Evaluation of Norway’s Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake

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Evaluation of Norway’s Support to Haiti after the 2010 Earthquake

December 2014
Particip GmbH

This report is the product of the authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of Norad Evaluation Department.
Note on layout and language

The layout of the document conforms to guidelines for accessibility and ease of reading, which require Arial font and left (not full) justification of the text.
Soon after the earthquake hit Haiti on 12 January 2010, Norway joined the massive international response to the appeals for humanitarian aid. Norway was among the first countries to also pledge support to medium and long-term reconstruction and development needs.

A major challenge was knowing how to utilize funds optimally. Adding to a humanitarian crisis of enormous magnitude and the loss of infrastructure, the combination of an inflow of international actors often poorly coordinated and the destruction of already weak state institutions, created challenges of unprecedented magnitude for the national and international efforts to help rebuild Haiti.

This evaluation looks at the Norwegian assistance to Haiti after the earthquake with a two-fold purpose. First, it looks at the effectiveness of Norwegian assistance to Haiti. It is too early to conclude on effects from the Norwegian support, since most of it aims at long-term development efforts. However, the report presents and discusses findings that can tell us whether it is likely that the Norwegian support will lead to achievement of intended objectives in future. Second, the evaluation seeks to improve future Norwegian development assistance in comparable situations elsewhere. It does so by extracting lessons on the ability of the Norwegian aid delivery system to manage knowledge and to navigate in complex political and institutional dynamics, making the best possible strategic and practical decisions.

Thus, the evaluation should be of interest for a wide audience beyond those involved in humanitarian and development efforts in Haiti. With regard to the first purpose, it adds to the overall body of knowledge about to what extent Norwegian humanitarian and development assistance is effectively utilised. With regard to the second purpose, it provides learning of relevance for a wide range of institutions involved in humanitarian and development efforts in fragile situations.

The evaluation was conducted by Particip GmbH. The consultants are responsible for the content of the report, including the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

Oslo, December 2014

Tale Kvalvaag
Director, Evaluation Department
Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to thank all individuals who contributed to the success of this evaluation. During the evaluation, numerous people answered our questions, provided us with documents and made themselves available to discuss the challenges and successes of Norway’s efforts in Haiti. We therefore thank the stakeholders, beneficiaries, project management teams, governmental staff and other donors that we had the privilege to meet or be in contact with.

We would also like to express our gratitude to the Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (Norad) and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), whose staff were extremely helpful throughout the evaluation process. We thank especially our evaluation manager at Norad’s Evaluation Department (EVAL), who provided very constructive and helpful support throughout all phases of this evaluation.

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<td>ACAPS</td>
<td>Assessment Capacities Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASRDLF</td>
<td>Association de Science Régionale de Langue Française</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BID</td>
<td>Banque interaméricaine de développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAED</td>
<td>Cadre de coordination de l'aide externe au développement d'Haïti</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>CERF</td>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGD</td>
<td>Center for Global Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAP</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHF</td>
<td>Common Humanitarian Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIAT</td>
<td>Comité Interministériel pour l'aménagement du territoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CIFP</td>
<td>Country Indicators for Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>CoP</td>
<td>Community of Practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Côte Sud Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCP</td>
<td>Dispositif de concentration de poisson (Fishing Aggregating Device - FAD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
</tr>
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<td>DEV</td>
<td>Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DPC</td>
<td>Direction de la Protection civile (Haitian Directorate for Civil Protection)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>DSB</td>
<td>Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap (Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection)</td>
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<td>DSNCRP</td>
<td>Document de stratégie nationale pour la croissance et la réduction de la pauvreté d’Haïti</td>
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<td>DSRP</td>
<td>Stratégie intérimaire pour la réduction de la pauvreté d’Haïti</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWS</td>
<td>Department for World Service</td>
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<td>ECOSOC</td>
<td>UN Economic and Social Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECVH</td>
<td>Enquête sur les conditions de vie en Haïti</td>
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<td>EDH</td>
<td>Electricité d'Haïti (Haitian state electricity company)</td>
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<td>EQ</td>
<td>Evaluation Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERRF</td>
<td>Emergency Relief &amp; Response Fund</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>UN Food and Agriculture Organisation</td>
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<td>FED</td>
<td>Femmes en démocratie</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<td>FNs</td>
<td>Forente nasjoner (United Nations)</td>
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<td>FoFS</td>
<td>Friend of Fragile States</td>
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<td>FRH</td>
<td>Fonds de reconstruction d’Haïti (see HRF)</td>
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<td>FTS</td>
<td>Financial Tracking Service</td>
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<td>GARR</td>
<td>Groupe d'Appui aux Réfugiés et Rapatriés</td>
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GBV  Gender Based Violence  
GdH  Gouvernement d’Haiti  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
GEF  Global Environment Facility  
GFDRR  Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery  
GNUD  Groupe des Nations unies pour le développement (see UNDG)  
GoH  Government of Haiti  
GPPI  Global Public Policy Institute  
HCT  Humanitarian Country Team  
HRF  Haiti Reconstruction Fund  
HTI  Haiti  
HUM  Humanitarian  
IA  Inter-Agency  
IADB  Inter-American Development Bank  
IASC  Inter-Agency Standing Committee  
IC  Initiative Committee  
ICT  Information and Communication Technology  
IDB  Inter-American Development Bank (see also IADB)  
IDEA  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance  
IDP  Internally Displaced Person  
IEG  Independent Evaluation Group  
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development  
IFI  International Financial Institutions  
IHRC  Interim Haiti Recovery Commission  
ILPI  International Law and Policy Institute  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
IMS  International Media Support  
INCAF  International Network on Fragility and Conflict  
IOI  Intended (and implicit) Overall Impact  
IOM  International Organisation for Migration  
JC  Judgement Criterion  
JNA  Joint Needs Assessment  
JPO  Junior Professional Officer  
KII  Key Informant Interview  
LLH  Life-Line Haiti  
LRRD  Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development  
LWF  Lutheran World Foundation  
MARDNDR  Haiti Ministry of Agriculture  
MENA  Middle East and North Africa  
MFA  Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
MINUSTAH  Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti  
MISSEH  Social Mission of Haitian Churches  
MODEM  Multi-Objective Decision Making  
MOFECs  Mouvement de Femmes de Cité Soleil  
MS  Microsoft  
MSF  Médecins Sans Frontières  
NCA  Norwegian Church Aid  
NDI  National Democratic Institute  
NFI  Non-Food Item  
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation  
NMFA  Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
NOK  Norwegian Krone  
NORAFRIC  NORCAP regional standby force Africa  
NORCAP  Norwegian Capacity  
NORDEM  Norwegian Centre for Human Rights and Democracy’ roster of experts
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URD</td>
<td>Urgence, réhabilitation, développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WBG</td>
<td>World Bank Group</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>World Health Organisation</td>
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Executive Summary
Executive summary

Objectives, scope and organisation of the evaluation
Norad (Evaluation Department) commissioned Particip GmbH, a German consulting firm, to conduct an evaluation of Norway’s aid portfolio in Haiti since the 2010 earthquake. The main objective of the evaluation was to produce knowledge that could be used to improve Norwegian decision-making and programming, especially concerning countries or contexts comparable to Haiti. The evaluation had two foci: the effectiveness of the Norwegian assistance – henceforth called Part A or “Programme”; and an examination of the Norwegian aid delivery system – called Part B or “Process”. The scope included all activities that benefited from Norwegian funding to Haiti during the period under evaluation (2010-12): humanitarian action, longer-term reconstruction and development.

The evaluation was conducted between January and September 2014, with main fieldwork (Oslo and Haiti) undertaken in May 2014. The team comprised four main evaluators, supported by a research assistant and two quality assurance experts. Final deliverables include the present evaluation report (Vol. 1, the main report with Annexes 1 to 2; and Vol. 2, with Annexes 3 to 10) and two policy briefs.

Context
Despite significant potential (e.g., strategic location, dynamic young population, active diaspora, multiple touristic sites), Haiti has remained the poorest country of the Americas for decades. In 2012, it was placed 161st out of 186 countries on the Human Development Index. Situated in a region that is regularly confronted by natural hazards, Haiti is characterised by a long history of social and political instability and fragile democratic institutions. The country was severely hit by an earthquake in January 2010, which killed more than 220,000 people, injured more than 300,000 and left 1.5 million homeless.

Recognised as a “fragile state” long before the earthquake, Haiti is ranked ninth in the “worst 10” on the Fund for Peace’s 2014 Fragile States Index. Political and socio-economic indicators that distinguish Haiti from other fragile contexts include its status as an island state, an acute-on-chronic dynamic, and the impact of an earthquake of such high magnitude in the largest urban centre of the country.
During the period 2010-2012, Norway funded 81 interventions, involving 52 implementing entities and totalling disbursements of 834.3 NOK million (a moderate level in comparison to that provided to other countries). The humanitarian response represents around 25% of Norway's portfolio. More than 30% of the development portfolio focussed on the Département du Sud, one region in the South of Haiti.

**Methodology**

With the above objectives and context, the team established 10 evaluation questions. Using frameworks of contribution analysis and organisational development, a mixed-methods package − containing quantitative and qualitative techniques − was developed to answer the questions.

The main elements for data compilation and primary data collection included: a portfolio review, a systematic literature review, a meta-analysis (focusing on 14 interventions), a model for organisational decision-making (MODEM), field visits, key informant interviews, focus group discussions (nine in Haiti, one in Oslo), two surveys, and an analysis of policy documents. An important tool was a triangulation matrix to track the convergence of evidence and gaps across the above techniques.

Limitations to the evaluation include a complete lack of statistical validity in any of the samples employed, the existence of undocumented activities in the scope of the evaluation (e.g. field trips by MFA staff, activities under framework agreements) and the fact that, for several major funded interventions, it is too early to expect that, four years after the earthquake, lasting impacts have already materialised.

**Main Findings**

*Programme and aid effectiveness*

The most fundamental finding is the lack of a documented country strategy for Norway’s support to Haiti 2010-12. The documents that come closest to laying out a strategy were two decision memos elaborated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) in January and July 2010. They highlight key priority areas, but do not present a comprehensive aid strategy with clear overall objectives. Two implicit intended overall impacts were identified post-facto by the evaluation team (as concluded from a focus group in Oslo, interviews and an e-survey): 1. Haiti is in the driver’s seat of its own development and reconstruction; 2. Haiti has a sustainable basis for development (i.e. building back better).

Once the humanitarian response to the earthquake was underway, Norway drew on experience and limited available information to identify four main themes of support − Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), Natural Resource Management (NRM), protection of vulnerable groups, political dialogue/governance − and two crosscutting themes (capacity building and human rights). These themes were generally relevant to the evolving context and most of them were given substantial attention during programme implementation.
Main findings: Programme

Overall strategy design

- A Norwegian “strategy” in Haiti, and its intended overall impact, were unclear.
- Main and cross-cutting themes and the geographic focus stated as priorities in initial guiding documents were given substantial attention.
- Situation extraordinary, but Norwegian response: business as usual, with a few noteworthy exceptions.
- Norway made a clear move away from central government support, towards greater attention to the local level.

Strategy implementation

- Norway was an international leader by example.
- Environment was a valid entry point for development in Haiti, and yielded positive achievements albeit uncertain wider/longer term effects in Natural Resource Management.
- Norway’s support to enhanced citizen participation (governance/dialogue) was relevant but challenged.
- Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) – at least in its purest articulation – is not a main theme in the Norwegian portfolio.
- Some contributions in the area of human rights are observed, despite geographic dispersion and isolation.
- Capacity building is clearly present but vaguely and irregularly targeted.
- Norway contributed to parallel structures without clearly articulating an explicit risk analysis and plan for hand-over to the government.
- Intervention objectives are not regularly linked to measurable outcomes and most programmatic successes have been achieved at the “output” level.
- Tangible improvements for the poorest groups in Haiti remain a highly complex endeavour.

Objectives of financed interventions were clearly formulated, but the monitoring and evaluation frameworks of most interventions reviewed were inadequate, characterised by confusion between direct outputs (e.g., numbers of people trained) and wider/longer-term effects (e.g., a reduction in poverty). This focus on outputs led several stakeholders to highlight very positive “results”, but the evaluation points to major difficulties in achieving the stated higher-level objectives (outcomes or impact). While some of these challenges are directly related to complexity and exogenous factors, there are also several internal weaknesses in the design of the portfolio, in particular, the failure to adopt a predictable and strategic vision, and to link up with wider efforts in the relevant areas/sectors both vertically and horizontally.

Influencing the effectiveness of other international aid was a key ambition for Norway during the first year of support. Substantial resources were invested in the work of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission and the Haitian Reconstruction Fund (HRF), a partnership between the Haitian government and the international community to co-ordinate post-earthquake reconstruction. Norway was active in international donor conferences on Haiti and national co-ordination mechanisms. Given the strong commitment of the international community to respond in a coordinated way while lobbying for government
ownership, support to the HRF was logical, as was Norway’s decision to return to more traditional bilateral aid when the mechanism went astray.

The fact that a large portion of Norwegian aid was directed to the Département du Sud combined with the active involvement of the Special Adviser (based in-country) resulted in a more concerted effort to co-ordinate among donors at that level. Although huge challenges remain, evidence does point to Norway as a catalyst for stronger co-ordinated international support in that region. However, beyond the efforts in the Département du Sud, its active participation in national co-ordination mechanisms, plus the widely-held perception of Norway as “a good donor”, there is no clear evidence that Norway has had substantial success in influencing the co-ordination and alignment of international aid to Haiti. The overall consensus is that international aid to Haiti was extraordinarily uncoordinated, biased by national interests of big donors, with limited impact overall despite a huge amount of funding. This lack of success in achieving greater aid effectiveness can be explained by the multiplicity of actors, the weak capacities of state institutions, and the shifting of the collective environment, with some donors (not Norway) being guided by their home public and their need to control use of the funds.

**Process & decision making**

Norway made some astute decisions in the Haiti portfolio. The first was the decision to concentrate efforts in one geographical area (Département du Sud), and the second was the very early decision to stay longer in the country (after the humanitarian phase).

These and many other decisions were made on the basis of very limited information (it is widely accepted that a majority of promised funding from donors, Norway included, was made prior to the first comprehensive needs assessment carried out jointly with major humanitarian actors in late January/early February 2010). The programme was defined on the basis of a complex web of political decisions, informal inputs and discussions, pre-existing knowledge, experience from other crises, and assessments and analysis at Haiti level. While there is consensus that chosen priorities “made sense”, the knowledge base underpinning are not entirely clear. For the Decision Memo of 28 January 2010, which defined the Norway portfolio to a great extent, the existing Haiti knowledge within MFA and the Norwegian partners, and experience from other disasters and/or fragile states, are the only cited sources. Alternative priorities were apparently not discussed.

Most survey respondents felt that the organisational culture in Norway is characterised above all by “flexible, informal decision-making”. Key informants also stressed the ability of Norway to seek bold and innovative solutions, and to apply fast and non-bureaucratic approaches. However, it is recognised that this approach in Haiti depended on having the right people with the right knowledge, skills and experience at the right time – and not on a system with clear checks and balances. Overall, flexibility may be a two-edged sword, unless accompanied by solid documentation of the arguments unpinning each flexed decision.
Main findings: Process

- True to reputation, Norway sought bold and innovative solutions and decision-making has consistently been swift and flexible
- Norway was a risk-willing donor in Haiti
- Extremely low capacity meant that the Haitian Government endorsed Norwegian initiatives, rather than providing to Norway real direction and ownership
- There is little evidence of explicit knowledge bases to underpin Norwegian decisions; alternative priorities were explored informally if at all
- The only evident mechanism found to enable reflection and learning is the frequent field visits by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a Special Adviser.

While co-operation between or with pertinent Government of Norway units was perceived as being strong, survey respondents were more critical on the question of whether working relations between MFA and Norad were “adequate, predictable and clear in regards to roles and responsibilities”. The Norwegian presence in Haiti was also perceived as much less adequate for effective decision-making. It remains to date the weakest element of the portfolio, depending much more on persons than on reliable systems.

Valuable learning was, and may continue to be, lost due to the absence of effective systems. The only evident, regularly-employed mechanism of monitoring and learning is the very frequent field visit to Haiti by MFA, and the presence of a Special Adviser. While in the Département du Sud, these visits were “hands-on”, providing ample opportunity for debate and flexible exploration of solutions to challenges, none of these visits produced trip reports. Multiple Norwegian partners outside the Département du Sud expressed strong disappointment at the lack of a mechanism that would create synergy and ensure cross-fertilization between Norway supported interventions. Despite explicit requests for more systematic exchanges across the greater portfolio, regular meetings were never organised. The lack of systematic documentation and sharing of approaches is a lost opportunity.

Norway is considered by many as a “risk-willing” donor. Norwegian decision-makers recognised, and accepted, a longer-term programme in Haiti as a calculated risk, but beyond short statements made in documents, no deliberate risk analysis (including an examination of the Haitian political economy) – a critical foundation for support to fragile states – was found.

