

EVALUATION DEPARTMENT



REPORT 13/2018



Photo: Ken Opprann

Evaluation of Organisational Aspects of Norwegian Aid Administration

ANNEX 4-9



Contents

ANNEX 4: INTERVIEW TEMPLATES	2
ANNEX 5: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANISATIONAL DESIGNS OF THE AID ADMINISTRATION IN COMPARABLE COUNTRIES	24
Overall organisation of bilateral DAC donors	24
A comparison of the Norwegian system with the system of Denmark, Sweden, the UK, Canada and the Netherlands	24
Overall organisation of aid administration in OECD-countries	25
Denmark	27
Sweden	28
The United Kingdom	29
Canada	30
The Netherlands	31
ANNEX 6: WHAT HAS GUIDED THE DIVISION OF LABOUR?	32
MDG, Paris, Bussan, Addis and SDGs	32
A strengthened focus on ownership, alignment and harmonization	33
More actors are invited in Accra in 2008	33
Inclusion of south-south co-operation, BRICS and private funders in Busan	33
A widening of scope through the Sustainable Development goals	33
However, recipient orientation has not probably not been strengthened	34
ANNEX 7: CRITERIA FOR SELECTION OF COUNTRIES FOR IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS	36
ANNEX 8: TYPOLOGY OF COUNTRIES	39
ANNEX 9: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS	48

Annex 4: Interview templates



TEMPLATE FOR INTERVIEW GUIDES

Evaluation of organizational aspects of the Norwegian aid administration

EMBASSY EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS



Innhold

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	2
MAPPING CURRENT DIVISION OF LABOR, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES, INCLUDING DELEGATED AUTHORITY	3
1.1. Introduction and background	3
1.2. Roles and types of projects	3
1.3. Questions regarding competence and capacity	4
1.4. Delegated authority (only to personnel with overall responsibility)	4

Introduction and background

Country:
Date:
Location:
Interviewee(s):

This guide gives an overview of the topics that should be covered in the interview. The questions, follow-up questions and the ordering of the questions are suggestive and should be adapted to the responses of the respondent. The purpose is to introduce each topic with a broad, open-ended question, and use follow-up questions (probes) to get more in-depth answers whenever required, but without leading the respondent.

Menon Economics is an economic analysis and consultant company located in Oslo, Norway. We have been commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) to undertake an independent evaluation of organizational aspects of the Norwegian Aid Administration. NCG Norway is a sub-consultant to the assignment. The main purpose of the evaluation is to map the division of labor, roles and responsibilities and delegated authority of Norwegian embassies in development cooperation, and investigate how this has developed since 2004. We will assess and discuss strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the current set-up related to the overall goals of Norwegian development cooperation.

Your responses will be kept strictly confidential. No one outside the evaluation team will have access to your response. The minutes from the interviews are stored in an archive with two-way security authentication. We will delete the minutes when the final evaluation report is accepted by Norad. The final evaluation report will include a list of all interviewees, but specific contributions and quotes will not be linked to those interviewed.

To understand the role of the Norwegian embassies, we are visiting embassies, recipients and other donors in four different countries: Mozambique, Kenya, Ethiopia and Nepal.

Mapping current division of labor, roles and responsibilities, including delegated authority

1.1. Introduction and background

- 1) For how long have you been employed at the embassy?
- 2) For how long have you worked at MFA/Norad
- 3) What kind of work do you do (if any) that is related to development cooperation?
- 4) How large share of your time do you spend on work related to development cooperation?
- 5) What are your responsibilities related to development cooperation? *(unless already covered when discussing development related tasks)*

1.2. Roles and types of projects

We see from the annual plans (virksomhetsplaner) and the project portfolio [if available] that the development cooperation work at the embassy is mainly related to [sectors, thematic areas].

1. Are your tasks particularly related to specific sectors or thematic areas? Are you responsible for specific sectors or thematic areas?
2. In the latest two parliamentary report from MFA there is a description of a broader role of the embassies with more focus on policy dialogue and assistance to Norwegian private sector. How does the embassy follow up on these new signals? Can you point at concrete projects or actions?
3. We see from your yearly dialogue with Norad that you get less assistance than you request. What is the practical implication of this for the implementation of projects?
4. When making decisions on major changes (identification, funding decision, scaling up, reducing, cancelling, postponing etc.) in the projects / program you have responsibility for, which organizational bodies are involved in that decision: (which part of the embassy, MFA, Norad)?
5. Would you say that any of these organizational bodies (embassy, MFA, Norad) has increased their influence on these strategically important issues the last years?
 - a. Which?
 - b. How?
 - c. When?
6. Would you say that any of these organizational bodies (embassy, MFA, Norad) has decreased their influence on these strategically important issues the last years?
 - a. Which?
 - b. How?
 - c. When?
7. Please rate the Regional department at the MFA's quality regarding managing the embassy with respect to strategic issues. 6 is excellent 1 is poor. Additional comments?
8. Please rate the Regional department at the MFA's quality regarding supporting/handling the embassy on more operational issues. 6 is excellent. 1 is poor. Additional comments?
9. When other organizational units are involved in the process, would you say that they contribute to strengthening quality? To what extent do you consider that they contribute to strengthening quality. Please rate from 1-6, where 6 is very much and 1 is insignificant:
 - Different units in MFA
 - Different units in Norad

- Other directorates/ministries
 - Consultants
10. When making these strategically important decisions, to what extent and how does the embassy coordinate with other donors?
 - o Has there been a change over time?
 - In what way?
 - When?
 11. To what extent does the ITC-systems (archives, PTA etc.) contribute to easing cooperation and coordination between different organizational units?
 12. The Ølberg-report has described an overlapping division of labor between Norad and the MFA. Is this creating a challenge for your work at the embassy?

1.3. Questions regarding competence and capacity

13. Did you have experience/training relevant to this work prior to starting this work?
 - a. Development cooperation?
 - b. Thematic sector?
 - c. Administration?
14. If no, has this been problematic?
15. How have you obtained the necessary competence?

1.4. Delegated authority (only to personnel with overall responsibility)

16. We see that the formats of annual plans and reporting of results according to the annual plans have been changed lately. Does that affect your work? In which way? Could you please rate the quality of the process of developing annual plans and reporting of results according to the annual plans as a tool for strategic decision making. 6 is excellent. 1 is poor. Please elaborate on the reason for your rating.
17. Does the Embassy have sufficient flexibility to prioritize the projects that it considers to be most important? Has there been a change in flexibility/autonomy in recent years?
18. Is a trade-off between reaching development goals (SDGs), Norwegian foreign policy interests and recipient country interests?
19. Have you experienced a change in the amount and type of financing for development assistance at the embassy?
 - i. In what way?
 - ii. When?
20. How has this change in financing affected the work of the embassy? Do you think it has affected the development cooperation work at the embassy? How?
21. In sum, as seen from the embassy, do you think roles and responsibilities in development cooperation has changed the last 5-10 years? If yes, what do you think have been the implications for development cooperation at country level?
22. In your view, what are the key lessons learnt from recent experience concerning development cooperation and country presence?



TEMPLATE FOR INTERVIEW GUIDES

Evaluation of organizational aspects of the Norwegian aid administration

DONOR/COLLABORATOR INTERVIEWS



Innhold

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	2
1.1. Introduction of interviewers	2
1.1.1. Introduction of Menon/NOG	2
1.1.2. Introduction of the purpose of the evaluation	2
1.1.3. Introduction of the purpose of the interview	2
1.2. Introduction of respondent	3
2. COOPERATION WITH THE EMBASSY	3
2.1. Relation to the Embassy	3
2.2. Project cooperation	3
3. ASSESSMENT OF COLLABORATION	4
4. PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE EMBASSY	5
5. ORGANIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN YOUR HOME COUNTRY [FOR EMBASSIES OF COMPARABLE COUNTRIES]	6
6. ENDING THE INTERVIEW	7

1. Introduction and background

Country:
Date:
Location:
Interviewee(s):

This guide gives an overview of the topics that should be covered in the interview. The questions, follow-up questions and the ordering of the questions are suggestive and should be adapted to the responses of the respondent. The purpose is to introduce each topic with a broad, open-ended question, and use follow-up questions (probes) to get more in-depth answers whenever required, but without leading the respondent.

1.1. Introduction of interviewers

Interviewers introduce themselves and explain the purpose of the evaluation and the interviews.

1.1.1. Introduction of Menon/NCG

Menon Economics is an economic analysis and consultant company located in Oslo, Norway. We have been commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) to undertake an independent evaluation of organizational aspects of the Norwegian Aid Administration.

