

# Forward-looking Review of the Support from the Royal Norwegian Embassy to CSOs in Angola through the Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid

BY SCANTEAM

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# Forward-looking Review of the Support from the Royal Norwegian Embassy to CSOs in Angola through the Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian People's Aid

## Draft Report



**Project:** Assess status of the implementation of NCA and NPA  
Angola Country Program Plan 2011 - 2015 and results  
achieved to date.

**Client:** Norwegian Embassy in Luanda

**Period:** August 2013

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DISCLAIMER

This Report is the responsibility of the consultants and does not necessarily reflect the views of Norad or the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign or their staff, or any other organization or informant referred to. Any remaining errors of fact or interpretation are the responsibility of Scanteam.

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADRA- Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente  
AJPD - Associação Justiça, Paz e Democracia  
ACM – Associação da mocidade Cristã / YMCA  
CICA - Conselho das Igrejas em Angola  
DW – Development Workshop  
FMJIG - Forum de Mulheres Jornalistas para Igualdade de Género  
IEBA - Igreja Evagelica Baptista em Angola  
IECA - Igreja Evalangelica Congregacional em Angola  
GBV – Gender Based Violence  
ML - Associação Mãos Livres  
LWF- Lutheran World Federation  
NCA – Norwegian Church Aid  
NCC – Nacional council Centre  
NPA – Norwegian People Aid  
PMA - Plataforma Mulheres em Acção  
PMA – Plataforma das Mulheres jornalistas  
UNDP – United Nations Development Program  
USAID – United Natuons agency for International Development

## Executive Summary

- (1) Civil society in Angola is at a crossroads. On one side, there is a shrinking space in front of a government with clear authoritarian – although not very repressive – characteristics. On the other side, most foreign donors and also international organizations are pulling out. One of the few remaining government donors – now probably the leading – is Norway. The Norwegian Government is decided to continue with its support to civil society, i.a. as a social responsibility due to the economic activities generated in Norway as a result of the contracts of the Norwegian oil industry in Angola. compensation for the high profits harvested by oil-related companies. But one of two remaining Norwegian NGOs, responsible for channelling the funds to Angolan partners, has now decided to close their development and human rights work in Angola: Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). That leaves Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) as the sole Norwegian NGO actor of any significance in the country.
- (2) Both the NCA and the NPA partnership program have recently been reviewed. Since the very clear priority of the review as expressed by the Norwegian Embassy was to look for possible options to substitute NPA, we have mostly relied on these reviews – generally speaking offering positive conclusions – in the backward-looking part of our assessment.
- (3) The NCA partnership group supported by the Norwegian Embassy consists of seven faith-based organizations. Their strength is their community base; their weakness is their fragile organizational structure particularly when it comes to project-related work. Through support from the Norwegian Embassy through NCA's support (10 million NOK per year), significant efforts have been made to professionalize their institutional capacity, and also to strengthen their rights-based and advocacy work taking advantage of the unused potential they have as legitimate rights defenders with a strong community base.
- (4) The NPA partnership program supported by the Norwegian Embassy started earlier than the NCA, and the 2011-2013 phase (12 million NOK per year) is the second one. The NPA partners are a mix of two of the most profiled human rights organizations in Angola (AJPD and Mãos Livres), one of the most experienced rural development organization (ADRA), and two gender rights organizations (PMA and FMJIG). NPA has developed this group into a strategic partnership arrangement with common activities in national and international advocacy, based i.a. on a common fund on which the partnership can draw on additional funds to individual budgets. This arrangement is highly appreciated by the partners, not least because of the synergy achieved between classical human rights and development organizations merging their rights-based understanding.
- (5) With the purpose of better understanding the financial and management situation of the NPA partners, we have assessed the degree of their financial dependency on NPA. What we have found is that one organization, Mãos Livres, is 100% dependent (and receiving the largest share – 30% - of the NPA partnership funding), PMA and AJPD receive around 50% of their funding from NPA, and FMJIG 33%. These organizations, and particularly Mãos Livres, will therefore be in a very critical situation if no way is found to continue the support coming from Norway. In terms of finance management and M&E, several of these partners have been very weak until NPA started a more concerted effort to enhance their capacities in 2012, but there is still a way to go (while an organization like

ADRA is quite professional in this regard). It is also important to remember that NPA is leaving seven partners behind which have until now benefitted from NPA's their Norad framework agreement, for a total of 3 million NOK in 2012. These organizations would actually also fit quite well in the a partnership arrangement, and a commitment to continue supporting civil society in Angola from the Norwegian government should also take them into account.

- (6) Based on a set of criteria and an extensive search for alternatives, the Review has drawn up five different options (without excluding hybrid solutions) for continued support to the organizations included in NPA's partnership program. Two of these options (1 and 2) assume that NPA accepts to maintain a formal responsibility while outsourcing all field work and bringing in the Embassy in an advisory board; the first outsourcing model would involve a tender-based consultancy model and the second an Angola NGO (Open Society or Development Workshop – DW) . Model 3 implies direct transfer of funding and implementation responsibility through one of the Angolan NGOs, in Model 4 the financial responsibility for both partnerships would go through Norwegian Church Aid with a sharing of follow-up responsibilities with other actors in their international network, the Act Alliance. Model 5 is a solution through the UN.
- (7) Based on the expressed preferences of the present NPA partners and our own criteria, the Review concludes with a preference for one of the two "NPA light" models, followed by the Model 3 with Open Society as the intermediary, and finally with the NCA model. We do not recommend the UN model.
- (8) A decision needs to be taken very soon, but even so, more time than what remains of the present agreement period (until end 2013) is required in order to have a new implementation system up and running. It is therefore recommended to provide for bridge funding based on the present NPA model for 2014 (or first half 2014, depending on the chosen option and the circumstances), so that necessary fiduciary and other viability assessments of the options may be carried out, offices set up, personnel recruited etc.
- (9) Given the critical role played by Norway (government and the two Norwegian INGOs) in support of the struggling Angolan civil society – not least the most prominent human rights defenders – it would be tragic if no way is found to continue this support, as much as possible maintaining the a strategic partnership model which has been in place until now. We will therefore strongly urge the partners that can contribute to a solution, on the government and non-government side in Norway as well as in Angola, to show flexibility in order to assure a continuation of this support.
- (10) Any recommendations for the future support from the Norwegian Embassy to the NCA partnership program?
- (11) Any recommendation as to whether to keep the support limited to the NGOs that have received support up to now, or to open it up ? (for example make it application based?)

# 1 Purpose of the Program and of this Review

## 1.1 Background

With the purpose of implementing the Norwegian government's support to civil society in Angola, the Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, Norad, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) entered into "Strategic Partnerships" (SP) for support to local civil society in Angola.

The Embassy has channeled support to local CSOs via NPA and NCA with the intent of providing resources necessary to coordinate and reinforce the capacity building of these Angolan CSOs. The arrangement was also assumed to be strategic from the point of view of the Norwegian CSOs, which would have the Embassy as a close dialogue partner. For NPA and NCA it was seen as a good opportunity to consolidate and expand their country activities and to support national partners with thematic training, joint workshops as well as expanding their CSO network.

To further streamline the management it was agreed (in 2011) that the management of this support should be transferred from the Embassy to Norad and be coordinated with the Norad-funded country programs of the Norwegian CSOs (part of their global framework agreements with Norad). This transfer of management was not intended to reduce the Embassy's strategic dialogue with the respective Norwegian CSOs and their local partners.

Thus, the SP-model, as it has been practiced in the current period 2011-13, has been a set up so that the NCA and NPA have received funding from the Embassy's budget to work with local partner organizations in Angola. However, it has formally been Norad's responsibility to manage the SP-agreements with NCA and NPA. The Review team raises certain question marks as to the rationality of this division of work, given that Norad – as opposed to the Embassy – has very limited contact with the Angolan SP partners.

The funding of the current SP-agreements with NCA and NPA are set to expire at the end of 2013. The Embassy's intention is to sustain the support to civil society in Angola *at minimum* the same level as today (22 million NOK per year, of which 12 million NOK in the previous period was channeled through NPA and 10 million NOK through NCA). NCA is planning to request further financing of their support to local CSOs in Angola beyond 2013, whereas NPA has decided to close down their development program (also comprising human rights) in Angola and will therefore not request funding after 2013.

## 1.2 Purpose of the Review

The general purpose of the assignment is to "produce evidence-based and forward-looking analysis and recommendation on the best way for the Embassy to organize its continued support to civil society in Angola".

Within this context, the review will have the two main aims.