Although Norwegian survey respondents highlight inputs from the Haitian government as the most influential factor on the aid portfolio, it is difficult to establish who is actually driving the priorities in the challenging environment of this country. Despite reported non-Haitian influences on the Action Plan for the Recovery and Development of Haiti, this plan (along with undocumented discussions with ministers and civil society representatives) was one of the only commonly cited sources in Norwegian documents to constitute government ownership of the principles that drove the portfolio.
Norway has a rich tradition of high-level policy documents and parliamentary white papers that contain clear and specific directives on what should be done in many different situations in humanitarian and development contexts. Humanitarian interventions appeared as the element of the Norwegian portfolio that was most firmly grounded in existing documented policy. However, none of the policy documents were mentioned specifically in the portfolio review, and there was no proof of a conscious decision to systematically apply existing lessons for a stronger programme in Haiti.

**Main conclusions**

**Overall effectiveness**

The effects of Norwegian support on the Haitian population have been moderate so far. In most instances, Norwegian assistance under evaluation has led to, or is likely to lead to the objectives stated in project documents/agreements at the output level. Norwegian assistance actively supported the four priority themes with differing twists. Natural Resource Management (NRM) efforts were appreciated by all stakeholders interviewed but show little tangible results to date. Norwegian efforts in dialogue/governance seem to be most effective at the central level (via support to MINUSTAH they contributed to free elections in late 2010). Beyond the humanitarian phase (when Norway managed to insert it on the international agenda), protection of vulnerable groups was not effectively made a focus of support. Working mainly from the central level, valuable efforts, such as in protecting women victims of SGBV often laboured in isolation. Explicit Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) was the weakest portion of the Norwegian portfolio, also with scattered efforts not adding up to an effective programme. While it was, in fact, unreasonable to expect visible results at this early stage, it is uncertain to which degree they are likely in the future.

Overall, Norwegian development assistance is unlikely to produce tangible improvement directly for poor people in Haiti, except in very focused settings, such as in supported fishing cooperatives in the Département du Sud, but, even there, the sustainability of the effects can still be questioned. Although more likely, evidence is lacking to link indirect support to tangible improvements for the poor.

**Conclusions: Effectiveness**

- Moderate effectiveness overall
- Program effectiveness above all at output level
- Excellent and rapid focus on one department
- Effective use of the environment as entry point
- Most effective as donor/leader by example and in rapidly and thoroughly bridging relief to development.

Norway influenced the effectiveness of international aid to Haiti by, above all, being a good example for delivering the promised volume of funds, initially supporting the HRF, and maintaining high standards as a good donor and friend.
of the UN. Norway’s influence on increasing the capacity of the Haitian
government is much less visible. Innovative for Norway, as compared to the
support provided to 17 other fragile states across the globe (2010-12) was the
proportion of investment considered ‘Interim or transitional funding’. In Haiti,
Norway may have set an unchallenged precedent for investing in the ‘grey area’
between disaster and development. It is this funding, a commendable decision
made swiftly from the start, that successfully and effectively helped bridge
response to development.

Evidence is not available to provide more conclusive statements on effects at
this date due to the timing of the evaluation and to the funding of mechanisms
that largely escape results attributable to Norway (e.g., MINUSTAH, CERF or
framework agreements). More evidence on the effects of Norway’s support,
especially at the higher, impact levels, may be consolidated as efforts reach
fruition (for several important interventions, the first years of implementation
were mainly used for studies and plans).

Deterrents to effectiveness

Despite important efforts deployed so far, the overall programme has been
only moderately effective. Beyond constraints created by a very challenging
environment, reasons for missing the mark are multiple: lack of an explicit
articulation of intended overall impact; absence of an explicit and systematic
recognition of risks and the need for a hand-over plan to GoH; overambitious
design of the funded interventions; lack of an explicit focus on statebuilding
(especially central level); limited requisite central/policy support for some
interventions; and insufficient synergies between the implemented actions and
with other donors.

Conclusions: Deterrents to effectiveness

- Time: evaluation too early to produce evidence for impact
- No country strategy and explicit intended overall impact
- No explicit political-economy grounded risk analysis
- Absence of a hand-over plan to GoH
- Ambitious design
- Lack of explicit focus on statebuilding and limited central level policy support
- Insufficient synergy between actions/donors

It is internationally recognised that efforts in fragile states require striving for
modest impacts over longer timeframes, with a prime focus on the various
intertwined dimensions of statebuilding. Although Norway has been an active
member of the International Network on Fragility and Conflict (INCAF) and is
one of the endorsing members of the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile
States, a specific policy to guide Norway on how to work in fragile states is
lacking. The result in Haiti was ambitious programming with little visible focus on
statebuilding.
Because statebuilding is deeply political, it may require parallel and simultaneous support at multiple levels: local/community, decentralised and central, as well as wider support to strengthening state-society relations. The lack of a documented risk analysis to investing in Haiti’s development highlights many unanswered questions on the sources of legitimacy that must be central to external interventions in statebuilding efforts. While peace-building and statebuilding often converge, support for these efforts often lacks a clear, strategic understanding of the context and (potential) role of international support in transforming key drivers of conflict and fragility. Norway in Haiti was no exception. There was also no evidence of an explicit division of labour with other donors to support these various dimensions.

With regard to supporting statebuilding at the central level, the political dynamic over the recent years proved to be a disincentive to Norway for stronger engagement. This situation contributed to a strong shift of Norway’s support (historically focused on peacebuilding and governance) towards the local level with a package of activities covering a wide range of thematic areas, most with no explicit connection to statebuilding. The evaluators uphold that Norway’s de facto choices have diluted the programme’s chances for sustainable impact. Enabling, even unintentionally, NGOs and the UN to replace government services may have served to create parallel structures which is not a testament to sustainable development. Even though this is often inevitable in fragile settings, there is no evidence to suggest that Norway recognised the supported efforts as parallel structures, or that they built in options to hand-over to the GoH in due course. The Haiti Action Plan and courtesy calls were insufficient to, alone, constitute government ownership. Increased dialogue is a requisite, but only partial, step towards government ownership.

There was also an insufficient use of results frameworks and no country strategy existed to promote synergy and to guide the efforts towards a predetermined overall impact. The evaluators believe that it is possible to set and monitor impacts within that strategy, without endangering the lauded flexibility of the Norwegian model.

A wide sectorial focus may ensure greater visibility and provide a more complete package for complex problems, such as in Haiti. However, although Norway contributed to some achievements in terms of co-ordination at the regional level (Département du Sud), synergies between the various efforts initiated so far remain weak. Local institutions still do not have the capacity and the sufficient level of ownership to ensure more coherence in these efforts. The package provided in the Département du Sud was wide, but patchwork. Beneficiaries of each effort were often separate, with none gaining the impact of a full holistic package required for sustainable development.

Limited achievements so far should not overshadow some of the positive choices Norway has made to enhance its action in Haiti. These include the rapid decision to remain longer in Haiti, the geographic concentration of some of its
development interventions, the adaptive approach it applied to navigate in a challenging context, and the use of Natural Resource Management/environment as a key entry point.

Main recommendations

Accepting the strengths of Norway as the quintessential flexible donor and partner, it is important to recognise the benefits of a country strategy. Although they should include logical frameworks and more carefully chosen goals and indicators, strategy documents can and must remain moving targets, incorporating genuine on-going learning as a rule. To capitalise on this learning, Norway will need to put into place and enforce more structured learning systems, such as informal opportunities for learning (“brown bag lunches”) and a system for better sharing and archiving of trip reports.

A country strategy will guide Norway to reach consensus as early as possible not only on the priorities identified for a given context and key implementing partners, but also on the length of investment and expected overall impact. Strategy development is also the time to document solid political economy and risk analyses and to capitalise on Norwegian and other policies that could strengthen the process. Most importantly, it will be an opportunity to centralise the main lines of strategic decisions in one document that can be shared with every partner, if not compiled with them.

Main recommendations

Flexibility, but within a structure
• Recognise the benefits of Country Strategies and develop them systematically
• Capitalise on the wealth of existing Norwegian policy documents
• Develop a structured learning system
• Nurture synergies within the country programme
• Identify ways to better track and learn from framework agreements.

Need for more realistic goals
• Develop the focused geographic concentration concept as part of the Norwegian model
• Develop genuine long-term partnerships with governments, recognising the limitations of fragile states and focusing on statebuilding as a central goal
• Vertical integration (practice to policy) – focus on small sustainable steps supported at multiple levels
• Horizontal integration (across sectors) – consider a package of interventions among same beneficiary group when addressing complex problems.

There is a serious need for more realistic goals built on a documented risk analysis. Geographical concentration combined with an explicit division of labour with other donors should become an integral part of the Norwegian model, with consideration given to an even narrower focus for certain components, such as within one of the department’s watersheds. Norway should also develop genuine long-term partnerships with governments, recognising the limitations of fragile
states and focusing on statebuilding as a central objective. A more careful exploration of transition financing instruments will be key. Building on their active participation in peace and statebuilding, Norway could consider piloting the New Deal in Haiti, if initiated by the government.

Along the same lines, Norway should revitalise a focus on small sustainable steps, supported at multiple levels wherever appropriate, as well as revisiting the sustainable development pillars in fragile states among the same beneficiary groups, to achieve synergies and maximise the chances for impact.

Norway has a rich library of “lessons learned” featured in national policies and parliamentary white papers. Innovative ways in which those lessons can be capitalised upon when developing country strategies or new targets of multi-sectorial support should be explored by MFA. Although useful at the country level, this may also have value at the macro level, as a way to provide checks and balances and compare country programmes across varying contexts.

Finally, Norway may want to rethink choices of partners in Haiti, improve co-ordination with other donors and foster more synergy across its portfolio country-wide. It may be time to more visibly consolidate its friendship with fragile states as a policy and niche for one of the world’s most flexible donors. For this, it is important to identify ways to track and learn from the multi-annual strategic funding agreements (partnership/framework agreements) Norway has established with some key partners and which are characterised by low level of or no earmarking. It is also time to explore alternatives to the “Special Adviser model” – one that can benefit from a learning institution on the longer term and not depend solely on the rich experience of individuals.
Main Report
1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation scope and purposes

The period under evaluation is 2010 to 2012, immediately after the earthquake hit Haiti. However, where appropriate, evidence from 2013 activities was also taken into account to better assess trends regarding the effects of Norwegian assistance. All Norwegian-funded activities for Haiti during the period were considered, including all spending and non-spending activities (i.e. the policy dialogue with the Haitian government and with donor and implementing organisations) and decision-making processes (see portfolio review in Annex 6). The evaluation covers longer-term development assistance and, to a lesser extent, humanitarian aid\(^1\).

The Evaluation of Norway’s support to Haiti had two purposes. The main emphasis of the evaluation was the assessment of the effectiveness of the Norwegian assistance to Haiti – henceforth called Part A or Programme. The evaluation took place shortly after implementation of the development assistance evaluated, and it is therefore still too early to measure medium-term and long-term effects. The evaluation concentrated on the effectiveness of the support, aspects related to sustainability, and the contribution (verified or probable) of interventions to the identified outcomes and impacts.

In addition, the evaluation aimed to generate knowledge on the Norwegian aid delivery system in fragile situations, and to provide recommendations for future decision-making at a strategic or operational level. This is henceforth referred to as the Part B or Process. The purpose of this second part of the evaluation was to build a foundation of evidence to systematically examine Norwegian decision-making processes, aid delivery systems and dynamics in states facing the double challenge of short-term humanitarian relief as well as sustainable development in the medium and long term, through the Haitian example.

1.2 Evaluation process

The evaluation started in February 2014. In March, an inception report was submitted, and a two-week field phase was conducted in May. The evaluation process was supervised by the Evaluation Department located in Norad and supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The evaluation team members’ roles and responsibilities were adjusted to the two-purpose

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1 Humanitarian response to the earthquake was already covered in various studies, including the Norad report 9/2010 Discussion
approach of the evaluation. Both parts of the evaluation had a focal point within the evaluation team, while the team leader was responsible for the leadership, co-ordination and consolidation of evidence. Two experienced experts assured methodological and thematic quality assurance. Final deliverables consist of the present evaluation report and a policy brief. The evaluation report consists of two volumes:

- Volume I, featuring the main report, as well as Annexes 1 to 2;
- Volume II, including Annexes 3 to 10 (published as a web annex).
2. Background on Haiti and Norway's support

2.1 Context of pre-2010 Haiti

Haiti regularly confronts natural hazards and is characterised by a long history of social and political instability and fragile democratic institutions. The devastating 2010 earthquake concluded a long period paved with catastrophes of both political and environmental dimensions. Multiple factors (including political instability since the Duvalier regime, demographic pressure on the environment, collapse of government institutions, rise of insecurity with economic consequences on tourism and investment) are responsible for the gradual but marked degradation of conditions since the mid-1980s. Although the return of Aristide in 1994 was considered a victory for democratic rule, ‘patrimonial’ leadership the following years brought much scepticism. Furthermore, links between the regime and drug-traffickers became a subject of great concern for countries in the region, especially for the United States, a long-time donor along with Canada.

The situation did not improve; it escalated into the first signs of a civil war with rebel forces capturing and ransacking Gonaïves in the last weeks of 2003. The political turmoil reached another summit in 2004, when Aristide was overthrown for the second time and went into exile in South Africa. The impact on the lives of Haitians was huge, as witnessed in the constantly deteriorating development, human rights and security indicators. Preventing the country from establishing effective national political institutions, a situation of poor governance at all levels of the administration has perpetuated. MINUSTAH, the UN peacekeeping mission deployed in 2004, improved the overall security situation. Although the political system remained fragile, the election of René Préval to the presidency in 2006 resulted in a number of years of stable legitimate government and relative economic and social stability. Food security and the provision of public services however remained problematic. The administration was guided, in part, by a document entitled ‘Interim Co-operation Framework’ that defined how donors and the government would collaborate. This initiative later resulted in the ‘National Strategic Document of Poverty Reduction’. Both documents highlighted governance, environmental management and risk mitigation.

On the environmental side, two major water-related disasters shook public conscience in 2004, the first locally and the second internationally. Gonaïves, a major city in Haiti, was flooded during Tropical Storm Jeanne; more than 2,000 Haitians died. The government and international partners joined efforts to rally for support. Later the same year, a tsunami struck the Indian Ocean on an even larger scale; attention to the vulnerability of coastal communities was further

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2 Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire (CCI).
3 Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSNCRP).
heightened across the globe. In 2008, four consecutive storms flooded the Gonaives area of Haiti. Two years later, on 12 January 2010, Haiti’s most congested city was severely affected by an earthquake that killed more than 220,000 people, injured more than 300,000 and left around 1.5 million homeless.

2.2 Haiti as a fragile state and comparability with other countries

Despite important potential (such as strategic location, dynamic young population, active diaspora, multiple touristic and historical sites, etc.), Haiti has remained the poorest country of the Americas for many decades. In 2013, Haiti was ranked 168th out of 186 countries on the Human Development Index (this represents a deterioration from Haiti’s 161st place in 2012).

The table below shows some key socio-economic indicators for Haiti. A comparison with its closest neighbour sharing Hispaniola, the Dominican Republic, reflects the particularly dire situation of Haiti.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Key indicators on Haiti and comparison with the Dominican Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Density (/km2)</td>
<td>331.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual growth [%]</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP total [million USD - current]</td>
<td>3,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita [USD current]</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy M/F</td>
<td>57/61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank - World Development Indicators

Haiti was recognised as a ‘fragile state’ long before the 2010 earthquake. Haiti still ranks in the worst 10 out of 178 countries on the Fund for Peace’s 2014 fragility indicators, situated between Yemen and Pakistan. The highest-ranking indicators for Haiti are:

- intervention of external actors: 9.8 (out of maximum 10);
- progressive deterioration of public services: 9.5, second only to Chad;
- poverty or economic decline: 9.4, the worst of all countries;
- uneven development: 9.3, second only to the Central African Republic;
- human flight: 9.1, the highest of the worst 10 countries.4

Between 2013 and 2014, Haiti improved on six of the ten indicators, now ranking 9th instead of 8th worst in this index (see Annex 5 for details on the main evolution in fragility indicators).

A factor that closely aligns to political instability, the misuse of power and corruption, is Haiti’s aid dependency. The country ranks 6th highest in the OECD list of fragile states’ official development assistance (ODA) per capita, after Micronesia, Solomon Islands, West Bank & Gaza, Liberia, and DR Congo, and right before Timor Leste.

The political and socio-economic situation in Haiti is complicated by the added fragility of the physical environment. An index developed by Carleton University more systematically accounts for environmental fragility. In their 2012 index, Haiti was ranked in 32nd place overall (one being the worst). Among the most fragile 32 countries, Haiti registered one of the six worst scores in environment (following Iraq, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Afghanistan and Pakistan).

While Haiti is not alone in ranking high on political and socio-economic indicators, elements that clearly distinguish Haiti from the ‘comparables’ cited above include its status as an island state, the acute-on-chronic dynamic and the striking of an acute event of such high magnitude in the largest urban centre of the country (much greater urban density than in the countries cited above).

2.3 Norway in Haiti

**Norway’s co-operation with Haiti before 2010**

Political dialogue having come to a standstill by 1996/97, Norway - encouraged by the United States - accepted to promote new dialogue in Haiti, with a focus on peace building. Norway’s involvement in Haiti at that time was modest, with some humanitarian funding (mainly channelled through Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) efforts and development of the national police. There was very limited commerce between Norway and Haiti.

