channelling Grant funds to the recipient. Furthermore, the review finds IUCN's organization, reporting, accounting, monitoring and internal evaluation systems cost-effective and satisfactory.

* IUCN's NCS process has been a pioneering approach showing that sustainable integration of comprehensive environment considerations in national plans

requires lots of time and political maturing where each country must find its own pace of progress with a minimum of external interference.

* IUCN's strength is in identifying and formulating project ideas. IUCN's lack of implementation experience has lead to local complaints that project proposals are vague, short of directions and lack the necessary elements and foundation for sustainable institutional and managerial integration. Parallel administrative setups and temporary allocations, while effective in the short run, are not conducive to permanent institutional strengthening and provide limited scope for training of local staff to take charge of the implementation stages of the projects.

* IUCN seeks to staff their regional and local offices and projects with local experts and consultants wherever possible. This has been achieved in Central America and Asia, but so far to a lesser extent in East Africa, where considerable dissatisfaction in this regard has been expressed.

* The novel nature and and hoc administrative set-up of many Grant funded IUCN activities are likely to encounter local conflicts and rivalries. It is impossible for IUCN to please all affected parties. Mutual confidence at the local level is crucial to effective achievement of lasting Grant targets. There are indications from the field work that IUCN has been only partly successful in this respect, and need to address such issues.

* IUCN's autonomy in the project formulation and pilot study stages risks leaving the impression that IUCN is a donor. Widespread local perceptions of IUCN's role relative to authorities and local interest groups in projects deviates from IUCN's own explanations. IUCN's staffing and recruitment practices for projects in East Africa have been criticized. IUCN has been criticized in recipient countries for their ways and means of channelling Grant funds. In sum, these four very different areas of concern are indicators of serious problems in IUCN's way of relating to the receipients, and should be taken as a warning by all parties concerned.

* NORAD has established administrative procedures for IUCN cooperation whereby NORAD's resident representatives in partner countries remain largely uninformed of IUCN-activities. This isolationist practice should be immediately changed and a formal dialogue and reporting relationship with the res. reps. established. This has been detrimental to the integration of such activities within the frame of overall development assistance.

* NORAD's use of IUCN in a Grant context has not contributed to the development of Norwegian aid-related environmental competence. Norwegian researchers and consultants have not been considered qualified to render Grant-services. Hardly any active attempts were made to involve them with IUCN in such work in spite of the 1987 Agreement containing a significant consultancy trust fund. The logical relationship between IUCN and Norwegian researchers is one of complementarity and cooperation. NORAD has failed to promote and fertilize this, and instead has created negative attitudes.

Chapter 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Special Grant for Environment and Development - the Grant - was established in 1984 with a view to strengthening of the overall environmental orientation in Norwegian development assistance. The management of the Grant has been decentralized to different departments of the Ministry and NORAD. The approach of the evaluation has been to study how each department and involved international and local institutions have implemented goals and objectives of the Grant, as presented in the preceding parts of this report. In the following these "individual" findings are integrated within the perspective of the Grant and environmental aspect of Norway's development assistance. For this purpose the different items of the Terms of Reference for the Evaluation are addressed.

5.1. OBJECTIVES AND FRAMEWORK

The objectives and guidelines for the Grant have been modified and altered since it was established in 1984. But the overall objectives remain the same. Although these are clearly in accordance with overall objectives for Norwegian development assistance as such, there are certain policy questions which should be recognized:

First, there is the principle of target orientation for Norwegian development assistance, which should be oriented towards poverty in rural areas. This target orientation is not explicitly listed among the principles for the Grant. It may even be questionable to constrain Grant operations strictly by this principle, because Grant goals may sometimes be more efficiently fulfilled by a less restrictive target orientation.

Second, there is the gender issue, which is not explicitly listed in the principles for the Grant. Although there are cases where this has been taken into account, one may safely conclude that the gender dimension has not been among the guiding principles for the Grant, and it should not constrain the use of the Grant.

Third, there is the principle of recipient orientation. It is clear that the Grant is meant to influence the environmental priorities and policies of recipient countries and cooperating institutions. The Grant thus introduces a possibility for "Green Conditionality" which would be in conflict with -- at least a static interpretation of -- the principle of recipient orientation. However, the additionality of the Grant results in a virtual zero opportunity cost, and therefore its initial influence will often be limited. Furthermore, as this has been applied in bilateral aid cooperation, through somewhat passive resident representatives and otherwise decentralized through IUCN, one cannot say that the Grant has been in contradiction to the principle of recipient orientation. The multilateral use of the Grant, on the other hand, has actively sought to influence recipient priorities and policies.

Finally, there is little doubt that the scope of the Grant was very broad and the objectives were ambitious, and hardly realistic when taking into account limitations in funds, in-house professional competence, and administrative capacity both in the Norwegian system and on the recipient side.

To-day there is no single document which states the current objectives and guidelines. This is perceived by most of those involved to be a constraint to the practical implementation of Grant objectives.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of this evaluation, a summary of the objectives were made in chapter 1., against which the following conclusions are made.

a) Increase the development assistance within the field of environment and long term natural resource management

When the Grant was introduced in 1984 this coincided with the White Paper No. 36 On Norwegian Development Assistance (1984-85), which introduced environmental protection and natural resource management as an overall objective for Norwegian Development assistance. This was further reiterated in White Paper No. 34 (1986-87). In 1990 environment, resource management and population are cited as first priority for Norwegian Development assistance. It was estimated that in 1990 NOK 1,167.5 mill. were spent on environmentally related activities. This represents 15 % of total Norwegian development assistance.

There is no doubt that Norwegian development assistance within the field of environment and long term natural resource management has become top priority, and allocations for this have increased considerably. But it is impossible to quantify to what extent this increase may be attributed to the Grant. The Grant started off with NOK 10.0 Mill. in 1984 and reached NOK 64.0 Mill. in 1990. This is only 5.5 % of the total aid spent on environmentally related activities.

Nevertheless, the Grant has contributed to this shift in focus of Norwegian development assistance. The fact that the responsibility for the application of the Grant was decentralized to the different departments, along with the visibility of the Grant, were factors that along with massive outside pressures forced the entire development assistance system to take the environmental issues seriously and to show results.

b) Strengthen the professional and scientific competence in developing countries

The term "professional and scientific competence" is very broad. Most Grant activities will in some way or another have contributed to the strengthening of professional and scientific competence. In chapter 1 a categorization of Grant activities was presented. Of these "Seminars and conferences", "Study tours", "Scholarships" and "Research" would be most directly aimed at professional and scientific competence. It is estimated that 13 % of Grant funds have been spent for this purpose. However, other activities, such as "Studies", "Policy Design", "Project Planning, Pre-studies" and "Environmental Impact Assessment", also contribute to this purpose. Taken together, it is estimated that approximately 34 % of Grant funds have been spent on competence raising.

Although this has undoubtedly been beneficial to the persons and institutions involved, the evaluation has revealed that the impact has been limited as many of the activities were one-time occurrences, not integrated into a professional development scheme. Furthermore, the involvement of national staff has in many cases been limited.

c) Strengthening of administrative capacity

It is estimated that 13 % of Grant funds have been directed towards administrative strengthening or establishment of institutions. Very few projects financed by the Grant have "hardware" inputs aiming at administrative capacity strengthening. But several projects include components addressing institutional and administrative issues. However, there is an inherent conflict between the Grant objective for administrative strengthening, which takes time and requires patience, and the principle that Grant activities shall be short term. In practice this contradiction has been magnified because Grant activities have often been implemented through ad hoc administrative set-ups.

d) Finance concrete activities in order to prevent deterioration of the natural resource base.

The term "concrete activities" is interpreted as those activities which bring about tangible, physical results as opposed to more abstract results or studies. It is estimated that only 6 % of the Grant has been spent on such concrete activities. The limited Grant budget, insufficient administrative capacity and short time frame for Grant activities inherently limit the suitability of the Grant for funding concrete activities.

e) Increase the willingness and capacity of the recipient countries to integrate environmental considerations in their development endeavours

The evaluation has recognized the increased willingness of developing countries to integrate environmental considerations in their development endeavours. However, to claim that the Grant has contributed to this would be rather presumptuous. First, the Grant has not been well integrated into Norwegian development assistance in the recipient countries. Second, the existence of the Grant is generally unknown to recipient governments.