1.1.2. Introduction of the purpose of the evaluation

The main purpose of the evaluation is to map the division of labor, roles and responsibilities and delegated authority of Norwegian embassies in development cooperation, and investigate how this has developed since 2004. We will investigate and discuss strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the current set-up related to the overall goals of Norwegian development cooperation.

1.1.3. Introduction of the purpose of the interview

To understand the role of the Norwegian embassies, we are visiting embassies, recipients and other donors in four different countries: Mozambique, Kenya, Ethiopia and Nepal.

The purpose is to learn from your experiences in collaborating with the Norwegian embassy in [country].

There are a number of topics we would like to talk about today:

- Your relation and cooperation with the Embassy
- Your assessment of the cooperation with the Embassy
- If relevant, any thoughts on how the role of the embassy has changed over time

Your responses will be kept strictly confidential. No one outside the evaluation team will have access to your response. The minutes from the interviews are stored in an archive with two-way security authentication. We will delete the minutes when the final evaluation report is accepted by Norad. The final

evaluation report will include a list of all interviewees, but specific contributions and quotes will not be linked to those interviewed.

1.2. Introduction of respondent

Could you please start by stating your position at [name of donor organization]?

For how long have you been employed at [name of donor organization]?

2. Cooperation with the Embassy

2.1. Relation to the Embassy

Could you please tell us about your relation to the Norwegian Embassy?

Examples:

- We have collaborated with the Embassy on designing and funding projects
- We have collaborated with the Embassy on funding projects
- The Embassy has coordinated projects we are involved with, that are funded through other channels
- Other type of collaboration?

2.2. Project cooperation

What kind of projects are you involved in that the Embassy has a role in? Could you tell us a bit more about the project(s)?

- When did it start?
- For how long will it last?
- What is the project budget, and how much is funded by the Embassy?
- What other sources of funding are there?
- What is the objective of the project?
- Who is involved in the project?
- What is the role of the Embassy for this project?
 1. Project design and funding
 2. Funding only
 3. Channeling funding from other sources
 4. Coordination of project partners
 5. Monitoring implementation
 6. Other?

When did you first start cooperating with the Norwegian Embassy? What kind of projects have you collaborated on since then?

Has the type of projects you collaborate on changed over time?

In what way? Why do you think that is?

3. Assessment of collaboration

You stated that you have collaborated with the Embassy on [answers from 2.1].

How would you assess your collaboration?

How would you assess the level of competence relevant to your collaboration, at the Embassy?

- Is the thematic competence at an adequate level?

How would you assess your communication with the Embassy?

- Are your contact persons easy to reach?

Have you ever been in contact with other Norwegian agencies, e.g. Norad, to seek advice or support? Why?

4. Perceived changes in the role of the Embassy

You told us about your history of collaboration with the Embassy from the start of your collaboration in [year of first involvement] until today.

Have you perceived any change in the role of the Embassy over this period of time?

Examples:

- Change in availability of funding
 1. In what way (increased/decreased availability, change in types of funding, funding for different projects)
 2. How has this affected your collaboration?
- Change in types of projects that Embassy is involved in (thematic areas, sectors in focus)
 1. How has this affected your collaboration
- Change in competence and assistance available from the Embassy (increased/decreased availability of relevant competence for your organization)
 1. How has this affected your collaboration?
- Change in where decision authority is placed? E.g. with respect to size of or type of project

5. Organization of development cooperation in your home country [for Embassies of comparable countries]

Could you describe the way ODA is organized in your country?

- What is the division of labor between ministries, directorates, embassies with respect to development cooperation?
- What is the delegated authority of the Embassies – what are their roles, responsibilities and decision power in development cooperation?

6. Ending the interview

Thank you, I don't have any more questions, but is there anything else you would like to tell me?

Explain that the minutes from the interview will be sent to them for approval



TEMPLATE FOR INTERVIEW GUIDES

Evaluation of organizational aspects of the Norwegian aid administration

RECIPIENT REPRESENTATIVE INTERVIEWS



Innhold

1.	INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	2
1.1.	Introduction of interviewers	2
1.1.1.	Introduction of Menon/NGC	2
1.1.2.	Introduction of the purpose of the evaluation	2
1.1.3.	Introduction of the purpose of the interview	2
1.2.	Introduction of respondent	2
2.	COOPERATION WITH THE EMBASSY	3
2.1.	Relation to the Embassy	3
2.2.	Project cooperation	3
3.	ASSESSMENT OF COLLABORATION	5
4.	PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE ROLE OF THE EMBASSY	6
5.	ENDING THE INTERVIEW	7

1. Introduction and background

Country:
Date:
Location:
Interviewee(s):

This guide gives an overview of the topics that should be covered in the interview. The questions, follow-up questions and the ordering of the questions are suggestive and should be adapted to the responses of the respondent. The purpose is to introduce each topic with a broad, open-ended question, and use follow-up questions (probes) to get more in-depth answers whenever required, but without leading the respondent.

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1.1.3. Introduction of the purpose of the interview

To understand the role of the Norwegian embassies, we are visiting embassies, recipients and other donors in four different countries: Mozambique, Kenya, Ethiopia and Nepal.

The purpose is to learn from your experiences in collaborating with the Norwegian embassy in [country].

There are a number of topics we would like to talk about today:

- Your relation and cooperation with the Embassy
- Your assessment of the cooperation with the Embassy
- If relevant, any thoughts on how the role of the embassy has changed over time

Your responses will be kept strictly confidential. No one outside the evaluation team will have access to your response. The minutes from the interviews are stored in an archive with two-way security authentication. We will delete the minutes when the final evaluation report is accepted by Norad. The final

evaluation report will include a list of all interviewees, but specific contributions and quotes will not be linked to those interviewed.

1.2. Introduction of respondent

Could you please start by stating your position at [name of recipient organization]?

For how long have you been employed at [name of recipient organization]?

2. Cooperation with the Embassy

2.1. Relation to the Embassy

Could you please tell us about your relation to the Norwegian Embassy?

Examples:

- The Embassy has initiated and funded projects
- The Embassy has funded projects initiated by others
- Received budget support from the Embassy
 1. If so, how much?
 2. Over how many years have you received this kind of support from the embassy?
 3. Has the amount of support changed over time? In what way?
- The Embassy has coordinated projects that are funded through other channels
- Received other type of assistance (expert advice, human resources, other?)

2.2. Project cooperation

What kind of projects are you involved in that the Embassy has a role in? Could you tell us a bit more about the project(s)?

- When did it start?
- For how long will it last?
- What is the project budget, and how much is funded by the Embassy?
- What other sources of funding are there?
- What is the objective of the project?
- Who is involved in the project?
- What is the role of the Embassy for this project?
 1. Project design and funding
 2. Funding only
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 4. Coordination of project partners
 5. Monitoring implementation
 6. Other?

When did you first start cooperating with the Norwegian Embassy? What kind of projects have you collaborated on since then?

Has the type of projects you collaborate on changed over time?

In what way? Why do you think that is?

3. Assessment of collaboration

You stated that you had received support for [answers from 2.1].

How would you assess support you got?

- Budget support: was it sufficient?
- Project support: amount of economic support, quality of other support
- Coordination support: quality, accessibility, communications

How would you assess the level of competence relevant to your collaboration, at the Embassy?

- Is the thematic competence at an adequate level?

How would you assess your communication with the Embassy?

- Are your contact persons easy to reach?

How would you assess the reporting requirements for the projects funded by the Embassy (*if relevant*).

- Too demanding, adequate, relaxed compared to other donors

Have you ever been in contact with other Norwegian agencies, e.g. Norad, to seek advice or support? Why?

4. Perceived changes in the role of the Embassy

You told us about your history of collaboration with the Embassy from the start of your collaboration in [year of first involvement] until today.

Have you perceived any change in the role of the Embassy over this period of time?

Examples:

- Change in availability of funding
 1. In what way (increased/decreased availability, change in types of funding, funding for different projects)
 2. How has this affected your work?
- Change in types of projects that Embassy is involved in (thematic areas, sectors in focus)
 1. How has this affected your work?
 2. Have you adjusted your projects to adapt to this change?
- Change in competence and assistance available from the Embassy (increased/decreased availability of relevant competence for your organization)
 1. How has this affected your work?
- Change in where decision authority is placed? E.g. with respect to size of or type of project

5. Ending the interview

Thank you, I don't have any more questions, but is there anything else you would like to tell me?