In 2004, by more closely associating peacebuilding and development (as in the Strategic Framework guiding Norway’s role in international peacebuilding efforts), the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) added another dimension to its interventions in Haiti. It set the stage for Norway’s support to leadership of United Nations and International Financial Institutions in peace building. The internal Norwegian country strategy draft for Haiti in 2007 reportedly had objectives targeting Haitian “political stability through the development of democratic institutions and practice with added contributions to the reduction of violence

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5 See the 2013 Fragile States resource flows report, p.52.
7 Acute refers to the quake - such an event is not often noted in the other countries mentioned - and chronic, the long-term fragility. For more information of ‘acute-on-chronic’ Paul Farmer (2011): Haiti: After the Earthquake, p. 36.
9 This document and any subsequent such country strategies were not fully made available for review by the evaluation team.
through the promotion of mechanisms for conflict resolution with peaceful means”.

Already in 2009, the Norad evaluation of peace building efforts in Haiti recommended that Norway invest more seriously in strategic design, monitoring and evaluation as well as in systems for institutional learning in Norway. Given Haiti’s fragility, thorough risk analysis was also strongly encouraged as the requisite foundation for a consolidated and long-term support package.

Norway’s co-operation with Haiti (2010-12)
Based on data extracted from the internal information systems of MFA and Norad, a detailed portfolio analysis of Norway’s cooperation with Haiti in the period 2010-2012 covers all ‘grants’ and other forms of financial agreements for which disbursements were made during the period. The review of the three-year programme portfolio identified 81 interventions (see the full list in Annex 6) corresponding to 95 unique grants or agreements, totalling 834.3 NOK million, and involving 42 agreement partners and 52 implementing entities.

The table below presents a summary of the portfolio (see also Annex 6).

Table 2 Portfolio overview (2010 – 2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
<th>Nr. or Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Funds disbursed</td>
<td>834.3 million NOK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions / grants or agreements</td>
<td>81 / 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Units (Management)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development / Humanitarian (Domains)</td>
<td>74% / 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target (thematic) areas</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAC Main sectors / Sub-sectors</td>
<td>17 / 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement partners / Group of agreement partners</td>
<td>42 / 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing entities / Categories of implementing entities</td>
<td>52 / 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements made via the United Nations (N=18)</td>
<td>40% (26% direct, 14% MINUSTAH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions to global aid mechanisms or made via framework agreements (e.g. Flash Appeal, CERF, MINUSTAH, NCA)</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbursements made via multi-laterals (includes UN above but also the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the World Bank (WB), etc.)</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions focusing on Département du Sud</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Norway internal case management system (PTA database)

11 Contributions to global aid mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) are also included in the analysis.
12 This amount is close to an internal MFA strategic document of March 2013 indicating that 822.24 NOK million had been disbursed over the period 2010-2012 (difference of less than 2%).
13 Departments/sections within MFA/Norad as defined in the internal information systems.
14 Target areas (as defined in the internal information systems) include: Emergency assistance; Good governance; Economic development and trade; Environment and energy; Health and social services; Education.
15 The partner with which Norway has signed a specific financial agreement. There can be different implementing partners for the same agreement partner.
Table 3 provides details on the distribution of the portfolio by target area and DAC sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Portfolio overview - Disbursements by Target area and DAC sector (in ‘000 NOK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target areas and DAC sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emergency assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>730 - Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>720 - Emergency Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>740 - Disaster prevention and preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>151 - Government and civil society, general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>152 - Conflict prevention and resolution, peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic development and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>430 - Other multisector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>600 - Action relating to debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>311 - Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>321 - Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environment and energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>230 - Energy generation and supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>312 - Forestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>410 - General environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health and social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>122 - Basic health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>160 - Other social infrastructure and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>140 - Water and sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>130 - Population policies/programmes and reproductive health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>111 - Education, level unspecified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grand Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparison to Norway’s support to other countries during the same 2010-12 period (see Figure 1 below), Haiti appears to fall into the middle area.
In light of support to comparable countries, Haiti has one of the most evenly mixed portfolios (response, “emergency assistance” and development) over the period. As seen in Figure 1, it and the largest portion of funding apparently attributed to aspects that may be linked to disaster prevention and/or risk reduction (the sums classified by Norway as ‘emergency assistance’ minus humanitarian response).
3. Methodology

3.1 Analytical frameworks

Although the analytical framework guiding this evaluation is classic and roughly linear, it is strongly recognised that the aid architecture and processes guiding programme implementation and potentially setting limits on impact are complex, circuitous and iterative. The combined simultaneous exploration of the programme and the process, therefore, resulted in a rather atypical evaluation centred on an already complex country, a fragile state. Other frameworks that are used to weave together components of the analysis include:

- **Contribution analysis framework**: in which we considered the cause-and-effect chains that connect design and implementation with development outcomes / impact, compiled evidence related to them and to other explanations to assert the extent to which interventions have made a contribution. Contributions (i.e., to MFA priorities) were double coded per intervention (by more than one evaluator separately and later debated / compared);
- **Model for Organizational Decision Making (MODEM)**: in which decisions are characterised by 1) the processes which led to them, 2) the knowledge base that fuels them and 3) their implementation and impact. MODEM applied in a combined humanitarian and development setting requires not only a simultaneous exploration of organizational culture and learning, but must also take into account the urgency to respond and the multiplicity of donors and actors.

3.2 Main components and methods for data collection and analysis

The evaluation drew on a mixed-methods (qualitative and quantitative) approach to capture and triangulate a wide diversity of sources and perspectives. Many techniques of data compilation and collection were applied in parallel (see also Table 4) and were tallied in a triangulation matrix. They are described in Table 5.

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Table 4  **Mixed Methods: Overview**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary Data</strong></td>
<td>Parts A and B: Qualitative judgments per evaluated element, coded and described in database cells; MODEM; Triangulation Matrix that made manifest the convergence of evidence</td>
<td>Part A: Portfolio Review of all identified interventions; Meta-Analysis of sampled interventions; Policy Review;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compilation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary Data</strong></td>
<td>Parts A and B: Key Informant Interviews (KII) using Topical Outline; Focus Group Discussions (FGD) during site visits (Haiti and Oslo)</td>
<td>Parts A and B: Surveys (in person and/or online)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection (in the “fields”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5  Method Descriptions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodological element (and purpose)</th>
<th>Instrument (Format)</th>
<th>Number (and if applicable, sampling)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desk study and systematic literature review (SLR): to provide context and perspective</td>
<td>SLR Database (MS Excel), aligned to main EQs and Norwegian priorities</td>
<td>Approx. 40 non-project documents reviewed, including 5 books</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio review: to gain understanding of scope of portfolio (census of all identified grants)</td>
<td>MS Excel</td>
<td>95 grants/ 81 interventions; 100% of the portfolio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta-Analysis (Part A): to explore development interventions and reflect their contribution to priority themes, quality of design, success in meeting objectives, etc.</td>
<td>Matrix in MS Excel, scoring by min. 2 evaluators, debate and analysis</td>
<td>Purposive sample of 14 development interventions (46% of the portfolio of development interventions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEM (Part B): to explore decisions in comparable manner reflecting institutional culture</td>
<td>Matrix in MS Excel</td>
<td>Purposive sample of 18 decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field visits (Part A): to witness in-depth project sites and progress of interventions</td>
<td>Live, in person, in Haiti</td>
<td>Purposive sample of 7 interventions (1 in PaP; 6 in Dept du Sud)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Informant Interviews (KII) Current and former MFA/Norad staff based in Oslo or Haiti, implementing partners, Norwegian research institutions, Government of Haiti (local/national), direct beneficiaries and local population, etc.</td>
<td>Topical Outlines (Parts A and B)</td>
<td>Part A (N=85 informants, sampled) and Part B (N=15 informants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group Discussions (FGD): to explore qualitative issues in groups</td>
<td>Topical Outlines Part A: Informal with ‘beneficiaries’, impromptu Part B: Formal, Oslo</td>
<td>Part A (N=9) in field visit sites and Part B (N=1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveys: to quantify opinions of key informants on a variety of issues Part A: stakeholders based in Haiti involved in the implementation of the interventions. Part B: MFA/Norad staff actively involved in Norway’s support to Haiti</td>
<td>2 Questionnaires Part A Survey: Paper Form Part B E-Survey: Online (SurveyGizmo)</td>
<td>Part A (N=21 respondents) and Part B (N=15 respondents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Overall) Policy Analysis: to dissect / analyse extent to which Haiti programme reflected national (and other) policies</td>
<td>Policy Matrix in MS Excel, scoring by min. 2 evaluators, debate, etc. (also, E-survey)</td>
<td>10 policy documents (9 Norwegian, 1 OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Overall) Triangulation Matrix: to compare the results of various tools/ methods to identify the areas where evidence converges, diverges or is lacking</td>
<td>Matrix in MS Excel</td>
<td>Rows were set up as evaluation questions and columns contained the 12 different sources of evidence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Methodological limitations

Limitations and gap analysis

The techniques employed in this evaluation were numerous in order to systematically compare evidence across sources and note its convergence, divergence and gaps. Quantitative techniques (e.g., surveys and meta-analysis) produce useful findings, but are only one of the sources regularly cited below in the findings. These quantitative techniques did not draw on statistical random samples and did not produce statistically valid evidence. They did, however, allow an aggregation of opinions (of evaluators and respondents) across many different sectors/profiles. In the surveys, purposive sampling was used to gain the widest possible diversity of voices. For the meta-analysis and policy analysis, opinions were scored by at least two team members individually, compared and debated until they demonstrated nothing more than a difference in magnitude. Each time numbers are cited below as evidence, it is with a clear indication of these limitations.

Although interviews were held with a majority of the framework agreement contractors both inside and outside Haiti, insufficient evidence was found to support conclusions regarding Norwegian global framework agreements/core contributions such as with MINUSTAH, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Red Cross. These entities make up more than 30% of the total portfolio (support for Haiti, 2010-12). Also in short supply were documents and especially evaluations that support conclusions about humanitarian efforts funded by Norway. While annual reports, reviews and evaluations were avidly sought and reviewed for CERF (Appeals, Annual Reports on Haiti, 5 year Evaluation) and Flash Appeal funding to UNDP, UNICEF (Mid-Term reports and Independent Review of UNICEF in Haiti), the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), WFP and FAO (Evaluation of FAO Haiti 2005-10), most of the documents found were developed at global level; as is the norm, those that focused on Haiti did not differentiate between donors. Finally, no internal trip reports exist to describe the frequent MFA visits to Haiti or what guidance was provided to improve the efforts of implementing entities there.

It is not always easy to know if there may be documentation available that has not been provided to the team, or whether documents simply do not exist. Because the evaluation team has no impression that anything was withheld from them for any reason, they chose to believe that the documents do not exist. Furthermore, documents felt missing by the team were sought avidly. The repeated request for trip reports, as one example, resulted in a visit to the MFA Office by a team member and the confirmation that Trip Reports did not exist as such. Other internal annual summary documents were proposed and shared (discussed below under Section 4.2.2). Although the lack of information available for review may sometimes appear to limit the reliability and validity of the findings, instead it becomes a finding in itself, thereby also adding insight to the body of evidence. Indeed, the same lack of easy-to-trace trails of evidence has been raised in earlier evaluations of Norway (i.e. Evaluation of Norwegian Support to Peacebuilding in Haiti 1998–2008).
All issues endangering the independence of evaluators were addressed prior to the evaluation start-up. One team member had prior experience with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Although the work was not specific to Haiti, the team was eventually not involved in the main work focusing on the analysis of NRC and OCHA support to Haiti and a rigorous system of double-checking and triangulation for issues concerning these two institutions was enforced.

**Disagreements and unresolved differences of opinion (among respondents and evaluators)**

A major divergence (even if not demonstrating a statistically valid difference) among respondents was found when disaggregating survey results to compare NGO responses to those of multilaterals and government. The same was found in qualitative answers during interviews: NGOs, especially in Port-au-Prince, were substantially less satisfied by Norwegian co-ordination than the multilaterals and even NGOs working in the Département du Sud. Despite being the source of a large portion of the compiled evidence, the response from MFA to the draft report demonstrated disagreement with some of the team’s findings and conclusions.
4. Findings

Despite areas of overlap, the findings presented in this chapter are organised into two parts, as per the Terms of Reference for the evaluation: programme (Part A) and process (Part B). Findings triangulated using factual evidence from multiple sources are retained here below. The description below each overall finding is limited to the main points of evidence with clear specification of the noted sources (SLR: systematic literature review; KII: key informant interviews). Much greater detail is available in Annex 4 (organised by evaluation question). Beyond the headings of each section below, evaluators’ interpretation of the evidence is reserved for the chapter on conclusions and recommendations.

4.1 Part A: Programme

4.1.1 Overall strategy

_A Norwegian “strategy” in Haiti, and its intended overall impact, were unclear_

Especially in a context as complex as Haiti, developing a clear strategy for a desired, or intended overall impact (IOI) is considered good practice. Such a strategy statement, in any form, was never identified from the extensive literature provided to the evaluation team by Norad/MFA (source: portfolio review). What was provided, highlighted explicitly in the ToR of the evaluation and proposed by key informants during interviews, was a “Beslutningsnotat”, loosely defined in English as “decision memo”, the most salient of them being the one dated 6 July 2010 (sources: portfolio review and KII). Nowhere in that document was there any visible intent to delineate a “strategy” and the word and its cognates, were not employed to present a Norwegian strategic position. Rather, a series of very clear action-related priorities were stipulated (discussed below and referred to as “priority themes”) in that guiding document, but with no mention of their combined ultimate desired impact.

A preliminary focus group discussion with seven Norwegian actors generated many possible articulations of the implicit IOI, but with no decisive or convincing consensus (source: focus group). To further clarify and test the proposed IOIs, 15 of them were rephrased into distinct elements\(^\text{17}\), and set up as a ranking exercise as part of an online survey of main actors (source: Part B e-survey).

\(^{17}\) The list included intentions at various scales, as expressed in literature and interviews. Respondents were encouraged not to focus on their preference of how aid objectives should be formulated. Rather, they were asked to recall actual intentions of Norway. The focus on one region (Département du Sud) is understood as being a method used, not as an aim in and of itself.
From this survey, there was again no unanimous choice, but the two highest rated IOIs were carried into the rest of the evaluation (see below).

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQ1 and EQ2.

Although not a benchmark for accountability, two reconstructed implicit intended overall impacts have, to date, not been achieved to any visible extent

A more important question than whether the implicit intended overall objectives (IOIs) were achieved is whether it was reasonable to expect to achieve them. Despite the generous appreciation overall provided by e-survey respondents, there were clearly members of the Haiti team (i.e. in Part B e-survey and key informant interviews) who were adamantly more modest in their expectations and less congratulatory about achieved impacts in Haiti. The evaluation team shares this modesty; it stems in part from the wide recognition of Haiti as a fragile state. Another main issue reflecting on achievement of these impacts involves timing. It is generally recognised that a substantial amount of time is needed before even modest impacts are visible in a developing country context, let alone a fragile state. Furthermore, the present evaluation took place when most of the major long-term interventions had only just begun.

For the above reasons, the discussion below is not a criticism of Norway per se: we cannot measure them against a benchmark of impact they did not make public. It is intended, however, to allow the reader to assess the quality of the intentions as well as the level of evidence assembled for the IOIs.

The two “intended overall impacts” most highly ranked were:

1. Haiti is in the driver’s seat of its own development and reconstruction.
2. Haiti has a sustainable basis for development (i.e. building back better).

Evidence frequently highlighted that an insufficient amount of support from donors, jointly, was targeted to statebuilding after the earthquake. As clearly supported by the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, it is essential to strive for modest impacts over longer timeframes in a fragile state, with a prime focus on statebuilding, security and justice\(^\text{17}\) (source: systematic literature review). Even in November 2014, there are few development experts who would claim that Haiti is in the driver’s seat of its own development. From the anonymous online survey of Part B, only half of the 12 who voted for Intended Overall Impact (IOI)-1 (“drivers’ seat”) claimed that the impact was achieved “to a great extent” (source: online survey). During the field visits and discussions with key informants, there was no convincing evidence to demonstrate Haitian officials in a driver’s seat. In a separate vein, the policy analysis revealed that the OECD principal “focus on statebuilding as a central objective” received the lowest score of all 10 principles for Fragile States (source: policy review).

\(^\text{17}\) Cf. the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals of the New Deal (see reference list).
Only four out of the seven that voted for IOI-2 (“sustainable basis”) considered the impact to have been achieved “to a great extent” or more. Nearly half of the respondents did not find the impacts had been achieved. Furthermore, existing interventions were given only ‘medium’ likelihood of being sustained when Norwegian funding ended (source: meta-analysis). The major detriment to success was reported to be “factors outside Norway’s control” (such as the fragility of the state); the second and third explanations were “Implementation” and “Design”. For all interventions funded by Norway in Haiti, a long-term accompaniment is still required to develop a favourable sustainable environment and to contribute to real change in the economic situation of targeted populations.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQ1, EQ2 and EQA2.

Extraordinary situation, but Norwegian response: business as usual, with a few noteworthy exceptions

As hinted above, the challenges in every fragile state context are indeed extraordinary. There are a few elements in Haiti (such as the quake hitting a densely populated urban centre) that further exacerbate these challenges, but once outside Port au Prince, the extraordinary nature is comparable to most fragile states (source: SLR). Extraordinary circumstances normally require extraordinary reactions. As the findings will attest below, however, excepting the rapid forward-looking decision to invest in the long-term in one department, no evidence was found for an element of response that deviates Norway in Haiti from its normal trajectory of generally ‘good donorship’ (sources: portfolio review, KII, surveys). In this sense, Norway was, true to reputation a good donor, conducting business as usual. The reaction was, however, insufficiently extraordinary to balance the nature of the context, details follow.

