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Published by: The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

October 1997

Print: GCSM AS, Oslo

Circulation: 800

E-551 E

ISBN 82-7177-483-2

Aid as a tool for promotion
of human rights and democracy:
What can Norway do?

by Hilde Selbervik

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A report submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
by Chr. Michelsen Institute

The Ministry does not accept any responsibility for the information
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Chr. Michelsen Institute



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Preface

This study was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a view to analysing how Norwegian development assistance could be used as an instrument for protection of human rights and promotion of democracy in developing countries. The terms of reference are set out in Appendix 2.

A considerable amount of literature on the subject was reviewed (see the bibliography) and numerous policy documents perused. As part of the study field trips were made to three programme countries (Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) in order to collect further information by way of interviews with MFA and NORAD officials in the field and other informants. In addition, for comparative purposes trips were made to Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden to interview aid officials in like-minded countries. The author wishes to thank all interviewees for their forthcoming attitude and for generously giving so much of their valuable time.

The assistance of Terje Dalseng was enlisted to prepare Appendix 1 which presents a statistical overview of Norway's human rights and democracy support for selected years in the 1990s.

Bergen, July 1997

Hilde Selbervik

Abbreviations

Afronet	Inter Africa Network for Human Rights and Development
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BAWATA	<i>Baraza La Wanawake Tanzania</i> , The National Women's Council - Tanzania.
CCM	<i>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</i> , Party of the Revolution (Tanzania)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
PD	Participatory Development
EC	European Commission
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EU	European Union
GG	Good Governance
GD	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMR	Institute of Human Rights (Norway)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway)
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy (Zambia)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Human Rights and Democracy
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Sida	Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency
UN	United Nations
UP	United Parties (Zimbabwe)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIP	United National Independence Party (Zambia)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
ZIMT	Zambia Independent Monitoring Team

Executive summary

1. Promotion of human rights and democracy has become an increasingly important objective in the foreign policy of Norway. In a series of policy statements different donors have stressed that human rights and democracy are main goals in development co-operation, and that continued aid flows to a larger extent will depend on the human rights record and the democratisation process at the recipient end.
2. Application of conditionality was initially confined to the economic sphere. It was gradually realised, however, that implementation of economic policies required well functioning political and bureaucratic structures. Hence, good governance was put on the agenda. At about the same time human rights and democratisation issues were given increasing attention.
3. Norway was one of the first countries to integrate human rights considerations into its aid policy. But it was not until the mid-1980s that they were made an explicit condition for receiving aid. While initially reluctant to impose economic conditionality Norway took a far more active stance in the political, democracy and human rights spheres. Gradually, Norway became part of an emerging consensus within the international donor community that conditionality was both legitimate and desirable.
4. The international human rights regime has its modern basis in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 and the two main covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from 1966, both ratified in 1976. Human rights encompass a wide range of rights which set minimum standards. In this study they should be taken to mean political and civil rights only.
5. A minimum definition of democracy calls for broad-based competition for state power through regular, free and fair elections; inclusive rights of political participation, so that no adult social group is excluded; and civil rights and political liberties, sufficient to ensure that political competition and participation are meaningful and authentic: freedom of expression, association, assembly, and the rule of law.
6. Good governance may be defined as a political regime which satisfies certain quality requirements, for example absence of corruption, respect for human rights, military expenditures adapted to genuine needs, transparency in the governing institutions, and the political will to be responsible towards the electorate through, among other things, elections.
7. Donors have a wide range of available strategies for promoting human rights and democracy. A broad distinction is often made between three basic ways in

which a donor government can influence another country's policies and actions: (a) pressure; (b) support; (c) persuasion.

8. Pressure includes the use of both negative and positive conditionality. The former means that the donor is threatening to terminate, suspend or reduce aid flows, or is actually doing so, if pre-set conditions are not met by the recipient. The latter means, on the other hand, that the donor is promising additional aid as a reward for "good behaviour", adoption of given policies or achievement of certain goals, set by the donor.
9. Conditionality may be applied at different levels, depending on the degree of political interference, i.e. the systemic or national level; the sectoral level; the project and programme level; and the administrative level. With regard to human rights and democracy conditionality is most often applied at the systemic level.
10. The support posture by a donor may take many forms. Mainstreaming human rights and democracy in all aid activities is one avenue; positive measures vis-à-vis public institutions or civil society, seen as a separate 'sector', is another vehicle. In either case the action taken must be adapted to the circumstances and political systems at hand.
11. Positive measures or unconditional support may be directed at public authorities or civil society. It means that resources are distributed directly to projects with explicit aims to improve a country's human rights situation and to further its democratic development.
12. Positive measures presuppose thorough knowledge of the political system in which they are to be implemented. Suitable entry points and niches need to be identified. Nearly all of Norway's programme countries can be characterised as either 'democracies in the making' or 'structurally deficient democracies' which offer opportunities for meaningful intervention with positive measures.
13. Persuasion and policy dialogue differ from conditionality because they are non-coercive; there is, in principle, no linkage between performance and supply of aid. They also differ from positive measures because there is no explicit reference to a certain development project, or action to be taken. Persuasion and policy dialogue are efforts by a donor to convince the recipient that changing its policy makes sense. Dialogue and persuasion requires a long time horizon to produce results, but these methods have two advantages over coercive approaches. First, even if results will be slow in coming they are likely to be much more sustainable because they grow from within. Second, they correspond better to the spirit of democracy which the donors purport to adhere to; conversely, conditionality is inherently anti-democratic.
14. A framework for analysing aid relations is provided by so-called linkage diplomacy. Linkage diplomacy is a technique of influence, where one state tries to induce changes in another state's behaviour. This is basically the same mechanism or process which takes place when a donor is using aid as a tool to influence the policy or behaviour in a recipient country. Aid money, which the recipient is more or less dependent on, can be seen as the donor's strength. The recipient's poor human rights record and/or (un)willingness to democratise can

be seen as the donor's weakness. By making promises (giving more aid) and/or threats (reduction or suspension of aid), the initiator state (the donor in this context) seeks the co-operation of its target state (the recipient) in an area (human rights and democracy) over which it possesses little control.

15. This model is based on two important dimensions, namely the *issue* and the *actor*. Three types of issues are distinguished, based on whether the issues at stake are identifiable and quantifiable: (a) concrete/substantive issues; (b) symbolic issues; and (c) transcendent issues. Trade, aid, and investment are examples on *concrete/substantive issues*, since they are generally both observable and quantifiable. The second type are *symbolic issues*, which are also easy to identify, e.g. control or change of a piece of territory, or withdrawal of troops. These issues are intangible and hard to measure because they are tied to prestige and national pride. The third category are the so-called *transcendent issues*, which are both difficult to identify and to measure. Generally declared goals like defence and promotion of democracy, containment of communism, improvement of human rights records, and unfriendly rhetoric and/or behaviour are examples of issues in this category. If other things are equal, the substantive linkages are most likely to succeed, while transcendent linkages are least likely to succeed.
16. The other main component in the model is the actor dimension, suggesting that the nature of the relationship between the actors will also influence the result of different linkage strategies. Two conditions will be useful in predicting the result of the different linkage processes: *penetration* and *similarity*. Penetration refers to asymmetrical dependence between countries. Similarity, on the other hand, refers to the ideological commonality or shared values between the countries in question.
17. When testing the model on cases of economic sanctions it was revealed that linkage politics in pursuit of substantive issues were most successful, second most successful were symbolic issues, and least successful were linkages involving transcendent issues. Drawing on these findings, political conditionality can be expected to be less effective, especially if the stipulated demands are general and vague, as they often are in political statements and policy papers.
18. The analysis also revealed that regardless of the nature of the issue involved, the linkage strategy was most effective if the target country (the recipient) wished to identify or identified itself with initiator state (the donor) in terms of values or ideology.
19. In conventional international relations theory, there have been two opposing views or models on how states interact and co-operate. The first one is called the "bargaining model", which specifies a causal relation between the delivery (or denial) of various rewards by the initiating country and the compliant foreign policy behaviour of target states. An opposing view is the "model of consensus". From this perspective the linkage strategy is seen as mutually desired rather than unilaterally coerced. Compliant behaviour by the target states is attributed to the penetration of dominant political, economic or

cultural systems via foreign influence. In terms of this model, successful linkage will result not from coercion, but from value infusion and installation. This strategy is a more gradual and slower process.

20. Whereas the model merely offers a description and analysis of a number of linkage cases over an historical period, the concepts and models could be used normatively, pro-actively and prescriptively by the donor community. For instance, efforts by donors to operationalise the issues and to establish benchmarks with a view to monitor progress, can be seen as one way of moving so-called transcendent issues (in the terminology of the model) of human rights and democracy closer to the category of tangible substantive issues. This could help enhance effectiveness. An attempt could be made in a possible phase II follow-up of this study to test the model on aid relationships.
21. The so-called like-minded countries have devoted increasing attention and money to human rights and democracy questions. And there has been a move from conditionality to positive measures. But practice suffers from lack of operational guidelines and operationalisation of the issues involved. This is partly due to the newness of this field in aid relations.
22. There is clearly a need for more operational guidelines and many of the so-called like-minded countries are in the process of addressing this deficiency. There is also a need for institutional capacity and competence in the aid administrations.
23. Few evaluations have been undertaken within the field of human rights and democracy support. A review of Canadian, Dutch and Norwegian experiences concludes that the conditionality posture has been a failure in all cases analysed, whereas positive measures have shown encouraging results. A similar conclusion was drawn by a report on interventions by the European Commission.
24. A cursory review of three Norwegian programme countries shows that the lack of operational guidelines and country-specific strategies in the field of human rights and democratisation leads to incoherence and *ad hoc* intervention. Furthermore, lack of capacity and competence hampers proper processing of applications from the recipient countries, and above all prevents a pro-active posture.
25. Based on an analysis of policies and practices the following recommendations can be made in order to improve Norwegian human rights and democratisation support:
 - (a) A detailed set of general guidelines for support within this sector should be worked out and made more operational than the rudiments already existing;
 - (b) A thorough overall assessment should be made of the human rights situation and the democratisation challenges of each programme country with a view to defining the problems and need for support;
 - (c) Detailed country-specific strategies for the human rights and democratisation sector (as is done for other sectors) should be worked out. This is necessary due to the wide variations between programme countries in terms of a number of factors: need and prospects for making an impact; entry

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- points and channels; Norway's donor position in the country in absolute and relative terms etc.;
- (d) Based on the overall assessment and the country-specific strategies appropriate entry points should be identified and projects designed to address the problems encountered. Project ideas and design should be discussed in a dialogue with the authorities concerned and civil society organisations;
 - (e) For each programme country a decision should be made as to prioritisation of the human rights and democratisation sector. If accorded high priority, the competence and capacity commensurate with the task at hand should be made available so as to be able to make an impact;
 - (f) Interventions and measures should as far as possible be co-ordinated with other donors in order to avoid overlap and duplication of effort. It would be worth while to consider what other donors are doing within this sector and to draw on their experiences.
26. The argument in favour of positive measures should not be interpreted to preclude the use of tougher means if warranted. A variety of means are available and may be used in combination or in sequence.

1. Introduction

Promotion of human rights and democracy has become an increasingly important objective in the foreign policy of Norway, as well as in that of other donors. In the late 1980s, and especially after the end of the Cold War, a series of policy statements by different donors have stressed that human rights and democracy are main goals in development co-operation, and that continued aid flows to a larger extent will depend on the human rights record and the democratisation process at the recipient end.

The new emphasis on human rights and democratisation was most recently expressed in Norwegian White Paper no. 19 (1995-96:11), which stated that promotion of human rights and democracy is one of the five main overall objectives in Norwegian development co-operation. Human rights observance and democracy were also viewed as prerequisites for economic and social development (*ibid*:6). Norwegian policy documents have underscored, however, that aid must not be used as an instrument for "rewarding" some governments and "punishing" others (White Paper no. 36 (1984-85):118). Rather, the Norwegian government considers that taking specific measures with a view to protecting and promoting human rights is more appropriate than punitive action against violators. Based on Norwegian White Paper no. 51 (1991-92) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) developed a strategy for promoting democracy (MFA 1992). It has also been underlined that development objectives and strategies have to be formulated in a policy *dialogue* between donor and recipient. This can be seen as an attempt to create a sense of "ownership" on the part of the recipient, which means that the developing countries themselves must take responsibility for their own development as well as become active participants. Donor-driven development co-operation is to become a thing of the past.

Only in certain serious circumstances may the Norwegian government, *as a last resort*, terminate, reduce, or modify its aid, i.e. when "a government of a country takes part in, tolerates or directly perpetrates violations of human rights; when these violations are systematic; when government efforts to end the abuse and bring the perpetrators to justice are lacking; and when the violations are gross and extensive" (White Paper no. 36 1985-84:118).

Nevertheless, with regard to human rights and democracy in developing countries, attention is focused on conditionality and responses to human rights abuses, especially in the public debate. In Norway there is a consensus across the established political party spectrum that donors are justified in imposing human

rights and democracy conditions before extending development assistance (Innst. S. no. 229 1995-96).¹

Political conditionality has in this context become a well-established concept, especially within the aid literature. It is first and foremost used and associated with what is commonly termed "negative conditionality", which means that the donor will threaten to terminate, suspend, or reduce the amount of aid given if certain conditions are not met. Even though political conditionality is a rather new instrument in the aid sphere, experiences tell us that the use of negative conditionality has not been very effective, except in a few cases where it has been possible to co-ordinate donor action and response. Hence, the donors will have to look for more co-operative models to promote and support a sustainable environment for human rights observance and democratisation. As a result, there seems to be a growing interest in the donor community for so-called positive measures. Use of the term "positive conditionality" is on the increase.

The overriding question in this study is how a small donor like Norway can help promote and support human rights and democracy in developing countries of the South by using aid as a lever. Which strategies are available and how do they work under varying circumstances?

The study examines which measures and strategies are available, and reviews experiences and lessons drawn from the pursuit of these policies by Norway and other so-called like-minded countries. This study is also trying to shed light on the potentials and limitations of such policies, as well as considering the experiences relevant to Norway in this regard. The study is discussing possible means and instruments, but basically focusing on incentive-like measures and what is termed positive conditionality. The purpose is to develop an inventory of available and potential "positive measures".

The study argues that positive conditionality and positive measures are preferable, because they are based on co-operation and less confrontational than "negative conditionality", which in principle and by its very nature is based on punishment. But, of course, there is also a coercive element in "positive conditionality", which lies in the very nature of conditionality. Nevertheless, the study stresses that "positive conditionality" and "positive measures" are just a few among several available instruments donors may use to promote democracy and human rights.

The study suggests that the register of measures should be broadened. It is suggested that donors try and develop a co-ordinated and coherent strategy for each country and that the measures used be seen in conjunction if they are to achieve the stated goals. One should also contextualise each case by taking type of

¹ Innst. S. no. 229 1995-96 is the Foreign Relations Committee report on White Paper no. 19 1995-96, the most recent and current policy document on development aid. A comprehensive list of the most important documents used in this report is included in the bibliography.

political system into consideration and its current phase of political development. There is a striking lack of operational guidelines within this field and an apparent lack of political will to elaborate such guidelines. Also, despite the fact that great emphasis is put on human rights and democracy in political statements, in practice the volume of aid disbursed to this field is limited, compared to the total volume of aid. That is not peculiar to Norway; it also applies to the rest of the donor community. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that this kind of support is generally not capital-intensive, compared to conventional aid projects. The relative modest volume of aid disbursed to this field cannot, therefore, be seen a reflection of priority alone. It is most important that the quality of interventions be upgraded, but if this sector is to be taken seriously, more money will be needed eventually .

By way of a short introduction a background is presented to the evolution of conditionality in aid relations and to the increasing emphasis put on human rights and democracy. Then some central concepts are defined and the study delimited, before discussing and outlining different strategies on how to promote human rights and democracy within the aid policy framework. But how do the various strategies work? Are they effective, and if yes, under which conditions? In order to shed some light on these broad questions an analytical framework for examining aid relations by so-called linkage diplomacy is presented in chapter four. Linkage diplomacy is a technique of influence, where one state tries to bring about changes in another state's behaviour. This is in principle the same mechanism which is being applied when a donor is using aid as a tool to influence the policy or behaviour in a recipient country. The linkage diplomacy theory will thus be adapted to the aid relationship.

Chapter five looks at how conditionality, and especially "positive conditionality" and positive measures, is perceived and used among several Western donors; the analysis is confined to bilateral relationships only, as suggested by the terms of reference. The study considers in particular how such instruments are judged and implemented by the so-called like-minded countries: Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Canada. Furthermore, how positive conditionality and positive measures are understood and practised in Norway are looked at. Findings are exemplified by looking at Norwegian efforts to promote and defend human rights and democracy in three Norwegian programme countries: Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Finally, the discussion is tied together in the conclusion and some recommendations are made.

Appendix 1 is a statistical survey of democracy and human rights projects supported by Norwegian development aid, covering the years 1990 and 1993-95, as required by the terms of reference (see appendix 2).

1.1 Sources and methodology

The study is making use of a wide range of primary and secondary sources of qualitative as well as quantitative nature. In addition to secondary literature on aid questions in books, relevant journals and magazines, the study is based on four main categories of primary sources: 1) official documents, including White Papers, official records of the proceedings of the Storting, annual reports about Norway's co-operation with developing countries, reports of the Foreign Relations Committee to the Storting, as well as corresponding documents from other donors and recipients; 2) newspapers; 3) archival material; 4) oral sources.

Interviews have been conducted with aid officials at the headquarters of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in some so-called like-minded countries, i.e. Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands. A large number of interviews have also been conducted with Norwegian officials at the fields missions in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as with representatives of recipient countries, like-minded donors, academics and others.

2. The evolution of human rights and political conditionality in aid relations

Aid has never been unconditional. Attaching strings to aid flows is as old as aid itself. But conditionality in its earlier form was rather confined to the programme or project level, although not always part of the vocabulary.² The emergence of conditionality is primarily associated with the major international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in conjunction with short-term macro-economic stabilisation and structural adjustment in the longer term (Gibbon 1993; Cassen and Associates 1994; Singer 1994). It is commonly referred to as policy-based lending, i.e. that loans are given only if the recipient makes a commitment to pursue certain economic policies believed to be conducive to growth (Harrigan, Mosley and Toye 1991). Initially, conditionality was thus confined to the economic sphere. Economic conditionality was driven by the crisis in African economies and the fact that they were unable to service their loans. Economic conditionality was linked to creating economic stability and efficiency, which was seen necessary to promote greater economic growth, rather than development in a broader sense.³

It was gradually realised, however, that implementation of economic policies required well functioning political and bureaucratic structures. In most developing countries these were poorly developed, and often ridden by corruption and severe inefficiency (World Bank 1989). The problems were associated with lack of accountability, transparency, and predictability on the part of politicians and bureaucrats, as well as the absence of the rule of law. All these were seen as obstacles to economic growth and development (World Bank 1992). As a result, the IMF and the World Bank increasingly took an interest in matters of governance, defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development. It was actually the

² Tying aid to procurement in the donor country, which is also a kind of conditionality, has increased gradually. In the case of Norway one may say that there was a movement from virtually untied aid in the 1960s to moderate tying as from the mid-1970s, followed in the 1980s and 1990s by increasing commercialisation of aid, involving substantial tying (Hagen 1986; Olsen 1987; Lenth 1990). These particular conditionalities are not, however, at the centre of attention in this study.

³ In recent years there has been an expanding literature and an increasing research interest in the link between aid and conditionality (Mosley 1987; Harrigan, Mosley and Toye 1991; Moore 1993; Thomas and Nash 1991). But most of this literature addresses economic and multilateral conditionality by the two major financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF. Far less has been done on bilateral aid conditionality and political conditionality (Hewitt and Killick 1996:130).

World Bank which introduced the concept of good governance, later also adopted by the rest of the international donor community. Eventually, good governance as a means to achieving sustained economic growth was added as a political element to the list of conditions imposed (Brautigam 1991; Lancaster 1993).

Parallel to the evolution of economic conditionality and its attendant of good governance in the interest of economic growth, and somewhat later, an array of other conditionalities have emerged. Towards the end of the 1980s, especially after 1989, and in the beginning of the 1990s political liberalisation and democratisation were put on the agenda, and imposed as conditions in their own right, not necessarily as measures to facilitate economic growth (Robinson 1993; Stokke 1995). The process resulting in the imposition of political conditionality had started well before the upheavals in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. However, the post-1989 events made the introduction of political conditionality less controversial and lent legitimacy to it.

Norway was at first reluctant to impose conditionality. It did not take an active part in, but rather resisted, the pressure exerted by the World Bank and the IMF and later the donor community at large, on African countries to implement economic reforms in the early 1980s. Norwegian development co-operation policy has traditionally put high value on solidarity, compassion and disinterestedness. As a matter of principle - in policy statements referred to as recipient-orientation - aid was to be extended on the terms of the recipients, i.e. in accordance with their plans and priorities (Wohlgemuth 1976). These were indeed important elements of Norwegian aid policy throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Making aid conditional on political and economic policies defined by the donors, was seen as objectionable and hence resisted, even though Norway has also been influenced by self-interest and internal political considerations (Pharo 1986). With no colonial past Norway adhered to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the newly independent states. This overall policy was widely hailed as a model for the entire donor community to emulate. Norway was, therefore, critical of structural adjustment programmes, and directed attention to the negative socio-political consequences that followed in the wake of harsh adjustment conditions and to what seemed tantamount to political interference.

In the mid-1980s Norway together with Sweden and Denmark gave up this position. This posture put Norway in the group of so-called like-minded countries, which included Denmark, Sweden, Canada and the Netherlands, whose aid policies differed considerably from those of other OECD countries, by being persistently more sympathetic to the recipients than to state self-interest and domestic pressure groups. By contrast, the policies of the bigger donors, like the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, had to a far greater degree been driven by strategic and economic considerations.

With respect to political conditionalities the Norwegian attitude was somewhat different. It was a significant change of attitude, therefore, when Norway in the mid-1980s, with the tabling of White Paper no. 36 (1984-85), and increasingly in the 1990s, began emphasising economic and political conditions for providing aid. Specific goals, priorities, and other conditionalities, including human rights performance, were formally brought into programme negotiations with recipient countries (NORAD 1990). Norway was one of the first countries to integrate human rights considerations into its aid policy (Baehr, Selbervik and Tostensen 1995), but was soon followed by the other so-called like-minded countries.

In Norway human rights was first put on the aid agenda in the mid-1970s (White Paper no. 93 1976-77). Although Norway at an early stage had included democracy and human rights observance among the principles and objectives of development assistance, it was not until the mid-1980s that they were made an explicit condition for receiving aid. While being reluctant to impose economic conditionality Norway took a far more active stance in the political, democracy and human rights spheres. Thus, Norway became part of an emerging consensus within the international donor community that conditionality was both legitimate and desirable (White Paper no. 19 1995-96).

When it comes to promoting human rights and democracy there has been a significant change of attitude in the donor community at large. The increasing consensus regarding political goals has prompted a wave of policy announcements by Western donors about the need for political reforms and that human rights, democracy and good governance will occupy a central place on the aid agenda. As the then British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Douglas Hurd, put it in a speech at the Overseas Development Institute in 1990: "Aid must go where it will be good" (Selbervik 1995:64). All the like-minded countries, Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, have put an even stronger emphasis on human rights and democracy. Canada claims that human rights are a fundamental and integral part of its foreign policy; the Netherlands says that human rights are a "cornerstone" and a "main pillar"; in Norway it is said to occupy an important position in foreign policy. The Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs has underlined that human rights is a very important aspect of Denmark's foreign policy, and that Denmark has taken the stand that the international community has a right to interfere if human rights are violated (*Udenrigs* no. 4 1995). This stance is also emphasised in Sidas aid strategy to promote democracy and human rights (Sida 1996).

But which strategies are actually available in order to promote and defend human rights and democracy? Before proceeding with a discussion of various strategies some of the central concepts will have to be defined, and the delimitation of the study set out.

2.1 Definitions and delimitation of the study

What is meant by broad and general concepts like human rights, democracy and good governance? They are indeed many-faceted, and there are gliding and to a certain extent overlapping meanings of these three concepts. This study addresses human rights mainly, but if one is to discuss and use political conditionality as a concept it is inevitable that democratisation and good governance be taken into consideration as well.

In donor policy guidelines and in political declarations human rights and democracy and even good governance are often treated as one package. In some Ministries of Foreign Affairs there seems to be no clear notion and definition of the different concepts.⁴ Many of the DAC documents on Participatory Development and Good Governance include all these concepts (DAC 1993). But although they are sometimes overlapping, they are not the same, and they do not necessarily go together even if they are all viewed as desirable by the donor community.

In policy documents the concepts are rarely operationalised, because it is both difficult and controversial. Even though human rights are seen as an international concern by Western donors and, hence, that their promotion does not constitute interference in other countries' internal affairs, human rights and political conditionality is still not universally accepted in practice. The most common objection to the use of political conditionality is precisely that it is perceived to be interference in another country's internal affairs. It is easier, therefore, and maybe more politically expedient to operate at a more general level; operationalisation would make it more apparent that political conditionality *is* interference after all.

Human rights

The so-called International Human Rights Regime or the term International Bill of Human Rights comprise several documents defining human rights. The concept has its roots in the Magna Carta and the French Revolution, but its modern basis is the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 and the two main covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from 1966, both ratified in 1976. A new Covenant, the Declaration on the Rights to Development, was ratified in 1986. Recent years have seen a growing numbers of conventions

⁴ Interviews in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 27.8.1996 and in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 19.9.1996.

Review of Human Rights⁵

C L A S S I C A L R I G H T S	CIVIL RIGHTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - right to self-determination - equality - women's rights - non-discrimination - protection of children - protection of minorities 	
		INTEGRITY RIGHTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - right to life - no death penalty - no slavery - no torture - freedom of residence - freedom of movement - right to leave any country, and to return - protection of privacy, honour and reputation - protection of property - freedom of thought, conscience and religion - right to seek asylum from persecution - right to nationality - right to family life
		DUE PROCESS RIGHTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no arbitrary arrest, detention or exile - right to effective remedy - right to fair trial - equality before courts - rights of the accused - nulla boena sine lege
	POLITICAL RIGHTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opinion and expression - assembly and association - take part in government - equal access to public service - the right to elect and to be elected 	
S O C I A L R I G H T S	SOCIO- ECONOMIC RIGHTS	LABOUR RIGHTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - right to work - equal pay for equal work - no forced labour - trade union - organise and col. bargaining - rest and leisure
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - adequate standard of living - right to food - right to health - right to housing - right to education 	
	CULTURAL RIGHTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to take part in cultural life - to benefit from scientific progress - protection of authorship & copyright - freedom in scientific research and creative activity 	

⁵ Source Heinz, Lingnau and Waller 1995.

and other Charters defining further and specifying human rights, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the European Social Charter. As will be seen in the figure, human rights encompass a wide range of rights. It must also be emphasised that these rights set minimum standards. When referring to human rights in this study, they should be taken to mean the political and civil rights only.

Democracy

Democracy is an even more difficult concept to deal with than human rights. There are no international legal instruments directed specifically at safeguarding democracy, corresponding to the protection of human rights.

Donor statements often acknowledge that inherent in the concept of democracy is the notion that it must emerge from within and grow from below, rather than being imposed from outside or from above. Taking this argument seriously would imply that so-called negative conditionality or any coercive measures are inappropriate tools of democratisation. Nevertheless, the holding of multi-party elections is perhaps the most common condition put forward by the donor community when political conditionality is applied. Admittedly, one important institutional expression of democracy is exactly the holding of free and fair elections, but the mere holding of formal elections does not measure up to a viable democracy. What happens before and after the elections, and during the inter-electoral periods, is arguably more important in promoting democracy than elections themselves, however important they may be. The main reason why donors have directed so much attention to the holding of elections is probably that it is a comparatively easy and straightforward mechanism to monitor and measure, and that its introduction may be induced from outside by way of negative conditionality. But unless other aspects of the democratisation process are attended to there is a distinct possibility or relapse into authoritarian practices regardless of formal elections being held periodically.

Other critical elements of sustainable democracy include the rights and obligations of government and opposition, the role of mass media, the nature and fairness of electoral laws, the procedures of voter registration, the principles and system of representation, and a vigilant civil society. There is thus a contradiction between the donors' declared objectives of nurturing democratisation from within and below, and the practice of imposing negative conditionality to achieve that goal. In recognition of this contradiction there is a search for alternative ways of accelerating the democratisation process through positive measures and incentives.

Some have simply defined democracy as the realisation of universal human rights, although the particular forms of democracy are seen to be related to the cultural heritage of a country (Heinz, Lingnau, Waller 1995:15). One also needs to be aware that societies having gone through a recent democratic transition do not

exhibit the same characteristics as more "mature" democracies. According to the DAC guidelines for Participatory Development and Good Governance (1995:11) "democratisation integrates participation into the political life of the country and provides a basis for legitimacy of government". Some rights are seen as essential for a functioning democracy (Heinz, Lingnau, Waller 1995:16):

- ◆ broad-based competition for state power through regular, free and fair elections;
- ◆ inclusive rights of political participation, so that no adult social group is excluded;
- ◆ civil rights and political liberties, sufficient to ensure that political competition and participation are meaningful and authentic: freedom of expression, association, assembly, and the rule of law.

The above points are minimum requirements for a system to qualify for the democracy label. However, a fully developed democratic system of governance entails much more. Apart from the formal rules and regulations of democracy the evolution of a *democratic political culture* is critical to the long-term consolidation of democratic rule. In fact, creating a democratic political culture amounts to the *institutionalisation* of democracy as a sustainable system of governance. History shows that it is conceivable to hold sham elections from time to time and still retain a large measure of autocracy. To nurture a genuinely democratic political culture takes time because it involves socialisation and inculcation of democratic values in the minds of people. In practice it will involve broad *popular participation* in public affairs, way beyond occasional elections. In this regard, the role of civil society is important. Positioned between the state and the private sphere of the family, the associational life of *civil society* can play an active part in developing such a democratic political culture as an expression of the true spirit of democracy.

The minimum criteria of democracy are relatively concrete and lend themselves to conditionality, at least as far as the holding of free and fair elections are concerned. Through election observation the donor community has acquired an instrument to monitor progress in this regard. It far more difficult to establish monitorable benchmarks as far as development of a democratic political culture is concerned.

Good governance

The NORAD publication *Bistands ABC* [The ABC of Aid] (1992:64) defines good governance as:

[a] political regime which satisfies certain quality requirements, for example absence of corruption, respect for human rights, military expenditures adapted to genuine needs, transparency in the governing institutions, and the political will to be responsible towards the electorate through, among other things, elections [author's unofficial translation].

The key elements in the good governance concept are *accountability* and *transparency*. According to DAC (1995:14) the term is understood in line with the World Bank definition to denote the use of political authority and exercise of control in society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. DAC considers that the rule of law, public sector management, control of corruption and reduction of excessive military expenditure are important dimensions of good governance.

The DAC guidelines (1995:5) emphasise that there is a "vital connection between open, democratic and accountable systems of governance and respect for human rights, and the ability to achieve sustained economic and social development".

When reading aid policy documents, particularly those published by the Bretton Woods institutions, one sometimes gets the impression that good governance implies a specific set of substantive policies, e.g. a liberalist programme of a certain brand. This obfuscates the issue. The definition of good governance should be confined to the management practices and procedures in public institutions being transparent and accountable as well as predictable. In principle, the policy content of the matters handled and processed through those institutions, is immaterial. It is conceivable that a relatively autocratic political regime may subscribe to the tenets of good governance.

3. Bilateral strategies for promotion of human rights and democracy

How can a donor specifically and operationally contribute to inducing political reform and to promoting human rights and democracy in developing countries? In order to answer this overriding question, the range of available strategies will first need to be identified. As shown in the table below, borrowed from Gillies (1996: 49), this range of policy options is wide. He ranks the various options in terms of their 'assertiveness' i.e. the lengths to which a donor is willing and able to go in terms of firmness or toughness to bring about change in the target state.

'Assertiveness' is, of course, not the only dimension along which options could be ranked. One problem with this repertoire of instruments is that it fails to address the unintended ramifications when applied. The side-effects may possibly be contained but Gillies offers few pointers as to how it could be done, except making a cost-benefit analysis of sorts. But in politics, as he concedes, there is no obvious common unit of account. As a general point of departure, the low assertiveness options would presumably be more suitable in the human rights and democratisation sphere. It would be important to adjust the instrument to the stakes at play and the nature of the issue at hand. The highest assertiveness options would probably be ruled out because, if applied, they would violate the very principles they set out to defend.

The effectiveness of the various options would depend on a host of other factors: the channels to be used; the complexity of the situation/issue; the relative power in inter-state relations; the ability to mobilise for joint actions with other donors etc.

In the aid literature a broad distinction is often made between three basic ways in which a donor government can influence another country's policies and actions: 1) pressure; 2) support; 3) persuasion (see for example Ball 1993; Nelson and Englington 1991 and 1992). Borrowing this distinction, it will be stressed that these strategies are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they are often complementary, and donors will tend to make use of variable combinations to promote political reform.

Table 2

A Hierarchy of Democratisation and Human Rights Policy Options⁶

<i>Policy Options</i>	<i>Assertiveness</i>
Quiet diplomacy	Low
Declaratory diplomacy	
Roll-call diplomacy (UN Human Rights Commission)	
Standard setting (UN forums)	
Policy dialogue	
NEGATIVE SIGNALS	Moderate
Grant asylum	
Suspend cultural contacts	
Suspend high-level meetings	
Voluntary investments codes	
Voice criticism in IFI ⁷	
Legislate guidelines on military exports	
Redirect ODA ⁸ to NGOs	
Recall ambassador (temporary)	
POSITIVE SIGNALS	
Increase ODA	
Reduce import tariffs	
Grant most-favoured-nation status	
Provide debt relief	
Increase refugee quotas	
Technical assistance (human rights, democracy, good governance)	
Suspend IFI credits	
Suspend or reduce ODA	
Suspend official export credits	
Impose arms sales embargo	
Recall ambassador (permanent)	
Withdraw most-favoured nation status	
Impose mandatory trade sanctions	
Break diplomatic relations	
Consult with "liberation forces"	
Humanitarian aid to "liberation forces"	
Military and economic aid to "liberation forces"	
Declare war	

⁶ Source Gillies 1996:49.

⁷ IFIs are international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

⁸ ODA is Official Development Assistance.

3.1 Pressure

In international relations exertion of pressure has been perhaps the most common means of influence, ranging from quiet to gunboat diplomacy via an array of sanctions - economic or military. Conditionality is but one instrument of pressure applied in the context of aid relations.

Discussing the conditionality concept

A major feature in the evolution of aid policies in the past two decades has been the introduction, extension and deepening of conditionality (Riddell 1995). Development assistance has increasingly been used as leverage to achieve various changes within developing countries. In the aid terminology and in the aid literature this has become known as aid conditionality (Hewitt and Killick 1996:131). Basically, conditionality means that a donor makes some attachment to the aid distribution. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a condition is "something demanded or required as a prerequisite to granting or performance of something else; a stipulation". This underlines the essentially coercive nature of conditionality. A main element is that the donor is trying to induce the recipient to pursue certain goals and to adopt certain policies, set by the donor, and to which the recipient would otherwise not have given equally high priority or no priority at all. Conditionality is not a single strategy, but a set of strategies that the donor can make use of (Nelson and Englington 1992). The concept of conditionality is used, however, with somewhat varying content.

In the aid literature a distinction is often drawn between *two generations of conditionality*. The *first generation* refers to so-called economic conditionality, introduced, as mentioned above, by the World Bank and the IMF in the early 1980s. Balance of payments and big sector loans were explicitly linked to the adoption of certain economic policies on the recipient side.

Economic conditionality was soon extended to include political conditionality. This so-called *second generation* of conditionality, which is also termed the new conditionality, emerged in the 1990s. Political conditionality made development aid conditional on implementation of political reforms in the recipient countries. Demands within the second generation of conditionality were confined to the promotion and fulfilment of human rights, democracy and good governance objectives, which is the main focus of this study. Political conditionality can be applied bilaterally (in state-to-state relations), but can also be a matter of multilateral agency-to-state relations. The main focus here, however, is on bilateral, state-to-state conditionality.

Conditionality or conditionalities can be attached *ex ante* or *ex post* - also referred to as *ex status quo* and *ex post facto* conditionality (see Stolz et al. 1996:36). *Ex ante* conditionality means that the donor sets the pursuit of certain objectives (here

human rights, democracy and good governance) as a condition before entering into an aid relationship. *Ex post* conditionality is really a contradiction in terms because conditions, by definition, can only be imposed in advance. What it does mean is that a donor expresses beforehand, but vaguely and implicitly, that there is an expectation that certain conditions will be met, and that the donor will consider afterwards what reaction to make if the conditions are not met.

The donor's response to the recipient's meeting or failure to meet the demands can be either negative or positive. *Negative conditionality* means that the donor is threatening to terminate, suspend or reduce aid flows, or is actually doing so, if pre-set conditions are not met by the recipient. To many scholars the conditionality concept covers only negative conditionality (see e.g. Stokke 1995:12). And when conditionality is referred to in the mass media, what is generally meant and understood is this kind of negative conditionality.

Others also include the carrot in addition to the stick, which may be termed *positive conditionality*. By that is meant that the donor is promising additional aid as a reward for "good behaviour", adoption of given policies or achievement of certain goals, set by the donor (see Waller 1995:111; Ball 1992; Nelson and Eglinton 1992). Additional aid resources can, for example, be earmarked for democracy and human rights measures, or given as a direct reward to a government by increasing the general volume of aid, or, for example, balance of payments support and debt relief.

By contrast, withholding balance of payments support and debt relief are the most common forms of sanction by the donor community, when negative conditionality is applied.⁹ This choice of reaction is based on the argument that sanctions at that macro level would "hurt" or affect the government more directly, than would, for example withdrawing project support. The latter would present the donor with the so-called "double penalty" dilemma - which means that also "innocent" recipients would be adversely affected.

Positive and negative conditionality can, in fact, be seen as two sides of the same coin; a negative or a positive reaction from the donor depending on whether the conditions are met or not - in practice a kind of punishment or reward, or as expressed by David Gillies (1996:236): "damned if you do - damned if you don't." Negative and positive conditionality can be used separately, or they can be used in conjunction. One may use conditionality as a reward for "good behaviour" and then try to support and accelerate a positive ongoing process in a particular country, i.e. taking positive measures. This does not necessarily mean that the same country will be punished if certain conditions are not met.

There will obviously be certain technical and budgetary problem in applying positive conditionality. If the overall level of the aid budget is stable from year to

⁹ Interviews in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 19.9.1996, and in Sida 27.8.1996.

year and additional aid is to be given in order to reward a country's positive development, that will cause budgetary strains on the part of the donor if the total volume of aid is not to increase. The latter has definitely not been the trend in recent years; at best aid flows have been stagnant if not decreasing. In the likely scenario that overall aid budgets will not increase in the near future, rewarding one country in line with the positive conditionality logic, would entail reduced aid flows elsewhere. By implication negative conditionality would thus have to be applied to other countries (i.e. leading to reduced volumes elsewhere) if the terms of positive conditionality are to be fulfilled vis-à-vis those performing well. A further operational complication would present itself to a donor if there is a positive trend in one area and a negative trend in another in the same country? Applying combined conditionalities involve many dilemmas, difficult judgements and trade-offs.

John P. Lewis (1993:41) has defined conditionality very broadly to include "donor's efforts of one kind or another to influence recipient policies". This definition seems too broad. Others are using conditionality under various labels like promotional conditionality, also including what in this study will be termed positive measures, which are direct support to projects and programmes within the field of democracy and human rights. In other words, positive measures are here understood as aid being used as a positive lever - as a catalyst towards building democracy and fostering human rights, but with no direct conditionality linkage. This will be called unconditional support for human rights, democracy, and good governance. Scholars like David Gillies (1996:232) and Adrian P. Hewitt and Tony Killick (1996:131) on the other hand, put both positive conditionality and "positive measures" in the same general category of positive conditionality. Still others are talking about positive and negative linkages (Nowak 1995). Positive linkage is what in this study will be termed positive measures, while negative linkage corresponds to negative conditionality. Furthermore, researchers like Samuel S. Mushi (1995:239) distinguishes between two forms of conditionality: explicit and implicit. The explicit variant corresponds, in effect, to negative conditionality, while implicit conditionality corresponds to positive measures.

As one can see there is some confusion with regard to terminology. For the purpose of this study it is considered helpful to make an analytical distinction between three concepts: "negative conditionality", "positive conditionality", and "positive measures". The latter is not linked to the fulfilment of certain conditions beyond completion of the project. "Positive measures" are thus what may be called unconditional support (even though, as mentioned earlier, no aid is really unconditional). "Positive measures" means that resources are distributed directly to projects with explicit aims to improve a country's human rights situation and to further its democratic development.

Notwithstanding their differences, the above mentioned strategies have the same aim of promoting and defending human rights and democratic rule.

Levels of conditionality

Conditionality can be applied at several levels. Walter Stolz (1996:37) distinguishes between four levels of conditionality, while Olav Stokke (1995:13-15) operates with six levels of political conditionality, depending on the degree of political interference. The argument for such differentiation is that intervention at a lower level is "less serious", than intervention at a higher level, but as Stokke (1995:14) notes "no linear relation applies since also other factors influence the degree of legitimacy or illegitimacy of an intervention". Stolz and Stokke are both agreed that the overall trend in recent years has been towards a higher degree of political interference.

One of the main arguments, advanced especially by scholars and politicians from the developing countries themselves, is that conditionality constitutes interference in their internal affairs. Predictably, this will often be the perception in recipient countries, followed by strong resentment of other countries' meddling in their internal affairs. Even though the international donor community has stated repeatedly in recent years, that human rights are no longer the exclusive preserve of domestic affairs, the conditions stipulated within this field do fall in the category of the highest level of interference. As a result, this is an area which has to be treated with circumspection.

Different levels of conditionality are summarised below, based on Stokke and Stolz' categories and the assumption that high level interference is more "serious" than intervention at a lower level. Only four levels of conditionality are covered.

1. Systemic and national level

Conditionality at this level is seen as the highest degree of political intervention, involving the *government and the governing institutions*. At this level the donor attempts to change the *national policies and national priorities* of the country concerned. Most of the demands within the second generation of conditionality belong to this category, e.g. pressure for democratic reforms, introduction of a multi-party system, holding of free and fair elections, improved human rights record, and most of the good governance agenda. In other words, most of the conditions discussed in this study belong basically to this first level.

But it should also be recalled that many of the elements of the first generation of conditionality, i.e. economic conditionality, belong to the systemic level, such as demands to open up for a market economy, the removal of statal steering mechanisms, and demands which try to change the recipient's overall economic policy.

2. Sectoral level

Efforts by a donor to modify a recipient's policy within a specific sector or area also constitute a rather high degree of political interference. But the distinction

between the sector level and the level above may be a bit unclear, since, for instance, demands to change national policies or priorities will often in practice be referring to a particular sector or area. But, as Stokke (1995:14) notes, there is still "a matter of degree involved, which marks the distinction ...". According to this perspective, demands with respect to more widely defined economic reforms will relate to the systemic level, while, for example, demand for a specific currency devaluation belongs to the sector level.

