Evaluation of five Humanitarian Programs of the Norwegian Refugee Council and of the Standby Roster NORCAP

Case Country Report - Somalia

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Ternstrom Consulting
in collaboration with Channel Research
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This report is the product of its authors, and responsibility for the accuracy of data included in this report rests with the authors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions presented in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of EVAL.

Täby, 2013

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Acronyms and abbreviations Somalia

CAD Core Activities Database
CGI Corrugated Galvanised Iron
CHF Common Humanitarian Fund (Country-specific)
DAC Development Assistance Committee
DIID Department for International Development (UK Aid)
EC European Commission
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office
EFSD Emergency Food Security and Distribution
FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis
GBV Gender-based violence
GREDO Gargaar Relief and Development Organisation
HAPPDA Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa
HCT Humanitarian Country Team
HINNA Women Pioneers for Peace and Life
HO Head Office
HOA Horn of Africa
ICLA Information, Counselling and Legal Advice
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation
LNGO Local Non-Governmental Organisation
LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
NFI Non-Food Item
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NMFA Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Norad Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NORCAP Norwegian Capacity
NRC Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
PETS Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
RO Regional Office
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VARDO Voluntary Action for Relief and Development Organisation
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
Executive Summary

This Case Country Report Somalia is part of an evaluation of five core competencies of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity) commissioned by Norad. Its prime purpose is to generate evidence and field-based data regarding NRC operations. Such evidence will then be used as the basis for findings, conclusions and recommendations in the overall synthesis report. Recommendations presented below are therefore primarily country specific. Recommendations of a more systemic nature will be presented in the synthesis report.

The overall objective guiding NRC’s work is: “to enhance protection and promote the rights of the displaced people in humanitarian need by improving living conditions and seeking durable solutions”. NRC has responded to this principle in Somalia as follows.

Shelter

NRC’s emergency shelter response has been relevant, effective and efficient, providing needed protection against the elements and violence. Shelter intervention modalities are evolving flexibly to meet Internally Displaced Persons’ needs. Implementation is area and context specific and aims toward durable solutions. Programming is well coordinated with other service providers, seeks to involve beneficiaries and adapts to needs, including examples of exit.

NRC’s Shelter activities in Somalia can be seen as a ‘best practice’ model, highly appropriate to the local context. While the same interventions may not be appropriate in other contexts the overall approach and high level of beneficiary participation should be replicable.

The NRC South Central team has two beneficiary feedback mechanisms that cover all projects and activities: one has yielded effective results; the other is not effective due to lack of registration and follow-up.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene has been introduced as a new Core Competence relatively recently but it has been an integral part of Shelter programming in Somalia since 2011. Throughout Somalia the construction of latrines and showers has been incorporated in Internally Displaced Persons’ sites where NRC is active in Shelter provision. Latrines in South Central were observed to be insufficient in number to meet Sphere standards, although the scarcity of available land to construct latrines in tightly-packed Internally Displaced Persons’ sites is a mitigating factor. In Bossaso, the number of latrines constructed does not conform to Sphere standards, mainly due to lack of adequate funding. For the same reason, NRC has not provided washing facilities. More of both facilities are planned in 2013 if funding becomes available.

A key challenge in all regions is how to de-sludge the latrines when they become full. While project documents refer to community maintenance of latrines and de-sludgable latrines have been constructed in South Central Somalia, NRC has encountered reluctance from communities to perform crucial maintenance such as de-sludging.

Emergency Food Security and Distribution

In response to the 2011 famine in South Central Somalia, NRC undertook an emergency food distribution operation project that was partially funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The evaluation confirms the effectiveness of the food voucher approach: beneficiaries used the vouchers for the intended purpose while the food items covered by the voucher were in line with people’s preferences.

NRC chose an intervention modality (food vouchers) to respond to beneficiary needs after conducting an exhaustive and well-documented analysis to identify the most appropriate
approach. This has protected NRC assets, staff, partners and beneficiaries. Beneficiaries were highly appreciative of the food they received, saying and said the voucher system gave them greater dignity than the cash transfers or food hand-outs used by other non-government organisations.

We identified two weaknesses in this operation: firstly, the intervention was not sufficiently timely. NRC’s decision to engage in a large-scale food security programme in response to the famine came late – when the famine was full under way - although the agency scaled up a response plan relatively quickly once the decision had been taken. Secondly, the intervention did not have a clearly-defined adaptation strategy after the initial emergency. A more timely re-assessment of needs would have revealed people’s evolving coping mechanisms, prompting NRC to modify its intervention activities.

**Camp Management and ICLA**

There were no Camp Management activities in Somalia during 2010-2012. ICLA activities have started in Puntland and Somaliland under the Shelter programme. These have focused on the resolution of land tenure issues and have been partially successful. However, the issue of durable solutions for the great majority of internally displaced persons remains outstanding and of concern to the humanitarian community. The introduction of ICLA as a separate core competence programme is being studied by NRC.

**Gender, Age and Diversity**

In relation to gender, the relevance and effectiveness of NRC’s programmes can be partly attributed to its efforts to ensure that women’s voices are heard in needs assessments and targeting. However, the lack of any female enumerators in formal and informal monitoring systems in South Central increases the risk that NRC will not get a complete picture of women’s real or potential protection concerns, given that they are commonly not able to talk about them with male monitors. By failing to hear the concerns of a majority of the beneficiary caseload, programmes run the risk of not reaching their full potential.

Efforts are being made in Puntland to adapt shelters for people using wheelchairs: another agency makes access ramps where needs are identified. Sick and disabled people are also accommodated in the South Central food project whereby NRC has procedures for them to receive their food.

**Corruption**

NRC’s internal mechanisms to prevent corruption appear to be effective with multiple checks at different levels. Procurement procedures and transactions emanating from field offices are reviewed and authorised by the Regional Office in Nairobi. However, while competitive bidding is held annually for procurement of non-food items, the same suppliers are selected every year for consistently producing higher quality bids. This is producing disaffection with other bidders who are not successful.

In the context of Somalia, beneficiaries of humanitarian aid in general have to pay ‘taxes’ in different forms (cash, food and non-food items) to community leaders (‘gatekeepers’) and sometimes, militia. Working with and through gatekeepers has become a *modus operandi* accepted by many aid agencies and donors as the only way of ‘doing business’ in Somalia - despite knowledge of serious human rights abuses committed by gatekeepers. While beneficiaries accept these payments as their contribution to ‘community services’, they represent a leakage in donor funds. Amounts cannot be verified quantitatively. Interviews with key informants suggest that the benefits – saving and protecting lives and livelihoods of up to half of the population – outweigh the risks of trying to prevent this form of ‘taxation’ altogether.
Relevance
NRC’s Shelter, Food, Non Food Items distributions and Water Sanitation and Hygiene interventions were relevant and have supported beneficiaries’ survival strategies. NRC clearly helped beneficiaries to cope with their daily challenges with greater dignity, strengthening their coping mechanisms and preventing further depletion of their assets, but there is little documented evidence of concrete outcomes.

NRC uses participatory approaches, including dialogue with local implementing partners and the cluster system to ensure that its programmes are appropriate to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries. Programming is re-assessed for relevance through annual planning and bi-annual review sessions, discussions in Cluster meetings, informal discussions with other partners and post-distribution monitoring, ensuring adjustments to beneficiary priorities at regular intervals. Staff is aware of and seeks to adhere to Sphere standards in Shelter. The number of latrines constructed does not conform to Sphere and washing facilities have not yet been constructed in Bossaso. The tightly-packed conditions in Mogadishu, unavailability of local engineers and the recent entry into Water, Sanitation and Hygiene programming in Bossaso, as well as inadequate funding, are constraining factors. NRC indicates that improvements to the programme will be implemented in 2013.

Local partners assessed the training and capacity-building they received as relevant to their partnership with NRC: compliance on NRC requirements, financial procedures, procurement and reporting. Furthermore, on-the-job training resulting from practical interaction with NRC has significantly contributed to building capacity.

NRC is responsive to beneficiary needs and adapts over time. The Public Expenditure Tracking Survey in Burao revealed a pattern of stepwise changes in shelter design based on experience gained and feedback from beneficiaries. In Bossaso, post-distribution monitoring revealed perceived flaws in shelter design. Based on this finding, NRC adapted its design to beneficiary preferences.

However project documents (narratives, logframes and reports) do not place enough emphasis on tracking outcomes, and are more geared to documenting outputs. This mirrors programming which is output, not outcome focused. Due to this output focus and a lack of baselines, documentation and monitoring, there is very little data on how output changes living conditions of the target population. NRC staff is institutionally aware of the need for conflict-sensitive programming, highly relevant to the Somalia context. Meanwhile, staff knowledge of assumptions underlying programming choices and the drivers for and against change are not documented systematically, reducing learning and programme quality. Baseline data is lacking for all projects reviewed.

Effectiveness
NRC interventions have been effective in providing beneficiaries with the means to survive with dignity, achieving the results sought in the projects. For example, although analysis shows that cash vouchers would have been a cheaper option from an administrative perspective, the food voucher system has borne out assumptions of greater security and dignity to beneficiaries. UN Consolidated Appeals regard emergency food, shelter and WASH (water, sanitation and hygiene) as life-saving interventions and NRC has implemented projects in all three.

Shelter materials used are effective in providing safe and protective homes. The different choices (plastic sheets, tents or corrugated iron based) made in disparate areas and contexts were rational and effective.

WASH interventions in the form of latrines provision and hygiene awareness training have been effective in improving protection and reducing open defecation and disease hazards. However, the effectiveness of WASH interventions needs to be assessed according to their
ability to reduce or mitigate hygiene-related illnesses and none of the three NRC offices were able to produce baseline or periodic mortality and morbidity data to prove this.

NRC has not produced hard evidence that its projects achieve the results intended. For example, the objectives of the food voucher project included: “to save lives” but no mortality or nutritional status data, before or after the project, was reported by NRC in the course of their activities, reducing the possibility to mark progress in project implementation.

Efficiency

NRC has systems in place to efficiently manage its operational activities and human resources, control mechanisms track progress. The system provides overall guidance via the annual strategy process as well as detailed work planning, including standardised logframes, at project level. However, it lacks planning at the intermediate, programme level, making it very difficult to get a grasp of overall operations at country level by core competence. These structural issues will be further discussed in the synthesis report.

At the operational level, the evaluation found that NRC has developed a network of systems that indicate a concern for tracking costs at all levels of management and programme implementation. The systems generate the data they need to assess and follow costs and to prevent diversion of funds. Although an abundance of data is available, this data is used for cost analysis to a very limited extent. If data is to contribute to proactive cost analysis, managers will need further training. Nevertheless, there is significant evidence of individual managers paying attention to cost and basing managerial decisions on such considerations.

The systems examined generate clear and transparent project documents, Standard Operating Procedures for every aspect of work (procurement, finance, distribution etc.) and pre-set templates to allow comparison across projects and sectors. Cost-tracking at field office level is done by project managers working closely with finance managers, but focus is on deviation from the implementation plan rather than on achieving efficiency gains.

All procurement gets reviewed by Regional Office (RO) Nairobi. NRC’s rapid expansion over the past few years has made it difficult for staff at the Regional Office Nairobi to effectively implement procurement oversight of the Field offices. Despite, at times severe, strain on staff the organisation appears to be coping. However, the volume of financial data generated by NRC field offices has at times been too much for the RO staff to handle efficiently resulting in “spot-check” based financial oversight.

NRC staff is well-trained, through mandatory induction courses on recruitment and periodic training or refresher courses that meet the demands of their work. Programmes within each geographical area are closely integrated with each other, promoting cost-effectiveness and coherence across sectors.

There are also challenges to efficiency: implementing an emergency food voucher project over a prolonged period is not an efficient approach (South Central) and mistakes were made in beneficiary targeting, including small families with two shelters (Bossaso). Retention of international staff was a problem cited by staff in all NRC offices visited. Frequent staff turnover means the need for renewed recruitment, training, loss of institutional memory and lower efficiency – but the evaluation recognises that retaining international staff for long periods in hardship duty stations is a general problem in international agencies and not specific to NRC.

Main recommendations

- The Emergency Food Security and Distribution programme in South Central should be reviewed in more depth and amended as soon as possible.
- WASH programmes should be scaled up and funding sought to meet Sphere standards.
- Female monitoring staff should be prioritised in recruitment.
• Exit strategies should be part of project design.
• Accountability to Beneficiaries: Feedback should be documented and followed up.
• Accountability to Donors: Given that corruption by powerful groups operating in Somalia is a general problem, not specific to NRC, coordinated efforts need to be taken jointly between agencies and donors to yield ideas on how to tackle it.
• Outcomes: Outputs are currently the basis of planning and reporting. NRC would benefit from making outcomes the focus of planning and follow-up.
1 Introduction and Background

This Case Country Report Somalia is part of an evaluation of five core competencies of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity) commissioned by Norad1. Its prime purpose is to generate evidence and field-based data regarding NRC operations. Such evidence will then be used as the basis for findings, conclusions and recommendations in the overall synthesis report. In this report, we focus on findings, and only present recommendations that are country specific. Recommendations of a more systemic nature will be presented in the main evaluation report.

The report presents the findings of the evaluation team from its field visits to Somalia between 25 September and 5 October 2012. The reader should be aware that the challenging security situation puts limitations on both NRC’s activities and the way the evaluation has been carried out. The broad scope of the Terms of Reference and the restricted time available for field research also contribute to limiting the evaluation’s depth. We have, for example, not been able to interact with the target population to the extent that would be normal in an evaluation. Similarly, we have not been able to select projects for detailed scrutiny at random, decreasing the extent to which the results can be generalised. We have also had to rely to a large extent on NRC, the organisation being evaluated, for arranging meetings, providing transportation and security details and in a few cases translators. This risks affecting the reliability of results but has not been possible to avoid.

1.1 Purpose and Scope

The purpose of the evaluation of which this Country Case Study is a part is to ‘contribute to the improvement of NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) and NORCAP (Norwegian Capacity) activities’.2 It aims to provide knowledge about the present and past situation and to facilitate integration of knowledge within NRC and NORCAP through learning.

The evaluation has five objectives: to i) assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of five of NRC’s core activities in three countries; ii) assess the quality of NORCAP responses (relevance and efficiency); iii) assess the existence of synergies between NRC and NORCAP activities; iv) provide scope for learning at different levels and; v) make recommendations regarding a) making WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) a new core competence; b) improvements in design and implementation of NRC core activities and; c) improvements in NORCAP’s competencies.

This report addresses mainly the first objective for one of the selected case countries; i.e. to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of five of NRC’s core activities in Somalia. The remaining objectives will be addressed in the main evaluation report, including findings based on interviews with NORCAP secondees, which will be presented together with findings from interviews with NORCAP secondees in other case countries, via Skype and through an online survey.

The scope of the part of the evaluation covered in this case country report is thus NRC activities within its core competencies Shelter, Camp Management, ICLA (Information, Counselling and Legal Advice), Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD)3 and WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene). In Somalia, although planned for, NRC is not implementing any ICLA programme although some ICLA activities are being conducted under the Shelter programme. Similarly, there are no refugee camps and no Camp Management activities in Somalia. Hence three core competencies remain. The period to be covered is 2010 to 2012. The aim of the evaluation is to provide insight into programme

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1 Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
2 Terms of Reference for the study.
3 EFSD has recently been re-named by NRC as Food Security (FS), We have chosen to keep the old name in the report, as this is the name used in the Terms of Reference and in a majority of NRC documents.
design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation during this period and to assess the relevance, effectiveness and efficiency of overall programmes and individual projects. The evaluation team has sought to examine not just what outputs have been achieved in country programmes but the wider outcomes. All three countries that were selected as country case studies (Somalia, South Sudan and Pakistan) are countries where political and humanitarian situations are highly dynamic and where security challenges can affect NRC programmes as well as evaluation methods. This, together with the nature of NRC’s activities, has affected the extent to which it has been possible to examine outcomes.

The main intended users of this report on Somalia are Norad, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA), Sida, NORCAP, NRC Head Office (HO), Regional Office (RO) Nairobi and the staff of NRC’s field offices in Somalia.

1.2 Country and regional context

Somalia has been without a central government for nearly two decades. In 1991-1992 the country was impacted by state collapse, inter-clan warfare, banditry and widespread famine, claiming the lives of thousands of Somalis. A Transitional Federal Government was established in 2004 as the 14th peace initiative for Somalia since 1991. The Transitional Federal Government was assisted by outside forces, most recently by the African Union under the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It was replaced by elections in September 2012 by what is widely considered by Somalis to be a more representative government headed by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Somalia is divided in three quite dissimilar and separate main areas, South Central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland. During the time of the Transitional Federal Government, most of South Central Somalia was taken over and controlled by Islamic opposition groups with al-Shabaab as the main power in all regions.

While the situation in South Central was characterised by constant warfare over the past two decades, Somaliland has remained stable since the early 1990s and was able to conduct peaceful presidential elections in 2012, where power transition took place relatively smoothly.

In Puntland the current government continues to struggle to achieve a broad degree of support while piracy has become a major challenge, extending over the past two years to all regions in Somalia. Al-Shabaab joined forces with al-Qaeda in early 2012 and, now ousted from control in South Central, is trying to set up operations in Puntland. The authorities in Bossaso have found and confiscated weapons they believe originate from al-Shabaab. In October 2012 an al-Shabaab website, Amiirnuur, said the militants were expanding their activities into Puntland, ‘intending to show its residents the true path of Islam’ (the group follows the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi version of Islam, while most Somalis are Sufis).

The humanitarian situation in Somalia deteriorated still further over the past three years, bringing increasing hardship to the population. A combination of inflation, food prices, devaluation, drought, insecurity and, in mid-2011, a widespread famine that affected the three main agricultural areas in South Central Somalia, has further depleted people’s resources and increased their vulnerability. Of the approximately 1.5 million people countrywide that humanitarian organisations estimated in 2011 to be in need of critical assistance, 1.2 million were in South Central, while Puntland hosts around 150,000 Internally

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4 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
7 Information provided by Norad, based on information from Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), UN-OCHA and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT).
Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Somaliland, 67,000 IDPs – mainly people who had fled the conflict in South Central.

Somalia’s instability has also had a regional impact, with people fleeing to other countries in the region – and beyond. The refugee camps in Dadaab hold in excess of 450,000 Somalis – the highest concentration of refugees in the world. Somalis have also fled to Ethiopia and Yemen.