4.1.2 Approach to aid delivery

Norway was an international leader by example

Although the need to stay on longer was supported by many authors and thought leaders19, Norway was one of the first donors to think longer term and one of the only donors to disburse the full volume of committed funds. The timely Norwegian payment of promises was noted by many (Katz, 201320; source: SLR). Norway readily recognised the importance of quickly initiating transition efforts to provide longer-term collaboration beyond humanitarian response. In particular, renewed support was provided to actions managed by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), the Cuban Medical Brigades, and Médecins Sans Frontières. In addition, the deployment of secondments in various UN organisations via the Norwegian Capacity (NORCAP) roster of experts was continued (source: Portfolio Review). One of the main elements hampering the

19 Kaufmann, 2010. Beyond Emergency Relief for Haiti: The Challenge of Effective Development Assistance: “The international community will need to be much more involved than usual, for a longer period, and in a more “hands-on” fashion than warranted in developing countries like Honduras or Indonesia”. Article for the Brookings Institution.
20 Katz, J., 2013. The Big Truck that Went By: how the world came to save Haiti and left behind a disaster”, p207.
response in Haiti had been the multiplicity of actors involved; in this context, Norway’s efforts to concentrate aid on key actors was particularly adequate, leading by example.

Influencing other donors was an important strategic choice for Norway. By their own account, Norway managed to have protection / human rights included among priorities (source: KII). The policy document most closely reflected in the Norway programme in Haiti was the 2008 Norway Humanitarian Policy (source: Policy review). This demonstrates the level of energy invested in the humanitarian response by highly experienced Norwegian staff and representatives. Norway’s efforts in making international aid more effective were well appreciated. Overall, Norway retains its reputation as a good donor; respondents to the Part A survey perceived ‘good donorship’ to be one of their main priorities. Figure 2 is an illustration of the answers given when survey respondents were asked to summarise in a single word their overall feeling about Norway as a donor in Haiti. Only one term was negative (“lack of coordination”), with the others reflecting a positive impact, such as “coherent”, “conscientious”, “effective”, “sustainable”, and “realistic”.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1, EQA3 and EQB3.

Figure 2  Words proposed by key informants to describe Norway as a donor in Haiti

Source: Particip GmbH.
**Norway was a catalyst for strong and better-coordinated international support to the Département du Sud**

The decision memo of July 2010 clearly identified a geographical priority area for Norway: “The South-western region, more specifically Département du Sud and the region around the city of Les Cayes, is one of the priority development areas in the authorities’ Action Plan”. The one-department concept was praised by many key informants as one of the best decisions made – and a more realistic level at which one can hope to have an impact in Haiti (source: key informant interviews - KII). Among the respondents to Part A survey, the focus on the region receives the highest score of success among all Norwegian priorities in Haiti. Engagement in the region started in late 2010 with the support of three interventions managed by entities previously present in the region: United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). The Department received a quarter of the Norwegian support in 2010/11 and over half in 2012 (source: Portfolio Review). Norway invited a number of its other existing partners (e.g. the Cuban Ministry of Health, Femmes en Democratie, NORCAP, Prosjekt Haiti) to also implement specific activities in the region. Some interventions at national level (e.g. the Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) project within MINUSTAH) also included activities in the Département du Sud (source: field visits). The Norwegian-funded Côte Sud Initiative (CSI), developed as a co-ordination mechanism, aims to attract other donors to invest in the region. The interviews with key informants and field visits confirm that while some improvements can be observed in terms of co-ordination (e.g. Green Table of Donors), huge challenges linger (see 2012 review of the CSI programme, and details in annex).

Although Norway made some contributions to enhanced co-ordination at national level via its active participation in national fora and joint donor funding mechanisms like the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF), beyond the efforts in the Département du Sud and the widely held image of Norway as ‘a good donor’ (see respondent-proposed qualities in Figure 2 above), there is no clear evidence that Norway has had substantial success in influencing the co-ordination, harmonisation and alignment of international aid at the country / macro-level (sources: desk study and KII).

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA3 and EQB3.

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21 There was no major intervention financed by Norway directly targeting the Département du Sud before that date.

22 Multi-lateral organizations, which represented 100% of the interventions implemented in the Département du Sud in the period 2010-11, still represented more than 85% of the portfolio in the region in 2012.

23 The 2012 review noted: “The significant effort that has been spent on branding and profiling the CSI has backfired. Rather than succeeding in raising awareness of what the programme is doing and in mobilising support for it, it has raised unrealistic expectations, failed to convey the current priorities of the programme and eroded public confidence and support. CSI appears, not incorrectly, as an externally conceived concept”.
Norway made a clear move away from central government support, towards greater attention to the local level

Coincident with the move to decongest Port au Prince and create a hub of development practice in the Département du Sud, Norway made a bold move to focus its programming at the department and local levels. Departmental co-ordination is manifest by Norwegian support to the UN coalition in the South (CSI) and the very first Green Table of Donors (Table verte des bailleurs) in which government authorities and multiple donors debated on the priorities of the region (pointed out as a major success by respondents of the Part A survey).

However, synergies between the various efforts initiated so far are weak. Local institutions still do not have the capacity to ensure more coherence in these efforts. Some approaches adopted by the local officials of the Ministry of Environment and UNDP are contested by the government institution in charge of land management at the central level. The situation at local level in Haiti, however, depends on decisions made in Port-au-Prince (e.g. on the allocation of resources to priority areas). Important factors upon which the success of projects depends often remain beyond the influence of the locally-specific interventions (source: KII).

Norway has participated only marginally in support to policy reform and statebuilding processes at national or central level. The position of Norway has provided some unearmarked funds to central government – mainly through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund. As highlighted in the 2012 “Review of the Norwegian support to Strengthening Citizens’ Political Influence in Haiti through the National Democratic Institute (NDI)”, Norway’s support focused on “organising the citizenry for advocacy purposes rather than directly trying to improve government performance” (sources: meta-analysis, KII and Portfolio Review).

While there is a limit to the influence that can be exerted at a political level by external actors (especially in isolation), it is crucial to integrate the political dimension of the supported actions in the design and implementation of the interventions (source: meta-analysis). Interviews with key informants also stressed that interventions were not systematically associated with higher-level dialogue (source: KII). The repeated unsuccessful efforts of the Special Adviser to Norway to “unblock” situations – for example, by mobilising senior representatives of the GoH – illustrate the necessity to go beyond localised technical aspects during project implementation. A more comprehensive approach to ensure continuous dialogue and the involvement of all key stakeholders was lacking.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1, EQA2 and EQA3.

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24 Interventions focusing on Département du Sud represent one third of the non-humanitarian part of the portfolio. This proportion has substantially increased after 2011 (for further details, see Annexes 4 and 6).

25 For instance, a vast project to transform the island of Île-à-Vache into a luxury resort and connect it to other countries via an international airport is likely to have a huge impact on the local dynamics in the Département du Sud. Some people interviewed fear a devastating impact on the already fragile ecosystem of the area.
Norway contributed to parallel structures without clearly articulating an explicit risk analysis and plan for hand-over to the GoH

In a fragile state, strong accompaniment of recognised government entities can be assumed. What is crucial, however, is a very deliberate risk analysis upfront and a clear plan for a hand-over to government any parallel efforts created within a programme. An example of parallel structures by Norway includes the support to the Cuban Medical Brigades (CMB) providing skilled and accessible health services in areas of need. Despite being an excellent initiative, the CMB set up parallel units inside Haitian institutions where the two sets of personnel would rarely interact (source: field visits and KII). There was reportedly no hands-on training provided or even scheduled by the Cubans, even in use of Cuban-introduced equipment. Haitian management was not privy to the Scope of Work of the Cuban personnel, nor certain that the equipment would stay with them when the Cubans left. Although Cuba actively contributes to training Haiti doctors in Cuba, this effort is not visibly linked to interventions that incentivise them to return to Haiti after their training, and share their skills widely in-country at times such as this. No documents were found to describe the in-country capacity-building roles of Cuban doctors and staff (source: Portfolio Review).

An example of another parallel structure developed in the Norway-funded interventions in Département du Sud was the “army of Ministry of Environment employees” (KII) that was used to run the environment programme. Although it is hard not to claim proud ‘ownership’ of such a generous package (staff, office, vehicles), there was no visible proof of ownership at any level - such that they would or could sustain it once the funding dried up. Using project staff to make the greatest impact possible during the funding period is acceptable, as long as it is accompanied by a clear acknowledgement of the risks it introduces, and a hand-over plan recognised by all parties.

A documented risk analysis for the overall Norway portfolio was absent and project designs only partially acknowledged the huge investments and other challenges required to address the complex issues of parallel structures in fragile states. Indeed, a systematic literature review revealed that Norway was not alone in foregoing such an analysis. Comprehensive risk analyses on Haiti are very rare, and those found were conducted prior to the 2010 earthquake.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1, EQA3 and EQB3.

The Haiti Reconstruction Fund quickly derailed from its original intent

Building on the lessons of the response provided in similar post-crisis contexts (e.g. Aceh), a multi-donor trust fund – the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) – was launched in 2010 with the objective “to support the mobilization, co-ordination and allocation of resources” provided by donors for the reconstruction

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26 The evaluation was not tasked to explore risk analysis specific to the project level.
efforts. While the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was the general platform for co-operation and political dialogue between the GoH, the civil society and the international community at the national level, the HRF served as a mechanism to coordinate and allocate resources consistent with the priorities set in the Haiti Action Plan (see box below and greater detail in Annex 6).

**The Haiti Reconstruction Fund**

After consultation with the GoH, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the United Nations and the World Bank, along with contributing donors, established a multi-donor fund called the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The objective of the HRF is to support the mobilization, coordination and allocation of resources in the form of contributions to improve basic living conditions and assist in building the capacity of the Government of Haiti in the longer term consistent with the Haiti Action Plan.

The HRF coordinates its activities with the Government of Haiti (GoH) and is supervised by a Steering Committee. The HRF is administered by the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group which also serves as Trustee, and constitutes pooled contributions to provide grant financing for priority activities (projects, programs and budget support) identified and/or endorsed by the IHRC/GoH within the GoH Recovery Plan.

The expected advantages of this multi-donor approach are that it:
- Increases harmonization by pooling resources from many donors in support of the Government’s Recovery Plan;
- Draws on the comparative advantages of proven international (IADB, UN and World Bank) and locally-active partners that are eligible to implement according to a Partner Entity’s rules and procedures;
- Reduces transaction costs for the Government and donors by working through one funding facility;
- Avoids overlapping initiatives and duplication of efforts; and
- Helps to meet strategic financing needs in the reconstruction process as identified by the GoH.


Given its potential to help meet the recovery needs identified in the Haiti Action Plan and increase aid effectiveness in the post-earthquake context, international donors, including Norway, invested heavily in making this mechanism work (source: KII). Norway firmly believed in the HRF since its inception and actively supported its launch (source: KII, desk study and meta-analysis). Almost half of its transition and development investment during the period 2010-2012 was channelled through the mechanism (source: portfolio review). The HRF helped to carry out some specific actions in the first year after the earthquake (including a budget support operation to help GoH meet immediate financial needs) and

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28 This was the case at least during the period 2010-2011. A new national platform for co-ordination and dialogue – Cadre de coordination de l’aide externe au développement d’Haïti (CAED) - was then progressively put in place.

contributed to addressing some pressing issues, such as debris removal
(source: KII and HRF reports and UN Development Group’s HRF annual
reports). By the end of 2012, the HRF had received US$ 380 million from 19
donors and covered a portfolio of 17 interventions in a wide variety of areas.

However, the HRF faced important challenges, including important delays during
its launch phase\(^\text{30}\) and in the first years of operation. Despite the high level of
donors’ commitment and the active work of its secretariat (source: KII), only US$ 56
million of all HRF contributions had been disbursed by partner entities by
early 2012 (source: HRF reports).\(^\text{31}\) This situation contrasts with the timeframe
for reconstruction outlined in the Haiti Action Plan for an 18-month period for the
main recovery phase. It also contrasts with the concept proposed by the Action
Plan, which foresaw a trust fund as a “fast payment mechanism”, an increase in
“the fluidity of financial flows”, one to “expedite procedures for supplying and
mobilizing operators to carry out the programmes”.

These difficulties are partly explained by fluctuating GoH commitment\(^\text{32}\) and a
variety of constraining factors – ranging from natural hazard events to the slow
approval process by the Haitian institutions and a certain administrative burden
on partner entities – which hampered the launch and implementation of the
funded interventions. As for other similar mechanisms, HRF’s multiple layers
(GoH/HRF/Partner entity/Implementing organisation) also created rigidity,
illustrated by the re-allocation process of the US$ 14 million initially planned for a
project focusing on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) which took almost three
years (see Annex 5 for further details).

The functioning of the HRF was considered by certain informants as too tightly
related to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), hence exposed to the
political dynamics of the latter (source: KII). When the IHRC ended in late 2011,
HRF steering committee discussions on new funding became less frequent
(source: minutes of HRF meetings and KII). Despite a dramatic increase in
disbursement rates in 2012-2013\(^\text{33}\), there was a growing feeling among donors
that the mechanism had become overly “bureaucratic”, it turned out to be “less
relevant” and did not provide the expected “substance” in terms of co-ordinating
and allocating resources to the priority needs of the country (source: KII).

Finally, despite commitments to support Government ownership and alignment
of the funded interventions with the Action Plan, decisions on allocations were
strongly influenced by international donors, who often, in consultation with a
small group of national decision-makers, favoured their own areas of interest.

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30 The HRF was established in spring 2010 but was formally launched during the summer 2010. The interna-
tional community and the GoH wanted to first have some elements (e.g. the IHCR) fully in place before its
official launch.

31 According to the February 2012 financial report presented at the 8th steering committee meeting, SUS 377
million had been received from 19 donors, SUS 265 million had been allocated to 17 identified interventions
and SUS 259 million had been transferred to the partner entity.

32 GoH commitment was affected by a prevailing political instability which reached a peak in 2011 when
difficulties were faced in forming a new government (see the UNDG-HRF 2011 annual report). As highlighted
by a key informant, “enormous amount of time and efforts were invested to get the new Government to
support the HRF”.

33 According to interviews and the documentation consulted (see MFA email correspondence dated May 2011
and minutes of the 6th & 7th Steering Committee meetings), Norway played a critical role in raising awareness
on the need to monitor more closely and accelerate disbursements.
Evidence reports a slight tension within the MFA between those who have promoted non-earmarking and others who favoured a more hands-on approach. When the second payment of Norway to the HRF (74 million NOK) was due in 2011, it was finally decided not to “earmark”. However, all donor contributions combined, un-earmarked funds eventually represent a small share of the HRF overall (less than 20%). The HRF 2012-13 annual report recognises that the system of “donor preferences” had resulted in a “reduced level of flexibility and availability of funding” and a position which is “at odds with the aim of strengthening government ownership and alignment with government priorities” (source: portfolio review).

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA3.

**Intervention objectives are not regularly linked to measurable outcomes and most programmatic successes have been achieved at the “output” level**

Several initiatives were successfully implemented, and a variety of outputs have been achieved in all sectors. Yet, successes are so far mainly observed at “output level”, and in most sectors – although probably still too early to measure – longer-term effects are likely to be hindered by a number of important obstacles. The difference between obtaining outputs and achieving higher-level objectives greatly explains the contrast between the very mixed observations of the meta-analysis conducted by the evaluators (which gave a score of 2.1 out of maximum 5 to the item “Success in meeting planned objectives”) and the positive perceptions of the key informants highlighted in the Part A survey. The meta-analysis shows that, in most interventions, objectives were clearly formulated35 but were seldom accompanied by measurable indicators.

Generally, the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) frameworks reviewed reveal some major weaknesses. Respondents to both surveys echoed this observation. (One respondent to the Part A survey stated: “Norway should not confuse the desire to be flexible with the absence of clear results frameworks and robust monitoring.”) A major characteristic of many of the M&E frameworks analysed is the focus on outputs, and the confusion between outputs and wider effects or “outcomes”. The 2012 review of the “Support to Strengthening Citizens’ Political Influence in Haiti through National Democratic Institute (NDI)” notes: “It appears that activities are being conflated or confused with results. (…) This leaves unaddressed the outcome and impact levels of the result chain. (…) There is

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34 Norway was the first donor to express its specific interests (June 2010, first steering committee meeting). Funds provided by Norway were expected to mainly go to interventions in the areas of environmental management, agricultural development and disaster risk management, and with a geographic focus on the Département du Sud. It is however important to highlight that Norway’s “preference” resulted from active consultations with the GoH and the relevant line ministries that started several months before the official launch of the HRF.

35 “Objectives are clearly formulated” means that general and specific objectives are clearly identified and well-articulated and precise indications are provided on the target beneficiaries, targeted geographical zones and issues to be addressed. Interventions with the most unclear design correspond to programmes reflecting the limited experience of “standard” design on the part of the chosen partner (e.g. Cuba Medical Brigade, managed by the Cuban Ministry of Health) or to multi-faceted programmes with specific objectives not easy to define (e.g. the programme implemented by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance).
nothing in the evaluation plan that alludes to anything that ordinary Haitians would consider results.” (source: desk study).