The first aim is to investigate and evaluate the experiences of stakeholders as to how the current management model has served the overall purpose of strengthening the civil society in Angola. The intention is to provide evidence of results of the current strategic partnership for Angolan beneficiaries (primarily focusing on output and outcome levels) and to identify what has worked in the current strategic partnership arrangement so as to underpin the achievement of the intended results.



The second main aim is to explore and elaborate on different alternative models as to how the Embassy could organize its support to civil society in Angola beyond 2013. Based on the evidence and stakeholders' assessments, the Review will attempt to provide some alternative strategic options for the Embassy on how to support the Angolan CSOs in a next three-year period, particularly for those organizations that have been part of NPA's partnership group.

During the initial meeting held with the Embassy, it was made clear that the main emphasis of the work was expected to be on the second of these aspects, given the fact that NPA is closing down its development and human rights work in Angola, thus leaving one of the two pillars of the program without a management partner. The backward-looking aim has also been addressed through recent evaluations of the two programs, on which this Review to a large extent will rely.

As we assess the current and potential beneficiaries within the Angolan CSOs we will include the strategic positioning and targeting of the CSO support and the financing level – into a *financing strategy*. Meanwhile, we need to identify options for channeling support and include the institutional arrangement of support to CSOs and questions related to the management of support.

### 1.3 Approach and Methodology

The following methodological approach has been applied in this Review:

- Review of relevant documents (plans and reports) as well as previous evaluations and reviews. In particular, we have relied strongly on the two recent reviews of the respective programs:
  - Interviews with key stakeholders – NCA and NPA staff (in Luanda and at HQs), Embassy staff, Norad staff, partners. For the backward-looking part, we have made follow-up interviews with the authors of the two above-mentioned reports
  - Individual as well as group interviews with NCA and NPA partners: since the situation of the NPA partners is most at risk, we had one initial common meeting with them, followed by individual meetings and a final common meeting where we presented our proposed options
  - Interviews with potential new managers of the NPA partnership
  - Interviews with other donors of similar programs in Angola
  - Interviews with key Angolan observers and informants
  -
1. The Review Team had intended to make a field trip visit to project areas outside of Luanda, but given the time constraints and the forward-looking focus of the exercise it was agreed with the Embassy to limit to Angola visit to Luanda interviews.
  - 2.

## 2 The Shrinking Space for Civil Society in Angola

Civil society in Angola has gone through different phases over the last decades, and is now confronting what can almost be characterized as a struggle for survival as an autonomous force.

The roots of civil society go back to the end of the colonial regime. As one of the most prominent CSO participant observers in the country points out, “(The post-independence MPLA) regime ended by developing a strong State at the expense of an obliterated society, where citizens did not have the right to participate freely within their own society.”<sup>1</sup>

The transition towards a multi-party system at the beginning of the nineties, offered a new opportunity for CSOs, at a time when State institutions were extremely fragile and unable to fulfill the most elementary services to citizens or to define public policies or even to execute laws. In many circumstances, local administrations of the State relied on NGOs to carry out these functions. During the worst phases of the armed conflict in Angola, NGOs helped to save millions of people from dying from hunger and disease. After the peace, the NGOs continued to provide vitally important public services, especially in health, education, sanitation, food security, etc.

But the central government soon realized the political challenge this might imply, and towards the end of the nineties the government decided to encourage and support the emergence and consolidation of *pro-governmental* CSOs “that functioned as chains of transmission of its policies and strategies, trying to undermine, influence and co-opt the genuine civil society movement.” (ibid.)

This new government strategy led to an increasing contradiction between government and the autonomous – often-critical – part of civil society, being seen more and more as an opponent, at times as an enemy.

This situation must be seen against the backdrop of the emerging post-war political model in Angola, summarized as follows by the Oxford University political scientist Ricardo Soares de Oliveira:

“Angola’s oil-fuelled reconstruction since the end of the civil war in 2002 is a world away from the mainstream liberal peacebuilding approach that Western donors have promoted and run since the end of cold war. The Angolan case is a pivotal example of what can be termed ‘illiberal peacebuilding’, a process of post-war reconstruction managed by local elites in defiance of liberal peace precepts on civil liberties, the rule of law, the expansion of economic freedoms and poverty alleviation, with a view to constructing a hegemonic order and an elite strangle-hold over the political economy.”<sup>2</sup>

Based on this understanding, no one should be surprised that there has never been a full opening for civil society in post-war Angola. The government has over the latest years approached this dilemma by drawing a new line between what they term the *civil* and the *political* society, by claiming that many CSOs with an advocacy agenda were getting involved in “politics” and thus almost pretending that the Constitutional Law banned citizens the right of being involved in politics, unless they acted through a political party. In 2007, some international and national NGOs were on this basis threatened with being

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<sup>1</sup> Fernando Pacheco (2009): “Civil Society in Angola: Fiction or Agent of Change?”, in Nuno Vidal & Patrick Chabal (eds) Southern Africa. Civil Society, Politics and donor Strategies (Brussels & Luanda: Media XXI & Firmamento with Angolan Catholic University, University of Coimbra & Wageningen University, 2009), pp.123-134.

<sup>2</sup> Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2011): “Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola”, in: J. of Modern African Studies, 49, 2 (2011), pp. 287–314. f Cambridge University Press 2011 doi:10.1017/S0022278X1100005X

rendered illegal. In 2008, UN's Human Rights Office (representing the High Commissioner for Human Rights) was declared non-grata in the country. Since then, it is quite obvious that the more critical NGOs – particularly the typical human rights defenders – must constantly consider how far they may go in criticizing government if they want to avoid harassment or in the worst of cases being prohibited, based on official and unofficial constraints.

There has long been reluctance within the population to mobilize for social and political claims. Many observers have found it difficult to understand this, on the background of the combination of growth with the maintenance of extreme socio-economic inequalities. This is normally explained partly by still quite fresh war memories, partly by the regime's great success to use its ample resources to coopt opposition leaders. 2011 and 2012 witnessed for the first time young people demonstrating in the streets of Luanda, for political change and better income distribution – perhaps inspired by the Arab Spring and possibly due to increased internet access. Most of the demonstrations, while legal according to the Constitution, were met with repression from the authorities and a lack of media coverage. The August 2012 general elections were however carried out in a peaceful environment. While not qualifying as fully “free and fair” according to international observers, the MPLA obtained 72% of the seats in Parliament (down from 82% in the 2008 elections), but lost some important popular constituencies in Luanda.

Yet another aspect of the state-CSO relationship may be observed in the provinces, and particularly at community-level. The first-ever elections of local authorities are scheduled for 2015, although many observers believe they will be postponed. A new arena of political competition is anyway emerging. A new law on local administration was passed in 2010 (Lei 2/10), which makes it compulsory for governments both at provincial, municipal and communal level to hold consultations with the population. This evidently opens up new perspectives, as we will come back to in the presentation of some of the results of the programs assessed in this Review. As Pacheco (op.cit.) points out:

“This legislation inserts innovative elements, such as the local administration management of part of the budget and of investments as well as the participation of citizens within public consultation mechanisms aimed at the communes and municipal districts, through local CSOs. (...) It is in this context that, for instance, CSOs have helped to stimulate and promote the creation of local forums, where the communities and their organizations interact with public institutions. These opportunities are in line with what certain Anglo-Saxon literature calls “new democratic spaces”, or in other words, areas of participation and opportunities for citizens to deliberate about issues of common interest, that can so greatly satisfy social and economic needs.”

A related phenomenon observed around the country is that previous CSO leaders are increasingly being recruited for leading local government positions, from deputy governors to municipal administrators (equivalent to non-elected mayors) and other key positions. The question is whether this is a measure of cooptation or whether people with CSO background really maintain a more independent voice. This is evidently different from case to case, but it represents a phenomenon that is not so frequently observed and acknowledged in the capital Luanda.

The Angolan civil society has always been very dependent on foreign funding, particularly because no government funds and hardly any private sector funds are available to advocacy groups (whereas service delivery through NGOs may be permitted).

When we speak about the civil society space, it is therefore strongly linked to the availability of foreign funding. During the war, Angola was a preferred development cooperation

country, attracting most of the prominent international NGOs, which also established partnership with Angolan NGOs. Both the UN and most western development agencies and Luanda-based embassies had funds available for Angolan civil society, principally for service delivery but also for human rights and governance purposes. But the Angolan government soon established clear limits to the role played by these foreign donors, as a reflection of their increasing concern about a critical national civil society.