However, there are encouraging cases pointing to a role for such ad hoc development cooperation in special areas. In the case of NORAD, Grant activities in Sri Lanka and Botswana have contributed to increased willingness to integrate environmental considerations in their development endeavours, such as formulation of National Conservation Strategies. Such positive experience is also observed in the multilateral use of the Grant. Several African countries have decided to undertake to develop National Environmental Action Plans, with assistance from the World Bank, where Grant funding has been instrumental. Another example is the "multiplier effect" of technical assistance allocations in the field of e.g. biodiversity projects administered by the World Bank with Grant funds. Here it has been observed that national governments commit substantial funds to such projects once the Grant funded initiative has been convincingly presented and studied.

f) Initiate and prepare activities, which may eventually be financed through the ordinary aid allocations

Regarding the bilateral development assistance, the Evaluation has identified Grant activities which have been initiated by the Grant and eventually continued in the country

programme as has been the case in Sri Lanka. However, these are exceptions, as the bulk of Grant activities have never developed into components of the country programme.

In multilateral cooperation with the World Bank, activities included in the applied-research "Environment Package" (initially financed by the Grant, see chapter 3.2.), were subsequently transferred to untied cofinancing and the SSE Grant, in accordance with the expressed goals of the Grant.

g) Increase the willingness of recipient countries to finance concrete environmental activities within the normal development assistance to the main recipient countries

Through country programme negotiations with most partner countries Norway has actively advocated components contributing to environmental protection and sustainable development. However, with few exceptions (Sri Lanka) it may be concluded that the Grant has so far played only a marginal role. It may even be argued that the Grant is counterproductive in this regard, as it provides "easy" money over and above the country frame, which may be perceived as a token of both donor and recipient country's environmental consciousness.

h) Strengthen the general understanding of environmental problems

Virtually all Grant activities have somehow contributed to strengthening the understanding of environmental problems, both in recipient countries, in institutions through which funds have been channelled, and also to a certain degree within the Norwegian development assistance system.

It is of course virtually impossible to distinguish how much of Grant funds have been used explicitly for this purpose, but it is estimated that 21 % of the funds have been directed toward information activities such as "Publications and films", "Seminars and Conferences" and "Campaigns".

i) First and foremost finance activities in main recipient countries

Table 1 in annex 3 presents geographic distribution of annual Grant disbursements. For 1984-90 as a whole, 36.9% of Grant funds were disbursed directly in Norway's partner countries, 16.6 % in other countries, and 46.5 % "globally" (not country-specific). The "global" portion increased from 22.7 % of total Grant disbursements in 1984-86, to 58.2 5 in 1990. The "partner country" portion declined from 50.8 % in 1988 to 29 % in 1990. However, it appears that a significant share of the "Global" portion has also benefitted the main recipient countries directly or indirectly. Of the non-global disbursements, the portion allocated to partner countries averaged 69 % for the entire period, first increasing from 1984 to 1988 (when partner countries received 84.8 % of the non-global allocation) and then declining to 69.5 % in 1990.

j) Finance follow-up activities of the World Commission for Environment and Development (WCED)

An important activity financed by the Grant has been dissemination of the findings and recommendations of the WCED-Report. An important follow up in this context has been the funding of brief, popularized books and booklets into several languages, presenting the WCED-findings for broad based discussions and policy dialogues. This has undoubtedly been successful. Furthermore, the Grant has contributed significantly to the financing of the Center for Our Common Future in Switzerland, and financed several regional follow conferences.

Regarding the Grant's role in following up the recommendations of the WCED, many Grant projects have contributed toward the implementation of the seven point "Strategic Imperatives", particularly regarding "conserving and enhancing the resource base", and to a certain, but lesser degree, "merging environment and economics in decision making". The Grant has been decisive for the pioneering operationalization of WCED-recommendations. A more active use of Grant money for such policy-oriented work is recommended.

k) Support preparation of national strategies for management of natural resources

The Grant has been used to finance two National Conservation Strategies (NCS) through IUCN in Bangladesh and Botswana. There have also been some projects in support of such NCSs. This evaluation has studied the Botswana NCS, which is definitely a success story. Funds have also been used for National Environmental Action Plans (NEAP) initiated and coordinated by the World Bank. The active participation of cooperating low-income developing countries in this process, and the reports so far, suggest that this process has also been successful.

The overall objectives of the Grant and Norwegian development assistance would have benefitted if more of the Grant had been in support of such activities.

l) Strengthen the environmental capacity and competence of international organizations

The Grant has provided additional funding to speed strengthening of the capacity of the Environment Department and the Regional Environment Divisions in the World Bank. This is manifested through the funding of a series of pilot programmes and actions that have permitted the Bank to expand their environmental administration at a faster rate than what would have otherwise occurred.

m) Smaller part may be used to develop professional competence in Norway about environmental issues in the Third World (no longer valid)

The Grant has allocated funds on several occasions to finance professional competence building in the development cooperation system. This includes secondment of professional staff from the Ministry and NORAD to institutions such as IUCN, IIED, LEEC, etc for extensive periods of time. These opportunities have hardly been used, yet

when used the participants have in most cases been given ample opportunities to benefit from such "Sabbaticals". NORAD and the Program Department have organized a few in-house training seminars on environmental issues, and the general opinion is that many more such initiatives are needed. NORAD has used the Grant to prepare internal Environmental Assessment Guidelines. The Evaluation has revealed that unfortunately NORAD has not succeeded in ensuring a widespread acceptance and use of these guidelines. Regarding professional competence outside the system, there have been several long term and productive secondments to multilateral organizations. Last, but not least, the arrangements whereby IUCN has become the predominant provider of environmental consultancy services through the Grant has not been conducive to the development of Norwegian competency in fields of relevance to the Grant.

5.2. STRATEGY FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE GRANT.

The evaluation has revealed that lack of strategy has been a major constraint on the application of the Grant in Norway's partner countries. In contrast, a strategy was developed for the other special allocation, the Women's Grant. Furthermore, the basis for such a strategy existed in the report "Environmental Protection and Development Assistance", presented by a working group jointly composed by the Ministry of Development Cooperation and the Ministry of Environment. This shortcoming is now being addressed as more and more resident representative offices are formulating environmental strategies for development assistance.

5.3. UTILIZATION, FOLLOW-UP AND CONTROL OF THE GRANT.

5.3.1. Concurrence of grant activities with environmental problems and priorities in recipient countries

For Tanzania, Zambia and Sri Lanka, environmental profiles were made in connection with this evaluation. The environmental profiles have revealed two types of environmental issues:

a) concrete problems of degradation of the environment
b) shortcomings and constraints in institutional set-ups and policies to address and remedy the concrete problems

In the cases of Tanzania and Zambia there have not been, until very recently, any national priorities to guide the use of the Grant, while in Sri Lanka such priorities emerged simultaneously with the application of the Grant. Consequently, in Tanzania and Zambia, the Grant became very focused on concrete environmental problems, hardly addressing the more fundamental institutional problems. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, the Grant came to address both types of issues.

5.3.2. Integration of grant activities into the administrative system of the recipient countries

For the countries for which special case studies have been carried out, the degree of integration of Grant activities varies significantly. It is primarily in Sri Lanka and

Botswana that Grant activities have really been integrated into the administrative system and continued financing secured.

The review of Grant use in cooperation with the World Bank has shown that activities initially supported by Grant funds have encouraged recipients to committ their own resources and other aid allocations to continue the activities.

5.4. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

5.4.1. Assessment of management model

In the revised guidelines from 1986 two principles for the management of the Grant were established. The overall policy coordination was placed with the Planning Department while the administrative responsibility for the application of the Grant was decentralized to the different departments who were assigned annual allocations. This management model has been characterized by lack of coordination and integration as the policy and coordinating role of the Planning Department has been gradually diluted and the different departments in the system have come to manage their allocations more and more in isolation. This disintegrated set-up exists both between the departments, and within NORAD.

