NORAD

Evaluation Report 8.98

Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples

The North-South Institute

Information from the
Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry's Information Section provides information with regard to current foreign policy, trade policy and development cooperation policy. Informative material can be ordered from
fax no. +47 22 24 27 87

Foreign Ministry switchboard,
Tel. +47 22 24 36 00
Fax +47 22 24 95 80 or +47 22 24 95 81

Information is available on Internet at
http://odin.dep.no/ud

Office address: 7. juni plassen, Oslo
Mailing address: P.O. Box 8114 DEP,
N-0032 OSLO, Norway

Information to the media:
The Ministry's Press Spokesman and the Senior Information Officer on development cooperation can be contacted through the Foreign Ministry switchboard

Foreign journalists:
The Norway International Press Centre, NIPS, is the Foreign Ministry's service centre for foreign journalists in Norway, tel. +47 22 83 83 10

In countries outside of Norway, information on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be obtained from Norwegian embassies or consulates

Published by: The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
september 1998
Print: GCSM AS, Oslo
Circulation: 1000
E-587 E
ISBN 82-7177-525-1

Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples

The North-South Institute
July 1998

Jean Daudelin, Alison Van Rooy and Gail Whiteman, Coordinators
Iara Ferraz, Peter Poole, Daniel Rothenberg,
Steve Schwartzman and Erik Whist, Researchers
José Barreiro and Gilio Brunelli, Advisors

«Do the Norwegian people know
the good work we are doing
with their money?»

Table of Contents

1. Executive Summary

1.1 MAIN MESSAGE

We found that the work of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples (Npip), a Norad program run by the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science (Fafo), has been an important support to the work of indigenous and pro-indigenous organizations in Latin America. We visited all but three partners of the program in Brazil, Guatemala, and Peru, and discussed their assessments of the relevance and effectiveness of the program in meeting their needs. With some room for improvement, the overall message was that the program was responsive, dependable, and in some cases crucial for the advancement of indigenous peoples' agendas in the region.

We also reviewed the policy and administrative environment of the program in Norway, including the relationship between Npip, Norad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other organizations in Norway, including the Saami, involved in working with indigenous peoples abroad. Our finding here is that the government has not been adequately supportive of the mandate of the program or of its administration by Fafo. Wrangling over contracts and the scope of the program has, over the long term, meant that the program has been strategically orphaned by *both* Norad and Fafo. While day to day administration is competent, the success of the program relies most heavily on the work of the program's staff and, on occasion, its Advisory Council.

Our recommendations, therefore, fall into three groups. At the system level, we propose a series of policy decisions and institutions that will improve the strategic coherence of *all* the work that Norway already accomplishes in support of indigenous peoples. At the level of the program's organizational home, we recommend ways in which the program can be brought under the umbrella of a firmer political commitment and strategic direction, both by the program executing agency and Norad, particularly in the re-positioning of the program's Advisory Council into an Advisory Board. At the program level, we make further suggestions for improving operations in the field, and more substantively, expanding the communications work of the program in Norway.

1.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM

The Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples (Npip) is a program of the governmental Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) since 1983 (and in a different form, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1980). Since 1991, the program has been administered by an outside agency, the Institute for Applied Social Sciences (Fafo), and from there continues to offer financial support to indigenous and pro-indigenous organizations in five Latin American countries: Chile, Peru, Guatemala, Brazil and Paraguay.

The mandate of the program is «to strengthen the capacity and ability of indigenous peoples to shape and control their own development given the present context of socio-economic change.» Toward that end, financial and technical support is offered for projects in the areas of rights and health, culture and education, and institution building and networking. In 1998, the budget is NOK 20 million for 40 projects in the five countries, administered by two professional staff members, supported by management and accounting services at Fafo.

Over the course of the program's history, either within Norad or Fafo, there has never been an evaluation of its success in meeting its mandate (although individual projects have been evaluated). As the contract with Fafo comes up for renewal in 1998, this evaluation has been commissioned.

1.3 TERMS OF REFERENCE AND METHODS

This evaluation focuses on the management of the program since Fafo took over its stewardship. However, support to indigenous peoples' efforts exists in many parts of the government (primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, its aid wing, and indirectly through support to the work of Norwegian NGOs also working in the field), and questions have been raised about coordination, relevance, and strategy throughout, not simply within Fafo's administration of Npip. The evaluation has therefore been designed to encompass a range of questions that will help the Norwegian government to move forward.

Key among the central questions posed in the initial Terms of Reference tendered by the Ministry are:

1. How *relevant* is Npip (and Norway's overall support) to the needs articulated by indigenous peoples in Latin America? To Norway's own policies?
2. How *effective* is current Npip (and other Norwegian) programming in terms of policy (overall direction), strategy (implementation plans), and management (administration)?
3. What *future* directions should be recommended, again in terms of policy, strategy, and management of Npip? Of other programs? Should Norway continue on its current course?

At the very centre of the overall evaluation, therefore, is Fafo's management of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples, both in Norway and in Latin America. However, while the evaluation has undertaken primary research to assess the work of Npip, it has *not* undertaken an in-depth evaluation of the success of individual projects or organizations supported by the program. In this report, we limit our attention to the *system, organizational home,* and *program* levels, and so steer clear of *project* level assessments.

The implementation of the evaluation involved seven basic steps:

1. A team of ten professionals (anthropologists, political scientists and organizational specialists) was constituted to undertake the research and to advise on the methodology and findings.
2. Five background papers were commissioned to provide the team with a shared basis of information on the key issues of the evaluation (these have become part of the report and its appendices).
3. The whole team, including the advisors, met in Ottawa for a closed five-day session in January 1998. The main objective of the meeting was to develop a shared basic understanding of the situation of indigenous peoples in Latin America and a common methodology for data collection.
4. Fieldwork in Latin America then took place over a period of a month in January and February 1998, building on previous fieldwork in Norway and the United States.
5. The complete team was brought back to Ottawa for a week-long closed meeting to share, gauge and consolidate the data collected.
6. Subsequent visits to Washington's multilateral agencies were made, and after the second team workshop, trips to Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands were also made in March 1998 to get more information on apparent alternatives to Norway's program.
7. The report's conclusions were discussed at a roundtable meeting in Oslo in March 1998, and a drafted report was circulated to a reference group of stakeholders in Norway (including an academic specialist in Latin America, a representative from the Saami academic community, and members from Fafo, Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). A second roundtable in April 1998 reviewed the written draft and discussed its findings. This final report incorporates agreed changes discussed at that meeting.

1.4 MAIN FINDINGS

Our report has outlined a range of strengths and weaknesses in the program and system in which Npip works, and has highlighted alternatives in use by other organizations. In this final chapter and summarized here, those assessments are boiled into a list of priority findings and key recommendations.

The Norwegian Strategy

The main message is that Norway's official work for, and with, indigenous peoples has demonstrated a remarkable empathy for indigenous peoples, with a degree of sensitivity closer to that of progressive NGOs than to most multilateral and bilateral agencies. However, the absence of a strategy throughout this array of Norwegian activity – including Npip but encompassing other government and non-governmental programs – robs Norway of improved coherence, effectiveness and visibility.

1. **Strength:** *Progressive and Important Work.* Norway already supports a wide range of activities through multilateral, bilateral, NGO, and Npip channels. These activities, progressive in their approach, have earned Norway a positive reputation in the countries where the work takes place.
   a) **Recommendation:** *Continue Work with Indigenous Peoples.*

2. **Problem:** *Poor Coordination.* Norway already supports a wide range of activities through multilateral, bilateral, NGO, and Npip channels. These activities have earned Norway a positive reputation in the countries where the work takes place. However, these activities are not framed within a coordinated,

unified outlook nor are they the topic of systematic communication among players.

a) **Recommendation:** *Prepare a Government-Wide Policy Statement to Guide Multilateral, Bilateral and NGO-Support Activities Related to Indigenous Issues.*

b) **Recommendation:** *Establish A National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy on Support for Indigenous Peoples.*

3. **Problem:** *Lack of Continuity.* Moreover, Npip represents only a relatively small part of Norway's support for indigenous peoples, with the rest of the funding disbursed through support for NGO initiatives. Such procedures offer little guarantee of continuity in effort.

a) **Recommendation:** *Provide Special Funding for Indigenous Programming.*

b) **Recommendation:** *Prepare to Use the Multilateral and Bilateral Programs, as Well as NGO Channels, to Implement Policy.*

c) **Recommendation:** *For Project Delivery* , as Distinct from Policy Development Work, Put Emphasis on Npip and NGO Channels.

4. **Problem:***Visibility.* Finally, the visibility of theses activities is low. Public awareness, support, and hence the political sustainability of Norway's support for indigenous is in now way guaranteed.

a) **Recommendation:** *Request that Parliament Publicly Endorse the Strategic Statement in Support of Indigenous Peoples.*

b) **Recommendation:** *Promote Npi's Education Role through Additional Contributions to its Communication Role.*

1.4.1 Template for a Norwegian Strategy for Indigenous Peoples

Building on the evaluation and on the overview of relevant alternative formula, we have put together a model strategy, elaborated in the conclusion, that combines the various institutional elements that we feel can address most weaknesses and opportunities that we have identified.

Template for a Norwegian Strategy for Indigenous Peoples

Strategy	Multilateral policy	Communication/Education	Program Delivery	
MFA/NORAD	MFA	Npip/EXECUTING AGENCY	NORAD	MFA/NORAD
Parliament	UN	Roundtable: Saami NGOs Parliament Academics National consultation to discuss/evaluate strategy and its implementation	Proactive: Npip Consultative Board Dedicated funding guaranteed for 3 years 3 year mandate closely related to government strategy	Reactive: NGOs Bilateral Dedicated fund
Saami Parliament	Multilateral development banks			

The table above, elaborated in the conclusion, identifies five key action areas, the institutions responsible for their implementation, and the central institutional characteristics of this implementation.

The Organizational Home

Npip's success is partly due to the shelter the program receives as an out-of-house program, the flexibility permitted within Fafo, the administrative competence brought by Fafo, and the quality of the staff recruited to manage it.

1. **Strength:** *Political and Bureaucratic Independence.* The key benefit of the current home, and the out-of-house model in general, is that the program has been sheltered from undue political pressure and administrative burdens. This shelter has permitted the program to be flexible, responsive, and agile in its work in the field.

2. **Strength:** *Administrative Simplicity and Efficiency.* Fafo's administration of the program in terms of reporting, accounting, and procedure are effective and non-bureaucratic.

a) **Recommendation:** *Retain an Out-of House Model for the Program.*

3. **Strength:** *Competent Staff.* Fafo has also retained high quality staff and assembled a competent Advisory Council. This specialization is important because of our finding that in-depth, specialized, and continuously verified knowledge of the indigenous landscape is crucial for program success.

The Npip project staff have clearly demonstrated that they have the required project competencies, with some improvements necessary (see recommendations for the program outlined below), particularly with respect to communication competencies.

Current staffing levels are insufficient, however, not only to ensure implementation of the public education dimension of Npip's mandate, but also to provide more appropriate project cycle administration and project monitoring.

a) **Recommendation:** *Increase staffing levels by one and possibly two persons, depending on the the size of the effort made in the area of public education.*

4. **Problem:** *Weak Strategic Programming.* Fafo's hands-off policy is partly responsible for the weak overall strategic planning and programmatic coherence of Npip.

a) **Recommendation:** *Improve Key Competencies and Qualities of the Organization.*

- *Ensure Program Competencies .*
- Ensure Organizational *Qualities.*

b) **Recommendation:** *Undertake a Development Plan.*

c) **Recommendation:** *Strengthen the Advisory Council.*

d) **Recommendation:** *Revise Norad Commitment.*

5. **Problem:** *Poor Record in Public Education and Information in Norway.* In Norway, the public education and information mandate has not been fulfilled. In the past, the impediments for action were understandable; current plans, however, are not sufficient to carry the mandate further.

a) **Recommendation:** *Develop an Information Strategy.*

b) **Recommendation:** *Augment Research.*

These weaknesses alone do not justify moving the program if improvements are undertaken. However, the choice of another home would need to take into account the advantages of the current model.

The Program

Our review of the program in Peru, Guatemala and Brazil, shows that it has largely been relevant to the needs of indigenous peoples and has had significant impact. Improvements to strengthen the program's record would involve better strategic coherence across regions and themes, a revision of the contract cycle, systems to counteract an excessive personalization, more consistent communications and more frequent use of evaluations.

Npip, as a dedicated program with dedicated staff and funds, has had a significant impact in the countries where projects were funded. The program has thus proven effective and relevant from the standpoint of its contribution to the capacity of indigenous people to guide their own future.

1. **Strength:** *Effectiveness and Relevance on the Ground.* Noting the caveat that the most relevant and important efforts are often the most difficult to achieve, we nonetheless found instances of effective use of program resources in many areas and in all the countries.
2. **Strength:** *Cost-Effectiveness and Comparative Advantage.* While we have not been able to comment on the cost-effectiveness of the program in an accounting sense (other than to note that the budget and financial systems are in order), we find that the *nature* of the program has special cost-effective benefits. As a small funder of both large and small indigenous organizations, Npip has acted as a lever for new funds, a complementary source of funding during periods of other outside funding, and a special source of funding for small organizations unable to access other resources.

However, while the program has had notable successes, it has also struggled with strategic and operational difficulties.

1. **Problem:** *Country-Choice Coherence.* The choice of countries eligible for the program, and the division of projects and budgets among countries within the

program, are not based on an assessment of indigenous needs or agendas in the region. Norad's restriction on eligible countries and Npip choices on project allocation do not seem to be adequately supported.

The choice of current countries and the choice for future expansion needs revision. We examined possible alternatives for choosing countries within Latin America. Our recommendation is that decisions on expansion within the continent (or to other regions of the world) should take the following elements into consideration:

a) **Recommendation:** *Undertake a Continental Profile.*
b) **Recommendation:** *Develop a High and Low-land Program Prior to other Expansion.*
c) **Recommendation:** *Contemplate New Regions.*
d) **Recommendation:** *Revise Decision to Leave Chile.*

2. **Problem:** *Thematic and Core Area Focus.* The decision to limit income-generation projects, and the (largely ignored) focus on three core areas for funding, indicates a lack of strategic planning both on the side of Fafo and Norad, as well as a lack of responsiveness to needs in the region.
   a) **Recommendation:** *Adopt One Broad Goal (Field of Activity or Thrust or Focus or General Orientation): Institutional And Capacity Building.*
   b) **Recommendation:** *Maintain Flexibility. Continue to consider both pro-indigenous and indigenous organizations.*
   c) **Recommendation:** *Include Income-Generating Projects.*
   d) **Recommendation:** *Retract the Double-or-No Funding Policy.*

3. *Problem: Funding cycle.* Npip is perceived as a reliable source of support by many important indigenous and non-indigenous support organizations in Latin America. Most organizations, however, find it difficult to work effectively within the one-year cycle, a pattern that is unusual among other donor organizations working with indigenous organizations.
   a) **Recommendation:** *Lengthen Funding Cycle.*
   b) **Recommendation:** *Reconfigure Budget to Allow For Risk.*

4. *Problem: Personalization.* The strict division of labour between coordinators has meant there is a danger of over-personalizing the program, potentially making partners vulnerable to personal, rather than organizational, decisions on funding. Steps need to be taken to offer an institutional relationship with the partners in addition to the personal one.
   a) **Recommendation:** *Build a Management System to Limit the Dangers of Personalization.*

5. *Problem: Field Evaluations.* We also find that the infrequent use of independent project evaluations is a problem, both as a danger to organizations whose funding may be cut because of personal misunderstandings with coordinators, and as a means for helping organizations improve their work.
   a) **Recommendation:** *Plan More Regular Evaluations.*

6. *Problem: Field Communications and Transparency.* The research also found that communications (in the shape of more formal procedures and more regular correspondence) needed to be improved in order for the program to act more transparently.
   a) **Recommendation:** *Undertake a Participatory Diagnosis.*
   b) **Recommendation:** *Install Standard Communication Guidelines.*
   c) **Recommendation:** *Implement Transparency Safeguards.*
   d) **Recommendation:** *Undertake a Pro-Active Funding Review.*

1.5 RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS

Based on these recommendations, we suggest that Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs present this evaluation publicly as a basis for discussion for a new strategy. Indigenous organizations who have formed the backbone of the information in this report should be included in this dissemination and discussion. We also suggest that discussions on lessons learned within the program further be disseminated to other NGO, bilateral, and multilateral programs working with indigenous peoples, that they may share in Norway's experience and open up further conversations on their own work. Whatever organization wins the tendering process, we recommend further that the contract negotiations take into consideration the needed improvements identified and that a minimum three year contract be signed.

2. Terms of Reference

This chapter of the report repeats key aspects of the terms of reference signed in our contract with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Our work needs to be assessed against these terms.

2.1 BACKGROUND

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has asked The North-South Institute to conduct an evaluation of Norway's support to indigenous peoples in Latin America, focusing on the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples (Npip).

Npip was originally established in 1983 within Norad, the Norwegian Agency for Development.[1] The program was founded in an act of Parliament after the Saami confrontation at the Alta dam in northern Norway in 1980 and growing solidarity elsewhere in Norway toward indigenous peoples in Latin America in particular. The invention of a program to support indigenous peoples outside of Norway was both a reflection of growing domestic interest in indigenous issues abroad and a gestures of reconciliation with Norway's own indigenous community.

The program now funds 40 projects in five countries (Paraguay, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, and Brazil) with a 1998 annual budget of NOK 20 million. It is the one of the few operational programs within Norad that has not been fully delegated to an outside agency. The evaluation comes at the end of almost 14 years of the program, whose administration has been managed for the last seven years by the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science, known as Fafo. Fafo is a research organization that focuses on studies of living conditions, welfare state development, labour relations and industrial policy in Norway and in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, several African countries, and in China. Npip is its only work with indigenous peoples and in Latin America.

This evaluation focuses on the management of the program since Fafo took over its stewardship. However, support to indigenous peoples' efforts exists in many parts of the government (primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad, its aid wing, and indirectly through support to the work of Norwegian NGOs also working in the field), and questions have been raised about coordination, relevance, and strategy throughout, not simply within Fafo's administration of Npip. The evaluation has therefore been designed to encompass a range of questions that will help the Norwegian government to move forward.

2.2 KEY QUESTIONS

This first section of the report sketches out in detail the terms of reference for the evaluation, the questions we sought to answer, how we did so, and our findings in detail. Key among those are the following central questions posed in the initial Terms of Reference tendered by the Ministry:

1. How **relevant** is Npip (and Norway's overall support) to the needs articulated by indigenous peoples in Latin America? To Norway's own policies?
2. How **effective** is current Npip (and other Norwegian) programming in terms of policy (overall direction), strategy (implementation plans), and management (administration)?
3. What **future** directions should be recommended, again in terms of policy, strategy, and management of Npip? Of other programs? Should Norway continue on its current course?

In order to answer these central concerns, we have designed the evaluation to embrace the scope of questions sketched below.

2.3 SCOPE

At the very centre of the overall evaluation is Fafo's management of the Norwegian Programme for Indigenous Peoples. It sets out to assess the *comparative* relevance and efficiency of Fafo/Npip's organizational/administrative model (executed largely in Norway) and its projects (executed almost entirely in Latin America) against other organizations in Norway and elsewhere engaged in similar work. This central organizational and

[1] At that time, Norad was integrated with the Norwegian Ministry for International Development. In 1990, the Ministry for International Development was dissolved and included in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the Ministry of Trade. Norad was at the same time established as an external directorate under the policy direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

programming assessment is the axis around which the rest of the research is organized. The relevance, effectiveness and future directions of Norway's *overall* support, programming, policies and strategies are clearly secondary to this main concern, although it will be important for discussion on future directions.

However, while the evaluation will undertake primary research and will assess the work of Npip, it will *not* undertake an in-depth evaluation of the success of individual projects or organizations supported by the program. As Npip continues its work, we believe that more frequent evaluations of individuals projects will be beneficial to the overall program. In this report, however, we limit our attention to the *program* and *system* level, and so steer clear of *project* level assessments.

The following scope for evaluation was proposed, presented in the chart on the next page and elaborated below. The questions posed in these paragraphs shaped our detailed field methodology, determined in a workshop held in Ottawa in January 1998, prior to the fieldwork in Latin America.

1. **Indigenous Context in Latin America.** The Ministry, and the Research Team, are concerned that Npip and other programming responds to the critiques, demands, and assessments articulated by the peoples for whom in principle support is being offered. While only some twenty percent or so of the research effort will be devoted to this component, it is the cornerstone of the whole evaluation and the agenda against which the relevance of Norway's contributions are to be measured.



Scope of the Evaluation
(note: shadowed area indicates focus of evaluation)

1.1 **Articulated Demands.** A component of the initial research elaborated through fieldwork has therefore been to assess the pulse of current issues within the Latin American indigenous agenda, particularly in the three countries explored: Peru, Guatemala, and Brazil. In particular, we are interested in exploring:

- What issues and demands are at the forefront of the indigenous agenda locally, nationally, and regionally?
- How have they changed over the past ten years?

We undertook this work through three briefing papers from experts on our research, advisory, and reference groups.

1.2 **Donor Landscape.** It is also important to look at what donors have been doing in response to or in spite of that set of concerns. Research in the field therefore explored not only what Norway has undertaken through the Npip, but also through other channels and in comparison with other donors. Priority will be given to indigenous peoples' assessment of their comparative relationships with various outside agencies.

- What are indigenous peoples demanding from donors?
- What value *could* donors add to that agenda in both financial and non-financial terms?
- What are other countries and other organizations doing to support indigenous peoples? What policies, strategies, and programs are underway? What models of management are they using successfully?
- How does Norway fit in that picture (bilaterally, multilaterally, and via NGOs and INGOs)?

  We undertook this work through one briefing paper, field meetings with bilateral and NGO donors in the three countries, contact with multilateral headquarters in Washington and New York, and interviews with key organizations in Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark.

2. **Norwegian Support for Indigenous Peoples.** The largest component of the research, some 70 percent of the effort, has been devoted to evaluating Npip from both the Norwegian and Latin American vantage points. Fieldwork in Brazil, Guatemala, Peru, the U.S., and Norway have generated primary and secondary information to make assessments of Npip's contribution. This contribution is assessed against the backdrop of other Norwegian efforts and the work of analogous organizations.

2.1 **Norwegian Context.** Across the government, an overarching aim «to strengthen the capacity and ability of indigenous peoples to shape and control their own development given the present context of socioeconomic change» has been made, although not detailed in formal policy statements.

- What policies *do* exist, formally and informally?
- What are policy issues to be resolved? Are policies integrated and elaborated with strategy decisions?
- How well does Norway's policy and practice mesh with today's indigenous agendas? Similarly, programs are spread across the government, including indirect programs via the Norwegian NGO community and the multilateral system.
- What programs exist? What activities are undertaken? How are they structured? What are their advantages and disadvantages?
- What agencies are involved? What communication channels, both formal and informal, exist among agencies and indigenous peoples? What kind of relationships have been forged? Why? What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- How well are programs linked to the policy and strategy?
- What are the areas of strength and weakness? What are the opportunities?

2.2 **Npip and Fafo.** In particular, the Npip needs to be examined as Norway's only directly government-run operational program. Questions have been raised both within and outside of Fafo about Fafo's policy and strategy choices, its performance (and the performance of its partner organizations), and its management. The evaluation therefore looks at both Npip's organization and management in Norway and its activities in the field.

- **Organizational Assessment.** How well has Fafo administered the tasks allocated through Npip? How are resources allocated? What kind of communication networks are in place, both formally and informally, with

Norad and other major players in Norway? What are the social and political dimensions of Fafo's work and the context in which it works?

- **Field Assessment.** Against the background of Npip's own mandate, how well has Fafo performed in fulfilling the program's goals, both in Latin America and in Norway? What aid delivery approaches has the organization used? What kind of relationship does Fafo have with its partner organizations, particularly regarding ownership and participation? What strategies has the organization developed for work in Latin America? How relevant and effective have those been?

2.3 **Saami Perspective.** The Norwegian people and government have had a difficult history with Norway's indigenous people, the Saami. In recent decades, however, government policy has changed to support the political and social participation of the Saami within Norway and, internationally, in support of the rights of indigenous peoples worldwide. How are the Saami interconnected with Norway's international support for indigenous peoples? This assessment of the government's international work has therefore sought to include a Saami perspective.

3. **Feasibility Options.** Throughout our initial discussions in Norway, it also became clear that the evaluation had been conceived specifically to help make important decisions in Spring 1998. These include the general direction of Norway's support (in the context of an numerically increasing aid budget), the need to evaluate Npip after many years of operation, the particular need to evaluate Fafo's management of the program (as its contract expires at the end of 1998), and the desire to explore options for expansion of the program in both money and geography. Ten percent of the research effort is therefore directed at suggesting options for decision-making derived from the fieldwork, and in organizing discussion around those options.

3.1 **Alternative Strategies and Policies.** Given the overview of Npip and macro policies explored in the evaluation, what alternative directions have been suggested better to meet the demands of indigenous peoples in Latin America? Are different strategies in order?

3.2 **Alternative Management Structures.** Even should Norwegian policy and accompanying strategy remain valid, could alternative management structures be suggested better to undertake the work? Should the government continue to run a separate program through the Npip? If so, should Fafo continue to run the program? If it does how could FAFO improve its management of the program?

3.3 **Options for Expansion and Revision of the Program.** As Norway anticipates an expansion of its support to indigenous peoples, both in terms of kroner and perhaps in geographic area, what suggestions could be made? Where would Norway's comparative advantage best be put to work?

3. Research Design

This chapter reviews the design of the research. The overall design was developed iteratively in response to the terms of reference and the findings we generated over the five months of the research. Based primarily on the assessments offered by partner organizations, the design was further buttressed by an independent assessment of the program's administrative management, and numerous interviews with outside agencies in Latin America and Europe.

3.1 METHOD

Npip and its articulation into the larger aid and foreign policy infrastructure of the Norwegian government was therefore assessed from the standpoints of their relevance and effectiveness; the weaknesses identified, both absolute and relative, served in turn as points of reference for the identification of alternatives to the program and to its wider institutional articulation.

Npip was assessed and compared at two levels. At the program level, the evaluation focused on the institutional structures and processes of Npip proper: its rules and procedures, strategic plans, workplans, staff responsibilities and activities, relations with the partners in the field, as well as the contract cycle from design to evaluation.

At the system level, the analysis focused on the insertion of Npip as a whole into the Norwegian government's foreign and aid policy environment, both in strategic and in organizational terms. In strategic terms, we looked at the program as a component of wider and longer term aid and foreign policy commitments and options. In organizational terms, we examined its relationship with Fafo, where it is housed; with Norad, from which it comes; and with the wider governmental and non-governmental policy community.

The relevance of the program was assessed on the basis of a confrontation with indigenous demands, as expressed by their own organizations, and with an assessment of indigenous peoples' situation, as understood by indigenous organizations, non-indigenous organizations working with indigenous peoples and with chosen experts in the field.

The approach was to be qualitative, comparative, and participatory. It was agreed that the evaluation would not attempt to quantify the relevance or effectiveness of Npip. Its comparative advantages, in contrast with other programs, however, would be a key measure of quality. Above all, the evaluation would involve Npip partners in the assessment of a program in which they play a crucial role.

The implementation of the evaluation involved seven basic steps:

1. A team of ten professionals (anthropologists, political scientists and organizational specialists) was constituted to undertake the research and to advise on the methodology and findings.
2. Five background papers were commissioned to provide the team with a shared basis of information on the key issues of the evaluation (these have become part of the report and its appendices).
3. The whole team, including the advisors, met in Ottawa for a closed five-day session in January 1998. The main objective of the meeting was to develop a shared basic understanding of the situation of indigenous peoples in Latin America and a common methodology for data collection.
4. Fieldwork in Latin America then took place over a period of a month in January and February 1998, building on previous fieldwork in Norway and the United States.
5. The complete team was brought back to Ottawa for a week-long closed meeting to share, gauge and consolidate the data collected.
6. Subsequent visits to Washington's multilateral agencies were made, and after the second team workshop, trips to Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands were also made in March 1998 to get more information on apparent alternatives to Norway's program.
7. The report's conclusions were discussed at a roundtable meeting in Oslo in March 1998, and a drafted report was circulated to a reference group of stakeholders in Norway (including an academic specialist in Latin America, a representative from the Saami academic community, and members from Fafo, Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). A second roundtable in April 1998 reviewed the written draft and discussed its findings. This final report incorporates agreed changes discussed at that meeting.

3.2 TEAM COMPOSITION

For the whole evaluation process, we put together an international team of three women and seven men: two managers, five field researchers, and three advisors, with the two managers and one of the three advisors also doing fieldwork. The group included three cultural/social anthropologists, one organizational specialist, two political scientists, one geographer and one specialist of development and management. Five team members spoke Spanish and four, Portuguese. Eight team members already had or were completing PhDs, three on Brazil, one on Guatemala and Peru, five on indigenous issues, and one on NGOs and development policy. Their full resumés are included in the proposal for the evaluation.

3.3 FIELD SITES

Fieldwork was realized in Norway, Peru, Guatemala, Brazil, the United States, Denmark and the Netherlands. A sub-team of two people visited all but two Npip-funded projects in Guatemala. Another sub-team of three people divided up the Brazilian projects, visiting all current and some past partners. One researcher spent a full month in the field; the two others, two weeks. In parallel to the work being done in Latin America, researchers were also active in Norway, exploring the institutional make-up and management of the program and its organizational surroundings; and in the United States, where the indigenous policies and programs of the large multilateral funding agencies were also assessed. To fill the gaps that remained once the data collected was consolidated, additional interviews were also programmed in the Netherlands, where some NGOs appear to have an exceptional track record among partner organizations in Latin America; in Denmark, whose official strategy is often mentioned and where other NGOs with interesting track records on indigenous issues in Latin America (and elsewhere) are located; and in Norway, where a number of key players needed to be interviewed or re-interviewed on the basis of questions that had emerged during the consolidation workshop.

3.4 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

A variety of sources were used in the course of the research. Summarized here, a detailed list is provided as an annex.

Archives. Archive work was undertaken in Norway and on a needs basis in Latin America. One researcher charged with mapping the institutional landscape in Norway went through all the relevant material at Fafo and Norad, supplemented by detailed project archive work at Fafo by two members of the field team during a visit prior to the methodology meeting.

Briefing papers. Five background papers were commissioned to experts in the field:

1. Multilateral Development Banks, The United Nations and Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, Stephan Schwartzman (now section 4.4)
2. Organizational Analysis, Erik Whist (now appendix 1)
3. Indigenous Peoples and Development in the Americas: Lessons from a Consultation Process, José Barreiro (appendix 2)
4. Indigenous Peoples in Latin America: Issues and Opportunities, Stephan Schwartzman (appendix 3)
5. Development Aid to Indigenous Peoples – A Sami Concern?, Henry Minde (appendix 4)

Interviews. The field researchers interviewed more than 200 people, either individually or collectively, during more than 70 meetings (a partial list is included as appendix 6). The standard questionnaire developed during the workshop was the basis of the meetings with the program partners in Latin America. Questions from the much more detailed data collection grid, as well as questions that had emerged from fieldwork, served as basis for the additional interviews with Norwegian, Dutch and Danish organizations. Interviews were also undertaken with officials from the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, DC. In addition to meeting with donor representatives responsible for the funded projects and for the direction or coordination of the organizations overseeing the projects, the researchers also tried as much as possible to meet the individuals directly charged with the implementation of the projects and with some of their beneficiaries. Moreover, an effort was made to interview individuals associated with other organizations, both local and foreign, who might be knowledgeable about the projects or the organization funded, Npip in general, or other projects or organizations whose experience might provide interesting insights about the program or how it could better function or be structured in the future.

Official documents. Official published documents were used extensively, beginning with the annual reports published by Fafo, but including also policy statements from the Norwegian government, including Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Policy statements and reports

published by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs were also used. Finally, various evaluation reports on partner organizations, other NGOs and other programs were also consulted.

Secondary literature. Various books and journal articles were used on the situation of indigenous peoples Latin America, on the international indigenous movements, and on Saami politics.

3.5 DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE

The data collection procedure was elaborated during the methodology workshop that took place directly prior to field trips to Latin America. Before the workshop, all members were provided with detailed information on Npip and on projects financed in all the countries where fieldwork was to take place, as well as all but one of the background papers. Also prior to the workshop, one member from each of the two country field teams spent a few days in Norway, primarily to survey the project archives and to meet the two Npip program officers.

The workshop began with an overview of the background to the project and a review of debates on the indigenous agenda in Latin America through presentation and discussion of the background papers. The objective was to arrive at a shared general vision of the situation of indigenous peoples in the Americas (a summary is included as appendix 5). A detailed data collection grid was then developed: both the program and the system in which it works were broken into component parts whose relevance and/or effectiveness was to be assessed. A master checklist in the form of a table of questions was prepared and subsequently boiled down to a questionnaire that was to guide the meetings with the partner organizations in the field, and another version to take to subsequent interviews in Norway. In addition to the specific questions identified, researchers were also to systematically ask for parallels to experiences with other funding agencies, as well as suggestions from partner organizations.

3.6 DATA ANALYSIS

Most of the data collected for the evaluation was analyzed during the consolidation meeting. After a debriefing, the field reports were broken down into packets of data, following the list of components parts of the program and system that had been identified prior to field work. These packets of data were grouped into series of key strengths, weaknesses and opportunities, both at the program and system levels. A general report outline was agreed. The group then discussed the alternatives that had emerged during field work in Latin America, mentioned by Npip partners or other organizations, as well as from the analysis of multilateral agencies. Finally, the remaining information gaps were identified, as well as possible sources of information that would help us fill them. Most remaining questions dealt with specific details about alternative European aid models or indigenous aid policy.

4. Background

This chapter of the report emphasizes the nature of the debates current in Latin America and among key multilateral players over the «Indigenous Agenda.» This background is an important building block in the evaluation's findings that in-depth, specialized, and continuously verified knowledge of the indigenous landscape is crucial for program success.

It is, of course, impossible to present a continent-wide agenda. Indigenous peoples, representing hundreds of different cultural groupings (approximately 200 alone in Brazil) live in widely different countries, and have organized themselves in markedly different ways to promote their interests. There are a number of reoccurring themes over the past decade, however, discussed below: land and identity, economic sustainability, and human rights protection (see also appendices 4 and 5). In each country, these themes take on varying importance, and are elaborated in the paragraphs that follow.

This national specificity of agendas, placed against a backdrop of recurrently relevant themes, provides the justification for our recommendations for changes to Npip's core areas, discussed in chapter eight.

4.1 THE INDIGENOUS SITUATION IN BRAZIL

Brazil is the largest and most populous nation in South America, at 8.5 million square kilometers and 165 million people. With a GNP of about $976 billion, Brazil is the 9 th largest economy in the world. Brazil's income distribution is among the most inequitable in the world, with the wealthiest 20 percent of population consuming 60 percent of income. Land distribution is still more inequitable, with one percent of landowners occupying nearly 50 percent of the land, and 50 percent of the landholders on about two percent of the land. Brazil, in the words of current president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, is no longer an underdeveloped country, it is an unjust one.

Most of Brazil's industrial development and growth occurred since the 1930s under a state-led import-substitution model. External price shocks in the 1970s and galloping internal deficits led to runaway inflation (upwards of 2000 percent per year in the early 1990s). President Cardoso made his mark nationally, as Minister of Finance under Itamar Franco, for designing the *Plano Real*, the dollar-linked currency and tight interest policies that have brought inflation into single digits for the first time in a generation. Private sector investment in Brazil has expanded enormously is response. The recent Asian financial crisis has cost Brazil heavily – to shore up investor confidence, Cardoso raised interest rates to some 30 percent per annum and drew down foreign exchange reserves to defend the currency. Growth has slowed and unemployment is up to 16 percent in Saõ Paulo, Brazil's economic powerhouse. Nonetheless, Cardoso's popularity remains high, based on his success to date in controlling inflation.

The sustainability of the *real* plan depends on longer term measures to control government expenditures and increase revenues, including privatization of state companies, and reform of social security and other deficit-ridden state agencies. These depend on legislation that must be passed by Congress, including in some cases constitutional amendments requiring supermajorities of well over 50 percent. Cardoso's centrist social-democratic party, PSDB, allies with the right-center PFL (bastion of the oligarchies of the northeast) and the amorphous and patronage-ridden PMDB and several smaller parties to gain a parliamentary majority. The Congress in 1997 passed a constitutional amendment allowing re-election to executive office (amidst a national scandal over vote-buying to ensure passage of the amendment, over which several Amazônian congressmen resigned), and Cardoso is currently poised to win re-election in November 1998.

The current quandary of Brazil's indigenous peoples is that 280,000 Indians, 0.2 percent of the national population, in some 200 societies, speaking about 170 languages and living in 547 areas, have rights to 11 percent of Brazil's territory, over 980,000 square kilometers. Over 98 percent of this land is in the Amazon, and about half of the indigenous population lives on it; the other half, in southern and northeastern Brazil, has about 2 percent of the land. Almost all of this land has been recognized by the government (or «demarcated») in the last 30 years; the majority has been recognized in the last ten years, since the 1988 Constitution. The central issues for indigenous peoples are first, the completion of the process of official recognition of their land rights (demarcation), and second, the sustainability of the indigenous

areas, in economic, social and environmental terms. Indigenous groups everywhere in Brazil seek income, access to health and education in their areas, and the areas suffer various kinds of environmental pressures.

The Cardoso government has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to completing the demarcation process (the 1988 Constitution stipulated that the process was to have been completed by 1993). However, indigenous issues have been a low priority at best, and at worst the object of political manipulation in negotiations for Congressional support for the government's reform program.

Major opposition to Indian land demarcation in the 1980s came from right-wing nationalist sectors of the military and national mining concerns. In the 1990s, as military influence waned, markets opened and demarcations proceeded, opposition has shifted to private property owners in southern Brazil. In January 1996, responding to a Supreme Court challenge to the constitutionality of land demarcation procedures, then-Minister of Justice Nelson Jobim issued Decree 1775, giving private interests, states and municipalities the right to challenge demarcations. Widely interpreted as a recipe for reducing Indian lands, the decree resulted in over 500 challenges to several dozen indigenous reserves. All of these were rejected by FUNAI.[2] Minister Jobim rejected all but 8 of the challenges, and issued eight «dispatches» calling for reductions of several areas. In the most controversial, the Raposa-Serra do Sol area in Roraima state, the minister issued a clearly political decision, flouting the technical criteria of his own decree, after negotiating the reduction of the area in exchange for the votes of the Roraima congressional delegation in support of the amendment permitting presidential re-election. This and several others of Jobim's decisions are being challenged in court by the Federal Attorney General's Office, and FUNAI's current President says he is seeking a revision of the decisions by the new Minister of Justice.

State governments in the Amazon have been the most consistent opponents to indigenous land demarcation. This resistance is exacerbated by the overrepresentation of the Amazon in the Congress– in law dating from the military dictatorship (but representing a much older and broader tendency), no state may have less than seven representatives to the lower house and none may have more than 70. Thus, Roraima, which by population criteria should have less than one congressman, has seven and Saõ Paulo, which should have 110, has 70. Two factors could potentially change this scenario for the better in the coming year.

First, there is relatively widespread popular and congressional support for ending the flagrantly un-democratic over-representation of the hinterlands, and a constitutional amendment has been proposed in the context of the administrative reform to do so. This will require a prior procedural change so that amendments can be passed by a smaller majority. The patronage interests of the Amazônian and northeastern states that benefit from the distortion are strong, but sentiment against the privilege for the backlands is high as well.

Second, the 1994 elections saw the election of opposition governors in Amapá and Pará states. One of these, Joaõ Paulo Capiberibe (Amapá) ran on an explicitly sustainable development platform, has vigorously supported the demarcation of Indian lands and the extractive reserves, and is likely to be re-elected. The current leader in the polls for governor in Acre state is wildly popular former mayor of Rio Branco Jorge Viana, a strong environmentalist and supporter of indigenous rights and social justice issues. If Viana becomes governor of Acre, two state governors, with likely support on many points from the government of Pará, would actively promote alternative approaches to development in the region. The political climate of the Amazon could become notably more favorable for indigenous peoples.

Recently passed and pending legislation in the Congress will affect indigenous areas particularly in the Amazon. In early February, the Congress passed the long-stalled Environmental Crimes Act (PL 1.6XX), giving the environmental agency, IBAMA, statutory authority to enforce environmental legislation for the first time since 1989. While last-minute deals weakened the bill, empowering IBAMA to collect fines its levies, apprehend and keep illegal timber and so on should restrict illegal resource extraction in indigenous areas.

The *Estatuto das Sociedades Indigenas* (Indigenous Societies Statute, legislation regulating the Constitutional text of 1988) was approved by a special commission of the Congress in 1994 but has been held up by the executive since. This act, which represented a consensus among indigenous organizations, NGOs and the major parties, would among other things specify what kinds of

[2] The *Fundçaõ Nacional do Indio* is the federal government's agency charged with implementing Brazil's indigenist policy.

resource extraction are to be permitted on indigenous lands. This would remove current obstacles to for example, sustainable forest management pilot projects in indigenous areas. Currently chances for movement on the bill appear slim however.

Senator Romero Jucá, (PFL-RR) has adapted (and worsened) language from the statute that regulates mineral extraction by companies on Indian land, and introduced a bill into the Senate. Dozens of firms have filed claims for mineral research and in some cases production on indigenous lands; these are currently in abeyance pending legislation. The government supported the bill. At a meeting between Jucá, presidential legislative staff, and the Instituto Socioambiental (ISA), ISA staff demonstrated to the government the number of claims pending on indigenous areas– and the potential liability to the government that approving the legislation absent administrative capacity to process them would represent. ISA also identified various flaws in the legislation. The government is presently reconsidering the bill, but this issue will return and represents potentially enormous pressure on mineral-rich indigenous areas in the Amazon.

4.2 THE INDIGENOUS SITUATION IN GUATEMALA

Guatemala is a highly divided nation, a country rich in natural resources where 85 percent of the population lives in poverty and where a small minority of non-indigenous, urban residents wields political and economic power over a majority indigenous, rural population. Guatemala is divided between indigenous people and ladinos, a term which now refers broadly to all non-indigenous Guatemalans.

Estimates of the percentage of Guatemalans who are indigenous range from 35 to 70 percent. The question of who is indigenous is highly charged, and in light of Guatemala's growing Maya identity movement, extremely political. While there are certain clear signs of indigenous identity – speaking an indigenous language, wearing traditional dress, practicing costumbre (a syncretic religion blending Catholic and traditional beliefs) – the question of indigenous identity remains extremely complex and increasingly a subject of public debate. Given centuries of radical apartheid-style racism, indigenous-looking Guatemalans seeking to improve their economic and social situation have typically sought to distance themselves from their indigenous heritage. As the Maya movement grows in power and influence, an opposing trend may develop, with increasing numbers of Guatemalans seeking to resuscitate or rediscover their Maya identity.

There are 23 indigenous groups in Guatemala – the Garifuna, the Xinca and 21 distinct Maya ethnicities. Since there are only 7000 Garifuna and less than 500 Xinca, Maya represent 99 percent of the nation's indigenous population. The ethnic divisions among Maya groups are largely defined by language. Several groups speak languages that are closely related and even mutually understandable, while other language families are quite distinct. There are also marked cultural differences between different indigenous groups and particular histories that produce tensions up to present day.

Although statistics on indigenous people are not necessarily accurate, they are useful. The ten largest indigenous groups are: K'iche' (1.8 million), Mam (1.1 million), K'aqchikel (1 million), Q'eqchi' (700,000), Poqomchi (260,000), Q'anjob'al (200,000), Tz'utujil (156,000), Ixil (130,000), Poqomam (128,000), and Chuj (85,000). Some language groups, such as Achi, are linguistically very similar to K'iche' (Achi is even referred to as K'iche' – Achi by linguists) while their identities are considered distinct by their members. Several indigenous groups have very small numbers of speakers (such as the Itzaj with less than 2,000 or Sipakapense with less than 6,000). Furthermore, most indigenous people understand their own identity in a highly local fashion. Nevertheless, what most clearly defines Maya identity as unitary is the way in which indigenous people are viewed from the ladino perspective, as different, other, and traditionally as second class citizens.

Most Maya people live in the rural highlands, where many departments have a majority indigenous population, and several have an indigenous presence of over 80 percent. Beginning in the 1970s, there has been a mass migration of indigenous people to urban areas, especially to the capital, Guatemala City. Nevertheless, it is in rural areas where the indigenous culture expressed in external signs is strongest – the dominance of indigenous languages (including many areas where indigenous men, and especially women, do not speak Spanish) and the use of traditional dress, especially among women. Indigenous culture is significantly different than ladino culture and, despite centuries of domination, indigenous Guatemalans remain grounded in traditional spiritual concepts which often serve to bind individuals and communities to the land, corn, ancestors and cycles of agricultural production.

Guatemala has among the most uneven distribution of wealth in all of Latin America, with nearly 90 percent of indigenous people living in poverty, and 60 percent living in extreme poverty. Only one on four indigenous families have electricity, half have no sanitary services and health statistics among indigenous Guatemalans are among the worst in the region. Less than 40 percent of indigenous people have completed elementary school and most work in agriculture, with less than two percent are involved in a profession. Sixty percent of indigenous children work full-time.

Guatemala's economy is rooted in agricultural production, particularly in the cultivation of coffee and sugar. Productive land in Guatemala is controlled by a small minority who run large plantations, where the majority of workers are indigenous. Two percent of the population controls 65 percent of the land. In most of the larger plantations, indigenous people migrate from their homes where they typically labor as subsistence farmers during the harvest season. In other areas, indigenous workers live on the plantations themselves, sometimes working for wages, other times as sharecroppers, often in conditions of extreme poverty, and sometimes laboring under debt peonage. Not surprisingly, the question of land is the premier issue in rural areas and one of the defining elements of the nation's extremely tense and violent recent history.

In 1944, the longtime dictator of Guatemala, Jorge Ubico was overthrown by Juan Jose Arevalo, ushering in a ten year period of democratic rule known as the «Democratic Spring.» In 1954, this period ended when a CIA-engineered coup overthrew Jacobo Arbenz, the democratically elected president who angered the nation's oligarchy by instituting a nationwide land reform. The land reform involved the forced sale and expropriation of large amounts of uncultivated land, including significant holdings of the United Fruit Company, which at the time was controlled by powerful US business interests. For the next several decades, Guatemala was ruled by a series of military governments or civilian governments with close links to the army, all of whom protected a landed oligarchy whose wealth was premised on the oppression of a majority indigenous population.

In the mid-1960s, the first guerrilla groups were formed, leading to 36 years of extraordinarily violent armed conflict. By the 1970s, there were several movements to organize indigenous people for a variety of social justice demands, from increased wages on plantations to land rights. These organizations, along with labor unions and other non-violent movements opposing oligarchic control of the economy, were violently repressed. Four different guerrilla movements then joined to form the URNG, a united guerrilla front, seeking a military overthrow of the state. Although the URNG gained significant support from popular movements with strong indigenous backing, the organization itself was not particularly sensitive to the special situation of Guatemala's indigenous population. By the late 1970s, state security forces opposition to a growing insurgency became increasingly violent.

By the early 1980s, the impact of the political violence on indigenous people became so severe as to be seen by many as genocidal. The Guatemalan state engaged in severe and violent repression leading to over 150,000 deaths, 50,000 disappearances, large scale massacres of entire villages, and the complete destruction of thousands of indigenous communities. The violence transformed rural Guatemala and produced over one million internal and external refugees. Whereas significant violence occurred in urban areas and among ladinos, virtually all of the nation's massacres, «scorched earth» policies and similarly violent strategies occurred in the countryside. In rural indigenous communities, social relations were radically transformed by political violence as daily life was militarized.

In December 1996, Guatemala formally ended thirty-six years of armed conflict with the signing of a peace treaty between the government and the URNG. Now, the Guatemalan state is undergoing a process of rapid modernization, pressured by agreements signed during the peace process and by the demands of a changing global political environment. The Guatemalan government is involved in a new project of national reconstruction structured by massive foreign aid within a context of international pressure towards greater economic and political integration into regional and global markets. This process involves a significant new role for indigenous people and a recognition of many aspects of the special needs of the nation's diverse indigenous population.

The Peace Process involved, among other things, the explicit presentation of indigenous demands as a key component of the negotiations. One of the peace accords, the *Accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples,* specifically names a series of indigenous demands and rights that need to respected by the Guatemalan state. In fact, in the aftermath of the violence, issues of indigenous

rights have become, like questions of human rights, a fundamental element of contemporary political debate.

In the wake of the war and the terrible suffering of Guatemala's indigenous population, the nation is experiencing the rise of a potentially powerful pan-Maya movement. Beginning in he 1990s, Maya intellectuals started outlining a framework for a nationwide indigenous movement. They built on decades of previous work, often grounded in linguistic and anthropological research. The current Maya movement has grown out of a disillusionment with the possibility that ladino political forces can adequately represent indigenous people.

There are currently over 400 Maya organizations, ranging from umbrella groups that present general indigenous demands to a larger society, to small groups working on issues of local concern, to organizations that focus on issues of land rights, human rights, bilingual education, and others. The needs of indigenous people on Guatemala are staggering, yet the development of a fledgling Maya movement offers indigenous people a vehicle to make concrete political demands. Central to this movement is a growing recognition that the Maya vote will play an ever larger role in determining who runs the nation.

All development projects dealing with indigenous people in Guatemala must be understood as linked to complex processes of democratization and modernization within a post-conflict context. The Maya movement is an especially important element of this process and promises to transform Guatemalan society, allowing a historically poor and marginalized population to access social power through a variety of diverse political and cultural activities.

4.3 THE INDIGENOUS SITUATION IN PERU

Peru is a deeply divided nation. Geographically it is split into three distinct regions: coast, highlands and jungle; socially, it is painfully divided between rich and poor, indigenous and non-indigenous. While there are no accurate statistics on what percentage of the Peruvian population is indigenous, estimates range between 35 and 60 percent. From the Spanish conquest up until the present, Peruvian society has been marked by extraordinary disparities of wealth and power structured along racial lines. Indigenous people have consistently been denied access to political and economic power and have been relegated to a position of profound social marginality.

Among Peru's indigenous population, there is a key distinction between peoples living in the jungle – lowland inhabitants of the Amazon basin – and those living in the highlands. Although the population of indigenous people in the highlands far exceeds the lowland population, the term «indigenous» in Peru is generally used to refer to peoples of the Amazon basin. The majority of indigenous people living in the highlands –between four and six million people – are Quechua, while a far smaller number of Aymara live in southern Peru near the Bolivian border. In the Amazon basin, there are between 250,000 and 350,000 indigenous people, divided among 56 ethnic groups. The groups with the largest population are the Ashaninka and Aguaruna with about 60,000 members each. Some groups are so small that they have no more than a few hundred members.

While the overall social statistics regarding contemporary Peru define the nation's residents as among the most disadvantaged in the hemisphere, these numbers are even more alarming when one considers the situation of indigenous people, the vast majority of whom are poor, or extremely poor. Indigenous populations in both the jungle and the highlands suffer extremely high levels of malnutrition, with some areas registering malnutrition in over half of all children. Indigenous people have among the hemisphere's highest rates of infant mortality (an average of 160 per 1,000 live births in the highlands) and have significantly lower life expectancy than the Peruvian average. Indigenous people often live in isolated rural areas where there are virtually no social services and extremely limited health care. In Lima, for example, there is one doctor for every 500 residents, while in the poorest regions of the highlands, there is only one doctor for every 25,000 residents. Indigenous Peruvians have very high rates of illiteracy (especially indigenous women), lack access to schools in rural areas, and remain severely underserved by the state.

In the early years of the Conquest, Peru's Indians were viewed as a separate nation, the *Republica de Indios* in which Indian aristocracy received special privileges and assisted the Spanish in controlling the large indigenous population. By the end of the 16th century, Spanish landowners seized the majority of productive lands in the highlands through massive, forced resettlement. Through this process, traditional Andean systems of authority and land ownership was replaced by the socio-economic institution of the hacienda, or landed estate, a quasi-feudal structure controlled by the non-indigenous elite which remained the dominant structure in the highlands until the 1960s.

The first Peruvian government to make serious inroads into the economic and social integration of Peru's indigenous population was a left-nationalist military government led by General Velasco, which took power in a 1968 coup. The centerpiece of the military government's plan was the Agrarian Reform Law which dismantled the hacienda system in the highlands through massive land redistribution and the formation of thousands of workers' cooperatives. Although agrarian reform failed to bring about the social equity that was its goal, the reform represents a key moment in a larger social process seeking greater inclusion and justice for indigenous peoples The Velasco military regime made Quechua the official language (along with Spanish) and was the first Peruvian government to make a meaningful commitment to expanding the state to consider indigenous social and political needs.

Highland residents generally view themselves as *campesinos,* or peasants, rather than indigenous people, the result of Peru's complex history of rural haciendas and the lasting influence of class-based ideology in defining peasant political movements. Despite centuries of domination, highland peoples continue to speak indigenous languages, practice a syncretic religion blending Catholicism with traditional beliefs, and have cultural beliefs markedly different than those of the non-indigenous population. Nevertheless, indigenous people of the highlands generally understand their identities as highly locally defined, linked to the community where they were raised, and tied to the particular indigenous dialect they speak. Indigenous political culture remains grounded in the *ayllu*, the local kinship-structured web of community relations.

There are no single issues that define the needs of Peru's highland peoples, largely because their extreme poverty has many causes and few simple solutions. Most indigenous highland peoples live in rural areas as subsistence farmers and herders. Only a very small percentage of the highlands are fertile enough to sustain local populations, which continue to grow at a rapid rate. Indigenous people can benefit from agricultural programs as well as a variety of other production based projects or credit schemes. In the highlands, the state has virtually no presence and there is an extraordinary need for educational programs, health care, infrastructural improvements and other types of development assistance.

Lowland indigenous people have a very distinct history from that of highland peoples. While there are significant social, cultural, economic and political differences between lowland indigenous peoples, they have much in common when compared to Peru's non-indigenous population or its highland population. In general, the dominant issue for lowland indigenous peoples is land use and land rights. Lowland groups are typically organized into small communities that are dispersed over relatively large territories, sometimes mobile and typically tied to traditional economic activities such as small-scale agriculture, fishing, gathering and hunting.

The indigenous idea of territory is profoundly linked to communal ownership. The first priority for such groups involves gaining legal title to their ancestral territories. Beginning in the 1970s, many lowland indigenous groups received legal title to their lands through the activities of AIDESEP and other indigenous organizations. Nevertheless, significant differences exist between the land situations of different groups. Where territories have been recognized and demarcated, priorities focus upon protection and future resource management. In such cases, the indigenous peoples must contend with competing interests, both outside forces and internal differences over how to use their resource base.

Unlike indigenous people of the highlands who were conquered centuries ago, indigenous groups living in the jungle have a relatively recent history of social and economic relations with the outside world. Some groups have relatively well-established contacts with non-indigenous society and others have far more limited contacts stretching back only a few decades. The situation and needs of particular groups varies in relationship to their contact with non-indigenous society, as well as their relationship with the Peruvian state, especially regarding issues of land. Increasingly, many lowland indigenous communities are permanent rather than temporary and the resources within the territories have been affected to varying degrees by industrial resource exploitation and invasions by colonists. Commercial enterprises, such as mining and oil and gas exploration have encroached upon many communities, displacing indigenous peoples and seriously affecting the natural environment. Other outside influences include missionaries, aid workers, coca cultivation and illegal drug operations.

