

EVALUATION DEPARTMENT

REPORT 8/2017



Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative: Lessons learned and recommendations

Evaluation Synthesis Report

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Commissioned by
the Evaluation Department

Carried out by
AECOM

Written by
Warren Olding

OCTOBER 2017

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Norad
Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation
www.norad.no
post-eval@norad.no

October 2017
Photo: Marte Lid (cover)
ISBN: 978-82-8369-035-4

Foreword

The intention with this evaluation synthesis report is to summarise lessons from evaluations of sustainable forest initiatives since 2009. The evaluation department is about to complete its second phase of real-time evaluations of the Norwegian Government's International Climate and Forest Initiative. In addition to evaluations done by the evaluation department, this report covers other relevant evaluations. A total of fifteen evaluations form the basis of the synthesis. Not all aspects of sustainable forest initiatives have been evaluated. Consequently, not all relevant aspects of these initiatives are discussed in the report. The aim of the synthesis is to facilitate learning and dialogue on how NICFI can become more effective and efficient in meeting its key objectives.

Oslo, October 2017



Per Øyvind Bastøe

Executive summary

This report presents a synthesis of the main findings identified from the external assessments and evaluations carried out since 2009 to date by Norad on Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI). To support the synthesis process and identification of lessons learned, the team responsible for the present study also assessed a selection of evaluation reports on the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the Forest Investment Programme (FIP) and the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD), together with annual reports from Norad (2007-2016), NICFI (2015 and 2016) and the government of Norway's annual budget reports relating to NICFI. The aim of the synthesis is to facilitate learning and dialogue on how NICFI can become more effective and efficient in meeting its key objectives. This is also important to build public confidence in the initiative both in Norway and in its partner countries as they move towards full implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

The team responsible for this report wish to point out that the scope of analysis has been confined to the thematic focus that was applied in each of the above-mentioned reports. The team also points out that in the interests of quality, the analysis of all reports took into account the evidence used to reach their main findings (in particular whether triangulation of evidence had taken place). The document analysis involved reading through all of the reports to identify major findings and capture lessons learned, which were summarised in a pre-set format reflecting the questions established in the terms of reference. To aid and help justify the synthesis of key findings and lessons learned the team selected those that appeared in at least two or more reports. The following main conclusions arise out of this synthesis:

Conclusion 1: There is wide consensus that NICFI has fulfilled its first objective by being highly instrumental in pushing the REDD+ agenda forward and playing a considerable role in building momentum towards agreement on a REDD+ framework under the UNFCCC,

including the anchoring of that agreement in the Paris Agreement.

Conclusion 2: NICFI's attempt to gain significant support for REDD+ to help reduce the risks associated with being the main donor of REDD+ has only partially materialized. To date NICFI continues to be the main donor to REDD+.

Conclusion 3: NICFI's hands-off approach based largely on a one-size-fits-all approach coupled with the fragmentation of its funding through a wide array of multilateral and bilateral channels reduces the opportunity to develop a specific approach adapted to the needs and capacity of each REDD+ country. This situation signifies there is further work required in most partner countries before NICFI can fully meet its second objective (measurable emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation).

Conclusion 4: NICFI and its implementing partners have generally forged strong relations and political support from government institu-

tions responsible for the environment to advance the REDD+ process. In partner countries with low deforestation rates this has helped increase forest conservation in line with NICFI's third objective (conservation of primary forests as carbon stores and biological diversity). However, in partner countries where deforestation and forest degradation are major challenges, forging closer relations with other key government institutions that have a mandate in forested areas (such as ministries responsible for finance, planning and development, the extraction industries, etc.) have generally not materialised. Likewise, there is significant evidence to indicate the private sector has not been not adequately engaged in REDD+ to promote green-growth developments.

Conclusion 5: NICFI has contributed significantly in engaging civil society in the REDD+ process, which includes indigenous peoples and other forest dependent community organisations. However, this engagement remains entrenched in consultative and advocacy processes, rather than in final decision-making which can legally bypass such processes on the grounds they are in the national interest. Thus the application of REDD+ safeguards are only being partially met in most countries so far.

Conclusion 6: NICFI's introduction of results-based indicators do not adequately track progress on implementation of the REDD+ process at the country level because there is no nationally defined agreement as to what constitutes completion of REDD+ Readiness. This situation limits learning and opportunities to align indicators and targets to national priorities and policies relating to the REDD+ agenda, as well as international commitments such as the monitoring of safeguards.

Conclusion 7: NICFI has improved its communication strategy in recent years which includes information about its funding in all its partner countries. However, due to the lack of reporting on tangible results and achievements at the country level its communication lacks the weight needed to widen its support base.

In the interests of stimulating debate and dialogue on improving the policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI, the following recommendations are made:

Recommendation 1: The Ministry of Environment and Norad should reassess how NICFI's approach can be better tailored to support country-specific needs, based on a needs assessment and a revised theory of change in which the central aim of REDD+ should be its

integration into existing national policies that focus on the reduction of rural poverty and insecurity and supporting sustainable economic development of the forest economy (through green growth initiatives).

Recommendation 2: NICFI should establish its own internal risk management strategy to guide future programming, planning, implementation and monitoring of its funds and results associated with the completion of the Readiness phase and the future application and continuity of results-based payments (RBPs).

Recommendation 3: To develop a more country-specific approach NICFI should identify with the partner country the coordination mechanism to be established to integrate REDD+ into relevant policies, strategies and plans in the interests of achieving greater effectiveness and efficiency at the country level.

Recommendation 4: Representatives from civil society (including women) and the private sector should be included in the national coordination mechanism proposed in the preceding recommendation.

Recommendation 5: NICFI should support the proposed national coordination mechanism reach a formal agreement as to what remains

to be achieved in the REDD+ Readiness phase before moving to RBPs. The agreement should include the indicators and targets to be applied to track progress and achievements ensuring explicit inclusion of horizontal objectives to be fulfilled (rights, gender, governance, etc.).

Recommendation 6: Through the development of country-based indicators and targets proposed in Recommendation 5, NICFI should aggregate key information from each partner country to produce standardised reports on overall progress, achievements and gaps relating to REDD+ Readiness at the regional and global levels to tailor communication of its programming, planning and implementation, to different audiences using different mediums.

1. Introduction

Since the 1990s Norway has been committed to assigning approximately one per cent of its gross national income (GNI) to international aid, which is administered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and partly by the Ministry of Climate and Environment. Addressing climate change is a prioritised area for Norwegian development cooperation.¹ Norway's climate finance is primarily allocated to its International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), which was launched in 2007 as part of the Government of Norway's (GoN) commitment to support efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+). The programme is managed by the the Ministry of Climate and Environment. GoN recognises that, "reducing such emissions could deliver a quarter of the climate change mitigation the world needs to stay on a two degrees warming pathway towards 2030".² GoN initially agreed

to commit NOK 3 billion a year (around USD 500 million at the time) to NICFI to support the implementation of REDD+ until a comprehensive global climate agreement came into force. Central to NICFI's strategy is the pay-for-performance approach, whereby verified reductions in GHG emissions resulting from lower deforestation/forest degradation and/or increased conservation/afforestation are eligible for financial payments from the initiative. This approach was seen as highly conducive to encouraging developing countries gain ownership of REDD+ and to foster an atmosphere of cooperation and engagement of developing countries in climate change mitigation.

NICFI uses both multilateral and bilateral channels to disburse its funds. Multilateral channels include the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) which includes the Readiness Fund and Carbon Fund for REDD+³, the

BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (BioCF-ISFL)⁴ the Forest Investment Programme (FIP)⁵ and the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD).⁶ Bilateral channels include bilateral agreements with REDD+ countries or sub-regions,⁷ support to civil society organisa-

4 BioCF-ISFL is managed by the World Bank and works with forest countries to reduce emissions from the land sector (in particular farmers) through smarter land use planning, policies and practices such as green supply chains).

5 FIP (0.78 billion) is managed by the World Bank and is one of four Climate Investment Funds (CIF) designed to support developed and developing countries reduce GHG emissions. FIP supports developing countries reduce deforestation and forest degradation and promote sustainable forest management. Other funds are the Clean Technology Fund (USD 5.6 billion), a Programme for Scaling-up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries (USD 0.78 billion) and a Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience (USD 1.2 billion).

6 UN-REDD unites technical expertise from the Food and Agriculture Organisation, United National Development Programme and United Nations Environment Programme to support nationally-led REDD+ processes and promote the informed and meaningful involvement of all stakeholders including indigenous peoples and other forest dependent communities.

7 They include agreements with Brazil (2008), Guyana (2009), Indonesia (2010), Vietnam (2012), Peru (2014), Liberia (2014) and Colombia (2015). In addition, NICFI supports forest countries in the Congo Basin through the Congo Basin Forest Fund managed by the Africa Development Bank and the Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI) which facilitated the signing of a Letter of Intent between CAFI and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2016 in which NICFI agreed to support the implementation of DRC's REDD+ Strategy and investment plan.

1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Climate, Conflict and Capital, 2009

2 Government of Norway website: www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/climate-and-environment/climate/climate-and-forest-initiative/kos-innsikt/hvorfor-norsk-regnskogsatsing/id2076569/

3 FCPF is managed by the World Bank and is a global partnership of governments, businesses, civil society and indigenous peoples focused in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation and enhancement of carbon stocks and sustainable management of forests

tions (CSOs) through open calls for proposals⁸ and direct funding through Norway's embassies.

The overarching goal of NICFI is to facilitate sustainable development and reduce poverty by fulfilling following three key objectives:

1. Contribute to the inclusion of REDD+ under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC);
2. Contribute to early actions for measurable emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation;
3. Promote the conservation of primary forests due to their importance as carbon stores and for their biological diversity.

The international climate policy arena has changed since NICFI was initiated⁹. As a consequence, the objectives have been reformulated as follows:

1. Contribute to the international climate regime being an effective means for reduced emissions from deforestation and forest.
2. Contribute to cost-effective, early and measurable reductions of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.
3. Contribute to the conservation of natural forest in order to ensure its ability to bind carbon.

⁸ Funded by the Climate and Forest Funding Scheme for Civil Society, which is mainly managed by the Civil Society Department, Norad.

⁹ A new comprehensive agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) came into place in Paris, December 2015 and REDD+ is included as a part of the new climate regime. In addition to the Paris Agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has been established and NICFI's objectives (both climate and development goals) feed into several of the SDGs.

2. Context

Between 2008 and 2016, NICFI has been Norway's single largest development assistance programme. Total disbursements as at the end of 2016 were almost NOK 5.859 billion (almost USD 1 billion).¹⁰ These disbursements confirm Norway has contributed around 70 per cent of global REDD+ funding in the same period. In addition, NICFI has pledged funding to multilateral funds including FCPF (includes its Readiness and Carbon Funds), FIP and UN-REDD, which together account for about half of all NICFI total funding commitments. Table 1 below provides details of the funding channels and financial disbursements and pledged funds (dependent on verified results according to relevant bilateral agreements) from 2008 to end of 2016.

DISBURSEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS OF NICFI BY FUNDING CHANNEL (2008-2016)

Funding Channel (Multilateral & Bi-lateral)	Pledged funds (NOK)	Disbursed (NOK)
A. Country/Regional partnership agreements		
Brazil (Amazon Fund)**	6,000,000,000*	8,229,480,000
Indonesia	6,000,000,000*	1,294,690,398
Guyana	1,500,000,000	1,043,998,429
Colombia	1,800,000,000	210,870,000
Tanzania	500,000,000	369,118,692
Vietnam	180,000,000	170,000,000
Ethiopia	120,000,000#	272,624,308
Mexico	90,000,000	90,000,000
Peru	1,800,000,000	111,988,000
Ecuador	300,000,000	0
Liberia	1,000,000,000	247,616,000
Congo Basin (CAFI, CARPE, R-PP)	400,000,000#	947,908,000
Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF)***	500,000,000	500,000,000
TOTAL (A)	20,190,000,000	13,488,293,827

Source: NICFI (commitments to global/thematic not available).

refers to annual commitments; * Based on average exchange rate of USD 1 = NOK 6.00

** the initial Amazon Fund commitment was met in 2015

¹⁰ NICFI applied an average exchange rate of USD 1 = NOK 6.00



Funding Channel (Multilateral & Bi-lateral)	Pledged funds (NOK)	Disbursed (NOK)
B. Global/Thematic support		
Civil Society Support	-	2,148,067,241
Bio Carbon Fund T3	-	690,000,000
Bio Carbon Fund+	-	58,350,000
UN-REDD	-	1,649,675,561
Forest Investment Programme	-	855,000,000
FCPF Readiness Fund	-	459,231,435
FCPF Carbon Fund	-	1,479,590,000
Green Economy Initiatives	-	353,390,814
Private Sector Initiatives	-	185,976,000
Indigenous Peoples	-	44,650,000
Strategic/other	-	628,729,909
TOTAL (B)	-	8,552,660,960
TOTAL (A+B)	-	22,040,954,787
Administration	-	565,676,990

3. Methodology

To produce the present report a team of three experts started by carrying out an analysis of the main findings identified from external assessments and evaluations carried out by Norad on Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) between 2009 and 2016. In addition, a selection of evaluation reports on the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), the Forest Investment Programme (FIP) and the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) were also analysed, together with annual reports from Norad (2007-2016), NICFI (2015 and 2016) and the government of Norway's annual budget reports relating to NICFI. To summarise the analysis of these documents the evaluation team used an evaluation matrix (see Annex 5) in which three main themes have been addressed in line with the Terms of Reference (see Annex 1). These are:

› **Policy relevance:** i.e. how relevant has NICFI been in supporting partner countries integrate REDD+ into their national development

policies, strategies and action plans as a means to advancing sustainable development and supporting global commitments to mitigate climate change as well as adapt to its effects?

- › **Effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI:** i.e. how far have NICFI's multilateral and bilateral channels met its objectives and achieved value for money?
- › **Sustainability:** i.e. have partner countries secured the guarantees they need from their own governments, international donors and/or the market to ensure the REDD+ process can be sustained, in particular results-based payments for verified GHG emissions reductions?

During the analysis of all documents key findings and lessons relating to cross-cutting objectives such as advancing human rights (especially in relation to land rights and access to resources), capacity in identifying and mitigating risk, and gender equality, were also identified. Main findings by theme were then screened and are synthesized in this report

in relation to the questions: "what have we learned?" (Section 4), followed by "what has been done?" (Section 5 – conclusions) and "what needs to be done?" (Section 6 – Recommendations).

To ensure such lessons meet minimum quality standards, the evaluation applied the following criteria as far as possible¹¹:

- › Each lesson specifies the context from which it is derived;
- › Each lesson establishes its relevance (where it should be applied and by whom);
- › Each lesson provides a prescription or action that can be applied in relation to current capacity and resources and which is "transferable" (i.e. generic and therefore applicable to other donors and stakeholders).

¹¹ Taken from the Lessons Learned Framework of the Evaluation Office, UNEP: <http://www.unep.org/evaluation/learning/lessons-learned-framework>

In addition, to further justify the synthesis of key lessons learned the team prioritised those that appeared in at least two or more reports assessed.

Taking into account the scope of analysis relates to the thematic focus applied in each of the above-mentioned reports the present report does not represent an exhaustive study on lessons learned. Instead, its main aim is to provide a synthesis of the lessons learned so far from the evaluations conducted by Norad and NICFI's multilateral partners to support reflection and dialogue on how to enhance the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI's funding in the run up to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and in terms of sustaining key activities and funding mechanisms relating to REDD+. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI is also supports the government of Norway's efforts to build public support for the initiative both in Norway and in its partner countries.

The final section on recommendations (section 6) include one specifically advocating the revision of the current Strategic Framework of NICFI (Theory of Change) with a new ToC aligned to national and international priorities and goals (see Annex 3 for a draft proposal).

4. Findings – What have we learned?

4.1 POLICY RELEVANCE

There is wide consensus in the documents reviewed that NICFI has been highly instrumental in pushing the REDD+ agenda forward at the international and national levels since 2009. In particular NICFI has played a considerable role in building momentum towards agreement on a REDD+ framework under the UNFCCC, and the anchoring of that agreement in the Paris Agreement. NICFI has therefore been largely successful in facilitating the inclusion of REDD+ in an international climate policy regime (Objective 1 of NICFI). Furthermore, there are currently 29 developing countries participating in REDD+ (REDD Desk).

A number of reports state this has been achieved thanks to high level political support from the Norwegian government in pledging large-scale funding to promote REDD+ through a wide number of multilateral and bilateral channels available (see Table 1). However, there is wide consensus that only a few of these countries have successfully integrated REDD+ into national and sector policies to gain access to results-based payments and support

1. LESSONS LEARNED:

- ▶ NICFI has played a major role in building momentum towards agreement on a REDD+ framework under the UNFCCC and anchoring it in the Paris Agreement.
- ▶ REDD+ remains largely focused on one-size-fits-all approach based on rewarding participating countries for verified reductions of GHG through results-based payments. Potential of emphasizing the strategic value of REDD+ as a means to supporting international and national commitments to reducing poverty and unsustainable growth – the main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation - remains to be realized.
- ▶ NICFI improved its ToC in 2015 to include sustainable development together with emissions reductions as its main goal. Nonetheless, since then the adoption of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016 have taken place, which provides new opportunities to advance REDD+ in participating countries, in particular through the fulfillment of nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
- ▶ In the few cases where REDD+ has been integrated into national development policy the role of NICFI funding has mainly been supportive of existing political commitments to reducing deforestation and forest degradation rates (Brazil or Indonesia) rather than acting as a “game changer”. Likewise, where deforestation rates are low (Guyana), REDD+ has raised high expectations that they will capture large amounts of international finance through forest conservation to support their national development;
- ▶ NICFI has been instrumental in establishing a three-phased approach to REDD+ , but there is no clearly internationally accepted definition as to what constitutes REDD+ Readiness (phases 1 and 2). Thus the emphasis given by multilateral channels to increase the number of REDD+ countries has not been underwritten by a clear message as to what they should achieve to comply with REDD+ Readiness.

wider sustainable development goals (first flagged in the RTE of 2010). **As a result, national ownership of REDD+ remains rather weak in the majority of participating countries.**

A large number of evaluation reports confirm that one of NICFI's main achievements so far has been to engage civil society more actively in policy dialogue on REDD+. They found bilateral cooperation mainly in the form of direct support to civil society organisations (through Calls for Proposals) and partnership agreements have been particularly instrumental in engaging civil society participation in REDD+ readiness activities such as preparing the REDD+ strategy, participating in capacity building exercises to develop and apply MRV systems, land use planning and advocacy campaigns on land tenure rights for indigenous peoples (IPs) and other forest dependent communities (FDCs), which is also a prerequisite to applying successful MRV systems at the community level.

