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Foreword

The mandate of Norad’s Evaluation Department is to initiate independent evaluations of Norwegian aid in order to contribute to learning and to hold the development aid administration accountable. Last year the Evaluation Department carried out four evaluations and three studies. In addition we have supported five evaluations undertaken by the evaluation offices of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. This annual report presents summaries of findings and recommendations based on these reports.

Many evaluations call for the use of Theory of Change in development aid. Theory of Change has become an increasingly popular term in aid work and evaluations in a number of other countries, while it is relatively little used in Norway. But what is Theory of Change?

Briefly, Theory of Change is a description of how it is thought that an intervention contributes to a desired change. It describes the change processes that will presumably come about in the situation at hand and within a given social, institutional and political context, and explains how the relevant intervention plays a part in these processes. It thereby makes explicit which assumptions underpin the intervention to create results. This is important information for making a decision about an aid intervention and for putting the correct strategies in place. Theories of change may be made before, during and following an intervention, and will generally alter as experience is gained.

In addition to being a planning tool, Theory of Change is also useful in evaluation work. There is much to be learned from evaluating what happened compared to what was presupposed in the Theory of Change. Moreover, a Theory of Change is often a necessary tool for assessing causality, i.e. the degree to which it was actually the aid intervention which caused the changes observed. This is especially interesting in light of developments in the past few years in many aid recipient countries. As a result of economic growth, for example, improvements are occurring in the majority of the development goals. Therefore many aid interventions can report on achievement of objectives, but we cannot take for granted that the improvements are attributable to aid. Further analysis – and a Theory of Change – is required to give an evaluation of aid contribution to the achievement of development goals.

A Theory of Change is actually no more than a strategy, and in development aid the Theory of Change is most often reflected in what is referred to as a results framework. However, the fact that the demand for better Theories of change in the last few years has arisen from the evaluation community is because the Theories of change in development aid are often not suitable for evaluation purposes. Firstly, the results framework places most emphasis on the types of results to be achieved, not on how they are to be achieved. Those responsible may have had many thoughts, but have perhaps not written them down in such a way that we can learn from them afterwards. The evaluators may have a demanding job to reconstruct the original Theory of Change. Secondly, there has been a tendency to look at the role of aid in isolation without taking account of all the other factors that play a part in change, both positive and negative. Thirdly, the results framework of development aid has placed little emphasis on the weakest link in the results chain: important assumptions that form the foundation, but which cannot be taken for granted. From an evaluation perspective it is often the weak links in
the Theory of Change that are most significant, for it is by studying these more closely that we can help reduce uncertainty and improve aid.

The Evaluation Department has as its overarching objective to contribute to quality and effectiveness in development cooperation. Our Theory of Change entails that through the evaluations we acquire knowledge of how aid is working, what it is leading to, whether it is relevant and for whom. This is knowledge that is used by decision makers and those responsible for the planning and implementation of aid. This Theory of Change is based on a number of assumptions, for example that the evaluations are of good quality and provide useful knowledge, and that those who work with aid are interested in learning. None of these can be taken for granted. We are continuously working to improve the evaluation work to render it as useful as possible. By publishing all evaluation results we help to hold decision makers and the aid administration to account through the media and public debate, which can increase interest in learning from the evaluations. External factors that influence our work include a diversity of cross-cutting priorities and objectives, highly complex conditions in the recipient country, methodological challenges that render it difficult to provide definitive answers to difficult questions, and limited resources.

Based on this year’s evaluations and studies, as in previous years, we highlight some lessons that we believe may be relevant for development cooperation. Firstly, we see that proper preparations are important for results measurement and evaluation. Evaluations are often complicated by a failure to make provision for obtaining important information from the outset. Practical preparatory work is an important part of the solution, but organizational change is also required. Secondly, coordination of aid is an important prerequisite to achieve the greatest possible impact. This concerns coordination between donors and local authorities, but also between donors, especially in humanitarian aid. Thirdly, we address how fostering local participation requires knowledge of local conditions. One should have knowledge of local power structures and be aware of how aid impacts on these.

Finally we provide an overview of the follow-up status of all our evaluations since 2009. New for 2014 is that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ own follow-up of our evaluations is published on the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation’s website. Here you can keep up with how and to what extent our evaluations are followed up, which is perhaps an indication of the degree to which the evaluation work is functioning.

The need for good preparatory work is a recurring topic throughout this annual report. A Theory of Change can be an important first step, but this must in due course be adapted as the conditions alter. The three experiences we highlight should be considered at a preparatory stage. Moreover we have included a separate section on evaluation at the outset of an aid intervention, in which we share some examples of how evaluations benefit from thorough preparatory work.

Tale Kvalvaag
Director
Evaluation Department
Lessons from 2013
Lessons from 2013

1. The importance of proper preparations for results measurement and evaluation

Those who conduct evaluations will primarily base these on currently available data. The main source of such data is the inbuilt systems for results measurement in each of the interventions. If this type of information is lacking or is of insufficient quality, the evaluation work will, in the best case, be more costly and in the worst case it will make many forms of evaluation impossible. Some information, such as baseline data on how the situation was at start-up, can be difficult to recreate retrospectively.

In order to evaluate an intervention it is also necessary to know what those responsible had originally thought the intervention should result in and how this should come about, whether this is described in a programme document, a results framework or a Theory of Change. As above, this is also difficult to recreate if it is not written down around the time of start-up.

This year’s evaluations indicate weaknesses in the results measurement systems. The evaluation of the Norway-India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health (NIPI) concludes that without a shared results framework for the initiative it is difficult to measure progress and results achieved. Despite some attempts to collect baseline data and develop indicators, it appears that these have either been incomplete or have not been used.

The real-time evaluation of Norway’s work on measurement, reporting, and verification of man-made forest-related greenhouse gas emissions as part of the Government of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative tells a similar story. The project has no results framework or similar mechanism which shows which Theory of Change lies behind it. A shared results framework of this type is particularly important in view of the fact that the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation are cooperating on this initiative. Our consultants therefore constructed a Theory of Change based on document analysis and dialogues with those responsible, which the project secretariat then approved. This formed the basis of a separate evaluation framework which the consultants used in their work.

The evaluation of how the aid administration provides the conditions for results measurement addresses the need for proper systems of results measurement at a systemic level. The report points to many opportunities for improvement when it comes to providing practical conditions for results measurement. However, it also states that such measures are not sufficient unless organizational change is undertaken simultaneously to ensure that the results documentation is more highly prioritized and requested by management.

