A Synthesis of Evaluations of Environmental Development Assistance by Multilateral Organisations

Norad
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
Postal address
P.O. Box 8034 Dep. NO-0030 OSLO
Visiting address
Ruseløkkveien 26, Oslo, Norway
Tel: +47 22 24 20 30
Fax: +47 22 24 20 31
No. of Copies: 200
postmottak@norad.no
www.norad.no

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A Synthesis of Evaluations of Environmental Development Assistance by Multilateral Organisations

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Jens Claussen and Stein Hansen
Nordic Consulting Group AS

“Responsibility for the contents and presentation of findings and recommendations rest with the evaluation team. The views and opinions expressed in the report do not necessarily correspond with those of Norad.”
Preface

The objective of this systematic presentation of experience is not to shed light on Norwegian 'outsourcing' of environmental assistance to multilateral organisations in general. It is to assess whether a set of selected evaluations and expert articles indicate that Norway has obtained greater influence and achieved greater efficiency in its environmental assistance through outsourcing of its funding, both regarding individual organisations and environmental-related assistance in general.

In line with the terms of reference the synthesis study is based on the documentation (a selection of evaluation reports and expert articles) that Nordic Consulting Group AS (NCG) has been asked to review by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad). The study is thus limited to a review of the documentation provided, even though NCG also possesses relevant experience-based knowledge about other multi-lateral development banks, such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Nordic Development Fund. This is because the synthesis study was to be based on conclusions from the studies Norad’s Evaluation Department had chosen for this assignment. On the basis of this and in accordance with the Terms of Reference, NCG has provided recommendations concerning the environmental and development benefits of channelling allocations for environmental purposes through the multilateral organisations selected for the review.

However, new evaluations, reviews and research concerning the efficiency and results of the performance of the multilateral organisations that Norad’s Evaluation Department has included in the mandate for this synthesis study are regularly initiated and completed. In response to such work the institutions initiate immediate organizational and longer term strategic focal changes. This includes their work targeted at the environment. UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank attended the workshop on 11th June and presented comments to the draft report there, and the Evaluation Departments of the latter two sent written supportive comments afterwards. Five of the reviewed institutions that were not present there have submitted written comments by their management to the draft report presented on 11th June 2009, drawing attention to recently completed or ongoing work. IIED, IUCN, UNDP and UN-HABITAT refer to major internal organizational- operational- and/or focal reform initiatives aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness in response to evaluation- and review recommendations. However, the outcomes of such initiatives require time to materialize, plus time to be properly assessed by independent external evaluators.

Information and findings from such recent initiatives regarding the involved institutions is important and will serve as supplements to the synthesis report presented
here as inputs to the ongoing internal Norad assessment of the future scope for outsourcing of environmental aid. However, it has been clear from the outset that this synthesis report should be completed without delay in the spring of 2009 based on the pre-selected evaluation reports and studies.

It is worth noting that a new corresponding study carried out at the request of Sida concerning Swedish development assistance (including environmental allocations), channelled through multilateral organisations confirms to a large extent, the findings in our study of the same organisations. This means that two synthesis studies carried out independently of each other, confirm many of the same observations, even though the study of Swedish environmental assistance has not been the subject of a specific review in our study and was only presented to NCG at the completion of this report.

The majority of the evaluation reports that form the basis for this knowledge overview have had other objectives than to shed light on the results of Norwegian environmental assistance. Norad’s Evaluation Department has therefore not expected the reports to provide such efficiency-specific information that one would like to have had in order to assess the performance and the results of the various multilateral organisations seen from a Norwegian perspective of environmental action. Neither would it be reasonable to expect that reports and expert articles are prepared in line with new professional “quality norms” or standards prepared for other organisations.

NCG AS wishes to thank the client for the trust and for useful comments to the draft report. NCG AS is responsible for the contents of the report as well as the recommendations, which are based on received material and our own knowledge and experience.

Oslo 26 August 2009

Stein Hansen,
NCG Team Leader
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Abbreviations

ADB  The Asian Development Bank
AfDB  The African Development Bank
AFUNET  The African University Network
AH  Agder Høgskole (Agder University College)
ALGAS  Asia Least-cost Greenhouse gas Abatement Strategy
BSP  Bali Strategic Plan of UNEP
CBD  The Convention for Biological Diversity
CC  Council Committee (in FAO)
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism
CITES  Convention on Trade in Endangered Species
CMC  Convention on Conservation of Migratory wild Species
COP  Conference of the Parties
CSD  Commission for Sustainable Development
DAC  Development Advisory Committee
EA  Executing Agency
EBF  FAO’s Extra Budget Fund
FAO  UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FN  United Nations
GEF  Global Environment Facility
GGFRP  Global Gas Flaring Reduction Programme
GHG  Greenhouse Gas
GRID-A  GRID Arendal
GBP  British Pound
GVU  Global Virtual University
IA  Implementing Agency
IBRD  International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA  International Development Agency
IDB  Inter-American Development Bank
IEE  Independent External Evaluation
IFC  International Finance Corporation
IIED  International Institute of Environment and Development
ILO  International Labour Organisation
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPCC  International Panel on Climate change
IPM  Integrated Pest Management
IUCN  The World Union for the Conservation of Nature
JI  Joint Implementation
LF  Logical Framework
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>LRTAP</td>
<td>Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution</td>
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<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
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<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
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<td>MEA</td>
<td>Multilateral Environmental Agreements</td>
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<td>MIGA</td>
<td>Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency</td>
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<td>NDF</td>
<td>Nordic Development Fund</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
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<td>NOMA</td>
<td>Norad’s Programme for Master Studies</td>
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<td>Norad</td>
<td>Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTF-PSI</td>
<td>Norwegian Trust Fund for Private Sector and Infrastructure</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Program Cooperation Agreement (with a UN organisation)</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Project Development Fund</td>
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<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Result Based Management</td>
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<td>RETA</td>
<td>Regional Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>RPB</td>
<td>FAO’s Regular Programme Budget</td>
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<td>SEI</td>
<td>Stockholm Environment Institute</td>
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<td>SGP</td>
<td>Small Grants Programme</td>
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<td>TFESSD</td>
<td>Trust Fund for Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>UD</td>
<td>(Norwegian) Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<td>UNCED</td>
<td>UN’s Conference on Environment and Development 1992</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN’s Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNEG</td>
<td>United Nations Evaluation Group</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Programme</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNFCCC</td>
<td>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</td>
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<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
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<td>UNION</td>
<td>United Nations Office at Nairobi</td>
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<td>UNU</td>
<td>United Nations University</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<td>WHC</td>
<td>World Heritage Convention</td>
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<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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Executive Summary
1. Summary: Conclusions and Recommendations

1.1 Using the Environmental Action Plan as a guideline for the assessments

The Norwegian Environmental Action Plan of June 2006 has been singled out as guideline for the assessment of the relevance of the environmental performance of multilateral organisations. Together with the quality standards for evaluation of OECD/DAC and UNEG (relevance, efficiency, effects and sustainability) this provides an important basis for the conclusions in this knowledge overview. At the same time it is important to emphasise that many of the environmental-based activities included in the evaluation reports reviewed in this synthesis study have been formulated and decided on long before the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan was prepared and approved.

What primarily distinguishes the Norwegian environmental action plan is that it comprises more or less everything related to the environment. This is summarised in four thematic investment areas and a large spectrum of activities entitled to support in relation to these, where a number of multilateral development assistance channels may be relevant for ‘outsourcing’.

The Norwegian Environmental Action Plan is so comprehensive that environmental activities that are irrelevant or of low priority may be hard to find. This action plan thus allows that almost everything a multilateral organisation chooses to call an environmental activity and to classify in one of the so-called main investment areas for Norwegian environmental cooperation qualifies for contributions from Norway.

1.2 The effects of ‘outsourcing’ on Norwegian influence and efficiency

In general this review of ‘outsourcing’ Norwegian environmental assistance to the organisations shows that their method of working and reporting does not make it possible to identify Norway’s contributions in the choice of projects/programmes and efficiency in implementation and result attainment of the projects/programmes. Norwegian contributions are often mixed with other contributions and no arrangement has been made to identify the influence of the individual contribution. Even when funds are earmarked for a special purpose a corresponding amount from the organisation’s budget could be ‘released for purposes on which Norway has no influences’.

Result Based Management (RBM) uses controllable indicators and advance formulation of baselines to show the direction of the development if the measure is not implemented. An attempt was made to introduce this to parts of the UN system.
already in the early 1990s, but it is still not an established practice within the UN system. It is only quite recently that a number of UN programmes and organisations (including UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNDP and FAO) have put forward new strategies and action plans in which they state that they will adopt RBM to assess results (development effect and impacts and not just use of resources). It is too early to say whether it will succeed this time. This makes it difficult to identify and measure environmental effects of Norwegian ‘outsourcing’ through the UN system.

The multilateral development banks have a completely different approach to such quantifying of results, since loans and allocations are granted most often on the basis of feasibility studies where result indicators are listed to make it possible to check the results. They deliberately seek to establish baselines against which the results of the final project can be measured. But neither are these concerned with trying to measure the partial allocations from individual contributors, such as Norway.

In the following section an attempt has been made to organise the conclusions and recommendations according to the degree of added value for Norway attained by ‘outsourcing’ to the respective organisations that have been included in the study, and to assess to what extent change in the activity of the organisation is necessary to obtain such added value.

1.3 Increased added value for Norway through increased contributions

It is important to emphasise that there are great variations in how the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan has influenced Norwegian allocations to individual organisations. For the biggest of the organisations reviewed, only parts of the budgets that Norway helps support are used for environmental measures.

The evaluation of the chosen multilateral organisations indicates that it is primarily the World Bank and GEF which have comprehensive documentation of results, also in relation to the Environmental Action Plan, and especially in relation to relevant environmental and development indicators at a global and regional level. At a national level the World Bank results are more variable.

The World Bank has a comparative advantage as a global player with global influence. It is a strong player insisting on dialogue at a high policy level, and is technically strong at country level. Environmental measures financed through the WB have considerable added value for Norway if the cooperation is strategically directed at important areas in the WB1 – after all Norway has little money and ought therefore not to spread the resources on many different areas.

Norway attains considerable added value for the Environmental Action Plan through GEF, linked to the development banks, UNDP’s and UNEP’s global and regional programmes for professional assistance.

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1 These experiences correspond largely with the conclusions in the recent evaluation of ADB in the Swedish review of multilateral organisations, see http://www.sweden.gov.se/dt/d/3365a1211926 “Swedish assessment of multilateral organisations”, March 2009, from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The internal efficiency is deemed to be fairly good and the external efficiency in the field is deemed as good. ADB’s prioritised investment and focus on fighting poverty and sustainable development is assessed as very relevant and good.
For GEF projects there are high transaction costs and long processing times for project preparation, but there are well-documented global results and a considerable and relevant added value for Norway in relation to the Environmental Action Plan compared with e.g. direct support for national projects and programmes through UNDP, UNEP, FAO and UN HABITAT.

1.4 Added value by change in type of allocations and/or the activity of the organisation

‘Outsourcing’ through FAO, UNDP and IIED in the form of general grants (budget support) brings little or no added value for Norway. For UNDP the support has relatively little impact in relation to UNDP’s national environmental goals in developing countries, as only a small part of UNDP’s core budget is used for the environment. GEF projects implemented by UNDP have however been shown to be globally environment-efficient, and in several cases also to bring about national and local effects. Through this an added value is obtained for Norway because of GEF’s role.

FAO plays an important normative role and covers a wide environmentally relevant area (all natural resources-based primary industries and management areas such as forest, water and soil), and can point to many relevant results at country level. However it is characterised by low efficiency, a rigid and cumbersome organisation, where transaction costs are very high, especially in general support.

IIED is an independent think-tank, which has documented impact, results in niche areas where they possess special evaluation competence, and which may form the basis for environmental strategies and policy reforms. General support from Norway is also applied however in areas where IIED does not have any advantage in competence, and this reduces the added value for Norway of such general support.

1.5 Added value by change in type of allocations and considerable change in the activities of the organisations

The historic role of UNEP as the initiator and creator of a large number of multilateral environmental agreements is undisputed, as is its role as a monitor of the global environment and purveyor of information in this field. But today UNEP has many and diverse objectives that cannot easily be rejected as irrelevant, but which are often expressed in terms, which are difficult to measure and check, since there is, a shortage of management by objectives within the organisation. So far UNEP has in practice focussed on investment and use of resources, not on Result Based Management (RBM). Any possible added value with regard to Norway’s Environmental Action Plan is therefore difficult to verify.

A similar conclusion also applies to UN-HABITAT. Several of the measures are environmentally relevant for Norway, but arranged in such a way that makes it difficult to assess results and effects. UN-HABITAT’s projects are characterised by inefficiency both in relation to costs and implementation.

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2 Both UNEP and UN-HABITAT have recently prepared new strategies and action plans in which better result reporting is to be included, but it is too early to conclude whether this will be possible to implement in practice.
The Global Virtual University (GVU) under the UN University is a purely Norwegian local environmentally related distance education initiative. It was established with strong support from key Norwegian politicians. GVU is supply driven without any prioritisation of the courses offered on the recipient side in poor countries. Both tuition and support functions are located in Norway (Agder). GVU would never have been established without full Norwegian financing and depends on Norwegian support for continued operations. Impact measures (number of graduates from developing countries) are available, and performance is generally high. However there is no comparison with corresponding results per Norwegian crown applied through the conventional assistance-financed Master’s scholarship programmes, for which the other higher education institutions compete in Norway. Support for GVU through the development assistance budget has now ceased as a result of the independent evaluation carried out for Norad in 2006.

IUCN has a comparative potential merit in being a unique organisation that brings together nations, professional milieux and interest organisations from all over the world. IUCN can point to several documented results of relevance for Norway’s Environmental Action Plan, including its normative work associated with criteria for red lists and protection of areas. However IUCN has lost much of its credibility as an impartial player through the market-orientation of its activities to finance an organisation that has expanded far beyond its original mandate. Added value for the Environmental Action Plan has therefore been declining as IUCN has gradually become a supplier of professional (consultancy) services rather than an independent institution promoting new environmentally related knowledge of strategic value.

1.6 Continued allocations will bring little added value to Norway

The Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) established after UNCED in 1992 can point to very few documented specific environmental results, and the global environmental added value for Norway is very small and perhaps negative, because other ‘like-minded’ countries and key development countries pay only minimal attention to the results of CSD’s activities.

The global conferences on the environment under the auspices of UN that started in Stockholm in 1972, culminated with UNCED in Rio in 1992, where Norway had a high profile with Prime Minister Brundtland as a key player with the Brundtland Commission’s Report setting the terms for future environmental action. This set out lasting guidelines for global and regional political environmental and development programmes, and speeded up the establishment of environmental ministries and directorates globally. This also took place in developing countries, though without much having materialised in the way of implementation, as these countries have had their budgets systematically starved and have become dependent on development assistance.

UNCED resulted in adopted global environmental conventions for climate and management of biological diversity, the Rio Declaration, the Forest Principles and the Desert Convention. At the same time as these resolutions have changed attitudes and become normative for later development assistance for the environment, the lack of follow-up has not incurred any form of penalty.
The later follow-up conferences, e.g. WSSD in Johannesburg in 2002, have provided little in the form of real binding environmental actions and associated allocations. The implementation plan contained concrete obligations on key environmental areas, but no penalties in the event of the non-fulfilment of the obligations. Even though the feedback and the summaries from the conference participants show that specific results regarding positive environmental policy have been achieved, there appears to be broad international agreement that the role of such conferences has become obsolete. Preparation and implementation cost too much in relation to the achieved environmental results.

1.7 Recommended actions

This review of the evaluations of multilateral organisations’ environmental assistance shows primarily that the greatest benefit/added value for Norway based on the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan of 2006 is to be had from outsourcing such contributions to the WB. The Swedish synthesis study shows the same for the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which works in the same way within its region. The Nordic Development Fund (NDF) is a Nordic managed multilateral development bank, which has recently had its mandate renewed for co-financing climate adaptation measures in poor countries together with the WB, ADB and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). NDF’s suitability as multilateral environment assistance channel for Norway has not been assessed in this synthesis study because the evaluations of NDF’s suitability have been carried out by NCG and not selected by Norad’s Evaluation Unit.

One area that requires increased effort is the development of new global programmes, i.e. global measures that meet global challenges in areas where Norway has a comparative professional advantage, while the World Bank with its high level policy dialogue with developing member countries has a comparative advantage as a global player. Another area is, as indicated by the WB’s own environmental report, to focus efforts at country level in those countries where the environmental benefits have the greatest global effect, but where WB efforts have so far been less than set out in the WB’s strategy. A third area indicated in several evaluations is to stimulate joint commitments with other multilateral and bilateral players at country level – and better cooperation and dialogue with business and environmental organisations.

Norway should continue to support GEF because of GEF’s unique environmental action mandate and because GEF uses the above institutions as well as UNDP and UNEP to execute its projects and programmes aimed at achieving environmental benefits at a global level. Norway may also be able to take the initiative for active participation with expertise in certain professional disciplines. However, Norway should support ongoing restructuring for increased efficiency of GEF’s planning/ follow-up model, which has been prepared as the ideal in such detail that “the requiring the best becomes the enemy of the good”.

For FAO and UNDP, both with high transaction costs, increased environmental cooperation with contributions from bilateral donors earmarked for environmental
measures with active follow-up in areas (countries and professional disciplines) where these UN organisations have shown comparative merit, is recommended. This may influence UNDP’s and FAO’s choice of measures/projects/programmes and have the potential for increased added value for Norway.

For IIED continued block grants would be relevant, but on condition that IIED is directed towards selected areas where they possess specific expertise or earmarked support for these areas.

For UNEP and UN-HABITAT, Norway should focus on and limit its environmental support to areas, where these have demonstrated that they are strong professionally in comparison with other multilateral institutions. As these are physically located together in Nairobi, it seems natural to encourage a synergistic cooperation in areas where they are both engaged. However, both are strongly limited by their administrative dependence on UN’s administrative office, UNON. An initiative should be speeded up to remove this costly inefficiency.

For IUCN general support is recommended concentrating on IUCN’s mandate as an independent professional institution, by reducing the need for financing through assignment-based activity. Despite the fact that IUCN has a global agenda they are tied in that 85% of their financing represents a narrow assistance agenda (ODA financing) instead of the global environmental agenda. The potential for Norway to increase added value through ‘outsourcing’ lies in influencing change in IUCN’s business model in line with recommendations from several evaluations of IUCN, and to apply the correct instruments for financing. This means not development assistance funding limited by ODA-requirements, but also allocations outside the development assistance budget.

Norway should consider ending allocations to CSD. Likewise Norway should reduce its investments in the preparation and implementation of global environmental conferences under the auspices of the UN, and finance participation of only routine preparations. The necessary knowledge and focus on global environmental challenges should now come through regular meetings in the established environmental conventions.
2. Assessments Using the Environmental Action Plan as a Guideline

2.1 The extent of the Environmental Action Plan

In their invitation to tender for the systematisation of experience Norad refer to the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan of June 2006 as regards relevance and prioritised areas of investment where it is desirable to achieve an “added value” by investing in measures with the backing of selected Multilateral Organisations (MOs).

The overriding objective of the Environmental Action Plan is that Norway’s environmental development cooperation should help realise the Millennium Goal and prepare conditions for poor people to improve their living conditions and health, as well as reducing their environmental vulnerability. The Norwegian efforts are based on the recognition that the environment and poor people’s living conditions are closely linked.

The systematisation of experience takes it for granted that Norway, as a political player internationally, will be a driving force in putting environmental problems on the agenda in bilateral and multilateral contexts. The aim is to make joint efforts to solve the environmental challenges of the developing countries and contribute to saving natural values of global importance for the future. It is with this background that Norway has become actively committed by granting funds for various environmental measures through MOs. Through the Environmental Action Plan Norway will:

- promote new political initiatives on the environment in multilateral organisations
- call for routines and procedures to take account of environmental considerations in multilateral organisations
- work to integrate the environment and sustainable development in the recipient countries’ strategies, plans and budgets. National poverty strategies will be a key element in this
- actively follow up the donor cooperation in the environmental field
- strengthen the cooperation between public and civilian players, including voluntary organisations.

In accordance with the Environmental Action Plan Norway will concentrate its assistance to environmental efforts around four thematic areas of investment:

- sustainable management of biological diversity and natural resources
- management of water resources, water and hygiene
- climate change and access to clean energy
- environmental contamination.
The plan emphasises that the main efforts will be directed at the work with biological diversity and sustainable management of natural resources. Endeavours to succeed in these demanding areas may include a broad range of activities within the prioritised areas of investment which the Environmental Action Plan is prepared to support. Within the areas of know-how and capacity-building the following apply:

- support national and regional skills and capacity-building for further development and implementation of agreements on the environment and natural resources:
  - support cooperation between institutions as an important part of capacity-building
  - contribute to the development of legislation and environmental requirements
  - support environmental professional cooperation and capacity-building through research and tuition
  - strengthen national and regional management of the environment and natural resources as part of an overarching cooperation and good governance
  - support cooperation in the south, the so-called South-South network.

and within environmentally integrated assistance and specific environment measures:

- strengthen the developing countries’ own capability to implement strategic environmental assessments and environmental impact analyses
- promote environmental integration by using these tools, especially within infrastructure, agriculture, oil and energy
- help partner countries prepare concrete environmental goals
- Ensure that international agreements on the environment are followed up in partner countries in connection with measures supported by Norway.

To achieve such goals a number of different channels have to be used depending on which are considered to be the most effective in each individual situation. This shall ensure that Norwegian assistance:

- can better ensure that environmental issues are integrated into the dialogue that takes place between the donor organisations and the authorities in a partner country
- improves the prospect of ensuring that national environmental legislation and standards are adhered to in the preparation and implementation of measures supported by Norway
- finances investments that are in accordance with the plans of the partner countries and are coordinated with other donors
  - supports participation of delegates from developing countries in international processes and negotiations on the environment and natural resources.

The Environmental Action Plan emphasises that the UN organisations are important cooperating partners and that Norway will continue the environmental cooperation through the WB and the regional development banks, as well as supporting the normative role of the secretariats of the international environmental conventions. Norway will be a driving force for the integration of environmental considerations into the work of the UN organisations and the international financial organisations. Norway will give priority to International Organisations (IOs) that reinforce their
efforts for the environment, including relevant voluntary organisations. The GEF is an important source of financing directed at global environmental challenges.

The review of the evaluation reports will be made in the light of whether they come within the above provisions in the Environmental Action Plan.

2.2 How to survey the effects of a measure

A selection of evaluation reports and articles on multilateral environmental activities procured by Norad’s Evaluation Department constitutes the basis for this synthesis study. These are assessed on the basis of whether they have a distinct structure. They are to include markers and preconditions that can be recorded before the start in the form of a baseline description. Furthermore these should be projected on the assumption that the measure is not being implemented (i.e. that the baseline is continued). They are then to be measured (supervised/monitored) continuously in the implementation phase and beyond. By comparing the baseline and results of the activities it is possible to identify the activity’s/ allocation’s possible “added value”. Such evaluations should be made appropriately on the basis of the UN’s Evaluation Group’s (UNEG) quality standards and norms for evaluation, see Appendix III for a presentation of these.