Until fairly recently, the vast majority of Peru's indigenous population lived in the highland and lowland peoples lived in relative isolation. Over the last fifty years there has been a steady migration of indigenous people from the highlands (and to a lesser degree form the jungle) to urban areas in the coastal region The mass migra-

tion from the highlands to cities has occurred in response to the severe limitations of productive agricultural land, the attractions of urban life and, most recently, the escalation of violence between the Peruvian military and armed insurgent movements. Lima, in particular, has witnessed extraordinary growth in the last fifty years with its population growing ten fold from 1940 to the present. Now, over seven million people live in Lima, one-third of the nation's population.

The experiences of indigenous migrants, whether from the jungle or highlands, is similar in terms of the dislocation, uncertainty and the experience of new challenges. Urban migrants face a new type of poverty based on wage labor rather than poverty linked to problems with agricultural production. By the 1980s, nearly one in four Lima residents, most of them indigenous people from the highlands, lived in one of the hundreds of sprawling slums that surround the city. Urban life is grounded on wage labor and a more fluid, uncertain relationship between work and the ability to sustain oneself and one's family. The majority of shantytown residents labor in the informal sector, where job security, in any sense of the word, is almost nonexistent. If one loses one's job, one enters a labor market in which less than one in five workers are fully employed.

Beginning in the early 1980s, two leftist guerrilla groups formed: *Sendero Luminoso* and the MRTA. By the mid–1980s, political violence had claimed thousand of lives as many rural people found themselves caught between the brutal actions of guerrilla units and the state's security forces. By the late 1980s, most of the country's population lived in «zones of emergency» where basic civil rights were suspended as the political violence escalated alongside the country's worst social and economic crisis of the twentieth century. Tens of thousands of largely indigenous Peruvians were «disappeared,» rural areas were highly militarized, random detentions and torture became common practices of state terror, as many thousands of highland (and in some cases, lowland) indigenous people were forced from their homes. The political violence disproportionally affected Peru's indigenous population in powerful ways. The long-term consequences have yet to be fully understood.

Alberto Fujimori's presidency, beginning in 1990, signaled a new era for Peru in social, economic and political terms. Hyperinflation, which reached a staggering 10,000 percent per year in the late 1980s, was significantly reduced as the economy was stabilized and opened for increased foreign investment. There were radical reductions in the number of state employees and state-controlled businesses. The military succeeded in nearly defeating both *Sendero Luminoso* and the MRTA, although while often committing gross violations of human rights. While Fujimori has established a certain order in Peru, it has been accomplished in an extremely autocratic manner, including at one point disbanding congress.

There are currently no powerful, mass-based national indigenous movement in Peru. AIDESEP and several other groups continue to organize lowland indigenous people, although they have limited national political presence. In the highlands, there are no major indigenous movements, in part an expression of the trauma and fear associated with political activity or organizing in the aftermath of a brutal counterinsurgency campaigns. Similarly, human rights advocates and civil society organizations have not defined indigenous issues as central to their demands.

4.4 MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, THE UN AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN LATIN AMERICA

This paper looks at a range of organizations involved in programs that affect indigenous peoples in Latin America, in particular in Brazil. The focus is on the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank, but the Corporación Andina del Fínanciamento, UNDP, the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, ILO Convention 169, and the current work on the Norwegian government are also briefly discussed.

4.4.1 The Multilateral Development Banks

The World Bank and InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) are between them the largest source of Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Latin America (as the multilateral banks (MDBs) are globally). The World Bank, with its sister institution the IMF, was founded immediately following the second world war by the governments of the allied nations at the Bretton Woods Conference. The capital subscribed and contributed by the Bank's member governments guarantees its issuance of bonds on international financial markets, the proceeds from which are loaned to governments to finance projects. Since the Bank's capital is guaranteed by the richest governments in the world, its bonds are highly rated, its costs of raising capital low, and it is able to extend credit at slightly below market rates to developing country governments that historically have had limited or no access to

international capital markets. As of 1997, the World Bank had 180 members and over $105 billion in outstanding loans and guarantees, out of a total of $396 billion in cumulative lending operations over the last 50 years (World Bank 1997). In 1997, the Bank approved $19.1 billion in new loans and credits.

Table 4.1 World Bank Lending to Latin America and the Caribbean (US$ billions)

FY	Average 1988–92	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
	$5.5	6.1	4.7	6.0	4.4	4.5

Source: World Bank Annual Report, 1996.

The IDB, created in 1960 on the model of the World Bank, is organized similarly, but its membership is restricted to the western hemisphere (and some European countries and Japan, which have small capital subscriptions that allow their companies to bid on IDB contracts). As of 1996, the IDB had made a cumulative total $81 billion in loans.

Table 4.2 IDB Lending
(US$ billions)

1988	1990	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
$1.6	3.8	6.0	5.9	5.2	7.2	6.7

Source: Inter-American Development Bank Annual Report, 1997

MDB operations are highly leveraged – typically the World Bank loans no more than half the cost of a given project, so that the actual cost of the projects in which the Bank invests is at least double the amount the Bank has lent. Increasingly, the Bank is involved in co-financing operations with bilateral aid and export credit agencies and the private sector. In 1997, the Bank organized or attracted $7.4 billion of cofinancing in addition to its $19.1 billion of loans and credits. With the increasing importance of private sector capital flows, the role of the MDBs as gatekeepers and guarantors of foreign investments can be expected to increase and MDB leadership has expressed clearly that it sees its role in these terms.

It is important to recall that the MDBs are public institutions. Their capital is put up by the member governments (largely of the north), and the large majority of their operations are loans at commercial interest rates to governments that are repaid by the taxpayers of the south. Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, had a net transfer of $17.2 billion to the World Bank between 1992 and 1997, in loan repayments, interest and fees.

4.4.2 ODA and the Private Sector

The relation between ODA, the sum of multilateral and bilateral aid flows, and private sector capital flows has inverted over the last seven years, with private capital flows now far outstripping aid in overall foreign investment. But the MDBs continue to play a key role in development financing, as gatekeepers for private capital flows, in the leverage of their investments, and in the impact of their policy dialogue with borrower governments.

Between 1990 and 1995, ODA remained constant or decreased slightly when adjusted for inflation, but private foreign investment (loans, portfolio investment, and private direct investment) nearly quadrupled. ODA totaled $57.9 billion in 1990 and $64.2 billion in 1995; private foreign resource flows grew from $44 billion in 1990 to $167.1 billion in 1991. In 1990, ODA was 57 percent of net resource flows to the developing world; in 1995 private investment was 72 percent of net flows (Rich 1996). Combined foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio equity flows (non-controlling shares in foreign companies) in Latin America grew from about $8 billion to over $32.8 billion from 1990 to 1994 (World Bank 1996). While market crises such as the one rocking southeast Asia presently can be expected to affect these rates of investment (particularly portfolio investment), they are unlikely to reverse the trend.

A significant share of private sector investment is for large infrastructure projects, particularly energy projects. This investment is also dependent upon public, either multilateral or bilateral risk insurance, co-financing, or guarantees. These large private sector projects are typically structured on a «non-recourse» basis, whereby lenders' access to the assets of major multinational project proponents is strictly limited in case of failure or default. Private banks are thus loath to finance such ventures unless public institutions – the private sector arms of the MDBs, bilateral export credit, insurance and guarantee agencies– assume part of the risk.

For this reason, environmental and social standards for foreign investment (including indigenous peoples' rights), are arguably even more important now than they were a decade ago when ODA was for most Latin coun-

tries the major (or only) source of foreign investment. Private capital inflows have increased enormously, but the only environmental and social policies for foreign investments are those of the MDBs, which are far ahead of most of the bilateral export agencies. The private sector arms of the banks– the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank and the InterAmerican Investment Corporation (IIC) of the IDB – which loan and make equity investments directly in private sector companies, and also play a key role in leveraging private capital for investments in the developing world. The World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides political risk insurance and other investment guarantees to private investors in its member countries. Both the World Bank and the IDB are also increasingly using their capital for the guarantee of private investments.

4.4.3 Effect on Indigenous Peoples

The most significant effect on indigenous peoples in Latin America of MDB investment to date has been their support for major infrastructure development projects that have increased pressure on and invasions of indigenous territories, involved forced relocation of indigenous communities, or contributed to the destruction of natural resources on which indigenous communities depend. Notable cases include the Chixoy dam in Guatemala, the Yacyreta dam in Argentina and Paraguay, the Carajas Iron Ore project in Brazil, the Polonoroeste road and agricultural colonization projects in northwestern Brazil, the IDB's Porto Velho-Rio Branco road project in same region, the IDB's Belize road project, World Bank support for oil development in Ecuador, IDB road improvement in the Bolivian lowlands, and energy sector loans to Brazil.

Both the IDB and the World Bank have since the early 1980s adopted environmental policies, policies relating to indigenous peoples, and policies to provide public access to information on their operations that have important consequences for indigenous peoples in the region. Both have also in specific instances included the demarcation of indigenous lands as project conditions, particularly in Brazil. Both policy reforms and project specific leverage for indigenous land protection resulted from external pressure on the banks, mobilized by NGOs and channeled through donor governments, and in which indigenous organizations and leaders have played key roles (Rich 1994). Both banks now have greatly increased staffing in the environmental area (and to lesser extent in the area of social impact and effect on indigenous peoples), and in recent years have begun to essay initiatives designed to assist indigenous peoples rather than attempting only to mitigate the negative impacts of projects, or simply ignoring their presence. Since the banks continue to be involved in infrastructure, and particularly in light of the catalytic role they increasingly assume with respect to private sector investment, it is important to examine the banks' policies that affect indigenous peoples, as well as the role they have played in demarcation and other initiatives that affect indigenous peoples.

4.4.4 World Bank Indigenous Peoples Policy

The World Bank's first policy on indigenous peoples, Operations Manual Statement 2.34, *Tribal People in Bank-Financed Projects,* was adopted in 1982 largely in consequence of heated polemics within and outside the Bank over the Bank's participation in the ill-fated Polonoroeste project, in which the World Bank financed the paving of over 1,000 kilometers of the BR-364 road through the northwestern Brazilian Amazon, affecting dozens of indigenous peoples in two states. The key principle of the policy was that «the Bank will not assist projects that knowingly involve encroachment on traditional territories being used or occupied by tribal people, unless adequate safeguards are provided» (World Bank 1982).

In 1991, the policy was revised and issued as an Operational Directive (OD 4.20 *Indigenous Peoples*). The major changes included broadening the definition of indigenous peoples so as to be more clearly applicable to ethnic and cultural minorities in Africa and southeast Asia as well as to Amerindians, and broadening the focus of the policy from mitigation of adverse impacts to seeing that indigenous people benefit from development. The OD states that «the objective at the center of this directive is to ensure that indigenous peoples do not suffer adverse effects during the development process, particularly from Bank-financed projects, and that they receive culturally compatible social and economic benefits» (World Bank OD 4.20, paragraph 6, September 1991). The policy further mandates informed participation of the indigenous peoples themselves in addressing issues of concern to them, and requires an Indigenous Peoples' Development Plan for any investment affecting indigenous peoples. The OD also specifies activities to be undertaken by Bank staff at each step in the Bank contract cycle, and provides for clear benchmarks for implementation of the commitments made in loan documents. In a subsequent reorganization of Bank policy, however, the Indigenous Peoples policy (like other policies) was reduced to general princi-

ples, with most of the contents (including links to specific stages of the contract cycle) being relegated to a «good practice» document. The Bank has maintained that such changes were in the interest of greater flexibility and efficiency. Outside observers note that they came on the heels of the widely publicized Wapenhans report, which found a trend toward declining project quality by the Bank's own criteria, and that loosening policies had the effect of lowering standards, in effect «raising» project quality by definitional fiat.

The Bank has completed two reviews of implementation of its indigenous peoples policies and is in process of completing a third. The first reviewed 15 Bank-financed projects affecting indigenous peoples, including 11 in Latin America and the Caribbean, from 1982– 1986. The review concluded that «the bank had made significant progress in identifying indigenous populations, but the design of components was unsystematic and lacking in coherence» (Partridge and Urquillas 1996, p. 22). In 1992, the Latin America and Caribbean Technical Department issued a review of 13 land regularization programs in which the Bank was involved in lowland South America (Wali and Davis 1992). The review found that while considerable progress was made in land demarcation and regularization, national legal frameworks in some countries impeded effective protection of indigenous lands, and that land regularization of itself was insufficient to guarantee tenure security. Also necessary are research, technical assistance, and training combining indigenous and western scientific knowledge of resource management.

Most recently the Latin America and Caribbean Environment Unit reviewed 153 projects approved since 1992 or in preparation since 1996 and found 63 that affected indigenous peoples. Most projects managed to establish early in the contract cycle that indigenous peoples were affected, but only 6 of the 30 projects under implementation had done required social assessments and only 11 of the 63 included Indigenous Peoples Development Plans. The authors found a «need for promoting higher awareness among governments of the Bank's policy on indigenous peoples' (Partridge and Urquillas 1996).

The Bank's reviews of policy implementation deal, of course, with specific projects as statistical or quasi-statistical data in highly condensed form. Another way of reviewing the implementation of the policy, as well as the effects of Bank projects on indigenous peoples more generally, is to look at the evolution of Bank work with indigenous peoples over time in a particular country or region.

4.4.4.1 The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples in Brazil

The Bank's involvement with indigenous issues in Brazil began in the early 1980s with the Polonoroeste program, a series of five loans for the paving of 1,084 kilometers of highway through the states of Mato Grosso and Rondônia, as well as support for the organization and rationalization of the colonization process on the frontier, totaling $367 million. After external criticism and warnings from staff and consultants, the Bank negotiated a plan for Indian land demarcation in the region initially covering 6 areas. The military government would not accept international funding for the demarcation of Indian lands, alleging that to do so would be an infringement of national sovereignty, but agreed in a side letter to carry out the demarcations itself. When by 1985, the demarcations, planned support services for colonization, and environmental protection had fallen drastically behind schedule; many indigenous areas were invaded; colonization projects were failing and their environmental effects spinning out of control; the Bank suspended the loans.

Under pressure from environmental and human rights organizations internationally, and through the intervention and participation of Brazilian NGOs, substantial advances in land demarcations were made. There are now some 57 indigenous areas, with varying degrees of legal recognition in Rondônia and Mato Grosso. In 1992, the Bank approved two Natural Resource Management Projects in the same two states for a total of US$ 374 million, which included indigenous land demarcation and some resources for assistance to the Indians. Both projects have been plagued by poor design and unrealistic goals (in the Bank's own analysis), and were completely reformulated in 1997.

The Bank moved a step further in the Carajas Iron Ore project, a $304 million investment in an open pit iron ore mine, a 900 km railroad and port facilities in the states of Pará and Maranhaõ, with an original project cost of $4.5 billion. In this case, the Bank included some 20 indigenous areas in 200-kilometer radius around the mine and railroad in a special project financed by the borrower, the state mining company CVRD. Here again, the effects on the indigenous areas of the development boom were great (in some cases devastating), land demarcations were slow, assistance was of uneven quality and the project

was highly controversial. However, Indian areas were recognized (although demarcation remains to be completed in some), and Bank insistence on its agreement with CVRD and the federal government was important to overcoming counter-pressure from the states and local economic interests.

The G7 Pilot Program for the Conservation of Brazilian Tropical Forest is the most recent chapter in Bank involvement with indigenous issues. The G7 Pilot Program was proposed at the G7 Summit of 1990 to support Brazil in efforts to halt deforestation in and promote the sustainable use of the Amazon. The G7 leaders requested that the World Bank and European Commission design a program, which the G7 nations would fund, to protect the Amazon. Signed in 1992 with a commitment of $250 million in grants from the donors, the Program in its current form has 13 sub-projects, including the project for the protection of indigenous lands in the Amazon (PPTAL). This program had some $20.9 million, mostly of German funding for the identification and demarcation of about 110 indigenous areas in the Amazon. In this case, the government agreed to accept international grant funding and has in effect undertaken an international obligation to carry out the identifications and demarcations.

The project has been slow to start, although no slower than the G7 Pilot Program as a whole, which had spent only 17 percent of the resources committed when government and donors met to evaluate the first (5 year) phase. Nonetheless, the project has begun identifying and demarcating indigenous areas, and under current budgetary conditions, is virtually the only source of funding for these activities. Currently, an approximately $10 million Indigenous Demonstration Projects fund (PDI) is being negotiated to support sustainable development activities in indigenous areas. This is modeled on the Demonstration Projects (PDA), a $13 million fund for resource management and sustainable development activities for NGOs which has been among the most successful components of the G7 program to date (in terms of actually using the money available, among others). The Bank and G7 donors have recognized that the sustainability of the indigenous areas is the central issue once legal recognition is resolved, as do Npi's partners.

It is clear that the Bank has at this point significant experience with indigenous peoples issues in Brazil, and has used its leverage to move forward land demarcation in its project areas. The Bank's leverage however, has been greatest precisely where its projects have had the most negative consequences for indigenous peoples. The Bank's indigenous peoples policy, adopted in large measure in response to the recognition on the part of some Bank staff of the perverse and at times disastrous effects of development on indigenous groups, became an important lever for indigenous groups and support organizations to obtain legal recognition of their rights.

The Bank remains a large and bureaucratic institution, however, with multiple and at times conflicting priorities. A good example is the Bank's 1997 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Brazil. The CAS is negotiated about every three years between upper-level Bank staff and borrower governments (typically ministries of finance or planning) and is the strategic plan for the Bank's portfolio in the country. According to Bank policy, environmental issues (indigenous peoples issues have historically been handled in the various environmental sectors of the Bank) as well as poverty alleviation are to be included in the CAS. In the Brazil CAS, environment is one of four priorities in the government's development plan for 1997– 1999. The Bank, as we have seen, has significant involvement in and experience with Indian land issues (which the government is under constitutional mandate to resolve), and the government can even point to significant progress in this area over the last decade (although less than expected of the current government). But the CAS is silent on the subject of the indigenous peoples. There is ample discussion of Brazil's infrastructure needs, estimated at some US$20 billion a year, but no mention of the fact that the government's infrastructure development plan projects US$3.6 billion of investments in the Amazon by the year 2000 in roads, railways, waterways, and energy projects many of which will affect indigenous peoples (as well as the environment), nor that three waterways in varying stages of study and construction have been embargoed in federal court for failure to comply with indigenous rights legislation. A series of environmental and indigenous peoples issues, which speak directly to the sustainability of the development planned and to the possibilities and cost of mitigating its negative impacts are utterly ignored in the document, as is the Bank's own considerable expertise in these areas.

Examining the Bank's history with indigenous peoples in Brazil demonstrates that the Bank has been on balance a positive force, and increasingly so over time, but it has acted most energetically under pressure and the «mainstreaming» of indigenous peoples (or indeed environmental) concerns remains uneven at best. Beyond «better informing borrower governments» of the Bank's indige-

nous peoples' policy, the Bank needs to more thoroughly incorporate its principles itself.

4.4.5 IDB Indigenous Peoples Policy

The IDB has since the mid-1980s had guidelines for indigenous peoples in development to be used by the Environmental Management Committee. These were roughly similar to World Bank Tribal Peoples' policy, but lacked the formal status of policy, i.e., they had not been approved by the Bank's board. An indigenous peoples' policy has been under preparation for more than a year in the Indigenous Peoples and Community Development Unit of the Social Programs and Sustainable Development Department of the Bank. The new Committee on Environmental and Social Impact (CESI) mentions «indigenous rights and community development issues» in its procedures as part of the scope of its review (applied to all bank projects before they area sent to the board for final approval). There is in addition a database on IDB projects affecting indigenous peoples. The Bank claims that social investment funds approved in 1996 in Guatemala, Guyana and Peru, a sustainable development project in the Petén of Guatemala, a social forestry program in Nicaragua and an alternative development program contain «measures or components to facilitate access to project services by indigenous groups» (IDB 1996, p. 27).

Probably the most innovative step towards creating long term means of support for indigenous development initiatives is the Indigenous Peoples' Fund (*Fondo Indigena*), created in 1992. The Fund includes not only regional and donor governments in its governing structure, but also indigenous organizations. Nineteen Latin American nations, and three from Europe have ratified the articles of agreement. Some $26 million in pledges from six countries have been secured to date. The goal is to create an endowment fund of $100 million, to be administered by the IDB. A proposal for the allocation of IDB funds from the concessional Fund for Special Operations is pending before the board; with approval, the endowment fund could begin generating revenue in 1998. Some controversy has already erupted over which indigenous organizations can legitimately participate in the fund's governing body, between CONAIE and the Ecuadorean government; the Brazilian government was decidedly obstructionist during negotiations leading to the creation of the fund (e.g., opposing the term «indigenous peoples»). Once the fund is endowed and there are resources to be distributed further NGO-government tensions can be expected to emerge.

4.4.6 Corporación Andina del Financiamento (CAF)

CAF is a regional multilateral bank established with support from the IDB, whose members are the Andean nations. Between 1992 and 1997 its *Programa Regional de Apoyo a los Pueblos Indigenas de la Cuenca de Amazonas* supported 75 projects in six countries for indigenous communities and organizations. These include training, education, communications and productive projects, and 15 projects for regional and national indigenous organizations, including COICA and organizations in Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador. CAF's publication on the program gives neither the program total nor individual project costs.

4.4.7 UNDP

The United Nations Development Program provides technical assistance and project funding for an array of activities around the world. Much of UNDP's work is directed at environmental and sustainable development issues as framed in international fora (e.g., preparations for the Rio Earth Summit, follow-up on Agenda 21). The organization has no specific mandate to support indigenous peoples, although there is occasional overlap between UNDP environmental work and indigenous peoples.

In Latin America, UNDP's largest role is probably in Brazil, where its so-called «nationally executed projects» are held to be a model for UNDP country programs more broadly. UNDP allocated some $6 million of its own money for core programs in Brazil in 1997, but disbursed about $200 million. For a three percent surcharge, UNDP receives government funds, channels them through a bank account in New York and hires consultants, sets up offices, and does the administration and accounting for the projects on behalf of the host or other governments. It is rumored that the *Plano Real*, Brazil's economic stabilization plan, was designed in a UNDP project. The «cost sharing» model underlying this arrangement involves the federal government (through the Agencia Brasileira de Cooperaçaõ, (ABC)), UNDP and the executing agency. UNDP's administrative flexibility and economies of scale make this option attractive to the government (i.e., it is quicker and often cheaper in terms of administrative costs to pay three percent to UNDP than for the government to administer its own projects). In addition, the UNDP model allows government agencies to get around federal hiring limitations and the intricacies and uncertainties of the federal budget process. Use of the interest accumulated on

deposits in New York is negotiated between UNDP and ABC. In the Environment Ministry alone, some 500 long and short term consultants are contracted through UNDP and the agency has projects with the Ministries of Education, Health, Planning and others. Both the G7 Pilot Program and the World Bank's Natural Resource Management Projects in Rondônia and Mato Grosso states depend on UNDP projects for consulting services, technical assistance and the operations of their executive secretariats.

This approach is clearly popular in sectors of the government, but there are criticisms. The German government (specifically its bilateral assistance agency, GTZ) is said to criticize UNDP for «dumping», or selling its services below cost. Costs for project monitoring and supervision by UNDP, for example, are included in project costs. GTZ is said (by UNDP staff) to want to compete in the same niche, but at a higher cost (15 percent). Unlike UNDP, GTZ aid has the relative disadvantage of being tied, that is, obliging the beneficiary to use German consultants and suppliers. The debate is said to be heated enough that Germany contemplates withdrawing from UNDP internationally. Staff of some other UN agencies in Brazil (e.g., FAO) say that UNDP's role as money conduit and cut-rate provider of administrative support undercuts their work as providers of technical assistance: government partners want more of what UNDP does and less of their own technical assistance.

The major consequence of the UNDP-GTZ dispute has been to hold up the indigenous lands component of the PPG7. Project funds are provided by GTZ but UNDP is involved in the overall administration, and the differences between the two have seriously delayed the disbursement of the funds.

4.4.8 The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations and the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

UN activity on indigenous peoples and their rights is currently centered on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) that is a body of the Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities organized under the Commission on Human Rights. The WGIP meets every year, since being constituted in 1982, for one or two weeks.

The mandate of the WGIP was initially to review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous populations and the evolution of international standards with regard to them. In spite of a limited mandate, the WGIP became the principal UN forum for the discussion of indigenous rights, since governments, indigenous organizations and international advocacy groups have been actively involved since the beginning. This is the only UN forum in which indigenous leaders have had the opportunity to discuss their demands and their understanding of the situation of their peoples.

In 1985 the mandate was redefined with the decision to write a Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The WGIP has also undertaken other initiatives such a designating 1993 the year of indigenous peoples and establishing an indigenous fund to underwrite the attendance of indigenous representatives at the sessions of the Working Group.

The Working Group discusses recent measures to protect indigenous rights, outlines developments concerning indigenous self-determination, suggest studies such as an ongoing examination of indigenous treaties and their role in international law, or an analysis of the intellectual property rights of the indigenous populations, and recommends development projects for the benefit of indigenous peoples. The Working Group, however, is not a tribunal since it lacks the power to receive and investigate complaints against states. It has no authority or power to affect states' compliance with indigenous rights. It is in essence limited to receiving and distributing information on indigenous rights, and exercising a sort of moral suasion.

The Draft of the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was completed in 1993 and is now under revision in the Commission on Human Rights. After 11 years of work, it now appears that the Commission, composed of government representatives, is reconsidering the Declaration and proposes extensive amendments. Indigenous delegates were relegated to an indigenous working group of the Commission, with limited power to participate in or intervene in the deliberations on the convention.

The WGIP is now redefining its role and mandate, and looking toward the creation of a Permanent Forum for the discussion of indigenous rights within the United Nations.

4.4.9 International Labor Organization Convention 169

ILO *Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries* is today the chief indigenous rights text under international law. The Convention was adopted in 1989 and has been in force since 1991 after ratification by a number of states. Nations that have ratified the convention include Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Norway, Dominica, Argentina, Guatemala and Venezuela. The Convention defines indigenous peoples as,

> peoples whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; and who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

The definition thus includes not only those who came first, but also those who can be distinguished on social, cultural and economic conditions. The Convention details a wide array of rights to be recognized and, in theory, incorporated into national frameworks by signatories. These include territorial and land rights (with «territory» construed more broadly than simple land ownership in western terms), rights to be consulted on projects that affect indigenous peoples land and livelihood, rights to participate in relevant national decisions and programs, rights to determine their own development priorities, and rights to identify themselves as indigenous for purposes of the Convention, among others. Indigenous peoples right to be involved in decisions affecting them is restated frequently in the text (art. 6, 7, 12, 15, 17, 20,22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 33). Convention 169, where ratified, replaces the previous ILO Convention 107 of 1957, which had an assimilationist view of the future of indigenous societies. Convention 169 clearly expresses in a variety of contexts the more contemporary notion of permanent indigenous rights to cultural difference. This is an important conceptual distinction, since if the cultural differences between indigenous and surrounding societies are the basis of indigenous peoples' rights, and these differences are transitory, then so too are the rights based on them. The notion of permanent cultural difference casts land and other rights in a different (and politically far more problematic) light for most states.

Convention 169 is non-binding, although ratifying nations are to add language to their national constitutions recognizing indigenous rights where this does not already exist. By article 19, states are to submit annual reports on national legislation and implementation of the principles of the Convention. An «expert committee for the enforcement of the convention and recommendations» then issues a report. Claims under the convention can be submitted to the ILO only by governments, unions, or employers' associations. Indigenous organizations cannot submit claims unless they are unions or associations of workers. Norway has taken an innovative approach in submitting its annual report to the Sami Parliament for comment, and including the Sami commentary with the report to the ILO.

The importance one places on the Working Group, the Draft Declaration and Convention 169 depends ultimately on one's view of international human rights law. Clearly international action on human rights moves most forcefully on the basis of international political consensus or agreement (e.g., a Security Council resolution condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), which is not likely to be forthcoming on indigenous peoples concerns in the near future. Currently, the existence of legal instruments such as Convention 169 can exert some moral suasion on nations with indigenous and tribal minorities or serve as a lever for indigenous groups to pressure national governments. Change in the circumstances of particular indigenous groups depends on the indigenous groups' own organization; national legal, institutional and policy frameworks; actors in development (financial institutions, private corporations); and the national and international alliances of indigenous peoples. International legal instruments can serve as reference points and can be used in indigenous peoples' strategies for self-determination, but these depend on conditions determined locally and nationally, not on the international legal instruments themselves.

The UN international legal instruments are in comparison to MDB indigenous peoples policy and guidelines much more comprehensive and far-reaching statements of the rights of the Indians. MDB policy is far more restricted and cautious in its language. This is a reflection of the fact that the UN instruments were designed as ideals and are non-binding, while World Bank policy is at least in theory obligatory for Bank staff, and in practice the language of

the MDB documents impinges on development decisions and negotiations with borrower governments. In the foreseeable future, the MDB policies will have more pragmatic effect, in part because they are more limited.

4.4.10 Norwegian Foreign Assistance and the MDBs

Some observations on the comparative advantages of the Npip in relation to the MDBs in particular can be made in light of the foregoing. While the MDBs have vastly greater resources to apply to development in Latin America than does the Norwegian government, and in recent years have begun to actually fund projects for indigenous peoples, these remain a small minority. The IDB's *Fondo Indigena* is the boldest foray in this direction but its financial underpinnings have yet to be secured. Even more importantly, the *Fondo Indígena* is in principle an open, participatory mechanism to create the means for indigenous peoples to support their own development initiatives. However, issues of transparency, accountability, effectiveness, regional and thematic priorities, efficiency and timeliness of support have not in practice been resolved or even tested within the *Fondo*. It is much more likely that these kinds of issues will be favorably resolved if the indigenous and support organizations that participate in and are supported by the *Fondo* are strong and independent. If indigenous organizations become dependent on this fund as a sole source of support, the chances of becoming patronage-driven will increase. Relatively modest but consistent and long-term support for indigenous and indigenous support organizations of the kind Npip has provided can play an important role in keeping these organizations independent.

The grant funding of the Indigenous Lands Component of the G7 Pilot Program is similarly a promising step, but it is far from clear that other regional governments would make international commitments to land demarcation of this order, or that the donor nations would fund such initiatives.

Since the MDBs respond to member demand, it is unlikely that they will allocate significantly more resources than at present to indigenous peoples issues. Few governments in the region will see much political benefit in responding to the specific needs of politically disenfranchised minorities, particularly not at commercial interest rates and where concessional loans are limited. Beyond this, the issue of central concern to the indigenous peoples– land and resource rights– is polemical and historically fraught with conflict. The MDBs can indeed use their leverage to pressure governments to comply with their own legislation, or with bank policy, but this leverage tends to be greatest where the banks have invested the most in the projects most damaging to indigenous peoples interests (e.g., Polonoroeste, Carajás). Furthermore, the MDBs have been most effective on indigenous peoples concerns where the banks and governments have had to deal with independent organizations (including many of Npip's partners).

* * * * *

Against the background of these debates, policies and institutions, the evaluation now turns to a pointed examination of the Norwegian system, the program's organizational home and work in Norway, and its success in the field.

5. The System: Norwegian Policy and Players

Against this background of issues and change in the Americas, the report turns to the system of policy and players in Norway. The program– and the whole of Norway's implicit and explicit policies toward indigenous peoples – sits on top of a complex set of motivations, activities, and agendas. This section of the report offers some of the team's thoughts on the Norwegian context, the demands being articulated by indigenous peoples in Latin America, and the work of multilateral and bilateral donors.

The main message here is that Norway's official work for, and with, indigenous peoples has demonstrated a remarkable empathy for indigenous peoples, with a degree of sensitivity closer to that of progressive NGOs than to most multilateral and bilateral agencies. However, the absence of a strategy throughout this array of Norwegian activity – including Npip but encompassing other government and non-governmental programs – robs Norway of improved coherence, effectiveness and visibility.

The cast of players in Norway working on indigenous issues has grown in the past decade to encompass a broad population. A short description of their work follows, with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses brought to the table.

5.1 NORAD

Norad funding through project and program grants reaches indigenous peoples through a host of Norwegian NGOs and other institutions, described in following sections. Its only indigenous-*specific* program, however, is Npip, the sole international indigenous program designed and managed by a government agency, although administered out of house.

In 1991, the program was passed to Fafo from within Norad for a number of reasons that are key to the character of the Fafo- Norad relationship today:

- **No operational role for** Norad. Under General Director Per Grimstad, Norad policy changed in the late 1980s to move away from running operational programs of its own. Today, the Norwegian Volunteer Service and Npip are Norad's only remaining operational programs, although now managed out of house.
- **Changed approach to indigenous and other issues.** Another element in this change of approach was to move away from targeting particular groups directly to promoting the responsibility of host governments in meeting the needs of their people.
- **Domestic prominence of the Saami.** Yet an indigenous-specific program was probably needed for domestic reasons, given the rising influence of the Saami on the domestic political scene and the establishment of a separate Parliament in 1989. The Saami community has not, however, been very interested in the Npip, concentrating their international activity almost exclusively on the ILO convention and the work of the UN committee.
- **Interest in rain forest and indigenous issues.** While the growing presence of the Saami is an important piece of the picture, others have suggested that an independent movement for a special program for indigenous peoples within Norad was established in the 1970s, inspired by the work of Norwegian anthropologist, Helge Kleivan.

These forces pushed the program out of Norad in 1990 when an alternative home was sought for the work. At that time, the program was allocated a mere NOK 7 million and only a one-third staff position – not a sign of the program's importance within the Ministry or Agency, despite its initial profile in Parliament. Over the course of its residence in Norad, consultants were called in from IWGIA (the Copenhagen-based International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs), and from within Norway. At the end, the program was left unstaffed and tread water for a year. When the program was handed over to Fafo, it was made up of 7 projects, with some 30–40 waiting for assessment.

After commissioning a study of alternate models for moving the program out of house from Nupi (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) and from the consulting group Scanteam, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited a group of NGOs and research institutes together to discuss possibilities. The interpretation of what then happened differs, but the following is a common explanation. The program was seen by domestic agencies and NGOs to be too difficult, based on the perception that work with indigenous peoples and their organizations was arduous, politically riven, unfruitful, and in a (then) unfashionable

issue area. All of those factors have since changed, meaning that the scope of interest for adopting the program today is higher.

Over the course of Fafo's subsequent management of the program, it is clear that considerable tension existed between Norad and the Institute (see appendix 1 for a full report). Detailed in subsequent pages, disputes over program emphases and contract conditions led to threats of removing the program, hence making planning difficult. Today, many of the disputes have been resolved, but tensions linger.

5.2 FAFO

Fafo, the Institute for Applied Social Science, was established in 1982 as a wing of the labour movement, undertaking research on social and living conditions of Norwegians and, later, in other countries. The corporatist nature of the Norwegian system means that this research continues to be deeply connected to policy-making and negotiation among labour, employer, and state organizations. The quality of Fafo's research in social surveying is considered good, but expensive.

The head of Fafo up until 1996 was an entrepreneurial and expansive public figure. His plans included rapid expansion of the Institute's work into other areas of research and into other countries. A new international portfolio was set up as a separate company, Fafo International Inc. (Fafi), and beginning in Lithuania, extended its work to other parts of the former Soviet Union, and later reached into the Middle East. Some of this international work was funded by Norad as part of the belief that social surveys and the strengthening of domestic statistical offices was a critical part of development and national planning, as it has been in Norway.

Over time, Fafo International was re-absorbed into the larger Institute, and in 1993, Fafo was further established as an organization distinct from the Labour movement, although its unofficial links with the Labour Party (until October 1997, still the government) are recognized. In comparison with analogous research bodies in Norway, Fafo receives a small allotment of core government funding of approximately NOK two million annually, about four percent of the annual budget – an issue when we come to discuss the costs of maintaining the program within Fafo. The «new» Institute and its «new» international wing therefore needed to look for projects to maintain its position and to carve out new niches.

The opportunity to acquire Npip came at a propitious time. The program, already well established, offered overhead and full-time employment of two professional people. Since Fafo's management of the program began, the budget has grown significantly to over NOK 15 million annually (NOK 20 million in 1998), spread across 5 countries and 40 projects (see Table 5.1). With the exception of Chile, all countries have received increased support, and a special emphasis has been placed in Guatemala.

The space that the program bought within Fafi (and later, after the 1993 merger with Fafo, in the Centre for International Studies), allowed the overall organization to expand its activities and prominence internationally. The Centre and all its programs, including Npip, now generate one-third of Fafo's income. Npip is supervised by the director of the Centre for International Studies, and staffed by a Brazil coordinator (the same member of staff

Table 5.1 Npip projects 1992 and 1997, per country (1992 actual costs, 1997 budget)

Country	Number of projects		Allocation in NOK	
	1992	1997	1992	1997
Brazil	10	14	3,276,686	4,402,200
Chile	4	4	1,135,669	726,000
Guatemala	3	12	1,330,575	5,187,600
Paraguay	2	3	661,502	1,089,000
Peru	6	6	1,025,604	2,399,100
Regional		1		264,000
Monitoring				1,021,540
Total	25	40	7,430,036	15,089,440

since 1991, with a year away on secondment) and a Spanish-speaking countries coordinator (the second member of staff to take this position, taking his post in 1996).

Fafo came into the national limelight in 1993 when Larssen invited Palestinians and Israelis to Oslo to prepare the groundwork for the peace accord. The Oslo Agreement, though well regarded, nonetheless created a stir in Norway, generating accusations against Larssen over alleged back-room wheeling and dealing. Many (both in and out of Fafo) believe that opposition parties targeted Fafo after the Oslo accord, suggesting that the Institute received too much government money and was too close to power. Fuel was added to the fire when Larssen, having left Fafo and been made a cabinet minister, was forced to resign over his handling of an investigation into his tax status.

While unrelated to Npip, the attention levied on Fafo has raised the tension level surrounding the evaluation. A number of people interviewed expressed concern that decisions about the program made in response to this evaluation may not be made on the basis of merit, but on the now-fading political focus on Fafo. Since the October 1997 election of the Christian Democrats, however, no particular attention has been placed to the Institute or its workings.

The timing of the evaluation itself is also of great importance. Never in the program's 14 year history has an evaluation been undertaken, and decisions have been stayed until its completion: this evaluation is to be used to make a number of key decisions, the most sensitive of which is whether to maintain the program at Fafo. The evaluation was originally to have been completed by the end of 1997 to feed into a New Year's decision to continue Fafo's contract; that decision has now been postponed to the end of 1998. As of October 1997, the new government in Norway has announced a pro-aid and pro-human rights emphasis for its development cooperation, and may well allocate substantial new sums for programming in the area of indigenous rights.

5.3 THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Norwegian development and foreign ministries are tightly intertwined. Though formally integrated in 1990, the two maintain considerable operational autonomy through two ministers with different responsibilities and portfolios. Although not directly linked to the Npip, the Ministry commissioned the evaluation at the request of Norad, and has taken an interest because of the program's political salience within Norway, its role in Latin America (where Norway has very little presence), and the importance of indigenous rights to Norway's work within the UN system, particularly in the Working Group on Indigenous Rights. There is interest in the Ministry in developing a policy and global program on indigenous peoples, similar to the Danish policy, but improving on its weaknesses.

Two branches within the Foreign Ministry are of particular relevance to the program.

5.3.1 The Department for Global Issues

The Ministry's Department for Global Issues undertakes some work concerning indigenous peoples through its UN section: funding to UNICEF for bilingual education in Guatemala, support to girls' education programs (including native languages) in Africa, funding to the now-ended Botswana program for the Bushmen, and efforts to get the FAO to undertake work on indigenous knowledge systems. There is no particular policy or emphasis on indigenous issues outside those projects, but an interest for more focused interventions may exist.

Within the Department's Section for Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance,, a pot of «political» money is available for quick disbursement to high-profile human rights and humanitarian efforts. It is the only operational/project-funding part of the Ministry (a white paper proposal to move it to Norad was recently defeated). Some of the division's money goes to indigenous organizations outside Norway (IWGIA, The Minority Rights Group, the Documentation Centre for Indigenous Peoples in Geneva, and other regional organizations), and in Norway, to the Saami Council to support its participation in international activities. The section is project-oriented, not program-oriented, and has no particular focus or plan for indigenous peoples.

5.3.2 The Legal Affairs Department

Through the Legal Affairs Department (and through the Ministry of Local Government), some funding also goes to indigenous issues within the Nordic Community, the UN, and the EU. One officer noted that the division has very little communication with Fafo or other organizations working in the field in Norway, and very little with Norad.

5.4 THE MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND LABOUR

The Ministry is charged with a number of key interventions regarding the ILO convention on indigenous peoples, and the work of the Saami community on this and other international issues. As also the chief meeting point between the Saami and the Norwegian government, the Ministry is the main source of funding for Saami participation in international fora. Thus far, however, interviewees indicate that few in the Saami community have expressed particular interest in Npip or in aid, preferring to focus their international efforts on the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. Next on the international agenda may well be the expansion of links with Saami people in Russia, Finland and Sweden, rather than expansion to Latin America where some links currently exist. See appendices six and eight for a fuller description of the international debate and work of key Saami institutions.

5.5 THE NGOS AND CHURCHES

There are perhaps only four major NGOs active in the three countries of our fieldwork that also have contacts with and/or policies concerning indigenous peoples: Redd Barna (Save the Children), Norwegian People's Aid, Norwegian Church Aid (which, while funded by the churches, has no evangelical mandate), and the Refugee Council.

Norwegian Church Aid (one of the church-based NGOs) began to focus on indigenous peoples during its work after the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala, and built a program around the prevention of discrimination. At the outset, NCA was operational; now, it supports peoples' organizations' own work. Eight groups are now supported in Guatemala (including CECOPA, COGA and ULEO), of which a large proportion of the membership is indigenous but none are indigenous-specific. In Peru, there is little focus on indigenous peoples; exceptions are work with Diaconia, the Lutheran World Federation's arm, in eco-agriculture in [sic] Ankash, Huan Cavalica, and Cajamarca. In Brazil, NCA supports ISA (also supported by Npip and the Rain Forest Foundation, the only other Norwegian NGOs working on indigenous issues in Brazil).

Norwegian People's Aid reported that the organization hasn't set up an indigenous focus (preferring «popular movements» and «oppressed peoples» as headings), but nonetheless maintain significant projects dealing with indigenous peoples: in Ecuador (run by the Spanish-speaking Npip coordinator in his previous position), Guatemala and Bolivia, and some minor presence in Chile and Nicaragua. In all cases, the focus is on building up existing or new organizations. In Guatemala, where there is an office, NPA works through the Project Counseling Services umbrella, and is linked with the Labour Movement. Because the peace accord specifically deals with indigenous issues, NPA may strengthen this focus of their work. NPA was also one of the organizations called to discuss the fate of the Npip when it moved to Fafo.

The Refugee Council similarly reports that much of its work in Guatemala (the only country of overlap with our fieldwork) is focused on indigenous peoples, but only because they are the bulk of the population and the bulk of the refugees and internally displaced. There is no program or policy specifically focused on indigenous peoples' issues.

Redd Barna, in a like fashion, does not describe its work in Guatemala (also the only country of overlap) specifically in terms of indigenous issues, even when a bulk of its work is with indigenous peoples and in some cases involves education projects to provide bilingual schools as part of a package of rights.

Two smaller NGOs have a particular interest in indigenous issues: The Norwegain Rainforest Foundation (which spends substantial amounts on indigenous issues) and FORUM, whose working group on indigenous peoples is particularly active, headed by Hernan Rojas . A peripheral but perhaps important third addition is the Human Rights Fund.

The Norwegian Rainforest Foundation is headed by Lars Løvold (who was on the Npip Advisory Council for the first three to four years). The Foundation has a similar strategy to Npip, but has a niche in dealing with ecological indigenous issues. Founded in 1989 after popstar Sting's European tour with a Brazilian indigenous leader (and the European-wide impetus subsequently given to indigenous rain forest issues), the Foundation is concentrated on Brazil. ISA is their largest partner, also supported by Npip (as is CTI and CPI). Their biggest accomplishment was the protection of a large indigenous area, and their program has subsequently added work in health, education (bilingual literacy in a culturally-sensitive setting and the training of indigenous teachers), sustainable economic alternatives, and sustainable agriculture. This year's high school campaign (Operasjon Dagsverk, generated through a day's work contribution by a large num-

ber of Norwegian high school students) has provided them with more than three years of funding. New areas of work include Sumatra and Papua New Guinea. Next year will see three new projects: an eight-year commitment to the Yanomami, continuation of a 1993 project for another six years with the Waiampi, and three years with the Rio Negro peoples.

FORUM is an umbrella group for organizations interested in the follow up to the Earth Summit's Agenda 21. At a recent meeting of FORUM's working group on indigenous peoples, questions were raised about the focus of their advocacy. The leadership felt that much needed to be done to bring the Latin American indigenous agenda to Norway; others felt that Norway should increase its international profile on indigenous issues. The group is made up of Saami representatives, NPA, NCA, RFF, and the Development Fund. The group wanted to do a report on indigenous peoples and Norway's policies and to make recommendations for policy, but were advised by Norad to wait until the current evaluation was complete before they acted. The group organized this year's Indigenous Week where Sissel Saugestad from the University of Tromsø spoke, criticizing Npip's focus on Latin America. Concerns raised within the group include:

- The need for a policy like the Danish model to be developed in Norway
- The lack of a holistic approach currently evident in Norway's work with indigenous peoples
- The inappropriateness of using large amounts of money in indigenous projects
- The lack of support to indigenous peoples' own agendas within Norway

The Human Rights Fund, supported by contributions from a dozen Norwegian NGOs, funds human rights organizations all over the world, including in Latin America. Some of those projects encompass indigenous issues.

The missionary organizations (of which 14 are Protestant, and one Catholic) have extensive Norad funding for the development work linked with their evangelical missions. Funneled through the Norsk Misjonsrads Bistandsnemnd (Norwegian Missionary Society) umbrella, the Protestant organizations find Norad funding for their work. Caritas, the Catholic church-based NGO, deals with Norad directly. Of the organizations we contacted, only a few had any work with indigenous peoples in Latin America:

The Lutheran Missionary Society has «integrated village development programs» in Puno, Peru, largely with Aymara-speaking people. This work is not part of a particular strategy for indigenous peoples.

The Missionary Alliance does not work in the three countries we visited, but does work with the Aymara in Bolivia. Again, there is no particular policy for working with indigenous peoples or issues.

The Pentecostal Church had a health program in Peru (the only Norwegian mission-run program in the Amazon), but it is now turned over to the local health authority, still funded from Norway. In Paraguay, the Church runs a health program for the Guarani, recently evaluated by a team including the former Npip coordinator for Paraguay and the other Spanish-speaking countries. That evaluation report has forced the Church to create a policy for its work with indigenous peoples. The manager of the Church's program notes that their change of perception is linked to changes in thinking on indigenous peoples among other Norwegian organizations, including a move toward more human rights work and more work with culture issues.

The Santalmisjonen works with indigenous people in Ecuador.

5.6 THE RESEARCH COMMUNITY

Within the Norwegian research community, four organizations were presented as candidates when the program was initially moved from Norad.

Nupi, the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Policy, has grown from 14 researchers in 1990 to 70 researchers today, encompassing both research and active training components. When Nupi's Board decided in 1990 to decline the offer of managing the program, the decision may have been made on the grounds that the Institute then had a research-only mandate and a small staff. Today, the situation is different, and the program would likely not be refused. On staff, Harald Skar (author of the initial feasibility report and very briefly the manager of the program in Fafo) remains the sole specialist on indigenous issues.

Sum, the Centre for Environment and Development at the University of Oslo, has a particular focus on the environmental-development link which may well encompass indigenous management of natural resources. When the program was available in 1990, however, the centre may have withdrawn its candidacy on the grounds that it was not interested in administering a non-research program. It

is not yet known whether Sum would present its candidature today.

Nihr, the Norwegian Institute for Human Rights has no special program of focus on indigenous peoples, it has on staff the earlier Spanish-speaking coordinator of the program at Fafo, as well as an early member of the Npip board. It is not yet known whether the Institute would present an application for the program today.

The Christian Michelsen Institute in Bergen, is one of the main sources of academic writing and consulting on development issues within Norway. It is not yet known whether the Institute would present an application for the program today.

Today, the Saami research community has also become interested in the program. Two such organizations have presented papers in the course of this evaluation to support greater involvement of Saami researchers and research institutions in Norway's overall strategy.

Centre for Environment and Development Studies (Semut) at The University of Tromsø runs joint university capacity-building programs or undertakes research in Botswana, Guatemala, Cameroon, Mali, Vietnam, Tibet and Namibia on issues that affect indigenous peoples particularly. The centre also makes an argument that university-based organizations have a special capacity in undertaking this kind of work:

1. Universities and their professionals have formed an important knowledge base when actions have been taken by indigenous peoples' organizations to forward their interests
2. Universities are better able to develop and maintain information gathered in the course of development work
3. Universities are also better able to meet the need of educating scientists with an indigenous background.

In its submission to the evaluation team, Semut argues that the current system (Npip in Fafo) means that:

> Many opportunities for constructing links between central and local Saami organisations and similar NGOs in the partner countries are being lost. Regarding managing capabilities in this field, there are today many alternatives that could be utilised, including the relevant centres at the University of Tromsø and the secretariat of the Saami Parliament. Another option could be a connected strategy.

By way of proposal, Semut advocates for a renewed double-strategy for Norway's aid program for indigenous peoples. One aspect would be for the government to support and maintain the relationship with NGOs, but representing broader segments of indigenous minorities. On the Norwegian side, Saami organisations (including possibly the Saami Parliament) should be more closely integrated into the national strategy.

Centre for Sami Studies, also at the University of Tromsø, submitted a second position paper. Agreeing with the thrust of the Semut position, the Centre concludes with:

> The Centre for Environment and Development Studies states in their note ... that it would perhaps be natural to involve Sami organisations and the Sami Parliament in a national strategy and this is a view we support. There could be different methods of involvement and organisation, but at this point we feel that this is a question which should be put forward to Sami organisations and the Sami Parliament.

5.7 OTHER SAAMI ORGANIZATIONS

Appendix 4 describes more fully the nature of the debate on Saami involvement in Norway's international programming, including:

The Saami Council, now encompassing relations with Saami people throughout the Arctic Circle, is the least likely to focus its efforts on Latin America, preferring to build on its existing Nordic networks.

The Saami Parliament, once headed by Ole Henrik Magga, an ardent promoter of Latin American-Saami links, may in the future be interested in working on an operational level. Its current international focus is on rights issues within the UN and on Northern Saami networks. A member of the parliament staff is on the Npip Board. It is unknown whether the Parliament would wish to become directly involved in Norway's development programming abroad.

The author of appendix 4, Professor Henry Minde at the University of Tromsø, concludes his review of the work of the Council, Parliament, and the University centres by arguing that:

> It is not enough to include the Sami perspective on [the work of Npip]. It is fair to say that my paper has shown that the research and organization capacity of the Samis has obviously increased during the 1990s. A natural

consequence should therefore be that the Sami organizations and institutions be rightly included as a part of the development aid. Assessments have to be made regarding how fast and how much of the development aid focused on indigenous people should be transferred, step by step, to Sami organizations and institutions.

As the next steps are contemplated after the completion of the evaluation, it is clear that the Saami research and political community need to be included in the discussions.

5.8 VOLUME OF SPENDING

This description of the relevant community is important to illustrate the breadth of interest and involvement in indigenous issues. Also important is a quick look at the volume of spending these organizations incur in programs identified as having an indigenous focus or effect on indigenous peoples.

A thumbnail sketch collected by Norad indicates a total of NOK 82.5 million spent last year from all sources (le 5.2). That total is heavily dominated by work in Guatemala (figure 5.3), and by Norad bilateral funding, Npip spending, and the work of Norwegian missionary societies and Norwegian Church Aid (figure 5.4). Npip, while *the* major player in this field, is thus only part of a wider overall Norwegian «program» of support, both official and non-governmental.

5.9 ASSESSMENT

This final section of the chapter offers an assessment of the current Norwegian system, concentrating on two areas of concern: communication and integration of issues within Norway, and political commitment to take the work further.

5.9.1 Communication and Integration

Given the small constituency involved in indigenous issues in Norway's development community, and the cumulative volume of work it supports, it is remarkable how little each member knows about the work of the other.

The Foreign Ministry's branches do not know what programs each undertakes, nor do they know much of what is happening in the non-governmental world. The communication between Norad and the Ministry is poor on indigenous issues, and neither knows very much about the domestic work of the Ministry of Labour and Local Government with Norwegian Saami. Given that indigenous issues have parliamentary sanction, and there is obvious interest in promoting that work further, it is no le how little departments with overlapping mandates communicate, either formally or informally.

Within the NGO world, and particularly among the big four (NCA, NPA, Redd Barna, and the Refugee Council), communication is much better. None other than RFF and the Indigenous Working Group of FORUM, however, have a focus on indigenous peoples. Native populations may be among their target groups, but largely because they are the poorest in Latin communities, not because they are indigenous per se.

Within this system, Npip stands remarkably alone. While there is field contact between Npip staff and project officers from other NGOs, the silence in Oslo is deafening. There is no regular formal communication between Npip and other members in the community. A number of reasons have been put forward to explain this lack of synergy. Prominent is resentment felt within the NGO community over Npip's preferential treatment by Norad, but perhaps equally valid are constraints on Npip's tiny staff of two.

For the longevity of the program and the potential success of a new Norwegian policy on indigenous peoples, these gaps in communication will need to be addressed.

Table 5.2 Norwegian Support to Indigenous Peoples, estimates of all channels

Note: This table is indicative of the scope of programming only. Drawn from a telephone survey by a Norad desk officer, it is *not* a representation of official figures.

Norwegian Organization	Country	NOK estimate, 1996
Norad, Central America	Guatemala	28,000,000
Norad, AMB Botswana	Botswana	1,300,000
		470,000
		1,000,000
Norwegian Church Aid	Botswana	200,000
	Namibia	400,000
	Brazil	800,000
	Guatemala	360,000
	Guatemala	190,000
	Honduras	88,000
	Nicaragua	410,000
	Peru	270,000
	Paraguay	200,000
	India	500,000
	Laos	2,000,000
	Philippines	50,000
	Vietnam	300,000
SAIH	Bolivia	380,000
		290,000
Norwegian CARE	Nicaragua	800,000
	Vietnam	900,000
Norwegian CARITAS	Bolivia	1,250,000
	Guatemala	90,000
Norwegian Missionary Alliance	Bolivia	10,000,000
Norwegian Santal Mission	Bangladesh	1,500,000
	Bhutan	790,000
	Ecuador	1,600,000
	India	900,000
Norwegian Missionary Aid	Cameroon	850,000
Norwegian Lutheran Mission	Bolivia	1,200,000
	Peru	1,700,000
Seventh Day Adventists	Paraguay	1,800,000
Fafo	**Brazil**	**4,000,000**
	Chile	**600,000**
	Guatemala	**5,000,000**
	Paraguay	**1,100,000**
	Peru	**1,900,000**
	Regional America	**390,000**
IWGIA	Program	720,000
Rainforest Foundation	Brazil	3,000,000
	Regional Asia	230,000
Development Fund	Costa Rica	360,000
	Nicaragua	180,000
Stromme Foundation	India	42,000
	India	214,000
	International	80,000
	Peru	1,050,000
[Flyktningeradet]	Guatemala	1,100,000
[Fadderforeningen Tso Pema]	Nepal	180,000
Norwegian People's Aid	Chile	240,000
	Ecuador	
	Honduras	190,000
	Guatemala	160,000
	Guatemala	200,000
	Guatemala	210,000
	Guatemala	
[Nordisk Ministerrad]	Seminar	115,000
International Alliance of Indigenous Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forest	Conference	700,000
Total		82,549,000



Figure 5.3 Norwegian Support to Indigenous Peoples by Country (Derived from Table 5.2)



Figure 5.4 Norwegian Support to Indigenous Peoples by Agency (Derived from Table 5.2)

5.9.2 Political Commitment

A second source of concern is the lack of political commitment toward maintaining and consolidating Norway's work on indigenous peoples.