How can we ensure that the conditions are created for results measurement in ways that give us necessary information with minimal use of resources? Can and should all results be measured? Is it reasonable to demand even more preparatory work and documentation, for example in the form of theories of change, in aid work that many believe has already become excessively bureaucratic? These are questions that the aid administration has posed for many years, and our evaluations show that they are still relevant – even though it is not obvious how they should be answered. One step in the right direction is to appreciate the basis already established with regard to results work by following up relevant requirements and guidelines,
and to ensure that results documentation leads to an improvement in development aid. Then it would be possible to consider further steps in the direction of more documentation, based on weighing up what is desirable against what is realistic.

2 Coordination as a necessary prerequisite

Aid is often characterized by many actors on the donor side who cooperate with recipients to create results. It is therefore important that the effort is coordinated both between donors and with national authorities, to achieve the maximum effect and to avoid overlap.

In the humanitarian field coordination is particularly crucial to ensure that the aid is effectively delivered. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) has established “coordination” as a separate criterion for evaluations. In the evaluation of five of the Norwegian Refugee Council’s humanitarian programmes, the organization’s coordination work was highlighted as an important element. Examples of this type of work are joint assessments and coordination meetings. The Norwegian Refugee Council’s coordination contributed to good relations with national and local authorities and thereby good access to the refugees. At a more general level this active participation in coordination work meant that the Norwegian Refugee Council contributed to a functioning humanitarian sector. The consultants therefore recommend that the Norwegian Refugee Council continues to invest in this type of coordination, and underline the importance of a recognition by donors that coordination has budgetary implications.

The evaluation of the Norway-India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health (NIPI) points out weaknesses in the management and administration of the intervention. According to the report the absence of a centralized coordination mechanism may have impacted on the effectiveness of the partnership, including through duplication of work. The consultants emphasize that coordination – everything from planning of surgical operations to better exchange of experiences – is important to ensure a strong association between state health systems and local health services, and to create synergies across the areas which NIPI works with.

Coordination is an important prerequisite for the success of aid, but this type of work takes time. Is there a willingness to set aside the necessary resources to ensure that the assistance is coordinated both with other donors and with local authorities? What is it that limits coordination: resource utilization, considerations of effectiveness – or is it at least equally a case of the individual donor organizations being insufficiently willing to adapt to each other or to yield authority to the recipient side?

3 Promoting local participation requires knowledge of local condition

A few years ago the Evaluation Department commissioned an evaluation of aid cooperation with Zambia for the period 1991 to 2005. At that time many believed that aid to Zambia had been less than effective because no change was perceived in poverty in that country. Power relations were used as an analytical framework to produce new explanatory models. The country was well on the way to being governed by an elite, with few effective spokespersons for the poor. Norway attempted to hold the government responsible by setting conditions
for aid, but also contributed to what the report describes as depoliticization of important development questions, and to a lack of connection between different policy areas.

Last year’s study of local participation in the health sector in Malawi indicates that something similar is happening at the local level. Most aid interventions will place an emphasis on participation by the local population. However, the report shows that it was only in the implementation phase of the interventions that the local population were drawn into the projects. They took part in the building of health clinics, but had no opportunity to participate in important decisions about where these should be located or what type of health services should be prioritized. In the relationship between educated health workers and patients with no education, the patients have little genuine influence on the design of services, and little opportunity to present their experiences and to complain about the services they receive.

This indicates conditions in aid that have been pointed to by many researchers: participation in development aid by the local public often has great limitations because the donors – and national authorities – are not always willing to delegate the most important questions to those who are affected. Instead it is often like the example from Malawi, that “participation” entails that the poor are permitted to take part in the implementation of projects, but are not given very much influence in their design, much less in the higher-level policy questions with regard to fighting poverty.

The study from Malawi concludes that if governments and donors wish to foster local participation, they need to understand the formal and informal power structures in a society and to anchor their work in these. The study of how the evaluations capture unintended effects of aid poses similar questions. It shows that several evaluations have questioned the extent to which the development actors lack knowledge of the power relations as such. Here, for example, it is pointed out that aid which was intended to influence local power relations in a particular direction may give different results than what was planned. The study shows an example of the donors forming a group opposed to local politicians so that these in turn feel powerless and thereby feel less ownership for the ongoing projects. It also points to a case in which an indigenous population organized by a Norwegian-funded activist ended up in violent confrontation with the police, which resulted in many deaths.

Local participation – i.e. that people in the target groups, particularly the poorest and most marginalized, have an influence on aid – is an important premise for Norwegian aid. Regardless of whether the Norwegian funding goes to small projects or to state institution-building, experience tells us that it may affect power relations, often in directions that are different from those that were desired or planned. This gives grounds for paying more attention to existing power structures and political conditions, for greater awareness of how aid can alter these both positively and negatively, and for daring to speak openly about polities rather than using a technical and academic language about social changes that are in essence political. The donors should perhaps also ask questions with regard to their own role in political questions, particularly in countries where there are democratically elected bodies both locally and nationally.
INSTITUTIONAL MAPPING
HENDA USIKU CATCHMENT AREA

- TBA
- Awa
- Community
  - Polyclinic
  - Community
  - Police
- SPUG
- VDC
- Social Welfare
- Health Centre
- Health
- Mitigation
- MONEY
- SPUG
- CHENDAUSIKU
- World Bank
Reports from the Evaluation Department
Background
As expressed in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, development policy emphasizes that the recipient country should have ownership of the aid it receives. The recipient country is often synonymous with the national authorities in the country. This study builds on the notion that it is also important to take into consideration ownership by those who receive aid.

The study consists of two reports: Report 1/2013 presents a general framework for analysing participation in development cooperation, while Report 2/2013 presents a detailed case study showing the framework applied to the health sector in Malawi. The study builds on data collection in six districts of Malawi.

Findings
The study discusses different forms of participation and analyses what pre-conditions must be in place for the local population to be able to participate in and have ownership of the development projects:
• It is important to understand how power relations affect local participation. There are often conflicting interests in a local population and not everyone has the same preconditions for promoting their interests or participating in the projects.
• It is a prerequisite that arenas exist where different groups of the local population can put forward their viewpoints. In Malawi local participation in the health sector was impeded by the absence of meeting places where the local population could effectively present their experiences and express their dissatisfaction with the health service.
• The opportunities for genuine participation increase if local authorities are given responsibility for resource distribution. There were limited opportunities for genuine participation in the health service in Malawi because all decisions on allocation for the projects were made at national level.

The report from the health sector in Malawi shows that it was only in the implementation phase of the interventions that the local population was drawn into the projects. For example, the local inhabitants participated in the building of health clinics, but had no opportunity to participate in decision-making concerning which health services should be prioritized or where the health clinics should be located. Ownership of the health interventions was therefore limited.

The study concludes that national governments and donors should embed the development interventions in the local communities and promote participation in these to a much greater degree than is the case today.