Explain that the minutes from the interview will be sent to them for approval

Annex 5: A comparative analysis of organisational designs of the aid administration in comparable countries

Overall organisation of bilateral DAC donors

In recent years there has been a trend towards merging directorates and government bodies specialised in aid and development assistance into Ministries of foreign affairs. Such mergers have taken place in Canada and Australia, and according to Gulrajani (2018) there is now talk of reform of development agencies in the USA and the UK, “once again centring on the possibilities of merging development and foreign affairs departments” (Gulrajani N. , 2018). For instance, the new administration in the USA issued an executive order in March 2017 that asks USAID to submit plans to improve its efficiency, accountability and effectiveness. A merger with the State Department is one option – albeit a suboptimal one according to a Congressional task force (Gulrajani N. , 2018)¹. Furthermore, in Denmark, focus on finding mutual gains in implementing foreign policy and development policy has been highlighted. With reference to chapter 3.3, the trend towards integration can be seen as part of a broader trend merging different organisational units with different goals into one in order to have a more coherent and co-ordinated response to issues going across several political goals. In the next sections we will shortly present the overall organisation of aid administration in different OECD-countries and assess strengths and weaknesses of different models.

A comparison of the Norwegian system with the systems of Denmark, Sweden, the UK, Canada and the Netherlands

With reference to the *purpose of the evaluation* we should identify relevant evaluations of decentralisation and delegated authority in the management of development co-operation in comparable countries/organisations, regarding country presence and role of embassies/field offices and discuss findings in relation to the Norwegian set-up. We have used the following criteria for selecting comparable countries:

- countries that increased the role of embassies as Norway did in 2004
- countries that give substantial development assistance as per cent of GDP
- Countries that Norway has a close relationship with and has co-operated with in the field of development assistance
- Differences with regards to the organisational structure (Ministry vs directorate)

Based on this, we have selected Denmark, Sweden, Canada, the UK and the Netherlands for the comparative analysis. The organisational structure and the autonomy of the embassy is provided in Table A.4.

Table A.4: Characteristics regarding the organisational structure and the autonomy of embassies

	Denmark	Sweden	UK	Canada	Netherlands	Norway
Integration of foreign and development policy implementation	Integrated	Disintegrated	Dis-integrated	Integrated	Integrated	Integrated
Policy implementation anchored in long-term strategy	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No
Duration of long-term strategy	5 years	5 years	3-5 years		Unknown	
Level of financial	DKK 10 million	SEK 80 million	GBP 20 million	Decisions must be	Unknown	NOK 10 million

¹ As the US has more than 20 agencies that together constitute the development architecture, a consolidation appears necessary to improve “resource optimization and policy coordination” (Konyndyk & Huang, 2017).

autonomy at embassy level

approved by Ministry

In the following sections, we will shortly present the aid management system at an overall level and the level of autonomy at embassy level for decisions on projects and programs. In all the countries of comparison, the level of autonomy in embassies is clearly anchored in and limited by long-term country strategies. Therefore, we also present the duration of the long-term strategy and the level of autonomy the embassy has on financial issues within the strategies.

In the comparison, we will focus on the organisational design and how this affects the delegated authority of embassies. The comparison is based on OECD DAC peer reviews, interviews with representatives of embassies in in-depth countries and a working paper from ODI (2015) on the issue.


Overall organisation of aid administration in OECD-countries

The report *“Managing Aid: Practices of DAC Member Countries”* (OECD, 2009) lists four main organisational models of how DAC member countries organise development aid. As all DAC countries see development co-operation as part of foreign policy, the main feature separating the models is the status of the ministry of foreign affairs in the individual countries. These “archetype” models are:

1. The ministry of foreign affairs takes the lead and is responsible for policy and implementation.
2. A development co-operation directorate or agency within the ministry of foreign affairs leads and is responsible for policy and implementation.
3. A ministry has overall responsibility for policy and a separate executing agency is responsible for implementation.
4. A ministry or agency, other than the ministry of foreign affairs, is responsible for both policy and implementation.

Faure, Long & Prizzon (2015) group OECD countries in these four organisational categories. Their categorization is presented in Figure A.1:

Figure A.1: Institutional structures for managing aid across DAC donors (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015)²



Norway is placed into category one, together with Denmark. In the OECD’s view, development policy and foreign policy are fully integrated within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Norad is a technical directorate responsible to the MFA. The OECD emphasises that the actual organisation in each country is the product of unique political environments, tradition and governance mechanisms. Similar structures may thus work differently in different countries, depending on for instance public sector management practices.

OECD (2009) does not attempt to conclude whether one specific institutional model is better than another in the delivery of effective development assistance. However, the report refers to an earlier exercise, namely *“Effective*

² Updated version of OECDs original (OECD, 2009), where more recent updates are taken into account

Aid Management. Twelve Lessons from DAC Peer Reviews” (OECD, 2008), that is as close to a description of “good practice” as OECD is likely to venture.

Is one model better than others?

One paper from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in 2015 studies the relationship between aid quantity and aid quality indicators, and the different institutional and political models for development co-operation, directly (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015). The study uses the same 4-tier classification as described by the OECD above. Norway is still grouped together with Denmark as having integrated development fully into the MFA – while most of the countries fall within models 2 and 3. The UK is the only donor with a separate ministry (model 4).

Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the four models, the report summarizes as follows with regards to Norway’s model 1:

Strengths

- Greater policy coherence for development for the policy areas falling under the same ministry (traditionally foreign affairs and sometimes trade).
- Better co-ordination between decision-making and implementing activities and direct access to in-country information that can be fed into the design of policies.

Weaknesses

- Foreign and commercial policy interests may take precedence over development interests. Multiple priorities for a single minister who oversees the work of the whole Ministry for Foreign Affairs and/or Trade.
- Staff posted in-country tend to be generalists with little specialist knowledge of development issues.
- Development specialists may receive little recognition for their expertise and have limited career prospects in ministries where generalist skills are valued more, increasing turnover and leading to a loss of in-house expertise.

The report then tries to correlate the four models with several international indices for performance in terms of aid quantity and quality indicators³ (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015). This analysis finds that

- DAC donors following model 1 show the highest overall score (although with increasing variation in performance in recent periods).
- Model 4 (the UK) is the second-best performer, and its performance has been trending upwards.
- With some more recent exceptions, model 2 outperforms model 3 over the sample period.

³ Mergers occur primarily to improve efficiency, performance and ensure better policy coherence. Gulrajani asks if these objectives are achieved in practice, looking at the Canadian and the Australian examples (Gulrajani N. , 2018). Accepting that it may be a little early to pass full judgement, the article finds the following:

- **Efficiency:** Administrative costs as a percentage of gross official development assistance fell in both Canada (5.2% to 4.6%) and Australia (6.5% to 5.2%), from 2013 to 2015. However, it is pointed out that increased use of private contractors for program delivery may have just shifted the cost from the “administration” to the “program” side. Efficiency improvements may be the result of policy changes as much as the merger itself, but the expectation that costs are reduced has “... to some degree, been realised in the Australian and Canadian examples.”
- **Effectiveness:** Perhaps better, but difficult to prove. Gulrajani (2018) uses the Commitment to Development Index (CGD, 2017) to assess aid quality. Australia scored approximately the same in 2017 as it did in 2013, while Canada improved slightly. It is difficult to attribute changes to reorganisation alone, and other aspects of development administration – like whether there is cabinet-level political representation – may be more important than the formal structure itself.

Policy coherence: *Not all see this as necessarily positive, as some development practitioners according to Gulrajani (2018) worry that self-interested foreign affairs departments will downgrade prioritization of the world’s poor. Others argue that better coherence means that a nation’s entire policy arsenal can then be used to address global development challenges. Gulrajani finds little evidence either way in relation to improved “policy coherence”. However, studies of the Canadian merger (PSAC, 2015) indicate that post-merger culture clashes may have prevented practical collaboration, thus leading to limited progress of a coherent whole-of-government agenda*

Denmark

In Denmark, policy development and policy implementation are integrated in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Danida, a former independent organisational unit under the Danish MFA, was integrated into the MFA in the 1990 (Danida, 2018). Denmark decentralised authority to embassies in 2003, just one year before the reform in the Norwegian aid administration. The decentralisation meant that additional tasks were transferred to Danish embassies, especially for identifying and preparing country programmes.

While major policy issues and final funding decisions remain in Copenhagen, Danish embassies have a key role in preparing new programmes. According to the OECD-DAC peer review of Denmark (2016), recent budget cuts have heavily affected organisational capacity, putting Denmark's highly decentralised model for development co-operation at risk (OECD, 2016). Danish government is pursuing to draw more synergies from Danish development co-operation and the AFA's Danish Trade Council, as well as with external departments and institutions, IFU and Denmark's Ministry for Business and Growth.