The same logic may be applied to the second generation of conditionality. It may be reasonable to argue, for example, that the so-called good governance agenda as a whole will belong to the systemic level, while more specific demands within this agenda such as public sector transparency may belong to the sector level. At any rate, the main point to be made is that when donors try to induce changes and promote human rights and democracy in recipient countries, they normally operate at a high degree of political intervention.

3. Project and programme level

The third level refers to the financial conditions for projects and programmes. Again, the distinction between this third level and the sector level may be blurred, especially when sector programmes are involved. But when reference is made to intervention at this level, what is involved is selection of certain projects in order to influence policies and priorities at the recipient end. This level of conditionality also covers the financial terms of grants and loans, and tying of procurement.

4. Administrative level

The fourth level refers to interference in the administrative matters of a project, such as accounting, auditing, reporting, evaluation etc. At this lowest level of interference the conditions set are rather to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the aid relationship, and to ensure project accountability.

As noted in the introduction, aid has never been unconditional. Long before the conditionality concept and *problematique* became part of the aid vocabulary, conditions were applied, particularly at what is referred to above as levels three and four. The overall trend in recent years has been intervention at higher levels and an escalation in numbers of conditions applied at all levels, also at lower levels. This has occurred in response to growing demands for greater effectiveness, improvement in quality and procedures to be observed in the various projects and programmes.

The increasing number of conditions applied may well come in conflict with and contribute to the pulverisation of new objectives such as "ownership" and "recipient responsibility".¹⁰ Increasing number of strings attached and more

¹⁰ The concept of "recipient responsibility" became an explicit principle and part of the aid terminology in the late 1980s and early 1990s. "Recipient orientation", on the other hand, had

stringent follow-up routines may contribute to increasingly complex management of detail by the donor and the recipient alike, when simplification was the objective. The worst scenarios may lead to the donors steering projects and programmes in detail, tantamount to a take-over, making a mockery of recipient responsibility. This line of reasoning will not be taken further, it will suffice to say that the content and effects of conditionality are many-faceted and contradictory.

The conditionality concept as used in this report refers mainly to the first level of conditionality and to some extent the second level. i.e. macro conditionality. This is also how political conditionality is applied and understood in policy papers and in the aid literature.

Even though there seems to be a growing consensus regarding the use of conditionality - the EU and the Japanese government perhaps being the most reluctant actors (Hewitt and Killick 1996) - and even if donor after donor have stated that human rights criticism is not to be seen as undue inference in other countries' internal affairs (Norwegian White Paper no. 51 1991-1992), political conditionality is still controversial. Even if there is reluctance or resentment in small or wider circles of developing countries, especially in poor African countries, they often have no alternative but to adjust to the "consensus" in the donor community if external finance is to be secured.

3.2 Support

The support posture by a donor can take many forms. Mainstreaming human rights and democracy in all aid activities is one avenue; positive measures vis-à-vis public institutions or civil society, seen as a separate 'sector', is another vehicle. In either case the action taken must be adapted to the circumstances and political systems at hand.

Integrating human rights into mainstream development co-operation

An alternative to applying pressure as a way of promoting human rights and democracy is to integrate and incorporate such concerns into mainstream development co-operation and to consider the human rights implications of major development schemes, programmes and projects. This avenue needs to be investigated more closely, and will need further operationalisation and concrete

been a main principle of Norwegian aid since its inception, meaning that aid ought to be extended in accordance with the plans and priorities of the recipient. Growing concern about aid dependence later led to the introduction of the principle of "recipient responsibility" which was meant to underscore the recipient's concern and primary responsibility for its own development, based on the acknowledgement that sustainable development could be achieved only if the recipients 'took charge' themselves. The concept also embodies the donors' increased emphasis on economic and political (pre)conditions for aid to be effective. It is seen as a "recipient responsibility" to adapt to such conditions and to create the preconditions, otherwise aid flows might be affected (White Paper no. 51 1991-92).

guidelines tied to mainstream development policy and to implementation practices. So far this course of action has scarcely been studied by the donors at all (Gillies 1996:232). In other words, developing a human rights awareness in mainstream development co-operation ought to be a concern. The first point is, of course, to make sure that human rights are not violated in the process of implementing projects and programmes, affecting adversely, for instance, vulnerable groups, ethnic minorities etc. One should also attempt to strengthen the human rights dimension in project designs, e.g. building in human rights components such as catering for the interests of women. But how could this concern be looked after generally and implemented in practice? Should human rights be a cross-cutting concern, always present in all projects, at all levels?

This particular issue is not central to this study and strictly speaking not part of the terms of reference. Nevertheless, some comments will be offered on the matter, especially since it was raised in a recent memorandum (NORAD 1996)¹¹ by NORAD's special adviser on human rights affairs, as an input to the question of mainstreaming human rights concerns in Norway's development assistance. Comments are also warranted because the memo proposes a strategy and procedure for integrating human rights concerns in all aid activities across the board. Such mainstreaming differs fundamentally from the alternative approach of emphasising projects and programmes specifically devised to achieve objectives in the human rights and democracy field exclusively, rather than one set of objectives among a multiplicity of others such as road construction, electricity generation and the like.

The memo acknowledges that at present there is no coherent strategy which defines and operationalises the human rights component as part of Norwegian aid policy. Taking as its point of departure the increased emphasis given human rights concerns in Norwegian policy documents and in the speeches to Parliament by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Development Co-operation on 10 October 1996, the memo seeks to fill a gap. The policy documents are considered unclear with respect to their operational implications. Is the intention to increase the number of projects in the specific aid area of human rights, or is promotion and protection of human rights to become an integral part of all development co-operation in line with the mainstreaming thinking? The memo interprets the documents to mean the latter. This approach is a tall order, indeed, and, if adopted, raises a number of procedural and substantive questions, depending on how broadly the field of human rights is defined.

It may be argued that all conventional aid projects contribute in some sense to the realisation of economic and social rights - directly or indirectly. For instance, a rural roads project is likely to help peasants market their produce and earn an

¹¹ It should be emphasised that this is not an official NORAD policy document, but rather an internal working paper of a preliminary nature intended as a basis for and an input to the ongoing discussion on these issues in NORAD, as well as in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

income from cash sales. Similarly, a school programme will contribute directly to the education of the population concerned. Apparently, the NORAD memo defines human rights as broadly as this.

There are grounds for questioning the wisdom of this all-embracing approach. At issue is not the substantive contention that, in effect, development co-operation is broadly speaking a grandiose human rights project in that it seeks to enhance the well-being of humankind. What is questioned is rather the practicality and feasibility of the approach suggested - on three grounds.

First, existing competence and capacity in this field is very limited in NORAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It can no doubt be enhanced through systematic staff training etc. But to achieve the desired effect training would have to be generalised and cover a large number of staff at all levels since all projects/activities would, in principle, be subjected to human rights impact assessment. The cost effectiveness of embarking on such a monumental training task may be questioned in view of the competition for staff time and competence from many other tasks to be performed. It should be recalled that total staff capacity is unlikely to increase in the near future. Should human rights assessment across the board be accorded that much higher priority than other legitimate concerns?

Second, it is questionable whether human rights concerns lend themselves to impact assessment as a tool for processing project proposals. At a very general level it does make sense to say that a water supply project will provide access to potable water and thus contribute to the fulfilment of an economic human right. But such a statement is so commonsensical that it is hardly worth making. When trying to trace more complex connections and linkages between project activities and human rights realisation, the intractable problems of attribution and causality emerge. The intervening factors are so many and so diverse that claims to the effect that the realisation of a social or economic right for a specific population is attributable to a given project would be hard to substantiate. For instance, how can assistance to macro-economic modelling be said to have a beneficial human rights impact? If a human rights impact assessment procedure were to be introduced, there is a distinct risk that to comply officers would merely produce generalities and platitudes of little operational value. If that were to happen, the whole exercise would become a meaningless ritual, not a steering tool.

Also, there is the problem of weighting. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that human rights impact assessment were feasible technically speaking, what weight would be assigned to that assessment as opposed to other objectives of the project? Should a negative (adverse human rights impact) or neutral result (no discernible impact one way or the other) from a human rights impact assessment be allowed to torpedo an otherwise sensible project? Admittedly, such trade-offs present themselves in many situations when dealing with multiple objectives.

However, in the case of human rights the parameters tend to become so vague and diffuse that no sensible trade-off is possible.

Third, in development co-operation there are already several so-called cross-sectoral concerns, such as the environment, women, and hiv/aids. With regard to the two first ones standardised checklists and impact assessment procedures have been elaborated and put into force. The NORAD memo suggests that a corresponding human rights checklist be work out and procedures for so-called human rights impact assessments be instituted. Again, assuming, for the sake of argument, that the idea is a good one, that it is doable for aid workers technically, and that competence and capacity are available - what would be the impact on the recipient side? It is not unlikely that the recipient may perceive donor insistence on human rights impact assessment in all projects as yet another conditionality demanding additional administrative resources and competence which may be lacking. Donors would be well advised to be more sensitive to the procedural and administrative constraints on the part of the recipients and adjust their demands accordingly. This applies *a fortiori* to a relationship which the donor wants to be based on the principle of 'recipient responsibility'.

Positive measures for democracy and human rights

What is meant by positive measures for democracy and human rights in concrete terms? How many different types of measures are at our disposal? How do they work? How effective are they? Which measures are of particular interest to Norway in this regard? Have other donors garnered experiences on which we may draw?

Positive measures comprise a wide range of different projects and areas of support. There may be hundreds of different projects worthy of donor support, (see for example DAC 1993). Examples of various projects can be listed, but the list would by no means be exhaustive, only illustrative. Since there are so many potential projects, it may be more useful to try and identify typologies of measures or what we can call clusters of measures. In principle there are two main ways in which a donor can offer assistance in this field: either through public authorities or through civil society (Heinz, Lingnau, Waller 1995; Stolz et al. 1996).

Reforming public authorities

A country's system of governance may be divided into three basic branches: the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. In the execution of policies and programmes the Executive has at its disposal a civil service or a bureaucracy to handle day-to day matters. A donor may assist projects and programmes designed to improve the performance and enhance the accountability and transparency of any one of these branches of government, or all of them.

The Executive (including the civil service)

Activities aiming at developing active support and respect for human rights and democracy within this branch of government could seek to encourage efficient and transparent practices, eradicate corruption, and inculcate respect for human rights among civil servants, especially within the police and the armed forces. Concrete areas of action might be support for improving the police and the prison system. This could be done through seminars, training programmes, technical assistance etc.

The Legislature

The aim of projects directed at this branch of government would be to ensure consultation and participation by the people in political life, and to improve the functioning of democratic institutions, such as parliament and the legislative committees. Concrete areas of actions might be electoral support and post-electoral follow-up, strengthening parliament and training of parliamentarians, assistance to drawing up constitutions, monitoring of elections, voter education etc. Support for the establishment of an ombudsman may also be put in this category. This is an institution often created by parliament, but functioning independently of the three branches of government.

The Judiciary

The overall aim of assisting the Judiciary is to strengthen the rule of law, to protect human rights, and to ensure reliable, just and independent administration of justice. A Judiciary which operates separately and independently from state interests and private influences is critical in order to protect human rights. Areas of action may be training of judges and lawyers, widening access to the judicial system through legal aid, establishing alternative mechanisms for resolving disputes, strengthening of courts etc. Financial support can be given to or channelled through, for example, the International Commission of Jurists, training of judges and court rapporteurs, organisation of seminars where these problems are on the agenda, and elaboration of legal codes for minors.

Strengthening civil society

Assisting NGOs working in the fields of human rights and democracy

The purpose of assisting NGOs working in the fields of human rights and democracy is to help promote and develop an awareness regarding these issues, and to enable people and civil society claim their rights. An emerging civil society is important to critically observe and criticise abuses by public authorities. Examples of concrete projects may be support to national and regional human right commissions and human rights institutes.

Assisting independent mass media

Assisting the free and independent mass media contributes to the free expression of public opinion. Free and independent mass media are important as meeting places of public dialogue, as mechanisms for exposing corruption and other forms of mismanagement which pose a threat to an emerging democracy. Specific areas of action within this category of assistance include training of journalists, support for documentation centres etc.

Assisting vulnerable groups

This type of assistance aims at enabling vulnerable groups, often discriminated against or neglected by the state, to claim their rights and to withstand suppression by public authorities or others. Vulnerable groups may include indigenous peoples, other minorities, children and women. Concrete projects might be legal assistance for women, support for organisations working for the protection of children's rights.

Many of the measures taken by donors are often small and scattered thinly over various sectors and on many projects (see Appendix 1 in the case of Norway). All the listed sectors may, of course, be important in their own right, but since any donor has limited amounts of money at its disposal, especially a relatively minor one like Norway, priorities have to be made and strategic sectors have to be identified. The strategic sectors have to be identified both on the basis of a thorough analysis of the needs in the recipient country, how the different sectors are functioning etc., and also in collaboration with the public authorities and/or groups in civil society. But the donor should also consider its comparative advantage and in what field its particular expertise lies. And it would be even better in terms of impact if measures could be co-ordinated with other donors.

Types of political system

Both the effect of positive measures, what particular measures should be used, and which channels one should make use of, and/or which channels are possible to make use of, must be seen in relation to the type of political system in place at the recipient end. Or as Walter Stolz (1996:26) puts it, positive measures must be seen "in relation to different phases of political development." It would be helpful, therefore, to try and identify various phases in the development of political systems. Stolz (1996:26; see also Heinz, Lingnau and Waller 1995) has identified eight such stages of political development as listed and discussed below. It must be emphasised, however, that the eight phases of political development by no means must be seen or understood as a result of a linear or inherent orderliness, implying that all countries go through all these stages in due course. There is no empirical substantiation, or theoretical basis for that matter, for such an assumption. These eight phases reflect political systems that can be observed today (Stolz 1996). It may, nevertheless, be justified to argue that this categorisation is too broad and does not fully reflect the variations between today's political systems, and also, on

the other hand, that distinctions between the different stages may be blurred. A country may jump over some stages or face major setbacks.

For the purpose of this report, this categorisation is merely considered as an analytical tool and framework for further discussion. Even though the categorisation must be treated with flexibility and discernment, it is useful and perhaps also necessary to try to identify various political systems, because taking decisions about which measures to adopt and judging which measures are possible to implement, will depend on how the political systems are functioning. Will a certain political system allow intervention by way of positive measures at all? Under what circumstances will interventions be feasible? To be able to answer such questions it is important that the donors look closely at the political system of the recipient country in order to judge how wide is the room for manoeuvre, where and how could measures be implemented? To make such analyses of specific systems and to monitor their evolution requires considerable skill and capacity on the part of the donor.

1. Authoritarian systems:

- a. Closed systems;
- b. Dispersed authoritarian systems;
- c. Partially open systems.

2. Countries in transition to democracy:

- a. Preparation for transition;
- b. Democracies in the making.

3. Established formal democracies:

- a. Structurally deficient democracies;
- b. Democracy in the phase of consolidation;
- c. Functioning democracies.

Authoritarian and so-called semi-authoritarian systems are under strong control by one party or a dictatorial regime. Many of the so-called one-party states in Africa prior to 1991 fall in this category - countries like Kenya under Moi before 1991 (even though many will argue that this is the case also after 1991) and Banda's Malawi are examples of classical authoritarian regimes. When an authoritarian system is dispersed there is no central state authority. Power is divided between different factions. When a system is partially open, for example Indonesia, one may find open entry points and niches that make it possible for local and international NGOs to operate.

Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian systems are often characterised by a poor human rights record, and it goes without saying that democratic institutions are lacking. For a donor to intervene with positive measures open channels of entry are required. It is a paradox, therefore, that where positive measures are most

needed they seem to be least effective and vice versa. This means that positive measures as defined in this report is a feasible option only under sub-category c. *partially open systems* of the first main category referred to above.¹² Perhaps the greatest challenge for a donor will be to identify appropriate points and niches of entry. This is a challenge for NORAD and the respective embassies, but also for Norwegian NGOs in co-operation with local and international NGOs.

When a clear expression of political will has emerged by the incumbent government to hand over power to the winner after democratic elections have been held - in other words when democratic elections are in preparation - we may talk about *countries in transition to democracy*.

According to Heinz, Lingnau and Waller (1995:19) a country will enter the post-electoral phase - *democracy in the making* - after the first free and fair election has been held and a realignment of political forces has occurred as a result. In election observation the terms freedom and fairness of elections are not used as much any longer, however, because they are so controversial, ambiguous and defy precise definition (Geisler 1993). Once a democracy in the making has set up formal democratic institutions, e.g. parliament, executive, and judiciary - an established democratic system is in place.

In the third stage, especially in *structurally deficient democracies*, the democratic institutions may be rather constrained or not fully independent. At this stage violations of human rights may be commonplace due to, e. g., ethnic tensions, which is perhaps one of the biggest challenges for many African states at this juncture, of which Kenya can again serve as a good example. Another possible cause of human rights violations is exclusion of large segments of the population from political participation, partly on ethnic grounds. Norway's three so-called programme countries under consideration below, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, will serve as illustrations of system types. Nearly all of Norway's programme countries fall in categories 2b and 3a.

In the phase of democratic consolidation the human rights record will have improved, but there are still problems when it comes to institutionalisation of democratic practices and procedures. A bottleneck at this stage can be, for example, that important sectors of society are still under authoritarian control.

When democracy is functioning satisfactorily the human rights record is generally good and all rights are in principle fully accepted and upheld, and the system is no longer suffering from major deficits of democratic governance.

¹² This does not mean that it is impossible to influence the behaviour of an authoritarian regime, only that the donor would have to use other tools, e. g. an international embargo.

3.3 Persuasion and dialogue

Persuasion and policy dialogue differ from conditionality because they are non-coercive; there is, in principle, no linkage between performance and supply of aid. They also differ from positive measures because there is no explicit reference to a certain development project, or action to be taken. This "strategy" is not at the centre of attention in this study, but will be mentioned very briefly, because policy dialogue constitutes the framework and basis for many of the other strategies mentioned, and because policy dialogue is mentioned by the Norwegian government as the main strategy within this field.

Persuasion and policy dialogue are efforts by a donor to convince the recipient that changing its policies makes sense. The donors may use various channels and settings to influence their counterparts and achieve this, e.g. international conferences. A much used forum for discussion of conditionality issues in the economic sphere is the so-called Consultative Group meetings under the auspices of the World Bank. Occasionally they have also been used to raise political questions, mostly related to good governance. Although such meetings are highly asymmetrical in attendance and power relations, adjunct fora with a different structure might be established for free discussion of general political issues of mutual interest.

Persuasion can also be practised through research, by which the understanding of the various alternatives are shared between researchers from the donor and the recipient countries alike. There may also be more informal discussions between foreign ambassadors and political leaders, as well as formal state visits. Norway's annual country programme negotiations with recipient countries are probably the most suitable framework for dialogue and persuasion. For instance, there is reason to believe that Norway's perseverance in raising gender issues in country programme negotiations has had a positive impact.

There is no doubt that dialogue and persuasion requires a long time horizon to produce results. But this method has two advantages over coercive approaches. First, even if results will be slow in coming they are likely to be much more sustainable because they grow from within, albeit with a little bit of help from friends. Second, it corresponds better to the spirit of democracy which the donors purport to adhere to; conversely, conditionality is inherently anti-democratic.

4. Linkage diplomacy: linking aid and human rights

How do the various strategies work? Are they effective, and if so, under which conditions are they effective? A few studies have been done to answer these questions, but they are too few to allow firm or far-reaching conclusions to be drawn. Are there any analytical methods or an analytical framework, which can serve as guidelines for the donors in order to choose a strategy and help the donors predict the effect and outcome of different strategies under varying conditions? It might be useful to draw some lessons from international relations (IR) theory. Chien-Pin Li (1993:349-370) has tried to develop a framework for analysing the mechanism which in IR theory is termed *linkage diplomacy*; and its effectiveness under varying conditions.

Linkage diplomacy, as defined in IR theory, is a technique of influence, where one state tries to induce changes in another state's behaviour. This technique of influence is used by making policy on one issue contingent on another state's behaviour on a different issue. National governments "project their power from one area of strength to secure objectives in areas of weakness" (Oye et al. 1979:13). This is basically the same mechanism or process which takes place when a donor is using aid as a tool to influence the policy or behaviour in a recipient country. We can thus draw an analogy to an aid relationship. Aid money, which the recipient is more or less dependent on, can be seen as the donor's strength. The recipient's poor human rights record and/or (un)willingness to democratise can be seen as the donor's weakness. By making promises (giving more aid) and/or threats (reduction or suspension of aid), the initiator state (the donor in our context) seeks the co-operation of its target state (the recipient) in an area (human rights and democracy) over which it possesses little control.¹³ Li's model is based on two important dimensions, namely the *issue* and the *actor*. These are seen as crucial to understanding or predicting the outcome of linkage diplomacy. This means that the nature of the issue and the nature of the relationship between the actors will influence the result.¹⁴

First, Li's argument will be outlined. Notwithstanding the fact that Li in his analysis defines linkage diplomacy only as economic sanctions in a negative sense, or what in the aid terminology and in this study corresponds to negative conditionality, his

¹³ In an aid relationship, which is the focus of this report, the target state will correspond to the recipient, while the initiator state is defined as the donor.

¹⁴ Li is also trying to make a contribution in order to build a bridge between the arguments of the realists and the opposing view, which has been put forward by dependency theorists.

model of linkage diplomacy will be adapted to the purposes of this report. It would be useful to see if lessons can be drawn from another kind of linkage diplomacy, namely when a donor tries to induce changes towards improving the recipient's human rights record or accelerating the democratisation process.

The first component in Li's model is the nature of the issues that are linked. Li distinguishes between three types of issues, based on whether the issues at stake are identifiable and quantifiable:¹⁵

1. Concrete/substantive issues;
2. Symbolic issues;
3. Transcendent issues.

Trade, aid, and investment are examples on *concrete/substantive issues*, since they are generally both observable and quantifiable. Issues of dispute within this category, according to Li, relate to "specified" and "well-defined" themes. Their economic consequences are the primary concern. In these cases countries differ over allocation of revenue, with little interest in abstract and ideological debates (Li 1993:351). Most economic demands on expropriation claims, level of taxation, prices of specific goods or materials, fall into this category.

The second types are *symbolic issues*, which are also easy to identify, e.g. control or change of a piece of territory, or withdrawal of troops. These issues are intangible and hard to measure because they are tied to prestige and national pride.

The third category are the so-called *transcendent issues*, which are both difficult to identify and to measure. Generally declared goals like defence and promotion of democracy, containment of communism, improvement of human rights records, and unfriendly rhetoric and/or behaviour are examples of issues in this category. Li claims that these issues are characterised by lack of a well-defined policy content. He argues, further, that "the concerns of these objectives are so abstract that their mundane meanings cannot be clarified; in addition, it is virtually impossible to determine the relative gain or loss on these issues" (Li 1993:352).

Li hypothesises that if other things are equal, the substantive linkages are most likely to succeed, while transcendent linkages are least likely to succeed. The main reason for this, is that substantive issues are easier to observe and count, and therefore easier for the target country to implement and for the initiator state to monitor.

One may argue that this typology seems too broad, and sometimes even blurred. However, within the different categories it is possible to rank various issues to make the scheme more specific. The purpose of making such a list is to show and

¹⁵ The typologies are borrowed from Mansbach and Vasquez (1981).

to be able to test whether different types of issues will have different effects on the result and to assess the effectiveness of the linkage strategies.

The other main component in Li's model is the actor dimension. Li asserts that the nature of the relationship between the actors will also influence the result of different linkage strategies. Based on the general literature within this field, Li suggests that two conditions will be useful in predicting the result of the different linkage processes: *penetration* and *similarity*. Penetration refers to asymmetrical dependence between countries (Li 1993:355). Penetration is, according to Li, often defined by economic dominance, but can also be wider and deeper, covering political, social and cultural fields as well. Li claims that penetration, moreover, can take the form of information and propaganda activities, financial subsidy of some associations, and military and financial aid. Although it may be a truism, the asymmetrical dependence between donor and recipient in aid relationships is quite pronounced; the recipient is far more dependent on the donor than vice versa.

Similarity, on the other hand, refers to the ideological commonality or shared values between the countries in question. Li acknowledges that ideological proximity is not an adequate precondition for creating a sphere of common interest, but claims that similarity in political ideology can reinforce the influence exerted by initiator states (donors) on target states (recipients).

This model was tested by Li on a sample of 118 cases of economic sanctions between 1914 and 1983, initiated by states and international organisations. Li's findings revealed that linkage politics in pursuit of substantive issues were most successful, and succeeded, in fact, in all the cases in this category. Second most successful were symbolic issues, which succeeded in 43.2 per cent of the cases analysed. Least successful were linkages involving transcendent issues, which succeed in only 32 per cent of the cases.

But some reservations may be raised with regard to the composition of the case material, which was, in fact, somewhat biased. Symbolic issues were involved in nearly three-quarter of the incidents, accounting for 88 out of 118 cases. Transcendent linkages ranked second, with about one-fifth or 25 out of 118 cases, while substantive linkages constituted only 5 of the cases, which means a mere 4 per cent. It may be justified, therefore, to question the universality of the findings; further analyses are needed before generally valid conclusions can be drawn. There is also reason to believe that the sample composition of types of issues might have been a bit different for the period after 1983, than for the period under investigation by Li, especially if the cases analysed involved traditional aid relationships. This is most likely because imposition of both economic and political conditionality has been increasing dramatically since 1983. Many issues within the definition of economic and political conditionality fall in the category of substantive and transcendent issues respectively. To complicate the picture even more,

interference in other countries' affairs, which this kind of linkages invariably entails, will contain an element of national pride and prestige.

Despite these qualifications, the findings support Li's hypothesis, that the less observable and less countable the linkage issue is, the likelihood of success is decreasing. Drawing on these findings, political conditionality can be expected to be less effective, especially if the stipulated demands are general and vague, as they often are in political statements and policy papers. Of course, one may argue that both economic and political conditionalities can be more or less tangible, and that distinctions are indeed blurred. General macro-economic conditionality seems less observable and quantifiable than demands for multi-party elections. But as a rule, economic conditionality is normally more operationalised than political conditionality.

Very little empirical research has been done on the effectiveness of political conditionality. When discussing lessons parallels are often drawn from experiences related to economic conditionality (see e.g. Orwa 1995). According to Li's argument, however, findings from economic conditionality, are not automatically transferable to political conditionality. In fact, political conditionality is less likely to be successful than economic conditionality. But one way of increasing the likelihood of a positive outcome is to make the imposed conditions more concrete and quantifiable. Nonetheless, more research is needed within this field, since drawing general lessons from experiences with economic conditionalities is highly questionable.

Li's analysis also revealed that regardless of the nature of the issue involved, the linkage strategy was most effective if the target country (the recipient in our terminology) wished to identify or identified itself with initiator state (the donor) in terms of values or ideology. The more the target state and the initiator shared the same standards or values, the probability of a positive outcome, as seen by the initiator state, would increase. Conversely, if the distance between the two is great in terms of basic and ideological values, and the incentives for the target state to change its attitude or policy are few, and the only means is pressure, then this strategy is less likely to be effective, i.e. the target state is less likely to comply. Should the target state or the recipient be compliant after all, this will rather depend on how much the initiator is dominating the target state economically or politically. In other words, if the initiator state is a dominant aid or trade partner, as for example in the USA-Kenya relationship, Kenya is more likely to give in to pressure put forward by the USA, than from a relative minor donor like Norway in both a political and economic sense.¹⁶

Applying the similarity argument to the Norway-Tanzania aid relationship would suggest that Norway's probability of success in influencing Tanzania would be high

¹⁶ In 1990 the diplomatic relations between Norway and Kenya were broken off and the aid relationship terminated.

on two counts. First, although still a small donor Norway is a relatively bigger donor to Tanzania than to Kenya, especially before 1986. Second, Tanzania and Norway are perceived to share values to a far greater extent than do (did) Norway and Kenya; Tanzania would thus be more likely to identify with the position of Norway.

In conventional IR theory, there have been two opposing views or models on how states interact and co-operate.¹⁷ The first one is called the "bargaining model", which "specifies a causal relation between the delivery (or denial) of various rewards by the initiating country and the compliant foreign policy behaviour of target states" (Li 1993:350). This perspective is based on traditional power analysis, which sees linkage diplomacy as the target states' future behaviour to be conditional on the initiator states' promises of reward or threats of punishment. Punishment can, for example, take the form of donor threats to cut or reduce the level of aid to a recipient or other kinds of economic threats like trade embargoes. Rewards can be promises by a donor to increase the amount of aid, if certain conditions are met by the recipient. In these examples, one may say that the donor is using its economic clout to put pressure on the recipient. Whether linkage diplomacy will work or not, according to the bargaining model, will depend on the calculated costs of alternative courses of actions made by the target state.

An opposing view is the consensus perspective, or what is termed the "model of consensus". From this perspective the linkage strategy is seen as mutually desired rather than unilaterally coerced. Within this perspective it is argued, as by Moon (1985), that compliant behaviour by the target states is attributed to the penetration of dominant political, economic or cultural systems via foreign influence. In terms of this model, successful linkage will result not from coercion, but from value infusion and installation. This strategy is a more gradual and slower process, and there will, of course, be a danger of relapse.

Instead of seeing these two models or perspectives as conflictual, Li suggests and argues that they are just different mechanisms working under varying conditions or contexts. One may go even further by adapting these models to the aid sphere by arguing that they are working as different mechanisms depending on whether the donor is using negative conditionality or positive measures in order to change the recipient's policy or behaviour. The "bargaining model" can be seen as the mechanism in operation when negative conditionality is applied. The term bargaining may in this regard be misleading, since, in view of the asymmetrical power relations, it is often more a matter of applying pressure than actual bargaining. The consensus model can be seen as the mechanism in operation when so-called positive measures are taken; the donor is trying to change policy slowly from within the recipient.

¹⁷ For a more thorough discussion, see among others Morgan 1990 and Morrow 1992.

Whereas Li merely offers a description and analysis of a number of linkage cases over an historical period, his concepts and models could be used normatively, pro-actively and prescriptively by the donor community. For instance, efforts by donors to operationalise the issues and to establish benchmarks with a view to monitor progress, can be seen as one way of moving so-called transcendent issues (in Li's terminology) of human rights and democracy closer to the category of tangible substantive issues. This could help enhance effectiveness.

5. Donor policies

5.1 Introduction

All the so-called like-minded countries - Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada and Norway - pursue similar aid policies. They allocate a relatively high proportion of GNP to development aid and put great emphasis on human rights and democracy. The like-minded countries also have a vocal domestic public opinion and articulate parliaments on human rights matters. Furthermore, they were pioneers in making an explicit link between human rights and development aid.¹⁸

Supporting democracy and human rights has been a principal objective of Swedish development aid since its very inception in the early 1960s, even though it was initially not given much emphasis in practice (Dunér 1991:20). In the mid-1970s countries like Norway and the Netherlands brought human rights considerations into the aid debate, and issued special White Papers on these issues.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it took more than a decade before these considerations were elaborated into a direct linkage between development aid and human rights. In 1986 Norway made human rights an objective of development aid, and was followed by Denmark and Canada in 1987 and 1988 respectively. But at the time the focus was more on *protection* than *promotion*, and on how to react to grave human rights violations, by applying negative conditionality. As formulated by Anders Krab-Johansen (1995:17), it seemed to be "a conditional reflex to think of sanctions as soon as human rights conditionality is mentioned". As an alternative to this negative approach a new concept, positive conditionality, appeared in the early 1990s, i.e. within the European Commission.²⁰ Literally, this concept referred to the carrot rather than the stick (see chapter three), but it also comprised positive measures, or "unconditional support",²¹ even though some donors gave some weight to the carrot aspect. The donors increasingly started to focus on direct

¹⁸ Reference is made to political and civil rights, as the general perception among these donors seems to be that traditionally nearly all aid contributes, by definition, to the fulfilment of basic economic and social human rights. This is, of course, an argument which warrants qualification, and which may also be questionable. However, that is beyond this study's terms of reference and will, therefore, not be discussed here.

¹⁹ See White Paper no. 93 1976-77 [On Norway and the International Protection of Human Rights]; see also the Policy Memorandum of 1979 issued by the Dutch government.

²⁰ Interview in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 February 1997.

²¹ Positive measures are sometimes confused with and used synonymously with positive conditionality, and sometimes, as in this context, a third strategy, as reward for good behaviour.

support and on fostering human rights, and after the end of the Cold War also on democracy. The Australian aid agency (AusAID 1995) expressed it most clearly, that insufficient attention has been given to civil and political rights in the past, and that there now seemed to be a need to explore new opportunities for such support. The donors had also earlier, of course, supported human rights projects, even though more rarely. In the 1990s special guidelines have been formulated, and some donors have set aside special funds for these activities.

This part of the study discusses these new policies, concepts and strategies which have been conceived and formulated, particularly among the like-minded countries. Attention is also given to the volume and administrative mechanism for such support, before looking at experiences and lessons learned. The practice of linking human rights and democracy to development aid may vary among these donors, and the operationalisation and development of guidelines remain very unfinished. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between the so-called like-minded countries with regard to human rights policies. Instead of going into detail on each country, general trends are highlighted, as well as similarities and differences.

The section below is limited mainly to the four like-minded countries Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Norway. Norwegian experiences and challenges, particularly in promoting human rights and democracy, especially through positive measures, are discussed in more detail in chapter six. Some attention is given to the last country in the like-minded group, Canada, and to the European Commission. Reference is also made to discussions within DAC, which has established a working group of its own, dealing specifically with these issues. The new concept of GG and PD (Good Governance and Participatory Development) stems from this working group.

Many countries have reorganised their Foreign Ministries in recent years as a response to international upheavals and new challenges, which may also have implications for aid policies. A more integrated approach to foreign policy has become the order of the day. The Dutch Foreign Ministry, for example, drew up its new structure as late as in September 1996, and is still trying to adapt to the new circumstances. As a result, the statistical records of disbursements for 1996 are still not ready. Many of the countries are also in the process of formulating new guidelines on human rights and democracy. Some of the findings of this study may, therefore, be of a somewhat preliminary nature, based on interviews and available policy documents.

5.2 Principles and policies

With increased emphasis on human rights in the 1980s, based on the International Bill of Rights, this policy area became a main priority in the development aid of the like-minded countries. Most recently it was stated clearly in Sida's policy and action plan on the prevention of conflict, protection of human rights and promotion

of democracy that: "[Sweden] is a signatory or has acceded to the International Conventions on Human Rights, is bound to their observance and committed to their implementation world-wide. These Conventions thus form part of the framework of this policy" (Sida 1996:2). The Netherlands, however, has not given human rights an equally explicit aim, even though they are seen as an important aspect and a major area in Dutch development aid.²² After the end of the Cold War democracy was increasingly linked to development aid, and included among the development objectives. Also the European Commission has given increased emphasis to human rights and democracy. With Lomé IV (1990, art. 5) a human rights clause was for the first time introduced by the European Commissions in the text of the agreement itself. On 28 November 1991 the European Council adopted a resolution on human rights, democracy and development.

At least at the policy level no clear distinction was made between the two concepts of human rights and democracy. While Sweden has democracy as one of its stated objectives, it seems to include human rights as well, Denmark has human rights as one of its stated development objectives, also embracing democracy. This apparent conceptual confusion is related, of course, to the fact that most donors see human rights and democracy as interdependent, or at least inextricably linked. A statement from a Swedish strategy paper may serve as an illustration: "where human rights are respected, there is in practice democracy" (DAC 1996). However, irrespective of this relationship the Swedish point of departure has been that respecting human rights and democracy have their own intrinsic value, and that this is a sufficient justification for using Swedish aid as an instrument to promote human rights and democracy (Falk 1994:136). When Denmark since 1989 has been in the process of reducing its number of programme countries with a view to concentrating aid to no more than 20 countries, one of the seven selection criteria was human rights respect. This process was completed in 1995, when Malawi was chosen as the 20th programme country (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996:23)

Many of the DAC members have broadened their objective even further to include good governance as well. The most recent Canadian policy paper, *Canada in the World* (1995), defined human rights, democracy and good governance as one out of six programme priorities. In addition, human rights and democracy, and to some extent good governance, are seen as mutually reinforcing as well as separate objectives in themselves. Often they are seen as instruments for the development of sustainable societies in a broad sense, for poverty reduction, as well as contributing to a more secure and equitable world. This broad view is perhaps most clearly expressed by Canada. But similar statements have been made by e.g. the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DANIDA 1993). Likewise, Sida (1996:1) has stated that: "Development is intimately linked to peace, security, democracy and respect for human rights". All the like-minded donors have thus made their aid more or less conditional on political reforms in the recipient countries. Australia, on the other

²² Interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997.

hand, which also has human rights among its objectives, is one of the few Western donors, which does not accept that aid be made conditional on moves towards democracy (DAC 1996:15).

However, the main principle among nearly all donors is that a positive and more co-operative approach is seen as preferable, and that conditionality is only for the extreme cases. That was also the main strategy in the 1980s, but the positive aspects have been given increased emphasis in the 1990s. It may be said that the policy in this regard has become softer. Even so, the Dutch government stated already in 1979 that "violations of human rights may not automatically be followed with a discontinuance of development aid" (quoted from Nordholt 1995:150). By contrast, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993:12) stated as late as in 1993 that "development aid should not continue to be disbursed to countries where the human rights situation is deteriorating" [author's translation]. However, according to several interviewees in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs this view is outdated; in such situations one would instead try to identify other channels for aid disbursement.²³ Nevertheless, all the like-minded countries have made statements with basically the same content, i.e. that negative conditionality, meaning withdrawal, reduction, or rechannelling of aid, will only be applied if and when the recipient government can be held responsible for grave and systematic human rights violations. But in the eyes of the Dutch government, negative conditionality is for the extreme cases only. The latest Dutch policy document, *A World of Dispute* (The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993:22-23), states that:

... There is a growing consensus that positive measures (aid aimed at promoting good governance) should be the rule, and negative measures (conditionality) the exception. Examples of the former are aid to help establish efficient government and judicial institutions, to shape a democratic culture both from below (participation) and from above (accountable government), to supervise electoral processes, to fight corruption and to demobilise militarised societies. Support for good government is now an important aspect of Dutch development co-operation. [...] In addition, donors are justified for reasons of development policy in reducing or even stopping the provision of aid in cases of flagrant or systematic violation of human rights, serious reductions in democracy and protracted and excessive military expenditure.

The European Commission's resolution on Human Rights and Democratic Development of November 1991 states that the Commission will go very far in avoiding application of negative conditionality, but concedes that this can be done in exceptional cases, e.g. in instances of "gross and continuous human rights violations". Some of the donors also indicate that if negative conditionalities are to be imposed, this should be done together with other donors (DAC 1996:8).

Few donors have a clear policy when it comes to positive conditionality, even though this is often the other side of the coin (cf. chapter three). The Dutch policy

²³ Interviews in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1996.

paper *A World of Difference* (1990) opened up for positive conditionality by presenting development aid as a reward in a democratisation process. This is not explicitly mentioned or further developed in the latest policy document, even though it is mentioned that " ... there is every reason to support those government services and private organisations in developing countries which are striving to achieve a lasting improvement in the administration of justice and in civil and political freedoms" (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993:23). The Norwegian White Paper no. 51 (1991-92:214) states that a positive development in a country may pave the way for increased disbursement of resources, in cases where other circumstances are favourable.

But according to several interviewees in the Swedish, Danish, and Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs it was acknowledged that a clear strategy on positive conditionality or any kind of reward mechanism had not been developed. However, it was admitted that such a mechanism could and would be applied in practice. On the part of Sweden it was suggested that more flexible funds like the regional allocation could be used for such purposes, or this could be the effect of the use of this allocation.²⁴

Even though applied in practice the conditionality concept is hardly referred to in policy papers. Aid bureaucrats do not like the term, and admit that a clear strategy does not exist. Nor is it desirable, both because it may be politically sensitive and because the donors do not want to play that card; they prefer space and flexibility to political manoeuvring.

Nevertheless, there is a broad consensus that the main strategy will be to support positive processes through positive measures that can contribute to democracy and respect for human rights. Both how can the donors contribute, in which areas and how should the donors support these processes? In practice the donors will have to prioritise because all good things do not necessarily go together.

5.3 Guidelines and areas of action for positive measures

To date the operational guidelines in this field of development assistance seem to have been poorly developed, both because it is a new field and because it is complex and often politically sensitive. The only existing guidelines are those elaborated by Norway, *Support for Democratic Development*, issued by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1992.²⁵ The point of departure in this fairly general document is how to strengthen democratisation; it does not deal particularly with human rights as such. This document is rather a description of various important factors in a democratic society with some indications as to how a

²⁴ The regional allocation in Sweden is not disbursed, however, on the basis of some kind of competition between various countries or/and projects like it is in Norway.

²⁵ The English version, however, was issued in 1993.

donor can contribute. On the Norwegian side there exists no strategy on how to promote human rights within the aid framework. The Netherlands has no particularly strategy paper for this sector either, whereas Sida (1993) and DANIDA (1993) have issued special reports on these issues. What is common to these reports is their very general nature. They seem merely to be suggesting a number of possible areas of intervention. None of the donors have developed more specific country strategies for this particular area.

The need for improved guidelines is acknowledged among the donors. Norway is currently in the process of specifying the guidelines further. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has made plans to work out a new policy document on this field in the course of 1997. Sida has just completed its policy and action plan on the prevention of conflict, protection of human rights and promotion of democracy, lead by Ingemar Gustafson, who is the head of the Department of Democracy within the new, reorganised Sida. This work started in response to a request by the Swedish government. Sida was to analyse the totality of bilaterally funded projects aimed at promoting democracy, human rights and conflict management. Sida was also instructed to propose a coherent policy, action plan and organisational structure for dealing with this issues. The work has just been completed, but not yet approved, let alone implemented. Denmark is also to work out its new strategy in the near future.

Nevertheless, it is very difficult to make guidelines for such a broad and complex field. They tend to remain very general and abstract. It seems to be more useful to develop country-specific strategies, which must, in turn, be based on more operational guidelines than the rudiments already existing.

The interpretation varies as to what should be included under the heading "positive measures" for human rights and democracy, and must be seen in the light of the diverging perceptions of what human rights and democracy are deemed to include. If one adopts the broad approach that all development co-operation is quintessentially human rights support, it would be impossible to identify particular human rights projects. Some countries such as Denmark include humanitarian aid in the general category of human rights. Norway and Sweden do not include humanitarian aid in general in the category of human rights and democracy projects. Conflict resolution, however, *is* included.

Nevertheless, most activities classified as human rights projects in reports to DAC refer to civil and political rights (DAC 1996). Projects under this label include e.g. support to official human rights institutions and organisations, NGOs engaged in legal aid and advocacy, and improved conditions for prisoners. For countries applying such an interpretation it is to a certain extent possible to separate democracy projects from human rights activities. Examples of the former are electoral assistance and monitoring, support for political parties etc. (see chapter

three). Many projects will, however, fall in a grey zone and may be put in either category.

One of the most difficult and greatest challenges for the new democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa is a weak or barely existing political opposition. Political parties are generally weak, particularly organisationally, and command few economic resources. Most donors have, however, taken a clear stand on the issue of financing or supporting political parties: a donor may support political *movements*, but not political *parties*.²⁶ If a political movement grows into a political party, donor support will be discontinued. This stance is based on the argument that donors are averse to becoming political actors by proxy in foreign countries; it is perceived as unacceptable political interference. Many would argue, however, that donors are interfering to such a high degree already, that support to political parties would not make much difference.