It is not to be denied that to arrive at meaningful and measurable result indicators (including quantitative, qualitative and binary ones), on for instance acquisition and efficient use of new technology, or on long-term sustainability, may prove to be very difficult in many situations, but it is not an adequate argument for not trying.

Experience from the multilateral development banks, in particular WB (see the review of received evaluation reports in chapter 12) and the Asian Development Bank (positively assessed in the recent Swedish synthesis study of multilateral organisations) shows that project and programme development indicators that can be measured regularly during the project’s/programme’s life-time, should definitely be used, and be compared with a baseline defined in advance. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) also practices this consistently (see the review of allocated evaluation as well as NCG’s partners’ own experience with GEF in chapter 9).

Over a number of years these development banks and GEF have meticulously developed, tested and improved the individual elements in the project cycle. Careful selection of measurable indicators of a project’s degree of success has been critical in this work, where the decisive factors for the approval by the bank’s board will have been whether the assumed “added value” created by the project will surpass its socio-economic costs. From this it follows that experts in the field must be able to select relevant development indicators (economic, social and environmental) which measure the differences in the development if the project is realised, and if it is not realised.

Ever new indicators are required to be included in the decision-making basis in the banks’ boards (e.g. costs incurred in compensation for forced relocation of people,

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calculation of development effects of value for particularly exposed people in the project area, indicators on the project's impacts on climate and biological diversity, especially if threatened species are affected, changes in harmful emissions to soil, water and air, deforestation, loss of cultural monuments, etc.)

Not everything can be measured in money. Today the banks have directives and guidelines for mitigating measures in these areas, which are strictly enforced in the preparation and implementation of projects. National authorities responsible for investment projects have gradually appropriated and learned to practise these directives and guidelines, as these will be a precondition for funding and loans from these development banks. NCG's partners have considerable experience in the development and use of such directives and guidelines in practical project and programme work with these institutions over the past 30 – 40 years.

Today comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessments are an integrated part of such obligatory project preparations and thus constitute a critical part of the decision-making for the banks' boards. Detailed directives have been prepared on how detailed and comprehensive such environmental impact assessments shall be. Details can be found on the banks' homepages.

Within counterfactual analyses in social sciences it would obviously be impossible to keep all other factors constant, thus isolating the effects of the respective measure. Undoubtedly the reality is that by trying out and demanding continuous follow-up of a number of selected indicators, a much more diversified picture will emerge as to whether the measure has achieved anything close to the desired results, than if only actual costs, procurement, meetings/conferences, number of resolutions (without the value/importance of these having been assessed) and the number of meeting participants were recorded.

The gathering of such information on the various effects of a measure over time requires pre-planning and approval by the recipient who must assume ownership of this method of control so that a decision on a realistic budget for the implementation may be counted on. The lack of such approval and budgeting will often be the factors that destroy the potential to follow up/monitor a measure from start to finish. In this way we can obtain useful knowledge that future measures may benefit from.

2.3 The basis for the synthesis study

This synthesis study is based on a number of evaluations and specialised articles by a selection of multilateral organisations engaged in environmental assistance. These evaluation reports and specialised articles have been selected by Norad’s Evaluation Department.

NCG has chosen to limit their analyses and conclusions to experience from a selection of evaluation reports and specialised articles concerning the multilateral organisations described in the chapters that follow. Efforts have been made not to use the authors’ own experiences and evaluations carried out for and by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Nordic Development Fund (NDF). Both of these
institutions however are very relevant candidates for Norwegian environmental assistance based on the priorities of the Environmental Action Plan.

Just before submitting the draft for the final report on 1 April 2009, the NCG consultants were notified that the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had had a review carried out of a large number of multilateral organisations on the basis of the criteria relevance and efficiency as channels for Swedish development assistance. The report was published in March 2009.

Even though this is outside NCG’s mandate for the synthesis study, NCG have chosen to appraise this recent Swedish review that focuses on the multilateral institutions which the evaluations and specialised articles received cover. In this way it has been possible to check whether there are correlations or contradictions in the conclusions regarding relevance and efficiency in the Swedish and the Norwegian background material. Any contradictions do not necessarily imply that one or the other has been wrong. This is because the Swedish review covers the entire assistance agenda, not just environmentally related assistance, and also because the Swedish source material is not entirely equivalent to what Norad’s Evaluation Unit has amassed for NCG’s study.

Environmentally related Norwegian development assistance (i.e. support coded by the Norwegian Development Cooperation administration with the policy marker environment as the main or partial objective) 2005-2007 distributed to bilateral and multilateral partners is presented in table 1 in Appendix 1-2. Table 2 in Appendix 1-2 shows the multilateral parts of this assistance for the same three years spread over the 42 partners for such assistance. Almost NOK 1.5 billion was allocated for this during this three-year period. The largest recipient by far is the World Bank (IDA and IBRD) with a total of NOK 435 million, followed by UNDP with NOK 250 million, GEF with NOK 111 million, FAO with 100 million, UNEP with NOK 94 million (NOK 131 million if GRID Arendal is included) and UN-HABITAT with NOK 70 million. IUCN with NOK 35 million and ADB with NOK 29 million, also rank high on the list.

This means that the multilateral organisations included in this synthesis study represent around NOK 1.2 billion, or roughly 80% of environmentally related assistance funds allocated in this way.

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4 See http://www.sweden.gov/ae/aeb/a/3365a121926 “Swedish assessment of multilateral organizations”, March 2009, from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
3. UN’s Development Programme (UNDP)

3.1 Background

UNDP is engaged in practically all aspects of development cooperation. Only a limited part of UNDP’s core budget is used on environmental activities. In the main, UNDP’s environmental activities are financed by Global Environment Facility (GEF).

NCG have been presented with two evaluation reports by UNDP as basis for this synthesis study:

(1) “Evaluation of the Role and Contribution of UNDP in Environment and Energy”, report from UNDP’s Evaluation Office, July 2008, and


The environmental and energy activities of UNDP are clearly described in (1) and this also applies to what are the limits of the evaluation (including what is not covered). This limitation is important in order to avoid misunderstandings about the extent of UNDP’s mandate and tasks in these fields. Furthermore it is important to understand how UNDP’s role in these areas is delimit by other UN organisations and programmes, and other multilateral players’ investments within the areas of environment and energy.

UNDP was a pioneer in UN organisations in trying to make use of result-based programme and project management (RBM). It is evident that the purpose of the RBM evaluation (2) has been to survey whether the extent of the introduction of RBM in UNDP in the 1990s has resulted in establishing a lasting RBM-management and administration culture in UNDP, and through this a better development effectiveness in the activities of UNDP’s development programmes (in which environment is one of the focus areas).

During the final phase of the work with this synthesis study (March 2009) the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden published a review (assessment) of UNDP as one of a number of multilateral organisations as part of the development of a strategy for cooperation with such organisations5. The focus is on relevance and efficiency. The review is not thorough and is mainly based on other external evaluations and reviews. It is not meant to compare efficiency between various organisa-

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There is little emphasis on reviewing “The Added Value” of UNDP environmental efforts.

### 3.2 Little emphasis on reviewing “The Added Value” of UNDP’s environmental efforts

The environmental evaluation report (1) shows that there is a lot of overlap and competition between various players in the multilateral “market for development cooperation” for environmental funding, and that the various players try to position themselves vis-à-vis the others in order to attract financing from bilateral donors for such investments. How this happens is that several agencies get involved in the same technical field, but cooperation agreements are not easy to implement because routines, reporting models and work cultures vary greatly between the different multilateral bureaucrats.

The RBM evaluation (2) concludes that there is still a long way to go before RBM and reporting have become an integrated norm. UNDP still measures its performance on the basis of what has been delivered and which inputs are used. This tradition, which has become a persistent UN practice, is that physically quantifiable inputs are measured (e.g., how many acts and regulations have been passed, how many participants have taken part in a meeting, how many cars or machines have been ordered, etc.). Results in the form of outcome/impact, for instance, whether the laws are better enforced, whether what they learned/perceived as the result of the participation has manifested itself in the form of new and improved routines, work methods, new technology, policy reforms, a better environment, reduced poverty, etc. are still not normally reported. This is despite the fact that the intention to record results has been presented regularly in strategies and action plans submitted to donors.

Neither is such result reporting realistic as long as there is no agreed initial practice to formulate a set of quantifiable indicators as to what is the desired objective of the measure. Furthermore, it would have been necessary to define a baseline against which the results of the undertaking should be measured.

A contrafactual way of thinking and analysis has been (and still is) largely absent in the UN system, and various attempts to introduce it during the past 10-15 years have not come to much, according to both the OIOS-IED evaluation of the UN Secretariat in 2008 op.cit. and this UNDP evaluation. The lack of incentives for the employees to make them more willing to take a risk and to try to obtain measurable development results have contributed to sticking to the old “safe” system event though results are lacking. The results will not be measured anyway and will not influence their future careers. Drivers for change are not remunerated by the system. The UNDP management and the UN Secretariat have done little to change this.

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6 This conclusion also applies to most of the other UN programs and organisations, according to the 2008 evaluation of the RBM progress within the UN system, carried out by UN’s central evaluation unit, Inspection and Evaluation Department (IED) in the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in New York. “Review of result-based management (RBM) at the United Nations Secretariat: RBM has been an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making”

7 This is a key conclusion in the evaluation report on RBM from IED-OIOS (2008) “Review of result-based management (RBM) at the United Nations Secretariat: RBM has been an administrative chore of little value to accountability and decision-making”, op.cit.

8 See IED-OIOS (2008), op.cit. as well as evaluations of UNDP, FAO, UNEP, UN-HABITAT and Global Virtual University which have been reviewed in the following chapters and form the basis for this synthesis study.
It is therefore not unexpected that UNDP's environmental evaluation (1) shows that there is still a long way to go before it is possible to identify, and in some form or another, determine the "added value" to which the activity/assistance allocation may have contributed, and to what extent this may be deemed a success.

The Swedish review of multilateral organisations (March 2009, op.cit.) includes UNDP. Like all other evaluations it concludes that UNDP's agenda is very relevant to Sweden’s (and Norway’s) development assistant objectives, including those related to the environment. UNDP's annual “Human Development Report” is indicated as a “flagship” and being complementary to the WB's annual “World Development Report”, and is of great value for all working within the field of development assistance.

The Swedish review considers that the UNDP has sound internal efficiency, but emphasises that there is room for improvement, especially with respect to RBM and the way UNDP communicates and learns from experience. These are conclusions that fall in line with those found in this synthesis study of the relevant evaluations.

ODI (Overseas Development Institute) and DFID evaluated UNDP in 2007 and compared efficiency and results achievement with other multilateral organisations. The conclusion was that UNDP compared very favourably. This result is in relatively sharp contrast to the two recent evaluations (1) and (2) which form the basis for this synthesis study, and this contrast is also emphasised in the Swedish review of UNDP.

3.3 UNDP’s Environmental co-financing with GEF: Is the Tail Wagging the Dog?

Most of UNDP’s environmentally related activities are co-financed with other agencies and the most dominant amongst these is Global Environment Facility (GEF). The result of this is that GEF’s requirements and criteria for project terms and choices have also come to influence much of the formulation of UNDP’s environmental projects. For these projects it is possible to identify to a certain degree (even if it is not possible to quantify) the role of the GEF component, because this is focused on global environmental values.

But it is often the case that there is an interaction between what GEF wants to achieve with its part of the financing, and the local impacts resulting from the original project which have been modified/alked in its formulation/choice of technology to secure GEF financing. This applies in particular where the GEF project contributes to the recipients becoming better equipped/adapted to handle anticipated climate changes or loss of biological diversity. This applies especially to GEF’s Small Grants Programme (SGP). Positive local effects of the GEF funding may however also come about if the GEF measure contributes to reduced dependence on imported energy, reduced local pollution, deforestation or erosion, protects biological diversity, or more sustainable forms of agriculture, fishing or forestry. The UNDP evaluation (1) does not however make any attempt to calculate such local/national added-effects of financial cooperation with GEF.
To put this in perspective, it should be noted that for every dollar provided by GEF, UNDP has secured about USD 2.67 in co-financing (although many of those funds do not pass through UNDP books). This amounts to USD 8.66 billion in co-financing mobilized by UNDP for environmental initiatives during the 1991 – 2009 period. By definition, such co-financing aims to bring about national benefits, while GEF funds pay for global benefits.

The evaluation criteria used in the UNDP’s environmental evaluation are derived from DAC, and the conclusion is that what is being done in the field of environment and energy is relevant. The conclusion in respect of impact is far less encouraging. The evaluation report (1) states here that “UNDP plans and strategies have brought little influence to bear on the choice of programme priorities and activities in the country programmes. In practice it is the access to GEF funds that to a large extent has governed the priorities in the choice of activities made by the UNDP’s country offices.” Furthermore this UNDP evaluation concludes (pages 1-13) that despite fine words, attempts to mainstream environment and environmental measures into other large national sector programmes, directly linked to the Millennium goals (i.e. combating poverty in a wide sense, and better leadership) have been shown to have had very little effect. At the same time UNDP has so far not succeeded in developing realistic goals for progression and relevant results in fulfilling the Millennium Goals.

The UNDP’s environmental evaluation (1) further concludes that the GEF-dominated projects have been largely successfully and efficiently implemented in accordance with global GEF objectives. A vital criterion for GEF financing is that a “baseline” and alternative development course be established for projects that are financed, so that it is possible to estimate the global “added value” of the GEF component. Thus much better documentation of effects, efficiency and environmental “added value” of GEF financed projects is available, than is the case for UNDP projects without GEF as partner.

Norway’s environmental action plan prioritises emphasis on climate-related measures and on the protection of biological diversity, and has chosen GEF as a channel for this. It is thus left to GEF to find cooperating partners who can best contribute to meeting GEF goals. UNDP is one of the key implementation partners for GEF.

The conclusion in (1) is that the imbalance created by this GEF dependency has received far too little attention within UNDP’s management. From an efficiency perspective the evaluation concludes that the capacity for planning and operation of environmental and energy-related activities in UNDP varies considerably between the various parts of UNDP and from one country office to another. The same applies to the ability/capacity to respond in coordination to the priorities presented by the recipient countries. There is considerable scope for improvement of UNDP’s role as an environmental driving force in the UN system.

Recently UNDP has taken several steps to improve efficiency and the effect of its funding in the environmental and energy fields. This has taken place following the criticism of the dominant GEF dependency and the conflicts caused in relation to
the relevance of the UNDP funding set against national environmental goals. UNDP is now attempting to be more pro-active in obtaining finance from a broader range of donors, thus hoping to reduce its dependence on GEF. In order to succeed however it is imperative that environmental considerations are much better integrated within other UNDP sector programmes where environmental conditions are important.

UNDP is in a unique position in individual countries by virtue of its presence through the country offices. True, the evaluation criticises UNDP’s local environmental presence for being in touch only with the most marginalised parts of the administrative machinery in the individual country, i.e. the environmental authorities. This limits the influence of UNDP’s environmental action in the individual country. It is therefore all the more important that UNDP takes local initiatives for cooperation between different UN organisations, whose work within other sectors touches on the environmental field, as well as with other bilateral and multilateral donors (including NGOs) to create a total donor presence (replacing overlapping and competition). This will assist in mainstreaming of inter-sectoral environmental measures. Here there is a considerable potential for improvement.

### 3.4 What has Norway achieved in the Environmental field through UNDP?

On the basis of the UNDP evaluation (1) it is possible to conclude that apart from GEF’s role, nothing explicitly describes and isolates Norad’s role and influence as a bilateral partner and a funder of environmental projects/programmes with the backing of UNDP.

At the same time figures from the Environmental Unit in UD (The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) show that UNDP received altogether NOK 250 million in environmental-related development assistance in the years 2005 – 2007, with NOK 175 Million in 2007 alone, i.e. more than doubling the preceding years’ amount. The allocation in 2007 corresponds to around US$ 30 million, and thus represents around 20% of UNDP’s budget for environment and energy measures, excluding the GEF funding of more than US$ 200 million a year. In 2007 UNDP had become the largest multilateral recipient of Norwegian aid for environmental projects together with the WB. Each of these received around 26% of the total environmental assistance allocation for multilateral organisations.

This is such a large part of UNDP’s basic allocations for environmental and energy (climate) measures that Norway should try actively to influence the use of these funds. This could take place through the UNDP country offices where it is known that funding could have a quantifiable effect on indicators set out in the Norwegian action plan on environmental development assistance. It has to be added here that the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan is so wide-reaching that it may be challenging to find environmental activities that are irrelevant or un-prioritised. This action plan allows for just about anything a multilateral organisation chooses to call environmental measures and to classify it in one of the so-called main funding areas for Norwegian environmental cooperation, thus qualifying it for Norwegian financial support.
The UNDP evaluation (1) states that a certain amount of distancing from the present GEF dependency would be desirable. Greater environmental cooperation with bilateral donors, either directly or through these contributing to UNDP’s basic grants earmarked for national environmental measures, would give such cooperating partners a unique opportunity to influence UNDP’s choice of measures/projects/programmes in this field. This in particular could be the key to appeal to donors and attract such greatly needed funds for environmental measures. Norad’s/The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ potential for influencing UNDP on the environmental front might therefore be quite considerable. Spain for instance has experienced this in its extensive earmarked grant of € 500 million for measures aimed directly at UN’s Millennium Goals, of which US$ 95 million are earmarked for environmental purposes.

The GEF areas of concentration, climate and biological diversity are at the same time key arenas for the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan, and Norway contributes considerably to the financing of GEF. This makes it easier for UNDP to procure financing for GEF measures in the individual countries. It may therefore be claimed that Norway contributes to the GEF dominance in the UNDP’s environmental agenda. The critical UNDP evaluation (1) states that this has resulted in GEF being the one who calls the shots for what UNDP does on the environmental front, and that this results in the reduction of priorities for national environmental and development goals anchored in the agreed Millennium Goals for combating poverty in many poor countries.

This worrying conclusion is natural because the UNDP evaluation (1) does not provide any support for saying that Norwegian GEF contributions are actively concentrated on SGP measures where local Millennium oriented results are emphasised, and more in accordance with UNDP’s original mandate. Against this backdrop and in the light of the strong criticism, at least in part, raised in the UNDP evaluation against the GEF dominance in UNDP’s environmental programmes (that there is more focus on global environmental threats than on national Millennium goals in relation to poverty reduction) it can be said that Norway undermines UNDP’s potential for directing its efforts towards nationally prioritised efforts in order to meet the declared Millennium goals in poor and small developing countries.

Norway distinguishes itself from many other OECD donors in that even on the establishment of the GEF in the early 1990s it resolved that grants to GEF should be additional to conventional development assistance allocations. For many other donors the GEF allocations meant that conventional development assistance could be reduced proportionately.

The report does not however provide any information that shows whether bilateral donors such as Norway counteract this disputed GEF effect through bilateral contributions to UNDP’s basic allocation. These may increase the amount of local environmental measures directed towards achieving national Millennium goals.

There is no information in the RBM evaluation report (2) on bilateral donors’ contributions (including Norway’s) for implementation and further development of RBM as
a management and operating tool in UNDP, and nor is there anything on a possible “added value” of their participation.

An important conclusion in the RBM evaluation (2) of UNDP is that the “added value” of these internal RBM reform measures has been very small. To the degree bilateral donors have contributed to co-financing of RBM reform measures the conclusion has to be that they “have had little value for money”.

3.5 Possibilities and limitations with UNDP as a channel for environmental development assistance

The Norwegian Environmental Action Plan, chapter 4.1. page 15 states that “UNDP will be important in helping partner countries integrate the environmental aspects in national development plans and in implementing concrete development measures”. On the basis of the two reviewed UNDP evaluation reports, it may be concluded that:

1. Norway, as a relatively large direct and indirect contributor to UNDP should seek to influence UNDP’s prioritisation so that any unwanted effects of GEF’s dominance is reduced. The explicit criticism of UNDP’s GEF-dependency and dominance in the choice of environmental measures has given UNDP more impetus to find alternative sources of financing, and thereby Norway’s potential for influence.

2. GEF-projects implemented under the auspices of UNDP have shown themselves to be effective in relation to both stated goals and costs. They are directed at global environmental problems and challenges which are central to the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan. For that reason UNDP might be an important and effective multilateral channel for this type of Norwegian development assistance.

3. At the same time UNDP’s need for more active action directed at national environmental challenges in coordination with the implementation of national strategies for the reduction of poverty paves the way for Norway to influence UNDP’s national environmental efforts. This is because Norway’s allocation to UNDP’s environmental work makes up a large part of UNDP’s basic funds.

4. In trying more actively to coordinate Norway’s UNDP environmental activities (1) with the basic grant and (2) via GEF, there should be potential for synergy or “double environmental benefits” so as to reduce or remove the unfavourable effect of GEF-dominance asserted in the UNDP evaluation.

5. The unsuccessful concentration on result-based reporting and management of environmental activities in UNDP means that there is still a long way to go before one can measure the partial effects/environmentally related “added values” of Norwegian UNDP grants in the environmental field. This is also because a lot of bilateral support is given more or less as budget support.
4. UN’s Environmental Programme (UNEP)

4.1 Background
The most important multilateral result of the Stockholm Conference in 1972 was the resolution to establish UNEP as UN’s Environment Programme. The establishment had a politically symbolic importance because it put the environment on the UN agenda as a separate programme, and because the headquarters became the first UN programme in Africa. At the same time it is worth noting that UNEP was also established as a UN programme within the UN system and not as a specialised and more autonomous UN organisation such as FAO, ILO, UNIDO, etc.

UNEP was established with a very wide mandate. UNEP is to exercise leadership and stimulate cooperation to protect the environment through being an inspirer and informer, and in this way making it easier for the member countries and their people to improve their quality of life and standard of living without reducing such possibilities for future generations. Perhaps this was not very specific and functional, but it was a fine prologue for the Brundtland Commission (in 1987) and UNCED (1992).

The driving force/executor role for the various multilateral environmental agreements to which UNEP has taken the initiative has been crucial. UNEP should be manned by technical expertise to fill the role as professional think-tank, helper and coordinator for these.

4.2 UNEP on the sidelines right from the start
UNEP’s organisational location as a UN program, and not as an autonomous specialised UN organisation has had a negative effect on UNEP’s influence and ability to be heard in various international fora. This has prevented UNEP from becoming the one and only global environmental “anchor institution”. The fundamental idea was to establish UNEP as the key debating and ideas forum for global environmental questions. This was to be similar to WTO’s role within international trade, ILO’s position for questions relating to the labour market and WHO for questions on health. The chosen organisational form however has prevented this from happening, see Maria Ivanova (2007), “Designing the United Nations Environment Programme: A Story of Compromise and Confrontation”, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2007, pp 337-361.
The chosen form of organisation implies that UNEP is subject to a number of time-consuming, expensive and very frustrating procedures even for insignificant decisions, which frustrates and demoralises management and staff.