In Denmark, the development co-operation is integrated in the MFA⁴, which takes the lead and is responsible for policy of implementation (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015). The highest-level representation in government is shared cabinet minister – Minister of Trade and Development Co-operation, MFA. Denmark's development co-operation is handled within the MFA through Danida (Danish International Development Agency), which has responsibility for the planning, implementation and quality assurance. The funds are also managed by Danida.

In 2003, Denmark's bilateral development co-operation in programme countries was decentralised, where the multilateral programme was partly decentralised in 2005. The decentralisation meant that additional tasks were transferred to Danish embassies, especially for identifying and preparing country programmes. While major policy issues and final funding decisions remain in Copenhagen, Danish embassies have a key role in preparing new programmes. When a programme is approved, embassies have complete freedom to manage it, including reallocating part of the funding (up to 10% in aid volume) whenever necessary (OECD, 2007).

The MFA has been undertaking significant staff reductions (9%) in 2016 and 2017, largely falling on MFA staff working on development co-operation in line with the budget cuts to Danish bilateral and multilateral ODA allocations. At the same time, the proportion of local staff in priority countries and territories is increasing relative to posted officers. With fewer staff overall, getting the right skill into the right place is a challenge. The changing composition of Danish development co-operation comes with a demand for new technical competences, but it also brings a shift away from aid programme management skills towards generalist and diplomacy skills (OECD, 2016).

Level of autonomy at embassy level

All Danish development co-operation is anchored in Country Policy Papers with a duration of 5 years. In the guidelines for development of the Country Policy Papers it is stated that:

“The Country Policy Papers provide a single integrated presentation of Denmark's policy towards a given priority country which encompasses Denmark's entire engagement and strategic direction in a country, i.e. foreign and security policy, development co-operation, humanitarian aid and commercial relations. The Country Policy Paper provides the strategic direction for all parts of Danish development co-operation. The draft Country Policy Paper will normally be prepared in parallel with the concept note for the country programme, and the two documents will be presented to the Programme Committee as a package. The Country Policy Paper reflects joint strategy processes, including where relevant drawing on the EU Joint Framework Document and building on Joint Programming Documents, where applicable”.


In pursuit of long-term results, it is the priority, to the extent possible, to support development of partners' capacity by using partner plans, procedures, budgets, monitoring frameworks and organisational set-ups.



⁴ From 2011 to 2015, the MFA was headed jointly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Co-operation (until 2014) who was later replaced by the Minister for Trade and Development. After the 2015 elections, the new government united its foreign affairs, trade and development portfolios under the responsibility of one minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The development and approval of country strategies is clearly anchored in the Danish MFA. The process of approval of programs is illustrated in Figure A.2. As seen in the figure, all decisions on programs that exceed 10 million DKK must be approved by the Minister for Development.

Figure A.2: Process of approval of programs in Danish MFA



Once the program is running, the embassy however has the autonomy to reallocate funds within the program at a maximal amount of 39 million DKK.

Sweden

In Sweden, the MFA has overall responsibility for policy and a separate executing agency is responsible for implementation. The MFA is responsible for Sweden’s development policies and management, and the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida) is the main agency responsible for implementing those policies and strategies. SIDA is managing both bilateral and multilateral development assistance. Support is anchored in 3-5 years strategies and the SIDA-office at embassies has the ability to reallocate funds for less than 50 million SEK without involving the HQ at SIDA.

The governmental development budget draft is jointly developed by the MFA and Sida (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015). SIDA (the Swedish International Development Agency) is a government agency working on behalf of the Swedish parliament and government, with the mission to reduce poverty in the world (Sida, 2018).

The MFA manages the four agencies implementing development policy. Sida is the largest of the four and disburses over 80% of Sweden’s bilateral aid. In 2006, the MFA restructured. It is not clear if the MFA’s ambition to lead Swedish development co-operation and to play an increasingly important role on the international stage can be fully achieved with the current resources. In late 2008, Sida also restructured, still in its early stages in 2009. While in headquarters the aim is to establish a clearer division of labour between the MFA and Sida, in the field the objective is to achieve an integrated team. Sida staff may be based in-country or at headquarters; staff at headquarters may be members of more than one country team, which can make line management complex but may facilitate sharing lessons (OECD, 2009).



Level of autonomy at embassy or SIDA country office level

Sweden has made some progress in decentralising its development co-operation by delegating financial authority to more field offices. Once a co-operation strategy and overall resource envelope have been agreed

with headquarters, the ambassador or country director has in most cases the authority to agree disbursements up to a ceiling of 50 million SEK (USD 7.5 million). Above 50 million SEK, decisions are referred to the Sida department director in headquarters. Sweden is also trying to decentralise by posting more staff to the field. However, the proportion of staff located in the field, whether employed by the MFA or by Sida, has not notably increased since the last peer review. In 2008, roughly 30% of all Sida staff were in the field (OECD, 2009).

The United Kingdom

In the UK, the Department for International Development (DFID) is responsible for both policy and implementation. Decentralisation on the agenda. The Head of Office at the different DFID country offices has the authority to delegate up to GBP 20 million.

Organisation:

In the UK, a ministry or agency other than the MFA is responsible for both policy and implementation. The highest-level representation in government is Dedicated cabinet minister – Secretary of State for International Development. The Department for International Development (DFID) is both the policymaking and implementing body. It has more than half of its staff working in field offices. DFID has its own budget separate from the Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) that covers nearly 90% of the UK’s ODA. For other ministries who disburse ODA, it is taken out of their departmental budget (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015).



Based on its business principle of “closeness to the client”, DFID has continued its emphasis on operational decentralisation to the field since the last Peer Review, where its 51 country offices benefit from substantial delegated authority and half of DFID staff resources are located overseas (OECD, 2009). International and British development agendas have been characterized by a regular process of change. To adjust to this environment, DFID needs co-ordinated strategic planning and a system ability to renew the internal skill mix flexibly and to assign staff relatively quickly. The doubling of aid by 2010, expectations of greater engagement in the more difficult fragile state environment and the donor trend toward more effective field approaches indications that staff requirements could shift significantly (OECD, 2006).

Level of autonomy at embassy level

DFID country offices have a significant autonomy, where decentralisation is a cornerstone in their philosophy. Country offices are responsible for preparing the country plan; implementing, monitoring and reporting on the plan, and to promote coherent UK policy and taking appropriate action if programme objectives require attention. In addition, DFID has strengthened its country planning process. In early 2008, a Country Planning Review Committee (CPRC) was formed, replacing the Quality Assurance Group. The committee reviews country plans before being submitted to ministers (OECD, 2009).

Progress have been made in decentralising development co-operation, by delegating more financial authority to DFIDs country offices. The Head of Office is delegated authority up to GBP 20 million (OECD, 2009). This is a substantial increase since the last peer review in 2006, where the Head of Office was delegated financial authority up to GBP 7.5 million per action (OECD, 2006).

Canada

Canada has a concentrated system for managing aid. CIDA has the main responsibility for managing Canada's ODA, and was amalgamated into the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Ministry in 2013. Measured in number of employees, the HQ level in Canada is quite large compared to employees at embassy level on development issues. The HQ has high involvement in implementation decisions at country level. The level of autonomy at embassy level is therefore quite restricted. Employees at embassies working on development issues report to HQ level in Canada, not to the ambassador. Canadian development assistance was previously anchored in long-term strategies. However, after integration of CIDA into the ministry, they shifted to one-year strategies. According to interviews, they are now planning to return to long-term strategies.

In Canada, a development co-operation directorate or agency within the MFA leads and is responsible for both policy and implementation. The highest level of representation is Shared cabinet minister – Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Ministry. The Canadian Development Agency (CIDA) was amalgamated into the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Ministry in 2013. The minister with responsibility for international development derives his powers from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The development budget is included in the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Ministry budget (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015).

The task of managing Canada's ODA rests mainly with CIDA, which is a department within the ministry. In 2007, 1852 of CIDA's staff (1 852) were concentrated at headquarters. 132 Canada-based staff were in field missions, supported by 166 locally-engaged personnel. CIDA started the process of recruiting and training generalists who can move from one work area to another in headquarters (OECD, 2007).

Canada's system for managing aid is more concentrated than most DAC members'. In 2010/11, 68% of its ODA was managed by a single agency, CIDA, and 98% of its ODA was concentrated in just five departments. While the proportion of Canada's ODA managed by CIDA is less than in the last peer review (75%), the Agency remains responsible for the bulk of Canadian development and humanitarian assistance. There has been some change to Canada's development co-operation system since its last peer review in 2007, mostly concerning CIDA. They include certain structural modifications and the launches of the Business Modernization Initiative (reengineer its processes to ensure consistent and efficient delivery of programming for better development results), incorporating decentralisation of operations. Since the last peer review, CIDA has embarked on a five-year decentralisation plan (2010-2015), with the objective to enhance field presence and achieve Canada's aid effectiveness agenda (OECD, 2012).