Supporting political parties is indeed difficult as well as hazardous, and may lead to unforeseen consequences. One may draw a simple analogy. If the European Commission, for example, before the referendum about Norwegian membership in the EU was held, had given substantial support to pro-EU parties, and if this backing led to or could have led to, or was perceived to have led to, that Norway became a member of the Union, this would have been considered unacceptable, and would certainly have caused an outcry among the anti-EU forces. Similar scenarios are conceivable in Africa, and the consequences could have been disastrous. Nevertheless, the argument by many African opposition forces is that the donors are supporting political parties indirectly, by supporting governments, which in practice means support for the ruling party. And since the incumbent party is controlling the resources and the legal framework from the one-party era largely intact, the democratic process is thwarted.²⁷

What can be done? Perhaps more creative and alternative approaches to this problem can be found.²⁸ But since there are so many pitfalls connected with such support, it must be considered and planned with utmost care and circumspection. The Netherlands is probably the most creative donor in this regard, and is also the only donor which in principle takes a positive attitude to supporting political parties.²⁹ Representatives of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs have raised this issue both within DAC and within the European Union, but found little support.³⁰

²⁶ There are exceptions, of course, some countries give such support "under the table".

²⁷ Views expressed by the opposition in Zambia and Tanzania.

²⁸ As part of the peace settlement in Mozambique, financing was given to political parties, as an agreement by both parties, administered by the UNDP. The situation here was very special, and may not be replicable in other countries. All the same, some ideas and general lessons may be drawn from this case.

²⁹ Interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997.

³⁰ The Swedish parliament has, in fact, made a decision on the possibilities for Swedish political parties to give financial support and to establish some sort of friendship agreements with sister parties in other countries. This is a form of indirect sponsorship and sharing of views

Whenever this idea has been raised in other forums, the United States has argued most persistently against it.³¹ Nevertheless, the Dutch have tried out one model, which may be an alternative for consideration.

In January 1994 the Foundation for the New South Africa was established in the Netherlands. The foundation was formed out of an acknowledgement that many of the new multi-party systems in Africa face difficulties in light of the legacies from their colonial or authoritarian past. The objective is to assist the democratisation process in South Africa, and to strengthen political parties or groups. The association is a co-operative venture between Dutch and South African political parties, but indirectly supported by the Dutch government. The Dutch political parties are participating jointly and have among other things been involved in supporting the development of party organisations, the promotion of dialogue, and in assisting parties preparing for election campaigns. Political parties and political groups are eligible for support according to a set of criteria irrespective of their having a functioning party structure. Recipients of support must base their activities on fundamental principles of democracy and racial equality, have a nation-wide reach, reject violence as a means of achieving their objectives, and must comply with the electoral code of conduct.³²

Possibilities of setting up joint foundations with other donors have been attempted, but so far without success. There has also been a mission in Ethiopia, to assess whether this concept could be transferred to that country, but the idea was dropped. A similar trust fund is under planning in Mozambique. The experiences so far with the South-Africa initiative seem quite good, and a broader evaluation of the project is due soon.³³

5.4 Volume of assistance, special allocations and institutions for promotion of human rights and democracy

Because so many different interpretations are in use as to which projects are to be included under the heading "human rights and democracy", it is virtually impossible to arrive at exact and comparable figures between various donors. Many donors do not seem to have a complete overview themselves. This may be explained partly by the fact that much of this kind of support is taken from so many different budget lines and going through so many different channels.³⁴

and experiences with other political parties. At the same time the donor government avoids becoming directly involved. Nevertheless, in this particular case support is being tried out together with political parties in Eastern Europe.

³¹ Interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997.

³² Interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1994, statement of 8 February 1994, issued by Minister for Development Co-operation, Jan Pronk; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995, Co-operation agreement concerning support for the democratisation process [...] of 17 November 1995.

³³ Interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997.

³⁴ Interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997; interviews in

However, some figures from DAC (1996) may be illustrative, largely based on donor reports. In 1993 Canada disbursed USD 26 million for human rights and democracy activities, Norway provided USD 54 million in 1994, the EU cumulative expenditure for the period 1990-93 was approximately USD 53 million. Sweden spent between USD 36 million and USD 55 million in 1993-94 for projects defined strictly as human rights projects, democratisation projects not included. According to Danida (1993:10-11), Danish support to human rights and democracy in the period 1988-93 amounted to DKK 545 million for more than 300 different, mostly small projects. Contributions to many small projects seem to characterise the positive measures financed by the like-minded countries, while for example USAID supports bigger, but fewer projects.³⁵ In 1993 Dutch support for human rights and democratisation efforts was approximately USD 16.5 million channelled through NGOs, and through country and regional programmes.

The only conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the volume of aid going to this area is relative modest and not commensurate with the high priority accorded this sector in political statements. However, it must be added that human rights and democracy support are not particularly capital-intensive, compared to conventional aid projects, such as road construction, hydro-electric power stations etc. Therefore, the amount of money *per se* going to this sector must not be seen as an adequate reflection of its priority. It would be more sensible to improve the quality of interventions, but more money would be needed eventually.

Denmark is the only country proposing a stipulated level of funding for its human rights and democracy support. It is suggested that this sector receive 5-8 per cent of the total aid volume to programme countries.³⁶ Sweden, on the other hand, has stated that human rights and democracy support will not always be an area of support:

DHRCM [democratisation, human rights and conflict management] support will not automatically be a feature of Sida's support to any country. If Sida in consultation with the Foreign Office decides that there is no need or purpose for such support to any given country, no allocation will be made (Sida 1996:12).

Sida and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996.

³⁵ Interview with USAID representative in Lusaka 1997.

³⁶ Interviews in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1996. According to Danida's yearbook for 1993 nearly DKK 55 million was allocated to human rights and democratisation projects, while making up only 1.3 per cent of total aid. But according to Danida's list of human rights projects as much as DKK 300 million was disbursed, which constitute 7 per cent of the total aid volume (Krab-Johansen 1995:21). The discrepancy between these figures was explained by the Danish Minister for Development Co-operation as a difference between commitments and actual disbursements. Krab-Johansen (*ibid.*) argues that the difference has more to do with a confusion within the agency on how to define human rights projects. At least this does illustrate the difficulty in categorising such projects, and that figures serve as illustrations only.

A similar posture, but not equally rigid, is expressed by the Netherlands, which through its special country strategies decides whether human rights or/and democratisation should be an area of priority, based on an overall assessment.³⁷ This may also be the Norwegian view, in principle, but since promotion of human rights and democracy are among the main objectives of Norwegian aid there seems to be a tendency that the objective included in various country strategies is merely a restatement of the overall objectives for Norwegian aid, instead of being specific to the country concerned. One may argue that all recipient countries have problems in this regard, and that this objective should always be high on the agenda. But perhaps it might be more operationally expedient to analyse the specific needs of the country concerned before deciding whether human rights and democracy support become an area of priority.

In response to the increased emphasis on "positive measures" in recent years, institutions dealing particularly with these issues have been established, and many donors have allocated special budget lines for the purpose of fostering democracy and human rights respect.

In 1995 the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) was established in Stockholm. The idea is to support democratic processes and free and fair elections around the world. Its approach is, as stated in one of IDEA's folders, "hands-on and practically oriented". The institute was established by 14 countries, with all continents represented. International IDEA is supposed to co-operate with other international organisations like the UN, but it is to maintain independence in dealing with information, research, capacity-building and in working out practical guidelines on how to promote and foster democracy. The first substantive reports from the institute are just emerging.

Another example of such an initiative, but more nationally based is the establishment in 1992 of the Norwegian Resource Bank for Human Rights and Democracy (NORDEM), funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The resource bank is supposed to maintain a roster of available democratic expertise. Experts have largely been recruited for short-term assignments in connection with election observation around the world.

Support to positive measures for human rights and democracy by the European Commission is financed from nine different budget lines, or transferred under the Lomé Convention in conjunction with technical co-operation programmes for countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Most of this assistance is sourced from the two major budget lines for developing countries: "Support for Human Rights and Democracy in Developing Countries", established in 1991 following the Council Resolution on human rights, democracy and development, and "Democratisation in Latin America".

³⁷ According to interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997.

All the like-minded countries have instituted special budget lines for human rights and democratisation. A general feature of this kind of aid seems to be its limited integration in the overall aid strategies for the respective countries. This appears to be less of a problem in Sweden, however, where the special allocation is administered by Sida. In the Netherlands and Denmark, where there are no separate aid directorates, responsibility for the administration of this special support has been split. Hence, integration has been made difficult. It has been suggested by interviewees in the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, that the administration of this type of aid be decentralised to the embassies in the recipient countries. However, these special allocations are not the only sources of funding for project of this nature. Support for human rights and democratisation projects are also disbursed under the country programmes, and regional allocations etc.

5.5 Administrative capacity

The increased emphasis on human rights and democracy is in some countries increasingly being reflected in an institutional rearrangement within this field; it was poorly designed previously. The most radical and expansive in this regard, at least among the group of like-minded, is the Netherlands. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently established a separate "Human Rights, Good Governance and Democratisation Department". This unit is not just dealing with these questions in connection with development aid, parts of the department are also charged with incorporating the human rights and democracy dimension into general foreign policy. For soft issues like human rights, this creates new challenges. They run the risk of being squeezed even more, but new opportunities have also been created.

The so-called South group, effectively Danida, within the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealing with all questions relating to developing countries, has a small policy department handling overriding good governance, human rights and democratisation concerns. Sida also has a separate department dealing with democratisation and human rights issues. In Norway the expertise on human rights and democratisation issues seems to be less concentrated than in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, even though NORAD has appointed a special adviser for human rights issues and a couple of positions in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been designated to handle such issues.

5.6 From principle to practice

It may seem unimportant to describe what donors *say* about human rights in comparison with what they *do*. As most donors have made statements regarding human rights, and these do not differ greatly, it would be misleading to opt for a 'do not look at what I do, listen to what I say' approach (Tomaševski 1993:83).

What are the donors' experiences with these policies, have they been implemented and, if so, how? And what strategies have been chosen? Although all donors put emphasis on positive measures as the preferable vehicle, negative conditionality seems to have been applied more often. It may seem like a paradox, therefore, when donors deny using aid as *punishment* but still spend meagre resources on *support* for human rights and democratisation processes. According to Katarina Tomaševski (1993:122), aid cut-backs on human rights ground became commonplace in the 1990s, practised by virtually all donors. She states further that "these would not change the common denominator of this practise; it is inherently arbitrary" (Tomaševski 1993:122). This view is supported by Jørgen Estrup, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Danish parliament. He has done an analysis of Danish practice in this field and concluded that "in praxis the dialogue has often been substituted with spontaneous cuts in aid, and the effort to promote rights for individuals and groups has become demands for democracy, pluralism, and election" (quoted in Krab-Johansen 1995:18). Krab-Johansen argues that, despite the Danish statement on avoidance of confrontation and the desire to influence development gradually in a positive direction, the opposite strategy seems to have been the rule rather than the exception (*ibid.*).

But is negative conditionality effective? David Gillies (1996) has recently published *Between Principle and Practice*, which is an analysis of the human rights policies and practices of Canada, the Netherlands and Norway. Gillies has studied several cases in the period 1973 to 1994 where bilateral development aid has been used deliberately as a tool in furtherance of human rights and democracy. It must be added that Gillies' analysis does not comprise all cases linking human rights and development aid in this period. He has identified 25 cases where aid has been linked negatively to human rights (cf. definition of negative conditionality as used in this study). In 23 of the cases the volume of aid was reduced, suspended, threatened to be suspended or reduced, modified and reduced, projects put "on hold", token suspension instituted, or aid relations terminated. The remaining two of the 25 instances were examples of non-action despite threats to take action. The subsequent human rights record and the rate of democratisation process in the respective recipient countries are then seen in relation to previous action taken by the donor in question. Gillies' findings were unequivocal in all 25 cases: the human rights situation continued to be poor or even worsening. His findings underscore the argument above (cf. chapter four).

But how can the connection between negative conditionality and the human rights and the democratisation process possibly be documented? How can other influential factors be isolated? It also needs to be specified which human rights conditions have deteriorated - all or only some? This is not discussed thoroughly by Gillies. One may argue, of course, that if a donor applies negative conditionality with the intention of improving the human rights record and facilitating the democratisation process, and that it later can be documented that such an

improvement did not result, one can safely state that the donor did not achieve its objective.

But the causal relationship is difficult to ascertain. Theoretically, the human rights and democracy situation may have improved, worsened or remained unchanged independently of the conditionality imposed by the donors. As a counterfactual hypothesis, the situation could have been even worse if conditionality had not been applied at all. Situations might also arise where human rights conditions improved in one area and worsened in another; how should such situations be assessed and measured? These pertinent questions are not addressed by Gillies. Obviously, if a donor stipulates very specific conditions - in effect a tangible operationalisation of the political conditions applied - the degree of fulfilment of these conditions could have been measured with some precision. Such specific conditions might include release of political prisoners, an end to harassment of the political opposition etc. If political conditions were imposed in such specific and tangible form, including time schedules for their fulfilment, it would not have been that difficult to judge the effectiveness of political conditionality.

But if we look at how political conditionality is practised it emerges that the conditions imposed are diffuse and without a clear operationalisation beforehand. Typical are more or less vague statements to the effect that distribution of aid will be made conditional on an improved human rights record and continuation of the democratisation process (see e.g. the Norwegian Country Strategy vis-à-vis Tanzania 1993-97). The political conditions are rarely formulated precisely and unequivocally *ex ante*, in the sense that their fulfilment is measurable *ex post*. In fact, although a contradiction in terms, political conditionality is usually *ex post* in the sense that donors postpone their decision whether or not to apply sanctions after an assessment of the situation has been made. There is no automaticity in the conditionality-sanctions sequence and no time schedule. Sanctions are applied, if at all, on a case by case basis after largely pragmatic considerations; most donors also await other donors' reactions before taking action.

This behaviour appears to result not primarily due to neglect of operationalisation. There seems to be a deliberate unwillingness to state conditions clearly *ex ante*. Donors appear to *want* the situation to be ambiguous or vague. *Ex ante* specification of conditions and the ensuing sanctions in case of failure to comply would reduce donor flexibility and scope for political manoeuvring.

Donors are also keenly aware that political conditionality is very sensitive. If political conditions were spelt out explicitly beforehand, the co-operative relationship between the recipient and the donor might become strained or otherwise jeopardised; most donors are disinclined to risk that. Another reason why donors do not operationalise their conditions may be related to the fact that it is exceedingly difficult. The sphere of politics and international relations does not

lend itself easily to operationalisation. There is also an element of unpredictability; specific negative political conditionality could become counterproductive.

On 25 March 1992 Indonesia decided to break off its aid relationship with the Netherlands. The decision was no doubt a response to negative conditionality applied by the Dutch government and its alleged "reckless use of development assistance as an instrument of intimidation or as a tool for threatening Indonesia".³⁸ The Dutch government had earlier decided to withdraw some of its aid following a massacre in the East Timorese capital, Dili, where at least one hundred people were killed by Indonesian troops. The Dutch Minister of Development Co-operation, Jan Pronk, continued an open and vocal criticism of political development in Indonesia. Instead of promising improvements, the Indonesian President, Suharto, saw an opportunity to stigmatise the Dutch government "in front of the whole world as the prototype of a colonial inspector" (Nordholt 1995:141).

What was achieved? The result was not an improved human rights situation, but instead the incident contributed to a consolidation of President Suharto's national and international position (*ibid.*:129). The Indonesian government could easily afford to forego Dutch aid, which only constituted a small percentage of Indonesia's total receipts of foreign aid. Despite the fact that some other donors had also decided to cut some of their aid, others were willing to enter and fill the gap, i.e. Japan. In 1993 Indonesia received even more aid from the donor community than had been pledged (Baehr, Selbervik and Tostensen 1995). After this incident it is claimed that the Dutch human rights policy has become more cautious, reserved and quiet.³⁹ The case illustrates that in addition to being ineffective, partly because of the Netherlands' smallness as a donor and its lack of international backing, its conditionality proved to be counterproductive. The case also demonstrates a recipient's sensitivity to criticism which was regarded as interference in internal affairs, to the point that it was willing to forego some Western aid, even though in this particular case it was compensated for subsequently.

As shown in chapter two, concepts like democracy and human rights are many-faceted and complex, and as shown above in this chapter various donors have different interpretations of what these concepts entail; no clear operationalisation seems to exist. This may lead to another important question: if one accepts that negative conditionality is not effective, why is that so? This may be due to many factors. Going back to Li's theoretical model in chapter four, the least effective conditionality issues were the abstract ones which were problematic to operationalise, i.e. transcendent issues. Human rights and democratisation issues fall in this category. The more tangible the linkage issue, the more likely it would

³⁸ Press statement issued by the Government of Indonesia, 25 March 1992 (quoted in Baehr, Selbervik and Tostensen 1995:73).

³⁹ Interviews in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 and 7 February 1997.

be fulfilled. This may be one of the explanations why political conditionality seems rather ineffective. One way to increase the effectiveness of political conditionality would, therefore, be trying to operationalise and state the conditions more clearly.


One may, for instance, look at one example where negative conditionality seems to have been effective, at least in the short run, and where the conditions imposed, were relatively well defined. When the Kenyan government in 1991 repealed section 2a of the constitution and opened up for a multi-party system, this occurred just one week after the donors had decided to suspend much of their aid until steps towards political liberalisation had been taken. It may be argued, that internal pressure also contributed to this decision on the part of the Kenya government, but the conditionality applied by the donor community was undoubtedly decisive. Yet, in spite of such conditionality "success" in the short run, the long-term effectiveness of this strategy for the democratisation process is far more doubtful; few will argue that the pressure exerted by the donor community has led to a fundamentally more democratic society in Kenya today. There may also be problems when donor demands are too tough and rigid, pushing the recipient government into a corner. Donors may have contributed to change in the short run, and the government would perhaps make some concessions. But in practice it will do its best to evade conditions. This has been much of a problem in terms of economic conditionality as well (cf. Mosley et al. 1991). The Kenya case illustrates the problem of durability and sustainability of democratic change. When changes are superimposed from outside, they may not be sustainable in the long run.

What is known about the effectiveness of positive conditionality? Even less research has been done on this issue (Nelson 1993). Donor policies seem to be even less clear on this point, which, moreover, makes it difficult to give concrete examples of experiences with positive conditionality. Again, one is confronted with some of the same methodological problems as when analysing the effect of negative conditionality. It may also be difficult to identify cases where positive conditionality has been applied. South Africa could be seen as one such example, involving several donors. Zambia after the first multi-party election in 1991 may be another one. However, in the South African case the aid provided could better be characterised as positive measures, or unconditional support for the ongoing democratisation process in the country. In practice the distinction between positive conditionality and positive measures may become blurred. Something which was meant as a kind of "reward for good behaviour", may grow into more regular positive measures.

Table no. 3

Hierarchy of objectives and criteria for the evaluation of positive measures in support of human rights and democracy*

Example 1: training of election monitors



Check-list

- a. Relevance: Are effectively trained monitors relevant for achieving free and fair elections?
- b. Effectiveness: Have the monitors been trained?
Have the monitors fulfilled their functions? (Have the beneficiaries been reached?)
- c. Impact 1: Has the training of monitors contributed to free and fair elections?
- d. Impact 2: Have free and fair elections contributed to an improvement of respect for human rights?
(Identification of the sector's contribution to general objectives)
- e. Efficiency: Have activities been organised in a timely manner and at least cost?

* Source Heinz, Lingnau and Waller 1995.

Gillies (1996) does not distinguish between positive conditionality and positive measures in his analysis. He has included 12 cases of positive measures, and some cases of positive conditionality. In the cases analysed, aid programmes were resumed or restored, new programmes were established, token resumption was expressed in one of the cases, or increased funding was transferred. Nevertheless, the conclusion was unequivocal. In all of the 12 cases the human rights record was improved or/and the democratisation process accelerated when aid was used as a positive tool. But again, one may raise queries related to causality. Nevertheless, Gillies' findings support the theoretical argument put forward in the previous chapter, at least when it come to the effectiveness of positive measures.

Very few evaluations addressing the effects of purely positive measures have been commenced. But one interesting evaluation has been undertaken by the German Development Institute (1995), *Evaluation of EC positive measures in favour of human rights and democracy 1991-1993*. The study concentrated on EC human rights and democratisation support to the six countries: Chile, Guatemala, Malawi, Philippines, Tunisia, and Uganda. More than 60 projects were evaluated. Instead of using indicators like cost-effectiveness, the projects were assessed at a more concrete level in terms of relevance, effectiveness, and where possible, their impact. This method may have contributed to solving some of the methodological objections raised above. A concrete example of how the projects were evaluated is shown in Table 3 above. The narrow selection of countries may, of course, be questioned since the EC gives this kind of support to more than 52 countries. Nevertheless, the findings are very interesting as well as encouraging with respect to this kind of support. The study concluded that in four of the six countries examined positive measures seemed to be successful, and that success was independent of sector supported.

Interventions should rather be related to phase of political development (cf. chapter three). Even though more empirical studies have to be undertaken before general lessons can be learnt, the few evaluations based on empirical evidence support the theoretical argument advanced in chapter four, which suggests that positive measures are more likely to succeed than conditionality, be it negative or positive, but especially the negative variant. However, it should be acknowledged, as underlined in the previous chapter, that the alternative of inducing changes from within is a far slower and gradual process, and will not always correspond to the short-term political interests of the donors.

6. Some experiences from three Norwegian programme countries

It is nearly twenty years since human rights and aid was formally and officially linked in Norway (White Paper no. 93 1976-77). In the 1990s increasing emphasis has been given to promotion of human rights and democracy, reflected in recent political statements and policy papers (see e.g. White Paper no. 19 1995-96). There also seems to be consensus among most political parties that these issues be given a prominent position in Norwegian development assistance. Already in 1985 (White Paper no. 36 1984-85) support in the form of positive measures was outlined as the main strategy. In 1991 this was reiterated (White Paper no. 51 1991-92 :214):

[...] the government will continue to put the main emphasis on positive measures to promote human rights and democracy, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Aid should be designed in such a way that it contributes to supporting and stimulating the further strengthening of the human rights system, the rule of law and democratic institutions. Development co-operation within this field should also be characterised by comprehensiveness and a long-term policy [author's unofficial translation].

This argument and view was recently reconfirmed and expounded by the Norwegian minister of development co-operation, Kari Nordheim-Larsen: "by means of development aid, we should endeavour to support measures, institutions and reform processes that promote democracy and human rights" (*Development Today* no. 2, 1997). She acknowledged, however, that Norway often faces many dilemmas in the implementation of this policy.

Democracy support is a relatively new area in Norwegian development co-operation (NORAD 1995:11). In addition to support to peace processes in countries ridden by civil-war, support to democracy and human rights has become items on the aid agenda vis-à-vis all of partner countries and a regular component in Norwegian development co-operation. Nearly all of Norway's 12 so-called priority countries - Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - are going through different phases of transition to democracy with multi-party systems. In Stoltz' scheme of eight phases of political development towards democracy (cf. chapter three) nearly all of the programme countries fall in categories 2b. 'democracies in the making' and 3a. 'structurally deficient democracies'. Systems

finding themselves in these phases are fragile and vulnerable to relapse into authoritarianism.

It is important for the donors, therefore, to plan and design their support carefully. The holding of multi-party elections has been emphasised by the donor community, particularly since many of the African states have modified their political institutions partly as a result of pressure from the donor community. It is vital, however, that the donors develop strategic plans for this sector together with the government and civil society with a view to consolidating and creating a viable democracy. This means that support must not be confined to matters related to multi-party elections.

This chapter does not offer an exhaustive discussion and analysis of Norwegian experiences with so-called positive measures in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania. Nor must it be seen as a comprehensive analysis of the political context. This part of the study is rather meant as illustrations of some of the arguments and points raised earlier, and rather more as a basis or point of departure for further analysis, as suggested in the terms of reference with respect to a phase II as a more thorough follow-up. Some of the dilemmas which the donors face within this field are highlighted, as well as the discrepancy between turgid rhetoric on these issues, and the emphasis and resource, both in terms of expertise and money, provided to this sector. The chapter also illustrates the need for contextualisation. If some of the gap between rhetoric and practice is to be bridged, the general point to be made is that the need for general guidelines is not as great as it is for country-specific strategies as well as expertise and capacity in terms of earmarked positions for this particular area.

First, a bit of the Zimbabwean context is summarised briefly, and some views from the Zimbabwean side on the donors' role and on aid as a tool for democracy and human rights are brought to light. Some of the challenges within this field are also identified, followed by a discussion some of the positive measures supported by Norway, the experiences made and the challenges encountered in implementing such support. Even though there are differences in the way in which support is administered and how projects are selected in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Tanzania, similar problems and challenges are found in all three countries. To start with, the case of Zimbabwe is treated in some detail before addressing more cursorily the other two country cases. The chapter concludes with some general and common remarks about experiences and makes some recommendation on how this type of support can be improved.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ This part is based principally on interviews with people in the field, as well as other material collected during the field trip (see bibliography).

6.1 Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean context

Despite Zimbabwe's relatively low gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (USD 520 in 1994), the country is considered to have great potential, due to a skilled workforce, a highly diversified economy, and abundant natural resources. The rate of GDP growth in 1994 was as high as 7.4 per cent (*EIU Country Profile Zimbabwe 1995-96:9*). The economic prospects for 1996 are not equally encouraging. The Zimbabwean minister of finance's projection of 7 per cent real GDP growth in 1996 is seen as over-optimistic, and the growth prospects are weaker after 1997 (*EIU 1996:7*). Nevertheless, among low-income countries, Zimbabwe is considered to be "moderately indebted"; in 1995 public debt stood at approximately 90 per cent of GNP. USAID (1996) has suggested that Zimbabwe is likely to graduate from the ranks of developing nations sometime in the first decade of the 21st century, if the country goes on with economic reforms in the years to come.

Since 1991 Zimbabwe has implemented an economic structural adjustment programme backed by the IMF and the World Bank. But steps towards a fully liberalised economy, which has put the country on the path towards private sector-led growth has not been without problems, and in recent years the per capita income has declined and the standard of living has deteriorated. The economic reforms have substantially increased Zimbabwe's attractiveness as a target for foreign investments. Also, disbursement of international aid has increased dramatically after economic reforms began in 1991, rising from USD 280 mill. in 1989 to USD 819 mill. in 1992. Grants make up about two-thirds of the total aid flow (*EIU Country Profile Zimbabwe 1995-96:33*). The economic structural adjustment programme was suspended, however, in May 1995. There have been several postponements of the negotiations of a new agreement between the IMF and Zimbabwe, some bilateral donors like the Netherlands and Britain have therefore withheld some of their aid, e.g. import commodity support, which was made conditional on a new agreement between IMF and Zimbabwe.

The five largest donors to Zimbabwe in 1994 were the UK with USD 37.8 mill., the USA and Sweden with USD 34 mill. each, and the Netherlands with USD 28.1 mill. Japan, Germany and Denmark are also substantial donors disbursing around USD 25 mill. each in 1994. Norway was the eighth biggest donor to Zimbabwe with USD 17.3 mill. in 1994; its share accounts for only 2-3 per cent of total bilateral aid to Zimbabwe (OECD 1996 :213).

Unlike many other African countries explicit political conditionality has not been applied to Zimbabwe by the donor community. This can be explained simply by reference to a relatively good human rights record, at least in comparison with

many other countries in the region. Gross and persistent human rights violations have been rare in Zimbabwe. The most notable historical exception are the atrocities committed in Matabeleland by the infamous so-called 5th brigade. There have been few incentives for the donors, therefore, to make threats to withdraw or reduce their aid on these grounds. But does this mean that human rights violations do not occur? Some reports indicate that the human rights situation has been worsening lately (*EUI* 1996:9; Human Rights Committee of South Africa 1996:46). It is too early to judge, however, if this will be a lasting trend for years to come, even though some will suggest that both politically and economically speaking, developments are not pointing in an unambiguously positive direction, and that this in itself may pose a threat to the human rights situation.

Another reason for the donors' reluctance to imposing political conditions on Zimbabwe and their reticence about interference in the political sphere may also be seen in the light of Zimbabwe's relative youth as an independent state, achieved after a protracted yet "successful" liberation war. Since Zimbabwe was perceived to be a young and "promising" state with great political and economic potential, the general view among donors seems to have been that Zimbabwe would be able to manage on its own. It is also a fact that Zimbabwe has not been as aid dependent as many other developing countries. Foreign aid has constituted "only" around 10 per cent of GNP. This means that the power relationship between the recipient and the donors has been less asymmetrical than in many other African countries, and the donors have had less power leverage over Zimbabwe. Many of these factors have changed in recent years; Zimbabwe's aid dependency is increasing. According to the Norwegian Country Strategy for Zimbabwe the figure is now approximately 15-20 per cent.

However, Zimbabwe's political situation and conditions have not figured prominently on the agenda in the so-called consultative group meetings. If good governance issues have been raised, like for example corruption, it has rather been to praise the government for a relative low corruption level; corrupt practices have been less deep-rooted and pervasive at all levels of Zimbabwe society than in many other African countries. Nevertheless, the corruption problem has been known for a long time and was seen as an increasing problem already in the Norwegian policy memorandum of 1992. Again, the donors' reluctance to interfere may be attributed to the factors mentioned above, and may, of course, also be related to a general problem of proof and documentation of corruption. The donors' somewhat passive attitude with regard to putting pressure on Zimbabwe must also be seen in the light of geo-political considerations; Zimbabwe's has played an important role as a front-line state against the now defunct apartheid state of South-Africa. With the demise of apartheid this geo-political consideration is no longer valid, and expressions of international concern about the growing corruption problem seem to increase.

One of the most publicised human rights problems in Zimbabwe recently was the government's vocal harassment of homosexuals. The generally weak position and rights of women is also a major human rights problem, mainly due to strong customary law traditions. There are also signs indicating that the freedom of the press is being curtailed, even though segments of the press are relatively critical and outspoken. The judiciary in Zimbabwe, however, particularly at higher levels, is regarded as fairly independent.

With respect to democratisation Zimbabwe is facing many and arguably greater challenges. Zimbabwe has been a *de jure* multi-party state since independence in 1980. Prior to 1990 there was serious public discussion on whether to formally abolish the multi-party system, but in 1990 it was decided not to introduce a *de jure* one-party state. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is virtually a *de facto* one-party state; the ruling party, Zanu-PF, has 147 out of the 150 seats in parliament. The United Parties (UP), which is a Zimbabwean opposition grouping, has, in fact, taken president Mugabe to court challenging the Electoral Act, the Political Finance Act, the Broadcasting Act and the Presidential Powers Act. The UP claimed that these acts favour the ruling party and that they are undemocratic (Human Rights Committee of South-Africa 1996). But as a whole the opposition is weak and divided. In Zimbabwe there is even a formalised system for subsidising political parties with more than 15 members in parliament, but no other party than Zanu-PF has ever reached that number and it appears unrealistic for any opposition party to reach that level of representation in the foreseeable future.

The perhaps greatest challenge for the democratisation process is to nurture a democratic political culture; many informants referred to a current "culture of fear". This culture of fear is partly seen as being a legacy of the liberation war, which is exploited and thus reinforced by the government in threatening people with, for example, withdrawal of seeds or holding back maize rations in drought periods if they do not vote for Zanu-PF.

All informants acknowledged the challenges and increasing problems facing the democratisation process. Albeit very critical of the incumbent regime, they all gave the impression that "the government was not all bad", and discouraged a confrontational posture by the donor community in the form of threats or sanctions of any kind. Nevertheless, they wanted the donors to carry on an active dialogue about these issues and to speak out when warranted. They considered that aid be used as a tool of democratisation by supporting e.g. civil society, human rights organisations and strengthening democratic institutions. Several informants expressed the view that Zimbabwe still offers channels and niches of entry, despite being a *de facto* one-party state with a very centralised government, a president with wide discretionary powers, and above him the party polit bureau. In the lower echelons of the state apparatus there are sympathetic bureaucrats as well as reform-oriented high-ranking civil servants who could play a constructive role in order to influence the government and its policy. Some even argued that the

Zimbabwean government is so much driven by wanting to give an impression of doing well, at least better than South-Africa, that playing on Zimbabwe's regional vanity may also be a possible way to induce changes. It was seen as important for the donors to focus and being vocal and supportive on these issues, but without being pushy.

Norwegian aid to Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has been a recipient of Norwegian aid since 1980. In a policy memorandum of 1992, it was stated that the volume of Norwegian aid to Zimbabwe should be maintained at the same level throughout the planning period 1992-95, despite the geo-political ramifications after the change to majority rule in South-Africa. However, it was underscored that there should be flexibility within the country frame so that the volume could be reduced later in the plan period.

Norwegian bilateral aid to Zimbabwe has decreased in recent years, from NOK 150.9 mill. in 1990 to NOK 114.8 mill. in 1995; it peaked in 1992 with NOK 171.4 mill. and hit a bottom level in 1993 (NORAD 1996). According to the planning figures there will be a slight reduction in the country frame in coming years (Agreed Minutes 1995). One of the reasons for this decline is the reduction in the country programme, which is, in fact, a general trend and part of Norway's new policy. More aid will be disbursed through the regional allocation for Africa. As a result, the level of aid to a particular country will be less predictable and stable from year to year, but the donor will have more flexibility.

Norwegian aid policy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe is of course embedded in the overall South policy of Norway, while the specific arrangement and operationalisation of aid to Zimbabwe is laid down in the "Policy Memorandum for Norwegian Aid to Zimbabwe 1992-95". A new country strategy for Norway's co-operation with Zimbabwe 1996-2000 has just been completed.

Human rights questions or the political situation in general has not been prominent in Norwegian-Zimbabwean aid relations. No explicit political conditionality has ever been imposed by the Norwegian government. But the country programme document for 1994-97 draws up the economic and political framework for the aid relationship.⁴¹ It states that to sustain the level of aid to Zimbabwe it is seen as important that the economic reform programme continues and that democratic development continues to give room for participation by a broad spectrum of society. When the latest annual consultations on development co-operation between Zimbabwe and Norway were held in Harare from 25-26 April 1995, the importance of democracy and respect for human rights was emphasised. The next annual consultation will be held in early 1997, at which time it is expected that Norway will put more emphasis on human rights issues.

⁴¹ Landprogram dokument 1994-1997:8.

The number of projects and the volume of aid channelled to the democracy and human rights sector has been lower to Zimbabwe compared to many of the other programme countries, with the exception of substantial support for strengthening women's rights. The most obvious reason seems to be that the human rights record and the prospects for the democratisation process has been judged to be better compared to many other countries. Figures are given in table 4 below:

Table 4: Human Rights and Democracy Support to Zimbabwe (in NOK mill.)

Zimbabwe	1990	1993	1994	1995
Total Norwegian aid	150.4	107.1	122.2	114.8
HR and democracy support	0.8	1.6	3.1	2.5
HR and democracy support as percentage of total Norwegian aid	0.5%	1.5%	2.5%	2.2%

As shown in the table above there has been an increase in human rights and democracy support in the 1990s, even though there was a slight reduction from 1994 to 1995. It is difficult to make a clear distinction between various democracy and human rights projects, and to add up the total for this kind of support (for further details see Appendix 1). The amounts must, therefore, be seen as indicative figures only. According to NORAD's annual reports Norway gave NOK 2.7 mill. in 1995 and only NOK 0.6 mill. in 1994 for what was labelled "administration/democracy/peace/human rights measures" (NORAD 1995 and 1996). Activities in the DAC category "peace, human rights, democracy and miscellaneous (09) received NOK 16,000, NOK 52,000, NOK 601,000 and NOK 2 mill. for the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively. The reason for this large discrepancy is that the figures in NORAD's annual reports include projects aimed at improving and strengthening women rights, whereas the reports to DAC do not. Beyond women's rights Norway has given little support to the human rights and democracy sector in Zimbabwe.

Already in 1992 it was stated that support for the democratisation process should be one of six areas of priority; the importance of supporting the positive trend towards democracy was emphasised (MFA 1992:11). Increased emphasis on democratisation and human rights was also part of the new country strategy for 1996-2000.

Support for positive measures in Zimbabwe has gone to various projects and through different channels. There is no special budget allocation for human rights and democracy, akin to those for other areas like culture, NGOs, environment and women. In the policy memorandum of 1992 it is stated, therefore, that support for democratisation and promotion of the rights of vulnerable groups be given priority through "conscious use of the [existing] special allocations" (MFA 1992:17). The special allocations are financial frames, which are not necessarily committed for a longer period to special projects and sectors as is the case with projects included in

the country programme. The special allocations are more flexible mechanisms administered by the embassies, which have been delegated authority to commit and incur expenditure for projects up to 15 million without approval from Oslo. Because of this flexibility many human rights and democracy projects are financed through these special allocations, particularly the allocation for NGOs. But since these allocations are not primarily directed towards human rights and democracy activities, and since there are no guidelines as to how much should be spent for such purposes, the volume disbursed depends on received applications, and on whether resources are available at the time when these applications are received. In Zimbabwe only 5 per cent of the special allocation for NGOs was disbursed to human rights measures in 1993 (NORAD 1994:25). It must also be added that only a few of the applications are from human rights organisations.

Other human rights and democratisation projects have been financed through the regional allocation for Africa, which is administered from Oslo. Support for organisational development of the trade union federation, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), has been sourced from the regional allocation. A diploma course, first held in 1994-95, on women's law at the University of Zimbabwe in co-operation with the University of Oslo was also been financed through this facility.

Support to the regional women's organisation "Women and Law in Southern Africa" (WLSA), which is an organisation engaged in raising the general awareness of the legal position of women, has been financed through the SADC allocation. This project was completed in 1996. A research project on Education for Human Rights at a regional institute for political and economic research and social debate, SAPES Trust, has also been financed through this allocation.

Very little support for human rights and democratisation measures goes through the country programme. One reason for this is probably that such support is considered politically sensitive. Therefore, most of this type of support is disbursed to local NGOs or through Norwegian NGOs. One exception to this rule is the Women and the Law project. This project is to provide information on legislation affecting women. It was started in 1992 and is administered by the Ministry of National Affairs in Zimbabwe.

What have been the experience so far with Norwegian human rights and democracy support in Zimbabwe? No evaluation of the combined human rights and democracy portfolio has been undertaken so far. But some of the projects have been evaluated. An evaluation of the diploma course on women's law was done previously, and a new evaluation is being undertaken in 1997. An evaluation of support to SAPES Trust is in progress. It is too early to say, therefore, what conclusions will be reached.

According to the Norwegian plan of operation in Zimbabwe for 1997 (MFA 1996:2) measures already started have laid a good foundation for further development in expanding the democracy and human rights component. It is further enunciated that in the years to come more emphasis will be put on strengthening co-operation with organisations that can contribute to a positive development. Competence-building and institutional development in public units holding responsibility in this area will be given priority. There seems indeed to be increased emphasis and a stronger political commitment to support the human rights and democratisation field, but the capacity and the institutional mechanisms do not match the needs.

Since there are no guidelines on how much aid should be disbursed to this sector, which area to be given priority, or which channels should be used, it is largely up to the respective embassies to improvise and make a plan for this sector. This may be seen to be in line with the objective of devolving decision-making authority from Oslo to embassies and NORAD missions in the field, based on the acknowledgement that the field missions are better placed to judge the need for such support in co-operation with the authorities of the recipient countries and with the NGO sector. But there is also a danger that such support may become rather arbitrary, especially since country-specific strategies for the human rights and democracy sector remain undeveloped. Such strategies ought to be based on an assessment of the country's human rights and democracy problem with a view to designing a programme of intervention. Such an approach could also contribute to improving the quality of interventions.

The lack of strategies may have led to incoherence and *ad hoc* support to relatively small and scattered projects, first and foremost initiated by the recipient. The assertion is justified that this sector - if the human rights and democracy field can be characterised as a sector - is marked precisely by *ad hoc* responses to local initiatives. This mode of operation also has its advantages. As a USAID representative said: being flexible and able to disburse money quickly is the small donor's great advantage in this area, compared to bigger donors like the US, which has a slower and more bureaucratic disbursement procedure.

The political signals from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been, however, to reduce both the number and the volume of the special allocations. The embassies will then have even less money available and less flexible facilities for human rights projects, since there is no special allocation for human rights and democracy.

The only special allocations for this area are the budget votes 0191 (support to refugees and human rights) and 0192 (measures for peace and democracy) administered by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The respective embassies can apply, for instance, on behalf of an organisation for support from these budget votes, but this is found to be cumbersome and bureaucratic. A small

proportion of the money from these budget votes, however, goes to the programme countries (cf. Appendix 1). It also seems to be a general problem that the money disbursed from these budget votes to a very little extent are integrated with other human rights projects in the respective country. There may be a case, therefore, for transferring responsibility for some of it to NORAD, after the Swedish model where the special allocation for democracy is administered by Sida, some of it decentralised to field missions. This would make it easier to take a more comprehensive approach and integrate this aid in an overall human rights and democracy strategy for each country. There would also have to be administrative capability for a more thorough follow-up than what is the case today. The fact that the human rights and democracy projects are disbursed through so many different channels leads to fragmentation of responsibility with an ensuing lack of coherence.

It may be questioned whether small and scattered project to a wide range of activities is the most sustainable approach. Notwithstanding the advantage of flexibility in response to *ad hoc* initiatives, the need to develop a longer time horizon within this field is equally strong, as it has been expressed in the recent Norwegian *Country Strategy for Zimbabwe* (1996:19): "The development of democracy and the strengthening of human rights should be considered from a long-term perspective...", and in general policy papers (cf. the introduction to this chapter). If this ambition is to be met a long-ranging policy and comprehensive country-specific strategies have to be work out. Where possible such support should be seen in conjunction with the country programmes. Given the current political situation in Zimbabwe, this could be the country where such an approach might be feasible; it should at least be tried out.

Although the positive measures supported and their administration varies from one country to another the point raised here appears to be of general applicability. The experiences from Tanzania and Zambia seem to bear this out. The following sections on those two country cases will therefore be somewhat briefer.

6.2 Tanzania

The Tanzanian context

The aid relationship between Tanzania and the like-minded countries, especially the Nordic countries, has been a particularly friendly one (Mushi 1995:228). Much of this was due to president Nyerere's ideology of *ujamaa*, which enjoyed widespread support in Norway as well as in the rest of the Nordic countries. It was perceived to have much in common with Nordic social democracy and welfarism.

After the mid-1970s the Tanzanian economy deteriorated rapidly, which paved the way for economic conditionality. Nevertheless, President Nyerere was able to resist IMF's pressure from 1979 until 1985, partly due to continued Nordic aid.

Norway was at first reluctant to impose conditionality. It did not take an active part in the pressures being exerted in the early 1980s by the World Bank and the IMF and later the donor community at large, on African countries to implement economic reforms. Norway was critical of structural adjustment programmes, and directed attention to the negative socio-political consequences that followed in the wake of harsh adjustment conditions and to what seemed tantamount to political interference. The intransigence of the Tanzania government led to a break-down of the negotiations with the international financial institutions. As a consequence, there was a dramatic reduction in credit and actual money flows from the World Bank and other donors. When Norway in 1985/86 changed its attitude towards conditionality with respect to Tanzania, it was the first time that Norway actively supported economic conditionality.