An Indigenous Bandwagon? One issue reiterated during interviews was the disparity between Norway's international profile as a promoter of indigenous issues (primarily through the UN Working Group), and the lack of attention to the indigenous agenda, other than the Saami's, within Norway. The lack of a clear-cut policy by the government is important, but within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is willingness to design a policy that is similar to, but much improved upon, the Danish policy. On the other side of the coin, there is also an issue among some that Norway has leapt upon an indigenous bandwagon, irresponsibly currying public favour, painting images of the «virtuous Indian» (especially when described as guardians of the rainforest).

A Latin Foothold? Others have asked whether Npip is simply an excuse to maintain a foothold into Latin America. One observer commented that it is appropriate for Norway to maintain its focus in Africa, where it has a long history, shared language, and missionary contacts. Work in Latin America and with indigenous peoples is more difficult because there are no historical connections, it is hard to pin down «indigenousness» in some countries, the overall Hispanic/lusophone culture is alien to Norwegians, and the Norwegian preference to give aid government-to-government is made more difficult by human rights problems.

The program exists in part because of Norway's interest in Nicaragua and Guatemala,[3] its concerns with the violence and authoritarianism in the region, its focus on gender equity, and a genuine feeling of solidarity. These links are not, however, very strong. As we see below, a recent interdepartmental review of the program voted to pull the program from Latin America altogether.

In 1994, a small working group with Norad and MFA participation met a number of times to review the work of Npip and to suggest changes in Norway's promotion of indigenous affairs more widely. The group was formed at a time of (unexplained) dissatisfaction with the program's presence in Fafo.

The main principles of support recommended were:

- Indigenous peoples should not remain on the sidelines of Norad's assistance program
- Indigenous peoples' issues should be given separate, non-country-specific, emphasis
- Indigenous peoples' support should have clearer goals
- Indigenous support should be process-oriented
- Geographical emphasis shall move away from Latin America
- Indigenous peoples' support should be more proactive
- Resources should be allocated for more active Norad administration
- Once every two years, Norad will call a meeting of all Norwegian NGOs, government agencies, churches to discuss indigenous issues

The report thus reflects a deep ambivalence about indigenous issues within the working group. At the same time that indigenous issues are to become more central in Norway's policy, recommendations to move away from Latin America – the region in the work where indigenous debates are the most well articulated – indicate a responsiveness to Norwegian, rather than indigenous, priorities.

We agree with the special emphasis on indigenous peoples, but we strongly disagree that country choices be subjected to overall core country emphasis. With the same rationale that guides our objection to GNP per capita exclusion (discussed later) – because indigenous peoples remain among the poorest even in wealthier countries – we find that a focus on Norway's core countries is not meaningful if support to active indigenous movements is to be the main criterion for country choice.

We also agree that any overall policy needs to have a clearer focus. Responsiveness to the agendas of indigenous peoples needs to be elaborated at the policy level, just as we have recommended at the program level. Why, after all, should the Norwegian government place indigenous issues squarely on its policy map? Any decision needs to start from a clear conviction of purpose and strategy. The Danish strategy, elaborated in the final chapter of this report, is a good starting point and comple-

[3] There are two evaluations now completed on Norway's support to Guatemala. One investigated the support given to four Norwegian NGOs: Redd Barna, Norwegian Church Aid, Norwegian Peoples' Aid and the Refugee Council under a special Peace Package allocation, due to continue for another two to four years. Another is a desk study commissioned by the MFA, undertaken by the Peace Research Institute and the Christian Michelsen Institute, on the support given by Norway to the peace process.

ment to the recommendation that Norad meet regularly with other Norwegian actors to elaborate a country-wide strategy for support. Part of the Norwegian scene, of course, is the indelible political link between domestic indigenous issues, the international work of the Saami community and Norway's foreign aid program. The question is where to go from there.

6. The Organization and Work in Norway

In this chapter, we review our findings about the organizational management of the program, including its communication and outreach work.[4] This portion of the evaluation is a summary of findings elaborated more fully in appendix 1.

Beginning with a review of the Npip-Fafo relationship, we find that Fafo has competently managed the day-to-day administration of the program, including hiring and retaining high-quality staff and disbursing money in a timely fashion. We find, however, that there is a lack of strategic planning within the Institute to take the program further, and that there has been little progress in fulfilling the Norwegian portion of the mandate. The chapter thus ends with a discussion of areas of opportunity for improvement, focusing on the strengthening of the Advisory Council.

6.1 FAFO-NORAD RELATIONS

A key element is the successful management of the Npip is the relationship between Fafo and Norad. While there may have been strained relations in the past, Fafo-Norad relations have improved considerably. Today's challenges are in jointly tackling strategic planning.

6.1.1 Norad Involvement

Norad has four levels of potential involvement in Npip affairs: the Director General; the Director of the NGO Department; the Head of Division, NGO Department; and the Senior Executive Officer. At various points in the program's history, some senior staff members have been more involved with the program's direction and focus than others, sometimes leading to serious strains in the Norad-Fafo relationship. The relationship between Npip program coordinators and the Norad Senior Executive Officer tends to be of an accounting nature.

The layers of responsibility are important in the assessment of Npip because of our finding that Norad policies toward the program, both contractual and informal, have changed over the course of its existence. As a government department, Norad has been uncomfor le with the delegation of a government program outside of the agency, at the same time that Norad has acknowledged its own inability to manage the program internally for staffing reasons. That institutional ambivalence has meant that individuals within the department have been at greater liberty to support or undermine the program according their own interests, despite the presence of a long-term, four-year first contract from 1991–95. The lack of firm institutional support within Norad has been a key cause for the weakness in strategic planning at Fafo, discussed below. While relations are much improved today, Norad's control of Npip and changing perceptions of FAFO's management of the problem have led to confusion within Npip and a sense of uncertainty. Npip requires a period of contractual stability in order for its staff to effectively plan for the future.

6.1.2 The contractual relationship

For administrative purposes, Norad sees Fafo as an «as-if» (quasi) NGO and attempts to stay out of its affairs. The current framework uses the same annual process for NGOs as is used for Npip, but the relationship is no ly different. Norad is more heavily involved in Npip's core area and country policy strategies than if it were truly an NGO, and a representative from Norad sits on the Npip board. Recent interviews indicate that Norad staff do not feel like the agency has *enough* strategic input on the program. Yet at the same time, Norad has become less involved in the program of its own volition and has reduced its involvement to a reporting relationship. In general, the decreased involvement of Norad is viewed by Fafo as a negative. Both groups are happy that Norad is on the Advisory Council.

Over time, the roles of Norad and Fafo in the setting of the work plans have changed. At present, Fafo develops the plan and Norad responds to it. However, since the desk officer is not an expert on indigenous issues, Norad's involvement tends to focus on the budget rather than on strategic issues. Lines of communication are typically between the program coordinators and the desk officer, which again emphasizes budgetary aspects with less focus on substantive issues.

---

[4] The organizational research was undertaken by Erik Whist of Scanteam, whose full report is attached as appendix 1. In addition to that report, supplementary data has been collected by Canadian team members. The field work in Norway in both cases comprised document analysis and personal interviews.

In general, Norad representatives have said that Fafo has done a good job with consolidating the administrative procedures for the program. Norad has not conveyed to us any fundamental problems with Fafo, reporting that the agency is happy with the current arrangement. However, Npip is an anomaly among Norad programs, administratively isolated from the rest of the agency's activities, and geographically isolated because Latin America is not a funding priority for Norad (with the noted exception of Nicaragua and Guatemala). In addition, Norad does not have a specific policy for indigenous peoples, a characteristic which further isolates Npip activities from the Norwegian government's mainstream aid portfolio.

Clarifying Norad's role within the management of the Npip is a *key area of opportunity*. In addition, providing long-term s ility to the Npip management is critical, along with developing ways to reduce the isolation of the Npip from the rest of Norad.

6.2 INTERNAL FAFO RELATIONS

The work of the program coordinators within the larger Institute is also a source of concern and opportunity, both in terms of the management of the program (including divisions of labour and program strategy) and the role of the program inside Fafo.

6.2.1 Strategic divisions of labour

Npip is managed by two program coordinators, forming a separate unit directly under the supervision of Centre for International Studies (CIS) Director. One coordinator has been there since 1991 (with a sabbatical leave); the other, since 1996. The CIS Director, who has experience in managing development projects, follows the program closely but does not overrule the coordinators. He is well informed about the overall and main aspects of Npip, although he is not involved in every project in detail. He is most involved in the following tasks:

- Preparation of the Npip activity plan
- Information dissemination
- Preparation of, and participation, in Advisory Council meetings

The program coordinators are responsible for program delivery and work autonomously. The division of labor is country-based: one coordinator manages Npip activities in Brazil, while the other manages activities in the remaining countries (Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay and Chile). A division of labour based on country has evolved over time and with the language and field experience of the coordinators. There seems to be little strategic rationale for the division of the program in this manner, however, other than to correspond to the country experience and language skills of the coordinators. Table 6.1 shows the main characteristics of this division; note also the unequal division of budget and number of projects.

Table 6.1 Program Profile For The Two Npip Coordinators

	Coordinator 1	Coordinator 2
Countries	Brazil	Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru
Number of projects	14	26
Amount in NOK	4.402.200	10.6877.240
Indigenous organizations	5	13
Pro-indigenous Organizations	6	8

In addition to these allocations of budget, projects and geographical spread, there is a practical division of labor regarding financial reporting. Coordinator two is more familiar with spread sheets and project management tools. He prepares the consolidated financial overview including inputs from Coordinator one. Previously, Coordinator one focused more on relations to other Fafo units and Coordinator two more on Norad and other external contacts. This division of labour is no longer in place.

There is, however, a strong assessment among the evaluation team members that the program would benefit from stronger integration between the two components. To a large degree, Npip operates as two programs run by two separate individuals. While some integration does exists, it tends to be of a communicative or reporting nature, ensuring that the three Npip staff members (the two coordinators and the CIS director) are informed about aspects of the program. This collaborative work is done through the following mechanisms:

- Joint preparation of plans and reports to Norad
- Circulation of travel reports
- Joint signature by the two coordinators on communications out of the Npip unit

6.2.2 Relations with other parts of Fafo

Currently, there is also little integrative management within the Npip unit and Fafo at large. Npip staff are not well integrated in the larger organization, nor are regular Fafo staff involved in the work of the program. There are no other programs in the Institute, other than perhaps the People-to-People program in Palestine, that focus on NGOs, and none that focus on indigenous peoples or in Latin America.

The coordinators report that the unit acts on its own and is not functionally interrelated with other Fafo divisions or within the rest of the CIS unit. It is felt that other departments and sections have little understanding of the specific nature of working with indigenous groups and the particular challenges of managing development cooperation support, although the current Director has made strides in sharing information about the program within the Institute. In particular, he is of the opinion that there is scope for closer communication and cooperation between Npip and other CIS activities:

- Support to NGOs, which is done through several CIS activities. Particularly the «People to People» program in Palestine and Israel have some similarities with Npip because they involve several NGOs where cross fertilization is also a target (Fafo has considered merging these two)
- Democracy and human rights, which is an important dimension in most CIS activities
- Living conditions, including living conditions surveys and indicators
- Many projects are development assistance, including institution building and management of financial support

In spite of this list of potential interactions, it is recognized that substantive integration and cooperation between Npip and other SIS activities is still not very close and that synergy has not been achieved so far. While Norad has requested that cross-fertilization occur within Fafo, it is over ambitious to expect that the Npip can internally export indigenous expertise throughout Fafo. On the other hand, the research strengths of other Fafo units might potentially be of use to the program to expand the mandate for Norwegian outreach.

The evaluation team finds that the development of an organizational management structure for Npip (above the current loose composition of individuals) is a *key area of opportunity*. Furthermore, an organizational set-up which focuses on greater cross-fertilization is a *key area of opportunity*.

6.3 PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

On the day-to-day level, however, we find that Fafo is responding well to Norad's requirement that an outside agency strengthen the program administratively and professionally. Fafo has es lished a good system for procedures on project/task execution, resource flows and administrative communication with those directly involved with Npip. Planning, implementation, budgetary control and reporting on projects function well, both between Npip and the participating organizations as well as between Npip and Norad. Paperwork is lean, records are competently kept, reporting procedures are sound, and accounting is competent. Fafo has also certainly expanded the professional resources involved the program, both through its retention of high-quality staff, but also its recruitment of a specialized and skilled Advisory Council.

The competence of the administration of the program and program funds has further been substantiated by the field research in Latin America.

6.4 STRATEGIC PLANNING

Although strong in administration, the program – including staff, Fafo, and Norad – is nonetheless weak in strategic planning. The evaluation finds weaknesses at a number of levels of strategic planning in the program, including its country mix, choice of core areas, and reactive stance.

6.4.1 Country choice

Despite the field success of many of Npip-funded projects within Latin America, there is a lack of shared and coherent strategic program planning for a given country or across the region. The division of labour by country has made joint planning difficult, and has meant that country (and regional) profiles remain the unwritten property of individual program coordinators. These problems of institutional memory have not become serious because the coordination staff has been s le, but their personal proximity to the program is risky. One of the risks, certainly, is in running the program as business-as-usual without reviewing its focus and impact. We are concerned, for example,

that neither staff nor management of the program have undertaken an effort to demonstrate how the current program mix (of countries, organizations, and projects) contributes to Npip's overall mandate.

6.4.2 Core areas and selection criteria

Another concern is with the partly arbitrary use of core areas and selection criteria. While core areas have nominally been identified, they do not necessarily reflect indigenous needs by country or region, nor are they consistently applied.

Article 4 in Enclosure III to the contract between Norad and Fafo states the following areas for project selection:

- Core areas:
  1. Human rights and health
  2. Culture and education
  3. Institution building and networking
- Emphasis on economic, social and ecological sustainability
- Geographic concentration: only projects in Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil and Chile may receive Npip support

This current list does not adequately reflect the priorities identified in our research and field visits – particularly in relation to land tenure, land use, and economic activity. A case in point was the 1995 decision to make income-generating projects ineligible for funding in 1995. Because the program coordinators felt they were not able to adequately monitor income-generating production work, a joint decision between Norad and Fafo was taken to eliminate new projects in this area. The decision was also discussed and agreed with the Advisory Council, but no feedback from the perspective of indigenous groups was obtained.

From an indigenous needs perspective, there is no strategic rationale for this loss of production projects. A lack of capacity in Norway on a key area of intervention should have been the subject for broader consultation and, in this case, for increasing the needed administrative skills in Oslo rather than for eliminating an important – albeit very difficult – part of the portfolio. This decision, among others we note in the program chapter, seems to reflect Norwegian priorities rather than indigenous needs.

In any case, the three existing core areas are not rigidly applied to screen projects, but are used retroactively as categories for reporting on projects once underway. There are also no explicit criteria to identify the type of organizations that may receive support, as long as they are either indigenous or pro-indigenous. Furthermore, while the 1997 contract stipulates that social, economic and ecological sustainability are to be used as additional criteria, these screens are not systematically applied. While project coordinators informally appear to apply social and economic sustainability screens in project reviews (i.e., at the time of the annual requests), they have not discussed or appear to use ecological sustainability screens.

6.4.3 Responsive or reactive?

The use of the core areas to describe past activities rather than to plan for new ones may, perhaps, stem from the Npip's philosophy of *responsiveness* to indigenous needs. However, from a planning perspective there is a key difference between a *strategically responsive* management approach (finding out what's needed on a broad scale) and a *tactically reactive* (waiting to be told what's needed) approach.

Currently, staff members focus on managing the current portfolio and using the monitoring visits to find new opportunities and determine indigenous needs; program staff thus often appear simply to react to requests. A *strategically responsive* identification of the actors and initiatives that express the «needs» and the «agenda» of the indigenous peoples, however, needs to structure portfolio development much more closely, because a *tactically reactive* approach alone carries the danger of losing touch with the broader agenda. Responsiveness at the project level, by contrast, implies the use of criteria based first on a strategic reading of the indigenous situation and agenda.

Strategic planning is critical if the program is to expand and remain relevant over the long term. The Advisory Council could provide guidance, particularly if its role is strengthened. Obviously, there could be greater strategic dialogue among the project coordinators, the CIS Director, the board, indigenous representatives from Latin America, and Norad. Strategic planning has thus been identified as a *key area of opportunity*.

6.5 COMMUNICATION IN NORWAY

Fafo's mandate is twofold: both to administer development funds in Latin America, and

> To contribute to increased involvement of and comprehension of issues related to indigenous peoples in the Norwegian development community and the public at large.

To this effect the contract (article 2.6) states that Fafo «shall build up a practically oriented resource base on indigenous populations with a view to strengthen the basis for the Program and to be a resource base for the Norwegian development assistance community.» Toward that end, the 1997 plan identifies three types of activities to be undertaken to target development cooperation and public opinion in Norway:

1. Systematization of experiences and professional development
   - Study facilities and advice to post graduate students
   - Seminars on themes and issues related to Npip
   - Preparation and publication of reports on themes and issues related to Npip

2. Information
   - Preparation and publication of presentation brochure and other information material
   - Participation in the «cooperation market place» and other cooperation fora

3. Coordination
   - Participation in meetings and conferences
   - Project cooperation and coordination with other international organizations

6.5.1 Systemization

Despite contractual obligations, Fafo and the Npip unit have not been able to systematize and disseminate their experience and knowledge on indigenous populations and development programming. Expertise gained from the management of Npip has not been actively disseminated nor has the Npip unit within Fafo often acted as a resource to other Norwegian groups. NGOs rarely approach Fafo for information and have not actively sought ongoing involvement with Fafo.[5]

An *important* exception to this finding is the 1996 when a day-long seminar on the program's experiences working in Latin America was held, and a conference report subsequently published in English. Another exception was the 1996 tour of Mayan Indians to visit the Saami community in Norway.

6.5.2 Information dissemination

It is a shared view that relatively little has been achieved in this regard in the course of the Fafo Norad cooperation.

Prior to the 1995 contract, Norad objected to most of Fafo's initiatives to fulfill this part of their mandate, thus providing an unreasonable obstacle to the fulfillment of their mandate. Part of Norad's difficulty might be explained by alleged concerns that Fafo had not been identifying the program as the work of the government. Whatever its truth then, there seems little evidence to support this allegation today. The most recent brochure and annual report appropriately places the Norad-Fafo relationship into context.

Moreover, the dispute over the provision of public information seems no longer to be a problem. On the contrary, in the annual Enclosure I to the contract, Norad has emphasized efforts to expand information on Npip and to increase cooperation and integration between Npip and other institutions and groups.

Although the budget allocation for information dissemination has been increased, little was accomplished before the March 1998 publication of a revised annual report and a new information brochure. Earlier promotion was limited to two channels: the annual report and Fafo's website. The annual reports, published since 1993 in Norwegian and (in 1995 and 1996) in English, have been the main source of information about the program. The detailed project and contextual descriptions contained in the report are rich sources of information, but were neither designed nor used to «market» the program or indigenous issues in Norway. On Fafo's website, Npip is not prominently displayed (http://www. Fafo.no/engelsk/) and the information on-line was out-of-date when we reviewed it.[6] There is also neither a link from Npip's website to Norad (http://www. Norad.no/eng/eng.html), nor any mention on Norad's website of Npip.

Although relatively little has been done to date, more is planned in this year (see Table 6.2). Staff indicate that the pressure of the workload is the main impediment to expansion.

---

5 This reluctance may, in part, be due to jealousies regarding Fafo's perceived «favouritism» from Norad due to Npip's 100 percent funding.

6 In contrast, Fafo's internet marketing of the People-to-People program (http://www.people-tp-people.org/) is vastly superior to Npip's coverage. For example, the site includes a 1998 call for project proposals, guidelines for applicants, project design summary, and listing of in-country NGOs.

Table 6.2 Objectives and achievements, 1997

Objectives and actions	Expected results 1997	Achieved results 1997
Systematization of experiences		
a) Es lishment of study facilities for graduate students	Recruit one graduate student	No
b) Seminar on themes of relevance to Npip	Undertake one seminar	No
c) Preparation and Publication of reports with themes from the Program	Publish report from seminar	No
Make the Program known		
a) Preparation and publication of presentation brochure on Npip	Publish brochure	Yes
b) Preparation and publication of other information material	Annual report Program on Internet	YesNo
c) Participation in seminars and meetings on and for Norwegian development cooperation	Participation in seminars and meetings	Some
Better coordination with other organizations		
a) Participate in meetings and seminars	Participate in meetings and seminars	Little
b) Project cooperation and coordination with other donors	Maintain and develop further present level of contacts	With international donors

6.5.3 Communications Strategy

According to the 1997 contractual priorities, Norad wants communication and resource dissemination to be included among Npip's activities in Norway. However, this element requires additional communication competencies *over and above* programming skills. In general, there does not appear to a strategic plan for communication, outreach and networking within Norway. Furthermore, if communication and resource dissemination in Norway are to truly become Npip priorities, then this expansion may require greater Advisory Council direction and involvement.

Improving these activities is a *key area of opportunity.*

6.6 ROLE OF THE ADVISORY COUNCIL

The role of the Npip Advisory Council has significantly changed over time. In the original 1991 draft agreement with Fafo, the Advisory Council had a much more powerful role to compensate for Fafo's lack of programming experience and lack of indigenous expertise. Originally designed as an the Advisory *Board,* it was to be responsible for the allocation of Npip funds and for appraising the professional quality of individual projects. The Board was to be responsible to Norad for the use of the funds and compliance with Npip guidelines, and was to be composed of members from relevant institutions and organizations and of individual resource persons. Fafo would have one seat in the Board, while Norad would not be a member of the Board. However, soon after the decision to move the program was put into place, Fafo objected to the proposed plan and Norad accepted these objections in the signing of the final document. The Board's role thus became advisory and not directive, and Fafo became responsible for appointing board members.

Overall, the involvement of the Advisory Council has been beneficial to the program: members have helped the coordinators deal with specific difficulties and general policy issues, and the overall Board was active in the heated discussions with Norad prior to the 1995 contract. With the 1995 contract, Norad became an observer to the Board, a move which is unanimously thought to be beneficial. In general, the Board has focused less on strategic issues and more on repairing Norad- Fafo relations, and has recently has requested increased involvement on strategic programming and less focus on reporting relations (see the Board memo, June 1995).

However, evaluation team shares some of the Board's concerns. We note that the number of meetings has declined from the minimum required (although the contract states that Advisory Council shall have three meetings a year, two meetings were held in 1995 and 1996 and only one in 1997), and we note further that the minutes and

agendas of meetings have been focused on procedural rather than strategic discussions. We are concerned that the Board has come to play a less pivotal and instrumental role in the development of the Npip.

The strengthening of the Advisory Council is a *key area of opportunity*.

6.7 NPIP BUDGET

The contract between Norad and Fafo states that Norad will finance Fafo's administrative costs for managing the program. Fafo receives 100 percent of program and administrative costs in contrast to the 80 percent funding normally allocated to NGOs, a point which we have mentioned has caused friction. Because Npip is a government program, we consider that full funding is appropriate but find the «as-if» arrangement an unsui le vehicle. It does not necessarily serve the program's public relations well if Npip is «disguised» as an NGO in governmental clothing.

The 1997 administrative budget included an allocation of NOK 1,722,000 for personnel, which also includes the cost of Fafo's administrative overhead. This allocation covers: salaries and social costs; management; professional advice; support services (accounting, financial supervision, auditing, computer services, secretarial services, office facilities, layout and printing of reports, and telecommunications). The percentage allocated to administration now appears reasonable: in 1997 the personnel cost represented 9.7 percent of total program cost, down from a 15.4 percent in 1992 (noting, however, that certain individual project costs were previously included in the administrative budget, and so budgets for the different years are not directly comparable).

Norad finds the present personnel cost acceptable. The Npip salary rate to Norad is NOK 76.000, which is lower than Fafo's set international rates of NOK 89,000 person/month, but higher than its national rate of 71,500. The Npip rate is also lower than the average CIS rate of NOK 80,100.

In general, our review of the overall Npip budget finds the allocations to administration to be reasonable. However, the evaluation team notes that communication costs are low, particularly if Fafo wishes to comply with the second part of the mandate. Greater communication funds are required in order to carry out the mandate, but we warn against taking funding from the current project portfolio. Increased communication funding is a *key area of opportunity*.

6.8 ASSESSMENT

In general, the organizational assessment of the program is favourable: Fafo has competently staffed and managed the administrative work of a difficult program. However, our main criticism is that the scope of Fafo's management of Npip is rather narrow, focused on maintaining business as usual. Specifically, there are some important shortcomings which are constraints to the future development of the Npip in a broader policy and strategy context: See the summary in Table 6.3.

The Two Program Approach. Npip is managed as two separate program components with little cross fertilization: Brazil (Portuguese speaking) and the other countries (Spanish speaking). Npip does not currently operate as an organization or a program, but rather as separate programs managed by individuals. Furthermore, there is no substantive rationale based on indigenous issues for the way the program has come to consist of two components, or for the current mix of core areas. The division of labour by country, budget, and number of projects is strikingly unbalanced.

Weakness in Strategic Planning. The annual plans and reports focus on individual projects and very little on strategic policy issues on support to indigenous populations and Npip as a whole. It is unclear why and how country choices, core areas and criteria are decided, and what direction the program is heading.

Table 6.3 Summary of the Organizational Assessment of the Npip

Strengths	Weaknesses	Areas of Opportunity
• Fafo has contributed to the professional and economic consolidation of the program. • Npip's long presence in Latin America has resulted in successful projects, and successful institutional building efforts. • The program has successfully grown over time. • Norad Fafo relations have improved over time. • Internal relations within Fafo have improved over time. • Advisory Council member expertise is strong (if utilized effectively).	• Npip is isolated from Norad and from the rest of Fafo. • Norad-Npip linkages are not substantive or strategic, but focus on reporting. • In reality, Npip is managed by individuals, not by an organization. • Lack of strategic use of the Advisory Council is a problem. • Communication & networking priorities have not been met. • Little strategic planning has been consistently used. • The Npip unit does not maintain a balanced division of labour.	• Restructure Npip project management. Npip needs organizational management, not just individual management. • Strengthen use of the Advisory Council. • Introduce strategic planning and evaluation regarding funding priorities and achievements. • Introduce a clear Project Evaluation Strategy and Process for Evaluation. • Develop a strong communication and networking plan for Norway • Improve Npip linkages with rest of Norad

Communication and Outreach Gaps. Experiences from Npip are not gathered and disseminated in a systematic manner, and the current plan is likely not sufficient to rectify the situation. Communication, outreach and networking in Norway is weak, due initially to Norad reluctance to fund non-project expenses.

7 The Program in Peru, Brazil and Guatemala

It is against the background of indigenous issues that the research teams were to assess the relevance of Npip's work. Their findings are remarkably consistent. Fieldwork largely corroborated the thrust of the research in Norway, which offered an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the program's administration as part of the explanation for the situation in the field. Summaries of the major strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for change for work in the field are presented in the following few pages, first in general terms, and then in a synthesis of the work in Brazil, Peru, Guatemala, and Norway. It is on the basis of these assessments that we offer an overall diagnosis of the program.

7.1 IMPACT, RELEVANCE AND EFFECTIVENESS

7.1.1 A Caveat And Four Key Outcomes

Before proceeding, however, a crucial caveat is in order. This evaluation did not evaluate the projects themselves but the functioning of the program as a whole. From that standpoint, the ultimate impact of project implementation was not our target.

From the beginning of the exercise, it was made clear to the partner organizations in Latin America that the evaluators they would meet were not to assess their performance, but that of Npip. In this manner, the outcomes of their projects were to a large extent out of bounds. This approach developed into a central feature of the evaluation methodology: for once, Southern partners provided the key inputs for an assessment of a Northern donor. The following discussion of impact should consequently not be construed as a central component of this evaluation, but instead as a useful complement to the discussion of the relevance and effectiveness of the program. It is our contention that a relevant and effective program can properly address the right problems without necessarily generating a significant impact in the short term. In other words, we consider a development program such as Npip as a kind of cancer research: a worthwhile endeavour, but one not to be assessed by the cure it has not yet found.

That being said, our team indeed found results that can be traced, albeit not always exclusively, to Npip. Of these, four must be mentioned because they address issues that are central to the problems and preoccupations of indigenous peoples in the region.

The first is land demarcation in Brazil. Npip was an early and key supporter of organizations such as ISA, CTI and CCPY that played a crucial role in the momentous changes that took place in this area in Brazil, and that saw a tiny, poor and political marginalized sector of the population lay claim to more than 10 percent of the territory of the biggest country of South America. None of those organizations depends exclusively or even primarily on Npip. Interviews in the field, however, showed that all considered the program a trusted partner whose contribution, close presence and reliability was highly valued.

The second area is the institutional development of indigenous organizations. Npip played an important role in the political capacity-building of indigenous peoples, a capacity that has been growing by leaps and bounds in the last fifteen years. This development is certainly crucial to the prospects for these peoples to effectively shape their future. However, the trajectory of indigenous organizations in most countries has been far from straight, with tensions and administrative problems often leading to crisis and division. Npip played a key role, jointly with a few other organizations, in the salvaging of AIDESEP, Peru's main indigenous organizations. Similarly, Npip has been helping COIAB, a major indigenous confederation in the Brazilian Amazon, by financing core organizational needs that most other agencies are reluctant to support, because they are harder to relate to measurable results.

Npip's impact was not only felt at the summit of indigenous umbrella organizations, however. Institutional capacity-building at the grassroots has been one of its main area of activities, and one that is important to the development of an effective capacity for indigenous peoples to shape their own future at all levels and in all issue areas. It is a fact, indeed, that the large federations have difficulty reaching «down» to the everyday life and problems of indigenous populations in addition to having their hands full with the national and the international agenda. Showing openness, a willingness to take risks, and a readiness to devote human resources to small endeavours, the program financed a significant number of initiatives led by small indigenous organizations, in Guatemala especially,

but also in Peru and in Brazil. In most cases, Npip was – and still is – the sole funder of these smaller, weaker, but potentially significant organizations.

Finally, one must mention the remarkable success of health monitor programs, such as PACA's and CPI-Acre's in Brazil and CIPA's in Peru, that led to the government's assumption of program financing, thus multiplying the impact of these programs. These cases, in spite of their limitations, offer good examples of how Npip's small amounts of money but strong and close presence can play an important role as seed for social programs that might not have emerged otherwise in these areas and among those populations.

7.1.2 Impact And Relevance: The Impossible Optimization?

As will be made clear in the following pages, the implementation of Npip had its share of deficiencies and we suggest ways in which those can be tackled. As a rule, however, and this too will be substantiated, our team came to the conclusion that Npip staff did a commendable job. Nevertheless, when one looks at the whole portfolio from the standpoint of its impact, the results have at times been feeble and, in a few cases, disastrous. To make sense of this apparent paradox, one must consider a few characteristics that are peculiar to the chosen field of intervention and whose combined outcome is the absence of an optimum combination of impact and relevance.

The first group of factors has to do with the specific issue-areas addressed by the projects. As the annexed background papers and the results of our fieldwork shows, the areas where the needs are most acutely felt are economic alternatives and institutional development. Yet, these areas are also those where experience suggests it is most difficult to get long-term results or real impact. Economic alternatives, in particular, appear to be extremely elusive, given the lack of resources of most people involved and the tremendous appeal of traditional sources of income (sale of natural resources).

The second group of factors concerns the type of organizations supported. Here, the implications of the mandate are clear: indigenous organizations must be supported, and increasingly, over and above non-indigenous support organizations. Even further, to the extent that the program endeavours to develop a general capacity of self-determination, support for emerging and smaller organization makes tremendous sense from the standpoint of relevance. Once again, however, and although the situation appears to be slowly changing, to bet on relevance by choosing projects supported by indigenous organizations is likely to provide less short-term impact, especially if those organizations are small.

Factoring in those characteristics enables one to generate an interesting template to provide both a «corrected» assessment of the program's impact, and to generate reasonable expectations for future results. At the core, it appears that the more the projects focus on economic alternatives and indigenous organizations, the least short or medium term impact these projects are likely to have. The paradox is that these areas may well be most the crucial from the standpoint of Npip's mandate. Similarly, projects that rely on non-indigenous support organizations and that focus on technical results such as legal demarcation are likely to have the most immediate impact, although their long term relevance might be limited if they are not accompanied by progress on the institutional and economic front.

Such are the dilemmas that aid programs need to confront on the crucial issue of impact. We hope the rest of this discussion will be helpful to this endeavour.

7.2 COST-EFFECTIVENESS

There are many ways to assess cost effectiveness and a positive or negative assessment will depend crucially on the criteria used to undertake that assessment. Concerning Npip, the following remarks are in order.

The program has a number of key characteristics that might make it look exceedingly cost-ineffective: it has proven willing to support small organizations and small projects; and it has often opted for very close monitoring of the projects it supports, involving in particular regular visits to partner organizations and their projects in the field. This type of support entails heavy monitoring expenses, especially when compared to the value of the projects themselves.

At the same time, however, Npip also has other characteristics closely linked to those mentioned above that also make it exceedingly cost-effective: its close support and long term approach has helped some of its partners «leverage» Npip funds by drawing on much larger national or international official programs. Moreover, the program's willingness to support non-project related organizational needs has enabled organizations to get funding for their other projects. As we will illustrate, this practice implies a

complementary role for Npip, supplementing larger aid programs that do not offer the same kind of support, and sometimes, as in the cases of health monitor projects, the program facilitates and in some cases literally makes possible the implementation of some government programs in isolated regions.

This combination of close monitoring, leverage, and complementarity is no doubt the key contribution that Npip makes to the entire aid package targeted to indigenous peoples in these countries. When that wider context is taken into account, the cost-effectiveness of that small program appears very high. This value, we feel, is reflected in the visibility that Npip has maintained among the organizations in the three countries visited, in spite of the ultimately small size of its projects.

7.3 GENERAL STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

In spite of its small size, we found that Npip has had a significant positive impact on the development and consolidation of organizations that have played, and continue to play, a key role in the betterment of the situation of indigenous peoples in the region.

That impact is most evident in the support Npip provided to indigenous and support organizations that find themselves in a strategic position in their respective country. In these cases, Npip has intervened at key moments of their development, typically during their formative stage or in times of crisis. The program has provided reliable institutional support for indigenous organizations whose institutional development is necessarily slow and who are unable to sustain themselves strictly on a project basis. Npip also provided seed money for projects in education and health care whose financing was subsequently taken over in part by national governments, achieving the only form of sustainability that is reasonably possible in these areas. Npip's continued support to these leveraged programs, moreover, has provided a lifeline that enables them to survive once less reliable national government funding becomes unavailable.

7.3.1 Overall Strengths

The key qualities associated with the program are the proximity, familiarity and personal relationships built by its staff, its flexibility and its openness to take risks with smaller organization and longer-term endeavours, as well as its reliability compared with local government support, funding from multilateral agencies, and even NGOs from other developed countries.

Npip is a program with a recognizable human face, one that builds on stable personal relationships. There has been a remarkable stability in personnel, and the few transitions that took place were smoothly negotiated and did not affect the quality of the relationship. This «human face» attribute is highly commended by partners in the region who compare Npip practice favourably with the unstable records of multilateral and official government agencies. Partners especially appreciate the opportunity to discuss project proposals as well as problems with Npip staff. From that standpoint, and unusually for a government program, Npip appears NGO-like. Even in comparison with other NGOs, the program's record for proximity is commended, remarkable in the absence of local Npip staff.

A look at Npip's project portfolio reveals a remarkable diversity of project themes, types and financial value, as well as a wide variety of partner organizations' type and size. As a whole, the program has shown remarkable flexibility in the choice of partners and projects, as well as in the type of support it was willing to provide.

The program is generally seen as a small but reliable source of support for organizations of various sizes, from small start-ups to larger ones whose budget sometimes dwarf Npip itself, and as a source of funding that serves reliable lifeline for projects whose main sources of support are more volatile. That reliability has much to do with the close personal involvement of program officers: although understanding of the constraints under which the coordinators work, partner organizations' representatives have the impression of talking with the decision-maker, i.e. they are secure in the impression that if the program officer is supportive, funding from Npip will follow. Similarly, Npip's long-term relationship with and commitment to some of their partner organizations is highly valued and translates into a very real partnership.

Npip staff is generally recognized as knowledgeable about indigenous peoples' situation and preoccupations and, perhaps more importantly, about the political dynamics within and among indigenous organizations and support organizations. Program officers are flexible and understanding of the challenges that confront work on indigenous issues and with indigenous peoples. While they have been willing to support indigenous organizations, they have not been dogmatic and have also supported

non-indigenous organizations in areas and for projects that indigenous organizations might be ill-prepared or unable to occupy and undertake.

7.3.2 Overall Weaknesses

The specific weaknesses identified by Npip partners lie in the personalization of the program, the uni-directional flow of information, an absence of clarity regarding the criteria that orient the selection of projects and partner organizations, the non-systematic use of external evaluation, the short contract cycles, and lack of staff capacity and time to work in the important area of income-generation.

The personalization of the program risks exacerbating the vulnerability of partners who are inherently dependent upon foreign aid, especially (but not exclusively) with the smaller organizations whose limited foreign connections cannot shelter them from personal disagreements or misunderstandings. With little knowledge of Npip as a whole, of Norad's policy, and even of others involved in the management of the program, organizations feel powerless and ignorant of the dynamics that determine the fate of their projects. Lack of clarity regarding selection criteria, little knowledge about other Npip-funded projects, and the almost general absence of systematic external evaluation of the projects reinforce the vulnerability of the organizations. This problem, one must note, is mostly *institutional* rather than personal. The evaluation team, which visited various organizations whose projects had been turned down or whose funding had been suspended, did not uncover relationships that had not been or, in a few cases, could not be mended. A more transparent and objective process, however, would widely be seen as a significant improvement over the current situation.

The one-year contract cycle is almost universally seen as a significant impediment to effective work. In a way, the cycle contradicts the reliability and commitment manifested by close personal monitoring and by the frequently long relationship established between Npip and partner organizations. These factors have lessened the impact of the one-year cycle, but we find no adequate reason not to raise the discussion as a matter for review.

From the field, and corroborating the two background papers in appendix 2 and 3, the phasing-out of the production area is widely seen as a major gap in the program, given the increasingly central place that economic self-sufficiency occupies on the indigenous agenda. The absence of provisions for income-generating work thereby weakens Npip's relevance, and needs to be reassessed. A caveat in this argument, however, regards staff competence. To support and monitor production endeavours calls for specific competencies that the current staff would need to acquire or hone, or for which support would need to be hired. The same holds for health care projects and other more specialized project areas.

The previous comments apply to both the Spanish-speaking countries and the Brazil sub-programs. Before examining these separately, however, a few comments must be made about their articulation from the standpoint of their partners in the field. The evaluation team was struck by the distinct emphasis and approaches between the two sub-programs, perhaps reflecting the personalized nature of the management as well as the workload of the two program officers. Varying importance has been given to some areas, with economic projects, for instance, found almost exclusively in the Spanish-speaking-countries program. The relative emphasis on indigenous organizations, when compared with non-indigenous ones, is significantly lesser in Brazil. Finally, and perhaps unavoidably, monitoring style and closeness has also varied, with the Brazil sub-program characterized by more hands-on monitoring.

The team has also noted that the impact of the program appears to be dependent on the quality of the partners in the country and, more generally, on the structure of the indigenous/support organization field. From that standpoint, Brazil offers a more institutionalized environment in which relatively small support can be leveraged to generate significant impact. Such a situation is to be found neither in Peru nor in Guatemala. Moreover, it appears that with commendable exceptions (CIR and COIAB in Brazil, and AIDESEP to a lesser extent in Peru), the capacity of indigenous organizations to manage important programs and longer term projects remain limited. As a result, an emphasis on support for indigenous organizations carries more risks, although it is arguably more consistent with Npip's mandate.

7.4 BRAZIL

BRAZIL
Location of NPIP Partners

1. CTI: Indigenist Work Center, land rights
2. CCPY: Pro-Yanomami Commission, organizational support and rights
3. CPI-AC: Comissaõ Pro-Indio Acre, health project
4. PACA: Proteçaõ Ambiental Cacoalense, health project
5. CIR: Conselho Indígena de Roraima, training and capacity building
6. UNI-Tefé: Uniaõ Nacional dos Indios Tefé, institutional support
7. COIAB: Coordenaçaõ das Organizaçoẽs Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira, institutional support
8. MEIAM: Movimento de Estudantes Indígenas do Amazonas, education
9. AMARN: Associaçaõ de Mulheres do Alto Rio Negro, handicraft production and women's rights
10. CSCN: Centro Social de Cultura Nativa, cultural centre
11. OPAN: Operaçaõ Amazona Nativa, health and rights
12. IAMA: Instituto de Antropologia e Meio Ambiente, health monitors
13. ISA: Instituto Socio-Ambiental, rights
14. OGPTB: Organizaçaõ Geral dos Professores Ticuna Bilingües, Magüta Museum

7.4.1 Strengths

Complementarity with larger donors. In fourteen years of supporting work with indigenous peoples, it has developed a substantial network of organizations, indigenous and non-indigenous that among them have enormous relevant knowledge. The development and continuing support of this network by Npip has helped maximize the benefits of MDB projects that affect indigenous peoples. Indeed, Npip's larger and longer-term partners in Brazil now have access to and are using World Bank as well as government funds to broaden and multiply pilot projects started with Npip support.

Such groups as CCPY, PACA, CPI-Acre, ISA, and CTI are obtaining funding from the G7 Pilot Program, the World Bank Rondônia and Mato Grosso Natural Resource Management Projects, and the IDB National Environment Fund for indigenous health, training, resource management and territorial control that is orders of magnitude greater than traditional funders (such as Npip) could provide. Similarly, CIPA in Peru and IPMA in Guatemala, discussed in the next section, have also been able to obtain government and/or large UN resources. For these organizations, the support from programs like Npip acts as a lever by which their impact is multiplied tremendously through access to these larger funds. Staff in various partner organizations point out that Npip support is particularly strategic for this kind of leveraging because it is reliable and consistent, while MDB and governmental funds are subject to unpredictable and prolonged delays in approval and disbursement and to political interference. As a result of the long-term relationships Npip has established, their support in Brazil has become highly leveraged. This experience is an important model for analyzing the Npip in relation to the MDBs.

One reason for this increased leverage is that Npip has the capability to work with independent grassroots groups and NGOs over the long term, without having to compromise the objectives of its projects to attend to short term fluctuations in the political climate. The MDBs have in recent years made some headway in supporting demarcations, coordinating the Indigenous Lands project of the G7 Pilot Program, and launching the *Fondo Indigena*, but independent support for Npip partners will allow them to complement these efforts, and could be critical in terms of monitoring and making them more effective. Indeed, where the Bank's progress in supporting Indian land rights has been greatest (in Brazil), Npip partners and former partners (CTI, CCPY, ISA, IAMA) have played key roles– informing the Indians of their rights, pressuring the Indian agency, documenting indigenous occupation, acting as consultants to Indian support projects, and so on. Viewed historically, the Bank's successes in Indian land demarcation in Brazil owe a great deal to the existence of independent indigenous and indigenist organizations, in which Npip has played a critical role. Had the same group of indigenous leaders and professionals, with the same goals had to rely on support from the government, or the Banks, over the same period, much less would have been achieved.

Long-term Relationships and Experience. Perhaps the most important comparative advantage the Npip has is its experience and long term relationships. These have produced demonstrable results, with respect to official recognition of land rights in Brazil, and also in training and education. The MDBs have, with rare exceptions, begun to support indigenous groups and NGOs only very recently. These are large institutions that historically have preferred loans of hundreds of millions of dollars because «small» loans are less cost-effective to administer (a source of criticism by the US, which pressures the Banks to cut costs and make more efficient use of staff). Npip and its networks of partners, working with small amounts of grant money, have much to contribute as independent actors to the efforts of the Banks to support indigenous peoples and their aspirations.

Consistency and Reliability. The central characteristics of the Npip program in Brazil are its consistency and reliability. The organizations we interviewed find it important that Norway has a specific program for indigenous peoples. A significant part of the projects that Npip supports today started prior to 1992 with Norad, and many newer projects have now been supported for six years. This long-term support has permitted Npip partners the necessary stability to make effective contributions to long-term processes of great importance to indigenous peoples. CTI (Indigenist Work Center), ISA (Socio-Environmental Institute, formerly CEDI and NDI), and CIR (Indigenous Council of Roraima) are all key catalysts in the national process of recognition of land rights of the last decade (almost all of the organizations that Npip supports have worked on this issue, and government recognition of 11 percent of Brazilian territory reflects in large measure the long-term work of these groups. Npip has supported other activities in some cases). Various other funders have desisted from supporting land demarcation work, in some cases for lack of demonstrable results; Npip has continued and consequently supported a largely successful process.

Strategy. Taken as a whole, the Brazil program has a coherent, if not explicit, strategy. This strategic success largely reflects the quality of Npip partner organizations, and their shared general objectives. Toward this end, partners approve of the breadth of program's core areas; broad enough to support good work. Among new efforts is important work focused on indigenous women. Npip has innovated in funding a pioneer indigenous women organization (AMARN) that caters to the economic and networking needs of urban migrants originating from Amazon communities.

Leverage. Npip partners now represent highly leveraged investments. As multilateral and governmental resources have become available in recent years, organizations such as CCPY, CTI, PACA (environmental Protection of Cacoal) and CPI-AC (Acre Pro-Indian Commission) that work on indigenous health and education, have tripled or quadrupled their budgets and begun to multiply pilot experiences. In part because of Npip-funded training through support NGOs and direct financial support for indigenous organizations and associations, there has been a proliferation of indigenous organizations and the demand on support NGO services has increased greatly. The indigenous organization PACA, for example, undertook two management courses: one for indigenous leaders from numerous indigenous societies in Rondônia, including participants from FUNAI (the National Indian Bureau); and one for an association in the municipality of Cacoal, Rondônia. Now, all the indigenous associations of the state (about 20) call for management training courses. Similar demands are also being made on groups that train health monitors and teachers.

Field Competence and Efficiency. The Npip coordinator has strong field experience, good knowledge of the key actors, and a solid mapping of who does what in the area. Npip is seen by partners more like an NGO than a government program because it is more efficient and more reliable than larger programs (such as the EU's). The leverage Npip has achieved depends upon this efficiency and reliability: governmental and multilateral resources are subject to large unpredictable delays in approval and disbursement, as well as to political whim and manipulation. Npip resources are strategic in allowing partners to negotiate larger projects, and may cover costs not provided by other funders.

Proximity. Partners generally trust the Npip contact person and find it important that they deal directly with the decision-maker, rather than with an intermediary. In particularly, the close monitoring of the program and the provision of auditing and other administrative training has been seen as important by most partner agencies. In some cases, audits have markedly strengthened institutions. In the case of CCPY, for example, an Npip-required management review led to an administrative restructuring that permitted substantial growth. UNI-Tefé also benefited from an Npip audit.

Grassroots Focus. Npip non-indigenous partners are actively creating and supporting grassroots indigenous organizations and associations. COIAB (Coordination of the Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon) and CIR (Indigenous Council of Roraima), two of the most important indigenous organizations in Brazil, hold that Npip support strengthens Indians as political actors. Npip's institutional support is seen as an important comparative advantage.

7.4.2 Weaknesses

However, the strengths of the program are also part of its weaknesses.

Proximity. Because the Brazil program is managed by one coordinator, problems have arisen. One is the lack of technical capacity to offer critical commentary on some types of projects (e.g. indigenous health/sanitation projects). While it is unreasonable to expect a single staff member to be competent in all areas of substantive programming, provisions need to be built into the system to allow for subject-specific support by outside consultants in addition to administrative support.

A related problem has to do with control over information. Several partners, especially the smaller ones, have little knowledge about the program and have the impression that information flows only one-way, from the partner organization to the funding agencies. They feel powerless in front of an officer who combines selection, monitoring *and* evaluating authority. The process lacks transparency. At the contract cycle level as well, the criteria for selection of projects or for deciding levels of funding are felt to be susceptible to arbitrary changes. What should be more clearly in place is transparency, clarity and a standardized set of criteria, known by all actors. Similarly, small organizations felt that Npip lacked flexibility when dealing with them: in some instances, they complained that only one field of activity, such as culture, was presented to them as open. As a whole, and for most organizations, the program lacks transparency: «partners» are

often takers and feel they are little say on, or even knowledge about, the discussions that lead to key decisions on areas of activities, selection criteria and basis of evaluation for their work. More generally, many wondered to what extent their work was known in Norway or, as one partner put it to an interviewer: «Do the Norwegian people know the good work we are doing with their money?

Production. The phasing out of production projects is seen by partner organizations and the evaluation team as the main limitation of the program's core areas. Demarcation of indigenous lands is not completed, and continued support is needed for the monitoring and protection of lands that have now be set aside. The central agenda, however, is moving away from land rights to the economic and environmental sustainability of the indigenous territories. The difficulty of undertaking successful income-generating projects is noted, yet difficulty should not be the main determinant to programming. The decision to phase out production seriously threatens the relevance of any program claiming to support indigenous peoples in Brazil.

Contract cycle. Year-by-year approval is also perceived as a significant impediment to the kind of medium and long-term planning needed. While partners commend the flexibility and reliability of support, they feel that one-year contract cycles effectively do not match their needs and, moreover, introduces a degree of uncertainty, insecurity, and significant administrative work.

Another problem has to do with Npip's incapacity to coordinate its requirements and contract cycles with the demands made on partners by other donors. While not alone in this criticism (few donors make such adjustments), Npip may wish to undertake a review of its timing demands in the interest of easing the reporting requirements on its partners.

Non-indigenous Bias. Indigenous organizations that have emerged, grown and become powerful in the course of Npip support nonetheless feel that too large a proportion of funding still goes to non-indigenous support organizations. This division of funding is compounded by the small size of the funds available; Npip support is insufficient for large projects and needs to be pooled with many others', hence complicating financing and reporting.

7.4.3 Opportunities

A balanced reading of strengths and weaknesses leads to the following areas of opportunity for movement.

Land and Production. There is a need for continued support for the land demarcation effort, an area where stunning successes have led many other funders to look elsewhere for new themes. Much work remains to be done, however. Above all, support is needed for the quest for sustainable ways to ensure the material well-being of the people who live in indigenous lands.

Year-by-year cycle. The possibility of longer-term (3–5 year) projects would significantly enhance the flexibility of the partner organizations.

Monitoring. The currently tight monitoring of projects is welcome by partners (particularly new or small organizations that are building their organizations) and should be maintained. At the same time, continuing openness to institutional support, distinct from auditing project financing, is important, as many other agencies are moving toward project-based financing.

Lifeline funding. Support for highly leveraged organizations should not be suspended automatically when their economic sustainability appears assured, even when the Npip contribution to the total budget becomes small. This support is often a lifeline and gives organizations flexibility in the face of the unreliability of other funders (government agencies in particular), and their comparatively more impersonal, bureaucratic and rigid approach to project funding and monitoring. Moreover, continued external funding is often the very condition of leverage for these organizations.

Transparency. Partner organizations, especially but not exclusively small ones, would like more transparency in the relationship, with better flows of information from the program and about Norwegian aid and indigenous policy. This increase in transparency would translate into stronger ownership of the program by its local partners. Exchanges with Norway would deepen and make more meaningful the link established through the individual program officer and funding.

Proximity. Dependence on the individual that runs the program could be lessened by an expansion of Npip staff, involvement of other staff members, and/or the contracting of outside evaluators. This diffusion of responsibility

would further facilitate the development of institutional memory with Npip and lessen the impression of vulnerability that the program's individualized presence carries.

Increase in Funding. While no drastic reorientation is called for, a gradual, prudent increase in support to *indigenous* organizations would be beneficial and consistent with Npip's mandate. This increased support should be made through increased project funding, while recognizing at the same time that work being done by support organizations would need to be maintained and may in fact increase in the process.

7.4.4 Case Studies from the Field Report: ISA, Instituto Socioambiental; UNI-Tefé, *Uniaõ Nacional dos Indies-Tefé*; and PACA, *Proteçaõ Ambiental Cacoalense*

Here, and elsewhere in this chapter, we have excerpted sections from the field reports to highlight arguments made in the core of the chapter. The organizations mentioned in these sections all consider Npip support to have been important – and sometimes crucial – to their achievements, either because of timing, responsiveness or Npip's role as main funder.

7.4.4.1 ISA: Instituto Socioambiental (Socio-environmental Institute)

The Socio-environmental Institute (ISA) was founded in 1994 through the fusion of two earlier organizations, the Indigenous Peoples Program of the Ecumenical Center for Documentation and Information (CEDI) and the Nucleus for Indigenous Rights (NDI). CEDI, founded in 1979, was in many ways characteristic (as well as formative) of the first generation of Brazilian NGOs born under the military dictatorship. With a wide array of program areas (education and schools; support to churches; foreign debt; labour movement; peasant movement; indigenous peoples), CEDI conceived itself as a support organization (enticed de assessor) to direct actors in grassroots social movements, and had as its goal the end of the military dictatorship and the re-democratization of Brazil.

Indigenous peoples featured in this broader agenda as one among various sectors of Brazilian population whose interests were prejudiced by the policies of the dictatorship, and thus as potential protagonists of the re-democratization of the country. Shelton Davis' groundbreaking study *Victims of the Miracle: Development and the Indians of Brazil*, which documents the disastrous consequences of the military's development policy on indigenous groups in the Amazon, provided a key theoretical framework for the program.

CEDI's Indigenous Peoples in Brazil program established an early comparative advantage in documentation of the situation of indigenous lands. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, CEDI executive secretary Beto Ricardo created an innovative network of anthropologists, journalists, medical personnel, government agency staff, Church-linked workers and indigenous leaders with direct experience of indigenous lands in order to begin to compile an independent data base on the legal and *de facto* situation of indigenous lands in Brazil. This information was circulated in the publication *Aconteceu* (initially annually, and subsequently every three of four years), including synthetic articles on 20 geographic regions, summaries of press reports, thematic articles, and by the mid-1980s, detailed listings of the indigenous areas, population and legal situation accompanied by maps. The same network was to have been mobilized to produce detailed, state-of-the art volumes on the situation of the indigenous peoples in each of the geographic regions. Only three of these volumes were ever actually produced, but the network of collaborators and data base they made possible, coupled with the program's increasing sophistication with mapping became strategic tools for the defense of indigenous land rights.

With the existence of this data base, and the network needed to constantly update it, it became impossible for the government to manipulate the data on indigenous lands at will, and the emerging indigenous movement was empowered to intervene in national indigenous policy in unexpected ways. The 1984–85 debates over the granting of mineral research rights on indigenous lands, led by the Union of Indigenous Nations (equipped with the CEDI dossier and map of the 23,973 mineral research authorizations covering a quarter of the Amazon and a third of all of the indigenous lands of the Amazon), led to the suspension of the research and mining authorizations on indigenous land.

This issue in fact became the key point of conflict in discussions of the indigenous rights chapter of the Constitution of 1988. CEDI's capability to produce technically sound, and geographically referenced information was central to the discussion taking place at all: left to its own devices, the government Indian agency, still under the sway of sectors of the military with close links to the

national mining companies with multiple claims on indigenous lands, would never have even done the mapping of mining claims onto Indian land, much less put the information in the hands of indigenous and other organizations of civil society.

CEDI's documentation, political acumen and extensive network were also central to the Indigenous Peoples chapter and associated language of the Constitution of 1988. Several important advances were made in the text; the presupposition that indigenous peoples were eventually to assimilate to the national society was supplanted by explicit recognition of rights to permanent cultural difference, and the indigenous peoples' permanent and inalienable right to the lands they traditionally occupy was unambiguously established.