The multilateral department in the Ministry (MULTI) has had the advantage of a well-established cooperation with their counterpart agencies. Once a mutual understanding of Norwegian support priorities and goals have been established, they have chosen to leave the bulk of professional judgements, assessments and administration to the recipient agencies. This means that MULTI has been primarily concerned with disbursement to their cooperating agencies, and leaves it to these for further disbursement to recipient countries. Clearly, the success of this management model hinges on the reliability of the multilateral agencies to recognise Norwegian development goals, and MULTI plays an active role as "watchdog" in the use of the Grant.

Within NORAD, however, the administrative set-up of the Grant has been a constraint. The management of the Grant within NORAD was not integrated into the development of Norway's bilateral assistance. The Grant was developed in isolation and not associated with the development of the country programmes. Furthermore, most resident representatives have not used the Grant as a tool to build up cooperation with relevant environmental institutions.

In none of the documents pertaining to the Grant are any criteria given for the distribution between departments. In the Guidelines for 1986 it is only stated that the departments will get the budget for their allocation from the Grant by February each year. In practice this will be on the basis of committed, planned and expected needs.

The lack of criteria for the distribution of the Grant between the Programme Department in the Ministry (PROG), MULTI and NORAD is further evidence of the absence of steering and policy.

Regarding more specific administrative issues, the following observations are made:

a) Routines and regulations relating to applications for Grant funds

None of the departments have produced any specific routines and regulations relating to the application for Grant funds. It is considered that special and detailed routines and regulations for the Grant would be contradictory to the flexible and promotional nature of the Grant, and would imply an unacceptable additional administrative burden on already hard-pressed staff. Normal funding application procedures are seen as adequate in this context.

b) Planning and implementation procedures

In all departments efforts were made to alleviate the administrative burden of the Grant both in planning and in implementation. In line with normal procedures, MULTI has relied as much as possible on multilateral organizations for this task. NORAD has developed a similar external reliance, through cooperation with IUCN. As a result, planning and implementation of the Grant has been far removed from the Norwegian development assistance system. Such remote control has resulted in the separation of managerial responsibility and budgetary control on the one hand, and the organizations carrying out planning and implementation of Grant activities on the other. In this way Grant disbursements to e.g. IUCN and the World Bank can be completed on short notice, but it does not follow that these institutions are able to disburse to final recipients equally swiftly, as we observed in case of the Technical Assistance Grant Program for Enviornment (TAGPE) in the World Bank.

c) Reporting and monitoring procedures and dissemination of experience gained

This evaluation has revealed that reporting and monitoring procedures have been inadequate. Originally the idea was that twice a year, substantive reports on the Grant would be submitted to the Directors' Meeting (consisting of Permanent Secretary and General Directors of NORAD and the Ministry), allowing for policy discussions and orientations. In recent years these reports have presented little information beyond total disbursements and requests of each department. It is therefore no surprise that policy guidance for the Grant is largely nonexistent. However, recipient instiutions such as IUCN, IIED, and the World Bank all prepare comprehensive reports on Grant use that could form the basis of a report to the Directors Meeting.

There is no procedure or mechanism for the dissemination of experiences gained. Originally it was the idea that this would be ensured through the Internal Committee on Environment ("Miljøutvalget") - ICE -, but this has never really functioned.

d) Budgetary coordination and control system

The Evaluation Team cannot see that the Grant requires any different budgeting and control procedures than other items in the development cooperation budget. Yet the Grant has been notorious for its lack of budgetary control. This has been demonstrated through the project inventory of Grant activities for this evaluation (see paragraph 2.3.1. and annex 3). For example, in the budgetary summary compiled by the Ministry/-

NORAD Plan II system, it emerges that many disbursements from the Grant were not registered with Plan II, recipients of funds were not always identified, and amounts of disbursements in the early years of the Grant are unreliable. Inconsistencies between figures at NORAD/Oslo and resident representative offices have also been observed.

e) Use of adequate competence in the administration of the Grant

Since the Grant was established, opinions have varied about the type of competence required for its administration. In NORAD/Oslo the management of the Grant was placed in the Division for Agriculture and Rural Development (LADU) (later NATUR) where the responsibility was assigned to the Environmental Advisor and associated staff. They were trained in natural sciences and ecology and had limited experience from development assistance. This type of competence was further strengthened through the cooperation with IUCN. At the resident representative offices the Grant was often managed by a person experienced in development assistance and with less competence on environmental issues. In the departments of the Ministry the competence has been mostly in general development assistance and to a lesser extent natural science and ecology. In some years there were conflicting views as to the type of competency required. Today this is less of an issue, as it seems to be accepted throughout the system that both types of competence are required.

5.4.2. The cooperation with the Ministry of Environment

The cooperation with the Ministry of Environment (MOE), described in chapter 1 and item 5.2. above, has not been without problems. There have been several conflicts. The first pertains directly to the Grant, where MOE feels that it was never allowed to play the role it had envisaged regarding individual projects. The second had to do with MOE's scepticism towards MULTI's way of channelling Grant money through the World Bank. The third conflict was also related to the Grant, it had to do with the development of Norwegian competence on environment and development and MOE criticism of the Ministry's reliance on foreign consultants provided predominantly by IUCN. One can say that the relationship between the two ministries was more characterized by conflict than by cooperation.

NORAD presently cooperates with the Directorate for Natural Resources and the Pollution Control Directorate. It would seem reasonable to re-establish an advisory contact forum with MOE to help NORAD in technical matters because NORAD is not staffed to pass many of the environment judgements that proper environmental assessment in project appraisals imply.

5.4.3. The cooperation with IUCN and IIED

The cooperation with IUCN has been almost exclusively through NORAD, who have channelled 43 % of their Grant disbursements through this organization. When NORAD initiated this cooperation, IUCN was actively working with the follow-up of the World Conservation Strategy through National Conservation Strategies, and Norway had decided to center key environmental aid efforts around these. Being hard pressed by regular aid cooperation matters, the additional burden of arranging meaningful project portfolios for

the Grant and disbursing it in time, led them to seek an agreement whereby IUCN would act as an intermediary between NORAD and the recipient countries. This would ensure that IUCN would present projects on behalf of the recipient governments. IUCN has fulfilled this role and reported promptly to NORAD/Oslo on all their Grant funded activities. This arrangement has been based on mutual trust and has worked well.

The smooth operation of IUCN has made life easier for NORAD as regards the Grant, and there is no doubt that important activities have been identified, formulated and negotiated with the help of IUCN's experts. IUCN's role as a catalyst in the National Conservation Strategy processes in several countries has also been facilitated as a result of the use of the Grant.

The country studies have revealed, however, that many in recipient countries have different perceptions of the role IUCN should play in relation to the Grant. IUCN's autonomy in project formulation and pilot studies risks creating the impression that IUCN is the donor. Local perceptions of IUCN's role relative to authorities and local interest groups deviate substantially from IUCN's own perception. IUCN's staffing and recruitment practices, as well as administrative set-ups for projects, have been criticized for failing to strengthen local competence and institutions. This is particularly so in East Africa. These areas of concern indicate problems in IUCNs relations with recipients, which should be taken as warning signs by all parties concerned.

It is also likely that exclusive use of IUCN has had a negative impact on the development of Norwegian expertise and competence in the areas that the Grant is meant to cover. Both internally in the aid administration and in the external Norwegian research and consulting community.

The cooperation between the Program Department in the Ministry (PROG) and IIED/LEEC has yielded impressive results in the form of some of the most important environmental awareness raising literature published internationally. It is interesting to note the apparent lack of awareness within Norway of this Grant impact! While these results are laudable, there now appears to be a lack of policy dialogue between PROG and IIED/LEEC. Both parties appear to expect the other to take initiatives; as a result very little progress is made in terms of follow up and work in the wake of the publications to raise awareness of WCED.

With regard to both IUCN and IIED/LEEC there is scope for a much closer cooperation with Norwegian experts and institutions, and framework agreements were established to promote this. With the exception of a few secondments, virtually no institutional cooperation has been encouraged or stimulated by PROG and NORAD, in spite of the incentives inherent in the framework agreements.

