








Added costs. Added value?

Evaluation of Norwegian support through and to umbrella and network organisations in civil society

Report 5/2014





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Evaluation of Norwegian support through and to umbrella and network organisations in civil society

October 2014

Niras in cooperation with Chr. Michelsen Institute

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Note on layout and language

The layout of the document conforms to guidelines for accessibility and ease of reading, which require Arial font and left (not full) justification of the text.

Preface

Umbrella and network organisations emerged in parallel with the proliferation of Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations involved in development cooperation since the 1980s. Diverse in nature, they share at least one feature: They are instruments for public funds to support civil society in development cooperation, while also representing their members vis-à-vis the government, whether in terms of grant management or advocacy efforts. By implication, they are subject to different and sometimes conflicting expectations from stakeholders.


This report explains how, historically, the model of umbrella and network organisations was motivated and justified by a view of this organizational set-up as a preferable administrative tool to reduce the administrative workload for Norad. More recently, the emphasis have been on the 'added value' of the organisations beyond the administrative functions.

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide guidance to future Norwegian support through and to civil society umbrella and network organisations, by assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and added value of such organisations as a model. While the actual performance of the organisations is of course relevant for an assessment of the model, the aim was not to assess each one. The report should therefore not form the basis for an assessment or ranking of any of the organisations under evaluation.

We hope that the report will contribute to a fruitful discussion on how to support civil society as effectively as possible in the future.

This evaluation was carried out by Niras. The consultants are responsible for the content of the report, including the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Oslo, October 2014



Tale Kvalvaag
Director, Evaluation Department

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This report has been prepared by a team from Niras AB, Sweden, working in association with Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI). The team was composed of

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Backstopping support was provided by Kristina Mastroianni, and quality assurance by Khalil Ansara, both Niras AB, Sweden.

The evaluation team wishes to thank all levels of the eight umbrella and network organisations participating in this evaluation – for their willingness to provide information through questionnaires, focus group meetings and interviews in Nepal, Tanzania and Norway. Also the team wishes to thank the Norwegian embassies in Nepal and Tanzania for their support during the team's field visits. Finally, thanks to the Department of Civil Society, Norad and the Evaluation Department, Norad, for their comments and suggestions for improving the content of the evaluation.

Table of contents

Preface	iii
Acknowledgements	v
Table of Contents	vii
Acronyms and abbreviations	ix
Executive summary	xiii
1. Introduction	3
2. Methodology	5
3. Norwegian support to the civil society and UNOs	9
4. Development of the UNO model	11
5. Background, mandate and activities of the eight UNOs	17
6. Pathways towards change	25
7. Findings	37
8. Conclusions	89
9. Recommendations	95
Annexes	99
Annex 1 Terms of Reference	101
Annex 2 Detailed Methodology.....	109
Annex 3 Documents Reviewed.....	119

The following annexes are available for download at www.norad.no/evaluation

Annex 4 List of persons consulted

Annex 5 Strengths and weaknesses of UNO funding versus local funding

Annex 6 Management and systems of the UNOs

Annex 7 Cost-efficiency

Annex 8 Stakeholder responses

Acronyms and abbreviations

AIDS	Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
Atlas Alliance	Norwegian Umbrella for the Disabled
BAKWATA	National Council of Muslims in Tanzania
BN	Norsk Misjonsråds Bistandsnemnd
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CCT	Christian Council of Tanzania
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
Danida	Danish International Aid Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCG	Drylands Coordination Group
DfID	Department for International Development
Digni	Norwegian Umbrella building on Christian Values
DPOs	Norwegian Organisations of Disabled Persons
ECEC	Early Childhood Education Centre
EITI	Extractive Industry Transport Initiatives
FCS	Foundation for Civil Societies
FemACT	Feminist Activist Coalition
FFO	Norwegian Federation of Organisations of Disabled People
FOKUS	Forum for Women and Development
ForUM	Forum for Environment and Development
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFPID	Guardians' Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disability
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IFC	Inter-Faith Standing Committee
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
LGBT	Lesbian, Gays, Bisexual and Transsexual People
LHLI	Norwegian Heart and Lung Patient Organisation's International Tuberculosis Foundation (LHL International)
LNU	Norwegian Children and Youth Council
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MTR	Mid-Term Review
MUKIKUTE	Fight against TB and AIDS in Temeke Municipality
NAB	Nepal Association of the Blind
NABP	Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
NFDN	National Federation of the Disabled Nepal
NFU	Norwegian Association for Persons with Development Disabilities
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NMC	Norwegian Mission Council
NPN	Nepal Parent's Network
NOK	Norwegian Kroner
Norad	Norwegian International Aid Agency
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODW	Operation's Days Work
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAF	Poverty Alleviation Fund
PHU	Public Health Unit

PWYP Norway	Publish What You Pay Norway
PWDD	Person with Developmental Disabilities
Sankalpa	Women's Alliance for Peace, Nepal
Sida	Swedish International Development Agency
SINTEC	Sintef Health Research
SSE	Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia
SWC	Social Welfare Council
TB	Tuberculosis
TGNP	Tanzania Gender Networking Programme
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
TRACE	Transparency and Accountability in Extractive Industries
TZS	Tanzania Shillings
UMN	United Mission Nepal
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNO	Umbrella and Network Organisations (in civil society)
USD	United State Dollar
VDC	Village Development Committee
VNS	Friendship North South
WB	World Bank
WEGE	Women Empowerment and Gender Equality
WHO	World Health Organisation
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZAPDD	Zanzibar Association of People with Developmental Disability

Executive Summary



Executive summary

Introduction

The purpose of the evaluation was to provide guidance to future Norwegian support through and to umbrella and network organisations (UNOs) in civil society by assessing their effectiveness, efficiency and value added with regard to supporting civil society development. Eight UNOs were involved in the evaluation:

- Atlas Alliance (Umbrella Organisation for the Disabled)
- Digni (Umbrella Organisation based on Christian Values)
- FOKUS (Forum for Women and Development)
- ForUM (Forum for Environment and Development)
- PWYP (Publish What You Pay) Norway
- VNS (Friendship North-South)
- DCG (Drylands Coordination Group)
- LNU (The Norwegian Children and Youth Council)

Objectives

The objectives of the evaluation were to (i) establish and assess the theory of change and the assumptions behind the Norwegian support through and to UNOs; (ii) assess the effectiveness and added value of the support given through and to the UNOs in Nepal and Tanzania from the perspective of the intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders; and (iii) assess the effectiveness, efficiency and value added of the UNOs as compared to alternative ways to channelling support to civil society development. OECD/DAC evaluation criteria were applied assessing effectiveness and efficiency. The UNOs were first and foremost conceptualised based on the data that was revealed to the team. The particular difference between the two categories, umbrella and network organisations, was the fund management mechanism.

Methodology

The methodology included document reviews, questionnaires, focus group meetings and interviews in Norway, Nepal and Tanzania. One questionnaire was prepared for the UNO secretariats and one questionnaire was sent to 122 UNO members and network partners. A 34.2% response rate was obtained. To further strengthen the data foundation focus group meetings with randomly selected Norwegian members and network partners were conducted. Field visit activities in Nepal and Tanzania were divided into two parts. One part evaluated the

effectiveness and efficiency of all the levels of the UNO structure, and the other part sought to (i) identify alternative funding mechanisms/modalities and assess their effectiveness and efficiency; and (ii) assess the counterfactual as well as a discussion of some of the possible consequences for the UNO as a model based on the findings.

The evaluation team did not conclude on the specific work of any one of the UNOs under evaluation. We did also not assess effectiveness and efficiency of each UNO secretariat as it would risk derailing the main focus of the evaluation, namely the UNO as a model. While the evaluation addressed various aspects of the value added and cost-efficiency of the UNO model the evaluation did not attempt to balance more generally on costs and benefits of the UNO structure.

The development of the umbrella/UNOs

The umbrella structure was initiated early in the 1980s. Conditions for accessing development cooperation funds became attractive for many CSOs as self-financing of projects was reduced in the late 1970s. At the same time State funding for development cooperation increased significantly. This caused strain on Norad's capacity to manage new project proposals. Consequently Norad wanted to outsource its administration and saw the umbrella structure as a possible solution, where transaction costs and work load would be reduced since all project proposals and funding would be channelled through one unit, a Secretariat. The main problem of the umbrellas was and still is the 'conflict of interest' between the umbrella being an administrator of public funds and at the same time representing the interests of its members and network partner towards the same administration. Due to its success new umbrella organisations emerged in the 1990s with the active support from Norad.

Pathways of change

Based on a UNO secretariat questionnaire and interviews the secretariats identified change drivers and enablers for the UNOs and their members/partners to achieve their goals as follows:

Organisational learning through capacity building, supported by an understanding of context, effective communication, networking and tools application facilitated by experienced and professional North CSOs targeting other North as well as South partners.

Based on these change drivers and enablers for goal achievements a theory of change emerged and pathways of change identified. In this process a number of important questions materialised – questions that were to be answered from the findings of the evaluation.

Findings and conclusions

The findings focused on the following: (i) the UNOs' value added; (ii) management and systems of the UNOs; (iii) characteristics of UNO members and network partners; (iv) cost-efficiency of the UNO value chain; (v) the effectiveness and efficiency of the UNOs in Nepal and Tanzania; and (vi) the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative funding modalities in Nepal and Tanzania.

Based on these findings of the evaluation it was possible to answer and conclude on most of these questions raised.

Organisational learning and capacity building: We conclude that the UNO members and partners overall were effective in building the organisational capacity of South partners. The value added of the UNOs as perceived by the UNOs themselves, i.e. networking, capacity development, advocacy and human rights based approaches, seemed overall applied. We nevertheless also concluded that none of the UNOs or their North partners was engaged in serious steps towards measuring capacity building impact on their organisations or projects. Also, the results framework applied for monitoring progress and measure achievements were insufficiently designed and used by most UNOs, mainly due to lack of knowledge, practice and inconsistent use of the framework by Norad. Logical sequencing for change applying a theory of change method was entirely lacking. There appeared to be limited buy-in from the UNO secretariats to invest time and money, and build-up of a culture catering for effective performance management.

Contextual understanding: We conclude that the relations between the North and South partner seemed overall to be based on trust and mutual respect. However, in several cases the North partner engaged in supporting local partners in projects that did not fit well with the local context and was often disputed by the end-beneficiaries. For example, poverty and illiteracy levels were not addressed where they should, and Norwegian or international development concepts, such as inclusive education, seemed to be applied where reluctance prevailed among end-beneficiaries. We also concluded that lack of thorough contextual analyses limited an important understanding of how to balance in practice between service delivery and rights based advocacy. Strong correlation was found between degree of service delivery and advocacy impact.

Effective communication: Based on the shortcoming of contextual understanding we conclude that the communication the UNO secretariats' claim they exercise in their daily practices did not fully comply. Likewise, while the UNOs claimed to have systems in place to tackle any serious project deviations, the data found in this evaluation did not fully support this claim. For example, it was considered detrimental to end-beneficiaries and probably waste of resources that a problematic approach was allowed to be continued for a long period time without any intervention from the responsible UNO. We also concluded that in countries where few of the end beneficiaries know English language, there is a serious danger of elite capture.

Networking: We conclude that networking, as a key value added of the UNOs, was an important mechanism used by the UNOs and their members and network partners to facilitate development of strong organisations in the South. However, we also conclude that it was a challenge and problematic to engage a broad membership in poor countries in advocacy work that it would take years or decades to accomplish.

Partner selection: Several of the UNO members and network partners have advocacy as their main purpose, but have teamed up with organisations whose membership expect (and need) service delivery. We observed that when projects subsequently focus on advocacy with slow or poor outcomes, it created conflicts between the members/intended beneficiaries and the CSO/UNO staff and leadership. We also found that the South partners and end beneficiaries tend in some cases to be passive and not opposing a strategy or approach, developed, mainly, by the North, probably because of fear of losing funding and the network. In such situations dominance could spill over into harmful activities. We finally conclude that smaller UNO members and network partners face organisational vulnerabilities, e.g. inexperienced project management, high staff turnover and a higher number of corruption cases reported as compared to the large UNOs.


Cost-efficiency: It was not possible from the available data to differentiate clearly between the administration of project funds and networking and advocacy activities. It was therefore difficult to analyse the cost-efficiency of the UNOs in managing Norad funds – even though the general data points to low cost-efficiency. It is likely that local funding mechanisms will be more cost-efficient than the North based, but one will have to carefully consider their capacities to manage funds. The more experienced the local CSOs/UNOs the more advantages they have in this regard. Overall the cost-efficiency analysis was inconclusive.

Local versus UNO funding: We conclude that a certain number of relatively strong and well-established and professionally staffed CSOs/UNOs exist in partner countries and that this implies that local funding mechanisms through these may be more cost-efficient than the North based. However, making use of local funding modalities also entails their challenges. For example, there is some evidence of civil society concern that the merging of donor priorities in a limited number of joint funds may reduce the sources of funding for many smaller CSOs.

Recommendations

Recommendations are divided into recommendations to Norad and recommendations to the UNOs. These are listed in Chapter 9 of the Evaluation Report.

Main Report



1. Introduction

According to the Terms of Reference (ToR) the purpose of the evaluation was to provide guidance to future Norwegian support through and to civil society umbrella and network organisations (UNOs) by assessing their effectiveness, efficiency and value added with regard to supporting civil society development.

The objectives of the evaluation were to (i) establish and assess the theory of change and the assumptions behind the Norwegian support to or through UNOs; (ii) assess the effectiveness and added value of the support given through or to the UNOs in Nepal and Tanzania from the perspective of the intended beneficiaries and other stakeholders; and (iii) assess the effectiveness, efficiency and value added of the UNOs as compared to alternative ways to channelling support to civil society development.

The evaluation questions related to the objectives were outlined in the ToR and focused on the history of the UNOs and factors for their establishments and development; the perceptions of their role as ‘agents of change’ and/or as a mechanism for channelling funds; cost issues; and their areas of activities and perception of strong partnerships.

Eight Norwegian UNOs were involved in the evaluation:

- Atlas-Alliance (Umbrella Organisation for the Disabled)
- Digni (Umbrella Organisation based on Christian Values)
- FOKUS (Forum for Women and Development)
- ForUM (Forum for Environment and Development)
- PWYP (Publish What You Pay) Norway
- VNS (Friendship North-South)
- DCG (Drylands Coordination Group)
- LNU (The Norwegian Children and Youth Council)

The report is structured as follows: Following the introduction (Chapter 1) a condensed version of the Methodology of the evaluation is presented (Chapter 2), in which the UNO model is discussed. Chapter 3 describes the Norwegian support to the civil society, including support to the UNOs, and Chapter 4 provides a detailed history of the development of the UNOs. Chapter 5 describes the background, mandate and activities of the eight UNOs of this evaluation.

Chapter 6 analyses the theory of change and identifies pathways towards change for the UNOs and discusses alternative models of change.

The Findings of the evaluation is presented in Chapter 7 and cover the following: the UNOs value added, the management and systems of the UNOs, cost-efficiency as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of national UNOs and alternative structures in Nepal and Tanzania. Chapters 8 and 9 present the Conclusion and Recommendations respectively.

Detailed information is provided in the Annexes on the methodology, strengths and weaknesses of UNO funding versus local funding, UNO management and systems, and cost-efficiency. Terms of Reference, List of people met and List of documents reviewed are also presented in the Annexes.

2. Methodology¹

2.1 The UNO model/s

A central part of the evaluation has been to assess the performance of the UNOs as development agents in civil society. Based on this assessment, it has been possible to identify to which extent the UNO, as a 'model', has added value and have been able to effectively and efficiently channelling 'support'² for development purposes to civil society.

In identifying conceptually one or several UNO models for channelling support to civil society development, the team adopted a simple inductive method, whereby the data collected formed the basis for building a model or models. This enabled the team to form a picture of the manner in which the various levels of the UNO structures perceived the operation and purposes of the UNO modality and provided a growing insight into their structures and key priorities.

Based on this method we categorise the Umbrella as *a hierarchically structured organisation that distributes funding (from a donor) for development purposes to local partners and projects in developing countries through locally based member organisations*. A civil society Network is categorised by its 'flat' and 'loose' organisational structure mainly addressing advocacy and/or research related issues.³

2.2 Data collection method

The main data collection tools used for the evaluation included evaluation reports and main studies that reflect generally on the civil society development and primarily on those that address UNO related issues, as well as questionnaires (including stakeholder mapping), interviews, focus group meetings and field visits to Nepal and Tanzania.

-
- 1 This chapter outlines the key elements of the methodology. A detailed methodology is presented in Annex 2.
 - 2 The team interprets 'support' as anything from representation, knowledge management, networking, capacity building, service provision and advocacy to funding as well as any other type of support that the UNO may perform that is perceived as benefits to their members, network partners, local partners and/or projects and end-beneficiaries. As such, the methodology includes an analysis of the UNOs' self-perception of their value added.
 - 3 Some scholars emphasise that networks "rely heavily on their loose linkages for the(ir) mandate to make significant changes". Also, if "new functions were imposed on the networks (namely to act as intermediaries, providing resources and services to third parties) their capacity to meet their original functions suffered". Hearn et al (2011), p.6

Two questionnaires were used for data collection. One questionnaire developed for the eight UNO secretariats and one questionnaire that were distributed to 122 members and network partners of the eight UNOs. The team initiated two focus group meetings to further strengthen the data foundation. One focus group was composed to address the umbrella issues, comprising 10 randomly selected UNO members, and one group for network issues, comprising 10 randomly selected UNO network partners. Following an analysis of the responses to the two questionnaires the evaluation team selected a sample of interviewees during follow-up meetings with key Norwegian stakeholders.

The field work in Nepal and Tanzania included meetings with local partners and projects of the eight UNO members and partners operating in the two case countries – based on data provided by the eight UNOs. The methodological approach to the field work was divided into two: (i) First, the main purpose was to assess the effectiveness, and where possible, the efficiency of the UNOs' projects; (ii) Second, the team identified and listed all possible national UNOs and other relevant CSOs that received alternative funding, i.e. 'direct funding', 'local funds' 'multi-donor funds' or similar, from Norway or other national and international sources – the purpose being to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of these organisations against the same criteria for the Norwegian UNO structure. The main data collection method in the field was the conduction of interviews. The team also made use of the archive in the embassies as well as Norad databases.⁴

The team used the OECD/DAC criteria of effectiveness and efficiency in the evaluation. Effectiveness refers to the outcome level of the results framework of the agreement between the UNO and Norad or the projects that UNO members and network partners are engaged in. Efficiency refers to the input and output levels of the results framework. Efficiency measures the outputs in relation to the inputs and activities that are under direct managerial control of the project or programme.⁵ In addition the team assessed the value added based on its definition in the ToR: as the 'significant difference' between the UNO support mechanisms and other ways of supporting civil society development. As such the evaluation addressed added value in two manners: (i) as a comparison between UNO support and 'other ways of supporting' looking at a 'value chain' and (ii) as the UNO secretariats' self-perception of their value added, as UNOs, towards their partners in the North and the South.

4 <http://www.norad.no/no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/avansert>

5 OECD (2002/2010)

3. Norwegian support to the civil society and UNOs

In the period 2008 to 2013, Norwegian development aid totalled NOK 162 008.2 million. Of this, NOK 34 560 million, or 22%, was support to non-governmental organisations (NGOs). NOK 22 118.9 million went through Norwegian NGOs, NOK 7 398 million went through international organisations, while local organisations in the South received NOK 5 006 million.⁶ There is no sign of major changes over the period, but international and local organisations have had a much higher increase in their funding (71,1%) in this period, from NOK 1 452.6 in 2008 to 2 485.1 in 2013, than do Norwegian NGOs (20,1%), from NOK 3 489.6 million in 2008 to 4 214.9 million in 2013.

Of the total support that went through NGOs, only 5% went through the eight selected UNOs in this evaluation, while close to 60% went through Norwegian NGOs with direct agreements. Among the UNOs, Digni stands out as the largest recipient, with NOK 926 million in the period (50,1% of the total UNO funding for 2008-2013), followed by the Atlas Alliance with NOK 483 million (26,1%), and FOKUS with NOK 222 million (12%). So, three umbrellas count for almost 90% of the total support to the UNOs. The other UNOs have received less than NOK 70 million each in the same period. The total funding has been relatively stable over the time period, increasing with approximately NOK 10-20 million each year. Funding for the individual UNOs and networks has similarly been stable with a small increase each year, with a relatively larger increase for Digni.

6 www.norad.no aid statistics

Table 1 Support through UNOs 2008-2013 (NOK million)

Partner category	Partner	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Sum 2008-2013	Share 2008-2013
Umbrellas and network organisations	Atlas	79	79	80	81	80	84	483	1,00 %
	DCG	7	7	6	6	6	7	40	0,12 %
	Digni	142	143	145	151	164	181	926	3,00 %
	FOKUS	33	32	39	33	41	43	222	1,00 %
	FORUM	5	6	6	8	8	8	41	0,12 %
	LNU	8	8	10	9	9	7	50	0,15 %
	PWYP	2	2	3	3	4	5	19	0,06 %
VNS	11	12	10	11	11	11	66	0,19 %	
Total umbrellas and networks		288	289	299	302	323	346	1 848	5 %
Other Norwegian NGOs		3 202	3 277	3 321	3 216	3 387	3 905	20 308	59 %
International NGOs		829	1 125	1 197	1 501		1 467	7 398	21 %
Local NGOs		623	744	799	899	959	981	5 006	14 %
Total NGOs		4 942	5 436	5 616	5 918	5 948	6 700	34 560	100 %

Source: Norad Statistical Department

Norwegian support to CSOs is channelled through 18 main budget posts. The largest posts are post 160 *Civil society and strengthening of democracy with 28%* (NOK 9 818 million in the period), and post 163 *Emergency aid, humanitarian support and human rights with 26%* (NOK 9 003 million).

Norwegian UNOs are first and foremost funded through post 160.70: Civil society. This post constitutes 22% of the total Norwegian support to CSOs, and a total of NOK 7 636 million from 2008 to 2013. Of this, the UNOs received 21.5%.

4. Development of the UNO model⁷

The evaluation was asked in the ToR to address the question on why and how the UNO model was developed and to grasp the historical development of the UNOs as a means to identify the possible future role of the UNO concept in the architecture of Norwegian development cooperation.⁸ In the following an analysis of the history of the umbrella concept and its application in the Norwegian civil society context is presented. The history can be illustrated by describing and analysing the relationship between the Norwegian Mission Council (NMC) and Norad.

The main messages from the analysis are that the umbrella organisation developed primarily as an administrative tool that reduced Norad's transaction costs and administrative work load and at the same time represented the interests of their members towards the same funding body, Norad. Also, the analysis showed the comprehensiveness of the umbrella support to their members in capacity development and as a discussion forum for development cooperation. Norad was found to be an active player in the promotion of the umbrella/UNO structure.

4.1 The origins

On 12 November 1981, Bjørn Johannessen, Director for Private Organisations in Norad, held a speech in the NMC with the title "Framework Norad-Mission Council". This was the first time the idea about the umbrella framework concept was openly brought into the development debate in Norway. A few years later the first framework agreement based on the umbrella concept was signed between Norad and "Norsk Misjonsråds Bistandsnemnd (BN)"⁹ on 4 November 1983, covering funding for the year 1984.

In 1977 Norad introduced a reduction of self-financing administrative costs to the private organisations from 50% to 20%. This opened the door to several new and smaller organisations into the development work. At the same time the amount of funds allocated for development cooperation increased significantly. The competition for funds intensified. The result was an increased number of project applications, a trend that developed rapidly during the late 1970s and the early 1980s – putting significant strain on Norad's management capacity. This

⁷ This chapter is mainly based on Dahl (1986), Gudvangen (1996), Norad (2004) and Østebø (2013), and interviews with Bjørn Johannessen, Director of Private Organisations in Norad, from 1979 to 1986 on 7 May 2014, and interview with Terje Vigtel, Director of Civil Society Department in Norad, 2000-2004 and 2007-2013 on 19 May 2014.

⁸ Terms of Reference, p. 2-3.

⁹ BN was later, in 2011, to be renamed Digni.

consequently prolonged approval procedures for the applications. The approval process was further protracted as projects above NOK 50 000 were to be decided by Norad's Board. At the same time staff increase in the public sector had come to a stop and it was not possible for Norad to expand its capacity through staff recruitment.

Solving this situation became the main agenda for Norad and with support from different political parties in the Parliament, Stortinget, the creation of the umbrella concept in development cooperation emerged. The NMC became instrumental in the increase of Norad's development cooperation budget in the early 1980s. Its purpose was to secure own funding to NCM's members as the competition for development cooperation budgets increased and also a further factor in NMC's gradual acceptance of the umbrella structure.

4.2 The benefits of the umbrella

The NMC had worked in missionary and practical support in developing countries for more than 100 years and their members were therefore also the first organisations that received public development funds – from early 1960s. The trust in the NMC was strong and Norad's Director Nils Vogt at the time said in connection with the umbrella framework agreement in 1984: "We embark on this agreement because we know that NMC has great experience from development work and because the NMC organisations have 'sacrificing' and experienced personnel."¹⁰

Johannessen had made it clear that the umbrella concept was not only for the benefit of Norad but also for the organisations. These benefits, he claimed, included¹¹:

- Better coordination of work with administrative and economic benefits as well as the benefits of exchanging experience between members;
- Insights into the opportunities and challenges of development work in different countries and in different sectors;
- Faster approval procedures and better planning;
- Professional capacity building;
- A basis for more coherent approach for the organisation's involvement in development work;
- Improved mutual respect among organisations (no previous serious interconnectedness had been practiced; often organisations being 'one-self-enough');
- Economies of scale when involved in increasingly integrated and complex projects;
- Strengthening the professional level and understanding of development cooperation.

¹⁰ Quoted from Gudvangen (1996) p. 22

¹¹ Gudvangen (1996), p. 23-24 and interview with Johannessen.

Johannessen predicted to a large extent the exact nature by which most umbrella organisations operate today – including the relatively strong secretariats. At the time however he suggested a small secretariat comprising 2-3 well-qualified high integrity staff – an independent body that Norad could deal with directly on behalf of all its member organisations.

4.3 Early challenges

Already in 1980 the NMC stressed that a future umbrella organisation should not be above the mission organisations but have advisory status. Several ideas emerged regarding the coordination and administration of a new BN umbrella structure. It was, among others, suggested that a desk officer group, attached to Norad and not to the NMC, should deal with project proposals. There was a fear among the member organisations of being controlled by an outside entity. Also, scepticism among members emerged regarding the distribution of Norad funds and it was proposed to institute a mechanism to handle any possible complaints from member organisations.

Since the NMC did not want to ‘mix’ missionary work with development activities a de-coupling from the NMC formed the basis and potential for the BN to become a strong organisation in itself. This was however a process that many member organisations did not favour.

The BN had its own reservations as a newly formed organisation. Should the BN be a bridge, easing the connection to Norad or be a buffer that ‘blocked’ the organisations’ direct contact to Norad? Without the direct contact to Norad the large organisations would lose influence. However without solving this issue, consensus was achieved among member organisations and the umbrella became a reality.

4.4 Norad conditions and their consequences

Norad’s Administrative Regulation (Regelverk) has guided the relationship between BN and Norad and between BN and its member organisations. From 1983 to 1996 three different versions of the Administrative Regulation was practiced by Norad. The main problem, according to the UNOs and their members, has been – and still is – that often the Regulations are open for interpretation. Also, the Regulation has often been presented with no prior warning or opportunities for preparing for the transition to new routines. Today annual revisions and supplements to the Regulation are issued by Norad where templates and formats for reporting are changed.¹² According to the member organisations these regular changes to the reporting system are time consuming when doing follow-up to project proposals and monitoring. With the creation of the BN Norad aimed to balance between the handing over of new management and administrative responsibilities to the BN Secretariat whenever possible, and, at the same time demanding performance of increasingly improved and regularly changing monitoring and control mechanisms of projects.

¹² Communication with Department of Civil Society, Norad.

Over the years Norad asked the mission organisations in BN to think more strategically, to prepare exit and manning plans for their projects, perform quality assessments of all project proposals, develop policy documents and guidelines for results achievements before being eligible for funding, prepare integrated project descriptions that reflected development cooperation policies and practices, and to approve and administer projects up till NOK 250 000. This increasing transfer of responsibilities to the BN resulted in an increase in the number of staff. For example, staffing increased from 1,5 to 5 persons over a relatively short period of time, 1984-1987. At the same time BN consolidated and simplified routines to avoid recruiting new staff.

The increase in staff enabled the BN to undertake field visits to the projects as a new monitoring mechanism from the 1990s. Furthermore, the use of external consultants increased as responsibilities for internal reviews and evaluations were transferred to the Secretariat. Time was increasingly spent on preparing travel reports, assessing project progress, and reading consultants' reports.

The nature of collaboration between the BN and Norad was never 'antagonistic' but fundamentally a relationship based on personal contacts and mutual trust. In many instances the NMC was privileged and it had enough funding – often above the means by which they could carry out projects. For example, there was a budgetary underspending of NOK 87 million in the period 1984-1996.