In 1985/86 Tanzania embarked on a major economic reform programme that decontrolled prices, interest rates and the exchange rate, and removed the monopoly position of many of the state-owned enterprises. Nevertheless, in spite of Tanzania's high potential and progress in recent years, it still ranks among the five poorest countries in the world. It continues to be ridden by fiscal mismanagement, corruption, lack of accountability, and poor governance. Developments in Eastern Africa in recent years have also created a refugee crisis due to chaos in Rwanda and Burundi. Moreover, Tanzania is one of the most debt-distressed countries in the world with an external debt twice the GDP. Even though Tanzania's annual economic growth rate has averaged 4 per cent since the economic reform programme began, which is much better than in the previous 20 years, it is still not adequate to make substantial improvement in the general standard of living for the average Tanzanian (*EIU* 1996:5).

Tanzania has been and still is one of the most aid-dependent developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, a fact which has weakened the country's bargaining power. The major bilateral donors to Tanzania in 1994 were Japan, Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, the United States, Finland, Switzerland and Italy. The Nordic group of donors (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland) have jointly been the largest bilateral donor in Tanzania for the past 30 years. In the beginning of the 1990s foreign aid constituted 45 per cent of GNP, two-thirds of imports and 20 per cent of the national budget. Today development aid accounts for approximately 80 per cent of the official money flow into the country in terms of foreign capital. In addition, an increasing part of the development budget is foreign aid (Norwegian Aid Commission 1995:239-246). This means that the donors have a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis Tanzania, and that changes in the aid administration or actual money flows may have great impact on the Tanzanian population. There has been a decrease in total aid to Tanzania lately, especially from the Nordic countries, but it has not been substantial due to compensatory increases from donors like Italy and Japan (OECD 1996:188). Nevertheless, as late as in 1992 Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands

disbursed 30.8 per cent of Tanzania's total aid (Norwegian Aid Commission 1995:241).

Few countries have received as much aid as Tanzania, and among the donors there seems to be increasing aid fatigue and growing impatience with the "endless" disbursement of aid, which does not seem to work and make an impact. However, Tanzania has enjoyed considerable sympathy in large segments of the donor community, especially among the like-minded countries. They have found it hard to accept that conditions are worse in Tanzania than in many comparable countries, e.g. Kenya.

However, the attitude among Tanzania's traditional donors has changed; in particular Sweden, Norway and Canada have dramatically scaled down the volume of their aid (OECD 1996:188), and made the remainder to an increasing degree conditional on economic reforms. The scaling down by Sweden has been particularly dramatic in view of the fact that for more than 20 years Swedish aid accounted for more than 50 per cent of total Nordic aid. Further reduction in Swedish aid has been planned, partly due to criticism in DAC's 1995/96 aid review report that Sweden had engendered aid dependency, and its advice that the aid volume be scaled down (EIU Tanzania 4th quarter 1996:17). The report focused particularly on Swedish aid in the 1980s, which helped the country resist pressure from the IMF to implement economic reforms. It should be added, however, that Tanzania's ability to withstand IMF pressure was not only due to Swedish support, but to the total aid flow from the Nordic countries. There are many other examples of aid reduction or withdrawal as a result of economic conditionality. In 1995 donors withdrew balance-of-payments support because of corruption. Since 1992 Tanzania has not been permitted to draw on any IMF facility (EIU Tanzania 4th quarter 1995:17).

As well as being in the middle of liberalising the economy, Tanzania is also in the early stages of a political transition to multi-party democracy (cf. phase 2b in the scheme in chapter 3). From independence in 1961 until the early 1980s, the country had a one-party system lead by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. However, in 1992 the Constitution was amended, and ended the constitutional supremacy of the ruling party. In October 1995 Tanzania held its first-ever, multi-party presidential election. International observers characterised the election on the mainland as "free and fair". Even though some irregularities were revealed, according to *EIU* (1995) not fewer than in the elections on Zanzibar (as part of the Tanzanian union), which was condemned by a large part of the donor community, the election result was deemed to reflect the will of the people. Benjamin Mkapa, the candidate of the incumbent party, became the president of the new government on 23 November 1995.

Tanzania faces many challenges and problems in developing and strengthening democratic institutions and in nurturing a dynamic and vigilant civil society.

Creating a democratic political culture is a particularly formidable task after decades of one-party rule. The most focused human rights and democratisation issues among the donors in the last two years have been the election on Zanzibar in 1995, and the government's harassment of the opposition on Zanzibar. After the flawed election large parts of the donor community chose to respond by applying negative conditionality. Together with other donors Norway expressed concern about the lack of transparency of the electoral process and the counting of ballots, and also about harassment of political opponents on the island, as well as reports about curtailment of the freedom of expression. It was decided, therefore, not to assist new development projects on Zanzibar until a solution has been found to the political problems on the island. Paradoxically, the implication of this decision was suspension of Phase IV of the electrification programme under consideration - a project which by the Norwegian Aid Commission (1995:48) was characterised as being highly successful in terms of achieving stated objectives.

What did the donor community achieve? This case is complex; to go into details would lead too far and extend beyond the terms of reference for this study. It will suffice to make a few points in connection with this case. The case of Zanzibar illustrates the limitations of applying negative conditionality, and, above all, that conditionality has to be contextualised. The Zanzibar case is also an example of a kind of partial conditionality imposed on only one part of the Union of Tanzania. The donor community achieved nothing: there will be no repeat election on Zanzibar and harassment of the opposition is continuing. Many informants claimed that the situation is very likely to remain stuck until the next election in 2000. Meanwhile, the donors are continuing their ordinary aid relationship with the Union government. There seems to be a tacit understanding between the donor community and the Union government to desist from exerting too much pressure on the Union government to take action. The Union government does not have the power to pressurise the Zanzibari government into compliance. If it tried, the existing fissures between Zanzibar and the mainland might increase, secessionist forces on Zanzibar would be strengthened, and the future of the Union would be put in jeopardy.

Norwegian aid to Tanzania

Tanzania has been one of Norway's principal aid recipients all along, and became the main recipient of Norwegian development aid in 1973. In 1990 Tanzania received as much as 20 per cent of total Norwegian bilateral aid. In recent years Norwegian aid to Tanzania has decreased dramatically, as shown in the table below, from NOK 643.7 mill. in 1990 to NOK 330.8 mill. in 1995. According to the planning figures for the period 1996-99, the country frame will be reduced even further (Agreed Minutes 1996). In 1995 Tanzania received only 11 per cent of total Norwegian bilateral aid, and Norway's share in Tanzania's total aid receipts was approximately 8 per cent (Norwegian Aid Commission 1995:241). The

Norwegian aid policy is outlined and operationalised in the Country Strategy for Norwegian Development Cooperation with Tanzania 1994-97 (MFA 1994).

According to the country strategy the overriding objective of Norwegian aid to Tanzania has since 1989 been economic reconstruction; safeguarding a basic level of social services (health and education); and contributing to responsible management of natural resources (MFA 1994:20). Political reform and democratisation and decentralisation are seen as prerequisites and key factors for sustainable development. Hence, political reform is considered vital and one of the main areas of concentration in aid relations between Norway and Tanzania (*ibid.*:33-37). In the plan of operation for 1997 democratisation is to be one of the four priority areas.

The absolute level of Norwegian aid to human rights and democratisation projects in Tanzania and as a percentage of total aid is shown in the table below.

Table 5: Human Rights and Democracy Support to Tanzania (In NOK mill.)

Tanzania	1990	1993	1994	1995
Total Norwegian aid	643.7	486.7	355	330.8
HR and democracy support	0.024	0.82	13.72	18.45
HR and democracy support as percentage of total aid	0.038%			5.6%

To strengthen human rights and to buttress democratic development has until recently not been central in the Norwegian-Tanzanian aid relationship. This area has in the latest years received increasing interest among many of the donors, and Norway has been in line with the rest of the donor community in this regard. As shown in table 5 there has been a substantial increase in the aid volume to the human rights and democratisation sector in recent years.

Again, it may be of interest to draw some comparisons with other aid statistics. According to NORAD's annual reports for 1994 and 1995, which indicate the level of aid to the much broader category of 'management, democracy, peace, and human rights', the volume of aid to this category for 1994 and 1995 were estimated at NOK 23.4 mill. and NOK 20.7 mill. respectively, which constituted 6.5 and 6.3 per cent of total Norwegian aid to Tanzania.

One may alternatively look at the projects within code 09 in DAC's categorisation for projects under the rubric of 'peace, human rights, democracy and miscellaneous'. In fact, this category is a kind of residual. Nevertheless, total volume levels for these projects for the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995 were the following: NOK 3.8 mill., NOK 0.87 mill., NOK 13.72 mill., NOK 18.24 mill. The huge discrepancy between, for example, the level in 1990 in table 5 and the DAC

code 09 figures may be explained by the fact that as much as NOK 3.776 mill. to cover salaries and housing for experts was included as miscellaneous under code 09. Similar such examples of anomalies could be given. This illustrates the problems of statistical comparability when categorisation of projects is arbitrary and statistical categories are inadequately or variably defined (see Appendix 1). It also illustrates the problems with DAC's categorisation. The figures must, therefore, be treated only as indicative and with great caution. It may be added that according to the country strategy, Norway did not provide any support to human rights and democratisation projects before 1993 (MFA 1994:21).

Within the area of democratisation most Norwegian support has been given in the form of small measures, such as travel support to the multi-party commission and seminars for newly established political parties. Support has also been given to various women's projects to strengthening women's rights. According to the country strategy the experiences with this kind of assistance have been good (MFA 1994:27). But to the knowledge of the author of this report no review or evaluation has been undertaken of Norwegian democratisation and human rights support to Tanzania. This could have been useful for further work.

The main reason for the high figures in 1994 and 1995 was substantial support for the administration of the elections. Most of this aid has been provided through a programme for political reform within the country programme, which is a positive step in the direction of a long-term policy within this area. The programme objectives also include strengthening democratic rights and enhancing the population's influence over its own life situation.

In 1996 NOK 4 mill. was allocated for various democratisation efforts through the political reform programme. NOK 2 mill. was also disbursed to various democratisation activities from the regional allocation. But because of delays in the Tanzanian treasury there was no disbursement through the political reform programme in 1996, and only NOK 1.3 mill. was disbursed from the regional allocation.

For 1997 a whole range of projects in many different areas has been planned, in effect covering all the areas discussed in chapter three, such as training directed towards parliamentarians, technical assistance to parliament, and support for the High Court in connection with hearings regarding election petitions in 1995. Other planned or ongoing activities include support to organisations like BAWATA to strengthen the legal and democratic rights of women, and activities to support training of political parties.

As a general observation support to the human rights and democratisation sector in Tanzania seems to exhibit the same characteristics as that in other countries. It is diverse, a bit *ad hoc* and arbitrary, disbursed from various sources and through

different channels, and concentrated around election periods. A longer term strategy and an evaluation of support provided so far are warranted.

6.3 Zambia

The Zambian context

Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world, and have today one of the world's highest rates of indebtedness. This places Zambia among the world's least developed nations (USAID 1996). Zambia is very dependent on aid, which is the country's largest source of foreign exchange and accounts for some 70 per cent of GDP. And aid dependency is increasing (Human Rights Watch 1996:47). At least 36 per cent of government revenue is derived directly from donor contributions. In 1995 real economic growth was negative with minus 3.9 per cent (EIU Zambia 1st quarter 1997:5). However, Zambia has in recent years made commitments to both political and economic reform, but it still needs high levels of donor support in order to ensure the continued functioning of the government.

Germany is Zambia's biggest donor, followed by Japan, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the European Union, and the United States. In 1996 the donor community pledged USD760 million in support to Zambia's development. Much of this is conditional on continued good governance and specific economic performance and reform criteria. According to the *Economist Intelligence Unit* (1995:37) " ... the flow of aid into Zambia has acted as a clear barometer of the government's relations with the Bretton Woods institutions whose stamp of approval is invariably essential before bilateral donations are made".

Bilateral aid has been frozen temporarily on a number of occasions, such as in 1991 around the elections and the ensuing change of government and again in 1994. These temporary suspensions of aid relate more to economic than political conditions, even though the distinction may be blurred. But the donors' massive reduction in their bilateral aid in 1996 prior to the general election was a response to conditions related to good governance, accountability and democratic practice. From the peak year of 1992, when Zambia received three times as much aid as the average in Africa, the level was reduced by one-third in 1996.

Zambia is one of the few Sub-Saharan African states that has not experienced one or more military coups, wars, or civil conflicts since independence in 1964. Zambia is also one of the few Sub-Saharan countries that has had a peaceful handing over of political power after an electoral defeat by the incumbent party. From 1964 Zambia was a *de jure* multi-party state as laid down in the constitution, but in practise it was a one-party state, with the United National Independence Party (UNIP) as the dominating party led by Kenneth Kaunda. From 1973 to 1991 Zambia was a *de jure* one-party state. Nevertheless, political unification of the

country has been weaker than in many other countries in the region; it was possible, therefore, for a trade union to become a base for political opposition which eventually evolved into a political party.

In 1991 Zambia became the first English-speaking state in post-colonial Africa to undergo a democratic transition by way of peaceful multi-party elections - the first one since independence - when the powerful Zambian trade unionist, Frederick J. T. Chiluba, won a convincing victory. The election in October 1991 was by international observers reported to be free and fair. Chiluba's new multi-party state was hailed as a model for other African states to emulate, and it was emphasised that the authoritarian former president, Kenneth Kaunda, had not been dethroned by the donor community and external pressure, but by a dynamic internal opposition. A democratic and free market system was tried installed, and international donors and lenders rushed to support the new government's endeavours to reform both the political and the economic sectors.

The second multi-party election scheduled for 1996, was expected to mean the solidification of multi-party democracy in Zambia. But the optimism expressed by the donor community in 1991 faded rapidly. The new president was soon accused by the donor community and by a divided internal opposition, of "back-peddalling on democracy and tolerating the kind of repression it once condemned" (*Washington Post* 25 July 1996). The ruling party, Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), tried to stifle the opposition, especially former president Kaunda, whose UNIP party was the only real competitor to the ruling party. In May 1996 the constitution was amended to bar Kaunda from running for the presidency on grounds that he was not a genuine Zambian, in contravention of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which Zambia has acceded.

As the election drew nearer the Zambian government showed little drive to follow up the commitments made at the Consultative Group meeting for Zambia in Bournemouth in 1995. At the Bournemouth meeting the donors had emphasised the importance of transparent and participatory processes of voter registration and constitutional reforms. It was also made clear that the amount of aid would depend on tangible progress in the good governance field (World Bank Press Release, 15 December 1995). According to several diplomats in Lusaka, it was in 1995 that the donors and the Zambian government reached an impasse, and thereafter the relationship only deteriorated further.

Studying effects of the application of negative conditionality in the case of Zambia is most interesting. It illustrates indeed the limitations and the many adverse effects negative conditionality may have. If negative conditionality were ever to work in practise, it would have to be in Zambia, for several reasons. In Zambia the donor community has been unusually well co-ordinated; Zambia is also heavily dependent on aid; and the cut and the freeze in aid in 1996 was substantial.

As the election was approaching donor after donor started cutting back on their aid, accompanied by rather strong statements expressing dissatisfaction with the run-up to the election. But despite such strong statements and reduced aid flows, the Zambian government was not willing to succumb to the conditions put forward by the donors, nor to fulfil the agreement with the donor community of 1995. On 18 November 1996 the election was held, but boycotted by most of the opposition parties. The election result was clear: the MMD won the election and Frederick Chiluba remained in power.

The donor community could only concede that negative conditionality had failed; president Chiluba had apparently been willing to pay the price in the form of aid cuts. The donors had to sit down and ponder over why it did not work, what they really had expected, and what to do next. Most of the donors took a position of wait and see, and further sanctions have not been agreed upon as a result of the election.

But what were the donors waiting for? First, they waited for the composition of parliament and the government, then they waited for the government's accession declaration, and the speech of the Minister of Finance and the national budget, to see if there were signals of concessions being made. Obviously, the donor community had been caught in a dilemma and faced a difficult situation in which they did not know what to do. A majority of the donors referred to await the outcome of the next Consultative Group meeting scheduled for early 1997.

The donors seem to be hoping for a more compromising initiative from the president, which might give them a pretext for gradually increasing their aid again. However, Chiluba appears to be continuing his confrontational line. Furthermore, the donor community is in a delicate situation in that they are split between bilateral and multilateral donors in their attitude. The IMF and the World Bank are satisfied that Zambia has honoured its commitments and reached the economic benchmarks, whereas the bilateral donors are dissatisfied with progress in the political sphere. But the multilaterals have stated that it is an untenable situation for them to continue if the bilaterals are not returning. The decrease in bilateral aid is also affecting the economic reforms. As summed up by the EIU (EIU Zambia 1st quarter 1997:7):

Donors must decide whether to continue to punish the government for the sins of 1996 and risk the expensive failure of structural adjustment in Zambia, or back down and surrender their influence over issues of good governance and civil liberties.

The EIU adds (*ibid.*) that "they are tempted to resume funding, but require a less confrontational approach from the Zambian government in order to do so." The prevailing perception seems to be that the donors will come back gradually.

What lessons can be drawn, and what did the donors achieve? They achieved nothing. If the donors get back on track, and no real steps have been taken by the Zambian government, there is a real danger that the donors have only lost their credibility. The case of Zambia illustrates that conditionality is not likely to be effective, and that, if applied, it has to be carefully planned and well timed.

Norwegian aid to Zambia

Zambia has received development aid from Norway since 1966 and was formally selected as a main partner country in the early 1970s. Since 1966 the Norwegian aid programme has undergone substantial changes in both volume and composition. Traditionally the most important sectors in the Zambian-Norwegian development co-operation have been agriculture, water and power supply, education and transport (*Zambia Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review 1986*). But similar to most other programme countries, support to democratisation and human rights has also become a part of Norwegian support to Zambia, although such support still constitutes a small proportion of the total aid programme (cf. table 6 below). The overriding goals of the Norway's development co-operation with Zambia are set out in the country strategy of 1993, among them consolidating democracy and strengthening civil society (MFA 1993).

As shown in table 6 below the volume of Norwegian aid to Zambia has decreased in the 1990s, from NOK 346 mill. in 1990 to NOK 222.7 mill in 1995. However, the volume of aid to human rights and democratisation measures has grown, both as a percentage of total aid and in absolute terms, from NOK 320,000 in 1990 to nearly NOK 5 mill. in 1995. In 1996 NOK 5.53 mill. was disbursed to human rights and democratisation activities. Norway has been one of the biggest donors to Zambia in this area, along with USAID, which provides substantial support but to fewer organisations. It is interesting to note, however, that the percentage of total aid disbursed to human rights and democratisation measures in the three programme countries, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia, is lower than the corresponding global figure for all bilateral aid (cf. the introductory highlights section of Appendix 1).

Table 6: Human Rights and Democracy Support to Zambia (In NOK mill.)

Zambia	1990	1993	1994	1995
Total Norwegian aid	346	235.5	361	222.7
HR and democracy support	0.32	0.1	3.35	4.95
HR and democracy as percentage of total Norwegian aid	0.09%	0.04%	0.9%	2.22%

In the particular case of Zambia it may also be interesting to compare the figures in table 6 with the figures in DAC's code 09. For the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and

1995 the total code 09 figures were the following: NOK 0.3 mill., NOK 0.14 mill., NOK 3.2 mill., NOK 4.1 mill. Unlike the cases of Tanzania and Zimbabwe there is hardly any discrepancy between table 6 and the DAC coding, even though some of the inclusion criteria may vary.

In Zambia NORAD has supported a whole range of projects and measures within the human rights and democratisation sector, some of which will be mentioned only briefly. However, in state-to-state co-operation there is no separate human rights and democratisation component. This fact may have affected the leverage of Norway as a donor vis-à-vis the Zambian government in a tense situation as that prior to the 1996 elections. Engagement with state institutions in this field, e.g. the police force or the judiciary, might have been more effective as a lever, but it is by no means certain given the generally defiant mood of the Chiluba government at that stage. In a longer term perspective, on the other hand, human rights and democratisation support to organisations of civil society makes a lot of sense. State-to-state co-operation and civil society support are not mutually exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing.

One of NORAD's priority areas has been the Civic Education Programme, which include information campaigns conducted by local organisations, to increase the political and democratic awareness among the population in general, and particularly directed towards the election process and the elections themselves.

One of the NORAD-supported NGOs is Afronet (Inter Africa Network for Human Rights and Development). Afronet was established in 1994 in the wake of the 1993 Vienna Human Rights Conference out of an acknowledgement of the need for an African alternative to the many Western human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Afronet also saw the need for an organisation which could co-ordinate the many African organisations with similar objectives. Besides being a regional organisation, it also runs national projects and programmes. NORAD started its co-operation with Afronet as the first donor in 1995. Afronet currently receives support from a range of donors. NORAD has also given support to ZIMT (Zambia Independent Monitoring Team), which was one of the local units of monitors during the 1991 and 1996 elections, but that organisation is also engaged in other activities like civic education.

Norway has also supported the conclusion of a collaborative agreement between the School of Law, University of Zambia and the Institute of Human Rights (IMR), University of Oslo to develop courses in human rights. IMR has also been involved in supporting an initiative to develop a proposal for new legislation on the electoral process. Other areas and projects supported by Norwegian aid include projects directed towards promoting and protecting the rights of women, children and vulnerable groups. NORAD is increasingly broadening the focus for such support and has lately provided support to the government-appointed constitutional commission. In 1996 NORAD also signed a contract with MISA-Zambia (the

Zambian branch of the Media Institute of Southern Africa), regarding a "Media Legal Defence Fund", which is working for a free, independent and pluralistic media situation in Zambia, and providing legal advice to media workers who face lawsuits as a result of their professional work.

A larger project with the aim of supporting democratic development at district level in the Northern Province has also been planned. It builds on Peace Corps experiences from developing a communal democracy in Luwingu. The project was supposed to have started in 1995, but was postponed until 1996. Because of negative conditionality applied by Norway due to dissatisfaction with the electoral process in 1996, NORAD decided not to start new projects until the political situation has changed for the better. As a result the project is still in abeyance. It is thus a paradox that when a donor applies negative sanctions against the government with the intention of inducing democratic change, it suspends projects at the grassroots with the same objective when the central government fails to comply. Perhaps the donors should develop a more flexible approach when negative conditionality is applied, and try to adjust their reaction to the objective they wish to achieve.

What lessons can be drawn, and what are the experiences so far and the challenges ahead with this kind of support? As mentioned above, there are many common characteristics and similar problems and challenges with this kind of support in the three Norwegian programme countries under review. But since there are no operational guidelines - on how much, through which channels, and to which areas. Since no country-specific strategies have been worked out for this field, there are some variations, especially in the administration of this kind of support. In contrast to Zimbabwe and Tanzania none of the human rights and democratisation projects in Zambia for the years 1990, 1993, 1994, and 1995 were disbursed through the regional allocation or over the country programme. The bulk of the so-called positive measures in Zambia were disbursed from the special allocation for NGOs. Most of Norwegian human rights and democratisation support is channelled to local NGOs, disregarding a couple of projects in 1995, which went through Norwegian NGOs. For instance, a human rights and women project was administered by Norwegian Church Aid. Most of the remaining human rights and democratisation projects, for the years referred to above, were projects designed to strengthen and support women's rights. In the same period only one project was sourced from one of the special budget votes (0191 and 0192) administered by the Second Political Affairs Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1994 NOK 19,000 was disbursed to IMR for the human rights education project at the University of Zambia.

What characterises this aid area in Zambia is the small size of grants to a wide variety of projects and organisations. Nearly all the projects have been initiated by the recipient. NORAD is not pro-actively involved in initiating human rights and democratisation projects. This may result in arbitrariness. Who gets support and

how much, will depend on the quality and number of applications received. There may be others, unknown to NORAD, in need of support and with the required professional and administrative capability to implement such projects. According to informants only 5 per cent of the applications came from organisations with a specific mandate to work on these issues.

No evaluation of the human rights and democratisation portfolio has been undertaken, but NORAD's general experience with the NGO sector is perceived to be fairly good. NORAD's impression is that many competent and committed people are involved in various NGOs in this field, but also that many of the organisations are city-based, one-man NGOs, totally dependent on aid. This is seen as a problem. Many of them are also considered very undemocratic in their structure, assuming the attitude: "we fight for democracy, but we do not need to be democratic". NORAD is cautious, therefore, when providing support. There is also a problem with so-called 'briefcase NGOs', i.e. organisations which change their objectives with the "fads and fashions" of the donor community. Today it is democracy and tomorrow it is something else. Therefore, NORAD is practising the general rule of quality control that before supporting an NGO, the organisation needs to have a proven record.

The Norwegian embassy in Lusaka has no earmarked position with special responsibility for the human rights and democratisation field. This has to do with the fact that the NORAD mission in Zambia was only recently upgraded to embassy status; human rights and democratisation have traditionally been dealt with by personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Since most human rights and democracy support in Zambia goes to local NGOs, the staff dealing with NGOs in practice also handle these issues. That seems not to be a problem in itself. The problem is rather that they have so many other responsibilities in addition to human rights and democratisation support. In order to improve the quality and coherence of the human rights and democratisation sector in Zambia, Norwegian personnel themselves suggested that a more comprehensive and specific strategy be developed for this sector. Perhaps the number of projects and areas of support could be reduced with a view to increasing impact through concentrating efforts. In order to do this and to take this sector seriously more expertise and an earmarked position would be helpful. The fact that it is a new field which is regarded as sensitive, underscores the need for more resources and staff.

6.4 Concluding remarks regarding Norwegian experiences

In order to ensure maximum effect, support for democratic development needs to be carefully planned. Thus within the general framework established by the political aspects and financial and technical resources of Norwegian development

co-operation, the areas, channels and type of efforts that are likely to have most influence on democratic development will be identified in each individual case. In cases of bilateral assistance this analysis has to take into account the situation in the country concerned and support provided by other donors ... (MFA 1993:9)

Within this area of assistance there seems to be a striking discrepancy between the purported emphasis and high priority given to this field at the political level, and reality at the operational field level. As a general characterisation this area can be said to be marked by a general lack of guidelines and strategies, shortage of competence and capacity within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD alike. However, the area is undergoing changes and there appears to be a will to rectify the situation both at headquarters and in the field. The problem is rather how to do it. If this field is to be taken seriously more resources have to be provided, not first and foremost in terms of money allocated, but rather expertise and capacity to improve quality.

As argued earlier and as shown in the section above this kind of support has to be adapted carefully to the societal context of the particular country concerned, since identification of the "needs" and opportunities for inducing change depends on the donors' resources and strength as well as interest groups in the recipient country. Even though better general guidelines would be helpful, it would be more important to work out country-specific strategies.

The so-called positive measures are generally small and scattered projects across a wide range of subject areas. Most of the assistance goes to seminars, travels, but also to human rights groups, civic education, support to parliaments, women rights projects, voter education and election observation. The total volume of aid to this sector is small, but it has increased from nearly zero at the beginning of the decade to 3.7 per cent of total aid in 1995. The fluctuations in the volume of this type of aid seem to be linked to election cycles.

Nearly all the projects have been started at the request and initiative from the recipient end. None of the Norwegian missions have played a particularly pro-active role in initiating such projects. This seems to be the case among the other donors as well. This reactive approach is in line with the increased emphasis put on so-called "recipient responsibility" and "ownership", which means that the recipients most take responsibility for their own development. The notion is based on the assumption that if the recipients themselves take a more active part in initiating the projects they will feel a stronger commitment to follow them through, and be able to shape them in their own image, which in sum is expected to enhance their sustainability. A somewhat more pro-active and strategic role on the part of the donor, however, need not undercut "ownership" and "recipient responsibility" but rather help avoid arbitrary interventions.

Perhaps one could draw some lessons from other areas and work out desk studies for this sector too. First, one could try to make an overall assessment of the needs for this kind of support after a survey and discussion of the most fundamental human rights problems and greatest democratisation challenges in the respective countries. The rudiments of the terms of reference for such an assessment could be the categories enumerated in chapter tree, which could help identify areas and forms of support. Ideally this should be done as far as possible in co-operation with the respective governments, and other interest groups within civil society. Against this background it would be possible to identify possible niches and points of entry. A survey of what other donors do in this field in the particular country would also have to be included, and their experiences so as to avoid the same mistakes being made over again and to prevent unnecessary overlap. On the basis of this assessment the donor would be able to decide whether human rights and democratisation should become a priority, and to determine its own competence, capacity and resource needs. Since the amount of available money is limited, and since one cannot support all good purposes within this field, a selection of sub-sectors will be necessary. For it is questionable whether spreading support on many small and diverse projects will give the best value for money.

One of the reasons why this area seems to be less developed than other traditional aid sectors is its relative newness. Another explanation may be that the donors are not really interested in making a clear policy in this field, because they want to retain political latitude. Furthermore, it should not be underestimated that it is an area of support which is extremely sensitive politically; by definition it involves a high level of interference (cf. chapter three). The donors must, therefore, design this kind of aid intervention very carefully. Competence and expertise is essential. But if this sector is to be taken seriously the declaratory emphasis has to be reflected in tangible form.

Before proceeding to specific experiences it must be added that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD are in the process of trying to strengthen this sector as a part of Norwegian development aid. Towards that end it is useful to secure some competence and to collect some facts about this sector in order to improve it in the future. In addition to that, and not least important, more research ought to be done on the effectiveness on this kind of aid. The evaluations undertaken of positive measures as a strategy to promote human right and democratisation are encouraging. But they are too few and the sector is too many-faceted to warrant firm conclusions. More research needs to be done.

On the basis of these general observations, some recommendations can be made in order to improve Norwegian human rights and democratisation support:

- ♦ A detailed set of general guidelines for support within this sector should be worked out and made more operational than the rudiments already existing;

- ◆ A thorough overall assessment should be made of the human rights situation and the democratisation challenges of each programme country with a view to defining the problems and need for support;
- ◆ Detailed country-specific strategies for the human rights and democratisation sector (as is done for other sectors) should be worked out. This is necessary due to the wide variations between programme countries in terms of a number of factors: need and prospects for making an impact; entry points and channels; Norway's donor position in the country in absolute and relative terms etc.;
- ◆ Based on the overall assessment and the country-specific strategies appropriate entry points should be identified and projects designed to address the problems encountered. Project ideas and design should be discussed in a dialogue with the authorities concerned and civil society organisations;
- ◆ For each programme country a decision should be made as to prioritisation of the human rights and democratisation sector. If accorded high priority, the competence and capacity commensurate with the task at hand should be made available so as to be able to make an impact;
- ◆ Interventions and measures should as far as possible be co-ordinated with other donors in order to avoid overlap and duplication of effort. It would be worthwhile to consider what other donors are doing within this sector and to draw on their experiences.

6.5 A combined strategy - a variety of means

Direct support to democratisation and human rights projects, so-called "positive measures", which has been at the centre of attention in this study, is, of course, just one of many strategies or vehicles for achieving the ultimate objective: an improved human rights situation and a more democratic system of governance. Supporting positive measures can also be seen as a conglomerate of strategies through a variety of means. This report is not arguing that positive measures would be the preferred strategy in all circumstances; other strategies will also have to be used - alone or in combination with others. A bilateral donor would have to consider the full range of available options before action is taken (see table 2).

This report has only considered bilateral strategies using aid as the principal tool. Multilateral means and institutions might be more effective, at least in some circumstances, but they fall beyond the terms of reference for this study. This report is simply arguing that co-operative strategies seem to be more effective than confrontational ones - a finding based on theory and corroborated by empirical evidence. Co-ordination within the donor community also seems to enhance effectiveness.

This general finding does not necessarily mean that a confrontational strategy should be ruled out under any circumstances or in any situation. Sometimes it may be an aim in itself to take a clear political stand and disassociate oneself from, for example, gross and severe human rights violations, disregarding whether such a

reaction will contribute to an improved human rights record, at least in the short run. Confrontational action could, for example, be sanctions or withdrawal of aid, with the well-known possible side-effect that the intended beneficiaries of aid would be penalised. The point to be made here is simply to underline that the donor state would have to consider carefully what it would like to achieve and apply the most appropriate means to that end. If the aim is *promotion* of human rights and democratisation, rather than just *disassociation* from autocratic regimes with a poor human rights record, conditionality does not appear to be a suitable strategy.

The greatest problem facing bilateral donors when applying political conditionality in developing countries, is their credibility.⁴² What happens when recipients refuse to comply and the conditionality strategy fails in terms of a positive outcome as seen by the donor? The logic of conditionality then dictates that the donors withdraw, reduce or suspend their aid. However, a common scenario seems to be that after temporary aid withdrawal, reduction or suspension donors are prone to reverse their decisions or modify them because a structural disbursement problem makes itself felt. There is so much money in the pipeline and so much pressure and strong incentives in the bureaucratic structure to dispose of the money made available through aid budgets that the funds are likely to start flowing again before long. The extent to which this happens would vary from country to country, and depend on how deeply a donor is involved in a particular country. But there seems to be a bandwagon effect: once one donor is back on track, the others tend to follow suit.

Since this 'disbursement imperative' phenomenon is well known at the recipient end it affects the credibility of conditionality. Recipients can allow themselves to sit on the fence for a while, or make some minor concessions, enough for the donors to resume disbursement. The donors will then have achieved nothing, except losing their credibility. There is a real danger that this will be a plausible scenario in Tanzania and Zambia, where the strategy to apply political conditionality did not work. So far the donors have taken a position of "wait and see" what other donors will do and whether, as in the case of Zambia, president Chiluba would meet some of the donors' conditions, so that things can get back to normal again.

The above argument does not mean that political conditionality should never be applied, but donors would have to consider carefully what they wish to achieve when applying it. For instance, likely responses and future scenarios in case of non-compliance should be worked out ahead of time. A general lesson may be, therefore, that the donor community ought to be more "cool-headed" before applying political conditionality, and, if applied, the donors must be more determined to stand firm and to follow up their commitments. The donors should

⁴² There seems to be many similarities with the experiences regarding economic conditionality, which has been amply documented by Paul Mosley (see Mosley et al. 1991, volumes one and two).

also be prepared to define more clearly - separately and jointly - what minimum concessions will be needed on the part of the recipient before resuming disbursement. So far the donors appear unwilling to do that for fear of narrowing their scope for political manoeuvring.

Applying political conditionality may also have other unintended side-effects and contribute to another paradox, which can in fact be illustrated by the case of Zimbabwe, the election on mainland Tanzania in 1995, and at least the first multi-party election in Zambia, as well as, for that matter, many other new multi-party elections in Africa, e.g. in Kenya. In the 1990s nearly all the donors have insisted on a multi-party system as a condition for aid. In fact, most African states have introduced multi-party systems in this period. One or a few (two in the case of Tanzania) sections of their constitutions were modified to meet the demand from the internal opposition or/and the donor community. However, the rest of the legal framework from the one-party area generally remains intact.

What often transpires after a multi-party election is that the donor community issues somewhat equivocal statements to the effect that despite irregularities, which did not materially affect the freedom and fairness of the election, by and large the results reflect the will of the people. Such pronouncements are made on a narrow election observation basis on and around polling day, neglecting considerations on the political playing field not being level in the run-up to the election due to the autocratic legacy. As long as the recipient government has amended its constitution to allow multiple parties and given a stamp of legitimacy by the donor community's proclaiming it freely and fairly elected, aid may continue to flow. Both the domestic opposition and the international donor community may be said to have been caught in a trap: the donor community has lost some of its bargaining power, and the recipient government can use the legitimisation given by the donors to suppress internal opposition. When the opposition and parts of the donor community are trying to apply pressure and/or induce changes in a recipient country towards further political reforms, the government is at liberty to retort that multi-partyism has been introduced, and that the government is not to be blamed for the opposition failing to garner more votes.

This again raises new questions and creates even greater challenges for the donor community. How can the donors contribute to giving the opposition more latitude and stimulate to "real democracy"? One strategy may be to try and stimulate the development of the party structure in the recipient countries. But again, and as was underscored in chapter five, supporting political parties is indeed difficult and hazardous, and may lead to unforeseen consequences if it is not properly planned and implemented.

This study concludes that a co-operative approach seems to be more effective and sustainable than a confrontational one. This will include positive measures, and active use of policy dialogue, as described earlier in this report. The strategies

could, of course, be used in combination. Based on interviews with donor representatives and others, it seems a striking paradox that the donor community is better co-ordinated when it comes to punishment than support.

This report has set out a general framework for support to the human rights and democratisation sector, and summarised some of the experiences gathered and lessons learnt. It has argued in favour of positive measures rather than a policy of conditionality. To that end the emphatic point has been made that there is a need for further operationalisation and contextualisation through preparing country-specific strategies of intervention for each of the programme countries. As suggested in the terms of reference for this study such a task could be a phase II follow-up assignment.

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- Kaela, Laurent, Lecturer, Political and Administrative Studies Department, University of Zambia.
- Kanganja, Dr. Joshua, Cabinet office, Deputy-Chairman of Human Rights Commission.
- Haugen, Kikkan, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy.
- Lomøy, Jon, Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy.
- James, Polhemus, Democracy/Governance Adviser, USAID.
- Mulenga, Staiford, Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT).
- Musukuma, John J. Co-ordinator, Southern African Broadcasting Association, Director of the Press Association of Zambia.
- Mwanajiti, Ngande, Executive Director, Afronet (the Inter Africa Network for Human Rights and Development).
- Saurvik, Leif, Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy.
- Wetterquist, Ingrid, First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden.

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- Auret, Mike, National Director, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe.
- Christiansen, Thure, First Secretary, Danish Embassy.
- Dahl, Johan H. Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy
- Dramdal, Torun, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy.
- Kubberud, Tor, Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy.
- Makore, M, National Co-ordinator, Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.
- Mandaza, Ibbo, Executive Director, Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies, (SARIPS).
- Matsheza, P., Under Secretary (Policy and Legislation), Ministry of Home Affairs.

Ncube, Welshman, Senior Lecturer, Department of Private Law, University of Zimbabwe,
Ronnås, Lars, First Secretary, Embassy of Sweden.
Stewart, Julie E., Associate Professor, Course Leader: NORAD Women's Law Programme, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe.

Interviews in Tanzania 27-31 January 1997:

Jørgensen, Nils-Johan, Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy.
Gjøes, Tore, Minister Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy.
Kiondo, Andrew, Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM).
Knudsen, Mette, First Secretary, Royal Danish Embassy.
Othman, Haroub, Professor, Institute of Development Studies, UDSM.
Mushi, Samuel, Professor, Department of Political and Administrative Studies, UDSM.
Rugumamu, Severine, Director, University Consultancy Bureau, UDSM.
Tibaijuka, Anna, Chairperson of Baraza La Wanawake Tanzania (BAWATA), The National Women's Council - Tanzania.
Valvatne, Lars Sigurd, Counsellor, Norwegian Embassy.
Wikstrøm, Lillian, First Secretary, Norwegian Embassy.

Interviews in the Netherlands 6-7 February 1997:

Hoeve-van Heek, Anke ter, Desk Officer Zambia and Malawi, Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA).
Kamper, Teunis, Head Project Support Division, Human Rights, Good Governance and Democratisation Department, NMFA.
Knyenenburg, Hans. W., Head of Central and East African Countries Section, NMFA.
Moquette, Marc, Senior Policy Adviser, Human Rights, Good Governance and Democratisation Department, NMFA.
Ngombane, Noby, Head of Africa Department, NMFA.
van Norren, Dorine, Desk Officer, Southern Africa Division, NMFA.
van Schaik, Ms, Strategic Policy Orientation Unit, NMFA.

Interviews in Sweden 27-28 August 1996:

Cedergren, Jan, Department for International Development Co-operation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Edström, Lars-Olof, Senior Adviser, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA).

Ehrenpreis, Dag, Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (Sida).

Odén, Bertil, Senior Researcher, Southern Africa Programme, Nordic Africa Institute.

Rylander, Sten, Assistant Director General, Department for East and West Africa, (Sida).

Säve-Söderbergh, Bengt, Secretary-General, International IDEA.

Wohlgemuth, Lennart, Director, Nordic Africa Institute.

Interviews in Denmark 19 September 1996:

Hørmann, Lars, Asia Section, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DMFA).

Rubow, Caroline, Head of Policy Section, DMFA.

Thomsen, Margit, East and West-Africa Section, DMFA.

Tjerk, Peter, Southern Africa Section, DMFA.

Appendix 1

Democracy and Human Rights Activities Supported by Norwegian Development Aid

A statistical report covering the years 1990 and 1993-95

Highlights

The survey covers democracy and human rights activities for the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995. It was initially meant to cover the last three years only, but 1990 is also included so that trends and variations in a longer time perspective may be traced. From 1990 to 1995 the disbursement to democracy and human rights projects increased dramatically from 0.55 per cent to 3.73 per cent of total aid. If disbursements to peace activities are also included the figures are 0.77 per cent and 4.96 per cent respectively. Strictly speaking disbursement to peace activities is not covered by the terms of reference, but since such issues often are intertwined with human rights and democratisation activities, peace projects have been included in the survey as well.

Total funding for democracy projects has been almost double the amount disbursed to human rights activities. Disbursements to peace efforts are slightly lower than those for human rights activities. From 1990 to 1993 there was a considerable leap in total volume disbursed to both democracy and human rights projects. But these two categories of projects saw no growth from 1993 to 1994. Peace projects, however, did not experience any significant increase in funding until 1994.

With respect to amounts disbursed per project, democracy projects received on average four times that of human rights projects. The average amounts disbursed to human rights activities increased steadily over the four years studied. The corresponding averages in financial support for peace efforts grew far more rapidly during the years 1993-95. Democracy projects received on average the same amounts in the years 1993 and 1994. However, in 1995 the average amount disbursed to each project increased sharply. While the average size of peace projects in 1990 was only half that of democracy projects, the average peace project in 1994 received more funding than what was given to the average

democracy project. In 1995 the average volume for democracy projects was once again larger than the corresponding average for peace activities.

In order to give a more accurate picture, the projects of each category have been grouped into different levels in terms of amount disbursed. It emerges clearly that the volume of most of the projects in any of the three categories ranges between NOK 100,000 and 500,000. Approximately 40 per cent of the projects fell within this range. The variation in average size is due to the fact that democracy support includes big projects. In 1995 there were 13 democracy projects above NOK 5 mill., but only one human rights project of that magnitude.

Financing of activities in support of democracy, human rights or peace efforts, comes mainly from budget lines or funds designated for such activities and from votes addressing the problems of particular conflict areas. The first type of funds includes the special fund for Democracy Promotion and Humanitarian Aid. The conflict areas represented in the budget structure are amongst others Southern Africa, Central America and Palestine.

The special gender vote is a significant source for financing human rights projects. This is a direct consequence of the practice of recording projects in support of the struggle for women's rights as human rights projects. More surprising is the fact that grants for NGO projects account for as much as 20 per cent of all human rights support.

NORAD has the administrative responsibility for the country programmes and a budget line for supporting NGOs. The MFA, on the other hand, is responsible for the fund for Democracy Support and Humanitarian Aid. Finally, with respect to some budget votes funding is channelled through both NORAD and the MFA. Responsibility is split with respect to the vote devoted to gender issues and the votes covering geographical regions, which represent significant sources of funding for the projects covered by this survey.