Level of autonomy at embassy level

Measured in number of employees, the HQ level in Canada is quite large compared to employees at embassy level on development issues. The HQ has high involvement in implementation decisions at country level. The level of autonomy at embassy level is therefore quite restricted. Employees at embassies working on development issues report to HQ level in Canada, not to the ambassador. Canadian development assistance was previously anchored in long-term strategies. However, after integration of CIDA into the ministry, they shifted to one-year strategies. According to interviews, they are now planning to return to long-term strategies.



The Netherlands

The Netherlands has one of the most concentrated system for managing development co-operation among the DAC members. It is an integrated system, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the hub of Dutch development co-operation. There has been a decentralisation of the organisational structures in the previous years, where the embassies have been delegated significant authority, also related to financial decision-making.

In the Netherlands, a development co-operation directorate or agency within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads and is responsible for both policy and implementation. The Netherlands is under the same model as Canada. The highest-level representation in government is Shared Cabinet Minister – Minister of Foreign Trade and Development co-operation and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Faure, Long, & Prizzon, 2015).

Of all the DAC members, the Dutch system for managing development co-operation is one of the most concentrated. Almost all its ODA is merged within one ministry. In 2011, the ministry was directly responsible for 87% of the Netherlands’ development co-operation, an increase of 7% since 2006 (OECD, 2011). The Directorate General for International Co-operation (DGIS) is, within the Ministry, the organisational heart of much of Dutch development co-operation (OECD, 2006).

In 1996, major increases in delegation of management responsibility was assigned to the embassies, after introduction of reforms. A more decentralised system gave the embassies responsibility for policy dialogue with partner country governments and other donors, formulation of Dutch country and sector policy, and implementation and financial management within the “delegated funds”. Further on, the MFA decided to move further in the decentralisation process by increasing the resources for which financial authority is decentralised to the embassies (OECD, 2006).

Level of autonomy at Embassy level

The Ministry has delegated significant authority to the embassies and decentralised its staff. Around 40% of development-related staff are located in headquarters, and 60% in the field. The delegated authority includes full responsibility of the embassies for their programmes. These programmes account for around one-third of the Netherlands’ bilateral aid. In addition, in agreement with headquarters, the embassy teams have the authority to approve financial disbursements to partners based on strategic four-year (the MASPs) and annual plans. The delegation of co-operation funds to embassies allow Dutch funding to be flexible and responsive. The field teams are given the flexibility to decide when and how to disburse funds and can also decide to re-direct support if circumstances change (OECD, 2011).



Annex 6: What has guided the division of labour?

In this annex we will focus on evaluation question 3, namely:

“Which major types of arguments and reasoning have guided the division of labour and current roles and responsibilities assigned to the embassies since the reform?”

In this regard we would illustrate that the 2004-reform was anchored in a view that developing countries needed to have ownership to own strategies and that donors needed to help fund these strategies. In this regard donor co-ordination was essential. Furthermore, we will describe how international declarations tried to strengthen the recipient orientation. After the financial crisis in 2008, more international focus has been on results and measuring results, as well as a move towards thematically oriented assistance. After a sharp increase in refugee-inflow in Europe after 2014, substantial focus has been on handling the challenge as well on as security issues. We argue that this has led to a decreased role of embassies as the main implementing organisational unit for development assistance among donors. Last in the we would show that a shift from a geographical towards a thematical focus is in line with a general trend in Norwegian central public administration.

MDG, Paris, Busan, Addis and SDGs

In the autumn of 2000m world leaders met in New York and adopted the UN Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). According to White Paper 35 (2003-2004) “The Millennium Development Goals target specific, time-limited, measurable results and define the major unsolved tasks: to eliminate poverty and starvation, to ensure universal education, to promote gender equality, to reduce infant mortality and maternal mortality, to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and other diseases, and to protect the environment. The eighth Millennium Development Goal particularly concerns the global partnership for development that is necessary if the goals are to be achieved”.

To achieve the MDGs the White Paper (Ibid) pointed at need for ownership by developing countries to their own strategies and the need for donors to co-ordinate in the financing of the strategies. According to the White Paper 35 (2003-2004), there were in the late 1990`s a growing international realisation that the developing countries “own their development processes themselves...” and that “aid recipients would have to take genuine responsibility for the results of measures financed from development assistance funds if they were to be sustainable, and recipients must also have enough economic and administrative elbow-room to fulfil their responsibilities. This led to an orientation away from donor-controlled projects towards sector programmes and budget support, whereby countries take responsibility for their own development (page 8)”. Furthermore: “The global changes that have taken place in development co-operation also entail a deeper realisation that development is not created by project-based aid, whereby foreign expertise builds up the infrastructure in a developing county and more or less “puts it on the right track”, which it is then expected to maintain itself. This concept has proved to work badly and has led to many “white elephants” (i.e. major projects that have proved to be unsustainable). A fundamental understanding has gradually arisen that a country’s development is primarily the result of the quality of its own policies and of its depth of ownership of these policies. Development can only be created in and by the developing countries themselves. It is the country’s own citizens and politicians that must decide how their future is to be formed.”

In this regard, co-ordination between donors was a necessity, amongst other to identify which areas to support if budget support was not given, or to align input or reactions on implementation. “The ECON report” (2003) puts it this way:

“The new development approach implies a next step in integration of development-focused embassies. In future, the main responsibility for both formulating (and linking the Norwegian efforts with the national priorities) and implementing development co-operation has to rest at the embassy level. The eyes and ears of the embassy are closest to the country reality and best placed to seize new opportunities and support long term engagements. This implies a shift in focus and account ability from headquarters (NORAD and MFA in Oslo) to embassies. In addition to normative work, a critical role of the Oslo-based administration is to assist, serve and advise the embassies and ensure that bilateral co-operation is consistent with broader regional approaches. These processes of change challenge existing competencies and skills mix in Oslo as well as at the embassy level.”

A strengthened focus on ownership, alignment and harmonization

In 2005 the focus on ownership, alignment and results were strengthened through the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005). In addition, the declaration has a strengthened focus on results and measurement of results. In the declaration the donors agreed to implement the following five principles and established a monitoring process for donors and recipients to hold each other accountable:

- **Ownership:** Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption
- **Alignment:** Donor countries align being these objectives and use local systems
- **Harmonization:** Donor countries co-ordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication
- **Results:** Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured
- **Results:** Donors and partners are accountable for results.

More actors are invited in Accra in 2008

In the third declaration on aid effectiveness, made in Accra in 2008, more actors were invited in. According to OECD (OECD, 2018) an unprecedented alliance of development partners – developing and donor countries, emerging economies, UN and multilateral institutions, global funds and civil society organisations - participated in discussions, broadening the stakeholders in the aid effectiveness agenda. The forum emphasised the need to deepen implementation towards the goals set in 2005 in the Paris Declaration, along with a set of priority areas for improvement. To strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) takes stock of progress and sets the agenda for accelerated advancement towards the Paris targets. It proposes improvement in the areas of ownership, partnerships and delivering results (Ibid). The principles put forward in the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action have gained support across the development community, changing aid practice for the better according to OECD (Ibid). It is now the norm for aid recipients to forge their own national development strategies with their parliaments and electorates (**ownership**); that donors support these plans (**alignment**); and streamline their efforts in-country (**harmonisation**); for development policies to be directed to achieving clear, monitorable goals (**managing for development results**); and for donors and recipients to be jointly responsible for achieving these goals (**mutual accountability**).

Inclusion of south-south co-operation, BRICS and private funders in Busan

According to OECD (Ibid) “the **Fourth High Level Forum** on Aid Effectiveness (Busan, 2011) marked a turning point in international discussions on aid and development. This event brought together over 3000 delegates to take stock of the progress made in delivering aid and furthering development activities across the globe, and to make collective plans for the future of aid and development for all stakeholders....

The conference delivered a number of important outcomes, the most important of these being the agreement on the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation by donors, providers of South-South co-operation, developing countries, CSOs, private sector representatives and others – with Brazil, China and India endorsing the Busan principles and agreeing to use these as a reference point for South-South co-operation”.

The declaration understates need for donor ownership of strategies and donor need for harmonization to help financing the implementation the strategies. The most important contribution of the Busan-declaration is the enlargement of actors contributing to the agenda. In this regard, the Busan Declaration followed up on the Accra Declaration.