At the same time the relatively isolated localisation of the headquarters in Nairobi with weak lines of communication to the rest of the UN system and the Washington institutions has made it difficult to coordinate the work of various secretariats for environmental agreements and conventions situated more centrally in Europe and North America and to recruit the desired qualified staff. The latter is made more difficult by the very time-consuming and rigid UN employment procedures and limited career opportunities for the employees. At the same time UNEP has been fobbed off with a very modest core budget from the UN, see Maria Ivanova (2007) op.cit.

These different conditions have been mutually reinforcing in a negative direction for UNEP’s ability to run an efficient operation and have resulted in UNEP having become a “low-status programme” in the UN system, according to the UN efficiency analysis by Steinar Andresen (2007), pages 12-15, see Appendix I-1, the list of references of supplied evaluations and expert articles.

### 4.3 UNEP as initiator of many Multilateral Environmental Agreements

UNEP’s normative role has been as an active player in the development of the international environmental policy agenda, especially through initiatives to get a number of independent multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) established within the three global environmental areas, viz. atmosphere, biological diversity and chemicals. UNEP has also participated in formulating the technical contents of these agreements.

Furthermore UNEP has played a role as negotiator and mediator, and through this contributed to easing the implementation of the agreement negotiations within the mentioned areas, with important exceptions for anything concerning the agreement on climate. In this UNEP played an important role in the preparations of the agenda, but was excluded from the negotiating phase. UNEP’s mandate was considered too narrow in relation to the climate negotiations, which strongly affect energy, trade and financial politics, in addition to, and together with, the environment. Another possible explanation which has been offered for the exclusion of UNEP in the climate field, is that UNEP – and not least the then head of UNEP – had assumed such a central position in the negotiation on the Montreal Protocol concerning ozone, (where UNEP’s holds the secretariat), that a number of member countries simply did not want UNEP’s presence during the climate negotiations, see S. Andresen (2007), op.cit., pages 12-13.

In the course of time so many such MEAs have been established that there has become considerable duplication and overlapping between several of them. The need for more such UNEP-initiated agreements has thus been greatly reduced. Still it has to be concluded that UNEP fulfilled its mandate effectively by establishing such multilateral agreements in a number of areas. This would probably not have come about – at least not with the same speed – if UNEP had not been established.
Within the area of biodiversity the following multilateral environmental agreements have been established:

- Convention on Biodiversity (CBD)
- Ramsar Convention
- Convention for the Protection of Migrating Wild Species (CMS)
- World Heritage Convention (WHC)

In the atmospheric field the following such multilateral agreements are in place:

- Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP)
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
- Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer with the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

In the chemical area the following agreements apply:

- The Basel Convention
- The Stockholm Convention, and
- The Rotterdam Convention.

### 4.4 UNEP failed in its role as MEA coordinator

That UNEP has been effective in having established the many multilateral agreements on the environment does not necessarily imply that UNEP would also be the best suited and an effective coordinator between these agreements. UNEP has headed such coordinating meeting activity between the different environmental agreements secretariats since 1994, and since 1998 provided the various agreement secretariats administrative assistance with for instance personnel and auditing services.

In the area of biodiversity UNEP has the formal administrative responsibility for the CBD secretariat, CITES and CMS, while UNESCO administers WHC. The Ramsar Convention is independent of the UN system with a secretariat located at IUCN. Today there is a joint Website for CBD, CITES, CMS, WHC and the Ramsar Convention. Furthermore there are a number of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) between CBD and the other conventions, as well as a dialogue group between these established in 2004.

As mentioned above, UNEP is excluded from the administration of the Climate Convention in the atmospheric conventions.

The international desire for more coordination between these agreements has resulted in increased efforts on coordination from UNEP such as establishing a separate division with responsibility for:

- coordination of environmental conventions in 1999
- tracking of contradictions in resolutions from the Conferences of the Parties (COP)
- harmonising and more efficient national reporting.
UNEP’s potential for effective agreement coordination must however be viewed in the light of current regulations for these agreements and the cooperation between them. The case is that every environmental agreement is subject to its own jurisdiction and it is the individual COPs which represent the highest decision-making authority. Therefore agreements on joint initiative and cooperation between various environmental agreements are resolved by the different COPs. Thus it is to their own COP that the respective agreement secretariats turn for guidance on how to behave vis-à-vis other multilateral environmental agreements. This is frustrating for UNEP which is pressured by its own council of member countries to provide more coordination between the agreements and harmonisation of what is being reported. At the same time it is the same countries in their respective COPs which work counter to UNEP influence for the respective agreements’ autonomy and judicial independence.

In many ways this frustrating conflict culminated in the Bali Resolution on the Strategic Plan for Technology Support and Capacity Building (BSP) in UNEP’s Council’s 23rd session in February 2005. This ambitious resolution was to enable UNEP to strengthen the above coordination. Furthermore BSP was to enable UNEP to deliver operative technological support and capacity-building environmental activities within and across sectors for developing countries. This would imply a considerable expansion of UNEP’s original work assignments and areas of expertise, from being limited to normative assignment to also becoming a multilateral agency for implementation. With this UNEP was intended to be the managerial agency to coordinate and to, some extent, implement expert assistance under its own auspices and in conjunction with other UN programmes and organisations, as well as with the multilateral development banks.

However such operative work presupposes an effective un-bureaucratic organisation which is able to take quick decisions, implement these efficiently. At the same time it should make sure that a baseline and follow-up system is established, monitoring the real outcome/impact of the measures set up against the non-implementation of the measure. Key figures in other multilateral institutions, like GEF (M.El-Ashry) and UNDP (G. Speth) were very critical to such an expansion of UNEP’s role. They maintained that UNEP’s strength is limited to the normative area and that operative activities be better carried out by organisations that are specialist in the sector, see Maria Ivanova (2007), op.cit.

On the basis of interviews with the various heads of the environmental agreements’ secretariats in 2003 and 2004, S. Andresen (2007) op.cit. concluded that:

There is no doubt that UNEP has played an important role through initiatives to help establish the various multilateral environmental agreements, but beyond the “delivery” itself the agreement secretariats see no advantages in being associated with UNEP or buying UNEP’s services for coordination of the agreements. UNEP might have been a cross-sectoral think-tank, but has not become so.

The MEA secretariats undoubtedly see the need for coordination between the various agreements, but they seek advice on this primarily from their COPs. They do
not seek advice about and help for coordination between the agreements from UNEP.

The agreement secretariats simply have very low expectations as to what UNEP can contribute in the way of coordination because such assistance from UNEP implies both expert and administrative services from UN headquarters (UNON) in Nairobi. The agreement secretariats have very poor experience with UNON’s excessive time-consuming and costly bureaucracy.

UNEP is able to organise work meetings and seminars, but little in the way of substance has come out of this. Reference is made, amongst others, to the Secretariat for the Climate Convention, which is often invited to UNEP events, but often declines, on the grounds that little except talk usually results from such arrangements. The coordinating role of UNEP is, at best, to prevent meeting collisions.

The agreement secretariats will instead themselves manage more and more of the administrative work with the agreements and the coordination between these, as is the case with the secretariat for the biodiversity convention.

The various agreements are simply not ready for coordination by UNEP, even though some of the smaller agreements (e.g. Ramsar and Basel) may see an advantage in being part of this UN family with UNEP as a suitable agreement coordinator. However these also emphasise the negative experiences with UNEP as a very inefficient and cumbersome, over-administered executor with somewhat mediocre expertise.

In the climate secretariat it is even argued that the results achieved would never have come about had it been part of the “UNEP family”.

4.5 Lack of confidence: Where does UNEP have comparative advantages?

Given UNEP’s inability to coordinate multilateral environmental efforts and MEAs and the lack of operative recognition UNEP has with the other UN programmes and organisations, not least with the multilateral financial institutions and with independent experts, the BSP plan appears to be very poorly thought through and illusory. By providing UNEP with the opportunity to build up its expertise and capacity, within its original normative area, this will contribute to further frustration and exasperation within the affected specialist environments.

The Norwegian Environmental Action Plan, chapter 4.1., page 15 states that “…in the multilateral cooperation UNEP and the secretariats for key global conventions in this field…are important partners, especially in the normative work and in relation to documentation and status in the field.”

It thus appears that Norway, through these formulations in the Environmental Action Plan has acknowledged that the ambitions present in 2005 with BSP are not realistic and executable and that UNEP’s area of responsibility should now be focused primarily on the original normative tasks including documentation of status
for some of the agreements and conventions where UNEP has established sound surveillance routines.

It is no doubt correct that UNEP plays an important role when it comes to choice of indicators for surveillance of the global environment, and to the surveillance itself, as well as to the comparison of information gathered in this area and directed at the decision-makers in the individual countries and at regional and global level.

As such, this is in agreement with the conclusions concerning UNEP's strengths and merits identified in the evaluation initiated by Norad on the framework agreement between UNEP and Norway in 2005 (see Norad Evaluation Report 4/2005: Evaluation of the Framework Agreement between the Government of Norway and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)) by Stein Hansen and Mike Fergus, Nordic Consulting Group AS.

Many of the conclusions in this evaluation are concurrent with and complimentary to those found in the evaluation of efficiency within UN's environmental institutions by Steinar Andresen (2007) op.cit., and which have been the subject of a number of analyses and evaluations by UNEP and other UN institutions and programmes with responsibility for the environment.

The Norad evaluation of 2005 which reviewed 24 framework-financed UNEP projects concluded as follows concerning the effectiveness of channelling funds for environmental development assistance through UNEP:

There is a tendency that UNEP establishes very complicated and bureaucratic structures for project implementation. This is both costly and time-consuming.

There is considerable overlap/duplication of the work in UNEP's various divisions, and this results in donors financing the same type of work in several of UNEP's departments concurrently. This comes about e.g. because UNEP has expanded its impact area and areas of activities beyond what was UNEP's original specialist field, and in this connection every individual UNEP division seeks to expand its area of responsibility.

The requirement for the effectiveness of development assistance sets out special monitoring requirements for the Norwegian framework agreement with UNEP because this provides support for projects in various UNEP divisions which all have the objective of integrating environmental considerations into national poverty strategies. Here there is a risk of both internal duplication and parallel operation with what other UN programmes and specialist organisations already do/have done, and with which they have extensive experience of implementing.

Many of the UNEP projects that Norway finances are over-ambitious or have contradictory goals as the projects are being designed so as to fit in with what UNEP thinks will please the donors.
Concerning the relevance of what UNEP is engaged in, the Norad evaluation from 2005 concludes that:

Just about all UNEP projects are described in such a way so as to meet one or more of the detailed objectives outlined in the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan.

UNEP’s project portfolio financed in line with the Norwegian framework agreement appears as an un-coordinated “stew” and not as a result of a coordinated strategy and action plan. This may be partly due to the internal competition for framework agreement funds between the various UNEP divisions.

Today one would probably conclude that the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan of June 2006 does not appear to be a purposeful strategic plan with defined priorities, but rather as a “stew”. In this plan they have tried to allow everything that can be related to environmental challenges as relevant and can be financed by Norwegian development assistance funds.

The assessments of UNEP in the new Swedish review of multilateral organisations are difficult to interpret. There is no disagreement that UNEP’s areas of responsibility and work have high and increasing international relevance and priority – neither from the evaluations that form the basis for this synthesis study.

As far as internal and external efficiency is concerned the Swedish review appears to be much more positive than the base material for this synthesis study would indicate. The positive tone in the Swedish review however is based on the fact that UNEP had reported that necessary and long required extensive efficiency measures were now on their way, and that work was ongoing to introduce RBM as part of a long-term development strategy (the same as is being reported from UN-HABITAT, see the following chapter). The Swedish review states however that it may take a long time before results of these measures come about in the organisation, especially when it comes to surveillance and reporting of results/impacts. Thus the efficiency- conclusions are not necessarily particularly different from what appears in the sources of this synthesis study. Concerning external efficiency the Swedish review emphasises that UNEP must be assessed as a normative, and not as an operative organisations, and that this specialisation should continue.

All in all these reviews show that UNEP as a UN programme has its comparative merit in normative technical areas, while UNEP does not have such merits in operative areas. As long as UNEP depends of UNON’s administrative services, the inefficiency will continue and be especially noticeable in operative areas.

4.6 What have been the effects of the Norwegian support?
Concerning the effects (outcome and impacts) of the UNEP activities financed through the Norwegian framework agreement the Norad evaluation of 2005 concluded that:
It is very difficult, not to say impossible to evaluate the effects and results of UNEP’s activities because the UNEP activities have set out so many and diverse objectives expressed in terms which are difficult to measure and check.

It is even more serious that the entire UNEP “culture” (and the UN culture in general, see the RBM discussion above) is aimed at recording efforts and physical deliveries (outputs) of the type “number of cars acquired”, “number of seminar participants”, “proposed acts and regulations”, “number of new manuals”, etc. The effects of the measures, however are not registered. Have the course participants become more skilled in doing their jobs as a result of the course participation, or has the UNEP input resulted in quantifiable application of acts and regulations?

This is only one more example from the UN milieu that result-based management (RBM) with the help of controllable indicators and advance formulation of baselines has still not become common practice. These should show the direction of development should the UNEP measure not be implemented. This is the outcome despite the fact that an attempt to introduce RBM was made in the early 1990s.

UNEP is a great believer in the lasting environmental effect (sustainability) of informing/creating awareness around focused environmental problems and associated institutional strengthening in the affected countries. UNEP maintains this confidence despite the fact that the authority and the political influence of the relatively young environmental ministries and directorates in the poor recipient countries, are most often weak.

So far UNEP has not adopted project-specific environmental and development indicators and systematic measuring of project effects with the help of such indicators to chart (lack of) improvement in comparison with baselines set out in advance. It is thus not possible to record and assess the environmental and developing impacts of the Norwegian financial contribution through this framework agreement despite the financing being entirely Norwegian.

4.7 How should Norway use UNEP?

The experience from the evaluations in hand is that Norway should focus on and limit its environmental development assistance through UNEP to the normative areas where UNEP has demonstrated that they are technically strong compared with other multilateral institutions which work in the environmental field. In this field the chances are that Norway can attain genuine added value so much the greater because this is a fairly untied technical field where it is not normally easy to get donors to finance normative activities. Such technical fields are primarily:

Monitoring of agreed environmental indicators within the key environmental fields where UNEP has been initiator of multilateral environmental agreements.

Development and operation of global remote sensing for various environmental aspects linked to effective warning systems.
Education create awareness/recognition of environmental threats and the interaction between the environment and other sectors in the community economy amongst opinion-makers, such as journalists and voluntary organisations.

Further training of environmental journalists, customs personnel, judges and public prosecutors to enable these to identify increasing environmental problems more effectively, and act before it is too late. In this respect they may be equipped to use/or possibly review acts and regulations and multilateral environmental agreements to bring about necessary changes in international trade and depositing of harmful effluents and chemicals, in addition to introducing rules for cleaner production methods.

Assistance to small developing countries – especially in Africa – to help these meet and document their agreed environmental agreements in accordance with the various multilateral environmental agreements.

Subsequent to the NCG evaluation of Norway’s cooperation with UNEP carried out in 2005 UNEP has developed a new medium term strategy and work programme where it is stated amongst other things that RBM will be adopted in order to measure results of the activity. Norway has now entered into a new framework agreement with UNEP where the funds are no longer earmarked for projects, but are dispersed more or less as budget support for six prioritised technical areas within this strategy. It remains to be seen if this will improve the surveillance of and reporting on progress within the various technical fields, the effectiveness and the degree of results achievement.
5. UN Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT)

5.1 Background

UN-HABITAT has an extensive, but primarily a normative mandate. This is to promote, support and supervise the implementation of the HABITAT agenda, where the following two goals are critical:

- Satisfactory living conditions for all people, and
- Sustainable development of urban settlements

Strategically UN-HABITAT shall endeavour to:

- Develop and argue for norms for sustainable and harmonious urban development, upgrading of settlement areas, prevention of slum development and combat poverty
- Prepare innovative mechanisms for financing of dwellings, infrastructure and urban services for the poor, and arrange to make these attractive for town planners and investors.

UN-HABITAT has five programme areas, of which two are directly related to the environment, namely:

- The water and sanitation programme
- The slum upgrading programme.

UN-HABITAT is located together with UNEP in Nairobi, and in the same way as UNEP, suffers from this geographically peripheral localisation and from a dependency on the administrative services of an inefficient UNON office9.

5.2 Assessment of UN-HABITAT’s environmental programmes

The previous programme agreement10 between Norway and UN-HABITAT for financing, inter alia, the above-mentioned programmes related to the environment has been reviewed for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD), see Stein-Erik Kruse and Don Okpala (2007), “Review of the Cooperation between UN-HABITAT and the Government of Norway”, Centre for Health and Social Development, Oslo.

The review was carried out so shortly after the start of Norwegian financing within the five programme areas that it is too early to draw absolute evaluation conclusions.

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9 Stein-Erik Kruse and Don Okpala (2007), Review of the Cooperation between UN-HABITAT and the Government of Norway, concludes that: “Both (i.e. UN-HABITAT’s Global Land Tool and Slum Upgrading Facility) have been forced to establish external administrative units to manage sub-contracting services - in order to bypass UN-HABITAT’s/UNON’s slow and inflexible bureaucratic systems - a major impediment to efficiency “, page ii.

10 New programme agreement has been entered into as of spring 2008.
However, the review concludes that the programmes supported by Norway are challenging and relevant to actual needs, and in line with UN-HABITAT’s mandate and areas of concentration. Nonetheless the mandate is so comprehensive that it is difficult to form an opinion whether priorities have been implemented effectively in a way that gives the selected activities the best possible impacts from Norwegian support within UN-HABITAT’s various areas of responsibility.

There are no proper analyses of UN-HABITAT’s cost-effectiveness. In the area of water and sanitation work there is only a statement saying that centralised operations in this programme reduce the cost-effectiveness. For the slum-upgrading programme and one of the other programmes supported by Norway, it has been necessary to establish separate administrative units outside the rigid, time-consuming and very inefficient UN-HABITAT and UNON bureaucracies\textsuperscript{11}. On this basis it is possible to conclude that UN-HABITAT’s programmes are marked by costly inefficiency and inefficient ability to implement.

However absolute conclusions on this can only be arrived at when there are data available to show that Norway might have received better results for the same amount within these programme areas by concentrating on alternative development assistance channels. Such a comparative analysis is so far not available.

UN-HABITAT has supposedly established an internal information management system (IMDIS), which is to cover progress and results (inputs and physical outputs). However it does not appear that UN-HABITAT has made arrangements to control the development of the programmes and various impacts on their target groups (outcomes and impacts) over time, on the basis of effect indicators which can be measured against a baseline and a development path where Norwegian development assistance was not available. Kruse and Okpala (2007) op.cit. have not succeeded in getting access to documentation in this area. In the light of this it is not surprising to find that the organisation has allocated very few resources for supervision, inspection and evaluation of their own activities\textsuperscript{12}.

The review also indicates that there is very little cooperation and synergy-creating activities between the complementary UN-HABITAT programmes. The way UN-HABITAT is organised gives little room for incentives for such cooperation between the various programmes of the organisation.

The review finds that the balance between UN-HABITAT’s normative and operative roles is fuzzy. Like UNEP, UN-HABITAT was established to become the contact point for discussions, exchange of opinions and debates between the authorities within their technical fields. On the basis of collected technical material and political contributions they were to prepare proposals for agreed international guidelines, standards and norms for use in preparing contracts, acts and regulations within their own technical area focussed on urban areas. This normative function has been of use primarily for developing countries.

\textsuperscript{11} Sten-Erik Kruse and Don Okpala (2007), op.cit. pagi ii
\textsuperscript{12} An RBM system is sought introduced and made operative during the strategy plan for 2008-2013 according to the Swedish review of March 2009, op.cit.
When it comes to operative functions, such as technical assistance and project preparation work, international is that these two UN programmes (UNEP and UN-HABITAT) have not shown that they have any comparative merits\(^\text{13}\). Besides, they have far too little focus on efficiency, as a result of them being subject to far too many rigid, time-consuming bureaucratic UN rules and regulations. Operative responsibility should be passed to organisations with the necessary flexibility and independent scope of action to take necessary decisions on implementation without having to undertake long and time-consuming detours for most of their decisions.

The Swedish review of multilateral organisations (March 2009 op.cit.) concludes that the operating areas of UN-HABITAT are relevant from a Swedish development assistance perspective. When it comes to UN-HABITAT’s internal and external efficiency the Swedish review is even more critical than that of Kruse and Okpala (2007, op.cit.). The internal efficiency is considered poor (not good) while the basis for evaluating external efficiency is considered too sparse to draw absolute conclusions, (see p.2 in the Swedish review of UN-HABITAT).

The Swedish review states that UN-HABITAT’s Council has repeatedly called for increased efficiency, and that this requires the introduction and active use of RBM, more focused activities and a better balance between normative and operative activities. So far UN-HABITAT have been tempted to commit themselves to implementation tasks for which they are neither equipped nor organised to handle. This problem is addressed in the new strategic plan for 2008-2013, but this has only just got going, so it is too early to tell what the effect will be.

Thus there is a clear complementarity between the normative and subsequent operative functions related to a technical field or a sector. A well developed and well functioning normative body will be able to clarify and arrange for effective operative implementation in accordance with defined guidelines, norms and standards, thus contributing to cost-effective and timely implementation of projects and programmes.

The Swedish review of March 2009 (op.cit.) reports that the cooperation between UN-HABITAT and other multilateral organisations such as UNDP, UNEP the World Bank and the regional development banks has been strengthened, without describing in which way this has come about.

5.3 **UN-HABITAT: an efficient multilateral channel for Norwegian development assistance?**

It is worth noting that Norway’s overall goal for the framework agreement with UN-HABITAT is to contribute to building a stronger (presumably more efficient) organisation. This must be interpreted as an indication that Norway has not been satisfied with UN-HABITAT as a multilateral development assistance channel – for instance in its ability to reach the stated Millennium goals. There is however a

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political requirement that Norway should continue to channel development assistance through UN programmes such as UN-HABITAT and UNEP. Norway therefore wants to strengthen these UN programmes in the areas mention, and thus trying to make them less inefficient.

On this basis it seems obvious that if Norway is politically tied to grant parts of its multilateral environmental support to UN-HABITAT, this support should primarily focus on normative environmental measures. This may be easily done in close cooperation with the normative work of UNEP, which, as mentioned, is geographically located in the same building complex. As mentioned with regard to UNEP in the previous chapter, access to resources from the donors of such (untied) normative work is often more limited than grants for operative work, where agreements on procurement of services and goods supplies from the donor country, often make it more attractive for donors to support operative activities.