The meta-analysis also shows that objectives are often not precisely quantified or measurable. For some of the sectors covered by Norway’s support, specific outcomes are particularly difficult to measure – a situation that is aggravated by the lack of robust data and time series in Haiti. In several instances, project documents of Norway-supported interventions clearly acknowledge this situation and highlight the need to carry out a first phase to gain contextual understanding and a baseline for future implementation. For instance, the project document of the “CSI I – Haiti South West Sustainable Development” programme states: “Due to a lack of data there is no attempt in 2011 – Year 0 of the CSI – to quantitatively collate or measure the high-level benefit of the project to the population”. Such an approach also poses a risk that most of the available resources allocated to the interventions are eventually absorbed by studies and other preliminary research activities; this risk was manifest in the case of several projects in particular in Département du Sud (source: KII).

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA2 and EQB2.

4.1.3 Specific findings related to priority themes

Main and cross-cutting themes and the geographic focus stated as priorities in initial guiding documents were given substantial attention

When the humanitarian response was already underway, Norway, based on experience and limited information, identified four main thematic areas (Disaster Risk Reduction – DRR; Natural Resource Management – NRM; protection of vulnerable groups; and dialogue/governance) and two cross-cutting themes (capacity building and human rights), alongside the target of a single department, discussed above. The Portfolio Review shows that, setting aside the vast majority of the portfolio (59%) that targeted emergency assistance, the balance of implemented activities largely aligned with these priorities with varying effects (discussed further below).

Aside from volume of funding attracted, respondents of the Part A survey perceived Norwegian priorities to have been given the following order of importance: geographical targeting (scoring 4.5 out of maximum 5.0), NRM-environment (4.3), good donorship (4.3), governance and dialogue (4.1), DRR / Prevention / Preparedness (4.0) and building local capacity (4.0). Priorities not perceived as among the most important included: building state capacity, protection of women/children, and human rights.

The specific issues that the support has tried to address, however, are complex, and the implementation of financed interventions has taken place in an extremely demanding environment. Important obstacles still impede the

36 Among these priorities, protection, human rights and limited DRR efforts had been the focus of Norwegian aid prior to the earthquake.
successful contributions of the support to long-term effects in these areas. Each is discussed in greater detail below.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1 and EQA2.

**Natural resource management (NRM) / environment was a valid entry point for development in Haiti, and yielded positive achievements albeit uncertain wider/longer term effects**

The second most important contribution of the portfolio to the initially stipulated Norwegian priorities (after good donorship) was NRM-environment: 50% of all interventions reviewed had at least a minor focus on NRM (source: meta-analysis). When asked to rank the perceived priorities of Norway in Haiti, respondents of the Part A survey scored NRM-environment highest (4.3 out of maximum 5). Oddly, excellent Norwegian policy documents\(^\text{37}\) were never mentioned by any source.

Almost all of the interventions of significant size in this thematic area have focused on the Département du Sud. Norway’s support also included some smaller interventions managed by NGOs in other regions, and an intervention ("Frontera Verde", led by UNDP) implemented on both sides of the border with the Dominican Republic\(^\text{38}\).

**Figure 3** Photo: Nursery at the ‘Centre d’interprétation de la Nature’ in Aquin (Département du Sud)

\(^{37}\) Such as 2011: Towards greener development: A coherent environmental and development policy, and 2006: Norwegian Action Plan for Environment in Development Cooperation; The principles of the 2011 policy were nonetheless perceived to be moderately reflected in the programme (given a score of 4.2 by Norwegian decision makers and 2.9 by evaluators.)

\(^{38}\) The intervention aimed at restoring transboundary ecosystems, while strengthening the relationships between the population and institutions of the two countries.
Despite significant delays of certain interventions (e.g. the programme supporting the protection of the Parc Macaya), evidence compiled from the meta-analysis\textsuperscript{39} and other sources (mainly the Part A survey and KII) confirms already substantial efforts made in this area and highlights some positive achievements. For instance, Norway’s support contributed to the official recognition by the GoH of a number of protected areas in the Département du Sud\textsuperscript{40}. Norway also financed vast reforestation initiatives\textsuperscript{41}. However, except small short term increases in revenues generated by the planting of fruit trees on farmers’ lands, no tangible effects can be observed on the population so far and the sustainability of these efforts remains very uncertain.

\textit{For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1 and EQA2.}

**Norwegian-financed interventions in enhanced citizen participation (governance and dialogue) were relevant but challenged**

The third most important contribution of the Norwegian portfolio in Haiti is on governance/democracy/dialogue, a contribution assessed by evaluators much stronger for national level interventions than those in the Département du Sud. A vast majority (86\%) of interventions analysed had at least a minor focus on this topic (source: meta-analysis). When asked to rank the perceived priorities of Norway in Haiti, Part A survey respondents placed governance/dialogue near the top of the list (4.1 out of maximum 5). A pertinent Norwegian policy document\textsuperscript{42} was however never mentioned by any source. Its principles were only modestly reflected in the programme. This can be only partly explained by its recent publication (source: policy analysis).

“Governance and dialogue” represent major co-operation points for Norway in Haiti; these themes were first addressed by the Norwegian co-operation with Haiti in 1998 in a context of peace-building/conflict resolution. During the period 2010-2013, the support covered a wide range of sub-themes and channels described in Annex 4. The largest supported interventions have focused on topics related to citizens’ participation, better dialogue between key actors in Haitian politics, and political stability. Norway also provided significant core contributions to MINUSTAH – estimated at US$ 20 million over the period 2010-2012 (see Annex 5), that intervened in Haiti in a variety of sectors, including conflict prevention, democracy and governance. Its presence in the country is seen as instrumental in the organisation of free elections in 2010.

\textsuperscript{39} As already indicated above, “Natural Resource Management/environment” is the thematic area that received the highest score in the meta-analysis (in terms of the effects, or potential effects, of Norway’s support in Haiti).

\textsuperscript{40} In August 2013, the GoH decreed the country’s first nine coastal and marine protected areas.

\textsuperscript{41} A UNDP implemented intervention led to the creation of more than 20 tree nurseries in a variety of locations in the Département du Sud. A vast replanted area in the St. Louis d’Aquin watershed is considered by the GoH as a model to follow.

\textsuperscript{42} 2013: Sharing for prosperity - Promoting democracy, fair distribution and growth in development policy.
Many informants praised longstanding partnerships established by Norway with national and international organisations as being a key factor of success. The position of Norway in Haiti – with no visible link to a “political agenda” – and its participation in international platforms such as “Friends of Haiti”, were also perceived as positive elements (source: KII).

By contributing to strengthen links between political actors and attenuating distrust between the government and its citizens, Norway’s support addressed a major factor of fragility. However, the support faced important challenges limiting visible results; these include complex dynamics in national political structures, the deficiencies of public institutions and the persistent failure of the State to deliver services.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1 and EQA2.

**Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) – at least in its purest articulation – is not a main theme in the Norwegian portfolio**

Most interventions focusing on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) were implemented in the Département du Sud, as is consistent with key strategic documents. Several interventions specifically focused on mitigating exposure in relation to risks associated to flooding in the hurricane season. Concepts related to watershed management were used in the overall design of the interventions, with a division between activities focusing upstream and downstream, and attention to riverbank protection through the construction of gabions and reforestation. Norway also supported a UNDP-led intervention aimed at developing national capacities in DRR.

Most visible effects were seen in the area of river bank protection. However, such infrastructure activities represent expensive investments that are difficult to replicate in all vulnerable areas and, overall, present a rather low level of sustainability.

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43 The Norwegian portfolio also includes smaller interventions implemented outside the region like “The joint programme for climate change/DRR financed via Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and which aims to empower vulnerable communities to adapt better to the effects of climate change and specific implement Disaster Risk Reduction activities.

44 The geography of many regions of the country is characterised by steep and rugged terrain. Also, the region is on the hurricane route and is defined as a high-risk zone. In 2001, a study conducted by Oxfam showed that the Département du Sud is the region of Haiti hit by the highest number of cyclones, being hit by 16 of the 27 cyclones that the country has had to endure between 1954 and 2001. It is followed by Département de Grande Anse, which was hit by 10 in the same period (see [http://www.mde-h.gouv.ht/etude/etudepdf.pdf](http://www.mde-h.gouv.ht/etude/etudepdf.pdf), p. 30). Since 2001, 12 cyclones have hit Haiti, out of which at least six directly affected the region ([http://www.haiti-reference.com/geographie/milieu/cyclones.php](http://www.haiti-reference.com/geographie/milieu/cyclones.php)).
Gleaned from the systematic literature review (SLR), meta-analysis, and Part A and B surveys, DRR – at least in its purest articulation – is not the main theme in the Norwegian portfolio in Haiti. A pertinent Norwegian policy document was only verbally cited by those involved in its development; its principles were moderately reflected in the programme (scored of 4.4 by Norwegian decision makers and 3.6 by evaluators; Source: policy analysis).

Rather, actors referred more to themes related to “eco-DRR” (DRR activities that focus predominantly on environment aspects). As for many other sectors, NRM can be recognised as contributing to reduced risk, but may not necessarily be packaged as a DRR effort. Rather, in the case of Haiti, “environment” was used as the main entry point into DRR-type efforts, and this is deemed appropriate. The evaluation team believes that any entry point is valid if defended by contextual relevance.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1 and EQA2.

Some contributions in human rights are observed, despite geographic dispersion and isolation

While protection of women / children received substantial attention in the context of humanitarian assistance, this topic was not placed among the top Norwegian priorities in the rest of the portfolio by the respondents to the Part A survey. Despite strong support in strategic Norwegian documents, among the four

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46 The decision memo of July 2010 notes: “Norway will follow up the Human Rights Council Special Session on Haiti’s recommendations for stronger inclusion of protection and rights perspectives into the reconstruction efforts.”
In addition to the support to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights provided after the earthquake and some very specific activities, such as those Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and partners addressed related to statelessness and migration, the main focus of interventions in the sector has been on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Norway’s support in this area included: the secondment of gender-based violence (GBV) experts to UN organisations via NORCAP (e.g. to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in 2012); a multi-annual project implemented by a Norwegian police contingent within MINUSTAH since 2010 and several projects implemented by NCA partners. (Source: portfolio review).

Successful human rights activities such as numerous awareness raising efforts have been carried out at the local level, an important number of police staff and local leaders have been trained and sensitised on SGBV issues, and specific infrastructure dedicated to SGBV has been built in several regions (source: KII). However, the sustainability of infrastructure activities (e.g. the construction/renovation of specialized police offices) remains low. Moreover, despite the variety of initiatives supported, the results of Norway’s investment in this area are conditioned by a weak judicial system and a patchy national policy and legislative framework related to SGBV. These issues are not visibly addressed by Norway’s support to Haiti, and only very partially by other donors. While these constraints were recognized by Norway, no explicit theory of change was found to take them duly into consideration.

Norway’s support in the realm of human rights was also characterised by an important geographical dispersion and a variety of small projects with no link between them. There was no attempt to achieve synergies or sharing of experience between support interventions until the end of 2013, when NCA and the SGBV team within MINUSTAH took the initiative to meet and share information on their respective actions. During the period, very few contacts were established between the Norwegian-supported actors and national co-ordination bodies focusing on the Protection Cluster/GBV sub-cluster headed by UNFPA.

For further details/complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1 and EQA2.

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47 While GARR (Groupe d’Appui aux Refugiés et Rapatriés) worked on protection of GBV victims and on the implementation of a multi-stakeholder approach locally in Plateau Central, MISSEH (The Social Mission of Haitian Churches) focused on raising awareness among women and local leaders within churches in Port-au-Prince and Cité Soleil. In addition, still via NCA, Norway financed the organisation Viva Rio, which has worked with the Police nationale d’Haiti (PNH), the United Nations Police (UNPOL) and MINUSTAH to provide training to PNH staff and local leaders on SGBV in the Port-au-Prince area (Bel Air).

48 The first law against rape (allowing perpetrators to be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison) was passed in 2004.
Capacity building is clearly present but vaguely and irregularly targeted

Capacity building was clearly evident in the portfolio: 100% of the studied interventions (source: meta-analysis) had at least a minor component that aims to build capacity among the targeted beneficiary group and/or institutions. According to the respondents of the Part A survey, the focus on capacity building varied between local and state actors (averaging 4.0 and 3.9, respectively out of maximum 5).

While some good practices are visible in certain interventions (such as the medium/long term coaching of key staff in ministries or local institutions), ownership as one end result of capacity building was not yet visibly manifest in most of the interventions visited. Investments were made to develop the capacities of local institutions such as the Ministry of Environment. However, some interviewees questioned the effects of the provision of equipment (e.g. cars, computers) on capacity building, and highlighted the distortion this created with efforts of other partners (i.e. setting a precedent for other partners less financially able or more determined not to create such non-sustainable incentives). Concerns also exist for the payment of salaries of project personnel presented as ministry staff, but who are unlikely to be taken over by national institutions after the interventions end (source: KII). One example of where capacity could have had an impact but was lacking was with the Cuban Medical Brigade efforts. While Norwegian support includes mechanisms for Haitian doctors educated in Cuba to practice with their Cuban counterparts in Haiti, building on-site capacity of Haitian hospital staff that could be sustained when Cubans leave the institutions remained limited (source: KII).

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1 and EQA2.

Tangible improvements for the poorest groups in Haiti remain a highly complex endeavour

The Terms of Reference specifically asks whether Norwegian assistance served, or is likely to serve, tangible improvement for poor people in Haiti. As highlighted above, a large part of the emergency response and a number of long term interventions (e.g. SGBV-related actions) explicitly targeted some of the most vulnerable groups of the population. Given the situation of poverty in Haiti49, it can also be assumed that most of Norway’s assistance to Haiti did target “poor” beneficiaries. However, only very few long term interventions have had an explicit focus on the “poorest” groups of the population50 (source: meta-analysis).

49 In 2012, the incidence of poverty was almost 60% at national level, and around 25% of the population was living in extreme poverty. The situation is particularly dire in rural areas (38% incidence of extreme poverty). These figures come from the 2012 survey ‘Enquête sur les conditions de vie des ménages après le séisme’ (ECVMAS) and are calculated on data related to household consumption.

50 While most of the population is highly vulnerable, certain groups (e.g. landless farmers/sharecroppers, rural workers who depend exclusively on wage employment, fishers who do not have their own boats, charcoal producers with no other activity, female headed households) are generally considered among the poorest groups in Haiti. Urban households with a higher monetary dependence on purchased essential goods/staple products may also result in particularly high levels of vulnerability.
Some aspects of poverty were directly addressed in interventions carried out in the Département du Sud. Limited small direct effects could be observed in certain instances (e.g. slight increase in catches by a local fishing association, or income generated by mango grafting on farmers’ lands). But these small achievements remain very fragile and there is still no strong evidence for long term positive effects on the economic situation of the wider target population (source: meta-analysis and KII). All studies on poverty in Haiti point to a multidimensional and highly complex phenomenon that will require comprehensive, long term and constantly adjusted efforts. Norway’s supported initiatives in Département du Sud constitute a starting point for such support at the local level. However, given the sheer complexity of the problem, it is impossible to assess at this stage whether an increase of a specific effort in this specific region and target group over a longer period would, alone, be sufficient to redress poverty. Requiring a deliberate analysis of the core beliefs that could lead to more fortune in Haiti51, such an endeavour is beyond the scope of this evaluation.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQA1.

4.2 Part B: Process

4.2.1 Overall decision making process

True to reputation, Norway sought bold and innovative solutions and decision-making has consistently been swift and flexible

The organizational culture in Norway is characterised above all by “flexible, informal decision-making” (60% of Part B e-survey respondents). Key informants also stressed the ability of Norway to seek bold and innovative solutions and to apply fast and non-bureaucratic approaches (source: KII). While most respondents see this as a positive feature, it is dependent on having the right people with the right knowledge, skills and experience to be effective decision-makers. Co-operation and co-ordination between/with pertinent Government of Norway units (scored at 4.3) and the number of dedicated personnel (scored at 3.4) were perceived as adequate to achieve desired impact.

While the Norwegian team was headed by a Special Envoy with Ambassador’s rank and supported by a Haiti-team in Oslo, by a regional Embassy (Caracas and later Havana) as well as by a Special Advisor in Haiti, the overall configuration and presence in Haiti (scored at 2.9 by mainly Norwegian E-survey respondents) was perceived as much less adequate for effective decision-making. Although it was a cost-effective decision to pair the intermittent diplomatic presence in key high-level co-ordination meetings (by the Special Envoy) with a more thorough knowledge of context and sustained dialogue with the authorities and partners (through the Special Adviser), tightly monitored by

51 See, for example, Easterly, W. 2014. The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor.
experienced MFA experts, the entire configuration relies on persons rather than on systems. Given Norway’s limited portfolio in the country, this setup may make good sense, but only if defended by an explicit risk analysis and a clear strategy with pellucid objectives for support to a fragile state such as Haiti is crafted.

Compared to 17 other interventions in fragile states across the globe (2010-12), the proportion of investment considered ‘Interim or transitional funding’ (emergency assistance using DAC criteria-- minus response funding) was highest in Haiti. Norway piloted the largest ever proportion of this type of funding in its Haiti programme, and may have thereby set an unchallenged precedent for investing in the ‘grey area’ between disaster and development (see in Figure 1; source: Portfolio Review). It is this funding, a commendable decision made swiftly from the start, that helped bridge response to the development, for example, in the Département du Sud.