4.5 BN as a Go-Between

Since BN was mainly the spring-off of an administrative relief process orchestrated by Norad and supported by the Storting, BN became an administrative tool for Norad. At the same time BN was expected to represent the interests of member organisations towards Norad. This has been a schism that highlights the apparent *conflict of interest* between BN being an administrator of public funds and representing its members and network partners towards the same administration.

This situation was clearly demonstrated during BN's adoption of its Women Empowerment and Gender Equality (WEGE) programme in 2007, which was primarily based on Norad's re-allocating of funds for gender equality activities. The Secretariat got strongly involved which led to criticisms from members that BN was stepping beyond its mandate. One source concluded that BN's strong involvement shed lights on how financial dependency on the State influenced the practices of the civil society sector.¹³ This example of internal tensions among members on the mandate of the Secretariat is not unique but is reflected in almost all the UNOs, to a lesser or larger extent.

In the view of several members the BN was bureaucratic – in situations 'more catholic than the Pope' in administering Norad funds and policies – an opinion mirrored in the 2004 evaluation of BN and Atlas Alliance.¹⁴ The same concerns

¹³ Østebø (2013) p. 20.

¹⁴ Norad (2004).

were expressed in the questionnaire and focus group meetings carried out by the evaluation team. The organisations want the funding, which it could not access without the BN, and the BN had to administer Norad funds and at the same time provide increased support to the organisations for them to comply with regular increasing demands for improved reporting coming from Norad.

The increasing transfer of administrative tasks to BN strengthened its power base towards its members – as well as towards Norad. However, the power base also narrowed because BN became almost fully dependent on public funds for its development work. Before project activities were mainly funded through a combination of funds from mission constituencies, at home and abroad, and from development cooperation. In addition, the BN Secretariat saw a demand for institutional and thematic capacity building of member organisations for them to fit their organisations to changing situations in the development cooperation.¹⁵

The bigger mission organisations did not need the same support as the smaller organisations from BN, if any support at all, e.g. in identifying projects and in planning. Many of these organisations already had project administrations established. This was not an area where BN should be involved. Also, the bigger organisations emphasised that it was the role of the BN simply to coordinate projects and disburse funds.

4.6 Promoting the umbrella model

By 1991 it became clear that the experiences with BN were so positive that Norad wanted to establish more umbrellas. Norad wanted to promote BN as a success story. As a result umbrella organisations started to emerge with the *active* support from Norad.

While this active Norad support gained momentum there was no official Norad policy documentation or statements issued that confirmed this active support. As such Norad's purpose with the creation of UNOs as expressed in the above analysis is based on key stakeholders, including first hand sources, involved in the process and secondary sources, e.g. studies – not on official Norad policies.

In Chapter 5 we have summarised the eight UNOs' background, mandate and areas of activities.

¹⁵ According to an Evaluation Report from 2000 the Norwegian CSOs changed their role in the 1990s from direct and field-based poverty reduction support to become institution builders and advocates for their partners, Norad (2000), p. 8.

5. Background, mandate and activities of the eight UNOs

5.1 Umbrellas

*Digni*¹⁶

Digni is an umbrella organisation that is faith-based, is locally rooted and provides services and support to its members and partners in the South. Digni's overall goal is to provide lasting results that are perceived as positive improvements for poor and marginalized men and women. Digni works in the areas of education, health and HIV/AIDS, peace and reconciliation, micro-finance and indigenous people, environment, gender equality and overall strengthening of the civil society in the South. It applies a human rights based approach. Digni supports in service delivery, advocacy and communication and capacity development. A number of specialists are employed to address the themes and areas of activities. In 2013 Digni started receiving extra funds coming from Norwegian embassies or MFA directly through Norad.

In the same way as Norad has delegated authority to make final decisions on projects and programmes to Digni, a framework agreement system has been established with three of the biggest Digni members. Two of these framework agreements started in 2013, and the third in 2014. This means that about half of the Digni project portfolio is now administrated by these three member organisations.

In connection with this "framework thinking", Digni has been focusing more on leadership and organisational development. The Secretariat is now doing two to three organisational reviews per year where all levels between the individual projects and Digni are analysed - with the aim of improving cooperation and implementation. The Secretariat has encouraged thematic learning projects and running some projects. It has also been instrumental in establishing different kinds of networks. Regular network meetings with members and partners in the global South are also part of the regular running of the Secretariat.

Digni has lifted issues where it has challenged the policy of Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). One example of this is 'religion and development'. Another issue is to call African Church leaders to Norway to challenge politicians and bureaucrats on development cooperation. Presently Digni is working on "power and partnership North/South" project and plans to publish a book on this issue this or next year.

¹⁶ This section is primarily based on Norad (2008c), interview with Digni Secretariat, the Digni questionnaire, www.digni.no.

The Secretariat manages the daily work of the organisation. The Board comprises nine members and is the responsible body for the overall direction of Digni's work between the annual General Assembly which is the highest decision-making body of Digni.

The Atlas Alliance¹⁷

The Atlas Alliance is an umbrella organisation for Norwegian organisations of disabled persons (DPOs) working within the field of disabled people's rights and on health issues (tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS) in developing countries. It was created in 1994 where several organisations for persons with disability were advised by Norad to join forces and create an umbrella structure. Several disability organisations were against the formation of an umbrella and consequently withdrew from the arrangement and received separate funding from Norad, e.g. Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted (NABP). NABP became a member again in 2005. Also, a catalyst in the establishment of the Atlas Alliance may have been the NRK's telethon (TV-aksjonen) in 1991 "A new life". The Atlas Alliance is rooted in the identity of its member organisations and their fight for human rights in Norway.

The Atlas Alliance's goal is to promote human rights and improve living conditions for people with disabilities and to fight tuberculosis in developing countries. Apart from transferring funds to its members for project implementation they are thematically focusing on organisational development, rehabilitation, education, health and regional networking. Atlas Alliance also conducts conferences and undertakes research.

Atlas Alliance has 19 members and three affiliated organisations, the latter comprising (i) LHL International (LHLI) which fights tuberculosis, (ii) SINTEC which is a large independent research institution, working among others on living conditions of people with disabilities in Southern Africa; and (iii) The Signo Foundation, which offers services to the deaf and deaf-blind people.

Atlas is managed on a daily basis by a Secretariat. It is supported by member based country, theme, technical and economic working groups/councils that link the Secretariat with member organisations.

FOKUS¹⁸

FOKUS followed shortly after the establishment of the Atlas Alliance and was initiated first and foremost through the NRK's Telethon in 1989. Forty-six Norwegian women's organisations and committees collaborated on a television fund-raiser programme called, "Women in the Third World". Experience and results from this NRK Telethon programme led to Norwegian women's organisations wanting lasting cooperation on international affairs and development. As a result, FOKUS was formally inaugurated in 1995 as an umbrella organisation actively supported by Norad.

17 This presentation is primarily based on Norad (2009c), interview with Atlas Alliance Secretariat, the Atlas questionnaire, and <http://www.atlas-alliansen.no/index.asp?id=40725>.

18 This section is primarily based on Norad (2008b), interview with FOKUS secretariat, the FOKUS questionnaire, and <http://www.fokuskvinner.no>.

FOKUS' overall goal is to work for the improvement of women's social, economic and political situation internationally, with an emphasis on countries in the South. FOKUS works on the basis of three pillars: advocacy and communication; projects; and competence development, and it has six thematic priorities: (i) sexual and reproductive health and rights; (ii) violence against women; (iii) women, peace and security; (iv) women's participation in economy and rights; (v) women's participation in politics and rights; and (vi) women and climate.

In 2008-2009 FOKUS did a transition from project to programme planning. Programmes shall be based on an overall programme strategy where the individual projects contribute to a common objective. FOKUS has decided to have three different types of programmes (i) member-based programmes, where a member organisation develops a programme with multiple local partners, possibly in multiple countries/regions; (ii) country/regional programmes, where several member organisations develop a programme with multiple local partners in a country/region but with various thematic foci; and (iii) thematic programmes, where one or more member organisations develop a programme with a thematic, but not a geographic focus, with several local partner organisations.

FOKUS is run on a daily basis by its Secretariat. The General Assembly is the annual meeting where all members are represented and where the eight members for the Board are selected.

The Friendship North-South (VNS)¹⁹

The Friendship North-South (VNS) was established in Kristiansand in 1990 with a board consisting of a few NGO representatives and primarily representatives from the local friendship groups. From 1990-1994 the secretary, supported by Fredskorpset, worked towards an independent organisation of local community groups, and in 1994 VNS got a separate framework agreement with Norad for the support of a secretariat (one person), exchange visits with the South and local information work for the friendship groups.

The goal of VNS is to work for peaceful, just and sustainable development through ordinary people's participation and cooperation. Through locally based cooperation arrangements VNS also aims to impact on people's possibilities to change their own environment. VNS operates an international network of local communities, municipalities, individuals who are engaged in mutual and equal cooperation of friendship.

As such, VNS is based on a people-to-people approach to development that aims at exchanging experience and ideas between schools and communities in the North and the South for strengthening mainly inter-cultural and development

¹⁹ This section is primarily based on Friendship North-South (2014), interview with VNS Secretariat, the VNS questionnaire, and www.vennskap.no.

understanding. To achieve this VNS works with two types of support: the School Programme, ELIMU, and the Community cooperation.

LNU²⁰

LNU was established in 1980, through the merging of two youth organisations that had been established in the early 1950s. It is an umbrella for Norwegian organisations for children and youth and has 96 member organisations of which approximately one third collaborate with partner organisations in the South. In contrast to the other umbrella organisations included in this study, LNU was not formed specifically to address development issues. LNU therefore administers funds to be distributed for activities that are taking place in local communities in Norway (including the NOK 170 million FriFond), as well funds that are earmarked for international cooperation.

LNU's international work is supported through five funds, two of them from Norad (Youth North-South and Information), two from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Democracy and the Middle East, the latter has recently been phased out), and one through Fredskorpset.

The agreement between LNU and Norad for the Youth North-South programme states that the support shall be used for projects that are run by youth, helping them to become leaders and to develop their organisations. Only democratic organisations can receive support, and the projects are to be evaluated on the basis on different criteria, including the degree to which the organisations have become more democratic, are autonomous from their mother organisations, and have influenced decision makers. The funding is very modest, ranging from NOK 30 000 to 150 000 per project.

5.2 Networks

The three networks under review in this evaluation have very different backgrounds. ForUM and PWYP Norway were established based on a campaign and preparatory work to upcoming development events, the international PWYP campaign in 2002 and the Earth Summit in 1992 for ForUM. DCG was established on the basis of the Norad funded Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia programme. While their concrete activities differ, they share a common effort in strengthening their network partners' advocacy competence and building their capacities in areas relevant to their respective themes and sectors. While action research is the prime focus of DCG portfolio, research is also included as an activity in the other two networks' portfolios.

20 This presentation is primarily based on interview with LNU's International Secretariat, the LNU questionnaire and www.lnu.no

ForUM²¹

ForUM was established in 1995 based on a group of organisations that came together in 1987 in connection with the preparations of the Earth Summit in 1992. Following the Summit efforts were made to continue the collaboration in more permanent structures. The transformation from a campaign to an organisation was turbulent where lack of ownership by partners to network-led processes challenged ForUM's mandate and its role as a network. During the following decade ForUM concentrated on influencing annual UN conferences. During this stage of ForUM's development it became necessary to institutionalise procedures for joint policy development to avoid uncertainties as to who in the network spoke on behalf of the network. From about 2007 the increasing professional strengthening of the civil society sector changed ForUM in the direction of becoming an 'agenda setter' and a 'think tank' for its partner organisations.

Government officials and politicians dealing with Norwegian and international civil society issues rely to a large extent on ForUM as a well-represented network that reflects the broad range of civil society in Norway. ForUM has influenced the civil society in at least two ways: (i) it has provided capacity building for its partner organisations to strengthen their advocacy skills and (ii) it has provided an arena for partner organisations to come together on the basis of establishing joint policy positions.

ForUM's main tasks are to manage the development of joint policies on key international development and environmental issues, and to undertake advocacy work to achieve concrete political results within chosen policy areas. It seeks to influence Norwegian officials and the positions adopted by Norway in international processes. It aims to expose contradictions and challenges across a broad range of topics relating to the environment, peace and development at national and international levels. ForUM collaborates with international networks and organisations on policy development, and assists them to participate actively in international processes. ForUM is engaged thematically working in the following areas/programmes: (i) climate and energy; (ii) finance and reform; (iii) corporate social responsibility (CSR); (iv) trade and the World Trade Organisation (WTO); (v) peace and human security; (vi) food security; (vii) fresh water and sanitation; and (viii) development cooperation.

ForUM's primary target groups are the Norwegian policy makers and decision-makers. Its secondary target group comprises delegations from other countries attending international conferences, international organisations and media. ForUM operates strategically with South partners that share its values and approach to development.

21 This presentation builds primarily on Aarholt Hegna (2011), Norad (2010b), interview with ForUM secretariat, the ForUM questionnaire and www.forumfor.no.

PWYP Norway²²

Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Norway was established in 2006 by the Norwegian Council for Africa, Norwegian Church Aid, Future in Our Hands and Transparency International Norway. The background to the international PWYP campaign was the publishing of the report “A Crude Awakening” by the British organisation Global Witness in 1999; an exposé of the apparent complicity of the oil and banking industries in the plundering of state assets during Angola’s 40-year civil war. The report concluded with a public call on the oil companies operating in Angola to ‘publish what you pay’.

The lack of transparency in the extractive industries was also of significant concern in other resource-rich but poor countries. Therefore in June 2002 Global Witness along with other large INGOs launched the PWYP campaign calling for all natural resource companies to disclose their payments to governments for every country of operation. Today the Norwegian chapter is linked to the global Publish What You Pay network, which organises and mobilises over 750 civil society organisations from over 70 countries in campaigning for transparency and accountability in the oil, gas and mining industries. The strength of the network is connected to its focussed and narrow scope. PWYP calls for companies to “publish what you pay” and for governments to “publish what you earn” as necessary accountability mechanisms for a proper management of natural resources revenues. The Norwegian chapter of the PWYP campaign network has particularly been active in (i) supporting and implementing the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)²³ process and (ii) conducting the capacity building programme, TRACE, targeting active campaigners in resource-rich developing countries.

PWYP Norway works through the following: (i) network building, facilitation and coordination activities, nationally and internationally; (ii) provision of analysis, knowledge building and political advocacy work; (iii) contribute to country-by-country reporting standards; (iv) serve the Norwegian EITI multi-stakeholder working group together with other CSOs, the government and the private sector; (v) inform on its work, including a newsletter; and (vi) support capacity strengthening of civil society.

The PWYP Norway’s highest decision making body is the Annual General Assembly, which elects the Board. The Secretariat is responsible for carrying out the work areas. All PWYP chapters are formed as national coalition with autonomous and independent platforms. PWYP Norway has 19 mostly large CSO and INGO members but includes also private sector representatives, e.g. Industry Energy. Members of PWYP worldwide coalitions of CSOs/NGOs must adhere to the membership principles, which are to advocate for the mandatory disclosure of payments made by the extraction industry companies to all national government on disaggregated and country-by-country basis.

22 This presentation builds primarily on interview with PWYP Norway Secretariat, the PWYP questionnaire, and <http://www.publishwhatyoupay.no/>.

23 <http://eiti.org/>

Drylands Coordination Group (DCG)²⁴

Drylands Coordination Group (DCG) was established in 1997 by Norwegian People's Aid, Norwegian Church Aid, Development Fund Norway, CARE Norway, ADRA Norway and Strømme Foundation and defines itself as a 'development research network'. DCG was established based on the former Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia (SSE) programme, which was funded fully by Norad. The SSE programme was established in the mid-80s to address the recurring and devastating droughts in the Sahel through a massive effort through both research and development aid, and the cooperation between these sectors. Although DCG is a CSO driven forum, it also constitutes a platform for mutual sharing between CSOs and government organisations, research institutions and policy making institutions in Norway, Ethiopia, Sudan and Mali.

Today, DCG is a network consisting of 77 member organisations: 43 in Mali, 20 in Ethiopia, 8 in Sudan and 6 in Norway. DCG has funded 57 projects in the project period (2008-2013). DCG projects include action research, studies, workshops, capacity building and policy work, on topics like sustainable dryland agriculture, conflicts over resources in pastoral areas and water harvesting. In 2014 DCG is implementing 10 projects.

Over the years there has been a move in DCG's focus from natural resources and conservation to people in development. The DCG network has expanded and there has been a focus on recruiting different types of members to make sure that the national networks represent the different sectors and actors involved in development. Concurrently with this expansion initiative and responsibility for the content of DCG's projects has moved from Norway to the national level in the South. The projects are designed and implemented by the national DCG groups, and aim to create synergy effects, build capacity and be relevant and applicable also outside of DCG.

DCG has gone from implementing a mix of short term and long term projects, to having a more solid focus on longer term projects, of three to four years. Both experience and evaluations indicated that DCG's best results stem from the longer term research projects and a strong commitment to a thematic area.

24 This presentation builds primarily on Norad (2007), interview with DCG Secretariat, the DCG questionnaire and <http://www.drylands-group.org/>.

6. Pathways towards change

6.1 Theory of change

6.1.1 Framework for theory of change

The basic elements that make up a suitable theory of change (ToC) model will normally include (i) *the understanding of the context* in which a project is able to influence change; (ii) *the long-term change* that the project seeks to support and for whose ultimate benefit; (iii) the *logical sequence* of the change that is anticipated to lead to the desired outcome; and (iv) the *assumptions* about how these changes might happen.²⁵

As for the ToC model it is reasonable to assume that the focus of the overall change would be identified within the framework of the Norwegian civil society policy as it is formulated in the Principles for Norad's support to Civil Society in the South.²⁶ The Principles highlight several themes and issues for the context and long-term changes. These particularly include the following: fight against poverty, oppression and corruption; the strengthening of partnerships; South-South collaboration; emphasising South partners' development priorities; and meeting end-beneficiaries' needs. These are, in the view of the evaluation team, the most important issues addressed in the Principles, and as such of critical importance for the evaluation to assess the UNOs' compliance to these Principles. In this context it is worth mentioning that the Atlas Alliance seems to be the only UNO that has the Principles included on its website.

Using the Principles as policy guidance for change in the civil society sector a logical sequencing for achieving those changes can be observed from two different perspectives: (i) the UNOs involved in development cooperation and (ii) Norad, the fund provider.

²⁵ Vogel (2012), p. 14.

²⁶ Norad (2009a)

Table 2 Goals of the eight UNOs

UNO	Goal/aim
Atlas	Atlas Alliance's goal is to promote human rights and improve living conditions for people with disabilities and to fight tuberculosis in developing countries
Digni	Digni's overall goal is to provide lasting results that are received as positive improvements for the poor and marginalised men and women
FOKUS	FOKUS' overall goal is to work towards the improvement of women's social, economic and political situation internationally, with an emphasis on countries in the South
LNU	LNU's aim is to contribute to strengthening the role of child and youth organisations in the development of a sustainable civil society
VNS	VNS's aim is to gather municipalities, organisations, groups, institutions and individuals for active friendship cooperation, developing human rights, promoting solidarity and cultural understanding and contacts, democracy and sustainable development between Norway and developing countries
PWYP Norway	PWYP Norway aims to organise and mobilise civil society organisations in resource rich countries in campaigning for transparency and accountability in the payment, receipt and management of revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries
ForUM	The ForUM community's goal is to manage the development of a joint policy on key international development and environmental issues
DCG	The overall goal of DCG is to contribute to improved food security for vulnerable households and communities in the drylands of Africa with activities in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali and Sudan

Source: UNO-Norad agreements, UNO websites.

6.1.2 Principles for change from a UNO perspective

From a UNO perspective the Principles for change should be achieved through the main goals and visions of the UNOs. As can be seen in Table 2 the main goals/visions of the UNOs are almost all in line with several of the changes outlined in the Principles, namely, addressing human rights issues, improvements of livelihoods of the poor and marginalised, strengthening the people-to-people approach, advocating for transparency and accountability, and policy development for the betterment of the poor. While some of the UNOs have a direct focus on poverty and marginalised target groups (Atlas Alliance, Digni, FOKUS and DCG) others focus mainly on the people-to-people approach (VNS and LNU) while the goals of two of the networks (ForUM and PWYP Norway) primarily reflect on strengthening of partnerships for policy changes nationally and internationally.

For the UNOs the means and ways of achieving their goals vary as can be seen from Table 3. They include a broad-ranged set of project activities and outputs related to advocacy, capacity development, organisational development for the UNOs themselves and their members and partners as well as research,

networking, communication and information sharing and knowledge management.

In the UNO secretariat questionnaire some of the organisations referred to the role that they and/or their members and partners have played in *changes* at the national policy level. Examples include changes in legislature that has helped the target group (Atlas Alliance); participating in the constitutional review process in Tanzania (FOKUS); successful inputs to ethical guidelines in Norway and international treaties (ForUM), and the adoption of research techniques in national plans and regional policies (DCG, VNS). Other examples include successful accomplishments at the local level, e.g. service delivery to individuals/communities and at the national level, e.g. a new section established in a ministry (Atlas Alliance).

Table 3 Contributing outputs for achieving UNO outcomes

UNO	Description of outputs
Atlas	Projects/programmes related to Organisational development, Community based rehabilitation, Inclusive Education and Health, Conferences and Research
Digni	Advocacy and communication, Competence development and Projects/Programmes covering Education, Health and HIV/AIDS, Peace and Reconciliation, Microfinance, Indigenous People, Environment, Gender equality, Human Rights and Civil society
FOKUS	Advocacy and communication, Competence development, Projects/Programmes (76 South projects carried out by 14 members) covering (i) sexual and reproductive health and rights, (ii) violence against women, (iii) Women, peace and security, (iv) Women's participation in economy and rights, (v) Women's participation in politics and rights, (vi) Women and Climate.
LNU	Projects / programmes and capacity building for Youth, Children, Women and the Environment / climate
VNS	Communication and dialogue, Conferences, Competence development, and Programme funding and management (Exchange-SPOR, Community and School-ELIMU)
PWYP Norway	Knowledge management / production, Information exchange, and CSO collaboration and capacity development with the South
ForUM	Thematic Programmes on Climate and Energy, Finance and Reform, Corporate Social Responsibility, Trade and the WTO, Peace and human security, Food security, Fresh water and sanitation, Development cooperation. In addition Information and lobbying and South collaboration
DCG	Projects/Programmes/research (57 projects conducted from 2008-2013, 10 projects ongoing in 2014) covering Action research, Policy research, Communication and policy work and Capacity building

Source: UNO-Norad agreements, UNO websites

Several UNOs stated in the questionnaire that the most vital *change driver* was *organisational learning* through *capacity building* of partner organisations in the South. Through these capacity-enhancement processes it is logically assumed that the skills and learning transferred to and the organisational strengthening built up of member and partner organisations have a positive impact on the delivery of advocacy and services through project activities aimed at end-beneficiaries.

What enables these drivers to move towards meeting the needs and solve the problems of the end-beneficiaries was also asked for in the questionnaire. The responses can be summarised as follows:

- Increased focus on themes reflected in national and international development challenges;
- Strengthening communication skills for partner organisations;
- Organisational learning for achieving outputs/goals of partner organisations, e.g. influencing development policies, setting priorities, use of development tools, adaptability to local situations;
- Experience and know-how of secretariats and members involved in South work;
- Extensive international network in North and South – involvement of and collaboration with South partners, and application of participatory approaches;
- On-going need for professionalising partner organisations' performance;
- Close dialogue based on people-to-people dialogue.

While there may be different views and overlap of what the drivers are and what the *enablers* are in the change process, we may well conclude that the key drivers/enablers for the UNOs to achieve their goals can be summarised as presented in Box 1.

Box 1 Drivers/enablers of the UNO change process

Organisational learning through capacity building, supported by an understanding of context, effective communication, networking and tools application facilitated by experienced and professional North UNOs targeting North as well as South collaborating partners.

None of the UNOs had prepared theories of change or explicit logical sequencing for the achievement of their organisational goals.

6.1.3 Principles for change from a Norad perspective


From a Norad perspective the ToC must take a different point of departure. It was primarily the need for outsourcing administrative tasks that drove Norad to initiate the UNO concept, not a development perspective. As the outsourcing of administrative responsibilities to the umbrellas increased over the years, it reduced Norad's transaction costs as well as its work load with regard to the management of the UNOs. As such, more resources were released for Norad to

address more strategic and development policy related issues.²⁷ 'Pathways of change' however seem to lack between Norad's original reasons for creating the umbrella model and Norad's development of civil society policies.

6.1.4 Theory of change for the Norwegian support to UNOs

Figure 1 shows the different perspectives from Norad and the UNOs – their different logical sequencing for goal achievements. As a result of the increased funding for civil society support and the subsequent administrative constraints in Norad (1) the UNOs were created (2) with the purpose to reduce Norad's transactions costs and staff work load (3). This released resources for policy development and cooperation effectiveness (5) leading Norad to guide development agents, including UNOs, to achieve the policy goals in civil society as presented in civil society policies, expressed in the latest policy document, the Principles (6).

Figure 1 Theory of Change for the Norwegian support to the UNOs



The UNO creation and the logical link towards the achievement of Norwegian civil society goals (6), described in the Principles, goes via the achievement of the UNOs goals (4) which are phrased in the UNOs' framework agreements with Norad.

²⁷ It must be noted that this statement is an assumption formulated by the team which cannot be verified entirely through discussions or interviews with former and current key stakeholders in Norad.

6.1.5 Theory of change for the UNOs' goal achievements

In our model, 'pathways of change' are missing from the creation of the UNOs (2) to the achievements of their goals (4). Questions must therefore be asked what links the establishment and consolidation of the UNOs to the likelihood of them achieving their development goals. Only in this manner is it possible to identify the "added evidence-based value beyond the extra costs incurred" through the different levels of the UNOs²⁸ and other identified value added.²⁹ These questions must be based on the identified key drivers and enablers for the UNO change process as described in Box 1. In doing so hidden pathways on the road from the UNO structure to its goal achievements will emerge. The questions include:

- **Organisational learning and capacity building:** Are application and organisational impact of the capacity building activities assessed and what tools are applied for this to happen? Are effective monitoring and evaluation tools applied for measuring application and impact on the UNOs goals?
- **Understanding of context:** Are contexts understood at different levels of the UNO and thoroughly addressed in projects? Are partner organisations selected based on the likelihood of them contributing to the achievements of the goals of the UNOs/member organisations and network partners? Are effective methods applied that identify the real needs and issues that are of concern to end-beneficiaries? Are projects designed based upon these needs and realistically addressed for achievement? What procedures and processes are the UNOs applying at each level that guarantee that end-beneficiaries' real needs are met and assessed on a continuous basis for changes over time?
- **Effective communication:** Are communication flows designed to ensure effective messaging of the concerns of the end-beneficiaries and addressing those concerns for resolve?
- **Networking:** Are networking undertaken as to effectively address end-beneficiaries concerns and development and rights' needs? What logical steps are taken by the UNOs to ensure that resources spent on networking at each level are targeted and to the benefit of the end-beneficiaries?
- **Tools development:** Are tools developed and applied within the UNO structure relevant, targeted and used effectively to meet the needs of the end-beneficiaries? Or may they be duplicated and ineffectively distributed and used?
- **Selection of partners:** Are the North UNOs effectively addressing the real civil society as they may be expressed in social, traditional and/or religious movements in developing countries? Or do they limit themselves to selecting

28 Det kongelige Utenriksdepartementet (2014), p. 159

29 See Chapter 7.1 The UNOs' value added

and collaborating with 'modern', institutionalised and like-minded CSOs in developing countries?

- **Cost-efficiency:** Is the UNO structure cost-efficient, expressed in the administrative and salary costs assessed against the total UNO funding?

The ToC cannot be understood or 'completed' unless several of these and related questions have been logically and reliably answered. While it has not been possible to address all of the above concerns the evaluation team has aimed at addressing as many as possible. As such, the 'completion' of the ToC is to be understood from (i) the answers that this evaluation has managed to provide as well as from (ii) internal discussions in each UNO on how more effectively achieving its results. 'Pathways' linking (2) to (4) are illustrated in Figure 2.

The answers are first and foremost based on the Findings of the evaluation, Chapter 7, and the relationship between these findings and the pathways towards change is presented in the Conclusion, Chapter 9.

6.1.6 Alternative models of change


Historically, support to the Norwegian CSOs, including the UNOs, has been based on their credibility towards Norad/MFA and the public as reliable providers of capacity development and transfer of experience to the civil society in the South. The credibility of the South partners has been their representativeness of the civil society in their recipient countries. Partnerships have been established on these grounds which legitimised development cooperation to the civil society. The power of this partnership has indisputably been with the North partner through which Norwegian funds were channelled.

This perception has gradually changed over time and there is currently an increased focus among many development agencies on strengthening the support to the South civil society. The background to this is partly that many of the national CSOs have grown stronger and more mature over time.³⁰ As such Norad perceives that South CSOs could under certain circumstances take the lead in partnerships established between Norwegian actors and the South partners. This re-direction of the civil society support and policy is hinted at in the 2009 Principles and discussed in other Norad documents.³¹

³⁰ These issues are well described and discussed in Danida (2013), pp. 38-43.

³¹ Norad (2012b), Norad (2013a)

Figure 2 Theory of Change for UNOs' goal achievements



Therefore it makes sense to take this approach as point of departure for considering alternative models for change. A few examples related to an alternative theory of change are presented below.