However it is not possible to draw measurable conclusions on UN-HABITAT’s contributions for the environment and development as a direct consequence of the framework agreement with Norway as long as there is no documentation from an operative RBM arrangement for monitoring and follow-up of the development of the individual activities over time, compared with a baseline for how the situation would have been without the Norwegian allocation.

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14 According to The Ministry of Foreign Affairs such cooperation has been entered into, regarding towns and climate under the auspices of a 2008 agreement between Norway and UN-HABITAT, but there is nothing of substance to show the effects of such cooperation.
6. Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD)

6.1 Background


The article brings forth clear definitions of how the UN institutions’ effectiveness should be measured, namely:

What they produce/deliver in the form of rules and programmes, as well as results of implemented arrangements in the form of extent of participation etc.

The consequences of what they deliver in the form of e.g. changes in performance, follow up and enforcement of the acts and regulation that have been introduced, and of the lessons learnt from conferences and congresses.

Finally – and the most difficult to record in a reliable way – the effects of the measures in the form of recorded changes in the chosen environmental and welfare indicators set out in advance in a baseline to be able to identify the “added value” of the measures.

The article further presents its chosen method for data gathering, as well as strengths and weaknesses of the data material used (primarily open interviews with UN staff about their roles, ideas and interests) for analyses of the efficiency of the assessed UN programmes.

CSD was established as a result of UNCED in 1992 and is the only institution that explicitly focuses on sustainable development. Its responsibility is to follow up the implementation of Agenda 21, and propose advice and proposals for future initiatives to achieve sustainable development internationally through a broad range of international partnerships at various levels.

6.2 Worthless results with a vague and non-committal mandate

Experience shows that with its very vague and non-committal mandate, just about anything may be interpreted as a success from the point of view of CSD. Nobody is obliged to deliver national status and development reports, and quality and contents on what is delivered varies to such an extent that it is not comparable.
Besides CSD has no defined national baselines to compare development with (though some countries have prepared such baselines on their own initiative), and there is no supervision as to whether what is being reported nationally actually reflects implementation of national environmental measures. A result is that national reports play a completely marginal role in the CSD meetings, and this in itself is a strong indicator that CSD has failed in its perhaps most important task, namely to follow up Agenda 21 globally.

For the lack of “a hidden threat” CSD has not succeeded in gaining approval for its policy recommendations. Most of the themes raised by CSD are handled much more effectively by other institutions\textsuperscript{15}. Gradually more and more players – including many NGOs from developing countries – have chosen to ignore CSD, and proposals have been made to close it down.

It is difficult to see what Norway gains in environmental policy benefits by using resources on CSD. The danger of losing respect amongst like-minded donors as well as from assistance recipients is probably greater.

\textsuperscript{15} See for instance Steinar Andresen (2007), op.cit. Page 327: “The CSD has not been able to identify many issues on which the international community is likely to move forward. A major problem is that most issues discussed by CSD are dealt with by other institutions with much more political clout”
7. Global UN Conferences

7.1 Background

- Agenda setting
- Participation (number of participants, political significance and the purpose of their participation)
- Thematic extent and
- Institution building.

7.2 Enthusiasm, and then the Fatigue Syndrome
The three conferences, after a comprehensive preparation process, resulted in weak political declarations and so-called “action plans”. But they had highly different results; with UNCED in 1992 being the most “productive” with its Agenda 21, the Rio declaration, the forest principles and the desertification convention, two binding environmental conventions (climate and biological diversity) and the establishment of two new institutions (the Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF)). While these resolutions have been important for changing attitudes and normative for later environmental assistance, the lack of follow-up has not entailed any form of penalties.

Many environmental ministries gained increased attention and status in their home countries as a result of the conference’s agenda. These global conferences resulted in environmental development assistance funding to developing countries which received assistance to make national environmental reports that had both status and recommended actions.

The UNHCE in 1972 resulted in the establishment of the United Nations’ environmental programme (UNEP) as well as two declarations, but one also has to take into account the fact that this conference gave rise to a series of initiatives to establish ministries of environment and environmental directorates throughout the world. These, however, have largely remained up until now, different governments’ “Cinderella”, with marginal influence over overall planning and economic policy. Many civil servants, researchers and NGO employees were involved in the preparatory work for these conferences, and the increase in knowledge and the understanding for the environment’s cross-sectoral role, and linkage to economic policy have,
without doubt, impressed themselves in wide circles, both politically and at the “grass-roots” level. The ownership of these environmental ministries and their supporting functions is most realistically reflected in the countries’ own budgets for these. So far the majority of poor developing countries have demonstrated a very weak ownership through the actual allocations. Instead they have based themselves on grant assistance from industrialised countries, which have made it possible to maintain larger allocations than otherwise to sectors to which they accord a higher priority, than to sustainable environment and natural resources management.

From an analysis of the indicators we can conclude that the significance of such global conferences culminated with UNCED in 1992, where the broad setting of the agenda was decisive in bringing sustainable development from the Brundtland Commission 1987 Report on to the global development agenda with the attendant attention in the media and the political fora. Both the numbers and the political level (over 100 heads of state attended) of the participants was the highest ever.

But after this, the significance of these conferences has fallen greatly, something that the WSSD of 2002 demonstrates. WSSD has had very limited significance and resulted in only two declarations. An action plan was adopted with concrete commitments in areas such as the preservation of bio-diversity, sustainable use of fisheries resources and access to water and sanitation for the world’s poor, without the failure to carry out these ambitious plans having any consequences for those who signed, and without ensuring the implementation of the plan’s goals. Many of the established institutions have demonstrated themselves to be weak and ineffective and partly with considerable overlapping, according to the analysis. Weaknesses have emerged particularly when budgeting for the implementation of the proposed plans and measures. National funding for this has largely not been given priority, and the developing countries, which had great expectations for increased development aid transfers for the implementation of national Agenda 21 plans as a result of the 1992 UNCED, have been disappointed.

For all of the UN institutions analysed, there were ambitions for their establishment, and not surprisingly, Steinar Andersen (2007) op.cit. concludes that one is nowhere near achieving the goals which had been set.
8. **UN’S Global Virtual University (GVU)**

8.1 **Background**

The GVU concept was developed through a cooperation between the United Nations University (UNU), UNEP, Agder University College (AC) and UNEP-GRID Arendal, and launched in 2002 as a 4-year pilot project. GVU is based in the United Nations University (UNU) as a coordinating umbrella organisation for participating centres of higher education which are qualified to award Master’s degrees in environment and sustainable development, based on modern, virtual Internet based remote tuition. GVU’s principal product in the pilot phase was a virtual, Internet-based Master’s degree programme in the operation of activities related to sustainable development. This course has been developed by the GVU partner, Agder College and financed through Norwegian development assistance, allocated in addition to the funds which other Norwegian places of higher learning compete for within the Norwegian Master’s degree grant programme.

The GVU itself is not authorised to award academic degrees. GVU’s role is limited to developing and operationalising the virtual remote tuition techniques which the different centres of education can link up to.

The purpose of this form of education is to reach students independently of where they are located so that they can connect themselves by the Internet to lectures, academic tutors and tutorial work with other students at home, or to a place of learning in another part of the world. A basic prerequisite, of course, is a rapid and reliable Internet system and personal computers for linking, downloading and filing of necessary educational materials. Internet based forms of remote tuition have developed quickly since the 1990s, and are in use in developed countries and in some developing countries, including Commonwealth countries.

The development and pilot testing of the GVU was financed with Norwegian development assistance funds, and it was therefore evaluated from a development-cooperation perspective in 2006 (see Stein Hansen and Erlend Sigvaldsen (2006), “Review of the Global University (GVU)”, Nordic Consulting Group AS, final report to Norad, dated 24 May 2006. The following assessment of the GVU as a suitable multilateral channel for environment assistance is based on this report.

8.2 **The Relevance of the GVU Environmental Course**

Norwegian development assistance focus on education and sustainable development is expressed in such broad and general terms in different reports to the
Storting that it would be difficult to develop a programme for this that was not relevant for Norway as a donor nation.

It has long been evident that developing countries themselves do not give priority to using their own budgets for higher environmental education and the training of professionals who will manage their own environment in a sustainable fashion. Institutions of higher learning in developing countries have virtually no funds whatsoever to set in train such studies. The practice has been to depend on international experts financed from development assistance to first prepare national poverty strategies and environmental strategies where all of the Millennium Development Goals regarding environment and poverty reduction are presented, and thereafter to seek funding for measures to achieve the goals described in line with what the donors are willing to finance.

In fact there has been established an extremely limited ownership (if any at all) of this type of measure for strengthening long-term environmental management. Consequently it is also difficult to recruit the desired number of well-qualified students to such courses from the qualified countries. These will not be the fields where one can secure a safe and successful career path.

Relevance for the recipient is a fundamental principle for Norwegian development assistance. If development assistance funding of the GVU model is to be defended, then its priorities must be in agreement with the priorities of the recipient countries, and not what Norwegian academic institutions wish to offer. Even if one can conclude that the GVU technology and educational methods have been developed, tested and adapted to the GVU programme’s professional content, this does not mean to say that it satisfies the educational needs of students from recipient countries in a professional or cost effective way.

The GVU courses are supply-driven by educational institutions in the North who have attempted to satisfy explicit environmental and development policy declarations from the donor countries, and thereby make it easier to attract development assistance funds for the development and testing of such courses. This has been successful – not least with the help of extensive lobbying from prominent Norwegian and overseas politicians, without having established any significant demand for such competence in countries in the South. Consequently it is difficult to see that the GVU courses have much relevance for the recipients.

### 8.3 Is the GVU model operative?

Independently of the GVU courses’ professional content, one can conclude that this form of “third generation” virtual classroom electronic teaching and electronic learning has been well received as a well-suited educational tool by most of the students who participated in the Agder University College courses in the pilot phase, and amongst teaching staff responsible for implementation.

There is widespread agreement that the experience with online student guidance from Agder University College’s environmental management course has been a success, and that it will be a tool for future remote tuition.
GVU and Agder University College have succeeded in developing and operationalising their virtual classroom concept for students in different countries. Tutors are trained in the use of this technology and the Master’s degree curriculum in Development Management has finally been approved after considerable delays, and the first M.Sc programme was started in 2005 and continued with in 2006. Despite the great cultural and educational differences between African and Norwegian students, the reports from participating students and teaching staff are overwhelmingly positive and the academic performance has been above average.

8.4 Will GVU’s development studies be sustainable?

Agder University College has stated that it will continue to offer the environmental management course (DM) whether or not the GVU will be continued. The development of the course is financed from development assistance funds, and Agder University College claim that they are ready to administer and continue with the course, at least as long as the student numbers were as low as they actually were in the pilot period.

No other country has shown any interest in taking over the running of the GVU, since the whole United Nations University concept is based on the assumption that the host nation for the UNU component will also be responsible for all financing. Thus far it has therefore only been the Norwegian development assistance authorities who have allowed themselves to be persuaded that UNU’s GVU concept can be a satisfactory alternative to the existing Master degrees on offer to students from developing countries. Without Norwegian financing a physical infrastructure the GVU will hardly be viable.

GVU supports the establishment of infrastructure and digital services through active participation in the African University Network (AFUNET), which will be an important instrument in overcoming network problems and challenges in Africa.

8.5 Will GVU be an effective channel for Multilateral Development Assistance?

The review of GVU’s pilot phase by Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) concludes that virtually all of the advantages and good qualities of the GVU concept, and progress forecasts in the implementation plan presented – which provided the basis for the approval of the grant application – turned out to be greatly exaggerated and unrealistic. Reports of major delays, cost over-runs and unsuccessful attempts to bring in highly reputed overseas centres of learning were only part of the conclusion.

The NCG review did not have access to data or documentation which could establish that the GVU had a measurable competitive advantage over established forms of outsourcing of academic courses. Such competitive advantages would presumably have included:

- Better access to academic environments all over the world
- Easy and cheap distribution throughout the world
- Easier to involve institutions in developing countries
- Easier to upgrade courses continuously
- Flexibility to adapt to local conditions
• Stimulating academic cooperation
• Lower annual costs per student compared with Norad’s reformed Master’s degree grant programme (NOMA).

On the contrary the NCG review found that GVU fell down on the points set out above, in relation to what established academic milieux had achieved. Even if we write off the amounts invested in GVU in the pilot phase, the annual operating costs per student are still high, which is partly due to the fact that one has not succeeded in exploiting the economies of scale (that is one has not been able to attract nearly as many students as they had based their preliminary calculations on).

African places of higher learning are not financially in a position to offer their teachers and students reliable and rapid broadband connections and computers which they can use to link up to the virtual classroom. It would be in conflict with Norwegian development assistance distribution policy to favour only a few selected students with possibilities for electronic learning in supply driven programmes.

It is too early to draw conclusions on GVU’s development impacts, on the basis of the NCG’s review. Even if an entirely completed GVU course had been available for review, there is little to indicate that GVU would have presented so-called “with and without” data for indicators of the success of implementation which would have been relevant to assess the environmental and development impacts of the GVU course as a multilateral channel for environmental development assistance. There is nowhere in the material available to NCG in its review which describes a counterfactual development path for this area of education, that is a forecast for how things would have developed in this field if one had only used existing education and training channels for providing masters’ degrees to students from developing countries.

In this connection it is worth mentioning that without GVU, Agder University College would continue to offer its environmental management courses to Masters’ students from developing countries. These would then be able to compete for NOMA grant funds in line with other developing country students applying to the Norwegian grants programme.

As a result of the NCG review, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to terminate assistance to GVU.
9. The Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN (FAO)

9.1 Background

Norway has cooperated with FAO for almost 40 years and has had framework agreement with them since 1970. In 2003 a new framework agreement was signed which covered all extra-budgetary contributions to FAO from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It manages all Norwegian support to FAO, whether it is to FAO’s regular programme, or activities financed only by Norway, or activities supported by several donors at a time.

Under this framework agreement Norway and FAO have agreed to a broad programme of cooperation, Programme Cooperation Agreement (PCA) which covers the period 2003-2004 with allocations to FAO’s five professional departments.

In 2005 Norway and FAO agreed on a strategic partnership to contribute to reforms within FAO and to improve the impacts and results within FAO’s central professional areas of activity, by improving the integration of FAO’s regular programme-budget-resources (RPB) and FAO’s Extra Budgetary Funds (EBF).

Under the PCA between Norway and FAO for 2005-2007 NOK 110 million was granted and was used in 2006-2007, but a number of the activities were extended into 2008.

Towards the end of 2007 there was an agreement to undertake an independent evaluation of the PCA cooperation as basis for a continuation of the co-operation. Environment recurs as a cross-sectoral theme for the work of the individual professional departments.

The very first independent, external evaluation of FAO’s work started in 2006 after FAO had already existed for 60 years! This was very comprehensive and covered the whole 60 year perspective, but with its emphasis after 1990. The evaluation was based on the UN system’s norms and standards for evaluation and on the OECD-DAC evaluation principles. FAO’s relevance, effectiveness and results achievement were compared with the corresponding factors for other central UN organisations (that is WHO, UNESCO, ILO and UNIDO) together with the OECD and the IMF. However the focus was first and foremost directed to the future, as there was a critical assessment of what ought to be FAO’s:

(1) Future relationship to the rest of the multilateral system
(2) Comparative advantage for different normative and professional areas of concentration
(3) Management and operating models for the future challenges within FAO’s professional areas

(4) Role in relation to global management system and in relation to food security, sustainable management of natural resources such as land, forest, water and fisheries.

As the basis for this review of FAO, there were thus two major evaluations:


9.2 A minimum of Result-Based Management (RBM) and operations in practice in FAO

The PCA between Norway and FAO for 2005-2007 defined goals, results, impacts and indicators in order to follow development in these over time for the different activities that the Norwegian funds were to finance. This was designed within a clearly defined RBM system and within a Logical Framework (LF) which is standard for Norwegian development assistance measures.

However the LF in the PCA was designed in a most unsatisfactory way:
• Activities, inputs, results and expected impacts were in many cases, misleadingly formulated
• The linkages between them were often unclear and vague
• Concrete goals were not presented
• The indicators were largely not measurable.

The PCA Evaluation (2008) op.cit. characterised this as a generic FAO problem because FAO puts in very little effort to working out an LF, and on formulating relevant, reliable and measurable result and impact indicators for use in its programmes, whether these are financed by the framework agreement with Norway or in another way. This fundamental FAO weakness strikes not only at measures financed by Norway, but also the FAO projects, and the whole FAO corporate system in general.

One result of this is that FAO staff responsible for projects have assumed that funds for their activities provided under the PCA can be regarded as supplementary to their respective programmes. They have therefore assumed that FAO’s (extremely deficient) regular programme requirements for monitoring and extremely vague and general documentation of relevance, effectiveness, results achievement, results and impacts will constitute adequate documentation.
This and the sometimes extremely unclear linkages between activities, results, areas of programme responsibility and strategic goals are also some of the critical points which the other independent evaluation of FAO (CC-IEE (2007)) notes.

The result of mainstreaming activities financed by the Norwegian PCA into FAO’s regular programme structure is to expose the Norwegian-financed activities to the fundamental weaknesses which have always characterised FAO’s regular programmes, that is unclear definitions of the different levels in the LF and the linkages between these. This has resulted in a set of activities which are difficult to follow and which are dispersed over a series of components, and these weaknesses have, according to the PCA evaluation (2008) influenced, in an unfortunate manner, results attainment, effects, effectiveness and the impacts of the Norwegian PCA.

The activities and the outputs have contributed to results achievement to a certain extent, but by no means as much as had been forecast when the projects were put forward for Norwegian PCA financing. The quality of the reports from the Norwegian PCA financed activities is unsatisfactory as they simply list inputs and outputs (not results and impacts).

Despite requests from Norway to focus on the spectrum of FAO results and impacts of the Norwegian PCA supported projects and programmes, those FAO staff responsible for projects have not attempted to present the activities and the outputs in such a way that one can link these to results and impacts. Thus one cannot judge the projects’ degree of success, measured in terms of the scheduled evaluation criteria and UN norms.

None of the PCA financed projects (project code FNOP) have been able to be linked to any of the FAO’s strategic goals. Thus they do not fit into the existing (but not utilised) RBM structure of FAO.

CC-IEE (2007) concludes in its historical evaluation that FAO has ended up in a financial and resource crisis which threatens FAO’s ability to deliver what it was established to deliver as regards the different primary sectors dependent on natural resources. Both financial allocations and staff have been greatly reduced since 1995.

In this critical situation FAO lacks consensus on a broad strategy which will show how FAO plans to tackle the crisis, meet the challenges and exploit the possibilities. They do not distinguish between what should have high priority and what should not. Thus FAO has to be in a position to decide which programmes they are going to keep, and which ones they will discontinue, and against such a background, draw up its financial and personnel requirements and describe how these can be met. Thus far FAO’s efforts have been fragmentary, focussing on individual components, rather than a coordinated and integrated strategy. This has undermined donor confidence in FAO and thereby the donors’ willingness to finance FAO to the same extent as before.
9.3 *A world threatened by climate change needs an FAO*

CC-IEE (2007) clearly concludes that a world confronted by climate change which is expected to influence primary industry particularly hard, needs much of the type of competence and advisory services FAO was established to provide. FAO was established first and foremost as the global institution for the management and distribution of knowledge on how primary industry can best exploit its resource base in a sustainable manner. No other organisation has so much expertise within these areas as FAO. At the same time this comprehensive evaluation concludes that FAO must now concentrate its efforts on sectors and areas where they have a comparative advantage, and rebuild as quickly as possible confidence amongst the donors that FAO as a centre of excellence can actually deliver what is expected of them in such a situation. An example of FAO’s important normative role is the negotiation of an internationally binding agreement on the management of genetic plant resources for food and agriculture.

This means that FAO must respond effectively and convincingly to the observed global and regional development trends related to primary industry, and show that it is capable of handling strategic challenges related to global food production, living standards, incomes and access to food together, and in a uniform and competitive manner. In this connection investments in sustainable production technologies in these industries occupy a central position. Such funding and training in their correct use can only be further developed quickly enough if one ensures that it is politically possible to establish conditions, institutions, legislation and infrastructure which is adjusted so that producers take the chance to invest in the necessary production facilities and related training in their use. FAO ought to be able to play a central role in ensuring that these critical enabling factors are put into place in the member countries in a balanced way.

One of FAO’s main areas of responsibility is to administer knowledge within its professional sectors, and to ensure the communication of this knowledge to its users, and in particular to users in poor countries. Here the challenge is first to balance between providing knowledge and thereafter to share it with potential users in an effective manner. The challenges of communication include copyright for poor countries and communicating knowledge in languages that recipients in poor countries can understand.

Communication of such knowledge with modern communication technology is effected today much more quickly and at greatly reduced costs compared with just a few years ago, and FAO is going to have to work hard at keeping apace with things in this field of communications technology.

A third dimension within the administration of knowledge and communication is collection, preparation, analysis and communication of basic statistics and data on FAO’s areas of responsibility, with incidental information systems for easy access and publishing analyses and statistics. This is also one of FAO’s primary functions because such data is of decisive significance in the design of policies for primary industry and strategies in the poorest member countries where just these vital natural resources are threatened by over-use and over-exploitation. Such knowledge
on food production, food security and vulnerability to, for example, climate change, will make it easier to work out precautionary strategies in these areas.

The complete knowledge base in FAO is available when developing countries want to borrow for primary industry projects from the development banks. FAO has established a cooperation on technical assistance for borrowers with these lending institutions through its investment centre.

9.4 Why is FAO an ineffective channel for multilateral development assistance?

Today’s FAO is judged by the two evaluation reports as rigid, ineffective and cumbersome with a very numerous and costly bureaucracy, compared with a selection of other multilateral organisations (see above) and this has resulted in an FAO with:

- Exaggeratedly large processes for transaction control
- Large degree of overlapping and duplication
- Limited degree of delegation of authority and responsibility internally
- Weakly developed horizontal lines of communication
- A high degree of centralisation (“All roads lead to Rome”)
- Highly fragmented relations between the head office and the field offices.

This unwieldy bureaucracy is characterised by a rigid, risk averse and highly centralised organisation structure not unlike what one finds in many of the poor recipient countries that FAO was established to assist. The ability to satisfy the member countries’ need for advice and support is thus greatly reduced. In other words FAO is characterised by a low level of development effectiveness in its knowledge inputs.

To change this, the future FAO must be a much more flexible and adaptable operative organisation than it has been so far. According to the very comprehensive and thorough-going CC-IEE (2007) evaluation (page 3) FAO has to have a much greater ability than it has shown so far, to adapt its inputs to varying framework conditions in different countries and regions, and at the same time be in a position to identify what really should be given priority. FAO must not allow itself to be swept away by whatever happens to be in fashion at any given time\(^\text{16}\). In addition FAO must be prepared to take risks, and FAO’s donors must be prepared that FAO will do so. In order for FAO to do this, there is a need for substantial organisational and working readjustments, and a reformed management culture in the Secretariat and in FAO’s Board.