These activities have been instrumental in engaging IPs and FDCs more actively in the REDD+ process at both the international and national levels. Most significant has been the development of political space to support the application of social and environmental

safeguards such as free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), which has also helped raise awareness and understanding of the benefits of REDD+ for IP and FDC organisations that were previously suspicious of REDD+.

However, participation in the REDD+ process has not resulted in significant reforms in policies, or major changes in the legal, regulatory and institutional framework of the majority of participating countries. **As a result, the active participation of civil society in the REDD+ process has so far not translated into effective participation in decision-making on the policy, legal and institutional reforms needed to integrate REDD+ into the national development process.**

4.2 EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF NICFI FUNDING

Several evaluation reports confirm NICFI's decision to channel the majority of NICFI funds through multilateral channels (in particular through FCPF, BioCF-ISFL, FIP and UN-REDD) has produced few tangible results so far relating to measurable emission reductions from deforestation and forest degradation, or on the conservation of primary forests as carbon stores and sanctuaries for high biological diversity (objectives 2 and 3 of NICFI).

2. LESSONS LEARNED:

- ▶ The instrumental value of NICFI has enabled IP and FDC organisations to participate in REDD+ but its intrinsic value has generally been underestimated; even where NICFI has helped develop innovative approaches to REDD+ that focus on environmental and human rights (such as Amazon Indigenous REDD+);
- ▶ The employment of international non-government organisations (iNGOs) to facilitate the participation of CSOs in REDD+ Readiness activities has developed an increasing degree of dependency between NICFI and iNGOs and between iNGOs and national CSOs over time which has so far not prioritised the transfer of skills and capacity to CSOs to take up a proactive role in the decision-making process;
- ▶ The implementation of REDD+ Readiness activities in the majority of participating countries relies heavily on the Ministry of Environment or equivalent, without adequate involvement of non-forest related ministries, or the private sector. Thus participation of civil society in REDD+ lacks adequate access to policy makers from other ministries or private investors who have conflicting mandates and/or interests in forested areas.

This has not been aided inadequate guidance at the UNFCCC level.

However, several reports (in particular the evaluations of FCPF) concluded that multilateral

institutions had been instrumental in building agreement and devising practical tools to support the application of the Readiness phase in a number of participating countries. However, several reports stated that the use of a wide number of multilateral channels has helped to scatter NICFI finance too widely across institutions that maintain their own rules and procedures concerning the management and disbursement of climate finance.

In spite of improvements in formal coordination of multilateral and bilateral channels in recent years at the global and country levels there is consensus that the coordination mechanisms in place need to be improved further, especially in relation to formal information exchange and dialogue at both the intra- and inter-institutional levels. Several evaluation reports commented that participating countries found it difficult to coordinate the plethora of institutions and funds involved, and this situation was a significant factor behind the delays being experienced in most countries concerning the implementation of REDD+ Readiness activities. Indeed, some countries stated they were confused as to how to monitor and report effectively on progress and lessons learned due to the large number of actors involved. Furthermore, the lack of standardised accounting to monitor NICFI funding at the country

level also has made it difficult to determine the trickle-down effect of NICFI at the country level.

As a result NICFI is largely unable to report on the tangible results of multilateral funding at the country level, nor calculate the cost-effectiveness/cost efficiency of such funding.

3. LESSONS LEARNED:

- ▶ The promotion of bottom-up approaches that uphold the sovereignty of participating countries has not made coordination any easier. This is despite efforts by NICFI to improve coordination at the multilateral level, especially with the FCPF secretariat;
- ▶ NICFI's hands-off approach has reduced its capacity to develop coordination, monitoring and reporting in partner countries, even though this is what many partner countries (Ministry of Environment) have confirmed is needed to advance REDD+ more effectively and efficiently;
- ▶ NICFI has assigned significant resources to REDD+ as part of Norway's commitment to spend one per cent of GNI on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). However, it has not assigned adequate resources to the staffing needed to ensure such funds produce tangible results in an effective and cost efficient manner, such as focal points in each partner country who identify and report on needs, gaps, barriers, results, lessons learnt, good practices etc.

In terms of bi-lateral funding there is evidence to indicate partnership agreements and support to iNGOs and other CSOs are effective in delivering positive results such as raising awareness on REDD+, improving dialogue between civil society and government and empowering IP and FDC organizations to develop their political space. This has been aided by fewer procedural constraints and bureaucracy than when managed by multilateral institutions.

However, there is also evidence confirming they are not adequately coordinated to ensure they complement each other, or support multilateral funding initiatives to improve effectiveness and efficiency at the country level. For example, initiatives supporting IPs and FDCs to gain territorial rights were found to be fragmented, which in some countries (for example Peru) has provoked calls from IP and FDC organisations for the establishment of a common agenda for land titling interventions to avoid potential duplications and overlaps of funding (especially relating to research) and facilitate speedier registration of land titles.

This situation has not been aided by the realisation of Calls for Proposals that supports iNGOs existing programmes and projects that generally cover several countries and which operate in isolation of each other (in part

because they are competing for resources and reputations). Under this approach iNGOs manage NICFI disbursements at the programme/thematic level which make it highly difficult to identify how much of NICFI funding reaches each country.

Furthermore, internal monitoring and reporting of results was found to concentrate heavily on operational advances and outputs at the programme level without adequate information on initial outcomes, lessons learned and good practices at the country to facilitate learning.

As a result NICFI and partner governments are largely unable to report on the tangible results of bilateral funding, nor calculate the cost-effectiveness/cost efficiency of such funding.

4. LESSONS LEARNED:

- The hands-off approach coupled with inadequate coordination of bilateral channels reduces the scope for the synergies needed to build a critical mass of support for REDD+ at the country level;
- The absence of clear and up-to-date guidelines on internal monitoring and reporting of outcomes, lessons learned and good practices relating to the effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI's bilateral support at the country level has limited its capacity to take informed decisions on future programming and planning that delivers value for money and increases NICFI's added value;

- Although NICFI has responded to recommendations to improve its presence at the country level to support the implementation of its bilateral partnerships (e.g. Brazil, Colombia or Indonesia) in the majority of countries with bilateral agreements there are no staff in participating countries to coordinate, monitor and learn.

The document review also identified evidence indicating there is inadequate institutional capacity to implement climate finance at the sub-national level in several countries where Norway has bilateral partnership agreements (for example, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia or Tanzania). This is mainly due to a general lack of institutional architecture, human capacity and financial resources outside the capitals and main cities. Consequently, the REDD+ process faces a major bottleneck given it is largely confined to national-level initiatives with limited opportunities for trickle down of NICFI resources to local government structures.

As a result NICFI risks establishing high levels of dependency on its bilateral funding to support CSO projects and programmes dedicated to developing capacity at the local level before NICFI can start supporting RBPs.

5. LESSONS LEARNED:

- Implementing REDD+ ultimately depends on the capacity of local government and CSOs to implement, continue and up-scale Readiness, but the timelines and resources currently applied by NICFI are not tailored to the specific needs and capacities of participating countries (including those in the CBFF);
- Although NICFI has been instrumental in moving Readiness activities such MRV forward through its bilateral channels, not enough attention has been given to establishing the institutional framework or financial incentives needed to operate these activities over the long-term. In a few cases where this is not the case (Brazil or Guyana) lessons learned on MRV systems have not been adequately transferred through formal communication channels;
- The engagement of IP and FDC organisations/federations through support to iNGOs has increased awareness about REDD+ safeguards and the benefits derived from their application in the REDD+ Readiness phase. However, so far this has not resulted in direct funding to develop the leadership, management and financial skills they will need to establish a benefit sharing mechanism that encourages change. In this regard reporting on what safeguards exist, how they are implemented and how they are monitored has been inadequate.

4.3 SUSTAINABILITY OF NICFI

A major finding from the document review concerns the lack of progress in identifying suitable funding mechanisms to sustain the REDD+ process, in particular RBPs. This was highlighted in the first RTE in 2010 and repeated in subsequent evaluation reports. In particular they state although NICFI has succeeded in stimulating other donors to support REDD+ by donating large amounts of funding into the multilateral system, Norway still finds itself as the main donor to REDD+.

Furthermore, despite the Paris Agreement no international agreement has been reached so far on the funding mechanism(s) to be established to sustain REDD+ over the long-term. Several reports stated this situation has not been aided by the general lack of engagement of the private sector in REDD+ Readiness, in particular concerning the feasibility of including market-based approaches to fund RBPs.

In response NICFI has begun to address this situation, which includes a thematic support to stimulate deforestation-free commodity supply chains and green growth in the latest funding round for CSOs (2016-2020). Nonetheless, **NICFI continues to be a high risk venture for GoN, which is not aided by significant delays in implementing REDD+ Readiness activities**

in the majority of REDD+ countries, which includes those with bilateral agreements.

6. LESSONS LEARNED:

- › The lack of clarity on the future financing mechanism of REDD+ remains a major sticking point for participating countries integrating REDD+ into their national development policies, strategies and plans;
- › NICFI does not have a robust risk management policy in place to fully address its weaknesses and reduce its exposure to threats, in particular in the event a global mechanism to sustain RBPs is not implemented, but also in countries where RBPs may not be suitable to drive emissions reductions, or where regular political changes and high staff rotation are a problem;
- › The general lack of engagement of the private sector and the Ministry of Finance in the REDD+ process at the country level places too much dependency on the Ministries of Environment to steer policy dialogue on financial issues for which they do not have a mandate.

The absence of adequate reporting on tangible results, lessons learned and good practices mentioned in the previous sub section has limited NICFI's capacity to develop an effective communication strategy promoting the benefits of REDD+ not just in financial terms, but as part of a wider strategy to improve food and nutritional security (by conserving genetic resources for

food and agriculture) improve livelihoods (through the creation of green jobs) and safeguard environmental services that not only sustain economic and social development, but reduce vulnerability to disasters (which can have a dramatic negative effect on gross domestic product). **In summary NICFI has not armed itself with the information it needs to justify the importance of sustaining REDD+ to politicians, the private sector and the general public who have doubts about its validity and benefits.**

7. LESSONS LEARNED:

- › NICFI's information strategy preaches mainly to the converted (i.e. through publications and web-based information about activities funded) with limited attention given to winning over political figures, the private sector or the general public;
- › NICFI's hands-off approach has contributed to reducing its visibility, especially through the multilateral channels, but also through its bilateral support to iNGOs many of whom provide little or no information about NICFI in their communications;
- › The results indicators provided by NICFI to track bilateral cooperation are based on a one-size-fits-all approach that cover all phases of REDD+ which not only omits tracking progress and achievements at the country level, but also includes indicators that are irrelevant in participating countries that are still in the Readiness phase (such as indicators relating to emissions reductions).

Concerning adequate integration of cross-cutting objectives in NICFI-funded interventions, the evaluation identified evidence from the synthesis of reports to confirm these objectives have not been adequately addressed, in particular in the national REDD+ strategies. On gender equality there is evidence confirming NICFI's support through UN-REDD has been gender sensitive thanks to the UN's own guidelines and commitments to gender equality.

However, at both the multilateral and bilateral levels too much attention is given to the number of women participating in project/programmes activities, rather than on the outcomes of this participation (such as whether they have improved access to services, resources, information, training, etc.). For example, the evaluation of NICFI's contribution to MRV (2013) found women play an important role in sustaining MRV systems and therefore need access to information, further training and other services.

On other cross-cutting objectives such as respecting human rights, the evaluation found that NICFI has placed greater emphasis on this objective in recent years. For example, the evaluation of empowerment of IPs and FDCs through support to CSOs (2016) confirmed NICFI's third round of funding to

CSOs in the period 2016-2020 includes a specific theme dedicated to advancing the rights of IPs and FDCs. **In summary NICFI has responded positively by integrating gender equality and rights more explicitly into its bilateral funding from 2016, although guidance as to how this should be monitored and reported remains inadequate to facilitate learning and guide future funding at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.**

8. LESSONS LEARNED:

- › NICFI's explicit commitment to advancing the rights of IP and other FDCs to gain formal access to forest goods and services is a crucial ingredient in their empowerment and fundamental to them becoming effective guardians of forest resources;
- › NICFI is likely to be more effective in integrating cross-cutting objectives such as advancing rights when it uses CSOs who specialize in meeting these objectives.
- › The absence of adequate guidelines from NICFI as to what constitutes the full integration of cross-cutting objectives reduces the opportunities for learning as to which risks threaten the sustainability of key REDD+ Readiness activities and developing consensus on how to mitigate or prevent them.

5. Conclusions - What has been done?

The main conclusion from the present evaluation is that the degree of success or failure of NICFI's support to REDD+ depends heavily on the political context at the country level. Where the political context has been favourable NICFI is able to respond positively and contribute to reduce deforestation rates (Brazil or Indonesia) or increase the conservation of forests as carbon sinks (Guyana). Meanwhile, ownership of REDD+ in most other participating countries remains low because the political context has not been supportive. Efforts by NICFI to pre-empt change through a mix of multilateral programmes or bilateral partnerships and support to CSOs have proved to be costly and slow, although there are positive signs that the political space for CSOs (including IP and FDC organisations) has increased in several REDD+ countries. Overall the main lesson learned is that the pledging of considerable amounts of funds generally does not act as a catalyst for change unless there is a demand for it. Consequently, NICFI's global approach and ToC are tuned to global as opposed to country-specific needs that generally focus on poverty

reduction, security and economic growth. The current study concludes as follows:

Conclusion 1: There is wide consensus that NICFI has been highly instrumental in pushing the REDD+ agenda forward. In particular it has played a considerable role in building momentum towards agreement on a REDD+ framework under the UNFCCC, and the anchoring of that agreement in the Paris Agreement. NICFI has therefore been largely successful in meeting its first objective (inclusion of REDD+ in an international climate policy regime). Furthermore, the number of developing countries participating in REDD+ has grown to 29 so far (REDD Desk).

Conclusion 2: NICFI's attempt to gain significant support for REDD+ to help reduce the risks associated with being the main donor of REDD+ has only partially materialized. To date NICFI remains the main donor to REDD+.

Conclusion 3: NICFI's hands-off approach largely based on a one-size-fits-all approach coupled with the fragmentation of its funding through a wide array of multilateral and

bilateral channels limits the opportunity to capture the specific needs and capacity of the majority of REDD+ countries. Indeed, there is evidence this approach may be counter-productive; even with the introduction of the phased approach to REDD+ that NICFI has helped bring about. This is mainly because it tends to saturate the absorption capacity at the country level. The situation is not aided by inadequate monitoring to support learning and poorly coordinated funding especially through the multilateral channels that apply their own heavy bureaucratic conditionality and which appear to have their own capacity constraints at the country level.

Conclusion 4: NICFI and its implementing partners have generally forged strong relations and political support from government institutions responsible for the environment to advance the REDD+ process. In partner countries with low deforestation rates this has helped increase forest conservation in line with NICFI's third objective (conservation of primary forests as carbon stores and biological diversity). However, in partner

countries where deforestation and forest degradation are major challenges, forging closer relations with other key government institutions that have a mandate in forested areas (such as ministries responsible for finance, planning and development, the extraction industries, etc.) have generally not materialised. Likewise, there is significant evidence to indicate the private sector has not been not adequately engaged in REDD+ to promote green-growth developments.

Conclusion 5: The engagement of civil society in REDD+ remains entrenched in consultative and advocacy processes, but rarely in final decision-making, which in some cases can legally bypass such processes on the grounds they are in the national interest. Thus the general consensus is that the application of REDD+ safeguards have only been partially met in most cases.

Conclusion 6: NICFI's attempt to improve monitoring through the introduction of results-based indicators for all countries currently limits learning because there is no nationally defined agreement as to what constitutes completion of REDD+ Readiness from which clear indicators and targets are identified and aligned to national priorities and policies as well as international commitments such as

the monitoring of safeguards. This situation has also made it difficult for NICFI/REDD+ to report on tangible results and evidence-based achievements at the country level, which are needed to support the aggregation of data to produce a clearer picture on REDD+ at the regional/global level.

Conclusion 7: NICFI has attempted to improve its communication strategy in recent years by producing annual reports since 2015. However, due to the lack of reporting on tangible results and achievements its communication lacks the weight needed to widen its support base. Furthermore, it is insufficiently tailored to reach different audiences in order to stimulate learning and reflection (includes governments, the private sector, specific groups within civil society, the general public and specific groups such as women and youths).

6. Recommendations – what needs to be done?

In line with the above conclusions and taking into account key recommendations identified in the document review, the evaluation proposes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1 to NICFI and Norad:

NICFI and Norad should reassess how NICFI's approach can be better tailored to support country-specific needs, based on a needs assessment and a revised theory of change in which the central aim of REDD+ should be its integration into existing national policies focusing on the reduction of rural poverty and insecurity and supporting sustainable economic development of the forest economy (through green growth initiatives). A revised theory of change should take into account the implications of the Paris Agreement, for example by focusing on the role NICFI can play in helping forest countries to meet and strengthen their NDCs.¹² Annex 3 provides ideas to guide NICFI should it decide to review its strategic framework.

¹² Includes vulnerability to natural and manmade disasters

Recommendation 2 to NICFI: NICFI should establish its own internal risk management strategy to guide future programming, planning, implementation and monitoring of its funds and results associated with the completion of the Readiness phase. It is highly recommended NICFI concentrates on identifying its risk management strategy in its partner countries first, given it has agreed to invest significant funding to 2020 through its partnership agreements and taking into account the potential to support the fulfillment of NDCs thereafter. This should include reducing the number of multilateral channels it currently uses, such as revisiting the support through FIP given its sunset clause, and reassessing the added value of the FCPF Carbon Fund in light of the Paris Agreement. It is recommended that the risk management strategy be supported by a specific study designed to provide insights and guidance on the best options to establish and sustain the RBP phase (or what should be done if it cannot be sustained). The Ministry of Environment in coordination with Norad should consider holding an international global conference

with implementing partners and partner countries to discuss main findings and recommendations to bring attention to the need for clarity on the sustainability of REDD+.

Recommendation 3 to NICFI, implementing partners and partner countries:

To develop a more country-specific approach NICFI should identify with the partner country the coordination mechanism to be established to integrate REDD+ into relevant policies, strategies and plans in the interests of achieving greater effectiveness and efficiency. Where this involves the establishment of a permanent national coordination unit for REDD+ NICFI should consider allocating funding to support some of its running costs. Whatever mechanism is chosen NICFI should seriously consider employing a focal point in the mechanism to ensure it is regularly informed about developments, achievements, gaps and lessons.