One programme supported in the Accountability Tanzania Fund has, for example, developed one of several ToC models where “successful change comes about through alliances of dissimilar actors – social movements, churches, sympathetic officials and private sector champions. If people can come together around a simple, winnable aim, this has a galvanizing effect that helps to overcome fear.”³²

In addition, the ToC model for the same programme included a closer look at “the local building blocks of more permanent, stable organisations – churches and mosques, saving groups, village militia, faith healers, cultural groups.

32 Vogel (2012) p. 32

Exploring and understanding this local granularity could help to identify potential allies, and to understand the political economy of change at the local level.”³³

Terje Vigtel, the former Director of Department of Civil Society, Norad, has a similar take on this ToC model, in relation to Africa. On his blog³⁴ he provides examples of what constitutes the African civil society, and concludes that “the strong civil society actors in Africa are not modern, well-organised NGOs but churches, traditional leaders, scout movements, urban unemployed youth, sports clubs, unions and other social movements,” and he states that “religious groups and traditional leaders should be important cooperation partners for Norwegian CSOs.”³⁵

He further argues that these groups and leaders can be a challenge to normally accepted Norwegian and politically correct values because they can “appear old-fashioned with inappropriate attitudes and values”. But being firmly grounded and with roots in the civil society these groups are to be taken seriously if real development for the benefits of the poor is to be effectively addressed. While acknowledging that local culture and structures are a part of the poverty problem there is deep concern also among these leaders and groups over poverty issues, the spreading of HIV/AIDS, increasing number of orphans and migration to urban areas.

Information from the team’s field work shows the likelihood of success in applying this approach to addressing civil society strengthening. For example, within the cultural and ‘religious’ domain it was possible for Christians to act as mediators in conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in Nepal, and in local Muslim communities in Tanzania local imams had abandoned the practices of female genital mutilation.

6.1.7 Local vs. UNO funding

In the following we have assessed some of the weaknesses and strengths of disbursement of funds through local funding mechanisms as opposed to funding through the UNO types of structure. The basis for this assessment is primarily team member experiences.³⁶ The strengths and weaknesses have been viewed from different perspectives that have been considered important for managing funds professionally and efficiently. They include:

- Understanding Norad’s rules and regulations, compliance, and accountability
- Understanding and applying Norad’s approach/objectives to development
- Affiliation with Norad/embassy
- Learning and transfer of knowledge to manage funds
- Capacity to manage fund
- Knowledge of the local context and relevance of the funded projects

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ <http://bistandogutvikling.blogg.no>

³⁵ http://bistandogutvikling.blogg.no/1383125561_tradisjonelle_og_reli.html

³⁶ The team also interviewed KPMG Tanzania which is an effective international fund/grant manager being locally represented. However, here we have only looked at local funding as funds/grants being managed by local CSOs or Norwegian CSOs with local representation.

The detailed analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of each of these perspectives are presented in Annex 5. Here follows a brief summary of the analysis.

The UNOs strengths lie in their historical accountability and access to Norad as well as their understanding Norad's rules and development objectives. International experience and strong capacity to manage funds is key to the donor; it requires fewer resources, before local partners will be able take up at the same professional level. Knowledge of local context enables the UNOs to capitalise on these in their advocacy efforts.

The potential strengths of a local funding mechanism is bound to its ability to gain from a learning by doing approach, and its ability to better understand and apply Norad's framework for compliance and accountability, and approaches to development. The potential close affiliation to the embassy could be capitalised upon with respect to work culture and policy dialogue. Also, projects are likely to be more relevant and often more cost effective applying local funding.

On the weakness side, the UNOs often put stringent rules and work load upon local partners for effective compliance to Norad rules. UNOs may also prioritise less local needs and rather follow official Norad/international policies. Also, the UNOs are in most cases seen as the dominant partner in a skewed power relationship due its access to finances. Likewise the UNOs will have an interest in stressing their own value added at the expense of the local value added of direct assistance. Lack of local knowledge may seriously affect the UNOs capacity to manage funds, and projects that are out of context may affect the UNO reputation which may extend to Norad.

Weaknesses of local funding lie with the requirements of building up new skills and understanding of compliance and control systems, and the financial and human resources required from Norad/embassy. The number of agreements for Norad/embassies to administrate would increase, yet administration could be outsourced.

The current trend is that more and more CSOs and INGOs – and even medium sized CSOs – are moving their headquarters or parts of their organisations from the North to the South. This is often legitimised in that the North CSO will then have proximity to the 'reality' in the countries they operate.³⁷

Within the same framework of managing funds locally as opposed to from the North the above strengths and weaknesses – while to some extent being somewhat stereotyped – may indicate that local funding mechanisms could be more cost-efficient the more experienced and solidly founded the local CSOs are.

³⁷ In connection with Oxfam's decision, in May 2014, to move its headquarters to the South it was noted on one of the professional media (LinkedIn) that "(w)hy should Oxfam Int'l be praised for moving its office? I doubt that local beneficiaries are going to be impressive by this largely symbolic move. The HQ leadership and staff might be more proximate but the gulf between locals and expats will remain. Colonial administrators also maintained offices in the colonies but ignored the interests and aspirations of the people. Attitudes and practices matter more than where an office is located."

Considering the premise that a significant number of relatively strong and well-established CSOs exist in partner countries, as confirmed to some extent in this evaluation, it is likely that local funding mechanisms will be more cost-efficient than the North based. While the UNO cost-efficiency analysis was overall inconclusive, indications in the figures from the cost-efficiency analysis appeared to show a trend towards lower efficiency, see Chapter 7.4.

7. Findings

In the following the main findings of the evaluation are presented. They include the following sub-chapters and headings:

- 7.1 The UNOs' value added
- 7.2 Management and systems of the UNOs
- 7.3 Characteristics of UNO members and network partners
- 7.4 Cost-efficiency of the UNO value chain, and
- 7.5 The effectiveness and efficiency of the UNOs in Nepal and Tanzania
- 7.6 The effectiveness and efficiency of alternative funding modalities in Nepal and Tanzania

Chapters 7.1 to 7.4 have been analysed primarily based on document reviews, two questionnaires, focus groups discussions and interviews with key stakeholders in Norway. Chapters 7.5 and 7.6 have been analysed primarily based on document reviews, field visits, focus group meetings and interviews with key stakeholders in Nepal and Tanzania.

7.1 The UNOs' value added

The UNO secretariat questionnaire asked the following: “What difference and possible added value does it have for the final beneficiaries that the support is given through a UNO?” Based on the answers from the eight secretariats five areas turned out to be particularly in focus: networking, capacity development, knowledge sharing and learning, advocacy, and human rights. Also, service delivery is briefly discussed.

7.1.1 Networking

All UNOs are involved in networking. Through networking UNOs develop solidarity with member organisations and partners in their areas of mandate. Atlas uses networking for promoting rights of disabled persons. It facilitates for international networking and experiences, and network itself regionally and globally. Digni initiates networks where members work together to develop methods and learn from each other. Digni also facilitates regional network meetings where members and their partners meet together with Digni staff. Different thematic areas are addressed at these meetings, for example organisational leadership and development, gender empowerment and rights based development. FOKUS networks with national and international organisations working in the field of women's human rights, draws lessons

across the variety of countries and themes that they are involved in – and applies this practically in programme work on the ground. During the last ten years, five FOKUS networking conferences were organised in order to establish contact between like-minded organisations across countries and continents to share strategies and experiences as well as important lessons learned. ForUM is actively involved in national and international networks for the benefit of poor and marginalised people, especially in developing countries. ForUM uses networks to bring policy issues and recommendations to the table involving South partners. LNU uses network for strengthening the knowledge of member organisations and to exchange experiences and guide the organisations in their work. PWYP Norway works together with different organisations and unions of a non-financial character and promotes transparency. VNS is involved in organising networks and capacity building activities for promoting good governance, result based management and voluntarism.

7.1.2 Capacity development

Like networking, all UNOs are involved in capacity development. Atlas carries out organisational capacity assessments, enabling members of the Alliance and their partners to plan, focus and monitor their work for greater effect, which leads to strengthened local ownership. Digni initiates capacity building of members to develop methods and learn from each other. FOKUS provides training for members and partners, both in Norway and in partner countries. These courses cover a range of topics, e.g. result based management and corruption prevention. Standardised, but at the same time adjustable training programmes improve the organisations' efficiency, and thereby benefiting the final beneficiaries. ForUM provides capacity support to South partners in advocacy enabling them to participate in international advocacy work. Support includes pre-conference training, translation of essential materials and support for travel expenses for South partners to international meetings. LNU provides guidance and capacity building to ensure quality in the projects of the member organisations. VNS integrates its follow-up to projects with capacity building and network services. In this way the final beneficiaries become a part of the organisation, they "own" VNS, and they take part in formulating strategies, organising the network and capacity building activities.

7.1.3 Knowledge sharing

Atlas has facilitated knowledge sharing related to competence development, informal and formal training, discussions and dialogue with member organisations. Digni has an overview of all the work that is supported through Digni and shares with its members learning, experiences and best practices. FOKUS shares its knowledge, work methods and goals with women's organisations in Norway. This enriches the collaboration and dialogue with members and women in partner organisations. ForUM provides knowledge sharing on advocacy to South partners. Member organisations of LNU exchange experiences through seminars, workshops, study trips, and meetings through which the member organisations increase their knowledge of and cooperation with others. PWYP Norway facilitates meetings between civil society in the South and decision makers in the North to increase their level of information,

knowledge and oversight on extraction industry issues. DCG involves partners in research projects.

7.1.4 Advocacy

All the UNOs are also involved in advocacy work. Some member organisations of FOKUS have for long played a key role in advocating for women's health that could offer quality reproductive care for women. ForUM advocacy work is uniquely targeted to participation in international networks and policy recommendations. LNU, under its wide ranging public information channel, provides support to organisations who work on advocacy on North-South issues. PWYP Norway has advocacy for transparency about corporate tax issues as its main focus; nationally through seminars, various forms of media and direct contact with decision makers, and internationally through the organisation's global network. VNS's work focuses on increasing intercultural understanding at the local level first of all, and can thus be said to be a form of 'advocacy from below'. DCG seeks to influence policy makers in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali and Sudan to adopt research based best practices. Through its Norwegian members, the specific challenges of the drylands areas are brought to the attention of Norwegian decision makers. Atlas' advocacy work focuses on systemic and political challenges both at country level in the South, through international advocacy work (UN, EU, Nordic cooperation etc) and by addressing the Norwegian government and their foreign and development policies.

7.1.5 Human rights

Atlas, Digni, and FOKUS are involved explicitly in human rights issues. Atlas may have increased the level of understanding of final beneficiaries, the disabled people, on their human rights through solidarity between disabled people in Norway and disabled people in developing countries. FOKUS support is geared directly at improving women's human rights situation and gender equality. Several of FOKUS' South partners are involved in monitoring for the fulfilment of the UN Women's Convention (CEDAW). Digni addresses issues related to organisational leadership and development, gender empowerment and rights based issues in development policy.

7.1.6 Service delivery

The UNOs did not select or highlight 'service delivery'³⁸ as an important UNO based value added in the questionnaire. This is most likely related to the trend in support to civil society in the South since the 1990s where institution building and advocacy strengthening of organisations 'replaced' direct and field-based poverty reduction.³⁹

In a 2012 DfID supported UNO programme report it is stated however that "the process of empowerment (of the poor) is often illustrated with examples of collective action by groups exerting pressure on duty bearers. Yet many of the projects visited in...(very poor areas in) ...India and Nepal begun by working with

38 The CSOs as service providers are defined as "delivering services to meet societal needs such as education, health, food and security; implementing disaster management, preparedness and emergency response." World Economic Forum (2013) p. 9.

39 Norad (2000), p. 8.

individuals in their homes. *This is a necessary strategy.*⁴⁰ As such, while collective based awareness raising of societal issues and challenges and advocating for change are important, it appears that meeting the needs of marginalised individuals and households, i.e. end-beneficiaries, is an indispensable strategic approach for civil society to meet its final goals.

This strategic approach may be even more important for the UNOs to grasp due to the 'distance' between top and bottom of particularly the umbrellas of the UNOs. As such the UNO secretariats and their members and network partners should be aware of and address service delivery needs of project beneficiaries. This could be done as an integrated part of the overall support already provided by the UNOs, particularly in their support in project identification and design, and in technical backstopping and quality assurance of project implementation.

7.2 Management and systems of the UNOs⁴¹

The UNOs are important grant recipients and they represent one of the main civil society support modalities. Norad contracts the UNOs to assure quality and to coordinate the State grant to their the member organisations. The State grant and its administration are stipulated contractually between the UNO and Norad.

The UNO secretariat questionnaire was designed to gain an insight on how the financial management and other aspects of the systems are implemented in the UNOs. Based on the questionnaire the following can be summarised:

- Most of the UNOs were entirely dependent on the financing from Norad or the Norwegian State for implementing their projects and programmes. Some UNOs have received income from television campaigns or individual donors.
- All UNOs reported that they had an established vision, mission and objectives and that these were communicated to their members and network partners, e.g. through official documents, meetings, information work, seminars, logical framework planning, etc. Only one UNO (Digni) had a risk management system in place. The other UNOs reported that they did not have a risk management system. While some project risks are identified during the planning process and expressed in the agreements with Norad, there was no system or defined process for organisational risk identification or management.⁴² The smaller UNOs that distribute funds to partners in the South (DCG, FOKUS) have experienced a higher percentage of reported cases of corruption than the large UNOs, e.g. Digni and Atlas Alliance.

40 TripleLine Consulting (2012), p. 5. (italics by the authors).

41 This section is based primarily on the 2nd part of the questionnaire responses provided by the UNOs addressing organisational and management related issues. A more detailed description is presented in Annex 6.

42 One case was presented in Bistandsaktuelt on 23 May 2014. It showed the Women's Front's loss of almost NOK ½ million of Norwegian development funds was in part due to inadequate risk management practices, see <http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/nyheter-og-reportasjer/arkiv-nyheter-og-reportasjer/advarer-om-strengere-ansvarsregler>.

- All UNOs informed that they had a process for prompt communication of mistakes, incidents, bad news, deviations and other relevant information to people who need to know. Atlas substantiated this with an example on this communication from an incident in Nepal.
- All UNOs used results based management framework for planning and reporting, and they stated that reporting and information were distributed timely and to relevant recipients.
- All UNOs reported that the personnel resources and competence of employees adequately matched the objectives of the organisation. Staff turnover seemed to be high in several of the small UNOs.
- While project accounting and monitoring seemed to be sufficiently organised, the questionnaire responses and field interviews showed that internal audit practices were insufficiently addressed. Most UNOs responded that one of their main tasks was to provide supportive supervision to their members and network partners' project work.
- Only two UNOs specified their administrative costs. Most of the UNOs reported that they follow Norad's guidelines. All UNOs reported that they follow-up on working hours regarding the salary costs for the work done in project administration. In the cost-efficiency analysis (see 7.4) it could be noticed that the administrative costs had not always been clearly defined in the financial reporting to Norad.

7.3 Characteristics of Norwegian UNO members and network partners

The following data present a summary of the characteristics of Norwegian members and network partners of the eight UNOs based on their responses provided through a questionnaire (Table 4) and supplementary information drawn from two focus group meetings and selected interviews.

More than 75% of the respondents consider themselves as active members of the UNOs, a little less than 25% partly active, while none considered themselves as inactive. This activity has in part included requests from the UNO secretariats to undertake special assignments that benefited other organisations in the UNOs. More than 60% had provided this type of service to the UNO organisations while 40% had not.

A similar percentage can be observed in which organisations have taken *independent* initiatives within the framework of the UNO structure over the last 5 years. The UNO secretariats appear to have been positively reflecting on these independent initiatives, since 63% indicate a 'positive' response from the UNO

secretariats and 37% 'very positive'. An example of these independent initiatives includes Wycliffe's anti-corruption work for grass-root level.⁴³

The effectiveness of *transfer of funds* from the umbrella organisations appeared to be high, i.e. 87,5% being in the 'high' to 'very high' categories. It appears that *advocacy* plays a relatively limited role in terms of utilisation of services by members, less than anticipated (57,1%). *Tools and guidelines* support to the organisations constituted 55,8%, also less than anticipated. From the UNO questionnaire and discussions held with the secretariats a significant part of their support is particularly given to organisational development and project management support functions, including support of tools and guidelines.

Table 4. Effectiveness/quality of UNO Secretariats' services provided to Norwegian members and network partners, as perceived by the latter (N=43)

Service	Percentage of members/ network partners using service	Effectiveness/quality (in percentage of service users)				
		Very low	Low	Acceptable	High	Very high
Transfer of funds	76,7			12,5	37,5	50,0
Capacity building / training	93,0			30,8	48,7	20,5
Knowledge management	86,0			43,2	40,5	16,2
Advocacy	57,1		4,3	21,7	43,5	30,4
Tools and guidelines	55,8			33,3	50,0	16,7
Networking within the UNO, sharing for collective learning	81,4			25,7	54,3	20,0
Independent networking	-	7,1	11,9	45,2	28,6	7,1
Project management	59,5			12,0	56,0	32,0
Involvement of South partner	(n=39)		2,6	10,3	35,9	51,3

Source: Questionnaire Database

Capacity building and training comprised the most significant support provided by the UNO secretariats to their members/network partners, 93% of the total sample. Almost 7-in-10 found the quality of that service 'high' or 'very high' while a little more than 3-in-10 found the quality 'acceptable', which may be considered too high considering the effort and resources spent. Capacity building was performed primarily in organisational development, project and financial management skills, planning/logframe, leadership, anti-corruption as well as themes/sectors that each UNO represents, e.g. gender and agriculture. Since capacity building comprises one of the most common and wide spread approaches to development cooperation support – also in the UNOs' support to their members, network and South partners – the training impact on these efforts is critical to assess. However it is seldom done, see Box 2.

Understanding how a training course or a project can be implemented in a better and more efficient manner, serves to improve the UNOs' opportunity to serve the greater good and achieve their objectives.

43 See for example <http://www.digni.no/newsread/news.aspx?docid=10460>

Box 2 Return on investment of capacity building

Studies have showed that the results and effects of capacity building are often poor. According to Kirkpatrick, several studies carried out in the U.S. in the 2000s show that design, development and delivery of training programmes do not add sufficient value to the organisations⁴⁴ – the main reason being that participants did not have the opportunity to use what they have learned, and had no or little supportive reinforcement back in the work place. One study showed that 15% of participants did not try new skills in the workplace, 70% said they tried but failed, while 15% were able to achieve sustained new behaviours. It is estimated that only 10% of those billions of dollars being invested by organisations in capacity building activities in the U.S. are translated into tangible values and transferred to job performance.⁴⁵ While these figures do not include the civil society sector as such, there is no reason to believe that the figures should be particularly different for the civil society sector.

Few efforts have been made to evaluate the training delivery at a comprehensive scale, i.e. beyond the immediate reaction to the training course itself and the learned knowledge and skills from the course. Apart from recent initiatives no serious efforts are made to measure the effectiveness of training delivery based on a chain of evidence from (i) the training itself through (ii) the skills and learning gained from the training, to (iii) the application of the learned skills in the workplace and (iv) the monetary results of the training impact evidenced at the organisational level. Such efforts should be made, particularly for investments in larger projects and comprehensive and regularly repeated training programmes performed by the UNOs.⁴⁶

Networking is a key feature of any UNO's work. However, almost one-in-five was not engaged in 'networking' (18,6%). At the same time more than one-in-three of the organisations practiced *independent networking* to a 'high' or 'very high' degree. This may indicate a certain degree of organisational detachment from the UNO 'families'.

The members and network partners perceived that the UNOs *represented* them: 76,8% saying to a 'high' degree and 'very high' degree. Still 23,2%, or almost one-in-four, were less confident in the UNOs 'representativeness', reflecting well the conflict of interest that the UNOs often face representing its members' interest towards Norad on the one side and contractually administering Norad funding on the other. 62,8% of the organisations stated that they, through their membership/partnership, *influenced important events* in the UNOs.

Disagreements/conflicts between the organisations and their secretariats were observed by one-in-five of the organisations. While this figure may appear high, 87,5% of the organisations at the same time stated that they were 'satisfied' with the resolving of disagreements/conflicts and 12,5% 'very satisfied'. With these percentages it appears that only few real disagreements/conflicts of any serious

44 Kirkpatrick et al (2010).

45 Jacques Ascher(2013), p 36.

46 Jack and Patricia Phillips have since mid-1990s developed an approach towards more results-based evaluations of projects (not only training programmes) using the Kirkpatrick 4 levels as their point of departure. This has included the promotion of a 'Return on Investment' (RoI) approach that identifies monetary values of costs and benefits of project interventions and their impact on the organisational level, see, Phillips et al (2012). See Sørensen (2015) forthcoming, for a practical application of the return on investment approach.

nature have occurred between the UNO secretariats and the organisations. These figures seem not to reflect fully the actual situation drawing on historical evidence.⁴⁷

Project management and M&E support to organisations comprise one of the main activities of the UNO secretariats and the organisations. Yet, only 60% claimed that such support was provided. This may indicate that organisations were not being sufficiently supported in this area, or, that there may be limited need for this service – particularly in the view of the large member and partner organisations have had project management structures well in place for many years. This is confirmed somehow by the fact that those responding to the questionnaire primarily were the bigger organisations.

The UNO members and network partners were also asked about their perception on the relationship to their *South partners*. The questionnaire asked about the practical support that the organisations provided to their South partners and what they perceived as a strong partnership. The responses focused on the following: (i) building trust through long-term commitment based on funding, common values of respect and transparency; (ii) effective communication; (iii) provision of relevant knowledge, competence and networking through capacity development activities; and (iv) facilitating the development of interested and involved partners.

The questionnaire also asked to what degree the local partners in the South were *involved* in defining and designing projects. Almost 90% of the organisations meant that their local partners were involved to a 'high' or 'very high' degree.

On the question if the members and network partners had clear and well-defined structures in place for *reporting* at the South project level (logframe, risk management, monitoring procedures, financial and auditing systems, etc.) 72,5% said that all structures were in place while 27,5 said that 'most' reporting structures were in place. When asked about if they faced reporting problems 62,5% said that they experienced 'a few' problems while 37,5 said they had no problems. The high percentage of 'a few' problems may relate (i) closely to the some of the disadvantages identified being a member or network partner of a UNO and/or (ii) to the fact that most UNOs do not manage to report on outputs and outcomes in accordance with stipulated logframe structures.⁴⁸

A relatively high percentage (39,5%) saw a variety of '*disadvantages*' being a member or network partner of the UNOs. Of these 39,5%, and from the results of the two focus group meetings the following key concerns can be summarised:

47 For example, the tensions emerged from the Women Empowerment and Gender Equality issues in Digni, see Østebø et al (2013), and the organisational challenges that ForUM has experienced over its lifetime, see e.g. Arholdt Hegna (2011).

48 Reporting on particularly outcomes and results is a common weakness throughout development cooperation. The comprehensiveness of this weakness is evidenced in several studies, e.g. Norad (2014), ICAI (2012) and Sørensen et al (2012).

- The bureaucracy with rules and regulations and demands on reporting is time consuming – ‘things take longer time’;
- Participating and coordinating UNO work in joint processes is time consuming which limits own organisational work;
- Decision-making processes in the UNOs can be time consuming;
- The ‘growth’ potential of several large organisations is limited, e.g. they are not able to exploit a high absorption capacity for development work among their South partner organisations;
- The lack of contact and direct communication with Norad frustrates some organisations, while partners in the countries have direct access to the embassies;
- Some UNO secretariats can be dominating towards members and network partners – they ‘take the stage’ internally and externally, and in cases carry out own projects.
- The smaller organisations tend to ‘disappear’ in some of the UNOs;
- Lack of trust between organisations and the UNOs and across organisations in general limits country coordination where it is relevant;
- Information is being ‘filtered’ through the UNO.

From the questionnaires and the focus group meetings we can summarise the main ‘disadvantages’ of being related to a UNO:

- Being a member or a network partner can be time consuming with apparent negative effects for the organisations and their activities;
- The UNO structure is considered a *constraint* to some organisations because it limits their ability to support and meet the needs and capacity of their local partners in the South;
- *Lack of trust* to some extent impacts negatively cooperation among UNO stakeholders in the countries in which they operate.

7.4 Cost-efficiency of the UNOs

Cost efficiency in this section is defined as an economic term used to describe the flow of funds from Norad to the end-beneficiary, i.e. its cost-efficiency. The focus has been to study each organisation individually in order to see any differences and make comparisons between the organisations and their structure for efficiently handling of Norad funds. The study has focused on comparing the transaction costs for the administration of Norad funds as these data are accessible and comparable between the organisations. It should be noted that if there are significant differences in productivity between the UNOs it might outweigh for different administration costs between UNOs. In addition, if the UNOs somehow improve efficiency and /or productivity in other parts of the chain, it may justify the additional transactions costs.

Further to clarifications and limitations to addressing cost-efficiency are presented in Annex 7 which also outlines the study for each of the UNOs involved in this evaluation. Below is a summary of the main findings for each of the UNO category.

7.4.1 Umbrella Organisations

Umbrella organisations coordinate, administrate and carry forward Norad funding to its Norwegian members. The cost-efficiency analysis of the five umbrella organisations, Atlas, Digni, FOKUS, LNU and VNS, was made by comparing their total Norad funding with the total costs of the secretariats. The salary costs in Table 5 represents the total salary paid to staff in the secretariats, including accounting and administration, as well as programme salaries, covering coordination, capacity building, monitoring or direct work with the programme.

Using total salary costs was necessary since Norad does not specify how to distinguish between administrative costs and programme salary costs. Also, different definitions of administrative salary within the UNOs varied. Office costs include office rent, postage and freight, telephone, stationery, printing, copying, office supplies/utilities, electricity and water, insurance, security and bank charges. Administrative salaries cover salaries for the accounting, administration, management and persons working indirectly with the project.

The total income and the number of projects managed through Atlas and Digni are substantially higher than for the other three umbrella organisations. The data show a significant difference in the salary and office costs. Atlas and Digni stand out as having low total salary and office costs compared to the amount of funds they administrate. The fewer projects administrated by an organisation, the higher the total salary and office costs are when compared to the funds administrated. This would imply that Atlas and Digni are more efficient in managing the Norad funds. However, the other umbrella organisations (FOKUS, LNU and VNS) have an extended focus on advocacy and networking activities and it is not possible with the data available to fully separate these costs from fund management. What the figures then really show is that Atlas and Digni

appear to be the only two proper umbrella organisations as fund management organisations, their main focus being on ensuring cost-efficiency.

Table 5 Administrative costs of the umbrella organisations (key figures 2012)

	Atlas	Digni	FOKUS	LNU	VNS
Personnel	8	13	13	16	7
Members	16	19	74	96	339
No. of Projects	57	124	37	19	3
Total income (mill NOK)	81,9	164,1	42,6	21,6	11,9
Total Norad funding (mill NOK)	80,3	163,1	33,0	1,8	8,7
Used Norad funding (mill NOK)	76,6	163,1	32,3	*	8,7
Total salary cost (%)	5.78	4.8	15.0	26.3	28.55
Total office cost (%)	1.35	1.2	13.3	14.7	18.28
Total costs of the secretariat (%)	8.79	8.7	27.1	-	-

Source: Audited Annual Financial reports and Financial Reports on Norad Funding.

(*) The Financial report did not give the actual information on what has been spent on Norad funding. It was not possible to report in this table the actual figures. For LNU and for VNS there is no reporting on the total costs for their secretariats.

7.4.2 Network organisations

As can be seen from Table 6, the three network organisations, ForUM, PWYP Norway and DCG, have high personnel costs in comparison with their total income when comparing with the umbrella organisations which manage large funds with less staff. However, when personnel costs are considered as cost 'per person' the costs levels more or less equal the personnel costs of the umbrellas. This indicates that salary levels are overall similar in both types of organisations.

Table 6 Cost data for the network organisations (key figures 2012)

	ForUM	PWYP	DCG/TKG
Personnel	11	3	8
Members	53	19	77
Total Income (mill NOK)	9,7	5,3	7,1
Total Norad Funding (mill NOK)	7.9	4.2	7,1
Used Norad Funding (mill NOK)	8.4	4.2	6,7
Total salary cost %	55.68	35.24	14,68
Total office cost %	19.23	8.22	9.48

Source: ForUM: Årsmelding 2012; PWYP Norway: Informasjonsrapport med regnskap 2012; DCG/TKG: TKG Regnskap 2012 and Revideret revisionsberetning 2012. For DCG members of the South have been included

In the framework agreement between Norad and ForUM, the administrative costs are stated to be 17% of the total Norad funding. The administrative costs have not been reported separately in ForUM's Annual Financial Report. According to the agreement between Norad and PWYP Norway the administration costs should be 7% and reported separately from the operational costs. However, the part of the administrative costs for Norad has not been separately reported in the annual report. For DCG the administration costs were

higher than the 7% as stated in the Norad agreement (9.48%) because IT support and insurance costs were more than it was budgeted for. DCG has not specified or reported the administration costs separately to Norad in 2012, but according to the information received this has been done in 2013.