As the reconstruction years proceeded and the country approached its first post-elections in 2008, the government understood that a measure of toleration was an unavoidable part of its ambition to promote an electoral suffrage system where the MPLA would reign supreme, while also gaining an improved international standing. However, as Soares points out, “the salient characteristic of this period is not the MPLA’s acceptance of dissenting views, but rather its consistent penetration of civil society organisations and professional associations, often dependent on the largesse of presidential foundations, achieving de facto political control while extolling their pluralism” (ibid. p. )

This questioning of foreign donors has taken its toll on the availability of foreign funding of the Angolan civil society, motivated by everything from concern for business interests to the drying up of development cooperation budgets. A marked change in attitude may be observed, according to Soares:

“Western diplomats are now often critical of NGO ‘destructive criticism towards the Angolan government’, and some express marked antipathy vis-à-vis leading Western NGOs active on Angolan issues. Angolan NGOs have complained about a reduction in Western commitment towards formerly ‘hot’ issues in the country. Foreign diplomats speak of a ‘nuanced approach’ to Angola and admit that ‘a confrontational strategy in this country [will] get you nowhere.’” (ibid. p. 302)

Particularly over the last couple of years, foreign funding for CSOs in Angola is being significantly reduced. The tremendous economic growth – with Angola now aspiring to become a middle-income country – coupled with a general perception of corruption, lack of transparency and bad income distribution policies are probably among main reasons why most donors are closing their Angola program, in addition to the extremely high costs (and therefore questionable cost-efficiency) of maintaining office and staff in Luanda. This is a paradox for Angolan civil society, which argues that this mix of growth and social maldistribution, failure to effectively improve the crucial human development indicators, and the permanence of serious human right and governance challenges, should rather enhance the funnelling of support to civil society. As already mentioned, heavy investments and expectations to achieve major business contracts – where political goodwill is normally required – is probably explaining that embassies are also closing most of the few remaining CSO financing windows.

*Norway* is today one of the few embassies that continue with a significant civil society program, also being willing to give priority to human rights organizations that are openly critical to the government. In addition to the two portfolios we are assessing here (totalling 22 million NOK per year), there is a budget of 8 million NOK for economic and social research cooperation between the Catholic University and the Bergen-based CMI, and 2 million NOK to a gender program financed through *UNDP*. In addition, 4 million NOK is set aside annually for human rights competence building in cooperation with the Angolan Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. A total corresponding to approximately 6 million

USD is therefore set aside annually by Norway for human rights and democracy activities in Angola.

In addition to this comes Norad's framework agreements for development programs, from which NPA received 3 million NOK (2012) and NCA 4 million NOK (2013), and support from the Oil for Development program (approximately 325,000 NOK each for 2012). So the total Norwegian government support to civil society in Angola through these two organizations amounts to well over 7 million USD annually.

The *European Union (EU/EC)* has several parallel financing systems, of which two have special relevance for civil society. The first, called *fund for non-state actors*, has almost 1.5 million € available for a two-year period (new period starting in January 2014, for which proposals must be presented by September of this year). Projects will have a duration of one and a half year, have a maximum budget of 195.000 €, and the activities would be within communication, research/documentation and capacity building. The area of Human Rights is not singled out as a priority, but HR organizations may perfectly well apply for funds earmarked for such activities. Institutional support is not permitted, and only five provinces are singled out for this support. The second fund is a specific *Human Rights Fund*. It is smaller, about 600.000 €, and specific priority areas will be defined in the new tender that is shortly to be announced. The last such fund was limited to civic education during the election campaign.

*USAID* has a partnership with the international organization World Learning, which may offer capacity building to local organizations. In this way, CSOs may improve their capacities to present project proposals, for instance to apply for the status as public utility providers of services outsourced by the state. This may also be of relevance for organizations seeking support from international donors.

A small fund of 300.000 USD is available for alternative social media, while the State Department (through US Embassy) has dedicated 40.000 USD to human rights and governance activities and some minor amounts (25.000 USD) for refugees etc. A new five-year strategy will be launched in 2014. Between 1 and 3 million USD per year will probably be set aside for democracy and governance activities which also will be available for civil society, but this will not include human rights.

Some very limited funds for civil society may also be available from the embassies of *Netherlands, Spain* and the *UK*. The Spanish cooperation agency AECID is closing its program this year. *Sweden* – once the leading western donor in Angola – discontinued its cooperation program several years ago. But efforts are made by the Embassy to re-initiate some funding of human rights and democracy activities, which the Swedish Embassy might want to coordinate with the Norwegian Embassy support mechanisms.

All *petroleum companies* operating in Angola are obliged to channel funds to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), but these mandatory part of this fundings must be authorized by the Angolan state company Sonangol. Companies may provide additional funding over and above what has been committed in their petroleum concession tenders, but foreign companies are primarily focused on high visibility projects in areas of health, education and sports as opposed to sensitive political issues like human rights. The two leading US oil companies in Angola, Chevron and Exxon, are working with USAID in their activities related to CSR, but these do not include human rights.



Among international NGOs, NPA is not alone among international organizations with a long-time and significant presence in Angola to close their development and human rights program at this time. The US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), has already done the same, and so is also the Dutch-based Oxfam-Novib (the latter will gradually close down towards the end of 2014).

In addition to NCA, other truth-based organizations like Christian Aid (UK) and Food for the World (Germany) will now be among the few remaining INGOs with funds available for civil society in Angola. The only significant additional actor identified by the Review Team is Open Society Institute of Southern Africa (OSISA), with an annual donation budget of about 2,2 million USD and a predominant profile to support human rights defending organizations.

As this overview shows, Norway is now the dominant foreign donor to civil society in Angola, particularly in the area of human rights and democracy. Two of the most high-profile human rights defence actors (Mãos Livres and AJPD) are among the NPA partners that have depended most heavily on Norwegian Support.

Given the constant concern that the Angolan government may be tempted to punish critical organizations and even their foreign donors, Norway may therefore be seen as taking a quite courageous position. This is very clearly recognized and appreciated by civil society in the country.

### 3 Results of the the Two Programs

Both the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) rely on Norad funds to implement their strategic programmes. NCA is globally in the process of implementing a four-year program plan (2011 – 2015). NPA is implementing the second phase of their Strategic partnership program from 2011-2013. Both these programs have recently been evaluated<sup>3</sup>, and the presentation of results below is to a large extent based on the reports from these two assessments complemented by the observations of the present Review Team.

#### 3.1 The NCA Program

NCA globally operates with five-year strategic planning periods, the present covering 2011 to 2015. During this strategic period, NCA in Angola has chosen to focus its interventions around two main pillars: Economic Justice and Gender Justice and more specifically under five thematic programs where projects are implemented through partners<sup>4</sup>:

- a) Resources and finance
- b) Social mitigation of HIV and AIDS
- c) Gender based violence
- d) Climate change adaptation
- e) WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene promotion)

NCA works in partnership with national organizations in Angola. Being a Faith-Based Organization (FBO), NCA gives priority to working with other faith-based actors, including churches.<sup>5</sup> NCA Angola is currently working with the following partners:

- a) CICA (Council of Christian Churches in Angola)
- b) IEBA (Evangelical Baptist Church of Angola)
- c) IECA (Evangelical Congregational Church of Angola)
- d) UCF (União Cristá Feminina / YWCA)
- e) ACM (Associação de Mocidade Angolana / YMCA)
- f) Mosaiko (Catholic Human Rights organization)
- g) IEA (Evangelical Church of Angola)

As an organization rooted in the Norwegian church community, NCA is in a good position to work with Angolan faith-based organizations in addressing issues like gender equity and equality, gender based violence, transparency and governance. NCA has specific competence in mainstreaming gender and protection, which is put to use in the cooperation with core church partners in Angola.

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<sup>3</sup> Ananda S. Millard and José Neto (2013): Mid-Term Review of the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) Angola Country program (2011-2013). Nordic Consulting Group.

...Pinoccas (2013): Midterm Evaluation Report – “Strategic Partnership” Phase II (Norwegian People's Aid)

<sup>4</sup> NCA's 2011-2015 global strategy, “Together for a just world – Empowering the poor and challenging the privileged” (ref. [http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Documents/Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Om%20Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Global\\_Strategy.pdf](http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Documents/Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Om%20Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Global_Strategy.pdf)) is presented as a matrix with five main dimensions: the right to peace and security; gender justice; economic justice; climate justice; the right to water and health. Under each of these dimensions, there are a total of 12 sub-dimensions, of which each country program may choose a limited number to concentrate on.

<sup>5</sup> Globally, NCA is not limiting its partnership to faith-based organizations, but in Angola it has been decided to concentrate on this universe.