Recommendations
• Both national governments and donors should acquire more knowledge about the local population and the local community. A framework for analysis of local participation is presented in Report 1/2013, and is intended as a tool to obtain this type of knowledge. The framework can be used in planning, implementation and evaluation of development interventions.
• Local participation should be linked to the traditional institutions that already exist.
Evaluation of the Norway-India Partnership Initiative for maternal and child health

Background
The Norway-India Partnership Initiative (NIPI) is one of five initiatives that Norway has entered into with national governments, the objective of which is to work towards the achievement of Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5 – to reduce child mortality and improve maternal health. The partnership shall contribute to goal achievement by providing strategic, catalytic and innovative support to the national health programme in India. The interventions that are found to improve better maternal and child health may be scaled up by the national government. The Norway-India Partnership Initiative has supported activities in four Indian states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha and Rajasthan).

Purpose
The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the degree to which the partnership has achieved the objectives set, and to document any lessons learned that the partnership can carry over from the first phase of the initiative into the next.

Findings
We wish to highlight the following findings and issues:
• The Norway-India Partnership Initiative is seen as relevant and well suited to the national health programme and the government health system. According to the report the partnership’s main contribution has been to help put maternal and child health on the national health agenda in India.
• The initiative’s model of working through existing organizations instead of establishing parallel structures is appropriate. However, the report raises the question of whether the selection of partners should have been more strategic. For example, in the opinion of the evaluation team the cooperation with United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO) did not function optimally because funds were used to finance the normal activities of the organizations instead of experimenting with new activities in line with the objectives of the partnership. According to the report the cooperation with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has been more successful.
• The report finds a number of deficiencies in the organization of the partnership, including unclear distribution of roles between the different governing bodies. The report questions whether the organizational structure is top-heavy given the mandate for the partnership initiative and the size of the budget.
• The report also points out deficiencies with regard to the coordination of the various partners. According to the report the secretariat which should have this role has not functioned, which may have impacted on the effectiveness of the partnership initiative.
• Furthermore the report finds deficiencies with regard to monitoring and evaluation. These are deficiencies that have been pointed out previously. Both a review of the partnership initiative in 2010 and a study in 2011 recommended that the partnership should strengthen this component, including development of a results framework. This
recommendation has not been followed. The absence of such a results framework renders it difficult to evaluate whether the initiative has achieved the goal of improved maternal and child health in India.

- The report furthermore finds that the gender equality perspective is not systematically integrated into the activities that are supported by the partnership.
- From the case study in which the evaluation examines more closely the use of lay people as healthcare workers in the follow-up of mothers/children, the report finds that doctors, nurses and mothers have a positive perception of the services provided by lay people. However, the report points out that the scheme may have unintended effects. For example, lay people are allocated more and different tasks than they should have. Other challenges are related to training and salary. The report mentions, for example, that the offer of further training varies between the different states and that there have been problems with salaries not being paid when they should be.

**Recommendations**

Recommendations on future alignment and management of the partnership initiative:

- Select interventions and partners in line with the objectives of the partnership initiative.
- Clarify roles and responsibilities and improve coordination between the various actors.
- Strengthen monitoring and evaluation of the activities.
- Strengthen the financial reporting of the partnership.
- Consolidate and document the results of the various activities to provide an evidence base for Indian authorities in their selection of activities to be continued or scaled up.
- Integrate the gender equality perspective in interventions that are supported through the partnership. This entails, for example, formulation of gender-sensitive objectives and indicators and use of the data collected to further develop the interventions.
Evaluation of five humanitarian programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the standby roster NORCAP

Background
In 2010 the Norwegian Refugee Council received more than NOK 1.2 billion to carry out its work, of which approximately half came from Norwegian donors, in particular the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Measured by the number of employees, the Norwegian Refugee Council is the largest Norwegian humanitarian organization. After consultations with affected partners it was decided that the evaluation should cover the following five humanitarian programmes: Information, Counselling and Legal assistance (ICLA); Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD); shelter; camp operations; and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH). In addition the evaluation should more closely examine the investment in the standby roster NORCAP. Pakistan, Somalia and South Sudan were selected as case countries.

Purpose
The main purpose of the evaluation was to gain insight into and contribute to an enhancement of important humanitarian programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council, and of NORCAP’s activities generally.

Findings
The evaluation points out that the Norwegian Refugee Council has a decentralized organization, and that its employees are motivated and professionally competent. Its financial management is on the whole solid and adapted to the current challenges. However, the report refers to the fact that the organization often lacks baseline data for the interventions, that the selection of projects is based to a varying extent on funding opportunities rather than other considerations, and that emphasis is placed on achieving rapid, direct outputs rather than more long-term effects.

Other key findings and conclusions:
• The Norwegian Refugee Council coordinates the effort well with local authorities and other aid organizations.
• The organization has good access to difficult areas and acts with understanding and caution in conflict situations.
• The Norwegian Refugee Council’s work within the five areas investigated is generally assessed as relevant and effective, especially in the light of the difficult conditions in which the activities take place. At the same time, reference is made to a potential for improvement.

• The Norwegian Refugee Council’s systems for monitoring and evaluation are rudimentary and often focused on measurement of direct outputs rather than long-term impacts.
• In South Sudan the organization’s support systems were unable to deal with the rapid expansion that took place. The Oslo head office reacted late with interventions to improve its efforts, which affected the cost-effectiveness of the interventions.
• The Norwegian Refugee Council has an important challenge with regard to formulating exit strategies.
• Staff recruited through NORCAP are strongly motivated and find their work in international organizations to be meaningful, but there are weaknesses in the way in which they are followed up, and in how they are utilized in some organizations. Some of those seconded have insufficient access to relevant equipment and fewer opportunities
than regular employees to participate in useful training, orientation and meetings. In some organizations the weaknesses also apply to their security, according to their own accounts.

- The evaluation shows a high level of satisfaction in affected organizations with the work of those seconded, but this satisfaction has not been documented.
- A gradual expansion of the service period for seconded personnel has in practice created expectations of higher financial payments among those engaged on missions, who increasingly perceive their assignments as an almost full-time occupation.
- NORCAP’s objective of deploying seconded personnel within a period of 72 hours has gradually become less relevant, since seconded personnel increasingly travel on missions that are not directly connected with acute crises.