The Swedish Foreign Ministry review of multilateral organisations published in March 2009 (op.cit.) bases its conclusions on FAO’s internal and external effectiveness precisely on the CC-IEE evaluation of 2007, and thus draws the same negative conclusions which are set out here.

Despite resolutions on administrative improvements, the established FAO culture is extremely resistant to change, and the administrative costs in terms of percentages of programme costs have simply continued to rise. In fact they exceed the program

\(^{16}\) CC-IEE (2007), p.3: The Organization (i.e. FAO)...has been slow to adapt, slow to distinguish areas of genuine priority from those which are the latest fad.
costs themselves in many country offices. One often finds that the travel budgets are inadequate for the experts who have been sent out to do what they have been put there to do.

The negative effects of these conditions on FAO’s professional work and on FAO’s reputation are considerable. FAO professionals find that they have to use a disproportionate amount of their available working time on struggling with bureaucratic and administrative hurdles, amongst other things, engaging consultants with the suitable expertise on conditions that are mutually acceptable. In some countries where FAO works a sizeable amount of FAO staff time is used on the management of contracts and payment of invoices. Not surprisingly FAO has difficulties in retaining the services of good professionals who become fed up with the rigidity and all the hurdles which make it difficult to do the work in the way it is supposed to be done. At the same time those that are no good remain in their positions and impede renewal in accordance with the changing needs for expertise. On the top of all this, the recruiting procedures are extremely time-consuming and linked to geographical distribution quotas, which also make it difficult to employ the expertise one would have wished to.

FAO’s management has to bear much of the responsibility for this failure by having neglected to secure an overall strategy with realistic priorities for FAO, together with neglecting to adapt allocated funds to the declared goals and challenges, nor requiring the Secretariat to deliver the results promised. This arises from the fact that the management organisation and the leadership have not been able to identify who is responsible for what. A considerable degree of mutual distrust and lack of understanding reigns between the member countries themselves, and between some of the member countries and the Secretariat, and this also has a negative influence on FAO’s corporate management.

Because of strongly conflicting interests within FAO’s membership, it is not particularly easy to attain agreement on a strategy to revive the confidence in FAO that is necessary for FAO to be granted increased funds, and so to grow again to “former heights”. Whilst a group of member countries first want financial allocation, and then the implementation of administrative and operational changes, another group requires to see fundamental internal reforms being put in place, reforms which take seriously the diagnoses set out in the evaluations, before they are willing to allocate any more money. It is from the latter group that FAO’s financing comes, and FAO’s position is under critical threat if there is no success in creating a coordinated strategy for reform.

9.5 Sectors and areas where FAO ought to be good

CC-IEE (2007) concludes that FAO’s most important contribution as a development institution is in these areas where FAO’s normative strength can be linked to the recipient countries’ need for expertise and capacity building and policy advice. Furthermore it concludes that FAO has greater comparative advantage within fisheries and forestry than in agricultural harvesting. In addition FAO has distinguished itself as a leader within the control of epidemic diseases in animals, and should play an more central role than it has done in the past in the struggle against
poverty through its involvement within animal husbandry, animal health and control of environmental problems caused by animal husbandry in fragile natural areas.

Sustainable land management and properties are becoming increasingly important as competition increases for increasingly scarce areas of arable land, with a subsequent pressure to plough up unploughed land and eco-systems containing threatened species. FAO has been a leader in the work in developing unified international classification standards for use in agro-ecological classification of land, and the methods on how to collect, analyse and present such data have been a typical FAO niche. This work is becoming more and more important in an international perspective.

Agriculture is totally dependent on access to water, and FAO has had a central role as regards databases for advisory services on the management of water supplies and irrigation for authorities in developing countries. Today this role has been weakened because FAO’s expertise is dissipated across many different fields that are poorly coordinated. If FAO wants to win back a strong position in this strategically significant area, then it must undertake drastic organisational changes so that the different technical groups within water and irrigation work together and in a coordinated fashion within a clearly formulated sector strategy. Much of the relevant expertise is in place, but the synergies can first be realised when the overall organisational measures are carried out.

FAO is the only global organisation with responsibility for global fisheries data and the only one that is structured to work with fishery sector interests and the follow-up of global environmental conventions relating to fisheries, including monitoring of the oceans’ global biology. FAO is also alone in being able to conduct the global dialogue between different players in the network, and has developed an internationally accepted Code of Conduct for sustainable management of fisheries resources.

At the same time CC-IEE (2007) concludes that today FAO lacks an overall strategy and action programme for its involvement in fisheries and marine management. FAO is still narrowly focussed on fisheries in the traditional sense (a dialogue at country level is only with Fisheries Ministries) without seeing the cross-sectoral issues and the need for the interplay between the economy and the environment and the potential for fisheries as animal husbandry for farmers. FAO is going to have to re-align itself to such an approach if it is going to win back its central position as a global fisheries management institution.

Within forest management FAO has developed a global partnership which supports the development of national and global information, policy advice and advice on good governance. FAO is the only global institution which looks at both the forest and the trees outside the forest in a holistic way (that is to say that they treat the environment, the economy and social perspectives within the same framework), and manage both small projects and global strategies. CC-IEE (2007) concluded that FAO’s forest management strategy is both sensible and well formulated.
FAO was amongst the first international organisations to put the role of women and the strengthening of women’s rights on its agenda. FAO’s management promotes the strengthening of women’s rights and an active treatment of gender roles in different programmes and programme contexts. This, however, has not emerged on the operational country level, except as a few small pilot projects. These have not made a breakthrough on the political agenda of the recipient countries. FAO lacks a strategy as a basis for interventions in this important area, and no funds are allocated to integrate a conscious strengthening of women’s rights and roles within the different programme areas and sectoral activities.

Sustainable natural resources management is another priority area for FAO. In the implementation of the Convention for Biological Diversity (CBD) this, together with access to and distribution of economic benefits through exploiting biological diversity, has increased attention on FAO, through, amongst other things, resource management in national park areas, and the relationship with agriculture in such fringe areas. FAO’s primary role is however to take into account the rural population’s short and long term, food security and nutritional interests. Thus FAO’s focus is put upon sustainable exploitation of these natural resources, and not on the traditional preservation and protection of the agricultural use of areas worthy of conservation.

As described in the section above regarding FAO and the global climate threat, it will be natural to ensure that FAO will play an increasingly central role as the global coordinator of strategies and measures for the adaptation of primary industry to changing climate conditions. Here FAO’s role should be a normative one while it also exploits its role as an interpreter of knowledge and data on the global arena in development globally, regionally and nationally within the primary natural resources of land, water, forest and biological diversity. Thus FAO can influence the setting of the agenda in the work with the global environmental conventions. FAO must use its unique global database in close cooperation with UNEP and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to ensure ongoing monitoring of these vital resources, and to operate systems for and management of early warning of potentially irreversible environmental threats.

The evaluations referred to find several examples of successful and effectively implemented FAO projects in individual countries or regions where FAO experts have done an excellent job, and have succeeded in transferring new and more sustainable routines and technologies to local farmers, fishermen and foresters. They have succeeded in doing so, not because of FAO’s central management and system of governance, but in spite of it.

An example of such intellectual pioneering work which represent “best practice” development assistance within the environmental field, and where FAO’s inputs have had lasting positive environmental and development impacts is: FAO’s Integrated Pest Management (IPM) programmes for rice cultivation and vegetables in South East Asia and the Mekong Region. This programme was evaluated by an independent group of experts in 2005; for details see the mid-term evaluation report: “Phase II of The Inter-Country Programme for the Development and Applica-
tion of Integrated Pest Management in Vegetable Growing in South and South-East Asia, published by FAO’s evaluation department in November 2005. In the area of IPM knowledge has been gradually extended and FAO’s role should, to an increasing degree, focus on development and testing of methods, regulation and control mechanisms for the further extension and lasting conversion to the use of IPM.

Other such “good practice” examples referred to in CC-IEE (2007) have to do with FAO’s efforts to develop sustainable fisheries, preservation and sustainable management of genetic plant resources, development of local field schools for small farmers (which were used in the IPM programme) and stimulating small farmers to become local decision-makers.

9.6 Can FAO be an effective environmental assistance channel for Norway?

There is little doubt that general budget support to a ponderous and over administered FAO centrally will be ineffective Norwegian assistance if the goal is to secure effective environmentally focused measures with FAO as a multilateral channel. This will be the case as long as FAO does not implement the reforms that the evaluations have recommended, and does not bind itself to a time schedule and a set of controls that ensure that the implementation of the inner reforms will actually take place.

From an environmental perspective it will be important, with climate threats against vulnerable, poor countries, to strengthen FAO in the normative and operational areas mentioned above where there are no other actors with global agendas. The challenge for Norway will be to get acceptance for the necessary FAO reforms so that results, capable of documentation, to the advantage of poor recipient groups can be realized. On the basis of years of increasing ineffectiveness it will be necessary to set clear performance requirements for FAO as a condition for larger allocations for such measures. Clear demands must be made for monitoring and actions to ensure that the global environmental conventions are observed.

CC-IEE (2007) compared FAO’s effectiveness with other multilateral development assistance organisation’s delivery of technical assistance at a country and regional basis and concluded that there was no basis for saying that the others were generally more effective suppliers of such development assistance services than FAO. At the same time CC-IEEC (2007) pointed out that FAO has considerable potential for improvement in this area because FAO’s programme is not adequately focussed. With the limited resources at its command, FAO ought to concentrate its efforts on fewer activities.

If this is successful then Norway ought be able to use FAO’s expertise and competence in many country and regional offices for the effective implementation of important country and regional programmes and projects of the type mentioned above, for example, the IPM programme which will be relevant and impact oriented in relation to the Millennium Goals and Norwegian development assistance policies concerning environmental action plan of 2006.
The Norwegian financed PCA framework agreement includes 11 components which can be said to affect almost all of the goals set out in the Norwegian environmental action plan of 2006. The large and wide-ranging priority areas and the sometimes general phrasing of the texts have given rise to very different interpretations of what are suitable priority areas. Almost anything can be said to be relevant within such an agreement.

The PCA evaluation found it difficult to produce documented results and impacts of the use of funds under the PCA agreement through FAO’s multilateral fund (Fish-Code and National Forest Programme Facility). The evaluation recommends that such funds should not be supported under the framework agreement, but that they are financed through direct support where the demands for the reporting of results is clearly spelled out and agreed beforehand.

Norwegian development assistance has combating poverty as its primary goal and the PCA evaluation found that this was not very well specified in the cooperation with FAO. This is due to the relatively general texts in the agreement, which open up for a broad spectrum of activities suitable for support which, in some way or other, can be linked to poverty. For several activities it was claimed that only by supporting activities which contribute to sustainable management of natural resources can one assist in reducing global poverty in the long term.

Because the component supported by the PCA funding is described in very general terms, it has been difficult to limit the geographical extension to the poorest countries, as Norway would have preferred. Instead the funding has been distributed between 70 member countries so that the poverty profile is rather unclear. It should not have been difficult to agree on clear criteria for the choice of country that the Norwegian funding was to be used on.

In two areas the PCA evaluation has revealed positive impacts of Norwegian funding through the cooperation agreement. These are cross-sectoral and interdepartmental cooperation within FAO, as well as stimulating FAO to participate more actively in partnerships with other players of different types. The Norwegian funding has actively promoted and made it possible to “oil the cogs” for such forms of cooperation which have created better and more effective internal cooperative relations. By establishing partnership with other external players one has also contributed to mobilizing extra funding for FAO activities which would otherwise not have been forthcoming. This has been important because such cooperation resulting in synergies has been rendered difficult, partly because of a lack of resources, and partly because of a lack of a culture of cooperation within FAO internally. In this way professional staff have shut themselves into their own little boxes and potential synergistic impacts have not emerged. The Norwegian framework agreement has been used to lower the barriers between disciplines and departments within FAO for a series of activities within the agreement’s 11 components, for example in Burkina Faso and Nepal.

The agreement has contributed to FAO’s capacity and knowledge building work on FAO’s sectors at the country level, through the financing of training, and the
preparation of guidelines and manuals for local staff members and consultants, but the quality has been highly variable.

The impacts of the use of agreement funds in creating respect for and integrating the gender perspective into the individual FAO activities have been disappointing, and it will be a long time before one can say that gender consciousness has been successfully developed within FAO. Use of Norwegian framework funds has contributed to increased awareness within FAO, but it will be a long time before there exists a conscious and active ownership in treating the gender dimension as an integrated part of FAO’s work.

The PCA Evaluation made the same observations regarding the treatment of the HIV/AIDS challenges in the different programmes in the member countries. In both of these areas there is a need for considerably more effort, and an internal change in attitudes, because working with such themes is viewed as being “second class work” within FAO. Due to the lack of funds in FAO’s budgets, extraordinary funds will be required if these important development activities are to be taken seriously. Then the Norwegian allocation under the agreement could represent an important contribution, but the environmental impact of this is somewhat indirect.

All in all the PCA evaluation concludes that the Norwegian framework agreement has contributed significantly in supporting FAO’s regular programme, and by doing so in a relatively flexible manner has contributed to stimulating cooperation across sectors and administrative departments in this otherwise very rigid organisation.

The PCA agreement has also made it possible for FAO to respond much more quickly than normally to requests from member countries for speedy measures, and to focus more on themes which are particularly important for poor countries. By making possible a rapid reaction to acute challenges the FAO staff is stimulated to take action faster than normal and so increase their effectiveness and inventiveness in tackling challenges.

If FAO is going to be used as a channel for Norwegian development assistance then Norway can use the Framework Agreement to advantage, and select individual activities from components in the PCA agreement that fit best with the strategy in the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan. Then one can make an agreement that these be financed separately within the agreement and on condition that an RBM control system is put in pace, with uniform indicators which FAO undertakes to follow up.
10. The Global Environment Facility (GEF)

10.1 Background

The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established with a multi-billion dollar budget as a result of a resolution at the UNCED (Rio Conference) in 1992. Its purpose was to finance the added costs involved in making otherwise accepted environmental development projects more globally environmentally friendly than what the recipient country and the multilateral financing institutions would have been willing to contribute themselves. It was resolved that the donor countries should contribute to the GEF in order to take care of the global common environmental values through cost-effective measures in poor countries and East-European transition countries which have ratified the global environmental conventions on climate, biological diversity, as well as sustainable management of the sea and water resources. GEF is the joint mechanism, which finances the work on the global environmental conventions for which all donor countries contribute. Norway’s contribution is based on international negotiations on “burden sharing” (payments to the fund in accordance with a modified “IDA key”) and it is not paid as an annually assessed additional amount in order to obtain special goal in relation to the environmental action plan. In contrast to other donor countries Norway has not participated in active co-financing of GEF projects.

Such funds should be additional to conventional development assistance, but in practice it has not been shown that GEF grants are genuinely additional to conventional development assistance allocations on ODA\(^\text{17}\) conditions.

In other words the GEF pays the additional costs which the changes in an otherwise sound development project will entail in order for the project to create added value of common global character, such as reduced emissions of climate gases, protection of biological diversity under threat, conservation of international sea and water resources, and reduced loss of agricultural and grazing land by preventing desertification.

The GEF finances various types of projects and pre-feasibility studies on grant conditions, varying from “small” – up to US$ 25,000 – “medium” up to US$ 1 million to “large” projects that can be as large as US$ 6 million.

\(^{17}\) ODA conditions: see www.oecd.org/glossary, and go to “DAC’s glossary” and access ODA for a detailed review of the conditions that development assistance grants have to meet in order to be registered as official development assistance (Overseas Development Assistance).
An application supported by the GEF must meet detailed application requirements and come from a country which has ratified the above-mentioned global environmental conventions for which the GEF is the financial mechanism. Detailed information on this is available on the member countries’ local GEF contact, and at the GEF’s homepages.

A number of extensive evaluations of different aspects of the GEF has been implemented which complement each other in providing an overall picture of the GEF’s strong and weak sides as a channel for environmental development assistance.18

### 10.2 Result achievement of GEF projects

The GEF’s “Annual Performance Report 2007” concludes that around 75% of completed GEF projects up until 2007 have been implemented in a satisfactory manner in terms of results achievement, and 58% were deemed to have a reasonable chance of being sustainable and able to independent continuation after completed GEF involvement.

The annual report mentioned above finds that there are great variations from project to project and from one year to the next in relation to GEF investments, pledged co-financing and actual reported co-financing without any definite tendency over time. The peak was reached in 2004 with an average of US$ 7.4 in pledged co-financing per US$ in GEF funds, and US$ 6.6/US$ in GEF funds in actual realised co-financing. The years 2003 and 2005 showed lowest pledged co-financing with US$ 1.5 per US$ in GEF funds, and US$ 1.3 and 1.6 in realised co-financing. In 2007 the two indicators were as high as 2.6 and 1.9 respectively. Actual co-financing has always turned out to be somewhat lower than pledged co-financing.

Capacity building as a result of finalised GEF projects has generally been positive and to some extent very considerable, but in many cases the acquired knowledge is not maintained because the instruction is experienced like a “shot in the arm” without any follow up and post-qualifying training, and without the measures being part of a larger context.

The annual report shows a strong connection between quality of a project’s preparation for supervision and evaluation at the start-up, and the actual quality of controls and follow-up in the implementation phase of the project. Approximately 2/3 of the projects are estimated to have had moderately satisfactory or better supervisory arrangements. The quality of the final evaluations (more than 40 each year) has improved year by year and in 2007 the assessment was moderately satisfactory, or better for 95% of these.

In 2007 83% of the GEF’s investments in completed biodiversity projects and 74% of investments in climate change projects were deemed to have attained their goals in at least a satisfactory way.

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Which types of global effects of GEF projects have been documented?

Four projects concerning energy efficiency implemented with the WB in Poland, Mexico, Thailand and Jamaica respectively have been evaluated, and on the basis of these it is possible to draw the following conclusions concerning positive project impacts (GEF 2006b):

In Thailand considerable market changes in households with respect to the use of lighting, fridges and air-conditioning were observed.

In all four countries considerable and lasting energy saving was observed and reduced climate gas emissions in connection with the restructuring in the housing market took place.

- The projects formed the basis for a considerable copying/repeat in the four countries themselves and in neighbouring countries.
- Considerable savings for consumers in combination with better product quality.
- Considerably better market conditions for distributors and retailers in the market for energy-saving products and equipment.
- Considerably improved competitive conditions in the producer market in Thailand.
- A certain development of capacity for demand-driven measures and energy efficiency within government institutions, but it remains to be seen if the effects become significant.

In certain areas the impacts were negligible:

- No significant restructuring, neither institutionally, commercially nor industrially in Thailand, despite this being something that was expected.
- Insignificant impact of the projects on integration/mainstreaming of energy efficiency goals in energy policies.
- Minimal/moderate contributions for integrating global environmental considerations in the countries’ energy policies.
• Modest contributions to the development of procedures and instruments for adopting global instruments aimed at the climate such as the Clean Development Mechanism and the Joint Implementation (CDM and JI).

The most clearly observable effects of these projects have been:
• Energy saving and associated GHG emission reductions have remained static and in fact increased since the projects were completed.
• Annual reductions during the analysis period are of the order of 0.5% of the power sector emissions, except for Thailand where the reduction has stayed around 3.5%.
• Corresponding emission reductions have been recorded for locally harmful emissions such as SO₂ and Nox.
• The programme costs are between US$ 1-5 per ton final reduction in CO₂ emissions apart from Jamaica where the costs are estimated to US$ 10 per ton.
• The cost-effectiveness fraction for the projects is in intervals of 2-5, except for Jamaica, where they were only 0.4.

10.4 What of local utility effects of GEF projects?
In GEF (2006a) there is explicit focus on the linking between local and global utility effects of global environmental programmes under the auspices of the GEF. The background is the GEF’s mandate to finance added costs in connection with achieving positive global environmental effects through expansion/reformulations of nationally prioritised project development programmes. These should play a role making sure these projects and programmes contribute to sustainable development. However in many cases local/national authorities are not prepared to start a project or a programme without any preliminaries and only on the basis of documented local/national environmental effects. Without such investments it is neither possible for the GEF to “piggyback” such projects in order to finance a marginal expansion of the project which might have yielded considerable global environmental benefits at a favourable cost. In such cases it would be relevant to engage the GEF and donors in order to get the basic project realised.

The analysis is based on a selection of a total of 132 projects spanning the period 1991 – 2000, which all explicitly mention that they were to create local incentives in order to generate global environmental improvements. In addition 113 final evaluations carried out by the GEF’s implementing organisations (WB, UNDP and UNEP) up to 2004 were included. To analyse the local effects a procedure was chosen which focused on sustainable livelihood approaches based on 7 generic improvement categories localised within global environmental projects. Subsequently the link between local and global utility effects were analysed by studying:
• changes in consumer patterns
• improvements in the local resource base
• reduced vulnerability in relation to global environmental changes
• changes faced by local societies in the institutional everyday life.

The analysis of these projects shows that in many areas with GEF projects global and local beneficial and harmful effects are interlinked. In many cases it appears that behaviour which brings improvements for local groups at the moment may
often create lasting environmental harm. Measures to counteract this may often have negative effects on the immediate benefits to the local population. This applies especially to projects that limit access to vulnerable natural resources to which a local population has traditionally had access, and which have made a considerable contribution to these people’s standard of living. A number of so-called Protected Area projects under the GEF’s biodiversity portfolio come within such a category. The challenge is to develop ways of compensating the losing parties. It is also a challenge to provide information and tuition on the consequences of alternative actions, to make these partners in sustainable management of a vulnerable local environment and not saboteurs of the measure.

The analysis also shows that instruments with incentives that encourage changing consumer patterns can be used actively at the same time to improve management of an area’s natural resources and the living conditions of the population. Here it is shown that global environmental benefits and local welfare benefits go hand in hand. Such links may be further reinforced through changes in the legislation and regulations, and arranging for investments in new technology and resources management regimes. As long as such changes are operated nationally/locally on priorities set out locally/nationally, GEF support may be a releasing factor for such investments and measures to be implemented, or at least speeded up.

Furthermore the project review shows that such measures may also contribute to establishing a more robust management regime for vulnerable local natural resources (for instance agricultural land threatened by erosion and impoverishment, and through this better local protection against/ability to resist harmful effects and negative consequences of e.g. global climate changes (for instance ever more serious natural disaster) at the local level. In this way GEF measures can at the same time contribute to more sustainable management of the local natural resources and incomes in consideration of the global environment. The positive experiences from the projects reviewed with GEF financing are combined in guidelines for future action, and experiences from unsuccessful projects are put together in order to learn some lessons from them in future local/national policy and project formulation.