A widening of scope through the Sustainable Development goals

In 2015, the international community agreed to 17 sustainable development goals. According to Kharas & Rogerson (2017), the introduction of the goals represents a paradigmatic shift from North-South aid orientation to a universal “leave no one behind’ transformation of all countries towards inclusive, sustainable growth.” According to the ODI-report (ibid) the SDGs are vastly more demanding and transformational than the traditional aid paradigm:

- Far wider scope. There are now 17 goal areas and 169 targets

- Going for zero: complete elimination, not just reduction of income poverty and other undesirable conditions
- Universality: every nation should frame and own its ambitions
- Leave no one behind: explicit concern with inequality, not just average progress level
- Highlighted focus on sustainable consumption patterns as well as on air, water and land use, and city life
- Explicit concerns with peacebuilding and human security, the rule of law and good governance
- A balance of responsibilities: priorities set at country level, supported by international partnerships

The SDG agenda states clearly that achieving these goals will not be possible without mobilizing the private sector. This, in combination with the broadness of the agenda coupled with less quantifiable target outcomes, leads to a concern by Kharas & Rogerson (2017) that it might result in a situation of “anything goes” – almost all interventions could be justified as a contribution to the SDG-agenda. Furthermore, the agenda makes it clear that the various policy areas must be seen in connection with one another and shows how efforts in one part of the world can affect the situation in another (Meld. St. 24 , 2016-2017). In this regard, the agenda strengthens the focus on coherence.

To achieve the SDGs, a substantial increase in funding is necessary. The report “From Billions to Trillions: Transforming Development Finance” (Development Committee, 2015) states that the involvement of the private sector and the use of private finance through new financial mechanisms are necessary to meet the financial needs. The report also states that “ODA must be targeted increasingly to crowd in other funding sources: (i) for Low-Income Countries (LICs), on the basis of poverty, vulnerability, and limited fiscal capacity; and (ii) for Middle-Income Countries (MICs), by playing an increasing role to leverage and catalyse public and private sources of financing.”

However, recipient orientation has probably not been strengthened

Despite a strong orientation towards following up and financing recipient development strategies, Valters and Whitty (2017) that UK, as well as other donors have shifted focus towards more focus on domestically driven affairs. Valters and Whitty (2017) as well as Kharas & Rogerson (2017) point to several explanation for this shift:

- More scepticism towards the results of development assistance (Kharas & Rogerson, 2017).
- Need for more flag-planting as a response to more scepticism (Whitty & Valters, 2017).
- Need for better measurement of results lead to a shift from multi-donor and complex program towards smaller projects where results are more clearly linked to grants given by recipient (Whitty & Valters, 2017).
- More need for flag-planting fuelled a canalisation of grants towards multi-bilateral donor trust funds managed by the multilaterals⁵ (Reinsberg, Michaelowa, & Eichenauer, 2015).
- Increase of funding to humanitarian crisis and refugee cost at donor countries (Kharas & Rogerson, 2017).
- Focus on securing global goods such as security, global health and environment. Through focusing on global goods, the connection between grants to development assistance and national interest of donor country is argued and illustrated (Kharas & Rogerson, 2017).

In sum these changes lead to from recipient orientation in the early years after the millennium towards a more focus on self interest in the years after the financial crisis and the sharp increase of refugees to Europe. By the increase of funding of projects and programs financing other means than bilateral support to recipient country lead programs, the importance of bilateral development assistance usually managed by embassies and country offices has been reduced compared to other channels for implementation. This has been the trend in several OECD countries, and as we saw in chapter 5, also in Norway. Hence, the role of embassies of Norway as an implementing organisational unit for development assistance has been reduced compared to other organisational units in the aid architecture. Since the same shift towards more thematic aid, increase of funding of global goods and refugees has taken place in several other OECD countries, we believe such changes

⁵ By multi-bilateral trust funds the donors channel funds to an international development organization that implements the development activities, without providing the organization with full authority to spend these funds at its own discretion. Due to this earmarking to specific areas in which the funds may be used, multilateral aid differs substantially from traditional core funding of multilaterals. Furthermore, due to their voluntary nature the multi-bilateral contributions provide substantially more flexibility to donor government.

also have taken place there. However, to be able to test this, one needs to make more detailed study of financing of projects and programs in the other OECD countries. Such data is unfortunately not available on a scale that would allow for such a detailed analysis.

Despite several international declarations expressing the need for recipient orientation, we have seen a shift in recent years towards more focus on thematic aid, often managed by the home office. We find this trend in Norway as well as in other OECD countries. In chapter 3.2, we show that the trend towards strengthening the head quarter at the expense of regional organisational units is not unique to development assistance, but rather a trend in Norwegian central public administration.

Annex 7: Criteria for selection of countries for in-depth analysis

With an increasing number of embassies managing development assistance, the question arises whether embassies should be treated as one or several groups of entities. For instance, the list of embassies that made disbursements of development assistance includes embassies such as Beijing, Sarajevo, Santiago and New Delhi, as well as Lilongwe, Maputo, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. The relative importance of development assistance in comparison with other issues dealt with by these embassies varies substantially. By treating embassies as one group, we miss out on important and systematic differences between embassies. We therefore introduce a typology of embassies that provides an analytical tool to improve the understanding of how different country characteristics affect the need for embassy resources, competence and decisional autonomy.

We believe the typology of embassies could be developed by analysing statistics on:

- 1) Characteristics of the country
- 2) Characteristics on Norway’s relationship with the country
- 3) Characteristics of Norwegian embassy in the country

In Table A.5, we illustrate how statistics on these characteristics could be used to develop a typology. The proposed data sources are indicated in parentheses.

Table A.5: How statistics on characteristics can be used to develop a typology

Characteristics of the country					Characteristics of Norway’s relation to the country					Characteristics of the embassy		
	GDP (World Bank)	GDP per capita (World Bank)	GDP growth for different periods (World Bank)	Vulnerability (OECD-index and Fund for Peace)	Presence of HQRs of international and regional organisations (Description of role on embassy webpage)	Norwegian export to country for different years and different industries (Menon export database)	Norwegian investments (flow, stock, direct and portfolio) in country for different years (Menon database, SSB)	Norwegian development assistance to country in all relevant channels for different years (Norad statistical database on development assistance)	Migration (flow and stock) from country to Norway for different years (Statistics Norway, SSB)	Number of diplomatic staffs, and change last five years (Embassy webpage and information from MFA)	Number of local staffs, and change last 5 years (Embassy webpage and information from MFA)	Number of side-accredited countries. Description of change. (Embassy webpage)
Country 1												
Country 2												



Typology of embassies such as:

- Embassies mainly concentrating on development assistance
- Embassies mainly concentrating on Norwegian economic interests
- Larger embassies with substantial diversity in roles
- Embassies in or near fragile states

- Countries that match the typology best
- Countries that both match one typology well, but at the same time also match other typologies

We have chosen the latter option, since findings in one embassy in this way can contribute to more than one typology. As a tool for more in-depth statistical analysis later in the evaluation process, but also as a tool to select countries for a country visit, we have gathered data on characteristics of the countries, characteristics of Norway’s bilateral relationship to the country, and characteristics of the embassy. The statistics are presented in annex 9 to the report.

In Table A.6, we list some central variables for the selection of for in-depth analysis.⁶ The ranking of countries, according to some characteristics, is presented in descending order. With regards to characteristics of individual embassies, here we have grouped the embassies as large, medium and small according to the number of diplomats:

Table A.6: Central variables for the selection of countries for the in-depth analysis

Characteristics of the country			Characteristics of Norway’s relation to country	Characteristics of the embassy
Top GDP	Top most fragile states	Top receivers of Norwegian bilateral development assistance 2006-2016	Top countries for Norwegian exports 2016	Number of diplomats at embassy in 2016
China	South- Sudan	Tanzania	China	India (Large)
India	Sudan	Palestine	Brazil	China (Large)
Brazil	Afghanistan	Malawi	Indonesia	Kenya (Large)
Indonesia	Nigeria	Mozambique	Nigeria	Malawi (Medium)
Thailand	Bangladesh	Brazil	India	Indonesia (Medium)
Nigeria	Ethiopia	Afghanistan	Angola	Nepal (Medium)
Iran	Kenya	Uganda	Vietnam	Tanzania (Medium)
Egypt	Myanmar	Zambia	Thailand	Nigeria (Small)
Philippines	Pakistan	Nepal	South Africa	Kosovo (Small)
Malaysia	Uganda	Indonesia	Egypt	Angola (Small)

With regards to the categorization “Embassies mainly concentrating on development assistance”, we suggest

- **Mozambique:** Mozambique is among the top recipients of development assistance from Norway. In recent years, bilateral co-operation has changed character due to a substantial increase in Norwegian exports, led by the discovery of offshore oil and gas fields. The country has a fairly high score on fragility and is a mid-sized Norwegian embassy.