Recommendation 4 to NICFI and bilateral implementing partners:

Representatives from civil society (including women) and the private sector should be included in the national

coordination mechanism proposed in the preceding recommendation. One of their main roles should be to coordinating the work of iNGOs and national NGOs to reduce the scope for overlapping and to stimulate synergies in line with the priorities of the national coordination mechanism. The direct employment of IP and FDC organisations that comply within minimum standards should be encouraged by NICFI in the interests of enhancing the sustainability of activities such as community-based MRV and negotiations on the benefit-sharing to be established to facilitate changes in behavior relating to deforestation and forest degradation.

Recommendation 5 to NICFI and partner countries (representatives in the proposed national coordination unit for REDD+): NICFI should support the proposed national coordination mechanism reach a formal agreement as to what remains to be achieved in the REDD+ Readiness phase before moving to RBPs. This agreement should be reached after participatory analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of REDD+ within the current political context of each country to ensure all parties agree it is realistic and achievable. The agreement should include the indicators and targets to be applied to

track progress and achievements ensuring explicit inclusion of horizontal objectives to be fulfilled (rights, gender, governance, etc.). Annex 4 provides information an initial assessment of NICFI's current indicators to aid the establishment of country-specific indicators and targets that will support learning at the sub-national, national and global levels on REDD+.

Recommendation 6 to NICFI, implementing partners and partner countries (representatives in the proposed national coordination mechanism for REDD+): Through the development of country-based indicators and targets proposed in Recommendation 5, NICFI should aggregate key information from each partner country to produce standardised reports on overall progress, achievements and gaps relating to REDD+ Readiness at the regional and global levels to support informed dialogue on its programming, planning and implementation, ensuring it is tailored to different audiences using different mediums. This should include the production of communication campaigns and the development of phone apps and blogs to engage youths, women, IPs, scientific community, private sector, etc. To sustain the campaign strategy and update it on a frequent basis, NICFI should ensure the communications department is adequately

staffed and resourced in order it can contract the third parties needed (especially in partner countries).

Annex 1 – Terms of Reference

Terms of reference- Call off 4 under the Framework Agreement governing “Real-time evaluation of The Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative” Norad contract number: 1401513.

The Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Lessons learned and recommendations for future programming

BACKGROUND

Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) has pledged up to three billion Kroner (NOK) – about US\$350 million – per year in development cooperation funding until 2020 to support REDD+. Almost NOK14 billion (US\$1.7 billion) has been invested so far in programs across Latin America, Asia and Africa as well as multi-lateral initiatives and civil society organizations. NICFI is Norway’s single largest development assistance program.

Since its establishment in 2008, NICFI has been an object of a real-time evaluation RTE managed by the independent Evaluation Department at the Norwegian Agency for

Development Cooperation (NORAD). Phase 1 of the RTE was conducted in 2010- 2013. The current Phase 2 of RTE started in 2015. A number of evaluations and studies on specific topics and themes have been conducted under the RTE. NICFI funding is channeled through a number of multilateral and bilateral partners who have also been conducting evaluations that contain a wealth of evaluative evidence. In addition, NICFI secretariat together with Norad, from time to time also commissions reviews on need basis.

RTE, partner evaluations and NICFI’s reviews are a potential source of timely information and rapid learning opportunities to improve ‘live’ projects, and inform the strategic direction of Norwegian policy. As NICFI is the backbone of global REDD+ financing, the evaluative evidence generated is also useful for building public confidence in NICFI in particular and the international climate action it supports in general.

MAIN OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this study is to provide a synthesis of the lessons learned in the implementation of the Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI).

SCOPE

The synthesis shall draw on the evaluation reports, project reviews /publications produced by NICFI and its implementing partners and other relevant secondary data emerging from the implementation of NICFI.

TASKS

- › Compiling NICFI related evaluative evidence from relevant evaluation reports, studies and secondary data to document lessons learned from implementation of NICFI.
- › Preparing a short document not exceeding 20 pages that presents the findings around lessons learned and recommendations for non-specialized reader.

- › Preparing a policy brief not exceeding 4 pages presenting main findings and recommendations.
- › Preparing a draft power-point presentation of the assignment, findings and recommendations for use in Evaluation Department future work related to NICFI.

METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS

- › **Data Collection** –The primary method is a desk review. All the relevant evaluations/ publications will be identified and form the basis for the study. A preliminary list is included in Annex A. The consultants shall at the earliest compile the final list that forms the basis of this study. In addition, key informant interviews may be carried out to validate the synthesis results.
- › **Screening of Evaluative Evidence** - only the evaluative evidence that meets minimum quality standards will be screened into the synthesis. Quality criteria (e.g. rigor of evaluation design, multiple lines of evidence) will be used to screen findings and recommendations to be synthesized.
- › **Categorization and analysis of the lessons learned** – lessons learned will be categorized

ESTIMATED TIMELINE AND CONSULTANT INPUT FOR THE PROJECT

Activity	End Date	Input (hours)
Project	30.10.2017	280
Data Collection	19.07.2017	40
Analysis and Draft Synthesis Report	14.08.2017	150
Final Synthesis Report	01.09.2017	50
Knowledge Products	09.10.2017	40

against themes of policy interest - such as the strategic alignment of the NICFI funding, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions.

- › The consultants may present independent well-founded recommendations for future programming of NICFI.

KEY DELIVERABLES

- › Synthesis report –draft and final report not exceeding 20 pages including executive summary, introduction, context, findings, conclusions, key lessons and recommendations.
- › Work in progress meeting on need basis - to be called by Evaluation Department.

- › Knowledge products and dissemination – video with slide show and a policy brief not exceeding 4 pages.

TIMELINE, RESOURCES AND CONSULTANT PROFILE

The table [above] presents the *estimated* timeline and consultant input for the project.

The total consultant input shall *not* exceed 300 hours.

Following are the qualifications, skills and experience required for the assignment:

- › Extensive experience and knowledge in evaluation and research methodologies

- › Knowledge of evaluation theory, practice and OECD-DAC quality standards for development evaluation
 - › Knowledge of NICFI and REDD+ policies and operations
 - › Excellent verbal and written skills in the English and Norwegian
 - › Availability for the key activities over the evaluation period.
- › It is expected that at the end of the assignment, the consultant will deliver a quality assured product together with all of the raw data and any other documentation used during the assignment.

MANAGEMENT AND QUALITY ASSURANCE

The study will be overseen by Norad Evaluation Department and will be shared (for information) with NICFI Secretariat.

- › The consultant will be guided by an Evaluation Departments Task Manager. The Task Manager will guide the consultants throughout the process and; facilitate data collection, key informant interviews, if needed. It is expected that the consultant would provide regular updates on progress to the Task Manager. This will ensure clear communications between the consultants and EVAL and will help solve any issues that may arise during the project.

ANNEX A (TO THE TERMS OF REFERENCE)

Evaluation Department, (2014). The Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative, Synthesising Report 2007-2013. Report 3/2014, Norad, Oslo.

All the evaluations conducted under RTE are available on the Evaluation Departments website. This report synthesizes the results of NICFI's support towards achievement of its core objectives over the period from 2007-2013. The focus is primarily a backward-looking compilation of documented results achieved. The assessment is made on available documents and the activities assessed are at different stages: design-implementation. It is intended to complement a forward-looking strategic study (Lash, J. 2014) of NICFI commissioned by the NICFI Secretariat. The report including annexes is available on

<https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/planned-and-ongoing-evaluations/ongoing-evaluations/real-time-evaluation-of-norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative/>

Lash, J. and Dyer, G. (2014) The Strategic Evaluation Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Report Oslo: The Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a high-level strategic review of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), highlighting strengths and weaknesses in the past, key elements of its current status, and possible threats and opportunities in the future. It is separate from, but complementary to, the real-time evaluation program conducted through the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The methodology consisted of a literature review regarding the history of REDD+ and NICFI, and a series of off-the-record interviews with a variety of key leaders and practitioners engaged in REDD+ efforts. The report is available on

https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/md/2011/vedlegg/klima/klima_skog-prosjektet/lash_final_nicfi_evaluationreport.pdf

The Evaluation Office, (2014) External evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (the UN-REDD Programme). United Nations Environment Program,

This report is an external evaluation of the UN collaborative programme on REDD. Three UN agencies - UNEP, FAO and UNDP - participated in

the implementation of the project. The purpose of the evaluation was to provide evidence of the results achieved vis-a-vis accountability requirements; promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing through result and lessons learned; and to inform the revision of the UN=REDD Programme Strategy beyond 2015. The report is available on

<http://www.unep.org/evaluation/external-evaluation-united-nations-collaborative-programme-reducing-emissions-deforestation-and>

Policy Board, (2015). UN-REDD Programme Strategic Framework 2016-20. UN Redd Programme, UNREDD/PB14/2015/III/3.

The report is available on

http://www.unredd.net/index.php?view=document&alias=14096-un-redd-pb14-2015-strategic-framework&category_slug=session-3-strategic-and-policy-issues&layout=default&option=com_docman&Itemid=134

Participants Committee (2011). First Program Evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), Washington DC: Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

The evaluation assesses the contribution of FCPF at both country and global levels. At the global level, the evaluation reviews the structure, functions, processes and impact drivers of the FCPF program as a whole, as well as the governance arrangements and delivery mechanisms.. At the country level, the evaluation reviews the formulation of R-PPs and the country context of the R-PPs (though not the R-PPs themselves), which include the structure, functions and processes of each country's "forest-relevant" system, the existing capacity and resources to formulate the R-PP. The report is available on

http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Jun2011/5.%20Final%20FCPF_EVALUATION_REPORT_June%2013th.pdf

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), (2012) Global Program Review Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. Washington DC: The World Bank.

This is the Global Program Review of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF).The methodology for this Global Program Review included a literature review, interviews with representatives of donor and REDD country participants, NGOs, IP organizations and other CSOs. The report is available on

https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/fcpf_gpr.pdf

Clarke,M., Mikkolainen, P., Camargo, M. and Elhassan, N. (2016). The Second Program Evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Helsinki: Indufor.

The second FCPF program evaluation covers 2011-2014. The report is available on

<https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2016/Nov/Second%20FCPF%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report%20Nov%202016%20%28ID%2094139%29.pdf>

LTS International, (2017). Evaluation of the Congo Basin Forest Fund. Abidjan: Independent Evaluation IDEV. African Development Bank. Forthcoming

This is a near end-of-fund evaluation of the CBFF. This Final Evaluation Report is based on the findings from the Portfolio Performance Review (PPR), the Organisation and Management Performance Review (OMPR) and the Case Studies Report. It provides an overarching analysis of the how the CBFF portfolio of projects and the CBFF governance structures contributed to achievement of the fund's objectives and results. The findings from this evaluation will inform decision making at the executive level and will help to ensure accountability and lesson learning at the project level and among implementing partners and project grantees.

Other relevant literature includes:

- › Annual Budget propositions from 2007-2017, (in Norwegian)
 - › See St.prp. nr 1 (2008-2009) Utenriksdepartementet;
 - › Prop 1 S (2014-2015) Klima- og miljødepartementet - Innst. 9 S (2014-2015) Innstilling fra energi- og miljøkomiteen pages 97-99 for discussion of the Climate and Environment allocation <https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/innstillinger/stortinget/2014-2015/inns-201415-009.pdf>


- › *White papers:*
 - › *Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009). “Climate, Conflict and Capital”. Report No. 13 (2008–2009).
<https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/report-no.-13-to-the-storting-2008-2009/id545698/>*

 - › *Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). Meld. St. 14 (2010–2011). “Towards greener development: On a coherent environmental and development policy”.
<https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/meld-st-14-2010-2011/id639684/>*

- › *The Annual reports from NICFI (two existing from 2015, 2016):*
- › *Norad Annual Results Reports. Available on Norad website*
- › *The Strategical framework for the climate and forest initiative (there are two versions - one came after the 2014 RTE, and it has been updated now in June 2017)*


Annex 2 – NICFI’s Theory of Change*

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR NICFI



Source: 2015-2016 NICFI Budget Proposal
 *The strategic framework includes a narrative section that describes the Theory of Change, but which is not included in this annex.

Annex 3 – Ideas for a new Theory of Change for NICFI



Annex 4 – Evaluation Matrix

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
1	2020	Real-time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative - Contributions to a Global REDD+ Regime 2007-2010	https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/up-load/md/2011/vedlegg/klima/klima_skogprosjektet/evalueringsrapportene/report_12_2010_global_web.pdf	First real-time evaluation of NICFI assesses NICFI's contribution to the development of REDD+ within a broader climate change agreement and looks at initial performance of NICFI and lessons learned. Note hard copy provided by Norad to TL in July 2017 while in Oslo	WO	Yes
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
1.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) The justification for supporting the inclusion of high forest cover/low deforestation rate countries such as Guyana, or countries where deforestation rates have come down (such as Brazil) needs to be clarified by NICFI; 2) the scale and diversity of NICFI funding has resulted in a plethora of constructs, proposals and terminology that are confusing to beneficiary governments and other stakeholders (identified in Call-off 2 and 3) NICFI's expectations of REDD+ host countries in terms of low carbon strategies and action plans, or safeguards for indigenous peoples (IPs) and other forest dependent communities (FDCs) lack clarity;			Recommendations: 1) Norway needs to clarify its specific objectives and the nature of present and potential REDD transactions in terms of expectations, benefit sharing, responsibilities, etc. This clarification process should clarify relevant social and environmental safeguards and point the way to a clear progression from initial donor-based support to a fully fledged international fund or market-based system for REDD+; 2) The current bilateral transactions should move away from output-based aid agreements and more on the purchase of environmental services given in a purchase transaction there is a transfer of a tradable asset from the account of one entity to another (whereas in an output based aid agreement the payment is based on the quantum of output achieved which usually overlooks asset ownership; 3) beneficiary governments need to develop a better understanding of REDD+ developments i.e. who is doing what, finance available, conditions, terms, progress, research (given there is considerable duplication of efforts, especially in areas such as research - p.28); 4) The issue of biodiversity protection (and its role in eco-services) needs to be adequately reflected in bilateral and multilaterals agreements rather than just focusing on forests; 5) Improve the internal procedures of NICFI to incorporate evaluation outputs based on a ranking system of a) immediate action; b) further examination; c) discounted or not relevant; d) issues neglected or unsubstantiated.		

<p>1.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) NICFI has contributed to injecting momentum into REDD+, establishing a phased approach and building institutional capacity, but tangible progress of REDD+ remains elusive because of lack of agreement on the overarching climate change framework (which makes it impossible to determine NICFI's contribution to such progress); 2) The leveraging of political momentum within climate change negotiations through the provision of large scale funds to selected countries appears to be a risky and inefficient approach, from an advocacy perspective; 3) aid funding by NICFI has not been tied to performance indicators (such as purchase of environmental services) and focuses mainly on output-based agreements; 4) There is a danger that REDD+ activities will become fragmented and disparate unless they are operated through a clear mechanism; 5) NICFI is a major player in REDD+ which means it can be proactive in stimulating political dialogue on developing the financial mechanism for REDD+ as well as agreements on developing a results-based regime; 5) NICFI's political and financial input to UN-REDD-programme, FIP and FCPF was regarded by many CSO and IGO representatives as important in terms of setting up an interim framework for funding of capacity building and other REDD+ readiness actions (evidence: Norway's support to Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania has been a positive input to the global REDD+ process as it builds bridges to future development of future multilateral or market-based funding, sets important precedents to increase international support to halt deforestation, informs discussion on the formation of a global REDD+ mechanism and allows the issues to be explored in a range of different contexts including forest conservation (Guyana) and emissions reduction (Brazil and Indonesia)).</p>	<p>Recommendations: 1) Norwegian-funded project proposals should include appreciation of the complexity of forest and land use issues to ensure REDD policies are not be viewed in isolation from issues such as forestry and agricultural development, land tenure and other rural issues; 2) need for closer coordination between MCE, MFA/ Norad; 3) Need for greater guidelines in areas such as developing a low carbon strategy and development plan (p.41), on safeguards, etc.</p>
<p>1.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: 1) The transformational change in forest governance sought by NICFI through the introduction of a new set of economic incentives will need a global agreement and corresponding long-term financial commitment by NICFI and other donors; 2) the commitments of USD 3.0 billion so far to REDD+ indicate Norway's contribution of USD 1 billion is not isolated; 3) The financing of the operational phase of REDD+ needs to be clarified by NICFI and other donors once the readiness phase has been completed in the beneficiary countries; 4) Norway needs to manage the main risks for NICFI (in particular if a climate change agreement is not reached, or, if there is an agreement, how far REDD+ initiatives become bogged down in circular discussion on negotiations on details (identified also in Call-off 2).</p>	<p>C. Recommendations: 1) The transformational change in forest governance sought by NICFI through the introduction of a new set of economic incentives will need a global agreement and corresponding long-term financial commitment by NICFI and other donors; 2) the commitments of USD 3.0 billion so far to REDD+ indicate Norway's contribution of USD 1 billion is not isolated; 3) The financing of the operational phase of REDD+ needs to be clarified by NICFI and other donors once the readiness phase has been completed in the beneficiary countries; 4) Norway needs to manage the main risks for NICFI (in particular if a climate change agreement is not reached, or, if there is an agreement, how far REDD+ initiatives become bogged down in circular discussion on negotiations on details (identified also in Call-off 2).</p>