5.4.4. The role of NORAD's resident representatives

From an early stage it was made clear that NORADs resident representatives should play an important role in management and development of Grant activities. Most resident representatives have not succeeded in this. They have not been able to disburse their mission administered allocations to develop sustainable cooperation with relevant

environmental institutions. Nor have they managed to integrate Grant activities within the country programmes. There are many reasons for this, such as lack of an operational strategy for the Grant, lack of qualified personnel, the peripheral role of the resident representatives in some major environmental projects implemented by IUCN, where there has been direct reporting to NORAD/Oslo.

Because no administrative capacity increase accompanied the resident representatives' responsibility for the Grant, it was often perceived as an additional administrative task. Insufficient administrative capacity at the resident representative offices has been an important limitation to achieving the objectives of the Grant.

5.5. THE FINANCIAL SIZE OF THE GRANT

The question of appropriate size of the Grant may be viewed from two different angles. On the one hand, from the point of view of the environmental problems in developing countries, the funding requirements are enourmous and the role of the Grant can never be significant in this context. Nevertheless, the objectives are very broad and ambitious, and from this point of view the funding is inadequate. On the other hand the financial size has been too large in view of the limited administrative capacity to develop and implement appropriate Grant activities. This is substantiated by the fact that the different departments and resident representatives have often been unable to approve projects to the amount of their annual allocations. Subsequent disbursement problems have emerged such as the frequent "end-of-year" rush to disburse Grant funds.

5.6. RECOMMENDATIONS

5.6.1. Prolongation or termination of the grant

An important issue for the evaluation is to determine whether the Grant should remain as is, be expanded or reduced, or be terminated. Termination or reduced Grant volume could result from success as much as from failure. If it is felt that the awareness, priority changes and catalytic effects have been so penetrating that they can be dealt with in a satisfactory manner in the country programs and through regular multilateral allocations in the future, then there would be little reason for maintaining this additional administrative burden on hard pressed Ministry- and NORAD staff, so long as the overall aid volume for environmental protection and natural resource management is not reduced with the cancellation of the Grant.

On the other hand, failure in the past may in fact justify continuation of the Grant if it is felt that the evolution of environmental motivation and awareness raising takes longer than was anticipated, and is worth supporting in this way. One should not therefore deduce success or failure simply on the basis of the recommendations of this evaluation.

These considerations should also be weighed against the advantages of the Grant as a flexible and expedient funding facility, and within the perspective of its expected catalytic effect.

The preceding chapters have shown that there are no clear-cut answers to the extent to which the Grant has achieved its objectives. The answers vary with the different objectives and the different channels through which the Grant has been implemented.

It is the recommendation of the Evaluation Team that the Grant should be prolonged, but with the modifications outlined below.

5.6.2. Choice of channels

Within the Norwegian development assistance system the channels have been the Programme Department (PROG), NORAD, the Multilateral Department (MULTI) and the Information Division (INFO).

MULTI has been successful in achieving the overall objectives of the Grant. It seems quite clear that MULTI may, through their normal funding, e.g. co-financing, core-funding and multi-bi arrangements, have the same possibilities to influence environmental considerations and priorities of the World Bank and the regional development banks as presently with the Grant. For reasons of administrative efficiency it is therefore recommended that the multilateral share of the Grant for the World Bank and the regional development banks be transferred to MULTIs other channels for such funding, i.e. those referred to above, which have been successfully coordinated and combined with the Grant in the past. If there is a danger that the amounts will be reduced rather than transferred, the recommendation is to retain this share of the Grant.

With regard to the more than 30 remaining multilateral organisations of relevance, such substitution is not feasible or practicable. Fore one, project cooperation is practised with no more than 9 of them, and in most cases the amounts are very small and tied for a considerable time period. For these agencies the core funding and existing projects cannot fully substitute for the Grant in terms of flexibility, efficiency and provision of influence on decision making. More important, however, for a number of institutions such as UNDP, UNEP, IFAD, UNIDO, WHO, UNRFNRE and ESCAP, where the Grant has been applied, there is no project cooperation to resort to at all if the Grant allocation were to be terminated. For these agencies a multi-share of the Grant should be retained.

The areas of environmental protection, natural resources management, sustainable development and integration of economics and resource management policies are all in the forefront of attention, where new awareness and approaches are emerging all the time. In this arena all countries are weak, and developing countries are particularly vulnerable. It is therefore important that PROG, being the focal policy point of Norwegian development assistance, has the necessary and flexible funding that the Grant assures.

The Grant still has an unused potential to render bilateral assistance, through the country programmes, environmentally more conscious. It is therefore recommended that NORAD should maintain such a Grant, but with the modifications outlined in the following paragraphs.

NORAD has suspended INFOs allocation from the Grant. The Evaluation Team agrees with this as an administrative simplification. At the same time, however, targeted information activities are often needed to support or prepare for activities financed within the Grant. NORAD should determine how to involve INFO expertise in an integrated way so that local information channels can be effectively used in promoting sustainable development initiatives. Resident Representatives will play a key role here.

The conclusion of the Evaluation Team is therefore that the Grant should be prolonged, but only for the purpose of meeting the specific needs of NORAD and PROG, and the non-bank activities of MULTI.

5.6.3. Aims

Grant activities should emanate from the recipient countries through NORADs resident representatives. It is therefore recommended that the Grant in the future shall be exclusively managed by the resident representatives with technical support from NATUR and other relevant NORAD-departments. This means that the Grant allocation administered from Oslo should be gradually phased out. To this effect it is recommended that no new projects should be approved for financing from NORAD/Oslo and that on-going projects should be phased out.

It must be a specific objective for the Grant that the recipient government be directly involved in its management (item 5.6.5. below).

Regarding PROG the aim of the Grant should be to enable PROG to support new activities pertaining to environmental policy issues in developing countries, which may not be financed through conventional channels. However, a prerequisite is that PROG is able to ensure necessary and qualified staff. Otherwise, the allocation should be terminated. PROG's framework agreements with IIED/LEEC and IUCN should be activated.

MULTI should use their share of the Grant as has been the practice in the past, but limited to multilateral institutions where there has been no project cooperation, unless the proposed revisions are to be used as a vehicle for reducing overall environmental cooperation with these banks.

5.6.4. Priorities of the Grant

The priority of the Grant should be to initiate activities and pre-studies on the condition that they will be instrumental and additional to environmental development as already incorporated in conventional development assistance. This includes innovative policy research, currently the responsibility of PROG and MULTI, and pilot studies in the field, currently the responsibility of MULTI and NORAD, in the latter case now proposed to be transferred to the resident representatives.

5.6.5. Guidelines and channels

If the Grant is prolonged, a revised document stating current objectives and guidelines should be prepared.

Activities submitted for Grant financing should not exceed two years.

Representatives of the recipient countries should be directly involved in the management of the Grant. This will probably be best achieved if the relevant ministry is given a direct role to play. A way of achieving this would be if an environmental government institution was nominated the focal point through which applications for the Grant from all institutions were channelled to the resident representative. The resident representative and this focal institution would then jointly approve projects for funding. This would strengthen one important aspect of recipient orientation. At the same time it is important to retain the flexibility to involve the NGO community directly where appropriate.

Regarding NORAD, funds should be channelled through national Government or Non Governmental institutions. To the extent that other institutions are involved, as for instance IUCN, this should only be subsequent to request and approval by the national institution involved, and only for technical assistance not project implementation. Nevertheless, on these premises, it is recommended to continue the cooperation with IUCN and not exclusively within the frame of the Grant. IUCN could have an important role to play in NORAD's regular program aid as well.

5.6.6. Financial frame

The financial frame of the allocation became too high, especially over the last years.

Given the previous conclusions and recommendations, it follows that the financial frame of the Grant should be reduced, financing the following two components only:

a) resident representative allocation, starting at NOK 1-2 mill. per mission and increasing as required. Total budget frame NOK 20 mill.
b) Program Department allocation: total budget frame NOK 5 mill.
c) Multilateral Department allocation: total budget frame NOK 5 mill.