Somalia is one of the most challenging and dangerous countries in the world for humanitarian aid workers and partners, who operate in a limited humanitarian space. Security constraints continue to hamper humanitarian operations across much of Somalia. Since September 2008, 18 aid agencies have been expelled by al-Shabaab from the regions of South and Central Somalia under their control. In 2011 al-Shabaab declared a ban on humanitarian agencies operating in Lower Shebelle and Bay regions, obliging NRC to re-orient its on-going famine-relief operations to Mogadishu.

1.3 NRC in Somalia

NRC commenced operations in Somaliland in 2004 and has since expanded to Puntland in 2006 and South Central in 2007. NRC’s current plans include five core competencies in Somalia: Shelter, Emergency Food Security and Distribution, Education, Information Counselling and Legal Advice (ICLA) and WASH (but not Camp Management). At the time of the evaluation NRC had 30 on-going projects funded by 9 different donors. The budgeted forecast for 2012 is over 150 million NOK (about US$ 26.8 million), making Somalia NRC’s biggest country programme in the organisation’s history.

- **South Central**: This is NRC’s largest operational area in Somalia in terms of number of projects and funding. Shelter, WASH, Emergency Food Security and Distribution and Education are mainly implemented in Banadir (Mogadishu). In 2011 Emergency Food Security and Distribution projects were implemented in Lower Shabelle, Bay and Banadir regions but funds and activities had to be relocated in November 2011 due to access restrictions imposed by al-Shabaab. Some Shelter, WASH and Education activities are also taking place in South Galkayo. The budget value of projects in South Central is NOK 94 m (US$16.7m).

- **Puntland**: NRC implements Shelter, WASH, Emergency Food Security and Distribution and Education projects in Bossaso, as well as Shelter, WASH and Education projects in Garowe and North Galkayo. Projects are valued at a total of NOK 38.3m (US$ 6.8m).

- **Somaliland**: Shelter, WASH and Education projects are being implemented in Hargeisa and Burao. Some of the operations in Western Hargeisa have been phased out as needs are seen to be adequately met. Organisational hopes to begin ICLA programming have not received adequate funding. NRC recently conducted an assessment in the Sanaag region of Somaliland, which revealed severe needs in terms of shelter, sanitation, education and food security of the displaced population. NRC hopes to expand to Sanaag before the end of 2012. A more detailed assessment has had to be postponed due to security concerns. Projects are valued at NOK 44m (US$ 7.8m).

The UN Consolidated Appeals for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 (OCHA) shows the evolution of the humanitarian crises in Somalia over the evaluation period and NRC’s relevance in responding to these. NRC’s contributions can be seen in the context

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8 Information in this section, including budget data, is drawn from the NRC Somalia Project Portfolio, NRC Nairobi, 17 September 2012.
9 The donors are: CHF, DFID, EC, ECHO, Norad, NMFA, Sida, UNHCR and NRC Private Donations.
10 The exchange rate used throughout this report is: US$1/NOK 5.6. We use m to indicate million.
11 Somalia Project Portfolio from RO Nairobi, op.cit.
12 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
of the 2012 Consolidated Appeal for Somalia\(^\text{13}\) for US$ 1.5 billion, giving a rough estimate of NRC’s contribution as 1.7% of the country’s total humanitarian needs.

NRC is well-represented in the Horn of Africa region, having programmes in Ethiopia, Yemen, Kenya and Somalia. The recent addition of the Regional Office in Nairobi brings decision-making, support and control closer to the Field offices, with local staff understanding of the local and regional contexts and surge capacity available should one office need rapid support during an emergency. Its presence in Nairobi also means that it can attend coordination meetings, high level discussions and intervene at diplomatic levels since most Embassies and UN offices, as well as the Humanitarian Coordinator covering Somalia, are situated there. Part of the motivation for investing in the Regional Office has been the Somali origins of humanitarian needs in the five countries covered by the office.

1.4 Document review\(^\text{14}\)

A large number of documents describing and analysing the general situation in Somalia or thematically were reviewed prior to the field work, and confirm the need for the type of activities that NRC are undertaking in Somalia. See e.g. the UN Consolidated Appeals for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 (UN 2010, 2011 and 2012) and the International Crisis Group report on Somalia from February 2012 (International Crisis Group 2012). The Somalia Food Insecurity Integrated Phase Classification from August – December 2012, by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU 2012) showed improvement in the famine situation but cautioned that the crisis was still not over. The OCHA “Somalia: Humanitarian Dashboard” report (OCHA September 2012) and the “Gender-Sensitive Response and Recovery” report by Oxfam (Oxfam 2012) both provide valuable background information for the evaluation.

Background information on NRC’s operations in Somalia was drawn from various NRC documents, e.g. the NRC Somalia Fact Sheet, 2011 and the NRC Somalia Programme Overview, June 2012. Multi-year and annual strategy proposals and annual progress reports covering the years under review gave additional information about activities planned and implemented. The NRC website www.nrc.no, gives an overview on NRC’s mission, standards and policies.

The team also reviewed a number of relevant evaluations on Somalia, including the Norad synthesis evaluation on Gender (Norad 2006), the IASC\(^\text{15}\) Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response in South-Central Somalia 2005 – 2010 (Polastro, undated), the evaluation of temporary shelter and hygiene promotion in Galkayo, Puntland by Fisher and Quanjer (Fisher and Quanjer 2011) and Guillemois evaluation of famine response, which covers the areas of Banadir, Bay and Lower Shabelle (Guillemois 2012).

These documents set the context and provided a basis on which the evaluators could see what NRC and other humanitarian actors had achieved (or failed to achieve) in the past with which to compare activities over the period covered.

A large number of project documents were made available by NRC Oslo, Nairobi, Mogadishu, Bossaso and Somaliland. A sample of these include: concept papers, assessment reports, logframes, consolidated project portfolio, power-point presentation of area strategy, as well as internal checklists to follow funding, reporting and financial data inputs. Annex 2 provides a description of a selection of these documents. A full list of documents that the evaluation team has had access to is available in Annex 3. Please note that this list is using the internal NRC names for documents, and that the list contains over 300 documents.

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\(^{14}\) Please note that we refer to the majority of NRC documents by internal names.

\(^{15}\) Inter-Agency Standing Committee.
The internal documents reviewed are mainly project specific and provided the team with insights into how NRC staff use guidelines, policies, activities, reports and monitoring for project activities. There was a lack of baseline documents. We did not find evidence of before - after comparisons to measure outcomes of interventions.

2 Research Strategy and Methodology

In this section we briefly describe the research strategy and methods used, and comment on reliability and validity of the results. Our task has been to examine NRC’s activities at field, country and regional level. The terms of reference focus on relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and cross-cutting issues. We have aimed at collecting data in a way that fulfills the DAC\textsuperscript{16} criteria, despite the difficulties in making first-hand observations and interviewing beneficiaries.

In line with DAC criteria, interpreted through the ALNAP Guide for evaluating humanitarian action (Beck 2006), the team’s overall evaluation strategy was to conduct a systematic and impartial examination of NRC’s humanitarian action intended to draw lessons to improve policy and practice and enhance accountability.

As suggested in the ALNAP Guide, the DAC criteria were used as complementary to each other. This meant that, for example, in evaluating effectiveness the team not only sought to determine if objectives had been met but whether they were appropriate to the context and beneficiary caseload in question, whether they were met efficiently, were sustainable and complementary to other interventions – both NRC’s and other actors’ activities. In order to promote lesson learning, the team examined what activities took place and why they were designed and implemented in that way.

The evaluation looked at relevance to determine the extent to which NRC’s interventions were priority activities according to the needs of beneficiaries and in line with NRC’s core competencies. For appropriateness, the team looked mainly at context, seeking to determine if the kind of activity implemented was right for particular events or phases of the humanitarian emergency, opportunities and constraints present at the time, if project interventions were designed with the participation of beneficiaries and were culturally and conflict sensitive.

Within the scope of the relevance and appropriateness aspect of the evaluation the team looked also at connectedness and coverage. These are issues that complement the Relevance question and the team considered it necessary, given the context of NRC programming, to examine them. The analysis of connectedness was mainly concerned with NRC’s internal connectedness to its own programmes and with the activities of other partners (also a coordination aspect). For coverage, the team examined the extent to which NRC had addressed the needs of major population groups in life-threatening situations and the efforts it had made to identify, reach out and assist them. This entailed an assessment of conflict-sensitivity: the extent to which NRC sought to reach the maximum number of people in need within a conflict environment that could have placed them, their implementing partners and beneficiaries at risk.

The team examined effectiveness, i.e. the extent to which NRC projects had achieved their objectives, through a variety of techniques. Given the famine emergency which had affected much of South Central Somalia during the evaluation timeframe, it was crucial to examine the timeliness aspect given the pressing needs of affected population groups. The team focused questions of efficiency mainly on the tools that NRC used to ensure that inputs were used and/or procured and the system of checks and balances.

In addition the team triangulated information from NRC’s documents and statements

\textsuperscript{16} Development Assistance Criteria.
concerning sustainability and exit strategies in interviews with various stakeholders. Cross-cutting issues were included to assess how they contributed to meeting the DAC criteria: Gender, Age, Diversity and Corruption were specified in the Terms of Reference, and Disaster Risk Reduction, Linking Relief with Rehabilitation and Development and Capacity-building were added by the team as relevant issues.

2.1 Focus on Systems and Processes
We have described and assessed what NRC has accomplished. Evaluation field access has been severely limited. In order to partially compensate for this we have examined NRC systems and processes, assessing whether NRC has the organisational capacity to accomplish their objectives and whether they can show that such capacity is being used.

Exploring relevance we have assessed if a certain activity is or was relevant to the intended beneficiaries by interviewing different stakeholders and by comparing the selected outputs with e.g. Sphere standards. We have also looked at the systems in place for assessing relevance, such as baseline studies, needs analyses, interaction with stakeholders. Finally, we have looked at documented evidence of the use of such methods and asked in interviews with various stakeholders if they have been used.

The question of whether a certain activity has achieved the intended results (effectiveness) has been approached at three different levels: we started by looking at plans and reports, making observations and interviewing different stakeholders to find out if the results have in fact been achieved. Secondly, we examined if NRC has the necessary "tools" for implementing and measuring the intended results, such as a system for reporting and follow-up, necessary staffing and skills etc. Thirdly, we compared reports, internal evaluations, interviews with staff, other organisations, implementing partners and beneficiaries to find out if they have knowledge of these tools and if they are actually being used.

For efficiency, a similar approach was adopted, assessing if activities have been implemented and results achieved in an efficient way (i.e. relating the achieved results to the resources spent). The evaluation context has limited the extent of this analysis – partly because the evaluation team has not been able to e.g. visit market places to cross-check local prices for goods supplied, but also because context has limited implementation alternatives available to NRC, reducing management choice to do it this way or not at all. We have paid attention to the systems that enable an organisation to make choices that encourage efficiency, such as methods for monitoring and evaluation, the way financial and activities data are used in project management, etc. We have also analysed whether reports are used and acted upon, by looking at the reports, budgets and budget revisions, monitoring efforts actually implemented etc. and by interviewing relevant staff and stakeholders.

Other evaluation topics, i.e. cross-cutting issues, conflict sensitivity, sustainability etc., have been approached in a similar way.

2.2 Impartiality vs. participation
Our initial intent was to add to the learning component by using elements of participatory evaluation, specifically by involving NRC staff (from non-evaluated projects) as research assistants. There is always a balance between learning and impartiality, and at the request of Norad, this strategy was changed. One of the research assistants, Mr Liban Hassan, a former NRC staff member in Somaliland, was kept on to support the team in South Central and Puntland, as his insight in the local context was considered highly valuable. A few days before the field work was about to begin, our Local Consultant for Somalia, Mr Abdishakur Othowai, had to resign from the team due to a family health emergency. We then sought,
and received, Norad’s approval to expand Mr Liban Hassan’s involvement in the evaluation. The team has been aware of the risk of bias due to his prior engagement with NRC, and for this reason he has not been involved in drawing conclusions or making recommendations. He has however contributed greatly to the understanding of the local context. To ensure non-bias, Mr Othowai was re-engaged to perform additional quality control of draft country report.

In two interviews made by Björn Ternström (local authority representatives), and eight interviews with female beneficiaries by Anne Davies it was not possible to find non-NRC translators. In all cases, the translators translated both positive and negative comments about NRC and we found no reason to doubt the correctness of their translations.

Although this has not been a participatory evaluation, NRC has been heavily involved in the planning, preparation and implementation stages. As part of the learning component, we have sought to involve them in the analysis of data collected by having data sharing and analysis meetings prior to departure from areas visited.

2.3 Attribution of results

Attribution of results becomes more difficult the further along the chain from output to outcome to impact you move. The nature of NRC’s planning, reporting and follow-up systems is such that there is little documented information that enables a comparison of “before” and “after” the intervention. Documented baseline studies and needs assessments are rare and reports show that planned efforts to assess results implemented are often delayed or made simpler. Planned and reported results are output focussed.

In several areas, attribution of output is simple as NRC is the only organisation supplying a certain good or service - or supply goods that are easily identifiable. To address attribution of output in other cases, as well as outcome, the team has used a simplified version of the most significant change method. We asked interviewees what important changes have occurred in their lives. Based on responses we refocused the question on a certain theme, e.g. shelter, and then used backwards tracing to ask for the reasons for this change in order to find out if the interviewee attributes the change to an activity undertaken by NRC. We have also asked for the effects of NRC activities. This gives information about both unintended effects and if the interviewee perceives that intended effects have been achieved.

The ideal target group for this kind of questioning is beneficiaries, and whenever possible such questions have been asked in interviews with beneficiaries. However, as the team has had limited access to beneficiaries, and limited ability to speak at length to them, we have mostly asked such questions in interviews with staff and other stakeholders.

A third way to approach attribution is to study the counterfactual, i.e. to ask what would have happened if the activity had not been implemented, or to compare the situation with a similar setting where the activity has not been implemented. The first way of approaching the counterfactual has the same limitations as the method described above, and in our view gives a more biased answer in that the activity is introduced to the respondent at the outset. The second approach is even less feasible given the security and logistical constraints, as it requires visits to more locations.

2.4 Data Collection

The following sources and methods were used to extract and triangulate\(^\text{17}\) information:

\(^{17}\) We understand the term ‘triangulation’ according to the OECD/DAC definition: ‘the use of three or more theories, sources of information or types of analysis to verify and substantiate an assessment’.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Nature of Source</th>
<th>Reason for selection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Document review</td>
<td>Documents from internet research</td>
<td>General policy papers, humanitarian evaluations, humanitarian issues</td>
<td>To verify the general and sectorial conditions in Somalia according to reports and issues papers (Common Appeals, food and nutrition data) To learn from humanitarian evaluations concerning Somalia or specific issues (e.g. Gender, ICLA) providing insights for questions needing to be asked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Documents from NRC Oslo</td>
<td>Policy Papers, Financial Handbook, Guidance notes, country programs</td>
<td>To assess the tools that guide field staff in their activities and triangulate the degree of their usefulness in the field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Documents from NRC Field Offices</td>
<td>Project documents</td>
<td>Detailed review of project proposals, reports, logframes etc. to assess and triangulate in stakeholder interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>NRC staff at HO and regional office, Nairobi</td>
<td>Individual staff interviews</td>
<td>To learn how NRC works: programming, project design, procurement, monitoring and evaluation, administration, human resources, interaction with staff in country offices; to triangulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NRC staff in each Area Office</td>
<td>Individual staff interviews, sometimes with other (national) staff in project area: Area Coordinators, project, admin, finance/procurement, human resources, monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>To learn how NRC works at field office level as above, plus relations/interaction with Regional Office (RO) Nairobi and capacity-building; triangulate findings in projects with questions on baseline documentation; triangulate HO/regional perspectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External partners</td>
<td>Senior representatives of UN agencies, NGOs and local authorities</td>
<td>To assess NRC’s coordination, contribution to Clusters, information-sharing, pro-activity (e.g. WASH, returns, durable solutions), cooperation, and to triangulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>Representatives of beneficiaries</td>
<td>To triangulate; assess results, levels of satisfaction, capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NORCAP secondees</td>
<td>NORCAP secondees to various organisations</td>
<td>To examine the experiences of NORCAP secondees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group Interviews/Focus group discussions</td>
<td>Implementing Partners</td>
<td>What they did, how they did it, interaction with NRC and capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Community leaders</td>
<td>To triangulate, assess satisfaction results, feedback, training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>To triangulate, assess results, satisfaction, capacity-building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Visits to project sites</td>
<td>To triangulate information collected from other sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data sharing and joint analysis sessions</td>
<td>NRC staff</td>
<td>To triangulate data collected at respective site and discuss findings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Data collection methods.
We obtained information regarding NRC’s performance on its core competencies from a variety of sources, triangulating as we went along. For example, a question concerning ‘effectiveness’ (e.g. Outcomes) in an Emergency Food Distribution core competence would be picked up from a project report, then we would question the relevant NRC staff member about it (sometimes more than one staff, e.g. Project manager and Monitoring and Evaluation staff) and triangulate it with community leaders, beneficiaries, peer groups and local partners as possible. The evaluation placed substantial emphasis on interviews with beneficiaries to assess their views against NRC reports, although this method was often difficult to implement given security constraints.

Before the field work began, the team developed a list of people or functions that we wished to interview, and asked for NRC's help in identifying these and setting up interviews. During field work, additional stakeholders were identified and interviewed. Semi structured interviews were conducted based on interview guidelines or checklists. These were extracted from the Evaluation Questions Matrix developed during the inception phase of the evaluation along with stakeholder adapted sets of methods and questions. Pre-field work team meetings allowed contextualisation. Responses and evidence were compiled and shared in the team, mainly through the matrix mentioned. Throughout the study a total of over 90 people were interviewed. Please see Annex 1 for a list of interviews and Annex 2 for a list of documents.