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
2	2020	Real-time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative - Executive Summaries from Country Reports (Brazil, DRC, Guyana, Indonesia and Tanzania)	https://www.norad.no/en/toolspublications/publications/2011/real-time-evaluation-of-norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative-contributions-to-national-redd-processes-2007-2010-executive-summaries-from-country-reports/	Assesses formulation and implementation of national REDD strategies and other REDD readiness efforts in Brazil. Assesses NICFI support to Brazil's Amazon Fund (a major REDD partner for NICFI). Note hard copy provided by Norad to TL in July 2017 while in Oslo.	WO	Yes
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
2.1	<p>A. Policy relevance: Brazil 1) NICFI's support to the Amazon Fund raised image of AF and acted as a catalyst for policy debate on deforestation, emissions and implementing a national approach to REDD (readiness). This has been aided by placing AF under the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and involving civil society to participate in the Guidance Committee for AF (becomes a national mechanism for the disbursement of RBP). DRC 1) in early stages of REDD+ thanks mainly to NICFI support in which main challenges are: a) developing forest governance; b) land and forest tenure; c) developing capacity at provincial level to support decentralised approaches (similar lessons learned in Liberia under Call-off 2 in 2016); 2) support integration of REDD into development agenda to support application of REDD process paying greater attention to empowering actors at provincial level and within civil society; Guyana: 1) NICFI provided an added incentive for Guyana to adopt ambitious plans to for national low carbon development (to capture international finance) which help propel concept of environmental services as an attractive development alternative; Indonesia: 1) the President's commitment to REDD+ has been most important factor in broadening national ownership of forests and addressing coordination of donors and bottlenecks in REDD+ readiness (created the UKP4 - Presidential Delivery Unit for the Supervision and Monitoring of Development of REDD+); 2) Donor coordination on REDD+ has been ad hoc and inadequate due to the number of donors, which NICFI has not been able to address due to its hands-off approach and on sovereignty issues; 3) UN-REDD is limited to readiness activities but has comparative advantage in its applying social and environmental safeguards in particular Free Prior and Informed Consent (due to UN Convention); Tanzania: 1) National Climate Change SC and supporting technical committee have not been activated which reduces scope for developing capacity in critical areas such as planning, designing and supporting decision-making on REDD+ finance, implementation and securing RBP; 2) Building capacity at the local level is crucial if REDD+ is to be implemented effectively and efficiently (also identified in Call-off 3); 3) capacity building needs to focus on land use planning to manage change of use to cater for population growth as well as support effective forest management and use; 4) Need for incorporation of cross-cutting objectives in the national REDD+ strategy (gender, HIV-Aids, anti-corruption, etc.</p>			<p>Recommendations: Brazil 1) Need for clarification of carbon rights in the Amazon region; b) rapid review of current regulations and procedures of AF as well as the bottlenecks and gaps which affect aid delivery leading to development of an integrated plan for AF (projects directed at key deforestation and degradation threats); 2) Widen disbursement options by promoting small grant projects and support to private sector. DRC: Support reforms and policy development to fully apply REDD+ process as part of the development strategy in DRC. Guyana: 1) importance of biodiversity conservation needs to be more clearly explained when promoting environmental services (includes hunting rights); 2) include all FDCs in the REDD process (not just Amerindian communities) as well as opposition party reps to minimise the politicisation of the LCDS; 3) Install permanent representation of Norway in Guyana to facilitate programme delivery (also recommended in Call-off 3 for Peru). Indonesia: 1) NICFI needs to employ staff in Embassy and in priority pilot provinces to respond to developments in Indonesia, liaise with Oslo and other donors and guide implementation of REDD+; 2) there should be interim reviews of progress (six months) to support independent annual reviews of deliverables and dialogue within the Joint Consultative Group proposed by government; Tanzania: 1) promote the integration of REDD+ on the planning process at the national level and in land use planning at the local level.</p>		

<p>2.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: Brazil 1) The AF consolidated ownership of forests and facilitated development of an effective governance system (national regulation and monitoring of deforestation in the Amazon) - a major factor in reducing deforestation rates (enforcement) and in stimulating proposals to extend governance to other forested regions; 2) Initial indications are that NICFI's procedural constraints and Brazil's unique approach to REDD have affected efficiency in aid delivery (legal framework, project application and selection processes, bureaucracy, lack of transparency in decision-making, etc.). Civil society and other stakeholders also believe these barriers reduce the scope for IPs to gain recognition of their rights and role in forest governance; 3) Brazil's national approach to REDD+ has left NICFI with little room to enter into political dialogue to address current deficiencies in AF (encroaching on sovereignty); DRC 1) difficult to assess efficiency of NICFI funding due to different mechanisms employed (also identified in Synthesis report and Call-off 3). Guyana: 1) MoU with Norway laid foundations for establishing a strategic framework for REDD based on a multi-stakeholder consultation process, forest governance to support MRV and recognition of rights of FDCs which increased ownership of REDD; 2) setting up the multi-stakeholder SC has engaged a wide variety of reps from civil society (but did not include political opposition); 3) NICFI has facilitated tighter control of forestry and mining at the field level and facilitated greater participation of Amerindian interests (as prescribed in the MoU), but other marginalised FDCs have been less engaged; 4) cross-sectional collaboration has helped improve links and participation of mining and forestry enterprise and increase compliance (operational standards); 5) Efficiency has been affected by delays in releasing funds coupled with unrealistic raising of expectations of REDD in Guyana. Indonesia: 1) The Norway-Indonesia Lol facilitated a multi-stakeholder process to produce the National REDD+ strategy by end of 2010 but support to MRV remained constrained by a lack of official definition as to what constitutes "forest degradation" or agreeing on the main causes; 2) integration of social and environmental safeguards in REDD strategies, laws and activities has been slow due to different interests on benefit sharing and political implications of advancing rights of FDCs ((political and economic); 3) drive to establish RBS for emissions reductions risks compromising broader cooperation objectives and social and environmental justice. Due to the sensitivity of these issues (sovereignty) indirect approaches may be needed (also observed in Call-off 2); 4) support to CSOs (through CSD) allows iNGOs to carry out important research that would otherwise not happen and support governance activities directly. Tanzania: 1) NICFI has financed establishment and implementation of the REDD Task Force and Secretariat, REDD Framework and Strategy which gives NICFI significant political leverage, but ownership of REDD is low.</p>	<p>Recommendations: Brazil 1) need to address the current legal and policy contradictions between a) efforts to reduce deforestation and encourage sustainable livelihoods through AF and b) support to large-scale infrastructure, extraction and agro-industrial projects; b) improve representation and expansion of support to private, state and federal institutions; DRC: Support effective decentralisation of the REDD+ process. Guyana: 1) The safeguards upheld by NICFI need to be clearly explained, conflicts identified and consensus reached in applying them; 2) enhance benefit sharing to reward improved practices of extraction industry; 3) prioritise capacity building in MRV (especially community level MRV) and ensure external consultants transfer skills to help generate employment; 4) address high cost of wood processing by improving conversion efficiency and support advocacy for reforms in log exports. Indonesia: 1) A two-year moratorium of licensing of new concessions needs to be backed up by a similar moratorium of existing licenses in priority natural forests and all peatlands. NICFI should aid this by reviewing the legality of all existing plantations, logging and mining concessions; 2) support the integration of social and environmental safeguards in national policy, strategy and legislation on REDD+ and support their application in pilot provinces. 3) support FDCs gain access licenses to forest lands for REDD+. Tanzania: 1) Develop capacity in the Prime Minister's Office and in Regional and Local authorities in order a suitable model engages districts effectively and efficiently in REDD+ activities.</p>
<p>2.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: Brazil 1) No clear sustainability strategy in place for the AF including a risk management strategy in the event deforestation rates go back up; 2) No clear strategy in place to use the Fund to address critical threats (including forest livelihoods) and optimise 20% for MRV (especially to support moves from monitoring large to small-scale deforestation; DRC 1) key issues for sustaining REDD will hinge on a) long-term funding secured to bring about forest and land tenure reforms and developing effective governance capacity at the provincial level, b) developing an effective and sustainable REDD National Coordination Unit (under the Prime Minister's Office); c) ensuring a substantial area of national forest estate is supported by sustainable management based on green economy approaches (to reduce dependency on wood-energy) and promotion of climate-smart agriculture. Guyana: 1) The Low Carbon Development Strategy will be difficult to sustain if potential conflicts with safeguard requirements are not resolved. Indonesia: 1) Lol does not address donor coordination, but government's intention to establish a Joint Consultation Group would improve opportunities to agree on sustainable finance of REDD+; Tanzania: 1) High dependency on NICFI funding needs to be addressed to increase national ownership of forests and sustain forest management at the local level;</p>	<p>Recommendations: Brazil 1) Strategic framework for AF (integrated plan) is supported by fund disbursement plan to target key threats with available resources as well as ensure new funds are captured to sustain priority actions;) Increase participation of IPs in AF and through specific projects; DRC: ensure sustainable mobilisation of funds to implement REDD+ process. Guyana: 1) Strengthen capacity of FDCs to manage their forested territories by themselves; 2) Improve the direct benefits from REDD to forest users. Indonesia: 1) To sustain the implementation of REDD+ at the local level there is a need to revise provincial land use plans in line with the REDD+ strategy (safeguards fully integrated) and to update the degraded lands database to ensure it includes data on economic, social and legal status of land units; 2) support the development of land tenure for FDCs (in order they can become effective guardians); 3) Improve understanding on the importance of biodiversity conservation as in the Lol to facilitate the inclusion of Papua province which has the largest primary forests in Indonesia. Tanzania: 1) Promote greater donor coordination through formal REDD+ meetings of the Development Partnership Group on Environment (1 or 2 times/year). Secure the long-term sustainability of the MRV framework by identifying main needs and gaps with other donors (Finland).</p>

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
3	2011	First Program Evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Washington DC: Forest Carbon Partnership Facility	http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Jun2011/5.%20Final%20FCPF_EVALUATION_REPORT_June%2013th.pdf	The evaluation assesses the contribution of FCPF at both country and global levels. At the global level, the evaluation reviews the structure, functions, processes and impact drivers of the FCPF program as a whole, as well as the governance arrangements and delivery mechanisms. At the country level, the evaluation reviews the formulation of R-PPs and the country context of the R-PPs (though not the R-PPs themselves), which include the structure, functions and processes of each country's „forest-relevant system, the existing capacity and resources to formulate the R-PP	CICERO	Triangulated evidence available. (Note: The WB IEG report (document 4) remarks that the first evaluation report was lacking in organizational independence, as the evaluation was overseen by the program secretariat (the FMT) rather than its governing body (the PC).)
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
3.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) The provision of practical tools and guidance for REDD+ readiness planning (such as templates for readiness preparation proposals (R-PPs) and guidelines for stakeholder engagement) as well as training and possibilities for exchange (formal and informal) has contributed to establishing a common framework and platform for REDD+ readiness work [in the absence of such a framework being available from the UNFCCC]. 2) The readiness process has in many cases created fresh impetus and momentum towards addressing governance challenges and forest sector reform. It has also opened up political space for national civil society actors to pursue such goals. 3) The coordination that has been achieved between the FCPF and UN-REDD has contributed to increased donor coordination, with a clearer division of labour in some cases and funding complementarity in others. 4) There are differences of opinion regarding the point at which countries are "ready", as no clear definition of readiness exists. In-country experience points to a more gradual and evolving approach, in which readiness proceeds alongside the testing of payment systems.			Recommendation: Develop clearer plans regarding the expansion of the program to new countries, including criteria for inclusion.		

<p>3.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) Challenges persist around coordination between different bi- and multilateral initiatives, in particular where there are differences in operational guidance. 2) The learning-by-doing approach, combined with high levels of participation and consensus-based decision making, has resulted in FCPF governance structures being regarded as effective and legitimate, strengthening country ownership. However, trade-offs between effective decision-making and participation are noted, and concerns are raised about the extent to which FCPF-supported processes are taking account of lessons already learned within the forestry and governance sectors (i.e. beyond REDD+). 3) The readiness process may have created unrealistic expectations regarding the degree and timing of REDD+ funds and benefits. In practice, disbursement has been slow. 4) Funding for civil society and IP participation is important for participatory processes at the national level. As the FCPF has only provided very limited dedicated funds for this, such costs have largely been met by complementary funding from Norad and Northern NGOs in particular [strengthening the finding that Norad CSO support has provided significant added value].</p>	<p>Recommendations: 1) Seek greater coordination and harmonization with other multilateral and bilateral funding sources, especially at the country level. 2) Ensure that new phases build on lessons learnt from other initiatives in the forest sector, as well as the lessons of previous program phases (e.g. that lessons from implementation of the Readiness Fund are brought forward to the implementation of the Carbon Fund)</p>
<p>3.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: As per ToR agreed by the FCPF Participants Committee (PC), this evaluation did not assess sustainability and impacts, due to the newness of the program. The WB IEG report further remarks that the first evaluation report is lacking in that it does not consider the continuing relevance of the FCPF given changes in the international context (see summary of document 4 below).</p>	<p>None</p>

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
4	2012	Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), "The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility." Global Program Review 6 (3)	https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/fcpf_gpr.pdf	This is the Global Program Review of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). The methodology for this Global Program Review included a literature review, interviews with representatives of donor and REDD country participants, NGOs, IP organizations and other CSOs.	CICERO	Based on triangulated evidence (findings from interviews are not included in the report for reference)
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
4.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) "REDD+ is a more expensive, complex, and protracted undertaking than was anticipated at the time of the FCPF's launch. It touches on a range of different sectors and requires an unusually high degree of political will, cross-sectoral and inter-ministerial coordination. To be successful, REDD+ will need to be configured as an integral part of participating countries' national development strategies." 2) Greater clarity is needed on the mission of the FCPF in relation to changes in the carbon market and the evolving nature of the Carbon Fund. This includes greater clarity on the circumstances under which the FCPF will support non-market versus market-based approaches to REDD+. There is also a need to clarify how the FCPF will balance issues of fairness and efficiency between REDD+ countries who are long-standing participants and new entrants, respectively, in the program. 3) There is a lack of a unified strategy on the level of the World Bank with regards to the Bank's approach to REDD+. Different programs under the auspices of the Bank contribute to raising expectations regarding REDD+ finance although the future of such finance is highly uncertain.			None		
4.2	B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) Alignment with other REDD+ financing initiatives is important to ensure effectiveness. The FCPF is dependent for the success of its mission on other multilateral and bilateral initiatives, such as the FIP and NICFI. While considerable effort has thus been made to coordinate between FCPF and FIN, sequencing is nonetheless an issue. Because of the time it is taking to move through the R-PP process, FIP investments are being approved while the readiness process is still in its initial stages. An opportunity is being missed for the analytical underpinnings and consultations taking place as part of the FCPF process to fully inform investments already underway and planned.			The IEG report concludes that "very little progress" has been made in this area since the first program evaluation (document 3) reported the same lesson one year earlier.		
4.3	C. Sustainability: 1) In a situation of uncertainty around long-term REDD+ finance, the report highlights the challenge of sustaining development outcomes already achieved, moderating stakeholder expectations, and avoiding making commitments beyond those on which the FCPF is willing and able to deliver. Since the Facility commenced operations, the relevance of its design has been undermined by changes in the external environment, especially the slow pace of negotiations at the UNFCCC and the fact that cap-and-trade schemes that were expected to be adopted by several industrialized countries, including the United States, have failed to materialize.			Recommendation 1): Awaiting clarity about future REDD+ financing, giving priority to "no regrets" activities such as legal and policy support for land tenure and forest governance reforms should be considered.		

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
5	2013	Real-Time Evaluation of NICFI – Contribution to Measurement, Reporting and Verification	https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/kld/kl/klima-og-skogprosjektet/real-time_evaluation_of_norway_s_international_climate_and_forest_initiative_contribution_to_measurement_reporting_and_verification.pdf	This evaluation looks at four areas of support by NICFI: 1) bilateral (Brazil, Tanzania, Guyana, Indonesia, Mexico, Ethiopia, Vietnam); 2) multi-lateral support (UNREDD, FCPF, GEO, FCT, GFOI); 3) MRV activities under the UNFCCC climate negotiations and; 4) small-scale projects funded mainly for CSOs. Note hard copy provided by Norad to TL in July 2017 while in Oslo	WO	Yes
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
5.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) Transferable lessons from MRV have not been adequately identified to support REDD+ (Guyana has a good MRV but not a model for others); 2) Coordination between NICFI, partners and other donors varies from one country to another, but is generally inadequate (due to hands-off approach and limited staff) and beneficiary countries feel overburdened by this lack of coordination; NICFI staff appear to be overstretched to carry out strategic thinking and policy dialogue on developing applying MRV (with other donors);			Recommendations: 1) Beneficiary countries need a designated body to operate MRV/ REDD+ supported by NICFI providing greater clarity on applying the NICFI MRV work track (guideline document needed); 2) Bilateral cooperation should be coordinated by NICFI to ensure it is supported by multilateral channels; 3) Increase NICFI staff levels on MRV supervision and guidance (especially at country level).		
5.2	B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) NICFI has made a major contribution to moving the MRV process forward both at the country level and in supporting progress in measurement of deforestation and informed decision-making at UNFCCC negotiations although more could be done to monitor outcomes (at country level); 2) Bi-lateral cooperation has generally been more effective and efficient than multilateral channels due to fewer procedural constraints and bureaucracy ; 3) Reporting and verification frameworks need to be developed and human resources trained, but this relies on a: a) political commitments to carry out a needs assessment, b) establish a permanent institutional framework for MRV/REDD+; c) a clear financial incentive for both government staff to apply MRV and operate the payments system in line with standards (Guyana only country with this); and d) guarantees in place by NICFI and other donors to ensure agreed payments will be delivered in time; 4) Global Forest Observation Initiative are limited due to low awareness and inadequate communication of FCT (Forest Carbon Tracking) ; UNREDD have been less effective in engaging a large number of countries in MRV than through bilateral channels (especially in Guyana and Indonesia); 5) UNREDD accounts for 47% of NICFI funding to MRV of which Tanzania is the main recipient, but economic efficiency is difficult to monitor (due to lack of a government unit for MRV in all cases except Guyana); Efficiency in Guyana in terms of implementing MRV has been high (NOK 1.20/hectare covered by MRV system) compared to others such as Tanzania (NOK 5.10 / ha). This is due to one institution manages MRV which is supported by qualified technical experts with low turnover rates.			Recommendations: 1) Need to retain and provide incentives for staff to stay committed to MRV. Covering a travel allowance is crucial to getting MRV systems up and running (until payments start flowing); 2) Supporting staff development for MRV should not be done to the detriment of forest conservation and management (must be monitored); 4) NICFI should develop clear operational level guidelines on MRV systems (indicators, milestones, risk assessment, etc.) to ensure MRV has clear baselines to show progress/drawbacks needed to support informed decision-making on policy reform and wider national development goals;; 5) Need to develop transparent costing systems for MRV systems to identify transferable lessons (including barriers, gaps, etc.).		
5.3	C. Sustainability: 1) the MRV systems need to communicate better the benefits of applying effective MRV to capture results-based payments (financial incentive of REDD+); 2) For the MRV system to remain sustainable a proportion of the payments have to be assigned to maintaining MRV systems; 3) MRV systems have greater chance of survival if they support other national objectives and plans			Recommendations: 1) MRV systems should operate to support national interests beyond results-based payments such as more effective land use planning (promote added-value of MRV); 2) MRV depends on a successful flow of results-based payments from which a percentage must go back into the MRV system to support future MRV and wider national interests.		