7.4.3 Cost-efficient issues

The cost-efficiency of the transfer of funds from the umbrella secretariats to their Norwegian members may be questioned. Normally, in the transfer of funds from one level to the next an administrative cost of 7% or 8% is deducted. In a four level chain where every level is authorised a 7% deduction, the final percent of a grant is deducted by about 25% (calculated as 7% deducted from the remaining grant at each level). If 8% is taken as a case the percentage deducted would be close to 30%. Most of the grants from Norad are administrated by umbrellas with a minimum of four layers. It has not been possible to verify whether all umbrella fund transfers from one level to the next include a 7% deduction. However, for Digni partners, 8% costs have been reported for members in Norway as well as for local partners and projects in Nepal.

The administrative costs are calculated differently at different levels and they can therefore differ significantly from organisation to organisation. This suggests that the Norad agreement at a set cost for administration could be restrictive for a flexible management of Norad funding through UNOs. This could either deter organisations from becoming even more efficient or force the organisation to pay for administration of Norad funds through other funding.

The administrative costs of the networking organisations cannot be directly compared to the Norad funding as a portfolio, because the network organisations often work directly with their partners without additional layers of transactions.

7.5 Effectiveness and efficiency of UNO support in Nepal and Tanzania

7.5.1 Introduction

In the following we present the context in which the UNOs operate in the two case countries, Nepal and Tanzania, followed by an analysis of the five UNO partners that work in the two countries. For each of the local partner and its projects we present the following:

- A brief *description* of the UNO partner and its projects;
- An *assessment* of the two evaluation criteria, effectiveness and efficiency, of the partner and its projects;
- A *discussion* point in which we:
 - i. identify factors that contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency;
 - ii. elaborate on a counterfactual situation in a modified form. We found it relevant to consider the counterfactual 'without' situation where funds

- were available for the project activities but the technical and other support from the North UNO absent. This would show what would have been the challenges and opportunities for the end-beneficiaries and their support groups, e.g. local partners, in a this specific 'without' situation;
- iii. discuss some of the consequences of the findings within the framework of the UNO model.

The data collection for this exercise mainly comprised the evaluations and organisational reviews of the individual UNO, relevant evaluations and reviews of their partners and projects as well as the data collected from the team's observations and interviews carried out in the field. In doing so we believe we have been able to triangulate data and validate findings and conclusions satisfactorily.

7.5.2 Nepal: context for civil society

Spread over 147,181 square km., Nepal has a population of 26.5 million, divided into more than 100 ethnic groups, with an annual population growth rate of 1.35% according to the 2011 Census. The current administrative system has a president and a head of the state. The executive power rests with the prime minister. Currently, there are five development regions and 75 districts which are further divided into 3754 Village Development Committees (VDC) and 99 municipalities, below which are Ward Development Committees (WDC) with an average population of 700 individuals.

Nearly one-fourth of the population live below the poverty line which is significantly lower than the poverty rate in 1995/96 which stood at 42%. However, there are significant differences across groups: the incidence of poverty in urban areas is 15 percent compared to 27 percent in rural areas; 42 percent of Dalits are poor compared to 23 percent of non-Dalits; and the likelihood of being poor a household headed by an illiterate person is 4.5 times greater than that of a household headed by a person who has completed Grade 11.

The main reasons for high poverty rates are that poverty alleviation measures are fragmentary and uncoordinated; and policies and programmes have yet to be made result oriented and effective. Other challenges include providing good governance, maintaining peace, order and security, combating corruption, providing electricity and managing transport system as well as reducing brain drain. Mitigating both natural and human induced disaster risks and mitigating the adverse effect of climate change are also important challenges Nepal faces.

Nepal has addressed these challenges using internal as well as external resources belonging to both state and non-state actors. For example, every development sector was linked to poverty reduction since 2002 and there is now a separate Ministry and specially created Fund for poverty reduction. The Government has taken important reform initiatives, in particular in relation to policy and legal reform, which are progressively shaping the inclusion and non-discrimination agenda including in the legislative body. Good governance is a

high priority area of the current Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007). The Government has devised legal, structural and policy arrangements to support good governance and has endorsed many international conventions.


Major development partners including the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, United Nations, United Kingdom, India, Japan, European Union, Norway, Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, China, Australia, USAID, Finland, Korea, Netherlands, Canada and others, e.g. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, have been partnering with the Government in its efforts to address the challenges. These agencies contributed US\$ 1 billion in 2011-12 through 454 projects in 39 different sectors. Norway was the 8th major donor contributing USD 41.68 million through 39 projects in 2011-12 with a share of 4% of the total disbursement of foreign aid that Nepal received in 2011-12.

There are more than 200,000 grassroots organisations, over 80,000 registered organisations and almost 250 international NGOs working in Nepal as CSOs. Most of these organisations emerged in the last two decades after the introduction of multi-party democracy. These organisations are involved in development and advocacy. There are also unregistered institutions who claimed to be real civil society and unite under specific issue such as the People Movement for political reform, freedom of speech and other democratic practices. The current political context in Nepal is non-interfering in the activities of the CSOs. There are however certain rules and regulations that a formal CSO should comply with, such a being registered with the Social Welfare Council (SWC). Their contribution is recognised in state plans and this can be judged from the importance given in the approach paper to the current 13th plan (Financial Year 2013/14 – 2015/16), in which Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) and NGOs are given high priority. The document recognises these organisations as development partners and actors, and intends to utilise their strengths to targeted sectors and regions.

7.5.3 Nepal: Assessment of UNO partners and their projects

Figure 3 presents the field work structure carried out in Nepal, showing the specific target groups at different UNO levels as well as their linkages.

Figure 3 UNO levels addressed – field work in Nepal⁴⁹



NFU: Norwegian Association for Persons with Developmental Disabilities; **NABP:** Norwegian Association of Blind and Partially Sighted; **FFO:** The Norwegian Federation of Organisations of Disabled People; **HP:** HimalPartner; **NPN:** Nepal Parent's Network; **GFPID:** Guardians' Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities; **NFDN:** National Federation of the Disabled, Nepal; **UMN:** United Mission Nepal; **NAB:** Nepal Association of the Blind.

Nepal Parent Network (NPN)/Guardians' Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities (GFPID)⁵⁰

The Nepal Parent's Network (NPN) – in 2011 to become the Guardians' Federation for Persons with Intellectual Disability (GFPID) – was founded in 2004 as an initiative of parents/relatives of persons with developmental disabilities, with support from the Norwegian Association for Persons with Developmental Disabilities (NFU). The NPN prioritised grass roots mobilisation and formation of new parents' groups, who were mainly working on influencing local and regional governments, and to mobilize and inspire parents to create and join additional groups. The main focus areas of the NPN have been to (i) increase the number of new parents' groups; (ii) become a national organisation for persons with developmental disabilities; (iii) increase the self-advocates participation within the network; and (iv) clarify the concepts of disability.

NPN transformed into the GFPID as a federal umbrella organisation in November 2011. The main aim of the Federation is to create an inclusive society to ensure the human rights of the persons with intellectual disabilities.

⁴⁹ It was not possible to prepare an assessment of the NFDN due to limited documentation.
⁵⁰ This section is primarily based on interviews with the Board and management of the GFPID during a focus group meeting including the NAB and NFDN; a MTR from 2011 and the GFPID Results report from 2013.

The Federation formulates appropriate policies and establishes functional linkages with the central government and international donor agencies in order to increase its access to various services and funds.

GFPID has strengthened its intra-organisational capacity with the purpose to intensify its lobbying and advocating activities for the betterment of its members. NPN had stimulated the networking at the regional level which strengthened the district organisations and served as a bridge between the centre (Kathmandu) and the grass-root organisations, and acted as local resource centres for capacity building activities. In 2014 GFPID has 34 district level organisations and 19 local cells at village level. The network, its programmes, as well as most of the operations and activities of the district organisations are funded by NFU. Also, GFPID has become a member of the National Federation of the Disabled of Nepal (NFDN). Seventeen board members are elected based on their geographical location and the election committee's recommendations. All board members have to be parents or guardians of children with intellectual disabilities.

Effectiveness: A 2010 Mid-Term Review (MTR) report stressed that very little had been documented on changes for people with developmental disabilities (PWDDs) within the framework of the NPN. Baseline data were absent and it was not possible to attribute any positive changes in the situations of the PWDD to the NPN. Intra-tensions between several sub-groups and organisations in the area of supporting PWDDs had contributed to the limited outcome of the NPN.

However the reports and narratives indicated some positive experiences, yet not evidenced or correlated to the NPN/GFPID, in terms of (i) increased awareness among parents (primarily through the establishment of the parent's organisations at district level), (ii) access to information and knowledge, responsiveness by the government, and (iii) an increasing acceptance of PWDDs in the society. Also, policy reforms have taken place, including the (iv) creation of an ID card system foreseeing benefits for disabled people and (v) the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, which also promotes inclusive education. The challenges however remain with regard to the implementation of those policies and translating them into direct benefits for the disabled. Lack of funds for allowances, difficulties in obtaining the ID cards for PWDDs, inadequate capacity of the government to manage inclusive classrooms were and still are serious challenges.

A special issue was NPN/GFPID's tackling of the Inclusive Education approach and policies. According to the 2010 MTR and the 2013 Results report from GFPID most parents found it hard to accept the inclusive education objective as viable. This was verified during the interviews with the GFPID management. Most parents continued to demand special education rather than inclusive education, for several reasons: (i) Most PWDD children have not benefited from the inclusive education enrolment due to limited resources in the schools; (ii) more harm to the many children seems to have been the case as they are exposed to an unfamiliar environment that does not facilitate learning; (iii) many children with PWDD enrolled in inclusive education classes had witnessed

harassments and/or sexual abuse; and (iv) parents pointed out that time was taken away from the ordinary class and the time spent on the PWDD was unproductive. Despite scaling down the ambitious goals of inclusive education from 2009 the GFPID has continued lobbying and advocating for inclusive education policies and programmes in different national fora. It seems that a clear discrepancy exists between what the GFPID promotes officially regarding inclusive education and what its members and children have experienced, with continuous technical and financial NFU support.

The development objectives of the GFPID are ambitious. The present country context with limited capacity of the government (as service provider) and the PWDDs (as service seekers) is a major hindrance to progress. Because of the country's poverty and literacy level, most of the parents still have a welfare orientation as against a right's perspective and expects immediate services/benefits.

The Nepal government has accepted to add additional information column in its national census (2011) to provide certain specific information of PWDDs. Fifteen district organisations succeeded to access public funds from their respective local government bodies which had been marked for the well-being of PWDDs. Also, GFPID has signed a one year long partnership agreement with My Rights funded by the Swedish Organisation of Disabled Persons International Aid Association. Furthermore, GFPID has been made a member in the educational curriculum development committee for disabled children by the Ministry of Education.

Efficiency: To manage professionally and transparently the financial procedures in GFPID, it developed, based on previous financial and administrative rules, financial regulations in 2012. Of all its expenditures, the majority went to programme expenses, such as trainings and seminars, lobbying and promotion activities, and incentives to strengthen the local parents' organisations. Regarding the cost of human resources, all parents' organisations are run by volunteer parents who do not receive remuneration. The NPN/GFPID only foresaw salaries or allowances for a full time network coordinator, a part-time legal advisor, (until 2011) two regional representatives, and since 2008 a helper in the office in Kathmandu. Despite the overall budget increase, the cost of these salaries and allowances has since the last three years been more or less 27% of the total expenditures.⁵¹ It is difficult to assess efficiency from the above information but it may indicate an unfortunate bias towards the administrative costs at the expense of programme costs.

Discussion points: There is a need for baseline and simple logframe structure for monitoring and evaluation to measure project progress and achievements. Also, no effectiveness will be achieved if actual needs of the end-beneficiaries are not addressed. The team finds the application of the inclusive education highly problematic. Over a 10 year period NFU has promoted inclusive education

⁵¹ Given privacy sensitivity and the open nature of this report, the evaluation will not reveal individual salaries in this report. The review team refers back for this to NPN's yearly audited financial statements.

despite most parents' resistance. In this respect NFU could have been more receptive towards this resistance and not wasted resources. This may even have been used counterproductively towards the end-beneficiaries.

There is a need for balancing service delivery (direct in-kind support and income generation activities) with advocacy work viewed from a contextual point of view (poverty, illiteracy, etc.). This could facilitate a strengthening of local stakeholders' engagement and ownership to the PWDD cause. The voluntarism as applied in the project is a challenge that may affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the project because time is taken away from often poor parents who face a survival agenda. On the other hand involving locally developed expertise (e.g. trained parents) strengthens local ownership to the project. Also, it appears that effective liaison with and lobbying towards government (national based organisation, membership of committee, etc.) has proven useful.

There is no doubt that NFU's support to NPN/GFPID has been useful in terms of networking, organisational development and capacity building. Without NFU's presence, but with funds available, NPN would probably have faced many challenges in maturing into a relatively strong Federation. It is believed that NFU's experience from other countries, maybe Zambia,⁵² can have facilitated the organisational strengthening of the GFPID. On the other side the actual needs of the end-beneficiaries (parents, guardians and the PWDDs) may very well have been addressed differently without the NFU support and the inclusive education approach may have been seriously challenged. Effective communication, cost-efficiency and understanding of the context are areas in which NFU's support to NPN/GFPID and its members could probably have performed better. While overall a trust relation is observable between GFPID and NFU it may be affected long-term if these weaknesses are not addressed. Furthermore, by not addressing inclusive education from a more critical standpoint within the Atlas Alliance family, the UNO as a network for exchange of experience and discussions has been underutilised.

Nepal Association of the Blind (NAB)⁵³

The Norwegian Association of the Blind and Partially Sighted (NABP) has been supporting blind and partially sighted people of Nepal since 1998 in accordance with agreements with the Social Welfare Council (SWC) in partnership with Nepal Netra Jyoti Sangh and Nepal Association of the Blind (NAB). The project is based in the NABP Office in Kathmandu. All activities are being directly implemented by partners in 30 districts. NABP does not implement any direct activities with the communities and beneficiaries in the field but through partner organisations. NABP in its role as a facilitator and coordinator ensures all the necessary technical support and capacity building required for its partners.

52 NFU's experience from Zambia guiding a fragmented and often tensioned disability sector into a strong Opportunity Zambia organisation through the Norwegian Disability Consortium.

53 This section is primarily based on interviews with representatives from NABP management and NAB staff in Nepal, an evaluation carried out in 2013 by the SWC and Pradhan (2014).

The objectives of the project have been to support for the strengthening of organisations of the blind at the national level, making them self-reliant, strong and sustainable, and to combat blindness through eye health. The project also provides rehabilitation and vocational skills training to the incurable blind in co-operation with NAB and makes the general public aware of the rights of the blind.

Effectiveness: In a 2013 Evaluation the project was rated successful due to its integrated approach that synchronised its health services, rehabilitation services, education and income generating activities with community development. Experienced partner organisations on disability issues resulted in better outcomes at community level.

Out of 641 197 persons examined and treated by NABP's Eye Health project 54 941, have had their vision restored after eye surgery. After vision restoration the patients have been able to resume their work which in turn has increased their economic conditions. The patients have started to manage their daily life and family life well and have started to take care of their children and send them to school. The good cooperation between the health and rehabilitation projects has eased the link between identification, treatment and training. Yet, despite the immediate and positive effect of the eye surgery no assessment has been made on the tangible socio-economic and educational benefits of the eye surgeries.

In the education sector, NAB has printed 300 copies of graphic tactile textbooks to an equal number of blind and partially sighted students with the support of the Department of Education. NAB also supported 64 students with scholarships, and 100 girls and boys have been enrolled in the primary school. As a result of the project activities, there has been increased access to education, training and work as reported in Atlas Progress Report from 2012.

Advocacy campaigns performed by NAB may have influenced the Government. One blind person is in the Constitution Assembly and specifications for the disabled are now mandatory in local governments' budgets. However, these steps cannot be attributed directly to the work of NABP/NAB. One aspect that limits work towards effectiveness of NAB is its lack of a clear strategy.

Efficiency: The project has been operating activities with low overhead cost of less than 7%, the main reason being that management, supervision and monitoring activities were locally based and the staff were few and locally recruited – saving travel costs and time for the NABP Norwegian program coordinator. NABP's follow-up to the reporting and procurement practices appeared transparent and in line with Government regulations. It appears also that per activity cost was less than what was planned and annual reports prepared by NABP Nepal office were in line with format prescribed by NABP Norway. Therefore efficiency may have been high on individual project outputs.

Discussion points: There is no effective monitoring and evaluation structure set up within the NAB that enable performance measurement at outcome level.

This is particularly needed when outputs have been produced in high quantities, and appear to be well and efficiently performed. Also, NAB/NABP has not established a theory of change that links the outputs to the higher levels and no pathways on how to achieve goals. The direct service delivery on eye health identification, treatment and follow-up seems to be closely linked to the performance of effective advocacy, yet not evidenced.

There are several funding agencies supporting minorities in Nepal. If the funds were channelled directly to NAB, the capacity of persons with visual impairment may have enhanced networking with rights based groups for advocacy. However, organisational capacity might not have been at the same high level. Based on the data available the team finds that NAB would probably continue the same activities as they are implementing now, also without NABP's technical support, provided the funds were available.

NABP seems to have contributed to NAB's organisational strengthening, cost-efficiency and effective communication and networking across Nepal and ensured a continuous targeted advocacy process which appears to have strengthened human rights based issues at policy levels. NAB itself appears to be a relatively strong and engaged and trustful partner for NABP. Yet, an understanding of a change process seems not to be in place, including effective performance measurement tools and practices as well as a strategy for the NABP. These points would be considered relevant for the UNO structure to address. Based on the findings these support themes, including strategic thinking, seem not be of high priority by most UNOs as well as their members and network partners in their collaboration with South partners.

United Mission Nepal (UMN)⁵⁴

UMN is a faith-based umbrella organisation. Its headquarters is in Kathmandu with INGO status. It works in different areas including health, education, livelihood, peace building and has dozens of funding sources with an annual budget of almost USD 7 million for 2012-2013. It works through local CSOs in Nepal using a cluster based approach and has 53 partners, mainly CSOs, a few government institutions but no private sector institutions. UMN has seven cluster teams and employs 15 expatriates from different countries. UMN has three projects supported through Digni with Norwegian funding support. Two are through HimalPartner (HP) and one through Normisjon. These are: (i) Integrated Peace Building (HP), (ii) Improving Access to Mental Health (HP) and (iii) Community Health programme (Normisjon). In this section we focus on the integrated peace building component as a representative component of the UMN. The other two projects are assessed separately hereafter.

Integrated peace building has been a part of UMN since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006. UMN has gone through three project phases in peace building. The first phase (2007-2010) was more about understanding

⁵⁴ This section is primarily based on interviews and discussions with UMN management staff, <http://www.umn.org.np/>, selected annual progress reports and evaluations, and a 'value added' assessment prepared by UMN.

peace building theoretically and concentrating activities at central level. The second phase (2011-2015) has laid emphasis on the local context. Trauma healing, community mediation activities are implemented in most affected VDCs in selected 10 districts where UMN has other activities. A third phase in peace building will be formulated with a new strategy to begin in 2016, including improved understanding and analysis of peace building processes.

Capacity building is a service to members that channel funds through UMN, including technical and managerial capacity to strengthen member organisations in their work. UMN applies a result based management approach.

Effectiveness: In peace building UMN has used dialogue process, created interfaith groups and implemented activities for awareness raising in schools and communities to understand religions. In one area Christians acted as mediators to resolve a conflict between Muslims and Pahadi Hindus – 258 cases were successfully resolved. Mediators gained trust from the community people and were recognised in their own and neighbouring VDCs for their community services. The community mediation service has been recognised and widely accepted as a local level dispute settlement mechanism. A survey conducted among the 70 disputants whose cases were settled by community mediators, shows mediation work is very effective in their community.

A total of 479 community leaders were trained in the prevention of domestic violence and gender discrimination. The trainings have contributed towards family and societal peace at large, yet only anecdotally evidenced. Trauma focus interventions have been implemented among survivors of the armed conflict, social conflict, domestic violence and natural disaster. These interventions helped 412 traumatised people to overcome their trauma, get back into their normal life and restore their hope. The Forgiveness and Reconciliation programme helped Christian leaders reconciling 61 individuals and 48 churches and communities, along with transforming 12 interpersonal conflicts.

While the above factual figures of services appear successful, links to outcome levels is inadequately addressed. For example, it would be useful to know what is meant by people 'come back into normal life' after trauma treatment, taken up work, family life, etc. How are these outcome levels measured? It was not possible for the evaluation team to visit target areas as they were located in difficult accessible locations. As in other cases mentioned in this report the need for improving methods for measuring the impact of the training delivered is crucial for assessing the link between output and outcome levels.

Funds channelled from Norad to HimalPartner in Norway are disbursed to UMN in Nepal. UMN then transfers funds to the HimalPartner projects. Using UMN as an intermediate at a first glance adds a level to the UNO structure that does not seem to make funding cost-efficient. However, the added value that HimalPartner project staff receives from the UMN services (training, advocacy, etc.) as well as the outsourcing of the administration to a well organised UMN

may very well outweigh the extra costs spent. A return on investment analysis could shed more light on this.

Efficiency: While UMN project activities have produced many outputs, as is presented above, their efficiency is more difficult to assess. Project performance is measured based on a results based framework and mid-term reviews are carried out mainly by internal UMN staff. UMN partner capacity assessment is performed every year, and UMN has applied an effective system for management response to evaluations, including implementation plans for recommendations to which they agreed. UMN also has guidelines and checklists for the monitoring of anti-corruption. This checklist is used by its partners. Furthermore, UMN has established a risk register that has been in use for about four years. This risk register is reviewed at Board meetings and it is updated on an annual basis.

In the UMN headquarters an administrative and a finance officer are working in the Finance Department. The finance officer in the project clusters report to the Finance Department in UMN headquarters. The Department then sends the biannual and annual financial reports per project to HimalPartner in Norway. Before the report is sent to Norway it goes through the Internal Audit Committee in UMN. The team observed however, that there was no actual internal audit carried out but the finance officer from UMN is doing some financial controlling.

Discussion points: While UMN's overall approach to results based management appears sound and well developed, a clear link towards the outcome level seems to be lacking. The adoption of a ToC approach could assist in linking its many and significant outputs to the outcome level. The organisational and management structure of UMN appears to be able to facilitate efficiency in project management. UMN is a large INGO and as such would not be negatively affected in its development projects in Nepal if HimalPartner was not present there, financially or organisationally. The UMN is a classic example of effective support to a well-established and strong (international) CSO that operates on 'economies of scale' that ensures efficient performance in almost all areas. Whether HimalPartner's presence in Nepal is relevant or not at overall management and administrative levels could be questioned, if UMN is able to take upon these tasks for other HimalPartner projects in Nepal.

Okhaldhunga Health Project⁵⁵

The Okhaldhunga health project started in 1962 as a dispensary which was upgraded to a hospital in 1968. The primary health care work was started in 1977. In the year 2003 and 2004 Okhaldhunga health project was renamed as Okhaldhunga Community Hospital with a Public Health Unit (PHU) which focuses on preventive and primary health care in rural areas. The hospital

55 This section has primarily been based on interviews with the head of the health project and two evaluations carried out in 2009 and 2013. However, the two evaluations are not directly project related evaluations. The 2009 evaluation is an assessment of the hospital as a whole, and the 2013 evaluation is about Norad support, Matriya Collaboration (2013). As such the effectiveness and efficiency analyses are not directly related to the Normisjon's project but to the hospital support in general. While this does not give full credit to the work of the Normisjon's efforts it may be considered as a proxy assessment of the project.

provides curative services to six districts with a target population of 160 000. The hospital provides additional services such as nutrition rehabilitation, social service, counselling, tuberculosis and clinics. The goal of this project is (i) that the clinics and community groups supported by PHU will be able to function independently; (ii) the hospital serves as a learning centre; (iii) educate health workers, medical practitioners and students. The hospital, through PHU, initiated a project entitled “Community Health at the foot of Mount Everest”. The strategy adopted by the hospital was to work alongside other stakeholders and strengthen the health system infrastructure of the Government health posts, sub-health posts and their service delivery to especially marginalised groups (women and children) through technical advice, training and provision of essential equipment in the districts.

Strengthening of the district hospital is included in the project, as the primary health care units need access to a secondary referral centre, both in order to function properly and to build their own credibility with the local population. The project has been in operation since 2005 with support from various agencies including Normisjon (through Norad) and the Child Fund Japan.

Effectiveness: Vaccinations to children have been covered 100% in each village the project has served. As such the effectiveness is high. There has been increased number of women going to the health institution for delivery. Similarly, mothers’ groups have through training been able to tap effectively into available public funds and resources at the village level for community health activities. In some phased-out Village Development Committees (VDCs), the experienced project staff have been employed by the VDC itself to continue the activities initiated by PHU during the project period.

Community training on domestic violence, health education, income generation and group management has resulted in lowering the cases of domestic violence incidents and gender based discrimination. More children are going to schools as a result of a ‘child-to-child class’ programme. These achievements have helped Nepal contribute to achieving the educational goals of the Millennium Development Goals in the project areas. The project has a team of 2 to 3 staff members in each target village. They have deep knowledge and practical experiences because many of them have been working for long periods of time in the health field. The evaluations found the works of the health posts, female community health volunteers and the mother groups were effective. The hospital and public health interventions have been successful in reaching out to the grassroots and in providing public health services through local health facilities.

Efficiency: For the efficiency the evaluation team relied on a financial review. It revealed that the project received about Rupees 43 million from 2010 to 2012 and that there was no significant variations noted between budgeted and actual project expenditure. The administrative cost was at 14% of the total outlay, which was 6% more than what was planned.

As per the 2013 evaluation, the project operates well-functioning financial management, reporting and controlling systems. The PHU has its own Financial Procedure Manual and Personnel Policies to ensure accountability and transparency in the financial and administrative activities of the organisation. All financial information related to the project is prepared and reported to the management periodically and systematically. The consumables and inventories are recorded and maintained properly. The Income and Expenditure Account is audited by chartered accountants annually. There exists a proper system of internal control. The financial procedure and the recording of financial transaction are set by the management and these procedures are reviewed periodically. For full operational effectiveness the project seems to be in need of a more experienced management and better means of transportation and communication.

Discussion points: The durable integration of CSO and government health service delivery activities targeting mostly vulnerable groups has proven effective. The project proves that service delivery is an important part of building relationships and networks for stronger and more effective advocacy – in areas where poverty is widespread. Furthermore, a strong outreach set-up has impacted on a positive link between outputs and some outcome levels, e.g. women groups' have been successful in obtaining local government funding. While the administrative costs-efficiency may be on the lower side (14% instead of 8%), it appears that the financial management systems of the project are well in place. Normisjon does not have a representative in Nepal and funds are channelled directly to UMN from Normisjon Norway for disbursement to and management of the project. As such this case does not impact on any counterfactual situation.

The funding arrangement from Normisjon to the UMN includes the similar advantages mentioned for the HimalPartner, i.e. UMN's 'economies of scale' structure. Yet, direct funding from Norad to UMN could be an option that would eliminate one administrative level without reducing the benefits for local project stakeholders, e.g. training, advocacy, etc. UMN's capacity to deal professionally and administratively with the project is probably sufficient for reporting to Norad or the embassy, or to an outsourced CSO/company.

7.5.4 Tanzania: context for civil society

Tanzania has a total population of 44.9 million and an annual population growth rate of 2.8%. Despite being very heterogeneous, with more than 130 ethnic groups and the population divided between Christianity, Islam and traditional beliefs, Tanzania has managed to build a sense of national unity, first of all through having Swahili as a national language. Nearly half of the population, 43.9%, is below 14 years. The life expectancy is close to 61 years and the literacy rate is 75.5% for males and 60.8% for females. Tanzania was a one party state under Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) from 1964 to 1992 and CCM is still in power. Despite very high economic growth, Tanzania remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Approximately 75% of the total population lives in rural households and these households constitute 80% of the country's poor.

Since 2001, the level of poverty in rural areas has remained stagnant at around 37% to 40%. Corruption has been one of the main challenges for the development of the country. While the government has made a number of policies and strategies to overcome corruption in the country, there have been no convincing efforts by the Government to strengthen transparency and accountability.

Official development assistance (ODA) to Tanzania increased from USD 1.6 billion in 2000/01 to USD 3 billion in 2010/11, which amounted to 14% of the GDP. Tanzania is supported by more than 40 bilateral and multilateral donors. Of the USD 14.4 billion of ODA disbursed to Tanzania between 2005 and 2010, IDA is the largest financier, providing an average of 20%, followed by the United Kingdom providing 10%, the United States of America 9%, Japan 8%, and the European Union 7%. In 2010-11, Norway was the 6th major donor with USD 73.23 million. The share of Norwegian aid in the total disbursement of foreign aid was 7% in 2010/11. Norway funded 30 projects in various political and socio-economic sectors. Energy was the largest sector (26.7%), followed by health (20%), transport (17%), financial reforms (13%), education and culture (13%) and finally poverty alleviation (10%).

Civil society organisations have had a tremendous growth from the 1990s onwards in terms of numbers, roles and geographical coverage. The number of CSOs grew from an estimate of 400 in 1990 to 4,000 by 2000. This is a tenfold increase in about 10 years. Arguably, this rapid growth is attributed to global, political and political reforms initiated during that period and the need for establishing more liberal and democratic systems of governance in Tanzania.