### 2.5 Selection of projects for study

A total of 85 projects have been implemented in Somalia by NRC during the period 2010 – 2012. After reviewing a broad range project documents (proposals, periodic reports, logframes) a sample of 11 projects was selected. The selection criteria were as follows:

- Projects that were possible to visit, given the security and logistical limitations.
- Projects that appeared highest in priority for NRC within each core competence, irrespective of donor\(^{19}\)
- Projects that could have been implemented over the three-year period in review
- Special attention was given to projects within the HAPPPDA\(^{20}\) framework agreement

The selected projects are listed in the table below. The project code is NRC’s internal project reference numbering, where the first two letters refer to country (SO), the second two to the type of activity (food = FK, shelter = FS), the first two digits indicate year and the last two refer to the individual project number. MNOK refers to million Norwegian Kroner.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Code, Location</th>
<th>Amount MNOK</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOFS1003 South Central</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>1 Jan – 31 Dec 2010</td>
<td>Shelter, hygiene, sanitation, non-food items (NFIs)</td>
<td>NMFA (HAPPDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFS1011 Somaliland</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1 Dec 2010 – 31 Dec 2011</td>
<td>Emergency shelter, Burao</td>
<td>NMFA (HAPPDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFK1103 South Central</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 Jan – 31 Dec 2011</td>
<td>NFIs</td>
<td>NMFA (HAPPDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFK1109 South Central</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1 Oct 2011 – 31 Dec 2012</td>
<td>EFSD - voucher</td>
<td>NMFA (HAPPDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFK1110 South Central</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>1 Aug 2011 – 31 Mar 2012</td>
<td>EFSD (voucher program)</td>
<td>Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFS1203 South Central</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1 Jan – 31 Dec 2012</td>
<td>Shelter</td>
<td>NMFA (HAPPDA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{19}\) WASH only became a core competency in mid-2011 and has been implemented within Shelter projects to date.  
\(^{20}\) Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa.
In South Central Somalia, the evaluation made an in-depth examination of project SOFK1109: “Access to food and support to resumption of productive activities in Somalia”. This project was selected because it covered NRC’s food response to the 2011-2012 famine, reflecting the activities that have mostly preoccupied the Mogadishu staff over the past eighteen months, complemented by Shelter and WASH interventions over the same period.

2.6 Organisation of the field visit

The evaluation was conducted by Ternstrom Consulting AB in association with Channel Research Ltd. The field visits were conducted by a team of four consultants; Björn Ternström (Team Leader and Lead Consultant Somalia), Anne Davies (International Consultant), Japhet Makongo (PETS\(^{22}\) consultant) and Liban Hassan (Local Consultant). The planning of the field work was done in dialogue with NRC, which provided logistics and security during field visits. This was unavoidable given the security situation, the limited availability of transportation, and a concern for possible negative effects on NRC's activities from the presence of the evaluation team. The evaluation team split up in order to be able to cover all three regions of Somalia. The following locations were visited:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Where</th>
<th>When</th>
<th>Who</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Office Nairobi</td>
<td>Sept 25–28th, Oct 13–15th</td>
<td>Björn Ternström</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mogadishu (South Central)</td>
<td>Sept 25–28th</td>
<td>Anne Davies, Liban Hassan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bossaso (Puntland)</td>
<td>Sept 30th-Oct 4th</td>
<td>Bjorn Ternstrom (until 2nd Oct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Anne Davies, Liban Hassan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargeisa (Somaliland)</td>
<td>Sept 30th</td>
<td>Japhet Makongo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burao (Somaliland)</td>
<td>Oct 1–5th</td>
<td>Bjorn Ternstrom (arrived 2nd Oct)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japhet Makongo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Field visit details.

\(^{21}\) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
\(^{22}\) PETS: Public expenditure tracking survey.
2.7 Limitations

2.7.1 Security
The highly insecure situation in Somalia affected the selection of areas and projects that were visited, the extent of direct observation that could be made, the way interviews were conducted and the amount of information that could be collected from the target population.

During the inception phase of the evaluation, a security meeting was arranged with NRC, Norad and the evaluation team leader to discuss logistics and planning of the field work. It was agreed that the team should spend as little time as possible in the field; that NRC should recommend and have the final say in the areas and projects to visit; that detailed field visit plans should be shared with as few individuals and organisations as possible; and that NRC should arrange local transport, security and help in preparations for interviews.

The organisation being evaluated has thus been involved in designing the field work to a larger extent than would be the case in an evaluation in an area where an evaluation team can move and interact with people freely. The security situation in South Central Somalia and Bossaso allowed very little time to conduct the evaluation and only a sample of key informants could be interviewed. The team communicated to NRC in advance of the evaluation who they would like to see and NRC arranged the interview schedule accordingly. At no time did NRC try to influence the interview selection process but, given the shortage of time, it was not possible to interview all those requested in the team’s list and some were not available, so NRC made the prioritisation. In each area we sought to reach beneficiaries and their representatives, local authorities or their equivalent, the international agencies (UN and NGOs) which had most inter-action with NRC or who were working in the same contexts.

In South Central, interviews with beneficiaries were extremely limited due to the exposure risk (targeted shooting or kidnap) outside the relative safety of the NRC compound. The International Consultant could stay only ten minutes in an IDP site - far too short a time to conduct reasonable interviews. These visits were limited to interviewing community leaders and asking for their permission to interview beneficiaries. The Local Consultant was able to conduct some interviews with individual beneficiaries but even his movements had to be limited to half an hour in each site. Despite cultural norms, female beneficiaries agreed to speak to him outside their homes. These were selected at random, without the presence of NRC.

In Bossaso the security situation was somewhat less restrictive and the consultants were able to conduct in-depth interviews with more beneficiaries than in South Central. However, site visits were still limited in duration for security reasons. To reduce exposure while expanding evaluation coverage, some interviews took place at NRC offices. While this gave the team opportunity to talk to more stakeholders (not including beneficiaries), information collected in these interviews relies on too few sources and may not represent the full picture.

Constraints notwithstanding, NRC provided full support in all areas visited.

Security constraints meant that the team could not simply ‘walk out the door and go to an interview’. It took time to organise security related to the visits meaning that fewer interviews could take place than hoped for. This is not unusual in conflict-affected contexts. The highly conflictual nature of the Somali context can make identifying individuals potentially life-threatening and the team was cautious about sharing advance plans of visits and locations. Visits were accompanied by an armed security detail in both Mogadishu and Bossaso, and a dusk to dawn curfew in Bossaso restricted the time available for interviews. The armed security guards kept a discreet presence in the IDP sites and IDP interviewees did not appear to be perturbed by – or even notice – their presence. In Burao, Somaliland, the security situation was more stable and a full (albeit “emergency adapted”) PETS was possible to implement.
In a non-conflict context, or a less dangerous one, evaluators would normally mingle in society, conduct spot-check interviews in a market or other public place to assess the level and degree of recovery and the conditions of people in general. This would provide a point of comparison to those whom the client is assisting – in this case, IDPs who have lost nearly everything in their flight. The situation in Somalia did not allow us to do this and NRC security would certainly not have permitted it. Thus we do not have such a point of comparison. This said, observing people in the streets while driving through town, it was evident that such people were not distinguishable to those in the settlements. The reason may be that several decades of conflict have rendered the Somali people so vulnerable and depleted that almost the entire population is ‘in need’ - of basic living conditions, health and education services and above all, peace.

2.7.2 Scope and content

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation were to assess NRC’s core competencies of Camp Management, Emergency Food Security and Distribution, Shelter, ICLA and WASH. In Somalia there have been no stand-alone ICLA or Camp Management activities in 2010-12. Our hopes of field data from neighbouring Kenya were dashed as NRC does not implement Camp Management in Dadaab either.

The Terms of Reference instruct the team to interview NORCAP personnel on assignments in case countries wherever relevant. During the field visit, we conducted interviews with NORCAP secondees when and where it was possible. NORCAP data will be presented in the main evaluation report.

The evaluation also includes a public expenditure tracking survey (PETS) of one project in Somalia. The findings of the PETS will be presented in a joint report for the three case countries. The joint report will include a description of PETS specific methodology.

2.8 Reliability and Validity

The way this field visit was implemented affects reliability and validity of the results of the evaluation. Neither country nor projects or areas were selected randomly, hence results cannot be generalised to other activities, areas or countries. Similarly, the involvement of NRC in the selection of projects and location is a potential cause for bias in the selection of projects, and hence evaluation results. In the dialogue concerning selection of project areas to visit we have asked for motivations regarding proposals. We have found them to be balanced between evaluation team criteria and logistical/security realities.

The selection of beneficiaries to interview has not been directly affected by NRC. However, interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries have been more scarce than ideal, and several of the interviews have taken place in the presence of armed guards.

Furthermore, according to documented accounts, beneficiaries are usually very circumspect in their interviews with external visitors, seeing them all as donors or journalists.

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23 In comments to the draft report NRC has noted that some ICLA activities were implemented under the Shelter programme.
24 Criteria varied between evaluation tasks e.g. PETS required relative stability to at all be possible, a project site with more than one core competency represented was given priority, a mix of activities completed in past six months and ongoing was sought.
They are under great pressure exerted by ‘gatekeepers\(^\text{26}\)’ to answer according to the script set by the latter\(^\text{27}\). Given this limitation the team realises that beneficiary answers may not be accurate. Thus the reliability of the answers received from beneficiaries cannot be guaranteed.

### 3 Findings\(^\text{28}\) on Core Competencies

In this section we present findings on core competencies. The next chapter present findings on an overall level.

#### 3.1 Shelter

**Shelter Finding 1: NRC’s Shelter programmes are designed with the principle of ‘putting people first’**

Evaluation observations show that NRC’s programmes are providing people with more than just physical structures. Despite operating in very challenging space limitations, NRC shelters have had the effect of promoting hygienic environments, helping to protect families against disease and violence, according to interviews with beneficiaries in Bossaso. The new hard Corrugated Galvanised Iron (CGI) shelters protect IDPs from fire, theft and gender-based violence (GBV) more effectively than plastic sheets or tents: “Our new house is bigger than our buuls and protects us from the cold so our children do not get sick. Also, it protects us against people trying to get in to steal things” (beneficiary statement in Bossaso).

**Shelter Finding 2: NRC has adapted the type of shelter provided over time to adjust to the changing situation of IDPs.**

Projects in 2010 and up to mid-2011 responded mainly to displacement related to drought, famine and conflict crises in South Central through provision of plastic sheeting and poles\(^\text{29}\). This intervention modality is a relevant response to a crisis where there is a rapidly expanding IDP population crowding into increasingly tightly-packed sites. Observing that the materials lasted only one year\(^\text{30}\), NRC moved to the provision of tents. A protection analysis that NRC conducted in June 2012\(^\text{31}\) concluded that provision of corrugated galvanized iron (CGI) structures would be cheaper and more durable than tents and these are now starting

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\(^{26}\) “The term refers to individuals who serve as representatives or ‘community leaders’ of IDPs, who often assert their influence through connections with the neighbourhood militia. In some cases the gatekeeper is one of the displaced, but the position is typically claimed by someone from the “host community” or neighbourhood where the camp has sprung up. The gatekeeper serves as a point of contact for the aid organisations working in the camp and a liaison to the local community, and thus exerts influence over the displaced by wielding power to determine who receives assistance and when. Camp residents pay the gatekeeper, typically in food aid, to use the land (which may or may not actually belong to the gatekeeper) or stay in their good graces”. From: Field Report: Somalia Famine Relief: A view from Mogadishu, (The Enough Project 2012). http://www.enoughproject.org/publications/somalia-famine-relief-view-mogadishu.

\(^{27}\) “The presence of gatekeepers is endemic in Mogadishu, and enables the large scale misappropriation or diversion of lifesaving assistance” UN Monitoring Group letter, op.cit., p. 315.

\(^{28}\) “IDPs interviewed routinely provided false information, fearful that anyone who presents complaints to outsiders - especially when the cameras are rolling -- risks physical abuse and possibly even death”. UN Monitoring Group letter, op.cit. p. 315.

\(^{29}\) The evaluation interprets the term ‘Finding’ according to the DAC glossary: “A finding uses evidence from one or more evaluations to allow for a factual statement.” In certain cases we have added our own assessments to the factual and triangulated findings, following the Terms of Reference request for ‘assessment’ as well as ‘description’.


\(^{31}\) Interview with NRC Shelter Project Manager, South Central.

Protection and Other Concerns for the New Shelter Typology in Zona K Settlement (South Central), NRC, June 2012.
to be provided instead of tents, where space allows. In Burao the PETS revealed a pattern of gradual improvement in CGI shelter design based on feedback from beneficiaries. Some remaining quality problems were also identified. Based on evidence gathered, the evaluation considers that the different approaches were relevant for each time and context.

Figure 3: A crowded IDP settlement in central Mogadishu where NRC plastic sheets complement traditional buuls. Photo by A. Davies.

**Shelter Finding 3: NRC has endeavoured to implement settlement and site planning according to international standards - where feasible**

The few IDP settlements visited in all areas of Somalia demonstrated that while, in some cases, NRC was able to give careful attention to site planning and implementation, in others it did not have control over the process. For instance, in most areas of Mogadishu, IDP settlements were self-selected by IDPs. Most are located in urban settings and are extremely crowded. Spaces between individual buuls – as seen in the above photo – are not in accordance with any acceptable standard but NRC could only react to facts on the ground and endeavour to make conditions safer by providing fire-retardant tents. In a new settlement provided by the Mogadishu authorities, NRC has ensured safer spacing but project staff indicated that it was faced with a choice of either providing more shelters and therefore assisting more IDP families or adhering strictly to Sphere standards of spacing and assisting less families. Thus, a compromise solution was chosen.

In Bossaso the situation is mixed. Some sites are crowded because of land owners’ reluctance to provide sufficient land for the number of IDPs present. In two sites visited (Buulo Minggis and Bariga Bossaso) NRC had – with other partners – negotiated for more land with private owners and a larger space was allocated. Here, NRC in conjunction with other agencies was able to plan the sites according to acceptable standards of spacing between shelters, wide fire breaks, space for communal latrines and an open play area. The space provided has allowed for the construction of the more durable ‘CGI’ shelters made of fire-resistant materials.
Figure 4: The above diagram is an example of site planning, the distribution of shelters by donor, allowing efficient cost-tracking. UN-HABITAT confirmed that the fire breaks are sufficiently wide to be effective against fire hazards.

In Somaliland sites were provided by the authorities for the construction of durable shelters and these have been spaced according to Sphere standards, also with space for communal latrines. NRC has conducted sustained advocacy with other agencies to secure land tenure for both permanent settlement areas and transitional ones, and has had some successes in Puntland and Somaliland.

Shelter Finding 4: Beneficiaries do not always agree with NRC choices

The new hybrid CGI shelters are not popular with beneficiaries in Mogadishu because, according to a protection study\(^{32}\), they fear not looking sufficiently vulnerable to attract aid. NRC considers this to be a defeatist perception that it will need to overcome with sustained advocacy to persuade people to move to the sites.\(^{33}\) Conversely, beneficiaries interviewed in Bossaso were highly appreciative of the 2011 model of ‘contractor-built’ CGI shelters and less satisfied with the 2012 model of ‘community development-built’ structures. This is because NRC does not provide all shelter materials and leaves part of the structure for the beneficiary to complete, which they say does not give them enough shelter from the elements. However, given that beneficiaries are mostly able to work and earn sufficient money to provide for modest additional materials themselves, the new approach is rational and an efficient use of project funds. Asked in evaluation interviews if they would prefer tents, all respondents replied in the negative.

\(^{32}\) Protection and Other Concerns op.cit.

\(^{33}\) The attitude could be attributable to United Nations findings that tents are high-value items coveted by ‘gatekeepers’ for re-sale. According to the report, IDP beneficiaries are instructed to keep them clean and in good condition so that they can be retrieved at the gatekeepers’ will, punishable by beatings. By this logic, gatekeepers would prefer to retain the lucrative tents – which, to keep beneficiaries looking poor, are covered by scraps of material to make them look like buuls - rather than have beneficiaries provided with the less easy to sell CGI shelters. See: Letter dated 27 June 2012 from the members of the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the Security Council, p 316; http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf
Shelter Finding 5: Beneficiaries' perceptions of shelter are contextual

Since 2011, new modalities were introduced in Bossaso to address a protracted IDP situation that has left people vulnerable to evictions. The construction of CGI shelters has replaced tents in sites where space is available and with relatively secure land tenure, responding to periodic crises where tents and buuls are burnt down in fires. Beneficiaries appreciate the CGIs as they are less prone to fire hazards and to intruders – to the extent that it is suspected\(^\text{34}\) (but not confirmed) that individuals started fires in a bid to be eligible for a CGI shelter. According to the Monitoring and Evaluation Manager in the Regional Office (RO) Nairobi, NRC’s policy, in line with other agencies, has been to respond to fires with limited shelter kits in order not to encourage fire. No household affected by fire has been provided with a CGI structure.

In Burao, on the other hand, beneficiaries expressed concern regarding the safety of the shelters, citing collapses and personal injury from flying CGI sheets in connection with high winds frequent in the area.\(^\text{35}\)

Shelter Finding 6: New NRC ‘community development’ shelters are proving to be efficient

NRC started in 2012 to pilot a system of providing shelter materials and training community members to construct shelters in Bossaso (‘community development’ approach). The moveable design of the structures is relevant to a context where IDPs risk eviction, as they would be able to transport their shelters to a new site. Involving the community through construction training and erecting the structures is efficient, providing beneficiaries with livelihoods and new skills, and is cheaper than the contractor-led approach.

Shelter Finding 7: NRC coordinates well with other agencies and local authorities

Evidence gathered from humanitarian agencies interviewed\(^\text{36}\) shows that NRC activities are well-coordinated with other actors who provide different inputs in the same sites e.g. water, and designs are commensurate with Shelter Cluster decisions.\(^\text{37}\) NRC, in conjunction with other agencies, is actively seeking more durable solutions to the protracted displacement situation in Bossaso: negotiations have been taking place for several years with the authorities to provide land and more secure tenure for permanent housing. However, this is extremely challenging with the current political stalemate. While NRC’s shelter interventions to date (i.e. tents, plastic sheets and hard shelters) are appropriate for a situation where there is no durable solution, only secure land tenure will allow those IDPs who wish to settle locally to do so – and bring to an end the ‘emergency’ status in Puntland.

In Burao, Somaliland, beneficiaries and local authorities objected to the design of proposed durable shelters. Local authorities requested that such shelters be built with a larger floor area in order to enable a subdivision of the space allowing parents and female children separate living spaces (based on the assumption that boys would stay outdoors). NRC noted the additional costs and managed to negotiate with the local authorities a cost sharing arrangement with local authorities providing in-kind support in the form of water and sand deliveries with an estimated value of US$150 per unit. The local authorities were then able to use this cost sharing arrangement to generate further funding from other donors as these were impressed by the commitment showed by the arrangement.\(^\text{38}\)

\(^{34}\) Interviews with NRC staff in Bossaso.
\(^{35}\) In comments to the draft report, NRC states that it is aware of only one such incident and reports that no one was injured and that NRC has taken all measures (including design, foundation, nails etc.) to ensure it does not happen again.
\(^{36}\) UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council interviews.
\(^{37}\) Interview with UNHCR, 2 October 2012.
\(^{38}\) Interview with Mr Mohamud Hasan, Major of Burao Town, triangulated with NRC staff.
Shelter Finding 8: Beneficiaries are included in NRC surveys and monitoring

Beneficiaries interviewed were satisfied that their community leaders were involved in needs assessments. Community leaders confirmed in interviews that they were involved in all phases of assessment, planning and monitoring of shelter interventions. Such participation allows NRC to consider beneficiary preferences and furthermore, community involvement in shelter construction helps beneficiary empowerment, capacity building and a chance to earn some income. Importantly, such participation is a security guarantee for NRC staff given that beneficiaries work closely with them, building mutual trust.