**Recommendations**

- The Norwegian Refugee Council should maintain its positive approach to coordination and cooperation in international humanitarian operations and should attempt to convince its donors that this has consequences in term of resources.
- A focus on short-term results should be supplemented by realistic and measurable objectives for medium and long-term efforts, and indicators should be defined.
- The Norwegian Refugee Council should continue its work to strengthen monitoring and evaluation with a view to being able to document what it achieves. It should develop methods for collecting baseline data and link these to monitoring reports.
- The organization should maintain and selectively increase its capacity to deliver results in the short term by investing in support systems.
- The Norwegian Refugee Council should continue its strategy of ensuring a high degree of competence and positive development of its national staff, and consider giving them a place on its board.
- The Norwegian Refugee Council should develop clear criteria for how it defines its core activities and should then prioritize its various activities differently depending on the level of ambition.
- As soon as possible the organization should introduce more control mechanisms to ensure that support systems are adequate in periods of rapid expansion.
- The deadline for deployment of NORCAP-seconded staff should be adapted to the type of assignment.
- The process for extending secondment periods should be strengthened and formalized.
- NORCAP’s relative strength should be ensured through the utilization of seconded personnel for activities that are consistent with NORCAP’s mandate.
- NORCAP should reinforce the mechanisms to ensure that strategies, policy guidelines, legislative provisions, rules and regulations are followed. This applies especially to risk management.
Evaluation of support to measurement, reporting and verification of emissions of man-made forest-related greenhouse gases

**Background**
The Norwegian government launched its climate and forest initiative in December 2007 and pledged up to NOK 3 billion annually to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+). A central component of REDD+ and for Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative is to measure, report and verify emissions from man-made forest-related greenhouse gases. This type of data is important if developing countries are to receive payment for results they achieve by reducing emissions. The initiative is the subject of a real-time evaluation that begun in 2010.

**Purpose**
The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the support given by the initiative for Measurement, Reporting and verification (MRV) and the extent to which this support has contributed to the objectives of the initiative. The evaluation examined three factors: 1) the degree to which the support has contributed to national capacity building and institutional strengthening of systems for measuring, reporting and verification; 2) the degree to which the support has been coordinated with the work of other actors; and 3) the effectiveness of different channels and where possible a comparison of these.

The evaluation covers the period 2007-2013, and encompasses field work in Indonesia, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guyana.

**Findings**
Contribution to the objectives of the climate and forest initiative:

- The support to measurement, reporting and verification has contributed with important lessons learned to the debate at an international level during climate negotiations. This in turn has contributed to the objective of the initiative to work towards the inclusion of REDD+ in the global agreement on climate change.
- The progress of the work towards the objective of verifiable reduction of greenhouse gas emissions has been variable, with Guyana as a successful example.
- There are still very few countries that have a fully functioning system for measurement, reporting and verification whereby they can receive payment for results. The costs of establishing systems for measurement, reporting and verification are relatively high.
- There is uncertainty about how far a future global agreement will secure adequate international financing to make it worthwhile for a country to build up comprehensive, costly MRV systems. Here there are wide differences between countries, including with regard to the costs involved in establishing such systems.
- However, the evaluation shows that systems of measurement, reporting and verification have an added value even though they may not provide access to international financing, because they build on national needs associated with the forest sector and land use, which in turn contributes to the systems’ sustainability.
- Measurements in Guyana have proved useful in increasing control of deforestation in areas of natural forest. This contributes to the objective of safeguarding natural forest.
- In countries with limited man-power resources there is a potential risk that increased resources
for measurement, reporting and verification may result in lower staffing for forest protection.

- Activities related to measurement, reporting and verification have not provided, and cannot be expected to provide, direct contributions to development objectives. However, a positive effect of developing such systems is increased openness about information related to forest management.

Contribution to capacity building, coordination and effectiveness of different channels:
- The evaluation finds variable progress in capacity building and states that it is difficult to evaluate the actual effect because of the complexity and diversity of recipients, and the lack of clear baseline data and reporting.
- At international level it reports good coordination between the climate and forest initiative and other actors. At national level a successful example is Guyana which elucidated the needs for coordination early in the process. In other countries there were examples of a lack of coordination between donors, also internally in multilateral organizations. In addition the initiative lacks a formalized results framework and risk assessment to guide its activities.
- It proved difficult to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of different channels. Bilateral support has generally been more effective than multilateral support, which has been affected by delayed payments and excessive bureaucracy. Despite this there are examples of positive effects of multilateral support.

The evaluation also identifies various success factors for the establishment of systems of measurement, reporting and verification:
- Technical support of a high standard and good timing.
- Clear plans for the development of systems of measurement, reporting and verification.
- Agreements on results-based financing.
- Good coordination between donors and those who will carry out the work.

- Clear legal frameworks for institutions involved.

**Recommendations**
- Support the work of calculating the costs of establishing systems of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV). This should be measured against the potential for payment for results in the form of emissions reduction.
- Prioritize the work by establishing such systems in countries with a varied forest structure, high deforestation and complex political and social contexts.
- Take account of the success factors identified when planning to establish MRV systems.
- Develop a support plan for development of MRV systems, especially with a view to the expected availability of results-based financing.
- Continue to encourage MRV systems that are not dependent on progress within REDD+, since these have a greater user value and build on national needs linked to the forest sector and land use.
• Assess the need for support for collection and analysis of data, and how projects that fall within the Group on Earth Observations (GEO) can meet these needs.
• Develop a more formalized results framework to improve the work, as well as communication internally and with other donors.
• Communicate lessons learned from the individual countries more effectively by focusing on transferable experiences.
• Increase focus on coordination with other donors to minimize the burden on the recipient country.
• Ensure that available personnel correspond to what is needed with regard to work on measurement, reporting and verification.
Can we measure the results of Norwegian aid?

**Background**
The requirement to be able to document the results of aid has increased, both internationally and in Norway. However, it has often been difficult to document the impacts of this aid and in our annual report for 2011 we pointed out that it is difficult to determine what is working well in development aid.

**Purpose**
This evaluation examines the work of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norad and the Norwegian embassies to measure results of the interventions they support. The Evaluation Department commissioned this evaluation to find the causes of the Norwegian aid administration’s failure to measure and report the results of the development aid to the extent that might be expected, and because the evaluations also fail to provide adequate answers to questions about results.

**Findings**
- Results measurement is not prioritized in practice. The political leadership has stated the need to demonstrate results, but many believe that this has not translated into a results-focus. Managers tend not to demand results measurement in planning or systematic follow-up of interventions, while employees find that they do not have time for it, and that there are few or no incentives to prioritize this aspect of the management’s responsibility. On the contrary, managers and employees have incentives to prioritize other often conflicting considerations, such as rapid disbursement of funds.
  - Handbooks, codes of conduct, courses and advisory services in the area of results are generally of good quality. Compared to other aid organizations (Danida, DFID and the World Bank) there are some weaknesses, such as less thorough requirements for measurements and indicators.
  - Existing regulations and guidelines are used to a varying degree.
  - The courses dealing with results measurement and evaluation provide the participants with basic knowledge, but they are too brief, have too few participants and receive low priority, particularly among managers.
- Many interventions are approved without a results framework and there is deficient follow-up of results. In exceptional cases there are good results frameworks and results reporting, but this is attributable to capable and dedicated individual employees rather than to a well-functioning system.
- Final reports (reviews) often report only on activities and not impacts.
- Weaknesses were found in the independent evaluations commissioned by the Evaluation Department. There are often large differences between the description of the assignment and the content of the final report. This can be attributed to the breadth and lack of focus of the descriptions, which can give the consultants great latitude for interpretation of the assignment.