Building on the momentum of the mobilization around the Constitution, in 1989 CEDI and a group of national indigenous leaders established the Nucleus for Indigenous Rights (NDI) in order to undertake legal work on the collective rights of the indigenous peoples. NDI, using the new language on indigenous rights and environment of the Constitution of 1988, won a series of precedent setting cases on illegal logging in Indian lands, and innovated in representing indigenous groups directly against both the government and private parties.

NDI's defense of the Guarani of the Sete Cerros area after five years of legal battles enabled the Guarani to recover traditional land initially invaded in the 1920's, going all the way to the Supreme Court. While the legal issues are complex (and far from resolved), the upshot is that NDI's legal work has been central to the defense of the constitutional principles of Indian land rights under severe attack from powerful propertied interests in southern Brazil and their political allies (including the ex-minister of Justice). Had NDI not had the necessary support (including that of Npip) to do this legal work, important aspects of the indigenous peoples chapter of the 1988 Constitution would already be compromised.

In 1994 NDI and the CEDI indigenous peoples program founded ISA, along with a member of a major Sao Paulo environmental organization. The move was in effect a consequence of the disbanding of CEDI as a unitary organization (CEDI «multiplied,» in the statement the group issued at the time.) The move reflected not only increasing specialization among programs, but a shared awareness that the original goal of re-democratization of Brazil had been attained. CEDI and the other large NGOs had indeed made history, but not just as they liked– given a choice, the people chose neoliberal Fernando Collor, not socialist Luis Ignacio da Silva (then deposed him when his corruption surpassed expectations).

Beyond this, the CEDI-NDI leadership recognized that with the end of the dictatorship, the terms of organizing had changed, that for a minority of 0.2 percent of the population to keep 11 percent of Brazil's territory it would need broader and more solid alliances in the national society and that the emerging urban, middle class environmental movement was potentially an important sector. The old model of *assessoria* (support to direct actors) was also supplanted by the notion of partnership, recognizing that a technically qualified citizens' organization could also advocate and speak directly to issues of public interest.

Here, as in other partnerships in Brazil, Npip's long-term, consistent support has been critical to the organizations that catalyzed major advances in the defense of indigenous rights. The Constitution of 1988 is a good example, as are the large number of indigenous land demarcations that followed upon it, many of which were orchestrated and prepared by CEDI, NDI and subsequently ISA. ISA, like other Npip partners, is now in a position to leverage much larger investments than Npip could envisage, but will continue to benefit from the independence that secure, if modest, Npip support permits.

7.4.4.2 UNI-Tefé: Uniaõ Nacional dos ìndios-Tefé (National Union of Indians-Tefé)

Established in 1993 UNI-Tefé includes an active nucleus of coordination (made up basically of a family network): a general coordinator, vice-coordinator, secretary, treasurer, one representative for the health care area and another for education, three interns and a council of three Tuxauas (Chiefs). The monitoring of the demarcation and preservation of indigenous territories and the formation of health monitors are the main objectives of the UNI-Tefé. In spite of its limited resources, UNI-Tefé is the most active indigenous organization in the region of the middle-Solimoẽs, a large area between the Japurá river (where one finds the Indigenous Council of Japurá, a member of UNI-Tefé, that joins the Miranha and Kanamari groups), the Juruá and Xeruá (where one finds the Deni), the Jutaí and its tributaries Biá and Ipixuna, where the Maku, Katukina and Kaixana live.

The seat of UNI-Tefé is a small boat (15hp) that the

coordinators and interns use when they travel. They live in the Jaquiri village, which lies at about ten hours by boat up stream from Tefé, inside the Projeto Mamirauá (MMA) ecological reserve. For logistical support, UNI-Tefé relies on the CIMI office in downtown Tefé with which they divide administrative expenses (office material and telephone).

Trips dedicated to networking, exchange of information and assistance to the more isolated indigenous groups such as the Deni (thanks to Npip support), the Maki, the Kaixana, Katukina and Kanamari are combined with the implementation of courses in the villages that cover health care (alternative nutrition), education and agricultural and economic sustainability.

The projects that deal with economic and environmental sustainability are seen as the guarantee for the preservation of the indigenous territories, and for that reason, have become a growing discussion topic regarding the future among the members of UNI-Tefé. One must remember that in this region, the dominant systems of distribution generate significant debt because of the discrepancy between the price paid for local product and that required for products from outside. Problems with intermediaries regarding the commercialization of small local production are made worse by the absence of local markets for those same products.

Support from Npip first came in 1993, after personal contact in 1992 between the current general coordinator of the UNI-Tefé and the program coordinator. The organization thinks that Npip has funds for small projects of institutional support and that, with the experience acquired and the success obtained in recent years, the program will be able to increase its support (more trips, in better conditions), making for more efficient work. They emphasize that this expansion will need to include effective support for the monitoring of the demarcation of indigenous territories in the region most vulnerable to invasion (there are five territories to be demarcated in the medium-Solimoẽs).

The coordination team of UNI-Tefé gives a lot of importance to the network of personal relations that are maintained with the donor agencies, above all to the regular visits of Npip coordinator to the area («if there was more time, it would be possible for them to better know what we do»). In spite of the difficulties related to telecommunications in the Amazon («sometimes the fax does not go though»), the most common form of communication with Npip is by telephone. Sometimes, the mail is also delayed significantly, and the requests cannot be met. There is a need to anticipate communication difficulties well in advance to avoid problems. They also feel that much could be gained through more contacts between organizations and projects supported by the program.

The coordinators of UNI-Tefé insist on the relations of trust that they have established with the Npip coordinator. UNI-Tefé receives 100 percent of its funding from the program and devotes them to the trips in the region and to covering at cost the expenses of the coordinator. They have received punctual support from other sources (CESE) to realize courses on project administration (1994) and for professors (1995), as well as a gift of 30,000 marks from Misereor to buy the boat (1994).

Although they believe that their last proposal (sent in October 1997) was under-budgeted, they wait for approval from Npip for the continuation of the project for three other years, at the same cost of about US$10,000, which, given its size, makes it a small project they feel should be approved.

During the time they were supported by Npip, 98 health monitors were trained (UNI-Tefé is currently selecting personnel for courses of microscopy in the indigenous territories, having already formed six groups). They also attribute to Npip support the growing discussion around the recuperation of traditional medicine among the peoples of the medium-Solimoẽs (integrating the issues of territorial preservation, health, food habits and cure).

The members of UNI-Tefé insist on the great importance of Npip support for the implementation of courses on accounting and financial management of projects in Tefé (as in Manaus and Boa Vista); they were planned for 1996 but could not be undertaken because of unexpected problems during the trips where the funds were spent.

7.4.4.3 PACA: Proteçaõ Ambiental Cacoalense (Environmental Protection of Cacoal)

PACA is now an environmental NGO that works in the municipality of Cacoal, RO, conducts training and capacity building courses with the Suruí and Cinta Larga Indians, does environmental education in rural schools, and provides technical assistance to indigenous groups and colonists' associations in agro-forestry, bee-keeping, fish farming and other sustainable development technologies, as well as fund-raising and management. The group also

supports income generation and organizational efforts of the Amondawa, a sub-group of the Uru-eu-wau-wau. The group was created in 1994 based on experience in health assistance starting in 1976 by Maria de Lourdes Carmo for the Suruí Indians.

The contact of the Suruí was in 1969, shortly after the construction of the 364 highway that links Cuiabá in Mato Grosso with Porto Velho in Rondônia. The road, one of three major arteries in the military government's National Integration Plan for the Amazon region, was the first overland connection between Rondônia and central and southern Brazil. Accompanied by large scale government colonization plans, the road brought rapid and uncontrolled migration to the region. Frontier boom towns such as Cacoal sprang up along the highway, and INCUR (the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform) settled migrants in official colonization projects across the state, while others spread out spontaneously.

The Suruí territory was invaded by small agricultural colonists shortly after the contact. The group lost about half of its population to diseases introduced in the first years after contact, and a large part of their territory was occupied. The Suruí, attracted first by FUNAI and then drawn by the new settlements, moved to the edges of their territory and took up many of the ways of the colonists (eating rice and beans, wearing clothes, living in wood frame regional houses). Paternalistic FUNAI assistance in this context of cultural dislocation created heavy dependence, subsequently exacerbated by loggers brought to the state by FUNAI in the mid-1980s, brokering a series of disastrous logging contracts that were subsequently declared illegal in federal court and suspended. Logging for mahogany and other high value tropical hardwoods generated money income for the first time, and various chiefs had trucks and cars. Alcoholism, and alcohol-related violence became widespread among the Suruí. The only visible remnant of this period are ramshackle regional-style wood houses with fiberglass roofing in the villages, too hot to use at mid-day. Evangelical Protestant missionaries also began to work in the area, focusing on alcoholism and today the Suruí no longer drink, having become Protestants.

Maria do Garmo Barcellos, popularly known as Maria dos ìndios, began working with the Suruí from personal inclination in 1976, taking in Suruí who had come to town for medical treatment and who had received little help from FUNAI. Her home became a focal point for the Suruí in Cacoal. The initial approach was simply to provide medical assistance to counter tuberculosis and high infant mortality caused by malnutrition. The work was funded by Norad, starting in 1989; in 1992, once Npip had taken over, the coordinator took de Lourdes to see the health training work CPI Acre was doing. Subsequently, Npip provided funding to set up training courses in Cacoal and to bring Paulo Alencar, the doctor from CPI AC, to run the courses in Cacoal. These courses were initially run through Cernic, a charitable organization Maria de Lourdes had set up for disabled, and IAMA in Saõ Paulo.

The group working with de Lourdes set up PACA, both to address environmental issues in Cacoal more broadly and to proceed with the training work in a better organized institutional setting. In 1994, the group constructed a training center with a grant from Npip and a donation of land from the municipality. The center, a modernized version of a Suruí longhouse (cement floor and walls with a traditional palm-thatch roof supported on a wooden structure derived from Tupi-Monde architecture), is used by PACA but also by government agencies, and has allowed the group to expand training to Cinta Larga and Mequens Indians. Health agents that the group has trained have been working among the Suruí for four years; this year nine Suruí monitors were certified by the state and four of these have been contracted (only four posts were available in Suruí area). PACA is also negotiating expansion of its training courses through the FNS, which has approved US$178,000 for this purpose.

In addition, PACA began giving management training courses to indigenous and colonist associations in 1997, and there continues to be a great demand for this service. Some US$ 20 million has been made available through the World Bank financed state environmental program, Planafloro, for Community Initiative Support Projects (PAIC). In the last two years, indigenous associations have proliferated across the state in response to growing demand. CUNPIR, the state level indigenous organization, has put training courses such as PACA's as a central point among demands to the state government.

This year, seven health posts were built in Suruí villages as smaller versions of the training center. Visiting the Suruí village, Linha Nove, the evaluator was able to see the installation with carefully kept but simple files (a notebook for each family treated), updated tables for vaccinations of all the children, and a weight chart for each child to track signs of malnutrition. The Suruí population is growing, and according to PACA staff, deaths from childhood malnutrition have declined notably.

PACA, and Maria de Lourdes, regard Npip as a model funding agency. PACA is aware that the move from providing assistance to doing training (with Npip encouragement) continues to yield increasing returns to work invested. Not only FNS, but the state government and UNDP seek them out – PACA's training programs have become a reference point in the state. The view here is the inverse of that in CPI-AC: Npip is the agency that has provided critical reflection, challenging the content of the group's projects and providing positive suggestions. Npip is prized for quick response and bureaucratic efficiency, for knowing the area and the Indians (this is the region where the coordinator did her academic fieldwork) and for regular visits and productive dialogue. It was notable that in interviews with Suruí leaders, while apparent that there are certain tensions between PACA and the Suruí association, Maitareilá, the Suruí emphasized that PACA's training courses were exemplary.

7.5 PERU

PERU

Location of NPIP Partners

We visited ten of the eleven projects supported in Peru, and listed below (ADAPS did not respond).

1. AIDESEP: Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana, institution-building
   FENEMAD: Federación Nativa del Rio Madre de Diós y Afluentes, scholarship
3. CIPA: Centro de Investigación y Promoción Amazónica, health and technical education
4. Rabin Rama, women's artisan cooperative
5. APECELI: Asociación de Micro y Pequeño Empresas de Cercado de Lima, micro loan fund
6. AGASA: Empresa Asociado en Galvanotécnica y Servicios Afines, metal fabrication and galvanizing

7. FUCSHICO: Fundación Cultural Shipibo-Conibo, cultural recuperation and radio program
8. AHIMREL: Asociación Hijos de Mollebamba Residentes en Lima, car repair shop
9. CFMB, women's residence in Lima
10. CAAT-Andino: Centro de Apoyo y Asesoramiento Técnico Financiero de Micro-Pequeños Empresarios Andinos, technical and business development support
11. ADAPS

In terms of numbers of projects, the Peru portfolio has been weighted in favour of Lima-based production or business development projects, but this will not be the case for much longer. Funding for projects 5, 6, 7, and 8 has either been terminated or will be discontinued due to the exclusion of production as a core area. The two production support projects (numbers 9 and 10) are also losing support and CFMB has lost funding as a result of fraud. The FENEMAD scholarship program will end once the remaining student has graduated on account of misuse of funds. FUCSHICO has been completed. As a result of this natural and imposed attrition, the Peruvian program will soon be reduced to two projects: AIDESEP and CIPA.

7.5.1 Strengths

Response To Projects In Crisis. Npip reaction to the AIDESEP crisis was commendable. Along with Oxfam America, they forced the issue when other donors either withdrew or were hesitant. Although demanding, they stayed with AIDESEP throughout, eventually not only salvaging the organization but providing it with the space in which to improve.

Supporting Non-Indigenous NGOs. Of the four Scandinavian NGOs that channel funds to AIDESEP, Npip is the only one that also supports CIPA, which in the past has not only been stigmatized as a non-indigenous NGO but was also closely associated with the indigenous NGO CONAP, a now enfeebled but once serious rival to AIDESEP for donor attentions. The support for CIPA has resulted in projects in health and craft production that are successful and worth adapting elsewhere.

Participation Of Women. CIPA's health and production projects supported by Npip have been successful in reaching their primary goals. In addition, the long-term commitment of Npip and its willingness to take the long view have also had significant secondary effects in terms of enabling women's groups to evolve and consider diversifying into other areas.

This secondary benefit further raises questions about the exclusion of production and the discussion to eliminate health projects as core areas. These areas are demonstrably two of the few channels by which women can advance their interest and position without interference from men.

7.4.2 Weaknesses

Program Coherence. We found no evidence of a general strategy for developing a project portfolio as tightly guided as that in Guatemala. While there was no declared intent to make the Peru program coherent, the mix of projects still appears by comparison to be overly diversified. The various production projects supported by Npip were coherent, in so far as they collectively addressed the problems encountered by urban migrants but with the phasing out of this core area, the portfolio appears lacking in structure. Such a project mix illustrates what is likely to result from a strictly reactive strategy.

Lack Of Communication And Discontinuity. According to information received during the field survey, the unfortunate case of the FENEMAD scholarship program was the result of misunderstood or irresponsible communication coupled with a change of staff at a critical time. By this account in 1992, FENEMAD was promised Npip support, in person and in writing, for a program that had been running well for several years. Through a series of mishaps during the transmission of responsibility between Npip staff, the funding did not materialize in that year. Funding made available for the subsequent year was used by the organization to cover lost costs; a move that was considered inappropriate by Npip. Further funding has thus been halted.

7.5.3 An Opportunity In Peru

The Peru portfolio will soon be reduced to two NGOs: AIDESEP and CIPA. This opening could be turned to an advantage for Npip, serving as a platform for elaborating a program as coherent as Guatemala's, and likely to create synergies between its component projects. That program could focus on AIDESEP's key concern on land and resource issues, a topic which has relevance throughout the Amazon. Such a re-building effort could provide context for interaction between Npip recipients in Peru and Brazil, where projects have made gains in territorial re-

covery, recognition and defense, and in related training and health issues.

7.5.4 Case Studies from the Field Report: AIDESEP and CIPA

In order to better illustrate the case made of the program in Peru, this last part of the analysis highlights sections from the field report.

7.5.4.1 AIDESEP: Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana

AIDESEP, the largest Indigenous organization in Peru, represents communities in the Amazon region. The head office is in Lima and there are six Regional Offices, of which FENEMAD is one. In turn, the regional offices represent a total 42 base organizations, which in turn represent over 1000 communities.

The key concerns of AIDESEP are:

- Land and natural resources
- Education, culture and science
- Indigenous health
- Indigenous rights and politics
- Ecology and economy

Each key concern has sub-issues. For example concerning land and natural resources:

- Territorial security
- Land titling
- Communal reserves
- Protected areas
- Flora and fauna
- Strategies for territorial defense

AIDESEP provides the following services to regional offices: generating projects and proposals, auditing and taxation advice, political lobbying and public representation. AIDESEP would like to get ten percent of all project funds that regional offices bring in and they would like the regional offices to specifically apply for this percentage. There is donor resistance and a key concern for AIDESEP is convincing donors that the AIDESEP percentage is central to the functioning of the whole system. So far, three donors have accepted this proposition.

The current president, Gil Inoach, is part of the new regime and has been assigned the task of re-building the organization after a financial crisis which caused most donors to withdraw or suspend support. He said that Npip helped with a «defensive shield» for AIDESEP during that long drawn-out affair.

AIDESEP became the dominant magnet for donor attentions late in the 1980s after the demise of rival CONAP. This precipitated an unprecedented flow of funds towards AIDESEP, and eventually a financial crisis that was not so much a matter of fraud as a combination of financial mismanagement and outstanding private loans.

Amongst AIDESEP's 21 donors of the day, only a few reacted decisively. Npip and Oxfam America in particular, although minor players at about US$30 thousand each, insisted upon a global audit that would engage the 19 other donors. The audit was eventually realized and the outcome for AIDESEP has been constructive. They accept the current external monitoring by the Npip-appointed accountant. The organization has decentralized and the Lima office is consolidating its coordinating and advisory role within the framework of the concerns outlined above.

7.5.4.2 CIPA: Centro de Investigación y Promoción Amazónica

In 1977, with support from Oxfam UK and IBIS (Denmark), CIPA was set up in Lima by a group of professionals. The initial focus was upon land titling and legal defense for indigenous communities, as well as land and natural resources issues related to petroleum exploration. The CIPA annual budget in 1997 was around US$300 thousand. Current donors include Npip, DIAKONA, UNIFEM, Ford Foundation women's program, *Movimento Laico per l'America Latina* (MLAL, Italy) and the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA).

Their first contact with Npip was in 1992, although CIPA members had heard of Npip as far back as 1985–86. Previously, they had only heard of Norad. The first proposal was on men's [issues]; the second involved indigenous women in Cuzco and Pucallpa in a health care project. This project has been funded steadily since 1992 and CIPA recently heard that support will continue. Recently Npip support has expanded to cover a vocational training course in Ocongate. This support, along with assistance to health projects, has proved successful not only by reaching their main objective but through their secondary effects in enabling women's groups to take on other cooperative responsibilities, particularly in artisan cooperatives. In other words, Npip support for that specific activity proved helpful in the development of skills that are transferable to other areas.

The CIPA Health Project in Cuzco, for example, began as an attempt to understand the health situation of indigenous people and to develop appropriate models to deal with health issues. CIPA decided to work in Cuzco in 1990, partly because their health project in the central jungle had become dangerous – terrorists had threatened and killed workers, patients and community members. CIPA decided to develop a project that would deal with the population of highland migrants who migrate to the jungle to work because they believed that this migration produced myriad problems.

During the first phase of the project (1993–94), CIPA teams visited 40 communities two times per year and undertook a diagnostic of the situation, along with health education. There is an office in Cuzco and the team works 20 days in the field per month. The team is made up of four people: one doctor, one nurse, one sanitation expert and one driver. Everyone but the doctor speaks Quechua.

The second phase (1995–96) combines local prevention with action to promote official medical attention. It is mainly an educational program that seeks to get communities to defend their health rights and make sure the state delivers the care that it has a responsibility to provide. Key to the program is training health care promoters. If this does not work individuals are encouraged to go to the local health center, and in the last instance they are sent to Cuzco hospital.

The first phase commenced in Cuzco in 1988–89 and the intention was to look at migrant populations, which turned out to be mainly men. The main illness was leishmaniasis, a disease that produces horrible deformities and is caused by a parasite introduced by a specific mosquito. Typically, it afflicts highlanders who travel to the forest to work. Although curable, albeit with somewhat expensive medication, very few people were being treated. The disease was until recently poorly understood by local populations; many people believed the disease to be highly contagious, leading to the ostracization of victims. As well, some believed the disease to be a product of witchcraft. Women left their husbands; men felt ashamed and hid from the community. One man was found living in a cave, scavenging for his food because he had been ostracized by a society which is normally very community-centered.

Many of men from Ocongate had traveled to the jungle to work as peons in old mining camps. They were generally contracted by intermediaries who offered high wages, good food and provided advances which would later be deducted from workers pay. These enganchadores would be paid for each worker. In 1996, 10 tons of gold were officially recorded as having been extracted from the lowland forest. The work camps were horrible places, where workers were often paid nothing, fed terrible food, and forced to labor under the supervision of armed bosses. To leave, it was often necessary to escape. With some workers as young as 12 years old, there were of course no legal protections and workers would sometimes be killed. CIPA has contracted a lawyer to help these workers defend themselves.

In 1988, CIPA discovered that 2530 percent of all men in Ocongate had leishmaniasis and started work in 40 communities in Ocongate, helping to form the *Asociación de Enfermos de Leishmaniasis de Ocongate*. There are now groups all over the altiplano in communities where the disease is found. The groups have been enormously successful in educating communities about the real causes of the disease, the fact that it is curable and in pressuring the Ministry of Health to provide free medicine to patients suffering from the disease. Previously the Ministry provided free treatment for TB and malaria but had no program for leishmaniasis. In fact, before CIPA's research, no one knew the seriousness of the problem. As a result of this project, there have been no serious cases of deformity found in the last six years.

In 1993, women's groups began to demand attention as well, saying that it was not fair that only men were receiving assistance. They spoke with women about the most serious problem, infection of reproductive organs, which CIPA felt was linked to migration and venereal diseases picked up by migrating men.

The goal of the program was not to provide health care services, but to empower local women with education about reproductive health which would help them ensure that the Ministry of Health served them adequately. Local health officials lacked interest at first but have since changed. CIPA field staff began to work with *Clubes de Madres* mothers' organizations (most of whom had been founded to help with food distribution through PRONA, the *Programa Nacional Apoyo de Alimentación*), often the only organizations in the communities. At first, it was difficult to deal with the women's groups who did not trust CIPA's intentions. Still, they started with a survey interviewing over 900 women and taking pap smears. They discovered that women had an average of two abortions (both spontaneous and those induced by traditional

methods) and eight children each, of whom four or five died. Twenty percent of the women had swollen reproductive tracts and 15 percent had contracted sexually transmitted diseases from returning male migrants.

It was difficult to gain the confidence of the women who were not open to talking about sex or sexual organs, saying that even their husbands had never seen their sexual organs, so why would they show them to strangers? Many feared that the pap smear was a means of sterilization, that blood was taken to be sold, or that CIPA wanted to steal their uteruses. The CIPA team got in touch with a sexologist in 1993 who helped them design new strategies for dealing with the indigenous women.

They had begun with a technical vision of women's health that involved experts coming to talk to «the uninformed.» The key to gaining the women's confidence involved a shift in attitude that many of the CIPA team members found to be personally revelatory. They started as researchers who expected to get their work done without questioning their own identities and attitudes, but found they were forced to reevaluate themselves because of the work with indigenous women. For example, as they thought about what they were asking the women to do, the female CIPA team members realized 1) that they had not actually examined themselves, and 2) that they had entered the communities with a certain unwillingness to share of themselves.

The key to educating the women began with the use of a mirror that would be placed on the ground under the skirts of both CIPA team members and the indigenous women. All the women would look on, discovering that physically they were all the same, a discovery that opened a dialogue in which the CIPA women used their own bodies to help educate the community women. Once the dialogue began, it became much easier to discuss different aspects of sexuality and women's reproductive health.

One of the most impressive aspects of the project involves the willingness on the part of CIPA to include fun activities within their project. They helped organize a women's soccer league that has turned out to be both a first rate organizing tool and something the women really love to do. Every group visited was truly excited talking about their soccer team and tournaments. As one woman said, «Soccer is the only thing we do for fun. At home we cook, clean, care for children, tend the fields. The only thing we get to do for our own enjoyment is play soccer.' The tournaments are exciting public events that draw large audiences. In one photo on CIPA's wall, the final game ends with penalty kicks and there is a crowd of over a thousand people watching. Many in the crowd are men who have never watched women play sports. The soccer teams have given the women status and opened up a public space for new leadership activities.

The women are now well organized and they speak openly about subjects that were previously oo, such as sexuality, diseases and reproductive health. They are clearly glad to have learned new and useful information. The project has also educated health care promoters who can help local women with information and with certain home remedies. All of the women seemed to know how to use the vinegar douche treatment which helped many. The strategy of the health promoters is to try and treat women at home first, then take them to the local clinic for more serious problems and then help them get to the hospital in Cuzco if the problems are very serious.

The women were also quite open to discussing birth control and there was a general agreement that controlling the number of children is a good thing. Most of the older women seemed to have had a lot of children whereas the younger women had had fewer and generally there was agreement that two or three children was the ideal number. However, in a general discussion of health, women reported having lost many children. In Carhuay, probably half of the 40 women present spoke about the number of births they had, from two to 12, and the number of children who had died. No woman who responded had not lost at least one child and some women had lost half of their children.

The project also seems to have had great success in helping women see themselves as more independent actors. Some described standing up for their rights against abusive husbands and being able to help resolve tensions and reduce abuse.

The women's groups are generally visited once per month. It is not clear that the women actually understand very *much* about reproductive health, however, particularly if one considers the six years of the program's existence. Since the program relies heavily on the local clinics run by the Health Ministry, there is often a problem in ensuring that the women get the health care they need. Doctors are often insensitive and medicine is often unavailable or too expensive. So, while the *Clubes de Madres* may be empowering, they cannot guarantee that women's health care improves significantly. At the same

time, it is clear that the women need to open up a space for discussing these issues in order to become integrated into a modern health care system and in order to pressure the Ministry of Health to respond to their needs.

It is strange that CIPA has not already expanded this program to include children's health issues since there are many ways to link the training of health care promoters to children's and infants' health needs. Many children die from preven le diseases, although the numbers appear to have decreased. It might make sense for CIPA to spend more time ensuring that promoters are aware of how to deal with the most pressing illnesses of women, children and infants. It is not clear that the training program is particularly specific or rigorous, although it is successful in opening political and soc ial space for indigenous women.

7.6 GUATEMALA



GUATEMALA

Location of NPIP Partners

The fieldwork conducted in Guatemala consisted of site visits to twelve projects funded by Npip, as well as a number of consultations with individuals and organizations involved in issues of development and indigenous peoples. The following projects were visited:

1. CECMA, Centro de Estudios de la Cultura Maya: Npip funded a seminar on indigenous law, as well as a research project leading to the publication of a book on indigenous law.
2. CEDIM, Centro de Documentación e Investigación Maya: Npip funds a Maya education project which trains bilingual teachers and prepares educational materials for use in nine community-based schools.
3. Nawal Wuj/Cholsamaj: Npip provided funding twice to purchase printing machinery to assist this Maya research and publication NGO, which developed a self-sustaining printing business.
4. COCADI, Coordinadora Kaqchikel de Desarrollo

Integral: Npip provided funding for revitalizing traditional leadership councils and later funded a program in institutional strengthening (although a major crisis in 1997 has paralyzed the organization).

5. COPMAG, Consejo de Pueblos Mayas de Guatemala: Npip provides funding for a program that began with UNICEF support to train literacy promoters who work in a variety of communities teaching reading and writing in several indigenous languages.
6. Instituto El Paraíso: Npip provides funding for the construction of a school to train teachers in bilingual education in the K'iche' language in a community that previously had no higher level educational opportunities.
7. Sociedad El Adelanto: Npip provides assistance to the oldest indigenous assistance organization in Guatemala for a school which is linked to a production project involving traditional weaving and handicraft skills.
8. AEMG, Asociación de Escritores Mayenses: Npip provided funding to rent land, purchase materials and prepare the necessary legal documents to es lish a K'iche' language radio station and will continue support as the station begins operation.
9. El Regional: Npip provides funding for a newspaper designed to serve indigenous communities, which includes special sections in K'iche' and Mam.
10. CDRO, Cooperación para el Desarrollo Rural de Occident: Npip provides funding for exchange programs between Maya and Amputee groups in Chile, and also funds the construction of three community centers.
11. IPMA, Instituto P.M. Aguacateko: Npip provides funding to help run a school which provides several levels of bilingual post-elementary school education for Aguacateko-speaking students.
12. Instituto El Tenám: Npip provides funding for the es lishment and construction of a post-elementary school working with Akateko-speaking students.

7.6.1 General Comments

The Guatemala program is both coherent and well planned. It is important to note that the overall quality of the program is not the result of a passive policy on the part of Npip. Rather than expect local priorities to manifest themselves in the form of project proposals forwarded to Norway, the Guatemala program is the result of a directed and highly informed effort by an experienced and imaginative Npip manager, the first to manage the program at Fafo. The coordinator spent a considerable amount of time in Guatemala and developed key local contacts along with an impressive knowledge of the needs of indigenous people in the country. Consequently, the Npip program in Guatemala does an excellent job of integrating Npip's objectives with local capacities, interests and ambitions. The program has been decidedly proactive and involved developing close personal contacts, soliciting applications, as well as responding to unsolicited proposals.

Guatemala receives the largest portion of Npip funding of any country in Latin America. Npip investment in Guatemala has grown steadily from the early 1990s to the present, from NOK 1.3 million in 1992 to NOK 5.6 million by 1997.

The Guatemalan program, both in terms of individual projects and when viewed as a whole, fulfills Npip's general mandate to strengthen capacity of indigenous peoples to guide their own future. The Guatemalan program funds a diverse series of projects run by local community-based organizations and non-governmental organizations that represent indigenous issues on a broad regional and national scale. The Guatemalan program funds several types of projects, with a special focus on Maya education projects providing bilingual and culturally supportive educational opportunities to underserved indigenous communities. These projects include fixed-site educational institutions serving the needs of specific communities (Instituto El Paraíso, Instituto El Tenám, IPMA, and SEA), and broad based educational programs that serve a number of communities covering several linguistic groups (COPMAG, CEDIM). The program also supports bilingual media projects (AEMG, El Regional), research and publication specifically linked to the emerging Maya movement (CECMA, Cholsamaj), and community development (CDRO, COCADI).

7.6.2 Strengths

Flexible funding strategies. The Guatemalan program uses several funding strategies including: general project support, focused project support, purchases of specific materials, and construction financing. General program support covers a variety of costs: salaries, rent, travel, operating expenses, etc. For some projects, Npip support is the sole or almost sole source of support (AEMG, SEA), although it is more common that projects also receive assistance from other donors (CEDIM, COCADI, El Regional, COPMAG). Some Npip funding is directed towards focused project support, financing particular projects that represent one element of an organization's

larger work, such as a particular research project (CECMA) or cultural exchange trip (CDRO).

Willingness to support economic projects. Npip is concerned with the long term sustainability of the projects it funds and, unlike many donors, has been willing to fund projects that are moving towards market-based self-sufficiency. Npip is to be commended for being open to funding development projects that combine traditional NGO non-profit work with the development of market-based self-sufficiency. For example, Npip supported Cholsamaj when they set up Nawal Wuj as a private business, now more profi le after acquiring new machinery and es lishing a strong reputation as a printer within an expanding Maya publishing market. Similarly, El Regional is in the process of covering an increased percentage of its budget with advertising revenues, like a typical commercial newspaper. In 1996, it covered 20 percent of costs this way and in 1997, covered 30 percent of costs and appears to be gaining financial viability.

Leverage. Npip has also played a role in what became a model, whereby education projects sponsored by foreign donors later receive government funds to operate increasingly independently of outside assistance. Since 1995, IPMA has relied on Npip funding to cover the majority of its operating expenses. The organization is now expecting to receive significant funding from the Ministry of Education and the staff believes that within a year the combination of parental contributions and governmental assistance will enable self-sufficiency. The Instituto El Paraíso and the Instituto El Tenám are also engaged on that road, although the funds expected are significantly less than those of IPMA.

7.6.3 Weaknesses

Excessively hands-off approach. In general, Npip's funding strategy has avoided direct involvement with the thematic content of the projects supported. This is less of a problem for those projects that are well-managed, though it represents the loss of important opportunities for those projects in need of greater assistance and capacity building. However, there are cases when Npip's funding strategy has involved direct engagement with project management issues. For example, they requested that IPMA conduct a survey of teachers' wages at nearby schools which showed that other area teachers in the area were earning eight to ten times as much, and led Npip to provide additional funding to improve wages.

COCADI represents the most troubling case among the Guatemalan projects. Recently, the board forced ten COCADI staff members, including several leaders, to leave the organization after they discovered serious mismanagement of funds. Apparently COCADI staff had been involved in a number of improper activities, including providing inappropriate loans to friends and family which were never paid back, selling the organization's property for personal gain, and outright theft of a significant amount of the organization's production and assets. The mismanagement of funds had been going on for some time, including several years when COCADI was receiving Npip funding, which included special funds provided for institutional strengthening.

Sometimes superficial linkage to organization. It is extremely important that Npip have a clear understanding of the internal structure and operation of the projects it funds. In the case of AEMG, the project nearly failed when it turned out that Npip's sole contact, the president, was not doing his job. The situation was ultimately remedied when the board recognized the president's inaction, forced him to step down and then es lished its own contacts with Npip which, to its credit, continued to support the project.

Poor information on the program. Npip views the organizations it funds as partners, a relationship premised on understanding, trust and mutually beneficial communication. The positive aspect of such a relationship is that it is grounded in mutual respect, a willingness to see the poor as social actors whose ideas, opinions and experiences are relevant and need to be heard. In many cases, Npip has not successfully set up the conditions for a true partnership. They have not presented recipients with clear, concise information as to who they are, what they do, and how they operate.

7.6.4 Opportunities

Closer monitoring of economic projects. An open question remains as to the degree of responsibility that Npip and other donors have regarding the type of problem that emerged in COCADI. To the extent that Npip had access to documentation of COCADI's activities through audits and evaluations, the coordinators should have known about the problems and sought to remedy them. The people who ultimately suffer most are the supposed beneficiaries of the project who lose trust in development projects in general. With this in mind, it seems crucial that Npip and other donors insist on transparency and im-

proved democratic practices within the organizations they fund. Similarly, donors must require that periodic audits be conducted by independent experts and it should be noted that all of the projects visited supported audits.

Better communication among partners. Npip might also want to invest resources in improved communication among different project organizations, particularly in Guatemala, where many groups are already linked by their commitment to an emerging Maya movement. Different recipients could benefit significantly by learning from each others' experiences rather than viewing each other as competitors for limited resources.

Similarly, we note a situation where some recipients are uncomfor le informing Npip about their needs, particularly when this involves asking for money to compensate non-salaried staff for their time and expenses. This problem is especially serious in those cases where the success of the project requires that participants invest a significant amount of their time in the day-to-day operation of the project. For example, several members of the school committee of the Instituto El Tenám work full time, or nearly full time, for the school. They currently receive no money to cover their hard costs or to compensate them for their time. In fact, an earlier attempt at starting an institute collapsed precisely because the school board did not have adequate time to run the school and make a living.

7.6.5 Case Studies from the Fieldnotes: El Regional and Instituto P.M. Aguacateko

To illustrate some of the general points made in the assessment of Npip's work in Guatemala, the chapter ends with case studies of El Regional and Instituto P.M. Aguacateko.

7.6.5.1 El Regional

El Regional is a national newspaper designed to serve the needs of indigenous highland populations, sold everywhere in Guatemala. The paper works out of Xela and Huehuetenango and publishes inserts in Mam and K'iche, which are distributed in their respective language areas. In the capital, both inserts are included although the paper is only available via subscription. Most municipalities in Quetzaltenango and Huehuetenango get El Regional, impressive given the large distances.

El Regional began in 1991 and Npip support began in 1993. The idea for the newspaper was to have a non-capital based newspaper that addresses community issues and speaks to an indigenous rural audience. The project grew out of a general idea of «development journalism» which came out of the UN and was linked to the Mac-Bride Report.

Mr. Amaya was working as a magazine journalist for a Colombian news magazine. He married an indigenous woman from Jacaltenango and they started the paper in Jacaltenango. In an area of 30,000 people, they sold 2,000 issues in Spanish and Jacalteco, noteworthy considering the challenges of publishing a newspaper in rural Guatemala where there are very high levels of illiteracy and extreme poverty.

Funded by the Swiss group ASTI (SIDA in Europe), El Regional also trains journalists in development journalism through work experience and a three-year educational program in development journalism at the university of San Carlos to obtain a degree in «T'cnico profesional universitario en periodismo para el desarrollo».

Currently, there are 30–35 employees and the total annual budget is approximately US$ 500,000. At first, the founders financed the paper with their own money but six months after starting, support from HIVOS (Netherlands) allowed them to expand the paper in Jacalteco, Mam and Kanjobal. Npip began funding in 1993 and support from IWGIA started in 1996. Currently, outside financing breaks down as follows: 50 percent from IWGIA, 35 percent from Npip, and 15 percent from HIVOS. In 1996, 20 percent of costs were covered by advertising but by 1997, the percentage had risen to 30 percent and in 1998, they estimate that 40 percent of costs will be covered by advertising. In 1998, they created a foundation to run the NGO side of El Regional, and kept the other aspect a private business.

Mr. Amaya views Npip as a friend rather than just a support institution. He has a better, more personal and trusting relationship with Npip than with other funding organization. He thinks Npip is better organized and less of a meddling bureaucracy. Since he has covered Norway extensively as a journalist, he knows all the players in the Norad – Fafo scene. He prefers Fafo to Norad because they are easier to deal with, and he explicitly mentioned that he would like to see Fafo keep control of Npip.

El Regional is well planned, supported by a sophisticated Board, and is in good financial shape, deriving a remarkable proportion of its revenue from advertising. It will be

quite an achievement if El Regional can become an economically viable newspaper and Npip will deserve much of that credit for its early and reliable support.

7.6.5.2 Instituto P.M. Aguacateko (IPMA)

The IPMA school began by offering classes in *básico* (similar to junior high school) and now teaches *educación diversificado,* the three years after *básico* (similar to high school). In 1993, the school started its first class of *magisteria* in bilingual education, preparing students to become bilingual teachers. The school set up shop in 1988 in a different set of buildings and, in 1991, moved to their current location. The goal of the school is to provide education at the professional level for local students so that students do not have to travel to Huehuetenango.

Students at IPMA pay Q 15 per month for education in the básico program and Q 45 per month for education in the magisteria program. In Huehuetenango, a similar school would cost Q 65–70 and Q 90 per month, respectively, in addition to Q 500–700 for rent, food and transportation. Since most parents in Aguacatan earn approximately Q 300 per month, many children would otherwise not be able to receive higher education. Most students also work, combining work in the fields in the morning (at Q5–7 per morning) with magisteria classes in the afternoon. There are a number of scholarship students (24 students in básico and 15 in magisteria) funded by the Fundación Frederique Engels, based in Guatemala. Also, the Asociación Becaria Guatemalteca funds six students with assistance of Q 25 per month.

Thirty five to forty percent of básico students and 30 percent of magisteria students are female. IPMA has graduated the following numbers of students in magisteria: 25 in 1993, 30 in 1994, 12 in 1995, 21 in 1996, 17 in 1997 and 26 are expected to finish in 1998. Most graduates are either teaching or working for NGOs, although some have gone to the USA to work. The school feels that there is a need for further training for their personnel and hope to expand the school to add other professional careers, especially secretary and perito contador.

Their total staff numbers 21, including 17 teachers and three administrators. The annual budget is US $50,000 and in 1998, IPMA began receiving a subsidy from the Ministry of Education. Until a year ago, the school was worried about funding but now that it appears that the Ministry of Education will provide funding, they are more certain about their future. They believe that in one more year, they can be self-financing if the Ministry of Education covers the costs. They also receive funding from Manos Unidas from Spain that paid for construction of the building; Fondo Canadiense from Canada that paid for building a schoolroom; and Tradiciones Para Mañana from France that helped pay about Q 27,000 for clothing used for traditional dances.

School staff first heard of Npip in 1992 from the Consejo de Pueblos Mayas, COPMAG, that later put them in touch with the Npip coordinator. The coordinator came to visit in August 1993, and the school staff sent their first proposal that same year, knowing little about the overall program. In August 1994, the coordinator took a proposal back with him to Norway and within a few months, responded that there was a possibility of funding. They received their first contract in April 1995 and the funds arrived in May.

IPMA's staff know that Fafo supports projects that help indigenous people and that focus on education and culture, but they have not heard of Npip. They think Fafo's selection criteria are education, strengthening cultural values and self-sustainability. They stay in touch with Fafo by fax, DHL and telephone.

The school seems to be functioning well, and the fact that it is now becoming self-sufficient through government funding provides an inspiring model for many donors.

8. Discussion and Assessment of the Overall Program

This part of the report aggregates the experiences and assessments of the field researchers in Latin America, North America and Europe, thus providing a diagnosis of the overall program. The analysis is divided into three sections: on the program's strategic plan (encompassing program's mandate, scope, implementation plan, and institutional set-up); its work in the field (including communication systems, transparency and accountability, outreach, organizational and staff competence, aid delivery, and resource allocation); and its organizational home (touching on different models of management).

Based on these overarching findings, we make the recommendations for changes in both programming and policy that follow in the final two chapters.

8.1 STRATEGY: WHAT IS THE PLAN?

While Npip has not elaborated a formal strategy and workplan to undertake its mandate, an informal working strategy is evident in its operations. This section describes our assessment of the planning that Npip has undertaken in delivering its programming, concentrating our criticisms on the communication systems that currently exist, both within Norway and with partner organizations.

8.1.1 Mandate

The mandate of the program reads: «To strengthen capacity of indigenous peoples to guide their own future.» The evaluation team felt strongly that the mandate is appropriately worded, but that its responsive tone has led to a «hands-off» problem in practice, as we shall see below.

The justification for a focus on indigenous peoples within a donor aid program is easily made. In most countries with an indigenous population, indigenous peoples are among the poorest of the poorest peoples. By concentrating on indigenous peoples, aid takes on a deliberate poverty focus. The difficulty is in putting into practice a program that is responsive to indigenous issues, but that nonetheless makes careful choices on how those assessments of issues are made. Should the program be responsive to the overall indigenous agenda? Is there one? Whose agenda does one adopt in cases of national difference? Should one design the program according to the priorities of particular organizations? How much does it matter if key organizations are indigenous or pro-indigenous? Should one simply be responsive to whatever indigenous groups propose as a project?

8.1.1.1 In Latin America

What we found in the fieldwork, however, is that the mandate's vagueness contributed to a reactive approach devoid of clear directions regarding the management of the program and the degree of involvement of the staff in relation to the partner organizations. There is, for instance, no clear process of application, systematic marketing of the program in the field or in Norway, consistently applied criteria for theme areas, or an evident strategy for leading the program in a definite direction. In interaction with partners (actual or potential), staff sometimes adopted hands-on approaches, soliciting particular kinds of proposals or actively helping proposal development through dialogue or back-and-forth exchanges. We have no indication, however, that such an attitude was consistent between the two sub-programs, or even within them. The agendas or priorities at work are unclear.

For example, in Brazil the record of matching projects with key opportunities and events in the national agenda over the past 14 years has been very good. Npip support has allowed strategic organizations to leverage substantial moneys from national and international sources to fulfill important tasks for indigenous peoples, particularly in the demarcation and protection of land. There is, however, no particular Npip concentration on land issues on paper, nor a clear direction recognized by partners for the further direction of the program's work.

In Guatemala, the record of matching the indigenous agenda with projects is mixed. While all programs are clearly focused on supporting Mayan culture and education, the kinds of projects supported are mixed. Building a school that provides Mayan education in an area without secondary schooling does not promote a national agenda, although it meets local community needs. Does Npip has a rationale for focusing on community programming over national programming? or vice versa? On paper, certainly, there is no discussion of the choice of emphasis.

In Peru, the situation is even less clear. The project portfolio carries no particular consistency: support is offered

to both national organizations working on a wide swath of issues and small, locally-run businesses. Moreover, although support for AIDESEP provides a clear proof of the program's commitment to the native movement, it is not clear it was designed to do so. There seems to be a need for greater consistency between the mandate and programming.

It is clear that Npip staff clearly have solid understandings of the environment in their countries of responsibility, hence the remarkable level of success in most of the projects supported. Yet, there is no evidence that the *program* has absorbed that understanding and turned it into a strategy.

8.1.1.2 Norway

We also spent some time looking at the implications of the mandate for Npip's work in Norway. While of subsidiary importance, developing Norwegian capacity to learn about indigenous peoples is important for a number of reasons: to maintain indigenous issues on the national political and public agenda; to expand Norway's work in other countries and in other ways; and to train Norwegians in indigenous issues so that they can take the work further. Institutional attitudes – in Norad, in MFA and Ministry of Finance, in NGOs, in the public – make a difference for the sustainability of the program.

We also felt that it was appropriate, although not necessary, for the Norwegian government to have a program of its own to support indigenous peoples. An acknowledgment of Norway's *political* interest in indigenous issues for both domestic and international reasons is recognized as legitimate by partner organizations; it is important to indigenous peoples' organizations with whom we spoke that Norway has a special program for their interests. Indeed, «waving the flag» does not hinder the overall agenda; if anything, recognition of the program's official status raises the stakes among other governments, and legitimizes Norway's interventions bilaterally and multilaterally. Its visibility means that Norway has put its money – albeit not a large sum – where its mouth is.

8.1.2 Scope of Programming

A second element in looking at the informal strategy of the program is the scope of its programming, both by country and by core area. Our overall finding is that the criteria for choosing particular countries is not particularly strategic, and that the core-area criteria for choosing particular projects serves little purpose other than in post-hoc reporting.

8.1.2.1 Countries

The portfolio of countries in which the program now works was developed in an ad hoc fashion over the course of the program's history within Norad and Fafo. Focusing initially in countries where the original staff – the consultants working within Norad – had expertise (Peru, Chile), increasing efforts in Brazil in reaction to the eco-movement of the early 1980s, and adding Guatemala as another brick in Norway's involvement in the peace edifice, the country list is not the outcome of responsiveness to indigenous peoples but to Norwegian priorities.

A consistent assessment among the members of the research team is that a Latin American program would better serve an indigenous agenda if it developed high and lowland programs, based on nationally-specific assessments of issues, *in addition* cross-border cooperation on like issues. In South America, a highland program would sensibly include Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Paraguay, and Bolivia; a lowland program would encompass Amazônian Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil.

Another consistent assessment was that exclusion of the basis on national GNP is an inappropriate criterion for work with indigenous peoples. The decision to retire from Chile is not based on responsiveness to indigenous peoples.

We also found that a key factor in the success of the current program, and any future expansion, is deep knowledge of the country and indigenous issues. True for Brazil, staffed by one officer, and for Peru, Chile, and Guatemala, the knowledge base on Paraguay – significantly different in cultural terms from its neighbours – is weaker. For this reason, and for reasons of work allocation and lost opportunities for cross-regional learning, we find it inappropriate that one coordinator be charged with management of programs in four countries and with two-thirds of the budget. This allocation indicates a weakness in work allocation on the side of management, and a lack of teamwork between coordinators.

We are also of the opinion that substantial improvements in programming could be gained with a more systematic, participatory assessment of national circumstances, augmented by efforts to encourage South-South exchanges on similar issues. Lessons from Brazil on land demarca-

tion, for example, may have relevance in building political will in Venezuela for the beginning of similar movements. Currently, in none of the existing countries is there an articulated plan on why the program is doing what it is doing, and where the program is headed. Discussed in the section on alternatives, there are a number of examples of consultation efforts practiced by other NGOs which may be of inspiration for Npip.

8.1.2.2 Core areas

Our overall finding is that the pretense of focus core areas has not been useful. Moreover, the elimination of production work, now rising rapidly on the agenda, may have rendered the program less relevant.

The origins of the list are found in initial consultations with IWGIA early in the program's history, echoing their own (still relevant) agenda. Originally a longer list, on which land rights dominated, the current three core areas include the following:

- Health and rights (though most health projects have been removed from the Brazilian program)
- Culture and education
- Institutional strengthening (which replaced production in the 1995 contract)

The current core areas remain broad. The advantage to that breadth is that nearly all programming can be organized under one or more headings, hence allowing the program to be open to a wide range of demands from partner organizations. The disadvantage is that they do not indicate *core* areas at all: they do not specify direction or type of change desired in each area, nor do they indicate areas of exclusion.

Moreover, there are a number of logical inconsistencies in the list. The heading of health and rights is an arbitrary linkage, given that many health projects have fallen from the portfolio, and most of the work on «rights» is focused on land demarcation work alone. The focus on institutional strengthening is not a topic like the others, but a *process* toward reaching a goal; a more logical alternative would be to focus on topic areas with a goal of strengthening institutions to carry out work in those areas. This odd grouping of core areas may be explained by a pessimistic assessment offered by one observer: that Norad was limited to lists of three, and so the inclusion of one topic necessarily entailed the exclusion of another. In any case, the list points to a process of bureaucratic compromise, not strategic planning.

In particular, the missing elements speak loudly. In the contract arrangements in 1991, the program was to pay special attention to economic, ecological and social sustainability. None of these elements are discussed in program paperwork, nor appear in the conversations about programming held in Norway. Also missing is an explicit reference to Norway's overall emphasis on gender equity.

8.1.2.3 Criteria

Once the a particular project falls within the ambit of the core areas, an additional set of questions are raised about the criteria for choosing one education project over another. There is no formal set of criteria for what makes a good project, although conversations with project officials include the following: the project idea is rooted in the community which it will serve, and the organization has the proven capacity to undertake such kinds of work. These informal sieves, however, do not help to fully explain the choice of family-linked production projects in Lima, or the support of massive NGO efforts toward land demarcation, or the choice of supporting one community school rather than another. Consistent with our earlier criticism, it is unclear what direction the program has taken in particular countries by looking at the project portfolio.

The evaluation team feels that the program's record in the three countries of seeking potential long-term partners with a capacity to develop models and influence policy reflects what is most valuable in the program's work (in Brazil, with ISA, CTI, CPPY, CIR, and CPI Acre; in Peru, with AIDESEP and CIPA). We feel that work at the community level with schools and health programs could therefore be supported as part of this overall strategy if the project's goal was to acquire access to public funds, spread the model, set up mechanisms in the public sector and government to change the policy, or otherwise contribute to a «leveraging» program. Some of our recommendations for criteria are included in the section on alternatives.

8.1.3 Contract cycle

The annual cycle of project solicitation, proposal writing and negotiation, disbursement, auditing, and reporting (described in appendix 1) is the focus of our criticism of the implementation plan of the program.

Its strengths are obvious. The program, and Fafo, have

built a system for quick, efficient, and most importantly, *reliable* disbursement of funds; a point which almost all partner organizations stressed as a key strength of the program. Any revision of the program needs to maintain this key attribute.

The weaknesses, however, are in the unreasonably tight timing of required paperwork from partners, and in the year-by-year planning process undertaken within Norad. Currently, the auditing system has meant that monies meant for January are typically not disbursed until February or March; the half year report is due in August (after only three or four months of operations), at the same time that proposals for continuation in the following year are due and the monitoring visits of the project coordinators are made. In all cases, the reporting requirements are made to suit the Norwegian financial year, and do not necessarily reflect the partner organization's financial year, or that of other funders who may be supporting their work. In almost all cases where work is supported over a number of years, the year-by-year funding system adds unnecessarily to partner organizations' workload.

Another weakness is in the unclear funding limits set by the program. While the coordinators argue that limits will attract applications for the maximum sum, the current system has meant repeated returns of applications to proponents for downsizing. The returning of proposals for re-budgeting makes the contract cycle deadlines tighter than they need be. While questions and requirements for additional information are a normal procedure and serve learning objectives for both parties, more transparency over funding levels could help reduce the cost of that learning process for the local organization.

Another problem raised by indigenous organizations in Brazil (and implied in Guatemala) is an unwritten practice of supporting the salaries of white people only (with the exception of CIR). Some articulate indigenous groups feel that a policy of salary support to (normally white) NGOs only indicates a hidden racism. The real issue is their perception that the time of local people involved in projects is not considered valuable, indicating inadequate relationships of trust in which needs can be honestly presented. While we are confident that other explanations are at work, we find that this conflict is symptomatic of the uncertainties brought about by an unclear financing policy.

A further concern was raised about the lack of a phasing-out policy. There is currently no process for deciding on phase-out or a requirement that an evaluation take place before phase-out. A systematic process is called for.

A final serious concern is the policy direction about funding competing organizations. The current policy indicates that in situations where representative indigenous organizations are at odds, Npip must fund neither or both in order to maintain distance from ideological battles. It is the strong assessment of the evaluation team that this policy is indefensible. It assumes that there are never disagreements in which one side is correct, and it supports duplicate work (as in Peru with AIDESEP and CIMA) or contradictory work.

8.1.4 Work Model

These observations about the importance of monitoring and independent evaluation raise an overall concern about the fragility of having personal relationships as the basis of programming. For the health of the partner organization, the coordinator, and the program, it is important that there is an institutional relationship in addition to the personal one.

It is a strength that there is a human face to the program, and important for partner organizations that the personal relationships are long-standing. *Especially* in the absence of clear core areas, project selection criteria, evaluation standards, and guidance on overall program strategy, however, the proximity of the coordinator presents a potential problem for the program. As argued earlier, we have found problems in communication and transparency throughout the program. Information and «institutional memory» remains almost solely with a given coordinator, whose workload, working habits and lack of an institutional system to deal adequately with that information make it difficult to do otherwise. It also means that learning from the field is not well absorbed into the subsequent planning of the work. The Fafo management of the program has not found a way to recognize or deal adequately with this problem.

On the part of Latin American organizations, this proximity gives rise to a number of problems. Groups do not feel that they have a right to complain or appeal against decisions. In the one case of a registered complaint (FENAMAD), the complainant was an expatriate American rather than a Peruvian. A year of promised funding was lost because of a failure of communication between incoming and outgoing Npip staff before FENAMAD complained. If application process were more formal, all would know

what the deadlines for responses were, and what their expectations for communication might rightly be. Mechanisms need to be built in to supplement, rather than replace, the human face of the program. Our suggestions, described in the section on alternatives, include a standard set of guidelines, a time le for responses, more routine communication, methods to gather suggestions, and an appeal process.

Another potential danger is the threat of capture. A project officer who has developed a long-term relationship with individuals in partner organizations may cease to be able or willing to make hard decisions or ask hard questions of his or her counterpart organizations. A few NGOs (like ICCO, in the Netherlands) pointedly rotate their staff out of countries where they have developed relationships longer than a number of years (four years seems typical).

A third related danger is the lack of transparency. Where relationships become personalized and become friendships instead of friendly institutional relationships, the nature of the partnership becomes increasingly opaque. Decisions may be made on intuitive grounds, may not be recorded systematically, or may be based on parochial agendas rather than a more strategic overall mission. Some of our suggestions for dealing with problems of proximity are described in the section on alternatives.

8.2 EXECUTION: WHAT DID THEY DO?

This section of the report moves from a critique of the strategy (the plan) to an assessment of the work in the field, both in Latin America and in Norway. Our overall opinion is that the work in Latin America has been competently managed by knowledgeable staff, but that serious weaknesses have left it vulnerable in both operational terms and broader direction. The work in Norway, acknowledged by all Norwegian-based participants, has been poor for a range of reasons, and presents a particularly large area of opportunity.