Trust in community leaders was not universal however. One group interview with community leaders in connection with the PETS in Burao was delayed by a large group of women insisting on being part of the interview as they did not trust community leaders to pass information on to community members following interaction with the NRC.

3.2 WASH

WASH Finding 1: NRC’s decision to intervene in the WASH sector was rational and appropriate, responding to assessed needs

NRC introduced WASH as a new Core Competence in 2012. However it has been an integral part of Shelter programming in Somalia since 2011, prior to which NRC advocated for it as a core activity. The NRC WASH Programme Manager in Nairobi indicated that NRC had tried unsuccessfully to encourage others to intervene in WASH in sites where NRC was implementing Shelter activities. Given the lack of complementarity, NRC saw no choice but to intervene. The situation demonstrates that this was a logical approach, both from the perspective of trying to involve others and, when this failed, creating synergies with the Shelter activities. Indeed, it would have been irresponsible not to ensure including safe and hygienic facilities in areas where NRC is either the sole implementer or where WASH activities carried out by other actors cannot be guaranteed. It is still a small component compared to Shelter, comprising only 15% of the Somalia budget, but is growing in importance and scope.

WASH Finding 2: Beneficiaries use NRC latrines where available

In a Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) survey conducted in November 2011 by the Horn of Africa Medical Doctors Initiative, at the request of NRC, in 24 IDP settlements 6,898 households in Mogadishu, access to latrines was found at 80% of those sampled, while latrine use was found to be at 64%. This data points towards the need for further hygiene awareness campaigns to raise usage and promote healthy practices.

WASH Finding 3: NRC’s WASH activities in Somalia combine hygiene promotion with material inputs

NRC conducts periodic hygiene awareness training at the time it delivers NFI inputs, such as soap, jerry cans and sanitation kits. The approach is relevant to cover the spectrum of beneficiary requirements for safe and healthy hygiene, from food preparation to general hygienic living practice. However it takes time to inculcate safe and hygienic practices into beneficiary mind-sets, especially since, in many locations, water is a scarce commodity that they must pay for. In South Central, Bossaso and Burao the construction of latrines and showers has been incorporated in IDP sites where NRC is active in Shelter. In Bossaso, NRC changed the positioning of its latrines according to beneficiary requests to have them in family clusters around shelters. Beneficiaries were observed by the evaluation to be maintaining the latrines independently, with the help of hygiene materials provided by NRC.

39 HAPPA revisio report, 26.2.11, SOFS1103 and SOFS1113: 1.1.11 – 31.12.11.
Those inspected were locked, the key held by a responsible member of the families involved, to ensure their proper use and cleanliness.

**WASH Finding 4: Latrines are an effective protection measure**

Beneficiaries appreciate the latrines, citing that women are no longer in danger of facing the bush at night and children are protected from open defecation sites (including the risks posed by packs of wild dogs)\(^{40}\). Women and children are now able to access latrines close to their homes, considerably improving their protection in comparison to previous practice.

**WASH Finding 5: The quality of NRC’s WASH interventions varies between projects and locations: latrines are not always commensurate with Sphere standards**

Latrines in South Central were observed from evaluation site visits to be insufficient in number to meet Sphere standards (1 latrine to 20 persons). The scarcity of available land to construct latrines in the crowded settlements is a mitigating factor here and NRC has done its best to build latrines where possible. In Bossaso, the number of latrines does not conform to Sphere. NRC staff report that this is due to insufficient funding and the still early stages of the WASH programme. Furthermore, NRC staff report that the ratio of 1 latrine to 30 persons has been endorsed by the WASH Cluster as a ‘good enough’ standard. The team visited two sites in Bossaso and checked with beneficiaries who the exact users were, finding the latrines to be clean and well-maintained by users. However, this finding reflects only limited observations given the time constraints of visiting all the sites. In comments to the draft report, Sida notes that during a visit to Bossaso in October 2012 it was revealed that there were no washing facilities in the settlements, while the current evaluation was informed that people use the latrines to wash and shower in. Many beneficiaries attested to their use of ash to wash their hands before preparing meals. NRC plans to install wash facilities outside the latrines in 2013, funds permitting.

**WASH Finding 6: NRC’s reports on WASH effectiveness lack evidence**

NRC claims in its 2011 revised report to HAPPD\(^{41}\) that its WASH interventions met the basic needs of beneficiaries by providing, among other inputs, 1,700 latrines. However, it does not mention how many beneficiaries these inputs were designed to reach, negating any possibility of confirming adherence to Sphere standards. The report further claims that its interventions “reduced morbidity by increasing sanitation and protection from the elements”. However, NRC could not provide the evaluation with any baseline study indicating morbidity rates before the intervention or after it. It is therefore not possible to independently verify the effectiveness of its intervention. Data verification and better quality control of reports are areas that NRC needs to work on.

**WASH Finding 7: Inefficient NRC planning risks jeopardising WASH successes to date**

A key challenge in all three regions is how to de-sludge the latrines when they become full. According to on-site observations and confirmation from NRC project personnel, latrines are filling up faster than anticipated due to new arrivals. This has not been factored into project narratives or budgets, and should have been from the outset. While project documents refer to community maintenance of latrines and de-sludgable latrines have been constructed in South Central Somalia, NRC has encountered reluctance from communities to perform crucial maintenance such as de-sludging. NRC urgently needs to consider how to protect its WASH inputs to date, its beneficiaries’ health and well-being and accountability to its donors, by identifying and implementing a de-sludging plan.

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\(^{40}\) Interviews with beneficiaries in Bossaso.
\(^{41}\) HAPPD revision report op.cit.
WASH Finding 8: NRC’s future efficiency threatened by a lack of qualified staff
According to NRC project management and human resources staff interviewed, access to appropriately-trained engineers is problematic. NRC has advertised many times to find local, competent engineers, without success. The Bossaso office is assessing improvements to latrines construction, including provision of parts that cannot be stolen, such as doors, and these improvements can be performed with existing staff. However the extension of latrines construction may be compromised by the lack of locally qualified engineers.

WASH Finding 9: Latrines were not gender separated nor designed for disabled
According to the WASH Programme Manager in RO Nairobi, a key future aim is to build separate latrines for male and female users and to design them as disabled-accessible. Given the pilot-project nature of the intervention and limited funding, this has not been possible up to now and would have meant fewer latrines built had it been implemented, according to the WASH project manager in Bossaso. Having well-built latrines close to their homes is appreciated by female beneficiaries who, according to interviews, were previously limited to the unsafe practice of defecating in the bush. They have not complained about the non-separation of the latrines into male and female facilities because they have found greater protection of the latrines being built in family clusters where individual families have responsibility for access and maintenance. This is a good example of how NRC has adapted to the context and beneficiary preferences. On the other hand, having the even greater safety and accessibility of separate latrines adapted to disabled users would be a rational next step for NRC and would also adhere more closely to Sphere standards. Due to space limitations in Mogadishu for adequate latrines, NRC is planning to experiment with different urban designs.

WASH Finding 10: Garbage removal is not being conducted appropriately
Land owners in Bossaso expressed the concern that agencies in general (including NRC) have not paid sufficient attention to garbage removal and that this is decreasing the value of their land. Indeed, evaluation observations confirmed the enormous volume of garbage in the IDP sites visited that not only detracts from the land but also poses a health risk to site residents, especially children. While NRC WASH interventions in the sites visited are efficient and effective, they are not complete without better attention to waste removal and this needs further discussion and resolution in conjunction with other agencies.
3.3 Emergency Food Security and Distribution (EFSD)

NRC has conducted emergency food distributions through a voucher system to displaced populations in South Central Somalia. This was not done in Somaliland and Puntland, where only limited food security programmes were implemented. In 2011 and 2012, NRC's overwhelming attention was addressed to the 2011 famine, although it had previously engaged in providing agricultural inputs in both South Central and Somaliland.42

EFSD Finding 1: NRC's emergency food response was relevant to the context

NRC’s approach of working through local suppliers and alongside local NGOs to secure access to communities that no other NGO was able to reach, while keeping direct control over the implementation of the project, was found to be particularly relevant, according to interviews with staff and a recent evaluation report (Guillemois, 2012). However, the late delivery of food vouchers – while not a point raised by beneficiaries in interviews - detracts from the effectiveness, and possibly the relevance, of the emergency food intervention (see F5 below).

EFSD Finding 2: The intervention was effective in responding to beneficiary needs

NRC’s quarterly post-distribution monitoring system, which surveys beneficiaries according to various indicators, confirms the effectiveness of the food vouchers; beneficiaries used these for the intended purpose and food items covered by the voucher were in line with people’s preferences. The post-distribution monitoring tool also shows that beneficiaries purchased these items with the vouchers and did not attempt to trade them for other food inputs – although this situation was starting to change by early 2012. Beneficiaries interviewed by the team were satisfied with the food although some said the quantity was not sufficient, not adapted to infants and some items were of bad quality. Asked what input most responded to their needs during the emergency, beneficiaries stated that it was food. Asked what had been the most significant change to their lives since they came to the sites, they responded that being able to eat more and more often, as well as better nutrition of their children. This conforms to information provided in the Post-Distribution monitoring reports.

42 Source: Project documents and interviews with NRC staff.
EFSD Finding 3: NRC’s emergency food programming was conflict-sensitive

NRC adapted rapidly to the al-Shabaab ban\textsuperscript{43} to two of the areas where NRC and its partners were conducting distribution, re-directing resources to newly arriving IDPs in Mogadishu. Blanket targeting of all new arrivals in specific sites reduced potential conflict, although this is difficult to verify: given the widespread needs and overall famine status of newly-arriving IDPs, it would have been extremely contentious, not to mention time-consuming, to have conducted a beneficiary targeting exercise.\textsuperscript{44} Re-orientation of emergency food-voucher delivery to only those who could reach Mogadishu was a responsible action to protect project funds, given that NRC would not have been able to monitor activities outside Mogadishu. By selecting suppliers from different clans and from different areas of Mogadishu, NRC not only ensures fair and transparent allocation of resources but also helps to allow access to beneficiaries and maintain security, since suppliers are from within the communities and want to ensure their safety.\textsuperscript{45}

EFSD Finding 4: NRC’s selected mode of intervention was efficient in reducing leakages

According to interviews with staff and project documents reviewed, the NRC emergency food distribution team went to great lengths to prevent leakage in the programme. By selecting the voucher system, corruption and leakage have been minimised: vouchers are printed on paper that would be difficult to forge, according to the staff interviewed, and distributions are announced only two days in advance to minimise the risk of theft of food items when beneficiaries go to distribution points to collect them. However, NRC has been unable to detect the extent to which beneficiaries have to hand over part of their food and non-food package to ‘gatekeepers’ or other authority, this being a contentious and potentially dangerous line of inquiry.

Two weaknesses stand out from interviews with food project staff in Mogadishu:

EFSD Finding 5: The food intervention was not sufficiently timely

NRC’s decision to engage in a large-scale food security programme in response to the famine was not taken in a timely manner – the delay due to expectations that other agencies would meet the needs. NRC only began its response when it became clear that other agencies were not able to address the overwhelming needs.

Once NRC took the decision to intervene, it took six weeks to deliver food vouchers to beneficiaries through the chosen procurement arrangement. While the time lag may be explained by NRC’s having to scale up its capacities in terms of funding, staff and implementation modalities, this is still too long for an emergency response, forcing beneficiaries to deplete their already meagre assets in the search for survival. Given NRC’s knowledge of the impending famine, it should have planned for a more timely intervention and put in place contingency plans.

EFSD Finding 6: The intervention has not been reviewed in a timely manner

Despite being initially intended as a six-month project, the NMFA-funded food voucher project was extended for a further nine months, due to end in December 2012. Without a

\textsuperscript{43} Interviews with project management staff explained that, at the time NRC was delivering food to people in their home areas to prevent them from displacing, Al Shabaab decided to ban the activities of all humanitarian agencies in those sites. NRC decided that it would not be responsible to deliver the food vouchers to Al Shabaab, as the latter requested, and preferred to re-orient its activities to assisting those who were able to reach Mogadishu. This is also explained in document: EFSD Activity Overview, NMFA, Sida, NRC South Central Somalia, 2011-2012, P.16.

\textsuperscript{44} Project Strategy document for SOFK1110 (the Sida food intervention that complements NMFA’s) states in its intervention rationale: “This is a targeting system NRC has used for NFI distributions in Mogadishu and the Afgooye Corridor for the past two years. The system reduces the risk to NRC staff in tense urban environments and recognizes the needs of host communities”.

\textsuperscript{45} See: NRC South Central experience-based methodology: dry food kit distribution.
clearly-defined, timely reassessment of needs, the project has been allowed to drift. The ‘famine evaluation’ (Guillemois, 2012), conducted in early 2012, found that an earlier re-assessment of needs could have revealed the IDPs' evolving coping mechanisms, allowing NRC to adapt intervention modalities earlier. Yet, several months after these findings (the report was only finalised in late August 2012) – NRC has not been proactive in redressing the situation. The current evaluation found that NRC is considering conducting a beneficiary intentions survey at a later unspecified date, but given that the UN declared the famine to be over in February 2012, a re-assessment should have been conducted much earlier.

3.4 ICLA

There are no ICLA programmes in South Central Somalia and conditions are not yet ripe for an ICLA intervention. ICLA is currently being assessed as a possible new programme in Puntland and conclusions have not yet been drawn, according to evaluation interviews with the ICLA Project Manager in Bossaso. NRC has however been active in resolving land tenure issues, in conjunction with other agencies, securing land usage rights for some permanent and some temporary IDP settlements.

ICLA Finding 1: It may not yet be timely to introduce ICLA in Bossaso

While not wishing to pre-empt the outcome of the ongoing ICLA assessment, the evaluation team considers, based on evidence to date, that a stand alone ICLA programme may not yet be justified (at least, in Bossaso) in the classic NRC sense of providing the target population with actionable counselling and legal advice – although information to beneficiaries on land tenure issues would be useful. Key challenges revolve around the lack of land tenure for permanent settlement in Puntland, as a durable solution for those IDPs not willing or able to return to their home areas. According to interviews with several agencies, this will only be solved with a concerted initiative from all agencies operating in Bossaso in conjunction with a more pro-active government involvement, something which is constrained by inter-clan rivalry and disputes. An ICLA programme could become relevant – and the additional costs that would be incurred, justifiable - once land tenure and property rights have been secured for IDPs and where legal interventions become possible. An NRC ICLA Project Manager has written a draft analysis outlining details of the challenges faced and initiatives undertaken to date by the international community in Puntland overall.

4 Overall findings

4.1 Relevance

Relevance Finding 1: NRC uses participatory approaches and the cluster system to ensure that its programmes are appropriate to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries

A sample of needs assessments undertaken with the participation of beneficiaries was reviewed by the evaluation team. The information in the assessments was found to be appropriate to guide NRC in its intervention strategies and ensure that approaches and inputs were relevant to beneficiaries’ most pressing needs. According to NRC staff interviewed, re-assessment of the relevance of inputs and approaches is conducted through annual planning and bi-annual review sessions, discussions in Cluster meetings, informal discussions with other partners and post-distribution monitoring, ensuring adjustments to

46 Land Negotiations and Allocation Procedures for IDPs – Lessons Learned (Puntland), NRC ICLA Project Manager, 2012.
47 Ibid.

Evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council - Case Country Report Somalia
beneficiary priorities at regular intervals. Adjustments made within the shelter programme both in terms of shelter provided and design of shelter provided confirmed the staff narrative. On the other hand, these mechanisms appear to have failed to detect the need to conduct periodic needs assessments and beneficiary verification reviews in the EFSD programme.

Relevance Finding 2: NRC used participation of its local partners to ensure relevance
The participation of local partners in the 2011 famine response programme design, needs assessments and baseline surveys was a highly relevant strategic approach: local partners’ closeness to communities meant that all aspects of community needs were considered.48 The assessments they conducted provide data on culturally appropriate food needs. For instance, although sugar is not high in nutrition, it is a priority item in the food voucher package because people are culturally used to it in their diet and would have found ways to (ab)use their food vouchers to procure it, had it not been included. The cost-sharing arrangements with the local authorities in Somaliland also confirm this finding49.

Relevance Finding 3: NRC’s shelter, Food, NFI distributions and WASH interventions are relevant and effective
According to local and international partners interviewed, people were already using other coping strategies to survive before NRC and other agencies could intervene. On the other hand, the same respondents admitted that more people would probably have died if NRC had not intervened when and where it did. While it may be difficult to prove that NRC’s programmes saved lives, they did help beneficiaries to cope with their daily challenges with greater dignity, strengthening their coping mechanisms and preventing further depletion of their assets50. At the height of the famine, people had to leave their homes or die, according to the local partners. During situational and needs assessments, where access was possible, these partners were able to witness the extent of the crisis and the degree of suffering. Although they emphasised that there is no hard evidence, they believe a lot of people died on their way to Mogadishu because the agencies had no access to them. From the evidence the partners obtained during the assessments, of people selling off assets at very low prices, NRC devised an intervention strategy to provide food closest to where people needed it in an attempt to prevent them from leaving, aiming at coverage of population groups in isolated areas where other agencies were not working. This is a very relevant approach but was unfortunately halted when al-Shabaab prohibited humanitarian agencies from accessing these more isolated communities.

Relevance Finding 4: NRC builds the capacity of its local partners
Partners also assessed the training and capacity-building they received as relevant to their partnership with NRC: compliance on NRC requirements, financial procedures, procurement and reporting. While their work with UNDP51 and FAO52 helps them get access to training on technical issues, in interviews with the evaluation team they expressed the need for more knowledge in the development of concepts and thinking at senior levels. They have discussed their needs with NRC. Representatives of local authorities in Somaliland indicated that on-the-job training resulting from practical interaction with NRC had significantly contributed to building capacity, this was particularly true for registration and distribution related systems.