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
6	2014	Real-Time Evaluation of NICFI, Synthesising Report 2007-2013 (LTS/Norad, Oslo)	https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/planned-and-ongoing-evaluations/ongoing-evaluations/real-time-evaluation-of-norways-international-climate-and-forest-initiative/	This report synthesizes the results of NICFI's support towards achievement of its core objectives over the period from 2007-2013. The focus is primarily a backward-looking compilation of documented results achieved. The assessment is made on available documents and the activities assessed are at different stages: design-implementation. It is intended to complement a forward-looking strategic study (Lash, J. 2014) of NICFI commissioned by the NICFI Secretariat. Note hard copy provided by Norad to TL in July 2017 while in Oslo	WO (CICE-RO to consult)	Triangulated evidence available on lessons learned
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
6.1	<p>A. Policy relevance: 1) The logic of multilateral partners to "sign up" new countries to REDD+ is not readily apparent without a lack of solid analysis at the country level as to why some countries have advanced the REDD+ process and others not. This statement can still be backed up today by: a) Call-off 2 evaluation (2016-2017) which stated Norway's commitment to supporting REDD+ in Liberia has not taken adequate account of the fact there is almost not institutional capacity to implement REDD+ outside of the capital Monrovia; b) Call-off 3 evaluation (2016-2017) identified institutional and legal barriers undermine the REDD+ process in Peru, such as current provisions within the Ministries of Agriculture or Energy and Mines that allow them to promote megaprojects in the Amazon to boost economic development; 2) Progress in meeting NICFI objectives has been most robust where the political context is supportive (i.e. they are relevant to national reforms and commitments already in place). This remains applicable today by: a) the above-mentioned Peru example; b) in Indonesia where Call-off 2 and 3 confirmed the political context advanced REDD+ until 2015 when political changes resulted in relegating REDD+ from the Presidency to the Ministry of Environment and a reduction of resources for the REDD+ agenda; 3) The payments for emissions reductions is seen by some national/sub national beneficiaries of REDD+ as the end game of the process, which has produced unrealistic payments expectations that focus on the instrumental as opposed to intrinsic value of NICFI funding. This can be backed up by: a) Call-off 3 which identified the instrumental value of NICFI in bringing about change through CSOs, but which underestimated the role of NICFI in advancing rights of FDCs (e.g. territorial).</p>			<p>Key recommendations: 1) Review the Theory of Change adopted by NICFI to support the development of a results-based framework at the country level in NICFI's partner countries (to aid identification of progress and achievements of NICFI and communicate them to interested parties); 2) Undertake a review of partnerships with other donors and the multilateral organisations, with a view towards optimising the multilaterals' activities. This should take into account their differing mandates, constraints and opportunities for synergy with NICFI's strengths.</p>		

<p>6.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) The flexible government system in Norway has been conducive to establishing NICFI as a highly responsive model. However, other donors do not work in the same way and this has implications on the way NICFI engages with other donors and its expectation of them. This is backed up by a) Call-off 2 (2016), which identified problems in coordinating multilateral (and bilateral) partners at the corporate and national levels given they apply different rules and procedures, which can also be confusing for beneficiary countries; b) Call-off 3 which found beneficiary countries such as Peru struggling to coordinate 11 major land titling interventions in the Amazon region most of which receive NICFI funding through multilateral or bi-lateral sources and which a leading national organisation of indigenous peoples has officially stated needs a common agenda; 2) NICFI has not adequately revised its strategy to accommodate for the slow progress of REDD+ in most partner countries coupled with the lower than planned mobilisation of global finance to support its implementation. This is backed up by a) Call-off 2 which called for the need for all partner countries to establish a permanent body dedicated to coordinating different multilateral and bilateral funding channels used by NICFI; b) Call-off 3 which highlighted the slow progress in implementing REDD+ means the target dates to start results-based payments are no longer realistic; 3) NICFI has successfully coordinated with other donors to mobilise new financial commitments (such as the bilateral partnerships in Indonesia, Brazil, etc.), but coordination at the national level remains limited. This is back up by: a) Call-off 2 which found coordination between FIP, FCPF and NICFI's bilateral partnerships at the national level require greater national supervision and guidance; b) Call-off 3 which found the bilateral partnership in Peru involving Norway and Germany needs to be better coordinated at the national level with UNREDD, FCPF and FIP; 4) The lack of a clearly articulated results framework for NICFI is unhelpful for securing coherent decision making and for optimising the value of available expertise and experience. This is backed up by a) Call-offs 2 and 3 which highlighted the need for improved indicators to help monitor, report and coordinate the results of NICFI at the national level; 5) The Oslo institutions responsible for NICFI (Ministries of Environment and Foreign Affairs) lack a common understanding and interpretation of NICFI aims and strategies that does not facilitate communication (reporting) and coordination (programming and planning) of operations at the national level; The cost effectiveness of NICFI has been unclear which detracts from stimulating interest in NICFI/REDD+. This is backed up by Call-off 3 which stated that cost efficiency and cost effectiveness cannot be identified/communicated at country level due to the global management of NICFI funding through iNGOs that in most cases manage funds for programmes covering several countries.</p>	<p>Key recommendations; 1) Develop a common approach with other donors to leverage greater efficiency and effectiveness from the multilateral institutions</p>
<p>6.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: 1) the resources allocated to REDD+ Readiness have focused on start-up requirements, rather than the running costs that have to be covered before countries can progress to results based payments. Almost all donors and multilateral stakeholders consider this to be a major challenge in advancing the REDD+ agenda. This is backed up by: a) Call-off 3 which identified gaps in covering some running costs linked to supporting the organisations of forest dependent communities address land dispute tribunals or cover the costs of soil analysis to determine communal land titling in the Amazon region of Peru, or The Amazon Fund in Brazil which remains project focused (supporting civil society organisations rather than political processes); 4) NICFI has played a leading role in establishing the multilateral architecture for REDD+, but its hands off approach has allowed multilateral and bilateral partners to become major beneficiaries of NICFI funding. This is backed up by Call-off 3 evaluation which found international non-government organisations (iNGOs) such as WWF, RRI and Conservation International have been major beneficiaries of the NICFI funding rounds for Civil Society Organisations, which has inadvertently has affected efficiency by increasing their dependency on each other (rather than leading to increased empowerment of IPs to take up NICFI funding directly); 2) NICFI has not clearly articulated the role of sub-national jurisdictional REDD+ programmes within the national context. This is backed up by Call-off 3 which found the role of the jurisdictional approach applied by the GCF Task Force Support Network in Brazil was not clear in the wider national context, nor conducive to empowering IP organisations in REDD+.</p>	<p>Key recommendations; 1) Improve the communication of key results and the lessons learned from channelling funds through multilateral and bilateral channels.</p>

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
7	2014	The Strategic Evaluation Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Report Oslo: The Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment	https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/md/2011/vedlegg/klima/klima_skog-prosjektet/lash_final_nicfi_evaluationreport.pdf	The purpose of this evaluation is to provide a high-level strategic review of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI), highlighting strengths and weaknesses in the past, key elements of its current status, and possible threats and opportunities in the future. It is separate from, but complementary to, the real-time evaluation program conducted through the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The methodology consisted of a literature review regarding the history of REDD+ and NICFI, and a series of off-the-record interviews with a variety of key leaders and practitioners engaged in REDD+	WO	Yes
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
7.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) NICFI has been a game changer in forest protection, climate change mitigation, and sustainable development efforts thanks to top-level political engagement (Prime Minister of Norway), significant financial commitments (political leverage), national focus of support (not just projects) to encourage forest-country ownership of REDD+ (on a results-based agenda) in the interests of hands-off approach; 2) NICFI creates political space needed to apply effective forest governance; 3) In some cases NICFI has raised expectations among forest countries, which due to NICFI's significant role in REDD+ means it is obliged to meet those expectations (even if the Paris Agreement does not mobilise a significant increase in climate finance); 3) Thinking on forest protection has evolved over last 10 years from one where it was seen as a barrier to economic development to one where there is greater understanding of the relationship between natural systems and economic development.			Recommendations: 1) Continue to expand at current pace, but ensuring incorporation of lessons learned and flexibility to changing events; 2) Maintain high level engagement to access top officials in partner countries; 3) To reduce the potential burden on meting partner country expectations on payments, Norway should build a shared vision for future success among REDD+ actors and establish risk management plans according to the future scenarios the global climate agreement could take (such as coalitions with other donors to maintain REDD+ momentum); 4) Collaboration between MCE and MFA is important to secure positive trends in thinking on the role of NRM in economic development transcribe into new policy and legal commitments. For this reason both need to work together to promote the business case for REDD+ (at company and economy-wide levels) aided by studies and engaging the private sector more deeply in REDD+		

<p>7.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) NICFI has successfully advanced technical and conceptual issues related to MRV and mapping in forest countries to apply REDD+ and improve forest governance in general; 2) NICFI - mainly through CSOs - has facilitated breakthroughs on longstanding, seemingly intractable issues related to participation and rights of IPs and FDCs, land tenure, and benefit sharing; 2) Awareness and understanding of REDD+ has increased significantly in just 7 years, but mainly among stakeholders; 3) top-level political engagement and a respectful, collaborative approach to partnership opened doors for many in forest countries to pursue their goals of protecting and sustainably managing their nation's natural resources (which supported strong economic development in some cases); 4) The results-based, (pay-for-performance) approach has allowed for national ownership of REDD+ efforts by forest countries and to reduce emissions in whatever ways are most suitable to their unique contexts (national approach helps avoid leakage; whereas projects deforestation generally moves to another area). However, reducing deforestation requires changing longstanding patterns of governance through reforms, new governance institutions, etc. A major challenge for the results-based approach is how to support the significant upfront institutional change necessary to produce results (and change cultural attitudes). The promise of future funding may not be sufficient to drive and sustain the process over many years (due to political cycles, capacity, budget constraints, etc.) to implement change/REDD+; 5) The success of REDD+ in Brazil and Indonesia has emphasized sustainable forest management as a development policy – a means of assuring livelihoods – rather than an emissions-reduction strategy. This suggests REDD+ can further national interests (as opposed to diverting them to emission reduction targets)</p>	<p>Recommendations: 1) NICFI should continue and expand funding to national and local CSOs to advance NICFI objectives; 2) NICFI should develop proactive, professional communication strategies for REDD+ and NICFI itself to meet core strategic goals, ensuring political support in donor nations for REDD+ funding and in forest nations for integrating REDD+ into their development strategies; 3) performance payments need not be contingent on specific, predetermined policies or actions related to safeguards; 4) Complementary, proactive communications strategies for both NICFI and the REDD+ concept generally should be pursued (should promote broad awareness and understanding of the key issues – why climate action is important, why forest protection is a critical component, and how both need to be done in ways that enable the poor to enhance their quality of life</p>
<p>7.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: 1) In some cases the fundamental reform needed to achieve emission-reduction results will take considerable time and effort, which may need additional upfront funding to sustain progress; 2) the staff dedicated to NICFI is small in Oslo and in partner countries there is few staff or none at all; 2) an international climate regime may not be the only, or even the best, source of such funding. NICFI is testing a new way of financing sustainable forest management, which could work well within the context of a comprehensive global climate agreement, or in other scenarios</p>	<p>Recommendation: 1) in complex countries where reforms are needed multilateral funding support must be provided on time, or advanced in some cases. This means not all NICFI funding should be linked to performance/results (without compromising its hands-off approach); marginal increases in staff should be made to ensure there is capacity to follow country-specific development and improve communication and information flows. 2) NICFI should identify different scenarios to finance sustainable forest management, such as North-South bilateral agreements, regional/sub-regional climate schemes, smaller groupings of countries, etc.; 3) sustainable forest management should be promoted as a development benefit (long-term economic prosperity and sustaining livelihoods)</p>

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
8	2014	The Evaluation Office, External evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (the UN-REDD Programme). United Nations Environment Program	http://www.unep.org/evaluation/external-evaluation-united-nations-collaborative-programme-reducing-emissions-deforestation-and	This report is an external evaluation of the UN collaborative programme on REDD. Three UN agencies. UNEP, FAO and UNDP, participated in the implementation of the project. The purpose of the evaluation was to provide evidence of the results achieved vis-a-vis accountability requirements; promote learning, feedback and knowledge sharing through result and lessons learned; and to inform the revision of the UN-REDD Programme Strategy after 2015.	WO	Yes
Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)				Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
8.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) UN-REDD is a highly relevant response to UNFCCC and REDD+ as it is largely consistent with country needs (integrated approach to forestry, environment and climate adaptation and mitigation policies relating to sustainable resource use); 2) UN-REDD is still too heavily driven by UN agencies and requirements of the mechanism as opposed to country-specific needs and challenges (also cited in synthesis and call-off 2); 3) strong buy-in from Ministries of Environment or Forestry but country ownership remains weak with inadequate involvement of policy makers, non-forest related ministries or private sector (also synthesis report); 4) UNREDD programme's comparative advantage is becoming clearer in global REDD+ thanks to technical inputs and response to country demands; 5) Programme's ability to achieve its intended results since 2013 is no longer aligned with ongoing UNFCCC negotiations, the evolving nature of REDD+ or the needs of country partners; 6) broader development impact (reducing deforestation and improving livelihoods) lies beyond UNREDD's reach as it does not address underlying drivers of deforestation and degradation			Recommendations: 1) need for a clear and explicit ToC to support a coherent strategy for the UNREDD programme to achieve results, set priorities, coordinate the allocation of resources, adapt management to changing times and monitor positive outcomes and sustainability (at country level); 2) improve coordination with FCPF supported by harmonised standards and approaches (based on core agency competences); 3) UN agencies should work closer with partner countries on developing country-based solutions that increase their ownership of REDD+; 4) advocate high level political support and capacity building across national governments; 5) ensure drivers of deforestation and degradation are fully addressed by engaging relevant stakeholders in REDD+ and focusing on resource rights of FDCs (includes carbon rights and related benefit sharing); 6) ensure countries provide information on how safeguards are addressed and respected; 7) mainstream gender equity across the Programme with sufficient funding to develop a systematic approach; 7) Policy Board should include fair and verifiable representation of CSOs IPs and FDCs in decision-making; 8) simplify the governance structure to reduce overlaps of the of the Policy Board by clarifying roles and responsibilities of the MG and Secretariat (latter focusing more on results-based planning, monitoring and reporting.		

<p>8.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) key outputs, and progress towards outcomes is improving especially raising awareness on importance of forests), advancing MRV and stakeholder engagement, and the development of national REDD+ governance systems, but uncertainty over future of REDD+ finance and slower than expected progress have affected efficiency and effectiveness (especially in countries with national programmes; 2) coordination with other initiatives is improving but existence of FCPF as another global multilateral programme for REDD+ readiness has reduced efficiency due to a lack of joint programming and implementation (includes lack of a common definition for readiness); 3) time, effort, and resources needed to achieve REDD+ readiness were greatly under-estimated as beneficiary countries differ considerably in terms of their initial capacity and ability and all face considerable challenges (none have so far achieved satisfactory ratings in all outcome areas); 4) challenges for beneficiary countries include the complex nature of the REDD+ agenda and misconceived idea that emissions reduction payments drive change; 5) the Multi-Partner Trust Fund is managed in accordance with Policy Board decisions on joint annual work plans and budgets, but it is not clear how the resources are allocated and used by each UN partner agency (as they do not share their individual agency work plans and budgets and apply different accounting and contracting rules which affects efficiency); 6) The distribution of resources across the Programme is not linked to a clearly articulated strategy even though NP budgets are developed by countries with the support of Programme staff (lack of clear strategic guidelines for the development of budgets for resources in NO and SNA-GP). This aided by strong incentives to promote activities that favour their interests and develop their capacities in lieu of local capacity solutions (also Call-off 3); 7) there is no integrated management system to track and monitor the use of available resources and quality of Programme results to support inter-agency coordination and planning at the country level (not aided by overlapping structures); 8) Changes in rules that condition the use, management, and governance of forests at national and sub-national levels means it will take longer to achieve programme objectives; 9) Cross-cutting objectives such as gender mainstreaming at country level is not taking place systematically in the Programme (also Call-off 3). Likewise IPs and FDCs have increased participation at global and national levels, but not in decision-making that addresses deforestation drivers. However increased participation of IPs and FDCs has helped raise their awareness</p>	<p>Recommendations: 1) Support the development of strategies and actions at the country level to overcome challenges to implementing the programme based on (formal) coordinated joint programming, planning and monitoring with FCPF (and others such as FIO, bilateral partnerships, CSOs); 3) ensure different administrative bodies within Programme do not overlap by developing joint decision-making and reporting to reduce transaction costs and improve joint accountability on effectiveness and efficiency; 4) Quick wins are critical for demonstrating that positive change is possible as the phased process to REDD+ does not attract political and economic engagement from public and private sectors (stakeholder engagement through capacity building is crucial to building trust and commitment (especially of IPs and FDCs)</p>
<p>8.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: 1) UNREDD's emphasis on Safeguards and free, prior and informed consent of FDCs has helped to sustain support from IPs and FDC organisations but effective participation in local decision-making and national policies on land tenure or benefit distribution have remained unresolved challenges; 2) the performance-based architecture of REDD+ has made progress dependent on the continuation of technical and financial support coming from abroad (also call-off 3); 3) extent to which partner countries will be able to sustain capacity and activities once Programme interventions end is unclear (sustainability of Programme is at risk).</p>	<p>Recommendations: 1) instead of promoting payments as a means to change there is a need to build on the capacities and motivation of in-country stakeholders to ensure the maintenance of forest resource systems continues over the long-term; 2) Support beneficiary countries sustain Programme results through clearer longer-term funding commitments to maintain international and national structures, and support local TA; 3) support calls for the development, regulation, and performance of carbon markets; 4) sustainable resource governance should build on lessons learned to improve socio-ecological outcomes (forest management and governance, conservation, poverty alleviation, integrated agriculture, rural development, structural reforms, or risk management)</p>