The OECD Peer Review commends the Norwegian MFA for the “flexible approach when it comes to allocating bilateral aid, choosing channels, instruments, sectors, and partners” but it also notes that the evidence base is “not easily seen” and without proper analyses to ensure feasibility, sustainability and the ability to achieve intended results (source: SLR). While in interviews, several respondents pointed to the lack of adequate human resources as a main factor for the lack of documented analysis, a difference of opinion portrayed autonomously in the e-survey suggested that the “number of staff is adequate”. “If we were to spend our time writing long documents, we would not be able to do our job” as one key stakeholder put it. This view was echoed by several key informants, strongly implying that MFA’s ability to “punch above its weight” hinged upon a non-formal way of working.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQB1.
Figure 5  Overview of key events and Norwegian decisions after the Haiti earthquake

12 Jan
Earthquake in Haiti

14 Jan
MFA announces that NOK 40 mil will be allocated for humanitarian aid to Haiti

16 Jan
Press release: Norwegian humanitarian aid to the earthquake victims is to be increased by NOK 60 mil

23 Jan
Press release: Approval of the allocation of another NOK 100 mil of humanitarian aid

22 Jan
First Agreement signed with Norwegian public sector (Norwegian Embassy Havana)

26 Jan
Minister of Development Sphørm and senior MFA staff meet in Oslo with Norwegian CSOs to brainstorm on Norway’s long term engagement in Haiti

27 Jan
First multi-lateral agreement signed (with WFP)

10 Jan 2010

16 Jan 2010

15 Jan 2010

20 Jan 2010

25 Jan 2010

30 Jan 2010

March
Action Plan for National Recovery and Development (PARDN) of Haiti

27 mar
Memo to MFA political leadership announcing total support of NOK 800 mil (200 mil hum; 600 mil medium/long term)

24 May
Memo concretising the Norwegian contribution:
- up to 60% of Norwegian support channelled through HRF
- confirmation of 4 priority areas
- Norway to aim for membership in the IHRC.

Oct
Norad publishes Guidance Note: Reconstruction and Long term Capacity Development in Haiti

2010

Mid-2010
Joel Boutroue becomes MFA’s formal representative in Haiti

27 Jan 2010
Press Release: Norway is appointed to the board of the IHRC

6 Jul
Beslutningsnotat: Decision memo suggesting focus on Dept du Sud

15 Jan 2010

12 Jan 2010

10 Jan 2010

22 Jan 2010

18 Jan
First Agreement signed with Norwegian public sector (Norwegian Embassy Havana)

23 Jan
Press release: Approval of the allocation of another NOK 100 mil of humanitarian aid

16 Jan
Press release: Norwegian humanitarian aid to the earthquake victims is to be increased by NOK 60 mil

11 Jan
Press release: Norwegian humanitarian aid to the earthquake victims is to be increased by NOK 60 mil

14 Jan
MFA announces that NOK 40 mil will be allocated for humanitarian aid to Haiti

25 Jan
First “Friends of Haiti” meeting in Montreal, Norway is absent

27 Jan
13th Special Session of UN Human Rights Council: “Support to the recovery process in Haiti”

17 Jan
First meeting of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) and of the Steering Committee of the HRF

2 Jun
World Summit for Future of Haiti in Punta Cana, DR. Large Norwegian envoy.

31 Mar
High level donor conference “Towards a New Future in Haiti” in New York

2 Jan
Flash Appeal for Haiti: requirements estimated at 3,3 bil NOK

Source: Documentation received from MFA / Norad
**Norway was a risk-willing donor in Haiti**

A vast majority of Part B e-survey respondents consider Norway as a donor to be ‘risk-willing’\(^{(52)}\). According to 47% of respondents, Norway is ‘risk willing’ with documented risk analysis and risk mitigation procedures. Another 33% perceive that Norway “is ‘risk willing’ with informal and / or ad hoc risk analysis and risk mitigation” (source: Part B e-survey). In the context of Haiti, to be risk-willing means initiating aid with a realistic recognition of limited chances for success. It is interesting that, despite this ‘risk-willingness’ and recognition, the same decision makers are quite generous when scoring the impact / results of the Norwegian portfolio in Haiti.

Evidence gleaned from interviews with Norwegian stakeholders support a high degree of awareness of risks within the Norwegian aid system, and that the decision to accept those risks was a deliberate one, and taken at the highest political level. There is also proof of written analyses of the situation in Haiti that specifically include potential obstacles (i.e. risks)\(^{(53)}\): e.g. the potential for political instability, weak governance, corruption and lack of inclusion and/or information on the recovery work (source: portfolio review). These risks and obstacles are not directly linked to the Norwegian assistance though, and there has been no visible analysis of whether and how they could be expected to impact viability or results.

There is also internal awareness of the organizational weaknesses / vulnerabilities: the level of ‘applicable’ knowledge, and ways to manage such a complex programme without adequate presence. There were critical voices and their concerns were heard, but the proposed structure was decidedly sufficient to move forward. Despite these anecdotes, no evidence was found for an explicit Risk Analysis and Mitigation Strategy (source: portfolio review). The level of recognition of the risks remains opaque and the manner chosen to mitigate the recognised risks is only implied in the portfolio.

There were also few elements explicit or visible to support principles of “do no harm”. Harm in this sense indicates many potential results of even a “good” project that were not anticipated because a thorough process of analysis was lacking at the start. One example is setting up a service and creating a demand for something that cannot be sustained once the project funding ends, or providing good or services free that result in a disruption of local markets, goods or labour.

*For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQB3.*

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\(^{(52)}\) Risk is defined by OECD as “the potential for a defined adverse event or outcome to occur” and cites three categories for that risk: contextual (largely beyond donor control), programmatic (failure to achieve aims and/or of causing harm) and institutional (risks to Norway). See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/48634348.pdf. Although not explicitly formulated in the survey, the team believes the respondents shared this definition.

\(^{(53)}\) MFA (Section for Peace and Reconciliation) produced several notes and strategic papers such as “Status for Norges fred – og forsoningsengasjement på Haiti” (February 2010), “Haiti. Dialogsporet – Strategisk veikart for høsten 2010” (19 August 2010), and similar ones for 2011 and 2012.
Extremely low capacity meant that the Haitian Government endorsed Norwegian initiatives, rather than providing to Norway real direction and ownership

The intention to support the Haitian Government’s leadership in defining the overall Norwegian programme was stressed in analyses and decision memos, particularly in 2010. Interviews and internal reports confirm that Norway consistently sought to engage relevant Haitian ministries, including Minister level, before making the most important decisions (source: portfolio review). Influences on Norway’s overall support to Haiti were multiple: inputs from the Haitian government (score of 4.0/5 in meta-analysis), changes in Haitian institutions in the same period (3.92) and political interests of Norway (3.91) were the most important (source: Part B e-survey respondents).

The articulation of the Haitian Government’s priorities in the aftermath of the earthquake (i.e., the Haiti Action Plan) was strongly influenced by international actors, including the Special Adviser of the Prime Minister (who shortly after became the Special Adviser to Norway). Such processes of alignment are characteristic of the relationship between international aid actors and an affected government in fragile states, and make it difficult to establish who is actually driving the priorities. There is little evidence of Haiti exerting real power and leadership (source: SLR, portfolio review and KII).

There is little evidence to support a strong alignment and /or Haitian endorsement of the Norwegian programme. The Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) and bilateral discussions with Ministries contributed to the existing alignment. The Interim Commission was the main forum initially, but with the discontinuation of the Interim Commission, discussions became more ad hoc. The single reported (by Norway) articulation of Haitian ‘choice’ is the Action Plan. While Norway was acutely aware of the weaknesses of the Government, and that there was little buy in to the Action Plan, the decision was to actively promote the plan and Governmental leadership of the implementation, as it was the only element upon which consensus could be built (source KII). Donor concerns particularly focused on the lack of inclusion and consultation with civil society and within the political establishment. The legitimacy of the action plan as a voice of anyone other than donors and influential members of the domestic and international business communities has been repeatedly and loudly questioned (source: SLR).

While the lack of real capacity to prioritise and plan made a genuine involvement in decision making questionable for the Haitian government, and despite noted

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54 The Haiti desk reports that all field visits include meetings at local and central level, and that the relevant ministries always run programming decisions. There is more evidence of endorsement though than of actively influencing strategic decisions.
Norwegian efforts to learn about Haitian priorities, the Haitian Government only symbolically endorsed Norwegian initiatives, rather than providing to Norway real direction and ownership.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQB3.

4.2.2 Learning and knowledge base

There is little evidence of explicit knowledge bases to underpin Norwegian decisions; alternative priorities were explored informally if at all

The Norwegian programme in Haiti was defined from a complex web of political decisions, informal input and discussions, pre-existing knowledge, experience from other crises and analysis at Haiti level (source: KII and portfolio review). Despite consensus that established Norwegian priorities in Haiti made sense, alternative priorities were apparently only discussed very briefly. For the 28 January 2010 decisions, which also to a great extent defined the portfolio, the existing Haiti knowledge within MFA and the Norwegian partners, and experience from other disasters/fragile states are the only cited sources (source: Portfolio Review). The formalised decision memo in June was to a greater extent informed by consultations with Haitian and international actors as well as the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), but the priorities remained to a large extent the same.

Norway has nonetheless accumulated and developed an important knowledge base to understand many elements key to the Haiti programme, including the various dimensions of fragility related to governance. As highlighted in the meta-analysis, however, these themes are barely mentioned in the project documentation related to the new areas of support covered after the earthquake (e.g. Natural Resource management - NRM). While key Norwegian respondents cited a few in discussions, none of the ten policies systematically dissected by the team were ever mentioned specifically in any studied document relating to the Haiti portfolio (source: policy analysis). There seems to be no conscious decision to take stock of the wealth of lessons therein to see which could be applied systematically for a stronger programme in Haiti and how.

While there is a tacit learning environment and a culture in Norway to improve and “do the right thing”, there are practically no systematic approaches or mechanisms to document or share lessons learned. There are indications that individuals quite consistently have adapted programming based on what they learn, but this is done informally between individuals, not at the system level. Furthermore, there have been lost opportunities, such as genuine learning gained from more systematic documentation.

Project and programme evaluations have been undertaken for only a few interventions, but do not appear to follow a set strategy or monitoring and evaluation system. Reviews / evaluations were not systematically implemented (only six external reviews/evaluations for 45 interventions screened). Where they
existed, however, useful feedback loops within MFA were established leading to some adaptions in the design of future interventions. Stakeholder interviews also reported MFA attention to improvements in the design and contents or targeting of various interventions. No documentation of these was found, however, as they happened gradually, and usually based on mutual agreements between the Oslo desk and the Special Adviser when travelling. While annual/semi-annual reporting (M&E) could lead to more systematic learning, few of these agreements have been recorded.

For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQB2.

The only evident mechanism found to enable reflection and learning is the frequent field visits by MFA and Special Adviser

The only evident mechanism, which was also highly appreciated and frequently cited by implementing entities and authorities alike in Haiti, is the frequent field visits by MFA and the Special Adviser (source: KII). The visits appear to be the main source of information on the evolution of projects; undocumented per se, it is difficult to share the lessons observed in the field with other stakeholders. Instead of trip reports per mission, MFA provided yearly status reports to the evaluation team57. A review of these confirmed the inability to track programmatic decisions proposed during the Haiti missions to explore if the decisions resulted in visible and meaningful changes in the field, etc. and if the results were eventually shared, as lessons learned.

While in the Département du Sud, it was unanimous that these visits were hands-on, provided ample room for debate and flexible exploration of solutions to highlighted challenges, multiple Norwegian partners outside the Département du Sud expressed strong disappointment in the lack of a mechanism that would create synergy, build better partnerships and harmonise efforts. Despite explicit requests for more systematic exchanges across the greater portfolio, regular meetings were never organised.

Key informants did confirm that the mission results or lessons learned were almost never shared even at the section/department level in Oslo (only one such example of sharing was remembered regarding the energy sector). Indeed, there is also little evidence of learning shared with other sections and departments outside of the Haiti team. The Haiti programme is internally seen as an innovative intervention where creative solutions have consistently been sought. A few new models were tested, e.g. the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) using civil defence equipment for soup kitchens at the request from the World Food Programme (WFP). Some critical issues were addressed in the real time evaluation58, but no further follow up from the MFA occurred that could support decision making in similar situations (source: portfolio review).

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There are practically no systematic approaches or mechanisms to document or share lessons learned. The lack of systematic documentation and sharing of methods and approaches is another opportunity lost for the Norwegian system. That includes Norad, who was used systematically in the design phase to provide quality assurance and advice. As there were no feedback loops returned to Norad on whether the advice was used, or the results of the programmes, valuable learning was and may continue to be lost.

*For further details / complementary evidence, see Annex 4 and, in particular, EQB2.*
5. Conclusions and recommendations

Overall, in its support to Haiti, Norway made some good choices, based on limited information available at the time: namely to invest in Haiti long-term, to concentrate in one department and to use NRM/environment as an entry point. However, the volatile political dynamic over the recent years, especially visible at the central level, has been a disincentive to Norway to influence the situation at central state level. This contributed to a strong shift of Norway’s support (historically focused on peacebuilding and governance) towards the local level and the implementation of a package of activities not explicitly connected to statebuilding, especially at the central level. Norway’s de facto choices not to articulate an intended overall impact, not to invest more directly in statebuilding and not to explicitly and systematically articulate the risks that were recognised (i.e. in a shared risk-analysis) and the non-production of a hand-over plan to GoH, have diluted the programme’s chances for sustainable impact.

5.1 Main lessons learned from Norway’s choices

Analysis of compiled evidence points to many lessons that could be learned from Norwegian support to Haiti since the earthquake. They are noted here at three levels: 1. Norwegian strategy and policy; 2. statebuilding and government of Haiti; 3. decision-making and priorities. These lessons to be learned can also be considered general conclusions (more specific conclusions follow below).

Norwegian strategy and policy

• The Norwegian model has a wavering link to tangible results. Although monitoring and evaluation seems to be used more and more, there was insufficient use of results frameworks in interventions and no country strategy existed to promote synergy and guide the efforts towards a predetermined intended overall impact. Setting a national “country strategy” for support is good practice and merits investment. The evaluators believe it is possible to set and monitor impacts within that strategy, without endangering the lauded flexibility of the Norwegian model.

• Except for the Humanitarian Policy, which was specifically mentioned by several key stakeholders as guiding the portfolio, there was little use of pertinent policy positions that materialise in existing Norwegian documents. An effective country strategy that recognises lessons learned could link choices and activities more firmly to policy documents.

59 This chapter on lessons learned and the following ones are based on the evidence presented in both the main report and the annexes. The identification of lessons learned has specifically drawn on the systematic literature review (SLR), the meta-analysis, Part B interviews with key informants and the Part B e-survey.
• It is essential to strive for modest impacts over longer timeframes in a fragile state, with a prime focus on statebuilding at multiple levels. Although Norway has been an active member of the International Network on Fragility and Conflict (INCAF) and is one of the endorsing members of the 2011 New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, a specific policy guiding Norway on how to work in fragile states, including the need for context analysis (political economy) and conflict-sensitivity (do-no-harm) may prove useful.

• As implemented, the Norwegian portfolio has been a patchwork of efforts with numerous strands that are only partially woven together and not carefully checked for potential synergies. This underscores a greater need for overall / centralised co-ordination of the portfolio.

• Outside the official circle, knowledge about Norway-funded actions is very low, even among other funded organizations. In the field, individuals inside Government entities are rarely aware of Norwegian support in the country. If the desire is for any public to be informed of the valuable efforts conducted with Norwegian money, publicity or more exchanges would be required.

Statebuilding and government ownership

• Overall, Norway has invested in strengthening central government to a limited extent. In a fragile state, the delicacy of public institutions should be assumed. As highlighted by OECD, at the heart of the interaction between social expectations, political settlement and the capability and responsiveness of the state lies the matter of 'legitimacy', which provides the basis for rule by primarily non-coercive means. States derive legitimacy from multiple sources that may coexist and/or compete. Understanding the sources of legitimacy must be central to external interventions in statebuilding efforts. No document was found to include an analysis of the political economies of statebuilding in Haiti.

• Given the strong commitment of the international community to respond in a co-ordinated way while lobbying for government ownership, support to the HRF was a logical decision. Adopting an alternative method to deliver aid might have led to some gains in efficiency but probably not to more aid effectiveness or government ownership. However, there still have been some missed opportunities in terms of using the HRF as a "strategic instrument", such as for greater harmonization among donors (e.g. via the development of common M&E procedures and a results framework) and stronger dialogue between national and international stakeholders. Reducing the HRF to a financial mechanism while leaving strategic discussions on external aid to the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHCR) certainly limited its added-value. In this context, the loss of momentum observed after less than two years and the return of several donors, including Norway, to more traditional bilateral aid followed an understandable logic. The struggle with the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) mechanism was not unique; it faced constraints similar to other aid delivery methods used in post-disaster contexts elsewhere.