Analyses show that one condition that is a persistent trait in successful projects is the active and open involvement of the affected local parties in the planning and formulation. This starts right from the initial phase of the project cycle, and through the entire implementation of the project where people serve as active participants in the supervision of the project’s progress. This is a precondition for the establishment of local ownership and through it obligations to rally round the undertaking of the project. In this connection it has proved very important to have thorough local knowledge of cultural and political conditions to ensure understanding and support from key persons/groups right from the start. To ensure sustainability, important measures within such categories should preferably be identified and implemented before a GEF project is finalised.

An equally important experience from this project review is that creation of optimal links between locally and globally aimed measures has not succeeded. The analysis
shows that inadequate knowledge of local conditions leads to inadequate preparation and follow-up in the areas listed as critical success factors above. In particular this has been decisive in whether a project succeeds or fails in exploiting the synergies of the potential links between local and global environmental and welfare effects. It is time-consuming to create lasting local ownership and trust in new operating methods and framework conditions, and short deadlines for planning, decision and implementation have often shown to lead to dissatisfaction and mistrust in projects and measures which initially are for the good of all. Time must be set aside to establish the necessary confidence and flexible and easy forms of cooperation, and it may be difficult to get impatient and hard-pressed donor representatives to accept this. The analysis shows that lessons have been learnt from former GEF projects and that new projects are formulated better and more accurately in these critical areas. But budgeting still has to become more realistic both in terms of time and money in order to avoid great delays in the implementation.

So far the GEF has been strongly convinced of the importance of developing alternative sources of income for locally affected population groups in a GEF project area. Eco-tourism has been in focus as an area of investment as an alternative to destructive resource management regimes within agriculture, forestry and the management of marine resources. In practice so far it is evident that alternative work possibilities in general and eco-tourism in particular, have not managed to compensate for the loss of traditional work places in local communities. The reason for the lack of success often appears to be the lack of infrastructure (roads, water, communications etc.) in the area one hopes to attract tourists to (often in competition with other tourist destinations). And such investments and associated operating arrangements do not normally enter into the scope of the relevant GEF project. Even where creating new profitable places of work by investing in eco-tourism is a success, it has been shown that it is primarily the most resourceful and innovative members of the local population who can make use of such possibilities, while the weaker ones tend to lose out or remain as they are.

10.5 Are some GEF-executors more efficient than others?

The GEF has no project activity in the field, because this is with the WB, UNDP etc. and time spent is largely there with these agencies, and not with the GEF. The GEF regulatory framework is put together in such a way as to avoid creating a new development assistance organisation, and to secure additional support to attain global environmental goals. The GEF attempts to prepare the conditions to enable recipient countries and international institutions to develop further environmental measures and framework conditions which may also secure greater private financial investment.

In June 2007 the GEF prepared a note for the GEF’s council on the various implementation organisations’ comparative merits, see GEF (2007). Unfortunately the note says nothing more than that the various implementation organisations have their comparative merits in the geographical areas and thematic fields they are designated to serve. In a diplomatic manner it states that AfDB (the African Development Bank) still remains on the starting line when it comes to being prepared to deal with projects that focus on global environmental challenges, while ADB (the
Asian Development Bank) already has more than 10 years experience with complicated and wide-ranging projects which focus on climate change projects (including the ALGAS project in the 1990s, which comprised the entire Asian region) and technical assistance in connection with GEF projects in the energy field. The multilateral development banks have the advantage of being able to mobilise far more financial resources for projects in US$ of GEF financing from their own and existing sources, than what the UN organisations are able to do. The latter have their comparative merits within capacity building and technical assistance for the thematic technical fields they are set to serve.

According to the 2007 annual report from the GEF on project investments completed at the end of 2007, 78% of those under the auspices of the World Bank were assessed to have reached their goals in a moderately satisfactory manner or better. Corresponding ranking for UNDP’s investments was 60% and for UNEP’s 66%.

Concerning attainment of moderate or better-expected sustainability, 56% of GEF investments under the auspices of the World Bank attained such ranking, while the equivalent ranking of investments under the auspices of UNDP and UNEP was 43% and 47%.

For the entire period of 2002-2007 an average of US$ 3.8 in co-financing per US$ GEF grants was mobilised for GEF projects under the auspices of the World Bank, while the corresponding co-financing mobilisation under the direction of UNDP and UNEP was US$ 1.3 and 1.5 respectively.

Significant delays – often for more than one year – characterise the implementation of GEF projects irrespective of which implementing organisation is responsible or which thematic areas are involved. Projects under the auspices of UNDP experience on average significantly longer delays (around 21 months compared with what was agreed in the contract at start-up), compared with 12 months for the World Bank and 10 months for UNEP. For climate change projects the average delay was as much as 22 months, while the delay in biodiversity projects was around 12 months. Delays are due to many different conditions, and typically recurring reasons are: over-optimistic project design, communications problems amongst the project partners, delays in money transfers, complicated implementation procedures, and delays in employment of key staff for the project (which is often linked to one or more of the above-mentioned conditions).

For 2007 the GEF registered that the quality of the supervision and control with project implementation was moderately satisfactory or better for 59% of the projects under the auspices of the World Bank, while it was 44% for UNDP and 43% for UNEP.

The quality of the final evaluations of GEF projects is assessed to moderately satisfactory or better for 94% of GEF projects under the auspices of the World Bank and UNDP and 100% for UNEP.
As regards internal procedures and measures for reducing the GEF organisations’ “climate footprints” the GEF 2007 annual report concludes that the World Bank and the regional development banks have come further than the UN organisations in implementing such measures.

10.6 The GEF process: when seeking the best becomes the enemy of the good

The GEF’s project cycle is generally regarded as complex, time-consuming and costly for the applicants. Ever since the establishment of the GEF the need for streamlining and simplification of the GEF’s project cycle has been called for by a number of internal and external evaluations and reviews, as well as many of GEF’s users and the GEF Council. In connection with the negotiations on the latest capital replenishments it is emphasised that the GEF should make its processes more streamlined and effective, (see for instance GEF (2007a) op.cit). Amongst other things, this comprehensive evaluation had the following conclusions:

A. The GEF’s project and activity cycle is not effective in completing projects in time

Experience shows that for every phase in the project cycle, the GEF’s ability to get things completed fails, or that the decision-making processes around completion are so long drawn out that significant delays occur before the next phase can commence. This has consequences for the age composition of GEF’s project portfolio.

This is illustrated by the fact that 46% of proposals for “large” GEF projects (FSP) that have been submitted for approval since the start in 1992 still have not been started. In practice it often takes as much as three years from when the concept is prepared until the project is commenced. Increasingly project proposals which are submitted for approval in a payment period have been prepared in an earlier period, e.g.

27 project proposals in the GEF -1 period were submitted for processing and approval during the following GEF-2 period.

16 of them were approved in the GEF-2 period, while 11 were carried forward for processing in the GEF-3 period

In the GEF-3 period as many as 166 projects from the GEF-2 period were still under processing

In the GEF-4 period there are still 2 project proposals from the GEF-1 period awaiting approval, 34 from GEF 2, and as many as 223 from GEF-3 period.

It is assumed that such an accumulation of proposals in waiting can weaken the GEF’s ability to catalyse and innovate, according to this evaluation, something that is made apparent by the fact that the number of new ideas in every capital replenishment period has gradually dropped from 56% in GEF-1, via 35% in GEF-2, to 19% in GEF-3. At the same time the share of approved new ideas in relation to
proposed new ideas has also dropped over time, from 56% in GEF-1, via 39% in GEF-2 to 30% in GEF-3.

The implementation time for the 191 completed large (FSP) GEF projects has been 47 months, with an average time excess of 9.2 months. The main worry here however is the time spent in preparation before the start-up of the project. It turned out that as much as 43% of the project time was spent on preparation before start-up, and this contributes to making GEF projects particularly vulnerable to changing political conditions and priorities, as well as changes in core staff and administrative personnel. It turned out that as many as 109 project proposals (46%) were refused before entering into the project portfolio.

B. The GEF’s project cycle is inefficient and the situation has gradually deteriorated

The GEF’s 2007 (a) evaluation concluded that the average duration of the project cycle – i.e. the time it takes from when the project is identified, prepared and formulated for implementation, is approved and gets going – has increased for each of the three GEF capital replenishment phases. With the long queues of projects to be finalised at each level in the project cycle a great number of projects will move slowly through the project cycle and the tendency is reinforced when GEF funds are used for financing project preparation activities. But it took 36 months from the “conception” to the start-up of large projects under the GEF-1 phase for proposals where the preparation was financed by GEF’s own PDF-A funds, then this time increased to 50 months in GEF-2, and further to 66 months in the GEF-3 phase. Not surprisingly 74% of 289 affected GEF users contacted as part of the mentioned evaluation responded that GEF’s project cycle is less satisfactory than what it is for other donors.

For medium sized projects (up to US$ 1 million) total costs for approval constituted around 8% of what they constituted for large projects, but the preparation time constituted all of 60% of the time it took to prepare a large project. In practice this means that every penny tied to a medium sized project requires four times more in preparation than a large project. This has made such medium sized projects less attractive for both applicants and for the GEF’s own administrative personnel.

This inefficiency is further reinforced when different GEF requirements change in the course of the project cycle up to final approval for start-up. Project proposals which are already considerably delayed must be processed over and over to meet new requirements to the frustration of all parties. The reasons for such delays and more expensive conditions can be summarised as:

- Ever increasing GEF complexity because of new requirements for standards in projects and new GEF modalities to relate to
- Duplication and lack of synchronisation in the project cycle between the GEF and the IAs and EAs
- New GEF procedures (mainstreaming with co-financiers, added cost calculations, special formats for application documents etc.)
• A large number of GEF “gatekeepers” with different qualifications and different degrees of updated knowledge amongst these as to what is required for GEF approval
• Lack of trust between the different partners in the GEF process.

There is still considerable mistrust between the GEF Secretariat, the established GEF agencies (IAs and EAs) and the GEF Council more than 15 years after the establishment of the GEF. Much duplication in the form of repeated reviews of applications and project documents by the various players, as well as detailed management contribute to delays and a poor cooperative climate.

C. The GEF’s project cycle is not cost-effective

The 2007 (a) evaluation shows that there is no correlation between how much time is spent in the preparatory project phases and the assessment of quality and the project implementation the project receives after completion. This leads to the following conclusions:
• Nothing indicates that weak project proposals take longer to prepare and cause delays, and
• The additional time a project proposal takes through the project cycle does not lead to better projects in the GEF’s portfolio, to judge from ex post grading of the success of the projects.

Thus it is not possible to say that the long time for project preparation, review and approval is cost effective as long as this does not lead to measurably better projects when these are measured after a completed project.

Nothing indicates that the GEF’s additional requirements for documentation, reviews and approval contribute to better project quality. On top of this the GEF’s internal cost-effectiveness is declining as the project cycle now takes longer and requires more input with the same budgets, results and scope of what the projects are to comprise.

At the same time care must be taken to ensure that important supervisory information on progress and the results achievements of a project are not lost when key personnel leave.

Furthermore, delay entails more cost increases because experience shows that good project applications are withdrawn because of delay and the uncertainty surrounding the approval process. Applicants simply lose patience, and it is often the best qualified applicants who first lose patience and withdraw. Others find that their original well qualified application has become outdated in the waiting time because new rules and orders have been added and that the application thus must be rewritten19.

19 The Ministry of the Environment informs us that a recently finalised evaluation of the GEF Secretariat presented to the board in November 2008 proves that 50% of all project-related enquiries are responded to within 10 days. 90% are responded to within 30 days. At the same time the Ministry emphasises that the so-called Resource Allocation Framework (RAF) which was forced on GEF by the US, has a number of unfortunate effects and is now under alteration. The Ministry has come across cases where the countries’ environmental authorities have wanted action and have proposed projects which have not been promoted by the countries’ finance or development authorities for fear of losing other projects because of the limitations set by the RAF.
10.7 Should Norway use the GEF as a multilateral channel for environmental assistance?

Norway gives priority to climate-related action and to protecting biological diversity, and has chosen the GEF as a channel for this. The GEF is thus left to find co-financing partners that are best suited to meet the GEF goals. In this chapter we have reviewed different appraisals and evaluations regarding the efficiency of the GEF’s key implementation partners, as well as the relevance of their choice of projects. We have also looked at the documentation of the impacts of the projects both in respect to global and local environmental and welfare impacts.

What has also been learnt from these projects is that it is significantly easier to evaluate the effects of a project when the relevant information is gathered continuously throughout the entire project cycle in line with an evaluation assignment that has been established before project start-up. Logical Framework (LF)/impact charts are central in the impact analyses and are necessary instruments for following a project’s development. At the same time it has to recognised that even with a well thought through baseline there will be great uncertainty as to the realism of this, and in over a longer time it will be very difficult to keep a basis for comparison comparable.

The evaluation reports reviewed show that the GEF and the multilateral development banks have established and practise considerably better routines in these areas than the UN organisations. The latter have not succeeded in implementing result based project planning and management in practice because emphasis has always been on budget and audit control (UN oversight services (OIOS) which is primarily focused on audit and control. Evaluation is somewhat pushed into the background) and not focussed on the projects’ socio-economic and environmental impacts (which is what is focused on in the evaluation reports). This is in spite of the fact that UN evaluation group (UNEG) have put a lot of work into formulating norms and standards and reviews.

The recent Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ review of multilateral organisation (2009, op.cit.) includes the GEF and draws largely the same conclusions as here.

All in all this review shows that a serious question has to be asked in respect of the GEF as a cost-effective multilateral channel for Norwegian environmental development assistance. However the review of the GEF evaluations shows that projects and their results are of reasonably high quality, and even where the results are not satisfactory, a sound diagnostic foundation has been laid in order to improve future investments.

Nonetheless the review of the multilateral development assistance channels for environmental assistance in the UN system concludes relatively negatively. This is not only in relation to cost-effectiveness, but also to results achievement and reporting. The GEF is one of the better alternatives for channelling of support for Norwegian environmental measures for implementation in poor countries, even if it comes in the form of budget support, which makes it difficult to measure the partial effect of Norwegian GEF contributions.
11. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED)

11.1 Background

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) was established in 1971 as one of the first private environmental and development organisations with an international agenda. IIED describes itself as an international research institute in the areas of environment and development policies.

IIED was, together with the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, amongst the first that explicitly focused its work on the reciprocal links between environment, economics, poverty and development, and has been engaged in a broad spectrum of activities related to this interactive complex.

IIED’s activities span a wide area related to the environment and bases its work on what is termed cooperation/partnership with other players within the same or related technical fields. Such players include all of those from multilateral organisations inside the UN system and the multilateral development banks via bilateral development assistance organisations to private organisations, business and industry and individuals.

Norway allocates block grants to IIED through Norad and these are equivalent of 3% of IIED’s GBP 8.9 million budget for 2006/2007.

The assessment of IIED’s suitability as a multilateral channel for Norwegian development assistance is based on the review of 21 February 2007 by Angela Cropper and Tina Wallace, “Review of IIED’s work” (Cropper and Wallace).

11.2 The relevance of IIED’s actions for Norwegian environmental assistance

IIED’s mission is to cooperate with others in order to change the world in the direction of real sustainable development with special emphasis on improving living conditions for the poorest people in the world. This is to happen through managing the world’s natural resources in a more sustainable and fair manner, such as paying explicit consideration to the environmental impacts of different political measures on the poor.

More explicitly IIED works to have established an ambitious, fair and robust agreement on measures to limit climate change as a follow-up to the Kyoto Agreement and has established climate change as one of its programme areas.
At the same time IIED wants environmental policies mainstreamed across the sectors in policy formulations with the Millennium development goals as the key objectives.

In order to succeed in this, IIED concentrates on strengthening local rights to land and natural resources, and improvement of, and full openness in local management, so as to take account of the rights of weak groups in an adequate manner.

In parallel with this, IIED works to meet the Millennium development goals within the area of water and sanitation conditions, and to strengthen poor town dwellers’ rights through the establishment and efficient operation of interest organisations so that their prioritised wishes may be taken into account in the political processes and allocations.

In light of the above-mentioned declared and wide-ranging goals it is difficult to see that some of what IIED does is not relevant for and in line with Norwegian environmental assistance.

The response from those cooperating with IIED is reported to be positive in Cropper and Wallace’s review with respect to IIED’s attention to cooperating parties’ priorities and wishes within the budget and time limitations of the individual assignments.

Cropper and Wallace do, however, report from the cooperating partners in developing countries that it is primarily IIED and not the local partner who conceives and formulates projects that are presented to donors. Even though there may be a good dialogue with the local partner about the projects’ final formulation and implementation, it is rare that the projects are identified through local needs assessments. Some people have claimed those that IIED describes as local partners can be more correctly described as subsidiary consultants. Many cooperating partners in developing countries regard IIED as a donor, others view IIED as a research institute, while still others regard IIED as lobbyists or mentors. This demonstrates in fact that IIED has not been communicating its role very well, or that IIED has a great number of “hats” to choose from and uses these depending on what type of assignment they take on.

11.3 Impact and efficiency in IIED’s programmes

IIED’s method of work is to establish and strengthen partnerships with reciprocal organisations and others who are specialists in complementary technical fields for the implementation of projects and studies. IIED wishes to appear as an independent, flexible and inter-disciplinary and innovative “think-tank” focused on solutions that are possible to implement, for instance through “bridge-building” in conflict situations. IIED wants to represent and establish capacity and expertise to provide a stronger voice in the political dialogue on these subjects for the weaker members of society. IIED offers this capacity and analysis tool for use by various clients in the preparation of their development assistance strategies on the interface of environment and development.
Cropper and Wallace have reviewed and assessed the impacts and efficiency aspects of two of IIED’s main programmes (1) The Climate Change Programme and (2) The East African Pastoral Programme.

The Climate Change Programme is new and does not have to take account of what others have done in this field. Here IIED has set out to find a niche which is complementary to what others already established do already. IIED has chosen to focus on communicating scientifically-based climate change knowledge through local capacity building. It has been decided to involve local partners in measures such as the interaction between climate change and health.

Another such activity is IIED’s organisation of working meetings for representatives from developing countries. These meetings focus on adaptation to climate change in these countries in advance of the regular conferences on climate change between the countries which have signed the agreement on climate change (UNFCCC). These working meetings have received large support and are of great help for the delegates from developing countries and for NGOs from developing countries who need expert knowledge ahead of the formal negotiations. This is useful for assuming technically based national positions, but just as much in order to establish a dialogue and agreement between groups of countries as to which positions they are going to assume in the negotiations. On the negative side, Cropper and Wallace observed that the IIED presentations differed substantially in themes and were quite superficial. The agenda was too little focused and tried to cover too many themes. Two day meetings of this type were far from sufficient in presenting and examining in depth, the complicated climate themes.

The policy analysis in IIED’s climate programme is carried out in collaboration with Stockholm’s Environmental Institute (SEI) and this is an example of how professional networks may be used in a constructive manner to create synergies.

IIED’s attempts to bring attention to and interest in global climate questions have gained wide attention and also cover the OECD countries. The programme has succeeded in developing good cooperative relations with the large voluntary development organisations, and in this context managed to arrange subsidiary events during the negotiations of the formal climate conference, with special focus on bridge building between environmental and development agendas.

IIED’s climate programme is primarily organised so as to strengthen the participants’ negotiation knowledge and to provide better understanding of the correlation between the environment and development.

However IIED is quite absent from the economic-political scene in the lobbying work for the climate agreement. Precisely because IIED has developed niche skills in dialogue and imparting knowledge within the climate field, they ought to enter into strategic alliances with other partners who are strong in the areas where financial policy, trade policy and consequences of environment/climate change overlap. This would pave the way for reciprocal self-reinforcing effects and thus greater efficiency in the use of donor funds in this field.
The East African Pastoral Programme has been initiated by IIED and is based on IIED’s experience of similar work in West Africa, and before that in East Africa, again in the 1990s. The objective of the programme is to strengthen pastoral civil society in East Africa, and is carried out in collaboration with a partner; the Resource Conflict Institute (RECONCILE) and in partnership with local pastoral organisations, voluntary organisation, government organisations, donors, universities and research centres in the East African countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The programme is financed by a group of donors (Norway is not included in the group). The programme’s first phase was completed in 2007.

The basic premise of the programme has been to initiate a process with informative debate with broad active participation in local communities on the fundamental challenges and conflicts that inhibit welfare development in pastoral societies. In doing so one can identify local demands for changes brought forward by local representatives who are thus able to achieve a more fruitful dialogue with the politicians. This may improve the potential and political willingness to adopt measures for a more sustainable growth and development in such societies.

The programme has been developed as a very long-term programme (15 years) because the many various conflicts are very complex and many-faceted, and vary from one local community to the next. There is no “blueprint” which may be copied from one area to another. It is emphasised that it is necessary to allow sufficient time to build up and establish sound local ownership for the measures and initiatives included in the programme. This is because it takes place in very vulnerable societies marked by much reciprocal mistrust and minimal historic contacts with the countries’ political institutions.

The first phase which is now completed had as its main objective the removal of prejudice and indifference on all sides of the conflict with the pastoral local societies. It was also to develop and present measures for a better functioning of pastoral local self-government in close dialogue with the rest of the affected parties. Phases 2 and 3 are to develop further the pastoral self-governing capacity to reciprocal dialogue with the rest of the country’s authorities and interest groups. All the time there is a focus on working with existing organisations and networks.

Cropper and Wallace found that the phase 1 implementation in Tanzania had provided very good and promising results measured against the pre-set targets and conditions. In Uganda and Kenya the response was also positive amongst the affected pastoral groups, but in both countries they felt that the fundamental causes of the conflicts and possible solutions to these should have received much greater attention in the course material and dialogues.

The working method of participant activity in the courses and the interactive way the courses were implemented was praised by all participants as an example to copy in other places. The programmes focus on creating a cross-section and on the interaction between the environment and development in a balanced way.
The complex and obscure pastoral “landscape” in East Africa has required considerable efforts and longer time than was originally foreseen for Phase 1 for the preparation of motivating and accepted manuals, where the experience from West Africa has only been of limited use. It has been reported that IIED showed great ability to listen and take local conditions into account in the preparation of this course material, which was aimed at a group of people who had never before taken part in this type of group learning and experience focussing on conflict understanding and solution.

However Cropper and Wallace also found a number of weaknesses in the programme’s Phase 1. For instance, there should have been more emphasis on the organisational side of the development challenges. This would have avoided the various pastoral groups failing to handle the identified problems and the conflicts that hinder development. Some interviewees pointed out that the programme was characterised by a certain amount of naivety since it did not focus on the fact that the three countries are about to revise their legislation on the rights to land, water and natural resources, and in this reform work consideration for the rights of the pastoral groups has been pushed into the background.

They further concluded that to succeed with such an ambitious programme, the budget has to be increased and the timing of the courses must be better adapted to the seasonal workloads of the participating parties in local societies. For one thing little consideration has been paid to women’s possibilities to participate actively and to be heard. The risk of participants losing confidence in those who have persuaded them to take part in the courses is great in such vulnerable civil structures. IIED must therefore be careful in their selection and management of whoever is to be in charge of the local capacity development. This in itself is very resource-demanding and must be budgeted for in the subsequent phases. Amongst other things several people have asked that IIED must be permanently established with relevant technical staff in the region to be able to follow up closely such demanding and specialised projects with such a high-risk profile.