Relevance Finding 5: NRC is responsive to beneficiary needs
The PETS in Burao revealed a pattern of stepwise changes in shelter design based on experience gained and feedback from beneficiaries. In Bossaso, post-distribution monitoring

48 Interviews with NRC’s local partners and Guillemois 2012 op.cit.
49 Interviews with Mayor of Burao and MRRR official.
50 Interviews with partners.
51 United Nations Development Program.
52 Food and Agriculture Organisation.
revealed that beneficiaries did not appreciate the NRC design of ventilation openings between the walls and roofs of their CGI shelters and used recycled materials to block them up. Based on this finding, NRC adapted its design to beneficiary preferences, demonstrating its responsiveness to their opinions.

It was through monitoring the use of the CGI shelters that NRC got the idea of providing shelters through a community development approach. Advantages include:

- Adherence to Sphere standards in terms of space.
- Movability: if IDPs are evicted they can move the materials to another site and rebuild them there;
- Adaptability to climate: NRC has compared the measurements in *buuls* with plastic sheeting, tents and CGIs. The CGIs are marginally cooler in the hot climate. They are also more impervious to the high summer winds.
- Community capacity-building: NRC trains community members on the construction of the hybrids and pays them incentives to erect them. This results not only in cost-efficiencies but also provides livelihoods opportunities to otherwise unemployed men.
- Self-sufficiency: This encourages people to improve their shelters independently, reinforcing their sense of dignity. It is widely accepted that IDPs find work in Bossaso on construction sites and at the port, and are not without means to support themselves minimally. Roofing materials observed by the evaluation team showed that beneficiaries are recycling materials picked up from around the site.
- Acceptance by beneficiaries, communities and authorities. People interviewed attested to their appropriateness to cultural norms.

*Figure 6, 7 and 8: Different typologies of ‘Community Development’ Shelter, selected according to beneficiary preferences. Photo from Puntland Shelter Strategy.*
Relevance Finding 6: NRC project documents do not include outcome measurements

The relevance of inputs and approaches is clear from stakeholder interviews, post-distribution monitoring and evaluation observations on the ground. However, NRC project documents lack descriptions of how they intend to measure outcomes. The inclusion of such measurements in logframes, along with commensurate reporting, would focus NRC staff on identifying evidence of outcomes in relation to inputs. Logframes used follow a set template, providing information on the intervention logic, objectively verifiable indicators, sources of verification, outputs and activities, as well as some risks and preconditions - but no measurement indicators for outcomes either before or during a project. This is a common finding in all the logframes reviewed. From information provided in them currently, most outcomes are impossible to measure. It is therefore also difficult to point to specific and verifiable project achievements, beyond outputs. As this is a common feature to NRC logframes in other countries reviewed, the evaluation will discuss this issue at greater length in the synthesis report.

Relevance Finding 7: NRC documents do not reflect underlying Theories of Change

Project documents and interviews with staff show that NRC staff is not yet familiar with the concept of theories of change. While they design projects in a logical and rational way, the team did not find documentation of assumptions or drivers of change. RO Nairobi is aware of this and plans to include it in future training. The evaluation will discuss this issue at greater length in the synthesis report.

Relevance Finding 8: Conflict-sensitive programming improves relevance and effectiveness of NRC’s projects

NRC staff is institutionally aware of the need for conflict-sensitive programming, highly relevant to the Somalia context. An example of this is NRC’s nimble readjustment of its food voucher project in South Central Somalia when the al-Shabaab prohibition edict forced it to abandon its food security intervention in famine-affected areas. Seeing that vulnerability targeting would not be appropriate, NRC decided to provide blanket targeting in sites where no other agencies were working. This prevented conflict between those registered and those filtered out. Distribution modalities were also conflict-sensitive with elaborate procedures drawn up to minimise risks to project assets, partners, NRC staff and beneficiaries.

4.2 Effectiveness

Effectiveness Finding 1: Interventions have been effective in providing beneficiaries with the means to survive with dignity, achieving the results sought in the projects

NRC considered the food voucher approach in Mogadishu to be more effective than cash vouchers: in the early phase of the famine food was not available on the local market and a cash or cash voucher approach would have strained supply and caused inflation, while the voucher approach put the burden of higher food prices on NRC. NRC conducted a comprehensive internal analysis of what would be the most relevant, efficient and cost-effective approach in the famine context. While the analysis shows that cash vouchers would have been a cheaper option from an administrative perspective, the food voucher system has borne out assumptions of greater security and dignity to beneficiaries – confirmed by the beneficiaries themselves in post-distribution monitoring and in interviews by the evaluation team.

53 In some cases there was documentation of risks.
54 Examples are: NRC South and Central experience-based Methodology: Dry Food Kit distribution and NFI distribution strategy documents.
55 Famine Response evaluation (Guillemois, 2012, op.cit) describes the analysis process that NRC undertook to decide on its intervention modality and found it to be the most relevant and effective.
56 Interviews with project staff in Mogadishu.
It is clear from information provided in successive UN Consolidated Appeals that emergency food, shelter and WASH are considered as life-saving interventions, and NRC has implemented projects in all three of these sectors. NRC’s interventions in these sectors responded effectively to people’s most pressing needs during the emergency.

**Effectiveness Finding 2: NRC has not produced hard evidence that its projects achieve the results intended**

The objectives of the food voucher project were: “to save lives and enable drought and famine affected households to recover by providing a predictable source of food and inputs to support the resumption of productive activities”.

It is difficult to assess how many lives were saved through the project since no data had been collected before or after the project to measure it. The evaluation team fully understand and empathise with the difficulties of measuring outcomes in terms of saving lives through project interventions. However, if this is stated as a specific objective, it needs to be measured. Outcome indicators would point to how the agency intends to measure it.

The recovery of drought and famine-affected households was successfully achieved according to NRC post-distribution monitoring data, assessed according to the number of meals per day before and after the project as well as the evolution of other coping strategies. The food voucher project was accompanied by a Non Food Items (NFI) intervention providing 3,000 households NFI kits and plastic sheets. Hence the overall recovery of the beneficiaries could be attributed to these and other agency inputs such as water and health provision. NRC stated that ‘undoubtedly the [food voucher] project saved lives’ but has not produced hard evidence to this effect.

**Effectiveness Finding 3: Shelter materials are effective in providing safe and protective homes**

Plastic sheets and poles in the early stages of the IDP influx to Mogadishu were effective in providing a minimum of shelter for people with none at all, but not sustainable due to their rapid deterioration, according to evaluation interviews. It took several months for NRC to procure tents, which can be seen as inefficient, but to stockpile the numbers required months in advance would have required funds that were not available at the time. Hard (CGI) shelters are cost-effective compared with tents due to their longer duration (four years for CGI shelters, one year for tents), in addition providing improved protection against intruders and fires. Given that the authorities are anxious to move IDPs out of public buildings and are willing to provide land for the construction of the CGIs, these will be the most likely NRC shelter options in the future. While the political situation remains in flux and return areas are not yet safe for return, NRC considers it will be difficult to gauge beneficiary intentions in order to plan durable solutions. Meanwhile the emergency stockpiling of tents and plastic sheeting is a rational emergency preparedness measure for potential new arrivals.

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57 NRC-172729-SOFK1109-Narrative Project Proposal to the NFMA.
58 In comments to the draft report, NRC requested a reflection on the coherence of the stated objective and the feasibility of achieving it. We propose the following: If an objective is ‘to save lives’, project managers need to consider how its achievement can be assessed and measured. The most illustrative measurement mechanism would be comparing mortality data before and after an intervention. Given that this data is often not available in emergencies, measuring a change in mortality rates may not be the most appropriate or feasible course of action. However, there are other ways to find out if lives have been saved. For example, questions to beneficiaries and other stakeholders can be included in post-distribution monitoring surveys, beneficiary satisfaction surveys and other monitoring and evaluation tools. Beneficiary feedback would necessarily be perceptions rather than facts: while they cannot know for certain how many lives have been saved, they can give their opinions, based on their own experiences and observations, providing qualitative rather than quantitative data on whether or not the project objective has been achieved. Project documents should strive to formulate objectives that are SMART (defined as: specific, measurable, achievable, results-based and trackable) – and provide realistic, evidence-based measurement indicators that enable project staff to assess if implementation is on track.
59 Correspondence between the evaluation team and Food Project Manager.
Effectiveness Finding 4: WASH interventions in the form of latrines provision and hygiene awareness training have been effective but documented measurement of outcomes is needed

The combination of these two activities has reduced open defecation and disease hazards, according to community leaders interviewed. This statement was triangulated with beneficiaries interviewed who elaborated that the interventions have helped them become more aware of the importance of good hygiene awareness and have provided protection for women venturing out at night, due to the close proximity of the latrines to shelters. However, the effectiveness of WASH interventions needs to be assessed according to their ability to reduce hygiene-related illnesses, but none of the three NRC offices were able to produce baseline or periodic health data to prove this. To assess results of WASH interventions a more focussed approach is needed to obtain this data from the outset of a programme and to monitor it regularly. Objectives described in the NRC 2011 – 2013 Strategy ‘displaced households obtain enhanced resistance to ill health, sustained family social life and reduced incidences of communicable diseases’ will not be able to be measured objectively because NRC has not collected the data.

Effectiveness Finding 5: Shelter interventions have been effective in protecting people from exposure, but documented measurement of outcomes is not available

Beneficiaries uniformly attested to the effectiveness of the CGI shelters in Bossaso in increasing their protection. However, while NRC in comments to the draft report has stated that no CGI settlement has burned and that approximately 850 non-CGI shelters have burned in Puntland between January and October 2012, there is no hard data to support this. NRC or the Shelter Cluster could have conducted studies to measure the extent to which transitional shelters have lowered the incidence of intrusions and fire hazards, providing hard evidence that they are a more relevant modality than tents. This would constitute a simple exercise involving a baseline survey at the beginning of a project to assess the numbers of tent and plastic sheeting shelters destroyed by fire, and another survey at the end of the project period to measure the incidence of fires in transitional shelter (CGI) homes. Since Shelter projects are continuing in all three locations it is not too late to put in place such a measurement tool.

4.3 Efficiency

Efficiency Finding 1: NRC has systems in place to efficiently manage its operational activities and human resources, control mechanisms track progress

During the field phase the consultants received much support from NRC staff who provided requested documents of a technical and programmatic nature, and furthermore allowed them to examine e-mail communications between offices. This ability to retrieve documents attests to NRC’s detailed filing system and to its retention of key documents such as needs assessments, the Core Activities Database (CAD), post-distribution monitoring reports, internal communications etc. The NRC Programme Policy Paper and Start-up Handbook were tools particularly cited by staff interviewed as useful guides for helping to make their interventions efficient.

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60 See Sphere standards: http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/hygiene-promotion/: “Hygiene promotion is a planned, systematic approach to enable people to take action to prevent and/or mitigate water, sanitation and hygiene-related diseases”.

61 “A thorough baseline data survey is necessary which identifies different groups in the community, their views about water, sanitation, health and their perceptions of the proposed project”. From: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Emergencies, Chapter 8 of the Handbook ‘Public Health Guide for Emergencies, pp 382 - 441, The Johns Hopkins and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies http://www.jhsphs.edu/sebin/u/j/Chapter_8_Water_Sanitation_and_Hygiene_in_Emergencies.pdf
However, despite the best efforts of staff, the team encountered difficulties in getting a clear overall picture of the different programmes in Somalia. This is important due to the volume of activities and in part due to the structure of the NRC planning and budgeting system. The system provides overall guidance via the annual strategy process as well as detailed work planning, including standardised logframes, at project level. However, it lacks planning at the intermediate, programme level, making it very difficult to get a grasp of overall operations at country level by core competence. These structural issues will be further discussed in the synthesis report.

At the operational level, the evaluation found that NRC has developed a network of systems that indicate a concern for tracking costs at all levels of management and programme implementation. According to staff interviewed, the systems generate the data they need to assess and follow costs. This data is mainly used for progress checking through expenditure follow-up of budgets (i.e. checking under- and overspending in relation to budgets). Although an abundance of data is available, it is used for cost analysis to a very limited extent.

The systems examined generate clear and transparent project documents, Standard Operating Procedures for every aspect of work (procurement, finance, distribution etc.) and pre-set templates to allow comparison across projects and sectors. Cost-tracking at field office level is done by project managers working closely with finance managers, but focus is on deviation from the implementation plan rather than achieving efficiency gains. Fortnightly meetings are held between these two departments to review expenditure tracking and detect possible deviations from plans. The new Agresso system should allow Project Managers to have more timely access to their own project costs in order to check ongoing expenditure individually and to plan ahead. If data is to contribute to proactive cost analysis, managers will need further training.

Meanwhile, these mechanisms seem to have missed a timely reappraisal of the food voucher programme, addressed at length in other paragraphs.

**Efficiency Finding 2: The volume of data generated by NRC field offices is too much for the RO staff to handle efficiently**

NRC field offices review and approve financial transactions according to the organisation's established process, then transmit financial data generated by the Agresso system to NRC RO in Nairobi. Here, the high number of projects and financial data generated are multiplying strains on the staff to monitor and control them efficiently. For example, financial oversight has to rely on spot-checks rather than systematic analysis. NRC Field staff say that if RO Nairobi finds anomalies in financial data, they query it to the field office and request a satisfactory response before approving the report – but this is only if RO Nairobi ‘catches’ the anomaly in a spot check.

**Efficiency Finding 3: The Core Activities Database is not fulfilling its potential as an analytical tool, limiting its efficiency**

Indicators in the Core Activities Database require project staff to produce and analyse data emerging from project implementation: numbers of beneficiaries, inputs, costs etc. According to interviews, the Core Activities Database appears to be an underused tool by project managers due to time constraints for a full analysis of the data. Some managers use it more than others. For example, the Core Activities Database for project SOFK1109 gives very little data even though the project has been running for a year. NRC reported after the evaluation’s field phase took place that the CAD has not met the needs of NRC globally and has been discontinued in 2013. According to NRC management, the system will be replaced with a more efficient reporting tool.

**Efficiency Finding 4: There is significant evidence of attention paid to cost and managerial decisions made based on such considerations**

According to food voucher project SOFK1109, funded by MFA for initially six months, the
project planned to cover 106,800 beneficiaries at a total cost of NOK 40 m\(^62\) (approximately US$ 7.2 m), bringing costs per beneficiary to US$ 67.4 overall. Calculated per month this comes to US$ 11.2, and annually, US$ 135 per beneficiary. This is a low cost, considering the benefits that accrued to beneficiaries of the project and its wide coverage. Although it was not possible to compare costs with other agencies, NRC itself notes that it is not the cheapest agency but can achieve cost efficiencies with economies of scale.

Some examples of efficiency across projects are as follows:

- NRC monthly market monitoring\(^63\) showed a steady decline in food prices over the SOFK1109 project implementation period, allowing NRC to achieve cost efficiencies of up to 15% against the budget. The reason for this, given in the report, was that suppliers became progressively more efficient at importing food.

- For Shelter in Mogadishu, project staff estimates that it will take up to four years before the newly planned transitional shelters become as cost-effective as plastic sheets and poles. This is in part due to economies of scale and in part because the shelters do not need replacing every year, as do plastic sheets and tents. However, their cost is becoming more competitive with the price of tents (tents: US$380, shelters: $270 per unit) whereas in Bossaso the tents remain more competitive (US$ 400 vs. US$ 420 for CGI shelters, but the CGI shelters are expected to last four years while tents only last one year.

- Although tents in Mogadishu are somewhat more expensive than those of other agencies the higher cost can be justified for environmental reasons. Rather than using locally sourced wooden poles for tent construction, NRC uses metal poles – imported but available on the local market - which are less onerous on the environment. This is a cost consideration that is also more efficient in the longer term since the metal poles last longer than wooden ones and can be recycled by beneficiaries for other uses.

- Part of budget monitoring is in identifying new ways to reduce costs. In Bossaso the community-development shelter idea came about in the search to find more efficient shelter modalities. Project monitoring found that beneficiaries often sold the cement that NRC provided to anchor the shelters, finding ways themselves to perform this more efficiently. Consequently NRC decided to divert the cement to latrines construction instead, decreasing the unit price of the shelter and achieving cost efficiencies for latrines.

- Following this finding, NRC consulted with beneficiaries on various options for completing their ‘community development’ based CGI housing (a pilot project) to cut costs further. Project monitoring found that beneficiaries were able to source roof materials by recycling what was left over from burnt shelters (tent fragments, plastic sheeting), complementing these with whatever they could find from previous buuls. A lesson drawn from these experiments was that, over time, beneficiaries contribute independently to housing improvements and require only a minimum of materials for essential shelter protection from the outset (confirmed by UN-HABITAT\(^64\)). This is of course not the case for everyone so NRC detects where people are demonstrably unable to do things for themselves (Especially Vulnerable Individuals – EVIs) and provides them with additional assistance.

- Tents are imported from China through NRC direct procurement and do not benefit the local economy. CGI materials are procured locally (though they are also imported) by the implementing partner. Using the implementing partner to do transitional shelter

\(^62\) Data sourced from the documents: Project Proposal to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1.10.2011 – 30.4.2012 and SOFK1109 P-info 40 NOK.  
\(^63\) Guillemois, 2012, op.cit.  
\(^64\) Interview with UN-HABITAT.
aids local markets and labour, since partners are part of the community and earnings they accrue are ploughed back into the local economy. According to NRC field staff, selecting suppliers from the community, balanced between different clan structures, ensures an effective and efficient security mechanism.\(^\text{65}\)

**Efficiency Finding 5: Inter-office synergies promote efficiency in NRC procurement policies, procedures and training for staff**

These activities take up a significant portion of daily work in the field and all departments of NRC’s structure: programme, finance, monitoring and evaluation, admin and logistics. The respective departments at Regional and Field level work closely together to ensure a smooth procurement process from tender to delivery. The systems, while relevant and necessary to ensure accountability, are also time-consuming and can lead to delays in getting emergency inputs to beneficiaries (as well as other delay factors such as changes in needs or documentation). For example, project staff stated that the procedures delayed timely procurement of food for the famine response.