The conclusion is that the Grant should be scaled down to a total of NOK 30,000,000.

5.6.7. Administrative routines

It would be beneficial if a clear distinction was made between NORADs operational responsibility and PROGs policy responsibility.

In regard to NORAD, the Evaluation Team recommends a transfer of the management of the Grant to the resident representatives, where the Grant should be closely integrated with or even incorporated into the country programme. This requires strengthening of

the environmental skills at these offices. For the application of the Grant in the recipient countries it will be necessary to develop guidelines for administrative routines such as submission of applications, approval procedures, transfer and accounting of funds, monitoring, reporting and auditing. It is recommended to study whether the administrative modality of the newly established consultancy assistance in Tanzania could be a model for resident representative management of the Grant.

Furthermore, it is important to strengthen NORADs in-house capacity and capability to carry out its advisory functions, vis a vis the resident representatives for better integration of Grant and country programme activities. This applies to all technical and regional divisions of NORAD, and several approaches should be considered.

In order to strengthen the Grant administration, the professional support of MOE should be sought where appropriate by establishing an advisory contact forum for NORAD. MOE (including the expertise available from MOE-Directorates) could provide their expert advice on professional/technical matters. NORAD is not staffed to pass all of the environmental judgements needed to appraise Grant applications.

External Norwegian expertise should be more actively considered for assisting the Resident Representatives and local experts to:

1) prepare environment profiles
2) prepare environmental action plans
3) identify future projects and areas of concentration
4) prepare environmental assessments

Routines should be instituted for

1) seconding Norwegian junior professionals to IUCN projects for training
2) effectuation the framework agreement with IUCN for training of Norwegian experts
3) more systematic development and use of Norwegians via the Project Development Fund.

All of this is in line with and in support of NORAD's new initiative to increase environmental training of aid personnel, and the much more active role and responsibility envisioned for the Resident Representatives in the field of environment.

Targeted information activities related to projects and programs in recipient countries could enhance the catalytic and awareness raising Grant effects. NORAD should develop routines and guidelines for how to involve its INFO in this process, and in this context establish whether there are economies of scale that suggests e.g. Nordic cooperation in this area.

ANNEXES

Annex 1

EVALUATION OF THE SPECIAL GRANT FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT - TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MFA) Special Grant for Environment and Development (hereinafter called "the Grant") was established as a pilot arrangement in 1984 with a budget of NOK 10 mill. The budget for 1989 amounts to NOK 59,5 mill.

The purpose of the Grant was to strengthen the competence in developing countries related to natural resource management and environmental problems and to fund specific activities within this field.

Sustainable utilization of natural resources has gradually been integrated as a priority in Norwegian development aid policies. In Government White Paper no. 34 (1986-87), this aim has been given first priority among Norwegian aid principles.

1.1. Amounts allocated for Environment and Development.

Norwegian assistance to specific environmental activities or projects and programmes where management of natual resources constitutes a substantial part, has been increased year by year. In 1985 it amounted to NOK 38 mill, in 1986 to NOK 180 mill. and 1987 NOK 268 mill.

The size of the Grant from 1984 to 1989 is shown in table 1; (mill.NOK)

1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
10,0	15,0	16,5	33,5	52,5	59,5

For the years 1984 and 1985 the Grant was distributed on the basis of received project proposals/ applications. From (and including) 1986 the budget has been divided within various departments of the Ministry at the beginning of the year as shown in table 2; (mill. NOK).

	1986	1987	1988
1. NORAD (Bilateral agency)	11,5	16,0	31,0
2. NORAD (Information div.)	0,5	6,8	2,0
3. MULTILATERAL DEPT.	3,0	5,0	13,5
4. PLANNING DEPT.**	1,5	6,4	6,0
TOTAL	16,5	34,2*	52,5

(*includes transfer from 1986 of 0,7 mill).
(**renamed Programme Dept.(PROG) in 1989)

Disbursements from the Grant amounts to (mill.NOK):

	1984	1985	1986	1987	total
Globally	1.260	1.762	7.852	16.675	27.549
Main partner co.	4.068	2.924	9.779	14.143	30.914
Other countries	4.650	6.776	1.672	3.900	16.998
Total	9.978	11.462	19.303	34.718	75.461

1.2 Channels for disbursement

The channels for allocation, disbursement and use of the Grant are several. The Multilateral Department has supported project specific activities and multi-bi projects under UNSO, UNEP, The World Bank, IIED, PANOS, ESCAP, IMO and UNESCO.

NORAD´s part of the Grant has partly been administered by its Division for Agriculture and Rural Development(renamed the Natural Resources Management Division in 1989) and partly by the resident representatives. In 1986 and 1987 each representative could spend up to NOK 500.000 without further authority from headquarters. In 1988 this amount was increased to NOK 750.000,-. NORAD has since the inception of the Grant used IUCN as a major channel.

A substantial part of PLAN/PROG´s allocation has also been channelled through IUCN and IIED.

Environmental aid efforts by international non-governmental organisations(INGOs) are supported from the Grant whereas such efforts by national non-governmental organisations are funded over the regular NGO-budget.

1.3. The Grant´s guidelines.

The guidelines have been amended several times since 1984. A major revision was undertaken in 1986, emphasizing:

a. the catalytic effect of the Grant
b. the intent to increase insight and interest for the conservation of the natural resource base
c. the prevention of deterioration and "repair" of damage
d. concentration on main partner countries

Competency building and information activities in Norway were also made eligible for support. This provision was however reversed by Parliament in 1988.

Activities that have been supported can be divided into the following categories:

a. Efforts strengthening the capacity of the recipient countries
i. administrative capacity
ii. scientific competency

b. Efforts generally contributing to increase of insight and interest for the environment and the conservation of the natural resource base
i. courses and seminars
ii. information activities

c. Efforts that relate to collection of data/preparation of surveys concerning the environment

d. Efforts implying elaboration of national conservation strategies

e. Support to research

f. Specific activities contributing to
i. prevention of deterioration of the natural resource base
ii. "repair" of damage

g. Specific efforts in connection with

i. desertification
ii. deforestation
iii. pollution
iv. erosion damage/loss of top soil
v. riverine systems
vi. ecosystems

1.4. Geographic distribution.

During the first two years 38 % of the Grant were used in Norway's main partner countries. For 1986 and 1987 this part was increased to 81%. Both the main partner and other recipient countries mainly fall within the group of LDCs.

1.5. Purpose.

The main purpose of the Grant today is to contribute to the strengthening of administrative capacity and scientific competency in the recipient countries and to fund specific activities in order to prevent deterioration of the natural resource base. Integration of environmental concerns in the development efforts of these countries is thus a major aim.

Another important purpose is to contribute to the integration of environmental concerns within Norwegian funded bilateral and multilateral projects/programmes and to the enlargement of the assistance to specific environmental projects

1.6. Management and Administration.

The administration of the Grant has since its inception undergone changes from a centralized to a more decentralized system. The role of the Advisory Committee for Environment and Development was in 1986 limited to assessment of applications exceeding NOK 1 mill and/or activities of principal interest. Previously it had assessed all applications. Decisions concerning all other applications were decentralized to Multilateral Department, NORAD,

Planning/Programme Department and Information Division withi a financial frame proposed by Planning/Programme Department and approved by the Secretary General. The latter was authorized to approve projects exceeding NOK 1 mill. up to 2 mill.

The Ministry of Environment has during the 1984-86 period received all project proposals for consideration and also forwarded proposals in their own capacity. Its role in the assessment was reduced in 1986.

2. OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF THE EVALUATION.

The main purpose of the Evaluation is to provide a basis for MFA's considerations regarding the continuation of the Grant as one of several instruments in the implementation of Norwegian assistance to environment and development. The evaluation shall analyse the purpose and use of the Grant in relation to Norwegian policies as well as recommendations by the World Commission on Environment and Development(WCED).

An important objective of the evaluation will be to find out whether the Grant has contributed to increased emphasis on environmental considerations in general Norwegian assistance and whether activities initially supported by the Grant have been continued through support from regular Norwegian aid or have been funded by recipient countries or multilateral organisations.