The amount geared towards democracy support, being channelled through the MFA, declined during the period under review. In 1990, although only 12 projects were recorded, 98 per cent of democracy support was disbursed from budget chapters handled by the MFA. In the following years, the MFA's financial support to democracy activities decreased and ended up at 24 per cent in 1995. The absolute amount also decreased, but not as sharply.

Democracy support from the fund for Humanitarian Aid has been reduced significantly. At the same time NORAD has increased its support to democracy promotion projects, and the regional votes which are channelled through both NORAD and the MFA, also show an increase with respect to democracy support. The latter fact indicates that the share of the total volume disbursed by the MFA, might be higher.

The picture for human rights projects is somewhat different. NORAD has a stable share of approximately 25 per cent of financial resources. The remaining funds for human rights activities show a slight predominance by MFA's grants. In 1995 these grants accounted for 37 per cent of human rights funding. In the same year 35 per cent of the funding was disbursed from split budget votes.

Peace projects exhibit the same decreasing trend as democracy projects when looking at the MFA share in total funding. Throughout the period from 1990 to 1995, NORAD has almost no disbursements to peace efforts from their budget chapters. It is the regional votes with split responsibility, that have ended up financing peace activities. In the year 1995 three-fourths of all peace projects was financed from the regional votes.

Disbursements to democracy activities and to human rights promotion were also compared with total disbursements from the NGO and humanitarian aid votes. In this survey, funding of emergency relief provided to victims of natural disasters is not included.

Total disbursements from the fund for humanitarian aid almost doubled from 1990 to 1995, with a sharp increase from 1990 to 1993. Over these two years the spending for democracy and human rights activities taken together, increased from less than 1 per cent of total aid volume to 9 per cent. The following two years the combined volume for democracy and human rights projects decreased, to 2.5 per cent of total disbursement in 1995. This is mainly due to the fact that funding of democracy projects could no longer be sourced from the fund for humanitarian aid.

The vote for financing of NGO-operated projects, has been more or less constant during the period under study. Approximately NOK 600 mill. has been disbursed annually to Norwegian and local NGOs. In 1995 6 per cent of this amount was directed towards democracy projects or was intended to improve human rights conditions. By contrast, the corresponding percentage was 0.9 in 1990. Funding of democracy activities did not become significant until 1995. Disbursements for human rights activities, on the other hand, have increased steadily during the period.

The geographical area referred to as 'Black South Africa' has received one-third of all democracy support funding. This area has been on the top of the disbursement list in all the three years 1993, 1994 and 1995. In 1990 democracy support was almost entirely directed towards Chile. The Palestinian administered territories is number two on the disbursement list by geographical area. Although this area entered the statistics only in 1994, it has received 15 per cent of all disbursement directed towards democracy support. One must bear in mind, however, that some of the assistance to the anti-apartheid struggle and support for the Palestinians, cannot be read directly out the official statistics.

Disbursements for democracy support broken down by region show that 60 per cent went to countries in Africa. The percentage was somewhat higher in 1993, but the overall picture has remained more or less the same.

With respect to disbursements for human rights activities, 27 per cent is recorded in the statistics as either having a global impact, or the target country is not specified. Among the specified countries Guatemala has received a significant amount of assistance to improve human rights conditions. The share of disbursements to Guatemala increased considerably in 1994 and 1995.

Funding of peace efforts is not broken down by year. Of the disbursed volume 57 per cent went to projects targeting Africa, and more specifically Mozambique and Angola. Guatemala and El Salvador account for the bulk of funding in Central America. Disbursement by regions shows a total of 11 per cent to Asia. This is partly due to the fact that some of the assistance for the Palestinians was previously recorded in the statistics as 'Asia - unspecified'.

Data sources

This analysis is based mainly on official Norwegian aid statistics, which record all activities that have received financial support within a particular budget year. Each activity entry include a short project title, the disbursed amount and the appropriate code. Activities are not traceable from one year to another.

The activities under review are aimed at promoting democracy and improving human rights conditions. Peace-supporting activities appear closely related to the two previously mentioned categories, and are hence included in this survey as well.

The main methodological problem is related to the criteria according to which activity records would be selected. The following selection criteria were used:

- the code indicating the sector supported;
- the budget chapter from which funding was drawn;
- special key words in the project title (e.g. democracy or human rights);
- scrutiny of the project title itself.

The above criteria were not considered sufficient in themselves for selection of relevant activities. For instance, the sector code (09) for peace, democracy and human rights, also comprise miscellaneous activities. Similarly, activities funded from the special Fund for Democracy Support would not automatically be included.

Further details about criteria and data sources

As mentioned above, each project entry in the general database, from which these statistics have been extracted, has a code indicating the relevant sector. Unfortunately for the purposes of this report, the sector classification is rather more adapted to conventional development aid projects, in sectors such as education, health, agriculture and industry. In order to identify democracy and human rights projects, therefore, a closer look had to be made among those coded under the 'miscellaneous' category.

The projects and activities in question have been found principally under the following sector codes as applied by DAC;

- 02 - Humanitarian assistance
- 09 - Democracy, human rights, peace and miscellaneous
- 91 - Women's projects
- 99 - Miscellaneous

Some budget chapters are of particular interest to this survey, i.e. the special Fund for Democracy Support, and part of the Fund for Humanitarian Assistance. Both of these funds may be used for human rights activities. Care has been taken, however, not to include ordinary humanitarian assistance projects in this report.

Through close examination of project titles, combined with the other criteria, a sub-set of activities was arrived at. This sub-set, dubbed 'Democracy, Human Rights and Peace Efforts', consists of 1,274 entries spanning the years 1990 and 1993-95. By comparison, total aid statistics cover about 14,235 project entries for the same years.

However, importance should not be attached to the sheer number of discrete activities. In compiling official aid statistics, different activities have often been lumped together under one project heading, or might have been split up into several projects, as the case may be. Most of the tables in this report show disbursed amounts; conclusions should be based on disbursement figures rather than number of projects.

For the purpose of this report, actual disbursement figures were selected as an expression of volume of support, rather than budget figures or commitments. In fact, official statistics reflect disbursement. Commitments are unreliably recorded, and are thus not suitable for depicting the true situation. The amounts entered are those actually disbursed to the respective recipients within a given year. It is not certain, however, whether the disbursed amounts were fully spent within that same year. A very small proportion of disbursed funds is returned. Such returned funds appear in the official statistics as negative figures. For the sake of simplicity, and due to their negligible volume, these negative amounts have been deleted from the tables contained in this report.

In some cases a comprehensive project may comprise distinct components aimed at supporting democracy, human rights or peace efforts. Such components may not have been recorded separately, however, and would not be traceable for inclusion in the statistics compiled for this report.

Placing an activity in the correct category by just reading the short project title of 40 characters is hazardous and difficult. The ambiguity of project titles may thus have led to a certain margin of error. However, selection has been made with respect to *all* criteria, and with a certain amount of cross-checking. Thus, the results are presented with a satisfactory degree of confidence.

In addition to the official statistics, data from project databases in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been inspected. Details contained in those databases go beyond the rudimentary data entries of the official statistics. Supplementary information was thus obtained.

Sub-categories

The main categories 'Democracy' and 'Human Rights' have been sub-divided further. This has been done mainly to sharpen the selection criteria, and some tables will show breakdowns by these sub-categories. The category 'Peace Efforts' remains intact.

Activities within the 'Democracy' category have been broken down into the following sub-categories:

- assistance to electoral processes, electoral observation etc.;
- assistance to improve governance;
- assistance for improvement of the legal system, including police training;
- support for a free press;
- other activities.

Activities within the 'Human Rights' category have been broken down into the following sub-categories:

- the words 'human rights' included in the project title;
- political and civil rights for women;
- the Beijing Conference on Women;
- children, minority groups, indigenous people;
- other activities.

Activities subsumed under the above sub-categories have been included in the tables below. The Beijing conference was a major event in 1994, and activities related to this event were coded separately. Other included activities related to the

situation of women are those designed to protect and promote their political and civil rights. On the other hand, general development projects whose principal objective is to improve the economic situation of women, have not been included, even though such projects could be seen to meet the social and economic rights of women.

Similarly, general trade union support, e.g. for procurement of equipment or educational programmes, have not been included; only projects directly supporting the struggle for workers' rights have qualified for inclusion.

The category of 'Peace Efforts' includes all activities pertaining to mediation and support for peace organisations. It also includes post-war activities like repatriation of refugees, and demobilisation and re-education of soldiers. Activities related to conventions on biological or chemical weapons do not qualify for inclusion.

The above delimitation of the statistical coverage is, of course, to some extent arbitrary and hence debatable. However, the discretion exercised seems reasonable in view of the emphasis placed on democracy and political and civil rights in the terms of reference.



Disbursed Amounts for each Category

Breakdown by years and sub-category

Democracy

	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
Election	2	56	28	32 960	45	37 003	21	29 874
Governance	2	2 005	21	37 404	25	38 175	13	19 055
Juridical	0	-	12	17 911	12	20 569	20	43 077
Free press	2	389	23	7 230	10	3 854	18	6 815
Other	6	21 118	10	13 876	13	19 340	40	92 402
SUM	12	23 568	94	109 381	105	118 941	112	191 223

All amounts are in 1000 NOK

Human Rights

	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
In text	10	3 195	38	10 476	62	27 140	80	47 402
Women	40	7 853	30	9 273	37	15 856	49	13 364
Bejingconf.	-	-	7	4 447	15	3 071	37	6 915
Children, minor.	15	4 054	47	7 978	35	8 910	43	15 942
Other	25	3 140	102	30 590	51	13 875	65	20 031
SUM	90	18 242	224	62 764	200	68 852	274	103 654

All amounts are in 1000 NOK

Total for Democracy and Human Rights

	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
SUM	102	41 810	318	172 145	305	187 793	386	294 877

All amounts are in 1000 NOK

Peace Efforts

	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
SUM	20	16 655	42	25 958	68	87 155	63	96 895


All amounts are in 1000 NOK

TOTAL, all categories

	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
SUM	122	58 465	360	198 103	373	274 948	449	391 772

All amounts are in 1000 NOK

The tables show number of activities and disbursed amount for each category in question. Crosstabulation of years by sub-categories for Democracy and Human Rights.



Comparison with total Norwegian Development Aid

Year	Total Norwegian Development Aid		The Percentage of total Aid disbursed to ...		
	# of projects	Disbursed	..democracy	..human Rights	Total (Demo+HR)
1990	2853	7 551 092	0,31 %	0,24 %	0,55 %
1993	3639	7 193 261	1,52 %	0,87 %	2,39 %
1994	3914	8 021 454	1,48 %	0,86 %	2,34 %
1995	3919	7 902 202	2,42 %	1,31 %	3,73 %

Year	The Percentage of total Aid disbursed to peace efforts	Grand Total
1990	0,22 %	0,77 %
1993	0,36 %	2,75 %
1994	1,09 %	3,43 %
1995	1,23 %	4,96 %

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows for each year the percentage of total Norwegian Development Aid disbursed to activities within the categories of Democracy, Human Rights and Peace Efforts. The total amount disbursed as development aid is shown together with the respective number of recorded activities for each year. The percentages refer to the amount disbursed and not to the number of activities.

Average amount disbursed to activities within each category

Breakdown by years

Year	Democracy	Human Rights	Peace eff.	Total
1990	1964	203	833	480
1993	1164	280	618	551
1994	1133	344	1282	738
1995	1707	378	1538	873
Total	1372	322	1174	709

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows the average amount disbursed to an activity. The figures are calculated from total amount disbursed divided by the number of activities for each category. The totals refer to the average for either one year (horizontal) or one category (vertical).

There is a clear tendency showing that the Democracy projects are on average four times as big as the Human Rights projects with respect to amount disbursed.

As mentioned above the number of activities from one year to another, may vary due to technical reasons and thus influence the average figures in a disturbing manner.

Size of Projects

Democracy

Size of project	Number of projects			
	1990	1993	1994	1995
Up to 49.000 NOK	4	14	14	11
50.000-99.000 NOK	0	10	14	14
100.000-499.000 NOK	4	36	46	44
500.000-999.000 NOK	2	9	12	14
1 mill - 5 mill. NOK	1	18	12	16
More than 5 mill NOK	1	7	7	13
SUM	12	94	105	112

Percentage distribution				
Size of project	1990	1993	1994	1995
Up to 49.000 NOK	33,3 %	14,9 %	13,3 %	9,8 %
50.000-99.000 NOK	0,0 %	10,6 %	13,3 %	12,5 %
100.000-499.000 NOK	33,3 %	38,3 %	43,8 %	39,3 %
500.000-999.000 NOK	16,7 %	9,6 %	11,4 %	12,5 %
1 mill - 5 mill. NOK	8,3 %	19,1 %	11,4 %	14,3 %
More than 5 mill NOK	8,3 %	7,4 %	6,7 %	11,6 %
SUM	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %

The table shows the Democracy projects categorized by the amount disbursed. For each year the table shows the number of projects within each category, and the relative percentage for the year in question.

Human Rights

Number of projects				
Size of project	1990	1993	1994	1995
Up to 49.000 NOK	30	68	44	57
50.000-99.000 NOK	11	33	31	36
100.000-499.000 NOK	39	88	78	124
500.000-999.000 NOK	8	20	30	30
1 mill - 5 mill. NOK	2	15	17	26
More than 5 mill NOK	0	0	0	1
SUM	90	224	200	274

Percentage distribution				
Size of project	1990	1993	1994	1995
Up to 49.000 NOK	33,3 %	30,4 %	22,0 %	20,8 %
50.000-99.000 NOK	12,2 %	14,7 %	15,5 %	13,1 %
100.000-499.000 NOK	43,3 %	39,3 %	39,0 %	45,3 %
500.000-999.000 NOK	8,9 %	8,9 %	15,0 %	10,9 %
1 mill - 5 mill. NOK	2,2 %	6,7 %	8,5 %	9,5 %
More than 5 mill NOK	0,0 %	0,0 %	0,0 %	0,4 %
SUM	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %

The table shows the Human Rights projects categorized by the amount disbursed. For each year the table shows the number of projects within each category, and the relative percentage for the year in question.


Peace Efforts

Number of projects				
Size of project	1990	1993	1994	1995
Up to 49.000 NOK	3	16	11	13
50.000-99.000 NOK	5	7	9	6
100.000-499.000 NOK	7	8	20	29
500.000-999.000 NOK	0	4	10	5
1 mill - 5 mill. NOK	4	6	12	5
More than 5 mill NOK	1	1	6	5
SUM	20	42	68	63

Percentage distribution

Size of project	1990	1993	1994	1995
Up to 49.000 NOK	15,0 %	38,1 %	16,2 %	20,6 %
50.000-99.000 NOK	25,0 %	16,7 %	13,2 %	9,5 %
100.000-499.000 NOK	35,0 %	19,0 %	29,4 %	46,0 %
500.000-999.000 NOK	0,0 %	9,5 %	14,7 %	7,9 %
1 mill - 5 mill. NOK	20,0 %	14,3 %	17,6 %	7,9 %
More than 5 mill NOK	5,0 %	2,4 %	8,8 %	7,9 %
SUM	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %

The table shows the Peace projects categorized by the amount disbursed. For each year the table shows the number of projects within each category, and the relative percentage for the year in question.



Total disbursements and number of activities for each category

Breakdown on budget chapters

For the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995

Democracy

Budget Chapter	Number	Amount % (of amount)	
Democracy support	100	112 648	25,4 %
Research, experts etc.	15	6 017	1,4 %
Humanitarian Assistance	88	92 409	20,9 %
Information etc.	3	263	0,1 %
Cooperation Tanzania	4	20 709	4,7 %
Cooperation Mozambique	1	10 000	2,3 %
Cooperation Bangladesh	2	4 212	1,0 %
Cooperation Nicaragua	3	17 484	3,9 %
Cooperation South-Afrika	4	41 723	9,4 %
Non-governmental Organisations	46	19 242	4,3 %
Peace activities	2	778	0,2 %
Regional Support - Central-America	12	13 662	3,1 %
SADDC support	17	47 783	10,8 %
Regional Support - Asia	8	2 744	0,6 %
Cooperation Palestina	5	48 231	10,9 %
Support misc. Regions	3	2 900	0,7 %
Special Grants (women/culture)	10	2 193	0,5 %
Sum for Democracy	323	442 998	100,0 %

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Human Rights

Budget Chapter	Number	Amount % (of amount)	
Democracy support	19	14 798	5,8 %
Research, experts etc.	40	11 078	4,4 %
Peace Corps	1	490	0,2 %
Humanitarian Assistance	312	82 364	32,5 %
Information etc.	5	395	0,2 %
Cooperation Zimbabwe	3	4 812	1,9 %
Cooperation Nicaragua	4	4 428	1,7 %
Non-governmental Organisations	175	51 434	20,3 %
Peace activities	2	250	0,1 %
Regional Support - Central-America	27	34 140	13,5 %
SADDC support	17	4 595	1,8 %
Regional Support - Asia	13	3 863	1,5 %
Support misc. Regions	1	124	0,0 %
Special Grants (97% women act.)	167	37 141	14,7 %
UNICEF support	2	3 600	1,4 %
Sum for Human Rights	788	253 512	100,0 %

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Peace Efforts

Budget Chapter	Number	Amount	% (of amount)
Democracy support	21	25 795	11,4 %
Research, experts etc.	5	502	0,2 %
Humanitarian Assistance	118	73 354	32,4 %
Cooperation Mozambique	2	8 300	3,7 %
Non-governmental Organisations	5	512	0,2 %
Peace activities	27	2 288	1,0 %
Regional Support - Central-America	5	18 498	8,2 %
SADC support	6	83 334	36,8 %
Regional Support - Asia	1	5 000	2,2 %
Cooperation Palestina	1	7 969	3,5 %
Support misc. Regions	1	1 094	0,5 %
Special Grants (women)	1	17	0,0 %
Sum for Peace Efforts	193	226 663	100,0 %

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The tables show the various budget allocations from which are funded the activities for Democracy, Human Rights and Peace Efforts respectively. The amounts shown and the number of activities are the sums for the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995.

Breakdown by administrative channel

	NORAD		MFA		Both	
	No.	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
Democracy	63	114 316	197	209 420	63	119 377
Human Rights	190	63 923	349	104 156	249	85 433
Peace Efforts	7	8 812	170	101 916	16	115 935
Sum	260	187 051	716	415 492	328	320 745

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows the number of activities and the total amount disbursed in the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995 crosstabulated by category by administrative channel.

“NORAD” is the “Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation” and “MFA” is “The Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. The columns with header “Both” indicates activities funded from budget allocations where the administrative responsibility is split between NORAD and MFA.

Breakdown by administrative channel, vertical percentages


	NORAD	MFA	Both
Democracy	61,1 %	50,4 %	37,2 %
Human Rights	34,2 %	25,1 %	26,6 %
Peace efforts	4,7 %	24,5 %	36,1 %
Sum	100,0 %	100,0 %	100,0 %

The table on the previous page shows what amount of total disbursements within each administrative channel, has gone to the respective categories. The base amount for each channel is the sum of disbursements in the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995. See above for explanation about the headers.

Breakdown by administrative channel, horizontal percentages

	NORAD	MFA	Both	Sum
Democracy	25,8 %	47,3 %	26,9 %	100 %
Human Rights	25,2 %	41,1 %	33,7 %	100 %
Peace efforts	3,9 %	45,0 %	51,1 %	100 %

The table shows for each category, what amount has been channelled through the respective administrative units. The base amount for each category is the sum of disbursements in the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995. See above for explanation about the headers.



Budget Categories - simplified

In order to give a yearly review, the budget chapters are grouped and ordered in accordance with the administrative channels.

Democracy

Budget group	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No	Amount	No	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
Democracy Support	1	20 000	35	24 329	23	26 313	41	42 006
Humanitarian Asst.	5	2 369	31	56 243	33	29 268	19	4 529
Misc. MFA only	2	615	6	3 668	1	80	-	-
Total MFA channel	8	22 984	72	84 240	57	55 661	60	46 535
Country Programmes	-	-	1	4 201	5	31 818	8	58 109
NGO support	2	550	7	2 624	19	4 489	18	11 694
Misc. NORAD	-	-	-	-	2	810	1	21
Total for NORAD	2	550	8	6 825	26	37 117	27	69 824
Regional grants	1	10	10	16 792	16	24 819	18	73 699
Special Grants	1	24	2	127	4	1 231	3	811
Misc. divided	-	-	2	1 397	2	113	4	354
Total divided	2	34	14	18 316	22	26 163	25	74 864
Grand total	12	23 568	94	109 381	105	118 941	112	191 223

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows the number of and the amounts disbursed to Democracy projects for each year, broken down on administrative channel and budget group. Divided grants are grants where the administrative responsibility is split between MFA and NORAD.

Democracy - percentages

Budget group	1990	1993	1994	1995
Democracy Support	85 %	22 %	22 %	22 %
Humanitarian Asst.	10 %	51 %	25 %	2 %
Misc. MFA only	3 %	3 %	0 %	0 %
Total MFA channel	98 %	77 %	47 %	24 %
Country Programmes	0 %	4 %	27 %	30 %
NGO support	2 %	2 %	4 %	6 %
Misc. NORAD	0 %	0 %	1 %	0 %
Total for NORAD	2 %	6 %	31 %	37 %
Regional grants	0 %	15 %	21 %	39 %
Special Grants	0 %	0 %	1 %	0 %
Misc. divided	0 %	1 %	0 %	0 %
Total divided	0 %	17 %	22 %	39 %
Grand total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

The table shows vertical percentages for the previous table.

Human Rights

Budget group	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No	Amount	No	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
Democracy Support	-	-	4	4 569	6	2 708	9	7 521
Humanitarian Asst.	20	3 510	133	30 421	80	21 270	79	27 163
Misc. MFA only	2	593	9	1 172	1	1 100	6	4 129
Total MFA channel	22	4 103	146	36 162	87	25 078	94	38 813
Country Programmes	-	-	1	1 187	2	4 625	4	3 428
NGO support	11	4 856	38	9 772	46	12 560	80	24 246
Misc. NORAD	1	35	3	2 614	-	-	4	600
Total for NORAD	12	4 891	42	13 573	48	17 185	88	28 274
Regional grants	13	3 195	6	3 310	20	15 429	19	20 788
Special Grants	34	3 584	28	9 423	35	8 699	70	15 435
Misc. divided	9	2 469	2	296	10	2 461	3	344
Total divided	56	9 248	36	13 029	65	26 589	92	36 567
Grand total	90	18 242	224	62 764	200	68 852	274	103 654

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows the number of and the amounts disbursed to Human Rights projects for each year, broken down on administrative channel and budget group. Divided grants are grants where the administrative responsibility is split between MFA and NORAD.

Human Rights - percentages

	1990	1993	1994	1995
Budget group				
Democracy Support	0 %	7 %	4 %	7 %
Humanitarian Asst.	19 %	48 %	31 %	26 %
Misc. MFA only	3 %	2 %	2 %	4 %
Total MFA channel	22 %	58 %	36 %	37 %
Country Programmes	0 %	2 %	7 %	3 %
NGO support	27 %	16 %	18 %	23 %
Misc. NORAD	0 %	4 %	0 %	1 %
Total for NORAD	27 %	22 %	25 %	27 %
Regional grants	18 %	5 %	22 %	20 %
Special Grants	20 %	15 %	13 %	15 %
Misc. divided	14 %	0 %	4 %	0 %
Total divided	51 %	21 %	39 %	35 %
Grand total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

The table shows vertical percentages for the previous table.

Peace Efforts

Budget group	1990		1993		1994		1995	
	No	Amount	No	Amount	No.	Amount	No.	Amount
Democracy Support	-	-	4	2 289	11	16 176	6	7 330
Humanitarian Asst.	15	16 062	27	8 665	41	38 964	35	9 663
Misc. MFA only	3	551	9	1 132	9	681	10	403
Total MFA channel	18	16 613	40	12 086	61	55 821	51	17 396
Country Programmes	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	8 300
NGO support	-	-	-	-	2	236	3	276
Misc. NORAD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total for NORAD	-	-	-	-	2	236	5	8 576
Regional grants	1	25	2	13 872	5	31 098	6	70 900
Special Grants	1	17	-	-	-	-	-	-
Misc. divided	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	23
Total divided	2	42	2	13 872	5	31 098	7	70 923
Grand total	20	16 655	42	25 958	68	87 155	63	96 895

All disbursed amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows the number of and the amounts disbursed to Peace projects for each year, broken down on administrative channel and budget group. Divided grants are grants where the administrative responsibility is split between MFA and NORAD.

Peace Efforts - percentages

Budget group	1990	1993	1994	1995
Democracy Support	0 %	9 %	19 %	8 %
Humanitarian Asst.	96 %	33 %	45 %	10 %
Misc. MFA only	3 %	4 %	1 %	0 %
Total MFA channel	100 %	47 %	64 %	18 %
Country Programmes	0 %	0 %	0 %	9 %
NGO support	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
Misc. NORAD	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
Total for NORAD	0 %	0 %	0 %	9 %
Regional grants	0 %	53 %	36 %	73 %
Special Grants	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
Misc. divided	0 %	0 %	0 %	0 %
Total divided	0 %	53 %	36 %	73 %
Grand total	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

The table shows vertical percentages for the previous table.

The Contribution from particular Grants


The Humanitarian Grants, adm. responsibility MFA

<i>Humanitarian Grants</i>	1990	1993	1994	1995
Funding Democracy	2 369	56 243	29 268	4 529
Funding Human Rights	3 510	30 421	21 270	27 163
Sum Demo & HR	5 879	86 664	50 538	31 692

HR - percentages	1990	1993	1994	1995
Funding Democracy	0,3 %	5,9 %	2,9 %	0,4 %
Funding Human Rights	0,5 %	3,2 %	2,1 %	2,1 %
Sum Demo & HR	0,9 %	9,1 %	5,1 %	2,5 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows the contribution from the Humanitarian Grants with respect to Democracy and Human Rights projects.




The NGO Grant, adm. responsibility NORAD

<i>Grant for NGO Support</i>	1990	1993	1994	1995
Funding Democracy	550	2 624	4 489	11 694
Funding Human Rights	4 856	9 772	12 560	24 246
Sum Demo & HR	5 406	12 396	17 049	35 940


NGO Grant - percentages	1990	1993	1994	1995
Funding Democracy	0,1 %	0,5 %	0,8 %	2,0 %
Funding Human Rights	0,8 %	1,8 %	2,1 %	4,1 %
Sum Demo & HR	0,9 %	2,3 %	2,9 %	6,0 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

The table shows the contribution from the Special Grant for NGO support with respect to Democracy and Human Rights projects.



For reference the growth of the Humanitarian and the NGO Grants are shown graphically.



Geographic Distribution

The tables show the sum of disbursements to democracy activities for the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995 for the top 10 countries, having received most of the aid in question. The amounts shown are in 1000 NOK and the country with highest amount received is displayed first.

Democracy projects - Disbursed 1995

Top 10 countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
BLACK SOUTH AFRICA	11	68 947	36 %
PALESTINIAN ADM. AREAS	8	46 465	24 %
TANZANIA	8	18 158	9 %
NICARAGUA	2	7 512	4 %
BURUNDI	4	7 395	4 %
GUATEMALA	10	7 346	4 %
UGANDA	5	7 026	4 %
ANGOLA	1	5 000	3 %
GLOBAL/UNSPECIFIED	11	4 216	2 %
ETHIOPIA	7	3 290	2 %
Total amount all countries - 1995	112	191 223	100 %

Democracy projects -Disbursed 1994

Top 10 countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
BLACK SOUTH AFRICA	19	25 752	22 %
PALESTINIAN ADM. AREAS	4	20 657	17 %
MOZAMBIQUE	10	15 858	13 %
UGANDA	3	13 231	11 %
TANZANIA	4	12 355	10 %
NICARAGUA	6	11 385	10 %
EL SALVADOR	9	4 388	4 %
GUATEMALA	4	3 032	3 %
MALAWI	1	1 700	1 %
NAMIBIA	3	1 330	1 %
Total amount all countries - 1994	105	118 941	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Democracy projects - Disbursed 1993

Top 10 countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
BLACK SOUTH AFRICA	15	50 426	46 %
EL SALVADOR	8	9 390	9 %
SOMALIA	1	6 643	6 %
CAMBODIA	3	6 414	6 %
UGANDA	2	6 085	6 %
MOZAMBIQUE	5	6 020	6 %
GLOBAL/UNSPECIFIED	8	5 284	5 %
BANGLADESH	1	4 201	4 %
ETHIOPIA	11	2 845	3 %
ERITREA	10	2 102	2 %
Total amount all countries - 1993	94	109 381	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Democracy projects - Disbursed 1990

All countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
CHILE	5	22 400	95 %
AMERICA UNSPECIFIED	1	595	3 %
PERU	1	365	2 %
PARAGUAY	1	118	1 %
NICARAGUA	2	60	0 %
GLOBAL/UNSPECIFIED	1	20	0 %
GUATEMALA	1	10	0 %
Total amount all countries - 1990	12	23 568	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Geographical Distribution - World Regions

Democracy projects Disbursed 1995

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Total disbursed	% disbursed
Europe	3	7	2 562	1 %
Africa	15	52	114 321	60 %
Central-America	5	20	18 636	10 %
South-America	4	4	2 614	1 %
Middle East	3	10	46 904	25 %
Asia	4	8	1 970	1 %
Global/Unspecified	*	11	4 216	2 %
SUM	34	112	191 223	100 %

**Democracy
projects
Disbursed 1994**

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Total disbursed	% disbursed
Europe	1	2	989	1 %
Africa	15	62	73 928	62 %
Central-America	4	21	19 109	16 %
South-America	3	4	1 448	1 %
Middle East	1	4	20 657	17 %
Asia	5	8	1 700	1 %
Global/Unspecified	*	4	1 110	1 %
SUM	29	105	118 941	100 %

**Democracy
projects
Disbursed 1993**

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Total disbursed	% disbursed
Europe	1	1	3	0 %
Africa	13	56	77 744	71 %
Central-America	3	14	11 753	11 %
South-America	2	4	1 823	2 %
Middle East	1	2	639	1 %
Asia	6	8	11 887	11 %
Global/Unspecified	*	9	5 532	5 %
SUM	26	94	109 381	100 %

**Democracy
projects
Disbursed 1990**

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Total disbursed	% disbursed
Central-America	2	3	70	0,3 %
South-America	4	8	23 478	99,6 %
Global/Unspecified	*	1	20	0,1 %
SUM	6	12	23 568	100,0 %

Geographic Distribution

Human Rights activities

This tables show the sum of disbursements to Human Rights activities for the years 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1995 for the top 10. The country with highest amount received is displayed first. The percentage is calculated on the basis of total disbursements to Human Rights activities during the same year.

Human Rights activities - Disbursed 1995

The top 10 countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
GLOBAL/UNSPECIFIED	77	22 864	22 %
GUATEMALA	19	20 602	20 %
NICARAGUA	15	5 463	5 %
ZAMBIA	23	4 885	5 %
BLACK SOUTH AFRICA	5	4 124	4 %
PAKISTAN	13	3 518	3 %
COLOMBIA	4	3 202	3 %
ETHIOPIA	2	3 080	3 %
MYANMAR	3	2 770	3 %
BRAZIL	4	2 605	3 %
Total amount all countries 1995	274	103 654	100 %

Human Rights activities - Disbursed 1994

The top 10 countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
GLOBAL/UNSPECIFIED	65	16 347	24 %
GUATEMALA	17	10 661	15 %
BLACK SOUTH AFRICA	4	3 454	5 %
AMERICA UNSPECIFIED	6	3 246	5 %
NICARAGUA	10	3 205	5 %
N.& C. AMERICA UNALL.	3	3 143	5 %
ZIMBABWE	4	2 883	4 %
ZAMBIA	19	2 751	4 %
MYANMAR	2	2 575	4 %
NEPAL	6	2 157	3 %
Total amount all countries 1994	200	68 852	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Human Rights activities - Disbursed 1993

The top 10 countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
GLOBAL/UNSPECIFIED	113	24 964	40 %
BLACK SOUTH AFRICA	10	6 058	10 %
AFRICA UNSPECIFIED	4	4 085	7 %
MOZAMBIQUE	1	3 644	6 %
PERU	6	2 627	4 %
GUATEMALA	10	2 329	4 %
N.& C. AMERICA UNALL.	2	2 130	3 %
BRAZIL	6	1 889	3 %
EL SALVADOR	3	1 569	2 %
ZIMBABWE	4	1 557	2 %
Total amount all countries 1993	224	62 764	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Disbursed 1990

The top 10 countries

Country	No. projects	Amount disbursed	%
GLOBAL/UNSPECIFIED	17	4 050	22 %
N.& C. AMERICA UNALL.	2	1 730	9 %
NAMIBIA	5	1 608	9 %
NICARAGUA	8	1 539	8 %
AMERICA UNSPECIFIED	3	1 194	7 %
ETHIOPIA	3	848	5 %
CHILE	2	838	5 %
ZIMBABWE	3	755	4 %
KENYA	2	673	4 %
NEPAL	1	541	3 %
Total amount all countries 1990	90	18 242	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Geographical Distribution - World Regions

Human Rights - Disbursed 1995

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Disbursed 95	% disbursed
Europe	3	5	718	1 %
Africa	16	77	24 817	24 %
Central-America	7	42	31 602	30 %
South-America	7	24	9 534	9 %
Middle East	2	4	1 038	1 %
Asia	11	45	13 081	13 %
Global/Unspecified	*	77	22 864	22 %
SUM	46	274	103 654	100 %

Human Rights - Disbursed 1994

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Disbursed 94	% disbursed
Europe	1	3	1 950	3 %
Africa	14	51	15 191	22 %
Central-America	6	37	20 941	30 %
South-America	7	16	5 619	8 %
Middle East	2	3	393	1 %
Asia	10	25	8 411	12 %
Global/Unspecified	*	65	16 347	24 %
SUM	40	200	68 852	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Human Rights - Disbursed 1993

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Disbursed 93	% disbursed
Europe	2	8	2 155	3 %
Africa	14	40	19 162	31 %
Central-America	4	20	6 467	10 %
South-America	7	22	6 057	10 %
Middle East	3	3	415	1 %
Asia	8	18	3 544	6 %
Global/Unspecified	*	113	24 964	40 %
SUM	38	224	62 764	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Human Rights - Disbursed 1990

Region	# of countries	# of projects	Disbursed 90	% disbursed
Africa	14	35	6 053	33 %
Central-America	3	11	3 540	19 %
South-America	5	8	2 570	14 %
Asia	8	18	1 898	10 %
Global/Unspecified	*	18	4 181	23 %
SUM	30	90	18 242	100 %

All amounts are shown in 1000 NOK

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description	
Administration				
<i>Peace efforts</i>				
0194.11	ADM	94	185	DISARMAMENT & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
0194.11	ADM	95	268	DISARMAMENT & DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
Sum Peace efforts Administration			453	
AFGHANISTAN				
<i>Democracy</i>				
0191.73	AFG	93	247	UNDP: MOBILE SATELITE-COMM. EQUIPM.(ABB)
Sum Democracy Afghanistan			247	
ANGOLA				
<i>Democracy</i>				
0174.70	AGO	95	5 000	UCAH;DEMobilIZATION & REINTEGRATION
Sum Democracy Angola			5 000	
<i>Peace efforts</i>				
0191.76	AGO	94	8 922	N FOLKEHJELP; MINE SURVEY
0150.83	AGO	95	25 000	AGO-007 UN PROGRAMME FOR DEMOBILIZATION
0192.70	AGO	95	5 000	DEP HUMANIT AFF;UCAH - DEMOB & REINTEGR
Sum Peace efforts Angola			43 922	
<i>Human Rights</i>				
0152.74	AGO	90	16	MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
0174.70	AGO	95	51	K NOEDHJELP;WOMENS CONFERENCE JOHANNESBG
Sum Human Rights Angola			43 989	
ALBANIA				
<i>Democracy</i>				
0192.70	ALB	95	750	EUROPARAADET;TECHN SUPP JUDICIAL SYSTEM
Sum Democracy Albania			750	
<i>Human Rights</i>				
0191.75	ALB	93	850	AKSJ N-ALB: OFFICE POLITICAL PRISIONERS
0191.75	ALB	93	500	AKSJ N-ALB:ANA 1993,INFO,STUDENTS,PRISON
0191.77	ALB	95	150	FOUNDT INTER ETHNIC;ETHNIC MINORTS MAKED

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Human Rights Albania			2 250

ARMENIA

Democracy

0192.70	ARM	95	300	D N FLYKTINGERAAD;UNHCR-DEMOCR & HR CTR
Sum Democracy Armenia			300	

AZERBAIJAN

Democracy

0191.75	AZE	95	62	AMB ANKARA;OSSE SURVEIL TEAM,PARLM ELECT
Sum Democracy Azerbaijan			62	

BURUNDI

Democracy

0192.70	BDI	94	149	SPECIAL REP BDI; TECHN ASS NATI ASSEMBL
0150.83	BDI	95	5 748	BDI-090 MISC. DEMOCRATIZATION ACTIVITIES
0177.11	BDI	95	4	INST MENNESKERETT;CONS SERV VISIT MPS
0192.70	BDI	95	1 000	INTERNATIONAL ALERT;PARLIAM VISIT S.A
0192.70	BDI	95	643	UN SPEC REPR S G;FREE & INDEPENDNT PRESS
Sum Democracy Burundi			7 544	

Peace efforts

0192.70	BDI	95	257	UN SPEC REPR S G;PEACE PROJECTS
0191.75	BDI	95	319	UN SPEC REPR S G;COMMISSION OF INQUIRY
Sum Peace efforts Burundi			8 120	

Human Rights

0191.75	BDI	94	350	UN CENTRE HR; TECHNICAL COOP HR
0192.70	BDI	95	544	UN SPEC REPR S G;ITEKA - HR WORK
0192.70	BDI	95	345	UN SPEC REPR S G;HR CENTRE
0192.70	BDI	95	643	UN SPEC REPR S G;SONORA - HR ORG
Sum Human Rights Burundi			10 002	

BANGLADESH

Democracy

0151.72	BGD	93	4 201	BGD-051 ELECTION COMMISSION (MR)
0151.72	BGD	94	11	BGD-051 ELECTION COMMISSION

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
BANGLADESH			
0173.71	BGD	94	85 BGD-030 RR:WORKSHOP NEWLY ELEC COUN MEMB
0151.74	BGD	95	500 BGD-055 ELECTORAL TRAINING INSTITUTE
0173.72	BGD	95	339 BGD-032 RR:BJDJC; TRAINING OF JOURNALIST
0173.72	BGD	95	372 BGD-032 RR:DEMOCRACYWATCH
Sum Democracy Bangladesh			5 508

Human Rights

0154.71	BGD	93	75 BGD-030 RR:PROTECTION OF WOMEN RIGHTS
0154.71	BGD	93	54 BGD-030 RR:TRIBAL WOMEN & LEGAL SIT.
0151.74	BGD	94	297 BGD-053 LAND RIGHTS INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
0173.71	BGD	94	91 BGD-030 RR:PROTECTION OF RIGHTS (BMP)
0173.71	BGD	94	46 BGD-030 RR:TRIBAL & LEGAL SITUATION
0173.71	BGD	95	184 BGD-030 RR:ANK;RIGHTS GARO WOMEN (INDIG)
0173.71	BGD	95	48 BGD-030 RR:BMP; PROTECTION WOMEN RIGHTS
0173.71	BGD	95	375 BGD-030 RR:AGA KHAN;WORKSHOP COUNC MEMB
0173.71	BGD	95	10 BGD-030 RR:R BH;TRIBAL & LEGAL SITUATION
0173.71	BGD	95	96 BGD-030 RR:BNPS; WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
0173.71	BGD	95	127 BGD-030 RR:NGO FORUM; FOLLOW UP BEIJING
0173.72	BGD	95	122 BGD-032 RR:LOSAUK; PROM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Sum Human Rights Bangladesh			7 033

BOLIVIA

Peace efforts

0189.70	BOL	93	27 INT LEAGUE FOR PEACE;CORE GROUP BOL (MR)
Sum Peace efforts Bolivia			27

BOTSWANA

Democracy

0155.70	BOT	93	128 K NØDHJELP; PUBLICATION OF NEWSPAPER
0150.83	BOT	94	379 BOT-090 SUPPORT PARLIAMENT ELECTION
0174.70	BOT	94	14 RR:ROMAN CATH CH; ELECTION OBSERVATION
0174.70	BOT	94	38 RR: OMBUDSMAN INST OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
0176.74	BOT	95	21 BOT-029 RR:MP'S VISIT TO NORWAY-STORTING
0174.70	BOT	95	127 K NOEDHJELP;MOKAEDI PUBLICATION
Sum Democracy Botswana			707

Human Rights

0154.71	BOT	90	58 BOT016 RES REP; BOT GROUP WOMEN AND LAW
0152.74	BOT	90	16 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
0154.71	BOT	93	67 BOT-016 WOMEN AND LAW-GROUP
0155.70	BOT	93	103 LO;TRAINING OF WOMEN TRADE UNIONIST

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
BOTSWANA			
0155.70	BOT	93	64 K NØDHJELP; ADVOCACY, BUSHMEN, HR (MR)
0155.70	BOT	93	213 K NØDHJELP; MISC.SUPPORT,BUSHMEN
0173.71	BOT	94	92 BOT-016 RR:PREPARATION BEIJING
0174.70	BOT	94	128 K NOEDHJELP; BUSHMENN SUPPORT COMM DEV
0173.71	BOT	95	39 BOT-016 RR:EMANG BASADI;POLIT EDUC WOMEN
0173.71	BOT	95	75 BOT-016 RR:NGO COAL; PREP BEIJING CONF
0173.71	BOT	95	205 BOT-016 RR:WOMEN & LAW S AFR, ORG BUILD
0173.74	BOT	95	182 BOT-031 RR:DITSHWANELO;AIDS-HUMAN RIGHTS
0174.70	BOT	95	59 BOT-028 RR:CHR COUNC; CONF HUMAN R CENTR
0174.70	BOT	95	278 BOT-028 RR:EMANG BASADI;POLIT EDUC WOMEN
0174.70	BOT	95	107 BOT-028 RR:COUNC OF WOMEN;YOUTH WORKSHOP
0174.70	BOT	95	170 K NOEDHJELP;LEGAL ADVICE & HR CTR(INDIG)
Sum Human Rights Botswana			2 563

BRAZIL

Democracy

0174.70	BRA	95	796 FAFO;INDIGENOUS LEGAL RIGHTS
Sum Democracy Brazil			796

Human Rights

0155.70	BRA	90	272 NUCLEO DIREITOS INDIGENAS, ORG. SUPPORT
0155.70	BRA	93	228 K NØDHJELP; CONSULT FOR INDIGINOUS PEOPL
0155.70	BRA	93	360 FAFO; HEALTH ASSISTANCE&CONSTIT'L RIGHTS
0155.70	BRA	93	530 FAFO; INDIGENOUS INFO&DOCUMENTATION PROG
0155.70	BRA	93	264 FAFO; INDEGENOUS LEGAL RIGHTS (MR)
0155.70	BRA	93	467 FAFO;INDIG AUTONOMY,RIGHTS & LEGISL (MR)
0155.70	BRA	93	40 FAFO; INDIGENOUS INFO CAMPAIGN
0174.70	BRA	94	304 FAFO; INDIGENOUS LEGAL RIGHTS
0174.70	BRA	94	542 FAFO; INDIGENOUS INFO & DOCUMENTATION
0173.71	BRA	95	1 700 UNICEF;PROMOTION OF CHILDRENS RIGHTS
0174.70	BRA	95	680 FAFO;DOCUMENTAT & PUBLICATION INDIGENOUS
0174.70	BRA	95	32 FAFO;INST BUILD & INFO INDIAN ORG(INDIG)
0174.70	BRA	95	193 FAFO;INST BUILDING INDIGENOUS PEOPL ORG
Sum Human Rights Brazil			6 408