63 Examples of such an analysis can be found in: Smits et al, 2013. Revolution and its discontents: state, factions and violence in the new Libya, Clingendael and van Veen, E. 2014 From the Struggle for Citizenship to the fragmentation of Justice: Yemen from 1990 to 2013 Clingendael.
Beyond the HRF and a specific support to political structures, support to central institutions was almost inexistent in the portfolio. Norway did not engage in any form of support to policy reforms / sector support at central level. There could have been a major contribution to more effective governance, appropriate policy environments and stronger society-state relationships. Rather, energy was invested in good ideas at the local level but often lacking merited support at the policy/central level. While peacebuilding and statebuilding often converge, support for these efforts has generally been found to lack “a clear, strategic understanding of the conflict and (potential) role of international support in transforming key conflict drivers. Programmes lack basic conflict sensitivity and are not well adapted to the context in which they operate”\(^{65}\). Although in 2010 “government ownership” was sought more explicitly than “statebuilding”, Norway may have missed a good opportunity to address Haiti’s fragility.

Because statebuilding is a deeply political process forged out of complex struggles over the balance of power, the rules of engagement and how resources should be distributed, it may require parallel and simultaneous support at multiple levels that was not found in the portfolio: local/community, decentralised and central, as well as wider support to strengthening state-society relations and legitimacy. Statebuilding must occur at every level, and reaps the greatest benefits when done so simultaneously. Support for statebuilding is no less important at the regional/local levels. Not the job for a single donor, it is also an effort that requires support from a wide range of partners. There was no evidence of an explicit division of labour with other donors to support the various dimensions of statebuilding.

Enabling, even unintentionally, NGOs and the UN to replace government services is not a testament to sustainable development. Even if this is often inevitable in fragile settings, the guiding issue is that there is no evidence to indicate that Norway recognised the efforts as parallel structures, or that they built in options to hand over to the GoH in due course.

Care needs to be taken when assuming alignment to national priorities, based on a single document (i.e. Action Plan) of debated origin. Increased dialogue is a necessary but only partial step towards government ownership. Government ownership of the Norwegian-funded efforts should be more visibly justified.

**Decision-making and priorities: geographic, temporal, sectorial and institutional**

- **Geographic:** concentrating on Département du Sud was one of the best decisions made. Concentrating and coordinating certain efforts even more narrowly (e.g. on the communities living in one of the department’s watersheds) might have been even more successful.

- **Temporal:** Committing rapidly to significant longer-term support in an acute-on-chronic situation is commendable and should be a norm for donors. Norway was in the lead on this – another good decision that forms one of the

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\(^{65}\) OECD (2012): Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility - Improving Learning for Results. This guidance was developed under the supervision of the INCAF on the basis of the evaluation of Norwegian support to peacebuilding in Haiti 1998-2008. The document identifies issues related specifically to work in fragile settings.

rare pieces of evidence to demonstrate Norwegian understanding of context and of the special needs of fragile states.

- Sectorial: A wide sectorial focus is a more challenging approach to produce impacts, but may assure greater visibility and provide a more complete package for complex problems, such as in Haiti. The package provided in the Département du Sud was wide, but patchwork. Beneficiaries of each effort were often separate, with none gaining the impact of a full package required for sustainable development. The risk of overstretching should be countered by sustained co-ordination with other donors and actors.

- Institutional: In Haiti, Norway visibly remains a close “friend of the United Nations”, to an extent that in this case ran counter to statebuilding and to desired impact. Support to multilaterals/UN and NGOs needs to be balanced to ensure sustainable results. Not all combinations in all contexts will produce results. General consensus on sustainable impact leads to a greater focus on direct contracting of local partners and less reliance on multilateral entities. Likewise, future support through mechanisms such as the HRF needs to be carefully considered to confirm if their design and the context in which they will be embedded will allow them to function efficiently (i.e. to provide a savings in time or to gain ownership).

More specific conclusions are provided below – first, specific to one of three main themes, and then aligned to a particular recommendation. At this point, the conclusions are supported where possible by literature from the systematic literature review (SLR). The recommendations are detailed, along with a proposal on the entity best placed to enact them and suggestions or ideas on steps to take. This is not meant to be prescriptive, but merely to help clarify the intent of the recommendation. To be noted are the strong links between the recommendations: a focus on one recommendation will often strongly contribute to the enactment of another.

5.2 Flexibility, but within a structure

**Thematic conclusions: drawn from all EQs (Parts A and B included)**

Flexibility has been a consistent feature of the Norwegian support to Haiti. Both Norwegian decision-makers and the Haitian and international counterparts expressed satisfaction with the manner in which programmes and allocations have easily adapted to changing needs. Bureaucratic impediments have been overcome, and flexible and non-traditional solutions have been found. However, the programme and its leaders are left extremely vulnerable by the combination of high reliance on very few individuals, a weak systematic approach to results, no comprehensive country strategy, no country-wide co-ordination meetings, and no readily accessible trip reports detailing lessons learned and suggestions made.

Valuable tools that already exist in Norway were ineffectively channelled to produce results. Norwegian investment in dozens of high-level policy documents is proof of a thorough digesting of lessons learned that are not put to good use in
any systematic or visible way. It appears that they are only referred to in systematic evaluations such as the present one, and Peace Building67 (2013).

Partnership/framework agreements comprise a major proportion of the Norwegian aid portfolio in Haiti (33% of total portfolio). The advantages to a donor of channelling funds through large entities or framework agreements (e.g. to overcome a lack of capacity and manpower within the donor organisations or a lack of presence on the ground, or to benefit from pooling risks, etc.) are perfectly clear. However, this does not come without other risks – such as no control over accountability and distance from potential learning and responsibilities.

In summary, a combination of both flexibility and structure may be ideal: *flexibility* to remain a genuine learning, non-paternalistic partner to countries and *rigour* to choose the appropriate overall impact (with quintessential iteration, allowing for evolution) to measure and report on what has worked, and to regularly rectify what has not.

### 5.2.1 Recommendation: Recognise the benefits of Country Strategies and develop them systematically

*Who: MFA with Norad support*

A country strategy based on a solid analysis of the political economy and risks will guide Norway to reach consensus as early as possible not only on the priorities identified for a given context and key implementing partners, but also on the length of investment and intended overall impact. Strategy development is also the time to capitalise on Norwegian national and other policies that could strengthen the process (see below). Most importantly, it will be an opportunity to centralise all main lines of strategic decisions in one document that can be shared with every partner or even compiled with them.

A country strategy cannot be set in stone. It needs to be developed as a living document that is consistently discussed and amended. A country strategy does not necessarily require setting up rigid goals and results frameworks. It should, as a rule, allow for the analysis of a changing context and articulate dilemmas and difficult choices, such as how to operationalise support for the Government.

*Suggested steps of action or ideas:*

1. Norad to produce a template and propose a process for developing Country Strategy Documents;
2. MFA to pilot the Template in 1-3 countries, applying different processes (a: developed in situ, jointly with partners; b: in by Oslo-Country team; c: by closest embassy or other).

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5.2.2 Recommendation: Capitalise on the wealth of existing policy documents

Who: Norad
Norway has a rich library of “lessons learned”, featured in national policies and parliamentary White Papers. Innovative ways in which these lessons can regularly be capitalised upon – when developing country strategies or new targets of multi-sectorial support for Norway – merit exploration. Although useful at the country level, this may also have value at the macro level, as a way to provide checks and balances and compare country programmes across varying contexts.

Suggested step of action or idea:
3. Drawing on a compilation of “Norway will…” actions from the ensemble of strategic documents, Norad should explore ways in which these statements can be regularly revisited (i.e. during the development of a country strategy) and/or rolled out into fluid, high-level M&E systems.

5.2.3 Recommendation: Develop a structured learning system

Who: MFA (and Norad)
The most important element of a learning system is regular stocktaking of where the programme is going. Periodic and iterative critical review of choices made, their consequences and how to improve them can greatly strengthen the programme. Although such review was conducted with very regular field trips to Haiti, and to the Département du Sud, no evidence was found for the exchanges and suggestions made during those trips or for how the learning was transferred to a wider audience.

Suggested steps of action or ideas:
1. MFA to develop informal but regular meeting points between sections and units: “Brown bag” informal learning seminars, workshops rather than formalised reports. These can be both sessions on country-specific lessons learned and thematic sessions (e.g. working in fragile states, multi-donor trust funds).
2. MFA to ensure that Norad is not only involved in the start-up of the programme, but is more regularly drawn into discussions on learning and lessons. Create and sustain a feedback loop between MFA and Norad.
3. MFA and Norad to identify ways to share trip reports more systematically among country-teams and, when appropriate, a wider audience.

5.2.4 Recommendation: Nurture synergies within the country programme

Who: MFA
A good complement to a Country Strategy document is a commitment to fostering exchanges across the full portfolio, inside and beyond any targeted geographical focus. Regular (bi-annual) meetings generally suffice to foster dialogue among a wide array of partners, exchanges of ideas, and a desired synergy that may lead to stronger impact.
Suggested steps of action or ideas:
1. Encourage a more systematic use of country-wide meetings in Norway aid management for all countries, but especially in Fragile States.
2. Find ways in Haiti to encourage more strategically a wider set of actors to consider efforts in the Département du Sud. Although this may (but not necessarily) divert their efforts from other areas, the new partners may be able to add the small sustainable steps often missing in the department dynamic.

5.2.5 Recommendation: Identify ways to track and learn from framework agreements
Who: MFA
Given the challenges in tracking results from framework agreements (e.g. the Central Emergency Response Fund - CERF) and the almost impossibility of attributing results to Norway once funds leave MFA, it would be useful to further explore any possible ways to learn from the framework agreement process and results.

Suggested steps of action or ideas:
1. Establish a list of framework-type agreements and their differences.
2. Explore ways to more carefully track and learn from framework agreements.

5.3 Need for more realistic goals
Thematic conclusions: drawn from all EQs (Parts A and B included)
There were some very clear and laudable decisions made by Norway that were quintessential proof of realism – namely, the move to focus on one department, and the early decision to stay longer. However, it was also observed that:
• the programmatic focus was very wide. Norway could have focused even more narrowly than on one department. The choice of department is also a decision that merits a documented justification unidentified to date.
• Norway has a mixed compilation of timeframes for interventions permitted to each partner, often (but not always) depending on the funding instrument. Impacts, especially in fragile states, require a lengthy investment, realistically up to 10-20 years. Although Norway is rightfully lauded for deciding very early to “stay a while”, the length of that period is still not known to date by actors or observers (including government).

Perhaps the least realistic element of the Norwegian portfolio in Haiti is the highly optimistic intended albeit only implicit overall impact of putting “Haiti in the driver’s seat”, without investing substantially and explicitly in statebuilding. Beyond efforts in co-ordination in the Département du Sud, elements within the portfolio that focused on statebuilding and actions guided by the Peacebuilding
and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) were neither clear nor systematic. Such a combined package could be achieved by division of labour with other donors. It would need to be made explicit in an initial strategy and will demand active co-ordination on issues not directly covered by Norway’s own support.

The impact of the Norway portfolio in Haiti was also less realistic, diluted due to a lack of vertical and horizontal integration across the programme. While a focus on the energy sector may have been strong in Département du Sud, the lack of a strong influence that could ensure political traction on energy in the capital, Port-au-Prince, caused a stalemate for a large portion of that sector’s effort. The attempts by MFA and its Special Adviser to lobby at the central level were not sufficient to unblock the situation. Localised efforts of many sectors benefit from a dual focus on both praxis and policy. Although Norway may prefer the more neutral and more tangible actions of field-based programming, it is not realistic to ignore the weighty effect of policy on praxis – even more so in fragile states.

On the horizontal side, impact becomes more realistic when one community (or any entity) receives a holistic package of support. The basic principles of “Do No Harm”, and the development of conflict-sensitive policies and programmes, are also central to achieving strong peacebuilding and development results. In the evaluated programme, separate communities, for whatever reason, got different but isolated parts of the wider Norwegian package. As only one example, some of those benefiting from reforestation efforts may have had no assistance with farming or other income-generating activities, thereby treating the symptoms and not the cause of the deforestation and its linked flooding problems. Although the UNDP intervention has tried to address this, the approach to comprehensively cover these issues has not been systematic. The still-missing dynamic is one of horizontal integration (See more in annex 4). The same consideration could be stated for fisheries. In the South, several initiatives have been conducted with a very modest participation of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR), especially the Directorate of Fisheries. Even though they are involved in the action, they do not feel deeply involved in the execution, which is co-ordinated by UN agencies in the region.

5.3.1 Recommendation: Develop the focused geographic concentration concept as part of the Norwegian model

Who: MFA

In the case of Haiti, moving the focus away from Port-au-Prince after the earthquake was a good and realistic strategy. Although the reasons for the choice of the Département du Sud (as opposed to any of the other eight departments) were numerous and always different, it was never suggested that it was a bad move. Beyond the context of Haiti itself (e.g. lower development outside Port-au-Prince, need to decongest the capital city), a focus on one department is even more modest and realistic with a view to making an impact.

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It capitalises on proximity to local actors, and greater chances for impact. It is in this focused geographical concentration that Norway may have a comparative advantage over other donors. The “geographic concentration” is intended for a package of lower level interventions that will need to be combined with concrete statebuilding support at the central level (e.g. through specific projects / Technical Assistance, active policy dialogue) in close co-ordination with other donors.

It does not, however, come free of complication. Foremost is the choice of which department. No document was found to provide detailed justification of the choice of Département du Sud. Partners outside the Département du Sud often felt neglected, and a strong focus on one area clearly resulted in missed opportunities for synergy. One department in Haiti is also quite a large entity, and the efforts supported by Norway could be considered patchwork across the department, even if co-ordinated at the department level. This points to the concept of a focus on, for example, one or two watersheds before scaling supported efforts to the level of a department.

Suggested steps of action or ideas:
1. Provide stronger, more readily available documentation on the rationale for the choice of a focused geographic concentration (i.e. department or other target).
2. Explore ways to measure impact, comparing the one-department model, one wider model (two departments, or full country) and one more focused model (one or two watersheds).

5.3.2 Recommendation: Develop genuine long-term partnerships with governments, recognising the limitations of fragile states and focusing on statebuilding as a central objective

Who: MFA

Widely viewed as a real partner (in comparison with other donors), Norway missed the opportunity to invest genuinely in restoring a government left in tatters by the earthquake (and well known to be fragile even prior to then). Norway, like most of the other donors, provided funds to select NGOs and large multilaterals to do what they do best – invest rapidly and widely to restore conditions. The necessity of building a bridge between society and the state was however only timidly addressed. For brief moments, glimpses of ownership of efforts by the government are visible at the department level, but they are erratic and easily cast back among other competing priorities. It is also easy to “own” or claim a project that provides a car, office space and a contingent of dozens of “soldiers” to get the job done (as found in the Department Office for the Ministry of Environment). It is much harder to establish if this qualifies as statebuilding. Perhaps it does, to a certain extent, by whetting the appetite and creating a demand for environmental transformation. But what is left when the funding dries up? Basic governance transformations may take 20-40 years70.

There are no universal solutions or quick fixes – even less so for fragile states. As gleaned from the systematic literature review, “The central dilemma in providing aid is that it is needed most in precisely those contexts where the prospects for its being used effectively are the lowest.”\(^{71}\) Such a statement is an argument not to end aid to the countries where measurable results are the least visible. Fragile states need Norway’s aid more than others, and precisely because of Norway’s flexible model, Norway should even more explicitly cast themselves as a Friend of Fragile States\(^{72}\), seizing every possible opportunity to partner and assist fragile governments, rather than getting the job done for them.

**Suggested steps of action or ideas:**

1. Explore more carefully transition financing\(^{73}\) instruments as a main means of partnership. Budget support is featured highly among the options due to high probability of contributing positively to institutional transformation and co-ordination.
2. Prepare a White Paper to guide Norway on how to work in fragile states, and why this may be an appropriate niche market. Start with the OECD recommendations to donors.
3. Adapt Norwegian funding mechanisms to allow long-term investments in fragile states.
4. Consider piloting\(^{74}\) the New Deal if Government of Haiti initiates it (no Norwegian-supported pilot to date; Denmark has two country-pilots, and Sweden has one).

### 5.3.3 Recommendation: Vertical integration (practice to policy) – focus on small sustainable steps supported at multiple levels

**Who:** MFA

Evaluative evidence is plentiful to show that the smallest steps registered the most visible outputs to date in Haiti. The most lauded efforts were those with the simplest “narrow, specific and tangible goals”\(^{75}\). These included efforts such as Cuban Medical Brigades, Prosjekt Haiti (Mama Troll), and singular, isolated very targeted, efforts inside the large multilateral programmes, such as mango grafting and fishing aggregating devices. These small steps need to be nurtured, and not isolated to the realm of indigenous NGOs. Aid is a useful tool, above all, for this precise type of effort.\(^{76}\)

Statebuilding requires parallel and simultaneous support at local and central levels. Although it is crucial to “leave policy choices to the host country”\(^{77}\), completely ignoring or neglecting them in an aid portfolio may leave programmes stranded with no impact. At the risk of becoming paternalistic, a

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72 ...more so than, for example, as a “critical Friend of the UN”. See ’MFA, 2012: Norway and the United Nations: Common Future, Common Solutions’: 9, 82.
75 Although Eggen and Roland are careful not to include fragile states in their reflections on development, many of the lessons remain valid. See, O. Eggen and K. Roland, 2014. Western Aid at a Crossroads: The End of Paternalism. Palgrave: Macmillian: 112.
76 ibid.
77 ibid: 111.
very careful selection of policies that promote pro-poor growth may merit support at central levels, and may be required for some sectorial lower-level programmes to flourish in fragile states.