11.4 Is IIED a suitable channel for Norwegian Multilateral Assistance?

While the review by Cropper and Wallace appears to be professionally thorough and well thought through, it must be noted that the authors have not undertaken an evaluation in accordance with the DAC’s evaluation norms. These assume that the project/programme has established an indicator-based baseline at project start, and a future development path if the project is not realised (alternatively, or in addition to following a set of relevant indicators for a control area which does not experience the same changes that the project represents). In this way the impacts of the project should be comparable with the baseline in a value-added analysis. Where this is missing, the possibility for appraising the effects and efficiency in IIED’s work is considerably limited.

Based on (1) the review of IIED’s method of working and special competence it can be concluded with certainty that IIED represents a great amount of independent niche competence. This can implement many valuable studies which in the next
instance can be important inputs in the preparation of local, national and global environmental programmes and strategies.

On the basis of (2) Cropper and Wallace’s assessments of IIED’s two chosen programmes (climate and the pastoral system), it is possible to conclude that IIED represents niche capacity directly relevant for environmental and poverty problems occupying a central position in the Norwegian environmental strategy and action plan. Both are characterised by a comprehensive training and dialogue promoting profile in areas where there are significant conflicts between the various parties.

At the same time it is important that Norway thoroughly examines which technical expertise IIED has available in the relevant areas of collaboration and how well they are represented locally.

As long as Norwegian development assistance takes place in the form of block grants (i.e. budget support with certain conditions for application) it is not possible to distinguish the environmental and developmental effects of the Norwegian assistance. But if projects and programmes implemented under support from the various donors (including Norway) are implemented and reported on in a satisfactory manner, then this should be sufficient grounds to look upon this channel positively for environmental development assistance.
12. The World Bank

12.1 Background

Two reports on the World Bank have been presented for this synthesis study.


The earlier report is a thorough review of the World Bank’s work in promoting the environment and sustainable development since the beginning of the 1990s. This was when sustainable development became a significant theme for the World Bank’s general policy agenda and for changes in the formulation of projects and programmes, for which the World Bank grants loans and subsidies. The evaluation appraises the entire World Bank group’s work and its relationship to all its clients, both in relation to work and its government clients for loans and grants (IFC/IDA/IBRD/MIGA) and private clients (especially IFC). By focusing on efficiency and results they have also identified external hindrances and internal conditions, which by changes in their approach and future strategy work, will supposedly be able to further increase efficiency.

This evaluation is an evaluation of the results of the World Bank’s work, and as such provides information on its strengths and weaknesses as well as the possibilities for change – though not specifically in relation to Norway. It also examines the role the shareowners and partners, such as Norway, can play or have played. In other words there are no direct links between the World Bank’s results and Norwegian contributions in the evaluation, only a basis on which to assess to what extent the World Bank has succeeded in promoting sustainable development through policy dialogue, expert advice and processes vis-à-vis the clients and through tangible results within programmes and projects.

The evaluation of TFESSD is of a completely different nature. It is an evaluation of results of the management of one amongst more than 800 earmarked funds the World Bank administers on behalf of bilateral donors. The TFESSD fund was established in 1999, financed by Norway and Finland. The fund was, together with another fund “Norwegian Trust Fund for Private Sector and Infrastructure” (NTF-
PSI)\textsuperscript{20}, a result of a process for gathering many smaller Norwegian-financed funds under one joint administration – partly to obtain better coordination of bilateral support to the World Bank and partly to gain a better opportunity to supervise the use of resources and influence processes internally in the World Bank in a more active manner. The evaluation of TFESSD focused on how the fund has strengthened and influenced the World Bank’s actions within sustainable development in a wider perspective, and not just development.

In many ways this evaluation is another extreme of the first-mentioned evaluation. This is because the World Bank’s earmarked funds, with bilateral and global collaboration projects and programmes, show that it is difficult to trace a single change or result due to such a limited fund with small and wide-ranging actions. Much of the evaluation is therefore based on impressions from interviews, which nevertheless for the basis for the conclusion of the evaluation: that, through the fund, Norway has influenced the World Bank’s work in line with Norwegian priorities as well, and individual projects have supplemented larger programmes and can therefore be ascribed some of the results (see paragraph on added value below).

\textbf{12.2 The World Bank’s environmental efforts: a global approach}

The World Bank is a global institution with representation in 184 client countries and relations to all its owners, through technical work and through concrete collaboration in global, regional and country-specific projects. The results of the World Bank’s work as presented in the evaluation report of its collective commitment, indicate that the World Bank to a large degree has succeeded in its work of being in the forefront in policy dialogue with its loan clients and through its grants, guarantees and loan commitments.

Although several UN organisations have tried to show the way, they do not have by any means the same position as the World Bank when it comes to access to professional resources which are then translated into concrete action. This happens through the access the World Bank enjoys in policy dialogue at the central decision-making level with member countries, and by virtue of its overwhelming financial position compared with other players. Between 1990 and 2007 it granted loans and grants for more than 6700 projects and programmes to a total value of NOK 2,800 billion, of which around one third was linked to sustainable development (the environment and management of natural resources). This includes the World Bank’s involvement through GEF and projects from the Montreal Protocol. Much of this has come about because of a gradual mainstreaming of environmental aspects in the World Bank’s policy dialogue and programmes, as through stricter internal environmental requirements in programmes.

The range of the World Bank’s programmes has been great. One of the most important instruments has been through the World Bank’s work with country strategies where emphasis has gradually been brought to bear on analyses of the more long-term impacts of the World Bank’s programmes. The evaluation however remarks that this has varied from country to country. There are examples from

\textsuperscript{20} Established in 2002
countries where there has been a greater emphasis on the environment in the analyses, at the same time as there are countries where growth considerations have not been sufficiently linked to regional and global negative environmental impacts. In some cases the environmental benefits could have been considerable had the World Bank lived up to its own environmental strategy in its work at country level.

Another important aspect that is noted is that the World Bank has not been consistent internally, i.e. IDA/BRD, MIGA and IFC have had their separate – and not identical – procedures and standards in their assessments. It is noted that considerable benefits can be obtained by harmonising internal environmental procedures and implementing joint analyses.

For bilateral players it is of specific relevance that the report acknowledges that at country level they are often perceived to be insufficiently receptive to real cooperation, but are often driven by the need to gain support for their own commitments. This is despite the report alluding to a number of examples of successful cooperation both with the UN system as well as international and national environmental organisations, and players from business and industry. This is something that bilateral players are invited to participate in more actively, at country level as well as in global programmes.

An example of the latter is Norway’s cooperation directly with the World Bank in some global environmental projects. Recently an evaluation of “The Global Gas Flaring Reduction Program (GGFRP)” was completed – an example of cooperation with private as well as public involvement to limit the burning off of gas from oil installations, and attempts to arrive at solutions to exploit the gas for profitable energy supply. For six years the results have created a network of cooperation of governmental and private players (oil companies), the implementation of pilot projects in eight countries, which have ratified a system of agreements on national standards for gas burning, and the development of national programmes for gas burning. These have been supplemented by incentives for investments of the gas in power production and other industry as well as for consumer purposes.

12.3 TFESSD; A small fund with great influence?

Compared with the World Bank’s total environmental commitment described above, Trust Fund for Environmental and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD) is a small fund spread over many thematic fields, that is environment, social development, poverty reduction and “social protection” respectively. The fund has, like other corresponding earmarked bilateral funds in the bank, been based on applications in the sense that the World Bank’s various divisions present project proposals which are processed by a reference, or steering group, based on some agreed criteria as to what the fund is to focus on under each theme.

In 2000 the fund was used to support the World Bank’s work on a new environmental strategy (2001), and in 2001 a large part of this “window on environment”

in the fund was used for the World Bank’s work on *World Development Report on Sustainable Development*.

With the new strategy agreed upon, TFESSD focused on work for the implementation of the strategy at country level and integration of the strategy in the World Bank’s individual commitments. As such the fund contributed to the World Bank’s work on integration of environmental considerations in programmes which are dealt with in the evaluation report of the World Bank’s total commitments.

In 2003 TFESSD was also a financial contributor to the World Development Report with the theme “Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World”, which in its turn was one of the fundamental documents for UN’s summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg. In addition TFESSD has financed work on updating of the World Bank’s internal environmental directives and reports from World Resources Institute.

The examples above illustrate that a somewhat small and limited fund, compared with the World Bank’s total portfolio and access to finance through the many bilateral funds, can still have significant influence relative to its size as long as it is made use of for strategically important activities.

The extent to which the fund has influenced rather than supported the commitments the World Bank would have found financing for, may be questioned. Put in another way, was an earmarked fund with a relatively large administrative participation from the donor countries necessary in order to appraise internal applications from the World Bank on financing of work which the World Bank would probably have found financing for anyway? For instance, it is not very likely that the World Bank would not have produced two of its annual development reports if the fund had not supported this work. Neither choice of theme nor contents was chosen under the influence of TFESSD.

On the other hand integration of a new environmental strategy at country level and in individual programmes may be ascribed to the fund. This would probably have been implemented anyway, but TFESSD contributed to it happening more quickly, as the World Bank’s access to financing faces a number of competing considerations.

**12.4 Added value and Norway’s Action Plan; more environmental benefit for Norwegian environmental investment through the World Bank than through others?**

The evaluation of the World Bank’s portfolio shows clearly that its comparative merit vis-à-vis many of the other organisations dealt with in this report is owing primarily to the World Bank’s position vis-à-vis client countries, its financial power and its considerable access to professional resources. This makes it a leading institution when it comes to developing insights, new methods and measures for increased global, regional and national environmental commitment. The report even points to many examples where it succeeds better than many of the other multilateral players discussed in this synthesis study. It did so by involving environmental
organisations in an energetic way, organisations which have traditionally been critical of the World Bank’s efforts.

In addition the World Bank stands apart from the many UN organisations reviewed here in being far more (if not sufficiently) obliged to document results achievement and lasting effects of what was the original goal, as regards a range of development factors (including poverty and environmental effects) than what is the case with UN organisations. As mentioned in previous chapters, the latter are mainly focused on budget and audit reporting, while development-related Result-Based Management has still not caught on as a prioritised reporting field in the UN system.

The Swedish review of multilateral organisations (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2009, op.cit,) is very clear and positive in its conclusion on relevance and efficiency regarding the World Bank as development assistance channel. To quote: “The World Bank is a highly relevant development player for policy development and finance, both globally and from a Swedish perspective..... The Bank is assessed as having very good internal effectiveness due to solid work on result-based management and evaluation that feeds into board bodies and the management structure as well as operational work......the Bank’s external effectiveness is assessed as very good. The Bank is result-oriented and often demonstrates better results than other Actors in the areas of implementation.”

The TFESSD fund has demonstrated that a small country like Norway can achieve a lot with strategic efforts which reinforce the World Bank’s efforts in specific areas, even with small amounts. Other measures financed by Norway, which have not been the subject of specific review here show much the same. The review of NTF-PSI and the evaluation of GGFRP, which has significant potential for greater involvement by Norwegian professional milieux are examples of this.

The evaluations show that Norway’s Environmental Action Plan has a considerable potential for implementation by using more funds from Norway for concentrated efforts on global programmes under the auspices of the World Bank as well as through increased strategic action via earmarked funds like TFESSD. Stronger and clearer action from the Norwegian side can be realised by separating out the TFESSD fund’s environmental component with a secretariat of its own. Here emphasis should be put on relevant competence but without necessarily establishing on the Norwegian side, the relatively comprehensive and costly management model that characterises NTF-PSI and TFESSD.

Within the environment field there are a number of specific themes under the environmental action plan which go far beyond just financing the World Bank’s annual development reports and work on implementation of the World Bank’s strategies at country level. These should be considered:

- One area that needs increased effort is the development of new global programmes similar to GGFRP i.e. global measures to meet global challenges in areas where Norway has a comparative technical advantage while the World Bank has a comparative advantage as a global player.
Another area is, as indicated by the World Bank’s own environmental report, to focus efforts at country level in those countries where the environmental benefits have the greatest global impact, but where the World Bank’s impact so far has been smaller than intended in the strategy.

A third area that is also stated in the TFESSD evaluation and in the World Bank’s own evaluation, is to stimulate joint action with other multilateral and bilateral organisations at country level – and increased cooperation and dialogue with business and industry and environmental organisations.
13. The World Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)

13.1 Background
Throughout its 60-year history IUCN has grown to become a considerable player on the international arena. It has done so as contributor to knowledge about, and as an influence on political processes globally, regionally and nationally in order to put emphasise the importance of biological diversity. In recent years it has promoted an ever stronger connection between biodiversity and balance between protection and sustainable exploitation of natural resources linked to poverty reduction with ever greater involvement, especially in Africa.

IUCN has both nations and voluntary organisations as members. The organisation has observer status at the UN. Norway is a member of the IUCN through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Environment, Norad, Noragric and the Directorate of the Management of Natural Resources. Over the past ten years the organisation has established stronger links to a number of countries through a gradual expansion with establishment of regional and country offices, not least in Africa.

IUCN’s vision is a world in which the Nature is valued and appreciated. The instruments to bring us closer to the goal lie in influencing and supporting societies around the world in protecting nature’s diversity and integrity as well as ensuring that the use of natural resources takes place in an ecologically sound manner. This is in line with the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan, which links the actions to the need for a sustainable development and poverty reduction.

While IUCN’s central administration is financed to a large extent by fees and general grants from member countries and organisations, the programme and project committees are financed by earmarked allocations from multilateral and bilateral donors. A growing part of activity has been financed by donor countries for programmes and projects that developing countries wish to have implemented (after IUCN has helped them formulate appropriate applications for grant financing in the recipient country).

IUCN functions as a network between governments, civil society, science, local action and global environmental challenges. Many of the results associated with IUCN’s work on global and regional environmental problems, such as conventions, have come about as a result of influence at political level linked to a broad involvement by professionals from many countries and institutions through this network.
IUCN has established national committees and a number of thematic commissions and work groups with participation of professionals on a voluntary basis. The evaluation presented for this IUCN review; *External Review of IUCN 2007*, 2008 (March) Volume I and II. Wageningen UR and Mestor Associates have focused on three specific aspects of IUCN’s activity:

1. The added value of IUCN’s activity for its members.
2. To what extent IUCN succeeds in linking the protection of Nature with poverty reduction in Africa.
3. Conversion of political resolutions into practice with emphasis on “The Water Programme” and “The Global Marine Programme”.

The emphasis in this review is primarily on the first point in the evaluation, cfr. The Terms of Reference. 

**13.2 IUCN; A unique model for cooperation by governments, experts and interest organisations?**

IUCN is unique in that its members are both governments and voluntary organisations from the entire world. The evaluation report confirms that this is how it is perceived by most of the representatives from the member states, organisations and milieus that were consulted. The membership base and organisation of a network of experts and state representatives provides the organisation with great credibility in its work.

Many of the results of the organisation’s work are used as references in political processes and as professionally independent products used by the members of the organisation. To some extent the organisation has succeeded in taking the initiative to bring its members together to follow up the results of their work.

According to the evaluation much of the project activity organised thematically and geographically, yield documented results. The main problem for the organisation is however that it has expanded in line with greater demand for technical expertise. This has steered it increasingly in the direction of “assignment-based” activity. This has, as the evaluation states, been at the expense of its core activity, which is to set the agenda and influence international dialogues to promote biological and sustainable resource management.

IUCN’s unique organisational model gives it a comparative advantage by bringing the network of politics, expertise and interest organisations together in a dialogue. According to the evaluation, however this has not been exploited. The increasing focus on “assignment-based” activity has also been referred to in many earlier reviews. Nevertheless the organisation continues its focus on assignment-based activity, something that is ascribed to two conditions in particular:

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22 An area that the Norwegian Ministry of the Environment especially appreciates is IUCN’s normative work linked to the criteria for “Red List” and area protection.

• much of its financing is tied to project activity while it has limited funds to initiate its own activities in line with its mandate;
• the management model of the organisation has gradually become a project organisation with less emphasis on gathering and coordinating knowledge.

Some of the organisation’s unique value as an independent player and organiser of dialogue has therefore weakened over time. For the organisation to exploit its comparative merit as a global player, the evaluation points to the following:
• The organisation must involve its members to a greater extent, instead of focusing on financing for the projects.
• The organisation has grown to have more than 1,000 employees and contract staff employed on an increasingly large portfolio of assignments in more than 60 countries. This has turned IUCN into a business enterprise (consultancy firm) rather than a member-based organisation that could have limited itself in size and number of employees.
• IUCN was established to promote a global agenda; despite this more than 85% of its financing is from members’ development assistance budgets which limits the impact area and is tied to a development assistance agenda. This is in spite of the fact that IUCN has a global environmental agenda which is far wider and more comprehensive than the development agenda which directs international development assistance.

For Norway there is doubt as to whether IUCN represents an organisation with the advantages it once had in relation to other technical environments, which are now involved in assignment-based activity. This poses a challenge for member countries such as Norway, when considering future support for the organisation rather than using funds on other technical agencies to implement development assistance measures.

13.3 Will changes have the potential to increase the Added Value?

In the evaluation report a number of ambitious and comprehensive proposals are quoted to show how IUCN is to change its activity and organisation to regain its comparative advantage as a global player. It is said that there is a need to review IUCN’s thematic strategies and areas of activities, to make an action plan/business plan on the basis of this, and to allocate resources in line with the plan.

On a slightly more realistic level, the primary challenge is probably to switch focus away from the assignment activity to more of its own activity initiated by its members. This may meet today’s global environmental challenges in a qualified and neutral manner.

This will mean organisational changes and a probable reduction in staff and administrative infrastructure. This will always cause internal resistance. To succeed in this there is a need for involvement from outside, not least from member countries such as Norway and organisations in Norway. From the Norwegian side there is also a need to change from finance tied to a narrow development assistance agenda to instruments that are adapted to IUCN’s global agenda. To continue development assistance support tied to a narrow development assistance agenda (even if it is
called block grants) gives little added value in relation to the use of other assignment-based organisations in Norway and internationally.
14. Comparing the Evaluations

This synthesis study has assessed evaluations and reviews from selected multilateral development banks, the UN-system's programmes and organisations and NGOs, on the basis of their relevance and suitability as channels for implementation of Norwegian-financed environmental assistance based on the priorities in the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan of 2006.

The analysis has exposed some clear differences between the various types of organisations, in the way they prepare and implement projects and measures. It also shows the potential for controlling and checking the results and whether measures have been planned and implemented in a cost-effective manner. To a significant extent these differences reflect different organisations and system cultures, which again must be assumed to be a result of the way these various types of organisations finance their projects and operations.

In table 14.1 the organisations are aggregated into three groups:
- Multilateral development banks
- UN programmes and organisations
- NGOs

The synthesis shows that the multilateral development banks and GEF score highest on the chosen UNEG criteria. Then come the NGOs, with the UN system ending last.
Table 14.1 Assessment hallmarks of the various types of relevant MOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Practices RBM and contraxtual supervision</th>
<th>Enables added value analyses</th>
<th>Makes it possible to identify the effect of Norwegian support</th>
<th>Is recipient driven</th>
<th>Degree of cost-efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral development banks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>Yes, systematically and very well documented</td>
<td>Yes, systematically and very well documented</td>
<td>Only for Norwegian trust funds and then only partly</td>
<td>Yes, to a large extent</td>
<td>Good monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>Yes, systematically and well documented</td>
<td>Yes, systematically and well documented</td>
<td>No, does not accept tied assistance</td>
<td>Yes, to a large extent</td>
<td>Reasonably good monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
<td>Yes, systematically and very well documented</td>
<td>Yes, systematically and very well documented</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, at least in principle</td>
<td>Gradually deteriorated over time, Great delays both in planning and implementation phase but with measures to improve efficiency on the way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN programmes and organisations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>No, has not managed for its own projects</td>
<td>Only for GEF projects</td>
<td>No, only at direct project support and then only in part</td>
<td>Yes, local projects, but to a lesser extent for GEF projects</td>
<td>Quite cumbersome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>No, but is due for introduction</td>
<td>Only for GEF projects, but maybe if they succeed in practising RBM as a routine</td>
<td>Only for projects in the cooperation agreement, and then only partly</td>
<td>To a very limited degree</td>
<td>Very inefficient, time-consuming and with high transaction costs, e.g. because of dependence on UNON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Practices RBM and contrafactual supervision</td>
<td>Enables added value analyses</td>
<td>Makes it possible to identify the effect of Norwegian support</td>
<td>Is recipient driven</td>
<td>Degree of cost-efficiency</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Yes, but only focused on input and not on results</td>
<td>In general no, only for individual projects</td>
<td>Only for some projects in the co-operation agreement, and then only partly</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Very inefficient, time-consuming and high transaction costs. Top-heavy, inefficient management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>No, but supposedly under introduction</td>
<td>No, but perhaps if they succeed in applying RBM as a routine</td>
<td>Only for projects under the co-operation agreement, and then only in part</td>
<td>Partly</td>
<td>Appears to be cumbersome and inefficiently managed, e.g. due to dependence on UNON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVU</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, it was wholly financed by Norwegian support, which ceased after the evaluation</td>
<td>No, it is managed by Norwegians</td>
<td>So far no signs of cost savings in relation to the MSc grant programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission for Sustainable Development</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Waste of money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global environmental conferences under the auspices of UN</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Waste of money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>Now and then</td>
<td>No, only partly if the projects are directly financed by Norway</td>
<td>Yes, and no, most-ly supply driven</td>
<td>Are becoming expensive consultants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The results for each of the MOs reviewed are summarised in the matrix below. If verifiable and efficient use of environmental development funds is what is sought, the multilateral development banks immediately stand out as ready for use. The GEF has gradually developed such a complicated and cumbersome system in the search for perfection, that the cost-efficiency and time discipline has a considerable potential for improvement. The two NGOs will also be functional after certain structural changes, while UN’s programmes and organisations do not appear as very competitive if documented and verifiable results and cost-efficiency are critical factors in selection.