BLACK SOUTH AFRICA

Democracy

0191.72	BSA	93	7 INST FOR MR; SPEAK AT ELEC SEMINAR (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	130 AWEPA,NEDERLAND;PARLAMENT CONF S-A (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	196 POL ACTORS PARTICIP AT CONSTITUTION (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	350 N JOURNALISTLAG; JOURNALIST TRAINING
0191.72	BSA	93	5 962 ARB.BEV.INT.STØTTE;SUPP MISC UNIONS (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
BLACK SOUTH AFRICA			
0191.72	BSA	93	18 577 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD; ORG DEV, DEMO (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	2 990 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD; INFO FOR VOTERS (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	2 000 N FOLKEHJELP; INFO FOR VOTERS, ANC (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	450 N EMBASSY/BLACK SASH; VOTER-INFO WOM (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	12 000 SAIH; DEMO IN GRASSROOT PROJ (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	564 MIN.FOR.AFF; DIPLOMATCOURSE FOR ANC-REPR
0192.70	BSA	93	2 000 SAIH: EDUCATION VOTER TRAINING (MR)
0192.70	BSA	93	2 000 ARB BEV INT STØTTEKOM: VOTER TRAIN (MR)
0192.70	BSA	93	1 000 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD: VOTER TRAINING (MR)
0192.70	BSA	93	2 200 ARB BEV INT STØTTEKOM: VOTER TRAIN (MR)
0191.72	BSA	94	350 SANET; TRAINING OF JOURNALISTS
0191.72	BSA	94	6 000 D N KIRKE ; SACC DIV DEMOCRACY PROJ
0191.72	BSA	94	8 000 D N KIRKE; DEMOCRACY PROJ RURAL AREAS
0191.72	BSA	94	4 194 D N KIRKE; DIV DEMOCRACY PROJ
0191.72	BSA	94	750 N LAERERLAG; TRAINING ELECTORS BY SADTU
0191.72	BSA	94	1 237 INST FOR MR; ELECTION MONITORING
0191.72	BSA	94	295 AWEPA; ELECTION OBSERVERS
0191.72	BSA	94	350 D N KIRKE; ELECTION MONITORING BY EMPSA
0191.72	BSA	94	246 NETWORK INDEP MONITORS; LOCAL OBS ELEC
0191.72	BSA	94	310 INST FOR MR; 2 UN ELECTION OBS
0191.72	BSA	94	115 INST FOR MR; TRAVEL 36 ELECTION OBS
0191.72	BSA	94	450 UOT; TRUST FUND OBS TO THE S A
0191.72	BSA	94	25 N COUNCIL AFR; ONE ELECTIONOBSERVER
0191.72	BSA	94	77 INST STUDY PUBL VIOLENCE; ELECT OBSERVER
0191.72	BSA	94	12 BULLETPROOF VESTS SA ELECTION
0191.72	BSA	94	228 COMMONWEALTH SECR; SECONDMENT POLICE
0191.72	BSA	94	3 000 NDEP ELEC COMM; VOTER EDUCATION PROGRAM
0191.72	BSA	94	45 VRAALSEN, TOM; TRAVEL ELECTION S A
0191.72	BSA	94	68 INST FOR MR; "NORWEGIAN ELEC ASSIST"
0150.77	BSA	95	2 667 BSA-006 MELLOMKIRKELIG RAAD; DEMOCRATIZAT
0192.70	BSA	95	2 248 BSA-008 INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY IN SA
0192.70	BSA	95	1 169 BSA-010 DEMOCRACY-MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORT
0192.70	BSA	95	14 848 BSA-012 SUPP DEMOCRACY THRU NORW NGO'S
0192.70	BSA	95	8 500 BSA-017 LOCAL ELECTION SUPPORT
0150.77	BSA	95	17 450 BSA-006 N FOLKEHJELP; DEMOCRATIZATN PROJ
0150.77	BSA	95	4 099 BSA-006 LO; NGO SUPP PROJ-DEMOCRATIZATION
0174.70	BSA	95	119 K NOEDHJELP; CHALLENGE NEWSLETTER
0174.70	BSA	95	170 K NOEDHJELP; PEACE, RECONCIL & DEMOC TRAIN
0174.70	BSA	95	170 K NOEDHJELP; POLITIC COUNSEL POLITICIANS
0150.77	BSA	95	17 507 BSA-006 SAIH; NGO SUPP PROJ-DEMOCRATIZATN
Sum Democracy Black South Africa			145 125

Peace efforts

0191.72	BSA	93	100 INT ALERT; EVALUAT S-A'S PEACE (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	300 WORLD CAMPAIGN; UN WEAPON EMBARGO (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	300 K NØDHJELP; PEACEPROCESS IN S-A (MR)
0191.72	BSA	94	175 WORLD CAMPAIGN; CAMP AGAINST MILITARY L
0191.72	BSA	94	800 NETWORK INDEP MONITORS; VIOLENCE MONITOR

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
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BLACK SOUTH AFRICA

0191.72	BSA	94	77	STATENS DATASENTRAL; VIOLENCE DOCUMENT
0174.70	BSA	95	170	K NOEDHJELP;PEACE & RECONCILIATION

Sum Peace efforts Black South			147 047	
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Human Rights

0155.70	BSA	93	85	K NØDHJELP; EMPSA,ECUMEN MONIT.PROG (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	50	FELLESRÅDET S-A; EX ANTIAPART CONF (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	20	KUNSTN.M.APARTHEID; ANTIAPAR CONF (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	634	STAT DATASENTR; GOLD COMM STUD VIOL (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	3 350	INST.F STUDY OF PUBL.VIOL; VIOLREG (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	49	KUNSTNERE MOT APARTHEID; ARTISTS CONFER.
0191.72	BSA	93	350	ARB.B.INT.STØTTE; WATCHING VIOLENCE (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	1 000	SALDEF(S.A.LEG DEF); LEGAL AID S-A (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	220	KUNSTN.M/APARTHEID;DELEGATES TO NOR (MR)
0191.72	BSA	93	300	FELLESKAMPANJEN; CAMPAIGN F/S.A (MR)
0191.72	BSA	94	1 000	LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; EDUC
0191.72	BSA	94	1 273	N FOLKEHJELP; ANC-OFFICE IN OSLO
0191.72	BSA	94	131	MISC HR ORGANISATIONS IN SA
0191.72	BSA	94	1 050	MELLOMKIRKELIG RAAD; LEGAL ADVICE OFFICE
0173.71	BSA	95	420	RAF-311 DEP WELFARE; PREP BEIJING CONF
0173.71	BSA	95	50	NAT NGO-SECRET STH AFR;PREP BEIJING CONF
0192.70	BSA	95	1 600	BSA-009 HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE OF SA
0192.70	BSA	95	1 800	BSA-011 AWEPA SA,CAPACITY BUILDING
0174.70	BSA	95	254	K NOEDHJELP;HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE

Sum Human Rights Black South			160 683	
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MYANMAR

Human Rights

0191.75	BUR	94	2 500	SAMARB UTV BURMA; HR PROJECTS
0191.75	BUR	94	75	JURISTFOR HUM AKSJ; HR INFO NET WORK
0191.75	BUR	95	2 500	SU-BURM;HUMANIT AID & H RIGHT MEASURES
0191.75	BUR	95	250	WIF; FACT FINDING MISSION
0191.75	BUR	95	20	INST MENNESKERETT;BURMA SEMINAR TRAVEL

Sum Human Rights Myanmar			5 345	
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N.& C. AMERICA UNALL.

Democracy

0152.71	CAM	94	276	CAM-021 DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY, COSTA RICA
0152.71	CAM	94	28	GAZETTE; SPANISH BROCHURE SUPP DEMOCRATI
0152.71	CAM	95	644	CAM-021 DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY, COSTA RICA

Sum Democracy N.& C. America			948	
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Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
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Peace efforts

0152.71	CAM	90	25	TRANSNATIONAL INST.DOC.PEACE PROCESS CAM
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Sum Peace efforts N.& C. America			973	
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Human Rights

0152.71	CAM	90	1 480	INTER AM.INST.HUM.RIGHTS FINANCIAL ASS
0191.74	CAM	90	250	N.FOLKEHJELP (H.AID AND H.RIGHTS)
0191.75	CAM	93	205	CEJIL: IMPROVEM HUM RIGHT SITUATION (MR)
0152.71	CAM	93	1 925	INTER-AM. INST. HUM.RIGHTS; CONTR (MR)
0173.71	CAM	94	188	CAM-310 RR:PUBL MEETING BEIJING CONF
0173.71	CAM	94	145	CAM-310 RR:REG NGO NETWORK FOR BEIJING
0152.71	CAM	94	2 810	INT-AM INSTITUT HUMAN RIGHTS; HUMAN RIGH
0173.71	CAM	95	369	CAM-310 RR:REG NGO NETWORK FOR BEIJING

Sum Human Rights N.& C. America			8 345	
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CHILE

Democracy

0155.70	CHL	90	185	N LÆRERLAG, DEMOCRACY COURSES
0191.75	CHL	90	1 211	CONTR. CONC.PARTIDOS POR LA DEMOCRACIA
0191.75	CHL	90	794	CONTR. CONC.PARTIDOS POR LA DEMOCRACIA
0191.75	CHL	90	210	NUEVA IMAGEN.DEMOCRAT PROCESS (MR)
0192.70	CHL	90	20 000	FOSIS, DEMOCRACY BUILDING (MR)
0155.70	CHL	93	260	N FOLKEHJELP; 1180 DEMO STRENGTHEN. (MR)
0155.70	CHL	93	380	N LÆRERLAG; DEMO EDUCATION/PIIE (MR)
0174.70	CHL	94	100	N FOLKEHJELP; DEMOCRACY STRENGTHENING
0174.70	CHL	95	465	N FOLKEHJELP;DEMOCRACY PROMOTING ACTIVIT

Sum Democracy Chile			23 605	
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Peace efforts

0191.74	CHL	90	6	INTERPRETATION,SEMINAR ON REPATRIATION
0191.74	CHL	90	5 000	MIDEPLAN,PROGRAM FOR REPATRIATION
0191.74	CHL	90	56	AGENCIA COOP. INTERNATIONAL.REPATRIATION

Sum Peace efforts Chile			28 667	
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Human Rights

0191.75	CHL	90	350	MELLOM KIRKELIG RÅD; FASIC HR WORK (MR)
0154.71	CHL	90	488	GLO322 RUNNING COSTS CASA DE LA MUJER
0154.71	CHL	93	355	GLO-369 ISIS,CHILEAN WOMEN'S NETWORK
0191.75	CHL	93	67	ALDHU: HUM RIGHTS PROJECT (MR)
0191.74	CHL	94	176	N FOLKEHJELP; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECTS
0191.74	CHL	95	756	N FOLKEHJELP;HUMAN RIGHTS MEASURES
0191.75	CHL	95	250	FASIC;INVESTIG DISAPPEAR & HR VIOLATIONS
0174.70	CHL	95	174	KVINNEFRONT N;EQUIPM WOMENS RADIO TIERRA

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
CHILE			
0174.70	CHL 95	174	N FOLKEHJELP;LOS RAISES-WOMEN'S ORGANIZN
0174.70	CHL 95	149	N FOLKEHJELP;CPP-HUMAN RESOURCES DEV
Sum Human Rights Chile			31 606
CHINA			
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0191.75	CHN 93	12	D N TIBETKOMITE: TIBET SEMINAR
0191.75	CHN 93	5	D N TIBETKOMITE:PART CONF ON TIBET (MR)
0154.71	CHN 93	55	ALL-CHINA WOMEN FED.;PREP.UN WOMEN CONF.
0173.71	CHN 94	50	MISC ORG; UN WOMEN'S CONF.
0173.71	CHN 95	63	AMB BEIJING; CHINA'S PREP BEIJING CONF
Sum Human Rights China			185
COLOMBIA			
<i>Democracy</i>			
0191.75	COL 95	20	INST MENNESKERETT;NORDEM PROJECT
Sum Democracy Colombia			20
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0191.75	COL 93	112	ALDHU: PROTECTION OF COL VITNESSES (MR)
0191.75	COL 93	10	D N FLYKTNINGERÅD:BORGEN,SEM ON COL (MR)
0191.74	COL 94	88	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
0191.74	COL 94	221	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
0191.75	COL 94	50	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD; HR INTERN DISPLACED
0191.75	COL 94	301	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD; HR PROJ & IDP
0191.74	COL 95	200	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD;LEGAL AID INTERN REFU
0191.74	COL 95	250	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD;PREVENT INTERN EXUPLS
0191.75	COL 95	2 727	N ROEDE KORS;REPORT HR VIOLATIONS PRISON
0191.75	COL 95	25	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD;HR CONFERENC COLOMBIA
Sum Human Rights Colombia			4 004
COSTA RICA			
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0191.75	CRI 95	179	DECADE HUMAN RIGHTS;EXTENDED TRAINING
0152.71	CRI 95	2 090	INT-AM INSTIT HUMAN RIGHTS;HUMAN RIGHTS
Sum Human Rights Costa Rica			2 269

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
ECUADOR			
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0191.75	ECU	90	138 ALDHU, PROJ FOR QUICHUA-INDIANS (MR)
0191.75	ECU	93	438 ALDHU:HUM.RIGHTS EFFORTS,INDIG PEOP (MR)
0174.70	ECU	94	70 N FOLKEHJELP; UPCCC:INDIGENOUS ORG
0174.70	ECU	95	177 N FOLKEHJELP;UPCCC-STRENGTHEN INDIG ORG
0174.70	ECU	95	40 N FOLKEHJELP;CPM-PROMOTE WOMEN'S ACTIVIT
Sum Human Rights Ecuador			863

ERITREA

Democracy

0192.70	ERI	93	150 UNICO:TRAVEL, ESTABLISH INDEP NEWSP (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	75 ELECTION COMMISION: PRINTING EQUIP (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	1 000 K NØDHJELP:INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER
0192.70	ERI	93	410 UNOVER:RADIO COMMUNICATION EQUIP (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	251 INST MENNESKERETTIGH: OBS APR 93 (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	30 Ø.STABRUN, CELEBRATION ERI NAT-DAY (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	109 N JOURNALISTHØGSK:E FOSSUM,5 MONTHS (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	7 EGIL FOSSUM,ADVISOR,REFERENDUM COMM (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	40 INST FOR MR: REPORT ELEC, UNOVER (MR)
0192.70	ERI	93	30 EGIL FOSSUM: ADVISOR, MISC EXP (MR)
0192.70	ERI	94	341 TRANSITIONAL GOV ERI; OPERATIONAL COSTS
0192.70	ERI	95	313 CONSTIT COMMISSION;PUBLIC AWAREN CAMPAIG
Sum Democracy Eritrea			2 756

Peace efforts

0191.76	ERI	94	6 700 N FOLKEHJELP; SURVEY MINE CLEARANCE
Sum Peace efforts Eritrea			9 456

Human Rights

0155.70	ERI	93	14 FIVH: ERITREAN WOMAN ORGANIZATION
0192.70	ERI	93	176 INST MENNSKRETTIGH: OBS UNOVER (MR)
Sum Human Rights Eritrea			9 646

ETHIOPIA

Democracy

0192.70	ETH	93	800 K NØDHJELP: MEDIA PROJECTS (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	283 INTER AFRICA GROUP: DEMOCRAT PROJ (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	134 ETH HUM RIGHTS & PEACE CENTRE: DEMO (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	25 INST MENNESKERETTIGH: NEW ETH CONST (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	58 EMB. A-ABEBA: MEDIA SEM, MIN OF DEV (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
ETHIOPIA			
0192.70	ETH	93	122 INST FOR MR: CONSULTANT ELECTION (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	372 ATTORNEY GENERAL ETH: GEN SUPPORT (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	84 INST FOR MR: EXPERT TO ATTORNEY (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	372 INTER AFRICA GROUP:MISC EQUIP RADIO (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	594 ELECTION COMMISSION: MISC EQUIPMENT (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	1 EMB.ADDIS ABEBA: MEDIA SEMINAR (MR)
0192.70	ETH	94	201 ELEC COMM TRANSIT GOV ETH; DEMOC PROJ
0192.70	ETH	94	246 MISC; MENGISTU COLLABORATORS TRIALS
0192.70	ETH	94	122 REGJ ADV ETH; EXPERT ASSIST ATTORNEY GEN
0192.70	ETH	94	143 REGJ ADV ETH; ASS OFF OF SPEC PROSECUTOR
0192.70	ETH	94	99 INST FOR MR; ELECTION OBSERVERS
0192.70	ETH	94	349 UNDP; ELECTION ASSISTANCE
0150.83	ETH	95	50 ETH-014 INST SUPPORT MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
0192.70	ETH	95	1 624 ELECTION COMMITTEE SUPPORT
0192.70	ETH	95	188 AMB ADDIS ABEBA;NGO GROUP ELECT OBSERV
0192.70	ETH	95	296 INST MENNESKERETT;ELECTION OBSERVERS
0192.70	ETH	95	66 INST MENNESKERETT;REPORT DEMOCRA PROCESS
0192.70	ETH	95	621 CMI;ELECTION OBSERV & DEMOCRACY TRAIN
0192.70	ETH	95	445 K NOEDHJELP;RADIO PROGRAMMES
Sum Democracy Ethiopia			7 295

Peace efforts

0191.75	ETH	90	300 CONTR.N.RØDE KORS (WAR PRISONERS)
0191.75	ETH	90	1 934 CARTER PRESID.CENTER."ETH PEACE TALKS"
0192.70	ETH	93	36 TOM VRAALSEN; SEM CONFLICT SOLVING (MR)
0191.75	ETH	94	8 ETH FORUM N; PARTICIPATION PEACE CONF
Sum Peace efforts Ethiopia			9 573

Human Rights

0155.70	ETH	90	806 UTV FONDET, THE ETH WOMEN UNION
0154.70	ETH	90	7 INSTITUTE OF HUMAN RIGHTS; ETHIOPIA
0191.75	ETH	90	35 INST FOR MR; SELF-DETERMINAT ERI (MR)
0155.70	ETH	93	148 REDD BARN: CHILD ADVOCACY (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	482 INST MENNESKERETTIGH:EXPERT E.MØSE (MR)
0192.70	ETH	93	267 INST MENNESKERETTIGH:CONSULTANT (MR)
0192.70	ETH	94	223 INST FOR MR; OBSERVERS TO MONITOR TRIALS
0191.76	ETH	95	2 964 K NOEDHJELP;POLITICAL EXPULSION
0174.70	ETH	95	116 FIVH;ERITREAN WOMENS UNION
Sum Human Rights Ethiopia			14 621

GEORGIA

Human Rights

0191.75	GEO	95	38 D N HELSINGFORSKOMITE;FACT FIND MISSION
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Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Human Rights Georgia		38	

LDCS UNSPECIFIED

Democracy

0184.74	GLO	90	20	PRIO, STUDY GEN. ELECTIONS SRI LANKA
0184.74	GLO	93	60	INDEX ON CENSORSH;SUBSCR DEV COUNTR (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	463	COMM GLOB GOVERNANCE: CONF GLOB GOV (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	149	INST MENNESKERETTIGH:NORDEM PROJ.
0191.75	GLO	93	50	ARTICLE 19: PRESS LAW PROGRAMME (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	164	ARTICLE19:CENSORSH REPORT BROADCAST (MR)
0167.11	GLO	93	1 356	UIO,PUBL.LAW DEPT; COOP AGREE.WOMAN.LAW
0166.75	GLO	93	42	PRIO; NATIONALISM & DEMOCRACY, ERI (MR)
0166.70	GLO	93	3 000	NAVF; RESEARCH ON POL PROCESSES (MR)
0176.74	GLO	94	800	GLO-367 IDLI SCHOLARSHIPS INT LAW ROMA
0176.74	GLO	94	10	GLO-367 ASICL SHOLARSHIPS INT LAW LONDON
0191.75	GLO	94	220	INDEX CENSORSHIP;EDITORIAL ASSIS BOOKLET
0176.75	GLO	94	80	FELLESRAADET S A; "DEMOCRACY IN AFR"
0177.11	GLO	95	243	BENCHMARK ENV CONS;STUDY DEMOCR GLOB GOV
0177.11	GLO	95	78	SIDA;DAC-WORKSHOP CIV SOCIETY & DEMOCRAC
0192.70	GLO	95	100	INST MENNESKERETT;NORDEM STAND BY FORCE
0192.70	GLO	95	460	INST MENNESKERETT;NORDEM STAND BY FORCE
0192.70	GLO	95	353	INST MENNESKERETT;NORDEM - PROJ ORG
0192.70	GLO	95	2 300	IDEA;DEMOCRACY CENTRE
0191.75	GLO	95	40	AMB HAAG;ARBITRATION COURT,FUND DEV COUN
0191.75	GLO	95	12	INST MENNESKERETT;NORDEM-BROCHURES
0191.75	GLO	95	260	INDEX ON CENSORSHIP;GENERAL SUPPORT 1995
0191.75	GLO	95	20	NORSK P.E.N;PARTICIPAT INT PEN CONGRESS
0191.75	GLO	95	350	INT COMM JURISTS;GENERAL SUPPORT 1995

Sum Democracy Ldcs Unspecified 10 630

Peace efforts

0189.70	GLO	90	106	FOLLOW-UP, UN CONF ON DEV & DISARM (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	71	GK MINNEAPOLIS:CONF UN PEACE&REFUGE (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	25	WOM INT LEAGUE PEACE & FREEDOM:PUBL (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6	KV.LIGAEN FRED & FRIHET:TRAVEL (MR)
0189.70	GLO	93	31	AMB IND, VISIT DIS&PEACE CENTER NPL (MR)
0189.70	GLO	93	35	LODGAARD, PART. PUGWASH COUNCIL (MR)
0189.70	GLO	93	17	UN;WORLD DIS CAMPAIGN: DISARM TIMES (MR)
0189.70	GLO	93	36	PUGWASH; CONTRIBUTION (MR)
0166.75	GLO	93	126	PRIO; SUSTAINABLE DEV & CONFLICT (MR)
0166.75	GLO	93	123	PRIO; BOOK:ENV,CONFL & SECURITY-AFR (MR)
0166.75	GLO	93	30	PRIO; WATER,RESOURCES & CONFL-W-AFR (MR)
0194.70	GLO	94	38	DIR LODGAARD; PUGWASH COUNCIL MEETING
0194.70	GLO	94	36	N PUGWASH COMMIT; FINANC SUPP, INTERN
0194.70	GLO	94	3	N PUGWASH COMMIT; INTERN MEETING DISARMA
0194.70	GLO	94	18	UN; DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN "DISARMA TIMES"
0191.75	GLO	94	50	DOMPROST KRSAND; "ETHNIC CONFL EAST EUR"

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
LDCS UNSPECIFIED			
0192.70	GLO	94	346 CONFERENCE ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION
0192.70	GLO	94	22 INST FOR MR; OAU CONF CONFLICT SOLVING
0191.75	GLO	94	33 AABREK; PEACE KEEPING SEMINAR S-COREA
0191.75	GLO	94	221 MISC; UN PEACE OPERATIONS TRAVEL GRANT
0191.75	GLO	94	100 UNITAR; PEACEMAKING PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
0191.75	GLO	94	100 N FOLKEHJELP; NEW METHODS MINE CLEARANCE
0191.75	GLO	94	1 500 NUPI; PEACEKEEPING OPERAT
0191.75	GLO	94	115 FAFO; PEACE KEEPING PROJECT
0192.70	GLO	94	630 JUSTISDEP; PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS MISC
0176.75	GLO	94	200 PRIO; DISARMAMENT & DEV
0194.70	GLO	95	16 UN;FINANCIAL SUPPORT, DISARMAMENT TIMES
0194.70	GLO	95	33 PUGWASH COUNCIL;PARTICIPATION COUNCIL
0194.70	GLO	95	5 N FREDRAAD;FAREWELL ON NUCL ARMS,SEMINA
0194.70	GLO	95	6 NEI ATOM;GLO TEST TREATY NUC ARMS,SEMINA
0194.70	GLO	95	10 KNUT PAUS;HAAG,PARTICI CHEM WEAPONS CONV
0194.70	GLO	95	11 NEI ATOM;SEMINAR PARTICIPATION,NAGASAKI
0194.70	GLO	95	13 NEI ATOM;PARTICIPAT NUCLEAR SEMIN TAHITI
0194.70	GLO	95	25 N KVNNER FRIV BEREDSKAP;DISARMAMENT CONF
0177.11	GLO	95	23 FREDSFORSK INST;UNESCO MEET WOMEN &PEACE
0191.75	GLO	95	272 D N FLYKTINGERAAD;NORTEAM PEACE MAKING
0194.70	GLO	95	16 MISC DEVELOPMENT & DISARMAMENT

Sum Peace efforts Ldcs Unspecified 15 078

Human Rights

0166.70	GLO	90	343 IMR, YEARBOOK HUMAN RIGHTS
0155.70	GLO	90	496 NORDISK SAMERÅD, WCIPS 6.WORLDCONFERENCE
0154.71	GLO	90	729 ODII;STUDY: WOMEN'S ORGANIZING ABILITIES
0167.11	GLO	90	226 GLO-350 LEGAL ASSISTANCE, TRANSLATION
0154.71	GLO	90	40 INNER WEEL; SEMINAR WOMEN 3RD WORLD
0154.71	GLO	90	10 KRISESENTER; CONFERENCE
0154.71	GLO	90	114 SAMI MISSONORG; CONFERENCE INDIGENIOUS
0154.72	GLO	90	50 INDIGENIOUS PEOPLES GROUPS
0184.74	GLO	90	250 IWGIA; INFO/COMM PROJECT
0156.72	GLO	90	35 ANTIRASISTISK;GEN.SUPPORT, INFO.ACTIV.
0191.75	GLO	90	350 CONTR.DEFENCE FOR CHILDREN INT (MR)
0191.75	GLO	90	150 CONTR.INTERNATIONAL ALERT (MR)
0191.75	GLO	90	100 CONTR.MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP (MR)
0191.75	GLO	90	35 PRIO,TRAVEL EXPENSES (MR)
0191.75	GLO	90	100 ANTISLAVERISELSKAPET-N.CONTRIBUTION (MR)
0191.75	GLO	90	550 CONTR. IWGIA
0191.75	GLO	90	472 NORDISK SAMERÅD.WORLDCONFERENCE
0191.75	GLO	93	6 KOM FOR JØDER I USSR;TRAVEL HR-CONF (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	10 NORW. LAWYERS; HR-COMPETITION (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	10 UIO; HUM. RIGHTS COMPETITION (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 N SAMERS RIKSFORB; CONF SELF-GOVERN (MR)
0154.71	GLO	93	1 GLO-014 WOMEN-CONTACT CONFERENCE
0154.71	GLO	93	100 GLO-369 DIV. WOMEN ORG,INTERN. SEMINARS
0191.75	GLO	93	1 PEDERSEN; NAVAJO NAT SUPREME COURT (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
LDCS UNSPECIFIED			
0191.75	GLO	93	17 SAMISKE KUNSTN FORB;CONF INDIG PEOP (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	24 N SAMERS RIKSFORB;CONF INDIG PEOPLE (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	340 MIN. OF FOR. AFF.; MISC EXPENSES (MR)
0155.70	GLO	93	172 LO;WOMEN'S SEMINAR
0155.70	GLO	93	290 LO;COMBAT CHILD LABOUR
0155.70	GLO	93	500 IWGIA: OPERATIONAL SUPPORT (MR)
0155.70	GLO	93	55 K NØDHJELP; PANOS, WOMEN AND CONFLICT
0191.75	GLO	93	106 UN: SEMINAR LEGAL QUESTIONS,GLO
0191.75	GLO	93	9 UN:SEMINAR LEGAL QUESTIONS,GLO
0191.75	GLO	93	70 ANTIRASISTISK SENTER: INFO-MAGAZINE
0191.75	GLO	93	620 HOLMENKOLL-SYMPIOSIET: MISC. (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	30 SAIH:INFO, NEWSLETTER ON EAST TIMOR (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	199 INST FOR MR: PROJ.ORGANIZ,NORDEM (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	338 UNSCOE, EXPERT ASSIST HR QUESTIONS
0191.75	GLO	93	36 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD:HR TRAINING SEM (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	125 UN:UN GLO VOLUNTARY FUND ON TORTURE
0191.75	GLO	93	104 UN: UN CONVENTION ON TORTURE,GLO
0191.75	GLO	93	370 UN CENTRE HR: REFUGEES PROB, GLO
0191.75	GLO	93	142 IPS: WORLD CONF ON HR, VIENNA (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	150 HURIDOCs: TRAINING/DOCUMENT, HR (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	106 INST INT STUDIES: SEM INT HR (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	75 INST FOR MR: ROUND TABLE CONF (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	137 WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUM. RIGHTS (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	220 INST FOR MR: NGO ACTIVITIES (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	62 EATIP: CONFERENCE ON TORTURE (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	31 D N MR'S HUSET: UNESCO-CONF (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	9 UIO: EITINGERS AWARD, STAY IN OSLO (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	2 SVEN EGIL OMDAL, PART HR COMM (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	16 FN-SAMBANDET:UNESCO-CONF,MONTREAL (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD: TRAVEL GRANT (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 CMI: WORLD-CONF,VIENNA (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 D N LÆGEFOR:TRAVEL GRANT,WORLD CONF (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 NOAS:TRAVEL GRANT,CONF ON HR (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 KVINNEUNIVERSITETET:CONF HR (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 D N FLYKTNINGERÅD:WORLD CONF VIENNA (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	10 D N MR HUSET: CONF IN VIENNA (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	8 ANTIRASISTISK SENTER: HUM RIGHTS (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	10 ANTIRASISTISK SENTER:TRAVEL GRANT (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	6 TEIGMO:CONF ON INDIG PEOPLE, GENEVA (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	25 MENTAL BARNEHJELP: SOUTH-AFR CONF (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	16 ODD ENGE; TRAVEL CONF WAR VICTIMS (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	22 J B HENRIKSEN,WORKSHOP INDIG PEOPLE (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	40 L-AM GRUPPENE: CONF INDIG PEOPLE (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	68 RIGHTS HUMANITY: ROUND WORLD CONF. (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	20 FIAN N: CONF HUM RIGHTS (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	135 INT HUM RIGHTS INTERNSH PROG, TRAIN (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	95 WORLD ORG.ANTI TORTURE: MR-EFFORTS (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	1 600 D N MENNESKERETTIGHETSFOND:GEN SUPP (MR)
0191.75	GLO	93	1 000 INTERNATIONAL ALERT: GEN SUPP (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
LDCS UNSPECIFIED			
0191.75	GLO 93	2 162	UN CENTRE HUMAN RIGHTS:GEN SUPP,GLO
0191.75	GLO 93	50	FIAN N: GENERAL SUPPORT (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	50	L B INST MENSCHENRECHTE: HR-EFFORTS (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	200	DEFENCE CHILDREN INTERN: GEN SUPP (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	118	INST MENNESKERETTIGH:MISC HR PROJ (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	450	IWGIA: GENERAL SUPPORT (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	212	GOREE INSTITUTE:GENERAL SUPPORT (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	450	DEFENCE CHILDREN INT: GEN SUPPORT (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	74	UN CENTRE HR: WORLD CONFTRAVEL, GLO
0191.75	GLO 93	734	UN CENTRE HR: VOLUNT FUND, TORTURE
0191.75	GLO 93	184	UN CENTRE HR: VOLUN FUND INDIG, YUG
0191.75	GLO 93	300	MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP: MINOR RIGHTS (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	100	INTERN. SERVICE FOR HR: GEN SUPP (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	200	UNREP NATIONS & PEOPL ORG; GEN SUPP (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	50	INST MENNESKERETTIGH: BOOK PUBL (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	100	ANTISLAVERISELSKAPET N: GEN SUPP (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	500	N JOURNALISTLAG:HUM RIGHTS PROJ (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	1 600	MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD: HUM RIGHTS PROJ (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	25	NORD SAMERÅD:OPEN;UN YEAR FOR INDIG (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	300	UITØ: CONF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	95	NORDISK SAMERÅD: HR & INDIG PEOPLE (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	39	UN CENTRE HR: COMPUTER EQUIPM, GLO
0191.75	GLO 93	20	UITØ: SEMINAR, INDIG PEOPLE LITT. (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	32	SAMETINGET:CONF ON INDIG PEOPLE GTM (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	36	UN CENTRE HR: CONSULT SERV HR, GLO
0191.75	GLO 93	173	UN CENTRE HR: TEIGMO, WORK, GLO
0191.75	GLO 93	100	UITØ: CONF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	50	WORLD COUNCIL INDIG PEOPLE, CONF (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	95	N SEKSJ NORDISK SAMERÅD: MISC ACT (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	15	EUROPEAN LAW STUDENTS ASS:SEM INDIG (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	500	IWGIA: GENERAL SUPPORT (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	372	UN CENTRE HR: VOLUN FUND INDIG, GLO
0191.75	GLO 93	50	DOCIP:INFORMATION CENTRE (MR)
0167.11	GLO 93	259	K.MORVIK; ASSIGNM.-PREP.UN WOMAN CONF.95
0167.11	GLO 93	37	MIN.O/FOR.AFFAIRS,DK; HR ASSESS. (MR)
0189.70	GLO 93	225	UN; WORLD DIS. CAMPAIGN; NEWSLETTER (MR)
0189.70	GLO 93	25	NUPI; TRAVEL SUPP. CONFERENCES (MR)
0166.74	GLO 93	863	GLO-0367 IDLI; SCHOLARSHIPS,INT.LAW,ROMA
0166.74	GLO 93	100	GLO-0367 ASICL; SCHOLARSHIPS,INT.LAW
0191.75	GLO 93	350	INT. COMM. OF JURISTS; SUPPORT (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	100	UITØ: CONF. ON SEX. ABUSED CHILDREN (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	40	AHF; INT. WORK AND CONFERENCES (MR)
0191.75	GLO 93	39	NORD SAMISK INST;CATALOG ON HR-CONV (MR)
0166.75	GLO 93	200	UNCTAD; NGO CONSULTATIONS (MR)
0166.75	GLO 93	30	NUPI; MIGR & NAT.BUILD IN KUWAIT (MR)
0166.75	GLO 93	42	L-AM. GRUPPENE; INDIAN CONFERENCE (MR)
0166.75	GLO 93	10	UNIV.OF SUSSEX;MINORITIES & RESOURC (MR)
0166.75	GLO 93	30	CLIVE GRYLLES; NATIVES & PETROL ECU (MR)
0166.75	GLO 93	85	FORUM FOR UTV.JOURN;HBOOK 3RD WORLD (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
LDCS UNSPECIFIED			
0154.71	GLO	93	25 UNIFEM-N; PART.GLOBAL MEETING PARIS
0154.71	GLO	93	302 N. HUSMORFORB. ;PREP. UN WOMEN CONF.
0154.71	GLO	93	567 IPS ;INFO PROJECT, UN WOMENS CONF.
0154.71	GLO	93	1 575 WOM. UNDER MUSLIM LAW; WOMEN & LAW
0154.71	GLO	93	19 INT. WOM.TRIBUNE CENTRE; WOMEN'S NETWORK
0154.71	GLO	93	1 500 UNDAW : TRUST FUND,UN WOMEN CONF.
0154.71	GLO	93	1 000 INT.WOM.HEALTH COAL; REPROD.RIGHTS&JUST.
0166.70	GLO	93	525 INST FOR MR; YEARBOOK HUM.RIGHT (MR)
0150.83	GLO	94	250 FORFATT FOR;SEMINAR ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
0173.71	GLO	94	680 GLO-369 ISIS WOMEN INTERNATIONAL MANILA
0173.71	GLO	94	630 GLO-369 FEMNET BEIJING
0174.70	GLO	94	287 LO; PROMOTING WOM RIGHTS IN CONSTRUCTION
0174.70	GLO	94	343 LO; COMBAT CHILD LABOUR
0174.70	GLO	94	670 DEFENCE CHILD INT; REDUCE CHILDRENS WORK
0174.70	GLO	94	530 IWGIA; ORG SUPPORT (INDIG)
0173.71	GLO	94	1 129 UNESCO; SPECIAL ADVISOR WOM UNIT (INST)
0160.72	GLO	94	1 100 UNICEF; VOICE OF CHILDREN (INST)
0177.01	GLO	94	750 UNDDSMS; ASSOC EXPERT HUMAN RIGHTS
0177.11	GLO	94	1 004 UIO PUBLIC LAW DEP; CONSULTA SERVIC WOM
0177.11	GLO	94	24 MORVIK; ASSIGNMENT PREP UN WOMEN CONF 95
0177.11	GLO	94	288 MORVIK; INFO STRATEGY UN WOM CONF 95
0191.75	GLO	94	20 SAMISK FORLAG; ARTICLES LAPP POPULATION
0191.75	GLO	94	1 LIBRESSO; QUARTERLY HR SUBSCRIPTION
0191.75	GLO	94	13 SAMETINGET; TRAVEL COSTS HR COMM (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	100 NUPI; "RACIST VIOLENCE"
0191.75	GLO	94	150 HR INFO; GENERAL CONTRIBUTION 1994
0191.75	GLO	94	40 INT WORK GROUP; HR FUND INDIG (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	450 DEFENCE CHILD INT; GEN CONTRIB (CHILD)
0191.75	GLO	94	50 DECADE HR EDUC; GEN CONTRIBUTION 1994
0191.75	GLO	94	100 ANTISLAVESELSKAPET; GEN CONTRIBUTION -94
0191.75	GLO	94	450 MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP; GENERAL SUPP 1994
0191.75	GLO	94	4 MISC; NATIONAL HR COMMISSION
0191.75	GLO	94	29 SAMETINGET; TRAVEL TO MEX GRANT (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	5 ADV FIRMA HJORT; PROCEDURE COMPETIT HR
0191.75	GLO	94	45 LANDSFOR LESP & HOMO; PARTICIP CONF
0191.75	GLO	94	75 INT CONSULT HR; "NON DEROGABLE RIGHTS"
0191.75	GLO	94	25 D N TIBETMISJON; SEM SUPP GROUPS TIBET
0191.75	GLO	94	50 ANTI RACISM INFO SERV; DOCUMENT CENTRE
0191.75	GLO	94	100 SOS TORTURE; GENERAL FUNDING 1994
0191.75	GLO	94	200 INT SERVICE HR; GENERAL FUNDING 1994
0191.75	GLO	94	60 SAMERÅDET; TRAVEL GENEVE MEETING (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	65 DANISH CENTER HR; HR SYMPOSIUM
0191.75	GLO	94	700 UN CENTRE HR; VOLUNTARY FUND VICT TORTUR
0191.75	GLO	94	350 INT COMM JURISTS; HR NEWSLETTER & REPORT
0191.75	GLO	94	100 SAMERAADDET; INT ACTIVITIES (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	22 SAMETINGET; TRAVEL TO GENEVE (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	1 J H UNIV PRESS; HR QUARTERLY SUBSCRIPT
0191.75	GLO	94	70 INT SOC HEALTH & HR; CONF ORG VIOLENCE
0191.75	GLO	94	11 AMB SAN JOSE; HR SEM FEE TO BRATTELAND

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
LDCS UNSPECIFIED			
0191.75	GLO	94	200 N ROEDE KORS; INFO PROJECT HUMAN RIGHTS
0191.75	GLO	94	16 N SAMERS RIKSFORB; TRAVEL SYDNEY (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	65 RIGHTS & HUMANITY; ROUND TABLE CONF HR
0191.75	GLO	94	50 N PEN CENTRE; FREEDON OF EXPRESSION CONF
0191.75	GLO	94	250 DEFENCE CHILD INT; OPERATING EXP (CHILD)
0191.75	GLO	94	500 UN CENTRE HR; INT DECADE INDIG (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	200 N FORFATTER UNION; "PERSECUTED AUTHORS"
0191.75	GLO	94	175 DECADE HR EDUC; NEWSLETTER PUBLISHING
0191.75	GLO	94	250 REHAB & FORSKN TORTUR OFRE; PSYCHOSOC
0191.75	GLO	94	500 UN CENTRE HR; TRUST FUND RACISM & DEMO
0191.75	GLO	94	500 UN CENTRE HR; FUND INDIG POP (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	300 UNIV UPPSALA; HR CONGRESS BEYOND VIENNA
0191.75	GLO	94	500 UN CENTRE HR; DECADE INDIG POP (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	94	6 MISC; TRAVEL TO CHINA HR QUESTIONS
0191.75	GLO	94	5 MISC; TRAVEL "DECADE INDIG POP" (INDIG)
0173.71	GLO	94	60 CMI; SEMINAR WOMEN & ISLAM
0173.71	GLO	94	29 INT WOMS RIGHTS ACT WATCH; IWRAW-SEM
0173.71	GLO	94	500 N HUSMORFORB; WORLD CONF WOMEN
0173.71	GLO	94	34 MISC INDIVID; NGO OBS WORLD CONF WOM
0173.71	GLO	94	175 WOM LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAW;WOM&LAW PROG
0173.71	GLO	94	200 ORG COM PEOPLES HUMAN RIGHTS; WOMEN
0173.71	GLO	94	450 N FOLKEHJELP; INFO WOMEN & VIOLENCE
0177.11	GLO	94	190 GLO-350 JURIDICAL CONSULTANCY
0191.75	GLO	94	221 MISC REFUGEES AND HUM RIGHTS
0173.71	GLO	95	424 GLO-033 WOMEN CONF & NGO FORUM BEIJING
0176.70	GLO	95	530 CMI;HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR BOOK 1995
0176.73	GLO	95	682 CMI;INST SUPP MUWATIN,PALEST HR & DEMOC
0171.72	GLO	95	50 AFGH KOM;GENERAL SUPPORT INFO
0171.72	GLO	95	20 STOETTEGRUPPA FOR BURMA;GEN SUPPORT INFO
0173.71	GLO	95	300 N HUSMORFORB; PREP BEIJING CONF
0173.71	GLO	95	155 IPS;INFO BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	1 000 WOMEN LIVING UNDER MUSLIM LAWS; HR EDUC
0171.72	GLO	95	40 N TIBETKOMITE;GENERAL SUPPORT INFO
0173.71	GLO	95	450 N FOLKEHJELP; INFO WOMEN & VIOLENCE
0173.71	GLO	95	58 NOR NGO-DELEG;TRAV SUPP&MEETINGS BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	3 PROD NOR NATIONAL REPORT BEIJING CONF
0173.71	GLO	95	132 PRINT NOR NAT REPORT BEIJING CONF
0173.71	GLO	95	300 PEOPLES DEC HR EDUC(PDHRE);EDUC HR WOMEN
0173.71	GLO	95	450 NOR NGOS; PARTICIPATION BEIJING CONF
0173.71	GLO	95	297 WOMENS FEATURE SERVICE(WFS); CONF NEWSP
0173.71	GLO	95	1 025 FOKUS; PREPARATIONS & FOLLOW UP BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	69 QUAKER UN OFFICE; SEMINARS BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	297 NGO FORUM SECR;DAILY NEWSPAPER (BEIJING)
0173.71	GLO	95	260 UIO INST KVINNERETT;WORKSHOP WOMENS LAW
0173.71	GLO	95	156 WETV(CANADA); COVERAGE OF EVENTS BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	40 UNESCO N;PREP SEM WOMEN & POV BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	300 IWTC; INFO & COMMUNICATION PROJ BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	180 NRK; TV-PRODUCTION ON BEIJING CONF
0173.71	GLO	95	165 DR JAHAN;SEMINAR & REP NGO FORUM BEIJING