NCA's work in Angola has mainly focused on long-term development and advocacy rather than emergency preparedness. The end objectives are undoubtedly to accompany and empower the "poor" and disadvantaged.

The traditional Christian churches and faith-based organizations, which are well established in Angola, have strong ties with the general population both in urban and rural areas of the country. Churches and faith-based institutions, much more than other civil society actors, count on solid support – even financial – from their respective congregations and communities, and they are therefore also more sustainable. This makes them crucial but often overlooked actors for the strengthening of civil society, and as catalysts for social change.

On the other hand, however, these institutions have generally quite weak organizational structures. The NCA program has therefore been of particular importance in the professionalization of these partners. There are still considerable challenges in administrative skills, e.g. in the quality of reporting, but NCA has made a clear difference in this regard, and also for the introduction of key concepts like human rights based approach. The Midterm Review has not found sufficient documentation to conclude with certainty if the intended outcomes have been reached. Certain concerns are raised about the awareness of partners about exposing victims of gender-based violence, and about the adequacy of work with HIV positive individuals.

The present Review Mission finds no reason to question the overall positive assessment of the NCA partnership program.

### 3.2 The NPA Program

NPA initiated its "Strategic Partnership" program in 2008, in collaboration between NPA, the Norwegian Embassy and four Angolan CSOs (phase I), as an instrument for popular empowerment by providing an opportunity for the direct beneficiaries to exercise their rights as enshrined in the Angolan Constitution.

The second phase of the program, presently under review, covers the three year period between 2011 and 2013 and involves three of the organizations that benefitted from the first phase, all working with human rights, as well as two new organizations focusing more specifically on women's rights and gender equality. These organizations are well positioned in the Angolan context, have deep knowledge of the social, political and economic dynamics and a good reputation among public, private and social institutions. Besides, these organizations have for a long time been working on promoting structural change in relation to their thematic areas. It is no secret that particularly two of these partners (*Mãos Livres* and AJPD) have a high and quite controversial profile in Angola, not shying away from openly criticizing the government. As such, they occupy a unique space within the context of Human Rights advocacy in Angola, with radius of operation all over the country although permanent presence is more limited. The Review noticed that there has been a high level of cooperation and sense of solidarity between the five organizations in the work being conducted.

For the implementation of this phase, NPA prepared a set of actions, e.g. an "implementation strategy" that includes providing financial resources for the partners' projects; a "common fund" to support joint activities that may respond to immediate



contextual change; the implementation of a monitoring plan as well as direct technical support to partners.

In this perspective, the five partner organizations prepared projects, budgets and three year implementation plans, which were submitted to NPA for approval; they identified beneficiaries of their interventions, defined geographic areas (provincial/municipality level) of action, based on which they developed their activities. These activities include, among others, training, dissemination of information through the media; lobby activities; providing legal assistance to disadvantaged people, etc.

The partners involved in the program are:

- a) Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA)
- b) Associação Justiça, Paz e Democracia (AJPD)
- c) Associação Mãos Livres (ML)
- d) Plataforma Mulheres em Acção (PMA)
- e) Forum de Mulheres Jornalistas para Igualdade de Género (FMJIG).

Some of the results of the work for the promotion of human rights are detailed below:

- I. **AJPD** was invited and involved in preparing the new penal code by the Ministry of Justice; as well as in the training of National Criminal Investigation Officers in the area of Human Rights, at the request of National Investigation Bureau (*DNIC*). In addition they were invited by The Human Rights State Secretariat to contribute to the elaboration of the National Human Rights Policy. Similarly, **ADRA and PMA** were requested by the National Assembly to participate in the discussions on the National Budget proposal;
- II. **PMA** was invited by the Cazenga Municipality Administration to be part of the Social Hearing and Consensus Council (CACS) of this Municipality
- III. Community-based organizations (CBOs) in **ADRA's** areas of intervention have been provided with tools to get involved in negotiations that influence on decision-making of high relevance for their lives. Some examples are the rejection of agricultural credit when there is lack of transparent procedures; integration of gender issues in planning and budgeting by Municipality Administrations; consultation with CBO networks like "Education for All" and "Food Security Strategy" providing local communities with considerable pressure to influence policies in these important sectors.
- IV. The resulting increase in demand for legal assistance services from **Mãos Livres** (more than 16.000 people sought the services of the organization) is relevant because it shows that people have access to information regarding the existence of these services and are taking the initiative to reach out to the services providers. This attitude demonstrates an important change, to which the Strategic Partnership has without a doubt made a very important contribution.
- V. These results are relevant because they show institutional changes and the trust that the partners have gained from these public institutions. The fact that the authorities are requesting assistance from CSO's also indicates a change in political willingness and vision relative to the involvement of non-state actors in public affairs.

The Mid-Term Review concluded that there has been significant progress in program implementation compared with the review made for the first phase. Monitoring and

capacity building processes implemented by NPA have been crucial for the performance of the partners. The great new element has been the establishment of a common fund for strategic activities. This has been critical for the strengthening of synergies among the partners, and between them and other CSOs. This strategic partnership has given the organizations a qualitative lift particular in terms of advocacy, nationally as well as internationally, with some partners talking about a real “internationalization” of their work. There are still challenges in planning, monitoring and reporting, and in reaching out to the entire country where the strategy has had no geographical limits. Also, partners have not been able to manage all projects properly, due to limited staff and weak planning. A key recommendation was therefore improve monitoring process either by reducing geographical scope, increasing the size of their team, or strengthening assistance to partners in Luanda.

Summing up, the support of both NPA and NCA is highly valuable and necessary in Angola. In particular, in the case of NCA the support gives confidence and a voice to the faith-based organizations with a strong social basis that else would not receive funds for non-religious work. NPA on the other hand, via their strategic partnership, was able to develop a multi-organizational model of partnership and capacity exchange, enhancing the empowerment of local communities. The partnership between classical human rights organizations and more mainstream CBOs adapting a rights-based perspective is of special relevance, making the partnership more effective and less vulnerable.

## 4 Financial dependency and sustainability of NPA partners

### 4.1 Financial dependency

The ToR raises the question about financial dependency and current sources of funding for the Angolan civil society organizations receiving financial and institutional development support through the strategic partnership programs. As the primary focus of this Review is on the NPA-supported partnerships, we shall concentrate on the situation of the five strategic NPA partners.

The recent mid-term review of the Strategic Partnership fund states that it was not identified as an intended objective to create financial sustainability of partners. In view of the number of donors and other financiers pulling out of Angola the question of how the partners in the medium term should reduce their dependency upon Norwegian funding is, in our view, highly pertinent.

Table 4.1 presents an overview of the sources of funding, NPAs share of total budget/financing, a list of other donors for the 5 strategic partners, with a view to inform the assessment of financial dependency.

Table 4.1 Overview of financiers, NPA's share of total funding <sup>6</sup>

| Name of organization  | Sources of funding | Share of funding through NPA | Other sources of funding  | Dependency*   |
|---|--------------------|------------------------------|---|---|
| The Association for Justice, Peace and Democracy (Source: Budget 2013)  | 4 sources          | 46%                          | Oxfam Novib, Open Society Food for the World                      | Medium to High. Oxfam Novib will be pulling out of Angola end 2014  |
| Plataforma Mulheres em acção (Source: Report first half 2013)   | 2 sources          | 51%                          | Oxfam Novib   | Medium to High, considering that the only other current source of financing is pulling out of Angola end 2014 |
| Mãos Livres: (Source: Budget 2013)  | 1 source           | 100%                         | None  | Totally dependent upon support from NPA   |
| Forum das Mulheres Jornalistas para Igualdade no género (FMJIG) (Source: Extract from budgeting and accounting system 2013) | 6 sources          | 33%                          | IEPELA, UNDP, Netherlands embassy, gifts and contributions, PANOS | Medium dependency. Have more diverse sources of funding   |
| Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e  | More than 10       | Not specified,               | Own revenue (15 % in 2011, 30 % more in 2010) UNDP, the           | Low dependency  |

<sup>6</sup> As an overall observation it can be noted that the Mid-term review of the Strategic Partnership Phase 2 pointed at a more limited number of donors for 4 of the 5 partners (the mid-term review points at an average of two donors per organization) than what was confirmed through this present assessment that was based on review of management documents of all five organizations.

|  |  |                            |   |  |
|--|--|----------------------------|---|--|
| do Ambiente (ADRA) (Source: web site: <a href="http://www.adra-angola.org">www.adra-angola.org</a> and annual report 2011) |  | estimated to less than 15% | Africa group of Sweden, British Petroleum, Spanish cooperation, Oxfam Novib, UNICEF, Food for the world, others |  |
|--|--|----------------------------|---|--|

\* We have defined a scale from *low* for financing shares ranging from 0% -20%, medium for financing shares ranging from 21%-45%, and high for financing shares ranging between 46%-100%

Three of the five strategic partners have a medium to high financial dependency. For ML, the strategic partnership fund is the only source of funding for the organization as some of its former donors, such as the Spanish International Development Cooperation Agency (AECID) and Trocaire have pulled out of Angola and ended their support to the organization. This factor can explain the rationale for NPA providing as much as 30% of the NPA Direct Strategic Partnership funding to ML, as seen in figure 4.1. below that presents an overview of the each beneficiaries’ share of total direct strategic partnership financing based on 2013 figures.