With regards to the categorization “Larger embassies with substantial diversity in roles”, we suggest

- **Kenya:** In Kenya, Norway has a fairly large embassy. Though bilateral development assistance is limited compared to the top recipients, a quite substantial amount of multilateral support is handled or followed up by the embassy with the presence of UNEP and UN-Habitat. Although Norwegian export to Kenya is limited (160 million NOK in 2016), trade with Kenya is relatively diverse⁷ in the sense that there is a relatively substantial presence of several industries. The country scores quite highly on fragility both due to internal issues and a relatively large immigrant population.
- **Brazil:** Brazil is among the top receivers of bilateral development assistance and is also one of the most important export markets for Norway. Norway also has substantial import from Brazil. Brazil’s GDP

⁶ In the table, we have taken out OECD-countries, as we believe these are least relevant for in-depth analysis. Several embassies in OECD-countries have handled development assistance in 2016. However, the total amount of assistance and the number of agreements is limited.

⁷ The largest countries for Norwegian exports are more dominated by maritime and oil and gas related exports (Menon export database 2017).

ranks as number 8 in the world. We have a mid-sized embassy in Brazil. The embassy and consulates might be a case of potential diversification of the bilateral co-operation.

With regards to the categorization “embassies mainly concentrating on Norwegian economic interest”, we suggest

- **Nigeria:** Nigeria is the most populated country in Africa and experiencing high population growth. The country ranks number four in GDP of countries that received development assistance. The country is among the top export countries for Norway, and Norwegian companies have substantial investments in Nigeria (Menon Database, 2017). The country ranks high on fragility.




With regards to the categorization “Embassies in or near fragile states”, we suggest

- **Afghanistan:** Afghanistan is among the top recipients of bilateral development assistance. With regard to total development assistance (bilateral and multilateral), Afghanistan is the top recipient in the period 2006-2016. It has a high level of fragility. Afghanistan is particularly interesting, because the handling of bilateral development assistance has been moved to Oslo. In the case of Afghanistan, we could build on the substantial work done in NOU 2016: 8 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001-2014.

Annex 8: Typology of countries

Table A.7 presents the dimensions over which we disaggregated the countries in the statistical analysis to investigate whether there are systematic differences in funds managed or human resources allocated to embassies in groups of countries. We disaggregated countries according to fragility, whether capital flows to the country from Norway consisted mainly of ODA or other sources, and the size of the embassy, measured by the number of posted staffs. After conducting a preliminary analysis of the three dimensions in the typology, there appears to be a systematic difference between the categories in only one of the dimensions. For both the level of fragility and the size of the embassy, there were no systematic trends or developments that could provide us with any deeper insight into the question on how the role of the embassies has developed over time.

Table A.7: Typology of states

Dimensions	Operationalisation	Data source	Systematic difference based on preliminary study
1) Characteristics of the country	Level of fragility in recipient country	Fund for Peace’s Fragility Index	
2) Characteristics on Norway’s relationship with the country	Combination of capital flows: ODA, export of goods and FDI stock	ODA: Norad	
		Norwegian export: SSB	
		Norwegian FDI (stock): SSB	
3) Characteristics of Norwegian embassy in the country	Size of the embassy (measured by number of diplomats)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	

For the dimension related to the amount of cross-border capital flows from various sources, however, this preliminary study showed signs of more systematic differences over time. Thus, we developed a more comprehensive and robust identification strategy for this dimension, which enabled us to categorize the focus of the embassy in the respective countries as either “Aid” or “Trade”.

We have categorized the countries where Norway has one or more development agreement (according to the previously defined conditions) in the period from 2004 to 2016. We have gathered data from SSB on the Norwegian exports of goods⁸ and stock of foreign direct investment from 2004 to 2016, in addition to the annual amount of development assistance (ODA). Countries are then categorized according to how much of the total capital flows the ODA share represents each year: if ODA represents 50 per cent or more, the relationship is categorized as primarily ODA. And opposite, if ODA represents less than 50 per cent, the relation is categorized as a trade relation.⁹

We find that many of the countries have switched categories over time. For example, Tanzania was categorized as an aid embassy until 2008. On the other hand, there are embassies first categorized as trade embassies before changing category to aid. Syria is one example, switching from trade to aid in 2011, after the outbreak of the civil war. Finally, several countries also change status several times, like Uganda, which started out in the aid category in 2004, switched to trade for two years in 08 and 09 before changing back to aid. Since 2012, however, it has remained as a trade embassy. Table A.8 presents an overview of the categorization of countries with embassies that manage development aid.


⁸ We have only gathered data on export of goods and not services. The reasons for this choice are that the available data on exports of services contains important weaknesses, and that the amount is considerably lower than for goods. The data on export of export is therefore sufficient for the purpose of this exercise.
⁹ See Annex 8 for the complete categorization of countries

Table A.8: Categorization of countries with embassies that manage development aid

		2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Countries with Norwegian embassy	Aid	12	14	15	14	15	16	17	18	15	18	16	13	16
	Trade	13	13	12	15	17	32	33	33	36	36	35	36	33
	<i>Total</i>	25	27	27	29	32	48	50	51	51	54	51	49	49

From 2004 to 2016, the number of “trade embassies” has more than doubled over the period, increasing from 13 to 33, while the number of “aid embassies” has remained relatively constant, between 12 and 16 embassies. Figure A.3 shows that the share of ODA funds managed by trade embassies has increased over time. In 2004, 25 per cent of the aid managed by the embassies was managed by trade embassies, while in 2016, this share has increased to 50 per cent. This is as expected if the amount managed remains constant or even increases, and the number of embassies characterized as trade embassies increases relative to aid embassies. On the other hand, efforts to concentrate aid to fewer countries, and perhaps to the poorest countries, could have resulted in a different pattern, with increasing shares of aid managed by embassies in “aid countries”. Investigating the characteristics of the countries in each of the categories would require more detailed analyses. We can however conclude that there has not been a shift away from channelling aid to embassies in countries that have a trade and investment relationship with Norway.

Figure A.3: Development assistance managed by embassies according to the country categorization. Adjusted for inflation (2016-NOK). Source: MFA and Menon (2018)



Presentation of categorization

In the years that there was no running ODA agreement between Norway and the respective country, we have categorized the country with the label “No ODA agreement”. It is not relevant for the scope of this study to investigate Norway’s relation to the country in a year where there is no development assistance.

Table A.9: Categorization of countries

Recipient Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Afghanistan	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Trade
Albania	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Algeria	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Angola	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Argentina	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Armenia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Azerbaijan	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Bangladesh	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Aid	Trade	Trade	Trade
Belarus	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement
Bhutan	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement
Bolivia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Bosnia and Herzegovina	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade
Botswana	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid

Brazil	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Burundi	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement
Cambodia	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid
Chile	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
China	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Colombia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Congo, Dem. Rep.	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Costa Rica	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement
Cote D'Ivoire	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Croatia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Cuba	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Aid
Egypt	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
El Salvador	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Eritrea	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Aid	Aid	Aid
Ethiopia	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid

Ghana	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Guatemala	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Haiti	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Honduras	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
India	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Indonesia	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Iran	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement
Iraq	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Israel	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Jordan	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Kazakhstan	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement
Kenya	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Kosovo	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Kyrgyz Rep.	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Laos	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement

Lebanon	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	
Liberia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	
Libya	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	
Macedonia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	
Madagascar	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid
Madagascar	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	
Malawi	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	
Malaysia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	
Maldives	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	
Mali	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	
Mauritius	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	
Mexico	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	
Moldova	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	
Mongolia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	

Montenegro	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Morocco	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Mozambique	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Aid
Myanmar	No ODA agreement	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade	Aid	Aid	Trade	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Namibia	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Nepal	Trade	Trade	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Aid	Trade	Trade	Aid
Nicaragua	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Trade
Niger	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid
Nigeria	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Pakistan	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Palestine	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Peru	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid
Philippines	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Rwanda	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Sao Tome & Principe	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Serbia	No ODA	No ODA	No ODA	No ODA	No ODA	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade

	agreement	agreement	agreement	agreement	agreement								
Seychelles	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Sierra Leone	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Singapore	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Somalia	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
South Africa	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
South-Sudan	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Sri Lanka	Aid	Aid	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
St.Vincent & Grenadines	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Sudan	Trade	Trade	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Swaziland	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Syrian Arab Republic	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Tajikistan	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Tanzania	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Thailand	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Timor-Leste	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Turkey	No ODA	No ODA	No ODA	No ODA	No ODA	No ODA	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade

	agreement	agreement	agreement	agreement	agreement	agreement								
Uganda	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Trade	Trade	Aid	Aid	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Ukraine	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement		Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Venezuela	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement		Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement	No ODA agreement
Vietnam	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade	Trade
Zambia	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid
Zimbabwe	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid	Aid

Annex 9: Additional information from the statistical analysis

To illustrate how characteristics of the embassy country and characteristics of Norway's relationship with the country can influence the role of the embassy, we have coloured the table cells in purple if the country's score is higher than the median¹⁰. The table presents statistics on the management of ODA, fragility, and capital flows from Norway.