Not a contradiction to the laudable focus on one department (see above), vertical integration will assure that the focus in one department reaps the largest possible benefits.

Suggested steps of action or ideas:
1. Prior to approving a programme proposal, identify the extent to which its success is dependent on the existence – or the application – of a national or other policy.
2. Determine whether or not there is need to add a component that will focus on this policy and, if so, identify who to do this and how.

5.3.4 Recommendation: Horizontal integration (across sectors) – consider a package of interventions among same beneficiary group when addressing complex problems

Who: MFA and Norad

It is not realistic to expect to build a sustainable basis for development if the same or overlapping groups of people are not receiving support from multiple pillars or sectors. Those benefiting from reforestation and social support will also be yearning for economic growth – and the efforts will be meaningless to them until they achieve that growth; those benefiting only from support in economic growth will be hampered by fragile environments incapable of, for example, yielding fruit – and the efforts will be meaningless until they can restore or preserve that environment. Horizontal integration of programmes is the act of aligning required pillars within the same target group. The integration of this idea in Norway’s support to Haiti (which has already been partly done as illustrated by the approach taken in certain components of the support to reforestation) should be further strengthened.

If sustainable development is a genuine goal, it is essential to strive to set up more modest aid packages featuring multiple pillars, founded on conflict sensitivity and governance, and among a smaller group of potential beneficiaries.

Suggested steps of action or ideas:
1. Identify the “poster child” of successful sustainable development financed by Norway anywhere in the world (especially among former fragile states). Evaluate the extent to which each pillar of sustainable development (and governance, security) was addressed, and its contribution to the overall impact.
2. Even with small, more targeted aid packages, evaluate, rectify and repeat. When successful, it should be spontaneously contagious among neighbouring communities.
Annexes
Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Evaluation of Norway’s support to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake

Background and rationale
At the high level donor conference ‘Towards a New Future in Haiti’ in New York on 31 March 2010, Norway pledged NOK 600 million to medium and long term assistance to Haiti, in addition to NOK 200 million that had already been provided for emergency relief following the earthquake 12 January 2010. By the end of 2012, Norway had fulfilled its commitments. A total of NOK 822 million had been disbursed, of which 223 million for humanitarian assistance.

A series of decisions made by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) over a period of about six months after the earthquake can be seen as constituting an overall strategy for the use of funds\(^1\). The Ministry laid out four main priorities that can, for the purpose of this evaluation, be interpreted as development objectives of Norwegian assistance (excluding the humanitarian assistance) to Haiti in the period:

- Reduced vulnerability to natural disasters
- Environment, reforestation, agriculture and alternative sources of energy
- Protection, in particular of women and children
- Political dialogue, governance and conflict resolution

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also emphasised Haitian leadership and Haitian capacity and alignment with the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti. Gender aspects were emphasised in several statements, and Haiti was one of the ‘focus countries’ in Norway’s strategic plan for Women, Peace and Security 2011-2013\(^2\). Norway stated a preference to multilateral channels and cooperation with regional actors (Cuba, Brazil, and Dominican Republic). Norway took part in several forums for co-ordination between multilateral organizations and with other donors to support the overall international efforts in Haiti, emphasizing Haitian leadership.

To avoid concentration of foreign aid to the capital, following consultations with the government of Haiti, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to give priority to the administrative division Département du Sud, in particular with regard to the priority areas of reducing vulnerability to natural disasters and

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1 The main components are summed up and formalized in an eight-page ‘decision document’ (beslutningsnotat) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 6 July 2010 (in Norwegian language).
support to environment/reforestation, agriculture and alternative energy. These priorities were implemented through a number of programmes and institutions including Haiti South West Sustainable Development Programme implemented by UNEP and UNOPS, Vulnerability Reduction in Watersheds/agriculture implemented by UNDP and FAO, and Natural Disaster Mitigation in the Southern Department in collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development.

The efforts to support protection of women and children focused on human rights promotion and instruments, and aimed more at nation-wide implementation, including strengthening human rights in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (Minustah). Political dialogue was to be promoted, among other channels, through support to the National Democratic Institute, local media, and facilitation of dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, local partners and NGOs including Norwegian Church Aid.

Almost half of the total amount provided (excluding humanitarian assistance) in the period (NOK 274 million) was disbursed through the multi donor trust fund, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). The fund is a ‘pass-through’ mechanism primarily established for the purpose of financial allocation rather than implementing activities, and funding through the HRF was, among others, used for budget support to the government and to finance parts of the Norwegian assistance that was implemented by UN organizations. Of the remaining funds, the largest amounts were provided to Minustah and the rest directly to UNDP, UNEP, other UN agencies, NGOs and a range of other organizations, most of them Norwegian.

An overview of all disbursements with brief description and statistical information can be downloaded from www.norad.no/statistics/advanced.

Several reviews and evaluations and internal assessments have been carried out of individual programs and institutions supported by Norway. They point to a very demanding context with a range of institutional and other challenges. Questions, warnings and criticism have also been raised in public both in Norway and elsewhere about the international support to Haiti after the quake, pointing at multiple challenges and some doubts about the effectiveness of the international efforts in producing the improvements expected. One concern in the international attention to the assistance to Haiti has been how much of the funds that actually reaches and leads to improvements for the poor.

In response to a question in the Norwegian Parliament 23 May 2012, the foreign minister indicated that the MFA would consider a ‘full evaluation’ of the

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Norwegian efforts to support Haiti in 2013. The MFA then requested Norad’s Evaluation department to take on such an evaluation. The Evaluation department decided to initiate the evaluation described in this Terms of Reference. It is developed to contribute to both of the main two objectives according to the mandate for evaluation of Norwegian aid: to keeping the actors in Norwegian development policy accountable for its administration, and to contribute to learning by gathering experience.

**Purpose and scope**

This evaluation covers Norwegian assistance to Haiti during 2010-2012 with a view to two purposes. The purposes are different by nature and require different methodological approaches, but there are nonetheless synergies that justify incorporating both purposes in one evaluation. Due to the high public attention around the international assistance to Haiti, emphasis will be on the first purpose below.

First, the evaluation will contribute to documenting the effectiveness of Norwegian assistance by producing knowledge on to which degree Norwegian assistance has led to, or is likely to lead to achievement of intended objectives. Since the evaluation is carried out short time after implementation, it is acknowledged that the achievement of most medium and long term objectives are to be expected in future, which is beyond empirical verification. The audience for this first purpose are stakeholders and the general public.

Second, the evaluation will help improve future Norwegian development assistance by contributing to enhanced capability of the Norwegian aid system to make good strategic and day-to-day decisions in comparable situations elsewhere. Although the situation in Haiti after the earthquake was truly unique, aid agencies occasionally face comparable challenges: To develop strategies and make decisions aiming at both short term humanitarian and long term development objectives, while facing complex humanitarian emergencies in fragile states and/or unusually demanding political and institutional contexts, often under short planning horizons. Lessons from Haiti may improve the ability of the Norwegian aid system to manage such challenges in future. The ‘Norwegian aid system’ (hereafter called ‘Norway’) includes, in principle, all actors involved in policy and decision making, planning and design, monitoring and evaluation – with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the most central actor. The audience for this part of the purpose is aid policy and strategy makers and relevant personnel in Norwegian and other aid agencies.

The evaluation object is all Norwegian assistance provided to Haiti during 2010-2012 with the following specifications: Aid aiming at medium and long term development objectives will be given priority for in-depth study. When evaluating

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4 According to the mandate for evaluation in the Norwegian aid administration, the MFA can request the Evaluation department of Norad to commission an evaluation. MFA does, however, not decide on or instruct Norad regarding evaluation questions and the Terms of Reference, which is decided by Norad’s Evaluation department after consultation with stakeholders. Although this evaluation has been initiated on the request from MFA, it would also fit well to the criteria applied by Norad’s Evaluation department and government regulations for evaluation of all public funds, emphasising the evaluation of activities of special nature, high risk, and importance.
humanitarian assistance, the evaluation will primarily consult documents made available to the team by the MFA and the implementing institutions. Activities and evidence of results during 2013 will be consulted when it can shed light on assistance during 2010-2012, for instance, if results produced in 2013 build directly on activities during preceding years. When responding to the second purpose, the evaluation object includes all processes and decisions involved in policy, strategy and decision making regarding Norwegian assistance to Haiti in the period.

**Evaluation objectives and evaluation questions**

In response to the first evaluation purpose, the evaluation objective is to assess the results of Norwegian assistance to date with a view to the possibilities for achieving medium and long term objectives in future. Where relevant, results materializing in tangible improvements for poor beneficiaries are of particular interest, acknowledging that many of the most important improvements are to be expected in future. Since humanitarian assistance will primarily be evaluated on the basis of documents, the evaluation will collect and compile available documentation of results, but is not expected to verify the quality and accuracy of reporting, since that cannot be done based on document reviews alone.

In response to the second evaluation purpose, the evaluation objective is to provide lessons learned on Norway’s ability to manage knowledge and to navigate in the complex political and institutional dynamics at local, district, national, regional and international level to enable making the best possible strategic and practical decisions at all levels and all phases with a view to optimal utilization of Norway’s own resources as well as the overall effectiveness of the international efforts. Although the evaluation object is limited to Norwegian assistance to Haiti, emphasis will be on general aspects that can be of relevance to comparable situations and contexts elsewhere.

**Evaluation questions and methodology**

The following questions will guide the methodology development and evaluation work:

- To what degree has Norwegian assistance under evaluation led to, or is likely to lead to the stated objectives in project documents/agreements?
- To what degree has Norwegian assistance supported, or is likely to support the four priorities laid out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
- To what degree has Norwegian assistance served, or is likely to serve, tangible improvement for poor people in Haiti, women and children in particular?
- In which ways did Norway influence the effectiveness of international aid to Haiti overall?
- In which ways did Norway influence the capacity of the Haitian government?

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5 One reason why the agencies’ own reporting of results will be used is to avoid placing (further) demand on people, public offices, local organizations and other institutions who may already have contributed to monitoring, reporting and evaluations of the post-earth quake humanitarian assistance.

6 The report will state explicitly that the evaluation team has not been asked to verify results reported from humanitarian assistance.

7 Programme documents and agreements will be consulted during the inception phase, leading to the development of more specific questions in the inception report, not in the tendering process.
– What are the likely unintended consequences, positive or negative, of Norwegian assistance, for instance on institutional capacity or local and regional political dynamics?
– How did Norway approach the challenge of learning, both by utilizing available knowledge and by learning from experience, to ensure that aid was optimally allocated, designed and implemented?
– How did Norway adapt and respond to, for example, different political and institutional interests, political and institutional changes, local and stakeholder inputs, experiences from implementation, internal and external reviews, or advice from Norad?
– On which basis were decisions made during different phases and at different levels, ranging from the overall policy and strategy decisions like geographic priority, sector priority and institutional collaboration, to the day-to-day strategic choices within each project and collaboration?

What are, in hindsight, the lessons learnt from Norway’s choices in terms of geographic priority, sector priorities and institutional collaboration?

**Methodology**

The nature of the evaluation object and the evaluation objectives poses some challenges with regard to methodology. For the first purpose, the time span is so short that for some activities it is too early to expect that lasting results have materialised at this time – in addition to the well-known problems of substantiating results of aid in complex and shifting contexts. For the second purpose, one can expect that there is limited documentation and probably few sources of information on the complex political and institutional dynamics involved, in particular at local, institutional and regional level, and it is difficult to identify relevant events and to trace processes, in particular since resources made available do not allow for long-term, in-depth case studies.

Moreover, since Haiti after the earthquake represented a context of unique nature, there is no reference available in the form of available comparators or the possibility of establishing credible counterfactuals to make it possible to answer some of the evaluation questions in conclusive ways.

The team will propose an outline of a methodological approach that optimises the possibility of producing evidence-based assessments within the limitations of the challenges above. The evaluation shall be carried out according to OECD DAC’s Evaluation Quality Standards and recognised academic and ethical principles. The methodological approach may include the components below:
– Reconstruction of the intervention logic/theory of change behind Norway’s assistance
– Analysis of relevant aspects of the political dynamics, primarily based on already published material with preference to academic research literature
– Consultation of all relevant programme documents, reviews and evaluations carried out in the period of Norwegian assistance as well as relevant studies,

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evaluations and reviews of other donors’ comparable assistance to Haiti during the same period

- Institutional mapping of learning, decision making, monitoring and evaluation in the Norwegian aid system in the period

- Consultation with statistical data, household surveys, programme monitoring and evaluation, or any other already available material that can shed light on the results of Norwegian assistance.

- A procedure to assess whether a selection of Norwegian initiatives is likely to lead to achievement of the intended objectives in future, including assessment of the intervention logic and of programme performance to date

- Case studies of a selection of strategic decisions made by Norway with a view to understanding to which degree they were well informed and represented the most appropriate alternative available at the time, and to understand and learn from possible shortcomings

- Stakeholder and expert interviews in Norway and Haiti, group discussions or stakeholder survey(s) to identify stakeholder perception and analysis, to supplement and qualify other methods and to enable direct inputs from stakeholders to selected evaluation questions. Consultations outside these countries can be made using electronic communication or by travelling if included in budget. The overall design and planning of the methodology should aim at minimising the administrative burden on key stakeholders in the government and public offices in Haiti.

**Budget and deliverables**

The budget will be based on an estimated maximum of 35 weeks (1400 hours) to cover all phases of the evaluation including travel time\(^9\), debriefing and dissemination to stakeholders\(^10\). Additional costs including costs for research assistants, all travel costs including allowances, and costs for data collection will be specified in the budget.

The deliverables consist of the following outputs. For specific time-schedule, see the Tender document.

- Inception report not exceeding 20 pages to be approved by the Evaluation department

- Draft report. After circulation to the stakeholders, the Evaluation department will provide feedback.

- Final report not exceeding 15,000 words excluding summary and annexes. The Evaluation team can choose to present two reports responding to each evaluation purpose, respectively. If so, each report can consist of a maximum of 10,000 words.

- Two policy briefs not exceeding 2 pages each, one targeting a wider audience and one targeting relevant personnel involved in development cooperation.

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9 Maximum seven hours per international travel.
10 Debriefing in Haiti will be done by the team during the planned country visit. Dissemination in Oslo will take place through a seminar, for which time and travel costs for 1-2 team members will be included in the budget. Further dissemination activities, if any, will be covered in separate agreement(s).
Dissemination in Oslo, including a seminar and availability for possible other dissemination activities organised by the Evaluation department.

All written material will be submitted electronically, and all supporting data will be made available to Norad. Norad retains all rights with respect to distribution, dissemination and publication of the deliverables.
Annex 2: List of documents

Norwegian assistance

Policy documents


Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009): Interests, Responsibilities and Opportunities. The main features of Norwegian foreign policy.


Key reference documents


**Project documentation**

Project documentation, communication and other documents provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its partners on interventions implemented by UN agencies (UNDP, UNEP, WFP, Unicef, OHCHR, UNDPKO, CERF, etc.), the World Bank, IADB, Norwegian Refugee Council, Norwegian Red Cross, NCA, Viva Rio, NDI, IDEA, IMS, etc.

**Other documentation**


Ternstrom Consulting AB (2013): Evaluation of Five Humanitarian Programmes of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP.


**Haiti National context**

**National strategy**


**Fragility context**


**Other documents**
ASRDLF (2012): La résilience de la paysannerie haïtienne en question.


Haiti Reconstruction Fund (2010-2013): Procès-verbaux, rapports du secrétariat et rapports financiers relatifs aux réunions de comité de pilotage 1 à 12.

Haiti Reconstruction Fund (2010-2013): Quarterly reports and annual reports.


Oxfam (2001): Cartes et étude de risques, de la vulnérabilité et des capacités de réponse en Haïti.


**Studies and evaluations on international aid in Haiti**


Bhattacharjee, Abhijit/ Lossio, Roberta (2011): Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake, commissioned by UNOCHA.


Binder, Andrea/ Grünewald, François/ Georges, Yvio (2010): Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake. Groupe URD/ GPPi.

Channel Research (2011): 5-Year Evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund, commissioned by UNOCHA.

Chen, Michelle (2010): The Total Failure of Global Aid in Haiti. Article for the online magazine Colorlines.


Norad (2010): Pre-appraisal of inception notes from UNEP/UNDP and project proposal from IDB.


UNEP (2010): UNEP in Haiti. 2010 Year in Review.


**Other documents**


Eggen, Øyvind/ Roland, Kjell (2013): Western Aid at a Crossroads: The End of Paternalism. Palgrave Pivot


Yamashiro Fordelone, Talita (2009): Triangular Co-operation and Aid Effectiveness. OECD.

Websites
ACAPS Haiti: http://www.acaps.org/deployments/ha-ti

Carlton Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/


Haiti Interim Cooperation Framework: http://haiticci.undg.org
Haiti Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe: http://www.mpce.gouv.ht/

Haiti Ministère de l'environnement : http://www.mde-h.gouv.ht/

Haiti Office of the Prime Minister: http://www.primature.gouv.ht/

Haiti Reconstruction Fund: http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/


NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity) by NRC: http://norcapweb.no/

Norway MFA: http://www.regjeringen.no/

OECD Conflict and Fragility - Statebuilding: http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/statebuilding.htm

UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF): http://www.unocha.org/cerf/