Figure 4.1. The 5 beneficiaries’ share of annual NPA Direct Strategic Partnership Funding (2013 – excluding Common Fund)

Related to future sources of funding it can be noted that three of the partner organizations (ADRA, ML and AJPD) have initiated processes with Government aiming at acquiring “Public Utility Status” which would transform them into “budgetary units” and make them eligible to access public funding.

The mid-term review recommended that a joint intervention take place and that the last year of the program should envisage concrete activities of mobilization of financial resources from other funding sources. This has been taken on-board by the NPA that is planning to assist the partner organizations in their fund-raising activities before closing their present Angola program.

## 4.2 Quality of M&E

The mid-term review of the program did not include an analysis of the financial management procedures and practices of the 5 strategic partners nor a comprehensive assessment of their monitoring and evaluation procedures and practices. Despite this fact, the mid-term evaluation revealed that the partnership system for monitoring of projects is still weak in spite of substantial improvements over the last year. The mid-term evaluation states that “no plans or reports indicate that this activity is going on in a systematic and structured manner”. To this observation we would like to stress that a document review of key management documents confirm that all 5 strategic partners have plans and reports that are timely and related to the funded activities. Moreover, it is important to note that the capacity development initiatives towards partners related to M&E, including the introduction of a framework for Program Monitoring Reporting (PMR) only took place towards mid-2012 and seems not yet to have become internalized and operationalized

within the organizations. A next phase should consider putting more emphasis on carrying out a needs assessment of the specific partner organizations and tailoring the capacity development activities even more. The partner organizations are highly diverse in terms of capacity, size and skills. The setting of specific targets for strengthened M&E (including financial) of the management seems a viable approach. In this context a strategy focusing more on developing and strengthening the partner organizations' own management systems and practices and less on introducing "project-specific" frameworks and procedures should be considered. This would strengthen the sustainability of the interventions. The current NPA approach introduces requirements intended to support the organization. However other donors present other project specific requirements which lead to a fragmentation of management procedures, use of parallel systems and an increase in the administrative burden of the beneficiary organizations.

The recent Mid-term evaluation did not assess the efficiency of NPA's management of the grant including the overhead in view of the services rendered. It will, however, be important to assess the administrative cost of a future mechanism for grant management and to carry out a comparison with the current costs. The current costs include an amount for NPA Head Office administration and a share of the costs of the Angola NPA representation. The costs related to the Strategic Partnership grant has, however, not been specified as a separate cost center. Consequently it is difficult to assess the current costs without a deeper analysis of the composition of the budget and accounts carrying out an analysis at transactions level. All such considerations are considered to lie beyond the scope of our assignment.

NPA's partners in Angola are not limited to the strategic partnership program. A total of seven Angolan NGOs have been benefitting from NPA's Norad Framework agreement, with a total value in 2012 of 3 million NOK.

Table: NPA's partners through the Norad Framework Agreement, 2012

| <i>Name of partner</i> (list the partners in the same order as in the previous plans) | Main area of work(key words only)   | Transferred 2012 |
|---|---|------------------|
| Grupo de Liderança Feminina (Female Leadership Group) (Glif)                          | Women in Development and Gender   | 510.000,00       |
| Forum Terra Kuanza Sul (Kuanza Sul Land Forum) (FTKS)                                 | Community education on Land Rights, community development, food security and nutrition.   | 510.000,00       |
| Rede Eleitoral (Electoral Network) (RE)   | Community education on electoral processes. Decentralization and deconcentration of state power and good governance.                                      | 510.000,00       |
| Hortacultural Cooperative of Amboím (CHOFA).  | Rural development, Land Rights, development of family agriculture, food security and nutrition.   | 300.000,00       |
| Youth Network for Participation and Citizenship (RJPC)                                | Youth development, citizenship and youth participation, good governance   | 365.000,00       |
| Network to Combat Urban Poverty in Luanda (RLCP)                                      | Citizenship and participation, Decentralization and deconcentration of state power and good governance, Food Security, nutrition and access to resources. | 500.000,00       |
| Land Nucleus - Malanje  | Community Education on Land Rights, community development, food security and nutrition.   | 320.000,00       |

|   |  |              |
|---|--|--------------|
| Total amount transferred to partners (account 6770) |  | 3.015.000,00 |
|---|--|--------------|

Source: NPA Progress Report (Angola), 2012

These partners will also lose a substantial share of their financial and broader partnership support as a consequence of NPA's decision to discontinue its development program in Angola. An issue to discuss is whether any of this support could be transferred to the strategic partnership program. In that case, it may be argued that the total budget for the latter should be increased, in order not to affect the already existing strategic partners.

The Review Team has not had the opportunity to assess these organizations individually. But is quite clear that their profile is not very different from those presently making up the strategic partnership group: most of them have a strong rights-based focus, women and youth are among the target groups. As such, they would seem to fit well within the partnership group.

## 5 Looking Ahead: Possible Future Options for the Continuation of the Norwegian CSO Support in Angola

The continued Norwegian support to civil society organizations in Angola, not least in the area of human rights, must be based on a set of criteria. On the background of interviews with the various partners, the Review Mission has identified the following seven criteria that – to the extent possible – should be met by the new implementation system:

- 1) a viable system for transfer of financial support, and for satisfactory financial reporting and auditing (according to Norwegian MFA standards)
- 2) a system that does not appear as too bureaucratic in terms of applications, reporting systems and delays with approval and payments, but of course within Norwegian standards for accountability, reporting, monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
- 3) a system that allows for institutional support (not limited to very specific activities) of a certain duration and predictability (at least three years)
- 4) a system that includes training and capacity building in institutional development, project implementation procedures, fund-raising and project formulation, reporting and M&E
- 5) a system that allows the partners to develop a “strategic joint partnership” in terms of horizontal exchange of experiences, common training and common action (national and international advocacy, public events etc.)
- 6) a system that does not exclude any of the present NCA and NPA strategic partners in Angola with funding from the Norwegian Embassy (and eventually even NPA’s Norad framework partners).
- 7) That intermediaries and partners accept the roles and responsibilities of the organizations involved in a future option.

Moreover the time required for an option to become fully operational and the cost of operations are recommended as additional factors relevant to the ranking of potential options.

### 5.1 Potential intermediaries in the Angolan context

Table 5.1. gives an overview of the potential intermediaries that were assessed during the mission and that have an Angolan presence.

Table 5.1. Overview of potential intermediaries for Norwegian CSO support

| Support through Norwegian NGO | Support through other agency- delegated authority | Support through Angolan NGO or INGO |
|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| NPA                           | UN  | Christian Aid                       |
| NCA                           | USAid   | Open Society Foundation             |
| NPA outsourcing               | EU  | Development Workshop                |
| NPA Angolan NGO               | Norwegian embassy                                 | ADRA                                |
| NCA Act Alliance              | Norwegian embassy/UNDP                            |                                     |
| Namibia - association         |   |                                     |



The limited number of organizations mentioned in the table above illustrates the challenge facing the partner organizations, as donors tend to pull out of Angola. The mission met with all the listed partners and the most relevant are marked in **bold**.