8.2.1 Communication, Transparency, and Accountability

Chief among the difficulties expressed by partner organizations are problems in communication with Npip staff. These concerns raised further questions about the transparency and accoun ility of the program to their partners in Latin America and, to a lesser extent, in Norway.

8.2.1.1 Latin America

In the three countries, we found instances of problems with consistent communication between the partner organization and the program. Organizations with email communication facilities such as ISA in Brazil, of course, fare much better than small, local organizations in Guatemala, where the sending of a single fax requires a five hour bus trip, an exorbitant fax cost, and an overnight stay. These technological problems are not the fault of Npip, of course, but they need to be enveloped in the program's work plans.

Some partners, especially in Peru and Guatemala, complained of long delays in the acknowledgment of receipt of proposals, of decisions on funding, and on standard communication about their project or the overall program. Most partners knew little of the work of other organizations supported by Npip, even in cases of obvious issue overlap. Almost none knew about criteria for project selection, the process for making decisions, the relationships between Fafo and the Norwegian government (although most knew that the program was a Norad initiative), or had received existing documentation on the program as a whole (we note that new brochures have been published in March 1998). This area provides substantial opportunities for improvement.

However, an obvious strength of the program is its annual visits to project partners. Considered tremendously important by all those we interviewed, this repeated personal contact has deepened relationships. Partner organizations like having the face to face conversations, need to be visited, and very much welcome dealing with the decision-maker. In almost all cases, Npi's policy of field visits compares favourably with partners' experiences with other funding agencies.

The repeated visits have not meant that a climate of trust has always been created, however. Particularly (but not exclusively) in the case of smaller organizations, outside of Brazil, we found a genuine reluctance to actively shape the relationship with Npip. Some organizations felt uncomfor le asking for support for costs in communicating with Fafo, payment for the labour of key members, assistance to make contact with other organizations working in similar areas, and help in dealing with tax and legal overheads (which are substantial in Brazil and Peru).

A related issue is the monopolization of information, an understandable consequence of a small program and

small staff contingent. In-depth information about program partners and projects is concentrated at the Norwegian end of the program, leading to the failure to build institutional memory within Npip or Fafo. At the Latin American end of the partnership, this monopolization can mean that partner organizations with a complaint or a request cannot but deal with the solitary officer in charge. No process of mediation or appeal is thus possible. We also found that organizations wanted to know what the project officers say about them to the Norwegian government; many were deeply aware of the importance of policy decisions on indigenous issues within Northern countries on a wider level, and of the impact of Npip's assessment of their reputation in particular.

We have not, however, discovered any evidence of questionable behaviour based on the problem of overly personal links with project officers. Our concerns are based on the policies and practices of similar organizations that have undergone difficulties based on the too-close proximity of staff to partners. Rotation is not the solution, however, because s ility is not the problem. Rotation can create other problems, such as the loss of built-up expertise. If the problems are (I) communication and (II) lack of institutional responsibility (as opposed to personal links and responsibilities), the solution could be (I) standard procedures and deadlines, well publicized and made known to all the partners concerned, and (II) institutional involvement through committees, the Board, and other formal processes.

8.2.1.2 Norway

Our team also looked at the communication patterns between Npip, Norad, other government agencies and the NGO community. This point is relevant to the program's ability to be an effective player on the Norwegian stage and to plan strategically. These communication patterns are distinct from the program's mandate for outreach, discussed below.

Our assessment is that Npip is isolated in terms of formal communication with Norad, other government agencies and with other NGOs and research institutions. The program's direct relationship with Norad is primarily via the desk officer, who processes the paperwork in accordance with the standard NGO frame agreement. Except at the time of contract negotiations (which were bitter in 1994), Norad places no overarching shape on the program, nor does it override the choices made by the program staff. Norad sits on the Board, a decision welcomed by all participants, but as an observer. There is no special expertise within the agency on indigenous issues.

The difficulty in the thin communication link between Npip and Norad is in the nature of the program: as a Norad program, Npip is subject to the guidance of the agency and the ministry. However, as an «as-if» NGO, Npip is treated as though it belonged to Fafo. The compromise in the funding system, meant in part to calm objections from NGOs subject to the 20–80 percent allocation formula (in contrast to Npip's 100 percent subsidy), has created an ownership problem. No one agency «owns» the program: Norad pays for it, and Fafo administers it, the Board supervises it only lightly, and so the ownership has fallen largely to its staff. Norad, particularly in the 1992–94 period, felt this problem keenly and created significant problems for the staff: Norad threatened to pull the projects back into Norad, to cancel countries, and to prohibit outreach work required by the contract (see appendix 1). There was a serious partnership issue with Norad, now apparently on the mend.

Communication links with the Board are another topic of concern. It is evident that today's Board is substantively stronger than previous groupings, and that the chair of the Board is in frequent contact with the coordinators. However, the Board as a whole has met much less frequently than required in the last two years, and has not concerned itself with strategic questions of direction of the program. The Board is clearly playing a subsidiary role; its strengthening is a clear area of opportunity.

As an overall institution, we found neither Fafo nor Norad to be good at communicating even general information about the program. Armed with no specific publicity material and no mention of the program in any of their other materials (with the exception of the Fafo website, which is two years out of date), neither agency has demonstrated ownership. As one Norwegian observer mentioned, «we've lost track of that little program that's somewhere out there.»

Formal links with other Norwegian government agencies, research agencies and NGOs were non-existent, and informal links were poor. Questions about the legitimacy of Fafo's stewardship of the program, given the wide range of other potential organizational homes felt to be available, has been an impediment to effective communication.

8.2.2 Outreach in Norway

Both contracts with Fafo specified a Norwegian outreach component to the work. In the opinion of all interviewed, that outreach work has been thin to date, but is slated for expansion. There are a number of reasons for this poor result.

Central was ambiguity on the part of Nora's various directors in early years to allow ownership of the program to go out of house. In the opinion of one observer, «it was as if the decision to relocate Npip to Fafo was instantly regretted.» Efforts by program staff to le outreach activities were rebutted until 1996, when one seminar was undertaken. Current plans, beginning with the publication of a new Annual Report and a four-language brochure in March 1998, include further seminars and the involvement of a graduate student and her research on indigenous peoples.

While these moves are clearly a promising sign of an improvement in the Norad- Fafo relationship, it is also clear that an information strategy – what the information is supposed to *do* – has not been elaborated. Current plans talk only of two vehicles: seminars and brochures. The strategy for expanding Norwegian competencies will need to be fleshed out in far more detail, and will need to take into account the skills and workloads of the current staff, the contributions to be made by Fafo and the Npip Board, the possibilities of expansion to include communications staff, and the comparative work of related organizations (such as the Rain Forest Fund). Outreach is evidently more than providing information (although this is a necessary step); but it is not yet clear that the further steps – why outreach? to whom? for what purpose? how? – have been thought through.

The original intention in the first and subsequent contracts was to provide «a practically-oriented source of knowledge.» The information was to be designed for NGOs and media, emphasizing the complexity and specificity of issues, thereby countering superficial analyses with micro-level work that would be more meaningful for policy. A plan to reach that goal is not yet in place.

8.2.3 Evaluation and monitoring

The team also looked at both the execution and planning of evaluation and monitoring. The plan includes two visits to the field each year by each coordinator, each of whom spends some 60–75 days a year in Latin America. The intent is to visit each project at least once a year and to spend at least one day in each organization.

A great strength of the program is its coordinators' frequent visits to the field: the importance of the «human face» of the program is hard to over-emphasize. We feel, however, that the timing remains a substantial problem for organizations. The monitoring trips in the summer need to occur earlier in the contract cycle, if the cycle remains as it is, in order to given organizations sufficient time for proposal planning for work in the following year.

A weakness of the program, though improved in recent years, is the absence of evaluations of projects as an on-going part of the process. We are of the opinion that regular, independent evaluations need to be part of the contract. As argued in sections below, the proximity of the coordinator as solicitor, approver, dispenser, and final evaluator of projects puts him or her in an unusually powerful position in relation to partner organizations. The institutionalization of a more regular evaluation process serves the additionally important goals of helping the organization to stay on its course, and to highlight problems long before they become crises (as happened with AIDESEP and COCADI), problems which may have been easier to see if the program had a presence on the ground.

8.3 HOME: IS THE STRUCTURE APPROPRIATE FOR THE MANDATE AND STRATEGY?

This section examines how the current model – out-sourcing a government program within a non-governmental agency – and the current home for the program suits its mandate. Our overall assessment is that considerable benefits have been drawn from the model, the most important of which is the autonomy of the program from both development fashion and burdensome paperwork. The greatest weakness is in the rigid and unreasonable system of reporting that is required through the «as if» arrangement between Fafo and Norad, and the lack of strategic planning and thinking within Fafo. Our discussion of alternatives looks at ways in which that autonomy can be maintained within a more flexible administrative arrangement and a stronger, overarching strategic approach.

8.3.1 Fafo's Competence

This section touches on the required competencies for running Npip, and evaluates the success of Fafo as an

organization and of its staff in supplying those skills. Our overall finding is that Fafo has engaged competent staff and an able, if underused, Board, but that the organization has not added much institutionally to success of the program. Blessing the program with benign neglect but adequate administrative support, Fafo has provided an adequate parking place.

8.3.1.1 Organizational

In 1990, Norad commissioned a feasibility study by Nupi academic Harald Skar and the consulting firm Scanteam. The feasibility study projected two models for the program: one, a fund to be allocated through a consortium of organizations; and two, as chosen, the administration of the program through one body. In this case, the recommendation had been for Norad to select an organization with the following «triangle of competencies:»

- Knowledge of indigenous issues
- Latin American experience
- Development project administration experience

Fafo clearly had none of those competencies at the outset. Its proposal to take on a specialist Board with management powers over the program, and to hire specialists to run the program, was seen by Norad directors at the time to be sufficient. Fafo's proven administrative competence was the final clincher. This composite of organizational factors and promises, in addition to a lack of interest among other organizations to tender for the program, explain its adoption.

The evaluation team feels that the original «triangle of competencies» was an appropriate way to look at the program. However, we have concerns about the manner in which those promises were carried out. Certainly, Fafo did hire competent staff and did set up a Board of specialists. Before the first contract was signed, however, Fafo re-organized its position on the powers of the Board; insisting that it be demoted from a Board of Directors to an Advisory Council, and that it (rather than Norad) should appoint its members. Our concern is that the special competence that the Board was to bring to the program was therefore significantly undermined.

Another concern deals with the lack of development experience of the institution as a whole. While the level of day-to-day paperwork within the program's Fafo office is reasonable, and its supervision in recent years more sympathetic and relevant, there has been no substantive institutional learning or professional development on issues of development management. For the staff of the program, Fafo has served as a convivial environment for getting on with their job; but not a source of direction, institutional learning, effective work management, or strategy planning.

Furthermore, we are concerned that there are significant lost opportunities in Fafo's stewardship of the program. As a research organization with a sophisticated publishing output, Fafo has nonetheless lent none of its research and publication skills to the Npip unit. Because all of Fafo's funding comes from external sources and the organization does not, unlike the universities and other research institutions, benefit from partial core funding, the institute has no incentive to undertake «unpaid» research or promotion of existing work.

We feel that the home organization of the program should have competence in the «triangle» areas, but also in channelling information, generating debate, and providing outreach services in order to meet the program's Norwegian mandate. Fafo could, but has not, undertaken this role, in large part for two reasons: the absence of direct funding for such activities, and the lack of «ownership» of the program by the Institute.

An additional criticism brought on by the lack of ownership focuses on the lack of strategic planning within the Institute (and the Board) for the future of the program. We note in particular the weaknesses in:

- Institutional backup and learning systems
- Management of staff conflicts, workload, and division of responsibilities
- Communication skills with the outside world
- Strategic planning processes

We also acknowledge, however, the following strengths (elaborated in appendix 1):

- Low paperwork
- Low unnecessary interference
- Improved financial accounting over the years
- Flexibility in administration
- Sympathetic supervision

Our overall assessment is that Fafo has provided a competent administrative environment for the program, and in its low intervention, has demanded minimal paperwork and imposed little unnecessary intervention. The more cynical among our interviewees have described Fafo's interests in the program as strictly financial, noting that an

ample overhead accompanies the funding.[7] This situation of benign negligence, however, has meant that the program's autonomy has come at the cost of under-used capacity within the organization and of a failure to plan strategically. More could be done.

8.3.1.2 Staffing

We look at staffing choices as part of the success of Fafo in administering the program. We found, as elaborated elsewhere in the report, that staff field knowledge is at an overall high level, their management and personal skills are admired by their partners, and their decisions on funding have largely met both the spirit and the letter of the program's mandate.

We also note weaknesses in substantive areas//— complaints were heard in the field about a lack of knowledge in health or other specific content areas, and self-criticism in Norway on a weakness in managing production projects//— but consider those weaknesses areas of opportunity when and if the program expands.

We also note with some concern the division of labour between coordinators, evident in the degree of monitoring possible in each of the countries supported. This division of labour needs to be analyzed and solutions generated by the Fafo management of the program because of concerns over even monitoring and adequate strategic planning. In particular, we feel that current staffing levels are insufficient, not only to ensure the implementation of the public education dimension of Npip's mandate, but especially from the standpoint of project cycle administration and project monitoring. We feel that this finding holds for both its Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking components, although the Brazil program involves significantly fewer projects and funds.

This contention is based on the quality of the follow-up that the responsible coordinators were able to provide, from the standpoint of the partner organizations. The Brazil sub-program's organizations have been monitored much more closely than the partner organizations in Spanish-speaking countries, and the Brazilian partners generally pointed to this factor as a big comparative advantage of Npip over most other donor programs. It is true that the «field» was much more complex in Peru and, especially, in Guatemala; the organizations were significantly weaker; and the program has supported more projects run by indigenous organizations and more production projects – all factors that clearly make for a more risky project portfolio. We feel, however, that this riskiness did in fact call for much closer monitoring, a service the coordinators were not able to provide, given the number of projects under way.

In other words, the direction of change in staffing should *not* be to increase the demands on the Brazil sub-program, but instead to make sure that the Spanish-speaking country program has a sufficiently low number of projects per staff member to ensure adequate monitoring. Given that the niche of Npip is, in large part, defined by proximity to the organizations and knowledge of the field, this reallocation would contribute to making overall execution more coherent.

8.3.2 Norad and Fafo: The «as if» model

The current contractual arrangement between Norad and Fafo treats Fafo as an «as if» NGO: the Institute signs the same frame agreement and undergoes the same yearly process of presenting a budget and list of projects to be funded from that year's parliamentary appropriation. The rationale for using an existing process is partly administrative – the process is familiar to all parties – and partly political. Because Fafo's 100 percent allocation is purported to be an irritant (none of the NGOs we interviewed said so directly; this observation was made by outside observers), the process was adopted to bring Fafo's relationship more clearly into line with that of other NGOs. We found little evidence that this process improved relationships with other organizations.

There are problems with this model, however. First of all, it reinforces the illusion that Fafo is owner of the program and responsible for its strategic direction. Norad necessarily pretends to be responsive to a program whose origins lie outside of its walls, as is the case with most projects and programs put forward by NGOs. Secondly, the model is the source of one of the program's key weaknesses: the highly inappropriate timing of reports, audits, and proposals from partner organizations. NGOs that receive block funding or independent revenues are much better able to provide rollover funding for their partner organizations,

---

7 We found that overhead – in 1997 recorded at 9.7 percent – was a reasonable amount, brought down from 15 percent in 1992 (we note that the change comes partially from reorganization of budget categories). NGOs funded by Norad, however, receive an allocation to cover only 6 percent overhead. For-profit organizations typically charge 15 percent or more for equivalent expenses. Fafo's overhead policies place it squarely between the alternatives.

thus absorbing and avoiding pressure from the Norwegian government's reporting requirements. Note that we do not disapprove of the nature and number of reports (both substantive and financial) required; our criticism is focused at the timing of the reports.

Our recommendations thus have taken into account the need for better strategic planning and more sensible systems for reporting and budgeting.

8.3.3 Fafo stewardship: The autonomy model

We also turned our attention to the place which Fafo has made for Npip in the Institute. The fit is not a natural one: no other unit within Fafo works in Latin America, with indigenous issues or with development projects (although the People-to-People program in Palestine comes closest in terms of programming).

This difference has contributed to the autonomy of the program within Fafo. While the staff of the Centre for International Studies meet regularly, there has been no natural reason for cross-over or debate within the organization. There has been no Fafo-sponsored research on Latin America or indigenous peoples, although plans for comparative living condition work among indigenous peoples in the Russian North were mentioned. Current plans for research in the program involve the adoption of a graduate student from the University of Oslo who will complete her fieldwork and research housed within Npip and Fafo.

The current director of the Centre is conscious of the difficulties in integrating Npip with the other programs, and has spent a disproportionately high amount of time working on improving the communication between Npip and other parts of Fafo, communicating with Norad, and involving the Board. His professional background in development has meant a closer and much improved interaction between staff and the Institute.

Our overall assessment is that the autonomy (or neglect) offered to the program by Fafo has inadvertently been one of the program's strengths. The staff are isolated from political pressures they might have felt had the program been housed within Norad, and from bureaucratic pressures or swings in public opinion had they been housed within a large NGO or research institute. Their personal competencies, though only lightly supervised by their manager and by the Board, are given reign to serve the mandate responsively. The danger, however, is that autonomy can easily be distracted toward personal preferences if control is not responsibly offered by the Board.

8.3.4 The Board: Direction or advice?

The demotion of the original idea of a Board of Directors to an Advisory Council at the outset of Fafo's management of the program is of concern to the evaluation team. Our interviews suggest that the Board has provided good advice in the past on a case-by-case basis, and has been propelled to action when the program was threatened with re-absorption within Norad. For the most part, however, the Board has been focused on improving the Fafo- Norad relationship. We also find that while the chair of the Board is frequently in contact with members of the staff, the full Board does meet not often enough to manage the quality and direction of the program, and has remained resolutely on the sidelines. In the past two years, the Board has not even met for the requisite three meetings a year. Neither Fafo, nor Norad, nor the Board have taken full ownership of the program.

Another concern is the practice of Fafo's appointment of members to the Board (originally, the formula included two NGO members, two from the research community, and two specialists in indigenous issues). There are no Latin American indigenous people represented, although a member of the Saami Parliamentary staff sits on the Board. Concerns include: the appropriateness of having Fafo appoint members to counsel a program it controls, the decision (though later rescinded) to have a spouse of one of the coordinators in a position of authority, and the perceived arbitrariness of removal of some members of the Board (generating hard feelings in the NGO community).

Again, discussed in the last chapter, we have generated a number of suggestions for the strengthening of the Board. We consider their role to be a key area of opportunity.

Our overall assessment, then, suggests that the autonomy of the program – however accidentally it has developed – needs to be maintained within a stronger strategic system with more effective checks and balances. While neither Fafo nor Norad has yet adopted the program as their own and planned adequately for its future, opportunities certainly exist for improvement.

9. Alternative Models

Before making the recommendations in the final chapter, we isolated those elements we felt truly matter to the success of the program and the Norwegian agenda. In this penultimate chapter, we describe models, both real and imagined, that have potential to deal with the issues we have identified. These are not meant as prescriptions for change, but as contributions to inspiration.

9.1 SYSTEM LEVEL

This section deals with real and potential alternatives for organizing an indigenous strategy at a systemic level. The Danish model is explored, as well as the alternative of using the fund-model of the Canadian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, or using the indigenous allocation within an existing multilateral agency.

9.1.1 The Danish Model

Denmark's current policy represents the most coherent point of comparison for policies of support for indigenous peoples. We feel that it does not represent a full alternative to the key issues mentioned in the previous chapter, but some of its components may help tackle Npip's limitations, especially those that concern the program's domestic mandate. As a whole, however, the current Norwegian policy has significant advantages over Denmark's, in spite of the higher Danish profile.

The so-called «Danish Model» is based on a formal *Strategy for Danish Support to Indigenous Peoples* elaborated in the first half of 1994 in response to a resolution of the Danish Parliament requiring the government to «present (...) a general strategy for increased, effective Danish assistance to the indigenous peoples of the world.»

The strategy has five formal components:

- A UN-level political dialogue focusing on the discussion of the UN draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and on the es lishment of a permanent UN forum for the discussion of indigenous issues;
- A bilateral dialogue with program countries that receive official aid from Denmark regarding the situation of indigenous peoples, as well as the consideration of projects related to that situation in DANIDA's (Denmark's aid program) aid strategy for that country [Bolivia and Nicaragua are Denmark's only program countries in Latin America];
- The integration of indigenous peoples' situation in Denmark's multilateral and bilateral assistance;
- Support for indigenous organizations and projects dealing with indigenous issues through funding of international and national NGOs active in the issue-area, and through the integration of indigenous issues in the regional strategies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Ministry of the Environment;
- Integration of indigenous perspectives, preoccupations and situation in the wider discussion of economic and trade issues.

One finds in sum two broad elements: policy activities, at the multilateral and bilateral levels; and project support, through DANIDA in program countries, and through international and national NGOs in non-country programs (for whom the ceiling of US$2,500 per capita GDP is lifted for projects that deal with indigenous peoples). In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is committed to regular assessments of the strategy, and has organized seminars in which its various components are examined. One such seminar took place in April 1996, and another one is scheduled for the Fall of 1998.

In practical terms, support for indigenous peoples is integrated as a cross-cutting issue throughout foreign, aid and international environmental policies. However, no staff or funding is exclusively dedicated to indigenous issues. In the case of bilateral assistance, for instance, a target of 5 percent has been es lished for the funding of projects dealing with human rights, of which indigenous issues are a component. It must be noted, however, that in program countries such as Bolivia, most aid projects end up supporting indigenous peoples, given their prominence among the poorest strata of the population.

The evaluation team felt that the strategy statement was remarkable for its outright commitment to tackling the «political marginalization» of indigenous peoples throughout the world. Beyond that issue, however, it was felt that there is little in the statement that went far beyond a general, if enlightened, foreign policy stance. In practical terms, it appears that the strategy has most impact at

the domestic level, catalyzing a dialogue and facilitating communication between government and non-governmental players, both national and international, on indigenous issues. Potentially, such a clear policy stand is also likely to give the issue a visibility that enhances its long-term sustainability.

Interviews with NGO partners of the Danish government, as well as meetings in the field (Peru) with organizations that were funded by both Npip and, through NGOs, the Danish government, suggest that the strategy makes little difference on the ground, either in terms of the range of projects supported (which is just as varied), or the type of presence (which varies from on-site permanent staff, to Npip-like regular visits, according to NGO strategies). On the bilateral side, the indigenous projects are managed through the embassy by the country desk in Denmark, as one dimension of the aid program, itself one among various bilateral issues. Moreover, given the absence of dedicated funding and staff for the bilateral program, and dependence on NGO initiatives in non-program countries, the current set-up offers little special guarantee of effectiveness in project delivery.

The existence of Npip, by contrast, ensures that a floor of support will be provided and ensures continuity as well as a degree of expertise in the follow-up. In addition, Norway also has a responsive NGO-based program through which funding is channeled to projects related to indigenous issues. In terms of *project delivery*, in any case, Norway has little to imitate from Denmark. The main deficiency in Norway's current approach lies in the absence of a formal commitment to indigenous issues and problems as a cross-cutting issues for all of Norad's programs. Were such a commitment made, the Norwegian set-up would have three channels for support to indigenous peoples: a dedicated program, a cross-cutting issue for bilateral aid, and a cross-cutting issue for NGO-delivered projects.

The key differences between Denmark's and Norway's approach, however, lie at the national level, in the clarity and visibility of the government's political commitment, which might be key to the long term political sustainability of the program, and above all the creation of a focus of dialogue and communication for all the players involved on the issue. To the extent that there is a political willingness to move in that direction, these dimensions of Denmark's approach are certainly the most interesting for Norway's program, given Norway's weaknesses in national-level coordination, communication and public education. What we know of the Danish experience, however, suggests that the adoption of a clear strategy on indigenous peoples is unlikely to resolve other Npip problems of effective strategic planning and programmatic coherence.

Finally, an overall policy/strategy should also provide guidance for Norway in multilateral organisations and ensure that the same basic parameters would structure not only its reactive and proactive project delivery, but also its national and international policy work on indigenous issues.

9.1.2 International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Aside from Denmark's, we could find no national policy which we could contemplate as full alternatives to the current situation in Norway. We thus looked for models that would offer interesting points of reference.

The autonomy of the program was seen as a key factor in the effectiveness, flexibility and agility that characterize its work. As the program stands now, that autonomy depends to a significant extent on the good will of both Norad and Fafo. We looked for institutional arrangements that could offer guarantees of autonomy.

One possible model is the multi-year parliamentary mandate and guaranteed funding that Canada's International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development enjoyed at its outset. Set up almost ten years ago and currently in its second mandate, the Centre is required to submit a strategic plan for the full duration of its mandate, but does not have to submit specific workplans every year. It reports and is audited annually, but remains free to roam within the broad mandate defined by its strategic plan. In the last year of its mandate, the Centre must submit a detailed report of activities, along with a strategic plan for its new mandate.

Such an arrangement opens up a realm of possibilities. It would significantly enhance the program's flexibility, enabling it to engage in a variety of support relationships, both at the institutional and project level. Longer contract cycles could be contemplated, which would meet an almost universal requirement of partners. The already high level of reliability that the program enjoys would also be consolidated.

9.1.3 The Multilateral Alternative

The team was asked also to comment on the alternatives available through the multilateral system in which Norway participates. In theory, multilateral channels could offer an effective and simple way to deliver support for indigenous peoples, especially given the limited resources the country has at its disposal to manage such a program in Latin America.

One of our researchers, Steve Schwartzman, carefully examined the current record of multilateral agencies in the field of indigenous peoples in an earlier section of this report. To summarize his results, and using Steve's words, «two ways for Norway to undercut its success would be to put its current funding into the multilaterals' programs, or to use the multilaterals as a model.»

The contrast between the multilateral aid model and Npip could hardly be more stark: Npip is small, personalized, agile, flexible, responsive and reliable over the medium and long term; multilateral programs are huge, impersonal, unresponsive and short-term. The size of their program certainly makes them key players in the field, but their limited reach to indigenous organizations, the complexity involved in dealing with them, and the often unreliable nature of their support for specific programs also makes them highly unwieldy as agents of institutional consolidation for indigenous peoples. To have significant impacts on indigenous peoples, they need smaller programs (such as Npip) that help develop the capacity of organizations to draw resources from these huge funds, and manage them in an effective manner. The whole issue of Npip's leveraged support lies there: organizations that grew stronger through years of support from Npip or similar programs see their projects' financing being taken over by larger agencies which progressively dwarf the original, critically important, support. While the larger sums of money ultimately ensure the wider impacts of the programs, they prove unable to stimulate their emergence.

Specific field experience confirm this general outlook. In Brazil, the G7 pilot project managed by the World Bank has proven slow and unreliable. The Bank's pilot program for the preservation of tropical forests was huge, remained mostly unspent, and proved slow to draw from. Only the small grants program for NGOs was spent, including by organizations funded by Npip that now have the capacity to access these funds.

Far from offering an alternative to Npip for supporting indigenous peoples, multilateral programs appear to be dependent on programs like it to penetrate the field and have a significant impact at the organizational and project level.

9.2 PROGRAM LEVEL

At the program level, we have looked for further lessons from organizations whose mandates resemble Npip's. We touch on the experiences of two.

9.2.1 ICCO

As one of the four Dutch NGOs which benefit from core funding from the Dutch government, the Protestant Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO) has long worked in all the same countries now present in Npip's portfolio. In interviews in Brazil, ICCO's partnership policy was highlighted for us and we sought their assessment of their own work.

ICCO does not have a particular policy on indigenous peoples, recognizing that indigenous peoples in the Andes – where the program is concentrated – do not often identify themselves primarily as indigenous. Indigenous issues are nonetheless core to ICCO's work and country strategies, developed individually and in a participatory manner with partner organizations.

In Brazil, for example, the nature of the partnership with organizations like ISA is very «mature;» ISA makes significant demands on ICCO for pushing the indigenous agenda in Europe. In Brazil, ICCO participates in a «Ideological Articulation Process» whereby a laborious system of local, regional, and national meetings among funded organizations are held to culminate in a yearly meeting to discuss the state of the debate, new organizations, and changes to the indigenous agenda. ICCO does not recommend that Npip follow this model (or a similar model in Guatemala), however: the meetings have become a competitive assembly of clients.

An alternative system was developed among highland partners in the Andes. By the end of the 1980s, it was clear that ICCO's development success in the region was poor. In response, and in collaboration with 40 Bolivian and Peruvian organizations, ICCO participated in the es lishment of a lightly structured Rural Secretariat. Recently evaluated, this model involves the participation of all member organizations in providing information on agricultural issues in exchange for the information they re-

ceive from their colleagues. ICCO is a member, and has provided institutional funding and sponsored a major study for the group, but does not determine its workplan. In this model, organizations participating are not necessarily funded in their other work by ICCO, but come to the le to share their experiences and knowledge.

With groups that ICCO does fund, however, there are different categories of partnership – a model which may be of inspiration to Npip in its strategic planning. While there is a four-year maximum funding term, certain organizations with long-term vision and strong institutional capacity can be promised rollover periods for much longer. ICCO is concerned that different kinds of partnership be tailored to organizations' vision and ability. The current system is very heavily weighted in favour of donor priorities and preferences, causing, for example, the inappropriate drowning of AIDESEP.

9.2.2 NOVIB

NOVIB, the secular organization among the Dutch core-funded NGOs, also works extensively in Brazil, as it does also in Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela. NOVIB is now launching a new Amazônian program.

Like other NGOs we visited in Norway and elsewhere, NOVIB has no particular policy on indigenous peoples, but indigenous peoples appear in their overall strategy document and the NGO undertakes widespread, indigenous-specific programming. Their program evolves from a consultative process that may be of inspiration as well in Npip planning.

NOVIB works only with large organizations, and primarily with institutional (vs. project) funding, partly as an outcome of the volume of its funding (US $2 million on average is disbursed by each member of the team in Brazil, each working with 20–30 organizations). Over the course of two years in the case of the five-year country strategy developed with Brazil, these 45 organizations met each year to discuss the national context, issues in common, NOVIB's agenda for lobbying in Northern countries, and core areas for programming. This long-term planning process is based on three-year approvals, which may be extended for up to five years.

Also of interest is NOVIB's evaluation system. Once every three to four years (in each funding cycle), an evaluation is commissioned, either on the results of the project, its larger impact, or on the organizational system (depending on the nature of the work). Based on this evaluation, commissioned to outsiders, the partner organization then presents its proposals.

NOVIB's longer-term funding cycles and more consistent use of evaluations may also provide a model for reform of Npip.

Based on these discussions of systemic and programmatic alternatives, the report comes to a conclusion in the next chapter by offering a detailed list of recommendations for reform.

10. Conclusion and Recommendations

Our report has outlined a range of strengths and weaknesses in the program and system in which Npip works, and has highlighted alternatives in use by other organizations. In this final chapter, those assessments are boiled into a list of priority findings and key recommendations.

The recommendations are organized to correspond to the discussion in the three core chapters of the report: the analysis of the Norwegian system, the organizational home of the program and its work in Norway, and the success of the program in the three countries we visited.

10.1 THE NORWEGIAN STRATEGY

The main message is that Norway's official work for, and with, indigenous peoples has demonstrated a remarkable empathy for indigenous peoples, with a degree of sensitivity closer to that of progressive NGOs than to most multilateral and bilateral agencies. However, the absence of a strategy throughout this array of Norwegian activity – including Npip but encompassing other government and non-governmental programs – robs Norway of improved coherence, effectiveness and visibility.

1. **Strength: Progressive and Important Work.** Norway already supports a wide range of activities through multilateral, bilateral, NGO, and Npip channels. These activities, progressive in their approach, have earned Norway a positive reputation in the countries where the work takes place.
   1.1 **Recommendation: Continue Work with Indigenous Peoples.** These various activities should be continued.

The weaknesses stem from a lack of strategy that would improve the overall effectiveness of all Norwegian programming. Key are problems of coordination, continuity, and visibility.

2. **Problem: Poor Coordination.** Norway already supports a wide range of activities through multilateral, bilateral, NGO, and Npip channels. These activities have earned Norway a positive reputation in the countries where the work takes place. However, these activities are not framed within a coordinated, unified outlook nor are they the topic of systematic communication among players.
   3.1 **Recommendation: Prepare a Government-Wide Policy Statement to Guide Multilateral, Bilateral and NGO-Support Activities Related to Indigenous Issues.** That statement would define the broad outlines of government policy, and make explicit the understanding of indigenous issues that underlies that policy. It would help clarify government commitment and provide a point of reference for discussion of the issues among government and non-government actors in Norway, in multilateral fora and in countries where the support is provided.
   3.2 **Recommendation: Establish a National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy on Support for Indigenous Peoples.** This roundtable would hold regular meetings to discuss the implementation of the national strategy and open avenues of dialogue and coordination among government agencies, NGOs and academics active in the field. In addition to organizing the meetings of the roundtable and publishing the outcomes of its discussions, a small (half-time position) secretariat could set up an all-year – preferably web-based – information clearing house on the activities of roundtable participants, both in Norway and outside. This secretariat could be part of an expanded Npip.

3. **Problem: Lack of Continuity.** Moreover, Npip represents a relatively small part of Norway's support for indigenous peoples, with the rest of the funding disbursed through support for NGO initiatives. Such procedures offer little guarantee of continuity in effort.
   3.1 **Recommendation: Provide Special Funding for Indigenous Programming**. With Npip as the Norwegian government's flagship, further consideration could be given to highlighting existing work and encouraging new work. This incentive could be offered through the inclusion of a budget line for programming for indigenous peoples, analogous to the gender and environmental funds (apparent difficulties with those funds would need to be addressed before adding a third one). That fund could be constituted by a part of Norad's regular NGO funding,

explicitly earmarked for projects related to indigenous issues see 10.1.1, Template for a Norwegian Strategy for Indigenous Peoples, point no. 5).

3.2 **Recommendation: Prepare to Use the Multilateral and Bilateral Programs, as well as NGO Channels, to Implement Policy**. The combination of Npip with the bilateral countries program and NGOs could provide the government with a combination of support channels that could offer both flexibility in responding to demands, and reliability of delivery to implement specific aspects of its strategy. In this manner, in other words, the Norwegian government could effectively combine a reactive and a proactive approach to program design and delivery.

3.3 **Recommendation: For Project Delivery, as Distinct from Policy Development Work, Put Emphasis on Npip and NGO Channels.** Compared to multilateral programs and, to a lesser extent, bilateral ones, the non-bureaucratic, flexible, and proximate relationship that these channels establish are better adapted to institutional strengthening. The partner organizations are then able to leverage that support by drawing on larger but more demanding and constraining multilateral and/or government funders.

4. **Problem: Visibility.** Finally, the visibility of theses activities is low. Public awareness, support, and hence the political sustainability of Norway's support for indigenous is in now way guaranteed.

4.1 **Recommendation: Request that Parliament Publicly Endorse the Strategic Statement in Support of Indigenous Peoples**. Support could be expressed for the statement either as a stand-alone declaration, or as part of a wider human rights strategy statement. This move would significantly enhance the visibility of the strategy, of programs such as Npip that would be clearly associated with it, and of the government's commitment to that strategy and those programs.

4.2 **Recommendation: Promote Npip's Education Role through Additional Contributions to its Communication Role**. Perhaps as a complement to supporting regular meetings of a roundtable on indigenous issues and fulfilling clearing house functions, an additional staff member person at Npip could be charged with enhancing the visibility of the program and of Norwegian policy among the wider public.

10.1.1 Template for a Norwegian Strategy for Indigenous Peoples

Building on the evaluation and on the overview of relevant alternative formula, we have put together a model strategy that combines the various institutional elements that we feel can address most weaknesses and opportunities that we have identified.

Table 10.1 identifies five key action areas, the institutions responsible for their implementation, and the central institutional characteristics of this implementation.

1. **Strategy.** In that model, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad are jointly responsible for the development of a strategy that identifies the basic parameters of a Norwegian policy for indigenous peoples. For maximum political sustainability, that strategy is endorsed by both the National Parliament and the Sami Parliament.

2. **Multilateral Policy.** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs develops its positions in the various multilateral fora and in multilateral aid agencies on the basis of this general policy statement.

3. **Communication/Education.** A national roundtable on indigenous issues is set up to discuss the situation of indigenous peoples in the world, and to address Norway's official and non-official activities in the area. A secretariat organizes an annual general meeting, regular policy discussion as well as public and specialized information sessions and serves as a clearing house for information on Norwegian organizations active in the field and on the projects they are involved in. Npip's executing agency could be responsible for these activities and use them to fulfill the public education dimension of its mandate. However, the secretariat could also be housed elsewhere.

4. **Proactive Program Delivery.** Effective program delivery is currently the main comparative advantage of Npip. Norway is the only country that has a staff and an aid budget dedicated to support for indigenous peoples. This earmarking increases the likelihood that the strategy is implemented. In that new framework, Npip (supported by a strengthened Ad-

visory Board) becomes the main channel for the implementation of the government strategy in the field. To facilitate work and reinforce the reliability and longer-term outlook of the current program, dedicated funding is guaranteed for three year periods, closely related to a specific mandate and strategic plan for each period.

5. **Reactive Program Delivery.** As in most developed countries, domestic voluntary organizations offer an attractive channel for the implementation of a broad aid strategy. That reactive approach offers flexibility, and opens the possibility of involvement in non-program countries and in areas that might not have been foreseen in Npip's strategic plan. In addition, the government should make it clear to local NGOs in NORAD program countries that it is interested in supporting projects that are compatible with its strategy. To encourage both domestic and program country NGOs to exploit the opportunity offered, a set amount of money should be made explicitly available for these projects.

As the main instrument of implementation, Npip forms the hub of this model strategy. As was made clear in the discussion of the Danish strategy, the adoption of a general statement on support for indigenous peoples is useful primarily to ensure the political sustainability of the aid program, to focus the domestic discussion on the issue and to offer a point of convergence for policy, programs and projects that address it. Building on the Danish model, the template suggested here goes further, complementing and buttressing the dedicated work currently performed by Npip.

Table 10.1 Template for a Norwegian Strategy for Indigenous Peoples

Strategy	Multilateral policy	Communication/ Education	Program Delivery	
MFA/NORAD	MFA	Npip's Executing Agency	NORAD	MFA/NORAD
Parliament Sami Parliament	UN Multilateral development banks	Roundtable: Sami NGOs Parliament Academics National consultation to discuss/evaluate strategy and its implementation	Proactive: Npip Consultative Board Dedicated funding guaranteed for 3 years 3 year mandate closely related to government strategy	Reactive: NGOs Bilateral Dedicated fund

10.2 THE ORGANIZATIONAL HOME

Npip's success is partly due to the shelter the program receives as an out-of-house program, the flexibility permitted within Fafo, the administrative competence brought by Fafo, and the quality of the staff recruited to manage it.

1. **Strength: Political and Bureaucratic Independence.** The key benefit of the current home, and the out-of-house model in general, is that the program has been sheltered from undue political pressure and administrative burdens. This shelter has permitted the program to be flexible, responsive, and agile in its work in the field.

2. **Strength: Administrative Simplicity and Efficiency.** Fafo's administration of the program in terms of reporting, accounting, and procedure are effective and non-bureaucratic.

2.1 **Recommendation: Retain an Out-of House Model for the Program.** In our assessment, many of the reasons which originally led to the Npip's management outside of Norad continue to exist: there is little specialization among Norad staff on indigenous issues; an inability to secure permanent staffing positions, and an awareness of the degree of administrative complexity in dealing with numerous small projects. Moreover, an out-of-house model could include

the requirement that the partner organization provide communication and information competence and capacity. A move back into Norad would also render the program vulnerable to more frequent changeovers of staff. This shift would damage one of the program's strongest features – its emphasis on building long-term personal relationships.

Reintegration into Norad may also create pressure on the Npip to reflect Norad core country priorities or short-term political preferences for specific countries or program themes, all of which may not reflect indigenous needs. Finally, interview data suggest that none of the participants – including Norad staff – had any inclination to see the program move back within the agency.

Consequently, we do *not* recommend returning the Npip to Norad as an internally administered program. The Npip should continue to be managed by an outside organization.

3. **Strength: Competent Staff.** Fafo has also retained high quality staff and assembled a competent Advisory Council. This specialization is important because of our finding that in-depth, specialized, and continuously verified knowledge of the indigenous landscape is crucial for program success.

   The Npip project staff have clearly demonstrated that they have the required project competencies, with some improvements necessary (see recommendations for the program outlined below), particularly with respect to communication competencies.

   It is not clear to us, however, that the current level and type of activity can be sustained at current staffing levels, given the requirements of project cycle administration and project monitoring. This issue will likely become acute if the need – discussed below – for increased efforts on public education and research is acted upon.

   3.1 **Recommendation: Increase staffing levels by one and possibly two persons, depending on the the size of the effort made in the area of public education.**

4. **Problem: Weak Strategic Programming.** Fafo's hands-off policy is partly responsible for the weak overall strategic planning and programmatic coherence of Npip.

   4.1 **Recommendation: Improve Key Competencies and Qualities of the Organization.** Given this finding, but aware of the weaknesses in its current administration, we sought to uncover the key competencies and qualities required to effectively manage the program. These are «first principles» for the management of an ideal program.

   The original feasibility study (1990) on administrative models for the Npip outlined what was called a «triangle of competencies:» competence on indigenous peoples, project management and Latin America. While the triangle is useful in that it describes general areas, or spheres, of competency, it is not specific enough. In addition, it does not distinguish between *organizational* and *staff competencies*. This distinction is important, particularly where staff competencies may be high but organizational competencies may be low. In addition to these skills, certain management qualities – «soft» competencies surrounding technical skills – are needed in order to effectively administer the Npip.

   Ensure Program Competencies. Regardless of which organization manages Npip, we recommend the development of the following program competencies in the organization and the staff:

   Organizational Competencies
   Required: (need to have)
   - Organizational leadership
   - Systems for strategic program management: (including, strategic planning, strategic project management & evaluation)
   - Human resource development: leadership, team building, staff development
   - Communications systems within the organization and to external parties
   - Systems for institutional learning
   - Finance/administration abilities
   - Research capabilities to draw lessons learned

Additional: (nice to have)
- Research capabilities to undertake general research on indigenous issues

Staff Competencies
Required Project Skills:
- Expertise on indigenous peoples
- Expertise in development programming and project execution
- Regional expertise
- Ability to work as a team within Npip and as a partner with indigenous groups
- Administrative expertise and project management skills

Required Communication skills
- Communications and public relations
- Networking
- Outreach

Ensure Organizational Qualities. In addition to specific organizational and staff *competencies*, there are a number of organizational *qualities* that are necessary to maximize the management of the Npip. The Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples, as a unique cornerstone of Norad's support for indigenous peoples, should be a valued program within its organizational home. The ideal home for the Npip is an organization which has long-term commitment to, enthusiasm with, and a strong vision for indigenous programming. A spirit of genuine partnership must permeate the organization and staff of the the program. This organizational vision we find missing.

These weaknesses alone, however, *do not justify* moving the program if improvements are undertaken.

More critical, however, is the fact that Fafo as an organization has not consistently demonstrated the needed organizational competencies. Although communication competencies may be easily acquired by the Npip unit (for example with increased links to the Fafo publication unit, or by hiring a communications coordinator), it is unclear whether Fafo wishes to provide program with the necessary level of organizational commitment and to improve its organizational competencies. Uncertainty over Norad's direction in the past is a substantial factor in the lack of organizational commitment, but this impediment is not a sufficient excuse for lack of strategy.

Nevertheless, in terms of day-to-day administration and delivery of funds, Npip is competently housed within Fafo. However, to take the programme further, FAFO or any other agency administering the program would have to demonstrate it has these necessary competencies and qualities.

4.2 **Recommendation: Undertake a Development Plan.** Consequently, we recommend that Npip's executing agency present plans to address the following weaknesses.
- Npip isolation from Norad, the rest of the executing agency, and other Norwegian players
- Organizational leadership and integration of Npip
- Strategic planning and management
- Role of the Advisory Council and linkages to the executing agency's governing board
- Communication and networking
- Level/degree of Saami involvement
- Human resources and teambuilding
- Systems for institutional memory and learning
- Research capabilities

In addition, the organization chosen must offer the enthusiasm and long-term commitment that is necessary for an effective indigenous program. It also needs to outline its vision for the future of the Npip, within Latin America and Norway, and within the organization itself. In general, it needs to present how it plans to «add value» to Npip.

4.3 **Recommendation: Strengthen the Advisory Council.** The Npip's Advisory Council has enormous potential for improving the program. However, over recent years, its involvement has declined considerably and its focus has remained on relations and not strategic funding issues. One key recommendation of this evaluation is to reactivate the Board. Furthermore, the Board's mandate and authority need to be reviewed and strengthened.

Currently, the board has an advisory capacity only. We recommend that the Board's authority be increased to provide direction and approval over strategic issues. We do not recommend that the board have authority over day-to-day management issues which should remain the

responsibility of the Npip staff. In the future, we also recommend that the Board's mandate focus on:

- Policy and strategic aspects of the Npip
- Dissemination of knowledge/expertise developed by Npip
- Participation of relevant NGOs, academic institutions, and the Saami

In addition, more formal links between the Npip Advisory Council and the executing agency's governing board need to be established. This will ensure greater integration and organizational commitment between the two. Finally, the Npip Board needs to meet on a more regular basis – its mandate requires at least three meetings per year.

4.4 **Recommendation: Revise Norad Commitment.** Finally, Norad needs to be willing to provide a longer-term commitment to the organization which administers the Npip. Currently, the one year contract period adds unnecessary ins ility to the program and hinders organizational commitment, thus weakening the support to indigenous and pro-indigenous organizations in Latin America.

5. **Problem: Poor Record in Public Education and Information in Norway.** In Norway, the public education and information mandate has not been fulfilled. In the past, the impediments for action were understandable; current plans, however, are not sufficient to carry the mandate further.

5.1 **Recommendation: Develop an Information Strategy.** An information outreach strategy needs to consider the audiences: the now hostile NGO and academic sector, as well as the policy community, media, and international organizations also working on indigenous issues. Channels for information outreach could include website pages, brochures, mailing lists, electronic newsletters, press releases, alerts, and annual reports. The strategy needs also to consider the messages it wishes to convey, whether to showcase the program, share lessons learned, or educate on general indigenous issues. While some of these tasks would require staff with substantive knowledge of the issues, most require communication skills.

5.2 **Recommendation: Augment Research.** A missed opportunity in Fafo's management of the program is research. In order both to build public support in Norway and increased capacity to work knowledgeably with indigenous issues, we feel strongly that the research connections of the program need to be buttressed. Options to be discussed may include funding research on lessons learned within Npip and the work of other NGOs; expanding the requirements of (an expanded) Npip staff to undertake research, conference, and academic work; funding a matching program for action-research on indigenous issues; sponsoring an indigenous unit within the executing agency (or another home) for specialized research on indigenous issues; or funding a fellowship or intern program.

10.3 THE PROGRAM

Our review of the program in Peru, Guatemala and Brazil, shows that it has largely been relevant to the needs of indigenous peoples and has had significant impact. Improvements to strengthen the program's record would involve better strategic coherence across regions and themes, a revision of the contract cycle, systems to counteract an excessive personalization, more consistent communications and more frequent use of evaluations.

Npip, as a dedicated program with dedicated staff and funds, has had a significant impact in the countries where projects were funded. The program has thus proven effective and relevant from the standpoint of its contribution to the capacity of indigenous people to guide their own future.

1. **Strength: Effectiveness and Relevance on the Ground.** Noting the caveat that the most relevant and important efforts are often the most difficult to achieve, we nonetheless found instances of effective use of program resources in many areas and in all the countries.

2. **Strength: Cost-Effectiveness and Comparative Advantage.** While we have not been able to comment on the cost-effectiveness of the program in an accounting sense (other than to note that the budget and financial systems are in order), we find that the *nature* of the program has special cost-effective benefits. As a small funder of both large and small

indigenous organizations, Npip has acted as a lever for new funds, a complementary source of funding during periods of other outside funding, and a special source of funding for small organizations unable to access other resources.

However, while the program has had no le successes, it has also struggled with strategic and operational difficulties.

I. **Problem: Country-Choice Coherence**. The choice of countries eligible for the program, and the division of projects and budgets among countries within the program, are not based on an assessment of indigenous needs or agendas in the region. Norad's restriction on eligible countries and Npip choices on project allocation do not seem to be adequately supported.

The choice of current countries and the choice for future expansion needs revision. We examined possible alternatives for choosing countries within Latin America. Our recommendation is that decisions on expansion within the continent (or to other regions of the world) should take the following elements into consideration:

1.1 **Recommendation: Undertake a Continental Profile.** If expansion is wanted, the program should undertake a continental profile on the indigenous agenda in the region, core areas for action in particular countries, as well as an in-depth assessment of the organizations now playing a role. This work is now done informally, dependent only on the skills of the coordinators. Key among suggested criteria for expansion are:

- Countries with a presence of organized indigenous and pro-indigenous agencies working within a visible movement
- Particular indigenous organizations that are making a breakthrough, experimenting with models that may be of importance for peoples in other countries

Given that there is only a small amount of money available, the program can dependably support only existing movements, even if given organizations are weak.

1.2 **Recommendation: Develop a High and Lowland Program Prior to other Expansion.** The option of moving into neighbouring Andean countries to develop a highland program, and into countries that share lowland Amazônian indigenous cultures, is the first to be considered before movement outside the region. We note, however, the danger of trade off between breadth and depth in relationships and programs if expansion is undertaken without corresponding expansion in staffing and resources. One way to explore options would be to allocate a proportion of the budget for new program development, including in other countries in the region.

1.3 **Recommendation: Contemplate New Regions.** Almost none of our interviewees in Europe felt that it was *in*appropriate to expand the program to other regions of the world, though none thought it sensible to leave Latin America, where the indigenous debate is most coherent (despite the lack of Norwegian core countries in the region) and the program so successful. Once a systemic implementation plan for the Norwegian government's policy is in place, there is no a priori reason to exclude expansion to selected countries in Asia (including the Lao Republic, Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka), Africa (in Botswana, Namibia, Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda?), and the Baring region (to build on existing Saami and circumpolar alliances).

1.4 **Recommendation: Revise Decision to Leave Chile.**

2. Problem: Thematic and Core Area Focus. The decision to limit income-generation projects, and the (largely ignored) focus on three core areas for funding, indicates a lack of strategic planning both on the side of Fafo and Norad, as well as a lack of responsiveness to needs in the region.

2.1. **Recommendation: Adopt One Broad Goal (Field of Activity or Thrust or Focus or General Orientation): Institutional And Capacity Building.** Npip has already staked a claim on institutional development in the belief that organizations are necessary vehicles for the expression and fulfillment of indigenous peo-

ples collective work. We recommend that the program focus on this goal, but work in a number of subject and theme areas as required. In effect, this suggestion would merely codify existing practice while helping the program gain a clearer identity. This clarified emphasis would prove useful not only for partners in the field, but also for co-funders.

We would make the additional recommendation that *institutional support* consider inclusion of salaries and core costs (including costs of communicating with the donor).

We are wary, however, of the allure of *capacity building* if it is undertaken out of its institutional context. It is important to avoid training without supporting the institution to make the training useful, or vice versa – funding the school, but not the curriculum; or funding a printing press producing Mayan material, but not linking that material with the school looking for Mayan material. Physical support to buildings and other infrastructure should equally be part of a broader strategy toward construction of institutions, not just buildings.

2.2 **Recommendation: Maintain Flexibility.** Continue to consider both pro-indigenous and indigenous organizations.

2.3 **Recommendation: Include Income-Generating Projects.** We feel strongly that the exclusion of income-generating projects needs to be revisited in light of the central importance that community economic sustainability has taken in recent years, especially once indigenous land has been legally recognized. Not to get involved in projects of this type would significantly weaken the relevance of the program.

adjustright In keeping with the broad emphasis on institutional and capacity building, criteria for accepting future applications may be that the proposal supports indigenous peoples organizations' other work, benefits the larger community, or furthers the indigenous movement. Support for income-generating projects should be considered, in conjunction with support for appropriate research and pilot projects, given the absence of significant success in devising sustainable economic alternatives for the indigenous areas in spite of the number of current and past experiments.

2.4 **Recommendation: Retract the Double-or-No Funding Policy.** Currently, the program is obliged to fund both or neither of two representative indigenous organizations if they have overlapping constituencies. This policy, while understandably put in place to avoid involvement in local politics, is not defensible as an overarching policy position. It assumes that there are no cases in which there is not a «right» answer. The policy should be retracted.

3. Problem: Funding cycle. Npip is perceived as a reliable source of support by many important indigenous and non-indigenous support organizations in Latin America. Most organizations, however, find it difficult to work effectively within the one-year cycle, a pattern that is unusual among other donor organizations working with indigenous organizations.

3.1 **Recommendation: Lengthen Funding Cycle.** We strongly recommend that the funding cycle be lengthened to three years. Alternatives include installation of the grant model in place by the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, or the adoption of a block grant system within the current framework.

3.2 **Recommendation: Reconfigure Budget to Allow For Risk.** Long-term investments in institutions have generated the successes we see today in Npip's work. Working with new or vulnerable indigenous organizations *is* risky and success is therefore dependent on longer-term interventions. We recommend that the budget be reconfigured to accept those risks strategically. The work of Development and Peace sets one example, whereby set-asides in the country budget are made for (1) short-term, one-off projects (allowing flexibility in the kinds of applications and reporting required), (2) contingencies and emergencies (allowing quick action), and (3) new initiative trials (allowing for new kinds of activities) in addition to their programming for long-term partnerships. This funding system allows the funding NGO to

plan phasing in and phasing out of organizations, to experiment with new or risky trial efforts, to deal quickly with problems, all at the same time as long-term institutional support can be offered.

4. **Problem: Personalization.** The strict division of labour between coordinators has meant there is a danger of over-personalizing the program, potentially making partners vulnerable to personal, rather than organizational, decisions on funding. Steps need to be taken to offer an institutional relationship with the partners in addition to the personal one.

   4.1 **Recommendation: Build a Management System to Limit the Dangers of Personalization.**

5. Problem: Field Evaluations. We also find that the infrequent use of independent project evaluations is a problem, both as a danger to organizations whose funding may be cut because of personal misunderstandings with coordinators, and as a means for helping organizations improve their work.

   5.1 **Recommendation: Plan More Regular Evaluations.**

6. Problem: Field Communications and Transparency. The research also found that communications (in the shape of more formal procedures and more regular correspondence) needed to be improved in order for the program to act more transparently.

   6.1 **Recommendation: Undertake a Participatory Diagnosis.** The program may wish to borrow from the experience of Development and Peace and from NOVIB, and consider undertaking a Consultation and Diagnostic Meeting once every three years with project partners within an existing country. Such a meeting would allow the program staff to review plans, build partnerships, facilitate links among partners, and get beyond recipient-donor relationships by jointly diagnosing the national and regional agendas. *How* those meetings take place, however, is important (the warnings elaborated by ICCO in having meetings simply to «manage clients» is a serious danger).

   6.2 **Recommendation: Install Standard Communication Guidelines.** We recommend a communication system be put in place whereby proposals are acknowledged immediately, with indications of the selection process and timing to follow; decisions are communicated when indicated; and regular letters and newsletters are sent to update the partner on Npip's work in the country and on issues of shared concern.

   6.3 **Recommendation: Implement Transparency Safeguards.** In order to improve transparency, we recommend that a system be implemented to: clarify to partners that they may write to the Npip supervisor or Chair of the Board in case of complaint or commendation; expand the oversight of the Npip supervisor to more closely supervise the work of the project officers; require that the project officers discuss their programming decisions jointly, share information on day-to-day programming decisions, and learn both Spanish and Portuguese in order better to complement each other's work; and rotate visits between staff members on an occasional basis.