The Evaluation will include desk studies based on existing documentation in MFA/NORAD archives, interviews with MFA/NORAD staff and other resource persons. Information will also be gathered from institutions and persons in Norway, recipient countries and selected multilateral and international organisations who have received allocations from the Grant.

3. SCOPE OF WORK

The evaluation shall comprise but not necessarily be limited to review, assess and analyse the following:

3.1. Objectives and Framework

The team shall:

3.1.1.assess whether the development objectives of the Grant are concise, clear and realistic in relation to the overall objectives of Norway's assistance to environment and development and the recommendations of the WCED.

3.1.2.discuss and assess the concurrence between objective, strategy and the utilisation of the Grant.

3.2.Utilisation, Follow-up and Control of the Grant

The team shall:

3.2.1 list and categorize all activities supported according to the criteria outlined in the Introduction,

3.2.2 assess whether the Norwegian priorities of support concur with identified problem areas and priorities of some main recipient countries.

3.2.3 assess whether the Norwegian funded activities have been integrated into the administrative system of the recipient countries.

3.3 Management and Administration

The team shall:

3.3.1. describe and assess the management model for the Grant, particularly the division of functions between the various MFA/NORAD departments concerning policy-coordination, planning and operation. Probable consequences of this division shall be assessed on choice of activities for support, administrative procedures and practice.

3.3.2. assess the appropriateness of the criteria for distribution of the Grant between the Planning/Programme Department, the Multilateral Department and NORAD.

3.3.3 The internal administration of the Grant within the involved departments shall be assessed in relation to:

- routines and regulations relating to applications for Grant funds
- approval procedures and decision-making relating to the advisory role of "Kontaktutvalget for miljø/bistand"
- planning and implementation procedures
- procedures related to reporting/monitoring and dissemination of experience gained
- budgetary coordination and control systems
- use of adequate competency in the management of the Grant.

3.3.4 assess the adequacy of cooperation between the MFA and the Ministry of Environment in the administration of the Grant

3.3.5 assess the appropriateness of the cooperation between MFA/NORAD and IIED and IUCN. We refer to separate terms of reference for the evaluation of IUCN.

3.3.6 analyse the particular role of the resident representatives with regard to identification of potential support activities and the allocation of their share of the Grant.

3.4 Role and Effects of the Grant

With regard to the bilateral, multi-bilateral and multilateral aid programmes.

3.4.1 assess the catalytic effect of the Grant, i.e. whether the Grant has contributed to increased attention and improvement in aid activities concerning environment and development. It shall be considered whether activities funded from the Grant might have been or have become

financed from ordinary budgets. If ordinary financing of the selected activities has been available, the team shall discuss whether financing has been justified by other reasons (e.g. minimizing delays).

The Grant's financial size shall be considered in relation to its overall aims and its possible function as a substitute for funding from regular sources.

3.4.2 assess the impact of Grant-funded activities in rleation to the main objectives of Norwegian development assistance and the recommendations of the WCED with regard to population, gender, sustainable use of natural resources, life support systems and genetic diversity. Particular emphasis shall be given to effects such as awareness-raising and impacts related to the strengthening of administrative and scientific capacity.

3.4.3 examine the effectiveness and efficiency of the various aid channels used and identify what consequences these have had on the selection of individual activities, implementation and catalytic effect.

3.4.4 the degree of participation by target beneficiaries at all levels in the project cycle shall be assessed.

4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 The team shall present conclusions regarding

- the extent to which the aims of the Grant have been achieved
- effectiveness and efficiency of supported activities
- the relative effectiveness of various channels of assistance
- adequacy of aims, strategies, financial frame, criteria, regulations and procedures.

4.2. The team shall discuss future options regarding prolongation or termination of the Grant and i.a discuss future financial frames, priorities,aims, guidelines, support categories, choice of channels and administrative routines.

5. REPORTING

A Draft Report comprising of findings, conclusions and recommendations on all points under para. 3. and 4. above shall be presented to MFA by 1 September 1991. The Final Report shall be prepared within three weeks after receipt of the MFA's comments on the Draft Report.

Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 21.03.1991

TERMS OF REFERENCE (T.O.R.)

for an

EVALUATION OF NORWEGIAN AID COOPERATION WITH IUCN

1. BACKGROUND

In connection with the evaluation of the Norwegian Special Fund for Environment and Development (Tilskudd til miljøtiltak i utviklingsland), the Ministry has decided to undertake a separate evaluation of the Norwegian aid cooperation with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).

2. EVALUATION ISSUES

The issues listed in the TOR for the evaluation of the special fund are also relevant for this evaluation.

In addition the following specific issues shall be covered:

2.1 Goals and policies

Delineate the explicit or implicit Norwegian and IUCN goals or interests of the cooperation. Discuss the degree of concurrence of goals, the actual and potential mechanisms for adjustments towards concurrence. This pertains particularly to environment and development but also areas like concept of cooperation with the recipient countries, poverty orientation, popular participation, gender roles, etc.

2.2 Definition of Environment and Development

Assess degree of concurrence between the Norwegian aid authorities and IUCN on interpretation of goals and priorities within the area of environment and development. Identify possible changes over time among each party.

2.3 Management and administration

Assess the adequacy of the Norwegian management, and administration of the cooperation; herunder formulation or decision on aims and strategies, modes of cooperation, and systems of reporting, communicating, budgeting, accounting and auditing.

Assess the adequacy of Norwegian procedures for commissioning assignments to IUCN, i.a. roles in

initiation and definitions of tasks, tender procedures, degree of competition, appraisals, etc.

Assess the adequacy of IUCN´s role and reponse.

2.4 IUCN´s cooperation with recipient countries

In some sampled projects, the team shall assess IUCN mode of cooperation with aid receiving countries, herunder:

2.4.1 The adequacy of mutual exchange of views and ideas with local parties towards the identification of problems, definition of priorities, formulation of project designs.

2.4.2 The adequacy of cooperation with local parties regarding project documentation, preparation, and submittal of applications for funding to NORAD or other donors.

2.4.3 The appropriateness of IUCN´s criteria as well as practice for selection of technology, materials and project personnel, including gender awareness.

2.4.4 IUCN´s policy and practice on counterpart training, transfer of knowledge and work methods/techniques as well as technology.

2.4.5 The adequacy of IUCN involvement of local parties in reporting, monitoring and drawing conclusions from the experience of completed projects (i.a. IUCN´s evaluation procedures).

2.4.6 The degree of flexibility built into IUCN´s project cycle, i.e. the IUCN´s ability to perceive and respond to changing circumstances during project implementation.

2.4.7 The adequacy of IUCN´s plans of and preparations for local takeover and independent continuation of projects after completion of IUCN involvement.

2.4.8 The cost-efficiency of IUCN´s administration in the sampled tasks (compared to possible alternatives).

2.5 Effects on Norwegian competence

Assess degree and type of cooperation between IUCN and Norwegian professionals and IUCN´s actual or potential catalytic effects on competence in the Norwegian aid administration and among other Norwegian professionals.

2.6 Conclusions and recommendations

Present conclusions and recommendations or options on paragraphs 2.1 - 2.5.

3. MODE OF WORK - REPORTING

Reference is made to the T.O.R. for the evaluation of the special fund.

Annex 2

INSTITUTIONS WHERE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED.

The evaluation of the Grant and of IUCN's role in the Grant have required a large number of interviews around the world. Institutions have been contacted in writing or on the phone, and key representatives of these have been interviewed in person or on the phone. In some cases communication has been a combination of both plus written communication. In addition, a number of individuals who have had a key involvement with the Grant have been contacted and interviewed in one or more of the above ways by the Evaluation Team.

The Evaluation has been carried out in two phases. The first phase -- the Inception Phase -- was undertaken by NIBR and DERAP, and as part of that work a large number of in depth interviews were conducted. The minutes of these interviews have played an important part in the second (main) phase of the evaluation. The institutions thus covered are therefore listed here together with those covered in the second phase.

Interviews have been carried out with people from the following institutions.