**Efficiency Finding 6: NRC staff is well-trained and motivated**

NRC staff is well-trained, through mandatory induction courses on recruitment and periodic training or refresher courses that meet the demands of their work. Project, Finance and Procurement staff in field offices and RO Nairobi attested to having been trained on the new Agresso system and report on the achievement of efficiencies through this system. Interviews with several international and national staff in all three areas revealed that staff consider NRC to be a ‘good employer’, providing career advancement possibilities and re-training on new competencies. An example of this is the promotion of the Cook in the Mogadishu Office to Logistics Assistant and now recently promoted to Logistics Officer. A Guard was able to advance to Administrative Assistant. National staff is also particularly satisfied with the policy to deploy those who wish to rotate to other offices in the region, citing this as an important part of learning new skills and experiences for their career advancement. The policy of deploying staff as ‘surge capacity’ for new emergencies in the region ensures a rapid response to emergencies. Efficiencies can be gained from deploying staff who know the system and the particular competencies required of them so they can become immediately effective.

**Efficiency Finding 7: Programmes within each geographical area are closely integrated with each other, promoting cost-effectiveness and coherence across sectors**

Although the Education component of NRC’s core competencies does not fall under the scope of this evaluation, it is nevertheless clear from evaluation observations and project documents reviewed that synergies between it and the Food, Shelter and WASH sectors not only improve overall efficiency but also constitute the sectors of most relevance to beneficiaries in responding to their most pressing needs.

**Efficiency Finding 8: The Food Voucher project over a prolonged period is not an efficient approach**

It has been clear for several months from post-distribution monitoring reports that beneficiaries are increasingly resorting to selling their food items and using the money to buy other items that meet their nutritional or other needs. This is because the food voucher only covers basic food items and, over time, beneficiaries need other food items to supplement their diet. The September 2011 – March 2012 post-distribution monitoring report indicates that beneficiaries tend to under-report the fact that they sell or swap their vouchers or food items for fear of losing their eligibility for a voucher. An earlier re-assessment of beneficiary

\(^{65}\) NRC-166413-SO FK1110-Emergency Food Assistance to South Central Somalia Sida (project proposal), 18.11.2011.
coping strategies and evolving needs would have pointed to the need for adjusting to a more relevant and efficient approach.

**Efficiency Finding 9: Beneficiary Targeting in Bossaso has showed up some defects**

In Bossaso, beneficiary targeting for the CGI shelters has been less efficient than it could have been since some beneficiaries interviewed admitted to having two shelters, even though their families were small. The interviews covered ten families, out of which one admitted having two shelters and another stated they knew of other beneficiaries who had more than one shelter. However, this finding represents only a small proportion of the overall number of beneficiaries in the Shelter project and, absent a wider monitoring sample, it is not possible to tell if the problem is either minimal or more widespread.

![Figure 9: Beneficiary’s second shelter used for business. Photo by A. Davies.](image)

**Efficiency Finding 10: Frequent staff turnover is a challenge that risks compromising efficiency**

Staff retention was a problem cited by staff in all NRC offices visited. Frequent staff turnover means the need for renewed recruitment and training and loss of institutional memory. International staff interviewed believed that more frequent rest and recuperation breaks would help mitigate rapid turnover pointing out that if they get more breaks, they will be more energised and positive about staying longer. They are aware that the policy is being reviewed at RO and Oslo levels. However, the problem is not just with international staff but national staff also has a high turnover. NRC human resources staff indicated that often national staff join the organisation, build their skills through training courses offered by NRC, and then find a better-paying job in another organisation. Although the evaluation collected no hard evidence to this effect, the costs to NRC of recruiting and training new staff, only for them to leave and have to repeat the process, must be considerable. On the other hand it can justifiably be considered as ‘national capacity-building’ and experience from other evaluations shows that this is a common problem to international NGOs worldwide.

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66 In comments to the draft report NRC stated that high turnover of national staff was not a problem in South Central.
4.4 Sustainability

Sustainability Finding 1: NRC has several weaknesses when it comes to sustainability

- Emergency interventions aim to save lives and livelihoods, then move into an early recovery modality. Sustainability of emergency distributions is not a necessary element since the intervention itself is one-off and time-specific. Under project SOFK1109, the sustainability chapter indicates that the project ‘will provide space and support for affected households to rebuild their livelihoods and resilience to future droughts. NRC will re-evaluate beneficiaries at harvest time to see which communities can be phased out of the food assistance part of the programme because they have successfully resumed their productive strategies’. These are rational activities but project reports do not provide any evidence that either is happening.

- Projects of a more protracted emergency nature, such as agricultural inputs to farmers in South Central and shelter interventions in Bossaso, need an in-built sustainability element to indicate how the project is likely to evolve and how NRC foresees its response evolving in tandem. The evaluation did not find any evidence that these issues had been taken into consideration.

- Latrine de-sludging in IDP sites in South Central and Bossaso is becoming increasingly urgent given that they are filling up rapidly. In order to cement the gains achieved by constructing latrines, maintenance is a key sustainability element and needs to be planned in any WASH project. Even if it is performed by the municipality or another actor, it still needs to be planned. Garbage collection is another area where NRC needs to intervene in order to sustain WASH effectiveness.

Sustainability Finding 2: Shelter programmes demonstrate sustainability and adaptation to evolving contexts

NRC adopted a sustainable approach to evolving shelter needs: moving from plastic sheeting and tents (not sustainable inputs for protracted displacement) to transitional CGI shelter which is more durable. In conjunction with other agencies, NRC has made efforts over several years to seek durable solutions for IDPs in Bossaso, with a view to providing permanent housing, but so far these have yielded limited results due to government paralysis on the issue, according to interviews with international partners.

In Burao, the close collaboration with local authorities has yielded increasing capacity on their part. The partnership has also been successful in demonstrating to both local authorities and their potential future funding partners that these authorities are capable of generating counterpart resources in response to needs.

4.5 Cross-cutting issues

4.5.3 Environment

Cross-cutting Issues Finding 1: NRC staff is aware that its programmes should respect the environment

NRC’s commitment to protecting the environment can be evidenced from its efforts to move away from providing plastic sheets and poles, calculating that the number of poles needed would contribute to serious depletion of Somalia’s already sparsely-forested land. The move to use CGI shelters in Mogadishu also reflects an attempt to save the environment by using sustainable materials.

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67 See NRC’s Concept Note: Protection and Other Concerns for the new Shelter Typology in Zone K Settlement, 2012, NRC Mogadishu.
Cross-cutting Issues Finding 2: NRC finds itself constrained by the environment in implementing projects efficiently

The environment is itself a constraining factor in constructing sufficient latrines and providing sufficient water for IDPs, especially evident in Bossaso, according to NRC shelter project staff in Puntland. The rocky ground is not suited for digging latrine trenches or in absorbing waste. Water is scarce and the only way to find enough of it to meet minimum standards is for agencies or IDPs to buy it from local providers who have invested in drilling wells.

4.5.4 Gender, Age and Disability

Cross-cutting Issues Finding 3: NRC projects and institutional policies aim to achieve greater gender balance

The evaluation found that, Somalia-wide, NRC is making great efforts to overcome the cultural sensitivities surrounding women in work and education. The NRC global policy on Gender is used by field staff as a guiding document, according to interviews with staff, and efficient procedures are in place to include women where necessary and possible: the 2010 and 2011 reports for emergency food distribution and the beneficiary tracking sheets show attention to beneficiary breakdown by gender and age. Female beneficiaries are included in assessments and monitoring: the RO Director maintains that it is the women who speak up the most in individual households and NRC can be sure to get their views, essential to getting inputs and activities right. However, while the South Central market research team is all-female, women are not employed to do post-distribution or regular field monitoring, according to monitoring and evaluation staff interviewed. This risks compromising the effectiveness of interventions: beneficiary women’s views and specific problems may go unnoticed since they cannot be raised with male monitors.

Cross-cutting Issues Finding 4: On the other hand, NRC still has a long way to go before it achieves gender balance in South Central and Puntland offices

In the case of South Central, this should be seen as relative to how the situation was two years ago when al-Shabaab forbade women to work in humanitarian agencies. Now the recruitment of female staff is only inhibited by a general lack of literacy among women in the general population. NRC is looking at innovative ways to address gender imbalance in its staff such as by recruiting local female staff who may not be fully literate but, through training and mentoring, have the potential to become efficient. NRC offers generous training programmes to staff to improve their skills and on the job mentoring.

Cross-cutting Issues Finding 5: Human Rights violations are particularly serious with regard to IDPs, especially Gender-based violence (GBV)

A United Nations report\(^{68}\) states that it is IDPs who are at greatest risk of sexual violence throughout Somalia, the threat being greatest at the time of aid distribution: IDP women and girls report that security guards and government soldiers at distribution points often demand access to aid in exchange for sex, according to the report. Furthermore, the report mentions that IDP settlements are frequently raided at nights after distribution has occurred. Incidents of sexual violence in IDP camps are especially high, with rape described as “endemic” by human rights activists and aid workers alike. In Mogadishu, women routinely report being assaulted by “men in uniforms”, whom they identify as “soldiers” or “police”\(^{69}\). In Puntland and Somaliland, displaced women report being gang-raped by members of the host community (this was confirmed by beneficiaries during our visit to the Bossaso IDP settlements). Despite

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\(^{69}\) The same report (p 326) indicates that sources are interviews with UN, INGOs and Somali NGOs heads of agencies, Nairobi and Mogadishu, December, 2011- March 2012.
its best efforts to protect women and girls, but given the prevalence of GBV noted in the UN report, some of this is likely to be happening in settlements covered by NRC. The situation suggests the worrying conclusion that foreign aid promotes greater human rights abuse towards the most vulnerable. It also reinforces the need for greater urgency in NRC setting up and appropriately staffing an emergency hotline for beneficiaries to lodge complaints, although the abuse goes largely under-reported, according to the report.

**Cross-cutting Issues Finding 6: WASH programming (latrine design and placement) has been changed due to gender and disability based feedback**

NRC has demonstrated sensitivity to beneficiary feedback in its WASH programme: it has changed latrine design by including stools and better handles for those with difficulties squatting. Latrine doors should now open inwards allowing the occupant to block intruders as well as avoid the door being opened "as a joke". Geographical placement of latrines has changed at the request of women who felt that previous placement was too open\(^70\).

**Cross-cutting Issues Finding 7: NRC is careful to ensure that project benefits and jobs are spread among different clans and that targeting includes host communities**

Project documents and interviews with staff demonstrate a commitment to ensuring cross-clan benefits and jobs, ensuring security and minimising grievances. The Mogadishu Emergency Food Distribution concept document states in its selection criteria for suppliers: ‘Suppliers to be identified from different tribes in the city on the basis on geographical location, fair and transparent allocation of resources in the society’. The Distribution Steps document indicates that selection criteria of beneficiaries shall include ‘Vulnerable members of the local host community living within the periphery of the IDP settlements’, the aim being to minimise resentment of the host community to the IDPs.

**Cross-cutting Issues Finding 8: Efforts have been made to include the disabled, elderly and women**

NRC is in discussions with another agency to make access ramps to latrines and shelters where needs are identified. NRC has special procedures for sick and disabled people to receive their food in South Central: for instance, a logframe for local partners shows that food voucher and NFI distribution points must be ‘away from conflict, in areas that are safe for women and elderly’.\(^71\) A concept paper from another partner indicates that women, elders and youth took part in assessments, finding that pregnant women were the most vulnerable.\(^72\)

Young people are not significantly singled out for special attention in Food, Shelter and WASH programs but the Education Sector, not included in this evaluation, specifically focuses on them.

**4.5.5 Corruption\(^73\)**

**Cross-cutting Issues Finding 9: NRC staff are sensitive to potential diversion of funds or assets, whether project or administration-related, given that they work in environments where corruption is endemic**

Each staff member interviewed described the elaborate system of checks and balances in

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\(^70\) interview with NRC regional WASH adviser.
\(^71\) Annex 7 of Agreement with Gedo, Workplan, September 2011.
\(^72\) Concept paper from HINNA (Women Pioneers for Peace and Life), 2010.
\(^73\) The Terms of Reference specifies ‘corruption’ as a cross-cutting issue. NRC uses the terms ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘diversion of funds’. The term ‘taxation’ is used in this report to denote various amounts of money, goods or services that power groups, including gatekeepers, extract from beneficiaries of humanitarian programs.
NRC procedures, especially procurement\textsuperscript{74}, to prevent corruption. Staff are guided by NRC’s logistics, procurement and ethics guidelines, both at the Regional and Field levels. The tight procedures and system of checks and balances between Field and Regional offices reduces the risk of corruption, according to project and finance staff interviewed, but it cannot be completely ruled out. Likely sources are suppliers and ‘gatekeepers’ (community leaders), according to finance, logistics, procurement and admin staff, who are all involved to a degree in tracking payments. Suppliers receive training and regular awareness talks that sensitise them to NRC’s zero tolerance policy on corruption. They know that any deviation from procedures, or breaches in the rules could lead to that supplier being blacklisted. As they all want the business with NRC, they are careful to respect the rules. Only one example of malpractice was registered by the Mogadishu office in the past two years where the supplier was unable to respect delivery commitments, citing inflation as his inability to purchase the goods. Although not strictly a question of corruption, his subsequent blacklisting by NRC served as an example to others of NRC’s commitment to its principles, and the consequences of not following them.\textsuperscript{75}

NRC’s procurement procedures conform to agency principles but risk disaffecting unsuccessful bidders, creating grievances. Interviews with NRC field staff in South Central indicate that unsuccessful bidders for procurement of NFIs have become disenchanted with the repeated use of the same suppliers – to the extent of offering staff a bribe in order to be considered. NRC tries to avoid disenchantment among unsuccessful bidders by publishing the successful bidders along with the reasons for their selection. Other innovative methods may need to be devised to avoid unnecessary grievances building up.

Cross-cutting issues Finding 10: Humanitarian agencies in Somalia struggle with probable diversion of project inputs but this is notoriously challenging to redress

Corruption is a delicate issue to detect, measure and redress in the case of beneficiary ‘taxes’ (Guillemois, 2012). Diversion of project inputs by ‘gatekeepers’ and other figures of authority is a known but unquantifiable risk to NRC along with other international humanitarian organisations working in Somalia. The United Nations Security Council Monitoring Group refers to the practice as ‘organised racketeering that exploits the plight of internally displaced persons for financial gain’, sanctioned by the authorities\textsuperscript{76}. Amounts cannot be verified quantitatively (one report claims that up to half of food aid delivered to South Central Somalia in 2011 was diverted to various militia and ‘gatekeepers’ working on their behalf, while another states that ‘only’ 1% is being diverted\textsuperscript{77}) but it can be taken as a given that a percentage of Norwegian Government (and other donor) funds, through these ‘taxes’, find their way to militia coffers. Questions that agencies, including NRC, ask themselves is how much is too much, and are the risks of trying to redress the situation likely to cause greater operational insecurity: monitoring of ‘taxing’ practices have resulted in death and injury to INGO\textsuperscript{78} and LNGO\textsuperscript{79} staff in the past. Interviews with key informants suggest that the benefits – saving and protecting lives and livelihoods of up to half of the population – outweigh the risks of trying to prevent this form of ‘taxation’ altogether.

NRC undertakes a number of measures to reduce the risk of diversion of funds such as having in place complaints mechanisms, community sensitisation, a presence in the field and repeated reminders to all stakeholders of its ‘zero tolerance’ policy on corruption, which may minimise it (though this is difficult to prove). There are few other tools available to combat the generalised level of corruption that does not put staff and beneficiaries at risk.

\textsuperscript{74} NRC South Central Experience-based methodology.
\textsuperscript{75} Corruption risks related to NRC overall procedures will be discussed in greater detail in the synthesis report.
\textsuperscript{78} International Non-Governmental Organisation
\textsuperscript{79} Local Non-Governmental Organisation
Cross-cutting Issues Finding 11: NRC’s rapid expansion risks leaving gaps in effective project monitoring

A key challenge has been NRC’s rapid expansion over the past few years, which has made it challenging for staff at RO Nairobi to effectively follow and respond to procurement oversight of the Field offices. Some policy breaches have been discovered e.g. pre-payment of suppliers when they are only supposed to be paid on delivery of goods/services. These are addressed when found.

4.6 Additional Issues

4.6.6 Accountability

Accountability is assessed here as both accountability to beneficiaries and to donors.

Additional Issues Finding 1: NRC instils institutional awareness in its staff to ensure accountability to beneficiaries

Several examples demonstrate NRC’s transparency and openness towards beneficiaries. Evidence of this can be seen from documents showing:

- participation of beneficiaries in assessments and monitoring, including the views of women, youth, elderly and disabled;  
- easy-to-understand drawings handed out to beneficiaries showing items they should receive in each distribution package;  
- sensitisation campaigns informing beneficiaries what the project can and cannot deliver;  
- In Mogadishu a hotline phone number is written on the back of each food voucher for beneficiaries to call and register complaints. However there is no registration of complaints and no documented evidence of follow-up action. Therefore the team could not assess the effectiveness of the beneficiary feedback mechanism. Post-distribution monitoring reports show that beneficiaries are consulted on a wide range of indicators, including number and composition of meals taken in a day, use of food vouchers, use of food, selling habits of vouchers or food, ‘taxing’ practices of third parties, etc. The innovative beneficiary feedback mechanism of the NRC office in Mogadishu, inviting beneficiaries to the office one day a week to discuss their complaints, has – according to NRC staff interviewed - resulted in greater trust between the parties and a kind of 'band of protection' for NRC workers, protecting them from violence and facilitating their access to sites.

Additional Issues Finding 2: Accountability to donors is demonstrated

Staff are aware of cost-drivers and, according to interviews, have sought cost-efficiency in project inputs (e.g. provision of cost-efficient shelters, emergency food distribution, competitive bidding for procurement). No corruption allegations have been made in the period under review according to RO Nairobi financial staff. The evaluation’s overall synthesis report will address the issue of corruption based on data from the three country case studies and the public expenditure tracking surveys made.

81 NFI Kit Composition document; EFSD Activity Overview (NMFA, Sida) presentation.  
82 Idem; monitoring and evaluation staff interviews.  
83 Beneficiary interviews; Post-Distribution Monitoring report (op.cit); Famine Response evaluation, Guillemois 2012, op.cit.
Additional Issues Finding 3: "Beneficiary taxation" remains an issue

Full accountability to donors is compromised by a lack of quantification and qualification of the leakage of project inputs through ‘beneficiary taxation’. While the evaluation team could not find specific evidence of corruption in the form of beneficiary taxation during the field phase it has been sufficiently documented (e.g. Guillemois, United Nations Monitoring Group), for it to be of concern – not only to NRC but all agencies and donors involved in the country. This is a contextual issue that NRC cannot be expected to tackle on its own. The organisation seeks to limit its impact through a series of measures based primarily on communication with the beneficiaries. We lack data to assess the effectiveness of this approach.