   6.4 **Recommendation: Undertake a Pro-Active Funding Review.** And, in order to compensate for the lack of pro-active demands on the part of smaller or newer organizations, we recommend a review of existing small projects for gaps in funding that may inhibit project success (such as recompense of communication costs); and the development and enactment of a proposal development system that would identify reasonable costs that might not be requested at the outset.

10.4 RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS

Based on these recommendations, we suggest that Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs present this evaluation publicly as a basis for discussion for a new strategy. Indigenous organizations who have formed the backbone of the information in this report should be included in this dissemination and discussion. We also suggest that discussions on lessons learned within the program further be disseminated to other NGO, bilateral, and multilateral programs working with indigenous peoples, that they may share in Norway's experience and open up further con-

versations on their own work. Whatever organisation wins the tendering process, we recommend further that the contract negotiations take into consideration the needed improvements identified and that a minimum three year contract be signed.

Appendices
Table of Contents

Appendix 1

Organizational Analysis

Table of Contents

1 Introduction: Background and Summary

1.1 NPIP HISTORY BEFORE NORAD AND FAFO CONTRACT

Starting in 1980, Norway has supported indigenous groups in Latin America. Until October 1991, this support was administered by the Division for Private Organizations (PRIVORG) in Norad. In 1989, when Npip consisted of some 40 ongoing project support contracts with annual cost of NOK 7 million and total financial commitments of NOK 16 million[1], PRIVORG had come to the conclusion that it would be more conducive for Npip if this was administered outside Norad itself. The justification for this was twofold:[2]

1. Management of Npip is a demanding channel for support, requiring human resources and special competence, which Norad did not have.
2. Norad wanted to contribute to transfer of knowledge about living conditions of indigenous groups to non-governmental organizations in Norway, of which many have indigenous populations as target groups and already receive Norad support.

In May 1990, Norad commissioned a study on alternative models for the management of Npip outside Norad, where Norad would not be operationally involved in the program. In the study[3] the consultants concluded that whatever the organizational set-up, it would have to include three main elements of what they referred to as the «triangle of competence»:

1. Competence on indigenous peoples
2. Competence on project management
3. Regional competence (Latin America)

The consultants presented two models:

1. Fund-model. This was a block transfer to a fund to be administered by a board, which would have to be constituted as a legal body and composed of members ensuring the «triangle of competence.» The secretariat should be in an existing organization.

2. Consortium model. This consortium would be composed of some of the larger Norwegian NGOs with experience working in Latin America and preferably with indigenous populations as target groups. The secretariat would be one of the member organizations which would have the legal and financial responsibility for the Npip allocation.

The consultants also recommended an advisory service both to Norad and the Npip administration, having in mind International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA).

Norad opted for the fund-model, including a board that would be responsible for the allocations of the Fund.

In the fall of 1990, Norad had meetings with the following Norwegian academic institutions that had presented their candidacy for administrating Npip. They were all academic research institutes; none of the Norwegian development assistance NGOs presented their candidacy.

- Institute for Human Rights, University of Oslo
- Norwegian on Foreign Studies (NUPI)
- Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen
- Centre for Development and Environment (SUM) University of Oslo

In reviewing these candidates and selecting NUPI, Norad recognized that competence on Latin America and indigenous peoples was limited and not institutionalized in Norway and that none of the candidates were tailored for the administration of Npip.

In May 1991, the Board of NUPI decided not to enter into a contract with Norad on the administration of Npip. At this stage, a fifth organization, Fafo, had also presented its candidacy. Of the original four candidates, Norad favoured SUM, and the choice therefore was between SUM and the newcomer Fafo. Based on interviews with the two, SUM was chosen as more qualified on development cooperation in third world countries and research on related issues, while Fafo was perceived as having an organizational set-up more favourable for the management of Npip. The arguments favouring Fafo were strengthened by the fact that, at this stage, Norad envisaged that the professional responsibility for the allocation of funds would be assigned to the Npip Board. This board was to be composed of institutions, organizations and individuals which would compensate for Fafo's lack of compe-

---

[1] Alternative models for NORAD management of the Indigenous Peoples Program, Scanteam, September 1990, page 1.

[2] Memorandum of November 20, 1992 from NORAD to Minister of Development Cooperation

[3] Alternative models for NORAD management of the Indigenous Peoples Program, Scanteam, September 1990.

tence on Latin America, indigenous groups and development cooperation in general. On this basis, Fafo was chosen and it was decided to enter into negotiations with Fafo as described in paragraph 1.3.

1.1 BRIEF PRESENTATION OF FAFO IN 1991

Fafo was created in 1982 by the Norwegian Trade Union LO, with the objective: «To produce, publish and market applied research, as well as consultancy and development studies which are of significance to voluntary organizations, public authorities and private business.» Fafo consisted of the following institutions:

- Fafond, a research foundation that acted as a holding company for Fafo's affiliated companies.
- Fafo International, which organized international activities of Fafo, providing research and consultancy services.
- SOTECO, a Soviet-Norwegian joint venture
- FIDECO, Fisheries Development Company of Norway

Fafo International was the unit of Fafo where Npip would be placed. The main activity of Fafo International was the organizing of living conditions surveys in the former USSR and the Middle East. The organizational set-up of Fafo was changed in 1993 as described in paragraph 3.1.3.

1.3 NORAD-FAFO AGREEMENT 1991 ON ADMINISTRATION OF NPIP

In its letter of June 11, 1991, Norad offered Fafo a contract for the management of Npip. Norad presented as justification for their selection Fafo's good administrative set-up and Fafo's expressed commitment to build up competence on Latin America and indigenous peoples. In its letter Norad highlighted the premises for management and operation of Npip:

- The contract between Fafo and Norad would be for a two-year trial period. Fafo would recruit and employ a secretariat of two persons to be located in Fafo. Norad would indicate professional qualifications for the two. It would be negotiated between Fafo and Norad how the former would be compensated for the administration of the Npip Secretariat.
- Norad would enter into a contract with a Board, which would have the responsibility for allocation of Npip funds to beneficiary organizations and for appraising the professional quality of individual projects. The Board would be responsible to Norad for the use of the funds and compliance with Npip guidelines. The Board would be composed of relevant institutions, organizations and individual resource persons. Fafo would have one seat in the Board. Norad would not be a member of the Board.
- During the trial period Npip would be limited to Latin America.
- Norad would contract IWGIA's international secretariat in Copenhagen to provide consulting services to Fafo, Npip secretariat, the Board and Norad.

Although the terms of the contract had been agreed, Fafo expressed concern about the division of administrative responsibilities assigned to the Fafo secretariat and managerial and legal responsibilities assigned to the Board. The outcome was that Norad accepted Fafo's objections and a contract between the two was signed on September 27, 1991, effective as of October 1, 1991.

The contract differs from the models presented in the 1990 consultant report and the set-up discussed with the first four candidates on some substantive matters:

- Fafo was given the full and total responsibility for the administration and management of Npip
- The Board would be appointed by Fafo and its responsibility limited to an advisory role to Fafo.
- Fafo itself would decide where to acquire consulting services, and no special role of IWGIA was included.

On September 19, 1995, the initial contract was replaced by the current contract (see chapter 2).

1.4 OVERVIEW OF PRESENT NPIP ACTIVITIES, BUDGET AND PRIORITIES

1.4.1 Npip Activities and Responsibilities

The Fafo report «Plans 1997» presents Npip activities, which are of two types: activities targeted to indigenous populations in Latin America and activities targeted to development cooperation and public opinion in Norway.

1.4.1.1 Activities Targeted to Indigenous Populations in Latin America

The current contract contains «Guidelines for Npip» (Enclosure III). In this, the goal of Npip is stated as to «strengthen the capacity of indigenous populations to decide on their own development.» The guidelines also sets out the following criteria for selection of projects to be supported by Npip:

1. Npip shall focus on the following core areas:
   I Civil rights issues and health
   II Culture and education
   III Institutional strengthening and networking
2. When selecting projects for support, emphasis shall be put on their economic, social and ecological sustainability.
3. At present, Npip activities are limited to Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil and Chile.

The following tables present the key figures on Npip activities in 1992 and 1997.

Table 1.1. Npip projects 1992 and 1997 per countries
(1992 actual costs, 1997 budget)

Country	Number of projects		Allocation in NOK	
	1992	1997	1992	1997
Brazil	10	14	3.276.686	4.402.200
Chile	4	4	1.135.669	726.000
Guatemala	3	12	1.330.575	5.187.600
Paraguay	2	3	661.502	1.089.000
Peru	6	6	1.025.604	2.399.100
Regional		1		264.000
Monitoring				1.021.540
Total	25	40	7.430.036	15.089.440

Table 1.2. Npip activities and core areas 1997

		Number of projects		Budget allocation	
		Number	Percentage	NOK	Percentage
I.	Civil rights issues and health	6	15,4	2.468.400	17,9
II.	Culture and education	24	61,5	8.114.700	58,8
III.	Institutional strengthening and networking	23,3	9	23,1	3.220.800
Total		39	100,0	13.803.900	100,0

The composition of Npip projects as per core areas differ in the five countries, as shown in table 1.3. (core area denomination was changed in 1995).

Table 1.3. Composition of Npip projects as per core areas, 1997

	I	II	III	Total
Brazil	4	5	5	14
Chile	0	3	1	4
Paraguay	1	2	0	3
Peru	1	4	1	6
Total	6	24	9	39

I Civil rights issues and health
II Culture and education
III Institutional strengthening and networking

Npip works in partnership with two types of recipient, as shown in table 1.4.

Table 1.4 Npip projects per types of recipient organizations in 1998

	Pro-indigenous organizations	Indigenous organizations	Total
Brazil	6	6	12
Chile	1	2	3
Guatemala	2	8	10
Paraguay	2	0	2
Peru	2	3	5
Total	13	19	32

The average annual allocation per project in 1997 was NOK 353.946, varying from NOK 66.000 to NOK 1.254.000.

Table 1.5. Npip 1992 and 1997 budgets

1.	PROJECT SUPPORT	1992	1997
1.1.	Local partners		
	Brazil	3.896.000	4.402.200
	Chile	567.000	726.000
	Guatemala	1.300.000	5.187.600
	Paraguay	514.000	1.089.000
	Peru	1.148.000	2.399.100
	Other – Regional	375.000	264.000
	Total local partners	7.800.000	14.067.900
1.2.	Monitoring, supervision		
	Supervision visits	390.000	400.000
	Project reviews		555.540
	Consulting services	75.000	66.000
	Total monitoring		1.021.540
	TOTAL PROJECT SUPPORT	8.265.000	15.089.440
2.	OTHER EXPENSES		
2.1.	Information and professional development		
	Advisory board	70.000	67.500
	Courses and literature		20.000
	Information material	50.000	138.000
	Seminar		50.000
	Start-up expenses	25.000	
	Total	145.000	275.500
2.2.	Administration		
	Personnel	1.540.000	1.722.000
	Miscellaneous	50.000	
	Auditing 1996, 1997		159.000
	Total administration		1.881.000
	TOTAL OTHER EXPENSES		2.156.500
3.	PROGRAM REVIEW		500.000
	GRAND TOTAL	10.000.000	17.745.940

1.4.1.2 Activities Targeted To Development Cooperation and Public Opinion In Norway.

The Contract (article 2.6.) states that:

> Fafo shall build up a practically-oriented knowledge base on indigenous populations with a view to strengthening the basis for the program, one which will be a resource base for Norwegian institutions and groups working on development cooperation.

The 1997 Plan of Action states that Npip has the following objectives related to these activities:

- Contribute to strengthening Norwegian competence in this field.
- Contribute to making this competence available and useful for others working on development cooperation.
- Contribute to increased involvement and understand-

ing on issues related to indigenous populations among people working on development cooperation and the public at large.

1.4.2 Npip Priorities

The contract (article 3.2.) states that Norad shall, in cooperation with Fafo, prepare annually enclosure II to the contact, which shall include «Description of particular challenges, objectives and priority core areas for the budget year, which shall be in accordance with the strategy of Npip and its long term goals.»

In table 1.6., contractual priorities for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 are presented.

Table 1.6. Npip priorities 1995, 1996 and 1997

Priorities 1995	Priorities 1996	Priorities 1997
• Further development of program profile • Expansion in Guatemala • Closer contact between Advisory Board and Norad • Extension of Advisory Board to include representative of Same Assembly • Organizational placement of Npip within Fafo	• Continuity of program • Contact between Fafo and Norad • Institutional anchoring of Npip within Fafo • Active cooperation with Advisory Board • Planning of possible extension of information work • Improvement of contacts between Npip and relevant Norwegian groups and institutions • Special attention to reforms in AIDESEP-Peru	• Adjust accounting period for all projects which makes calendar year reporting possible • Carry out program review in order to clarify guidelines and criteria for Npip continuation • Increase integration of Npip into relevant professional environments, such as seminars and post graduate student • Increase public knowledge of program through publications and dissemination of information material and participation in seminars and meetings

1.4.3 Npip Organizational Set-Up

Figure 1.1. gives an overview of the organizational structure of Npip. This is described and discussed in detail in chapter 3.

Figure 1.1. Organizational structure of Npip



1.5 NPIP AND OTHER NORWEGIAN SUPPORT TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Npip constitutes 21.4 percent of Norway's total support to indigenous peoples. In 1996, the total amount was NOK 82,549,000, that went both to Latin America and countries elsewhere in the world. But Norwegian support is concentrated to Latin America, 85 percent of the total. Support to indigenous peoples in Latin America outside Npip goes both to Npip-countries and others.

1.6 THE EVALUATION OF NPIP AND THE SCOPE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has commissioned The North-South Institute to undertake an evaluation of Npip. The scope of work also includes the administration of the program and the relationship between Fafo and Norad, the focus of the present organizational analysis.

The sources of information for this analysis have been Fafo and Norad archives and interviews with key persons involved in the program in Norway. Views from participating organizations and others outside Norway are not included.

2. The Contracts between Norad and Fafo

2.1 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF INITIAL CONTRACT

The contract, signed September 27, 1991, consisted of a main body and an enclosure. The main elements of the contract may be summarized as follows:

1. Norad delegates the administration and the responsibility for the Npip to Fafo for a two year trial period.
2. The purpose of Fafo's administration of Npip is to consolidate the program administratively and professionally and to increase the involvement and comprehension on indigenous questions in the Norwegian cooperation community and the public opinion at large.
3. The overall goal of Npip is to strengthen the capability of the indigenous peoples to decide on the processes of change which they are undergoing.
4. The individual projects are the responsibility of the participating organizations.

The contract included the following items

Main body:

- Purpose and background
- Tasks, organization and administration
- Financing and budget
- Reporting and accounting
- Publishing
- Duration

Enclosure:

- General
- Definition of indigenous populations
- Goal
- Criteria for project selection
- Technical and geographic framework

2.2 THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE NEW CONTRACT

The contract period for the first contract was from October 1, 1991 till October 1, 1993. However, it was extended annually and the current contract was signed only on September 19, 1995.

In the course of these four years, cooperation between Fafo and Norad encountered several serious problems that eventually brought about the new contract two years after the end of the initial contract period. The most important issues and milestones before the new contract was signed are listed below:

1992 *January*

Fafo presents a Strategy Document, proposing three core areas in two geographic regions:

1. Projects targeted to defend and strengthen vulnerable indigenous groups in the Amazonas regions of Brazil, Peru and Paraguay.
2. Legal advice and culture and education projects amongst Maya populations in Guatemala and Belize and Quechua-, Aymara- and Mapuche-speaking populations in Peru and Chile.
3. Income-generating projects in the same geographic regions as core area two.

September

Fafo presents a memo to Norad to discuss the following items:

1. Increase of allocations to South and Central America
2. Extension of program to other continents

3. Establishment of a research unit in connection with Npip
4. Specific activities related to UN Indigenous Peoples' Year
5. Proposal on donor conference
6. Proposal for revised presentation brochure of Npip

Meeting held between Norad and Fafo based on the above. On items 1 and 2, Norad responded that the allocation would not be increased before Npip had found a more definite profile and that the program would remain exclusively in Latin America. Items 4 and 5 were left pending. The presentation brochure was approved, but Norad questioned its purpose and who would receive it. Norad requested that Norad's role should be made clearer.

December
Fafo proposes a conference on indigenous peoples that Norad finds too ambitious.

1993 *April*
Meeting between Norad and Fafo, where Fafo proposes to:

1. Visit other European donors to indigenous populations in preparation of donor conference
2. Expand program to Ecuador and Colombia
3. Expand Npip administration with a view to increase Npip information activities

Norad is against all three proposals. Two other items are also addressed:

1. Norad questions why Npip works only in Latin America and not also in Africa.
2. Fafo requests permission to use the Npip information brochure, which Norad does not want Fafo to do, because of uncertainty about whether it may be said that Fafo, rather than Norad, manages the program.

May
The Advisory Board discusses at length the conflicting views between Fafo and Norad.

June
Meeting between Norad and Fafo:

1. Norad will take the initiative for a meeting with NGOs and other groups to present Npip to a larger group.
2. The Norad – Fafo contract is extended to December 1993.
3. Fafo is requested to present proposal for new contract.

September
Fafo presents proposal for new contract.

1994 *January*
In response to Norad's request, Fafo presents proposal for broad and open conference on Npip.

February
Norad extends original contract one year.

March
Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) establishes an internal reference group to review Npip.

April
The Advisory Board discusses strategic input to Norad on the continuation of the program.

July
In response to request from Norad, Fafo presents memo on its experiences from managing Npip.

Norad-MFA internal reference group presents its recommendations:

1. Support to indigenous populations shall not be outside Norad's other cooperation activities.
2. Support to indigenous peoples shall have clearer objective.
3. Support to indigenous peoples shall be process-oriented.
4. The geographic focus shall be shifted away from South America.
5. Support to indigenous peoples shall be more active (not only responsive to requests).
6. Norad ought to give priority to resources enabling Norad itself to manage the support..
7. Support to indigenous peoples should be a priority for Norad.

Norad invites NGOs and research institutes to a meeting on Npip, which Norad then cancels.

October
As an outcome of discussions in the internal reference group between Norad and MFA and meetings with Fafo, Norad makes the following decisions (letter of October 31).

1. Negotiations with Fafo are initiated for the prolongation of the contract.
2. The intention is a long term contract.
3. Npip will in principle be continued along the guide-

lines prepared by Fafo and the Advisory Board.
4. Possibilities for extension may be considered following consultations between Norad, Fafo and the Advisory Board.
5. Npip should be evaluated in the course of 1995.
6. In the contract negotiations Norad will emphasize how Fafo will institutionalize Npip in its own organization and how one may see to it that administrative costs are kept at a reasonable level.
7. Emphasis will be put on availability of Npip experiences to the MFA/ Norad system.
8. It is recommended that the Advisory Board will be expanded with one representative from the Same Assembly.
9. Close contact between Npip and other groups in Norway working with indigenous peoples' issues is encouraged, as for instance research institutes, universities and organizations.

1995 *February*
On request from Norad Fafo submits proposal for new contract.

March
Meeting between Norad and Fafo where several matters of concern are raised, which Norad summarizes in its letter of March 30, 1995:
1. Norad expresses its satisfaction with the way the content of the program has evolved in response to views expressed by Norad.
2. Norad is disappointed that Fafo has shown little willingness to integrate Npip into the Fafo organization as a whole and not been able to use the experience from and for other Fafo activities.
3. Norad wishes to have a long term contract on the management of Npip, but is uncertain whether Fafo is the most suitable organization. The Fafo – Norad contract is therefore extended only until December 31, 1995.

May – July
Exchange of letters and meetings between Norad and Fafo on institutionalization of Npip in Fafo, where Norad specifies its views in letter of June 12 1995 to which Fafo responds in letter of July 6, 1995, enclosing statement from the Advisory Board.

June
The Advisory Board discusses extensively substantive and organizational matters related to Npip. The outcome is that the Advisory Board presents to Norad an extensive memorandum «Views of the Advisory Board on the continuation of Npip,» which addresses the following:
- Conclusions of the Advisory Board
- General views
- The Advisory Board's proposal to Norad and Fafo
- The role of the Advisory Board

August
Norad decides to enter into a new three year contract with Fafo, based on:

1. The recommendations of the Advisory Board
2. The lack of alternatives to Fafo
3. Fafo's largely adequate response to challenges Norad has presented on the institutionalization of Npip into Fafo

September
The new contract for a three year period is signed on September 19, 1995.

2.3 SUMMARY OF CURRENT CONTRACT

The present contract has the following structure:

Main body
1. Main principles for the cooperation between Norad and Fafo
2. Background, purpose and tasks
3. Annual plans, budgets and financing
4. Fafo's power
5. Control of results and reporting
6. Decisions on economy and management
7. Cooperation – disputes
8. Publishing of material
9. Termination

Enclosure I
1. Project number
2. Goals and priorities
3. Approved projects, budgets and financing
4. Reports and accounts
5. Indicative figures

Enclosure II Guidelines on economic management, home accounts and project accounts
1. Economic management
2. Requirements for external auditors

Enclosure III Guidelines for Npip

1. General
2. Definition of indigenous populations
3. Objective
4. Criteria for project selection

2.4 MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1991 AND 1995 CONTRACT

There are important differences in the cooperation between Norad and Fafo under the first and second contract, as summarized below:

First contract 1991–95	Second contract 1995 – present
• Contract tailored for Fafo and Npip • Wide flexibility for Fafo • Two dates for submission of requests	• Contract based on frame agreement for NGOs • Clearer criteria for selection of projects and organizations • Eligibility of support to pro-indigenous organizations clearer • Management modalities and procedures made explicit • Auditing requirements made explicit • Less flexibility • Norad becomes member of Advisory Board

In conclusion, this chapter has described the very difficult conflicts between Norad and Fafo on the implementation of the contract on the management of Npip. This conflict dominated the relationship for four years, particularly during 1993 and 1994. With the new 1995 contract, most of these conflicts had been resolved and a framework for Fafo's role and responsibilities had been agreed. The new 1995 contract sets out a framework that is in line with Norad's and FRIV's normal rules and procedures for management of Norad financed activities outside Norad. The climate around Norad – Fafo cooperation since 1995 has therefore improved substantially, as described in chapter 3.

3. Present Organizational Set-up for Npip Management and Implementation

3.1 ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP AND TASK MANAGEMENT

3.1.1 Introduction

Npip is an allocation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' budget, assigned to Norad, the agency that has the constitutional responsibility for the budget allocation. Through its contract with Fafo, Norad has delegated the execution of the program. This chapter addresses the implementation of the 1995 contract from an organizational point of view, based on information gathered in Norway.

Figure 1.1. shows the institutional participants of the program, presented below.

3.1.2 Norad and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In Norad the responsibility for Npip lies with the Department for Nongovernmental Organizations (FRIV), which has the following structure:

Figure 3.1. Organizational structure of FRIV



The FRIV management of Npip is assigned to a specific desk officer in the Cooperatio Section. The Director of FRIV follows the program.

Norad's main responsibilities pertaining to the program are to:

1. Supervise Fafo's execution of the program
2. Study the annual request from Fafo
3. Jointly with Fafo, prepare the Annual Enclosure I to the contract, a document containing:
   - Description of particular challenges, goals and priorities to be addressed in the course of the year
   - List of approved projects
   - Annual budget and plan of financing including

indicative figures for the following two years (article 3.2.)

At present, no other Norad units are formally involved in the management of Npip, nor is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs involved. On a more informal basis, other units in Norad are also involved: the Asia and Latin America Department, the Information Division and the Human Rights Advisor. However, in 1994, FRIV organized an internal working group with participants from other Norad departments and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to review Norad's activities targeted to indigenous populations. The conclusions of the work group were presented in July 1994 and recommended important changes in objectives, scope and work modality of Npip. Although the work of this group was an important input in the process that led to the 1995 Contract, their recommendations were not followed (see paragraph 2.2.).

In 1997, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a working group on UN Decade for Indigenous Peoples, with members from three MFA departments (Human Rights Advisor, Legal Department, Bilateral Department, Political Department), Ministry of Local Government and Labour and the Sami Assembly.

3.1.3 Fafo

Since July 1993, Fafo has been operating as a foundation.[4] Its goal is to undertake research and provide its clients knowledge of importance for strategic-planning and decision-making. Fafo's research activities are organized in three departments:

1. Centre for Studies on Trade Union and Labour
2. Centre for Studies of Public Policies
3. Centre for International Studies

The economic, administrative and personnel management of Fafo is the responsibility of the Economic and Administrative Department. There is also a separate department of publications.

Fafo's income and expenses in 1995 and 1996 is shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Fafo income and expenses 1996 and 1995 (NOK 1000)

Income and Expenses	1996	1995
Income		
Income from projects	50.498	47.589
Public grants	4.187	4.095
Sale of reports	1.541	911
Income from rent	564	547
Contributions	4.500	1.000
Total income	61.290	54.142
Expenses		
Direct project related costs	22.928	21.766
Personal costs	24.837	22.920
Other operational costs	7.131	5.703
Depreciation	1.864	1.711
Losses	14	69
Total expenses	56.774	52.169

82.5 percent of Fafo's income (NOK 50.5 million) in 1996 came from 59 clients paying for projects undertaken by Fafo. This includes Npip funds of NOK 12.5 million which was channeled through Fafo, and is not actually Fafo income. Table 3.2. shows the distribution of the remaining NOK 49.6 million per type of client.

Fafo competes with other research institutes. Many of these receive a base allocation, which in some cases may go as high as 50 % of total income. Such base allocation to Fafo is only 4 %. As a matter of fact, in 1996 Parliament reduced the base allocation to Fafo to NOK 2,2 mill. This is NOK 40.000 per researcher.

In 1996 Fafo had 109 projects under execution and published some 40 reports.

Table 3.2. Categories of Fafo clients in 1996

Category of Client	Percentage of Total
Public administration	43 %
Norwegian Research Council	12 %
Private organizations and companies	31 %
International organizations	14 %

[4] This presentation is based on FAFO Annual Report 1996.

Table 3.3. Fafo personnel as of 1 January 1996

	Staff members *	Graduate students
Center for studies on trade union and labour	21	4
Center for studies on public policies	20	2
Center for international studies	24	4
Economy and administration department	13	5 **
Publications and information department	4	
Total	82	15

*) Including staff members on leave
**) «Civil workers» (Volunteers exempted from military service)

Fafo personnel numbers for January 1997 are shown in table 3.3

Its assets are contributions from the Norwegian Trade Union and private companies, in large part invested in the buildings where Fafo is located.

Fafo International, which is where Npip was located, was renamed Centre for International Studies (SIS). SIS has four regional sections, each headed by a research coordinator. Until 1995, Npip was located in one of these sections. Since 1995, Npip is placed directly under the Department Director. The Npip unit has two staff members.

The themes where SIS works and has competence are:
- Research on living conditions and undertaking of living conditions surveys
- Population (demography, migration, labour market)
- Nation building, democratization, implementation of peace treaties
- Labour and labour market
- Human rights including indigenous peoples, children, refugees
- Development cooperation, transfer of knowledge (capacity building) and institutional development

The geographic regions where SIS has projects are:
- Middle East and North Africa
- Africa South of Sahara
- Barents region and Baltic
- Latin America
- China

SIS is currently going through a consolidation phase, reviewing its priorities on research themes and regions.

3.1.4 Advisory Board

Fafo appoints an Npip Advisory Board, presently of six members, whose task is to provide professional advice on the program. The Board shall be composed of people with relevant professional or organizational background. In nominating members, Fafo wants to have a Board composed of:
- Professional knowledge on indigenous populations
- Geographical knowledge on Latin America
- Knowledge on human rights, peace process
- Experience from cooperation with NGOs
- Norwegian Sami Association

The Advisory Board has been constituted twice, 1992 and 1996.

With the 1995 contract, Norad meets as an observer in the Board. In 1993, Norad also suggested that they should meet in the Advisory Board meetings, but the Board did not find that appropriate.

The 1991 contract states that the Board shall have at least

Table 3.4. Npip participating organizations in 1998

	Pro-indigenous organizations	Indigenous Organizations	Total
Brazil	6	6	12
Chile	1	2	3
Guatemala	2	8	10
Paraguay	2	0	2
Peru	2	3	5
Total	13	19	32

two meetings per year; the 1995 contract states that there should be at least three meetings per year. In table 3.7. in paragraph 3.2.4. the topics addressed at the different meetings are listed.

3.1.5 Participant Organizations

In 1998 there were 32 Npip participant organizations. Of these, 19 are indigenous organizations while 13 are pro-indigenous. The composition varies among the five Npip countries as shown in table 3.4.

3.2 MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS AND RELATED ISSUES

3.2.1 Npip and Fafo

3.2.1.1 Npip Unit Activities

The Npip unit, which has the operational responsibility for the execution of the Npip and the implementation of the Norad – Fafo contract, has two permanent staff members. In table 3.5., the main activities and tasks of the Npip unit throughout the year are shown.

In addition to these annual activities, there have been others such as the introduction of a local auditing system in 1996, preparation of an Npip information brochure in 1997 and major seminars in 1996 and planned for 1998.

3.2.1.2 Npip Unit Division of Labour

Npip is managed by two program coordinators, forming the Npip unit directly under the supervision of SIS Director. One coordinator has been there since 1991 (with a leave of absence from October 1995 to October 1996), the other since 1996. The former has a Bachelors degree in anthropology; the other, a Masters degree in history. They are not researchers, as the bulk of Fafo staff, but people with practical experience in the management of development programs.

The division of labour between the two is that one coordinator manages Npip activities in Brazil, the other activ-

Table 3.5. Annual Npip unit activities

	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D
Appraisal and finalization of individual project plans (deadline for submission September 1)									X	X		
Preparation of Npip Annual Plan (deadline for submission to Norad November 1)									X	X		
Report to OECD/DAC through Norad	X											
Dialogue with organizations on plans and budgets	X	X	X									
Finalization of annual contracts with organizations	X	X	X									
Monitoring visits		X	X					X	X		X	X
Review of annual reports from organizations (Deadline April 1)			X	X								
Preparation of Annual Report to Norad					X	X		X				
Review half year reports from organizations									X			
Review of accounting and auditing reports from organizations			X	X	X	X						
Preparation of financial reports for Fafo accounting unit and auditor					X	X						
Publishing of Npip Annual Report				X								
Meetings Advisory Board		X				X				X		
Seminar on indigenous peoples (1998)				X								

Table 3.6. Program profile for the two Npip coordinators

	Coordinator 1	Coordinator 2
Countries	Brazil	Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru
Number of projects	14	26
Amount in NOK	4.402.200	10.6877.240
Indigenous organizations	5	13
Pro indigenous organizations	6	8

ities in the remaining countries (Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay and Chile). Table 3.6. shows the main characteristics of this division.

There is no further division of labour between the two, who function as a team on all cross cutting activities. However, there is a certain practical division of labour regarding financial reporting. Coordinator 2 is more familiar with spread sheets and project management tools. He prepares the consolidated financial overview including inputs from Coordinator 1. Previously, there was also a tendency for Coordinator 1 to focus on relations with other Fafo units and for Coordinator 2 to focus on relations with Norad and other external contacts. This division of responsibilities is no longer the case.

The fact that there is no further division of labour implies a certain amount of parallel work, which may include some duplication on cross-cutting activities not directly targeted to individual projects and partner organizations. Furthermore, it is felt that program planning as well as activity planning for the Npip unit suffers from this lack of a shared and coherent planning process.

There is also a feeling that the program as a whole would have benefited from a stronger integration between the two program components. This and other divisions of labour have been discussed between the coordinators and the SIS Director, but no changes have been made so far. The integration has been mostly to ensure that the three (the two coordinators and the SIS director) are informed about all aspects of the program. This is done through the following mechanisms:

- Joint preparation of reports and plans to Norad
- Circulation of travel reports
- Joint signature by the two coordinators on communications out of the Npip unit

Integration between the coordinators and between Npip activities are closer than before.

3.2.1.3 The Relationship between the Npip Unit and the SIS Director

Prior to 1995, Npip was part of one of the four SIS sections. However, this location did not function well and, as a result of internal problems, Npip was for a certain time managed directly by the Fafo General Director. Since 1995, the program has been returned to SIS, but is not assigned to any of the four section chiefs but supervised directly by the SIS Director.

The SIS Director follows the program closely and dedicates much of his time to Npip. He is well informed about the overall and main aspects of Npip, although not about every project in detail. The tasks where he is most involved are the following:

- Preparation of Npip activity plan
- Preparation of plans and reports to Norad
- Information dissemination
- Preparation of and participation in Advisory Board meetings

He has participated in two monitoring visits.

The relations are unbureaucratic and the management structure quite flat, although the SIS Director remains with the responsibilities vis a vis the outside. The SIS director follows the program closely, but does not overrule the others.

The present SIS Director is much more closely involved with Npip activities than previous directors. He is not a researcher, but has practical experience from managing development cooperation projects. Under his management, the rest of Fafo has come to have a better understanding of Npip.

3.2.1.4 The Relationship between Npip and other Fafo Activities

Npip and Other Fafo Programs

The Npip coordinators report that there is little communi-

cation between themselves and other Fafo activities. It is felt that other departments and sections have little understanding of the specific nature of working with indigenous groups and the particular challenges of managing development cooperation. Fafo's main activities are research and the staff are researchers.

Nevertheless, the SIS Director is of the opinion that there is scope for closer communication and cooperation between Npip and other SIS activities, less so outside SIS. The SIS Director draws the attention to the following SIS cross cutting themes:

- Support to NGOs, undertaken through several SIS activities. The «People to People» program in Palestine and Israel in particular have some similarities with Npip because they involve several NGOs where cross-fertilization is also a target. (Fafo has considered merging these two).
- Democracy and human rights, an important dimension in most SIS activities
- Living conditions, including living conditions surveys and indicators
- Development assistance, including institution building and management of financial support

In spite of this, it is recognized that substantive integration and cooperation between Npip and other SIS activities is still not very close and that synergy has not been achieved so far.

Fafo Support Activities yo Npip – Administrative Budget
The contract between Norad and Fafo states that Norad will finance Fafo's administrative costs for managing the program. Previously, certain individual project costs were included in the administrative budget, which is no longer the case. The administrative budgets for the different years are therefore not directly comparable.

The 1997 administrative budget included an allocation of NOK 1,722,000 for personnel, which also includes Fafo's administrative overhead. This allocation covers:

- Salaries and social costs
- Management
- Professional advice
- Support services:
  Accounting
  Financial supervision
  Auditing
  Computer services
  Secretarial services
  office facilities
  Lay out and printing of reports
  Telecommunications

In addition to the two coordinators, in 1996, a civil worker (on national service) and another SIS staff member worked closely with Npip. It is also envisaged that a graduate student would undertake research in connection with the program.

Fafo has two set of fixed rates (1998 person/month):

National rates	NOK 71,500
International rates	NOK 89,000

Average SIS rates are NOK 80,100; Npip rate to Norad is NOK 76,000.

In 1997, the personnel cost is 9.7 percent of total program cost, down from 15.4 percent in 1992. Norad finds the present personnel cost acceptable. It is the view of Norad that this percentage is not comparable to that of ordinary NGOs which receive 80 percent of total project or program cost to which 6 percent administrative overhead is added.

Management of Npip accounts are as follows:

- Transfer of funds to participating organizations takes place one to three times per year and is based on request from the program coordinator. The actual transfer order to the bank is signed by the director of administration department and the accountant.
- Travel claims from program coordinators are approved by SIS director before submitted to the administration department.

Auditing is done by Fafo's own external auditor, who receives project audits from the local external auditors through the program coordinators.

Reimbursement of travel claims from program coordinators goes through the SIS Director to the accounting department. The SIS Director approves all travel activities.

A practical problem is the lack of compatibility of software used by the Npip unit and the accounting department. A difficulty has also been that as a research institute, Fafo operates accounts which respond to requirements other than those that are part of Npip project management.

Fafo's administrative support to Npip and the involve-

ment of the Economic and Administrative department have been strengthened since 1995. Nevertheless, it is the view of SIS that the economic and financial support services provided to SIS, and Npip in particular, leaves much to be desired. In response, Fafo has now located one person from the Economic and Administrative department in SIS.

3.2.2 Fafo-Norad

The relationship between Fafo and Norad has been determined by the two contracts of 1991 and 1995, as presented in chapter 2. It has been clarified that while Norad has the budgetary responsibility of the Ministry's allocation to Npip and hence a supervisory and controlling responsibility, explained below, the full responsibility for all aspects of the execution of Npip lies with Fafo. Within this contractual framework, Fafo has been granted a high level of freedom and flexibility.

In earlier sections, the history leading to the 1995 contract was described. Norad involvement in Npip was greatest in 1994 and 1995 when issues related to the new contract were discussed and finalized. Since 1995, Norad has been most involved in ensuring that the new auditing requirements are abided by; otherwise, Norad has responded to Fafo initiatives.

At present, Norad's policy is not to get more directly involved than what is required to comply with their supervisory and approval responsibilities. This is in line with FRIV policy to all NGOs. However, Fafo is not an NGO, and this relationship may explain Norad's closer participation with Npip than with ordinary NGOs through its role on the Advisory Board.

The main elements guiding the relationship between Fafo and Norad are:

- Annual report
- Annual plan
- Annual enclosure II to contract
- Auditors report
- Meetings in advisory board
- Monitoring visits
- Formal meetings
- Informal contacts

3.2.2.1 Annual Report

Fafo presents to Norad the annual report for the previous year by July 1. The 1996 Report had the following structure:

1. Review of objectives and priorities as stated in Enclosure I to contract (see below). In this part achievements and constraints for each of the items are addressed
2. List of completed projects.
3. Reports on individual projects. Each project is addressed on 1 or 1.5 pages as follows:
   - Summary box, giving country, name of partner organization, project name, development objective, ethnic group, localization, core area, organizational type, project period, annual amounts of financial support, date of last monitoring visit
   - Project background
   - Results achieved in the course of the year
   - Fafo comments
4. Accounts

3.2.2.2 Annual plan

By November 1, Fafo presents the annual plan for the following year. Norad treats this as a request for financing of Npip activities, and as such it follows the normal Norad steps for financial approval for NGOs. This ends up with an approval of an allocation to Fafo. In the case of Fafo, this approval is further developed into the one year Enclosure I of the contract.

The 1998 Annual Plan has a structure very similar to that of the Annual Report:

1. Introduction. This presents a summary overview of Npip.
2. Action Plan. This is an action plan for the Npip unit, addressing the two Npip areas of action:
   - Activities targeted to indigenous populations
   - Activities targeted to the development cooperation community in Norway

   The action plans for these two activities are presented in tables including objectives, actions and expected results, followed by comments.
3. Project plans
   - Summary box, giving (the same lay-out as annual report)
   - Background (similar to annual report)
   - Plans for 1998
4. In this part each project is presented separately. The presentation is similar to that in the annual report (see above)
5. Enclosure – Npip budget
   - Financial support each project
   - Other project related costs
   - Information, Advisory Board, seminars etc.
   - Npip administrative costs

3.2.2.3 Annual Enclosure I to Contract

Article 3.2. in the contract states that Norad shall, in cooperation with Fafo, prepare an annual enclosure to the contract, which includes:

- Description of particular challenges, objectives and priorities to be followed by Fafo in the course of the year in view of the Npip strategy and its long term objectives
- List of approved projects
- Budget and financing plan, including indicative figures for the two following years

The Norad approval procedure of the Annual Plan culminates with such an annual document, which has been prepared for 1995, 1996 and 1997. In 1995, the initiative was largely with Norad; n ow it is done in close consultation with Fafo and based on the inputs from the annual plan.

3.2.2.4 Auditing Reports

One major change in the 1995 contract, compared with the first contract, is that new contract includes comprehensive and detailed guidelines on auditing. Fafo receives auditing reports from external local auditors and these are submitted to Fafo's own auditor together with all other accounts. The consolidated audits are presented to Norad together with the Annual Report by July 1 each year. As explained below, it has been a major task to establish the required system for local auditing. It is an achievement that this now functions well and that the audits for 1995 and 1996 have been approved by Norad

3.2.2.5 Meetings and Informal Contacts

The contract states that half-year meetings are to be held between Norad and Fafo, and that these meetings may be combined with meetings in the Advisory Board. This has meant that formal half-year meetings, like those that took place before 1995, are no longer held. Contacts are on an informal basis and as required. The FRIV Director and the desk officer participate in the Advisory Board meeting.

3.2.2.6 Monitoring Visits

Norad staff has participated in two monitoring visits, in 1995 to Paraguay and Peru and in 1996 to Brazil.

3.2.3 Fafo and Partner Organizations

In relation to the partner organizations, the role of Fafo is to receive and appraise requests, transfer funds, provide advice and monitor the execution of activities and utilization of funds. The responsibility for the execution of Npip projects lies with the partner organizations, as specified in the contract with each organization. The items in the Npip budget targeted to the organizations are (1997 figures):

- Support to local partners (NOK 14.067.900)
- Supervision visits (NOK 400.000)
- Project reviews or evaluations (NOK 555.540)
- Consulting services (66.000)

Fafo's responsibilities vis à vis the organizations are described below.

3.2.3.1 Receiving and Approving Requests

Fafo receives requests for funding of projects from organizations. The deadline for such requests to Fafo is September 1. Article 4 in Enclosure III to the contract between Norad and Fafo states the following criteria for project selection:

1. Core areas:
   - I Human rights and health
   - II Culture and education
   - III Institution building and net working
2. Emphasis on economic, social and ecological sustainability
3. Geographic concentration; only projects in Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay, Brazil and Chile may receive Npip support.

The core areas were redefined in the process leading up to the new contract. It is worth noting that income generating projects are not eligible for funding, which they had been under the former criteria. The criteria are not rigid and are used less as targets than as categories for listing projects. The criteria address the quality of projects and there are no criteria pertaining to type of organizations which may receive support.

Having received the requests, the Npip unit will appraise and present those they approve in the annual plan to Norad by November 1.

The contract and working relationship with Norad gives Fafo a high degree of flexibility in approving projects, undertaking budget revisions within the total allocation, and shifting resources between projects as required. Norad has also been willing to provide extra funds if so required.

3.2.3.2 Annual Contracts

Following Norad's approval of the Annual Npip plan, Fafo and the partner organization enter into a contract. The contract follows the standard Norad lay-out with two enclosures:

- General rules
- Annual plans and budgets with clauses on reporting and auditing

For ongoing projects, contracts for continued support for the coming year will be granted only if the organization has complied with their obligations to submit progress reports and annual audits. The Npip unit devotes considerable time and effort to have reports, audits and other additional information in place before a contract (extension) is signed.

3.2.3.3 Funds Transfers

Transfers from Fafo to each organizations takes place one to three times a year, usually in three instalments:

1. When contract (extension) for the budget year has been signed
2. Audit report from preceding year has been received
3. Preliminary report ongoing year has been received

3.2.3.4 Monitoring Visits

All participating organizations are visited by the program coordinator once a year, during which:

1. Project progress is reviewed in view of plans and reports
2. New plans and budgets are examined
3. The situation of project in the present context is reviewed

During the visit, the program coordinator will communicate with the participating organization, the local auditor, local consultants involved with the project, other donors and third persons who may provide relevant information. During the visit, the program coordinator may also meet with other organizations eligible for Npip support.

The program coordinator prepares back-to-office mission reports which are followed by regular communications with the partner organizations. These reports are written in Norwegian and are circulated among the program coordinators and the SIS director. A review of the last back-to-office mission reports shows that these are comprehensive reports. However, there is no systematic feedback to the organizations based on these reports and some do not seem well structured for operational management purpose.

3.2.3.5 Reporting

The annual reporting system from the organizations consists of:

1. Six month report by August to Fafo
2. Annual report with accounts and audit by March the following year

The organizations report according to their initial plans and budgets, including audit reports from local auditors. Obtaining these reports on time requires work on the part of the Npip unit. For some organizations, it has not been easy to apply Norad's required Logical Framework Analysis terminology for reporting purposes.

The contracts between Norad and Fafo and with the organizations also state that completion reports are to be submitted. Few projects have actually been completed, and for those few, the annual report for the final year has been accepted as completion report.

3.2.3.6 Annual Audits

With the 1995 contract, auditing requirements of participating organizations were made more stringent and comprehensive, in line with requirements for all NGOs receiving Norad funds. The organization now forwards the accounts to the local auditor. The local auditor's report follows the organization's report to Fafo and it is then submitted to Fafo's own auditor (Ernst & Young) and then to Norad. The Npip coordinators spend much time verifying accounts and audits before these are forwarded to Ernst & Young.

For Fafo and the organizations it has been a major effort to get this auditing system in place. Norad's guidelines have been translated into Spanish and Portuguese and have been addressed at all monitoring visits. In addition, Fafo's auditor undertook quality control visits to Npip organizations and their local auditors in Brazil and Guatemala in June 1997, to appraise local auditors and to help put in place the local auditing system. The auditing has revealed that organizations lack good accounting systems, but very few irregularities have been identified.

The dates of the 1995 and 1996 audits are as follows: The 1995 audit was submitted on July 1, 1996 and approved

on April 2, 1997; the 1996 audit was submitted on July 11, 1997 and approved on November 27, 1997.

While approval of the 1995 audit entailed a cumbersome process with a large amount of queries from Norad, approval of the 1996 report was easier. Fafo has tried to convince Norad that indigenous organizations are weak and have difficulties meeting Norad's auditing requirements. Norad has not been willing to make any exceptions, but has allowed for the necessary time to get the system in place.

Today, Norad's rigidity and unwillingness to waive the auditing requirements may be seen to have contributed to the institutional strengthening of the participating organizations. The fact that Fafo has been able to comply is an indicator of successful Fafo management of the program.

3.2.3.7 Regular Support Activities

In addition to and in connection with the activities described above, there is a considerable amount of communication between the Npip unit and the organizations via telephone, telefax, courier, mail, and other means. This communication is largely based on initiative from Fafo.

3.2.3.8

Project Reviews and EvaluationsIndividual project reviews and evaluations are planned and included in annual budgets. They are mostly undertaken by consultants in the region.

3.2.3.9 Local Consultants

The annual budget also includes an allocation for local consultants, who may undertake certain support activities to the organizations.

3.2.4 Fafo and Advisory Board

The contract states that Fafo is to appoint the Advisory Board. The contract also gives the Board a purely advisory role. (Back in 1990–91, it was Norad's idea that Norad itself would appoint the Board and that the Board would be a decision making body).

In table 3.7., dates and agenda for all Advisory Board meetings are listed. As may be seen, the Board has addressed both substantive and organizational matters. A review of the very comprehensive minutes from the meetings shows that the Board has had extensive discussions on policy matters. On two occasions, the Board addressed substantive matters in writing. In May 1993, the Board presented a manifesto to Norad in support of Npip, expressing concern about the way Norad handled the program and role of Fafo. In June 1995, the Board presented a statement to Norad, expressing its views on the continuation of Npip under the headings:

1. Conclusions of the Advisory Board
2. General views
3. The Advisory Board's proposal to Norad and Fafo
4. The role of the Advisory Board

The active role of the Advisory Board, including meetings with Norad, was instrumental in bringing about the 1995 contract.

In 1996, the Board had two meetings. In the first (March 1996), the Board discussed institutionalization and anchoring of Npip in Fafo and strategies on Npip profile. The second meeting in March and the only meeting in 1997 reviewed reports and plans, and undertook planning and discussions on the Npip seminar and evaluation.

With the 1995 contract, Norad became an observer to the Board. The chairman of the Npip Board, as well as Fafo and Norad staff, have expressed unanimous favourable opinions on Norad's participation. There is a shared view that the Board functions well and contributes to Npip.

However, judging from the brief minutes of the sole 1997 meeting, the Board has come to play a less pivotal and instrumental role in the development of Npip. Table 3.7. also shows that although the Fafo – Norad contract states that Advisory Board shall have three meetings a year, two meetings were held in 1995 and 1996 and only one in 1997.

3.2.5 Fafo and Others Working in Related Areas

Fafo's mandate is twofold, the second part of it being targeted to the Norwegian development community for which the Npip objective is:

> To contribute to increased involvement of and comprehension of issues related to indigenous peoples in the Norwegian development community and the public at large

To this effect the contract (article 2.6) states that Fafo «shall build up a practically oriented resource base on indigenous populations with a view to strengthen the ba-

Table 3.7. Npip Advisory Board meetings and agenda

	Meeting 1	Meeting 2
1992	April 23 1. Presentation of Fafo international 2. Election of chairman and vice-chairman 3. Board's mandate and routines 4. The history of Npip 5. Npip activities and budget 6. Future plans	
1993	March 23 1. Review of 1992 Annual Report 2. Discussion on views on Npip future and 1993 Annual Plan 3. Possible activities for Npip in the UN year for indigenous peoples	May 6 1. The status of Npip as an independent unit 2. Experiences from and views on the Advisory Board
1994	April 11 1. Review of Annual Report 2. Evaluation of experiences from the management of the program 3. Preparation of strategy input to Norad on the continuation of the program	September 16 1. Advisory Board and Fafo meet with: 2. Norad 3. Same Assembly 4. University of Tromsø 5. Presentation 6. Npip process 7. Premises for further work 8. Participants and types of cooperation 9. Tasks and follow-up
1995	June 16 1. Report on negotiations with Norad on new contract 2. The organizational set-up and links of Npip 3. The role of the Advisory Board 4. Report on Npip activities in 1994 5. Fafo's plans 6. Project plans 1995 (program profile, core areas and possible new project types)	December 19 1. New contract and Npip objectives 2. Next two years 3. Annual report 1994 4. Activity plan 1996 5. Nora's travel report visits to Peru and Paraguay 6. Meeting schedule 1995
1996	March 27 1. Planning of seminar «Institution building and indigenous peoples» 2. Reform process in AIDESEP, Peru 3. Mission report Brazil 4. Mission report Guatemala 5. Fafo memo on anchoring of Npip in Fafo and possible external cooperating partners 6. Discussion on stronger Npip profile of project types within core groups	October 30 1. Status preparation of Annual Report 1995 2. Status 1996 3. Plans 1997 4. Plan for meetings 1997
1997	April 10 1. Status report 2. Seminar fall 1997 3. Mandate for Npip evaluation	

sis for the program and to be a resource base for the Norwegian development assistance community.»

It is a shared view that relatively little has been achieved in this regard in the course of the Fafo – Norad cooperation. Initially, Norad objected to most of Fafo's initiatives to fulfill this part of their mandate although this reticence is no longer present. On the contrary, in the annual Enclosure I to the contract, Norad has emphasized efforts to expand information on Npip and to increase cooperation and integration between Npip and other institutions and groups.

However, although the budget allocation for information dissemination has been increased, relatively little has been done. Nevertheless, Fafo draws the attention to the following in response to this part of their mandate:

- The first annual Npip reports were comprehensive and distributed to relevant Norwegian NGOs.
- The layout of reports have been changed to make them more accessible, and are translated into English.
- Reports from partner organizations are available.
- Partner organizations themselves prepare reports with Npip support, which are available to others.
- Evaluations of specific projects are undertaken.
- A 1996 seminar on institution building was held.

An information brochure on Npip has been finished. In table 3.8., three objectives, actions and expected results targeted to the second part of Fafo's mandate and achievements in 1997 are listed. The table shows that in spite of the intentions, few of the intended results were achieved. In spite of efforts made, Fafo and the Npip unit has not been able to systematize in a more coherent manner their experience and knowledge on indigenous populations and modalities to support their development. So far, this work is rather haphazard and unsystematic, nor is it disseminated in an active manner.

Generally speaking, cooperation between Fafo and Norwegian NGOs working with indigenous issues has not progressed, although there are cases of practical cooperation in countries and regions where both Npip and a given NGO is working (particularly Guatemala). NGOs have been somewhat reticent towards Fafo, in part because of Fafo's ambiguous role. While Fafo works under the same type of agreement with Norad as the NGOs, Fafo is not an NGO but a research foundation. It receives 100 percent financing for Npip activities, including full financing of administrative costs. NGOs receive 80 percent financial support for project costs and not full financing of administrative costs. Some NGOs have created a «Forum on development and environment,» but Fafo is not invited to participate. NGOs rarely approach Fafo for information and not been favourable to cooperation with Fafo.

There are also other Norwegian research institutes with whom Fafo might have developed some cooperation. This cooperation has not taken place.

4 Conclusions

The principles for Npip and Fafo's involvement are stated in the contract with enclosures, dated September 19, 1995. The main elements are quoted below. Norad guidelines for the Npip states:

Table 3.8. Objectives and achievements, 1997

Objectives and Actions	Expected Results 1997	Achieved Results 1997
Systematization of experiences		
a) Establish study facilities for graduate students	Recruit one graduate student	No
b) Seminar on themes of relevance to Npip	Undertake one seminar	No
c) Preparation and publication of reports with themes from the program	Publish report from seminar	No
Make the program known		
a) Preparation and publication of presentation brochure on Npip	Publication of brochure	Yes
b) Preparation and publication of other information material	Annual report	Yes
	Program on Internet	No
c) Participation in seminars and meetings on and for Norwegian development cooperation	Participation in seminars and meetings	Some
Better coordination with other organizations		
a) Participation at meetings and seminars	Participate at meetings and seminars	Little
b) Project cooperation and coordination with other donors	Maintain and develop further present level of contacts	With international donors

> The goal of Npip is to strengthen the capability of indigenous populations to influence and determine their own development. The basis for support to indigenous groups is Norad's principle on recipient responsibility. Local participation in decision making is the basis for sustainable development.

Norad has entered into a contract with Fafo on annual allocation for the period 1995–1997 which covers the administration of and project costs for the Npip. The purpose of Fafo's administration of Npip is twofold, its mandate consisting of two parts:

- To strengthen the program administratively and professionally
- To contribute to increased involvement and understanding on issues related to indigenous peoples in the Norwegian development community and the public opinion as such.

Fafo has administered the program during six years, a period which may be described as consisting of three phases:

1. 1992 and 1993 Phase 1: Introductory phase
2. 1994 and 1995 Phase 2: Transition phase
3. 1996 and 1997 Phase 3: Consolidation phase

During phase 1 and 2, the Npip and the Fafo – Norad relations went through a very difficult period, regarding both substantive matters related to Npip content and profile, as well as organization and management of the program. These conflicts, exacerbated by internal conflicts in Fafo, dominated the relationship for the first four years, particularly during 1993 and 1994. After 1995, internal conflicts in Fafo that hampered the work situation of Npip staff and the anchoring of Npip within the organization, have been rectified. With the new 1995 contract, most of the conflicts with Norad have been resolved and a framework for Fafo's role and responsibilities as well for Norad's involvement has been agreed. The new 1995 contract sets out a framework that is in line with Norad's and FRIV's normal rules and procedures for management of Norad financed activities outside Norad. The climate around Npip and Norad – Fafo cooperation since 1995 has therefore improved substantially.

In its management of Npip, Fafo is responding well to the first part of its mandate: to strengthen the program administratively and professionally. Fafo has established a good system for procedures on project / task execution, resource flows and communication with those directly involved with Npip. Planning, implementation, control (both on achievements and accounting/auditing) and reporting on projects function well, both between Fafo and the participating organizations as well as between Fafo and Norad.

However, the scope of Fafo's management of Npip today is rather narrow, with an element of improving «business as usual». Although the following should not alter the basically favourable assessment of Fafo's management of Npip, there are some important shortcomings that are constraints to the development of Npip in a broader policy and strategy context:

1. Npip is managed as two separate program components: Brazil (Portuguese-speaking) and the other countries (Spanish-speaking).
2. There is no substantive rationale (based on indigenous issues) for the way the program has come to consist of two components.
3. There is little-cross fertilization between the two components.
4. The annual plans and reports focus on individual projects and very little on strategic policy issues on support to indigenous populations and Npip as a whole.
5. Experiences from Npip are not gathered and disseminated in a systematic manner.
6. Outcomes and follow-up of monitoring missions are not reported systematically back to participating organizations. Back-to-office monitoring missions are not used as active management and communication tools.