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
9	2015	Policy Board, (2015). UN-REDD Programme Strategic Framework 2016-20. UN-REDD Programme, UNREDD/PB14/2015/III/3.	http://www.unredd.net/index.php?view=document&alias=14096-un-redd-pb14-2015-strategic-framework&category_slug=session-3-strategic-and-policy-issues&layout=default&option=com_docman&Itemid=134	The strategic framework forms the basis of a programme document that will be finalized and approved in accordance with the agreed governance arrangements of the UN-REDD Programme from 2016 to 2020. As part of this process a results framework will be developed.	WO	Strategic framework 2016-2020 incorporates lessons from 2008-2015
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
9.1	<p>Key elements: 1) ToC revised as follows: Goal: reduce forest emissions and enhance carbon stocks in forests while contributing to national sustainable development. Main actions: ensure that REDD+ readiness processes culminate in the establishment of an institutional landscape where national capacities have been developed such that flows of REDD+ RBPs will be managed in an effective, transparent and equitable manner; Assumptions (if GHG emissions are to be reduced and carbon stock increased: a) political commitments to REDD+ are consistent with national sustainable development strategies; b) political will and finance support REDD+ process and address drivers of deforestation and degradation; c) multi-stakeholder engagement in consultative process at the national level; Desired outcomes: a) REDD+ contributes significantly to mitigating climate change based on following outputs: i) countries have technically and economically sound national REDD+ strategies and action plans integrated into national development plans; ii) countries address, respect and report on application of the Cancun safeguards (through Safeguards Information System);iii) countries enhance social and environmental benefits through stakeholder validated analysis of REDD+ (food, water and energy security, green economic growth, etc.); b) Country contributions to the mitigation of climate change through REDD+ are measured, reported and verified based on institutional framework established to obtain following outputs: i) maintain national forest monitoring systems (NFMS); ii) estimated forest reference emissions levels (FREL/FRL) are submitted to the UNFCCC in accordance with requirements to access results-based payments (RBPs) from the UNFCCC financing mechanisms; iii) Countries produce estimates of emissions and removals associated with their REDD+ activities that are consistent with their FREL/FRL and their land-use GHG inventories in compliance with UNFCCC; c) REDD+ contributions to the mitigation of climate change are implemented and safeguarded with policies and measures that constitute results-based actions (RBAs). Institutional framework in place to obtain following outputs: i) REDD+ policies and measures (PAMs) implemented and generate emissions reductions while capturing lessons learned for subsequent improvement of the National Strategy/Action Plans; ii) access and disburse REDD+ finance (RBF); iii) Cancun Safeguards integrated in relevant policies, laws and regulations and reported to UNFCCC in accordance with procedures;</p>			<p>Recommendations: 1) Ensure countries are in driving seat in developing REDD+ (through capacity development and effective multi-stakeholder participation); 2) Do not adopt a "one-size-fits-all" approach to developing REDD+ but rather tailor TA and funding to needs of each country (also in synthesis report and call-off 2 and 3); 3) establish transparent forest MRV systems to improve understanding on performance Budget to fulfil outcomes estimated at USD 300 million; 4) Carbon values is not sufficient to alter land use, budgetary and NRM decisions and practices. Instead REDD+ must be linked to national sustainable development agendas (through which focus on priority forested areas and livelihoods can be made); 5) REDD+ should have a cross-sector approach to involve other institutions than Min of Environment/Forestry to address the drivers of deforestation and degradation; 6) Apply risk management to take into account the time it may take to address the drivers of deforestation and promote green growth (cultural shift); 7) participation of all stakeholders (men and women) is essential in decision-making at all levels to increase credibility of REDD+; 8) REDD+ should not be viewed as a benefit-sharing scheme but part of a broader national transformation process to improving land management and mitigating climate change; 9) Key to advancing REDD+ is clarifying land tenure to ensure customary rights of IPs FDCs are fully respected and included in the decision-making process; 10) Development of Safeguards should be included in the national REDD+ strategy and action plan monitored with a small number of significant indicators within a wider results-based monitoring and evaluation framework to chart progress at the country and global levels; 11) Ensure tools and guidelines are universally applied to support decision-making on tackling deforestation/degradation, enhance carbon stocks, improve forest management, etc.; 12) Allocate USD 300 m. to the SF 2016-2020.</p>		

2) Cross-cutting themes fully integrated and reported in relation to above outcomes and outputs to continue to a) build trust and partnerships between government and non-government stakeholders; b) fully integrate participation of IPs and other FDCs in REDD+; c) create multi-stakeholder platforms; d) put vital issues on the agenda (rights to land and natural resources, enact FPIC, governance deficits that lead to deforestation/ degradation and unsustainable management (tenure security is an important enabling condition for REDD+ - also in Call off 3). 3) Principles (UN Development Group): adopting human rights based approaches (HRBA) for programming, with particular reference to the guidelines on IP issues; gender equality; environmental sustainability; results-based management; and capacity development; 4) Management: a) Management Group (MG) will be responsible for joint oversight and consolidated planning, budgeting and results-based reporting for the entire Programme; b) strategic group (SG) formed by senior representatives of the three UN agencies to oversee inter-agency cooperation and provide strategic guidance; c) Secretariat will facilitate overall coordination and support the operation of the MG and the Programme's governance mechanism; d) collaboration with FCPF GCF and GEF will be strengthened; e) inter-agency country support teams will be established to be led by one UN-REDD Programme adviser; f) Alignment of financial and administrative arrangements between the three agencies accompanied by unified contractual and reporting arrangements; g) enhance dialogue with FIP on cooperation at the country level; 5) Communication and knowledge sharing improved aided by the REDD+ Academy and online learning platform.

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
10	2016	Clarke, Mikkolainen, P., Camargo, M. and Elhassan, N. The Second Program Evaluation of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). Helsinki: Indufor	https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/fcp/files/2016/Nov/Second%20FCPF%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report%20Nov%202016%20%28ID%2094139%29.pdf	This is a near end-of-fund evaluation of the CBFF. This Final Evaluation Report is based on the findings from the Portfolio Performance Review (PPR), the Organisation and Management Performance Review (OMPR) and the Case Studies Report. It provides an overarching analysis of the how the CBFF portfolio of projects and the CBFF governance structures contributed to achievement of the fund's objectives and results. The findings from this evaluation will inform decision making at the executive level and will help to ensure accountability and lesson learning at the project level and among implementing partners and project grantees.	CICERO	Triangulated evidence available
Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)				Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
10.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) A key strength of the FCPF has been the common structure it has contributed to readiness work, e.g., by providing templates, tools and knowledge-sharing. However, it is also noted that the existence of different environmental and social safeguards in different programs (e.g. FCPF, FIR, UNFCCC, UNREDD) has been a challenge for implementation and created concerns about additional work burdens. The evaluation remarks that the FCPF's role as a standards setter in readiness work was perhaps of particular importance in the phase prior to the adoption of the Warsaw framework under the UNFCCC. (CICERO comment: If supported by other findings, this may suggest that a review of NICFI's portfolio to ensure alignment with most recent UNFCCC guidance might be worth considering.) 2) Land tenure is viewed as an important prerequisite for successful implementation of REDD+, but is also seen as "highly sensitive political issues in most REDD countries". Evidence reviewed in the evaluation process suggests that insufficient attention was paid to issues of tenure rights within the FCPF. (This is supported by a review of country submissions to the Carbon Fund that was published after the evaluation period but is nevertheless noted in the report - see: Rights and Resources Initiative, "Community Rights and Tenure in Country Emission Reduction Programs: Status and Risks for the FCPF Carbon Fund". Washington, D.C., 2016.)			None		

<p>10.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) The FCPF has made efforts to ensure high levels of stakeholder engagement at all levels. This has resulted in improved participation especially at the global level. Should continue working to involve multi-sector stakeholders on the country level. 2) It has been challenging to reach advanced stages of readiness in individual countries as well as on portfolio level. Disbursement rates for readiness implementation have been significantly lower than initially expected and results-based finance was yet to be delivered by the time of the evaluation. Disbursement rates at country level were slowed down due to, among other factors, long approval processes, technical review processes, and difficult due diligence and safeguard requirements. 3) Some weaknesses identified in the program evaluation are linked to recommendations from the first evaluation that were not followed up - such as a formal knowledge-sharing and communications strategy and poor engagement with the private sector. 4) The Common Approach for Environmental and Social Safeguards (i.e. between FCPF and UNREDD) contributed positively to the program's effectiveness by allowing support to REDD countries to be channelled through multiple Delivery Partners (beyond the World Bank)</p>	
<p>10.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: 1) "The FCPF has not managed to attract private sector interest and engage effectively across the portfolio." It is noted that this is a common challenge across the REDD+ landscape, and not specific to the FCPF. The evaluation points out that to the extent FCPF processes have leveraged finance from other sources, this is primarily (and in several countries exclusively) finance from multilateral initiatives such as FIP and UN-REDD, and bilateral sources such as NICFI. 2) The sustainability of results in terms of quantified emission reductions from the FCPF Carbon Fund is called into question by the evaluation report: "It is unclear to what extent the FCPF will reduce emissions in the long term, as it has yet to pilot the legal aspects of its incentive mechanism (i.e. ERPAs)." (CICERO comment: This concern is even more relevant in a post-Paris context, as REDD+ countries are now taking on national obligations in the form of NDCs that may have implications for the ownership and transferability of emission reductions achieved through REDD+. There are ongoing discussions about the ramifications of this, apparent, for example, in NICFI's commissioning of an "Options Assessment Report" from the Meridian Institute about this and related topics.)</p>	<p>Recommendation: Create a "private sector program" to improve private sector engagement. The program could be run under the umbrella of the GCF Private Sector Facility or similar organizations.</p>

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
11	2007-2017	Annual Budget propositions from 2007-2017, (in Norwegian)	https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/innstillinger/stortinget/2014-2015/inns-201415-009.pdf	Annual Budget propositions from 2007-2017 allow the evaluation to assess trends in NICFI funding which can be cross-referenced with other documents assessed by the evaluation team	CICERO	Secondary sources: Findings seem (among other sources) to be based on review of evaluation reports, most of which are analyzed separately within this matrix.
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
11.1	<p>A. Policy relevance: 1)</p> <p>2007-2008: Halting tropical deforestation portrayed as measure that can give fast reductions in GHG emissions 2008-2009 (the MFA submission, particularly mentioned in ToR): Halting tropical deforestation portrayed as measure that will (my emphasis) give fast reductions in GHG emissions. Sustainable development and poverty reduction stated as important goals (since the funding comes from the ODA budget, and climate change and poverty are interlinked). Biodiversity and indigenous people's rights stated as important co-benefits in addition to GHG emissions reductions, "triple win". Norway's Bali pledge mentioned as very important for the dynamics in the run-up to COP 15 in Copenhagen.</p> <p>2009-2010: Largely following the same line as the previous years, stating that Norway will continue its program, and that Norway is a frontrunner in this field.</p> <p>2010-2011: Largely following the same line as the previous years, stating that Norway will continue its program, and that Norway is a frontrunner in this field.</p> <p>2011-2012: Largely following the same line as the previous years, stating that Norway will continue its program. Climate adaptation mentioned as a target.</p> <p>2012-2013: Largely following the same line as the previous years, stating that Norway will continue its program and upscale the funding.</p> <p>2013-2014: Largely following the same line as the previous years.</p> <p>2014-2015: Stating that Norway will continue its program for the budget year 2014-2015, and expects that international REDD+ funding will increase by appr. 14% from 2013 to 2014.</p> <p>Innst. 9 S – 2014–2015: NICFI still perceived as a very central policy instrument for climate and development goals. But must take a broader view than incentivizing, and also help bring about reforms, take into account non-carbon benefits, etc.</p> <p>2015-2016: For the first time the climate effect of NICFI is estimated: a reduction of 40 million tonnes of CO2 in 2016. It is stated that NICFI funding is reported as ODA. It is also stated that NICFI contributes to sustainable development.</p> <p>2016-2017: It is stated that NICFI (in combination with other measures Norway funds outside its borders, such as energy) contributes to global reduction of GHGs, and climate adaptation. It is stated that such measures are a central part of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and will be followed up in the coming years. In line with steering signals from the Government and Parliament, Norway has entered into agreements that emphasize payment for verified emissions reductions. In 2017 it is suggested ("det legges opp til") that Norway pays for about 40 million tonnes of CO2 in emissions reductions, mainly in Brazil, Colombia and Guyana.</p>			Not applicable		

11.2	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1)</p> <p>2007-2008: - none</p> <p>2008-2009 (the MFA submission, particularly mentioned in ToR): It is listed how NICFI spreads its funding: (Brazil, UN-REDD, African Development bank (Congo basin), Tanzania), but not how that affects efficiency and effectiveness. It is stated that Norway's engagement in REDD is based on REDD being an efficient and cost-effective measure. MRV stated as important.</p> <p>2009-2010: Largely following the same line as the previous year, stating that NICFI shall be an efficient and cost-effective measure.</p> <p>2010-2011: Largely following the same line as the previous years, stating that NICFI shall be an efficient and cost-effective measure.</p> <p>2011-2012: Largely following the same line as the previous years, stating that NICFI is an important measure as tropical deforestation causes 17% of global emissions.</p> <p>2012-2013: Largely following the same line as the previous years.</p> <p>2013-2014: Largely following the same line as the previous years.</p> <p>2014-2015: Largely following the same line as the previous years, stating that NICFI is an important contribution to the international effort of curbing tropical deforestation.</p> <p>Innst. 9 S – 2014–2015: Results of NICFI so far have in sum been good. NICFI perceived as a very important policy instrument for its objectives, incl. sustainability. Points to importance of linking to green growth, and cooperation with the private sector. The committee has noticed the two evaluations of NICFI released in 2014, it supports the government's proposed revised strategy, and recommends increased attention to the following issues: the importance of indigenous people's role in protecting forests, a broad REDD+ approach incl. safeguards (rights, sustainability, better coupling to foreign affairs policies and better operationalization of these), improved governance, national approaches (incl. limiting sub-national approaches), increased support to civil society, Norwegian presence in collaborating countries and the importance of gender issues.</p> <p>2015-2016: In the budget proposition it is suggested ("det legges opp til") that Norway pays for about 40 million tonnes of CO2 in emissions reductions.</p> <p>2016-2017: It is stated that NICFI (in combination with other measures Norway funds outside its borders, such as energy) contributes to global reduction of GHGs, and climate adaptation. It is stated that such measures are a central part of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and will be followed up in the coming years. In line with steering signals from the Government and Parliament, Norway has entered into agreements that emphasize payment for verified emissions reductions. In 2017 it is suggested ("det legges opp til") that Norway pays for about 40 million tonnes of CO2 in emissions reductions, mainly in Brazil, Colombia and Guyana.</p>	Not applicable
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11.3

C. Sustainability: 1)

2007-2008: -

2008-2009 (the MFA submission, particularly mentioned in ToR): It is acknowledged that NICFI entails a lot of risk (remote areas, governance, corruption, strong commercial interests etc.), and that patience, long-term perspectives and willingness to trial and failure are important elements in NICFI. It is stated that broad international cooperation is important to succeed, and that Norway aims to carry out its policies in cooperation with other countries and organizations. Australia, the UK and Germany mentioned as important actors. A condition for the Norwegian engagement is that adequate mechanisms for transfer of big funds for forest measures/policies are established, for instance through the UN or the World Bank. Gender issues mentioned as important.

2009-2010: Upscaling of the budget, as pledged.

2010-2011: Upscaling of the budget, as projected (relatively small increase, 60 million NOK).

2011-2012: Upscaling of the budget, as pledged (increase of 387 million NOK).

2012-2013: Upscaling of the budget, as pledged (increase of 400 million NOK).

2013-2014: Largely following the same line as the previous years.

2014-2015: Upscaling of the budget (increase of 134 million NOK).

Innst. 9 S – 2014–2015: The committee supports an increase in funding for NICFI up until 3 bn NOK in 2015, and that funding shall be kept at that level until 2020.

2015-2016: It is stated that the NICFI budget has de facto grown by an average of 21.5% annually in the period 2009-2013, and it is expected that the budget will increase on average 9% annually in the period 2013-2016. It is stated that NICFI contributes to sustainable development.

2016-2017: It is stated that the NICFI budget has de facto grown by an average of 21.5% annually in the period 2009-2013, and it is expected that the budget will increase on average 3.6% annually in the period 2013-2017. It is stated that NICFI contributes to sustainable development. It is also stated that NICFI (in combination with other measures Norway funds outside its borders, such as energy) contributes to global reduction of GHGs, and climate adaptation. It is stated that such measures are a central part of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement, and will be followed up in the coming years. In line with steering signals from the Government and Parliament, Norway has entered into agreements that emphasize payment for verified emissions reductions. In 2017 it is suggested (“det legges opp til”) that Norway pays for about 40 million tonnes of CO2 in emissions reductions, mainly in Brazil, Colombia and Guyana.