A situational analysis of CSOs conducted in 2006 indicated that CSOs were working in a number of social sectors and thematic areas, including HIV and AIDS, capacity building and coordination, good governance and democracy, socio-economic development, poverty alleviation, human rights and litigation, rural development, education, media, science and technology, gender and equity, youth development, social welfare and health. As for advocacy, a central role is played by 10-15 well-funded elite based organisations in Dar es Salaam. To facilitate support to smaller CSOs across the country, donors have established a funding agency, the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS).

In line with prevalent ideals of partnership CSOs are increasingly being recognised by the Government, the lending agencies and the donor community as potent forces for social and economic development. This recognition has been reflected in various national development strategies including the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty I & II.

CSOs are expected to improve the wellbeing of citizens through effectively engaging in policy formulation and project implementation from grassroots to national level. Despite the inclusion of CSOs as central development partners in policy documents, the Government has maintained a relatively ambivalent relationship towards CSOs. CSOs that are critical, particularly in the periods

before elections, have been accused of running the errands of opposition parties. There are a number of examples of CSOs that have been threatened to be deregistered. In April 2014, a CSO working for the rights of lesbian, gays, bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) people and sex workers was deregistered on the grounds that it promoted homosexuality.

7.5.5 Tanzania: Assessment of UNO partners and projects

Figure 5 presents the field work structure carried out in Tanzania, showing the specific target groups at different levels as well as their linkage in the UNO structure.




Figure 4 UNO levels addressed – field work in Tanzania

NFU: Norwegian Association for Persons with Developmental Disabilities; **LHLI:** Norwegian Heart and Lung Patient Organization (LHL)'s International Tuberculosis Foundation (LHL International); **TRACE:** Transparency and Accountability in Extractive Industries; **ZAPDD:** Zanzibar Association for People with Developmental Disabilities; **MUKIKUTE:** Mapambano ya Kifua kikuu na **UKIMWI** Temeke (Fight against TB and AIDS in Temeke Municipality) **TGNP:** Tanzania Gender Networking Programme.

MUKIKUTE⁵⁶

This section describes the partnership between the Norwegian LHL International (LHLI) and MUKIKUTE, the Temeke Municipal Council and Pastoral Activities and Services for People Living with HIV and AIDS (PASADA).

The main aim of the project is to help people suffering from tuberculosis (TB) and provide effective health communication. This is done through partnership with four organisations of which the evaluation team focused on MUKIKUTE. MUKIKUTE was established in 2005 and has had a project portfolio budget of USD 800 000 from 2010-2013 of which LHLI provided about 60%. MUKIKUTE

⁵⁶ This section is based on interviews with MUKIKUTE's board and management, several volunteer groups, and one TB patient in Temeke, Dar es Salaam; MUKIKUTE information brochures; www.mukikute.org; project documents, URT (2010); Haram (2008) and Nilsson (2009).

has 13 staff members and about 250 volunteers in Temeke District, where it originated, and 1.800 volunteers in 60 districts in 15 regions of Tanzania Mainland.

MUKIKUTE organises 'TB clubs' at the local level where the main principle is Community Direct Observed Therapy (DOT), where TB patients get support from former patients and relatives to take their medication regularly. Failure to access health facilities and to take the medication correctly has previously been a problem, particularly for the approximately 40% of the patients who are co-infected with HIV. Historically, MUKIKUTE has its roots in the year 2000, when nine former TB patients were involved as treatment supporters through a research project headed by a staff member of the National Tuberculosis and Leprosy Programme who took his PhD in international health at the University of Bergen, funded by LHLI. The research focused on community based TB treatment, i.e. outside of health facilities. Through the help of LHLI, MUKIKUTE was established by 20 former TB patients. MUKIKUTE was the first officially registered NGO in Tanzania for this patient group.

MUKIKUTE focuses on five main activities: (i) to educate TB and HIV/AIDS patients who are on treatment; (ii) to bring TB suspects for diagnosis; (iii) to counsel the community to check their health status frequently; (iv) to collaborate with health specialists and famous people in the community in fighting against TB & HIV/AIDS; and (v) to educate the community, the families and the patients on the use of the TB & HIV/AIDS booklets.

MUKIKUTE has a special outreach to groups that may find it difficult to use the formal health system, including females involved in transactional sex, men who have sex with men, and drug users. The support from LHLI has included office rent, vehicles, computers, a motorcycle, a HIV-testing van, and information material, and has recently, following suggestion from MUKIKUTE, also included support to income generating activities.

As part of the project, 40 traditional healers have been trained to diagnose TB symptoms. When asked whether they do not lose income by sending patients to the formal health system, the healer whom the team met said that on the contrary, they got increased prestige when they made an initial TB diagnosis and referred the patient for treatment.

Effectiveness: An evaluation commissioned by Atlas in 2009 stated that LHLI's support to patient empowerment and community mobilization "has improved TB treatment outcomes in the targeted communities".⁵⁷ WHO has identified MUKIKUTE as one of the best practices in the involvement and empowering of TB patients. LHLI has sponsored an external consultant from WHO to follow the case management of individual patients at the Kibong'oto National TB hospital. In 2012, Temeke Municipal was awarded the Prize for the best performing Municipal in TB control in the country. This prize can to a large degree be attributed to the project. According to the beneficiaries, stigma has been reduced as a result of the project. However, no effective monitoring and

⁵⁷ Quoted in Nilsson (2009), p.19.

evaluation system has been adopted that clearly evidence and attribute these impacts to the project.

The project in Temeke was planned as a pilot with a goal to implement community based TB care as part of a national policy. After having established eight clubs in Temeke, MUKIKUTE has established clubs in 15 of the 29 regions of the country. One of the TB clubs in Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam, has received support from the Foundation for Civil Society. This shows that there are possibilities for domestic funding for the local branches. The project has a rights based approach, but at the same time offers concrete and tangible services to TB patients. This appears to give the organisation more legitimacy compared to a focus on advocacy only.

Efficiency: According to MUKIKUTE, 80% of the TB patients in Temeke now take their medication at home. This saves the health system for resources and time. According to LHLI's travel reports, which are of very good quality, the investments in income generating activities for TB patients have had mixed results. The contracts between LHLI and its partners in Tanzania states that "funding from other sources or donors that support the project must be documented in the budget and narrative reporting to avoid possible duplicating funding and to secure financial transparency". The contracts also states that LHLI must be allowed access to all original invoices and receipts.

Although MUKIKUTE has received funding from several donors during the last few years (WHO, Columbia University, Centre for Disease Control, MDM France and the Elton John Aids Foundation), no overall organisational review or audit has been conducted, which is risky in terms of accountability. LHLI's project visit reports refer to some irregularities in terms of MUKIKUTE's financial management.

The rapid expansion of the organisation has entailed some leadership struggles and public authorities appear to be ambivalent about MUKIKUTE's national expansion. A major challenge is retaining volunteers after their initial training, especially in the new groups formed in other parts of the country. The volunteers in Dar es Salaam told the team that some of the patients think that they are being paid by MUKIKUTE/donors, and ask them for money.

LHLI has done a commendable job in bringing together governmental and non-governmental structures. The team also sees it as very positive that a thorough study of the local context was done prior to implementing the project.⁵⁸

Discussion points: MUKIKUTE's strength is that it is genuinely based with people at the grass root level who have suffered from TB themselves and as such have a strong outreach, providing strong legitimacy – the same situation as with people with disabilities and their organisations. MUKIKUTE's TB service provision enables savings on local authorities' health budgets resulting in high efficiency for public health services and often better service to patients. A

58 Haram (2008)

patient organisation like MUKIKUTE that grows quickly in terms of budgets and outreach needs professional staff in order to handle finances and communication with the donors and target groups for accountability. As with most of the UNO members' South partner organisations the monitoring and evaluation systems of MUKIKUTE is lacking and requires more effective support from LHLI. While being based on volunteerism the project seems somehow to work. However, based on the team's findings volunteerism will have its limits and will eventually affect efficiency and effectiveness. LHLI's thorough project preparation has been critical for a successful and implementable design.

LHLI has paid training courses for MUKIKUTE staff in computer skills, finance management, English, etc. and has helped MUKIKUTE develop procurement and accounting manuals (in 2012) and a financial statement system. LHLI has also covered participation in national fora related to TB, HIV and microcredit. The support from LHLI appears to have been pivotal for MUKIKUTE to develop its capacities and skills in the first place, and this is the major reason why other donors have later decided to provide support to MUKIKUTE.

In 2013, WHO supported MUKIKUTE with an annual grant of USD 600,000 which means WHO is now the main donor. The project design is specifically designed to fit realities in the localities. While this is a very positive aspect of the project, it also shows that the main value of LHLI's support has been the financial aspect, since MUKIKUTE had experience with Community Direct Observed Therapy (DOT) before it received the LHLI support. Yet, LHLI has provided added value to the concept and is an internationally recognised specialist organisation on DOT. LHLI has linked MUKIKUTE to their partners in Malawi and Zambia and the organisations have visited each other.

Without the technical support but with funding available MUKIKUTE would probably have needed professional support for organisational development to be able to manage the rapidly growing support to the TB patients. It appears that LHLI's support at an early stage has facilitated a process in which MUKIKUTE has become a well-functioning patient organisation to the benefit of its members.

Strong regional networking support and effective outreach has enabled the attraction of new donors and thus allowed MUKIKUTE to become a stronger and more financially viable organisation. While continuous organisational capacity support may be required short-term direct funding could be considered, with reporting to Norad, the embassy or outsourced to a local firm/CSO.

Zanzibar Association for People with Developmental Disabilities (ZAPDD)⁵⁹

This section presents and analyses NFU's partnership with ZAPDD and the Unit of Inclusive Education and Life Skills within the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training.

⁵⁹ This section is primarily based on interviews with ZAPDD staff, members, and National Executive Committee (Board), staff at the Unit for Inclusive Education and Life Skills, Ministry of Education and Vocational Learning, teachers who have received training, and children with special needs. Also documents were reviewed, including Development Links Consult (2014), a mid-term review form 2010, Financial statement for 2013, CMT & CO (2014) and Lewis (2014). The consultant (Lewis) has in-depth knowledge of inclusive education, but limited knowledge about the local context. The consultant appears to be strongly in favour of inclusive education and does not question whether inclusive education is what Zanzibar wants or needs. She does, however, question whether the way that inclusive education was implemented in the project was aligned with local needs.

The main aim of the two projects is to improve the situation for children and youth with development disabilities. The partnership with ZAPDD seeks to do this by building the organisation's capacity, enabling it to do advocacy for the rights of PWDDs, and reducing stigma at community level. The partnership with the Unit for Inclusive Education and Life Skills has focused on introducing inclusive education in primary schools (50 out of approximately 400 schools). The support to the Ministry Unit is channelled through ZAPDD, and the Head of the Unit is also a board member of ZAPDD.

Project 1: Organisational development of ZAPDD

ZAPDD was established in 1999 and has received support for organisational development from NFU since 2002 – totalling approximately NOK 700 000 annually. ZAPDD's main office is in Stone Town, and there are 60 local branches in Unguja and Pemba, including regional offices. The organisation has close to 2 000 members, of whom 57% are PWDDs. ZAPDD has 12 staff and its main activities have included (i) community sensitisation and mobilisation; (ii) youth development activities; and (iii) project management and monitoring.

One project component has included training of parents and PWDDs on HIV/ AIDS and this training appears to have been highly appreciated. Caretakers are very concerned about rape and feel that their children are at high risk. While the project has created awareness, parents still feel powerless because the legal system is corrupt and may not deal transparently with cases reported. The project has emphasised self-advocacy and this component appears to have been successful. PWDDs who attended the meetings with the evaluation team were relatively vocal. Parents of PWDDs who were not members of the organisation argued that ZAPDD had nothing to offer them. Many of the parents are poor, and having a PWDD often incurs extra costs and extra time for caring. Parents would therefore prefer support to vocational training, as well as economic support, for example for medicine for epilepsy (which parents have to buy themselves when government clinics are out of stock). The 2014 draft evaluation mentions that ZAPDD's advocacy interventions have engendered reforms in the public health sector delivery system to respond more effectively to the needs of disadvantaged persons, such as PWDDs.

Effectiveness: The draft 2014 final evaluation states that planned activities have been effectively executed, but that it is hard to determine the results because baseline data and clear performance indicators are lacking. On the ZAPDD's operational development plan the evaluation concludes that it "lacks a sound M&E plan and reflects a clear overlap of objective indicators and expected results and result indicators, making performance assessment almost impossible". The evaluation criticises the fusion of management and governance roles. High turnover of staff and limited expertise on project management, monitoring and evaluation, and disability issues has also negatively affected the effectiveness of ZAPDD.

A major challenge with the project appears to be its main focus on advocacy, which seems not aligned in full with the beneficiaries' main needs and priorities. The parents and caretakers whom the team met prioritised improved possibilities

for income generation for PWDDs for them to sustain themselves to a larger degree. Yet, the improved access to health services for PWDDs should be acknowledged and partly attributed to the work of ZAPDD.

NFU is an advocacy organisation and this functions well in Norway where the welfare state to a large degree is responsible for the basic needs of PWDDs and their parents. The ZAPDD management appreciates very much the opportunities that the project has provided for regional networking. However, in a setting where people are very poor, and where the prospects for a welfare state in the near future are very weak, it is hard for caretakers and PWDDs to appreciate the need for regional networking as long as basic needs like wheel chairs, medicine, and transport are not addressed. In some cases equipment for PWDDs has been budgeted for, but they have never been purchased (i.e. braille machines).

ZAPDD may not be the right organisation to be funded for advocacy at national and regional levels. Advocacy at those levels should be left to umbrellas working on the rights of people with disabilities which could be mandated by its members to represent ZAPDD in such fora.

Efficiency : A large share of the total budget is used for meetings and workshops, capacity building, and lobbying. The outcomes of these are very difficult to measure. The 2014 final evaluation found the efficiency to be at a high level and the financial management practices and distribution of expenditure between direct and indirect costs to be “reasonable”. The report questions the “added value of the branch and regional structures in terms of enhancing efficiency” as long as the project implementation remained centralised. The 2013 audit does not mention any negative findings. Limited expertise on project management and monitoring and evaluation affects efficiency negatively.

Project reports refer to individual success stories, for example a PWDD who has received rabbits from ZAPDD and who has had an income from this. However, there is no information about how many PWDDs who have received this kind of support. Among the people the team met, none had received such support, and the 2014 final evaluation shows that the rabbit project was discontinued because the rabbits did not survive. Apparently, support is given to the branch level (tawi) and shared between the members, but there is no information about the sums in the project report, nor in the mid-term review (2010) or the final evaluation (2014).

Discussion points: With no properly developed monitoring and evaluation tools and human capacity in place, combined with high staff turn overs, effective performance measurement of progress and achievements is not possible. Focusing almost entirely on advocacy is inadequate and against the end-beneficiaries’ perceived needs. Without a priority on these needs effectiveness will never be achieved. A thorough contextual analysis of the local situation is needed, e.g. poverty situation, risks and priorities of end-beneficiaries, and clear and logical linkage established between outputs and outcomes, applying ToC.

Even if efficiency is considered somehow satisfactory, for effectiveness to be achieved a stronger outreach is also required.

According to NFU, its main added value is the competence and experience the organisation has as an advocacy organisation in Norway. The evaluation team questions to what degree this experience can be transferred to the Tanzanian setting. In practical terms, NFU's main role in the partnership is to plan with partners, set up a budget, revise the budget, and do reporting. Project visits are usually done twice per year, including a financial controller from Norway. These roles could probably be fulfilled more cost efficiently by a local consultancy firm or expert. The 2014 final evaluation describes the technical support from NFU as 'less than optimal'.

NFU seems not to address adequately the concerns of the end-beneficiaries. This implies that the project does not communicate or network effectively or fully understand the local context and that the ZAPDD is not organisationally constructed to meet these needs. Furthermore, the limited organisational capacity of the ZAPDD implies that they cannot operate without further external support. The UNO structure however is only useful to the local partners if the UNO truly engage on the basis of an assessment of the end-beneficiaries needs. If networking is an important value added for all UNOs this controversy should be raised across the members of the Atlas family.

Project 2: Inclusive education

The Ministry for Education and Vocational Training established a Special Education Unit in 1999. Until then, some students with physical handicaps were in school, but very few PWDDs. Currently there are seven special education classes in Zanzibar town.⁶⁰ The teacher–student ratio is 1:5-9, in contrast to normal classes that may have up to 70 pupils or more. Inclusive education was introduced in 2004 by the project and in compliance with official policies. Over the ten years that have passed, the NFU project has sponsored training for teachers at 50 schools, while other donors have funded 36 schools. In Zanzibar town, PWDDs attend special education for the first 3 to 4 years, and are then integrated into inclusive schools.

Outside Zanzibar town there is no special education, and children with special needs therefore enter into normal school from grade 1. Some caretakers see this as a better alternative than keeping their children at home, since they increase their vocabulary and learn to interact with others. However, the parents said that they would prefer special education because teachers in inclusive schools spend very little time catering for children with special needs (could be maximum 5-10 minutes at the end of each class).

The training funded by the project consists of two to three modules of 7 to 9 days each conducted at the Teachers' Training Centre. The training covers the principles of inclusive education and a brief introduction to sign language and braille. Teachers who have participated in the training say that they cannot use

⁶⁰ Four schools for developmental handicaps, one for visual impairment, and two for hearing impairment.

sign language or braille after having completed the modules, but they know some words. The teachers clearly do not have enough skills or equipment to truly implement inclusive education.

Parents are worried about the prospects for livelihood for PWDDs after completing primary school. According to one informant, only 20 students with disabilities in Zanzibar have proceeded to secondary school since 2000. The parents argue that it would be more useful for the children to have vocational training (*ufundi*) which could help them secure a future livelihood.

Effectiveness: The project was recently evaluated by an external consultant commissioned by NFU.⁶¹ The evaluation states that the project had contributed to changed attitudes among parents and trained teachers. Each visited school could provide at least one example of a previously excluded child who was now attending school, and the consultant could notice a clear difference in expressed attitudes among trained teachers compared to non-trained teachers.

However, the evaluation is very critical to a number of aspects with the project. The major criticism is that the school system itself is not child centred, which is a basic requirement for inclusive education and that there has been a focus on quantity, not quality. None of the schools visited had basic learning equipment for the students, like exercise books, pencils or pens. The report also states that there was a mismatch between what was reported by project participants and what the evaluator herself observed. There is no solid M&E strategy, it is too complex and ZAPDD does not appear to monitor or follow-up the activities being implemented by the Ministry Unit. There is a significant gap in the capacity to develop and use M&E processes. The vocational and income generation activities of the visited branches were not making much progress. ZADPP's long-term plan presents expected results that are often ambiguous or vague and with no information about how the results will be measured or verified.

More fundamentally, the evaluation questions "whether it is appropriate for an impairment specific organisation like NFU, and its local partner ZAPDD, to be leading actors in inclusive education development in Zanzibar – given that inclusive education has to be approached from a broad perspective." Based on the discussions with the key stakeholders of the project the evaluation team backs this position.

Efficiency: The external evaluation concludes that the evidence gathered "suggests that on the whole activities are carried out efficiently". However, the evaluation does not provide any budget figures – neither at aggregate level nor broken down at the various project components. There is also no information in the evaluation as to the numbers of teachers who have been trained, the amount of funding that reaches the branch level of ZAPDD, etc. The mid-term review of 2010 found that in the period 2007-2010, 2 255 teachers were trained, but the great majority was trained at their own school by fellow teachers. 560 were

61 Lewis (2014).

provided with external training of trainers' courses. There appears to have been limited coordination with other donors to inclusive education in Zanzibar, like Sight Savers and CREATE (USAID/Aga Khan Foundation).

The team agrees with the mid-term review and the final evaluation of the project which questions the set-up where funding to the Ministry goes through ZAPDD and where some Ministry staff are also members of the ZAPDD Board. This means that the reporting relationships are blurred and it is difficult to tell "who reports to whom and which partner is accountable for what."⁶²

The agreement between Atlas and Norad states that the overall goal of Atlas is to improve the livelihood (*levekår*) of persons with disabilities (and people affected by TB) in poor countries. In the team's view, inclusive education is probably not the best solution for reaching this goal in Zanzibar.

Discussion points: Project monitoring and evaluation is weak and does not cater for any solid measuring of results at neither output nor outcome levels. There seems to be a discrepancy between services delivered by the Ministry Unit and the actual needs of the end beneficiaries, who seem to have other priorities. Capacity and resources available for the Government to service an inclusive education ambition for PWDDs is basically non-existent. Effectiveness is therefore almost nil. As such, the project design lacks sufficient contextual knowledge and experience for the project to be both efficient and effective. Also, it seems that there is a conflict of interests between composition of the ZAPDD Board and the Ministry project which compromise accountability.

If the Unit at the Ministry had received the same funds – untied to NFU – it may have been more free to decide whether inclusive education is indeed the right solution for the PWDDs – particularly taking into consideration the limited resources available within the educational sector and the disadvantages experienced by the PWDDs themselves. Yet, Government policies on inclusive education would have limited any re-direction.

Alternative scenarios could include decentralised special education for children with development disabilities 1-2 days a week, including some sort of vocational training. This would still give the students more time with the teachers than the scattered support they may get today. The evaluation is highly critical of the fact that NFU has "gone beyond its usual remit" by taking responsibility for a project on inclusive education implemented by the government. "NFU is a small and relatively narrowly focused international NGO/DPO, with limited staff capacity. Unlike large international NGOs NFU does not have the capacity, field staff, or remit to be involved in the direct running of inclusive education programmes – and yet this is in effect what has happened in Zanzibar."⁶³

62 Ibid, p. 34.

63 Ibid, p. 45

The project lacks contextual knowledge and communication to and with the end-beneficiaries, as well as effective networking targeted internally in the Atlas family for resolving the approach taken on inclusive education.⁶⁴

Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP)⁶⁵

This section presents and analyses FOKUS's partnership with TGNP. TGNP was formed in 1993 and is considered one of the most influential women's organisations in the Tanzania. The founders of TGNP were mostly feminists with an academic background and the majority of the founders are still with the organisation. TGNP has worked mainly on advocacy and is aiming at changing social and economic structures. In 2008 the organisation introduced a major shift, seeking to work at the grass root level. TGNP holds the Secretariat for the Feminist Activist Coalition (FemAct), a coalition of more than 40 NGOs. Together with FemAct, TGNP organises the biannual gender festival which is well known and respected among stakeholders. TGNP has also initiated Tanzania Feminist Forum, a forum for NGOs working on women's rights. TGNP houses a resource centre with 7.000 books. The centre is open to the public. TGNP has 26 staff of which nine are supportive staff.

TGNP's main funder is Sweden, which now covers 30% of the total annual budget of USD 1.7 million (in the period 2008-2012 Sweden provided 50% of the organisation's funds, a total of SEK 28.6 million). TGNP generated own revenue of USD 272 000 in 2012. The Norwegian Embassy supported TGNP in 2008 and 2009. In 2009 the Norwegian Embassy's support was channelled through Norwegian Church Aid's (NCA) Tanzania office. NCA introduced TGNP and FOKUS to each other, as the two organisations are more like-minded than NCA and TGNP. From 2010, TGNP has received funds through FOKUS. The funding from FOKUS has been approximately NOK 550 000 per year (2010-2014) and is a contribution to the basket funding based on TGNPs strategic plan.

TGNP is known for its high level of integrity, and it is the only large NGO that has supported the rights of LGBTI persons and sex workers. This has, however, also entailed that the organisation has lost some of its credibility among other NGOs in Tanzania.

Effectiveness: The 2014 external evaluation of the TNGP is overall very positive. In terms of effectiveness, the evaluation states that "TGNP activities have contributed to several significant effects and changes in behaviour and actions on local/village level".⁶⁶ Villagers' possibility to hold decision-makers accountable and responsible has increased, and more marginalized women raise women's issues. Concrete example mentioned in the report is that local authorities at the ward level managed to put pressure on the district authorities

64 The evaluation firmly believes that all forms of empowerment are individually based – at first. This is a confirmed development effort performed by many CSOs around the world. An example from a UNO context: "The process of empowerment is often illustrated with examples of collective action by groups exerting pressure on duty bearers. Yet many of the projects visited in... (very poor areas in) ...India and Nepal begun by working with individuals in their homes. This is a necessary strategy." TripleLine Consulting (2012), p. 5.

65 This description draws primarily on interview with the TGNP's board and management; Coulter et al (2014), and <http://www.tgnp.org/>.

66 Coulter et al (2014).

to resume an ambulance service, and that women have claimed their rights in court. People who have been trained are aware of and engaged in the constitutional reform process and local and national elections.

The evaluation is more critical towards the effectiveness of the Knowledge and Information Centres since they appear to be not very well known and less used than anticipated. The centres were established recently (2012 and 2013) so this may change. TGNP has received support from DfID to use the outcome mapping method, but donors are not fully satisfied with TGNP's achievements in this regard. The government acknowledges TGNP and regularly invites them to stakeholder meetings on gender issues. The evaluation states that the change in national policies on the use of the Gender Responsive Budgeting can be attributed to TGNP. A major added value of TGNP, according to the evaluation, is the link between grassroots and policy. According to the evaluation, the Norwegian embassy, and TGNP itself, TGNP has been very central in the ongoing work on the constitutional reform process.

Based on the information from the M&E responsible in TGNP an M&E system is being developed but not currently in full effect. This may appear contradictory to the evaluation report's positive reflections on effectiveness apart from anecdotal evidence. This may also question whether TGNP fully understands of the role of M&E for measuring its progress and achievements. The evaluation also points out that TGNP's reporting has focused on activities and outputs rather than on the kind of changes and effects that the activities/output may have contributed to.

Efficiency: As for efficiency, the external evaluation states that "in general, TGNP is using its funds in a responsible and cost-efficient way". However, the evaluation is critical towards TGNP's reliance on external consultants in strategic processes, both because of the costs involved and the lack of ownership that this entails. The evaluation also questions the costs spent on information materials (approximately 40% of the budget). There has been no review on how and to what degree the material has been used and what the actual outcomes have been. The evaluation notes that TGNP has difficulties in making clear prioritisations, and it has a tendency to "try to please many stakeholders by doing as many things as possible, thereby risking spreading itself too thin".

TGNPs homepage does not contain any information on where the organisation gets its funding from. To the team, this is a sign of poor transparency. It has also entailed that a mapping of civil society organisations in Tanzania wrongly concluded that TGNP operated without external funding.

Discussion points: The lack of base line and an effective M&E systems for performance management is surprising for an 'old' and experienced CSO as TGNP. Combined with lack of transparency on funding information there is a need for TGNP to strengthen its processes and procedures in the organisation. TGNP seems also to be highly dependent on external consultants in their work

which allows for detachments to important issues and problems – particularly when addressing key planning and execution documents, including strategies. In a discussion of the UNO as a model the main benefit for TGNP, apart from funding, has been the networking opportunities that FOKUS has provided internationally and nationally. In 2012, TGNP participated in the Convention for the Status of Women Conference, where FOKUS introduced the TGNP representatives to high ranking Norwegian officials. At a national level, collaboration with FOKUS' partners in other parts of Tanzania has helped TGNP increase their focus on sexual reproductive health and bodily integrity, and to take side in the very contentious debate on LGBT rights. TGNP feels that it would be hard for a feminist organisation like theirs to access funding from intermediaries or local funds. The Foundation for Civil Society, however, was of the opinion that the Foundation is funding a wide range of organisations, including one that is working on a highly controversial issue, the revision of the laws governing abortion.⁶⁷

VNS School Exchange Programme⁶⁸

The VNS School Exchange Programme has broadly phrased objectives that should contribute to (i) education for sustainable development and address the root causes of poverty and provide insight into of democracy and democratic decision-making; (ii) building friendship, empathy and cultural understanding; and (iii) develop youth to become agents of change in development.

The VNS School Exchange Programme builds on a people-to-people exchange approach that aims to engage teachers and students in the North and the South and their respective host families over normally a two week period.

The Assistant Head Master of the Lumumba Secondary School in Zanzibar Town (a government elite secondary school) was in exchange in a programme in 2008 with the Mo i Rana Secondary School in Northern Norway. He went there with one other teacher and 5 students. His experience was very positive. He praised some of the advantages of the Norwegian school system and life in general compared to the Tanzanian school system and living conditions. This included the small-sized classes, environmental concern and behaviour, sharing of household responsibilities between men and women, etc. He has taught his students many of the positive things he learned, including taking care of the environment noting the advantages it would have on the local community, e.g. in terms of improved health. Also, he taught students about the different life conditions, family structures (core families versus extended families), the education system and what the Zanzibar students can learn from other cultures.

67 Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA) <http://www.tawla.or.tz/>; Lange et al (2014).

68 This presentation is mainly based on discussions with two teachers and four students at Lumumba Secondary School in Zanzibar Town on 30 April 2014, and Garden (2002); Juma et al (2009) and VNS (2009). The first two documents cover an analysis of a significant number of schools in the North and the South. The first evaluation is in the view of the evaluation team reliable, well-written where findings are relevant, and conclusions verifiable and recommendations applicable. The second document is an internal review and less critical. It focuses on 'appreciating what we have achieved and findings ways of doing it better'. (p. 7). The organisational review to some extent lack evidence for several of its findings. The March 2014 Review report provides a very positive assessment of the School programme. The team did not have access to report of the programmes on the peer mediation and dialogue.