## 5.2 Presentation of options

In this section five options are presented, without excluding the possibility to combine them in a hybrid fashion. It is important to note that options 1 and 2 are subject to NPA accepting to maintain a role in a future grant scheme, limiting their involvement to Head Office level. Options 3, 4 and 5 do not involve NPA a part from during the transition period:

1. NPA “light”, with outsourced administration and M&E
2. NPA with administration and M&E carried out by Open Society Foundation (OSISA) or Development Workshop (DW)
3. Grant scheme administered by Open Society Foundation or Development Workshop
4. Grant scheme administered by Act Alliance with NCA as coordinator
5. UNDP administers the grant scheme in collaboration with the Norwegian embassy similar to the current grant “Promoting Angolan Women's Empowerment through CSOs”

### **Option 1:** NPA “light”, with outsourced administration and M&E


This model would be based on NPA being willing to maintain an involvement in the management/administration of the grant scheme at head office level. The outsourcing would imply the following:

- Norad would maintain an agreement with NPA much in line with the current arrangement, but with clear provision for outsourcing;
- The formal responsibility for NPA would remain the same but the resource needs to manage/administer the mechanism would be strongly reduced;
- NPA, possibly together with provided assistance from MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would be responsible for preparing a tender with technical specifications and requirements needed for a service provider to take over the administration of the grant scheme in Angola for the next 3 year period in line with Norwegian regulations for grant management and specific needs and requirements of the NPA Head Office;
- The scope of services would tentatively include:
  - o Presence in Angola with adequate capacity to carry out the required strategic advice to NPA Norway,
  - o To carry out M&E and assess the quality of proposed plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audit reports received from partner organizations and give advice to inform decision-making at NPA Head Office level.
  - o Intervene when plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audits are not timely or do not have the required quality as per the Norwegian requirements;
  - o Convene regular strategic partnership meetings and represent a link between partner organizations and NPA Norway;



- Facilitate the strategic partnership activities among the Angolan partner organizations, including national and international advocacy, and administer the Common Fund including the presentation of audits;
  - Report on use of Common Fund including presentation of Audits;
  - Render services related to targeted capacity development activities based on needs assessment and specific action plans;
  - The disbursements would be made from NPA Norway, on recommendation from the service provider based on assessment of the plans/budgets of partners and their respective audit reports. The disbursements could be made through the intermediary (service provider) or directly to the partner organisations. Both options should be considered on a case-by-case basis.
  - To reduce the administrative burden on NPA Norway the Common Fund should be administered by the service provider. This would imply that the amount of work related to financial management for NPA Norway would be considerably reduced compared to the current situation. There would be a maximum of 2 -3 disbursements per year for each partner organisation.
- NPA Norway, in collaboration with MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would need to monitor and evaluate the quality of the service provision, through the establishment of an advisory board
  - If needed, NPA could be strengthened at Head Office level to cater for the capacity increase potentially needed to implement such an arrangement.

Figure 5.1. below presents a schematic graphic illustration of the Option 1 NPA “Light”.



**Option 2:** NPA with administration and M&E carried out by Open Society Foundation (OSISA) or Development Workshop (DW)


This model would also be based on NPA being willing to maintain an involvement in the management/administration of the grant scheme at head office level. The outsourcing to Open Society Foundation or Development Workshop would imply the following, including some preparatory steps:

- Norad would maintain an agreement with NPA much in line with the current arrangement, but with clear provision for outsourcing to either OSISA or DW;
- The formal responsibility for NPA would remain the same but the resource needs to manage/administer the mechanism would be considerably reduced;
- The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would be responsible for hiring services to carry out a due diligence of OSISA/DW to assess the strengths and weaknesses and potential risks of the intermediaries and define the necessary safeguard measures;
- NPA, in collaboration with the MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola will prepare contracts and the technical specifications and requirements needed for OSISA or DW to be service providers and take over the administration of the grant scheme in Angola for the next 3 year period in line with Norwegian regulations for grant management and specific needs and requirements of the NPA Head Office;

The scope of services would tentatively include:

- o Presence in Angola with adequate capacity to carry out the required strategic advice to NPA Norway,
- o To carry out M&E and assess the quality of proposed plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audit reports received from partner organizations and provide advice to inform decision-making at NPA Head Office level.
- o Intervene when plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audits are not timely or do not have the required quality as per the Norwegian requirements;
- o Convene regular strategic partnership meetings and represent a link between partner organizations and NPA Norway;
- o Administer the Common Fund for joint activities;
- o Report on use of Common Fund including presentation of Audits;
- o Render services related to targeted capacity development activities base on needs assessment and specific action plans;
- o The disbursements would be made from NPA Norway, on recommendation from the service provider based on assessment of the plans/budgets of partners and their respective audit reports. The disbursements could be made through the intermediary (service provider) or directly to the partner organisations. Both options should be considered on a case by case basis and based on the result of the due diligence of OSISA and DW respectively;
- o To reduce the administrative burden on NPA Norway the Common Fund should be administered by the service provider. This would imply that the amount of work related to financial management for NPA Norway would be considerably reduced compared to the current situation. There would be a maximum of 2 -3 disbursements per year for each partner organisation.
- NPA Norway, in collaboration with MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would need to monitor and evaluate the quality of the service provision, for instance through an advisory board.
- If needed, NPA could be strengthened at Head Office level to cater for the capacity increase potentially needed to implement such an arrangement.

Figure 5.2. below presents a schematic graphic illustration of Option 2 NPA with OSISA or DW.



**Option 3:** Grant scheme administered by Open Society Foundation or Development Workshop

This model would be based on Open Society Foundation or Development Workshop taking over the administration of the grant scheme and would imply the following, including preparatory steps:


- The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would enter into an agreement with Open Society Foundation or Development Workshop as a service provider much in line with the outsourcing arrangement presented in option 1 for NPA;
- The parliamentary and formal responsibility for the grant scheme would remain within the Norwegian administration, but the resource needs to manage/administer the mechanism would be considerably reduced as compared to internal administration of the grant scheme;
- The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would be responsible for hiring the services to carry out a due diligence of OSISA/DW to assess the strengths and weaknesses and potential risks of the intermediaries and define the necessary safeguard measures;
- The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola will prepare contracts and the technical specifications and requirements needed for OSISA or DW to act as service providers and take over the administration of the grant scheme in Angola for the next 3 year period in line with Norwegian regulations for grant management and specific needs and requirements of the NPA Head Office;

The scope of services would tentatively include:

- Presence in Angola with adequate capacity to carry out the required strategic advice to NPA Norway,
- To carry out M&E and assess the quality of proposed plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audit reports received from partner organizations and give advice to inform decision-making at NPA Head Office level.

- Intervene when plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audits are not timely or do not have the required quality as per the Norwegian requirements;
- Convene regular strategic partnership meetings and represent a link between partner organizations and NPA Norway;
- Administer the Common Fund for joint activities;
- Report on use of Common Fund including presentation of Audits;
- Render services related to targeted capacity development activities base on needs assessment and specific action plans;
- The disbursements could be made from the Norad/Norwegian embassy as a transfer to the intermediary or directly to the partner organisations, on recommendation from the service provider based on assessment of the plans/budgets of partners and their respective audit reports. The choice between these two options (disbursements through the intermediary (service provider) or directly to the partner organisations) should be decided upon the result of the due diligence of OSISA and DW respectively;
- The Common Fund should be administered by the service provider. This would imply that the amount of work related to financial management for Norad/ the Norwegian embassy in Angola should be kept to a minimum.
  - The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would need to monitor the quality of the service provision on a regular basis;
  - If needed, a consultant could be contracted to carry out annual monitoring missions of the intermediary/service provider.

Figure 5.3. below presents a schematic graphic illustration of Option 3 administration by OSISA or DW.




**Option 4:** Grant scheme administered by Act Alliance with NCA as coordinator

Since NCA will stay put in Angola and continue with its strategic partnership program (plus its Norad framework program), one option is that Act alliance with NCA as the coordinator take over the administration of the strategic partnership funding. NCA is willing to do this within the Act alliance and has also signalled a willingness to take on the transfer of funds for all the five strategic partners, if required.