**Recommendations**
- Leaders must reinforce the knowledge about and prioritization of practical and specific aspects of results measurement and results-based management, in addition to demanding better results work.
• Employees should have clear incentives to work with results, with consequences for their career paths, and they must be given time and resources to carry this out.
• Management must make provisions for a results focus in both planning and follow-up of interventions.
• The Evaluation Department must make clear in its mandates the results that are to be measured and the requirements that are to be set for the competence of consultants.

In the evaluation it is underscores that aid can be enhanced by utilizing existing research and evaluations. Based on an assessment of what is known about the relevant type of intervention and the probability of achieving the objective, a decision can be made as to whether the intervention should be evaluated or not, and what type of evaluation will then be possible and useful. If a type of intervention is well studied and there is reasonable certainty that it will work, resources can be freed for evaluation of the interventions about which there is little knowledge.

Results measurement and evaluation of Norwegian aid administration

Results measurement and evaluation are often used interchangeably. They are often referred to by the term “monitoring and evaluation” (M&E). Although they are closely interlinked, they are nevertheless quite different aspects of the aid administration.

Ongoing results work should be carried out for all aid interventions at all times, by the same persons responsible for implementation of the interventions. Evaluations are additional to the obligatory results work and are only conducted for selected interventions, or generally for a large number of interventions simultaneously. The initiative for evaluations can come from several quarters, including the Evaluation Department in Norad. The evaluations are conducted by external experts.

While the main emphasis of the results work is on whether the objectives set for the intervention are achieved, the evaluation work seeks to answer a number of other questions, for example whether the intervention is relevant, whether it is cost-effective or whether it is in line with policy guidelines. The evaluations often also help to check that the ongoing results work is adequate, and address in more depth the question of whether aid is actually the cause of the results that are reported, since there may also be other conditions that have contributed to the desired changes.

Results measurement and evaluations are mutually interdependent. Results measurement is necessary in order to evaluate effectiveness, and findings from evaluations reinforce the results measurement in the long term and make the need for good results work evident. The report that is discussed here emphasized the interplay between the ongoing results work and the subsequent evaluation with a view to the possibility of documenting the results of aid.
How do evaluations cover unintended effects?

Background
The results of aid are usually reported according to predetermined indicators for achievement of objectives, developed on the basis of assumptions about the results of aid at the start of the project. Experience and research tell us that aid also has a number of unintended effects, which the traditional results work is not designed to capture. In line with the guidelines set by the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the evaluation work has the task of identifying such unintended effects of aid, both positive and negative. However, since this is only one of many questions that the evaluations are supposed to answer, it is not always prioritized.

Purpose
The study aimed to discover the degree to which unintended consequences of aid are identified in evaluation reports, what we can learn from these, and what consequences this may have for the aid administration. The study reviewed all evaluation reports commissioned by the Evaluation Department in the period 2010-2013, as well as a selection of reports commissioned by other donor countries.

Findings
The study provides an overview of what the research says about unintended effects of aid. Some of these effects are well known and relevant for almost all forms of aid, such as negative macro-economic consequences of a large amount of aid, the administrative burden on the recipient country, and political and societal impacts. Such effects are most visible at an aggregate level (macro level). In addition there are a number of more specific effects depending on the particular intervention. Some of these can be relatively easy to predict, while others only come to light afterwards. The effects can be both positive and negative, and in many cases this depends on whom one asks.

Some key findings:
• The review of the Norwegian evaluation reports shows that unintended effects were mentioned in a relatively large number of reports, and that there was no essential difference in evaluations of Norwegian aid compared with evaluations of Swedish and UK aid.
• The Evaluation Department has explicitly requested information on unintended effects in slightly less than 40 per cent of the evaluations. There are important differences between sectors: information on negative effects was requested in all evaluations of humanitarian aid and business development, which are the two sectors that have received most attention in this regard, and far less frequently in other sectors.
• Even when this type of information is requested, the evaluation reports do not always mention unintended effects. There are also evaluation reports that mention unintended effects even when this has not been requested by the Evaluation Department.
• The authors of the report find that when unintended effects are mentioned in the evaluation reports themselves, it is with an emphasis on the positive effects, as well as small and less significant negative effects. The larger and potenti-
ally more serious negative effects are little mentioned, even those that could easily have been predicted. Furthermore, the authors find that when negative effects are mentioned, the wording used is vague and cautious.

- The authors point especially to the fact that there is a lack of information about the known unintended effects of aid at a macro level, such as economic, administrative and political effects when a country receives a large amount of aid. They especially highlight that there is little attention paid to possible unintended, broader political effects of aid.

**Recommendations**

- Based on existing knowledge of the type of unintended effects that are most likely, commissioning parties should be more specific in their request with regard to the type of unintended effects they wish the evaluations to examine in more detail.
- It is recommended that separate evaluations be conducted that only examine unintended effects of aid.
- Commissioning agencies should be clearer in their requirements regarding how the evaluation reports should present findings related to unintended effects.
- More attention should be paid to unintended effects in formulating and documenting ongoing results of aid activity. This should be included in risk assessments.
Evaluation at the start or at the end? The advantage of an early start

Evaluations are often conducted at around the time when the project ends, but can also commence at around the start of the project. This is the case for some of the evaluation work that the Evaluation Department is now performing: namely real-time evaluations that are ongoing through large parts of the intervention period, and studies that aim to obtain baseline information that is necessary to conduct future evaluations. One type of evaluation that will greatly benefit from thorough preparatory work is an impact evaluation (see below).

It is a great advantage to plan the evaluation together with the project. Although it may take time before we can speak about the effects of an intervention, real-time evaluations and baseline data for impact evaluations and other evaluations also provide useful information along the way.

Impact evaluation of the Norway-India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health (NIPI 2)
The Evaluation Department has initiated an impact evaluation of the Norway-India Partnership Initiative to improve maternal/child health, also known as NIPI. The purpose of the initiative is to help reduce child and maternal mortality in India. The initiative was begun in 2006 and is one of five partnership initiatives that Norway supports in order to contribute to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5.

Despite the fact that this commitment represents a significant portion of Norwegian aid for global health, an evaluation from 2010 showed great deficiencies with regard to documentation of the extent to which these initiatives are achieving their objectives1.

The process evaluation of the first phase in India (2006-2012) that is presented in this annual report shows that these problems continued to exist (see p. 13) as this partnership initiative entered its second phase (2013-2018).