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
LDCS UNSPECIFIED			
0173.71	GLO	95	94 GRAFISK CONSULT AS;BROCHURE WID BEIJING
0177.11	GLO	95	75 UIO INST KVINNERETT; WOMEN LAW ASPECTS
0177.11	GLO	95	101 MORVIK;INFO STRATEGY BEIJING CONFERENCE
0173.71	GLO	95	124 DAWN;TRAVEL SUPPORT FOR BEIJING
0173.71	GLO	95	148 DAWN;BEIJING NGO TRAVEL COSTS
0191.75	GLO	95	5 GJERDE;CONFERENCE ON GYPSIES TRAVEL SUPP
0191.75	GLO	95	12 INST MENNESKERETT;MINIMUM PROTECTN OF HR
0191.75	GLO	95	28 MISC RECIPIENTS;TRAVEL CHINA-HR ISSUES
0191.75	GLO	95	4 PAVALL;OPEN INDIG PEOPLES DECADE,TRAVEL
0191.75	GLO	95	150 SAMETINGET;INTERNATIONAL ACTIVIT-TRAVEL
0191.75	GLO	95	40 SAMETINGET;SEMIN ON UN & INDIGEN PEOPLE
0191.75	GLO	95	25 FRAMFYL;INT FALCON MOVEMENT-CONF 1995
0191.75	GLO	95	100 SAMERAADET;DEP EXP INDG PEOPL ISSUES &HR
0191.75	GLO	95	25 N SAMERS RIKSFORB;CONF CULTURAL DIVERSIT
0191.75	GLO	95	450 MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP;GENERAL SUPPORT 95
0191.75	GLO	95	450 DEFENCE CHILDR INT;GEN SUPPORT 95
0191.75	GLO	95	16 UNIV FORLAG;SUBSCRIPTION HUMAN RIGHTS
0191.75	GLO	95	200 NANSENSKOLEN;CO-PROJECT DEMOCRACY HR
0191.75	GLO	95	165 OSLO-KON;COORD INTERNAT WORK ON RUSHDIE
0191.75	GLO	95	26 INST MENNESKERETT;DIPLOMA COURSES INT HR
0191.75	GLO	95	43 INST MENNESKERETT;HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING
0191.75	GLO	95	21 INST MENNESKERETT;TEXTBOOKS HUMAN RIGHTS
0191.75	GLO	95	10 N SAMERS RIKSFORB;WORLD YOUTH ASSEMBLY
0191.75	GLO	95	2 340 D N MENNESKERETTIGHETFOND;CONTRIBUTIONS
0191.75	GLO	95	500 UN CENTRE HR;UN FUND AGAINST RACISM
0191.75	GLO	95	100 WCIP;WORKSHOP ON WOMENS NETWORK
0191.75	GLO	95	300 MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP;"WORLD DIR MINORI"
0191.75	GLO	95	17 UNIV FORLAG;'HUMAN RIGHTS'
0191.75	GLO	95	1 J HOPKINS UNIV PRESS;HR QUARTELY SUBSCR
0191.75	GLO	95	638 DECADE HUMAN RIGHTS;HR EDUCATION WOMEN
0191.75	GLO	95	500 INST MENNESKERETT;TRAINING HR OBSERVERS
0191.75	GLO	95	200 INTERNAT SERV HUMAN RIGHTS;GENERAL SUPP
0191.75	GLO	95	500 IWGIA;OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURE (INDIG)
0191.75	GLO	95	100 INT DISABILITY FOUND;OPERATIONAL EXPENDI
0191.75	GLO	95	150 ARTICLE 19;NAT SECUR &FREEDOM EXPRESSION
0191.75	GLO	95	50 DOCIP;DOCUMENTAT CENTR INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
0191.75	GLO	95	80 WCIP;CONF ON HUMAN R & INDIG PEOPLE PERU
0191.75	GLO	95	150 FIAN;TRAINING ON HUMAN RIGHTS
0191.75	GLO	95	10 INST MENNESKERETT;T OPSAHL'S MEMORIAL SEM
0191.75	GLO	95	150 HURIDOCS;PROGRAMME FOR TRAINING IN HR
0191.75	GLO	95	800 MELLOMKIRKELIG RAAD;REG/LOCAL HR-WORK
0174.70	GLO	95	260 LO;PROMOTING WOMENS RIGHT IN CONSTRUCTN
0174.70	GLO	95	687 LO;CHILD-COMBAT CHILD LABOUR,ICFTU
0174.70	GLO	95	1 240 DEFENCE CHILDR INT;COMBAT CHILD LABOUR
0174.70	GLO	95	800 IWGIA;OPERATIONAL EXPENDITURE (INDIG)
0176.70	GLO	95	17 INST MENNESKERETT; YEARBOOK
0160.71	GLO	95	2 500 UNICEF;SUPPORT TO VOICE OF CHILDREN
0174.70	GLO	95	170 K NOEDHJELP;MINING & INDIGENOUS PEOPLE
0174.70	GLO	95	288 K NOEDHJELP;BEIJING CONFERENCE

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
LDCS UNSPECIFIED			
0174.70	GLO 95	153	FAFO;TRAVELS & EXCHANGE INDIGENOUS
0177.11	GLO 95	168	GLO-350 JUDICIAL CONSULTANCY
0176.75	GLO 95	300	HANDEL & KONTOR;INFO PROJ CHILD LABOUR
Sum Human Rights Ldcs			83 303
GUINEA-BISSAU			
<i>Democracy</i>			
0192.70	GNB 94	500	UNDP; ELECTORIAL ASSISTANCE
Sum Democracy Guinea-bissau			500
GUATEMALA			
<i>Democracy</i>			
0152.71	GTM 90	10	CIEPRODH, SEM.HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRATIZATI
0155.70	GTM 93	304	N FOLKEHJELP; DEMO INITIATIVES (MR)
0155.70	GTM 93	340	FAFO; BILINGUAL NEWSPAPER
0191.75	GTM 93	1 037	EL REGIONAL:PRINT EQUI INDIAN NEWSP (MR)
0155.70	GTM 93	212	N FOLKEHJELP; ORG'ING DEMO (MR)
0152.71	GTM 94	1 554	GTM-013 REDD BARNA; MISC DEMOCRATIZATION
0174.70	GTM 94	456	N FOLKEHJELP; DEMOCRATIZATION INITATIVES
0174.70	GTM 94	722	FAFO; MULTILINGUAL NEWSPAPER
0174.70	GTM 94	300	N FOLKEHJELP; ORG CAMPESINOS DEMOCRATIZA
0152.71	GTM 95	1 351	GTM-011 N FOLKEHJELP; PEACE & DEM PROCES
0152.71	GTM 95	2 325	GTM-013 REDD BARNA; MISC DEMOCRAT PROJ
0152.71	GTM 95	1 584	GTM-023 FAMDEGUA; RECONCIL & DEMOCRAT
0191.74	GTM 95	80	LO;FURTHER EDUCATION LAWYERS
0191.74	GTM 95	16	MISC RECIPIENTS;CACIF REPR TRIP NORWAY
0192.70	GTM 95	206	K NOEDHJELP;CIEDEG - ELECTION PARTICIP
0192.70	GTM 95	250	D N FLYKTINGERAAD;5 ELECTION OBSERVERS
0174.70	GTM 95	634	N FOLKEHJELP;DEMOCRATIZATION INITIATIVES
0174.70	GTM 95	800	FAFO;MULTILINGUAL NEWS
0174.70	GTM 95	100	FAFO;RADIO
Sum Democracy Guatemala			12 281
<i>Peace efforts</i>			
0191.75	GTM 90	70	NAT.RECONCIL.COMM.ESQUIPULAS AGREEM (MR)
0191.75	GTM 90	100	LUTHERAN WORLD FOUND.PEACEPROCESS (MR)
0191.75	GTM 90	127	MELLOMKIRKELIGRÅD.GTM-NEGOTIATIONS (MR)
0191.74	GTM 93	1 000	K NØDHJELP: PEACE WORK,STREET CHILD (MR)
0191.74	GTM 93	679	COM NACIONAL RECONC: PEACE PROC. (MR)
0191.75	GTM 93	400	K NØDHJELP:PEACE NEGOTIATIONS (MR)
0191.75	GTM 93	500	K NØDHJELP:PEACEPROS,CONVERSATIONS (MR)
0191.75	GTM 93	6	PEACE NEGOTIATIONS GTM; CONVERS (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
GUATEMALA			
0191.75	GTM	93	53 NOBEL PEACE PRIZE:TRAVEL EXPENSES (MR)
0152.71	GTM	94	2 814 GTM-011 N FOLKEHJELP; PEACE & DEM PROCES
0152.71	GTM	94	115 GTM-017 IRIPAZ-RECONCILIATION PROSESS
0191.74	GTM	94	500 K NOEDHJELP; PEACE PROCESS
0191.74	GTM	94	1 000 K NOEDHJELP; PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.74	GTM	94	350 N ROEDE KORS; PEACE PROCESS MEETING OSLO
0192.70	GTM	94	1 139 GTM; PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0192.70	GTM	94	1 981 UNIDAD REVOLUC NACIONAL GTM; PEACE NEGO
0191.74	GTM	94	500 K NOEDHJELP; PEACE ACTIVITIES
0152.71	GTM	95	12 000 GTM-014 UNHCR; REPATR OF REFUGEES PROGR
0191.74	GTM	95	500 K NOEDHJELP;PEACE WORK
0191.74	GTM	95	150 K NOEDHJELP;PEACE PROCESS-ADMIN SUPPORT

Sum Peace efforts Guatemala 36 265

Human Rights

0155.70	GTM	93	224 REDD BARNA:PREVENT. HEALTH, CHILD.RIGHTS
0155.70	GTM	93	198 REDD BARNA: LEGAL OFFICE
0191.74	GTM	93	100 INST FOR MR: PROJ.AGAINST VIOLENCE (MR)
0191.74	GTM	93	20 L-AM GRUPPENE:ADVERT GTM NEWSPAPERS (MR)
0191.74	GTM	93	590 D N FLYKTINGERÅD:LEGAL AID REFUGE (MR)
0155.70	GTM	93	565 K NØDHJELP;CIEDEG-REFUGE/HUM RIGHTS (MR)
0155.70	GTM	93	67 FAFO; SEMINAR, MAYAN COMMON LAW
0155.70	GTM	93	93 FAFO; RESEARCH MAYAN COMMON LAW
0191.75	GTM	93	10 MELLIN OLSEN:INDIGENOUS PEOPLE,TRAVEL GR
0155.70	GTM	93	462 N FOLKEHJELP; EDUC.&VILL.DEV.INDIGEN.PEO
0152.71	GTM	94	630 GTM-003 ARCHBISHOPS HR OFFICE; HR INF TV
0152.71	GTM	94	472 GTM-005 CIEDEG-EVANG CHURCHES HR PROGR
0152.71	GTM	94	360 GTM-009 SECRETARIAT HR OMBUDSMEN
0152.71	GTM	94	2 355 GTM-010 D N FLYKTINGERAAD; HR REFUGEES
0152.71	GTM	94	1 508 GTM-001 OMBUDSMAN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
0152.71	GTM	94	120 GTM-015 COMMUNICAR, INDIGENOUS DICTIONAR
0152.71	GTM	94	1 575 GTM-002 INFO ON HUMAN RIGHTS
0152.71	GTM	94	50 GTM-019 TIERRA VIVA-WOMEN & LAW
0152.71	GTM	94	630 GTM-021 COPREDEH-HUMAN RIGHTS INFO
0174.70	GTM	94	210 D N FLYKTINGERAAD; FUNDADESE HR REFUGEE
0174.70	GTM	94	899 D N FLYKTINGERAAD; OTARDE HR REFUGEES
0174.70	GTM	94	74 FAFO; RESEARCH ON MAYAN LAW
0191.75	GTM	94	204 REGIONAL NEWSPAPER; PRINT MACHINE INDIG
0191.74	GTM	94	286 MEMB ARMED FORCED; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJ
0191.74	GTM	94	75 COMISION DERECHOS HUM; COMM HUMAN RIGHTS
0191.75	GTM	94	500 CARITAS N; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECTS
0191.74	GTM	94	713 D N FLYKTINGERAAD; LEG PROTECT REFUGEES
0152.71	GTM	95	168 GTM-001 OMBUDSMAN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
0152.71	GTM	95	2 150 GTM-003 ARCHBISHOP'S HR OFFICE; HR INFO
0152.71	GTM	95	53 GTM-005 CIEDEG; EVANG CHURCHES HR PROGR
0152.71	GTM	95	327 GTM-009 REG SECRETARIAT HR OMBUDSMEN
0152.71	GTM	95	1 998 GTM-010 D N FLYKTINGERAAD; HR REFUGEES
0152.71	GTM	95	620 GTM-019 TIERRA VIVA; WOMEN & LAW

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description	
GUATEMALA				
0152.71	GTM	95	70	GTM-021 COPREDEH; HUMAN RIGHTS INFO
0152.71	GTM	95	6 300	GTM-022 MINUGUA;H R VERIFICATION MISSION
0152.71	GTM	95	2 644	GTM-024 UNDP; HUMAN RIGHTS INFO (SECPAZ)
0152.71	GTM	95	1 819	GTM-026 HR TRAINING OF ARMED FORCES
0191.74	GTM	95	51	PRESID HR COMM; MEMBERS ARMED FORCE
0191.74	GTM	95	840	N JOUR LAG;JOURNALISTS HUMAN RIGHTS
0191.74	GTM	95	3	L-AM GRUPPENE;GUATEM CAMPAIGN-TRAVEL EXP
0191.74	GTM	95	92	PRESID HR COMM; HR TRAVELS-COL NOACK
0192.70	GTM	95	1 844	UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA NACIONAL; GEN SUPP
0191.75	GTM	95	28	L-AM GRUPPENE;GUATEMALA CAMPAIGN TRAVEL
0191.75	GTM	95	11	L-AM GRUPPENE;TRAVEL SUPP GTM PARTICIP
0174.70	GTM	95	1 089	L-AM GRUPPENE;CONAVIGUA- SUPP CTR WOMEN
0174.70	GTM	95	495	CARITAS N;HUMAN RIGHTS,ODHA
Sum Human Rights Guatemala			69 857	
HONDURAS				
<i>Human Rights</i>				
0174.70	HND	94	935	K NOEDHJELP; COMMUNITY DEV HUMAN RIGHTS
0174.70	HND	94	220	REDD BARNA; LEGAL OFFICE
0152.71	HND	94	530	UNDP; REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
0152.71	HND	95	26	UNDP;REGIONAL HR OMBUDSMAN IN HONDURAS
0174.70	HND	95	255	REDD BARNA;LEGAL AID OFFICE
0174.70	HND	95	933	K NOEDHJELP;COMMUNITY DEV & HR (INST B)
Sum Human Rights Honduras			2 899	
HAITI				
<i>Democracy</i>				
0192.70	HTI	95	162	D N FLYKTINGERAAD;ELECTION OBSERVERS
0191.74	HTI	95	999	UN SECRETARIAT;OBSERVATION OF ELECTIONS
Sum Democracy Haiti			1 161	
<i>Peace efforts</i>				
0192.70	HTI	95	980	K NOEDHJELP;LVF PROGR PEACE & RECONCIL
Sum Peace efforts Haiti			2 141	
<i>Human Rights</i>				
0174.70	HTI	94	123	K NOEDHJELP; HAITI WOM SUPP CONF BOSTON
0191.74	HTI	95	1 364	N ROEDE KORS;ICRC-APPEAL 1995
Sum Human Rights Haiti			3 628	

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
INDIA			
<i>Peace efforts</i>			
0154.71	IND	90	17 IND033 GANDI PEACE CENTRE, WORKSHOP
Sum Peace efforts India			17
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0154.72	IND	90	17 CONFRANCE ON INDIGENOUS CULTURES
0191.75	IND	90	89 3.WORLD CONGRESS ON H.RIGHTS (MR)
0154.71	IND	90	63 IND033 RES REP; RAPE RELIEF SERV.BOOKLET
0154.71	IND	90	18 IND033 RES REP; WOMEN RESOURCE CENTRE
0154.71	IND	90	143 IND033 RR; CHABRA: FILM WOMEN & VIOLENCE
0154.71	IND	90	14 IND033 RR;WOMEN CULT.CENTRE/READING ROOM
0154.71	IND	90	25 IND033 RES R; F.AGNES, RESEARCH ON RAPE
0154.71	IND	90	58 IND033 RES REP; SNTD WOMEN'S UNIV.
0154.71	IND	90	73 IND033RR;SHADINI:STUD.SHELTER HOME-WOMEN
0154.74	IND	93	135 IND-051 ALL INDIA WOMEN'S CONFERENCE
0155.70	IND	93	457 REDD BARNA:DOCUMENT. CENTRE,CHILD LABOUR
0155.70	IND	93	63 K NØDHJELP; LEADERSHIP-TRAINING,WOMEN
0173.74	IND	94	246 IND-051 RR:ALL INDIA WOMENS CONFERENCE
0177.11	IND	94	78 IND-300 RR: CHILD LABOUR
0151.74	IND	95	116 IND-059 UNDP; ELIMINATING CHILD LABOUR
0173.71	IND	95	485 IND-033 RR:COORD UNIT; PREP BEIJING CONF
0174.70	IND	95	541 REDD BARNA;DOCUM CENTRE CHILD LABOUR
Sum Human Rights India			2 638
INDONESIA			
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0174.70	INS	95	42 K NOEDHJELP;HUMAN RIGHTS EAST TIMOR
Sum Human Rights Indonesia			42
IRAQ			
<i>Democracy</i>			
0191.75	IRQ	93	439 UNICEF: RADIO-COMMUNICATION EQUIPM,IRQ
0191.75	IRQ	93	200 SOLIDAR KURDERNE: MICROFONS PARLAM (MR)
Sum Democracy Iraq			639
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0191.75	IRQ	93	34 SOLIDAR KOM KURDERNE: PARLAM DELEG (MR)
0191.73	IRQ	94	18 N COUNCIL KURDISH RIGHTS; TRAVEL GRANT

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Human Rights Iraq			691

ISRAEL

Human Rights

0191.75	ISR	93	108	ISRAELI INFO CENTRE HR: GEN SUPP (MR)
Sum Human Rights Israel			108	

KENYA

Democracy

0191.75	KEN	93	200	MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD: SEMINAR DEMO (MR)
0191.75	KEN	93	500	K NØDHJELP:DEMOCRACY WORK (MR)
0191.75	KEN	93	61	INST MENNESKERETTIGH: DEMO.EFF KEN (MR)
0191.75	KEN	94	63	INST FOR MR; DEMOCRACY BUILDING
0191.75	KEN	94	263	N KIRKELIG RAAD; DEMOCRATIC ASSISTANCE
0192.70	KEN	95	489	K NOEDHJELP;DEMOCRACY EDUC & AWARENESS
0191.75	KEN	95	24	AMB NAIROBI;LEGAL PUBLICATION
0191.75	KEN	95	80	CTR GOVERNANCE & D;PUBL PARLIAMENT BILL
Sum Democracy Kenya			1 680	

Human Rights

0154.71	KEN	90	500	IAS/UNIV NAIROBI; WOMAN STUDIES PROJECT
0167.70	KEN	90	173	NORAD SCOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
0191.75	KEN	93	14	KOIGI WA WAMWERE:TRAVEL SUPPORT (MR)
0191.75	KEN	93	5	KOIGI WA WAMWERE,TRAVEL GRANT (MR)
0191.75	KEN	93	500	NDEHURIO:HUM.RIGHTS EFFORTS IN KEN (MR)
0191.75	KEN	94	8	D N ADVOKATFOR;TRAVEL LONDON AMNESTY INT
0192.70	KEN	94	32	STOETTEKOM WAMVERE; OBSERVER TRIAL
0192.70	KEN	95	57	STOETTEKOM WAMWERE;TRAVEL & TRIAL
0191.75	KEN	95	61	STOETTEKOM WAMWERE;TRIAL OBSERVERS
0191.75	KEN	95	5	AMB NAIROBI;HUMAN RIGHTS MEETING
0191.75	KEN	95	11	INST MENNESKERETT;VISIT G IMANYARA
0191.75	KEN	95	18	AMB NAIROBI;HR-NEWSPAPER LAW NAIROBI
0191.75	KEN	95	29	KENYA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION;GEN SUPP
0191.75	KEN	95	50	INST MENNESKERETT;CONTACT ORGAN FOR KENY
Sum Human Rights Kenya			3 143	

CAMBODIA

Democracy

0191.75	KHM	93	425	INST MENNESKERETTIGH:OBS, ELECTIONS (MR)
0191.75	KHM	93	50	KHMER INST DEMOCRACY: GEN SUPPORT (MR)
0192.70	KHM	93	5 939	UNTAC:SECONDMENT POLICEMEN (MR)
0191.75	KHM	94	100	KHMER INST DEMO; DEMOCRACY RESOURCE CENT

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Democracy Cambodia			6 514

Peace efforts

0151.74	KHM	94	5 000	KHM-003 UNDP; MINE CLEARING
0191.75	KHM	94	7 000	N FOLKEHJELP; DEMINING PROGRAMME
0191.75	KHM	94	2 000	N FOLKEHJELP; MINE CLEARANCE
Sum Peace efforts Cambodia			20 514	

Human Rights

0191.75	KHM	90	10	INST.FOR MENNESKERET.REPORT FROM MEETING
0151.74	KHM	94	441	KHM-001 HUMAN RIGHTS/AWARENESS RAISING
0192.70	KHM	94	500	UN CENTRE HR; UN HR PROGRAMME
0151.74	KHM	95	105	KHM-001 HUMAN RIGHTS (INST BUILDING)
0151.74	KHM	95	410	KHM-004 UNDP/UNV HUMAN RIGHTS EXPERTS
0192.70	KHM	95	500	UNHCR;DEV HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE
Sum Human Rights Cambodia			22 480	

LEBANON

Human Rights

0173.71	LBN	95	106	RAL-311 WOMENS COURT, BEIRUT HEARING
Sum Human Rights Lebanon			106	

SRI LANKA

Democracy

0151.74	LKA	94	703	LKA-036 REGIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION (ICES)
0151.74	LKA	94	175	LKA-040 POL AWARENESS CONSTITUT REFORM
0151.74	LKA	95	275	LKA-036 ICES; REGIONAL DEMOCRATIZATION
Sum Democracy Sri Lanka			1 153	

Peace efforts

0191.75	LKA	90	62	WIF H.AID, PEACE EFFORTS IN LKA (MR)
0191.75	LKA	90	88	WIF H.AID, PEACE EFFORT IN LKA (MR)
0191.75	LKA	94	2 000	WORLDWIDE INT FOUND; PEACE PROMOTION
0191.75	LKA	95	300	FORUT;SRI LANKA FORUM
Sum Peace efforts Sri Lanka			3 603	

Human Rights

0154.71	LKA	90	120	LKA021 RR; WOMEN'S RESEARCH/INFO CENTRE
0151.74	LKA	93	538	LKA-034 MARGA INST,PRO ETHN HARMONY (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
SRI LANKA			
0151.74	LKA	94	360 LKA-037 HR DISAPPEARANCES & DETAINEES
0151.74	LKA	94	200 LKA-038 HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK
0191.75	LKA	94	150 ARTICLE 19; FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION PROJ
Sum Human Rights Sri Lanka			4 971

LESOTHO

Human Rights

0167.70	LSO	90	173 NORAD SCHOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
0152.74	LSO	90	16 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
Sum Human Rights Lesotho			189

MIDDLE EAST UNALL.

Democracy

0192.70	MEU	95	377 COPP-PALESTINIAN POLICE FORCE
Sum Democracy Middle East Unall.			377

Peace efforts

0191.75	MEU	94	20 M EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.75	MEU	94	66 M EAST PEACE PROCESS; CONF POLICE FORCE
0192.70	MEU	94	4 218 MISC; INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN HEBRON
0191.75	MEU	94	361 PEACE NOW; PEACE EFFORTS
0191.75	MEU	94	361 M EAST PEACE PROCESS; PEACE CONCERT
0192.70	MEU	95	250 ISRAELI-PALEST THEATRE BERGEN FESTSPILL
0191.75	MEU	95	52 MISC RECIPIENTS;PEACE CONCERT OSLO SPECT
0191.75	MEU	95	1 111 FAFO;SEMINAR MIDDLE-EAST PEACE PROCESS
0191.75	MEU	95	162 K NOEDHJELP;PALESTINIAN PEACE INFO CENTR
0191.75	MEU	95	162 K NOEDHJELP;INT CENTR FOR PEACE MID EAST
0191.75	MEU	95	200 UIO;SUMMER SCHOOL,12 ISRAELIES&PALESTIN
0191.75	MEU	95	400 PLO;GEN SUPP PLO OSLO OFFICE
0191.75	MEU	95	40 FELLESUTV PALEST;MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE
0191.75	MEU	95	200 PLO;SUPP PLOS NORWEGIAN OFFICE
Sum Peace efforts Middle East Unall.			7 980

Human Rights

0191.75	MEU	94	200 PAL INDEP COMM OF HR; ESTABLISH HR COMM
0191.75	MEU	94	175 ISR INFO CENTER HR; CONTRIBUTION -94 ISR
0191.75	MEU	95	682 ARBEIDERBEVEG INT;HUMAN,PROF RIGH M-EAST
0191.75	MEU	95	100 BTSELEM;ISRAELI HR INFO CTR OCCUP AREAS
0191.75	MEU	95	150 PALESTINIAN CTR HR;MONITOR HR SITUATION

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Human Rights Middle East			9 287

MALI

Peace efforts

0192.70	MLI	95	450	K NOEDHJELP;CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Sum Peace efforts Mali			450	

MONGOLIA

Human Rights

0191.75	MNG	94	48	ADVOKATFOR; LEGAL AID PROJECT
0191.75	MNG	94	80	D N ADVOKATFOR; LEGAL AID PROJECT
Sum Human Rights Mongolia			128	

MOZAMBIQUE

Democracy

0150.83	MOZ	93	259	MOZ-090 SADC CULTURESECR, DEMO (MR)
0154.72	MOZ	93	70	MOZ-045 RR:MEDIA
0167.11	MOZ	93	41	MOZ-300 RR:LEGISLATION
0150.83	MOZ	93	650	INST.FOR MENN.RETT; OBS AT NOR ELEC (MR)
0150.83	MOZ	93	5 000	UNDP; SUPP TO THE ELECTION PROCESS (MR)
0173.72	MOZ	94	555	MOZ-045 RR:REGION DEMOCRACY CONFERANCE
0174.70	MOZ	94	131	RR:ONJ;STUDY TOUR-ELECTIONS S.A.
0174.70	MOZ	94	114	RR:COOP EDITORIAL; PUBLISH NEWSPAPER
0150.83	MOZ	94	2 000	MOZ-090 UNOMOZ; FUND-POLITCAL PARTIES
0150.74	MOZ	94	10 000	MOZ-100 IMP SUPP: ELECTION SUPPORT
0177.11	MOZ	94	83	MOZ-300 RR: ELECTION SEMINAR SARDC
0192.70	MOZ	94	278	D N FLYKTINGERAAD; HOME & ID REGISTRAT
0192.70	MOZ	94	2 500	UNDP; ELECTION SUPPORT
0192.70	MOZ	94	131	INST FOR MR; ELECTION OBSERVERS
0192.70	MOZ	94	66	EURO PARLIAMENT S A; ELECTION OBSERVERS
0192.70	MOZ	95	446	D N FLYKTINGERAAD;PUBLIC REGISTRATION
0192.70	MOZ	95	113	D N FLYKTINGERAAD;COMPET DEV LOCAL NGOS
0192.70	MOZ	95	123	JUSTISDEP;ONUMOS - UN OPERATION
Sum Democracy Mozambique			22 560	

Peace efforts

0150.83	MOZ	93	3 872	N FOLKEHJELP; MINE CLEARANCE (MR)
0150.83	MOZ	93	10 000	UNDP; INSURANCE SCHEME DEMOB SOLD (MR)
0150.83	MOZ	94	15 200	MOZ-092 N.FOLKEHJELP;MINE CLEARANCE
0192.70	MOZ	94	2 097	JUSTISDEP; PEACE KEEPING OPERAT ONUMOS
0174.70	MOZ	94	107	RR:FENCING MINEFIELD
0150.74	MOZ	95	2 000	MOZ-086 MINE CLEARANCE MOZAMBIK

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description	
MOZAMBIQUE				
0150.83	MOZ	95	28 471	MOZ-092 N FOLKEHJELP; MINE CLEARANCE
0192.70	MOZ	95	393	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD;CONFLICT PREV THEATRE
0150.74	MOZ	95	6 300	MOZ-100 IMP SUPP:UNDP;DEMOB SOLDIERS FND
0150.83	MOZ	95	791	MOZ-090 D N FLYKTNINGERÅD; MISC REFUGE
Sum Peace efforts Mozambique			91 791	

Human Rights

0167.70	MOZ	90	347	NORAD SCHOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
0154.71	MOZ	90	108	MOZ043 RES REP; AMEEMMEE,NNY WOMEN'S ORG
0152.74	MOZ	90	17	MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
0192.70	MOZ	93	3 644	D N FLYKTNINGERÅD: LEGAL ASS (MR)
0174.70	MOZ	94	31	RR:ONJ;MEDIA CONFERENCE CONCERNING WOMEN
0174.70	MOZ	94	13	RR:SOTEMAZA;WOMEN
0192.70	MOZ	94	104	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD, LEG AID WOM (REFUGE)
0192.70	MOZ	95	188	D N FLYKTNINGERAAD;INFO & LEGAL AID
0174.70	MOZ	95	112	N FOLKEHJELP;OMM WOMEN'S ORGANIZATION
0174.70	MOZ	95	246	N FOLKEHJELP;CHARGARA WOMEN MOB. CENTRE
0174.70	MOZ	95	165	N FOLKEHJELP;WOMEN NETWORKING
Sum Human Rights Mozambique			96 766	

Multilaterla Assistance

Democracy

0192.70	MUL	93	248	UN FUND ELECTION ASSISTANCE:CASH
Sum Democracy Multilaterla			248	

Peace efforts

0191.75	MUL	90	3 000	UNHCR (REF. AND REPATR. PEOPLES FROM MOZ
0191.75	MUL	90	300	UNBRO REPAT.PROG CAMBODIA NOR.EXPERT
0189.70	MUL	90	350	UNIDIR.UN INSTITUTE FOR DISARM.RESEARCH
0189.70	MUL	90	95	UN - WORLD DISARMAMENT CAMPAIGN
0189.70	MUL	93	707	UN INST FOR DISARM RESEARCH; CONTRIBUTIO
Sum Peace efforts Multilaterla			4 700	

Human Rights

0191.75	MUL	90	131	UN VOLUNTARY FUND FOR INDEGENIOUS PEOPLE
Sum Human Rights Multilaterla			4 831	

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
MALAWI			
<i>Democracy</i>			
0191.75	MWI	93	1 700 AIS: ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRACY (MR)
0191.75	MWI	93	14 AIS:MALAWI DEMOCR PARTY,REPR VISIT (MR)
0192.70	MWI	94	1 700 UNDP; GENERAL ELECTIONS ASSISTANCE
Sum Democracy Malawi			3 414
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0152.74	MWI	90	16 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
Sum Human Rights Malawi			3 430
MALAYSIA			
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0155.70	MYS	90	225 LO, WOMEN PROGRAMME
Sum Human Rights Malaysia			225
NAMIBIA			
<i>Democracy</i>			
0150.82	NAM	94	700 REG-089 MEDIA INST OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
0174.70	NAM	94	510 K NOEDHJELP; LAC LEGAL AID CENTER
0150.83	NAM	94	120 ELECTORAL COMISSION; VOTER EDUC VIDEOS
0150.82	NAM	95	1 000 REG-089 MEDIA INSTITUTE SOUTHERN AFRICA
Sum Democracy Namibia			2 330
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0155.70	NAM	90	23 N LÆRERLAG, LEGAL SUPPORT
0152.74	NAM	90	400 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, COMMUNIC CENTRE (MR)
0152.74	NAM	90	475 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, LEGAL ASSIST.CENTRE
0152.74	NAM	90	120 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, HUM RIGHT TRUST (MR)
0152.74	NAM	90	590 NAMIBIA CONFERENCE (MR)
0154.71	NAM	93	295 NAM-007 RR:LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTRE
0155.70	NAM	93	404 K NØDHJELP; LEGAL AID CENTRE, WINDHOEK
0155.70	NAM	93	102 K NØDHJELP;LEG AID CENTRE/HUM RIGHT (MR)
0173.71	NAM	94	160 NAM-007 RR:BEIJING 95 PREP NGO PREP COM
0173.71	NAM	94	49 NAM-007 RR:BEIJING 95 PREP UNDP TRUST F
0173.71	NAM	94	10 NAM-007 RR:LEGAL ASSISTANCE, WOMEN
0174.70	NAM	94	24 K NOEDHJELP; CCN WOMEN CONFERENCE
0173.71	NAM	95	50 NAM-007 RR:NGO PREP BEIJING CONF
0174.70	NAM	95	424 K NOEDHJELP;LEGAL AID CTR-HUMAN RIGHTS
0174.70	NAM	95	634 NAMIBIAFORENINGEN;HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Human Rights Namibia			6 090

NIGERIA

Democracy

0184.74	NGA	93	183	INDEX ON CENSORSHIP;INFO ACTIVITIES (MR)
0192.70	NGA	93	5	EMB.LAGOS: OBSERVER ELECTIONS (MR)
Sum Democracy Nigeria			188	

NICARAGUA

Democracy

0191.75	NIC	90	36	INST FOR MR; ELECTION PROCESS (MR)
0154.71	NIC	90	24	NIC013 RR; COLECTIVO DE MUJERES, RADIO
0191.74	NIC	93	145	N FOLKEHJELP;TEACH.SUMU-LEADER,ELEC (MR)
0191.74	NIC	93	325	N FOLKEHJELP;TEACHING,ELECTIONS '94 (MR)
0152.70	NIC	94	1 500	NIC-024 ELECTIONS ON THE ATLANTIC COAST
0152.70	NIC	94	9 500	NIC-025 CSE/ISSUING OF IDENTITY CARDS
0174.70	NIC	94	111	N FOLKEHJELP; DEMOCRATISATION FUND
0192.70	NIC	94	75	MISC; LOCAL ELECTION OBSERVERS
0191.74	NIC	94	169	AMB MANAGUA; INFO CAMPAIGN CONSTITUTION
0177.11	NIC	94	30	NIC-300 RR: DEMOCRATICATION & HR STUDY
0152.70	NIC	95	6 484	NIC-025 CSE;ISSUING OF IDENTITY CARDS
0174.70	NIC	95	1 028	N FOLKEHJELP;DEMOCRATIZATION FUND
Sum Democracy Nicaragua			19 427	

Peace efforts

0174.70	NIC	94	129	RR:C.E.I;RECONSILIATION,WAR VICTIMS
Sum Peace efforts Nicaragua			19 556	

Human Rights

0155.70	NIC	90	1 027	UTV FONDET, DEV.AWARENESS AMONG WOMEN
0155.70	NIC	90	142	UTV FONDET, WOMEN OFFICE AMNLAE
0154.72	NIC	90	70	MINORITY GROUPS,CONF. ON INDIGENIOUS PEO
0154.72	NIC	90	40	UNAP,WOMENS ORGANISATIONS
0154.71	NIC	90	151	NIC013 RR; TRAINING DEFENSORAS LEGALES
0154.71	NIC	90	24	NIC013 RR;WOMEN MOVEMENT,L.A.FEM.MEETING
0154.71	NIC	90	27	NIC013 RR; AMNLAE,JINOTEPE WOMEN'S HOUSE
0154.71	NIC	90	58	NIC013 RR; COOP JULIA HERRERA DE POMARES
0154.72	NIC	93	18	NIC-003 RR:INDIGINEOUS CONGRESS
0154.71	NIC	93	1	NIC-013 RR:AMNLAE,ANTI VIOLENCE CAMPAIGN
0154.71	NIC	93	357	NIC-013 RR: LAWYERS
0154.71	NIC	93	59	NIC-013 RR:ACCION YA,CRISIS HOUSE,ESTELI
0154.71	NIC	93	4	NIC-013 RR:SI MUJER,WOMEN NETWORK
0152.70	NIC	94	2 000	NIC-026 LEGAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
NICARAGUA			
0173.71	NIC	94	182 NIC-013 RR: TRAINING IN WOMENS RIGHTS
0173.71	NIC	94	155 NIC-013 RR: CRISIS HOUSE-ESTELI
0173.71	NIC	94	14 NIC-013 RR: CAMPAIGN AGAINST VIOLENCE
0173.71	NIC	94	106 NIC-013 RR: WOMENS CIVIC FORUM
0174.70	NIC	94	506 RR:CENIDH;EDUCATION,HUMAN RIGHTS
0174.70	NIC	94	83 RR:CEDEMETRA;EDUCATION,HUMAN RIGHTS
0174.70	NIC	94	73 REDD BARNA; REGIONAL CHILD MOVEMENT
0174.70	NIC	94	45 N KVINNEFORB; WOM HOUSE ETHNIC MINORIES
0177.11	NIC	94	41 NIC-300 RR: PREPARATION HR-OMBUD
0152.70	NIC	95	1 493 NIC-026 INIM;LEGAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
0152.70	NIC	95	535 NIC-028 HUMAN RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN
0152.70	NIC	95	400 NIC-029 COMMISSION FOR CHILDRENS RIGHTS
0173.71	NIC	95	335 NIC-013 RR:CDC; LEGAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN
0173.71	NIC	95	236 NIC-013 RR:CRISIS HOUSE - ESTELI
0173.71	NIC	95	78 NIC-013 RR:CIVIC FORUM FOR WOMEN
0173.71	NIC	95	184 NIC-013 RR:NETWORK AGAINST VIOLENCE
0173.71	NIC	95	70 NIC-013 RR:TV PROG BEIJING FOLLOW UP
0174.70	NIC	95	43 NIC-017 RR:CENIDH;EDUCATION HUMAN RIGHTS
0174.70	NIC	95	141 NIC-017 RR:CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES
0174.70	NIC	95	87 NIC-017 RR:AJDN;LEGAL ASS OFFICE 11 PHAS
0174.70	NIC	95	279 N KVINNEFORB;WOMEN CTR ETHNIC MINORITIES
0174.70	NIC	95	385 REDD BARNA;WORKING CHILDREN ESTELI
0174.70	NIC	95	551 REDD BARNA;WORKING CHILDREN MANAGUA
0174.70	NIC	95	646 REDD BARNA;WORKING CHILDREN ESTELI

Sum Human Rights Nicaragua 30 202

NEPAL

Democracy

0151.74	NPL	93	245 DELEGATION OF M.PS FROM NEPAL (MR)
0151.74	NPL	95	100 NPL-008 HIMAL MAGAZINE COMPETENCE RAISE
0191.75	NPL	95	50 D N ADVOKATFOR;SEMINAR NEPAL LAW SOCIETY

Sum Democracy Nepal 395

Human Rights

0155.70	NPL	90	541 ADVOKATFORENING, FREE LEGAL AID
0151.74	NPL	93	305 NPL-005 INSEC: HUM RIGHTS YEARBOOK (MR)
0155.70	NPL	93	620 D N ADVOKATFOR:FREE LEG AID & ADVIC (MR)
0191.75	NPL	93	250 D N ADVOKATFOR: HR PROJ NEPAL (MR)
0151.74	NPL	94	152 NPL-005 INSEC-HR YEAR BOOK
0151.74	NPL	94	400 NPL-006 WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS PROJECT
0174.70	NPL	94	650 REDD BARNA; SUPP CWIN CHILD WORKERS
0174.70	NPL	94	655 ADVOKATFOR; FREE LEGAL AID
0191.75	NPL	94	50 ADVOKATFOR; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
0191.75	NPL	94	250 D N ADVOKATFORENING; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJ
0151.74	NPL	95	400 NPL-005 INSEC; HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR BOOK

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
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NEPAL

0174.70	NPL	95	711	D N ADVOKATFOR;FREE LEGAL AID
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Sum Human Rights Nepal			5 379	
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PAKISTAN

Democracy

0151.74	PAK	93	580	LKA-036 ICES;OBSERVERS ELECTION PAK (MR)
0151.74	PAK	94	166	PAK-021 TRAVEL SUPP ELECTION COMM

Sum Democracy Pakistan			746	
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Human Rights

0154.71	PAK	90	286	PAK009 RR; AGHS/LAC:LEGAL AID FOR WOMEN
0154.71	PAK	90	15	PAK009 RR;SHIRKATGAH,SEM.ON PROSTITUTION
0154.71	PAK	93	105	PAK-009 RR:BEDARI WOMENS CENTRE
0151.74	PAK	95	139	PAK-023 WOMENS & CHILDRENS RIGHTS (NOR)
0174.70	PAK	95	120	PAK-011 RR:DCHD;DEM COMM FOR HUMAN DEVEL
0174.70	PAK	95	1 868	PAK-011 RR:HRC;HUMAN RIGHTS COMM CAMPUS
0173.71	PAK	95	161	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL;LEGAL CENTRES
0173.71	PAK	95	145	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL; ASSIST WOMEN
0173.71	PAK	95	20	PAK-009 RR:AGHS HAMARA GAHR;WOMENS HOUSE
0173.71	PAK	95	264	PAK-009 RR:UNICEF; BEIJING CONF
0173.71	PAK	95	127	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL; ASSIST CHILDR
0173.71	PAK	95	262	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL;LEGAL TRAINING
0173.71	PAK	95	63	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL; DOCUM CENTRE
0173.71	PAK	95	59	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL; HOTLINE
0173.71	PAK	95	101	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL; WOMENS HOUSE
0173.71	PAK	95	189	PAK-009 RR:LEGAL AID CELL; GEN EXPENSES

Sum Human Rights Pakistan			4 670	
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PALESTINIAN ADM. AREAS

Democracy

0154.70	PAL	94	3 437	PAL POLICE FORCE; PAYMENT OF SALARIES
0192.70	PAL	94	16 414	MISC; PALESTINIAN POLICE FORCE COOP
0191.75	PAL	94	266	UNSCO; POLICE ADVICER FROM NORWAY
0173.71	PAL	94	540	PAL TEAM ; WOM ELECTION STRATEG WORKSHOP
0192.70	PAL	95	259	N FOLKEHJELP;MISC DEMOC PROJ PALST YOUTH
0191.75	PAL	95	416	POLITIHOEGSKOLEN;TRAINING PALEST POLICE
0191.75	PAL	95	896	GAZ-006 KVEKERHJ; MISC PROJ,DEMOCRACY
0173.72	PAL	95	100	GAZ-331 PAL WRITERS UNION;LITERAT FUND
0154.70	PAL	95	4 612	GAZ-999 UNHCR; LEGAL SYSTEM
0154.70	PAL	95	20 119	UNRWA; PALESTINSKE POLITISTYRKER
0154.70	PAL	95	12 703	UNWRA; PALESTINSKE POLITISTYRKER
0154.70	PAL	95	7 360	D N FLYKTINGERAAD; ELECTION OBSERV