The teacher had also noted some 'negative' aspects with Norwegian society, like the high degree of personal freedom for young people. Similar experience was expressed by some of the students interviewed.

In 2013 VNS conducted a capacity enhancement training on peer mediation and dialogue for the Lumumba Secondary School. A seminar was conducted over 2 days and students were given tools on how to undertake mediation in the school whenever a 'conflict' emerged and they were advised to form a youth club that would deal with such emerging conflicts. Since the formation of the club in 2010 it has had two cases. One case dealt with a stolen book and the other with a 'clash' over cleaning of a class room. Both 'conflicts' were solved satisfactorily. The students claim that they benefitted from the seminar and they have been successful in applying the approach in 'conflict' situations.

On the question about the initiation and involvement of the school in the theme of peer mediation and dialogue the School claimed not to have been involved. The school was informed about the upcoming seminar. The teachers should select 20 students that would receive 'training'. On the question of whether they found the theme relevant and essential for them and the school, they identified other more concerned issues that the school, they as students and their community were facing. Both teachers and students highlighted that the School exchange may have benefitted more if school related issues could have been addressed more thoroughly. This should have included skills and exchange of learning methods of teaching, the use of different media in the teaching and its role in society, and the role of the school in the local community, etc. In the 2002 evaluation and the 2009 review the issues of involvement were raised by participants of the programme. The 2009 organisational review further stressed that several North students felt that they were left with the heavier burden of the collaboration and that the South schools lacked commitment.

The Lumumba Secondary School is also part of the South-South collaboration with the Paarl School in South Africa, also administered by VNS Norway. During a visit to South Africa the Lumumba School participants did not experience any teaching activities. It was the wish of the students and the teachers to have received more relevant interaction with the school and view the school's function and role in the society in South Africa.

Effectiveness: The Tanzanian teacher's exchange experience in Norway and his transfer of knowledge to students in his school may well have been effective, for example, resulting in better environmental behaviour among students and their parents with some kind of health impact. We do not know the extent of this effect, however.

While the youth club for peer mediation and dialogues may have turned out positively for the students the lack of effective involvement on the side of the Lumumba School has made this programme 'VNS-driven' and have not met the needs of the end-beneficiaries, i.e. students and teachers. While the peer mediation and dialogues may make sense in a Norwegian context it seems not

to be of similar importance in the Zanzibar context. This may be verified by the fact that the two cases (a 'lost book' and a 'clean class room') seem to be the only issues raised over a two year period. Lack of involvement, lack of understanding the local context and lack of addressing actual needs seem to have created successful outputs of an exchange that will however have limited or no effect. Both the evaluation and the self-assessment review underscore that the effect of the programme for the involved individuals in terms of higher education choice and career are high – for the North school students. In most cases this will not be the case for the South participants.

Only outputs that meet criteria for involvement and actual needs would be able to bring the produced outputs further and become effective and sustainable in a school and societal context. So if lack of commitment on the side of the South partners has prevailed throughout the programme it is probably more a question of deficiencies in programme design than lack of South partners' motivation for participation.

Efficiency: The broad objectives of the VNS school programme indicate that most activities and outputs have been achieved, i.e. programme exchange activities have been carried out. The efficiency of the exchange programme was addressed in a 2002 evaluation. It calculated as follows: If each student attends three years at the school approximately 15-25 students out of approximately a total of 1 500 students will have been engaged in the exchange programme. The same would be the case for the collaborating school in the South – here with more numbers of total students.

According to the evaluation, the active participation of the youth in the exchange programme is considered a precondition for the exchange to have an effect. However, the efficiency will be (very) low as the spread of the exchange idea is narrowly focused on a few selected teachers and students. As such the effect may therefore also be limited, even though several of the selected students may choose international studies and careers. If efficiency is most likely low, larger impact will only occur if most youth in the school and in the locality are involved in the exchange activities, whether travelling or not to a foreign country. This will probably include an increased budget. It is questionable if the peer mediation seminar has been efficient considering the results of the two cases, while not underestimating the intangible results of building mediation skills and practices among the students.

The collaboration is dominated by the North stakeholders as regards initiatives, management of programme, reporting, etc. Ownership to the programme and therefore also the benefits primarily lies there and not primarily in the South. With limited ownership and relevance to the South partners to the exchange programme there is no or limited effect on the South side – no matter how many outputs are produced (e.g. established peer mediation youth clubs, solved cases, etc.). The policy recommendation suggested in the 2009 self-assessment calls for a complete re-design of the strategic approach to the programme with a

focus on involving the ideas and needs of the South partners. This seems not to have applied in this particular case.

Discussion points: Lack of involvement and addressing real needs of South partners limits effectiveness and sustained outcome. While transfer of skills and knowledge may have an impact, it must be evidenced through measurement of progress and achievements. Also, the domination the North CSO limits the effectiveness of the support, particularly if a contextual analysis is not performed. While participation per se does not guarantee progress or achievements in projects, it is often required for equal and mutual benefits in institutional exchange – aiming towards ownership and measured against appropriately designed indicators.

If the resources were available and the programme would not be controlled by VNS, the Lumumba Secondary School could have had the opportunity to scrutinise the partner 'market' itself and select appropriate partners, in the North or in the South, and design a programme content that may suit better the School and its partners' needs; or be assisted in this process by the embassy or Norad. The Lumumba Secondary School was wisely chosen by its Norwegian partner, Fyrstikkalléen School because it was a well-run elite school with sufficient human and technical resources and as such the school could probably be capable to arrange and run such a programme in collaboration with their selected partner(s).

There is a lack of contextual knowledge and acknowledging beneficiary needs. While 90% of all UNOs in the questionnaire survey states that they have involved and engaged effectively local partners in projects it seems to be missing in this case.

PWYP Norway TRACE Programme

The PWYP Norway initiated the Transparency and Accountability in Extractive Industries (TRACE) programme in 2008, funded by Norad. The purpose of the programme was to provide civil society in resource rich countries in the South access to knowledge, to strengthen its capacity to work effectively on these issues and provide an arena for networking and experience sharing. The programme is offered in one pre-defined region at a time. The regions are determined by geographical and linguistic factors. The programme is divided into two (previously three) modules and the group consists of 20-30 participants. Up till now almost 100 participants have attended the training.

The TRACE programme gives an opportunity for active learning of both theoretical and practical knowledge, experience and skills, so that participants in a more informed, effective and efficient manner put their learning to good use and into practice both before, during and immediately after the programme. PWYP Norway works together with participants on relevant advocacy areas, e.g. engage in public dialogues, as an integrated part of the programme. From civil society in the South, there has been an increasing demand for understanding the complexity and secrecy of the extraction industry and the challenges for

transparency of governments. Through the programme PWYP Norway facilitates direct South-South and triangular cooperation on the transparency and accountability issues in the extraction industry.

In the 2013-2014 TRACE programme five participants from Tanzania participated and the evaluation team managed to interview two of them, one employed in the Norwegian Church Aid in Tanzania, the other a centrally placed coordinator for the Interfaith Standing Committee (IFC). IFC is a committee for all three main religious directions in Tanzania, the Muslims, Catholics and other Christian denominations. Funded by NCA, the IFC has played a central part in bringing public attention to the mining sector in Tanzania since 2006. This has been done through visits to mining areas, and commissioned reports which show the negative consequences for local communities as well as how much tax revenue Tanzania has been losing out from the sector. The reports have been published in the names of the IFC members⁶⁹ IFC and NCA collaborate with the Tanzanian Policy Forum's Extractive Industries Working Group.

Effectiveness and Efficiency: Together with other specialists the PWYP trained persons facilitated knowledge and insight to the members of the IFC and empowered it in its advocacy work on issues related to the extractive industry, taxation, tax justice and illicit flows. Concrete examples given were learning what the concept "government take" actually implies, and to understand contracts. As such, the increased confidence of the IFC members on those issues has contributed to the Government taking the IFC increasingly serious. Recently the Tanzania Revenue Authority invited the IFC for a seminar, and expressed that they appreciated their work very much. IFC is pressing for mining and gas contracts to be open to the public. The PWYP training appears to have been paid off to a high degree in this case. PWYP Norway undertook in 2013 a self-assessment survey in which participants in the TRACE training provided descriptions that implied significant progress in the fields in the participating countries. Effective use of a results based approach for measuring progress and achievements would strengthen the credibility of PWYP Norway, e.g. documenting clearly the impact of the TRACE programme to the IFC's work. This is particularly important as it is a programme that is repeated over time.

Discussion points: The TRACE programme participants' application and use of their skills and learning towards the IFC seems to have been effective with a clear impact at the outcome level, yet useful performance measurement mechanisms seem not to be well in place. The apparent successfulness of the training programme lies in the fact that the learned knowledge and skills are applied effectively. Knowing the nature of influencing mechanisms and make use of existing capacities, the IFC, is critical to creating successful outcomes. The collaboration between PWYP Norway, Norwegian Church Aid and the IFC is a very interesting model for civil society engagement and advocacy. The NCA and IFC staff who have been trained appear to be very professional, realising that their influence is through the Bishops and other members of the IFC. While

69 Curtis et al (2008); TEC BAKWATA CCT (2012).

Tanzanian politicians and officials may ignore the advocacy efforts made by NGOs, it is almost impossible for them to ignore high ranking religious leaders. In one case a Minister tried to ridicule a member of the IFC for lacking knowledge about the extractive industry, and this created news coverage in favour of IFC.

PWYP Norway is the only chapter within the PWYP international campaign that provides in-depth training on the transparency and accountability in extraction industries. However, donors and CSOs nationally and internationally are increasingly targeting this area and most probably other stakeholders engaged in the field would have been able to take up this skills enhancement exercise. At the same time the very fact that the TRACE programme originates in Norway, where the oil industry has been handled in a way that brings long term benefits to the population, is probably very inspiring to participants in the South.

In a discussion of the UNO as a model strong networking and effective capacity development seem to have facilitated a successful application of the TRACE training programme in Tanzania.

7.6 Effectiveness and efficiency of alternative modalities in Nepal and Tanzania

Below is presented two organisations from Nepal, Sankalpa and the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF), and one from Tanzania, the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS). We do not discuss counterfactual but focus on factors that relates to effectiveness and efficiency as well as discuss local funding within the perspective of the UNO model.

7.6.1 Nepal

Sankalpa⁷⁰

Sankalpa was initiated as an umbrella organisation after the peace process in Nepal began in April 2006 and it was legally established in June 2011. The set-up of Sankalpa was 'donor driven'. Nepal was selected as a case country for gender focus and as such Sankalpa was 'designed' to support women's organisations in Nepal, supported financially by the Norwegian Embassy. Sankalpa is an alliance of 11 women organisations that work for a peaceful, just, equitable and democratic Nepal where women play a decisive and powerful role in governance and politics. Sankalpa members include a broad range of CSOs – small and large, umbrellas and networks, new and old and experienced – all addressing different concerns of women issues, such as alternative educational support to adolescent girls and women, advocacy on inclusion of women in

70 This presentation is primarily based on a mid-term review by Shresta et al (2014) and Comments by the Embassy to the MTR report, 4 March 2014, and interviews with the Sankalpa Management and Board and a focus group meeting with all 11 Sankalpa members.

politics and governance, and mainstreaming the rights of marginalised women, such as the Dalit, indigenous, disabled, conflict-affected and rural-based girls and women into national development. The large members of Sankalpa are also funded from other sources, both national and international. Eight out of the 11 organisations are engaged in projects in the regions, districts, wards and villages, and most of them have long experience. Sankalpa is organised in the five regions for coordination of activities and outreach.

Sankalpa's secretariat and main activities have been exclusively funded by the Embassy, including the project on 'Rights-based advocacy to empower women for political and social justice'. The project aimed at three outcomes: (i) increased representation of women at national and sub-national governance structure, political parties and civil service; (ii) increased lobbying for women's rights and transnational justice; and (iii) strengthening Sankalpa's organisational effectiveness and efficiency.

Most of the members claimed that the Sankalpa support complemented their own organisations' work which brought a more integrated and coherent understanding of women issues (e.g. community mediators, conflict affected women, ethnicity, etc.). This created a stronger gender policy approach to bring to higher levels.

Effectiveness: The 2014 mid-term review discusses the effectiveness and efficiency of Sankalpa's key activities in the areas of alliance building and networking, the promotion of inclusion and advocacy as well as research, documentation and institutional development of the organisation. Also it evaluates the three outcomes of the Rights-based project. Unfortunately, the mid-term review seems not to provide the necessary evidence or documentation, not even anecdotal evidence or case studies, needed to measure the progress and achievements of Sankalpa's work. This is confirmed in the Comments to the MTR from the Embassy. For example, evidence lacks on Sankalpa's contribution to (i) the higher turnout of women in the 2013 election; (ii) the training of trainers for the National Action Plan; (iii) results of radio/TV interventions; and the (iv) the good collaboration between Sankalpa and government institutions.

The Project Document from 2011 claims that the project will be subject to effective monitoring and evaluation through the establishment of a results-based management system. This seems not to have happened, and based on the Embassy's comments it appears that there are significant room for improvement regarding Sankalpa's M&E system.

Efficiency: The mid-term review found insufficiency in data available for measuring the efficiency of Sankalpa's performance. For example, it is mentioned in the Embassy comments that the efficiency of Sankalpa as an umbrella structure for servicing the objectives of Sankalpa was not properly addressed – considering the 11 organisations' huge networks and outreach, the apparent well-functioning secretariat, and the financial resources from the

Embassy. Whenever issues related to efficiency and effectiveness were addressed during the interview the main responses from the Secretariat were that 'we are still learning'. Sankalpa comprises large and experienced women's organisations with many years of experience, and as such should have systems in place that enables it to assess its own performance.

Discussion points: Lack of baseline and appropriate mechanisms for measuring performance, e.g. effectively designed results framework for actual use in planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, is a major hindrance for assessing outputs and outcomes.

Sankalpa covers very different organisations, which is positive for networking and outreach, but may be a challenge for strategic work and sense of shared purpose;

The fact that the umbrella is basically a Norwegian construction leaves the question about other possible support mechanisms, e.g. funding through already existing and well-functioning women's organisations. It does not seem logical or cost-efficient to establish such an umbrella unless a thorough prior study has been carried out.

In a discussion of the UNO as a model Sankalpa may well be a case in which a large locally established UNO does not seem to work very effectively or efficiently - an overall weak organisation where cost-efficiency is low. However, the Sankalpa construction may eventually develop into a stronger UNO on women's issues in Nepal if getting the appropriate organisational and management support.

Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF)⁷¹

The Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) was established in 2004 under the Ordinance 2060 which recognised PAF as an autonomous organisation with 'absolute' authority. PAF is an umbrella institution that targets the poor and fight against extreme poverty working through partner organisations. Its secretariat is based in Kathmandu. It has an annual budget of approximately USD 80 million, primarily funded by the World Bank.

PAF is a targeted programme initiative supporting the Nepali 10th National Development Plan. It provides resources directly to the poor, ensuring, in principle, community ownership. PAF is guided by the principle that the poor themselves are the best source of information and the best to manage their needs and resource. PAF envisions itself as a national instrument to uplift livelihood of poor people. The Executive Director of PAF works as the Secretary of the PAF Board. Since the only government official represented in the PAF board of governors is the Secretary of the National Planning Commission, there is, in principle, no government influence in the day-to-day working of PAF.

⁷¹ This section is primarily based on an interview with the PAF Executive Director, World Bank (2012), Poverty Alleviation Fund (2013) and <http://www.pafnepal.org.np/en/>

The target beneficiaries of PAF are poor women, the disabled, Dalit, Janajatis, and the vulnerable communities living below the poverty line. The goal of PAF is to reduce extreme forms of poverty from its programme districts. PAF aims to enable the target groups to gain access to resources for their productive self-employment, to encourage them to undertake income-generating activities for poverty alleviation and improved quality of life. PAF focuses on the most deprived districts and also reaching out to other poverty-stricken areas through innovative programmes under the Innovative Special Window.

PAF has adopted demand led community-based approach to poverty alleviation. Keeping the target communities at the driving seat, it encourages initiatives to improve their livelihoods, particularly organising them into community organisations. The target communities are the sole actor. They plan what they need and prioritise on the basis of their capacity and local resource potentials. PAF provides support for technical assistance in areas such as social mobilisation and capacity building through partner organisations and funds directly through small grants to the community to implement sub-projects. PAF runs four major programme components: Social Mobilisation, Income Generation, Small Community Infrastructure Development and Capacity Building.

Based on the experience gained in six districts, PAF recently expanded its programme coverage to an additional 19 districts thus covering all 25 districts belonging to the category of most deprived districts in Nepal.

Effectiveness: PAF appears to be a very well-organised and well-managed autonomous institution that has a unique approach to address poverty reduction in Nepal. An external evaluation of PAF's performance in 2010 showed the overall welfare of PAF assisted households improved between 13% and 49% as compared to non-PAF supported households. The estimated net impact on per capita consumption growth was 13% for households that took part in the PAF income-generation programme, 28% for households that received monetary support from PAF and 49% for beneficiaries who received monetary support over the last six months. The net impact in per capita consumption growth is even higher among Dalits and Janajatis, i.e. 34% against 28% for households receiving monetary support. School enrolment rates among 6-15 year old children increased proportionally with the per capita consumption growth. Measurable impacts included a reduction in child malnutrition by 5-10% and improved access to services related to agriculture centres, community forest and farmer groups.

A well-documented impact study on the PAF's Social Fund on the Welfare of the Rural Households was conducted in 2012. It proved a 19% real per capita consumption growth over a period of two years. Other impacts showed an increase in food security of 19% and a 15% increase in the enrolment rate of the 6-15 years children. Other impact indicators related to social capital, malnutrition and gender empowerment were not evaluated.

The evaluation team found that the PAF approach to address poverty issues is a very strong factor for effective and efficient aid delivery, and in line with international results based priorities. The impact study found that PAF was 'very effective'. In total 50% of the total number of households covered by PAF is above the poverty line.

The presence of revolving funds and support by PAF to strengthen institutional aspects through mainly the cooperative or community are mechanisms that stretch the support beyond the mere service delivery. Close liaison with the local and community governments further strengthens the overall sustainability as the local government funds also include similar type of support, that is, for complementary activities at community level.

Impact on a local basis in the selected districts among the selected households is significant and as such the 'localised' effectiveness is considered high. While these activities are limited to selected households in selected districts they may be considered scattered and therefore with an overall limited effect at outcome level.

Efficiency: In the 2013 annual report PAF states that it met 87% of its 'physical' target and 73% of its financial target. The reason why PAF had underspend was not clear, but may include too few PAF resources and /or too few qualified partner organisations.

Of the total of PAF's expenditure 94% went to programme implementation through the community organisations (77%) and partner organisations (17%), while 2% was spent on monitoring, training, studies and workshops and less than 3.5% in administrative costs. With small administrative costs efficiency appears to be high, even if monitoring and capacity development is included. Yet, the selection procedure for the partner organisations (of which there is currently 369 covering 40 districts) was not clear – and yet they comprise 17% of the total costs. The qualifications and the quality of their services to the communities and projects were not possible to assess. While training of partner organisations and community organisations are important ingredients of the support mechanisms there are no assessments of the impact of the training conducted.

According to recent annual reports output delivery has been achieved to a large extent and efficiency can therefore be considered high. However, no doubt that quality of capacity building of partner and community organisations should be considered for a more in-depth analysis for both efficiency and for impact on local organisational and financial sustainability.

Another major strong efficiency factor includes the poor beneficiaries' access to funds directly through their bank accounts. Without intermediaries costs are significantly reduced. The communities are in full charge of funds for their activities. They are supported in basic financial management and leadership training for community organisations. Also, an effective anti-corruption

mechanism has been applied to the programme. It is not known if it is effective or not.

Discussion points: The PAF modality seems to present a very strong and evidence based mechanism for alleviating poverty in an effective manner. Also, PAF applies effective measurable tools for assessing progress and results building on solid baseline data. Obviously, the principle of the '*lowest levels of management*' is applied in PAF. The apparent effectiveness and efficiency of this approach has been proven and reflects the successes of the same principle applied during the UN water decade.

A major strength of the PAF involves the availability of designing tailor-made 'windows' that opens up for support of any kind of themes and topics that may be in need in the communities as well as may support donor policies. This enables for 'earmarked' community funding which could be relevant for the Norwegian Embassy support.⁷² Recently, the Japanese Social Development Fund allocated USD 2.7 million addressing poor artisan communities with a strong gender focus in marketing their products.

A special value added is the local authorities' complementary funding of community development projects supports opportunities for sustained effect of the accumulated investments.

In a discussion of the UNO as a model PAF appears to be ideal in all aspects. It is a UNO that shows strengths on performance management, targeting the end-beneficiaries based on their needs, and overall an effective fund management. The latter may be partly questioned by the use of local CSOs in their support to the marginalised end-beneficiaries. Obviously, capacity building of local communities' capacity to manage projects, should be applied in a framework of 'economies of scale' where the impact of the training delivered by local CSOs should be enhanced.

Social Welfare Council⁷³

The Social Welfare Council (SWC) is a Government based entity that carries out evaluations and reviews and provides licences to INGOs and their local partners operating projects in Nepal. It has during its life time, four years, carried out approximately 300 reviews and evaluations, including those that Norway is supporting, a task that it is mandated to perform on behalf of the Government. The SWC is an important institution that can identify and measure the impact of all registered CSOs work in the country.

However, the capacity of the SWC is poor as it does not have the financial resources available to conduct high quality reviews and evaluations, i.e. paying

72 The evaluation team also met with representatives from a youth education project, implemented by the Strømme Foundation and partly funded by Norad through LNU. The Foundation provided a very effective project set-up with a thorough investigative period for project preparation, a strong M&E system and recruitment of a local management, all ingredients that strengthen effectiveness and efficiency.

73 This information is based primarily on an interview conducted with the Head of M&E of SWC.

reasonable fees for good evaluators. Funds from the government are limited and the INGOs allocate only few funds for reviews and evaluations of their own programmes. Most of the 300 reviews and evaluations have had limited effect at an aggregated (country) level since they have not been subject to an aggregated analysis, i.e. a meta-evaluation.

It is in the interest of all stakeholders related to civil society development that an institution like SWC is effectively operating. It provides important information that will enable each project in the CSO sector to improve its performance, yet not all projects have effective follow-up mechanisms for review and evaluation responses.

Strengthening SWC will enable donors to assess possible new CSO candidates and projects for support and the Government can assess its possibilities for supplement service delivery in areas where projects have such a focus.

7.6.2 Tanzania

The Foundation for Civil Society (FCS)⁷⁴

The Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) started its operations in January 2003 - as a Tanzanian non-profit company, designed and funded by a group of like-minded development partners which include DfID, CIDA, SDC, Sida, Norwegian Embassy, Embassy of Netherland, Comic Relief and Irish Aid with an annual budget of USD 14 million. FCS seeks to fund projects that will ensure that citizens are aware of their rights and responsibilities, and able to demand accountability from public resources. FCS serves all 30 regions of the country.

FCS is one of the largest support mechanisms for capacity building and grant support in Tanzania and has four levels of governance: The members, the board of directors, the management team and staff. The members are the highest authority and they exercise their authority through an Annual General Meeting. The Board of Directors provides regular oversight of the activities of the Foundation. The management team comprises the Executive Director and sector managers for grants, business development and partnerships, finance and administration, internal auditing, capacity development, information, publicity and communication, and monitoring and evaluation.

The FCS supports and enables citizens to become a strong driving force for change in (i) improving the civil society sector by enhancing technical and institutional capacity of CSOs/grantees; (ii) supporting initiatives for constructive dialogues between CSOs, parliamentarians, the Government, private sector and development partners; and (iii) contributing to the improvement of civil society sector's image. FCS was designed to focus on advocacy, but in recent years, grants have also been given to certain forms of service delivery.

⁷⁴ This description is based primarily on the team's interview with the FDC Director and management and a focus group meeting with representatives for five selected grantees, <http://www.thefoundation.or.tz>, and the *Foundation for Civil Society (2013c)* and Evensmo et al (2011).

Effectiveness: The mid-term impact assessment conducted in May 2013 revealed that the funding has resulted in considerable engagement in policy processes, high level of citizens' awareness on their rights, and increasing demand for accountability from public resources. Moreover, the capacity of FCS supported CSOs has been strengthened in terms of their effectiveness, sustainability and accountability, although with variations. The impact assessment further noted that the reported awareness and involvement in key government policy processes (such as policy formulation, dialogue, translation and implementation among FCS supported CSOs) increased from 50% in 2010 to 67% in 2011. With support from FCS, several policies, laws, by-laws and regulations have been developed, reviewed, translated, including the acts on Persons with Disability Act and the Child Law Act.

While many CSOs often experience that government leaders both at local and regional levels are suspicious towards their work, many reports that their relations have improved over time. This was the case with some of the projects that the team interviewed. Nine out of ten FCS supported CSOs have village/ street governments or ward executive officials participating in their local meetings. This is good for integration with the government system.

FCS generally has not maintained the same CSOs in its financial loop. One reason was that less than half of the supported CSOs received clean audit reports (30% in 2010 and 45% in 2012), which may make them refrain from applying again. The assessment found it hard to establish a pattern of flow of funds, and the number and type of beneficiaries reached by FCS over time. The impact assessment showed that there is a significant increase in the level of awareness of some of the fundamental democratic rights, up from less than 40% in 2007, to 50% in 2009, and 60-85% in 2011. By all standards, local citizens, particularly women, have been empowered and apparently have relatively high capacity to demand accountability from their local leaders. Although FCS supported CSOs have been active in the districts they operate, the media, radio and newspapers have been the main source of increased awareness on policy. FCS's achievements may be difficult to attribute to only FCS, as there were concurrent interventions conducted by several organisations within the same geographical localities, such as TGNP and Policy Forum.

While a system of monitoring and evaluation is in place for all grantees it is not always fully applied as the grantees in many cases are grassroots based and often cannot meet official aid effectiveness standards. Yet the large and medium grantees manage to report at activity and output levels. Generally, the reporting system is acknowledged by the grantees and they do not spend a lot of time on this. From the interview it was clear that they found the M&E formats and procedures simple and not time-consuming, particularly compared to other donors' requirements, e.g. WWF and Sida. According to the FCS Director the organisational strengthening of many of the smaller NGOs supported by the Foundation has been used for these to enter new networks and their ability to seek funds from other sources. Some strategic issues that are still pending for FCS to become a strong and sustained national CSO include strengthening its

sector research on baseline data and further improvement to its M&E systems. What may also be needed is a meta-evaluation of all project evaluations (or sector based) carried out over the last 3-5 years to assess overall impact of FCS support.

Efficiency: FCS may be unable to meet its financial obligations if major donors like DfID, Norwegian Embassy and Netherland (34%, 18% and 13% respectively as of 2012 Annual Report) withdraw. One main concern that the grantees observed was related to the problem of disbursements which had significant effect on the efficiency of the implementation the projects. For example, in some cases late disbursement results in price increase for equipment that does not match the original budget.

The FCS has proved to grow steadily in a period of 11 years of its operations in terms of its capacity on technical aspects and funding, increased number of grantees, increased grants size, increased staff and increased geographical coverage. Its number of grants approved has increased overtime from 36 approved grants in 2003 (worth TZS 807 million) to 621 approved grants in 2012 (TZS 17,6 billion). The FCS value of total annual grants awards has also increased over time, from TZS 717 million in 2003 to over TZS 14 billion in the year 2012. The amount of grants disbursed has also increased since the FCS inception, from an equivalent of USD 830 000 in 2003 to an equivalent of USD 9 million in 2012.

From the 2012 annual budget, the figures show that, out of 14.3 USD million spent, the largest share of the budget (69%) was spent on grants while the remaining was used for capacity development (16%), institutional development (1%), company expenses (2%), and recurrent expenditure (12%). As per the 2012 Annual Report, a total of 890 projects were supported (9 strategic grants, 367 medium grants and 514 small grants) in all 30 regions of Tanzania. Of the total number of applications, 16% were granted support. The FCS has set a clear guidance for funds to the grantee applicants from initial stages of call for proposal advertisements to final stages of contracts and disbursement of grants. Several assessments of the FCS have acclaimed the effectiveness of the grant system.⁷⁵

The FCS is strong in terms of having guidance, procedures and manuals that guide all operations of the organisation including manuals on human resources, finance operations, grants management and procurement as well as code of ethics that require all staff to declare conflict of interests. Board members are supposed to sign a declaration of vested interests when approving all grants to sub-grantees. On the negative side, FCS has delayed the disbursement of funds to grantees, which have negatively affected the achievement of planned activities within the project time.

75 See for example Evensmo et al (2011).

Discussion points: Overall organisational capacity, strong management and operational systems, a well-developed outreach to local communities and local authorities make FCS a highly effective organisation. There is obviously a need for improved design of M&E systems that meet both grassroots reporting and higher levels reporting without compromising effective performance management. One related problem is that FCS does not have enough funds to commission separate reviews of the larger projects.