Additional Issues Finding 4: All agencies in Somalia experience challenges in meeting Sphere standards regarding Shelter and WASH

The influx of IDPs in both South Central Somalia and Puntland has created massive overcrowding. Finding sufficient land to decongest current sites, allowing for bigger shelter structures and sufficient WASH facilities, is a particular challenge. According to UNHCR, agencies have agreed that the term ‘appropriate standards’ should be used in these contexts. NRC in both Mogadishu and Bossaso is making efforts towards securing additional land to space out shelters to adhere more closely to Sphere standard WASH facilities.

4.6.7 Linking relief rehabilitation and development (LRRD)

LRRD is linked to sustainability and is examined here as the NRC’s record of looking ahead, planning for the future and liaising with development agencies and Clusters to plan joint efforts for moving into different phases of humanitarian action.

Additional Issues Finding 5: NRC could have been better prepared for the famine crisis in mid-2011

A growing body of evidence for months prior to the official famine declaration should have been a sufficient trigger for NRC to pre-position emergency stocks and to urgently seek standby funding and prepare standby agreements with partners. 84

Additional Issues Finding 6: Even while it was preoccupied with responding to the famine crisis, NRC should have been preparing for a recovery-oriented intervention in Mogadishu

The evaluation found no evidence of such planning for EFSD, which is only now, after one year, beginning to emerge. On the other hand, the recent ‘CGI Lite’ design, piloted by NRC in Zona K Mogadishu, demonstrates planning to evolve towards a recovery phase with bigger, more durable and dignified shelters. These should help alleviate the cramped conditions of the IDP sites and provide more opportunities for improved WASH interventions in anticipation of a likely protracted IDP situation (despite beneficiary resistance to the idea).

Additional Issues Finding 7: NRC Puntland and Somaliland are aware of the need for LRRD but face limitations

NRC, in conjunction with other partners, has been focussing for some years on seeking durable solutions for protracted IDPs who are likely to remain in the more northern urban areas, according to interviews with NRC, UNHCR, and UN-Habitat. The many challenges of securing land tenure are well-documented in the recent ICLA draft assessment. 85 The move to CGI transitional shelter, including the new community developed shelters, is partly a

84 This is related to a larger issue concerning the NRC’s very high dependence on project funds. That issue will be discussed in greater detail the synthesis report.

85 Land Negotiations and Allocation Procedures for IDPs Lessons Learned (Puntland), NRC 2012.
reflection of recovery planning.

NRC has done extensive work in conjunction with other agencies to secure stable land tenure for IDPs. The Bariga Bossaso site visited by the team in Bossaso is an example of where joint advocacy to the Puntland authorities has resulted in an extended (five year) land tenure agreement to afford IDPs a measure of stability while longer-term solutions are sought. Land tenure for other sites not visited by the team has also been successfully negotiated, including for durable solutions (e.g. Galkayo).

In Somaliland, significant investments have been made in good relations with local authorities, including building the capacity of such authorities. In Western Hargeisa, NRC is phasing out its support based on its opinion that needs to a high extent have been met. Interventions, for example in shelter and schools, have gradually been adapted to changing circumstances and adaptation that has taken place in close collaboration with both the cluster system and local authorities.

5 Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

Overall Conclusion
The key objective guiding NRC’s work is: "To enhance protection and promote the rights of the displaced people in humanitarian need by improving living conditions and seeking durable solutions". Within this framework, and considering the humanitarian operational context in Somalia, NRC has been able to implement programmes efficiently and effectively, using a wide array of strategies and tools to maintain access to beneficiaries to deliver relevant goods and services – with some shortcomings.

Systemic issues related to the rapid expansion of NRC operations in the region have strained support systems but appear to have been managed during the period studied. In the opinion of the evaluation team the existence of the regional office has played a major role in allowing NRC to address such challenges. The role of the regional office will be further discussed in the synthesis report.

EFSD Conclusion: NRC chose an effective intervention modality (food vouchers) to respond to beneficiary needs after conducting an exhaustive analysis to identify the most appropriate approach. This approach was effective in protecting NRC assets, staff, partners and beneficiaries. However, while NRC’s intervention strategy was relevant to the context, the time it took to decide whether to intervene or not and, once the decision had been taken, to scale up its emergency food voucher programme to implementation was not efficient. NRC had ample warning of the impending crisis and could have taken earlier measures to prepare for a rapid intervention by setting up contingency response systems. Similarly, NRC has not been timely in adapting the EFSD intervention in Mogadishu to the evolving context.

Shelter Conclusion: The shelter interventions in Somalia have been relevant, efficient and effective, well-coordinated with other actors according to evaluation sites visited and interviews with community leaders and beneficiaries, partners and local authorities. NRC has given careful consideration to evolving beneficiary needs, especially improved protection, has displayed creativity in designing new pilot interventions and has adapted designs based on feedback received. NRC can consider its Shelter activities in Somalia as a ‘best practice’ model, highly appropriate to the local context. For this reason the interventions may not be appropriate in other contexts but the decision-making, beneficiary participation and coordination processes definitely are. Evidence of outcomes is lacking for the Shelter sector: in Bossaso this could be planned using measurement of fire outbreaks in the different kinds of shelter to determine the degree of higher protection afforded by CGI shelters.
**WASH Conclusion:** This has been a relevant intervention in the areas evaluated. It is not yet scaled up to full efficiency or effectiveness but, in conjunction with hygiene awareness and outreach training, it is at least maintaining a minimum of hygiene in IDP sites. However, the sustainability of these inputs in all locations visited is in jeopardy if NRC does not plan for an appropriate intervention to deal with the latrines when they are full and unusable, and such planning should have taken place from the project design stage. As in the Shelter sector, evidence of outcomes is lacking for the WASH sector. Outcomes could be measured from health indicators before and after the intervention, but this has not been planned in project documents.

**Gender Conclusion:** The relevance and effectiveness of NRC’s programmes can be partly attributed to its efforts to ensure that women’s voices are heard in needs assessments and targeting. However, while the head of monitoring and evaluation in South Central is a woman, the lack of female enumerators in formal and informal monitoring systems in South Central runs the risk of leaving an unfinished picture on women’s real or potential protection concerns, given that they would not be able to talk about them with male monitors. For example, it would be interesting to hear women’s views on the specific uses of the solar lamps that NRC provides with each shelter kit in South Central.

**Exit Strategies Conclusion:** NRC has not sufficiently explored potential exit strategies at the programme design phase in any of its projects, according to documents reviewed. In the food voucher project, post distribution monitoring documents show that beneficiaries are now selling part of their voucher-prescribed food items to buy other food items that respond to their nutritional needs, as well as other NIFs. This project could have evolved faster towards an exit strategy, or at the very least, evolved towards a modification of its intervention modalities, which have not been done for over one year. Shelter projects reflect an evolution of the IDP context and are becoming more sustainable. It is not possible to discount the need for shelter projects while these protracted crises remain. Indeed, retaining emergency items in stock is a relevant preparedness strategy for future crises. In comments to the draft report, NRC notes that it struggles to maintain a minimum of contingency stocks due to donor regulations and its annual grant cycle.

**Accountability to Beneficiaries Conclusion:** The NRC South Central team has excellent beneficiary feedback mechanisms that cover all projects and activities. However, while the hotline set up to receive beneficiary complaints is being monitored, calls are not logged and there is no evidence of follow-up of complaints. NRC Bossaso does not have any formal complaints mechanism and could usefully follow the example set by Mogadishu. Activities in Burao capture beneficiaries' views about NRC both through direct interaction and through close cooperation with local authorities.

**Accountability to Donors Conclusion:** NRC has effective strategies to minimise corruption in its corporate dealings with partners and internally with staff and partner training. It has sensible and relevant mechanisms to discourage corruption in its programmes. The issue of ‘taxation’ of beneficiaries – of which the team did not find first hand evidence in the field, only in other reports - is a general challenge for humanitarian agencies in South Central and as such would need to be addressed in a coordinated fashion.

**Outcomes Conclusion:** Project documents (narratives, logframes and reports) do not place enough emphasis on tracking outcomes, requirements being more geared to outputs. Shelter outcomes may be complex to assess, given the variety of factors that might attribute improvement or deterioration, but at the very least it would be possible to document the decrease in the numbers of fires, attributable to the adjustment of transitional shelters to tents and plastic sheeting, and thus to improved protection. EFSD and WASH projects should also include outcomes measurement indicators. It is not acceptable evidence of the impact of donor funding to report ‘NRC’s interventions undoubtedly contributed to saving lives and reducing mortality’. In addition, there is a lack of baseline data for all projects – or if this exists, NRC was unable to provide documentary proof. Baseline data should be available.
by which to measure project progress, such as, in the case of EFSD, nutrition and health data and in the case of WASH, the health situation of beneficiaries (incidence of diarrhoea, cholera and other water and sanitation-related diseases), before and after the intervention.

**Procurement Conclusion:** The current emergency procurement system is effective but it may generate grievances from unsuccessful bidders.

**Monitoring and Evaluation Conclusion:** Recent efforts to introduce monitoring and evaluation in programming are commendable and appropriate. The previous absence of a systematic monitoring and evaluation function reflects a serious organisational gap.

### 5.2 Recommendations

**EFSD Recommendation:** The EFSD emergency food voucher programme in South Central should be reviewed as soon as possible.

NRC should rapidly start focusing on assessing new intervention modalities to respond to evolving beneficiary activities and capacities. Despite the uncertainty of the IDP intentions in Mogadishu, there are possibilities to move into recovery activities that can easily be adapted as the political and security situations evolve. Beneficiary verification and re-targeting needs to be urgently undertaken to reduce the risks of beneficiary dependency.

**WASH Recommendation:** WASH programmes should be scaled up

In all NRC country programmes where there is a NRC Shelter component and where other actors are not available or willing to undertake them. De-sludging in both regions should now be an integral component of future projects. Failure to do so risks compromising inputs to date as well as beneficiary health. Longer-term maintenance of latrines should be a key planning feature in new WASH projects as well as improved garbage management. The evaluation agrees with NRC’s stated intention to separate men’s and women’s showers and latrines in future. Additional funding is needed to scale up to international standards and NRC should advocate strongly for sufficient funds to meet its obligations.

**Gender Recommendation:** Female monitoring staff should be prioritised in recruitment

NRC Mogadishu could consider female monitors/enumerators to work in teams to ensure that women’s protection or other concerns can be raised in confidence and appropriate measures taken to redress them. By failing to hear the concerns of a majority of the beneficiary caseload, programmes run the risk of not reaching their full effectiveness potential. Generally in Somalia, NRC could consider recruiting women who are not fully literate but who demonstrate a potential to contribute to programmes - with additional capacity-building initiatives.

**Exit Strategies Recommendation:** Exit strategies should be part of project design

NRC should always build in to project design the possible ways in which the project could evolve or be phased out. Needs assessments in emergencies should be conducted at regular intervals, such as every six months, to re-assess evolving capacities, needs and targeting. Baseline studies are necessary for all programming, even in emergencies.

**Accountability to Beneficiaries Recommendation:** Feedback should be documented and followed up

The South Central team should ensure permanent staffing of the telephone hotline (this could be done on a roster basis drawn from existing local staff) to log complaints and ensure that these are followed up appropriately. Otherwise beneficiaries could reasonably become disaffected and claim that ‘NRC does not listen’, undoing the good work on other feedback.
mechanisms. The hotline is especially necessary in South Central to log human rights abuses such as GBV, not just for food distribution irregularities. The Bossaso team should consider putting in place either or both of the beneficiary feedback mechanisms used in South Central Somalia, which could provide greater insights and responsiveness to beneficiary concerns.

**Outcomes Recommendation: Outcomes should become the focus of planning and follow-up**

NRC should place more emphasis on results-based programming by focussing more on outcomes in project proposal narratives, logframes and reports. Outputs and activities are documented and need to continue to be so. A greater effort is needed to obtain baseline data against which to measure outcomes through monitoring. Care should be taken to formulate logframes in such a way that they provide SMART\textsuperscript{86} objectives, with outcome indicators and results clearly linked to objectives. If an objective is to ‘save lives’ then NRC must produce evidence in its reports on the extent to which it has done so.

**Preparedness Recommendation:** In future, NRC could set up emergency response systems by pre-positioning suppliers, preparing contracts, procurement procedures and other essential activities so that when a crisis breaks, it would be in a position to respond rapidly.

\textsuperscript{86} Defined as: specific, measurable, achievable, results-based and trackable.
## Annex 1: List of Interviews

*M = Male, F = Female*

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87 Gargaar Relief and Development Organisation
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<sup>88</sup> Voluntary Action for Relief and Development Organisation.
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<td>Deputy Regional Director HOA\textsuperscript{89} region/ Country Director Somalia/Kenya</td>
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<td>Geir A. Schei</td>
<td>First Secretary</td>
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<td>Ayaki Ito</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>Pierre Bry</td>
<td>Head of Funding Unit, Head of Unit Internal Auditor</td>
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<td>Colleague</td>
<td>UNOCHA Somalia, CHF\textsuperscript{90}</td>
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<td>Christine Nilsson</td>
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<td>Marine Gevorgyan</td>
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<td>Leith Baker</td>
<td>Regional Monitoring and Evaluation manager, HOA region</td>
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<td>Erik Demers</td>
<td>Programme Director, HOA region</td>
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<td>Karoline Eckroth</td>
<td>Grants Coordinator/Programme Support, Somalia/Kenya</td>
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<td>Prudence Achirokop</td>
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<td>Bossassso, Puntland</td>
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\textsuperscript{89} Horn of Africa
\textsuperscript{90} Common Humanitarian Fund
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<td>Burao, Somaliland</td>
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<td>Boisy Williams</td>
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<td>93</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Ibrahim Osman Ismail</td>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Head of Sub-Office, Burao</td>
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Annex 2: Document review

Prior to the field phase:
The country case study started with a review of internet resources, both NRC and external, describing and analysing the general situation in Somalia or thematically. A cross-section of these includes:

- UN Consolidated Appeals for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 (OCHA), showing the evolution of the humanitarian crises in Somalia over the evaluation period and NRC’s relevance in responding to these;
- International Crisis Group report on Somalia, February 2012 (a political review);
- “Somalia Food Insecurity Integrated Phase Classification: August – December 2012” by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU), showing improvement in the famine situation but cautioning that the crisis was still not over;
- “Somalia: Humanitarian Dashboard”, OCHA, September 2012;
- “Gender-Sensitive Response and Recovery”, Oxfam, 2012;
- NRC Somalia Fact Sheet, 2011;
- NRC Somalia Programme Overview, June 2012;
- Multi-year/ annual strategy proposals and annual progress reports covering the years under review,
- The NRC website www.nrc.no - for an overview on NRC’s mission, standards and policies.

Several evaluations on Somalia were also reviewed, including:

- "Norad synthesis evaluation on Gender, 2006”;
- "Evaluation of Temporary Shelter and Hygiene Promotion in Galkayo, Puntland", Fisher and Quanjer, 2011,

These documents set the context and provided a basis on which the evaluators could see what NRC and other humanitarian actors had achieved (or failed to achieve) in the past with which to compare activities over the period covered.

During the evaluation
A large number of project documents were made available by NRC Oslo, Nairobi, Mogadishu, Bossaso and Somaliland. A sample of these include: concept papers, assessment reports, logframes, consolidated project portfolio, power-point presentation of area strategy, as well as internal checklists to follow funding, reporting and financial data inputs.

- Narrative project proposal to the NMFA for project SOFK1109 for an amount of NOK 40m (approximately US$ 7.2m): “Access to food and support to resumption of productive activities in Somalia”. This document provides a sound rationale for beneficiary targeting, explaining the need to target 100% of communities when these were either displaced or hosting IDPs in famine-affected areas and quoting reliable sources of information to show how such communities would be identified.
- Logframe of SOFK1109, annex to the project;
- Narrative project proposal to the NMFA for project SOFS1103:
- “Improving living conditions for IDPs in South Central Somalia through provision of
NFIs, Temporary Shelter, Hygiene and Sanitation and Education”, NMFA 2011.

- Logframe of NRC Project SOFS1103, annex to the project.
- The “SC SOM Food Access Distribution and Registration Summary database”, which tracks the locations where beneficiaries are receiving food, broken down by specific site, month, gender of heads of households, quantities of each food item distributed per month, donations to the project by donor and amount, numbers of beneficiaries planned and those actually receiving food, by location. This is an excellent tracking tool allowing NRC to keep abreast of essential project data – as long as it is kept up to date (manual inputting to excel spreadsheet) – to use for reporting.
- Core Activity Database (CAD) - excerpt relating to project SOFK1109 (see synthesis evaluation report for further details on the overall Core Activities Database system).
- Agreements with local partners implementing various projects clearly set out NRC’s conditions, reporting requirements and penalties for partner non-compliance. Workplans and logframes are annexed to the Agreements.
- “Emergency Food Distribution guidelines”, laying out step by step modalities of procuring and distributing food vouchers, beneficiary registration, distribution points etc. This paper shows NRC’s attention to making distribution safe and accessible to the most vulnerable (elderly people, disabled, pregnant women, women with young children and other vulnerable persons). It also explains NRC’s policy of selecting suppliers identified from different tribes in the city on the basis of geographical location, fair and transparent allocation of resources in society, access to beneficiaries and security.
- "Emergency Food Security (EFS) Minimum Standard Training” presentation, NRC, April 2015. This presentation shows how NRC trained its partners and staff on the subject.

Sample of other documents reviewed:

- Somalia Project Portfolio – provided by Regional Office Nairobi (PDU), a useful overview of projects implemented in each area, by donor.
- HAPPPDA report revision (Feb. 2012)
- HAPPPDA annual progress reports, 2010 and 2012.
- Norad annual progress report (global funding) 2010
- South Central implementing partners’ assessment reports covering 2009, 10 and 11 but not 2012. The assessments provide a good chronological overview of how the conflict dynamics contributed to the famine, obliging the affected population to move from previously safe places in Mogadishu to outlying districts and back again as the famine evolved. They also provide a solid rationale for NRC intervention, describing appalling living conditions in IDP sites set up spontaneously in government buildings and small, packed sites.
- NFIs Distribution Methodology (specific to South-Central projects) – a useful guide to implementing partners on beneficiary selection criteria, how NRC procures NFIs (Non-Food Items), packages them and ensures their cultural relevance; the contents of an NFI kit. The design of the NRC standard kits was jointly done with the beneficiaries, especially women, who utilise most of the components of the kit. The quantities of cooking items are informed by cultural practices such as those requiring separate cooking arrangements for different family groups within a household or the separation of particular foods during preparation.
- Documents showing drawings of items included in distribution packages to inform beneficiaries on their contents (Food, NFI, carpentry tools etc.) (South Central).
- Beneficiary selection criteria to receive NFIs (South Central).
• “Protection and Other Concerns for the New Shelter Typology in Zone K Settlement” (South Central).
• Distribution databases for Shelter and WASH interventions, South Central. These monitoring tools give a detailed breakdown of every site, number of beneficiaries by gender and age, activities conducted, numbers of items in each site, donor.
• Post-distribution monitoring report for 2012 WASH project, Bossaso.
• The Puntland Corruption Risk Mapping, 2012, demonstrates NRC’s awareness of risks inherent in recruitment of staff and maps out mitigation strategies for each risk identified with weighting of risks to the organisation.
• Communications between RO Nairobi and FO Bossaso reviewing the design of latrines – August and September 2012.