These shortcomings may in part explain why Fafo has been able to implement the second part of its mandate to such a limited extent: to contribute to increased involvement and understanding on issues related to indigenous peoples in the Norwegian development community and the public opinion as such. All acknowledge that little has been done and achieved in this regard, although Fafo made several attempts to comply in the first two phases that Norad did not approve.

One major recent effort was undertaken in 1996 with the seminar «Institutional Development in an Indigenous Context,» followed by a publication of presented papers. A similar seminar was planned for 1997, but postponed until 1998. Likewise, other activities addressing this part of the mandate were planned for in 1997, but not implemented.

Although little has been achieved, it should be noted that

in Norway the community involved with indigenous questions in general and in Latin America in particular, is rather small. Some NGOs are not open to Fafo initiatives and are reticent to enter into a dialogue with them. It has not been easy to ensure good and broad participation in some of the Fafo initiatives. This finding means that, in order to comply with this part of the mandate, Fafo will have to allocate more resources and adopt a much more active approach.

In view of the limited scope of this study it is difficult to say something meaningful on the future of Npip and alternative organizational arrangements for the management of the program, as any changes will have to be in response to the goal, content, scope and modality of Norwegian support. However, if the conclusion is that Npip shall continue more or less as it is today and administered outside Norad, it is difficult to see any justification to change the present set-up. Fafo now has in place a well-running administration of the program, apparently conducive to the implementation of Npip objectives and targets. There are presently no NGOs or other institutions who alone would be better fit to manage Npip as it is today.

However, if Fafo is to continue managing Npip, a new contract will have to be signed (the present is valid only through 1998). In that case, it is recommended to make explicit the following:

1. Stronger integration between the two program components, so that Npip comes out with a more holistic profile
2. A systematic way of collecting, presenting and disseminating Npip experiences to others working with indigenous questions
3. Reactivation of the Advisory Board (there was only one meeting in 1997, contract says three).
4. Revision and strengthening of the mandate of the Advisory Board to focus on:
   - Policy and strategic aspects of Npip
   - Dissemination to and promotion of participation of relevant NGOs and academic institutions outside Fafo

Appendix 2

Indigenous Peoples and Development in the Americas: Lessons from a Consultation Process

José Barreiro

Summary: Various consultations among indigenous development practitioneers conducted from 1984 to 1996 described community projects and produced a set of development themes and topics of concern to indigenous communities. These notes are developed from materials shared at consultations with Apikan Indigenous Network (Ottawa), archived at Cornell University (Akwe:kon). They are offered to stimulate participatory discussion on development work with indigenous peoples' communities.

1. Latin America Indigenous Peoples

The most widely accepted estimate for the total population of the 500 indigenous peoples in Latin America is 40 million, although evolving definitions of ethnicity tend to push the number up considerably. The largest enclaves of indigenous population are found in Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Colombia, but there are indigenous nations in nearly every country of the Southern American hemisphere, including the Caribbean islands.

Most indigenous people are agriculturalists and are connected to their dominant societies through work and commercial trade. Others live in very isolated areas of tropical forest; they fish, hunt, gather and practice primarily subsistence agriculture. Other groups between these two poles live in varying degrees of articulation with their respective national societies and maintain distinct modes of technology.

Population estimates are disputed because national census methods can distort actual numbers by restrictive language-based definitions of indigenous identity. The denial of identity has been rampant historically and is one method by which nation states have suppressed indigenous land rights. War, repression, dispossesion and extreme remoteness, which kept indigenous peoples from meeting each other for many centuries, have been now largely overcome. International organizations of indigenous peoples have linked hundreds of communities and thus the process of mutual recognition and common representation vis à vis the international community has significantly strengthened in the past twenty years.

In both Peru and Guatemala, a period of intense warfare through the 1980s has ceded to a present condition of recovery and potential rebuilding of traditional native communities, as well as bases for indigenous-oriented coalitions of political importance. Native communities of lowland and highlands have increasingly reasserted rights of self-determined decision-making, even in the midsts of military repression and economic misery. As international and national programs have proliferated, a thinking about development from indigenous perspectives has also emerged.

A comunications and development process among indigenous people conducted by my office in recent years generated a ten-year dialogue on community development between indigenous development practitioners, north and south. Since it is informed by indigenous community development practitioners from indigenous bases, the recommendations gathered therein might be useful bases for an evaluation of projects with indigenous communities.

2. Indigenous Definitions of Development

The term development is always defined by the economic politics of the user. In recent history we have seen two major tendencies that defined development: the capitalist and the socialist. These two definitions struggled with each other intensely but always converged in the seemingly inherent need for industrial expansion, for urbanization and for the globalization of structures to govern people, natural resources and the environment. In the post Soviet period, that convergence intesifies as development is defined by the neo-liberal technocratic vision. This is evident in the endorsement of regional trade agreements by both major political parties in the U.S. as the emerging cornerposts of the global thrust to production and market.

This type of progress, whatever its merits, is largely a process that invades agricultural, rural and rainforest regions, severely limiting family and community-level production of food and non-industrial products and accelerating human (indigenous) migration to urban areas.

In a sort of generic understanding (and critique) of this process, indigenous peoples, particularly from communities with strong cultural and spiritual bases, have expressed unwillingness to accept it as the definition of progress and development. The land-based, community-oriented nature of indigenous peoples signal a different path to future outcomes. The significance attached to the Domestic Mode of Production (or subsistence economy) as a base of social safety net to be protected, and not as a limitation to market activity or as an anachronism to be discarded, is widespread. The identification of the land of the community or nation, its defence and expansion is of utmost importance across the hemisphere. The respect for the traditional or naturalistic indigenous belief systems is growing and the ancient mandate to promote language and spiritual culture enjoys widespread acceptance. Whether seen as a creation of the de-colonization process or as the result of continued cultural and ethnic resistence, the seeking of answers to societal problems in the «ways of the ancestors» constitutes a real motivator and is a root cause of a substantial portion of indigenous peoples intellectual discourse. This does not imply that the seeking of economic opportunities, via the natural economy or the marketplace, contradicts the dictates of traditional living. However, most culturally aware indigenous development practitioners express deep respect for protecting the «core traditional communities,» in which the old knowledge can survive. «Listening to the true messages of our elders is crucial to sustaining our own directions.»

The apparent result of preserving and projecting developmental goals based on natural world cultural positions has been the emergence of an indigenous voice in international circles. From victims of genocide and/or objects of human rights sympathies, indigenous peoples pass now to the role of self-representation and protagonism in the international arena. It is time to listen carefully to the articulations of indigenous thinking on progress and development. Definitions of sustainability can now take into account the experience of millenary indigenous community inhabitation.

3. Indigenous Peoples' Points of Commonality

It has been assumed that indigenous peoples have no cultural or social-thinking commonalities because they emerge from such diverse ecologies and cultures. However, those indigenous communities seeking international resources and partnerships to carry on development projects have articulated rationales that are cohesive, practical and intellectually kindred. Particularly in the past decade, many indigenous peoples sought to improve their conditions and reached out to the international community for various forms of assistance. Despite the obvious diversity, however, a set of common concerns and principles can be described. These principles, often represented in spiritual ceremony, include respect for place of origen, for the longterm future impact of actions taken in the present as well as the expressed importance attached to the glue of kinship and community. All are elements of sustainability.

Six points of commonality:

3.1 IDENTITY IN THE LAND AND THE PROTECTION AND PRODUCTION OF THE EARTH

Land (and preferably territory) provides the base of sustainability for all other human factors, including the social, cultural, economic, political and spiritual. indigenous peoples have great attachment to original land bases and stay and/or seek to return to the place of birth in their lifetimes. There is always concern if not always practical achievement for the continuation of Indigenous jurisdiction over the ancestral territory, as well as concern over environment and ecology of the home lands.

In the context of jurisdiction and political autonomy, traditional indigenous political processes are characterized by the struggle to stay independent of both left and right wing ideologies, political parties and their often sanguine hostilities. This continues to seem justified in light of headlines in August 1993, (New York Times), twice documenting massacres of Amazonian Indians, in Brazil and Peru, by right and left wing elements respectively, as well as the December 1997, massacre of Mayan villagers in Chiapas.

In Guatemala, the peace accords of recent past have opened political space where the tricky process of land

tenure definition by indigenous communities can be more peacefully articulated. Defining, documenting and fighting court actions on behalf of communal and individual Indian land titles is a growing trend. In the 1990s, in Guatemala, as in Peru and other countries of majority indigenous population, the Indian peasantry in the highlands and the forest tribal communities, is becoming aware of a pan-Indian political consciousness. The potential economic empowerment of agricultural Indian producers when coupled to more direct access to regional and international markets, previously kept in check by death squads and military massacre, needs only partnership to develop. Cultural and social implications of indigenous consciousness on the political life of the countries like Peru and Guatemala are an increasingly visible phenomenon. Legal and developmental assistance to core communities during these intensely transitional times is often requested.

In many indigenous communities the change from common lands to individual fee simple title signals division and even dispersion. State policy, whether through the Allotment Acts of the United States or the Indian ejido destruction of recent Mexican legality, tends toward privatizing lands. There are some exceptions – successful land claims in Canada and U.S., the «collective patrimony» titles that Guatemala's INTA program has awarded communical Mayan communities – but the current trend is destructive of Indian communities's land holding patterns.

In every consultation conducted by the Akwe:kon project at Cornell with indigenous community leadership, participants from the Amazon, Central America and elsewhere expressed the desire to self-determined futures based on land and community. When providing fundaments of their cultural vision, indigenous speakers refer to the «spirituality» of Indian ways of life. There was unanimous expression of the belief that indigenous spirituality is rooted in the land.

Native elders' mandate for independent thinking often roots back in the concern for food self-sufficiency . Food production is essential, locally and regionally, so that the community or kinship nation rounds out its cultural concerns and practices. Sometimes, common community work sessions are most associated with the traditional agricultural rituals and maintain social and spiritual cohesion. Family food production is often seen as the fundamental grass-roots insurance policy. It is also appreciated as the basis of social cohesion, ritual offering and spiritual ceremony. «When our full village Way of Life is working, there is nothing more fulfilling because it intimately relates the spiritual, the cosmological, the agronomical, the social and the economic. This is the Indian community, for instance, working around the cycle of corn, from clearing of the field to the harvest, distribution and use of the crops. From the blessings of the seed ceremony to the common harvest bees, where the whole community gathers each family's fields.»

In Nicaragua in the 1980s, and earlier in El Salvador (1930s) and most recently in Chiapas, Mexico, indigenous people have fought state armies over the right to land for raising homesteading crops – including the valuable subsistence crops of rice, corn and beans. «To a great level, our people went to war against the Sandinista government to protect our village agriculture and our village elders' leadership.» Since the end of that war and return of the Miskito refugees, the Miskito organization, Pana Pana, has concentrated in assisting village food production efforts, both in agriculture and in fishing.

«We are trying to see what we can do for ourselves. Returning from the war, we realized that before these past ten years, our people we were poor, but we had animals, gardens, we had all the eggs, fish. The land is productive and we have many people still who know how to work it.»

The traditional (almost always modified) indigenous family and community homestead production capability has been analyzed in the dialogue, at least in Latin America, as a base of low chemical input production and land use formula. It offers many perma-cultural, stacked-functions and closed-systems ideas that are increasingly studied by university researchers.

The principle of cultural preservation is also practically expressed in fundamental indigenous agronomic systems. Dr. Jane Mt. Pleasant, a Tuscarora agronomist at Cornell University, points out the dangers of yearly profit-sheet farming, where maximization of financial gain is put ahead of soil conservation and long term production. «Native farming systems in the northeast of the United States and Canada – the corn, beans and squash gardens – have proven, long term qualities and are designed that way. These methods provide a total-circle system, sustainable and labor intensive.»

Reinforcing traditional knowledge from the local to the regional or ethnic-wide level is a method often mentioned. Indigenous to indigenous knowledge transfer has

been stressed. One village may have families that manufacture cloth or blankets while another may know the best seed-selection methods or the manufacture of natural insecticides. «Composting is an old method of fertilizing in the Mayan highlands. Our organization ascertained the best traditional methods and added some of what we knew of appropriate technology developed in North American and Europe. This idea takes very well in villages concerned about chemical poisons and the loss of soil fertility.» A development specialist working in Guatemala: «People come from other villages to learn these composting methods, which shorten the time it takes to make compost by more than half. Now it is viable and actually people don't only use it themselves, they bag it and sell it to other villages.»

3.2 MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNITY COHESION IN THE FACE OF NEW SITUATIONS, INCORPORATING BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT

Presently a major question among indigenous community development organizers is how to create better working community systems to balance against being overrun by «modernity» and/or economic exploitation from the outside. An often-asked question is: how can we balance between basic community enhancing values (generosity/reciprocity) and profit-making (capital-driven) production?

In this context, pressure on indigenous traditional communities often comes from the inside. Community members developing business enterprises can become impatient with the traditional leadership. Competing frames of mind as well as frames of time severely test communication and common community orientations. Disagreable levels of accountability and lack of common understanding of tribal finances are recurring factors that often impede great potentials.

One dichotomy that arises in communities pits the circular and inclusive nature of traditional community values against the strict scheduling and capital-intensive, managerial nature of business. Just as often traditional community leadership «cannot keep up with the speed in which communications now move through populations... There is a need to get ahead of the problems with enhanced decision and structural capacity. Or risk getting run over. Sometimes antagonism is high between traditional mindsets and business people who are coming ahead in the making of money. These developers are easy to dismiss in a cultural sense, but they are often the ones with problem solving capacity. To survive and prosper as communities, we must rationally use the best talents of both types of people. Just being against the new developments is not enough to succeed as a policy. Traditional groups need to speed up their administrative aspects without compromising their values and principles.»

This most important discussion, on the nature and requirements of income-generation, has widened considerably within the indigenous world. The stress on market and enterprise development in the partnership language prescribed by the consultations, simultaneously expressed respect for traditional knowledge, in an inclusive discussion that entwined the points of view.

3.3 RETENTION OF TRADITIONAL LANGUAGE, PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURAL MEDICINAL PRACTICES

Participants often said that language is culture and culture is language. Yet, indigenous languages are clearly in danger among many peoples. The wisdom of the older generations and the knowledge and values that create culture all need constant safeguarding.

An area needing preservation is in women's health and family/tribal knowledge of midwifery. «The women lose a great body of knowledge when they stop the midwives from operating, knowledge that was transferred by the generations from grandmother to mother and daughter. Encouraging multi-generational nurturing among women is the most important thing to survive and we can build on that. Midwifery pertains to control of reproduction and family ways.» As they recover old methods and preserve and bring back these connections, the language of these traditional activities is recovered. «Our languages describe a way of life and a particular ecology. I hear the words of women's medicine by practicing women's medicine.» Women from northern and southern American indigenous communities agreed to meet ongoingly, with the north seeking resources and introducing the topices and the southern Indian midwives and healers sharing their substantial knowledge of natural women's healing methods.

Midwifery is one current way to reconcile traditional and scientific medical knowledge, both of which are useful, if analyzed correctly. «We need to be aware of and use the best of medical science but we must also be careful not to throw away our basic preventive care practices, the use of

natural medicines and the purification practices of our elders.» The midwifery network is one area of growing partnership, with projects in the making for training and assessment between aboriginal midwives associated with the Ontario College of Midwives and indigenous midwives in Belize, Guatemala, Brazil and Bolivia.

The propagation of traditional medicines has high value in many indigenous communities. «We have very good medicines. Now we are systematically cataloguing and propagating them.» Green medicine projects are important also to Mayas, Kunas, Aymaras, Mapuche and others. These types of primary economic activities, previously labeled as «subsistence activities» and demeaned as primitive by technocratic developers, now are the target of bio-piratical campaigns by northern companies and scientific projects. Nevertheless, green medicine is uniformly identified and endorsed by indigenous community development participants as integral to the sustainability of village communities and the basis for continuing education in eco-systemic living.

3.4 COMMUNITY-GUIDED DEVELOPMENT VS. DEPENDENCY CREATION

Development projects should always be community based. They should address problems identified by the community and analyzed through local and regional indigenous people, enterprises and organizations.

Constant analysis of dependency creation and promotion is very recommended in development work. Even well-intended assistance is identified with its source and thus the sense of well-being and assurance engendered in the community returns to that source, seeks that source for continuing relief. Thus, community control and ownership become essential. The creation of indigenous, community-based NGOs is a recommended goal. Who thinks it? Who does it? Who assists it? All these factors signal major directions for indigenous peoples.

«It makes a big difference if the NGO is from USAID or the Catholic Church or any other outside agency, as opposed to an indigenous NGO that the people can see themselves working in, thinking like them, coming out of them. Whoever facilitates the process, no matter how self-effacing, will signal to the community what and who the leadership is, where to look for direction. At the point that the community sees itself, its own members as the leadership, this is when they see that their own leadership is actually possible.»

Apikan president Simon Brascoupé (Algonquin, Ottawa) has synthesized several developmental models that are useful to indigenous peoples. The «community-based» model is a bottom-up approach based on the ideas of consciousness-raising and empowerment ... [it] enables communities to sustain cultural continuity and decision-making, ensuring community cohesion.»

Other models approaching self-determined development also articulated by Brascoupé include: Self-government, Culture-based and Traditional Way of Life. In Canada, self-government pertains to agreements negotiated by individual nations and the state. The Cree and the Inuit have settled claims and Agreements in advantageous terms under this model. The culture-based model incorporates indigenous cultural prescriptions to the community-based approach. «...while Americans [tend to] dream of individual wealth, riches, and power, indigenous Americans [often] seek group objectives, spirituality and a relationship to the environment.» The Traditional Way model brings up the fundamental values, «less about instrumental thinking than about process,» it is about spirituality. «Elders have also pointed out that development should be based on respect. ... A growing body of literature,» writes Brascoupé, «demonstrates that subsistence economies can survive and develop in harmony with the market economy.»

3.5 CONCERN FOR WATER, SOIL AND FOREST DEGRADATION, POVERTY IN DIMINISHING RESOURCES

Communities with long term commitments to their environment sustain memory of workability that can prove extremely useful in ecological preservation and improvement. However, this knowledge is not often identified and documented and it is used only sparingly. Indigenous NGOs are compiling and deepening their own knowledge base and spreading it among communities that hold limited genres and systems of knowledge. Both in Guatemala and in Nicaragua, indigenous NGOs often facilitate training of cultural practitioners from among varieties of villages depending on which ones still sustain what knowledge bases. By gathering the practical and important skills into workshop processes and then making them available where they no longer are practiced.

The forest is identified with life, with community wealth and well-being. The destruction of the forest, its animal and plant life, is seen the major cause of Indian people's poverty. Indigenous communities are often the poorest of

the poor. «While 66% of the population of Guatemala is poor, almost 90% of the indigenous population is poor by the same standards. In Mexico as the indigenous population density increases so does the poverty estimate. In municipalities with 10 to 40% Indigenous, 46% of the population is poor. In municipalities with over 70% Indigenous, over 80% of the population is poor.»

Indigenous poverty appears to intensify. Speakers refer to better times for indigenous communities, when things were done well and people were fed, even though they did not participate in the industrial economy. Traditional methods of agriculture and the use of woodlots and fruitlots – the forest, in many cases – are identified with that past well-being.

«They are destroying the forest in a very indiscriminating way, polluting the rivers and all of nature so we can hardly survive. There are ways that we can find a solution to the problem based on sustainable development to avoid damaging the natural ecosystem. We should plant the ground without depriving it from its productivity, have cattle without damaging the prairies, turning them into deserts, to increase fishing without using dynamite.» The Shuara have initiated a reforestation program, «handled by the Shuara community.»

In Guatemala, an indigenous NGO has instituted the Plan Ceiba, which runs traditional and contemporary forest appreciation and reforestation programs in village schools impacting a major watershed. «Sometimes villagers needing wood for fuel and heating needs do impact a forest negatively. But this is out of necessity, because large areas of forest are being cut indiscriminately for lumber. In those same villages, we are bringing in the elders to tell the traditional stories and we hear many concerns among village members for areas that are losing vegetation, the need to replant trees, what varieties and just how to do it. In all these villages it is not unusual that the entire population of the village will volunteer to plant trees and reforestate whole areas around them.» Plan Ceiba is documented in video tape with narration in English.

Native involvement with nature preservation projects is an identifiable phenomenon. The clear connection between native peoples and natural world preservation signals a theme of deep potential that might be more focused in the philanthropic community. Indigenous-led and controlled projects of traditional knowledge preservation have consequence for strategies and practices of ecological sustainability. Mac Chapin has aptly documented this phenomenon in his map, «The Coexistence of Indigenous Peoples and the Natural Environment in Central America.»

The preservation of traditional knowledge extends to medicines and the collection and propagation of heirloom seeds or indigenous germplasm. «From our own community in Tesuque Pueblo we have met with other Indian communities in New Mexico and Arizona, we want to work with one another to exchange knowledge of farming and to support one another.

Among Miskitos, Kunas, Caribs, Shuara and other communities represented in the seminar series, forest conservation concepts abounded and projects are being organized. Medicinal plants projects are growing yet quite conservative. Indigenous to indigenous partnerships are particularly sought there.

3.6 CONCERN FOR DEVELOPING RESOURCES AND COMMUNITY BASES IN THE MARKETPLACE

While homestead food and other production is seen as a base to work from, none of the participants spoke in isolationist terms. The need to develop income generating enterprises was articulated, coupled with the commitment to train and develop people in methods and practices of organizational infrastructure, and to conduct business and economic planning. As they strive to have the space to grow, educate and prosper, indigenous populations have many skills and resources. The opportunity to meet the current «modernization» processes on better footing and equanimity is highly desired.

«We need increased training of Indigenous-based scientists and managers – but these must also be trained and monitored to operate in ways that safeguard and build upon the potential prosperity of indigenous traditional wisdom, knowledge and methods.»

The relationship between North and South is crucial in this quest. The North is sought by the South to help in in sustaining media access on cases of human rights abuses, as well as a place to secure information, seed grants and intermediary investment capital to start projects and ventures. However, what is sought is not simply capital and the results are not just measured in dollar dividends. «Perhaps Indian projects are not so profit oriented, that is, we are not looking to set up opportunities with vast investment returns. We are more looking to set up lateral-

intensive enterprises that employ maximum numbers gainfully and operate at a gain, not at a loss, especially for the long term benefit of the community and local populations.»

The North looks to the South for sources of traditional, eco-systemic knowledge, for partnerships and in order to translate labor and natural resources into marketable products and opportunities. The exchange, when conducted with respect for community values and directions, can be the gruel of survival and the beginning of leveling the economic playing field for indigenous peoples. «There are more and more indigenous communities from the south coming to North America to strike this type of relationship, as well as for cultural exchanges.»

4. Barriers to Sustainable Indigenous Community-Based Development

Intellectual and real barriers to sustainable community based development among indigenous peoples are interwoven. Among the major factors:

4.1 UNMITIGATED RESOURCE EXTRACTION

The consumerist and materialist prescriptions of the northern (global) market economies often clash with those of the indigenous traditionalist model, which is more modest in its resource extraction and use.

The extraction of resources from third and fourth world regions to feed the northern industrial hemisphere is quite rapid and pressured, often diminishing greatly the resources that might otherwise by legally and ecologically more properly used by indigenous, and other local peoples in those regions. The ability to plan and operate economically according to indigenous traditional prescriptions is hampered by the constant intrusions from external extractors. This is one level of activity, ie. the defence of territories and natural resources and people's labor, that takes up considerable energy away from more fruitful development activities.

4.2 RACISM INHERENT IN THE ASCENDING CONCEPT OF CIVILIZATION

Another major factor hampering indigenous sustainable development is the ongoing attitude of racism against so-called inferior, underdeveloped, or primitive peoples. The much-accepted historical scale of savagery to civilization, with its inherent Euro-centric denial of indigenous intelligence has permeated most instructional bases and created a wall of disdain, paternalism and misunderstanding over indigenous decision making that is being reduced only with a lot of effort and perseverance. Vigorous arguments for termination of indigenous rights throughout the hemisphere – a direct impact in post-NAFTA Mexico – are growing dangerously, often as part of right wing, fundamentalist positions.

4.3 FUNDAMENTAL RESISTANCE OF ABORIGINALITY BY NATION-STATES

The fundamental resistance by nation-states to granting or upholding rights based on aboriginality, based in part on the paternalism justified by the barrier discussed in section B above, continually tempers the quest for rights. The inherent fear by nation-states is about the obvious affinity of indigenous peoples to lands that are precisely divided by international borders. This reality, repeated in nearly every border in the hemisphere, particularly when linked to the concept and practice of separate jurisdictions based on aboriginality, is a major cause for nation-states to vote against indigenous declarations at the United Nations and a major barrier to indigenous people developing as whole ethnic communities or kinship nations. Another sad result of this demographic phenomenon is that conflicts between nation-states, ie. the recent Peru-Ecuador war, which occur primarily along borders, often run over indigenous communities.

4.4 UNRELIABLE OR DOMINEERING PARTNERS

Political parties, unions, churches and NGOs often try to manipulate indigenous community processes. There are myriad governmental lateral aid programs and NGOs with poor operational procedures and no restraints on arrogant or dictatorial behavior. NGOs fighting ideological fights or turf fights often inject controversy and factionalism where there need not be any. The question of land rights and spiritual significance versus economic imperatives, trade, income-generation is thus often exacerbated by the polemics of extra-indigenous groups.

5. The Shifting Paradigm

Western development models are under intense scrutiny these days. The total growth, profit-intensive, neo-liberal

western scientific development model exhibits substantial problems, particularly in the accelerated creation of low-income urban populations, and in fostering the breakdown of social controls by destroying old mores without creating new forms of family and community supports. indigenous peoples, among other self-defined local populations, are seeking their own solutions with ways of thinking not easily ascertained in the industrialized world. As concern over environmental degradation deepens and as the social fabric of Western industrial societies continues to disintegrate, interest and curiosity about American Indian cultures has grown.

Some of the public interest in indigenous ways is romantic, with expectations of mysticism on demand. But the deeper dialogue has been joined among thinking practitioners and academic researchers and has many genuine adaptations to offer. The principles of indigenous cultures, as well as the mandates and positions of recent dialogue processes, such as the ones canvassed for this discussionpaper, are drawing significant attention and increasing respect. The wholistic context, weaving social and economic and ecological factors into long term sustenance, provides frameworks and potential solutions to the fragmentary process of the West.

indigenous peoples are mentioned with some prominence in the resolutions adopted at the 1992 Rio Summit, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, (UNCED). Chapter 26 of Agenda 21 supports indigenous led development, links it to the preservation of the environment and urges its «capacity-building» support. Similarly, Article 8 of the United Nations Biodiversity Convention calls for «respect for the innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities .. and ... the sustainable use of biological diversity.»

A 1993 brief of International Documents Related to indigenous Peoples Development for the Apikan process, states: «indigenous peoples are mentioned in these important international documents, in everything from the conservation of biological diversity to sustainable agriculture and rural development.» There is a loud call for governments to «recognize and foster traditional methods of knowledge, emphasizing in particular the role of women relevant to the conservation.» Interest in indigenous peoples coincides with the growing interest in bio-diversity preservation. Indigenous village systems are increasingly looked to as potentially revealing of sustainable approaches to third world development.

The driving tenets of an Indigenous-led development necessarily emerge from deeply held cultural constructs relative to humankind's spiritual and practical relationships in and with the natural world. Patient and forthright building upon community skills and resources and access to solution oriented methodologies will lead to opportunities for prosperous community economics.

Finally, with their central notion of the community as base and as constituency, and neither simply the single family nor the mega-scale nation-state, indigenous models step outside the usual social models. While seeking markets for existing products and assisting the building of enterprise, the indigenous model suggested by the consultation processes identifies limitations in industrial development and suspects the thesis-antithesis approach that would dictate, for instance, job-creation to the detriment of longterm sustainability or vice versa. The emerging general model offers a contrasting goal to help stabilize and strengthen communities and thus to move toward prosperity This is unique because it is genuine, emerging from practical forums for indigenous people that sought solutions within the balance and creativity prescribed by traditional teachings.

It appears a good moment in the international context to consider indigenous approaches to community development. A more wholistic paradigm is suggested by many researchers that is starting to influence policy. Native peoples' directions in development are made more feasible by this trend.

An indigenous model calls for:

1. Gathering the native intelligentsia, sustaining the dialogue, formally, opinion gathering to open up thinking and planning resources.
2. Maintaining high standards, practice, analysis, authenticity, documentation, accountability.
3. Being Indigenous-led yet inclusive of people of all backgrounds, with caution about the all engrossing consultantship world that tends to exclude the exercise of organized indian leadership.
4. Applying the ABCD strategy as endorsed by indigenous participants in the Apikan conferences, ie. = A. North-South partnerships, assisting: B. Local empowerment: C. Access to resources: D. Enterprise/Project Enhancement.

As indigenous people coalesce the primary factors to the formulation of policy and models of practice, the Cornell, Apikan, MacArthur and other processes have identified a

wide core of hemispheric players who can mobilize to incorporate proposals and explore the culture bases that can inform the development process without being limited by ideologically driven fact-patterns. Locally empowered communities can thus propose their own projects and find the way to discuss their various processes toward solutions. Viable proposals coupled to resources creates movement toward sustained enterprise.

5.1 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND INCOME GENERATION

Consistently throughout the many conferences, cultural elders have been involved and the traditional aspects of indigenous thinking have been incorporated and often endorsed. As well, the process also has supported business and income generation ideas and projects. This total approach to indigenous futures is uniquely important in its intent to blend what are in some circles highly contentious positions, as some indigenous support groups and some «indigenista» organizations have challenged income-generation projects as inherently destructive of indigenous peoples.

However, as has been confirmed by Apikan/UNDP Scoping Missions in 1994 and 1995, most indigenous communities are determined to seek both economic life and markets as well as sustainable and rational use of natural resources. The full variety of talents and energies, in all fields of training, must be recruitable to fulfill this mandate.

The opinion of most immediate consensus is that indigenous peoples North and South want to meet and whenever possible work together to create partnerships. Secondly, indigenous people, by and large, want to join the economic currents, want to produce and trade with the world. Thirdly, communities are very independent and want to formulate policy based on local needs and values. Fourthly, and always present, planning must stress the longterm, the sustainable elements, nurture nature, help it produce.

6. The Role of Indigenous Partnerships

Respectful resource networking with indigenous peoples demands long-term commitment, the creation of friendships and family/community relations. Some speak of building silent trust, a concept that certainly goes beyond the measurements of standard evaluations. In getting together, the southern and northern indigenous nations, particularly through their NGOs, are providing a common territory. «If we talk to each other, as indigenous people, we see we have undergone many similar experiences. There is a lot to share. We should send whole families in exchanges, work toward long-term community relationships.»

The indigenous communities appear to be broadening self-directed development options. Despite quite limited resource allocation, nevertheless, by meeting with each other directly and devising ways to work together and by focusing specifically on the North-South partnerships approach, indigenous peoples are catalizing energies and new working relationships.

Current trends provide an opening to indigenous organizations and communities searching for support in reconstructing their communities from the disruptive effects of territorial, cultural, social and spiritual impositions. The nearly one thousand proposals that came to the MacArthur Foundation as a result of a 1992 indigenous Peoples Initiative, from which thirty-eight projects were funded, addressed a wide range of social issues and problems. The dire community needs of indigenous peoples generated proposals directed at resolving economic and legal issues. Looking ahead, the question arises how to turn the experience of working together between Indians and philanthropic organizations into a stronger and more permanent relationship. What continuity will the northern foundations give to empower the indigenous peoples' movement in the full spectrum of preservation activities, from human rights to culture-based, self-sufficient development?

Among the indigenous communities of the hemisphere, at the international level, the present call is to make the Decade of indigenous Peoples a real opportunity for community prosperity. «We need more time and assistance over a period of concerted reconstruction. We have a way of life that is only now beginning to gain acceptance. Help us rebuild now. We'll show the world the true capacity and potential of indigenous peoples.»

Appendix 3

Indigenous Peoples in Latin America: Issues and Opportunitie

Stephan Schwartzman, Environmental Defense Fund

1. Introduction

Indigenous peoples in Latin America are the poorest and least enfranchised minority on the continent. With the lowest incomes, highest infant mortality and childhood malnutrition rates, and least access to basic services, the situation of indigenous peoples exemplifies most of what has not worked about development, state or market-led, in the post-war era. From the disastrous dislocations of isolated indigenous groups in the Brazilian Amazon of the 1960s, chronicled in Shelton Davis's critique of military development, *Victims of the Miracle*, to the revolt in Chiapas, the experience of indigenous peoples of the development process, and their resistance to it, constitute a profound indictment of the failings of successive development models.

Indigenous peoples are also the most culturally and ethnically diverse in the hemisphere. Some 400 languages are spoken in Latin America (World Bank 1994), by probably a somewhat greater number of indigenous societies. One of the most important trends of the last 30 years has been the emergence of regional, national, and international indigenous organizations, all of which affirm preservation or rehabilitation of cultural identity as central goals, as well as a very broad process of ethnic and cultural reaffirmation at the local level. The political mobilization of indigenous organizations, including struggles for land, economic opportunities, and representation is very generally if not universally based in some process of ethnic and cultural reaffirmation. While virtually all indigenous organizations seek the condition of effective national citizenship for their members, none do so at the expense of assimilation, and indigenous organizations increasingly call for autonomy or self-determination, in the sense of control over territories and decision making power on resource use and development within their lands.

Indigenous peoples also occupy a position of increasing global strategic importance. Indigenous peoples, by virtue of their great cultural diversity, occupy a very large part of the remaining primary forests of the Amazon and Central America and have enormous knowledge of these critical ecosystems. Large part of these forests remain forest today in function of the indigenous presence. The value of these forests – their biodiversity, watershed protection, regional climate regulation, and their role in the global climate equation – is largely uncalculated, and is some measure incalculable. But it is increasing, and will continue to increase as global environmental degradation increases, as will the urgency of finding means to approximate the values of these «ecosystem services» and design mechanisms to compensate their owners. The future of the tropical forests of Latin America is inexorably linked – for better or for worse – to the future of the indigenous peoples. The valuation of the forests, and the specific forms of compensation for the national and global ecosystem services they provide that come into being hold both great promise and great peril for the Indians, and the forest.

A few general observations on the Norwegian Program for indigenous peoples(Npip) follow from the foregoing. As a development strategy in Latin America, a program focusing on indigenous peoples makes good sense. Indigenous peoples have not benefited from conventional development, and have often suffered from it. Understanding what does work for indigenous peoples may then have important applications for the significant sectors of the rural poor in Latin America who also number among the excluded, as well as for the Indians. NORAD has also pioneered in funding indigenous organizations and NGOs – control over the design of projects and use of resources is a universal demand, and few official assistance agencies, until very recently have been willing to work directly with NGOs and grassroots indigenous groups. NORAD is in fact considerably ahead of the curve in having dedicated resources to Npip over the last 14 years. The multilateral banks – the World Bank, InterAmerican Development Bank IDB), Coporacion Andina del Financiamento (CAF) – have only much more recently recognized the importance of indigenous development, or allocated resources or expertise to support such work. NORAD's 14 years of experience is itself a comparative advantage, simply in terms of what the agency has learned, or can

learn from this experience. This is all the more so in light of the increasing global importance of indigenous lands, and indigenous knowledge, and of even more rapidly increasing pressure upon them.

In the following sections, I will summarize data on the economic situation of indigenous peoples in the hemisphere, and discuss the central issue of land rights, briefly examining several South American cases. Land rights are central to the agendas of all the indigenous organizations in Latin America – the struggle for land is the most general unifying principle among indigenous organizations throughout the hemisphere, and indigenous identity, identity as an Indian rather than a Macuxi or Ashaninka, is historically everywhere bound up with the realization that land can be lost – and won (without prejudice to the cultural centrality of diverse and more complex concepts of land, territory and place in innumerable indigenous societies). I will then discuss several issues likely to condition the future of the indigenous territories and peoples of the hemisphere: infrastructure development; indigenous economic alternatives; and indigenous rights and the environment.

2. Economic Situation

A recent World Bank study of the economic situation of indigenous peoples finds important, if alarming statistical regularities among indigenous populations in Latin America. There are some 40 million indigenous people in Latin America, about 10 percent of the region's population. Since different countries apply different census criteria this figure is only an approximation, and indigenous organizations argue that there are many more. Indigenous peoples are very small minorities in some countries (0.2 percent of national population in Brazil, 0.8 percent in Venezuela, much larger minorities in others (44 percent in Guatemala, 29 percent in Ecuador, 40 percent in Peru, 14 percent in Mexico) and in Bolivia and rural areas of several other countries, the majority. In Central America and the Amazon nations, indigenous peoples' lands cover large part of the remaining tropical forest. The Bank's report concludes that, «To a very large extent, being of indigenous origin is synonymous with poverty . . . most indigenous people live in conditions of extreme poverty.» (World Bank: 1993, p. 225) Indigenous people have the highest infant mortality rates, the highest childhood malnutrition, are poorer than non-indigenous populations and have less access to services (schools, health care, potable water, sanitation, electricity).

3. Land Rights

Land rights and control over natural resources are central to indigenous communities and organizations throughout the hemisphere. That there are no comprehensive, reliable data on the extent of indigenous territories in the region as a whole is a direct reflection of the fundamental principle of the last 500 years of conflict between indigenous peoples and the Latin states – the regional states have established themselves through the occupation of indigenous lands. Current figures for the extent of Indian territories reflect the rise of indigenous organizations, their strategies of national and international alliance; they map the areas where Indians have on some level won the struggle for the land. It is worthy of note that of the Amazon nations, the country with the smallest indigenous minority Brazil also has the largest expanse of officially recognized territory (11 percent of the national territory, or 20 percent of the Brazilian Amazon). Differing legal regimes for recognition of indigenous land rights to some extent cloud comparisons, and indicate enormous disparities between existing legal instruments for Indian land protection.

Indigenous Lands in Amazon Pact Nations

Country	No. of ethnic groups	Estimated Indigenous Population *	Lands Protected (hectares)
Bolivia	31	171,827	2,053,000
Brazil	200	280,000	99,000,000
Columbia	52	70,000	18,507,793
Ecuador	6	94,700	1,918,706
Peru	60	300,000	3,822,302
Guyana	9	40,000	3,040,000**
Suriname	5	7,400	–
Venezuela	16	386,700	8,870,000

(source: IDB 1992 (updated for Brazil) * Amazon region, except for Brazil **Sizer 1996

Interpreting some of these partial data convey something of the complexity of attempting to generalize about the situation of indigenous land rights and tenure across the region. In the case of Venezuela, for example, the 8.8 million hectares listed by the IDB includes the 8 million hectare Orinoco – Casquiare Biosphere Reserve, which, while in theory prohibiting development by outsiders, offers very limited control over the area to its Yanomami inhabitants, and includes part of a National park. Many of Venezuela's indigenous peoples in fact live in parks and other *Areas Baijo Regime Especial* (ABRAE), an umbrella category of protected areas that comprehends and parks, reserves, historical sites and other areas. The Venezuelan Constitution contains language stipulating that indigenous rights are to be respected in the creation of such areas. But most government agencies are unaware of the Constitutional language, and various categories of reserves (e.g., forest reserves) are open to commercial exploitation by concession. Thus, the government agencies frequently hand out concessions on indigenous lands without even consulting the Indians. Some 72 percent of indigenous communities lack any type of land title (Colchester 1995: p.5), and no indigenous communities in the Amazonian states of Amazonas and Bolivar have definitive titles. While Venezuela passed a decree incorporating Convention 107 on Tribal and indigenous Populations into national law in 1983, legislative mechanisms for the protection of Indian lands in Venezuela are in fact vague and incoherent. Thus, when President Rafael Caldera resolved to open the 3.5 million hectare Imataca forest reserve, inhabited by some 10,000 Indians in the states of Bolivar and Delta Amarcuro to mining and logging concessions last year, indigenous inhabitants were outraged. The Indians, having sought definitive land rights in the area for a decade and heard from a succession of government agencies that their demands were impossible, because the area was a forest reserve, found the mineral and timber rights of their lands on the trading block from one day to the next. CONIVE and other indigenous organizations mobilized demonstrations in Caracas, winning support from members of the Congress as well sectors of the public. Caldera's decree has been suspended by the Supreme Court in response to a lawsuit, final decision of which is pending. In a context of institutional fragility of this order, it is difficult even to calculate what can and cannot be said to be land officially recognized as indigenous. What can be affirmed is that Venezuela's legal apparatus for the protection of Indian land rights is inadequate and lags far behind other countries in the region.

Venezuela is unfortunately far from the worst case in this regard. Suriname, in addition to the Amerindian population of 6,000 – 7,500 counts some 41,000 Maroons, descendants of escaped slaves who maintained West African traditions for 300 years, among its rural population. Together Maroons and Amerindians comprise over 10 percent of the national population. Nonetheless, the only form of official recognition of the land rights of these groups is a generic agreement to demarcate tribal lands in the 1992 peace agreement that ended the civil war between Suriname's government and five armed groups in the interior, to date essentially unimplemented, and lacking any institutional means to be implemented. There is in addition a statement in the 1992 Forest Management Act that tribal land should be declared «communal forest» in benefit of the tribal communities (Sizer and Rice 1995, p.26). At present, the government appears poised to let timber concessions to Indonesian, Malaysian and Chinese companies to some 25 percent of the national territory. The three largest of these concessions would affect some 10,000 Maroons and 1,200 Amerindians, none of whom were so much as consulted prior to the negotiations.

It is not the case, however, that a small indigenous minority, generally poorly defined rural land tenure and ambitious governmental development projects necessarily spell disaster for Indian land rights. The case of Brazil is illustrative. With Costa Rica, Brazil has the smallest indigenous minority in the hemisphere. The military dictatorship that ruled from 1964 to 1985 had ambitions for infrastructure and colonization projects that are still typically characterized in Brazil as «pharonic», many of which were in fact carried out, often with international financing. Land tenure in Brazil's continental Amazon region remains chaotic today. Nonetheless, indigenous peoples, who had virtually no rights to specific areas concretely recognized in 1968, when Brazil's current Indian agency (FUNAI) was created, today have completely demarcated and registered lands covering about 6 percent of the national territory, or 10 percent of the Amazon, close to 50 million hectares, and the government has committed to completing the demarcation process, largely already started, in another 5 percent of the national territory. The current government has repeatedly committed to completing the demarcation process in the entire 11 percent of the national territory, or 20 percent of the Amazon. Most of the advance has occurred since the promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, which strengthened in important aspects already relatively strong Indian rights legislation. Brazil's progress in the demarcation of indigenous lands, general and serious problems with invasions, poor health conditions, education, dependence and lack of viable and

sustainable economic alternatives notwithstanding, is arguably one of the most positive trends for human rights and the environment in the hemisphere over the last 30 years.

The apparently counterintuitive case of Brazil bears some reflection, both as a caution against facile generalizations for the continent and for potential lessons of broader applicability. The very gains indigenous peoples have made in the demarcation process in Brazil, it must be pointed out, have both a positive and a negative face. Almost all Indian land in Brazil is in the Amazon (99 percent), although only about half of the indigenous population lives there. This implies that half of Brazil's Indians lost a very great part of their traditional territory in the more densely settled south and northeast before demarcation began, and now live in desperate poverty in extremely restricted, often degraded, areas. For those indigenous peoples of the Amazon that survived the colonial slaving incursions, forced assimilation, and the depredations of successive booms, most of the forested part of the Amazon remained sparsely occupied or unoccupied by non-Indians until the 1960s. While the constitutional principle that Indians have rights to the lands they traditionally occupy (but not subsoil rights) has figured in Brazilian constitutions since 1934, only in late 1960s under the military government were institutional means to implement this principle created, with the establishment of FUNAI, the National Indian Foundation in 1968 and the elaboration of the Indian Statute in 1973. The military created this apparatus in the context of a geopolitical strategy for the integration and development of the Amazon (PIN), including extensive infrastructure development, colonization, and fiscal incentives for the occupation of the region. The role of FUNAI was to clear the way to development and integration by pacifying uncontacted Indians and demarcating their territories. But the military's integration schemes while imposing substantial ecological and social costs on the Indians, other traditional populations, and the forest, largely failed in economic terms, were widely criticized internationally and nationally and are now discredited. The Indians in the meanwhile appropriated the institutional mechanisms for demarcation, building their own organizations, national and international alliances with the Church, human rights organizations, democratic opponents of the dictatorship, NGOs, environmentalists and researchers. While often operating at a disadvantage in local conflicts, they were able to translate local face-to-face struggles into national institutional contests, or international symbolic polemics where the terms were better. With strategic interventions from diverse indigenous groups, the Church, and professional NGOs, the Constitution of 1988 strengthened rather than weakening indigenous land rights, military initiatives to halt or turn back the demarcation process were turned back (ultimately in the Supreme Court) and demarcation has proceeded since. Both indigenous and indigenist organizations supported by NORAD played critical roles in this process, which the evaluation should detail. One key to this process was the existence of an independent, accurate and iterative data base on the extent of Indian lands, compiled by the Ecumenical Center for Documentation and Information (CEDI).

Nevertheless, even the most substantial demarcations (Yanomami, Mekragnoti Kayapo) represent the restriction or reduction of the pre-1960s territories of the Indians, a forced accommodation to the new frontiers of development. That is, even the greatest victories in the demarcation process also necessarily imply the need for new strategies for protection of the territories, for its occupation by the Indians under vastly changed terms, for the use and conservation of the natural resources of the areas. Even the largest indigenous areas in Brazil are increasingly islands in a sea of destruction and change, and their inhabitants are constrained to come to terms with new, often forbidding landscapes.

It currently appears likely that the demarcation process will be completed (as is indeed mandated by the Constitution of 1988), and that the government will legally document and physically demarcate 11 percent of the national territory as indigenous land. Some 80 percent of the territories suffer some kind of invasion, many regional political elites remain utterly opposed to the protection of indigenous lands, and major legal issues concerning mineral and timber exploitation and water projects on indigenous lands remain to be resolved. With new needs, collapsing government services and growing populations the sustainability of the indigenous areas and impoverishment of the Indians are concern increasingly voiced by the Indians. While 11 percent of the national territory for 0.2 percent of the population is substantial amount of land, securing that territory over time will require long term construction of stronger organizations and new alliances within Brazil, as well as strengthening international support for indigenous issues.

Colombia is another case in which indigenous groups in the Amazon have made substantial gains in land demarcation in recent years, under very different circumstances. The figure of the *resguardo*, originally applied to indige-

nous lands in the Andes governed by community councils was extended in the agrarian reform of the 1960s The agrarian reform agency also created a number of reserves, of ambiguous legal status, in the Amazon region. With the emergence of the organized indigenous movement in the Andes and regional organizations in the lowlands, these groups and indigenous rights activists pressured the government in the late 1980s to transform the reserves into *resguardos*. By the end of 1989 over 18 million hectares of the Colombian Amazon had been recognized as *resguardos*, nearly half of the region. The Colombian Amazon is still remote and inaccessible: while guerrilla activity and drug traffic are problems in some areas, infrastructure development has been slight and transportation is still largely by river. The international prominence of the Amazon at the time, as well as the efforts of the politically well-connected Colombian indigenous rights activists is held to have played an important role: the creation of the *resguardos* was in the Amazon, whereas the major bases of the national indigenous organization are in the Andes. The Constitution of 1991 in addition gives Indians the right to make decisions on resource management and development in their territories. Oil concessions granted in the U'wa territory this, entirely against the will of the Indians, who have threatened collective suicide if exploitation goes forward, however, raises doubts as to the government's political will to implement constitutional guarantees.

4. Infrastructure Development and Globalization

Over the last two decades infrastructure development and natural resource exploitation (roads, hydroelectric dams, mineral exploitation, logging and oil extraction) in South America have presented major threats to the survival and well-being of indigenous groups and to the integrity of their territories in South America. In Central America, extrapolation of cold war politics onto local class and ethnic conflicts and decades of disastrously misguided US policy in the region overshadowed other concerns (and indeed precluded much development investment under any model). With the end of the cold war, development and its financing and terms, in particular infrastructure development and resource exploitation increasingly condition the prospects of indigenous peoples across the hemisphere.

Few would attempt to claim that the liberal economic reforms that have swept the continent in this decade in and of themselves offer solutions for the indigenous peoples. The Zapatista revolt in Chiapas is ample indication that the prospect of free trade held little promise to the Indians there (and the recent and tragic massacre in Chiapas is clear evidence of the risk at which indigenous people and leaders undertake resistance to local oligarchies and regional elites in much of the continent.) However, it is important also to recognize that indigenous peoples in most of Latin America garnered few benefits from the protectionist, state-led, import-substitution development models now being overturned by economic liberalization, privatization, and globalization. Liberalization may accelerate unsustainable resource exploitation and increase pressure on indigenous lands, and market-imposed fiscal austerity may shrink government budgets, limiting already precarious services to indigenous communities. But fiscal austerity may also for example curtail uneconomic agricultural credit subsidies typically captured by rich large landowners that make otherwise unviable investments (say, in invading Indian territory in the Amazon) attractive. Privatization of money-losing state enterprises should in theory free public resources to fund the state's heightened activity as regulator and guarantor of free competition, and regulation, by the legal codes of most Latin countries includes some form of protection of indigenous rights. Risks and potential benefits of the new development model for indigenous peoples need to be evaluated and analyzed on a country-by-country basis.

Projected and ongoing infrastructure development and natural resource exploitation is however still among the chief present threats to indigenous lands. The InterAmerican Development Bank projects that some $12 billion investment per year is required over the next five years to make Latin American economies competitive internationally. With the massive increase of private capital flows to the region (chiefly foreign direct investment and portfolio investment) virtually eclipsing ODA and public sector investment in the 1990s, much of this is projected to come from private sources. Net private capital flows to Latin America and the Caribbean increased from US$ 28.7 billion, or 2.1 percent of GDP in 1992 to $74.3 billion, or 4.6 percent of GDP in 1996. While it is still far from clear how much private capital will be available for infrastructure development, ongoing projects are already affecting indigenous communities.

- Oil Development in the Western Amazon – Twenty years of oil exploitation by the Texaco/Petroecuador consortium has compromised the health and habitant of tens of thousands of people, including many Indians, in dozens do communities. Newer developments

by Maxus Energy Corporation, including some in ostensibly protected areas and the Huaorani territory threaten large scale environmental destruction and public health effects. Shell Oil's proposed development of the Camisea fields in the Peruvian Amazon, coupled with the Bolivia – Brazil natural-gas pipeline now under construction will greatly increase oil and natural gas extraction across large part of the Peruvian Amazon and Bolivia, with ready markets in Saõ Paulo and Mercosur.

- Paraná – Paraguay Waterway – Promoted by the 5-country intergovernmental commission on the waterway (Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay), the projected 2,000 km waterway would require dredging, straightening of curves and rock removal at key point along the Paraguay water course, with potentially massive effects on the critical Pantanal ecosystem. Several indigenous groups live in the Pantanal and would be directly affected, and perhaps 20,000 extremely poor and marginalized Gaurani in Brazil could suffer indirect impacts with the expansion of agribusiness stimulated by the waterway, as well as some 20,000 indigenous people in over 50 communities in Paraguay (Meliá 1997).
- Brazil in Action – The Brazilian government projects some R$3.6 billion investment in roads, energy and energy projects in the Amazon by the year 2000. While budgetary outlays so far are a tiny fraction of this amount, several of the projects (BR 174 road, from Manaus to Caracas and the Tocantins – Araguaia waterway have already occasioned conflicts with indigenous groups). As these works go forward, the economic growth they are intended to stimulate will affect tens of thousands of indigenous people. Venezuela's economic diversification strategy has led not only to the highly contentious Decree 1850, which opened the Imataca forest reserve to mining and logging concessions but to a flood of multinational mining claims (perhaps as many as 600 in Imataca, see above). The Las Cristalinas lode, near the reserve is held to contain some $4 billion worth of gold, and Placer Dome, among the largest international mining concerns is negotiating a concession. Pemon communities fear that supplying energy to the Las Cristalinas complex may imply flooding part of (officially unrecognized) land in an expansion capacity to the Guri hydroelectric.

Other cases that have been recently contested by indigenous groups include IDB financed road building in Belize and plans to complete the Pan American Highway through the Darien Gap in Panama, and many more example could be adduced.

In most of these situations the central issue is that infrastructure development that will increase economic activity and particularly resource extraction in or around indigenous lands is planned or proceeding prior to recognition or demarcation of indigenous lands, and in many cases prior to the existence of adequate institutional means for effective recognition of indigenous land rights. This at the limit threatens to repeat scenarios like that of the Cofan of Ecuador, whose territory has been massively degraded, remains littered with toxic waste pits and who been driven, in the words of a World Bank account to «rapid acculturation and near cultural extermination.» In Suriname, Goldenstar Mining's insistence on forced resettlement of the Nieu Koffekamp Maroon community in the Gros Rosbel gold mining concession is threatening to reignite the tensions that plunged the interior of country into civil war in the 1980s. In Brazil, planned waterways through indigenous areas have already elicited on-the-ground and legal challenges, and local level resource wars continue in Indian lands in the mahogany belt and gold mining areas. Key legislative struggles loom on mineral and timber extraction in Indian areas and on water project development in Indian areas. Increased pressure on indigenous groups and organizations to negotiate directly with multinationals (e.g., Shell in Camisea) is to be expected or is already occurring, and for much of the region the central challenge will be to use resistance, or the threat of resistance, to infrastructure development to leverage effective recognition and protection of land rights.

5. Economic Alternatives

Since the early 1980s, indigenous communities and organizations, NGOs and more recently aid agencies have variously attempted and assisted efforts to create economic alternatives at the grassroots level. Increasingly these have been cast, in the Amazon region in particular as «sustainable alternatives» that is, attempts to improve incomes and standards of living while preserving forests and biological diversity. A number of Npip/Fafo's partners have work in this area. The projects range from extremely small single-village initiatives over limited time periods, to regional efforts involving dozens of communities over multi-year periods, and focus on agriculture, handicrafts, non-timber forest products, livestock, processing and marketing. While the number of experiences in the Amazon countries alone is great and generalizations perhaps risky, a large majority of the projects

have not attained the economic «take-off» point, at least as it is imagined by donors. That is, while many benefits may accrue to communities, there are few cases in which grassroots economic projects become economically self-sustaining and continue or grow without outside support, while appreciably raising living standards or income. On the other hand, various kinds of ostensibly economic projects have indeed materially supported successful organizing initiatives, including ethnic and cultural reaffirmation and land rights struggles. The Indian rubber tapper cooperatives of Acre and cattle projects with Macuxi communities in the Raposa/Serra do Sol region of Roraima state in the early 1980s are two examples. In Acre, indigenous rights activists with the Acre Pro-Indian Commission (CPI-AC) secured financing initially from Oxfam-UK, principally for working capital to stock co-ops, aimed at Indians whose existence was essentially ignored by the Brazilian state, and who had since the late 19 th century fallen under the sway of rubber baron patrons, who occupied their lands and held the Indians in the debt peonage typical of «traditional» native rubber production in the Amazon. The point of the coops was in theory to replace the patrons as buyers of rubber and sellers of goods, allowing the Indians access to the market on less exploitative terms and improving incomes. Few if any of the coops in fact became economically self-sustaining in the first years, but the outside resources allowed the communities to break the patrons' stranglehold on commerce and subsidized effective mobilization for land demarcation. Whereas in 1975 FUNAI recognized no indigenous groups in the state (the Indians were considered «caboclos» or assimilated peasants of indigenous descent in the region), by the end of the 1980s some 26 areas for over a dozen ethnic groups had been demarcated, in function of the pressure generated by the communities.