This model would imply the following:

- Norad would enter into an agreement with NCA in much the same way as the current agreement they have with NPA;
- There would be a formal responsibility of NCA for the strategic partnership under the Act Alliance in much the same way as their current responsibility with the faith-based partners today. There would be a division of labour between different organisations within the Act Alliance in much the same way as the alliance works in other countries;
- The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola, possibly in collaboration with the NCA, would be responsible for carrying out a due diligence of Lutheran World Federation and Christian Aid to assess their capacity, strengths and weaknesses and potential risks of their being service providers and/or intermediaries and define the necessary safeguard measures. The scope of services suggested will be agreed between the Act Alliance partners taking into consideration the result of such an assessment;
- The scope of services of the Act Alliance would tentatively include:
  - Presence in Angola with adequate capacity to carry out the required strategic advice to NCA Norway,
  - To carry out M&E and assess the quality of proposed plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audit reports received from partner organizations and give advice to inform decision-making at NCA Head Office level.
  - Intervene when plans and budgets, periodic reporting and audits are not timely or do not have the required quality as per the Norwegian requirements;
  - Convene regular strategic partnership meetings and represent a link between partner organizations and NCA Norway;
  - Administer the Common Fund for joint activities;
  - Report on use of Common Fund including presentation of Audits;
  - Render services related to targeted capacity development activities base on needs assessment and specific action plans;
  - The disbursements would be made from NCA Norway, on recommendation from the service provider based on assessment of the plans/budgets of partners and their respective audit reports. The disbursements could be made through the intermediary (most probably the Lutheran World Federation) or directly to the partner organisations. Both options should be considered on a case by case basis and based on the result of the due diligence of LWF/Christian Aid;
  - To reduce the administrative burden on NCA Norway the Common Fund should be administered by NCA Angola or LWF. This would imply that the amount of work related to financial management for NCA Norway would be kept to an absolute minimum. There would be a maximum of 2 -3 disbursements per year for each partner organisation.
- MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would need to monitor and evaluate the quality of the service provision through the Act Alliance in much the same way as today.
- If needed, NCA could be strengthened at Head Office level to cater for the capacity increase potentially needed to implement such an arrangement.
- There would be a need to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding between the different organisations taking on roles and responsibilities for the strategic partnership within the Act Alliance.

Figure 5.4. below presents a schematic graphic illustration of Option 4 administration by Act Alliance with NCA as coordinator.




**Option 5:** UNDP administers the grant scheme in collaboration with the Norwegian embassy

This model would be based on creating a specific grant scheme with the UNDP as an implementing partner in principle based on the model of the current grant “Promoting Angolan Women's Empowerment through CSOs”. The model would imply that:

- The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola would enter into an agreement with the UNDP as an implementing partner/administrator of the grant scheme;
- The MFA/Norad/Norwegian embassy in Angola will prepare program document and agreements and agree on a management model with the UNDP to make sure that the grant scheme in Angola for the next 3 year period is designed in line with the specific strategic objectives of the strategic partnership.

Figure 5.5. below presents a schematic graphic illustration of Option 5 Implementing partner UNDP





### 5.3 Assessment of options against criteria

In the following sections the options are ranked according to the seven design criteria and the two implementation criteria. The ranking is done in a schematic way with the highest ranking marked by \*\*\*, medium ranking marked by \*\* and lowest ranking marked by \*.

- 1) a viable system for transfer of financial support, and for satisfactory financial reporting and auditing (according to Norwegian MFA standards)

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| **(*)                   | **                       | **/*                 | ***                             | ***                      |

- 2) a system that does not appear as too bureaucratic in terms of applications, reporting systems and delays with approval and payments, but of course within Norwegian standards for accountability, reporting, monitoring and evaluation (M&E)

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| ***                     | ***                      | ***                  | ***                             | **                       |

- 3) a system that allows for institutional support (not limited to very specific activities) of a certain duration and predictability (at least three years)

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| ***                     | ***                      | ***                  | ***                             | **                       |

- 4) a system that includes training and capacity building in institutional development, project implementation procedures, fund-raising and project formulation, reporting and M&E

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| ***                     | ***                      | ***                  | ***                             | ***                      |

- 5) a system that allows the partners to develop a "strategic partnership" in terms of horizontal exchange of experiences and common action (national and international advocacy, public events etc.)

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| ***                     | ***                      | ***                  | ***                             | **                       |

6) a system that does not exclude any of the present NPA strategic partners in Angola (and eventually even NPA's Norad framework partners).

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| ***                     | ***                      | **                   | **                              | *                        |

7) That intermediaries and partners accept the roles and responsibilities of the organizations involved in a future option.

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| ?                       | ?                        | ?                    | ***                             | **                       |

Moreover the time required for an option to become fully operational and the cost of operations are recommended as additional factors relevant to the ranking of potential options.

Implementation criteria 1) Time required to establish the mechanism

| Option 1<br>NPA "light" | Option 2<br>NPA/OSISA/DW | Option 3<br>OSISA/DW | Option 4<br>Act<br>Alliance/NCA | Option 5<br>UNDP/embassy |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| **                      | *                        | *                    | ***                             | **                       |

Estimated cost of operations will still need to be explored for the most relevant and preferred options.

## 5.4 Transition phase

In view of the management processes and procedures within the Norwegian administration and the need for predictability of financing from the partner organization it is important to establish some clarity on how the transition from the existing support through NPA towards a new financing mechanism and grant scheme should be managed. The following section outlines a set of next steps and considerations that need to be taken into account, including an indicative timetable.

There are three different perspectives and processes in parallel:

- NPAs closing down, that has already started and will be finalized by April 30<sup>th</sup> 2014
- Design and operationalization of the new financial mechanism and grant scheme



- Possible need for intermediary action (a Bridging phase) until a new grant scheme is fully operational

*NPAs closing down:*

The key challenges facing the NPA in the process of closing down are related to a perceived insecurity and unpredictability facing the partner organizations and retention of staff. It is important that the Norwegian Embassy takes on a role as a guarantor of continued support and communicates clearly to the partner organizations the intention to continue support at approximately the same level as in previous years (eventually also including the Norad Framework support). Furthermore it is important to decide to which extent it will be possible to offer current NPA staff new job opportunities within the preferred options chosen for the future grant scheme. NPA is planning to carry out several activities related to fund raising and other joint training sessions. The Norwegian Embassy should aim at participating in some of the sessions to liaise with the partner organizations and use these events to inform partner organizations on decisions made and the time-line for establishing a future grant scheme.

*Design and operationalization of a new financial mechanism and grant scheme:*

As mentioned in previous chapters of this report, the team recommends that three options are further designed and detailed and that a due diligence assessment is carried out prior to a final decision. Risk management and mitigation and the administrative cost of a potential solution should be clarified prior to a final decision and subsequent operationalization of the future grant scheme. This action should be initiated immediately and if possible a due diligence should be carried out by end-October 2013. Preferably, the Norwegian embassy should make a final decision on future intermediary by October/mid-November.

Moreover, it is important to underline that the team has based the assessment on the assumption that the core principles and objectives of the grant scheme will be maintained and that the group of potential beneficiaries will be relatively stable. However, it is important to confirm the intention to maintain the support for 2014, propose the support level for 2014 (perhaps increasing total budget with 3 million NOK in order to maintain support to the NPA framework partners) within the deadlines established for the internal budget preparation and resource allocation process in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also communicate deadlines for partner organizations to submit their budget proposals for 2014. Since the three year period of phase 2 is now coming to closure, and in view of the need to agree on a grant scheme design with new intermediaries, the team recommends that the support in 2014 be provided for a one-year period only and that a new strategy be developed for 2015-2018, providing space for the new actors to enter stage on the strategic direction and priorities of the program. The partner organizations should already in September/October 2013 be requested to submit their budget proposals/project proposals in order to enable the Norwegian Embassy in Angola in collaboration with future intermediaries to make an assessment of support levels and the beneficiaries planned for 2014.

*Need for bridging:*

The presence of NPA until April 30<sup>th</sup> 2014 can cater for involvement of both the out-going and the in-coming intermediaries during the transition. It is important that the actors involved agree (the actors being: Norad, the Norwegian embassy, NPA and a new

intermediary) on how the Monitoring and Evaluation processes for 2011 (some audit issues still pending), 2012 and 2013 should be handled. Moreover, clarification of the guidelines towards partner organizations on future procedures for budget preparation, new agreement design, new M&E procedures need to be established. To facilitate the process, harmonization to NPA standards can be applied for a transition (*bridging*) year 2014 and new procedures developed for the three-year period 2015-2018.

Moreover, depending on which option is chosen, it might take some time for a future solution to become operational. This has not been included in the assessment/ranking criteria, but options **1 NPA "light"** and **4 Act Alliance/NCA** are probably the two options that would take least time to prepare.

## 6 Conclusions and Recommendations

The conclusions here are concentrated to the considerations about future options for substituting NPA's present role as intermediary of Norwegian public funding of CSOs in Angola.

Among the five alternatives considered, the *UNDP option* (No. 5) has the lowest score according to our criteria, mostly because of its expected bureaucratic and time-consuming handling of applications and limited capacity for developing a strategic partnership among all the present beneficiary organizations with a clear advocacy profile. It is clear, however, that the UNDP option would offer a well-known and reliable financial management system. Still, this is the option with the least support from the beneficiaries. We will therefore exclude it from further consideration.

All the four remaining alternatives are scoring well on the proposed criteria.