The above documents are mainly project specific and provided the team with insights into how NRC staff use guidelines, policies, activities, reports and monitoring for project activities. However, it would have been useful to review specific baseline documents, such as surveys or studies on nutritional and health status in South Central, which could have enabled an assessment of project outcomes, but NRC either did not have these or did not make them available, despite requests. Communications with RO Nairobi indicate the nature of queries the field offices send to RO Nairobi and the support provided by the latter. A list of the documents the team has had access to is included at the end of the report.
Annex 3: List of Documents, Somalia Updated 20121124
(The list may contain duplicates)
Published documents and external sources

Beck, T., 2006, Evaluating Humanitarian Action using the OECD-DAC Criteria, ALNAP
CHF Review Evaluation TORs 16 November 2011 (file does not open)
Davies, R. and J. Dart, 2005, The Most Significant Change Technique – A Guide to its use,
Emergency shelter NFI cluster: Transitional Shelter Workshop Report 2012
Guillemois, 2012, Post-Distribution Monitoring report (op.cit); Famine Response evaluation.
Land Negotiations and Allocation Procedures for IDPS - Lessons Learned (Puntland), unpublished document

United Nations, 2011, United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator's Key Messages Horn of Africa Issue No 7, 18 November 2011


Various Embassy/NMFA emails relating to the Somali humanitarian situation

**Somalia Documents Received from NRC, Oslo**

**Assessments**

NRC 2011 Somalia Food Security Context Report

NRC 2012 Programmatic Assessment Report Sanaag Region Somaliland 19 to 22 June 2012

**Background**

WASH Cluster 2012 Strategic Operational Framework 2012 Somalia

NRC 2012 Program Overview Somalia August 2012

NRC 2012 Shelter Presentation Puntland

NRC 2012 Project Tracker Somalia Updated June 2012

Return Consortium 2012 Standard Operating Procedures for Voluntary Return in Somalia

NRC 2012 Somalia Fact Sheet Updated March 2012

NRC 2012 Program Overview Somalia presentation 12 Aug

NRC 2012 NRC Puntland 2007 2012 Shelter Presentation Puntland PoA 2012

NRC Africa and HO Contact List as at May 2012

**Country Strategies**


NRC 2010 Kenya-Somalia Strategy Map 2010 -2012


NRC 2011 Strategy Horn of Africa 2012 - 2014

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

NRC 2011 Management response - Shelter evaluation in Puntland

NRC 2011 South Central Food Access Program Operational Plan 15 August 2011

NRC 2011 Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, NRC Horn of Africa

NRC 2012 Monitoring and Evaluation Implementation Plan Format Draft 12-01-2012


**Plans and Reports**

NRC 2011 Horn of Africa Annual Report 2011


NRC 2011 Annual Report Somalia Kenya 2010

NRC 2011 Somalia Kenya Strategic Map and Annual Plan of Action 2011-13 - Final draft

NRC 2012 Budget Proposal Overview 2012 Somalia

NRC 2012 Horn of Africa Plan of Action 2012 – 2014

NRC 2012 Horn of Africa Annual report 2011
Quarterly Reports to HO
NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q3 2010
NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q1 2010
NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q2 2010
NRC 2010 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q3 2010
NRC 2011 Somaliland Quarterly Report Q3 2011
NRC 2011 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q2 2011
NRC 2011 Somalia Kenya Quarterly Report Q4 2010
NRC 2012 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q1 2012
NRC 2012 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q4 2011
NRC 2012 Combined Horn of Africa Quarterly Report Q2 2012
NRC 2012 Somalia Quarterly Report Q2 2012

General Projects
NRC 2009 NRC Sida SOMALIA Budget 2010
NRC 2011 Accelerated Primary Education Support Program in Somalia 3rd Interim Narrative Report + Final
NRC 2011 Results report for 2009-2010 SOFK1002 Sida 06 06 2011 Final Report
NRC 2011 Results Report Somalia 2009-2010 to Sida SOFM1004 Sida - SOFT1004 SOFS1004
NRC 2011 Final Report to ECHO Provision of Shelter and NFI Kits in Burco Region of Somalia SOFS1006 Final Report 20110127
NRC 2011 Final Report to OCHA Support to IDP alt basic education and transition to formal school Puntland Bulo Elay Bossasso SOFS1114
NRC 2012 NMFA-NRC Framework Agreement Humanitarian Assistance and Protection to People Displaced in Africa SOFM1203
NRC 2012 Final Report IDPs Somalia UNHCR 2011
NRC 2012 Final Report to ECHO Emergency Assistance to Displaced people in Somalia SC, Puntland & Somaliland 31jan12 NBO Response
NRC 2012 Final Report to ECHO Emergency Assistance to Displaced people in Somalia South Central, Puntland & Somaliland SOFM1006
NRC 2012 Final Report to OCHA Support to drought affected displaced populations through improved access to food Banadir SOFK1104

Specific Project Documents for Possible Focus Projects (names and order as received)

General agreements for focus projects
6XFM1003 HAPPPDA Annual Plan 2012 - Sent to Donor
6XFM1003 HAPPPDA Annual Progress Report 2011 - Sent to Donor
6XFM1102 SOFM1104 Somalia Annual Plan 2011 (234548)
20111026 MG IFTI C-152763 - PUNTLAND SHELTER 6XFM1102_Framework Agreement Sida_Annual plan template 2012 and 2013
NRC-126859 - 6XFM1003 - Framework Agreement NMFA 2010-2012_REVISED Annual Plan 2010_20 05 2010
NRC-128380 - 6XFM1003 - Signed Framework Agreement NMFA 2010-2012 + annexe 1
NRC-150738 - 6XFM1003 SOFM1003 Somalia Annual Progress Report HAPPPDA.pdf
NRC-150739 - SOFM1103 Annual Plan to NMFA pdf
NRC-155989 - 6XFM1003 Submitted revised Annual Plan 2011 HAPPPDA
Food Security and Distribution

SOFK1104 CHF Food Vouchers Mogadishu
SOFK1104 CHF - Final Report Submitted to Donor 13.03.2012 (269828)
SOFK1104 Proposal OCHA CHF Submitted (253787)
SOFK1105 UNHCR Food Vouchers Lower Shebelle
SOFK1105 Application UNHCR (253782)
SOFK1105 Budget UNHCR (253781)
SOFK1105 UNHCR - Final Financial Report
SOFK1105 UNHCR - Final Report Narrative
SOFK1107 CHF Food Vouchers Lower Shebelle
SOFK1107 - CHF final report (272978)
SOFK1107 CHF Voucher Lower Shabelle 827k 11 August2011.pdf (250839)
SOFK1107 Proposal CHF OCHA Submitted (253766)
SOFK1108 ECHO Food Vouchers
ECHO SOFK1108 - PDM Report.pdf (284279)
NRC-166518 - SOFK1108 Grant Agreement with ECHO
SOFK1108 Amendment ECHO - Signed (267508)
SOFK1108 ECHO Intermediate report (261044)
SOFK1108 Final Narrative Report. 7th August 2012.doc (284269)
SOFK1108 Map of the Action Location (249295)
SOFK1108 Revised work plan 30.12.2011 (263114)
SOFK1108 Single Form ECHO (249292)
SOFK1108 Single Form Interim Report (260814)
SOFK1109 NMFA Food distribution/livelihood
6XFM1003 SOFK1109 SC LFA Revision 07Mar12 (269298)
SOFK1109 EFTFS1101 Cover Letter Countersigned Addendum (258258)
SOFK1109 NMFA proposal Food Access SO SC (249271)
SOFM1106 HAPPPDA EFSD SOFK1109 -15 -16 Pinto 2011-2012
SOFK1110 Sida Food vouchers L Shebelle
6XFM1102 SOFK1110 Emergency Food Assistance SC Sida REVIS 27Feb2012
SOFK1110 Answer on questions Proposal Sida drought Somalia (251606)
SOFK1110 Cover Letter Project Proposal to Sida (250710)
SOFK1110 Emergency Food Assistance to South Central Somalia Sida (250604)
SOFK1115 NMFA Food Vouchers
6XFM1003 SOFK1115 SL LFA Revision 07Mar12 (269299)
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SOFM1106 HAPPPDA EFSD SOFK1109 SOFK1115 SOFK1116 P-info 2011-2012 split (269350)
SOFK1116 NMFA Food Voucher
6XFM1003 SOFK1116 PL LFA Revision 07Mar12 (269300)
SOFM1106 HAPPPDA EFSD SOFK1109 SOFK1115 SOFK1116 P-info 2011-2012 split (269350)
Puntland shelter and school construction
SOFS1002 NMFA GAP
Copy of SOFM102_Variance explanation+MB_SOFT - zedek 24-11-10
Final Approved Jan 2011 NRC-145659 - SOFM1002 Approval of Budget Revision
NRC-160104 - SOFM1002 Final report Education and School Construction in Puntland
SOFM1002-00_Puntland_20100831 (REVISION -from field)
SOFS1002- NRC PL LFA school construction Annex 2 2010831 (REVISION)
SOFS1002_School construction_20101023
SOFT1002 - NRC PL LFA_Education Annex 1 20100515
SOFT1002_ABE_20101023
SOFS1002_Admin_20101022
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SOFS1002 Final report Education and School Construction in Puntland
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SOFT1002 - NRC PL LFA_Education Annex 1 20100515
SOFT1002_ABE_20101023
SOFS1002_Admin_20101022
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SOFM1004 Sida - SOFT1004 SOFS1004
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SOFS1005 UNHCR
SOFM1005 UNHCR Final Report
SOFM1005 UNHCR Cover Letter
SOFM1005 UNHCR Final Report
SOFM1005 UNHCR IPFMR
UNHCR SOFS1005 IPFMR
UNHCR SOFS1005 Inventory Report
UNHCR SOFS1005 Revised budget Vs initial budget
UNHCR SOFS1005 Staffing List
Final SOFM1005 SOFS1005 Puntland Interim Report 20100707 (2)
NRC-114810 - SOFM1005 SOFS1005 Puntland Sub-Project Description 20101217
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SOFS1005_Shelter Workplan PL 20101217
SOFS1009 ECHO
Annex 1- NFI's, Sanitation and Hygiene kits
Annex 2 - Revised Latrines BoQs
NRC-135452 - SOFM1006 SOFS1009 PL 20100920
SOFK1108 2011_01040_MR_01_02_26-Jan-12 revision request
SOFM1006 ECHO Progress Report 9 March 2011
SOFS1009_PL ECHO 20100902
Summary Sheet ECHO- 20100902
110428 ECHO SOFM1006 Final Report Annexes v2
Single Form SOFM1006 - final report
SOFM1006 Payment request
090122+Latrine,+WB,+Garbage
ECHO Technical documents
ina igare-Model- Semi permanent Shelter
ina igare-Model.pdf1 - Semi permanent Shelter
ina igare-Model.pdf3 -Semi permanent Shelter
Latrine drawing-Model
NRC-165183 - SOFM1006 Single Form to ECHO - intermediate report (final)
Evaluation of the Norwegian Refugee Council - Case Country Report Somalia

Slab Designs samples
SOFM1006 ECHO Reponse to Donor Questions 17.09.2011

SOFS1017 UNHCR
SOFM1005 UNHCR Final Report
NRC-114810 - SOFM1005 SOFS1005 Puntland Sub-Project Description 20101217.doc
NRC-114811 - SOFM1005 SOFS1014 SL Sub-Project Description + FINAL+now+with+Hargeisaco+revision 20101217.docx
NRC-114813 - SOFM1005 SOFK1001 SC Sub-Project Description 20101217.docx
SOFK1001_Protection Workplan SC_ 20101217.doc
SOFK1001_Workplan Log & Emergency_SC_ 20101217.docx
SOFM1005-01_UNHCR S_20101217.xlsx
SOFS1005_Shelter Workplan PL 20101217.docx
SOFS10014_Workplan UNHCR SL 20101217.docx
SOFS1102 NMFA
20120827 SOFM1102 NMFA GAP - Final Report
ABE learner drop out assessment in Galkaiyo-Mudug region
ABE Level 2 drop out assessment report
ABE NMFA AND APES SUPPORTED SCHOOLS
Annex 3 NRC TRAINING REPORT governance training
Annex 4 architectural drawings
Annex 5 summary of targets and accomplishments
Girls Education Campaigns posters
NMFA GAP Assessments Puntland 2011
School construction assessments and other documents
School needs assessment for NMFA project for classroom extensions
Workplan for curricular MoE and Agencies
NRC-177134 - SOFM1102 SOFT1102 LFA Education Puntland rev 30.11.2011
NRC-177148 - SOFM1102 SOFS1102 School Const Budget Revision
NRC-177149 - SOFM1102 SOFS1115 Shelter Budget Revision
NRC-177150 - SOFM1102 SOFT1102 Education Budget Revision
NRC-177151 - SOFM1102 SOFZ1102 Admin Budget Revision
NRC-177153 - SOFM1102 Puntland GAP Narrative Application rev. 02.12.2011
NRC-177167 - SOFM1102, SOFS1102 LFA GAP Puntland School Construction rev. 02.12.2011
NRC-177205 - SOFM1102, SOFS1115 LFA GAP Puntland Shelter and Construction rev. 02.12.2011
NRC-177428 - SOFM1101 GAP Addendum 3MNOK Somalia Signed
SOFS1104 Sida
NRC-173590 - 6XF1102 Annual Progress Report Sida YEP COMPONENT- ed
nrc-187365 - 6XF1102 SOFM1104 Final Financial Report_20120325
NRC-187366 - 6XF1102 KEFT1103 Final Financial Report (2)
SOFM1104 Sida - Annual Progress Report 20Mar2012 (Autosaved)
NRC-143664 - SOFM1104 LFA SC PL SL DDB
NRC-149966 - 6XF1102 SOFM1104 Somalia Annual Plan 2011
SOFS1105 UNHCR
SOFM1105 UNHCR Final Narrative Report
SOFM1105 UNHCR Final Report
SOFM1105 UNHCR Interim Narrative Report - V1 15 July
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SOFM1105 UNHCR IPFMR - July V1
SOFM1105_IPFMR 1_20110101-20110331
20110928 SOFM1105_EXTRA BUDGET FINAL
20111011 SOFS1105 Puntland Sub-Project Description

OPTION I PERMANENT SHELTER-Model
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SOFS1105 Puntland Sub-Project Description 20110210
SOFS1105_Shelter+Protection Workplan PL 20110210
Staffing table UNHCR-staff cost comparison 20110110
UNHCR_Permanent_shelters[1]

SOFS1110 CHF

SOFS1110 Agreement OCHA (257935)
SOFS1110 CHF PL Bulo Eelay Agreement (240344)
SOFS1110 CHF PL Shelter Submitted (247613)
SOFS1110 - Interim Report CHF - Submitted (255899)

SOFS1202 NMFA GAP
SOFM1202 SOFS1202 School Construction Puntland GAP Proposal (285391)
SOFM1202, SOFS1202 LFA NMFA GAP PL School Construction (260499)

SOFS1204 Sida
6XFM1202 SOFM1204 SOFS1204 PL Sida P-info (259178)

SOFS1205 UNHCR
SOFS1205 UNHCR - Agreement.pdf, 14.06.12.pdf (278907)

Somaliland School Construction

SOFM1201 NMFA
SOFM1201 Narrative proposal NMFA GAP SL Education and School Construction (260356)
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SOFM1201 SOFT1201 Education Somaliland GAP Proposal (285370)
SOFM1201 SOFZ1201 Support Somaliland GAP Proposal (285367)
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SOFM1201, SOFT1201 LFA NMFA GAP SL Education (260357)

SOFS1001 NMFA
SOFM0901- Annex 4 SOFS1001 LFA Temp+shelter20081217 (169303)
SOFM0901 SOFS1001 Annex 4 LFA School Construction 20091209 (199749)
SOFM0901 SOFS1001 School Construction SL 29112009 (Revised).xls (199789)
SOFM0901 SOFS1001 SL Budget revised 22.11.2010 (229443)

SOFS1101 NMFA
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 2011 LFA School Construction (226740)
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 2012 LFA School Construction (226744)
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 2013 LFA School Construction (226746)
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 LFA School Construction Revised 30.211.2011 (260902)
SOFM1101 SOFS1101 School Construction Budget (226752)
SOFM1101 - Norad Addendum, Education and School Construction 01.12.2011 (268273)
SOFS1101 SOFM1101 Somaliland School Construction Revised (260875)

WASH
SOFM1006 ECHO
SOFM1006- final report to ECHO (267219)
SOFM1006 Single Form to ECHO - intermediate report (final) (249297)
SOFM1006 Single Form to ECHO (220287)
SOFS1008 ECHO Somaliland: SOFM1006 SOFS1008 ECHO SL 20100920 (220292)
SOFS1009 ECHO Puntland: SOFM1006 SOFS1009 PL 20100920 (220294)
SOFS1010 ECHO South Central: SOFM1006 SOFS1010 SC 20100920 (220297)

SOFS0903 NMFA
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Annex 2 LFA Shelter 23.04.2010 (210787)
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 LFA (166272)
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Revised 2010 School Construction SC LFA (209118)
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 revised LFA (184384)
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Revision 2010 SC School Construction 07.04.2010 (209134)
SOFM0903 SOFS0903 Shelter Budget (166278)
SOFM0903 revised SC_Shelter_20090604 (184432)

SOFS1007 CHF
CHF SOFS1007 Final Report Draft
SOFS1007 CHF Final Report Submitted (255455)
SOFS1007 CHF project sheet SC 20100625 (216865)
SOFS1007 Interim Report 110324. (250117)
SOFS1007 SC WASH Emergency Interim Report with Responses to OCHA 110324 (241010)

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