Norway
Ministry of Development Cooperation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Environment
NORAD

Tanzania
NORAD/Dar es Salaam
Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTEC)
Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources And Environment
Forest Division
National Land Use and Planning Commission (NLUPC)
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Economic Affairs
National Environment Management Council (NEMC)
Ngorongoro Conservation Area Authority
Ngorongoro Management Plan Ad Hoc Committee
Game Division
Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services
Tanzania National Parks
Tanga Regional Development Directorate
Serengeti Regional Conservation Strategy Project
Serengeti Wildlife Research Centre
East Usambara Project
Tanzania Tree Planting Foundation

Zambia
NORAD/ Lusaka

Natural Resources Department
University of Zambia
National Commission for Development Planning
Department of Energy
National Parks and Wildlife Service
Luangwa Valley Integrated Resources Development Project, including project personnel, other departments and local population
Save the Rhino Trust
Swedish Development Agency
United States Agency for International Development
Canadian Development Agency
Danish Development Agency
Finnish Development Agency

Sri Lanka
NORAD/Colombo
Forest Department
Wildlife Department
Ministry of Environment
National Environmental Steering Committee
Central Environment Authority
World Conservation Union (IUCN)
The World Bank
Moneragala District Environmental Authority
District authorities in Moneragala
Sinharaja Rainforest Conservation Project
Knuckles Rainforest Conservation Project
National Research Agency

Botswana
NORAD/Gaborone
IUCN Botswana Office
Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing
Kalahari Conservation Society
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
Forestry Association of Botswana
Botswana Society
Ministry of Agriculture
University of Botswana

International organizations
The World Bank, Washington
IUCN Head Quarters, Switzerland
IUCN Regional Office, Washington D.C.
IUCN Regional Office, Nairobi
IIED, London
LEEC, London
PANOS

Annex 3

THE DATABASE

1. Introduction

In connection with this evaluation the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a project inventory,"Statistics on the Special Grant for Environment and Development, Disbursements 1984 - 90", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1991, which follows as an unpublished enclosure to this evaluation. The report includes:

* Approved and Disbursed Amounts 1984 - 90
* Disbursed amounts per administrative units
* Disbursed amounts per administrative unit and recipient countries
* Project activities and environmental issues
* Annual disbursements per institution
* Project inventory of Grant financed projects

The statistical sources have been the Ministry/NORAD Plan-II statistics and a special questionnaire as outlined below.

2. Existing statistics

In the publication the following observations on the data on the Grant are made:

> "The source of data for these statistics and the forthcoming project inventory is the official accounting, official statistics and the internal administrative system, Plan-II. Plan-II is the only system ordering data by projects and displaying information across years. Unfortunately this system is poorly managed. Data before 1988 are rudimentary and for many projects the updating has been insufficient.
>
> To obtain a completed project inventory, the existing data regarding the disbursements of the grant had to be broken down and assigned to specific projects. These assignments were done on the base of short texts in the accounting data and consultations with the present executive officers responsible for the grant. The project information may still contain errors, these are more likely to occur in the data concerning the first years of the grant.
>
> The assignments of administrative responsibility are also prone to errors. In particular the differentiation between representatives has been difficult.
>
> Information on recipient institutions should be correct when existing, but this part of the statistics suffers from a large amount of dark holes. Data on the recipient institution is missing for 18.7% of the projects, counting for 7.4% of the disbursements. For a major part of the projects a questionnaire was sent to the respective administrative units. Among others this questionnaire asked for name and category of recipient institution. Due to that inquiry the information situation was improved for the two last years, 1989 and 1990. See the table on summary data for institutions broken down on groups, for details.

The practice of defining projects may vary between the different disbursement units, and even between the various executive officers. Sometimes relatively small disbursements are registered as many projects, where other executive officers would set up a collective project. Sometimes additional payments to a big project are registered as a project of its own, and sometimes the first disbursements are registered as one project while later disbursements have caused the creation of a new project. This practice might have no roots in the realities of the projects.

Trying not to violate the practice of the various disbursement units, some adaptions have been made to provide an easy readable project inventory, making it possible to track down each project from the first disbursement to the last or optionally to the year 1990, which is the last year covered by these statistics. Projects starting in 1991 or projects having no disbursements in the period 1984 to 1990 are not included.

The process of designating a recipient country, i.e. the country where the grant has its impact, does not follow an uniform practice. A project may one year be assigned to a specific country, while the next year it is denoted with the term "Global". Sometimes a project is assigned to a specific country solely because the recipient, e.g. a multilateral institution, has its headquarters in that country. Another reason for country assignment has been the geographical location of an international congress, etc. Some corrections have been undertaken to ensure consistency within the project inventory.

A discrepancy was discovered between the official accounting and the official statistics. Some disbursements to Kenya in 1988 was registered on projects in Sri Lanka. After correcting for these errors the totals were no longer in accordance with the official accounting. A full revelation of this discrepancy was beyond the scope of this statistical project, and the tables and project inventory are presented still containing some errors for 1988. The magnitude of the errors are NOK 0,9 mill."

The report lists all Projects with the following information:

* Project ID number. This is the code for the country where the project is implemented and a number for each project.
* Disbursing unit, which will be NORAD/Oslo, NORAD/Res.Rep., MULTI, PROG or INFO.
* Cooperating institution, which is the institution to whom the money is transferred
* Code for country where project is implemented. Projects which are not country specific have the code GLO.
* Project title
* Annual and total disbursements

In the following those tables of which are particular relevance for the main report are presented.

2. Tables

2.1. Grant disbursements

TABLE 1. GRANT DISBURSEMENTS PER COUNTRY

	Up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	TOTAL
Global	9.246	15.735	14.990	37.183	38.741	115.895
Botswana	1.698	1.905	288	659	953	5.803
Cape Verde	2.650	0	0	0	0	2.650
Ethiopia	0	0	0	100	1.204	1.304
Gambia	1.839	0	0	0	0	1.839
Kenya	2.591	2.720	4.218	4.257	2.388	16.174
Madagascar	300	0	0	163	103	566
Mozambique	0	352	662	2.053	897	3.964
Mauritania	0	1.200	130	700	0	2.030
Namibia	0	0	0	200	0	200
Niger	1.500	1.000	0	0	0	2.500
Regional Africa	200	0	2.127	3.377	0	5.704
Senegal	2.020	0	0	0	0	2.020
Tanzania	2.430	1.384	3.490	3.552	3.181	14.037
Uganda	0	450	648	2.944	4.669	8.711
Zambia	2.827	2.462	1.661	894	509	8.353
Zimbabwe	1.622	2.504	680	1.896	758	7.460
Sum Africa	**19.677**	**13.977**	**13.904**	**21.095**	**14.662**	**83.315**
Brazil	0	0	0	1.100	0	1.100
Central America	1.817	1.250	0	210	0	3.277
Chile	0	0	0	90	79	169
Mexico	0	0	0	1.050	0	1.050
Nicaragua	136	0	653	1.433	3.485	5.707
Regional America	0	0	0	185	311	496
Sum America	**1.953**	**1.250**	**653**	**4.068**	**3.875**	**11.799**
Bangladesh	770	1.570	2.511	2.289	2.646	9.786
India	2.893	275	1.287	664	960	6.079
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	693	693
Sri Lanka	1.076	991	1.992	1.199	233	5.491
Malaysia	0	0	0	319	30	349
Nepal	0	0	98	101	378	577
Pakistan	754	720	1.552	2.301	3.244	8.571
Regional Asia	4.400	200	400	515	1.135	6.650
Sum Asia	**8.893**	**3.756**	**7.840**	**7.388**	**9.319**	**38.196**
TOTAL	40.769	34.718	37.386	69.735	66.591	249.205

Table 2. RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES DISBURSEMENTS (NOK MILL.)