**Table 14.2: Ranking of MOs for suitability as a channel for Norwegian environmental assistance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Result evaluation</th>
<th>Added value for Norway</th>
<th>Conclusion/recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased added value through increased grants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>Many verified results globally and regionally (e.g. GEF projects), more varied results nationally</td>
<td>Considerable added value by support through global programmes</td>
<td>Potential for increased and extended support for global programmes where Norway also has technical advantages. Potential for extended cooperation with the World Bank at national and bilateral level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>Many verified results globally and regionally (e.g. of GEF projects), more varied result nationally</td>
<td>Considerable added value by support through regional and national programmes</td>
<td>Potential for increased and extended support for regional programmes where Norway also has technical advantages. Potential for extended cooperation with the Asian Development Bank at national and bilateral level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Verified results for a large amount of the activity despite high transaction costs</td>
<td>Considerable added value of its global environmental focus</td>
<td>Continued support and possibility for increased added value and increased efficiency in reorganisation of GEF’s planning/follow-up model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Result evaluation</td>
<td>Added value for Norway</td>
<td>Conclusion/recommendation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FAO</strong></td>
<td>Many results but low efficiency. Difficult to measure effects on the basis of present RBM routines</td>
<td>High transaction costs in general support</td>
<td>Earmarked support for areas where FAO has a comparative advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IIED</strong></td>
<td>Verified results in study areas where IIED has special competence</td>
<td>General support from Norway which is applied also in areas where IIED does not have advantages reduces the added value</td>
<td>Continue block grants but with stricter regulations for IIED directed at specific areas where they have special competence or earmarked support for these areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP</strong></td>
<td>Relatively low efficiency in relation to UNDP’s national environmental goals in developing countries. High efficiency in GEF-financed projects. Is still weak in relation to RBM.</td>
<td>Indirect through Norway’s financing of GEF, but to the extent where bilateral donors have contributed directly, they have had “low value for money”.</td>
<td>Increased environmental cooperation with bilateral donors earmarked for environmental actions with active follow-up, may influence UNDP’s choice of measures/projects/programmes and potentially bring added value for Norway by exploiting complementarity between local and global components</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IUCN</strong></td>
<td>Many verified results, especially normative ones, but has lost a lot of credibility through “market orienting” its activity to finance an organisation growing away beyond its original mandate.</td>
<td>Decreasing added value because of the “market orientation” of its activity. Has gradually become a supplier of technical services rather than an independent institution bringing new knowledge.</td>
<td>Continued general assistance as well as focussing on its activity as an independent professional institution with reduced emphasis on the need for financing through assignment-based activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GVU</strong></td>
<td>Verified impacts, but not lasting results.</td>
<td>Potential for increased impact by separating GVU’s support activity.</td>
<td>Irrelevant as candidate since Norwegian development assistance stopped as a result of the evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Increased added value through change of funding methods and/or the activities of the organisation**

**Increased added value through change of funding methods and considerable change in the activities of the organisation**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Result evaluation</th>
<th>Added value for Norway</th>
<th>Conclusion/recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNEP</strong></td>
<td>Beyond taking the initiative to, and establishing of multilateral environmental agreements, global environmental monitoring and various training/information programmes, UNEP activities have very many and diverse goals, often expressed in terms that are difficult to measure and check without a well-functioning RBM system.</td>
<td>Difficult to verify because of low degree of management by objectives.</td>
<td>Norway should focus and limit its environmental assistance through UNEP to normative areas and environmental monitoring, where UNEP has shown that they are technically strong compared with other multilateral institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UN-HABITAT</strong></td>
<td>Evaluations conclude that there are many relevant measures, but difficult to quantify results without a well-functioning RBM system.</td>
<td>Difficult to verify because of low management by objectives of the activity.</td>
<td>Grants from Norway should focus on normative environmental efforts, and preferably in close cooperation with UNEP’s work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commission for Sustainable Development</strong></td>
<td>Few verified results</td>
<td>Small, perhaps even negative added value for Norway as driver</td>
<td>Should consider winding down support for CSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global environmental conferences under UN auspices</strong></td>
<td>No results after UNCED in 1992.</td>
<td>No documented results of substantial value for the target groups Norway officially wants to reach with its development assistance.</td>
<td>Only participation without costly preparations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendixes
APPENDIX 1: 
Terms of Reference

Terms of reference for synthesis of evaluations of multilateral organisations’ development assistance related to the environment

1 Purpose of the memo

In its strategy Norad have focussed on learning as much as possible from their own evaluations, but also from evaluations of the activities of other donors. Comparing the experience of different donors makes it possible to assess weak and strong sides of various forms of measures, as well as the efforts of the various development assistance players.

This memo is a description of the Terms of Reference for the work of combining the experience in development assistance related to environmental efforts through bilateral organisations which have received Norwegian funding during the past five years. Multilateral organisations have key roles in the Norwegian Action Plan for the Environment within development assistance cooperation, but there is little systematised knowledge about the quality and the results of their activity. This assignment is however limited to systematising experience drawn from a selection of recent reports from evaluations and reviews of multilateral channels supported with Norwegian finance, and a few relevant research articles. The reports and the articles are specified in a subsequent appendix.

2 Background

The multilateral organisations (MO) have been the most important international channels for environmental development assistance based on the budgets’ objectives measured in US$. The MO concept here embraces development banks, UN organisations and other multilateral organisations. Bilateral environmental assistance has however been most important on the part of Norway. During the period 1980-1999, barely 44% of the Norwegian environmental assistance was multilateral, according to Hicks et al. (who uses another definition of environmentally related development assistance than what is common practice in The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad). In recent years Norway has allowed an increasing part of the environmental assistance to be channelled through multi and multi-bilateral agencies according to Norad’s statistics, and thus the bilateral share has dropped from 71% in 2005 to 60% in 2007.

Assistance to developing countries has generally become much more environmentally focussed during the 1980s and 1990s. In the period 1980-1999, 17 out of...
19 donor countries increased their environmentally directed assistance considerably (the only exception in this period was New Zealand and Norway). Denmark was without comparison the donor with the highest number of environmentally related projects measured in budget funds per inhabitant ($181) in these years, while Norway was amongst the five countries which allocated $50 or more. This picture has probably changed significantly in recent years, at least on the part of Norway, which increased its allocations for environmental development assistance by 62% from 2005 to 2007 (see table 1 in appendix 2).

The multilateral organisations (MOs) tripled their budgets for environmentally related assistance up to 1999, and this represents a clear increase in environmentally friendly measures compared with “non-environmentally friendly” or “dirty” measures. The greatest growth in multilateral development assistance in 1980-1999 was however within “environmentally neutral” forms, such as health, education etc., which do not have direct environmental impacts.

In general the international environmental development assistance via MO during the years 1980-1999 was extremely concentrated, with 90% of the environmental funds channelled through only five different agencies; The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ASDB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), EU and the Global Environmental Fund (GEF). The World Bank, which alone made up 1/3 of the environmentally related allocations amongst MOs, increased their environmental measures by almost 90% from 1980 to 1999. But the rate of growth was far greater in many other MOs (the EU Commission increased its environmental allocations by 600%). Significant sums and large increases in environmental efforts also took place within OPEC’s development fund (OFID) and the Islamic Development Bank (the latter is probably an unexpected development, seen from the West). Only the African Development Bank (AFDB) reduced its environmental allocations during this 20-year period.

The Norwegian multilateral environmental allocations have also been very concentrated with almost 85% of the allocations in 2004-2005 going through five different channels. The World Bank and UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) were allocated most of the environmental assistance with around NOK 100 million each year, while IBRD (the World Bank’s “unit for middle-income countries”), the GEF and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) also received significant allocations in these years. Fifteen other multilateral organisations received environmentally related support from Norway, of which UNDP was amongst the most important. In comparison with the general international support via MO, only a small amount of Norwegian environmental support was channelled through the regional development banks.

The evaluation reports and the research articles that form the basis for this knowledge overview only cover some of the many multilateral players which have been central in the international, also the Norwegian, environmental-related assistance. A summary of the experience drawn from these sources is therefore not likely to

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25 See the ref. above (p.189)
give a representative or overall picture, neither of the Norwegian-supported mea-
ures through MO, nor of the general international environmental assistance through
such channels. The systematisation has a more limited purpose, where the focus is
not on how much resources are channelled through MO, but what are the docu-
mented results of MO’s environmental efforts and their ability to implement such
measures.

3 The objective of the knowledge overview

The fact that governments more often let their development assistance pass
through multilateral organisations is “instrumental” in the sense that these are
measures geared to achieve certain results (which are not always clearly formulated
and thus possible to evaluate). Channelling resources through MOs can, according
to Hicks et al. (2008) be seen as “outsourcing” where the purpose is partly to:
– obtain increased influence on the efforts of an organisation and the develop-
ment assistance system in general,
– implement measures a donor is not able to implement on his own, but has to
coordinate with others (such as taking care of benefits of global character, such
as the protection of biodiversity and prevent climate changes), and in part
– implement measures more efficiently than by using bilateral or other channels
which do not have access to the same expertise as large and specialised MOs
have (whether this refers to special technical competence or to conditions in a
recipient nation/institution).

The objective of this systematisation of experience is not to shed light on Norwegian
“outsourcing” of the environmental assistance to multilateral organisations in
general, but to assess whether the reports in hand indicated that:

i. through its allocations Norway has gained greater influence and achieved better
efficiency in the environmentally related development assistance, both in
respect of individual organisations and the environmentally related development
assistance work in general.

In addition, the systematisation of experience is intended to – to the degree the
reports allow this to:

ii. meet The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ wish for information which can shed light
on strong and weak sides on the environmental efforts of the various MOs, and
which organisations are best suited to implement Norwegian environmental
policy as it is stated in the Environmental Action Plan and made operative in
the current activity. Important conditions to have examined would be compara-
tive merits assessed on the basis of OECD’s common evaluation criteria
(relevance, goal achievement, efficiency, sustainability, impacts), in addition to
giving priority to the environment as a cross-sectoral theme, as well as to the
Norwegian key themes specified in the Environmental Action Plan. The MOs’
own capability to implement and coordinate the performance with other players
is another aspect that needs to be looked into, and to what extent results are
reported for MOs as a whole and for recipient countries and their populations.
iii. find out which environmentally related measures that seem to be more or less successful, whether this means influencing the activities of various players, or results in the form of changes in environmental conditions and living conditions for the population

It shall also provide a better basis for subsequently being able to document the results of Norwegian environmentally development assistance, including:

iv. assessing the quality and importance of the reporting systems that the individual multilateral organisation and MOs have established in general. The quality is based on the relevance and reliability of the reports that are produced, while an indicator of the impact may be how the affected parties react to, and follow up, findings and recommendations in the evaluations (in the form of “management response” etc.). Such assessments are essential as it is difficult for Norway to implement evaluations only of what are the results of the activities of a multilateral institution. One point of departure for the assessments shall be DAC’s and UNEG’s quality standards for evaluations, and to what degree these have been followed up both in relation to evaluation processes and the technical contents of the reports.

v. contributing with baseline data on environmental performance of various multilateral players as it was just before and during the start-up of the implementation of the Norwegian Environmental Action Plan. The baseline data will then include the efforts for the environment as transverse data and within each part of the prioritised themes in the action plan, as well as assess the performance in accordance with DAC’s normal criteria as outlined under point ii above. Such baseline data will be important in order to assess what will be the long-term impacts of the Norwegian action plan, which the action plan requires to have evaluated in 2015 or just after:

The majority of the evaluation reports that make up the base material for this knowledge overview have had other objectives than to shed light on the results of Norwegian environmental development assistance. It is therefore not reasonable to expect that the reports provide the information one would have preferred in order to assess the efforts and the results of the different MOs from a Norwegian perspective, and which would have been desirable based on the Norwegian environmental action plan. Neither is it reasonable to expect that reports and technical articles be formulated on the basis of new technical “quality norms” or standards intended for other organisations.

The use of the Norwegian environmental action plan and DAC’s/UNEG’s quality standards as a starting point for evaluations is therefore only meant as an aid for identifying strong and weak sides of the activities of the various MOs and their reporting systems – from newer “Norwegian criteria”. These aids will probably help clarify joint features and differences in the evaluation reports, and to which degree facts, conclusions and recommendations pull in the same direction.
4 Reporting
An oral reporting relating to UNDP’s and the World Bank’s environmental evaluations was expected in connection with a joint seminar planned in Oslo at the end of January 2009 or the beginning of February, in which UNDP and WB were to present their latest environmental evaluations for The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norad.

The synthesis report is to be written in Norwegian, but will be translated into English as it is expected to be of international interest. The report shall have a brief summary of the most important findings and shall also provide recommendations on what and how Norwegian environmental management may contribute to multilateral organisations improving their environmentally related activity. The final report will be submitted electronically and be ready for printing according to EVAL standard format for synthesis reports.

5 Budget and timescale
The assignment is estimated to take eight weeks of 40 hours and is based on it being a desk study, where the Evaluation Unit supplies most of the reports and other documentation electronically and paper versions at start-up. Cost estimates are to include all expenses except printing costs and translation into English.

The Evaluation Unit announces a limited call for tenders on 19 November with closing date for submission of tenders 15 December and an allocation of the assignment on 3 January. The review will take place medio January – March with a draft report having been submitted by 31 March 2009. Final report is submitted two weeks following the receipt of the comments from the Evaluation Unit.

6 Criteria for the choice of consultant
The main criterion for choice of consultant will be technical competence within analysis/evaluation/review of the environmental performance of multilateral organisations, where broad experience and professional quality will be essential (50%). Experience of synthesis studies within the technical field will be important (20%). Price (20%) and supply capacity (10%) will also count. Interested bidders must include an overview of former relevant assignments.
Appendix 1-1: 
Relevant evaluation reports/articles on environmental development assistance by multilateral organisations

Early on in the process the consultant should consider if there are also relevant evaluations of the environmental efforts by the regional banks, UN-HABITAT and other important players receiving financial support from Norway, and accordingly supplement these if such reports are identified in the course of the work.

The following reports have so far been identified as relevant and appropriate:

United Nations institutions in general:

GEF
- Joint Evaluation of the GEF Activity Cycle and Modalities. 2007 (May).
- Evaluation report No. 33. GEF Evaluation Office
- The Role of Local Benefits in Global Environmental Programs. 2006. Evaluation report No. 30. GEF’s Evaluation Office

UNEP

The World Bank

A Synthesis of Evaluations of Environmental Development Assistance by Multilateral Organisations
IUCN

FAO

UN-HABITAT
Appendix 1.2: Environmentally related development assistance 2005-07 on bilateral and multilateral partners

Table 1: Development Assistance with policy marker\(^1\) environment as main, or partial goal according to development assistance type 2005-07 (NOK 1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>931,022</td>
<td>904,986</td>
<td>1,274,850</td>
<td>3,109,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-bilateral</td>
<td>350,359</td>
<td>432,940</td>
<td>680,004</td>
<td>1,463,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral(^2)</td>
<td>169,675</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total(^3)</td>
<td>1,309,559</td>
<td>1,552,889</td>
<td>2,124,529</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) An agreement may have none or several policy markers. They are therefore not reciprocally exclusive.

2) Figures based on the assessment by the Environmental Unit in The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Multilateral support to the following organisations: ITTO, IUCN, UNCCD, UNEP, UNFCC, UN-HABITAT, UNIDO

Only total figures for 2005 and 2006 are presented, as the figures base is not updated in relation to changes in the statistical classification of 2007.

3) Includes multilateral support calculated by the Environmental Unit in The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Table 2: Multi-bilateral development assistance coded with policy marker\(^4\) environment as main or partial goal according to agreement partner 2005-07 (NOK 1,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement partner</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>Grand total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDB – African Development Bank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,841</td>
<td>10,841</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDB – Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>3,523</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>28,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFOR – Centre for International forestry Research</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comisión Trinacional del Plan Trifinio/Trinational Commission for the Trifino Plan</td>
<td>3,958</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>5,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
<td>16,985</td>
<td>29,850</td>
<td>53,166</td>
<td>100,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF – Global Environment Facility</td>
<td>43,952</td>
<td>43,952</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>111,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRID – Arendal</td>
<td>11,036</td>
<td>13,310</td>
<td>12,750</td>
<td>37,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRISAT – International Crop Research for Semi-Arid Tropics</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>27,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO – International Labour Organisation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infopeche – Intergovernmental Organization for Marketing Information &amp; Fishery Products</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPGRI – International Plant Genetic Resources Institute</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITTO – Int. Tropical Timber Org.</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN – The World Conservation Union</td>
<td>9,003</td>
<td>9,048</td>
<td>16,657</td>
<td>34,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norges Bank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>2,596</td>
<td>6,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>3,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEF – Poverty and Environment Fund</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN diverse</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>716</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN General Trust Fund</td>
<td>14,144</td>
<td>2,088</td>
<td>16,232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN/International Strategy for Disaster Reduction</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP – UN Development Programme</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>56,248</td>
<td>174,518</td>
<td>250,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNECE – United Nations Economic Commission for Europe</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP – Un Environment Programme</td>
<td>29,456</td>
<td>34,752</td>
<td>29,682</td>
<td>93,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO – UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
<td>9,840</td>
<td>2,460</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFF – United Nations Forum on Forest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>302</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-HABITAT – United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR – UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>21,221</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO – UN Development Organisation</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>8,450</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>20,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED NATIONS OFFICE IN NAIROBI</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Total Number of Evaluations</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO – UN Organisation</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5,594</td>
<td>8,722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS – UN Office for Project Services</td>
<td>2,946</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>7,062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNV – UN volunteers</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>448</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URC-UNEP Risoe Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP – World Food Programme</td>
<td>24,825</td>
<td>24,825</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>2,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIPO – World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>481</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>27,015</td>
<td>14,510</td>
<td>58,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WorldFish Centre</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>350,359</td>
<td>432,940</td>
<td>680,004</td>
<td>1,463,303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2:
UNEG’s Standards and Norms for Evaluations

DAC’s/UNEG’s quality standards and assessment norms form a well prepared and
tested basis on which to draw conclusions about the validity and reliability of the
evaluation reports’ methods (for instance: are DAC’s five evaluation criteria correctly
taken care of, and are suitable data for drawing conclusions along these lines been
discussed as basis for efficiency and impact conclusions), presentation and docu-
m entation of the contributions of financed development assistance activities to
results achievement, based on the evaluations in the selected reports and articles.

UNEG’s quality standards for review and utility assessment of evaluation reports
contain 18 dimensions as follow, and they provide some possibility for comparing
the quality of what is evaluated across evaluated activities:

1. The front page (title page) should reflect the main message, and the first page
   in the report should contain de most important conclusions and recommenda-
   tions.

2. The evaluation reports must contain a short and concise summary of the
   conclusions and recommendations (executive summary).

3. The activity under evaluation must be clearly described for instance in the form
   of a model structure with markers and preconditions which can be registered
   before start-up and are projected on the condition that the measure is not
   implemented (baseline), and which is monitored concurrently in the implemen-
   tation phase and after, both against “baseline” and against the preconditions
   about the development of the project, which formed the basis for decision for
   implementing the project. This is in order to be able to identify the “added
   value” to which the activity/development assistance allocation has contributed,
   and to what extent this may be deemed a success. (Whether it is possible to
draw out the effect of a Norwegian contribution in a relevant project cannot be
stated on a general basis).

4. The role of and the contribution from the relevant MO and other subcontractors/
   project participants – including Norad/The Ministry of Foreign Affairs – must be
   clearly described if a contribution from the subcontractor to the activity is to be
   identified.
5. The purpose of, and the context the evaluation is part of must be clearly described.

6. The evaluation report should contain an explanation of the chosen evaluation criteria.

7. The evaluation report should contain an unequivocal description and explanation of the purpose of the evaluation and what the evaluation is to include/cover.

8. The evaluation report should indicate as to what extent the problem of gender roles and relevant human rights considerations have been taken care of.

9. The evaluation method used should be described in a clear and unequivocal way, also the limitations the chosen method and available data mean for drawing conclusions along DAC’s five evaluation dimensions.

10. The evaluation report should present a complete description of affected interest groups and their degree of participation in the process.

11. The evaluation report should contain a discussion as to what degree the evaluation design itself contains ethical safety arrangements where this is relevant.

12. In the presentation of conclusions and recommendations performance, results and various effects should be possible to monitor/verify, or at least a good reason should be given for why such quantification will not be meaningful.

13. The analysis should contain a relevant and adapted discussion of the contributions by various interest groups.

14. The evaluation report should as far as possible identify the reasons for results achievement or the lack of such, and identify difficulties that have arisen which have resulted in lower results achievement than originally intended.

15. The evaluation report’s conclusions must be substantiated by the analyses which have used the chosen method for analysis of collected information/data. The conclusions in the evaluation report must provide insight that identify and give proposals for solutions to important problems/obstacles for results achievement.

16. Recommendations should be well substantiated by representative data and analyses based on the chosen method, be relevant and realistic, and contain recommended clear priorities for action and measures.

17. Experience and insight that are presented should be generalised for use in a wider connection and relevant areas for application should be indicated.
18. The evaluation report should contain relevant and complete enclosures so that more detailed insight on various effects and consequences may be sought.

It is important to emphasise that this point of departure should only be regarded as an aid/checklist to map out the clarity and quality, and the reliability of the implemented evaluation, and through this the validity of the conclusions that are drawn. In this the answer below the standards 9 and 16 will play a key role, as these two standards provide a basis for assessing whether the project/measure subject to evaluation has been initially arranged in such a way that relevant and reliable “baseline” data are gathered to form the basis for a realistic “with/without” impact analysis, both of short-term and long-term impacts. This is crucial in order to:

II. clarify strong and weak sides of the environmental performance by various MOs and on this basis identify which organisations can be best employed to implement Norwegian policy as set out in the Environmental Action Plan and is being operationalised in the current activity

III. assess the quality and the importance of the reporting system which the individual multilateral organisation and MOs generally have established

At the same time it is important to emphasise that the possibility to draw clear conclusions along DAC’s five evaluation dimensions from the presented reports depends directly on the quality (standard) of the reports measured with the help of the 18 standards presented above.

UNEG’s evaluation norms are organised in 13 categories, each with a number of detailed sub-norms, where the first ones clarify what the evaluations are to comprise and contribute to, and how evaluation sets itself apart from other types of analyses and controls, and where the main question will always be focused on relevance, efficiency, impact/utility, sustainability; i.e. this is something that should be done – in contrast to what one has chosen to do in a regular way (i.e. what the audit control will focus on).

Other categories of UNEG’s evaluation norms focus on

b) the responsibility for the evaluation
c) evaluation policy
d) the intention of the evaluation
e) impartiality f) independence
g) ability to be evaluated
h) evaluation quality
i) evaluation competence
j) transparency/access and consultations
k) evaluation ethics
l) follow-up of evaluation, and
m) the contribution of the evaluation to learning, competence and capacity building
It is however important to remember that even though the mentioned reports might receive a high score based on an assessment following UNEG’s standards and norms, it does not follow that the reports make it possible to identify the partial effect of Norway’s contribution to the evaluated measures. The reason for this is that the evaluation mandates of the MOs mostly do not make it meaningful to focus on the impacts of the individual donor’s passive financial support. Instead the focus should be that through such support the individual donor has prioritised projects and measures on the basis of the above-mentioned objectives and the measures outlined in his own concrete environmental action plan, and has assessed that these objectives can be reached more effectively in the implementation through the MO channels than if they were attempted to be implemented bilaterally in isolation. Thus it is quite possible that an MO may emerge as a very good channel for conveying special measures supported by Norway vis-à-vis the Environmental Action Plan even though the project and its evaluation do not mention Norway’s support explicitly.
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