The impact evaluation that is now underway will therefore seek to provide answers as to whether the measures that are supported through this initiative do in fact contribute to improved health for mothers and children in the areas in which the initiative operates. Specifically, what is examined is what happens with two groups of households, one of which shall have had access to health services throughout the first phase of the partnership initiative (2006-2012) and will have access to new services in phase two, while the other group has only had access to the health services provided in phase one. A comparison of the two groups should allow for assessing the impact of the second phase of the initiative (see text box for an explanation of the methodology).

The evaluation team collected baseline data at the turn of the year 2013/14, and will collect new data in 2016. A final evaluation of the impacts of the health services introduced during phase two of the initiative will not be made until the data from the second round of data collection has been analysed. The existing baseline report in the meantime provides information on the status of the health service today and how people report on their own health. This report can also provide information on the first phase of the initiative on this basis.

Impact evaluation
An impact evaluation shall demonstrate the impacts of aid and say something about what difference the projects are making for the recipients compared to a situation in which they had not received aid. These types of evaluation thus say something about causality. However, an impact evaluation should not only measure the effects, but also explain them. The mechanisms that are fundamental in order for a project to have the expected impact can be investigated using both quantitative and qualitative methods. In order to demonstrate a causal relationship, methodologies are used that enable a comparison of two groups of people: a “control group” which does not have access to the project, and a group that has access to the project whose impact is being investigated. If these groups have the same characteristics similar and a change is observed in one group and not the other, this change can be attributed to the intervention/aid. To ensure that they are as similar as possible, either those who will have access to the project are drawn randomly (experimental method, also called a randomized study), or quasi-experimental methods are used to “construct” a control group. The quality of these methods will dictate how robust the results are. One challenge for impact evaluations is external validity, i.e. the degree to which the findings are also valid for other contexts than the one that has been investigated.

Real-time evaluation of the Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development of Higher Education Institutions and Research for Development

The Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development of Higher Education Institutions and Research for Development (NORHED) is a programme which supports university cooperation between Norwegian institutions and institutions in low and middle income countries. The programme has an annual budget of NOK 130 million and the objective is to help strengthen the capacity of educational institutions in the South in the form of more and better research and more and better-educated candidates.

The objective of the real-time evaluation of NORHED is to contribute to learning within the field of higher education and development, so that future investments can be more effective in building capacity at institutes of higher education to promote development. The evaluation therefore balances the two goals of evaluation, i.e. learning and accountability.
The real-time evaluation of NORHED consists of several series of studies that will be conducted over several years. The first series deals with capacity at the institutional level, and the first study in this series will describe a theory of change for how NORHED can contribute to capacity development. The second series consists of studies that deal with the relationship between higher education and development in other sectors of society. NORHED contributes to such a small part of the educational activity of each individual country that it will not be possible to observe at national level. Instead the studies will answer general questions such as what existing literature says about the opportunities that support to higher education may represent for development. The third series will include a process evaluation of NORHED, in which the individual studies will look, for example, at internal dynamics, incentive schemes, leadership and management, and the cooperation between institutions in North and South.

It will be several years before we have an answer to many of the questions asked as part of the real-time evaluation, but the information collected and presented can nevertheless contribute to a discussion about the programme as it proceeds. Moreover, by starting early it is possible to ensure the collection of baseline data that is needed for discussion about changes at a later stage.

Baseline study of Norwegian aid to Myanmar
Myanmar and Norway have recently entered into a long-term development cooperation after some years of Norwegian engagement where the main emphasis was on the peace process and humanitarian support. Even though preliminary studies are being conducted in connection with individual interventions as part of ongoing results work, there will often be a need for further baseline data in connection with future evaluations.

The evaluations that are commissioned by the Evaluation Department generally cover efforts that are long-term and strategic, and most often cover many different interventions, possibly over several thematic areas or financing.
channels. The data we need to be able to evaluate these efforts are therefore of a somewhat different character than would be required for a single project. Because Norway is now entering into a long-term cooperation with the government and other actors in Myanmar, we have a unique chance to collect data that can give us important answers with regard to what results the interventions have had.

For this reason the Evaluation Department is commissioning a study in 2014 that comprises collection and analysis of baseline data within selected areas of this cooperation. The main purpose of this baseline study is to enable better evaluations of Norwegian aid efforts in the future.

**Preliminary study for evaluation of support to capacity development**

In 2014 the Evaluation Department will initiate an evaluation of Norwegian support to capacity development, which has been a priority area for Norwegian and western aid for many years. The evaluation is to be closely coordinated with corresponding evaluation work by Sida (Sweden) and Danida (Denmark), and will result in a joint report in 2015.

In relation to this the Evaluation Department has commissioned a preliminary study of the type of information and methods that have been used in previous evaluation and research on aid-financed support of institutional capacity development, and which of these have the greatest potential to answer important evaluation questions, particularly questions about effectiveness. This preliminary study is coordinated with parallel studies in Sweden and Denmark, in which Sida examines findings and experiences of previous evaluations and research, while Danida looks at conceptual and theoretical questions.

The study provides a thorough overview of important methodological questions, taking into account both theoretical discussions and practical experiences, and discusses the possibility of acquiring knowledge about capacity development in different ways. The study shows that most previous evaluations of aid-financed support to capacity development have been conducted along somewhat the same lines.

The attention has generally been directed at the institution that is under evaluation. Even though practically all evaluations highlight the importance of looking at the context – social, cultural, legal and other framework conditions – few have examined in depth the way in which this affects aid for capacity development.

Furthermore, few studies have attempted to state the impact of aid through in-depth assessments of causal relationships. This is understandable based on the fact that both the information available and methodological limitations render it difficult to state the degree to which aid is an actual cause of changes in an institution. However, the study states that the best way of doing this is through evaluations based on work with Theories of Change, and provides recommendations linked to different models, data (indicators) and choice of methodology. It gives a number of examples of the types of models, data and indicators that have been used in previous evaluations, which will be of benefit to future evaluations. The study, along with the preliminary studies conducted by Sida and Danida, is available on the Sida website (www.sida.se).
Other evaluation reports
Background
UNDP’s operational activities are primarily organised through country programmes. The Global Programme was designed to strengthen UNDP development cooperation at the country, regional and global levels. It achieves this through supporting the analysis of development problems and providing context-specific development solutions. The Fourth Global Programmes covers the time period from 2009 till 2013.

Purpose
The objective of the evaluation was to assess programme performance, draw conclusions and offer key recommendations for strengthening effectiveness. The evaluation covered all five geographic regions of UNDP work. The evaluation also assessed synergies between the Global Programme and country programmes.