Option 4 (*Act Alliance / NCA*) offers a well-known channel to the Norwegian donors. The greatest disadvantage is that it would not keep the present beneficiaries together as strategic partners in one united group with one facilitator, although they would be under the same umbrella. Some of the beneficiaries have also felt it as slightly uncomfortable to be part of a truth-based network. There could furthermore be arguments against putting all eggs in one basket when supporting civil society, which as a matter of principle represent pluralism. Still, this alternative would be acceptable, and it would probably require less time and preparations than any of the other to be operational.

Option 3 (*Direct implementation by an Angolan NGO actor*) would be fully acceptable to the beneficiaries, and it is clearly in line with the philosophy of strengthening civil society to leave the full management of these funds to the an actor in Angolan civil society itself. The main drawback in this case would be that a process of fiduciary assessment would be necessary for the Norwegian public finance system to accept it. It is yet to be decided whether Norad or the Embassy would have the management responsibility. In the choice between OSISA and DW, the beneficiaries tend to choose DW out of fear for losing other support from OSISA if they also will be facilitating the Norwegian funding. By establishing clear criteria, this fear should be possible to avoid. In the choice between the two we believe the OSISA has a more professional finance management system, already known to Norwegian MFA/Norad. Since OSISA is already a well-experienced manager of funds to Angolan CSOs of about half magnitude compared to that the Norwegian Embassy, we believe this is the better sub-alternative under Options 2 as well as 3.

The clearly preferred alternative for the beneficiaries is one of the options involving NPA, basically because this is perceived to offer the highest probability that the strategic partnership – so much appreciated – will be maintained. We are still expecting a response from NPA whether the organization is willing to take the responsibility implied according to one of the two options 1 and 2, and which of them would be preferred. Option 1 requires a public tender process, Option 2 a fiduciary assessment. In case NPA accepts to keep a limited role, the Review team would propose a hybrid solution implying OSISA strengthened by a Norway-based consultancy team which may also strengthen NPA HQ, thereby facilitating a continuous link between the Angolan and the Norwegian NGO community.

Recommendations:

- 1) We strongly support the intention of the Norwegian development cooperation system (MFA / Norad / Embassy in Angola) to continue funding civil society in Angola, both through the NCA strategic partnership and by finding a new way to support the partnership previously facilitated by NPA. If possible, even organizations that have previously benefitted from NPA's Norad framework agreement could be considered as part of this group, and they would fit well into the already existing strategic partnership group. This would require an increase in the total funding to approximately 25 million NOK annually over the next three years.
- 2) In the choice of options, we recommend that Norad and the Embassy consider the options 1 – 4 outlined above up against each other, with a preference for a hybrid of 1 and 2 if NPA accepts to be part it, a preference for OSISA as the local NGO partner in Option 2 and 3, and the NCA / Act Alliance (Option 4) as the last – but fully acceptable – alternative. Norad and MFA need to clarify the division of roles between them, particularly Option 3 is chosen. The Review Team believes that the Embassy in that case is best placed to take management responsibility of behalf of the Norwegian public system, due to its active presence in Angola.
- 3) Options 2, 3 and 4 all require a fiduciary assessment to be carried out, and this should be initiated as soon as possible. A final decision can probably only be taken after such an assessment.
- 4) It is not realistic to have a new partnership arrangement for the previous NPA partners up and running in time to transfer fresh funds by 1 January. Since many of the NPA beneficiaries are so critically dependent on this funding, we strongly recommend a bridging year (or half year) and that the embassy enters into agreements for support in 2014, with more or less the same funding level as until now. All necessary steps need to be taken to have new three-year agreements in place by 2015 (or mid-2015, depending on the option to be chosen and the circumstances)).
- 5) Independently of which option is chosen, and in spite of considerable activities over the last year, much work remains to be done with the NPA partner organizations to improve financial management and M&E systems. This is also the case – and perhaps even more so –with the NCA partners. The partner organizations are highly diverse in terms of capacity, size and skills. Setting specific targets for strengthened M&E (including financial) of the management seems a viable approach. In this context a strategy focusing more on developing and strengthening the partner organizations' own management systems and practices and less on introducing "project-specific" frameworks and procedures should be considered. This would strengthen the sustainability of the interventions.
- 6) Limited activities have so far been aimed at strengthening the financial stability of the most dependent beneficiaries'. However, NPA is planning to provide support to partners in developing or strengthening their fund-raising activities in the near future. This is in line with the recommendations presented in the Mid-term evaluation of the program, which we fully support.

## Annex A: Terms of Reference

NPA, Angola Progress Report 2002

NPA local partners: samples of 2011 and 2012 annual reports and semi-annual progress reports

NPA partners budgets for relevant projects financed by NPA for 2012 and 2013

NPA Strategic Partnership Phase 2; Proposal

...Pinoccas (2013): Midterm Evaluation Report – “Strategic Partnership” Phase II  
(Norwegian People’s Aid)

A sample of audit reports for the NPA partners

Project Monitoring Tool manual (English version)

## Annex B: List of Informants

### Norwegian Embassy

Ambassador Ingrid Ofstad  
Hans Christian Kjølseth  
Jon Otto Brødholt

### Norwegian Church Aid:

Vibeke Skauerud – Country Representative  
Sergio Calundungo – NCA, Luanda  
Johan Hindahl, NCA HQ  
Veslemøy Ask, NCA HQ

### NCA Partners

Eduardo V. Sassa – DDC IEA  
Tuiko Elisa – UCF, Project Coordinator  
João Bonzove – CICA

### Norwegian People's Aid:

Steinar Sundvoll, Country Director  
Pedro Garcia Mvemba – Project Coordinator, NPA Luanda  
Jane Filseth Andersen, NPA HQ  
Åge Skagestad, NPA HQ

### NPA Partners

Azevedo Banzo Gueve ???  
Julio Canteim – Mosaico  
Salvador Freire - Mãos Livres  
Zola Ferreira - Mãos Livres  
Guilherme Firmino – Mãos Livres  
Belarmino Jeembi – General Director, ADRA  
Josina de Carvalho – FMJ  
Teresa Quivenguele – ADRA  
Lucia Silveira – AJPD  
Veronica Sapalo – PMA

### Vande Rodrigues ???

### Donors and Potential Implementation Partners

Maria Ribeiro – UN Resident Coordinator  
Lena Sundh – Swedish Ambassador in Angola  
Kate Tirzi – Project Coordinator, PAANE II, European Union  
Jorge Cardoso – Programme Specialist, Governance Cluster, UNDP  
Olaf Juergensen, UNDP (Deputy Country Director)  
Teresa McGhie – Country Manager, USAID  
Domingos Menezes – Project Manager, USAID  
Analdina Nouemou – Civil society Advisor, USAID  
Derek Wright – Political Officer, United States Embassy

Allain Cain - Development Workshop  
... - Development Workshop  
Elias Isaac, Open Society Institute Southern Africa  
Maria do Rosario Advirta – Christian Aid  
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Samuel Pinoccas (Consultant, Mid-Term Review of NPA's partnership program)

## Annex C: Documents Consulted

NPA, Angola Progress Report 2002

NPA Strategic Partnership Phase 2; Proposal

Samuel Pinoccas (2013): Midterm Evaluation Report – “Strategic Partnership” Phase II (Norwegian People’s Aid)

NPA local partners: samples of 2011 and 2012 annual reports and semi-annual progress reports reports

NPA partners budgets for relevant projects financed by NPA for 2012 and 2013

A sample of audit reports for the NPA partners

Project Monitoring Tool manual (English version)

### NCA Angola Progress Report ???

NCA Strategic partners: 2012 reports

NCA’s 2011-2015 global strategy, “Together for a just world – Empowering the poor and challenging the privileged”;

[http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Documents/Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Om%20Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Global\\_Strategy.pdf](http://www.kirkensnodhjelp.no/Documents/Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Om%20Kirkens%20Nødhjelp/Global_Strategy.pdf)

Ananda S. Millard and José Neto (2013): Mid-Term Review of the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) Angola Country program (2011-2013). Nordic Consulting Group.

Fernando Pacheco (2009): “Civil Society in Angola: Fiction or Agent of Change?”, in Nuno Vidal & Patrick Chabal (eds) *Southern Africa. Civil Society, Politics and donor Strategies* (Brussels & Luanda: Media XXI & Firmamento with Angolan Catholic University, University of Coimbra & Wageningen University, 2009), pp.123-134.

Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2011): “Illiberal peacebuilding in Angola”, in: *J. of Modern African Studies*, 49, 2 (2011), pp. 287–314. f Cambridge University Press 2011 doi:10.1017/S0022278X1100005X