Not applicable

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
12	2015 & 2016	Annual reports from NICFI	https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/klima-og-miljo/klima/klima-og-skogsatsingen/kos-innsikt/statusrapport/id2440215/	Annual reports provide an insight into progress as seen by NICFI and NICFI thinking on future programming and planning	CICERO	Secondary sources: Findings seem to be largely based on review of evaluation reports, most of which are analyzed separately within this matrix.
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
12.1A	<p>A. Policy relevance: 1) 2014: It is stated that Norway has been leading in developing the REDD+ mechanism under the UNFCCC. Deforestation is described as a market failure, and one must get the incentives (NICFI) right for diverse actors (governments, private sector, forest dwellers). It is also a governance challenge. Each country's government must decide what are the right policies/measures (including combinations of carrot (e.g. financial incentives) and stick (e.g. regulations)). Experience shows that the most important measures/policies are land-use planning, sorting out land tenure (incl. indigenous peoples' rights), fighting illegal deforestation, involvement of affected groups in land use decisions. For the private sector, reputational risk, market access and stable supply chains are important incentives, along with CSR. Refers repeatedly to the Norad RTE reports and the Lash-report, e.g. regarding progress towards overall objectives. Norway's efforts on consensus-building on MRV and reference levels is emphasized as important. Emphasizes a phased approach with compensation for verified emissions reductions from the forest sector as the ultimate target. Repeats result-based approach as an important principle. Acknowledges that funding can come from a wide array of funding sources, and that the Green Climate Fund can become an important mechanism for channelling result-based financing. REDD+ finance needs upscaling, including outside the UNFCCC. REDD+ negotiations have brought important discussions regarding biodiversity and indigenous people's rights into the UNFCCC, and NICFI has been an important catalyser in this work. CSO funding has been important for giving civil society experience with REDD+ and increased capacity to take part in the climate negotiations. Norway has been open to input from CSOs. The report emphasizes the importance of interlinks between climate change and development (green growth, clean energy, reduced deforestation, reduced emissions from agriculture). Results are preferably measured in verified emissions reductions, but also implemented measures such as political reforms, legislation and inclusive decision making. NICFI is reported as ODA. Work on governance improvements important, such as building of administrative institutions, expertise and capacity, arenas for consultation, availability of information as well as legislation, policy development and political reforms: these issues are necessary preconditions for developing and implementing REDD+ in the respective countries, for legitimacy, and for result-based payments. Indigenous people's rights important, as well as support for CSOs (for different functions, such as capacity building, "watchdogs", implementers etc.). Quote (translated): "Strengthened competence and capacity are often crucial for local people and organizations to be able to participate in decision-making processes that concern them. The effects of capacity building in society are just as often difficult to say anything certain about. However, the evaluation [RTE] points out that support for civil society has contributed to important capacity building at the local and national level." Gender equality stated as important and where NICFI makes an effort, but it also challenging, and in need of increased attention.</p>			Not applicable		

12.1B	<p>2015: NICFI is (strongly) coupled to development, SDGs and Paris Agreement, incl. carbon neutrality and the necessity to curb deforestation in order to fulfil the targets in the Paris Agreement. (National) governments are ultimately responsible for achieving results, but support from local communities, interest organizations and the private sector is crucial. In 2015, a lot of effort was put on enabling indigenous peoples to participate in preparations to the Paris meeting (also in cooperation with UNDP): necessary for the achievements. Also increased cooperation with the private sector (large food chains, agribusiness, and investors) crucial and has resulted in success (ref. to the New York declaration on supply chains). Still only Brazil and Guyana receive result-based payments, but Colombia and Ecuador report reductions in deforestation. More countries in the NICFI portfolio. Forest fires in Indonesia troublesome, but has generated media attention, and political attention (moratorium for conversion of land on its way, Norway has promised economic support). More focus on alternative sources of income (which do not lead to deforestation) for forest dwellers.</p> <p>(Almost) translated quote: "All of the NICFI partner countries have challenges in governance. Several countries must be regarded as vulnerable states with histories of conflicts, strong social and political opposites, a fragile democracy and weak public institutions. The alignment of cooperation with partner countries reflects this reality. Therefore, Norway supports partner countries' work on policy design, legislation and reforms; building and strengthening of administrative institutions, expertise and capacity; disclosure of information, and strengthening and involvement of civil society. These are necessary prerequisites for a country to be able to design and implement the national REDD + work in a proper manner and be able to receive performance-based payments." Good governance etc. also prerequisite for improved cooperation between NICFI and the private sector.</p> <p>(Almost) translated quote: "Support for improving the governance of our partner countries must be catalytic. It will contribute to political processes, cross-sectoral cooperation and reforms in natural resources and land management." Peru and Indonesia mentioned as examples.</p> <p>(Almost) translated quote: "Ultimately, efforts for better governance in natural resource management in general, and in the forest sector in particular, is a contribution to state-building and a just and climate-friendly development in tropical forest countries. This work requires predictability and a long-term perspective, both from Norway and our partner countries. The major payments, which are an important incentive for forest countries, will first come when the results exist. That is, when deforestation is actually reduced, as has happened in the pioneer country of Brazil."</p> <p>Separate chapter on the importance of cooperating with the private sector.</p>	Not applicable
12.2A	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) 2014: The report states that previous evaluations converge in concluding positively regarding NICFI's significance and goal achievements. Cooperation with tropical forest countries lead to emissions reductions and progress in the climate negotiations, and the international community gains practical experience in reducing deforestation and forest degradation. The current cabinet has emphasized cooperation with the private sector (also recommended by the Norad RTE and the Lash-report), increased collaboration with other donor countries regarding payment for verified emissions reductions, and effective and result-focused implementation of NICFI. This report should be understood as a response to prior evaluations encouragement to improve the reporting from NICFI. Refers repeatedly to the Norad RTE reports and the Lash-report, e.g. regarding progress towards overall objectives. NICFI support, both through the Amazon Fund and the CSO scheme, has contributed to give people alternative sources of income, such as non-timber products. NICFI has also been important in safeguards related to biodiversity. Norway has played a considerable role in bringing about major REDD+ decisions in the UNFCCC, incl. the Paris Agreement. Objective number 1 of NICFI (the inclusion of REDD+ in an international climate policy regime) is considered met with the Paris Agreement.</p>	Not applicable

12.2B	<p>2015: NICFI has been important for the achievements in the Paris Agreement. Together with partner countries, NICFI has shown that reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation can be combined with economic development and increased welfare. "Formidable" results of NICFI the last years and confidence in future possible results. Norad's RTE shows that NICFI promotes poverty reduction and strengthens governance (including economic governance), which contributes to positive results in climate policies. Brazil's reduction in deforestation put forward as one example of NICFI's results, quote: "Norway has paid 200 million of these tons."</p>	Not applicable
12.3A	<p>C. Sustainability: 1) 2014: Corruption and illegal logging are risks to NICFI, important focus area, together with biodiversity and safeguards in general. CSO support important in this work.</p>	Not applicable
12.3B	<p>2015: In Paris, Norway announced it would prolong NICFI until 2030 and its agreement with Brazil until 2020. It was also announced that Norway would cooperate with Germany and the UK for building a REDD+ programme in Colombia. Together with Germany and the UK Norway announced 5 bn USD until 2020 in support for countries that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation through the REDD+ framework.</p>	Not applicable

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
13	2009-2016	<p>Annual "Results reports":</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Norad 2009 results report - no mention of NICFI or REDD+ - Norad 2010 results report - no relevant mentions - Norad 2011 results report - no relevant mentions - Norad 2012 results report: General description of NICFI and REDD+, case study on Amazon Fund. No new relevant findings/lessons. - Norad 2013 results report - no relevant mentions - Norad 2014 results report: Case study on AMAN's role in Indonesian constitutional court case - Norad 2015 results report: Case study on women's participation in REDD+ process in PNG <p>Annual evaluation reports:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Norad 2009 evaluation report: No relevant mention of REDD+ or NICFI - Norad 2010 evaluation report: Summarizes main findings from first real-time evaluation of NICFI (document #1 - LTS) - Norad 2011 evaluation report: Summarizes general PES/REDD findings from the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie). One relevant finding reproduced to the right (item 1) - Norad 2012 evaluation report: Summarizes findings from evaluation of NICFI civil society support (LTS) - Norad 2013 evaluation report: Summarizes findings of evaluation report on NICFI reporting/verification (document #5 - LTS) - Norad 2014/15 evaluation report: Summarizes findings from real-time evaluation synthesis report (document #6 - LTS). Findings highlighted as "strategic" are reproduced to the right (items 2-5). - Norad 2015/16 evaluation report: Summarizes findings from real-time evaluation report on literature review and programme theory (AECOM). Findings are reproduced to the right (items 6-13) 	<p>Norad annual "Results reports" and annual "Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation" reports for the period 2009-2016 primarily summarize other evaluation reports and studies - many of which are also included elsewhere in this matrix. They provide Norad's overview of REDD+ and NICFI which lessons are highlighted.</p>	CICERO	<p>Secondary sources: Findings based on review of evaluation reports, most of which are analyzed separately within this matrix.</p>

No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)	Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)
13.1	<p>1) Payments for environmental services work but watch out for adverse and spillover effects. REDD/PES programs need to be embedded in larger national systems which track overall deforestation at a regional or national scale instead of using a project-based accounting system. (From 2011 evaluation report, based on 3ie findings.)</p> <p>2) The multilateral partners are increasing the number of countries in their portfolio. Some of these receive results-based payment but many show little progress. Before including more new countries, the reason for the lack of progress should therefore be analysed.</p> <p>3) The lack of security in connection with REDD+ financing poses the greatest risk for future results. More attention to costs and to the capacity for maintaining the various systems are required as well as an analysis of the magnitude of future financing within REDD+.</p> <p>4) REDD+ as results-based financing is probably not viable in all countries.</p> <p>5) The strongest progress within REDD+ has taken place in countries in which there is national political support and where interventions to decrease deforestation were in place before the agreement with Norway was entered into. Norwegian funding in the shape of results-based disbursements were not a decisive economic incentive but had a politically motivating impact on ongoing activities as well as opening up for new activities.</p> <p>6) The climate and forest initiative is "well under way" in making its overarching theory of change more concrete, but it still has some way to go with regard to concretizing its programme theories at the country level.</p> <p>7) Planning and coordination under the REDD+ initiative are progressing, but an investigation is needed into whether the coordination between donors and actors can be improved.</p> <p>8) Use of local community surveillance of deforestation and forest degradation is increasing, and this is a cost-effective means of exercising surveillance of forest resources.</p> <p>9) The factors required to ensure that result-based disbursements function according to intention are seldom present.</p> <p>10) There is limited evidence that REDD+ has resulted in major behavioural changes.</p> <p>11) There is little documentation of the use of impact analyses in REDD+ projects.</p> <p>12) Reform of land ownership rights is important if REDD+ is to succeed.</p> <p>13) There is a need to further develop the framework for measuring, reporting and verifying results achieved.</p>	Not applicable

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
14	2015	Real Time Evaluation: Call-off 1	https://www.norad.no/contentassets/a9fc17536e8a4fc6947f0e7a04eb8a6b/real-time-evaluation-of-nicfi-literature-review-and-programme-theory.pdf	Two studies conducted: Study A – to review and summarise research relevant to REDD+ and identify the gaps where more research/evaluation is needed. Study B – to consider the program theory/ theories behind NICFI/REDD+ and assess the extent to which the current intervention theories and design of NICFI show the conditions necessary, as stated in previous studies, to achieve its objectives. This includes an assessment of the degree to which the program/intervention theory or theories are built on available research based knowledge and includes findings from study A	WO	Review of literature already available (includes documents in this evaluation)
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
14.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) tracking expenditure of NICFI at the national level in areas such as MRV is difficult to identify (also identified in Call-off 3); 2) reviews of readiness processes demonstrate progress in planning, coordination and demonstration activities, but less on tenure, MRV, finance, benefit-sharing systems, policies and laws and institutional building; 3) Transferable lessons from PES, CDM, FLEGT, etc. to REDD+ are limited (due to ?); 4) REDD+ has increased global discussions on tenure, rights, forest benefit-sharing, etc. which has led to agreement on the need to improve land use planning and management in REDD+ countries; 5) knowledge sharing and participation are key to improving equity; STUDY 2: 1) ToC for NICFI-REDD+ is still unelaborated at the critical level of national agreements; 2) results based payments take time to work (especially the transition from a non-conditional aid context to a more precise pay for performance context), but NICFI has applied unrealistic time periods to achieve its expected outcomes (rather than as a long-term initiative) especially where RBP is not sated to some countries/situations.			Recommendations: 1) there is a need to develop ToC at the country level to clarify sequencing of activities, outputs and expected outcomes; 2) reduce the use of intermediaries in delivery by working more directly with private, non-governmental sectors to improve efficiency effectiveness and sustainability of REDD+ activities.		
14.2	B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) Progress is evident in planning, coordination and demonstration activities, with community-based monitoring clearly on the rise and promoted as a cost-effective way of measuring and monitoring carbon emissions; 2) Land tenure is a key topic in REDD+ but has not seen much pragmatic change across REDD+ countries; 3) Benefits sharing mechanisms are also pending clarification in many countries with regards to how funds or facilities are structured effectively; 4) Information on Safeguards, including what safeguards exist, how they are implemented and how they are monitored, remains weak in all countries; 5) effectiveness is affected by inadequate attention given to cultural changes needed before the drivers of deforestation/degradation can be dealt with; 6) governance and social challenges dominate REDD+ literature in which the key focus is on establishing MRV rather than its challenges and gaps; 7) Some REDD+ projects have managed resources efficiently by training villagers, IP and FDCs which has increased ownership (best practice Guyana); 8) it is difficult to identify value for money provided by NICFI before the cost associated with emissions reductions can be known;			Recommendations: 1) more studies needed on how to enhance effectiveness through building on a) coordination between upfront funding to forestry and forest governance versus results based programmes of the donors, b) integrating safeguards in MRV; c) capacity building in local and national institutions; d) specific studies such as action research study of REDD+ in Indonesia; e) cross-cutting study on key factors enabling results-based payments to work under REDD+ (includes setting up appropriate financial mechanisms and programme portfolios); f) whether recipient v co-investor paradigms suit current NICFI priority areas		
14.3	C. Sustainability: 1) Too much attention is given to MRV and carbon emissions rather than on avoiding leakage and ensuring their sustainability. This is not aided by difficulty in tracking expenditure at the country level; 2) moving from a hands-off funder to co-investor has been impeded in some cases by inclusion of intermediaries (?) and pay for performance paradigm (as opposed to co-investment paradigm).			Recommendations: 1) REDD+ should be used to create incentives to create local, green economies with local benefits; 2) Enhance opportunities for sustaining MRV systems by increasing capacity at the local level to develop community-based monitoring systems that also facilitate equitable engagement of women and other marginal groups (youths); 3) identify and communicate transferable lessons that make results-based payments work (win-win).		

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
15	2017	RTE Call-off 2: An evaluation of co-ordination within and across multilateral and bilateral partners (focuses on Indonesia, Liberia and Peru)	Forthcoming	Provides evidence-based conclusions and lessons learned on the current level of coordination between multilateral funding channels used by NICFI (in particular the FCPF, FIP, BIOCEF-ID-SL and UNREDD in 3 case study countries - Indonesia, Liberia and Peru). Note TL supported production of final draft report and worked with Norad on finalising conclusions and recommendations. Interviews were also conducted in Peru during the Call-off 3 evaluation (which also included Peru and Indonesia)	WO	Triangulated evidence available (Report not yet approved – hence in red)
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
15.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) coordination of UNREDD and FCPF remains highly relevant if NICFI is to meet its objectives; 2) There is high dependency on Informal coordination of their funding mechanisms at the country level in order to move the REDD+ agenda forward; coordinating and reporting on NICFI-specific funding through multilateral channels is low and this reduces scope for coordination at the country level (where reporting on NICFI expenditure is generally not required); 3) Lack of standardised monitoring and reporting on progress and performance of FCPF, FIP BioCF-IFSL, UNREDD at the country level has reduced the relevance of REDD+ within the wider national development objectives (Peru, Indonesia); 4) Coordination capacity is limited in most countries and this detracts from effective coordination of multilateral and bilateral channels (e.g. Liberia has almost no capacity to implement REDD+ at the local level)			Recommendations: 1) Intensify efforts to develop formal dialogue mechanisms with partner countries by establishing a permanent national coordination unit for REDD+ with staff and budget (based on multi-sectoral representation); 2) Use bilateral funding to support the development of the coordination unit; 3) Ensure NICFI and other key donors assign a focal person to work in all priority partner countries to support coordination and application of the REDD+ process; 4) ensure the focal persons identify all gaps relating to policy, legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks in each partner country in order to support the beneficiary country make informed decisions on advancing REDD+ Ensure NICFI and other key donors assign a focal person to work in all priority partner countries to support coordination and application of the REDD+ process; 4) ensure the focal persons identify all gaps relating to policy, legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks in each REDD+ partner country.		
15.2	B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) NICFI's use of multi-lateral channels has sparked a plethora of formal and informal dialogue and interchange of knowledge on implementing REDD+ aided by formal coordination mechanisms between NICFI Secretariat and FCPF and BioCF-IFSL in World Bank WDC, or through NICFI reps in some consulates or embassies (Indonesia); 2) effectiveness of multilateral (and bilateral) coordination at the country remains inadequate (resulting in delays) due the lack of a national entity assigned with the resources and authority to coordinate them and monitor progress; 3) Some REDD+ countries (e.g., Peru) rely on informal coordination to move the REDD+ agenda forward (due to inadequate formal coordination mechanisms); 4) coordination between UNREDD's main implementing partners and other development partners indicates they work together (defining scope of work and institutional levels of engagement); 5) there is no conclusive evidence as to the efficiency of multilateral channels in delivering results with NCFI funding as there is no separate accounting of NICFI funds; 6) political changes, high staff rotation, lack of domestic resources and insufficient engagement of local experts has affected efficiency and reduced institutional memory on REDD+ (Peru); 7) Independent decision-making within the World Bank on the management of some projects directly or through regional development banks has confused some beneficiary countries and contributed to delays (Peru); 8) UNREDD and FCPF and FIP do not apply the same standards when measuring environmental and social Safeguards which confuses beneficiary countries as to how they should be measured.			1) NICFI should explore the opportunities to simplify and standardise procedures and rules governing the use of funds through the FCPF, FIP and BioCF-IFSL channels and work towards aligning them with its bilateral assistance to meet NICFI/REDD+ objectives; 1) NICFI coordinator in each partner country should encourage the beneficiary government to establish specific working groups to manage and coordinate different aspects of climate and finance cooperation such as relating to land titling, developing the forest economy and developing effective forest management and governance		
15.3	C. Sustainability: 1) Not assessed in the evaluation			Recommendation: not assessed in the evaluation		

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
16	2017	RTE Call-off 3: An evaluation of empowerment of indigenous peoples and forest dependent local communities through support to civil society organisations	To be published 11. October 2017	Provides evidence-based information on key findings and lessons learned on the contribution of bilateral funding through the CSD Rounds to support the empowerment of IPs and FDCs to take on a more active role in REDD+. Note TL was a senior expert in Call-off 3 and produced the final draft report after meetings with Norad in June 2017	WO	Triangulated evidence available
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
16.1	A. Policy relevance: 1) Although there is a common understanding on the instrumental value of empowerment of IP/FDCs (Ministry of Climate and Environment, Norad and the vast majority of CSOs) in reducing green house gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation the intrinsic value remains at most implicit in NICFI's theory of change; 2) recognition of the territorial rights and access to forest goods and services is a crucial ingredient in the empowerment of IP and other FDCs and their role as effective guardians of forest resources; 3) the specific thematic area "Securing Indigenous and Other Forest-dependent Populations' Rights and Initiatives", under NICFI's Round III for CSOs (2016-2020), has strengthened the relevance of NICFI to IP and FDCs in advancing their territorial rights; 3) the lack of adequate baseline data, intermediary progress indicators and analytical work, in particular at the country level continues to hold back learning and reporting of progress and achievements; 4) the absence of gender equality, in particular relating to women and youths, as an explicit cross-cutting NICFI objective reduces the scope of empowerment among IPs and FDCs and constrains the learning process.			Recommendations: 1) Prioritize analytical work that draws on information at the country level, in the interests of identifying lessons learned and good practices to support programming and facilitate project implementation and monitoring; 2) Create a dedicated funding window for direct financing of IP and FDC organizations at the country level based on minimum standards.		
16.2	B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: 1) The lack of reporting by grant recipients on the use of NICFI funds at the country or thematic levels inhibits evaluation of how much of NICFI funding trickles down to the country level; 2) A number of IP and FDC organizations are evolving as a viable channel to manage NICFI resources directly, but this has not been addressed in the risk management applied in CSD Round III for the period 2016-2020 and this reduces the scope for NICFI to empower IPs and FDCs at less cost (main risks related to weak internal planning and organization, inadequate leadership skills and transparency in decision-making); 3) the ability and willingness of the CSO and other NICFI implementing partners to take up a coordination role between NICFI and other donor-funded projects is a major determinant in the efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI funding at the country level; 4) NICFI has empowered IP/FDC organizations to participate actively in policy dialogue at the local, national and international levels to defend their territorial rights and interests, but this has generally not translated into the necessary policy, legal and institutional reforms relating to their rights (in particular on land tenure); 5) The empowerment of IP and other FDC organisations is generally more effective when NICFI mobilises CSOs whose core objectives are dedicated to developing their internal capacity to advocate their rights and interests (as opposed to natural resources management of nature conservation); 6) CSOs are generally unable to document reductions in deforestation or improvements in livelihoods despite increased participation and empowerment. This is not aided by both a lack of standard procedures to monitor report and verify deforestation or conservation of forested territories and specific requirements from NICFI as to aggregating and reporting such data at the national level.			Recommendations: 1) Develop more effective monitoring of results at the country level including baseline data, output and outcome indicators and targets (preferably those set by the country); 2) Strengthen Norad's information base concerning the tracking of expenditure and assessing the value added of the supported interventions at the country level (in particular focusing on complementarity of NICFI funding channels and the trickle down levels at the country level.		