FCS is strong in transferring skills, knowledge and capacity enhancement to CSOs and grantees that appear to have, in cases, long-term positive impact for these, e.g. effective fundraising following membership of FCS. Also, FCS has through its huge network of CSOs and grantees significant insight into local context and their particularities and needs, and with a strong network in place FCS is able to provide quality services within specialised sectors, such as in disability and gender. Furthermore, FCS is able to design tailor-made fund mechanisms (e.g. windows) that suit/match specific needs and ensure their effective implementation, qua FCS's network.

In a discussion of the UNO as a model a great advantage of FCS compared to funding through North CSOs is that CSOs that have insufficient knowledge of English can receive funding, which means that there is a substantially higher outreach to small and rural CSOs. Another advantage is the step-wise funding which means small and inexperienced CSOs get a chance to develop and some of them later get funding also from other donors. On the other hand, the direct funding from donors usually involves larger funds. FOKUS and TGNP argue that a funding mechanism like FCS will exclude CSOs that work on controversial issues like abortion or the rights of LGBT persons and sex workers. FCS's respond to this is that "although we are silent on such issues, we have never refused an application on those grounds."⁷⁶

⁷⁶ A Tanzanian CSO run and led by LGBT persons was recently de-registered by the Government on the grounds that it promoted homosexuality. FCS and other CSOs' silence in regard to controversial issues must be seen in this context.

8. Conclusions

In recent years, there has been a debate within Norad concerning the role of Norwegian NGOs in strengthening civil society in the South. It has been argued that support through Norwegian NGOs contributes to a situation where priorities are set in the North, and that the model may add costs that are not necessarily reflected by the added value that support through Norwegian CSOs represents.

This evaluation has focused on the support that is channelled to and through eight selected Norwegian UNOs. These UNOs receive a small share of the total Norwegian support that is channelled through CSOs; yet, the sum for the period 2008-2013 amounts to almost NOK 2 billion.

Based on the history of the UNOs their legitimacy seem to be based on (i) their cost-effectiveness, i.e. reduced transaction costs on the side of Norad; (ii) their role as a funding mechanism, i.e. the UNO secretariat being a prerequisite for members to acquire funds; (iii) their overall organisational and capacity development support to their members' and partners' as well as the compliance to meeting reporting demands from Norad; and (iv) a discussion forum in development cooperation.

The value added of the UNOs was perceived by the UNO secretariats as containing the following five areas: networking, capacity development, knowledge sharing, advocacy and human rights based approaches. Service delivery was not seen as a value added.

Based on the UNO and member/partner questionnaires and the theory of change analysis we concluded that the drivers and enablers in the change process of the UNOs' strive towards goal achievements, were as follows: *Organisational development and learning through capacity building, supported by an understanding of context, effective communication, networking and tools application facilitated by experienced and professional North CSOs targeting other North as well as South partners.*

There appears to be a reasonable close working relationship between members/network partners and their secretariats. Overall key services provided by the secretariats seem to be of an overall acceptable-to-high quality as perceived by the members and network partners. Disadvantages as perceived by the members and network partners being engaged in a UNO structure included that most UNO related work is time consuming, the capacities of several members

cannot be fully utilised in their support to their South partners, and lack of trust limits collaboration between members and partners in countries they work.

In conclusion, the members and partners relationship to their respective secretariats shows a mixed picture – a picture that reflects well the schism between being an active and contributing UNO member and partner, and being subject to a framework with limited manoeuvring opportunities.

The UNO members and network partners' perception of their support to their South partners included the following: (i) building trust through long-term commitment based on funding, common values of respect and transparency, and effective communication; (ii) provision of relevant knowledge, competence and networking through capacity development activities; (iii) ensuring interested and involved partners.

Almost all members and network partners perceived that their South partners were actively engaged in all aspects of the project preparation and reporting, including budgets and financial management. A fairly large number found that these project and reporting related activities constituted a significant amount of time for members, network partners and South partners alike.

Based on the Findings of the evaluation (Chapter 7) and the questions raised for identifying Pathways towards change (Chapter 5) it is now possible to answer and conclude on some of these questions.

Organisational learning and capacity building: The UNOs seem to have been effective in building the organisational capacity of South partners, especially the ones that are relatively young, through staff training and networking. South partners that have existed for a relatively longer period, having matured as organisations, can often manage interventions themselves effectively, including fund management, also without UNO support. These large, well-established CSOs appreciate the networking opportunities that the partnership with Norwegian CSOs entails, particularly internationally. Overall, the value added as perceived by the UNOs themselves, i.e. providing networking, capacity development, advocacy and human rights based approaches, have, overall, been delivered. Service delivery formed a major concern among many end-beneficiaries interviewed in Nepal and Tanzania, but was not included as a value added by the UNOs.⁷⁷

While it should be acknowledged that the UNOs' overall concern and work are to provide a broad range of services that benefit the poor and excluded groups of the society, it seems that they do not apply tools that may effectively discover main concerns and the real needs of end-beneficiaries.⁷⁸

77 Service delivery forms a very important component of the DfID's supported comprehensive Civil Society Challenge Fund.

78 One such useful methodology that has proven successful is classic grounded theory, see for example the research on poverty in Greenland, in Sorensen (2010). A condensed English version of the same is presented in Christiansen et al. (2013). Other relevant methodologies include appreciative inquiry and participatory appraisals.

It was not possible to verify to which extent the capacity building was relevant or provided a measurable return on investment. None of the UNOs or their North partners seems to have engaged in serious steps towards measuring capacity building impact, which is highly critical as many resources are often allocated for capacity building activities.

The results framework applied for monitoring progress and measuring achievements are insufficiently designed and used by most UNOs, mainly due to lack of knowledge and practice.⁷⁹ This prevails throughout all the levels of the UNO structure and is exacerbated by the inconsistent use of M&E tools by Norad. This is evident from the design and content of the framework agreements between Norad and the UNOs and in the financial management reporting. In most instances neither baseline nor indicators have been thoroughly developed with the active involvement of stakeholders – despite this latter being a key value added stated by UNO members and network partners. Logical sequencing for change applying a theory of change method is entirely lacking. Often project activities and outputs are achieved but links to the outcome level been limited. While it has been observed generally⁸⁰ as well as in this evaluation that most CSOs embrace a positive attitude towards evaluations, existing management responses to evaluations seems not to be used effectively.

Most of the Norwegian member organisations visit their projects once or twice per year. The reporting procedures vary a lot between the Norwegian member organisations. While some write very detailed and informative travel reports, others do not. Annual project visits do probably not give a full picture of project activities, results and impact. At the same time, more frequent visits would add to the administrative costs and in some cases burdening the project stakeholders. With the present system, the Norwegian UNO members and network partners are doing the financial management control of the South partner's accounting system (in addition to audits by local audit firms). This situation is not ideal since the Norwegian member will often have inadequate knowledge of the local prices and the language which the receipts are written in, the procurement systems, etc.

Contextual understanding: In some cases the power relations between the North and South partner have entailed that the models that the North partner has brought with it has been implemented – despite not being well fit to the local context and not wanted/preferred by the end-beneficiaries. For example, poverty and illiteracy levels are not addressed where they should, and Norwegian or international development concepts, such as inclusive education, seem to be applied where reluctance prevails among end-beneficiaries.

79 M&E practices of CSOs in Norwegian development cooperation have been evaluated recently, Norad (2012c). The report stated that the six CSOs evaluated (of which one was Digni) "perform well" and "have practical experience from monitoring and evaluation; and they have been exposed to training" and "invested in systems development". p. xv-xvi). From the perspective of this evaluation, despite the inconsistencies in Norad reporting requirements, it is problematic that M&E tools are still poorly developed, applied and not well understood, as they form the basis for measuring the value for money as well as the capacity of the organisations to achieve their goals.

80 Norad (2012c), p. 43ff

Lack of thorough contextual analyses also limits an important understanding of the balance between service delivery and rights based advocacy. From the case studies it is clear that in poverty stricken areas service delivery is often a prerequisite for implementing effective advocacy. A strong membership base across a poor district, region or the country for advocacy effectiveness can only be built credibly if balanced with sufficient service delivery support which meets specific and tangible needs of the vulnerable local beneficiaries. The team found strong correlation between the degree of service delivery and advocacy impact.

Effective communication: Based on the shortcoming of contextual understanding it appears that the effective communication that the UNO secretariats claim they exercise in their daily practices does not comply in full. Likewise the UNOs claim to have systems in place to tackle any serious project deviations, but also this seems not to comply entirely. For example, it seems detrimental to the end-beneficiaries and probably waste of resources that a particular approach is allowed continually for a long period time without any intervention from the responsible UNO.

In countries where few of the end-beneficiaries know English, there is a serious danger of elite capture, that is, the CSO staff and management may very easily monopolise the communication with the Norwegian CSO. For staff and management, the preference may be training, networking, improved salaries etc., while the end-beneficiaries may have very different priorities. This was the case in several of the visited projects.

Networking: Overall networking seems to be an important mechanism used by the UNOs and their members/partners to facilitate development of strong organisations in the South. Networking is key value added as perceived by the UNOs themselves. On the other hand, in some partnerships funding for networking and advocacy seems also to be spent on seminars and international travelling for CSO staff and top management. It is a challenge to assess to what degree participation at an international conference will ultimately meet the real needs of the end-beneficiaries. Also, it is a challenge to engage a broad membership in poor countries for advocacy work that it may take years or decades to accomplish.

Partner selection: Several of the UNO members and partner organisations have advocacy as their main purpose, but have teamed up with organisations whose membership expect (and need) service delivery. When the funded project then focuses on advocacy with slow or poor outcomes, it can create conflicts between the members/intended beneficiaries and the CSO staff and leadership.

The South partners and end-beneficiaries tend in several cases to be passive and receptive not opposing a strategy or approach, developed, mainly by the North, probably because of fear of losing funding and the network. In such situations dominance could spill over into harmful activities. In most of the organisational reviews and the evaluations of the UNOs, it is observed that the

local South partner often saw the collaboration “very much valued”.⁸¹ While this may be true, the evaluation team may suspect, based on this evaluation, in some or even many cases, such comments to be a cover for ‘fear’ rather than an honest opinion.

The support through the UNOs enables very small Norwegian CSOs to take part in development cooperation.⁸² Smaller organisations generally have less experience in project management than do the larger Norwegian CSOs that often are specialised in development cooperation. Also, the smaller organisations often have a higher turnover of staff. They also have less experience in their way of handling risk management and corruption compared to larger Norwegian CSOs. The questionnaire sent to UNOs show that the smaller UNOs that distribute funds to partners in the South (DCG, FOKUS) have experienced a higher percentage of reported cases of corruption than the large UNOs, e.g. Digni and Atlas.

Cost-efficiency: The cost-efficiency of the transfer of funds from the umbrella secretariats to their Norwegian members may be questioned. The final administrative costs for a project could be up till 30% in a four level UNO chain. The administrative costs of the networking organisations however cannot be directly compared to the Norad funding as a portfolio, because the network organisations often work directly with their partners without additional layers of transactions.

Neither Norad policies nor the agreements between Norad and UNOs define what should be counted as administrative costs. The UNOs therefore have different interpretations of what should be counted as administration costs versus programme costs. As the administration costs are not clearly reported for all the UNOs it is not possible for Norad to control if the agreement has been followed. Norad’s control system mainly depend upon reviews and evaluation reports, which have a tendency to have very little focus on financial management and may not give the correct and relevant information. A standard reporting format for the UNOs has not been established and due to this different reporting formats are in use and this leads to difficulty in comparing and analysing the different UNOs.

Since it is not possible from the available data to differentiate clearly between the administration of project funds and networking and advocacy activities, it is difficult to analyse the cost-efficiency of the UNOs in managing Norad funds – even though the general data points to low efficiency.

Local vs. UNO funding: Considering the premise that a significant number of relatively strong and well-established CSOs exist in partner countries, which has been confirmed in this evaluation, it is likely that local funding mechanisms may be more cost-efficient than Northern based. There is in the two countries visited a group of well-educated people who are able to fulfil the role that the staff of the Norwegian NGOs perform in the partnerships – at a much lower cost. For

81 E.g. Norad (2009c), p. 6.

82 The Fadder-arrangement in Atlas Alliance is an example.

example, the ratio between salary expenses at executive level in Norwegian CSOs and executive salaries in large national CSOs in Tanzania was approximately 20 to 1. From a cost-efficiency point of view it is reasonable to ask if the North CSO executive adds 20 times more value than the equivalent South executive.

A particular positive aspect with national funds/foundations is that they are more accessible to CSOs whose staff and members have a poor command of English. When communication is done in the national (or local) language, the whole process is likely to become more 'democratic', since more members of the CSO can actively participate in reporting and communication with the funder.

However, making use of local funding modalities also have their challenges. For example, multi-donor baskets may have unintended and negative consequences in relation to an independent and diverse civil society. For example, "there is some evidence of civil society concern that the convergence of donor priorities in a limited number of joint funds may reduce the sources of funding for many, particularly smaller, CSOs. It may encourage others to divert from their primary mission to obtain funding since there are fewer alternative sources of funding; reduce CSO access to individual donors; and undermine the mediating role donors have played between civil society and governments."⁸³

Other points/issues: The umbrella structure has most probably entailed that certain groups, like persons with disability, have received more support than if the umbrella structure had not been there. Moreover, Norwegian UNOs play an important role in creating knowledge about, and engagement for, the South in Norwegian society. This is done both through the member organisations' activities and in local communities in Norway and through the UNOs' information work at a national level and their lobbying towards politicians.

83 INTRAC/Danida (2014), p. 5.

9. Recommendations

Recommendations to Norad

1. Norad should consider to what degree it would be feasible to channel an increasing share of Norwegian civil society funding through strong and successful national CSOs/UNOs in the South, particularly those that would provide funding to local organisations and non-conventional civil society movements. A feasibility study could be carried out that primarily investigates the financial implications of changing the fund managing structure from North to South and what possible implications this would have for the Norwegian based civil society work.
2. In a situation where more funding is channelled directly to the South, it is important to have sufficient control and monitoring mechanisms in place. Norad should therefore assist in strengthening national structures for monitoring and evaluation of CSOs. Also, the support to national CSOs/ UNOs should where possible be executed within a framework of common donor harmonisation efforts.
3. Norad should prepare Civil Society Notes as previously suggested in Norad (2013a). These Notes aim to facilitate new and alternative models that emphasise South demand-driven support, e.g. through social and religious movements. It is important that approaches to address more unconventional civil society actors are based on suitably adopted research methods with a focus on 'doing no harm', e.g. using classic grounded theory, appreciative inquiry, and participatory appraisals.
4. Norad should, firstly, standardise its results framework for all UNOs. Secondly, Norad should field test new, simple and time-saving tools for project monitoring and results achievements. Key ingredients in such a framework could be: narratives phrased in generic terms, use simplified yet effective indicators, e.g. quantity, quality, time (QQT) and strengthening risk mitigation. This approach should be combined with the application of theory of change and piloted in two UNOs.
5. Only a meta-evaluation of the performance of UNO structures in Norwegian civil society support would provide the necessary documentation for any important policy changes regarding the future role of the UNOs in Norwegian development cooperation. This would include a sufficiently large sample of evaluations of UNO-like structures, including evaluations of INGOs, that could bring together otherwise scattered knowledge and lessons learned.

6. Norad should clarify what costs that can be counted as administrative costs, and what that can be included as programme costs. At the same time, Norad should develop more flexible agreements with the UNOs in terms of the fixed level of administration costs to encourage continuous improvement of cost-efficiency while also ensuring that the fund management does not tap into funding from other sources.
7. Norad should initiate and make mandatory a standard reporting format for the financial part of the annual reports to Norad, where the administrative costs are separately reported and specified according to the agreement between Norad and the UNOs. Also, all evaluations of UNOs and particular projects should include a financial assessment.
8. In order to determine the cost-efficiency of the UNO value chain, performance audits of two UNOs should be carried out, testing if this will inform better financial decision making of Norad.

Recommendations to the UNOs

9. In order to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of the UNO funding skills, it is critical to enhance the skills of UNOs, members, network partners, and project staff in designing theory and pathways of change and developing useful and operational results frameworks.
10. The UNO must ensure that in-depth analysis of the local political economy context in recipient countries are carried out by its partners before deciding on a specific approach or strategy of a planned intervention. While this is already required in the standard Norad agreement with the UNOs, it seems not to take place to a sufficient degree. This is particularly important when working within the framework of internationally set development conventions and broad based human rights based approaches.
11. The UNOs must strengthen their internal flow of information and exchange of experiences – across all vertical levels. This will ensure a greater degree of common understanding and tackling of emerging issues and problems.
12. While some UNOs prepare a management response to each evaluation and review that has been conducted, their members and network partners should do the same for improved decision-making.
13. Since resources and costs spent on smaller Norwegian CSOs are high for some of the UNOs, relevant UNOs should consider downscaling such activities and re-allocate funds for activities in the South, while limiting any inverse impact on broad based civil society development in Norway.
14. The benefits of service delivery versus advocacy work needs to be carefully considered by the UNOs. Steps should be taken to ensure that projects carried out in poverty stricken areas are supported with service delivery either through the project or through government bodies or a combination of

both. Small and/or young organisations in the South should not be funded to do advocacy work at national levels – this should be left to large national CSOs and more influential umbrellas and networks.

Annexes



Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of the Norwegian support through and to umbrella- and network organisations in civil society

1. Introduction

Norwegian support to civil society organisations (CSOs) in development cooperation amounted to a total of almost 6 billion NOK¹ in 2012 from different state budget chapters and via different extending agencies, such as Norad's department for civil society, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norwegian embassies. The funding is channelled through Norwegian CSOs, through international and regional CSOs and national and local CSOs based in the country of support. Relatively large amounts are provided to CSOs' provision of humanitarian assistance. Most of the remaining funds are provided to support CSOs' contributions to public service delivery, and/or to strengthen civil society in developing countries. The purpose stated in official documents for support to those functions of civil society organisations has been relatively stable over the years. According to the latest Norwegian budget proposal² the purpose is to strengthen civil society as a driving force and as agents of change with a view to create more open and democratic societies and contribute to reach international and national goals. The same document acknowledges that the scope for CSOs to play such a role varies between countries and will often involve support to service delivery as 'the basis for CSOs as agents of change'. Norad's support to CSOs is guided by a set of principles for support to civil society³.

Part of the Norwegian support is channelled through Norwegian umbrella- and network organisations and /or regional or national umbrella or network organisations in the countries of cooperation. A characteristic of these organisations is the heterogeneous nature of the organisations labelled umbrella or network organisations⁴. Some of those organisations have been established due to an interest among member organisations to collaborate on specific issues of common ground within their core mandate and interests, while some seem to have been established primarily for the purpose of channelling and managing

¹ Source: Norad statistical base, covering all chapters and extending entities.

² For recent policy documents, see Prop. 1 S (2012-2013), chapters on support to civil society, and Meld. St. 25: Dele for å skape. Demokrati, rettferdig fordeling og vekst i utviklingspolitikken.

³ Norad, principles for Norad's support to Civil Society in the South, Oslo, May 2009. Some changes in these guidelines, of specific relevance for umbrella- and networks, were made in 2012.

⁴ There is not a readily available, official definition of umbrella and network organisations. A common characteristic is that the umbrella- and network organisations work as advocates to further the interests of its membership, including representing and supporting the members in various ways. One factor mentioned to differentiate these two is that the umbrella organisation also has a function of channelling financial support to its member organisations.

donor funds and/or to establish a common platform for collaboration with donors. Some are primarily involved in channelling development assistance of more traditional nature in development countries. Others are primarily engaged in advocacy activities in their home country (whether in Norway or a developing country) or in international forums. One important challenge for this evaluation is to approach them conceptually as (a) model(s) while still grasping the diversity of these organisations and how they function.

The modalities, the value added and the effects of the support through civil society organisations are under continuous debate, and numerous evaluations/ reviews have been conducted, focusing on different aspects of the support⁵. A few have looked specifically at umbrella- and network organisations but still, systematic studies of Norwegian support via this/these model(s) have not been done. The evaluation thus intends to offer insight into an aspect of the Norwegian support where there is little evaluation based information available.

The evaluation will provide insight into the role, functioning, effectiveness and efficiency of both Norwegian and nationally based⁶ umbrella- and network organisations and feed into the analyses of the role of civil society organisations and the support to CSOs in the Norwegian development cooperation.

The results and effects of the support through civil society organisations should be measured on the basis of the situation and context in the societies where they operate, emphasizing their role and strength as actors of change. As the context and situation in the societies where civil society organisations operate change over time the Norwegian support also have to adapt to new realities and challenges. The role and function of such organisations in development cooperation have evolved throughout the history of its existence. It is of interest to grasp the historical development and the possible future role of such models in the architecture of the Norwegian development cooperation.

2. Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to provide guidance to future Norwegian support through and to civil society umbrella and network organisations, by assessing their effectiveness, efficiency and added value with regard to supporting civil society development.

5 The following, commissioned by the Evaluation department and Department of civil society, will be of special interest as a basis of documentation and learning for the evaluation: Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksemplifisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemnd og Atlas-alliansen, Evalueringsrapport 4/2004; Evaluation of Norwegian Development Coordination through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007), Evaluation Report 3/2009; Results of development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in East Africa, Evaluation Report 1/2011; Kartleggingsrapport om paraply-/nettverksorganisasjoner, Norad, Avdeling for siviilt samfunn, 2012 (unpublished) ; Tracking impact. An exploratory study of the wider effects of Norwegian civil society support to countries in the South, Norad's civil society panel, March 2012. This list does not exclude other reviews/evaluations of the organisations involved. It would be of interest to see how these and other reviews and evaluations have been followed up.

6 The evaluation will use the term "nationally based" to cover umbrella- and network organisations based in the country of study to differentiate from the organisations based in Norway. The term may, however, include international, national and local organisations.

3. Objectives, questions and scope

The objectives of this evaluation are:

- i. Establish and assess the theory (/ies) of change and the assumptions behind the Norwegian support to or through umbrella- and network organisations, including historical and contextual factors contributing to this, differences of opinion and judgement among actors, and the role of different partners in the interaction.
- ii. Assess the effectiveness and added value of the support given through/to the organisations in the selected countries from the perspective of the intended beneficiaries of the support and other key stakeholders.
- iii. Assess the effectiveness, efficiency and added value of umbrella- and network organisations as compared to alternative (counterfactual) ways of channelling support to civil society development, including an analysis of which factors that contribute to effectiveness, efficiency and added value.

Effectiveness and efficiency are understood as in OECD DAC's evaluation criteria. "Added value" means any significant difference – positive or negative – between support through such organisations as compared to other means of supporting civil society development in the countries where they operate – whether in a development country or in Norway and internationally. For CSOs primarily engaged in advocacy activities, "civil society development" refers to the combined influence of CSOs on state and society in the country where they operate or, when relevant, in international forums.

The evaluation will look specifically at umbrella and network organisations, respectively. One factor to differentiate the two could be that in the umbrella organisations, a key function is to channel financial support to its member organisations.

The following indicative list of **evaluation questions** should be addressed, keeping in mind the need for separate analyses of the Norwegian and the nationally based organisations, and that the different evaluation questions should be applied differently and with varying emphasis for organisations working primarily in Norway or international forums:

- Why and how was the model (/models) of umbrella- and network organisations developed?
- Which areas and activities do the support through umbrella- and network organisations cover, and what is the specific role of the umbrella- and network organisations?
- What is the role of the umbrella- and network organisations, Norwegian and/ or nationally based, as an agent of change in the society in the country studied?

- Which systems have the umbrella- and network organisations, Norwegian and nationally based, established for their support to organisations, including criteria for selection and monitoring?
- What are the costs and economic benefits of implementation through the umbrella-/network organisation, also taking into account that these organisations may serve to reduce costs at other actors involved, both at Norad/MFA and among member/recipient/partner organisations?
- What is the opinion of the member organisations and other stakeholders, including relevant authorities, regarding the cooperation and the umbrella-/network organisation? Do they have suggestions of changes or opinions regarding alternative organisation models?
- Which contextual, cultural or other specific factors are of importance to the possibility to generalise findings beyond the case countries?
- What would be the alternative models of organisation? Which other organisational models are found in the case countries that can be used for comparison⁷?
- What difference and possible added value does it make for final beneficiaries that the support is given to or through umbrella- and network organisations?
- What kind of power relations are of importance in the country context of special relevance for the activities of the organisations and to what degree are the organisations, including the Norwegian, aware of these, and able to respond adequately in their actions. For cross-cutting issues, like gender and anti-corruption, such conditions should be included in the assessment.

The evaluation will focus on the **time period** 2008-2012. Older data can be collected when relevant.

The evaluation will include two **case countries** for study in addition to looking more specifically at the work of the organisations in Norway, but should focus on lessons assumed to be of general relevance to future Norwegian support to civil society. The case countries for study will be *Tanzania and Nepal*. These countries are selected on the following criteria: a) significant volume of development aid including the support to civil society, and specifically through umbrella- and network organisations; b) the possibility for comparison across geographical, contextual and sectorial differences. The consultant may also propose data collection in other countries in other ways than regular country visits.

⁷ The following alternatives for comparison may be of special relevance: support through traditional Norwegian CSOs, through international civil society organisations or networks, or directly (from Norad, MFA or embassies) to national organisations in developing countries.

All umbrella- and network **organisations** that receive/channel support from Norway are, in principle, of interest for the evaluation, while the Norwegian organisations are pre-selected.⁸ In the case country studies, the Norwegian organisations that are supporting activities in the country, whether permanently represented or not, are pre-selected for in-depth study. In addition, some nationally based organisations are seen as particularly interesting. However, the aim is to draw general lessons rather than providing conclusive assessments of each one.

Hence, the evaluation will include, at least, a study of the following organisations. *In Norway*: Stiftelsen Atlas-alliansen (Atlas), Digni, Forum for Kvinner og Utviklingsspørsmål (FOKUS), Landsrådet for Norges barne- og ungdomsorganisasjoner (LNU), Vennskap Nord/Sør (VNS), Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Norge, Drylands Coordination Group (TKG), Forum for Utvikling og Miljø (ForUM). *In Tanzania*: ATLAS, Digni, FOKUS and Foundation for Civil Society. *In Nepal*: ATLAS, Digni, LNU and Sankalpa.

The tenderer should propose further criteria for selection, including for the nationally based organisations. The final selection of organisations for study will be decided in the inception phase, in consultation with the Evaluation department and the stakeholders.

4. Approach and methodology

The evaluation will be collecting data from multiple sources, including review of project documents and evaluation reports, research and studies, interviews, group discussions, survey(s), and observation of activities in the case countries. The evaluation team may consult stakeholders and organisations in other countries than the case countries by way of surveys and phone interviews. The evaluation shall demonstrate how triangulation of methods and multiple data sources are being used to substantiate findings and assessments. The consultant will propose the methodological design in the tender. It should include:

- Mapping of all Norwegian umbrella- and network organisations involved in development cooperation, and all such organisations receiving or channelling support from Norway in the case countries, picturing the various types of linkages between the umbrella- and network organisations and their partners⁹. The mapping exercise should build on a mapping of Norwegian umbrella- and network organisations, produced for Norad (in Norwegian only) and a study tracking impact of support to CSOs more widely¹⁰. It should

8 The study mentioned in note 5 "Kartleggingsrapport om paraply- /nettverksorganisasjoner" include the following Norwegian umbrella- and network organisations: Stiftelsen Atlas-alliansen (Atlas); Digni; Forum for Kvinner og Utviklingsspørsmål (FOKUS); Landsrådet for Norges barne- og ungdomsorganisasjoner (LNU); Vennskap Nord/Sør (VNS); Publish What you PaY Norge (PWYP Norge); Tørrlandskoordineringsgruppen (TKG); Forum for Utvikling og Miljø (ForUM).

9 The mapping should cover both umbrella- and network organisations based in Norway and their cooperating/ implementing partners in the country, and such nationally based organisations supported directly by Norway and their cooperating partners. Data will be made available from Norad, the Norwegian embassies and each organisation and should include: Type of organisation; membership of the organisation, other partners in the country; kind of support given by the organisation to its members including amounts of financial assistance if relevant; sector/issues covered; financial support received by Norwegian aid; other financial support.

10 See note 5.

describe the flow of finances and other resources, characteristics of the key relations in the networks such as information flow and knowledge sharing, quality management, accountability and so on with a view to assessing the effects of the umbrella- or network organisation on the performance of other CSOs or the achievement of joint objectives.

- Contextual analysis including institutional/political economy analyses in the two case countries, primarily based on already existing sources such as academic and other studies of relevance, supported by stakeholder interviews.
- Theories of change/intervention logic, including reconstruction of the theories of change applied by Norad, the theory of change applied by the organisations under study, as well as specific or generic theories of change established by the evaluation team, specifying the roles of umbrella- or network organisations.
- Effectiveness and efficiency analysis comparing support through or to umbrella and network organisations with direct support to individual CSOs. Rather than aiming at conclusive statements for each organisation the team will develop and apply a model for systematic assessment of different mechanism, by which channelling support to or through these organisations may impact on effectiveness and efficiency, positively or negatively, as compared to direct support to individual CSOs.
- Construction/simulation of alternative (counterfactual) models for support to civil society development in the two case countries and Norway¹¹.
- The evaluation shall be conducted in accordance with the prevailing DAC OECD Evaluation Quality Standards.