Findings
It has been a challenge for the Fourth Global Programme to strike a balance between specific country support and strategic support to global and regional public goods. The evaluation questions whether the Fourth Global Programme serves the declared purpose in its current shape. Other findings include the following:

• The Global Programme contribution was important to UNDP participation in global policy debate on for instance climate and energy.
• The substance and scope of global projects varied considerably. Many projects promoted new ideas or approaches, but cross-country learning and replication remained a challenge.
• The Global Programme faced challenges in responding to country office needs to effectively support governments in national capacity development.
• Perceptions of advisory services and levels of satisfaction varied across regions and practices.
• Growing emphasis in the corporate programme frameworks on knowledge management as a factor in the contribution to development results did not translate into adequate concrete measures.
• Implementation of the gender equality strategy was not strong enough to address the development and institutional gender priorities of UNDP. Global Programme resources were essential in supporting gender-related activities.
• The Global Programme helped raise the priority of supporting South-South solutions, but mainstreaming challenges remained at the corporate level, where South-South cooperation needed to be adequately articulated and institutionalized within UNDP programme implementation.

• Improvement was evident in the cross-practice work in key thematic areas, although there were limitations in systematically promoting and institutionalizing such programming.

Recommendations
• UNDP should strengthen the Global Programme to add value beyond what UNDP accomplishes through its regional and country programmes.
• The Global Programme should specifically address the need for more specialized policy and technical services in a small number of programme areas.
• Through the Global Programme, UNDP should translate commitment into actions by ensuring that systematic knowledge sharing activities are put in place and address other constraints that impede knowledge sharing.
• Integrating gender in UNDP programmes and policy engagement needs to be further prioritized.
• Enhance the efficiency of the global and regional programmes by establishing clear accountability for more effective coordination between policy and regional bureaux, and by strengthening regional service centres as a vital link between headquarters and country offices.
The UN Development Programme: Evaluation of support to Afghanistan

Background
The UNDP’s Evaluation Office conducts regular evaluations of the development results of UNDP’s country programmes. This report evaluates UNDP’s support to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the largest of UNDP’s country programmes and represents approximately 15 per cent of all UNDP’s expenditure. In the period 2009-2013 the organization spent approximately USD 3 340 million in Afghanistan, including support to better governance and the national budget process.

Purpose
The purpose was to analyse UNDP’s direct and indirect contribution to Afghanistan’s development within a number of thematic areas in the period 2009-2014. In addition the management (administration) of the programme was evaluated.

Findings
• UNDP has contributed to the development and operation of a growing police force.
• More than 2000 small infrastructure projects have been conducted, from building of roads and bridges to schools and health centres. However, the projects are concentrated geographically around the provincial capitals.
• UNDP has financed equipment, buildings, furniture and recruitment of a large number of national and international professionals to strengthen the capacity of different public entities, but the sustainability of this has been questioned. Few of the interventions have been based on a thorough evaluation of either current or future capacity.
• Some results have been achieved with regard to strengthening women’s rights, but cultural factors represent a significant limitation.
• Very few of the main development results that UNDP has contributed to will be sustainable when the international support ceases. UNDP’s programmes are based on a prerequisite that the organization will be in Afghanistan for the long term, and it therefore lacks exit strategies.
• UNDP has insufficient links with civil society. At this decisive time for Afghanistan, strong pressure and active civil society organizations are needed to advocate for better education and health, state accountability, the fight against corruption, and particularly support to women’s role in society.
• UNDP has shown commitment to national ownership and leadership, but has not always recognized this as an obligation, and still has a strong focus on UNDP’s own deliveries.
• UNDP has established solid partnerships with the Afghan government and other donors, while relations with other UN organizations, the World Bank, civil society and the private sector have been weaker.
• Because of poor security and difficult terrain, international aid has a tendency to remain in the capital with limited activity at provincial, district and village level. UNDP has worked with the central government in Kabul and has paid limited attention to the traditional Afghan governance. A better interplay between the government and the traditional governance and conflict resolution systems may be important for future political stability and security in Afghanistan.
Recommendations

- UNDP should continue to build trust with the government and its donors to increase the probability that they will support the ideas, frameworks and directions promoted by UNDP.
- UNDP should continue to prioritize democratic governance and rule of law, because the organization has a clear comparative advantage here. Greater attention must be paid to the weakest aspects of Afghan democracy – local government, legislators and the courts. In addition, sustainable development work is needed to reduce poverty.
- UNDP should investigate the possibility of setting up more multinational funds for support to transition work.
- UNDP should strengthen its commitment to contribute to coordination of aid processes.
- UNDP’s country office should strengthen its operational capacity and effectiveness by developing a unitary team of national and international employees committed to achieving results for Afghanistan.
- Subnational governance should continue to be an important component of the country programme. UNDP should establish regional offices that can better integrate UNDP’s project activities.
- UNDP should work with the traditional Afghan governance and judicial system, since these have legitimacy. Giving them a role in the construction of the Afghan state results in increased capacity.
- To ensure sustainability for UNDP’s capacity building, more evaluation is required in programme design and during implementation. A gradual increase in the use of national actors should be considered in order to raise capacity in a sustainable manner.
- UNDP should reach out to civil society, including through information activities during the elections and by involving carefully selected voluntary organizations in the implementation of its programmes, primarily at provincial and district level, but also in advocacy and awareness-raising.
Background
During the period 2006-2012, The World Bank Group consisting of The International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the World Bank (WB) has provided $17.7 billion of targeted support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). The support has mainly involved provision of finance, services, information and improved access to markets for the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. The World Bank Group has also provided advisory services targeting Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.

Purpose
The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess, to what extent the World Bank Group has effectively promoted inclusive growth through its targeted support to Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. The assessment employs a variety of evaluative techniques to shed light on the relevance, efficacy, efficiency, and work quality of the support activities of the World Bank Group.

Findings
- Current literature offers surprisingly little guidance on the actual efficacy of the most common forms of targeted Small and Medium-sized Enterprise support, either for direct beneficiaries or, more broadly, for markets and economies. Data collected at the enterprise level however suggests that there is a need to focus on systemic challenges facing small and medium enterprises. The main challenges identified include provision of reliable electric power supply, an honest and transparent public sector, moderate taxes, political-stability, fair rules of the game, an educated workforce, and a developed, competitive and stable financial system.
- Currently, there are problems with each of the World Bank Group institutions’ approach to defining Small and Medium-sized Enterprises. Relatively few projects define Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (that is, who is eligible for benefits) and fewer still use that definition in their provision for support.

Recommendations
- Targeted support for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises needs to be firmly grounded in a clear, understanding of what distinguishes a Small and Medium-sized Enterprise from other enterprises and how the proposed support will remove the challenges constraining Small and Medium-sized Enterprises ability to contribute to employment, growth, and economic opportunity.
- The World Bank Group institutions should harmonize their approach to Small and Medium-sized Enterprise.
- Each of the institutions should make clear the objectives and justification for support, clarify how the support will remove the systemic challenges constraining the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, what main forms it will take, and how it will be monitored and evaluated.
- World Bank Group management should shift its focus from already better-served firms and markets to support firms in low-income, fragile and conflict-affected countries with underdeveloped financial systems.
• Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency should radically rethink its approach to providing guarantees for investments through its Small Investment Program. It may consider a merger of this program with its regular program or redesign it to improve performance.
The World Bank: Assistance to low-income fragile and conflict-affected states

Background
About 370 million people live in low-income fragile and conflict-affected states. These countries have higher poverty rates, lower growth rates, and weaker human development indicators than other low-income countries. The World Bank Group has identified support to these states as a strategic priority, critical to achieving its mission of poverty alleviation and shared prosperity.