16.3

C. Sustainability: 1) CSOs whose core interests concern the empowerment of IP and other FDC organisations have generally not yet prioritised the transfer of skills to such organisations to both tap NICFI funds directly and generate their own income from the forest economy; 2) The employment of iNGOs and other CSOs under the NICFI CSD funding rounds (or through UNREDD in countries such as Indonesia) has contributed to a growing dependency, both between IPs/FDCs and CSOs, and CSOs and Norwegian funding, that risks the sustainability of activities funded by NICFI; 3) The inadequate gender focus in NICFI reduces the opportunities of sustaining the empowerment process of IP and FDCs (and in optimising the development of the forest economy); 4) the constraints in the learning process (due to gaps in horizontal and vertical exchange of experience-based knowledge and information at the country level, and between the country level and Oslo) reduces the scope to learn lessons and up-scale good practices that are conducive to sustaining NICFI-funded actions.

Recommendations: 1) Strengthen knowledge and information sharing between stakeholders at the country level, and the country level and Oslo as a means to fully align its programme priorities with policy and legal context and specific needs in the partner countries; 2) Fully integrate gender equality as a cross cutting objective in all thematic areas of NICFI funding

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
17	2012	Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative Lessons Learned from Support to Civil Society Organisations	https://www.norad.no/globalassets/import-2162015-80434-am/www.norad.no-ny/filarkiv/evalueringsavdelings-filer/evaluation-report-civil-society_climate_and_forest_initiative-2012.pdf	The evaluation draws lessons learned from NICFI's support to CSOs in: 1) improving the prospects of the inclusion of a REDD mechanism in a post-2012 climate regime; 2) the preparation of mechanisms and implementation of activities to attain verifiable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions; 3) the conservation of natural forests to maintain their carbon storage capacity; 4) meeting the general objectives of Norwegian development cooperation (improving livelihoods, economic and social development and the environment).	CICERO	YES
Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)				Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
17.1	<p>A. Policy relevance:</p> <p>There are two major issues identified at portfolio level that require attention. The first is the potential benefit of a strategic approach to management of the portfolio, which was not done in respect of the current projects, but is clearly indicated in the latest call for proposals and the rules for these project (sic). The second relates to knowledge management, which is closely linked to reporting systems. While current reporting is good for contractual purposes it seems less useful in providing results and transferring knowledge to Oslo, consequently limiting easy access by the Climate and Forest Initiative to the valuable information that has been obtained and not making the scope and extent of this information readily available to the Norwegian public. Despite not being designed in this way, most of the projects in the portfolio are in fact well-aligned with one or more of the NICFI objectives (Finding 1). This in part is due to the process of contract negotiation during which tightening was possible. A number of supported organisations regard REDD+ as an opportunity to pursue their own agenda, which is not a problem provided the common interests are served (Finding 4) but in a minority of cases action is needed to optimise the contribution to NICFI Objectives from supported activities (Finding 21). In most cases, approaches to improved governance are being tackled by projects more broadly than simply for REDD+, which given the current uncertainties over the way in which international and national REDD+ policies will develop is appropriate (Finding 3); several projects have usefully linked governance for REDD+ with that for the EU Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade programme. In all the countries visited, projects showed good alignment with national REDD+ efforts (Finding 5) which has undoubtedly been instrumental in most projects securing good national ownership (Finding 6). The Portfolio is both thematically and financially additional at sub-national and local levels, although less so at national and international levels, with the project funds often being only a small proportion of the funding available to the grant holder, especially the large INGOs (Finding 9). Most grant holders, and especially the INGOs, have adopted a programmatic approach, with the supported project being subsumed into this (Finding 2). Although this approach provides potential added value to the funding (Finding 25) it also creates difficulties with reporting and, especially, attribution. The issue of programmatic approaches incorporating project funding is one that arises when INGOs receive grants, which may only contribute a very small proportion of the overall programme budget. INGOs bring added value (Finding 8) from their experience and awareness of REDD+ (Finding 10) and also through their ability to provide support to their in-country partners (Finding 22). INGOs also engage in substantial strategic thinking around REDD+ (Finding 35) although in counter to this, they tend to have their own strategies and because they may be in competition with each other, this may inhibit the possibilities for joint action between them.</p>			<p>Recommendations (cut and pasted from chapter 9)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NICFI Secretariat and Norad should consider changing the management structure. A new structure might include a steering committee (MoE, MFA, Norad with co-opted specialists as required) and a full-time programme management team headed by a person with good knowledge of REDD+ and development programmes supported by a staff of around five technical and administrative personnel, all of whom are fully employed in the management of the CSSS without other responsibilities. The steering committee members should be able to provide adequate time to prepare for and attend regular meetings to discuss plans and progress in detail. The programme management team should undertake regular field visits to ongoing projects and optimise the value of these around relevant project meetings or similar events. • The reporting system for all projects needs to be revised to provide for results-based reporting or an equivalently informative system at the request of the grant holder. Proposals pre-contract need to be consistently framed, especially on budget items which also need to specify separately proposed expenditure by country where projects work across more than one. • Noting that many of the supported projects are delivered as part of a wider programme, consideration should be given to how handle financing and reporting of projects that follow this model given that there is interdependence between the CSSS funded 'project' and the rest of the programme. . At the same time, an appropriate methodology should be developed for attribution of impact to CSSS from activities that draw on pooled funding. 		

17.2

B. Efficiency and effectiveness of NICFI: Projects working on governance appear to be valuable in promoting an enabling environment for REDD+ (Finding 12). The strong focus on safeguards, particularly social safeguards and notably those relating to rights of indigenous people and forest dependant (sic) communities has provided a valuable contribution (Finding 14) and this has been valuable for the development of National REDD+ strategies, particularly in respect of safeguards (Finding 16). Advocacy has been successful in triggering relevant legislative changes (Finding 13). Both of these findings can be linked to credibility and value placed on NICFI supported CSO actors by governments (Finding 7). Overall, there has been valuable building of local and national level civil society capacity (Finding 18), transforming partners into REDD+ actors with clear roles at a range of scales. Although relatively few in number, the supported research projects have generated, or are expected to do so, internationally relevant technical developments (Finding 20). The demonstration activities have trialled a range of market-based and other approaches to sub-national REDD+ implementation, leading to a foundation from which approaches to scale-up may be drawn at the national level and methodologies might be synthesised and agreed and standards drawn at the international level (Finding 15). Projects active at the local level have supported community development, empowerment and tenure rights, which should provide the groundwork for local communities and forest dependent indigenous peoples to engage with REDD+ and become REDD+ actors (Findings 17 and 19). The demonstration activities provide important inputs in relation to biodiversity and gender aspects of REDD+, which are not addressed elsewhere in the portfolio (Finding 19). The demonstrations also provide the only examples of engagement with the private sector within the portfolio, although this is limited (Finding 19). The partnerships that have been created within the supported projects are, with few exceptions, strong and efficient (Finding 23) although there is room for wider collaboration (Finding 24). At national level, the coordination of portfolio activities is mixed and there seems to be limited coordination with non-portfolio REDD+ activities (Finding 26). Knowledge transfer is generally good within supported organisations but less so externally (Finding 36). There is wide variation between projects on their efficiency in capturing and communicating lessons learned (Finding 29). Linked to this (Finding 30) is that there seems to be no formal process for sharing interim lessons learned with the Norwegian government agencies? It is unclear that all relevant information and published material from the supported projects is adequately available in Oslo (Finding 37). Overall, portfolio level synergies are not being captured (Finding 32). Contractual aspects seem to be well regarded by grant holders (Finding 33) although communications with Oslo were reported as difficult for some. There is a wide range of formality around project monitoring and evaluation (Finding 31), with many grant recipients using results-based systems but then reworking this into the required narrative reporting, (on which there have been misunderstandings as results-based reports with a short narrative section would be acceptable). The question of how to deal with projects that have been integrated into programmes is one that requires more consideration by both parties (Finding 34).

- A knowledge management system needs to be created that provides single point access covering updates on REDD+, project results, publications and other relevant information to users with projects ensuring that all publications are made available. This could be either handled by the NICFI secretariat, with additional resources allocated, or wholly or partly outsourced to a specialist Norwegian organisation working in close collaboration with the secretariat.

- The programme management team should commission, as required, studies, thematic and meta-analyses to ensure capture of information from projects run by different organisations and institutions and to maximise the extent and relevance of lessons learnt and the dissemination of new information. Consideration also needs to be given to in-country coordination of portfolio elements, either with a dedicated person or using an alternative method.

- The strategic thinking being carried out by many of the current project grant holders is a valuable resource that should be investigated, captured and used as part of the ongoing development of thinking around REDD+ and its future development. This requires a dedicated team in Oslo using a range of methods.

- In funding projects and activities that engage local communities

17.3**C. Sustainability:**

[T]he progress of local level pilot and readiness activities is slower than grant recipients anticipated (Finding 11) and demonstration projects carry a risk of causing local level disillusionment with REDD+ if investment falls through (Finding 15). In the face of the uncertainties surrounding the future shape of REDD+, most projects seem to be highly adaptable (Finding 28).

General lessons learned from the evaluation (cut and pasted from chapter 10):

It is clear that the portfolio could have substantial value from the individual projects and from the synergy in terms of experience and lessons being learned in different situations but communication between projects is erratic and the reporting system, while effective for grant management, is not fully geared to a good information flow on findings and outcomes. There still appear to be divergent views between the various agencies involved in Oslo on the objectives that NICFI Civil Society projects should be addressing. Interviews with project personnel confirmed that they found the climate/development balance being sought to be unclear. The evaluation team is surprised at the relatively low proportion of funds devoted to managing the portfolio and concerned that compared with grant schemes of similar value, there are mixed lines of communication and insufficient time available for the people charged with the management to ensure that all parties have reached a clear consensus on aspects of management. A comprehensive set of guidelines for work related to the Climate and Forest Initiative was issued in 2009. Given the complexities of the civil society support scheme and the often new areas being covered in the grants, a "Memorandum of Understanding" that identifies and deals with specific matters beyond those covered in these guidelines might be helpful for all involved. While the programme has provided substantial value, it is notable that while the understanding of the portfolio reached from the desk-study phase gave a rather negative impression, this impression was substantially changed to a much more positive one following the field phase. Given that the desk-study phase was undertaken using information available in Oslo, it is possible that the full value of the scheme is not readily apparent although it is noted that people from all three agencies have visited at least some projects on a fairly regular basis; this should have helped understanding of the real value being delivered. This evaluation can only provide suggestions for action; if a change of approach is contemplated then it is vital it be owned by those engaged in the process of delivering the portfolio and is fully compliant with all relevant rules and regulations. In order to optimise the substantial benefits from the funding, the evaluation team believes that more time for good communication among those involved is required. None of the apparent "issues" noted in this evaluation is irresolvable but resolution cannot be done while the people involved are so diverted by their key responsibilities that there is no time to think, or discuss.

No	Date	Name of Evaluation/Report	Web reference	Justification for selection	Analysis of document	Lines of evidence on lessons learned
18	2012	Independent evaluation of the Climate Investment Funds by CF International (TL Mark Wagner)	https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/opev/Documents/Independent_Evaluation_of_the_Climate_Investment_Funds.pdf	The evaluation assesses: 1) the development and organizational effectiveness of the CIF to 2014 and 2) documents experiences and lessons for the benefit of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Given the above list of documents do not specifically assess the FIP, it is considered important to include this World Bank-funded independent evaluation in the present review given lessons have been drawn on FIP from its analysis. Note: analysis of other funds such as Green Climate Fund will not be included.	CICERO	Triangulated evidence available
No	Summary of main lessons learned (Strategic lessons learned and good practices: strategic alignment of the NICFI funding/policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of NICFI and its partners, risk management and sustainability of the NICFI interventions)			Any other comments (such as key recommendations, risks, etc.)		
18.1	<p>A. Policy relevance: 1) FIP design documents do not clearly define how transformational change is to be achieved. While some FIP interventions are poised to initiate important changes with transformational potential (for example in Burkina Faso and Mexico), many FIP plans fail to show clearly how projects can jointly contribute to sectoral transformation and associated institutional and policy changes, shifts in forest management paradigms, and re-orientation of sector strategies and investment priorities. And demonstrated. More than half of FIP investment plans do not address the strongest drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. 2) The landscape of climate finance has changed since the CIF were founded, and the GCF—the embodiment of the new financial architecture—is approaching operational readiness. The CIF have not yet clarified their interpretation of how and when to exercise the “sunset clause” that provides for the CIF to be discontinued when appropriate mechanisms are in place under the UNFCCC. 3) Ambitious, complex, and innovative projects in the climate realm take time; enabling conditions are important. Innovative new organizations benefit from flexibility to learn and to adapt their procedures and structures.</p>			<p>Recommendations re: 1)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognize that projects and plans focused on transformative institutional changes may not yield near-term carbon or resilience benefits. - Agree on a specific interpretation of ‘transformation’ that focuses on the logic of demonstration effects, lowering technology costs through economies of scale, and removing policy and regulatory barriers. - Ensure that research and learning is geared to identify key barriers to impact and assess the degree to which interventions address those. 		

<p>18.2</p>	<p>B. Efficiency and effectiveness: 1) FIP has built on national REDD+ planning processes and dialogue platforms, and in some countries has contributed to the design of enabling policies and measures. However, more than half of FIP plans do not clearly describe how FIP fits into the broader REDD+ country context, making it difficult to understand how these plans would complement other ongoing and planned efforts. In some countries – notably Indonesia – FIP failed to integrate itself into the national REDD+ process. 2) The CIF's 'light touch' approach relied on the MDBs for supervision, quality control, fiduciary controls, safeguards, and accountability at the project level, with remaining management responsibilities assigned to an administrative unit. However, the 'light touch' was achieved in part by shifting responsibilities elsewhere, and some contributors have devoted substantial effort to review functions. 3) While guidance on consultation processes are better developed in FIP than in other CIF funds and programs, FIP guidelines are ambiguous on whether free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) rules apply to projects affecting indigenous people. Civil society and indigenous peoples have raised concerns on the inconsistency of FIP consultation processes with FPIC. 4) Governance efficiency and effectiveness have been hindered by the CIF's complex architecture. The consensus decision rule, together with the lack of a secretariat with a strong executive function, has hampered efficient decision-making, resulting sometimes in indecision and micromanagement. 5) Half of FIP recipients have not met FIP's indicative timelines for investment plan preparation. To some extent, this reflects a trade-off between quality/extent of consultation and speed of preparation.</p>	<p>Recommendation re: 4) Consensus decision-making has advantages and disadvantages. One way of dealing with this could be to define categories of decisions for which consensus is not required. Recommendation re: 5) Explicitly recognize, and offer guidance on trade-offs among objectives.</p>
<p>18.3</p>	<p>C. Sustainability: 1) The majority of FIP projects depend on continuing external support. If not enough attention is paid to sustainability and bringing in complementary financing from private sector and securing payments for ecosystem and environmental services, many FIP projects risk ending as isolated interventions with limited impact beyond project life or project site. 2) As CIF losses are shared among contributors with different degrees of risk tolerance, the CIF skew towards risk aversion. This has dampened CIF appetite for risky (potentially innovative) private sector projects. 3) There are continuing challenges to incorporate gender perspectives in climate investments. The CIF began without a gender focus, but attention to gender increased over time in investment plans, although not always in consultations. (Note: Applies to CIF generally, not specific to FIR)</p>	<p>Recommendation re: 2) Policy and regulatory reform can remove barriers to private sector investment; programmatic series of policy based loans or grants are one avenue to accomplish this.</p>

Acronyms and abbreviations

BioCF-		GoN	Government of Norway	ToC	Theory of Change
ISFL	BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes	IMAZON	Institute of Man and Environment of Amazonia	ToR	Terms of Reference
CAFI	Central African Forest Initiative	IP	Indigenous People	UN	United Nations
CARPE	Central Africa Regional Programme for Environment	IPBES	Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
CBFF	Congo Basin Forest Fund	MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
CF	Carbon Fund	NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution	UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
CFFSCS	Climate and Forest Funding Scheme for Civil Society	NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	UNREDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
CICERO	Center for International Climate Research	NOK	Norwegian Kroner	USD	United States Dollars
COP	Conference of the Parties	Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation		
CSD	Civil Society Department	NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative		
CSO	Civil Society Organization	OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee		
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo	PMU	Project Management Unit		
EU	European Union	REDD+	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation		
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	R-PP	Readiness Preparation Proposal		
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility	RTE	Real-Time Evaluation		
FDC	Forest Dependent Communities	SDG	Sustainable Development Goals		
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Facility (European Union)	TL	Team Leader		
FIP	Forest Investment Program				
GHG	Greenhouse Gases				
GNI	Gross National Income				

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2010

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- 17.10 Evaluation: Real-Time Evaluation of Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative. Country Report: Tanzania
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- 3.10 Synthesis Main Report: Evaluation of Norwegian Business-related Assistance
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- 2009**
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- 1.06 Synthesis Report: Lessons from Evaluations of Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation
- 2005**
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- 4.05 Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
- 3.05 Gender and Development – a review of evaluation report 1997–2004
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- 3A.02 Évaluation du programme ACOPAMA's programme du BIT sur l'« Appui associatif et coopératif aux Initiatives de Développement à la Base » en Afrique de l'Ouest de 1978 à 1999
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Overview of Policies and Trends 1988–1998
- 1.00 Review of Norwegian Health-related Development
Cooperation 1988–1997

1999

- 10.99 Evaluation of AWEPA, The Association of
European Parliamentarians for Africa, and AEI,
The African European Institute
- 9.99 Evaluation of the United Nations Capital
Development Fund (UNCDF)
- 8.99 Aid Coordination and Aid Effectiveness
- 7.99 Policies and Strategies for Poverty Reduction
in Norwegian Development Aid