	Up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total
Bangladesh	0	220	704	444	679	2.047
Botswana	648	173	95	659	953	2.528
India	116	60	584	486	795	2.041
Kenya	0	1.125	1.868	1.936	453	5.382
Sri Lanka	1.076	91	887	934	219	3.207
Madagascar	0	0	0	163	103	266
Mozambique	0	352	662	922	897	2.833
Nicaragua	0	0	653	1.433	695	2.781
Pakistan	0	0	0	36	422	458
Tanzania	720	0	149	674	315	1.858
Zambia	1.399	0	298	796	57	2.550
Zimbabwe	0	0	680	775	648	2.103
TOTAL	3.959	2.021	6.580	9.258	6.236	28.054

Table 3 IUCN DISBURSEMENT PER COUNTRY

	Up to 1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	Total IUCN
Bangladesh	750	1.520	1.807	1.883	1.726	7.686
Botswana	1.050	1.732	193	300	0	3.275
Central America	1.817	1.250	0	0	0	3.067
Glo	2.259	865	693	5.582	5.524	14.923
Kenya	0	0	0	0	946	946
Sri Lanka	0	900	1.605	855	7	3.367
Mozambique	0	0	0	1.131	0	1.131
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	2.160	2.160
Pakistan	0	0	238	26	2.929	3.193
Tanzania	1.710	1.184	1.835	1.331	2.759	8.819
Uganda	0	450	648	876	4.209	6.183
Zambia	1.052	342	391	0	0	1.785
Zimbabwe	1.222	980	69	1.118	110	3.499
TOTAL	9.860	9.223	7.479	13.102	20.370	60.034

Table 4. IUCN AND TOTAL GRANT DISBURSEMENT PER COUNTRY

	IUCN Disb.	Total Grant	IUCN % of Total Grant
Bangladesh	7.686	9.786	78.5
Botswana	3.275	5.803	56.4
Central America	3.067	3.277	93.6
Global	14.923	115.895	12.9
Kenya	946	16.174	5.9
Sri Lanka	3.367	5.491	61.3
Mozambique	1.131	3.964	28.5
Nicaragua	2.160	5.707	37.9
Pakistan	3.193	8.571	37.3
Tanzania	8.819	14.037	62.8
Uganda	6.183	8.711	71.0
Zambia	1.785	8.353	21.4
Zimbabwe	3.499	7.460	46.9
TOTAL	60.034	249.205	24.1

Table 5 GRANT PROJECTS IN TANZANIA (NOK MILL.)

NORAD/Oslo

		Total expend.
*	Ngorongoro Conservation and Development Project	1.706
*	Tanzania Forestry Manual	1.006
*	Serengeti Regional Conservation Study	3.748
*	East Usambara Forest Inventory	1.719
*	Tanga Marine Study	75
*	Mwanihana Forest Study	230
*	Coral Reef Study	353
*	"Our Common Future" Information	8
*	Mweka College of Wildlife Management	1.234
	Total	10.079

NORAD/Dar es Salaam

*	Land degradation study, Sukumaland	82
*	Tree Planting, Singida	426
*	Soil Conservation and Afforestation - Kigoma	38
*	Pesticide studies	45
*	Seminars, symposium and workshops	331
*	Shinyanga Soil Conservation and Afforestation	280
*	Preparation Kilimanjaro Development Programme	26
*	Photo exhibition Ngorongoro	92
*	Various training activities	186
*	Ngorongoro Commission Travel to Luangwa Valley	107
*	National Environment	75
*	Miscellaneous activities, including study tours	170
	Total	1.858

GRANT TOTAL 11.937

Table 6. GRANT PROJECTS IN ZAMBIA (NOK MILL.)

		Total expend.
NORAD/Oslo		
*	Luangwa Valley Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP)	3.566
*	National Resource Base Data Bank	1.194
*	Decentralization of the National Conservation Strategy	391
*	Production and Marketing of Exotic Charcoal	452
	Total	5.603
NORAD/Lusaka		
*	Miscellaneous activities	517
*	Scholarships concerning LIRDP	317
*	Zebra Film	317
*	Consultancy Study Wildlife Management (LIRDP)	632
*	Save the Rhino Trust	767
	Total	2.550
GRANT TOTAL		8.153

Table 7 LIST OF GRANT ACTIVITIES IN SRI LANKA (NOK MILL.)

		Total expend.
NORAD/Oslo		
*	Pre-study on environment	173
*	Sinharaja Rainforest Conservation Project	1.142
*	Knuckles Rainforest Conservation Project	965
	Total	2.280
NORAD/Colombo		
*	Miscellaneous activities, courses and conferences	583
*	Mapping Forest and Eco-systems	711
*	Youth Environment Education Program	8
*	Naresa Research	6
*	Strengthening of District Environmental Agencies	400
*	Environmental Protection and Management	1.300
*	Mobilization of Community Support for Environmental Conservation and Awareness in Moneragala District	150
*	Directory of Protected Areas in Sri Lanka	49
	Total	3.207
GRANT TOTAL		5.487

2.2. Categorization of projects

For the projects in the Project Inventory the categorization shown in tables 8 and 9 were made.

The data-collection for this categorization based on questionnaires, was decentralized to the different departments of the Ministry, NORAD and the resident representatives. The advantage of this decentralized data-collection is that those knowing the projects will provide the data. The disadvantage is the danger of inconsistency in the categorization of the projects due to different interpretations of categories and the criteria of this. The results should therefore only be taken as estimations and indications of basic trends in the data base.

Tables 8 and 9 present activities and issues addressed by NORAD projects financed by the Grant and tables 10 and 11 MULTI projects. Each project may include more than

one activity and address more than one issue. Taking this into account, the total disbursement for a project was equally divided between the checked activities. These weighed figures are then estimates of disbursements on different activities and environmental issues.

Table 8. THE GRANT AND TYPE OF ACTIVITIES (Estimates) NORAD

	Activity	No. of Projects including activity	Total NOK Mill.
a)	Estab. of inst.-adm. strength	48	22.579
b)	Seminars and conferences	43	7.534
c)	Campaigns	15	1.287
d)	Study Tours	15	2.334
e)	Scholarships	8	761
f)	Support to staffing of inst.	8	1.507
g)	Studies	41	6.477
h)	Policy Design	9	5.270
i)	Project planning, pre-studies	19	3.635
j)	Research	25	4.973
k)	Environment impact analysis	8	2.269
l)	Implementation of projects	30	11.939
m)	Information, publications, film	47	12.437
n)	Consultancies	10	2.519
*)	Not registered/unknown	84	27.083
Total disbursed			112.619

Table 9. THE GRANT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Estimates) NORAD

	Environmental issue	No. of projects addressing issue	Total NOK Mill.
a)	Desertification	25	1.854
b)	Woods and forests	55	19.888
c)	Pollution (air/water)	21	2.287
d)	Erosion/soil degrad.	28	2.541
e)	Inland water resc. prot.	17	4.507
f)	Wildlife	22	7.773
g)	Energy	20	2.030
h)	Costal zones - marine env.	16	1.946
i)	General environment	88	37.759
j)	Human development	25	3.013
*)	Not registrered/unknown	47	29.009
Total disbursed			112.619

Table 10. THE GRANT AND TYPE OF ACTIVITIES (Estimates) MULTI

	Activity	No. of Projects including activity	Total NOK Mill.
a)	Estab. of inst.-adm. strength	9	7.094
b)	Seminars and conferences	11	7.922
c)	Campaigns	2	968
d)	Study Tours	2	1.143
e)	Scholarships		
f)	Support to staffing of inst.	2	893
g)	Studies	11	11.814
h)	Policy Design	5	3.946
i)	Project planning, pre-studies	3	8.543
j)	Research	3	753
k)	Environment impact analysis	3	8.512
l)	Implementation of projects	1	525
m)	Information, publications, film	3	2.685
n)	Consultancies	7	10.471
*)	Not registered/unknown	9	19.653
Total disbursed			84.934

Table 9. THE GRANT AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Estimates) MULTI

	Environmental issue	No. of projects addressing issue	Total NOK Mill.
a)	Desertification	5	7.068
b)	Woods and forests	5	7.252
c)	Pollution (air/water)	8	12.322
d)	Erosion/soil degrad.	4	6.855
e)	Inland water resc. prot.	2	6.516
f)	Wildlife	3	6.833
g)	Energy	3	2.830
h)	Costal zones - marine env.		
i)	General environment	15	11.805
j)	Human development	5	3.790
*)	Not registered/unknown	9	19.653
Total disbursed			84.934

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