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Democracy Palestinian Adm.			67 122

Peace efforts

0191.75	PAL	93	1 065	FAFO:PEACE NEGOTIATION, SEM, WORKSH (MR)
0191.75	PAL	93	1 494	FAFO:PEACE PROSESS,M-EAST,SEPT '93 (MR)
0154.70	PAL	94	7 969	D N FORSVAR; PRECENCE HEBRON
0191.75	PAL	94	882	M EAST PEACE PROCESS; MISC
0191.75	PAL	94	700	PAL LIBERATION ORG; OSLO OFFICE ADM COST
Sum Peace efforts Palestinian Adm.			79 232	

Human Rights

0191.75	PAL	93	273	KVEKERHJELP:LEG ADV PAL ARRESTED (MR)
Sum Human Rights Palestinian Adm.			79 505	

PERU

Democracy

0155.70	PER	90	365	N JOURN LAG, TRAINING JOURNALISTS
0174.70	PER	94	121	FAFO; JURIDICAL TRAINING
Sum Democracy Peru			486	

Human Rights

0154.71	PER	93	225	GLO-369 FLORA TRISTAN,PERUVIAN WOM.NETW.
0191.74	PER	93	370	CARITAS N: HUM RIGHTS,CO-OP. CEAS (MR)
0191.74	PER	93	300	D N FLYKTNINGERÅD:LEG RIGHTS,REFUGE (MR)
0191.74	PER	93	1 498	N RØDE KORS: HUMAN RIGHTS (MR)
0155.70	PER	93	111	K NØDHJELP;INDIG.HUMAN PROMOTION P. (MR)
0155.70	PER	93	123	FAFO; INDIGENOUS LEGAL RIGHTS (MR)
0174.70	PER	94	497	K NOEDHJELP; INFO DOCUMENTATION WOM
0174.70	PER	95	281	KVINNEFRONT N;DOCUM CENTRE FOR WOMEN
0174.70	PER	95	182	N LAERERLAG;HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
0174.70	PER	95	459	K NOEDHJELP;CENDOC-INFO & DOCUM CTR WOM
0174.70	PER	95	20	K NOEDHJELP;CENDOC-WOMENS CONF BEIJING
Sum Human Rights Peru			4 552	

PHILIPPINES

Democracy

0166.72	PHI	93	200	TRANSNAT.INST; DEMO PEOPLES PART. (MR)
Sum Democracy Philippines			200	

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Peace efforts			
0174.70	PHI	95	64 K NOEDHJELP;PEACE WORK
0174.70	PHI	95	42 K NOEDHJELP;SOUTH/SOUTH CONF PEACE WORK
Sum Peace efforts Philippines			306

Human Rights

0191.75	PHI	90	50 ESTABL.OF HR CENTER; UNIV IN MANIL (MR)
0191.75	PHI	93	185 REHAB&FORSK SENT TORTURERTE: TREATM (MR)
0174.70	PHI	95	85 K NOEDHJELP;ADVOC INDIG HR & NAT RESOURC
Sum Human Rights Philippines			626

PARAGUAY

Democracy

0191.75	PRY	90	118 CONTR.CIPAE TRAINING IN DEMOCRACY (MR)
Sum Democracy Paraguay			118

Human Rights

0191.75	PRY	90	128 ALDHU, H.RIGHTS PROJECT (MR)
0155.70	PRY	93	170 K NØDHJELP; CIPAE,HUMAN RIGHT WORK (MR)
0191.75	PRY	93	115 CIPAE: LEGAL ADVICING, HR EDUC (MR)
0191.74	PRY	94	124 K NOEDHJELP; HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT
0191.74	PRY	95	124 K NOEDHJELP;CIPAE-HUMAN RIGHTS MEASURES
Sum Human Rights Paraguay			779

AFRICA UNSPECIFIED

Democracy

0150.83	RAF	93	500 GLOB.COAL.FOR AFR; DEMO & G.GOV. (MR)
0177.11	RAF	95	29 CMI;MEETING ON DEMOCRA TRANSISION AFRICA
0174.70	RAF	95	10 ABANTU FOR DEV;AFRIC WOM & SYST GOVERNMT
Sum Democracy Africa Unspecified			539

Peace efforts

0194.70	RAF	94	61 UN; REG CENTER PEACE & DEV AFRICA
0192.70	RAF	94	1 769 JUSTISDEP; PEACE KEEPING OPERAT MINURSO
0191.75	RAF	95	200 CMI;SEMINAR CONFLICT RESOLUT IN AFRICA
Sum Peace efforts Africa			2 569

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Human Rights			
0154.71	RAF	93	660 GLO-369 ISSIS,WOMEN'S NETWORK AFRICA
0191.75	RAF	93	35 JAN ERICHSEN, PART HR CONF IN ERI (MR)
0166.74	RAF	93	1 651 RAF-0001 SCHOLARSHIP,WOMENLAW,OSL.HARARE
0154.71	RAF	93	1 739 UN ECA ; WOMEN CONF - REG PREP AFRIC
0150.83	RAF	94	1 309 RAF-001 WOMENS LAW, UNIV OF OSLO-HARARE
0174.70	RAF	94	332 LO; TRADE UNION EDUCATION WOMEN
0150.83	RAF	95	1 229 RAF-001 WOMENS LAW, UNIV OF OSLO -HARARE
0176.72	RAF	95	100 OSREA; WOMENS RESEARCH PROG
Sum Human Rights Africa			9 624

AMERICA UNSPECIFIED

Democracy			
0189.70	RAM	90	595 SOUTH-AM.COMM FOR PEACE,SECU & DEMO (MR)
0155.70	RAM	93	1 000 N JOURNALISTLAG:EDUC. LAT-AM JOURNALISTS
0189.70	RAM	93	183 S-AM COMM FOR PEACE,SECURITY & DEMO (MR)
0174.70	RAM	94	1 127 N JOURNALISTLAG; EDUC PROJ LAT-AM JOURNA
0191.74	RAM	94	100 ARIAS FOUND; MISC DEMOCRACY PROJ
0174.70	RAM	95	1 333 N JOUR LAG;EDUCATION JOURNALISTS LAT-AM
Sum Democracy America			4 338

Peace efforts			
0194.70	RAM	94	62 UN; REG CENTER PEACE & DEV LAT-AM
Sum Peace efforts America			4 400

Human Rights			
0155.70	RAM	90	786 INT.W.G INDEGENIOUS AF, INDEGENIOUS PROJ
0155.70	RAM	90	258 CONSULTANT STUDY, INDIGENIOUS AFFAIRS
0191.75	RAM	90	150 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD.H.RIGHTS WORK (MR)
0155.70	RAM	93	102 LO;WOMEN'S EDUCATION
0155.70	RAM	93	72 N INDIAN.FOREN; CONF ON ABORIGINES (MR)
0191.75	RAM	93	100 N INDIANSK FOR:EURO CONF IND QUEST (MR)
0174.70	RAM	94	291 D N FLYKTINGERAAD; ARMIF HR REFUGEES
0174.70	RAM	94	8 N INDIANSK FORENING; INDIGENOUS CONFERAN
0173.71	RAM	94	2 196 UNIFEM; PROMOTE INDIGOUS WOM & DOMESTICS
0191.74	RAM	94	350 N JOURNALISTLAG; HR PROJ JOURNALISTS
0191.75	RAM	94	151 AMB MEX; PEACE INIATIVE MEETING (INDIG)
0191.74	RAM	94	250 ASOS DE DERECHOS HUMANOS; NEWSPAPER
0173.71	RAM	95	800 IADB;WOMENS LEADERSHIP
0191.74	RAM	95	14 L-AM GRUPPENE;CHIAPAS CAMP 95-TRAVEL EXP
0174.70	RAM	95	42 K NOEDHJELP;VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
0174.70	RAM	95	85 K NOEDHJELP;AWARENESS RAISING & HR
Sum Human Rights America			10 055

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
ASIA UNSPECIFIED			
<i>Democracy</i>			
0191.75	RAS	94	250 N JOURNALISTLAG; DEMO EDUC JOURNALIST
0191.75	RAS	94	210 N FOLKEHJELP; ORG/DEMOCRACY TRAINING
0192.70	RAS	95	13 NABLUS-FORENINGEN;ELEC OBSERVS VIS STVGR
0192.70	RAS	95	321 OSSE;ODHIR-ELECT SURVEIL BELARUS KASAKS
Sum Democracy Asia Unspecified			794
<i>Peace efforts</i>			
0191.75	RAS	93	24 FAFO: RØED LARSEN,PEACE NEGO PARTIC (MR)
0191.75	RAS	93	85 D N FORFATTERFOR:PAL/NORW/ISRAELIAN CONF
0191.75	RAS	93	98 D N FORF.FOREN: PAL/NOR/ISR MEETING (MR)
0191.75	RAS	93	177 UD:CONF. PEACE & SECURITY M-EAST (MR)
0192.70	RAS	93	20 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS M-EAST, MISC (MR)
0192.70	RAS	93	1 500 FAFO:PEACE NEGOTIATIONS M-EAST,MISC (MR)
0194.70	RAS	94	78 UN; REG CENTER PEACE & DEV INST BUILD
0192.70	RAS	94	2 253 FAFO; PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.75	RAS	94	236 INT ALERT; CONFL SOLVING AZERB-ARMENIA
0191.75	RAS	94	200 PRIO; PEACE CAUCASUS
0191.75	RAS	94	324 WCED; PEACE NEGOTIATIONS MEETING COSTS
0192.70	RAS	94	800 K NOEDHJELP; PAL LECTURERES FOR PEACE
0191.75	RAS	95	250 PRIO;"PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS" PROJECT
0191.75	RAS	95	285 ECONOMIC COOP FOUND;PEACE ACTIVITIES
0191.75	RAS	95	100 PRIO;"SEARCH FOR RCOMMON GROUNDS" CONF
0191.75	RAS	95	692 MISC RECIPIENTS;NOBEL PEACE PRIZE-1994
0191.75	RAS	95	258 PRIO;"PEACE IN THE CAUCASUS"
Sum Peace efforts Asia Unspecified			8 174
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0191.75	RAS	90	137 KVEKERHJELPEN,LEGAL HELP OFF.JERUSALEM
0191.75	RAS	90	14 FN-SAMBANDET; HR PROJ/CONF IND/PAK (MR)
0155.70	RAS	93	407 LO;TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR WOMEN
0155.70	RAS	93	158 LO;TRADE UNIONS RIGHTS
0191.75	RAS	93	20 SOLIDARIT KOM KURDERE:INFO ON KURDS (MR)
0191.75	RAS	93	100 ANTI-SLAVERY INT:SLAVERY PROJ,S-ASI (MR)
0174.70	RAS	94	10 LO; TRADE UNIONS RIGHTS
0177.11	RAS	94	29 GLAD; PRP UN WOM CONF ASIAN & PACIF CONF
0191.75	RAS	94	730 QUAKER SERV N; LEGAL ASSISTANCE
0191.75	RAS	95	350 INST KURDE DE PARIS;ESTABL HR DIVISION
0191.75	RAS	95	205 D N HELSINGFORSKOMITE;CONF CAUCAS CONFLI
0191.75	RAS	95	100 HAMOKED;FREEDOM MOVEMT RESIDENCY &FAMILY
0191.75	RAS	95	200 ANTISLAVERISELSKAPET;GENERAL SUPPORT
0191.75	RAS	95	500 INST MENNESKERETT;SEMIN KURD HR SITUAT
0191.75	RAS	95	300 MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP;INDIG PEOPL RIGHTS
0191.75	RAS	95	100 ANTI SLAVERY INT;COMBATING CHILD LABOUR
0174.70	RAS	95	114 LO;TRADE UNION RIGHTS,ICFTU

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
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ASIA UNSPECIFIED

0174.70	RAS	95	85	K NOEDHJELP;CHURCHES & WOM CTR INDO-CHIN
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Sum Human Rights Asia Unspecified			11 733
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RWANDA

Peace efforts

0191.75	RWA	94	200	P STROEMMES MST; PEACE & RECONCIL CAMP
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Sum Peace efforts Rwanda			200
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Human Rights

0155.70	RWA	93	74	P STRØMMES MST;STRENGHTEN. WOMEN-GROUPES
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0191.75	RWA	94	700	UN CENTER HR; HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS
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0191.75	RWA	95	1 312	INST MENNESKERETT;HR FIELD OPERATION RWA
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0174.70	RWA	95	502	P STROEMMES MST;WOMENS ASSOCIATIONS
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Sum Human Rights Rwanda			2 788
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SOUTH OF SAHARA UNALL.

Democracy

0192.70	SAF	95	300	NORAD RR ZAM;PARLIAM SEMINAR STHRN-AFRIC
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0150.82	SAF	95	1 200	REG-096 SADC PARLIAMENTARY COOP PROGRAM
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Sum Democracy South Of Sahara			1 500
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Peace efforts

0150.82	SAF	95	1 094	REG-101 TRAINING FOR PEACE SADC
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Sum Peace efforts South Of Sahara			2 594
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Human Rights

0150.83	SAF	93	40	CMI;SEM ON SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFR (MR)
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0173.72	SAF	94	77	RAF-331 N KIRKELIGE RAAD; WOM CONF SADC
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Sum Human Rights South Of Sahara			2 711
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SUDAN

Democracy

0191.76	SDN	93	202	UNDP:HUM.AID,SATELITE COMM. EQUIPM,SUDAN
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Sum Democracy Sudan			202
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Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Peace efforts			
0191.75	SDN	90	321 FAFOND,POSSIBILITY STUDY ON PEACE IN SDN
0191.75	SDN	94	33 SDN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.75	SDN	94	750 K NOEDHJELP; PEACE & RECONSILITATION
0191.75	SDN	94	1 238 SDN; PEACE EFFORTS
0191.75	SDN	95	900 K NOEDHJELP;WORK PEACE & RECONCILIATION
0191.75	SDN	95	92 CMI;FOREIGN DEP SEMINAR OSLO
Sum Peace efforts Sudan			3 536
Human Rights			
0155.70	SDN	90	280 K NØDHJELP, IAC CIRCUMCISION OF WOMEN
0191.75	SDN	93	61 SØREBØE; TRAVEL, MEETINGS ON SDN (MR)
0174.70	SDN	95	127 K NOEDHJELP; ROUND TABLE COUNSEL & HR
Sum Human Rights Sudan			4 004
EL SALVADOR			
Democracy			
0152.71	SLV	93	1 485 CAM-028 IEJES, ELEC PREPARATIONS (MR)
0192.70	SLV	93	24 ONUSAL:TECN EQUIPM, POLICE ACADEMY (MR)
0192.70	SLV	93	1 332 UNDP:NATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY, SLV (MR)
0192.70	SLV	93	1 714 UNDP: DEMOCRATIC ORG.S IN SLV (MR)
0192.70	SLV	93	8 EMB.S JOSE:POLICE ACADEMY,OVERHEAD (MR)
0192.70	SLV	93	996 N FOLKEHJELP: YOUTH PARTICIP ELEC (MR)
0192.70	SLV	93	831 JUSTISDEP:NOR TEACHERS POLICE ACAD (MR)
0152.71	SLV	93	3 000 UNICEF;SUPP FOR NATIONAL RECONSTRUC (MR)
0152.71	SLV	94	765 CAM-028 ELECTION PREP EL SALVADOR
0192.70	SLV	94	1 860 N CONFED TRADE UNIONS; DEMOCRACY EDUC
0192.70	SLV	94	450 N FOLKEHJELP; EDUC ELECTORIAL OFFICERS
0192.70	SLV	94	250 K NOEDHJELP; ELECTION OBSERVATION PROJ
0192.70	SLV	94	129 N FOLKEHJELP; ELECTION OBSERVATION TEAM
0192.70	SLV	94	28 INST FOR MR; ELECTION OBSERVERS
0191.74	SLV	94	288 K NOEDHJELP; INFO ON DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
0192.70	SLV	94	70 N FOLKEHJELP; 1ST AID MEASURES ELECTION
0191.74	SLV	94	548 UNDP; RECRUITMENT POLICE ACADEMY
0152.71	SLV	95	640 SLV-004 FESPAD; STRENGTH RULE OF LAW
0191.74	SLV	95	350 D N FLYKTINGERAAD;DOCUM LEGALIZ PROPERT
0191.74	SLV	95	82 ASPAD;COURSES,FMLN MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
0192.70	SLV	95	311 UNDP;RECRUITING CAMPAIGN POLICE ACADEMY
0174.70	SLV	95	590 N FOLKEHJELP;INST STRENGTHN CIV SOCIETY
Sum Democracy El Salvador			15 751
Peace efforts			
0191.74	SLV	90	2 898 N.FOLKEHJELP.REPATRIATION
0191.74	SLV	90	1 800 K.NØDHJELP,REPATRIATION

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
EL SALVADOR			
0191.74	SLV	93	8 FENASTRAS: MISC PROJ PEACE PROSSESS (MR)
0192.70	SLV	93	733 UNDP:AGRI EDUC EX-SOLDIERS, SLV (MR)
0192.70	SLV	94	921 JUSTISDEP; PEACE KEEPING ONUSAL
0152.71	SLV	95	3 544 SLV-001 UNDP; PEACE PROCESS (INST BUILD)
Sum Peace efforts El Salvador			25 655

Human Rights

0191.74	SLV	90	271 N.FOLKEHJHELP; H.RIGHTS WORK (MR)
0191.74	SLV	93	329 D N FLYKTNINGERÅD:DOCUMENT. & LEGALISAT.
0155.70	SLV	93	790 N FOLKEHJELP;COMM & STRENGT.CIV.SOC (MR)
0152.71	SLV	93	450 CENTR. HUM. RIGHTS STUD.; CONTR (MR)
0152.71	SLV	94	980 SLV-001 UNDP; SUPPORT HR COMMISSIONER
0174.70	SLV	94	390 D N FLYKTNINGERAAD; FASSTRAS HR REFUGEES
0192.70	SLV	94	754 UN OBS SLV; INVESTING COMM DEATH SQUAD
0174.70	SLV	95	321 AP KVINNE BEVEG;HUMAN RIGHTS-COMADRES
Sum Human Rights El Salvador			29 940

SOMALIA

Democracy

0191.76	SOM	93	6 643 UNOSOM:ESTABLISHM NAT CIVIL POLICE
Sum Democracy Somalia			6 643

Peace efforts

0191.76	SOM	93	1 500 LIFE & PEACE INST:DISTR/REG.COUNCIL (MR)
0191.75	SOM	95	474 NUPI;UN SEMINAR "LESSONS LEARNED"
Sum Peace efforts Somalia			8 617

SWAZILAND

Human Rights

0167.70	SWA	90	173 NORAD SCOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
Sum Human Rights Swaziland			173

TANZANIA

Democracy

0150.83	TAN	93	73 TAN-094 DEMOCRATIZATION ACTIVITIES (MR)
0154.72	TAN	93	57 TAN-065 RR:PURCH. JOURNALISM TEXTBOOKS
0150.71	TAN	94	10 807 TAN-026 POLITICAL REFORM PROGRAMME
0150.83	TAN	94	426 TAN-094 UPGRADING OF PARLIAMENT LIBRARY

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
TANZANIA			
0173.72	TAN	94	51 TAN-065 RR:JOURNALISM TEXTBOOK PURCHASIG
0150.83	TAN	94	1 071 TAN-094 MIN JUSTICE; LEGAL SECT REFORM
0150.71	TAN	95	7 216 TAN-026 POLITICAL REFORM PROGRAMME
0150.71	TAN	95	279 TAN-095 CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
0150.83	TAN	95	7 788 TAN-094 DEMOCRATIZATION ACTIVITIES
0174.70	TAN	95	61 TAN-076 RR:MEDIA TRUST;WSHOP ON ELECTION
0192.70	TAN	95	64 UNREPR NAT & PEOPLES;ELECT SURVEIL ZANZI
0192.70	TAN	95	264 INST MENNESKERETT;8 ELECTION OBSERVERS
0192.70	TAN	95	79 INST MENNESKERETT;ELECT REPORT & DEMOCRA
0150.71	TAN	95	2 407 TAN-026 UNDP; INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS
Sum Democracy Tanzania			30 643
Human Rights			
0167.70	TAN	90	166 NORAD SCHOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
0154.71	TAN	90	14 TAN063 RES REP; SEMINAR WOMAN/LAW/DEV.
0154.71	TAN	90	45 TAN063 RR; SUWATA-LEGAL CAMPAIGN,IRINGA
0152.74	TAN	90	17 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
0154.71	TAN	93	8 TAN-063 RR:TANGO, INTERN. WOMAN-DAY
0155.70	TAN	93	684 LO;WOMENS PROGRAM
0173.71	TAN	94	10 TAN-063 RR: SUWATA LEGAL AID SCHEME
0173.71	TAN	94	17 TAN-063 RR: UWT LEGAL AID SCHEME TANGA
0174.70	TAN	94	429 RR: TANGO; WOMENS CONFERENCE BEIJING
0174.70	TAN	94	96 RR:KUELENA;CHILDRENS RIGHTS
0174.70	TAN	94	54 RR:TADREG;SUPP. TO HUMAN RIGHTS-SEMINAR
0174.70	TAN	94	760 LO; TRADE UNION EDUCATION OF WOMEN
0173.71	TAN	95	79 TAN-063 RR:TANGO; WOMEN CONF BEIJING
0173.71	TAN	95	163 TAN-063 RR:SUWATA LEGAL AID SCHEME
0173.71	TAN	95	14 TAN-063 RR:UWT TANGA; LEGAL AID SCHEME
0174.70	TAN	95	23 TAN-076 RR:KULENA;CHILDRENS RIGHTS
Sum Human Rights Tanzania			33 222
THAILAND			
Human Rights			
0174.70	THA	94	323 REDD BARNNA; CENTRE CONCERNS CHILD LABOUR
0174.70	THA	95	192 N KVINN JUR F;STUDY CENTRE FOR WOMEN
0174.70	THA	95	227 REDD BARNNA;CHILD WELFARE LAWS
Sum Human Rights Thailand			742
UGANDA			
Democracy			
0150.83	UGA	93	5 000 UGA-090 UNDP, SUPP.TO ELECT PROCESS (MR)
0192.70	UGA	93	1 085 D N ADV FORENING:COOP "UGA LAW SOC" (MR)

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
UGANDA			
0150.83	UGA	94	19 AKABWAI; OBSERVER OF ELECTIONS IN N
0150.83	UGA	94	13 000 UGA-090 IDA; CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
0192.70	UGA	94	212 INST FOR MR; ELECTION OBSERVERS
0192.70	UGA	95	950 D N ADVOKATFOR;LEGAL AID
0192.70	UGA	95	65 D N ADVOKATFOR;ADMIN EXPENSES
0192.70	UGA	95	250 D N ADVOKATFOR;STUDIES UGAND LAW SOCIETY
0174.70	UGA	95	61 N JOUR LAG;PILOT STUDY-AID UGA MEDIA WOM
0150.83	UGA	95	5 700 UGA-090 UNDP;PARLIAMTR & PRESID ELECTION
Sum Democracy Uganda			26 342

Human Rights

0167.70	UGA	90	345 NORAD SCOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
0192.70	UGA	94	1 095 D N ADVOKATFOR; ADM SUPPORT COSTS
0174.70	UGA	95	822 REDD BARNA;CHILDR RIGHTS ADVOCACY
Sum Human Rights Uganda			28 604

YUGOSLAVIA -EX

Democracy

0191.75	YUG	93	3 PEN-KLUBBEN; CONGRESS IN DUBROVNIK (MR)
0191.75	YUG	94	150 UNESCO N; FREE PRESS PROJ FRY
0191.75	YUG	94	839 EUROPARAADET; CENSUS IN MAK
0192.70	YUG	95	336 N FOLKEHJELP;INDEPENDENT INFO NETWORK
0192.70	YUG	95	173 N FOLKEHJELP;EDUCAT KOSOVO JOURNALISTS
0192.70	YUG	95	231 N FOLKEHJELP;DEMOCR - PRINTING EQUIPM
0191.75	YUG	95	628 UNESCO;SUPPORT, INDEPENDENT TV STATIONS
0191.75	YUG	95	144 D N LAEGEFOR;SYMPOSIUM ON WAR CRIMES
Sum Democracy Yugoslavia -ex			2 504

Peace efforts

0191.75	YUG	93	8 STOLTENBERG:PEACE NEGOTIATIONS,MISC (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	473 PEACE NEGOTIATIONS EX.YUGOSLAVIA (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	66 KAI EIDE,STOLTENBERG PEACE NEGOTIAT (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	43 STOLTENBERG,PEACE NEGOTIATIONS,MISC (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	5 JANSSONS PERSONTRANSP:BHZ PRESIDENT (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	99 UN: INT CONF ON EX YUGOSLAVIA,YUG
0191.75	YUG	93	80 UN:INTERN. CONF. EX-YUGOSLAVIA
0191.75	YUG	94	3 YUG PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.75	YUG	94	84 YUG; PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.75	YUG	94	300 N FOLKEHJELP; PEACE MEETING YOUNG CHILD
0191.75	YUG	94	702 X-YUG; PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.75	YUG	94	80 NARVIK "PEACEWEEK"; YOUTH CONFERENCE BHZ
0191.75	YUG	94	15 MR M MATHISEN; PEACE MONUM.SARAJEVO BHZ
0191.75	YUG	94	83 INT PHYSIC PREV NUCLEAR WAR; PEACE WORK

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
YUGOSLAVIA -EX			
0191.75	YUG	94	175 N FOLKEHJELP; PEACE MEETING (CHILD)
0191.77	YUG	95	1 278 UN ICFY;STOLTENBERG PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
0191.77	YUG	95	50 KVINNER VISER VEI;SEMINAR WOMEN & PEACE
0191.77	YUG	95	105 UN ICFY;PEACE CONFERENCE
0191.77	YUG	95	127 UN ICFY;OBSERVERS 0104-3009 95
0191.77	YUG	95	200 N FOLKEHJELP;SECURITY ADVISER
0191.77	YUG	95	100 FAFO;UN COMMANDERS WORKSHOP
0191.77	YUG	95	50 UITØ;PEACE CONFERENCE
0191.77	YUG	95	200 N FOLKEHJELP;PEACE & RECONCIL MEETING
0191.77	YUG	95	170 VOICE OF CHILDREN;PEACE&RECONC SRB REGIO
0191.75	YUG	95	4 MISC RECIP;STOLTENBERGS PEACE MISSION
0191.75	YUG	95	100 INST MENNESKERETT;CONF-BOSNIA PEACE (BHZ
0191.75	YUG	95	60 NANSENSKOLEN;CONF BOSN-SEARCH SOLUT (BHZ
0191.75	YUG	95	100 FAFO: UN COMMANDER WORKSHOP
Sum Peace efforts Yugoslavia -ex			7 264

Human Rights

0191.75	YUG	93	282 D N FLYKTINGERÅD: REG PRISONERS (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	158 INST MENNESKERETTIGH: HR PROJECT (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	260 INST FOR MR: PROJECT "JUGOKRIM" (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	15 INST MENNESKERETTIGH:TRANSLATION (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	67 DANSKE CENTER MENNESKERETTIGH:SEM (MR)
0191.75	YUG	93	23 ROMERIKE KRISESENTER:EXP MEETING (MR)
0191.75	YUG	94	350 D N HELSINGF KOM ; HR PROJECT IN BALKAN
0191.75	YUG	94	100 INT FED HR; LEGAL COOP & DIALOGUE
0191.75	YUG	94	1 500 INST FOR MR; INT WAR TRIBUNAL FRY
0191.75	YUG	95	15 KVINNER VISER VEI;SEMINAR-TRAVEL SUPPORT
0191.75	YUG	95	439 INST MENNESKERETT;PROJECT INVESTIGATORS
0191.75	YUG	95	76 D N HELSINGFORSKOMITE;FACT FINDING MISSI
Sum Human Rights Yugoslavia -ex			10 549

ZAMBIA

Democracy

0174.70	ZAM	94	12 RR:ZIMT; WORKSHOP ELECTION
0174.70	ZAM	94	90 RR:ZIMT;BY-ELECT. (EASTERN)
0174.70	ZAM	94	356 RR:INST OF LAW ;LEGAL CLINIC
0174.70	ZAM	94	2 RR: ZIMT; SEMINAR DEMOCRACY
0174.70	ZAM	94	49 RR:ZIMT;BY-ELECTS.CHIKANKATA
0174.70	ZAM	94	66 RR:NWLG;CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
0174.70	ZAM	95	65 ZAM-047 RR:SCM;INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
Sum Democracy Zambia			640

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
<i>Human Rights</i>			
0167.70	ZAM	90	173 NORAD SCOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
0154.71	ZAM	90	41 ZAM031 RR; WOMEN'S RIGHT COMM.
0154.71	ZAM	90	59 ZAM031 RR; WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT, C.C.M.
0154.71	ZAM	90	58 ZAM031 RR;WOMEN LAW/DEVELOPMENT,WORKSHOP
0154.71	ZAM	90	15 ZAM031 RES REP; WOMEN'S GROUP ZAMBEZI
0152.74	ZAM	90	16 MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
0154.71	ZAM	93	97 ZAM-031 RR: HUM RIGHTS CONF VIENNA (MR)
0173.71	ZAM	94	150 ZAM-031 RR: WOMEN FOR CHANGE INST SUPPOR
0173.71	ZAM	94	99 ZAM-031 RR: NGO-WID REPORT BEIJING
0173.71	ZAM	94	107 ZAM-031 RR: GENDER BIAS IN COURTS
0173.71	ZAM	94	225 ZAM-031 RR: TRUST FUND BEIJING
0173.71	ZAM	94	83 ZAM-031 RR: WILDAF, MEDIA EDUC WOM RIGHT
0174.70	ZAM	94	5 RR:PRINTING OF NGO DIRECTORY INDIG
0174.70	ZAM	94	246 LO; TRADE UNION EDUCATION OF WOMEN
0191.75	ZAM	94	19 INST FOR MR; EDUC HUMAN RIGHTS UNIV ZAM
0174.70	ZAM	94	680 N FORB PSYK UTVH;ADVOCACY DISABILITY ORG
0173.71	ZAM	94	135 ZAM-031 RR: PROGR OF ACTION WIDOWS
0174.70	ZAM	94	18 RR:AFR.RELIEF FOUND;TRAINING NEEDS
0174.70	ZAM	94	9 RR:ZCH;WORKSHOP
0174.70	ZAM	94	119 RR:CENTER FOR DEV.INFO;BUDGET 1994
0174.70	ZAM	94	198 RR:ZAM CIVIC EDUC ASS;INSTITUT SUPP
0174.70	ZAM	94	507 RR:AFR.RELIEF FOUND.;TRAINING OF NGO'S
0174.70	ZAM	94	8 RR:RAINBOW MONITORS;SEMINAR
0174.70	ZAM	94	5 RR: NWLG; ACC TRAINING
0174.70	ZAM	94	92 RR: NWLG; INSTITUTIONAL SUPP
0177.45	ZAM	94	46 PROJECT EXPERTS; MISC EQUIPMENT
0173.71	ZAM	95	200 ZAM-031 RR:WOMEN FOR CHANGE; INST BUILD
0173.71	ZAM	95	250 ZAM-031 RR:NAT COM; PREP FOR BEIJING
0173.71	ZAM	95	11 ZAM-031 RR:NAT COM; PREP FOR BEIJING
0173.71	ZAM	95	93 ZAM-031 RR:CAUC W COUNC; GENDER WORKSHOP
0174.70	ZAM	95	28 ZAM-047 RR:BBZ;CHILDREN RIGHTS SEMINAR
0174.70	ZAM	95	335 K NOEDHJELP;CCZ-EDUCATION,HR & WOMEN
0153.99	ZAM	95	490 NORAD VOLUNTEERS
0174.70	ZAM	95	697 N FORB PSYK UTVH;ADVOCACY DISABILITY ORG
0174.70	ZAM	95	4 ZAM-047 RR:ALL NGOS;PRINTIN OF DIRECTORY
0174.70	ZAM	95	200 ZAM-047 RR:AFRONET;INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
0174.70	ZAM	95	15 ZAM-047 RR:CDI;INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
0174.70	ZAM	95	322 ZAM-047 RR:ZCEA;INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
0174.70	ZAM	95	1 008 ZAM-047 RR:ARF;TRAINING PROGRAMME
0174.70	ZAM	95	37 ZAM-047 RR:GGAZ;INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT
0174.70	ZAM	95	24 ZAM-047 RR:ARF;INTERNAL EVALUATION
0174.70	ZAM	95	1 ZAM-047 RR:ZIMT; WORKSHOP
0174.70	ZAM	95	250 ZAM-047 RR:NGOTSU;TRAINING PROGRAMME
0174.70	ZAM	95	48 ZAM-047 RR:YMCA;ZONAL MEETING
0174.70	ZAM	95	70 ZAM-047 RR:SCM;EXCHANGE PROGRAMME
0174.70	ZAM	95	28 ZAM-047 RR:BBZ;CHILDREN RIGHTS SEMINAR
0174.70	ZAM	95	45 ZAM-047 RR:CSA;WORKSHOP
0174.70	ZAM	95	667 ZAM-047 RR:LEGAL CLINIC;INSTITUT SUPPORT
0174.70	ZAM	95	62 ZAM-047 RR:NWLG;INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

Activities regarding Democracy, Human Rights and Peace efforts

Bdg.chapter	Year	Amount	Description
Sum Human Rights Zambia		8 735	

ZAIRE

Democracy

0191.75	ZAR	94	50	PENTECOSTAL FOREIGN MISSION; DEMOC TRAIN
Sum Democracy Zaire			50	

Human Rights

0191.75	ZAR	95	1 268	UN CENTRE HR;UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Sum Human Rights Zaire			1 318	

ZIMBABWE

Democracy

0174.70	ZIB	94	170	K NOEDHJELP; MEDIA INFORMATION
0174.70	ZIB	95	165	ZIB-018 RR:STREETS AHEAD;INSTIT SUPPORT
Sum Democracy Zimbabwe			335	

Human Rights

0167.70	ZIB	90	693	NORAD SCHOLARSHIPS WOMENS LAW
0154.71	ZIB	90	46	ZIB010 RES REP; CONF. WOMEN AND LAW
0152.74	ZIB	90	16	MELLOMKIRKELIG RÅD, CHURCH CONF (MR)
0150.75	ZIB	93	1 187	ZIB-0027 WOMEN AND LAW
0154.71	ZIB	93	25	ZIB-010 RR:NANGO BEIJING PREPARATIONS
0155.70	ZIB	93	293	LO;TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR WOMEN
0150.83	ZIB	93	52	ZIB GOV;WORLD ORDER MODEL PROJ.CONF (MR)
0150.75	ZIB	94	2 625	ZIB-027 WOMEN AND LAW
0173.71	ZIB	94	179	ZIB-010 RR:NANGO;PREP BEIJING CONF
0174.70	ZIB	94	68	K NOEDHJELP; BUILD OF WOM CRISES CENTER
0177.11	ZIB	94	11	ZIB-300 RR: WOMEN & LAW PROJECT CONSULT
0150.75	ZIB	95	1 000	ZIB-027 WOMEN AND LAW
0173.71	ZIB	95	49	ZIB-010 RR:ZWR CN; BEIJING PREPS
0173.71	ZIB	95	79	ZIB-010 RR:INTER PRESS SERV;BEIJING CONF
0173.71	ZIB	95	140	ZIB-010 RR:WLSA; BEIJING CONFERENCE
0173.71	ZIB	95	35	ZIB-010 RR:MAC; BEIJING CONFERENCE
0173.71	ZIB	95	95	ZIB-010 RR:ZWR CN; REG WORKSHOP-BEIJING
0174.70	ZIB	95	188	ZIB-018 RR:WAG;WOMENS ACTION GROUP SUPPT
0174.70	ZIB	95	461	N FOLKEHJELP;ZIMRIGHTS - HR PROJECT
0150.82	ZIB	95	124	REG-098 CHILDREN & LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRIC
0174.70	ZIB	95	170	K NOEDHJELP;DOCUMENTAT & INFORMAT CENTRE
Sum Human Rights Zimbabwe			7 871	

Appendix 2

Terms of reference

Study of positive measures for promotion of human rights in Norway's programme countries

1. Introduction

Norway was among the first donors to link human rights to development assistance; this linkage was made already in 1976 (White Paper no. 93 1976-77). But it was not until 1986 that promotion of human rights, particularly political and civil rights, was made an explicit goal in aid policy. Subsequent White Papers have expanded the field to include democracy, rule of law and good governance as well, collectively referred to as political conditionality. White Paper no. 36 (1984-85) (also restated in more recent policy documents) opened up for use of negative conditionality. It was stated that withdrawal or reduction of aid would be justified if violations of human rights were grave, persistent and systematic. Norwegian authorities have reiterated, however, that the main emphasis be placed on positive measures. Nonetheless, public opinion often raises demands for sanctions and aid cut-backs, which would serve to create a clearer impression of assertiveness.

Both the Commission on development assistance (cf. NOU 1995:5) and White Paper no. 19 (1995-96) put emphasis on protection of human rights and democratisation as critical elements in a sustainable development for the countries of the South. The need for better integration of measures towards democratisation and human rights promotion into general aid policies, as well as North-South policies more broadly, was especially underscored. The Commission on development assistance suggested that more attention be given to these issues.

2. Objectives

The main purpose of this study is to undertake an analytical review of the availability of 'positive measures' for promotion of human rights while using aid as an instrument. Emphasis shall be placed on political and civil rights. The study shall also examine which of the available instruments have been used, and what lessons have been learned so far. As a basis for the discussion an overview shall be made initially of on-going and recently concluded measures financed by the aid authorities.

3. Tasks

The study shall comprise five main components:

1. The consultant shall provide a comprehensive overview of aid-financed measures in the field of human rights, including information appertaining to budget line, volume, recipient country and institution, type of measure/instrument, type of recipient (mass media, NGOs, private sector, vulnerable groups, public authorities etc.) and their current status. Apart from such an overview the consultant shall select a few examples of measures with a view to making a closer examination regarding processing and reporting.
2. The consultant shall review the literature on political conditionality and positive measures in order to arrive at an inventory of which measures are available and how they work. The main emphasis shall be put on observance of human rights. The consultant shall also investigate how political conditionality has been operationalised, and consider the implications of such a policy.
3. Furthermore, the consultant shall discuss how positive conditionality and positive measures are perceived and used by important Western donors, including the so-called like-minded countries, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands and Canada. It may also be useful to draw on the experiences of Australia, which has attached great to the use of political conditionality, particularly vis-à-vis Indonesia and China.
4. The consultant shall discuss how positive conditionality and positive measures have been perceived and used by Norway.
5. The consultant shall undertake an analysis of collected material with a view to producing and 'inventory' of measures/instruments, and consider the contexts in which they have been applied.

An overview study of this nature cannot be expected to detail concrete examples/cases. Hence, it may be fruitful to go into more depth with regard to two or three cases in a follow-up phase. An empirical case could be a particular donor, a recipient country, or a special study of a specific type of measure/instrument, or an historical event. A proposal for a follow-up phase, e.g. one or more case studies, shall be made in the course of phase I in consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. Time frame

The assignment shall be completed within a time frame of six person-months, i.e. 900 working hours.

EVALUATION REPORTS

- 1.87 The Water Supply Programme in Western Province, Zambia
2.87 Sosio-kulturelle forhold i bistanden
3.87 Summary Findings of 23 Evaluation Reports
4.87 NORAD's Provisions for Investment Support
5.87 Multilateral bistand gjennom FN-systemet
6.87 Promoting Imports from Developing Countries
- 1.88 UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women
2.88 The Norwegian Multi-Bilateral Programme under UNFPA
3.88 Rural Roads Maintenance, Mbeya and Tanga Regions, Tanzania
4.88 Import Support, Tanzania
5.88 Nordic Technical Assistance Personnel to Eastern Africa
6.88 Good Aid for Women?
7.88 Soil Science Fellowship Course in Norway
- 1.89 Parallel Financing and Mixed Credits
2.89 The Women's Grant, Desk Study Review
3.89 The Norwegian Volunteer Service
4.89 Fisheries Research Vessel - "Dr. Fridtjof Nansen"
5.89 Institute of Development Management, Tanzania
6.89 DUHs forskningsprogrammer
7.89 Rural Water Supply, Zimbabwe
8.89 Commodity Import Programme, Zimbabwe
9.89 Dairy Sector Support, Zimbabwe
- 1.90 Mini-Hydropower Plants, Lesotho
2.90 Operation and Maintenance in Development Assistance
3.90 Telecommunications in SADCC Countries
4.90 Energy support in SADCC Countries
5.90 International Research and Training Institute for Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)
6.90 Socio-cultural Conditions in Development Assistance
7.90 Non-Project Financial Assistance to Mozambique
- 1.91 Hjelp til selvhjelp og levedyktig utvikling
2.91 Diploma Courses at the Norwegian Institute of Technology
3.91 The Women's Grant in Bilateral Assistance
4.91 Hambantota Integrated Rural Development Programme, Sri Lanka
5.91 The Special Grant for Environment and Development
- 1.92 NGOs as partners in health care, Zambia
2.92 The Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia Programme
3.92 De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand, Fase I
- 1.93 Internal learning from evaluation and reviews
2.93 Macroeconomic impacts of import support to Tanzania
3.93 Garantiordning for investeringer i og eksport til utviklingsland
4.93 Capacity-Building in Development Cooperation Towards integration and recipient responsibility
- 1.94 Evaluation of World Food Programme
2.94 Evaluation of the Norwegian Junior Expert Programme with UN Organisations
- 1.95 Technical Cooperation in Transition
2.95 Evaluering av FN-sambandet i Norge
3.95 NGOs as a channel in development aid
3A.95 Rapport fra presentasjonsmøte av "Evalueringen av de frivillige organisasjoner"
4.95 Rural Development and Local Government in Tanzania
5.95 Integration of Environmental Concerns into Norwegian Bilateral Development Assistance: Policies and Performance
- 1.96 NORAD's Support of the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) in Botswana
2.96 Norwegian Development Aid Experiences. A Review of Evaluation Studies 1986-92
3.96 The Norwegian People's Aid Mine Clearance Project in Cambodia
4.96 Democratic Global Civil Governance Report of the 1995 Benchmark Survey of NGOs
5.96 Evaluation of the Yearbook Human Rights in Developing Countries
- 1.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS
2.97 «Kultursjokk og korrektiv» – Evaluering av UD/NORADs studiereiser for lærere
3.97 Evaluation of decentralisation and development
4.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique
5.97 Aid to Basic Education in Africa – Opportunities and Constraints
6.97 Norwegian Church Aid's Humanitarian and Peace-making Work in Mali
7.97 Aid as a tool for promotion of human rights and democracy: What can Norway do?