Purpose
This evaluation assesses the relevance and effectiveness of World Bank Group’s country strategies and assistance programs to low income fragile and conflict-affected states. Bank Group performance is evaluated in 33 low-income fragile and conflict-affected states against performance in other low-income countries that have never been classified as fragile.

Findings
• World Bank’s portfolio performance in low-income fragile and conflict-affected states has improved since 2001 compared to low-income countries that are not fragile. Progress is evident in several areas however several challenges and constraints remain.
• Country assistance strategies for these states are not tailored to fragility and conflict drivers and lack strategies for managing political economy and conflict risks.
• The Bank has been relatively effective in mainstreaming gender within its health, education, and community-driven development portfolios, but it has paid insufficient attention to conflict-related violence against women and economic empowerment of women in these states.
• Community-driven development has been useful for delivering short-term assistance to the local communities in fragile and conflict-affected states; but its long-term sustainability remains questionable.
• The World Bank Group lacks a realistic framework for promoting inclusive growth and jobs that is based on economic opportunities and constraints in fragile and conflict-affected states and effective coordination across World Bank Group institutions.
• Fragile and conflict-affected states have received less aid per-capita from International Development Association, the part of the World Bank that helps the poorest countries, than other low-income countries that have never been classified as fragile or affected by conflict.

Recommendations
• Develop more accurate mechanism to classify fragile and conflict affected states and tailor country assistance strategies to contexts in these countries.
• Address the effects of conflict-related violence against women and emphasize economic empowerment of women in low-income fragile and conflict affected states.
• Enhance the sustainability of community development programs and support institutional capacity building at national and subnational levels.
• Develop more realistic frameworks for inclusive growth and jobs and adapt the business models, incentives, and systems of the International Finance Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency to the needs of fragile and conflict affected countries.
Background
The World Bank is the trustee of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and its related trust funds. It hosts its secretariat and implements some of its projects such as the implementation of Global Environment Facility’s private-sector projects through the International Finance Corporation. This review focuses primarily on the role of the Bank as an implementing agency.

Purpose
The main purpose of this review is to help improve the relevance and effectiveness of the World Bank Group’s partnership with the Global Environment Facility. The review documents how the partnership between the World Bank and Global Environment Facility has evolved since the establishment of GEF in early 1990s.

Findings
• The Global Environment Facility’s focus on global environmental benefits complements the World Bank’s own environmental priorities. For the GEF, the World Bank continues to be the principal mobilizer of investment projects and related expertise, covering all its focal areas.
• The relevance of the institutional design of the Bank Group Global Environment Facility partnership however has diminished significantly over time due to emergence of new implementing agencies and funding alternatives for Global Environment Facility. The relative and absolute magnitude of the partnership has decreased in the recent years.
• The World Bank now plays a more consultative than a collaborative role in preparation of Global Environment Facility policy and documents. The World Bank, Global Environment Facility, and the broader development community could benefit from a more effective partnership, however neither party seems to be willing to work more collaboratively in this area.
• World Bank-implemented Global Environment Facility projects have generally progressed more slowly and their overall average performance has declined according to most rating criteria as compared to other environmental projects of the Bank.

Factors explaining the developments include ambiguity in the respective roles and responsibilities of the management and staff.
• The Bank Group has firmly integrated global environmental objectives into its corporate strategies, although the Global Environment Facility has not been the only causal factor in this regard. At the level of the Bank Group’s Country Assistance Strategies, mainstreaming is less obvious.
• Global Environment Facility has promoted innovative approaches for improving global environmental sustainability. Global Environment Facility reports success in co-financing and leveraging of its funds from other resources however the evidence is unreliable.

Recommendations
• The Bank Group and the Global Environment Facility should either (re-)establish conditions for a close partnership based on collaboration and complementarity or redefine the roles and responsibilities.
• The partners needs to acknowledge that competition among
implementing agencies has introduced incentives that are difficult to reconcile with the original paradigm of collaboration and complementarity on which the Global Environmental Facility was founded.

- The partners need to agree on a shared project-cycle that makes full use of the World Bank and International Finance Coopération quality assurance mechanisms, while guaranteeing high-quality projects according to Global Environment Facility standards.
- The World Bank should develop a formal policy for hosting the secretariats of global programs located in the Bank. When considering implementation role in global programs, the Bank should have an explicit initial agreement on the division of labor which is based on shared project cycles.
- Ambitious targets for co-financing in global programs create incentives for inaccurate reporting and may not have the desired effect of maximizing the program objectives. To mitigate this risk, the programs should ensure that reported co-financing figures are clearly defined, measured, and verified.
Follow-up of evaluations
## Follow-up of evaluations

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<td>Joint donor office in Juba</td>
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<td>Integration of emergency aid, reconstruction and development</td>
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2 This overview has been prepared by Norad’s Evaluation Department based on copies received of follow-up memos and reports in accordance with the Instructions for the Evaluation Activity in Norwegian Aid Management.
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<td>Declaration of Paris</td>
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<td>Study of monitoring and evaluation in six Norwegian civil society organizations</td>
<td>7/2012</td>
<td>16.5.2013</td>
<td>14.5.2014</td>
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<td>Study of the use of evaluations in the Norwegian development cooperation system</td>
<td>8/2012</td>
<td>30.4.2013</td>
<td>16.6.2013</td>
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<td>Norway’s bilateral agricultural support to food security</td>
<td>9/2012</td>
<td>3.6.2013</td>
<td>22.1.2014</td>
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<td>Norway-India Partnership Initiative for Maternal and Child Health (NIPI I)</td>
<td>3/2013</td>
<td>7.11.2013</td>
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<td>Climate and forest initiative – real-time evaluation</td>
<td>5/2013</td>
<td>28.11.2013</td>
<td>11.2.2014*</td>
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<td>Evaluation of results measurement in aid management</td>
<td>1/2014</td>
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<td>Unintended effects in evaluations of Norwegian aid</td>
<td>2/2014</td>
<td>Follow-up of this study is included in the memo note for report 1/2014</td>
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* As of 1 January 2014 the Ministry for Climate and Environment is responsible for follow-up of the real-time evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative.

**The follow-up report is prepared and approved by this ministry.**

*4 Prepared and approved by the Ministry of Climate and Environment.*