The rights, dignity and welfare of participants in the evaluation shall be protected. Anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants shall be protected. The evaluation shall be undertaken with integrity and honesty and ensure inclusiveness of views of all stakeholders.

5. Organisation

The evaluation will be managed by the Evaluation department, Norad. An independent team of researchers or consultants will be assigned the evaluation according to standard procurement procedures including open international call for tenders. Qualifications required are described in the tender document. The evaluation team will report to Norad through the team leader. The team leader shall be in charge of all deliveries and will report to Norad on the team's progress, including any problems that may jeopardise the assignment.

All decisions concerning these Terms of Reference, the inception report and other reports are subject to approval by the Evaluation department.

¹¹ See note 7

The team will be responsible for collection of data. The team is entitled to consult widely with stakeholders pertinent to the assignment. Access to archives and statistics will be facilitated by Norad and stakeholders.

The MFA, the relevant Norwegian Embassies, relevant departments in Norad including the department for civil society, and the Norwegian umbrella- and network organisations will be asked to comment on the draft inception report and the draft final report, including draft country reports attached. In addition, other organisations included for study may be invited to comment upon reports or specific issues during the process.

The evaluation team shall take note of all comments received from stakeholders. Where there are significant divergence of views between the evaluation team and stakeholders, this should be reflected in the final report.

Quality assurance shall be provided by the institution delivering the consultancy services, and shall involve a specified person who is external to the evaluation team and who will be involved in all key phases of the evaluation. Further specification for quality assurance is given in Part 3, Annex 1. Specifications for Preparing Technical Proposal.

6. Budget and deliverables

Budget

The tenderer will provide a total budget in NOK, specifying fees per hour and day, cost for country visits and other costs. The evaluation will be budgeted with a maximum input of 200 consultant days.

The team is expected to undertake field studies in the case countries with sufficient time for thorough consultation with stakeholders, and presentation of preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations to stakeholders in the country at the end of the field visit shall be planned for.

The budget should include costs for a meeting to present the final report in Oslo. The consultants may be requested to make additional presentations, in which case the costs will be covered by Norad outside the tender budget.

The budget shall be specified as explained in Part 3, Annex 3, Price.

Deliverables

The deliverables in the consultancy consists of the following outputs:

- Inception Report not exceeding 15 pages shall be prepared, and commented upon by the main stakeholders, before final approval by Norad's Evaluation department.
- Draft Final Report, including country reports as annexes, for preliminary approval by Norad's Evaluation department for circulation to the

stakeholders. The stakeholders shall provide feedback that will include comments on structure, facts, content, conclusions and recommendations.

- Final Evaluation Report.
- Seminar for presentation of the final report in Oslo.

All presentations and reports (to be prepared in accordance with the Evaluation department's guidelines given in Annex A-3 Guidelines for Reports of this document) are to be submitted in electronic form in accordance with the deadlines set in the time-schedule specified under Section 2 Administrative Conditions in Part 1 Tender specification of this document.

Norad's Evaluation department retains the sole rights with respect to all distribution, dissemination and publication of the deliverables. All supporting material shall be made available to Norad's Evaluation department, ensuring the anonymity of informants in compliance with generally accepted principles.

Annex 2: Detailed Methodology

1. Evaluation Process

Preparatory work for the evaluation started in late December 2013. It included (i) internal team dialogue on the assignment structure and evaluation questions, preliminary division of labour, key issues related to the Terms of References (ToR) and document reading; (ii) a revised outline of the work plan for the assignment; (iii) planned communication with the eight UNOs, Norad and embassies in Nepal and Tanzania; and (iv) drafting of data collection tools, including an integrated results framework for performance assessment, questionnaires, interviews and focus group meetings.

A questionnaire for the UNO secretariats/managements (=secretariats) was designed. On 8 January 2014 the questionnaire was sent to the secretariats of the eight UNOs. The responses were of good quality, in many cases comprising elaborated information to the questions posed in the questionnaire. The findings were subsequently collected and organised and used as a basis for follow-up interviews with each of the eight UNOs in Oslo in the period 20-23 January 2014. During the same period the team had discussions with Norad's Evaluation Department and the Department for Civil Society.

Based on the data collected analyses were carried out and preliminary patterns identified. Draft results framework for each UNO was developed for distribution for planned interviews and theory of change discussions in Oslo, but was withdrawn due to time pressure put on the UNOs.

Following the submission and approval of the Inception Report in February 2014 a questionnaire targeting the members and network partner of the UNOs was designed and sent out on 28 February 2014. Following the response and sorting of the data collected, findings were presented to two focus groups in Oslo on 25 March 2014. Additional interviews were carried out in Oslo in the period 24-27 March 2014 with members and network partners of the UNOs and particularly those active in the case countries, Nepal and Tanzania. Field work was carried out in Nepal from 31 March to 8 April 2014 and from 23 April to 2 May 2014 in Tanzania. A team data validation session was held on 12 May 2014 in Stockholm.

2. The UNO model/s

A central part of the evaluation was to assess the performance of the UNOs as development agents in civil society through an assessment of their effectiveness and efficiency. Based on this assessment, the team identified the value added

that the UNO, as a 'model', had for channelling support for development purposes to civil society. The team interpreted 'support' as anything from representation, knowledge management, networking, capacity building, service provision and advocacy to funding as well as any other type of support that the UNO may perform that is perceived as benefits to their members, network partners, local partners and/or projects and end-beneficiaries. As such, the methodology included an analysis of the UNOs' self-perception of their value added.

In identifying conceptually one or several UNO models for channelling support to civil society development we adopted a simple inductive method. The data collected formed the basis for building a model or models. This enabled the team to form a picture of the manner in which the various levels of the UNO structures perceived the operation and purposes of the UNO modality and provided a growing insight into their structures. We did not preconceive the model concept but had the data 'tell the story'. Through this process we identified variations in the UNO structure and through comparison of data from various levels of the UNO structure conceptualised the model/s, identifying key properties.

Based on this method we categorised the Umbrella as *a hierarchically structured organisation that distributes funding (from a donor) for development purposes to local partners and projects in developing countries through domestically based member organisations*. A civil society Network was categorised by its *'flat' and 'loose' organisational structure mainly addressing advocacy and/or research related issues*.¹²

The most interesting issue was that the network partners' functional tasks included almost the same ones as for the umbrellas, i.e. funding, capacity building, networking, advocacy and organisational development. The *flexibility* of the network organisations appeared at a first glance to be the main characteristic as compared to the umbrella organisations – with its flat and loose structure. However, data revealed that this flexibility was equally 'restrained' as was the case with the umbrellas. For example, should ForUM be a coordinator and meeting place for organisations or play a more proactive and independent advocacy role? How should ForUM prioritise its resources and to what extent should it serve those who fund them or those they represent.¹³ These questions have been key discussion points within network organisations as well as in umbrella organisations throughout their existence. The three network organisations investigated, ForUM, DCG and PWYP Norway, were hugely different in areas of support, target groups and organisational structures and a 'model'-seeking process based on only three organisations was not considered appropriate. During the course of the evaluation it was found that several of the umbrellas actually could be considered more like networks as their activities,

12 Some scholars emphasise that networks "rely heavily on their loose linkages for the(ir) mandate to make significant changes". Also, if "new functions were imposed on the networks (namely to act as intermediaries, providing resources and services to third parties) their capacity to meet their original functions suffered". Hearn and Mendezabal (2011), p.6

13 See Aarholt Hegna (2010), p.4.

costs and time spent as compared to the mere managing of Norad funding were significantly higher.

The team therefore saw the main difference between the two 'models', umbrellas and networks, as being the particular *funding* mechanism the umbrellas provide through Norwegian partners to their South partners and projects. Based on this 'definition', only Digni and Atlas would be considered 'true' umbrellas, the remaining six organisations as networks.

3. Data collection method

The main tools used for the evaluation included document reviews, questionnaires, interviews, focus group meetings and field visits to Nepal and Tanzania. Document reviews included evaluation reports and main studies that reflected generally on the civil society development and primarily on those that addressed UNO related issues.

3.1 Stakeholder mapping and questionnaires

A *stakeholder mapping* was prepared and key informants identified. The mapping included a listing of all Norwegian members and network partners and their contacts for questionnaire and interview purposes as well as relevant individuals. The lists specifically identified those members and network partners that were engaged in projects and activities in the South, including those in Nepal and Tanzania. As such, the mapping formed a basis for initiating a thorough stakeholder analysis.

Two *questionnaires* were used for data collection. A questionnaire developed for the eight UNO secretariats comprised two sections, one that related specifically to issues on the history of the UNO in Norway, Nepal and Tanzania, overall development concerns and issues, and the role of the UNO in these contexts, e.g. poverty, change, value added, priorities and accountability. The second part mainly addressed organisational and financial management related questions. Based on an analysis of the responses and interviews conducted with the UNO secretariats in January 2014 a new questionnaire was designed and sent to the members and network partners of the eight UNOs.

The questionnaire for the UNO members and network partners included questions related to the role of the secretariats and the relationship between the secretariats and the UNO members/partners, including assessment of the quality of services provided by the UNO secretariats to their members/partners and the members/partners support to their South partners. The questionnaire was distributed to 122 members and network partners of the eight UNOs. By making the sample too small the team risked, if the response rate was too low, that reliability of the conclusions made from the data analysed would be questionable. A 34,2% response rate was achieved, which was considered a reasonable rate due to the limited time requested for the response to be returned (2 weeks). Yet, the evaluation team initiated two focus group meetings to further strengthen the data foundation. One focus group was composed to address the umbrella issues, comprising 10 randomly selected UNO umbrella members, and

one group for network issues, comprising 10 randomly selected UNO network partners. Both meetings were held on 25 March 2014 in Oslo.

Table 1 Questionnaire response rate of UNO members and network partners

UNO	Response Percent	Response Count
Atlas-Alliance	16,3%	7
Digni	27,9%	12
FOKUS	9,3%	4
ForUM	4,7%	2
LNU	25,6%	11
PWYP Norway	0,0%	0
DCG	9,3%	4
VNS	7,0%	3

Source: questionnaire database

The sample of UNO members and network partners selected for the questionnaire included the 'big three' UNO members working in the South whom all received the questionnaire – based on the mere size of their budgets, i.e. Atlas, Digni and FOKUS. As for the networks, ForUM, PWYP Norway and DCG, all their Norwegian network partners received the questionnaire. As regards VNS and LNU, the mere size of their memberships called for a reduced number of recipients of the questionnaire. VNS's partners involved in the 10 projects in Tanzania were included, covering school, community and South-South cooperation, in addition to 10 randomly selected projects, a total of 20 questionnaire recipients. LNU had 32 partners of its total of 96 working in the South of which 15 randomly selected received the questionnaire. The total sample came to 147 members/network partners (Table 1). However, due to the fact that individual organisations were connected to more than one of the eight UNOs, the number was reduced to 122 members and network partners. In the questionnaire the member/network partner was asked to select one of several UNOs on which it was to base its questionnaire response. For example, Fellesrådet for Africa is a member of FOKUS and network partner in ForUM and PWYP Norway. It chose to respond to the questionnaire as network partner of ForUM.

The distribution of the responses showed a vast majority of the members/ partners related their answers to an umbrella organisation (86%) and relatively few to the networks (14%). This challenged the interpretation of the data collected and the validity of data analysis for the network partners. Based on the questionnaire data, the interviews and the focus group meetings with selected members and network partners it was the view of the team that the commonalities of activities (organisational development, capacity building, networking, advocacy, etc.) carried out by all UNOs – networks as well as umbrellas – were so similar that the data collected reflected the characteristics of all UNOs, networks as well as umbrellas, while acknowledging differences of different UNOs.

Following an analysis of the responses to the two questionnaires the evaluation team selected a sample of interviewees during follow-up meetings with key Norwegian stakeholders in Oslo, 21-24 March 2014, including the previously mentioned two focus group meetings.

3.2 Field work approach

For the *field work* the team gathered a list of local partners and projects of the eight UNOs operating in the two case countries, Nepal and Tanzania. The initial data were provided by the Norwegian UNOs' members and network partners. As the number of stakeholders were relatively limited in the two countries the conduct of open/semi-guided interviews were considered to be most effective, leaving out a questionnaire option.

The methodological approach to the field work was divided into two.

Table 2 Sample for UNO member and network partner questionnaire (2013)

	Atlas	Digni	FOKUS	ForUM	LNU	PWYP	DCG	VNS	Total
Total budget (in million NOK)	84	181	43	8	7	5	7	11	
Total members/network partners (N)	16	19	74	43	96	20	6	339	
No. operating in the South *	10	19	35	22	32	15	71	145	
No. operating in Nepal	4	2	-	-	1**	-	-	-	
No. operating in Tanzania	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	10	
Sample	10	19	35	22	15	20	6	20	147/122

(*) These data were received from the organisations

(**) This project is funded by LNU from ODW funds, not Norad.

First, the main purpose was to assess the effectiveness, and where possible, the efficiency of the UNOs' projects in Nepal and Tanzania. The team aimed at meeting with as many local partners and projects as possible which operated in the two countries. In Nepal members of the three umbrellas, Atlas, LNU and Digni, carried out projects and the team met with all representatives of the local partners, apart from the two LHLI partners, and selected end-beneficiaries. In Tanzania members of the three umbrellas, Atlas, VNS and FOKUS, carried out projects and the team met with several local partners, their projects and selected end-beneficiaries. As for the networks, the team managed to meet with two participants of PWYP Norway's TRACE programme in Tanzania. Focus group meetings were held with partners of HimalPartner and NABP in Nepal and with partners of NFU and LHLI in Tanzania.

Second, the team, with the assistance of the Norwegian embassies, identified and listed all possible national UNOs and other relevant CSOs that received alternative funding, i.e. 'direct funding', 'local funds' 'multi-donor funds' or similar, from Norway or other national and international sources. The purpose was to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of these organisations against the same criteria for the Norwegian members/partners of the UNOs. One national

UNO was pre-determined for comparison, i.e. Sankalpa in Nepal. Others were selected based on their immediate relevance to meet Norwegian development and civil society cooperation policies and poverty reduction focus in general.¹⁴

The main data collection method was the conduction of interviews. Yet, it was obviously important to add documentation from the identified organisations, including reviews, evaluations and studies, for the evaluation team to validate interview findings and assess the organisations' effectiveness and efficiency.

The team made use of the archive in the embassies as well as Norad databases¹⁵ for planning purposes in identifying relevant CSOs to be used for comparison of alternative structures to the current UNO modality. This work was supplemented by utilising the embassies' knowledge and the team's networks and individual knowledge of the civil society sector in Nepal and Tanzania.

The selecting of specific CSOs for the evaluation were based on two main criteria: (i) the CSOs relevance as possible alternative modalities for direct Norwegian funding, e.g. through the Embassy, Norad or INGOs to individual CSOs, national UNOs or local basket/core funding mechanisms or a combination of these, and (ii) the CSOs willingness to participate and reveal relevant information to the team regarding key features of the evaluation, i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and value added.

Finally, in Nepal the team also visited an LNU financed project and a few embassy supported CSOs, including INSEC, and the Danish funding mechanism, HUGOU. We also discussed with the NGO Federation of Nepal. We have in our overall conclusions drawn on the experience from these organisations but they have not been included specifically in the analysis. The LNU project is only partly funded by Norad and the embassy supported CSOs were not within a UNO framework or could be considered as alternative models for direct funding support. Nevertheless they revealed important information on how CSOs work and network in Nepal. In Tanzania, the team visited a few embassy supported CSOs, including the Tanzanian Media Council. The latter was not been included in the analysis.

4. Effectiveness and efficiency

Effectiveness refers to the outcome level of the results framework of the agreement between the UNO and Norad or the projects that UNO members and network partners are engaged in. It is defined as a measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objective at outcome (and impact) level.¹⁶ Effectiveness measures how well the UNO *contributes* to the development outcome stated in the results framework. As such, the UNO will not be the responsible organisation for achieving the outcome, but provide evidence on

14 The aim of the civil society support is to empower a democratic civil society in the South through the (i) mobilisation of voluntary organisations and social movements against poverty, oppression and discrimination, and (ii) support players that work for democratisation, human rights and redistribution of power. Particular emphasis is on equality, women and children's rights, environment, transparency in capital flows, and transparency in public administration. Det kongelige Utenriksdepartementet (2014), p. 160

15 <http://www.norad.no/no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/avansert>

16 OECD (2002/2010)

how supported project outputs are used by those stakeholders that have the prime responsibility for achieving the outcome – e.g. local partners and institutions, and local and national governments in target countries.

However, Norad's results framework structure applied in the eight UNO agreements with Norad varied significantly, so without a standardised structure comparison of performance across the UNOs was a challenge. Furthermore, the results framework analysis was not the focus of the evaluation, but the UNO as a model and modality for civil society development. Effectiveness measurement was therefore limited to the projects that the North UNO members and network partners were engaged in in the two case countries.

The data collection methods for effectiveness have included reviews, evaluations, studies and interviews.

Efficiency refers to the *input* and *output levels* of the results framework. Efficiency measures the outputs in relation to the inputs and activities that are under direct managerial control of the project or programme.¹⁷ It measures how well the UNO or UNO member/network partner or South partner manage their activities – covering, for example, strategies and planning, project design, monitoring and evaluation, human resources management, and partnership arrangements with other CSOs and/or UNOs, government entities at national and local levels as well as donors. As was the case with effectiveness measurement, efficiency assessment has been limited to the projects that the North members and network partners have been engaged in in the two case countries.

Data collection methods have included reviews, evaluations, studies and interviews. It should particularly be noted that data available for assessing the efficiency differed significantly. In some situations it was only possible for the team to access organisational structures as the main pieces of documentation, which would hint the degree by which the organisation could smoothly implement its activities. In other situations the team had supplementary financial data that provided additional analysis to the efficiency level.

A particular aspect of efficiency was the financial management of the UNOs. The evaluation reviewed progress and financial reporting comparing with work plans and budgets. In addition, sample tests were taken on internal controls and risk management. An analysis of what was considered as administration costs as well as operational costs was included and compared with the total funding as a measure for cost-efficiency of the UNOs. Attention was also paid to the capacity and resources, including personnel and tools used.

17 OECD (2002/2010)

5. Value added

Value added is defined in the ToR as the ‘significant difference’ between the UNO support mechanisms and *other ways of supporting* civil society development. As such the evaluation addressed added value in two ways:

- as a comparison between UNO support and ‘other ways of supporting’ looking at a ‘value chain’ (Figure 1), and
- as the UNO secretariats’ self-perception of their value added, as UNOs, towards their partners in the North and the South.

As regards item (i), the focus of the comparison has been to assess to which extent any extra level in the ‘value chain’ – from Norad funding to the end-beneficiary – has “added evidence-based value beyond the extra costs incurred”.¹⁸ This is shown in the cost-efficiency analysis of the UNOs.

The value added under item (ii) has been ‘measured’ against what was experienced by the UNOs members and network partners, and the South partners, projects and end-beneficiaries.

Figure 1 illustrates the ‘value chain’ between key stakeholders. The chain consists in principle of six levels and five links¹⁹, but may differ from project to project:


- Norad
- The UNO secretariat
- UNO members / network partners
- Local partners
- Projects
- End-beneficiaries/Users

The value added for each link was addressed and analysed by the team – *where data was obtainable*. It was important for the team to ensure that the *all* levels of the value chain were addressed and analysed. The team made its best efforts to evidence the perceived value added identified at each level/link of the UNOs. The same stringent methodology was not possible to apply for the alternative direct funding mechanisms identified and analysed in Nepal and Tanzania. Therefore, from a methodological and data perspective the comparison was not possible to carry out in a fully consistent manner.

¹⁸ Det kongelige Utenriksdepartementet (2014), p.159

¹⁹ In some instances funds have passed six to nine administrative levels, Norad (2011), p. 46-47.

Figure 1 The UNO Value Chain



6. Limitations

1. The team was careful in extracting general conclusions from the UNOs work in Norway, Nepal and Tanzania – with a view to the specific contexts of the countries in question.
2. The team received documentation from all levels of the UNO structure for the evaluation. It included financial reports, annual and progress reports, relevant research and studies, appraisals, mid-term reviews and evaluations, brochures and pamphlets, strategic plans and policies. Yet, the team may not have been supplied with other relevant documentation. Due to inadequate financial reporting for some UNOs and also for some partners in the case countries it was not possible to perform full financial analyses.
3. The evaluation did not address effectiveness and efficiency at the UNO secretariat level, only of members and network partners' projects in the two case countries. In this process the evaluation team was dependent on mid-term reviews and evaluations of projects for relevant information. These documents supplemented data collection through the interviews conducted. The quality of these documents varied significantly and was taken into consideration when assessing the effectiveness and efficiency.

4. While the evaluation addressed various aspects of the value added and cost-efficiency of the UNO model the evaluation did not attempt to balance more generally on costs and benefits of the UNO structure.
5. The team was dedicated to obtaining as objective and honest answers as possible from as many stakeholders as possible in the two case countries, including end-beneficiaries. Therefore meetings of UNO structured CSOs in Nepal and Tanzania were divided into first a meeting with the secretariats followed by a meeting with local partners as well as end-beneficiaries, where possible. However, in some cases secretariat representatives participated in the latter meetings and the results of these meetings were less informative on real issues and concerns.
6. A major focus of this evaluation has been to investigate the North-South relationship of the UNOs in Nepal and Tanzania. This priority has resulted in less focus on those UNOs that have their main work related to a Norwegian and international context and those that do not have activities in the two countries, i.e. ForUM and DCG. As such their work has been less focused upon in the evaluation.
7. CSOs are generally increasingly their engaging with the private sector, and vice versa. Therefore, the evaluation included questions on this exchange and collaboration. However, data revealed that the UNOs had very limited or no relationship to the private sector. Therefore it was not possible to discuss this important issue.
8. The UNOs operate within a Norwegian institutional context which the team has not been asked to evaluate, i.e. Norad as the body for development cooperation, and more specifically the Department for Civil Society. A more full understanding of the role of the Department and the interaction between the Department and the UNOs may shed more light on issues of relevance to the questions addressed in this evaluation. The team has however drawn on information provided by the Department.

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EVALUATION REPORTS

- 10.00 Taken for Granted? An Evaluation of Norway's Special Grant for the Environment
- 1.01 Evaluation of the Norwegian Human Rights Fund
- 2.01 Economic Impacts on the Least Developed Countries of the Elimination of Import Tariffs on their Products
- 3.01 Evaluation of the Public Support to the Norwegian NGOs Working in Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 3A.01 Evaluación del Apoyo Público a las ONGs Noruegas que Trabajan en Nicaragua 1994–1999
- 4.01 The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Cooperation on Poverty Reduction
- 5.01 Evaluation of Development Co-operation between Bangladesh and Norway, 1995–2000
- 6.01 Can democratisation prevent conflicts? Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa
- 7.01 Reconciliation Among Young People in the Balkans An Evaluation of the Post Pessimist Network
- 1.02 Evaluation of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM)
- 2.02 Evaluation of the International Humanitarian Assistance of the Norwegian Red Cross
- 3.02 Evaluation of ACOPAMA An ILO program for "Cooperative and Organizational Support to Grassroots Initiatives" in Western Africa 1978 – 1999
- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMA Un programme du BIT sur l'« Appui associatif et coopératif aux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l'Ouest de 1978 à 1999
- 4.02 Legal Aid Against the Odds Evaluation of the Civil Rights Project (CRP) of the Norwegian Refugee Council in former Yugoslavia
- 1.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund)
- 2.03 Evaluation of the Norwegian Education Trust Fund for African the World Bank
- 3.03 Evaluering av Bistandstorgets Evalueringsnettverk
- 1.04 Towards Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of the Peacebuilding.
- 2.04 Norwegian Peace-building policies: Lessons Learnt and Challenges Ahead
- 3.04 Evaluation of CESAR's activities in the Middle East Funded by Norway
- 4.04 Evaluering av ordningen med støtte gjennom paraplyorganisasjoner. Eksempelvisert ved støtte til Norsk Misjons Bistandsnemda og Atlas-alliansen
- 5.04 Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka: Building Civil Society
- 6.04 Study of the impact of the work of Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Study: Study of the impact of the work of FORUT in Sri Lanka and Save the Children Norway in Ethiopia: Building Civil Society
- 1.05 –Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norad Fellowship Programme
- 2.05 –Evaluation: Women Can Do It – an evaluation of the WCDI programme in the Western Balkans
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 5.05 Evaluation of the "Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation (1997–2005)"
- 1.06 Inter-Ministerial Cooperation. An Effective Model for Capacity Development?
- 2.06 Evaluation of Fredskorpset
- 1.06 – Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 1.07 Evaluation of the Norwegian Petroleum-Related Assistance
- 1.07 – Synteserapport: Humanitær innsats ved naturkatastrofer: En syntese av evalueringsfunn
- 1.07 – Study: The Norwegian International Effort against Female Genital Mutilation
- 2.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Power-related Assistance
- 2.07 – Study Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGOs in South America
- 3.07 Evaluation of the Effects of the using M-621 Cargo Trucks in Humanitarian Transport Operations
- 4.07 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Support to Zambia (1991 - 2005)
- 5.07 Evaluation of the Development Cooperation to Norwegian NGOs in Guatemala
- 1.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)
- 1.08 Study: The challenge of Assessing Aid Impact: A review of Norwegian Evaluation Practise
- 1.08 Synthesis Study: On Best Practise and Innovative Approaches to Capacity Development in Low Income African Countries
- 2.08 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of the Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD)
- 2.08 Synthesis Study: Cash Transfers Contributing to Social Protection: A Synthesis of Evaluation Findings
- 2.08 Study: Anti- Corruption Approaches. A Literature Review
- 3.08 Evaluation: Mid-term Evaluation of the EEA Grants
- 4.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian HIV/AIDS Responses
- 5.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Research and Development Activities in Conflict Prevention and Peace-building
- 6.08 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation in the Fisheries Sector
- 1.09 Evaluation: Joint Evaluation of Nepal's Education for All 2004-2009 Sector Programme
- 1.09 Study Report: Global Aid Architecture and the Health Millennium Development Goals
- 2.09 Evaluation: Mid-Term Evaluation of the Joint Donor Team in Juba, Sudan
- 2.09 Study Report: A synthesis of Evaluations of Environment Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
- 3.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation through Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations in Northern Uganda (2003-2007)
- 3.09 Study Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Sri Lanka Case Study
- 4.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to the Protection of Cultural Heritage
- 4.09 Study Report: Norwegian Environmental Action Plan
- 5.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008
- 6.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Humanitarian Mine Action Activities of Norwegian People's Aid
- 7.09 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and of Norad's Programme for Master Studies (NOMA)
- 1.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Norwegian Centre for Democracy Support 2002–2009
- 2.10 Synthesis Study: Support to Legislatures
- 3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
- 4.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance South Africa Case Study
- 5.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Bangladesh Case Study
- 6.10 Study: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance Uganda Case Study
- 7.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the Western Balkans
- 8.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of Transparency International
- 9.10 Study: Evaluability Study of Partnership Initiatives
- 10.10 Evaluation: Democracy Support through the United Nations
- 11.10 Evaluation: Evaluation of the International Organization for Migration and its Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
- 12.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI)
- 13.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Brasil
- 14.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Democratic Republic of Congo
- 15.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Guyana
- 16.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Indonesia
- 17.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Tanzania
- 18.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 1.11 Evaluation: Results of Development Cooperation through Norwegian NGO's in East Africa
- 2.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Research on Norwegian Development Assistance
- 3.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of the Strategy for Norway's Culture and Sports Cooperation with Countries in the South
- 4.11 Study: Contextual Choices in Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learned
- 5.11 Pawns of Peace. Evaluation of Norwegian peace efforts in Sri Lanka, 1997-2009
- 6.11 Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts, 2002-2009
- 7.11 Evaluation: Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation to Promote Human Rights
- 8.11 Norway's Trade Related Assistance through Multilateral Organizations: A Synthesis Study
- 9.11 Activity-Based Financial Flows in UN System: A study of Select UN Organisations Volume 1 Synthesis Volume 2 Case Studies
- 10.11 Evaluation of Norwegian Health Sector Support to Botswana
- 1.12 Mainstreaming disability in the new development paradigm. Evaluation of Norwegian support to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.
- 2.12 Hunting for Per Diem. The uses and Abuses of Travel Compensation in Three Developing Countries
- 3.12 Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2001-2011
- 4.12 Evaluation of the Health Results Innovation Trust Fund
- 5.12 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations.
- 6.12 Facing the Resource Curse: Norway's Oil for Development Program A Study of Monitoring and Evaluation in Six Norwegian Civil Society Organisations
- 7.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
- 8.12 Use of Evaluations in the Norwegian Development Cooperation System
- 9.12 Evaluation of Norway's Bilateral Agricultural Support to Food Security
- 1.13 A Framework for Analysing Participation in Development
- 2.13 Local Perceptions, Participation and Accountability in Malawi's Health Sector
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- 2.14 Unintended Effects in Evaluations of Norwegian Aid
- 3.14 Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
- 4.14 Evaluation Series of NORHED Higher Education and Research for Development. Theory of Change and Evaluation Methods.

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