Table A.10: Statistics indicating differences in the role of embassies

Country characteristics			Characteristics of the country's relationship with Norway				Characteristics of the diplomatic unit	
Country	Indicators of economic development		Indicator on security related role	Indicators of trade related role		Indicators of development related role	Indicators of migration related role	Diplomatic staff (2017)
	GDP current USD-B (2016)	GDP per capita USD (2016)	Fragile states index (2017)	Sum of export to country by Norway in MNOK in 2016	Sum Foreign direct investments and portfolio investment in MNOK in 2016	SUM of Norwegian ODA to country managed by embassy in MNOK (2017)	Immigrants from country in Norway in 2016 (in 1000)	
	Source: World Bank and IMF	Source: Fund for Peace	Source: Menon economic Eksport database	Source: Statistics Norway	Source: Norad database	Source: Statistics Norway	Source: MFA	
Afghanistan	19	562	107,3	117	17	4 492	17	8
Angola	90	3 111	91,1	4 400	27 643	26 639	1	4
Bangladesh	221	1 359	89,1	376	963	5 596	1	3
Brazil	1 796	8 650	68,2	17 600	106 183	375 326	5	9
China	11 199	8 123	74,7	33 749	139 428	45 724	9	22
Colombia	282	5 806	78,9	361	13 779	267 061	2	6
Congo, Dem. Rep.	36	460	110	1 178	-	49 073	2	2
Cuba	87	7 602	64,6	10	-	11 109	1	5
Egypt	336	3 514	89,8	1 603	2 215	31 552	1	6
Ethiopia	72	707	101,1	34	-	389 395	8	11
Ghana	43	1 513	69,7	395	970	18 434	2	10
Guatemala	69	4 147	83,1	113	-	17 818	0	1
India	2 264	1 709	77,9	4 076	83 233	118 362	17	14
Indonesia	932	3 570	72,9	5 262	36 233	225 304	1	9
Israel	319	37 293	22,3	1 534	28 200	3 928	1	6
Jordan	39	4 088	78,7	264	2 874	38 323	1	15
Kenya	71	1 455	96,4	161	3 064	17 381	2	12
Kosovo	7	3 661	96,4	6	427	4 211	10	3
Lebanon	48	7 914	88,2	165	554	43 405	3	4
Madagascar	10	401	66,1	1	-	54 500	0	1
Malawi	5	301	88	18	-	380 354	0	10
Mexico	1 046	8 201	74,3	2 380	81 383	10 004	1	4
Mozambique	11	382	89	261	223	242 207	1	7
Myanmar	67	1 275	95,7	44	61	96 909	3	6
Nepal	21	730	91	13	-	224 900	2	9
Nigeria	405	2 178	101,6	4 987	8 274	101 559	2	7
Pakistan	284	1 468	98,9	605	435	46 703	20	14
Palestine	13	2 943	98,9	1	-	434 854	3	9
Philippines	305	2 951	84,4	1 854	29 676	7 838	21	5
Serbia	38	5 348	70	330	59	29 269	6	4
Singapore*	297	52 960	32,5	9 626	174 830	589	0	3
South Africa	295	5 274	72,3	2 510	43 946	54 325	1	9
South Sudan	96	2 415	110,6	1 318	-	216 984	0	6
Sri Lanka	81	3 835	37,9	124	752	39 167	9	4
Sudan	96	2 415	110,6	38	-	63 100	5	6
Tanzania	47	879	80,3	168	7 956	226 974	1	8
Thailand	407	5 908	76,2	2 962	35 516	104	20	7
Turkey	858	10 788	80,8	4 890	36 399	5 709	12	11
Uganda	26	615	96	43	428	84 652	1	8
Ukraine	93	2 186	74	1	1 098	5 021	5	6
Vietnam	203	2 186	70,2	3 330	3 195	817	14	7

*FDI and portfolio figures are from 2015

As seen in the table, both the country characteristics and the characteristics of Norway's relationship with the country indicate a high variation in the roles of embassies managing development assistance. In addition, the role of embassies also varies due to factors not presented in the table. For example, the embassy in Nairobi has substantial responsibility for following up Norwegian assistance provided through multilateral organisations with headquarters in the country. Furthermore, the embassy in Addis Ababa is following up the work of the African Union.

¹⁰ We could also have used the mean of the figures, but since there are substantial outliers, especially with regard to the trade statistics, the median is a better choice.

In conclusion, we find that the role of embassies varies to a high degree according to Norwegian interests in the country. In some countries, the embassy's role is more concentrated on development assistance, but for the most, the embassies have plural roles securing different aspects of different Norwegian interests.

In this regard, we must highlight that there are substantial weaknesses with regard to how these statistics can be used to shed light on the role of embassies. The most substantial weakness is related to the fact that most embassies have side-accredited countries. Hence, they follow up Norwegian interests in the countries that are side-accredited to the embassy. For example, Congo is side-accredited to Uganda, Syria is side-accredited to Lebanon, Eritrea is side-accredited to Ethiopia and Somalia is side-accredited to Kenya. In the table, we present data on migration, security and ODA. However, the role of the embassies in following up the side-accredited countries can be substantial. Therefore, only presenting statistics regarding the country where the embassy is present is likely to underestimate its role. However, the purpose of presenting the statistics is not to illustrate the role of each embassy, but rather to illustrate that the embassies' roles are highly variable depending on both country characteristics and the characteristics of Norway's relationship with the country.

Furthermore, there are weaknesses regarding trade statistics. Even though there may be substantial Norwegian investments or exports to a country, this does not necessarily indicate that the effort the embassy has to put into securing these economic interests is equally high. It is reasonable to assume that the need for follow-up is dependent on the quality and functionality of the legal framework regulating trade and investments, which sectors the trade and investments take place in, public involvement in these sectors etc. Based on this, it is reasonable to assume that the larger the difference in culture, legal framework and geographic distance, the more need for involvement by the embassy. Furthermore, the more information on business opportunities is publicly available, the less need there is for businesses to seek assistance from the embassy.

The accessibility of information probably also affects the level of effort necessary to handle migration issues. It is reasonable to assume that the less information that is publicly available, the more demanding is the task related to migration. Hence, handling migration issues in a functional democracy with good access to information is likely to be easier than handling migration issues in a fragile or failed state.

Finally, assistance to a country can be channelled through the embassy, or through other channels such as NGOs and multilaterals. The embassies are instructed to follow up support provided by other channels. Substantial channelling of funds through multilaterals or NGOs might increase the workload of the embassy substantially. However, interviews with representatives at five embassies chosen for in-depth analysis indicate that the effort that is laid down for follow up is substantially less than the effort laid down when the embassy itself is responsible for the management of agreements. On this background, the amount of funds managed by an embassy is a fairly good indication of its role within development assistance.

Although there are several weaknesses with regard to using the gathered statistics, they provide an illustration of how the role of embassies that manage development assistance is defined by Norway's interest in the countries where the embassy is placed and in the countries that are side-accredited to the embassy. The purpose of the statistical analysis is not to define the particular role of each embassy. Rather it is to provide a quite superficial illustration of the substantial variation in how Norway's interest could lead the embassies to have quite different roles. The roles are depending on which interests are present in the country or in side-accredited countries. In accordance with the description of the purpose of the MFA, managing development assistance could be one of such interests.

Figure A.4: Disaggregation of Norwegian bilateral ODA across budget posts. Source: MFA and Menon (2018)




Figure A.5: Left axis: total ODA managed by the embassies. Right axis: the share managed by the top ten embassies each year. Source: MFA & Menon (2018)




Table A.11: Share of employees in Norad distributed by age

	<30	30-39	40-49	50-59	>60
2002	6.0	28.0	23.0	32.0	11.0
2005	7.7	21.3	19.3	30.0	21.7
2009	1.7	24.3	25.7	23.0	25.2
2018	2.6	28.1	30.0	25.9	13.3