The cattle projects initially formulated through the Catholic Diocese of Roraima with Macuxi communities had a similar trajectory. Large part of the Macuxi tropical savanna territory was invaded starting in the last century by cattle ranchers, and subsequently placer gold and diamond miners, and increasing parts of their territory was occupied in face of government inaction. The cattle projects were also initially justified as economic projects – a small herd of cattle (some 30 head) was given to a single community which was to raise them on common land, keep the first year's offspring and pass on the breeding stock to another community. While the herd increased, the real effect was not to raise incomes or living standards, but to forestall the occupation of further lands by the ranchers (since the Indians' cattle were already there) and to gradually displace large part of the invading ranchers through re-appropriation of increasingly large areas of savanna. After more than a decade of Church-supported cattle projects, by 1993, a regional indigenous organization (CIR), today one of the largest and best organized grassroots indigenous organizations in Brazil represented about 85 of the 100 villages in the Raposa-Serra do Sol region, had taken over the cattle projects, and the largest ranchers, pushed out by the Indians' cattle, had abandoned the area. In response to CIR's pressure, FUNAI identified a 1.6 million hectare area for the Macuxi and four neighboring tribes. The demarcation of this area has been so far blocked by maneuvers of the state government, but with the identification (the first phase in the legal recognition process) complete, the entire area will in all likelihood eventually be demarcated.

In Ecuador where indigenous organizations have made among the greatest gains in the hemisphere in achieving political representation, economic projects over the last decade have played a similar role. Whereas donors have tended to take a narrow view, assuming that the point of the projects was to simply to attain economic self-sufficiency, indigenous leaders have taken a less rigidly bounded view, in light of a broader agenda including building their organizations, achieving greater political voice and recognition of land rights. Oxfam-US and Cultural Survival support for CONFENIAE and CONIAE, the national and Amazonian confederations of indigenous organizations was translated by the organizations into effective mobilization for land rights and successful entry into electoral politics in 1996, with the election of former CONAIE coordinator Luis Macas to the Congress and capture of various mayoralities.

In short, economic projects that appear problematic to donors may have very substantial benefits to the indigenous organizations, viewed from a broader perspective. It is nonetheless true that even where indigenous communities and organizations have won recognition of land rights and control over territory, increasing incomes and improving living standards remains a high priority and economic obstacles are great. Even when indigenous lands are recognized, indigenous peoples lack mineral and water rights, and small-scale agriculture in the rural hinterlands of Latin America is seldom a recipe for prosperity for anyone. In forest areas, sustainable forestry, bioprospecting, nontimber forest products, handicrafts and tourism each has potential pitfalls and problems, but also present potential economic opportunities.

6. Indigenous Peoples and The Environment

Indigenous peoples occupy 20 percent of the Brazilian Amazon, half of Colombia's Amazon region, and much of the forest area of Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia. indigenous land rights are officially recognized in Brazilian and Colombian Amazon. In Venezuela some 13 million hectares of protected areas are in fact inhabited by Indians, and in Ecudor, Bolivia and Peru indigenous organizations have made major gains in recent years in securing recognition for community lands over larger expanses of territory than countries have afforded highland groups (typically treated under agrarian reform law as peasants) (Davis and Wali, 1993). A recent mapping exercise of the remaining Central American forest shows that large part o f this too is inhabited by indigenous peoples (Chapin 19). With increasing international and national attention focused on tropical forests in the 1980s, and broader public attention to conflicts between indigenous groups and state and corporate development in the Amazon region in particular (e.g., the Kayapo and the Xingu river dams in Brazil; the Huaroni and oil development in Ecuador) relations between environmentalists and indigenous organizations ramified and new alliances became possible, as well as new areas of conflict. (Brysk 1994; Poole 1989; Schwartzman and Santillin.)

One manifestation of the environmentalist – indigenous alliance was the meeting called by COICA (the Coordinating Body of indigenous Organizations of the Amazon Basin, an international indigenous organization founded in 1984 with representation from national organizations in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela and Guyana) and an array of northern environmental and conservation organizations in Quito in 1990. A declaration of general principles, supporting the role of indigenous peoples in defense of tropical forests was agreed upon. Subsequently, the Amazon Coalition was formed at the initiative of COICA, to better coordinate the activities of northern NGOs in support of indigenous peoples and the Amazon environment, which currently has some 60 organizations as members.

The alliance formalized in Quito has undoubtedly fallen short of expectations. Many of the larger environmental organizations that subscribed to it initially have other agendas that may conflict with indigenous land struggles (and some indeed have actively elaborated theoretical and research programs designed to limit indigenous peoples' claims to effectively conserve biological diversity). But the damage to the traditional conservationists' model of environmental protection in the tropics, based in the North American concept of empty parks, has been done. National governments, multilateral lending institutions, environmental organizations and even multinational corporations increasingly recognize that major development (or conservation) decisions affecting tropical forest areas require at least the appearance of consultation with their indigenous inhabitants. Reluctantly or not, national and international actors in tropical forest areas have come to the realization that much of the remaining tropical forest of the world is inhabited by Indians and other traditional peoples.

At the most general level then, the issues for the indigenous peoples in forest areas include how and to what extent tropical forests will be valued; to what extent they will participate in the valuation and to whom will benefits accrue? The «indigenous territory» model of land rights and forest conservation proposed by COICA was clearly formulated in light of these concerns (Chirif *et al,* 1991). In brief the idea here is that governments should recognize indigenous land and resource rights in large enough areas of forest that Indians be able to sustainably manage and conserve the forest, and recognize sufficient indigenous autonomy in managing the areas that their efforts to do so are not undermined by paternalistic or compromised government agencies or vitiated by ceding resource rights to predatory actors. Indigenous organizations in Peru and Ecuador have in fact pushed the limits of existing indigenous rights legislation to create larger reserves than was common, based in existing agrarian or Indian law. The 100,000 ha. Awa Ethnic Forest Reserve in Ecuador is a case in point. The Ecuadorean government created the reserve and resettled and titled colonists outside of it in response to pressure from Awa and CONAIE and in exchange for the Awa's agreement to conserve the resource base. (Davis and Wali 1993). Creation of large indigenous areas in Brazil (e.g., Yanomami and Mekragnoti Kayapo), while conforming to indigenous legislation, was defended by environmentalists, and recognized by government and environmentalists alike as an environmental advance.

Key international leverage points that may have real consequences in the forests include the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Climate Convention. While the Convention on Biological Diversity is a non-binding agreement, it does call for signatories to carry out national surveys, and at least one country has framed legislation on

access to biological diversity (the Brazilian biological diversity access law is under consideration in the Senate), as suggested in the Convention. The Brazilian draft legislation includes as a general principle the «participation of indigenous peoples and local communities in decisions that have as their object access to genetic resources in the areas they occupy;» (Projeto de Lei No. 306, de 1995, Lei de Acesso à Biodiversidade Brasileira), as well as an entire chapter on «protection of knowledge», which privileges the right of local communities to collectively benefit from their knowledge of biological resources. While it is generally agreed that the value of the biological diversity of the forest is immense, and the promise of genetic engineering and biotechnology to transform the way forests are valued is great, it is equally agreed that the potential future value of biological diversity has so far had little if any impact on how resources are allocated in the forests.

The Climate Convention, and in particular the Clean Development Mechanism, included in the Kyoto Protocol may also come to affect forests. The Kyoto Protocol is a binding agreement which commits those industrialized nations that ratify it to a schedule of stabilization and reduction of greenhouse gas (chiefly CO_2, but also a basket of six other gases that affect global climate) emissions. Uncertainties surrounding the convention are legion (will the US Senate ever ratify it? How likely are emissions reduction targets to be met in the absence of clear enforcement mechanisms?), but the possibility of substantial north-south resource transfers in the context of the convention is nonetheless real. Forests are important here because the Clean Development Mechanism makes it possible for northern industries or governments to buy CO_2 or other greenhouse gas «credits» from southern sources in order to meet their emissions reduction targets. Paying for forest protection is in theory one means of effecting such a trade. For example, US Energy Company X is required under the convention to reduce its overall CO_2 emissions by «y» tons of carbon/year. Should Company X determine that its cost in meeting the cap is lower through paying for the preservation of a given amount of forest in Peru, so that «y» tons of carbon are sequestered there, than for example in installing scrubbers in plants in New York, it might choose to pay for forest protection. The institutional issues associated with such trades are little short of nightmarish (who keeps track of trades, who monitors compliance, what forest is eligible, who ultimately is compensated). However, based on existing costs of CO_2 reduction, the value of CO_2 sequestration in tropical forests already exceeds the market value of agricultural land and may exceed the timber value as well (World Bank 1992). In addition, possible pilot projects in CO_2 emissions-for-forest trading that could come out of the Clean Development Mechanism could become models for designing compensation mechanisms for the larger array of ecosystem services that forests provide (watershed and soil conservation, biological diversity protection, local and regional climate regulation).

The promise and the peril of such global discussions of the value of ecosystem services for indigenous peoples are fundamentally the same in the case of biological diversity as for CO_2 sequestration. To the extent that the indigenous groups control their territories and the resources in them and can enter into transparent agreements that provide adequate resources for protection, these potential mechanisms promise much. If on the other hand, governments or private actors perceive a valorization of forest land (including indigenous lands) and set out to capture the new value at the expense of the Indians, then these mechanisms would differ little from other forms of expropriation already well known across the continent, and would lead to significant conflicts. Given the record of the governments and the private sector in conservation to date, the latter scenario is likely to be much worse for the forest than something along the lines of COICA's indigenous territories model. While compensation for the ecosystem services of the forest offers the greatest potential that currently can be envisaged for significant north – south resource transfers in benefit of indigenous peoples in forested areas and the forest, this potential will not be realized unless indigenous land and resource rights are adequately protected. Given the large extent of remaining forest inhabited by indigenous peoples and the poverty in which they live, protection of indigenous land and resource rights and the creation of effective means to compensate them for ecosystem services would also have very significant global environmental advantages. In short, COICA's «indigenous territory» forest management model, is in its general outlines, proposes a good global bargain. Making this outcome more likely will require continued strengthening of indigenous organizations and technically capable NGO partners; continued work on land and resource rights, including work on economic alternatives and sustainable management demonstration projects, even if these do not become financially self-sustaining in the short term; and local, national and international efforts to limit invasion and expropriation of lands occupied by indigenous peoples in new infrastructure and resource extraction ventures.

7. References

Brysk, Alison, «Acting Globally: Indian Rights and International Politics in Latin America» in *Indigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America*, Donna Lee Van Cott Ed. (Inter-American Dialogue/St. Martin's Press, 1994).

Chapin, Mac, *The Coexistence of peoples and the Natural Environment in Central America*, A Special Map Supplement to: Research & Exploration (National Geographic Society, 1992).

Chirif, A., P. Gracia, and R. Chase Smith, *El Indigena y Su Territoria Son Uno Solo* (Oxfam America and the Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indigenas de la Cuenca Amazonica – COICA, Lima, Peru, 1991).

Colchester, Marcus with Fiona Watson, *Venezuela: Violations of Indigenous Rights, Report to the International Labour Office on the Observation of ILO Convention 107* (Survival International and World Rainforest Movement, 1995).

Davis, Shelton H. and Wali Alaka, *Indigenous Territories and Tropical Forest Management in Latin America* (World Bank, Environment Department, WPS 1100, 1993).

Inter-American Development Bank, United Nations Development Program, and Amazon Cooperation Treaty, *Amazonia without Myths* (1992).

Melià, Bartome «Evaluation of the Impacts of the Hidrovía Paraguay-Paraná: an Environmental Economist's Perspective» in *The Hidrovía Paraguay-Paraná Navigation Project – Report of an Independent Review* (Environmental Defense Fund, 1997).

Psacharopoulos, George and Harry Anthony Patrinos, *Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America: an Empirical Analysis* (World Bank, 1994).

Sizer, Nigel, *Profit Without Plunder: Reaping Revenue from Guyana's Tropical Forests Without Destroying Them* (World Resources Institute, 1996).

Sizer, Nigel and Richard Rice, *Backs to the Wall in Suriname: Forest Policy in a Country in Crisis* (World Resources Institute, 1995).

Poole, Peter, *Developing a Partnership of Indigenous Peoples, Conservationists, and Land Use Planners in Latin America* (World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Technical Department, 1989) WPS 245.

Schwartzman, Stephan and Marcio Santilli, *Indigenous Reserves and Land Use Change in the Brazilian Amazon* (Environmental Defense Fund, 1997).

World Bank, *Indigenous Peoples and Poverty in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis* (Technical Department, Latin American and Caribbean region, 1993).

Appendix 4

Development Aid to Indigenous Peoples: A Sami Concern?

Henry Minde

1. Introduction

The following paper will briefly sketch the background of the Sami engagement in the international movement of indigenous peoples from the mid 1970s until the 1990s. The paper will also discuss some obvious changes in the policy and the motives during this period.

It was not surprising that sooner or later the question of international solidarity had to be publicly discussed. An incident at an education conference in Kautokeino in the autumn 1996 resulted in an intensive controversy in the local newspapers, which raised the following issues:

- Was the Sami solidarity focused only at indigenous peoples in the most developed and English-speaking countries (like US, Canada and Australia) and on celebrated persons (like Rigoberta Menchu Tum)?
- Was it necessary to choose between peoples in Latin America and the Russian North (Barents region)?
- Who was to blame that the Samis had been too little engaged in development aid in Latin America, the Sami organizations or the Norwegian state?

The opinion that indigenous peoples of North and South should meet and whenever possible work together to create partnerships, has been emphasised in the evaluation process.[1] Therefore, I will conclude by mentioning some aspects of the rise of Sami capacity of research and development aid during recent years.

2. The International Involvement

The pan-Sami process began within the framework of the Nordic Sami Conferences which were held in public every three years from 1953 onwards. The people at these conferences elected the members of the Nordic Sami Council – in fact, an indigenista organization. A major contribution in the early stages was made by non-Sami, both as lecturers and as active participants and advisors, but the involvement of the Sami in this process grew in stages.

From the end of the 1960s, the Sami gradually took over the entire running of the organization. However, the question of representation was not resolved before the 1970s, when the delegates could be elected by new nation-wide organizations in each individual country. A natural result of this was that only Sami were elected to the Council. The time had run out for the so-called «friends of the Sami.»

The Nordic Sami Council was now used as a forum from which to launch ethno-political declarations at the Nordic states, stating that the Sami were «a people with its own territory, culture and social structure,» as expressed in the cultural programme adopted by the Sami Conference in 1971. The central demand was «to be recognised as an ethnic group.»

From 1971–74, the Council was drawn into the international network that the Indian chief George Manuel was in the process of creating. Several of the delegates to the 1974 Nordic Sami conference had attended the First Circumpolar Arctic People's Conference held in Copenhagen in November 1973. According to the reports, the atmosphere and discussion at this conference was intense and aroused great expectations for the world- wide organization of indigenous peoples that was in the planning stage, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP). The new elite among the Sami, who took over from the «friends of the Sami,» were not able to sustain the earlier level of activity and influence vis-à-vis the Nordic Council. But it was this Council which elected Sami delegates to the WCIP's general assemblies and which nominated candidates for leadership positions in the international network.

The radical critique of the authorities voiced by the Indians of the U.S. and Canada during the 1960s was a long time coming among the Nordic Sami.

Prior to the Alta conflict (1979–81) no Nordic State dealt

---

[1] Cf. Barreiro, discussion paper 1998.

with the Sami as peoples that had special rights. Those matters which the Sami had managed to raise with the central authorities were seen in the «welfare-state perspective» either as problems which concerned outlying districts, primary industry or the handicapped. At the end of the 1950s when the Nordic states considered whether or not the Sami were covered by the old ILO Convention 107 of 1957 concerning the «Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations,» the decision was exclusion, on the grounds that the Sami were generally well integrated into society. The Finnish President Uhro Kekkonen, used this argument in his Address to the Parliament. The idea that the Sami were an indigenous people was quite foreign to both the Nordic authorities and – I have to add – the great majority of the Sami until the late 1970s.

Through the Nordic Sami Council and the WCIP, the Sami had worked to build up a network for indigenous peoples, which helped bring about a change of heart, viewed most clearly in Norway. Typically it was the human rights group in the Foreign Ministry that led the way. The Norwegian government contributed funds to the WCIP at the time of the Kiruna Conference in 1977 and continued to make subsequent contributions. When Torvald Stoltenberg, then Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry, made Norway's lead speech at the UN's conference against racism in 1978, he linked the concept of indigenous people directly to the Sami of Norway. When the Norwegian public became aware that this could have an impact on the handling of the Alta affair, all aspects of the question came to light. The Sami organizations and individual members of Parliament demanded that Norway immediately ratify the above mentioned ILO Convention 107. However, before this occurred, the ILO took up the process of making revisions to the Convention, which in 1989, led to Convention 169.

In the meantime the indigenous peoples in FinnoScandia, Greenland, North and South America and Oceania had created WCIP in 1975. The WCIP made it easier for the various national indigenous organizations around the world to share information, learn from each other's strategies and coordinate common initiatives vis-à-vis the UN-system. But the WCIP was neither representative as such, nor was it strong and effective. The General Assembly met on average only once every three years and in the beginning, the secretariat consisted of one or two persons situated in Canada, at one time even on the prairie.

A shift occurred in the late 1960s concerning the potential of indigenous organizations to influence the political agenda of the international bodies. A number of de-colonisation and minority resolutions were presented to the UN and increasing attention was paid by the public to the depressed situation of the so-called «Fourth World People.» The UN had taken action to accommodate some of the procedural requests that indigenous peoples and their supporting groups had put forward at the very outset, including the acceptance of indigenous peoples as a distinct group, disassociation of the issue of indigenous peoples from the problem of minority rights, and most importantly, in May 1982, the authorization of ECOSOC to establish the Working Group on Indigenous Populations.

As a result of the solidarity work during the Alta conflicts, the Sami organizations had been even more deeply involved in the wave of the international movement. And even though the Sami have been divided between four nation-states, including Russia, and have been split in many political fractions in each country, they have still talked at the UN conferences with one voice – officially at least. This unanimous Sami voice was quite important in setting the standard both in the UN and the ILO in the late 1980s and 1990s, especially in the preparation of a new ILO Convention about indigenous peoples (ILO Convention 169 of 1989).

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Russian Sami could at last participate on equal terms with their sisters and brothers in the Nordic countries. The Nordic Sami Council, renamed simply as Sami Council, attended the Helsinki Conference in 1990. After the establishment of an elected parliamentary system in Norway and Sweden around 1990, the importance of the Council could have been questioned. However the Rovaniemi-Process, in which indigenous organizations around the Arctic insisted on participating, gave the Council new important political objectives and channels.

3. The Involvement of Sami Organizations in Development Aid

In a public debate, Tor Gjertsen, a senior lecturer at the Finnmark college and a former staff member in the Norwegian Aid Programme in Latin America, brought into focus what he thought was a lack of Sami solidarity with the indigenous peoples in the Third World, particularly in Latin America.[2] His contribution led to an excited debate

[2] *Finnmark Dagblad* 07.09.1996; 05.10.1996; 26.10.1996 and 10.10.1996.

in the local newspaper (Finnmark Dagblad, Nordlys and Sagat), from which I will make reference only to the contributions from Nils Thomas Utsi[3] and Svein Roald Nystø.[4], both of whom have been chairman of The National Association of Norwegian Sami (NSR) with the latter currently President of the (Norwegian) Sami Parliament.

Utsi believed that even though the Sami had been very supportive in building up the Latin American branch of WCIP (e.g. CORPI), the Sami organizations had done far too little to assist the most disadvantaged of the indigenous peoples. He emphasised that the fundamental principle in all development aid should bee the priorities and the objectives of the indigenous peoples concerned. At the seventh WCIP conference in Guatemala 1993, the Sami Council (where Utsi was then a member) had therefore actively pressed for a resolution to implement such a principle. For the purpose of effective contribution in carrying out development aid, the indigenous peoples were encouraged to organize themselves.[5] From the accounts of the (Nordic) Sami Council, in the period from the late 1970s to 1991, the Council transferred yearly between NKR 150,000–325,000 to WCIP for different programmes and organization-building. Although the governments in Norway and Sweden had also applied for the money, the Council directly funded two programmes in Nicaragua (1981) and Guatemala (1982), providing respectively, NKR 40 000 and 480 000.

In Utsi's opinion, one could not blame the Sami organizations for lacking solidarity, because these organizations had only imagined power. The state was to blame if they did not have enough money or resources. He mentioned examples from 1990s, when the Norwegian Foreign Ministry had refused an application from the Council for a cooperation project with an organization in Ecuador. Utsi concluded, «when the FM enforced their own priorities on our organization there was not any room for our own solidarity work.» He continued to reflect upon whether the Sami organization should fully accept the priorities set by the states: «There is an imminent danger that the development aid would be a colonialist enterprise in a new form.»

The importance of world-wide indigenous solidarity was an opinion adopted also by Sven-Roald Nystø, but he emphasised that the indigenous peoples' situation had changed significantly since the WCIP was created. Nystø wrote that now it was necessary for the Sami Parliaments, to focus on collaboration with the indigenous peoples living in the Barents-region. These statements must be viewed against the background of the fall of the Iron Curtain (1989), the membership of the Russian Sami in the Sami Council (1990) and the Russian Inuit in ICC (1992), the establishment of the Russian Association of Northern Minorities and these organizations' involvement and participation in the process of creating the Arctic Council (September 1996). In the Arctic Council, it was accepted that state-wide organizations like ICC, the Sami Council and the Russian Association should be permanent participants. In Nystø's opinion, the solidarity with other indigenous peoples should be taken care of in another manner, at least not by Sami NGOs.

In spite of a clear change in the 1990s of the focus of the leading political elite, it appears that the Sami academic institutions have moved in the opposite direction, as the result of the UN International Decade of Indigenous Peoples. In November 1993, the Center for Sami Studies at the University of Tromsø arranged a Conference on Indigenous Politics and Self-Government, in which peoples from Guatemala participated.[6] More or less as a direct result of that conference, the Center for Sami Studies, together with Sami College and Nordic Sami Institute in Kautokeino, initiated a research programme, which started up the autumn of 1997, about indigenous peoples as a network with funding from the Norwegian Research Council.[7]

Simultaneously, SEMUT (Center for Environment and Development Studies) at the University of Tromsø, in close cooperation with Center for Sami Studies, initiated two programmes in cooperation with San Carlos University in Guatemala, one in healthcare and one called «Maya Competence Building,» which are now being funded by NUFU for a period of three to four years. Also in Guatemala, during the past few years, the Swedish section of the Sami Council has participated in the international inspection of the repatriation of refugees, and

---

3 *Ibid* 14.10.1996.

4 *Ibid* 16.10.1996.

5 Connected with this viewpoint an other member of the *Sami Council,* Lars P. Niia, added at the mentioned conference: «This could be strengthened by programmes of international finacial and tecnical cooperation aimed at building indigenous peoples own management and research institutions and protecting indigenous peoples' control of their knowledge of ecosystems.» (Niia 1993)

6 Cf. the procedings of the Conference: Brantenberg, T (et.al., eds.): *Becoming Visible* (1995).

7 Cf. an interview with the coordinator of that programme, profesor Ole Henrik Magga, in *Forskning*, 1997, no. 7.

lead their own programme of supporting Mayan organizations. Also the Norwegian Sami Parliament has appointed one of their members, Maret Gutthor, to the advisory council of Fafo.

4. Concluding Remarks

As one of the common objectives during the UN International Decade, the Sami Parliaments declared in 1997:

> The implementation of a genuine indigenous profile within the development aid policies of Finland, Norway and Sweden, with particular focus on indigenous peoples' possibilities of organising their own interests before the authorities of their respective nation states and before the international community.[8]

But it is not enough to include the Sami perspective on that work. It is fair to say that my paper has shown that the research and organization capacity of the Samis has obviously increased during the 1990s. A natural consequence should therefore be that the Sami organizations and institutions be rightly included as a part of the development aid. Assessments have to be made regarding how fast and how much of the development aid focused of indigenous people should be transferred, step by step, to Sami organizations and institutions.

5. References

Barreiro; J. 1998: «Indigenous Peoples and Development in the Americas: Lessons from a Consultation Process,» Discussion paper, Evaluation Projects of Norwegian Programme for Indigenous Peoples, 1998.

Minde, H. 1996: «The Making of an International Movement of Indigenous Peoples,» i: Scandinavian Journal of History 1996:3.

Minde, H. 1998: «Mot rasediskriminering, for urfolksretter – to sider av samme sak?,» (kommer) i: Broderstad, E.G. (red.): Samiske rettigheter. Seminarrapport utgitt av Senter for samiske studier.

Niia, L.P. 1993: «Theme II, Environment and development,» International conference of Indigenous peoples, Guatemala 6–10 December 1993.

[8] Ch. 2.2.2: «International measures that must be implemented», point 4.

Appendix 5: Indigenous Issues, Debates, and Trends

Indigenous Organizations
- Role of indigenous formal political leaders is growing
- Legitimation of indigenous issues has been a success in the region
- Lowland vs. highland issues are different and need different treatment
- Institutional strength seems to be the key factor in success
- Autonomy and self-determination are shared goals
- Formal political representation is a prime goal

Allies
- International visibility of indigenous issues has increased foreign support
- North-South Indian alliances are increasing
- Alliances within countries are growing
- There is both convergence and divergence between environmentalists and indigenous peoples

Common Agenda
- Communication problems exist between indigenous and pro-indigenous organizations and the grassroots
- Communication problems also exist between donors and NGOs
- There are questions about the continuing relevance of ODA
- The creation of dependency on aid is seen as a problem
- Cultural incompetence of new aid players is also a problem; it may mean that the evaluation of indigenous efforts may be inappropriately interpreted
- The development of an indigenous elite is worrisome
- A holistic sense of community is key to successful organizing

Indigenous Peoples in Latin America are dealing with a range of interconnected issues (bulleted in the accompanying boxes). The major issues have to do with the following factors:
- Inter-ethnic relationships in Latin America are often strained for reasons of land tenure, racism, and class distinction
- The demography of indigenous peoples means that their populations will increase; thus altering the status quo in the future
- Land and identity are inextricably linked and land is under competing demand
- Communities are forming organizations in order to deal with remarkable similar agendas
- Those organizations charged with facing the outside world have their own set of relationships and issues to resolve

Land and Identity
- Conflict over protected lands continues
- Relationship with the land is key in cultural identity
- Land demarcation and legal status (and mechanisms) of land are therefore central
- Indigenous'ness is an evolving idea
- Struggles to strengthen identity in a different cultural environment are continuing
- Recovery of language is particularly important
- Identity politics are therefore central
- Spirituality as a way of life is a key element of cultural efforts
- Evangelical movements in Latin America are therefore particularly worrisome

Maintenance of Community
- Political divisions are threatening
- Layers of colonialism are still relevant
- Access to services in health and education are poor; deterioration of health is a problem; reproductive rights and traditional systems are not guaranteed in practice
- Traditional knowledge needs to be preserved; Living tradition needs to be celebrated; languages are endangered; Recognition of language (bilinguals, official languages) is important
- The cultural education and socialization of children are endangered; Generation loss is feared
- Poverty and marginalization continue
- Human rights violations continue; access to media is poor
- There are gendered differences in the problems of indigenous peoples
- Migration is a central problem; Urban native issues are different from those in rural areas

New Issues
- Indigenous protagonism
- Indigenous thinking on the table
- Indigenous organizations with voice
- Presence on indigenous issues

Global Factors

Global Dynamics
- International regimes:
  - Environmental: Kyoto and Biodiversity
  - ILO 169
- Trade and investment liberalization:
  - WTO
  - MAI
  - Mercosur
  - FTAA/NAFTA
- Drug trade and drug-related violence

US Policy
- US migration policies

State Policies
- Indigenous land rights
- Health policies
- Education policies
- Infrastructure projects
- Security policies

Appendix 6

List of Contacts

1. Contacts in Brazil

Associaçaõ Maitareilá do Povo Indígena Sururuí, Cacoal, RO

- Almir Narayamogã Sururi, Coordinator
- Itabira Suruí – Suruí chief
- Celso Nati Suruí – Suruí chief

CCPY

- Claudia Andujar, President
- Carols Zaquini, Coordinator of field projects
- Fernando Bittencourt, Administrator
- Bruce Albert, Anthropologist

CPI-AC, Acre Pro-Indian Commission

- Nietta Lindenbergh, Coordinator, Education Project
- Vera Olinda da Paiva, Director, Education Project
- Paulo Alencar, Director, Health Project
- Marcelo Piedrafita, Anthropologist
- Biraci Brasil Iauanaua, Iauanaua indigenous leader

CTI

- Maria Inês Ladeira Project Coordinator, coastal Guarani
- Dominique Gallois, Project Coordinator, Waiampi

Savanna Fruits, Indigenist Work Center, CTI

- Virginia Valladaõ, Project Coordinator

Video in the Villages, CTI

- Vincent Carelli, Project Coordinator

Guarani, Mato Grosso do Sul

- Celso Shitoshi Aoki, Project Coordinator

Green Party

- Norberto Sales Tene, Kaxinawa teacher and town council member from Jordaõ

ISA

- Andre Villas Boas, Coordinator, Xingu Program

PACA, Environmental Protection of Cacoal, Rondonia

- Dalvanira Goncalves Costa, Health Coordinator
- Alenete Ruis Ferreira, Environmental Education Coordinator
- Carlos Leonardo Pereira da Silva, Agroforestry Coordinator
- Maria de Lourdes Pereira da Silva, Founder

Workers' Party, Acre

- Marina Silva da Souza, Senator
- Jorge Viana, former Mayor, Rio Branco, AC, candidate for Governor

UNDP

- Staff in Brasilia (who asked to remain anonymous)

1.1 MANAUS

AMARN

- Maria das Dores Carvalho Romaõ, Financial Officer
- Maria Gorete Fonseca Chaves, General Coordinator
- Maria Deolinda, AMARN Founder and Fiscal Council Member
- Inês, Ex-coordinator
- Maria Jardilina Assis de Vasconcelos, Sociologist, Consultant
- Raimundo Nonato Pereira da Silva, Sociologist, Consultant

CIMI Norte I

- Terezinha Pereira da Silva, Documentation
- Egon Dionisio Heck, Communication
- Miguel Feeney, Regional Coordinator

COIAB

- Maria do Carmo Trindade Serra, Executive and Administrative Secretary (ex-AMARN)
- Elcio Manchineri (*Tóia*), Financial Officer
- Darcy Comapa, Gneral Coordinator
- Silvio Cavuscens, Coord. Board Consultant
- Manuel da Silva Lima, Communication Consultant

MEIAM

- Carlos Ferraz, Financial Officer (from Rio Negro) – contacted at COIAB's offiice
- Benedito do Espírito Santo Pena Maciel, Consultant (from Pastoral Indigenista)

- Benjamin Castro, Coordinator (also FOIRN)
- Joaõ Paulo Lima Barreto , Member, Philosophy student (from Rio Negro)

Other contacts:

- Fabio Vaz Almeida, Anthropologist / Amazonian Museum, UFAM

1.2 TEFÉ

1.2.1 UNI -Tefé

- André da Cruz, Coordinator
- Genival de Oliveira dos Santos (Vice-Coord.)
- Mariano Fernandes Cruz, General Secretary
- Tomé Fernandes Cruz, Financial Officer
- Manoel Zacarias and wife, UNI Tefé members (leader of a Ticuna village, «Barreira da Missaõ», the nearest to Tefé)
- Celina Cadena da Silva, COIAB's Health Project Coordinator
- Jean Robson Pinheiro Jacintho (Tefé Prelature), Consultant
- Evanir Kich – COMIN (Luteran Church), Consultant

1.3 BENJAMIN CONSTANT

CGTT (General Council of the Ticuna Tribe)

- Pedro Inácio Pinheiro – CGTT/*Maguta* Museum (Present Administration)
- Nino Fernandes – CGTT/*Maguta* Museum (Present Admin.), Ex-OGPTB Director

OGPTB (General Organisation of the Ticuna Bilangual Teachers)

- Constantino Ramos Lopes, Consultant (ex-Maguta Museum)
- Francisco Juliaõ Ferreira, President
- José Guedes Tenazor, First Secretary
- Anita Fermin Vaz, Second Secretary
- Jussara Gomes Gruber, Consultant (education projects)
- Reinaldo Otaviano do Carmo – FUNAI/Tabatinga

1.4 BOA VISTA

CCPY (Pro Yanomami Commission)

- Carlo Zacquini, Regional Coordinator
- Dra. Deise Alves Francisco, Health Project (Local Team Coordinator)
- Dr.Claudio Esteves de Oliveira, Health Project (Field Coordinator)

CIR (Indigenous Council of Roraima)

- Léia Vale de Oliveira, Administrative Secretary
- Sâmara Bezerra do Vale, Financial Officer
- Jerônimo Pereira da Silva, General Coordinator
- José Adalberto da Silva, Vice-Coord./Executive Secretary
- Alvino Andrade da Silva, Administrative Assistant
- Renato Lang, Administrative Consultant
- Paulo Pankararu, Lawyer, Juridical Consultant

1.5 RIO DE JANEIRO

- Joaõ Pacheco de Oliveira Filho – Anthropologist, Full Professor at PPGAS/ National Museum/UFRJ and Consultant of the CGTT (*Conselho Geral da Tribo Ticuna*, whose members have recently assumed the activities of the *Museum Maguta*, at Benjamin Constant/AM).

1.6 BRECIFE

AFINCO (by phone)

- Dora (courses on financial issues)
- Álvaro (book)

2. Contacts in Peru

AIDESEP

- Gil Inoach, President

CIPA – Centro de Investigacion y Promoción Amazonica

- Alfredo Prado
- Jaime Calmet

FENAMAD

- Nilo Arroba, auditor

2.1 CUZCO

- Henry Coaquira
- Maria Mercedes Olave
- Celia Achahui
- Edwin Almanza
- Vladimir Arregui
- Mothers' Club of Chacachimpa, Ocongate, Cuzco
- Various Mothers' Clubs from Carhuayo, Cuzco
- Students and teachers at Training School in Ocongate. Cuzco

2.2 PUCALLPA

- Mirna Gomez Heredia
- Various Mothers' Clubs from Pucallpa and Yarinacocha

AGASA – Empresa Asociado en Galvanotecnica y Servicios Afines
- Alfredo Huaytalla

AHIMREL – Asociación Hijos de Mollebamba Residentes en Lima
- Tiburcio Diaz Tanta
- Zosimo Lusa Tanta

APECELI – Asociación de Micro y Pequeno Empresas de Cercado de Lima
- Dorys Ninataype Carpio

CAAT-Andino
- Vicente Huaytalla

CFMB
- Nilo Arroba, auditor

FUSCHICO – Fundación Cultural Shipibo Conibo
- Glorioso Castro
- Susanna D'Avila Urquia
- Raynor Castro

Rabin Rama
- Mirna Gomez Heredia, CIPA Director in Pucallpa
- Gilda Amacifuen, founder

2.3 ADDITIONAL PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND/OR CONSULTED IN PERU

- Richard Smith, Development Consultant
- Kethi Meentzen, Anthropologist with many years of experience working with indigenous people in Peru
- Kevin Healy, InterAmerican Foundation, contacted by telephone
- Margarita Ramon – OXFAM, Program Director with many years experience working with indigenous peoples in Peru
- Pancho Soberon, APRODEH, Director of key Peruvian human rights organization which collects information on the impact of political violence on indigenous people
- Tom Moore, worked directly on FENAMAD scholarship program
- Kimberly Theidon, works closely with indigenous populations severely impacted by political violence in the highlands
- IWGIA representative, telephone conversation

3. Contacts in Guatemala

AEMG– Asociacion de Escritores Mayenses
- Nery Urtado, Accounting
- Alberto Ajtun, Vice-president of association
- Timotea Colop, Tesorera
- Rolando Pastos, Secretary
- Ing. Raoul Robles, Technical advisor
- Juan Jacinto Gomez
- Vladimiro Rosales, President

CDRO – Cooperación para el Deserrollo Rural de Occidente
- Gregorio Garcia
- Guillermo Tzoc

CECMA – Centro de Estudios de la Cultura Maya
- Pedro Bal Cumes

CEDIM – Centro de Documentation e Investigacion Maya
- Maria Alicia Telon

COCADI – Coordinadora Kaqchikel de Desarrollo Integral
- Walter Pwac Cortez
- Liliane Anita Sincal
- Various representatives from communities served by COCADI
- Angel Reyna (consultant brought on to review COCADI crisis)

COPMAG – Consejo de Pueblos Mayas de Guatemala
- Jose Domingo Zerraza
- Miguel Itzep
- Miguel Ceto Lopez

El Regional
- Estheiman Amaya

Instituto El Paraíso
- Marcos de Jesus Ajpacaja Sohom
- The students and faculty of Instituto El Paraiso

Instituto El Tenám
- Domingo Francisco Manuel, Presidente de Comite

- Marcos Miguel Gonzalez Matias, Tesorero
- Maria Teresa Miculax Olcot, wife of Domingo Jacinto Matias Mateo
- Sergio Juarez Mendez

IPMA – Instituto P.M. Aguacateko
- Mariano Rodriguez Alcon

Nawal Wuj/Cholsamaj
- Demetrio Rodriguez

SEA – Sociedad El Adelanto
- Noe Quijivix Yax – President 1997–98
- Various members of the Board of Directors

3.1 ADDITIONAL PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND/OR CONSULTED IN GUATEMALA

MINUGUA – UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
- Susan Soux, Head of Indigenous Affairs
- Guillermo Padilla and Marcela Tovar, Specialists in Indigenous Affairs

Comision para El Esclarecimiento Historico
- Roberto Rodriguez
- Greg Grandin
- Marcie Mursky

Discussion with the head of the Final Report and other CEH staff members regarding data gathered on the impact of political violence on Guatemala's majority indigenous population.

Others
- Guillermo Rodriguez, CISMA, conducted evaluations of many Npip programs including: COCADI, COPMAG, Instituto El Paraiso, IPMA, and Sociedad El Adelanto in 1997.
- Amilcar Mendez, Founder of CERJ, one of the most important indigenous human rights organizations who is currently a Congressman
- John Brodhout, Norwegian Ambassador, the Norwegian Embassy – discussion with Norwegian Ambassador and asistant about Norway's programs to aid indigenous peoples in Guatemala
- Per Ranestaad, Npip, Norway

4. Contacts in Norway

The Development Fund (Utviklingsfondet)
- Svend Skjønsberg

Fafo
- Dag Odnes, Director
- Per Ranestad, Npip coordinator
- Elisabeth Forseth, Npip coordinator
- Arne Groenningsaeter, CIS Director
- Eduardo Archetti, Npip Board

FORUM
- S. Ananthakrishnan
- Mari Holmboe Ruge

Lutheran Alliance
- Sven Nilsen
- Hans Birkeland

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Hilde Austad, Department for Global Issues
- Heddy Astrup, Department for Global Issues
- Asbjorn Eidhammer, Department for Global Issues
- Kamilla Kolhuus, Legal Affairs Department
- Herbert Linder, Regional Advisor on Latin America
- Per Mogstad, Department for Global Issues
- Dag Nissen, Assistant Director General
- Wegger Strømmen, ex-Foreign Service Officer

Ministry of Local Government and Labour
- Arne Arnesen
- Leif Dunfjeld

NORAD , Department of NGOs, Volunteers and Cultural Cooperation
- Terje Vigtel
- Elin Eikeland

Norske Misjonsallianse
- Mr. Kristian Larsen//tab

Norsk Misjonsrads Bistandsnemd
- Nils. Chr. Faarlunde
- Arne Kjell Ramstol//tab

Norwegian Church Aid
- Hilde Salvesen
- Johan Hindal
- Hans Petter Hergum

Norwegian Human Rights Fund
- Margot Skarpeteig//tab

Norwegian Institute for Human Rights
- Asbjorn Eide
- Stener Ekern

Norwegain Institute of International Affairs
- Harald Olav Skar

Norwegian People's Aid
- Signe Flydal Blichfeldt
- David Bergan

Norwegain Refugee Council
- Nina Frankenberg
- Turid Laegereid

Pentecostal Church
- Helge Bjorklund

The Norwegain Rainforest Foundation
- Lars Løvold

Redd Barna
- Kjersti Barre
- Kari Thomassen

Salvation Army
- Olaug Gulliksen

Support Network for Indigenous Peoples
- Hernan Rojas

5. Contacts in Denmark

IBIS
- Mariane Victor

IWGIA, International Working Group for Indigenous Peoples
- Karen B. Andersen

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Caroline Rubow

6. Contacts in Netherlands

Bilance
- Bernardo Krommendijk

ICCO, Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation
- Pim Verhallen

NOVIB, Netherlands Organization for International Development Cooperation
- Rosa Borges
- Harrie Oppenoorth

Institute of Social Studies
- Frits Wils

7. Contacts in the United States

Inter-American Development Bank
- Ann Deruyttere, Chief of Indigenous Peoples and Community Development Unit, Social Programs and Sustainable Development Department
- Carmen Albertos, Indigenous Peoples and Community Development Unit, Social Programs and Sustainable Development Department

World Bank
- Shelton Davis, Principal Sociologist, Social Development Development
- Jorge Urquillas, Environmental Unit, Technical Department of the Latin America and Caribbean Region
- Daniel Gross, Senior Anthropologist, Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development, Latin American and Caribbean Region

Amazon Coalition
- Melina Selverston, Coordinator

Bank Information Center
- Kari Hammerschlag, Latin America and Carribbean Program

8. Members of the Reference Group

Academic Advisors
- Marit Melhuus, University of Oslo
- Henry Minde, University of Tromsø

Fafo
- Arne Grønningsaeter
- Elisabeth Forseth
- Per Ranestad

Norad
- Terje Vigtel
- Elin Eikeland

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Erik Berg, Evaluation Unit

Appendix 7

Selected Sources

Brantenberg, Terje, and Janne Hansen and Henry Minde (eds.), Becoming Visible: Indigenous Politics and Self-Government, Tromsø: The University of Tromsø, Centre for Sámi Studies, 1995.

de Kadt, Emanuel and Domingos Armani, Paulo Roberto Lopes, Ian William Mac Arthur, Dorine Plantenga, Sebastiaõ Soares, Monique van Wortel and Nick Peacock, NGOs and Institutional Development: The Dutch Co-Financing Programme in Brazil, The Hague: DGIS/Bilance, Icco & Novib, 1997.

Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, Strategy for Danish Support to Indigenous Peoples, Copenhagen, July 1994.

Denmark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Danida, Support to Indigenous Peoples: Seminar on Experiences and Perspectives, Copenhagen, 1997.

Ekern, Stener, «Development Aid to Indigenous Peoples is an Exercise in Crossing Boundaries,» in Human Rights in Developing Countries. Yearbook 1997, eds. Hugo Stokke, Astri Suhrke, Arne Tostensen, The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International; Oslo: Nordic Human Rights Publications, 1997.

El Programa Noruego para Pueblos Indígenas (PNPI)/O Programa Noruegues Para Povos Indigenas (PNPI), brochure, Oslo: Fafo, 1998.

European Alliance with Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples Participation in Sustainable Development No. 4: Indigenous Peoples Participation in Forest Management, European Alliance with Indigenous Peoples, 1997.

European Alliance with Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Peoples Participation in Sustainable Development: Implementing Agenda 21, Indigenous Peoples Participation in European Union Development Policies, European Alliance with Indigenous Peoples, 1995.

Gemeenschappelijk Overleg Medefinanciering, Brazil: NGO Country Profile 1996–1, Amsterdam: GOM Oegstgeest, 1996.

Holmbo Ruge, Mari and Helene Bank, From Agenda to Action: Experiences and Reflection of Norwegian Non-governmental Organisations On the Road from the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 1992 to Earth Summit +5, 1997, Oslo: The Norwegian Forum for Environment and Development (ForUM), 1997.

Instituto de Antropologia e Meio Ambiente (IAMA), Programa Institucional do Iama. Programaçaõ de Atividades. Período: 1998 a 2001, Saõ Paulo, 1998.

Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation (ICCO), Signs of Hope: Mission and Policy of ICCO, Zeist: ICCO, 1994.

Larsen, Kristian and Jan-Ake Alvarsson, Evaluation of Norwegian Pentecostal Mission's Development Project at Paso Cadena Paraguay: Guarani Indians on the Eve of Integration, Oslo, 1988.

Minde, Henry, «A Century of Norwegian Research into Sámi Rights» in Scandinavian Studies in Law, Oslo, 1993.

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Annual Report, Oslo, 1996.

The Norwegian Programme for Indigenous Peoples, Annual Report, Oslo: Fafo, 1996.

The Norwegian Programme for Indigenous Peoples, Institutional Development in an Indigenous Context. Papers from the seminar on June 7, 1996, Oslo: Fafo, 1997.

The Norwegian Programme for Indigenous Peoples, Status Report, Oslo: Fafo, 1995.

Novib, Characteristic [sic] for Novib's approach, The Hague: Novib.

Redd Barna, Annual Report, Oslo: Redd Barna, 1996.

Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development Cooperation, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997.

Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Strategy for Environment in Development Cooperation, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1997.

Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A Changing World: Report No. 19 to the Storting (1995–96), Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996.

Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Official Norwegian Report 1995: Norwegian South Policy for a Changing World, Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995.

Utviklingsfondet (The Development Fund), Annual Report, Oslo: Utviklingsfondet, 1996.

Wearne, Phillip, Return of the Indian: Conquest and Revival in the Americas, London: Cassell, 1996.

Wray, Nathalia; Fiona Wilson, and Per Ranestad, IBIS and Indigenous Peoples: Encounters and Shocks, Review of Ibis's South America Programme, evaluation, 1997.

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE NORWEGIAN PROGRAMME FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND OTHER SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

Norway has over the years been a firm supporter of the rights of indigenous peoples in the UN and other international foras. It was the first country that ratified the ILO Convention on the "Rights of Indigenous Peoples" (Convention no. 169/89). For decades Norway has also financially supported indigenous peoples' organisations on the international, national and local level in their work for human rights and basic needs fullfilment. I.a IWGIAs work for the empowernment and organisational strength of indigenous peoples, the formation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples(WCIP) and the Indian Council in South America (CISA). It has also partfunded the international work of Norwegian indigenous organisations, i.e the Saami Council, the Norwegian Section of the Nordic Saami Council etc.

Today financial support is provided through various channels in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Political Dept., Multilateral Dept.,Bilateral Dept.) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation(NORAD). Assistance is given through the NGO-grant and the regional grant for Central America. NORAD's main tool in this respect is however the Norwegian Programme for Indigenous Peoples (NPIP). The main focus of this evaluation will be on NPIP.

The programme was established in 1991 when NORAD contracted the FAFO Institute for Applied Social Sciences to administer a programme comprising their indigenous portfolio. This became the Norwegian Programme for Indigenous Peoples(NPIP).

NPIP's main purpose is to strengthen the capacity and ability of indigenous peoples to shape and control their own development given the present context of socioeconomic change. Three "Areas of Support" define the direction of activities within the programme. They are: (1) Health and Rights, (2) Culture and Education and (3) Institution Building and Networking. NPIP concentrates its efforts in five countries: Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru.

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The main objectives of the evaluation are:

2.1 to present and categorize Norway's financial support to indigenous peoples during the period 1990-96. Norway's policy toward indigenous peoples as expressed in Government Whitepapers, in UN and other international organisations /foras shall be summed up and analyzed.

2.2 to assess the results, relevance, effectiveness, cost efficiency, possible impact and sustainability of NPIP projetcs and activities. A comparative approach in relation to relevant government donor/NGOprogrammes - Norwegian as well as foreign- shall be attempted;

2.3 to outline possible future administrative models whereby Norway's support to indigenous peoples through various channels, both financial and political, could be better coordinated, strengthened and broadened. The future role of NPIP within this context shall be given particular attention.

3. SCOPE

3.1 Administration

- Assess NPIP's mode of work, administrative and management structures and their possible impact on both the general and the specific content/design of the programme;

- Assess FAFO's role and performance as counterpart and manager of NPIP in relation to the local organizations in the target countries as well as governmental and parastatal institutions responsible for indigenous affairs. What are the recipients experience with FAFO?

- How has FAFO selected partners and why have partners selected FAFO? How has the Programme been made known in the cooperating countries?

- How has FAFO managed and administered public funds within this specific field of development aid?

- Identify factors (external and internal) that have contributed to the Programme's performance level.What consequences have the size of the programme(financially) had on impact and cost effectiveness?

- Assess the role of the Advisory Council - how has it contributed to the development of NPIP.

3.2 The relationship between FAFO and NORAD

- To what extent has the definition of tasks and the degree of decision making autonomy been clearly and consistently communicated from NORAD and to what extent has FAFO adhered to these definitions?

- To what extent has the relationship betwen NORAD and FAFO been conducive to achieving the overall goals of the Programme and to what extent has it created obstacles.

3.3 Impact and relevance of the programme

- to what extent has the Programme achieved its main objective to strengthen the ability of indigenous peoples to shape their own future?

- assess the strategies (strategy for the promotion of rights/basic needs fullfillment- selection of sectors etc.)of NPIP in some selected countries in relation to relevance. What alternative

approaches could have been selected? Has selection of partner organisations / projects has been conducive to this strategy.

- assess the impact, results, effectiveness, cost efficiency and sustainability of some selected projects. A similar assessment shall be made of relevant/comparable projects implemented by other Norwegian and international organisations.

- assess the role of recipient organisations/groups in developing project ideas, planning, designing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating their projects (the "ownership" aspect). To what degree are Norwegian administrative/planning regulations relevant to the recipients' rationality? How has NPIP solved the discrepancies between the approaches?

- NPIP's achievements with regard to creating networks and the potential value of such arrangements shall be assessed.

- NPIP's attention to gender issues and sustainable ecological development shall be given particular attention.

3.4 Scientific/technical backstopping

NPIPs experience with the Norwegian resource base- general and sectorwise- on matters related to indigenous peoples in Latin America shall be assessed both capacity and competency wise. Possible future measures to strengthen this base in partnership with institutions in recipient countries, shall be identified.

NPIPs public relation/information work shall be assessed.

3. 5 Future Norwegian Support to Indigenous Peoples

Assess the role of the programme within the broader framework of Norwegian assistance to indigenous peoples. How could this framework in the future be developed to secure increased synergi between various channels, grants and activities? Between policy development and aid; between aid and trade?

How could the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of the Programme be improved?

How could the involvement of the Norwegian/the recipient countries resource base in partnership be strengthened in the future.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The team shall present conclusions with regard to:

Norway's future relationship to indigenous peoples combining foreign policy considerations, aid and trade etc. Possible models for a future organisational framwork for improved cooperation and coordination shall be considered;

the achievements of NPIP, strengths and weaknesses in administration and programme implementation.Possible future roles, strategies and activities.

the future role of the Norwegian/recipient country - resource base;

5. EVALUATION PLAN

The evaluation shall be implemented during the months of September, October and the first half of November 1997. The team shall consist of four members all familiar with the problems and policies facing indigenous peoples in Latin America. All team members should be familiar with English and either Portuguese or Spanish. At least one team member should be familiar with Portuguese. At least one of the team members shall be female.

The team shall possess relevant theoretical knowledge and practical experience from working with idigenous people in Latin America. Disciplines that are particularly relevant are organisation and administration, socialantropology/ sociology, economy etc.

EVALUATION REPORTS

1.87 The Water Supply Programme in Western Province, Zambia
2.87 Sosio-kulturelle forhold i bistanden
3.87 Summary Findings of 23 Evaluation Reports
4.87 NORAD's Provisions for Investment Support
5.87 Multilateral bistand gjennom FN-systemet
6.87 Promoting Imports from Developing Countries

1.88 UNIFEM - United Nations Development Fund for Women
2.88 The Norwegian Multi-Bilateral Programme under UNFPA
3.88 Rural Roads Maintenance, Mbeya and Tanga Regions, Tanzania
4.88 Import Support, Tanzania
5.88 Nordic Technical Assistance Personnel to Eastern Africa
6.88 Good Aid for Women?
7.88 Soil Science Fellowship Course in Norway

1.89 Parallel Financing and Mixed Credits
2.89 The Women's Grant. Desk Study Review
3.89 The Norwegian Volunteer Service
4.89 Fisheries Research Vessel - "Dr. Fridtjof Nansen"
5.89 Institute of Development Management, Tanzania
6.89 DUHs forskningsprogrammer
7.89 Rural Water Supply, Zimbabwe
8.89 Commodity Import Programme, Zimbabwe
9.89 Dairy Sector Support, Zimbabwe

1.90 Mini-Hydropower Plants, Lesotho
2.90 Operation and Maintenance in Development Assistance
3.90 Telecommunications in SADCC Countries
4.90 Energy support in SADCC Countries
5.90 International Research and Training Institue for Advancement of Women (INSTRAW)
6.90 Socio-cultural Conditions in Development Assistance
7.90 Non-Project Financial Assistance to Mozambique

1.91 Hjelp til selvhjelp og levedyktig utvikling
2.91 Diploma Courses at the Norwegian Institute of Technology
3.91 The Women's Grant in Bilateral Assistance
4.91 Hambantota Integrated Rural Development Programme, Sri Lanka
5.91 The Special Grant for Environment and Development

1.92 NGOs as partners in health care, Zambia
2.92 The Sahel-Sudan-Ethiopia Programme
3.92 De private organisasjonene som kanal for norsk bistand, Fase1

1.93 Internal learning from evaluation and reviews
2.93 Macroeconomic impacts of import support to Tanzania
3.93 Garantiordning for investeringer i og eksport til utviklingsland
4.93 Capacity-Building in Development Cooperation Towards integration and recipient responsibility

1.94 Evaluation of World Food Programme
2.94 Evaluation of the Norwegian Junior Expert Programme with UN Organisations

1.95 Technical Cooperation in Transition
2.95 Evaluering av FN-sambandet i Norge
3.95 NGOs as a channel in development aid
3A.95 Rapport fra presentasjonsmøte av "Evalueringen av de frivillige organisasjoner"
4.95 Rural Development and Local Government in Tanzania
5.95 Integration of Environmental Concerns into Norwegian Bilateral Development Assistance: Policies and Performance
1.96 NORAD's Support of the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP) in Botswana
2.96 Norwegian Development Aid Experiences. A Review of Evaluation Studies 1986-92
3.96 The Norwegian People´s Aid Mine Clearance Project in Cambodia
4.96 Democratic Global Civil Governance Report of the 1995 Benchmark Survey of NGOs
5.96 Evaluation of the Yearbook Human Rights in Developing Countries

1.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Prevent and Control HIV/AIDS
2.97 «Kultursjokk og korrektiv» – Evaluering av UD/NORADs studiereiser for lærere
3.97 Evaluation of decentralisation and development
4.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique
5.97 Aid to Basic Education in Africa – Opportunities and Constraints
6.97 Norwegian Church Aid's Humanitarian and Peace-making Work in Mali
7.97 Aid as a tool for promotion of human rights and democracy: What can Norway do?
8.97 Evaluation of the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala
9.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Worldview International Foundation
10.97 Review of Norwegian Assistance to IPS
11.97 Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan
12.97 Cooperation for Health Development WHO's support to programmes at country level

1.98 «Twinning for Development» Institutional Cooperation between Public Institutions in Norway and the South
2.98 Institutional Cooperation between Sokoine and Norwegian Agricultural Universities
3.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development promoted by Norwegian Private Companies and Consulting Firms
4.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development promoted by Norwegian Non-Governmental Organisations
5.98 Development through Institutions? Institutional Development in Norwegian Bilateral Assistence. Synthesis Report
6.98 Managing good fortune – Macroeconomic management and the role of aid in Botswana
7.98 The World Bank and Poverty in Africa
8.98 Evaluation of the Norwegian Program for Indigenous Peoples

Royal Ministry 7. juni plassen, P.O. Box 8114 DEP, N-0032 OSLO, Norway